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**Letter dated 28 October 2014 from the Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic established pursuant to Security Council resolution 2127 (2013) addressed to the President of the Security Council**

On behalf of the members of the Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic established pursuant to Security Council resolution 2127 (2013), I have the honour to transmit herewith the final report of the Panel prepared in accordance with paragraph 59 (c) of the resolution.

In this connection, I would appreciate if the present letter, together with its enclosure, were brought to the attention of the members of the Council and issued as a document of the Council.

*(Signed)* Aurélien **Llorca**  
Coordinator

Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic established  
pursuant to Security Council resolution 2127 (2013)

*(Signed)* Paul-Simon **Handy**  
Expert

*(Signed)* Ahmed **Himmiche**  
Expert

*(Signed)* Ruben **de Koning**  
Expert

*(Signed)* Carolina **Reyes Aragón**  
Expert



## **Final report of the Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic established pursuant to Security Council resolution 2127 (2013)**

### *Summary*

Despite the signature of a cessation-of-hostilities agreement in Brazzaville on 23 July 2014, armed groups remain in control of or still exert influence over almost all inhabited areas of the Central African Republic.

Although the general security situation is perceived to have partially improved, in particular in Bangui, the Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic estimates that some 2,000 former Séléka fighters, excluding the elements cantoned in Bangui, and some 1,500 militiamen associated with the anti-balaka movement continue to pose a permanent threat to the peace, security and stability of the country, which remains de facto partitioned.

Any improvement in the security situation in the Central African Republic also depends on the neighbouring States' continuous commitment to the peace process. In carrying out its mandate, the Panel documented several incidents in the northern part of the country bordering Chad, including the killing of civilians, the burning of villages and forced displacement. These recurrent attacks by unknown armed groups and former Séléka units under the command of Brigadier General Mahamat Alkhatim have resulted in the establishment of a buffer zone between Chad and the provinces of Ouham and Ouham-Pendé in the Central African Republic.

In addition, the increasing fragmentation of the main armed groups active in the country and the recent implosion of the Front populaire pour la renaissance de centrafricaine, the new political structure representing the former Séléka, constitute significant challenges to the stabilization of the political landscape in order to hold free, fair, transparent and inclusive presidential and legislative elections in February 2015.

There have been few direct confrontations between former Séléka and anti-balaka forces since 5 December 2013, but both armed groups, in particular the anti-balaka, have constantly targeted civilians. In this context, the offensive against Séléka positions in Batangafo (Ouham Province) carried out the week after the signature of the cessation-of-hostilities agreement in Brazzaville by one of the most prominent anti-balaka commanders, who is a member of the command-and-control structure of the military branch of the Coordination nationale des libérateurs du peuple centrafricain of Patrice Edouard Ngaïssona, also known as the Mouvement des patriotes anti-balaka, demonstrates that any real commitment by political leaders to ceasing hostilities remains in doubt.

Furthermore, the Panel assesses that competition among political representatives of armed groups for ministerial positions, as well as among military commanders for control of resources, accounts for the recent infighting between former components of the Séléka and anti-balaka rival factions. The appointment to the post of Minister of Youth and Sports in the new transitional cabinet of the leader of an armed group called Révolution et justice reinforces the prospect that being the commander of a politico-military movement could lead to top governmental positions and therefore validates the strategy of political spoilers.

Since the suspension of the Central African Republic from the Kimberley Process in May 2013, an additional 140,000 carats of diamonds, valued at \$24 million, are estimated to have been smuggled out of the country. In May 2014, Belgian authorities seized 6,634 carats that had been sent through Kinshasa and then Dubai to a company based in Antwerp, Belgium, called Kardiam. Kardiam is the Belgian branch of the Central African diamond-trading company Badica.

The Panel believes that some of the diamonds seized in Belgium came from Sam-Ouandja and Bria (Haute-Kotto Province) in the east of the country, where former Séléka forces impose taxes on aircraft transporting diamonds and receive security payments from diamond collectors. Meanwhile, members of groups associated with the anti-balaka movement are involved in artisanal diamond production around Berberati and Carnot (Mambéré-Kadeï Province) in the west. While often smuggled abroad, these diamonds also enter the formal trading chain, requiring mitigating measures by the principal buying house, Sodiam.

