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Chairman: Mr. Francisco URRUTIA (Colombia).

AGENDA ITEM 17

The Korean question:

- (a) **Report of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (A/2711, A/2786, A/C.1/L.116, A/C.1/L.117, A/C.1/L.118, A/C.1/L.119) (*continued*)**

At the invitation of the Chairman, Mr. Y. T. Pyun, representative of the Republic of Korea, took a place at the Committee Table.

1. Mr. LIU Chieh (China) wished to stress two important events which bore upon the situation in Korea. The first of those related to the implementation of the principle of voluntary repatriation. He considered that the 14,000 Chinese prisoners of war who had chosen freedom had provided evidence to the effect that the Chinese people were opposed to an unjust war and to the puppet régime in Peiping. The second event was the failure of the Korean Political Conference at Geneva to reach a settlement of the question. The Chinese delegation had entertained certain misgivings when the Geneva Conference had been called. On the one hand that Conference had created a precedent for the settlement of political problems outside the United Nations; on the other hand, it had enabled the Communists to engage in propaganda while strengthening their forces of aggression. In fact, another Asian country fighting for its freedom had been dismembered and the free world had not come closer to a solution of the Korean problem. From another point of view, the debates at Geneva and the fifteen-Power report on the Conference (A/2786) had revealed the lack of good faith of the Communist aggressors. Their appetite whetted, they now wished to resume negotiations under conditions which would enable them to extend their control over the whole of Korea.

2. The United Nations had achieved a victory for the principle of collective actions, but it was to be questioned whether it had come any nearer to its desired objective of a unified, independent and democratic Korea. In the northern part of the country, where the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission had been unable to exercise its functions, the Communists were building up their military strength while they en-

deavoured to subvert the Republic of Korea. The debate in the Committee had given the general impression that the United Nations could, at present, do no more than maintain the *status quo* and hope for a solution at a future date. But the United Nations should at least refrain from considering any measures that might be interpreted as a retreat. It should repudiate any suggestion aimed at a relaxation of the embargo on shipments of strategic materials to the aggressor nations, or at diminishing the importance of the United Nations machinery bearing upon the unification and rehabilitation of Korea. The Organization's responsibility in Korea had begun before 1950 and the principles which had been so firmly established could not now be abandoned.

3. The Chinese delegation considered that the First Committee should give its full approval to the fifteen-Power report on the Political Conference at Geneva.

4. Mr. LORIDAN (Belgium) recalled that the victory of the United Nations in the Pacific in 1945 had appeared to hold out a promise of independence for Korea, according to the statements of the victors. Unfortunately, the artificial division of Korea had continued, since the Soviet Union and North Korea had refused to accept any international system for the supervision of really free general elections. Later, North Korea had prevented the application of the terms of General Assembly resolutions and the Soviet Union had supported the aggression against the Government which the United Nations recognized as the only one existing in Korea. In response to the appeal of the United Nations, Belgium had sent armed forces to Korea; as a result it now had a special interest in the Korean question.

5. Paragraph 60 of the Armistice Agreement had provided for the convening of a political conference, and under the terms of General Assembly resolution 711 (VII) of 28 August 1953, Belgium had been invited to Geneva, taking part at that Conference to represent "the side contributing armed forces under the Unified Command in Korea". Thus, a sort of United Nations mandate had been conferred upon fifteen Powers. The report of the fifteen Powers, which had been submitted to the First Committee following the failure of the Conference, included an annex consisting of a declaration signed by the fifteen States and by the representative of the Republic of Korea.

6. Under the terms of the draft resolution (A/C.1/L.119), jointly submitted by Belgium and the other fourteen Powers, the General Assembly would approve that report. The report had, in fact, received the unanimous approval of fifteen countries which, acting freely, had defended the principles, the acts and what Mr. Molotov had called the honour of the United Nations. The General Assembly should therefore support a position taken to safeguard the competence and moral authority of the United Nations in the Korean settlement. The report itself set forth two basic principles

which conditioned a resumption of negotiations aimed at a peaceful settlement, on the basis of the establishment of a unified, democratic and independent Korea. Moreover, those two principles were interdependent. The moral authority of the United Nations had in fact been denied at Geneva. On 15 June 1954, Mr. Molotov, the representative of the Soviet Union at the Conference, had stated that as the Organization had acted as "a belligerent party" it had no moral right to act as an impartial organization in the solution of the problem. Those affirmations had been repeated by Mr. Malik. As Mr. Spaak, the representative of Belgium, had said, they could have fatal consequences for the United Nations and, moreover, they were tantamount to the rejection of an international system for the supervision of elections, and supervision was essential in order to ensure that they would be free.

