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Chairman: Mr. Ismail FAHMY
(United Arab Republic).

AGENDA ITEMS 29, 30 AND 31

Question of general and complete disarmament:

(a) **Report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation
Committee on Disarmament (A/6951-DC/229;
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possible use of nuclear weapons and on the security
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**Urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear
tests: report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation
Committee on Disarmament (A/6951-DC/229)**

**Elimination of foreign military bases in the countries of
Asia, Africa and Latin America: report of the Conference
of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament
(A/6951-DC/229)**

1. The CHAIRMAN: As the Committee previously agreed
[1542nd meeting], we will now start the discussion on
agenda items 29, 30 and 31.

2. Mr. TOMOROWICZ (Poland): Our debate this year
encompasses the three problems of general and complete
disarmament, the urgent need for the suspension of nuclear
and thermonuclear tests, and the elimination of foreign
military bases in the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin
America. The fourth component of our usual disarmament
package, the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, is, as we
know, the subject of continued and far-advanced negotia-

tions with a view to the elaboration of a treaty. We all hope
that these negotiations will be finalized in the nearest
future, for the benefit of all of us.

3. Disarmament undoubtedly is of the greatest importance
to every country represented in this Committee. Poland,
whose very biological existence was threatened during the
last war, and which, in order to survive after the war, had to
mobilize the energies of each and every one of its citizens
on the vital task of rebuilding a country condemned by the
Nazis to oblivion, obviously is interested in the achievement
of this goal.

4. We aim at the achievement of disarmament. We see its
necessity, its promises. Being realists, we see its complexity.
From this arises our advocacy of partial measures and from
this arise our proposals and our attitude, both in the
conference of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Commit-
tee and in the United Nations.

5. This very same realism dictates to us tenacity in our
gradual but consistent quest for disarmament. We consider
that every step which slows down the armaments race,
every step which contributes to the liquidation of centres
of inflammation and thus to the lessening of tension, brings
us closer to comprehensive disarmament; just as denying
the value of such steps, opposing them, independently of
the premises on which opposition might be based, makes
comprehensive disarmament more remote.

6. We recognize the highly complicated technicalities
incorporated in every process of disarmament but, at the
same time, we are fully aware of the decisive role of the
subjective approach to the whole problem of disarmament,
of the existence of the will to disarm. In the absence of that
will, technicalities will be resorted to as excuses and
presented as insurmountable obstacles to any measures of
disarmament.

7. For years now, we have been discussing the question of
a comprehensive ban on the testing of nuclear weapons in
all environments. For years, opponents of such a ban have
been advancing the argument of on-the-spot inspection,
first with regard to tests in all environments. And then, in
1963, when the will to take action in the field of testing
manifested itself, it proved possible to conclude the
Moscow Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the
atmosphere, in outer space and under water. With the
signing of that Treaty, all technical arguments in respect of
the ban envisaged in the agreement were discontinued; they
were proved objectively to be not substantiated.

8. The arguments against the inclusion in the Treaty of
underground tests on the pretext of the need for an
elaborate system of on-the-spot inspection remained, and

are still being advanced. Was it because of the existence of those arguments that the Treaty did not include underground tests, or was it because of the omission of those tests that the arguments survived?

9. Today all evidence points to the necessity and urgency of extending the ban to underground tests. All evidence points to the existence of objective possibilities of detecting any such underground tests. Existing national means give all necessary guarantees of detection. An exchange of data between existing national seismic stations—an idea contained in the well-known Swedish proposals¹—is but one example of the possible solutions.

10. In these circumstances, the lack of agreement to ban underground tests can be attributed only to the absence of the will to conclude such an agreement. The fact that technical arguments are advanced continuously by the United States against the banning of underground tests suggests strongly that the United States is interested, in fact, in keeping open the possibilities of conducting underground tests. Yesterday's *New York Times* informs us that since 1963 the United States has conducted 117 underground nuclear weapon tests designed to perfect and enlarge its nuclear arsenal. The true purpose of United States objections to making the Treaty comprehensive was probably best explained by Senator Henry M. Jackson, Chairman of the Military Applications Sub-Committee of the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy, when he said: "Results are being attained that were previously thought impossible under the Treaty restrictions." He went on to say that by exploiting underground tests very significant advances had been made in weapons technology and in developing "new and radically different weapon design concepts". There we have military considerations dictating political unwillingness to agree to a comprehensive test ban; technical pretexts being used as a shield.

11. We believe that it is not only military considerations that stand in the way of disarmament. Obstacles to disarmament may, and do, spring from the very roots of the foreign policy of a given country when that policy was born out of political tension, developed as a function of tension and has become a function of the maintenance of that tension. Such is the case as regards the Federal Republic of Germany, which is building up its predominance in Western Europe upon the position it occupies as the most important strategic base of NATO. That intricate role, which has been so gladly accepted by the Bonn Government from the first day of its existence, has been used constantly both as a lever and as an instrument of pressure to boost its political, economic and military hegemony in Western Europe. There is no need to say that any more serious step towards disarmament, any relaxation of tension, would be incompatible with a national policy thus formulated.

12. Such a policy, by its nature, would, if anything, dictate active opposition to any disarmament measures. That active opposition has been manifested by the Bonn Government in every instance to both regional and general measures of disarmament. Bonn rejected the Rapacki and Gomulka plans, just as it bitterly attacked the Macmillan

proposals in 1959. It resisted the Moscow Treaty of 1963, just as it is in the forefront of the opposition to a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. The Federal Republic of Germany is the only country that has clamoured all along, with such vicious consistency and so openly, to enter into possession of nuclear armaments, as reaffirmed only a few days ago by Dr. Schroeder, the West German Defence Minister.

13. In the circumstances, it certainly would not be irrelevant to stress with the greatest anxiety the fact that the West German Army, to which a leading military role in the West has been attributed, is being thoroughly indoctrinated with Nazi books. The works of Hans Grimm, the preacher of the theory of *lebensraum* with quotations such as "Hitler was the greatest statesman that Europe has ever known", bought out of the budget of the West German Ministry of Defence, are being distributed to more than a thousand libraries in military barracks all over West Germany. To give just one other example, one might mention a book entitled *The Lost Campaign*, published in 1943 by the central publishing house of the Nazi Party (NSDAP) and reprinted in 1953 by the West German publishing house, National und Soldaten Zeitung.

14. We have permitted ourselves to take some of the time of the Committee on this matter not only because we are immediate neighbours of Germany and experienced, not a long time ago, the atrocities of a world war, but also because West German policy is an important factor obstructing positive action on disarmament. However, it fits well within the broad framework of strategic thinking and outdated military doctrines which directly counteract all the efforts and concrete proposals aimed at the implementation of General Assembly resolution 1378 (XIV) of 20 November 1959.

15. It is not difficulties of a technical nature but adherence to the policy from a position of strength which, throughout all these eight years, has rendered impossible the attainment of more concrete results in comprehensive measures of disarmament proposed on so many occasions by the Government of the Soviet Union. It is that policy which dictates the strategy of the so-called "local" wars, designed to maintain or establish, through the use of force, the position and interests of the aggressive Power. That strategy not only constitutes a flagrant violation of the principles of the Charter and brings immense suffering to the peoples who happen to be subjected to that strategy but also is immensely dangerous to the cause of peace.

