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CONTENTS

Chairman: Mr. Leopoldo BENITES (Ecuador).

AGENDA ITEM 96

Status of the implementation of the Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of their Independence and Sovereignty (continued) (A/6397, A/C.1/938-940, A/C.1/L.367, A/C.1/L.388)

GENERAL DEBATE (continued)

- 1. Mr. NIMMANHEMINDA (Thailand) said that the adoption of General Assembly resolution 2131 (XX) containing the Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of their Independence and Sovereignty had been one of the most commendable steps taken at the twentieth session. Although the Declaration was not in itself a formulation, a codification or an interpretation of the rules of international law, it had laid down a standard of conduct for States. When voting for resolution 2131 (XX) his delegation had hoped it would be strictly observed by all States. It was now for the Committee to make an objective assessment of how the rules of conduct laid down in the Declaration had been implemented during the year that had elapsed. With regret and disappointment, he noted that not only had there been no improvement in the world situation with regard to peace, but also that the world had never been closer to general conflict.
- 2. The terms "intervention" and "aggression" were today widely used to support charges and countercharges in disputes and conflicts among States. Although no general agreement had been reached on the definitions of the two expressions in international law, it was neither true nor logical to say that the international community had no legal standard for making a distinction between the aggressors and their victims or between those who intervened in the internal affairs of another State and those who were the objects of such unlawful intervention. There could be no doubt, for example, that an attack by armed forces, or armed attack by "unofficial" agents, including irregular forces, armed bands and volunteers, should fall within the purview of the term

"aggression", except for operations carried out by virtue of the Charter or under the authority of the competent organs of the United Nations, as had been the case when the United Nations had intervened in Korea in 1950. Although it was often contended that the legal concept of intervention was even less clear than that of aggression, General Assembly resolution 2131 (XX) laid down sufficiently clear guidelines on the subject. Nevertheless, recent cases of aggression and unlawful intervention in South-East Asia showed how the principles of the United Nations, in particular those stated in resolution 2131 (XX), had been flouted and hypocritically defended.

- 3. There were two fundamental misconceptions about the nature of the conflict in South-East Asia, the first attributing the whole trouble to ideological conflict and the second seeking to depict it as a struggle of the peoples of South-East Asia against colonialism, in exercise of their right to selfdetermination. Ideological differences had existed and always would exist, but that did not necessarily mean that mankind was condemned perpetually to fight and kill his fellow creatures for his own survival. Threats to international peace and security occurred only when a nation or group of nations denied other peoples the right to freedom and sought to impose its own ideology and political hegemony on them by force. The most obvious cause of disturbance of the peace was in fact the practice of a doctrine which advocated violence and had world domination as its declared goal. The expansionist policy of some nations which espoused that doctrine was thus not surprising.
- 4. The most dangerous conflicts now raging in South-East Asia were between the enemies of peace, who respected no morality but that of their own political creed, and the peaceful peoples who were forced to defend their national independence, security and freedom. The enemies of peace in the case of South-East Asia were chiefly Communist China and North Viet-Nam. Immediately after the establishment of its control over mainland China, Communist China had embarked upon a policy of belligerence, expansion and intervention, not only in Asia but in Africa, the Middle East, Latin America and even some of the communist countries. From its own public statements, reiterated over the past seventeen years, the use of force and violence as well as interventionist activities under the banner of the "war of liberation" or the so-called "people's war", had been the formal policy of that regime. In Viet-Nam, Communist China had given continual and full political and material support to North Viet-Namese aggression and intervention and through incitement and implicit intimidation had obstinately forestalled

all efforts for a negotiated settlement. In many instances, its bellicosity and cynical attitude were even more ruthless than those of North Viet-Nam.

