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Chairman: Mr. Ismail FAHMY
(United Arab Republic).

AGENDA ITEM 33

The Korean question (*continued*) (A/6696/Rev.1, A/6696/Add.1-3, A/6712, A/6836; A/C.1/947 and Corr.1, 949, 950, 951, 953; A/C.1/L.401 and Add.1-2, L.404 and Add.1-3, L.405 and Add.1, L.407, L.408)

- (a) Report of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea;
- (b) Withdrawal of United States and all other foreign forces occupying South Korea under the flag of the United Nations;
- (c) Dissolution of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea

1. The CHAIRMAN: Before we proceed with the explanations of vote, the United States representative has asked to exercise his right of reply.

2. Mr. BROOMFIELD (United States of America): Many delegations have remarked upon the futility of charges and counter-charges made during this debate. No one would deny that exchanges of that nature make little immediate contribution to the solution of the real problem before us—the responsibility of the international community for facilitating the reunification of Korea. I would strongly argue, however, that it is never futile to seek to separate fact from fiction, for it is on the basis of fact, not fiction, that our judgements must be made, as individuals as well as in our capacity as government representatives. It is in that spirit that my delegation wishes to reply to and comment upon some of the charges made during this debate.

3. I shall deal first with the question of the comparative natures of the Republic of Korea and North Korea. No objective observer, whether Korean or otherwise, would contend for a moment that the Republic of Korea represents a perfect democracy or the epitome of representative government; nor would any objective observer be

surprised that a nation such as the Republic of Korea, which regained independence and sovereignty only in the late forties, should not have fully achieved in a few years that which has not been achieved by many other, more developed, nations over many years, many decades or many centuries—or which in some cases has never been achieved.

4. However, surely no objective person can fail to see a fundamental difference between the Republic of Korea and North Korea. In the Republic of Korea there is a basic commitment among the people and their leaders to representative government and a strong determination to achieve a system of government wherein all the people have the right to join in choosing their leaders and holding those leaders responsible for their actions. In North Korea there is no evidence of such a commitment, at least among the present leaders. But let us rely on actions and not words. The Republic of Korea has ever since its creation been willing to have its electoral processes subject to the observation of the outside world, by the press and by foreign visitors and commissions appointed by the United Nations, even though that observation might result in calling attention to the imperfections and failings of the system. The Republic of Korea conducts elections where candidates and programmes are many and varied and where an individual is not elected simply because he is the only candidate placed before the people but because he heatedly contests with an opponent for the support of the majority. In the Republic of Korea the majority by which a candidate is elected is often painfully slim, not some 99.44 per cent of the votes cast.

5. The Republic of Korea has a legislature whose members are extremely active and free to assail their Government, to attack its every move and to disagree with its every policy. The Republic of Korea has a press which is often as violent in its denunciation of the Government as have been some of the statements made by the communist delegations in this Committee.

6. I can think of no better tribute to the right of the press in South Korea to speak its mind than the North Korean memorandum distributed today at the request of the Soviet Union. It is a memorandum based in its entirety upon quotations from the press in South Korea. Every member of this Committee, including the most ardent supporters of North Korea, knows full well that it is inconceivable that such quotations could be found in the press of North Korea concerning the electoral processes in the north.

7. In short, the Republic of Korea has recognized that the essence of democracy and representative government is that the people shall have a genuine selection in the choice of their leaders and shall be free to voice their opposition to those leaders at any given time. Certainly, the voices of

opposition in South Korea have been loud—sometimes even shrill—but this is a sign of strength, not weakness, of a willingness to permit the people to speak out rather than to stifle every thought or word which might offend those in authority.

8. We are frequently reminded of mistakes and miscalculations made by the leaders in certain communist countries—mistakes which have been freely admitted by different leaders a decade or so after the event—and we cannot but wonder why those countries do not draw the obvious conclusion that mistakes could have been avoided, not regretted, had the people in these countries been free to voice their opposition in the first place.

9. Until these statements I have just made about the Republic of Korea can also be made about North Korea and can be verified by outside independent observers, all claims that North Korea is a model of democratic government will fall on deaf ears, and no amount of jargon or double-talk will convince any objective observer that it is North Korea rather than the Republic of Korea which has set its sights on the achievement of a truly democratic and representative form of government.

10. Let me turn next to the charges and counter-charges concerning the increases of tension along the demilitarized zone established by the Armistice Agreement of 1953.¹ I think one thing should be stressed: no one has denied that there is a serious increase in the number of incidents along the demilitarized zone, nor has there been any denial that these incidents are all taking place south of the demarcation line, that is, outside the territory controlled by North Korea. But here the similarities between the charges and the differences begin. The fundamental difference is this: the charges made by the United Nations Command, and referred to in the UNCURK report, have been made together with a willingness—indeed repeated requests—to have the charges investigated.

11. These requests for investigation are not window-dressing: they stem from certain knowledge that the incidents have taken place and from incontestable evidence that they have been caused by North Korean violations of the Armistice Agreement.

12. The machinery for investigation of these incidents is at hand: the joint observer teams established by the Armistice Agreement of 1953. That machinery can be put into operation at any time by a simple word—and the word is “yes”—from the North Korean members of the Military Armistice Commission.

13. Unfortunately, as the United Nations Command has reported—and this, too, is subject to verification—the “North Korean authorities have shown themselves unwilling to co-operate in enabling the Commission to carry out its assigned mission. They have . . . almost invariably refused to permit joint observer teams . . . to investigate violations.”²

¹ See *Official Records of the Security Council, Eighth Year, Supplement for July, August and September 1953*, document S/3079, appendix A.

² *Ibid.*, *Twenty-second Year, Supplement for October, November and December 1967*, document S/8217.

14. If North Korea is not responsible for these incidents, what reason does it have to fear investigations thereof? Until that question is answered, the charges that forces of the Republic of Korea or the United Nations Command are responsible for the incidents within the territory of the Republic of Korea will continue to have the ring of sheer fantasy.

15. Several representatives have referred to the Armistice Agreement of 1953, which includes a provision calling for the convening of a political conference to settle the problem of unification. They have sought to give the impression that this provision was never carried out and that such a conference was never held. Either their memories are short, their history is faulty or they wish to disguise the truth.

16. The Korean Political Conference was held. It was convened in Geneva on 26 April 1954. It was unable to achieve any constructive results, despite two months of earnest negotiation, because of the clear unwillingness of the communist delegations to consider any arrangements which would have permitted the Korean people to achieve unification under adequate international supervision.

17. And whilst speaking of incorrect history, I might also mention the inaccurate statement of the Bulgarian representative this morning [*1522nd meeting*] concerning the conclusion of a mutual defence agreement between the Republic of Korea and my own country. He may wish to have his historical sources checked.

18. Let me now turn to the charges made about the United Nations forces sent to Korea under the Security Council resolutions. On 27 June 1950, having determined that the North Korean invasion of South Korea was a breach of the peace, the Security Council took into account the Republic of Korea's urgent appeal to the United Nations for assistance and went on to recommend that:

“ . . . the Members of the United Nations furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area.” [*Security Council Resolution 83 (1950)*.]

19. My Government and fifteen other Member States responded to that recommendation by sending active military forces to Korea. In the case of the United States forces they were returning to Korea after having been withdrawn almost one year to the day before—a withdrawal which had been observed and verified by the United Nations Commission.

20. The forces sent by Members of the United Nations eventually came to number over 340,000—more than 300,000 from the United States and nearly 40,000 from fifteen other Member nations.

21. Less than two weeks later, on 7 July 1950, the Security Council adopted a further resolution [*Resolution 84 (1950)*], which recommended that Member States providing military forces in the defence of South Korea should place them under a unified command, and the United States was asked to designate a commander of these forces sent by Members of the United Nations.

22. That is how the United Nations Command came into being. That is how foreign forces under the flag and auspices of the United Nations came to Korea in 1950. They came not to occupy it, but to prevent the extinction of the Republic of Korea. They came not unilaterally or uninvited, but in response to urgent appeals from the Republic of Korea and resolutions adopted by the Security Council. It is a fact that those forces in the early 1950s were predominantly United States forces. How could it have been otherwise if the reaction of Member States was to be prompt and effective enough to prevent the extinction of the Republic of Korea? Most of the United Nations forces sent in the early 1950s have now been withdrawn. Those of the United States have been reduced to approximately 50,000 men. Those of seven other troop-contributing countries have been completely withdrawn. Those of eight other countries have been reduced to the function of liaison with the United Nations Command and the Military Armistice Commission, the provision of the Honour Guards, and in one case a small infantry group. The continued presence of these forces, as well as their mission, is still determined both by the will of the people of South Korea and by the Security Council decisions under which they were dispatched. Their presence can and will be ended whenever it is requested by the Republic of Korea or whenever there has been a restoration of peace and security in the area—a goal which hardly seems within reach at a moment when reports of increasingly grave incidents along the demilitarized zone continue to grow and multiply.

23. It has also been charged that the United Nations Command has failed to keep the United Nations informed of its activities in Korea. This charge can best be answered by referring to the statement made on behalf of the Secretary-General this morning.

24. I would also spend a brief moment on the charges made about the decision of the Republic of Korea to send its troops to help in the defence of South Viet-Nam. It is hardly for my delegation to explain this decision. That explanation has already been made and ably presented by the distinguished Foreign Minister of the Republic of Korea. I would, however, submit that there is no reason to wonder why the Republic of Korea should make such a decision. After all, the Republic of Korea itself was saved from extinction in 1950 by the collective help of other nations, including that of other Asian nations. Is it surprising then that when another Asian nation faces a similar threat a decade and a half later, the Republic of Korea should be not only willing but even eager to help in meeting that threat, even if that involves some decrease in its own defensive capacity at a time of increasing tension along the demarcation line? This, after all, is the essence of collective security: that a group of nations recognize that a threat to any one of them represents a threat to all of them; that there should be, therefore, a collective responsibility in meeting that threat, even though it may at any one given time be directed against only one of them. It is action in response to this sense of collective responsibility to which the representatives of Eastern Europe are really objecting, presumably because that is precisely what is preventing the success of North Viet-Nam's effort to take over South Viet-Nam.

