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Chairman: Mr. Mario AMADEO (Argentina).

AGENDA ITEM 19

Question of disarmament (A/4868 and Corr.1, A/4879, A/4880, A/4887, A/4891, A/4892, A/C.1/856, A/C.1/L.297 and Add.1) (continued)

1. Mr. GREEN (Canada) said that recent developments in Berlin and the break-down of the moratorium on nuclear weapons tests demonstrated the urgency of resuming disarmament negotiations. In that connexion, Canada was glad that thanks to the Assembly's efforts it had been decided to resume negotiations on tests. The conclusion of a treaty on the permanent cessation of nuclear tests would be an important achievement in itself, and would also be a first step towards general disarmament. The action taken on that question should be reinforced by steps to bring about a resumption of negotiations on general and complete disarmament. Consequently, it was gratifying that the United States and the Soviet Union had agreed on the principles which should guide such negotiations and that the Committee had already taken a practical step by adopting draft resolution A/C.1/L.299 and Add.1. Of course, there were still differences on how those principles should be translated into practice, particularly with regard to methods of verification, but those difficulties should be capable of solution in the course of detailed negotiations.

2. The only remaining obstacle to resumed negotiations was the lack of agreement concerning the composition of the body in which they were to take place. The negotiating body should be such as to give the major military Powers an opportunity for detailed discussions and to ensure that the interest of all States in disarmament was adequately reflected. It should therefore be one in which the two sides would face each other and which would have the benefit of the participation of other countries from areas of the world which had not been represented in the previous negotiating body. In that connexion, the Canadian delegation recognized that it would be better to broaden the membership of the Ten-Nation Committee than merely to add a chairman, vice-chairman and rapporteur from countries other than the ten represented, as Canada had proposed at the fifteenth session. For example, the new committee might have a membership of thirteen or sixteen, one or two representatives, as the case might be, being added from Africa, Asia and Latin America. The presiding officer of the negotiating group could be either the Chairman of the Disarmament Commission, since he was well qualified and

would provide continuity, or a member of the delegation of one of the countries newly admitted to the Committee, on the understanding that his appointment would not interfere with his country's full participation in the negotiations.

3. Regardless of its composition, the negotiating body should have close relations with the United Nations. Since the question of disarmament was of vital interest to all Members of the United Nations, provision should be made for it to report regularly to the Disarmament Commission. Moreover, it might prove advisable to consider, as the negotiations proceeded, the establishment of United Nations committees to study specific aspects of disarmament from a regional or specialized point of view. Such committees would expedite the study of certain problems and enable additional Member States to take part in a detailed consideration of disarmament. In the last analysis, the fundamental point was not the number of members of the proposed negotiating body, but the determination to get on with actual negotiations. He therefore urged the United States and the Soviet Union to come to early agreement on the composition of an appropriate body.

4. Canada had participated in the preparation of the new disarmament plan presented by the President of the United States on 25 September (A/4891), and fully supported it. From the very first stage, the plan provided for substantial reductions in nuclear armaments and the means of their delivery, nuclear weapons being the most dangerous, together with a parallel reduction in conventional armaments, which were equally significant if the principle of balance between the two great Powers was to be maintained. In addition, the parties would pledge themselves to continue with the plan until its completion, as provided in the principles adopted by the Commonwealth Prime Ministers in their statement of 17 March 1961 (A/4868 and Corr.1) and in the principles agreed upon in the joint statement of the United States and the Soviet Union (A/4879). Moreover, the plan provided for the establishment of effective peace-keeping machinery, as set forth in the principles agreed upon between the two great Powers concerned. The Canadian delegation regarded that as a very important question, which should be studied in detail by a special body set up for the purpose within the United Nations. Finally, the authors of the new proposals had attempted to take account of the earlier Soviet position; they had been careful to ensure that the measures proposed should give no military advantage to either State or group of States, and they had presented their plan not on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, but as a contribution to constructive negotiations.

5. Since there was agreement on the basic principles, since the question of the composition of the negotiating body should be capable of easy solution and since the two parties had submitted detailed proposals which

had a number of significant elements in common, there should be no delay in getting down to the actual consideration of a full programme of disarmament. However, disarmament involved not only reducing armaments with a view to their total elimination, but also putting a stop to the development of new and more deadly weapons. The General Assembly had already accomplished a great deal at the current session, and as a result there had been an easing of international tension. There was therefore reason to view the future with optimism.

