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- (c) Dissolution of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea . . . . . 1

**Chairman: Mr. Ismail FAHMY**  
**(United Arab Republic).**

**AGENDA ITEM 33**

**The Korean question (*continued*) (A/6696/Rev.1, A/6696/Add.1-3, A/6712, A/6836; A/C.1/947 and Corr.1, 949, 950, 951; A/C.1/L.399/Rev.1, L.400 and Add.1, L.401 and Add.1, L.404, L.405):**

- (a) Report of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea;**
- (b) Withdrawal of United States and all other foreign forces occupying South Korea under the flag of the United Nations;**
- (c) Dissolution of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea**

1. The CHAIRMAN: Before I call on the first speaker on my list for this afternoon I may inform the members of the Committee that a revised text, document A/C.1/L.399/Rev.1, has been circulated. It will be noticed that it has a new paragraph as the second preambular paragraph.

2. The first speaker on my list on the question of the invitation is the representative of the Central African Republic, on whom I now call.

3. Mr. GALLIN-DOUATHE (Central African Republic) (*translated from French*): Mr. Chairman, in taking the floor for the first time since this Committee began its work, the delegation of the Central African Republic wishes to express to you and to your colleagues its pleasure at your unanimous election and, at this very advanced stage in our work, to extend to you, as well as to the other officers, our respectful and hearty congratulations. The delegation of the Central African Republic appreciates the delicate and complex nature of our work and would like to assure you of its modest co-operation, in the conviction that under your eminent leadership the Committee will surely achieve fruitful results.

4. Having said that, the delegation of the Central African Republic would like to begin its statement by addressing, through you, a friendly welcome to the Republic of Korea. Once again, the Organization's First political Committee is faced with the Korean question. My Government and my people are only too well aware of the distressing nature of that question, involving as it does the future of a country representing one of the world's oldest civilizations. This explains the indignation and the deep concern of the delegation of the Central African Republic at the attitude of total and complete obstruction manifested by one of the parties and the long road that lies ahead before the goal of a peaceful and lasting settlement of the Korean question is reached.

5. Nevertheless, my delegation has noted with keen interest the zeal with which, notwithstanding the perplexing problems confronting it, the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK) is pursuing its thankless task in Korea. I should therefore like to associate my delegation with the gratitude and encouragement expressed to the Commission by the distinguished speakers who have preceded us.

6. As we know, the Korean question has been recurring on the Organization's agenda for over fifteen years. It reflects the distress of a people divided in the aftermath of the Second World War and, for reasons beyond its control, deprived of a considerable portion of its national territory. It is a disturbing problem which over the years has become steadily more important. Distinguished champions of the principle of self-determination have already made that point eloquently. Nevertheless, in anticipation of the voting, my delegation would like to limit its statement on the substance of the problem to a few comments which it feels do deserve to be brought out, if only to back up those that have already been made in greater detail by a number of speakers.

7. We have followed with particular interest the critical analysis made by the friendly delegations that have spoken ahead of us, especially with regard to the background of the Korean question.

8. From certain statements that seemed to us clear and objective, it seems to be clearly established first of all that there exists on the part of the Republic of Korea a sincere desire for arbitration with a view to a peaceful settlement, under the auspices of the United Nations; and secondly, that there is on the part of the North Korean régime a definite obstructionism that is being dangerously intensified by an armed opposition.

9. Those are the conclusions reached by my delegation, and it is on these conclusions that my delegation will base

its statement concerning the question that both disturbs us and demands our attention.

10. With regard to the peaceful settlement which the United Nations continues to hope will be the culmination of the problem of Korean unification and rehabilitation, we recall that when the United Nations first took up the question it advocated popular free consultations, based on democratic principles, to be held throughout the territory of Korea. Moreover, we are all aware that because the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea was refused entry into North Korea, general elections were held only in the southern part of the country, giving birth to the Republic of Korea which the General Assembly recognized in 1948 as being the sole legitimate Government for the whole of Korea [*resolution 195 (III)*]. Almost simultaneously another régime, the outcome of elections that were highly suspect, took over in North Korea and embarked on armed aggression, first against the Republic of Korea and then against the United Nations. The cease-fire group set up by the Organization was unable at the time to re-establish peace. Later on, in July 1953, an Armistice Agreement<sup>1</sup> was finally concluded. A year later, at Geneva, a conference was held in an attempt to find a solution to the conflict by way of a peaceful settlement based, first of all, on free elections under international supervision to ensure proportional legislative representation for the indigenous population and secondly on the maintenance of United Nations forces in Korea until such time as the unification, democratization and independence of Korea could be achieved.

11. The United Nations General Assembly in 1954 approved the measures adopted at Geneva [*resolution 811 (IX)*], but of course the North Korean régime rejected them. Since that time, the goals laid down have continued to form the basis of United Nations action, as reaffirmed on many occasions, with regard to the Korean question and the unification and rehabilitation of the country.

12. A number of serious complaints have been brought against the North Korean régime. It has violated the armistice by increasing its war potential and its military strength. Supported by foreign troops, it has engaged in war against the Republic of Korea. The North Korean elections were no more than a consultation that disregarded every freely accepted democratic rule. The North Korean régime was set up in defiance of the United Nations resolution recognizing the Republic of Korea as the only legitimate Government for the whole of the Korean territory. Not only did North Korea refuse to recognize the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea, but it also called for the dissolution of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea. North Korea and its allies sabotaged the Geneva Conference, as everyone here can well recall.

13. The North Korean leaders openly stated that their régime would never recognize and would firmly reject all United Nations resolutions concerning Korea. In making that statement, the North Korean régime challenges the

competence and authority of the United Nations. Indeed, it has declared war against our Organization, the symbol of peace.

14. Such is the present state of affairs facing the United Nations, whose activity in Korea is being met with brute force and reduced to ineffectiveness. The succinct report submitted by the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea is quite eloquent in that connexion. My delegation is of the opinion that there can be no question of capitulation on the part of the Organization. The General Assembly has the duty to remain true to its principles and to abide by the consequences of its decisions. For that reason my delegation urges it to continue to protect the Republic of Korea against any kind of aggression, and to assist it in peacefully regaining its national unity. That is one of the urgent duties of the Organization towards the Republic of Korea, which has recognized United Nations competence and authority and has co-operated and is continuing to co-operate in all the efforts that are being put forth by the United Nations. The demand by the North Korean régime for the withdrawal of the United Nations forces from South Korea is aimed at making the Republic of Korea vulnerable to further aggression. Those forces must pursue their mission in Korea until the goals set by the United Nations have been met. That, moreover, is the ardent desire of the Korean people.

15. At the international level, the Republic of Korea has established diplomatic relations in all quarters; it has ratified numerous international treaties and conventions; it is a member of many important United Nations specialized agencies, and it plays a part in many intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations.

16. Strengthening its democratic foundations on the domestic front, the Republic of Korea has undertaken free and competitive economic reconstruction.

17. My delegation therefore considers that the United Nations has a duty to pursue the noble task of achieving the unification and rehabilitation of Korea. The attainment of a united, independent and democratic Korea will, we feel, contribute to the maintenance of peace and security not only in that part of the world, but in the rest of the world as well. In addition, the reunification and rehabilitation of Korea will help to safeguard the sacred principles of the Organization. Accordingly, encouragement must be given to the activity of UNCURK, and thus my delegation wholeheartedly supports the maintenance of United Nations forces in that region of the Far East.

18. Those, in brief, are the considerations that have prompted the Central African Republic to co-sponsor resolution A/C.1/L.399/Rev.1, and that will determine my delegation's ultimate position in the voting that will take place later on at the conclusion of the discussion raised once again at the current session on the Korean question.

19. Mr. BROOMFIELD (United States of America): Mr. Chairman, before beginning my delegation also would like to express its satisfaction that this Committee agreed to your proposal—a proposal entirely in line with our own thinking—that the Korean question be taken up at an early stage in the Committee's proceedings.

<sup>1</sup> See *Official Records of the Security Council, Eighth Year, Supplement for July, August and September 1953*, document S/3079, Appendix A.

20. As we begin anew our discussions of the Korean question the first order of business relates to inviting representatives of the Korean people, those after all most directly concerned, to take part in our debate without the right of vote. The Committee has before it two proposals on this question: one is contained in document A/C.1/L.399/Rev.1 and co-sponsored now by thirteen countries. Five of these countries come from the Asian-Pacific area, the area with the greatest direct interest in a peaceful solution of the Korean problem; four come from Africa and four from the Western hemisphere. The delegation of the Soviet Union suggested this morning [*1511th meeting*] that this large number of countries has joined in co-sponsoring the proposal in document A/C.1/L.399/Rev.1 because the United States has marshalled some mythical arsenal. I will leave it to these countries themselves to state whether this was in fact the case.

21. The core of this proposal is simple and direct: that representatives of both the Republic of Korea and North Korea should be invited to participate in the debate on the Korean question under parallel circumstances, namely, with both accepting unequivocally the competence and the authority of the United Nations to take action on the Korean question.