An estimated two tons of gold is trafficked each year from the Central African Republic, mainly through Cameroon. This illicit trade involves collectors from Yaloké (Ombella-Mpoko Province) and Boda (Lobaye Province) who fled to Cameroon as a consequence of attacks based on religion committed by anti-balaka groups starting in January 2014, which resulted in the takeover of artisanal gold mines in the vicinity of Yaloké. In Ndassima, near Bambari (Ouaka Province), former Séléka forces collect approximately \$150,000 in taxes per year from local gold production, which is estimated at 180 kg per year. An equal amount of taxes is levied on the coffee trade from Bambari to the Sudan. These parallel taxation systems provide former Séléka leaders, in particular General Ali Darrassa Mahamat, with a sustainable source of income to maintain forces on the ground.

The Panel has not yet observed any significant violation of the arms embargo in support of armed groups, considering that logistics and security constraints have prevented the Panel from travelling to the north-eastern region of the Central African Republic. The Panel continues nevertheless to investigate networks involved in the smuggling of hunting ammunition to anti-balaka groups. The Panel also documented the first case of training of and assistance to an armed group by western mercenary personnel.

The humanitarian situation in the Central African Republic remains volatile. Of the country's 4.6 million inhabitants, some 2.5 million continue to be in need of humanitarian assistance. Although international non-governmental organizations and humanitarian partners have increased their presence and operations, insecurity, logistical problems and a lack of funding remain some of the principal challenges to move the country out of the current situation of humanitarian emergency.

From 5 December 2013 to mid-August 2014, the Panel documented a total of 1,034 conflict-related incidents, including 247 reports of obstruction of humanitarian aid. During the same period, the Panel also recorded in its database the killing of 3,003 civilians throughout the country, including 22 aid workers.

In the present report, the Panel outlines the evolution of the political and security context in the Central African Republic since its interim report was published on 1 July 2014 (S/2014/452), presents new case studies and makes recommendations to the Security Council and the Committee established pursuant to resolution 2127 (2013) concerning the Central African Republic.

## **I. Background**

### **A. Mandate and appointment**

1. By its resolution 2127 (2013) of 5 December 2013, the Security Council imposed a sanctions regime on the Central African Republic and established a committee (the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 2127 (2013) concerning the Central African Republic) and a panel of experts (the Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic) to monitor its implementation. By resolution 2134 (2014), adopted on 28 January 2014, the Council imposed additional measures (a travel ban and an assets freeze) on individuals and entities responsible for the acts set out in paragraphs 36 and 37 of that resolution, and extended the mandate of the Committee and the Panel until 27 January 2015.

2. On 13 February 2014, the Secretary-General, in consultation with the Committee, appointed the five members of the Panel (S/2014/98), which consists of a regional expert (Paul-Simon Handy), an arms expert (Ahmed Himmiche), a finance and natural resources expert (Ruben de Koning), an armed groups expert and the Coordinator of the Panel (Aurélien Llorca) and a humanitarian expert (Carolina Reyes Aragón).

3. The Panel is home-based but maintained an almost permanent presence in Bangui throughout the investigation phase of its mandate, which ran from March to August 2014. The Panel also travelled by road to the following places: Bambari, Batalimo, Batangafo, Béloko, Bémal, Berberati, Boali, Boda, Boguila, Bossangoa, Bouar, Bouca, Cantonier, Carnot, Damara, Gadzi, Grimari, Guen, Markounda, Mbaïki, Paoua, Sibut and Yaloké. Owing to a shortage of fuel for United Nations air operations in the Central African Republic and other kinds of restrictions, the Panel could travel only by air to Ndélé and Bria. At the regional level, the Panel travelled on three occasions to Cameroon (Batouri, Bertoua, Douala, Kenzou and Yaoundé) and undertook one visit to Gabon (Libreville), one to the Congo (Brazzaville) and one to the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Kinshasa).

4. On 26 June 2014, the Panel submitted its interim report (S/2014/452) to the President of the Security Council, in accordance with paragraph 59 (c) of resolution 2127 (2013). On 1 July 2014, the report was published on the Security Council website following a discussion between the Panel and the Committee on 29 May 2014.