6. Mr. SULAIMAN (Iraq) said that although it was true that the future of the world was mainly in the hands of two great Powers, it should not be left to them alone. In view of the millions of people they represented and the position they held between two rival camps, the non-aligned countries should be able to make an effective contribution to the solution of the disarmament problem.

7. The failure of the Geneva negotiations and the resumption of nuclear tests could not be considered apart from the great political problems of the times. Furthermore, the arms race had the effect of increasing international tension and rendering more difficult the solution of political problems. Accordingly, the settlement of political differences and that of the disarmament problem must go forward together.

8. His delegation welcomed the statements made by the Soviet Union and the Western countries on 21 November (1199th meeting) concerning the resumption of negotiations. A test-ban treaty would improve the climate for future disarmament negotiations, but it should not be overlooked that a ban on tests was a necessary part of a programme for general and complete disarmament. While it was true that through testing, nuclear armaments could be perfected and their production made easier while the difficulty of inspection would be increased, it was equally true that the nuclear Powers already had enough bombs to destroy each other and the rest of the world with them. A test-ban agreement, important as it was, would not stop the manufacture of nuclear weapons, and the major issue would still be general and complete disarmament. In that connexion, the element of time was of primary importance, as the Prime Minister of India, Mr. Nehru, had said at the fifteenth session of the General Assembly (882nd plenary meeting).

9. Since the end of the Second World War, the United States had introduced seven and the Soviet Union eight major disarmament plans. Nevertheless, nuclear stockpiles had continued to grow, and conference after conference had failed to achieve tangible results; indeed, certain great Powers had even withdrawn their proposals just when the other side had expressed its willingness to accept them. For example, the Western Governments had repudiated in September 1955 what they had been advocating up to 10 May 1955.

10. Unless mutual fear and suspicion gave way to a measure of trust, it was difficult to see how agreement could be reached. In the absence of that basic element of confidence, all the technicalities of control and inspection were futile. On the other hand, agreement might be possible if the two sides frankly accepted the principle of coexistence and admitted that war or the threat of war had become obsolete as an instrument of national policy.

11. It was tragic that after a decade of disarmament negotiations, the objective sought was no longer to

prevent war by eliminating nuclear weapons but rather to deter would-be aggressors by means of mutual disclosure and verification. The strategy of deterrence was based on fear, and, since each side could justify its arms build-up by the need to "deter" a potential foe, the arms race was continuing, with all its hazards. The twenty-five countries which had taken part in the Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries at Belgrade in September 1961 had declared unanimously that disarmament was the most urgent task facing mankind. The Assembly had before it a Soviet plan for general and complete disarmament (A/C.1/856) and other proposals. The joint statement of principles (A/4879) was directed towards the same objectives as those of the draft resolution introduced in 1960 by Iraq and other uncommitted countries (A/C.1/L.259 and Add.1-2).

12. What was important, however, was that those principles should be implemented. Agreement was lacking on the composition of the negotiating body, and it was to be hoped that the two Governments principally concerned would quickly reach a decision on that question, as was urged in the draft resolution adopted by the First Committee on 21 November (A/C.1/L.299 and Add.1). That resolution provided that the composition of the negotiating body should be satisfactory not only to both parties but also to the rest of the world. The participation of the non-aligned countries was essential, as the Belgrade Conference had affirmed. Although it was true that the negotiations would have no chance of success without agreement between the great Powers, it was equally true that the representatives of the uncommitted countries could and should play a useful part. Since their very existence and their future were closely bound up with the preservation of peace, they could not be regarded as mere spectators.

13. It was ultimately the responsibility of the United Nations to find a constructive solution to the problem of general and complete disarmament. As the Yugoslav representative had observed, it was difficult to see how the current session of the Assembly could end without the assurance that negotiations on general and complete disarmament would begin without delay. If that assurance was not forthcoming, the General Assembly should decide at the present session, as recommended by the Belgrade Conference, to convene a world disarmament conference under the auspices of the United Nations.

