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Chairman: Mr. Mario AMADEO (Argentina).

AGENDA ITEMS 73 AND 72

Continuation of suspension of nuclear and thermo-nuclear tests and obligations of States to refrain from their renewal (A/4801 and Add.1, A/C.1/L.283/Rev.2 and Rev.2/Add.1, A/C.1/L.291, A/C.1/L.292) (continued)

The urgent need for a treaty to ban nuclear weapons tests under effective international control (A/4799, A/C.1/L.280, A/C.1/L.292) (continued)

1. Mr. DJERMAKOYE (Niger) and Mr. VEGA GOMEZ (El Salvador), whose delegations had been unable to take part in the vote on draft resolution A/C.1/L.288/Rev.1 at the previous meeting, said that, if they had been present, they would have voted in favour of the proposal.

2. The CHAIRMAN said that, proceeding with the general debate on the first two items on the Committee's agenda, he would first call on the representative of the United States who had asked to exercise his right of reply.

3. Mr. DEAN (United States of America), replying to certain comments made by the Indian representative at the 1175th meeting regarding the attitude of the United States, pointed out that he had perhaps been wrong in saying that India tended to equate the Soviet Union and the United States; in reality, the Indian delegation had been far more critical of the United States than of the Soviet Union, although the United States had neither violated the moratorium nor carried out tests in the atmosphere.

4. Contrary to what the Indian representative maintained, the United States had not, while negotiating at Geneva, made preparations for one or more nuclear tests to be carried out according to a well-planned programme, as the Soviet Union had done. Furthermore, there was a considerable difference, not only between explosions of several megatons in the atmosphere and underground explosions of a few kilotons without radio-active fall-out, but also between the attitude of the United States, which had observed the moratorium, and the contempt shown by the Soviet Union towards that moratorium.

5. In addition, although he had not said that Project Vela had been carried out "with the entire consent of the Soviet Government", he recalled that he had stated that the Soviet Union had been well informed of the project and had accepted its purpose, which was to improve the detection capabilities of a treaty. However, despite the expressed desire of Soviet scientists to participate in that project, the Soviet Government had opposed such action even though the United States, at its request, had granted it the right to inspect all research operations, including the internal mechanism of the nuclear devices which were to be used.

6. The representative of India could not contend, in order to explain away his inaccuracies, that his information had been taken from American publications whose errors should be corrected by the competent American authorities. The United States Press was a free Press and the reports it published were not subject to government control. Certainly, no official publication had ever claimed that Project Vela was designed to improve nuclear weapons; its purpose was solely to improve detection capabilities.

7. The United States could not agree to an uncontrolled moratorium which the Soviet Union, after employing dilatory tactics, could once again unilaterally violate. The Soviet Union, indeed, had stated that it would continue to violate the moratorium even if the Committee voted for one.

8. By contrast, despite the tests being conducted by the Soviet Union, the United States Government stood ready to sign a treaty which would have as its objective the prohibition of all nuclear weapons tests, provided that it included a system of international control and appropriate and effective inspection.

9. Mr. CHAKRAVARTY (India), replying to the United States representative, pointed out that, at the 1174th meeting, Mr. Dean had in fact stated that Project Vela was being carried out "with the entire consent of the Soviet Government".

10. On the other hand, while it was true that the United States Press was not subject to control, it would be normal, when false information on a matter of great importance was published therein, for authoritative sources to use the same Press in order to make the necessary corrections.

11. Mr. UNDEN (Sweden) pointed out that, whatever the reasons given to justify the current rearmament, it was beyond question that international tension increased at the same pace as the increase in armaments. Accordingly, although the desire for general and complete disarmament certainly existed in all countries, it was essential to form a world-wide public opinion calling for that disarmament.

