

# GENERAL ASSEMBLY

NINTH SESSION

Official Records



## FIRST COMMITTEE, 700th MEETING

Tuesday, 26 October 1954,  
at 10.30 a.m.

New York

## CONTENTS

	Page
Agenda item 20: Regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments: report of the Disarmament Commission ( <i>continued</i> )	215
Agenda item 68: Conclusion of an international convention (treaty) on the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of mass destruction ( <i>continued</i> )	215

Chairman: Mr. Francisco URRUTIA (Colombia).

## AGENDA ITEMS 20 AND 68

**Regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments: report of the disarmament commission (A/2685, A/C.1/751, A/C.1/752/Rev.2, A/C.1/L.100, A/C.1/L.101) (*continued*)**

**Conclusion of an international convention (treaty) on the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of mass destruction (A/2742 and Corr.1, A/2742/Add.1, A/C.1/750) (*continued*)**

1. Mr. MENON (India): My delegation feels that it would enable the Committee to appreciate the point of view of my country and Government if we stated at the outset our understanding of the context and the objectives of the debate now before the Committee. It is not my intention to spend the time of the Committee on a historical outline of the antecedent circumstances, but I think that it is necessary at first to say that we conceive the objective of this debate not as the preparation of a disarmament convention or the resolving of conflict in points of view or exaggerating them; we consider the objective of the present debate in this Committee at this session to be the examination of points of agreement and the consolidation of that agreement, the problem then to be returned to the Disarmament Commission for the working out of details. We do not regard the General Assembly as the appropriate forum, at this stage, for the hammering out of very complex and detailed problems where even agreements appear to be disagreements in the context of the debate.

2. The Committee will no doubt have in mind the fact that we are now engaged in a debate on the basis of the report of the Disarmament Commission, the essential factor of which is the Franco-British proposal [DC/53, *in annex 9*]. The Committee can congratulate itself that it is as a result of the debates and decisions of last year that it has been made possible to have the report here. It will be recalled that we began the debate on disarmament at the last session in an atmosphere of comparative gloom and resignation to the notion that the best thing we could do was merely to keep the Disarmament Commission

alive. The objective of the draft resolution that was submitted at the time was that no recession should take place but that the problem should be kept alive and simply referred back to the Disarmament Commission for such action as was possible. But the contributions made in the Committee, the draft resolutions and suggestions, led, among other things, to various affirmations of a political and moral character which resulted in the establishment of a small sub-committee with the freedom to meet wherever it chose, and also to meet in private.

3. Although those recommendations may appear to be not so significant so far as the words are concerned, they seem to have contributed — indeed, they did contribute — to the successful results of the work of the Disarmament Commission this year. We are therefore able to deal with the Anglo-French proposal as a basis, which means that a basis had been discovered even before this Committee met, at least so far as the great majority of the members of the sub-committee was concerned. And the fact that the report of the Disarmament Commission has come before the Committee as a unanimous report — unanimous in the sense that the decision to submit it was unanimous — means that, even before we met, there was recognition, admission and agreement on the part of the two camps into which the sub-committee until then had been divided that it was necessary to make further progress on that basis.

4. We are accustomed here to the atmosphere of debate, and sometimes, if I may say so with great respect, we are too prone to disregard the gains that are made. First of all, then, let me point out that we have reason to feel satisfied that our debates are useful — that the contribution that the Committee makes is substantial. Our debates lead to progress and to a resolving of differences; they lead to the reconciliation of different points of view. Secondly, we have a working basis in the Anglo-French proposal which, even at the time it was submitted, was not vetoed or objected to or regarded as totally objectionable even by the party which, at that time, was not prepared to accept it as it stood. In the initial stages of the session, and almost as it opened, the Soviet Union, by accepting the Anglo-French proposal as a basis of discussion, enabled that progress to go a little further, and it is in that context that we have to look at our work here.

5. At this stage in this debate it is unnecessary for me to recapitulate at length the points of agreement and disagreement that present themselves in regard to this problem at the present moment. Suffice it for me to say briefly that there is agreement among those principally concerned — and therefore, no doubt, in the Assembly itself — that there should be a disarmament convention or treaty provided. I am not sure what the difference is between a treaty and a convention, but to me it appears to be that while “treaty” usually refers to negotiated agreement — bilateral, trilateral or quadrilateral — a convention is a common agreement that is put forward by a body such as this, and others are invited to sign it. In

the present context, of course, "convention" is the more appropriate term. But whatever it is, the idea that there should be reduction of armaments and prohibition of weapons of mass destruction has been agreed to. There is agreement, also, among all parties concerned, that there must be machinery for control, whatever it is called, that that machinery must be international and that it must be effective. And, as I shall try to develop later on, it has become clear as the debate has developed that there is also agreement that all this must be done in harmony with the generally accepted conception of international law and the provisions of the Charter.

6. But having said all that, we still have to address ourselves to unresolved points. The two main aspects of those unresolved points appear to concern the limits within which reduction can take place and what has been roughly called the machinery of control. I shall address the latter half of my observations to these two aspects at some length.

7. To say that we have this remarkable degree of progress is not a kind of romantic optimism, and in this connexion may I say that it appears to my delegation that this juxtaposition of the optimists and the pessimists has no relation to the objectives or to the realities of our work here. If there are nations, groups, Governments or representatives who feel less optimistic than others, then that is only an argument for greater endeavour. On the other hand, if there is reason for optimism, then it is an occasion for more enthusiastic endeavour in the near future.

8. Coupled with these advances that have been made in the work of the Disarmament Commission itself, reference has already been made, both in the Assembly and in committee, to the comparatively more favourable conditions that exist in the world, and I think that the recapitulation and repetition of them should not tax our patience.

9. We have seen in the last two years the cessation of major hostilities in two great theatres of war—war that had raged for many years and that had taken toll of millions and millions of persons—and that is no mean achievement in the history of human effort. In other words, two wars which, in the old days, would have been considered as very considerable major wars, have come to an end. There has been the resolution of disputes in the Adriatic and the conclusion of the agreement between Yugoslavia and Italy with regard to Trieste. There has been, also, the resolving of the long-standing difficulties between the United Kingdom and Egypt in the Suez area, and in our part of the world, whatever may be the previous history of it, it is a matter of very great importance that these two countries have re-established their friendship. The same thing applies to the position of Iran, nearer to us, and to our own country. It gives me pleasure to say this with the representative of France present; my own country, only two days ago, reached a friendly agreement with France after patient negotiation during which there had never been, at any time, any breaking points or any walking out over a period of many years, and the problems resolved, although small in magnitude so far as concerns territory and population, involved deep questions of principle. We are glad to take this opportunity of saying that we have thus added one further item to the achievements of reconciliation.

10. But, as against that, we have taken into account the fact that during the period when the Disarmament Com-

mission was considering the working papers and the machinery of control, working out common points about major reductions, working out phrases such as that nations shall regard themselves as committed to the prohibition of atomic weapons, working out positions whereby cuts could be made in what are called conventional armaments and armed forces, at the same time the great nations of the world found themselves engaged in the production of more arms, in what last year's resolution referred to as "competitive rearmament"—at least, that is the phrase that was introduced at an earlier stage [*A/C.1/L.74/Rev.2*—and what was finally referred to as "competition in the development of armaments and armed forces beyond what is necessary for the individual or collective security of Member States" [*resolution 715(VIII)*]. In other words, while there have been all these improvements, we have not come to the turning of the corner, to the point of putting a halt to the drift towards greater and greater armaments. That is the problem that confronts us. That is on the debit side.

11. But it is equally to be regretted—and this is one of the things that we have to make good hereafter—that neither in this Committee nor elsewhere have we yet reached the point at which this problem will become one of common exploration. The position taken by the United Kingdom and France in finding a common agreement and putting forward a common memorandum—and I suppose that the United Kingdom and France have not always been very good friends—has as its basis an attitude of common exploration. And it is only when that attitude of common exploration prevails among the five great Powers that we shall be able to make greater advances. There is evidence of that in this Committee—I shall refer to that later—and I think we all have reason to congratulate ourselves when these vast and ominous problems are examined from another point of view than that of finding how many differences exist, than that of the cynical Greek philosopher who said that liberty consists in the emphasis of differences with my neighbour. Therefore we must recognize that what we require in the approach to this problem is this attitude of common exploration—which does not mean that one has to surrender a point of view until one is convinced that it has to be surrendered or amended.

12. We also have the situation that a solution of this problem of armaments—that is to say, to render war no longer a part of the conceptions or contingencies admitted by States—has been made even more necessary by the conditions of the world itself. And on this point we have very respectable and weighty authority furnished as recently at last week. The President of the United States, speaking on 20 October, said:

"Professional armies, professional navies have given way to the nation in arms; and now we have had, in these modern days, science give to us weapons that mean not only is the whole nation in arms, but the whole nation is constantly exposed to the threat of destruction.

"We have arrived at that point, my friends, when war does not present the possibility of victory or defeat. War would present to us only the alternative in degrees of destruction. There could be no truly successful outcome."

If that is the view of one of the most powerful States in the world, on whose decisions war and peace can depend to a considerable extent, then one must ask: what can

be the purpose of pursuing any course except that of the outlawry of war? Whatever may be the ethical aspect of it, whatever may be the possibilities or the factors of strength or weakness of one side or the other, here we have a statement which I, for one, am prepared to accept, and I am sure that the greater part of the world would accept it: that "there could be no truly successful outcome". But if we know that there can be no such outcome, why should we pursue the course that has been pursued so far?

13. My delegation has always held the view that there can be no progress in disarmament unless the great Powers come to an agreement. Sometimes this has been called a great-Power problem. It is a great-Power problem in the sense that without the great Powers there could be no agreement. But it is equally true that, with them alone, agreement cannot be easily brought about. The public opinion of the world, the co-operation of other States—I shall not use the word "pressures", but the impact of their opinion—the consultations and the co-operation that can come from them, the degree of security that small nations feel in the world, all these are contributory factors in bringing about agreement among the great Powers.

14. I hope that nothing I have said will lend itself to the interpretation by one or other of the components of this great-Power group, as it is called, that the rest of the world thinks that they are a band of mischief-makers that are trying to make trouble while the rest of the world wants to live in peace. That would be a rather immature way of looking at the problem. It so happens that, if there is to be disarmament, those who have the more potent arms and whose arms are the conclusive factors in the world must come to an agreement with regard to the limitation or abandonment of those arms. That is all we mean by saying that it is a great-Power problem. It is not as though the great Powers are thought of as the big bad wolves in this matter, while all the rest of us are very saintly. That is not the position. The position is that, in the context of the economic, military and political circumstances of the world, the capacity to say that this shall stop rests with the great Powers to a very considerable extent. But that does not mean that we can abdicate our responsibilities or, what is more, that we do not have a very serious contribution to make, or that we ourselves may not be putting impediments in the way.

15. This is the attitude that my country takes to this problem of disarmament. We have always said that this matter cannot be decided on the basis of counting heads or on the basis of what are called the rights of sovereign States. By that, I mean that it cannot simply be said that all opinions are of equal value in this matter. They have to be given the weight they deserve in the context of the circumstances I have mentioned.

