

2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Distr.: General
5 May 2015

Original: English

Summary record of the 1st meeting

Held at Headquarters, New York, on Monday, 27 April 2015, at 10.30 a. m.

Acting President: Mr. Román-Morey (Peru)
President: Ms. Feroukhi (Algeria)

Contents

Opening of the Conference by the Chair of the third session of the Preparatory Committee

Election of the President of the Conference

Address on behalf of the Secretary-General of the United Nations

Statement by the President of the Conference

Address by the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency

Adoption of the rules of procedure

Requests for observer status

Election of Chairs and Vice-Chairs of the Main Committees, the Drafting Committee and the Credentials Committee

Election of Vice-Presidents

Appointment of the Credentials Committee

Confirmation of the nomination of the Secretary-General of the Conference

Adoption of the agenda

Programme of work

General debate

This record is subject to correction.

Corrections should be submitted in one of the working languages. They should be set forth in a memorandum and also incorporated in a copy of the record. They should be sent as soon as possible to the Chief of the Documents Control Unit (srcorrections@un.org).

Corrected records will be reissued electronically on the Official Document System of the United Nations (<http://documents.un.org/>).

15-06565 (E)



Please recycle



The meeting was called to order at 10.35 a. m.

Opening of the Conference by the Chair of the third session of the Preparatory Committee

1. **The Acting President**, introducing the final report of the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT/CONF.2015/1), said that the Treaty had played a crucial role in promoting nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy since its entry into force. The current Review Conference would provide an opportunity for States parties to reaffirm their full commitment to the Treaty, in addition to the consensus outcomes of previous Review Conferences, to ensure that it remained the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime.

2. The Preparatory Committee had held three sessions between April 2012 and May 2014; 148 States parties to the Treaty had participated in one or more of those sessions, together with States not parties to the Treaty, specialized agencies, international and regional intergovernmental organizations, non-governmental organizations and members of academia who had participated in accordance with the agreed modalities. At each session, one meeting had been set aside for presentations by non-governmental organizations.

3. The Preparatory Committee had reached agreement on all main issues related to the organization of the Conference, including the date and venue of the Conference; the draft rules of procedure; the financial arrangements; the provisional agenda; and the allocation of items to the Main Committees. The recommendations on those issues were reflected in the report. However, it had decided to defer consideration of a final document or documents of the Conference to the 2015 Review Conference.

4. Most of the Preparatory Committee's meetings had been devoted to a substantive discussion of all aspects of the Treaty and of three clusters of issues based on the allocation of items to the Main Committees of the 2010 Review Conference (NPT/CONF.2010/DEC.1). The Committee had also considered the following three specific blocks of issues: nuclear disarmament and security assurances; regional issues, including with respect to the Middle East and the implementation of the 1995 resolution on

the Middle East; and peaceful uses of nuclear energy and other provisions of the Treaty, and improving the effectiveness of the strengthened review process.

5. The Chairs of the first and second sessions of the Preparatory Committee had prepared factual summaries of the consideration of the issues of the Committee. In the course of those discussions and in those of its third session, many proposals had been made, including those contained in the documents listed in annex II to the final report. Despite making every effort, however, the Preparatory Committee had been unable to produce a consensus report containing substantive recommendations to the Review Conference.

Election of the President of the Conference

6. **The Acting President** announced that the Preparatory Committee, at its third session, had unanimously recommended the election of Ms. Taous Feroukhi of Algeria as President.

7. *Ms. Feroukhi (Algeria) was elected President of the Conference by acclamation.*

8. *Ms. Feroukhi (Algeria) took the Chair.*

Address on behalf of the Secretary-General of the United Nations

9. **Mr. Eliasson** (Deputy Secretary-General of the United Nations), speaking on behalf of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, said that the Secretary-General expressed his deepest sympathy and condolences to the people and Government of Nepal at a time of grief and humanitarian plight following the horrific earthquake that had affected large parts of the country. Eliminating nuclear weapons was a top priority for the Organization; no other weapon had the potential to inflict such wanton destruction on the world. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was the cornerstone of the non-proliferation regime and an essential basis for realizing a nuclear-weapons-free world, a critical global public good that would benefit all nations.

10. The purpose of the current Review Conference was to ensure that the Treaty retained its central role in the world's collective security, and to chart a clear path forward for what the non-proliferation regime would be in 2020, the fiftieth anniversary of its entry into force. He called upon States parties to work hard and constructively to produce an outcome that strengthened

the Treaty, promoted its universality, ensured compliance by all parties with all its provisions, and reinforced the Treaty's principal goals, namely to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and bring about their elimination. He urged participants to build on common ground, to be inclusive and to show flexibility.

11. He also encouraged all States parties to deepen their engagement with civil society groups, which played an important role in strengthening Treaty norms and in promoting disarmament. The President of the 2015 Review Conference and the United Nations had received several petitions from civil society groups calling for the successful conclusion of the Conference and the elimination of nuclear weapons. Those petitions had received millions of signatures from concerned citizens and were a powerful reminder of the hopes and expectations of people around the world. He thanked the many individuals and organizations that had done so much to champion disarmament over the years and pledged his full support for their principled commitment to that cause.

12. Agreement on the 64-point action plan contained in the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT/CONF.2010/50 (vol. I), together with progress on the resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference after 15 years of inaction, had resulted in a successful Review Conference in 2010. Agreement on the action plan represented a high point of international consensus, delivering a road map for achieving the Treaty's aims. The current Review Conference must demonstrate how and when the action plan would be implemented, or it could risk becoming irrelevant. Such progress demanded that every State party should comply with its obligations under each of the Treaty's reinforcing pillars.

13. At its heart, the Treaty was a grand bargain underpinned by the symbiotic relationship between nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, neither of which could be advanced without the other. Progress on both was in everyone's interest. The danger posed by nuclear weapons had not diminished since the previous Review Conference. Proliferation challenges persisted, including with respect to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Yet, the important understanding between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the five permanent members of the Security

Council and Germany proved that such challenges could be dealt with through diplomacy. A final agreement verified by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) could help ease serious regional security concerns in addition to achieving progress on non-proliferation.