16. The most striking example of such wars, with their mechanics of escalation and their disastrous consequences, is in Viet-Nam. The fact that the weight of bombs dropped in Viet-Nam by United States forces exceeds the tonnage dropped by the United States on the Axis Powers of Europe in the Second World War demonstrates that there are no limits to escalation, which can easily lead to a holocaust. That is where the policy from the position of strength leads.

17. It is that policy and that strategy which dictate the tendency to establish, maintain and develop a network of military bases in foreign territories, both dependent and independent.

¹ See *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1965*, document DC/227, annex 1, sect. B.

18. It is not deterrence—which by its nature implies an ever-increasing armaments race, in the field of nuclear weapons in particular—that can constitute a basis for peace, for the danger of the armaments race is increasing with each passing day. Its dimensions are ominously described in the report of the Secretary-General:

“There is one inescapable and basic fact. It is that the nuclear armouries which are in being already contain large megaton weapons every one of which has a destructive power greater than that of all the conventional explosive that has ever been used in warfare since the day gunpowder was discovered. Were such weapons ever to be used in numbers, hundreds of millions of people might be killed, and civilization as we know it, as well as organized community life, would inevitably come to an end in the countries involved in the conflict.” [*A/6858 and Corr.1, para. 1.*]

19. It was with that in mind that we welcomed and supported the initiative taken by the Soviet Union for the speedy conclusion of a convention prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons.

20. The report of the Secretary-General does not stop at indicating the extreme gravity of the menace of the nuclear arms race, although that is an extremely valuable aspect of the report, for we agree with the Secretary-General that the gravity of that menace has all but been lost through repetition. The value of the report goes further, in that it demonstrates, on the one hand, the deadly vicious circle into which the concept of deterrence may lead the nuclear weapon States and, on the other hand, the futility in military and security terms, and the prohibitive cost in economic terms, for countries which might envisage entering the nuclear arms race. The report:

“...unhesitatingly concludes... that whatever the path to national and international security in the future, it is certainly not to be found in the further spread and elaboration of nuclear weapons... And the longer the world waits, the more nuclear arsenals grow, the greater and more difficult becomes the eventual task.” [*Ibid., para. 94.*]

21. The Polish delegation, together with the delegations of Canada, Japan, Mexico, Nigeria and Norway, had the honour to initiate at the last session of the General Assembly the study which is now before the Committee. We are happy to note that the Secretary-General, with the assistance of consultant experts appointed in accordance with General Assembly resolution 2162 A (XXI), has now presented to us a report which is simple in language, precise in fact and telling in its conclusions. We should like to express our gratitude to the Secretary-General and the consultant experts for the preparation of this important document. The report constitutes a most valuable contribution to the understanding and knowledge of the problem. It can thus play an important role in rallying support and encouraging progress towards nuclear disarmament and the achievement of our goal—general and complete disarmament.

22. With those considerations in mind, the Polish delegation, together with the delegation of Canada, is at present engaged in consultations on a draft resolution providing for the fullest and widest dissemination of the report.

23. We started discussion on general and complete disarmament eight years ago. The necessity of arriving at comprehensive results is today infinitely more urgent. It stems from the upward spiral of armaments and their growing sophistication. Our present and future security imposes upon us the obligation to mobilize all means at our disposal to overcome existing obstacles of a subjective nature which, up to now, have unfortunately succeeded in barring any measure of major importance towards general and complete disarmament.

24. As a non-nuclear State, Poland realizes the particular necessity to act promptly and effectively. Non-nuclear countries have everything to lose and nothing to gain from the nuclear armaments race. They have everything to gain and nothing to lose from stopping the nuclear armaments race and the further proliferation of nuclear weapons. We dare not submit ourselves idly to an imposed process of stabilizing peace by means of the arms race. Such a peace could offer no guarantee except that of an increasing danger.

25. Our debate this year has been held against the background of what we all hope is the final stage in the elaboration of a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. We in Poland will welcome most warmly the conclusion of such a treaty. The encouraging fact of the negotiations on the treaty cannot but give new emphasis to redoubled efforts towards progress in general and complete disarmament, where we have unfortunately been, and still are, trailing behind the process of weapons development.

26. To quote once more the report of the Secretary-General:

“...informed people the world over understandably become impatient for measures of disarmament additional to the few measures of arms limitation that have already been agreed to...”. [*Ibid.*]

27. It is for us to see that we lose no more time.

28. Mrs. MYRDAL (Sweden): The Member States participating in the work of this Committee must not only be ready to speak but eager to speak as we have been waiting through many long weeks to raise our voices in anguish about the whole question of disarmament, and particularly about the unreasonable course in which developments in regard to nuclear weapons are continuing without cessation.

29. The Swedish delegation, itself a member of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee, shares the regret, or even outright frustration, caused by the delay in that Committee's submitting its annually expected report and by the fact that, now it has arrived, it provides us with such a meagre basis for our deliberations.

30. We are fully aware that the item on which progress is stalled is the one concerned with non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, but also that this is the first one where we have reasons to hope to obtain, somewhat later, the most substantive recommendations. On that item, with both its sub-items, it would certainly, I submit, be premature to open any debate here in the absence of a report from the Disarmament Committee, which, once it is completed, should bring us significant steps forward and become the

focus for a major debate, offering to all United Nations Member States an opportunity to participate.

31. The Swedish delegation deems it important that we should utilize the short time still available to us to express at least our most general concern about the perspectives in the field of international disarmament and, more specifically, take action on agenda item 29 (b), the report of the Secretary-General on the effects of the possible use of nuclear weapons and on the security and economic implications for States of the acquisition and further development of these weapons [A/6858 and Corr.1]. That highly valuable report has not been channelled through the Eighteen-Nation Committee. The report itself, so rich in substance, is not only of extraordinary importance, but also calls for urgent consideration.

32. I intend today to make some comments on that sub-item, while reserving my right to make a separate statement on the test-ban issue, that is on the agenda item labelled "The urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermo-nuclear tests".

33. In the immediate context of the general debate which your decision, Mr. Chairman, has opened to us, I first want briefly to plead that we, the Member States of the United Nations, stop and think of what is happening to the whole question of disarmament. It has been with us, as a most burning issue, from the very first session of the Assembly, now more than twenty years ago. The whole history of our deliberations might well be depicted as one of a serial of lost opportunities—with a few brighter exceptions such as the Moscow Treaty of 1963 on a partial test ban and the outer space Treaty adopted last year as resolution 2222 (XX).

34. Looking back specifically to the records of last year's proceedings of this Committee, we find that they constitute a *florilegium* of expressions of the firmest confidence that we were just about to achieve a veritable breakthrough. At least one measure aimed at halting the nuclear arms race, namely a non-proliferation treaty, was hailed as being practically within reach.

