



Security Council

Seventieth year

7508th meeting

Thursday, 20 August 2015, 10 a.m.

New York

Provisional

President: Mrs. Ogwu. (Nigeria)

Members:

Angola	Mr. Gaspar Martins
Chad	Mr. Cherif
Chile	Mr. Barros Melet
China	Mr. Wang Min
France	Mr. Lamek
Jordan	Mr. Hmoud
Lithuania	Ms. Murmokaitė
Malaysia	Mr. Ibrahim
New Zealand	Mr. Taula
Russian Federation	Mr. Iliichev
Spain	Mr. Gasso Matoses
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	Mr. Wilson
United States of America	Mr. Pressman
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)	Mr. Ramírez Carreño

Agenda

Maintenance of international peace and security

Consolidating Security Council engagement on security sector reform: towards further implementation of resolution 2151 (2014)

Letter dated 11 August 2015 from the Permanent Representative of Nigeria to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (S/2015/614)

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The meeting was called to order at 10 a.m.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

Maintenance of international peace and security

Consolidating Security Council engagement on security sector reform: towards further implementation of resolution 2151 (2014)

Letter dated 11 August 2015 from the Permanent Representative of Nigeria to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (S/2015/614)

The President: In accordance with rule 39 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure, I invite the following briefers to participate in this meeting: Mr. Dmitry Titov, Assistant Secretary-General for Rule of Law and Security Institutions, Department of Peacekeeping Operations; Ms. Zainab Hawa Bangura, Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict; and Ms. Izumi Nakamitsu, Assistant Secretary-General and Assistant Administrator of the United Nations Development Programme.

The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda.

I wish to draw the attention of Council members to document S/2015/614, which contains the text of a letter dated 11 August 2015 from the Permanent Representative of Nigeria to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, transmitting a concept note on the item under consideration.

I now give the floor to Mr. Titov.

Mr. Titov: On behalf of Under-Secretary-General Hervé Ladsous, I am glad to take part in this important meeting. I wish to thank you, Ambassador Ogwu, for this timely initiative and for your special personal leadership on this strategic issue. We particularly appreciate the background paper (S/2015/614, annex) circulated by Nigeria for this meeting; it articulates many important questions, especially those with which we are dealing.

I would also like to pay special tribute to Slovakia and South Africa for their long-standing and very dedicated service as co-Chairs of the United Nations Group of Friends of Security Sector Reform and for

their many efforts in support of resolution 2151 (2014), including its implementation in the field.

Last year, while briefing the Council, the Secretary-General said, "The purpose of security sector reform, simply put, is to make people's lives safer" (S/PV.7161, p.2). We could not agree more. Well-trained, well-supported, accountable and service-oriented police and military professionals are a country's best defence against the violence and instability that threaten both lives and livelihoods. From the perspective of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), the Council is right to do more to strengthen legitimate institutions and governance, not only to break cycles of violence, but also to provide citizen security, justice and economic growth.

A quick scan of Foreign Policy's 2015 Fragile States Index demonstrates the strong correlation between the performance of the security apparatus and overall fragility. The five most fragile countries in this index — South Sudan, Somalia, the Central African Republic, the Sudan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo — are all vivid reminders that a country's security sector is closely linked with both the perception of State legitimacy and long-term socioeconomic and political development.

For this reason, DPKO believes that, depending on specific circumstances, security-sector management and professionalization should be at the core of peace operations' mandates and activities.

Understandably, some Member States express caution about the United Nations engagement in security-sector management. However, the philosophy of the United Nations practice has been simple: security-sector reform (SSR) can be achieved only if host countries themselves agree to it. No one can impose or import a security system. That simply does not work, at least in the long term. The role of the United Nations is to support nationally owned SSR efforts when mandated or requested to do so. At the same time, it is our obligation to share the best international practices with recipient States.

Over the past 16 months, the Council has adopted 21 resolutions containing elements of security-sector reform and management. In 17 peace operations conducted globally, the United Nations is actively helping host countries professionalize their security sector, so that they themselves can better support their nations in addressing national and regional security

threats, including terrorism, violent extremism and organized crime.

In the field, we are focusing on four central priorities which are explicit in resolution 2151 (2014).

First, the United Nations views SSR as a political process as much as a technical one. To train and equip is indispensable in post-conflict situations. But as demonstrated in a variety of mission contexts, security-sector management is most effective when it is also linked to broader reforms.

In Mali, for example, the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali provided its technical expertise during the development of the recently signed Peace Agreement. The Mission is now helping Malian authorities as they prepare to integrate armed groups into the national security forces and revise the presidential decree on the National Council on Security Sector Reform. Together with the European Union and other partners, training is ongoing for the national army, police and gendarmerie, along with mentoring in the field. We are also engaged in building the Malian anti-organized-crime capacity, and, together with the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and INTERPOL, DPKO is actively doing the same in other West African countries.

In the Central African Republic, the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) helped the Government to develop its draft Constitution, which, as a result, now includes defence and security provisions. In addition, 2,000 members of the Central African armed forces have been preliminarily vetted, which has already led to the reinstatement of the First Territorial Infantry Battalion.

Secondly, the international community must focus on the need to integrate sector-wide delivery. The security sector does not only cover defence; it includes justice and corrections, policing, border management and other areas. Building the capacity of each of these services should preferably be balanced and mutually reinforcing.

In Somalia, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) and the Government are implementing a security sector public expenditure review, which will help develop a sustainable security architecture. The Mission is also helping integrate militia forces into the Somali National Army and to strengthen the capacity of 11,000 officers in the

Somali National Army so that they will be able to engage with the African Union Mission in Somalia. On policing, UNSOM has also assisted the Government in developing a comprehensive plan that includes training, infrastructure development and equipment for police in Mogadishu and beyond.

The United Nations provides similar, multifaceted support in Guinea-Bissau. I know that the Council has received a briefing from the Department of Political Affairs (DPA) on the political situation in that country last Friday. The United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau has advised the Government to develop a new law on the establishment of the special pension fund. This legislation will pave the way for the retirement of almost 1,500 personnel in the armed forces and security sector.

Thirdly, in the spirit of national ownership, we support Governments in their efforts to develop State security plans and convene international partners around those plans. In Liberia, the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) has responded to the requests of the Council by working with the Government to produce a transition plan that is largely focused on the security sector. UNMIL has also trained almost 3,000 police officers and supported the review of the national security strategy, while the bilateral partners have assisted with the national army and specialized police.

Meanwhile, the support of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti for the vetting of national police officers has resulted in an additional 1,200 certified national police officers, thereby making progress towards the goals of the national police development plan. This effort complements the training that the United Nations — again, together with donors — has provided to 14,000 Haitian National Police officers and over 200 corrections officers over several years. All of this training is undertaken on the basis of United Nations standards, human rights law and due diligence policy.

Fourthly, building strong and accountable security sectors helps the United Nations to deliver on key mandated activities, including the protection of civilians, the prevention of sexual and gender-based violence, and others. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, for example, United Nations police deployed recently alongside the Congolese National Police to mentor, advise and help protect civilians in the troubled town of Beni, where armed groups were launching

deadly attacks on the population. Colleagues from the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo also manage the prosecution support cells programme, which has helped the military justice system of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to reduce impunity and address conflict-related sexual violence. This is an integral United Nations activity in many operations.

All of these are only examples, which demonstrate the concrete action of my colleagues from DPKO in the field on a daily basis. Yet I must acknowledge that the whole system could do better. In South Sudan, for example, the United Nations did not manage the security dialogue properly or effectively, which contributed to the unravelling of peace. The lack of success in this context demonstrates the political imperative for sustained and well-resourced efforts towards SSR in peace operations.

Within the framework of the inter-agency Security Sector Task Force, DPKO's special unit dedicated to security sector management has also carried out a number of other system-wide initiatives, including — again, as only one example — support to DPA in its efforts in Iraq and earlier in Libya. With colleagues from the United Nations Development Programme, who will also speak this morning, we hope to increase our engagement with other partners, including the Peacebuilding Support Office and the World Bank.

Meanwhile, DPKO has also undertaken mapping initiatives with regional partners, including the European Union and the African Union (AU). Over the past five years, the Department has built a serious, strategic partnership with the African Union Commission. This has resulted in the adoption of the first and unique African Union policy framework on SSR. As stressed in resolution 2151 (2014), we need to enhance cooperation with regional and subregional organizations, including regional economic communities, in order to ensure the compatibility of approaches and closer coordination. Through all the initiatives we have mentioned this morning, DPKO is also trying to address a number of persistent challenges. Therefore, we would like to propose a few recommendations for the Council's future consideration.

First, SSR is sometimes viewed as a technical process, while it could and should provide crucial solutions to some political engagements. Moreover, there are instances when United Nations support to SSR comes too little and too. Security sector management

should obviously concentrate on post-conflict situations, but it could also be used for prevention purposes in some specific contexts. Furthermore, the Special Representatives of the Secretary-General should be empowered and indeed encouraged to take initiative and ownership on security sector management issues. I stress that this should be done from the earliest days of the mission onwards. This should not be seen as a second- or third-tier activity, and progress towards security sector benchmarks should be embedded into any mission's entry and exit strategies.

Secondly, commitments to strengthening the security sector, whether on the part of international partners or host States, are often difficult to formalize, especially when they come at the later stages of United Nations intervention. The Council could consider requesting that host States and the United Nations agree on special compacts — which the Council has already discussed informally — in the security sector and wider governance areas. That should be done at the time when operations are being established, and could help in implementing specific reforms and allocating national resources in a sustained manner and based on national commitments.

Thirdly, I believe that we in DPKO could better serve the Security Council by increasing our engagement with its members on SSR. Already, having had two briefings in two years dedicated to this strategic topic is a step in the right direction, and the Council should perhaps encourage us, through the Secretary-General's reports, to provide more detailed information on national and international efforts in this vital area, as well as on the whole issue of peace sustainment.

Before I conclude, I would like to reiterate that any peace operation should ideally leave behind at least a basic functioning security and rule-of-law system. From our perspective, this should be considered a strategic priority goal for most of our operations, so that the Council will not be seized over and over again with relapsing conflicts, human suffering, impunity and instability.

The President: I thank Mr. Titov for his statement.

I now give the floor to Ms. Bangura.

Ms. Bangura: I thank you, Madam President, for extending an invitation to me to brief the Security Council on matters related to the important cross-cutting issue of security sector reform (SSR). It is a pleasure to join my colleagues from the Department

of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in addressing the Council today.