14. A Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction could provide substantial benefits, in addition to the disarmament and non-proliferation gains that would flow from such an agreement. It was disappointing that too little progress had been made towards convening an international conference on that topic, despite the determined efforts of the facilitator assigned to coordinate the conference, and the expectations of the international community for results. The Review Conference must focus on seeking means to enable States of the region to move forward on that issue with a shared vision and purpose.

15. Between 1990 and 2010, the international community had taken bold steps towards a nuclear-weapons-free world. There had been massive reductions in deployed arsenals. States had closed their weapons facilities and made impressive moves towards more transparent nuclear doctrines. Nonetheless, he was deeply concerned that over the previous five years, that process seemed to have stalled. It was especially troubling that recent developments indicated that the trend towards nuclear zero was reversing. Instead of progress towards new arms reduction agreements, there were allegations of destabilizing violations of existing agreements.

16. Instead of a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty in force or a treaty banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons, the world was witnessing expensive modernization programmes that would entrench nuclear weapons for decades to come. In place of proposals for accelerating nuclear weapons disarmament, including the Secretary-General's five-point plan, there had been a dangerous return to cold war mentalities. That reversal was a regression for the world.

17. He called upon leaders to abandon short-term political posturing and instead embrace a bold and global vision that met the demands of humanity. True national security could only be achieved outside and away from the shadow of the nuclear threat, which must be removed for the sake of present and future generations. That was the message conveyed by the

Hibakusha, the survivors of the nuclear attacks carried out 70 years previously on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan. He challenged all those who doubted the urgency of nuclear disarmament to learn about the experiences of the *Hibakusha*. He also defied anyone to look into the eyes of those courageous and resilient individuals and say that they knew better what nuclear weapons brought. The *Hibakusha* were a sober living reminder of the horrific humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons and the urgent need for their abolition. He thanked those witnesses for their participation and urged the Review Conference to heed their warnings and deliver results.

18. In that connection, he was heartened by growing momentum for humanitarian considerations to be placed at the centre of disarmament deliberations. The humanitarian movement had injected a moral imperative into a frozen debate. That imperative should be the subject of serious consideration by the Review Conference. The coming weeks would be challenging, as participants sought to advance the world's shared ambition to remove the dangers posed by nuclear weapons, which constituted an historic imperative. He called on participants to act with urgency to fulfil the responsibilities entrusted to them by the peoples of the world, who aspired to achieve a more secure future for all.

Statement by the President of the Conference

19. **The President** said that her country, Algeria, was strongly committed to the objectives of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and to the achievement by diplomatic means of global peace and security, particularly in the region to which Algeria belonged. She vowed to do her utmost to help delegations make progress on all three pillars of the Treaty, namely disarmament, non-proliferation and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and looked forward to working with the new Chairs of the Main Committees of the 2015 Review Conference. She also commended Ms. Cabacutulan of the Philippines for successfully presiding over the 2010 Review Conference.

20. To fulfil her mandate, she would rely, first and foremost, on States parties engaging constructively with each other to take stock of progress made since 2010 and to formulate goals to be achieved in time for the 2020 Review Conference, which would coincide with the twenty-fifth anniversary of the indefinite extension of the Treaty. She was confident that the

Conference could achieve substantive results commensurate with its aspirations that would enhance the credibility of the Treaty, foster global security and promote solidarity between peoples.

Address by the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency

21. **Mr. Amano** (Director General, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)) said that the Agency and the Non-Proliferation Treaty had a common goal, namely to ensure that humanity derived maximum benefit from the peaceful uses of nuclear science and technology, which contributed to development, in areas such as human health, agriculture, water management and energy. The Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference had emphasized the importance of the IAEA Technical Cooperation Programme, recognizing it as one of the main vehicles for the transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes.

22. The impact of the Agency's work on the daily lives of millions of people around the world was extraordinary and deserved to be better known. Indeed, that work literally saved lives. During the Ebola virus outbreak in West Africa in 2014, IAEA had supplied simple testing kits based on a nuclear-derived technique to diagnose the disease much more quickly. Moreover, through its Programme of Action for Cancer Therapy, IAEA helped developing countries enhance the availability of nuclear medicine and radiation oncology services. It had also helped countries improve their soil and water management and made available food irradiation techniques that made food safer and extended its shelf life. The IAEA Peaceful Uses Initiative had also helped to raise over 60 million euros for projects that benefited more than 130 countries. He hoped to continue that valuable initiative with the support of member States. He urged them all to ensure that the importance of science and technology, including nuclear technology, was acknowledged in the Final Document of the present Review Conference and as an important part of the post-2015 development agenda.

23. The International Atomic Energy Agency was unique in the United Nations system in that it had its own network of laboratories. In 2012, it had created the Ocean Acidification International Coordination Centre in Monaco to bring together leading scientists to examine the impact of ocean acidification on marine ecosystems. In 2014, it had launched the ReNuAL Project with a view to modernizing the Agency's eight

nuclear applications laboratories at Seibersdorf, Austria, which offered training to scientists, supported research in areas such as human health and food, and provided analytical services to national laboratories. He appealed to all countries to contribute generously to the modernization of those laboratories.

24. Extensive efforts had been made to strengthen nuclear safety since the accident that had occurred in 2011 at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant in Japan, causing great distress and hardship for the people affected and undermining public confidence in nuclear power throughout the world. That accident was a painful reminder that a terrible accident could occur anywhere, and that plant operators, nuclear regulators and Governments must remain fully committed to the “safety first” principle. The Agency was finalizing an assessment report on the accident. Despite the accident, however, nuclear power had continued to be an important component of the global energy mix. IAEA projections showed that the use of nuclear power would increase in the coming decades. Many countries saw nuclear power as a stable and clean source of energy that could improve energy security and mitigate the impact of climate change.