14. Mr. SOSA RODRIGUEZ (Venezuela) said that disarmament was the only salvation for a world threatened with total destruction. The great Powers appeared to have realized that fact, for in spite of the cold-war atmosphere which was weighing more heavily than ever upon mankind, they had reached agreement on a joint statement of the principles on which disarmament negotiations should be based (A/4879). His delegation was pleased that the joint statement embodied a number of the principles set forth in the draft resolution which it had joined with other delegations in submitting at the previous session (A/C.1/L.259 and Add.1-2).

15. The main obstacle to the achievement of disarmament was unquestionably mistrust, which poisoned the atmosphere at the negotiating table and constantly spurred on the arms race. It would be utopian, after so many years of disappointment, to cherish the hope that confidence would be reborn and that disarmament would follow automatically in its wake. The realistic

approach was to disarm in spite of the lack of trust. But disarmament would not be possible under those conditions unless provision was made for a system of mutual safeguards; thence the need for controls—which, however, was one of the points on which the Western Powers and the Soviet Union remained divided. Obviously, disarmament measures must not at any stage give one side a military advantage over the other; the only way to prevent that was to set up a system of effective international control which would apply to all aspects and all phases of disarmament.

16. Another point of disagreement between the Western Powers and the Soviet Union was the composition of the projected negotiating body. The problem appeared to be which uncommitted countries should be chosen to supplement the Ten-Nation Committee. In his view, those countries should be selected on the basis of whether they enjoyed the confidence of the major Powers, not simply on the basis of their neutrality; the essential point was that there should be no doubt of their impartiality and that they should be capable of resisting pressure. It was to be hoped that the United States and the Soviet Union would be able to overcome that difficulty in their future negotiations.

17. Mr. TSEVEGMID (Mongolia) said that despite the sincere efforts of the Soviet Union and the other socialist States, the problem of disarmament was far from solution. The United States and the other Western Powers stubbornly continued to block the achievement of disarmament. For example, they were opposed to the participation of the uncommitted countries, on an equal footing, in the work of the negotiating body. They continued to press their proposals for control over armaments, which would have the effect not of facilitating disarmament but of increasing international tension and the danger of a catastrophic war. The Mongolian people had already suffered greatly from war, and it was aware that another war would bring untold sorrow to mankind. That was why his delegation had supported the draft resolutions submitted by African and Asian delegations calling for the establishment of a denuclearized zone in Africa (A/C.1/L.291/Rev.1 and Rev.1/Add.1-3) and for a ban on the use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons (A/C.1/L.292 and Add.1-3); it would also support any proposal to denuclearize other parts of the world. In that connexion, Japan, the only country in the world which had experienced the horrors of atomic attack, might have been expected to be foremost among those striving to remove the threat of war and to bring about disarmament. However, the Japanese representative had done nothing more than hold forth on the need to establish an atmosphere of trust, the complexity of the problems of control, and so forth.

18. That was not the attitude of the Mongolian delegation, which was deeply aware of the need to save mankind from the scourge of war. It unreservedly supported the Soviet proposals for general and complete disarmament (A/C.1/856), which not only were designed to establish peace and security in the world but would also serve to release vast resources which could be used for peaceful purposes. Under the Soviet programme, disarmament would begin with the prohibition and destruction of the means of delivering nuclear weapons together with the elimination of foreign bases. Those measures would remove the danger of a nuclear surprise attack and put an end to the arms race.

19. His delegation hoped that the Assembly would, at its sixteenth session, lay sound foundations for constructive negotiations looking to general and complete disarmament.

20. Mr. CORNER (New Zealand) declared that the possibilities of progress towards disarmament depended largely on growth of confidence between the two major Powers. That fact raised fundamental issues of ideologies and national purposes transcending the scope of disarmament. Moreover, progress depended on thorough negotiation between the two great Powers of complex and constantly changing technical questions which were unlikely ever to be resolved in a political body reflecting the Organization's full membership.

21. There were, however, circumstances in which the pressure of world opinion could act effectively through the debates and resolutions of a United Nations body. General Assembly resolution 1617 (XV) was a very simple one, yet it had been adopted unanimously; and he believed it had done much to impel the two countries not to break off their talks until they had agreed upon one forward step—the joint statement before the Committee (A/4879).

22. In circumstances where the great Powers failed to give the lead, it was naturally tempting for delegations of other countries to introduce their individual schemes; but the restraint shown by the Assembly in 1960 seemed to have been justified. The principles before the Committee contained nothing novel and their scope was very limited. Moreover, the representative of the Soviet Union had already given warning that they contained formulations which could be given various interpretations. Nevertheless, the text was better than nothing, and nothing could happen unless the great Powers agreed.

