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**Chairman: Mr. Mario AMADEO (Argentina).**

AGENDA ITEMS 73 AND 72

**Continuation of suspension of nuclear and thermo-nuclear tests and obligations of States to refrain from their renewal (A/4801 and Add.1, A/C.1/L.291/Rev.1 and Rev.1/Add.1-3, A/C.1/L.292 and Add.1-3) (continued)**

**The urgent need for a treaty to ban nuclear weapons tests under effective international control (A/4799, A/C.1/L.292 and Add.1-3) (continued)**

1. Mr. TURBAY AYALA (Colombia) recalled that at the previous meeting he had requested a thirty-minute recess in order to prepare an amendment to the fourteen-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.291/Rev.1 and Rev.1/Add.1-3) which would reconcile the views of the African delegations. Since he had not yet been able to ascertain the opinions of the various delegations consulted, he thought it would be better not to keep the Committee waiting any longer, and he therefore would not submit an amendment. For that reason, the Colombian delegation would abstain in the vote on the fourteen-Power draft resolution.

2. The CHAIRMAN said that there were no more speakers in the debate on the two draft resolutions before the Committee, and that he would call upon representatives who had asked to explain their votes.

3. Mr. BITSIOS (Greece) said that he understood and respected the intentions of the sponsors of the fourteen-Power draft resolution on the denuclearization of Africa (A/C.1/L.291/Rev.1 and Rev.1/Add.1-3). Consequently, he thought it regrettable that some delegations had sought to link that African plan to certain proposals which were not new, and which related to other much smaller geographical regions, one of them embracing Greece. Greece's position with respect to those proposals was determined above all by its profound belief that peace was indivisible, and that in the present strategic situation any proposal which would have the effect of destroying the notion of collective security and breaking up defensive measures would only result in placing the national survival of countries at the mercy of an act of aggression from

outside the region, whether the latter was described as demilitarized or denuclearized. The fourteen-Power draft resolution should have been taken on its merits and kept outside any controversies which might exist on other continents. He keenly regretted that some delegations had felt otherwise, for that being the case the Greek delegation would be unable to vote in favour of the draft resolution.

4. Sir Michael WRIGHT (United Kingdom) wished to explain the United Kingdom's vote on the twelve-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.292 and Add.1-3). His delegation welcomed the amendments submitted by Italy (A/C.1/L.295) because they brought the declaration into conformity with the United Nations Charter. If those amendments were adopted, his delegation would support the draft resolution as amended. If, on the other hand, the amendments were not adopted, it would regretfully have to vote against the draft resolution. By voting against it, the United Kingdom delegation would not be voting against the elimination of all stockpiles of nuclear weapons or against the cessation of the production of such weapons. Those measures were an essential part of the programme for general and complete disarmament submitted by the United States, which the United Kingdom was eager to see adopted.

5. Mr. LORINC (Hungary) said that he favoured the two draft resolutions even though he believed that the only real solution to the problem of nuclear weapons was general and complete disarmament. In his view, the fourteen-Power draft resolution, as the representative of the United Arab Republic had said, represented the minimum legitimate demand that could be made by the countries of Africa. Moreover, the sponsors of the draft resolution were independent African countries speaking for a large part of the continent. They were the ones to speak on behalf of their continent, and not colonial Powers like France and the United Kingdom, which possessed military bases in Africa and exploded bombs there. The Hungarian delegation would therefore vote in favour of the fourteen-Power draft resolution, despite the fact that it constituted only a relatively limited step towards general and complete disarmament.

6. If the twelve-Power draft resolution was adopted and implemented, it would be an important advance towards the final abolition of nuclear weapons. The Hungarian delegation would therefore vote for it. On the other hand, it would vote against the Italian amendments, for the reasons already explained by the representative of Ethiopia.

