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Chairman: Mr. Francisco URRUTIA (Colombia).

AGENDA ITEM 62

Application, under the auspices of the United Nations, of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples in the case of the population of the island of Cyprus (A/2703, A/C.1/747, A/C.1/753, A/C.1/L.124, A/C.1/L.125, A/C.1/L.126, A/C.1/L.127) (*concluded*)

1. Mr. SERRANO (Philippines) observed that with the inclusion of the Cyprus question in the agenda despite the objections raised, a general debate might have been expected. Since, however, the Committee had given priority to the New Zealand draft resolution (A/C.1/L.125) in order to have an opportunity of considering whether it might not be wiser not to take up the Greek draft resolution (A/C.1/L.124), the substance of the question should not have been discussed until a decision had been taken on the New Zealand draft. In fact, however, the statements made by the representatives of the United Kingdom, Turkey and Greece had dealt with the substance of the matter; accordingly there seemed to be general agreement to disregard the priority given to the New Zealand draft resolution.

2. The United Kingdom representative had argued that to disturb the present status of Cyprus would be to play into the hands of those who were seeking to divide the free world. On the other hand, the Greek representative had given an assurance that his country would never allow anything to impair Anglo-Greek friendship, and had stated that to grant the Cypriots their freedom would only strengthen the ties between the two countries.

3. Bearing in mind the wise and moderate statements that had been made, the Philippines would consider it a matter of duty to combine its appreciation of the realities of the situation with firmness of principle, for it could not allow its admiration for the United Kingdom to outweigh its respect for the principle of self-determination, to which it owed its existence as a State.

4. On the side of the United Kingdom, the case had been argued from the standpoint of the rule of domestic jurisdiction, of the sanctity of treaties and of political and security considerations, while on the other side

the right of self-determination of peoples was considered the paramount factor. If possible, therefore, a compromise had to be found, taking into account the yearning of the peoples for their freedom, the mutual regard of the British and Greek peoples, and the strategic obligations of the United Kingdom, a pillar of freedom and peace in the world.

5. Cyprus, with a population four-fifths Greek, had once had its own city-states like the other Greek city-states; it had later become part, first of the Kingdom of Macedonia, then of the Byzantine Empire; and finally, in 1571, it had fallen under Turkish rule. By a Convention of defensive alliance signed on 4 June 1878, Turkey had ceded Cyprus to the United Kingdom to enable the latter to join in the defence of Turkey's Asian territories against Russia. In 1914, Cyprus had passed under the sovereignty of the British Crown, which Turkey had recognized in article 20 of the Treaty of Peace signed at Lausanne in 1923.

6. Reference had been made to the Cypriots' age-old desire for union with Greece. In 1907, Mr. Winston Churchill, then Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies, had said that, in view of the patriotic devotion which characterized the Greek nation, it was only natural that the Cypriot people, who were of Greek descent, should regard their incorporation with their mother country as an ideal to be fervently cherished. Lloyd George, Ramsay Macdonald, John Parker, and many others had voiced their recognition of that separatist sentiment. However, since Greece believed, rightly or wrongly, that further bilateral negotiations with the United Kingdom would be useless, it had decided to refer the question to the United Nations. It would be remembered that Mr. Hopkinson, the Minister of State for Colonial Affairs, had stated on 28 July 1954 with reference to Cyprus that there were certain territories in the Commonwealth which could never expect to be independent.

7. Article 2, paragraph 7, of the Charter, which had been referred to by the United Kingdom and Turkey, could not be isolated from the rest of the Charter, which not only laid down objectives but also in some cases prescribed the means for their accomplishment. The construction placed upon the domestic jurisdiction rule by the United Kingdom and Turkey would render the other provisions completely nugatory and deprive the organs of the United Nations of any competence, even where such competence was expressly recognized. Accordingly, the word "nothing" in Article 2, paragraph 7, could not be construed as applying to all other provisions of the Charter; that would reduce the instrument to complete nullity. Moreover, the word "essentially" implied that there was a residual area where discussion was permissible. There could be no doubt, therefore, that the General Assembly was competent to apply the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, which was one of the basic principles of the United Nations. Further, Article

10 authorized the General Assembly to "discuss any questions or any matters within the scope of the present Charter or relating to the powers and functions of any organs provided for in the present Charter".

8. Moreover, certain utterances of British leaders which already been quoted, and the United Kingdom's conditional offer of Cyprus to Greece in 1915, barred the United Kingdom from invoking the rule of domestic jurisdiction, for there had been a tacit recognition of the legitimacy of the aspirations of the Cypriots to self-determination. By subscribing to the Charter, the United Kingdom had undertaken to respect any legitimate United Nations action to give effect to that principle.

