



General Assembly

Sixty-ninth session

First Committee

23rd meeting

Monday, 3 November 2014, 10 a.m.

New York

Official Records

Chair: Mr. Rattray (Jamaica)

The meeting was called to order at 10 a.m.

Agenda items 87 to 104 (continued)

Action on all draft resolutions and decisions submitted under disarmament and international security agenda items

The Chair: I should like to announce that this meeting will now be suspended due to a request received by the Chair for a delay to allow last minute consultations on a draft resolution to be finalized.

The meeting was suspended at 10.05 a.m. and resumed at 10.30 a.m.

The Chair: We will now hear the three remaining delegations that had asked to speak in explanation of vote after the vote on cluster 1, "Nuclear weapons" but did not get the opportunity to do so by the time we adjourned on Friday.

Mr. Neto (Brazil): I have requested the floor to explain my delegation's abstention in the voting on draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.25, entitled "The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation". Although Brazil is not a party to the Code of Conduct, we have voted in favour of this text for the past nine years. That is because we acknowledge and respect the fact that many States have already subscribed to this instrument as a practical step against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery.

We also agree about the importance of regional and international efforts to prevent and curb the

proliferation of ballistic missile systems capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction as a contribution to international peace and security as contained in the third preambular paragraph of the draft resolution. Furthermore, we welcome the view expressed in the eighth preambular paragraph that "States should not be excluded from utilizing the benefits of space for peaceful purposes". Nevertheless, the substantial changes made this year in paragraphs 2 and 3 prompted the Brazilian abstention on this draft resolution.

Brazil would like to reiterate its concern with the idea reflected in the Code of Conduct that space launch vehicle programmes could conceal ballistic missile programmes. This notion disregards the unequivocal non-proliferation commitments of countries developing exclusively peaceful space programmes, such as Brazil. Paragraph 3 of the draft resolution seems to reaffirm this arbitrary view by placing space launch vehicle and ballistic missile capabilities on the same footing. Furthermore, it is Brazil's long-standing position that the Code of Conduct should also adequately address the question of international cooperation, which is of the utmost importance for developing countries.

In this context, we would welcome possible amendments to the Code in conformity with its article 5 (c) in order to accommodate the concerns expressed by Brazil regarding cooperation and space launch vehicle programmes and thus enable further efforts towards the universalization of the Hague Code of Conduct, as called for in paragraph 2 of the draft resolution.

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14-60064 (E)



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Brazil believes that an effective and equitable international order depends essentially on the observance of legally binding commitments. We expect that initiatives such as The Hague Code of Conduct could evolve and converge into the negotiation of a legal instrument of a universal character establishing clear obligations and rights for all States.

Mr. Ibrahim (Syrian Arab Republic) (*spoke in Arabic*): My delegation would like to explain its vote on draft resolutions A/C.1/69/L.25 and A/C.1/69/L.56.

First, on draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.25, the Syrian Arab Republic reiterates its full commitment to the Charter of the United Nations and the Organization's collective work for the effective implementation of disarmament mechanisms and the disarmament of weapons of mass destruction, including first and foremost nuclear weapons, as well as a clear nuclear disarmament programme at all levels, including the right to self-defence in line with Article 51 of the Charter.

Some States are trying to conclude non-proliferation and disarmament instruments outside the framework of the United Nations, which takes us in the opposite direction to non-proliferation. The Hague Code of Conduct seeks to prevent the proliferation of ballistic missiles but is discriminatory and does not address the deep-rooted causes of proliferation. We therefore abstained in the voting on draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.25.

Turning to draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.56, my delegation abstained in the voting because Syria has reiterated and continues to reiterate that a treaty on an issue as sensitive as that concerning the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) should bear in mind the concerns of non-nuclear-weapon States, which represent the majority of the countries of the world. The CTBT offers no protections from the use or threat of use of these weapons and does not allow for the acquisition of peaceful technology.

The text offers no guarantee from nuclear-weapon States with respect to eliminating their nuclear arsenals and stockpiles. It does not put an end to the threat of use of nuclear weapons or raise the issue of nuclear tests, the qualitative development of such weapons, or the production of new weapons. Questions have also been raised regarding rights to inspections. There is a danger of false interpretation here. The Treaty allows signatory countries to take measures against non-signatory

countries. Chapter VII of the Charter should be borne in mind in that context, as should the right of States to join the Treaty. Syria stresses these weak points.

Israel is the only country in the Middle East that has weapons of mass destruction and nuclear weapons or is working towards further developing them quantitatively and qualitatively. It is still not a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and refuses to allow its nuclear infrastructure to be inspected. That is an obstacle to all efforts to attain a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and represents a danger to the world, given the threats emanating from Israel.

Lastly, we would like to express our reservations over the provisions of the draft resolution that make specific mention of the NPT.

Mr. Robotjazi (Islamic Republic of Iran): I should like to explain the position of my delegation regarding draft resolutions A/C.1/69/L.25 and A/C.1/69/L.56.

First on draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.25, entitled "The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation". The Hague Code of Conduct, an instrument drafted and endorsed outside the United Nations in an unbalanced and incomprehensive manner, does not represent a negotiated text. The Hague Code of Conduct does not involve any disarmament objective. It seeks to preserve the status quo. It is also silent on vertical proliferation. It acknowledges the possession and development of ballistic missiles by a few States while it seeks to discourage others from acquiring them without any incentive.

The Hague Code of Conduct has exclusively focused on ballistic missiles and has failed to address other kinds of missiles. It is silent on cruise missiles. It has not provided a definition of ballistic missiles capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction. As a result, the Code of Conduct does not distinguish between a space launch vehicles programme and a ballistic missiles programme. Rather than providing incentives for membership, it restricts international cooperation and assistance in the area of space launch vehicles. The right of all States to the peaceful application of space, including having access to the necessary technology for a space launch vehicle, has been overlooked or neglected. The draft resolution has not been drafted in consultation with the non-subscribing States. Therefore, my delegation was obliged to vote against this draft resolution.

On draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.56, entitled “Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty”, my delegation wishes to disassociate itself from references in the draft to resolutions of the Security Council because of the language of the text and the way it has been drafted.

The Chair: The Committee will now turn to informal paper 4, beginning with cluster 2, “Other weapons of mass destruction”.

I shall now give the floor to delegations wishing to make general statements or to introduce draft resolutions under cluster 2.

In recognizing the first speaker who has requested the floor let me just say on behalf of all delegations of the First Committee, a warm welcome to the newly arrived Permanent Representative, our dear colleague Ambassador Winid from Poland. We very much look forward to working with you, Sir.

Mr. Winid (Poland): I thank you, Sir, for your welcoming words. I should like to take this opportunity once again to assure you of Poland’s full support for your leadership of the First Committee.

As the head of the Polish delegation to the First Committee, I take the floor once again to refer to draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.63, entitled “Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction”, which Poland, as the sole sponsor, has introduced every year to the Committee. The draft resolution has been adopted without a vote for a number of years.

The consensus on the text confirms the common and firm approach of the international community to the prohibition of chemical weapons and the goal of a chemical-weapon-free world. That has an additional measurable value, and we should not forget it. We strongly believe that this should be the case also this year, especially because, since the adoption of resolution 68/45 in 2013, the implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) has achieved significant milestones, in particular regarding the elimination of the Syrian chemical weapons programme. Last year we stood united when Syria joined the Convention. As members know, the consensus on this issue guided discussions in the Security Council, the General Assembly and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW).

This year, as in previous years, Poland has followed the same principles in its work on the draft resolution. All amendments and suggestions have been considered from the point of view of meeting the consensus requirement. We did not give special treatment to any proposal made to us. That is why we did not go beyond the issues that have been agreed and discussed in The Hague. The sponsor firmly believes that it is of the utmost importance not to interfere with the pace of the implementation of the Convention inside the OPCW, which is the sole international agency dealing with chemical weapons. The text of the draft resolution is forward-looking in all aspects and will be reviewed next year to reflect the status of implementation of the CWC.

