

UNODA OCCASIONAL PAPERS

No. 15, MARCH 2009

DEVELOPING A BIOLOGICAL INCIDENT DATABASE

23 October 2008, United Nations, New York

UNODA
United Nations Office for
Disarmament Affairs

Organized by the
United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs

In cooperation with the
NGO Committee on Disarmament, Peace and Security



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Contents

Foreword	v
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Presentation

Development of a Biological Incident Database in the context of the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy <i>Franz Kolar and Karin Hjalmarsson</i>	3
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General Assembly resolutions

Excerpt from the General Assembly resolution on the 2005 World Summit Outcome (A/RES/60/1)	19
The United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy of 8 September 2006, including Plan of Action (A/RES/60/288)	23
The United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy (resolution adopted on 5 September 2008 after first biennial review) (A/RES/62/272)	37

Reports of the Secretary-General

Excerpt from the report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change (A/59/565)	43
Excerpt from the report of the Secretary-General entitled “In larger freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all” (A/59/2005)	55
Excerpt from the report of the Secretary-General entitled “Uniting against terrorism: recommendations for a global counter-terrorism strategy” (A/60/825)	71
Excerpt from the report of the Secretary-General entitled “United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy: activities of the United Nations system in implementing the Strategy” (A/62/898)	83

Appendices

Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force members	93
Biological Incident Database form	95

Foreword

The United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy was adopted by Member States on 8 September 2006, in the form of a resolution and an annexed Plan of action (A/RES/60/288). It is a unique global instrument intended to enhance national, regional and international efforts to counter terrorism. The Strategy builds on the resolve of Member States “to consistently, unequivocally and strongly condemn terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, committed by whomever, wherever and for whatever purposes, as it constitutes one of the most serious threats to international peace and security” (para. 1 of the Plan of action). Additionally, the Strategy sets forth concrete measures to address the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism and to strengthen the individual and collective capacity of States and the United Nations to prevent and combat it—while ensuring the protection of human rights and upholding the rule of law.

Among the measures set forth related to biological threats, this publication addresses bioincidents. Paragraph II of the Plan of action invites, inter alia, “the United Nations system to develop, together with Member States, a single comprehensive database on biological incidents, ensuring that it is complementary to the biocrimes database contemplated by the International Criminal Police Organization”.

To that end, a template of the Biological Incident Database (BID) has been developed based on proposals by experts from interested Member States and on public information available in case studies. Its aim is to raise awareness and build capacity with respect to preparedness, risk assessment and consequence management of biological incidents. Its purpose is to strengthen the capabilities of States to prevent and combat terrorism. The BID form has been reproduced in appendix II of this volume and will be available online upon request by contacting Mr. Franz Kolar through UNODA-web@un.org.

On 23 October 2008 in the margins of the First Committee during the 63rd session of the General Assembly, the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs and the NGO Committee on Disarmament, Peace and International Security jointly sponsored a presentation for all interested delegations and civil society representatives to intro-

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duce the template of the database. This publication reproduces the presentation in narrative, together with graphics from the power point display.

UNODA Occasional Papers No. 15 was issued with a view to reaching a wider audience than those who were able to attend the presentation.

- Ed.

PRESENTATION

Development of a Biological Incident Database in the context of the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy¹

Franz Kolar* and Karin Hjalmarsson**

Abstract

As part of the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, UNODA is developing an online Biological Incident Database (BID). To assist Member States in preventing and combating terrorism, BID categorizes the causes of disease outbreaks as natural, accidental or deliberate. It provides a platform for information sharing, fostering a better understanding of the range of biological incidents as well as past responses and lessons learned. BID should serve as an invaluable preparation tool should a similar incident occur in the future. UNODA hopes that Member States will use the available pilot system of BID and provide feedback.

ON 21 OCTOBER 2008, the Secretary-General gave a speech at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University on “Securing the Common Good in a Time of Global Crises”. He stated that: “Terrorism is another threat that can affect anyone, anywhere at any time. Combined with the threat of weapons of mass destruction, it is perhaps the most serious threat to international peace and security.”

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** *Ms. Hjalmarsson is a microbiologist in the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs.*

¹ Adapted from a presentation made on 23 October 2008 by the authors.

Combating terrorism has been on the United Nations agenda for years. In 2004, a High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change recommended that the Secretary-General promote a comprehensive Global Strategy to strengthen the ability of States to counter terrorism and promote the rule of law while protecting human rights (see A/59/565, section V: Nuclear, radiological, chemical and biological weapons, on p. 43).²

A/RES/60/288, *inter alia*, invited the United Nations system to develop, together with Member States, a single comprehensive database on biological incidents ensuring that it is complementary to the biocrimes database contemplated by Interpol.

In March 2005, the anniversary of the Madrid train bombings, when more than 1,600 people were killed and maimed, the Secretary-General set out the elements of such a strategy. Through his report, “In larger freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all”

(see A/59/2005, section III: Freedom from fear, on p. 55), he urged Member States to adopt these elements. Later that year the Member States met for the World Summit 2005.³ As an outcome of the Summit, the States agreed to develop the Secretary-General’s suggestions and submit proposals for strengthening the capacity of the United Nations system to combat terrorism (see A/RES/60/1, section III: Peace and collective security, on p. 19). The Secretary-General then submitted the report “Uniting against terrorism: recommendations for a global counter-terrorism strategy” (see A/60/825, section III: Denying terrorists the means to carry out an attack, on p. 71), further illustrating increased coordination of Member States’ counter-terrorism efforts. Subsequently, in September 2006, the General Assembly adopted by consensus A/RES/60/288, “The United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy” (see text on p. 23), whereby States agreed to take a set of concrete measures to address terrorism in all its aspects.

² This and all subsequent United Nations documents are available in their entirety at <http://ods.un.org>.

³ World Summit 2005 was High-level Plenary Meeting of the General Assembly, held 14-16 September 2005, to review the progress made towards the commitments in the Millennium Declaration. Further information is available at <http://www.un.org/summit2005>.

In 2008, the General Assembly adopted A/RES/62/272 (see text on p. 37), which reconfirmed the UN Strategy, urged the institutionalization of the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF) and stressed that its activities were to be carried out through regular interaction with Member States. Through the resolution, the General Assembly also reiterated the same message: "... its strong condemnation of terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, committed by whomever, wherever and for whatever purposes, as it constitutes one of the most serious threats to international peace and security."

The Security Council had passed a number of resolutions, whereby several subsidiary bodies were established. For example, United Nations Security Council resolution (UNSCR) 1267 (1999) established what is known as the "Al-Qaida and Taliban Sanctions Committee"; UNSCR 1373 (2001) created the Counter-Terrorism Committee to bolster the ability of Member States to prevent terrorist acts; and UNSCR 1540 (2004) established the "1540 Committee" to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery.

Since its adoption, the United Nations system has contributed to the implementation of the Counter-Terrorism Strategy in two ways:

1. Departments, Specialized Agencies and Funds and Programmes have taken action within their own work plans, both individually and in partnerships.
2. Twenty-four entities of the United Nations system and the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol) have collaborated through the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force.

United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA)

UNODA is a member of the UN system-wide CTITF and a member of its working group on preventing and responding to weapons of mass destruction (WMD) attacks (see appendix I for the list of CTITF members). Together with Member States, UNODA has been given the task of developing a single comprehensive database on biological incidents that is complimentary to the biocrimes database contemplated by Interpol.

Four pillars of the Counter-Terrorism Strategy

- Address conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism
- **Prevent and combat terrorism**
- Build State's capacity to prevent and combat terrorism and strengthen the role of the UN
- Ensure respect for human rights for all and the rule of law, as the basis in the fight against terrorism

This part falls under the second pillar of the Counter-Terrorism Strategy's plan of action to prevent and combat terrorism. As there is no single, internationally recognized definition of the term "biological incident", the working definition for the database is: an event in which a biological agent harms or threatens to harm humans, livestock or agricultural or economic assets.

Member States might develop a definition of "biological agent" in connection with the bioincident database but, for the purpose of this presentation, "biological agents" could be bacteria, viruses or parasites as well as toxins or other biological substances.

Purpose/goal of the Biological Incident Database (BID)

In supporting the measures to prevent and combat terrorism, the development of a biological incident database provides for a format for bioincident information sharing, and thereby promotes better understanding of the range of incidents as well as past responses and lessons learned.

BID aims to provide information that will help Member States to prevent and combat terrorism.


The data may also be useful in the fields of detection, protection, containment and management of events involving biological incidents, thus strengthening the response capabilities of Member States.

As Member States possess detailed information on biological incidents that have occurred, the BID offers an exchange opportunity for knowledge and information sharing. This can be useful for entities such as law enforcement, emergency response, customs, transportation and public health.

Another added value of the database is that Member States may add information on assistance, which could be used for capacity-building.

As a result of information retrieved from the database, States could initiate outreach activities and training to further build capacity. As no such international comprehensive resource database currently exists to prevent and combat terrorism, the BID can fill that void.

Biological Incidents



The spectrum of bioincidents can be divided into three major groups, depending on the cause of the incident:

1. Disease outbreaks due to natural causes

These are diseases naturally occurring. These include re-emerging infectious diseases, thought to have been under control or eradicated, as well as newly emerging diseases, in a susceptible population (examples are HIV and SARS). Presently, there are huge concerns for a species-shift of the Avian flu virus that would enable it to efficiently infect and spread among humans.

2. Disease-outbreaks due to accidents

These are incidents connected to human activities, such as handling infectious agents at a facility. Release of an agent into the environment, or exposure of individuals, could occur through incidents or accidents with breach of safety barriers and containment. When recognized that an agent is released or individuals are exposed, it is usually investigated to determine the cause and possibly establish whether appropriate procedures had been followed, as well as to identify improvements in safety barriers. Safety barriers may also be breached through lack of awareness or neglect of established regulations, guidelines or protocols.


3. Incidents related to deliberate release or misuse of disease-causing agents

This encompasses a wide range of different incidents—from an unauthorized shipment, illegal possession of an agent and deliberate use of an agent to harm—infecting one or more individuals or causing mass fatalities.

Natural

Natural disease outbreaks following normal patterns

Infectious diseases have existed throughout the history of humankind and are caused by many different kinds of microbes and



parasites. The international community deals with disease outbreaks by natural causes on a daily basis.

Due to travel, migration, urbanization and global trade, disease outbreaks are spreading faster and more easily. Global health has become a challenge. For rapid intervention and control, systems and mechanisms for surveillance, disease reporting, early warning and response have all been developed and are implemented globally.

Bioincidents, in the form of disease outbreaks due to natural causes, could be of two types:

1. those following normal patterns
2. those with a pattern deviating from the normal; the so-called unusual disease outbreaks.

The latter, unusual disease outbreaks, might be of special interest for the Bioincident Database.

Unusual disease outbreaks – deviating from the normal pattern

Natural unusual disease outbreaks are of concern as they could initially be perceived as caused by a deliberate use. Such concerns have been voiced for some outbreaks.

However, in most cases the outbreaks have been shown to deviate from normal patterns because of:

- Unusual or rare infection route

In 2006, an individual that became ill was hospitalized and confirmed as having had inhaled Anthrax, which raised concern as this type of infection is extremely rare. An investigation was launched that involved health departments in coordination with law enforcement. The investigation of the case revealed that the patient was working with unprocessed hides in a confined space. The work generated dust, which could have spread Anthrax. To support this, the individual's apartment, a studio in a warehouse where he worked with the hides, and a van used for transport both tested positive for Bacillus anthracis. Officials suggested that the case was isolated and discounted terrorism.

- Re-emergence of an agent after a long period of absence

- First-time appearance of a disease-causing agent in a susceptible population
 - *In 2000, there was a large outbreak (several hundred cases) of rabbit fever, or tularemia, in a conflict area. This raised the question of the outbreak's origin and its epidemiological characteristics. Public health records going back as far as 1946 disclosed no prior reports of the disease in this area. Some authorities expressed concern over possible intentional use of a causative agent, which could be categorized as a biothreat agent. The epidemiological investigation performed suggested that the source of the outbreak was rodents, and that the transmission occurred through contaminated food or water.*
 - *In the late summer and fall of 1999, the first known outbreak of West Nile virus-borne encephalitis was reported in the Western Hemisphere. West Nile fever is a mosquito-borne infection that can cause serious illness and, in some cases, death. A striking feature of the initial human epidemic was the high number of avian deaths in the accompanying epizootic. Analysis indicated that a single viral strain was introduced and circulated during the outbreak. How the West Nile virus was introduced is not known. However, the nucleotide sequence of the virus isolated during this outbreak was most similar to that of a 1998 isolate from another part of the world.*
- Lastly, an outbreak deviating from the normal pattern could also be caused by the appearance of a hitherto unknown agent in a population. This was the case when the HIV and SARS viruses entered the human population.

Data on "lessons learned" can provide a better preparation for similar future events.

The unusual pattern of the disease outbreak could be seen in the form of:

- An unusually high number of cases

A large outbreak of Q fever (Coxiella burnetii infection) occurred in 2007 with approximately 170 cases reported, as opposed to normally 5-20 cases per year in the affected country. In 2008, an even larger outbreak occurred, with almost 700 cases reported, denoting the largest outbreak of Q fever ever reported worldwide.

- An unusual time curve for an outbreak with a rapid onset, causing many people to become ill at the same time
- Specific groups of individuals affected
- An unusual time of the year for an outbreak of a disease that normally has a seasonal pattern.

To assist in assessing or resolving a situation with unusual disease-outbreaks, it would be useful to have their descriptions and lessons learned in the database.

In addition to seven specified diseases, 194 States Parties to the International Health Regulations (2005) are obliged to report to the World Health Organization (WHO) any unusual disease outbreaks and unusual clusters of cases with the potential to impact international public health.


Another reporting mechanism is through annual confidence-building measures under the Biological Weapons Convention, which has 163 States parties.

Accidental/human activities source

Release of biological agents could occur through accidents or incidents at facilities handling the agents or during their shipment or transport.

Laboratory or facility incident

Breaches of safety barriers and of containment in facilities or laboratories can be caused by accidents and result in the release of or exposure to a disease-causing agent. Other breaches of barriers at facilities occur when established regulations, guidelines and procedures are neglected, as well as the lack of risk awareness associated with the work performed.



There are reports on the release of infectious agents from laboratories or facilities through accidents, resulting in exposure and infection of facility workers.

