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Chairman: Mr. Frederick H. BOLAND (Ireland).

**Request for the inclusion of an additional item in the agenda of the fifteenth session: item proposed by Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, the Sudan, Tunisia, the United Arab Republic and Yemen (A/4521)**

1. The CHAIRMAN said that the Committee had been convened to consider the inclusion of two additional items in the agenda of the fifteenth session of the General Assembly. He invited it to consider first the request (A/4521) for the inclusion of an item entitled "Question of Oman".
2. Sir Patrick DEAN (United Kingdom) said that he opposed the inclusion of the item in the agenda. The assertions in the explanatory memorandum (A/4521) to the effect that Oman was an independent and sovereign State and that its independence had been confirmed in the so-called Treaty of Sib were completely at variance with historical and political reality. There was no such thing as an independent State of Oman. Since the second half of the eighteenth century, sovereignty over the south-eastern corner of Arabia, including the mountainous district in the interior known as Oman, had been exercised by the family of the present Sultan of Muscat and Oman. The Sultan's sovereignty over Oman had been recognized in one way or another in international treaties such as those concluded with the United Kingdom in 1891 and in 1951, with the United States in 1833 and 1958, with France in 1846 and with India in 1953.
3. Since the middle of the eighteenth century there had been occasional conflicts between the Sultan and the Imam of Oman, who was primarily a religious leader. The trouble which had broken out in 1913, largely because of the Sultan's efforts to suppress arms traffic and the slave trade, had been brought to an end in 1920 by an agreement concluded at Sib between the Sultan and a number of tribal leaders in Oman whereby the tribes had been allowed a measure of local autonomy but Oman had not been recognized in any way as an independent State. The Sib agreement, which was in no sense an international treaty but an agreement regulating the relations between the sovereign and some of his tribes, had worked well for thirty-four years, until

the Imam's death in 1954. His successor, however, claiming to be an independent ruler, had raised a rebellion in 1957, with assistance from abroad. Sporadic fighting had gone on until January 1959, when the Sultan's forces, assisted by less than 300 United Kingdom troops, had obliged the rebels to flee to Saudi Arabia.

4. In spite of the fact that the situation in the area had been peaceful since that date, the Imam and his followers had gone on maintaining that hostilities were continuing on a scale which should give rise to international concern. In fact, the Committee was being asked to discuss mythical aggression against a non-existent State. The Security Council had declined to put the question of Oman on its agenda in August 1957,<sup>1/</sup> at which time skirmishing had actually been taking place in the interior. It would be illogical for the General Committee to take a contrary decision a year and nine months after the cessation of hostilities.

5. The reason United Kingdom troops were involved in what was an internal conflict was that the United Kingdom had for a long time been in close and friendly relations with the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman. Under agreements concluded in 1958 and 1960, the United Kingdom was helping the Sultan both to carry out a programme of economic development and to strengthen his armed forces. A few United Kingdom officers and instructors were, accordingly, in the Sultanate. The reason advanced in the explanatory memorandum in document A/4521, i.e. that the conflict had arisen because of the refusal of the Imam to grant oil concessions to United Kingdom companies, was at variance with the facts, because the Imam had no authority to grant any oil concessions.

6. The United Kingdom was opposed to the inclusion of the item in the agenda for the additional reason that a personal representative of the Secretary-General had recently been sent on an exploratory mission to an area adjoining Oman—in connexion with a dispute which was quite distinct from the issue before the Committee—in order to see whether it was possible to bring about an improvement in the relations between the Government of Saudi Arabia and the neighbouring rulers, including the Sultan of Muscat and Oman. The successful outcome of the mission might also have a beneficial effect on the relations between the United Kingdom and Saudi Arabia. The United Kingdom would regret any developments likely to interfere with the progress towards that end.

7. For the foregoing reasons he hoped that the Committee would decide not to recommend the inclusion of the item in the General Assembly's agenda.

8. Mr. PACHACHI (Iraq) regretted that the representative of the United Kingdom had seen fit to oppose the inclusion of the item in the agenda. The very fact

<sup>1/</sup> See *Official Records of the Security Council, Twelfth Year*, 784th meeting.

of the existence of a dispute made consideration of the question by the General Assembly necessary. A conflict that had gone on for six years should not be allowed to continue.

