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**Chairman: Mr. Mario AMADEO (Argentina).**

**Order of discussion of agenda items (A/C.1/844, A/C.1/  
L.281, A/C.1/L.282) (continued)**

1. Mr. SHAHA (Nepal), answering remarks made by the representative of the Soviet Union at the 1164th meeting, said he did not find it necessary to change one word of what he had said before.

2. Mr. WINIEWICZ (Poland) said that it was not enough to consider the cessation of nuclear tests. The only effective way of averting the danger of war was to speed up the achievement of general and complete disarmament.

3. The joint statement by the Soviet Union and the United States of agreed principles for disarmament negotiations (A/4879) showed that the two great Powers agreed on the urgency of general and complete disarmament and on the general scope of principles on which a thorough disarmament discussion and disarmament agreement should be based. The question of disarmament should therefore be the first item of the agenda, and the Committee should consider the joint statement of the Soviet Union and the United States as soon as possible.

4. The sponsors of the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.280, instead of taking the attitude towards a ban on nuclear tests which they had adopted at the fifteenth session, now insisted that priority should be given to their item; they thereby risked provoking an exchange of recriminations that would poison the whole climate of the Committee's meetings, which should be harmonious and constructive when the disarmament issue was being considered.

5. The Polish delegation thought that the question of the cessation of tests, including the item proposed by India, could be considered in conjunction with the problem of general and complete disarmament. It continued to advocate the complete elimination of weapons of mass destruction (including nuclear weapons), the prohibition of their manufacture, and a ban on their testing; but it could not overlook the facts. It had profited by the lesson of what had taken place during the three years of the Geneva negotiations between the nuclear Powers. That should answer the questions which the representative of the United Kingdom had asked at the previous meeting.

6. At the fifteenth session—when the Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests had seemed to be on the way towards a successful conclusion—many countries, including India and the United Kingdom, had spoken in favour of a joint dis-

ussion on a number of problems related to disarmament. It would be illogical to decide to separate the problem of tests from that of disarmament as a whole, now that developments had shown that the narrow path of the Geneva negotiations could not lead to a speedy understanding. In that connexion, he pointed out that the problem of tests was included in the United States programme for general and complete disarmament, and he felt it should be discussed within the framework of such a scheme.

7. Mr. MILLA BERMUDEZ (Honduras) recalled the eloquent warning which Mr. Peive, the representative of the USSR, had given in the Committee on 7 November 1957<sup>1/</sup> against the dangers of atomic radiation. He wondered whether that statement, which was very interesting from many points of view, did not apply exactly to the nuclear weapons tests which the Soviet Union had resumed and was actively continuing.

8. The same question arose with regard to the statement made to the Press in January 1958 by Professor Lebedinsky, a member of the Soviet delegation to the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation; he had said that the USSR had asked the Committee to call for the immediate suspension of nuclear tests, which threatened to increase the incidence of hereditary diseases and of cancer. Professor Kuzin, another member of the Soviet delegation to the Scientific Committee, had said that if nuclear tests continued at the same rate—which was much slower than the present rate—mankind would lose more than a million individuals in each generation through hereditary diseases. Lastly, Mr. Khrushchev, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, had declared on 14 January 1960 in the Supreme Soviet that any one of the three atomic Powers which violated the undertaking it had given to all Members of the United Nations not to resume nuclear weapons tests would cover itself with shame and would be condemned by all the peoples of the world.

9. The Honduran delegation thought that everything should be done to protect the existence and future of the peoples of the world and to stop the race towards suicide. The Soviet Union and the United States should immediately end nuclear testing. That was why the Committee should give priority to agenda items 72 and 73, on the understanding that draft resolutions would be considered separately.

10. Mr. BUDO (Albania) said that the most important question, on which the solution of other international problems largely depended, was general and complete disarmament. The Committee should therefore begin its work by considering that question. It would not be right to consider the question of the cessation of nuclear weapons tests first, as some delegations wished, because that question was only one aspect

<sup>1/</sup> Official Records of the General Assembly, Twelfth Session, First Committee, 895th meeting.

of the general problem of disarmament; if it were given priority, agreement on the main question would only be complicated and made more difficult. Nor would such a procedure make possible a true solution of the problem of nuclear tests, because, while the arms race and preparations for war continued, there would be no real guarantees that nuclear weapons tests would not begin again.

