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Chairman: Mr. Omar Abdel Hamid ADEEL
(Sudan).

Welcome to the representative of Algeria

1. The CHAIRMAN expressed the Committee's welcome to the representative of Algeria. His presence was particularly significant in that the question of Algeria had been on the Committee's agenda at six sessions of the General Assembly.
2. Mr. KHELLADI (Algeria) expressed appreciation of the welcome extended to his delegation, which would make every effort to contribute constructively to the work of the Committee.

AGENDA ITEM 77

The urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermo-nuclear tests (A/5141 and Add.1)

GENERAL DEBATE

3. The CHAIRMAN said that while he had no desire to limit discussion of the four highly important items relating to disarmament, it was desirable that consideration of those items should be completed both in the Committee and in plenary meeting by the time the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament reconvened at Geneva on 12 November.
4. Mr. LALL (India) said that the item before the Committee had been placed on the agenda at the request of his delegation (A/5141 and Add.1). He recalled that the question of nuclear testing had been brought before the United Nations for the first time in 1954, on the initiative of the Prime Minister of India, Mr. Nehru, who had pointed out that nuclear weapons threatened mankind's very existence. At the present time, when nuclear testing had reached a peak of intensity, the problem of human survival existed in a far more acute form than it had eight years earlier. It had recently been stated that a single 20-megaton bomb would bring death to 6 million of New York's 8 million inhabitants within two days after it had been dropped on the city, and that six to eight bombs of 500 to 1,000 megatons could destroy all life in the United States.
5. It was significant that the leaders of the two principal nuclear Powers were in agreement on the

futility of the present arms race. The President of the United States, Mr. Kennedy, had stated in March 1962 that the "amassing of destructive power does not beget security", while the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, Mr. Khrushchev, had declared in July that the concept of the balance of fear was "contrary to common sense". Both leaders were thus pursuing policies that were at variance with their own expressed views.

6. The eight non-aligned countries at the Geneva Conference had carefully studied the contention of the United States and the United Kingdom that compulsory on-site inspection was essential to a nuclear test ban treaty, as well as the Soviet Union's position that to admit inspection teams to its territory would mean permitting espionage. On 16 April 1962, the eight countries had submitted a memorandum^{1/} setting forth their own proposals for a test ban treaty which had been accepted by the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States as a basis for further negotiations. It was a measure of the progress that had been achieved since the sixteenth session of the General Assembly that the United Kingdom and the United States delegations at Geneva had on 27 August 1962 submitted a draft treaty^{2/} which called for the cessation of testing in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water without inspection of any kind. A similar spirit of compromise had been shown by the Soviet representative at Geneva, who had stated on 9 May 1962 that it would be possible for the Soviet Union in certain cases to invite the international commission set up under a test ban treaty to conduct on-site inspections in Soviet territory along the lines suggested in the eight-nation memorandum. It was thus clear that the memorandum had helped to bring about a more flexible approach by the nuclear Powers, and that, as the United Kingdom representative at Geneva had stated on 20 August 1962, the difference between the two sides was not very great.

7. Confirmation of the validity of the eight-nation memorandum had been provided at a conference held at Cambridge, England, a few weeks earlier—one of the series of "Pugwash conferences". The outstanding scientists, men of affairs and political scientists from the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and other countries who had attended that conference had suggested two alternatives for a test ban treaty: first, one embodying the provisions of the eight-nation memorandum but requiring one compulsory on-site inspection each year in the territory of each of the signatories, to be concluded for an indefinite period; and second, a similar treaty but with no provision for compulsory inspection, to be concluded for a trial period of two years, after

^{1/} Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for January 1961 to December 1962, document DC/203, annex 1, sect. J.

^{2/} *Ibid.*, document DC/205, annex 1, sect. P.

which, if it proved satisfactory, it could be put into effect for an indefinite period.

8. It was clear from the Pugwash proposals that no problem of interpretation existed in connexion with the eight-nation memorandum. The authors of the memorandum had deliberately refrained from offering any interpretation of it because they had not wished to be drawn into controversy with the two sides at Geneva. It was not true, as some had suggested, that the memorandum offered no means of deterring violations of a test ban treaty. Under the memorandum, it was not the parties to the treaty but the international commission which would decide whether a particular event was suspicious and significant, whether further clarification of its nature was necessary, whether the country concerned should be consulted on the matter, and whether a visit to the site of the event was necessary in order to determine its nature. Lastly, the memorandum provided that if a party to the test ban treaty had not co-operated fully to establish the nature of an event, the other parties should be free to act as they saw fit.