In 2006, a laboratory had an incident that caused an infection of a laboratory worker with the causative agent of Malta fever (or undulant fever), Brucella. During the investigation, it was revealed that a number of workers tested positive for Q fever agent components, suggesting that exposure had taken place for this agent as well.

Also, facility accidents have released disease-causing agents into the environment, which in one well-known case led to the infection of livestock in the vicinity of a facility.


In August 2007, there was an outbreak of Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD). During the investigation, work was performed at an analytical laboratory to identify the strain of the virus. According to published reports, once their test results identified the FMD virus strain it became clear that the laboratory itself—the only known location where this strain is held in the country—was the likely source. Two independent reviews, commissioned by the authorities, con-

Research and analysis of data on biological incidents can support Member States with capacity-building.

cluded that the virus had most likely leaked out from drainage pipe work at the laboratory facility, contaminating the surrounding soil, and was then carried by vehicles from the site to the proximity of the farm where the outbreak started.

Deliberate

Several types of bioincidents may be regarded as deliberate, or in breach of international treaties, agreements and national legislation aimed at eliminating the risk of misusing biological agents for hostile purposes.



Bioincidents range from unauthorized acquisition and possession to the actual misuse of agents to cause harm in individuals, animals or plants.

Unauthorized acquisition of a biological agent may occur through:

- Shipment
- Transfer or Smuggling

In 1997 the Rabbit Hemorrhagic Disease was confirmed in a country that was thought to be free from the infection. According to national authorities, the outbreak started with someone

smuggling Rabbit Hemorrhagic Disease into the country. Earlier this same year, an effort had been made by agricultural organizations to gain approval for the introduction of the disease to control the rabbit population on farms. However, it was rejected by the authorities.

- Sale
- Theft/Unauthorized possession of biological agents

In 1995, four people were arrested for possessing the biological toxin Ricin. In 2005, an individual pleaded guilty for its possession and in 2006, a man was sentenced for attempting to manufacture the toxin. Most recently, in August 2008, a man pleaded guilty to a count of possession of Ricin.

Deliberate misuse of biological agents may include:

- Planned use of a biological agent

In 2000, authorities discovered a machine used to place counterfeit approval stamps on expired and salmonella-carrying eggs for sale (with the assumed purpose of spreading salmonella).

- Threat of use

In 1999, a man was arrested on charges that he had threatened two judges with the use of Ricin. Inert materials that could be used to manufacture Ricin were seized from his house.

- Actual use of biological agents

In 1984, on two occasions in restaurants, salads and dressings were contaminated with salmonella. Following the second occasion, 751 individuals fell ill. Apparently, the perpetrators were aiming to manipulate a subsequent local election.


Between 1990 and 1995 the Aum Shinrikyo⁴ sect produced and attempted to use biological agents. They unsuccessfully aimed to spray what they believed to be botulinum toxin and Anthrax bacteria.

⁴ Aum Shinrikyo is the Japanese religious movement that gained international notoriety in 1995, when it carried out the sarin gas attack in the Tokyo subways.

In 2001, several letters containing dry-powdered Anthrax spores were sent through the postal system to news media offices and Governmental officials. At least 22 people developed Anthrax infections, five of whom died by inhaling the bacteria. According to public reporting, an analysis of the Anthrax strain linked it to a specific laboratory and individual.

Building the BID

In July 2007, 18 experts from interested Member States and representatives of international organizations met in New York to discuss issues surrounding the BID development.



Informal discussions were held on the scope and timeliness of a database system, data submission from Member States, a database template and suggested next steps.

During the expert discussions, different opinions ranged from data security and how to handle it, to the database format itself. Technical experts recommended the input of narratives (as opposed to only check boxes or single field data) to broaden the scope of information. A direction for the initial stages of the development was provided and a pilot database entry system created (see A/62/898, section III: Measures to prevent and combat terrorism, on p. 83). Member States can now enter test data with User IDs, passwords and a data link provided by UNODA.

The BID is web based, with pre-defined data entry fields. Its content comprises information on:

- Type of biological incident;
- Organism/Toxin delivery method;
- Methods of discovery, detection;
- Impact (casualties, economic);
- Geographic areas affected;
- History/development of incident; and
- Consequence management, which pertains to measures such as quarantine, destruction, decontamination.

Next steps include:

- Expanding the network of contact points;
- Continued cooperation with Interpol;
- Data entry by Member States;
- Implementation of improvements/changes; and
- A data retrieval application, including search capabilities.

The UN Office for Disarmament Affairs hopes that the Member States will use the available pilot system of the Biological Incident Database and provide feedback.

**GENERAL ASSEMBLY
RESOLUTIONS**

Excerpt from the General Assembly resolution on the 2005 World Summit Outcome (A/RES/60/1)*

Terrorism

81. We strongly condemn terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, committed by whomever, wherever and for whatever purposes, as it constitutes one of the most serious threats to international peace and security.

82. We welcome the Secretary-General's identification of elements of a counter-terrorism strategy. These elements should be developed by the General Assembly without delay with a view to adopting and implementing a strategy to promote comprehensive, coordinated and consistent responses, at the national, regional and international levels, to counter terrorism, which also takes into account the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism. In this context, we commend the various initiatives to promote dialogue, tolerance and understanding among civilizations.

83. We stress the need to make every effort to reach an agreement on and conclude a comprehensive convention on international terrorism during the sixtieth session of the General Assembly.

84. We acknowledge that the question of convening a high-level conference under the auspices of the United Nations to formulate an international response to terrorism in all its forms and manifestations could be considered.

85. We recognize that international cooperation to fight terrorism must be conducted in conformity with international law, including the Charter and relevant international conventions and protocols. States must ensure that any measures taken to combat terrorism comply with their obligations under international law, in particular human rights law, refugee law and international humanitarian law.

* From section III: Peace and collective security.

86. We reiterate our call upon States to refrain from organizing, financing, encouraging, providing training for or otherwise supporting terrorist activities and to take appropriate measures to ensure that their territories are not used for such activities.

87. We acknowledge the important role played by the United Nations in combating terrorism and also stress the vital contribution of regional and bilateral cooperation, particularly at the practical level of law enforcement cooperation and technical exchange.

88. We urge the international community, including the United Nations, to assist States in building national and regional capacity to combat terrorism. We invite the Secretary-General to submit proposals to the General Assembly and the Security Council, within their respective mandates, to strengthen the capacity of the United Nations system to assist States in combating terrorism and to enhance the coordination of United Nations activities in this regard.

89. We stress the importance of assisting victims of terrorism and of providing them and their families with support to cope with their loss and their grief.

90. We encourage the Security Council to consider ways to strengthen its monitoring and enforcement role in counter-terrorism, including by consolidating State reporting requirements, taking into account and respecting the different mandates of its counter-terrorism subsidiary bodies. We are committed to cooperating fully with the three competent subsidiary bodies in the fulfilment of their tasks, recognizing that many States continue to require assistance in implementing relevant Security Council resolutions.

91. We support efforts for the early entry into force of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism³¹ and strongly encourage States to consider becoming parties to it

³¹ Resolution 59/290, annex.

expeditiously and acceding without delay to the twelve other international conventions and protocols against terrorism and implementing them.

...

*8th plenary meeting
16 September 2005*

The United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy of 8 September 2006, including Plan of Action (A/RES/60/288)

The General Assembly,

Guided by the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and reaffirming its role under the Charter, including on questions related to international peace and security,

Reiterating its strong condemnation of terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, committed by whomever, wherever and for whatever purposes, as it constitutes one of the most serious threats to international peace and security,

Reaffirming the Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism, contained in the annex to General Assembly resolution 49/60 of 9 December 1994, the Declaration to Supplement the 1994 Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism, contained in the annex to General Assembly resolution 51/210 of 17 December 1996, and the 2005 World Summit Outcome,¹ in particular its section on terrorism,

Recalling all General Assembly resolutions on measures to eliminate international terrorism, including resolution 46/51 of 9 December 1991, and Security Council resolutions on threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts, as well as relevant resolutions of the General Assembly on the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism,

Recalling also that, in the 2005 World Summit Outcome, world leaders rededicated themselves to support all efforts to uphold the sovereign equality of all States, respect their territorial integrity and political independence, to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes

¹ See resolution 60/1.

and principles of the United Nations, to uphold the resolution of disputes by peaceful means and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, the right to self-determination of peoples which remain under colonial domination or foreign occupation, non-interference in the internal affairs of States, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for the equal rights of all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion, international cooperation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural or humanitarian character, and the fulfilment in good faith of the obligations assumed in accordance with the Charter,

Recalling further the mandate contained in the 2005 World Summit Outcome that the General Assembly should develop without delay the elements identified by the Secretary-General for a counter-terrorism strategy, with a view to adopting and implementing a strategy to promote comprehensive, coordinated and consistent responses, at the national, regional and international levels, to counter terrorism, which also takes into account the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism,

Reaffirming that acts, methods and practices of terrorism in all its forms and manifestations are activities aimed at the destruction of human rights, fundamental freedoms and democracy, threatening territorial integrity, security of States and destabilizing legitimately constituted Governments, and that the international community should take the necessary steps to enhance cooperation to prevent and combat terrorism,

Reaffirming also that terrorism cannot and should not be associated with any religion, nationality, civilization or ethnic group,

Reaffirming further Member States' determination to make every effort to reach an agreement on and conclude a comprehensive convention on international terrorism, including by resolving the outstanding issues related to the legal definition and scope of the acts covered by the convention, so that it can serve as an effective instrument to counter terrorism,

Continuing to acknowledge that the question of convening a high-level conference under the auspices of the United Nations to

formulate an international response to terrorism in all its forms and manifestations could be considered,

Recognizing that development, peace and security, and human rights are interlinked and mutually reinforcing,

Bearing in mind the need to address the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism,

Affirming Member States' determination to continue to do all they can to resolve conflict, end foreign occupation, confront oppression, eradicate poverty, promote sustained economic growth, sustainable development, global prosperity, good governance, human rights for all and rule of law, improve intercultural understanding and ensure respect for all religions, religious values, beliefs or cultures,

1. *Expresses its appreciation* for the report entitled "Uniting against terrorism: recommendations for a global counter-terrorism strategy" submitted by the Secretary-General to the General Assembly;²

2. *Adopts* the present resolution and its annex as the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy ("the Strategy");

3. *Decides*, without prejudice to the continuation of the discussion in its relevant committees of all their agenda items related to terrorism and counter-terrorism, to undertake the following steps for the effective follow-up of the Strategy:

(a) To launch the Strategy at a high-level segment of its sixty-first session;

(b) To examine in two years progress made in the implementation of the Strategy, and to consider updating it to respond to changes, recognizing that many of the measures contained in the Strategy can be achieved immediately, some will require sustained work through the coming few years and some should be treated as long-term objectives;

(c) To invite the Secretary-General to contribute to the future deliberations of the General Assembly on the review of the implementation and updating of the Strategy;

² A/60/825.

(d) To encourage Member States, the United Nations and other appropriate international, regional and subregional organizations to support the implementation of the Strategy, including through mobilizing resources and expertise;

(e) To further encourage non-governmental organizations and civil society to engage, as appropriate, on how to enhance efforts to implement the Strategy;

4. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its sixty-second session an item entitled “The United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy”.

*99th plenary meeting
8 September 2006*

Annex

Plan of action

We, the States Members of the United Nations, resolve:

1. To consistently, unequivocally and strongly condemn terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, committed by whomever, wherever and for whatever purposes, as it constitutes one of the most serious threats to international peace and security;

2. To take urgent action to prevent and combat terrorism in all its forms and manifestations and, in particular:

(a) To consider becoming parties without delay to the existing international conventions and protocols against terrorism, and implementing them, and to make every effort to reach an agreement on and conclude a comprehensive convention on international terrorism;

(b) To implement all General Assembly resolutions on measures to eliminate international terrorism and relevant General Assembly resolutions on the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism;

(c) To implement all Security Council resolutions related to international terrorism and to cooperate fully with the counter-terrorism subsidiary bodies of the Security Council in the fulfilment of their

tasks, recognizing that many States continue to require assistance in implementing these resolutions;

3. To recognize that international cooperation and any measures that we undertake to prevent and combat terrorism must comply with our obligations under international law, including the Charter of the United Nations and relevant international conventions and protocols, in particular human rights law, refugee law and international humanitarian law.

I. Measures to address the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism

We resolve to undertake the following measures aimed at addressing the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism, including but not limited to prolonged unresolved conflicts, dehumanization of victims of terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, lack of the rule of law and violations of human rights, ethnic, national and religious discrimination, political exclusion, socio-economic marginalization and lack of good governance, while recognizing that none of these conditions can excuse or justify acts of terrorism:

1. To continue to strengthen and make best possible use of the capacities of the United Nations in areas such as conflict prevention, negotiation, mediation, conciliation, judicial settlement, rule of law, peacekeeping and peacebuilding, in order to contribute to the successful prevention and peaceful resolution of prolonged unresolved conflicts. We recognize that the peaceful resolution of such conflicts would contribute to strengthening the global fight against terrorism;

2. To continue to arrange under the auspices of the United Nations initiatives and programmes to promote dialogue, tolerance and understanding among civilizations, cultures, peoples and religions, and to promote mutual respect for and prevent the defamation of religions, religious values, beliefs and cultures. In this regard, we welcome the launching by the Secretary-General of the initiative on the Alliance of Civilizations. We also welcome similar initiatives that have been taken in other parts of the world;

3. To promote a culture of peace, justice and human development, ethnic, national and religious tolerance and respect for all religions, religious values, beliefs or cultures by establishing and

encouraging, as appropriate, education and public awareness programmes involving all sectors of society. In this regard, we encourage the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization to play a key role, including through inter-faith and intra-faith dialogue and dialogue among civilizations;

4. To continue to work to adopt such measures as may be necessary and appropriate and in accordance with our respective obligations under international law to prohibit by law incitement to commit a terrorist act or acts and prevent such conduct;

5. To reiterate our determination to ensure the timely and full realization of the development goals and objectives agreed at the major United Nations conferences and summits, including the Millennium Development Goals. We reaffirm our commitment to eradicate poverty and promote sustained economic growth, sustainable development and global prosperity for all;

6. To pursue and reinforce development and social inclusion agendas at every level as goals in themselves, recognizing that success in this area, especially on youth unemployment, could reduce marginalization and the subsequent sense of victimization that propels extremism and the recruitment of terrorists;

7. To encourage the United Nations system as a whole to scale up the cooperation and assistance it is already conducting in the fields of rule of law, human rights and good governance to support sustained economic and social development;

8. To consider putting in place, on a voluntary basis, national systems of assistance that would promote the needs of victims of terrorism and their families and facilitate the normalization of their lives. In this regard, we encourage States to request the relevant United Nations entities to help them to develop such national systems. We will also strive to promote international solidarity in support of victims and foster the involvement of civil society in a global campaign against terrorism and for its condemnation. This could include exploring at the General Assembly the possibility of developing practical mechanisms to provide assistance to victims.

