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Chairman: Mr. Francisco URRUTIA (Colombia).

AGENDA ITEM 20 AND 68

Regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments: report of the Disarmament Commission (A/2685, A/C.1/752/Rev.2, A/C.1/L.100, A/C.1/L.101, A/C.1/L.102, A/C.1/L.103/Rev.1) (*concluded*)

Conclusion of an international convention (treaty) on the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of mass destruction (A/2742 and Corr 1, A/2742/Add.1, A/C.1/750) (*concluded*)

1. Mr. MATES (Yugoslavia): When we came to this Committee this morning we hoped and expected that we might conclude the item on disarmament today and possibly in the morning. We hoped and expected that this would be done by approving unanimously a draft resolution which would enable the continuation of efforts to reach further agreement, and ultimately final agreement, in the Disarmament Commission and its Sub-Committee.

2. My delegation is gratified by the fact that another draft resolution [A/C.1/L.102], sponsored by the five Powers which were members of the London Sub-Committee, has been accepted by the representative of India, thus making it possible to have another draft resolution which is not only sponsored unanimously by the Powers most directly involved but which will also command, as we hope, the unanimous support of the Committee.

3. I should not wish to leave the subject without mentioning the contribution made in this respect by the representative of India, Mr. Menon, which has made it possible for his draft resolution [A/C.1/L.100] to be sent to the Disarmament Commission by a decision unanimously supported by the members of the Sub-Committee and by other members of this Committee.

4. It has been stated that the fact that we shall have a unanimous vote on the main draft resolution [A/C.1/752/Rev.2] is important. My delegation fully subscribes to this view. It has also been stated that the importance of unanimity on this particular subject should not be

overestimated and that we should not forget that there is still a hard road ahead. We subscribe to this statement also, but I think it might be of some interest to note what would have happened if this unanimity had not been achieved. In order to see, in its true perspective, the importance of unanimity, even if it be on a limited scale and only in respect of one step, one should try to imagine what the situation would have been if it had not come about. I think it would be very difficult to deny that this would have been a very serious matter. When certain events take place their importance sometimes lies in the fact that something else has not happened, rather than in the events themselves. We had hoped that the work of this Committee would thus come to a close on a note of unanimity, and that there would be neither further prolongation of debate nor a division on a proposal related to the subject of disarmament.

5. My delegation came to the First Committee today with an open mind as regards the Australian draft resolution [A/C.1/L.101]. We thought that it might be possible to find a way to achieve complete unanimity on this draft resolution as well. We felt a little sad when we found that this appeared to be more difficult than we had anticipated. Certain ways of dealing with the draft resolution have been suggested on the one hand. On the other hand, amendments of its text have been proposed that, in our view, could contribute to its improvement. It does not appear very likely that this result will be obtained. My delegation is in agreement with those who have made this proposal, which has been most eloquently put before the Committee by the representative of France, Mr. Moch. But in saying that, I should also like to emphasize that we have full understanding for the basic intention which has inspired the Australian delegation, since the beginning of the work of the Committee this year, to press for further clarification on this issue. We have read the Australian draft resolution with great interest, after having listened to the statements made earlier in this debate by the representative of Australia. We do not find it difficult to agree with the expression of the desire to have greater clarity, but we have, perhaps, a slightly different approach to it. It is desirable to clarify divergent positions if the aim is to reconcile them and to bring about agreement, but such clarification, in our opinion, must come from those whose views we are now discussing.

6. The Australian draft resolution [A/C.1/L.101] seeks clarification of the views of the Powers primarily involved; it suggests that a working paper be prepared concerning the views of the great Powers "on various aspects of the disarmament problem".

7. It has also been said, and by representatives of some of the Powers most concerned, that it is not so easy to clarify these positions at once; that it is a slow process. After all, if it were not so, the situation would have been much worse at present, because what is encouraging in the first place in the whole discussion is that we have a

development of the views of the countries principally involved. Therefore the only thing we can do is to plead with those Powers to expedite the process of clarification which will, I hope, at the same time also bring their views closer together.

8. I do not think, however, that we should force them to hurry, but we should urge them to do so. I am not saying that they themselves do not wish to expedite the process, but I do understand that they may have difficulty in so doing and I think that we should recognize such difficulty. It is not an abnegation of our interest in the progress of the matter and in bringing the views on disarmament closer together; I think, rather, that it is an interpretation of our interest and of our willingness to contribute our humble wisdom to the cause of attaining greater clarity and helping to create a climate suitable for the reaching of understanding. That is why I think that we should follow this procedure. This, however, is one thing; it is quite another thing to try to impose upon the great Powers something that must be developed among them, as a group and individually. Therefore such an imposition would scarcely contribute to our task.

9. In order to clarify this point of view, I should like to analyse very briefly what it would actually mean if we now requested the preparation of a document which would clarify the views which have been expressed here. A few minutes ago I mentioned the clarification of the various positions—which means new statements. That is how we understand such clarification—clarification of what has already been said. That would mean that we felt that what had been said was not quite clear and was not quite understood. In voting for such a draft resolution, we, the representatives of sixty states, would be expressing our feeling that we had not been able fully to understand what had been said by the representatives of the countries most deeply concerned in the matter before us. If we say that, can we, at the same time, expect the Secretariat to understand fully what we confess was beyond our understanding? Are we actually prepared to express two such contradictory ideas—one negative, and the other over-positive? I believe it is scarcely possible to think so. If not, then, in my opinion, there is only one possible solution, namely, that the Secretariat should try to extract from these different representatives more than they said in the Committee, to force them to reply to certain questions in a certain sense—and the questions in this particular matter would be asked by the Secretariat. Either the Secretariat would put the questions and ask representatives to elucidate, or it would give its own interpretation and, by the process of obtaining subsequent corrections, it would implicitly put the questions to those representatives. I humbly submit that if such be the case—and I am inclined to believe that this is the only logical interpretation of the draft resolution, because certainly nobody would accept the first one—then its aim would not be to ascertain the facts, to ascertain what had been said, but to attempt to force those countries to make further statements; and thus the working paper requested would no longer be an *exposé* of positions taken in this debate, but something more.

10. I should like to try to bring the Australian draft into harmony with the five-Power draft resolution [*A/C.1/752/Rev.2*] which, I hope, will be adopted unanimously, but I find it very difficult to reconcile one with the other because, under the joint draft resolution, if we approve it, we would decide that this further process of reconciling the respective viewpoints should be undertaken by the Disarmament Commission and, principally, by the

Sub-Committee. If we do adopt this view, I think we should adhere to it because it implies that the five members of the Sub-Committee should come together to continue their discussions where they left off in this Committee and try to clarify the situation still further in private discussions. I do not believe that, at the same time, we should adopt a draft resolution which would call for a different process, that of correspondence or discussion by the Secretariat with the members of the Sub-Committee.

11. Therefore, to my mind—and I am quite willing to hear the views of others which might tend to prove that I am wrong—the only result, in seeking this clarification by the method proposed in the Australian draft resolution, would be to interfere with the progress of the debates to come as outlined in the main draft resolution of the five Powers.

12. I should like to repeat something that I said when I spoke for the first time in the general debate on this question [*689th meeting*], namely, that, in the view of our delegation, it is not important to look at the statements made during the debate with a magnifying glass in order to discover the various disagreements, genuine or otherwise. This in itself would be a complicated task because there have been many statements and we have read them without the assistance of the Secretariat. We have tried to understand them, and we have found that even in this short period of time during which the debate has taken place, a certain amount of evolution in the statements themselves has taken place. Therefore, any search with a magnifying glass through the statements might tend only to confuse rather than to clarify the picture. And it would be difficult to try to produce a document without a thorough scrutiny of all the statements.

13. There is another aspect of this draft resolution submitted by the Australian delegation concerning which I should like to make a few remarks, and that is the request to put into the document to be prepared by the Secretariat a presentation of the present positions of the great Powers. "Present", as I understood it from the representative of Australia, means the date of the adoption of the draft resolution—the views and the positions of the great Powers on the various aspects of the disarmament problem at that time. At the same time, the draft resolution recommends to the Disarmament Commission that it request the Secretariat, as soon as practicable, to prepare the working paper. What would that mean? In the first place, it means that the Commission would meet and hold a discussion and that, at a certain moment—possibly at the beginning of its work—it would try to find out what the practicable moment was. The Commission might decide that the practicable moment was at the end or in the middle of the discussion. Then, having begun its discussion where we left off, it would have to seek to clarify the positions taken two or three months earlier in the First Committee of the General Assembly. Not only am I unable to understand how this task could help the discussion, but I feel that it would be very likely to provoke unnecessary and possibly undesirable discussions among the members of the Sub-Committee. From the statements we have already heard in this debate, we have to face the fact that they have, or might have, views on that very task of preparing this paper which would necessitate a discussion in the Sub-Committee. We therefore think that this is a further complication and a further argument against seeking clarification in this way.

14. This is rendered even more important by the fact that, as has been ably stated by the representative of France [701st meeting], the key word in this draft resolution, which is "recommends", has acquired in international language, the connotation of a request to which the Disarmament Commission is more or less morally compelled to accede, and, having expressed our views on the undesirability of interfering with the future work of the Commission, we have to state that we think that this would not be desirable.

15. It is our task here—and I am not speaking in the name of a great Power—to try to facilitate the work of the Disarmament Commission and not to introduce elements which might make its work more difficult. Of course, this does not mean that we are against clarification. We hope that such clarification will result from the continuation of discussions in the Commission and in its Sub-Committee. Of course, it might be desirable—and I think that it would not be difficult—for the members of that body to agree that, before they transmit their report to the General Assembly, some document should be issued, possibly even as part of the report itself, from which we would be able to learn what progress they had achieved. Such clarification, of course, would be necessary, and I think that it would be unavoidable. Moreover, even without our recommendation, I feel sure that no one in the Disarmament Commission or in the Sub-Committee would ever have thought of returning to the General Assembly without giving us a picture showing how far they had gone in their discussions, because those would be discussions in which we had not participated and on which we should desire and expect a report.

16. Having said all this, I think it is hardly necessary to add that, despite the fact that we understand the intentions of the representative of Australia, we definitely cannot support his draft resolution. If this draft resolution could be submitted to the Commission, in a form in which it did not have an almost mandatory and compelling character, we would be in a position to support it. But whatever the word "recommends" may mean in the dictionary, as long as the draft resolution is as mandatory as it now is, we cannot support it.

17. Mr. SERRANO (Philippines): I shall confine myself to the Australian draft resolution [A/C.1/L.101] and shall speak very briefly thereon.

18. The Philippine delegation associates itself fully with the views so lucidly expressed this morning [701st meeting] by Sir Percy Spender in answer to criticisms of the Australian draft resolution. Since I had announced on a previous occasion [700th meeting] the willingness of the Philippine delegation to co-sponsor this Australian draft resolution, and since, as a matter of fact, the purpose of that draft resolution was one of my chief concerns, I am constrained to add a few words.

19. The objections to the Australian draft resolution emanate, I believe, from a misconception of the task of the Secretariat. It appears to be portrayed in the role of a historian engaged in the evaluation of facts, events and circumstances, and called upon to reduce to concrete propositions the results of its evaluation. I do not think that the Australian draft resolution calls for this kind of task.

20. In the factual presentation of the present position of the great Powers, of their points of agreement and disagreement, and of the proposals offered here to bridge their differences, the Secretariat is necessarily confined to the records of the disarmament question. It would, to

be sure, resort to a process of condensation and of separation of essentials from non-essentials and of the relevant from the irrelevant. But in doing so it would undoubtedly restate, wherever possible in verbatim form, the exact statements as they appeared in the records, without comment. Beyond the actual record, I have no doubt, the Secretariat would not seek to explore; and within the record it would attempt to state, with the utmost fidelity, what the record contained. In the performance of such a task the Secretariat has eminently shown its great competence, which, so far, has never in any way been doubted. In the final analysis, therefore, its work, as called for by the Australian draft resolution, would be in effect merely to remove the dross from the gold and the chaff from the grain.

21. I do not think it just or reasonable to assume that the Secretariat would state for one party a position different from that which that party had actually taken in the disarmament question. The draft resolution does not empower it to indulge in deductions. The test of the accuracy of the presentation of the position of one party or another as the Secretariat would put it would be what the record actually disclosed in the precise terms expressed therein, and not what one party which had spoken would want it to appear. And in this respect the Secretariat would accept no higher master than the exact terms of the record.

