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Chairman: Mr. C. W. A. SCHURMANN
 (Netherlands).

AGENDA ITEM 74

Denuclearization of Latin America (A/5415/Rev.1, A/5447 and Add.1, A/C.1/L.329) (continued)

GENERAL DEBATE AND CONSIDERATION OF DRAFT RESOLUTION A/C.1/L.329 (continued)

1. Mr. TARABANOV (Bulgaria) said that the idea of denuclearization owed its origin to the peoples' desire to remove the danger of war by eliminating nuclear weapons from certain areas. Thus, the establishment of denuclearized zones was designed to safeguard the security of States and help to improve the international situation. The People's Republic of Bulgaria believed that the establishment of such zones would help to create favourable conditions for general and complete disarmament, and for that reason favoured the denuclearization of Latin America.

2. It was regrettable that the countries belonging to the Western military alliances had thought it necessary to set prior conditions for the establishment of denuclearized zones. The United States representative had contended, for example, that the establishment of such zones in areas where nuclear weapons were stored under existing agreements would upset the balance of power and might serve to increase tension; he thus ruled out the possibility of establishing denuclearized zones in Europe, Asia and the Pacific, i.e. in the areas that were covered with United States nuclear bases. In addition, the Australian representative had formulated four conditions for the establishment of denuclearized zones—that all the countries in the area were in agreement, that the denuclearization arrangement was one that did not upset the balance of power, that a satisfactory verification system existed, and that there were no nuclear targets in the zone in question. It had also been stated that the initiative must come from the countries of the area concerned. In setting those conditions, the Western countries were

trying to use the establishment of denuclearized zones for their own purposes. In particular, to contend that denuclearized zones could not be established in areas where nuclear weapons were already installed meant taking a position that was at variance with the idea of denuclearization, since the latter was a process designed to bring about the complete elimination of nuclear weapons from the zones in question.

3. It was surprising that some Latin American delegations seemed resigned to accepting the conditions set by the Western Powers. Although it had been said that the United States, by setting those conditions, had acknowledged, by implication, that the denuclearization of Latin America would not upset the balance of power, he feared that to accept the United States conditions when the forthcoming studies were carried out might heavily mortgage the future of denuclearization in general. The socialist countries were therefore in favour of unconditional denuclearization. The Soviet Union had indicated its willingness to provide every guarantee necessary to ensure respect for denuclearized zones or individual States which declared their territory denuclearized. The United States, on the other hand, was creating artificial obstacles in order to retain its military bases in Latin America while at the same time proclaiming its support for the denuclearization of that region. It was obvious that Latin America could not be denuclearized so long as the United States retained bases there which could be transformed into nuclear bases at a moment's notice. Hence, the adoption of draft resolution A/C.1/L.329 could only serve to create the illusion that the denuclearization of Latin America could be achieved without compelling the United States to dismantle its bases in the region. Moreover, it would in effect mean accepting the various conditions set by the United States, and would thus hinder the establishment of denuclearized zones in other areas.

4. His delegation would therefore be unable to support the draft resolution on the denuclearization of Latin America.

5. Mr. FEDORENKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that his country had always favoured the establishment of denuclearized zones, which would help to reduce the risk of war, check the spread of nuclear weapons and create an atmosphere of trust favourable to the achievement of general and complete disarmament. His Government felt that the obligations resulting from the establishment of such zones could be assumed not only by States comprising an entire continent but even by groups of States and individual States. Proposals had been made for the denuclearization of virtually every part of the world, including Europe. It was regrettable, in that connexion, that militarist circles in West Germany and other countries opposed the adoption of the Rapacki plan, which could help to reduce tension and safeguard the security of the countries concerned. In any event, some of the

decisions adopted by the General Assembly—for example, resolutions 1652 (XVI) and 1884 (XVIII)—and the conclusion of the Antarctic Treaty of 1 December 1959 showed that the desirability of establishing denuclearized zones was recognized. Nevertheless, no denuclearized zone had actually been established as yet, owing to the fact that the Western Powers, unlike the Soviet Union, were laying down a whole set of conditions which were blocking progress in that direction. The United States contended, for example, that it was not possible to denuclearize Europe or other areas in which nuclear weapons were part of "existing security arrangements", since that might upset the balance of power. That argument was obviously only a pretext which the United States was using for the purpose of opposing denuclearization. Furthermore, it might well be asked what right the United States had to exclude certain areas automatically without first consulting the countries concerned, particularly since many States had declared that the question of whether to belong to a denuclearized zone was solely one for the decision of the sovereign States concerned. Thus, although it claimed to be opposed to the dissemination of nuclear weapons, the United States was trying to exclude dozens of countries from the area in which the dissemination of those weapons would be prohibited.