7. Mr. Sohlman, the representative of Sweden in the Committee had already shown (738th meeting) that the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission was not in a position to act impartially and effectively: its composition, far from ensuring its objectivity, had often made it impossible to take the necessary decisions and implement them. Mr. Sohlman did not therefore consider the commissions proposed by the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union at the Conference to be acceptable.

8. Under those conditions approval of the report on the Conference would mean that the General Assembly supported the principles on which any negotiation of a peaceful settlement should be based. Although the representatives of the Soviet Union had affirmed that the fifteen Powers had closed the door to any negotiation, those Powers, on the contrary, desired a resumption of such negotiations. The Belgian representative had repeatedly expressed the wish at Geneva that they might be resumed under better circumstances, subject, however, to the condition which he laid down in his final statement of 15 June 1954, namely that these negotiations should be carried out under the auspices of the United Nations.

9. Belgium was still in favour of the settlement of all disputes by negotiations on the basis of mutual respect for the fundamental rights of all, but the cause of peace would not gain anything from a conference doomed to failure. The Belgian delegation therefore rejected the Soviet draft resolution (A/C.1/L.116). Although there might seem to be unanimity on the aims of the operative part of that resolution, such unanimity would be based on a misunderstanding, for all the Communist countries would first have to cease to contest the competence and moral authority of the United Nations, which they accused of belligerence and even of armed aggression, and accept the principle of a really impartial and at the same time effective supervision of elections.

10. The Belgian delegation still hoped that more favourable circumstances might arise and the joint draft resolution therefore expressed the hope that it would soon prove possible to make progress towards the objectives of the United Nations. The Korean people and the whole world expected the United Nations to establish a unified, independent and democratic Korea.

11. Mr. SKRZESZEWSKI (Poland) referred to the documents presented at the present session which clearly showed that some States were trying to spread the

war and had opposed the settlement of the Korean question. Despite the armistice of 27 July 1953, Korea was still a danger area.

12. In the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission and in the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, of which it was a member, Poland had, for its part, endeavoured to ensure peace by the supervision and implementation of the provisions of the Armistice Agreement, despite the dangers to which the members of those bodies were exposed due to the activities of certain South Korean elements. It was unfortunate that the so-called "United Nations" Command had attempted to hamper the activities of those two commissions.

13. It was clear from the reports of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission (A/2641) that the Command had allowed agents of Syngman Rhee and Chiang Kai-shek to organize a reign of terror in the camps, making it impossible to carry out the campaign of explanations to prisoners. Consequently, as shown in the majority and the minority reports of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, tens of thousands of prisoners of war had been prevented from returning to their homes and many had been enrolled by force in foreign armies, in violation of the Armistice Agreement and of all moral and humanitarian principles. To be sure, the United States Command, which virtually was the United Nations Command, had stated in its report on the operation of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission (A/2642) that it was not aware of those activities, but it was known that South Korea was under the full control of United States forces and that the South Korean régime only carried out their orders.

14. Although the facts were already known through the press and through documents already published, it might be recalled that a number of prisoners wishing to be repatriated had been massacred and that the United States Command, responsible for the crimes of the agents of Syngman Rhee and Chiang Kai-shek, had not allowed the guilty to be tried by a court composed of Indian members.

15. Some members of the Committee had referred to the Swedish representative's statement concerning the work of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission. Poland, for its part, had made every effort to ensure that the Commission's work would be brought to a successful conclusion as soon as possible, so that its Polish members could return home. But in view of the obstacles raised by the United States, it was essential that the United Nations come to a speedy decision to settle the Korean problem. In the meantime, however, Poland was ready to discharge its responsibilities and certainly did not want to repudiate its obligations unilaterally.

16. Actually, the greatest difficulties confronting the Supervisory Commission had arisen during the organizational stage when the methods to be adopted were being considered. On the other hand, during the last few months, the Commission had made constant progress in its work.