11. It was surprising that the United States should ask that the question of the cessation of tests should be examined as an urgent matter, for the United States was responsible for the fact that no agreement had been reached on the prohibition of nuclear tests. It had continually sought to remain in a position to carry on underground tests of nuclear weapons, by trying to legalize, by international agreement, the right to make such tests. Moreover, when the Soviet Union, with the support of other countries, had proposed that the question of disarmament should be considered in plenary meeting of the General Assembly immediately after the general debate, the United States had opposed the proposal in order to delay the discussion for as long as possible. That was why the United States now wanted the question of nuclear tests to be given priority and considered apart from the question of disarmament. All those facts showed that the United States Government was not anxious to reach an agreement on general and complete disarmament; that was borne out by the speech made at the 1163rd meeting by its representative, who had presented the problem of general and complete disarmament as an insoluble one.

12. The eagerness displayed by the United States for a cessation of nuclear weapons tests was due to considerations of propaganda; in fact the United States wanted, not to achieve a real ban on tests, but simply to delay consideration of the problem of general and complete disarmament for as long as possible, in order to continue the arms race and preparations for war. The Committee should frustrate those designs by giving priority to the question of general and complete disarmament. Without such disarmament, there could be no true cessation of nuclear weapons tests. The conclusion of an agreement for the cessation of tests would not diminish the danger of nuclear war, since it would not prevent the continued production and stockpiling of nuclear weapons. That was why the Albanian delegation gave unqualified support to the Soviet proposal on the priority to be given to the question of disarmament and on the order to be followed in considering agenda items 19, 73, 72 and 81.

13. Mr. WACHUKU (Nigeria) supported the Indian proposal (A/C.1/L.282). He thought that agenda item 73 should be examined separately because, although no nuclear testing was currently taking place in the Sahara, there was no guarantee that France would not begin another series of tests if the Assembly did not intervene. It was not desirable to examine agenda items 72 and 73 together, as the United States proposed (A/C.1/L.281), or to examine them concurrently with the question of disarmament. All those questions were important, but the problem of nuclear tests was particularly pressing; after it had been solved, it would be possible to deal with the others, but if it were considered at the same time as the question of disarmament a solution might never be reached.

14. The great Powers had resumed nuclear testing. Everyone agreed that fall-out was dangerous to human health and that tests should be ended. Once it had

been decided that nuclear tests should again be suspended, the other questions could be considered one after another. The question of disarmament and that of the conclusion of a treaty prohibiting nuclear weapons could even be considered together. But there was no doubt whatever that the question of the continued suspension of tests should be examined separately, in order that the threat to mankind involved in nuclear testing should disappear.

15. Mr. TARABANOV (Bulgaria) thought the problems which the Committee was called upon to solve so important that the work should be carefully organized. In that connexion, he thought the Committee should adopt the Soviet proposal that all questions relating to disarmament should be considered together and given priority. All delegations agreed that disarmament questions should be considered first, which was certainly auspicious. Moreover, agenda items 19, 72, 73 and 81 should be considered together because all those questions were only different aspects of the problem of disarmament. In present circumstances, the question of the cessation of nuclear tests could be solved only as a part of general and complete disarmament; an isolated treaty on the question could not remove the threat of nuclear war, since it could in no way arrest the continuation of the arms race. So long as the arms race continued the danger of war would increase, and it was difficult to find a separate solution for any particular problem bound up with the whole question of disarmament.

16. In that respect, it was regrettable that the United States, after having signed a joint statement with the Soviet Union recognizing the need to reach an agreement on general and complete disarmament as soon as possible, should refuse to admit that such a procedure would make the Committee's work much easier. The Committee should immediately concentrate on the question of general and complete disarmament, and should set up a new representative organ to work out in detail the clauses and provisions of a programme and treaty of general and complete disarmament. The treaty would solve the problem of nuclear tests, simply by eliminating all nuclear and other weapons held by States. It would also solve the problem of control, which had been a stumbling-block at the Geneva discussions on the cessation of tests.