7. Mr. OKAZAKI (Japan) said that he would vote for the twelve-Power draft resolution because the disaster of nuclear warfare must be prevented by all means and the adoption of a resolution along those lines might have a stimulating effect on the efforts being made to achieve nuclear disarmament. However, Japan was not abandoning its basic position on dis-

armament in general. It continued to maintain that every disarmament measure should be accompanied by effective international control and inspection. The adoption of the declaration would not in any way reduce the necessity of tackling the problem of nuclear disarmament, and should be followed by sincere efforts to reach agreement on more complete measures in the field of nuclear disarmament.

8. The Japanese delegation understood the considerations which had prompted the Italian delegation to submit its amendments (A/C.1/L.295). However, it believed that special importance should be attached to measures designed to avert the threat of a nuclear war. It would therefore abstain in the vote on the amendments. In that connexion, he requested a separate vote on the first part of the sixth amendment, reading "Substitute the words 'to consider the means of prohibiting' for the words 'for signing a convention on the prohibition of'". If a separate vote was taken, the Japanese delegation would vote in favour of that part of the amendment.

9. Mr. LEGENDRE (France) said he recognized that the principles underlying the declaration in the twelve-Power draft resolution were generous ones, but questioned whether such a declaration represented an appropriate and effective approach to the basic problems facing the Committee; to reduce international tension and to make gradual progress towards real disarmament. In the present-day world, a world in which undertakings made one day were suddenly withdrawn the next, to try to begin with measures involving purely moral obligations, without controls or sanctions, might well have the effect of intensifying mistrust and increasing tension. The French delegation therefore hoped that the Committee would return to real disarmament measures accompanied by effective international control and would not allow itself to be diverted from that course. Moreover, the references that had been made to The Hague Convention of 29 July 1899 and to the Geneva Protocol of 27 June 1925 prohibiting the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons had been misjudged; those weapons were too different from present-day nuclear weapons to bear comparison with them. In the view of the French Government, as it had been stated by the representative of France at the fourteenth session (1030th meeting), solemn but unverifiable moral prohibitions left distrust in existence, and such declarations should be included in an over-all plan only when other measures, themselves controllable and controlled, had contributed to re-establishing a minimum of international confidence.<sup>1/</sup> For those reasons, the French delegation would vote against the declaration, which, while well intentioned, was actually pointless and illusory. If, however, the draft resolution was amended so as to bring the problem back into line with the United Nations Charter and the right of self-defence, or if it was supplemented so as to provide for international control within the framework of a disarmament plan, the French delegation might be able to support it as amended.

10. The French delegation respected and fully appreciated the intentions of the sponsors of the fourteen-Power draft resolution on the denuclearization of Africa, but it considered that the United Nations was not competent to lay down a special status for any region or continent so long as the countries concerned

had not agreed amongst themselves, either by convention or otherwise, on certain measures of interest to them or established a particular status. Moreover, measures for regional disarmament should be examined with the utmost care, for applied to certain regions or in particular circumstances they might have more detrimental than beneficial effects. For that reason, the proposals reintroduced by the representatives of the Soviet Union and Poland must be regarded with the utmost caution, since they betrayed only too obviously the political aims underlying them.

11. Finally, it was as dangerous as it was illusory to seek to begin disarmament, whether regional or general, with measures which either were not real disarmament measures, or could not, by their very nature, be controlled, or were not accompanied by effective international control. For those reasons, the French delegation would prefer to abstain in the vote on the fourteen-Power draft resolution.

12. U ON SEIN (Burma) said that Burma had always opposed tests of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons, wherever they might be carried out. He therefore appreciated the anxiety which had prompted the African States to urge that their continent should be regarded as a denuclearized zone. Consequently, his delegation would vote for the fourteen-Power draft resolution. For similar reasons, it would vote for the twelve-Power draft resolution. However, it would be unable to support the Italian amendments to the latter.

13. Mr. DE MELO FRANCO (Brazil) said that he would vote for the fourteen-Power draft resolution, since his delegation felt that the nuclear neutralization of a continent like Africa could only serve to promote the cause of peace and to eliminate at least one source of international friction. On the other hand, it would be obliged to abstain from the vote on the twelve-Power draft resolution, for it believed that the question dealt with in that draft resolution could more properly be considered within the framework of general and complete disarmament. The Italian amendments did not alter that aspect of the matter.

