

United Nations
**GENERAL
ASSEMBLY**

SEVENTEENTH SESSION

Official Records

**FIRST COMMITTEE, 1279th
MEETING**

Friday, 16 November 1962,
at 3 p.m.



NEW YORK

CONTENTS

	Page
<i>Agenda item 90:</i>	
<i>Question of general and complete disarmament: report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (continued)</i>	
<i>General debate (concluded)</i>	173
<i>Consideration of draft resolutions</i>	177

Chairman: Mr. Omar Abdel Hamid ADEEL
(Sudan).

AGENDA ITEM 90

Question of general and complete disarmament: report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (A/5197, A/5200, DC/203, A/C.1/867, A/C.1/871, A/C.1/875, A/C.1/L.312/Rev.2, A/C.1/L.317/Rev.1 and Rev.1/Add.1) (continued)

GENERAL DEBATE (concluded)

1. Mr. DEAN (United States of America) said that the various statements made during the debate would be of great help to all the members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee when they resumed their work in Geneva. It was said that the Committee had so far made no progress; but it should be borne in mind that both the Soviet Union and the United States, the latter with the support of the United Kingdom, had submitted to it draft outlines of treaties containing detailed provisions for disarmament. That was the first time in the history of the disarmament negotiations that such detailed proposals had been made.

2. It had also been agreed, in the joint statement of agreed principles drawn up in 1961 by the United States and the Soviet Union (A/4879) and endorsed by the General Assembly in its resolution 1722 (XVI), that disarmament should be carried out without creating any military imbalance at any stage. Although the United States did not consider that its disarmament proposals were necessarily the best possible, it had come to the conclusion after a year of intensive study that the most effective way of disarming would be to maintain the present military balance between the two sides while an international disarmament organization was set up to carry out the work of inspection, supervision and verification. The disarmament process, moreover, should take place in three stages, with a verified reduction of conventional arms, nuclear arms and manpower at each stage. A glance at the map would show that if, as desired by the Soviet Union, all nuclear weapons and all means of delivery together with all facilities connected with the production or launching of such weapons were destroyed in the first stage, and if at the same time 30 per cent of con-

ventional arms were eliminated, the United States, which was almost entirely surrounded by ocean, would be quite unable to respond to appeals from other parts of the world, or even from the United Nations itself. The Soviet Union and its allies, on the other hand, would have freedom of movement from East Germany to Communist China.

3. The Soviet plan provided for the elimination of all foreign bases in the first stage. But there again, the Soviet Union was in quite a different situation from the United States. Its territory was so vast that it did not need foreign bases—if the bases on the territory it had annexed over the last twenty years were not to be considered such. The United States had bases in Greece and Turkey because those countries had asked for its aid after the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR had boasted of his ability to use rockets against them. It was obvious that the Soviet plan would give the Soviet Union itself a tremendous military advantage at the end of the first stage. That was hardly an objective approach, and yet objectivity was essential if the goal of general and complete disarmament—including the elimination of all bases, whether domestic or foreign—was to be achieved.

4. The United States plan provided for the destruction of all nuclear weapons and means of delivery by the end of the third stage. It was prepared to sign a treaty stopping all nuclear tests in all environments with effective controls; if that was not done earlier, it should be done in the first stage of disarmament. At each stage the nature of the reductions would depend on the type of weapons involved, their location and the distribution of personnel. Two amendments^{1/} had been made to the United States plan^{2/} as a result of the discussions at Geneva, and the Soviet Union had also made several modifications^{3/} in its own plan.^{4/} One of the most interesting recent developments had been the statement made by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the USSR to the General Assembly on 21 September (1127th plenary meeting), in which he had suggested the possibility of retaining certain specified types of means of delivery until the second stage instead of destroying them all in the first stage. That proposal would certainly be the subject of more detailed discussion when the Geneva negotiations resumed, for it offered a considerable chance of progress.

5. Another problem which the two sides might discuss at Geneva would be the method of solving disputes as arms were reduced. The United States had proposed that in the second stage all parties should accept the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice without reservations, and that some way should be found of

^{1/} Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for January 1961 to December 1962, document DC/205, annex 1, sect. E and F.

^{2/} *Ibid.*, document DC/203, annex 1, sect. F.