9. The problem was in fact a political one: the great Powers were unable to agree on a nuclear test ban, even though they had arrived at a basis for negotiation, because they were unwilling to abandon the cold war, i.e., to abandon their preparations for a war of destruction. Nuclear testing was a matter which could not be left to the sole discretion of the nuclear Powers, for the rest of the world was entitled to protection against mass destruction. As the American author, Lewis Mumford, had observed, no nation could treat as a purely private right its decision on a matter that would affect the life and health and continued existence of the rest of mankind. The nuclear Powers had no right to continue the testing of nuclear weapons, which was leading mankind to annihilation. He appealed to them to enter into serious negotiations with a view to reaching agreement on the basis of the eight-nation memorandum.

10. Mr. STEVENSON (United States of America) said that the danger which nuclear weapons constituted to world peace, the survival of civilization and the health of mankind, instead of receding, had increased, so that the Committee's discussion at the current session of the Assembly was even more urgent. The purpose of the discussion was not to replace but rather to encourage the negotiations going on at Geneva. The Assembly could register emphatically mankind's feelings about nuclear testing; at Geneva those feelings had to be translated into concrete form, and the sooner that was done the better.

11. Nuclear military power imposed a solemn three-fold duty on the nation possessing it: first, to maintain that power in adequate measure to protect its own security and that of the countries and peoples which looked to it for protection; second, to use it with such restraint that the peace of the world was nowhere endangered; and finally, to discover some way to reduce a level of military power which served only to counterbalance a concentration of power in other hands.

12. The United States Government was committed to the discharge of all three responsibilities, but the Committee was concerned today with the third, the urgent need to find some way of controlling the arms race.

13. Representatives of Member States without nuclear weapons no doubt felt annoyed and frustrated by the nuclear Powers' prolonged dialogue on what seemed to be technicalities. But to a State burdened with nuclear power it was painfully evident that the problem was incredibly complex and intensely practical. The nuclear Powers therefore had a duty to be quite blunt about the realities and the practical relevance of the present debate in the Assembly to the arms race. Recrimination was pointless; the point was to draw appropriate lessons from the accumulated experience.

14. One reality of the nuclear arms race had emerged dramatically just before the convening of the sixteenth session of the General Assembly. For approximately three years a voluntary, uninspected and informal moratorium on nuclear testing had been in effect, while the Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests had finally reached agreement on a preamble, seventeen articles, and two annexes of a draft treaty to end nuclear testing. The Soviet Union had agreed on the principle of international inspection to guarantee the fulfilment of the treaty's provisions, and the issue remaining had been the number of detection posts and of on-site inspections. Meanwhile, the United Kingdom and the United States had refrained from testing.

15. Then, when the United Kingdom and the United States had come forward with new proposals which reasonably met all of the remaining objections, the Soviet delegation had begun a retreat from points already agreed on, culminating in a complete reversal of its position. The explanation had come on 30 August 1961, when the USSR had announced its intention to resume testing, which it had in fact done two days later. The Soviet Union had unilaterally ended the moratorium by conducting a massive series of nuclear tests in the atmosphere. That series had been under preparation for a long time, and had been climaxed by an explosion of a force surpassing all rational military use. The Soviet Union's sudden reversal had dramatized the need for a firm agreement which would give stability to the ending of tests and confidence to all of the parties.

16. That experience had provided the first lesson about the realities of the nuclear arms race: that a voluntary, unverified moratorium did not reduce tension, put a brake on the arms race or contribute to the peace of the world. It was obvious that where national security was concerned, an open society could not undertake with a closed society an arrangement which could not be verified.

17. The next reality about the nuclear arms race was that it could be ended by an agreement in which each party could have confidence. On 19 October 1961, in the First Committee,^{3/} he had repeated that the United States was willing to conclude a test-ban treaty, and had stated that such a treaty could be signed within thirty days. He had also stated that if the Soviet Union refused to stop testing in the atmosphere and if as a result the security of the United States was endangered, the United States Government would be obliged to resume testing in the atmosphere.