17. On the other hand, he wondered whether it was realistic to suggest the separate discussion and solution of the problem of the cessation of tests, given that the Geneva discussions had failed; such a suggestion might be designed to prevent a settlement of the question of general and complete disarmament. The United States representative had declared that the question of nuclear tests should not be buried under the many complexities of disarmament debates. He had thereby desired to indicate his opinion that the question of general and complete disarmament could not be solved; but Member States were unlikely to accept that possibility. It should also be noted that, although in previous years the United States had insisted that the disarmament questions should be considered simultaneously, the United States representative was proposing the opposite now, when there seemed to be some chance of achieving results. The United Kingdom had also reversed its position. It could therefore be asked whether the proposal that the question of the cessation of tests and the question of the conclusion of an agreement to that end should be considered before any other disarmament question was not a subterfuge designed to prevent the Commit-

tee from so organizing its work that it might reach a solution. It might also be asked what practical result would be achieved if the question of nuclear tests were examined separately. There was no question of recommending the resumption of the Geneva negotiations, since such negotiations would only provide the Western Powers with a means of delaying the conclusion of a treaty on general and complete disarmament. That was why the question of general and complete disarmament should be examined first, with a view to the preparation of a programme and the conclusion of a treaty. In that way it would be possible to study and solve all disarmament questions without exception.

18. Mr. FLORES AVENDAÑO (Guatemala) said he agreed with the representative of Canada that the discussion should not be adjourned without the adoption of a resolution which would result in an end to nuclear tests. Referring to the Nigerian representative's arguments, he said that the immediate cessation of nuclear tests should be accompanied by the negotiation of a treaty guaranteeing it. Replying to the representative of Bulgaria, he observed that the USSR, if its intentions were sincere, should accept at least a part of the whole notion of general and complete disarmament—namely, the cessation of nuclear tests.

19. The Guatemalan delegation agreed with the many representatives who had protested against the resumption of nuclear testing. Mankind demanded an end to the evils which were already beginning to destroy the health and even the life of man. Guatemala therefore begged the Powers responsible for that tragic situation to end the tests. That was why it supported the Indian proposal. However, agenda items 72 and 73 could be merged in one, entitled, for instance: "Immediate cessation of nuclear and thermo-nuclear tests, and conclusion without delay of a treaty guaranteeing it under effective international control". In any case, the Committee's work should not end until effect had been given to the hopes of mankind.

20. Mr. AHMED (United Arab Republic) thought that at the current session of the Assembly the suspension of nuclear and thermo-nuclear tests was of paramount importance and should be discussed immediately and independently. It was admittedly desirable that the great Powers should conclude a treaty on the suspension of nuclear tests; but that was a question requiring long discussion, since talks had already lasted for three years without any substantial or practical results. On the other hand, a resolution on the suspension of tests through a moratorium could and should be adopted at the current session, as a practical and easier measure pending the conclusion of a treaty on the subject. Such a position did not imply that the question of general and complete disarmament was not of prime importance. On the contrary, the United Arab Republic hoped that a treaty on general and complete disarmament would soon be concluded. But priority should, in present circumstances, be given to the most urgent and least difficult question. For that reason the delegation of the United Arab Republic would vote in favour of the Indian proposal (A/C.1/L.282).

21. Mr. PALAMARCHUK (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) said that, on the list of questions which the General Assembly had referred to the Committee (A/C.1/844), the question of disarmament was the first—as it should be, since the three other questions connected with disarmament were subsidiary to it. The Ukrainian delegation would like the Committee to examine the problem of general and complete dis-

armament first, with its constituent parts: the questions relating to nuclear weapons. That was the only arrangement under which it would be possible to hold a fruitful discussion of the problem most exercising mankind.