25. The Agency continued to promote innovation in the use of nuclear power, especially through the International Project on Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles, which focused on innovation in areas such as nuclear waste management and proliferation resistance. Important progress had been made in advancing nuclear fuel assurance schemes, such as with the low-enriched uranium reserve in Angarsk, Russian Federation, the nuclear fuel assurance concept advanced by the United Kingdom, and the Agency’s work to establish an IAEA low-enriched uranium bank in Kazakhstan.

26. The Agency was well placed to continue playing a central role in helping the world coordinate efforts to combat the very real threat of nuclear terrorism. Demand for its services was growing steadily. The Agency provided nuclear security training to thousands of people annually, helped countries to improve the physical security of their nuclear facilities, and maintained the most authoritative global database on illicit trafficking in nuclear and other radioactive materials. It had also hosted the International Conference on Nuclear Security in 2013.

27. The most important area of unfinished business in nuclear security remained the entry into force of the 2005 Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, although the end was nearly in sight, as only 17 more States needed to adhere to the Amendment for it to come into force. He urged all countries that had not yet done so to adhere to the Amendment.

28. IAEA safeguards were a fundamental component of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and played an indispensable role in the implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The Agency was continually striving to increase efficiencies, without compromising effectiveness, in the implementation of safeguards; it had applied safeguards to more than 1,250 facilities in 180 States, 100 facilities more than at the time of the 2010 Review Conference. In 2014, IAEA inspectors had spent nearly 13,000 calendar days in the field. Six non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty had brought into force comprehensive safeguards agreements with the Agency since the last Review Conference. He urged the non-nuclear-weapon States that had not yet done so to conclude comprehensive safeguards agreements and bring them into force at the earliest opportunity.

29. The implementation of an additional protocol significantly increased the Agency’s ability to detect any undeclared nuclear material and activities. An additional 24 States had brought additional protocols into force since 2010, bringing the total to 125. He urged all States that had not yet done so to bring additional protocols into force as soon as possible. The Agency had engaged in an intensive dialogue with its member States to enhance their understanding of the State-level safeguards concept, and would continue its efforts in that regard. Since the previous Review Conference, the Agency had completely modernized its analytical laboratories and greatly enhanced its ability to analyse nuclear material and environmental samples.

30. The International Atomic Energy Agency remained seriously concerned about the nuclear programme of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Although nearly six years had passed since Agency inspectors had been asked to leave that country, the Agency maintained its readiness to play a key role in verifying the country’s nuclear programme. He called upon the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to comply fully with its obligations under relevant Security Council resolutions, to cooperate promptly with the

Agency in implementing its safeguards agreement, and to resolve all outstanding issues.

31. The Agency continued to verify the non-diversion of nuclear material declared by the Islamic Republic of Iran in the implementation of its safeguards agreement. Nevertheless, the Agency was not in a position to provide credible assurances as to the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in the Islamic Republic of Iran, and to conclude that all nuclear material in that country was used in peaceful activities. Nonetheless, there had been important developments concerning safeguards implementation in that country.

32. In November 2013, the Agency and the Islamic Republic of Iran had agreed to cooperate further to resolve all present and past issues under a framework for cooperation. The Agency would continue to seek clarifications regarding possible military dimensions and would present an objective, impartial report to its member States subsequently. The Islamic Republic of Iran and the five permanent members of the Security Council and Germany had entered into a joint agreement on nuclear-related measures which the Agency had been asked to monitor and verify. IAEA welcomed the recent announcement by all the countries involved on key parameters for a joint comprehensive plan of action. The Agency would continue to play an essential role, including in verifying nuclear-related measures, once the comprehensive agreement was concluded. Implementation by the Islamic Republic of Iran of the additional protocol to its safeguards agreement would enable the Agency to provide credible assurances as to the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in that country.

33. With regard to the Syrian Arab Republic, the Agency had concluded in June 2011 that a building destroyed at the Dayr al-Zawr site in September 2007 was very likely the home of a nuclear reactor that should have been declared to the Agency. He called on the Syrian Arab Republic to cooperate fully with the Agency in connection with unresolved issues related to that site and other locations.

34. Lastly, a nuclear-weapons-free world was a common objective of all stakeholders of the Treaty. In that connection, the Agency had participated in the conferences on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons, held Oslo and Vienna in March 2013 and December 2014, respectively. It had also convened the

Forum on Experience of Possible Relevance to the Creation of a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in the Middle East in November 2011, which had shown that it was possible to have a constructive dialogue on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in that region, despite the complexity of the issue and the different opinions of the States concerned. The Agency would continue its efforts to support the establishment of such a zone.

Adoption of the rules of procedure

35. **The President** recalled that, at its third session, the Preparatory Committee had agreed to recommend to the Conference the draft rules of procedure contained in annex III of its final report (NPT/CONF.2015/1). She took it that the Conference wished to adopt the draft rules of procedure.

36. *It was so decided.*

Requests for observer status

37. **The President**, referring to rule 44, paragraph 1, of the rules of procedure, said that a request for observer status had been received from Israel. She took it that the Conference wished to accede to that request.

38. *It was so decided.*

39. **The President**, referring to rule 44, paragraph 3, of the rules of procedure, requests for observer status had been received from the African Union, the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials, the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization, the European Union, the International Committee of the Red Cross, the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, the League of Arab States, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation and the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean. She took it that the Conference wished to accede to those requests.

40. *It was so decided.*

41. **The President**, referring to rule 44, paragraph 4, of the rules of procedure, said that requests to attend meetings of the plenary or of the Main Committees had been received from the 107 non-governmental organizations listed in document NPT/CONF.2015/INF/4. Furthermore, the Preparatory

Committee had agreed to recommend to the Conference, that representatives of non-governmental organizations should be allowed to attend meetings, other than those designated closed, and to receive documents of the Conference, and that, in accordance with past practice, non-governmental organizations should be allowed to make written material available, at their own expense, to the participants in the Conference and to address the Conference, consistent with the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference. She took it that the Conference wished to accede to those requests and to proceed in accordance with the recommendation of its Preparatory Committee.