9. It had been vigorously argued that the application of the principle of self-determination would entail a transfer of sovereignty in favour of a certain State, and would thereby enable that State to alter the provisions of a treaty which it had signed, in the case in point, the Treaty of Lausanne. The United Kingdom took the view that it would be dangerous to establish a precedent whereby any Member State might invoke the right of self-determination, backed by ethnic or historical factors, to extend its territory at the expense of another Member State. In fact, however, the draft resolution submitted by Greece (A/C.1/L.124) did not say that Cyprus should be united with or annexed to Greece; Greece was not advancing a territorial claim, but was merely acting under Article 35 of the Charter, as any other Member of the United Nations might have done. If there was any possibility of misconception as to Greece's position, it was only because Cyprus had no legal standing with the United Nations and had therefore been unable to raise the matter directly.

10. It was true that, in the event of affirmative action by the General Assembly, the people of Cyprus might decide to unite with the mother country. The right of self-determination should not, however, be confused with the exercise of that right or the possible results of its exercise. The Charter could not prescribe how the abstract principle should be applied; each people was the sole judge of how it should exercise its right of self-determination, even though a Member of the United Nations might be dissatisfied or adversely affected thereby.

11. Thus, the right of the Cypriots to self-determination could not be invalidated by the possibility that its outcome might be union with Greece rather than independence or membership of the British Commonwealth. Indeed, General Assembly resolution 742 (VIII) of 27 November 1953 recognized that self-government could also be achieved by association with another State if that were done freely. That, incidentally, answered the argument that *enosis* was necessarily inconsistent with the right of Cyprus to self-determination.

12. It was the view of the United Kingdom that Greece, as a party to the Treaty of Lausanne, would be committing a breach of its obligations if it sought to disturb the state of affairs created by that treaty. In fact, however, it was Turkey that had been a party to the cession of Cyprus; and in any event neither Turkey, which had ceded Cyprus, nor the United Kingdom, which had been the grantee, nor Greece, which had been a witness, could deprive the Cypriots of their right to self-determination.

13. The right of non-self-governing peoples to decide their own destinies was inviolable, independently of treaties and of the Charter, which merely recognized the existence of that right. Its application could be delayed or qualified, but could not be withheld indefinitely. The fact that Greece had invoked the right of behalf of Cyprus was purely a procedural matter. If Cyprus decided to remain a member of the British Commonwealth, Greece would not make the slightest protest; Mr. Kyrou had given an assurance to that effect. The inhabitants of Cyprus were therefore entitled to ask that the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples should be applied to them, particularly since their political maturity had not been challenged.

14. The United Kingdom had alleged that the 100,000 Turks in Cyprus had religious beliefs and racial and cultural ties with another country as strong as those of the Greeks; but as there was no such thing as a perfectly homogeneous people with no differences of race, language or religion, that argument would bar all possibility of the application of the right to self-determination.

15. The United Kingdom had granted independence to India, Pakistan, Burma and Ceylon, and on 29 June 1954 had joined with the United States in signing a declaration of principles proclaiming the right of peoples to self-government. Similarly, in the Pacific Charter, the United Kingdom had proclaimed the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, which it had always championed, and had undertaken to promote the independence of all peoples which desired and were able to undertake its responsibilities. Such declarations were worthy of British tradition, and could not be qualified by any considerations of race or geography.

16. While the right of the inhabitants of Cyprus to self-determination was undeniable, it was also reasonable to bear in mind certain considerations of expediency arising out of the present international situation. The United Kingdom, a pillar of the free world, had assumed tremendous defence obligations, and, with the withdrawal of its forces from the Suez Canal Zone, it had made Cyprus its headquarters in the Mediterranean. Thus, the fate of the United Kingdom and of the democratic world might well hang on Cyprus, which was a vitally important link in the chain of defence of freedom. Cyprus would, however, be a much stouter bulwark with a free population than with a subject and discontented one.

17. The Philippine delegation therefore considered that, while the General Assembly should recognize the Cypriot people's right to self-determination, steps should be taken by way of direct negotiations between the parties to decide on the date, method and conditions for the granting of that right.

18. The Cypriots, in their patriotism, and the Government of Greece, with its appreciation of world realities, had said that, in the event of the union of Cyprus with Greece, they would be prepared to conclude agreements, bilateral or under international guarantee, to grant the United Kingdom the right to maintain bases in Cyprus and station its troops there, and similar privileges. Those were assurances which the United Kingdom and the free world would undoubtedly appreciate; and, given a friendly spirit of mutual goodwill, a satisfactory

compromise could be achieved. Freedom without security was no better than security without freedom.

