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Monday, 3 November 2014, 3 p.m.
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Official Records

President: Mr. Kutesa (Uganda)

In the absence of the President, Ms. Rambally (Saint Lucia), Vice-President, took the Chair.

The meeting was called to order at 3.10 p.m.

Agenda item 86 (continued)

Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency

Note by the Secretary-General transmitting the report of the International Atomic Energy Agency (A/69/255)

Draft resolution (A/69/L.7)

Ms. Paik Ji-ah (Republic of Korea): My delegation would like to thank Mr. Yukiya Amano, Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), for presenting the Agency's report (see reviewing the IAEA's work over the past year A/69/255) and outlining future priorities (see A/69/PV.37). With nuclear power and applications of nuclear technology expected to play a growing role in the coming decades, we attach great importance to the central role of the Agency in promoting safe, secure and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. We are pleased with the report, which summarizes well the wide range of the Agency's work carried out in line with the priorities set by its member States.

Taking this opportunity, my delegation would like to comment on the Agency's activities and related developments in the fields of nuclear safety, security and safeguards.

First of all, the IAEA has made important contributions to the global nuclear safety framework, in terms of both improving the safety standards of nuclear facilities and materials and increasing awareness of safety-related issues among member States. We look forward to the continued implementation of the IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear Safety.

We also look forward to the publication of the comprehensive report next year on the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident. My delegation sincerely hopes that the important lessons and recommendations that can be drawn from that accident will be incorporated into each member State's nuclear safety infrastructure in order to better prepare us to avoid such tragic accidents and to minimize the impact from such accidents in the future. In that regard, we hope that the commitment to sharing information in a transparent and timely manner continues.

We are pleased to note the IAEA's many productive activities in the field of nuclear security over the past year. We look forward to the second International Conference on Nuclear Security, to be held in December 2016, based on the outcome of the first Conference, in 2013. The work of the Nuclear Security Guidance Committee has also been fruitful, contributing to greater transparency, quality, coherence and consistency in publications on nuclear security guidance. In addition, we appreciate the Agency's focused approach to bringing into force the 2005 Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, which has resulted in additional ratifications by member States, including Korea in May.

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The Nuclear Security Summit process, which began in Washington and continued in Seoul and The Hague, and the IAEA's efforts to support national and international efforts to establish and maintain effective nuclear security have been mutually reinforcing. The Summits have served as a useful mechanism to consolidate political commitment at the highest level to promote nuclear security across the globe, while the Agency has played an important role in translating that enhanced political momentum into concrete actions. As we prepare for the fourth Nuclear Security Summit in 2016, we look forward to exploring ways to maximize the synergy between the IAEA and the Nuclear Security Summit process.

Turning to safeguards-related issues, my delegation appreciates the Agency's efforts to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of safeguards implementation. We welcome the fact that the IAEA Board of Governors took note of the Supplementary Document to the report on the State-level concept. We are convinced that the State-level concept will allow the Agency to make better use of its resources by concentrating efforts on areas of greater significance for safeguards and on improving responsiveness to changing circumstances. We are also encouraged by the increasing number of comprehensive safeguards agreements, additional protocols and amended small-quantities protocols in force.

However, the cases of non-compliance on the part of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Iran and Syria continue to pose grave challenges to the international non-proliferation regime and the IAEA safeguards system. Of particular concern to my delegation is North Korea's continuous pursuit of its nuclear capability. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea has conducted three nuclear tests and publicly threatened the international society by the announcement of further nuclear tests. In addition, North Korea continued its nuclear activities in Yongbyon, including the operation of a 5-megawatt graphite-moderated reactor. As the IAEA Director General aptly highlighted in his latest report of September 2014, such actions are clear violations of relevant Security Council resolutions.

We once again urge the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to come into full compliance with its obligations under all relevant Security Council resolutions and commitments under the 19 September 2005 Joint Statement of the Six-Party Talks. Standing

firm by its principle that North Korea's nuclear ambition cannot be tolerated, the Republic of Korea will continue its efforts with the international community to achieve complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearization of North Korea.

Turning to the Iranian nuclear issue, we commend the Agency for its efforts to actively engage Iran under the Joint Statement on a Framework for Cooperation, of November 2013, with the aim of resolving all present and past verification issues relating to the Iranian nuclear programme. We also appreciate the Agency's role in verifying and monitoring Iran's voluntary measures under the Joint Plan of Action between the permanent five plus one and Iran in November 2013. We call upon Iran to work closely with the Agency in order to resolve all outstanding issues, including those relating to possible military dimensions, in a timely manner.