12. He expressed deep regret at the failure of the Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear

Weapons Tests. Even if its objective had been merely to "freeze" the status quo in the field of nuclear weapons, that standstill in the armaments race would already have been an important step in the right direction. Moreover, it seemed to be in the common interest of all the participating Governments to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to countries which did not yet possess them and to check the manufacture of new types of nuclear weapons in countries belonging to the "nuclear club". Differences had arisen mainly on the subject of control, which should not have assumed such great importance since, except for underground tests, nuclear weapons tests could be detected by means of available instruments, and the experts assembled at Geneva had eventually arrived at the conclusion that the control system did not have to be 100 per cent efficient. In March 1961, the United States had presented a proposal including a number of concessions, but the Soviet Union had unfortunately not made any corresponding concessions. The last proposals by the Soviet Union had been regarded by the Western Powers as an attempt to introduce the troika principle into the control machinery. Finally, the Soviet Government had decided to break the moratorium. The inevitable conclusion seemed to be that, for one reason or another, the Soviet Union was no longer interested in bringing the negotiations to a positive conclusion. The United States had at first said that it would not resume testing except in the laboratories and underground; but later, it had announced that, in view of the number of Soviet tests, it might also be obliged to carry out tests in the atmosphere.

13. At the time of the Geneva Conference, the three participating Governments had deemed it preferable to deal with the prohibition of nuclear weapons tests, which did not upset the balance of military power, independently of other disarmament issues. At the current session, however, the Soviet Union had unjustifiably changed its position on the matter, and he hoped that—as its memorandum of 26 September 1961 (A/4892) seemed to indicate—it would not persist in that attitude. If the question of discontinuing nuclear weapons tests were to be dealt with as a part of the whole problem of disarmament, as the Soviet Union wished, it was probable that nuclear tests would be continued on both sides and that additional countries might join the "nuclear club". In its memorandum (A/4892), the Soviet Government quite rightly stressed the dangers of such dissemination of nuclear weapons, but he regretted that it failed to recognize those dangers in determining its position on the issues dealt with at the Geneva Conference.

14. He suggested a few measures which could be taken to promote an agreement on the prohibition of nuclear weapons tests. Since the negotiations between the three great Powers had failed, the non-nuclear Powers might be approached about taking the initiative to bring about an agreement on the prohibition of nuclear tests. If a large number of States were to form a "non-nuclear club" and exert pressure on the nuclear Powers, the latter might perhaps more easily reach an agreement.

15. In addition, the non-nuclear States might declare that they refused to participate in nuclear armaments and that they did not themselves intend to manufacture nuclear weapons or permit stockpiling of such weapons in their territories for their own or some other State's account. If the Disarmament Commission or one of its sub-committees were to organize an inquiry to

ascertain whether the non-nuclear States were prepared to enter into such an undertaking, those States might be given an opportunity to specify the terms of such a commitment; it might be made subject, for example, to the simultaneous acceptance of other States or to the undertaking of the nuclear Powers to refrain from using nuclear weapons against the countries concerned. An inquiry of that kind would reveal whether the procedure was applicable and, if so, the nuclear Powers would be asked whether they were prepared to refrain from conducting tests. However desirable such an outcome might be, it should not be expected of the three great Powers concerned that they would at present assume any far-reaching commitments such as an undertaking to stop the manufacture of all types of nuclear weapons; the plan he had outlined, however, would make it very difficult indeed to perfect new types of nuclear weapons and would prevent further radio-active fall-out. The Swedish Government attached the utmost importance to that last factor, and the Swedish public had reacted strongly against the gigantic tests which the Soviet Union was conducting in the Arctic region. Lastly, if the ban on nuclear weapons tests could be widened to include also a ban on the importation of such weapons into countries which did not produce them, and a ban on the stockpiling of those weapons, the effect would be to convert those countries into denuclearized zones—the basic premise of the Rapacki plan applied on a world-wide scale. Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Mali and Morocco had put forward the same idea at the General Assembly's fifteenth session, when they had asked that the whole of the African continent should be regarded as a denuclearized zone (A/C.1/L.264). Several Balkan States had also declared themselves in favour of a nuclear-free zone in the Balkans. In support of an extension of those nuclear-free zones, he recalled the arguments adduced in the memorandum submitted by the Soviet Government (A/4892). Countries and continents which had not yet built up their military defence should be offered the benefits inherent in an extensive ban on nuclear weapons and should be asked to assume the necessary obligations.