42. *It was so decided.*

Election of Chairs and Vice-Chairs of the Main Committees, the Drafting Committee and the Credentials Committee

43. **The President** recalled that, at its third session, the Preparatory Committee had agreed to recommend that the Main Committees should be chaired by the Chairs of the third, second and first Preparatory Committees, or their successors. It had also agreed to recommend that the post of Chair of the Drafting Committee should be assumed by a representative of the Group of Eastern European States, and the post of Chair of the Credentials Committee by a representative of the Group of Non-Aligned and Other States. The following candidates for the posts of Chair had been endorsed by the respective Groups of States: for Main Committee I, Mr. Román-Morey (Peru); for Main Committee II, Mr. Istrate (Romania); for Main Committee III, Mr. Stuart (Australia); and for the Drafting Committee, Mr. Drobnjak (Croatia). No nominations had yet been received for the Credentials Committee.

44. *Mr. Román-Morey (Peru), Mr. Istrate (Romania), Mr. Stuart (Australia) and Mr. Drobnjak (Croatia) were elected Chairs of Main Committee I, Main Committee II, Main Committee III and the Drafting Committee, respectively.*

45. **The President** said that, in accordance with rule 5 of the rules of procedure, the Conference should elect two Vice-Chairs for each of the three Main Committees, the Drafting Committee and the Credentials Committee. The following nominations for the posts of Vice-Chair had been received: for Main Committee I, Mr. Logar (Slovenia) and Mr. van der

Kwast (Netherlands); for Main Committee II, Mr. Ozawa (Japan); for Main Committee III, Mr. Bravo (Chile); for the Drafting Committee, Mr. Sobral Cordeiro (Portugal); and for the Credentials Committee, Mr. Rowland (United Kingdom). Additional nominations for the post of Vice-Chair of Main Committee II, Main Committee III, the Drafting Committee and the Credentials Committee had yet to be received.

46. *Mr. Logar (Slovenia), Mr. van der Kwast (Netherlands), Mr. Ozawa (Japan), Mr. Bravo (Chile), Mr. Sobral Cordeiro (Portugal) and Mr. Rowland (United Kingdom) were elected Vice-Chairs of Main Committee I, Main Committee II, Main Committee III, the Drafting Committee and the Credentials Committee, respectively.*

Election of Vice-Presidents

47. **The President** said that, in accordance with rule 5 of the rules of procedure, the Committee should elect 34 Vice-Presidents of the Conference. The following nominations had been received for the posts of Vice-President: from the Group of Eastern European States: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia; from the Group of Western States: Finland, France, Germany, Japan, Republic of Korea and Switzerland; from the Group of Non-Aligned and Other States: Chile, China, Colombia, Ecuador, Egypt, Guatemala, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Malaysia, Morocco, Nigeria, Philippines, South Africa, Syrian Arab Republic and Thailand. She noted that eight additional Vice-Presidents remained to be proposed.

48. *Bulgaria, Chile, China, Colombia, Czech Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Finland, France, Germany, Guatemala, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Japan, Malaysia, Morocco, Nigeria, Philippines, Poland, Republic of Korea, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic and Thailand were elected Vice-Presidents of the Conference.*

Appointment of the Credentials Committee

49. **The President** said that, in accordance with rule 3 of the rules of procedure, the Conference should appoint six members of the Credentials Committee on the proposal of the President of the Conference, in addition to the Chair and two Vice-Chairs elected. Accordingly, she proposed the following members of the Credentials Committee, while noting that three

further members remained to be proposed: Kyrgyzstan, Norway and Poland.

50. *Kyrgyzstan, Norway and Poland were elected members of the Credentials Committee.*

Confirmation of the nomination of the Secretary-General of the Conference

51. **The President** said that, at its first session, the Preparatory Committee had decided to invite the Secretary-General of the United Nations, in consultation with members of the Preparatory Committee, to nominate an official to act as provisional Secretary-General of the 2015 Review Conference. At its third session, the Committee had been informed of the decision by the Secretary-General to nominate Mr. Thomas Markram, Office for Disarmament Affairs, to serve in that capacity.

52. *Mr. Markram was confirmed as Secretary-General of the 2015 Review Conference.*

Adoption of the agenda

53. **The President** said she took it that the Conference wished to adopt the provisional agenda contained in annex IV of the final report of the Preparatory Committee (NPT/CONF.2015/1).

54. *It was so decided.*

Programme of work

55. **The President** drew attention to the draft programme of work (NPT/CONF.2015/INF/3), which remained open to modifications, pending consideration by the Conference, should circumstances require and in order to ensure that time was utilized in as efficient a manner as possible. On that understanding, she took it that the Conference wished to take note of the draft programme of work.

56. *It was so decided.*

General debate

57. **Mr. Zarif** (Islamic Republic of Iran), speaking on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, said that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was an essential foundation for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation and played a crucial role in promoting international cooperation and assistance in support of the inalienable right of States

parties to peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The full, non-discriminatory and balanced implementation of the three pillars of the Treaty was necessary for maintaining its credibility, realizing its objectives and promoting international peace and security.

58. The status of implementation of the action plan contained in the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT/CONF.2010/50 (vol. I)) was far from encouraging. The nuclear-weapon States had made little progress in eliminating their nuclear arsenals and the role of nuclear weapons in their national security policies had not diminished. Some States were modernizing their arsenals and planning research on new warheads, while others had announced their intention to develop new delivery vehicles for nuclear weapons. The non-nuclear-weapon States had yet to receive unequivocal and legally binding security assurances. The transfer of nuclear technology continued to face impediments that were inconsistent with the Treaty and no progress had been made to achieve universal adherence to the Treaty in the Middle East.