In the light of our full support for the IAEA's work to achieve our common goal of harnessing nuclear energy in the service of peace and development for humanity, the Republic of Korea is pleased to co-sponsor draft resolution A/69/L.7, on the report of the IAEA.

Mr. Elshandawily (Egypt): I make this statement on behalf of Mr. Abdellatif Aboulatta, Permanent Representative of Egypt to the United Nations.

Egypt appreciates its ongoing cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in the Agency's fields of expertise, serving economic, social and human development. That cooperation is especially important as Egypt is developing a programme to construct nuclear power plants to produce electrical energy and to desalinate water in order to meet the growing demands of its citizens, including those of the industrial sector. There is broad cooperation between Egypt and the IAEA to enhance Egyptian capabilities and human resources within that programme. In addition, there are various technical cooperation programmes between Egypt and the IAEA in other fields of nuclear applications, including scientific research, food security, the environment, cancer treatment, industry, mineral wealth and water resources, to name just a few.

Egypt also welcomes cooperation with the IAEA in the field of nuclear security, the prime responsibility for which rests with the State at the national level. Egypt reaffirms the central role of the IAEA in enhancing the peaceful uses by member States of nuclear energy,

in parallel with efforts to enhance nuclear security. I would like to point out that Egypt, in cooperation with the Agency, is nearing the completion of a regional Nuclear Security Training and Support Centre. Egypt also welcomes cooperation with the Agency in the field of nuclear safety. That work is of special importance in guaranteeing national capabilities to deal with nuclear and radiological emergencies. Egypt benefits substantially from cooperating with the IAEA to enhance its capacities in that regard.

Egypt would also like to highlight the importance of the support provided by the IAEA through regional cooperation agreements in the fields of nuclear energy and technology. We refer in particular to the African Regional Cooperative Agreement for Research, Development and Training Related to Nuclear Science and Technology, in which Egypt actively participates, which benefits regional cooperation within the African continent as well as with Arab States.

With regard to matters concerning nuclear non-proliferation, Egypt reiterates the importance of enhancing the efficiency and effectiveness of the Agency's comprehensive safeguards. We would like to recall in that regard the adoption by the fifty-eighth General Conference of the IAEA of Egypt's annual resolution regarding the application of IAEA safeguards in the Middle East. The implementation of the resolution would ensure that the remaining non-member State in the region accedes to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) as a non-nuclear-weapon State, and would affirm the urgent need for that State to agree forthwith to the application of comprehensive full-scope Agency safeguards to its nuclear facilities as an important confidence-building measure and as a step in enhancing peace and security in the context of the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.

Egypt is keen to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of the Agency's safeguards. It is vital that the mechanisms and measures aimed at achieving that goal are clear and transparent and are undertaken with the participation of all IAEA member States. Only that can guarantee full respect for the inalienable right of all States to development, research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, in accordance with article IV of the NPT. In that context, Egypt would also like to affirm that the development of Agency safeguards should not lead to the imposition of

additional obligations exceeding the current contractual obligations of member States.

Mr. Benítez Verson (Cuba) (*spoke in Spanish*): Cuba supports the important work of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and we welcome the new member States: Comoros, Djibouti, Guyana and Vanuatu.

Technical cooperation is one of the main pillars of the IAEA and should be given priority attention. In the 2012-2013 cycle, Cuba reached a high rate of implementation in its technical cooperation programme with the IAEA, a rate of 97.34 per cent. Latin America for its part, was the region that achieved the highest rate of project execution, 89.3 per cent. Our region can and should obtain more resources from the IAEA for technical cooperation.

Cuba has updated its national programming framework for technical cooperation during the 2014-2018 period, which is based on our country's efforts in the early detection and treatment of cancer, the leading cause of death in Cuba. We have given particular priority to the IAEA Programme of Action for Cancer Therapy. That Programme should be provided the financial resources necessary to broaden its scope and its results.

The criminal policy of the economic, commercial and financial embargo imposed by the Government of the United States against Cuba for more than five decades is affecting the implementation of our technical cooperation programme with the IAEA. The embargo significantly increases our country's difficulties in acquiring the necessary equipment for technical cooperation projects. That raises costs and delays implementation unnecessarily.