35. That great tide of optimism is, I regret to say, largely spent as we now again embark on a disarmament debate. Not only are we less certain about the final emergence of the special measures on which the somewhat euphoric debate centred a year ago and on which the long labours of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee have been concentrated during this whole year. What is more important, it seems to me, is the general darkening of the situation. While disarmament talks have dragged on, factual developments have moved in the direction of turning the spiral of the nuclear armaments race upward, steeply and perhaps irrevocably upward.

36. It is not possible, I find, to exclude from a speech on disarmament here in the United Nations a reference to the recent news of further development of nuclear devices for military purposes on the part of both the super-Powers. Contrary to the hope of all humanity, the Governments of the main Powers have not been able to commence discussions even on a mutual restraint in as far as the development and deployment of nuclear missiles and

anti-missile missiles is concerned. Both Powers seem to have gone ahead instead with decisions to pour more money into the further refinement and enlargement of their capabilities in regard to strategic nuclear weapons, both in the defensive and the offensive category. This cannot but have a very unfortunate and discouraging psychological effect. Perhaps it is already undercutting the hopes that this generation, which, in the political sphere, is sensing a lessening of the risks of a war between the super-Powers, should also see them entering upon a course of gradual nuclear disarmament. There can be no purpose in hiding the sombre truth that signs point in the opposite, the negative, direction in regard to the nuclear armaments race between them. This has already been absorbed by public opinion in all our countries, thus greatly contributing to the malaise which is now such a dominating mood of mankind.

37. But accelerating the armaments race is so obviously not a course dictated by reason. Judged by any criteria of rationality and objectivity, neither national security nor international security is enhanced by the continued build-up of the military systems of the super-Powers. I might quote eloquent testimonies to the lack of sense in this open-end race according to the action-reaction formula, as for example most recently expressed by the United States Secretary of Defense, Mr. McNamara.

38. The deterrence would be as effective, and probably more so, at a lower level of nuclear armaments and certainly less wasteful of financial and technological resources which the world sorely needs for constructive purposes. Many a time I entertain a thought, which is in depth, I submit, not as irreverent as it may superficially look, that this new phase of the nuclear arms race is not motivated by any real or even by any perceived military threat but is to a considerable degree just a quasi-automatic result of the competitive urge of great Powers never to forgo a weapon which could be contrived in order to surpass the achievements of the other major Power. That element of competition, of suspense, is equally prevalent in what is also aptly called the "space race". It becomes, of course, so much more dangerous and more wasteful when it is a race to achieve the most refined implements of mass destruction.

39. I have wanted to sketch the present situation with these few words, as I believe it is highly important that we see the disarmament issue as a whole, that we sense it as a tremendous challenge to us to turn to a course of reason. It becomes more and more urgent that the disarmament problems should be attacked along a broad frontier encompassing, as the Swedish Government has constantly upheld, measures for restriction of nuclear armaments on the part of nuclear-weapon Powers as well as of would-be nuclear-weapon Powers. The Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament should have before it, when it reconvenes after this Assembly, a list of several concrete steps on the progress which must be made within the nearest future—if what is already late is not to become too late.

40. Turning now to the Secretary-General's report on the effect on nuclear weapons [A/6858 and Corr.1], may I begin by paying a very high tribute to all who have been concerned with that report, in the first instance to the Secretary-General, for the original initiative in proposing

such a study as well as his endorsing of the final report, and to the twelve distinguished experts who have participated in the work. They have undertaken such a scrupulous and objective analysis of the real meaning of atomic war, and have provided us with an excellent summary, brief in form but very weighty in content. As a matter of fact, I also want to congratulate the whole international community on the fine spirit of harmony and co-operation which marks the report. Of course, such positive and consequently creative co-operation comes naturally to experts. That in itself is a fact of which we have as yet not taken full account. It indicates that when the debate unfolds on the level of reason, differences in national outlook do not function as obstacles, however sensitive and controversial the issue. We can only hope that the leaders of nations might find this same road to agreements, agreements which must come to seem natural, yes, unavoidable, as soon as the statesmen take rational cognizance of the disastrous consequences of nuclear weapons.

41. In order that effective steps shall begin to be taken towards dismantling that fearful implement of death, this report is timely—if not overdue. Can we ever move out from this new era where the world lives under a sign which the zodiac has so far not provided for—a thirteenth monster of ill omen?

42. So far, the strategic debate has tended to deal with concepts such as mutual deterrence, first and second strikes, and overkill capacity, which seem so highly theoretical that the material realities involved are easily overlooked. The experts' report gives us a healthy briefing on these realities. Statesmen are told what a country will suffer from a nuclear attack in terms of eliminated fractions or even majorities of the population, crippled industrial and commercial life and collapsed functions of the society. Generals are told about chaos beyond imagination resulting from battle-field use of tactical nuclear weapons, possibly halting all military operations. Local authorities are told that regions and cities chosen as nuclear targets will cease to function as organized units for economic life.

43. The man in the street is told what might happen to him, his home and his family, ranging from complete annihilation at ground zeros through a frightful spectrum of death, burns, wounds, shock and fire.

44. Finally, world public opinion is told about sufferings of long-term radioactive irradiation including "a genetic burden which would become manifest in the disabilities of later generations". [*A/6858 and Corr.1, para. 1.*] The report states specifically that the so-called "clean" bomb will produce a considerable amount of the very long-lived isotope carbon-14 with a half-life of 5,800 years. The immediate effect of that isotope will be low, but it will soon be uniformly mixed into the natural carbon cycle and become an inescapable source of internal irradiation within all living matter for more than a thousand generations. Lack of information about radio-genetics has so far prohibited reliable calculations about genetic damage. But so much is known that an all-out nuclear war will induce important changes in the gene-pool of homo sapiens. We cannot forecast what the characteristics will be of the resulting variant species of man if and when such debilities are caused.

45. Sweden has had the honour to contribute not only the knowledgeable participation of one of the twelve wise men but also a fairly considerable amount of fresh data. According to a tradition which we seek to establish, my Government is particularly willing to expose knowledge which in many other countries is kept classified. Thus, we have not only published but actively publicized a report with up-to-date data on bacteriological, chemical and telecommunications warfare. In this connexion I venture to mention that the Swedish Government would wish an initiative to be taken for a study, within the framework of the United Nations and as a sequel to the present report, on the problems concerning the chemical and biological means of warfare, which may constitute a grave danger of new kinds of war carrying whole populations to the very precipice of annihilation.

46. Guided by the same principle of laying bare the dangers of armaments developments to the public at large, we have made a very thorough-going study of the consequences, under varied detailed assumptions, of nuclear attacks on Swedish cities. I happen to have seen the original data, in all their grimness, as referring to my own birthplace, the university town of Uppsala, where alternative assumptions were made about the attack occurring during day-time or night-time, working day or holiday, after due warning or without sufficient warning.

47. One set of generalized conclusions from the Swedish study is given in the experts' report, namely that

"... an attack carried out with about 200 weapons, ranging from 20 kilotons to 200 kilotons in yield, would result in 2 to 3 million casualties, i.e. 30 to 40 per cent of the total population of about 7 million people. It also showed that between 30 to 70 per cent of Swedish industry would be destroyed, and that about two thirds of the industrial workers would receive fatal or severe injuries" [*A/6858 and Corr.1, para. 27*].

