

United Nations
**GENERAL
 ASSEMBLY**

SIXTEENTH SESSION

Official Records



**FIRST COMMITTEE, 1180th
 MEETING**

Monday, 30 October 1961,
 at 11.5 a.m.

NEW YORK

CONTENTS

	Page
<i>Expression of welcome to the representatives of Mauritania and Mongolia</i>	93
<i>Agenda items 73 and 72:</i>	
<i>Continuation of suspension of nuclear and thermo-nuclear tests and obligations of States to refrain from their renewal (continued)</i>	93
<i>The urgent need for a treaty to ban nuclear weapons tests under effective international control (continued)</i>	

Chairman: Mr. Mario AMADEO (Argentina).

Expression of welcome to the representatives of Mauritania and Mongolia

1. The CHAIRMAN welcomed the representatives of Mauritania and Mongolia, who were to participate in the Committee's work for the first time.

AGENDA ITEMS 73 AND 72

Continuation of suspension of nuclear and thermo-nuclear tests and obligations of States to refrain from their renewal (A/4801 and Add.1, A/C.1/L.283/Rev.2 and Rev.2/Add.1, A/C.1/L.291 and Add.1, A/C.1/L.292) (continued)

The urgent need for a treaty to ban nuclear weapons tests under effective international control (A/4799, A/C.1/L.280, A/C.1/L.292) (continued)

2. Mr. DEAN (United States of America), speaking on a point of order, said that, in order to speed up the Committee's work, he withdrew the motion he had submitted at the 1179th meeting that the Committee should take up the United Kingdom-United States draft resolution (A/C.1/L.280) immediately after taking a decision on the six-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.283/Rev.2 and Rev.2/Add.1). However, he still considered that motion to be in order and reserved the right to submit it again.

3. Mr. QUAISON-SACKEY (Ghana), speaking on a point of order, said that in order to enable delegations to express their views on the six-Power draft resolution, he withdrew the motion he had made at the 1179th meeting for the closure of the debate.

4. Mr. STEVENSON (United States of America) stated that the Soviet Union, spurning the appeal just addressed to it by the General Assembly and by all peace-loving peoples, had exploded with no justification whatsoever a giant bomb of a power apparently greater than fifty megatons. That act was the culmination of a series of explosions whereby the Soviet Union had broken the moratorium on nuclear

tests, greatly increased atmospheric pollution and given a signal for a new arms race more perilous than ever.

5. Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics), exercising his right of reply, quoted a passage from a statement made by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR on 27 October at the Twenty-second Congress of the Communist Party.

6. Mr. Khrushchev had, *inter alia*, expressed surprise at the hysterical tone of the reaction by capitalist propaganda to the news of the forthcoming explosion of a 50-megaton nuclear device, considering that the United States had been the first to make atomic bombs and had deemed itself legally and morally justified in using them against the defenceless population of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. He had gone on to recall that the Soviet Union, after proposing general and complete disarmament and the destruction of all nuclear weapons under the strictest international control, had considerably reduced its armed forces and liquidated its military bases abroad. During that time the Western Powers had been intensifying their rearmament, increasing their armed forces and conducting military manoeuvres near the frontiers of the Soviet Union, which they were openly threatening with war over the peace treaty with Germany. Faced with the danger of a new war, the Soviet Union had been obliged to improve its thermo-nuclear weapons and test new prototypes in order to strengthen its security and that of the socialist community. Mr. Khrushchev had assured those who had informed him of their concern over the recent explosions that Soviet scientists were making every effort to reduce the harmful effects of the tests to a minimum. He had warned them against imperialist propaganda which, under cover of humanitarian sentiments, sought to prevent the USSR from improving its defensive capacity and to facilitate preparations for a new war against it. Mr. Khrushchev had appealed to the leaders of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, West Germany and other countries to renounce their "position of strength" policy and the cold war and to adhere to the realistic principles of peaceful coexistence.

7. The German question appeared to be passing through a critical phase, and the only way to avert the threat of war was to disarm.