6. The conclusion of the Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, signed at Moscow on 5 August 1963, and the adoption of General Assembly resolution 1884 (XVIII) had opened new prospects for progress towards disarmament through such measures as the establishment of denuclearized zones. A number of States, including the countries of Latin America, had indicated their willingness to make arrangements for the denuclearization of their territory. Those States could conclude regional or group agreements or even treaties transforming a particular area into a denuclearized zone, or, as a first step, they could declare their own territory a denuclearized zone. However, while it was most desirable that Latin America should be denuclearized, it was obvious that the aims of draft resolution A/C.1/L.329 could not be achieved unless the nuclear Powers were prepared to respect that region's status, and, in particular, unless the United States undertook to refrain from installing nuclear weapons south of its frontiers, to liquidate its military bases in Latin America, and to refrain from employing nuclear weapons against the States of that region. The other nuclear Powers with colonies in Latin America should enter into a similar undertaking. However, the United States would not agree to those conditions, and by refusing to abandon its military bases in the area was demonstrating that it was in reality opposed to the denuclearization of Latin America. His delegation would therefore be unable to support the draft resolution; it hoped, however, that the United States would reconsider its position in the matter.

7. Mr. HAJEK (Czechoslovakia) said that while the spectre of nuclear war would be finally banished only by general and complete disarmament, he was nevertheless in favour of all measures for restricting the proliferation and use of nuclear weapons. Genuine denuclearization of any part of the world was in the interest of all countries, and it assumed great moral and practical importance in the case of areas where the presence of nuclear weapons made the danger more obvious.

8. He agreed that any decision concerning the denuclearization of a zone, region or group of countries must be made by the sovereign States directly concerned and that no one had the right to interfere with or set conditions for the implementation of that decision. The question arose what role the United Nations had to play. Under the Charter and the relevant resolutions, the General Assembly was required to support any decision looking to regional denuclearization taken by the States of a given area and to help to create conditions favourable to the achievement of that aim. The Assembly must therefore state its views clearly on the position of the nuclear Powers. It was not enough for the countries concerned to state that they were prepared to conclude denuclearization arrangements. The decision was not one for them alone, since for the most part they were not in possession of nuclear weapons and did not intend to produce them or acquire them from other States. The nuclear Powers must undertake to respect the zone's status, i.e. not to introduce nuclear weapons into the zone, not to transfer such weapons to the States comprising the zone, not to provide those States with information enabling them to manufacture such weapons, not to introduce nuclear weapons into territories under their jurisdiction or into military bases established in the zone, and to remove any nuclear weapons that might be in the zone. They must also, as the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the USSR had proposed in his statement to the General Assembly (1208th plenary meeting, para. 180), offer assurances that in the event of war they would not employ nuclear weapons against the denuclearized countries.

9. Unfortunately, the Soviet Union's unequivocal position had not served as an example for the other nuclear Powers. The latter were prepared to regard Latin America as a denuclearized zone provided that the areas of the Western hemisphere administered and occupied by the United States did not form a part of that zone. That reservation was implied in the conditions imposed by the United States, which the United States delegation had confirmed in its reply to the Cuban representative at the 1339th meeting. However, the United States and its allies went even further, seeking to deny certain States the right to denuclearize themselves on the pretext that that would affect the strategic balance of power. That was a myth which was being used in regard to Latin America, where the United States was the only nuclear Power, just as it had been used for the purpose of rejecting any plan for European denuclearization.