16. Since the failure of the Geneva negotiations appeared unfortunately to be an accomplished fact, the plan he had described would have the advantage of enabling the non-nuclear countries to take the initiative; the Disarmament Commission should be given the task of conducting an inquiry into the practical possibilities of carrying it out.

17. Mr. SHUKAIRY (Saudi Arabia) recalled that war and the testing of weapons were as old as man himself. Only the methods had changed. It was a tragic paradox that in the era of the United Nations man should be carrying out experiments on the entire human race, on the present generation and on the generations to come. The very existence of the planet was threatened and it was to be feared that civilization would be totally destroyed. As for the dangers of atomic radiation, they were well known. Apart from the available scientific data, the survivors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki bore witness to the effects of radio-active fall-out on the human body. The feeling of relief at the end of the Second World War had been short-lived and a total war of radio-active fall-out had now been declared against mankind as a whole. Since the great Powers had exploded their first hydrogen bomb, successive nuclear tests by the United States and the Soviet Union had grown ceaselessly in number and in power, and their first victims,

Japanese fishermen, had revived harsh memories. On 1 April 1954, the Japanese Parliament had adopted a resolution calling for international control of weapons and tests. The fate of the Japanese victims had aroused public opinion throughout the world, particularly in Asia and Africa, and the Asian-African Conference held at Bandung in April 1955 had made an urgent appeal that nuclear test explosions should be stopped. The Bandung spirit seemed to have inspired a holy war against nuclear rearmament, and in January 1958 a petition signed by 9,234 scientists had asked the United Nations to outlaw nuclear weapons tests. It was after that campaign that Mr. Stevenson had pledged his support for the banning of nuclear explosions, a move which had lost him a large number of votes in the presidential campaign. The Saudi Arabian delegation wished to salute Mr. Stevenson for his helpful attitude to the cause of peace. On issues of war and peace, a man must seek to satisfy the requirements of the United Nations Charter rather than those of voters. Mr. Truman had not, unfortunately, taken that path on the Palestine question. Although he had won the election, he had harmed the cause of peace and the cause of the United Nations in the Middle East for a long time to come. Quite recently, he had said that the radio-activity from the explosion of 100 bombs was much less than that produced by the sun every day. He had added that the United States should carry out all the tests necessary for the achievement of its ends. It was not surprising, when such statements were being made, that the Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests should have ended in failure. The September 1961 issue of the *Reader's Digest* contained an article entitled "Why Nuclear Testing is a 'Must' for Freedom", signed by Louis L. Strauss, a former Chairman of the United States Atomic Energy Commission. If there was a freedom to engage in mass annihilation, it should perhaps be included among the fundamental freedoms referred to in the Charter of the United Nations.

18. To judge from the positions adopted by the great Powers, nuclear test explosions should be authorized as a means of self-defence. What was their record in that respect? The United States representative had stated in the Committee (1171st meeting) that unless a treaty was concluded promptly, the United States would be obliged to prepare to take the measures necessary to protect its security and that of the world community. That policy was not new. The United States delegation had invoked the same argument in July 1956, in the Disarmament Commission,^{1/} in order to justify the continuation of nuclear tests. The Soviet Union, for its part, had defended nuclear tests by similar arguments. On 9 September 1961, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, Mr. Khrushchev, had announced that in view of the NATO countries' feverish preparations for war against the Soviet Union and the socialist countries, the USSR had decided to resume nuclear tests, as it would be verging on irresponsibility not to reckon with the possibility that it would be the victim of aggression.

19. Thus, after fifteen years of discussions and negotiations on disarmament, the only point on which the two major Powers were agreed was that nuclear test explosions were a necessity for self-defence. Indeed, the movement in favour of the cessation of nuclear explosions was mainly a movement of the people. The nuclear Powers had repeatedly advocated

tests. After the Bermuda Conference of March 1957, the United States and the United Kingdom had announced in a joint communiqué that continued nuclear testing was required. On 1 April 1957, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom had not hesitated to state in the House of Commons that to give up tests meant giving up the bomb. As for Mr. Dulles, who at the time had been United States Secretary of State, the arguments which he had produced in the General Assembly at the twelfth session (680th plenary meeting) in defence of nuclear tests almost gave the impression that the improvement of nuclear weapons was a blessing for mankind. He had, moreover, explained, in a radio and television address to the people of the United States on 22 July 1957, that the United States was not using the word "disarmament" in any literal sense, that no one was thinking of disarming and that the United States was not contemplating the abolition of nuclear weapons.