22. There is also a second and distinct proposal before the Committee, [*A/C.1/L.400 and Add.1*] even though an effort has been made to disguise this fact by presenting it in the form of amendments. I shall reserve the position of my delegation as to how the Committee should deal with this second proposal, presented as amendments, until a later time. The core of the second proposal, whose co-sponsorship is less broad and hardly representative of the Asian-Pacific region, is that the representatives of the Republic of Korea and North Korea should participate in our debate under different circumstances, namely, with one side accepting without reservation the competence and the authority of the United Nations to take action on the Korean question while the other side categorically rejects that competence and authority.

23. It should be clear from the contrast between the two proposals that underlying the supposedly procedural act of extending an invitation, are questions of great substantive importance. It is to those questions that I wish to call the Committee's attention today.

24. Stated briefly the questions are: Does the United Nations under its Charter have the competence and the authority to deal with the Korean question? If so, would it not be contrary and prejudicial to the competence and authority of the United Nations to take steps which would encourage those who reject the United Nations authority? Is it not, instead, proper and necessary both to the dignity and to the effectiveness of the United Nations to ask that those who would appear before us to present their views on this question accept without reservation the competence and the authority of this Organization to deal with the Korean question?

25. There is an additional question involved, one whose implications extend far beyond the Korean question itself. This is: Can the international community afford to permit any one régime or any small group of countries to

determine that there are certain international problems, problems which all sides agree are directly related to the maintenance of international peace and security, which shall not fall within the competence of the United Nations, simply because that one régime or small group of countries does not want the United States involved in any way?

26. It is to these questions that I wish to draw the attention of the Committee. First, does the United Nations, under the terms of its Charter, have the competence and the authority to deal with the Korean question? The answer to that question flows from the nature of the Korean problem, the Charter of this Organization and the record of two decades. In essence, the Korean question is the problem of one people, one nation divided unnaturally against its will; the problem of one people seeking to put into practice, in freedom and peace, the principle of self-determination, one of the basic principles of the Charter of this great Organization. Moreover, all agree that this unwanted division has created a situation which has a direct bearing upon the international peace and security of the area—even those who vehemently maintain a position of “hands off” towards the United Nations, including North Korea itself.

27. In a letter dated 18 October of this year, and contained in document A/C.1/951, the North Korean Foreign Ministry speaks of “the danger of the outbreak of a new war”, and similarly, last year, North Korea asserted—and here again I quote its own words—that

“... the unification of Korea is an urgent question whose solution brooks no delay both in view of the national interests of the Korean people and for the sake of world peace.”<sup>2</sup>

28. That is no argument against the authority and competence of the United Nations. On the contrary, it is virtually a mandate for the exercise of the competence and the authority of this Organization. It is hardly to be wondered, therefore, that for two decades this Organization has again and again, by overwhelming majorities, asserted and confirmed its competence and authority to deal with the Korean question. Again, last year, in a resolution passed by a vote of 67 to 19, this Organization reaffirmed its right

“... to take collective action to maintain peace and security and to extend its good offices in seeking a peaceful settlement in Korea in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter,” [*General Assembly resolution 2224 (XXI)*].

29. Ever since 1947 this Organization has assumed, by overwhelming majorities, the responsibility for helping to resolve the problem of Korea by peaceful means. As we consider the Korean question once again this year, it behooves us to recall how that responsibility has been exercised.

30. With the end of the Second World War and the surrender of the forces then occupying Korea, the Korean people hoped to be able at long last to take their place in the international community as a fully independent and united country. Those hopes were frustrated, however, by

<sup>2</sup> A/6370 (mimeographed).

outside forces over which the Korean people had no control. The opportunity for unity and independence was blocked by the unexpected determination of one of the Allies in the Second World War, the Soviet Union, to transform the line established at the thirty-eighth parallel for order and convenience in the surrender of enemy forces into a permanent and quite unnatural division of the Korean nation. Instead of the unity and independence they longed for, the Korean people found their country divided. In the north, under the occupation of foreign forces, there was established a régime alien to Korean culture and tradition, a régime which did not subscribe to the principle of national self-determination, a régime led by individuals who were strangers to the Korean people.

31. Against that background, the General Assembly turned its attention to the Korean problem almost twenty years ago. The result was the formulation of a programme designed to bring to all the people of Korea what they had long sought—unity, independence and a national government chosen by and responsive to the entire populace.

32. The United Nations programme involved two essential elements: first, the withdrawal from Korea of all foreign forces, from above and below the thirty-eighth parallel; and second, the establishment of a single national Government based on the freely expressed will of all the people of Korea, again above and below the thirty-eighth parallel. It should be emphasized that both elements of that programme were to be subject to observation by a Commission of the United Nations.

33. The Soviet Union and the authorities in North Korea subject to Soviet control insisted that Korea was “off limits” to the world community, that the United Nations had no right to concern itself in any way with the unity and independence of Korea. Thus, they refused to permit North Korea to benefit from the programme formulated by the General Assembly.

34. However, the programme of the General Assembly was carried out to the south of the thirty-eighth parallel—that part of Korea not subject to Soviet control. Fortunately, that was also the part where the great majority of the Korean people lived then, as they do now. In the south, under the auspices and observation of the United Nations, a National Government was chosen through free elections. The Republic of Korea came into being and was recognised by this Assembly as the only lawful Government in Korea based upon the freely expressed will of the Korean people. [*General Assembly resolution 195 (III)*] Under that programme also all foreign forces were withdrawn from the south, the withdrawal being observed and verified by a United Nations Commission created by this Assembly. I would add at this point that every subsequent election in the Republic of Korea has been held under the observation of the United Nations Commission.

35. No such United Nations observation or verification was possible in the north with regard either to the withdrawal of foreign forces or to the process by which North Korean authorities claimed their right to govern. The reason given by the Soviet Union was that the Korean problem was and could be of no concern to the United Nations. Behind that argument, however, there clearly lay a

basic unwillingness to permit any international observation and verification of the electoral process or the withdrawal of foreign forces.

36. Then in June 1950, in the face of North Korea's attempt to conquer and destroy the Republic of Korea by armed force, the United Nations assumed a new and much more dramatic responsibility in Korea. Historians will never forget that the United Nations rose to the challenge posed by the North's invasion of the South, and that under Security Council resolutions Members acted promptly, collectively and effectively to prevent the success of that armed invasion. While the cost of meeting that challenge was immense, few contended then, nor have contended since, that the cost was not worth the end: the saving of the Republic of Korea as a free and independent country, and a successful testing of the concept of collective security.

37. Even while the battle imposed by North Korea's invasion was being waged, the United Nations again asserted its responsibility for and its commitment to certain basic objectives in Korea: first, unification through peaceful means; second, the establishment of a single government for all Koreans, basing its right to govern not on force but on popular consent expressed in free elections; and third, the restoration of international peace and security in the area.

38. We are frequently told that those objectives have not been achieved, that there is no unified, independent and democratic government for all the people of Korea, and that international peace and security have not been fully restored in the area. Those facts are self-evident, but they do not detract in any way from the validity and the rightness of the objectives which the United Nations has set forth, nor do they in any way reduce the responsibility of the United Nations to help resolve the problems it set out to tackle in Korea two decades ago, including the paramount problem of a people divided against its will and denied the opportunity to establish a national government responsive to the wishes of all the people of Korea.

39. I now turn to the second question posed earlier: if the General Assembly continues to accept the responsibilities assumed by the United Nations in Korea, if we continue to believe that the United Nations has both the competence and the authority to deal with the Korean question, would it not be prejudicial to encourage in any way those who say that Korea is not and cannot be the legitimate concern of the United Nations? The attitude of North Korea and of those who espouse its cause in the Assembly is, of course, no secret. North Korea would have the United Nations shed the responsibility it has assumed and forgo the objectives it has laid down. North Korea would have the United Nations decide that it should no longer be concerned with the division of Korea or with the international tensions that are caused thereby. That has been abundantly clear for many years. It has been demonstrated again this year in a statement issued by North Korea on 21 August. In that statement, which is before the Committee in document A/6696/Add.2, North Korea again insists, with no ambiguity, that “the United Nations has neither competence nor authority to concern itself in the Korean question” and that “whatever resolution the United Nations may adopt arbitrarily on the Korean question, it is entirely null and void”.

40. Nor is it any secret that the sponsors of the amendments to the thirteen-Power draft resolution on seating share that view and would have the General Assembly endorse it. They would have the General Assembly go on record to the effect that the United Nations should for ever and unequivocally give up its right to deal with the Korean question; that the United Nations should forgo its efforts to bring about the reunification of Korea under a free and independent government elected by the people. Indeed, the sponsors of the amended resolution on seating are largely the same nations which have submitted a resolution calling for the dissolution of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea, [A/C.1/L.404] as well as a second draft resolution which provides that "there should be no further discussion of the 'Korean question' in the United Nations" [A/C.1/L.401 and Add.1].

41. Stripped to its bare essentials, the attitude of North Korea and of the sponsors of the amendments to the draft resolution on seating is this: "United Nations, the principles that you have espoused, calling for the peaceful reunification of all Korea in accordance with the freely-expressed will of its people, are principles which we are not prepared to accept. Therefore, abandon your pretence to competence and authority over the Korean problem. Abandon the Republic of Korea, set up in accordance with your principles, and leave us alone to attempt to achieve our own ends as we see fit."

