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**Chairman: Mr. Francisco URRUTIA (Colombia).**

**AGENDA ITEM 67**

**International co-operation in developing the peaceful uses of atomic energy: report of the United States of America (A/2734, A/2738, A/C.1/L.105) (*continued*)**

1. Mr. VYSHINSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics), recalled that various other representatives had reviewed the history of scientific discoveries in physics and chemistry and had mentioned outstanding scientists whose contributions to the development of science had led to the great discovery of atomic energy. For his part, he wished to supplement those statements with some facts concerning that sphere of scientific research in the USSR.

2. As was well known, atomic science was based on two fundamental principles: the law of the conservation of matter, discovered in the eighteenth century by the Russian scientist Lomonosov and the French scientist Lavoisier; and the law of the conservation of energy, discovered in the nineteenth century by Meyer, Joule, and Helmholtz. Those two laws were of course merely two aspects of a single principle, since it had been established that matter could be transmuted into energy and vice versa. That transformation was to be observed in the process of the fission of the uranium nucleus.

3. It was fitting, in that connexion, to emphasize the importance, in the development of nuclear physics, of the discovery made in 1869 by the Russian scientist, Mendeleev, of the periodic law of chemical elements. Mendeleev's law had paved the way for subsequent discoveries in the field of the transformation of elements.

4. The first step in that direction had been Becquerel's discovery, in 1896, of the radio-activity of uranium, but ten years earlier the Russian scientist, Butlerov, had established the principle of the divisibility of the atom.

5. In 1898, as Mr. Moch had recalled (708th meeting), Marie Skłodowska Curie and her husband, Pierre Curie, had discovered the principle of the radio-activity of thorium; moreover, from ores found at Joachimsthal, in Czechoslovakia, they had discovered two other radio-active elements: polonium—so named in honour of Marie Curie's native Poland—and radium. It was worth noting that those elements had subse-

quently been given their appropriate places in Mendeleev's periodic table.

6. The discovery of radio-activity, apart from its practical value, had had a profound effect on scientific methodology, since it had destroyed the notion of the immutability of the atom and shown that vast reserves of energy were located in the nucleus.

7. Mr. Vyshinsky recalled that Mr. Moch had mentioned the names of various scientists who had contributed to the development of nuclear physics. He wished to point out, in that connexion, that the fundamental law of the equivalence of mass and energy had been foreshadowed by the law of light pressure, discovered by the eminent Russian physicist, Lehedev.

8. Mr. Moch had referred to various periods in the development of atomic science. During the second of those periods, between the two world wars, Soviet scientists had done very important work in that field. Atomic energy was now extensively used in Soviet industry, agriculture, biology and public health. Numerous problems connected with the use of radio-active substances for peaceful purposes had been solved. Soviet science made extensive use of tracers to study various chemical and biological processes. Tracers were also used in solving many complex problems in various fields of science and technology. Radiation and radio-active isotopes were extensively used in Soviet medicine, industry and other fields; Mr. Vyshinsky listed a number of examples of such uses.

9. A major step in the peaceful utilization of atomic energy had been the opening in the USSR of the world's first industrial electric power station run by atomic energy. The date of 27 June 1954 would remain as a real milestone in the use of atomic energy for peaceful ends. On that date, the power station, with a usable output of 5,000 kilowatts, had started to provide electric power for industry and agriculture. Work was in progress on the building of other industrial atomic power stations, with an output of 50,000 to 100,000 kilowatts.

10. Whereas, in the United States and other Western countries, there were constant warnings against expecting too rapid progress in the utilization of atomic energy for peaceful purposes, in the USSR there were no apprehensions on that score, since nothing warranted them. The Soviet State was able to produce atomic energy on an extensive scale and was profoundly concerned that that energy should be used only for peaceful purposes and for the well-being of the people; such utilization of atomic energy by other countries too would result in a tremendous increase in world productivity and wealth, as well as in technical and cultural progress.