22. At previous sessions the Committee had given priority to the question of general and complete disarmament but, owing to lack of agreement between the two main parties, it had not been able to adopt a resolution laying down clearly and precisely the general lines on which a disarmament treaty should be concluded. Circumstances were now more propitious: the Committee had before it a joint statement by the Governments of the United States and the USSR (A/4879), which laid down fundamental principles for disarmament negotiations. The Committee might usefully begin by extending that agreement of principle and deciding on the general lines of a treaty on general and complete disarmament. That would also make it easier to solve the question of the cessation and prohibition of nuclear weapons tests, in which the Soviet Union was far from losing interest, whatever might be said for propaganda purposes. If the Committee followed that procedure, it would no longer confine itself to words, but would really take action, in the sense in which the President of the United States had used the word when he had submitted the new United States programme in the General Assembly.

23. The United States proposal (A/C.1/L.281) did not mention general and complete disarmament, presumably because the United States delegation thought that the prospect of an agreement on the subject was much too distant whereas a treaty on the cessation of nuclear tests could be signed at once. But even if, against all expectations, such a treaty were concluded, it would be mere window-dressing, since the arms race would proceed and nuclear weapons would continue to accumulate.

24. Neither the Soviet Union nor anyone else denied the harmful effects of radiation, and only most reluctantly had the Soviet Union decided to resume tests; but it was important to realize that the essential need today was to avert the danger of nuclear war, to save hundreds of millions of human lives and to prevent atomic weapons from going into action—and that could only be achieved through general and complete disarmament.

25. The Ukrainian delegation would therefore vote in favour of the Soviet proposal concerning the order in which the various questions should be considered; it could not support the United States proposal.

26. Mr. DEAN (United States of America) recalled that President Kennedy had submitted to the General Assembly (1013th plenary meeting) a detailed plan of general and complete disarmament, and that the United States was ready to do everything in its power to carry it out. But general and complete disarmament was a vast and complicated field, and to work it out would take some time. That was why the United States delegation thought that questions relating to the prohibition of nuclear tests should be considered first.

27. Recalling the reasons why his delegation had asked (1163rd meeting) that the item proposed by the United States and the United Kingdom should be considered first, he observed that, if the Committee decided to consider first the item proposed by India, it would be saying in effect that a simple decision to

continue the suspension of nuclear tests and to impose upon States the obligation to abstain from resuming them was more important or desirable than recommending the conclusion of an effective international treaty providing for the immediate cessation, under international control, of all nuclear tests.

28. Instead of prejudging the issue in that way, the Committee should seriously discuss both aspects of the problem of the cessation of nuclear tests, and should consider which was the soundest and most lasting solution; suspension alone, without control or inspection, or a treaty worked out with the greatest care and providing for effective measures of control. However, if the Committee decided to consider the two items relating to tests separately, the United States delegation, being firmly convinced that a realistic ban should be based on an agreement providing for international control, would insist that the question which it and the United Kingdom delegation had proposed should be given priority, since chronologically it preceded the question proposed by India.

29. The United States and the United Kingdom had worked out a draft treaty (A/4772) designed to prohibit for ever, under effective international inspection and control, the testing of all nuclear weapons, in all environments. The sponsors of that draft and the Soviet Union already agreed on many points. However, the Soviet Union, after long and secret preparations, had begun a series of tests of nuclear weapons in the atmosphere, in callous disregard of General Assembly resolution 1578 (XV), which it had supported; while the United States and the United Kingdom, whatever the representatives of Romania and the USSR might say, had scrupulously observed the moratorium imposed, and had even abstained from all preparations for further tests. The Committee should understand that the only way of ensuring the permanent cessation of nuclear tests was the conclusion of the treaty advocated by the United States and the United Kingdom. Although the representative of Nigeria was under the impression that the suspension proposed by India would bring about an immediate cessation of nuclear tests, those considerations should convince him of the need for a control organization established by treaty. The United States was ready to sign such a treaty immediately. However, if the Soviet Union persisted in its present course of action and continued its tests in the atmosphere, the United States would be forced, much against its will, to reconsider its decision not to carry out similar tests. With regard to the tests carried out by France, neither the United Kingdom nor the United States had played any sort of part in them.