23. Apart from the joint statement, the Committee had before it a programme for general and complete disarmament submitted by the United States (A/4891), and basic provisions of a treaty on general and complete disarmament submitted by the Soviet Union (A/C.1/856). The New Zealand delegation regarded the United States programme as the most practical effort yet made to pin down the idea of general and complete disarmament, to expose the connexion between the concept of total disarmament and that of total peace, and to provide a safe means of achieving both in double harness. Yet neither country could expect one plan or the other to be endorsed by the General Assembly at its sixteenth session. As the representative of Yugoslavia had said (1197th meeting), the disarmament problem could not be settled simply by a majority vote.

24. The two plans were very comprehensive, and both sides certainly wished to disarm. However, the idea of general and complete disarmament was exploited for propaganda purposes. The Western doubts about aspects of the Soviet plan were explained not by secret desires to commit espionage but by the fact that it seemed contrary to reason and experience to expect that the total elimination of this or that weapon could be achieved overnight. Given the desperate predicament in which the world was placed, the refusal to give up slogans and over-simplifications was rather terrifying. Soviet proposals for total disarmament had continued almost unchanged from those which Mr. Litvinov had submitted at Geneva in 1927.^{1/} But the

^{1/} League of Nations, Documents of the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference, Series V, Minutes of the Fourth Session (Publications of the League of Nations, IX. Disarmament, 1928.IX.2), p. 10.

world had become more complex since then, and if ideas did not encompass that complexity the fate of the world would be imperilled.

25. It was, however, encouraging that the Soviet Union had shifted its position in the past two years on the timing of the disarmament process. Admittedly, it still advocated a time limit of four or five years; but it seemed willing to consider other proposals, and its plans were thus becoming more realistic. Such developments led to greater confidence which was in short supply, particularly after the realization that the Soviet Union had been preparing a series of nuclear tests while negotiating at Geneva in apparent good faith.

26. One of the principles agreed upon by the Prime Ministers of the Commonwealth Governments in their statement of 17 March 1961 (A/4868 and Corr.1) was that, once started, the process of disarmament should be continued without interruption until it was completed, subject to verification at each stage. That principle, reflected in paragraph 4 of the joint statement by the Soviet Union and the United States (A/4879), combined as realistically as possible the idea of the continuity of the disarmament process with the necessity to attain general and complete disarmament within a comparatively short time.

27. The New Zealand delegation regretted that in Soviet statements the antithesis between control over armaments and control over disarmament was still presented in such a doctrinaire fashion. It had paid particular attention to the Soviet Union's refusal to admit the principle that verification should cover not only agreed reductions but also the armed forces and armaments which each party would retain at each stage. It was to be hoped that that problem would receive the careful consideration it deserved. It was hard to see how the necessary confidence could exist between the parties unless each stage in the disarmament process allowed for adequate verification both of the steps being taken and of the remaining levels of armaments. The Soviet Union's attitude seemed, however, to follow more or less from its general position, particularly in the light of the extremely drastic measures envisaged in the first stage of its proposed draft treaty.

28. The over-simplified objection to "control over armaments without disarmament" ought to have been abandoned after the precise explanation of the Western position given years ago by Mr. Moch: "no disarmament without control; no control without disarmament; but, progressively, all disarmament that could be effectively controlled"^{2/}. But negotiations on control were just what the Soviet Union had always evaded. It declared that it would accept proposals for control if its disarmament proposals were accepted, but slipped away as soon as the discussion entered into details.

29. It was, on the other hand, gratifying that the fundamental problem of security and of military advantage had been carefully dealt with by scientists of the United States, the Soviet Union and other countries who had met recently in the United States. The studies that were being made, and the establishment by a number of Governments of special agencies, were to be welcomed, if only because they should lead to a better appreciation of the technical and scientific aspects of disarmament. Perhaps parallel efforts

should be made in the United Nations. At least, it was to be hoped that thought would be given to proposals for utilizing the Disarmament Commission or sub-committees of it to undertake certain specific studies. His delegation had noted with interest the suggestion made by the Secretary of State for External Affairs of Canada that, as negotiations proceeded, United Nations committees should be established to study specific aspects of disarmament. The establishment of such working groups should lead to the fuller use of resources in the Secretariat, the harnessing of which might amount to a form of technical assistance to delegations of small countries like New Zealand which did not find it easy to keep pace with all the facts and ideas in that ever more complicated field.