10. In the case of Europe, it was argued that denuclearization would leave the Western Powers exposed to their adversaries' vast superiority in conventional armaments. However, Mr. McNamara, the United States Secretary of Defense, had recently stated that it was time to abandon the notion—which underlay all discussion of United States policy—that a Western David, possessing virtually no conventional weapons and only a nuclear sling, stood facing a Communist Goliath who was equipped with conventional armaments. It was precisely that myth which the representatives of the Western Powers used to justify their negative attitude in negotiations on disarmament and collateral measures and to block any reasonable plan for regional denuclearization. Another piece of fiction propagated with regard to Western Europe was that generals who had been recognized as war criminals had now become guardian angels of peace who could be entrusted with nuclear weapons in a multilateral NATO

force. His delegation did not believe in miracles, and certainly not in that one. It therefore supported Poland's proposal to establish a denuclearized zone in central Europe which it believed would help to ensure peace in Europe and bring about conditions favourable to general and complete disarmament.

11. His delegation favoured the establishment of denuclearized zones wherever the countries of the area concerned desired such action. It therefore appreciated at its true worth the initiative of a group of Latin American countries, but it deplored the fact that the negative attitude of the United States nullified the will of the peoples of the region. By its categorical opposition to the creation of denuclearized zones in other parts of the world, the United States was preventing the generalization of that useful and effective idea. It was regrettable that in the present circumstances the General Assembly was unable to change the attitude of the United States and that consequently the draft resolution was unsatisfactory, since it could not guarantee that the studies envisaged would be carried out under conditions of equality and security for the countries of Latin America and in such a manner as to further the noble purposes of peace, which were the *raison d'être* of denuclearization. Those were the views that would determine the Czechoslovak delegation's position in voting on the draft resolution under consideration. Nevertheless, Czechoslovakia would not relax its efforts to achieve effective denuclearization whenever that would satisfy the aspirations of the peoples concerned and the needs of peace.

12. Mr. KISELEV (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) said that his delegation had always favoured the establishment of denuclearized zones, since they reduced the danger of nuclear war and were a step towards the achievement of general and complete disarmament. For that reason it had welcomed the appeal made by the Summit Conference of Independent African States, held at Addis Ababa in May 1963, to all States to respect the denuclearization of Africa. The Soviet Government had offered to furnish all necessary guarantees in that regard, provided that the United States and the other nuclear Powers did likewise. The Byelorussian Government had also supported other proposals aimed at the establishment of denuclearized zones in Europe and elsewhere. In May 1963 the Soviet Union had proposed the denuclearization of the Mediterranean region; but, far from giving rise to serious negotiation, that important proposal had been dismissed by the representatives of the Western Powers in the Eighteen-Nation Committee as a mere propaganda manoeuvre whose implementation would upset the balance of forces. The Western Powers had thus shown how much their policy differed from their statements. The same could be said regarding the fate of the proposal concerning the Scandinavian countries made by the President of Finland on 28 May 1963, based on a revised form of the plan put forward by the Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Undén, in the First Committee (1178th meeting) at the sixteenth session of the Assembly. The Finnish proposal had been rejected by Denmark and Norway, which were members of NATO.

13. As to the denuclearization of Latin America, the Byelorussian delegation had welcomed the declaration issued by the Presidents of five Latin American Republics on 29 April 1963 (A/5415/Add.1), but believed that the draft resolution submitted by the Latin American States (A/C.1/L.329) was not formulated in sufficiently concrete terms; in particular, his delega-

tion fully agreed with the reasons why Cuba could not subscribe to the draft resolution. The draft was not sufficiently specific; it did not indicate clearly which territories were to be denuclearized. If the region concerned was Latin America properly so called, it was hard to see why the United States representative, who had supported the draft resolution, had not declared his country's willingness to liquidate its bases at Guantánamo, in the Panama Canal Zone and in Puerto Rico; one could not seriously consider reservations or exceptions of any kind. The Byelorussian Government would always support decisions which took due account of the interests of all parties; it remained aware of the need for putting an end to the dissemination of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons and for creating a climate of peaceful co-existence in the world.

14. Mr. STELLE (United States of America), exercising his right of reply, wished to correct certain misrepresentations regarding the United States position on the question of a Latin American nuclear-free zone. The Soviet representative and other representatives of the Eastern bloc, distorting that position, had claimed that the United States would not undertake to respect such a zone. He wished to make it clear that the United States would respect any agreement worked out by the States of Latin America to establish a nuclear-free zone which met the criteria his Government believed necessary.