11. Mr. Vyshinsky recalled that Mr. Saburov, the Deputy Prime Minister of the Soviet Union, had declared on 6 November that Soviet science had achieved great strides in utilizing atomic energy for

peaceful ends. One of the most striking illustrations of Soviet achievements in that field was the electric power station run by atomic energy to which Mr. Vyshinsky had already referred. That generator was already in operation and was supplying current to industry and agriculture in adjoining regions. The USSR Government attached great importance to the further electrification of the country and, as a result of its efforts, three times more electric power was being produced than before the Second World War. Vast hydro-electric power stations had been put into operation and others, including the world's largest, were under construction in various parts of the Soviet Union. Atomic energy would undoubtedly play a great part in the further development of the power resources of the USSR.

12. It was only natural that the Soviet Union should be insisting so strongly on the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes only. It wanted to eliminate all threats to the peaceful work of the Soviet peoples and of all peoples, since all were interested in peace and in guarantees against the danger of a new world war. That danger was increased by the race in the accumulation of atomic, hydrogen and other weapons whose destructive force grew greater year by year.

13. As for the references to the difficulties of rapid and large-scale development in the use of atomic energy to produce electric power, the USSR delegation considered that real difficulty lay in the basic trend of the policy of the countries concerned, especially the United States and the United Kingdom.

14. It was no accident that the Chairman of the United States Atomic Energy Commission, in a report to the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy, had said that two decades would have to pass before fissionable material could compete with conventional fuel. That pessimistic note had been sounded by various representatives in the First Committee in statements to the effect that at present the utilization of atomic energy for peaceful purposes was economically unsound and unprofitable, and was likely to remain so for years to come.

15. The Press reports on the report of the Chairman of the United States Atomic Energy Commission had further indicated that, in the near future, nuclear power facilities would not be able to compete even with diesel power plants either in the Middle East or in numerous parts of Southern Asia or Latin America; atomic power could compete with diesel power only where diesel fuel costs were more than 25 cents per gallon and where electric power demand guaranteed a large workload.

16. In that connexion, Mr. Vyshinsky noted that the periodical, *Business Week*, had recently indicated that, according to the aforementioned report, technical and economic considerations were not the only ones to account for the fact that it was unlikely that atomic energy would be used for the development of other countries for some time to come. The periodical had stated that as long as the cold war continued, it would be difficult to persuade Congress to approve a wide dissemination of information on atomic energy, let alone persuade it to appropriate funds for financing any extensive development of atomic energy abroad.

17. Thus the policy of stockpiling atomic weapons on the one hand, and considerations as to the profitability of using atomic energy for peaceful purposes on the other, created the two main difficulties con-

fronting the Western countries in putting into effect any extensive programme for the peaceful use of atomic energy. According to published material, not one of the nuclear reactors in operation in the United States was being used to generate power for industry and agriculture, and work on the construction of the only power facility envisaged for that purpose was not to begin till the following year.

18. Various representatives, and in particular the representatives of Canada and Liberia, had pointed out that the question under consideration was closely linked to the question of the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of the atomic weapon; that it was indeed the other side of the coin. The organic link between the peaceful use of atomic energy and the prohibition of the atomic weapon was, of course, an unchallengeable fact. That was the way in which the question had been stated at previous sessions of the General Assembly. In the historic resolution which the General Assembly had adopted unanimously on 24 January 1946 (resolution 1 (I)), establishing the Atomic Energy Commission it had instructed that Commission to submit specific proposals for extending the exchange of basic scientific information among all nations concerning peaceful uses of atomic energy for control of atomic energy to the extent necessary to ensure its use for peaceful purposes only and for the elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons and all other major weapons adaptable to mass destruction.

19. In reality, every ton of fissionable material earmarked for the production of atomic weapons meant that much less production of atomic energy for peaceful purposes, and that much less use of that magnificent discovery of human reason for the welfare of mankind. Yet the representatives of the United States and its partners had not referred to that point during the debate, although it had paramount importance.

20. In its negotiations and correspondence with the United States, the USSR Government had already had occasion to point out that the implementation of the United States proposals for the creation of an international pool of atomic materials to be used for peaceful purposes would not remove the threat of atomic warfare, since the major part of nuclear materials would continue to be earmarked for the production of atomic weapons and States able to produce them would in no way be prevented from further increasing their stockpiles.