22. On the other hand, the utility of such a factual presentation easily commends itself to all who are profoundly interested in the progress of our disarmament work. It would provide, in effect, a partial inventory of our disarmament efforts and would reflect the present status of this gigantic business of disarming the world. To the parties to the negotiations it would serve as a useful guide. I cannot understand how parties to any dispute can advance to any agreement without a clear knowledge of where they agree or disagree. A clear delineation and definition of issues is to the disputing parties an essential condition to any expectation of understanding. Moreover, such factual presentation of the points at issue between the Western Powers and the Soviet Union, and of the various proposals which have been offered in this Committee to bridge their differences, would likewise serve as a useful guide to the Members of the United Nations in the appraisal not only of the present position of the disarmament problem but also of the degree of progress that might hereafter be made.

23. What is most important, in our opinion, is this. With the United Nations and the whole world knowing where the Western Powers and the Soviet Union stand now on the various aspects of the vital disarmament question, public opinion will have no difficulty in ascertaining where responsibility lies for the progress or frustration of disarmament labours in the future. We know not what the future holds in store for the Disarmament Commission as it resumes its task. But if disarmament labours are to fail—and we pray God that they may succeed—the world must have a safe and intelligent basis for passing judgment upon whichever party is responsible for that failure.

24. These are the larger considerations upon which I conceive the Australian draft resolution to rest.

25. I close with the statement that I completely agree with the suggestion to delete the two words "descriptive and" in the draft resolution submitted by the Australian delegation.

26. Mr. MOCH (France) (*translated from French*): It is, I think, unfortunate that the Australian draft resolution has become a centre of debate. In the first place, in spite of the time we have spent on it, the debate is on a secondary issue, our main purpose being disarmament, and secondly it tends to spoil the atmosphere for the unanimous and, we all hope, solemn vote we are about to take.

27. I ask for the floor again — and I apologize for doing so — since I think I should explain one or two points. The first concerns the part which should be played by the States which the Australian and other representatives have called the “small powers”. I have already indicated [690th meeting] that I do not think that this term is particularly appropriate, pointing out that it is wrong to differentiate between States simply on the basis of the number of their divisions, the size of their population and their area, and that many of them, while they are poor in terms of guns, are great by reason of their history, their civilization, their struggles for independence and their moral influence. If I needed to cite examples, I would only have to turn to my right and to my left to find them.

28. But that is only a minor point. I am profoundly convinced that the Powers which I shall describe as those less directly interested in the armaments race are not less concerned than the others about the consequences of a thermo-nuclear massacre, and that therefore, like the others, they have a contribution to make to our discussions and enjoy the same right to speak. They do not have to confine themselves to studying a report which has been prepared by the Secretariat with great difficulty after long discussions with the sponsors of the draft resolutions at present before us; it is important that they should also put forward suggestions and contribute to our combined efforts by making definite proposals. And you all know that the members of the Disarmament Commission will always be glad, and interested, to hear their views. That is what these Powers want, and I think it would be more useful than studying a report, however objective, which is out of date a few hours after its publication as a result of the march of events.

29. I should like also to refer to that part of the Australian representative's statement [701st meeting] in which he alleged, if I am not mistaken, that I opposed his proposal because the Soviet Union representative was opposed to it. My thinking this morning was not affected either by the personality of the representative of the Soviet Union or by the fact that he represents that country. I simply wanted to say, as I am now saying again, that the Secretariat could not carry out the extremely delicate task which the Australian representative would like it to be given unless all the authors of the proposals were completely agreed amongst themselves. And I added that that condition, which, to use a mathematical concept, is necessary but not sufficient to ensure the success of the work, did not at present exist because of the opposition of one of the authors, and that an agreement that such a report should be drafted would involve the Committee in long discussions on completely minor matters and entail considerable delays which would be detrimental to the success of our work. That is the argument which has just been ably expounded by the representative of Yugoslavia. It explains what I meant this morning, and I am glad to endorse it now.

30. The Australian representative referred [701st meeting] to the possibility of our failure. At one point he said “if the final work, however, produces nothing . . .”

and again later “if the final work . . . proves . . . abortive . . .”. I must state here that I refuse to entertain this possibility. We have no right not to believe in success. But even in the event suggested by the Australian representative, I would not be able to agree that the Secretariat should draw up such a balance sheet. For in that event it would be more than ever the duty of the parties directly concerned to explain the differences in their points of view, and you may rest assured that they would not fail to do so. It would be for them to explain why they had not succeeded in reaching agreement, and they would be particularly anxious to do so because each would, of course, try to cast the blame for failure on the other. But the Secretariat could not act as a substitute for them or become an arbitrator, however impartial.

31. I do not want to go back to the speech made a short while ago by the representative of the Philippines, but I would recall his suggestion to the effect that certain parts of the work need not be mentioned by the Secretariat — those which he called “chaff”, I think — that other parts could be summarized and yet others be produced in full. But do you really believe that any of the parties concerned would agree to the omission from the description of its whole position of a formula which the Secretariat felt to be of secondary importance and therefore summarized or discarded? It is obvious that the adoption of the suggestion would merely postpone the difficulty instead of solving it, since it would still be necessary to choose between the superfluous, the useful, and the essential.

32. Moreover — as the representative of Yugoslavia has just said, so that I need not dwell on this point — there would be serious difficulties in the way of crystallizing the present situation as proposed. For there is no present situation. There are proposals, of which some, unanimously accepted as a basis for discussion, do not cover all the aspects of this vast problem. The representative of the United Kingdom will agree that the proposals which were submitted jointly by France and the United Kingdom [DC/53, annex 9] and which the Soviet Union delegation has taken as a basis, concern the timing of the various operations but do not make provision for everything for which provision should be made in a disarmament treaty. Then there are other proposals which have not met with unanimous agreement and which still need to be studied and discussed. Besides these proposals, there are their authors, the people who, having submitted them, refuse, as I do, to turn them into a kind of ultimatum and declare that they are *ne varietur*; on the contrary they are people who are determined to make further efforts to reach understanding and reconcile the different points of view. Why, then, in this film about laying the basis for peace, which we want to see to a successful conclusion, should we suddenly stop the picture and freeze a dynamic situation at the risk of putting our differences in the foreground, of showing a close-up of them (I think that is the technical term)? Why emphasize our differences? Why put them down in black and white, when we should on the contrary be solving them after doing all we can to make them fade out of the picture.

33. I am very sorry that the representative of Australia turned down the two suggestions I made this morning, and I must confess — for we owe it to each other to be completely frank as well as cordial in our relations — that what he said only made me more certain of my position, since it strengthened my view that his proposal was fraught with difficulties, and that although it was

certainly an original one and absolutely well meant, it would have an unfortunate effect; and I repeat that the French delegation could not support it.

34. The amendments [A/C.1/L.103] proposed by the representative of El Salvador, more or less *in extremis*, are interesting and we should thank him for the eloquent way in which he tried to clarify the position. But if he will allow me to give him some friendly advice, I would express my belief that it is dangerous to try to amend a text accepted by five co-authors and to do so by means of amendments on which the five co-authors would have to agree unanimously in order that one of them might be able to vote in its favour. In fact we have had such good fortune—we have the right to say so—as to have before us two texts on which there is unanimous agreement. Some have said that the texts are not very substantial. If they are right, if it is nothing but a house of cards—I do not wish to believe that, but if it is so—let us refrain from touching a single card for fear of bringing the whole thing down.

35. Obviously the position would have been different, and I would have had to make a basic decision, if the representative of El Salvador, instead of submitting amendments to a text proposed by the Five Powers, had drafted a separate text concerning solely the wording of the Australian draft resolution, that is, opposing that draft. In that case I would say that I would prefer a text based on the Salvadorian representative's ideas to the text submitted to us by the Australian representative; I would do so for the reasons which I explained this morning and to which I do not intend to revert this evening.

36. Mr. VYSHINSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (*translated from Russian*)): I think it is necessary, first of all, to discuss today's statement by Sir Percy Spender with reference to the critical attitude which many delegations have shown towards his draft resolution [A/C.1/L.101].

37. Sir Percy said in the first place that it was not, of course, essential that the suggested working paper should be of 100 per cent value. In my opinion, however, 100 per cent accuracy is an essential requirement, for if even 1 per cent of it is allowed to diverge from the facts, the result would be the same as if a spoonful of tar were dropped into a barrel of honey. What is a spoonful of tar in comparison with a whole barrel of honey? It is less than 1 per cent. But to take the positive results of the deliberations of the five members of the Sub-Committee or the twelve members of the Disarmament Commission and season them with this "tar", even in very small quantities, even that would be dangerous and harmful and would do nothing to advance our cause.

38. Why do I think that there may be such a spoonful of tar? It is not I who think so, but the Australian representative, the author of the draft resolution himself, since he said that 100 per cent accuracy was unnecessary in presenting the facts. The implication is that he admits that a certain percentage will not be an accurate presentation. In my opinion, however, it is especially necessary in our work to try to ensure that only that which is 100 per cent true should be accepted as fact. That is my first point to illustrate the unsoundness of the Australian draft resolution.

39. Secondly, he said that it was certainly not the Australian delegation's intention that the Secretariat should crystallize viewpoints on these matters. But if the Secretariat's task is not to crystallize, that is to say, to present

the various viewpoints in a clearer, more precise and purified form, then what is its task in fact to be? The implication is that it is not to crystallize at all, but to present something approximative, something inaccurate, something which has not been freed from the accretions which are perhaps confusing the issue and preventing proper understanding.

40. In my opinion, if the Secretariat is to be given anything at all to do, it should be precisely the job of "crystallizing" viewpoints, as it has been called. There would be no point in anything else. If the author himself rejects the idea of crystallization, what does his proposal in fact amount to? What is its purpose? I think I may say, by the way, that the Philippine representative revealed that purpose very clearly when he said that, if there were to be no agreed decisions, it would be necessary to ascertain where the responsibility lay. This is an approach which does not accord in the least with the circumstances, or with our tasks, or with the conditions in which we propose to work in the Sub-Committee and the Disarmament Commission.

41. Must we already think about responsibility and prepare documents to pin the blame on someone? Is this a proper approach to what is called seeking agreed decisions? I submit that it is not a proper approach. It is what is called preparing an alibi and that certainly cannot form part of the task of this Sub-Committee and of the Disarmament Commission. I associate myself completely with Mr. Moch's statement, when he said, as I understood him, that there could be no question of making preparations at this time to determine who is responsible if we meet with failure in our future work, because, in the first place, it is pointless to anticipate that we will necessarily meet with failure, and, in the second place, no purpose is served by looking for culprits. What is proposed to be done with the culprits when they have been found? Are they to be censured? Are they to be punished? If so, how? We should be told this at once, so that we may know what consequences to expect for disobeying the Secretary-General, if he, as the arbiter, attributes to us views which we perhaps do not hold.

42. The second argument in favour of crystallization—and this also fails to withstand criticism—was: "We are still in the dark about certain aspects of the Soviet proposal." This, too, reveals an aim which, in my opinion, should not be adopted by this Committee—the aim of issuing further instructions regarding the work of the Disarmament Commission and its Sub-Committee.

43. If Sir Percy Spender is doubtful about certain aspects of the Soviet proposals—as he has the right to be—why does he not ask the Soviet Union delegation to clear up all his doubts for him, as some other representatives have asked us to do? If he has already done so, but says that the Soviet explanations still do not satisfy him, what justification can he have for thinking that the Secretariat, in preparing the reference document, will be more competent to remove his doubts on those aspects than the delegation expounding them? Essentially, this would be tantamount to applying not to the source but to an interpreter. But why and with what justification should the Secretariat, — and I speak with all due respect for its role and its importance in our work, — have to assume the responsibility—and I doubt whether it will—of acting not only as an intermediary, a description which we will admit, if you like, although I have always regarded the Secretary-General's role as being political and not purely administrative, —

but also as an interpreter, as a sort of judge over delegations to decide whether or not a delegation is stating its own point of view correctly, or whether that view is correctly or incorrectly stated in the documents in question? No one, of course, could obtain any positive satisfaction from proceeding in such a manner.