### **B. Methodology**

5. The Panel endeavours to ensure compliance with the standards recommended by the Informal Working Group of the Security Council on General Issues of Sanctions in its report of December 2006 (S/2006/997, annex). These standards call for reliance on verified, genuine documents, concrete evidence and on-site observations by experts, including photographs wherever possible. When physical inspection was not possible, the Panel attempted to corroborate information using multiple independent sources to appropriately meet the highest achievable standard, placing a higher value on statements by principal actors and first-hand witnesses to events.

6. While it intends to be as transparent as possible, in situations where identifying sources would expose them or others to unacceptable safety risks, the

Panel intends to withhold identifying information and place the relevant evidence in United Nations archives.

7. The Panel is equally committed to the highest degree of fairness and will endeavour to make available to parties, where appropriate and possible, any information in the report for which those parties may be cited, for their review, comment and response within a specified deadline.

8. The Panel safeguards the independence of its work against any effort to undermine its impartiality or create a perception of bias. The Panel approved the text, conclusions and recommendations in the present report on the basis of consensus prior to its transmission by the Coordinator to the President of the Security Council.

9. In accordance with General Assembly resolutions on the control of documentation and word limits, in particular resolutions 52/214, 53/208 and 59/265, the Panel decided to place some case studies and findings in the annexes to the report.

### **C. Cooperation with stakeholders and organizations**

10. The Panel would like to highlight again the excellent level of cooperation with the transitional authorities of the Central African Republic and, more particularly, with the Government of the former Prime Minister, André Nzapayéké. At the level of the presidency, the Panel looks forward to the designation of a new focal point following the appointment of a new cabinet on 26 August 2014.

11. The Panel enjoys valuable support from the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) and has a good working relationship with Operation Sangaris and the European Union Force in the Central African Republic. The Panel has also enjoyed excellent cooperation with the African-led International Support Mission in the Central African Republic (MISCA), which provided armed escorts to the Panel for missions to the field when required. In general, the Panel has developed effective cooperation with a large range of international actors, companies, individuals and organizations.

12. The Panel transmitted 84 items of official correspondence to 51 States, organizations and private entities, and has received 45 replies to date providing the information requested; nine requests remain pending (see annex 1). The level of cooperation from Member States neighbouring the Central African Republic is described below (see paras. 13-15).

## **II. Threats to peace and security**

### **A. Political and regional context**

13. As mentioned in the interim report, the dynamics of the Central African region are key to understanding the repeated cycles of violence that have characterized successive crises in the Central African Republic since the beginning of the 1990s (see S/2014/452, para. 34). To deepen its understanding of the region, and in pursuance of Security Council resolutions 2127 (2013) and 2134 (2014), the Panel transmitted official correspondence requesting visits to Cameroon (on 17 March and 9 July 2014), Chad (on 3, 5 and 26 June 2014), the Democratic Republic of the

Congo (on 16 July 2014), the Congo (on 10 June and 9 July 2014), South Sudan (on 10 July 2014), the Sudan (on 10 and 16 June 2014) and Uganda (on 9 June and 9 July 2014).

14. With the exception of Chad, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda (in one of two letters), the Panel did not receive official responses to its proposals to carry out visits from the permanent missions to the United Nations of the countries neighbouring the Central African Republic.<sup>1</sup> In some instances, not even the facilitation efforts of the Chair of the Committee resulted in the receipt of an official response to the Panel's request to visit the relevant States. The Chair convened a meeting with the neighbouring States on 12 September 2014 to discuss the lack of response to the Panel's requests for information and to conduct visits. This low level of cooperation from some States in the region, including the Congo, South Sudan and the Sudan, has prevented the Panel from conducting planned investigations on matters related to key aspects of its mandate.

15. Nevertheless, the Panel wishes to thank the Governments of Cameroon and the Democratic Republic of the Congo for having facilitated the visits of several experts during the reporting period despite the fact that no official replies were sent and some requests for information from these two States remain pending.

#### **Political context**

16. As mentioned in the section on armed groups (see paras. 47-110 below), there has been an increase in clashes within the former Séléka and the anti-balaka that have resulted in those forces having difficulty exerting command-and-control authority. This may indicate a new phase of further fragmentation.<sup>2</sup>

17. Tensions have been particularly apparent during both government and international mediation efforts, which encourage armed groups to reveal their objectives and position themselves. Such efforts include the forum on national reconciliation in the Central African Republic held in Brazzaville from 21 to 23 July 2014 (see paras. 25-29 below) and the government reshuffle of 22 August 2014. On both occasions, tensions within the former Séléka and the anti-balaka increased substantially.