17. The Swedish representative had regretted that the Supervisory Commission was composed of four members. But that had not prevented a certain number of unanimous decisions on such matters as the establishment of mobile inspection units, the adoption of general working rules, the issue of instructions to various

groups, and measures dealing with armistice violations at Pusan. Those had been positive results. On the other hand, several decisions taken by a majority of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission had remained a dead letter, owing to the activities of the agents of Syngman Rhee and Chiang Kai-shek.

18. The Swedish representative had also stated that the Commission had carried out a greater number of supervisory missions in the southern part of Korea than in the north. However, that was due to the fact that the rotation of men and materials had been much more frequent in the south than in the north. Moreover, supervision could not encompass all of Korea but could consist only of spot checks to determine whether the reports submitted by the parties themselves corresponded to the actual state of affairs. The inspection teams operating in South Korea had reported that the data furnished by the United Nations Command were not borne out by their own observations, so that there was reason to doubt whether that Command was observing the terms of the Armistice Agreement. It had supplied the South Korean Army with equipment on the pretext of supplying spare parts, having brought in, in the period ending on 15 April 1954, sufficient material to set up 465 pieces of ordinance, 1,365 machine-guns, 6,400 rockets-launchers, and 145 mine-throwers; in addition 106 mine-throwers had been disassembled in three parts and had been sent in different boxes. Furthermore, a shipment of 177 airplanes had been concealed from the inspection team on the pretext that they were not combat aircraft. With regard to the 5 million rifle spare parts, the United States Command had, unfortunately, made a declaration only after they had been discovered by the inspection teams.

19. It could be seen from the report of the Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (A/2711, paras. 17-19) that the safety of the members of neutral commissions was not guaranteed in South Korea. For example, a South Korean general had stated that the Polish and Czechoslovak members represented hostile States; a few days later demonstrations directed against those members had occurred. The Seoul Government had even insisted on the disbandment of the Supervisory Commission because it was an obstacle to its military preparations.

20. What the Commission had termed incidents and demonstrations in paragraph 18 of its report had, in fact, been attempts to use force to prevent the teams from carrying out their functions, for example by firing shots and throwing grenades into the premises of the inspection teams. What was worse, those demonstrations had been instigated by the South Korean Government. That was borne out by the fact that the demonstrators had been led by the police band, and by statements made by official persons. On 23 November 1954, a South Korean general had even gone so far as to send the Polish and the Czechoslovak representatives an ultimatum demanding that they leave South Korea within a week. That was so flagrant a violation of the Armistice Agreement that a United States general had had to intervene.

21. The Swedish and Swiss representatives had also encountered difficulties and had suffered maltreatment; a Swedish captain, for example, had been slapped by an American soldier. Those occurrences were particularly intolerable in that they involved persons enjoying diplomatic immunity and not, as some had tried to make it appear, soldiers under the discipline of the United States armed forces.

22. Another form of violation of the Armistice Agreement had occurred when the United States had concluded a mutual assistance treaty with the Seoul Government which provided for an occupation by foreign forces for an unlimited period of time and threatened Korea's future.

23. As all those acts, which had been committed in violation of the Armistice Agreement, were a threat to the peace, all the States that had taken part in the negotiations should bring their influence to bear in order to put an end to them, and the United States, for its part, should guarantee the personal safety of the members of the Supervisory Commission and bring about conditions under which they could perform their duties.

24. With regard to the Korean problem as a whole, one of the basic conditions for agreement was the dissolution of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea. It had been made the tool of forces that were seeking to control Korea; it had been used to mask aggression and as a propaganda weapon for Syngman Rhee and to serve as a screen for his arbitrary actions. Moreover, the Commission itself had admitted in its report that it was ineffectual. Its partiality was clearly demonstrated by the fact that it cited the appeals for preventive war, the violations of the Armistice Agreement and the attacks against the members of the neutral commissions without comment and treated the elections organized by Syngman Rhee as though they had been democratic elections.

25. As far as the fifteen-Power report on the Korean Conference at Geneva was concerned, it constituted a one-sided presentation of the facts and proved that those States sought only to prevent the United Nations from breaking the current deadlock. The fifteen-Power draft resolution provided for approval of that report; it would thereby set a particularly dangerous precedent, since the United Nations had not received the documents relating to that Conference, whose failure had been caused by the very authors of the report.