II. Measures to prevent and combat terrorism

We resolve to undertake the following measures to prevent and combat terrorism, in particular by denying terrorists access to the means to carry out their attacks, to their targets and to the desired impact of their attacks:

1. To refrain from organizing, instigating, facilitating, participating in, financing, encouraging or tolerating terrorist activities and to take appropriate practical measures to ensure that our respective territories are not used for terrorist installations or training camps, or for the preparation or organization of terrorist acts intended to be committed against other States or their citizens;

2. To cooperate fully in the fight against terrorism, in accordance with our obligations under international law, in order to find, deny safe haven and bring to justice, on the basis of the principle of extradite or prosecute, any person who supports, facilitates, participates or attempts to participate in the financing, planning, preparation or perpetration of terrorist acts or provides safe havens;

3. To ensure the apprehension and prosecution or extradition of perpetrators of terrorist acts, in accordance with the relevant provisions of national and international law, in particular human rights law, refugee law and international humanitarian law. We will endeavour to conclude and implement to that effect mutual judicial assistance and extradition agreements and to strengthen cooperation between law enforcement agencies;

4. To intensify cooperation, as appropriate, in exchanging timely and accurate information concerning the prevention and combating of terrorism;

5. To strengthen coordination and cooperation among States in combating crimes that might be connected with terrorism, including drug trafficking in all its aspects, illicit arms trade, in particular of small arms and light weapons, including man-portable air defence systems, money-laundering and smuggling of nuclear, chemical, biological, radiological and other potentially deadly materials;

6. To consider becoming parties without delay to the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime³ and to the three protocols supplementing it,⁴ and implementing them;

7. To take appropriate measures, before granting asylum, for the purpose of ensuring that the asylum-seeker has not engaged in terrorist activities and, after granting asylum, for the purpose of ensuring that the refugee status is not used in a manner contrary to the provisions set out in section II, paragraph 1, above;

8. To encourage relevant regional and subregional organizations to create or strengthen counter-terrorism mechanisms or centres. Should they require cooperation and assistance to this end, we encourage the Counter-Terrorism Committee and its Executive Directorate and, where consistent with their existing mandates, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and the International Criminal Police Organization, to facilitate its provision;

9. To acknowledge that the question of creating an international centre to fight terrorism could be considered, as part of international efforts to enhance the fight against terrorism;

10. To encourage States to implement the comprehensive international standards embodied in the Forty Recommendations on Money-Laundering and Nine Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing of the Financial Action Task Force, recognizing that States may require assistance in implementing them;

11. To invite the United Nations system to develop, together with Member States, a single comprehensive database on biological incidents, ensuring that it is complementary to the biocrimes database contemplated by the International Criminal Police Organization. We also encourage the Secretary-General to update the roster of experts and laboratories, as well as the technical guidelines and procedures, available to him for the timely and efficient investigation of alleged use. In addition, we note the importance of the proposal of the Secretary-General to bring together, within the framework of the United Nations, the major biotechnology stakeholders, including industry, the scientific community, civil society and Governments, into a common

³ Resolution 55/25, annex I.

⁴ Resolution 55/25, annexes II and III; and resolution 55/255, annex.

programme aimed at ensuring that biotechnology advances are not used for terrorist or other criminal purposes but for the public good, with due respect for the basic international norms on intellectual property rights;

12. To work with the United Nations with due regard to confidentiality, respecting human rights and in compliance with other obligations under international law, to explore ways and means to:

(a) Coordinate efforts at the international and regional levels to counter terrorism in all its forms and manifestations on the Internet;

(b) Use the Internet as a tool for countering the spread of terrorism, while recognizing that States may require assistance in this regard;

13. To step up national efforts and bilateral, subregional, regional and international cooperation, as appropriate, to improve border and customs controls in order to prevent and detect the movement of terrorists and prevent and detect the illicit traffic in, inter alia, small arms and light weapons, conventional ammunition and explosives, and nuclear, chemical, biological or radiological weapons and materials, while recognizing that States may require assistance to that effect;

14. To encourage the Counter-Terrorism Committee and its Executive Directorate to continue to work with States, at their request, to facilitate the adoption of legislation and administrative measures to implement the terrorist travel-related obligations and to identify best practices in this area, drawing whenever possible on those developed by technical international organizations, such as the International Civil Aviation Organization, the World Customs Organization and the International Criminal Police Organization;

15. To encourage the Committee established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1267 (1999) to continue to work to strengthen the effectiveness of the travel ban under the United Nations sanctions regime against Al-Qaida and the Taliban and associated individuals and entities, as well as to ensure, as a matter of priority, that fair and transparent procedures exist for placing individuals and entities on its lists, for removing them and for granting humanitarian exceptions. In this regard, we encourage States to share information, including by

widely distributing the International Criminal Police Organization/United Nations special notices concerning people subject to this sanctions regime;

16. To step up efforts and cooperation at every level, as appropriate, to improve the security of manufacturing and issuing identity and travel documents and to prevent and detect their alteration or fraudulent use, while recognizing that States may require assistance in doing so. In this regard, we invite the International Criminal Police Organization to enhance its database on stolen and lost travel documents, and we will endeavour to make full use of this tool, as appropriate, in particular by sharing relevant information;

17. To invite the United Nations to improve coordination in planning a response to a terrorist attack using nuclear, chemical, biological or radiological weapons or materials, in particular by reviewing and improving the effectiveness of the existing inter-agency coordination mechanisms for assistance delivery, relief operations and victim support, so that all States can receive adequate assistance. In this regard, we invite the General Assembly and the Security Council to develop guidelines for the necessary cooperation and assistance in the event of a terrorist attack using weapons of mass destruction;

18. To step up all efforts to improve the security and protection of particularly vulnerable targets, such as infrastructure and public places, as well as the response to terrorist attacks and other disasters, in particular in the area of civil protection, while recognizing that States may require assistance to this effect.

III. Measures to build States' capacity to prevent and combat terrorism and to strengthen the role of the United Nations system in this regard

We recognize that capacity-building in all States is a core element of the global counter-terrorism effort, and resolve to undertake the following measures to develop State capacity to prevent and combat terrorism and enhance coordination and coherence within the United Nations system in promoting international cooperation in countering terrorism:

1. To encourage Member States to consider making voluntary contributions to United Nations counter-terrorism cooperation

and technical assistance projects, and to explore additional sources of funding in this regard. We also encourage the United Nations to consider reaching out to the private sector for contributions to capacity-building programmes, in particular in the areas of port, maritime and civil aviation security;

2. To take advantage of the framework provided by relevant international, regional and subregional organizations to share best practices in counter-terrorism capacity-building, and to facilitate their contributions to the international community's efforts in this area;

3. To consider establishing appropriate mechanisms to rationalize States' reporting requirements in the field of counter-terrorism and eliminate duplication of reporting requests, taking into account and respecting the different mandates of the General Assembly, the Security Council and its subsidiary bodies that deal with counter-terrorism;

4. To encourage measures, including regular informal meetings, to enhance, as appropriate, more frequent exchanges of information on cooperation and technical assistance among Member States, United Nations bodies dealing with counter-terrorism, relevant specialized agencies, relevant international, regional and subregional organizations and the donor community, to develop States' capacities to implement relevant United Nations resolutions;

5. To welcome the intention of the Secretary-General to institutionalize, within existing resources, the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force within the Secretariat in order to ensure overall coordination and coherence in the counter-terrorism efforts of the United Nations system;

6. To encourage the Counter-Terrorism Committee and its Executive Directorate to continue to improve the coherence and efficiency of technical assistance delivery in the field of counter-terrorism, in particular by strengthening its dialogue with States and relevant international, regional and subregional organizations and working closely, including by sharing information, with all bilateral and multilateral technical assistance providers;

7. To encourage the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, including its Terrorism Prevention Branch, to enhance, in

close consultation with the Counter-Terrorism Committee and its Executive Directorate, its provision of technical assistance to States, upon request, to facilitate the implementation of the international conventions and protocols related to the prevention and suppression of terrorism and relevant United Nations resolutions;

8. To encourage the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and the International Criminal Police Organization to enhance cooperation with States to help them to comply fully with international norms and obligations to combat money-laundering and the financing of terrorism;

9. To encourage the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons to continue their efforts, within their respective mandates, in helping States to build capacity to prevent terrorists from accessing nuclear, chemical or radiological materials, to ensure security at related facilities and to respond effectively in the event of an attack using such materials;

10. To encourage the World Health Organization to step up its technical assistance to help States to improve their public health systems to prevent and prepare for biological attacks by terrorists;

11. To continue to work within the United Nations system to support the reform and modernization of border management systems, facilities and institutions at the national, regional and international levels;

12. To encourage the International Maritime Organization, the World Customs Organization and the International Civil Aviation Organization to strengthen their cooperation, work with States to identify any national shortfalls in areas of transport security and provide assistance, upon request, to address them;

13. To encourage the United Nations to work with Member States and relevant international, regional and subregional organizations to identify and share best practices to prevent terrorist attacks on particularly vulnerable targets. We invite the International Criminal Police Organization to work with the Secretary-General so that he can submit proposals to this effect. We also recognize the importance of developing public-private partnerships in this area.

IV. Measures to ensure respect for human rights for all and the rule of law as the fundamental basis of the fight against terrorism

We resolve to undertake the following measures, reaffirming that the promotion and protection of human rights for all and the rule of law is essential to all components of the Strategy, recognizing that effective counter-terrorism measures and the protection of human rights are not conflicting goals, but complementary and mutually reinforcing, and stressing the need to promote and protect the rights of victims of terrorism:

1. To reaffirm that General Assembly resolution 60/158 of 16 December 2005 provides the fundamental framework for the “Protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism”;

2. To reaffirm that States must ensure that any measures taken to combat terrorism comply with their obligations under international law, in particular human rights law, refugee law and international humanitarian law;

3. To consider becoming parties without delay to the core international instruments on human rights law, refugee law and international humanitarian law, and implementing them, as well as to consider accepting the competence of international and relevant regional human rights monitoring bodies;

4. To make every effort to develop and maintain an effective and rule of law-based national criminal justice system that can ensure, in accordance with our obligations under international law, that any person who participates in the financing, planning, preparation or perpetration of terrorist acts or in support of terrorist acts is brought to justice, on the basis of the principle to extradite or prosecute, with due respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and that such terrorist acts are established as serious criminal offences in domestic laws and regulations. We recognize that States may require assistance in developing and maintaining such effective and rule of law-based criminal justice systems, and we encourage them to resort to the technical assistance delivered, inter alia, by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime;

5. To reaffirm the important role of the United Nations system in strengthening the international legal architecture by promoting the rule of law, respect for human rights and effective criminal justice systems, which constitute the fundamental basis of our common fight against terrorism;

6. To support the Human Rights Council and to contribute, as it takes shape, to its work on the question of the promotion and protection of human rights for all in the fight against terrorism;

7. To support the strengthening of the operational capacity of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, with a particular emphasis on increasing field operations and presences. The Office should continue to play a lead role in examining the question of protecting human rights while countering terrorism, by making general recommendations on the human rights obligations of States and providing them with assistance and advice, in particular in the area of raising awareness of international human rights law among national law-enforcement agencies, at the request of States;

8. To support the role of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism. The Special Rapporteur should continue to support the efforts of States and offer concrete advice by corresponding with Governments, making country visits, liaising with the United Nations and regional organizations and reporting on these issues.

The United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy (resolution adopted on 5 September 2008 after first biennial review) (A/RES/62/272)

The General Assembly,

Reaffirming the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, contained in General Assembly resolution 60/288 of 8 September 2006, which called for, inter alia, an examination in two years of progress made in the implementation of the Strategy and for consideration to be given to updating it to respond to changes, as provided for in paragraph 3 (b) of that resolution,

Recalling the pivotal role of the General Assembly in following up the implementation and the updating of the Strategy,

Renewing its unwavering commitment to strengthen international cooperation to prevent and combat terrorism in all its forms and manifestations,

Recognizing that international cooperation and any measures undertaken by Member States to prevent and combat terrorism must fully comply with their obligations under international law, including the Charter of the United Nations and relevant international conventions and protocols, in particular human rights law, refugee law and international humanitarian law,

Convinced that the General Assembly is the competent organ with universal membership to address the issue of international terrorism,

Mindful of the need to enhance the role of the United Nations and the specialized agencies, within their mandates, in the implementation of the Strategy,

Stressing that the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force shall carry out its activities within the framework of its mandate, with

policy guidance offered by Member States through interaction with the General Assembly on a regular basis,

Recognizing the importance of institutionalizing the Task Force within the Secretariat,

1. *Reiterates its strong condemnation* of terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, committed by whomever, wherever and for whatever purposes, as it constitutes one of the most serious threats to international peace and security;

2. *Reaffirms* the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy and its four pillars, which constitute an ongoing effort, and calls upon Member States, the United Nations and other appropriate international, regional and subregional organizations to step up their efforts to implement the Strategy in an integrated manner and in all its aspects;

3. *Takes note* of the report of the Secretary-General entitled “United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy: activities of the United Nations system in implementing the Strategy”;¹

4. *Also takes note* of the measures that Member States as well as appropriate international, regional and subregional organizations have adopted within the framework of the Strategy, as presented at the first biennial review of the Strategy, on 4 and 5 September 2008, all of which strengthen cooperation to fight terrorism, in particular through the exchange of best practices;

5. *Reaffirms* the primary responsibility of Member States to implement the Strategy while further recognizing the need to enhance the important role the United Nations plays, in coordination with other international, regional and subregional organizations, as appropriate, in facilitating coherence in the implementation of the Strategy at the national, regional and global levels and in providing assistance, especially in the area of capacity-building;

6. *Encourages* non-governmental organizations and civil society to engage, as appropriate, on how to enhance efforts to implement the Strategy, including through interaction with Member States and the United Nations system;

¹ A/62/898.