#### *The transition Government*

18. The main political development during the reporting period was the appointment on 22 August 2014 of a new Government under Prime Minister Mahamat Kamoun,<sup>3</sup> the first Muslim to serve in that position in the country since independence. Kamoun's appointment was criticized by a majority of local and international actors, albeit for different reasons. He therefore appears as the most

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<sup>1</sup> The Permanent Mission of Cameroon to the United Nations replied on 21 April 2014 to the Panel's request to visit Cameroon from 12 to 19 April 2014.

<sup>2</sup> On 25 August 2014, violent, armed fighting took place in Bambari between the former Séléka forces of General Zakaria Damane and Brigadier General Joseph Zoundeko, chief of staff of the armed group, and elements led by General Ali Darrassa Mahamat, Séléka regional commander. Similarly, anti-balaka factions engaged in violent clashes in July and August 2014 (see paras. 47-110).

<sup>3</sup> A positive aspect of the new government and the new presidential cabinet is that there are far fewer minister-counsellors than in the previous government, in which most of those counsellors were underutilized.

visible sign that the Transitional Head of State, President Catherine Samba-Panza, is now determined to take ownership of the political transition process.

19. The difficulties faced by the previous Government, led by former Prime Minister Nzapayéké, to implement the transition road map seriously hampered the Government's credibility. Between January and August 2014, the Nzapayéké administration had made little progress on key aspects of the transition road map. Its record was particularly poor in promoting reconciliation between the former Séléka and the anti-balaka. While symbolic actions such as demonstrations and sports activities were taken, the absence of a coherent strategy taking into account national and international reconciliation initiatives seemed to have been the main stumbling block. Furthermore, the Government did not publicly support notable efforts by national non-governmental organizations in brokering direct talks between the ex-Séléka and the anti-balaka nor did it include such partners in its strategy for reconciliation.

20. Small local non-governmental organizations like Pareto and Mou-Da have been very active in promoting a rapprochement between the main armed groups. Because they were created recently (2014) and hardly have any record in the mediation and reconciliation sector, the Government has not deemed it worth supporting them. Pareto has achieved major successes, however, in bringing former Séléka and anti-balaka forces to the negotiating table in Bangui (May-July 2014) and Bambari (July-August 2014). Before the Brazzaville forum, Pareto had already prepared the ground for a cessation-of-hostilities agreement, the signature of which was postponed because of the Brazzaville forum.<sup>4</sup> On the other hand, transitional authorities widely cooperated with some international non-governmental organizations in the field of reconciliation. Organizations like the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue and the Community of Sant'Egidio, which have an established record of conducting mediation in the Central African Republic, continue to play an important role in assisting the Government.<sup>5</sup>

21. The transition Government's record has also been poor in the area of disarmament and security sector reform, particularly with regard to the necessary reorganization of the armed forces of the Central African Republic and the re-establishment of the military justice system. Characteristic of this deficiency was the Prime Minister's call for voluntary disarmament on 8 June 2014, which led to only a small number of mostly old rifles and ammunition being turned in (see paras. 151-186 below).

22. Personal rivalries between government members have led, among other things, to some refusals to interact with former Séléka ministers, appointments being made

<sup>4</sup> The Panel held interviews with Sébastien Wénézoui in Bangui on 17 August 2014 and with Eric Nérés Massi on 29 July 2014. It also held meetings with representatives of Pareto and Mou-Da in Bangui in July and August 2014. In addition, the Panel met the special representative of Denis Sassou Nguesso, President of the Congo and head of the committee following up on the implementation of the Libreville agreement, in Bangui on 1 August 2014 (see annex 2).