26. The debates at the seventh session of the General Assembly were still too recent for anyone to take the view that the United States had done its utmost to convene a political conference seriously. On the contrary, what had delayed the convening of the conference was the insistence in some quarters that certain States that were directly concerned should be excluded. Consequently, the Geneva Conference could not be regarded as the implementation of the decisions taken at the seventh session.

27. The statement on the proposals made by the People's Democratic Republic of Korea and the People's Republic of China contained in the report was equally misleading. It could not be denied that the United Nations had been a belligerent, for the name of the United Nations had been illegally applied to the United States forces and even aircraft. Moreover, the United Nations Command had signed the Armistice Agreement. It was difficult to see, then, how the United Nations could be regarded as a neutral body and as a final arbiter.

28. In order to solve the Korean problem it was necessary first to revoke the illegal decisions of the United Nations relating to the so-called North Korean "aggression", the blockage of China and the partition of Korea. Those decisions had left a source of conflict smouldering in South Korea.

29. Unless napalm warfare was compatible with neutrality it was inadmissible to suggest, as the authors of document A/2786 had done, that the United Nations should extend its good offices to seeking a peaceful settlement in Korea. The three delegations had proposed, quite correctly, that neutral commissions be set up. With regard to the objection concerning the composition of the proposed commission to supervise the elections, it was preferable that the proposed commissions should proceed only on the basis of unanimous votes. To advocate any other procedure would indicate a desire not to find a solution to the problem but to impose the will of the majority on the minority. Furthermore, the authors of the report did not conceal the fact that they hoped to ensure election results favourable to them by retaining interventionist troops in Korea, while the Chinese volunteers would be evacuated. One of the essential premises for the peaceful settlement of the Korean question was that the Korean people should be allowed to determine their future themselves, free from foreign pressure. That was why foreign troops should be withdrawn before the elections.

30. The United States delegation had rejected the North Korean proposals at Geneva, for it did not want free elections to be held in Korea. It had also opposed the USSR draft declaration in which the participants would agree not to resume military operations, and the proposal of the People's Republic of China that the parties to the Conference declare their willingness to persevere in their efforts towards a peaceful settlement of the question. The Belgian and the United Kingdom representatives had supported that proposal. Sir Anthony Eden had even said that it reflected the spirit of the Conference. Nevertheless, as a result of pressure on the part of the United States, that proposal had been rejected and the Conference had ended in a deadlock.

31. Despite the failure of the Conference, the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea continued its efforts to reach an agreement. Thus, it had invited the representatives of all Korean political, social and professional groups to attend a conference on the question of unification.

32. A few years previously the Korean question had been one of the most serious problems before the United Nations. While the situation had been alleviated by the cessation of hostilities, it remained a potential source of war. At the last meeting of the Conference, held at Geneva on 5 June 1954, several representatives, among them those of Belgium and the United Kingdom, had expressed the hope that the question would be discussed again. Therefore, now that the question of Indo-China had been settled, the General Assembly should recommend continued efforts to reach a final peaceful settlement of the Korean question. It was obvious that its speedy settlement would bring about a relaxation of international tensions and would facilitate agreement on other pending questions.

33. His delegation would support any draft resolution calling for a resumption of efforts to reach a peaceful settlement of the question and to satisfy the aspirations of the Korean people on the basis of a unified, independent and democratic State. It wholeheartedly supported the USSR draft resolutions (A/C.1/L.116 and A/C.1/L.117).

34. Mr. SHUKAIRI (Syria) noted that the wounds of the Korean War were hardly healed; the war was,

still fresh in the memory of all and there was therefore no need to review its history.

35. The representatives of the United States, the USSR and the United Kingdom had mentioned the efforts that had been made to convene the Korean Political Conference at Geneva. The fact that it had been convened had been the only positive result achieved, for the Conference itself had been a failure, and Korea was still divided.

36. In considering that question, the First Committee should refrain from passing judgment; it should establish the facts by approaching the problem in a calm and objective manner.