25. I would conclude by dealing with the pack of inconsistent charges made about the legality and utility of

the United Nations continuing to concern itself with the problem of Korea. The United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK) has been castigated and vilified for the faults of others. It is blamed for having nothing to report about political and economic developments in North Korea; it is sharply criticized because it has nothing to say about the views of North Korean authorities towards elections; it is rebuked for failing to record the political achievements of the North Korean people. Well, the fault of course lies not with UNCURK; it lies with the unwillingness of North Korea to permit any contact whatsoever with UNCURK or, for that matter, with any other observers from the outside world. The attacks are thus entirely misdirected; their target should be North Korea.

26. We are told that the Korean people do want to be reunited and, until they are, there will continue to be tension and insecurity in the area. From this incontestable premise the extraordinary conclusion is drawn, substantiated by feeble references to Article 2, paragraph 7, of the Charter, that the Korean problem is outside the competence of the United Nations. Or again, we are told that the continued division of Korea denies the people of Korea the right to decide their own destiny, the right to determine their own future. From this, another incontestable premise, flows another extraordinary conclusion: that the Korean problem is strictly an internal affair in which no outside interference, by the United Nations or otherwise, will be tolerated. And still later we are told that there must be free and democratic elections in Korea, and from this incontestable premise flows the remarkable conclusion that free elections under the auspices of the United Nations are out of the question and would be an intolerable affront to the people of Korea. And finally we are told, almost sheepishly, that there is, after all, some legitimate international interest in the settlement of the Korean problem, but that it is still no business of the United Nations and must never again be discussed here.

27. When all is said and done, when all of the venom and the false accusation and inconsistent argument and topsy-turvy logic have been sifted from the charges made by those who support the first two draft resolutions before this Committee [*A/C.1/L.401 and Add.1-2 and A/C.1/L.404 and Add.1-3*], we are left with one stark reality: this Assembly is being asked to endorse the concept that the United Nations has no right to play any role, even the role of discussion, in seeking to bring to an end the division of one people and the tensions resulting therefrom. This is the concept which pervades every statement they have made and every draft proposal they have presented, this year and in years gone by. It is an intolerable concept to any who are concerned about not only the specific problem of a divided Korea, but the effectiveness and the strengthening of the United Nations itself.

28. The CHAIRMAN: Before I call on the next speaker I should like to consult members of the Committee on the desirability of limiting the time for exercise of the right of reply or explanations of votes to five minutes, as was done last year, during the twenty-first session. Personally, I do not favour that procedure provided members of the Committee agree that we should sit here this afternoon until we have finished voting on the various drafts before

the Committee. If we all agree to that, I do not believe there is any necessity to limit the time allowed for explanations of votes or exercise of the right of reply.

29. Mr. MENDELEVICH (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translated from Russian*): We have not quite understood, and should like to make sure whether or not you intend to limit the length of time for statements. We should be grateful if you could repeat your explanation.

30. The CHAIRMAN: Apparently the representative of the Soviet Union did not follow my explanation. I thought I said very clearly that I did not intend to limit the time allowed provided the Committee agreed to sit here until we either adopted or rejected the draft resolutions. If there is no objection to that, we shall proceed accordingly.

It was so decided.

31. The CHAIRMAN: I call upon the representative of the Republic of Korea to make a statement.

32. Mr. YONG SHIK KIM (Republic of Korea): I have asked for the floor not to prolong this debate but only to make a brief, sincere appeal as the time draws near for the Committee to vote on the Korean question. We have heard the representatives of many Member States express heartening words on behalf of the United Nations historic and enlightened stand for peace and democracy in my country. Regrettably, we have also heard voices advocating a negative position, one that denies the facts of history, slanders the defenders of democracy and freedom and advocates steps that would bring not freedom but coercion and tyranny, not peace but war.

33. A recent example of this sort of untruth is the utterly worthless and groundless charge made by certain representatives regarding the free elections in my country.

34. Our gratitude for the many expressions on behalf of the continued presence of the United Nations in our country is unbounded; our hope is great. As for the opposite stand, we can only have regret, sorrow and grave misgivings. To advocate the removal from the highly dangerous situation in Korea of the only world body which exists solely for the maintenance of the peace of mankind is to fly in the face of bitter experience. What has happened in other situations when these counsels of cynicism have been heeded? What happened in Korea in 1950 and afterwards, after allied troops had been withdrawn? Do the repeated and blatant challenges to the Truce of 1953 in the form of the dangerous incidents precipitated recently by the North offer assurances of peace?

35. I trust that the preponderance of representatives of Member States meeting in this Committee will disregard the slander and denunciation directed at the free Republic of Korea and its courageous allies, who wish to keep my country free and to remain free themselves. I trust also that the Committee will be mindful of our memorandum A/C.1/950 previously submitted to it. I appeal to the members of the Committee to support draft resolution A/C.1/L.405 and Add.1 sponsored by Australia and fourteen other Member States, because that draft resolution provides the most reasonable and peaceful method for the

unification of Korea. Its adoption by the Committee would mark an important step towards the achievement of that which many of us most desire—the peace and security of Korea and the Far East. Adoption by the Committee of that draft resolution would renew our faith and give us the confidence to carry on our unremitting efforts to attain the peaceful reunification of Korea. It would also renew the faith of all the peace-loving and freedom-loving peoples of the world who look to the United Nations as the principal guarantor of peace and security, and would assure them once more that the United Nations lives up to its responsibilities.

36. It would be impossible for me, feeling as I do and representing the Republic of Korea before this body, to leave this forum without expressing our deep gratitude to the United Nations forces in Korea for their continued stalwart defence of my nation, and to the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea for its determined efforts to achieve the peaceful unification of Korea. I wish also to express my profound appreciation of the understanding and support of many representatives in the debates on our problem.

37. The CHAIRMAN: The Committee will now hear the explanations of votes. Nine delegations wish to give their explanations before the vote, and the first is the representative of Iraq.

38. Mr. RAOUF (Iraq): The purpose of my intervention is to express my delegation's attitude to the items inscribed on the agenda under the heading "The Korean question" and to explain our vote before voting on the draft resolutions submitted to the Committee. Before proceeding, however, I should like to avail myself of this opportunity to state that it gives me tremendous pleasure that my intervention today coincides with the fiftieth anniversary of the glorious Soviet revolution, that revolution which inaugurated a new era in the annals of history and paved the way towards brighter horizons and the progress of mankind. My country enjoys the closest bonds of friendship and co-operation, based on mutual respect, with the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries which were inspired by that glorious revolution. It is with the utmost pleasure, therefore, that I extend my delegation's congratulations, through the Soviet delegation, to the Government and the peoples of the Soviet Union on this heart-warming occasion.

39. With regard to the substance of agenda item 33 with its three sub-items, it may be useful to remember that the whole Korean question is a relic of the cold war, one aspect of the discredited policy of containment pursued by certain Governments vis-à-vis the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China which manifested itself in the north by a desire to perpetuate a military presence in Korea and in the south by adamant persistence in a war against the people of Viet-Nam. Once this fact is recognized, it should not be difficult to see the picture in its right perspective. Our attitude would then be determined in the light of the answer to one question: should we allow one Member State and its allies to pursue its cold-war policies under the flag of the United Nations? An affirmative answer would be a disservice to the United Nations and the principles of the Charter. The only alternative to this is to deny our tacit

acquiescence in the cold war designs by withdrawing the mantle of the United Nations which so far has helped to cover up such designs.

40. For seventeen years UNCURK has not been able to fulfil its mission and has served only as an observation post of one side of the fence, mainly because of the objection of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to the presence of foreign troops in the south of the country, and for more than fourteen years there has not been any manifestation of major bellicose activities that warrant the presence of such a large number of foreign troops, even under the banner of the United Nations. Is it not time to change our approach to the whole question and seek a way to deal effectively with the problem rather than adhere to obdurate positions? If the approach has proved futile for seventeen years, then perhaps it is high time to change it, particularly when that approach has served only the cold war policies of a certain super-Power rather than the interests of the people of the country. Korea, after all is said and done, is one country and one people and it is really unjust to subordinate their natural right to unity to the policies of containment of China from the north and south, which is exactly what is behind the present impasse. As UNCURK has not lived up to the expectations that led to its creation and noting that the United Nations forces have overstayed their welcome my delegation will vote for UNCURK's dissolution proposed in draft resolution A/C.1/L.404 and Add.1-3. We shall also vote in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/L.401 and Add.1-2 and the amendments contained in document A/C.1/L.407 and against the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.405 and Add.1.

41. Before I conclude my statement I find it necessary to express our views regarding certain references in the statements of some delegations to the withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) from the armistice lines along the Sinai Peninsula. While arguing for the retention of the United States Forces under the banner of the United Nations in Korea, some delegations found it fit to draw a parallel between those forces and UNEF, and asked whether we had not learned a lesson from the withdrawal of UNEF. Some delegations, in this line of argument, went so far as to state that certain representatives, who, a mere few weeks ago, were violently accusing the Secretariat of the United Nations of being more or less responsible for the war in the Middle East because the Secretary-General withdrew the United Nations Forces from that region, nevertheless today ask for the withdrawal of the United Nations Forces from Korea. That is an irresponsible line of argument which is tendentious, and it falsifies the records of even so recent a session as the fifth emergency special session.

42. This line of argument, first, distorts the facts by drawing a parallel where a parallel does not exist—that is, between UNEF and the so-called United Nations forces in Korea. It conveniently ignores the difference in the functions of those forces, for, while the former was established solely—and I quote from General Assembly resolution 1000 (ES-1)—“to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities” resulting from Israeli aggression in late October 1956, the latter was, and remains, a fighting force, formed under Chapter VII of the Charter. The Secretary-General himself outlined the legal position with regard

to the nature of the functions of UNEF in his special report of 18 May 1967 to the General Assembly and reiterated that position in his annual report:

“The Secretary-General noted that there was widespread misunderstanding about the nature of the United Nations peace-keeping operations in general, and UNEF in particular . . . the United Nations Emergency Force was a peace-keeping operation, not an enforcement operation . . . it was not in any sense related to Chapter VII of the Charter.”³

43. This line of argument, secondly, falsifies the records inasmuch as it attributes to delegations attitudes they never have taken, attitudes which are in fact diametrically contrary to their stand. For, to the best knowledge of my delegation, not a single sponsor of draft resolution A/C.1/L.401 and Add.1-2 calling for the withdrawal of foreign forces under the title of “United Nations Forces” from Korea, has blamed the Secretary-General for his decision to withdraw UNEF upon the request of the Government of the United Arab Republic. In point of fact, it was the representative of that Government which has embarked on aggression time and again, and most recently early in June 1967, that master of deceit and conceit, who bemoaned, with characteristic crocodile tears, the absence of the fire brigade at the time when his Government started the fire. We all remember that that cynical accusation compelled the Secretary-General to intervene for the first time in the deliberations of a United Nations organ to set the record straight and unmask the hypocrisy of that accusation and reveal it for what it was worth.