7. *Calls upon* the United Nations entities involved in supporting counter-terrorism efforts to continue to facilitate the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism;

8. *Calls upon* States that have not done so to consider becoming parties in a timely manner to the existing international conventions and protocols against terrorism, and upon all States to make every effort to conclude a comprehensive convention on international terrorism, and recalls the commitments of Member States with regard to the implementation of General Assembly and Security Council resolutions relating to international terrorism;

9. *Notes with appreciation* the continued contribution of United Nations entities and subsidiary bodies of the Security Council to the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force;

10. *Reaffirms* the need to enhance international cooperation in countering terrorism, and in this regard recalls the role of the United Nations system in promoting international cooperation and capacity-building as one of the elements of the Strategy;

11. *Urges* the Secretary-General to make the necessary arrangements to carry out the institutionalization of the Task Force, in accordance with resolution 60/288, in order to ensure overall coordination and coherence in the counter-terrorism efforts of the United Nations system;

12. *Decides* to interact with the Task Force on a regular basis, in order to receive briefings and reports on its current and future work, assess the work being undertaken on the Strategy implementation efforts, including the work of the Task Force, and to offer policy guidance;

13. *Requests* the Secretary-General to submit to the General Assembly at its sixty-fourth session a report on progress made in the implementation of the Strategy, which could contain suggestions for its future implementation by the United Nations system, as well as in the implementation of the present resolution;

14. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its sixty-fourth session the item entitled “The United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy” in order to undertake in two years an

examination of the report of the Secretary-General requested in paragraph 13 above, as well as the implementation of the Strategy on the part of Member States and to consider updating the Strategy to respond to changes.

*120th plenary meeting
5 September 2008*

REPORTS OF THE
SECRETARY-GENERAL

Excerpt from the report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change (A/59/565)*

A more secure world: our shared responsibility**

V. Nuclear, radiological, chemical and biological weapons

A. The threats we face

1. Nuclear weapons

107. Any use of nuclear weapons, by accident or design, risks human casualties and economic dislocation on a catastrophic scale. Stopping the proliferation of such weapons — and their potential use, by either State or non-State actors — must remain an urgent priority for collective security.

108. The threat posed by nuclear proliferation — the spread of nuclear weapons among States — arises in two ways. The first and most immediate concern is that some countries, under cover of their current Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons membership, will covertly and illegally develop full-scale weapons programmes, or that — acting within the letter but perhaps not the spirit of the Treaty — they will acquire all the materials and expertise needed for weapons programmes with the option of withdrawing from the Treaty at the point when they are ready to proceed with weaponization.

109. The second longer-term, concern is about the erosion and possible collapse of the whole Treaty regime. Almost 60 States currently

* From, part two: Collective security and the challenge of prevention. The note of the Secretary-General transmitting the report was dated 2 December 2004.

** Footnotes and annotations to the present report are available online at www.un.org/secureworld.

operate or are constructing nuclear power or research reactors, and at least 40 possess the industrial and scientific infrastructure which would enable them, if they chose, to build nuclear weapons at relatively short notice if the legal and normative constraints of the Treaty regime no longer apply.

110. Both concerns are now very real: the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is not as effective a constraint as it was. In 1963, when only four States had nuclear arsenals, the United States Government predicted that the following decade would see the emergence of 15 to 25 nuclear-weapon States; others predicted the number would be as high as 50. As of 2004, only eight States are known to have nuclear arsenals. The strong non-proliferation regime — embodied in IAEA and the Treaty itself — helped dramatically to slow the predicted rate of proliferation. It made three critical contributions: it bolstered a normative prohibition against the ownership, use and proliferation of these weapons; it ensured that States could benefit from nuclear technologies, but with oversight; and it reassured States about the capacities of neighbours and potential rivals, allowing them to avoid unnecessary arms races.

111. But the nuclear non-proliferation regime is now at risk because of lack of compliance with existing commitments, withdrawal or threats of withdrawal from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to escape those commitments, a changing international security environment and the diffusion of technology. We are approaching a point at which the erosion of the non-proliferation regime could become irreversible and result in a cascade of proliferation.

112. Regardless of whether more States acquire nuclear weapons, there are also grave risks posed by the existence of large stockpiles of nuclear and radiological materials. Today 1,300 kilograms of highly enriched uranium exist in research reactors in 27 countries. The total volume of HEU stockpiles is far greater, and many HEU storage sites in the world are inadequately secured. States have publicly confirmed 20 cases of nuclear material diversion and more than 200 incidents involving illicit trafficking in nuclear materials have been documented over the past decade. Scientists have repeatedly warned of the ease with which terrorists could, with parts from the open market, assemble a simple “gun-type” nuclear device that simply collides two quantities

of HEU. Experts suggest that if a simple nuclear device were detonated in a major city, the number of deaths would range from tens of thousands to more than one million. The shock to international commerce, employment and travel would amount to at least one trillion dollars. Such an attack could have further, far-reaching implications for international security, democratic governance and civil rights.

2. Radiological weapons

113. A different threat is posed by radiological weapons, which are more weapons of mass disruption than mass destruction. Radiological weapons can use plutonium or highly enriched uranium but can rely simply on radioactive materials, of which there are millions of sources used in medical and industrial facilities worldwide. The immediate destructive effect of a radiological or “dirty” bomb is only as great as its conventional explosive, and even the radiation effects of such a bomb are likely to be limited. The more harmful effects of disruption and economic damage would be prompted by public alarm and the necessity of evacuating and decontaminating affected areas. The ubiquity of radiological materials and the crude requirements for detonating such a device suggest a high likelihood of use. This puts a premium on educating the public about the limited consequences of radiological weapons in order to mitigate some of the alarm and uncertainty that would be unleashed in the event of an attack.

3. Chemical and biological weapons

114. Chemical and biological materials also pose a growing threat: they share with nuclear weapons the awful potential of being used in a single attack to inflict mass casualties. Chemical agents are widespread and relatively easy to acquire and weaponize. There are almost 6,000 industrial chemical facilities worldwide, posing potential targets and opportunities for the acquisition of materials. Chemical-weapon States have lagged behind in the destruction of chemical weapons scheduled by the Chemical Weapons Convention: of the 70,000 metric tons of declared weapons agents, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) has verified the destruction of only 9,600, and if the current pace persists, the Convention’s goal of the complete destruction of chemical weapons agents will not be met even by the agreed extended deadline of 2012.

115. While rapid growth and scientific advances in the biotechnology sector hold out the prospect of prevention and cure for many diseases, they also increase opportunities for the development of deadly new ones. Dramatic advances in recombinant DNA technology and direct genetic manipulation raise the spectre of “designer bugs”, which may be developed to reconstruct eradicated diseases and to resist existing vaccinations, antibiotics and other treatments. There are countless fermentation, medical and research facilities equipped to produce biological agents. Meanwhile, the biological toxin ricin has been discovered in several terrorist workshops. Unlike anthrax, which can be treated by antibiotics, ricin has no antidote and is lethal to humans in quantities smaller than the size of a pinhead. Use of similar materials to cause deliberate outbreaks of infectious disease could prove equally if not more lethal than a nuclear detonation. Under worst-case assumptions, an attack using only one gram of weaponized smallpox could produce between 100,000 and 1,000,000 fatalities.

116. That a high-damage attack has not occurred is not a cause for complacency but a call for urgent prevention.

B. Meeting the challenge of prevention

117. Multilayered action is required. The first layer of an effective strategy to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, radiological, chemical and biological weapons should feature global instruments that reduce the demand for them. The second layer should contain global instruments that operate on the supply side — to limit the capacity of both States and non-State actors to acquire weapons and the materials and expertise needed to build them. The third layer must consist of Security Council enforcement activity underpinned by credible, shared information and analysis. The fourth layer must comprise national and international civilian and public health defence.

1. Better strategies to reduce demand

118. Lacklustre disarmament by the nuclear-weapon States weakens the diplomatic force of the non-proliferation regime and thus its ability to constrain proliferation. Despite Security Council commitment to the contrary (resolution 984 (1995)), these nuclear-weapon States are increasingly unwilling to pledge assurances of non-use (negative secu-

rity assurances) and they maintain the right to retaliate with nuclear weapons against chemical or biological attack.

119. Despite the end of the cold war, nuclear-weapon States earn only a mixed grade in fulfilling their disarmament commitments. While the United States and the Russian Federation have dismantled roughly half of their nuclear weapons, committed to large reductions in deployed strategic warheads and eliminated most of their non-strategic nuclear weapons, such progress has been overshadowed by recent reversals. In 2000, the nuclear-weapon States committed to 13 practical steps towards nuclear disarmament, which were all but renounced by them at the 2004 meeting of the Preparatory Committee for the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

120. The nuclear-weapon States must take several steps to restart disarmament:

(a) They must honour their commitments under article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to move towards disarmament and be ready to undertake specific measures in fulfilment of those commitments;

(b) They should reaffirm their previous commitments not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States, to further diminish the perceived value of nuclear weapons, and secure robust international cooperation to staunch proliferation, formalizing such commitments in pending and future nuclear-weapon-free zones agreements.

121. The United States and the Russian Federation, other nuclear-weapon States and States not party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons should commit to practical measures to reduce the risk of accidental nuclear war, including, where appropriate, a progressive schedule for de-alerting their strategic nuclear weapons.

122. In addition, we believe it would be valuable if the Security Council explicitly pledged to take collective action in response to a nuclear attack or the threat of such attack on a non-nuclear-weapon State.

123. Given the challenge to the nuclear non-proliferation regime posed by States not party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and recognizing the impact of that challenge on regional insecurity, **we recommend that negotiations to resolve regional conflicts include confidence-building measures and steps towards disarmament.**

124. **States not party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons should pledge a commitment to non-proliferation and disarmament, demonstrating their commitment by ratifying the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and supporting negotiations for a fissile material cut-off treaty, both of which are open to nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States alike. We recommend that peace efforts in the Middle East and South Asia launch nuclear disarmament talks that could lead to the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in those regions similar to those established for Latin America and the Caribbean, Africa, the South Pacific and South-East Asia.**

125. For biological and chemical weapons, there is both an obligation and a historic opportunity to fully eliminate all declared chemical weapons stockpiles: **all chemical-weapon States should expedite the scheduled destruction of all existing chemical weapons stockpiles by the agreed target date of 2012.**

126. Verification of the Chemical Weapons Convention should also be further strengthened, and the long-standing impasse over a verification mechanism for the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, which has undermined confidence in the overall regime, should be overcome. **States parties to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention should without delay return to negotiations for a credible verification protocol, inviting the active participation of the biotechnology industry.** States parties to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention must increase bilateral diplomatic pressure to universalize membership.

2. Better strategies to reduce supply

127. We recognize that nuclear energy, in the view of many, is an important source of power for civilian uses and may become even more crucial in the context of a worldwide effort to reduce depend-

ency on fossil fuels and emissions of greenhouse gases. At the same time, the mounting tension between the goals of achieving a more effective non-proliferation regime and the right of all signatories of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to develop civilian nuclear industries needs to be addressed and defused.

128. Article IV of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons guarantees States parties' rights to develop the research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes; this right must be preserved. The Treaty also specifies that this right must be used in conformity with its articles I and II; this obligation also must be respected. In recent years, it has become clear that the proliferation risks from the enrichment of uranium and from the reprocessing of spent fuel are great and increasing. These two processes in particular provide a route by which Treaty signatories can (and in some cases have) clandestinely pursued activities not in conformity with the Treaty and designed to give them the option of acquiring a nuclear-weapon capability.

129. Two remedies are required. First, the inspection and verification rules that have governed IAEA through the mid-1990s have proven increasingly inadequate. IAEA initiated more stringent inspection rules in the Model Additional Protocol, but as yet only one third of the States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons have ratified the Protocol. **The IAEA Board of Governors should recognize the Model Additional Protocol as today's standard for IAEA safeguards, and the Security Council should be prepared to act in cases of serious concern over non-compliance with non-proliferation and safeguards standards.**

130. Second, **we urge that negotiations be engaged without delay and carried forward to an early conclusion on an arrangement, based on the existing provisions of articles III and IX of the IAEA statute, which would enable IAEA to act as a guarantor for the supply of fissile material to civilian nuclear users.** Such an arrangement would need to put the Agency in a position to meet, through suppliers it authorized, demands for nuclear fuel supplies of low enriched uranium and for the reprocessing of spent fuel at market rates and to provide a guarantee of uninterrupted supply of these services,

as long as there was no breach of safeguard or inspection procedures at the facilities in question.

131. While that arrangement is being negotiated, States should, without surrendering the right under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to construct such facilities, voluntarily institute a time-limited moratorium on the construction of any further enrichment or reprocessing facilities, with a commitment to the moratorium matched by a guarantee of the supply of fissile materials by the current suppliers at market rates.

132. Recent experience of the activities of the A.Q. Khan network has demonstrated the need for and the value of measures taken to interdict the illicit and clandestine trade in components for nuclear programmes. This problem is currently being addressed on a voluntary basis by the Proliferation Security Initiative. **We believe that all States should be encouraged to join this voluntary initiative.**

133. In order to reinforce international legal provisions against the illicit trafficking of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and materials, ongoing negotiations at the International Maritime Organization (IMO) to amend the 1988 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation should be completed in a timely manner. The Security Council may need to be prepared to consider mandatory action if progress in the Convention negotiations is unsatisfactory.

134. While the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons provides the right of withdrawal from the Treaty, States should be urged not to do so. Those who withdraw should be held responsible for violations committed while still a party to the Treaty. **A State's notice of withdrawal from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons should prompt immediate verification of its compliance with the Treaty, if necessary mandated by the Security Council. The IAEA Board of Governors should resolve that, in the event of violations, all assistance provided by IAEA should be withdrawn.**

135. Urgent short-term action is needed to defend against the possible terrorist use of nuclear, radiological, chemical and biological weapons. High priority must be accorded to consolidating, securing,

and when possible eliminating potentially hazardous materials, and implementing effective export controls. To that end, we welcome the Global Threat Reduction Initiative, which facilitates (a) the reduction of global highly enriched uranium stockpiles, (b) the conversion of HEU research reactors to “proliferation-resistant” reactors, and (c) the “downblending” of existing HEU. **The proposed timeline for implementing the Global Threat Reduction Initiative should be halved from 10 to 5 years.**

136. The Security Council, acting under its resolution 1540 (2004), can offer States model legislation for security, tracking, criminalization and export controls, and by 2006 develop minimum standards for United Nations Member State implementation. To achieve that goal, the implementation committee of Council resolution 1540 (2004) should establish a permanent liaison with IAEA, OPCW and the Nuclear Suppliers Group.