30. He repeated that his delegation was not opposed to the consideration of the Indian item relating to a moratorium. However, since it was in favour of the simultaneous discussion of a moratorium and of a treaty for the prohibition of tests, it was opposed to the oral motion made by the representative of India (1163rd meeting) that the Indian proposal (A/C.1/L.282) should be voted on first.

31. Mr. USHER (Ivory Coast) said that, as the representative of a developing country which might suffer terribly in the event of war, he would support any draft likely to ensure peace. Although the Indian item did not deal with the substance of the disarmament problem, it deserved support because it was designed to suspend nuclear tests, which endangered the life and health of mankind.

32. It was important to avoid discussing disarmament under the threat of such tests, and a climate propitious to negotiation must be established. The great Powers themselves had felt the need for such a climate, since, before their latest negotiations, they had decided to suspend tests. The breaking of the moratorium had caused deep dismay in all countries of the world, but it was hoped that the discussion in the Committee would lead to a solution.

33. The delegation of the Ivory Coast thought that the Committee should adopt—without a vote being necessary—a resolution calling for the suspension of nuclear tests, the question of disarmament remaining before the United Nations. Thereafter, in a more relaxed atmosphere, the Committee could consider the substance of the problem, tackling the difficulties one by one and beginning with those which the experts had already studied. Agenda item 72, which dealt with only one aspect of disarmament, should be considered first; then the other aspects of the question should be considered, care being taken to give all parties the necessary guarantees until the achievement of complete disarmament.

34. The delegation of the Ivory Coast would prefer there to be no formal order of priority for the consideration of the various questions proposed.

35. Mr. DE MELO FRANCO (Brazil) recalled that at the Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments, held at Geneva in 1932, Mr. Litvinov, the Soviet Union representative, had presented a plan for a general and complete disarmament. Owing to the enormous difficulties inherent in the problem, the great Powers had been unable to reach an agreement. The catastrophe which had left no country, large or small, unscathed had been the result.

36. In view of the complexity of the problem, attention should be devoted first to its most urgent and most concrete aspects. The Committee should consider the question of the suspension and prohibition of nuclear tests before examining the plans for disarmament.

37. The United States and the United Kingdom representatives had made it clear, in their statements, that they could not have complete faith in the effectiveness of a moratorium unaccompanied by legal guarantees. Furthermore, it was apparently felt that the immediate suspension of nuclear tests might reinforce any temporary disparity between the two blocs. Those reasons might be excellent for countries which possessed nuclear weapons; but they could not convince the others, which constituted the great majority of States Members of the United Nations.

38. Unfortunately, little had been accomplished by unilateral commitments to suspend nuclear explosions. France had arrogated to itself the right to carry out tests for reasons of security; and that had enabled the Soviet Union to use the same pretext for the resumption, in September 1961, of its own explosions, the biological and political effects of which aroused the concern of the whole world. The United States had felt itself compelled to resume underground tests and, according to its Press, was considering the possibility of resuming tests in the atmosphere, as the United States representative had just confirmed.

39. In the light of all those deeply regrettable facts, the Brazilian delegation considered that the first step must be to consider simultaneously the two proposals

concerning nuclear weapons tests, for the conclusion of a treaty on the subject was an urgent necessity.

40. Mr. RONAN (Ireland) said his Government hoped that the item entitled "Prevention of the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons", which it had submitted for inclusion in the agenda, would be considered immediately after the three other items concerning disarmament but that it would be dealt with separately. In view of the dangers involved in the wider spread of nuclear weapons, a full discussion of that question was imperative. In addition, in preparing its draft resolution his delegation would like to be able to take into account the opinions which would be expressed in the discussion of the three other items, and any decisions which the Committee might take with respect to them.

41. Regarding those three other items, his delegation could not refuse to support the Indian proposal, as its implementation would remove a cause of great and immediate anxiety, despite the problems involved in an uncontrolled moratorium. That did not mean that it would not like to see the voluntary suspension of tests placed on a contractual basis. With regard to the Soviet Union proposal, he considered that, in present circumstances, the nuclear test ban items should have priority over the general disarmament discussion.