44. Lastly, that line of argument is tendentious as it wittingly or unwittingly alleges that the withdrawal of UNEF was the direct reason for the outbreak of war last June in the Middle East and that, by the same token, had UNEF not been withdrawn there would have been no war in the Middle East. The representative who drew that conclusion may be reminded of at least the Secretary-General's progress report on UNEF to the seventeenth session of the General Assembly⁴ which stated that since the Force helped to maintain “virtually uninterrupted peace and quiet” along the armistice line, it was regretted that there had been no appreciable reduction in the number of air violations. How Israel's last act of aggression began is still fresh in our minds. To refresh the memory of those delegations who prefer to ignore the fact that it was Israel's policy of aggression that perpetuated the recent war in the Middle East, I quote the following passage from the two Churchills' book entitled *The Six Day War*,⁵ page 91 of the American edition: “How did the Israelis manage to achieve absolute success in so short a time? General Hod, the Commander of the Israeli Air Force, gave the following reasons: ‘(1) Sixteen years of planning had gone into those eighty minutes. We lived the plan, we slept on the plan, we ate the plan. Constantly we perfected it.’”

45. Let us hope that this quotation serves to remind some forgetful delegations that it was the application of that plan

³ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-second Session, Supplement No. 1.*

⁴ *Ibid.*, *Seventeenth Session, Annexes*, agenda items 32 and 63, document A/5172, para. 1.

⁵ Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1967.

of aggression, pent up for sixteen years, that started the recent war in the Middle East; and that, UNEF or no UNEF, Israel would not have hesitated for a single moment to embark on aggression when it suited her to do so.

46. As for the delegations who wanted to learn a lesson by equating the withdrawal of UNEF to the demand for withdrawal of foreign troops from Korea, we suggest that they learn their lesson somewhere else, in the parables of the United Nations. Let them learn a lesson from Israel's flouting with impunity of resolution 194 (III), which for eighteen years has been repeated by the General Assembly. Let them learn a lesson from the recent parable of the United Nations failure to brand the aggressor with the stigma of aggression, from its failure to force the aggressor to respect its decisions on Jerusalem and the treatment of civilians in occupied territories. Let them learn their lesson from Abba Eban's challenge to the United Nations, so far unanswered, to restrict its attempts to solve world crises "to its capabilities". If a lesson is to be learned at all it is the sad and bitter lesson that, United Nations or no United Nations, a country can get away with aggression as long as it feels that a super-Power is behind it.

47. Mr. MENDELEVICH (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translated from Russian*): As the First Committee is concluding its discussion on the Korean question, the Soviet delegation deems it necessary to express its views on the draft resolutions and amendments.

48. However, before proceeding to the main part of our statement, I must say a few words about the remarks made today by the representative of the United States. A considerable portion of his statement was devoted to proving that no single objective observer could fail to reach definite conclusions about the situation in South and North Korea if he were to compare the situation in the two parts of the country.

49. Yet it is no secret that it is precisely the United States delegation, with the assistance of certain other delegations from among the allies of the United States, which prevented the General Assembly from trying to obtain a completely objective picture of the situation in both parts of Korea. For it was the United States delegation, with the assistance of the delegations of some other States which were its allies, that prevented the First Committee of the General Assembly from inviting the representatives of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to participate in our work. It appeared that the United States delegation was frightened of hearing the true words about the position in Korea which would have been heard in this room from the primary source as it were—the representatives of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

50. So how can the representative of the United States speak of objective observers if the United States itself is depriving the General Assembly of the opportunity of approaching the matter in a completely objective manner? True, in a later part of his statement, the representative of the United States gave us to understand more clearly whom he had in mind when he spoke of "objective observers" who would be comparing the situation in the two parts of Korea. By "objective observer", it turned out that he certainly did not mean the United Nations or the States

Members of the United Nations. He meant himself, because it was he who made attempt to make the comparison about which he was speaking when he referred to an "objective observer". The representative of a country which is illegally occupying South Korea under the flag of the United Nations and is responsible for everything that is happening there, spoke to us here from the standpoint of an "objective observer".

51. Such is the objective observer who spoke today in the First Committee. Of course, from his standpoint of objectivity, he gave unqualified praise to the existing régime in South Korea, and apparently, for the sake of objectivity, he did not mention at all that this régime came to power as a result of a violent military coup which, with blood and iron, crushed the indignation the people of South Korea felt against the venal régime of Syngman Rhee.

52. And so the representative of the United States, speaking in the role of an objective observer, told us about the different constitutional or pseudo-constitutional processes in South Korea, but he forgot and did not say a single word—obviously in the interests of objectivity—about the fact that all these processes are taking place under the occupation of South Korea by the United States army. We are not, I think, mistaken, if I say that in this room there are representatives of a great many States which, during their history, including the recent decades, have known for themselves what was meant by American occupation and what an effect it has on constitutional and democratic processes.

53. So what kind of objectivity have we here? Of course, in the last part of his statement the United States representative went even further in revealing the substance of the matter. He made it even more understandable why he was heaping praise on the South Korean régime, in speaking from his vantage point of so-called objective observer. He praised it because the South Korean régime has sent tens of thousands of the sons of the Korean people to Viet-Nam in the interests of certain circles in the United States.

54. A good deal has been said about this crime of the South Korean régime in the discussion and we do not want to dwell on this in any detail. We are simply mentioning it because it explains why the delegation of the United States heaps such praise on the South Korean régime. This is an open secret—the sending to the front in the aggressive war of the United States in Viet-Nam of tens of thousands of the sons of the Korean people. That explains the special partiality of the delegation of the United States for the South Korean régime.

55. The discussion which was held in the First Committee has shown, quite convincingly in our view, how important and opportune was the initiative of a number of socialist and Afro-Asian countries which proposed that this session of the General Assembly should discuss and take a decision on the withdrawal of American and all other foreign troops now occupying South Korea under the United Nations flag.

56. In the statements of the delegations of those countries, which really want to help the Korean people to achieve their national aspirations, it was convincingly

shown that the American occupation of South Korea is the main obstacle to the unification of the Korean people and to the establishment of durable peace in Korea, and the Far East as a whole.

57. Many delegations in the course of the discussion quite rightly pointed out that the presence of the "United Nations forces" in Korea has nothing whatsoever in common with the United Nations Charter and that what we have in South Korea are not "United Nations armed forces", as the United States representatives here try their hardest to show, but United States troops which are illegally using the United Nations flag to cover up the occupation of a part of Korean territory.

58. The discussion also leaves no doubt that Washington bears the responsibility for the armed provocations which, on an ever-increasing scale, have been committed now for more than a year along the demarcation line against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea by American armed forces and South Korean troops. Very convincing evidence on this score was made available to States Members of the United Nations by the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in the memorandum of 18 October this year, circulated as a General Assembly document [A/C.1/951].

59. This was precisely the reason why, in the Pentagon or some other Government organ of the United States, an antedated report was hastily assembled and circulated, put out by the so-called "unified command" as, for purposes of disguise, the Headquarters of the American Occupation Forces in South Korea still calls itself. In this compilation by the American military we find an attempt to slander the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, its peace-loving aspirations and measures, and at the same time shield those who are carrying out and encouraging the dangerous acts of provocation on the 38th parallel, thus creating a serious threat to peace in the Far East. But such falsifications only serve to reveal those guilty of the armed provocations.

60. In spite of these attempts on the part of the representatives of the United States, they have been unable, in the course of the discussion, to adduce any convincing reasons for the continuation, for more than fourteen years after the conclusion of the truce, of the occupation of South Korea. The American occupationists are remaining there only because the United States is still stubbornly trying to use the occupation of South Korea for the continuation of intervention in the affairs of the Korean people, to retain the territory of South Korea as a military and strategic beach-head in the Far East, and to be able to continue using tens of thousands of South Korean soldiers as cheap hirelings for the aggressive war in Viet-Nam.

61. The intensification of acts of armed provocation and the increasingly frequent violations of the Armistice by American and South Korean troops clearly show that the question of the withdrawal of foreign troops from South Korea is an urgent one and its solution cannot and must not be put off any longer.

62. Taking this into account, the Soviet delegation calls upon all delegations to vote in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/L.401. The main point of this draft is the clearly

formulated demand for the withdrawal from South Korea, within a period of six months, of all the American and foreign troops, with their weapons and armaments, who are occupying South Korea under the United Nations flag. The decision of the United Nations to withdraw American and other troops from South Korea should promote the elimination of one of the dangerous hotbeds of international tension and finally open the way to the peaceful unification of the Korean nation without intervention from outside.

63. As for the Albanian amendment [A/C.1/L.408] to this draft resolution, its content does not depart from the corresponding paragraph of the operative part of the draft resolution, which provides that the General Assembly decides no longer to discuss the Korean question in the United Nations. Therefore, we would see no reason for not voting in favour of this amendment if it were proposed as an addition to the preamble. However, since this amendment has been submitted to replace one of the paragraphs of the preamble which has its own content and which is important for the draft resolution as a whole, the Soviet delegation will abstain on the Albanian amendment.

64. In the other draft resolution submitted for the consideration of the Committee by the delegations of Cambodia, Congo (Brazzaville), Guinea, Mali, Mauritania and other countries [A/C.1/L.404], it is proposed that an end be put to the existence of the so-called United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea which is being used for the purpose of foreign intervention in the affairs of the Korean people.