30. The arms race continued and was full of danger. The threat was so tremendous that total disarmament seemed the only solution. That solution, however, did not preclude other steps enabling more speedy progress to be made. Total disarmament implied total peace. Failing that ideal, many people would willingly also accept partial measures of disarmament, or even of arms control.

31. Could the small countries which did not possess nuclear arms help to end the present deadlock? His delegation considered that they could help to reach a solution precisely because they were not nuclear Powers. If they were genuinely concerned to find the desired answers, their political positions were of minor significance. His delegation, therefore, could not subscribe to the idea that the negotiators would make progress only if there was equal representation of the so-called three groupings of States. It was interesting to note in that connexion that the United States and its allies were far from having voted in the same way on the resolutions adopted under agenda items 72 and 73. The same could not be said of the countries belonging to the Soviet group.

32. However that might be, the important thing was to resume negotiations as soon as possible. The debate would certainly be more constructive if the members of the Committee knew that negotiations were to be resumed without delay. It was to be hoped, in particular, that the two sides would quickly reach a compromise on the composition of the negotiating body. India's initiative on that question seemed to be constructive.

33. The non-nuclear countries should also be devoting attention to their role in a disarmed world, where it was at least evident that the United Nations itself would have to accept new responsibilities and undergo substantial changes in its structure. It was therefore gratifying to note that many speakers had stressed the principle that progress in disarmament should be accompanied by measures to strengthen the institutions responsible for maintaining peace and settling international disputes. Nevertheless, the United Nations must make sure that its executive organs always retained their independence. As for those who denied that it was possible to be neutral, what sort of disarmed world did they envisage? In that respect, also, the Soviet plan for total disarmament was not entirely convincing, since it said nothing about relations between men in a disarmed world.

34. The plans for total disarmament already looked forward to the day when all countries would rely on the United Nations for their defence. But very few would put themselves in the hands of the Organization as it now was. There was still much to be done to

^{2/} *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirteenth Session, First Committee, 955th meeting, para. 18.*

establish the kind of organization which would inspire confidence in the small countries. In that context, India's proposal for a United Nations Year for International Co-operation took on particular significance. There was still time to prepare the United Nations for the world of total peace; but time might be running out.

35. U ON SEIN (Burma) considered that the responsibility for saving mankind from the danger of a nuclear war lay with the major nuclear Powers. Mankind was more and more alarmed at the destructive power which a war would unleash, as was shown, among other things, by the resolutions recently adopted by the Committee. That was why it was important to achieve general and complete disarmament, as had been stated by the twenty-five non-aligned countries which had participated in the Belgrade Conference.

36. It was unfortunate that there was still disagreement between the Western Powers and the Soviet Union on the question of disarmament. It was, however, encouraging to note that the United States and the Soviet Union had agreed on a number of principles. Both were in favour of general and complete disarmament under effective international control, to be achieved within a certain time limit. They also recognized that disarmament should be balanced and should not enable any State to gain an advantage over another. His delegation wished therefore to appeal to the United States and the Soviet Union to continue their efforts to achieve general and complete disarmament.

37. Burma supported draft resolution A/C.1/L.297 and Add.1, because it was in favour of any measure designed to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons. It also welcomed the fact that the major nuclear Powers had decided to resume negotiations on the cessation of tests. Finally, it was ready to support any constructive measure which would cease international tension, re-establish confidence and help to bring about general and complete disarmament.

38. Mr. THORS (Iceland) observed that after fifteen years of debate on disarmament, the United Nations had still not achieved any tangible results. There had been proposal after proposal and conference after conference, but all the while the production and dissemination of increasingly effective and devastating weapons of destruction had continued. The Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests, which had aroused some hope of co-operation between the big Powers, had been abruptly broken off by the Soviet Union, which had initiated a series of nuclear tests of unprecedented magnitude. The total military expenditure of all States exceeded \$100,000 million, a sum which could be devoted to improving living conditions throughout the world.

