

**GENERAL  
ASSEMBLY**

TWENTY-SEVENTH SESSION

Official Records



Wednesday, 20 September 1972,  
at 3.15 p.m.

**NEW YORK**

*Chairman:* Mr. Stanisław TREPCZYŃSKI  
(Poland).

**Organization of the twenty-seventh session of the General  
Assembly: memorandum by the Secretary-General  
(A/BUR/179/Rev.1, sect.II)**

1. The CHAIRMAN drew attention to the Secretary-General's observations and proposals in his memorandum on the organization of the twenty-seventh session (A/BUR/179/Rev.1).

2. The CHAIRMAN said that the General Committee might wish to stress the need for punctuality in opening meetings and to draw the General Assembly's attention to the amended text of rules 69 and 110 of the rules of procedure (A/520/Rev.11), whereby the President of the General Assembly might declare a meeting open and permit the debate to proceed when at least one third of the members were present, and the Chairman of a Main Committee might declare a meeting open and permit the debate to proceed when at least one quarter of the members were present.

*The General Committee decided to recommend to the General Assembly the adoption of the suggestions in paragraphs 2 to 7 of the Secretary-General's memorandum.*

*The General Committee decided to recommend that the General Assembly should maintain for the twenty-seventh session the option referred to in paragraph 8 of the Secretary-General's memorandum.*

*The General Committee decided to recommend to the General Assembly the adoption of the suggestions in paragraphs 9 to 11 of the Secretary-General's memorandum.*

**Adoption of the agenda: memorandum by the Secretary-General (A/BUR/179/Rev.1, sect. III)**

3. The CHAIRMAN recalled that, in accordance with rule 40 of the rules of procedure, the Committee was not called upon to consider the substance of any item except in so far as it bore on its decision concerning the inclusion of the item in the agenda.

4. Mr. RANKIN (Canada) drew attention to the "Conclusions of the Special Committee on the Rationalization of the Procedures and Organization of the General Assembly" (A/520/Rev.11, annex V), and, in particular, paragraph 12 thereof which stated: "subject

to the limitation prescribed in rule 40 . . . the General Committee should examine the provisional agenda . . . more attentively and carry out more fully and consistently its functions of recommending with regard to each item its inclusion in the agenda, the rejection of the request for inclusion or its inclusion in the provisional agenda of a future session, as well as of allocating items to the Main Committees, regard being had to rules 99 and 101 of the rules of procedure, with a view to ensuring that all items inscribed on the agenda can be taken up by the end of the session".

5. In view of his delegation's close involvement in the work of the Special Committee, after consultations and in accordance with rule 40 of the rules of procedure, he wished to propose that the Committee should recommend to the General Assembly that agenda item 21 should be deleted and that items 52, 92, 93 and 94 should be deleted from the agenda of the twenty-seventh session and included in the provisional agenda of the twenty-eighth session.

6. The CHAIRMAN said that, if there were no objections, he would take it that the Committee would consider the Canadian proposals when the relevant items came up for discussion.

*It was so decided.*

7. The CHAIRMAN drew attention to paragraph 13 of the Secretary-General's memorandum (A/BUR/179/Rev.1) concerning the report of the Economic and Social Council.

*The General Committee took note of the observations in paragraph 13 of the Secretary-General's memorandum.*

8. The CHAIRMAN drew the Committee's attention to the draft agenda for the twenty-seventh session as it appeared in paragraph 14 of the Secretary-General's memorandum. He suggested that, where appropriate, the items should be considered in groups.

**ITEMS 1 TO 6**

9. The CHAIRMAN noted that the General Assembly had already dealt with items 1 to 6.

**ITEMS 7 TO 20**

*The General Committee decided to recommend to the General Assembly that items 7 to 20 should be included in the agenda.*

## ITEM 21

10. Mr. RANKIN (Canada) said that the reason why his delegation had proposed that item 21 should be deleted from the agenda was that there were no immediate plans for further installations. When such plans were made, they would of course have to be discussed by the Fifth Committee in view of their financial implications. It was therefore not necessary to retain the item on the agenda at the present stage.

*The General Committee decided to recommend to the General Assembly that item 21 should not be included in the agenda.*

## ITEMS 22 TO 24

11. Mr. RAMPHUL (Mauritius) said that, in the light of consultations in the African group, he wished to request that the plenary of the General Assembly should give priority to item 23 relating to the report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. It was extremely important for African members and for liberation movements that the debate should not be postponed until the latter part of the Assembly. Furthermore, if the general debate on item 23 were held at an early stage, members could work out the positions they would adopt in the Fourth Committee and receive guidelines from the General Assembly concerning the questions of Namibia, Southern Rhodesia and the Territories under Portuguese administration.

12. Mr. EL HASSEN (Mauritania) supported the suggestion, particularly in view of the importance which the African Heads of State had attached to colonial questions at the conference of the Organization of African Unity at Rabat.<sup>1</sup>

13. The CHAIRMAN said that at the present stage the Committee was called upon merely to decide on the inclusion of items in the agenda. The question raised by the representatives of Mauritius and Mauritania would be borne in mind when the Committee decided on the allocation of items.

*The General Committee decided to recommend to the General Assembly that items 22 to 24 should be included in the agenda.*

## ITEMS 25 TO 34

14. Mr. SUY (Belgium) suggested that items 26 and 27 should be grouped together as they both dealt with reports of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space and were in practice discussed jointly.

15. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) did not agree with that suggestion. Item 27 relating to the preparation of an international treaty concerning

the moon had been brought before the General Assembly as a separate item and discussed separately by the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. Furthermore, there had been new developments in connexion with the item and little remained to be done before complete agreement would be reached in the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. He therefore saw no reason why the two items should be merged.

*The General Committee decided to recommend to the General Assembly that items 25 to 34 should be included in the agenda.*

## ITEMS 35, 36, 37 AND 96

16. Mr. EL HASSEN (Mauritania), supported by Mr. TOURÉ (Guinea), proposed that items 35, 36 and 37 should be discussed in conjunction with item 96.

17. Mr. NKUNDABAGENZI (Rwanda) recalled that at its twenty-sixth session the General Assembly had decided to remove the items relating to Korea from the agenda. The dialogue which had been initiated between North and South Korea was bearing fruit and thus it was essential that the Assembly should avoid any passionate debate which might prejudice it. It might therefore be appropriate to consider removing those items from the agenda of the twenty-seventh session.