65. This too is a very appropriate measure, since the existence of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea is in contradiction to the most important principles of the United Nations Charter and is quite inadmissible in the light of the well-known Declaration of the United Nations on non-intervention in the internal affairs of States and the protection of their independence and sovereignty.

66. Many representatives who have spoken have quite rightly stressed that the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea has been a complete failure and the sooner a decision is taken to dissolve this Commission the sooner will ways and means be found for the peaceful unification of the Korean people.

67. We hope that all States Members of the United Nations which really wish to assist in the speedy realization of the national aspirations of the Korean people will support the draft resolution calling for the dissolution of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea.

68. As in previous years the First Committee has before it a stereotyped draft resolution on the so-called Korean question, a question which in reality does not exist as an item that could really be dealt with by the United Nations.

69. The inclusion of this item in the agenda of the United Nations, as the discussion which has just been concluded shows perfectly, has but one purpose in view, and that is to use the United Nations flag to cover up the continuing

United States intervention in Korea, its intervention in the internal affairs of the Korean people, and to give those violent and arbitrary actions against the Korean people the appearance of legality.

70. It is sufficient to glance at the draft resolution submitted once again by the United States and some of its allies to dispel any doubt whatsoever that the United Nations is once more being invited to pursue the policy imposed on it by Washington year after year. Once again it is proposed to prolong the existence of the notorious United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea and even to intensify its activities. In this draft resolution the United Nations is again called upon to sanction the continuation of the occupation of South Korea by United States forces under the United Nations flag.

71. During the course of the discussion the representatives of the United States and of some other countries which follow in the wake of its policy with regard to Korea have gone to great lengths in discussing how important it is to preserve the so-called United Nations presence in Korea and the responsibility of the United Nations for a solution to the Korea problem. But of course they too are well aware that the only real purpose of those arguments is to see to it, in the interest of the imperialist policy of the United States, that the present fragmentation of Korea is maintained and that the occupation of the southern part of the country by United States armed forces under the United Nations flag is continued.

72. The real responsibility of the United Nations is quite different. It is to afford the Korean people the opportunity to decide for itself on its domestic problems, without interference by foreign troops or foreign organs.

73. It is in the light of the foregoing that the Soviet delegation supports the amendments submitted by Cambodia, the Congo (Brazzaville), Guinea, Mali, Mauritania and a number of other countries, to the draft resolution of the United States and some of its allies, in document A/C.1/L.407. These amendments quite correctly emphasize that in the present circumstances the most appropriate method for a peaceful settlement of the Korean question would be the "convening of a conference of the States concerned in which the representatives of North Korea and South Korea would participate as well as the representatives of the States interested in the solution of the Korean question which would be appointed in equal numbers by the authorities of South Korea and North Korea respectively". In accordance with these considerations the operative part of the amendments proposes that the so-called Korean question should be withdrawn from the agenda and should not in future be considered by the United Nations.

74. The Soviet delegation believes that the time has come for the United Nations to measure up to the tasks set for it by the Charter and to display a sense of responsibility with regard to the fate of the Korean people and to peace in the Far East. We hope that the States Members of the United Nations will support the amendments submitted by some Afro-Asian and socialist countries to the draft resolution of the United States and its allies on the so-called Korean question.

75. Before concluding, the Soviet delegation considers it its pleasant duty to express its deep appreciation to all those who have congratulated us here in the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly on the fiftieth anniversary of the great October Socialist Revolution, on the fiftieth anniversary of the creation of the Soviet State.

76. The delegations of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic have requested me also to convey their thanks on their behalf.

77. Our country today is celebrating a great holiday, not only our national holiday, but a holiday for all progressive people in the world. I should like to assure all those who have congratulated us that their wishes for peace and progress will be conveyed to the Soviet Government and to the peoples of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

78. Mr. AKWEI (Ghana): Before I begin my intervention, may I be permitted first to proffer to the Government and peoples of the USSR through their delegation the warmest felicitations of the delegation of Ghana on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the great October Revolution. This revolution will go down in history for what it is: a great watershed in the annals of human history, unleashing forces for social justice, for the dignity of man and the liberation of subject peoples which will continue to work their impact on human affairs long after our groping efforts here have been relegated to the limbo of history. We salute the Soviet people. We congratulate them on their achievements and we wish them well for the future.

79. My delegation has followed with interest the course of the debate in this Committee on both the procedural and substantive aspects of the Korean question. At this stage, just before we cast our vote, we cannot but be dismayed at the lack of realism and the ostrich-like attitude that most of us have displayed.

80. The Korean question has been before the United Nations for two decades. Every year we meet to consider the question and we do no more and no less than restate firm and rigid positions, introduce the same opposing resolutions, manage to pass one of them and then bury the matter for the next round. Somebody here has aptly described that as watching a film on the Korean question every year in this Committee. I think that what we should honestly ask ourselves is this: What do we want—what does the United Nations want—in Korea? Is not our objective "to bring about by peaceful means the establishment of a unified, independent and democratic Korea under a representative form of government, and the full restoration of international peace and security in the area"? If that is the objective, are we helping to bring about its fulfilment?

81. I feel constrained to return briefly to the procedural aspect of this question, that is to say, the question of invitations, because in the opinion of my delegation it is closely linked with the substantive aspect. Here we are seriously discussing the future of the Korean people, how they should be reunified and how we could all help to bring about peace in the area; yet we have not made it possible for a part of the Korean people without whose active co-operation our objective can never be realized to come

and make their views known to us. I must say in all sincerity that the absence of representatives of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea from our discussions makes my delegation feel that we are wasting our time in pretending to go into the substance of the matter and pretending that simply by passing the same old resolutions the Korean question will by some good chance be solved.

82. In any case, we are now seized of the three substantive aspects of the Korean question: (a) the report of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea, (b) the withdrawal of United States and other foreign forces from Korea and (c) the dissolution of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea.

83. Regarding the report from UNCURK, [A/6712] while my delegation commends that thorough report we note that, as in previous years, it is limited to the southern part of Korea, due, we are told, to the refusal of the northern sector of Korea to co-operate with the Commission. We may well ask, then, whether the Commission is fulfilling the task assigned to it, that is to say, to bring about the unification of an independent and democratic Korea by peaceful means and the restoration of international peace and security in the area. It seems to my delegation that UNCURK is not, by any stretch of the imagination, fulfilling the mandate given to it, and that we are obliged therefore to consider new ways and means of enabling it to fulfil its mandate. Just saying that it is one party which prevents UNCURK from fulfilling its mandate is not making a serious and useful contribution. Why is that party preventing the Commission from carrying out its mandate? That is what we should look into, and then we should try to make adjustments.

84. Several delegations have questioned the legality of United Nations involvement in Korea in the first instance. While it is not my wish to go into the merits of their arguments, it is the opinion of my delegation that there is one incontrovertible fact which must be borne in mind, namely, that the United Nations of 1967 is not the United Nations of 1950, nor is the international situation of 1967 the same as the international situation of 1950. There has perforce to be a reappraisal of positions, of attitudes and of certain power-allegiances which were taken for granted in 1950. Is it not high time that the composition of UNCURK was revised? There is not, for instance, a single ally of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on the Commission. Judging from the positions consistently held in this Committee by certain members of the Commission, is it surprising that North Korea should feel hesitant about co-operating with the Commission?

85. That leads me to the other aspect of the Korean question relating to UNCURK namely, that of its dissolution. As I have said before, my delegation is disappointed with the performance of UNCURK so far, particularly its failure to advance the objective for which it was created, whatever the reasons for that failure, but we do not feel that because of that it should be dissolved summarily, because the mandate it has is a noble one and we should not—and we cannot—by its dissolution wash our hands of it. What we need to do is so to reconstitute it as to give it at least some chance of success.

86. I now turn to the third aspect of the question, that is to say the withdrawal of United States and other foreign forces from Korea. Allegations have been made here to the effect that what are called United Nations forces in Korea are in fact United States forces, taking direct instructions only from the United States Government, reporting only to the United States Government and financed solely by the United States Government. The delegations of Poland and Hungary even requested the Secretary-General to inform the Committee whether the United Nations had ever received any report from what some regard as United Nations forces in Korea, whether the United Nations had any hand in appointing the commanders of those forces and whether the United Nations had anything to do with the financing of its forces and their recruitment. My delegation is very interested in having answers to these questions and has been disappointed at the long delay in providing them. This morning [1522nd meeting] we had from the Secretary-General some answers to some of these questions. A preliminary study of those answers, however, can only leave us with a feeling of disappointment at their limited scope.

87. In the absence of fully documented and continuous answers to those questions, my delegation cannot but have some reservations about the effective United Nations control of the forces in Korea.

88. The presence of foreign troops on anybody else's soil, whether it be in Korea or anywhere else, cannot but be resented. It seems a little curious to us that it is only in Korea that one of the super-Powers has committed its forces under the United Nations flag. In the Middle East, in the Congo and in Cyprus, where we have the most recent instances of United Nations military commitments, it has been the accepted norm for the super-Powers not to commit troops but only to provide logistic and financial support. We do not, of course, question the sovereign right of South Korea to request the stationing of United States forces on its territory, but then they should be known to be United States forces and not what some think to be United Nations forces while others think they are not.

89. My delegation deeply regrets that we in the United Nations should refuse to change with the times and that we should still adhere to rigid, cold-war positions, to the detriment of the interests of the Korean peoples.

90. We have seen fundamental shifts from former taboos. Even in the United Nations and in international relations, countries are adapting every day to changed circumstances.

91. It may not be out of place to comment here that no two political situations could perhaps be completely analogous in every particular, but at the same time we could not help observing that there are certain elements in the situation in Viet-Nam and the two Germanys which have some relevance to the Korean question.

92. As regards Viet-Nam, we have been assured by the United States Administration—and we have been impressed by this repeated assurance—that it is prepared to talk to the North Viet-Nameese authorities, whenever and wherever they can be found, in the sole interest of bringing peace to unhappy Viet-Nam.

93. There was a time when they were not so disposed or when they were so disposed only on certain conditions; but gradually they have moved from rigid positions to the more flexible position today, when they want to talk unconditionally with North Viet-Nam in spite of the terrible slaughter of the past which, unfortunately, still continues.