For a number of years, as we have progressively shifted the conflict-related sexual violence agenda to the operational level, we have recognized the critical nexus between sexual violence crimes and dysfunctional security sector reform processes, or the incomplete disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) of former combatants. Indeed, the Security Council has already articulated the crucial connection between security-sector reform and conflict-related sexual violence in a number of resolutions, including resolution 2106 (2013), on sexual violence in conflict in 2013, as well as resolution 2151 (2014), the first thematic resolution on security-sector reform, which was sponsored by Nigeria in 2014.

Essentially, a comprehensive response to conflict-related sexual violence must include proactive and purposeful engagement with the security sector, particularly in settings where the security services may have been involved in the commission of sexual violence. Such engagement with the security sector has now become part of the *modus operandi* of our mandate. I welcome this opportunity to highlight some of our emerging experience and practice in that regard.

Through our monitoring, analysis and reporting arrangements, mandated under resolution 1960 (2010), we have been able to verify that a number of national security services, including national armed forces and national police, are among the perpetrators of conflict-related sexual violence crimes. Therefore, we have encouraged national authorities to respond accordingly, and are supporting them in a process to strengthen their institutional capacity to monitor and ensure accountability within the security forces.

As I have stressed repeatedly, the essential starting point is to ensure national ownership, leadership and responsibility. Accordingly, I have focused especially on gaining commitments at the highest political levels through my advocacy. Over the past two years in particular, we have been able to report consistently to the Security Council with regard to commitments obtained from political and military leaders in a number of our priority countries.

For example, in the past few years we have signed political-level agreements in the form of joint communiqués with the Governments of the Democratic

Republic of the Congo, Guinea, Somalia and South Sudan. Those agreements form the basis for ongoing engagement at strategic and operational levels, for the practical implementation of the commitments made. The Team of Experts on the Rule of Law and Sexual Violence in Conflict supports the Governments with technical and logistical assistance to turn those high-level political agreements into concrete actions and activities to be undertaken by the Governments. The Team of Experts reports to me and — with members of the team from DPKO, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and the United Nations Development Programme, led by a Director in my Office — represents one of the best and most innovative examples of the One UN initiative.

The commitments they help to operationalize entail some fundamental reforms of the security sector, in line with resolution 2106 (2013). They include, first, issuing clear orders to all defence and security forces through chains of command prohibiting sexual violence and providing accountability measures for breaching such orders in accordance with international standards; secondly, ensuring that all elements joining the army, the police or other security institutions are vetted so that no element involved in the commission of serious violations of human rights and humanitarian law, including sexual violence, is allowed to join those institutions; thirdly, prohibitions against sexual violence in codes of conduct and military and police field manuals or their equivalents; fourthly, developing action plans specific to the national army and the national police that include, respectively, the reinforcement of the military justice system and the establishment or strengthening of special police units on sexual violence; fifthly, ensuring that perpetrators of sexual violence crimes are excluded from amnesty provisions in the context of conflict-resolution processes, and that all those who have perpetrated or are responsible for acts of sexual violence are excluded from the security institutions; sixthly, ensuring that the military and police speaks out in the strongest terms against sexual violence in conflict, including through internal and public campaigns; and, finally, ensuring that security services establish mechanisms for the protection of victims, witnesses and others who report crimes committed by the army or the police, including civil society and judicial actors engaged in the fight against conflict-related sexual violence.

The elements I have just elaborated on have formed the basis for the development of concrete operational or

implementation plans, which we refer to as action plans to prevent conflict-related sexual violence, in countries such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Côte d'Ivoire.

In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, where we have focused consistent attention since the establishment of the mandate, the joint communiqué signed with the Government and the action plan developed with our support by the Forces armées de la République démocratique du Congo (FARDC) have begun to yield some tangible results. For instance, in the 2014 reporting period, military tribunals convicted 135 individuals of sexual violence crimes, including 76 members of the armed forces, 41 members of the national police and 18 members of armed groups. Crucially, the FARDC action plan includes specific undertakings signed by senior commanders, whereby they personally commit to prevent and respond to sexual violence through a series of actions. That has served to reinforce both individual and command responsibility.

In a number of cases, the actions undertaken to address sexual violence have resulted in significant institutional and structural reforms within the security institutions, as well as an increased number of prosecutions and convictions. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the national army has established a high-level and dedicated infrastructure in the form of an armed services commission to ensure the implementation of the action plan on sexual violence. Similarly, the national army of Côte d'Ivoire has established a committee on conflict-related sexual violence that includes senior commanding officers from the army, the gendarmerie and the police to oversee the institutional response.

Since 2013, the Team of Experts has deployed an expert to the Democratic Republic of the Congo to support military justice efforts, including in the framework of the Prosecution Support Cell. In Guinea, the Team of Experts has provided technical support to a domestic panel of judges established to investigate and prosecute crimes committed against opposition supporters on 28 September 2009, including at least 109 cases of sexual violence. That has resulted in 16 indictments, including against high-ranking military officials, and, most recently, former president Dadis Camara. That represents one of the rare times that a former Head of State has been indicted by a fully national process.

In a number of priority countries, police have established or strengthened specialized units dealing with crimes against women and children, including sexual violence crimes — for example, our mandate is supporting the establishment and functioning of such a specialized unit in the gendarmerie in the Central African Republic. Such initiatives may be viewed as an entry point and provide avenues for more fundamental reforms within those institutions. Vetting during recruitment drives and prior to the integration of armed groups into the armed forces to exclude those who have committed or commanded sexual violence represent crucial shifts in attitudes and practice, and contribute to the professionalization of the security sector.

It is also evident that where SSR or DDR processes have failed, it has sometimes contributed to the commission of sexual violence crimes. For example, we have received reports of sexual violence being committed in the post-conflict setting within communities by so-called civilians. However, in a number of such cases the perpetrators are former combatants who were demobilized under hurriedly conducted DDR processes.

Another significant challenge relates to the informal integration of militia groups into national armed forces. For the most part, such armed groups are poorly trained and have often committed gross human rights violations, which is a significant threat to the integrity and professionalism of national security institutions and hinders accountability for sexual violence crimes.

In addition to the specific points of action I have outlined here, I wish to conclude by proposing four overarching recommendations related to security-sector reform and sexual violence in conflict.

First, the role of security institutions in preventing sexual violence crimes may be enhanced by striving to mainstream sexual violence considerations consistently in security-sector reform processes, in view of the nexus between SSR and conflict-related sexual violence. That includes a specific reference by the Security Council to the prevention of sexual violence in provisions related to SSR and DDR in all relevant country-specific resolutions, as well as in the relevant provisions of peace agreements and ceasefire frameworks.

Secondly, preventing sexual violence crimes and ensuring accountability should be considered fundamental indicator criteria of success of SSR programmes as a whole and, as such, should be

included in SSR programme monitoring and evaluation frameworks.

Thirdly, we should ensure that multilateral and bilateral SSR support and assistance include targeted resources and training to support national security institutions in enhancing their capacity to prevent and address crimes of sexual violence.

Fourthly, we should ensure a proportional representation of women in security institutions at all levels as the basis for the creation of security forces who respect and protect women and children in times of war and of peace.

The linkage between SSR and sexual violence will continue to be a priority focus of my mandate and a key aspect of the work of our programme, as well as that of the Team of Experts on the Rule of Law and Sexual Violence in Conflict, which has played a central role in supporting our engagements with national authorities in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, the Central African Republic, South Sudan, Guinea and elsewhere.

The President: I thank Ms. Bangura for her statement.

I now give the floor to Ms. Nakamitsu.

Ms. Nakamitsu: On behalf of the Administrator of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Ms. Helen Clark, I would like to sincerely thank you, Madam President, for convening this very important meeting and UNDP to brief members of the Council on this crucial topic. I would also like to express our gratitude to the Nigerian delegation and you for your personal leadership on this very important issue.

Security sector reform (SSR) is a relatively new area for us, but as co-Chairs of both the United Nations inter-agency Security Sector Reform Task Force and the Global Focal Point for Police, Justice and Corrections, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and UNDP increasingly reap the benefits of working closely together to sustain peace in settings where Security Council mandates apply. Resolution 2151 (2014) highlights aspects of security that are particularly important to UNDP. It emphasizes people's safety, human rights and democratic oversight in the security sector. These are essential foundations for the rule of law, peace and sustainable development.

The proposed goal 16, on peaceful, just and inclusive societies of the 2030 agenda for sustainable

development further recognizes the important linkages between peace and development and urges Member States to promote the rule of law, safety and justice. It also calls for effective, accountable and transparent institutions at all levels. This also applies to the security institutions responsible for providing a safe and secure environment to people and communities. Please allow me to highlight briefly three essential ingredients for successful SSR implementation in post-conflict environments from the UNDP perspectives.

First, security sector reform is a long-term process, and we must understand and accept that SSR requires both concerted efforts in the lifetime of United Nations peace operations and long-term sustained efforts and support beyond peace operations. It is therefore critical to sequence and strategically prioritize various tasks. Security Council mandates on SSR have become more comprehensive, requiring United Nations peace operations to implement an increasingly wide range of SSR tasks. But we also know that addressing the negative power bases in the security services of post-conflict countries is one of the most challenging aspects of post-conflict reconstruction and transformation. In fact, it is one of the structural causes that had led those countries to violent conflicts in the first place. Military and security cadres often have vested interests in the political settlements that follow peace agreements.

Therefore, it is not easy to resolve these challenges. This means that the implementation of holistic approaches to SSR by the United Nations requires a sustained focus on building political will for meaningful reforms. Strong political support from the Council will be key in that regard, and therefore Mr. Titov's suggestion of a possible compact is indeed an interesting one. At the same time, national capacity-building efforts that will continue over time need to be supported by predictable and reliable sources of funding. In order to be effective, such efforts must be carried out in a conflict-sensitive manner and be built into longer-term development assistance programming.

Secondly, at the country level, as Mr. Titov pointed out, we must have the right balance and combination of technical expertise and guidance, on the one hand, and political accompaniment, on the other, for a successful SSR. In order for the United Nations to make a difference in this area, we must find ways for peace operations to work closely with country teams in an integrated manner, and we must strive to use our

collective resources and capacities more efficiently and in a more impactful way.