59. The continued existence of nuclear weapons posed the greatest threat to humanity. The continued lack of progress in the fulfilment of nuclear disarmament obligations and commitments by the nuclear-weapon States could undermine the object and purpose of the Treaty and the credibility of the non-proliferation regime. Each article of the Treaty was binding on all States parties in any and all circumstances. The Non-Aligned Movement reaffirmed its proposal, as contained in working paper NPT/CONF.2015/WP.14, for the urgent commencement of negotiations, in the Conference on Disarmament, on a comprehensive nuclear weapons convention, which should include a phased programme and a specified time frame for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

60. The Non-Aligned Movement remained deeply concerned about the military and security doctrines of the nuclear-weapon States and of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which attempted to justify the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons on the basis of the irrational concept of nuclear deterrence and nuclear military alliances. Any use or threat of use of nuclear weapons should be considered a crime against humanity and a violation of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and international

law, in particular, international humanitarian law. In that regard, he called for the complete exclusion of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons from military doctrines. The Non-Aligned Movement was, moreover, dissatisfied with the lack of political will and effort by the nuclear-weapon States to address the legitimate interest of non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty to receive unconditional and legally binding security assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons under all circumstances pending their elimination.

61. Any horizontal proliferation or nuclear-weapon-sharing by States parties constituted a violation of non-proliferation obligations under articles I and II of the Treaty. Proliferation concerns were best addressed through multilateral, comprehensive and non-discriminatory agreements. Additional measures related to safeguards should not affect the rights of non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty.

62. The International Atomic Energy Agency was the sole competent authority for the verification of the fulfilment of safeguards obligations. The strict observance of the IAEA statute and relevant comprehensive safeguards agreements was essential in conducting verification activities.

63. Universal adherence to the Treaty could not be overemphasized; he called on all States that had not yet done so to accede to the Treaty, as non-nuclear-weapon States, and to place all their nuclear facilities under IAEA full-scope safeguards. All States parties should seek the universal ratification of the Treaty and should refrain from taking actions that could negatively affect that goal. He congratulated the State of Palestine for becoming the newest State party to the Treaty.

64. Referring to article IV of the Treaty, he said that each State party, in line with its national requirements and in accordance with the rights and obligations defined in the Treaty, had a sovereign right to define its national energy and fuel-cycle policies, including the inalienable right to develop, for peaceful purposes, a full national nuclear fuel cycle. The Non-Aligned Movement strongly rejected, and called for the immediate removal of, any limitations on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, including restrictions on exports to other States parties of nuclear material, equipment and technology. States parties should refrain from actions that would limit certain peaceful nuclear activities on the basis of their so-called sensitive

nature, as the Treaty did not prohibit the transfer or use of nuclear technology, equipment or material on such grounds.

65. At the sixteenth summit of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, held in Tehran in 2012, the Movement had reiterated its support for the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. It had also called upon Israel, as the only State in the region that had neither acceded to the Treaty nor declared its intention to do so, to renounce possession of nuclear weapons, to accede to the Treaty without preconditions and without further delay, to place promptly all its nuclear facilities under IAEA full-scope safeguards, and to conduct its nuclear activities in conformity with the non-proliferation regime. The Movement had moreover expressed great concern over the acquisition of nuclear capability by Israel, which posed a serious and continuing threat to the security of neighbouring and other States, and had condemned Israel for continuing to develop and stockpile nuclear arsenals. Finally, the Movement had called for the complete prohibition of the transfer of all nuclear-related equipment, information, facilities and resources and the provision of assistance in nuclear science or technology to Israel.

66. The Non-Aligned Movement placed high priority on the implementation of the action plan adopted at the 2010 Review Conference and of the resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference. Its members were profoundly disappointed by the failure of the conveners to hold a conference in 2012 on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction, as had been collectively agreed by the 2010 Review Conference. The Non-Aligned Movement strongly rejected the arguments put forward by the conveners for failing to hold the conference as mandated.

67. Renewed political will on the part of all States parties would be necessary for a successful conclusion to the 2015 Review Conference. The action plan adopted at the 2010 Review Conference provided a sound basis for the current Review Conference to build on in order to strengthen implementation of the Treaty, especially with regard to nuclear disarmament, and achieve universal adherence. The Movement of Non-Aligned Countries stood ready to engage constructively with other partners to reach a

comprehensive, balanced and practical substantive outcome, which should contain clear time-bound commitments by nuclear-weapon States to eliminate all their nuclear weapons.

68. **Mr. Lajčák** (Slovakia) said that the Treaty on Non-Proliferation was a unique framework for maintaining and strengthening peace, security and stability. It was important, amidst growing differences among States parties on a number of issues, to establish common ground and to maintain a balanced approach to the three pillars of the Treaty. Efforts to reach consensus should not result in the exclusion of certain relevant issues in the context of the non-proliferation regime, which could in turn jeopardize the aims of the Review Conference.

69. Nuclear disarmament strengthened the Treaty and the non-proliferation regime as a whole. Efforts to reduce nuclear arsenals must be driven by a genuine intention to ultimately eliminate them altogether. Diminishing the role of nuclear weapons in security strategies and defence doctrines would pave the way for such reductions. In advancing towards nuclear disarmament, States parties to the Treaty should strive to develop a set of mutually reinforcing and legally binding instruments that would lead to the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

70. The three conferences on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons, held in Oslo in March 2013, Nayarit, Mexico, in February 2014 and Vienna in December 2014 had underscored the horrific consequences of nuclear weapon explosions. His country had participated actively in all those conferences and continued to support the process that would lead to the total elimination of nuclear arsenals, including the reasons for their existence.

71. Non-compliance ranked highly among the serious challenges facing the non-proliferation regime. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction continued to be one of the major threats to international peace and security. Concerted efforts by States parties would be necessary to eliminate that threat while sustaining a global interest in nuclear energy and its peaceful uses. IAEA played an important role in the prevention of proliferation. States must cooperate with the Agency in order to facilitate the implementation of safeguards agreements. IAEA full-scope safeguards and additional protocols constituted the current verification standard. He called on all States parties that had not yet done so

to ratify both a comprehensive safeguards agreement and an additional protocol with IAEA.