94. Could this flexibility not be applied to the Korean question, or are we to wait until there is another conflagration there before we dislodge ourselves from doctrinaire, rigid, hard positions based on legal quibbles and niceties, in an effort to secure peace and reunification in Korea?

95. Similarly, with regard to the two Germanys, there was a time not so long ago when the Governments of West and East Germany regarded themselves as incapable of communicating with each other directly, or with other nations which had diplomatic relations with either of them, with the exception of the great Powers. In the case of one of them this was exalted into the famous Hallstein Doctrine, but from what we read today this is no longer the position with the two Germanys, for the simple reason that both West Germany and East Germany are probably thinking more in terms of the paramount interests of the German peoples and therefore they are prepared to move somewhat closer from doctrinaire and rigid positions.

96. Why should not a similar spirit of flexibility be invoked to help us in considering the Korean question in a new light? We cannot blindly follow the precedents of the past, when the membership of the United Nations was so different from what it is today, especially in this Committee, and when the fissures of the cold war were so hard. Who would have thought a few years ago that we might have a President of the General Assembly from Eastern Europe? But we are moving forward in various fields: why not on the Korean question?

97. We have no ideological position on the matter, nor do we have a doctrinaire approach, for that would only stand in the way of achieving a political understanding and, ultimately, a settlement of the problem. Indeed, we have the most friendly relations with the Republic of Korea, but we would be dishonest with ourselves if we did not truthfully say how we view the matter.

98. My delegation is disappointed that again this year, as in previous years, we should repeat in this Committee the motions of last year and simply bury the matter without any meaningful result.

99. The problem of Korea is firstly a problem of the two super-Powers, because they created it. It is also a problem of the Korean people, who are so unhappily divided. Last but not least, it is a problem of the United Nations, since questions of international peace and security are involved.

100. A heavy responsibility therefore rests on these two super-Powers to arrive at suitable accommodation with each other; and an equally heavy responsibility rests on the Korean people, through their existing Governments, to move closer to common ground, or at least to discuss their problem—a recognition which should make both sides accept certain modifications in their respective draft resolutions.

101. A heavy responsibility equally rests on the United Nations, through this Committee, to review the principles governing its own commitment in Korea, and to make possible this dialogue between the two Koreas.

102. We have not seen during this debate any real interest on the part of these parties in taking these positions. It is for these reasons that my delegation cannot be a party to any resolution not aimed at making progress in this vital area, and we must therefore abstain.

103. The CHAIRMAN: Before calling on the next speaker, I should like to inform the Committee that there are still seven more speakers in explanation of vote. With all candour, I must say that I think you will all agree that in the statements we have heard this afternoon—and without any reflection on any particular delegation—there has been a tendency to turn the explanation of vote into a new general debate. I am entirely at the disposal of the Committee: if the Committee would like to reopen the general debate, it is entitled to take that decision. But I hope that in future, if the Committee does not reverse its previous decision that the general debate has been closed, representatives will try hard—I realize that sometimes this is practically impossible—to keep their statements within the framework of explanations of vote.

104. Mr. TSERENCHOODOL (Mongolia) (*translated from Russian*): I shall heed your appeal, Mr. Chairman, and shall be brief. Guided by the provisions of the United Nations Charter, the principles of non-intervention in the internal affairs of other States, our delegation, together with a number of Afro-Asian and other delegations, has submitted a draft resolution on the dissolution of the United Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea.

105. The very creation of this Commission and its long existence under the aegis of the United Nations is completely contrary to the United Nations Charter—namely, the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of other States and the self-determination of States.

106. Everyone knows that the Korea question concerns the unification of temporarily separated territories of one country. It is therefore an internal matter which must be decided by the people themselves without any intervention from outside. Accordingly, the United Nations has no right to discuss the Korean question, and should remove the item from its agenda and dissolve the so-called Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea.

107. The consideration of the so-called Korean question on the basis of the one-sided report of the United Nations Commission, which in practice justifies the occupation by American and other foreign troops of Southern Korea, does not help in the least towards a solution of this question but rather hinders a solution of the basic problem of the unification of Korea.

108. The annual reports submitted to the United Nations by the Commission make it quite clear what a shameful mission it is performing. There has been no mention in the reports of the proposals which have been repeatedly put forward by the Government of the Democratic People's

Republic of Korea and were warmly supported by world public opinion.

109. On the orders of the United States, the Seoul régime rejects any initiative put forward by the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, designed to effect the reunification of the country on a peaceful and democratic basis. In particular, the many proposals for the conclusion of an agreement between the North and the South on the renunciation of the use of force against each other, on the reduction of the armies of both Governments to 100,000, and the convening of a conference of the countries concerned for the peaceful settlement of the Korean and other questions.

110. On the contrary, the so-called report of the Commission contains malicious attacks against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and its peace-loving policy. For example, on page 8 of the Commission's report there appear false assertions against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea which distort the facts, particularly the allegations that the Government of the Democratic People's Republic violates the demilitarized zone and is committing aggression against South Korea. At the same time, in that report there appears not a single word about the deliberate and provocative acts committed by the United States and South Korean forces at sea, on land and in the air.

111. In the report nearly a whole chapter is devoted to the so-called presidential and National Assembly elections held on 3 May and 8 June of this year respectively. The Commission asserts that those elections were conducted in an atmosphere of freedom and under the observation of the United Nations. But in fact they were nothing but a shameful farce, the opponents of Park Chung Hee being savagely suppressed. It became known from the world press that the authorities used all possible means of falsifying the returns, from plain fraud to the substitution of voting urns with inserted ballot papers.

112. These facts also once again demonstrate that the reports of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea amount only to a whitewashing of the policies of colonial enslavement and war of the United States imperialists. That Commission from the very beginning of its existence has been an obedient tool in the hands of the United States, an instrument of the command of the United States occupation forces in South Korea, used to justify the illegal occupation of Korean soil by foreign aggressors.

113. That Commission incites the puppet régime of South Korea to commit further irresponsible acts of aggression not only against the Democratic People's Republic of North Korea, but also against the other peoples of Asia, in particular to make it participate on an even larger scale in the shameful and brutal United States war in Viet-Nam, where the people is heroically defending itself against the violators of peace.

114. For all these reasons, the Government of the People's Republic of Mongolia welcomed the important proposal of the Governments of Cambodia, Congo (Brazzaville) and Yemen to consider, as a separate and urgent item, at the present session of the General Assembly the dissolution of

the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea.

115. We hope that the members of the Committee will give this urgent problem their due consideration and will find it possible to support the draft resolution submitted by several countries.

116. Our delegation will, of course, vote against draft resolution A/C.1/L.405.

117. Mr. KLUSAK (Czechoslovakia) (*translated from Russian*): May I begin my statement by expressing on behalf of the Czechoslovak delegation, our sincere and cordial congratulations to the delegations of the Soviet Union, the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic and the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, and through them to the peoples of the Soviet Union, on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the great October Revolution and the first socialist State, the Soviet Union. I should also like, on behalf of the Czechoslovak delegation, to note the great role the Soviet Union is playing in the cause of peace, disarmament and the elimination of the danger of nuclear conflict, and for the liberation, equality and security of all peoples. The peoples of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, liberated at the end of the Second World War by the heroic forces of the Soviet Army from the Hitlerite invaders, together with other peace-loving countries and progressive forces throughout the world, observe with great joy, enthusiasm, faith and firm confidence, the fiftieth Great October anniversary, the great holiday marking a bright future for all progressive forces in the world.

118. Before we proceed to vote, I should like briefly to express the views of the Czechoslovak delegation on draft resolution A/C.1/L.405, submitted by the United States and certain other countries. To begin with, I must say that this draft resolution is in our view totally unacceptable. Under its terms, the General Assembly would once again have to confirm a situation that has continued already for a number of years and that has led, as has long been clear and as has been confirmed in the course of the discussions, to no results whatsoever.

119. There is no need once again to demonstrate that attempts to implement unrealistic measures that are neither in conformity with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter, nor with the demands arising out of the realities of the situation, can in no way help to solve the problem, and that, moreover, the proposals contained in such drafts undermine the prestige of the United Nations.

120. Throughout the discussions in this Committee, and in the statement made today by the United States representative as well, no real argument has been put forward which might shake our conviction. On the contrary, it can even be said that the course of these discussions has even strengthened us in our views. The Czechoslovak delegation will therefore vote against draft resolution A/C.1/L.405.

121. The only way which can help to bring about a rapid settlement of the Korean problem would, in the view of the Czechoslovak delegation, be for the General Assembly to demand the withdrawal without delay of United States and

other foreign troops now occupying South Korea under the United Nations flag, and the dissolution within a few months of the so-called United States Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea.

122. We have already had occasion to express our views in detail in support of the two draft resolutions that seek to achieve these two purposes.

123. The Czechoslovak delegation welcomes and supports the amendments to the United States draft resolution that are contained in document A/C.1/L.407, submitted by the delegations of Cambodia, Guinea, the Congo (Brazzaville), Mauritania, Mali, Mongolia and Romania. It considers these amendments necessary for changing draft resolution A/C.1/L.405 in such a way that it could promote a just solution to the Korean problem. The idea of convening a conference of parties interested in the settlement of the Korean problem is one of the initiatives of the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, contained in its Memorandum of 21 August 1967, which we mentioned in our previous statement.

124. We believe that in the existing circumstances such a conference, in which representatives of both parts of Korea and of other interested States chosen by them, would participate, would be more effective and would undoubtedly be much more useful as an instrument for solving the Korean problem than this discussion in the United Nations, which takes place in conditions of discrimination against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

Mr. Tchernouchtchenko (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic), Vice-Chairman, took the Chair.

125. Mr. SHAW (Australia): Mr. Chairman, in response to your appeal for brevity, I shall speak for a shorter period than the five minutes which you suggested should be our limit. Indeed, my delegation had not wished to speak further at all; but we feel that there has been such a determined attempt to present a distorted picture of the situation which we are discussing that we have to restate very briefly the salient features of that situation which will guide us in voting on the two draft resolutions contained in documents A/C.1/L.401 and Add.1-2 and A/C.1/L.404 and Add.1-3 and on the amendments contained in A/C.1/L.407 and A/C.1/L.408. In brief, those features are the following.