18. The CHAIRMAN said that if there was no objection he would take it that the Committee wished to consider items 35, 36, 37 and 96 together.

*It was so decided.*

19. The CHAIRMAN said that, in accordance with rule 43 of the rules of procedure, the representatives of Algeria, Democratic Yemen, Mongolia, Romania, Sierra Leone, Yugoslavia and Zambia had requested permission to take part in the discussion of the items relating to Korea.

*At the invitation of the Chairman, Mr. Rahal (Algeria), Mr. Ismail (Democratic Yemen), Mr. Puntsagnorov (Mongolia), Mr. Macovescu (Romania), Mr. Taylor-Kamara (Sierra Leone), Mr. Mojsov (Yugoslavia) and Mr. Lusaka (Zambia) took places at the Committee table.*

20. The CHAIRMAN said that the representative of Saudi Arabia had asked to participate in the debate on the present question. If there was no objection, he would invite him to take part in the discussion.

*At the invitation of the Chairman, Mr. Baroody (Saudi Arabia) took a place at the Committee table.*

21. Mr. RAHAL (Algeria) explained why Algeria, along with 28 other countries, had requested the inclusion of a new item—item 96—entitled "Creation of favourable conditions to accelerate the independent and peaceful reunification of Korea" (A/8752 and Corr.1 and Add.1-10).

<sup>1</sup> Nineteenth Ordinary Session of the Council of Ministers, held from 5 to 12 June 1972.

22. He recalled that at its twenty-sixth session the General Assembly had decided to defer debate on the question of Korea, in which the United Nations had been involved since 1950, until the twenty-seventh session of the General Assembly. The proponents of that move had considered that polemics should be avoided since there was some improvement in the situation, contact having been established between the two Koreas through their respective Red Cross societies. The decision to reopen the discussion on the problem of Korea had been left to the twenty-seventh session of the General Assembly and it could well be thought that the inclusion of the question on the agenda of the twenty-seventh session represented a commitment undertaken at the previous session. It appeared however that certain delegations were again using the same arguments to convince the Committee that a debate on the question of Korea might hamper the efforts being made by the leaders of North and South Korea to find a solution to their problems. In his delegation's view, delaying tactics of that kind would put the United Nations in the position of abdicating its responsibilities towards Korea. His delegation refused to accept such manoeuvres which, if they became embedded in the practice of the Organization, would divert it from its tasks and duties.

23. In the case of the Korean question the situation was particularly serious. It was a situation in which the United Nations had played an important and controversial role. Foreign troops were still stationed in Korea under cover of the United Nations flag. A United Nations Commission was said to have the task of bringing about the unification and rehabilitation of Korea. Thus, at a time when there were favourable developments and when efforts were being made everywhere to ease tensions and avert threats to the peace, how could the United Nations sit back and express a mere hope that the situation would improve and that those concerned would settle the matter for themselves? It would be difficult to accept such an attitude even if the United Nations were not directly involved, but it surely could not be accepted when earlier decisions of the United Nations, its presence and intervention in Korea, had a direct bearing on the situation in that country.

24. There was a further important reason for the United Nations to consider the question of Korea at its twenty-seventh session. The original decisions had been taken when the Organization had consisted of only about 60 Members. The membership had since more than doubled, and it was essential to determine whether the United Nations as it was 20 years later still wished to continue the operations which were being carried out in the name of all Member States.

25. In urging a discussion on the question of Korea, he and his fellow sponsors were concerned that nothing should be done to impede present progress in the area. The joint communiqué issued by North and South Korea related to much more than reuniting families separated since Korea had been divided. The two parties had declared their willingness jointly to seek reunification of Korea by peaceful means, without foreign intervention. Discussion of the question at the twenty-

seventh session, it was to be hoped, would clarify the situation and encourage those concerned to continue their efforts along the lines which they had agreed upon. The United Nations should reflect on how far the presence of foreign troops under the United Nations flag, and the activities of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea, ran counter to the expressed wishes of the two Korean Governments to continue discussions without foreign interference. Such a debate would reflect the main thoughts in the minds of the two parties.

26. For all those reasons, 29 countries, including Algeria, had requested the inclusion of a new item in the agenda of the twenty-seventh session. The wording of the item and the explanatory memorandum (A/8752 and Corr.1) and the draft resolution (A/8752/Add.9) accompanying the request for inclusion clearly showed the sponsors' concern to act in conformity with the wishes of the Korean people themselves and to eliminate from the discussion anything which might exacerbate the problem or revive former passions. The sponsors' wish was to take into account the new, promising situation in the area, and to redefine the United Nations commitment in the question of Korea. Similarly, the sponsors proposed that item 35 (Withdrawal of United States and all other foreign forces occupying South Korea under the flag of the United Nations) and item 36 (Dissolution of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea) should be deleted from the agenda.

27. He wished to appeal to those delegations which, during the twenty-sixth session, had sought to postpone the discussion of Korea not to resort to the same manoeuvre. The entire Organization would suffer if it failed to take the opportunity which was offered to promote and encourage the peaceful settlement of a problem which had been before the United Nations for more than 25 years. It was time to abandon sterile procedural wrangles, to turn to more constructive tasks and to accept boldly the responsibility incumbent on all Member States.

28. Mr. HUANG Hua (China) said that his delegation supported the statements made by the representatives of Mauritania and Algeria, and also favoured deletion of agenda items 35 and 36.

29. The people of Korea had for many years made untiring efforts to achieve the independent and peaceful reunification of their country, which was the greatest national aspiration of the entire Korean people. The recent agreement on principles for the independent and peaceful reunification of the country without recourse to foreign forces, and without foreign interference, had opened up a new prospect for the entire country. The proposal made by Algeria and 28 other countries was most timely, and was certain to promote favourable conditions for accelerating the independent and peaceful reunification of Korea.