9. The question before the Committee involved two important considerations: on the one hand, there was the struggle against colonial domination and foreign influence; on the other, there was a political dispute between the United Kingdom and the Arab States. The United Nations was pre-eminently suited to deal with the issue, particularly so in the year 1960, when the question of the liquidation of colonialism was before the General Assembly. While most of Asia was now free and Africa was throwing off the yoke, the situation in Oman could not be ignored.

10. Politically, the question had affected and continued to affect the relations between the United Kingdom and the Arab States. All normal diplomatic means had been practically exhausted. In 1957 the Arab States had brought the complaint before the Security Council<sup>2/</sup> but, because of the peculiar composition of the Council at that time, the question had failed to secure the necessary majority for inclusion in the agenda.

11. The salient facts of the matter were that Oman was beyond any doubt a separate entity which had enjoyed an independent existence. Muscat had never exercised authority over Oman. The very fact that the relations between Muscat and Oman fell within the competence of the political agent responsible for Muscat's foreign affairs showed that the relations between the two countries were regarded in Muscat as foreign and not domestic in character.

12. Even were it conceded that the issue was domestic in character, the right of the United Kingdom to intervene in an internal conflict would still deserve consideration. As Sir Hartley Shawcross, former Attorney General of the United Kingdom, had said a foreign Power should not intervene in a domestic dispute, even in pursuance of a treaty. Such interference would necessarily be directed against a portion of the population of the country concerned. The truth was that the United Kingdom forces had been employed against the people of Oman because the latter had refused to grant oil concessions to United Kingdom-controlled companies. The dispute should be regarded as international in character for the additional reason that it had had an adverse effect on the relations between the United Kingdom and the Arab States. The situation in Oman was a classical example of a colonial problem, where naked force was brought into play against a people struggling for freedom.

13. The two aspects of the question to which he had referred indicated that the question deserved consideration by the United Nations. The General Committee should therefore recommend its inclusion in the agenda.

14. Mr. FEKINI (Libya) said that the request for the inclusion of the item in the General Assembly's agenda was dictated by concern for peace and security in the area. Oman, an independent State, had opposed the United Kingdom ever since the latter had begun to extend its influence into southern Arabia. Oman's independence had been recognized and reaffirmed in

the Treaty of Sib, which stipulated without ambiguity that there should be no interference by Muscat in the affairs of Oman, and in the conclusion of which the United Kingdom had acted as an intermediary between the two parties. The principle of non-intervention had been respected until 1955, when difficulties had arisen after the Imamate had refused to allow United Kingdom concerns to prospect for oil. Since 17 December 1955, when the Sultan of Muscat had begun his operations against Oman, with United Kingdom support, the people of that country had been suffering from the scourge of an unjust war. In August 1957 the question had been brought before the Security Council, and it was indeed regrettable that that body, which was responsible for the maintenance of peace, had failed to give due attention to the problem. The hopes that the dispute might be solved by negotiation had unfortunately been dashed. The gravity of the situation in Oman could not be concealed and the reinforcements sent into the area demonstrated the scale of the aggression.

15. The situation was becoming steadily more serious. On 15 April 1959 the Imam had launched an appeal to the world to put an end to the repressive campaign against his country. In referring to the Secretary-General's efforts to find a solution to another problem in the area, the representative of the United Kingdom had admitted that the two questions were distinct. That issue should not therefore prevent the Committee from recommending the inclusion of the question in the agenda. The United Nations could not remain inactive in the face of a grave and tragic situation which affected all the Arab peoples.

16. Mr. ADEEL (Sudan) said that, despite his country's most friendly relations with the people and Government of the United Kingdom, he supported the inclusion of the item in the agenda of the General Assembly. His country's only motive in doing so was to ensure that the complaint of a small and peace-loving people, whose traditional sovereignty and independence had been interfered with by superior external forces, should be investigated and, if possible, remedied. The independence and sovereignty of Oman had been recorded since the dawn of Islamic history. The people of Oman had guarded it jealously against foreign attacks, such as those by Portugal in 1650 and by Persia in 1737. The Treaty of Sib had recognized the sovereignty and independence of Oman without any ambiguity and beyond any doubt. It was true that the Security Council had decided in 1957 not to consider the question of Oman but the voting figures demonstrated that the question merited discussion. He therefore appealed to the Committee to recommend that the item should be included in the agenda.