The effective management of nuclear security does not allow for any exclusions or selectivity. The international norms that govern nuclear security should be adopted within the framework of the IAEA, based on multilateral negotiations that are transparent and inclusive, with the participation of all States. Cuba welcomes the holding of the upcoming IAEA International Conference on Nuclear Security, which will take place in December 2016 with participation at the ministerial level.

The entry into force of the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, which Cuba ratified last year, will give

greater protection to nuclear installations and materials and facilitate cooperation between States to prevent and combat related crimes. We will continue to enhance our excellent cooperation with the IAEA in implementing projects for improved nuclear physical security and the control of our borders and the installations that have in Category 1 and Category 2 radioactive materials. In the context of the IAEA safeguards, for seven consecutive years, our country has obtained double certification and satisfactory results from IAEA inspections.

We must preserve the credibility of the IAEA's activities in the area of safeguards, ensuring impartial and professional updates in that area. Cuba supports the efforts to improve the efficiency of the safeguards, provided that that does not affect the legitimate rights of States nor establish any discriminatory or selective practices. The State-level concept of safeguards must be cautiously analysed by according due respect to the concerns of States in that regard.

We need greater efficiency and effectiveness in adopting IAEA decisions. That will involve enhancing the General Conference as the supreme legislative body, in which all member States participate. We also need to examine in depth the membership and functions of the Board of Governors.

We welcome the progress made in ongoing negotiations between the IAEA and the Islamic Republic of Iran. We encourage further progress in that process. We also reaffirm our firm support for establishing a Middle East nuclear-weapons-free zone. We deeply regret the fact that the conference on that issue, planned for 2012, has still not been held. That jeopardizes the credibility of the entire system established by the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Cuba encourages the holding of that conference without any further delay.

The existence of over 16,000 nuclear weapons continues to seriously threaten humanity with annihilation. That is why nuclear disarmament cannot be a goal that is continually postponed and made conditional. The only way to avoid the use, or threat of use, of such weapons is their total elimination and prohibition under strict international verification. It is up to the IAEA to play an important role in achieving that goal.

In conclusion, I want to emphasize the fact that Cuba will remain steadfast in the battle to achieve a

world free of nuclear weapons. That is our commitment to future generations.

Ms. Babio (Argentina) (*spoke in Spanish*): Argentina wishes to express its appreciation of and support for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and to thank the Agency for its annual report for 2013 (see A/69/255). Argentina believes that the IAEA has played a central role with regard to in non-proliferation and international cooperation for scientific and technological development in the nuclear field.

Its effective monitoring of nuclear activities is essential, for example, to meet nuclear security goals. Our country has steadily maintained that the leadership role in articulating the future design of the nuclear security architecture should be the responsibility of the IAEA. It is the relevant body in the United Nations system in the field of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

Argentina believes that one of the pillars of the Agency's work is nuclear and radiation security and the safe transport and handling of radioactive waste - areas that my country thinks are very important - as well as international cooperation in that field. The IAEA plays a key role in promoting nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, and our country contributes significantly to the work of the Agency with experts and services, and is a regional reference point.

Since the establishment of the IAEA in 1957, Argentina has actively participated in its technical cooperation programme through its technical agencies. Our active presence there has allowed us to finance a large number of national and regional projects, as has our participation as a donor to third countries through the IAEA, including to programmes within the Regional Cooperation Agreement for the Promotion of Nuclear Science and Technology in Latin America and the Caribbean.

As a point of interest with regard to the technical cooperation programme for the biennium 2014-2015, we are participating in 20 technical cooperation projects at the national, regional and interregional levels. Argentina is also up to date with its financial obligations for technical cooperation and has made advance payments for its voluntary contributions to the IAEA Technical Cooperation Fund for 2015 and 2016.

In addition, our country has actively participated in the work of expert groups in the areas of power reactors, research reactors, nuclear fuel cycles and the development of infrastructure. I will highlight the current promotion of regional training with the promotion of the online platform of our main training reactor, the RA-6. We also play a key role in LANET, the Latin American Network for Education in Nuclear Technology. Argentina believes that we should join forces so as to generate more solid, effective and sustainable long-term nuclear infrastructure.