44. It has been suggested here, and the Australian draft resolution itself says so, that the Secretariat should base itself on the facts in preparing its reference document. But what facts, may I ask? It is proposed, then, that a working paper should be prepared, giving a factual presentation of the present positions of the great Powers. In other words, the Secretariat, in preparing the working paper, is to base itself on the facts. What facts, may I ask?

45. The Philippine representative explains that the Secretariat will necessarily be confined to the verbatim records. But if these records are the only source from which one may acquaint oneself with the positions of the various delegations, surely the members of this Committee, the members of the Disarmament Commission and the members of the Sub-Committee are capable of studying those documents, the verbatim records, themselves, and making up their own minds independently, without a tutor, as to the positions of the various States?

46. This is a somewhat strange situation. We have verbatim records but even so, one representative told me today that matters were still not clear to him, the parties must know where they agree and where they disagree, a clear distinction must be drawn between matters on which agreement has been reached and those on which agreement has not been reached, the degree of progress the Disarmament Commission has made must be determined and so forth. But this should be determined, in the first place, by the members of the Disarmament Commission themselves, by the members of the Sub-Committee, because if those of us who sit in the Sub-Committee do not decide on what points we agree and on what we disagree, how can the Sub-Committee be expected to achieve any success at all?

47. But it is no use saying "this is not clear to us and this we understand differently, so let the Secretariat prepare this reference document and then everything will be cleared up". Nothing will be made clear, for if the Secretariat is to be guided by the verbatim records alone, it will have only the actual speeches to go on—what has been said by the delegations concerned and nothing more. But we already have these documents, the verbatim records which are self-explanatory, so that any further explanation is quite superfluous. From this point of view, therefore, the draft resolution does not stand up to criticism. We are told by the Australian representative that we must prepare a reference document to help the Committee or the Disarmament Commission to find its way about in these various matters. I consider it a slight on the First Committee and on all representatives that we should be considered so immature, so deficient in understanding, that a handful of Secretariat experts have to be instructed to prepare explanations in order that we may understand what we are talking about, the implication being that, from the political point of view, we are just semi-literate and unable to make sense of anything at all. We should understand what we are talking about, but since we do not, the Secretariat must be instructed to prepare a reference document.

48. If the representatives agree to this, they must, of course, vote for the draft resolution. I personally think that it is beneath the dignity of a representative, of a self-

respecting human being, to do so. Such an approach is quite an improper one for our Organization to adopt. I hope that my way of looking at this matter will be understood. The members of the Committee must be helped to realize what is involved in these questions. The position taken up today—unfortunately, I do not have the record, but I think I am conveying it correctly—by Sir Percy Spender and supported by the representative of the Philippines shows that we are unable to understand one another. Of course, Mr. Moch said very frankly today that he himself has difficulty in correctly expressing his own thoughts, so complex are the issues involved. In my opinion, this statement by Mr. Moch should be taken seriously. None of us can maintain that what he has once said is completely clear to everybody. We ourselves are not always sure that we are expressing ourselves correctly. I know that a speaker sometimes thinks he has expressed his ideas quite clearly, but when what he has said begins to be discussed, he himself—if he is endowed with normal faculties and is not just mumbling what is written down, and if he uses his judgment—will immediately realize: "Ah, that was a weak spot. I didn't explain that quite clearly. Here they have misunderstood me". Thus it is not only those who are listening to us who are to blame; we ourselves are also often to blame for the fact that we are misunderstood. I begin to think about what I said, how I said it, why I argued that way, whether that was correct—perhaps it should have been said differently to make it clearer, so that everyone listening could understand my thoughts as I wished to express them, and not as they appear in cold print. But what can the Secretariat do in this respect? Perhaps the Secretariat can say: "Mr. Vyshinsky described his position in that way, but it is not clear enough. He said something else by way of explanation, but that too is not sufficiently clear. The conclusion therefore is that Mr. Vyshinsky is responsible for the obscurity". And that is that. What more can it say? I think Mr. Hammarskjöld will fully agree with me. Yet an attempt is now being made to use such a method to explain our delegation's various points of view.

49. Today, for example, Sir Pierson Dixon spoke. I apologize for speaking *ad hominem*; I know that he intends to speak again and, if I am not mistaken, to say that my remarks show that I did not quite understand him. What, in that case, is to be done? I may admit that I did not understand him, and perhaps I too shall have to say: "Sir Pierson, I agree that I did not quite understand you, but in that case please express yourself more clearly, and I shall understand you better". We must both share the responsibility not only the one who misunderstands, but also the one who is misunderstood. In such cases, the responsibility often, though not always, lies with both sides. What is to be done in such cases? What has to be done is, of course, to appeal to Sir Pierson Dixon, to Mr. Vyshinsky or to anyone else concerned, and then we shall clarify our positions. Where can we do this? In the Disarmament Commission and in the Sub-Committee. Lastly, how will all the other fifty-five States get to know what is going on there? They will learn this from the report which the Sub-Committee and the Disarmament Commission have to make on their work to the First Committee or the General Assembly and the Security Council. The report will describe and assess the situation on the basis of what took place.

50. I therefore consider that there is no justification for the conclusion that anything has to be explained to us. I think we might have to explain something to the Secretariat experts. What will the situation be in that

case? Do I have the right to explain to the Secretariat that it is misrepresenting me? I shall be told that I have. Is the Secretariat obliged to correct this? It is. In that case, therefore, you will have to deal with my explanations and not with those of the Secretariat. Again it will be my explanation that matters, and not that of the Secretariat if, for instance, I am given a reproduction of my statement on a few sheets of paper and I cross it out and say that it is all wrong and that I expressed myself in some other way. For if it were not obligatory for the Secretariat to accept that, the incredible situation would arise that the Secretariat would be editing our speeches and deciding what they meant, in other words, it would substitute its own understanding for ours. But in that case, I must yield my place here to the Secretariat, while I step aside and await its decision. What more can I do, if the Secretariat instead of myself is to describe my position on various points? I was asked a curious question today: will you agree to correct what the Secretariat produces? But if I am to make corrections, whose will the statement be—the Secretariat's or mine? I think every reasonable man will say: "yours, of course". It is the duty of the Secretariat to express the matter as I require it to be expressed. In that case the decisions, the statement and the viewpoint will, of course, be mine. Consequently, such proposals are quite unfounded.

51. Sir Percy Spender asked who was better qualified for such work than the Secretariat. I am absolutely unable to agree with Sir Percy that the Secretariat is more qualified than any of the representatives who come here to defend their attitudes and express their points of view. A delegation is of course more qualified than all the secretariats in the world put together, not merely our own Secretariat, though I do not mean by that that the Secretariat is a superfluous institution. My attitude towards it is one of complete respect, though I am bound to state that I consider the Secretariat a political institution. Mr. Hammarskjöld can confirm that I have spoken to him more than once about my views on the functions and tasks of the Secretariat. I told him that the Secretariat was a political and not an administrative organ, and that his influence as Secretary-General must count in the settlement of political questions.

52. A limit must be drawn, however. The influence to which I have referred cannot become so extensive that the Secretariat can edit our speeches and distribute them in the form which it gives them. No one with a correct understanding of his functions as representative of his State in this high international forum could accept that view. Such a proposal is completely unacceptable.

53. I fully agree with what Mr. Mates, the Yugoslav representative, said here. He rightly objected to the draft resolution submitted by Australia and the Philippines. At present I do not so much wish to emphasize the fact that he adopted that particular attitude—one which in my opinion is completely correct—as the fact that he correctly expressed the issue with regard to our tasks and the meaning of the proposal we are at present discussing.

54. Indeed, the task of our Sub-Committee and of the Disarmament Commission will be to eliminate as many disagreements and to find as many points of contact and agreement as possible. For that purpose, we must express our positions more clearly, and to do so we must define them more clearly. The one is inseparable from the other. Who can do this more successfully—the dele-

gations themselves, or some kind of body outside the delegations, even though it is highly qualified, exercises the utmost political restraint and enjoys our common confidence? The delegations themselves, of course. No one can explain more clearly than the representatives themselves what they said by way of explanation of their previous statements.

55. If there are any representatives among us who cannot do this, they must be replaced. But I think that that is not the case. I believe that each of us is competent enough to be able, in the end, to find the correct and accurate expression of his position, so that, if agreement is not reached, we shall be clear as to the points on which we failed to agree. Can this task be carried out by the delegations or not? I believe not only that it can be carried out, but that it must be carried out by them. What will be the function of the Sub-Committee, if not to explore all approaches to the agreement mentioned in our draft resolution, submitted by the five Powers [A/C.1/752/Rev.2]? What will be our function, if not to define our positions as clearly as possible, to define as clearly as possible the points on which we can or cannot agree and, in that connexion, to take any decisions which may be involved, acting with a clear and distinct idea of what is actually taking place at a given moment, on a given question and in relation to a given proposal submitted on that question, whether adopted or not?

56. I quite fail to see what other approach there could be to this matter. I agree that any other approach could only confuse the issue, particularly if it is based on procedures so alien to our tasks—and to what I am sure are the wishes of the whole Committee—as the documentation of the various positions in advance, so that someone may subsequently be held responsible, morally or otherwise.

57. Such a course cannot be accepted, for it would be impossible to work in the Sub-Committee or in the Disarmament Commission on such a basis. One could not even express one's opinions freely, for they would be recorded somewhere in a fixed and final form—even if only in the verbatim record. By the way, I doubt whether verbatim records will continue to be kept. But if it is proposed already that some kind of survey should be prepared on the basis of our present verbatim records, the matter will not stop at that—you have heard the objections raised. It will be necessary to ascertain what changes were subsequently made. And then the question of responsibility will arise, the question of the final result. One will have to know what kind of result is produced, how it has been reached and in relation to what question. Surely you do not wish to entrust the Secretariat with all that responsibility?

58. Such a proposal is humiliating to representatives. The Soviet delegation considers that to deal with the question in such a way would be humiliating to itself, and we therefore protest against such a draft resolution. We have seen the separate draft resolution, we have seen the amendments to that draft resolution and we protest against the whole idea.

59. I should like to recall our experience in the Sub-Committee under the Chairmanship of Mr. Padilla Nervo, the Mexican representative, who was at that time President of the General Assembly. Besides Mr. Padilla Nervo, the Sub-Committee comprised Mr. Moch, Sir Gladwyn Jebb, Mr. Jessup and me. After concluding our work, we presented to the sixth session of the General Assembly in Paris in 1951 a memorandum

[A/C.1/677] reflecting the positions of all our delegations and indicating the points on which at that time agreement had been reached. I think Mr. Moch will agree that we were able to reach agreement on a considerable number of points. Mr Moch is nodding his head, so that I know that I am right in saying this. The points on which we had succeeded in reaching agreement were noted in the memorandum which was submitted to the First Committee in Paris. The First Committee then adopted a draft resolution [A/C.1/684] on the subject for submission to the General Assembly.

60. Unfortunately, for various reasons we did not then solve the problems we should have solved, but we came to terms. We can either speak of this or not speak of it now. But the fact remains that we were able to prepare a memorandum and that it clearly stated the positions of all delegations, including the points of agreement and disagreement, and contained an analysis and a balance-sheet. We prepared it ourselves, without any assistance from the Secretariat. It is true that the Sub-Committee had to draw up the memorandum twice. Once, when it prepared the memorandum, it was unsuitable; one delegation objected to it, pointing out an inaccuracy, and another delegation also drew attention to inaccuracies. Five of us delved back into the verbatim records and drew up a second memorandum, which was unanimously confirmed, in spite of our differences. This memorandum was submitted to the First Committee on our collective responsibility. Is this kind of working procedure correct or not? I think it is correct. Can there be any better system than this? I do not think so. Is this system likely to help us in our work? It will undoubtedly help our work. You will say that there has been no result. But the absence of any result is due not to the fact that the Secretariat did not prepare this memorandum, but to other reasons.

61. We cannot be certain at this stage that the desired result will be achieved. But what has the Secretariat's participation to do with this? Whether we achieve a good or a bad result will not depend on the fact that we did not understand each other, but on the fact that, although we fully understand each other, we may not agree with all the other positions. Does no one understand the meaning of our proposal for a one-third reduction? They do. If they do not agree with the proposal, it is not because they do not understand it, but because they consider this course to be less acceptable than some other course.