As underscored by the recent report of the High-Level Independent Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (see S/2015/446), such joint approaches are a necessity for enhancing operational coherence. We are pleased to see acknowledgement in the Panel's report that Mission budgets should ensure that funds for programming are available to support that work as well as the recognition that United Nations agencies, such as UNDP, are well placed to support peace operations in that regard. The fact that the Council invited UNDP to brief it today is further testimony that our programming work, which brings together the required technical expertise, is indeed an important part of the implementation of the mandates given to the United Nations.

By working together, the United Nations is more capable of delivering those comprehensive mandates. For example, linking police salary payments with support to improved community policing on issues related to gender-based violence and with better recruitment and training of cadets makes eminent sense and is already delivering positive results on the ground, as seen in Somalia. There, UNDP works with the Global Focal Point partners, DPKO and UN-Women, as well as the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia, in delivering a joint rule-of-law programme that includes training and mentoring for the Puntland police force. Through the programme, we are supporting 25 police officers, including six women, who are studying criminal science thanks to a police scholarship initiative developed in partnership with Puntland State University. This might seem like a small initiative, but we are investing in creating and supporting the leadership of a police force that will put people's security and safety at the core of their service.

In another case, UNDP, through a joint initiative with the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic, UN-Women and the Global Focal Point, redeployed police and gendarmerie forces in the Central African Republic by supplying general food allowances and salary payments. Those efforts allowed justice sector activities to resume and reduced cases of robbery, including armed robbery, in the country.

Thirdly, for SSR to succeed, we must have a coherent strategy among all actors who support it — from the United Nations, regional organizations and other

Member States — and the full ownership, leadership and political commitment of national stakeholders. Successful SSR requires support and investment from Member States, whether through development support, Government-provided personnel or direct cooperation, to reinforce and complement United Nations efforts. We have many lessons learned over past decades in that regard — for example, from Afghanistan. In other places, such as the Central African Republic, Mali and Somalia, where many actors are involved, we have also learned that better coordination efforts between regional entities and the United Nations should be prioritized to enhance our collective impact.

Within the United Nations system, coordination between United Nations missions and country teams should commence as soon as Security Council mandates on SSR are established and should be linked to joint planning undertaken by the global focal point, which encompasses important aspects of SSR, especially on police reform. I very much agree with Mr. Titov's statement that SSR is not only about the defence sector.

For reforms to be sustainable, joint programmes need to be aligned with national development plans and national budgets. I would also add that joint engagement throughout the lifetime of a mission will also help the United Nations to manage smooth transitions as missions draw down.

In conclusion, let me stress that the United Nations system needs to translate security sector reform in post-conflict settings into tangible results that are immediately felt by ordinary people on the street. As I stated earlier, SSR is a long-term process. However, for UNDP it is the number one priority in the lifespan of United Nations peace operations. We must look at security in the broader context of promoting safe and secure environments for communities and people, especially for women, and in terms of facilitating people's participation in efforts to strengthen and reform security institutions.

We must also pay more attention to advancing gender equality and security for women, as Special Representative Bangura pointed out. Although this year marks the tenth year anniversary of resolution 1325 (2000), on women and peace and security, we continue to see high levels of violence against women and girls in conflict and, unfortunately, high levels of impunity. Those situations require a comprehensive and coordinated response on the part of the United Nations system and the international community. Only

by promoting people's security and safety and human rights and democratic oversight in the security sector, can we lay the foundation for the rule of law, peace and sustainable development.

The President: I thank Ms. Nakamitsu for her briefing.

I shall now give the floor to the members of the Security Council.

Mr. Iliichev (Russian Federation) (*spoke in Russian*): We would like to thank the Nigerian delegation for convening today's meeting on the issue of security sector reform (SSR). We are also grateful to Assistant Secretary-General Titov, Assistant Secretary-General Nakamitsu and Special Representative of the Secretary-General Bangura for their detailed briefings.

Security sector reform is one of the most important components of peacekeeping during the post-conflict period. Relevant measures help not only in achieving national reconciliation, but also in ensuring the security of State institutions, thereby promoting effective civilian protection, strengthening stability and preventing the emergence of new violence.

Undoubtedly, security sector reform should be conducted in the context of broader rebuilding processes, including a package of efforts on the political, economic and social fronts. Only a holistic approach will provide hope for lasting peace and security. The success of security sector reform depends, first and foremost, on ownership on the part of national Governments and their determination to take responsible efforts in drafting and implementing national strategies and priorities in that sphere.

A lack of progress in security sector reform was one of the basic causes of an escalation of armed conflict in South Sudan, where national armed forces broke into warring camps. Another negative example was the situation preceding the military coup d'état in the Central African Republic in the spring of 2014, where the army and police did not reflect either the ethnic or the religious composition of the population. They also lacked proper equipment and training due, in part, to fears of former President Bozizé of threats to his power.

It is unfortunate that in a number of cases of countries experiencing conflict situations, they are unable, without outside support, to ensure security and rebuild viable and effective State institutions. In such situations, assistance from the international

community is of critical importance. Such assistance should be guided by fundamental principles, including the host country's agreement, respect for its national sovereignty and political independence. Such efforts must also focus on strengthening national capacities, based on the country's specific situation.

A central role in coordinating and agreeing upon SSR efforts should be played by the United Nations, which has a diverse toolkit of effective instruments. First and foremost I am thinking of Security Council authorized peacekeeping missions. Peacekeepers' multifaceted mandates include tasks aimed at assisting with SSR, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration efforts and rebuilding law-and-order structures and the rule of law in general. Outstanding work in that area is also carried out by the Peacebuilding Fund and the Peacebuilding Commission, whose complementary significantly increases the chances for establishing sound, accountable and professional national security bodies.

In the current context there is also need to take into account the regional aspects of conflict and the transborder nature of threats, in cases where a spike in violence in one country could ignite violence in neighbouring countries and, indeed, in the region as a whole. In that context, it is of great importance to develop cooperation between and among the States of the region, as well as with regional and subregional organizations. Such cooperation should include information exchange of frontline experience and providing resources to ensure swift and effective responses to emerging threats.

In conclusion we would like to underscore the Russian Federation's commitment to developing international cooperation in SSR, including in peacekeeping operations and providing peacekeeping staff with the necessary expertise and equipment, including advanced training for peacekeepers on United Nations standards.

Ms. Murmokaitė (Lithuania): I thank you, Madam President, for organizing this briefing. I would also like to thank Assistant Secretary-General Dmitry Titov, Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict Zainab Hawa Bangura and Ms. Izumi Nakamitsu, Assistant Administrator of the United Nations Development Programme, for their insights and comprehensive briefings to the Security Council.

At the Council's debate on security sector reform (SSR) last year (see S/PV.7161), we called on the United Nations to do more to help States coming out of conflict to reform their police and military forces. We advocated for reinforced efforts to ensure that security institutions in post-conflict environments were a source of safety, security and trust, rather than of extortion and fear. Over a year since that debate and the adoption of resolution 2151 (2014), we can ask ourselves if enough is being done to put the resolution into action. Are the voices of women, youth and civil society being heard well enough by those implementing SSR efforts? Is the vetting effective enough to bar those who have committed rape and abuse from joining police and military ranks? Have we become better in meeting the needs of the countries concerned?

As has been said many times, ensuring national ownership of SRR processes is essential. To succeed, national authorities must lead, own and drive reform efforts. The United Nations and other contributing actors on the ground can assist Governments in their efforts, with a clear objective to create effective, accountable and human rights-respecting national security structures. In that regard, we welcome the Department of Peacekeeping Operations compact initiative aimed at helping to better coordinate responsibilities between the United Nations and national Governments.

As we have heard this morning, the subject itself is wide-ranging, and I cannot deal with all of the issues. I would like to touch upon just a few of them, starting with trust.

While the pressure to rebuild security sector institutions as a country emerges out of conflict may be enormous, Governments must make sure that SSR activities involve all segments of society and respond to the concerns of all, including the most affected and vulnerable groups. That is the best way to ensure the common ownership of the reform and to prevent lingering grievances from resurfacing at a later stage. The support of the good offices of the United Nations in that respect could be helpful.

An army or a local police force made up exclusively of one ethnicity, one tribe or one faith in multi-ethnic, multireligious communities would inevitably challenge their impartiality and put into question their readiness to protect all members of the community. It would also serve to raise fears and suspicions of bias — for example, in situations such as the violence we have witnessed in the Central African Republic.

Likewise, an exclusively male police force, or prosecutorial bodies, for that matter, would raise legitimate concerns and fears among women about their safety and security and would inevitably prevent women from complaining about sexual violence, rape and other abuses. Integrating a gender perspective into security sector reform is therefore a question of trust and confidence in the bodies and in the reform itself. A gender perspective must become part of the daily work of armed forces, police and law-and-order institutions. It should make those institutions more inclusive and accountable, strengthen popular trust in them and improve the overall effectiveness of security sector reform. Specific programmes aimed at preventing sexual harassment and gender-based violence must be implemented so that both the general female population and the women serving in the armed and police forces are guaranteed safety and recourse to justice in cases of abuse. Witness and victim protection mechanisms must also be put in place.

In that regard, we would like to emphasize the importance of the Secretary-General's seven-point action plan on women's participation in peacebuilding, as well as the whole range of measures that the United Nations has established to date, including on the matter referred to today by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General. They offer practical ways forward that should be taken by the United Nations system, with the support of Member States, regional partners and implementing countries.

Justice and accountability are other factors linked to security sector reform, and an underlying element for SSR durability. They are an integral part of peace and reconciliation efforts. If left unaddressed, a lack of accountability for past crimes can lead to a reopening of old wounds — and therefore a resurgence of conflict, bringing the efforts of any country emerging out of conflict to naught. Therefore, security sector reform should entail, *inter alia*, solid human rights training, mentoring, due diligence policies and an embedded culture of individual responsibility among the ranks — from top to bottom and bottom to top — for abuses of office, including human rights abuses.

In countries plagued by repeated cycles of violence, members of the security forces are known to have participated in serious human rights abuses and crimes against humanity, including killings, summary executions, mass rapes, torture, arbitrary arrests and abductions. Vetting mechanisms therefore should be a

central component of troop selection in order to break with past abuses and build disciplined, rights-respecting forces that protect civilians instead of preying on them. Cleaning up the ranks also serves to strengthen the trust between local populations and the armed and police forces, as well as the general confidence in the irreversibility of post-conflict recovery.

In that regard, we welcome the steps taken by the Democratic Republic of the Congo to introduce vetting and build a security sector free from child recruitment and sexual violence. We encourage the Government to further develop cooperation with United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) in implementing a zero-tolerance policy towards violations of human rights law and humanitarian law.