137. **States parties to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention should also negotiate a new bio-security protocol to classify dangerous biological agents and establish binding international standards for the export of such agents.** Within a designated time frame, States parties to the Convention should refrain from participating in such biotechnology commerce with non-members.

138. IAEA member States should increase funding for its programmes that help to locate and secure radioactive sources and that assist States in establishing pertinent domestic legislation. **Moreover, the Conference on Disarmament should move without further delay to negotiate a verifiable fissile material cut-off treaty that, on a designated schedule, ends the production of highly enriched uranium for non-weapon as well as weapons purposes.**

3. Better enforcement capability

139. The Security Council today has few arrows in its quiver other than sanctions and military force to enforce non-proliferation agreements. Moreover, a special referral to the Security Council that results in no action is worse than no referral. The ability of the Security Council to generate credible information about potential instances of proliferation should be strengthened.

140. To that end, links between IAEA and OPCW and the Security Council must also be strengthened. **The Directors-General of IAEA and OPCW should be invited by the Security Council to report to it twice-yearly on the status of safeguards and verification processes, as well as on any serious concerns they have which might fall short of an actual breach of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the Chemical Weapons Convention.**

141. The Security Council should also be prepared to deploy inspection capacities for suspected nuclear and chemical violations, drawing on the capacities of IAEA and OPCW. Until multilateral negotiations yield a Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention verification mechanism, the Security Council should avail itself of the Secretary-General's roster of inspectors for biological weapons, who should remain independent and work under United Nations staff codes. This roster of inspectors should also be available to advise the Council and liaise with WHO authorities in the event of a suspicious disease outbreak, as discussed below.

4. *Better public health defences*

142. Scientific advancements in biotechnology and the ubiquity of facilities capable of producing biological agents circumscribe prospects for the elimination of biological weapons and complicate verification efforts. But unlike nuclear weapons, many (though not all) biological agents can be countered by vaccinations and effective responses (including rapid diagnosis, quarantines and treatment). Well-prepared societies may thus be able to avoid the worst-case scenarios of biological attacks.

143. However, at present, international aid for infectious disease monitoring, detection and response is lacking, security planning and spending are poorly coordinated with health-care policies and budgets, and there is insufficient understanding that an inevitable, new biological future makes active bio-defence the most viable option against the likelihood of attack.

144. Given the potential international security threat posed by the intentional release of an infectious biological agent or an overwhelming natural outbreak of an infectious disease, there is a need for the WHO Director-General, through the Secretary-General, to keep the

Security Council informed during any suspicious or overwhelming outbreak of infectious disease. In such an event, the Security Council should be prepared to support the work of WHO investigators or to deploy experts reporting directly to the Council, and if existing International Health Regulations do not provide adequate access for WHO investigations and response coordination, the Security Council should be prepared to mandate greater compliance. In the event that a State is unable to adequately quarantine large numbers of potential carriers, the Security Council should be prepared to support international action to assist in cordon operations. **The Security Council should consult with the WHO Director-General to establish the necessary procedures for working together in the event of a suspicious or overwhelming outbreak of infectious disease.**

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Excerpt from the report of the Secretary-General entitled “In larger freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all” (A/59/2005)*

III. Freedom from fear

74. While, in the development sphere, we suffer from weak implementation, on the security side, despite a heightened sense of threat among many we lack even a basic consensus and implementation, where it occurs, is all too often contested.

75. Unless we can agree on a shared assessment of these threats and a common understanding of our obligations in addressing them, the United Nations will lag in providing security to all of its members and all the world’s people. Our ability to assist those who seek freedom from fear will then be partial at best.

A. A vision of collective security

76. In November 2003, alarmed by the lack of agreement among Member States on the proper role of the United Nations in providing collective security — or even on the nature of the most compelling threats that we face — I set up the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change. The Panel delivered its report, “A more secure world: our shared responsibility” (A/59/565), in December 2004.

77. I fully embrace the broad vision that the report articulates and its case for a more comprehensive concept of collective security: one that tackles new threats and old and that addresses the security concerns of all States. I believe that this concept can bridge the gap between divergent views of security and give us the guidance we need to face today’s dilemmas.

* The report was dated 21 March 2005.

78. The threats to peace and security in the twenty-first century include not just international war and conflict but civil violence, organized crime, terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. They also include poverty, deadly infectious disease and environmental degradation since these can have equally catastrophic consequences. All of these threats can cause death or lessen life chances on a large scale. All of them can undermine States as the basic unit of the international system.

79. Depending on wealth, geography and power, we perceive different threats as the most pressing. But the truth is we cannot afford to choose. Collective security today depends on accepting that the threats which each region of the world perceives as most urgent are in fact equally so for all.

80. In our globalized world, the threats we face are interconnected. The rich are vulnerable to the threats that attack the poor and the strong are vulnerable to the weak, as well as vice versa. A nuclear terrorist attack on the United States or Europe would have devastating effects on the whole world. But so would the appearance of a new virulent pandemic disease in a poor country with no effective health-care system.

81. On this interconnectedness of threats we must found a new security consensus, the first article of which must be that all are entitled to freedom from fear, and that whatever threatens one threatens all. Once we understand this, we have no choice but to tackle the whole range of threats. We must respond to HIV/AIDS as robustly as we do to terrorism and to poverty as effectively as we do to proliferation. We must strive just as hard to eliminate the threat of small arms and light weapons as we do to eliminate the threat of weapons of mass destruction. Moreover, we must address all these threats preventively, acting at a sufficiently early stage with the full range of available instruments.

82. We need to ensure that States abide by the security treaties they have signed so that all can continue to reap the benefit. More consistent monitoring, more effective implementation and, where necessary, firmer enforcement are essential if States are to have confidence in multilateral mechanisms and use them to avoid conflict.

83. These are not theoretical issues but issues of deadly urgency. If we do not reach a consensus on them this year and start to act on it, we may not have another chance. This year, if ever, we must transform the United Nations into the effective instrument for preventing conflict that it was always meant to be by acting on several key policy and institutional priorities.

84. We must act to ensure that catastrophic terrorism never becomes a reality. This will require a new global strategy, which begins with Member States agreeing on a definition of terrorism and including it in a comprehensive convention. It will also require all States to sign, ratify, implement and comply with comprehensive conventions against organized crime and corruption. And it will require from them a commitment to take urgent steps to prevent nuclear, chemical and biological weapons getting into the hands of terrorist groups.

85. We must revitalize our multilateral frameworks for handling threats from nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. The threat posed by these weapons is not limited to terrorist use. The existence of multilateral instruments to promote disarmament and prevent proliferation among States has been central to the maintenance of international peace and security ever since those instruments were agreed. But they are now in danger of erosion. They must be revitalized to ensure continued progress on disarmament and to address the growing risk of a cascade of proliferation, especially in the nuclear field.

86. We must continue to reduce the prevalence and risk of war. This requires both the emphasis on development outlined in section II above and the strengthening of tools to deliver the military and civilian support needed to prevent and end wars as well as to build a sustainable peace. Investment in prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding can save millions of lives. If only two peace agreements had been successfully implemented in the early 1990s — the Bicesse Accords in Angola and the Arusha Accords in Rwanda — we could have prevented the deaths of almost three million people.

B. Preventing catastrophic terrorism

Transnational terrorism

87. Terrorism is a threat to all that the United Nations stands for: respect for human rights, the rule of law, the protection of civilians, tolerance among peoples and nations, and the peaceful resolution of conflict. It is a threat that has grown more urgent in the last five years. Transnational networks of terrorist groups have global reach and make common cause to pose a universal threat. Such groups profess a desire to acquire nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and to inflict mass casualties. Even one such attack and the chain of events it might set off could change our world forever.

88. Our strategy against terrorism must be comprehensive and should be based on five pillars: it must aim at dissuading people from resorting to terrorism or supporting it; it must deny terrorists access to funds and materials; it must deter States from sponsoring terrorism; it must develop State capacity to defeat terrorism; and it must defend human rights. **I urge Member States and civil society organizations everywhere to join in that strategy.**

89. Several steps are urgently required, as described below.

90. We must convince all those who may be tempted to support terrorism that it is neither an acceptable nor an effective way to advance their cause. But the moral authority of the United Nations and its strength in condemning terrorism have been hampered by the inability of Member States to agree on a comprehensive convention that includes a definition.

91. It is time to set aside debates on so-called “State terrorism”. The use of force by States is already thoroughly regulated under international law. And the right to resist occupation must be understood in its true meaning. It cannot include the right to deliberately kill or maim civilians. I endorse fully the High-level Panel’s call for a definition of terrorism, which would make it clear that, in addition to actions already proscribed by existing conventions, any action constitutes terrorism if it is intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians or non-combatants with the purpose of intimidating a population or compelling a Government or an international organization to do or abstain from doing any act. **I believe this proposal has clear**

moral force, and I strongly urge world leaders to unite behind it and to conclude a comprehensive convention on terrorism before the end of the sixtieth session of the General Assembly.

92. It is vital that we deny terrorists access to nuclear materials. This means consolidating, securing and, when possible, eliminating hazardous materials and implementing effective export controls. While the Group of Eight Major Industrialized Countries (G8) and the Security Council have taken important steps to do this, we need to make sure that these measures are fully enforced and that they reinforce each other. **I urge Member States to complete, without delay, an international convention for the suppression of acts of nuclear terrorism.**

93. The threat of biological terrorism differs from that of nuclear terrorism. There will soon be thousands of laboratories around the world capable of producing designer bugs with awesome lethal potential. Our best defence against this danger lies in strengthening public health, and the recommendations to this end contained in section II above have a double merit: they would both help to address the scourge of naturally occurring infectious disease and contribute to our safety against manmade outbreaks. As we commit ourselves to strengthen local health systems — a task that will take us a generation — we must also ensure that our existing global response is adequate. The World Health Organization Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network has done an impressive job in monitoring and responding to outbreaks of deadly infectious disease, whether natural or suspicious. But it has done so on a shoestring. **I urge Member States to give it the resources it needs to do the job thoroughly, in all our interests.**

94. Terrorists are accountable to no one. We, on the other hand, must never lose sight of our accountability to citizens all around the world. In our struggle against terrorism, we must never compromise human rights. When we do so we facilitate achievement of one of the terrorist's objectives. By ceding the moral high ground we provoke tension, hatred and mistrust of Governments among precisely those parts of the population where terrorists find recruits. **I urge Member States to create a special rapporteur who would report to the Commission on Human Rights on the compatibility of counter-terrorism measures with international human rights laws.**

Organized crime

95. The threat of terrorism is closely linked to that of organized crime, which is growing and affects the security of all States. Organized crime contributes to State weakness, impedes economic growth, fuels many civil wars, regularly undermines United Nations peacebuilding efforts and provides financing mechanisms to terrorist groups. Organized criminal groups are also heavily involved in the illegal smuggling of migrants and trafficking in firearms.

96. In recent years, the United Nations has made important progress in building a framework of international standards and norms for the fight against organized crime and corruption, with the adoption or entry into force of several major conventions and protocols. However, many of the States parties to these treaties have not implemented them adequately, sometimes because they genuinely lack the capacity to do so. **All States should both ratify and implement these conventions, while helping each other to strengthen their domestic criminal justice and rule-of-law systems. And Member States should give adequate resources to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime for its key role in overseeing implementation of the conventions.**

C. Nuclear, biological and chemical weapons

97. Multilateral efforts to bridle the dangers of nuclear technology while harnessing its promise are nearly as old as the United Nations itself. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,¹² 35 years old this month, has proved indispensable: it has not only diminished nuclear peril but has also demonstrated the value of multilateral agreements in safeguarding international peace and security. But today, the Treaty has suffered the first withdrawal of a party to the Treaty and faces a crisis of confidence and compliance born of a growing strain on verification and enforcement. The Conference on Disarmament, for its part, faces a crisis of relevance resulting in part from dysfunctional decision-making procedures and the paralysis that accompanies them.

98. Progress in both disarmament and non-proliferation is essential and neither should be held hostage to the other. Recent moves towards disarmament by the nuclear-weapon States should be recognized.

Bilateral agreements, including the 2002 Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty signed by the United States and the Russian Federation, have led to the dismantlement of thousands of nuclear weapons, accompanied by commitments to further sharp reductions in stockpiles. **However, the unique status of nuclear-weapon States also entails a unique responsibility, and they must do more, including but not limited to further reductions in their arsenals of non-strategic nuclear weapons and pursuing arms control agreements that entail not just dismantlement but irreversibility. They should also reaffirm their commitment to negative security assurances. Swift negotiation of a fissile material cut-off treaty is essential. The moratorium on nuclear test explosions must also be upheld until we can achieve the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty. I strongly encourage States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to endorse these measures at the 2005 Review Conference.**

99. The spread of nuclear technology has exacerbated a long-standing tension within the nuclear regime, arising from the simple fact that the technology required for civilian nuclear fuel can also be used to develop nuclear weapons. Measures to mitigate this tension must confront the dangers of nuclear proliferation but must also take into account the important environmental, energy, economic and research applications of nuclear technology. **First, the verification authority of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) must be strengthened through universal adoption of the Model Additional Protocol. Second, while the access of non-nuclear weapon States to the benefits of nuclear technology should not be curtailed, we should focus on creating incentives for States to voluntarily forego the development of domestic uranium enrichment and plutonium separation capacities, while guaranteeing their supply of the fuel necessary to develop peaceful uses.** One option is an arrangement in which IAEA would act as a guarantor for the supply of fissile material to civilian nuclear users at market rates.

100. While the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons remains the foundation of the non-proliferation regime, we should welcome recent efforts to supplement it. These include Security Council resolution 1540 (2004), designed to prevent non-State actors from gaining access to nuclear, chemical and biological weapons,

technology and materials, and their means of delivery; and the voluntary Proliferation Security Initiative, under which more and more States are cooperating to prevent illicit trafficking in nuclear, biological and chemical weapons.