72. The Agency should continue to implement integrated safeguards for those States in which both a comprehensive safeguards agreement and an additional protocol were in force and in which the Agency's secretariat had concluded that all nuclear material remained in peaceful activities. His Government also supported the diplomatic efforts of the United Kingdom, France, Germany, China, Russia, the United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran to find a comprehensive solution to the Iranian nuclear issue. He welcomed the agreement on the parameters for a joint comprehensive plan of action regarding the nuclear programme of the Islamic Republic of Iran, which, he hoped would be finalized shortly. IAEA had also played a crucial role in the verification of that country's nuclear programme.

73. It was regrettable that the conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction, scheduled to be held in 2012, had been postponed. He hoped that the current Review Conference could provide the momentum needed to convene that conference in the near future.

74. Making available a set of non-proliferation and disarmament instruments to the international community was an important part of strengthening the international security architecture. Stagnation in the development of related norms endangered the global security environment. In the context of negotiations within the Conference on Disarmament, the international community must strive to move forward in a way that strengthened, rather than weakened, the global non-proliferation and disarmament regime. The revitalization of the Conference on Disarmament was in the vital interests of the non-proliferation regime and the Treaty on Non-Proliferation was its cornerstone.

75. Slovakia supported the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, in accordance with article IV of the Treaty. Trust and confidence were keys in the development of such uses; the highest safety and security standards and non-proliferation conditions must be maintained in that context.

76. **Mr. Judeh** (Jordan) said that increasing global tensions and a rise in extremism and terrorism had made the goals of the Review Conference more urgent than ever. The success of non-proliferation efforts

depended on universalization of the Treaty. Universal adherence to the Treaty in the Middle East required the implementation of the 1995 resolution calling for the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. Unfortunately, however, that resolution had not been implemented and the conference on the establishment of such a zone planned for 2012 had not taken place. The success of the Review Conference would depend in no small measure on the establishment of an implementation mechanism for that resolution, which had been the basis for the indefinite extension of the Treaty. A binding mechanism should also be created to provide non-nuclear-weapon States with assurances that nuclear weapons would not be used against them. That mechanism should include a clear call to nuclear-weapon States to eliminate their nuclear weapons.

77. All States had a fundamental right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy, which were indispensable for the sustainable development of States that did not possess other sources of energy. Needless to say, peaceful nuclear energy programmes should meet the strictest of agreed-upon international safety standards, and be subject to IAEA comprehensive safeguards in order to ensure that they were not merely fronts for weapons programmes. His delegation welcomed the three conferences on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons that had been held in Oslo, Nayarit, Mexico, and Vienna, and the progress made in the negotiations over the nuclear programme of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

78. His country was a party to and in compliance with all the major nuclear-weapon agreements and a State member of IAEA. It had submitted three national reports to the United Nations on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, pursuant to Security Council resolution 1540 (2004), and would be hosting a regional workshop on the implementation of that resolution in June 2015.

79. **Ms. Wallström** (Sweden) said that 100 years after the first use of chemical weapons during the First World War and 70 years after the nuclear bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, there were 16,000 nuclear weapons still in existence, many of them ready to be launched in a matter of minutes. Nevertheless, it was important not to lose hope. Where there was sufficient political will, progress could be achieved, as evidenced by past agreements on nuclear weapons reductions and disarmament treaties and the recent negotiations on the

Iranian nuclear programme. Heightened tensions in the world and the deteriorating global security environment had led to an increasing awareness of the risks posed by nuclear weapons and the potential catastrophic consequences of their use. His country was pleased to see that the humanitarian perspective on nuclear weapons was gaining momentum, and would work to ensure that putting people first would be a guiding principle of the Review Conference.

80. Since the Treaty's grand bargain of a world free of nuclear weapons remained unfulfilled, with nuclear weapons still being enhanced or acquired in many parts of the world, commitments made under the Treaty must be fulfilled urgently, with the unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to completely eliminate their nuclear weapons.

81. His country welcomed the New START Treaty between the Russian Federation and the United States of America, and urged the Russian Federation to take up the offer made by the President of the United States in 2013 to negotiate further and deeper cuts in the two countries' nuclear arsenals. He called for non-strategic nuclear weapons to be included in future negotiations. Sweden also strongly condemned the nuclear test explosions carried out by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and called upon that country to return to the Treaty, to comply with IAEA safeguards without delay, and to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. His delegation welcomed the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in several parts of the world and was committed to the establishment of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. It commended Finland for its efforts to convene the conference that had been agreed upon to that effect.

82. **Mr. Burkhalter** (Switzerland) said that substantial progress on disarmament and non-proliferation was all the more necessary given the many uncertainties facing the international community and the current strain on the nuclear regime. His delegation called on all parties to use the Review Conference to search for common ground, help achieve a consensus outcome and reinvigorate the Treaty. However, that would only be possible if they all engaged in constructive dialogue. The final document of the Review Conference should advance that dialogue by reaffirming previous agreements and charting a way forward for real progress on all three pillars of the Treaty. It should confirm that the action plan developed at the 2010 Review Conference remained the international

community's road map. His delegation was prepared to define ambitious but realistic benchmarks to accelerate the implementation of that action plan.

83. Switzerland had been doing its utmost to increase awareness of the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of using nuclear weapons. Those consequences were behind its commitment to work towards nuclear disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear security.

84. The Review Conference must emphasize the need to continue and even enhance efforts to significantly reduce nuclear stockpiles, dismantle warheads, decommission nuclear facilities and make progress on verification procedures. It should stress the need for results-oriented and inclusive negotiations, and for stronger efforts to agree on goals for quantitative reductions. It must also address legal gaps and other shortcomings in the nuclear regime. For example, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty had still not entered into force and negotiations on a treaty prohibiting the production of fissile material had yet to commence. There was therefore a need for thorough and inclusive discussions about possible additional instruments to advance multilateral nuclear disarmament.