^{3/} *Ibid.*, document DC/205, annex 1, sect. D.

^{4/} *Ibid.*, document DC/203, annex 1, sect. C.

strengthening the authority of the Court. It had also suggested that a United Nations peace observation corps might be established, since some such body would be necessary after the end of the third stage, when no nation was supposed to have any more arms. Considerable thought would have to be given to the question how it was to be set up, whether it should be entirely under the direction and control of the United Nations or whether individual members should agree to make certain quotas of troops and weapons available on call. Then there was the difficult question of whether the five permanent members of the Security Council should have any legal power over the way in which the United Nations peace corps was to be used. There would obviously be a great problem if after all five had disarmed completely, any one of them could veto the use of the peace corps. But if there was to be no veto, it would have to be agreed whether the decision to use the corps should be taken by the General Assembly, and if so by what vote. All those matters would be discussed in the Eighteen-Nation Committee. In view of the statements made by the Soviet Union and other members of that Committee, it appeared that there was a good chance of progress towards a ban on nuclear tests and towards general and complete disarmament itself.

6. Turning to the four-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.312/Rev.2), he believed that the United States position on nuclear-free zones was well known. While the First Committee could not force any group of States to enact a self-denying ordinance with respect to nuclear weapons and means of delivery, the United States would support efforts freely undertaken by all States in the Latin American area to work out arrangements for a nuclear-free zone, including adequate provision for verification. Once such arrangements were put into effect, the nuclear Powers ought to cooperate fully in helping to ensure that the area remained nuclear-free. The United States was thus sympathetic towards the four-Power draft resolution. But whether or not such arrangements were worked out would depend on the countries in the area. One Latin American country, which had recently attempted to acquire a nuclear capability, thereby threatening the rest of the area, had now adopted a stand which, if adhered to, would make the establishment of a nuclear-free zone impossible. The conditions stated by the Cuban representative at the previous meeting were quite unacceptable to the other Latin American nations and to the United States. It could only be concluded that Cuba was not willing to enter into arrangements for a nuclear-free zone. Since full agreement between the parties concerned was an essential condition for such regional arrangements, the United States delegation considered that it would be preferable to postpone action on the proposal until such agreement had been reached.

7. In that connexion, he wished to refer to the threat made by the Cuban representative at the previous meeting and by the Cuban Prime Minister in a letter to the Secretary-General, to the effect that United States reconnaissance aircraft would penetrate Cuban air space at the risk of being destroyed. The United States position was that until the agreement between the United States and the USSR providing for United Nations verification of the withdrawal of offensive weapons from Cuba had been carried out in full, it would be forced to continue to take measures to guard against any threat to the Western hemisphere from

Cuba, in accordance with the decisions taken by the Organization of American States.

8. Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that now that the Committee's debate on general and complete disarmament was drawing to a close, he thought it would be useful to draw some conclusions from the discussion. However, he was obliged first to reply to certain remarks made by the United States representative. Firstly, the United States representative had tried in the last part of his statement to give the impression that he was speaking on behalf of all the Latin American countries; but he had no right to do that and the United States position in the matter had received no support from those countries. Secondly, the statement that the United States intended to continue violating Cuban air space gave ground for serious concern over the possibility of maintaining peace in the Caribbean. Cuba, like any other country, had certain rights established by the United Nations Charter, by resolutions of the General Assembly and by the rules of international law. It was fully entitled, and indeed obliged, to take any measures necessary to protect its frontier from violations of any kind. Cuba's legitimate protest against the constant infringement of its sovereignty should therefore receive the Assembly's unanimous support.

9. The recent Cuban crisis, caused by the warlike activities of the United States, had given a special stimulus to the Committee's debates, compelling representatives to consider what could be done to avoid a thermo-nuclear war. The Soviet delegation fully agreed that the crisis had shown how urgent it was that an agreement should be reached on general and complete disarmament. As the representative of Ceylon had argued at the 1269th meeting, it had demonstrated the bankruptcy of the theories of containment and of the nuclear deterrent. The Soviet Union had long pointed out the danger of such theories, since it believed that peace could be achieved only by the abolition of weapons. However important other steps to reduce international tension might be, they could only be a palliative. The problem of disarmament was to be viewed first of all as a matter of eliminating the danger of nuclear war; the most important result of the Committee's debate was the general realization of that truth, which had been stated by representatives of socialist and neutralist countries, and even of some countries belonging to Western Military blocs. Clearly, therefore, it was that principle which must guide the future negotiations at the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