19. Mr. ZARUBIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that his delegation could not accept the contention that the United Nations had no competence in the matter. Chapter XI of the Charter gave the Organization the right to take a decision on the question; under Article 73, Members of the United Nations administering territories whose people had not yet attained a full measure of self-government had certain obligations, including that of promoting the well-being of the inhabitants and, to that end, of ensuring their political, economic, social and educational advancement, and developing self-government. The United Nations was further justified in dealing with the Cyprus question in view of the fact that, in the present case, the violation of the rights set forth in Article 73 might create a threat to the peace.

20. Moreover, the only issue was the application to Cyprus of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples laid down in Article 55 of the Charter. Under resolution 637 A (VII), States Members of the United Nations were called upon to "uphold the principle of self-determination of all peoples and nations" and the request of the people of Cyprus for the application of that resolution, which provided for plebiscites or "other recognized democratic means", could not be refused.

21. Cyprus had been a British colony since 1878. According to Archbishop Makarios III (A/C.1/747), its inhabitants were harshly treated, all discussion of the Cyprus question being treated as sedition. A further breach of the provisions of Article 73 of the Charter was the fact that, far from promoting the advancement of the population, the Administration was seeking to arrest it. A draft constitution recently prepared by the United Kingdom provided for the establishment of a purely consultative assembly, two-thirds of whose members would be appointed by the Governor and only one-third elected by the population. It was not surprising that the overwhelming majority of the population should be opposed to the creation of such an assembly. In addition, more land had recently been taken from the population for military installations, to the detriment of the economic situation of the Cypriots, which was in any case precarious. The population of Cyprus was united in its demands. British repression had been powerless to induce the Cypriots to renounce their demands, and they had already expressed their desire for a plebiscite.

22. The application to Cyprus of the principles of Article 73 would serve to strengthen the authority of the Charter and would contribute to the maintenance of peace. In view of the gravity of the situation, after exhausting all other possibilities, Greece had decided to appeal to the United Nations. The people of Cyprus was now looking to the United Nations to give it the right to determine its own future.

23. The Soviet Union delegation therefore supported the Greek draft resolution (A/C.1/L.124) and would vote against the New Zealand draft resolution (A/C.1/L.125), which would deprive the Cypriots of the opportunity to decide their own future.

24. Sir Percy SPENDER (Australia) reminded the Committee that he had voted against the inclusion of the Cyprus question in the agenda on the ground that the matter was outside the General Assembly's competence

and that its discussion would only increase irritation and consequently be prejudicial to the cause of peace and security. That view had been borne out by the debate.

25. Australia was bound to the United Kingdom by the closest ties that could exist between two independent countries. It was also bound to Greece by the admiration which its culture and its contribution to the cause of freedom merited. Mr. Kyrou had referred to the Australian troops who had been in Greece; it was a fact that those troops would never forget the kindness and the courage of the Greek people.

26. Nevertheless, the Greek representative's statement had failed to prove that there was any ground for the Committee to intervene in the dispute. It was argued that the issue was the principle of self-determination, a principle which each Member State defined to suit itself, but not even the Greek representative himself could deny that his draft resolution was meant to be the first step towards the union of Cyprus with Greece. Despite the fact that the representative of Ecuador had denied, at the 751st meeting, that the Committee was being asked to concern itself with *enosis*, in other words, with a territorial claim, that, in reality, was the principle to which the United Nations was being called upon to subscribe. In no circumstances, however, could the First Committee consider a political claim by one country to what was the undisputed territory of another.

27. Why had the question come before the First Committee rather than before the Fourth Committee, to which so many references had been made during the discussion? What connexion did it have with the maintenance of peace and security? The truth was that the question at issue was neither the principle of self-determination nor a dispute between the population of Cyprus or Greece and the United Kingdom: essentially, it was a disguised territorial claim.

28. The delegations of Poland, Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union had of course claimed to be deeply concerned with the right of self-determination. In fact, they were interested in the population of Cyprus solely as a pawn in their world policy. Had the peoples of Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Poland or Lithuania been given the right of self-determination? And would the Soviet Union permit the application of the principle to the different ethnic groups within its borders, or to East Germany?

29. It was true, as the Polish and Ecuadorian representatives had said, that the relevant part of the Charter was Chapter XI; the United Kingdom had accepted the obligations laid down in the chapter to develop self-government and to further international peace and security. That country, which had done so much for the cause of freedom, for example during the dark days of 1940, could be relied on to discharge its obligations under Chapter XI of the Charter and to treat the population of Cyprus justly.

30. The Australian delegation was convinced that a solution to the problem should not be sought in the First Committee, or by draft resolutions like the one proposed by Greece; it would vote for the New Zealand draft resolution.