30. The Chinese Government and people had always held that a country's affairs should be managed by its

people, without any foreign interference. The continued existence of the so-called United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea and of a United Nations military command in South Korea were the root cause of the continued division of Korea, and a serious obstacle to reunification. It was thus incumbent on the United Nations to discuss immediately and earnestly measures to eliminate those obstacles. Such action by the Organization would not only promote the principal aspiration of the people of Korea, but also contribute to restoring the prestige which the United Nations had lost over the Korean question.

31. His delegation totally rejected the argument that discussion of the question of Korea at the twenty-seventh session would have an adverse effect on the negotiations under way. Indeed, the start of those negotiations made it all the more desirable for the United Nations to discuss the question, so as to create favourable conditions for the independent and peaceful reunification of Korea.

32. Mr. MOJSOV (Yugoslavia) observed that his country was a sponsor of the proposal requesting the inclusion of a new item on the question of Korea (item 96) in the agenda of the twenty-seventh session. As was pointed out in the explanatory memorandum accompanying the request (A/8752 and Corr.1), there were several aspects of the direct responsibility of the United Nations with respect to Korea. The General Assembly had several times concerned itself with the question of reunifying the country, while at a previous stage the United Nations had resorted to direct military intervention in the country, had established the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea and had stationed foreign troops on Korean soil under the United Nations flag.

33. New conditions had now been created which might enable the Organization to achieve a long-sought-after goal. More than 25 years after the artificial division of Korea, and nearly 20 years since the signing of the Armistice Agreement, the two countries had reached preliminary agreement on the question of reunification by peaceful means and without outside interference. That achievement reflected both *détente* throughout the world, as a result of awareness of new realities in Asia and elsewhere, and a desire on the part of the people of Korea to reunite and secure independence and peace.

34. The proposal submitted by the group of 29 countries, including Yugoslavia, constituted a completely new, more realistic and more flexible approach to the problem. It stressed unification by peaceful means, through negotiations between equals and without any interference from outside. Discussion on those lines would transcend the basis on which debates had been conducted for many years under such agenda items as 35 and 36, which should now be deleted.

35. The United Nations should do more than take note of current developments in Korea: it should sup-

port and accelerate them. The activities of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea, and the presence of foreign troops in South Korea, should be reviewed. He had no doubt that the United Nations could assist the current trends without interfering in the independent solution of Korea's own problems.

36. He could not accept the argument that consideration of the question of Korea at the twenty-seventh session would amount to interference or would jeopardize the processes which had been initiated. The argument that United Nations support could impede or prevent positive developments was a harmful one. In addition, the United Nations would be guilty of a grave error if it failed to make use of the opportunity to promote the development of new relations between the two Koreas. Indeed, it was an encouraging sign, when efforts were being made to minimize the importance and effectiveness of the United Nations, that the Organization's support was being sought in such an important and long-standing question.

37. Sir Colin CROWE (United Kingdom) said that his delegation had no objection to the proposal that agenda items 35 and 36 should be deleted. At the same time, he wished to propose that the General Committee should recommend the inclusion of item 37 (Question of Korea: report of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea) and item 96 in the provisional agenda of the twenty-eighth session. The reasons for such a procedure had been clearly set out by the representative of Rwanda.

38. His Government firmly hoped that the negotiations under way between the two Red Cross societies would lead not only to the reuniting of divided families, but also to talks in political and other fields which would lead to the eventual reunification of the country. In addition, the joint communiqué issued by North and South Korea on 4 July 1972 announcing agreement on principles for the reunification of Korea constituted an extremely important political development. He drew attention to its reference to the need for independent Korean efforts to achieve reunification without external interference.

39. His Government wished to give all possible assistance to the people of Korea in achieving their desired goal. This was also the aim professed by the delegations which favoured the inclusion of the new item on Korea in the Assembly's agenda. However, the best contribution the United Nations could make was to refrain from stating its own views and interpretations of the situation in Korea. That should be left to the Koreans themselves. Debates in the United Nations on the question of Korea had led only to the acrimonious atmosphere of the cold war period. Negotiations so far in Korea had produced a spirit of *détente* which renewed debate and confrontation might well disturb. He therefore urged that the Committee should follow the same course as that decided upon at the twenty-sixth session.

which had obviously made a considerable contribution to the progress achieved so far.

40. Mr. TAYLOR-KAMARA (Sierra Leone) said that the two Koreas should be allowed to continue their efforts to reach agreement without outside interference. He had just returned from a visit to North Korea where he had observed the great material progress which had been made. He had become aware of the spirit of friendship and understanding of the Korean people and realized that the only obstacle to Korean unification was the presence of foreign troops under the United Nations flag. Such use of the United Nations flag was contrary to the Charter. By debating the Korean question the General Assembly would help Korea to achieve independence and unity.

41. Mr. PUNTSAGNOROV (Mongolia) said that the Korean negotiations had received wide support as a step in the direction of reducing tension in Asia. The negotiators had agreed on the main principle of trying to achieve peaceful unification, which was fully in keeping with the Charter. It was the duty of the United Nations to promote those positive developments. The main difficulty lay in the presence of foreign troops, masquerading under the United Nations flag. The withdrawal of United States troops from South Korea would be in accord with the national will of the Korean people and would strengthen peace and security in that part of the world. The question of Korea should, therefore, be debated at the present session.

42. Mr. OGISO (Japan) said that his delegation had no objection to the deletion of items 35 and 36 and supported the proposal that items 37 and 96 should be deferred until the twenty-eighth session. Recent developments had justified the Committee's decision on the Korean question at the twenty-sixth session. The United Nations should not jeopardize the negotiations by holding debates which might lead to acrimonious exchanges such as had occurred in the past. In that respect it was salutary to note that North and South Korea had publicly pledged themselves not to slander and defame each other. Such undertakings did much to ease tension and foster an atmosphere of mutual trust. The Committee might also note that in spite of such undertakings the documents on the Korean question which had been circulated indicated that any debate on the question would be just as bitter as on previous occasions.

43. Mr. MACOVESCU (Romania) said that recent favourable developments in Korea had led his delegation to co-sponsor the proposal to include item 96 in the agenda of the twenty-seventh session. Romania had always supported Korean unification and self-determination, without foreign interference. All countries welcomed the present negotiations for they would help the cause of peace throughout the world. It was the duty of the United Nations to play a constructive part in the development of favourable conditions for the peaceful unification of Korea.