15. Mr. NOVIKOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics), referring to the statement that the Soviet delegation had misrepresented the United States position, wished to make clear the Soviet position. The Soviet Union believed it was indispensable that the Latin American denuclearized zone should include Panama, the Panama Canal and Puerto Rico. The Soviet Union insisted, moreover, that the United States bases situated in the denuclearized zone should be dismantled and that no more nuclear weapons should be left in that part of the world. Lastly, it insisted that the United States, together with the Soviet Union, should undertake to respect that denuclearized zone. The Soviet Union understood the United States position to be that it was prepared to give that undertaking if United States nuclear weapons remained in the zone. However, in that case it would not be a denuclearized zone at all.

AGENDA ITEM 27

Question of convening a conference for the purpose of signing a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons: report of the Secretary-General (A/5518, A/C.1/L.330 and Add.1) (continued)

GENERAL DEBATE (concluded) AND CONSIDERATION OF DRAFT RESOLUTION A/C.1/L.330 AND ADD.1 (continued)

16. Mr. TAHOURDIN (United Kingdom) said that his Government had already expressed its views on the question now before the Committee in its reply of 9 April 1962^{1/} to the inquiry conducted by the Secretary-General in pursuance of General Assembly resolution 1653 (XVI). The United Kingdom strongly sympathized with all efforts to remove the danger of nuclear war; it had already undertaken in the Charter of the United Nations to refrain from the

^{1/} See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Seventeenth Session, Annexes, agenda item 26, document A/5174, annex II.*

threat or use of force, and it had solemnly declared that it would not use weapons of any kind for purposes of aggression. Having said that, he felt bound to point out that his Government did not believe that the danger of nuclear war could be eliminated by a simple prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons. In the first place, such a prohibition would be completely unenforceable in present conditions. Secondly, it was clear that so long as the danger of war existed, the danger of nuclear war would also exist; in other words, if war broke out between nuclear Powers, the decision whether or not to use nuclear weapons would be taken independently and, if necessary, regardless of any existing prohibitions. The Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, Mr. Khrushchev, had recognized that fact when he had said that any war that broke out would be a thermo-nuclear war and that world peace must be assured not by undertaking to refrain from the use of nuclear weapons but by a radical solution of the issues. Finally, the United Kingdom Government considered that the existence of an unenforceable prohibition would not contribute to international security and might even impair it by breeding a false impression that aggressive action could be undertaken without risking nuclear war. The United Kingdom Government therefore believed, like Mr. Khrushchev, that the only solution lay in general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

17. As to the text of draft resolution A/C.1/L.330 and Add.1, the first preambular paragraph referred to a resolution which the United Kingdom had opposed. The United Kingdom would not oppose discussion of the question at the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, as mentioned in the second preambular paragraph, but it could not accept the implication in operative paragraph 1 that a case for convening a special conference had been made and that a study of the question should be undertaken as a matter of urgency. The replies so far received by the Secretary-General showed that only a minority of Member States were in favour of such a conference; the fact that a third of the Member States had not thought it fit even to reply to the Secretary-General in the two years which had elapsed since the adoption of General Assembly resolution 1653 (XVI) hardly suggested a world-wide sense of urgency about—and still less, support for—that illusory way of seeking to remove the danger of nuclear war. For all those reasons, the United Kingdom delegation regarded the draft resolution as highly misleading; it could not be regarded as a purely procedural matter, as some representatives had asserted. The United Kingdom would therefore be obliged to vote against the draft resolution if it was put to the vote.

18. Mr. BYELOUSOV (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) recalled that at the sixteenth session of the General Assembly his delegation had supported the declaration adopted by the Assembly in resolution 1653 (XVI). The socialist countries had often proposed to the Western Powers that they should agree to prohibit nuclear weapons and destroy their stockpiles; that proposal was the corner-stone of the Soviet disarmament programme presented in 1959.^{2/} The Western Powers had opposed the adoption of the United Nations declaration and they were today opposing the proposal that the Conference of the Eighteen-

Nation Committee on Disarmament should examine the question of convening a conference for the purpose of signing a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons. That attitude required no comment, but it was none the less eloquent, since it demonstrated that the members of NATO, that allegedly peaceful alliance, still insisted on the right to use nuclear weapons if a new war should break out.