20. In such circumstances, it would have been a miracle if the Geneva Conference had succeeded. Its failure had been due not to questions of language, as the United Kingdom representative had seemed to imply, but to the atmosphere of fear and suspicion prevailing in international relations. The United Nations, to which the United Kingdom representative had made an appeal (1173rd meeting), did not have the necessary means at its disposal to further disarmament. Nevertheless, it had not spared any effort to do so. It was interesting to recall, in that connexion, that, as far back as 1946, Sir Winston Churchill had considered it imprudent to entrust the secret of the manufacture of the atomic bomb to the United Nations. Many appeals had been made with a view to finding a solution to the present crisis. Even the great Powers had used the Assembly as a platform from which to appeal to each other. Mr. Stevenson had announced (1171st meeting) that the United States Government was ready to resume negotiations without delay and that a treaty providing for effective control could be signed within thirty days. The United Kingdom representative, for his part, had appealed to the Soviet Union to show good will and join in the search for fair and reasonable compromises (1173rd meeting).

21. Unfortunately, things had scarcely changed since 31 October 1958, when the Geneva Conference had opened, except that, after the explosions carried out by the Soviet Union and the United States, the world had been plunged into a sea of radio-activity. After 330 meetings, the representatives of the three Powers had failed to reach agreement. On one side and the other, assurances had been given about the measures taken to keep the increase in radio-activity to a minimum and the West had no reason to complain about the explanations provided in that respect by Mr. Khrushchev. However, although the three nuclear Powers spoke one language, the nuclear language, it seemed that they liked to exchange positions. In the beginning the Soviet Union had considered that nuclear tests must be kept apart from disarmament and dealt with separately. Now it believed that the question should be linked with disarmament. The United States and the United Kingdom, on the other hand, had followed the same path in reverse. No one knew the reasons for those sudden changes.

22. In 1956, when Mr. Krishna Menon had presented to the Disarmament Commission a detailed report on the harmful effects of nuclear tests,^{2/} the United

^{1/} See *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission*, 59th meeting.

^{2/} *Ibid.*, 58th meeting.

Kingdom representative had stated that his Government would continue nuclear tests until an agreement had been reached on the prohibition of nuclear weapons production.^{3/} On 29 August 1957, the same Government had presented to the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission the "package plan" of the Western Powers,^{4/} under which nuclear testing was to be part and parcel of the whole question of disarmament. At the twelfth session of the General Assembly, the United Kingdom had voted against an Indian draft resolution^{5/} which appealed to the States concerned simply to agree without delay to suspend tests of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons. That proposal had been rejected. The United States, for its part, had fallen in line with the United Kingdom, and just before the meeting of the Conference of Experts to Study the Possibility of Detecting Violations of a Possible Agreement on the Suspension of Nuclear Tests, held at Geneva in July and August 1958, had declared that the Conference was being held without prejudice to the positions of the parties on the interdependence of the various aspects of disarmament. According to the United Kingdom representative (1173rd meeting), what had prevented the conclusion of a treaty on nuclear tests was the Soviet Union's refusal to accept an international control system, in which the small and uncommitted countries would participate and would have a deciding vote. That was a fallacious explanation and nothing was to be gained by taking cover behind the uncommitted countries. The Soviet Union had not hesitated to state the real causes for the failure of the Conference. Others had been afraid to do so. The United Kingdom representative had refrained from mentioning the nuclear explosions undertaken by France in the Sahara, over the protests of the people of Asia and Africa and in violation of a General Assembly resolution. What was more, at the very time when the Geneva Conference on the Discontinuation of Nuclear Weapons Tests had been in session, France had been collaborating with Israel in the field of atomic research, helping that country to manufacture the atomic bomb, and President de Gaulle had declared his intention of becoming a member of the atomic club. It was not logical to reproach the Soviet Union, as the United Kingdom representative had done, for taking measures which France, for its part, could take without being criticized.