10. Many delegations had discussed the reasons why the Eighteen-Nation Committee had failed to achieve any tangible results; but unfortunately their accounts had not always been correct, and some had revealed a desire to confuse the issue. The statement of the Italian representative, for example, had been full of distortions, which inevitably raised the question whether his delegation really wanted an agreement on disarmament. He had insinuated that the Soviet Union had put forward its proposals merely for propaganda purposes, adding that if that was so, the negotiations might be dangerous as well as fruitless. The Soviet Union did indeed engage in propaganda and would continue to do so, but it was propaganda for peace and was accompanied by practical steps to preserve peace. The Soviet proposal for general and complete disarmament had also been called propaganda in its time, and Italy had been among those making that assertion. Yet everyone now recognized that the proposal must

be implemented as soon as possible, since it was the only reliable basis for peace. Even the Italian representative supported it.

11. The representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom and certain other countries had claimed that the main stumbling-block in the negotiations was the question of control and of measures to guarantee security while disarmament was being carried out and after it had been completed. It was undeniable that there were differences of opinion on those matters, but they were merely a reflection of a more basic disagreement concerning the actual nature of disarmament. What was the significance of control? A complete inspection of all national military forces and equipment unaccompanied by any reduction in such forces and equipment would provide absolutely no guarantee against war. It was not control that would prevent war, but disarmament. Hence the first task was to agree on the nature and extent of the basic measures of disarmament. When that had been done, the Soviet Union would be willing to agree on the necessary control measures. As the Hungarian representative had pointed out, the only secrets of importance related to military power and the technology connected with it. As that power was eliminated, the need for secrecy would disappear. And the representative of Bulgaria had demonstrated that all States were alike in that respect, a fact which must be accepted if the question of control was to be settled.

12. The same considerations applied to the maintenance of security. Before working out what measures were necessary in that connexion, the two sides must be clear what they intended to do with regard to disarmament, since it was only disarmament which would make such measures necessary.

13. The Soviet Government considered that general and complete disarmament should be begun by eliminating the danger of nuclear war. But it was not only the Soviet Union that wanted to avoid nuclear war. There were many countries, particularly the smaller, densely populated ones, which would suffer much more from such a war than the Soviet Union. In urging the need to remove that danger the Soviet Union was acting not only in its own interests but in the interests of mankind as a whole. In an earlier statement (1267th meeting), the Soviet delegation had explained why it was necessary to begin disarmament by eliminating the means of delivery of nuclear weapons. It should be noted that the Soviet Union was prepared to abolish nuclear weapons themselves in the very first stage, but since the United States and its allies would not agree to that, other paths had to be found. The method of neutralizing nuclear weapons by destroying the means of delivery had the advantage that it made the problem of control, to which the Western Powers attached so much importance, easier to solve.

14. The United States representative had tried to refute the Soviet argument that his delegation's plan would not ensure the prohibition of nuclear weapons. But he had failed to answer when asked directly why the United States had not agreed to include a statement of principle on the prohibition of nuclear weapons in the first articles of the draft treaty. Instead, he had quoted part of the United States draft referring to the elimination of nuclear weapons from the national arsenals of States. Apart from the fact that the United States formula would allow international forces to be armed with nuclear weapons, as was indeed the United States intention, it did not impose any definite obliga-

tion to remove them from national forces; indeed, it could only be regarded as expressing a general aspiration, since it was not tied down by any time limits applicable to the treaty as a whole.