International guarantees constitute another pillar of the Agency. Along with nuclear and radiological safety, they are especially important for enhancing nuclear development. Argentina would like to reiterate in concluding that those guarantees must be anchored in an atmosphere of cooperation dialogue between the Agency and member States.

Mr. Al-Taie (Iraq) (*spoke in Arabic*): My Government would like to express its gratitude to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and to its Director General, Mr. Yukiya Amano, and its Secretariat for producing the Agency's annual report for 2013 (see A/69/255). We appreciate the work of the Agency during the period covered by the report, particularly its activities concerning safeguards, verification, and nuclear safety and security, and in the areas of science and technology and technological cooperation. That work allows member States to enjoy progress and growth.

My delegation reasserts the inalienable rights of the parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) to produce and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and to develop cooperative projects and national programmes in that field, in particular in developing countries, free from the imposition by certain States of obstacles, monopolies or conditions that could endanger the interests of developing States.

We reaffirm the importance of the principles of balance and mutual assistance in the activities of the Agency with respect to budgetary matters. Any attempt to reduce the technical cooperation programme or its budget will not be favourably received. We hope that funding resources will be predictable, safe and exact, and that there will be some increase in the regular budget so as to reduce the gap between resources and needs. We hope that the working group responsible for the budget, which began its work earlier this year, will be successful.

The use of new technology, along with developments in the area of food security, disease prevention and biomedical management, should bring benefits to all peoples of the planet. We would therefore like to thank the IAEA and its technical cooperation programme for their training and development programmes for Arab countries and Asia. The implementation rate of those programmes in Iraq is approaching 100 per cent.

With a view to reducing radioactive waste, we have been working for seven years with experts from the IAEA and friendly countries, including European Union countries, to dismantle nuclear sites built by the previous Iraqi nuclear programme. Despite the difficulties we have experienced with respect to security and the environment, considerable progress has been made in that area. The installations at Tuwaitha have been decommissioned, and we have an action plan agreed with the Agency for the remaining installations. Our Government is committed to improving security measures to spare future generations the effects of nuclear pollution from destroyed sites or the remnants of the 1991 and 2003 wars. All of the measures adopted have followed IAEA guidelines. We have also established a national commission to develop an overall strategy for managing nuclear waste, and we hope to be able to dispose of all such waste in a safe way.

We are also working on the peaceful use of nuclear energy with a view to harnessing it for medical, agricultural, industrial and environmental projects, and we call on the Agency to provide further assistance to Iraq in those areas. We reiterate that Iraq requires international support to decontaminate its environment.

Iraqi national institutions are also assessing the dangers of terrorist groups acquiring access to nuclear installations and material. That is being monitored by our national centre, which is headed by the Cabinet of Ministers.

Iraqi institutions are continuing their efforts to ensure the security and safety of our nuclear activities in accordance with our laws and executive powers. On 7 July, Iraq became a party to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. We have also ratified the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism. We have prepared a draft law to ratify the Convention on Nuclear Safety and the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, which will be submitted to the Parliament. In discussions with the Agency, we have

developed our nuclear safety and security programme with a view to better protecting the safety of our nuclear installations and nuclear material, as well as to gathering information and necessary data in that area. We have also made much progress towards ensuring that we have a national system for the management of dual-use and sensitive material subject to international conventions.

We reiterate the importance of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. It is vital that the parties to the Treaty submit their installations to inspection by the Agency. We also stress the need to implement Security Council resolution 487 (1981), which calls on Israel to put all its nuclear installations under the Agency's safeguards system, along with paragraph 14 of Council resolution 687 (1991), calling for a nuclear-weapon-free zone and a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. We stress as well the need to implement the Final Document of the 1995 NPT Review Conference and the decision taken in 2010 to implement the 1995 resolution on establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.

Regarding nuclear security, we pay tribute to the leading role being played by the IAEA and wish it success in implementing the Nuclear Security Plan 2014-2017.

The past three months have revealed a great deal about terrorist organizations and their activities. That has led the international community to reassess the threat to international peace and security that such groups represent and to adopt Security Council resolutions whose implementation requires coordinated efforts at the international level to combat terrorism and to limit the sources of funding of such groups and to combat their access to resources and weapons. We salute the efforts of the five permanent members of the Security Council and the European Union to establish an international alliance to combat terrorist organizations.