37. The report on the Conference showed that the three Communist delegations had rejected certain principles upon which the solution of the problem depended, on the ground that the United Nations had lost its moral and legal authority to deal with the Korean problem. The United States and United Kingdom representatives had eloquently defended the authority of the United Nations in the First Committee. They deserved thanks for adopting that attitude; it was especially appreciated by the small States, as they had always striven to support the authority of the Organization, which some of the great Powers had at times not hesitated to challenge. The Syrian delegation considered that the authority of the United Nations was indivisible and had to be accepted as a whole. It could not be invoked in Korea and repudiated in Jerusalem. Yet, although the General Assembly had decreed the internationalization of Jerusalem under United Nations supervision, the ambassadors of the United States and the United Kingdom to Israel had presented their credentials in Jerusalem, a city over which, under the terms of the relevant General Assembly resolutions, Israel had no sovereignty. Consequently, it should be understood that the small Powers, in supporting the development of United Nations authority, were not prepared to accept it as mercenaries or satellites. They wished to uphold it in all circumstances, and therefore refused to enter into partnership with others who did not share that attitude.

38. In the case of Korea, conciliation would clearly not be easy. But the declared views of the two parties had much common ground of agreement. Both the United States and the USSR had expressed support for the unification and independence of Korea. Both had urged free elections under international supervision. They agreed on principles and objectives and disagreed only over procedure. Negotiations were consequently not only possible and desirable, they were imperative. The Syrian delegation did not minimize the importance of procedure in such an issue; but it could not associate itself with the assertion that basic principles had been denied by certain delegations.

39. The Syrian delegation was strengthened in that attitude by the fact that one of the parties concerned had been refused a hearing in the Committee. It was an elementary principle of justice that the destiny of peoples should not be examined in their absence. The First Committee was called upon to formulate conclusions and to pass recommendations; it was being urged to support measures designed to ensure the free expression of the will of the Korean people; and at the same time it was in a position to hear only one side of the question. It was true that North Korea had been found guilty of aggression. But it should not be forgotten that that aggressor was a party to the

Armistice Agreement and had taken part in a conference convened in pursuance of a decision by the United Nations. The condemnation of North Korea should not entail injustice on the part of the United Nations. Otherwise it would have been wrong to conclude an armistice with the aggressors and to seek a peaceful solution with them. If the United Nations was determined to establish a unified, independent and democratic Korea by peaceful means, it could not act without all the parties principally involved.

40. The depressing aspect of the Korean question was the general tone of despair prevalent in the report on the Korean Political Conference. Negotiations, it was said, were fruitless, and consequently no idea of resolving the deadlock was entertained. The United Kingdom representative had offered a frank explanation of that disappointing conclusion: he had said that the parties had not so far agreed on a definition of freedom and democracy. The question was whether Korea would have to wait until those concepts had been defined.

41. Mr. KISELYOV (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) said that the Korean question was still one of the questions whose settlement could have far-reaching effects on the international situation. The Soviet Union, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the People's Republic of China had made great efforts to achieve a unified, independent and democratic Korea. The armistice concluded in Korea had been a step in the right direction. Efforts should be continued to reach a final solution.

42. The United States representative had repeated (737th meeting) that it had been North Korea which had first attacked South Korea in June 1950. There was no need to refute that charge once again. It had already been demonstrated that, in fact, it had been Syngman Rhee who, in June 1950, had first ordered his troops to cross the frontier and attack North Korea.

43. The representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom had argued that the Korean Conference at Geneva had been the political conference called for under the terms of General Assembly resolution 711 (VII) of 28 August 1953. Since the Geneva Conference had been convened in pursuance of a decision of the meeting of the four Foreign Ministers in Berlin, that argument was untenable and its only purpose had been to prevent a resumption of negotiations with representatives of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the People's Republic of China.

44. The United States and United Kingdom representatives had adopted a biased attitude: in order to escape blame for the failure of the Conference they had distorted or ignored certain proposals made at the Geneva Conference by the representatives of the USSR, the People's Republic of China and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. They alleged that the North Koreans did not want free elections, although General Nam Il, the representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, had on 27 April proposed free elections throughout Korea, the establishment of an all-Korean commission to draft electoral law, and the withdrawal of foreign troops before the elections. Those fair proposals, which could have ensured the creation of a unified, independent and democratic State, had been rejected by the western Powers. On 22 May, the Chinese delegation had made a further proposal

concerning the international supervision of the election. That proposal, too, had been turned down by the United States and its allies. The United Kingdom representative's assertions (738th meeting) were thus unfounded. The same representative had added that no proposal by the Communist delegations gave grounds for hoping that there would be any basic change in their point of view. But why was it absolutely necessary to accept the western point of view, without trying to reach a compromise? The USSR representative had very pertinently said that the days when conditions could be dictated to the other side were past.