Verification and vetting are currently being undertaken in the Central African Republic, where preparations are under way for the national elections. The pressure to have the armed forces in place and ready to provide security for the people during that vital transition time should not lead to compromising on the integrity of the troops. As per resolution 2217 (2015), the transitional authorities must investigate swiftly alleged violations and abuses in order to hold perpetrators accountable and to ensure that those responsible for such violations and abuses are excluded from the security sector. Granted, it is a challenging task, and the assistance of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic in that respect remains very important.

The sharing of information and cooperation between national authorities and peacekeeping missions, as well as with the relevant international actors, contribute to the success of the vetting process. In that regard, we would like to welcome the efforts in Côte d'Ivoire, where the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the Ministry of the Interior are developing terms of reference for police vetting.

Finally, the success of security sector reform requires having a clear picture on how effective particular measures have been — what works and what does not in a given situation — and how best to avoid the typical mistakes in the process. The implementation of monitoring instruments, such as sets of indicators and benchmarks like those developed in Côte d'Ivoire and Liberia, have an important role to play in ensuring the sustained relevance and effectiveness of the support

provided to national Governments. In that context, a specific focus during Security Council's visits on issues raised by the Special Representatives of the Secretary-General, as well as an annual closed-door briefing by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations on the implementation of resolution 2151 (2014), as proposed by the Nigerian presidency in its concept note (S/2015/614,annex), could offer a useful venue for discussion and exchange on lessons learned.

Finally, let us not forget the system-wide, holistic, long-term approach, as underlined by the Assistant Administrator of UNDP, as well as the underlying linkages between SSR and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) processes. If DDR fails, if it is only partial or incomplete, conducting solid and durable reform of the security sector will be hard to achieve.

Mr. Hmoud (Jordan) (*spoke in Arabic*): I would like to thank all the briefers: Mr. Titov, Assistant Secretary-General for Rule of Law and Security Institutions; Ms. Nikamitsu, Assistant Secretary-General and Assistant Administrator of the United Nations Development Programme; and Ms. Bangura, Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict. I also thank Nigeria for convening today's meeting.

The previous debate by the Security Council on security sector reform (SSR) (see S/PV.7161) made it abundantly clear that that concept is important in post-conflict situations, including its contribution to establishing a modern State that is committed to the rule of law, good governance and the avoidance of relapse into conflict. Thanks to efforts made by Nigeria, the Security Council adopted resolution 2151 (2014), the first resolution devoted solely to SSR. As we meet today to consider the implementation of the resolution, we stress the importance of the Security Council's consideration of SSR in a complementary manner and in conjunction with debates regarding peacebuilding processes.

We have already set out our position on SSR in terms of peacebuilding and peacekeeping. We have also emphasized that United Nations engagement should always be based on certain basic principles, namely, that host countries have the primary responsibility for providing security; the need to respect national ownership; and their sovereign right to determine their own national priorities. It is important for national authorities to be kept informed and to provide for populations' needs and aspirations. However, we stress

the new challenges confronting SSR, especially given the increasing complexity and the increase in the number of peacekeeping mandates.

I wish to thank the delegation of Nigeria for its useful concept note (S/2015/614, annex), which indicates clearly some of the challenges we must consider in order to achieve our primary goal of creating sustainable and efficient security structures that are accountable and take into consideration the rule of law, international human rights law and international standards.

The way for the Security Council to engage genuinely with the issue of security sector reform in post-conflict situations is by establishing transparent cooperation among itself, the troop-contributing countries, the Secretariat and host countries, particularly during the consultations on drafting and renewing the mandates of peacekeeping operations and special political missions.

We cannot overlook the political nature of SSR, especially in countries recovering from conflict. We should recognize that it can be used as an integral part of the wider political process and as an element in mediation plans aimed at launching a national dialogue and helping to achieve a political solution in many of the cases on the Council's agenda. We therefore call for concerted and integrated efforts on the part of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the Department of Political Affairs (DPA), so that the DPKO can benefit from DPA's evaluations of the political platforms and positions of all the parties in each situation. We call for SSR to be included in the plans and proposals of the Mediation Support Unit. We hope that the heads and chiefs of United Nations special political missions and the Special Envoys of the Secretary-General will take note of and consider those plans with the aim of achieving successful security sector reform. We also believe that SSR units should be supported so that they can provide advice and in order to increase the levels of cooperation and coordination with regional and subregional organizations.

The Council can be more effective in bringing about security sector reform by drafting peacekeeping mandates clearly and giving priority to SSR in the peacekeeping operations that require that essential element, thereby ensuring that host countries can clearly interpret their mandates and that United Nations entities are able to effectively implement the SSR provisions. The Council will also be better able to address non-traditional challenges by focusing

the counter-terrorism committees' work so that they specifically target efforts to build new and more modern States in countries emerging from conflict. It should also ensure the establishment of an environment conducive to ensuring the success of SSR by giving particular attention to arms embargoes and exceptions to them that can ensure support for national security institutions.

The United Nations has a pivotal role to play in supporting SSR in post-conflict situations and in States undergoing political transition by focusing on host countries' national requirements and by fulfilling their needs. We should encourage support for the security sector through such means as the provision of training, financial and technical support and cooperation with regional organizations.

Mr. Pressman (United States of America): I would like to thank you, Madam President, for organizing this important meeting and for your personal leadership and leadership of the Nigerian delegation on the issue of advancing security sector reform. It is critical and appropriate that the Security Council emphasize the role of security sector reform in making local institutions more effective and accountable and fostering both a sense of and actual safety and security. I would also like to thank Assistant Secretary-Generals Titov and Nakamitsu and Special Representative Bangura for their briefings.

As the Security Council reaffirmed in April 2014 when we adopted the first ever resolution focused solely on security sector reform (resolution 2151 (2014)), such reform is an essential aspect of prevention, and focusing on preventing conflict or relapses into it is something that we must all do more of and become better at doing. Security sector reform helps build accountable, effective and efficient institutions and provides a foundation for resilience in fragile States. It also provides a foundation for the rule of law and respect for human rights. Resolution 2151 (2014) rightly emphasized national ownership; indeed, some of the Security Council's most complex missions, such as in Kosovo and Timor-Leste, have succeeded because of the national authorities' commitment to achieving reforms in partnership with the international community. In Liberia, efforts have led to an increase in the number of women working in the security sector, a strong focus on community policing and increased training on human rights and gender issues. Sierra Leone has taken a holistic approach to security sector

reform that has included disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, the establishment of a special court and the reform of security institutions.

But we have also seen, for example in the recent history of the Central African Republic, that when attention fades, progress may too. The Government of the Central African Republic launched a vigorous security sector reform campaign in 2008, starting with an international security sector reform assessment of the country's needs and the establishment of a timeline for achieving its security sector goals. While the Government was making progress, having implemented some 70 per cent of the plan within a year, its programmes were both financially costly and politically difficult. They fell by the wayside. Instead of pursuing the integration that was needed, the Government held on to its resources, never fully integrated the police and the army, and allowed the process to get caught in political patronage and internal bureaucratic wrangling, all of which contributed to the violence that surged up again in 2012.

Sustaining the reform of security institutions is critical not only to making people safe but also to preventing relapses into war. National ownership of security sector reform is essential, but it should not mean that the international community in general, or the Security Council in particular, should be passive as time goes on. When the memory of conflict begins to fade, and host Governments are confronting the hardest and most difficult challenges, that is when we have a particular responsibility to support, encourage and press for completion of security sector initiatives.

We welcome the idea described by Assistant Secretary-General Titov of a security sector reform compact between the United Nations and host Governments. When a Government's focus on completing reforms wanes, we have a responsibility to use the Security Council and the good offices of the Secretary-General to remind national leaders of their part in such a compact. There are few places where the relapse into conflict represents a more pressing issue than in South Sudan. We have seen the devastation that war has wrought on the country's security sector and, indeed, on every other sector. A new country, once a source of great hope, has become a painful and horrifying humanitarian catastrophe. Crimes that shock the conscience are being perpetrated against the people of South Sudan and they are being perpetrated with impunity. It is time for leaders to act to end the

carnage. The region and the friends of South Sudan are united.

The choice confronting the Government is plain, and it is incumbent upon us to make the consequences of failing to choose the path of peace equally clear. We must do so in support of the region, in support of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, in support of the people of South Sudan, and in support of peace. War has ravaged South Sudan. It has vanquished hope; it has set back a generation; it must, and it can end. While it is our collective hope that the Government of South Sudan will sign the peace agreement that is on the table, it is also our collective responsibility to act if it does not. There is no other choice. Maintaining the status quo is only a recipe for more rape, more murder, more hunger and more devastation. It is time for us to move forward together to make the choices confronting the parties unambiguously clear and to render equally apparent our commitment to holding those who reject peace and choose the path of war accountable.

Police have a growing role in peace operations, developing host-Government institutions capable of taking over law-enforcement capabilities and often providing critical civilian protection functions. We can and should strengthen the role of United Nations policing in our peacekeeping missions by providing more institutionalized training and equipment for foreign police units and individual police advisers, and, importantly, increasing women's participation in security forces. We have seen in Darfur, with the all-female formed police unit, that increasing the number of women in policing roles advances security and helps build trust and confidence in security forces.

The entire community should be brought into security sector reform initiatives, rather than marginalized by them. We welcome Special Representative of the Secretary-General Bangura's engagement in working with Governments to make their institutions more effective and accountable. The participation of women in post-conflict security services is crucial to creating structures that are representative, trusted, legitimate and able to meet the security needs of all. Our collective investment in helping strengthen security sectors is an investment in creating reliable partners to not just build safe and stable societies at home, but also to play an active role in defeating transnational threats everywhere. It is an investment in protecting conflict, and it is an investment in peace and stability.

Mr. Gaspar Martins (Angola): Let me start by thanking Nigeria for organizing this debate on a very important topic. I am extremely pleased to bring back this topic to the Council, where it is crucial to have this discussion on security sector reform (SSR). We join other members of the Council in welcoming the Assistant Secretary-General for Rule of Law and Security Institutions, Dmitry Tivov. We also welcome Ms. Zainab Bangura, Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict, and Ms. Izumi Nakamitsu, Assistant Secretary-General and Assistant Administrator of the United Nations Development Programme.