- 5. Leaving aside Communist China's intervention in other South-East Asian countries, such as Indonesia, the Philippines and Malaysia, its intervention in the internal affairs of Thailand and its aggression against Thailand's political independence were a clear case. Communist China's hostility towards Thailand had not begun with the latter's signature of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty in 1954, or even with its participation in the collective defence of South Viet-Nam. Attempts at intimidation and interference in Thailand's internal affairs by the organization of subversive networks dated back to 1949 and had been steadily intensified ever since. After the failure of Communist China's attempt to draw the Thai people into its orbit by the formation of the so-called Thai Nationality Autonomous Area early in 1953, preparations for armed insurrection in Thailand had begun, with infiltration, intimidation, murder and other terrorist acts, on a pattern resembling that used in South Viet-Nam. Helicopters from bases in North Viet-Nam and the communist-controlled part of Laos had clandestinely dropped arms and agents in Thai territory. Young persons had been persuaded by seditious propaganda, trickery and coercion to attend the training camps in Communist China, North Viet-Nam and the Laotian territory under Pathet Lao control, and afterwards infiltrated back into Thailand with other foreign agents. In 1962 a clandestine radio station, calling itself the "Voice of the people of Thailand", had been established and had broadcast twenty-eight hours a week the messages of Radio Peking and Radio Hanoi attacking the Thai Government and inciting the Thai people to take up arms against the Government. The following years had seen considerable efforts to create a number of nebulous political fronts organized and directed by Peking. A few undesirable Thai elements had been organized by Communist China to pose as representatives of the Thai people and attend such functions as the International Labour Solidarity Conference in Hanoi and the Tricontinental Conference in Havana. Such persons had declared that their mission was to liberate Thailand—a country which had been independent from time immemorial-by armed struggle. Communist China's intention to commit aggression against Thailand was openly confirmed by its leaders' statements. Moreover, Peking-based fronts were also supported by the National Liberation Front of South Viet-Nam in Hanoi, which had pledged mutual assistance.
- 6. The systematic aggression and intervention in Laos, Thailand and South Viet-Nam revealed a large-scale conspiracy by Communist China and North Viet-Nam against peace and security in the area. One of the most authentic proofs of communist aggression in South-East Asia had been the address by the Prime Minister of the neutral Kingdom of Laos in the Assembly's general debate on 18 October 1966 (1447th plenary meeting) about North Viet-Namese military operations in his country.
- 7. In the case of Viet-Nam there was no doubt that the fighting in the south was organized from the

- north, with North Viet-Namese forces and leaders, and weapons from Communist China and certain other countries. The People's Revolutionary Party, which controlled all aspects of the Viet Cong movement, including its political façade, the National Liberation Front of South Viet-Nam, was merely a branch of the communist Lao Dong party which was ruling North Viet-Nam.
- 8. It was argued by those who supported or sympathized with North Viet-Nam that the fighting in South Viet-Nam was the internal affair of the Viet-Namese themselves, whether North or South, and that it thus followed that no other State had any right to interfere. That attitude seemed to be reflected in the USSR draft resolution (A/C.1/L.367), particularly in sub-paragraphs (\underline{a}) , (\underline{c}) and (\underline{d}) of the operative paragraph in which the expression "the domestic affairs of States and peoples" was used. The expression "domestic affairs of States" was well known, but the meaning of the expression "domestic affairs of peoples" was unclear. If armed intervention by North Viet-Nam against the Republic of Viet-Nam were permitted on the grounds that it was the domestic affair of the Viet-Namese people, the same grounds might be used by South Korea to attack North Korea or by West Germany against East Germany. North Viet-Nam and South Viet-Nam had been recognized by the Geneva Agreements of 1954 as two separate international entities divided by a fixed line of demarcation, and it was an essential principle of the Agreements that neither zone should interfere in the affairs of the other. As a victim of North Viet-Namese aggression, South Viet-Nam had full right to defend itself and to ask other countries for aid in resisting aggression. Measures of collective self-defence, in particular when undertaken at the express request of the legitimate Government of the victim State, were not acts of intervention and were in conformity with the provisions of the Charter which had been restated in the Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of their Independence and Sovereignty.
- 9. Peace could not be attained while aggressors were allowed to reap the fruits of their aggression with impunity. International peace and security depended primarily upon respect for international law, the fulfilment in good faith of treaty and Charter obligations and the sincere execution of what were generally accepted as the principles that should govern relations among States.
- 10. Mr. SEYDOUX (France) said that the concept of non-intervention involved, first, the principle of the equality of States and, secondly, the principle of State sovereignty, both of which were fundamental concepts of the United Nations. His delegation was more concerned at the moment with the reasons which demanded the observance of those principles than with certain situations that had arisen from their violation. It was well aware, however, of the grave dangers to the international community posed by the existence of open or latent conflicts; one example was the war in Viet-Nam, and his delegation hoped that the time would soon come when the Viet-Namese people would be able to decide their own fate in peace and free from all intervention.