44. The sponsors of item 96 did not wish to involve the United Nations in internal Korean affairs: the uni-

fication of Korea was certainly a matter to be decided by the Korean people alone. Nevertheless, by debating the Korean question the United Nations could do much to promote the cause of international peace and security.

45. Mr. KRÖYER (Iceland) said that his delegation had no objection to the deletion of items 35 and 36. Iceland had always been sympathetic towards the Korean people and wished to encourage their efforts to achieve unification.

46. At the twenty-sixth session his delegation had voted in favour of deferring consideration of the Korean question; events had fully justified that approach. He quoted from paragraphs 4 and 5 of the explanatory memorandum accompanying the request for the inclusion of item 96 (A/8752 and Corr.1) to the effect that the United Nations should encourage the recent favourable developments in the Korean negotiations. In the view of his delegation the United Nations could best achieve that end by refraining from public debate of the Korean question. Therefore, it supported the proposal to defer consideration of items 37 and 96 until the twenty-eighth session. However, if the General Assembly decided to debate those items, representatives of North and South Korea should be invited to take part.

47. Mr. RANKIN (Canada) said that his delegation had no objection to the deletion of items 35 and 36 and agreed that consideration of items 37 and 96 should be postponed. The decision taken at the twenty-sixth session to defer consideration of the Korean question had proved fully justified. There was universal praise for the successful progress of the Korean negotiations and widespread confidence that the Korean people would overcome all obstacles to unification.

48. The success of the negotiations had encouraged the hope that a similarly constructive and conciliatory approach might develop within the United Nations. Those hopes had been disappointed, for item 96 did not represent such an approach; it would, rather, reinstate the former approach to the Korean question. The resurrection of acrimonious issues in a United Nations debate could only damage the prospect of Korean unification. The United Nations could indeed do much to promote a settlement in Korea, but not in that way and not at the present time.

49. Those who favoured a General Assembly debate should reflect on their priorities. Was the prestige of a United Nations debate really of greater importance than the settlement of the Korean problem?

50. Mr. BAROODY (Saudi Arabia) said that although the United Nations had been discussing Korea since 1950, it had not been able to achieve anything for the simple reason that the problem stemmed not from the Korean people but from the partition of Korea by the United States and the Soviet Union to serve their own ideological and political ends.

51. He pointed out that the underlying situation had not changed since 1966, when he had made a statement

on the Korean question in the First Committee. Nevertheless, the theory that ideology was more important than ethnology and the political philosophy which set brother against brother would eventually fail.

52. The United Nations was bearing false witness in complying with the wishes of the big Powers; it should have a mind of its own. Those Powers had divided Berlin and Germany on the grounds that "they held the security of the world in their hands". But what was that security? The world lived in the shadow of fear and war. The Committee should ignore the nationality of the supporters and opponents of consideration of the Korean question; it should decide the matter on its own merits.

53. Encouraging progress had been made in the Korean negotiations; outsiders should not interfere and the Koreans should not be asked to come and testify in the United Nations. If the negotiations eventually failed, the United States, the Soviet Union and China should be asked to use their good offices to achieve a settlement.

54. Mr. NKUNDABAGENZI (Rwanda) said that the question under consideration was a very important one to his delegation. The fact that his country maintained friendly relations with both parts of Korea showed that its intentions in the matter were sincere. Rwanda had been pleased to learn of the opening of contacts between both parts of Korea and was convinced that the future of Korea would be in the hands of the Korean people themselves. Since the decision at the twenty-sixth session to postpone consideration of the question of Korea had been fully justified by subsequent developments, he felt that was all the more reason to take a similar decision at the current session and avoid emotional debates in the United Nations. Such an approach was not a "manoeuvre", as stated by the representative of Algeria, but a realistic attitude based on cogent arguments. In postponing consideration of the matter, the United Nations would not be capitulating but would be giving the Korean people an opportunity to discuss reunification themselves. He therefore felt that items 35 and 36 should be deleted and items 37 and 96 postponed until the twenty-eighth session.

55. Mr. LUSAKA (Zambia), whose delegation was one of the 29 sponsors of the request for the inclusion of item 96, said that the change which had taken place in Korea since 1971 made it necessary to discuss the question of Korea at the current session. Talks between the two parts of Korea were continuing at a high level and the joint statement of 4 July 1972 clearly indicated that relations between them had improved. Those who opposed the inclusion of item 96 would be doing more harm than good since only a debate on the matter would lead to further improvement in the situation. The presence of foreign troops under the United Nations flag made it necessary for the item to be discussed in the United Nations. The presence of such troops in one part of Korea did not facilitate reunification. His delegation was confident that item 96 would be included

and items 35 and 36 deleted and that, when items 96 and 37 were considered, both parts of Korea would be represented without prior conditions.

56. Mr. SUY (Belgium) paid a tribute to the sense of realism and moderation of the sponsors of the request for inclusion and noted with satisfaction that the draft resolution contained in document A/8752/Add.9 had been drafted in less controversial terms than those used in previous years. Nevertheless, he regretted that the sponsors of the draft resolution had not felt it necessary to consult the authorities or the Permanent Observer of the Republic of Korea.

57. His delegation was firmly convinced that the General Assembly should consider the advisability of discussing the question solely in the light of the positive contribution that a debate at the current session could make to the solution of the Korean problem. His delegation felt that, in view of the many obstacles which still had to be surmounted, the time had not yet come for the General Assembly to take the risk of jeopardizing the success of the talks which were already under way by holding a debate which would be likely to arouse passions fruitlessly or to result in the adoption of a resolution which would present Pyongyang and Seoul with a fait accompli and thus place limits on the concessions they might be willing to make. Public diplomacy was sometimes more dangerous than secret diplomacy. There had been other recent instances where the parties concerned had felt it preferable to use quiet or secret diplomacy. In the case of Korea, had the wisdom and appropriateness of the decision taken the previous year not been confirmed by events? Was it not then even more appropriate at the current session to allow the authorities of North and South Korea to reach agreement between themselves, free from any external pressure, on questions relating to the exchange of families and other humanitarian measures? The solution of those problems and later of the problem of the reunification of the country depended exclusively on the will of the two parts of the country and could not be imposed from outside, even by the United Nations.