23. However that might be, the question was to find a way out of the present crisis. The United States and the United Kingdom had suggested that the United Nations should appeal to the parties concerned to resume the Geneva negotiations. Those countries did not need the General Assembly's authority to do so, any more than they needed it to pursue their nuclear experiments. Furthermore, the Soviet Union's position showed that it was apparently unwilling to follow that course, and to use the Committee in order to uphold the position of one party or another was a dangerous game. Nuclear tests were the most dangerous aspect of nuclear rearmament, which would lead to total destruction. A resumption of the Geneva Conference would not solve that burning question. Failure led only to failure and the problem was essentially a political one. The question of nuclear weapons tests could only be solved within the framework of disarmament. Since the road travelled in the past had led to a dead end, another must be sought; the question, together with

disarmament as a whole, must be attacked by a totally different approach. For fifteen years the United Nations had been trying to solve the problem. It had exhausted all the means at its command. At present, the responsibility lay squarely on the great Powers.

24. The Saudi Arabian delegation therefore proposed that the President of the United States, Mr. Kennedy, and the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, Mr. Khrushchev, should hold a summit conference devoted entirely to the question of disarmament, including a ban on nuclear tests. The meeting should not rise until the business was finished. The two statesmen were, of course, highly occupied with many things national and international, but no pre-occupation was paramount to world peace and security.

25. Secondly, the Saudi Arabian delegation proposed that, after that meeting, a special session of the General Assembly should be convened, to be attended by Heads of State or Heads of Government, and that it should not rise until the whole question of disarmament had been settled by the conclusion of a treaty ready for ratification and execution. Those two meetings would involve many difficulties, but failure to act without delay would lead to a catastrophe. All efforts should therefore be concerted before it was too late.

26. Mr. RAFAEL (Israel), exercising his right of reply, said that he wished once more to refute the allegation that Israel was producing atomic bombs. Mr. Ben-Gurion, the Prime Minister of Israel, had said in the Knesset on 21 December 1960 that the report that Israel was producing an atomic bomb was either a deliberate or an unconscious untruth. Israel was building a research reactor exclusively for peaceful purposes.

27. Mr. SHUKAIRY (Saudi Arabia), exercising his right of reply, said that when the United States intelligence service had informed the United States Atomic Energy Commission that atomic reactors were being built in Israel, Israel had claimed that they were textile plants. If Israel stood by its statement of denial, Saudi Arabia would suggest that the International Atomic Energy Agency should be requested to investigate in Israel whether those reactors were for peaceful purposes or of a warlike nature.

28. Mr. DEAN (United States of America), exercising his right of reply, said that all citizens of the United States, including Mr. Truman and Mr. Strauss, had the right freely to speak their own opinions, even if they disagreed with the policy of the Government. The United States delegation officially repeated that, despite the Soviet tests, the United States stood ready to sign a treaty with effective international controls which would have as its objective the banning of all atomic tests. The United States still thought it possible to negotiate such a treaty, in which the non-aligned States would have an important voice.

29. Mr. VAKIL (Iran) said that his country was particularly vulnerable to radio-active fall-out because of its latitude and climate. He wondered whether the resumption of nuclear tests by the USSR would not be followed by other still greater explosions carried out by both great Powers and, eventually, by other nations. An immediate suspension of tests was therefore of the utmost urgency.

30. The existence of the United Nations offered grounds for hope, because it enabled the different countries of the world to present their views and to appeal to the nuclear Powers to see reason.

^{3/} *Ibid.*, 59th meeting.

^{4/} *Ibid.*, Supplement for January to December 1957, document DC/113, annex 5.

^{5/} *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twelfth Session, Annexes*, agenda item 24, document A/C.1/L.176/Rev.4.