8. Mr. STEVENSON (United States of America), exercising his right of reply, pointed out that, when Stalin had been informed at Potsdam that the United States had the atomic bomb, he had expressed the hope that it would use it. At the time the USSR had made no protest against the atomic bombing of Hiroshima. And in 1946 it had rejected the proposal by the United States to internationalize atomic energy under the Baruch plan.^{1/} The Soviet Union had pro-

^{1/} See Official Records of the Atomic Energy Commission, First Year No. 1, 1st meeting, pp. 4-14.

posed a moratorium on testing and promised to uphold it, but had just carried out a series of nuclear tests which it had long had in preparation while participating in the Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests. Lastly, in spite of the resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 27 October (resolution 1632 (XVI)), the USSR had exploded a nuclear device of unprecedented destructive power, for no purpose except intimidation.

9. Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics), exercising his right of reply, said that, in the face of the threat of nuclear war held over mankind by the policy of the United States and its allies, everything possible had to be done to protect the peace-loving peoples. One way to prevent a nuclear war which would cause the death of millions of human beings was to increase the defensive power of the USSR.

10. Mr. CORNER (New Zealand) felt that the explosion of a bomb with a power of perhaps seventy-five megatons was an act with no military justification which greatly increased the dangers from radio-active fall-out and was inconsistent with the declared principles of the Soviet Union, which claimed to act in the interests of future generations.

11. New Zealand, like most Members of the United Nations, had neither nuclear weapons nor any intention of acquiring them. Nevertheless, it was allied to one of the two principal nuclear Powers, the United States, whose basic ideals it shared and with which it participated in collective security arrangements. The future of the free world depended upon the effectiveness of the Western Powers' defensive system.

12. The nuclear policy of the United States and the West during the past sixteen years had been entirely defensive. If proposals made by the United States as far back as 1946 had been accepted, the development of that fearsome capacity would have been placed under the control of an international and impartial authority. Those proposals had been made when the United States had possessed absolute supremacy in nuclear weapons and exclusive knowledge of the techniques of their manufacture.

13. The New Zealand Government had welcomed the decision of the major nuclear Powers in 1958 to cease the testing of nuclear weapons. That had been a wise decision at the time, particularly in view of the encouraging progress of the Geneva negotiations. That favourable development had given grounds for hope, but that hope had been abruptly ended, at any rate for the time being, by the Soviet Union's breach of the moratorium. The Prime Minister of New Zealand had expressed his country's profound regret at the resumption of testing by the Soviet Union. While also dismayed at the resumption of tests by the United States, the Prime Minister had recognized that, since the USSR was obviously seeking to establish a nuclear preponderance for itself, the United States had had little option but to look to its defensive position. The breaking of the moratorium had resulted in a greatly increased danger from nuclear fall-out and, even more serious, had gravely compromised the precarious balance of nuclear deterrent power, on which world peace and security might depend.

14. In the present circumstances, his delegation sincerely doubted the effectiveness of a voluntary cessation of tests, a procedure which had failed even at a time when negotiations on a treaty to stop all tests

had been actually in progress. Whatever some speakers might say, the present position was not the same as that which had prevailed before the opening of the Geneva Conference. By attempting to impose an unpoliced ban, the United Nations would play into the hands of the country which had violated the moratorium and would penalize the United States, which had not merely observed the moratorium until its unilateral rupture but had also so far refrained from resuming tests in the atmosphere. By confining itself to such a step, the United Nations would also run the risk of jeopardizing a security system which directly protected many countries and enabled many others to play an independent role in the international community.

15. The conclusion of a treaty would be the best solution. There was no doubt that, if each did his part, a treaty could speedily be elaborated, signed and put into effect. The Geneva negotiations had been far advanced at the time when they had had to be abandoned. Only a few points remained to be settled, and two of the three participants stood ready to negotiate on those points as soon as the talks could be resumed.

16. The moratorium had failed, not because tests had been conducted in secret, but because one side had been able to undertake in secret very extensive measures leading to a new series of explosions the moment it had seen fit. It must also be remembered that there had not, strictly speaking, been any violation of a treaty or international undertaking, but merely a breach of faith. His delegation was firmly convinced that nothing less than a fully binding treaty obligation could give any appreciable degree of security against the resumption of testing by one or other of the nuclear Powers, and that nothing but an adequate system of international control could persuade those Powers to accept such an obligation. Moreover, the signing of a treaty to ban nuclear tests would have the advantage of placing a marker on the road to negotiation for wider measures of disarmament.