14. Mr. DELGADO (Philippines) said that he would vote for the two draft resolutions despite their deficiencies of form and, to some extent, substance. His delegation particularly supported operative paragraph 1 (c) of the twelve-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.292 and Add.1-3), for a nuclear war would clearly be directed against mankind in general, in view of the volume of fall-out that would result and the genetic effects of radiation.

15. The convening of a special conference to sign a convention prohibiting the use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons for war purposes might provide a solution to the problem. Such a prohibition would, of course, have to be subject to effective international control and inspection, in accordance with the two resolutions on that subject already adopted by the General Assembly.

16. Since it was opposed to all nuclear tests, no matter where they were conducted, his delegation could not but endorse the action taken by African delegations in their desire to have the African continent recognized as a denuclearized neutral zone. It wished to observe, however, that Africa was not the only continent to which such a ban should apply.

17. Mr. CISSE (Senegal) said he had proposed that the words "especially in Africa" should be substituted for the words "in Africa" in the fourteen-Power draft

<sup>1/</sup> See Official Records of the General Assembly, Fourteenth Session, Annexes, agenda item 70, document A/C.1/821, para. 22.

resolution (A/C.1/L.291/Rev.1 and Rev.1/Add.1-3), because he felt that the entire world should be denuclearized. His delegation would vote for the draft resolution, just as it had voted for all the other resolutions directed against nuclear testing. It would also vote for the twelve-Power draft resolution since it was opposed to war and therefore, *a fortiori*, to the use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons for war purposes. For similar reasons, his delegation would vote against the Italian amendments.

18. Mr. RONAN (Ireland) recalled that his country's Minister for External Affairs had urged in the General Assembly on a number of occasions that denuclearized zones should gradually be established in Europe, the Middle East, the Far East, Africa and elsewhere. Approval of the principles enunciated in the fourteen-Power draft resolution would constitute an important step towards the creation of such zones. His delegation would therefore vote for that draft resolution and for the Libyan amendment (A/C.1/L.296).

19. Although the twelve-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.292 and Add.1-3) contained some elements which were acceptable, his delegation seriously doubted the value of a declaration of that kind. Since the leaders of the major Powers had indicated that they would not hesitate to use their most powerful weapons if their vital interests were seriously threatened, the proposed declaration would be of little practical value and might create a false sense of security. His delegation would therefore be obliged to vote against sub-paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) of operative paragraph 1 and, if they were adopted, against the draft resolution as a whole. It would abstain from the vote on certain other parts of the draft resolution.

20. The Italian amendments (A/C.1/L.295) did not greatly alter the fundamental view of his delegation as to the value of a declaration of the kind proposed. Although the amendments were unexceptionable in themselves, they would detract from the value of the declaration and, in many instances, result in tautology. For example, they would cause operative paragraph 1 (a) to state that action contrary to the United Nations Charter was a violation of the Charter. His delegation would therefore abstain in the vote on the amendments and if they were adopted would also be obliged to abstain in the vote on the twelve-Power draft resolution as a whole.

21. Mr. PAZHAWAK (Afghanistan) said that he would vote against the Italian amendments (A/C.1/L.295) while bearing in mind the traditional friendly relations existing between Afghanistan and Italy. He viewed the amendments as an attack on the form and substance of the twelve-Power draft resolution and said that their adoption would make the proposal meaningless and useless.

22. The insertion of the phrase "contrary to the United Nations Charter" in the draft resolution left open the possibility of interpreting the Charter as allowing war, even nuclear war, in certain circumstances; since the Charter did not allow war but, on the contrary, prohibited it, the amendments attacked not only the basis of the draft resolution but the Charter itself.

23. The vote of Afghanistan against the Italian amendments was intended to protect the purpose of the draft resolution and defend the purposes of the United Nations Charter.