Ms. Bila (Ukraine): Ukraine supports the activities of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in promoting the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. We also take a positive view of the Agency's activities in all the main statutory areas: nuclear safety and security; nuclear science, technology and applications; and safeguards and nuclear verification. The Agency makes a significant contribution to the achievement of global development goals.

We acknowledge the Agency's central role in strengthening the global nuclear safety framework, particularly in the light of the accidents at the Chernobyl and Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plants. Ukraine considers it important to ensure that the development and use of nuclear energy takes place under strict safety and security conditions. We have a solid track record on maintaining safety and security at our nuclear facilities. All of our nuclear power plants are currently operating in regular mode, and we are in full compliance with our obligations under the Convention on Nuclear Safety, as was recently confirmed at the Sixth Review Meeting of the Contracting Parties to the Convention.

We reiterate our strong support for the Agency's technical cooperation programme. Ukraine values the Programme's in the responsible development of peaceful applications of nuclear technology in the areas of human health, food and agriculture, water management and strengthening nuclear and radiation safety. It serves as a powerful tool for the exchange of nuclear knowledge and capacity-building among member States.

The IAEA's regional and national technical cooperation projects have contributed significantly to nuclear safety and to improving the overall effectiveness of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in Ukraine. In 2014 and 2015 Ukraine has continued and will continue to work with the IAEA in areas such as radioactive waste management and nuclear power plant decommissioning; developing decontamination, recultivation and reconstruction infrastructure for existing uranium mines and former uranium production facilities; defining safety goals and regulatory strategies for nuclear power plants; and strengthening our radiation therapy dosimetry laboratory.

Minimizing the consequences of the Chernobyl accident, as well as the social and economic rehabilitation of territories contaminated by it, is a priority for the Government of Ukraine. Construction of a new safe confinement over the destroyed unit 4 of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant is currently under way, with completion planned for 2015. It will enable us to transform the object shelter into an environmentally and ecologically safe system. We continue to back ongoing regional projects for Europe within the IAEA's technical cooperation programme aimed at supporting a return to normal radiological environmental conditions for the areas affected by the Chernobyl accident as well

as decommissioning and waste management for the Chernobyl and A1 nuclear power plants.

Nuclear security is an important and integral part of the Agency's activity. Ukraine commends it for its work to assist States, at their request, in enhancing their national nuclear and radioactive security regimes and improving their physical protection of nuclear materials. We would like to emphasize the IAEA's important role in fostering international cooperation in that area. Ukraine welcomes the IAEA's adoption of its Nuclear Security Plan 2014-2017.

Proceeding from the understanding that the responsibility for nuclear security rests with individual States, Ukraine wishes to emphasize that all of its nuclear facilities are operating in regular mode. The relevant Ukrainian authorities have undertaken additional effective measures to ensure their nuclear security, including the reinforced physical protection of 15 power units in operation at four nuclear power plant sites.

Ukraine is fully committed to participating in effective multilateral action aimed at combating the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and considers the universalization of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to be of the utmost importance. We stress the paramount importance of the IAEA safeguards for providing effective control over sensitive materials and activities. The Agency's system of safeguards is a fundamental component of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime. We believe that, taken together, the comprehensive safeguards agreement and its additional protocol constitute the best standard for verification and that universal adherence to both instruments strengthens the global nuclear non-proliferation regime.

Ukraine supports the Agency's efforts to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of its safeguards system. We have taken note of the Director General's report in the Supplementary Document to the Report on the Conceptualization and Development of Safeguards Implementation at the State Level, and we commend the Agency's work aimed at further supporting the effective application of safeguards and expanding the possibility of accomplishing new tasks related to the development of nuclear technologies.

Ukraine does not recognize the illegitimately proclaimed Republic of Crimea or its illegal annexation as a constituent entity by the Russian Federation.

Ukraine's sovereignty, political independence, unity and territorial integrity were emphasized in resolution 68/262, on the territorial integrity of Ukraine, adopted on 27 March. The Russian Federation's illegal actions have violated the universally recognized principles and norms of international law, Russia's obligations under the Charter of the United Nations, and the bilateral and multilateral treaties guaranteeing Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity and the inviolability of its borders.

The Russian Federation has flagrantly violated the security assurances that it, together with the United States and the United Kingdom, provided to Ukraine in the memorandum signed in connection with Ukraine's accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The ongoing occupation of part of Ukraine's territory – the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, where Ukrainian nuclear facilities and material are located — undermines the non-proliferation regime established by the Treaty, to which Ukraine acceded as a non-nuclear-weapon State by accepting, pursuant to article III of the Treaty, the safeguards defined in the safeguards agreement and additional protocol between Ukraine and the IAEA.

