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Chairman: Mr. C. W. A. SCHURMANN
(Netherlands).

AGENDA ITEM 26

Question of general and complete disarmament: report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (A/5408-DC/207, A/5488-DC/208) (continued)

GENERAL DEBATE (continued)

1. Mr. PALAMARCHUK (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) said that despite the long effort to achieve disarmament, the turning-point marked by the submission in 1959 by the USSR of a proposal for general and complete disarmament under strict international control,^{1/} and the many other proposals made since then by the Soviet Union, it had not proved possible to reach agreement. It was not the socialist countries that were responsible for that situation; it was common knowledge that the opposition came from the United States military-industrial complex, which had a stake in perpetuating the arms race. In an article published in the September 1963 issue of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Senator Joseph S. Clark had clearly brought out the negative attitude which the United States Congress was taking towards disarmament even during the current period of relatively relaxed tension; thus, even while United States spokesmen continued to speak of disarmament, the United States was accelerating the arms race by announcing its intention to establish a NATO multilateral nuclear force. It was difficult to accept the argument that the Federal Republic of Germany had undertaken not to manufacture nuclear weapons, since it was to be given control over nuclear weapons to be supplied to NATO. His delegation fully shared the Polish delegation's view of the irredentist attitude of the German militarists; it should be recalled that the Defence Minister of the Federal Republic had recently stated that United States military forces in Europe should under no circumstances be reduced, and that he had been able to gain his point in Washington.

2. Despite the efforts made by some delegations, which deserved commendation, the results achieved by the Eighteen-Nation Committee had been utterly inadequate. What little progress there had been with

regard to general and complete disarmament was of a marginal nature. The Committee worked in the shadow of a mountain of armaments, and not a single decision had been taken with a view to carrying out the disarmament programme which was essential to a lasting peace. Although it was the socialist countries that had called for the establishment of the Eighteen-Nation Committee, they could judge its work only on the basis of the results achieved. The Soviet Union had proposed that there should be a meeting of the States represented on the Committee at the summit level during the first half of 1964; the Committee's future prospects would depend on whether that proposal was carried out. No delegation had opposed it, and a number of countries, both members and non-members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee, had given it their support, thus indicating their desire that the Committee should become a more dynamic body.

3. Now that the Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water had been signed, it should be possible to conclude agreements on collateral measures. While a non-aggression pact between the States parties to the North Atlantic Treaty and the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty would not, of course, be sufficient in itself to prevent war, it would have a not inconsiderable deterrent effect. The arguments advanced against such a pact were unfounded; the Charter of the United Nations had prevented neither the establishment of NATO nor the unification of the Warsaw Treaty countries. Moreover, the countries which might accede to the pact were not all Members of the United Nations. In any event, such a pact would reduce international tension in the area where it was most dangerous, i.e. in Europe; it was for that reason, incidentally, that a multilateral pact of the kind suggested by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Brazil in the General Assembly (1208th plenary meeting) seemed less advisable at the present time. It had also been contended that a non-aggression pact could not be concluded unless it contained guarantees concerning West Berlin. However, that issue did not come within the scope of a pact of that kind; if they were concerned about it, there was nothing to prevent the Western Powers from bringing the matter up in its proper context, i.e. in connexion with the conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany.

4. Reverting to the question of general and complete disarmament, he expressed the view that the draft treaty submitted by the Soviet Union^{2/} met the demands of mankind and took account of present world conditions. The prohibition and complete destruction of nuclear weapons was the corner-stone of the Soviet programme, whereas the Western proposals did not embody an unqualified obligation to destroy weapons of mass destruction. It should be noted in that connexion that a number of countries had expressed the view that

^{1/} See Official Records of the General Assembly, Fourteenth Session, Annexes, agenda item 70, document A/4219.

^{2/} Official Records of the General Assembly, Seventeenth Session, Annexes, agenda item 90, document A/C.1/867.

the conclusion of the partial test ban treaty should open the way for the complete prohibition of nuclear weapons. His delegation hoped that even the sceptics would ultimately come to recognize that disarmament was a realistic and attainable objective. The pressure of public opinion must be brought to bear on those who still opposed it, so that war would be banished for ever as a means of solving international problems.

5. Mr. PALAR (Indonesia) said that for the first time the General Assembly was in a position to note that there had been progress towards disarmament. More than one hundred countries had signed a partial nuclear test ban treaty; the Assembly had adopted resolution 1884 (XVIII) calling upon all States to refrain from placing weapons of mass destruction in outer space; and a direct communications link had been established between the Heads of Government of the Soviet Union and the United States. Other measures were under consideration, and the Soviet Union had just made an important concession by agreeing that the two major nuclear Powers should retain part of their deterrent force until the end of the third stage of disarmament. That was an encouraging move, for the two disarmament plans, originally conceived on the basis of opposing strategies, had until now provided scarcely any basis for comparative study. As the representatives of the United Arab Republic and Sweden had pointed out, a new situation had now been created and could be exploited. However, the Eighteen-Nation Committee, and particularly the nuclear Powers, would have to abandon theories founded on fear and suspicion and take advantage of the existing opportunity to negotiate on measures directly related to general disarmament. The General Assembly must do everything possible to further that end.