31. Mr. CHAMANDI (Yemen) regretted that two friendly nations—Greece and the United Kingdom—had been unable to settle the problem of the right of self-determination of the people of Cyprus, a right so

strongly defended by the United Kingdom delegation, amongst others, during the discussion of the question of West Irian.

32. The Government of Yemen had a serious dispute with the United Kingdom concerning territories occupied by that country to the south and east of Yemen, and had been endeavouring to reach agreement with the United Kingdom by means of friendly negotiations. Unfortunately, however, the United Kingdom had recently attempted to settle the question by bombing and acts of terrorism. It was therefore particularly important to Yemen that such disputes should be settled by diplomacy and by granting occupied territories and dependent peoples the right of self-determination laid down in a number of articles of the Charter.

33. The point was not that Cyprus belonged to this or that country, but that it belonged to its own population, which was entitled to decide its future status. On the other hand, it was essential to avoid the possibility of any section of the population being subjected to discrimination. When, therefore, the principle of self-determination was implemented under United Nations supervision, adequate constitutional guarantees would have to be provided to safeguard the equal rights of all Cypriots, majority and minority alike.

34. The fact that a substantial majority, both in the General Committee and in the General Assembly, had voted for the inclusion of the item in the agenda, proved the sincere desire of Member States to help the peoples to attain their independence, as prescribed by the Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It was appropriate that Greece should have submitted the question to the United Nations in the name of the majority of the island's population, which was averse to violence. Certain Powers would therefore do better to promote the emancipation of peoples than to rally to the support of those who invoked Article 2, paragraph 7, of the Charter in an attempt to repress the national aspirations of non-self-governing peoples. If certain Powers really took such pride in the progress made in the territories under their administration, why were they so alarmed at the mere mention of the term "self-determination"?

35. The statement made on 28 July 1954 by the United Kingdom Minister of State for Colonial Affairs, to which reference had already been made, was particularly objectionable, as it implied that certain territories would be deemed to perpetual dependence, in defiance of the Charter and of General Assembly resolution 637 A (VII).

36. Some delegations had claimed that the issue involved the transfer of sovereignty, but the title of the item showed that that was not the case. It was for the people of Cyprus to determine its future status, to decide whether it wished to remain within the Commonwealth, to unite with Greece or to be independent.

37. It had argued that the strategic importance of the island must outweigh the wishes of the population, but both Governments—that of the United Kingdom and that of Greece—were members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and should be able to find an amicable solution by direct negotiation in conformity with the Charter and with the friendly relations existing between them.

38. The delegation of Yemen associated itself with the statement made by the representative of Syria at the previous meeting that the problems of the Arab world

had always been with the West, and that the defence of the Arab world accordingly depended not on the holding of a military base at Cyprus, but on the final emancipation of the Arab world.

39. The delegation of Yemen would vote against the New Zealand draft resolution (A/C.1/L.125) and in favour of the Greek draft resolution (A/C.1/L.124).

40. Mr. MUNRO (New Zealand) observed that Mr. Kyrou had referred (750th meeting) to the Greek people's gratitude to the New Zealand troops. Those troops had in fact fought in that part of the world on more than one occasion: in Palestine and at Gallipoli in the First World War, and in Greece and at El Alamein in the Second World War. Thus New Zealand knew from its own experience the strategic importance of the area in which Cyprus was located. At the same time, differences of opinion could not affect the traditional ties of friendship between the Greek people and New Zealand.

41. There had already been a very full discussion on the basis of the New Zealand draft resolution (A/C.1/L.125). It had never been the New Zealand delegation's intention to prevent the parties from presenting their views at length. Despite what the Ecuadorian representative had seemed to suggest (751st meeting), Mr. Munro was always glad to listen to the statements of the representatives of Latin America. Now that the question had been considered and discussed, however, his delegation proposed that there should be no further consideration. The argument that the adoption of the draft resolution required a two-thirds majority had been demolished by the full freedom of discussion which the Chairman had permitted.

42. The Greek representative's last statement (751st meeting) had contained arguments of substance, and had only confirmed the view that further consideration of the item would be dangerous. It was also clear that the heart of the item was the Greek claim for the union of Greece and Cyprus. It was significant that Mr. Kyrou had scarcely referred to the concept of *enosis* except by quotation. The lack of emphasis on the Greek claim suggested lack of confidence on Mr. Kyrou's part in the possibility of the Assembly endorsing it. Yet that remained Greece's objective, as could be seen from section II of the letter from the Prime Minister of Greece (A/2703); for to say that "it would not be enough to repeat that Cyprus belongs to the Greek world; Cyprus is Greece itself", was to assert that Cyprus should be under Greek rule. That territorial claim, under whatever guise, damaged Greece's relations with Turkey and with the United Kingdom and endangered the stability of that part of the world, as was apparent from the statements made by the Greek and the Turkish representatives.