62. Accordingly, all my efforts are now bent on preventing a vote on the Australian draft resolution, for all the reasons which have been given by the authors of that draft and by the Philippine representative, who supported it—I do not know who else supported it, but it seems to me that there were many who objected. The Committee itself can deal with this task; it can itself set forth the positions of all the States. If everything is not clear today, we should not close our debate. If everything is still so far from clear that we do not know the position of any given delegation, it would be a mistake to close the debate today and confine our discussions to procedural questions relating to the draft resolutions under consideration. We should return to the general debate and not begrudge ourselves two more weeks in order that everything should be made clear, but made clear to us, and not to the specialists of the Secretariat, who are being set up as our tutors or preceptors. Such a measure is unjustified; we need no preceptors or tutors. We want to reach agreement among ourselves,

by expressing our views in our own words and by explaining what is still not clear. With all due regard to the Secretariat, its assistance is not necessary for this. We do not need such assistance.

63. We therefore urge that the First Committee should not be humiliated by a proposal which—contrary, I am sure, to the wishes of the Australian and Philippine representatives, and irrespective of their subjective aims—objectively places us in an impossible situation from the moral and political points of view and a situation unacceptable from the practical viewpoint, as no practical results can be obtained from it.

64. On behalf of my delegation, I must say that I cannot endorse any paper setting forth my position unless it is set forth in my own words. I am also unable to endorse any paper setting forth the positions of other delegations, unless I am sure that those positions are set forth in the words used by the delegations themselves, because words play a very important part and cannot be ignored. The same position may be expressed in different words. Let us take this draft resolution as an example. It states: "The General Assembly recommends to the Disarmament Commission that it request the Secretariat . . ." In Russian, the verb "to request" may be translated by "*predlozhit*" or "*prossit*". "*Prossit*" the Secretariat means one thing and "*predlozhit*" to the Secretariat means another. In Russian, the word "recommends" is not binding. I can recommend to you that you take a good rest today, but our work makes it impossible for you to take a rest. If I were your supervisor, however, and set great store by the working capacity of my colleagues, I could "order" you to rest and you would then be obliged to do so. This shows what different shades of meaning there are even in such simple words, which seem to be absolutely clear.

65. It is now proposed that a special body outside the delegations and, of course, having its own political and juridical views, should tell me what I think, how I speak and how I express my thoughts and should disseminate the results throughout the world. I apologize for going into further detail, but I should like to cite an example. Today I was really amazed. I opened the *New York Times* this morning and read a report about our work yesterday. It stated that Mr. Vyshinsky objected to the Indian draft resolution [A/C.1/L.100]. But I never objected to it anywhere. Why did it say that? Because someone wanted to play a practical joke on me? I doubt it. I think that the correspondent, Mr. Hamilton, must have been deaf in one ear at the time, or perhaps in both ears. In any case, Mr. Hamilton says: "Mr. Vyshinsky, it is understood, replied that the Soviet Union was strongly opposed to the Indian resolution and would join the Western Powers in referring it to the Disarmament Commission". But this is nonsense, because the two statements are contradictory. If I am to join the Western Powers, who want to refer the draft resolution to the Disarmament Commission, that means that I too want to refer it to the Commission, and if I want to refer it to the Commission, why should it be inferred that I am strongly opposed to the draft resolution, especially as I have said nothing of the kind? If writers of this sort are ever called upon to act as literary advisers and experts and to write our statements and explain our positions, matters will have come to a pretty pass. I cannot agree to this.

66. I therefore appeal to the reason and good will of other delegations, and especially to the authors of the draft, and ask them to withdraw this draft resolution.

If they do not withdraw it, my delegation will have to vote against it. It is most unpleasant for me to vote against a draft resolution submitted to us here; I much prefer to vote in favour of agreed texts, such as our first two five-Power draft resolutions. As the representative of the Soviet Union, no other course will be open to me, for the reasons which I have just stated, than to vote against that draft.

67. Mr. BARRINGTON (Burma): I have asked to address the Committee primarily to speak on the draft resolution submitted by Australia and the Philippines. As far as the two five-Power draft resolutions [*A/C.1/752/Rev.2* and *A/C.1/L.102*] are concerned, they have our full and enthusiastic support. We trust that they will receive the unanimous support of this Committee and that their adoption will usher in a period of fruitful co-operation and understanding on this question of disarmament.

68. My delegation was favourably disposed towards the Australian draft resolution [*A/C.1/L.101*] when it was first suggested by Sir Percy Spender. However, I have to say now, after having heard the views expressed on this proposal today and yesterday, that we have serious doubts as to the wisdom of moving the draft resolution at this stage of our proceedings. Even if we ignore the practical difficulties—and these are extremely serious in the eyes of my delegation—we are troubled by the matter of timing. It seems to my delegation that the draft resolution has come either too late or much too early. The document which this proposal would bring into being would have been extremely useful had it been available to us in the early stages of this debate. But now that the debate is drawing to a close, the document cannot, in our view, serve any useful purpose as far as the work of this Committee is concerned.

69. This still leaves the question of informing world opinion. But if it is world opinion about which we are worried, there seems to my delegation to be no great need for haste. From that point of view, surely, it would be preferable—and I say this deliberately—to await at least the results of the deliberations of the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission and of the Disarmament Commission itself. I am not suggesting that it should be done then. However, I say that that must be the time to consider it again.

70. To insist on this work being undertaken and rushed now might only distract the parties principally concerned from their main task. This, in our view, would be distinctly unfortunate. As the representative of France said, we need to exploit the agreements reached so far, even if they relate mainly to procedural issues. We think, therefore, that nothing of this nature should be done now. I emphasize it now again, since it might tend to dissipate the favourable atmosphere generated by the tentative agreements.

71. For these reasons, my delegation regrets that it is unable to support the draft resolution submitted by Australia and the Philippines and will be constrained to oppose it if it is brought to the vote.

72. Mr. MENON (India): The Chairman will soon, I hope, begin asking the Committee to record its decisions on the draft resolutions that have been submitted to it during the last two days. I have in previous interventions today [*701st meeting*] informed the Chairman that my delegation proposes to speak on the draft resolution without in any way marring the effect of the consensus of opinion that has been reached, not only on the matter

of these draft resolutions, but on the general approach towards the next stage of the working out of the problem of disarmament. My delegation, and I personally, are not given to exuberant sentiment. We have been too long associated with the English. Therefore, we take things in a way that tends to approach that masterpiece of Albionism—understatement.

73. But I think it is right to say that the stage which we are about to enter is epochal. We are too close to the events with which we are so intimately tied up, in which we are participants—to a certain extent we are the architects—to be able to appreciate either the distance which we have travelled or the speed at which we are travelling. Those who participate in the making of history are not historians. Historians are the people who write about them long afterwards, when they do not have either a Secretariat memorandum or the verbatim records. Therefore we are not likely to appreciate the importance of the turning point which we have reached, and even at the risk of someone thinking privately that I am referring to events outside this assembly, I think we are probably today marking a stage as important as the one that was reached a few months ago when, for the first time in twenty-five years, the guns of war were silenced in the world; that is to say, in this cold war we have now passed on to a period where, instead of conflict, parties seem to embark upon co-operation.

74. The process of common exploration has begun and I refuse to believe that it is going to be short-lived. I share the sentiments of the representative of France that we have no right to speak about deadlocks, because deadlocks by definition are things that are to be broken. There cannot be a permanent period of deadlock at any time, because in the processes that go on within it, it resolves itself, if nothing else. Therefore my delegation puts forward these thoughts because it regards it as politically unwise, as paying little tribute to the common people of the world, that we should minimize the real importance of this advance and talk in terms of procedure and principle. Advance is substantial in itself.

75. But before I enter into more detailed aspects, I want to take this opportunity of paying a very sincere tribute to the delegation of Canada and to its chairman, who was the initiator of the process which is about to take place. We are particularly happy that it comes from Canada, with which, during the last two years, we have been associated very closely in processes of conciliation and negotiation. Along with the Canadians today, in that war-torn part of Asia, my country is engaged in the tasks of metaphorically binding up the wounds of war in association with the French and their former opponents. We want, therefore, to place on record our tribute to the sister State in our Commonwealth, Canada, and the chairman of its delegation who has played such an important part in bringing this about. I have also the secret joy to feel that my friend, Mr. Martin, now thinks that it is possible to talk to those with whom he differs. We have also set in motion a process whereby we no longer think the emphasis of difference is the essence of independence. It is necessary to be able to talk to the people with whom we are wholly in disagreement, because there is no other way of resolving conflict. In this draft resolution [*A/C.1/752/Rev.2*] we have made more than the advance of registering a decision; we have made a definite political advance which, we hope, will resolve, as time goes on and by, the continuance of these same processes, that aspect of international disease which has been called "the cold war". This principal draft resolu-

tion which is before us—the draft resolution moved originally by the delegation of Canada and afterwards co-sponsored by the other four Powers—proclaims this development in international co-operation that has been reached, and therefore, as I said, it is more than just a decision upon one topic.

76. With regard to the substance of the draft resolution, I am free to confess that there are many of us, I imagine, ourselves not excluded—none of us really suffer from the lack of self-esteem or a sense of value of ourselves—who would think that we could probably draft it better. We certainly could draft it differently. But that is not the real point before us. More than any detailed improvements in the substance, the great achievement of the unanimity of the parties is what is important, and my delegation will do nothing to mar this sense of achievement, which is itself a great contribution to the work of the Disarmament Commission.

77. We hope that the sponsors of the joint draft resolution have taken note, in paragraph 3 of the operative part, of the whole content of General Assembly resolution 715 (VIII), namely, that the Sub-Committee should meet, if necessary, in private and in any part of the world. It is very good sometimes to read either imaginative or lurid fiction in the newspapers connected with political events, but I think it is sometimes useful for those who make events to be able to talk to each other without the impediment of their thoughts being distorted. That takes me to a related aspect of this question, to which I made reference yesterday.

78. Therefore, before I pass to another question, may I say that my delegation will support the five-Power draft resolution [A/C.1/752/Rev. 2]—I have to say five “Power” although I do not like this word “Power”, but that is how they say it—that has been put before this Committee, and we will do so enthusiastically.

79. Now we come to what has been called the Indian draft resolution [A/C.1/L.100]. I would not enter into the merits of it and I do not propose to debate it, because to debate it would, to a certain extent, detract from the procedures we have followed this morning. But it will be noted that the draft resolution moved by the five Powers [A/C.1/L.102] says that “the records of the meetings of the First Committee at which this draft resolution was discussed” should be transmitted to the Disarmament Commission. But that, of course, includes the observations made on them by everybody concerned. I propose to deal with them as gently and as moderately, and with as great restraint, as I can.

80. First of all, I want to say that the representative of France has outlined [700th meeting] what he means by the connotation which he attaches to the substance of the second draft resolution [A/C.1/L.102], that is, by referring the Indian draft resolution to the Sub-Committee. I read it this morning: “In doing so I would emphasize that this referral should not be confused with a rejection”. Of course, I do not confuse it. It cannot be the same. Quite to the contrary—and that is what is more important—it would represent the taking into consideration of these proposals. My delegation, both by habit and by conviction, takes the statements of responsible persons entirely and fully at their face value and I have no doubt at all that these words mean exactly what they say, that is, that the draft resolution will go to the Sub-Committee and will obtain the degree of consideration, examination, criticism, and all the rest that is appropriate.

81. In normal times, or in circumstances when unanimity was not so important, it would have been possible to quarrel with the word “appropriate”, which is introduced in this draft resolution. However, in the circumstances, I shall not do so.

82. There are certain aspects of the observations that were made in connexion with this which, I would say, should be regarded only as a critique of the draft resolution and not as an analysis of it. I feel that if the representative of France had not spoken so soon after the draft resolution was presented and if it had been possible for an exchange of views to take place, the processes to which Mr. Vyshinsky referred a while ago might have come into play.

83. I am happy that the French delegation regards the earlier part of the preamble, at any rate, as not being inconsistent with the positions which we have taken up, but he quite naturally feels that it could have come somewhere else. I must, however, register our position with regard to the sixth paragraph of the preamble. This paragraph refers to the cessation of hostilities in various parts of the world, including Korea and Indo-China. The verbatim record shows Mr. Moch as having said [700th meeting]: “The sixth paragraph of the preamble refers to the Geneva agreements, that is to say, to measures which are, strictly speaking, alien to our agenda”. I think that this is a correct statement, providing the “strictly speaking” can be very strictly construed. But I would want it to be placed on record that my delegation does not regard the cessation of the eight-year war in Indo-China—to which the Government of France and its distinguished Prime Minister have made a contribution without which no such outcome would have been possible—as something that can just be regarded as an isolated event having no relation to these matters. I am certain that that is not the meaning of this phrase. I think that it only means that it would be better not to complicate our present problem by drawing in other matters.