<sup>5</sup> From 10 to 12 June 2014, the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue facilitated a meeting held in preparation of the reconciliation forum to be organized in Bangui before the end of 2014. The Centre had already played an important facilitation role during the national dialogue in 2003 and the inclusive political dialogue of 2008. The Community of Sant'Egidio has been involved in mediation in the Central African Republic since 2013 and continues to offer its good offices.

on the basis of personal or ethnic and regional connections<sup>6</sup> and the absence of an objective performance measurement system. As a result, the interim administration, in which some officials are underutilized, has been seen as weak.<sup>7</sup>

#### *International mediation*

23. International mediation efforts to resolve the crisis in the Central African Republic involve several bodies and commissions whose aim it is to support the transition Government in the implementation of its decisions. Despite some difficulties at the outset, coordination has substantially improved in recent months. The United Nations, the African Union, the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) and other key partners of the Central African Republic are increasingly finding their roles as both strategic partners of the transition Government (within the group of eight stakeholders<sup>8</sup> that provides support to the International Contact Group on the Central African Republic) and as part of the mediation team (see annex 3).<sup>9</sup> However, the technical committee following up on the Libreville agreement still needs to prove its efficiency, in a context where the agreement is increasingly being contested as a legal basis of the transition.<sup>10</sup>

24. In addition to the holding of regular coordination meetings with all stakeholders, a main achievement of international mediation in recent months has been the convening of the forum on national reconciliation in the Central African Republic.

#### *Forum on national reconciliation in the Central African Republic*

25. The forum on national reconciliation in the Central African Republic was held in Brazzaville from 21 to 23 July 2014 under the good offices of the President of the Congo, Denis Sassou Nguesso, in his role as international mediator. The prospect of a reconciliation meeting arose at an extraordinary ECCAS meeting held on the margins of the twenty-third ordinary session of the African Union, held in Malabo on 26 and 27 June 2014. At that meeting, it was also decided to transform the ECCAS mediation effort into an international mediation effort including the African Union and the United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa. On the first day of the Brazzaville forum, the delegation of former Séléka requested the partition of the

<sup>6</sup> While the new Government has fewer members, the President's cabinet in particular appears to include a high number of officials with links to the President.

<sup>7</sup> Public criticism accompanied the management of an Angolan grant of \$10 million aimed at paying civil servants' salaries in March 2014. According to local and specialized press, one of the closest collaborators of the President, currently serving as Prime Minister, was involved in the alleged misappropriation of some of those funds. According to media reports, this was one reason why the International Monetary Fund suspended its operations in the Central African Republic (see "Allies lose faith", *Africa Confidential*, vol. 55, No. 17 (29 August 2014)).

<sup>8</sup> The group comprises, in addition to the United Nations, the African Union and ECCAS, the European Union, the World Bank, the Congo, France and the United States of America.

<sup>9</sup> According to some political actors in Bangui, a key development in recent international mediation efforts has been the scaling down of the traditional role of Chad because it was increasingly considered in Bangui to be part of the problem. Meeting with a former Prime Minister, Bangui, 4 August 2014.

<sup>10</sup> Given the existence of the international mediation team and the group of eight stakeholders, the committee following up on the Libreville agreement has struggled to exist and demonstrate concrete achievements. Meetings with a former Prime Minister and a foreign diplomat, Bangui, 4 and 5 August 2014.



Central African Republic as a precondition for negotiations. This request is highly contested within the armed group's ranks and constitutes a fault line among the former Séléka.<sup>11</sup>

26. Because of the way in which it was announced and prepared,<sup>12</sup> the Brazzaville forum was strongly contested by some key stakeholders, who opposed what they considered to be the marginalization of Central African actors in the resolution of the crisis in their country.<sup>13</sup> Nevertheless, the forum managed to bring about a much-needed agreement on the cessation of hostilities that, among other things, commits the signatories to refrain from any project aimed at the partition of the Central African Republic (see annex 4, article 3 (d) of the agreement). Interviews with key actors in Bangui have revealed that interpretations of article 3 (d) of the cessation-of-hostilities agreement differ widely: whereas former Séléka members consider the paragraph to be a rejection of the partition of the country as a precondition for negotiation, international mediators and the Government view it as a binding guarantee to safeguard the country's unity.

27. Owing to the former Séléka's internal divisions over its negotiating position, the cessation-of-hostilities agreement was signed in the final stages of the Brazzaville forum and includes a number of technical caveats that could be used by some to delay implementation.<sup>14</sup> The cessation-of-hostilities agreement and the forum in general have, however, created a positive momentum that culminated in a government reshuffle and a new resolve to implement the transition road map under the scrutiny of international mediators.