48. The immense potentialities of destruction, as given in the Swedish example, might, however, be considerably reduced if appropriate precautionary measures can be undertaken. The conditions prevailing in Sweden have enabled us to prepare such measures pertaining, in the first place, to an evacuation of citizens not absolutely needed for war efforts and, secondly, to the construction of underground shelters for the remaining population in the cities and for essential industries. Our endeavours in regard to civilian defence, which amounts to what is probably the most comprehensive system as yet built, have required tens of years of work and hundreds of millions of dollars in expenditure. If we could assume that the measures so prepared would give full effect, the casualty lists cited in the report are calculated to be reduced from 2 to 3 million down to 200,000 to 300,000. There exists, however, an irony of war, which makes it impossible to foresee with any certitude whether such more optimistic forecasts; based on defense measures carefully pre-planned, will prevail over the more pessimistic ones, related as they are to the confusion which might result from the shock of war operations.

49. It may, of course, be admitted that the description of nuclear weapon effects given in the report does not produce findings or conclusions essentially different from what could have been known before. However, the systematic

presentation of these findings in a cool analytical style does open the subject from a new angle, hopefully strengthening the existing hesitation to launch a nuclear war.

50. If there has up to now been any speculation in the minds of anybody that perhaps there could be a winner in a nuclear war, and perhaps a chance of civilized survival after a nuclear attack, such speculations should now be impossible.

51. The experts also provide us with an analysis of the economic implications of the acquisition of nuclear weapons. As shown in the report, independent manufacture of nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles will present a country with a necessity to reserve a considerable scientific, technical and industrial capability for this purpose. For any country the basic research will take time and the basic investment will be large. Still, these obstacles, although great, may not alone be enough to prevent new additions to the nuclear club. According to the report, six countries, other than the present nuclear weapon Powers, would be in a position to contemplate an added expenditure for development of a modest nuclear arm without reallocating a major part of their technical resources from constructive research and development activities. The same six appear to be the only ones capable of finding the necessary resources to set up a small high-quality nuclear military force.

52. There are, however, reservations in order in regard to these conclusions of the report. They are valid only if independent manufacture is the one alternative open; that is, only if non-dissemination of nuclear weapons as such is made an established principle for international behaviour. If it were possible freely to buy atomic bombs on the world market, then one country could rely on other countries' basic research and investments, thus making the bombs cheaper for all. Therefore, the present policy of the nuclear weapon Powers not to transfer nuclear weapons into the control of non-nuclear weapon countries is an important measure to stop the spread of nuclear weapons. As I have repeated many a time, an international treaty to that effect was within reach at least a year ago, and might, although restricted in scope, have been used as a stepping-stone. However, it is, of course, not a sufficiently prohibitive one. The important margin of six States, now non-nuclear weapon ones, but capable of raising the necessary resources to become nuclear weapon Powers, has to be covered by a non-proliferation agreement. The effect of such an agreement can be extended even to States remaining as non-signatories by prescribing International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards on transfers to them from all signatories, as Sweden has proposed in the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee in regard to the control article in a non-proliferation treaty. The potential capabilities of IAEA safeguards for cutting off fissionable material supplies of foreign origin thus becomes an important possibility for plugging any loop-holes for the manufacture of atomic bombs.

53. Another effective feature of the economic analysis in the report is the demonstration of the big gap which exists between the entry to the nuclear club, that is, the firing of a first shot, and achieving the capability of fighting a nuclear war. This gap is now widening so much that it clearly diminishes the status value of nuclear-club member-

ship justified some ten or fifteen years ago. It also demonstrates the difference between super-Powers, second class nuclear weapon Powers, and newly recruited club members. This, in turn, makes the difference between nuclear and non-nuclear weapon Powers, and between some of them and the potential aspirants, much vaguer than a decade ago. Only the super-Powers are in fact capable of keeping up the race. In the view of the Swedish Government, such conclusions very much strengthen the justification for extending the application of disarmament measures, such as the prohibition against proliferation, into the domain of the nuclear weapon Powers themselves.

54. Finally, the experts, in a conclusive way, present the security implications of making and possessing nuclear weapons as being often, and perhaps always, mistaken ones. They "unhesitatingly" conclude:

"from the considerations that have been set out that whatever the path to national and international security in the future, it is certainly not to be found in the further spread and elaboration of nuclear weapons" [*A/6858 and Corr.1, para. 94*].

And I stress the word "elaboration".

55. This conclusion is supported by a flood of arguments. The report also defines the central issue involved:

"The ultimate question for the world to decide in our nuclear age—and this applies both to nuclear and non-nuclear Powers—is what short-term interests it is prepared to sacrifice in exchange for an assurance of survival and security." [*Ibid., para. 42*].

The close interdependence of the security of nuclear and non-nuclear weapon countries is duly stressed.

56. The report does not set out to prescribe any ways for achieving a higher degree of true national and world security; this obviously was beyond their mandate. Non-proliferation, a comprehensive test ban, a reduction of existing stocks of nuclear weapons, guarantees and nuclear-free zones are enumerated as measures of major assistance. But in the report

"These measures are mentioned neither to argue the case for them nor to set them in any order of priority." [*Ibid., para. 93*].

Be that as it may, the report itself is a very strong argument for several and preferably all such measures to be undertaken urgently.

57. While the experts have not made any specific recommendations to the Governments of the world, the duty falling to the statesmen responsible for world development is nevertheless strongly visible. These statesmen should not be able to overlook the considered view of the experts that a continued nuclear arms race will decrease national and world security, withdraw money urgently needed for other purposes and increase the risk of a nuclear war which no doubt would make "ground-zero" the adequate descriptive term for what might come to happen to our civilization.

58. The CHAIRMAN: I call on the representative of Pakistan on a point of order.

59. Mr. SHAHI (Pakistan): Mr. Chairman, in the statement you made at the 1542nd meeting of this Committee held on 7 December 1967 you proposed:

“that the Committee should take simultaneously agenda items 29, 30 and 31—item 29, the question of general and complete disarmament with its two sub-items, item 30 dealing with the urgent need for the suspension of nuclear and thermo-nuclear tests, and item 31 dealing with the elimination of foreign military bases, etc.” [1542nd meeting, para. 2].

You also urged representatives:

“to make statements—either one statement or more if they wish—on these three items. This does not prevent the Committee from adopting more than one draft resolution on these items” [ibid., para. 3].

60. In the statement you made, Mr. Chairman, at the 1544th meeting held on 8 December 1967 you expressed the hope that this Committee would be able to “complete the work on all our items by next Friday” [1544th meeting, para. 121].

61. Among the agenda items on this Committee’s agenda is item 28, “Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons: (a) Report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament; and (b) Report of the Preparatory Committee for the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States”.

62. We have before us with reference to this agenda item, the Interim Report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament [A/6951-DC/229], and we also have the report of the Preparatory Committee for the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States [A/6817].

63. In the name of my delegation I would request that time be allotted for the discussion of agenda item 28 with its two sub-headings and that separate meetings should be set aside for our discussion of these two sub-items under item 28.