42. Whatever arguments are made in support of the amendments to the thirteen-Power draft resolution on seating, the plain and simple political truth is this: those amendments are offered in a spirit which seeks to deny the United Nations competence and authority to deal with the Korean question. It follows that the endorsement of those amendments by the Assembly would give support and encouragement to that view—a view which cannot be squared with either the United Nations Charter or the record of two decades. Endorsement of the amendments would simply encourage those who would declare the Korean problem, for some unexplained reason, to be beyond the purview of this Organization. Their endorsement would simply encourage those who would have the Assembly give up, shed responsibilities assumed because they are difficult, lay aside burdens because they are heavy and close its eyes to a problem which affects the peace and security of Asia and some 40 million people in Korea itself.

43. It is for that reason that my delegation—and, I am confident, the overwhelming majority of the Assembly—is strongly opposed to the amendments offered to the thirteen-Power draft resolution on seating.

44. I turn now to the third question posed earlier: Is it not proper and necessary, both to the dignity and to the effectiveness of the United Nations, to ask that those who would join in our discussion of the Korean question should accept without reservation the competence and authority of the United Nations to take action on this question?

45. The argument is made this year, as it has been in the past, that any invitation extended must be compatible with the dignity of those being invited and should make no discriminatory or unreasonable demands upon them. Draft

resolution A/C.1/L.399/Rev.1 does not ask either the Republic of Korea or North Korea to do anything incompatible with their dignity, nor, above all, does it advocate that they be treated in an unequal or discriminatory manner: quite the contrary. It asks that both the Republic of Korea and North Korea equally honour the dignity of this Organization by accepting without reservation its competence and authority within the terms of the Charter to take action on the Korean problem.

46. I think that to urge otherwise—to urge that North Korea be invited without accepting the competence and authority of the United Nations, even though the Republic of Korea has repeatedly stated its acceptance of the United Nations in this matter—this is to urge unequal treatment; this is to urge discrimination; this is to put the claims of one party above the dignity of the world Organization.

47. The argument is also made this year, as in the past, that it is unprofitable for the Committee to debate a question unless the parties directly involved are present, or at least are invited to be present.

48. This argument ignores or overlooks a much more fundamental consideration. If this Organization intends to continue to exercise its competence and authority with respect to the problem of Korea, as it obviously does, is it not both responsible and necessary that those who appear before us do so in order to help, not deride, our search for a solution; that they accept the competence and authority of this Organization, rather than flaunt their disregard for any decisions the United Nations might take?

49. To invite them under any other circumstances would be to invite them to use this Committee as a platform for attacking not only the manner in which the United Nations has exercised its responsibilities in Korea but also the very right of the United Nations to concern itself with the Korean question. This would indeed be an indignity—not for them, but for the United Nations.

50. Finally, I turn to the fourth question posed earlier: Can the international community afford to encourage any one régime or any small group of countries who would determine that a given international problem, which so obviously affects questions of national self-determination and international peace and security, shall be "off limits" to the United Nations simply because they do not want the United Nations involved?

51. To pose the question is to answer it. For I submit that there is no responsible government anxious to maintain or strengthen the United Nations which would be willing to encourage or promote in any way the untenable position I have cited.

52. There are already areas of the world which some would declare barred to the United Nations—areas which, despite the fact that they are the scenes of armed conflict and problems vitally affecting international peace and security, we are told fall outside the purview of the United Nations. I submit that it is in the interests of this Organization and all Member States to refrain from any step—including endorsement of the amendments to the thirteen-Power seating proposal—which would serve to

encourage those who would make of Korea another such area. Surely it is in all our interests to refrain from giving any support to those who would place arbitrary geographical limitations upon the competence and authority of the United Nations, under the Charter, to be concerned with or to take action on problems where there is international tension, instability and admitted dangers to the international peace and security.

53. In conclusion, let me state my delegation's belief that the formula used to invite representatives of Korea to take part in our discussions should contain no unreasonable demands of either the Republic of Korea or of North Korea, that it should ask each of them to appear on the same basis, and that it should be mindful of the strength and effectiveness of this world Organization. At the same time, the formula must recognize the facts as they are: that the Republic of Korea has unequivocally accepted the competence and authority of the United Nations to take action on the Korean problem, whereas North Korea continues to hold the view that this Organization does not now possess and never has possessed any right to concern itself with this problem.

54. The formula we use must uphold our authority and competence to continue to deal with a problem which all recognize is related to peace and security in Asia. The formula to be used must in no way imply that we are abdicating the role of the United Nations in Korea, or that we accept the view that this Organization has no right to be concerned with the problems and tensions arising from the unwanted and unnatural division of the Korean people.

55. For these reasons, we strongly urge the adoption of the draft resolution we have joined in co-sponsoring. It is the only formula which takes into account the legitimate interests of the Republic of Korea, North Korea, and the United Nations itself.

56. Mr. CSATORDAY (Hungary): In the view of the Hungarian delegation, the subject we are discussing now, although procedural in character, is of very great importance. It is no exaggeration to say that upon its handling depends the success or failure of our discussion of the substance of item 33 of the agenda, the Korean question.

57. Someone might ask why many of us place so much emphasis on the question of invitation in this discussion. The answer is not difficult to give. Let me say first of all that no fruitful discussion of any question in the United Nations can be imagined without the presence and active participation of the parties directly concerned.

58. For this reason we can safely say that a positive approach on the part of Member States to the invitation of these parties is proof of their desire to facilitate a solution of the problem. Conversely, any attempt to hinder or prevent the invitation of all the parties concerned is clearly aimed at blocking any meaningful solution.

59. I wish to say at the outset that the United States and the other co-sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/L.399/Rev.1, in trying to keep out representatives of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, obviously have no other desire than to doom to failure our discussion of the substance of the matter.

60. What are the considerations that should govern us in deciding who to invite to these discussions? In answering that question, we should take into account nothing else but our Charter. Any other consideration but that of its phrasing is to be rejected, because it is clearly motivated by considerations other than the principles of the Charter.

61. The draft resolution presented by the United States and its allies clearly contradicts Article 2 (7) of the Charter when it sets as a precondition for the presence of the representatives of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea nothing less than recognition of the right of the United Nations to intervene in the domestic affairs of a sovereign State. This draft resolution not only thus violates the Charter, but it invites the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to do the same. It is an appeal to a sovereign State to relinquish its sovereignty in exchange for a hearing by our Organization. That demand for advance acceptance of conditions singularly lacks any legal foundation, for the Charter contains no such provisions. What is more, it is self-contradictory because it attaches strings to a simple invitation, which the Charter does not provide even for States demanding to be admitted to the United Nations. As is known, the only condition the Charter imposes on a State applying for membership, or requires from it, is, in the words of the Charter, that it "... accept the obligations contained in the present Charter ...".

62. It never occurred to the drafters of our Charter to demand advance compliance with any decisions of the General Assembly of the United Nations. Yet such is the demand put to a non-member State in a much lesser case in the matter of an invitation to a discussion in the General Assembly. The authors of the draft resolution ask for such advance acceptance by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea of decisions affecting its internal affairs. I submit that such a demand not only is in flagrant contradiction of the Charter and the sovereignty of nations, but also would be considered absurd even in national jurisdictions when the parties are invited to attend private lawsuits, as I had occasion to show in an earlier intervention [*1503rd meeting*].

63. It is obviously even less acceptable in the United Nations where the parties are not private persons but sovereign nations which cannot by any standards be required to accept decisions violating the very principle of sovereignty upon which international order, and consequently the United Nations itself, is built.

64. The Hungarian delegation cannot but reject the contention of the representative of the Philippines this morning [*1511th meeting*] that it would be absurd to equate the two interested parties. We were equally surprised to hear from the representative of Japan that it would be unjust to formulate the invitation to the two parties in the same way. This is indeed a strange sense of justice and strange logic. Are those representatives trying to ridicule the basic legal concept of excluding prejudice at the very outset, of dealing seriously with any subject that requires an objective decision?

65. Moreover, do the authors of this absurd demand in the draft resolution really wish to do away with the concept of the sovereignty of nations by formulating the requirement

of advance compliance by a State which is not even a member of this Organization? If so, they must say so and take the consequences for the future.

66. References have been made to the ready compliance of the South Korean régime with this absurd demand. The all-too-ready submission of a régime based on foreign occupation, which for this reason cannot prize its sovereignty highly, is only natural. It shows that the masters of that régime in their own interests require that their client should not bother too much about considerations of sovereignty or otherwise. But we may perhaps be allowed to ask whether those who require the South Korean régime to set so low a value on its alleged independence would be ready to accept the competence of the United Nations, say, in investigating the implementation of fundamental human rights in their own country. We may be excused for answering our own question and saying that they would probably reject it with indignation by referring to their sovereignty. But why then do they ask others to accept a demand which is not justifiable by any principle of the Charter? They certainly do so in the awareness that by provoking a rejection of such attempts they can deprive us of the presence of one of the parties for at least another year.

67. I find it more than strange that the United States should accuse the Democratic People's Republic of Korea of not respecting the Charter of the United Nations. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea observes the principles of the Charter in its international relations, as was clearly stated in the letter of the Foreign Minister of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in document A/C.1/949. Needless to say, it is the United States, not the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, that should be found guilty of constant and brutal violations of our Charter. It is the United States, not the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, that is guilty of aggression in Viet-Nam. It is the United States, not the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, that systematically intervenes in the internal affairs of other countries and peoples. And it is not the Democratic People's Republic of Korea that keeps its armed forces in the territory of the United States, but the United States that occupies South Korea. I wonder whether the United States is ready to face the verdict of humanity on who violates the Charter of the United Nations, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea or the United States. So much for who respects our Charter.