17. Mr. MEZINCESCU (Romania) said that he had no difficulty in assessing the issue. On the one side were the Arab States, which were asking that the question of Oman should be included in the agenda; on the other side was the United Kingdom, which was affirming that the question was one involving the internal affairs of the Sultanate of Muscat. It was strange to hear the representatives of the colonial Powers at the fifteenth session of the General Assembly still speaking the language of colonial masters. The United Nations should consider the issue because it could thereby help the people of Oman to regain independence. It was indeed high time that all traces of colonialism were eliminated throughout the world.

<sup>2/</sup> *Ibid.*, Twelfth Year, Supplement for July, August and September 1957, document S/3865 and Add.1.

18. The representative of the United Kingdom had referred to a mission sent by the Secretary-General to Saudi Arabia. The Secretary-General was regarded by the colonial Powers as a mechanic who should repair the machinery of colonial domination whenever it broke down. The fact that the Secretary-General had sent that mission, far from constituting a reason for rejecting the item, made its inclusion in the agenda all the more necessary.

19. Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that his country attached great significance to the question of Oman. It was in favour of the inclusion of the item in the agenda, not only because it supported, as a matter of principle, the struggle of peoples for national independence, but also because of its appraisal of the situation in the area. The explanatory memorandum in document A/4521 and the speeches made by the representatives of the Arab countries in support of the inclusion of the item had shown that the United Kingdom had launched an armed aggression against Oman which was still continuing, and that the situation had still further deteriorated in recent times. The aggression by the United Kingdom threatened peace and security in the middle East and might endanger world peace.

20. As far back as 1957 the Arab States had brought the issue before the Security Council but the attempt to discuss it at that time had been wrecked by the colonial Powers. It was now perfectly clear what a heavy price the people of Oman had had to pay for that decision on the part of the United Nations. The situation could no longer be tolerated at a time when the world was witnessing the downfall of the shameful colonial system and when the United Nations had just admitted to membership seventeen States whose peoples had thrown off the shackles of colonialism. Moreover, the question had come before the General Committee at a time when the complete liquidation of colonialism was on the General Assembly's agenda. The continuation of aggression against the independence of Oman should be a warning to the newly independent countries. It showed that the colonialists, forced to retreat on some fronts, were trying to recoup their losses wherever their strength allowed them to do so. The request that the question of Oman should be included in the agenda of the fifteenth session of the General Assembly was well founded; in the interest of all the peoples struggling for independence, the Assembly should take the necessary steps to put an end to all aggression.

21. For the foregoing reasons, his delegation would vote for the inclusion of the item in the agenda.

22. Mr. BARCO (United States of America) recalled that, when the question of Oman had come before the Security Council in 1957, the United States representative had pointed out that the facts with regard to the situation in the region were exceedingly complex and certainly not clear and that it was not even certain who were the real parties in the dispute. For that reason the United States, while expressing the hope that those concerned would settle any legitimate grievances by peaceful means, had abstained in the Security Council vote on the question of inscription and would do so again at the present juncture, reiterating the same hope.

23. His delegation thought it proper to abstain for the added reason that it had noted with satisfaction the initiative which the Secretary-General had taken in sending an exploratory mission to the area. Anything

likely to jeopardize the success of that mission should be avoided.

24. The SECRETARY-GENERAL pointed out that the statement just made to the effect that he had sent an exploratory mission to Saudi Arabia on his own initiative did not correspond to the facts of the case. Early in the spring of 1959 the Government of Saudi Arabia had asked him if he could be present at talks between its representatives and those of the Government of the United Kingdom. As the suggestion had proved to be acceptable to the Government of the United Kingdom, he had seen no reason why he should not help in that way. Saudi Arabia had also approached him to find out whether he could help by sending a fact-finding mission to the area. He had brought that fact to the attention of the Security Council. He could not claim any merit for sending the mission, for he had merely been responding to Saudi Arabia's request.

25. Mr. BARCO (United States of America) said that he had used the term "initiative" in a purely generic sense and had not intended to convey an impression at variance with what the Secretary-General had just said.

26. Mr. STANOVNIK (Yugoslavia) said that his delegation would not oppose the inclusion of any item in the Assembly's agenda if there was any demonstrable justification for its consideration. The fact that the inclusion of the question of Oman had been sponsored by ten States was in itself an important consideration. The representatives of Iraq and Libya had advanced cogent arguments in support of the request. The very fact that the views expressed by the United Kingdom representative were so much at variance with those of the Arab States showed that the dispute was serious and warranted consideration by the United Nations. He would therefore support the inclusion of the item in the agenda.