18. The Soviet Union had rejected the United States offer, ignored the Assembly's appeal and continued its series of tests to the end. But even after nearly

^{3/} See Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixteenth Session, First Committee, 1171st meeting.

fifty Soviet tests in the atmosphere and before the United States had begun its tests in the atmosphere, the United States and the United Kingdom had again urged at Geneva a test ban with international supervision and inspection involving annually less than one part in 2,000 of the Soviet territory. Even that offer had been rejected. At last, after detailed scientific study, the President of the United States had reluctantly determined that in the interests of its own security the United States would also have to resume testing in the atmosphere. And now, before the United States series had even been completed, the Soviet Union was testing again.

19. The lesson to be drawn from that part of recent experience merely confirmed that the only known effective restraint upon military power was opposing national military power; an increase on one side was inevitably following by an increase on the other.

20. However, the other side of the situation should be noted. If nuclear testing could be stopped simultaneously, each side would be able to accept such a balance as long as it was ascertainable that the stoppage had in fact taken place.

21. At least two more reassuring conclusions could be drawn from experience in the nuclear testing issue. First, although the Assembly was overwhelmingly made up of States without nuclear weapons, it was not without influence on those who had them. In the quest for control of the nuclear arms race, the General Assembly assuredly had overwhelming world opinion behind it; certainly that was true of United States opinion. Encouraged by the Assembly's call for renewed negotiations for an internationally monitored test ban agreement, the United States had returned to negotiations.

22. The second hopeful conclusion was that continuous negotiation did at least help to uncover hard-core problems and narrow the debate to the real issues. The work, while tedious and frustrating, was immensely important, because at long last the right questions could be asked and wrong answers exposed. If failure came in the end again, at least the reason for it would be known, and then a new attempt would have to be made.

23. In the meantime, the Soviet Government, in a new reversal, had expressed willingness to accept a nuclear test ban agreement in advance of general and complete disarmament, as well as some arrangement in which an international commission would be a feature; it was, however, as yet unwilling to concede the rights of international supervision and inspection. The United States and the United Kingdom, for their part, had agreed that a reduction could now be made in the number of sites within the Soviet Union required for the monitoring of seismic disturbances and in the number of inspections within Soviet territory. They had been able to accept those changes because of recent improvements in scientific techniques for the detection of underground disturbances.

24. On 27 August 1962, the United States and the United Kingdom had submitted a draft treaty at Geneva^{4/} providing for a ban on all tests for all time, subject only to the necessity of inspection for underground tests. In moving towards the goal of a

test-ban treaty, the Western Powers had been aided at Geneva by the contributions of Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden and the United Arab Republic, whose memorandum of 16 April^{5/} had been useful in bringing the opposing positions closer together. He expressed the gratitude of the United States Government to those delegations.

25. The continued insistence of the Western Powers on identification and verification of underground phenomena was based on the scientific fact that knowledge and techniques did not exist to distinguish between earthquakes and underground nuclear explosions without on-site inspection. The United States delegation would circulate to all Member States a brief memorandum on that problem. The Soviet Union had repeatedly been invited to substantiate its statements implying that it had instruments by means of which underground nuclear tests could be detected and identified on a purely national basis; however, they had thus far declined the invitation.

26. Nevertheless, the Geneva negotiations had served to bring out the precise issue. Therefore, it was now possible to ask the right question: would the Soviet Union agree—as the Western Powers had agreed—to the necessary control posts, manned by Soviet nationals under an international system, for the monitoring of seismic events, and to the presence of a limited number of international verification teams on its territory?

27. The Soviet Union had abandoned its insistence that a test cessation agreement must be part of general and complete disarmament; and by accepting the eight-nation memorandum as a basis for negotiation, it had also agreed to an international control system for monitoring tests. The only remaining major obstacle was the Soviet Union's failure to reaffirm the position which it had taken from 1958 under November 1961—that on-site inspection was a necessary element of any test ban agreement. Instead, the Soviet Union had proposed inspection by invitation: the State on whose territory a seismic event took place would decide whether it would agree to an inspection. Such an arrangement defeated the purpose of inspection, by giving a veto power over verification to the very State in which the suspicious event took place, whereas the very point of inspection was to give all parties confidence that the treaty was not being violated.