68. The draft resolution submitted by the United States and others has one purpose only: by preventing the Democratic People's Republic of Korea from participating in our discussions, its sponsors wish to perpetuate the occupation régime in South Korea, as another draft resolution [A/C.1/L.405] submitted by many of the same countries clearly demonstrates. The United States is determined to do this because without military bases abroad its imperialist policy cannot be put into practice properly. During the last few weeks more and more has been said by responsible American personalities about defending the national interests of the United States in far-away Asia. Similarly, we have heard those quarters declare that the so-called strategic perimeter of the United States passes through South Viet-Nam and South Korea.

69. Such outspoken declarations are in clear contradiction of the statement we just heard from the representative of the United States. We must therefore be thankful for them because they at least do not conceal the true purposes of the United States regarding Asia, and thus also Korea. We feel all the more sorry, after hearing such clear pronouncements, that our minds should be taxed here with empty references to the noble aims of our Charter, to self-determination and other such things.

70. But, we may ask, what has the United Nations to do with the strategic considerations of the United States? Is the United Nations under any obligation, or, what is more important, does it have the right to lend its banner, to imperialist policies like these? Do we really want to be associated with a policy which is more and more the object of sharp criticism even by important political personalities in the United States? I feel that these questions require no answers.

71. Some speakers have here recalled the previous practice of the United Nations by advocating the sending of a unilateral invitation to the South Korean régime. Such attempts seek to identify the conduct of our Organization with the practices of the cold war. Through constant references to the record of the United Nations in the Korean problem we are asked to believe that the shameful war waged against the Korean people under the banner of the United Nations is something to be proud of. Without wishing to go into the substance of this question, may I be permitted to say that the Korean war is as much something to be proud of as is the war against the people of Viet-Nam. During the Korean war, the United States, profiting from the atmosphere of the cold war and making use of the then composition of our Organization, succeeded in putting the United Nations at its service, just as it is vainly trying to do at this time in its war against the people of Viet-Nam. But the world of today is not the world of that time, and in spite of its weaknesses the United Nations of today is not the docile tool in the hands of the United States that it was at the time of the Korean war. I therefore feel that those who keep reminding us of the record of the United Nations in Korea should not forget that that record is a shameful one, that it is a record of using the United Nations as a belligerent party opposed to the struggle for freedom of an Asian people. It is in our common interest to separate the United Nations from that ill-famed campaign and thus help the Organization find its way back to the Charter in its dealings with Korea.

72. The so-called Korean question is one of the left-overs in the United Nations of the cold war. The amendments submitted to the draft resolution by Cambodia and certain other States seek to get rid of all that is so blatantly unilateral and that has for so long characterized the cold-war practices prevailing in the United Nations. The authors of these amendments want us to take a course in conformity with the principles of the Charter. For these reasons, my delegation highly appreciates their noble endeavours and their useful contribution to our work.

73. I have tried to show how common sense, the generally accepted principles of international law and of fair play, respect for the sovereignty of nations, the interests of peaceful coexistence—briefly, how the Charter of the

United Nations requires us to stop the practice of discrimination that has so far characterized our activities with regard to the matter of invitation. We appeal to delegations not to doom to failure our forthcoming discussions by repeating the mistakes of the past. Since the Hungarian delegation would like to move ahead and contribute to the solution of the problems confronting the Korean people, it will vote in favour of the draft resolution only if it is modified by the amendments which will enable both parties, without discrimination, to participate in our discussions.

74. Mr. HASSAN (Somalia): The Korean question is under consideration once more by this Committee. My delegation feels that matters of such importance demand that all the parties involved be given a chance to state their views. It is equitable that the parties to a problem of such magnitude should be heard. The barring of one of the main sides will hamper solution and will in no way contribute towards a lasting and peaceful settlement of the Korean question. My delegation feels that the presence of both Korean Governments will enhance the Committee's understanding of the problem, and it is on that basis that we consider the participation of both North Korea and South Korea as essential.

75. Mr. DIACONESCU (Romania) (*translated from French*): Among the items on the agenda, there is one (item 33(a)) entitled "The Korean question: report of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea". At previous sessions, Romania has on more than one occasion drawn attention to the fact that the Korean question means, in effect, the re-establishment on democratic and peaceful bases of the national unity of Korea, a country temporarily divided, and hence that the problem falls within the exclusive competence of the Korean people. Under the provisions of the United Nations Charter, it is the task of the Korean people to bring about the unification of their country through the exercise of their inalienable and indefeasible right to free self-determination, without any outside interference whatsoever.

*Mr. Tchernouchchenko (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic), Vice-Chairman, took the Chair.*

76. For that reason, the Romanian delegation, along with a number of others, considers that the inclusion of the Korean question on the General Assembly's agenda is a flagrant violation of basic Charter principles. Notwithstanding the valid objections to discussion of the question once again by the United Nations, we again find before us the report of the so-called United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea.

77. Since once again this year the voice of reason has gone unheeded, we are firmly convinced that it is in the interest both of the United Nations and of the solution to the real problem of Korea itself to refrain from repeating yet again the sterile discussions that have been held on that subject in previous years. We are firmly convinced that we can give real meaning to this debate by inviting representatives of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and representatives of the Republic of Korea—the parties concerned—to take part in the consideration of the Korean question without voting rights. Despite the discriminatory and even

hostile manner in which it has been treated up to the present by certain countries Members of this Organization, for whom keeping the Korean question before the United Nations serves merely to camouflage a policy of domination in the Far East, the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has just reiterated its desire to be represented in the discussions on the Korean question.

78. In order for such an invitation to be acceptable, it must of course, as any invitation must, be unaccompanied by any conditions, especially conditions that discriminate against one of those invited in favour of the other. Unfortunately, once again the draft resolution submitted by the United States of America and twelve other countries [*A/C.1/L.399/Rev.1*] does not appear to take into account the elementary rules of justice and respect due to States; paragraph 1 simply decides to invite a representative of the Republic of Korea to take part in the discussion of the Korean question, without right of vote; however, in paragraph 2, the draft makes the invitation to be extended to the representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, a party equally concerned, subject to conditions that are completely unacceptable to any independent sovereign State.

79. My delegation is of the opinion that the competence and authority of the United Nations with regard to the question of Korean unification—which the sponsors of that draft wish to force upon the Democratic People's Republic of Korea as the price of its invitation—have from the outset been based on false premises. As I have just said, they are in flagrant contradiction with the fundamental principles of the Charter, in particular with principles of United Nations non-interference in affairs essentially within the national jurisdiction of a State, and with the principle of the sacred right of peoples to self-determination.

80. If the United Nations genuinely wishes to act in conformity with its Charter, it must unconditionally invite the representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, as an interested party, to take part in the discussion on the Korean question.

81. We are of the opinion that the First Committee would display proof of wisdom, justice and a fine spirit of impartiality were it to extend to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and to the Republic of Korea a single, unconditional invitation rather than two completely different invitations, one based on the ordinary rules of courtesy and the other on criteria that run counter to normal practice in relations between sovereign States.

82. By ensuring the presence of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea during the discussion of the Korean question, the Committee would rid the discussion of the unreality that has characterized it up to now. The voluminous verbatim records of the discussions on the Korean question convincingly prove that it is impossible to apply to the question of Korean unification a solution arrived at from outside, without the participation of one of the parties directly concerned. In circumstances where the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is systematically barred from participating in the consideration of a matter of vital importance to it, clearly no one can argue against the right of that country's Government to ignore resolu-

tions adopted by the United Nations without its representative's participation or consent.

83. Moreover, it is illogical to advance as an argument against the participation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea that country's refusal to recognize the validity of resolutions adopted in its absence by the United Nations, while at the same time preventing it from taking part in discussion of that question. Hence it is not right to cite the just stand taken by that country's Government in rejecting United Nations resolutions adopted without its being consulted as inconsistent with its attitude of deep respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter. The statement issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea published a few days ago [A/C.1/949] emphasizes once again the adherence of that country's Government to the principles of the Charter.

84. Finally, a positive decision on the question of inviting the Korean representatives would provide an incentive for contacts and eventually for negotiations between the two Korean parties with a view to working out for themselves ways and means of solving the problem of the unification of Korea.

85. That very eagerness to do something constructive is at the basis of the amendments submitted by the delegations of Burundi, Cambodia, the Congo (Brazzaville), Guinea, Mali, Mauritania, Mongolia and the Syrian Arab Republic, which Romania had the honour to co-sponsor.

86. The purpose of those amendments could not be more simple: they are designed to redress an injustice, to word the invitation to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in such a way that that country, as an independent and sovereign State, will be able to accept it.

87. I venture to hope that those amendments will meet with the understanding and support of the members of this Committee.

88. Mr. HUOT SAMBATH (Cambodia) (*translated from French*): At the 1503rd meeting, on Monday 23 October, the Cambodian delegation proposed, in order to make the Committee's work run smoothly and efficiently, that the question of the invitation to be extended to both Korean parties be considered and discussed and decided immediately and separately from the substance of the Korean question.