27. Mr. TARABANOV (Bulgaria) said that his country could not remain neutral in the dispute in view of the valid reasons advanced by the Arab States in favour of the inclusion of the item in the agenda. The representative of the United Kingdom had said that Oman was a fictitious State. It was indeed true that there could be no independence in Oman so long as United Kingdom forces were in occupation of the country, but if the British left the country the people of Oman would regain that freedom for which they had been struggling for years. The Committee had been told by ten Arab States that a dangerous situation existed in the area. The presence of United Kingdom troops made peaceful conditions impossible. The issue was clearly a colonial one and, as such, it should come before the General Assembly. For those reasons he supported the inclusion of the item in the agenda.

28. Sir Claude COREA (Ceylon) said that his delegation would agree to the inclusion of the proposed item in the agenda of the session for three reasons, the most important being that Ceylon always endeavoured, as a matter of principle, to support an application for the inclusion of an item by any Member State or any country if there appeared to be fairly good grounds for such application, since the United Nations was the only forum in the world to which all could come to air their grievances, real or imaginary. That argument was reinforced in the present instance by the fact that no less than ten Member States had sponsored the request, and it was not to be supposed that they had acted lightly. In the second place, the question concerned a

small country and the United Nations should not risk the charge that it took no interest in the affairs of small peoples; on the contrary, the smaller the country the greater the obligation of the United Nations to safeguard the rights and interests of its people. Thirdly, since a number of statements had been made which went into the substance of the matter, it was only proper that the whole subject should be gone into thoroughly so that the charges made might be substantiated or refuted.

29. Mr. SOSA RODRIGUEZ (Venezuela) said that, since ten Member States from the Middle East considered that the matter merited the attention of the United Nations and since there was undoubtedly a state of conflict in Oman, his delegation would support the inclusion of the item in the Assembly's agenda.

30. Mr. BERARD (France) said that his delegation found nothing in the explanatory memorandum to justify any change in the position it had taken on the same matter when it had been brought before the Security Council in 1957. Furthermore, his delegation had serious doubts about the legal compatibility of the request with the principles of the United Nations Charter. It would therefore vote against the proposal to include the item in the Assembly's agenda.

31. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote the request for the inclusion of the question of Oman in the agenda of the fifteenth session of the General Assembly.

*The Committee decided, by 14 votes to 2, with 4 abstentions, to recommend to the General Assembly that the item should be included in the agenda.*

32. The CHAIRMAN invited suggestions for the allocation of the item.

33. Mr. FEKINI (Libya) suggested that since there was some political conflict involved the item might be referred either to the First Committee or to the Special Political Committee.

34. Sir Claude COREA (Ceylon), speaking as the Chairman of the First Committee, pointed out that although the agenda of that Committee was not large it included items which would call for lengthy discussion.

35. The CHAIRMAN suggested that in that case the Committee might recommend that the question of Oman be referred to the Special Political Committee.

*It was so decided.*

**Request for the inclusion of an additional item in the agenda of the fifteenth session: item proposed by Cuba (A/4543)**

*At the invitation of the Chairman, Mr. Roa García (Cuba) took a place at the Committee table.*

36. Mr. ROA GARCIA (Cuba), presenting his Government's request (A/4543) for the inclusion of an additional item entitled "Complaint by the Revolutionary Government of Cuba regarding the various plans of aggression and acts of intervention being executed by the Government of the United States of America against the Republic of Cuba, constituting a manifest violation of its territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence, and a clear threat to international peace and security" in the agenda of the General Assembly, asked that in view of its importance and urgency the item should be dealt with by the General Assembly itself in

plenary session and not referred to one of its Committees.

37. The plans of aggression and acts of intervention were not a matter of the past; they were being prosecuted at that very instant, in flagrant violation of the basic principles of the United Nations Charter and the most elementary rules of international law. A large-scale war was in active preparation against Cuba, with bases of operation in the territory of the United States, the Republic of Guatemala and Swan Island, whose occupation by United States forces infringed the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Honduras, to which geographically and historically it belonged. The attempt at intimidation in the embargo just imposed on United States exports to Cuba and the crudely imperialistic measures proposed by the candidates for the Presidency of the United States, Vice President Nixon and Senator Kennedy, in their current debate on the subject of Cuba gave all the more importance and urgency to the complaint made by his country's Government, for they showed that the United States Government had no regard whatever for the right of peoples to self-determination or for the principles of the Charters of the United Nations and the Organization of American States. Both typified the "position-of-strength" attitude of the imperialist Powers and both demonstrated before the eyes of the world that it was the determined policy of the United States Government to deny to the peoples of Latin America, Africa and Asia the right to develop, freely and independently, their political, economic, social and cultural lives.

