United Nations
GENERAL ASSEMBLY
SIXTEENTH SESSION
Official Records

FIRST COMMITTEE, 1195th MEETING

Wednesday, 15 November 1961, at 10.50 a.m.

NEW YORK

CONTENTS

Chairman: **Mr. Mario AMADEO (Argentina).**

AGENDA ITEM 19

Question of disarmament (A/4868 and Corr.1, A/4879, A/4880, A/4887, A/4891, A/4892, A/C.1/856)

1. Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) noted that the Committee could have begun its work, as the Soviet Union had proposed, by considering the essential question of general and complete disarmament, but that, at the request of several delegations, it had decided to deal first with nuclear tests, although that matter could obviously be settled only by general and complete disarmament. The recent deterioration in the international situation was due to the war-mongering policy adopted by the United States and its allies after the Soviet Union had proposed to conclude a peace treaty with both German States, for that would have been a real obstacle to the plans for revenge of the West German militarists. Nevertheless, at the Twenty-second Congress of the Communist Party, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, Mr. Khrushchev, had declared that the USSR was ready to join the Western Powers in seeking, by means of negotiation, agreed solutions to the situation which would be equally acceptable to both parties. But the Western Powers had chosen another way. The Government of the United States had turned a deaf ear to the appeal of the Soviet Union and announced a large increase in its military budget, its arms, including nuclear devices, and its forces. While the Soviet Government advocated removing the source of war in Central Europe and converting Europe into a region of peace, the United States and its allies in NATO had reinforced the despatch of troops and equipment to Europe, strengthened their nuclear bases in Western Europe and, in spite of the warning of the USSR, had in fact taken under their protection the seekers of revenge in Western Germany, who wanted to take advantage of the present instability in order to alter the frontier lines by force to their own advantage. The Soviet Union had proposed that under the German peace treaty, West Berlin should be converted into a demilitarized free city, in order to restore normal conditions to West Berlin; yet the United States and its allies had replied with provocative actions against the German Democratic Republic. Was that attitude, which was so dangerous to peace, to be explained by the growing influence of the West German militarists over the United States and its Western allies?

2. Faced by the increasing threat of war, the Soviet Union was resolved to struggle without respite for a solution of the problem of disarmament. It was a simple matter: if the terrible modern weapons were not to be used, they must be destroyed; and that was only possible under general and complete disarmament. The progress of science had made any partial programme ineffective. Even if armed forces and armaments were considerably reduced, States would still have the means to destroy hundreds of millions of persons. For that reason the Soviet Union had submitted its programme of general and complete disarmament (A/4219) to the General Assembly at its fourteenth session.

3. The struggle for general and complete disarmament was the foundation of the policy of peaceful coexistence followed by the Soviet Government, and was one of the essential purposes of the programme prepared by the Twenty-second Congress of the Communist Party. The Committee had before it the programme of disarmament in three stages (A/C.1/856), which the Soviet Union had submitted at the fifteenth session. He recalled the essential points of that programme, which was to be applied under strict international control, corresponding in scale at each stage to the scope and nature of the disarmament measures. It was obvious that that programme, which would end the arms race and avert the threat of nuclear-ballistic war, would also solve the problem of the cessation of nuclear tests. The Soviet Union was ready not only to cease testing immediately, but to destroy all the weapons it already possessed if other States would agree to sign a treaty of general and complete disarmament. In order to guarantee the security of States once general and complete disarmament had been achieved, the Soviet Government proposed that the Security Council should be allowed to use the police or militia contingents which would remain at the disposal of States.

4. The Soviet programme of general and complete disarmament had been warmly received throughout the world. Eminent statesmen and representatives of political organizations had spoken in its favour. What was more, in resolution 1378 (XIV) the General Assembly had called upon Governments to make every effort to achieve a constructive solution of the problem of general and complete disarmament. Nevertheless disarmament had not yet been brought about. At the fifteenth session, owing to the attitude of the United States and its allies, unfortunately no agreement had been reached on the principles which should guide disarmament negotiations. Since then, certain hopeful signs had suggested that the Assembly, at its sixteenth session, might be able to end the deadlock with regard to disarmament. One of those signs was the joint statement by the USSR and the United States of agreed principles for disarmament negotiations (A/4879). A record of the bilateral exchanges of views

which had led to the drawing up of those principles had been submitted by the Soviet Union (A/4887).