28. Interviews with various local and international actors in Bangui have led the Panel to believe that the new Government was not formed in a manner consistent with the level of consultation called for in the Libreville agreement, the N'Djamena Declaration and the Transition charter. Both the choice of the Prime Minister and of government members were heavily contested by key local and international actors.<sup>15</sup> A more significant development, however, is the fact that former leaders of armed groups have taken government office as political leaders. In addition to being a reward for violence, this mode of patronage contravenes the objective of ending

<sup>11</sup> Interviews with political leaders of the former Séléka, Bangui, July and August 2014.

<sup>12</sup> The Transition President of the Central African Republic was invited to the meeting in Malabo at the last moment and was only allowed to attend parts of the deliberations. Because of this and because the forum was scheduled to take place outside the Central African Republic, many local opinion leaders viewed it as the international community's diktat (see the interview of former Prime Minister Nzapayéké broadcast on France 24 on 27 June 2014, available from [www.france24.com/fr/2014-06-27-2146-le-journal-lafrique-centrafrique-andre-nzapayeke-sommet-ua-rwanda-ramadan](http://www.france24.com/fr/2014-06-27-2146-le-journal-lafrique-centrafrique-andre-nzapayeke-sommet-ua-rwanda-ramadan). Accessed on 30 June 2014).

<sup>13</sup> Discussions held by the Panel in Bangui on 26 July 2014 with Nicolas Tiangaye, former Prime Minister and leader of the Convention républicaine pour le progrès social, a political party affiliated with the Alliance des forces démocratiques pour la transition. The Alliance, the reverend Nicolas Guerekomaye (one of the three leaders of the religious platform) and the civil society platform are key actors that decided to boycott the Brazzaville forum.

<sup>14</sup> Interview with a researcher and expert on the Central African Republic, Bangui, 5 August 2014. The following main shortcomings of the agreement were identified: no verification commission, no sanction specified in case of violation of the agreement and no clear identification of the warring parties' positions and locations.

<sup>15</sup> Meetings with two members of the group of eight stakeholders and with a member of the Transitional National Council, Bangui, August 2014.

impunity set out in Security Council resolutions 2127 (2013), 2134 (2014) and 2149 (2014).<sup>16</sup>

29. The Brazzaville agreement adds a new layer to an increasing number of agreements, declarations and unwritten decisions that have been signed in response to successive crises in the Central African Republic.<sup>17</sup> Owing to the long-standing nature of the conflict and the constant change in actors, some confusion over the legal basis of the transition has been created. Local and international actors continue to disagree on what the transition is, which could eventually lead to institutional instability in the Central African Republic. Leaders of the opposition Alliance des forces démocratiques pour la transition have repeatedly pointed out the selective implementation of the transitional institutional apparatus by political actors. For example, they have pointed out that, according to the Libreville political agreement, the Prime Minister should come from the opposition political parties, but neither Nzapayéké nor Kamoun emanate from the opposition. In the same vein, the alleged lack of consultation that accompanied the new Government's formation was contested by some members of the Transitional National Council as a violation of the Libreville agreement by the President.<sup>18</sup>

#### *Political violations of the Brazzaville agreement*

30. Since the entry into force of the cessation-of-hostilities agreement signed in Brazzaville, several political violations have taken place throughout the Central African Republic, several of which were recorded by the Panel (see paras. 31-35 below).

31. On 17 August 2014, an unsigned document with the letterhead of the president of the Front populaire pour la renaissance de centrafrique (FPRC), Michel Djotodia, and his first vice-president, Mahamat Nourredine Adam, calling for the independence of the Republic of Dar el Kouti was circulated to the press (see annex 5). The document originated from Mal-Mal Essen, an FPRC member known to be one of the key ideologues of Nourredine Adam. Although some prominent members of the armed group denied involvement, the Panel's interviews with some members of the FPRC political bureau attested to the authenticity of the document. The interviewees pointed out that the announcement of independence was planned to occur at a later stage but was leaked; they confirmed, however, that the document reflects the discussions of those considered to be part of the radical wing of the group.<sup>19</sup>

32. The authenticity of the above-mentioned document was indirectly confirmed on 3 September 2014, when a daily newspaper in Benin, *Matin Libre*, published an interview with Djotodia in which the exiled leader of FPRC said that he was in favour of a return to peace in the Central African Republic. According to Djotodia, there are only two alternatives for that to happen: either the former Séléka come

<sup>16</sup> The leader of the relatively small armed group Révolution et justice, Armel Sayo, was appointed Minister of Sports in the new Government on 22 August 2014.