38. His Government's complaint was based on irrefutable facts and on specific violations of the cardinal principles of the United Nations Charter and of international law. Moreover, the plans of aggression and acts of intervention being executed by the Government of the United States against the Republic of Cuba, violating its territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence, were aggravating the tension already existing and creating a clear threat to international peace and security. Any armed attack, whether direct or indirect, by the Government of the United States against Cuba might well be the prelude to a third world war.

39. Despite its experience of the failure of international organizations to uphold the principles they proclaimed, his Government was confident that its complaint would be admitted and that the item would be allocated, as it requested, direct to the General Assembly. It was for each State to decide to which organ to submit any complaint it might have to make. The danger threatening Cuba, a small and defenceless country, should awaken the conscience of the world; Cuba's voice should be heard in the highest forum, and as soon as possible. Every day that passed was one more day for the aggressors and warmongers to go unpunished. The Government and people of Cuba had abundant proof that a large-scale invasion of their territory was to be launched at any moment. The question was not academic: it was a matter of the life and death of a State Member of the United Nations. The invasion had been planned, organized and financed by the United States Government, the Pentagon and the monopolies affected by Cuba's revolutionary laws, the methods used against Guatemala in 1954 being used again against his own country. The Cuban people, how-

ever, together with their legitimate Government, were determined to repel any invasion of their territory, cost what it might. The invasion might take place in a few days or a few hours. The Committee should bear that in mind in taking its decision on the acceptance of the item and on its allocation.

40. Mr. BARCO (United States of America) said that there were many reasons that would justify a refusal by the General Committee to recommend the inclusion in the Assembly's agenda of the item proposed by the representative of Cuba. There was, first and foremost, the assertion in the explanatory memorandum attached to the Cuban request (A/4543) that an invasion of Cuba by United States armed forces was imminent: that was a fantastic and absurd allegation and not worthy of the Committee's attention. There were other false and unfounded charges of United States aggressive intentions towards Cuba—charges which had already been made in the Security Council, at the meetings of the Foreign Ministers of members of the Organization of American States (OAS) and at the meeting of a special committee of the OAS on economic matters at Bogotá in September 1960; at none of those meetings had those charges gained any credence whatever. The United States Government had already given a clear assurance that it had no intention whatever of launching a military attack against Cuba. He had been instructed by his Government to repeat that solemn assurance today: Cuba need have no fear of an attack from the United States; the United States Government adhered to the principles upon which the United Nations and the OAS were founded, and despite all the provocative and unfriendly acts of the present Cuban Government it entertained abiding feelings of friendship for the Cuban people. The fact that the Cuban Government had brought its charges, not before the OAS, to which under its treaty obligations it was required to submit such complaints first, or to the Security Council, the organ of the United Nations primarily responsible for maintaining peace and security, but before the General Assembly, showed that it was prompted by political reasons and not by any real desire to solve the problem. If it sincerely wished to improve its relations with the United States it could and should make use of the Ad Hoc Good Offices Committee set up at the Seventh Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American States held at San José from 22 to 29 August 1960.

41. There was another important reason why the Committee would be justified in recommending that the Cuban delegation's request should be rejected. Both Cuba and the United States had undertaken, under the United Nations Charter, the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, signed at Rio de Janeiro on 2 September 1947, and the Charter of the Organization of American States, signed at Bogotá on 30 April 1948, to try to settle any dispute with another member of that organization through direct negotiation and conciliation or through the regional bodies before bringing the matter to the United Nations. The United States had frequently expressed its willingness to negotiate with the Government of Cuba in an attempt to resolve the differences between the two countries, but the Cuban Government had either ignored such offers or had made useful negotiation impossible by insisting on unacceptable conditions. The Security Council, when it had heard similar charges by Cuba in July 1960, had decided to defer consideration of the matter since it

was already being considered by the OAS.<sup>3/</sup> That organization still had the questions before it, as was appropriate.