In that connection, the Ukrainian side emphasizes, first, that according to the Constitution of Ukraine and Ukraine's law on securing the rights and freedoms of citizens and the legal regime in the temporarily occupied territory of Ukraine, Ukraine's sovereignty extends throughout its entire territory, which is indivisible and inviolable within its existing borders. Secondly, Ukraine retains jurisdiction over all nuclear facilities and materials - including the DR-100 research reactor and other nuclear facilities at the Sevastopol National University for Nuclear Energy and Industry — which are the property of Ukraine and are located in the temporarily occupied territory. Thirdly, the provisions of the safeguards agreement between Ukraine and the IAEA in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons remain fully effective and apply to all of the nuclear facilities and materials in Ukraine, including those located in the temporarily occupied territory of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol. Ukraine supports the IAEA's principled position on continuing to apply the safeguards to Ukrainian nuclear facilities and materials, in accordance with the norms of international law and the IAEA Statute and based on the fact that the Autonomous Republic of Crimea is an integral part of Ukraine.

I would like to emphasize that Ukraine prohibits throughout its territory — including the temporarily occupied Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol — the deployment of nuclear weapons and diversion of Ukrainian nuclear materials and facilities for military purposes, including the DR-100 research reactor and other nuclear facilities of the Sevastopol National University for Nuclear Energy and Industry. We therefore urge the Russian side to abstain from any actions that might lead to violations of the nuclear-free status of the part of Ukraine's territory occupied by the Russian Federation and might hamper the possibility of extending to Ukraine's nuclear facilities and materials the 21 February 1985 agreement between the former Soviet Union and the Agency and its additional protocol of 22 March 2000, .

The Fukushima Daiichi accident in 2011 resulted in widespread concern about the safety of nuclear power plants worldwide and triggered discussions about the feasibility of nuclear energy as a source of power generation. We would like to reiterate that nuclear power will continue to be an important component of Ukraine's energy strategy in the middle and long term and will continue to serve as a basis for the sustainable development of our national economy. Its growing importance has been reflected in the updated energy strategy of Ukraine for the period until 2030.

In conclusion, we would like to join other delegations in welcoming the IAEA report to the sixty-ninth session of the General Assembly (see A/69/255) and to express our appreciation for the work done by the Agency.

Mr. Percaya (Indonesia): I would like to begin by expressing my delegation's sincere thanks to the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for presenting the Agency's comprehensive annual report (see A/69/255) and for his statement (see A/69/PV.37), both of which contain important information about the activities of the Agency during 2013 and 2014. We look forward to continuing to work closely with Ambassador Amano and to strengthening the established cooperation between Indonesia and the IAEA.

The IAEA has a vital role to play in assisting and promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear science and technology, especially in developing countries, including Indonesia. For Indonesia, nuclear technology is a valuable tool for addressing many aspects of our

national development programmes, particularly in the areas of health, food and agriculture, water resources management, environmental protection and industry. Among the applications for ensuring food security and improving people's livelihoods, Indonesia has been using radiation-induced mutation and other nuclear and radioisotope techniques to increase crop quality and productivity. We are also enhancing irradiation technology applications for the sanitary and phytosanitary treatment of agricultural products.

We continue to have great confidence in the usefulness of nuclear technologies and the synergies fostered by international cooperation in the nuclear field, for which the work of the IAEA is critical. Indonesia commends the Agency's various activities in the field of applying nuclear technology to the areas of food security and agriculture, disease prevention and control, water resources and environmental management, and radioisotope and radiation technology. We also commend the progress made by the Agency in nuclear energy development and welcome the assistance provided to member States interested in launching and expanding nuclear power programmes.

Owing to the growth of the industrial sector in Indonesia, there is increasing demand for energy. We are determined to harness nuclear energy as part of the national energy mix in order to secure our energy supply, and we intend to introduce nuclear power plants for that purpose. We are especially thankful to the IAEA for providing Indonesia with technical assistance in infrastructure development, which is one of the important steps in the introduction of nuclear power plants. Indeed, the IAEA Department of Technical Cooperation plays an indispensable role as the Agency's main vehicle for delivering on the Agency's mandate to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear technology, especially in the developing regions of the world. There is a need for all of us to continue supporting the IAEA's resources for technical cooperation.