64. Mr. NSANZE (Burundi) (*translated from French*): I asked to speak in order to support the motion just made by the representative of Pakistan. The chief reasons leading my delegation to support the motion are quite clear. As the Committee knows, the young nations in particular and the third-world nations in general have preoccupations which are somewhat different from those of certain big Powers that are already at the nuclear level. In our view the general debate on agenda item 28 should cover also the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States—a question which was raised earlier—because these States have a first-priority concern, which is to achieve economic development in order to avoid being rushed into membership of the nuclear club.

65. These, briefly, are the reasons why I support the motion of the representative of Pakistan.

66. Mr. BAROODY (Saudi Arabia): It will be recalled that, last year, the proposal to convene a conference of non-nuclear-weapon States received forty-eight votes. It is rather strange that this year there seems to be silence in some quarters about taking up the report of the Prepara-

tory Committee for the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States [A/6817]. The emphasis is being placed on the non-proliferation treaty, as is indicated in the report of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament [A/6951-DC/229].

67. It is no secret that the super-Powers have been communicating with many small Powers—most of them non-nuclear-weapon Powers—asking them to consider favourably the question of adhering to the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. We—and I am talking now of Saudi Arabia—do not manufacture any weapons at all. I believe that the majority of Asian and African States—and I dare say the Latin American States—are not manufacturers or producers even of sophisticated conventional weapons, not to mention nuclear weapons. Why should that resolution which was adopted last year by forty-eight votes be relegated to oblivion? If my good friend, the representative of Pakistan, had not raised that question, that would have been the result.

68. Why should we, the small Powers, those that are non-nuclear, just blindly huddle behind the super-Powers without being given an opportunity to exchange views and clarify issues and see how they affect us? Do the super-Powers have a monopoly on good sense? Perhaps they have a monopoly, but it is only a monopoly of certain secrets and of the weapons which, as our good colleague from Sweden just mentioned in her statement, are known to be so destructive that they could perhaps put an end to civilization. The representative of Sweden spoke for most of us in this regard. The small Powers may not be in a position to produce nuclear weapons, but this does not preclude their having as much wisdom and good sense as the super-Powers.

69. Therefore, it stands to reason that the community of nations should encourage the discussion of this item, with a view to having all Powers meet to discuss things, exchange views and consolidate some position before they are—I do not want to use the word “pressured”—before they are persuaded to affix their signatures to a non-proliferation treaty which has the two super-Powers behind it. If I am not mistaken, this is the first time in twenty years that I have found a document here signed by those two super-Powers, namely the document which is the interim report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. This is very encouraging, very laudable, it is true. But those super-Powers should give us small Powers a chance too. Therefore, not only do I second what my good friend from Pakistan said—and he also received the support of the representative of Burundi—but I also wish to take the liberty of urging this Committee, Mr. Chairman, to give favourable consideration to the item that has been brought to your attention.

70. Mr. LAI (Malaysia): Without entering into the substance of item 28, my delegation would like to add our support to the proposal just put forward by the representative of Pakistan. We think it is reasonable to request that item 28 be taken up together with items 29, 30 and 31, all of which are matters covered by the report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. Certainly, in the humble opinion of my delegation, items 29, 30 and 31 are no more relevant to the interim report of the Eighteen-Nation Committee than is item 28.

71. Mr. ILLANES (Chile) (*translated from Spanish*): The delegation of Chile shares the view expressed by the speakers who have preceded us in recommending to the Committee that we may be allowed to consider, either together with or following the items we are now examining, item 28 concerning the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. We are interested, in particular, in having the report of the Preparatory Committee for the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States—which is before us in document A/6817—studied by this Committee.

72. Chile is a member of that Preparatory Committee, and during the present year we have worked to prepare a group of recommendations which we consider worthy of this Committee's attention. It would be very strange if we were not to have the opportunity to discuss this item, and if this work should be left in a kind of limbo.

73. Last year we supported General Assembly resolution 2153 (XXI). We did so in the conviction that the initiative of holding a conference of non-nuclear weapons States was a constructive step towards speeding up the attainment of the objective of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, on the one hand, and, on the other, towards eliciting and harmonizing the views of the non-nuclear countries on such important problems connected with non-proliferation as guarantees of the security of those States against a nuclear threat and full access to the technology and benefits of the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, and others of equal importance.

74. Therefore, we believe that the Conference is of the greatest importance for the non-nuclear weapons countries and that holding this Conference will help to speed up the process of non-proliferation. We also believe that any treaty which may be signed on this question will be more satisfactory and will have a more meaningful permanent effect than it would if the Conference were not held.

75. For these reasons, we firmly support the proposal just made by the representative of Pakistan.

76. Mr. NABWERA (Kenya): In supporting the motion made by the representative of Pakistan, I should like to point out to the Committee that the relevant resolution under which the report was prepared said specifically that the Conference will have to be held not later than July 1968. For this reason my delegation feels that it is important that the Committee set a time for the discussion of item 28, (a) and (b), so that a decision may be made and we can go ahead.

77. Mr. VINCI (Italy): I should like to add a few comments to those made by the previous speakers on the point of order that has been raised by the representative of Pakistan.

78. As we all know, the problem of how to deal with the various items connected with disarmament has been the subject of endless consultations among the members of the First Committee. We believe that the suggestion made by you, Mr. Chairman, several meetings back, of considering the items discussed in Geneva to the extent that they have been covered by the interim report of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee [A/6951-DC/229] represented a

sound and correct decision. It could not have been otherwise, in view of the very concise nature of that document.

79. The point of order raised by the representative of Pakistan, however, brings up a very relevant problem, in our view, namely that of how to deal with the matter that has been the subject of resolution 2153 B (XXI), adopted at the twenty-first session of the General Assembly, the subject of intensive efforts by an *ad hoc* committee, and the subject of a report which all of us have no doubt studied. I refer, of course, to the report of the Preparatory Committee for the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States [A/6817].

80. We are fully aware of the fact that, from a technical point of view, this report appears under item 28, namely the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, which, it has been suggested, should not be taken up now because of the advanced stage of the negotiations going on in Geneva with the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee. In this regard we wish to make two special remarks.

81. First, it would create a most dangerous precedent, no matter what the circumstances are, simply to ignore a report produced by a Committee established by a General Assembly resolution.

82. Second, it has been our constant contention that the problems of disarmament, be they of a nuclear or a conventional nature, be they considered in Geneva or elsewhere, represent a whole which cannot be divided into its component parts without a serious risk of missing what should be the right and most constructive approach to a solution. Taking up these problems in a piece-meal fashion is like looking at the tree and not seeing the forest.

83. For these reasons, we expressed reservations about the advisability of isolating the problem of the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons from the context of general and complete disarmament. For the same reason, we feel that the three items at present on the agenda of the First Committee could be more usefully considered if we had in mind and made proper reference to nuclear proliferation, as has already been done this morning by previous speakers.

