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AGENDA ITEM 32

The Korean question: reports of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (continued) (A/5812, A/6012 and Corr.1; A/C.1/897, 899, 925, 927, 928; A/C.1/L.355 and Add.1, L.362)

1. The CHAIRMAN said that in accordance with the resolution adopted by the Committee at the previous meeting (A/C.1/930), the representative of the Republic of Korea was invited to take a place at the Committee table.

At the invitation of the Chairman, Mr. Young Shik Kim, representative of the Republic of Korea, took a place at the Committee table.

2. Mr. LOPEZ (Philippines), supported by Mr. MATSUI (Japan) and Mr. AJAVON (Togo), suggested that the representative of the Republic of Korea should be invited to speak first, since his views would be of assistance to the Committee; that procedure would be in accordance with the practice already established both in the Committee and in the General Assembly.

3. Mr. CHIMIDDORJ (Mongolia), supported by Mr. PRANDLER (Hungary), opposed the suggestion of the Philippine representative. There was no reason to change the list of speakers already drawn up.

4. The CHAIRMAN said that since the proposal made by the representative of the Philippines did not enjoy unanimous support it would be put to a vote.

The proposal was adopted by 35 votes to 12, with 8 abstentions.

5. Mr. Yong Shik KIM (Republic of Korea) thanked the Committee for its invitation to participate in the discussion and said that he was grateful to the members of the Committee for their support of and interest in United Nations efforts for the unification of his country. Korea had been freed from nearly four decades of colonial rule at the end of the Second World War, but, unlike other newly independent countries in Africa and Asia, it was artificially and tragically divided against the will of the people. A direct outgrowth of that division had been the Korean

war, during which fifty Korean cities had been destroyed, ten million people had been driven from their homes and two million had died of wounds, cold and hunger.

6. The answer to the Korean question lay in the removal of the unnatural division of the country and in the reunification of the people, who were a homogeneous nation with the same language, customs and culture. The United Nations, where the question had been under discussion since 1947, had offered and repeatedly reaffirmed a formula for the unification of Korea: application of the principle of self-determination under United Nations auspices. That formula had most recently been set out in General Assembly resolution 1964 (XVIII), which stated that the objectives of the United Nations in Korea were to bring about, by peaceful means, the establishment of a unified, independent and democratic Korea under a representative form of government and the full restoration of international peace and security in the area. That formula, which the Republic of Korea fully supported and accepted as the only practical and reasonable means of achieving unification, had been consistently supported by the overwhelming majority of members of the Committee.

7. The failure to solve the Korean question was due to the refusal of some countries to accept the United Nations formula, in violation of their obligations under the Charter, rather than to any fault or weakness in the formula itself. The basic issue was whether the principle of self-determination was to be carried out under United Nations auspices and whether the nation or nations concerned accepted the competence of the United Nations, and on that issue attitudes were diametrically opposed. The overwhelming majority of Member States and the Republic of Korea had unequivocally accepted the competence and authority of the United Nations and supported its resolutions on Korea. On the other hand, the régime in North Korea continued to defy the United Nations and to reject all its resolutions on the unification of Korea. In its official statements of 4 September (A/C.1/897) and 23 November 1965 (A/C.1/925), that régime had again declared that the United Nations had no right to discuss the Korean question and urged the withdrawal of the United Nations forces and the dissolution of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK).

8. The unification of Korea had been the cardinal aim of the United Nations since the Organization had first undertaken responsibility for the Korean question. The Republic of Korea had been established through free elections observed by UNCURK, and its Govern-

ment had been recognized by the United Nations as the only lawful Government in the country. In contrast, the so-called Democratic People's Republic of Korea had been installed by Soviet occupation forces in 1948 and had launched unprovoked aggression against the Republic of Korea in June 1950, when United Nations forces, under Security Council resolutions, had come to the defence of the Republic.

9. Mr. CHIMIDDORJ (Mongolia), speaking on a point of order, said that the resolution by virtue of which the representative of the Republic of Korea was speaking (A/C.1/930) recognized the existence of two nations in Korea by its reference to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The representative of the Republic of Korea was merely speaking before the Committee to put forward the position of his Government and had no right to attack others or to speak for the whole of Korea.

10. Mr. CORNER (New Zealand), speaking on a point of order, recalled that the resolution had invited the representative of the Republic of Korea to "take part in the discussion"; he should therefore be allowed to do so.