43. Some of the statements made in the Committee had been affirmations of principles without any regard to the realities of the situation. The representative of Ecuador had said that the debate had been curious in some respects; and it was indeed curious to hear the communist bloc supporting *enosis* under the name of self-determination when they had denied self-determination, under the cloak of mock plebiscites, to the Balkan States. Fortunately the representative of Iraq, with his customary lucidity, had brought the discussion back to the strategic aspects of the problem (751st meeting).

44. The United Kingdom, whose adherence to the principle of self-determination had been proved, had

vast responsibilities, one of which was to play a major part for all the free world, including both Greece and New Zealand, in preserving the stability of the Eastern Mediterranean. That necessarily involved the preservation of the stability and integrity of Cyprus, which would be endangered by the present controversy. Any attempt to obtain from the General Assembly a verdict on the merits of the question could only create bad feeling between Greece and the United Kingdom, between Greece and Turkey, and between the majority and the minority in Cyprus itself.

45. In the confidence that that view was widely held in the Committee, the New Zealand delegation urged that its draft resolution (A/C.1/L.125) should be adopted.

46. Mr. SARPEN (Turkey) pointed out, with reference to certain points raised by the Greek representative, that the Treaty of Lausanne was not just another bilateral or even multilateral treaty such as those that were calculated and concluded to cover just one specific subject. On the contrary, it was a well-known fact that that treaty had been drawn up to settle various matters pertaining to territorial status and sovereignty between the Allied and Associated Powers—including Greece—and Turkey. Although the treaty was composed of two sections, the first being a peace treaty and the second consisting of protocols and additional agreements among the parties directly concerned, it was nevertheless an indivisible whole. The provisions relating to the status of Cyprus were to be found in the Peace Treaty. They were binding on all signatories, including Greece, which had made no reservations on that subject. Moreover, if, as the Greek delegation argued, Turkey alone had yielded Cyprus to the United Kingdom, and if Greece did not recognize that transfer of sovereignty, it followed, according to the logic of the Greek delegation, that Cyprus should still be under Turkish sovereignty. That was generally called a *reductio ad absurdum*.

47. Such criticism as Mr. Sarper had voiced regarding the Greek Orthodox clergy of Cyprus had nothing to do with their religious activities; indeed, the Patriarch of the Greek Orthodox Church, His Holiness, Athanasios, resided in Istanbul and was treated with all the respect due his high position.

48. Mr. Kyrou had spoken of the Achaean origin of the Cypriots, but modern historians agreed that the Achaeans were of Germanic origin. At any rate, that was a matter of ancient history and had little relevance to the present discussion.

49. Mr. Sarper said that he had not, of course, taken a position against the principle of self-determination, but against its abuse and misuse. Turkey had once founded one of the greatest empires of history, a distinctive feature of which had been that it had had no colonies. All parts of the Ottoman Empire had had equal rights.

50. He was gratified to note that he was in full agreement with the Greek representative on one point; he was convinced that it was in the interests of the countries concerned and of the free world that the relations of friendship and the ties of alliance between Turkey, Greece and Yugoslavia should remain intact and uninjured. For its part, Turkey would put no obstacle in the path of the further development of those happy relations.

51. Mr. WINIEWICZ (Poland) pointed out, in reply to the representative of Australia, that, if the right

of self-determination had not been respected in Poland and Czechoslovakia, those two States would not be Members of the United Nations. Sir Percy Spender seemed to have forgotten that millions of Poles had died during the Second World War in defence of their right to self-determination. Mr. Winiewicz protested against the Australian accusation that Poland's defence of the right of the people of Cyprus to self-determination was in bad faith.

52. Mr. BENITES VINUEZA (Ecuador) said, in reply to the New Zealand representative, that, in the statement he had made at the previous meeting, he had never doubted the sincerity of that representative's intentions, and had merely voiced his confidence that the New Zealand delegation felt the same respect for other delegations as it received from them.

53. He wished to point out to the representative of Australia that he had never cast doubt on the sincerity of the United Kingdom. It was well known that the United Kingdom had always carried out its obligations to lead peoples towards self-government. Moreover, the United Kingdom had assisted Ecuador with blood and money during its struggle for independence.

54. Finally, with regard to Sir Percy Spender's statement that the present question was solely one of *enosis*, Mr. Benites Vinueza wished to call attention to the fact that, as shown by the wording of the agenda item, the point at issue was the right of the people of Cyprus to self-determination. The granting of that right might lead to *enosis*, as it might lead to some other solution.