21. It would appear that the authors of the original proposal put forward by President Eisenhower on 8 December 1953 (470th plenary meeting) had never envisaged that proposal as a means of eliminating the threat of a war waged with atomic or hydrogen weapons. That very circumstance had given rise to increasing misgivings in various countries, the more so since atomic and hydrogen weapons were becoming ever more destructive in nature. It should be noted that atomic projectiles and similar horrible instruments were being used to equip infantry units.

22. Mr. Vyshinsky agreed with the statement made on 5 November (707th meeting) by the representative of the United States to the effect that the paramount problem facing the world was the danger of atomic war. Mr. Lodge had also said that there must be the promise of something more than explosions. But promises could have no weight unless backed up by effective measures calculated to benefit mankind. What

was needed was action to eliminate the threat of war, to reduce the burden of armaments and to remove existing obstacles to peaceful and friendly co-operation among peoples. That was why the USSR pressed for such measures as the unconditional prohibition of atomic and hydrogen weapons and, as a step in that direction, the unconditional undertaking not to use those weapons. It was profoundly convinced that the efforts of all peace-loving peoples should be directed to that end. The repeated USSR proposals on the subject were in line with the demand of all peoples for an end to the atomic armaments race and for the adoption without delay of measures aimed at sparing mankind the horrors of a war waged with atomic and hydrogen weapons.

23. It could not be doubted that, as the USSR had pointed out in its note of 22 September 1954 (A/2738), an international agreement prohibiting atomic weapons and instituting a system of control to ensure observance of that prohibition would open wide prospects for the utilization of atomic energy for peaceful ends. If military uses were prohibited, all atomic energy would have to be used for peaceful purposes, provided, of course, that the principles of international law were observed and States complied with the principle of *pacta servanda sunt*.

24. It had been further stated, in the Note of 22 September, that although agreement had not thus far been reached, the significance of the efforts made to reach agreement should not be minimized. Such efforts, Mr. Vyshinsky said, should be pursued; indeed, the need for an agreement was more urgent than ever, as he had made clear during the discussion of the Soviet proposal (A/C.1/750) for an international convention on the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons, a proposal which would be discussed in the near future by the Disarmament Commission and its Sub-Committee.

25. An unconditional undertaking, in the form of an international convention, to refrain from using atomic weapons, would greatly facilitate and expedite the implementation of the disarmament proposals set out in the Soviet draft resolution. It should be noted, however, that the Soviet Union did not make the execution of those proposals contingent upon a prior undertaking to refrain from using atomic weapons. That was also the USSR position regarding accession to an international agreement for the development of atomic energy for peaceful purposes, and regarding participation in an international agency set up to that end.

26. The President of the United States had said, on 8 December 1953, that one of the purposes of the creation of an international pool of fissionable materials was to begin to diminish the potential destructive power of the world's atomic stockpiles and to find some acceptable solution for the problem of atomic armaments, in other words, of the atomic armaments race. But there was no reason to believe that, if the proposed agreement on international co-operation in developing atomic energy for peaceful purposes were adopted, it would help to halt the armaments race or, *a fortiori*, to eliminate the threat of another world war.

27. It was well known that the production of atomic materials was increasing every year, and that it was increasing so quickly that the earmarking of a small

amount of atomic materials for peaceful ends would in no way reduce the quantity of atomic and hydrogen bombs produced. It was also well known that it was possible to produce atomic energy for peaceful ends by a process which would not only fail to decrease but, on the contrary, would increase the quantity of fissionable materials involved. Non-dangerous fissionable materials could thus become dangerous and could be used for atomic and hydrogen weapons. The USSR Government had already pointed out that the proposed plan for developing the use of atomic energy for peaceful ends would thus lead to an increase in the stockpiles of atomic weapons, without any limitations at all. It was clearly impossible to pin hopes of any cessation of the atomic armaments race on the proposal set forth in the United States *aide mémoire* of 19 March 1954 (A/2738), although it was not clear whether that was still what was proposed.