6. The question of "collateral measures" was necessarily a many-faceted one. Some of those measures came within the scope of the actual disarmament programme; they would be dealt with separately, either because they were preparatory steps leading to the implementation of disarmament or because they seemed to give promise of early agreement. Others, such as those designed to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, would probably not be included in the general disarmament treaty but would be embodied in other agreements which, it was to be hoped, would be negotiated prior to the treaty. Everyone was familiar with the collateral measures suitable for early negotiation; they were primarily concerned with reducing the risk of war by accident or surprise attack, preventing the dissemination of nuclear weapons, fixing a cut-off date for armaments production, freezing armaments at existing levels and transferring fissionable material to peaceful uses. Two other important proposals on the First Committee's agenda were the establishment of nuclear-free zones and the signing of a convention to prohibit the use of nuclear weapons.

7. In his delegation's view, there was much value in the Soviet proposal for a non-aggression pact between the NATO and the Warsaw Treaty countries. Technical collateral measures such as those he had just mentioned would have no effect if the political atmosphere was not favourable; for that reason, measures should be taken to ease the tensions of the cold war. The Western Powers, however, did not seem to be convinced that such a pact would be in their interest at present. The chief obstacle preventing Western consent was the problem of the status of the German Democratic Republic. The West feared that the Soviet Union might

use the proposed pact to bring about the formal confirmation of the German Democratic Republic as an independent State, an eventuality which the Federal Republic of Germany declared it would never accept. But there were some indications that the Soviet Union might be willing to come to an arrangement under which the question of the status of East Germany would be side-stepped. If that proved to be the case, his delegation would strongly urge the West to make concessions in its turn. The problems caused by the division of Germany must be resolved if any significant progress was to be made in disarmament negotiations, and they would have to be resolved by the States responsible for creating the situation in the first place. In any event, the issue could not be allowed to hinder the progress of disarmament.

8. A favourable political climate for the solution of cold-war issues and for the accomplishment of general disarmament could be created by achieving some progress towards agreement on collateral measures and a comprehensive test ban treaty. He had already stated (1317th meeting) during the debate on the question of nuclear tests that any progress made on collateral measures would encourage the three nuclear Powers to refrain from further testing and, conversely, that negotiations on a comprehensive test ban would help to bring about agreement on collateral measures. The influence exerted in the matter by the pressure of public opinion could not be overestimated. That pressure must not be relaxed, and for that reason his delegation supported the Soviet proposal that a meeting of the Heads of Government of the countries participating in the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament should be held in 1964. Mr. Lester Pearson, the Prime Minister of Canada, had said that great care would be necessary to ensure that the results of such a meeting were not disappointing. At the present state of negotiations, when some agreements had already been reached and others were within sight, the negotiating Powers could not afford to disappoint the hopes of mankind. World public opinion would compel them to negotiate in earnest and inhibit them from abandoning earlier agreements. There was reason to expect that several meetings of Heads of Government would be held during the disarmament process, for what was involved for all was a war against the threat of annihilation.

9. The President of the United States, Mr. Kennedy, had recently acknowledged that within about two years the People's Republic of China would have to be invited to join the disarmament negotiations. But much of the success of those later discussions would depend on what had been achieved earlier. No Power—France not excepted—could escape its responsibility in that matter. A successful summit conference in 1964 could influence the attitudes towards disarmament negotiations of both France and the People's Republic of China.

10. Until the three nuclear Powers provided convincing evidence of their intention to renounce the use of nuclear weapons and to disarm, France would never renounce its desire to become a nuclear Power, or consent to join in the disarmament negotiations. It was therefore urgent to take immediate steps to convince France of the genuineness of the "détente" between East and West on disarmament matters.