5. In the view of the Soviet delegation it was of the greatest importance that the need to come to an agreement on general and complete disarmament under effective international control had been recognized in the joint statement. The USSR also thought that the positive measures described in paragraph 3 were most important. The statement also provided that the disarmament programme should be implemented by stages, and the Soviet Union was glad that the United States—as its memorandum of 14 September 1961 (A/4880, II) showed—agreed that, once the time-limits for the various measures and stages had been worked out, it would be possible to estimate the time-limits for carrying out the total programme of general and complete disarmament. There had also been agreement on the need for balanced measures of disarmament and on the machinery and methods of control. Lastly, the USSR and the United States had agreed on several important measures for the maintenance of international peace and security in a disarmed world. The agreed principles could certainly serve as a foundation for negotiations on a treaty of general and complete disarmament.

6. Most States agreed on the main details of the working body to be set up for the negotiations. The Soviet Government had already said at the fifteenth session that that body should be made up of equal numbers of representatives of the socialist States, the Western States and the neutralist States. It would then be possible to take into account the balance of forces in the present world and the equal concern of all States for the solution of the problem of disarmament. Who could say, for instance, that Indonesia or India, Mexico or the United Arab Republic, Ghana or Burma were less interested in the solution of the disarmament problem than the USSR or the United States? The constructive part which the neutralist countries could play in those negotiations was generally acknowledged, even by certain Western Powers which had previously opposed participation by those countries.

7. Despite such positive factors, the problem of disarmament was far from being solved. The aggressive policy of the Western Powers was the main, though not the only obstacle to general and complete disarmament. An agreement on fundamental principles was obviously a step in the right direction, but it was possible that matters would go no further if the United States and its allies were unwilling to pass on to the preparation of a treaty for general and complete disarmament and the subsequent enforcement of the measures agreed upon.

8. The United States attitude towards the fundamental question of control continued to disquiet the Soviet Government. The latter, as stated in the "Basic provisions of a treaty on general and complete disarmament" (A/C.1/856), deemed it essential that there should be strict international control over all disarmament measures from the very beginning. It considered that such international control should be carried out within the framework of general and complete disarmament, without any veto or restrictions, and that the inspectors should be able to go wherever their presence was necessary for the performance of their duties. The control, of course, would have to be over disarmament and not over the armed forces and weapons retained by the States at any given stage, since that, far from ensuring the enforcement of disarmament, would give a unilateral advantage to States with aggressive intentions. That, however, was precisely what the United States wanted. Even after the bilateral negotiations which had led to the joint statement of principles (A/4879), the United States representative had stated in a letter to the Soviet representative (A/4880, III) that "a key element in the United States position" was that the control should apply not only to the measures of disarmament but also to the armed forces and armaments retained at each stage. The United States position was no new one: at the thirteenth session of the General Assembly both Mr. Dulles, at the 749th plenary meeting, and Mr. Lodge, in the First Committee, had clearly indicated that the important thing for the United States was not the cessation of the arms race or disarmament but "arms control".

9. The Soviet Union had expected a more constructive attitude from the United States Government. Before becoming President of the United States, Mr. Kennedy himself had said in the Senate on 14 June 1960 that the United States Government had been unwilling to plan for disarmament and unable to offer creative proposals of its own. Unfortunately, the stand taken recently by the United States Government was not in keeping with the hopes which he had aroused. The Committee had to understand that it was not the Soviet Union which was making difficulties over international control of disarmament. At the fifteenth session Mr. Khrushchev had told the General Assembly (900th plenary meeting) that the USSR was prepared to accept the proposals of the Western Powers regarding control provided that those Powers accepted the Soviet programme for general and complete disarmament. The Soviet Government had confirmed that proposal on several occasions. Instead of replying to it clearly and unequivocally the Western Powers had rather unconvincingly insisted on the need for joint negotiations in working out a system of control. Yet the Soviet Government had several times vainly invited the Western Powers to join it in working out not only measures for disarmament but also measures for control. It had gone even further and submitted to them its own proposals for control, which had also been rejected. Finally, the USSR had offered to let the United States and its allies work out the control programme, but even that offer had not met with their approval. It rather looked as if the Western Powers were simply trying to exploit the question of control for propaganda purposes. If such were the case it was evident that future disarmament negotiations would produce only negative results.