24. Mr. ADEEL (Sudan), discussing the Italian amendments as one of the sponsors of the twelve-Power draft resolution, said that they were intended to incorporate in the declaration the arguments concerning the principle of self-defence which had been advanced in particular by the United Kingdom and United States delegations. Those arguments were unquestionably valid in their proper context, but what was involved in the present instance was a war against all mankind.

25. The Italian delegation proposed, in particular, that the words "to violate the Charter of the United Nations" in operative paragraph 1 (d) should be deleted. Thus altered, that vital portion of the declaration would lose its present profound significance; if the amendment was adopted, his delegation would be obliged to vote against the draft resolution as a whole. The fact that the United States representative had stated (1192nd meeting) that his delegation would vote in favour of the draft resolution only if the Italian amendments were adopted confirmed the validity of the apprehensions aroused by the Italian amendments.

26. Mr. NINCIC (Yugoslavia) said that he would vote for the two draft resolutions. However, if the Italian amendments were adopted, he would be obliged to vote against the twelve-Power draft declaration as a whole, since the declaration was designed to outlaw the use of nuclear weapons as contrary to the spirit, letter and aims of the Charter of the United Nations, whereas the changes proposed by Italy would have the effect of sanctioning the use of those weapons.

27. Mr. ZOPPI (Italy) said he was convinced that it was essential to act within the framework of the Charter; it was therefore dangerous to isolate the problem of nuclear weapons from the principles of the Charter relating to the use of force in any form. Although the sponsors of the draft declaration (A/C.1/L.292 and Add.1-3) were acting out of praiseworthy motives, a ban on the use of nuclear weapons would have more likelihood of being effective if it was closely linked with a programme of general and complete disarmament embodying adequate safeguards. His delegation therefore felt that the declaration should be considered within the framework of disarmament; if, however, that was not possible, it would prefer to see its amendments adopted so that it could vote for the declaration as a whole.

28. Mr. SUGAIR (Saudi Arabia) observed that the right of non-alignment was now recognized by all countries and that it was perfectly proper, inasmuch as the nuclear Powers had been unable to reach agreement on putting an end to nuclear testing, that the African countries should address a solemn appeal to all States for the denuclearization of their continent. His delegation would therefore vote for the two draft resolutions before the Committee (A/C.1/L.291/Rev.1 and Rev.1/Add.1-3, and A/C.1/L.292 and Add.1-3) and for the Libyan amendment (A/C.1/L.296). It would not be able to support the Italian amendments (A/C.1/L.295), which, in its view, were at variance with the immediate purposes of the twelve-Power draft declaration.

29. Mr. BOUZIRI (Tunisia) regretted the Italian representative's view that the question dealt with in the twelve-Power draft resolution could be considered within the framework of disarmament, for his delegation regarded the matter as an urgent one. In addition, the Italian amendments had the effect of shifting the centre of gravity of the draft resolution and of giving the impression that the Charter permitted the use of

nuclear weapons. He wished to repeat his request that the Italian delegation should withdraw its amendments.

30. Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that the Italian amendments seemed to him an attempt to justify the use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons against man. Those amendments would completely falsify the meaning of the twelve-Power draft resolution and distort the spirit of the Charter itself. Italy's aim was to secure acceptance of the principle that the use of nuclear weapons for war purposes was not a violation of the Charter, as stated in the draft resolution, but a measure specifically sanctioned by the Charter. That interpretation of the Charter was endorsed by the members of Western military blocs, which were preparing to unleash a nuclear rocket war and consequently seeking to justify the use of nuclear weapons. It was obvious that if nuclear weapons had been known when the Charter had been drawn up, a reference would have been included to those instruments of mass destruction and their barbaric nature. Those considerations sufficed to show why his delegation would vote against the Italian amendments.

31. The fourteen-Power draft resolution reflected the legitimate desire of the African countries to stay out of the nuclear competition between military blocs and to save their peoples from the fate suffered by the inhabitants of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Those countries fully realized that, in the event of war, nuclear bases and stocks of nuclear weapons in Africa would inevitably be targets. His delegation understood the attitude of those countries and would support their draft resolution.