42. There were, however, some new charges in the explanatory memorandum attached to the Cuban request. One was that of the violation of Cuban air space by a United States aircraft on 29 September 1960. Not one piece of evidence had been produced to support the claim that any such flight originated in the United States, that the plane was registered in the United States, or that it was piloted by United States airmen. The United States rejected that charge as completely false and reminded the Committee of the extraordinary precautionary measures it had taken and was taking to ensure that no illegal flights should originate in its territory. There was also the charge of the invasion of Cuban territory by "a band of mercenaries coming from Florida", with the complicity of the State Department, the Pentagon and the United States "monopolies". There was no proof of such charges and his delegation categorically rejected the implication that the United States supported or in any way endorsed such activities. With regard to the three United States citizens who were stated to have taken part in the expedition, the United States Government did not countenance or condone such actions by its citizens; indeed, it sought by every legal means to prevent the participation of United States nationals in foreign adventures. As to the charge that the United States had instituted an embargo on its exports to Cuba in order to obstruct the Revolutionary Government's industrialization programme, the fact was that export controls had reluctantly been put into effect by the United States in defence of the legitimate economic interest of its people against the discriminatory and aggressive economic policies of the present Government of Cuba. While making his ridiculous accusation that the United States was attempting to reconvert Cuba into a colonial dependency, the representative of Cuba had referred to the recent attack on the Cuban Consulate at Miami. The United States Government had conveyed its regrets for that incident, and additional protection had been arranged for the Consulate. His Government would be prepared to agree to the investigation of the matter by the Ad Hoc Good Offices Committee of the OAS if the Government of Cuba also agreed.

43. Despite the foregoing reasons which militated against the inclusion of the Cuban item in the agenda of the General Assembly, his delegation was prepared to vote for its inclusion and welcomed the opportunity to set forth the facts relating to the Cuban charges. The present tension between the United States and Cuba was due, not to the actions of the United States Government, but to those of the Cuban Government, as aided and abetted by the Soviet Union and Communist China which were attempting, through Cuba, to penetrate into the American world and to sever the bonds between the American peoples.

44. Though the item would normally have fallen within the competence of the OAS, the United States had become accustomed to the manner in which the Cuban delegation demanded the attention of the United Nations. The Government of Cuba which in no small measure owed its independence to the United States insisted the United States was an "aggressor" at a time when the Cuban Government was placing Cuba ever more tightly

<sup>3/</sup> *Ibid.*, Fifteenth Year, 876th meeting.

in the grasp of totalitarian aggressive powers bent on overthrowing the constitutional governments in the western hemisphere.

45. His delegation was confident that, if the item were included in its agenda, the General Assembly would take no action which would have the effect of weakening the inter-American system, the oldest and most effective regional system in the world.

46. Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that his delegation was of the firm opinion that the General Committee should recommend to the General Assembly the inclusion of the proposed item in its agenda. The question was an important one: there was ample evidence of a real threat to a Member State and it was essential that the General Assembly should take urgent measures to correct the situation. The Cuban Government was in possession of information proving that the recent aggressive actions of the United States were but a prelude to a large-scale invasion of that country. The Security Council had already taken some action in the matter but that was not enough in view of more recent developments. The United Nations must take action to defend a Member State whose sovereignty was threatened. Any attempt on the part of the United States to repeat the Guatemala story would have serious consequences. All peace-loving countries were ready to help prevent any new attempt at colonial subjugation. His Government supported the Cuban people as it supported all peoples struggling for freedom and independence. It was also concerned to safeguard international peace and security; it was not possible to ignore the fact that a military conflict arising in one part of the world might extend to other parts. The matter was thus urgent and important and it was essential that it should be urgently considered by the Assembly in plenary meeting.

*The Committee decided without objection to recommend to the General Assembly that the item should be included in the agenda.*

47. The CHAIRMAN invited the Committee to make suggestions for the allocation of the new item.

48. Mr. BARCO (United States of America) held that it would be best to deal with the item in the normal way, in committee, where the charges made against the United States could be thoroughly examined. He therefore proposed that the Committee should recommend the allocation of the item to the First Committee.

49. Mr. MEZINCESCU (Romania) did not think that that proposal was in accordance with the situation as described by the representative of Cuba. The matter was urgent. The question had already been brought before the OAS without result. Cuba felt itself to be threatened and it was only right that its complaint should be heard in the General Assembly itself.

50. Mr. MAJOLI (Italy) saw no justification for referring the item direct to the Assembly. He drew attention to rule 67 of the Assembly's rules of procedure and urged that the item should be given preliminary consideration in committee in the normal way. As to the argument of urgency, he saw no reason to doubt the assurances given by the United States delegation. Although exceptions had been allowed in the past in the discussion of items at emergency special sessions of the General Assembly, he did not consider that they applied in the present instance. It was, in his

view, correct and necessary to refer the matter first to an appropriate Committee for consideration.