10. It had to be noted, too, that the United States, in its interpretation of the agreed principles (A/4879), was trying to read into those principles a meaning which could only make the solution of the problem of disarmament more complicated. The Soviet Government, however, was prepared to consider that such an interpretation was not final and to allow the United States Government time to consider the principles in question more realistically.

11. During the bilateral negotiations it had been agreed that, while working for an agreement on a comprehensive disarmament programme, certain steps might usefully be taken to facilitate its preparation and application. The Soviet Government had therefore submitted a memorandum on measures to ease international tension, strengthen confidence

among States and contribute to general and complete disarmament (A/4892) which included the freezing of the military budgets of States, renunciation of the use of nuclear weapons, prohibition of war propaganda, the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the NATO countries and the Warsaw Treaty countries, withdrawal of troops from foreign territory, measures to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons, the establishment of nuclear-free zones, and steps to decrease the danger of surprise attack. Such measures would be in everyone's interest and would give no military advantage to anyone. It was possible and necessary that they should be put into effect independently of an agreement on general and complete disarmament, and vice versa.

12. In the same spirit the Soviet delegation had supported the proposal of the African States concerning the denuclearization of Africa (A/C.1/L.291/Rev.1 and Rev.1/Add.1-3) and the twelve-Power draft declaration on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons for war purposes (A/C.1/L.292 and Add.1-3). In contrast, there must be some reason why the delegations of the NATO countries, despite their insistence on so-called initial measures, had voted against those proposals.

13. In that connexion a careful study should be made of the proposal made by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Sweden at the 1178th meeting that States which did not possess nuclear weapons should declare that they refused to participate in nuclear armament and did not intend either to manufacture nuclear devices themselves or to allow them to be stockpiled in their territory.

14. What the United States was proposing, however, was entirely different. President Kennedy had told the General Assembly on 25 September (1013th plenary meeting) that the United States disarmament programme provided for the signature by all States of a treaty banning nuclear tests; the cessation of the production of fissionable materials for military purposes; the prohibition of the use of outer space for military purposes; the discontinuance of the manufacture of means of delivering nuclear weapons, etc. Those measures, however, could be put into effect only as part and parcel of a programme of general and complete disarmament and after agreement had been reached on the liquidation of stockpiles of nuclear weapons and the complete prohibition of such weapons.

15. It was equally impossible to institute control over the manufacture of means of delivering nuclear weapons unless it was agreed that such means of delivery should be destroyed, as they would be in the first stage of disarmament under the Soviet programme (A/C.1/856). The United States Government seemed to want all those measures to be applied outside the programme of general and complete disarmament—which meant that it was seeking, not disarmament under international control, but the establishment of control over armaments: in other words, the establishment of a legalized espionage system. It should be noted that none of the measures proposed by the United States included the abolition or destruction of any armaments.

16. That unrealistic policy was also reflected in the programme for general and complete disarmament proposed by the United States Government (A/4891). Since that new United States programme was now under study by the Soviet Government, his delegation would for the time being refrain from passing final judgement on it, but it sprang to the eye on first reading that, even in the first stage, the insignificant measures of disarmament proposed were out of balance with the control measures, which were unwarrantably sweeping. The only practical disarmament measure in the first stage would reduce the armed forces of the United States and the Soviet Union to 2.1 million each, while the control proposed would encompass all armed forces and armaments remaining to the two States, atomic industry, means of delivering nuclear weapons, etc.