126. First, the Republic of Korea has repeatedly carried out democratic elections under United Nations supervision or observation. It was North Korea which consolidated the division of Korea by its refusal to allow such elections to be held among the quarter of Korea's population under its control. It is quite wrong for North Korea now to be pictured by its partisans in this debate as a proponent of democratic elections.

127. Secondly, the United Nations forces are in Korea as the residue of the forces sent there properly in response to a Security Council request to repel a determined attempt by the régime of North Korea to invade and occupy the south. They are there also in response to the specific and continuous request of the elected Government of the Republic of Korea. Public statements by the North Korean Government and the record of its increasing use of force in

recent months make the fear of the Government of the Republic of Korea prudent and justified.

128. Thirdly, the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea is making little progress at present, it is true. The reason for this is that North Korea refuses to respond to it in any way. In such a situation it is surely more reasonable to ascribe the responsibility to the obstinate party rather than to the available instrument, which that party refuses to use.

129. For these reasons, we cannot accept the contentious and partisan resolutions and amendments which I referred to above. We consider them to be unfounded and designed to further an assumption which we do not accept—that is, that the United Nations has no role to play in Korea. We reject that assumption and accordingly we shall vote against the resolutions as a whole and, if necessary, in part, and against the amendments.

130. Miss BROOKS (Liberia): In explaining the vote of my delegation on the documents before us I shall refer to them in the order in which they have been submitted.

131. In connexion with the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.401 and Add.1-2, I wish to state that the co-sponsors have raised a fundamental issue, as did the statements in respect of this particular resolution, but the resolution does not seek to solve the problem which it raises. The problem I refer to is that of effective control by the United Nations over forces which are operating under the United Nations flag. We believe that whatever may have been the circumstances in the past, after twenty-two years of maturity the United Nations should have effective control over any forces operating under its flag. However, to withdraw those forces would not solve the basic problem which is referred to indirectly in the resolution to which I have referred. The point is that as regards troops financed through the United Nations there should be a regular report to the United Nations from the forces operating as United Nations forces in any area, so that the United Nations may be an effective peace-making organ. I realize that on several occasions my delegation has voted for the withdrawal of troops from certain areas of the world, but there is a slight distinction here. We have voted for the withdrawal of troops from colonial territories. Here the Security Council has taken some action regarding the forces in South Korea. Therefore we feel that the proper thing to do is have an up-to-date report on the activities of the forces in Korea and to take the matter to the Security Council for study, and perhaps to take more effective action in the matter.

132. The next question to be considered is the actual fact, the reality of the situation, in that there are two Governments in Korea each claiming to have complete and effective control. If that is so, the views of those Governments must be considered and we cannot ask that troops be withdrawn from South Korea without taking into consideration the views of that Government. That is why my delegation supported the view that, if there must be unification, the views of both sides must be expressed here in the United Nations. If we did not vote to hear them, our reason was as stated at the appropriate time.

133. With regard to resolution A/C.1/L.404 and Add.1-3, I would say that the United Nations has played a vital role

in the self-determination of peoples. I must stress, too, that the United Nations can be no more and no less effective than its Members allow it to be. I do not think that stress would be placed on the United Nations inability to solve the problem immediately but that the Members of the United Nations should re-examine their personal interests and put the vital, paramount interest of the people of Korea first, allowing the United Nations to function effectively as a peace-keeping, peace-maintaining or peace-making organization. I do not think the problem would be solved by withdrawal. I have the feeling that that would have the opposite result.

134. If the resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.405 and Add.1 were put to vote paragraph by paragraph my delegation would abstain on the last pre-ambular paragraph. We would do so because we feel that we cannot conscientiously be hopeful that conditions will be created for the reunification of Korea unless we hear the views of both sides. We would also abstain on paragraph 2 if it were put to vote separately, because we do not believe that any arrangement can be made for elections which are genuine unless the views of both sides have been heard and considered by the United Nations.

135. As regards the amendments in document A/C.1/L.407, I should like to say that the United Nations cannot abdicate its responsibility as an organization for maintaining or making peace in the world. I regret to say that I cannot support the amendment in document A/C.1/L.408, because it is in violation of the Charter of the United Nations, especially Article 10. The United Nations does have competence to deal with this matter.

136. In view of what I have said, my delegation will abstain on the draft resolutions and draft amendments which I have already mentioned and will vote in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/L.405 and Add.1, if it is put to a vote as a whole.

137. We hope that the co-sponsors of the draft will take into consideration the constructive criticisms which have been made, and that some action will be taken as far as the United Nations supervision of the forces in Korea is concerned. We also hope that some action will be taken by those who oppose the hearing of the views of the North Korean people when the question of unification of Korea comes up for consideration at the next session of the General Assembly. We hope that the Powers which are in a position to do something about it will have settled their differences and will be able to hear here both parties directly concerned so that a peaceful solution of the question of Korea will be possible.

138. Mr. CSATORDAY (Hungary): I wish to refer to the draft resolution of which my delegation is not a co-sponsor, that is, the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.405. In the light of information we have received this morning [1522nd meeting] from the Secretary-General and the statement made by the United States representative, and on examination of the text of this draft, some problematical questions arise.

139. The draft resolution says that the withdrawal of United Nations forces from Korea will take place only

when the Republic of Korea so requests. It is not a secret to anyone here that the Republic of Korea will request their withdrawal only when it is suggested by the United States. The draft resolution seems to forget completely that the United Nations has something to do with these forces and that it should have some authority to deal with them. We understand that this draft resolution sponsored by the United States and other Powers gives preference to the interests of the United States and allows them arbitrary freedom of action in South Korea. If we look at the report of UNCURK, we do not see any steps taken by UNCURK to examine the position of the so-called United Nations force in South Korea. Thus UNCURK will never interfere with the arbitrary activities of the United States.

140. On the basis of the information received from the Secretary-General and in the light of the statement made by the representative of the United States my delegation comes to the following conclusions. The foreign troops in South Korea are only from the United States; other countries have only liaison officers, which means one or two men altogether. After more than ten years, for the first time now, the United Nations has received official information from the United States on the size of its forces in South Korea. Until now this information has apparently been withheld even from the Secretary-General, since it is not contained in the information we received this morning.

141. The representative of the United States in his statement said that we should not confuse facts with fiction. I can only tell him that in South Korea the facts are that the troops are United States troops, and the fiction is that they are United Nations troops. We should not confuse the two. I think it should be said openly that these are not the United Nations troops and that they are simply the troops of the United States armed forces.

142. The second conclusion that we are led to draw from the information made available to us is that the so-called United Nations troops never received any directives from the United Nations but only from the United States, and so they were only carrying out the policy of the United States Government aimed at occupation of foreign territories.

143. Thirdly, in the information given by the Secretary-General we have seen the very careful wording on the use of the flag of the United Nations which was permitted to the armed forces in the course of their operations. But there is no provision whatsoever for such use of the flag of the United Nations after the armistice. Thus my delegation thinks that after the armistice was concluded in Korea the United States army had no right whatsoever to use the United Nations flag.

144. Fourthly, the reports provided so far by the United States to the United Nations cover the period until 31 August 1953. There is no report on the activities of the so-called United Nations forces in Korea for periods after that date.

145. Fifth, on the person of the Commander-in-Chief of the so-called United Nations Forces in Korea, the last information reached the United Nations on 7 June 1963. Maybe even the Secretary-General does not know today who is the Commander of the so-called United Nations

Forces in Korea. Was there any change afterwards? And we very much regret that we are not getting any information on the persons whose names have been given to the United Nations as Commanders of the so-called United Nations Forces. No information whatsoever has been forthcoming on the activities of the so-called United Nations Forces since the armistice agreement was concluded. Thus, the Commander is only responsible to the United States Government, and not to the United Nations. That is also the arbitrary interpretation of the United States Government; that is why it is not supplying any information to the United Nations.

146. The sixth and final conclusion is that the presence of the so-called United Nations Forces in South Korea is only for the purpose of perpetuating United States occupation of the southern part of Korea.

147. In the view of my delegation, the United Nations should not condone this crime against the Korean people. In the view of my delegation this attitude of the United States contradicts the principles of the Charter, harms the authority of the United Nations and debases its dignity. This perpetuation of the United States occupation of South Korea contradicts the interests of the Korean people themselves. It only leads to further tension in that region and forces the South Korean authorities to engage in warlike adventures and to give blood and flesh for United States military ambitions elsewhere in Asia.

148. The Hungarian delegation firmly opposes this policy. That is why it will reject completely the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.405 and Add.1.

Mr. Fahmy (United Arab Republic) resumed the Chair.

149. Mr. RAMIREZ (Philippines): The Philippine delegation wishes to make a brief statement to explain its vote on the resolutions under consideration by this Committee.

150. The Philippine delegation will vote against draft resolution A/C.1/L.404 and Add.1-3 on the dissolution of UNCURK.

151. Certain delegations have stated that the UNCURK report has ignored North Korean proposals on unification. We wish to invite the attention of members of the Committee to paragraph 6 of Chapter I of the Report, which states that the positions of the Republic of Korea and the North Korean authorities on the question of unification were set out in their memoranda of 7 October 1966 and 21 July 1966.⁶

152. The Commission has been intensifying its efforts to carry out the mandate of the United Nations. It unfortunately has no access to this territory under the North Korean authorities and has had no contact with them. In an attempt to contact the North Korean authorities, UNCURK made an appeal in a radio broadcast on 30 July 1967. The text of the appeal appears as Annex V of the Report. Permit me to quote the pertinent portion of that broadcast:

“On behalf of UNCURK, which represents the United Nations in this matter, I make a sincere appeal to the

leaders and people both from north and south Korea to co-operate with the Commission and to work with and through it in the achievement of the United Nations aims to reunify the country. The Commission is ready at all times to do what is possible to bring the two parts of the country together and would welcome approaches designed to aid the task given it by the United Nations.

“Leaders and people of Korea, the Commission invites you to co-operate with UNCURK in carrying out United Nations objectives, and it would be happy to consider with you how this might best be done. The Commission is always available to discuss proposals and to take whatever measures are within its power to bring about the long-sought-after reunification of this country, so tragically divided after the Second World War. But we do need and ask you for your full co-operation and support in this question and also in removing existing tensions which prevent Korea from enjoying peace and full prosperity.”