31. The Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests, although limited to that specific problem, might have been the first stage on the road to general disarmament. If it had succeeded, it might have helped to reassure the nuclear Powers, which were rather unrealistically trying to eliminate each and every risk before making moves towards disarmament. The failure of the Conference had been partly due to certain factors obstructing the negotiations. One such factor had been the highly suspicious attitude of the Soviet Union towards the question of control. That attitude had led it, in March 1961, to reject the very conciliatory proposals put forward by the United States, which might perhaps have been presented at an earlier stage. Again, negotiations had been held up by the inordinate slowness of Governments in sending instructions to their representatives. And lastly, the Soviet Union had abruptly ended the negotiations by resuming its nuclear tests.

32. In 1958 the Soviet Union had declared that it was completely possible to establish effective control over the discontinuance of atomic and hydrogen weapons tests,^{6/} and that, if those tests were not brought to an end, the danger of radiation would become even more serious in the future.^{7/} He hoped that, despite its radical change of attitude, the Soviet Union would return to that position.

33. The task of the Committee was clear. The first step was to induce the nuclear Powers to refrain from all testing of nuclear weapons. In the meantime, work should immediately be started on the conclusion of a nuclear test ban treaty, with built-in guarantees for adequate control.

34. Mr. WINIEWICZ (Poland) said that it was insincere to contend that those who approached the problem of nuclear tests within the context of general and complete disarmament were against ceasing such tests. In reality, the Western Powers had for years opposed the complete cessation of nuclear tests and still seemed to subscribe to that attitude. The fact that they had always preferred to speak of "suspension" was in itself quite revealing.

35. When the question of the final cessation of testing had been taken up separately in 1958, the idea had been to seek ways and means of moving the entire problem of disarmament out of the deadlocks. It had been hoped that a settlement of the question would prepare the way for disarmament negotiations. But the Western Powers had persistently isolated the problem of testing from the problem of disarmament. By insisting on setting up an unnecessarily expanded system of control, they had sought to enable Western military experts to control vast territories in other countries, an advantage which the West had unsuccessfully tried to gain in previous disarmament negotiations, and which the socialist countries had refused to sanction. The socialist countries were in favour of a system of inspection and control, provided that it was inspection and control of the process of disarmament and not of armaments themselves. It had also been hoped that negotiations on the cessation of tests would help to improve the international climate. But the Western Powers had obviously been bent on evading the complete prohibition of all tests, with the aim of keeping a loop-hole open for underground tests in the future. Even during the negotiations, the President of the

United States had declared that his country considered itself free to resume nuclear weapons testing, with advance notice, and that it would continue its active programme of weapon research development. Mr. John A. McCone, Chairman of the United States Atomic Energy Commission, had declared in October 1960 that tunnels and shafts in the Nevada test area were ready for new trial explosions, which could start within a few weeks.

36. The Western countries had also avoided the moratorium through the tests carried out by France, in defiance of the legitimate protests of African nations and of United Nations resolutions. France had reached an agreement with the United States on co-operation in application of nuclear weapons, and both those countries closely collaborated with the Federal Republic of Germany in working out the latest rocket arms programme.

37. The United States had just assured West Germany that its promises to give the Bonn Government's armed forces nuclear capability would be fulfilled. It could therefore be no coincidence that Bonn was the source of the most vehement objections to the Polish plan for a nuclear-free zone in Central Europe, which was known as the Rapacki plan. Revenge-seeking circles in West Germany were an essential obstacle to a return to normal in Europe. They were seeking to sabotage all serious negotiations between East and West by gambling on discord between the great Powers. Six million people had been killed in Poland alone during the Second World War, and the German officers who had been largely responsible were now regaining influence within NATO. When the Soviet proposal for a peace treaty with Germany had been rejected, the socialist countries had felt constrained to take steps to ensure their security.

38. As long as arsenals of nuclear weapons existed, the Powers which possessed those weapons would continue to perfect them and those which did not would try to acquire them. That was why, as the Soviet Union had declared in 1959, only general and complete disarmament could eliminate the danger of new war preparations and the threat of a nuclear disaster. Even the understandable concern felt about radio-active fall-out should not divert attention from the much greater danger of an all-out nuclear war which would leave the world a heap of radio-active dust, on which pitiful hordes of survivors wandered. The only way to avoid that danger was to destroy the existing stockpiles of nuclear weapons, to stop their production and to prevent the resumption of such production; in other words, to proceed to general and complete disarmament.