89. In a statement made at the 1504th meeting, on the afternoon of that same day, the Chairman gave his opinion that the logical procedure when examining the Korean question was to devote the first stage of the discussion to the procedural issue, in other words the invitation to be extended to the parties in question.

90. Without going into the substance of the Korean question, the Cambodian delegation will therefore confine itself to speaking on the highly important question of procedure; it proposes to state its position in greater detail when the Committee takes up the substance of the Korean question.

91. One country, a sponsor of draft resolution A/C.1/L.399/Rev.1, stated just a few weeks ago during the general

debate that "respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples . . . constitutes the essential condition for the establishment of a real community of sovereign and equal nations" [1589th plenary meeting, paras. 51 and 52].

92. But what do we find in the draft resolution? We find that its sponsors have violated the very principles of the United Nations Charter, in particular the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, by attaching strings to the invitation to be extended to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea that no independent and sovereign State can accept. Since the United Nations is not a body having supra-national jurisdiction, it cannot impose conditions on the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Nor can it demand that a non-member State acknowledge its competence and authority or oblige that State to accept in advance the measures envisaged by a tractable majority when that same Organization allows some Member States to flout its Charter and still retain their status as Members.

93. Whether the American imperialists like it or not, there is an independent and sovereign State known as the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, whose Government's international relations are always carried out in the spirit of the principles of the Charter.

94. In the report published last year in connexion with the twenty-first session of the General Assembly, the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea stated that: "Official statements emanating from the north Korean authorities are unavailable [*as to*] the ways and means for unification" of the country.<sup>3</sup>

95. Why then are the American imperialists so set in their past mistaken ways and why do they persist in denying to the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, as one of the interested parties, the right to come here and present its views freely on the Korean question? Draft resolution A/C.1/L.399/Rev.1 clearly reveals that its sponsors, some of whom are members of the Commission in question, do not really want the Korean question to be examined fairly and effectively, for the American imperialists are anxious to hold on to their military base in South Korea, which is vital to their provocative and aggressive world policy, especially with regard to Asia.

96. In an attempt to mislead the Members of the United Nations and international public opinion, the sponsors of the draft today introduced a revision to their initial draft [A/C.1/L.399/Rev.1]. That last-minute attempt proves that the twelve countries that are sponsoring draft resolution A/C.1/L.399 are forced to recognize—as we have always stressed here—that the Korean question cannot be effectively and equitably examined unless both the parties concerned take part freely in our discussions. If the United Nations genuinely wants to consider the Korean issues with all the seriousness they deserve, it must extend a simultaneous invitation to both interested parties to come and take part in its discussions without setting any prior conditions. For that reason the Cambodian delegation,

<sup>3</sup> See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-first Session, Supplement No. 12 (A/6312)*, para. 13.

along with other co-sponsoring countries, has submitted some amendments to the draft resolution submitted by twelve countries including the United States, which undeniably constitutes a flagrant violation of the principle of self-determination and sovereignty of States enshrined both in international law and in the United Nations Charter.

97. The Cambodian delegation hopes that the Committee will respect the principles of the United Nations Charter and adopt by a large majority the amendments submitted by Cambodia, The Congo (Brazzaville), Guinea, Mali, Mauritania, Mongolia and Romania, rejecting draft resolution A/C.1/L.399/Rev.I.

98. Mr. TURBAY AYALA (Colombia) (*translated from Spanish*): The delegation of Colombia feels called upon to explain, however briefly, its support for the resolution [A/C.1/L.399/Rev.I] extending invitations to the representatives of the Republic of Korea and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to attend these meetings.

99. While reserving the right to speak at a later stage on other aspects of the Korean question, I would like today to refer briefly to the specific matter of the invitations.

100. I have to say that this is not the first time that good intentions have been distorted and attempts made to present certain countries in a light different from that which is proper to them. It has been argued here, for example, that those of us that have sponsored the resolution to enable the representatives of the Republic of Korea and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to come to the United Nations are using obstructionist tactics to prevent the latter's spokesman from coming by imposing certain minimum conditions. My delegation takes a very simple view of the question, namely that the General Assembly is the one to lay down the rules for granting hearings, and that it is not for those invited to impose conditions for accepting the invitation. It would obviously be discriminatory to place on an equal footing, when granting hearings, those who deny the authority of the United Nations and those who expressly recognize it. That would indeed be discrimination. The least we can ask in the matter of invitations is that those invited allow a measure of authority to those extending the invitation.

101. Why do the members of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea want us to invite them? Is it to legitimize a discussion they consider illegal or to participate in the illegality? That is the dilemma. If it is the former, why should they consider themselves as possessed of a special gift of expurgation? Why should they believe that when they come face to face with the other 122 Members of the United Nations we will acquire saintliness and the items we are dealing with will become legitimate? If the United Nations is acting illegally in inviting them, and without changing its attitude continues to do so, it could certainly be accused of acting illegally if it agreed to the presence of a spokesman representing those who have so far accused it of acting illegally.

102. We feel it is time to make some headway with the discussions, to ease inflexible positions so as to stop marking time and make some real, satisfactory progress. The Korean question, for example, has been under discus-

sion practically since the inception of the Organization. It is likewise high time we made some advance in the actual language used in these discussions; it need not always be contentious and bristling. Many representatives talk constantly of imperialism, of puppets and of aggressors. But any kind of verbal aggression at once provokes the other side to react. No one can call a State a puppet of another without that State taking up the cudgels, nor can any State tolerate a lack of the consideration to which States here represented are entitled. Hence it would be a good thing if the actual language used in the Assembly and its Committees were a little more cordial in an attempt to find common ground. At least let us speak the same language of friendliness.

103. If the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has vital information to give us and revelations to make, I do not believe that either would be any less forceful if its spokesmen treated us with respect and consideration and recognized that the acts we perform are legal. It is not conceivable that the value of their assertions must start out from the basis or principle of the illegality of our own assertions.

104. My country participated in the dispatch of troops to Korea on the understanding that it was serving the cause of the United Nations, and not simply intervening in the internal affairs of Asian countries. Today my delegation believes that the United Nations, which is in no sense an interfering busybody or a force in the service of particular Powers but is acting in accordance with its Purposes and Principles, is right in extending invitations to the representatives of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Republic of Korea, but on an equal footing, i.e. they must both recognize and acknowledge the legitimacy of our acts.

105. This is the way we feel, and my delegation has no other motive in voting for the resolution co-sponsored by Colombia.

106. Mr. CRAW (New Zealand): The draft resolution, of which New Zealand is a co-sponsor, is based on a view which the First Committee has reaffirmed many times. The proposal is quite a simple one: it is that the Republic of Korea and the so-called Democratic People's Republic of Korea—that is, North Korea—should be invited to take part in this Committee's discussion of the Korean question, provided that they first unequivocally accept the competence and authority of the United Nations to consider and act on the Korean question.

107. That proviso is surely very important. This Committee has every right—indeed, it has a plain duty—to require satisfaction on this point. This year, as in previous years, the obligation to furnish a clear and positive answer falls equally on each of the parties—South Korea and North Korea. We have heard talk of discrimination but let me repeat that the obligation to furnish the answer falls equally on each of the parties. There is no question of discrimination at all, whatever may have been asserted to the contrary this afternoon. We are not asking one side to accept conditions which we do not ask the other side to accept. What is in contrast—and it is a crucial difference—is the attitude adopted by the two parties.

108. This year, as in previous years, the Republic of Korea has shown itself to be fully entitled to receive an invitation to take part in our debate. The letter sent by the Government of the Republic to the Secretary-General on 3 October [A/C.1/947 and Corr.1]—the thirteen-Power draft resolution as it now stands refers to this in its third preambular paragraph—provides the necessary assurances.

109. This year, as in previous years, however, the North Korean authorities have persisted in asserting that the United Nations has no standing in the Korean question. Their truculent and, if I may say so, offensive statement of 21 August [A/6696/Add.2] hardly encouraged the hope that they would take the opportunity which the thirteen-Power draft resolution offers them to reconsider their attitude. Their cable of 20 October to the Secretary-General [A/C.1/949] has all the marks of a definitive and completely negative reply. The choice is still theirs, however. If they refuse to make an appropriate response, if the necessary assurances are not forthcoming, then it seems to my delegation that this Committee can take only one course. In justice to itself and the Assembly which it serves it must invite the Republic of Korea to participate in our discussion and remain firm in rejecting the North Korean line that the Korean question is none of the United Nations business.

110. We have heard this afternoon from the representative of Hungary who has rightly stressed the need for objectivity. But I am afraid he then proceeded to ignore completely his own advice by distorting history and misrepresenting the facts, because manifestly the Korean question is the business of the United Nations. It was the business of the United Nations in 1948 when the Republic of Korea came into being as the result of free elections observed by the United Nations Commission. It was the business of the United Nations in 1950—and God knows there are bodies in Korea from many countries which testify to that—when the United Nations, faithful to the central purposes of its Charter, took effective collective action to repel the savage aggression launched from the north against the Republic in the south. Our people, for one, does not lightly forget that aggression. And it is now the business of the United Nations, for the passage of years has in no way diminished this Organization's interest in the maintenance of peace in Korea and in the peaceful reunification of that country in accordance with the freely-expressed wishes of its people.