28. Supporting evidence could be found in a recent article in the *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, stating that the exploitation of atomic energy inevitably implied a constant increase in the reserves of concentrated fissionable fuel materials. The article stated that while the distinction between such materials and weapon-grade materials was undoubtedly meaningful, it gave no grounds for complacency concerning the accumulation of large reserves of plutonium and other fissionable materials which were the basis for a large-scale and growing peaceful atomic industry. The elementary facts, the article had declared, were such that if many countries in the world were not to forego the use of atomic energy, large reserves of atomic explosives would be accumulated all over the globe. The ease with which such reserves could be turned to destructive ends had also been stressed by Mr. Baruch in his book *A Philosophy for our Time*.

29. Further support for the USSR position on that point could be found in *The New York Times* of 20 May 1954 in an article entitled "An Atomic Maginot Line", by Mr. Hanson Baldwin, which stated that industrial reactors produced radio-active by-products of potential military significance. The article thus confirmed the indubitable fact that it was essential to take steps to halt the production of atomic weapons.

30. The USSR Government, while warmly supporting the idea of using atomic energy for peaceful purposes, deemed it essential to strive for a radical solution of the problem of the use of atomic energy, since in the absence of such a solution there could be no assurance that that energy would not be used for the production of weapons. It was confident that the possibilities of agreement on international co-operation in developing the peaceful uses of atomic energy were far from exhausted. It was profoundly convinced, however, that international co-operation in that field could be fruitful only if based on principles that would rule out the possibility of exploiting such co-operation against the legitimate interests of States.

31. The first of those principles—which, incidentally, had already been set out in the Soviet Note of 22 September 1954—was that an agreement concerning the use of atomic energy should not put any country or group of countries in a privileged position of which they could take advantage to impose their will on other States. The proposals contained in the seven-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.105) were contrary to that important principle. The USSR Government believed that the proposed international agency, estab-

lished by international agreement, could successfully perform its functions only if its terms of reference were broad enough to enable it to carry out effectively the tasks assigned to it, and if, at the same time, its powers could not be used to the detriment of the security of States. It took that view because, as Mr. Vyshinsky had just pointed out, the mere fact of using atomic energy for peaceful purposes did not prevent the production of materials which could be used for armaments. Control was essential, a control based on certain principles which would safeguard the interests of all States, so that none could obtain a privileged position.

32. The USSR had sought clarification of the present United States proposal, which appeared to reduce the responsibility of the international agency to the General Assembly and to the Security Council. Mr. Lodge's answer, although evasive in its wording, had left no doubt that the United States was trying to eliminate the Security Council from the question. The suggestion that the international organ should be connected with the United Nations by an agreement similar to the agreements between the United Nations and the specialized agencies, which were only tenuously connected with the General Assembly, let alone the Security Council, was contrary to the principles set forth in the USSR Note of 22 September.

33. Moreover, the point draft resolution contained provisions which virtually determined the character of the international agency in advance, whereas that was a matter which should clearly be subject to subsequent negotiations and conversations of the kind which the United States had expressed its readiness to conduct with the USSR on questions relating to the establishment of an international agency for developing the peaceful uses of atomic energy. No progress could be made in the matter if the mutual interests of all the parties were not taken into consideration.

34. The Soviet delegation therefore considered that those provisions should be deleted from the joint draft resolution. To determine the character of the agency at that stage would be ill-advised and would make it more difficult to reach mutually acceptable agreements on a number of important technical questions. Such technical questions could not be circumvented by facile answers, and the United States representative would doubtless have given the Committee more reassuring answers had he devoted more time to the matter. Mr. Vyshinsky was confident that the joint draft resolution could be modified in such a way as to make it acceptable to all members of the Committee.