17. Testing was an issue which could be separated from the general problems of disarmament, and which should be so separated because of its extreme urgency. His delegation therefore unreservedly supported the United Kingdom-United States draft resolution (A/C.1/L.280), considering it preferable to the six-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.283/Rev.2 and Rev.2/Add.1), that had now been outstripped by events.

18. Mr. SCHURMANN (Netherlands) recalled that the General Assembly had expressed itself on the subject of the discontinuance of nuclear test explosions on a number of occasions in previous years. It had stated its conviction that the cessation of test explosions should be attained by way of an international treaty and had held that that question and the question of general and complete disarmament should be dealt with separately, which did not mean that there was no connexion between the two questions or that the conclusion of a treaty would not facilitate practical progress in regard to disarmament. Each year the General Assembly had urged the nuclear Powers to continue their voluntary suspension of tests pending the conclusion of an international treaty, but it had always recognized that an agreement on the prohibition of nuclear weapons tests with effective international control was important, urgent and imperative. Thus, the Assembly had clearly indicated that the prime objective was the conclusion of a treaty.

Apart from certain reservations with regard to a continued voluntary moratorium, his Government had always been in agreement with the General Assembly on that question.

19. Although the negotiations at Geneva were understandably slow, steady progress had been made and his Government therefore considered that, despite the recent actions of the Soviet Union, efforts to conclude a treaty on the suspension of tests should not be abandoned. In the first place, that aim had lost none of its urgency and importance; in the second place, a treaty on tests would not only prevent the dangers of radiation and fall-out, but would also have the effect of slowing down the present armaments race; in the third place, it should be possible, from a technical point of view, for the two parties to reach agreement on the issues on which they had still been divided on 21 March 1961; in the fourth place, the negotiations begun at Geneva seemed at present to be the only possible effective method. The method proposed by the Soviet Union, for example, which would consist of combining the negotiations on the test ban with the discussion of a treaty on general and complete disarmament, was unacceptable. The speedy attainment of a controlled cessation of all tests would not be promoted—on the contrary, it would be hampered and even blocked—by amalgamating both problems into one complex question. To do so would be to sacrifice most of the important progress which had been made at Geneva and which had brought a treaty within reach—while the negotiations on a treaty on general and complete disarmament, comprising all the complicated aspects of arms control and reduction, had not even begun and would certainly not be successfully concluded within a short period of time.

20. It was clear from the records of the Geneva Conference that, contrary to what had been claimed, the United States and the United Kingdom had not pressed for the incorporation in the treaty of excessive control and inspection provisions. In fact, those countries had gone out of their way to meet the Soviet Union on those two points, as could be seen from their proposals on equal Soviet Union and United States-United Kingdom representation in the control commission, on the functions of the administrator and on the powers and composition of the inspection teams. Moreover, the United States representative had asked the Soviet representative what particular functions of the proposed administrator gave the Soviet Union concern. Up to the present, there had apparently been no clear answer from the Soviet Union on that point.

21. While his delegation understood the feelings of those representatives who had urged the Committee to lay stress on the necessity for a renewed voluntary suspension of tests, it believed that it was not enough to call on the great Powers to renew the moratorium. A moratorium had already been tried but, unfortunately, had failed to achieve its aim. The Soviet Union, which had in the past championed that method, now forgot its solemn declaration of August 1959 that it would not be the first to resume testing, and the statement by Mr. Khrushchev before the Council of Ministers of the USSR on 4 January 1960 that the Government which first resumed the testing of nuclear weapons would shoulder a heavy responsibility before the whole of mankind. It was to be feared that after the Soviet Union had concluded its present series of tests, it would again unblushingly associate itself

with those who still believed in the possible efficacy of a moratorium.

22. Even as a stopgap, a voluntary moratorium without real control was a defective measure, because a system for the detection and identification of explosions was essential to ensure observance of the rule, accepted by all, that one party should not obtain a military advantage at the cost of the other.