11. Mr. Yong Shik KIM (Republic of Korea), resuming his statement, said that in contrast to the United Nations formula for unification, the North Korean Communists had put forward some specious proposals based on two fundamental propositions: first, that the United Nations forces should withdraw from Korea, and second, that the Korean question should be "solved" by the Koreans themselves. The second proposition meant the holding of elections without the application of the democratic principle of representation proportional to the population and without impartial United Nations supervision. In addition to the constant threat to international peace and security posed by the military build-up of the North Korean Communists and the presence of external military forces in close proximity, the communist régime in the North had organized a vast reserve of more than a million "worker-peasant red guards", who were armed with modern equipment and received four hours of training weekly. The flagrant violations of the Armistic Agreement^{1/} by the North Korean régime constituted both a breach of an international agreement and a challenge to the United Nations; as of 30 June 1965, 4,457 such violations had been proved but only two had been admitted by the North Koreans.

12. The Communist argument that the Korean question should be "solved" by the Koreans themselves was a fraud, since it was not based on the principle of self-determination. The régime in the north had consistently rejected the holding of elections under United Nations supervision and had never really submitted itself to the judgement of the people. It was plain that the communist proposal for the unification of Korea was a proposal to unify Korea under communism, but the Korean people, if given the opportunity to express their will freely, would decisively reject communist totalitarianism in favour of freedom and democracy.

^{1/} See Official Records of the Security Council, Eighth Year, Supplement for July, August and September 1953, document S/3079, appendix A.

13. Pursuant to General Assembly resolution 195 (III), which declared that the Government of the Republic of Korea was the only lawful Government in Korea and recommended that Member States and other nations, in establishing their relations with the Government of the Republic of Korea, take that fact into consideration, seventy-two nations had established diplomatic relations with the Republic of Korea. The Republic had signed many international treaties and conventions and had also sought to promote goodwill and friendly relations with all peace-loving countries. On three occasions, in 1949, 1957 and 1958, the General Assembly had affirmed that the Republic of Korea should be admitted to membership in the United Nations, and but on all three occasions the Republic's application had been vetoed in the Security Council by the USSR. He urged the Committee to help the Republic of Korea to achieve its goal of participation in the work of the Organization as a Member State.

14. The Republic of Korea would continue to support the objectives and principles of the United Nations, and the Korean people had unwavering faith in the ultimate victory of the United Nations cause. The attainment of a unified, independent and democratic Korea would represent a triumph for that cause and a contribution to the peace and security of Asia and the whole world.

15. Mr. NABRIT (United States of America) said that the essence of the Korean problem was, quite simply, how to end the unnatural, undesired and enforced division of an ancient people peacefully and in such a manner as to ensure that the Government of the united country reflected the wishes of the majority of the Korean people.

16. The UNCURK reports before the Committee (A/5812, A/6012 and Corr.1) were factual and objective accounts of developments in the Republic of Korea over the past two years. They confirmed the Republic's strong desire for unification and its support of United Nations objectives in Korea. It was regrettable that the Commission again found that, in striking contrast to the Republic of Korea, the North Korean authorities had continued to deny the competence of the United Nations and had refused to deal with UNCURK, its principal representative in Korea. The reports noted the constitutional and economic progress made in the Republic, and the establishment of diplomatic relations with seventy-two States, sixty-seven of which were Members of the United Nations.

17. The United Nations formula for the unification of Korea went back as far as 1947, when the General Assembly had first considered the problem of ending the unnatural division of the country and its people. The essentials of that formula, which had been repeatedly reaffirmed by the General Assembly, were, firstly, that unification must be achieved peacefully, and, secondly, that unification must come about in a way which ensured that the Government of the united country would be responsive and responsible to the freely expressed will of the majority of the people. It was to achieve those aims that the General Assembly had proposed free and democratic elections throughout Korea under United Nations supervision, the number

of representatives from each district to be proportional to the population. No one would claim that that was the only way to achieve the unification of Korea, but it was the only formula yet proposed which would enable all the Korean people freely to exercise their right of self-determination and to satisfy their desire for unification. Whereas the Republic of Korea had repeatedly committed itself without reservation to accept the United Nations formula for unification, North Korea had refused to deal with the United Nations Commission and denied it entry into North Korea. It was not surprising that North Korea rejected the idea of free elections under impartial United Nations supervision, for it knew full well what the outcome would be.

18. The purpose of the draft resolution sponsored by the United States and twelve other countries (A/C.1/L.355 and Add.1) was to enable the United Nations to reaffirm its commitment to bring about the unification of Korea, its belief that such unification must be achieved peacefully and in a manner reflecting the freely expressed will of the Korean people, and its conviction that the problem of a divided Korea was of vital concern to the United Nations and that the United Nations Commission should therefore continue its work so that at least the door should remain open for peaceful and democratic unification.

19. The draft resolution sponsored by Hungary and Mongolia (A/C.1/L.362), on the other hand, was contradictory and unworthy of the Committee. While proclaiming that the question of Korea was of no concern to the United Nations, at the same time it decided that the Republic of Korea could not accept whatever assistance it considered necessary to defend itself against a neighbour which in 1950 had set out to destroy it by armed invasion. While calling on the United Nations to abdicate all responsibility with regard to Korea, at the same time it recognized that the unification of Korea was vitally related to the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East. Although the draft resolution claimed to be interested in the unification of Korea, every step envisaged was clearly designed to perpetuate the division of that country. Moreover, it conveniently erased the record of the past and ignored the facts of the present in calling for the withdrawal of all foreign forces from the Republic of Korea. One year after the last such withdrawal, in 1950, North Korea had launched a massive and unprovoked armed attack on the Republic of Korea and United Nations forces had been sent in response to that attack, under resolutions adopted by the Security Council. Those forces which still remained in the Republic of Korea were there at the request of the Government for the sole purpose of ensuring its adequate defence against the possibility of renewed attacks. While the draft resolution submitted by Hungary and Mongolia called for the dissolution of the United Nations Commission on the ground that it had failed to bring about unification, it made no reference to the fact that that failure had been due to the refusal of the North Korean authorities to deal with the Commission and to consider any formula for unification based on the free self-determination of the people. The Commission should remain as a useful symbol of the United Nations in Korea to facilitate any steps which might

be agreed upon by the parties concerned for the peaceful unification of their country.

20. In contrast to the contradictory and negative draft resolution submitted by Hungary and Mongolia, the thirteen-Power draft resolution would reaffirm the Organization's dedication to principles to which all its Members adhered, renew its pledge to the Korean people to help bring an end to the enforced division of Korea, and reassert its responsibility for dealing with a problem related to peace and security in Asia. He therefore strongly urged its adoption in the interests of international peace and the welfare of all the Korean people.

21. Mr. AJAVON (Togo) said that the Togolese people felt particular concern over the problems of divided countries since it had itself been wrongly deprived of a large portion of its national territory as a result of the country's partition between France and the United Kingdom after the First World War. In the case of Germany, Viet-Nam and Korea, however, partition had come about not as the result of colonialism but through the division of the world into spheres of influence by the great Powers. The partitioned countries had become battlefields in the cold war and the interest of their peoples were totally ignored. However, as the world grew smaller, the peoples were becoming increasingly aware of their interdependence and as time went on, mankind would grow even more united and the great Powers would voluntarily renounce their striving for supremacy; that would open the way to the settlement of problems now dividing the world, including the problem of partitioned countries.

22. He commended UNCURK for the outstanding work it had done and above all for the objectivity with which it performed its mission; it had undoubtedly helped to give the peoples concerned an understanding of the true purposes and intentions of the United Nations. The Organization's task was to bring about Korea's peaceful and harmonious reunification. Yet despite UNCURK's efforts, no material progress had been made so far. In his delegation's view, the only way to achieve the objectives of the United Nations, which were defined in General Assembly resolution 1964 (XVIII), was to ascertain, first of all, the real wishes of the people through free elections held throughout the territory under United Nations supervision, as called for in past resolutions of the General Assembly. It was significant in that regard that the South Korean Government had not only accepted the competence and authority of the United Nations but permitted UNCURK to supervise South Korean elections; it had also consistently declared its readiness to participate in the work of the First Committee. The evidence that South Korea had a democratic régime and a truly representative Government could not be denied; UNCURK's report of 21 November 1963^{2/} was clear in that regard, and he cited in particular paragraphs 11, 12 and 16 of that report. The influence of the United Nations in Korea had been beneficial, for it had brought not only peace but stability. In the circumstances, the United Nations had rightly

^{2/} Official Records of the General Assembly, Eighteenth Session, Supplement No. 12A.

recognized the Government of South Korea as the only genuine Government in the whole of Korean territory.

23. The attitude of the North Korean Government contrasted strangely with South Korea's position. North Korea took a negative view of United Nations deliberations on the Korean question and denied its competence to deal with the issue, as could be seen from document A/C.1/925. The argument that the United Nations had no jurisdiction in certain controversial fields was not new, especially for the African delegations. They had been put forward for years in the Fourth Committee and the Security Council by the colonial Powers. Yet the United Kingdom had in the end declared that the Rhodesian question was a matter of international concern, and the General Assembly, despite the arguments denying its jurisdiction, had never ceased to concern itself with apartheid and the Portuguese Territories. It was paradoxical, incidentally, that those delegations that advocated non-intervention by the United Nations in Korean affairs were active in the discussions on apartheid and Portugal's colonies. His delegation found no merit in the claim that the presence of United States troops in South Korea was a major impediment to the settlement of the Korean question; the UNCURK report made no mention of any such impediment.

24. Since the North Korean authorities had continued to deny the competence of the United Nations and had refused to deal with UNCURK, as stated in the most recent report of UNCURK (A/6012, para. 11), and since they wanted the United Nations to stop discussing the Korean question and to dissolve UNCURK, as indicated in document A/C.1/897, they could not logically ask to be authorized to take part in the Organization's deliberations on the question. His delegation had accordingly opposed inviting a North Korean delegation to participate in the Committee's discussions, and it would continue to do so until the North Korean authorities recognized the competence and authority of the United Nations.

25. His delegation deeply sympathized with peoples who had been unjustly separated by circumstances and who longed to be reunited; their struggle deserved the support of all States that loved freedom, justice and peace. It would accordingly vote in favour of the thirteen-Power draft resolution, which it considered to be more consistent with the interests of the Korean people than the draft resolution submitted by Hungary and Mongolia.

26. Sir Roger JACKLING (United Kingdom) said that the question at issue was the right of the Korean people to a real and lasting peace, based upon the unification and independence of their country. The North Korean authorities bore a heavy responsibility for the fact that the objectives of the United Nations in Korea, clearly set forth in General Assembly resolution 1964 (XVIII), remained as distant as ever.

27. The intemperance of the most recent North Korean statements (A/C.1/897 and A/C.1/925), and the contemptuous attitude towards the United Nations which those statements displayed, were unhappily all too familiar. By contrast, the Government of the Republic of Korea had repeatedly affirmed its ac-

ceptance of the competence and authority of the United Nations, and had expressed its readiness to cooperate fully with the Organization.

28. His delegation welcomed the constitutional and economic progress made in the Republic of Korea, authorities had seen fit, in their statement of 23 November (A/C.1/925), to deny and distort those achievements. The responsibility of the United Nations was thereby made all the greater, and the First Committee would be gravely at fault if it took any decision that might jeopardize the continued peaceful progress of the Republic of Korea.

29. Demands had been made for the immediate withdrawal of United Nations forces from Korea. The North Koreans and their supporters had tried to confuse the issue with baseless accusations against the United States and others, which were repeated in the draft resolution submitted by Hungary and Mongolia, which was entirely unacceptable to his delegation. The United Nations forces in Korea were there at the request of the Government of the Republic of Korea; so long as the North Korean authorities persisted in their present attitude, the forces could not but be regarded as an essential deterrent.

30. The Government of the Republic of Korea had expressed the hope (A/C.1/899) that the General Assembly would take a significant step at its present session towards solving the Korean question on the basis of the genuine free will of the Korean people and the principles set forth in the relevant resolutions of the United Nations. The First Committee could not disregard that appeal. It must reject altogether the proposition on which the two-Power draft resolution appeared to be based: that the United Nations should abandon its responsibilities and wash its hands of Korea. It was for those reasons that his delegation had become a sponsor of the thirteen-Power draft resolution.

31. Mr. FEDORENKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that contrary to the Charter and the will of the Korean people the United Nations had now been carrying on its futile discussion of the Korean question for almost twenty years. But the creation of a united, independent and democratic Korea was the domestic affair of the Korean people which, like any other people, had a right to decide its own destiny without outside interference, in accordance with the principles of self-determination repeatedly reaffirmed in United Nations resolutions. The best way of solving the problem, therefore, was direct negotiations between the two parties without any outside interference. The Soviet Union accordingly continued to oppose consideration of the so-called Korean question in the United Nations.

32. On the other hand, the question of the withdrawal of foreign troops from South Korea was connected with the maintenance of international peace and security, and there the United Nations could play a useful role. The principal obstacle to the peaceful and democratic unification of Korea was the continuing occupation of South Korea by United States and other foreign troops. By turning South Korea into a military appendage and upholding by force the reactionary South Korean régime, the United States was not only

hindering the peaceful unification of the country but also generating tension throughout the Far East and creating a threat to international peace and security. Transformed into a military base. South Korea was being used by the United States against the national liberation movement of the Asian peoples. Contrary to the will of the Korean people, the South Korean authorities were even sending troops to take part in the aggression against Viet-Nam. The United States representative had spoken of the "democratic" practices developing in South Korea thanks to the goodness and generosity of his Government. But the world was only too familiar with the "blessings" the United States had brought to Viet-Nam, Korea and the Dominican Republic, and with the monstrous sufferings visited upon the peoples of those countries in violation of the principles of international law and of the United Nations Charter. But the United States representative's panegyric upon the Seoul régime was hardly surprising, since it was common knowledge that it was little more than a puppet-show mounted by the Pentagon.

33. There could be no conceivable justification for the continued presence of United States troops in South Korea more than ten years after the conclusion of the Korean war. By contrast, all foreign troops had long since been withdrawn from the territory of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The pointlessness of a continued United States presence on the 38th parallel was recognized even in the United States itself. But the continued occupation of South Korea was inseparably connected with Washington's policy of maintaining its troops and military bases in the territory of other States. Twenty years after the end of the Second World War, the world was covered with a network of United States military bases. That was a thoroughly abnormal situation.

34. The constant attempts by the United States to present its occupation of Korea as the result of decisions by the United Nations could mislead no one. Such "decisions" had been taken in violation of the Charter and were thus invalid. Furthermore, they had been taken in the absence of representatives of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

35. The so-called United Nations Commission on the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea could do nothing to bring about the unification of the country. On the contrary, it was being used as a cover for the foreign occupation of South Korea and should be dissolved. He drew attention to the letter from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (A/C.1/925), which confirmed that the United States was preventing the reunification of Korea and making feverish preparations for another war.

36. The Soviet people stood firmly behind the Korean people in their struggle to overcome the consequences of colonial rule. The Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea had repeatedly put forward constructive proposals with a view to the reunification of the country; it had repeatedly proposed the conclusion of a peace treaty between North and South after the withdrawal of foreign troops from South Korea, including a non-aggression pact and a reduction of armed forces to a minimum. But those initiatives

had been rejected by the South Korean régime. The Soviet Union supported the just demands of the Korean people, and could not but condemn the attempts to deal with all-Korean affairs without the participation of the North. In that connexion, he reaffirmed his Government's well-known position in regard to the Treaty on Basic Relations concluded between Japan and South Korea.

37. The withdrawal of United States troops was a prerequisite for the normalization of the atmosphere in the region and the peaceful unification of Korea on a democratic basis. The draft resolution submitted by Hungary and Mongolia was directed to those ends and would receive the support of his delegation.

38. Mr. MATSUI (Japan) said that the problem of Korea, as one of the few remaining legacies of the Second World War, could be solved only by the United Nations. It was essential for all the people of Korea, both North and South, and for the peace and security of the region, that the United Nations presence in that country should continue. For those reasons, his delegation strongly supported the thirteen-Power draft resolution.

39. By contrast, the two-Power draft resolution spoke for itself. The General Assembly could not possibly adopt as its own the defiant attitude of the North Korean authorities by which the draft was inspired, nor could it repudiate everything the United Nations stood for. In particular, his delegation could not accept the description of United Nations forces stationed in Korea as "foreign troops", or the attempt to equate those forces with colonial occupation troops. The greater part of the United Nations force originally required to restore peace in Korea had already been withdrawn. No one wanted the remaining forces to stay in Korea a minute longer than was necessary, but their premature withdrawal, before the Organization's humanitarian objectives were achieved, would reflect little credit on the United Nations.

40. The recently concluded Treaty on Basic Relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea had a serious bearing on the agenda item before the Committee. The Treaty, which had come into force a few days ago, was the culmination of fourteen years of negotiations whose difficulty could be fully understood only against the historical background of Japanese-Korean relations over the past several decades. Although the two nations had been closely linked since time immemorial, events had not always run smoothly in recent history. The time had clearly come, however, for the resumption of normal and good neighbourly relations, and the Treaty would undoubtedly mark a significant step forward in the history of both nations. It stated the basic principles that were to govern normal relations between the two countries, and provided among other things that diplomatic and consular relations would be established, that the Government of the Republic of Korea was the only lawful Government in Korea as specified in General Assembly resolution 195 (III), and that relations between the two countries would be guided by the principles of the United Nations Charter.

41. He was aware, however, that there was some ill-intended criticism directed against Japan and

the Treaty, such as the statement emanating from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (A/C.1/925). That was a scurrilous diatribe, and quite unworthy of refutation. Such inflammatory statements, designed to create confusion and fear, were totally groundless. Japan sincerely looked forward to the attainment of a unified, independent and democratic Korea, through the assistance and co-operation of the United Nations. The Treaty just concluded between Japan and the Republic of Korea would certainly contribute to the achievement of that goal.

42. Mr. LAMANI (Albania) said that the discussion of the Korean question by the United Nations was a violation of international law and the fundamental principles of the Organization, particularly the principle of non-intervention. The position adopted by the United Nations served the interests of the enemies of the Korean people, not the cause of international peace and security. The use of the United Nations flag by the United States imperialists to cover up their occupation of South Korea and their aggression against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea had reduced the Organization to the role of a belligerent and deprived it of any moral right to consider the Korean question. In addition, it had seriously undermined the prestige and authority of the United Nations. The aims of the United States were made obvious by its eagerness to have representatives of the puppet régime of South Korea participate in the debate and its refusal to give the representatives of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea the same right. It was the latter representatives who should be heard, if the United Nations really wished to be informed of the facts in Korea and to learn the views of the qualified representatives of the Korean people.

43. The United States imperialists, who had launched a devastating war against the heroic people of North Korea, had been totally defeated, and the victory of the Korean people had been a serious blow to the United States policy of aggression. By accusing its victim of aggression, the United States was seeking to perpetuate its occupation of South Korea and use that part of the country as a base for aggression against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the People's Republic of China and other peaceful countries in that region. In violation of the Armistice Agreement, it had engaged in provocations against North Korea and maintained and increased its troops in South Korea. By contrast, the Chinese volunteers who had gone to the aid of their Korean brothers had withdrawn from North Korea after the defeat of the aggressors. The United States had also organized a series of provocations against the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission established under the Armistice Agreement and had finally driven it from South Korea. Meanwhile, the opposition of the South Korean people to the criminal United States plans had continually grown.

44. In desperation, the United States imperialists had compelled the puppet Government of South Korea to conclude the Treaty on Basic Relations with Japan, attempting by that means to postpone *sine die* the question of the peaceful reunification of Korea. The United States wished to create a base for its new

military alliance in North-East Asia, aimed against the socialist States and other peace-loving countries in Asia and designed to set Asian against Asian. The United States had already sent South Korean troops to fight in its barbarous war against the heroic Viet-Namense people.

45. The colonialist policy of the United States had brought political disorder and economic catastrophe to South Korea. Industrial and agricultural production had declined sharply, and the miserable standard of living was reflected in a high suicide rate. In their struggle against United States occupation, the South Koreans had overthrown one after another the puppet régimes which opposed the reunification so much feared by their American masters.

46. North Korea had always pursued a peaceful policy of friendship with other countries and had made great efforts to achieve the reunification of the country. In contrast to the southern part of the country, North Korea had recovered from its serious war wounds and rebuilt a new and prosperous life.

47. In its latest annual report (A/6012 and Corr.1), UNCURK—which was nothing but a tool in the hands of the United States—painted a false picture of the situation in Korea and attempted to camouflage the aggressive policy of the United States and justify its occupation of South Korea. It repeated the unfounded charge that responsibility for the lack of progress in the reunification of Korea rested with North Korea. The Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea had always rightly maintained that the unification of Korea was the exclusive concern of the Korean people and should be carried out peacefully and democratically without any outside interference. It had made several fair, realistic and concrete proposals, all of which had met with systematic rejection from the United States—the master in South Korea. The first step towards reunification should be the withdrawal from South Korea of all United States forces and other foreign troops.

48. The United Nations, for its part, should cease all intervention in the internal affairs of Korea, condemn the United States for its aggression against that country, annul all its illegal resolutions on the question, take the necessary measures for the withdrawal of the United States troops, and disband UNCURK.

49. Mr. PATIÑO (Colombia) said that his delegation's continuing interest in the Korean question was shown by its sponsorship of the thirteen-Power draft resolution. Colombia had been proud to participate in the armed action by the United Nations in defence of the Republic of Korea. In accordance with its peace-loving policy and support for the principle of self-determination, it favoured the unification of Korea under a democratically elected Government. There was little change of rapid progress towards that goal, but the United Nations should not relax its efforts. The Government of South Korea had shown its willingness to work for unification by democratic means, but the attitude of the Government of North Korea continued to be negative.

50. The draft resolution submitted by Hungary and Mongolia presented the picture of the Korean question

which had been painted by communist propaganda and repeated all the communist slogans on the subject. It ignored the reason for the presence in Korea of United Nations armed forces and for the existence of UNCURK, and it ignored the relevant decisions of the General Assembly and the Security Council. That draft resolution would undoubtedly be rejected, as the invitation to North Korea to participate in the debate had been rejected at the preceding meeting.

51. Mr. JIMENEZ (Philippines) said that while the question of Korea had already been exhaustively discussed in the United Nations, the fact that it had repeatedly appeared on the agenda served to underline its far-reaching importance. As an adherent of the principle of self-determination and the right of peoples to national unity, his Government was happy to be a sponsor of the thirteen-Power draft resolution. The United Nations had assumed responsibility for Korea as long ago as 1947, and had watched over the country's interests ever since. It must continue to do everything possible to help Korea take its place in the family of nations as a free, democratic and united State.

52. The United Nations objectives in Korea, first proclaimed at the Geneva Conference of 1954, could be summed up in four words: unity, peace, freedom and democracy. Unification, the dream of all peoples who had been divided by the Second World War, was a major key to political stability. It must, however, be attained through peaceful and democratic procedures, not through force. The invasion of South Korea had been an attempt to unify the country by force. The Geneva principles had specified the means by which Korea was to be unified: free elections throughout the country and the constitution of a legislature based on proportional representation. That task had been entrusted to the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea. His Government would like to see the Commission strengthened, for it had accomplished much despite the limited resources at its disposal and the unremitting hostility of the North Korean régime. The Republic of Korea had already travelled far on the road to full economic recovery; but the nagging problem of unification persisted. The North Korean authorities continued to challenge the authority and competence of the United Nations and so to block progress towards unification.

53. No one should believe that North Korea and mainland China had abandoned their hopes of taking over the whole of Korea. It was only the presence of United Nations forces in the country which prevented the North Korean authorities from renewing their abortive adventure—that was why they insisted on the withdrawal of those forces. Nevertheless, negotiations directed toward unification must be continued, in the hope that somewhere, sometime, there would be a softening of attitudes. Meanwhile, it was his delegation's hope that the thirteen-Power draft resolution would receive the Committee's support.

54. Mr. PRANDLER (Hungary) said that in violation of the Agreements on the Cessation of Hostilities in Indo-China, signed at Geneva on 20 July 1954, which

prohibited the dispatch of foreign troops to Viet-Nam, South Korean troops were now being sent to fight in that country. The Geneva provisions concerning Viet-Nam were being violated by those who had frustrated the hope that the Geneva negotiations on Korea would bring at least a temporary solution to the Korean problem. The situation was the more intolerable in that the United Nations had thus become a party to developments endangering international peace and security.

55. The so-called Korean question was a dismal legacy of the cold war; even States which insisted on the continuance of the United Nations intervention now did so with a bad conscience, for their position was obviously untenable. It was a position particularly incomprehensible to those States which, having recently attained their independence, would prefer to give their time and energy to questions which were of real importance to them. The Hungarian delegation had consistently done its utmost to help to put an end to that violation of the Charter and restore the reputation of the United Nations. The only way to do that, however, was to take a fresh, objective approach to the question of Korea. Firstly, it should be recognized that the question of Korea was that of the unification of Korea, which was essentially a domestic affair of the Korean people; consequently, the United Nations "presence" in Korea should be discontinued, foreign troops withdrawn and UNCURK dissolved. Secondly, the United Nations might offer its good offices to the parties concerned, which could be done only by encouraging a dialogue between the parties.

56. There were no legal, political or moral grounds for the United Nations to remain involved in the so-called Korean question. As for the legal grounds, the Korean adventure had been pressed on the United Nations in clear violation of the Charter, by ignoring the rule of unanimity of the permanent members of the Security Council and by resorting to the General Assembly in a matter in which it had no competence. Politically, the United Nations had been pushed into the Korean conflict by the United States after the start of its war of aggression. Morally, there obviously had never been any grounds for United Nations involvement. Moreover, the continued insistence of the United States on including the item in the agenda embarrassed all Member States, which for various reasons did not wish to lend their name to United States power politics. The United States insisted on a United Nations "presence" in Korea as a cover for its military occupation of South Korea, which violated not only the basic rules of international law and the principle of non-intervention but also numerous past declarations of intention by the United States Government.

57. In contrast to South Korea, there were no foreign troops stationed in North Korea, the Chinese People's Volunteers having been withdrawn seven years earlier. The North Korean Government had declared on several occasions that a peace treaty should be concluded between the two parts of the country, providing for non-aggression and a reduction of the armed forces of South and North Korea to at most 100,000 men each; but that step could be taken

only if all foreign troops were withdrawn from South Korea.

58. UNCURK was a sad reminder of the cold war years of the United Nations. Its reports tried to paint an attractive picture of the development of representative government, although the changing South Korean Governments had had only one thing in common—their utter disregard for political and human rights, their police-state methods and their complete inability to stop the deterioration of the economic situation. The dissolution of UNCURK would be a great service to the cause of the peaceful unification of Korea. It would also assist the United Nations and those members of UNCURK who found themselves in the awkward position of having to co-operate with that body, if only in a perfunctory manner. The members of the Committee would have noted that the latest report of UNCURK (A/6012 and Corr.1) had not been signed by the representative of Chile.

59. For the reasons he had stated, he opposed the thirteen-Power draft resolution, which gave fresh evidence that the sponsors were unable to grasp the realities of the changing international situation and the so-called Korean question. His delegation had joined Mongolia in sponsoring draft resolution A/C.1/L.362, which expressed the real aspirations of the Korean people and the earnest desire of the North Korean Government to contribute to the peaceful solution of a problem which was a serious source of international tension.

60. Mr. CHIMIDDORJ (Mongolia) said that the settlement of the Korean question and the unification of Korea were the concern of the Korean people alone; no State or group of States and no organization had the right to interfere. Consequently, any discussion of the Korean question in the United Nations was a violation of the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of States and peoples, a violation which only served to aggravate the aggression against North Korea committed under the flag of the United Nations. The United States regularly placed the Korean question on the agenda of the Assembly for the sole purpose of justifying its aggression and the occupation of South Korea by foreign troops.

61. The so-called elections held under United Nations supervision had been a dismal failure and President Syngman Rhee had been overthrown by the people of South Korea. That showed that the United States and certain other States had been illegally using the United Nations flag to force on the Korean people an objectionable puppet régime. Moreover, the recent decision by the First Committee not to invite representatives of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to participate in its debate once again showed that the United Nations was unable to promote the cause of the reunification of Korea in the interests of the whole Korean people.

62. The real reason why Korea was still divided and why the South Korean people were suffering foreign military occupation and politico-military dictatorship was that United States troops were stationed in Korea, in violation of the Armistice Agreement. While there were no foreign troops in North Korea, in the

South there were large numbers of United States troops, equipped with the most modern weapons. South Korea was thus being transformed into a military and political bridge-head of the United States in the Far East. The South Korean Army had also been increased considerably in strength. The South Korean authorities flatly refused to hold peaceful negotiations on the unification of Korea, and engaged in provocative actions against North Korea. The participation of South Korean soldiers in the United States aggression in Viet-Nam showed that South Korea was being used as an instrument for the repression of the national liberation movement in Asia.

63. The Treaty on Basic Relations had been concluded between South Korea and Japan in the face of widespread protests by the Japanese and Korean peoples. The Treaty was not only designed to perpetuate the division of Korea and the enslavement of its people, but was a step towards the creation of an aggressive military bloc in North-East Asia.

64. Under the military terrorist régime of South Korea, political and democratic rights were being trampled underfoot. The economic situation was rapidly deteriorating, industrial output had declined and there was misery and unemployment. The current situation in South Korea, which was the direct consequence of the division of Korea and the presence there of United States and other foreign troops, was naturally a source of concern to the whole world.

65. The way to a solution of the Korean question was indicated in the repeated proposals made by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, which had proposed a confederation of South and North Korea or some other form of association between them, and the resumption of economic and cultural exchanges between North and South. Those proposals reflected the urgent demands and basic needs of the entire Korean people and would promote the peaceful unification of Korea and improve the international situation. However, they had been repeatedly rejected by the South Korean authorities and their masters, who thus bore the responsibility for the consequences of the continuing division of Korea.

66. The primary prerequisite for a solution of the Korean question was the rapid withdrawal of all foreign troops and weapons from South Korea and the commencement of direct negotiations between North and South Korea without any foreign interference. Such a solution was outlined in the two-Power draft resolution, whose adoption would be a constructive step towards the reduction of international tension and the establishment of confidence and mutual understanding among States.

67. His delegation considered that UNCURK, whose latest one-sided and tendentious report was now before the Committee, had been established illegally and served only to undermine the authority of the United Nations. It was also a considerable financial burden; in the past four years, UNCURK had cost half a million dollars, or the equivalent of the annual contributions of sixteen States Members of the United Nations. There was no point in retaining an

organ which was not impartial in its composition and activities and which had proved useless in practice.

68. Mongolia would vote against the thirteen-Power draft resolution, whose aim was to perpetuate the

division of Korea and thus maintain a situation fraught with danger for Asia and the Far East.

The meeting rose at 1.15 p.m.