84. I say this because I have a public and a Government to which I am responsible, and we could not put ourselves in the position of saying that this great achievement of the determination of a war, which has brought fighting in the world to an end, can just be regarded as something unconnected with the problem we have in mind.

85. I hope that the representative of France will take these observations in the spirit in which they are offered. It is not meant by any means as a kind of criticism or as an attempt merely to make points. It is intended only to place on record that we regard this as one of the great contributions to the change of atmosphere which has made the present developments possible.

86. When we submitted our draft resolution, it was not with any idea that it was incapable of improvement. In submitting it, I informed the Committee that we were prepared to amend it any way, as long as it was possible for us to agree that what emerged would be something useful. My Government and my delegation believe that our task here is to seek agreement and to seek to persuade. It is axiomatic that no one can persuade unless he himself is willing to be persuaded. I have been persuaded by the arguments, by the discussions and by the talks we have had, that our purposes are achieved by the particular modality that has been adopted in regard to the reference of this draft resolution.

87. However, in addition to that, there are paragraphs in this draft resolution which would have aroused debate, and I have no hesitation in referring to the eighth paragraph of the preamble. If it had been debated, I do not think that this paragraph would have been adopted unanimously by this Committee, or even that it would have been adopted at all. In that circumstance, we would have been prepared either to modify it or to withdraw it. After all, it is only a statement of opinion, but it does not alter the main position. I want to reiterate this point, namely, that the delegation of India has asked for nothing more than the consideration of certain ideas. It has not said that an "armament truce" should be accomplished in a particular way, that it is entirely feasible or that there are no practical difficulties. All we have said is that it is one of the matters that should be considered, so that if it is not possible to achieve this, the world will at least know why it is not possible. This is not in the sense of imposing sanctions on those who made it impossible, but simply in order that the problem may be made well known.

88. I say this not in order to justify our position as a debating matter, but simply so that the Sub-Committee may know that all that we sought to do from the very beginning was to place these ideas, through the medium of the General Assembly, before the Sub-Committee for its consideration. Also, this provides us with the opportunity of expressing our point of view.

89. As I informed the Committee yesterday, we have tried other methods in the past and, unfortunately, those methods ended in cold storage. But I think that the temperature of the Committee has now changed. It is no longer cold; I hope it is not too warm; it is temperately warm, and comfortably so. Therefore this reference is not a matter of cold storage.

90. Though I feel compelled by a sense of duty to go further into this analysis, I refrain from doing so because I do not want to open up these things in any way. I am sure that the draft resolution, when referred to the Commission, will receive such attention as it deserves, and it must stand on its own merits.

91. Now with regard to paragraph 2 of the operative part, it is obvious that that cannot be referred to the Commission. There is no meaning in that—it would make nonsense of the whole situation. Therefore, as I stated this morning, we have withdrawn that paragraph and have ourselves issued a revision [*A/C.1/L.100/Rev.1*]. I had requested the permission of the Committee, but I have been advised that it is not necessary for me to do so because we are entitled to revise the draft resolution.

92. However, there is one aspect of this matter which is more substantial. There is a reference here to co-operation, that is to say to ascertaining or receiving views and ideas of States not members of the Disarmament Commission.

93. I think that it is now common ground that the nations of the world, whether large or small, are all concerned in this matter. The governments of the world should not be placed in the position that the developments in the disarmament question reach them only as newspaper reports. I agree that newspapers are quicker than anything else. But it is quite likely that public opinion in their countries, policy statements by their ministers, and so on, may be conditioned by, and even in some cases may be based on, these reports, which may lead to further complications.

94. Therefore I submit—not in the form of a resolution—that in the process of the serious work which is being undertaken, subject to such considerations as agreements for temporary secrecy that may exist in the Sub-Committee, the component Governments of the General Assembly should be kept informed in the normal way of the progress that is being made, so that it would be possible for them to be adequately informed and equipped to deal with criticisms, with other developments or with such adjustments and adaptations of policy as each of us has to make.

95. Apart from anything else, it is not a very dignified position for a government to be in when decisions which concern it and which are being taken somewhere else, come to it only in the process of a debate in the General Assembly or in the report which the Commission makes several months later. I am not saying that it is always possible to avoid this. But my delegation simply submits that this process of consultation, the process of developing the feeling and the sense of active co-operation that should develop among all States Members of the United Nations and all members of the Sub-Committee, must assume an organic character. It does not mean a reference to consultation, it does not mean seeking a mandate—it is simply an aspect of team-work within all the limitations and with all the special characteristics that attend this matter. Therefore my delegation requests that this should be borne in mind in considering the particular clause in the draft resolution that refers to this question.

96. Reference has been made to the procedural character of the joint draft resolution [*A/C.1/752/Rev.2*]. Now I do not know where procedure ends and principle begins, or vice versa. I do know that there are certain matters which can be more or less exclusively classified as procedure, and others as something else. But in this question of disarmament, the main thing that we are trying to do is to arrive at a procedure. A convention is a procedure, and nothing else. A convention is an instrument, and an instrument is a procedure. But it is a procedure which is vital—it is a procedure which stops the competition in arming and which stops the process that leads to war. Therefore this emphasis that this is purely a procedural victory is one that I do not understand.

97. I want to say, on behalf of my delegation, that we regard the agreements reached as being of major importance. We regard the agreements reached as being the proclamation by former opposite camps that they are prepared to go forward on the road to achieve this goal on a common basis. This does not mean that, as they go along, they will not look in this or in the other direction, or that they may not have arguments about some particular route to be taken in getting towards the goal.

98. Therefore the major importance of the draft resolution that is before us is this, that the parties which are usually called the East and the West have now come to an agreement on the bases of discussion, and that the bases of discussion are the Anglo-French proposals [*DC/53, annex 9*] submitted to us. That is the major agreement. After having spoken about that major agreement, there are all the other items, (a), (b), (c) and (d) of the Canadian draft resolution, and all that follows, which are all matters of agreement and which are again sponsored by those five delegations. Not only has this present General Assembly developed this quality, but it has done something further. We should be de-

ceiving ourselves if we did not admit that there have been occasions in this Assembly when we have passed resolutions unanimously and that unanimity has not covered agreement but has only been a reflection of our desire not to sharpen disagreements.

99. In this particular case, however, the parties concerned have stated their disagreements and said that they proposed to find a way out among themselves. I take the liberty of re-imposing in the statement I am making the principle of the five sponsors of the draft resolution. Mr. Lloyd, speaking on 20 October, said [694th meeting]: "What is more, the Soviet Union has publicly declared that it accepts our proposal as a basis. I do not think that that is a misrepresentation of the present position as between us and the Soviet Union . . .". And here is the important part: " . . . so I think it is wrong to say that there has been no progress". It is a very mild way of putting it, but then, you see, it comes from the representative of the United Kingdom.

100. Then we have Mr. Moch, who, in the Latin manner, is a little more expressive. He said [685th meeting]: "I ask these questions as one desirous of frank co-operation among us. For years, here and elsewhere, I have constantly striven for supervised disarmament." I expressed the sentiments of my delegation, by way of a tribute to Mr. Moch, yesterday. Mr. Moch went on to say: "I believe that notable progress has at last been made between June and October . . ." Therefore, there cannot be any question of a procedural advance.

101. The representative of the Soviet Union said [686th meeting]: "It is easy to see that in this respect we agree on the main principle." Therefore, there again, from another side, comes the same view.

102. For the United States, Mr. Wadsworth said [687th meeting]: "We are still hopeful that these Soviet proposals represent an important step in the direction of an agreed disarmament programme." Not only agreement on just getting through the business of this Committee, but an important step in the direction of an agreed disarmament programme.

103. There are not many assemblies which, in the short space of time and in the context of the troubles of our world today, would regard that as a very small procedural advance. I will reserve until last the remarks of the initial author of the present settlement—and that is Mr. Martin—who said that he would agree with Mr. Vyshinsky when he said that there was no inseparable contradiction between the two positions. That, I think, is the classical definition overcoming the deadlock; when you say that there are no inseparable contradictions between the two positions, the separateness has disappeared.

104. Therefore I would like, in commenting on this draft resolution to the Committee—or, rather, in expressing our appreciation to the Committee—to refer to two words which have been used in this Committee so often. One is the word "unanimously", when we say that we hope the draft resolution will be unanimously carried. The other is the word "acclamation", when we say that we hope it will be carried by acclamation. I propose to refer to this towards the end of my observations.

105. There is one problem, one matter of business, to which I must refer and that is what I stated yesterday [700th meeting] with regard to the working paper [DC/53, annex 4] that has been submitted. We put our

position in this matter quite frankly to the Committee, that we appreciated the work that had gone into it and that, for the first time, an effort of this kind had been made, but, equally, we stated that it was a working paper. That is to say, it was a basis from which the greatest problems of control and supervision and so on would be worked out. What is more, there are contradictions in that working paper itself. We are, according to that paper, to state our position with regard to the control and use of atomic energy for industrial purposes. It is a matter which is arguable whether it even comes as fully within the terms of reference of the Disarmament Commission as set out in that document. This is not in any way to discount its value. We regard it as a notable contribution, a contribution that would assist in the detailed tasks that are before us, but the very way to kill that paper, the very way to make it a centre of controversy, is to elevate it to the position of a statute. That is not what it is. It is provided as an analysis, both as a compendium of problems and as a prescription of remedies. That is how it should be.

106. There is an amendment before us from the representative of El Salvador [A/C.1/L.103/Rev.1]. We are in a difficult position with regard to this. A separate draft resolution has just come out and I would like to say that we are entirely in agreement that all the proceedings of this Committee should be communicated to the Disarmament Commission. We are, however, in the same position as Mr. Moch, in not wanting to break from the general consensus of opinion. It was partly the same reasons which persuaded us to take up our position with regard to our own draft resolution. We believe that atmosphere has a great deal to do with the finding of solutions. After all, human beings have to bring about these situations and their approach and reconcilability to each other, and the context of the reconciliation, is very important. I would, however, say that if we are adopting a resolution, if I may put it this way, we feel equally—in view of our recent experience of difficulty in amending a co-sponsored draft resolution—that once you start amending it, many other amendments will come about. Therefore we are quite prepared to take it as it is. As a consolation, may I take the liberty of pointing out to the representative of El Salvador that paragraph 1 (c) of the operative part of the Indian draft resolution says: "The discussions and suggestions on disarmament in the General Assembly".

107. That is to say, the whole of the proceedings in this matter will be part of the communication to the Disarmament Commission. That is how we satisfied ourselves, but I do not want the impression to be conveyed that we are only concerned with the particular draft resolution that we put forward. We feel sure that the draft resolution will be generously and honestly interpreted in a kind of "packed-in" way. The draft resolution has been referred to the Committee, and it says that all the suggestions and everything else must be referred to the Disarmament Commission. Speaking for ourselves, we would be quite satisfied with that. If it had been possible for us, without major deviation from our purposes, namely, to proclaim to ourselves, to our own hearts and minds, above all, the dignity and the unanimity we have reached, we would have been willing to support the draft resolution that is now put forward.

108. In the circumstances of the explanations, it may perhaps be possible for the representative of El Salvador—in the light of these explanations and of this request—to place his opinions on record, and it may be

possible for us to conclude this particular part of the Committee's proceedings with unanimous decisions on the two five-Power draft resolutions.