101. The availability of ballistic missiles with extended range and greater accuracy is of growing concern to many States, as is the spread of shoulder-fired missiles which could be used by terrorists. **Member States should adopt effective national export controls covering missiles and other means of delivery for nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, rockets and shoulder-fired missiles, as well as a ban on transferring any of them to non-State actors.** The Security Council should also consider adopting a resolution aimed at making it harder for terrorists to acquire or use shoulder-fired missiles.

102. Where progress has been made, it should be consolidated. The 1997 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction¹³ calls for the complete elimination and destruction of chemical weapons by all States parties, thus offering a historic opportunity to complete a task begun more than a century ago. **States parties to the Convention on Chemical Weapons should recommit themselves to achieving the scheduled destruction of declared chemical weapons stockpiles. I call upon all States to accede immediately to the Convention.**

103. The 1975 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction¹⁴ has enjoyed a remarkable degree of support and adherence, and has been strengthened further through recent annual meetings. **States parties should consolidate the results of these meetings at the 2006 Review Conference and commit themselves to further measures to strengthen the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. I also call upon all States to accede immediately to the Convention and to increase the transparency of bio-defence programmes.**

104. Further efforts are needed to bolster the biological security regime. The capability of the Secretary-General to investigate suspected use of biological agents, as authorized by the General Assembly in its resolution 42/37, should be strengthened to incorporate the latest

technology and expertise; and the Security Council should make use of that capability, consistent with Security Council resolution 620 (1988).

105. Indeed, the Security Council must be better informed on all matters relevant to nuclear, chemical and biological threats. I encourage the Council to regularly invite the Director-General of IAEA and the Director-General of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons to brief the Council on the status of safeguards and verification processes. And I myself stand ready, in consultation with the Director-General of the World Health Organization, to use my powers under Article 99 of the Charter of the United Nations to call to the attention of the Security Council any overwhelming outbreak of infectious disease that threatens international peace and security.

D. Reducing the risk and prevalence of war

106. No task is more fundamental to the United Nations than the prevention and resolution of deadly conflict. Prevention, in particular, must be central to all our efforts, from combating poverty and promoting sustainable development; through strengthening national capacities to manage conflict, promoting democracy and the rule of law, and curbing the flow of small arms and light weapons; to directing preventive operational activities, such as the use of good offices, Security Council missions and preventive deployments.

107. Member States must ensure that the United Nations has the right structure and sufficient resources to perform these vital tasks.

Mediation

108. Although it is difficult to demonstrate, the United Nations has almost certainly prevented many wars by using the Secretary-General's "good offices" to help resolve conflicts peacefully. And over the past 15 years, more civil wars have ended through mediation than in the previous two centuries, in large part because the United Nations provided leadership, opportunities for negotiation, strategic coordination and the resources to implement peace agreements. But we could undoubtedly save many more lives if we had the capacity and personnel to do so. **I urge Member States to allocate additional resources to the Secretary-General for his good offices function.**

Sanctions

109. Sanctions are a vital tool at the disposal of the Security Council for dealing preventively with threats to international peace and security. They constitute a necessary middle ground between war and words. In some cases, sanctions can help to produce agreements. In others, they can be combined with military pressure to weaken and isolate rebel groups or States that are in flagrant violation of Security Council resolutions.

110. The use of financial, diplomatic, arms, aviation, travel and commodity sanctions to target belligerents, in particular the individuals most directly responsible for reprehensible policies, will continue to be a vital tool in the United Nations arsenal. **All Security Council sanctions should be effectively implemented and enforced by strengthening State capacity to implement sanctions, establishing well resourced monitoring mechanisms and mitigating humanitarian consequences.** Given the difficult environments in which sanctions are often used and the lessons learned in recent years, future sanctions regimes must also be structured carefully so as to minimize the suffering caused to innocent third parties — including the civilian populations of targeted States — and to protect the integrity of the programmes and institutions involved.

Peacekeeping

111. Over the decades, the United Nations has done a great deal to stabilize zones of conflict, and in the last 15 years or so also to help countries emerge from conflict, by deploying peacekeeping forces. Since the issuance of the report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (A/55/305-S/2000/809, annex), which led to important reforms in the management of our peacekeeping operations, the renewed confidence of Member States in United Nations peacekeeping has led to a surge in demand, with the result that the United Nations now has more missions on the ground than ever before. The majority of these are in Africa, where — I regret to say — developed countries are increasingly reluctant to contribute troops. As a result, our capacity is severely stretched.

112. **I appeal to Member States to do more to ensure that the United Nations has effective capacities for peacekeeping, com-**

mensurate with the demands that they place upon it. In particular, I urge them to improve our deployment options by creating strategic reserves that can be deployed rapidly, within the framework of United Nations arrangements. United Nations capacity should not be developed in competition with the admirable efforts now being made by many regional organizations but in cooperation with them. Decisions by the European Union to create standby battle groups, for instance, and by the African Union to create African reserve capacities, are a very valuable complement to our own efforts. **Indeed, I believe the time is now ripe for a decisive move forward: the establishment of an interlocking system of peacekeeping capacities that will enable the United Nations to work with relevant regional organizations in predictable and reliable partnerships.**

113. Since the rule of law is an essential element of lasting peace, United Nations peacekeepers and peacebuilders have a solemn responsibility to respect the law themselves, and especially to respect the rights of the people whom it is their mission to help. In the light of recent allegations of misconduct by United Nations administrators and peacekeepers, the United Nations system should reaffirm its commitment to respect, adhere to and implement international law, fundamental human rights and the basic standards of due process. I will work to strengthen the internal capacity of the United Nations to exercise oversight of peacekeeping operations, and I remind Member States of their obligation to prosecute any members of their national contingents who commit crimes or offences in the States where they are deployed. **I am especially troubled by instances in which United Nations peacekeepers are alleged to have sexually exploited minors and other vulnerable people, and I have enacted a policy of “zero tolerance” towards such offences that applies to all personnel engaged in United Nations operations. I strongly encourage Member States to do the same with respect to their national contingents.**

Peacebuilding

114. Our record of success in mediating and implementing peace agreements is sadly blemished by some devastating failures. Indeed, several of the most violent and tragic episodes of the 1990s occurred after the negotiation of peace agreements — for instance in Angola

in 1993 and in Rwanda in 1994. Roughly half of all countries that emerge from war lapse back into violence within five years. These two points drive home the message: if we are going to prevent conflict we must ensure that peace agreements are implemented in a sustained and sustainable manner. Yet at this very point there is a gaping hole in the United Nations institutional machinery: no part of the United Nations system effectively addresses the challenge of helping countries with the transition from war to lasting peace. **I therefore propose to Member States that they create an intergovernmental Peacebuilding Commission, as well as a Peacebuilding Support Office within the United Nations Secretariat, to achieve this end.**

115. A Peacebuilding Commission could perform the following functions: in the immediate aftermath of war, improve United Nations planning for sustained recovery, focusing on early efforts to establish the necessary institutions; help to ensure predictable financing for early recovery activities, in part by providing an overview of assessed, voluntary and standing funding mechanisms; improve the coordination of the many post-conflict activities of the United Nations funds, programmes and agencies; provide a forum in which the United Nations, major bilateral donors, troop contributors, relevant regional actors and organizations, the international financial institutions and the national or transitional Government of the country concerned can share information about their respective post-conflict recovery strategies, in the interests of greater coherence; periodically review progress towards medium-term recovery goals; and extend the period of political attention to post-conflict recovery. I do not believe that such a body should have an early warning or monitoring function, but it would be valuable if Member States could at any stage make use of the Peacebuilding Commission's advice and could request assistance from a standing fund for peacebuilding to build their domestic institutions for reducing conflict, including through strengthening the rule-of-law institutions.

116. I believe that such a body would best combine efficiency with legitimacy if it were to report to the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council in sequence, depending on the phase of the conflict. Simultaneous reporting lines should be avoided because they will create duplication and confusion.

117. The Peacebuilding Commission would be most effective if its core membership comprised a sub-set of Security Council members, a similar number of Economic and Social Council members, leading troop contributors and the major donors to a standing fund for peacebuilding. In its country-specific operations, the Peacebuilding Commission should involve the national or transitional authorities, relevant regional actors and organizations, troop contributors, where applicable, and the major donors to the specific country.

118. The participation of international financial institutions is vital. I have started discussions with them to determine how best they can be involved, with due respect for their mandates and governing arrangements.

119. Once these discussions are completed, in advance of September 2005, I will present Member States a more fully developed proposal for their consideration.

Small arms, light weapons and landmines

120. The accumulation and proliferation of small arms and light weapons continues to be a serious threat to peace, stability and sustainable development. Since the adoption in 2001 of the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects,¹⁵ awareness of the problem has grown and there have been various initiatives to tackle it. We must now begin to make a real difference by ensuring better enforcement of arms embargoes, strengthening programmes for the disarmament of ex-combatants and negotiating a legally binding international instrument to regulate the marking and tracing of small arms and light weapons, as well as one to prevent, combat and eradicate illicit brokering. **I urge Member States to agree on an instrument to regulate marking and tracing no later than next year's Review Conference on the Programme of Action, and to expedite negotiations on an instrument on illicit brokering.**

121. We must also continue our work to remove the scourge of landmines, which — along with other explosive remnants of war — still kill and maim innocent people in nearly half the world's countries and hold back entire communities from working their way out of poverty. The Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production

and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction,¹⁶ supplemented by Amended Protocol II¹⁷ to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects,¹⁸ now has 144 States parties and has made a real difference on the ground. Transfers of mines have virtually halted, large tracts of previously mined lands have been cleared and more than 31 million stockpiled mines have been destroyed. Yet not all States parties to the Convention have fully implemented it and there are vast stockpiles of mines in the arsenals of States that remain outside it. **I therefore urge States parties to implement their obligations in full, and call on those States that have not yet done so to accede to both the Convention and the Protocol at the earliest possible moment.**

E. Use of force

122. Finally, an essential part of the consensus we seek must be agreement on when and how force can be used to defend international peace and security. In recent years, this issue has deeply divided Member States. They have disagreed about whether States have the right to use military force pre-emptively, to defend themselves against imminent threats; whether they have the right to use it preventively to defend themselves against latent or non-imminent threats; and whether they have the right — or perhaps the obligation — to use it protectively to rescue the citizens of other States from genocide or comparable crimes.

123. Agreement must be reached on these questions if the United Nations is to be — as it was intended to be — a forum for resolving differences rather than a mere stage for acting them out. And yet I believe the Charter of our Organization, as it stands, offers a good basis for the understanding that we need.

124. Imminent threats are fully covered by Article 51, which safeguards the inherent right of sovereign States to defend themselves against armed attack. Lawyers have long recognized that this covers an imminent attack as well as one that has already happened.

125. Where threats are not imminent but latent, the Charter gives full authority to the Security Council to use military force, including preventively, to preserve international peace and security. As to genocide,

ethnic cleansing and other such crimes against humanity, are they not also threats to international peace and security, against which humanity should be able to look to the Security Council for protection?

126. The task is not to find alternatives to the Security Council as a source of authority but to make it work better. When considering whether to authorize or endorse the use of military force, the Council should come to a common view on how to weigh the seriousness of the threat; the proper purpose of the proposed military action; whether means short of the use of force might plausibly succeed in stopping the threat; whether the military option is proportional to the threat at hand; and whether there is a reasonable chance of success. By undertaking to make the case for military action in this way, the Council would add transparency to its deliberations and make its decisions more likely to be respected, by both Governments and world public opinion. **I therefore recommend that the Security Council adopt a resolution setting out these principles and expressing its intention to be guided by them when deciding whether to authorize or mandate the use of force.**

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Notes

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¹² United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 729, No. 10485.

¹³ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-seventh Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/47/27)*, appendix I.

¹⁴ General Assembly resolution 2826 (XXVI), annex.

¹⁵ See *Report of the United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, New York, 9-20 July 2001 (A/CONF.192/15)*, chap. IV.

¹⁶ CD/1478.

¹⁷ CCW/CONF.I/16 (Part I), annex B.

¹⁸ See *The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook*, vol. 5: 1980 (United Nations publications, Sales No. E.81.IX.4), appendix VII.

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Excerpt from the report of the Secretary-General entitled “Uniting against terrorism: recommendations for a global counter-terrorism strategy” (A/60/825)

B. Denying access to weapons, including weapons of mass destruction*

43. Once a terrorist has money with which to plan an atrocity, he will next turn to what practical means he can use — how to get hold of a weapon. While most terrorist attacks so far have used conventional weapons, no one can disregard the enormously destructive potential of terrorists using nuclear, biological, chemical or radiological weapons. Several terrorist groups have professed a determination to obtain weapons of mass destruction and some have even used them, fortunately without catastrophic impact. Denying them access to these materials must be a serious part of the international effort.

...

2. Nuclear, biological, chemical or radiological weapons

47. A nuclear, biological, chemical or radiological terrorist attack would have a devastatingly far-reaching impact. In addition to causing widespread death and destruction, it could deal a crippling blow to the world economy and drive millions of people into dire poverty. An ensuing effect on infant mortality could unleash a second wave of deaths throughout the developing world.

48. Our common goal must be to secure, and wherever possible eliminate, nuclear, biological, chemical or radiological weapons and implement effective domestic and export controls on dual-use materials related to weapons of mass destruction. Although there exist

* From section III: Denying terrorists the means to carry out an attack. The report was dated 27 April 2006.

distinct challenges for controlling the peaceful use of each type of hazardous material, United Nations organizations like the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons have been working with Member States to address these challenges. That vital work must be strengthened.

49. Equally, States should reinforce existing non-proliferation mechanisms and create effective tools to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missiles, consistent with relevant international treaties. As stressed, *inter alia*, in the Riyadh Declaration adopted at the Counter-Terrorism International Conference held in February 2005, there is, *inter alia*, a need to strengthen international measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction and to support the role of the United Nations in this respect. States must fully implement Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) by enacting and enforcing effective national legal and regulatory measures to prevent non-State actors from acquiring weapons of mass destruction. I also urge Member States to take steps specified in General Assembly resolution 60/78 on measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction and resolution 60/73 on preventing the risk of radiological terrorism.

