



CONTENTS

	Page
<i>Agenda items 73 and 72:</i>	
<i>Continuation of suspension of nuclear and thermo-nuclear tests and obligations of States to refrain from their renewal (continued)</i>	} 115
<i>The urgent need for a treaty to ban nuclear weapons tests under effective international control (continued)</i>	

Chairman: Mr. Mario AMADEO (Argentina).

AGENDA ITEMS 73 AND 72

Continuation of suspension of nuclear and thermo-nuclear tests and obligations of States to refrain from their renewal (A/4801 and Add.1, A/C.1/L.283/Rev.2 and Rev.2/Add.1, A/C.1/L.291 and Add.1, A/C.1/L.292 and Add.1) (continued)

The urgent need for a treaty to ban nuclear weapons tests under effective international control (A/4799, A/C.1/L.280, A/C.1/L.292 and Add.1) (continued)

1. The CHAIRMAN reminded the Committee that the general debate on agenda items 73 and 72 had been temporarily adjourned and that the six-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.283/Rev.2 and Rev.2/Add.1) was under consideration.

2. Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) noted that several delegations were maintaining their former positions with regard to nuclear tests and ignoring the extreme international tension caused by the attitude of the Western Powers. He therefore thought it necessary to repeat the views of the USSR, for which purpose he set forth the main points of his Government's memorandum of 26 September 1961 (A/4893), which showed clearly why the problem of the cessation of tests could not at present be solved apart from the problem of general and complete disarmament.

3. With respect to the six-Power draft resolution, he pointed out that a decision on the cessation of nuclear tests outside a system of disarmament would not be a first step towards the solution of the general problem of disarmament. Cessation of tests was not even a disarmament measure, for it would not reduce either forces or armaments, conventional or nuclear, nor interrupt the manufacture of nuclear devices. The arms race would continue and the danger of nuclear war would constantly increase. The sponsors of the draft resolution were doubtless sincere and devoted to the cause of peace, but it must admitted that their attitude was unrealistic. The Soviet delegation was convinced that in the present circumstances the threat of war could be averted only by general and complete

disarmament, and could therefore not vote for the six-Power draft resolution.

4. International tension had increased considerably since the Soviet Union had decided to conclude a peace treaty with Germany and to restore a normal situation in Berlin. The Western Powers had reacted by intensifying their military preparations and by committing acts of provocation in Berlin. The United States and its allies were leading the world towards a nuclear war, which would cause the death of hundreds of millions of human beings. Only the firm attitude and defence measures of the Soviet Union could calm the warmongers of the West. That was why they protested so violently against the measures the USSR was taking to strengthen its security. In the United Nations they were exploiting the humanitarian feelings of the uncommitted countries by emphasizing the dangers of radio-active fall-out, and were scheming for the adoption of all kinds of amendments favouring their policy.

5. Because of those facts the Soviet delegation would vote against the seven-Power amendment (A/C.1/L.294) to the six-Power draft resolution.

Mr. Ignacio-Pinto (Dahomey), Vice-Chairman, took the Chair.

6. Mr. DE LEQUERICA (Spain) thought that in the matter of general disarmament, and in particular of nuclear explosions, the United Nations must resolutely exert its considerable moral influence to persuade the nuclear Powers to reach lasting agreements with its help.

7. For the solution of the nuclear problem, actions did most but words were not completely useless if they expressed intentions and did not lead to confusion. All proposals should therefore be considered from a practical point of view.

8. The Spanish delegation was aware of the facts, and of the great danger to which nuclear explosions subjected mankind. In particular it realized the danger in the existence of a Power like the Soviet empire, which asserted its political ambitions and was restrained by no scruples in its determination to impose its ideology. History showed, however, that the forces intent on maintaining order and balance generally succeeded in resisting subjugation, at the price of great vigilance and appreciation of reality.

9. The Spanish delegation understood and approved the humanitarian motives of the sponsors of the six-Power draft resolution. Like them, it wanted nuclear testing to be stopped once and for all. It differed from them not in intention but over method. It could not in all conscience support a proposal asking the Western nuclear Powers to forget what had just happened and to accept without sufficient guarantees a moratorium which would place countries of good faith at a disadvantage. That was why the Spanish delegation opposed operative paragraph 2 of the six-Power draft resolu-

tion. There was no guarantee that a country like the Soviet Union, which had broken the previous moratorium to carry out a series of explosions prepared in secret, would observe a new moratorium. There was little hope that it would respect a resolution adopted by a majority of the General Assembly, seeing that it had just defied its almost unanimous appeal in resolution 1632 (XVI).