17. It should be recalled that when the United States had first proposed the reduction of force levels to 2.1 million, during the 1957 negotiations in the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission in London, it had candidly stated that that reduction would in no way interfere with the deployment of its armed forces to numerous military bases on foreign soil all over the world.

18. The first stage of the United States disarmament programme also included measures relating to nuclear weapon delivery vehicles, but made no mention of military bases on foreign soil. Everyone knew that the USSR was ahead of the United States in means of delivering nuclear weapons but had no military bases on foreign soil. The outcome of the United States proposals would thus conflict with the principle, to which the United States had subscribed, that the disarmament programme should not at any stage confer a military advantage on either side. The Soviet Union's principal means of defence would be weakened, whereas the means of aggression afforded by the United States bases would remain intact.

19. The USSR was nevertheless ready to enter into negotiations without delay for a programme of general and complete disarmament based on the fundamental principles already agreed between the Soviet Union and the United States, and it was prepared to sign immediately a treaty on general and complete disarmament.

20. The Committee and the General Assembly could make a useful contribution to the organization of such negotiations by embodying in a resolution the principles set forth in the joint statement by the Soviet Union and the United States, and by establishing a disarmament committee composed of representatives of socialist, Western and neutralist States. That committee could be instructed to draft a treaty on general and complete disarmament by, say, 1 June 1962. It would then be useful to convene a special session of the General Assembly, not later than 1 June 1962, to examine that draft treaty. Indeed, the Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Belgrade in September 1961, put forward the idea of a special session of the General Assembly on disarmament. His delegation was prepared to submit a draft resolution for that purpose; however, since the basic principles of general and complete disarmament had been developed and presented jointly by the United States and the USSR, it would be logical for the draft resolution also to be submitted jointly by those two Powers, and perhaps by other countries as well. His delegation was passing the text of the draft resolution in question to the United States delegation and hoped that it could be submitted jointly in the near future.

21. Mr. STEVENSON (United States of America) observed that the question of Berlin and Germany, to

which the USSR representative had referred, was irrelevant to the matter before the Committee; all the more so since the Berlin problem was one created by the Soviet Union for its own purposes. It was the USSR which was trying to breach the agreements on Berlin, which had illegally erected a wall dividing the city, and which was seeking to perpetuate the division of Germany. When the Soviet Union expressed the desire to liquidate the "vestiges of the war", it had in mind only the Western presence in Berlin, freedom of movement within the city, and hope for the re-unification of Germany.

22. The USSR representative, who had commented that the United States disarmament plan was ambiguous regarding the production of arms and fissionable materials, should turn to sub-paragraph (c) of the paragraph setting out the steps to be taken during the final phase—stage III—of the programme proposed by the United States (A/4891).

23. His delegation agreed with the Soviet delegation that disarmament was one of the most important questions before the Committee; it hoped that, on examination, the draft resolution which had just been passed to it would provide more grounds for hope than the USSR representative's statement portended.

24. In the past, most wars had served to promote what was conceived to be the national, princely or religious interest of those who won them. They had sometimes been a means of settling international disputes, of changing political control, of inducing social transformation, and even of stimulating science and technology. On the moral plane, the extent of the evils of war had been only a matter of degree: whether millions had been killed or only thousands; whether the victims had included children in a big city or only young men killed on battlefields. Again, war had not been a very efficient way of settling disputes. Yesterday's enemies were today's friends. The victor paid first for the destruction of his enemy, and then for the reconstruction of a country which had become his friend.

25. However, war in the future would differ fundamentally from war in the past—not in degree but in kind. Thermo-nuclear war could not serve any national interest whatsoever. The stark fact must now be faced that war had ceased to be practical, and that no nation could contemplate resort to it except in defence against intolerable aggression. It was therefore necessary to abolish war in order to save mankind for, as long as the threat of nuclear death persisted, hundreds of millions of people would be living on borrowed time.