109. That is all I wish to say with regard to the draft resolutions. We hope that these two words, "unanimity" and "acclamation", really mean what they convey; not unanimity in the sense of all sixty hands going up but unanimity on the goal that has to be reached, the appreciation that various principles have been agreed upon and, what matters more than anything else, unanimity, and even enthusiasm for unanimity. That enthusiasm for unanimity has been expressed by certain delegations in saying that draft resolutions will be adopted by acclamation. There is no need for us to get excited, but, at the same time, it would be a sad state of affairs if we were to become prisoners of all the gloom we have created ourselves. That is to say, if we are afraid of achievement; the fear of achievement is the fear that we may be disappointed, and therefore we may not rejoice. In that case, we may never have the opportunity to rejoice now, or to rejoice when the achievement comes, so why should we not be thankful for the advance we have made and proclaim to ourselves and to the world that we have now, in this particular problem, reached a situation where, at any rate, it is one of the turning points? It is a major development that makes negotiation, conciliation and, what is more, the establishment of the common goal, the settlement of the achievement of disarmament, a practical problem. Therefore we do not apologize for regarding this as a major advance and not merely a procedural victory. There are no rules of procedure for that victory; and if the five States have been able to agree on all that was set out in a Canadian draft resolution and, what is more, if they have been able to agree even to take into consideration such a humble effort as our own, on each occasion saying: "We do not want to break up this unanimity"—that is one of the by-products of our discussion this afternoon, that each one of them says: "We do not want to do anything that impairs this agreement"—is that not a reiteration of the desire for a common exploration, for common achievements? Therefore let us now pass on to the situation where the index of power is proclaimed not merely by guns or by bombs, but by the common consent of governments.

110. Mr. SARPÉR (Turkey): I shall try to explain very briefly the views of my delegation on the draft resolutions now under consideration.

111. The lengthy debate on disarmament has been completed—at least I hope so—and we have reached the second phase of our deliberations, namely, consideration of the various draft resolutions before us. Prior to expressing the views of my delegation on these drafts, I wish to emphasize briefly the importance, in our opinion, of one particular fact. The rather exhaustive general debate on the present item has been, in our view, extremely useful and has contributed much to our efforts in seeking an acceptable solution to the vital problem of disarmament. If it did not bring about a general agreement on the various intricate aspects of the problem, it has helped, I am sure, considerably in the clarification of many points of importance. Indeed, if anything has resulted at all, at least a common and promising understanding has been reached among the Powers principally involved—I say "Powers"; I do not dislike the expression because if they were not Powers we should not try to disarm them, after all—on the procedure to be followed. We consider even that a good omen.

112. As for the draft resolutions themselves, let me state briefly our views on them. My delegation supports the five-Power draft resolution [*A/C.1/752/Rev.2*]. As we all remember, this draft resolution, in its original form, was submitted to the First Committee by the representative of Canada on 13 October [*688th meeting*] and the delegations of France, the United Kingdom and the United States agreed to become co-sponsors after the appeal made by the representative of Canada. While not being able to agree at once, the representative of the Soviet Union then promised a sympathetic study of Mr. Martin's suggestion. To our great satisfaction, the members of the Committee were informed on 22 October [*697th meeting*] by the representative of Canada, Mr. Johnson, that the Soviet Union delegation had agreed to join with the other four members of the Disarmament Commission Sub-Committee in co-sponsoring the draft resolution with the revisions which had been worked out jointly.

113. We join our other colleagues who have preceded us in welcoming this as a satisfactory development, and we wish to offer our congratulations to all those—especially the representative of Canada—who succeeded in producing such a successful result. The representative of Canada, who explained to the Committee the general terms of the original Canadian draft resolution when he introduced it, also commented later on the revised text which is now before us. Therefore, I do not need to go into details. His lucid statements on the revisions incorporated in the original text have amply shown that the principles contained in the original draft were upheld despite some rectifications and revisions. I only wish to point out that we are in general agreement with his explanations as a whole and, specifically, we share his interpretation with regard to the omission of the word "balanced" in paragraph 1 (a) of the revised draft resolution. I should like to quote the following passage from his statement on 22 October [*697th meeting*]:

"The consideration which we had originally in mind when we included the words 'balanced reduction' was not that the reductions should be proportionate—that was an old Soviet proposal which we had always rejected—but that the over-all effect of the reductions should be equitable and should not create an imbalance which could threaten any nation's security."

114. My delegation hopes that the five-Power draft resolution will be adopted unanimously in our Committee and, later, in the General Assembly.

115. Finally, I should like to add that we are prepared to support the draft resolution [*A/C.1/L.101*] submitted by Sir Percy Spender, the representative of Australia. The arguments put forward in his last intervention [*701st meeting*] during this morning's meeting, have convinced my delegation once more of the usefulness of his proposal. Therefore we shall vote in favour of it. We have listened carefully to the objections raised to the Australian draft resolution, and we are not quite in agreement with those who objected to it. We all know, for example, that the verbatim records are not among the so-called "Official Records" of the First Committee. The Official Records are what we call the summary records, if I am not mistaken. In the preparation of the summary records, the Secretariat does, and always did, a very satisfactory job of summarizing our respective positions, and I do not agree and do not understand why, the Secretariat's efficiency should be questioned in this particular case. As far as our individual or collective dignity is concerned, the proposal, in my opinion, has

absolutely nothing to do with the personal or collective dignity of any delegation here. For these reasons I am going to support the Australian draft resolution.

116. Furthermore, I am going to support the five-Power draft resolution [A/C.1/L.102], which refers the Indian draft resolution [A/C.1/L.100] to the Disarmament Commission.

117. Mr. URQUIA (El Salvador) (*translated from Spanish*): From certain statements at this afternoon's meeting, particularly those made by the representatives of Yugoslavia, France, the USSR and Burma, it would seem that there is less and less likelihood of the Australian draft resolution [A/C.1/L.101] in its present form, or rather the working paper mentioned in the Australian draft resolution, being approved or serving any practical purpose.

118. I went to explain briefly why my delegation, which this morning submitted a proposal [A/C.1/L.103] in the form of amendments to the five-Power draft resolution [A/C.1/L.102], referring the Indian draft resolution [A/C.1/L.100] to the Disarmament Commission, has now decided to submit its proposal in the form of a separate draft resolution [A/C.1/L.103/Rev.1], following the most opportune and interesting suggestion made by the French representative.

119. Actually, we had thought that the Indian draft resolution could be combined with that of Australia and that both draft resolutions could be transmitted to the Disarmament Commission; we believed at first that it would be advisable to extend the scope of paragraph 2 of the five-Power draft resolution to refer not only to the records of the meetings at which the Indian proposal was considered but to all the records of First Committee meetings at which the different aspects of the disarmament problem were considered and fully discussed.

120. We felt that the ideas which my delegation was modestly putting forward might be incorporated in the "secondary"—if I may call it so—five-Power draft resolution, so as to reconcile as far as possible the different tendencies that exist in the Committee at this late stage, when we are almost on the point of voting on the different draft resolutions.

121. Nevertheless, as I have said, in view of the revised form which we have given to our draft resolution in the light of the timely remarks made by the French representative, and as the five sponsors, which of course include the four great Powers, are in full agreement with regard to the text of their draft resolution on the Indian proposal, it would perhaps be more advisable to give separate consideration to the proposals contained in the Salvadorian draft resolution.

122. We have therefore submitted, in the form of a separate draft resolution, the substance of what we had proposed as an amendment to the five-Power draft resolution. The draft resolution now submitted by El Salvador is an exact counterpart of the five-Power draft resolution. The latter refers to the Indian draft resolution and transmits the records of our Committee's debate on the Indian proposal to the Disarmament Commission. The draft resolution which El Salvador is now introducing refers to the Australian proposal and also transmits to the Disarmament Commission, for information, the records of those meetings of our Committee at which the different aspects of the disarmament problem have been discussed.

123. For the reasons which I gave this morning, I do not think that delegations will have any objection to transmitting to the Disarmament Commission the records of the debates showing the positions, opinions and points of view, not only of the great Powers but also of other States which are not great Powers, but which, through their delegations, have contributed interesting ideas, thoughts and suggestions that may well be useful to the Disarmament Commission and later, if the question is referred back to the General Assembly, to that body also.

124. I do not think that the Indian representative was mistaken when he said that, as his draft resolution was submitted rather late—that is to say, only the day before yesterday—there had not really been any debate on it; there has been little more, as I said this morning, than an explanation of its parts, a few objections from the French representative, the Soviet representative's statement that he was not sufficiently familiar with the draft resolution to be able to comment on it, and later, at today's meeting, the most acceptable statement, from every point of view, of the representative of India, that he agreed that his draft resolution should be referred to the Disarmament Commission without further discussion.

125. If that is so—and it must be so since Mr. Menon, who is the person most directly concerned, agrees to it—it is even more desirable that the Disarmament Commission should have the records of all the debates that have taken place here on this problem, in the course of which, though some delegations may disagree, we have heard some very important suggestions that could be used and have not necessarily emanated either from the great Powers or from the States belonging to the Disarmament Commission.

126. Mr. Menon has told us that he considers that the text of the principal five-Power draft resolution [A/C.1/752/Rev.2]—that is to say the draft resolution originally introduced by the Canadian delegation—already contains certain indications that the general debate and records should engage the attention of the Disarmament Commission. If so, it would be unnecessary to state in the "secondary" five-Power draft resolution [A/C.1/L.102] that the records of the debate on the Indian proposal are to be transmitted to the Disarmament Commission. If that is already covered by the principal five-Power draft resolution, it would be redundant to repeat it in the five-Power draft resolution referring to the procedure recommended in dealing with the Indian draft resolution.

127. But I also want to refer to something I mentioned in passing at this morning's meeting, namely the paragraph setting out the factors to which the Disarmament Commission should attach importance in considering this matter. This is paragraph 2 of the operative part of the principal draft resolution, which reads as follows:

"Requests the Disarmament Commission to seek an acceptable solution of the disarmament problem, taking into account the various proposals referred to in the preamble of the present resolution and any other proposals within the Commission's terms of reference".

Apart from this, I would point out to Mr. Menon that we do not find anywhere in the original five-Power draft resolution any statement that the Disarmament Commission must necessarily, under the terms of that draft resolution, take account of our debates. But we must bear in

mind that this draft resolution mentions "the various proposals referred to in the preamble of the present resolution". These words refer to the Soviet Union draft resolution [A/C.1/750], which is explicitly mentioned in the preamble, and the proposals contained in the report of the Disarmament Commission [DC/55] which are mentioned here, not explicitly, but implicitly among "the documents annexed thereto", i.e., the documents annexed to the reports.

128. Paragraph 2 goes on to mention "any other proposals within the Commission's terms of reference". The proposals submitted to us up to now have, of course, been made by the great Powers, or at least by States belonging to the Disarmament Commission. But our suggestion is that the Disarmament Commission should consider not only formal draft resolutions but also the numerous ideas that have been put forward here in connexion with the different proposals, although they do not themselves constitute formal draft resolutions; they are not really proposals in themselves but they are useful and interesting suggestions which should be considered by the Disarmament Commission.

129. I want to emphasize that there is a similarity between what I call the "secondary" five-Power draft resolution, because it certainly is secondary to the main draft resolution originally presented by Canada—which simply lays down a procedure for dealing with the Indian draft resolution, i.e., transmitting it to the Disarmament Commission, together with the records of the debate in our Committee on the Indian proposal—and the new form in which, as I said, the Salvadorian delegation decided to submit what was originally its amendment, following the very acceptable suggestion made by the French representative. For now we say in our draft resolution, "Refers to the Disarmament Commission for its consideration the draft resolution submitted by Australia [A/C.1/L.101];" and "Decides to transmit to the Disarmament Commission for its information the records of the meetings of the First Committee at which items 20 and 68 of the agenda were considered".

130. This would to a great extent provide a way out of the difficult position in which many representatives find themselves in view of the fact that the Australian delegation has made a great contribution to the general debate; and that, as we must recognize, the only purpose of its draft resolution is to help, in the first place, the members of the Disarmament Commission and in the second place, all the other delegations to the United Nations. As I have said, this would, up to a certain point, provide a way out of the position in which delegations find themselves as a result of fact that countries which belong to the Disarmament Commission and are great Powers have openly and repeatedly opposed acceptance of the Australian draft resolution.

131. Therefore, if we deal with the Australian draft resolution in the same way in which we dealt with the Indian draft resolution, the Australian delegation cannot feel offended any more than the Indian delegation did; in neither case does the transmission of the respective draft resolution to the Disarmament Commission imply that it has been rejected.

132. I wanted to make these clarifications, and I strongly urge representatives to remember that the Salvadorian amendments no longer exist as amendments, but have been embodied instead in a separate draft resolution [A/C.1/L.103/Rev.1].

133. I merely wish to add that, as the Salvadorian draft resolution proposes a procedure in dealing with the Australian draft resolution, it should, in my opinion, be put to the vote before the latter, with which it is incompatible. The Australian draft resolution should not be put to the vote first, although it was submitted first, because ours proposes that the Australian draft resolution should be transmitted to the Disarmament Commission without a vote.