111. The responsibility and the legitimate interests of the United Nations have been long sustained and remain unchallenged, and it is not obliged to accept the slanders levelled against it by the authorities in North Korea. Its record of collective action and collective endeavour in Korea does, on the other hand, place a special obligation on it to require all those concerned to acknowledge its authority and its competence in the Korean issue. Those who refuse to give that acknowledgment must, in our view, forfeit any claim to come to this Committee and to take part in our discussion.

*Mr. Fahmy (United Arab Republic) resumed the Chair.*

112. We have heard this afternoon, from a number of representatives, a great deal about respect for the rights of

States, but I could only hope to have heard from the same representatives some reference to respect for the rights of the United Nations in this matter.

113. It follows from what I have said that the New Zealand delegation cannot, of course, accept the amendments proposed by Cambodia and others to our thirteen-Power draft resolution. Indeed it seems to me arguable—and this has been pointed out by other representatives—whether they can accurately be described as amendments, since they seek not so much to modify as wholly to negate the terms of our draft. We shall vote against the proposals put forward by Cambodia and others, and we join with other delegations sponsoring the thirteen-Power draft resolution in urging their rejection by this Committee.

114. Mr. TOMOROWICZ (Poland): Once again we have been drawn into a debate which should not be. Once again we are confronted with obstacles in performing our duty—for it is the contention of my delegation that nothing should hamper the Committee in benefiting from the participation in our debates of the most competent parties whenever an important problem is to be considered.

115. It is only too clear that we must not allow our judgement and decisions to be crippled by deliberately barring access to the most competent source of information and advice. The adherence to this principle becomes all the more imperative when the most competent party happens to be at the same time the one most directly concerned with the problem under discussion.

116. We are about to begin the discussion on item 33 pertaining to Korea. Our delegation will participate fully in the forthcoming debate, presenting our views on the merits of the problem. We all are very well aware of the fact that there are sharp differences of opinion, to say the least, on the subject. But whatever may be the differences of opinion they cannot obscure the fact that the presence of the interested Korean parties is essential when a question of such vital importance to the Korean nation as that of the peaceful unification of Korea and the withdrawal of foreign forces from that country is concerned.

117. If anything, the very fact that differences of opinion exist in our Committee makes it all the more necessary to ensure the participation of the parties concerned. This would seem to be a question beyond debate. In our opinion it should be beyond debate also because it is a basic tenet of international relations, of international conduct and of international morality and ethics that the parties most directly concerned should be able to participate in, to influence and what is more to have a decisive say in a matter which is the matter of the fate of their nation.

118. Is it realistic, is it indeed acceptable, that we here should discuss and attempt to take decisions affecting the future of a country and its peaceful development and unity without the participation of its representatives? We are sure that many here share the same opinion as far as the invitation to the interested parties is concerned.

119. Quite independently of how the American resolutions were phrased, their aim has invariably been the same—to deny the Korean people the right to decide their

future; to deny them even the elementary right of being present at discussions concerning their future. The true objective is transparent; it is to continue the occupation of South Korea and to thwart the will of the Korean people to unity, independence and peaceful development. But I shall dwell on this matter at an appropriate time.

120. It is particularly unfortunate—it is inadmissible—that the United Nations should be used as a cover for such activities. Draft resolution A/C.1/L.399/Rev.1 is a perfect illustration of the American position and the tactics adopted. Instead of openly attempting to reject the proposal to invite both parties to participate in the discussion of the items of interest to these parties, the authors of that draft resolution are now proposing a document which is meant to serve the same aim, but under the shield of pretended respect for the observance of the Charter.

121. May I ask whether insistence upon the sovereign right of every nation to decide its fate by itself is consistent with the Charter? May I ask whether calling for negotiations with a view to the peaceful settlement of the internal problems of one nation is consistent with the Charter? May I ask whether, in the conditions of Korea, to ask for increased contacts between the two parties of divided Korea, to call for increased economic and cultural relations, to call for free elections, is consistent with the Charter? For this is what the Korean People's Democratic Republic has been doing for many years now. And there can be only one answer to our question: not only is this consistent with the Charter, but it is a practical implementation of the principles of the Charter by the Korean People's Democratic Republic in its policy.

122. On the other hand, the South Koreans' refusal to have any contacts with the Korean People's Democratic Republic, their acceptance of foreign occupation and the presence of foreign military bases in South Korea is what, in our opinion, contradicts the spirit and the basic principles of the Charter. We shall, however, not object to the invitation of the representatives of South Korea although we have definite opinions about their representativeness. On this point also we shall have more to say.

123. And now to return for a moment to the document. How do the unequivocal conditions contained in the proposed American draft resolution compare with the fact that we accept at the same time the presence here of the representatives of South Africa, in spite of the constant and flagrant violations of all pertinent decisions and resolutions of the United Nations by the Government of that country? Why is it that we are up against such tremendous difficulties in solving the problem of South West Africa? Is it not because of the negative attitude of the principal partners in trade with South Africa? There seems to be a common denominator here making it possible for the South African Government to ignore the decisions of the General Assembly while, on the other hand, all possible ways and means are used not to let the representatives of the Korean People's Democratic Republic participate in our debates on the Korean question. Both these attitudes emanate from the policy "from position of strength". They result from putting the interests of a particular Power above and before the principles of the Charter.

124. To sum up: the Polish delegation strongly urges the adoption of a decision calling for the participation of the Korean People's Democratic Republic in our debate on item 33. We therefore support the amendments contained in document A/C.1/L.400 and Add.1. We do so because those amendments aim at establishing a rule which, as we have said, is basic to international relations, basic to discussion of the future of Korea and basic to the interests and to the authority of our Organization.

125. Mr. SALIM (United Republic of Tanzania): In deciding whether or not an invitation should be extended to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, it is logical that we should ask ourselves whether we are really serious in our wish to help the Korean people to achieve unification. If we are, it is ridiculous to think that we can even attempt to do so without the co-operation of the parties directly concerned—in this case, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Republic of Korea. Any discussion of the Korean question without the participation of both Koreas would be as fruitless as it would be a waste of the valuable time of this Committee. The same would be true if only one party were allowed to take part in the debate. How can anyone attempt mediation or conciliation in a conflict between two parties by listening simply to distorted statements by one party?

126. It is the firm opinion of my delegation that the representatives of both parts of Korea must be invited to take part in any debate on the Korean item. We are fully conscious of the genuine desire of the Korean people to achieve the unification of their homeland. Through our relations and contact with the Government and people of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea we are firmly convinced of their ardent and legitimate wish to see their homeland united. My delegation is convinced also that the same desire inspires the people of the Republic of Korea. In fact, one of the fundamental objectives of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's foreign policy is the attainment of national unification. What right has this Committee, therefore, to exclude the representative of its people from participation in the debate which is supposed to work out ways and means of deciding its destiny? How can this Committee regard the sovereignty of a country as something to be treated lightly? If we consider ourselves competent to discuss and pronounce judgement on the destiny of a sovereign people, is it not logical, is it not pure common sense, that we should at least apply the elementary standards of justice by allowing both parties involved to assume their rightful roles and represent their respective positions? It follows also that any attempt to lay down preconditions is as uncalled for as it is unrealistic.

127. To conclude, the Tanzanian delegation strongly upholds the position that any discussion on the Korean question must be held in the presence of representatives of both the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Republic of Korea, the parties directly concerned with the problem. Therefore the Tanzanian delegation finds draft resolution A/C.1/L.399, now revised as draft resolution A/C.1/L.399/Rev.1, sponsored by Australia, the United States and others, to be quite contrary to this spirit. It is discriminatory and lays down preconditions which no sovereign people could accept. Therefore the draft resolution is completely unacceptable to our delegation.

128. On the other hand, we are pleased to note the draft amendments sponsored by Cambodia, Guinea, Mongolia and others, which are reasonable, fair and just. My delegation fully supports those draft amendments. In fact, I am happy to announce that my delegation has decided to co-sponsor those draft amendments.

129. Mr. SHAW (Australia): We have now come to consider item 33, the Korean question, and, as you have said, Mr. Chairman, we are dealing first with certain procedural points. May I remark that already, under the guise of discussing procedural questions, we have had at least four quite substantial debates on the Korean question in the current session of the General Assembly. I refer to the debate in the General Committee when, in addition to the item dealing with the report of the United Nations Commission on Korea, a so-called new and urgent item dealing with the withdrawal of forces from South Korea was introduced. After that had been accepted and debated in the General Assembly, a further contentiously-worded item calling for the dissolution of the United Nations Commission was also debated in the General Assembly. Furthermore, last week we had in this Committee a quite lengthy debate on what was introduced as a procedural item only.

130. I want to make it quite clear again that the Australian delegation has welcomed at all times full and early discussion of the Korean question in the United Nations. However, I feel bound to point out that under procedural devices certain delegations have made political and indeed what might be described as propaganda statements on the substance of the issues involved in Korea a long time prior to the agenda item coming before us. I can hardly believe that that is correct procedure.