26. The United States was proud of its consistent record of effort towards the abolition of armaments. It had supported the two Conferences of The Hague in 1899 and 1907. It had taken the lead in naval disarmament after the First World War. It had done its utmost to make a success of the Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments, held at Geneva in 1932. After the Second World War it had reduced its armed forces to the minimum, in the belief that some progress had been made towards a peaceful world. Disarmament had been one of the first items on the agenda of the United Nations General Assembly. In 1946 the United States had proposed [1/] to destroy the few atomic weapons which it alone had possessed, to outlaw for ever the manufacture of such weapons and to place the development of atomic energy in all its forms under the full control of the United Nations—all with a view to preventing an atomic arms race. The USSR's rejection of that initiative had had tragic consequences. For the past fifteen years commissions, committees, sub-committees and conferences, inside and outside the United Nations, had been trying to resolve the question of general disarmament and to decide on the first steps towards it.

27. After the Soviet delegation had withdrawn, in June 1960, from the Conference of the Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament, the main hopes had been focussed on the three-Power negotiations at Geneva for a treaty to ban the testing of atomic weapons. After two and a half years of patient negotiations, in the course of which significant progress had been made, the United States and the United Kingdom had presented a comprehensive draft treaty which, they had had every reason to believe, would meet the remaining points of difference with the Soviet Union. The United States and the United Kingdom had been prepared to sign a comprehensive treaty at once—and they still were.

28. At the end of August 1961 the world had learned that the Soviet Union had broken the moratorium on nuclear testing which that country itself had advocated and had vowed never to break. The United States and the United Kingdom had immediately offered to agree with the USSR to ban at once all tests in the atmosphere, in order to spare mankind the hazards of radio-active fall-out. That offer, like the Baruch Plan of 1946, [1/] had been rejected by the Soviet Union.

29. Since that time, the Soviet Union had carried on a series of nuclear weapons tests resulting in unprecedented pollution of the atmosphere. In disregard of the appeals of the Governments and peoples of the non-communist world and in defiance of General Assembly resolution 1632 (XVI), it had gone so far as to explode a super-bomb of more than 50 megatons, the main purpose of which was to serve the political strategy of terror.

30. For months, the Soviet Union had been steadily maintaining that it would agree to a ban on nuclear weapons tests only as part of an agreement for general and complete disarmament. By insisting on linking an issue which had almost been resolved to the difficult problem of disarmament, it had increased the difficulties. A few days earlier, the General Assembly had rejected the idea of delaying a test-ban treaty by calling once again, by a vote of 71 to 11, for the urgent resumption of negotiations to outlaw nuclear tests (resolution 1649 (XVI)).

31. Because of the insistance of the Soviet Union on making the prohibition of tests dependent on the achievement of general and complete disarmament, the world was looking to the current debate to answer two burning questions: did the Soviet Union really want disarmament, and did it in fact want to end nuclear weapons tests? In view of the tragic consequences of a failure of all efforts to reach agreement on disarmament, the Government of the United States intended to try again to ensure that the weapons which had made war inconceivable should be laid aside quickly before other countries were forced in self-defence to embark on the senseless arms race.

32. The United States plan for general and complete disarmament went far beyond a mere series of

1/ See Official Records of the Atomic Energy Commission, First Year, No. 1, 1st meeting, pp. 4-14.

technical steps for arms reduction; it included measures to ensure the use of outer space for peaceful purposes, international programmes for economic and social progress, and the establishment of peace machinery, which must go hand in hand with the destruction of the instruments of war. Even in a world without arms, ideological, political, social and economic conflicts would still go on. The hope of building a world free from war would therefore remain utopian so long as provision was not also being made to set up adequate machinery for settling disputes and create the institutions required for that purpose.