Before concluding, I should like to make one more remark. It took more than a century and the lives of thousands of victims of chemical warfare before the international community was able to agree a total ban not only on the use of chemical weapons but also on their development, production and stockpiling. Next year will mark the very sad anniversary when, 100 years ago in Ypres in Flanders’ fields, the first large-scale gas attack took place. That was a very tragic development. That is why I appeal to all member States in this room to send a very positive message that the United Nations community is still united on the path towards a chemical-weapons-free world.

The Chair: The Committee will now hear delegations wishing to explain their position before we take action on the draft resolutions listed under cluster 2, “Other weapons of mass destruction”.

Mr. Ibrahim (Syrian Arab Republic) (*spoke in Arabic*): My delegation would like to explain its position on draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.63, entitled “Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction”.

The Syrian Arab Republic is a State party to the Convention on Chemical Weapons (CWC). Like all States parties, we participate in the meetings and discussions of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) on all topics. Ever since it became a member, the Syrian Arab Republic has honoured its responsibilities to the OPCW and the decisions of the Executive Board. We have met all of our obligations before their deadlines. We have been cooperative with the United Nations mission and the

OPCW. We have provided full cooperation to the Organization, despite the fact that the environment is far from normal and traditional and is, as everyone knows, very dangerous.

The directives of the political leadership in Syria stress the importance of opening the entirety of the chemical weapons programme, cooperating with all missions and facilitating the work of the inspectors and organizers so that they can successfully conclude their work. That approach has been hailed repeatedly by the OPCW, the United Nations and the international community. Syria has shown complete transparency regarding its chemical programme and transfers among the different international parties, including the participation of ships from many countries, including States that are still doubtful about our cooperation.

Despite these doubts and despite the campaigns aimed at spreading doubt, be they waged by Arab nations or others, the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic has respected all its international commitments and has completely ended its chemical weapons programme. Based on Syria's convictions and its refusal to use such weapons, we have condemned them and seek the establishment of a Middle East free of weapons of mass destruction and nuclear weapons as a way of demonstrating our rejection of the use of chemical weapons to the international community. To that end, Syria has become a member of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.

The only country with biological, chemical and nuclear weapons in the region is the State of Israel. The international community and countries that support Israel must bring pressure to bear in order to eliminate these stockpiles and programmes and push Israel to become a member of all instruments and treaties on such topics.

The Syrian Government calls upon regional Arab partners and international partners that are fostering terrorism in Syria to meet their obligations, support the work of the OPCW and help to shut down local or international terrorist organizations. These parties should take up the responsible fight against those who finance and support such groups, which must not be allowed to use such weapons against Syrian civilians or the Syrian armed forces. We call on these parties not to cover up terrorist crimes that have been detailed in a great many reports and international inquiries based on explicit documents. The Syrian Government believes

that these parties are responsible and that Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Israel are fully responsible for the crimes that have been committed through the use of chemical weapons in Syria and all future such crimes in the Syrian Arab Republic.

My Government reiterates its call for this dossier not to be politicized, for people to abstain from making non-objective statements, and for all doubts regarding the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic to be laid to rest. There are no chemical weapons in our country. This dossier is closed; it is part of the past.

Syria continues to address technological issues with the OPCW in a constructive spirit. We know of no argument that would justify the inclusion in draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.63 of the fourth and fifth preambular paragraphs concerning the implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention. They merely reflect the political nature of the draft resolution and show that some countries are working to support the agenda of Israel, which, I repeat, is the only country in the region that has a chemical weapons programme. We will therefore abstain in the voting on the fourth and fifth preambular paragraphs.

Mr. Aljowaily (Egypt) (*spoke in Arabic*): My delegation is speaking in explanation of position on draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.34/Rev.1, entitled "Preventing the acquisition by terrorists of radioactive sources". The first version covered a large number of new ideas that were discussed in other forums but which did not achieve consensus there. The Egyptian delegation has notified the two sponsoring States and shared our objective remarks regarding the discussions in that framework in Vienna or in Abu Dhabi. Egypt has reiterated its remarks in open-ended consultations convened to discuss the draft.

Egypt notes that certain contentious wording has been omitted from the draft resolution and that some of its own ideas have been included in the operative part. Although we retain certain reservations, the Egyptian delegation supports the adoption of the draft resolution without a vote until we can study all technical issues and any new issue raised by international governmental agencies and incorporated into the final version of the draft resolution once it is transmitted to the General Assembly in early December.

The Chair: The Committee will now proceed to take action on the draft resolutions listed under cluster 2, "Other weapons of mass destruction".

We will first take action on draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.34/Rev.1, entitled “Preventing the acquisition by terrorists of radioactive sources”.

I give the floor to the Secretary of the Committee.

Mr. Nakano (Secretary of the Committee): Draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.34/Rev.1 was introduced by the representative of France at the Committee’s 16th meeting, on 25 October. The sponsors of the draft resolution are listed in documents A/C.1/69/L.34/Rev.1 and A/C.1/69/CRP.4/Rev.6.

The Chair: The sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.34/Rev.1 have expressed the wish that it be adopted by the Committee without a vote. If I hear no objection, I shall take it that the Committee wishes to act accordingly.

Draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.34/Rev.1 was adopted.

The Chair: The Committee will now proceed to take action on draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.63, entitled “Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction”.

I give the floor to the Secretary of the Committee.

Mr. Nakano (Secretary of the Committee): Draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.63 was introduced by the representative of Poland at the Committee’s 17th meeting, on 27 October. The sponsor of the draft resolution is named in document A/C.1/69/L.63.

The Chair: A recorded vote has been requested. Separate, recorded votes have been requested on the fourth and fifth preambular paragraphs. I shall put these paragraphs to the vote first, one by one, starting with the fourth preambular paragraph.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour:

Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cabo Verde, Cambodia, Canada, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala,

Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Micronesia (Federated States of), Monaco, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Tunisia, Turkey, Tuvalu, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zimbabwe

Against:

None

Abstaining:

Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Cuba, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Ecuador, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Nicaragua, Russian Federation, Syrian Arab Republic, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)

The fourth preambular paragraph was retained by 158 votes to none, with 9 abstentions.

The Chair: The Committee will now take action on the fifth preambular paragraph.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour:

Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cabo Verde, Cambodia, Canada, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech

Republic, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Egypt, El Salvador, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Micronesia (Federated States of), Monaco, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Tuvalu, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against:

None

Abstaining:

Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Cuba, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Ecuador, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Nicaragua, Russian Federation, Syrian Arab Republic, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)

The fifth preambular paragraph was retained by 159 votes to none, with 9 abstentions.

The Chair: The Committee will now proceed to take action on draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.63 as a whole.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour:

Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia

(Plurinational State of), Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cabo Verde, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Micronesia (Federated States of), Monaco, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Thailand, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Timor-Leste, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Tuvalu, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against:

None

Draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.63, as a whole, was adopted by 175 votes to none.

The Chair: I now call on those representatives wishing to speak in explanation of vote or position on the draft resolutions just adopted.

Ms. Crittenberger (United States of America): I have asked for the floor to explain our vote on draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.63 on behalf of the Commonwealth of Australia, the Kingdom of Belgium, the Republic of Bulgaria, Canada, the Czech Republic, the Kingdom of Denmark, the Republic of Estonia, the Republic of France, the Republic of Finland, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Hellenic Republic, Hungary, Ireland, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, the Republic of Korea, the Republic of Latvia, the Republic of Lithuania, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Republic of Malta, the Republic of Moldova, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, New Zealand, the Kingdom of Norway, the Portuguese Republic, the State of Qatar, Romania, the Republic of Slovenia, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the Kingdom of Spain, the Kingdom of Sweden, the Republic of Turkey, Ukraine, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and my own country, the United States of America.

Our respective countries intended to join consensus on this draft resolution to reflect our enduring support for the objectives of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction (CWC) and the work of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). Our position on this draft resolution also underscores our continued commitment to the international effort to eliminate the Syrian chemical weapons programme in its entirety. On this latter point, however, we believe that this draft resolution should have gone further in addressing the use of chlorine as a chemical weapon in Syria and the gaps and discrepancies in Syria's Chemical Weapons Convention declaration. These are very serious concerns that pose a fundamental challenge to the CWC and they must be fully resolved so as to ensure the cessation of chemical weapons use in Syria and the complete elimination of Syria's chemical weapons programme.