35. Resolution 1 (I), of 24 January 1946, had stated that the Atomic Energy Commission was to deal with problems that had arisen as a result of the discovery of atomic energy. The new international agency would have the same aim; it should therefore have the same basis and similar tasks and conditions of work. The resolution of 1946 had provided that the Atomic Energy Commission was to submit its reports and recommendations to the Security Council, which reports and recommendations would be made public unless the Council, in the interests of peace and security, directed otherwise. The Council had thus had the right to issue directions to the Commission in matters relating to peace and security, although the Commission was to be autonomous in working out proposals for the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes. Since it was widely agreed, however, that the two questions of the prohi-

bition of the atomic weapon and the development of the peaceful uses of atomic energy were but two sides of the same coin, how was it possible to leave the Security Council out of account? The argument that the veto operated in the Security Council was untenable; the principle of the concurrence of the five permanent members was the mainspring of the Security Council.

36. The joint draft resolution conflicted with the principle set out in resolution 1 (I) that in matters relating to peace and security the Atomic Energy Commission would be accountable to the Security Council, since the draft now before the Committee provided that the agency, once it was established, should negotiate an appropriate form of agreement with the United Nations, similar to those of the specialized agencies. Mr. Vyshinsky wished to point out that the relationship of the specialized agencies with the United Nations was of a very different nature, and that it was not covered by resolutions such as that of 24 January 1946. If the time had now come to set up an international agency to deal with matters relating to the peaceful uses of atomic energy, the appropriate foundation was at hand—the unanimously adopted resolution of 24 January 1946.

37. Turning to the question of the functions of the proposed agency, Mr. Vyshinsky recalled that he had sought to elicit some explanation (708th meeting) from the United States representative as to why the scope of international co-operation in the peaceful uses of atomic energy had been so evidently narrowed down under the present plans, as was clear from a comparison between Mr. Lodge's statement of 5 November (707th meeting) on the one hand, and, on the other hand, President Eisenhower's statement of 8 December 1953 (470th plenary meeting) and the United States memorandum of 19 March 1954 (A/2738). Mr. Lodge's reply (709th meeting) that the United States did not intend to restrict the scope of its technical assistance was unsatisfactory. The difference between the earlier plans and the present plan was striking.

38. The current plan of work for the international agency would rule out, at least for some years, the important task mentioned by President Eisenhower on 8 December 1953, namely, the supplying of power and energy to those areas of the world where there was a shortage of it. In that connexion, the Committee had been told that it should not expect abundant electric power resources to materialize overnight, a warning which was scarcely necessary. The important thing however, was to lay down a programme to ensure that the matter would not be shelved. Furthermore the present proposals completely ignored the promise made the previous year of a plan which would encourage investigation into the most effective peacetime uses of fissionable materials. And whereas the memorandum of 19 March 1954 had included among the functions of the agency the supply of specialized equipment, the conduct of experiments and tests, and the provision of aid in making financial arrangements for the support of appropriate projects, such functions had been omitted from the present plan. Even the training of atomic specialists was now to be undertaken by the United States itself because, according to the United States representative, it would be impossible for the agency to undertake that task and work out the necessary programme in the first years of its activity.

Why it would be impossible, Mr. Vyshinsky did not know.

39. It could not be expected, of course, that complex programmes should be carried out in short order, but if the plan of work was thus to be limited for a number of years, leaving aside the most important task of technical and economic assistance in the utilization of atomic energy for peaceful ends, which in previous plans had been regarded as the core of the agency's work, was it not accurate to say that the current plan did in fact narrow down the scope of the proposed international co-operation? Everything could not be done at once, but a comprehensive plan could make provision for technical and economic assistance at a later stage. The solution of important problems, such as the provision of substantial assistance to those in urgent need of assistance should not be indefinitely deferred.

40. Mr. Moch had said (708th meeting) that it was impossible to examine the atomic problem without looking at the broader problem of the development of power resources. Yet although Mr. Moch was a co-sponsor of the joint draft resolution, that text did not even hint at the solution of the momentous problems discussed by the representative of France. Mr. Moch had cited very interesting facts concerning the utilization of power in under-developed countries—which should rather be termed “under-industrialized” countries—and had rightly concluded that the only way to raise standards of living was to solve the problem of atomic energy in the interests of all mankind, with priority for the under-developed areas, which accounted for two-thirds of the world's population. Mr. Vyshinsky therefore hoped that Mr. Moch would find it possible to support the USSR point of view in that respect when a start was made in dealing with practical problems. It would be easy to include in the plan provisions which would correct its deficiencies with regard to economic and technical assistance.