45. The New Zealand representative had said (739th meeting) that under the plan proposed by the South Koreans on 25 May 1954 free elections could have been held in Korea. However, that plan also contemplated the extension of the anti-popular constitution of South Korea to the whole of Korea. It also provided for the withdrawal of the Chinese volunteers a month before the elections and for the continued presence of United States troops throughout the elections. Such a proposal was clearly unacceptable.

46. On the other hand, the proposals of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the People's Republic of China and the draft declaration proposed by the Soviet Union had been rejected by the United States and its allies. It was strange, then, to hear the Australian and New Zealand representatives claim that the western nations had done everything in their power to reach an agreement. If anything, the sixteen western Powers had accentuated and had widened the differences of opinion. The Geneva Conference had ended in failure because the United States and its allies had not wanted a unified, independent and democratic Korea, but an extension of Syngman Rhee's régime to the whole Korea.

47. After the failure of the Conference, the South Korean authorities had worked harder than ever to undermine the armistice. On 7 June 1954 the Minister of Foreign Affairs of South Korea had asserted that the armistice convention was no longer in force, and that his Government was released from all obligations in that respect. On 17 July, President Syngman Rhee had declared that there would be no more negotiations, and that his Government had agreed with the United States that the Geneva Conference should be considered as the last attempt at negotiations. Obviously, the United States was not keen on a settlement and was making use of every pretext to keep troops in South Korea in order to further its strategic plans. The mutual defence treaty between the United States and South Korea, ratified in January 1954, consequently provided for the maintenance of United States naval and military forces in South Korea for an indefinite period. That treaty was intended to turn South Korea into a United States base and was an obstacle to the unification and independence of Korea.

48. The Republic of South Korea had been put on a war-time footing. The number of South Korean divisions, had been increased from 20 to 35. It was easy to see why the proposals of the People's Democratic Republic of Korea for the reduction of armed forces and for the liquidation of the military situation had been rejected by South Korea and the United States.

49. The United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea had not played a very brilliant role. Its report (A/2711) was evidence enough that it had accomplished nothing towards the

unification and independence of Korea. It supported the anti-popular régime of Syngman Rhee, ignored the basic facts of the economic situation in South Korea and repeated, without condemning, the bellicose statements of President Syngman Rhee. The Commission stated that it had been unable to supervise strictly the elections that had been held in May. As it had notified the South Korean authorities, in advance, of the plan it intended to follow for supervising the elections, that supervision had obviously lacked the necessary independence. The Commission had not noticed that South Korea had become a police State, or that a state of emergency had been declared at the time when the elections had been held. It was therefore not surprising that the authorities of the People's Democratic Republic of Korea could not agree to the proposal that elections for the whole of Korea should follow the pattern of those held in South Korea.

50. The Commission did not mention the wretched economic situation in South Korea resulting from the country's militarization and enslavement by foreign monopolies. It had done nothing to bring North and South Korea closer together or to improve economic conditions in the country. It had prevented a final peaceful settlement of the Korean problem. In fact, it should be discontinued.

51. General Assembly resolution 505 (V), adopted under United States pressure on 18 May 1951, regarding an embargo on trade with the People's Democratic Republic of Korea and the People's Republic of China

was not only illegal but was a serious obstacle to the resumption of normal trade relations between States and to peace. The General Assembly should show its wisdom by revoking that resolution.

52. The General Assembly should bear in mind the Korean people's desire for unification, independence and democracy. It should facilitate agreement between the parties by encouraging direct negotiations between them. An international conference on Korea attended by the States concerned would also help towards the achievement of a satisfactory solution. Those were the reasons why the Byelorussian delegation supported the draft resolutions presented by the USSR.

53. The CHAIRMAN announced that the General Committee would meet at 3 p.m., and that the President of the General Assembly had suggested that the First Committee should nevertheless meet at 3.30 p.m., if necessary under the chairmanship of the Vice-Chairman.

54. Mr. Yakov MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said he would rather attend both the meetings of the General Committee and that of the First Committee.

55. Mr. KYROU (Greece) suggested that the Committee should meet at 4 p.m. at the latest, if the General Committee had not risen by that time.

The suggestion was adopted.

The meeting rose at 1.10 p.m.