- 11. As several Latin American delegations had pointed out, the principle of non-intervention must apply to every feature of a nation's identity, whether political, economic, social or cultural. Intervention might be open or subtle, depending on which of those features it was aimed at. It might take the form of armed interference or of economic pressure in the guise of ostensibly disinterested assistance; the needs of the developing countries made them most vulnerable to such pressure.
- 12. In many cases intervention consisted in providing goods or equipment on terms dictated by the supplying country or granting military assistance in exchange for political alignment. But there were other forms of intervention as well, particularly those involved in subversion: subsidizing opposition elements in a country, broadcasting hostile propaganda against it, training terrorists and guerrilla fighters and supplying them with transport facilities or military support for aggression. All such forms of interference by States were harmful to peace and violated the United Nations Charter; similarly, any action taken by the United Nations itself in violation of Article 2, paragraph 7, of the Charter would constitute unjustified intervention.
- 13. If the concept of non-intervention was related to that of State sovereignty, it must also be recognized that States had the right to conclude agreements which they believed would guarantee their security. Intervention by a State in the affairs of another at the latter's request pursuant to such an agreement could not be regarded as coming under the provisions of General Assembly resolution 2131 (XX).
- 14. His delegation would be prepared to support both the Soviet draft resolution (A/C.1/L.367) and the nineteen-Power amendments (A/C.1/L.388). It hoped, however, that the sponsors of the two documents would reach agreement on a single text, which could then be certain of adoption by a very large majority.
- 15. Mr. LEKIC (Yugoslavia) said that the Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of their Independence and Sovereignty had been adopted in order to remove one of the main causes of instability in international relations. Any attempt to ignore the current need to ensure the independence, freedom and full equality of all peoples would adversely affect not only international relations, but also the role and importance of the United Nations. The Declaration was, therefore, an instrument by which Member States could check the forces which were continuing to ignore the changes ocurring in the world. In itself, the Declaration was but a step, albeit an important step, towards the goal of the democratization of international relations and the safeguarding of peace. All States should bend all their efforts towards achieving the implementation of its principles, particularly in view of developments during the past year in which various forms of intervention had continued to have an adverse effect on the international situation. Events had taken place which were inadmissible, both in their immediate effects and, particularly, in their possible catastrophic con-

- sequences. It was high time to give earnest consideration to actions and practices which were a flagrant contradiction of the principles of the Declaration. National interests should not be secured at the expense of the interests of other States but only, and exclusively, in the interests of the international community as a whole.
- 16. The Presidents of Yugoslavia and the United Arab Republic and the Prime Minister of India, meeting at New Delhi in October 1966, had expressed alarm at the intensified use of force and the exercise of pressures on the part of some Powers against the newly independent and other developing countries. The war being waged in Viet-Nam, whose purpose was to break the unanimous and heroic resistance of the Viet-Namese people, was a flagrant violation both of the Declaration and of the principles of the United Nations Charter. Mankind's individual collective conscience could not remain indifferent to the brutal acts being perpetrated against the people of Viet-Nam. Those acts must cease in order to protect a small and poor nation, and to safeguard the principles of the Charter, the Declaration and contemporary international law, and in the interests of preserving world peace. As the Yugoslav Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs had stated in the Assembly's general debate (1432nd plenary meeting), though the military operations were confined to a given region, the war in Viet-Nam was a world problem, not only because the interests of the great Powers were committed, but also becasue it constituted a threat to peace in general. The failure of foreign intervention to destroy the will of the Viet-Namese people to be free was further confirmation of the fact that peoples could not be prevented by force from achieving independence and choosing their own social system if they were truly determined to do so. The joint communique issued on 24 October 1966, after the meeting of President Tito, President Nasser and Prime Minister Gandhi at New Delhi, had proposed that a solution to the problem of Viet-Nam should be sought on the basis of the cessation of the bombing of North Viet-Nam, the implementation of the Geneva Agreements of 1954, the withdrawal of all foreign military forces, and the recognition of the National Liberation Front as one of the main parties in any negotiations. His delegation shared the concern of many other delegations about the continued deterioration of the situation in other parts of South-East Asia, particularly in Cambodia and Laos, which might lead to further intervention and further escalation of the war in the region.
- 17. In view of recent developments, both in Asia and other parts of the world, it was becoming clear, as had been seen from the very serious debate which had been initiated on the subject in the Committee, that foreign military bases, irrespective of the legal forms of their establishment, were often being used not only for interference in the internal affairs of other States, but also for waging military operations. Paragraph 6 of the Declaration required all States to respect the right of self-determination and independence of peoples and nations and to contribute to the complete elimination of racial discrimination and colonialism in all forms and mani-

festations. Some colonial Powers, however, were continuing to use all means in their power to maintain their established positions and to prevent subjugated peoples from achieving their freedom. Portugal was carrying on aggressive and wide-scale military operations against the national liberation movements of Angola, Mozambique and so-called Portuguese Guinea. The peoples of Southern Rhodesia and South West Africa were being subjected to harsh forms of foreign domination and a solution had yet to be found to the problem of Aden and the Protectorates.