32. The twelve-Power draft resolution was also perfectly clear. The conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons for war purposes would certainly make for the prevention of nuclear war and would be a first step towards the complete prohibition of nuclear weapons which, of course, was possible only against a background of general and complete disarmament. His delegation would accordingly vote in favour of that draft resolution.

33. Mr. BELAUNDE (Peru) said that he fully supported the aims and high ideals expressed in the preamble to the fourteen-Power draft resolution and would vote in favour of the proposal although, in his view, the most effective way to prevent Africa from becoming an area of nuclear activity was not a recommendation carrying purely moral force but the immediate conclusion of a treaty among the States concerned.

34. The twelve-Power draft resolution expressed the universal feeling about nuclear war in unequivocal terms; if the various principles stated in that proposal were put to the vote separately, his delegation would certainly endorse them, even though they would be more suitably included in the preamble of the draft resolution on disarmament which the Committee was to adopt later. The General Assembly had already expressed disapproval of the use of nuclear weapons, and the next step was to initiate negotiations on all aspects of disarmament, including its effective control. The proposal for the signing of a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons reflected a pessimistic attitude to such negotiations. For those various reasons, his delegation would abstain on the draft resolution as a whole.

35. Mr. FERNANDEZ (Argentina) said that he fully appreciated the concern felt by the sponsors of the

fourteen-Power draft resolution at the hazards of nuclear testing. The draft resolution reproduced the language of previous decisions relating to a particular region—the African continent—and addressed an appeal to all Member States. It would consequently be useful for the Assembly to adopt such a resolution if it expressed the views of all the countries concerned. It appeared, however, that they were far from unanimous on the subject and his delegation would therefore have to abstain on the proposal.

36. His delegation was not sure that the twelve-Power draft resolution, which would declare a ban on the use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons for war purposes, was within the scope of agenda items 73 and 72; it had also some faults to find with the drafting. The Italian amendments improved the proposal considerably and had the effect of stating the problem more correctly in terms of the Charter. His delegation would therefore vote in favour of those amendments and, if they were adopted, in favour of the draft resolution as amended. It wished to make it clear, however, that its votes would be cast on the understanding that those provisions could not be construed as authorizing, either explicitly or implicitly, the use of nuclear or thermo-nuclear weapons in cases not specifically contemplated in the declaration.

37. Mr. VELAZQUEZ (Uruguay) said that his delegation, having voted in favour of the two draft resolutions on nuclear tests which had already been adopted by the First Committee, would also wish to vote in favour of the fourteen-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.291/Rev.1 and Rev.1/Add.1-3), which supplemented them. The latter proposal admittedly called for some comment. For example, the preamble made no mention of the resolution recently adopted on a nuclear test moratorium (General Assembly resolution 1648 (XVI)), and some of the operative part appeared to go beyond the declared objective. Moreover, the proposal concerned the need to prevent Africa from becoming involved in any competition associated with ideological struggles; that was a legitimate principle, but one far removed from the guiding principle of the Uruguayan Government's foreign policy. However, the only consideration which gave his delegation pause was the lack of unanimity among African States on the value and timeliness of that draft resolution. If some African States maintained their reservations when the proposal was put to the vote, his delegation would have to abstain. On the other hand, it would vote in favour of the Libyan amendment (A/C.1/L.296), which improved the text considerably.

38. His delegation would like to support the twelve-Power draft resolution, for it was in keeping with Uruguay's humanitarian and pacifist tradition. However, the proposal should have been examined at the same time as the other questions relating to general and complete disarmament. Although the proposed declaration was on a high moral plane and expressed a universal aspiration, his delegation could not vote for it in isolation, and for the same reasons would have to abstain on the Italian amendments.