85. To eliminate nuclear weapons, States parties must work with nuclear-armed States to collectively shape a security environment conducive to a nuclear-weapon-free world by, above all, strengthening the work of the United Nations. Total elimination of nuclear weapons could only be achieved through a gradual reduction of risks related to nuclear weapons. Nuclear-armed States must reduce the operational readiness of their weapons and lengthen decision times. From a doctrinal standpoint, Switzerland proposed that the sole purpose of those weapons should be to deter their use by other States.

86. Lastly, while the international community would never be able to avoid all crises, it could, through confidence-building measures, strengthen communication channels, particularly between armed forces, to reduce the risks of an unintended nuclear war. Switzerland welcomed the joint statement on the Iranian nuclear programme delivered in Lausanne recently and encouraged the parties involved to conclude a comprehensive long-term agreement, which would constitute real success for non-proliferation. His delegation was ready to help facilitate further

negotiations and would continue to support diplomatic efforts to resolve proliferation challenges. It urged the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to return to the Treaty and encouraged the parties involved in the Six-Party Talks to relaunch the negotiation process. It welcomed the steady strengthening of safeguards in recent years and believed that continued outreach would be necessary to promote the adoption of additional protocols to the IAEA comprehensive safeguards agreements.

87. **Mr. Gómez Robledo** (Mexico) said that the goals of non-proliferation and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy contained in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons had generally been fulfilled, and some countries, including his own, had made voluntary commitments beyond the Treaty's provisions. Mexico welcomed the preliminary agreement reached between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the five permanent members of the Security Council and Germany on key parameters for a joint comprehensive plan of action for the Iranian nuclear programme.

88. The continued existence of nuclear weapons undermined the Treaty regime and posed the risk of a detonation, accidental or otherwise. The use or threat of use of nuclear weapons was a violation of international law and the possession of nuclear arsenals was neither legal nor legitimate. There was an obligation, established in international jurisprudence, to both conduct and conclude multilateral negotiations leading to complete nuclear disarmament. The duty to conduct such negotiations in good faith remained the only unfulfilled Treaty obligation.

89. The three conferences on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons that had been held in Norway, Mexico and Austria had helped to raise awareness of that issue. In that connection, it was encouraging to see that more than 80 per cent of Member States had already endorsed the Humanitarian Initiative on the Impact of Nuclear Weapons. His delegation believed in the need for a legally binding international agreement on prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling, possession, transfer, placement and use of nuclear weapons on humanitarian grounds. Such an instrument could be negotiated in the Conference on Disarmament, but given the stalemate within that body, other options should be explored.

90. The Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) had already started high-

level negotiations to prohibit and eliminate nuclear weapons in its region through a binding legal instrument. It had also endorsed the pledge by the Austrian Government to cooperate with all stakeholders in efforts to fill the legal gap for the prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons and to cooperate with all stakeholders to achieve that goal. Such initiatives showed that a world free of nuclear weapons was indeed possible. The current Review Conference should mark a turning point in efforts to achieve that ultimate goal of the Treaty.

91. **Mr. Koenders** (Netherlands), speaking on behalf of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative, said that the Initiative was a cross-regional grouping bringing together non-nuclear-weapon States from diverse backgrounds, which could play a constructive and proactive role in bridging positions to help craft a successful outcome at the current Review Conference. The members of the Initiative were fully committed to the Treaty as the cornerstone of the global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime, and stressed the importance of universal adherence to the Treaty. They were deeply concerned at the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons; that concern fundamentally underpinned all their work for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation in pursuit of a world free of nuclear weapons.

92. The members of the Initiative reaffirmed the positions they had expressed in the statement issued following their eighth ministerial meeting, held in Hiroshima, Japan, on 12 April 2014, including the intention to actively contribute to a successful outcome at the current Review Conference.

93. In addition to the 17 working papers it had submitted thus far, the Initiative was submitting for consideration a working paper on transparency by non-nuclear-weapon States and a working paper containing a comprehensive list of practical recommendations for an outcome document that addressed all three pillars of the Treaty. The recommendations were intended to be a menu of possible elements that could assist the Conference in arriving at an action-oriented outcome document that built upon the action plan contained in the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference. As the Initiative, with its diverse and cross-regional membership, had been able to reach consensus on that

text, it hoped that the text would be acceptable to all States at the Review Conference.

94. On disarmament, the Initiative welcomed the steps taken thus far by the nuclear-weapon States, including by the Russian Federation and the United States under the New START Treaty, which had been implemented despite the current difficult political climate. With a view to obtaining an unequivocal undertaking from all nuclear-weapon States to eliminate their nuclear arsenals in accordance with article VI of the Treaty, the Initiative called for greater progress in meeting disarmament commitments, including enhanced transparency, a diminished role for nuclear weapons in military and security doctrines, and deeper reductions in all types of nuclear weapons. The members of the Initiative called on all States that had not yet done so to sign and ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, and welcomed the work of the fissile material cut-off treaty group of governmental experts, which had recently adopted a robust consensus-based report reflecting the most in-depth discussions on the topic to date.

95. With regard to non-proliferation, the authority of the International Atomic Energy Agency to verify both the correctness and the completeness of State reports should be strengthened, and nuclear suppliers should meet strict guidelines before entering into new supply arrangements with non-nuclear-weapon States. Increased accessibility and broader application of nuclear science and technology were important, as was the central role of IAEA in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and verification. States should also commit to the ongoing implementation of safeguards and appropriate and effective levels of safety and security.

96. The Initiative strongly condemned the continued development by North Korea of its nuclear and ballistic missile programmes, which undermined the Treaty and the global non-proliferation regime and posed a great threat to regional and global peace and security. North Korea should take concrete steps to honour its commitments under the 2005 Joint Statement of the Fourth Round of the Six-Party Talks; to fully comply with its obligations under all the relevant Security Council resolutions; to immediately cease all related activities in Yongbyon; to abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programmes; to comply with its IAEA safeguards agreement; and to return to the Treaty.