134. Mr. BELAUNDE (Peru) (*translated from Spanish*): Just a few words to clarify the position of Peru. I should like to say, first of all, that in the course of the present debate, which might appear to be a procedural one, we have heard statements which the Peruvian delegation has great pleasure in endorsing.

135. We have heard from the French representative that the great Powers have not taken up a rigid position, that there is nothing final about the situation, that is to say, that they intend to discuss the question in a dynamic, comprehensive and progressive manner, no delegation having adopted a static or frozen attitude.

136. This statement is so important that it really warrants the long debate in which we have been engaged all day today; and it has been endorsed—and this, of course, is of special importance as far as the position of the Soviet delegation is concerned—by Mr. Vyshinsky's statement this afternoon, which we heard with great pleasure, to the effect that in this discussion, the aim should be to extend the areas of agreement and eliminate the areas of disagreement.

137. I believe that the Committee should take note of these statements, which provide real grounds for confidence that the Disarmament Commission and its Subcommittee are about to enter on a progressive, dynamic and fruitful period.

138. I want to say a few words about the Peruvian delegation's purpose and reason in supporting the Australian draft resolution [A/C.1/L.101]. I do not think that this draft resolution can be called biased or tendentious. In my opinion, its purpose is not to freeze the great Powers' position. As far as the Peruvian delegation is concerned, the draft resolution only proposes that we should have a compendium, in the technical sense of the word, that is to say, an easily manageable collection of documents, not of interpretations, and on this point I agree with Mr. Vyshinsky. The Secretariat should interpret neither the opinions of the great Powers nor those of the Powers which are improperly called, as Mr. Moch rightly said, the small Powers. Only the author himself is able to interpret his own opinions with authority.

139. Therefore the working paper mentioned would merely be a summary, or a collection of essential records of the debate on disarmament; that is how I interpret the Australian draft resolution. I would call it a collection of essential verbatim records on disarmament which would be of assistance as a *vade mecum* to the Disarmament Commission itself and to other Governments and delegations in following this important question step by step.

140. Let me remind you that an enormous number of documents have appeared on disarmament since the 1946 discussions; they should be collected in one volume, without any interpretation, without drawing any conclusions and without any hidden purpose which might give grounds to suspicion, because I do not wish it to be said that we are already trying to establish responsibilities that have not yet been incurred.

141. In this spirit, the Peruvian delegation will support the Australian draft resolution and vote for it when the time comes. Incidentally, instead of saying "for their information, giving a descriptive and factual presentation", I should prefer that only documentary information be mentioned; I should be very grateful if the Australian representative could accept this small amendment.

142. I must also state our position with regard to the Salvadorian proposal. The Salvadorian draft resolution [A/C.1/L.103/Rev.1], which was presented in such an eloquent, wise and timely fashion by Mr. Urquía, of course contains two parts, the first of which refers the Australian draft resolution to the Disarmament Commission. The Salvadorian delegation must excuse me if I abstain in the vote on the first part, as I am going to vote in favour of the Australian proposal.

143. As for the second paragraph of the Salvadorian draft resolution, I have nothing but praise for it, and I shall vote for it, since both the Lebanese and the Peruvian delegations politely drew the attention of the five Powers to the fact that paragraph 2 of their draft resolution ought also to indicate that the debates should be taken into account, and I stated [698th meeting]—with no intention of submitting an amendment—that I would interpret that part of the draft resolution as meaning the same thing. But it is better that that should be explicitly stated, rather than be left merely as the subjective and unilateral interpretation of the Peruvian delegation.

144. For these reasons, I shall vote in favour of the second paragraph of the Salvadorian proposal.

145. The CHAIRMAN (*translated from Spanish*): The list of speakers is exhausted, and I shall now give the floor to delegations which wish to reply under rule 116 of the rules of procedure.

146. However, I should like to clarify one point. Rule 116 states that the Chairman "may, however, accord the right of reply to any member if a speech delivered after he has declared the list closed makes this desirable". I consider it desirable to give the floor to any representative who wishes to reply, but I think you will all agree with me that what is meant by "reply", is merely a reply to definite points, in connexion with which reference has been made to the representative who asks for the floor. The right to reply cannot be used to reopen debates that are already closed.

147. Having said this, I give the floor to the representative of Australia, who has asked to reply.

148. Sir Percy SPENDER (Australia): I shall not make a long statement, nor shall I transgress the Chairman's ruling. I, myself, have an inherent objection to repetition.

149. I shall make these observations in general terms. I do not desire to go into some of the detailed remarks made, for example, by the representative of the Soviet Union and the representative of France.

150. The argument of those two representatives was based on two main objections. The first related to the usefulness of our draft resolution [A/C.1/L.101] and the second to the difficulties which lie in the way of its implementation. I should only like to say this: it is significant that the United Kingdom believes that there is some usefulness in our draft resolution. It is equally significant that the United Kingdom does not think that the difficulties of preparing the paper called for in the

draft resolution are insuperable. There have been no objections on that score from either the United States or Canada. Hence, I cannot believe that the difficulties are as great as was suggested by the representative of the Soviet Union and the representative of France, or that those representatives have sufficiently appreciated the usefulness of the proposal.

151. I should like to say quite clearly that I very well understand and appreciate the motives which have guided the representative of El Salvador in presenting his draft resolution [A/C.1/L.103/Rev.1]. The second paragraph of the draft resolution which he has presented deals with the records of the First Committee's meeting. We not only have no objection to that paragraph, but shall vote in favour of it.

152. I cannot, however, support the first paragraph of the Salvadorian draft resolution, which would have the General Assembly refer the Australian draft resolution to the Disarmament Commission for its consideration. I propose to vote against that paragraph, for the reason which I shall shortly present, and I hope that those who support the Australian draft resolution will also vote against the paragraph.

153. The reason why I shall vote against the second paragraph of the Salvadorian draft resolution is that I know that, in the world in which I live, its adoption would kill the Australian draft resolution. It is true that my draft resolution would go to the Disarmament Commission, but if anyone happened to find it there later on, it would be quite a miracle. That is truly what will take place.

154. I appreciate very much the desire to conciliate opposing views. But I fear—and I say this despite my great appreciation of the efforts made by the representative of El Salvador—that the adoption of the Salvadorian draft resolution would stultify the principle which we seek to have enunciated. That would be particularly so if the First Committee were to adopt the Salvadorian representative's suggestion and vote on his draft resolution before voting on the Australian draft resolution.

155. I have listened with great care to the debate here. Australia has never had any other desire than to adjust its views, in so far as it should do that, to meet the views of others. I must, however, confess that, when I heard the Soviet Union representative's observations, I was more convinced than ever that I was fighting for a principle which was right. As soon as a resolution is adopted, we should have a clarification—through the Secretariat—of the precise positions of the great Powers on the various aspects of the disarmament problem.

156. For those reasons, I must state with regret that I cannot accede to the request of the representative of El Salvador. This is a matter of principle, and we, who believe very firmly in adhering to principles, cannot depart from the terms of our draft resolution, except to this extent: I am not wedded to the words of that text. I am concerned only with its concept. Indeed, I should have no objection to any alteration such as that suggested by the representative of Peru. My purpose is to obtain something which we do not clearly have today—certainly it is not clear to me, if it is to everyone else in the room—namely, a factual or documented presentation of the present positions of the great Powers. I have tried to make it quite clear that it is not my intention to crystallize the positions so as to make them static. After all, everything in life moves forward. There is

no such thing as a stationary position in life. What we, at least, have been seeking is a definition of the issues. It has always been my belief that in any dispute which exists, it assists the disputants and those who may have to pass judgment upon their activities to have the issues defined. That is so in domestic law: I cannot see why it should not apply with equal force to international law.

157. The history of our participation here demonstrates, I think, that we have always endeavoured under normal circumstances, to adjust our views to those of others. But we believe that a matter of principle is involved in this case. We shall therefore be obliged to vote against the first paragraph of the Salvadorian draft resolution. I hope that the representative of El Salvador will understand our reasons for so doing. Hoping as we do to obtain sufficient support for our own draft resolution, we should prefer that representatives stand up and be counted on the question whether or not they believe that we are fighting for a correct principle.

158. The CHAIRMAN: I think that the Committee must now decide on the motion of the representative of India concerning the order in which the draft resolutions should be put to the vote.

159. The Philippine draft resolution [A/C.1/751] has been withdrawn. The Salvadorian amendment [A/C.1/L.103] has also been withdrawn. There is now a Salvadorian draft resolution [A/C.1/L.103/Rev.1] before the Committee.

160. In those circumstances, the Committee must vote first on the five-Power draft resolution [A/C.1/752/Rev.2].

161. The representative of India has moved that the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.102 should be voted on before the Australian draft resolution [A/C.1/L.101]. If there is no objection, we shall vote in that order. If there is an objection, I shall put to the vote the motion of the representative of India. I therefore now ask if there is any objection to that motion.

162. Sir Percy SPENDER (Australia): As I understand it, the motion is that the Salvadorian draft resolution should be put to the vote before the Australian draft resolution.

163. The CHAIRMAN: We shall deal with that point later. At the moment we are considering the motion made by the representative of India that the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.102 should be voted upon before the Australian draft resolution [A/C.1/L.101]. Is there any objection to that motion?

164. As there is no objection, the motion is adopted.

165. The Committee will therefore vote first on the five-Power draft resolution [A/C.1/752/Rev.2]. After that, the draft contained in document A/C.1/L.102 will be put to the vote. The representative of India has asked for authorization to withdraw paragraph 2 of the operative part of his draft resolution [A/C.1/L.100]. I take it that there is no objection to that, and if it is decided to refer the Indian draft resolution to the Disarmament Commission, that paragraph will be omitted.

166. The representative of El Salvador has moved that his draft resolution [A/C.1/L.103/Rev.1] be put to the vote before the Australian draft resolution [A/C.1/L.101]. As I did in the case of the Indian motion, I asked the Committee if there is any objection to the Salvadorian motion concerning the order of voting.

167. Sir Percy SPENDER (Australia): For the reasons which I have already given, I do object. My draft resolution was submitted first, and I believe it should be voted upon first. If the voting is postponed, then the results would be as I have already indicated, and my objection is based on that ground.

168. The CHAIRMAN: Since the representative of El Salvador has made a formal motion, I shall put it to the vote.

169. Mr. AL-JAMALI (Iraq): I think it is preferable that the original order of the draft resolutions be retained, and that the Australian draft resolution be voted upon first. Some representatives, like me, will support the Australian draft resolution and, if it is not adopted, we will support the draft resolution of El Salvador. If the order of voting is reversed, however, I could not support the draft resolution of El Salvador. The logical way is to dispose of the Australian draft resolution first.

170. Mr. VYSHINSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translated from Russian*): My reasons are different from those of the Iraqi representative, as I do not agree with either draft. I think, however, that it would be violating the rules of procedure to vote on the Salvadorian draft after the Australian. The former text is a separate draft resolution and cannot be regarded as an amendment. It is exclusive, since, if the Salvadorian proposal to the effect that the Australian draft resolution be referred to another body is adopted, the Australian draft resolution can no longer be put to the vote. The Salvadorian draft resolution therefore excludes the other draft to a greater extent than does the Australian text.

171. I therefore propose that we follow the procedure suggested by the delegation of El Salvador. I think that that would be more correct.

172. The CHAIRMAN: Rule 132 of our rules of procedure states: "If two or more proposals relate to the same question, a committee shall, unless it decides otherwise, vote on the proposals in the order in which they have been submitted." Normally we should vote on the proposals in the order of their submission, but a motion has been made to change that order, and therefore I must consult the Committee.

173. Mr. URQUIA (El Salvador) (*translated from Spanish*): I fully agree with the Chairman that, in accordance with the rules of procedure, we should normally have to vote first on the Australian draft resolution because it was submitted first, but as I have introduced a formal motion, he must ask the Committee whether it wishes to vote first on the draft resolution of El Salvador or on that of Australia. As the representative of the Soviet Union had said, we have before us an independent proposal, because it is a separate draft resolution, although it has the effect of an amendment. I submitted it in this form at the suggestion of one of the great Powers, which felt that we should not disrupt the apparent unanimity on the second five-Power draft resolution. Although submitted in this form, the draft resolution is still a separate proposal. As the representative of the Soviet Union said, if the draft resolution of El Salvador were adopted it would not be necessary to vote on the Australian draft resolution, which the former draft resolution refers to the Disarmament Commission. As the draft resolution submitted by El Salvador would dispose of the Australian draft resolution without taking a decision on it, the most logical thing would be to vote first on the former and, if that is rejected, on the Australian draft resolution.