39. Mr. BURNS (Canada) said that he fully appreciated the motives which had prompted the sponsors of the twelve-Power draft resolution and respected their concern at the threat to the peoples of the world which the use of nuclear weapons of mass destruction represented. In the light of past experience and present circumstances, however, the method proposed did not appear effective. All the declarations

and agreements referred to in the third preambular paragraph had been violated, and recent events had shown the insecurity of unilateral declarations on the suspension of nuclear tests,

40. The only way to be sure that nuclear weapons would not be used in war was to eliminate them from the arsenals of the nations. Such elimination was proposed in the United States programme for general and complete disarmament and also in the plan put forward by the Soviet Union. Declarations of good intent had always failed when nations had been faced with the alternative of using what weapons they had or facing defeat. The General Assembly should therefore concentrate its moral force on helping to bring about the speedy resumption of negotiations on general and complete disarmament.

41. His delegation would vote in favour of the Italian amendments, for they would bring the draft resolution more closely into line with the Charter. If those amendments were adopted, his delegation would vote in favour of the draft resolution as amended; otherwise, it would have to abstain.

42. Mr. DE LEQUERICA (Spain) said that the fourteen-Power draft resolution had the serious disadvantage that its peaceful purpose was limited to a single continent. Despite the good intentions of its sponsors, such a resolution would not be practical. The General Assembly should endeavour to seek universal agreements. Moreover, the representatives of some African countries had declared that opinion on the question was not unanimous, even among the African nations. The Spanish delegation would, consequently, abstain from voting on the draft resolution.

43. With regard to the twelve-Power draft resolution, the Spanish delegation considered that it exceeded the scope of the items under discussion in the Committee and, indeed, dealt with an entirely different question. Such a resolution seemed unnecessary, since recourse to war as a means of settling international disputes was already proscribed in more specific terms in the Charter. Moreover, it would be unjust to deprive countries of the right of self-defence.

44. The Italian amendments to the twelve-Power draft resolution represented a substantial improvement and did not go beyond the Charter, Article 51 of which expressly stated that nothing in the Charter impaired the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence.

45. Mr. HAEKKERUP (Denmark) was glad that the sponsors of the fourteen-Power draft resolution were prepared to accept the Libyan amendment (A/C.1/L.296) and said that the Danish delegation would find it easier to vote in favour of the amended text.

46. Where the twelve-Power draft resolution was concerned, although the Danish delegation broadly agreed with the general outline of that proposal and respected the motives behind it, it disagreed in certain respects with the present wording, which, in its view, was not entirely consistent with the letter and spirit of the Charter. The adoption of the Italian amendments would substantially improve the text, which the Danish delegation would then be able to support. On the other hand, if the Italian amendments were not adopted, the Danish delegation would be obliged to abstain in the voting, because it considered that the question of eliminating nuclear weapons was part of the broader question of general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

47. Mr. WEI (China) appreciated the wish of the African countries to devote their uninterrupted attention to the task of economic and social development, as stated in the fifth preambular paragraph of the fourteen-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.291/Rev.1 and Rev.1/Add.1-3), and said that China was glad to be able to co-operate with the African countries with that end in view. In regard, however, to the proposal to consider the African continent as a denuclearized zone, the Chinese delegation agreed with the representative of the Ivory Coast that the problem should first be considered by the African Heads of State. In view of the high motives of the sponsors, and of the Libyan amendment, the Chinese delegation would abstain from voting.

48. The proposal in the twelve-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.292 and Add.1-3) had been submitted to the Atomic Energy Commission by the Soviet Union as far back as 1946,<sup>2/</sup> and had been rejected as affording no assurance that such weapons would not be used. The General Assembly had since rejected all similar proposals.

49. The Briand-Kellogg Pact<sup>3/</sup> had not averted the outbreak of war. The moratorium on nuclear tests had not prevented the Soviet Union from setting off a series of powerful explosions, and on 5 November 1961, Mr. Khrushchev had told a correspondent of *The New York Times* that if either side in a war felt that it was losing, it would undoubtedly use its nuclear bombs.

50. The Chinese delegation had consistently advocated the elimination of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction, but had always voted against proposals providing for prohibition without control. Its attitude remained unchanged. Finally, it welcomed the amendments submitted by Italy, which were aimed at bringing the draft resolution into line with the Charter of the United Nations.