153. In connexion with the observation of elections in the Republic of Korea conducted by UNCURK, which has been criticized by certain speakers this morning, we wish to state that under the resolutions of the General Assembly UNCURK should be available for consultation and observation. During the last elections in the Republic of Korea UNCURK was officially invited by the Government of the Republic of Korea to observe the elections. That is stated in paragraph 66 of the Report. There was, therefore, no intention whatsoever on the part of UNCURK or the United Nations to interfere in the domestic affairs of a sovereign State.

154. Remarks have been made as to the reason for UNCURK incorporating in paragraph 23 of the Report the following:

“A matter of great concern to the Commission was the potential threat to peace in the area by an unprecedented increase in the number of incidents in and around the demilitarized zone and in the increased number of agenda infiltrated into the territory of the Republic.”

It must be remembered that under previous resolutions of the General Assembly UNCURK, which inherited the functions of previous Commissions, is called upon to make observation of events which might lead to the renewal of hostilities. Pursuant to the requirements of the General Assembly resolutions, developments which constitute a potential threat to peace have to be reported to the United Nations.

155. In view of these considerations, and taking into account the views previously expressed by the Philippine delegation during the debate, we will vote against draft resolution A/C.1/L.401 and Add.1-2, as the United Nations forces are in Korea solely to maintain peace and security in that area.

156. Mr. ACHKAR (Guinea) (*translated from French*): I wish to explain my delegation's vote. We naturally listened carefully to the appeal made earlier by the Chairman. But let me first take advantage of this opportunity to extend to the delegations of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic our warmest congratulations

⁶ Documents A/C.1/934 and A/6370 (mimeographed).

on the fiftieth anniversary of the great socialist October Revolution. The people and Government of the Republic of Guinea sincerely rejoice at the great triumphs the Soviet people has achieved in its Herculean efforts to build a prosperous nation under social justice. It salutes the descendants of the 1917 revolutionaries whose steadily increasing success hold forth a solid promise of liberation and development for peoples long oppressed and humiliated.

157. Those who like myself were reared in the former colonialism are aware that the qualitative changes which have occurred in recent decades are due in large part to the achievements of the socialist revolution throughout the world. We therefore hail the friendly Soviet people, engaged in the struggle for progress and peace against the forces of evil, against colonialism and racism.

158. We share the pride of the Soviets in the achievements made by their people and by the socialist world in general, since we know that those achievements are the guarantee of mankind's future success in its efforts towards peace and progress. The Soviet people and its friends have every reason to rejoice on this memorable day. Guinea joins with them in rejoicing very sincerely and very warmly.

159. My delegation has co-sponsored amendments to draft resolution A/C.1/L.405 and Add.1, and they appear in document A/C.1/L.407. For my delegation the adoption of those amendments by the Committee would mean that we had obtained complete satisfaction in regard to the serious matters facing us for we feel that our amendments put the problem in its true perspective.

160. We all know that the real problem in Korea is the question of reunification of that divided country. We also know that the Korean people alone has the right—and also the duty—to work out its reunification in complete freedom, without foreign interference of any kind. We know further that reunification will be impossible so long as foreign troops are stationed in one part of the Korean territory, whether those troops are under the United Nations flag or not. I should like, incidentally, to hail the decision taken by certain countries to terminate their presence—even if only symbolic—in Korea. We trust that the Government of the United States of America will follow that example in the very near future and withdraw its troops from South Korea, thereby creating conditions for a reunification which the Korean people will decide in complete sovereignty.

161. We are also opposed to the continued presence of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea, for the very simple reason that the Commission is a puppet body. That has been stated in a number of ways, but they all add up to the fact that the Commission receives its orders from outside the Organization and that it does not enhance the prestige of the United Nations.

162. For all these reasons, my delegation will vote in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/L.401 and Add.1 and 2. If our amendments to draft resolution A/C.1/L.405 and Add.1 are adopted, we will vote for that draft; otherwise, we will vote against it, even though we could have accepted some of its provisions.

163. That is the explanation of vote we felt compelled to give at this late stage of our work.

164. The CHAIRMAN: The Committee will now proceed to vote on the various draft resolutions and amendments which are before it. Before we vote I shall try to explain the situation.

165. We have three draft resolutions: the first one in document A/C.1/L.401 and Add.1-2, and co-sponsored by fourteen Powers. To that draft there is an amendment contained in document A/C.1/L.408 and submitted on 6 November.

166. The second draft resolution is contained in document A/C.1/L.404 and Add.1-3. It is co-sponsored by fifteen Powers, including Cuba.

167. The third draft resolution is contained in document A/C.1/L.405 and Add.1. It was submitted by fifteen Powers. To that draft there are a series of amendments contained in document A/C.1/L.407. These amendments were submitted on 30 October and are co-sponsored by seven Powers.

168. The Committee will first deal with draft resolution A/C.1/L.401 and Add.1-2 and will vote first on the amendment to that draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.408, the amendment submitted by Albania. A roll-call has been requested for all the voting. In accordance with the request of the delegation of Albania, the Committee will vote separately on each paragraph of the preamble of document A/C.1/L.401 and Add.1-2 and then, when we reach the sixth preambular paragraph, before we vote on the original preambular paragraph we shall vote on the Albanian amendment.

169. I now put to the vote the first preambular paragraph of draft resolution A/C.1/L.401 and Add.1-2.

A vote was taken by roll-call.

Yemen, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.

In favour: Yugoslavia, Albania, Algeria, Bulgaria, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Republic, Cambodia, Congo (Brazzaville), Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Guinea, Hungary, Iraq, Mali, Mauritania, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, Syria, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Republic, United Republic of Tanzania.

Against: Argentina, Australia, Barbados, Belgium, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Canada, Central African Republic, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dahomey, Denmark, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, France, Gabon, Gambia, Greece, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Japan, Lesotho, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Malta, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Rwanda, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela.

Abstaining: Afghanistan, Austria, Burma, Cameroon, Ceylon, Chad, Cyprus, Ethiopia, Finland, Ghana, Guatemala, India, Indonesia, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Laos, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Nepal, Nigeria, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Sudan, Tunisia, Uganda, Upper Volta.

The first preambular paragraph was rejected by 59 votes to 23, with 31 abstentions.

170. The CHAIRMAN: The Committee will now vote on the second preambular paragraph of draft resolution A/C.1/L.401 and Add.1-2.

A vote was taken by roll-call.

Syria, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.

In favour: Syria, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Republic, United Republic of Tanzania, Yugoslavia, Algeria, Bulgaria, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cambodia, Congo (Brazzaville), Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Guinea, Hungary, Iraq, Mali, Mauritania, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, Sudan.

Against: Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela, Argentina, Australia, Barbados, Belgium, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Canada, Central African Republic, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dahomey, Denmark, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, France, Gabon, Gambia, Greece, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Japan, Lesotho, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Malta, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Rwanda, South Africa, Spain, Sweden.

Abstaining: Tunisia, Uganda, Upper Volta, Afghanistan, Austria, Burma, Cameroon, Ceylon, Chad, Cyprus, Ethiopia, Finland, Ghana, Guatemala, India, Indonesia, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Laos, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Mexico, Nepal, Nigeria, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia.

The second preambular paragraph was rejected by 58 votes to 23, with 31 abstentions.

171. The CHAIRMAN: I call on the representative of Sudan on a point of order in connexion with the conduct of the voting.

172. Mr. ABDULLAH (Sudan): When we voted on the first preambular paragraph of this resolution I thought we were voting on something else, so I abstained. My correct vote should be 'Yes'. I should like this to appear in the record.

173. The CHAIRMAN: The statement of the representative of Sudan is on the record.

174. The CHAIRMAN: The Committee will now vote on the third preambular paragraph of draft resolution A/C.1/L.401 and Add.1-2.

A vote was taken by roll-call.

Sierra Leone, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.

In favour: Sudan, Syria, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Republic, United Republic of Tanzania, Yugoslavia, Albania, Algeria, Bulgaria, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cambodia, Congo (Brazzaville), Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Guinea, Hungary, Iraq, Mali, Mauritania, Mongolia, Poland, Romania.

Against: South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela, Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Central African Republic, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dahomey, Denmark, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, France, Gabon, Gambia, Greece, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Japan, Lesotho, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Rwanda.

Abstaining: Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Upper Volta, Afghanistan, Austria, Barbados, Botswana, Burma, Cameroon, Ceylon, Chad, Cyprus, Ethiopia, Finland, Ghana, Guatemala, Guyana, India, Indonesia, Iran, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Laos, Lebanon, Libya, Malta, Nepal, Nigeria, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia.

The third preambular paragraph was rejected by 52 votes to 24, with 36 abstentions.

175. The CHAIRMAN: The Committee will now vote on the fourth preambular paragraph of draft resolution A/C.1/L.401 and Add.1-2.

A vote was taken by roll-call.

Dahomey, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.

In favour: Guinea, Hungary, Iraq, Mali, Mauritania, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, Sudan, Syria, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Republic, United Republic of Tanzania, Yugoslavia, Albania, Algeria, Bulgaria, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cambodia, Congo (Brazzaville), Cuba, Czechoslovakia.

Against: Dahomey, Denmark, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, France, Gabon, Gambia, Greece, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Japan, Laos, Lesotho, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Rwanda, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela, Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Central African Republic, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica.

Abstaining: Ethiopia, Finland, Ghana, Guatemala, Guyana, India, Indonesia, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya,

Lebanon, Libya, Malta, Nepal, Nigeria, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Upper Volta, Afghanistan, Austria, Barbados, Botswana, Burma, Ceylon, Chad, Cyprus.

The fourth preambular paragraph was rejected by 54 votes to 24, with 33 abstentions.

176. The CHAIRMAN: The Committee will now vote on the fifth preambular paragraph of draft resolution A/C.1/L.401 and Add.1-2.

A vote was taken by roll-call.

Sudan, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.

In favour: Sudan, Syria, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Republic, United Republic of Tanzania, Yugoslavia, Albania, Algeria, Bulgaria, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cambodia, Congo (Brazzaville), Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Guinea, Hungary, Iraq, Mali, Mauritania, Mongolia, Poland, Romania.