15. Another argument advanced by the Western Powers was that the Soviet Union's proposals would give it a military advantage; but that objection was completely artificial. For a number of years the West had cultivated a picture of the Soviet Union as a country which, being technically backward, was obliged to rely on numerical strength and conventional arms. It was claimed that the West was obliged to counter Soviet conventional superiority with nuclear weapons. Such arguments were ridiculous, as was shown by the Soviet Union's well-known successes in science and technology. The Soviet Union's armed forces had all the most modern types of equipment at their disposal, and its defence system was based on that equipment. Thus by divesting itself of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery it would be sacrificing no less than the Western Powers. The Soviet proposals were not intended to give it an advantage; they were intended to halt the arms race and the slide towards nuclear war, and that would be to everyone's advantage. The Western Powers had not challenged the data, based on Western sources, which the Soviet Union had submitted to the Eighteen-Nation Committee to prove the fact that the forces in Europe at the disposal of the European members of NATO, without the United States, were approximately equal to those at the disposal of the Warsaw Pact countries. Under the Soviet proposal, that balance would be maintained throughout the process of disarmament, so that there was no justification for fear of Soviet superiority in conventional forces. Indeed, the Soviet Union had proposed a sharper cut in conventional forces during the first stage than that called for by the Western plan. It had even welcomed an Indian proposal to reduce the strength of conventional armed forces to 1.5 million men at the very outset, which had been rejected by the United States.

16. The argument that the Soviet Union derived some sort of military advantage from its geographical position was also unconvincing. If any State stood to gain, by reason of its geographical position, from the elimination of the means of delivering nuclear weapons, it was the United States, whose territory would once again become invulnerable to attack. As far as the European allies of the United States were concerned, the two blocs were, as he had already pointed out, equal in strength on the European continent. Nor was it true that the situation was affected by the problem of communications between the United States and Europe, since troops could be transported across the Atlantic with little difficulty nowadays. The United States seemed to be arguing that the Soviet Union's geographical position made disarmament impossible.

17. He was glad that the need to eliminate foreign military bases was gaining increasing recognition in the United Nations. Notwithstanding the United States representative's efforts to prove otherwise, there was a fundamental difference between such bases and the military installations set up by States in their own territory for defensive purposes. Foreign military bases posed a threat not only to the countries against which they were directed but also to those in which they were situated; by establishing bases in foreign countries, the United States was exposing the peoples of those countries to the danger of nuclear war. The Soviet Union could not give up its long-range missiles unless the threat to its security created by United

States bases was removed at the same time. Moreover, as the Syrian representative had pointed out, foreign military bases could also be used against countries which were fighting for their independence, as in the case of the imperialist attack on Egypt in 1956. It should be pointed out in that connexion that the United States base at Guantanamo, Cuba, was clearly an instrument of United States colonial policy.

18. The Western Powers contended that United States military bases had been brought into being by cold-war tensions and were defensive in nature. But those bases had existed long before the beginning of the cold war, and had in fact served to intensify it. Moreover, they could scarcely be termed defensive in nature, since the countries in which they were situated had never been attacked from the East but had on the contrary been a springboard for aggression against the East on more than one occasion. Spain was threatened by no one, whereas the United States bases in its territory threatened not only peace but also the Spanish people, since they helped to support the reactionary Franco régime.

19. The Irish representative had said at the 1267th meeting that establishing a foreign nuclear base was like pushing a gun through a neighbour's window and could have dangerous consequences. It was unfortunate, however, that the Irish representative had not taken an equally forthright position when the United States had established its nuclear bases in such countries as Italy, Greece, Turkey, the Federal Republic of Germany, and Spain.

20. The Soviet disarmament plan was designed to maintain the strategic balance of forces while disarmament was under way. The Western Powers' objections to it did not spring from their fear that the balance would be upset but rather from their unwillingness to undertake genuine disarmament measures during the first stage. The United Kingdom representative had made that clear when he had said that the Soviet draft treaty was overloaded with disarmament measures in the first stage.

21. The Western Powers contended that general and complete disarmament could best be achieved by simultaneously reducing all types of armaments in the same proportion. That approach made little sense, since nuclear weapons obviously represented a far greater threat to peace than did, for example, machine-guns or pistols. Since the Western Powers agreed that the question of nuclear testing deserved priority, he wondered why they did not take the same position with regard to nuclear disarmament.

22. The Soviet draft treaty provided for measures to maintain international peace and security after disarmament had been achieved. However, the problem of maintaining peace in a disarmed world was not simply a matter of setting up the proper machinery: of equal importance was the willingness of States to make use of existing instruments for regulating international relations. In the recent Cuban crisis, it was the United States which had by-passed the United Nations and brought the world to the brink of nuclear war, whereas the Soviet Union had shown its desire to work through the United Nations. The United States was opposed to the world-wide movement for national liberation. However, it was not the national liberation movement that was violating the principles of the United Nations Charter but rather those who were forcing the colonial peoples to take up arms in their fight for freedom. The United States appeared to favour the establishment

of an international police force which, after the achievement of disarmament, would dictate the kind of régime each country would have. He noted, in that connexion, that the United States representative had asked whether the use of international armed forces in a disarmed world would be subject to a veto. The United States representative was surely aware that, under Article 43 of the Charter, such matters were decided by the Security Council. If he was in favour of revising the Charter, he should say so openly.