On 10 September, the OPCW fact-finding mission set up by the Director-General to establish the facts regarding allegations of continued chemical weapons use in Syria concluded that the testimony of primary witnesses and supporting documentation, including medical reports and other relevant information, constitutes a compelling confirmation with a high degree of confidence that chlorine was used as a weapon systematically and repeatedly in attacks against three villages in northern Syria during April and May of 2014. The fact-finding mission also emphasizes that

“in describing the incidents involving the release of toxic chemicals, witnesses invariably connected the devices to helicopters flying overhead”.

It is well known that only the Syrian military possesses the capability to use helicopters in such attacks. The conclusions and evidentiary findings of the fact-finding mission report implicate the Syrian Government in deadly chemical weapons attacks. The use of chlorine or any other toxic chemical as a weapon is a clear breach of the Chemical Weapons Convention and of Security Council resolution 2118 (2013). Such a breach raises serious concerns about the willingness of Syria to comply with its fundamental treaty obligations not to possess or use chemical weapons.

Our countries also remain deeply concerned about the important questions raised by the gaps, discrepancies and inconsistencies in Syria's Chemical Weapons Convention declaration. It is incumbent upon the Syrian Arab Republic to provide the international community with credible evidence to support its claims that it has fully abandoned its chemical weapons programme. The Syria chemical weapons file remains open and will not be closed until all these issues are fully addressed and Syria complies with its obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention and Security Council resolution 2118 (2013).

Mrs. Del Sol Dominguez (Cuba) (*spoke in Spanish*): The Cuban delegation would like to explain its position regarding draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.63, entitled “Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction”. It is unfortunate that, for the first time since this important text has been presented, the traditional consensus on the text has not been preserved. This situation does not benefit anyone; on the contrary, it affects us all negatively.

Cuba attaches great importance to the Chemical Weapons Convention and as a State party participates actively in the work of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). The full implementation of all provisions of the Convention requires the joint efforts of all States. The General Assembly is not the appropriate forum for reproducing discussions that take place in the OPCW in The Hague. To the contrary, the General Assembly is the forum in which we must promote and consolidate the unity of all States in support of the Convention.

The Cuban delegation proposed to the sponsors constructive amendments aimed at striking a better balance in the text. Unfortunately, these were ignored. Cuba therefore abstained in the voting on the fourth and fifth preambular paragraphs. We call on the primary sponsors to reflect upon what happened this year and to reconsider the manner in which the draft resolution is handled. We hope that today's vote does not set a negative precedent for the future. We have the responsibility to work towards consensus for the benefit of the Chemical Weapons Convention.

Mr. Luque Márquez (Ecuador) (*spoke in Spanish*): Ecuador is a firm supporter of the universalization of the Chemical Weapons Convention and of the full implementation of its provisions. We recall that my country signed the Convention on 14 January 1993, the second day it was opened for signature. My country does not possess and has never possessed chemical weapons, and we condemn their use by whoever might do so and wherever that might be. Ecuador has been constant in respecting and calling for respect for the functions and authority of the various United Nations bodies and their specialized agencies, as well as of organizations established under the different international instruments charged with verifying proper implementation.

For this reason, although we voted in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.63, entitled "Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction", as a whole, as a sign of our ongoing support for and adherence to that instrument, my delegation was compelled to abstain in the voting on the fourth and fifth preambular paragraphs, which we believe introduce an imbalance among the purposes and goals of the draft resolution, which seeks to promote the full implementation of the Convention on Chemical Weapons and not to refer piecemeal to specific situations that should be addressed in other forums — in this case, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and its Executive Board.

Moreover, the delegation of Ecuador deplores having noted a growing trend at this session of the First Committee towards including in draft resolutions that have traditionally been adopted by consensus new and controversial elements that have endangered the adoption of these draft resolutions without a vote. This situation is all the more serious when these draft resolutions refer to international instruments that

are universal in nature and around which we should therefore build goodwill and not tear it down. This is a matter of particular concern to us, and we will consider it further when we meet to discuss the working methods of the Committee.

Ms. Rahaminoff-Honig (Israel): Israel voted in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.63, entitled "Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction". Israel's ongoing support of this text is consonant with its signature of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in 1993, its strong support of the goals and purposes of this significant Treaty, as well as the close dialogue and contact Israel maintains with the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW).

The removal from Syria and destruction of its declared chemical weapons are indeed an important achievement with significant regional security ramifications. At the same time, it is important to recognize that the work has still not been concluded and that the threats emanating from Syria, including those pertaining to residual chemical capabilities, are still valid in many respects. The chemical weapons issue is part of a greater unfolding human tragedy in which hundreds of thousands have been killed, injured and displaced in Syria.

Since Syria's accession to the CWC, dozens of incidents have been reported in which chemicals have been used against the civilian population. The OPCW's fact-finding mission has reported the gathering of information that constitutes "compelling confirmation" that toxic chemicals were used as a weapon "systematically and repeatedly" in three villages in northern Syria. The fact-finding mission reported with a high degree of confidence that the toxic chemical used was chlorine either in pure form or in admixture. Additional information is still being investigated. These repeated incidents of use of chemicals undermine the basic premise of the Chemical Weapons Convention and further erode the norm against the use of chemical weapons. It is especially worrying when it is done by a State that has undertaken to join the Chemical Weapons Convention and to commit itself to implementing and abiding by the obligations stipulated in the treaty.

The remainder of residual chemical weapons capabilities in Syria is of great concern in itself due to the ongoing instability of that country and the extensive presence of terrorist groups and other non-State actors.

The international community must remain vigilant against these threats and foil any non-compliance as well as dangers of proliferation. Until Syria completely and accurately fulfils all its obligations pertaining to chemical weapons the international community must continue to insist that all outstanding questions are fully addressed.

Mr. Yermakov (Russian Federation) (*spoke in Russian*): The Russian delegation is speaking in explanation of its vote on draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.63, entitled “Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction”. The Russian Federation has been an unswerving champion of the Chemical Weapons Convention and is in favour of a thorough and impartial consideration of all issues, without exception, related to the Convention as a conventional mechanism specifically created for that purpose.

It is no secret that only experts are able to give a responsible assessment of given cases of the possible use of chemical weapons. In that respect, the Russian delegation supported the draft resolution as a whole but abstained in the voting on the fourth and fifth preambular paragraphs. Overall, we do not oppose the content of those paragraphs. The outstanding issue of the chemical demilitarization of Syria must be addressed in close cooperation between Damascus and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). That also fully applies to the completion of the destruction outside Syria of the removed components and precursors of chemical weapons. It also applies to the clarification of all aspects of Syria’s initial announcement to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons of its military chemical programme and the ongoing work in Syria of the OPCW fact-finding mission to establish evidence of potential use of chlorine as a chemical warfare agent.

However, we believe that virtually all the aforementioned issues are of a mostly technical nature and ultimately are being successfully resolved by the OPCW Technical Secretariat. Moreover, all this is happening in conditions of unprecedented transparency and cooperation on the part of the Syrian authorities. We are convinced that the courageous and responsible action of the Syrian authorities in destroying their chemical arsenal merits the full support of the international community and, of equal importance, protection from biased and unjustified criticism.

At the same time, we note that the Russian proposal to include a reference in the draft resolution to the provisions of Security Council resolution 2118 (2013), whereby States must inform the Security Council of cases of acquisition of chemical weapons by non-State actors, has been ignored. We do not understand why our proposal was rejected. We believe that this situation is unjustified, as there have been many reports of the use of toxic chemicals as chemical weapons by radical Islamists in the Middle East. The growing threat of the use by terrorists of toxic chemicals for military purposes in the Middle East requires the unswerving attention of the international community.

Mr. Ceylan (Turkey): Turkey endorses the statement delivered by the representative of the United States and, in my national capacity, I should now like to make the following statement.