55. Mr. KYROU (Greece) expressed his gratification at the statements made by the representatives of Ecuador, Syria, El Salvador, Poland, Indonesia, Czechoslovakia, the Philippines, the Soviet Union and Yemen. He was also satisfied, to some extent, at least, with the statement made by the representative of Iraq. It was not for his delegation to thank those delegations, for Greece was asking nothing for itself. Nevertheless, it was gratified to note that those delegations were ready to defend the right of the Cypriot people to self-determination.

56. In reply to a point raised at the previous meeting by the representative of Iraq, Mr. Kyrou recalled that, when the question of Morocco had been submitted to the Security Council, the Greek delegation had upheld the principle of the competence of the United Nations. It had abstained in the vote on the inclusion of that question in the Council agenda only because it had believed that the General Assembly provided a better forum. Greece had always believed that the Assembly should consider the Moroccan question, as well as the Tunisian question.

57. The Greek delegation was grateful to the representatives of Australia and New Zealand for their generous words about Greece, but he wished to point out that Mr. Munro's statement was not borne out by the facts. The Greek Prime Minister had been able to say, in his letter to the Secretary-General (A/2703), that Cyprus was a Greek island which had been inhabited by Greeks for thousands of years, because that was the truth. Nevertheless, Mr. Kyrou had expressly stated, again and again, that Greece was requesting not a transfer of sovereignty but merely United Nations recognition of the Cypriot people's right to self-determination. The Greek delegation would have been happy to see any other delegation sponsor the item.

58. Those who argued from Greece's position that it was advocating treaty revisions or might threaten traditional friendships simply did not have the courage to see the problem in its true light, as the problem of a civilized people which was under foreign rule and which desired independence. The Greek delegation sought neither a revision of the Treaty of Lausanne nor a transfer of sovereignty of any kind; it merely desired that the Cypriots should be given the right to self-determination.

59. Mr. PETRZELKA (Czechoslovakia) associated himself with the Polish representative's protest against the Australian delegation's attack on Czechoslovakia and Poland.

60. He was surprised that Australia should have forgotten that all Members of the United Nations were required to respect the Charter and the right of self-determination.

61. Sir Percy SPENDER (Australia) said he had asked whether the governments of certain countries—among them Poland and Czechoslovakia—had given their peoples the right of self-determination, and that he had received no reply to his question.

62. Mr. URQUIA (El Salvador) said the delegations of Colombia and El Salvador were submitting a joint amendment to the New Zealand draft resolution (A/C.1/L.125). Its purpose was to provide a reasoned basis for that draft resolution. According to that amendment (A/C.1/L.126), the following clause should be inserted as a preamble:

"Considering that, for the time being, it does not appear appropriate to adopt a resolution on the question of Cyprus."

63. Mr. Urquía drew attention to an apparent error in the Spanish translation of the words "not to consider further" in the New Zealand draft resolution. In any case, his delegation's vote would be based on the existing Spanish text.

64. The CHAIRMAN said that the Spanish translation of the New Zealand draft resolution had been made with his approval.

65. Mr. MUNRO (New Zealand) said that he had approached the debate on the question of Cyprus in a spirit of conciliation. He was therefore prepared to accept the amendment proposed by Colombia and El Salvador, provided no other amendment was presented.

66. Mr. NUTTING (United Kingdom) and Mr. SARPÉR (Turkey) also accepted the amendment proposed by El Salvador and Colombia, subject to the reservation made by the representative of New Zealand.

67. Mr. KYROU (Greece) expressed satisfaction with the standard of the debate, which augured well for the solution of the problem. He accepted the amendment proposed by Colombia and El Salvador.

68. If the amendment was accepted, it would be better to delete the word "further" from the New Zealand draft resolution.

69. Mr. DE LA COLINA (Mexico) said he was sure that it would be inadvisable to adopt a resolution on the substance of the question. His delegation would vote for the amended New Zealand draft resolution because it did not prejudge the issue and would accordingly give the nations principally concerned the chance to reach an amicable solution quickly.

70. Mr. SERRANO (Philippines) drew attention to his statement that the principle of the right to self-determination should be applied in respect of the people of Cyprus. It was clear, however, that a majority of the Committee favoured the postponement of the item.

71. Mr. Serrano wished to submit an amendment (A/C.1/L.127) to the New Zealand draft resolution, providing for the insertion, as the first paragraph of the preamble, of the following clause:

"Having in mind the Purposes and Principles of the Charter".

72. Mr. MUNRO (New Zealand) said he could not accept the drafting change suggested by the representative of Greece.

73. He was also unable to accept the Philippine amendment; the draft resolution, as already amended, was complete in itself and seemed likely to secure a large majority.