97. The understanding reached between the relevant parties on the key parameters for a joint comprehensive plan of action for the Iranian nuclear programme was a welcome step which would hopefully lead to a final and comprehensive resolution of all the concerns of the international community regarding that programme. All stakeholders, including countries of the Middle East region, the convenors and the facilitator, should continue to work constructively to reach agreement on the arrangements for a conference on a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East to take place at the earliest opportunity.

98. Lastly, the members of the Initiative understood that, instead of focusing on differences, States parties were most effective when they focused on areas of agreement in promoting practical actions to achieve outcomes that were of common interest. All States parties had a responsibility to fulfil their commitments and obligations under the Treaty and to work to uphold and strengthen the non-proliferation and disarmament regime.

99. Speaking as the representative of the Netherlands, he said that despite some progress made since the 2010 Review Conference with regard to nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and the implementation of safeguards, much remained to be done. The safeguards regime required further strengthening, as did the capacity of IAEA to verify efficiently that all the fissile material in non-nuclear-weapon States was used only for peaceful purposes. The Netherlands called on all those countries that had not yet done so to ratify and implement additional protocols to their safeguards agreements.

100. States parties to the Treaty needed to approach compliance cases in a straightforward manner. In that connection, they should condemn the ongoing development by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea of its nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programme.

101. The dissatisfaction conveyed by some States parties over the slow pace of disarmament was understandable; the growing attention being paid to the humanitarian consequences of a nuclear weapon explosion was no doubt an expression of that concern. Humanitarian considerations underpinned his country's efforts in every area of disarmament and non-proliferation. He hoped that that approach would give new momentum to disarmament and inspire the

Review Conference to take the necessary steps to ensure the worldwide elimination of nuclear weapons.

102. The Netherlands supported the call for further reductions of strategic and non-strategic weapons. While the current geopolitical situation and lack of trust were not conducive to progress, States parties should not abandon their ambition of achieving a world free of nuclear weapons. In that connection, article IV should be taken seriously, and eventually, States parties would need to ban the nuclear bomb. Whatever differences existed between States parties, it was important to choose a practical, effective approach.

103. In order to build trust, States parties needed to improve transparency, further reduce the role of nuclear weapons in security and military doctrines, ensure the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, and start negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Above all, States should maintain an open dialogue and persevere in their efforts to achieve disarmament. It was in that spirit that the Netherlands had offered to host the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit and that it had elected to play an active role in the new partnership for nuclear disarmament verification. It also looked forward to contributing to related discussions as a non-permanent member of the Security Council, for which it was a candidate for the 2017-2018 term.

104. **Mr. Ybañez Rubio** (Spain) welcomed the preliminary agreement reached on 2 April 2015 in Lausanne on the Iranian nuclear programme, which was a significant step forward, as negotiation was the only way of resolving such complicated matters. Spain supported the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons and called for the universalization of the Treaty and full compliance with its provisions and the plan of action contained in the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference.

105. With regard to nuclear disarmament, all States, in particular those with large nuclear arsenals, had a special responsibility to implement article VI of the Treaty. In that connection, his delegation welcomed the agreements on nuclear disarmament that those States had already signed, but urged them to make even more ambitious commitments on the topic. His delegation followed with great interest the debate on the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of the use of nuclear weapons, which highlighted the need for

nuclear disarmament to be undertaken in a gradual manner, under the provisions of the Treaty.

106. States that had not yet done so should sign the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty to enable it to go into effect. The Conference on Disarmament should also start negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty, as it remained the sole forum in which to negotiate multilateral disarmament treaties, despite the recent stalemate in its work.

107. In the area of non-proliferation, Spain firmly supported the role of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the importance of universal adherence to additional protocols as the criterion for verification under the safeguards agreements. It called for the immediate holding of a conference on the establishment of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery in the Middle East as a crucial step in ensuring peace and security in the region. The draft agreement concerning the Iranian nuclear programme was a positive step in ensuring the exclusively peaceful nature of that programme and supporting the Treaty process and dialogue in the region. Spain condemned the nuclear tests conducted by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and called for that State to abandon its nuclear programme and return to the Treaty and IAEA safeguards.

108. The current Review Conference should reaffirm that right of all States parties to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Spain participated in efforts to counter the use of sensitive nuclear materials and technologies by non-State actors for terrorist ends, and supported all initiatives undertaken in line with Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) to combat the asymmetric proliferation of nuclear weapons. It also participated in efforts to enhance nuclear security, such as the Nuclear Security Summit process and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism.

109. **Mr. Lamamra** (Algeria) said that 45 years after the signing of the Treaty, the goal of the total elimination of nuclear weapons remained elusive, with nuclear weapons still being part of the military doctrine and deterrence policy of many countries. The tens of billions of dollars diverted annually to nuclear weapons would be better spent on the alleviation of poverty, ignorance and disease. Until a convention prohibiting the use, possession, stockpiling or development of nuclear weapons was signed, non-nuclear States should be provided with assurances

against the use and threat of use of nuclear weapons through a binding international instrument. He was pleased to see a growing awareness of the humanitarian dimension of the nuclear challenge. Responsibility for non-proliferation should be shared between the nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States. In that regard, his delegation commended the work of IAEA, which should remain an independent and non-politicized agency.

110. His country had been among the first to sign the Treaty of Pelindaba, which established the African nuclear-weapon-free zone. It remained concerned about the obstacles that had thus far prevented implementation of the 1995 resolution on the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. His delegation welcomed the accession of the State of Palestine to the Treaty, and noted with satisfaction the positive developments in relation to the Iranian nuclear programme. It also reaffirmed the fundamental and inalienable right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy, which were playing an increasingly important role in economic and social development. Countries had a sovereign right to develop nuclear energy in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty, and there should be no limitations on transfers of expertise and equipment intended to assist them in that regard.

111. Lastly, the Review Conference provided an important opportunity to help eliminate the spectre of nuclear weapons for future generations. Its success depended on finding formulations that would reinforce the balance and credibility of the Treaty. His country was honoured to be serving as President of the Review Conference.

The meeting rose at 1.20 p. m.