41. The question of measures for reducing the potential destructive force of atomic energy was also important, and it could not be answered by saying that that aspect came under the heading of disarmament, since disarmament was admittedly linked to the problem under discussion. President Eisenhower's speech had placed that question at the head of the problems to be solved. His proposal had now been reduced to a mere offer to supply isotopes and to organize courses of study. The authors of the joint draft resolution might not be able, at that point, to clarify the exact connexion between the two problems; in that case, the USSR delegation would welcome assurances that attention would be given to the matter in the agency itself and that the agency's plan of work would include an item on the reduction of the potential destructive force of atomic energy. It was of course impossible to lay everything down at once in a single draft resolution; it would be sufficient to state that that would be one of the agency's tasks. Unless something was done on those lines, the joint draft resolution would be a purely formal document.

42. The representative of Sweden had stressed the need (710th meeting) for clarifying those points, stating that it would be necessary to define the connexion between the United States plan, on the one hand, and a definitive disarmament plan in the field of nuclear weapons, on the other hand. The representative

of Sweden had also drawn attention to the serious USSR argument that the very application of atomic energy for peaceful purposes could be used for increasing the production of atomic weapons and had quoted the United States answer to the effect that ways could be devised to solve that problem. Mr. Sandler had naturally asked what those ways were and why such safeguards should be kept secret if they had already been discovered. Mr. Vyshinsky wholeheartedly endorsed the perspicacious comments of the Swedish representative on that matter, which could not be brushed aside.

43. The United States representative had said that the international agency must be a kind of clearing-house and that since the resources of the agency would be limited, it would be more useful to use them for additional programmes rather than for expensive custodial measures. The meaning of that statement was not clear. Mr. Vyshinsky understood it to mean that if projects for the use of fissionable material transferred through the international agency from one State to another were made contingent upon approval by the international agency, the agency would have the right to approve or reject the plans established by States for the use of fissionable materials for peaceful ends. But for the decisions of the international agency to be binding on its members, even if those decisions were unacceptable to the States concerned, would spell a flagrant violation of international law, and the Soviet delegation could not agree to such a situation.

44. Turning again to the joint draft resolution, Mr. Vyshinsky criticized it on the grounds that it limited the circle of participants in the international agency and in the international conference, and that it envisaged the agency as a specialized agency, instead of a body within the United Nations. Those shortcomings would hamper the progress of international co-operation in developing the peaceful uses of atomic energy. The USSR delegation believed that a number of questions relating to such co-operation required further examination in the form of negotiations between the States concerned. Mr. Vyshinsky proposed to revert to the matter when the Committee came to the discussion of specific proposals. At that stage, he merely wished to declare that the USSR supported the principle of international co-operation in developing the peaceful uses of atomic energy, and would continue to press for such co-operation.

45. Mr. LODGE (United States of America) stated that he would make a few remarks at the present meeting, replying *in extenso* to the points raised by the Soviet representative at the following meeting of the Committee. The representative of the USSR had appeared to be concerned about the support of the United States Congress for the proposed programme and about the attitude of the United States business community. When President Eisenhower had made his proposal in December 1953, he had taken all those factors into account. Far from opposition or delay, the Congress at its previous session had amended the Atomic Energy Act so that it would conform to the proposal which President Eisenhower had made. Those amendments enabled the United States to make materials and information available outside the country. There was no evidence of any resistance from the United States business community. The Soviet representative had again used Press articles as sacred

evidence of United States official policy. It was necessary to reiterate that the United States had a free Press which spoke for itself and not for the Government.

46. The plan under discussion was not a disarmament proposal. The question of disarmament had already been discussed in the First Committee and had been referred to the Disarmament Commission. The present plan was something entirely different, and it was senseless to complain that it was not a disarmament proposal.

47. Mr. Lodge wished to make it clear that he had not said that the United States refused to have any connexion between the proposed agency and the Security Council. He had expressed the hope that this matter would not be paralysed by the veto. He took no joy in the veto, the abuse of which had paralysed the legal power of the Organization. The United States Government was only eager to carry out the present plan without its being frustrated by Soviet vetoes.