23. He would also like to point out that the Western Powers had as yet had nothing specific to say in reply to the Soviet contention that the control measures proposed by the West would, in the absence of substantial measures of disarmament, be merely a means of gathering military information about the other side.

24. Many speakers had referred to the desirability of creating denuclearized zones as a means of reducing international tension and hastening the conclusion of an agreement on general and complete disarmament. The Soviet Union and other socialist countries had consistently favoured such measures. However, the United States representative in his first statement (1267th meeting), while speaking in favour of nuclear-free zones, had nevertheless made it clear that he visualized the establishment of such zones only in areas where there were at present no nuclear weapons. At the present meeting, moreover, he had expressed misgivings about the proposal for the denuclearization of Latin America (A/C.1/L.312/Rev.2) because of certain additional suggestions offered in that connexion by the Cuban representative. In any case, the denuclearization of Latin America would have little meaning so long as the United States continued its preparations for nuclear war in Europe, the Middle East and elsewhere. The vast military preparations under way in West Germany were well known, even though the Soviet Union, unlike the United States, did not carry out unauthorized flights over the territory of other countries. It had recently been reported from London that the United Kingdom Government planned to join with other Western European countries in establishing a "Western European nuclear force". It should be noted in that connexion that the United Kingdom representative was among those who had spoken in the First Committee against the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons.

25. The United States Secretary of State had recently said that he would like to see a United Nations meeting at which each State simply indicated the contribution it was prepared to make to disarmament. He was glad to make such a statement now on behalf of his Government: the Soviet Union was prepared to destroy, in the first stage of disarmament, all of its missiles and other means of delivering nuclear weapons; it was willing to reduce its armed forces to 1.7 million men, or even less, at the same time. It was prepared to eliminate all nuclear weapons in the second stage, or even, if the Western Powers agreed, in the first stage. In addition, it favoured the implementation of all those measures under strict international control. His Government therefore felt entitled to ask the United States whether it was prepared to take comparable measures by dismantling the nuclear bases which it was maintaining in various parts of the world.

26. Mr. DE LEQUERICA (Spain), exercising his right of reply, said that the Spanish bases established by agreement between Spain and the United States were merely a normal part of the Western defence system

which had been made necessary by the Soviet threat to world peace. In reply to the Soviet representative's remarks against colonialism, he said that Spain was no longer a colonial country. However, he quoted an editorial in The New York Times of 24 September 1960, which spoke of the Soviet Union's colonial dominion over Hungary and other countries as well as many non-Russian peoples now living in the prison of nations which constituted the Soviet Union. The article had added that colonialism should indeed be ended as soon as possible, but that the United Nations and the world should make sure that the Soviet colonial empire was included.

27. Mr. DEAN (United States of America), exercising his right of reply, said that the Soviet Union's secret establishment of nuclear missile bases on Cuban soil had created a grave threat to the peace, security and defence of the Western hemisphere and the whole world. The nations of the Western hemisphere had reacted strongly to that threat, through regional arrangements clearly recognized in the United Nations Charter and in keeping with well-accepted principles of international law. An agreement had been reached between the United States and the Soviet Union which gave hope of eliminating the threat; representatives at the United Nations could judge for themselves whether the Cuban Government was facilitating the implementation of that agreement or placing obstacles in its way.

28. Since the Soviet Union had so far failed to fulfil its agreement to secure on-site inspection of the dismantling of Cuban missile bases, air surveillance was the only means of assurance left; contrary to the Soviet representative's statement, he (Mr. Dean) had never said that such surveillance was a violation of Cuban air space.

29. The United States had given freedom to the people of Cuba, as it had to the people of the Philippines. He challenged the Soviet representative to name even one country among the territories which had come under the control of the Soviet Union during and after the Second World War to which it had granted independence since that time.