28. The United States frankly could not understand why some inspection at the site, which had been acceptable to the Soviet Union a year ago, should not be acceptable today. The Soviet Union's answer that international verification was but a cover for "imperialist espionage" was transparently wrong. First, the international inspection teams would be chosen and organized by the executive officer of the international control system, who would be chosen by the commission only with the agreement of the Soviet Union, among other States. Second, transportation of the inspectors to and from the site would be controlled by the Soviet Government or the country involved. Third, while on the site the inspectors could be accompanied by government observers. Fourth, the areas subject to inspection would be extremely small and strictly limited by the treaty. Fifth, the location of the sites to be inspected would be determined by instrumentation under international control.

^{4/} See Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for January 1961 to December 1962, document DC/205, annex I, sect. C.

^{5/} Ibid., document DC/203, annex I, sect. J.

Finally, only a limited number of on-site inspections would be conducted each year. Could espionage be conducted under those circumstances? The question answered itself.

29. If the hard facts prevailed over the mythical spectre of "espionage", a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty could be completed. But even if the Soviet Union refused to accept a comprehensive and verified test ban treaty in the near future, a great deal could be done to curb the nuclear arms race: an agreement could be made to ban all weapon testing under water, in the atmosphere and in outer space—that is to say, all testing above ground—which had been referred to as a "limited ban". While the United States would much prefer a treaty banning all testing everywhere, a ban on all but underground testing would deal with 90 per cent of the problem, and it would deal with the test environments of greatest concern. Since there was no radio-active fall-out from an underground test, a treaty banning tests in the oceans, the atmosphere and outer space would end at least the growing radiation hazard.

30. An agreement providing for the limited ban referred to should be easy to make because national detection systems were now so well developed that nuclear explosions above ground could be identified without on-site inspection. There was no obstacle whatever to such an agreement; the only question was whether the Soviet Union would agree with the other nuclear Powers to cease testing above ground. Unfortunately, its response was negative. It had rejected even a limited test ban agreement on the ground that such an agreement would "legalize underground testing". But what it would in fact do would be to make testing in the three environments in which almost all testing and radiation took place illegal; moreover, it would break the deadlock at long last.

31. Should a ban on testing in three environments—which could be agreed on immediately—be refused just because agreement could not be reached on the fourth environment? Surely, in the field of disarmament nine-tenths of a loaf was far better than none.

32. The United States and the United Kingdom had put forward a draft text banning all nuclear tests above ground without exception.^{6/} It was difficult to understand why the Soviet Union, which had formerly approved the principle of inspection, had since opposed any inspection, and why it declined to ban tests in the environment in which external or national detection systems were known to be adequate. It was to be hoped that Soviet opposition to any progress would thaw at the present session of the General Assembly; that along would suffice to make the Assembly an historic success.

33. He wished to recapitulate the United States position on nuclear testing. First, the United States was committed to the goal of general and complete disarmament, including the total elimination of all nuclear weapons and all means of their delivery. The United States delegation would return to the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament and would stay there as long as might be necessary. Secondly, the United States was prepared to sign at once a treaty banning all further tests in all environments, provided only that the Soviet Union accepted the detection and verification procedures,

^{6/} *Ibid.*, document DC/205, annex 1, sect. P.

under international control, necessary to identify and detect underground tests. Thirdly, if the Soviet Union could not or would not tolerate that modicum of co-operation, the United States was prepared to sign immediately a treaty banning all tests above ground—in the oceans, the atmosphere and outer space. That would prevent any further poisoning of the atmosphere, inhibit further development of nuclear weapons, put a partial brake on the proliferation of nuclear weapons capability and make a next step far easier.

34. The United States Government was neither pessimistic nor optimistic about the nuclear test issue. It was determined to persist until reason prevailed to arrest and reverse the upward spiral of nuclear arms. The moment when a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty would again become possible might be at hand. The Soviet Union had completed two large nuclear test series in the past year; the United States, which was completing a series begun last spring, far smaller than the Soviet series, was quite prepared to stop testing as soon as it had dependable means of knowing that the Soviet Union would stop tests and would not resume them. In the present period of possible equilibrium in the nuclear arms race, firm insistence by the General Assembly could forestall another cycle of nuclear tests; the Assembly should make the most of the decisive moment. If the First Committee or the Geneva Conference could agree on a ban on nuclear testing of every kind, with security for all, a heavy burden would be lifted from the hearts and shoulders of all mankind. If that could not be done, then at least the seas, the air and the space beyond should be cleared of nuclear weapons and radiation. He urged the Committee to resolve unanimously to end tests in those environments.

35. Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) pointed out that although the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament had, as could be seen from its report (A/5200),^{7/} agreed to a resumption of work in Geneva on 12 November 1962, the Co-Chairmen, after consultation with members of the Committee, were empowered by the Committee to set a different date for reconvening in Geneva if circumstances in their judgement so warranted. He considered that option important because it meant that the First Committee was not absolutely bound to complete its debate by 12 November.

36. The United States representative had just asserted that the United States was committed to the goal of general and complete disarmament, including the total elimination of all nuclear weapons. But during the work of the Eighteen-Nation Committee, the United States position had not been as radical as might be inferred from that statement. For instance, when the Soviet delegation in the Eighteen-Nation Committee had proposed that the prohibition of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction should be specified in the working draft of part I of the treaty^{8/} as one of the goals of general and complete disarmament, the United States representative had categorically opposed that proposal, and

^{7/} Same text as document DC/205. See Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for January 1961 to December 1962.

^{8/} See Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for January 1961 to December 1962, document DC/205, annex 1, sect. G.

agreement had proved impossible. But if the United States really desired the elimination of all nuclear weapons, it was hard to understand why it had opposed that formula.

37. The question of the cessation of nuclear tests had been on the General Assembly's agenda for eight years; it had many times been fully debated in the First Committee and in plenary meetings of the General Assembly, as also at various conferences. The people of the world had clearly expressed their view that nuclear weapon tests must cease. But the problem remained unsolved. The Eighteen-Nation Committee, after six months of negotiations on a test ban treaty, had been unable to report any practical results.

38. What had prevented agreement? In the Soviet view, the basic difficulty was the policy of the United States and its military allies. The socialist and the neutral countries were against nuclear tests; and the Soviet Union, as was well known, wanted the complete prohibition of nuclear tests of every kind. The United States representative and other Western representatives had stressed the difficulty of controlling the observance of a test ban treaty; but that was only a pretext, designed to conceal their unwillingness to give up the arms race, and to ensure that they were left a free hand in the production of weapons of mass destruction. They had asserted that tests in the atmosphere, under water and in outer space could not be detected without an elaborate system of controls. Both in the General Assembly and at the Geneva talks, they had insisted that international control and inspection must come before the cessation of tests. When tests had taken place, however, they had in fact been detected in many States without the international controls insisted on by the Western Powers who had had to admit that their insistence on control and inspection had been inspired by ulterior motives.

39. But having been forced to concede that tests in the atmosphere, under water and in outer space could not go undetected, the Western Powers had continued to insist that controls were necessary for underground tests. Both science and experience, however, had shown that that was not true; the underground explosion in New Mexico on 10 December 1961, set off to prove the Western thesis, had been registered in several States thousands of miles away, including the Soviet Union. In February 1962 an underground test had been carried out unannounced in the Soviet Union to prove that the Western position was false and was merely a pretext for preventing agreement on the prohibition of all tests. That had been confirmed when the United States Atomic Energy Commission had announced that it had detected an explosion in the Soviet Union. An unannounced underground test carried out by France in the Sahara had been detected by sixty-five countries in Europe, Africa and America.

40. Although the experts of the United States Department of Defense were now forced to admit that underground tests could be detected thousands of miles away, Western political leaders still asserted that the matter needed study by a technical body or conference of scientists. But such a study would merely serve the purposes of those who wished to delay agreement and to cover up a policy condemned by the whole world.

41. Present relations among States forbade any free exchange of information on nuclear weapons or means of detection; that gave those who were against agreement the opportunity to complicate a very simple question. In fact, controls did already exist and on a large scale; but the peoples wanted tests not only recorded but ended. The Soviet proposal to ban all nuclear tests and organize control based on national detection systems was realistic and in the general interest. Agreement on it could be reached immediately, if the United States and its allies accepted that reasonable position instead of pursuing aims of their own which had nothing to do with the need for test ban control.

42. The United States and United Kingdom representatives had protested that their countries were prepared to accept international inspection posts in their territories, and had asked why the Soviet Union would not do the same. The plain answer was that such inspection posts were unnecessary, and that those who so fervently desired to penetrate into Soviet territory were concealing their true motives. United States military leaders had revealed how anxious they were to pinpoint nuclear objectives. It was reported in the New York Times of 2 October 1962 that General Taylor, who had just been appointed chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, believed that a more exact knowledge of bombing targets in the Soviet Union was essential. That was also the basis of the "counterforce" doctrine advocated by Mr. McNamara, United States Secretary of Defense, a doctrine which clearly implied the legitimization of nuclear war. And the so-called international control posts and inspection could in fact be used for that very purpose of supplying the staff of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) with information for a nuclear attack.

43. The Western Powers opposed any proposal to prohibit nuclear weapon tests based on the use of national means of detection; they thereby showed once again that they put their own selfish interests before the interests of the whole world.

44. The Soviet Government appreciated the efforts made by the eight neutral members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee to end the deadlock caused by the Western Powers. In their memorandum of 16 April 1962, which had been referred to by the Indian representative, the neutrals had proposed that control of the cessation of nuclear tests should be effected through existing national systems, that the data received through those systems should be evaluated by an international commission composed of a limited number of highly qualified scientists, and that the question of inviting the commission to carry out an on-site inspection of any suspicious event should be decided by the States concerned. As the Indian representative had pointed out, the memorandum was a compromise between the Soviet and the Western positions. Thus, it offered a test by means of which it could be determined whether or not the Powers concerned really desired an agreement on the cessation of nuclear tests.

45. Although the eight-nation memorandum was not a perfect solution and did not coincide with the Soviet position, the Soviet delegation had recognized it as a constructive contribution, and on 19 April 1962 had expressed its willingness to use the memorandum as a basis for negotiations and for an agreement. The clear and frank attitude of the Soviet Union should

be compared with that of the United States and the United Kingdom, which had categorically refused to examine the memorandum, with whose main features they had completely disagreed, until the Soviet Union's willingness to discuss it had compelled them to change their attitude for tactical reasons, which had not affected their basic position. The United States and the United Kingdom had merely used parts of the memorandum as an opportunity for reiterating unacceptable proposals of their own that they had been putting forward in Geneva for the past four years. Their so-called new proposals had contained no concessions to the Soviet Union or to common sense. The Western Powers still insisted on international control posts and compulsory inspection in the territory of other States, including the Soviet Union. They had been forced to admit that inspection posts were no longer necessary for explosions in the atmosphere, under water or in outer space; but they were still demanding inspection posts for underground explosions. Their fundamental attitude was unchanged.

46. The Western Powers had also proposed a partial solution of the problem: the cessation only of tests in the atmosphere, under water and in outer space. That was nothing new; it reflected the old United States policy of retaining a free hand to perfect the means of mass destruction. The fact was that the United States did not want a test ban. The United States representative had spoken of the number of Soviet tests carried out, but had not mentioned the more than fifty underground tests conducted by the United States. Those tests had been carried out underground not for humanitarian reasons; despite the warnings of scientists as to the harmful effects of high-altitude nuclear explosions, the United States had carried out one such explosion and were planning three more. The United States representative at the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament in Geneva had revealed his country's true motives when he had admitted that underground tests were valuable for developing new nuclear weapons. Obviously, to ban only three out of four possible kinds of tests meant to legalize the fourth kind: underground nuclear tests. Moreover, it would dull the vigilance of the peoples and would play into the hands of those wishing to continue nuclear testing, who would be free to stockpile weapons of mass destruction, to the mortal danger of peace-loving States.

47. The real motive of the United States and its allies in proposing the authorization of underground tests accompanied by the prohibition of all other types of tests was to tie the hands of the Soviet Union and the socialist countries while leaving the aggressive NATO bloc free to increase its destructive power. Faced with that policy, the Soviet Union would take all measures necessary to strengthen its own defenses and those of all socialist countries. If the problem of the cessation of nuclear tests was to be solved, an honest approach was essential.

48. Speaking in the Assembly's general debate (1127th plenary meeting), Mr. Gromyko, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, had explained the new Soviet proposals made to the Western Powers: if those Powers could not agree at once to a ban on all nuclear tests, the Soviet Union would agree to a treaty banning tests in the atmosphere, under water and in outer space and providing for continued negotiations on the banning of underground tests, on

the understanding that there should be no underground tests during the negotiations. That proposal took into account the views of the Western Powers, and thus offered further proof of Soviet readiness to facilitate agreement by all possible means.

49. The Soviet Union was gratified at the general support shown for its proposal, which showed that the peoples regarded it as an excellent basis for agreement. The solution of the problem now lay with the United States and its allies; but unfortunately they had not yet shown any desire to contribute to an agreement. It was to be hoped that the Western Powers had not said their last word; but hitherto they had merely repeated old allegations. It was wrong to suggest, as Lord Home had done (1134th plenary meeting), that the Soviet Union was proposing an uncontrolled moratorium on underground nuclear tests. The necessary scientific and technical means were available to ensure the implementation of obligations assumed with regard to underground tests—a fact which, as Lord Home knew, had been stated publicly and repeatedly by British scientists.

50. It might legitimately be asked which side showed a greater interest in carrying out underground tests—the Soviet Union or the Western Powers. The answer was obvious. The United States had carried out more than fifty such tests; even France had tried to conceal its tests underground; and it was clear that every underground test carried out by the United States brought it new data used to perfect nuclear weapons. It was the Soviet Union rather than the Western Powers which was justified in fearing violations by the other side. Despite that, the Soviet Union was prepared to put aside its fears, in order to halt the nuclear armaments race and prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons; but the Western Powers, with their vast experience of nuclear testing, pretended that they were in danger. That was the true position.

51. The Western Powers had also opposed the reasonable proposal that no underground tests should be conducted during the negotiations on the banning of such tests. It would almost seem that the Western Powers had exhausted reasonable arguments, and were being forced to resort to such distortions.

52. Mr. Gromyko had pointed out the absurdity of the suggestion that the Soviet Union had violated the moratorium. There had never been a moratorium; and it was strange that the very people who had wrecked negotiations on a real moratorium spoke of the violation of a non-existent one. The myth of the moratorium had been exposed when the Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom and other NATO countries had started a new round of nuclear tests. The Soviet Union had done everything possible to bring about agreement on the banning of nuclear tests; but it could not stand idly by while the Western Powers conducted nuclear tests in order to obtain military advantages. The statement made by the United States Government in December 1959 and the nuclear tests carried out by France had freed the Soviet Union from its undertaking not to engage in nuclear tests; but even then the Soviet Union had shown extreme moderation. It was only the threat of nuclear war from the NATO bloc that had forced it to carry out tests of its thermo-nuclear weapons in the summer of 1961. At a time when the United States was intensifying its preparations for war against the Soviet Union, it had been the latter's

duty to defend its own security and that of its friends and allies. In so doing it was also defending the whole of humanity and promoting the maintenance of international peace. The Soviet strength in rockets and nuclear weapons had several times preserved mankind from world war threatened by the West.

53. Since the United States had been the first to carry out nuclear tests, it must be the first to end them. The Soviet Union was entitled in justice and in the interests of world peace to be the last to conduct tests. It did not desire to do so; it wished to make a reality of general and complete disarmament. At the World Congress for General Disarmament and Peace, held at Moscow in July 1962, Mr. Khrushchev, the head of the Soviet Government, had stated that the Soviet Union was prepared to conclude with all Powers possessing nuclear weapons an agreement providing for the banning of all nuclear weapon tests. The Soviet delegation was authorized to confirm that policy.

54. During the discussions in the Eighteen-Nation Committee and at the current session of the General Assembly, the neutral representatives had proposed that 1 January 1963 should be fixed as the date for the ending of all nuclear tests. The Soviet Union was prepared to support that proposal; but the United States representative had not even referred to it, and the question arose whether the United States did not think the fixing of such a date unnecessary. It was the will of the entire world that all nuclear tests

without exception should cease; the peoples of the world were calling upon the United Nations to take steps to end the nuclear armaments race. A formal resolution, pious wishes and further discussions were no longer sufficient; firm and decisive action was needed. The problem of ending nuclear weapon tests could be solved immediately.

55. The United States had proposed two alternatives—a general treaty with control and inspection, or a limited agreement for the cessation of tests other than tests underground; both were unacceptable. The Soviet proposal, which was in the interests of all peoples and all States, was that nuclear tests should be prohibited in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, and that an agreement should be made not to carry out tests underground while negotiations were proceeding for their prohibition. Speaking to members of the Gandhi Peace Foundation on 1 October 1962, Mr. Khrushchev had stated that the Soviet Union would strive to achieve the total banning of all nuclear tests, and would accept the memorandum submitted by India and seven other neutral nations to the Eighteen-Nation Committee as a basis for negotiations.

56. The Soviet Union was convinced that the desire of millions of human beings to prevent nuclear war and consolidate peace would triumph over all obstacles, and would ensure peace and prosperity throughout the world.

The meeting rose at 5.55 p.m.