23. The last two gigantic explosions conducted by the Soviet Union could only be regarded as an act of terror against humanity. In conducting those tests, the Soviet Union had exposed the health of mankind to risks which could not be justified by any argument. His delegation had therefore unreservedly supported the eight-Power draft resolution, which had been adopted by the Assembly as resolution 1632 (XVI). It could do no other than give vent to its feelings of horror and repugnance at the Soviet Union's disregard of an almost unanimous appeal by the whole of mankind.

24. His Government strongly hoped for a speedy discontinuance, through an international treaty, of all test explosions on all continents and in all environments and that the great group of non-nuclear Powers represented in the Committee would again express itself in favour of such a treaty.

25. Mr. BURNS (Canada) noted with dismay that, despite the General Assembly's solemn appeal, the Soviet Union had cynically fulfilled its threat to explode a nuclear super-bomb, disregarding the consequences of such a reckless experiment for mankind. His delegation hoped that the universal revulsion caused by the Soviet Union's action might serve to persuade that country to pay greater heed to world opinion.

26. Despite the doubts expressed by some representatives whether, in view of what had happened, there was very much point in adopting a resolution calling for an unsupported moratorium, his Government endorsed the six-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.283/Rev.2 and Rev.2/Add.1) because it was necessary to put an end to the dangers of radioactive fall-out and because the purpose of nuclear testing was to perfect nuclear weapons. The nuclear Powers asserted that they had been or might be obliged to resume testing because their national security required it. But surely a succession of tests conducted by both sides would lead to mutual destruction, which would extend far beyond the borders of the belligerents.

27. The General Assembly should therefore in the first instance call upon the nuclear Powers to refrain from further testing. In that connexion, the sponsors of the six-Power draft resolution apparently intended, in operative paragraphs 2 and 3, to meet the views expressed by the major nuclear Powers in regard to a moratorium. On the one hand, the United States representatives had made it clear that they were resolutely opposed to a further uncontrolled moratorium, having been deceived by the Soviet Union's violation of the voluntary suspension which had been in force during the Geneva negotiations. As a consequence of that violation, the United States might find that it had been placed at a relative disadvantage in the development of nuclear weapons and it was therefore unwilling to trust another uninspected, unsupervised moratorium. His delegation had much sympathy with the United States viewpoint and it appreciated the

respect which that country had shown for the terms of General Assembly resolution 1577 (XV) and 1578 (XV). The United States had not carried out any nuclear weapons tests until the large Soviet explosions; the four tests it had subsequently made had been carried out underground and had produced no radioactive fall-out.

28. The United States had emphasized several times that it was ready to sign at once a treaty banning nuclear tests permanently under effective international control—in other words, the treaty which had been drawn up in the Geneva negotiations and which, to be completed, required only agreement on three points. But the Soviet Union had not agreed to negotiate a solution to those three points, which related basically to the degree of control and verification which the Soviet Union was prepared to accept. The Soviet Union professed to believe that the necessary control measures would be used for spying unless their own citizens were able to exercise a veto over the practical functioning of the control system. That morbid apprehension of espionage seemed extraordinary in a great nation like the Soviet Union. The text of the draft treaty (A/4772), as well as the statements made in the Committee by the United States and United Kingdom representatives and the records of the Geneva Conference, clearly showed that the proposed control machinery could not be used for espionage.

29. His delegation believed that the positions of the United States and the Soviet Union, the essential features of which he recalled, might be reconciled. The Soviet Union, to demonstrate the sincerity of its frequently professed desire for general and complete disarmament, must not only refrain from further testing of nuclear weapons but show its willingness to enter into "internationally binding agreements" as outlined in the six-Power draft resolution. Since the purpose of nuclear testing was the development and perfection of nuclear armaments, an agreement on the cessation of nuclear testing could be one of the first measures of disarmament to be negotiated and put into effect. It seemed evident, however, from the stated attitudes of both the United States and the Soviet Union that a resolution simply calling for the cessation of nuclear tests would not be enough and that it must be supplemented by another calling for the conclusion of a treaty which would provide a permanent guarantee against the resumption of tests. His delegation would therefore also vote in favour of the United Kingdom-United States draft resolution (A/C.1/L.280).