11. In the case of the People's Republic of China, the problem was different, since that country had been excluded by other States from the disarmament negotiations. There were signs, however, of a swing of

public opinion in favour of co-operation with the People's Republic of China. It was difficult to imagine its participation in disarmament negotiations without a reconsideration by the Western Powers of their position on the status of Taiwan—which was a prerequisite for among other things, the solution of the question of Chinese representation in the United Nations. It was reasonable to hope that the realities of the situation would be appreciated, but in view of the urgency of the matter, it might be possible to reach some interim solution which would enable the People's Republic of China to participate in the disarmament negotiations at the proper time. Some use might, for example, be made of the fact that the Eighteen-Nation Committee was not wholly a creation of the United Nations; its composition, it would be recalled, had been decided by the United States and the Soviet Union in joint consultation and had then been endorsed by the General Assembly in resolution 1722 (XVI). Thus, it should be possible for those two Powers to invite the People's Republic of China to participate in the discussions. If they felt that the balance in the Eighteen-Nation Committee might be disturbed by the presence of the People's Republic of China, they could perhaps bring in two additional countries—say, one Western Power and one non-aligned Power. In any case, even if the problem of Chinese representation in the United Nations had not been solved by that time, the Peking Government might perhaps be able to accept an invitation from a committee that was not technically a United Nations body. Of course such an invitation would be tendered only when the present negotiations on collateral measures and a comprehensive test ban treaty had approached a successful conclusion. The pressure of world public opinion and the need for bringing the People's Republic of China to the forum as soon as possible would probably force the Powers now negotiating to reach a stage of significant agreement within a year. Therefore, by the nineteenth session of the General Assembly it might be possible for the Indonesian delegation to frame its suggestion that the People's Republic of China should be invited to participate in the work of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament in the form of a draft resolution that would stand a good chance of being adopted.

12. Mr. BENITES (Ecuador) said that the only document on the denuclearization of Latin America was a declaration by the Presidents of Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Mexico and Ecuador (A/5415/Rev.1) which gave moral expression to a desire that could later be converted into a legal commitment. It should be pointed out first of all that the capacity to sign bilateral or multilateral agreements rested solely on the sovereignty of States, and that, provided that such agreements were of such a nature as to encourage the relaxation of international tensions, the United Nations could not oppose them but rather had the duty to encourage them. It had been asserted that in establishing a denuclearized zone due regard must be had to the balance of military forces; that might be true when nuclear weapons already existed in the zone, but it did not apply to zones in which there were no nuclear weapons. As for appropriate measures of verification and other technical and legal aspects of the question, they would naturally be taken into consideration when the Latin American countries were negotiating a denuclearization treaty; in that respect also, the decisions taken would be based on the sovereignty of the States concerned. In addition, it had been declared that there must be

unanimous consent on the part of the States in the zone to be denuclearized; that was obviously true, but there was nothing to prevent certain States from arriving even today at partial agreements aimed at the future denuclearization of the entire zone.

13. The denuclearization of geographical regions was not a new idea. In its resolution 1652 (XVI), the General Assembly called upon Member States to consider the continent of Africa as a denuclearized zone; there was no reason to deny to Latin America what had been granted to Africa. Moreover, the importance of denuclearization had been stressed in other decisions of the General Assembly, specifically in certain provisions of resolution 1665 (XVI). Furthermore, both the United States and the USSR, in their drafts submitted to the Eighteen-Nation Committee, had included provisions for the non-transfer of nuclear weapons.

14. A number of special reasons could be cited to support the idea of the denuclearization of Latin America. First, since the industrial development of the Latin American countries—even the most advanced—was not complete, all their resources should be devoted to the economic development and social welfare of their peoples. Secondly, none of the countries in question could manufacture or accept nuclear weapons without diverting part of the economic potential necessary for raising their standards of living. Thirdly, the possession of nuclear weapons by one or more countries of the zone could lead to an armaments race. Fourthly, the general development of history and international law in Latin America favoured the use of peaceful means of resolving international differences. Lastly, the actual use of nuclear weapons in Latin America for purposes of common defence was an unknown quantity and might not justify the dangers it would create.

15. The progress of technology suggested that the problems of storing nuclear weapons and setting up means for launching weapon vehicles would shortly lose much of their significance, and that the danger of new nuclearized zones would tend to diminish correspondingly.

16. In conclusion, he paid a tribute to the Eighteen-Nation Committee for the part it had played in connexion with the agreements already concluded; he was confident that that Committee could assist the disarmament negotiations by encouraging agreements on points about which there was no fundamental disagreement between the major nuclear Powers and by preventing the spread of nuclear weapons to areas which were still free from them. Ecuador sincerely hoped that the United States proposal to transfer 60,000 kilogrammes of fissionable material to peaceful uses, provided the Soviet Union transferred 40,000 kilogrammes, would be implemented during the first stage of disarmament.

17. Countries such as Ecuador were greatly interested in certain applications of nuclear energy, among other things for desalinating sea water for use in agriculture and industry, and in the campaign against tropical diseases. It was to be hoped that in future atomic energy would cease to be something terrifying and would become a factor for peace and harmony.

18. Mr. KHOSBAYAR (Mongolia) welcomed the fact that the partial measures taken since the previous session of the General Assembly had had a beneficial influence on the international climate. They did not eliminate the danger of nuclear warfare, however;

general and complete disarmament alone could safeguard and preserve world peace. It was therefore regrettable to note that the arms race was being pursued at an increased pace and that the Eighteen-Nation Committee had made hardly any progress because the Western Powers were constantly seeking to delay the solution of the problem of disarmament.