51. Mr. ILLUECA (Panama) felt that all Member States should be assured that the items they proposed would be given due attention. The American States eagerly desired the establishment of friendly relations among the countries of the region, in accordance with the fundamental principles of the OAS. It was his objective opinion that the allocation of the Cuban complaint to the First Committee would be equally satisfactory to all States. Since the heads of delegations served in the First Committee as well as in the plenary meetings of the General Assembly, there was really little difference between those two bodies.

52. Mr. TARABANOV (Bulgaria), referring to the suggestion of some representatives that the normal procedure should be followed, wondered whether the United States was following a "normal procedure" with respect to Cuba. It was scarcely normal for the question of intervention in Cuba to become an issue in the United States election campaign. The United States might use the same procedure it had adopted against the Arbenz Government in Guatemala; it was therefore essential that the item should be assigned to the General Assembly, for immediate discussion in plenary session.

53. Mr. BERARD (France) said that in view of the gravity of the charges made by the Cuban Government against the United States, he would have supposed that the Cuban Government would want to have its complaint very carefully considered. As the Italian representative had pointed out, the usual procedure was to refer such items to a Committee, which could give them the serious attention they warranted. He therefore considered that the Cuban complaint should be given careful consideration by the First Committee, which would ultimately report back to the General Assembly.

54. Mr. ORTIZ MARTIN (Costa Rica) said that his Government had always held that the best method of deciding such regional conflicts was through the OAS. While his Government naturally would not deny the competence of the United Nations to consider the Cuban complaint, it felt that discussion in the General Assembly would not further a settlement of the question, since calm and quiet discussion was essential to a solution, and recent meetings of the General Assembly had been characterized by recriminations and animosity. He would vote in favour of allocation of the item to the First Committee.

55. Mr. ADEEL (Sudan) appealed to the Cuban representative not to press for the item to be allocated direct to the General Assembly. As the representative of a small country, he appreciated the feelings of a small country which feared a powerful neighbour. The United States representative had, however, given a firm assurance of his Government's peaceful intentions, which could be regarded as a responsible statement emanating from a responsible State. Moreover, if the United States Government did not abide by that assurance, Cuba could appeal to the Security Council and receive a hearing at short notice. Lastly, there was the matter of precedent. A similar complaint of the USSR against the United States had been allocated to the First Committee. Again, if urgency was to be considered, the Algerian question should take precedence since a war was being waged there with daily loss of life.



56. Mr. HASAN (Pakistan) agreed with the Panamanian representative that there was no difference between the treatment accorded to such items in plenary session and that accorded by the First Committee. He thought that the allocation of the item should follow the usual procedure.

57. Mr. MEZINCESCU (Romania) recalled that the First Committee had already decided to treat seven items as urgent. Moreover, if the Cuban complaint was allocated to the First Committee, it would not be considered for five or six weeks. He did not agree with the representative of the Sudan that the assurances of the United States Government should be given great weight: in fact, that Government's assertion in document A/4537 that the prevention of unauthorized flights over Cuba was not easy seemed to be a story prepared to cover subsequent flights. The Committee should give credence to the statements of the Cuban Government and recommend the allocation of the item to the General Assembly in plenary session.

58. Mr. ROA GARCIA (Cuba) formally reiterated his Government's request that its complaint should be considered by the General Assembly in plenary session. That request was a matter of principle; it would be a test of the protection that a small nation could secure in the United Nations against larger countries. He was sorry that he could not respond to the appeal of the Sudanese representative. The assurances given by the United States representative were intended merely to deceive; the President of the United States, Mr. Eisenhower, had given similar assurances but flights had subsequently been made over Cuba and the sugar quota had been reduced. The United States representative had suggested that the Cuban complaint had not been prompted by any real concern about the problem. Yet the problem was indeed urgent, inasmuch as an invasion was being prepared. Furthermore, Cuba had the right to appeal to the United Nations without consulting the United States Government and without turning first to the OAS. He did not understand why the United States should object to Cuba's complaint being discussed in plenary session, if it had as good a case as the United States representative suggested. If the complaint was sent to the First Committee, it might never be discussed, for the First Committee's agenda was already overburdened.

59. He urged all the small countries who had suffered from United States imperialism to support his request. The United States representative's suggestion that his country's difficulties with Cuba had been inspired by the Soviet Union was absolutely false; like similar charges that had been made against Guatemala, it was intended to prevent the liberation of the Cuban people from oppression by United States monopolies.