131. We have now come to take up item 33 formally and in its entirety for the first time. You have correctly recommended, Mr. Chairman, that we take first the question of an invitation to representatives of the two parts of the divided country of Korea, a matter which has been the subject of two draft resolutions—one, that introduced, as revised, by the delegation of the Philippines this morning, [1511th meeting] and the other purporting to be an amendment to that draft. In short, the purport of the resolution of which Australia is a co-sponsor is that both the Republic of Korea and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea might participate in the discussion of the Korean question provided both parties accepted the competence and authority of the United Nations within the terms of the Charter to take action on the Korean question. The point of the amendment moved by the delegation of Cambodia and others is to remove that proviso. The co-sponsors of the original resolution take the view that in so far as there is merit in the amendment, that is taken care of in the additional paragraph in the revised version supported by my delegation and introduced this morning.

132. On this question of invitations to representatives of the two parts of Korea to participate in our debate, it has been submitted by some delegations that the question should be regarded simply as one of a dispute between two equal parties. For our part, our insistence that representatives must accept the competence and authority of the United Nations is based on the fact that there are

differences in the positions of the two parties. In short, the differences, which a number of the delegations supporting the case of North Korea have glossed over, relate to three major points. Firstly, there is the fact of the past aggression of North Korea against South Korea, which was the subject of joint defensive action by the United Nations. Secondly, there are the continued aggressive words and deeds of the North Korean régime against South Korea. Thirdly, there is the long-standing and continuing attitude of the North Koreans in rejecting, in contemptuous terms, the authority of the United Nations.

133. In considering the terms in which invitations are to be addressed, therefore, it is relevant, indeed necessary, to examine those differences between the attitudes of the two parties. This requires in the first instance that we go back in history a little to explain how it is there are two Koreas just as there are, in the far-distant Western Hemisphere, two Germanys.

134. As we all know, the country of Korea has had a long history as an independent entity. It was divided as a result of the hazards of war. At the end of the war, the northern part of the country was occupied by Russian forces which had entered that country following their short-lived intervention in the war against Japan. The southern portion was occupied by United States' forces. From the earliest days of the United Nations, Members wanted to reduce that artificial division of Korea and not let it harden into a permanent division. In the early days, a Joint Commission had been set up by the two occupying Powers to establish a provisional Korean Government, but differences between those two occupying Powers could not be resolved and the matter was therefore brought before the second session of the General Assembly in September 1947. At that session of the General Assembly a United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea consisting of representatives of nine Member States was set up to provide for the establishment of a national Government composed of duly elected representatives of the Korean people [*General Assembly resolution 112 B (II)*].

135. That Temporary Commission had a wide membership, representing all the various groups within the General Assembly. A representative of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic was invited to participate, but chose not to do so. The Temporary Commission had a mandate to enter North Korea as well as South Korea to try to bring about conditions under which a free Government could be chosen for all Korea, based on free elections. It is a matter of fact—historical fact, sad fact—that the Temporary Commission was not allowed to enter North Korea. It was therefore directed to implement the Assembly's programmes in such parts of Korea as were accessible to it, and in May 1948 it observed elections in South Korea.

136. The General Assembly considered the report of the Temporary Commission and declared, in resolution 195 (III):

“... that there has been established a lawful government (the Government of the Republic of Korea) having effective control and jurisdiction over that part of Korea where the Temporary Commission was able to observe and consult and in which the great majority of the people of all Korea reside; that this Government is based on

elections which were a valid expression of the free will of the electorate of that part of Korea and which were observed by the Temporary Commission; and that this is the only such Government in Korea;”.

137. By the same resolution the General Assembly established a United Nations Commission on Korea, again with the object of trying to bring about the unification of that country. It so happened that I was a member of that Commission and Chairman in 1948-49, and I can testify personally to the efforts made by the Commission to make contacts with and even to enter North Korea, and to the contemptuous way in which all those efforts were rebuffed by the authorities in North Korea. But the failure of the Commission to make progress does not reflect on the Commission itself, or on the mandates which have been assigned to other commissions by successive sessions of the General Assembly. The reason for the failure has been the complete denial by the North Korean authorities of any United Nations interest in or responsibility for the unification of Korea.

138. To proceed a little further in history—and this seems to have been conveniently forgotten by some delegations here—in June 1950 the forces of North Korea invaded South Korea. That fact was verified by military observers from the United Nations Commission who were located just south of the Thirty-eighth Parallel and their reports are recorded in the documentation submitted to the Security Council and may be consulted. The fact of the military invasion of South Korea by forces from North Korea cannot be blurred or forgotten. Indeed, at that time the communist régime in North Korea considered that it could impose its will by force on the whole of Korea. In its attempt it caused great devastation and suffering to the people of Korea, who fought heroically to resist the imposition of a ruthless and unpopular régime and ideology.

139. I found it strange, too, when I heard the representative of Hungary say this afternoon that he found it “more than strange” that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea should be accused of not respecting the principles of the United Nations Charter. I suppose the basic principle of the Charter is that nations should not indulge in armed aggression or settle disputes by the use of force.

140. Following the news of the invasion in June 1950 the United Nations Security Council, by its resolution 83 (1950), called on all Members to assist the Government and people of South Korea to resist armed aggression. In response to that call, sixteen Members of the United Nations, drawn from all the geographical regions of the world—Asia, Africa, Europe, North and South America and Australia and New Zealand—served under the United Nations flag. Heavy losses were sustained by all those participating, casualties, including killed, wounded and missing, adding up to 455,000. The representative of Hungary, referring to that United Nations intervention, spoke of “the shameful war waged against the Korean people under the banner of the United Nations” and said “the record of the United Nations in Korea... is a shameful one”.

141. I must say quite frankly that I find those remarks insulting to the men of the fighting forces of my country,

who fought and suffered and died in Korea. I find them insulting to the men of the fighting forces of all the sixteen Member States who participated in the resistance against aggression in Korea. I find them insulting to the United Nations.

142. After the North Korean aggressors and their Chinese allies had been beaten back, the armistice which was signed left Korea still divided. That was not the wish of the United Nations or of the Korean people, but the result of the war. In the light of the history of armed attack from the north, the people of the south are hardly able to put much confidence in the good faith and integrity of their neighbours to the north.

143. Certain representatives here may not have such a vivid and personal recollection of the Korean war as others, including myself, and there are those whom it may suit to have those things forgotten, while there are still others, perhaps, who say that all that is past history and that we should now wipe the slate clean, look at the new situation and start all over again. The representative of the Soviet Union, for example, spoke complainingly this morning about “the discriminatory attitude towards North Korea”, and of the “deformed and biased view” which he said the General Assembly had taken on the problem.

144. Is there anything to lead us to believe that the North Korean régime has changed its attitude? Can it be said that the deeds and words of the North Koreans now indicate a new desire to settle the question of Korean unity in accordance with the principles laid down by the United Nations Charter?

145. Let us look at the facts, I shall quote from the report of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea, which comments on the number of serious incidents which have taken place south of the demarcation line in the past year and the large number of North Korean agents introduced into other parts of the territory of the Republic of Korea for the purpose of sabotage and assassination:

“United Nations Command encounters with intruders south of the military demarcation line numbered 110 during the first seven months of 1967, whereas the numbers were eight in the whole of 1964, twenty-seven in 1965, and twenty-five in 1966. The number of north Koreans killed or captured in the vicinity of the demilitarized zone during the first half of 1967 increased greatly and totalled 170. Attacks by north Koreans resulted in many casualties among United Nations forces, the number for the first half of 1967 being almost three times as large as that for the whole of 1966.

“There was also an increase in both the number of north Korean agents introduced into the Republic of Korea by sea and in the number of those killed or captured. Agents entered the Republic in larger groups and were more heavily armed and better equipped than in the past. The number who surrendered or were killed or captured as at 31 July 1967 was 228 compared with 106 for the entire year 1966.” [A/6712, paras. 104 and 105.]

146. As a result of those actions, ninety-two South Korean soldiers and fourteen United Nations soldiers were killed and 195 South Korean soldiers and thirty-nine

United Nations soldiers were wounded in the first eight months of this year.

147. We might consider that report when, a little later in the debate, we come to discuss the sub-items calling for the withdrawal of the United Nations forces from South Korea and the dissolution of the United Nations Commission. All I would say at this time is that such calls in the light of the incidents recorded above in what I have just said, have a somewhat sinister ring about them.

148. We do not have to look back very far in the history of this Organization and of the world to be reminded of an example in which a United Nations presence and force was removed from an area which is the subject of tension and armed incidents. What then is the purpose behind this concerted effort by a number of delegations from Communist countries, and others, for the removal of the United Nations presence and forces in Korea?

149. I come now to my third point, suggesting that there is a difference in the attitudes of the Republic of Korea and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in regard to the United Nations. As we have noted from our documents, the Government of North Korea has denounced any attempt by the United Nations to put the Korean question again on the agenda of the General Assembly.

150. At the request of the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, we have had circulated to us three statements on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea: those appearing in documents A/6696/Add.2, A/C.1/949 and A/C.1/951. I might remark in passing that these statements are interlarded with abuse and slanderous epithets about warmongers and imperialist aggressors, puppet cliques and so forth. That language may be customary to the international exchanges maintained by the Government of North Korea, but I hope it does not come to be accepted as normal in international usage as practised in the United Nations.

151. Leaving aside the offensive words and tone of these communications, we find that the North Korean authorities have again simply denounced any attempt by the United Nations to put the Korean question again on the agenda of the General Assembly. The North Korean newspaper *Rodong Shimmun*, in its editorial of 23 August, said that no matter what resolution was adopted by the United Nations on the Korean question the Korean people would never recognize it.