58. Certain delegations, particularly those of Algeria and Yugoslavia, had referred to new conditions which justified consideration of the matter at the present session. That argument could not be accepted since it was not the existence of new conditions which should be studied by the Committee but rather the nature of the new conditions and the extent to which they were likely to contribute to the objective desired by all. It was precisely the new conditions to which the representatives of Algeria and Yugoslavia had referred which made it preferable for the United Nations to abstain from a debate at the current stage. He therefore supported the formal proposal by the representative of the United Kingdom that items 37 and 96 should be postponed until the twenty-eighth session.

59. Mr. REYES (Philippines) said that his delegation's position was identical with that of previous speakers who had not objected to the deletion of items 35 and 36

and had favoured the postponement of items 37 and 96 until the twenty-eighth session. That appeared to be the approach dictated by common sense. Both parts of Korea had indicated that they were promoting developments in the important dialogue now under way between them. In view of the many positive developments that were taking place, it would be best to leave well enough alone and allow the dialogue between the Koreans themselves to proceed undisturbed. Although the case for that position had been very well put by previous speakers, he felt that the following points deserved serious consideration. Some elements of the 29-Power draft resolution (A/8752/Add.9) would involve a reversal of previous United Nations decisions and would inevitably lead to acrimonious debates. The whole dialogue between North and South Korea was based on one important fact, the precarious balance of forces on each side. He requested the sponsors of the draft resolution to give careful consideration to the possible consequences of a premature disturbance of the very basis of the dialogue. He was sure members of the United Nations would remember that not long before, in a certain situation, the United Nations presence had been suddenly removed and the tragic consequences were still unresolved. If the dialogue was allowed to proceed undisturbed, it might result in the elimination of the very points which were being prematurely raised in the 29-Power draft resolution. Although the draft resolution had a large number of sponsors, there were few Asian countries among them. That would seem to indicate that it was the feeling of Korea's neighbours, who would normally be expected to be concerned about what happened in Korea, that the North-South dialogue should be given a chance to continue undisturbed. He also referred to what had recently become a significant trend in international relations: many of the positive results of the welcome *détente* in Europe and elsewhere had been brought about by quiet diplomacy free from acrimonious debates of the type that would be invited if item 96 was included in the agenda.

60. In conclusion, he hoped that the dialogue would continue and finally result in the reunification of Korea.

61. Mr. BUSH (United States of America) said that his delegation strongly supported the United Kingdom proposal to defer consideration of items 37 and 96 for one year. His delegation's hopes were much raised by the contacts currently under way between North and South Korea and everyone was aware of the significant progress which had been made in talks which had been held as recently as 30 August and 13 September 1972. Throughout the Korean Peninsula, members of families separated by the fighting of a generation earlier could now entertain hopes of visiting each other and of eventually being reunited. The talks gave encouragement to all who were interested in a bettering of conditions in Asia and the Pacific region. His delegation had also noted with the deepest interest the joint statement issued on 4 July 1972, which detailed a number of points which both sides had agreed should be followed in order to promote the reunification of Korea, to foster mutual trust, and to prevent the outbreak of unexpected

military incidents. He drew particular attention to the agreement between the two sides not to slander or defame each other, not to undertake armed provocations on either a large or small scale, and to take positive measures to prevent inadvertent military incidents. It should be recognized that previous debates on the question in the General Assembly had been marked by considerable tension and bitter language. A debate on item 96 would raise passions, stimulate invective and lead to impassioned rights of reply—and replies to rights of reply—continuing over an extended period of time. Such a public debate at the present time might jeopardize the progress which North and South Korea had so painstakingly begun to make. His delegation did not want to run that risk and therefore requested the Committee to recommend that consideration of all aspects of the Korean question be deferred until the twenty-eighth session so as not to jeopardize what had been accomplished or to place in doubt the possibility of further agreement. He requested all members to support the United Kingdom proposal.

62. Mr. ISMAIL (Democratic Yemen) said that his Government was pleased that the people of Korea were trying to resolve the problem of the reunification of their country; it supported their action fully. His delegation supported the inclusion of item 96 in the agenda because it believed it to be in harmony with the initiative taken by the two Governments and felt that it would contribute to stability and peace in the region. A comparison of the stated objectives of the United Nations Commission for the Reunification and Rehabilitation of Korea and the content of the joint statement made it clear that the objectives of the United Nations were on the way to being achieved. It was the duty of the General Assembly, not as a third party, but as a party involved by virtue of its responsibilities under the Charter, to create and find peaceful solutions to international problems. The inclusion of item 96 in the agenda would help substantially to create an atmosphere which would encourage both parties to seek a peaceful settlement. The deletion of items 35 and 36 had been carefully considered by the sponsors of the new proposal and had been felt to be in accordance with the new situation. The United Nations was involved in the problem because some foreign troops, mainly United States troops, were still in Korea under the United Nations flag. Any objection to the 29-Power draft resolution would not be in keeping with the objective of the creation of favourable conditions to accelerate the independent and peaceful reunification of Korea, would run counter to the spirit of the Charter, and would completely nullify the efforts being made by the two parts of Korea. He believed that anyone who objected to the inclusion of item 96 was motivated by self-interest and not concerned for peace and security in the world in general and in Korea in particular.

63. Mr. MALIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that his delegation strongly supported the inclusion of item 96 in the agenda and the deletion of items 35 and 36. The proposal for the inclusion of the item had been submitted by a large group of non-aligned and socialist States, including the Soviet Union. Consider-

ation of the question of Korea in the proposed new form at the current session of the General Assembly was made necessary by the following facts. The Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea had recently taken important political initiatives to normalize the situation in the Korean Peninsula and to create a favourable atmosphere for the peaceful reunification of Korea on a democratic basis without any foreign interference whatsoever. Those peaceful acts had been most broadly supported in both parts of Korea and had given rise to positive results. The Soviet Union had from the very beginning consistently supported and continued to support the constructive efforts of the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to normalize the situation in Korea, to bring about the independent and peaceful reunification of the country without any foreign interference and the withdrawal for that purpose of the foreign troops in South Korea and to have the activities of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea suspended.