Security sector reform is indeed an important aspect of multidimensional peace operations. Where peacekeeping operations are required to create an effective, professional and responsible security sector, SSR is one of the critical elements of the foundations of peace and sustainable development. In that regard, we reiterate the point already referred to by other speakers, who emphasized that SSR must be based on national ownership in order to be possible. It is also recognized that successful, sustainable and nationally led security sector reforms require focused efforts, dedicated resources and the concerted political will of all the parties involved.

In Angola, in order to ensure the success of SSR, a legal framework for national dialogue on security sector reform has been created. It involves a programme for the technical and professional training of demobilized personnel, and the promotion of and training in entrepreneurship for former combatants as a means of promoting the social integration into civil society of thousands of men and women coming from disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) programmes implemented in the country, in particular at the end of a long civil war. In that ongoing process, it has also been possible, through the recruitment of new entrants into the army and police, to involve them in an effective nation-building process as they are trained to play a role not just in security, but also in the various forms of nation-building under way in the country.

We stress that security sector reform should be based on participatory commitments and fully include the widest range of stakeholders, including civil society. In that connection, it is important to enhance the host country's ability to develop, manage and implement reforms that should be flexible, adaptable and tailored to the post-conflict country's concerns and needs.

Resolution 2151 (2014) — the first stand-alone Security Council resolution concerning SSR — is a milestone decision that has impacted a wide range of mandates given to United Nations peacekeeping and special political missions. The main challenge to security sector reform remains the deficiency of actual political will to reform, as we have seen in different countries on the agenda of the Security Council. We must therefore recognize that reforming a country's security sector is a political endeavour and must not be treated as a strictly technical matter. United Nations peacekeeping and special political missions must ensure therefore that Special Representatives of the Secretary-General, through their good offices, engage in intense political dialogue on SSR in the country to which they are assigned at the earliest stage of their mission. Security sector reform remains a crucial tool not only for conflict prevention in post-conflict States, but also in the prevention of post-electoral violence like that which we are now seeing in Burundi.

The partnerships on SSR of the United Nations with regional organizations, such as the African Union and European Union, have in the past been a sound foundation that has enabled the implementation of a comprehensive SSR process with coordinated information-sharing developing into an effective division of labour. When implementing SSR in the field, those partnerships should form the basis on which Special Representatives of the Secretary-General ensure that a comprehensive SSR process is thoroughly coordinated with information-sharing and developed into an effective division of labour. The technical guidance and guidelines of the United Nations system integrated into SSR can be improved through regular consultations with Member States, in order for the Secretariat to continue to update and elaborate new guidelines, including the development of training modules based on best practices.

In countries with ongoing DDR and SSR programmes, the United Nations should provide information to the host countries' security sectors on implementation and follow-up in order to avoid the exclusion of ex-combatants and to create the best possible conditions for their integration into civilian life, which is a crucial element in the peace and consolidation process. In countries like Liberia, where the Security Council intends to end its mission, draw down or reduce the personnel of its peacekeeping mission, the Peacebuilding Commission and the Security Council in particular should establish mechanisms to prevent

the risk of the resurgence of conflict after the United Nations mission exits. In that context, we also call on the Peacebuilding Commission to continue to play its very key advocacy role through the United Nations and international and regional financial institutions, as well as with bilateral and multilateral donors, in order to continue to mobilize logistical and financial resources in support of countries engaged in a peacebuilding process.

In conclusion, I would like to reiterate that security sector reform is not the only concern of post-conflict countries, but must be combined with reforms in other areas, including administration, justice, the rule of law and good governance, in order to ensure long-lasting stability.

Mr. Ramírez Carreño (Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela) (*spoke in Spanish*): The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela would like to thank the Nigerian presidency for convening this briefing and for distributing the concept note (S/2015/614, annex). Security sector reform is a topic of vital importance. We would also like to thank Mr. Dmitry Titov, Assistant Secretary-General for Rule of Law and Security Institutions of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations; Ms. Zainab Hawa Bangura, Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict; and Ms. Izumi Nakamitsu, Assistant Administrator of the Crisis Response Unit of the United Nations Development Programme.

Guaranteeing security is a basic function of the State. In post-conflict situations, security institutions, such as military and police forces, may be the most visible representatives of the State in the eyes of the general public. As a result, when those institutions are effective, responsible and professional they can have a decisive and positive effect on the population's trust in Government institutions.

The transition from weak or weakened security institutions to viable and robust ones has become a major part of United Nations efforts in post-conflict reconstruction. Indeed, 10 multidimensional peacekeeping operations now have mandates that include support for such reforms. In that regard, we acknowledge the work of the Security Sector Reform Unit of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and of the Peacebuilding Commission.

The restoration of Government authority and control in all sectors in the immediate aftermath of

conflict is a prerequisite for sustainable peace and stability. That is why it is essential to establish effective and accountable security structures that respect the law, are sustainable and meet national priorities and the needs of the population. Such structures are crucial in order to avoid a relapse into conflict. In that regard, it is vital to recognize the links between security sector reform and broader reform processes, including national reconciliation and political dialogue. As clearly pointed out in the concept note, the process of security sector reform is as political as it is technical. Such a reform process must take place within the framework of a strong sense of national ownership. The State must appropriate the process of reconciliation, inclusion and the strengthening of military and national forces with the aim of avoiding a relapse into conflict. Governments themselves must determine the priorities for conducting such reforms and coordinating their implementation; they must also take responsibility for the results. Under no circumstances should the essential vision of the reform process be imposed on the recipient State

Peace agreements often overlook the need to reform the deployment of military and police forces in States in post-conflict situations. While the need to demobilize, disarm and demilitarize former combatants is generally addressed, the equally critical need to create, reconstitute and train the military and police forces of countries emerging from conflict is not always taken up with the same dedication. The absence of security sector reform can become fundamental when the time comes to promote lasting peace and to avoid the relapse of a country emerging from civil war. We would like to stress that the political component cannot be uncoupled from the success of future reconciliation and reconstruction efforts in societies that have been battered by war, as we can see from the experience of Angola.

Avoiding a relapse into conflict requires a set of security institutions that are capable of tackling the re-emergence of insurgent groups loyal to one or the other warring party. To the degree that the military and police institutions that emerge from a peace agreement are incapable of preserving the authority of the State and guaranteeing the security of the population, the possibility of a relapse into conflict will remain latent. In addition, we must bear in mind that any effort to achieve a lasting peace that fails to integrate former combatants in the security apparatus and political and economic institutions of the State by making them part

of the solution leaves open the possibility that they will take up arms again.

Finally, the Council needs to undertake a broader, deeper discussion of the experience of security sector reform situations in countries affected by foreign military invasions and interventions that bring about the collapse of all State institutions. The traumatic and terrible experiences in Iraq and Libya should prompt a profound analysis. The collapse of State institutions in those countries as a result of foreign military intervention, as well as the social fragmentation produced by a strategy of occupying and dominating the population, including through sexual and sectarian violence as a means to punish and terrorize sectors of the population accused of supporting one group or another or the former regimes, beyond the terrible social and humanitarian effects of war itself, created fertile ground for the emergence of the terrible phenomenon of terrorism and extremism such as the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant and other violent groups that today pose the greatest threat to peace and security in the entire region of the Middle East and North Africa. The illegal trafficking in small arms and light weapons, along with political and economic support for non-State actors in the region, have become the main stimulus for the emergence of terrorist groups. The weak security forces of those brother countries, along with their lack of unity and poor training, prevent them from restoring national authority and ensuring the safety of their civilian populations, which are the victims of the atrocities perpetrated by those criminal groups. That is the terrible and disastrous reality that the Council must discuss and learn from so that it is never repeated again.

Mr. Wilson (United Kingdom): I thank Assistant Secretaries-General Titov and Nakamitsu, as well as Special Representative of the Secretary-General Bangura, for their very thoughtful briefings, as well as for the number of recommendations they made to the us, which I found very creative and which we really need to take seriously as the Council. I also pay tribute to your leadership, Madam President, for having brought this important issue back to the Council once again.

It is 18 months since we last discussed security sector reform (SSR), and in that time more than 780,000 people have been killed by armed violence. That is almost one person every minute. Only a tenth of those deaths occurred at the hands of terrorists or in full conflict situations. Too many of them occurred

in countries that were emerging from conflict, where stability, security and justice have yet to be embedded. We all have a role to play to stop these deaths. Ensuring an effective and accountable security sector in these countries is a vital way of doing so.

So what can we do, as a Council and as Governments, to achieve this? I think that there are three things. First of all, we need to engage honestly and sensitively with Governments and their institutions. Security and justice are critical to stability, but if not handled properly, these issues can fuel instability. Ill-disciplined, unaccountable security forces operating in fragile political climates can just as easily create grievances as address them. We need to judge our support according to the right political preconditions. We cannot allow our enthusiasm for getting things done to undermine the help that we are trying to give.

Honest engagement can bring risk, and it often requires working with institutions that do not necessarily meet international standards for human rights transparency. But not engaging is not an option. It is precisely these institutional security and justice failures that allow crime and violence to flourish. They are among the key drivers of conflict and extremism. The Council is then left to tackle the violence and dysfunctionality that they bring.

The second point that I want to make is that we need to integrate our work on SSR into our longer-term work on conflict prevention, peacebuilding and development. We have made a good start. The fact that Assistant Secretary-General Nakamitsu is here from the United Nations Development Programme today briefing the Council is progress in itself.

In addition, for the first time, our global goals on development (SDGs) contain a goal on peace, justice and security. This goal cannot be achieved without effective, efficient security forces that can respond to citizens' needs.

But we want to see more. A fully functional and professional security sector is essential to sustainable peace and also for the timely exit of United Nations peace operations. We need better sequenced and better prioritized mandates for peacekeeping operations to achieve this, and we need effective systems to ensure that the progress made on security forces does not fall away once peacekeeping operations leave. If we get these things right, not only will we decrease the average

15-year lifespan of a peace operation, but we can avoid the tragic relapse into conflict that we see so often.

This all requires a strong requirement on the part of the international community to support countries through the whole of the conflict cycle. But it also requires national political leaders to show courage and drive reforms themselves. That is the only way to ensure that the local security sector is able to deliver for its population when a mission ends.

It is this concept of local ownership that informs my third point. Locally owned political processes are vital to the success of security-sector reform, much more so than externally imposed solutions. That is easy to say but hard to deliver. In practice, this means that efforts to build security capability in the short term must be embedded in longer-term efforts to strengthen accountability and the oversight mechanisms in ministries of defence, the interior and justice. As both Dmitry Titov and Izumi Nakamitsu have said, it means that we have to use all of the tools available to the United Nations, not just the military, to deliver security-sector reform. It means coordinated responses, and, as we heard in this Chamber earlier this week, working with regional and subregional organizations. This is the best way to ingrain coherent security-sector reform plans within peacebuilding strategies.

To succeed, we also require reform processes that are fully gender-sensitive and that incorporate the perspectives and concerns of women. As we heard today from Special Representative Bangura, gender-sensitive SSR programmes are an important tool in the fight against sexual violence. We know how much there still is to do on this.

Madam President, let me conclude by thanking you again for having brought this important issue back to the Council. It is an issue that my Government cares about deeply. This year, we will spend more than \$250 million on security-sector reform. That money is making a difference. To cite just once example, in Sierra Leone it has helped the local Government improve access to security and justice for nearly 300,000 women and girls in remote districts. We support these programmes and more because we believe that security and access to justice is a basic service, on a par with health care and education. It is a fundamental right, as recognized in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. We owe it to the hundreds of thousands killed since we last discussed this issue to ensure that this right is upheld.

Mr. Taula (New Zealand): I wish to thank you, Madam President, for having convened this meeting and for Nigeria's long-standing engagement in security-sector reform (SSR). I also thank Assistant Secretary-General Titov for his update and the progress made since the adoption of resolution 2151 (2014), as well as Special Representative of the Secretary-General Bangura and Assistant Administrator Nakamitsu for their briefings.

New Zealand considers effective SSR to be critical for sustainable peace. We recognize SSR as a strategic, long-term process, and we have seen some successes, such as in Timor-Leste and Sierra Leone. But we acknowledge that each situation is different and that tailored approaches are required. There is also a need to learn lessons from where SSR efforts have fallen short, for example in South Sudan, as noted by Mr. Titov.

As this is an inherently long-term challenge, it is important that we better coordinate Council-mandated SSR activities with related efforts by other parts of the United Nations system and other international actors and bilateral donors. As noted in the concept note for this briefing (S/2015/614, annex), Special Representatives of the Secretary-General could have a greater role to play in this regard. Although there is a heavy focus on SSR in many peacekeeping missions, SSR functions are now also being mandated across the spectrum of United Nations peace operations, from prevention to post-conflict stabilization, for example in the SPMs?? Special Programming Missions?? in Libya and Somalia and United Nations offices such as United Nations Office in West Africa.

We need to look carefully at how SSR is mandated in peace operations, particularly in the context of the peace operations review and its recommendations concerning phased mandates. We believe that it is important for SSR to be embedded in mandates from the start, including when peace agreements are being conceived and negotiated. New Zealand acknowledges the development of the United Nations 2011 policy framework for defence sector reform, and its continued implementation. While components of SSR do not work in isolation, it is critical to develop accountable, professional and effective security forces that support and adhere to the rule of law. We see merit in the Council's considering empowering Special Representatives of the Secretary-General to more directly support nationally owned security sector reform policy and implementation frameworks. We also

support the concept of SSR compacts between missions and host Governments. Those could both encourage host country engagement and tie the achievement of SSR benchmarks to the ultimate exit strategy of a mission. We also stress the importance of women's full and effective participation in SSR processes.

Given the critical nature of SSR to the ultimate success of a mission, we believe Council oversight should be improved. In order to support that, we would like to see more meaningful reporting on SSR and regular mission reports. Reporting needs to be both more consistent and of higher quality, providing a frank assessment of progress, key obstacles and options for addressing them.

In conclusion, we believe that resolution 2151 (2014) was a very important step. But we need to work harder to make SSR more effective, and therefore improve the environment for sustainable peace and security.

Mr. Barros Melet (Chile) (*spoke in Spanish*): We thank the Nigerian presidency for having organized this meeting, and Mr. Dmitry Titov, Ms. Zainab Bangura and Ms. Izumi Nakamitsu for their participation in this important debate.

Peacekeeping operations currently deployed in the field are mandated to cooperate in the reform of their respective security sectors as they seek to provide countries emerging from conflict with capacities essential to ensuring the rule of law. Broader mandates involve greater responsibilities for the United Nations system and in particular for the Council. They also require the closer attention of, among others, the Heads of mission, Special Envoys and Representatives and Force Commanders, who must grasp the strategic value of such reforms and assume leadership in ongoing coordination with national authorities, as appropriate.

From that perspective, we believe that the central objective of security sector reform remains the creation of national institutions that are subject to civil authority, effective, inclusive and accountable so to contribute to international peace and security, sustainable development and the full exercise of human rights. These reforms should be based on State policies in the long term, take advantage of existing institutional capacities, prevent their total collapse and take into consideration, *inter alia*, local traditions or cultural heritage. The incorporation of radical elements into permanent institutions of a State is not advisable,

which is why we must find mechanisms for their demobilization and social reintegration.

However, there can be no doubt that monitoring these reforms in countries emerging from conflict must be a priority and ongoing task of the Council. Understanding that security sector reform is undertaken in specific and unique political contexts, we favour the implementation of broad and inclusive national agreements and commitments that will lay the foundations for transformative processes that ensure national ownership. The cooperation of other States and organizations can contribute to the effectiveness and sustainability of these processes.

We are aware in turn that any reform requires parallel readjustments in judicial and prison systems, as well as the systematization of the training of security forces and their financing. Without the ability to prosecute criminals and without predictable economic resources, security institutions will work in a vacuum that may limit their work, at the risk of entrenching bad practices that will have to be unlearned. Responsible, transparent and efficient security forces have the enormous potential to make the people feel safe, which is essential to facilitating the processes of reconciliation and confidence-building among civil society, armed groups and the Government. We believe in an inclusive process of reform that seeks the allegiance of the people as the beneficiaries of peacebuilding and the rule of law.

We have much to learn from countries that have successfully emerged from conflict and established professional and inclusive forces that serve the rule of law. The lessons learned and best practices developed can form a kind of catalog of potential solutions and serve other countries undertaking key reforms. Under resolution 2151 (2014), we must intensify the exchange of experiences, an area where South-South cooperation can play a leading role. Latin America has deep experience in security sector reform that could be shared with other regions. In this context and by way of illustration, since 1996 Chile has maintained technical assistance programmes with the Haitian National Police whereby approximately 60 Haitian officers and non-commissioned officers are trained in the military schools of my country. That involvement has played a key character in our participation in the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti.

At the same time, it is necessary for countries undertaking reforms to consider the effective and equal

participation of women in all stages of these processes, which will also require a cultural change. The impact of such inclusion may facilitate national reconciliation and the restoration of trust between civil society and institutions. We hope that the comprehensive survey of the implementation of resolution 1325 (2000) will offer guidelines in this area, including on the training of contingents with regard to the incorporation of the gender perspective and the policy of zero tolerance of violence against women, including sexual violence.

We wish to conclude by insisting that mandates be adapted to local realities and that the international community design its cooperation around national programmes and priorities, with comprehensive and coherent approaches that create strong and responsible countries and institutions able to take the path of peace.

Mr. Cherif (Chad) (*spoke in French*): I thank Nigeria for having organized today's meeting on consolidating Security Council engagement on security sector reform through the further implementation of resolution 2151 (2014). I also thank Mr. Titov, Ms. Bangura and Ms. Nakamitsu for their briefings.

Creating professional security institutions that are competent, uphold the rule of law and serve the people is a difficult and long-term undertaking that requires resources and conducive political and social conditions. Unfortunately, such factors are often lacking in countries experiencing or emerging from conflict. The engagement of the United Nations and other players is necessary to that end. Chad voted in favour of resolution 2151 (2014). Concerned exclusively with security sector reform, it was the first resolution of its type. It reflects the key importance of security sector reform, which has become a cornerstone of United Nations peacekeeping operations and special political missions. I should like to make a few observations in that respect.

Security sector reform after conflict is critical to building peace and stability, as well as to promoting the rule of law and good governance, extending State authority and preventing relapse into conflict. The regular reports of the Secretary-General on this issue reveal that United Nations activities in support of national security sector reform initiatives encounter certain difficulties related to understanding the national political context, taking support for security sector reform into account from the very onset of the peace process, the engagement of national authorities,

including transitional authorities, and security conditions in the country concerned.

My country also notes other challenges, such as institutional weaknesses in the host country and a lack or shortfall of financing and other resources. In order to overcome some of those problems, we suggest that the Security Council undertake consultations with the host country in the course of negotiating the mandate of a peacekeeping operation, with a view to identifying national priorities for the reform of the security sector. As set out in resolution 2151 (2014), national ownership and a country's own determination of its priorities on the basis of its needs and particular situation are essential. In that regard, it is up to them to determine and prioritize the make-up of the security sector, including, among others, the defence sector and the police, penal, legal, border and immigration services.

Outside stakeholders, such as countries providing assistance and regional and international organizations, including the United Nations, should take into account the concerns of the host country. In the absence of a peace agreement during a transition period where national security institutions are practically non-existent, the support of the United Nations in security sector reform is crucial in helping national authorities to develop a national programme in that regard, all the while taking their priorities into account.

Moreover, given that the African continent is where most security sector reform processes are under way, it is essential to step up the interaction between the Security Council and the African Union in connection with providing support for such efforts. In that regard, we should recall that the African Union has in place a Policy Framework on Security Sector Reform, the development of which took place against the backdrop of broad consultation with many actors concerned, including the United Nations, the member States of the African Union, African civil society and the various regional economic communities. The purpose of the Framework is to help guide member States of the African Union in transforming their security sectors, with a view to making them more effective and efficient in ensuring control in a democratic manner, while taking into account the needs of the people in the area of justice.

In addition to security sector reform, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) are also important. Following disarmament, those who have

been demobilized should be provided economic opportunities in order to reintegrate into society. We underscore the fact that Chad, which has experienced a long period of conflict, has undertaken quite compelling efforts in that regard, including putting in place a DDR programme and establishing good-neighbourly relations with surrounding countries. Our efforts have resulted in an improvement of the country's security institutions, which today are contributing to preserving peace and maintaining security beyond our national borders. Chad is prepared to share its modest experience in that regard.

Given the security situation in the Sahel and in various North African countries where terrorist groups and transnational criminal networks are exploiting porous borders to carry out their illegal activities, thereby jeopardizing international peace and security, Chad would like to emphasize the importance of stepping up border security. We call upon the relevant entities of the United Nations and on Member States to support the efforts of the countries of the region in that regard.

In conclusion, I wish to underscore the importance of security sector reform. The efforts of the United Nations to support national initiatives on security sector reform are essential, but they must take into account national ownership and the priorities of the countries concerned, in line with their needs and their specific situations, so as to generate greater synergy. Chad urges the United Nations to strengthen its cooperation with the African Union in the area of support for security sector reform in order to help African States to benefit from the process, including through the Policy Framework, without losing sight of the need to link DDR programmes with strengthened border security, in particular in countries of the Sahel experiencing manifold security issues, especially the terrorism threat.

Mr. Wang Min (China) (*spoke in Chinese*): China appreciates Nigeria's initiative to convene this meeting on security sector reform (SSR). I would like to thank Assistant Secretary-General Titov, Special Representative of the Secretary-General Bangura and Assistant Administrator Nakamitsu for their respective briefings.

Security sector reform is an integral part and essential element of United Nations peacekeeping and peacebuilding. United Nations SSR assistance to post-conflict countries aimed at building professional,

efficient and dedicated security sectors is conducive to the maintenance of peace, security and stability in recipient countries, as well as helpful in creating enabling conditions for post-conflict reconstruction in those countries.

In recent years, the United Nations has actively assisted the SSR efforts of post-conflict countries and has achieved positive results. Sierra Leone and Liberia, among other countries, have gradually restored stability, and their security sectors have once again taken on their essential responsibility for national stability. However, in some other post-conflict countries SSR continues to face considerable challenges. Member States must seriously review good practices and lessons learned and, on the basis of existing achievements, further explore how to improve SSR. China would like to make four points on this issue.

First, it is important to observe national ownership of the SSR process. The maintenance of national security is the sovereign right of a State, and the host country should have ownership of the SSR process. In assisting host countries with SSR efforts, the United Nations and other entities should respect the sovereignty and ownership of the host countries. While providing constructive assistance in line with their needs, there is also a need to avoid micromanagement. More important, a guest should never usurp the role of the host.

Secondly, the United Nations should adhere to the principle of adapting SSR to local specificities. Post-conflict countries face myriad challenges that vary from country to country, and their SSR needs vary as well. While providing assistance to countries for their SSR processes, the United Nations needs to reflect the differences in line with their realities and specific conditions. It must develop a policy for each country, while identifying priority areas and the focus for the work. Efforts should also be made to avoid stereotyping and a one-size-fits-all approach.

Thirdly, the Organization must implement policies in an integrated manner. Security sector reform is central to peacebuilding in post-conflict countries. The United Nations should act mindful of the need to comprehensively implement peacebuilding strategies, reinforce integrated planning on SSR and ensure that SSR is closely combined with efforts to achieve national reconciliation, promote coordinated social and economic development and eradicate poverty, among other things. It should also ensure the eradication of the

root causes of conflict so as to achieve lasting peace and security.

Fourthly, regional and subregional organizations should play their full role. Over the years, the African Union and other regional and subregional organizations have done a great deal of work and build up a wealth of experience in helping post-conflict countries with their SSR efforts. The United Nations should encourage such organizations to scale up their participation in SSR and support them in playing a greater role. In addition, the United Nations should bolster its communication and coordination with the organizations concerned through information-sharing and exchanging best practices in order to build synergies on SSR.

This year, the United Nations will carry out a comprehensive review of its peacebuilding architecture in order to take stock of positive experiences in peacebuilding over the past decade and promote the peacebuilding undertaking. China has taken note of the report of the Secretary-General's Advisory Group of Experts on the issue. We also welcome the decision by the Presidents of the Security Council and the General Assembly to appoint Angola and Australia as facilitators for the intergovernmental review process. China is prepared to participate in the discussions and will work with other Member States to ensure that the review produces positive results so that the Organization will be better able to carry out its sacred responsibility for maintaining international peace and security, as it has been entrusted to do by the Charter of the United Nations.

Mr. Gasso Matoses (Spain) (*spoke in Spanish*): We would like to thank the Nigerian presidency of the Security Council for organizing this informative briefing. This is a timely debate, which certainly suitably complements the debates we have held in the past few weeks. An effective security sector is undoubtedly a guarantee of stability, peace and economic development.

We noted that a year ago resolution 2151 (2014), adopted under Nigeria's presidency, demonstrated that it was important to have such a reform at this time. We are now in an even more opportune time to assess the developments that have taken place in the past year. In the past year, we have seen more United Nations peacekeeping operations and special political missions receiving a mandate from the Council to deepen work in this area. For the countries immersed in conflict or in post-conflict situations, security sector reform

is extraordinarily difficult. Nonetheless, there is no alternative. Without it, we would see a deepening of, or relapse into, the same conflict-charged situations.

As a result, security sector reform serves, at the same time, a healthy and preventive dimension. On the basis of the accumulated experiences and lessons learned, a question would be: How are we carrying out the mission, and are we being effective when it comes to reforming the security sector? We could talk about the issue by coordinating three principal concepts: cooperation, trust and continuity of the process.

First, allow me to begin with the first of those elements, the necessary international cooperation in this area. The main element of the security sector reform makes it one of the most sensitive structures within the State apparatus. As a result, reform must necessarily at all times be carried out under national ownership and leadership that is perfectly compatible with international support as well as the support of regional or subregional organizations. In that regard, we must highlight the importance of continuing to develop, for instance, partnerships between them and the United Nations and the African Union or with subregional organizations on the African continent, bearing in mind that it is on this continent that most countries find themselves immersed in security sector reform.

We would also like to reiterate that Spain is contributing significantly, within the framework of the European Union, to training and providing advice for security sector reform in countries such as Somalia, the Niger, Mali and the Central African Republic, as well as outside the continent, in Afghanistan. However, all these efforts would be futile without the participation of civil society in this process where the building of trust is an important element.

Secondly, an aspect I would like to comment on is that security sector reform has an important technical component. But we should not fool ourselves; it is essentially a political process, the ultimate objective of which is to enhance the trust of society in their own States, thereby strengthening State institutions. As a result, security sector reform empowered to build the necessary trust and confidence must be a process that is inclusive in the sense that the entire nation should feel that it is a part of the change taking place. When I talk about inclusiveness I also want to refer to this as a process that is sensitive to gender issues. As we heard from the speakers, women's participation in all phases

of security sector reform is crucial. We trust that will be made clear in the month of October when we will discuss the reform of resolution 1325 (2000) on women and peace and security. Only in that way can we really talk about local ownership where security and peace are considered essential public goods.

Likewise, building trust means that we must bear in mind the economic and budgetary aspects of those reforms. Rational allocation of human, economic and material resources to the security sector is crucial. Lastly in that regard, it is necessary to ensure that State protection mechanisms for its citizens involve the necessary democratic control on the part of society. Security sector reform implies a high degree of political responsibility and accountability, including mechanisms that make it possible to fight against corruption. The very close relationship that exists between security sector reform and the reform of the justice sector, due to their nature, are interconnected.

Thirdly, security sector reform is an ongoing process, a medium- and long-term process, which due to its very nature has a longer life than that of United Nations peacekeeping missions. I said earlier that there are more and more peacekeeping missions with mandates related to strengthening the security sector. However, the exit strategies planned by Department of Peacekeeping Operations must be gradual and progressive. They must be drawn up according to objective, clear and verifiable parameters within the framework of a road map that defines the strategies clearly. They must be drawn up jointly with the host State, whose ownership must be encouraged to ensure that there is a proper assumption of responsibility on the part of the State on the matter of its own security sector.

There is still another element that we must bear in mind when a peacekeeping mission comes to an end. The Peacebuilding Commission plays a prominent role in this area through demonstrating the continuity of robust and well-coordinated support on the part of the international community for security sector reform. With its focus on development, the Commission acts as the third part of the peace, security and development apparatus, which we in the Chamber have established, especially through the country-specific configurations. All such international efforts must be accompanied by a sustained national effort, which would make it possible for the State to offer its citizens suitable functions and

mechanisms when it comes to police and armed forces, border control, the protection of civilians and justice.

Finally, it is no wonder that the sustainable development goals that will be adopted at the next major meeting of the General Assembly in September will include peacebuilding objectives. That gives us an idea of the importance of the sector as well as the interrelationship between peace, security and sustainable human development.

Mr. Ibrahim (Malaysia): At the outset, I wish to thank you, Madam President, and the Nigerian delegation for organizing this meeting. My delegation is of the view that the briefings today afford us an opportunity to reflect on, among other things, the role played by the United Nations in general and by the Council in particular, as well as the role of the relevant actors at the national and regional levels in implementing the security sector reform (SSR) agenda in various contexts, including those outlined in resolution 2151 (2014). In that connection, I thank you, Madam, for the detail concept note (S/2015/614, annex), which serves to frame and conceptualize our discussion today.

I join other Council members in expressing appreciation to Mr. Titov, Assistant Secretary-General of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations; Ms. Zainab Bangura, Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict; and Ms. Izumi Nakanitsu of United Nations Development Programme, for sharing their views and perspectives, which have helped enrich our discussions today.

I wish to echo the concern expressed by Ms. Bangura in her earlier briefing to the Council (see S/PV.7428), which highlighted, among other things, the disturbing trend of increased instances of sexual violence, including rape, sexual slavery and forced marriage, particularly in the context of conflict situations and increasing violent extremism. In certain instances, security personnel are themselves guilty of practicing such heinous acts. There can be no better example of the need for SSR to become implemented in States than the evidence of those charged with the responsibility of protecting civilians.

On that note, Malaysia commends the Secretary-General for taking decisive action in responding to the allegations of sexual violence by United Nations peacekeepers. All troop-contributing countries, including those contributing national forces, must maintain vigilance and not hesitate to investigate and,

where appropriate, hold perpetrators to account to ensure that there is no impunity.

In reaffirming support for resolution 2151 (2014) and its continuing implementation, I wish to elaborate on the issue of SSR in the context of post-conflict peacebuilding. Indeed, the importance of security sector reform was among the themes raised during the Council's informal interactive dialogue on peacebuilding on 25 June. Certain key points emanating from that exchange could, in my delegation's view, frame possible responses to the challenges, questions and issues raised in the concept note for today's meeting.

For instance, Malaysia highlights that given its unique convening role, the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) is well placed to coordinate the participation of a wide array of critical regional and international actors to assist concerned countries, including on reform of their security sector. By bringing together security and development actors, the PBC can perform a bridging role between United Nations principal organs and actors, thereby addressing fragmentation and the duplication of efforts. In the context of reforming the security sector, which itself is a precursor to establishing an environment conducive to sustainable development and peace, this is a crucial element. At the same time, the inclusive nature of the PBC membership, drawn from the general membership of the United Nations and the Council, along with other actors, means that it is also well placed to ensure that national priorities could be factored into the Council's mandate design process. That element is particularly crucial to ensuring the buy-in of concerned countries regarding possible SSR initiatives.