33. The United States pledged itself to spare no effort to achieve general and complete disarmament without reservation and in the shortest possible span of time; in other words, to bring about the elimination of all national forces capable of international aggression. The non-aligned countries had set the same goal at the Belgrade Conference. In order to attain it, the United States had made a radical proposal. Its plan called, inter alia, for the following measures: large reductions in conventional and nuclear armaments even in the first stage; an end to the production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes and the transfer of existing stocks for non-weapons use; a halt in the further development of independent national nuclear capabilities; destruction or conversion to peaceful uses of strategic nuclear weapons delivery vehicles; prohibition of the manufacture of such vehicles; abolition of chemical, biological and radiological weapons. To ensure that those measures were actually carried out by each side, the United States had also proposed the creation of an international disarmament organization within the framework of the United Nations.

34. Although the proposed plan was very comprehensive and had been carefully prepared, the United States would give sympathetic consideration to any improvements which might be suggested. However, it would remain inflexible on the question of verification, because it was not a technical point but a fundamental principle essential to progress in disarmament. It was evident—and the arms race itself testified to the fact—that there was an atmosphere of mutual mistrust among the great Powers. It could not be otherwise when the Soviet leaders had repeatedly proclaimed their hostility towards the United States, its institutions and its way of life. Stalin had said that sincere diplomacy was impossible, and Lenin had acknowledged that his country had violated the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk thirty or forty times. More recently, the Soviet Union had violated agreements pledging self-determination to the peoples of Eastern Europe and had built a wall through the middle of a city in violation of another agreement. In the circumstances, it was essential to demand independent and international verification of agreements concluded with the Soviet Union. The United States was prepared to submit to verification procedures under international control at every stage of disarmament.

35. From 19 June to 19 September, representatives of the Soviet Union and the United States had discussed questions relating to disarmament and the resumption of negotiations in an appropriate forum. Following those exchanges of views, the two countries had issued a joint statement of agreed principles for disarmament negotiations (A/4879), which represented a measure of progress, since one of those principles was international control of all disarmament measures. However, the statement made in the General Assembly by the representative of the Soviet Union on 26 September (1016th plenary meeting) indicated that in the view of the USSR Government inspection should apply to the destruction of armaments but not to existing stocks or to current production. But it was pointless to verify that a weapon was being destroyed if there was no guarantee at the same time that two others were not being produced to take its place. That might well mean witnessing nothing but the destruction of inventories of obsolete equipment. Thus, the Soviet position appeared not to have changed. The Soviet Union had refused to say, in the joint statement of agreed principles, that verification should ensure not only that agreed reductions took place, but also that retained armed forces and arms did not exceed agreed levels at any stage. It maintained that such verification would constitute international espionage. If that was so, clearly there could be no agreement for general and complete disarmament, because no matter how many weapons were destroyed, it was those which were left that would represent the danger and that would enable one State to attack others. If the Soviet concept of disarmament inspection were accepted, arsenals might easily be larger at the end of the first stage of "disarmament" than at the beginning; States would disarm in public while remaining perfectly free to rearm in private. It was to be hoped that the Soviet Union would agree to change its position in that respect.

36. The United States and the Soviet Union had been unable to reach agreement on the composition of a negotiating body, although the United States position on the matter, which was set forth in document A/4880, was very flexible. The Soviet Union, for its part, was insisting on a restrictive formula based on artificial and arbitrary criteria. Incidentally, the Soviet Union had made repeated demands for changes in the negotiating body. The Ten-Nation Committee had been established at Soviet insistence, with an equal number of Eastern and Western delegations, even though there were several major Powers on the Western side and only one on the other side. However, the Soviet Union had expressed dissatisfaction with the work of that Committee and had abruptly withdrawn from it. The latest Soviet proposal, calling for the new body to be composed of three groups, was all too reminiscent of the Soviet view, which was completely extraneous to disarmament, that the world could be neatly divided into three "blocs". The United States, for its part, recognized that all nations had a vital stake in the cause of peace and disarmament. That was why it had agreed that all Members of the United Nations should be members of the Disarmament Commission and, similarly, had proposed that ten new members, chosen on the basis of equitable geographical distribution, should be added to the Ten-Nation Committee. In any event, the United States hoped that the Soviet Union was prepared to discuss with it the composition of the negotiating body.