Turkey voted in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.63. However, we believe that the wording in the sixth preambular paragraph runs counter to the facts on the ground. The Syrian regime continues to attack its own people with chemical weapons. It does not fully comply with its obligations emanating from the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction (CWC), the relevant Security Council resolutions — particularly resolution 2118 (2013) — and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) Executive Council decision of 27 September 2013. This flagrant violation of international law is a threat to international peace and security.

The use of chlorine gas as a chemical weapon in Syria is not a hypothetical matter but a real, established fact. It is well-documented by two different independent bodies whose mandates emanate from different organs — namely, the fact-finding mission of the OPCW, whose reports will be transmitted to the Security Council under the provisions of resolution 2118 (2013), and the Independent International Commission of Inquiry that reports to the Human Rights Council. Nevertheless, those two different bodies arrived at the same stark conclusion on the Syrian chemical case, that the regime is responsible for chemical weapon attacks against its own people.

The fact-finding mission’s second report, which we believe must be circulated to Security Council members without further delay, concludes that helicopters

that only the regime possesses were overflying during airborne chlorine attacks. The Independent International Commission of Inquiry also determined that Syrian Government forces used chlorine. The Human Rights Council, in its relevant resolution dated 23 September 2014, has noted with grave concern that the use of chlorine by the regime is a severe violation of the CWC and international law.

Another major issue that stands out in relation to the implementation of the CWC, which draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.63 aims to support, is the dismantling of the Syrian regime's chemical weapons programme, the elimination of all its chemical weapon stockpiles, and the destruction of its production and acquisition means and facilities. That was the objective of the OPCW Executive Council decision and the Security Council resolution. However, a year later that objective has still to be fully achieved. The destruction of the 12 chemical weapons production facilities in Syria remains the source of utmost concern.

We are mindful of the very important task undertaken by the United Nations and OPCW personnel who worked under extremely dangerous conditions in Syria and finally managed to remove the declared part of the Syrian regime's chemical stockpiles from the country. We commend the intensive efforts and cooperation of the Joint Mission of the OPCW and the United Nations and the Member States in the destruction of declared chemicals. However, we are convinced that the cooperation between the regime and the Joint Mission could not be effective because of the regime's approach. The regime continues to attempt to abuse OPCW initiatives and increase its brutal oppression of the people for its survival. The regime therefore did not fully cooperate with the Joint Mission and played to gain time.

Question marks persist concerning the discrepancies between declared and actual figures of chemical weapons and production facilities. Until these gaps, discrepancies and inconsistencies are thoroughly addressed in a credible manner, which is incumbent on the regime, we believe that the progress made is far from satisfactory and the case remains open. Every delay and every loophole in the destruction of Syria's chemical weapons programme gives the regime a free hand to further increase its brutal repression against its own people.

We share the ultimate objective of supporting the CWC and the OPCW as the sole international legally

binding instrument that bans an entire category of weapons of mass destruction. The CWC occupies an important place in the field of international disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation and Turkey remains fully committed to its commitments in this regard.

Mr. Robotjazi (Islamic Republic of Iran): I should like to explain the position of my delegation on draft resolutions A/C.1/69/L.63 and A/C.1/69/L.34/Rev.1.

With respect to draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.63, for two decades the General Assembly's resolutions on the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction (CWC) have been adopted without a vote. We regret that this year the draft resolution failed to achieve consensus as a result of either ill-informed or ill-intentioned attempts to highlight the issue of the implementation of obligations by a specific State party to the Convention in an unbalanced manner. That could have been avoided if the sponsor had conducted inclusive consultations in a transparent and unbiased manner. In order to reassert the tradition of adopting this draft resolution without a vote, we call on the sponsor to alter its approach in consultations next year and to preserve the draft resolution from politicization.

The main aim of the draft resolution is to reflect the global consensus and the need for the full implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention and to uphold the international norm against the use of chemical weapons. Country-specific issues relating to the implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention should be addressed within the relevant organization, namely, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.

Next, I should like to explain the position of my delegation on draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.34/Rev.1, entitled "Preventing the acquisition by terrorists of radioactive sources". My delegation fully supports the main objective of the draft resolution. To preserve the global consensus on this issue, it is necessary to avoid overloading the text of the draft resolution with unrelated matters. When the initial draft text was circulated in early October in New York, we expressed our concern regarding the incorporation of much new language and many concepts that are still under consideration and discussion in Vienna within the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), with respect to which there is no agreement.

We are pleased that the sponsors chose to put the draft resolution back on the right track and modified their initial ambitious approach. We call on the sponsors to refrain from bringing forward issues that are of a technical nature and should be exclusively considered within the IAEA. Given the limited time available, consideration of the new provisions of draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.34/Rev.1 is still under way by the relevant authorities in Tehran, and therefore my delegation reserves its right to make further comments on this draft resolution at a later stage.

Mr. Al Saad (Saudi Arabia) (*spoke in Arabic*): My country aligns itself with the statement made by the representative of the United States of America. We voted in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.63, entitled “Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction”, because in the Middle East the Syrian regime has been killing its own people with every variety of available weapon, including chemical weapons. The number of Syrians killed at the hands of their own Government has exceeded 300,000. Can members imagine a regime that kills so many of its own people simply because they ask to live in dignity and freedom that preserve their humanity? A regime that kills such a large number of its own people has no moral deterrence that prevents it from using chemical weapons, lying about it, or falsely accusing other States and charging them with responsibility for what is going on in Syria.

The Syrian regime lies to the entire world by denying the use of chemical weapons while the reports of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons prove the contrary. We believe that the Syrian regime may be providing terrorist organizations with chemical weapons — groups condemned by my country and the entire international community that are classified as terrorist organizations, against which the entire world is waging war.

Mr. Toro-Carnevali (Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela) (*spoke in Spanish*): I take the floor in connection with draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.63, entitled “Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction”.

My country fully supports the implementation and universalization of the Convention, and voted in favour of the draft resolution as a whole. However, we abstained in the voting on the fourth and fifth

preambular paragraphs. My delegation laments having been compelled to express its discomfort with the tenor of those paragraphs, in a draft resolution that had to date enjoyed consensus. Unfortunately, we could not support the fourth and fifth preambular paragraphs. We believe that they bring an imbalance to the objectives and purposes of the draft resolution. They seek to transform a draft resolution on a common and universal goal into a text covering one country specifically. There is a proper place for such concerns, and they should be considered in that context. It seems to us that this is not the most appropriate forum for doing so.

Mr. Jiménez (Nicaragua) (*spoke in Spanish*): My delegation would like to explain its vote on draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.63, entitled “Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction”.

Nicaragua also fully supports the universalization and implementation of the Convention. Nicaragua is a country free of chemical weapons, and we condemn the use of such weapons from wherever they come. It is for that reason that we voted in favour of the draft resolution as a whole. However, unfortunately, we were compelled to abstain in the voting on the fourth and fifth preambular paragraphs.

We believe that those paragraphs focus on one State party to the Convention in an unbalanced manner. That brings imbalance to a draft resolution that for the first time contains six paragraphs on one single case. At the same time, it includes technical elements that are already being addressed in the appropriate forum, which we believe to be the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and not the United Nations at this juncture. We also believe that this is being addressed in a coordinated manner with the Syrian Government, which we have welcomed. We continue to urge the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic to work with the Organization.

We wished to make these comments on this draft resolution and our voting so that, in our future work, we can refrain from including elements that trigger a vote on a draft resolution of such great importance, including the elements that I have mentioned.

Mr. Elshandawily (Egypt): I take the floor to provide the delegation of Egypt’s explanation of vote on draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.63, entitled “Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition

of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction”.

Egypt wholeheartedly participated in the negotiations establishing the Convention and has always supported the aims of the Convention. In that context, Egypt voted in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.63 despite discomfort regarding particular language and wording and despite concerns that important elements remain missing from the draft resolution.

The lack of progress towards the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East leaves Egypt no choice but to insist on linking accession to this treaty to the universalization of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in the Middle East, where there remains only one State that is not party to any of the three multilateral treaties on weapons of mass destruction.