16. The present position, so far as the debate and the progress of disarmament are concerned, is that we now have a draft resolution [*A/C.1/752/Rev.2*] before the Committee which is sponsored by the five members of the Sub-Committee. Irrespective of the content of that proposal, the joint sponsorship is in itself a great advance over anything that we have achieved so far. And what is the essence of that sponsorship? To me, the essence of that sponsorship is not any particular wording about cuts or major reductions, or whatever it may be; that is all very important, but the major factor is that the five States concerned, which have worked on this problem, and whose contribution has military, political and

other significance of a special character, have committed themselves to further exploration and have so proclaimed before this Committee. In other words, they have stated to us this position: that, irrespective of the different positions they hold, further attempts at adjustment, at exploration, at finding answers to difficulties, are not only necessary but possible.

17. It would be very wrong of us to think that this proposal is simply a tactical move for postponement or reference to a committee. That is not the way it has been put forward. It has been put forward as a statement that there are these major problems and that on these major problems a general degree of agreement is possible—agreement reached again by the process not of saying "Take it or leave it", but by the process of patient negotiation to which Mr. Johnson, of Canada, has paid tribute [*697th meeting*]. What has been achieved has been the result of patient negotiation, and what we have here is a proclamation of the success of the methods of conciliation and mature adjustment in the course of this debate.

18. Earlier in this debate [*693rd meeting*], my delegation requested the United Kingdom representative to give some clarification on a number of points. As I said at the time, there were two reasons for the request. The first was the fact that Mr. Lloyd, one of the authors of the proposal, was leaving, and the other was that the debate here—as I said at the beginning of these observations this morning—was being conducted on the basis of the Anglo-French memorandum. I had the good fortune to hear from Mr. Moch, the representative of France [*697th meeting*], that the answers which Mr. Lloyd gave [*694th meeting*] were joint answers. In other words, today—and I want to emphasize this fact—we have not only the Anglo-French memorandum, but also an annotation, a clarification of it. We should read the answers given by Mr. Lloyd along with the memorandum. His answers would have been important even if they had represented only the view of the United Kingdom—as he said at the time that they did—but they are still more important in the light of Mr. Moch's statement that he and the United Kingdom representative had discussed the matter and that the answers represented the joint views of the United Kingdom and France; the authors of the memorandum.

19. Hence, as I have already said, the clarifications which we have been given are now part of the text of the Anglo-French memorandum. That text is to be read with the clarifications. No one has offered any contradictions to those clarifications, and, what is more important, no one has challenged the thesis that has been put forward.

20. Thus there has been a great deal of give and take. In public speaking, there is sometimes a greater emphasis on the "take" than on the "give". That is why the General Assembly wisely decided at its last session that the Disarmament Sub-Committee should meet in private. Publicity has its great advantages, and we are all subscribers to the doctrine of open covenants, openly arrived at. I think, however, that the "arrived at" is more important. Sometimes an open covenant may be privately arrived at and openly proclaimed. However that may be, in the context of public debate differences may tend to appear to be greatly exaggerated.

21. There is no doubt, however, that there are differences and that those differences must be resolved. But am I not right in saying that it appears from the context of

this debate that, while the differences are still fundamental and must be resolved before any convention can be signed, they have been reduced to dimensions in which they are capable of being resolved by adjustments or by finding a middle way? What is required, therefore, is a reinforcement of the attitude to which I have already referred. In the first place—and here I speak for my delegation—we not only must be thankful for the improvements that have taken place, but must also consciously accept them as assets to the possibility of a settlement. It seems to my delegation that it would be a political error and a poor tribute to the achievements of the past year simply to say: "It is not too bad; it could have been worse". We should regard those achievements as indications of a better state of affairs to come, as proof of the potency and efficacy of the methods which have been employed and, finally, as an answer to those who say that the points of view are irreconcilable. I do not want to introduce any words that are still the subject of controversy, but I would say that, living in this world as we do, we must learn to live with differences and not make those differences the points of isolation.

22. Thus, when we consider the origins and history of the Anglo-French memorandum, the success that that memorandum has achieved in being accepted as a basis of discussion, the fact that, thanks to the initiative of the Canadian delegation, a joint request has been put forward that certain propositions should be accepted as common ground and referred for consideration to the Disarmament Commission: when we consider all those things, we realize that very considerable advances have been made.

23. I repeat that there are still unresolved differences. Again, it is not my purpose at this stage of the debate to go into these differences, *seriatim*, at any great length. I should like, however, to think that, broadly speaking, they fall into two groups.

24. The first concerns quantum and quality—what may be called the limits of armaments and armed forces. In that respect, again, we have made some progress. Mr. Lloyd's reply—which I now qualify as an Anglo-French reply—has made the position very clear. To my delegation, the main factor is that it has been accepted that what we are aiming at is an equitable level, equitable reductions. Hence it is not a question of being addicted to any particular formula or even to particular figures. The governing condition is the word "equitable". We therefore must now proceed from this general notion of equitability—which, of course, does no more than to show the way to a solution.

25. Now, if there is to be equitability, we must establish the factors which make for equitability. At a later stage in these observations, I shall refer to a draft resolution [*A/C.1/L.100*] which has been circulated in behalf of my delegation. We think that it would amply repay us to go back over the laborious work done by the Disarmament Commission over the past years, when some of the points of view which are now rejected by one side were actually that side's own points of view, and vice versa. As I have said, the factors which enter into equitability must be established. I do not believe—and here I am speaking for myself—that it is impossible in international affairs to define a difficult problem or idea. It is always possible to list the attributes of such problems or ideas. For example, it may not be easy—and I hope that I am not now treading on the toes of any other committee—

to define aggression; I myself find it very difficult to arrive at such a definition. It is however, possible to list the components of aggression.

26. My delegation's view in that respect is set out in its draft resolution. Of course, it is not our business to make recommendations or give orders or instructions to the Disarmament Commission. We are, however, entitled as one of the peoples concerned—in the sense that war is everyone's concern because its impact is so terrible, so evil—to suggest and hope that the Disarmament Commission and the sub-committee will go into the ingredients, the elements, the factors that govern equitable reduction. The Disarmament Commission's second report [*DC/20*]—I shall not quote from it—sets out some of those factors, and they have been the subject of discussion in the General Assembly. Hence it should be possible to consider the factors governing equitable reduction, the quantum and the quality—or, if one prefers, the levels. If those factors were considered, the institutional machinery that we have established would be able to make decisions, to have some guidance as to what those limits and levels were.

27. Quite naturally, decisions with regard to quantum and quality have very largely during the discussions of the past years been rule-of-thumb decisions. Even now, the Soviet Union puts forward the case of what is called a one-third reduction. I am sure that we were all happy to hear from Mr. Vyshinsky yesterday [*699th meeting*] that the essence of the proposal for a one-third reduction was to place insistence on the fact that the reduction should be a major one. The figure of one-third was not a mathematical fraction of the whole integer. The intention was that the reduction should not be a small one, and a one-third reduction was regarded as a major reduction. Mr. Vyshinsky told us that that was therefore another way of saying "a major reduction"; it was a more specific way of stating it. If that is so, it certainly represents an advance.

28. At any rate, to determine these factors of equitable reduction, the limits, the quantum and the quality of armaments and armed forces, would conform to the purposes of the Charter, to the international obligations of States and to the national necessities, political and otherwise of States. That determination would not be one of the instruments that might, even without a definite political policy in that respect, be the causes of world war. Those factors are worthy of study. It is my delegation's view that they should be laid down in objective terms, without addiction to slogans of one kind or another or to rigid positions. If we reduce the factors to simple components, then words which have gained inhibitory or prohibitory significance will probably fall into their places. That would be a more scientific approach to this problem.

29. That was the approach adopted by the authors of the Franco-British proposals before they came to their conclusions. That is why, in the draft resolution that we have submitted, to which I reserve the right to return at the next stage of the debate, we have suggested that the Disarmament Commission—or the Sub-Committee, perhaps—should study the factors governing reduction. A new approach is required instead of the one where one side insists on a one-third reduction and the other insists on something else.

30. However, we would say at this stage, not in order to add to the difficulties but in order to have all the facts, at least so far as we can, before the minds and the eyes

of the people who are to deal with them, that in taking into account these factors it would be necessary to take into account also all regional groupings. It is not sufficient to think in terms of a national entity. I do not want to labour this point at the moment, but I am satisfied with the explanation given—as I have said, it is now a Franco-British explanation—that these references to major reductions, to limitations, and so on, refer to the armies of the world as a whole, and therefore all these factors will be taken into consideration.

31. I am also happy to have been able to ascertain from the Franco-British side that it is their view that all proposals that are put forward must come within the terms of the Charter. Although it is not necessary to restate this, it is as well to put it on paper. Mr. Lloyd said that the answer to my question was definitely yes. In our view, the proposals that are put forward will have to come within the terms of the Charter. There are other aspects of this, to which I will have to turn later.

32. That brings us to the position that if these proposals are to be within the terms of the Charter, and if we accept the idea that the limitations and the other matters that go with them have to be considered in scientific, factual terms for the main purpose of bringing about a situation where the world is not armed at a level that is likely to lead to conflict, then the reductions themselves obviously must not be intended to establish a position of tug-of-war. In other words, we have to move towards the conception of the United Nations, not towards the conception of the nineteenth century, with its doctrine of the balance of power. Balances of power are necessary when policies are based entirely upon power, but I hope the time will soon come when we will all recognize that the ingredients of power are not merely guns and bombs, but that the main ingredient of power is consent.

33. Authority, in the last analysis, must be based upon consent. That is so in the municipal community, and that is so everywhere. The most potent and easily seen sign of authority, it is said, is the policeman round the corner, but no policeman round the corner can function in a civilized society unless he has behind him the consent of the society he represents. That is true in international affairs, even more so in the context of sovereign States.

34. Therefore, while we consider that, in some respects, the two positions taken up are somewhat rigid, we do not ourselves accept either of these rigid positions and, in the context of the *rapprochement* that has taken place, we hope we can make further advances in this matter. Constructively, we have made the suggestions that are embodied in the draft resolution we have put forward. That, I think, is sufficient for the present purpose in dealing with the questions of limits.

35. Then we come to the more difficult part of this problem, that of so-called control. May I say, with great respect, that it would be unfortunate if we thought of control merely in a negative or restrictive sense. Control is a constructive idea. Control is the institutional representation of the determination of nations for the securing of agreements that have been reached. In other words, we must think of control rather in terms of traffic policemen than in terms of punitive policemen. Control, fortunately for us, has now been reduced to institutional terms.

36. My delegation does not take the view that mere dedication on paper, mere proclamations of the desire to impose restrictions on oneself, would be adequate in

the present circumstances of the world. It may well be that humanity and civilization will advance to the stage when the word of a nation is its bond, and nothing more is required. It would be a good thing if there were acts of self-abnegation in this way, but, as things are, we have to provide that the agreements reached are maintained, and that is why control must be institutional.

37. On this matter, as I have said before, there is agreement that there must be control, that the control must be international, and that the control must be effective. The difference appears to be in regard to the timing of the various controls or control positions and the procedures to be adopted. In this matter, may I say at the outset that my delegation has not been able to understand the insistence of the Soviet Union on two control bodies, one temporary and one permanent.