64. As was well known, contacts had been established and developed between North and South Korea. Under the circumstances it was the duty of the United Nations to do all it could to promote those new contacts. The 29-Power proposal which was aimed at creating a favourable atmosphere for the further development of those contacts and at fostering them, was being made with due regard to recent political events in the Korean Peninsula.

65. The Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea had repeatedly stressed that the elimination of foreign intervention was the most important condition for the achievement of the peaceful reunification of Korea by the Korean people themselves. The Soviet Union firmly supported the legitimate demands that foreign interference in the affairs of the Korean people should cease. It was a well known fact that in the past the United Nations had been used by forces hostile to the Korean people for the purposes of concealing foreign intervention in Korea and interfering in the affairs of the Korean people. That practice must now be ended. The United Nations should promote the creation of normal and favourable conditions for the solution of the Korean problem by the Korean people themselves through contacts and negotiations between representatives of the two parts of Korea. The question of the reunification of Korea was a purely internal affair of the Korean people and must be settled by them independently, without foreign interference, even under the United Nations flag or through United Nations organs. The Soviet Union had consistently taken that stand on the question and continued to adhere to that position and principle. For those reasons, it had become a sponsor of the 29-Power draft resolution which provided for the withdrawal of all foreign troops from South Korea and the suspension of the activities of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea and appealed to all States to refrain from interference in the affairs of the Korean people. It was necessary to put an end to the use of the United Nations flag for

interference in the affairs of Korea. The prolonged presence of foreign troops in South Korea was a serious obstacle to the reunification of the country. That question directly involved the United Nations itself since the foreign troops occupying South Korea had so far camouflaged their illegal presence under the flag of the United Nations. The continuing activities of the illegally-constituted United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea represented another serious obstacle to the independent solution of the Korean problem by the Korean people themselves. The adoption by the United Nations of measures to eliminate those obstacles would undoubtedly promote the creation of more favourable conditions for the peaceful reunification of Korea, would be in the interests of the Korean people, and would be fully in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter.

66. Some speakers who had opposed consideration of the matter at the twenty-seventh session had started from the right premise but reached the wrong conclusion. One speaker had referred to the joint statement by the two parts of Korea that the question of reunification must be settled independently without foreign interference and at the same time had objected to United Nations consideration of the matter. The United Nations should promote the new developments and help the Korean people to achieve reunification without any foreign interference. Those who opposed consideration of item 96 were using strange logic. For them, the presence in Korea of foreign troops or of the shameful United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea did not constitute interference in the internal affairs of Korea, but consideration of the Korean question in a new form at the twenty-seventh session did. He could not agree to such an approach. Consideration of the matter at the twenty-seventh session would promote the developments which had taken place since the twenty-sixth session and would contribute to the creation of the conditions necessary for the peaceful and independent reunification of the two parts of Korea. One speaker had feared that consideration of the question would lead to passionate debates and make the climate worse. However, for many years there had been passionate debates on the matter in the United Nations. At the current session both parties concerned could make statements before the General Assembly and participate in the debate on the matter. Those opposing consideration of item 96 had no grounds for doing so.

67. He wished to point out to the representative of Saudi Arabia that the press had covered the Brezhnev-Nixon talks in detail and that the most important results of the talks had been issued in a Security Council document,<sup>2</sup> which outlined the basis for relations between the United States and the Soviet Union and which contained a joint statement. He could assure the representative of Saudi Arabia that no secret agreements had been concluded during the talks.

<sup>2</sup> See *Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-seventh Year, Supplement for April, May and June 1972*, document S/10674.



68. The United Nations would be taking a useful step towards promoting and developing contacts between North and South Korea if it invited representatives of both the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and South Korea, without any preconditions, to participate in the consideration of the question at the present session. Such a decision would be a just one since it would end the discrimination which had existed for so many years in the United Nations because of pressure from those who had their own selfish interests to pursue in Korea and wished to prevent unification.

69. Those delegations which advocated postponing discussion of the Korean question until the twenty-eighth session should really support the inclusion of item 96 so that, with a new approach and with the parties concerned participating in the debate, a contribution could be made to the effective solution of the question to the satisfaction of all the Korean people and in the interests of international peace and security. Postponement of the debate could have a negative effect, particularly since the Korean people expected support and assistance from the United Nations and not discrimination or artificial postponement of the Korean question. He also wished to point out that his delegation objected to item 37, which served as a pretext for unlawful interference in Korea.

70. Mr. CORADIN (Haiti) supported the proposal to delete items 35 and 36 from the agenda of the twenty-seventh session. The international community could not ignore the *détente* which had developed in Korea and the encouraging meetings between the Red Cross Societies of North and South Korea. He considered that the parties to the dispute should be allowed to pursue their negotiations calmly and he therefore supported the proposal to defer consideration of items 37 and 96 until the twenty-eighth session of the General Assembly in order not to prejudice the current negotiations.

71. Mr. SCOTT (New Zealand) said that his delegation supported the proposal that items 37 and 96 should be included in the provisional agenda of the twenty-eighth session of the General Assembly.

72. His Government had noted the encouraging developments towards reconciliation which had taken place in recent months, as reflected in the joint statement of 4 July 1972. That statement, following the meetings of the Red Cross societies of North and South Korea, constituted for the first time since the Second World War the establishment of direct bilateral contacts between North and South Korea. The New Zealand Minister for Foreign Affairs had expressed hope that it would lead to action that would help to end the hostility between North and South Korea. Since that time, the first two plenary meetings of North and South Korean Red Cross representatives had taken place and further meetings were planned. Those developments were evidence of the sincere desire of both parties to settle their differences by direct negotiations, to turn aside from confrontation, to ease tension, and in a peaceful manner to remove the artificial barriers that existed between them.

73. The Korean question could best be solved by the Koreans themselves. The United Nations should give them credit for the conciliatory and constructive moves of recent months. In fact, the parties had commented that the decision of the General Assembly at its twenty-sixth session to defer consideration of the Korean question had been a great help and that the unification problem could be solved by the Koreans alone.