Additionally, in September 2013 Egypt invited States of the region that had not signed or ratified any of the multilateral instruments on weapons of mass destruction to commit themselves to becoming parties to those instruments and to deposit letters to that effect with the Security Council in order for the Secretary-General to arrange for accession by all States of the region to occur simultaneously. All States of the region except one answered that call, as is clear from the note by the Secretary-General contained in document A/68/781.

Egypt reiterates once again its call for a Middle East free from all weapons of mass destruction — nuclear, chemical and biological. It is up to that State to now respond to this renewed call.

The Chair: I shall now give the floor to speakers who wish to speak in exercise of the right of reply under cluster 2. May I remind all delegations that the first intervention in the right of reply is limited to 10 minutes, and the second intervention to 5 minutes.

Mr. Ibrahim (Syrian Arab Republic) (*spoke in Arabic*): The representative of Saudi Arabia, in trying to politicize the discussion, made a political statement in which he tried to make his regime sound innocent and tried to protect terrorist organizations that commit heinous crimes against the Syrian people. If we look at the current state of international terrorism, we see that Saudi Arabia is a leading State sponsor of terrorism. Of the 19 terrorists who waged an attack on New York in

2001, 15 were Saudi citizens. The leaders of terrorist organizations in Syria and the entire region are mostly Saudis. The Saudi representative is trying to say that his regime is innocent. But I do not think anyone would believe what his regime is saying. Saudi Arabia not only supports terrorism, but it also funds weapons, including chemical weapons, that kill civilians and destroys all that stands for civilization.

Mr. Al Saad (Saudi Arabia) (*spoke in Arabic*): Saudi Arabia is speaking in exercise of the right to reply to the statement made by the representative of Syria.

May God help our friend from the Syrian Arab Republic! He is in a not very envious position. The atrocities committed by the Syrian regime have been exposed to all the countries of the world. These atrocities are plain for all to see, so may God help them!

As to his statement regarding the incidents in New York, he said that many of those who perpetrated the terrorist attacks in New York were Saudi nationals. The terrorists of the Islamic State come from all countries of the world. At this point, can we blame their acts on the countries of their origin? Are these countries being treated as terrorists for the acts of a number of isolated individuals who have joined the Islamic State? Obviously, the answer is no.

I have one other observation to make. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is among the countries to have suffered most from terrorism. My country has taken national measures to criminalize all those who have participated in the acts of terrorist groups or who have provided them aid, including supplies to the Islamic State and other organizations. If one looks at the facts and figures, Saudi Arabia is among the countries to have participated most actively in combating terrorism. Recently, we provided \$100 million to the Counter-Terrorism Centre established by the United Nations.

Mr. Al-Thani (Qatar) (*spoke in Arabic*): I have asked to speak in exercise of the right of reply to respond to the Syrian representative's accusations, which were in fact unfruitful attempts to accuse of terrorism all those who have called for conformity with international law for the atrocities that have been committed against the Syrian people. Qatar is well aware of the dangers of terrorism and of foreign combatants, both in our region and throughout the world. We have no common interests with terrorists. We will continue to cooperate with the international community in combatting terrorism and cutting off its sources in the region.

The truth that everyone is aware of is that the repressive policy of the Syrian regime does not seek to combat terrorism, but is rather the main cause of terrorism in Syria. The Syrian regime has been using chemical weapons against its own people. That is an atrocious terrorist act, a crime that must not go unpunished, and one that we simply cannot ignore.

The Chair: The Committee will now turn its attention to cluster 4, entitled “Conventional weapons”. I shall first give the floor to delegations that wish to make general statements or to introduce draft resolutions under this cluster.

I give the floor to the representative of Mozambique to introduce draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.5/Rev.1.

Mr. Gumende (Mozambique): In my capacity as Chair of the third Review Conference of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, held in Maputo in June, and on behalf of other authors — namely, Algeria and Belgium — Mozambique has the honour to introduce draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.5/Rev.1, entitled “Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on Their Destruction”. The draft resolution retains the spirit and essence of resolution 68/30, adopted on 5 December 2013, and contains minor changes to reflect the results of the Maputo Review Conference.

Many actions have been undertaken in the framework of the Convention, particularly in the following domains: the destruction of stockpiled anti-personnel mines, the destruction of anti-personnel mines in mined areas, transparency measures, and national implementation measures. However, much needs to be done in order to free the world of landmines. Therefore, the draft resolution requests States parties to better address the challenges posed by landmines. It also invites all States that have not signed the Convention to accede to it without delay so as to achieve its universalization.

The draft resolution also stresses the importance of the full and effective implementation and of compliance with the Convention, including through the continued implementation of the Maputo action plan for the period 2014-2019.

Against that backdrop, I would kindly request the support of all Member States for the adoption of this draft resolution.

The Chair: I shall now give the floor to those delegations that wish to explain their positions or votes before the Committee takes action on the draft resolutions listed under cluster 4.

Ms. Crittenberger (United States of America): I have asked for the floor to explain the United States vote on draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.5/Rev.1, entitled “Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on Their Destruction”, on which my delegation will abstain.

As many representatives are aware, in recent months the United States has announced a number of important changes to United States anti-personnel landmine policy. On 27 June, the United States delegation at the third Review Conference of the Ottawa Convention, held in Maputo, announced that the United States would not produce or otherwise acquire any anti-personnel munitions that are not compliant with the Ottawa Convention, including replacing such munitions as they expire in the coming years.

On 23 September, the United States further announced that it was aligning its anti-personnel landmine policy outside the Korean peninsula with the key requirements of the Ottawa Convention. That means that the United States will neither use anti-personnel mines outside the Korean peninsula, nor assist, encourage or induce anyone outside the Korean peninsula to engage in activity prohibited by the Ottawa Convention, and will finally undertake to destroy anti-personnel landmine stockpiles not required for the defence of the Republic of Korea.

Those measures represent important further steps to advance the humanitarian aims of the Ottawa Convention and to bring United States practice into closer alignment with the international humanitarian movement embodied in the Ottawa Convention. Even as we take the steps announced earlier this year, the unique circumstances on the Korean peninsula preclude us from changing our landmine policy there at this time. As such, we are not presently in a position to comply fully with or seek accession to the Ottawa Convention, and we must continue to abstain on this draft resolution. However, we will continue our diligent efforts to pursue material and operational solutions that

would be compliant with, and ultimately allow us to accede to, the Ottawa Convention, while ensuring our ability to respond to the contingencies on the Korean peninsula and to meet our alliance commitments to the Republic of Korea.

More broadly, the United States is the world's single-largest financial supporter of humanitarian mine action, providing more than \$2.3 billion in aid in more than 90 countries for conventional weapons destruction programmes since 1993. The United States will continue to support this important work and remains committed to a continuing partnership with Ottawa States parties and non-governmental organizations in addressing the humanitarian impact of anti-personnel landmines.

Mr. Eloumni (Morocco): I speak in explanation of vote before the voting on draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.5/Rev.1, entitled "Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on Their Destruction".

Morocco, which actively contributed to the preparatory process of the Ottawa Convention, has decided to vote in favour of the draft resolution, as it has done with similar draft resolutions since 2004, in order to reiterate its support for the eminently humanitarian objectives of the Convention, in particular that of protecting civilians from the unacceptable damage caused by anti-personnel mines.

Similarly, the ratification by Morocco, in March 2002, of the Amended Protocol II of the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or To Have Indiscriminate Effects, as well as its regular submission, since 2003, of a national report on the implementation of the provisions of that Protocol, reflect Morocco's support for the universal impetus towards the elimination of anti-personnel mines. To that end, Morocco applies the provisions of the Ottawa Convention in the field of demining, the destruction of stockpiles, outreach and training and assistance to victims. In that regard, we would like to highlight the following elements.

First, the remarkable demining effort made by the Royal Armed Forces have allowed for the recuperation and destruction of thousands of anti-personnel mines, anti-tank mines and unexploded devices. Secondly, the Moroccan authorities have made efforts to provide care to victims and to address their needs for medical,

social and economic rehabilitation. Thirdly, Morocco continues to support countries in the region in the field of demining, as well as to continue dialogue with non-governmental organizations with a view to pursuing the goals of the Convention.