30. The CHAIRMAN declared the general debate on the item under discussion concluded.

CONSIDERATION OF DRAFT RESOLUTIONS (A/C.1/L.312/REV.2, A/C.1/L.317/REV.1 AND REV.1/ADD.1)

31. Mr. MATSCH (Austria) said that draft resolution A/C.1/L.317/Rev.1 and Rev.1/Add.1 recalled the grave dangers to humanity inherent in the menace of nuclear war, and reaffirmed the principles agreed upon in the joint statement of the United States and the Soviet Union, endorsed by the General Assembly in its resolution 1722 (XVI) as the basis for negotiations on general and complete disarmament. At the same time, it recognized the inescapable fact that the efforts of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament at Geneva had not yet produced **substantial agreement but only a rapprochement of a limited character**. Nevertheless, it welcomed the spirit of compromise displayed by the leaders of the major Powers. In that spirit and in the light of all the considerations mentioned, the draft set forth the following provisions.

32. Operative paragraph 1 reaffirmed the need for the conclusion, at the earliest possible date, of an

agreement on general and complete disarmament. Operative paragraph 2 called upon the Eighteen-Nation Committee to resume its negotiations at Geneva expeditiously and in a spirit of constructive compromise. Operative paragraph 3 recommended that the Eighteen-Nation Committee should also give urgent attention to a various collateral measures which could result in a strengthening of mutual confidence; examples that might be cited were measures to reduce the risk of war by accident, miscalculation or failure of communications, to prevent the use of weapons of mass destruction in outer space, to check the further dissemination of nuclear weapons, to secure the establishment of nuclear-free zones, to provide for the stationing of observers at key road and rail centres to report on military movements, and to ensure the immediate halting of the arms race as a preliminary step to general and complete disarmament.

33. The purpose of operative paragraph 5 was to enable the Secretary-General to provide the Eighteen-Nation Committee with the documents and records of the current discussion, so as to give it the benefit of the valuable comments made by delegations during the debate. He hoped that the draft resolution would receive the unanimous support of the First Committee, and he appealed to the eighteen delegations who would soon return to negotiate at Geneva to continue their efforts with the same perseverance.

34. Mr. JACOME (Ecuador) said that draft resolution A/C.1/L.312/Rev.2, while it did not directly point the way to general and complete disarmament, offered a means by which Latin America would be prevented from becoming an area of nuclear warfare or of preparation for nuclear warfare. He did not believe that the denuclearization of Latin America would make it an easy prey for conquest or domination by militarily stronger Powers; despite their relative weakness, the Latin American States had maintained their individuality and independence, and they trusted in the protection of international law and morality, as embodied in the Charter of the United Nations. Until the values of the Charter prevailed as the standard of international conduct, the inter-American system could be relied upon for the peaceful and friendly settlement of disputes arising within the hemisphere and for protection against any outside threat. His delegation had therefore joined the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/L.312/Rev.2, and hoped that it would meet with the approval of the First Committee.

35. Mr. COULIBALY (Mali) said that he wished to express his Government's disappointment at the impasse reached on the disarmament question despite prolonged negotiation. The difficulties standing in the way of disarmament were not so much technical as **political; they were caused chiefly by the distrust between the two opposing blocs led by the two major nuclear Powers**. Satisfactory results could not be expected from negotiation in an atmosphere in which each side was most concerned with justifying that distrust. In addition, competition between the two blocs in various regions produced sporadic crises, the most recent of which had been the Cuban crisis.

36. The manufacture and stockpiling of all weapons, particularly nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons, should be condemned unanimously by all who were working for the progress and survival of humanity. What was needed in the First Committee's discussions **was not exchanges of charges between East and West or philosophical justifications of one or another social**

system, but concrete and objective proposals by the major military Powers for the urgent solution of the disarmament problem. He appealed to the Powers currently engaged in the manufacture and dissemination of weapons, especially weapons of mass destruction, to realize the dangers to which they were exposing the peaceful nations of the world.

37. His Government was opposed to the presence of foreign bases in any country, and believed that any treaty or agreement on general and complete disarmament should provide for the elimination of such bases. The Eighteen-Nation Committee should resume its work without delay, and should heed the aspirations expressed in the First Committee on behalf of all nations. All humanity wished to put an end to the manufacture of weapons, and desired the complete destruction of existing stockpiles and the reconversion of war industries, so as to usher in an era of peaceful co-operation based on mutual confidence.