42. Replying to a question by the CHAIRMAN, Mr. RONAN (Ireland) said that he had not formally proposed that the item placed on the agenda at his Government's request should be considered immediately after the other disarmament items. He had merely expressed a desire to that effect, indicating that that order of priority would be logical in view of the urgency of the problem. He hoped that the question could be considered before the Assembly adjourned in December.

43. Mr. PIPINELIS (Greece) noted that many of the opinions which had been expressed reflected a state of suspicion and fear which caused exaggerated importance to be attached to certain aspects of the question. In his view, the most practical and most logical approach to the problem was that suggested by the United States. That view might be reinforced by the fact that the United States proposals had met with opposition coming from different sides. Some had objected that they would delay the suspension of nuclear tests, others that they would delay general and complete disarmament. The suspension of nuclear tests was indeed a matter of urgency, but haste towards that goal would be possible only at the expense of another aspect of the problem: control, which was no less important. To suspend nuclear tests without control would be to reward the less scrupulous party to any future agreement. Moreover, any breach of that agreement would not necessarily be the result of ill-will. It might very well result from the natural concern that any country which suspected bad faith on the part of a possible foe might feel for its own security.

44. Moreover, the suspension of nuclear tests was certainly not a secondary aspect of the disarmament problem. As a result of the frenzied advance of modern science, which was constantly making new contributions to the arms race, new factual situations were repeatedly changing all the elements of the problem.

45. The main reason for the mutual accusations of inconsistency by the Governments of the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom was the fact that considerable advances were constantly being made in the technique of nuclear rearmament. For that reason, Govern-

ments had frequently found themselves compelled to abandon their previous positions and adopt new ones. They could hardly be blamed on that score.

46. The objection made by certain countries—by the Soviet Union, for example, in its memorandum of 26 September 1961 (A/4893)—that the United States proposal would be likely to delay and even to jeopardize general and complete disarmament, indicated a concern which certainly had to be borne in mind. On reflection, however, one might say that there seemed to be a basic misunderstanding on the subject, resulting from the unwholesome state of suspicion which at present prevailed. In fact, under operative paragraph 3 of the draft resolution submitted by the United States and the United Kingdom (A/C.1/L.280), the General Assembly would request the States negotiating the treaty on the banning of nuclear weapons test to report to the Disarmament Commission by 1 March 1962 on the progress of their negotiations.

47. As soon as a treaty was negotiated and concluded, the question of ratification would arise. If one of the parties, say the Soviet Union, found after the conclusion of a treaty on the suspension of nuclear tests that negotiations on the other parts of the disarmament programme were making no progress and that it might find itself bound by a treaty on the suspension of tests without disarmament being attained, it was very likely that the Soviet Government would not ratify the treaty. As all aspects of the problem were interdependent, all of them had to be settled if disarmament was to be fully achieved.

48. The first step must be the prohibition of nuclear tests, primarily because important progress had been made towards that prohibition in the negotiations at Geneva. Naturally there were difficulties in connexion with certain points, such as the organization of a control system; but the same difficulty existed in respect of general and complete disarmament. It was also important to bear in mind that nuclear tests had in recent years brought a new dimension into the question of disarmament, the dimension of the instability created by the progress of science and military technology. At any moment a new invention might have such far-reaching effects that any existing disarmament plan would have to be revised.

49. Accordingly, if progress was to be possible at all, it was necessary to begin with the negotiation of a treaty on the cessation and prohibition of nuclear weapon tests.

50. Mr. IFEAGWU (Nigeria), replying to the observations of the representatives of Guatemala and the United States regarding the statement made by the Chairman of the Nigerian delegation, said that in his Government's view there was an urgent need for a treaty banning nuclear weapons, but the first thing to be done was to suspend tests. His delegation understood the concern over the dangers of a moratorium unaccompanied by any control or guarantee. When a fire was raging in a neighbourhood, however, it was necessary to isolate it in order to deal with it more effectively. Accordingly, it would seem that the first step should be a moratorium, but the moratorium should be controlled and policed. The next step could consist of negotiations for a general treaty, which might occupy from six months to a year. If on the other hand nuclear tests continued during the negotiations, those negotiations would be held under duress, which was undesirable.

The meeting rose at 6.5 p.m.