37. While the first steps towards disarmament were being considered, an immediate start could be made in strengthening the existing machinery for the maintenance of peace. The experience gained by the United Nations in Korea, the Middle East and the Congo provided adequate guidance in that regard. Its intervention in those areas had made the United Nations a better instrument for keeping the peace, and now it must be made even more effective. Events in the Congo had shown that the success of peace-keeping missions was largely dependent on four

factors: the ready availability of national units; their discipline, training and capacity to work with contingents of other nationalities; the duration of their commitment to the United Nations, and the existence of a clear chain of command from United Nations Headquarters. Taking account of those four factors, the United States had already suggested that all countries should indicate the kind of military units which they would be prepared to make available to the United Nations, and it now proposed that Member States should provide the United Nations with an inventory of the forces, equipment and logistic support which they could put at its disposal for the purpose of maintaining peace. In addition, national units should be given special training in keeping with the special character of United Nations operations, and manuals should be prepared in the light of recent experience with a view to assisting the United Nations in the training of officers and assisting Member States in the training of non-commissioned personnel.

38. Since an international police force was needed only when there already existed a serious threat to peace, consideration must also be given to improving the machinery for settling disputes before they constituted such a threat. Greater advantage must therefore be taken of the opportunities already afforded in that regard by the United Nations and the International Court of Justice. The Secretary-General might wish to present his own ideas for expanding and improving the machinery for observation, fact-finding, conciliation, mediation and adjudication. He would unquestionably wish to make use of the members of his staff in conciliation activities, and the political organs themselves might wish on occasion to avail themselves of the services of rapporteurs. Such measures would make it possible to create forthwith the kind of peace-keeping machinery that would be required for the settlement of disputes in a world without war. A start could therefore be made at once, without awaiting the conclusion of a disarmament agreement.

39. An immediate start could also be made on actual disarmament, since a draft treaty banning all nuclear tests was in existence (A/4772). In that way, general and complete disarmament could be achieved more rapidly, for some measures could be taken sooner than others without disadvantage to any nation or group of nations. Moreover, the United States had presented the boldest and most comprehensive disarmament plan ever put forward (A/4891), and had enacted a law creating a new Arms Control and Disarmament Agency which was under the direct authority of the President. It was therefore possible to achieve disarmament and to create a world without war in which countries would retain their sovereignty but would relinquish the sovereign right to commit national suicide. The only question was whether all countries would agree to give up the means of coercing others by the use of force. If not, the arms race would continue, for those who loved freedom and had the power to defend it would not be coerced.

40. As the first steps to set the world forthwith on the road to disarmament, the Committee should establish a negotiating body, endorse the joint statement agreed upon by the United States and the Soviet Union (A/4879), and recommend that the new body should take up its tasks immediately.

41. Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics), replying to an observation by the United States representative, expressed surprise that the latter had described the Soviet delegation's attitude with regard to nuclear testing as negative, when the United States delegation had shown its true face at the previous meeting by voting against two draft resolutions adopted by the Committee. The first of those draft resolutions (A/C.1/L.291/Rev.1 and Rev.1/Add.1-3) called upon all States to refrain from using the territory, territorial waters or air space of Africa in testing, storing or transporting nuclear weapons. In the second (A/C.1/L.292 and Add.1-3), the General Assembly declared that the use of nuclear weapons was a direct violation of the United Nations Charter. In voting against those two draft resolutions, the United States had shown that its attitude was determined not by any humanitarian consideration but solely by its military interests.

42. Mr. STEVENSON (United States of America) said that it was hypocritical to reproach the United States for being honestly opposed to an uncontrolled and uninspected moratorium when the Soviet Union had violated the moratorium for which it had voted and had then gone on to explode a bomb of more than 50 megatons in defiance of the General Assembly's appeal. The United States was prepared to sign forthwith a treaty banning nuclear tests. If the Soviet Union was ready to do the same, it should prove it with deeds rather than words. The Soviet Union had voted for a moratorium and had then broken it. When the United States voted, it meant it.

The meeting rose at 1.25 p.m.

Litho in U.N. 77101—May 1962—2,100