Ensuring that nuclear science and technology are used exclusively for peaceful purposes is a statutory function of the Agency. We therefore appreciate the IAEA's activities to verify that States are fully complying with their non-proliferation obligations and to confirm that nuclear material is being used for peaceful purposes. We are convinced that the Agency's safeguards have contributed to strengthening collective security and have helped to create an environment conducive to nuclear cooperation.

With respect to the IAEA's function in the area of nuclear safety, Indonesia welcomes its activities undertaken to establish safety standards. We recognize the Agency's central role in promoting international cooperation, coordinating international efforts to strengthen global nuclear safety, and providing expertise and advice in that field. We also welcome the progress made on the implementation of the IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear Safety. While the primary responsibility for nuclear safety is in the hands of each State, we believe that the IAEA's role in assuring the safety of all nuclear activities worldwide should be enhanced and strengthened to the extent mandated by its Statute.

Turning to the Agency's activities in the area of nuclear security, our view is that while the responsibility of ensuring nuclear security within a State lies primarily with its Government, international cooperation and coordination to ensure nuclear security worldwide are crucial, and the IAEA again has a central role to play in that regard. We are pleased that the IAEA has helped countries to reduce the risk of terrorists obtaining nuclear or radioactive materials and to prevent sabotage at nuclear facilities.

To conclude, we reiterate our appreciation of the IAEA, as its activities have greatly contributed to a more prosperous, secure and safe world. The IAEA needs our continued and strong support for fulfilling the mandate enshrined in its Statute, and Indonesia will continue to play its role in that regard.

The Acting President: We have heard the last speaker in the debate on agenda item 86. We shall now proceed to consider draft resolution A/69/L.7.

Before giving the floor to the speakers in explanation of vote before the vote, may I remind delegations that explanations of vote are limited to 10 minutes and should be made by delegations from their seats.

Mr. An Myong Hun (Democratic People's Republic of Korea): The delegation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea would like to state its position on draft resolution A/69/L.7, entitled "Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency". This statement will also constitute my delegation's reply to irrelevant and even hostile statements made by some delegations, including those of Japan and South Korea, concerning the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula. The delegation of the Democratic People's Republic of

Korea rejects those statements and therefore also rejects the draft resolution.

The possession of nuclear deterrence by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is the result of the hostility of the United States against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, which is why the solution to the nuclear issue depends entirely on the withdrawal of the United States' hostile policy. Nevertheless, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) submits every year to the General Assembly the same partial and unjust resolution, in step with the hostile policy of the United States, designed to disarm and destroy the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Since the IAEA's action is devoid of impartiality and objectivity, it has lost its integrity.

It was the United States and the IAEA that created suspicions about our peaceful nuclear facilities, and it was also they who forced my country to take self-defensive measures to withdraw from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. We have never recognized the resolutions of the Security Council and the Board of Governors of the IAEA on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. As we have made clear, the nuclear issue of the Korean peninsula is the product of the United States' hostile policy and its nuclear threats against my country, and we were compelled to possess nuclear deterrence in order to defend our sovereignty and right to exist.

As long as the United States hostile policy persists, peace and security on the Korean peninsula and in its surrounding region cannot be expected, nor can a solution to the nuclear issue. The hostile policy of the United States, including the aggressive joint military exercises against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, must be totally eliminated if the danger of nuclear war is to be removed from the Korean peninsula.

If the United States continues to threaten and blackmail the Democratic People's Republic of Korea with nuclear weapons, we will continue to exercise the right to self-defence by strengthening our nuclear deterrence capabilities. If the IAEA wants to see a proper solution to the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula, it must take a fair stance by questioning the move of the United States, which created the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula and continues to threaten my country with nuclear weapons.

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea delegation wishes to again put on record its

opposition to draft resolution A/69/L.7 concerning the IAEA report.

The Acting President: We have heard the only speaker in explanation of vote before the vote.

The Assembly will now take a decision on draft resolution A/69/L.7, entitled "Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency".

I give the floor to the representative of the Secretariat.

Mr. Zhang Saijin (Department for General Assembly and Conference Management): I should like to announce that since the submission of the draft resolution, in addition to those delegations listed in the document, the following countries have also become sponsors of draft resolution A/69/L.7: Colombia, Iceland, Liechtenstein, the Republic of Moldova, the Russian Federation and San Marino.