39. The fact that eight African countries had submitted a draft resolution (A/C.1/L.291) recommending that the African continent should be made a nuclear-free zone, similar to that proposed in the Rapacki plan, and the fact that the Foreign Minister of Sweden had referred to the Rapacki plan, showed that the problem of the cessation of tests was inseparable from that of general and complete disarmament. The refusal of the Western Powers to consider the question of the cessation of tests in conjunction with that of complete and general disarmament suggested that they did not really believe in disarmament.

40. Conversations on disarmament should nevertheless be possible, considering that the United States and the Soviet Union had already reached agreement on the principles for such conversations, but the posi-

^{6/} Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirteenth Session, Annexes, agenda items 64, 70 and 72, document A/3929, para. 28.

^{7/} *Ibid.*, document A/3915, para. 4.

tion of the Western Powers was not very convincing: the United States and the United Kingdom, while offering to sign an agreement on the cessation of tests, were seeking to include in that agreement the very clauses which had brought the Geneva talks to a deadlock.

41. Moreover, though they declared themselves in favour of general and complete disarmament, the Western countries were doing their utmost to avert any debate on disarmament. Only in the light of the ensuing discussions would it be possible to know their true intentions.

42. In conclusion, he stressed that the separate consideration of the question of nuclear tests had led to the loss of a proper perspective, encouraging polemics at a time when the task of the Committee and of the General Assembly should be to seek out unifying factors and to create by their actions a favourable international atmosphere.

43. Mr. DEAN (United States of America) said that the United States and the United Kingdom had submitted, at Geneva, a complete draft treaty having as its objective the banning of all nuclear weapons tests; the proposals that those countries had made on 28 and 30 August were set forth in the United States white paper.^{8/} He pointed out that it had been possible to detect, by means of distant instruments, the tests conducted in the atmosphere by the Soviet Union, because the explosions had been very powerful; it was not possible, however, to detect atmospheric tests in the thousand-ton range, or those conducted at a very high altitude. Some of the tests in the low-kiloton range were very important from the standpoint of determining the effects of missiles upon missiles. Underwater tests in the Southern hemisphere and in some of the oceans were difficult to detect without ship stations and submerged hydro-acoustical equipment. Provision for all those points was made in the treaty. Finally, the statement of principles, which he had worked out together with Mr. McCloy, was a joint statement of certain agreed principles. The Soviet Union had clearly stated that it did not accept the principle of inspection at each stage of the disarmament process. Although that was a very important principle, the United States was quite prepared to hold talks with the Soviet Union in order to pursue the subject of general and complete disarmament as a whole.

44. Mr. DJERMAKOYE (Niger) deplored the fact that, instead of serving the cause of economic development and the social advancement of peoples, nuclear energy was increasingly being converted into an instrument of destruction. Although they would not admit it, the great Powers were coming steadily nearer to what they had condemned at the time of the Second World War and, in such circumstances, one might question the value of the great principles which had mobilized the world. The nuclear Powers were assuming a terrible responsibility, and he paid tribute to the efforts made by the Indian representative to call both camps to reason, as well as to those countries which, by making concrete proposals, had shown their disapproval of those who were placing the world in jeopardy when they should be ensuring its survival. The delegation of Niger would vote in favour of any

proposal designed to lead the two main Powers to resume negotiations.