10. The Assembly should call for the cessation of tests, but that cessation must be effective and guaranteed. While the United States and the United Kingdom had scrupulously respected the moratorium, the other party had not only broken it but had boasted of its intention to ignore that vague moral commitment. When the Western Powers had had a monopoly of atomic power, they had shown that they had no intention of abusing it to impose their will. They were therefore entitled to demand binding international rules, and the General Assembly should not put pressure on them for reasons which were neither justified nor genuinely humanitarian. Since the Spanish delegation did not believe that the United Nations should ask the Western Powers to disarm, it had many reservations to make about the six-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.283/Rev.2 and Rev.2/Add.1). The wording of operative paragraph 2 of that draft was even more dangerous than that of the first revised text (A/C.1/L.283/Rev.1), since it connected the moratorium with agreements in regard to general and complete disarmament, for which negotiations would inevitably be slow and complicated.

11. The most urgent measure was adoption of the draft resolution submitted by the United States and the United Kingdom (A/C.1/L.280). But the proposed international treaty, including the control measures, must of course be accepted by all the Powers concerned. The present debate had shown that such a treaty could be concluded; the aim had nearly been reached at the last meetings of the Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests. The representative of the United States had repeated at the 1183rd meeting that his country was ready to resume negotiations for the conclusion of that treaty, without which world peace would be a myth.

12. In all countries, even the Soviet Union, there was a great desire for conciliation, on which the Spanish delegation relied. At the moment it was most concerned about actions tending to throw all responsibility for recent events on other Powers and to give disruptive forces an appearance of humanity, in order to deceive the vigilance of the countries concerned.

13. Mr. MENEMENCIOLU (Turkey) briefly surveyed the development of the question of nuclear tests, and observed that recent events had shown a self-imposed moratorium to be ineffective. Without effective control, preparation for nuclear explosions could not be disclosed and prevented. Moreover, since no international provisions effectively bound the great nuclear Powers, world opinion could not always raise its voice to censure a State violating a self-imposed moratorium. The adoption of the six-Power draft resolution would create a false feeling of security, which would prevent world opinion from putting the necessary moral pressure on the nuclear Powers to achieve the only true solution: the conclusion of a treaty banning nuclear tests under effective international control. None of the nuclear Powers represented in the Committee had proposed to resume the moratorium in order to solve the problem and the Prime Minister

of India himself had admitted that recent events had shaken his confidence in the efficacy of a moratorium. In those circumstances it was hard to understand why the sponsors of the six-Power draft resolution persistently maintained that the adoption of their proposals would be the best way to deal with the grave question before the Committee.

14. With regard to the Soviet propaganda documents that had been circulated in document A/C.1/853 and Corr.2, he referred to his statement made on 24 August 1961 at the third special session of the General Assembly (1002nd plenary meeting).

15. Mr. WEI (China) considered that the six-Power draft resolution was basically a moral appeal for the restoration of the moratorium on nuclear tests. Two questions, however, arose. The first was whether such an appeal was likely to be accepted by the Powers concerned. The Soviet Union had made quite clear that there could be no further suspension of nuclear tests until an agreement on general and complete disarmament had been concluded. The United States, for its part, maintained that a treaty banning nuclear weapons tests under effective international control could be negotiated and signed very rapidly, but that for its own security it could not accept another voluntary suspension without control. Both Powers therefore considered another voluntary suspension of tests unacceptable, the difference being that the Soviet Union had violated the moratorium for no conceivable reason, while the United States was forced to take the necessary measures for its own defence and for that of the free world.

16. The second question was whether it would be prudent at the present time for the General Assembly to press the Powers, especially the victim Powers, to accept another voluntary suspension of tests. The Chinese delegation did not think so. The current series of Soviet tests, including the explosion on 30 October of the 50-megaton super-bomb, demonstrated the futility of a voluntary moratorium. No only had Mr. Khrushchev completely ignored the appeal by the General Assembly (resolution 1632 (XVI)) and exploded a bomb two-and-a-half times as powerful as the 30-megaton bomb of 23 October, but he had called the eighty-seven Members who had voted in favour of the appeal hysterical. There was no justification for that wanton contempt of the USSR for the health and welfare of the human race.

17. The sponsors of the seven-Power amendment (A/C.1/L.294) to the six-Power draft resolution were to be congratulated on their contribution, for it introduced into the draft resolution the important element of international control.

18. The Chinese delegation would unreservedly support the draft resolution submitted by the United Kingdom and the United States (A/C.1/L.280), which was closely related to the text under review. The Assembly should call for immediate resumption of the Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests and the conclusion as soon as possible of a treaty for the controlled banning of nuclear weapons tests.