30. There was no reason why negotiations should not be resumed immediately, and other nations which had developed nuclear weapons or had the means of doing so might also take part.

31. If the Soviet Union insisted that the question of nuclear testing should be considered as a part of general disarmament, it should be possible for that to be done, priority being given to the question of nuclear tests, but, in view of the urgency of reaching an agreement on the cessation of tests, consideration of the question should not be delayed until negotiations began on other disarmament measures or on the broad question of general and complete disarmament.

32. The conclusion of an early agreement on the cessation of nuclear tests safeguarded by effective international controls would facilitate the progress of negotiations on general and complete disarmament

and restore a measure of confidence between the two great nuclear Powers, without which there could be no prospect of disarmament.

33. Mr. PAZHAWAK (Afghanistan) said that his delegation was against nuclear tests of any size, by any Power, at any time, anywhere and in any environment. It therefore regretted that tests had been resumed, and was concerned about the circumstances that had led the nuclear Powers to resume tests. The discontinuance of tests was essential, and his delegation would be willing to accept any measures that might be agreed upon by the nuclear Powers, without whose agreement it was impossible to hope for any constructive and lasting result; it would therefore support any draft resolution on the lines of the six-Power draft, and was willing to consider any other practical measure which would achieve the permanent discontinuance of tests.

34. It had become increasingly clear that the circumstances which had led to the resumption of nuclear tests were alarming, and the Assembly should express its great disquiet. In fact, the explosion of bombs, which had aroused great uneasiness, was but a dangerous result of the international tension and the circumstances which had caused the resumption of tests. It was therefore necessary to be realistic and remember the difficulties of the situation. That was the purpose of the revised Afghan amendment (A/C.1/L.289/Rev.1) to the six-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.283/Rev.2 and Rev.2/Add.1).

35. Mr. ENGEN (Norway) declared that the world would never forget that the Soviet Union, despite the appeal made to it, had exploded a monstrous bomb that very morning. That was one more reason for pressing ahead with efforts to free the world from the scourge of nuclear testing.

36. It was most regrettable that the Soviet Union should have brought about the failure of the Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests and then resumed nuclear testing under the pretext of safeguarding its national security because of the increased international tension. Admittedly, international tension had increased, mainly owing to the situation in Germany, but it was tragic that the Berlin crisis, which was due to the Soviet Union, had compelled that State to resume nuclear testing, with all the consequences entailed for the health of millions of people and for the international situation. Much had been said by the representative of the USSR and others about the so-called aggressive character of the alliance to which Norway belonged, but it was not aggressive. In fact, if a member of NATO had created a crisis such as the one which the Soviet Union had fostered in Germany, Norway would have refused to be a party to such a policy.

37. In view of the test explosions which the Soviet Union had recently set off in the atmosphere, it was mandatory to put an end to such testing. Accordingly, the Norwegian Parliament had adopted a resolution on 23 October condemning nuclear testing (A/C.1/849). That condemnation meant that, in the opinion of the Norwegian people, no Government had a moral right to poison the air, the water and the food that were the very basis of human life, whether in the interest of its own citizens or those of other countries. There was no longer any doubt that the radioactive fall-out resulting from testing did entail danger to human health. That danger must be eliminated as soon as possible. His Government therefore wel-

comed the fact that the United States and the United Kingdom were prepared to sign a treaty banning nuclear tests under adequate international control, and to resume negotiations forthwith with the object of discussing any counter-proposals which the Soviet Union might wish to present. The Soviet Union, however, had refused to consider that solution. It was indispensable to establish a control and inspection system, not for detecting tests made in the atmosphere but to prevent States from preparing for such tests. A moratorium on testing could only be a half-measure unless it was accompanied by an agreement binding the parties not to prepare for further tests. The only solution was a treaty to ban tests, with international control, but the Soviet Union refused to conclude such a treaty as long as there was no agreement on general and complete disarmament. The Norwegian delegation would strongly urge the Soviet Union to reconsider its position.