19. The Ukrainian Government still supported the proposal now before the Committee, and believed that the Ethiopian initiative was timely. The Ukrainian delegation supported the draft resolution.

20. Mr. DATCU (Romania) reaffirmed his delegation's keen interest in the subject under discussion. The Romanian delegation was convinced that a ban on the use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons would contribute to a solution of the problem of general and complete disarmament. The existence of nuclear weapons, the expansion of stockpiles and the ever-growing risk of their use constituted a threat to all States. Romania therefore supported the Ethiopian initiative, and considered it needless to repeat the arguments already put forward in favour of convening a special conference. It sufficed to say that the conclusion of a convention was the more desirable because the destructive effects of nuclear weapons were far greater than those of the weapons already prohibited by international conventions. Romania believed that in the interests of peace the question should be regarded as urgent, and it would give its full support to the draft resolution.

21. Mr. NOVIKOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that the Soviet Union had always favoured the unconditional prohibition and destruction of nuclear weapons. It was clear that the best solution of that problem would be to prohibit nuclear weapons completely, cut off the production of such weapons and destroy all stockpiles. That was exactly what was proposed in the draft treaty on general and complete disarmament submitted by the Soviet Union to the Eighteen-Nation Committee.^{3/} Before such a treaty could be concluded, however, the conclusion of an agreement prohibiting the use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons would be useful. In that connexion, the Soviet Union had welcomed the General Assembly's declaration, in its resolution 1653 (XVI), that the use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons was contrary to the spirit, letter and aims of the United Nations Charter, to international law and to the laws of humanity. Similarly, it favoured the convening of a conference for the purpose of signing a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons. In its reply of 10 March 1962^{4/} to the Secretary-General's inquiry, the Soviet Government had said that the conclusion of such a convention would promote the complete prohibition of weapons of mass destruction, help to strengthen confidence among States and thus help to bring about a solution of the problem of general and complete disarmament. It was useful in that connexion to recall the important role played by the Geneva Protocol of 1925, which had prohibited the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons.

^{3/} Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for January 1961 to December 1962, document DC/203, annex 1, sect. C (ENDC/2).

^{4/} See Official Records of the General Assembly, Seventeenth Session, Annexes, agenda item 26, document A/5174, annex II.

^{2/} *Ibid.*, Fourteenth Session, Annexes, agenda item 70, document A/4219.

22. The replies of Governments to the inquiries made by the Secretary-General in pursuance of General Assembly resolutions 1653 (XVI)^{5/} and 1801 (XVII) (A/5518) showed that many countries supported the idea of prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons. After the conclusion of the partial test ban treaty and the General Assembly's adoption of resolution 1884 (XVIII), an agreement on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons would be a good augury. Unfortunately, the United States opposed such a prohibition. Contrary to the United States representative's statement, a solution of the problem of the prohibition of nuclear weapons was not to be found in the disarmament proposals submitted by the United States to the Eighteen-Nation Committee, since those proposals made no provision for a ban on the use of nuclear weapons, let alone for their destruction. There was no doubt that nuclear weapons were much more destructive than others, and that the majority of Member States and all the peoples of the world eagerly desired their earliest possible prohibition and elimination.

23. The draft resolution (A/C.1/L.330 and Add.1) provided that the Eighteen-Nation Committee should

^{5/} *Ibid.*, documents A/5174 and Add.1-2.

report to the General Assembly at its nineteenth session. The Soviet delegation would have preferred to have the matter settled during the current session, but it was prepared to support the draft resolution.

24. The CHAIRMAN said that the general debate on the item under discussion was concluded.

25. Mr. PAZHWAQ (Afghanistan) said that the Afghan delegation supported in principle the convening of a conference for the purpose of signing a convention on the prohibition of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons, with the understanding that due regard should be had to the most appropriate time for the convening of that conference. Although the draft resolution would request the Eighteen-Nation Committee to study the question urgently, that request should not be regarded as in any way affecting the important task already undertaken by the Eighteen-Nation Committee, in particular with a view to the destruction of nuclear weapons rather than their mere prohibition. It was in that spirit that the Afghan delegation would vote in favour of the draft resolution.

The meeting rose at 12.40 p.m.