74. Mr. HOPPENOT (France) said that his delegation would vote for the New Zealand draft resolution as amended. It would ask, however, for a separate vote on each of the two paragraphs, because it would have to abstain from voting on the preambular clause introduced by the joint amendment.

75. The beginnings of the general debate which had taken place had confirmed the apprehensions a number of representatives had felt when the item had been entered on the agenda. Much of what had been said would only tend to exacerbate feelings and lead to fruitless contention. Any discussion of a draft resolution which sanctioned United Nations intervention in the relations between the United Kingdom and Cyprus—an intervention unjustified in law and pernicious in its effects—would be contrary to the purposes of the Charter. A solution of the problem could be sought only by respecting both the principles of the Charter and the provisions of the relevant treaties, and in an atmosphere of greater calm.

76. The French delegation's vote would be based on its desire to limit the harm already done by two days of sterile polemics, and on its friendship for the two great peoples which the present debate had so unfortunately brought into opposition.

77. Mr. JOHNSON (Canada) said that the debate had confirmed his delegation's conviction that a discussion of the matter would do more harm than good, both to the Cypriots and to the United Nations.

78. He would vote for the New Zealand draft resolution as amended.

79. Mr. KYROU (Greece) said his delegation would vote for the New Zealand draft resolution as amended.

80. Since there had already been a discussion, it was illogical to use the word "further" in the operative part of the draft resolution.

81. The Philippine amendment was excellent, and Mr. Kyrou saw no reason for opposing it.

82. Mr. SARPÉR (Turkey) said he would vote for the New Zealand draft resolution as amended, though his vote must not be taken to imply acceptance of the view that the United Nations was competent to deal with the matter.

83. He opposed the Philippine amendment (A/C.1/L.127), which was too vague to be useful and was open to misinterpretation.

84. Mr. NUTTING (United Kingdom) said he was opposed to the Philippine amendment because the already amended New Zealand draft resolution was complete in itself. Moreover, if reference was made to the purposes and principles of the Charter, reference might also be made to the Treaty of Lausanne and a number of other diplomatic instruments. Lastly, the New Zealand draft resolution was essentially a procedural one. The Philippine amendment would completely alter its effect.

85. Mr. KHALIDY (Iraq) said he would vote for the New Zealand draft resolution as amended.

86. He could not accept the Philippine amendment, which would transform the text into a substantive draft resolution.

87. Mr. LEME (Brazil) said he would vote for the New Zealand draft resolution as amended.

88. He saw no justification for the Philippine amendment; it went without saying that the resolutions of the General Assembly were in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter.

89. Mr. SERRANO (Philippines) said he had had no hidden motive in proposing his amendment; he had merely wished to stress the fact that the principles and purposes of the United Nations Charter were paramount.

90. Mr. MIR KHAN (Pakistan) reminded the representative of Greece, in connexion with the suggested deletion of the word "further", that the discussion had been purely procedural; had it been otherwise, the Pakistan delegation would have taken part in the debate.

91. Mr. FRANCO Y FRANCO (Dominican Republic) said his delegation had intended to vote for the New Zealand draft resolution. It would do so even more willingly now that it had been amended.

92. The Philippine amendment, on the other hand, was neither useful nor necessary, and the Dominican delegation could not, therefore, accept it.

93. The CHAIRMAN, in reply to a question by the representative of CHILE, said that since there had been a discussion, a simple majority would be enough to secure the adoption of a draft resolution.

94. Mr. BORBERG (Denmark) said that the General Assembly had presumably been mindful of the purposes and principles of the Charter when adopting all previous resolutions. He asked the Philippine representative, therefore, whether he would not consider withdrawing his amendment.

95. Mr. SERRANO (Philippines) said that he did not wish to stand in the way of the wishes of the majority. He would therefore withdraw his amendment.

96. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote the preambular paragraph (A/C.1/L.126) of the New Zealand draft resolution as amended.

97. Mr. KYROU (Greece) asked for a roll-call vote.

A vote was taken by roll-call.

The Dominican Republic, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.

In favour: Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Lebanon, Liberia, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Pe-

ru, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Sweden, Syria, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Venezuela, Yemen, Afghanistan, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Denmark.

Against: None.

Abstaining: France, Luxembourg, Poland, Thailand, Turkey, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of South Africa, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Uruguay, Yugoslavia, Australia, Belgium, Burma, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Chile, Czechoslovakia.

The preambular paragraph was adopted by 44 votes to none, with 16 abstentions.

98. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote the operative part of the draft resolution.

The operative part was adopted by 49 votes to none, with 11 abstentions.

99. The CHAIRMAN put the New Zealand draft resolution as amended (A/C.1/L.125 and A/C.1/L.126) to the vote as a whole.

The draft resolution was adopted by 49 votes to none, with 11 abstentions.