38. To alleviate the dangers from radio-active fallout, a new moratorium had been proposed, similar to that which had been in force up to 1 September 1961. That did not appear to be a satisfactory solution, since one of the parties had used the previous moratorium as a cover for the preparation of extensive new tests. In the circumstances, it would perhaps be more realistic to base future efforts on the fact that one of the nuclear Powers, the Soviet Union, was unwilling to give up its freedom of action by accepting the obligations of a treaty with controls. The serious danger from tests in the atmosphere and under water could be eliminated or greatly reduced if the nuclear Powers would accept a moratorium for those tests that needed no control machinery for detection. That would, of course, leave the nuclear Powers free to conduct underground tests, and there would be no control machinery to prevent the preparation of tests, but some measure of safety might thus be achieved. Such a limited moratorium would, moreover, not preclude agreement on a test-ban treaty. A first practical step might be to persuade the nuclear Powers to give a pledge to the United Nations not to carry out any more tests of nuclear weapons in the atmosphere. Such a moratorium, which would not be voluntary or unilateral but based on a pledge to the United Nations, could eventually be widened.

39. His delegation's attitude to the six-Power draft resolution, in which the nuclear Powers were urged to refrain from further test explosions pending the conclusion of a test-ban treaty, would depend on that moratorium being lifted in time, so that it would be truly provisional, in the sense that it would be in force only pending the conclusion of a treaty. The Norwegian delegation would like to see such a moratorium take the form of a commitment to the United Nations, through the General Assembly or the Disarmament Commission. The six-Power text was, however, acceptable to his delegation in principle, although it had strong reservations on linking the moratorium to the conclusion of a treaty on general and complete disarmament.

40. His delegation would support the United States-United Kingdom draft resolution, which invited the nuclear Powers to resume negotiations for a treaty banning nuclear weapons testing, with effective international control.

41. At a later stage he might wish to comment on the other draft resolutions.

42. Mr. MARTINO (Italy) said that a settlement of the question of nuclear disarmament was essential for the preservation of world peace. Absolute priority must therefore be given not only to an agreement on the cessation of tests but to the establishment of a supervisory system that would form a constituent part of the international order. Despite the apparent logic of the Soviet position, there were at least two good reasons for giving the test ban precedence over negotiations on general and complete disarmament. First, nuclear tests were harmful to human health and were an element in the arms race. In the second place, what stood in the way of a resumption of negotiations and the conclusion of a disarmament agreement was mistrust between the parties. But it was clear that those who manufactured ever more powerful weapons, who exploded 50-megaton bombs and desired to enrich their collection with even 100-megaton bombs could scarcely inspire the confidence necessary for serious negotiations on general and complete disarmament. If the parties could reach an agreement to ban tests and stop the production of thermo-nuclear weapons, they would then be able to conclude a wider agreement on the progressive reduction of armaments and on their eventual abolition. On the other hand, a resumption of negotiations was unthinkable so long as the armaments race continued apace and the world produced weapons of mass destruction on such a scale that a reduction or elimination of other instruments of war would clearly be useless.

43. His delegation regretted that the Baruch Plan, generously proposed by the United States with a view to realizing general and complete disarmament in the field of nuclear weapons at a time when that country was the only one which possessed them, had not been accepted, for it could have been carried out with comparative ease. The United States had not taken advantage of its superiority to pursue a policy of conquest or intimidation; it had only used it to resist the expansion of international communism. That American superiority had thus served to safeguard peace. When the situation had grown complicated by reason of the accumulation of stockpiles and the perfection of means of delivering nuclear weapons, the Western Powers had proposed a controlled cessation of the testing and production of fissionable materials for military purposes, and the reconversion of stocks; but the Soviet Union had not accepted those proposals, calling purely and simply for the cessation of tests. The parties had however agreed, in the autumn of 1958, to begin negotiations for a treaty to ban nuclear tests under effective international control. The moratorium accepted at that time had not, therefore, been the ultimate goal; it had been a form of pledge by the parties to accept specific obligations at a later stage. Effective co-operation between the Eastern and Western Powers had marked the first stage of the Geneva Conference, but suspicion and mistrust had appeared as soon as difficulties had arisen. The Soviet Union had claimed to be convinced that the United States wanted to exclude underground tests from the agreement on the cessation of atomic tests. But it was obvious that if the United States had wanted to retain freedom to conduct underground tests, it would not have proposed a special régime for explosions below the 4.75 seismic threshold as being undetectable. Neither would it have promoted special studies to facilitate precise verification or proposed to lower the 4.75 threshold.