Against: Sweden, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Canada, Central African Republic, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dahomey, Denmark, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, France, Gabon, Gambia, Greece, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Japan, Lesotho, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Malta, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Rwanda, South Africa, Spain.

Abstaining: Tunisia, Uganda, Upper Volta, Afghanistan, Barbados, Burma, Cameroon, Ceylon, Chad, Cyprus, Ethiopia, Finland, Ghana, Guatemala, India, Indonesia, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Laos, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Nepal, Nigeria, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia.

The fifth preambular paragraph was rejected by 59 votes to 24, with 30 abstentions.

177. The CHAIRMAN: The Committee will now vote on the amendment submitted by Albania to the sixth preambular paragraph contained in document A/C.1/L.401 and Add.1-2. The amendment is contained in document A/C.1/L.408.

A vote was taken by roll-call.

Uruguay, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.

In favour: Albania, Algeria, Burundi, Cambodia, Congo (Brazzaville).

Against: Uruguay, Venezuela, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Barbados, Belgium, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Canada,

Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Dahomey, Denmark, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Ethiopia, France, Gabon, Gambia, Greece, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Japan, Laos, Lesotho, Liberia, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Malta, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Rwanda, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America.

Abstaining: Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Bulgaria, Burma, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon, Ceylon, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Finland, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Lebanon, Libya, Mali, Mauritania, Mongolia, Nepal, Nigeria, Pakistan, Poland, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Republic, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta.

The amendment was rejected by 65 votes to 5, with 43 abstentions.

178. The CHAIRMAN: The Committee will now proceed to vote on the original sixth preambular paragraph of draft resolution A/C.1/L.401 and Add.1-2.

A vote was taken by roll-call.

Norway, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.

In favour: Poland, Romania, Sudan, Syrian Arab Republic, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Republic, United Republic of Tanzania, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cambodia, Congo (Brazzaville), Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Guinea, Hungary, Iraq, Mali, Mauritania, Mongolia.

Against: Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Rwanda, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Thailand, Togo, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela, Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Canada, Central African Republic, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dahomey, Denmark, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, France, Gabon, Gambia, Greece, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Japan, Lesotho, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Malta, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger.

Abstaining: Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Upper Volta, Afghanistan, Algeria, Austria, Barbados, Burma, Burundi, Cameroon, Ceylon, Chad, Cyprus, Ethiopia, Finland, Ghana, Guatemala, Guyana, India, Indonesia, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Laos, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Nepal, Nigeria.

The sixth preambular paragraph was rejected by 56 votes to 21, with 35 abstentions.

179. The CHAIRMAN: The Committee will now vote on the seventh preambular paragraph of draft resolution A/C.1/L.401 and Add.1-2 on page 2.

A vote was taken by roll-call.

Spain, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.

In favour: Sudan, Syria, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Republic, United Republic of Tanzania, Yugoslavia, Albania, Algeria, Bulgaria, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cambodia, Congo (Brazzaville), Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Guinea, Hungary, Iraq, Mali, Mauritania, Mongolia, Poland, Romania.

Against: Spain, Sweden, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Barbados, Belgium, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Canada, Central African Republic, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dahomey, Denmark, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, France, Gabon, Gambia, Greece, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Japan, Lesotho, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Malta, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Rwanda, South Africa.

Abstaining: Tunisia, Uganda, Upper Volta, Afghanistan, Burma, Cameroon, Ceylon, Chad, Cyprus, Ethiopia, Finland, Ghana, Guatemala, India, Indonesia, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Laos, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Nepal, Nigeria, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia.

The seventh preambular paragraph was rejected by 60 votes to 24, with 29 abstentions.

180. The CHAIRMAN: The Committee will now vote on the eighth preambular paragraph of draft resolution A/C.1/L.401 and Add.1-2.

A vote was taken by roll-call.

Botswana, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.

In favour: Bulgaria, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cambodia, Congo (Brazzaville), Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Guinea, Hungary, Iraq, Laos, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, Sudan, Syria, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Republic, United Republic of Tanzania, Yugoslavia, Albania, Algeria, Barbados.

Against: Botswana, Brazil, Central African Republic, China, Colombia, Dahomey, Denmark, Gabon, Gambia, Greece, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Philippines, Rwanda, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Australia, Belgium, Bolivia.

Abstaining: Burma, Cameroon, Canada, Ceylon, Chad, Chile, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Ghana, Guatemala, Guyana, India, Indonesia, Iran, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Saudi Arabia, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Afghanistan, Argentina, Austria.

The eighth preambular paragraph was rejected by 36 votes to 27, with 49 abstentions.

181. The CHAIRMAN: Before we proceed any further, I should like to inquire from the co-sponsors of the draft resolution whether, in the light of the vote, they would like to proceed to a vote on the operative part without the preamble. It may be helpful to have some indication from one of the co-sponsors.

182. Mr. MENDELEVICH (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translated from Russian*): As one of the sponsors of the draft resolution, the Soviet delegation requests that a vote should be taken on the paragraphs of the operative part together and not separately, since these paragraphs form the substance of the draft resolution.

183. The CHAIRMAN: The Committee will now proceed to vote on the operative part in its entirety.

A vote was taken by roll-call.

Mali, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.

In favour: Mali, Mauritania, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, Sudan, Syria, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Republic, United Republic of Tanzania, Yugoslavia, Albania, Algeria, Bulgaria, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cambodia, Congo (Brazzaville), Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Guinea, Hungary, Iraq.

Against: Malta, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Rwanda, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela, Argentina, Australia, Barbados, Belgium, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Canada, Central African Republic, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dahomey, Denmark, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, France, Gabon, Gambia, Greece, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Japan, Lesotho, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia.

Abstaining: Nepal, Nigeria, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Tunisia, Uganda, Upper Volta, Afghanistan, Austria, Burma, Cameroon, Ceylon, Chad, Cyprus, Ethiopia, Finland, Ghana, Guatemala, India, Indonesia, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Laos, Lebanon, Libya.

The operative part of draft resolution A/C.1/L.401 and Add.1-2 was rejected by 59 votes to 24, with 29 abstentions.

184. The CHAIRMAN: The Committee will now proceed to vote on the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.404 and Add.1-3, sponsored by fifteen Powers.

A vote was taken by roll-call.

Botswana, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.

In favour: Bulgaria, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cambodia, Congo (Brazzaville), Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Guinea, Hungary, Iraq, Mali, Mauritania, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, Sudan, Syria, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Republic, Upper Volta, Yugoslavia, Albania, Algeria.

Against: Botswana, Brazil, Canada, Central African Republic, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dahomey, Denmark, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, France, Gabon, Gambia, Greece, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Japan, Lesotho, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Malta, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Rwanda, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Barbados, Belgium, Bolivia.

Abstaining: Burma, Cameroon, Ceylon, Chad, Cyprus, Ethiopia, Finland, Ghana, Guatemala, India, Indonesia, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Laos, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Nepal, Nigeria, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Tunisia, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania, Afghanistan.

The draft resolution was rejected by 60 votes to 24, with 29 abstentions.

185. The CHAIRMAN: The Committee will now vote on the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.405 and on the amendments to that draft contained in A/C.1/L.407. Before we proceed to vote, I should like to ask the co-sponsors if they have any objection to all the amendments contained in A/C.1/L.407 being put to the vote at one time. If there is no objection, I shall take it that the Committee and the co-sponsors agree to this proposal.

It was so decided.

186. The CHAIRMAN: The Committee will now proceed to vote on the amendments contained in document A/C.1/L.407.

A vote was taken by roll-call.

Malaysia, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.

In favour: Mali, Mauritania, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, Sudan, Syria, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Republic, Yugoslavia, Algeria, Bulgaria, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cambodia, Congo (Brazzaville), Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Guinea, Hungary, Iraq.

Against: Malaysia, Malta, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Rwanda, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Barbados, Belgium, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Canada, Central African Republic, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dahomey, Denmark, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, France, Gabon, Gambia, Greece, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Japan, Laos, Lesotho, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi.

Abstaining: Nepal, Nigeria, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Tunisia, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Afghanistan, Burma, Cameroon, Ceylon, Cyprus, Ethiopia, Finland, Ghana, Guatemala, India, Indonesia, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya.

The amendments were rejected by 61 votes to 22, with 28 abstentions.

187. The CHAIRMAN: The Committee will now vote on the draft resolution proposed by Australia and 14 Powers, contained in document A/C.1/L.405 and Add.1.

A vote was taken by roll-call.

Argentina, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.

In favour: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Barbados, Belgium, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Canada, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dahomey, Denmark, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Ethiopia, France, Gabon, Gambia, Greece, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Laos, Lesotho, Liberia, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Malta, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela.

Against: Bulgaria, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cambodia, Congo (Brazzaville), Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Guinea, Hungary, Iraq, Mali, Mauritania, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, Sudan, Syria, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Republic, Yugoslavia, Albania, Algeria.

Abstaining: Burma, Cameroon, Ceylon, Cyprus, Finland, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Jordan, Kenya, Lebanon, Libya, Nepal, Nigeria, Pakistan, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Tunisia, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Afghanistan.

The draft resolution was adopted by 67 votes to 23, with 23 abstentions.

188. The CHAIRMAN: The Committee has concluded consideration of the draft resolutions and amendments before it under item 33, the Korean question.

189. I have received a request from two members of the Committee to explain their votes after the voting. I shall give them the floor tomorrow. Tomorrow two meetings are scheduled. After we complete the Korean question we shall take up the item proposed by Malta regarding the reservation of the sea-bed and the ocean floor exclusively for peaceful purposes—that is, agenda item 92. I hope that delegations will be ready to participate in that debate.

190. Now, personally, I should like to say a word to the representative of the Soviet Union and to add my voice to the congratulations which have been extended to him and to his delegation on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary

of the October Revolution. Other members of the Committee have spoken of the great achievements of the Soviet Union and its people in many fields since that historic date. I think a tribute should also be paid to the valuable contribution that the Soviet Union has made to the work of the United Nations since its very inception and the support it has thus given to the goal of peaceful international co-operation on which this Organization is founded.

191. I thank you all for your co-operation.

The meeting rose at 7 p.m.