51. Sir Muhammad Zafrulla KHAN (Pakistan) said that his delegation would vote for the fourteen-Power draft resolution declaring the continent of Africa to be a denuclearized zone, and supported all parts of that proposal.

52. His delegation still had certain doubts concerning the twelve-Power draft resolution, which dealt with a single aspect of disarmament in isolation from other aspects of the subject. However, it would vote for operative paragraph 1, since the general principle stated in that paragraph was in accordance with its own attitude.

53. On the other hand, it considered that the Italian amendments were unnecessary. A resolution could not have the effect of amending the Charter. Also, both the draft resolution and the amendments seemed to have been so hastily drawn up that it would be difficult to assess the effect of the proposal, especially if the Italian amendments were incorporated. Some great Powers which opposed any ban on nuclear testing had declared themselves in support of the draft resolution. They, therefore, seemed to believe that it would not prevent them from continuing to test nuclear weapons with a view to their possible defensive use.

54. The delegation of Pakistan would abstain from voting on the Italian amendments, but would support

<sup>2/</sup> See Official Records of the Atomic Energy Commission, First Year, No. 2, 2nd meeting, pp. 26-28.

<sup>3/</sup> General Treaty for the Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy, signed at Paris on 27 August 1928 (League of Nations, Treaty Series, vol. XCIV, 1929, No. 2137).

operative paragraph 1 of the draft resolution, even if the Italian amendments were adopted. Operative paragraph 2 related to a question which was part of the general problem of disarmament. As his delegation did not know what would emerge from the debates in the Committee and in the Assembly on that subject, it would be obliged to abstain from voting on that paragraph. Should the proposal prove to be necessary at a later stage, it would be happy to support it.

55. Mr. SOSA RODRIGUEZ (Venezuela), referring to the fourteen-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.291/Rev.1 and Rev.1/Add.1-3), said that his delegation had recently voted in favour of General Assembly resolution 1648 (XVI), which called for the suspension of nuclear testing not only in the African continent but in all continents. A resolution adopted a few days later and referring only to Africa might have the effect of weakening the prohibition contained in the first resolution with regard to the other continents, including the American. The Venezuelan delegation would nevertheless have voted for the fourteen-Power draft resolution had there been unanimity among the African countries on the subject, in which case it would have interpreted the proposal as representing the application of a general principle to a concrete case. But as unanimity among the African States had been lacking, and as the provisions of sub-paragraphs (b) and (c) of the operative paragraph were matters exclusively within the jurisdiction of each individual State, it was not for a country in another continent to recommend their application to the African continent. The Libyan amendment (A/C.1/L.296) undoubtedly improved the text of the draft resolution and his delegation would support it, but would abstain from voting on the draft resolution itself.

56. With regard to the Italian amendments (A/C.1/L.295) to the twelve-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.292 and Add.1-3), it was hardly possible, without deviating from the spirit of the Charter, to draw a distinction between the use of weapons of mass destruction in conformity with the Charter and the use of such weapons contrary to the Charter. The use of such weapons could never be in keeping with the Charter.

57. As to the twelve-Power draft resolution, his delegation considered that the use of nuclear weapons should be prohibited, but did not agree with the wording of the proposal, because the prohibition of such weapons could not be dealt with in isolation, but must be considered within the general framework of disarmament. Moreover, it was necessary to prohibit not only the use of such weapons, but also their manufacture and stockpiling, and also to call for the destruction of all existing stocks. Furthermore, a draft resolution which prohibited the use of nuclear weapons only would a *contrario sensu* authorize the use of conventional weapons which, although less dangerous, could nevertheless also wipe out entire populations. Consequently his delegation would abstain from voting on the Italian amendments and would also abstain from voting on the draft resolution, regardless of the result of the vote on the amendments.

58. Mr. ZOPPI (Italy), replying to the Soviet representative's criticisms of the Italian amendments, pointed out that the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR had repeatedly stated that he would not hesitate to use nuclear weapons if necessary and had even mentioned how many missiles would be sent against Italy.

The meeting rose at 1.20 p.m.