50. A majority of States have reported to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) on the status of their planned steps in fulfilling the resolution's requirements, including those pertaining to domestic and export controls and contributions to international cooperation. Yet, as at 19 April 2006, 62 States had not yet reported to the Committee. I urge them to do so without delay. Those reports help to identify and close gaps in the system that terrorists might exploit.

51. The recent adoption of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, which aims to assist States in thwarting terrorist groups possessing nuclear material and in post-crisis situations by rendering the nuclear material safe in accordance with safeguards provided by IAEA, is a major advance in multilateral efforts to prevent nuclear terrorism. I call on all States to become parties to it and implement it fully. The same applies to the amended Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. I also

commend the Global Threat Reduction Initiative and the beneficial work that it has brought about.

3. *The challenge of biological terrorism*

52. The most important under-addressed threat relating to terrorism, and one which acutely requires new thinking on the part of the international community, is that of terrorists using a biological weapon. Biotechnology, like computer technology, has developed exponentially. Such advances herald promising breakthroughs and are one of the key battlefronts in our attempts to eliminate the infectious diseases that kill upwards of 14 million people every year. They can, however, also bring incalculable harm if put to destructive use by those who seek to develop designer diseases and pathogens.

53. We find ourselves now at a point akin to the period in the 1950s, when farsighted citizens, scientists, diplomats and international civil servants recognized the enormous potential impact, both good and bad, of nuclear power. The challenge then was to harness the power of nuclear energy for civilian purposes, and to minimize its use and spread in nuclear weapons. The result was the creation of IAEA and, eventually, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The answer to biotechnology's dual-use dilemma will look very different. But the approach to developing it must be equally ambitious.

54. Preventing bioterrorism requires innovative solutions specific to the nature of the threat. Biotechnology is not like nuclear technology. Soon, tens of thousands of laboratories worldwide will be operating in a multi-billion-dollar industry. Even students working in small laboratories will be able to carry out gene manipulation. The approach to fighting the abuse of biotechnology for terrorist purposes will have more in common with measures against cybercrime than with the work to control nuclear proliferation.

55. Many Member States see biological weapons as a State-sponsored threat, for which the proper antidote is the Biological Weapons Convention. Indeed, the Convention does need strengthening and I hope that progress is made at the forthcoming Sixth Review Conference. Nonetheless, we need additional measures to address the problem of non-State actors.

56. International dialogue has begun through the follow-up process to the Biological Weapons Convention, while civil society has made novel efforts to address the dual-use issue. The International Committee of the Red Cross has sought to bring attention to the problem among Governments, industry and scientific communities. The International Centre for Genetic Engineering and Biotechnology, working together with various national academies of science, has drafted a code of conduct for scientists working in the biotechnology field.

57. These efforts are to be applauded but, unless they are brought together, their effects will be diffuse. What we need now is a forum that will bring together the various stakeholders — Governments, industry, science, public health, security, the public writ large — into a common programme, built from the bottom up, to ensure that biotechnology's advances are used for the public good and that the benefits are shared equitably around the world. Such an effort must ensure that nothing is done to impede the potential positive benefits from this technology. The United Nations is well placed to coordinate and facilitate such a forum, and to bring to the table a wide range of relevant actors. I urge Member States to consider this proposal in the near future.

...

7. *Strengthening State capacity to prevent terrorists from acquiring nuclear, biological, chemical, or radiological materials, and ensuring better preparedness for an attack with such materials**

87. The International Atomic Energy Agency and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons have been active in helping States to build capacity to prevent terrorists from accessing nuclear, biological, chemical or radiological materials, and to respond effectively in the event of an attack using such materials. I urge them to work together to identify and address any gaps in this area.

88. In addition, I suggest that Member States examine the possibility of asking the Security Council to promote facilitation of technical assistance to counter terrorist development, acquisition, and use of

* From section V: Developing State capacity to prevent terrorism, subsection A: Priority areas.

weapons of mass destruction, through the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate and the group of experts who assist the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004). In addition, the General Assembly and the Security Council may wish to consider adopting a resolution calling on all States to provide the necessary cooperation and assistance in the event of a terrorist attack using weapons of mass destruction. It may also be necessary to develop or review guidelines for Member States on their response to such an attack, in particular steps to report it and to request international assistance.

89. To prevent terrorists from acquiring chemical materials, States should ensure that security at chemical plants is kept to the highest standard, and I urge the relevant United Nations entities to provide assistance where needed. A mechanism should also be developed to allow the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, in cooperation with other relevant United Nations actors, to provide necessary assistance and coordinate the response and relief operations in case of a chemical weapon attack or the release of chemical agents.

90. To help prevent and ensure preparedness for a biological attack, a major initiative is needed to strengthen States' public health systems. Improving the world's health systems will have multiple positive impacts, including reducing the number of people that die each year of infectious disease. The same measures can deny those terrorists tempted to use pathogens for nefarious purposes both their targets and their desired impact. The World Health Organization (WHO) has done good work in providing technical assistance to help States to improve their public health systems, but efforts must be stepped up dramatically. Support from Member States — in the form of resources, political will and cooperation — is vital. In addition, the United Nations should work to develop a single comprehensive database on biological incidents and promote information-sharing to facilitate threat and risk assessment and support criminal investigation. Updating the roster of biological experts and laboratories at the disposal of the Secretary-General is also necessary.

91. Overall, the United Nations must improve coordination in planning a response to a terrorist attack using weapons of mass destruction. In particular, it will be necessary to review and improve

the effectiveness of the existing inter-agency coordination mechanism for assistance delivery and relief operations, including risk assessment, emergency response and crisis management, and victim support, as well as emergency recovery plans, so that all States can receive adequate assistance. The United Nations humanitarian response mechanisms are available in case terrorist attacks have major humanitarian implications and international assistance is required. Several reform initiatives are already under way that would strengthen the ability of the humanitarian community to respond rapidly and effectively to humanitarian emergencies in general.

B. Providing proper resources to counter terrorism

92. Demands by Member States on United Nations entities to provide technical assistance have increased dramatically in recent years. This unprecedented growth in demand has not been matched by the required increase in resources, however. Moreover, much of the United Nations technical assistance delivery in the area of counter-terrorism is financed through voluntary funding, which tends to be volatile and prevents entities from engaging in long-term planning. I call on Member States to explore additional and more reliable sources of funding.

93. For example, it is estimated that the demand for, and delivery of, the technical assistance services of the Terrorism Prevention Branch of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime has increased at least threefold since 2003, in terms of the substantive content and the quantity of required activities. At the same time, the core resource allocation for the Branch — for providing the specialized expertise and carrying out the core backstopping functions — has remained the same since 2003, making it necessary for resource requirements to be met through voluntary assistance, which has significant operational drawbacks. Member States should therefore consider additional regular budget funding for these types of activities.

C. Promoting United Nations system-wide coherence in countering terrorism

94. A remarkably wide array of organizations, departments, agencies, units and groups in the United Nations system and among its partners are actively involved in building State capacity to prevent

terrorism. Indeed, the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force counts members representing 23 different entities. Many of them are independent organizations and specialized agencies with their own governing arrangements. Annex I to the present report presents an overview of their wide-ranging activities.

95. This organizational fragmentation emphasizes the breadth of activities undertaken by the United Nations system in this area. It also reflects the need for specialized and multifaceted responses to tackle the complex threat of terrorism. At the same time, it requires us to ensure that the work of the United Nations is coherent and that scarce resources are not wasted through inadequate sharing of information and duplication of work. Only by means of a strong push to improve cooperation and coordination can the United Nations realize its full potential in assisting States to build their capacity to counter terrorism.

96. The Counter-Terrorism Committee, established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1373 (2001), is at the core of our efforts to improve the coherence and efficiency of technical assistance delivery. Resolution 1373 (2001) mandates the Committee not only to monitor compliance but also to facilitate the provision of technical assistance to States that would enhance their capacities to implement their counter-terrorism obligations. The Committee's initial request for States to report on their efforts to implement resolution 1373 (2001) produced an overwhelmingly positive response. As of the time of writing, all 191 Member States have sent at least one report to the Committee. Many have submitted two, three or more reports. Through these reports, the world has gained, for the first time, a global overview of the laws and institutional arrangements that are in place in Member States and the ability to identify where shortfalls exist.

97. To reinforce the Counter-Terrorism Committee's efforts towards more effective collaboration and State capacity-building, the Committee established the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate, which became fully operational late in 2005. Through the Executive Directorate's on-site visits to capitals, and dialogue with States and with relevant international, regional and subregional organizations, the Committee has moved beyond its focus on written reports and improved its ability to monitor and assess what actions

States are actually taking to combat terrorism. The Executive Directorate also enhances the Committee's capacity to identify and prioritize the technical assistance needs of Member States.

98. The Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate has carried out 7 on-site visits so far, and plans to complete 10 more by the end of 2006. I applaud the fact that the Executive Directorate was joined on the visits by representatives of other entities of the United Nations system and on occasion even by regional organizations. I urge relevant organizations to build further on such synergies among various entities. Once assessments are carried out, available human and financial resources for the provision of technical assistance should be matched to the need.

99. I also welcome development of a new assessment tool which allows the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate to assess, in a systematic and transparent manner, to what degree States have implemented the obligations laid down in Security Council resolution 1373 (2001). This will allow the Executive Directorate to establish priority areas within countries. Technical assistance providers, including bilateral donors, should be forthcoming, with due respect to confidentiality, in sharing information on the technical assistance projects that are under way or completed. I urge the Executive Directorate to work closely with all technical assistance providers and share information that might be helpful for them in their assistance programmes.

1. *Improving information-sharing*

100. Given the wide range of United Nations entities working on counter-terrorism issues, it is crucial that the coordination and sharing of information is enhanced to the fullest degree possible. To this end, I recommend the creation of an informal group, to include United Nations technical assistance providers, as well as donors and recipients, which could meet once or twice per year to exchange information.

101. Such coordination will also need to include better sharing of information in the field. Several innovative mechanisms could be adopted to that end.

102. First, I will ensure that information on all available United Nations counter-terrorism resources will be made available in one place — in the form of an online handbook. This is needed both by States and by United Nations country teams. It should contain, inter alia, contact details of focal points for United Nations bodies and assistance providers. It should also make clear where to look for relevant resources, including best practices available in key areas and frequently asked questions. I ask the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force to work with the relevant entities to create such a handbook as soon as possible.

103. Second, technical assistance delivery activities need to be better coordinated and reinforced at the country level. We need to make the best use of existing United Nations country offices. We should have United Nations system-wide focal points and a natural flow of information around the system, in particular to and from the field, as work goes forward on counter-terrorism, to make sure it is done in the context of the United Nations overall approach in any country. Resident coordinators and other senior officials in the field are in a prime position to detect signs of popular sympathy for terrorist groups or ideologies, extremist recruitment and hate media. By bringing this to the attention of the United Nations system and the international community, they can help to promote early action.

104. Third, synergies among international, regional and subregional organizations should be enhanced. We need to reinforce and maximize existing arrangements and mechanisms and establish new channels of cooperation, with due respect to confidentiality. The United Nations, in particular the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate, can be instrumental in helping to establish regional counter-terrorism mechanisms and centres. Full flow of information is critical; shared analysis and assessment by all actors in a particular country is a priority. We should strive for shared assessment visits between organizations to help to reduce the burden on States.

2. Streamlining reporting mechanisms

105. Excessively burdensome reporting obligations are a problem throughout the United Nations system, as emphasized in my recently released report entitled “Mandating and delivering: analysis and rec-

ommendations to facilitate the review of mandates” (A/60/733). With regard to reporting mechanisms related to counter-terrorism, a number of practical steps can help to alleviate the problem.

106. First, an assessment should be made of the extent to which lack of energy and interest, lack of will, or lack of capacity has led to a fall-off in reporting to the Security Council as called for in resolutions 1267 (1999) and its successors, resolutions 1373 (2001) and 1540 (2004).

107. Second, as the majority of States that have not reported to all three Committees are in specific regions, the Committees could examine a regional approach to raising awareness of the issues. Without undermining the principle that each State must submit a separate report, the Council could identify a mechanism or a relevant Member State that could offer help and advice to States of a region.

108. Third, the Committees should make every effort to coordinate requests for information, both among themselves and with other international organizations, to ensure that they are aware of information already submitted and to avoid separate requests for similar information. The 2005 World Summit Outcome encouraged the Security Council to consider ways to consolidate State reporting requirements, taking into account and respecting the different mandates of its counter-terrorism subsidiary bodies. I hope that the Security Council can consider and take action on the recommendations already made by the expert groups that support its counter-terrorism committees. In addition, requests for information should be tailored to the recipient State. The period between requests should be long enough to allow States time to implement or review relevant national legislation or procedures so as to avoid multiple reports which provide little new information.

3. *Institutionalizing the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force*

109. The Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force, based in my Office, is an important mechanism with the potential for ensuring overall coordination and coherence in the United Nations system’s counter-terrorism efforts. Given its success so far, not only in helping me to develop recommendations for a counter-terrorism strategy but

also in promoting cooperation among relevant United Nations entities, I am taking steps to institutionalize the Task Force within the Secretariat. This will include creating a small support function within my Office to coordinate and develop its activities, in particular implementing the outcomes of the deliberations of Member States on the recommendations contained throughout this report.

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Excerpt from the report of the Secretary-General entitled “United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy: activities of the United Nations system in implementing the Strategy” (A/62/898)*

III. Measures to prevent and combat terrorism

24. The Strategy recognizes that terrorists need both the means to carry out their attacks and a set of high value targets. The Strategy calls for various actions that Member States can take to deny terrorists access to resources. It also calls for action to protect particularly vulnerable targets.

25. Since the adoption of the Strategy, the United Nations system has supported the work of Member States in three main ways: helping to draft legal instruments and guidelines that establish standards for preventative action; compiling rosters and databases that help centralize information about resources available to both prevent and respond to terrorist acts; and, when requested, providing assessments of existing counter-terrorism capacities of Member States.

26. The Office of Legal Affairs of the Secretariat, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), the International Maritime Organization (IMO) and the World Bank have been key contributors to the development of legal instruments, standards, recommendations and guidance that can assist in countering terrorism.