The Acting President: May I take it that the General Assembly decides to adopt draft resolution A/69/L.7?

Draft resolution A/69/L.7 was adopted (resolution 69/7).

The Acting President: I now call on those representatives who have requested to speak in exercise the right of reply. May I remind members that statements in the exercise of the right of reply are limited to 10 minutes for the first intervention and to five minutes for the second intervention and should be made by delegations from their seats.

Mrs. Jakubonė (Lithuania): Lithuania exercises its right of reply with regard to the statement delivered by the representative of Belarus (see A/69/PV.37). Countries developing new nuclear energy projects are expected to follow the principles of transparency and responsibility. Each country has the right to develop nuclear energy, provided that international obligations on nuclear safety are not forgotten and national decisions are taken in a broader context of possible transboundary implications. That is why we express our concern when nuclear energy installations in closed neighbourhoods are being constructed without the proper implementation of international conventions, nuclear safety standards and dialogue with neighbours. The lack of transparency and essential information, especially on site selection, seismic evaluation and emergency preparedness plans, are disturbing.

Confidence-building and maximum safety are crucial for nuclear energy development. The implementation of the safety standards of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), adherence to the Convention on Nuclear Safety and cooperation with specialized IAEA missions for the whole nuclear fuel cycle, including site safety, should become inseparable from any nuclear power programme. Therefore, acknowledging that it is our common interest to ensure a maximum safety level in nuclear power plants, we call on all countries implementing nuclear energy projects to use the instruments provided by the IAEA and international conventions from the very beginning of the project in order to guarantee a safe environment and the safe use of nuclear energy.

Mr. Pankin (Russian Federation) (*spoke in Russian*): Frankly, we are amazed that the Ukrainian delegation has once again used any available opportunity presented by the United Nations platform for its rhetoric and insinuations and for raising issues that are not relevant to the agenda item. I do not wish to enter into polemics, but I need to make a few comments with regard to the status of nuclear installations in Crimea.

The agreement of 21 February 1985 between the Soviet Union and the International Atomic Energy Agency and its additional protocol of 22 March 2000 have covered all the territory of the Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol as subjects of the Russian Federation since 18 March. Russia, acting in a spirit of openness and cooperation, has worked with the Secretariat of the IAEA on the status of the nuclear installations in the Republic of Crimea and Sevastopol and on establishing peaceful conditions in which IAEA safeguards can be possible, in accordance with the agreement between us and the IAEA. Therefore, the situation is fully in line with international law.

Secondly, according to the voluntary decision of the people of Crimea to unite with Russia, in the referendum of 16 March, which was carried out in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, and the agreement of 18 March to absorb Crimea into the Russian Federation, the territory of the Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol are under the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation. Therefore, Russia has taken full responsibility for nuclear installations in its new territories. Furthermore, the Russian Federation is ready to provide the Agency, if it so requests, with any information on the nuclear material being used. That is

all provided for in the agreement between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the IAEA of 1985.

Regarding the suggestion that the actions of the Russian Federation highlight the instability of the whole concept of negative safety guarantees for non-nuclear States and thereby destroy the nuclear non-proliferation regime, it is worth noting that the only common component of the Budapest Memorandum and the concept of negative guarantees in the classical meaning is the commitment not to use nuclear weapons or threaten to use them against non-nuclear-weapon States. The Russian Federation's promise to Ukraine in that regard has in no way been violated. The remaining commitments under the Budapest Memorandum represent the principles of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and have nothing to do with the concept of negative safeguards in particular or with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in general. Therefore, claims that the actions

of the Russian Federation undermine the nuclear non-proliferation regime are inconsistent and not in good faith.

Ms. Bila (Ukraine): I am not going to get into a long speech to explain how what has just been said are lies. I will briefly explain that the agreement between Ukraine and the International Atomic Energy Agency is the main document regulating and providing safeguards relating to objects located on the occupied territory, and that was determined by the territory. Therefore, it is not for anyone in this Hall to speak about any documents between Russia and the Agency concerning objects that are on Ukrainian territory.

The Acting President: May I take it that it is the wish of the General Assembly to conclude its consideration of agenda item 86?

It was so decided.

The meeting rose at 4.15 p.m.