45. Mr. PLIMSOLL (Australia) said that Australia earnestly desired the cessation of nuclear tests and had, in the past, voted for the resolutions requesting the nuclear Powers to suspend such tests while they sought to reach an agreement on the permanent prohibition of nuclear testing. But in considering a similar proposal which was being put forward at the current session, the Committee should not forget how the present feeling of crisis had arisen. It had been provoked by the long and heavy series of tests on which the Soviet Union had embarked in the Arctic and in Siberia. If the Soviet Union had not resumed nuclear tests, there would be no tests in the atmosphere at present and no nuclear fall-out anywhere in the world. Those tests had been prepared over a long period of time. In such circumstances, it was not possible to consider the draft resolutions before the Committee in the same spirit as in previous years. The three great Powers had made voluntary declarations that none of them would be the first to resume nuclear tests, and the United Nations itself had given its imprimatur to those declarations. The Soviet Union's decision to recommence testing had naturally faced the other nuclear Powers with the question as to what their own attitude should be. For their part, the United States and the United Kingdom had made every effort to limit the consequences of the Soviet decision. They had made an appeal to the Soviet Union, proposing that the three nuclear Powers should agree not to undertake tests which took place in the atmosphere and produced radio-active fall-out. They had indicated that with regard to testing in the atmosphere they were prepared to rely on existing means of detection and were not asking for additional controls. Unfortunately, the appeal had not been heeded.

46. That series of events illustrated the weaknesses of a voluntary moratorium without inspection or control. How could one be sure that the moratorium was being observed by all the parties? How was one to detect underground tests, for example? But, despite all the doubts, the voluntary moratorium had been observed, they believed, until recently. The USSR had been the one that broke and terminated the moratorium. It was clear now that the moral force of United Nations resolutions was not enough. Finally, there was the question of the means of ascertaining whether a country was not making preparations for tests. The Soviet Union had demonstrated its ability to keep the vast preparations on which it had been engaged entirely concealed. For all those reasons, the Australian delegation believed that a moratorium needed to be controlled and to involve inspection.

47. The extremely expensive tests being conducted by the Soviet Union were designed not only to terrify the world but, above all, to increase the military strength of that country. In those circumstances, the United States could not be asked to jeopardize its own security and, if it deemed such action necessary, it would be entitled to resume testing. The United States had so far confined itself to conducting underground tests, which had not added to radio-active fall-out, but it had quite legitimately reserved the right to resume tests in the atmosphere. For it had been made clear that the Soviet Union, on its side, reserved the right to continue to conduct nuclear tests in the future and that, even if a new moratorium was agreed upon, that country might devote itself to preparing for further tests and embark on another series in due course.

^{8/} United States Disarmament Administration, Department of State, Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests: History and Analysis of Negotiations (Department of State publication 7258, Disarmament Series 4, October 1961).

48. The defence of the United States was not alone at stake. It was in the interest of all countries, committed and uncommitted, that the defences of the United States should not remain at a standstill while the other great nuclear Power was indulging in long series of tests. And it was not desirable that one of two States should be continually building up its defences while the other remained passive.

49. The Australian delegation, which earnestly desired the cessation of nuclear tests, did not think that such a cessation could be brought about, as in previous years, simply by the adoption of a resolution. The voluntary moratorium no longer had any value, and a resolution requesting the Powers concerned to observe a moratorium without inspection and without commitments would not be respected by the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, efforts must be made to achieve the cessation of nuclear tests without waiting for general and complete disarmament, if only in view of the harmful effects of tests on human health, particularly if conducted over a period of time in large strength and large numbers. Moreover, the prohibition of nuclear tests could be a way of attacking the problem of disarmament, because, though such a prohibition would require inspection machinery, it needed much less complicated and less pervasive organization than

other forms of disarmament. The representative of Poland, by raising the question of the Rapacki plan, had indicated in effect that there were certain areas where it was possible to conclude agreements on particular aspects of disarmament without waiting for general and complete disarmament. Such disarmament remained the ultimate aim, but that aim must not stand in the way of any possible progress anywhere. Although many military and other considerations linked the question of nuclear tests with that of general and complete disarmament, it was necessary, without further delay, to put an end to tests and to prevent additional nuclear Powers from emerging. In view of their size, the present tests being conducted by the Soviet Union raised much greater problems than had existed in the past. But the approach could not be a simple call upon countries to cease tests, when it was known that one Power had already conducted so many in the previous few weeks and that the remaining nuclear Powers felt, for their own safety, that they must do something to keep pace. In present circumstances, the United Nations must urge the nuclear Powers to bring about, and must assist in bringing about, an effective cessation of tests, adequately inspected and controlled.

The meeting rose at 6.40 p.m.