Since 2006, the Kingdom of Morocco has voluntarily submitted a report pursuant to article 7 of the Ottawa Convention. In the same vein, Morocco regularly attends the meetings of States parties and the Review Conferences of the Convention. Morocco's accession to the Ottawa Convention is a strategic goal linked to security imperatives with regard to respect for its territorial integrity.

The Chair: The Committee will now proceed to take action on the draft resolutions listed under cluster 4.

We will first take action on draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.5/Rev.1, entitled "Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on Their Destruction".

I give the floor to the Secretary of the Committee.

Mr. Nakano (Secretary of the Committee): Draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.5/Rev.1 was introduced by the representative of Mozambique at the Committee's 15th meeting, on 23 October. The sponsors are listed in document A/C.1/69/L.5/Rev.1. In addition, the following oral statement is made in accordance with rule 153 of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly.

Under the terms of paragraph 9 of draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.5/Rev.1, the General Assembly would request the Secretary-General, in accordance with article 11, paragraph 1, of the Convention, to undertake the preparations necessary to convene the fourteenth Meeting of the States Parties to the Convention and, on behalf of the States parties and in accordance with article 11, paragraph 4, of the Convention, to invite States not parties to the Convention, as well as the United Nations, other relevant international organizations or institutions, regional organizations, the International Committee of the Red Cross and relevant non-governmental organizations, to attend the Fourteenth Meeting of the States Parties as observers.

In accordance with article 14 of the Convention, the cost of the next Fourteenth Meeting of the States Parties would be borne by the States parties and States not parties to the Convention participating

therein, in accordance with the United Nations scale of assessments, adjusted appropriately. Preliminary cost estimates for servicing the 2015 fourteenth Meeting of the States Parties were prepared by the Secretariat and approved by the States parties at their Third Review Conference, held in Maputo from 23 to 27 June 2014.

It is recalled that all activities related to international conventions or treaties that, under their respective legal arrangements, ought to be financed outside the regular budget of the United Nations, may be undertaken by the Secretariat only when sufficient funding is received, in advance, from States parties and States not parties participating at the meetings.

Accordingly, the adoption of draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.5/Rev.1 would not give rise to any financial implications under the programme budget for the biennium 2014-2015.

The Chair: A recorded vote has been requested.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour:

Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cabo Verde, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Latvia, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Micronesia (Federated States of), Monaco, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint

Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Senegal, Serbia, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Thailand, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against:

None

Abstaining:

Cuba, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Egypt, India, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Israel, Lebanon, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, Republic of Korea, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Syrian Arab Republic, United States of America, Uzbekistan, Viet Nam

Draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.5/Rev.1 was adopted by 160 votes to none, with 17 abstentions.

The Chair: The Committee will now proceed to take action on draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.50, entitled "Information on confidence-building measures in the field of conventional arms".

I give the floor to the Secretary of the Committee.

Mr. Nakano (Secretary of the Committee): Draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.50 was introduced by the representative of Argentina at the Committee's 15th meeting, on 23 October. The sponsors are listed in documents A/C.1/69/L.50 and A/C.1/69/CRP.4/Rev.6. In addition, Fiji and Liechtenstein have become sponsors.

The Chair: The sponsors of the draft resolution have expressed the wish that the Committee adopt it without a vote. If I hear no objection, I shall take it that the Committee wishes to act accordingly.

Draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.50 was adopted.

The Chair: I shall now give the floor to those representatives who wish to speak in explanation of vote or position following the voting.

Mr. Varma (India): India would like to explain its vote on draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.5/Rev.1, entitled "Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of

Anti-personnel Mines and on Their Destruction". India abstained in the voting on this draft resolution.

India supports the vision of a world free of anti-personnel landmines and is committed to their eventual elimination. The availability of militarily effective alternative technologies that can perform cost-effectively the legitimate defensive role of anti-personnel landmines will considerably facilitate the goal of the complete elimination of anti-personnel mines.

India is a high contracting party to Amended Protocol II of the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or To Have Indiscriminate Effects, which enshrines the approach of taking into account the legitimate defence requirements of States, especially those with long borders. India has fulfilled its obligations under Amended Protocol II, including, inter alia, stopping the production of non-detectable mines, as well as rendering all our anti-personnel mines detectable. India is observing a moratorium on the export and transfer of anti-personnel landmines.

We have taken a number of measures to address the humanitarian concerns arising from the use of anti-personnel landmines, in accordance with international humanitarian law. India remains committed to increased international cooperation and assistance for mine clearance and rehabilitation of mine victims and is willing to contribute to technical assistance and expertise to achieve that end.

India participated as an observer in the third Review Conference of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, held in Maputo from 23 to 27 June 2014.

Mr. Ammar (Pakistan): I have requested the floor to explain the position of my delegation on draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.5/Rev.1, entitled "Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on Their Destruction". My delegation abstained in the voting on the draft resolution.

Landmines continue to play a significant role in the defence needs of many States, especially those in regions of conflicts and disputes. Pakistan remains committed to pursuing the objectives of a universal and non-discriminatory ban on anti-personnel mines in a

manner that takes into account the legitimate defence requirements of States.

Ms. Vladulescu (Romania), Vice-Chair, took the Chair.

Given our security compulsions and the need to guard our long borders not protected by any natural obstacle, the use of landmines forms an important part of our self-defence strategy. As such, it is not possible for Pakistan to agree to demands for the complete prohibition of anti-personnel landmines until such time as viable alternatives are available. The objective of the total elimination of anti-personnel landmines can best be promoted, inter alia, by making available non-lethal, militarily and cost-effective alternate technologies.

Pakistan is a party to Amended Protocol II of the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or To Have Indiscriminate Effects, which regulates the use of landmines in both internal and external conflicts to prevent civilians from falling victim to landmines. We continue to implement the Protocol with great earnestness. Pakistan, as one of the largest troop contributors to United Nations-led peacekeeping operations, has actively contributed to demining operations in several affected countries in the past. We are prepared to provide training facilities to mine-affected countries, within our national resources.

Pakistan enjoys a unique record of clearing all minefields after the three wars in South Asia. There has never been a humanitarian situation caused by the use of those mines. We remain committed to ensuring that mines in our military inventory will never become a cause for civilian casualties.

Mr. Kim Ju Song (Democratic People's Republic of Korea): I have requested the floor to explain our position on draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.5/Rev.1. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea abstained in the voting on this draft resolution.

While the Democratic People's Republic of Korea shares the humanitarian concerns associated with the use of anti-personnel mines, we will not give up the use of mines, in keeping with the right to self-defence, due to the particular security environment on the Korean peninsula. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea has for decades been the subject of the hostile policy of the United States, which refuses to join the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and

on Their Destruction and insists on the use of mines on the Korean peninsula. The United States has planted millions of mines in the demilitarized zone. This year again, the United States has staged large-scale joint military exercises in South Korea — namely, Key Resolve and Foal Eagle, to name just two.

Given the imminent security threat, the persistent hostility and the anti-personnel mines deployed by United States forces in South Korea for more than 60 years, under such circumstances the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is not in a position to join the Ottawa Convention or to support this draft resolution.

Ms. Del Sol Dominguez (Cuba) (*spoke in Spanish*): The delegation of Cuba abstained in the voting on draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.5/Rev.1, entitled “Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on Their Destruction”.

Cuba fully shares the legitimate humanitarian concerns associated with the indiscriminate and irresponsible use of anti-personnel mines. Our country is a State party to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or To Have Indiscriminate Effects, including Additional Protocol II. Cuba fully and strictly complies with the prohibitions and restrictions on the use of mines established by that Convention.

The Chair returned to the Chair.

Cuba has been subjected for more than five decades to a policy of ongoing hostility and aggression by a military super-Power. Hence, it is not possible for our country to forgo the use of mines for the preservation of its sovereignty and territorial integrity, pursuant to the right to self-defence as recognized by the Charter of the United Nations.

Cuba will continue to support all efforts that, maintaining the necessary balance between humanitarian and national security questions, are aimed at eliminating the terrible effects that these cause among the civilian populations and the economy of many countries, specifically referring to the indiscriminate and irresponsible use of anti-personnel mines.