74. His delegation considered that any action which the United Nations might undertake at the current stage should be designed to reduce tension and to facilitate dialogue. Previous debates in the General Assembly on the Korean question had been acrimonious and sterile, and postponement of the debate from the twenty-sixth session had contributed greatly to the reduction of tension and had facilitated the recent historic progress. If a debate were to be held at the twenty-seventh session, it would sour the atmosphere and prejudice the chances of further progress. It would be difficult in such a debate not to formalize past positions of confrontation for the record. The best role the United Nations could play was to bend every effort towards encouraging the parties freely to continue their dialogue without the hindrance of polemics. Consideration of the Korean question should therefore be deferred until the twenty-eighth session of the General Assembly.

75. Mr. ESPINOSA (Colombia) said that his delegation supported the deletion of items 35 and 36 and the inclusion of items 37 and 96 in the provisional agenda of the twenty-eighth session. He considered that the best contribution the United Nations could make to the rapprochement which was just beginning between the two parts of Korea was to avoid any debate which might be detrimental to the atmosphere of calm which had made dialogue between the two Red Cross societies possible. The United Kingdom proposal should be adopted as it would enable the two parts of Korea to continue their negotiations independently, avoid external interference and forestall a debate which would bring back the era of the cold war.

76. Postponement of the debate from the twenty-sixth session had been most propitious for the negotiations. A change of approach at the present stage would be inexcusable. The United Nations should show its respect for the peaceful way in which the authorities of North and South Korea were negotiating by including items 37 and 96 in the agenda of the twenty-eighth session, particularly since such a decision might enable those concerned to consolidate the understanding which they had achieved and the agreements which they were in the process of reaching. A debate might have disastrous consequences and destroy a rapprochement which might lead to the unification and well-being of the people of both parts of Korea who had suffered the scourge of war. The Korean people had the right to expect that when they decided to work for peace other countries would at least be discreet. It was their lives, families and welfare which were at stake. They had the knowledge and authority to discuss such important questions. The United Nations should not hamper them. Accord-

ingly, his delegation supported the United Kingdom proposal as well as the proposal to delete items 35 and 36.

77. Mr. ČERNÍK (Czechoslovakia) said that the General Assembly now had a unique opportunity to make a contribution towards the peaceful solution of a problem which was a long-standing result of the cold war period. The occupation of the southern part of Korea by United States troops under the flag of the United Nations represented an infamous chapter of that part of history, as did the activities of the so-called United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea.

78. Changes in the Organization in harmony with the over-all trend towards decreasing tensions in the world constituted a pre-condition for restoring the prestige of the United Nations in the Korean Peninsula. Other prerequisites for the peaceful unification of Korea were the recent developments and change in atmosphere in that Peninsula. Representatives of North and South Korea had joined efforts with a view to seeking ways to unify their severely tried country without any foreign intervention, as had been made clear in the joint statement of 4 July 1972.

79. Guided by a desire to promote that favourable development, a group of countries, including the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, had requested the inclusion of a new item entitled "Creation of favourable conditions to accelerate the independent and peaceful unification of Korea". As had been stated in the explanatory memorandum accompanying the request (A/8752 and Corr.1), the proposed debate was not designed to make the United Nations interfere in the discussion of problems which the two Governments concerned wished to solve without foreign intervention. The intention was to discuss in the presence of the representatives of both parts of Korea how the United Nations could promote further favourable developments in Korea and Asia as a whole. His delegation was of the opinion that, by taking the measures proposed in the draft resolution (A/8752/Add.9), in particular that relating to the suspension of the activities of the so-called United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea, the Assembly would be embarking on a fruitful path. The right of foreign troops occupying the southern part of Korea to use the United Nations flag should be terminated and foreign troops should be withdrawn, thus creating conditions for lasting peace and accelerating the reunification of the country. His delegation hoped that both sides would continue the negotiations now under way with a view to concluding a peace agreement, reducing arms and achieving the independent and peaceful reunification of Korea as soon as possible. It supported the inclusion of the new item in the agenda and considered that it should replace all the so-called Korean items in the agenda of the twenty-seventh session, particularly items 35 and 36.

80. Mr. EL HASSEN (Mauritania) said that the Korean problem would not have existed were it not for the cold war. The United Nations had been involved

in the events of that era and particularly those which had led to the division of the Korean nation and people into two rival parts. The United Nations had engaged its responsibility, in particular, when on 7 July 1950 the Security Council had adopted a resolution (84 (1950)) requesting the United States to designate a commander for the forces in Korea and authorizing the command to use the United Nations flag. That resolution had been adopted in the absence of an important member of the Security Council who had refused to take part in the debate in protest at the attempts being made to legalize the occupation of South Korea by a foreign force.

81. The United Nations should follow the trend of history. The great Powers had now embarked on an era of *détente*, consultation and mutual assistance rather than cold war. It was unfortunate that vestiges of a darker era still remained. The United Nations should move with history, as it had done at the twenty-sixth session when it had restored to the People's Republic of China its lawful rights, and should create favourable conditions for the reunification of Korea. By virtue of the Charter the United Nations was now called upon to reconsider the Korean question with particular reference to the activities of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea and of the unified command.

82. Mr. RAMPHUL (Mauritius) said that his delegation supported the proposal made by the representative of Rwanda. Divided countries should be given the opportunity to solve their problems without unnecessary interference from outside, and it was the duty of the United Nations to encourage negotiations between equals. Items 37 and 96 should therefore be placed on the provisional agenda of the twenty-eighth session.

83. Mr. TOURÉ (Guinea) noted that the new prospects for the future of Korea which had emerged from the recent negotiations had been welcomed by the entire international community. Those who favoured postponement of discussion of the question of Korea demonstrated an attitude which was disturbing. Member States should face up to their obligations. The people of Korea had become aware of the need for reunification, and those who favoured the inclusion of a new item on Korea in the agenda of the General Assembly had realized that the United Nations should not abdicate its role, since that would only produce a weakening of the Organization. Those who opposed the inclusion of the new item and its discussion contributed to a deepening of divisions between the people of Korea. It was those countries which always sought to defer the application of the right of peoples to self-determination. The United Nations should carry out its obligations, both those implied under the Charter and its responsibility to the people of Korea, by including the new item in the agenda.

84. Mr. BAROODY (Saudi Arabia), speaking in exercise of his right of reply, said that he had not intended

to decry rapprochement between the United States and the Soviet Union. He had merely wished to point out that past experience showed that official joint declarations did not always spell out the whole range of agreements which had been reached.