<sup>17</sup> It is generally acknowledged that the Libreville Global Peace Agreement of 2008, the political agreement of 2013, the N'Djamena declarations of 2013 and 2014, the Transition charter and the Brazzaville agreement represent the foundations of the transition in the Central African Republic.

<sup>18</sup> Meetings with Nicolas Tiangaye and Martin Ziguélé, Bangui, May, July and August 2014. Skype interview with some members of the Transitional National Council, 25 August 2014.

<sup>19</sup> Interview with political leaders of the former Séléka, Bangui, 18 August 2014.

back to power or the country undergoes partition, to allow peaceful coexistence (see paras. 47-110, on armed groups).<sup>20</sup>

33. In addition to contravening article 3 (d) of the Brazzaville agreement, which was signed by the FPRC representative, any demand for the partition of the Central African Republic represents, in the view of the Panel, a trigger that could promote further violence and contribute to sowing the seeds of division within the country by perpetuating the idea of two irreconcilable communities (see S/2014/452, executive summary).

34. The anti-balaka group also committed a political violation of the cessation-of-hostilities agreement. On 30 July 2014, Captain Gilbert Kamezolaï, an anti-balaka leader and member of the armed forces of the Central African Republic, organized a press conference at the Prime Minister's office during which he called upon all members of the armed forces who were in armed groups to return to their units and to their barracks. Kamezolaï claimed to want to send a strong signal that the war was over for armed forces personnel who had lent their services to the anti-balaka. The *coordination générale* of the anti-balaka reacted abruptly by distancing itself from Kamezolaï. For Sébastien Wénézoui, deputy general coordinator of the anti-balaka movement, Kamezolaï's call was null and void because it was not approved by the group's leadership.<sup>21</sup>

35. The Panel considers this to be a political violation of the cessation-of-hostilities agreement by the *coordination générale* of the anti-balaka, as it delegitimizes and condemns an initiative that is in line with the agreement.

### **Regional context: Chad and the Central African Republic**

36. Chad is a key neighbour of the Central African Republic. The two countries share a border of 1,200 km that stretches from the north-west to the north-east of the Central African Republic. Owing to the living and trading practices of communities on both sides, the border has always been an area of extensive trade in goods and of movement of people. In particular, the exchange in agricultural goods and cattle has increased over the last decades, creating economic opportunities on both sides that have, however, remained outside the official revenue streams of both States.<sup>22</sup>

37. In this context, the border region between the Central African Republic and Chad has experienced repeated instances of instability over the past two decades, prompting the two States and the Sudan to set up a tripartite force in 2011 with the aim of securing mutual borders against banditry and rebel activities. Prior to this,

<sup>20</sup> See <http://matinlibre.com/index.php/international/item/192-djotodia-jai-la-capacite-de-reconcilier-chretiens-et-musulmans> (accessed on 4 September 2014).

<sup>21</sup> <http://www.rjdh-rca.net/actualites/actualite/bangui-ddiscord-entre-les-leaders-des-anti-balaka-au-sujet-de-la-declaration-demandant-aux-elements-faca-des-anti-balaka-de-regagner-les-rangs.html> (accessed on 9 September 2014).

<sup>22</sup> See also, for example, the transnational movement of pastoralists from Chad to the Central African Republic that has been a source of increasing violence between cattle herders and local farmers (International Crisis Group, "The security challenges of pastoralism in central Africa", Africa Report No. 215 (1 April 2014)).

instability in the tri-border region had led to the deployment of international forces between 2008 and 2010.<sup>23</sup>

*The interests of Chad*

38. Like other neighbouring States, Chad has strategic interests in the Central African Republic that are behind its political and military involvement in that country over the past 20 years.<sup>24</sup> The complex recent history of conflicts in the region (in Chad, the Sudan, including Darfur, and Uganda), together with weak State capacities to control borders, have favoured the use of Chadian territory by various armed groups.