Furthermore, we join the call for all States that are in a position to do so to provide the necessary financial, technical and humanitarian assistance needed for mine

removal and social rehabilitation, as well as economic support for the victims.

Mr. Elshandawily (Egypt): I take the floor to explain Egypt's abstention in the voting on draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.5/Rev.1, entitled “Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on Their Destruction”.

Egypt abstained in the voting owing to the unbalanced nature of this instrument, which was developed and concluded outside the framework of the United Nations. Egypt imposed a moratorium on its capacity to produce and export landmines in the 1980s, long before the conclusion of the Convention.

We view the Convention as lacking balance between the humanitarian concerns related to the production and use of anti-personnel landmines and their legitimate military uses in border protection, particularly in countries with long borders and that face an extraordinary security challenge.

Furthermore, the Convention does not impose any legal responsibility on States to remove anti-personnel mines that they have placed in the territory of other States, making it impossible for many of these States to meet the demining requirements on their own. That is particularly true in the case of Egypt, which still has millions of landmines on its territory placed by the warring States during the Second World War.

This serious concern is further exacerbated by the insufficient framework of international cooperation set up by the Convention, which is still limited in effect, and highly dependent on the goodwill of donor States.

Mr. Loon (Singapore): I take the floor to explain my delegation's vote in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.5/Rev.1, entitled “Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on Their Destruction”.

Singapore's position on anti-personnel landmines has been clear and open. As in past years, Singapore supports and will continue to support all initiatives against the indiscriminate use of anti-personnel landmines, especially when they are directed at innocent and defenceless civilians.

With that in mind, Singapore declared a two-year moratorium, in May 1996, on the export of

anti-personnel landmines without self-neutralizing mechanisms. In February 1998, Singapore expanded the moratorium to include all manner of anti-personnel landmines, not just those without self-neutralizing mechanisms, and extended the moratorium indefinitely.

We also support the work of the Convention by regularly attending the meetings of the State parties to the Convention. At the same time, like several other countries, Singapore firmly states that the legitimate security concerns and the right to self-defence of any State cannot be disregarded.

Singapore supports international efforts to resolve the humanitarian concerns over anti-personnel landmines. We will continue to work with members of the international community towards finding a durable and truly global solution.

Ms. Kim Hye-Jin (Republic of Korea): My delegation would like to speak on draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.5/Rev.1, entitled “Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on Their Destruction”.

As we have expressed on many occasions, the Republic of Korea fully sympathizes with the spirit and objectives of the Ottawa Convention and this draft resolution. However, due to the security situation on the Korean peninsula, we are compelled to give priority to our security concerns and are unable to accede to the Convention at this point, and therefore abstained in the voting on this draft resolution.

Nevertheless, we are no less concerned about the problems associated with anti-personnel mines and are committed to mitigating the suffering caused by their use. In that respect, the Korean Government is exercising tight controls over anti-personnel landmines and has been enforcing an indefinite extension of the moratorium on their export since 1997. In addition, the Republic of Korea joined the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or To Have Indiscriminate Effects, as well as its Amended Protocol II, under which we are participating in a range of discussions and activities to ensure only a limited and responsible use. We also joined Protocol V, on explosive remnants of war, and are implementing all the relevant obligations.

The Korean Government has contributed more than \$8.5 million since 1993 for demining and victim

assistance through the relevant United Nations programmes, including the Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Action, and the International Trust Fund for demining and mine victim assistance. The Republic of Korea will continue to contribute to international efforts for mine clearance and victim assistance.

Mr. Tarbah (Libya) (*spoke in Arabic*): My delegation would like to explain its vote on draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.5/Rev.1, entitled “Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on Their Destruction”.

Libya is not a State party to the Convention, and the Transitional Government is not in a position to address this issue. However, Libya shares the humanitarian concerns over the use of anti-personnel mines, above all their damaging effects and all obstacles linked to development. We have suffered from this problem and that of unexploded ordnance since the end of the Second World War. This problem was exacerbated by the activities of the Al-Qadhafi brigades to proliferate such mines.

Non-governmental organizations helped Libya to mitigate this problem during the recent Libyan revolution. Libya would like to thank the civil society organizations that provided technical and material assistance in eliminating mines and helped the victims of the dictatorial regime. We hope that such assistance will continue.

Libya changed its vote on the implementation of this Convention for the first time at the sixty-eighth session of the General Assembly. We no longer abstain, but support and vote in favour of the draft resolution.

The Chair: The Committee will now turn to cluster 5, entitled “Other disarmament measures and international security”. As I mentioned earlier, at the request of sponsoring delegations, action on draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.47, entitled “Women, disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control”, will be taken as soon as consultations conclude, which we hope will be towards the end of this meeting. If that is not possible, we will defer action on that item until tomorrow.

I shall first give the floor to those delegations that wish to make general statements or to introduce draft resolutions under this cluster.

I give the floor to the representative of the Republic of Korea to introduce draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.48.

Ms. Kim Hye-Jin (Republic of Korea): On behalf of the Republic of Korea and Australia, I am honoured to introduce draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.48, entitled “Preventing and combating illicit brokering activities”. I am further pleased to inform the Committee that the draft resolution is now sponsored by 62 countries.

As the title notes, this draft resolution focuses on international efforts to prevent and combat illicit brokering activities as an important means to effectively address the proliferation of all weapons of mass destruction and the illicit transfer of conventional weapons. The draft resolution proposes that States establish appropriate national laws, encourages States to implement the relevant international obligations and emphasizes the importance of capacity-building, international cooperation and assistance in order to strengthen efforts towards those ends.

The text of this year’s draft resolution has been updated from the previous resolution 67/43 to reflect recent and relevant developments in this field, such as the adoption and entry into force of the Arms Trade Treaty and the adoption of Security Council resolution 2117 (2013). Specifically, two new preambular paragraphs were introduced into the draft resolution in that regard.

First, in the eighth preambular paragraph, the draft resolution recognizes

“the importance of States parties to the Arms Trade treaty taking measures, pursuant to their national laws, to regulate brokering taking place under their jurisdiction, in accordance with article 10 of the Treaty”.

Secondly, in the ninth preambular paragraph, the draft resolution notes the adoption of Security Council resolution 2117 (2013),

“in which the Council encourages cooperation and information-sharing on suspect brokering activities to address the illicit transfer, destabilizing accumulation and misuse of small arms and light weapons”.

My delegation would like to take this opportunity to thank the sponsors of the draft resolution, as well as colleagues and delegations, for their cooperation and engagement during the consultations. My delegation

seeks the continued support of all Member States for this draft resolution.

The Chair: The Committee will now proceed to take action on the draft resolutions listed under cluster 5.

We will first take action on draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.48, entitled “Preventing and combating illicit brokering activities”.

I give the floor to the Secretary of the Committee.

Mr. Nakano (Secretary of the Committee): Draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.48 was introduced by the representative of Australia at the Committee’s 14th meeting, on 22 October. The sponsors of the draft resolution are listed in documents A/C.1/69/L.48 and A/C.1/69/CRP.4/Rev.6. In addition, Nigeria and Samoa have also become sponsors.

The Chair: A recorded vote has been requested. A separate, recorded vote has been requested on the eighth preambular paragraph.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour:

Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cabo Verde, Cambodia, Canada, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mexico, Micronesia (Federated States of), Monaco, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of

Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Thailand, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Timor-Leste, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Yemen, Zambia

Against:

None

Abstaining:

Cuba, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Egypt, India, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Sri Lanka, Syrian Arab Republic, Zimbabwe

The eighth preambular paragraph was retained by 159 votes to none, with 8 abstentions.

The Chair: We shall now vote on the draft resolution as a whole.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour:

Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cabo Verde, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Micronesia (Federated States of), Monaco,

Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Thailand, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against:

None

Abstaining:

Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Iran (Islamic Republic of)

Draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.48, as a whole, was adopted by 174 votes to none, with 2 abstentions.

The Chair: I shall now give the floor to those representatives who wish to speak in explanation of vote following the voting.

Ms. Del Sol Dominguez (Cuba) (spoke in Spanish):

The Cuban delegation voted in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.48, given the importance that our country attaches to adopting effective, multilaterally negotiated and non-discriminatory measures aimed at preventing and combating illicit brokering activities.