84. Even in the absence of a detailed report from the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee, we feel that we cannot ignore the report of the Preparatory Committee for the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States [A/6817]. I say this without committing ourselves at this stage, of course, on its contents and its recommendations. We will come to that later when we discuss the substance of the question. But the report in question is a most valuable document, in our view, which deserves our consideration in order that we may find out how its recommendations can be fitted into the complex procedure which we hope will lead us to the objective of general and complete disarmament, both nuclear and conventional.

85. Finally, I wish to say that we have with this statement expressed our preference for a wholesome and thorough discussion of all the items, including the report of the Preparatory Committee for the Conference of non-nuclear Powers, but if you, Mr. Chairman, should find from your

consultations that it would be more useful and at the same time more appropriate to have special meetings, as suggested by the representative of Pakistan, we will abide by your decision.

86. Mr. SIMBULE (Zambia): My delegation also feels strongly about the point raised by the representative of Pakistan. My delegation believes that items on the subject of disarmament should be given most serious consideration, and that means that non-nuclear Powers should have a greater say in the deliberations on this matter. Zambia does not have the material or the know-how for the manufacture of nuclear weapons, but we also feel that we are in a better position to make an objective analysis and to offer advice on this matter. For these reasons, we welcome the point raised by the representative of Pakistan.

87. Finally, my delegation is rather disappointed to see that the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee does not seem to have made progress, but we hope that its final report will spell out the practical measures suggested by both the nuclear and the non-nuclear Powers on that Committee.

88. The CHAIRMAN: Before giving the floor to the next speaker, I should like to clarify the situation as I see it in the light of the point of order raised by the representative of Pakistan and supported by some delegations.

89. According to the point of order raised by the representative of Pakistan, he requested the Chair to set a time for the discussion of item 28. In view of the very few days at our disposal, and in view of the fact that the Committee has agreed that we should discuss three items simultaneously, I believe that it will not be feasible, and perhaps not possible, for the Chair to set a fixed time for the discussion of item 28. It is not feasible, but not because I do not want to accommodate the wishes expressed by the representative of Pakistan and others, but because I cannot visualize now when the Committee will be able to dispose of the three items. As the Committee will have noticed, this morning we had only two speakers. Not only that, but I have already received two draft resolutions, and, as the Polish representative said in his statement, I expect a third draft resolution, and possibly more, on the three items. Therefore, I hope that the representative of Pakistan will understand that I cannot set a fixed time to discuss item 28.

90. After the statement made by the representative of Pakistan, and after the statements made in support of him, I feel that there is a slight difference between his proposal and those of those who supported him, or at least, some of them. For instance, the representative of Malaysia is of the opinion that we should take item 28 together with the three items we have already agreed to take together. I think the representative of Chile supported this idea too. I am not sure whether, if the proposal of the representative of Malaysia is acceptable to the Committee, this will satisfy the representative of Pakistan. What I can assure the representative of Pakistan and other delegations here is that I will see to it that all remaining items on disarmament will be disposed of by this Committee and, I am sure, by the General Assembly, before we adjourn.

91. How we are going to dispose of these items, and in which form, I cannot foretell at this stage. In the light of

this explanation, I seek more advice from the Committee on the two proposals, one made by the representative of Pakistan and the other by the representative of Malaysia. If the Committee agrees to the proposal made by the representative of Malaysia, then I think the situation could be very easily facilitated. But the Committee, in doing so, would be reversing a previous decision which it made on 7 December [1542nd meeting]. Moreover, reference was made to the fact that it might be possible to take up sub-item (b) of item 28 now. I do not believe that this would be a wise procedure, and it might create a serious precedent. Therefore, the only way out before this Committee is to agree or not to agree to take up simultaneously item 28 and the three items which we agreed to take up as of this morning.

92. I should like to add that I do not intend to curtail the freedom of any representative who speaks on the three items—that is, 29, 30 and 31—to refer to any question related to disarmament, including the non-proliferation treaty or even the Conference. In fact, as you all know, the representative of Poland referred this morning to the non-proliferation treaty and its importance.

93. Mr. CORREA DO LAGO (Brazil): I was going to support the proposal made by the representative of Pakistan, but I have listened to your comments, Mr. Chairman, on your difficulty in fixing a date for the discussion of item 28. However, my delegation feels that, in view of the approaching adjournment of this Committee, we should decide when to take up that important item on our agenda. I heard also that you were inclined to put to the Committee the suggestion made by the representative of Malaysia that we might take item 28 together with items 29, 30 and 31. In these circumstances, I just wish to add that I am inclined to think we should follow the procedure mentioned by you at the end of your last intervention.

94. Mr. SHAHI (Pakistan): My suggestion that item 28 (a) and (b) should be discussed in separate meetings was intended to facilitate the orderly transaction of the business of this Committee and to prevent diffuseness of discussion. However, if it is your view, as having responsibility for the orderly conduct of the proceedings of this Committee, that item 28 should be discussed along with the other items now under discussion, as proposed by the representative of Malaysia, that proposal is acceptable to my delegation.

95. Mr. FISHER (United States of America): Mr. Chairman, a few days ago you indicated that, because of the special circumstances relating to the work of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, a decision must be taken regarding the order in which the Committee would consider the various disarmament items. The Committee then decided to consider three of those items—that is, items 29, 30 and 31. We are now engaged in considering those items and I would point out that no objections were raised to your decision at the time it was made. It was a decision adopted with apparent unanimity by this body and it was made on the basis of the fact that the non-proliferation treaty, which is an integral part of item 28, is still under intensive discussion by the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, as pointed out in the report of that Committee—a report which is made not just by the two co-Chairmen but, as is indicated therein, by the two

co-Chairmen on behalf of the Conference: that is, all its participating members.

96. Therefore I would urge that you adhere to the previous order and I wish to make it perfectly clear that when we have completed our consideration of these items we shall, of course, have no objection to the Committee's taking up—and indeed we propose that it should take up—both parts of item 28.

97. Mr. ETIANG (Uganda): If I have understood the representative of the United States correctly, his intervention implies the complete reverse of what the Chairman has just indicated to us—namely, the difficulty in fixing a definite time for separate consideration of item 28. I should like to appeal to the representative of the United States not to insist on the order he has proposed, which would appear to be impossible if we are to continue discussion in the order previously agreed by the Committee. In the light of present developments it has become certain that it will not be possible to fix a definite time for the discussion of item 28, which we and certain other delegations feel very strongly should be discussed. I appeal to the representative of the United States, therefore, not to insist on what he has just said.

98. Mr. MENDELEVICH (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translated from Russian*): May I state our views concerning the position in the Committee and the most appropriate way to proceed. We are now considering three items of the agenda: 29, 30 and 31. Following the Chairman's proposal, the Committee decided at its 1542nd meeting to consider those three items together, with the possible adoption of one or more resolutions.

99. When the Chairman made that proposal and when the Committee took its decision on 7 December, no delegation had any doubts that that decision was a correct and sensible one. Had there been any such doubts delegations would certainly have expressed them and we should have been able to argue them out.

100. I repeat, at that time not a single delegation expressed any objections or doubts regarding the Chairman's proposal. However, we knew then, and we know now, that in addition to those three items on the agenda there is yet another one which has not yet been considered—item 28 concerning the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. In conformity with the mandate given to the Committee by the General Assembly, that item must be examined on the basis of two fundamental documents—the report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament and the report of the Preparatory Committee for the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States.