- 18. Many recently independent States which were attempting to give full economic and political substance to their freedom had become the target of reactionary and neo-colonialist forces. In an attempt to retrieve lost positions in such States, or else to acquire new ones, those forces were using the difficult economic and social situation of the newly liberated countries, which was a direct consequence of centuries of colonial slavery, as a pretext to interfere in their domestic affairs and to impose upon them new forms of colonialism and subjugation. The methods used ranged from occasional foreign intervention through interference, subversion, blackmail and threats, to the direct use of force. In order to help the newly liberated countries to protect their independence, and also to assist the peoples still under the colonial yoke to free themselves, a concerted effort should be made to bring about the complete elimination of colonialism in all its forms. Lasting peace was not possible while many peoples continued to be deprived of the fundamental rights guaranteed to them under the Charter. Colonialism was not only an anachronism but an ominous and direct threat to peace and security.
- 19. The status of the implementation of the Declaration in economic terms was also worthy of close attention. Not only were economic relations at present far from satisfactory, but they were being used in a manner contrary to the fundamental principles of the Declaration. The developing countries were experiencing great difficulties because their development was being hampered by the interference of many of the economically developed countries. International trade was not developing in accordance with economic laws and the general interest; it was, to a great extent, being used as a means of exerting pressure and even as a means of intervention. Politically motivated decisions were impeding its normal development and did not enhance better political relations or promote healthier economic conditions. Such developments implied a lack of perception, not only of generally wider interests, but of national interests as well.
- 20. Increasingly complex international relations called for a comprehensive approach to all aspects of the problems of the developing world. All were agreed that peace, freedom, independence and the equality of peoples were vital preconditions for the further successful development of States. Therefore strict implementation of the Declaration had a particular significance, both because it improved the international atmosphere and helped to relax tension and because it was essential for the rejection of position-of-strength policies and for the solu-

tion of other acute problems facing the United Nations. No progress could be expected in disarmament, economic development, the elimination of colonialism, peaceful co-operation and the strengthening of the United Nations unless the vital principle of non-intervention was respected.

- 21. The Soviet draft resolution was a logical step forward towards the attainment of international peace and co-operation based upon equality. Its adoption would help to ensure respect for, and application of, the principles embodied in the Declaration.
- 22. Mr. FUENTEALBA (Chile) said that his delegation had voted for General Assembly resolution 2131 (XX) and still believed in its usefulness, not because it held any illusion that men could be reformed by good laws, but because it believed that a clear statement of position by the United Nations was valuable as a point of reference in judging the willingness of States to establish a system of peaceful, stable and fruitful coexistence.
- 23. The central idea of the resolution was the positive principle that every State must have an independent personality which must be respected and every State must respect the personality of other States. Thus, the right of self-determination and the obligation to refrain from intervention were not two unrelated principles but two aspects of the same principle and could not be separated without distorting reality.
- 24. Respect for the principle of non-intervention was an essential condition for peace. Wars, such as the war in Viet-Nam, happened because not everyone respected it. Its violations took the most varied forms, and no definition of intervention was acceptable unless it included them all. For that reason, resolution 2131 (XX) had condemned all forms of intervention without exception. Armed aggression, veiled threats, political interference, economic aggression, internal subversion incited and supported morally and materially by an intervening State and cultural aggression were all clear violations of the principle of non-intervention, and all must be eliminated in order to build a peaceful world order.
- 25. In some cases, such as armed aggression, forcible political control of one State by another, or the unilateral imposition of rules of international trade by the great Powers, intervention was easy to detect. On the other hand, in the case of civil war or popular rebellion it was more difficult to determine whether there was foreign intervention. Internal political crises and readjustments of the economic, social and cultural structure occurred in every nation and should not be used as an excuse for outside interference, either by the United Nations or by any other world or regional organization. The best way to guarantee the success of genuine popular revolutions was to let them retain their autonomy and personality. Wherever outsiders had intervened in the name of solidarity, anti-imperialism or other lofty slogans, the noblest and most exemplary revolutions had been betrayed and the sole victim had been the people in whose name the revolution had been waged. Chile's highest aspiration was to carry out a peaceful revolution without interference from anyone. It would neither attempt to

export its revolution nor accept any outside attempt to control it.