48. The USSR representative's remarks about alleged changes in the United States proposal were particularly remarkable when it was remembered that the Soviet Government had had ten months in which to accept the original draft. The Soviet representative had criticized the new draft because it was not the same as the old draft. When it was old he would probably criticize it because it was not new. That would be amusing if it were not tragic to see the evident plan to delay action. Mr. Lodge inquired what the Soviet Union wanted, what it would accept, what it would give that would come anywhere near matching what the United States had offered.

49. Noting that the Soviet representative had said he warmly supported the development of the peaceful uses of atomic energy, the United States representative expressed the hope that that did not mean that Mr. Vyshinsky was merely supporting that development inside the Soviet Union. Mr. Lodge hoped it meant that the Soviet representative would vote for the joint draft resolution before the First Committee and thus make the benefits of the peaceful uses of atomic energy available to the whole world.

50. Mr. VYSHINSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) stated that he had heard with satisfaction the statement of the United States representative to the effect that the United States did not rule out a link between the proposed agency and the Security Council. If that were so, it constituted a significant step forward, and the only question that remained to be decided was the form that that link should take. Mr. Lodge said he did not like the veto, but the veto had been supported both by Mr. Dulles in his book *War or Peace* and by Edward R. Stettinius in 1945. The principle of unanimity was the basic principle for the co-operation of the great Powers.

51. The USSR delegation had found in the present draft as well as in the previous one both satisfactory and unsatisfactory aspects. When the Committee started to discuss the text of the joint draft resolution, the Soviet delegation would submit certain provisions for incorporation in that draft in order to make it acceptable to the Soviet Union.

52. Mr. BELAUNDE (Peru) stated that his delegation believed that the peaceful use of atomic energy was closely and directly related to the development of the under-industrialized countries, and it was in that connexion that he had referred (710th meeting) to the close relationship between the joint draft resolution submitted by the Powers which he had called the "nuclear Powers", and the draft resolution under consideration in the Second Committee on the establishment of a special fund for the economic development of the under-developed countries. But that did not mean that Peru in any way underestimated the generous offer made by the industrial Powers.

53. Mr. Belaúnde then pointed out that he had also said, in his earlier statement, that the conference which was to be convened under the present plan should serve not only as a platform for the exchange of scientific information, but also as an open forum where the under-industrialized countries could state their needs.

54. The Peruvian delegation had reserved its right, at that time, to submit a proposal for the setting up of regional centres where in addition to exchanging information, the nine States concerned would consider what types of power would be most suitable for the development of the under-industrialized countries, and how such power should be used.

55. Mr. Belaúnde hoped, therefore, that the representative of the Soviet Union would agree that he had not intended, in his previous statement, to give second place to the use of atomic energy for the needs of under-developed or under-industrialized countries.

56. The representative of Peru agreed with the USSR delegation that there was a very close relationship between the present item and the disarmament question. However, the development of the peaceful uses of atomic energy should not be subordinated to the results of the work of the Disarmament Commission. Work should be carried on concurrently on both questions, and it was to be hoped that even if the Disarmament Commission did not achieve speedy results, the peaceful application of atomic energy would create an atmosphere in which the great Powers would feel constrained not to divert atomic energy to military uses. Mr. Belaúnde did not think, however, that there was any need to refer to that matter in the present draft resolution since, as the USSR representative had himself recognized, the question of disarmament and the question of the prohibition of atomic weapons must be settled in a convention, and it was for the Disarmament Commission, not the First Committee, to draft the convention. At the moment, the First Committee could consider only the question of the peaceful uses of atomic energy, and that goal required universal support.

57. With regard to the part which the Security Council should play in the proposed international agency Mr. Belaúnde felt that the under-industrialized nations would be more likely to have their requests for nuclear energy met in a body which took decision by majority vote than in the Security Council, where owing to the principle of the unanimity of the permanent members of the Council, one negative vote could defeat such requests.

The meeting rose at 5.15 p.m.