27. The Office of Legal Affairs has been providing extensive support to the Ad Hoc Committee established by General Assembly resolution 51/210 of 17 December 1996, which is drafting a comprehensive convention on international terrorism. While significant progress has been

* The report was dated 7 July 2008.

made, there is still some disagreement among Member States regarding the scope of the convention. Attempts will be made to resolve the disagreement in the Sixth Committee during the sixty-third session of the General Assembly.

28. The International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism entered into force on 7 July 2007. As of 25 June 2008, only 40 States were parties to the Convention. The number of parties to the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material was 136 as of May 2008. However, only 15 States have ratified or acceded to the 2005 Amendment. IAEA is actively promoting adherence to the Convention and its 2005 Amendment, and to the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, through various nuclear security missions, training events, conferences and workshops related to Security Council resolution 1540 (2004). Unfortunately, none of the existing global counter-terrorism instruments enjoy universal participation, although the number of State parties has been increasing.

29. ICAO has also been working to strengthen the international legal regime against terrorism. Responding to the recommendations of the Strategy that legislative and administrative measures be taken to implement counter-terrorist travel practices, the ICAO Legal Committee has prepared two draft conventions relating to compensation for damage caused by aircraft to third parties arising from acts of unlawful interference or from general risks. The former includes a proposal for the establishment of a supplementary compensation mechanism. ICAO has also drafted two treaties designed to update existing aviation security conventions by addressing new and emerging threats, such as the use of a civil aircraft as a weapon and the use of biological, chemical and nuclear substances for the purposes of attacks.

30. Following an alleged terrorist plot against civilian aircraft over the North Atlantic, in August 2006, ICAO approved additional recommended security control guidelines for the screening of baggage for immediate implementation by States. In order to enhance border control security, ICAO published a Supplement to Document 9303, Part 1, Machine Readable Passports, and established the Public Key Directory as an essential component of the “ICAO Blueprint” for the issuance of ePassports. The ICAO Aviation Security Panel continues

to work on the Standards and Recommended Practices to the Convention on International Civil Aviation, to address the new and emerging threats to civil aviation.

31. IMO has worked on developing legal instruments and adopting standards aimed at protecting international transport from terrorist activities. IMO adopted mandatory measures to enhance maritime security under the 1974 International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) and the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code. These have been implemented by 158 Member States, representing 99 per cent of the world's merchant fleet (around 40,000 ships) engaged in international voyages. Close to 10,000 port facilities have their security plans developed and approved. Through the adoption of amendments to SOLAS in 2006, IMO is currently implementing a new mandatory long-range tracking and identification system to permit the tracking of ships globally.

32. As custodian of the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and its three protocols, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime has continued to assist Member States with the ratification and implementation of these instruments. It has helped countries to use the provisions of the Convention and its protocols to address terrorist activities through domestic criminal law, to adopt new frameworks for mutual legal assistance, and to facilitate extradition, law enforcement cooperation, technical assistance and training.

33. The Strategy calls on the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1267 (1999) to strengthen the effectiveness of the United Nations sanctions regime against Al-Qaida and the Taliban, while ensuring that measures taken or policies adopted comply with high standards of transparency and accountability. The Security Council has accepted recommendations from the 1267 Committee Monitoring Team designed to help States combat crimes that might be connected with terrorism, including drug trafficking, the illicit arms trade and money-laundering. The Team has suggested ways that the 1267 Committee might strengthen the effectiveness of the travel ban under the sanctions regime and ensure that fair and transparent procedures exist for placing individuals and entities on its list, for removing them and for granting humanitarian exceptions. The monitoring team is also working closely with the International Criminal Police

Organization (INTERPOL) on improving the quantity, quality and distribution of special notices concerning people subject to sanctions, and has established links with private sector entities whose cooperation is key to effective implementation. It has gathered information from States concerning the nature of the threat posed by Al-Qaida and the Taliban, and has offered suggestions to the Council as to how the sanctions regime might maintain and increase its impact as the threat evolves.

34. The contribution of the World Bank to strengthening legal regimes has been threefold: assessing country compliance with the Forty Recommendations on Money-Laundering and Nine Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing of the Financial Action Task Force; delivering related technical assistance to countries; and performing policy development work in this area. It has recently conducted a study on the use of new technologies for financial services looking at how to reduce the opportunities for terrorist financing. The study should give rise to further risk management methodologies.

35. Since July 2007, the Office for Disarmament Affairs has been consulting with government experts and representatives of several international organizations on the scope and feasibility of a single comprehensive database on biological incidents, as requested in the Strategy. In April 2008, the Office started the development of the software platform for the *Biological Incident Database* to provide a secure web-based data entry tool for reporting biological incidents. This system is already available for pilot use by interested Member States.

36. The Office for Disarmament Affairs has also been working with Member States since March 2007 to update the roster of experts and laboratories and technical appendices of the guidelines and procedures, which are available to the Secretary-General for timely and efficient investigations of alleged use.

37. The *IAEA Illicit Trafficking Database* programme predates the adoption of the Strategy, but the initiative has become an important contributor to Strategy implementation. Currently, 99 Member States contribute information to and benefit from the database. As of 31 December 2007, participating States had reported or otherwise confirmed 1,340 trafficking incidents. Of those, 303 incidents involved the

seizure of nuclear material or radioactive sources from persons who possessed them illegally and, in some cases, attempted to sell them or smuggle them across borders. Of particular concern were those incidents involving the unauthorized possession of highly enriched uranium and plutonium. From 1993 to 2007, 15 such incidents were reported to IAEA.

38. Combining the data from the *IAEA Illicit Trafficking Database*, INTERPOL's Project Geiger collects and analyses data on the theft of radiological materials to identify methods and trends and the vulnerability of materials to theft by terrorists for use in the manufacture of so-called "dirty bombs", conventional explosives armed with radiological materials.

39. ICAO, for its part, has developed an aviation security point of contact network for the communication of imminent threats to civil air transport operations. Eighty-three States are partners in this effort.

40. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations also plays an important role in compiling information that can assist in threat reduction and management. United Nations peacekeepers monitor violence levels, unauthorized movement of armaments and drugs, and the movement of militia groups, and also secure major communication centres. The joint mission analysis centres and joint operation centres in peacekeeping operations carry out integrated analysis of terrorist threats.

41. The third category of United Nations system support to the implementation of the second pillar of the Strategy is the provision of capacity assessments for interested Member States. The Counter-Terrorism Committee and its Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate play a key role in this arena. The Executive Directorate, on behalf of the Committee, monitors and promotes the implementation of Security Council resolution 1373 (2001) by Member States. On the basis of reports submitted to the Committee by Member States on their implementation of resolution 1373 (2001), and information gathered from additional sources, the Executive Directorate has prepared preliminary implementation assessments for all 192 Member States and a global survey that assesses the status of implementation of the resolution by all Member States. Since September 2006, the Executive Directorate has conducted 19 visits to Member States to monitor and promote

their implementation of resolution 1373 (2001) and resolution 1624 (2005). During those visits, various members of the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force took part in and contributed to its outcome report. In addition, the Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate, the 1267 Committee Monitoring Team, and the expert group of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) have worked together to enhance the capacities of Member States in understanding the requirements for effectively implementing the various Security Council resolutions related to terrorism.

42. Human rights are increasingly looked at by the Executive Directorate and the Counter-Terrorism Committee in their reviews. The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism have made proposals on strengthening their practical linkages with the Committee and its Executive Directorate, including through joint country visits.

43. In other areas of assessment, the ICAO Universal Security Audit Programme initiated in January 2008 a new six-year cycle of ICAO aviation security audits focusing on States' aviation security oversight capabilities. Follow-up visits to audited States are demonstrating a markedly increased level of implementation of the ICAO security standards.

44. The United Nations Interregional Criminal and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI) has conducted a risk assessment of illicit trafficking of chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear materials and weapons in the Euro-Asian region, collecting and analysing data from 25 countries. On the basis of the assessment, UNICRI, in cooperation with the European Commission and the technical support of the European Police Office, IAEA, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, the Southeast European Cooperative Initiative Regional Centre for Combating Trans-border Crime and the World Customs Organization, has developed a pilot knowledge management system in South-East Europe and the Caucasus region. The aim of the system is to improve information exchange among countries and develop a durable cooperation legacy in the area of trafficking of chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear materials.

45. Both the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank have focused their assessment efforts in support of the global fight against money-laundering and the financing of terrorism. Since 2004, IMF has been providing diagnostics and needs assessments, as well as assessments of money-laundering and financing of terrorism risks. The World Bank has performed worldwide nearly 400 technical assistance missions on a country or regional basis. These have been focused on developing anti-money-laundering measures and combating the financing of terrorism frameworks, building financial intelligence unit capacities, and improving oversight of the financial sector and its players.

46. In addition to work done in their individual capacities, entities are also working together through the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force to support the second pillar of the Strategy through three working groups: on preventing and responding to weapons of mass destruction attacks, on tackling the financing of terrorism, and on countering the use of the Internet for terrorist purposes.

47. The working group on preventing and responding to weapons of mass destruction attacks aims to improve the assistance provided to Member States by the United Nations system and international organizations in detection, prevention and response measures. UNICRI has, upon the request of the Task Force, started mapping and assessing all the programmes and activities currently being implemented by Task Force entities to help Member States in preventing and responding to weapons of mass destruction terrorist attacks.

48. Through its working group on tackling the financing of terrorism, the Task Force is developing a report to survey and analyse the effectiveness of the current measures in place in a number of countries to combat terrorist-financing and to identify new approaches to address this issue. The report is based on statistical analysis of reports of IMF, the World Bank and the Committee Executive Directorate, on discussions with experts and on case research. Since its establishment, the working group has convened seven round tables in Vienna and New York to explore its views and proposals with outside experts in the areas of banking, intelligence (including financial intelligence), regulation, law enforcement and criminal justice.

49. The working group on countering the use of the Internet for terrorist purposes aims to bring together stakeholders and partners to discuss the abuse and misuse of the Internet for terrorist purposes, and compile best practices for preventing the Internet from being used for radicalization that may lead to terrorism, terrorist recruitment, operational planning for terrorist activities and fundraising for terrorism. On the basis of information provided by Member States, the international technological industry, members of academia and relevant international and regional actors, the Task Force, through this working group, will map out existing legal and technical measures being used to counter terrorist use of the Internet, for a report that will be completed later this year.

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APPENDICES

Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force members

The Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force includes representatives from:

- Counter-terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED)
- Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO)
- Department of Political Affairs (DPA)
- Department of Public Information (DPI)
- Department of Safety and Security (DSS)
- Expert Staff of 1540 Committee
- International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
- International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)
- International Maritime Organization (IMO)
- International Monetary Fund (IMF)
- International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL)
- Monitoring Team of 1267 Committee
- Office for Disarmament Affairs (ODA)
- Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR)
- Office of Legal Affairs (OLA)
- Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)
- Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights while countering terrorism
- United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
- United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)

- United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI)
 - United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)
 - World Customs Organization (WCO)
 - World Bank
 - World Health Organization (WHO)
-

Biological Incident Database form

1. **Title:**

2. **Organism or toxin:**

3. **Type of incident:**

Conflict/Bio-defense research/Threat/Spoiled natural material/
Contaminated natural materials (e.g. untanned leather/hides)/
Unintentional consequences of research/Terrorism/Theft/Hoax/
Unauthorized shipment/possession/sale or transfer/Planned use
(plot)/Suspicious/unusual disease outbreak/Accidental disease
outbreak (i.e. laboratory accident)/Not listed

4. **Date of incident or/and reported date:**

Year: Month: Day:

Narrative:

5. **Single or multiple incidents:** Single/Multiple

Narrative:

6. **Location of primary incident (country):**

7. **Biological agent**

Used

Suspected

Confirmed

Type of biological agent: Fungi/Bacteria/Virus/Toxin/Rickettsia

Name:

Other:

Unknown:

Not specified:

Narrative for scientific name:

Resulting illness: _____

Narrative:

8. **Source of agent:**

- Isolated pure culture
- Clinical isolate
- Environmental isolate
- Toxin:

- Crude
- Purified

• Narrative on purity:

Unknown

Narrative:

9. **Agent (physical appearance) and amount:**

- Liquid;
- Powder;

- Aerosol;
- Solid;
- Other: _____

Quantity (concentration): _____

Narrative:

10. **Method of delivery/exposure:**

- Contaminated food and liquid
- Aerosol (in closed or open area)
- Direct human contact
- Inanimate material
- Infected animals, plants or insects
- Other: _____

Narrative:

11. **Type of incident (include):**

- Conflict
- Bio-defence research
- Threat
- Spoiled natural material
- Contaminated natural materials (e.g. untanned leather/hides)
- Unintentional consequences of research
- Criminal:
 - Terrorism
 - Theft

- Hoax
- Unauthorized shipment/possession/sale or transfer
- Planned use (plot);
- Suspicious/unusual disease outbreak;
- Accidental disease outbreak (i.e. laboratory accident);
- Other: _____

Narrative:

12. **Incident scope:**

- Local
- National
- Regional
- International

Narrative:

13. **Biological detection method** (if known):

Technique name: _____

Narrative:

14. **Method of discovery, detection or seizure** (include):

- Public health monitoring
- Agricultural surveillance
- Veterinary surveillance
- Environmental monitoring alert
- Interdiction

- Not specified
- Unknown

Narrative:

15. **Type of location of primary incident** (include):

- Private residence
- Private office
- Public building/space
- Industrial site
- Religious assembly
- Government office/building
- Major public event
- International Organizations premises
- Embassy property
- Public transport
- Agricultural site/farm
- Other: _____

Narrative:

16. **Economic impact/damage:** Slight/Medium/Severe

Narrative:

17. **Areas/countries subsequently affected:**

Narrative:

18. **Development of incident:** Contained/Secondary infections;

Narrative:

19. **Related to incident** (consequence management):

Number treated by medical personnel:

- On-site: _____
- Prophylactic: _____
- Intervention: _____
- Counselling: _____
- Asymptomatic: _____

Number hospitalised:

- Minor: _____
- Seriously: _____
- Critical: _____

Number of deaths:

Fear and panic

- Local: Slight/Medium/Severe
- International: Slight/Medium/Severe
- Narrative (e.g. number calls on hot line)

Narrative:

20. **Decontamination procedures:**

Narrative:

21. **Key points of contact in country for further information:**

Narrative:

22. **Responding authorities** (national and international):

Narrative:
