
2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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Main Committee III

Summary record of the 2nd meeting

Held at Headquarters, New York, on Tuesday, 5 May 2015, at 10 a.m.

Chair: Mr. Stuart (Australia)
later: Mr. Bravo (Vice-Chair) (Chile)
later: Mr. Stuart (Australia)

Contents

General exchange of views (*continued*)

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The meeting was called to order at 10.05 a.m.

General exchange of views (*continued*)

1. **Mr. McIlroy** (United Kingdom) said that the inalienable right of States parties to utilize civil nuclear energy in compliance with non-proliferation obligations had been part of the grand bargain of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. His country had been operating nuclear facilities since the mid-1950s and was proud to be the partner of choice for many other countries wishing to develop safe and secure civil nuclear power, which had the potential to meet the growing need for reliable and consistent low-carbon energy.

2. His country was a strong supporter of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Technical Cooperation Programme, which made a significant contribution to the effort to achieve the Millennium Development Goals by providing support for the safe and effective use of nuclear techniques in numerous fields, including medical diagnosis and crop protection. The United Kingdom had also recently contributed funds towards modernization of the Agency's laboratories in Seibersdorf, Austria through the Peaceful Uses Initiative. It was important for the Technical Cooperation Programme to be focused on projects with realistically sustainable ongoing benefits. The action plan contained in the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol. I)) had created a framework of deliverables for nuclear technologies that continued to have relevance.

3. Since the previous Review Conference, his Government had taken steps to enhance its civil nuclear regulatory framework, including the establishment of the Office for Nuclear Regulation as a statutory independent regulator. The nuclear fuel assurance initiative, which had been proposed by the United Kingdom in response to the call for the development of multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle, had been adopted at the IAEA Board of Governors meeting in March 2011. A menu of viable and credible fuel supply assurances should be created that would enable new nuclear States to avoid expensive enrichment technologies, without placing a burden on States that chose not to take part.

4. The United Kingdom was a party to a number of international conventions on nuclear safety and

security, and urged other States to sign and ratify all such instruments as soon as possible. His Government had also funded a series of events hosted by the International Network of Emerging Nuclear Specialists to discuss a mechanism for implementing the right of States to withdraw from the Treaty in a way that did not undermine the collective right to global security. He hoped that the current Review Conference would build a consensus on how to move forward on that issue as well as on strengthening the review process in general.

5. **Mr. Motta Pinto Coelho** (Brazil) said that nuclear technology would continue to be of great relevance to the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals and the post-2015 sustainable development goals. Brazil was both a donor to and a beneficiary of the Technical Cooperation Programme of IAEA, and commended that Agency's timely and appropriate response to the Fukushima Daiichi accident. Brazil had participated actively in IAEA conferences and the Nuclear Security Summits, and was satisfied with the outcomes of the Diplomatic Conference of the Contracting Parties to the Convention on Nuclear Safety held in Argentina in February 2015.

6. Concerns about nuclear security and safety were legitimate, but should not be used as a pretext for the imposition of constraints on the inalienable right of States to peaceful uses of nuclear energy. It was not civilian nuclear facilities, but stockpiles of nuclear material for military use that posed the greatest security risk. At the 2014 Nuclear Summit, Brazil, along with 14 other countries, had submitted a joint statement entitled "In larger security: a comprehensive approach to nuclear security", in response to those concerns. The quest for nuclear security and non-proliferation could not be dissociated from effective implementation of the disarmament commitments contained in the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Discussion of withdrawal from the Treaty should focus less on constraints to deter States parties from withdrawing and more on incentives to encourage them to remain.

7. Given the importance of nuclear energy to economic and social development, the Review Conference should encourage IAEA to take part in discussions on the post-2015 development agenda, call upon States to strengthen the IAEA Technical Cooperation Programme, and facilitate exchanges of equipment, materials and scientific and technological

information without any constraints that were inconsistent with the Treaty. It should also recognize that the vast majority of nuclear materials were contained in military stockpiles that were not subject to international supervision, and call upon nuclear-weapon States to show greater transparency with regard to the content of those stockpiles and the measures taken to ensure their security.

8. **Mr. Mathews** (Australia), speaking also on behalf of the Vienna Group of Ten, said that nuclear applications played an essential role in areas such as human health, agriculture, food safety and nutrition, energy and environmental protection. All parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons had the right to develop research, produce and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, with the proviso that the best possible non-proliferation, safety and security conditions were maintained. Accordingly, the Vienna Group had prepared a comprehensive working paper (NPT/CONF.2015/WP.1) to encourage discussion of the so-called Vienna issues, namely the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, compliance and verification, export controls, cooperation on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, nuclear safety and security, and withdrawal from the Non-Proliferation Treaty. It contained a number of recommendations for consideration by the Review Conference.

9. **Mr. Biontino** (Germany) said that all States parties to the Treaty had an inalienable right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, subject to their international obligations under articles I, II and III of the Treaty. Germany would cooperate with States wishing to develop a peaceful and transparent civil nuclear programme that met the highest standards of safety, security, non-proliferation and respect for the environment. It also supported the IAEA Technical Cooperation Programme and its Peaceful Uses Initiative as a means of promoting the benefits of nuclear technology in areas such as human health, agriculture, water management, industrial applications and energy. Capacity-building focusing on peaceful applications of nuclear energy and technologies was essential for countries planning to launch a nuclear power programme. In that connection, Germany had contributed 4.76 million euros to the IAEA Technical Cooperation Fund; it had also supported the modernization of the IAEA laboratories in Seibersdorf, Austria with an extrabudgetary contribution of

1.6 million euros in 2014 and was considering a further voluntary contribution in 2015.

10. The Fukushima Daiichi incident had been a reminder of the risks associated with nuclear technology. All States should therefore support the implementation of the IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear Safety and the Convention on Nuclear Safety, while continuously improving their emergency preparedness and response measures. Multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle promoted energy security and non-proliferation without distorting the existing market.

11. His Government supported the work of the IAEA to establish a low enriched uranium bank in Kazakhstan. It also acknowledged the right of withdrawal enshrined in article X of the Treaty. However, that right should not be abused and should be exercised only in the event of extraordinary Treaty-related circumstances, and a withdrawing State must give notice to all other States parties three months in advance of such withdrawal. In any event, the right of withdrawal was governed by the provisions of the Treaty and other relevant international legislation, and a withdrawing State party was still liable for Treaty violations that predated that notification. Furthermore, withdrawal did not affect the rights or obligations of the withdrawing State party or any other States parties, including those related to IAEA safeguards. Consequently, nuclear materials, equipment and technology acquired prior to withdrawal would remain subject to those safeguards or fall-back safeguards. Nuclear-supplying States should therefore incorporate dismantling or return clauses or fall-back safeguards into contracts concluded with other States parties.

12. **Mr. Journès** (France) said that the development of civil nuclear energy was a key to achieving the goals of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. There were 443 nuclear reactors currently in operation worldwide, and 65 others were under construction. Those figures showed that many States continued to view nuclear energy as an opportunity to meet their energy needs while addressing the issue of climate change. His country had mastered all nuclear technologies and was conducting research into fourth-generation reactors within the framework of an international project, in cooperation with other countries and with ongoing support from IAEA. The aim was to develop nuclear energy responsibly while respecting the shared future of peoples and other

States, in keeping with the highest possible standards of safety, security and non-proliferation.

13. To meet the challenge of training new generations of civilian nuclear elites, France had embarked upon a new capacity-building initiative intended to enable interested States to cooperate and identify ways to share competencies and boost international training capacity. There was strong demand for such training in States with nuclear programmes, in particular States establishing nuclear programmes for the first time. Similarly, France supported the IAEA designated International Centres based on Research Reactors initiative to facilitate access by member States to modern research reactors. The French Alternative Energies and Atomic Energy Commission had accordingly obtained such designation and stood ready to assist other States wishing to obtain the same designation for their nuclear facilities.

14. Strengthened nuclear safety had been a feature of the current review cycle. The international community should continue to learn lessons from the Fukushima Daiichi incident and develop a capacity to manage nuclear or radiological emergencies. In the interest of transparency, France had made public its tailored implementation of the IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear Safety and invited other States to follow its example. International peer review missions should also be stepped up. In 2014, France had hosted an Integrated Regulatory Review Service mission and would soon host an Operational Safety Review Team mission.

15. It was encouraging that the Diplomatic Conference of Contracting Parties to the Convention on Nuclear Safety had unanimously agreed on the need for political commitment to implementing measures to raise safety standards in nuclear facilities. France also supported the development of a global regime of third party liability in the field of nuclear energy and called on more States to therefore become parties to the related international conventions. Furthermore, the revised Paris Convention on Nuclear Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy, the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage and the Joint Protocol Relating to the Application of the Vienna Convention and the Paris Convention were a sufficient basis for compensating for nuclear damage. France was also committed to improving nuclear security and the security of radioactive sources in particular, by strengthening the relevant international

framework and researching technologies that would no longer require such sources.

16. The IAEA Technical Cooperation Programme contributed to the effort to achieve the Millennium Development Goals not only in the area of energy but also in health care, agriculture, environmental protection and sustainable development. At a time when access to nuclear energy was a key to controlling climate change, the Review Conference should make concrete progress in implementing the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which was the cornerstone of global nuclear security.

17. **Ms. Jamal** (Malaysia) said that Malaysia attached great importance to the inalienable right of all States parties to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination, as enshrined in article IV of the Treaty. It was the right of States parties to determine their participation in such areas of nuclear energy and to decide on their fuel cycle policies. No steps should be taken by any parties that might be interpreted as affecting those rights.

18. The International Atomic Energy Agency played a vital role through its Technical Cooperation Programme, the resources of which should be sufficient, assured and predictable, in order to ensure that all planned programmes could be implemented effectively and efficiently. The Programme should continue to be carried out in accordance with the IAEA statute, the revised guiding principles as contained in INFCIRC/267, and the decisions of the IAEA policymaking organs.

19. Malaysia was a recipient of and a contributor to technical cooperation, which had promoted nuclear knowledge-sharing and the transfer of nuclear technology for the further enhancement of scientific and technological capabilities. In the long term, such enhancement would benefit and contribute to her country's socioeconomic development. Her delegation reaffirmed its support for the Peaceful Uses Initiative, which aimed to provide extrabudgetary funding in order to support implementation of technical cooperation projects and fostered partnerships among States on projects it supported. She welcomed the financial contributions to the Initiative, in particular those of Japan and the United States.

20. **Mr. Ibrahim** (Syrian Arab Republic) said that peaceful uses of nuclear energy were a benefit of

scientific progress that was part of the common human heritage. Even though article IV of the Treaty was unambiguous that there should be no obstacles placed in the way of States parties that wished to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, certain States continued to impose discriminatory conditions on the export of nuclear technology to developing States. On the other hand, those very same States were quite happy to transfer technology to Israel, and to provide that country with cover to develop military nuclear facilities despite its persistent refusal to join the Treaty. Pressure should be put on Israel to halt its nuclear activities and place its nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards, in accordance with United Nations Security Council resolution 487 (1981).

21. The Syrian Arab Republic hoped that the framework agreement on the Iranian nuclear programme would be followed by a final agreement that guaranteed the right of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy while also removing any misunderstanding on the part of the other parties about the nature of its nuclear programme. His Government reiterated its insistence that the Western States should fulfil their obligation to lift the economic sanctions that had been unjustly imposed on the Iranian people. Putting an end to double standards in the implementation of the Treaty was the only way to ensure universal compliance.

22. *Mr. Bravo (Chile), Vice-Chair, took the Chair.*

23. **Mr. Fu** Cong (China) said that, as one of the greatest scientific and technological achievements of the twentieth century, nuclear energy had made important contributions to the sustainable development of human society. The prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons should not detract from the legitimate right of all countries, and developing countries in particular, to the peaceful use of nuclear energy. The International Atomic Energy Agency should therefore step up its technical assistance and promote international cooperation, and member States should provide greater resources for that purpose.

24. All countries should strengthen their legislation and their monitoring and management mechanisms to bolster the security of their nuclear materials and facilities. They should also consolidate the international legal framework concerning nuclear safety and security, promote the universalization of the

International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, and combat illicit trafficking of nuclear materials. Nuclear safety included the prevention and control of radioactive pollution through comprehensive regulations and a culture of safety supported by adequate financial resources. There should nevertheless be an improved mechanism for the emergency response to nuclear accidents.

25. China had recently launched a programme for the orderly development of nuclear energy. In addition to 23 nuclear power units currently in operation, a further 25 were being built, representing over 40 per cent of the units under construction worldwide. China was committed to international cooperation in the area of nuclear energy and had made contributions to IAEA as a board member, and made donations to the Agency's Technical Cooperation Fund. It had also sent experts to other member States and received thousands of foreign technical personnel for training in China.

26. As the first nuclear-weapon State to bring into force an additional protocol and to establish a comprehensive system for controlling nuclear materials and exports, China had fulfilled its international obligations and commitments and continued to cooperate with IAEA, including by ratifying the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material.

27. **Mr. Youn** Jong-kwon (Republic of Korea) said that the inalienable right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy must be exercised in conformity with Treaty obligations. As a former beneficiary of IAEA technical cooperation and current donor, his country had a demonstrated record of sharing its nuclear expertise with developing States and contributing to the IAEA Technical Cooperation Fund. That Fund's resources should be sufficient, assured and predictable. His country had also contributed over \$4 million to various projects of the Peaceful Uses Initiative since its inception in 2011, and was in the process of contributing another \$1 million for 2015.

28. His delegation hoped that the lessons learned from the Fukushima Daiichi accident would be incorporated into the nuclear safety regime. It supported the IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear Safety, welcomed the adoption of the Vienna Declaration on Nuclear Safety, and supported the strengthening of the Convention on Nuclear Safety. The three Nuclear Security Summits, one of which his country had hosted

in 2012, had made significant contributions towards enhancing global nuclear security, which would in turn advance all three pillars of the Treaty. The Republic of Korea called for the timely establishment of the IAEA low enriched uranium fuel bank in Kazakhstan, the revitalization of discussions on the development of multilateral approaches to the fuel cycle, and the development of proliferation-resistant spent fuel management schemes.

29. **Mr. Daryaei** (Islamic Republic of Iran) said that the use of science and technology for peaceful purposes was the inalienable right of any sovereign State. Nuclear energy was an environmentally friendly source of energy and had a growing range of applications, making it a key to sustainable socioeconomic development, especially in developing countries. Balance between the norms, institutions and regulations of each of the three pillars of the Non-Proliferation Treaty would ensure that the Treaty remained credible and would contribute to international peace and security. The inalienable right of all States to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, without discrimination, emanated from two broader propositions, namely, that scientific and technological achievements were the common heritage of humankind, and that a balance between rights and obligations was the basis for any sound legal instrument. Article IV of the Treaty required all States parties to facilitate exchanges of equipment and information for peaceful uses.

30. In light of the increasing demand for nuclear energy, his country's neighbours, mainly oil-exporting countries, had launched welcome initiatives on the peaceful use of nuclear energy in response to the need to diversify energy resources in order to meet future requirements. Nuclear energy was also needed, especially in developing countries, in the areas of health care, industry, agriculture and environmental protection. Article III of the Treaty explicitly stipulated that the implementation of safeguards should not hamper the sustainable development of States parties or international coordination in peaceful nuclear activities.

31. The Treaty did not prohibit the transfer or use of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes; it merely stated that such technology should be subject to full-scope IAEA safeguards, and article IV of the Treaty left no room for reinterpretation or limitation of the peaceful use of nuclear energy. The interpretation used

by some States parties as a pretext for preventing the transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes was therefore inconsistent with the objectives of the Treaty. Attempts by some States parties to limit the right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy, including through the Security Council, or to turn confidence-building measures into mandatory ones contravened article IV of the Treaty. Indeed, the adoption of such measures would upset the balance of rights and responsibilities, increase discrimination between States parties, and destroy the fundamental bargain of the Treaty.

32. The legitimate demand by developing countries for technical cooperation through the regular IAEA budget had been ignored for decades by industrial countries, some of which had stipulated on political grounds that voluntary funds should not be paid to certain developing countries. Safeguard activities, on the other hand, were funded from the regular budget. That discrimination should be abandoned. States parties should ensure that IAEA resources for assisting developing countries were sufficient, assured and predictable, but no steps had been taken in that direction.

33. Non-proliferation measures should facilitate rather than hamper the exercise of the right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The imposition of restrictions on that right in violation of article IV of the Treaty had been arrogantly continued, thereby undermining the integrity and credibility of the Treaty. Unilaterally enforced export control regimes hampered access by developing countries to nuclear technologies for peaceful purposes, even though nothing in the IAEA statute, the Treaty, the comprehensive safeguards agreements or the additional protocols to those agreements prohibited or restricted enrichment and reprocessing activities.

34. Each party to the Treaty had a sovereign right to define its national energy policies, including the inalienable right to develop a full national nuclear fuel cycle for peaceful purposes. The promotional statutory pillar of the IAEA statute should not be jeopardized by illegal and politically motivated attempts to deprive a developing member State of technical cooperation intended for humanitarian and peaceful uses. There should be a balance between the promotional and safeguards activities of the Agency. The Islamic Republic of Iran would pursue all legal areas of nuclear energy exclusively for peaceful purposes,

under full Agency supervision. As a responsible nuclear technology owner, it had put in place a legal framework to protect nuclear materials and facilities from unauthorized access.

35. All States members of the Agency should be involved in nuclear security in an inclusive manner; a selective and discriminatory approach to nuclear security would not result in internationally agreed measures. Damage resulting from the politicization of the Agency was contrary to the Treaty and the comprehensive safeguards agreements. The 2015 Review Conference should therefore establish a mechanism to examine the implementation of article IV by nuclear technology owners and provide compensation for any damage caused by a failure to implement the article or by politically motivated discrimination.

36. No State party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty could be expected to do more than it was obligated to do under the Treaty and its comprehensive safeguards agreement, or to renounce part of its inalienable right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Negotiation was the only way to dispel ambiguities and promote cooperation in disarmament and non-proliferation. Furthermore, urgent measures were needed to prevent the recurrence of assassinations of Iranian scientists by terrorist groups affiliated with the intelligence services of certain countries and Israel. States parties should address that issue, which was relevant to the spirit and letter of the Treaty and the IAEA statute.

37. **Mr. Przeniosło** (Poland) said that in 2014, his country had launched a programme to build its first nuclear power plant, with the goal of producing 12 per cent of its electricity from nuclear energy by 2030. Under the auspices of the Global Threat Reduction Initiative, Poland was well on its way to eliminating all highly enriched uranium from its territory by 2016. International cooperation and the sharing of expertise were essential to enhancing international nuclear safety standards. Poland had taken part in all the Nuclear Security Summits and, in 2014, thanks to steps that it had taken to counter the threat of nuclear terrorism, it had moved up to the sixth spot on the Nuclear Threat Initiative's nuclear security index for countries with weapons-usable nuclear materials.

38. The IAEA Technical Cooperation Programme made a major contribution to the responsible development of peaceful applications of nuclear

technology. In addition to the ongoing Peaceful Uses Initiative, the capacity-building initiative recently proposed by France could be an important component of the peaceful-uses regime. He urged the Review Conference to make specific recommendations on nuclear safety and security in support of the central role of IAEA.

39. *Mr. Stuart (Australia) resumed the Chair.*

40. **Mr. Stalder** (Switzerland) said that implementation of the measures on peaceful uses of nuclear energy adopted by the 2010 Review Conference had been encouraging. Global interest in using nuclear power to generate electricity was growing, and his country had made a special contribution to projects for the renovation of IAEA laboratories. The State-level concept was crucial for the long-term future of IAEA safeguards, particularly because there were certain States outside the Treaty regime that benefited from peaceful-uses cooperation. Switzerland called on those States to adopt internationally recognized non-proliferation norms.

41. Peaceful uses went hand in hand with responsibility for nuclear safety. The Diplomatic Conference of the Contracting Parties to the Convention on Nuclear Safety, held in February 2015, to consider the amendment proposed by his country to that Convention, had adopted the Vienna Declaration on Nuclear Safety, which supported the principle that future nuclear installations should be designed and constructed with the aim of preventing accidents and, if accidents should occur, mitigating their effects. The discussion of the IAEA final report on the Fukushima Daiichi disaster, scheduled for June 2015, would be an opportunity for that Agency's Board of Governors to promote international engagement on nuclear safety. In the meantime, States that had not yet done so should accede as soon as possible to the Convention and other nuclear-safety instruments, and implement the key elements of the IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear Safety.

42. Peaceful uses also went hand in hand with responsibility for nuclear security. Since an act of nuclear terrorism would have repercussions beyond the boundaries of any particular State, nuclear security was a matter of global concern. Switzerland called on States that had not yet done so to accede to such international instruments as the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and the Amendment thereto, and the Code of Conduct on the

Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources. New challenges, such as cyberattacks, must also be anticipated. Switzerland had taken part in the various Nuclear Security Summits, and encouraged States parties to use the ministerial conference on nuclear security scheduled for December 2016 to define the future role of IAEA in nuclear security. To be credible, the international nuclear security regime must expand beyond materials for peaceful uses, to include the 85 per cent of weapons-usable nuclear material that was under military control.

43. **Mr. Schroor** (Netherlands) said that IAEA had a pivotal role in facilitating peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and that Agency's Technical Cooperation Programme had an important contribution to make to the post-2015 development agenda. His country consistently paid its target contributions to the Agency's Technical Cooperation Fund. All States parties should work together to strengthen nuclear security, including by fulfilling requirements such as those contained in Security Council resolution 1540 (2004). In addition to its share of the European Union contribution, the Netherlands had recently contributed an additional 1 million euros to the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund. It actively promoted adoption of the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. The working papers submitted by the Vienna Group of Ten ([NPT/CONF.2015/WP.1](#)) and the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative ([NPT/CONF.2015/WP.16](#) and [NPT/CONF.2015/WP.17](#)) contained valuable recommendations for improving nuclear security at the national and global levels.

44. **Ms. Mindaoudou** (Niger) said that peaceful uses of nuclear energy had the potential to help developing States become energy independent. Her Government had set the goal of providing both the industrial and the public sectors with affordable and accessible energy by 2025 through energy diversification that included a nuclear programme under the auspices of the Economic Community of West African States. The benefits of nuclear technology to development should be taken into account in the formulation of the sustainable development goals. Her country had benefited greatly from technical cooperation with IAEA. Enhanced technology transfer under the auspices of IAEA to help African countries add nuclear energy to their energy mix would increase States parties' confidence in and compliance with the Treaty.

45. **Mr. Shukri** (Saudi Arabia) said that the guarantee of the inalienable right of all States parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination had been the impetus for many States to accede to the Treaty and comply with its provisions. The imposition by certain States of excessive and unjustified restrictions on the transfer of peaceful nuclear technology would have a negative impact on national nuclear programmes and international nuclear cooperation. All States had the right to set their own priorities on peaceful uses of nuclear energy and the nuclear fuel cycle without prejudice to international agreements and arrangements.

46. He called on States members of IAEA to increase resources for that Agency's Technical Cooperation Programme. His own country's national programme for the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, which operated in accordance with international agreements and under the IAEA comprehensive safeguards system, was intended to serve the purposes of sustainable development and conservation of hydrocarbon resources.

47. **Mr. Al-Taie** (Iraq) said that peaceful uses of nuclear energy had become a necessary component of development, with important applications in the areas of clean energy, agriculture, and scientific and medical research. Non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty had agreed to refrain from developing nuclear weapons in exchange for access to nuclear technology and fuel. Selective restrictions on the transfer of such technology were not consistent with the spirit and letter of the Treaty. He called on IAEA to step up its Technical Cooperation Programme and to enhance its role in facilitating the transfer of nuclear technology to developing States. The professionalism and expertise of IAEA made it the ideal framework for ensuring the peaceful nature of nuclear programmes.

48. Nevertheless, it might be useful to create a multilateral non-discriminatory mechanism for ensuring transparency in the Agency's work. International cooperation must take place within the framework of the Treaty. His delegation supported efforts to universalize the comprehensive safeguards system, but also stressed the optional character of additional protocols, which should not be made a condition for technology transfer. He called on IAEA to focus its technical assistance efforts on States parties to the Treaty.

49. **Mr. Silpathamtada** (Thailand) said that the right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy had been a key element of the grand bargain struck by the States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and represented a significant incentive for compliance with non-proliferation obligations. Peaceful uses of nuclear technology had a wide variety of applications and an important role to play in the post-2015 development agenda. The IAEA Technical Cooperation Programme had been responsible for lifting many out of poverty, and the Peaceful Uses Initiative had allowed for implementation of projects in several countries, including his own, that might otherwise have remained unfunded. He urged States parties to ensure that IAEA resources for technical cooperation were sufficient, assured and predictable.

50. His country had hosted the first two formal meetings of the Network of Regulatory Bodies on Atomic Energy that had been set up by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations in 2013 to ensure the highest standards of safety and security in activities relating to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

51. **Mr. Niyazaliev** (Kyrgyzstan), speaking on behalf of the Central Asian States, said that radioactive tailings left behind by uranium mining were a serious problem in his region, with potentially catastrophic consequences in some cases. Some burial sites were located in areas prone to earthquakes, landslides and flooding, where toxic substances seeping into the fresh water grid would have major consequences for millions of people that would take decades to mitigate. The Central Asian States, in cooperation with the United Nations Development Programme and other international organizations, had organized a high-level forum on uranium tailings, held in Geneva in 2009, and in 2013, the General Assembly had adopted resolution 68/218 on the role of the international community in averting the radiation threat in Central Asia.

52. The five Central Asian States had also signed the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia. One of the innovative features of that Treaty was that it called for remediation of environmental damage to the region from prior nuclear-weapon activities. He drew attention to the working paper on the environmental consequences of uranium mining (NPT/CONF.2015/WP.26) submitted by the Kyrgyz Republic on behalf of the Central Asian States, which reiterated the appeal of previous Review Conferences to all Governments and international organizations

with expertise in the clean-up and disposal of radioactive contaminants to consider providing assistance in that area.

53. **Mr. Rosnes** (Norway) said that all States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons had a right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination, provided that they carried out all their nuclear activities were carried out in accordance with the highest standards of safety, security and non-proliferation. Nuclear energy played an essential role in a number of areas central to human development, including health, water management and agriculture. Considering the expected growth in nuclear power, IAEA was more important than ever in helping States improve their safety standards, particularly in the light of the Fukushima Daiichi accident. Norway intended to step up its efforts to support the crucial work of the Agency, including through financial support for projects under the Peaceful Uses Initiative.

54. For a coastal State like Norway, transport safety was a particular priority. His Government appreciated the ongoing cooperation between coastal States and States that transported radioactive materials. The implementation of IAEA comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols was essential to the protection of collective security. The Nuclear Security Summits had contributed substantially to nuclear security and to keeping fissile material beyond the reach of terrorists. Norway urged all States that had not yet done so to become parties to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and the Amendment thereto, and the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism.

55. IAEA had a central role in strengthening the nuclear security framework globally and in coordinating international activities in the field of nuclear energy. The goal must be to secure all fissile materials. It was encouraging that a growing number of civilian research reactors were being converted to use low-enriched uranium. In Norway, the use of highly radioactive sources in hospitals had been discontinued. The working paper submitted by the Vienna Group of Ten (NPT/CONF.2015/WP.1) provided useful guidance on core focus areas for the responsible peaceful use of nuclear energy.

56. **Mr. Isnomo** (Indonesia) said that it was crucial to keep a balanced, comprehensive and non-discriminatory

approach to the three pillars of the Treaty. The universality of the Treaty should be made a priority, and States that were not yet parties should immediately accede to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States. Nuclear technology was an indispensable component of peoples' socioeconomic and technological development, particularly in developing countries such as Indonesia. It was therefore important that all States should fully realize their inalienable right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy without discrimination, in accordance with article IV of the Treaty.

57. Indonesia had committed itself to optimizing the use of new and renewable energy resources in order to secure the energy supply that was needed for sustaining its economic growth. Its activities with the International Atomic Energy Agency on furthering the application of nuclear science and technology were focused on addressing many aspects of its development programme, in particular in the areas of health, food and agriculture, water resources management, environmental protection and industry.

58. There were, undeniably, potential benefits to the responsible use of nuclear technologies and the synergies fostered by international cooperation in the nuclear field. IAEA played an important role through its statutory mandate to implement many provisions of the Treaty regarding the peaceful uses of nuclear technology. Its Technical Cooperation Programme should therefore be further supported by providing it with sufficient, assured and predictable resources. His Government had been supporting that Programme since 1957 and, through the Agency's Peaceful Uses Initiative, had supported technical projects in Myanmar, Cambodia and Jordan in the field of agriculture and the utilization of research reactors.

59. The nexus between nuclear security and nuclear safety — and the sustained efforts that were required to continue to address those two issues — should be dealt with in a coherent and synergistic manner. Effective emergency preparedness, response and mitigation capabilities should also be maintained in a manner that addressed both nuclear security and nuclear safety. The link between the international nuclear response system and the international humanitarian coordination system should also be strengthened. Enhancing universal adherence to the nuclear safety framework, especially IAEA nuclear safety standards, was no less important. The primary responsibility for nuclear safety was in the hands of each State, but the role of IAEA in assuring

the safety of all nuclear activities worldwide should be enhanced and strengthened to the extent mandated by the Agency's statute.

60. Strengthening nuclear safety should be a continuous effort, reinvigorated from time to time by the incorporation of new experiences, needs and innovations. Indonesia continued to take the necessary measures to secure all nuclear materials in all its facilities in accordance with existing international safety standards, working together with other nations at the bilateral, regional and global levels. It had been using and would continue to use low-enriched uranium in the production of radioisotopes and the operation of nuclear research reactors. Radioactive portal monitors had been installed in some Indonesian seaports to control nuclear and radioactive materials, and the country had acceded to the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism.

61. His Government had started drawing up a draft comprehensive law on nuclear security and had established a centre of excellence in nuclear security and emergency preparedness. It had also developed an implementation kit for model national legislation on nuclear security, which had been presented at the Nuclear Security Summit held in The Hague in 2014. Indonesia welcomed the joint plan of action agreed between Iran and the five permanent members of the Security Council and Germany, and hoped that it would serve as a strong basis for a comprehensive agreement on the Iranian nuclear issue. Nonetheless, continued efforts were needed to build international confidence in the peaceful purposes of the Iranian nuclear programme.

62. The current Review Conference should reaffirm the validity of article IV of the Treaty with a view to ensuring that the rights of all States parties were fully protected and that no State party was limited in the exercise of its right to develop research, produce and use nuclear technologies for peaceful purposes.

63. **Mr. Aly** (Egypt) said that issues addressed by the Committee were not only important for the balanced and effective implementation of the Treaty, but crucial to scientific development, medical and industrial progress and the overall prosperity of peoples around the world. IAEA played a unique and central role as the sole authority mandated with the application of safeguards to verify compliance with Treaty

commitments, and the global focal point on technical cooperation in the nuclear field.

64. While most parties saw the inalienable right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy as a key component of the grand bargain the Treaty promised at its inception, a good majority of non-nuclear-weapon States had not yet reaped the expected benefits of that right, owing mostly to unjustified restrictions on nuclear technology transfers. Nonetheless, non-nuclear-weapon States, including Egypt, were encouraged by the high standards identified by IAEA in ensuring the necessary conditions for the safe and secure operation of peaceful nuclear facilities. States should therefore ensure that they were on the right track with regards to the protection and promotion of the right to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, in the context of the balanced implementation of the two other main pillars of the Treaty.

65. Currently, non-nuclear-weapon States alone remained subject to a strict comprehensive safeguards system, including when they had supplemented their comprehensive safeguards agreement with an additional protocol, further adding to the intrusiveness in scale, procedure and obligations of what was already in place. At the same time, nuclear-weapon States and non-States parties to the Treaty that possessed nuclear weapons were not subject to any safeguards system that could effectively prevent them from producing further nuclear weapons, ensure their compliance with their nuclear disarmament commitments, or even verify the irreversibility of such activities. That represented a failure in preventing vertical nuclear proliferation and in effectively advancing towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

66. Some nuclear supplier arrangements had chosen to impose on non-nuclear-weapon States exaggerated conditions of supply not required under the Treaty, while exempting non-States parties from even a comprehensive safeguards agreement as a condition of supply and reaching out to non-States parties for closer ties and potential rewards. Such actions rewarded States that failed to sign on to the Treaty, impeded efforts to ensure and promote an essential right under the Treaty and hindered the universalization of the Treaty.

67. While IAEA was entirely equipped with the expertise and infrastructure required to perform a role in nuclear disarmament, that role remained very

limited, despite existing legal obligations in the field and the growing international sentiment against nuclear weapons. Unjustified restrictions on the inalienable right to peaceful use should be eliminated, and the right of every State party to choose the energy mix most suitable to its needs should be respected, as long as the relevant nuclear material and facilities were subject to comprehensive safeguards.

68. Lastly, Egypt had submitted a working paper (NPT/CONF.2015/WP.38), which contained a number of recommendations on the peaceful use of nuclear energy for consideration by the Conference.

69. **Ms. Yparraguirre** (Philippines), reaffirming the inalienable right of States parties to the development, research, production and use of nuclear energy without discrimination, said that the Philippines and other States had benefitted from close partnership and cooperation with IAEA through national and regional projects in the nuclear field geared towards improving agricultural productivity, enhancing industry competitiveness, securing a safe and clean environment through water resource management and marine pollution control, providing quality health care, including in the fight against cancer, and ensuring nuclear safety and security.

70. The Agency's Technical Cooperation Programme should therefore be strengthened. Its Peaceful Uses Initiative provided extrabudgetary resources, allowing the Agency to implement additional projects for its member States and to fulfil its statutory responsibilities. States that were in a position to do so should contribute to the Initiative.

71. The Philippines strongly supported the global nuclear safety regime through the efficient and effective implementation of international legal instruments, development of safety standards enhancement of national safety infrastructure, coordination of international emergency preparedness and response mechanisms and promotion of a nuclear safety culture. A national nuclear security support centre was being established in the country, with the assistance of IAEA, in support of the national nuclear security plan.

72. **Ms. Liufalani** (New Zealand) said that while New Zealand had decided not to include nuclear power in its energy mix, it benefitted from and contributed to advances in nuclear science. States parties had the right to benefit from the peaceful uses of such energy, but

must apply the highest standards of safeguards, safety and security through all stages of the nuclear fuel cycle. New Zealand supported the Peaceful Uses Initiative, including the Initiative's Sahel water management project, to which it would make a further substantial contribution. In addition, it had hosted the annual meeting of the Regional Cooperation Agreement for Research, Development and Training in Nuclear Science and Technology for the Asia-Pacific Region.

73. The ongoing IAEA efforts to coordinate and share lessons learned from the Fukushima Daiichi accident were welcome, as they highlighted the importance of continued vigilance, in particular given the fact that nuclear accidents did not respect national boundaries. That was especially true for accidents occurring during the maritime transport of nuclear material, and New Zealand continued to actively promote the safe transport of such material and the adoption of the highest possible standards in that respect. It was essential that coastal and other interested States should receive notification in advance of shipments. New Zealand had joined a number of States at the Agency in agreeing on voluntary best practices guidelines on communication to apply to certain shipments of radioactive material and looked forward to their implementation. It also welcomed efforts to improve the international nuclear liability regime and take into account the concerns of non-nuclear coastal States.

74. New Zealand supported international efforts to strengthen nuclear security, including through its participation in the Nuclear Security Summits; the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund, to which it had recently contributed 100,000 New Zealand dollars; the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism; the Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, to which it had donated more than \$7 million New Zealand dollars over the past decade; and the upcoming regional tabletop exercise, to be held under the auspices of the Proliferation Security Initiative.

75. The country was committed to promoting disarmament and non-proliferation, and made funds available for education on the issues. It was regrettable that progress on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy had not been matched by progress on nuclear disarmament, as that undermined the authority and integrity of the Treaty.

76. **Ms. Nordberg** (Finland) said all parties to the Treaty should work towards promoting the responsible development and safe and peaceful use of nuclear energy. At the same time, related technologies and goods should not be disseminated for other than peaceful purposes. Nuclear applications could play an essential role in many peaceful areas and had made a considerable contribution to efforts aimed at achieving the Millennium Development Goals. IAEA and its Technical Cooperation Programme played an important role in that regard and should continue to do so. The extension of the IAEA Peaceful Uses Initiative was welcome.

77. Nuclear power played a major role in the global energy mix and in Finland in particular, where it was the biggest-single source of energy and was expected to take on even greater significance. The safety record of Finnish nuclear power plants was good, and the performance indicators had been excellent. Strategies for safely and securely disposing of spent nuclear fuel and nuclear and other radioactive waste were necessary from the very beginning of a nuclear power programme, and Finland was among the forerunners in that area. It was currently licensing a final underground repository for spent fuel, called Onkalo, which would meet strict and appropriate safety, security and safeguards requirements and make use of advanced technology.

78. Governments and international organizations must continue to take active steps to enhance safety measures for all fuel cycle activities and ensure that nuclear safety was continuously improved in areas that had been overlooked in the wake of the Fukushima Daiichi accident. Countries using nuclear power, or embarking upon a nuclear power programme, should have a sound legislative and regulatory framework on nuclear and radiation safety. Regulatory bodies should be given authority and independence in their decision-making, be provided with the necessary resources, and enjoy the trust of the citizens.

79. Finland had made full use of safety-related IAEA advisory services, peer review missions and existing nuclear security guidance, and strongly encouraged other States to do likewise. National nuclear security systems would not reach their full potential without cooperation at the international level. The International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism should be ratified by more States, and the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical

Protection of Nuclear Material should be brought into force. Finland had ratified the Amendment and encouraged all States parties to do so as well.

80. Lastly, efforts aimed at the effective physical protection of all nuclear and other radioactive materials should also cover materials used in nuclear weapons. Finland continued to provide financial and in-kind support to IAEA nuclear security activities, including the Nuclear Security Fund. The threat of nuclear terrorism and the need to address it through international cooperation had been the focus of the Nuclear Security Summits from the very beginning. Finland also took part in the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism and had agreed to host its plenary meeting in Helsinki in 2015, which was open to all States, including those that had not yet joined the Initiative.

The meeting rose at 1 p.m.