38. It may be that the background of our development and our history is rather different, but at any rate we believe that the very idea of having something temporary and of having something permanent is one of those things that, in the vicissitudes of international relations, is likely to reopen the whole of the problem at some other time, whereas, if this matter is decided now, it is decided once and for all. We, from the background of our constitutional development and our civilization, believe that these institutions can be planned so as to be capable of automatic development. It is possible, within the statutes of the control authority, to have appointed dates for the emergence into action of the various institutions. We believe it would be definitely an impediment to agreement if there were undue insistence upon one set of controls following another. That is not to disregard the difficulties and doubts and suspicions that may exist, but we hope it will be possible in the early meetings of the Sub-Committee to hold this problem in abeyance and to get down to the functions the control body is to perform.

39. At this stage, I should like to say there is one aspect of this control body to which very little reference has been made during this debate. The only place where it to a certain extent appears is in the so-called Patterson document, that is, the United States working paper [DC/53, annex 4]. I will refer to that paper in a moment. That aspect to which I refer relates to the composition of the control body. Only a control body which enjoys the confidence of all the parties concerned can hope to function, and it is the composition of the control body more than anything else that appears to lie behind all the suspicions, all the prejudices and all the fears that have been engendered on the other side. With the assurance that the control body would function judicially, equitably, and impartially, and that it would have its eyes only on the objectives of the convention itself, a great deal of this trouble probably would disappear. Of course, that particular problem is as difficult of solution as anything else, and we would therefore like to address ourselves for a moment to this question of control machinery.

40. In the course of the observations I have made before this Committee, I have already sought clarification from the Franco-British side with regard to the expression "control organ". It is generally agreed that it is not used in a technical sense, but that it refers to control machinery. Mr. Lloyd was also good enough to clarify the point that he, and later, also, the representative of France, had always thought of the disarmament convention and the control organ as being established in the framework of the United Nations, and that they were not at the present, regardless of the reference to a world dis-

armament conference as an essential necessity, thinking in terms of anything else. If that is so, then, axiomatically, something follows. It follows that any institution set up under the United Nations cannot go beyond the Charter; that is to say, it is impossible for a principal to create a subsidiary organ with an authority higher than itself. Therefore its outside limits are the limits set by the United Nations Charter.

41. May I at this stage, with great respect and without giving offence to anybody, say that a debate on disarmament does not appear to us to be the context or the occasion where questions of the revision of the Charter or of fundamental ills in the constitution of the United Nations can be usefully debated. We cannot revise the Charter or change the conditions under which the United Nations exists by, so to speak, the back door. If there is sufficient consent for it, sufficient public opinion for it, then it is a problem which must stand on its merits and by itself. We have to take ourselves as we are, a body of sovereign nations willing to delegate part of our sovereign functions, but not our sovereignties, in the context of an agreement. Indeed, my understanding of it is that this is an essential attribute of sovereignty—the right of a State to surrender any part of its functions provided it surrenders them of its own sovereign will. That is how treaties and agreements are made.

42. Since the institutions proposed are to be under the United Nations and must therefore be in conformity with the Charter and, presumably, with the precepts of international law, it follows that any organ that is set up—by organ I mean any machinery that it created—must act in accordance with the fundamental principles of the Charter, whether in relation to the Security Council or the Secretariat or the General Assembly or to any other principal organ of the United Nations. I submit, therefore, that to regard the nations on either side as sovereign nations hermetically sealed off one from the other, whose sovereignty is not amenable to treaty obligations or to consent or to the procedures that have been commonly established and at the same time to speak of control machinery as though it were world government, is not the right approach to the matter. If we want a world government, with a world executive, a world judiciary and a world parliament—no doubt it would be a very desirable thing to have some time—we will not get it through armaments control; that is to say, we cannot work to a State from a machinery largely connected with military affairs.

43. It is not possible, then, for the United Nations—or for my delegation—to create something that is more powerful than itself, that is, which is not confined within its authority. At the same time, however, a control machinery that is not effective—and there is agreement on this now among the five sponsors of the draft resolution—is a snare and a delusion. It is likely to create a sense of false security; it leaves so many loopholes for evasions. Therefore it must be effective, and the wisdom of this Committee and of the Disarmament Commission has to be directed in the immediate present to finding ways and means whereby effectiveness can be obtained, at the same time retaining the basis and the purposes of our Organization. That is our problem.

44. It therefore appears to me that at the next stage of this matter one would address oneself to the statutes that are necessary for control. We cannot deal with this problem of control merely in terms of rigid positions and slogans. It has to be translated into terms of statutes

of control law, and that law, in the context of our Organization, would be something whose basic principles would be part of the conventions and treaties established. It would equally be part of the treaties and conventions established that each national State would immediately pass legislation to conform to those situations. In concrete terms, therefore, if by convention a particular type of armament was abolished, or a particular limit of armament was established, or a particular method of ingress or egress was provided, or if a particular manner of enforcement was agreed upon—I shall explain what I mean by enforcement—then it would immediately be the obligation of the national authority to pass a national law whereby this could be enforced. In other words, a breach of the convention would automatically become a breach of national law.

45. Much has been said here about enforcement and sanctions. To my understanding, which may be poor, it appears that there is here a play of words which only adds to our complications. Mr. Lloyd went so far as to make the difference between enforcement and sanctions. Sanctions, like sovereignty, is one of those words that have bedeviled international law ever since people began to think about it.

46. We are told, for example, that there must be sanction power in the control commission. We have moved away from that position, and now we are talking in terms of enforcement. I should like to know from those who say that there can be no interference with domestic jurisdiction—a phrase which we hear in many contexts, which has adherents and which cuts across all lines according to the context in which it is brought out—how there can be any control at all if it is not possible to secure any co-operation from the national authority. In that case, there would be unilateral action and not action taken by a concert of nations.

47. On the other hand, we are told that the inspector must have the right to invoke the national authority to get something done—a right one can understand—but perhaps Mr. Moch or someone else would tell us how it is possible in the present context of affairs to function except through that national authority. Can an international inspector physically obtain the enforcement of orders except through the national authority? Is it possible for an international inspector forcibly to do something to machinery, to shut down the doors, etc.?

48. It will therefore be necessary, in the statutes that are produced under the convention, to lay down what is required in great detail. There will be statutes, and rules made under the statutes and procedures established under the rules. When this develops, it will be a great field of international law just as it is in the case of belligerency, in the case of neutrality and in the case of other things that have so developed.

49. All these statutes and the rules made under the statutes will be part of the commitments of the nations which sign the convention. The signatory States will immediately incorporate them in their national laws according to their national procedures, including the penalties which will be visited upon individuals, managers of factories or workmen or whoever commits a breach of law, because at once we have international authority and national sovereignty united in a common purpose, and any disobedience of the convention would become disobedience of national law. Enforcement would therefore mean that the international authority functioned not as a body which merely reported information it received,



but as a body which served notice and which pointed out that there had been a breach of the agreement in terms that were not vague, terms not subject to interpretation.

50. There is no doubt that if that is so, then there is a commitment both for the individual and for the State; a breach of that commitment by the individual would be tantamount to disregard and disobedience of national law, while a breach by the State would be a breach of the international convention. To refuse to carry out the statutes which have been passed in the country in conformity with the international treaty becomes a major violation of international law. Whether there is a violation or not, I am afraid to confess, sometimes is a matter of interpretation, but is there anyone in this Committee who can tell us that treaties have not always presented problems of interpretation? There has been no time when agreements have not presented problems of interpretation.

51. That of course means that we have got to provide the machinery for it, the machinery of tribunals or courts, or whatever it may be that is connected with it, in the same way as it exists in national communities in regard to industrial disputes. This approach is one of the reasons why I tried to draw out my good friend, Mr. Lloyd, on the question of domestic legislation in his own country. It is not possible for a factory inspector to go and lock the doors and walk out any more than for a policeman to do so with a private house. However, a person who disobeys the law takes the consequences. That is the meaning of sanctions, and those consequences are very serious. That is not to reduce the position to the absurdity of the inspector saying, "Pull down that gauge" (I hope at least he will say, "Please pull down that gauge"), or to the opposite absurdity of saying, "Oh no, take this matter to the Security Council" every time it is desired to work half an hour more than usual. These are extreme positions, and I believe myself, quite frankly, while honestly stated, they are debating positions at the moment. They are debating positions not in the sense of spinning out words, but in the sense that they are the two extreme views between which reconciliation must be found.

52. Therefore, to go back to what I was saying, it appears to me that the international convention would have to be centred on these words "effective" and "international". It would bear a considerable relation to the composition of the control commission itself, and that also should provide, by the detailed work it does, for the formulation of the statutes to the convention. Coupled with it is the provision that the signatories would incorporate the terms of the convention in their legislations; that would be the national co-operation they would give. That co-operation does not consist merely in allowing inspectors to go around; it consists in adjusting the whole judicial and administrative machinery of the country to carry out an international obligation. So these statutes are made. When you come down to details, these statutes, as in the case of a factory, come down to the rules. If we were thinking of an industrial factory, there would be rules about boilers and engines and other relevant machinery. In these statutes there would be rules laid down to the last details, rules put into operation by national authorities who are participants in the international convention. They are the law-makers as much as anybody else, and therefore it becomes a matter of common consent.

53. This is the approach that appears to my delegation to be something that no doubt is in the minds of the

wise people who are dealing with this. But we are asked here to say what we think about it. It is the approach on the lines of which some of these apparently irreconcilable positions may fall into their place. It is the more factual, the more practical and the more scientific approach to make in regard to these matters. Therefore one refers to the only document that we have before us; that is, the working paper submitted by the United States. It is a working paper which was not submitted to this Committee but to the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission. It is part of the papers of the report of the Disarmament Commission, and therefore we are seized of it.

54. I should like at once to say that this is the first and only attempt at some detailed analysis of this position. There is a great deal in this which is worth very serious consideration. But it would be wrong to say either that it has been submitted as a final text or that it can be accepted as it stands. No one has asked that that should be done. It is what it calls itself. It is a working paper. And, as a working paper, some of these facts are laid down with a more practical approach. It states, in paragraph 2 [DC/53, annex 4], that "the broad objectives in establishing control organs are: (i) to provide international control of atomic energy so as to enforce observance of prohibition and elimination of atomic and hydrogen weapons"—that is common ground—"and to ensure use of nuclear materials for peaceful purposes, (ii) to supervise programmes for limitation . . . and prohibition . . . ; (iii) to supervise the various safeguards . . . including . . . verification", and it then goes on to the fourth point about "an open world". I shall speak about that separately. So in the main this paper itself speaks in terms of supervision.

55. Supervision does not mean simply observation and making a note. Supervision, as I said a while ago, is more like a traffic policeman. Supervision is the ensuring of enforcement in terms of international law which has become national law. In the last analysis, the only persons who can use physical force against the nationals of a country are the national authorities themselves, unless there is an army of occupation. No one suggests that an international inspecting team should have the physical power to come into conflict with the national authorities. That could not be the suggestion that is put forward. I have been saying all this in order to point out that when it comes down to a practical working out of this proposition—I do not say there will be no difficulties; that would be a very sorry way of looking at things—it should be possible to resolve it in this way of defining the detailed functions of the control organ and the responsibility of the national authority for co-operating with it.

56. It may be convenient to bring to your attention subparagraph (iv) of the aforementioned paragraph 2, to which Mr. Lloyd has made very flattering references. I confess that I do not understand what it means. It reads:

"To help develop an open world by assuring each participating State that other States are observing the various agreements and by providing knowledge upon which States can take rapid action to provide for their security in the event of serious violations of the disarmament agreement."

The first part of it is a very welcome phrase, "to help develop an open world". An open world, of course, means not the tearing down of national identities but having egress and ingress and reducing obstructions, whether they be tariffs or prohibitions of various kinds. The part,

however, about "assuring each participating State" frankly requires some explanation, though not necessarily here, because, as I said at the beginning, this is not the place to come to detailed agreement. Up to a point one can understand that part. But if it means that if there is a violation by one State we get back to the law of the jungle and each State then prepares for retaliatory action, I think it is a very serious matter. Therefore, with regard to sub-paragraph (iv) of paragraph 2, I make no criticism. I simply express the feeling that, at the present moment, it is a very open statement and it can mean a lot of things.

57. Then we come in this working paper to the other factor that I have mentioned, which does not deal with what may be called complications but with the machinery. To a very large extent, it relies upon what is called a secretariat. Now what I say has no reference to the United Nations Secretariat at the moment. Reliance is placed entirely on the fact that the "secretariat should be staffed with international civil servants appointed by the Director-General" [paragraph 13]. Of course, ultimately that is the only way. But that is putting the cart before the horse. We do not have an international civil service or all the elements that make it at the moment. And when the times comes that there is such a person as an international civil servant who is trusted by the whole world, then no checks or balances will be necessary. This is the kind of thing one has to work towards.

58. I think we should congratulate ourselves that the United States Government, through its representative, has made available to others some points for consideration. That is what this paper calls itself: a working paper. But I must say in frankness that our consideration of the appositeness of this paper relates only to the first part. The second part, which deals with the civilian uses of atomic energy, is an independent proposition. It would not be in accordance with realities to try to deal with both problems at once. Mr. Lloyd, in answer to the questions he was asked, and I believe in one of his statements—I do not know which one it was—said that these problems were related. He recognized the relation. That is as far as he went. That, I take it, is the Franco-British position: the problems are related. But we cannot include the whole question of atomic development as a sub-proposition under disarmament inspectors.

59. There is no harm in looking at the working paper. Its usefulness, however, in our view, is in the first part; in the second part, those elements are useful that relate to the conversion or to the prohibition of atomic weapons; because, in regard to disarmament, what we are trying to do is not to regulate atomic power for armed purposes but to prohibit it. It is undesirable, in our view, that this idea of regulation, which appertains to other armaments, should in effect—not deliberately—be applied to other fields. At the same time, however, there are aspects of the suggestions and proposals made here which are of some value and which must enable people to hope that when it comes down to the practical part, everybody becomes practical. For example, paragraph 37 (f) of the United States working paper states:

"In the event of a finding by the Authority of violations, obstructions, discrepancies, or pertinent omissions by a State, call upon such State to remedy forthwith the violation or other infraction; in the event of failure within a reasonable time"—there again is no question of shutting doors or anything of that kind—"of the offending State to comply fully, report the vio-

lation or other infraction to the Security Council, to the General Assembly, and to all States in order to permit appropriate action by the United Nations or by individual States in accordance with the treaty establishing the control organ."

I do not see why we should not pay attention to these well thought out things where some of the difficulties already stand resolved. It is general in terms, but there is no doubt that that sub-paragraph was written with an eye to the practical, with the recognition of facts as they are.

60. Paragraph 41 of the United States working paper goes on to say:

"The Authority should be empowered to take action as appropriate short of the imposition of sanctions as provided in Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, to remedy any violations or infractions in connexion with the enforcement of the provisions of the treaty establishing the system for the control of atomic energy."

61. While I still maintain the reservation with respect to the civilian uses—and the other proposition is coming in another item on the agenda to be subsequently discussed—I think these ideas which are put forward are constructive ones and show the way to resolving some of the difficulties that have been put forward and, what is more, to removing some of these suspicions. But ultimately, whatever machinery of control is established, it is not only reasonable, but it is axiomatic that no control, no law, will work without public opinion. If that is true in a national community, it is even more true in an international community. The institutions must enable trust to be maintained, must reinforce that trust. But without international understanding, that is to say, if this control machinery is set up and the disarmament convention established in the context that everybody is trying to break it, then it will be broken.

62. There is no doubt that while small States may be more fearful, may be more subjected to the heavy hand of the bigger ones, if the giants that are involved in this are not brought into it on the basis of consent, then there is very little hope of the thing working at all. Therefore we must lay greater stress on, and capitalize and consolidate, the gains that have been made. We must, if I may say so with respect, abandon this idea that the other fellow is not likely to honour an obligation. The main thing is to make the other side, whoever it is, accept the obligation to provide all reasonable machinery for its maintenance, so that the officials in a particular State do not go wrong, and the violation can be easily located, as referring to particular national law covered by the international law.

63. There has been in the course of this discussion considerable, and, if I may say so, unrelated discussion on the whole problem of the veto. The veto, incidentally is a word which does not appear anywhere in the Charter. That is very important, because we have lost sight of the constructive aspect of this matter. The Charter refers to the need for "the concurring votes" of certain Powers in certain cases. If that should be abolished then, as I have said, it must come about in the normal way. It is not without significance that not one of the permanent members of the Security Council is willing to abandon the veto. The only objection is to the other fellow using the veto. It is just like saying, "I have no objection to a dictatorship so long as I am the dictator." We had the very honest, straightforward and statesman like utterance from Mr. Lodge, three or four days ago



that the United States would not give up the veto on any question where it was called upon to use its armed forces. It is an entirely right position.

64. I am not saying that the veto cannot be abused or has not been abused, or will not be abused. What I am saying is this: we should not throw the baby out with the bathwater. This concurrence of the great Powers is something on which this Organization has been built, and it is very bad practice, as any lawyer knows, to make bad law on account of hard cases. Therefore all this argument about the veto, and so on, no doubt has its relevance in a particular place, but it has no meaning so far as this particular question is concerned, because the Franco-British position is that the Charter must be respected. Mr. Lloyd, referring to my final question—although I did not ask him a question—whether all the proposals put forward would be clearly within the terms of the Charter, said the following [694th meeting]:

“The answer to that question is ‘yes’. In our view, the proposals which we put forward would have to be within the terms of the Charter. On the question of the veto and the position of the Charter in relation to the veto, we would say, I think, that it would be quite wrong for a treaty between States to provide that the veto should not operate in the Security Council on this or that matter; that it would be contrary to the Charter to insert such a provision in a multi-lateral treaty; but that it would be perfectly consistent with the Charter to say that certain enforcement measures should be decided upon in the control organization by majority vote.”

65. If I may say so with respect, that is a very correct and lucid statement of international law in relation to the Charter and the veto. What sort of obedience, what sort of respect for international law can it be when we violate that law by national agreements? Bi-national agreements have been suggested. If we stipulate that the veto shall not apply, without at the same time taking the provision concerning the veto away from the Charter, then of course what we are doing in that way can be done in some other way; that is, we come to a common agreement and then we make a separate common agreement — or some States make a separate common agreement — to alter that. The question of the veto has been drawn like a red herring across the whole of this discussion. It is, of course, relevant to the working out of things; there will be plenty of arguments in the Security Council as to whether the veto applies in a particular matter or not, and there is no doubt that the veto will be used in inconvenient moments, and perhaps unreasonably. I do not deny all this. But I wonder whether the use of the veto, and all that has gone around it, is not a symptom rather than a malady itself; that is to say, the whole position arises from the power relationships which exist.

66. Again I would like to make the statement, which may only invite rebuke from either side, that neither the obduracy of a minority, its sulkiness or its obstinacy, or its use of shock power, on the one hand, nor the easily available power of a majority, can ever bring about international agreements. This is the view which is to be found in the Disarmament Commission's second report, and it was expressed by the representative of the United States at one of the meetings of the Disarmament Commission, where he said:

“There must be agreement on . . . international control, but it must not be subject to the veto nor branded as a plan controlled by a United States mechanical majority” [DC/20, para. 292].

It works both ways. Therefore the position of the Security Council in respect to it, in the view of my delegation, is governed by the principles of the Charter and by general considerations — and we should not make bad law for a hard case.

67. Nothing that I have said takes away from our considered view that a control is no control at all unless it is effective, unless it provides in detail, and by scientific adjustment, all the things that are to be done, because in actual fact it is not a question of interpreting a clause of an agreement, but laying down whether something may or may not be done in a place of work. Of course, if we were to push the argument to its logical extreme of suggesting that an inspector must be stationed at every industrial establishment in the world, or something of that character, then we reduce the whole thing to an absurdity. You would have an army of inspectors larger than the armies in the world.

68. Therefore it comes to this common sense view that we cannot function, we cannot establish this treaty, we cannot establish the machinery of control or anything else, in a vacuum. Any idea that a control machinery can exist outside the national characteristics of people, outside the unhappy conflicts that may exist at the moment, outside national sovereignties, outside the machineries of adjustment that exist, outside national public opinion, would be an unreal view to take. This is probably the most powerful machinery that would exist, because it is the machinery which seeks to restrain arms, to restrain conflict and to restrain war, and it would be unthinkable, it would be unscientific, in my opinion, to think that such a machinery can exist in a world vacuum. It can only exist in the framework of national circumstances, in the atmosphere of good and evil as it exists, in the context of adjustment and consent. Fortunately for us we see, as I said in the beginning, a movement in that direction, because we have now come to the stage when the prohibition of arms and actual disarmament has become necessary on account of the conditions that exist in the world.

69. Before I go on to my next point, I want to deal with a particular aspect of what has been called the conditional use of the atomic weapon. On this point, my delegation has followed a position which it must continue to maintain, namely, that we do not consider that there are any circumstances in which the atomic weapon can be used. We entirely agree that it is impossible under present conditions to agree to unconditional prohibition, but we have always said that it is possible to arrive at a stage of non-use by agreement, in the same way as it has been stated in the Franco-British memorandum that nations will feel themselves committed, or words to that effect. However, to say that atomic weapons shall not be used except in the case of aggression is to permit their use and to make atomic weapons part of the armaments of the world. Indeed, it is far better to say nothing at all. Moreover, aggression remains undefined and the degree of aggression is not stated. Over and above all this, what are the scientific facts?

70. We have the statement of Professor Adrian to the effect that the human race could not survive if more than a few thousand large atomic bombs were exploded, regardless of where they fell. That is to say, this conditional weapon, the weapon that can be used in case of aggression, would naturally provoke its own use more and more. That is the only thing of which we are sure: arms mean more arms and war means more war. The human race could not survive if more than a few thou-

sand large atomic bombs were exploded. Professor Adrian goes on to add: "We must face the possibility that repeated atomic explosions will lead to a degree of general radioactivity which no one can tolerate or escape." This refers to a period when there is no war. That is to say, if the manufacture and development of atomic weapons continues to take place, these explosions will lead to a degree of general radioactivity which no one can tolerate.

71. Then there is the statement of another professor, Sir George Thomson of Oxford University, who said that the hydrogen bomb was "absolutely crazy as a weapon" and a possible form of suicide. I think that it is more than suicide: it is suicide for the States that use them, it is genocide for the rest of the world and infanticide for posterity.

72. We have even further evidence of this. Professor Otto R. Frisch, of Cambridge University, speaks about the cobalt bomb made by "seeding" hydrogen bombs with cobalt, and this, he states, might result in radiation so deadly and wide-spread as to wipe out civilization.

73. We have an American authority, Professor Leo Szilard, of the University of Chicago, who states that 400 one-ton deuterium-cobalt bombs would release enough radioactivity to extinguish all life on earth.

74. In these circumstances, if there was any argument for situations in which atomic power could be used for destruction, it has been entirely ruled out. It is the remedy that is worse than the disease. Therefore there can be no circumstance in which my delegation would ever subscribe to the use of atomic power for destructive purposes.

75. I should like at this stage to refer to the draft resolution which has been submitted to the Committee on behalf of my delegation. Before speaking on this draft resolution, however, I want to state that my delegation will support the joint draft resolution submitted by Canada and four other States [*A/C.1/752/Rev. 2*]. We had hoped that in the course of negotiations on it, some alterations would be made. But in view of the fact that the five great Powers mainly concerned have agreed and that it is a draft which refers the question for further consideration, it would be wrong for anyone to interfere with it. We join with others in the hope that it will be adopted by acclamation and sent to the Assembly as a great step towards further endeavours for disarmament.

76. However, we still would like to invite the attention of the sponsors concerned, who have greater technical knowledge than we have, to the possibility of referring to the dismantling of these weapons if they are not converted for use. We say that for this reason. We are told that it is not possible to destroy the atomic bomb because total destruction means explosion and the release of radioactivity in the way I have mentioned. We do not profess to know all about these things, but the fact remains that there are large quantities of these weapons in the world, so we are told, and the absorption of them in civilian use may take considerable time. If they are not absorbed, they remain as weapons; in this the whole idea of prohibition and the whole idea of non-use suffers some detraction.

77. Dr. von Neumann, recently appointed by President Eisenhower to the United States Atomic Energy Commission, stated: "I am convinced that it would take a long time before it could be applied economically as atomic energy." It is quite reasonable to think that it would take considerable time before all this fissionable material that has been accumulated for war purposes can

be absorbed. Therefore, if it is technically impossible, it is technically impossible. We suggested that the weapons should be destroyed, but we were told that destruction was not possible. Therefore we suggest dismantling, so that they cannot be used. We asked the sponsors of the joint draft resolution whether, if for nothing else than for the sake of world public opinion—which is probably the most important factor in the whole of this question—they would take that into account.

78. Having expressed our great appreciation and gladness that we now have before the Committee the main conclusion that we should reach in this question, my delegation has submitted a draft resolution [*A/C.1/L.100*]. This draft resolution is in no way contradictory either to the wording or to the purposes of the five-Power draft resolution. It in no way detracts from the joint draft. We submit it because we think that for our own position, for the strengthening of the position of the members of the Sub-Committee, and for bringing confidence and good feeling in world public opinion, it is necessary for us to reaffirm some of the things which were stated at the last session of the General Assembly and which are not fully covered here in the preamble. Therefore in our preamble we reaffirm those positions. Also, there was nothing in the previous decisions of the Assembly with regard to the situation as it is at present. In the operative part of this draft—and we have no objection to altering the words in any way that suits anyone—we have requested that there should be effective co-operation with States that are not members of the Disarmament Commission.

79. Now in April 1954, the Government of India submitted to the Secretary-General a request that consideration should be given to obtaining a standstill of explosions. At that time, we did not have the learned authority of all the professors whose views I have read out, that is to say, that the explosions themselves create a degree of radioactivity which no one can tolerate or escape. We suggested, therefore, that in view of the disarmament discussions, and so on, we could at any rate put a stop to explosions. We requested the Secretary-General that it should be considered by the Disarmament Commission. We did not say that it should be adopted—we had no right to say that—but we felt that, as a Member State of the United Nations, we had the right to ask for it to be considered. The document was submitted to the Sub-Committee [*DC/44 and Corr.1*], but it was never considered. It has been distributed as a United Nations document, which happens to a lot of documents, including those from non-governmental organizations. We are not making a complaint about this—we are only arguing the point that effective methods of co-operation with States which are not members of the Disarmament Commission should be established; that is to say, procedures for this must be found. This is not mandatory; it is a suggestion. After all, if disarmament is to come about, we must have the support of the large and the small. A small State can be a great nuisance and can prove to be a weak link in the chain. It is therefore necessary to secure the co-operation of States and to provide for the channelling of their views and for such participation as they may wish.

80. This idea was also in the minds of the authors of the Franco-British proposal. We therefore asked the Sub-Committee to take into consideration procedures for effective co-operation.

81. We have been told privately that our suggestion was not technically practicable. Of course, technicians and experts can disagree. We are told that it is possible to

explode atomic bombs secretly. Well, we want, and the world wants, far more evidence than is supplied by one technician. We all know that expert witnesses are one of the problems of our courts—they appear on both sides.

82. Secondly, Sir Percy Spender, the representative of Australia, has submitted a draft resolution [A/C.1/L.101] asking that the points of agreement and difference should be tabulated by the Secretariat and made available to the Disarmament Commission so that its work may be simplified. This is an excellent suggestion, with which we are in agreement, but we think it should go a little further and not merely relate to putting down the points of agreement and difference but also the main suggestions and submissions made to this Committee by various delegations. That is one way of making the work of the Disarmament Commission more cosmopolitan, more representative, and, if I may say so, more fruitful. At any rate, it would enable the Sub-Committee to be armed with answers, if the suggestions made are impractical. We hope it will be possible for the representative of Australia to consider the suggestion and, if he agrees with it, to include it in his own draft resolution.

83. I have also referred in our draft resolution to one other point that had been made before, namely, the consideration of the factors that decide the quantum and the quality of armaments, and so on.

84. We now come to paragraph 1 (a) of the Indian draft resolution. The Committee may remember that my delegation made this suggestion in submitting observations to the general debate in the General Assembly [492nd meeting], that we would request the Disarmament Commission to study the possibilities of an armaments truce. That is to say, a disarmament convention is now common ground. The establishment of institutions is common ground. But whether there is common ground or not, it is a fact established by scientists that in the conditions of atomic power at the present moment our civilization stands under the threat of extinction. I wonder, in those circumstances, whether we could not apply to this proposition the analogous situation that arises in the conditions of non-cold war, that is, if there is a severe conflict, we try in this way to call a halt for the time being, not necessarily by the establishment of controls or by anticipating all that has to be done, but in the same way as the Franco-British proposal suggests — or Mr. Lloyd, I forget which — that nations must consider themselves committed. It is for the wisdom of these gentlemen to consider whether it is not possible, pending the conclusion of this truce, to establish some degree of cessation. This has been referred to in the memorandum as “freezing”, and so on.

85. The United Kingdom, as I said, has said that the Disarmament Sub-Committee should also consider whether the Disarmament Commission should limit in any way the expenditures of the participating Powers for military purposes. As the disarmament programme proceeds — this is exactly what we are saying — it may well be found that budgetary control provides one of the most effective safeguards. The Sub-Committee should also consider the suggestion that among the first steps towards world disarmament there will be a freeze, or standstill agreement, in regard to military expenditure, which would bind the signatories not to increase in any way their expenditure for military purposes.

86. We are not committing ourselves to one method or to another. All we are saying is, just as in the case of a war we try to achieve a cease-fire, or an armistice —

after all, we are living in a world of armistices, we are able to maintain ourselves not so much by peace as by cessation of hostilities — in the same way, would it not be possible for the Committee to consider the establishment of an armaments truce? Here again, I would like to say that the draft resolution does not make it mandatory, but simply suggests a study of the ways and means of establishing an armaments truce. The rejection of the suggestion would mean that without study, or only with such studies as may be undertaken in private, the matter would not even be considered. That would be a poor consolation to the peoples of the world who look to the day when these ominous weapons no longer threaten to destroy civilization altogether. So we think that nothing is lost. We are not making an inroad into the powers, the status or the functions of the Committee. There is no idea, other than is obvious in the thing itself, which makes it unacceptable to anybody to study ways and means of establishing an armaments truce pending the conclusion of the disarmament convention.

87. Further, the draft resolution — I shall explain it later on at the appropriate occasion — also says that all these recommendations are covered by paragraph 2 of the joint draft resolution. That is to say, they all come under the umbrella of other proposals. These other proposals include the United States paper, the letter we sent out earlier this year, I hope, other proposals that have come out from here and the various suggestions that have been made. There is a world problem, and a project which requires the willing co-operation and alignment of all the forces in the world, great or small. As someone said yesterday, nations are referred to as great and small. These are conventional expressions used in certain contexts, but all nations are important in creating this great world settlement.

88. I hope, therefore, when the time comes it will be possible for the Assembly to adopt this draft resolution. My delegation will be entirely prepared to make any alterations in the wording in order to conform with the draft resolution that the Committee has previously passed, and it has been drafted on the assumption that the other draft resolution will be unanimously accepted — an anticipation which I think it is reasonable for us to make.

89. These, therefore, are the observations my delegation wishes to submit, and I would like to end with the thought that the progress that we have made may enable us to hope that the main element in disarmament, that is, the recognition of its inevitability, its absolute necessity, and, what is more, the recognition that conditions in the world today are more propitious than they have been ever since the war, may be a great factor in bringing our work to greater success next year.

90. The CHAIRMAN: Does any representative wish to reply to statements delivered after the list of speakers was closed?

91. Mr. Charles MALIK (Lebanon): I will only take two minutes of your time. I shall never argue *ad hominem*. When one resorts to *argumentum ad hominem*, one only discloses, I am afraid, that one is unable, or unwilling, to argue objectively. It is therefore to be regretted that Mr. Vyshinsky, in part, at least, of his remarks yesterday [699th meeting], found it necessary, or expedient, to argue *ad hominem*.

92. I have always had the highest regard for Mr. Vyshinsky, both as a person and as a representative of his great country. I have profited from listening or talk-

ing to him all through these years as much as I have from listening or talking to any other person. The considerations I urged yesterday [698th meeting] are on the minds of millions upon millions of people throughout the world. It does not serve the cause of peace or, therefore, of disarmament, to avoid facing them as boldly as possible. I raised them candidly in the interests of clarification and only with a view to reassuring troubled minds. Regardless of what was said about my good faith, it can be objectively shown that I raised these matters in perfect good faith and only in the interests of peace. Whether these things have been adequately faced, whether adequate theoretical reassurance has come forward, I shall leave it to any fair student of these matters to judge for himself.

93. Concerning professors, of course, it is not for me to defend them. But, however they may be viewed, I think there is one thing that can be said of them, namely, that they have never brought about any wars. I feel that the same cannot be said of other breeds of men.

94. Furthermore, two German lines were read to us yesterday about them. You will recall that these lines read as follows:

*“Siebenundsiebzig Professoren:  
Vaterland, du bist verloren!”*

which may be translated, very poorly, as,  
“Seventy-seven professors:  
Fatherland, thou art lost!”

However, the two preceding lines of the poem were not quoted, although they are quite illuminating. They are as follows:

*“Siebenundsiebzig Advokaten,  
Vaterland, du bist verraten!”*

which means:

“Seventy-seven advocates,  
Oh my Fatherland, thou are betrayed!”

or, in still better English:

“In seventy-seven lawyers’ hands,  
Betrayed thou art, my Fatherland!”

95. Mr. VYSHINSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translated from Russian*): Mr. Malik thinks that he has extricated himself very easily from the embarrassing situation which he himself created yesterday and for which he is now responsible. The two additional lines of Heine he has cited naturally have some meaning, but if he cited them in connexion with the principle he has proclaimed here—that one should not speak *ad hominem*—then I must say that he is not even attempting to live up to his own principles, since he himself has spoken *ad hominem*. I, on the other hand, spoke not of any one man in my intervention, but of the danger of the sermons delivered by persons, some of them professors, who lack a sense of practical reality and do not understand that they cannot settle practical questions in the light of abstract theories—and distorted ones at that—as some representatives here have done.

96. Mr. Malik has avoided entirely the questions which he raised yesterday. He has not taken the time to confirm that the true Marxist-Leninist doctrine leads to the result he mentioned, and he has not said one word to refute my remark that his conception was simply a distortion of the truth. I also think that I said enough yesterday to convince everyone that there is not a grain of truth in what Mr. Malik then said about the Marxist-Leninist doctrine.

97. I agree with him that, if the First Committee is interested in the question, it can ascertain objectively whether

things really are as he described them, or whether they are quite otherwise—as indeed they must be, unless we twist the meaning of the greatest works of those great men whom yesterday he tried to discredit.

98. The CHAIRMAN: If no other representative wishes to speak, I shall declare the general debate closed, and I shall now give the floor to representatives who wish to speak on the draft resolutions.

99. Mr. ENTEZAM (Iran) (*translated from French*): I shall try to set an example of brevity and explain, in a few words, my delegation’s views on the three draft resolutions before us.

100. I shall begin with the five-Power draft resolution [A/C.1/752/Rev.2], and I do not think there is any need to speak about it at length. I have already been able to express my delegation’s satisfaction at the agreement among the five Powers. As Mr. Menon has just said, we can only congratulate ourselves upon it. It would be improper for us to intervene and change anything in the text which is before us, for we know with what difficulties agreement has been reached. I share Mr. Menon’s hope that our Committee will approve this draft resolution unanimously and by acclamation.

101. I come now to the draft resolution submitted by the Indian delegation [A/C.1/L.100]. Personally I have every sympathy for it, but I must confess that my delegation has not had time to study it with all the care it deserves. The text contains some very interesting ideas such as the study of ways and means of establishing an “armament truce”, but I wonder whether, at this stage of our debates, we can go into the details of this draft resolution. Having heard the eloquent and moving speech by Mr. Menon, I think that we shall be well advised—and this is a mere suggestion—to refer this text to the Disarmament Commission as we did last year in the case of other draft resolutions.

102. The last paragraph of the Indian draft resolution raises a matter which certainly cannot be referred to the Disarmament Commission, namely, the reconvening of the ninth session of the General Assembly by the President “as appropriate”. We can take up that idea later when the work of the Assembly is more advanced. If the Indian delegation would agree to have its draft resolution referred to the Disarmament Commission, it could then put forward a fresh proposal embodying this idea.

103. The Australian draft resolution [A/C.1/L.101] contains a very interesting idea. It would be extremely useful, not only for the Disarmament Commission but also for all the Members of the United Nations, to have a working paper prepared by the Secretariat “giving a descriptive and factual presentation of the present positions of the great Powers on various aspects of the disarmament problem”. I feel, however, that there is some incongruity between the title of the draft resolution and its contents. After three weeks of impassioned debate on so important and vital a problem as disarmament, I feel that we should be placed in an awkward position if we submitted to the General Assembly, under the title “Conclusion of an international convention (treaty) on the reduction of armaments . . .”, a draft resolution in which the General Assembly would merely recommend that the Disarmament Commission should request the Secretariat, “as soon as practicable”, to prepare a working paper. We would run the risk, if I may say so, of appearing a little ridiculous in the eyes of public opinion. However, as the idea is valuable, it should be borne in mind.

104. One solution would be to leave the Disarmament Commission free to take action on the basis of the discussions in our Committee. I am certain that it would be glad to request the Secretariat to prepare this useful paper. If the Disarmament Commission or the Secretariat were so formalistic as to think that a decision of the General Assembly was necessary, there would be another solution: the sponsors of the five-Power draft could perhaps agree to the insertion of the Australian proposal in their draft resolution. The most suitable place would be between paragraphs 3 and 4 of the operative part. The Australian proposal would become paragraph 4 of the five-Power draft and the present paragraph 4 would become paragraph 5.

105. I hope that the Australian delegation will understand the reasons underlying my suggestion and will interpret it merely as the expression of a sincere desire to uphold the prestige of the United Nations.

106. Mr. MOCH (France) (*translated from French*): First of all, I would like to thank Mr. Entezam for his statement, which will allow me to be very brief. Indeed, I feel that we should now conclude our discussion as quickly as possible since there is a danger that it may digress from the main issue or expend itself in considerations which are minor in comparison with the problems we are studying. We have had some side-issues. Irrelevant questions of dogma and theory have been raised and the working methods of disarmament bodies, including control machinery, have been discussed. These latter questions may be touched upon generally in a meeting comprising sixty delegations but cannot be usefully discussed in detail except in a small committee.

107. Precisely because the debate has been general, it has produced general ideas. However, if we let ourselves become involved in details, we may emphasize unduly divergencies which future study can perhaps reconcile. Furthermore, we run the risk of giving those listening to us, and not only in this room, a false idea of the general tone of our debates. I therefore feel that, by prolonging the debate, we shall be liable to create misunderstandings without coming any nearer to a solution.

108. For me, the essential point is that two moves towards a *rapprochement* have been made; first, the Franco-British memorandum of 11 June [DC/53, annex 9] and, secondly, the statement by Mr. Vyshinsky in the General Assembly on 30 September last [484th meeting]. These two moves have produced, for the first time since 1946, a joint five-Power draft resolution which, though mainly procedural, also touches upon principles. For me, I repeat, that is the most important point. We have all spoken of our reasons for optimism and also of the difficulties that remain to be solved. These, as we know, cannot be settled here but only after close study in a small committee, which must be reconvened at the earliest opportunity.

109. For all these reasons I should like to introduce, as it were, a motion on a point of order, or rather, since it is not a formal motion, a wish on a point of order, if I may put it that way, my wish being that the debate should be rapidly concluded by a single unanimous vote on the draft resolution jointly submitted by the five Powers.

110. I should like to explain what I mean. Mr. Menon has just made an important and useful statement which I followed with the greatest attention and which, I think, should be studied thoroughly in a small committee. Indeed, the text of this statement will provide the members of the Sub-Committee, as well as those of us who read it at leisure, with much food for thought. We all owe Mr.

Menon a debt of gratitude and I shall of course refrain from discussing the points raised by his speech without having read the exact text and having had time to reflect upon it.

111. Mr. Menon did not mention his draft resolution until the end of his statement. I would request him and also the Australian representative to agree to have their two drafts referred to the Disarmament Commission. However, I must stress that such a course would not mean that they were being rejected, but on the contrary that they were being taken into consideration. I make this request, first, for the general reason which I have just given, namely, the need to close this debate as soon as possible—today if we can—by a unanimous vote which would not be followed by other votes likely to make our debate seem, from a distance, more confused, and secondly, for special reasons related to both the draft resolutions in question.

112. I cannot reply to Mr. Entezam about the inclusion of the Australian text in the five-Power draft resolution without first consulting the other four sponsors. I have been unable to do this, of course, as I am speaking immediately after Mr. Entezam. I feel, however, that this draft resolution encroaches to some extent on the functions of the Disarmament Commission and that it is for the Commission itself to request this study if it considers it useful, feasible, and profitable. It is not for the General Assembly to advise such a study. Consequently, at first sight and speaking personally, I believe that, for the moment, it is better to refer it to the Commission, rather than to insert it between two of the operative paragraphs of the joint five-Power draft resolution.

113. I also feel—and here I fully agree with the Australian representative—that this task of setting out the different views will be easier when the Sub-Committee has concluded its discussions. In any case, we are not certain whether there will then still be any disagreement since, fortunately, we are entering a new stage in our work. I think that it would therefore be better merely to refer the Australian draft resolution to the Disarmament Commission.

114. With regard to the draft resolution submitted by the Indian delegation [A/C.1/L.100], I think that the first five paragraphs of the preamble are valuable and prompted by generous motives. Nevertheless, they do reaffirm the terms of earlier resolutions and hence their value is in some respects debatable. They might even seem out of place, appearing, as they do, not at the beginning of the major draft resolution to be adopted by the First Committee, but at the beginning of a secondary draft resolution. This secondary character has been recognized by Mr. Menon, since in his own draft he refers several times to the five-Power draft resolution.

115. The sixth paragraph of the preamble refers to the Geneva agreements, that is to say, to measures which are, strictly speaking, alien to our agenda.

116. I have no comments to make on the seventh paragraph of the preamble. We all note with satisfaction the degree of agreement we have reached, but such a statement is more striking in the text of the draft resolution sponsored by the five great Powers. Besides, the statement is much more forceful if made jointly by five Powers than if made in a secondary draft resolution.

117. The eighth paragraph, although only a part of the preamble of the draft resolution, actually contains an assertion which, if endorsed first by the Committee and then by the Assembly, would be hardly distinguishable

from a formal stand taken by the General Assembly. Consequently, this paragraph should not be accepted lightly. The agreements relating to the freezing of armaments at their present levels referred to in the Indian draft resolution bear only an artificial resemblance to the measures proposed in the Franco-British memorandum of June last. Indeed, in our text—and I feel that here I am speaking also for the United Kingdom representative, although I have not consulted him—this freezing is actually part and parcel of a general convention for controlled disarmament. Furthermore, it has not been accepted in its present form by the Soviet Union delegation and we would be running into difficulties if we accepted Mr. Menon's proposal. The freezing envisaged in the Franco-British memorandum represents one phase of the general process, whereas the agreements suggested by the Indian representative would precede the signature of agreements relating to disarmament and would be different from and independent of those agreements. Furthermore, they would probably not entail control, although this is not expressly stated in the text of the Indian draft resolution. Therefore, while in agreement on the substance—and how could we fail to be in agreement on a plan to freeze the level of armaments and of expenditures when we desire to achieve as rapidly as possible a major reduction in that level—and also on the objective, I feel that the only reasonable solution is to refer the Indian draft resolution to the Commission, as I said a few moments ago.

118. I come now to paragraph 1 of the operative part. This paragraph enumerates and places on an equal footing a series of measures and procedures which cannot be even remotely compared with the proposals contained in paragraph 2 of the operative part of the five-Power draft which “requests the Disarmament Commission to seek an acceptable solution of the disarmament problem, taking into account the various proposals referred to it in the preamble of the present resolution”—I shall not remind you what these are for you all know them—and any other proposals within the Commission's terms of reference”. That, of course, covers the proposals put forward by France and the United Kingdom, by the Soviet Union and by the United States, which are well known, but not the proposal that States which are not members of the Disarmament Commission should appear before the Commission, or the proposal that certain studies should be made, for instance, a study of the factors which, in the opinion of the Commission, should govern the equitable reduction of armed forces and armaments. This is a matter which the Commission alone must deal with, and I shall refrain today from entering into a discussion of criteria and factors, which would prove endless.

119. I shall now enumerate the specific objections of the French delegation to this part of the Indian draft resolution [A/C.1/L.100].

120. With reference to paragraph 1, sub-paragraph (a), of the operative part, we cannot, by accepting a text which recommends the study of “an armament truce”, give the impression of endorsing the idea contained in the eighth paragraph of the preamble, because of the difference which I just pointed out between a freezing as part of a general and controlled plan of disarmament and a freezing which would be independent of it. Perhaps that is not Mr. Menon's idea, but his text amounts to that.

121. With reference to sub-paragraph (b)—“procedures for effective co-operation with . . . States not mem-

bers of the Disarmament Commission”—I should like to point out that such procedures exist, that the rules of procedure of the Commission, based on the rules of procedure of the Security Council, provide for the participation of States not members of the Commission, and that, in the Commission and the Sub-Committee, my colleagues—I am sure I can speak for them on this point—and I have been and always will be in favour of hearing the views of other States. Thus, on this point, Mr. Menon should be entirely satisfied if the matter is referred to the Commission.

122. With reference to sub-paragraph (c), it is obvious that the Commission should take into account the discussions on disarmament in the General Assembly. That, I would say, is one of its basic tasks. There is therefore no need to mention the fact, as it follows from the very constitution of the Commission.

123. Sub-paragraph (d) concerns the method of work. That is a matter for the Commission. I repeat that I do not want to become involved today in a discussion of working methods. I should be guilty of the fault which I mentioned just now of unduly prolonging the discussion and of concluding it with an anti-climax, whereas in fact the main task should be to try to take advantage of the agreement which has been achieved among the five Powers.

124. With regard to paragraph 2 of the operative part, Mr. Entezam will forgive me if I say that I am not completely in agreement with him. The procedure proposed seems unnecessary, because it would place an excessive responsibility upon the President of the Assembly by asking him to keep the Assembly in session while not actually meeting by a process of procedural jugglery. In any case it will always be possible, if necessary, to convene a special session. Let us imagine, and it is not such a wild dream, that in the Sub-Committee we succeed in reaching agreement on all the controversial points which have been fully discussed here recently. If you wish, let us all make this optimistic supposition. Do you believe that, if this five-Power group reached such an unanimous solution and submitted it to the Disarmament Commission, which comprises twelve States, a single State would oppose the immediate convening of a special session of the General Assembly to approve the marvellous result thus achieved? It must surely be realized that in such an event we should all agree, enthusiastically, to the convening of a special session of the General Assembly, which would be the Assembly of peace. I do not think that it is wise to place this heavy onus upon the President and I am fully confident that the Secretary-General, at the request of the Disarmament Commission and with the support of a sufficient number of countries to form a quorum, would immediately convene a special session in which we would express the joy of which today we have only a distant glimpse.

125. That is why I urge all representatives, and in particular those who have sponsored proposals, to agree that these drafts should be referred to the Commission—this means that they would be expedited and not shelved—and to conclude the debate as soon as possible with a unanimous vote on the five-Power draft, thus making a unique and auspicious impact upon world opinion.

126. Mr. SERRANO (Philippines): In my statement before this Committee on 12 October [687th meeting], I endeavoured to trace patiently and with objectivity the evolution of the various proposals which the Western Powers and the Soviet Union had offered for the reduc-



tion of conventional armaments and armed forces and the prohibition and control of nuclear weapons. To dispel the prevailing pessimism, which had weighed heavily upon and brought despair to the hearts of men everywhere, I sought to punctuate the three distinct advances which we had achieved in our long and arduous toil to realize our age-old dream of a weaponless world—namely, progressive crystallization of opposing views, demonstration of a common perseverance in seeking common ground, and, finally, discovery of points of agreement from what appeared then to be hopelessly divergent views. I went further by stating that the draft resolution which Mr. Vyshinsky had offered in his speech of 30 September in the General Assembly [484th meeting] constituted a remarkable advance towards the desired goal.

127. I must assure the Committee that, when I made that statement, I was not carried away by unreasoning optimism. Viewed against the background of the almost nine years of unyielding obduracy with which the Soviet Union had spurned all Western proposals, the sudden announcement that the Soviet Union was willing to consider the Franco-British memorandum of 11 June 1954 as a basis of negotiation was like a sudden streak of light in an impenetrable gloom. Despite our natural tendency to misgivings, born of past disappointments, the Soviet draft resolution, I thought, must be taken for what it might be worth if we were genuinely interested in reducing world tensions. Like shipwrecked voyagers in a tempestuous sea, we must clutch at any floating debris for a chance, no matter how faint, of salvation. I regarded it as highly desirable, therefore, that, as the Soviet Union had shown a sudden favourable disposition to *rapprochement*, full advantage should be taken of the psychological moment by bringing both parties immediately together, before any incident arose which might provoke discordant notes and wreck the chances of possible reconciliation. This was the rationale and the basic motivation of the draft resolution presented by my delegation [A/C.1/751].

128. Despite our draft resolution, the debates have continued unabated to this very day, in accordance with our rules of procedure. I must, however, state that, to my delegation's complete gratification, our fear that prolonged debates might rattle old skeletons and rip open the wounds that time had healed did not materialize. The exchanges of view were conducted on the highest level and without recrimination. Furthermore, the period of about one month which we proposed in our draft resolution for a private reconciliation of opposing views has been substantially shortened by these debates. Both the Western Powers and the Soviet Union, undoubtedly believing that they need more time thoroughly to thresh out their differences, have unmistakably shown a preference for giving the Disarmament Commission, as opposed to a working group of this Committee, the task of accomplishing an objective identical to that which the Philippine delegation had in mind when it submitted its draft resolution. The five-Power draft resolution [A/C.1/752/Rev.2] evidences this mutual desire and is to us a most gratifying sign of the new spirit of amity in which the great Powers are seeking to explore anew their differences of view.

129. We wish to make it clear that the delegation of the Philippines feels that its objective of bringing the contending parties to some sort of *rapprochement* has been achieved in the joint draft resolution. It is true that we sought to attain that end through different means, but—at least in this instance—the means are in our opinion

immaterial, so long as the larger end is served. We hereby voice our hope that the five-Power joint draft resolution will presage the beginning of a successful search for a solution to the elusive problem of disarmament and peace in our time.

130. In view of all those considerations, and happy in the thought that both the Western Powers and the Soviet Union appear agreeable to our primary objective—namely, that they should work out their differences with a view to achieving a tangible agreement of some kind on disarmament—I am constrained, with satisfaction, to withdraw, and I do hereby withdraw, the draft resolution of the Philippines [A/C.1/751]. I do that in order to pave the way for what we trust may be unanimous approval of the five-Power joint draft resolution.

131. I hope that all the members of this Committee share that sentiment. If they do, I would take the liberty of inviting Mr. Menon, in the interest of unanimity, to consider the advisability of withdrawing the Indian draft resolution [A/C.1/L.100]. Since most of the ideas contained in the operative part of that draft resolution may properly be addressed to the Disarmament Commission in accordance with the views of some other members of this Committee, and since we believe that the draft resolution itself commends the Disarmament Commission's serious consideration, we feel that Mr. Menon may wish seriously to consider the invitation we have addressed to him.

132. There is one point upon which we feel that the Philippine delegation should insist. If this Committee cannot, for lack of time, work out a limited formula of agreement on some aspect or aspects of the opposing disarmament proposals of the Soviet Union and the Western Powers, it should somehow endeavour to achieve something definite and concrete before it finishes its consideration of this vital agenda item. It must at least be able to supply a working guide to the Disarmament Commission in the form of a descriptive and factual presentation of the present positions of the Western Powers and the Soviet Union on the various aspects of the disarmament problem. In this respect the assistance of the Secretariat will, we trust, be extremely valuable.

133. To that end, we are happy to announce that, in response to the very kind invitation of Sir Percy Spender, the Philippine delegation would be only too willing to co-sponsor the draft resolution submitted yesterday by the Australian delegation [A/C.1/L.101]. There has, however, been some suggestion that that draft resolution might be embodied in the draft resolution submitted jointly by the five Powers. We are not concerned with the means by which the same purpose may be achieved. Whether the suggestion is embodied in the joint draft resolution or is presented as an independent draft resolution, we should be only too happy if the Disarmament Commission could be furnished with some working guide by means of which it could intelligently proceed with its future negotiations on disarmament.

134. As this Committee is about to ring down the curtain on its consideration of this crucial item on its agenda, I am pleased—with very great diffidence, I assure the Committee—to assess the modest contribution that the Philippine delegation has endeavoured to make to a solution of the disarmament problem. It has at least helped to stimulate a deep and abiding interest among the middle-sized and smaller Powers and to develop a growing consciousness that disarmament is no less the concern of those Powers than it is of the big Powers. It has aided in creating and maintaining an atmosphere of good will

and has induced a sober and an increasingly more objective analysis of the differences of view among the big Powers. Lastly, it has helped to bring a deeper sense of urgency to the problem of reaching an acceptable solution to the disarmament problem. Representing a small and powerless country, the Philippine delegation cannot pretend to assume any higher role than the one it has attempted to play, in the manner that I have stated.

135. Sir Percy SPENDER (Australia): I should like to make a few brief observations on the Australian draft resolution [A/C.1/L.101].

136. I listened with interest to the suggestion made by the representative of Iran. I shall be perfectly happy, if the co-sponsors of the main draft resolution agree, to follow his suggestion and incorporate the Australian draft resolution in the joint draft resolution, as an amendment. I had not myself thought that it would be wise to move the text of the Australian draft resolution as an amendment to the joint draft resolution, for two reasons. First, I did not desire to interfere with the unanimity of the five Powers which had agreed upon the terms of what is called the Canadian draft resolution by introducing an amendment. Secondly, I did not think that a purely procedural motion—which, as I have made quite clear in my previous statements, our draft resolution is—properly could find its place in a substantive draft resolution, and the five-Power draft resolution is, after all, a substantive one. Nevertheless, I want to make it perfectly clear that I shall be only too happy to follow the suggestion of the representative of Iran, provided that the five Powers which have sponsored the joint draft resolution are prepared to have the Australian text incorporated in their text, in the way that he has proposed.

137. I come now to the suggestion made by the representative of France that the Australian draft resolution should merely be referred to the Disarmament Commission. I should have thought that it would have been clear that I could not adopt such a suggestion, for the reason which I have advanced in this Committee on more than one occasion. I believe that it is for this Committee to determine whether it does or does not wish the Secretariat to prepare the document suggested in the Australian draft resolution. I do not believe that we should merely refer the matter to the Disarmament Commission and its Sub-Committee for decision.

138. Secondly, if I may say so with great respect to the representative of France, he did not emphasize in his observation one aspect of our draft resolution. Our draft resolution is not only intended to provide a working paper for the work of the Disarmament Commission and its Sub-Committee. For reasons which I have already given, I place equal emphasis upon the fact that that paper should be available for the information and guidance of every nation represented upon this Committee. Therefore I regret very much that I am unable to accept the suggestion of the representative of France.

139. Australia will therefore request that its draft resolution be voted upon either as part of the main draft resolution or, if that proves unacceptable to the five Powers sponsoring that draft resolution, then as a separate draft.

140. The CHAIRMAN (*translated from French*): We have heard two suggestions which would certainly greatly facilitate the debate. The representative of Iran has made a proposal which requires the agreement of the five States which have presented the joint draft resolution. The other suggestion, made by the representative

of France, is that all States which have submitted draft resolutions should agree to their reference to the Disarmament Commission. In the circumstances, it might be advisable to adjourn the meeting now and see whether the different delegations can come to some agreement during the lunch hour. We could then resume the debate at 3 p.m.

141. Mr. MENON (India): I wish that I could understand the position in the way it has been presented by the Chairman. Of course, the Committee is master of its own procedure, and it can terminate discussion at any time. In the course of my observations, I reserved the position of my delegation to explain our draft resolution [A/C.1/L.100] at a later stage. Furthermore, the representative of France, in asking that there should be no more debate, went into the merits of the Indian draft resolution. His presentation of that draft resolution did not correspond to my understanding of it. Further, there was a suggestion that the parallel I drew between the Franco-British memorandum and our draft resolution was only a superficial one. The position, then, is this, that the delegation which wishes our discussion to be suspended states its own case and then asks that the debate be closed. That does not seem to be a very consistent method of debate, but I am entirely in the hands of the Committee.

142. It does appear to us that this second or third effort at shutting down discussion in this Committee should not pass without resistance. It will be remembered that in the earlier part of this debate the idea was that what was then the Canadian draft resolution [A/C.1/752] should be put to the vote, but it was generally agreed that we should continue with the full debate. It is not our intention either to prolong the debate unnecessarily or to introduce factors which would be inimical to a settlement, but unless the Committee takes the view that disarmament is one of those matters on which delegations other than the five which have sponsored the joint draft resolution have nothing to say, then it would be improper to do this sort of thing.

143. However, I am entirely in the hands of the Committee. If it is decided that the draft resolutions should be put to the vote, then I hope that my delegation will be given an opportunity of at least correcting some of the statements made by the representative of France.

144. The CHAIRMAN: I want to be very clear. I do not have to take any decisions. According to our rules of procedure, when we finish the discussion on the draft resolutions before the Committee, then we must proceed to a vote. There are no more speakers on my list, and I think it would be improper to begin voting now. On the contrary, I think that the proper procedure would be to take some time to see if the different delegations which have made suggestions can get together. Perhaps in that way we would have a clear situation at this afternoon's meeting.

145. Mr. MOCH (France) (*translated from French*): I have no objection to that procedure; I even think that it might be advisable to delay this afternoon's meeting a little, in order to follow the Chairman's suggestion and enable the five sponsors of the joint draft resolution to agree on our future course.

146. Mr. VYSHINSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translated from Russian*): My delegation feels that it would be wiser to follow a different course from the one which is now proposed. We have heard

Mr. Menon's detailed statement, in which he explained the proposals set forth in the Indian draft resolution. I think it would be quite natural and legitimate to give us time — which my delegation certainly needs — to study more carefully what Mr. Menon said today. We have heard only the interpretation of his statement, and in interpretation there are always many misunderstandings. We have not yet had the verbatim record. It is impossible to give serious consideration to important statements by relying solely on what we hear over the microphone. I therefore feel that the hour and a half or two hours which the luncheon recess would give us are quite inadequate to enable us in addition, as the representative of the five sponsors of the draft resolution has suggested, to discuss among ourselves the questions raised today in the Committee, since many of us have a number of other obligations to discharge during that period. As everyone knows, we use that time for diplomatic meetings and to lunch with various colleagues who have already been invited, so that we cannot use this time for any other activities.

147. I should therefore like to propose, first, that we ask the Secretariat to expedite the distribution of copies of Mr. Menon's speech, as we have already decided that we must study the verbatim records and, secondly, that in view of the lack of speakers, we should cancel this afternoon's meeting and meet tomorrow morning. In the interim, we can acquaint ourselves with Mr. Menon's speech and think over the observations just made by Mr. Moch, who was in a happier position than most of us because he had already had an opportunity of acquainting himself with the Indian draft resolution and was able to refer to it point by point. It seems to me, therefore, that it would be quite wrong, and not in the best interests of our work, to hurry in this way and to try at all costs to make up our minds about everything that has been said by 3 p.m., without having had a chance of thinking it all over. My proposal, therefore, is as I have put it to you. If the Committee were to adopt it, then I think we should find that we had arranged our work in a more profitable way and one which would be more useful and give better results. My proposal, then, is that we postpone our meeting until tomorrow and that we should be provided with verbatim copies of the speeches made on this subject by Mr. Menon, Mr. Moch and other representatives.

148. As for the Australian delegation, I should like to take this opportunity of saying at once that I think its proposal extremely rash. With all due respect to the capacities of the Secretariat, how could we ask it to describe the positions taken on the various aspects of a disarmament system by the various delegations and more particularly, as a matter of fact, by the great Powers? This would mean that someone would take it upon himself to decide what my position was — and this after sundry representatives have said that my position appears not clear on this point and not altogether clear on that point and so on. Yesterday, for instance, I had to spend a great deal of time in explanations.

149. I think it would be quite wrong to adopt such a course and I, at least, would never agree to recognize a document which neither I personally nor my delegation had approved. For the only persons who can expound the views of my delegation or of any other delegation, for that matter, are the members of the delegation themselves and not some outside experts. I think that this is the wrong approach in such a case. It would be quite

wrong for the Secretariat to describe the position of a given delegation without that delegation's approval. The government concerned would therefore have to give its approval and say that such was indeed its position. Otherwise we shall come up against the difficulties we encountered yesterday when a complete misconstruction was placed on documents quoted. We must not repeat that experience. I therefore think that the Australian delegation's proposal is a dangerous one since it suggests that the Secretariat should put together some sort of compendium, if I may call it that, purporting to express the points of view of every one of us, but without our assistance. Where should we be then? And even if it were then proposed that we should approve it, we should in effect be told: "The whole discussion is set forth in this document; please approve it and say that that is what happened."

150. I think that would be a complete waste of effort and would not advance matters in the least. If members of the Committee have not succeeded in understanding each other's positions up to now, then no guide-book prepared by the Secretariat is going to help them. Of course I am not in the least suggesting that the Secretariat is incapable of an objective appraisal of the facts, but it would be a very difficult task and would undoubtedly require the participation of the representatives concerned. We are so pressed for time that we can hardly afford to engage in such literary labours, especially as they would have no practical use. In any expression of views, new questions continually arise in the minds even of the authors themselves. How much more, then, would that be the case if the Secretariat tried to explain the position of this or that representative, since it might of course understand the facts in one way, or in another, or it might misunderstand them, or it might attach to them a significance that was not theirs at all. I would repeat, therefore, that I think this proposal extremely risky and I have grave doubts as to the advisability of considering such a course.

151. I received this proposal only yesterday and my delegation has not yet been able to give it full consideration; we work together as a group, like any other delegation; we discuss and decide what position to adopt, and so on. To get all this finished today, to decide in the space of two hours whether we should say "yes" or "no" would be, so to speak, such a disarmament race that it would not advance our work.

152. I therefore propose that we defer our meeting until tomorrow. I propose that the documents should be circulated to us and that we should be allowed to read and study them at leisure. Then we shall be able to say what our position is. At the present moment, at any rate, I am unable to say whether or not I find the whole of Mr. Menon's statement sound and acceptable, because it was not all sufficiently clear to me as I listened to it. I have no doubt that this is very understandable to everyone. I sincerely hope that the Committee will consider my proposal favourably.

153. Mr. MOCH (France) (*translated from French*): I am quite willing to support the proposal that the discussion should be adjourned until tomorrow morning, for there is much merit in Mr. Vyshinsky's arguments. Moreover, he has only to make such a request for us to agree to it out of mere courtesy. But I must add that if, to adopt the term used in the French interpretation of Mr. Vyshinsky's statement, I "dissected" the proposal of the representative of India, it was only because the

draft resolution was circulated yesterday afternoon and we have consequently had time to analyze it.

154. The CHAIRMAN (*translated from French*): I should like to add something to the French representative's answer. The draft resolution was circulated yesterday in some languages but not until later in others.

155. The situation is now as follows: two of the sponsors of the joint draft resolution, whose acceptance we need if we are to have a unanimously adopted joint text, have requested that there should be no meeting this afternoon. If the Committee agrees, therefore, we shall not meet again until tomorrow, 27 October, at 10.30 a.m. I hope that the various delegations will take advantage of this interval to consult with each other and see if we can really proceed tomorrow without further interruptions.

156. Mr. ENTEZAM (Iran) (*translated from French*): Before the meeting is adjourned, I should like to give some explanation about the Australian draft resolution [A/C.1/L.101]. I made two suggestions on the point. I did not absolutely insist that the idea in that draft should be included in the five-Power draft resolution, but I said that if the five Powers could agree to include that idea it might facilitate our work. My other suggestion, to which I attached more importance, was that the Disarmament Commission should be guided by the debates in this Committee. I am sure that the Commission itself could in due course ask the Secretariat to prepare this working paper. As a matter of fact, one of the difficulties

I find in the Australian draft resolution is the expression "present positions". It is extremely difficult to know what is meant by "present positions". Does it mean the positions before or after 30 September? Moreover, if the question is referred to the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission, the discussions will be held in private, and the positions of the five Powers may never be known. I understand perfectly well how difficult it would be for the Secretariat to prepare the working paper, and I was only endeavouring to find another solution when I suggested that, if the five Powers agreed, the point could be included in the joint draft resolution.

157. As regards the final paragraph of the Indian draft resolution, I think Mr. Moch may have misunderstood me, and I take this opportunity of paying a tribute to the interpreters, for I have often noticed that when my ideas are not very clearly expressed, the representatives who follow my statement from the interpretation understand me very well, while those who follow my spoken words are unable to understand me. When I spoke of that paragraph, I meant that the idea of adjourning this session and resuming it at a later date was a suggestion which could be discussed at the proper time, when we saw what progress had been made. I was not thinking only of the question of disarmament. There may be some other reason why it might be useful to continue this session. My idea was to let time show how our work progressed; if the Indian delegation presses the point, it could make a suggestion to that effect in due course.

*The meeting rose at 1.10 p.m.*