Through its partnerships with regional organizations and international and national financial institutions, the PBC could help sustain the attention and commitment of the international community towards national peacebuilding priorities, with a focus on addressing drivers of conflict and building resilient institutions, including the SSR agenda. Within the context of existing peace operations, it is conceivable that such assistance could be provided in the draw-down phase. That said, it is worth highlighting that SSR efforts need not necessarily follow armed conflict.

The United Nations and a number of regional organizations have a wealth of experience and have to date built up a substantial corpus of knowledge on security sector reform. The fact that the majority of United Nations peacekeeping operations contain

SSR components, each with its own peculiarity and adaptation to the situation and specific needs on the ground, indicates that the design and implementation of the SSR agenda must continue to be the product of close cooperation and collaboration among the United Nations, the concerned country and other relevant actors. In that connection, Malaysia is encouraged to note that the implementation of the African Union's policy framework on security sector reform is proceeding apace at the national, subregional and regional levels.

On the donor side, we note the strong frameworks under which the European Union, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development are assisting the overall security sector reform agenda. Ongoing efforts are necessary to coordinate actions and efforts between both donor and recipient with a view to seeking mutually satisfactory outcomes to the reform agenda.

On a related note, efforts aimed at curbing the proliferation of small arms and light weapons and their munitions, especially in conflict situations, deserve our full commitment and support. Malaysia strongly believes that limiting the supply and availability of such weapons could effectively contribute to peace initiatives and to post-conflict peacebuilding. It is for that reason, among others, that Malaysia co-sponsored resolution 2220 (2015), adopted on 22 May.

In conclusion, allow me to recap certain key points that I believe could be useful in taking forward the SSR agenda, as follows. First, SSR initiatives, particularly those spearheaded by the United Nations or other multilateral or regional actors, should remain inclusive and take into account national priorities, thereby ensuring the buy-in of concerned countries. Secondly, SSR must be recognized as not a exclusively technical but also a political exercise. A certain level of flexibility must be built into SSR initiatives, particularly at both the design and implementation phase. Thirdly, regular coordination among the various actors, including those within the United Nations system, is crucial to ensuring that efforts are not fragmented or duplicated. Finally, a key element of SSR should be a focus on limiting the supply of small arms and light weapons and their munitions to conflict situations.

Mr. Lamek (France) (*spoke in French*): I thank you, Madam, for having organized this meeting on

security sector reform (SSR). I also thank Mr. Titov, Ms. Bangura and Ms. Nakamitsu for their briefings.

I shall limit myself to making three observations. First, as many speakers before me have said, SSR is more of a political exercise than a technical one. It is decisive in post-crisis stabilization and consolidation, and requires significant work in the area of support to the host country. In post-conflict situations, security institutions must be established that are transparent, effective and fair and strive, within a system of good governance, to uphold democratic principles and human rights. Yet the national ownership of the host country, political will, ongoing and inclusive dialogue between those responsible for SSR, civil society and Governments are all essential if the process is to succeed.

The United Nations encounters difficulties when local authorities do not commit as firmly to SSR as called for in the relevant resolutions. We must never forget that, as I said, security sector reform is as much a political as a technical process. Its goals of rebuilding the national armed forces and internal security forces, as well as the judiciary and penal systems, are linked to the fundamental sovereign functioning of the State and the end game of reinstating a national system and a chain of command that restore security, belonging and confidence in the State by enshrining the protection of civilians and the upholding of human rights, all in line with fundamental democratic requirements.

This work is important in the context of the United Nations efforts to resolve disputes and establish lasting peace. It is often key to the exit strategies of peacekeeping or special political missions, as it allows for a transfer of operational responsibility for security to the host country. On the other hand, we know that incomplete or unsuccessful SSR can be a factor for tension or even relapse into violence. In undertaking these activities, United Nations missions need adequate resources adapted to every stage of a crisis. The Council tries to reflect that need in its approach to mandates. As we have just said, SSR is a delicate and often lengthy process. The United Nations has a role to play in improving the expertise of its missions and its access to local stakeholders. That, I believe, raises the question of the language spoken by the experts.

The United Nations can also enjoy close cooperation with other players on the ground, as in the case of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated

Stabilization Mission in Mali and the European Union Training Mission in Mali. I stress that the adapted deployment of significant SSR resources is not always immediately necessary in peacekeeping operations. Such operations do not always need to play a direct operational role; instead, they may act as technical advisers, motivators and coordinators. Moreover, they cannot substitute for the role of local authorities, who must conduct a thorough analysis of needs and define the requirements of outside support.

Priorities and sequencing need therefore to be established. Among generally urgent measures, rehabilitating the police and gendarmerie services and restarting an integrated corrections chain of command are absolutely essential, as the Council noted in the Central African Republic. The Council can also identify certain priorities, as for example when it talks about the need for a rapid reaction military force in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. It is for those reasons that France feels that peacekeeping efforts regarding SSR have to be sequenced and adapted to the phase of the crisis, as well as focused on several initial priorities that involve experts in sufficient numbers and qualifications, adjusted to the needs and capacities of the host country, in close cooperation with the numerous international actors, including the European Union, bilateral partners and other donors.

By way of conclusion, the Council must have at its disposal precise elements regarding the implementation of SSR programmes. In resolution 2151 (2014), we called for such coordination and for an increased role for the Council. Unfortunately, the Security Council is not always regularly or sufficiently well informed of progress in that field. I therefore reiterate our call for the Special Representatives of the Secretary-General to provide better details on those processes during their various briefings to the Council or in meetings of the Council with troop- and police- contributing countries. They must insist on an implementation strategy and, if necessary, on its linkage with disarmament, demobilization and reintegration measures by ensuring the effective of coordination with other United Nations organs and agencies, or even on the potential difficulties that they might encounter with the authorities of the host country. In that way, the Council should have at its disposal a regular analysis of results and improvements to be made. Successful SSR is a factor for stability and development for concerned countries, and thus a guarantee of success for the United Nations.

The President: I shall now make a statement in my capacity as the representative of Nigeria.

First, I want to thank our briefers: Assistant Secretary-General Titov, Assistant Secretary-General Nakamitsu and Special Representative of the Secretary-General Bangura for their very comprehensive briefings. I must acknowledge that we have all been greatly enriched by their perspectives on our very important discussion this morning.

Our meeting today offers the Council an opportunity to advance the enduring discourse on security sector reform (SSR) and to explore ways of giving practical and effective application to resolution 2151 (2014), which provides a clear and common basis of guidance for United Nations support to SSR. We believe that the implementation of the resolution would benefit from a prioritized plan of action that could form the basis of periodic reports of the Secretary-General. That, in our view, would allow the Council to monitor progress in the implementation of the resolution. We are pleased to note that there has been a steady increase in the demand for SSR. Today, as we speak, the number of Security Council resolutions that reference SSR stands at 37. SSR has become more integral to peacekeeping with a significant number of peacekeeping operations supporting the reform of security institutions.

The Security Sector Reform Unit of the Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions, whose Assistant Secretary-General we have just listened to this morning, has been instrumental in the effort to mainstream SSR. We want to commend the unit for that important achievement. We also welcome the work of the Office of Special Representative Bangura and the Team of Experts in providing support to national authorities, including in SSR processes. Indeed, the United Nations Development Programme must also be recognized, particularly as the co-chair of the United Nations inter-agency Task Force on Security Sector Reform, and its valuable contribution to advancing both the rule of law and SSR.

The modest experience acquired so far indicates that the quality and impact of United Nations support to SSR depends on its coherence and effective coordination within the United Nations and between the United Nations and other stakeholders supporting SSR processes. With the multiplicity of actors supporting SSR in situations where national capacity for coordination is often limited, it is imperative to

establish clarity of rules and division of labour among those involved in the reform process.

That is why we encourage the concept of an SSR compact among peace operations, international partners and the host State, as espoused by Mr. Titov. Such a compact would foster predictability, prevent duplication and ensure mutual accountability and transparency in the implementation of the United Nations mandate. It would also strengthen the effectiveness of United Nations assistance by setting out focused and time-bound priorities, as well as provide an enabling framework for partnership between international partners and host Governments. In clarifying roles, it is important to emphasize that States — as most speakers have noted this morning — bear the primary responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security within their borders. States must continue to take the lead in determining their own security sector priorities. That is the essence and primacy of the idea of national ownership.

The global normative frameworks on SSR expounded by the United Nations must be placed within the specificity of the sociopolitical realities of the particular country that is undergoing reform. In that regard, the SSR policy framework of the African Union, adopted only in 2013, aptly addresses the complicity of the relationship between the former security institutions of the State, on the one hand, and the resilience of traditional and often informal customary African security institutions, on the other. The future viability of SSR in Africa will depend to a large extent on how effectively we are able to balance the relationship between the statutory formality and customary informality of security institutions in Africa.

National efforts at ensuring security must take into consideration regional and global threats to security. That is more poignant in the current global environment, where transnational threats increasingly emanate essentially from non-State actors. In specific terms, the link between national SSR processes and various regional and global initiatives must be emphasized at this point. The adoption of the African Union Policy Framework on Security Sector Reform provides opportunities for increasing cooperation with the United Nations and other regional organizations. In turn, the adoption of an Economic Community of West African States SSR policy framework would complement that process at the subregional level.

Several speakers before me this morning have emphasized the need to remain cognizant of the

preventive dimension of security sector governance and how that could promote peacebuilding.

I would like to say that Nigeria encourages continued engagement with SSR on the part of other United Nations organs, notably the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council. We welcome the attention the General Assembly accords to SSR-related issues, especially under goal 16 of the post-2015 sustainable development agenda. That underscores the important link between security and development. It is our collective responsibility not only to guard, guide and protect that nexus; we must cultivate their symbiotic relationship as well.

It is gratifying to note that considerable progress has been achieved in taking the SSR agenda forward. But we believe that much more can and indeed must be done to support SSR processes. In resolution 2151 (2014), we already have a platform for action. What is needed now is for all hands to be on deck at the global, regional and national levels. Only a collective, collaborative and concerted effort will ensure our success in this important endeavour.

I now resume my functions as President of the Council.

The meeting rose at 12.30 p.m.