174. Mr. TAKIEDDINE (Lebanon) (*translated from French*): I wish to ask whether the Salvadorian draft resolution is an amendment. If it is, the position is clear; it should be put to the vote first. But if it is a separate draft resolution, the Committee will have to be consulted. My delegation, for example, intends to vote against the adoption of the Australian draft resolution. If the Salvadorian draft resolution is adopted, there will be no need to take a vote on the Australian draft resolution. I therefore entirely agree that the Committee should vote first on the Salvadorian draft resolution, and that should settle the fate of the Australian draft resolution.

175. The CHAIRMAN (*translated from French*): The Salvadorian draft resolution was originally submitted as an amendment; then it was submitted as a new draft resolution. But the representative of El Salvador based his request that his draft resolution be put to the vote first on rule 132 of our rules of procedure. I must therefore ascertain what the Committee's wishes are in this respect.

176. Mr. VYSHINSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translated from Russian*): I also know rule 132 of the rules of procedure which you have just invoked, but I should like to draw attention to the wording of the text which you read. The rule states: "If two or more proposals relate to the same question, a committee shall, unless it decides otherwise, vote on the proposals in the order in which they have been submitted." I therefore propose that the Committee should "decide otherwise" on the ground that, although formally the Salvadorian proposal is a separate or independent draft resolution, in practice it excludes the possibility of voting on the Australian draft resolution. Our future votes on the other draft resolution therefore naturally depend on it. I think that rule 132 of the rules of procedure should be applied fully, in other words, that the Committee should really be consulted on the decision it wishes to take. If the Committee "decides otherwise", we shall vote on the Salvadorian proposal, and if the Committee does not so decide, rule 132 of the rules of procedure will apply.

177. The CHAIRMAN (*translated from French*): That is exactly what I intended to do; I meant to ask the Committee if it wished to "decide otherwise".

178. Mr. SARPER (Turkey): The proposal of El Salvador is not an amendment. There is no doubt about that. Nor does the Salvadorian draft resolution constitute a previous question, as the representative of the Soviet Union put it. I would prefer to use the French expression, which is clearer, and say that it is not a *question préalable*. It is clearly an alternative proposal, and it can be considered neither as an amendment nor as a *question préalable*. Since there is a formal motion by the representative of El Salvador that the Committee should "decide otherwise", as Mr. Vyshinsky put it, it would be correct for the Chairman to consult the Committee.

179. Mr. ENTEZAM (Iran) (*translated from French*): I would like to suggest that instead of spending hours in arguing whether the Australian or the Salvadorian draft resolution should be put to the vote first, the Committee be asked to vote on the Salvadorian motion to the effect that the draft resolution of El Salvador should have precedence. I know that the Chairman intended to do so, but I am appealing to all my colleagues to avoid repetition on this question.

180. The CHAIRMAN (*translated from French*): Then we shall now vote on the motion of the representative of El Salvador, that his draft resolution be put to the vote before the Australian draft resolution.

The motion of El Salvador was adopted by 36 votes to 15, with 6 abstentions.

181. The CHAIRMAN (*translated from French*): The procedure has now been decided. I will therefore ask the Committee to vote in turn on the first five-Power draft resolution [A/C.1/752/Rev.2], the second five-Power draft resolution [A.C.1/L.102], on the Salvadorian draft resolution [A/C.1/L.103/Rev.1] and finally on the Australian draft resolution [A/C.1/L.101].

182. There is a point on which I should like the advice of the Soviet Union delegation. I suppose—but I would like to know what the Soviet Union representative thinks about this—that there is no need for the Committee to vote on the Soviet Union draft resolution [A/C.1/750] which relates to the second item with which we have to deal, since in the third paragraph of the five-Power draft resolution this proposal is specifically mentioned. However, I would like to have the Soviet Union delegation's views on that point.

183. Mr. VYSHINSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translated from Russian*): You are quite right.

184. The CHAIRMAN (*translated from French*): So there now remains only the Pakistan representative's request to speak on a particular point.

185. Mr. MIR KHAN (Pakistan): I heard the representative of Peru make a suggestion to the Australian delegation to modify the words in its resolution; to replace the words "descriptive and factual" by the word "documentary". I heard Sir Percy Spender say that he had no objection to this. I desire clarification as to whether that draft resolution stands modified with those words.

186. The CHAIRMAN: I should like to have the Australian delegation's answer to this question.

187. Sir Percy SPENDER (Australia): As I indicated during the course of my last statement, I have no objection to that because I think it would produce the same results. I assume that my co-sponsor, the representative of the Philippines, also agrees.

188. The CHAIRMAN: When we come to the vote on this draft resolution, we will read the exact wording.

189. We shall now vote, first of all, on the draft resolution jointly submitted by the five Powers [A/C.1/752/Rev.2].

The draft resolution was adopted unanimously.

190. The CHAIRMAN (*translated from French*): I now put to the vote the second five-Power draft resolution [A/C.1/L.102].

The draft resolution was adopted by 58 votes to 1.

191. The CHAIRMAN (*translated from French*): In accordance with the suggestion made by the Syrian delegation, I now wish to congratulate, on the Committee's behalf, the five countries which submitted the first of these draft resolutions, which was adopted unanimously.

192. We now come to the Salvadorian draft resolution [A/C.1/L.103/Rev.1].

193. Mr. SARPER (Turkey): I ask for a separate vote.

194. The CHAIRMAN (*translated from French*): A request has been made for a separate vote on this draft resolution and we shall comply with that request; we shall vote on this draft in two parts.

195. Prince WAN WAITHAYAKON (Thailand): Would you please settle now the wording of the Australian draft resolution inasmuch as the draft resolution of El Salvador refers to the Australian draft resolution.

196. The CHAIRMAN: We are going to vote first on the El Salvador draft resolution. The wording of the Australian draft resolution is as follows¹:

"The General Assembly

"Recommends to the Disarmament Commission that it request the Secretariat as soon as practicable to prepare a working paper for the Commission and for circulation to all the Members of the United Nations for their information, giving a documentary presentation of the present positions of the great Powers on various aspects of the disarmament problem."

197. We shall first vote on the draft resolution of El Salvador: we shall divide it into two parts.

198. The delegation of El Salvador has requested a roll-call vote on each of the two paragraphs of its draft resolution [A/C.1/L.103/Rev.I]. The roll-call is allowed. I therefore invite the Committee to vote on paragraph 1 of the El Salvador draft resolution.

A vote was taken by roll-call.

Iran, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.

In favour: Iran, Israel, Lebanon, Mexico, Nicaragua, Saudi Arabia, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Argentina, Brazil, Burma, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, France, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras.

Against: Iraq, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Philippines, Poland, Sweden, Syria, Turkey, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of South Africa, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Australia, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Canada, China, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Ethiopia, Iceland.

Abstaining: Liberia, Luxembourg, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Thailand, Afghanistan, Belgium, Cuba, India, Indonesia.

Paragraph 1 was adopted by 24 votes to 23, with 11 abstentions.

199. The CHAIRMAN (*translated from Spanish*): We shall now vote on paragraph 2 of the draft resolution.

A vote was taken by roll-call.

Israel, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.

In favour: Israel, Lebanon, Liberia, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Saudi Arabia,

Syria, Thailand, Turkey, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of South Africa, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Burma, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq.

Against: None.

Abstaining: Norway, Sweden, Denmark.

Paragraph 2 was adopted by 55 votes to none, with 3 abstentions.

200. The CHAIRMAN (*translated from French*): I do not think that there is any need to vote on the draft resolution as a whole.

201. I should like to ask the Australian delegation if, in view of the vote, it insists on a vote on its draft resolution.

202. Sir Percy SPENDER (Australia): As I sought to make clear in the course of my intervention, if the Salvadorian draft resolution were carried, as it has been, I would regard that as being a decision against my draft resolution.

203. The CHAIRMAN (*translated from French*): In that case, there is no need to vote on the Australian draft resolution.

204. Prince VAN WAITHAYAKON (Thailand): Will you not put the Salvadorian draft resolution as a whole to the vote?

205. The CHAIRMAN: This is what I explained a few minutes ago. Both paragraphs have been approved. Therefore, when all the paragraphs of a resolution are approved, there is no need to put to a vote the resolution as a whole. The authors of the resolution did not insist on doing so.

206. Mr. MUÑOZ (Argentina) (*translated from Spanish*): I think the representative of Thailand is right. In accordance with rule 130 of the rules of procedure the Committee must vote on the draft resolution as a whole. A separate vote has been taken on the various parts of the resolution, in accordance with rule 130, the fourth sentence of which reads: "If the motion for division is carried, those parts of the proposal or of the amendment which are subsequently approved shall be put to the vote as a whole." I therefore think that the Committee is obliged to vote on the draft resolution as a whole.

207. The CHAIRMAN: I think that the representative of Argentina is right. But what has happened until now is that this rule really is only in force when some of the paragraphs are approved and others are not. But when all the paragraphs are approved, it does not seem necessary to have a vote as a whole. However, if any representative desires it, and if the representative of Argentina insists, I will do so.

208. Mr. URQUIA (El Salvador) (*translated from Spanish*): I agree with the Chairman's first remark, which he has just confirmed in replying to the Argentine representative. Since the two paragraphs of the draft resolution have been adopted, it would be super-

¹ The definitive text of the draft resolution presented by Australia and the Philippines was issued subsequently as document A/C.1/L.101/Rev.1.

fluous to vote on the draft resolution as a whole, in accordance with the usual practice followed by the United Nations, as the Chairman rightly said. There is, too, another very obvious reason: the two parts of the joint draft resolution are not interconnected; each is absolutely independent of the other, like two separate resolutions. I regard the Argentine representative's point of view purely as one of form, because a rule of procedure says that when we have voted on the parts of a proposal we must then vote on the whole. But there is a reason for that rule of procedure: when the various parts of a draft resolution constituting a single whole have been voted on, the proposal must of necessity be voted on as a whole. In this case, however, as Mr. Muñoz will note, each paragraph is absolutely independent of the other; they refer to different matters. Each, therefore, has been approved, but if both paragraphs are to form one single draft resolution, it would be difficult to apply the rules of procedure automatically, because I do not think that that is the way it is done in the United Nations.

209. I therefore think that the Chairman's first idea was the most correct and the most legal one, because this is a legal matter, since it is a question of the interpretation and application of the rules of procedure.

210. I appeal to the Chairman to maintain his position unless a formal motion is submitted to the contrary or the representative of Argentina challenges what may be interpreted as a decision of the Chairman, when in reply to the question by the representative of Thailand which prompted the Argentine representative's statement, he announced that the voting had been completed.

211. The CHAIRMAN (*translated from Spanish*): The representative of Argentina has said that he will not press his point.

212. Prince WAN WAITHAYAKON (Thailand): The Chairman had not announced that the voting was

over. I had a point in mind, and I am not theoretical about it. I am not going to take up the matter of rules, because I know the rules very well. But it is a practical question. I abstained on the first paragraph and now I am prepared to vote in its favour if the whole draft resolution is put to the vote.

213. The CHAIRMAN: There is no point to this. If one delegation asks for a vote on the draft as a whole, we will put the vote as a whole. I do not think we should lose more time. The Committee will now vote on the draft resolution of El Salvador [A/C.1/L.103/Rev.1] as a whole.

The draft resolution as a whole was adopted by 47 votes to none, with 8 abstentions.

Programme of work of the Committee

214. The CHAIRMAN (*translated from French*): The First Committee has now concluded its consideration of items 20 and 68 of its agenda. It now has before it the following item: "Methods which might be used to maintain and strengthen international peace and security in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the Charter: report of the Collective Measures Committee".²

215. The Committee will now decide by a vote whether it wishes the next meeting to be held tomorrow or Friday afternoon.

A vote was taken by a show of hands.

216. The CHAIRMAN: A majority of the members voted in favour of having our next meeting on Friday afternoon. The Committee, therefore, will meet on Friday, 29 October, at 3 o'clock.

The meeting rose at 6.25 p.m.

² Item 19 on the agenda of the General Assembly.