101. The Soviet delegation considers that, since that item is on the agenda of the First Committee, the First Committee must of course deal with it in one way or another. We were happy to hear the Chairman say that he intends to organize our work in such a way that no single item on the agenda will remain unexamined by the Committee. What is the best way to organize our work in the relatively short period of time remaining before 19 December?

102. We have no doubt that it would be logical and natural to continue the discussion which started today with two most interesting and detailed statements by the representatives of Poland and Sweden on the three items on the agenda, items 29, 30 and 31.

103. We also have no doubt that at present the Committee is unable to undertake a wide-ranging discussion on the substance of the question of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, because instead of having one of the documents necessary for the General Assembly to take a decision, namely the report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, we have only an interim report containing some very important, and in our view, hopeful statements. It states:

“Pursuant to the recommendations of the General Assembly in resolution 2153 A (XXI) the Eighteen-Nation Committee has undertaken intensive consideration of a draft treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Representatives participating in the work of the Committee have made valuable contributions towards the achievement of a treaty which would be in conformity with that resolution. These contributions are contained in the public records of the Committee. The Committee has already made substantial progress, although a final draft has not as yet been achieved” [A/6951-DC/229, para. 5].

Further, in paragraph 6 of its interim report, we read that:

“the . . . Committee is continuing its work with a view to negotiating a draft treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons”.

It further states that being

“unable at this time to provide a report on this question for the consideration of the United Nations General Assembly . . . the Committee intends to submit a full report including all relevant documents, as soon as possible”.

104. From those statements in the interim report we learn, first, that the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament has been working in conformity with the terms of reference laid down by the General Assembly; secondly, that substantial progress has been achieved; and that the Committee, although unable to present a report to the General Assembly for its consideration, as provided for in the agenda, intends to submit such a report “as soon as possible”.

105. Let me therefore summarize how we see this part of the situation: at the present time we are not able to undertake a large-scale discussion of the question of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. At the same time we do have the second of the documents mentioned in the agenda, the report of the Preparatory Committee for the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States. Since that report has been presented to the General Assembly in conformity with its resolution, it goes without saying that at the appropriate time the General Assembly will have to consider that report. We have no doubts about that and are convinced that the time is bound to come when the General Assembly will be able to examine that report.

106. However, would it be appropriate in the present conditions to take up separately one of the documents

which the General Assembly will have to consider under item 28 and engage in separate consideration of that document? We think that would be wrong and that in the best interests of this question, it would be an unrealistic and ineffective approach. But, I repeat, even at this stage of our discussions in the First Committee at the twenty-second session of the General Assembly we have to decide what we must finally do about the consideration of the report.

107. Since the Chairman has told us that he intended to organize the Committee's work in such a way that all items in the agenda would be discussed, we should like to ask him to make it possible in the time remaining, especially since he has already planned the work for this Committee, to conclude the discussion on the three items of the agenda, items 29, 30 and 31, on Friday. We shall have some time left to decide, and we hope we shall decide unanimously in the interest of all States, nuclear and non-nuclear, how we intend to proceed with item 28, including consideration of both documents mentioned in the agenda.

108. I repeat that the Soviet delegation considers that item 28 should be discussed by the General Assembly in all its aspects and that the General Assembly should take a decision before 19 December on the future procedure for consideration of this item. It also wishes to state that, of course, the second of the two documents mentioned in the item—the report of the Preparatory Committee for the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States—must, of course, also be discussed at the appropriate moment.

109. The CHAIRMAN: Before I call upon the next speaker I should like to clarify one point which has been mentioned repeatedly in some statements.

110. I did not say at our meeting on Friday afternoon, 8 December [1544th meeting], that I intended that consideration of the three items should be finished on Friday. What I said, as can be seen from the record of that meeting, was that I hoped we could complete the work on all our items by next Friday—all our items, not only the three.

111. Mr. NABWERA (Kenya): I should like to express the surprise of my delegation at the way in which the representative of the Soviet Union has tried to handle this problem. One would have thought that what he was saying was quite obvious to us and that since item 28 appeared on the agenda among the items given to this Committee we would have to discuss the item one way or another. If I understood the Soviet representative correctly—and I listened only to the interpretation—according to him we shall never be able to discuss the report of the Preparatory Committee for the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States unless the non-proliferation treaty is ready for discussion; and, as I said in my earlier intervention, that Conference is supposed to be held, in accordance with a resolution of the General Assembly, in the year 1968 and not later than July.

112. I think that it would be only fair if the representative of the Soviet Union would show his true colours and tell this Committee whether he would like to see this item discussed or postponed until the nuclear Powers have agreed on a non-proliferation treaty.

113. It was quite clear to my delegation from the start that, although there was some relationship between what was going on in Geneva and the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States, those two items could be discussed without tying one to the other. After all, the Soviet Union wants to guarantee its security. National security is first and foremost for the Soviet Union. Why should the representative of the Soviet Union deny the non-nuclear-weapon States the only opportunity of sitting down among themselves and discussing the question of their security, individually and collectively? Why should our security be tied to that of the Soviet Union? It is because of this that my delegation feels that the Committee should take a decision now whether or not it will discuss this item, and if so, when.

114. Mr. SHAHI (Pakistan): I am speaking again on a point of clarification, but before I do so I wish to support what the representative of Kenya has said with regard to taking a decision as to the most appropriate time for discussing item 28. The representative of Kenya is Chairman of the Preparatory Committee, and he has fully explained the circumstances of the situation.

115. Speaking for my delegation, let me say that we appreciate fully the circumstances explained by the representatives of the United States and the Soviet Union regarding the discussion of the substance of the question of the non-proliferation treaty. The circumstances that inhibit a large-scale discussion of the report of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament do not apply to the consideration of the report of the Preparatory Committee for the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States [A/6817]. How that consideration should proceed and what decisions should be taken is a different matter. The point is, as the Chairman of the Preparatory Committee has explained, that this Committee has to take a decision with regard to the timing of the Conference. Without prejudice to the views of any delegation on that matter, we do feel that the report of the Preparatory Committee should not be left in limbo.

116. Mr. VINCI (Italy): The hour is getting late and I should like to make just one brief remark. As I understand it, there is no delegation that objects to the discussion of the report of the Preparatory Committee for the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States. The question is quite different. It is how and when we should discuss this item. As I see it, in the light of what the Chairman has very clearly stated, the main question is to see whether we have time for a special meeting to discuss this report. I understand that the Chairman feels that it would be very difficult to set a special meeting for that purpose. We can take one of two courses: we can either set Thursday and Friday for the discussion of this report, which I understand would be quite difficult, or we can discuss this item with the other items, as has been suggested by the delegation of Malaysia. I think that a decision as to how we are to proceed should be taken now. I repeat that we can set a date for the discussion of this item, which could be Thursday and Friday, or Friday and Saturday, but the Chairman has said that he would like to finish all our work on Friday. Therefore, as I understand it, that does not leave us much choice. I leave it to the other delegations, but I believe that the only choice left to us, since no delegation has objected to discussing the report, is to consider it with the other items, namely items 29, 30 and 31.