85. His main point had been that the United States and the Soviet Union had partitioned Korea in order to maintain the balance of power. Those countries, and others, still wished to consolidate their spheres of influence on the basis of a balance-of-power policy. As for the presence of the United States and other foreign troops in South Korea, he wished to know why the Soviet Union, or indeed any other country, did not demand a withdrawal of United States troops from European countries too. He would be extremely happy to see North and South Korea reunited: he appealed to all Governments concerned to use their good offices to promote an acceleration of the process of contacts and negotiations. Meanwhile, consideration of items 37 and 96 should be deferred until the twenty-eighth session.

86. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) urged the representative of Saudi Arabia not to sow suspicions but to support the 29 sponsors and help to have their proposal adopted.

87. The CHAIRMAN said that, if there were no objections, he would take it that the Committee decided to recommend to the General Assembly that items 35 and 36 should not be included in the agenda.

*The General Committee decided to recommend to the General Assembly that items 35 and 36 should not be included in the agenda.*

88. The CHAIRMAN said that, under rule 133 of the rules of procedure, if two or more proposals were made relating to the same question, the Committee should, unless if decided otherwise, vote on the proposals in the order in which they had been submitted. The Committee should therefore proceed to vote on the 29-Power proposal for the inclusion of item 96.

89. Sir Colin CROWE (United Kingdom) said that it was most unusual for the General Committee to vote on a proposal for the inclusion of an item in the agenda. He moved that the Committee should give priority to his proposal and vote on it forthwith.

*The motion to give priority to the United Kingdom proposal was adopted by 17 votes to 7.*

90. The CHAIRMAN invited the Committee to vote on the United Kingdom proposal that consideration of items 37 and 96 should be deferred to the twenty-eighth session.

*The General Committee decided by 16 votes to 7, with 1 abstention, to recommend to the General Assembly that items 37 and 96 should be included in the provisional agenda of the twenty-eighth session.*

## ITEM 99

91. The CHAIRMAN informed the Committee that the Secretary-General wished to make a statement on the item.

92. The SECRETARY-GENERAL recalled that on 8 September he had requested that the General Assembly include in its agenda an additional item of an important and urgent character for the forthcoming session, an item entitled "Measures to prevent terrorism and other forms of violence which endanger or take innocent human lives or jeopardize fundamental freedoms" (A/8791). In proposing that item he had had in mind the increasing incidence of acts of violence directed at national leaders, diplomatic envoys, international passengers and other innocent civilians. Those acts of violence had created throughout the world a climate of fear from which no one was immune. In the hope of facilitating the Committee's deliberations on the item, he wished to make a few remarks in addition to the brief explanatory memorandum which had accompanied his request for the inscription.

93. He was fully aware that the problem of terrorism and violence was an immensely complex one to which there were no short cuts and no easy solutions, and knew that a number of Governments would have difficulties in formulating their approach to the problem.

94. He had proposed the item, nevertheless, because there was deep and general concern with the phenomenon of international terrorism, because the scope of terrorist activity as well as its underlying causes had become increasingly international, and because modern technology had added a formidable new dimension to that ancient problem.

95. In proposing the item he had had the general problem in mind, and not any specific incident or situation. He felt strongly that the United Nations should face up to the international aspects of that very difficult problem and that, if it did not do so, the climate of fear, which was already an ominous feature of the times, would inevitably become worse. There was also the risk of a steady erosion, through indiscriminate violence, of the already tenuous structure of international law, order and behaviour, in which innocent people, often completely unconnected with the issues involved, would increasingly fall victims. Such a development would inevitably also endanger international relations and make even more difficult the efforts of the United Nations and of Governments to achieve peaceful solutions of serious problems. Those were the main reasons which had impelled him to request the inclusion of the item.

96. In passing, he wished to call the attention of the General Committee to the observations made by the International Law Commission of the United Nations in the report which it had adopted on 7 July 1972 and which would be before the current session of the General Assembly. While the Commission dealt specifically with

the question of the inviolability and protection of diplomats and other persons entitled to special protection under international law, it had recognized that that was but part of the wider question of the commission of acts of terrorism. In paragraph 65 of its report the Commission had, *inter alia*, remarked that:

“The over-all problem of terrorism throughout the world is one of great complexity but there can be no question as to the need to reduce the commission of terrorist acts even if they can never be completely eliminated. The General Assembly may consider it important to give consideration to this general problem.”<sup>3</sup>

97. Obviously it was no good to consider that very complex phenomenon without at the same time considering the underlying situations which gave rise to terrorism and violence in many parts of the world. It was those underlying causes that made the problem so appallingly difficult to tackle because of their variety and different natures, and which also made it so difficult for Governments to agree upon the kind of measures which could reverse the current trend to violence. The roots of terrorism and violence in many cases lay in misery, frustration, grievance and despair so deep that men were prepared to sacrifice human lives, including their own, in the attempt to effect radical changes.

98. He also wished to make it quite clear that it was not his intention, in proposing the item, to affect principles enunciated by the General Assembly regarding

colonial and dependent peoples seeking independence and liberation.

99. It would be unrealistic to suppose that quick solutions to such a large and complex problem could be agreed upon. Nothing could be less productive in achieving the basic objectives which all had in common than an inconclusive and acrimonious debate. It was for that reason that he had suggested that the item first be referred to the Sixth Committee for a measured and calm analysis and discussion. He hoped that, if the General Committee agreed to that course, a start could be made and a frank, full and responsible discussion could be held. He also hoped that in the process some common ground could be found, so that the world community, in the General Assembly, could begin to combat the feeling of general helplessness which peoples and Governments all over the world had so often experienced in recent years in the face of indiscriminate violence.

100. Since he had become Secretary-General he had often had the feeling that in the case of serious international issues, the United Nations was criticized if it did act and criticized if it did not act. He believed that, as Secretary-General, he should, when faced with that dilemma, choose the former alternative. That was why, after careful consideration, he had decided to request the inclusion of the item. He hoped that the members of the General Committee and of the General Assembly would understand his reasons and support the proposal.

<sup>3</sup> *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-seventh Session, Supplement No. 10 (A/8710/Rev.1).*

*The meeting rose at 7.40 p.m.*