44. The negotiations had not proceeded as rapidly as the United States and the United Kingdom had hoped and two new factors had emerged. First, the membership of the "atomic club" had begun to increase. Nevertheless, the arguments of the Soviet Union concerning the French tests could not be taken seriously, for they were hardly of a nature to alarm the USSR and had been carried out as part of a national policy, not part of a co-ordinated Western plan. Nevertheless, the conclusion of an agreement on the cessation of tests raised new difficulties now that other States had taken to experimenting with or without explosions. It was not certain that those States would be willing to sign an agreement without having taken part in the negotiations.

45. The second factor was far wider in scope and quite different in character. It was the situation brought about by the resumption of testing by the Soviet Union, which claimed that it had been driven to it by the "aggressive policy of the United States in Berlin and elsewhere" and because the United States had allegedly sabotaged the Geneva negotiations. But everyone knew who had precipitated the new Berlin crisis and caused the break-down of the disarmament talks. Mr. Khrushchev himself had admitted that the tests had been resumed in the interests of the Soviet Union. Did that mean that the USSR had given up the idea of winning the world over to Communist ideology by peaceful means? That it had decided not to co-operate in building a world order founded on agreement, co-operation and trust between all States? It was from that angle that the question of controls must be considered, the real nature of which was not technical but essentially political. The issue at stake was respect for the legal basis underlying international relations in a civilized world. Any contract must include guarantees for its fulfilment, which in the circumstances were provided by an international order based on law and designed to promote co-operation and trust. If considerations of national interest were to prevail, the international order would rest entirely on force.

46. The Italian delegation appreciated the efforts made by the Indian Government since 1954 to put an end to nuclear tests. But if it was desired to find a practical solution the whole situation must first be examined. It was vital to understand the difference between tests in the atmosphere, dangerous for health, and innocuous underground tests; between gigantic explosions meant to produce weapons of mass de-

struction, and small explosions for the purpose of perfecting tactical weapons; between explosions intended to diminish destructive power and those designed to increase it; between those who had shown good faith in agreeing to a moratorium and negotiations on the cessation of tests and those who sought to use nuclear weapons for dangerous competition; lastly, between those who complied with the dictates of public opinion and those who sought to intimidate it. Clearly, all tests should be condemned, wherever they took place and whoever initiated them, but an effort should be made to keep a sense of proportion.

47. A moratorium was a truce mutually agreed upon by the parties, and if one of the parties failed to observe it, it was no longer binding on anyone. Simply to recommend a moratorium at that stage would therefore not be a wise course: it would only be respected by countries which, by reason of their democratic system, took account of public opinion, whereas those which had already proved themselves capable of breaking the truce with impunity, and thus also their solemn pledge, would not feel themselves bound to comply with it. Although the General Assembly had just adopted, by an overwhelming majority, resolution 1632 (XVI) appealing to the Soviet Government to forego its plan to test a 50-megaton bomb, Mr. Khrushchev had described as hysterical the anxiety of eighty-seven Members of the Assembly and, despite that appeal, the USSR had exploded a bomb of 75 megatons. What was even more serious was that a truce enacted under such conditions would increase the danger of war. In practice, freedom of action by one party must inevitably be met with freedom of action by the other. That solution was certainly an evil, but it was a lesser evil.

48. The Italian delegation believed that it was still possible to check the terrible evolution of nuclear weapons. The Assembly must demand the speediest possible conclusion of a treaty to ban nuclear tests under effective international control. Mankind could not await the conclusion of negotiations on general and complete disarmament, for it was in danger and must in the meantime be saved. The Italian delegation would therefore support any initiative likely to hasten the conclusion of an international agreement, based on specific undertakings and appropriate guarantees, for the cessation under international supervision of all nuclear weapons testing.

The meeting rose at 1.10 p.m.