Mr. Amadeo (Argentina) resumed the Chair.

19. Mr. Roland COOPER (Liberia) said that the world community had never been so close to an appalling disaster. Nuclear explosions, the fall-out from which did not remain within the frontiers of the countries responsible for them, were a criminal enterprise

which rendered a grave disservice to the cause of global harmony. The harmful effects of nuclear tests and the continual growth of nuclear arsenals might have disastrous consequences for humanity unless positive action were taken immediately to halt the use and production of such devices. While regretting the apparent futility of the Geneva talks, the Liberian delegation hoped that the current debate would help to eliminate suspicion, vindictiveness, acerbity and confusion. It was necessary to revert to the suspension of nuclear tests, but any moratorium or any verbal agreement reached by the nuclear Powers should immediately be followed by a treaty binding upon all. No country could feel itself protected by mere promises.

20. The Liberian delegation would vote for the six-Power draft resolution modified by the seven-Power amendment, and for any other text prescribing the cessation of nuclear weapons tests and the conclusion of a treaty banning them under effective international control.

21. Mr. RONAN (Ireland) was also profoundly disappointed that the Soviet Union had resumed nuclear testing, just when considerable progress had been achieved in the negotiation of an international agreement which would have banned the testing of nuclear weapons subject to control and inspection. Nuclear testing had three aspects. First, its aim was to develop new weapons or to refine existing ones, so that thermo-nuclear war would be even more deadly. Secondly, it accelerated the arms race, for any series of tests carried out by one side was likely to spur the other on to do the same. Thirdly, it was not a threat only, since radio-active fall-out endangered the life and health of present and future generations.

22. The nuclear Powers claimed that the tests were necessary for their security. It was, however, no longer tolerable for a country to purchase security at the expense of the welfare of mankind. Further, it was always to be feared that other countries might embark on nuclear tests. Countries should therefore agree to prevent further spread of nuclear devices, to halt tests in the atmosphere and under water tests immediately, to conclude a test-ban treaty, and to achieve general and complete disarmament.

23. The Irish delegation sympathized with the position of the United States and the United Kingdom, which asked with some reason whether the recommendation of a moratorium by the Assembly could be effective since the previous moratorium had been violated. However, in view of the harmful effects of the tests it was imperative to demand their immediate cessation and to urge in the strongest terms that the moratorium should be made binding by the early conclusion of a treaty with adequate control measures. It could, of course, be maintained that an immediate cessation of tests would be unacceptable because the new series of Soviet tests had upset the balance of power and was forcing the other nuclear Powers to resume tests in the atmosphere. However, it was to be hoped that the offer of the United States and the United Kingdom to sign immediately a treaty banning all tests showed that they did not fear that an immediate cessation of tests would result in a permanent imbalance of armaments. Though the Irish delegation appreciated the instability of a moratorium not based on formal agreement, it strongly urged the nuclear Powers to consider the establishment of a fresh moratorium, even if only for one year, for example, but renewable. Such a moratorium would

favour the conclusion of a permanent treaty. The United States and the United Kingdom had shown remarkable restraint in refraining so far from resuming tests in the atmosphere despite provocation. The moral force of world opinion, which had been questioned by some representatives, was therefore on their side.

24. The Irish delegation supported the six-Power draft resolution calling for cessation of the testing of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons. It took some exception, however, to the words "or general and complete disarmament" in operative paragraph 2 because, though strongly in favour of general and complete disarmament, it feared that those words might imply that there was no need to undertake separate negotiations with a view to the conclusion of a treaty on the cessation of tests. It also supported the seven-Power amendment, which strengthened the appeal for the conclusion of a treaty. Lastly it supported in principle the draft resolution of the United States and the United Kingdom; but, since Ireland had not taken part in the Geneva negotiations, it had some reservations with regard to certain provisions of the text relating to the proposed treaty.

25. Mr. KOIRALA (Nepal) profoundly regretted that nuclear bombs had been exploded despite the fervent appeal launched by the United Nations. The Nepalese delegation was opposed to all explosions, whichever country conducted them. For that reason it was one of the sponsors of the six-Power draft resolution.

26. Although every delegation recognized the urgency of the need to stop the tests, it had been maintained that the six-Power draft resolution would not achieve its purpose without a binding treaty. The sponsors of the draft resolution were not opposed to the idea of a treaty; in fact, operative paragraph 3 called for the conclusion of one. But a treaty was possible only if all the nuclear Powers were ready to sign it. Precisely because one party wanted the question of a treaty to be dealt with separately, while the other wanted it debated as part of general and complete disarmament, the draft resolution allowed for either approach. Nevertheless, the Nepalese delegation had always maintained that priority should be given to the conclusion of a nuclear test ban treaty; and that, in its opinion, was the purpose of the six-Power draft resolution. To ensure the survival of mankind Nepal, on behalf of all the small countries, urgently appealed to the nuclear Powers to put an end to the tests.