152. This has been made explicit in the statement of the Foreign Minister of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea [A/C.1/949] in which he declares simply in the last paragraph that:

“The Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea will consider null and void and will not recognize whatever ‘resolution’ the United Nations may adopt arbitrarily without the participation and consent of its representative.”

The condition on which the North Korean régime would presumably agree to come here would be that it would be given the power of veto over any resolution which the United Nations might adopt.

153. To recapitulate my argument, I have tried to establish that this is not simply a question of inviting, without any pre-conditions, the representatives of both South and North Korea to participate in our debates. We cannot simply equate these two parts.

154. The Republic of Korea has a government which as early as 1947 submitted to free elections supervised by the United Nations in all the territory over which it had control. It has many times accepted in full the competence of the United Nations, and this is repeated in documents A/C.1/947 and A/C.1/950. The Republic of Korea maintains, or has agreed to establish, diplomatic relations with seventy-six States, seventy-two of which are Members of the United Nations.

155. The Republic of Korea has developed a vigorous and active political life, democratically expressed in a series of elections. It has been able to emerge from the devastation of war brought to it through aggression and to raise its level of economic growth to the extraordinary achievement in 1966 of an increase in the gross national product of 13.4 per cent. Anyone who has recently been to the Republic of Korea can bear testimony to the vigour of its economic and political life.

156. On the other hand, the North Korean authorities fought a war of aggression, firstly against their neighbour and then against the forces of the United Nations. They have rejected repeated resolutions of the General Assembly; they have refused to co-operate with all three of the subsidiary organs which the General Assembly has set up to deal with the problem of reunification. They have denied in writing the legal authority of the United Nations even to discuss the Korean question. The monolithic one-party régime which was imposed by force on the people of North Korea remains determined to impose its views on the other three-quarters of the population of Korea.

157. It is in those circumstances that the co-sponsors of the draft resolution, as revised, seek to make it a condition that any representatives coming before this Committee should accept the authority of the General Assembly; and we ask the support of this Committee for that draft resolution.

158. To conclude, I would emphasize that this is not simply a negative position. The objective of the United Nations in Korea is to establish a unified, independent and democratic Korea under a representative form of government. The attainment of this United Nations objective in Korea will accord with the wishes and interests of the people of Korea. It will also accord with the wishes and interests of the peoples of the Asian and Pacific areas and of the world as a whole.

159. Mr. BITSIOS (Greece) (*translated from French*): It is clear from the discussion begun this morning that, when we have set aside all superfluous verbiage, the essence of the question before this Committee is that of deciding whether we should invite the North Korean representatives to take part in our discussions, even though we know that the North Korean régime does not recognize United Nations competence and authority in the Korean question.

160. The General Assembly has on many occasions approached this question by establishing, through a series of related resolutions, a principle in keeping with the spirit and the letter of the Charter. The principle is that a country not a Member of the United Nations—as is the case with North Korea—cannot expound its views before the General Assembly without having first accepted certain obligations incumbent on United Nations Members, in other words, without having recognized United Nations competence and authority in the matter with which it is concerned. To challenge that principle would be tantamount to challenging the fundamental concepts on which the Organization is based, its mission as guardian of world peace and its increasingly successful aim of becoming a universal organization by the acceptance of its principles and its purposes by all States throughout the world.

161. Thus the only question that arises with regard to the matter at present before us is whether North Korea has recently given us any indication of its intention to change its attitude towards the United Nations and to collaborate with it with a view to settling the question of Korean reunification within a framework of valid assurances such as only the United Nations can provide. No such indication is forthcoming. On the contrary, we have before us a whole series of documents from the North Korean Government testifying to its absolute, persistent and whole-hearted opposition to having the Korean question considered by the United Nations.

162. In the light of the foregoing, and of the Organization's duty to safeguard the maintenance of world peace and security, we are forced to conclude that there is no other course open to us than the one we have pursued up to now as embodied in the thirteen-Power draft resolution, namely, not to invite North Korea to state its views before our Committee unless it first recognizes United Nations competence and authority in that matter.

163. It is not a question of laying down conditions for anyone. It is a question of applying a principle. For that reason, my delegation will support the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.399/Rev.1 as a whole and in its present form.

164. Mr. AMERASINGHE (Ceylon): The Korean question seems to have become more a matter of procedure than of substance. The mists of the cold war tend to blur the real question at issue.

165. If we paused for a moment to separate the two elements, we would recognize the fact that the object of all our efforts is the peaceful reunification of a divided country. The process of reunification could best be advanced if the parties concerned were left free to act without outside interference. By outside interference we do not mean any efforts by the United Nations to exercise its good offices and its moderating influence to bring the parties together for a peaceful settlement of their differences.

166. If we agree with the argument that North Korea cannot be allowed to participate in any discussion of the future of Korea conducted under the auspices of the United Nations unless it accepts and recognizes the competence

and authority of the United Nations, we are left with the alternative of discussing the future of Korea, including North Korea, in the absence of North Korean representatives.

167. That is what the draft resolution seeks to achieve, in the certain knowledge that its terms and conditions for North Korean participation will prove unacceptable. The procedure envisaged would merely enable us to conduct a debate and reach decisions without any prospect of their successful implementation. But it would enable such decisions to be taken in circumstances which constitute a contravention of a widely recognized and elementary principle of law and justice, namely, that any party to a dispute has a right to be heard and should be given the opportunity of being heard.

168. Were we to insist on the jurisdiction, competence and authority of the United Nations being accepted and recognized as a condition precedent to participation even without the right to vote in the discussions and deliberations of the United Nations, we would find ourselves trapped in a snare from which even the most subtle and elaborate casuistry could not rescue us. I need only remind this Committee that there are countries which are Members of the United Nations which do not recognize the competence of the United Nations in regard to certain questions concerning them. But they are not deprived of the right to participate in discussions relating to those questions and even to vote if they so choose. They are merely given the privilege of ignoring United Nations decisions.

169. Here we have the case of a party whose entire future is involved in the question that is to be discussed. But we demand of it an even greater degree of respect for the authority of the United Nations than we do of Member States. It has been stated that unequivocal recognition of the competence and authority of the United Nations is indispensable for the maintenance of the dignity of the United Nations. Any mention of dignity, like any mention of self-respect, touches a most sensitive chord in us. But what is the real merit, what is the legitimate implication of the acceptance of the competence and authority of a body? Is it not that it entails the consequential obligation of abiding by the decisions of that body, or is it the contention of the authors and sponsors of the draft resolution that we should be satisfied with maintaining that, as long as a country or party declares its willingness to recognize the competence and authority of the United Nations, it is free to treat the consequential United Nations resolutions and decisions with indifference, contumacy and even contempt?

170. What constitutes the greater, the more insolent affront to the dignity of the United Nations: for a Member State of the United Nations, which has acknowledged the competence and authority of the United Nations, to spurn that authority's decisions whenever it chooses, or for a party, whilst stating that it cannot accept United Nations competence, to agree nevertheless to participate in United Nations discussions? Surely the greater affront to United Nations dignity comes from the insubordination of the peccant Member State.

171. Our appeal to this Committee is to adopt a course that both principle and expediency would appear to dictate

and issue an invitation without conditions to both parties to take part without the right of vote in our discussions on the Korean question.

172. Mr. TINOCO (Costa Rica) (*translated from Spanish*): From what we have been hearing during these meetings it is quite clear that there is an almost unanimous consensus in favour of bringing about the unification of Korea within the framework of the United Nations Charter. I have not heard a single voice opposed to that ideal solution desired by all the Members of the Organization. There is also a general feeling that it would be highly desirable and practically useful for representatives of the Governments of North Korea and South Korea to come here and state their views.

173. The point that divides the advocates of the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.399/Rev.1 and those in favour of amending the proposal is a matter of principle. We who are sponsoring the draft resolution want both Governments, before coming to the Assembly or to this Committee, to recognize explicitly, unequivocally, without hemming and hawing, the competence and authority of the United Nations under the Charter to adopt measures to deal with this question which has been worrying the world community for so many years.

174. It is a matter of law that prompts us to stipulate this recognition; for no-one can have recourse to a tribunal—if we wish to regard ourselves as such—or to an organic body, while at the same time denying the competence of that

body to hear the arguments of the parties appearing before it. I do not know whether it is because of my legal training, but I cannot conceive how anyone who denies the competence of a tribunal can appear before that same tribunal and ask to be heard. By the very fact of coming here, the representatives of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, even though they made no explicit declaration, would be making an implicit gesture of recognition of our authority in coming and expressing their objections to the arguments of the representatives of the Republic of Korea.

175. But it would be an unacceptable situation for the United Nations if, after coming here as before coming here, those representatives denied its competence; for they would thereby be placing the United Nations in a legally untenable position from the time when the Organization considered that a specific resolution of the General Assembly was needed with a view to applying the principles of the Charter to the Republic of Korea.

176. For this reason the delegation of Costa Rica has co-sponsored draft resolution A/C.1/L.399/Rev.1, and believes that if they analyse the situation and the circumstances dispassionately, the members of the First Committee will support our draft resolution and reject the amendments to it, or rather not so much amendments as the elements designed to destroy the cardinal principles of the draft.

*The meeting rose at 5.55 p.m.*