117. Mr. BAROODY (Saudi Arabia): I do not know whether the work of this Committee will be facilitated by my remarks, which will be in the nature of suggestions. We already have two draft resolutions before us, one submitted by the delegation of Malta [A/C.1/L.411] and the other by the delegation of Hungary [A/C.1/L.412]. I presume that those draft resolutions have to be disposed of during this session. However, I am not so sure. May I suggest that item 28 (b), the report of the Preparatory Committee for the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States, be crystallized in a draft resolution, which would be an affirmation, rather than something new, of the resolution that was adopted at the previous session. This would be a device that we could use, if the representative of Pakistan, or any other representative, might wish to submit such a draft resolution. We could very well pronounce ourselves on it, thereby by-passing the difficulty we are trying to make for ourselves by saying that there should be a general debate on all the items, and so forth. It would be a procedural type of draft resolution. I do not know whether the date given, July 1968, would remain or whether some other date would be set. That would depend on the advice and wisdom of the Preparatory Committee with respect to what we have heard from the representatives of the United States and the Soviet Union. One thing is certain. The representative of the Soviet Union referred to the words "as soon as possible" in the interim report of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee—"The Committee intends to submit a full report, including all relevant documents, as soon as possible [A/6951-DC/229, para. 6]." We know that the words "as soon as possible" may mean tomorrow or five years hence. We do not know when "as soon as possible" will be. We do know one thing, and that is that the report is not ready. But that should not preclude carrying out a decision that was taken last year to hold a conference. The reaffirmation can be made, if the Preparatory Committee so wishes, in a draft resolution pertaining strictly to the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States.

118. The CHAIRMAN: In view of the late hour, I shall try to clarify the situation as I see it. Before doing so, however, I should like to comment on the last statement of the representative of Saudi Arabia. I wish that his proposal could really facilitate the situation. However, I am afraid that that is not so and I hope that he will agree with me when I say that, in the exercise of all my authority, even if I decided that any draft resolution formally submitted under item 28 (b) would be receivable by the Chairman and circulated, that draft resolution could not be discussed, let alone acted upon, unless the Committee decided formally to consider item 28.

119. This does not mean, as I have said before, that I will prevent any representative from referring either to sub-item 28 (a) or sub-item 28 (b) in his general statement under the three items. Having this in mind, the situation is as follows: listening to the second statement of the representative of Pakistan, agreeing to the suggestion made by the representative of Malaysia, then this is the only way out, namely, that if the representative of Malaysia is formally proposing that the Committee take up item 28, together with the other three items, then it is up to the Committee to decide whether or not to accept this Malaysian proposal. If the Committee in its wisdom agrees to the Malaysian proposal, then the Committee will be reconsidering a previous decision which it took last Thursday, 7 December.

120. I should like to inquire of the representative of Malaysia whether or not he is formally proposing this.

121. Mr. LAI (Malaysia): I have refrained from going into details because we believe that most of the details are known by members of this Committee. I should like to say at the outset that when we made that proposal it was not the intention of my delegation to rock the boat, as it were, especially when progress of major importance is being achieved in Geneva. But we were faced with the reality that unless we take up this item together with the three items, this item will not be dealt with at all. Mr. Chairman, you have confirmed that it is not possible for you to set aside a special date to discuss this item, and we thought that the only possible way would be to have it discussed with the three other items.

122. I would certainly be only too happy to make a formal proposal to that effect.

123. The CHAIRMAN: The Committee has just heard the representative of Malaysia make a formal proposal to the effect that the Committee should take up item 28 together with items 29, 30 and 31.

124. Mr. GURINOVICH (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) (*translated from Russian*): Mr. Chairman, since the procedural side of the original Pakistani proposal is quite clear and since we now have before us a formal proposal on which you will have to take a decision, and bearing in mind too the fact that this question took many delegations by surprise—we had expected a somewhat more definite result from the consultations which had been going on for quite some time—may I ask that the meeting should be adjourned and that we come back for a decision on this matter later.

125. This is a formal proposal that the meeting should be adjourned forthwith.

126. The CHAIRMAN: I have one more speaker on my list. As the Committee has just heard, the Foreign Minister of Byelorussia has made a formal proposal for adjournment. This type of motion normally is voted upon without discussion. However, I wonder whether the Foreign Minister of Byelorussia would like us to proceed with his motion or whether he will agree that we should give the floor to the last speaker on my list.

127. Mr. GURINOVICH (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) (*translated from Russian*): I agree with your proposal that we hear one more speaker, but I would ask you not to take any further decision at this meeting.

128. Mr. SHAHI (Pakistan): In order to reach an agreement which is satisfactory to all delegations concerned, in order to avoid having to go to a vote on a matter of procedure—which, in this case would be particularly unfortunate and which would be construed as preventing discussion, and thus be contrary to the traditions of the United Nations—and in view of certain conversations which took place on the basis of confidence and a gentleman's agreement, by reason of which my delegation decided not to raise the question of discussion of item 28—on the very day that the Chairman of this Committee said that we

should discuss items 29, 30 and 31, which was not understood by my delegation to mean the exclusion of the discussion of item 28 at any time—however, in order to reach an amicable conclusion and a constructive outcome, in a spirit of harmony, may I propose earnestly, Mr. Chairman, that you set apart Thursday afternoon and Friday for the discussion of item 28. As to what action should be taken would depend on the outcome of the debate and the consultations which will be held—we hope in a constructive spirit.

129. I make this proposal.

130. Mr. MISHRA (India): When we first heard the proposal made by the representative of Pakistan, we had the intention of supporting it, until we heard the intervention of the representative of Malaysia. Then, of course, you pointed out, Mr. Chairman, that you had some difficulty in setting apart some time for the exclusive discussion of item 28.

131. Now that the representative of Pakistan has made a fresh proposal, we would support it, subject to your convenience, Mr. Chairman, in finding the time which has been suggested. We would earnestly hope that the division which we were approaching now will thus be avoided. Therefore, in very brief terms, we support the proposal just made by the representative of Pakistan.

132. The CHAIRMAN: Before commenting on the proposal made by the representative of Pakistan, I should like to apologize to the representative of the Byelorussian SSR because I did not put his motion to a vote right away. But I would like to add that, while listening to the proposal made by the representative of Pakistan, I thought that it was identical with the proposal which he made at the very beginning of this discussion. Up to now, and since he made his first proposal, nothing has changed which makes me feel that I can promise the Committee that by Thursday afternoon we would be able to dispose of items 29, 30 and 31. In fact, I have serious doubts about it.

133. In my previous statement, when I stated my intention to finish all items on Friday, I said that I hoped that it would be possible. I did not say that it was possible. That is why, in my opinion, we should adjourn the meeting now, to allow further consultations during the lunch hour. When we convene at 3 p.m., we will then see what we can do.

134. If there is no objection to that procedure, I shall take it that it is so decided.

It was so decided.

The meeting rose at 1.10 p.m.