19. The Mongolian Government whole-heartedly supported the draft treaty on general and complete disarmament submitted by the Soviet Union as being best calculated to ward off the threat of a nuclear war. Moreover, it was well known that, in a conciliatory spirit, the Soviet Union had agreed that the parties might retain a certain number of missiles until the end of the third stage—a proposal that deserved to be closely studied. On the other hand, the United States disarmament plan would not eliminate the danger of a nuclear war and could therefore not serve as a basis for an agreement on general and complete disarmament.

20. The adoption of partial measures—such as the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the NATO countries and the Warsaw Treaty countries, the signing of a declaration under which States would renounce the use of foreign territories for storing nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, measures to prevent a surprise attack, and the conclusion of an agreement prohibiting all nuclear weapon tests—would help to ease international tension and to bring about general and complete disarmament. The conclusion of the proposed non-aggression pact would be an especially important step because it was in Europe that the armed forces of the two major nuclear Powers were concentrated. Nevertheless, far from supporting that suggestion, the NATO countries continued to take measures that were likely to increase international tension. One such measure was the plan to establish a NATO multilateral nuclear force, which was clearly intended to satisfy the demands of the West German revanchists. Other strategic measures designed to increase the nuclear strength of NATO were also planned. It was clear that the Western countries should renounce such measures, which were in contradiction with the very aims of disarmament. Nor was it normal that in peace-time the United States and its allies should maintain numerous military bases on foreign soil and endeavour to reinforce them by equipping them with the most modern nuclear weapons. The fact that the United States was considering replacing those bases by atomic submarines armed with Polaris missiles only increased the danger of a surprise attack. It was consequently indispensable that all military bases on foreign soil should be immediately liquidated. Lastly, his delegation favoured the establishment of denuclearized zones, particularly in central Europe and the Mediterranean area.

21. If the Eighteen-Nation Committee was to discharge its difficult task successfully, it would have to deal seriously with the fundamental problems and embark on practical negotiations, taking into account the proposals made during the current session of the Assembly. In that respect, a meeting of the Eighteen-Nation Committee at the highest level, as proposed by the Soviet Union, might prove extremely useful. He hoped that the General Assembly would take constructive decisions designed to guide the work of the Eighteen-Nation Committee towards the speedy con-

clusion of an agreement on general and complete disarmament.

22. Mr. MAJID (Afghanistan) welcomed the improvement in the international atmosphere brought about by the achievements of the previous two months and hoped that it would herald other agreements that would strengthen international harmony and safeguard mankind against annihilation. The question of disarmament was one of prime importance, and the encouraging statements made by the representatives of the great Powers afforded hope that future negotiations would help to narrow the gap between the parties. Efforts should be made to reach agreement in particular on the following questions: the cessation of underground tests, the prevention of wider dissemination of nuclear weapons, safeguards against surprise attack, the reduction of the risk of war by accident or miscalculation, the transfer of fissionable materials to peaceful purposes, and the establishment of denuclearized zones. The General Assembly should therefore provide the Eighteen-Nation Committee with directives which would assist it in its work. It was to be hoped that that Committee would duly study the various proposals that had been made, and that the world's leading statesmen would take advantage of the prevailing favourable climate in order to press forward the negotiations on disarmament.

23. His delegation favoured the creation of denuclearized zones and considered that the United Nations should take steps towards that end, for the advocates of such zones were motivated by peaceful aspirations and by concern for the welfare of their peoples.

24. Mr. BARNES (Liberia) considered it essential that an agreement on disarmament should be reached if mankind was to be safeguarded against destruction. To that end, a satisfactory system of international control and inspection must be established as an essential condition, and the principle of retaining properly balanced forces during the disarmament process must be observed. Although the differences between the United States and Soviet proposals were marked, that did not alter the fact that the necessary compromise solutions should be sought without delay. That task lay within the province of the Eighteen-Nation Committee, which should therefore resume its negotiations as soon as possible. In view of the improvement in the international climate resulting from the agreements recently achieved in various fields, there was reason to hope that some progress could be made towards disarmament.

25. His delegation strongly favoured the establishment of denuclearized zones, but felt that the countries concerned should first reach an agreement on that subject; the General Assembly could then give the agreement its approval.

26. The question of convening a conference for the purpose of signing a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons should preferably be referred to the Eighteen-Nation Committee, which was in the best position to study it.

27. He trusted that the Eighteen-Nation Committee would strive for the adoption of other collateral measures likely to ease international tension still further, and that it would redouble its efforts to achieve a meaningful agreement on disarmament as quickly as possible.

The meeting rose at 5.10 p.m.