100. Mr. BLANCO (Cuba) said that his delegation had always upheld the right of peoples to self-determination. It would have voted for the Greek draft resolution, but, since the New Zealand draft resolution was only procedural, it had voted for it without thereby taking a position on the substance. It was to be hoped that the adoption of that draft resolution would facilitate contact between the States directly concerned.

101. Mr. LUDIN (Afghanistan) said that his delegation had voted for the inclusion of the item in the agenda. It supported the principle of the right of the Cypriot people to self-determination and believed that the General Assembly was competent to deal with the matter.

102. In a spirit of conciliation and understanding, the Afghanistan delegation had voted for the New Zealand draft resolution, as amended.

103. Mr. LORIDAN (Belgium) said that the Belgian delegation's vote in favour of the New Zealand draft resolution, as amended, must not be interpreted as prejudging the question of the General Assembly's competence. The draft resolution which had been adopted was entirely procedural, and the question of Cyprus was a matter essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of the United Kingdom.

104. Mr. DU PLESSIS (Union of South Africa) said his delegation had opposed the inclusion of the question of Cyprus in the agenda, as it was a matter essentially within the United Kingdom's domestic jurisdiction. It had accordingly been unable to vote for a draft resolution which might have been interpreted as recognizing United Nations competence in the matter.

105. The Union of South Africa regretted that a dispute had arisen between Greece and the United Kingdom, countries with which the Union of South Africa maintained very good relations.

106. Mr. MAZA (Chile) said that his delegation had voted against the inclusion of the question in the agenda because it was essentially a problem involving the union of a territory with the country of origin

of the majority of its inhabitants. It was not for the United Nations to intervene in such matters. That position obviously in no way affected Chile's friendship for Turkey, Greece and the United Kingdom.

107. Sir Percy SPENDER (Australia) said that his delegation had voted for the draft resolution as a whole, but had abstained on the preambular paragraph proposed by Colombia and El Salvador, in order to remain consistent with its view that the matter should never have been placed on the agenda.

108. Mr. PEREZ PEREZ (Venezuela) said that his delegation had opposed the inclusion of the item in the agenda, and had voted for the New Zealand draft resolution as amended, solely for reasons of expediency; it had considered that to take up a problem which could only impair relations between the States concerned was pointless.

109. Its vote was without prejudice to any position it might wish to take on other occasions when problems of the same kind were considered.

110. Mr. SERRANO (Philippines) said that his delegation would have voted against the New Zealand draft resolution if it had not been amended, as its effect would then have been to set the Cyprus question aside completely.

111. It had, however, voted for the amended draft resolution, the effect of which was merely to defer the matter, and which was not incompatible with the Philippine Government's views on the merits of the question.

112. Mr. NUTTING (United Kingdom) said that his delegation had accepted the amendment submitted by Colombia and El Salvador because it did not believe that that amendment in any way weakened its position. In accepting it, his delegation had not, of course, accepted the principle of the General Assembly's competence in a matter of the present kind. It was glad that the importance of considerations of expediency had been given due recognition in an extremely complex political problem.

113. Mr. TOV (Israel) said that his country maintained the best possible relations with all the countries most immediately concerned in the question which had

participated in the discussion, and it had ancient bonds of friendship with the people of Cyprus. His delegation had had no difficulty in voting for the New Zealand draft resolution, as amended.

114. Mr. LALL (India) said that India was firmly opposed to colonialism and hoped that the colonial status of Cyprus would come to an end as a result of developments of a peaceful character in the island. The administering Power could do much in that direction.

115. The Indian delegation had voted for the draft resolution, as amended; it was a procedural draft resolution, but its acceptance by those mainly concerned augured well for the future.

116. Mr. ZARUBIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) regretted that the Greek delegation had withdrawn its draft resolution (A/C.1/L.124), as his own delegation had been ready to support it.

117. The Soviet Union delegation had not been able to vote for the draft resolution which had been adopted, since it believed that it in no way met the wishes of the population of Cyprus. It had therefore abstained.

118. The CHAIRMAN observed that the Greek delegation had not withdrawn its draft resolution; the fact that a procedural draft resolution had been given priority and adopted had prevented a vote on the text submitted by Greece.

119. Mr. KYROU (Greece) said that his delegation had voted for the New Zealand draft resolution as amended because it contained the words "for the time being". Those words implied that the United Nations was prepared to meet any new request.

120. The Greek delegation was glad that the United Kingdom representative had voted for the draft resolution. The debate had luckily been sufficiently extensive, and public opinion had thus been aroused. Contrary to what some representatives of the United Kingdom had stated, the matter was an international problem.

The meeting rose at 6.15 p.m.