At the second Summit of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States, held last January in Havana, the leaders of our region emphasized the importance of working multilaterally in the framework of the United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects in a transparent and non-discriminatory manner, so as to move towards the adoption of legally binding instruments in the area of illicit brokering activities. Although the overall balance of draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.48 is positive,

it is nevertheless far from perfect. Looking towards the future, we hope that the authors will overcome the problems in the text, in the interests of preserving consensus. In that regard, our delegation would like to note for the record the following considerations.

First, as we understand it, paragraph 2 does not refer to the implementation by States of those treaties and international instruments to which those States are parties and whose obligations have been accepted by sovereign decision. This paragraph should in no way be interpreted as a source of legitimacy for instruments that are not in the end fully consistent with the Charter of the United Nations with and international law.

Secondly, in Cuba's opinion, the inclusion of a reference to Security Council resolution 2117 (2013) is not a step in the right direction. That resolution not only is not the result of agreement among all States Members of the United Nations, but it does not even reflect consensus among the 15 members of the Council; it was the object of a divided vote in that organ. Resolution 2117 (2013) unjustifiably omits the unacceptability of arms transfers to actors that are not duly authorized by States. Furthermore, it establishes an explicit link to the concept of the responsibility to protect that does not bear in mind the discussions and lack of consensus on that notion among States.

Thirdly, in its preambular section, reference is made to the Nuclear Security Summit. Participation in that forum is open only to a limited group of States. We reiterate that, owing to its global dimension and impact, a review of nuclear physical security and safety internationally should be undertaken in an inclusive, broad and transparent manner. The International Atomic Energy Agency has the central role in the promotion and coordination of international efforts and cooperation when it comes to strengthening nuclear safety.

Fourthly, in Cuba's view, the reference in the eighth preambular paragraph to the Arms Trade Treaty introduces an element of imbalance to the draft resolution. As is known, that instrument does not enjoy consensus among Member States; legitimate concerns have been expressed about it, including by Cuba. For those reasons Cuba abstained in the separate voting on the eighth preambular paragraph.

Mr. Varma (India): India voted in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.48, entitled "Preventing and combating illicit brokering activities", because we

fully support the objectives of the draft resolution. However, we were constrained to abstain in the voting on the eighth preambular paragraph, which contains a reference to the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT). As we explained on another occasion — with reference to draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.32 — India is undertaking a review of its position on the ATT, until the completion of that review, we will abstain in the voting on any draft resolutions that contain references to the ATT.

Mr. Robotjazi (Islamic Republic of Iran): I have taken the floor to explain the position of my delegation on draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.48, entitled "Preventing and combating illicit brokering activities".

As there exists licit as well as illicit trade and brokering in small arms and light weapons, Member States addressed both issues within the United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects. While recognizing the legal trade and brokering in small arms and light weapons, Member States have emphasized the need to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit trade and brokering in such weapons.

However, the notion of illicit brokering in weapons of mass destruction, which is wrongly reflected in this draft resolution, implies that there is a licit trade in weapons of mass destruction. Under major international conventions on weapons of mass destruction, the production, development, research, transfer and use of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons is prohibited — undoubtedly, their trade or brokering is illegal as well. Accordingly, the only interpretation of some paragraphs contained in this draft resolution could be that the transfer of such inhuman weapons from a possessor State to non-possessor States is legal, while, for instance, in the case of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the transfer of nuclear weapons from a nuclear-weapon State to a non-nuclear-weapon State is legally prohibited and illegal.

While appreciating and sharing the views of the main sponsors of the draft resolution on the need to prevent and combat illicit brokering in small arms and light weapons, and the importance of preventing the terrorist groups from having access to weapons of mass destruction, which is a valid concern, the Committee has already dealt with it in other draft resolutions. Furthermore, we are of the view that, logically and methodologically, it is inappropriate to mix these two

completely different concepts, since the issue of small arms and light weapons is totally different from the that of weapons of mass destruction.

With regard to the reference to the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) in the eighth preambular paragraph, the position of my delegation is well known. The ATT is an instrument full of legal flaws and loopholes. My delegation is not in a position to support the eighth preambular paragraph as it has been drafted.

We constructively consulted the sponsors of the draft resolution and proposed some compromise amendments and language in order to enable us to join the consensus on this draft resolution. However, the sponsors could not accommodate our major concerns, and substantial problems still exist with the draft.

For those reasons, my delegation abstained in the voting on draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.48.

Mr. Elshandawily (Egypt): I take the floor to explain Egypt's vote in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.48.

We abstained in the separate voting on the eighth preambular paragraph, because it refers to the Arms Trade Treaty. The position of Egypt with regard to the Arms Trade Treaty is well known, and we wish to reiterate and refer to our explanation of vote on the draft resolution entitled "The Arms Trade Treaty" (A/C.1/69/L.32/Rev.1). Therefore, there is no need to repeat it here. I simply wish to add to that explanation of vote that Egypt considers that any reference to the entry into force of the Arms Trade Treaty is applicable solely to the implementation of the Treaty among its States parties.

The Chair: For the record, I wish to remind the Committee that, under this cluster, we still have to take action on draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.47, entitled "Women, disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control". We shall return to this cluster, most likely tomorrow morning.

We now turn to the draft resolution and the draft decision under cluster 6, entitled "Regional disarmament and security". I shall first give the floor to delegations that wish to make general statements or to introduce draft resolutions.

Mr. Moktefi (Algeria) (*spoke in French*): Under agenda item 101, it is my honour to introduce to the First Committee draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.54, entitled "Strengthening of security and cooperation in the

Mediterranean region". Other than technical updates, the draft resolution includes all of the text contained in the previous resolution 68/67.

The text of the draft resolution notes, inter alia, efforts made by Mediterranean countries comprehensively to confront their common challenges. The general goal is to make the Mediterranean a zone of dialogue, exchange and cooperation that guarantees peace, stability and prosperity. The text also calls on the States of the Mediterranean region that have still to do so to accede to all legal instruments relative to disarmament and non-proliferation arising from multilateral negotiations. It also encourages States in the region to foster the creation of the necessary conditions to bolster mutual confidence measures.

Moreover, the draft resolution encourages Mediterranean countries to further step up their cooperation in countering terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, including the possible use of weapons of mass destruction by terrorists. Cooperation is also encouraged in combating organized crime and illicit weapons transfers. Finally, the text reaffirms that security in the Mediterranean is closely linked to security in Europe, as well as to international peace and security.

Algeria, along with the 67 sponsors, counts on the support of all the Member States to adopt by consensus this draft resolution, which is of ever-greater importance and pertinence in light of the developments occurring in the Mediterranean region.

The Chair: The Committee will proceed to take action on the draft resolutions listed under cluster 6.

The Committee will now proceed to take action on draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.54, entitled "Strengthening of security and cooperation in the Mediterranean region".

I give the floor to the Secretary of the Committee.

Mr. Nakano (Secretary of the Committee): Draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.54 was introduced by the representative of Algeria at the Committee's 18th meeting, on 27 October. The sponsors of the draft resolution are listed in documents A/C.1/69/L.54 and A/C.1/69/CRP.4/Rev.6.

The Chair: The sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.54 have expressed the wish that the Committee adopt it without a vote. If I hear no

objection, I shall take it that the Committee wishes to act accordingly.

Draft resolution A/C.1/69/L.54 was adopted.

The Chair: The Committee will now proceed to take action on draft decision A/C.1/69/L.62, entitled “Maintenance of international security — good-neighbourliness, stability and development in South-Eastern Europe”.

I give the floor to the Secretary of the Committee.

Mr. Nakano (Secretary of the Committee): Draft decision A/C.1/69/L.62 was submitted by the representative of The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. The sponsor of the draft decision is listed in document A/C.1.69/L.62.

The Chair: The sponsor of draft decision A/C.1/69/L.62 has expressed the wish that the Committee adopt it without a vote. If I hear no objection, I shall take it that the Committee wishes to act accordingly.

Draft decision A/C.1/69/L.62 was adopted.

The meeting rose at 1 p.m.