- 26. The various social revolutions in the developing countries needed outside assistance in order to achieve their goals. Without belittling the results achieved through bilateral assistance, Chile believed that the only kind of assistance which could fully respect the personality of such revolutions was assistance provided by the entire world community through the United Nations. The future world order must be based on a stable peace and therefore on justice and freedom; international coexistence would be more peaceful when even the situations that might give an opportunity for conflict were eliminated.
- 27. Every word and idea in the Soviet draft resolution was, in itself, completely logical and irreproachable; unfortunately, however, it left out of consideration many of the forms of intervention currently practised. The General Assembly's vigorous condemnation of intervention in all its forms, as embodied in resolution 2131 (XX), would be weakened if the First Committee were to adopt a resolution which referred only to some forms of violation of the principle of non-intervention and completely overlooked other forms which were equally reprehensible. For that reason Chile and the other Latin American countries had submitted amendments to the Soviet draft resolution which were designed to restore the complete and objective view of the problem adopted by the General Assembly at its twentieth session.
- 28. Several representatives had spoken at length of the so-called Tricontinental Conference held at Havana in January 1966 and of the danger of aggression which its decisions posed to Latin American countries. His Government believed, however, that there was a much more insidious and fearsome aggression confronting Latin America: the aggression of over-population, poverty, illiteracy and despair. No agreements and no security measures could prevail against that aggression unless they were based on an organized and determined struggle to eliminate misery and injustice.
- 29. The people of Chile respected political, religious and other beliefs of every kind, both in their own country and elsewhere. All information media in Chile were open to the expression of the most varied ideologies and no one in Chile was persecuted, imprisoned or killed for holding and disseminating ideas of any kind. What his country would not tolerate was any attempt to impose ideas by force or, under the pretext of legitimate dissemination of ideas, to incite violent subversion against the Government lawfully and voluntarily established by the Chilean people. Chile respected the rights of other States and demanded equal respect for its own rights. It was for that reason that Chile rejected certain agreements reached at the so-called Tricontinental Conference which implied an intention to interfere in its domestic affairs. Any other decisions taken at the Conference did not trouble Chile at all. Although it did not share the philosophy which had inspired it, Chile regarded its deliberations with interest as reflections of the strategy and tactics of an ideology which had as much right as any other to seek support throughout the world.

- 30. Mr. MALITZA (Romania) said that some delegations had wondered whether, in view of the thorough discussion which had taken place at the previous session, there would be any point in further consideration of the principle of non-intervention. In his delegation's view, the principle was of such great importance that it would be well if it were reaffirmed in every resolution of the General Assembly. The international community was made up of sovereign entities and its supreme law was unconditional respect for the inalienable right of every people to self-determination, sovereignty, national independence, equality before the law and freedom from intervention. Therefore, discussion of the status of implementation of the Declaration was quite justified, particularly in view of recent events which had made it quite evident that persevering efforts still had to be made to ensure universal respect for the principle of non-intervention.
- 31. Although universally recognized, the principle of non-intervention had been flagrantly transgressed on many occasions and it should be reaffirmed because the underlying political motives of some States ignored it. There were still many cases in which, in violation of that principle, State sovereignty was being infringed. States were intervening in different ways in the domestic affairs of other States and even resorting to force. There was even an interventionist vocabulary and ideology which strove to legitimize intervention. History was full of examples of intervention, and myriad arguments had been advanced to justify it by invoking some "special mission", or the pretext of fulfilling "an international duty" or preserving peace. There were many cases in which the announcement of the "special interest" of certain States in often far-distant regions was the prelude to the transfer of military forces and the beginning of armed conflict.
- 32. Linked with the notion of "special interest" was the imperialist theory of "spheres of influence", which divided the world into sectors and by which some States took upon themselves the right to interfere in the sphere which they considered theirs. That theory claimed that international life, like nature, abhored a vacuum, and that if domination by one Power ceased, another Power had to take its place. The General Assembly had often had to face local conflicts brought about by the practitioners of that old colonialist policy. But the time had come for all to recognize that the elimination of foreign influence did not create a vacuum in international life. Where foreign domination was eliminated there were always peoples which had the right to decide their own destiny according to their own political aspirations and to affirm their own identity.
- 33. Another false theory was that the existence of certain alliances and agreements justified interference in the affairs of other States. No agreements or commitments of any kind could prevail over the fundamental principles of international relations. That theory was at the basis of the most flagrant violation of the principle of non-intervention, the United States aggression in Viet-Nam. No agreement or alliance between the United States and the Republic of Viet-Nam could justify the aggressive

war the United States was waging against the Viet-Namese people; no "special mission" could justify sending armed forces to countries throughout the world, thus infiringing State sovereignty and creating bases for intervention. Such actions were totally contrary to the Declaration, which stated that no State had the right to intervent, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other State. The argument that if the United States left that suffering country its place would be taken by someone other than the inhabitants was groundless. The Viet-Namese people had been struggling for twenty years to safeguard their right to life, freedom, self-determination and freedom from foreign intervention. Moreover, the war the United States was waging in Viet-Nam was a grave danger to world peace. Any local conflict was a source of tension for the world as a whole and involved the interests of all States; it should not be forgotten that local conflicts had sparked two world conflagrations.

- 34. His Government continued to maintain that the Viet-Namese people should be able freely to decide its own destiny, in conformity with its will and its national aspirations. To that end, it was urgently necessary for the United States to be realistic and to cease, unconditionally, immediately and definitively, bombing the sovereign state of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam. In addition, all American military forces and other interventionist troops should be withdrawn, and all foreign military bases eliminated from Viet-Nam, and the Geneva Agreements on Viet-Nam should be strictly implemented.
- 35. In a world which was shrinking as a result of high-speed communications and transportation, all countries, particularly those which, because of their military power, might be tempted to act as they saw fit in international relations, should show a greater measure of self-restraint and refrain from any actions contrary to the fundamental principles of inter-State relations. The major concern of the more than fifty countries that had become independent since the establishment of the United Nations was to determine their own future and not to be hampered by foreign intervention or interference. They could not stand silently by when faced with such extreme forms of intervention as armed force, bombs and the imposition of undesirable regimes.
- 36. The dizzying advances of science and technology had not been accompanied by similar progress in international respect for the rule of law. Many great projects which might bring the world more security, stability and well-being were postponed or cancelled because the principles of inter-State relations were not being respected. Sovereign nations and countries should treat each other with respect and should recognize all the elementary rules, respect for which was a precondition for peaceful coexistence. In signing the Charter all States Members of the United Nations had committed themselves to promote the rule of law in international relations. That involved a rejection of the policy of strength and the idea that international life could be reduced to a simple confrontation of forces and strategical positions, with scant regard for law or morality.

- 37. His country fully supported any effort to promote legal norms which were of particular interest to small and medium-sized countries and which would meet the long-term interests of the larger Powers. As the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party, Nicolae Ceausescu, had recently said, the only healthy basis for relations between countries and peoples lay in the principles of sovereignty and national independence, non-interference in the domestic affairs of other States and respect for the right of all peoples to self-determination.
- 38. Romania therefore supported the initiative to reaffirm at the current session the principle of non-intervention. A reaffirmation of that cardinal principle would strengthen peace and reduce the part played by arbitrariness and force in international relations; it was also an essential prerequisite for the establishment of a lasting basis for peaceful relations and co-operation among States.
- 39. Mr. KHATRI (Nepal) said that his delegation regarded the principle of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of States as the main pillar of inter-State relationships. Nepal wished to follow a policy of friendship with all nations on the basis of that principle and of mutual respect of the rights it entailed. Except under the authority of the United Nations, acting for the purposes of the Charter, violation of the principle of non-intervention was totally inadmissible. Nepal's relations with other countries were governed by the Pancha Shila and by the ten principles of Bandung, which embodied the principle of non-intervention. It was also a party to the Belgrade Declaration of September 1961 and the Cairo Declaration of October 1964, both of which condemned intervention in the domestic affairs of States. The provision in Article 2, paragraph 4, of the United Nations Charter enjoining Member States to refrain from the threat or use of force in their international relations was its most important provision. It symbolized the culmination of the development of international law and international morality in regard to the principle of non-intervention. Violation of that provision was the root cause of many of the world's troubles.
- 40. The most frequently used pretexts for intervention were the so-called balance of power, the collective security of military alliances, imaginary self-preservation and the extension by States of their so-called spheres of influence. All such pretexts were totally inadmissible. The right to intervene in the domestic affairs of States belonged solely to the United Nations in the interest of the maintenance of peace and security and furtherance of the purposes of the Charter. Abrogation of that right by a single State or group of States, without reference to and consent by the United Nations, would cut off the basis of inter-State relationships and seriously undermine the authority of the world Organization.
- 41. His delegation had therefore unreservedly supported the item on non-intervention proposed by the Soviet Union the previous year and still believed that a declaration on non-intervention merited more enthusiastic support, particularly by the smaller States, since the proposal emanated from a State

which had all the material prerequisites for intervention in the domestic affairs of other States. He wished to express his delegation's appreciation to the Soviet delegation for raising the question again and affording the Committee an opportunity to review the implementation or lack of implementation of the declaration contained in General Assembly resolution 2131 (XX). Despite the Declaration, unsolicited intervention, armed or otherwise, in the domestic affairs of other States had continued to violate the basic norm of international conduct and to endanger international peace and security. His own country's concern for the implementation of United Nations decisions was illustrated by the joint communique issued earlier that year by the Chairman of the Nepalese Council of Ministers and the Indian Prime Minister, reiterating their countries' faith in the Declaration. While armed intervention was, of course, the most serious kind, other methods, such as the establishment of camps, the training of saboteurs and the organization of hostile expeditions for infiltration across frontiers were just as unlawful and just as dangerous.

- 42. In the case of Viet-Nam, the basic cause of all the sufferings of the innocent people was unquestionably the deliberate violation of the Geneva Agreements of 1954, which expressly forbade foreign intervention in Viet-Nam. That country most pathetically symbolized the difficulties of a small country enmeshed in the web of big-Power politics. His delegation urged the Powers whose intervention was preventing the fulfilment of the natural aspirations of the Viet-Namese people for unity, sovereignty and independence, to allow it to shape its own destiny in accordance with its own free will.
- 43. The Soviet draft resolution reaffirmed the basic fact that, not only in Viet-Nam but in other parts of the world, intervention in the domestic affairs of States was the basic source of danger to the cause of international peace. His delegation strongly supported the draft resolution and appreciated the conciliatory motives inspiring the nineteen-Power amendments. The draft resolution asked all States to observe scrupulously, in their relations with one another, the provisions of the Declaration which, in turn, did nothing more or less than reaffirm Member States' support for and faith in the principles of the United Nations Charter. His delegation therefore appealed to all delegations to approach the question in the same spirit of accommodation, moderation and goodwill which had characterized the Committee's discussions of the question the previous year.
- 44. Mr. SHEVCHENKO (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) said that, by adopting the Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of their Independence and Sovereignty, the General Assembly had given expression to the legitimate concern felt by the peoples of all countries at the series of interventions by one of the major Powers in the domestic affairs of Viet-Nam, the Dominican Republic, Cuba and other countries of Latin America. Nearly a year had passed since the Declaration had been adopted. But the trend of events in the past year had made it necessary for the General Assembly

to direct its attention once again to the question of non-intervention and to consider how States Members were complying with the principles of the Declaration.

- 45. As in earlier years, intervention in the domestic affairs of States had been part of the official foreign policy of the United States. The United States had committed armed or indirect intervention in the domestic affairs of peoples in Asia, America, Africa and Europe. Even after the General Assembly had solemnly declared that non-intervention was an inviolable principle of international law, the scale of United States intervention had continued to expand.
- 46. Many United States political leaders, including those responsible for determining the country's foreign policy, openly referred to their "right" to intervene in the domestic affairs of other countries and peoples, and to the "responsibility" of the United States for ensuring that peoples did not adopt a way of life which was not to the liking of United States ruling circles. Members of the United States Congress were inciting their Government to permit further armed intervention in the domestic affairs of peoples. They were expressing their approval of various forms of direct and indirect intervention practised by the United States Government, including the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency. They were calling for economic sanctions against countries whose policies differed from their own. All those views were being expressed in a country whose representative had voted for the Declaration at the twentieth session.
- 47. In a statement in the Assembly's general debate (1436th plenary meeting), the Ukrainian Minister for Foreign Affairs had said that the imperialists would not willingly abandon their policy of intervening in the domestic affairs of other States. But the peoples of the world could and should create insuperable obstacles to imperialist intervention policies. The United Nations, too, should help to uphold the equality and sovereignty of States.
- 48. The most flagrant example of United States intervention in the domestic affairs of other States was its intervention in Viet-Nam. It was quite clear that the United States was trying to impose a regime of its own choice on South Viet-Nam. United States propagandists asserted that South Viet-Nam was the victim of aggression from the North, and that the war of liberation in South Viet-Nam was being conducted by "regular units" introduced from the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam. But everyone knew that the argument was entirely false. In South Viet-Nam a civil war had been in progress for several years against the Saigon dictatorship imposed by the United States. That fact was recognized even by people who had no sympathies with communism at all, and even by prominent figures in the United States who were deeply concerned at the futility of United States policy in Viet-Nam. Political events in South Viet-Nam had offered convincing proof that all sections of the population were involved in the struggle against the Saigon régime, which had brought the country to complete economic ruin. No "injection" of economic aid and no promises of a new "Marshall Plan* for South-East Asia could improve the situa-

tion, since the Saigon regime was based on corruption, venality and treachery.

- 49. The United States was trying to organize "elections" in South Viet-Nam. But the sole purpose of the elections was to give an appearance of legality to the existing corrupt Government. Free elections could never be held as long as United States troops were occupying South Viet-Nam. No country had the right to impose its will on the Viet-Namese people or on any other people. Only the Viet-Namese people could decide how it would be governed in the future. It had an inalienable right to do so.
- 50. Intervention in the domestic affairs of other countries and peoples was one of the main features of United States policy in other continents as well. In Latin America, United States intervention took many forms. The notorious resolution adopted by the House of Representatives on 20 September 1965. which "legalized" armed or indirect Extervention by the United States in countries of the Western hemisphere, was still in force. Leading circles in the United States were still hoping to establish a permanent inter-American armed force as an instrument of covert intervention. To prepare the ground for armed intervention, official and semi-official organizations operating under the instructions of the United States Central Intelligence Agency were very active in Latin America. On 27 April 1966. The New York Times had stated that the CIA had become one of the most important instruments of United States policy. Economic pressure, political blackmail, conspiracy, subversive activities and ideological diversion were an integral part of the imperialist policy of intervention, just as much as armed intervention itself. In most cases, efforts were made to conceal those indirect forms of intervention by asserting that the activities of the CIA did not in any way infringe the sovereignty of other States, and by alleging rather that other countries were engaged in covert intervention.
- 51. The United States was using its whole arsenal of methods of intervention against Cuba. It had incited its hirelings to undertake an armed invasion. It was landing saboteurs and assassins on the island. It was continuing to commit provocative acts, such as the murder of Cuban frontier guards near the United States base at Guantánamo. The Cuban people was heroically resisting United States intervention in its domestic affairs. Its efforts were supported by the socialist countries and by all peoples of the world. The Soviet people, including the Ukrainian people, was linked with close ties of friendship and revolutionary solidarity to the Cuban people, and would give it every possible assistance.
- 52. Representatives of countries members of the Organization of American States (OAS) had, unfortunately, tried to divert the Committee's attention from United States plans to use that organization for intervention in the domestic affairs of peoples on a permanent basis. They had referred to the attempts to represent the decisions of the Tricontinental Conference at Havana as violations of the United Nations Declaration on non-intervention. But there was nothing in the Declaration which prevented organizations from expressing their views on crucial

- problems of present-day politics. There was nothing which forbade nations to express their solidarity with peoples fighting against colonialism and imperialism for their political and economic independence.
- 53. As a result of subversive activities by the imperialists in Africa, reactionary regimes had been imposed on newly independent countries, whose sovereignty was being imparied by leonine military and economic agreements. Colonial monopolies were interfering high-handedly in the domestic affairs of newly liberated people.
- 54. In the Near East, the imperialists were trying to prevent the peoples of Arabia from obtaining their independence, and were intervening in the civil war in Yemen in support of feudal and reactionary forces.
- 55. In South-East Asia the armed intervention by United States imperialists in Viet-Nam was accompanied by intervention of various kinds in the domestic affairs of neighbouring States, such as Laos and Cambodia. Since the middle of 1964, United States jet aircraft from airfields in Thailand and South Viet-Nam, and from aircraft carriers of the United States Seventh Fleet, had been using bombs and chemical weapons against the people of Laos in areas where the population was still abiding by the agreements reached at the International Conference on the Settlement of the Laotian Question, held at Geneva in 1962. The armed forces of the United States and its puppets were regularly violating the Cambodian frontier. The United States was intensifying its military and political pressure on Cambodia. Suggestions had been made in the United States Congress that economic pressure should be applied to Cambodia to persuade it to abandon its policy of neutrality. All those suggestions were being made in the United States in flagrant disregard of the United Nations Declaration, which stated categorically that no state might use or encourage the use of economic, political or any other type of measures to coerce another State.
- 56. The United States was intervening in the domestic affairs of free peoples in many other ways. Every year, for instance, ceremonies were held in the presence of United States government officials to commemorate unsuccessful attempts by the enemies of the Ukrainian SSR to impose a social order which the Ukrainian people had rejected after the October revolution. From the United States of America and the Federal Republic of Germany, subversive organizations consisting of former members of the Nazi occupying forces were trying to intervene in the domestic affairs of the Ukrainian people and were slandering the Ukrainian SSR. Their calumnies were published in the United States Congressional Record. Gatherings of enemies of the Ukrainian people were addressed by members of the United States Government. All such activities were clear examples of subversion. They were in flagrant violation of the Declaration in resolution 2131 (XX) and of the undertakings given by the United States Government at the time when diplomatic relations had been established between the United States and the USSR. The United States had, in particular, undertaken "not to permit the formation or residence on its

territory of any organization or group" which had as an aim the bringing about of a change in the political and social order in the Soviet Union. He mentioned subversive activities of that kind, not because they represented the slightest threat to Soviet Ukraine but merely because he wished to show how deeply the philosophy of direct and in-

direct intervention had penetrated United States for eign policy.

57. His delegation would support any proposal for a further reaffirmation of the principles of the Declaration. The United Nations should put an end to armed and other types of intervention by the imperialists, and thereby lend succour to the peoples in their struggle against imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism.

The meeting rose at 1.25 p.m.

^{1/} See Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers: The Soviet Union, 1933-1939, Department of State publication 4539 (Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1952), p. 29.