39. The small countries could only endeavour to mobilize the moral forces of the world and bring them to bear on the Governments of the great Powers who held the fate of mankind in their hands. But those Governments could not embark on disarmament so long as they continued to mistrust each other, and even with a more favourable atmosphere in international relations, collective security could be preserved only if each step towards disarmament was coupled with controls.

40. Since the beginning of the session, prospects had become somewhat brighter, as a result of the United States-USSR joint statement of agreed principles (A/4879) and the Soviet acceptance of the United

States and United Kingdom request to resume negotiations at Geneva. People all over the world hoped that those negotiations would be vigorously pursued in good faith and would result in an agreement on the complete cessation of all tests under effective control.

41. The joint statement made no reference to agreement on the composition of the negotiating body, a very important point which, fortunately, had been raised in a draft resolution recently adopted by the Committee (A/C.1/L.299 and Add.1). If the negotiations were to be resumed in the Ten-Nation Committee, the latter should be enlarged so as to represent the various geographical areas of the world. For example, Mexico, India, Sweden and an African State might be added to the membership. The number of additional members was not very important, although a small committee would probably be more likely to achieve results. In the view of the Icelandic delegation, the disarmament negotiations should not be referred to the Disarmament Commission, whose large membership would militate against effective results. The negotiations were a delicate matter and should be conducted in an atmosphere protected from the glare of publicity and from political manoeuvres.

42. He urged the Governments of the great Powers on whom the solution of the disarmament problem ultimately depended to break the present deadlock by abandoning their intransigence and their political intrigues; if they did not, they would lose the confidence of the world's peoples.

43. Mr. HAKIM (Lebanon) said that the joint statement of the United States and the Soviet Union (A/4879) was an important step forward which, he hoped, would be followed by further progress in the forthcoming disarmament negotiations. However, many difficulties would have to be overcome before those principles could be implemented. The main stumbling-block was control of disarmament, the principle of which was stated in paragraph 6 of the joint statement. The statements made on 15 November (1195th meeting) by the representatives of the United States and the Soviet Union indicated that the latter, while it would allow verification of armaments destroyed at every stage, would not agree to verification of retained armaments, for fear that the other side might attack it if it had the advantage; whereas the United States demanded verification at every stage of the armaments retained in order to be sure that the armaments destroyed were not replaced gradually by even greater quantities. That was the crux of the problem. The Lebanese delegation was convinced that both the United States and the Soviet Union sincerely wanted to solve the disarmament problem, and that neither had anything to gain by unleashing a nuclear war, since they would both be the first victims. It also believed that the two countries were willing to do everything in their power to avoid a limited war which might degenerate into a nuclear war. However, they had to ensure their national security. At the present time, each side believed that the only way to prevent the other from attacking first was to possess weapons with which it could destroy its adversary in case of attack.

44. Since the national security of the great Powers depended on the ability to deter a potential aggressor by possessing a nuclear arsenal which could destroy him, perhaps nuclear weapons and their means of delivery should be the last to be destroyed. Each side would feel safe even after having renounced all other

armaments, if it could retain its nuclear weapons. Of course, in the process of eliminating conventional armaments, the fifth of the agreed principles contained in the joint statement would have to be strictly applied. But in the case of conventional armaments the dilemma of disarmament control by verification of weapons destroyed and weapons retained would not be as acute. Moreover, it would be necessary, in the early stages of disarmament, to establish denuclearized zones in major areas of conflict and to conclude non-aggression pacts, while the nuclear Powers would solemnly undertake not to use nuclear weapons. Thus, there would be only two great nuclear Powers, each armed solely with the nuclear weapons considered sufficient for deterring attack by the other—which would be a far less dangerous situation than the one which now prevailed. That was why an agreement should be reached to ban nuclear weapons tests, and why measures should be taken to prevent the wider dissemina-

tion of those weapons. In that respect, the Lebanese delegation supported the measures proposed in draft resolution A/C.1/L.297 and Add.1. Of course, the question of the elimination of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery would arise in the last stage of disarmament. However, the problem could be solved if both sides agreed, for a transitional period, to entrust to an impartial peace-keeping world authority under the United Nations enough nuclear weapons and means of delivery to deter aggression during the final stage of nuclear disarmament.

45. The problem of international control of disarmament would be the most difficult to solve in any future negotiations. It could be solved only through a sincere effort by all parties. The small nations could contribute to the success of that effort by playing a role of conciliation and mediation.

The meeting rose at 6 p.m.