38. His delegation therefore recommended the unanimous adoption of draft resolution A/C.1/L.317/Rev.1 and Rev.1/Add.1. But its adoption was not enough; and its implementation would depend in large measure on the sense of responsibility of the Powers currently engaged in the arms race. Without their understanding and willingness to sacrifice, the United Nations would be weakened, to the great detriment of all humanity.

39. Mr. BAGHDELIEH (Tanganyika) said it was regrettable that so little had been achieved in the efforts to bring about an agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union on a solution to the disarmament problem. He hoped that France would be persuaded to attend the deliberations of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament when it reconvened.

40. The dangerous effects of armaments had been demonstrated in connexion with the situations at Suez, in the Congo and, most recently, in Cuba. When the great Powers had a surplus of arms, they were tempted to use them against small nations or supply them to opposing factions in order to create international tension while furthering their own ambitions. The Western Powers were currently arming the Government of South Africa out of all proportion of its defence needs. His Government was gravely concerned about the supply of arms to South Africa; moreover, it was reliably reported that bases were being built in that country and that atomic missiles would soon be made available to it. It was the imperialistic ambition of the racist Government of South Africa to annex Bechuanaland, Swaziland and Basutoland and absorb South West Africa, and possibly to give extensive assistance to Southern Rhodesia after the dissolution of the Central African Federation. The case of South Africa showed clearly why the small nations placed such stress on disarmament and on halting the supply of nuclear armaments to countries not at present in possession of them.

41. His delegation believed that any disarmament treaty must provide for control and inspection by an international organization; in the field of disarmament, inspection did not imply any surrender of sovereignty. In addition, it held that foreign bases and the means of delivering nuclear weapons should be done away with at a very early stage.

42. His delegation strongly recommended the adoption of draft resolution A/C.1/L.317/Rev.1 and Rev.1/Add.1, which would encourage the resumption of negotiations in a new spirit of constructive compromise until agreement was reached. The great Powers must realize that mankind was tired of being kept in fear under the balance of terror, which made the future uncertain for the ordinary citizen of any nation.

43. He warned against any talk of war for freedom; freedom could be preserved or extended only by a growing feeling of security and a diminution of the fears that promoted intolerance.

44. Mr. BOTHA (South Africa), exercising his right of reply, emphatically rejected the Tanganyikan representative's charge that South Africa was arming itself for offensive purposes, as well as his remarks concerning the construction of bases and the delivery of missiles to South Africa.

45. Mr. BARNES (Liberia) said that everyone was agreed that in a nuclear age war could no longer be an instrument of national policy or a means of solving international disputes. Moreover, the experience of the First and Second World Wars had proved that wars could not be localized or limited. The extreme precariousness of the present situation had been recognized by the leaders of the United States and the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, efforts to achieve general and complete disarmament had thus far ended in stalemate.

46. His delegation recognized the fundamental differences between the United States and Soviet programmes for disarmament. However, the pressing need for the removal of the existing threat to mankind's survival made it imperative to continue working for a reasonable solution until a meaningful agreement was reached; draft resolution A/C.1/L.317/Rev.1 and Rev.1/Add.1 could achieve that goal.

47. His delegation would vote in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/L.312/Rev.2 providing for the denuclearization of Latin America. In its view that draft resolution constituted a collateral measure in the disarmament scheme as a whole and was similar to General Assembly resolution 1652 (XVI) on the denuclearization of Africa.

48. Despite the conviction of reasonable men that a nuclear war would destroy all humanity, some strategists still gave the impression that a nuclear war could be "won" at some cost in casualties. It might perhaps be useful if the Eighteen-Nation Committee, upon the resumption of negotiations, would consider what the biological, economic, social and political effects of a nuclear war would be. That would have the salutary effect of further stimulating the efforts to achieve a disarmament agreement.

49. He emphasized the importance of eliminating international distrust if peace was to be maintained. He hoped that the Eighteen-Nation Committee would resume its negotiations at an early date and, with the co-operation of the great Powers, would bring them to a successful conclusion.

The meeting rose at 6.5 p.m.