60. Mr. STANOVNIK (Yugoslavia) recalled that in previous discussions on the allocation of items his delegation had stressed practical considerations, including the urgency and importance of the matters to be discussed. The Committee should be guided by the views of those primarily concerned. The representative of Cuba had argued forcefully that his Government's complaint was urgent. The item could not be given urgent consideration in the First Committee, where the priority of items on the agenda had already given rise to much discussion. Agenda items 78 (Question of Tibet), 81 (Question of Hungary) and 85 (The situation in the Republic of the Congo), for example, had

already been allocated to the General Assembly in plenary session. To be consistent in its decisions, the Committee should comply with the Cuban Government's request.

61. Mr. AUGUSTE (Haiti) felt that questions such as the Cuban complaint should, in accordance with the Pact of Bogotá,<sup>4/</sup> first be considered by the OAS. As for allocation, he thought the item could best be discussed in the somewhat calmer atmosphere of the First Committee.

62. Mr. FEKINI (Libya) said that he had supported the inclusion of the item in the agenda in the hope that the debates would promote a peaceful and friendly settlement of the difficulties which had arisen between Cuba and the United States. He entirely shared the view of the Yugoslav representative concerning the allocation of that item, the more so since there had already been a number of departures from the normal procedure mentioned by the representatives of Italy and France. He hoped that the United States representative, who had already shown commendable moderation, would accede to the Cuban Government's request. If he was compelled to vote on the question, he would vote in favour of the allocation of the item direct to the General Assembly.

63. Sir Patrick DEAN (United Kingdom) thought that, if the Cuban Government was indeed so concerned about United States actions as to consider them "an immediate threat to international peace and security", it would have asked for an urgent meeting of the Security Council. It had, however, preferred to press for discussion of its complaint in plenary session, on the grounds of urgency. His delegation's primary concern was that the work of the General Assembly should be accomplished as expeditiously as possible. The agenda for the plenary meetings was heavily burdened with items regarded as important by many delegations; a strong case would have to be made to support the allocation of additional items to the plenary Assembly, and the discussion on the Cuban complaint had not shown such a case. He felt that the Cuban complaint could best be dealt with by the First Committee.

64. Mr. BARCO (United States of America) said that his Government had no wish to deny any State the opportunity to obtain consideration of any grievances against the United States, or to prevent Members of the United Nations from considering such questions and contributing to their solution. Such consideration should, however, be thorough, deliberate and dignified. If Cuba really felt that its complaint was urgent, it could apply to the Security Council or to the OAS. If Cuba wanted a thorough consideration of its charges, the United States would have no objection to the First Committee taking up the item earlier than would normally be the case.

65. Mr. ROA GARCIA (Cuba) stressed once again the urgency of his Government's complaint. At that very moment, the United States Government was preparing an act of provocation at the Guantánamo naval base with a view to influencing the United States elections. He failed to see why Cuba should apply to the Security Council or to the OAS, since both bodies had refused to acknowledge the truth of the Cuban charges. The General Assembly should debate the Cuban complaint

<sup>4/</sup> American Treaty on Pacific Settlement, signed at Bogotá on 30 April 1948 (United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 30, 1949, No. 449).

before the forum of world opinion; his Government did not fear such a debate.

66. The CHAIRMAN invited the Committee to vote on the proposal by the representative of the USSR that the Committee should recommend to the General Assembly the allocation to plenary session of the item proposed by Cuba in document A/4543.

67. Mr. BARCO (United States of America), speaking on a point of order, did not consider that the USSR proposal should be put to the vote first. That proposal had been made during the debate on the inclusion of the item in the agenda, whereas the United States had made the first proposal during the debate on allocation.

68. The CHAIRMAN said the representative of the USSR had referred to both questions in his speech; he did not think the USSR proposal was out of order.

*The proposal was rejected by 10 votes to 6, with 4 abstentions.*

69. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote the United States proposal that the Committee should recommend to the General Assembly that the item be allocated to the First Committee.

*The proposal was adopted by 12 votes to 3, with 5 abstentions.*

70. Mr. BARCO (United States of America) said that he did not consider that the priority of the vote had been proper. He believed it to have been out of order and thought that the Committee should bear in mind that the practice was a very unparliamentary one and one that should not be followed in future.

The meeting rose at 6.20 p.m.