27. The seven-Power amendment was in conformity with the draft resolution that Nepal had sponsored at the previous session which had been adopted by the Assembly as resolution 1578 (XV), and he therefore supported it.

28. Mr. GARCIA INCHAUSTEGUI (Cuba) said that Cuba was opposed to all nuclear tests, whatever their size, the place of explosion, or the country carrying them out. In view, however, of the arms race undertaken by the United States and its allies, the Cuban delegation sincerely desired that the country which had assisted Cuba in its struggle against United States imperialism and supported the peoples of Africa and Asia in their fight for independence, namely the Soviet Union, should not be placed at a disadvantage as compared with the colonialist Powers.

29. It was necessary to eliminate warmongering, to negotiate to remove points of friction, to abolish colonialism and neo-colonialism, and to bring about gen-

eral and complete disarmament. Cuba was even now threatened by the imperialism of the United States, which possessed nuclear bases at Puerto Rico nearby. Moreover, despite the denials of the United States authorities, everyone knew that Cuba had been the victim of an armed aggression by that country in April 1961. It was precisely because the colonialists only understood power that it was important not to disrupt the balance of power in their favour.

30. His delegation would vote for the Afghan amendment (A/C.1/L.289/Rev.1) to the six-Power draft resolution because the aggressive policy of the United States, the nuclear tests carried out by one of its allies, and its own nuclear preparations, had led the Soviet Union to resume tests. It would also vote for the six-Power draft resolution because that was an appeal to all nuclear Powers and in conformity with the Declaration of the Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Belgrade in September 1961. The participants in the Conference had declared that it was essential for an agreement on the prohibition of all nuclear and thermo-nuclear tests to be urgently concluded, and that with that aim in view it was necessary that negotiations should be immediately resumed, separately or as part of the negotiations on general disarmament. Cuba, for its part, was against all nuclear tests and considered that their cessation should be guaranteed by an agreement on general and complete disarmament.

31. Mr. NA CHAMPASSAK (Laos) affirmed the fierce opposition of the Laotian delegation to all nuclear and thermo-nuclear tests, whatever their nature and wherever they might take place. He thus deeply deplored the unprecedented way in which the Soviet Union had defied the world by exploding a 50-megaton bomb in the atmosphere in contempt of General Assembly resolution 1632 (XVI). The arguments advanced by the representative of the Soviet Union to justify his Government's actions—that the Soviet Union had been compelled by the war preparations of the Western Powers to perfect its ultimate weapons in order to secure its territory—were false arguments drawn from a false conception of international life. They were a justification of terror and intimidation, for no one could claim that by causing humanity to tremble he was defending peace, or that by polluting the atmosphere he was bringing eternal peace

to the earth. In fact, the frantic rate of the explosions carried out by the Soviet Union during the previous two months could be interpreted only as an attempt to destroy humanity, for nothing could justify them.

32. Those responsible for the defence of the Soviet Union constantly declared that the Red Army was invincible and possessed enough nuclear weapons to deal fatal blows to any aggressor in any part of the world. Those responsible in Western countries had made similar statements. But if the Soviet Union had enough weapons to destroy the entire world, it might be asked why it still felt bound to improve instruments of death and mass destruction. Moreover, since the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, Mr. Khrushchev, had promised the Soviet people a better life in eternal peace and had acclaimed the principle of peaceful coexistence, to which the Laotian Government had always subscribed, it might also be asked whether the frantic preparations for general massacre represented by the present series of explosions would help bring to fruition the dreams of happiness and peace of all peoples in general and of the Soviet people in particular, and whether it would not reduce the principle of coexistence to a shout of menace.

33. The monstrous danger of radio-active fall-out plunged humanity into terror. Three years of moratorium had created a false sense of security. To call eagerly for a new moratorium without control was simply to refuse to learn from experience. Things being as they were, a new moratorium would be likely to crush human hopes once more. For that reason the Laotian delegation, while ardently desiring an immediate suspension of nuclear tests, considered it essential for the great Powers to negotiate between themselves a treaty prohibiting, under effective international control, all nuclear weapons tests. Without a system of effective international control, fear and anxiety would not diminish and peace would remain in the balance. The Laotian delegation therefore launched the present appeal to the great Powers to negotiate.

34. In voting on the various draft resolutions and amendments before the Committee, the Laotian delegation would be guided by the above considerations.

The meeting rose at 12.55 p.m.