39. Of paramount interest to Chad is the security of its southern border. The presence of former Chadian armed groups, some of which were part of the Séléka rebellion in the Central African Republic (see paras. 47-110),<sup>25</sup> is a cause of concern for the Government of Chad, which considers the monitoring and control of the southern border as highly strategic.<sup>26</sup> The fact that the Doba oil fields are located about 150 km from the south-western border is also significant, as oil has been the highest source of foreign currency for Chad since 2003.

40. Successive coups d'état in Chad during the 1970s and the 1980s have generated substantial numbers of refugees in neighbouring States, including the Central African Republic. In the course of 2014, targeted killings of Muslims in the Central African Republic have generated massive flows of Chadian and Central African citizens into Chad (see S/2014/452, sect. V).

41. The high number of refugees has heavily affected stability in south-eastern Chad, in particular in the regions of Logone Oriental, Mandoul and Moyen Chari, where most refugees are assembled in camps. The refugee crisis has also had a particularly strong impact on cattle herders from Chad and the Central African Republic who have lost parts of their herds during migration, have suffered attacks and are now facing challenges linked to resource scarcity in southern Chad.<sup>27</sup> With the closure of the border between Chad and the Central African Republic, it is

<sup>23</sup> The Security Council, by its resolution 1778 (2007), authorized the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT) to be deployed in eastern Chad and north-eastern Central African Republic. A European Union force in Chad and the Central African Republic paved the way for the deployment of MINURCAT.

<sup>24</sup> Chadian soldiers have been deployed to the Central African Republic as part of subregional forces and on a bilateral basis. In addition to being part of a tripartite force together with the Sudan and the Central African Republic, Chadian soldiers have participated in deployments of ECCAS and of the Central African Economic and Monetary Community in the Central African Republic (as part of the Central Africa Multinational Force and the Mission for the Consolidation of Peace in the Central African Republic) and have been deployed under the African Union flag (as part of MISCA), for a total of 12 years, from 2002 to 2014. On a bilateral basis, Chadian special forces provided protection to former President of the Central African Republic Bozizé from 2003 to 2013.

<sup>25</sup> Brigadier General Mahamat Alkhatim is a prominent member of the former Séléka who used to be a Chadian rebel and who was reintegrated into the army in 1997. He took part in the coup against former President Bozizé in 2003 and in the Séléka rebellion in 2013.

<sup>26</sup> Meeting with a former official of the Government of Chad who opposes the current President of Chad, Idriss Deby Itno, June 2014.

<sup>27</sup> See [www.plateforme-pastorale-tchad.org/classified/Rapport\\_Provisoire-diagnostic-pastoral-sudTchad.pdf](http://www.plateforme-pastorale-tchad.org/classified/Rapport_Provisoire-diagnostic-pastoral-sudTchad.pdf).

unlikely that traditional cattle grazing routes will be followed in 2014, putting additional pressure on the second-most important source of income for Chad.<sup>28</sup>

*Securing the border of the Central African Republic*

42. As a country contributing troops to MISCA, Chad had most of its troops in *préfectures* located along the border with the Central African Republic. Since Chad withdrew from MISCA on 16 April 2014 and since the border was closed on 11 May 2014, the Panel has documented several security incidents that have taken place in the territory of the Central African Republic along the border with Chad in the north-west. These dynamics of violence are in part triggered by the continued cycle of attacks and reprisals among Muslims and non-Muslims, bandits and herders, and among the various armed groups present in the area, and include acts of violence and abuse by armed groups against the civilian population.<sup>29</sup>

43. During the Panel's missions to the north-west of the Central African Republic, witnesses consistently referred to unspecified groups of armed men coming from Chad who were involved in looting and burning of villages.<sup>30</sup> The high number of burned villages along the border has forced local populations into camps for internally displaced persons and refugees on both sides of the border, or to unknown locations.

44. It is important to note that the security situation in the north-east of the Central African Republic, which is currently under the direct control of the former Séléka, is markedly different from the situation in the north-west. The Panel has not yet received any report of similar attacks by unspecified armed men emanating from Chad in this area, with the exception of bandits stealing vehicles in the Central African Republic and then crossing the border towards Chad.

45. Since 17 April 2014, the Panel has documented 17 incidents that indicate a robust security presence along the western part of the border between Chad and the Central African Republic. The following are the most striking examples:

(a) On 1 May 2014, unknown armed men allegedly coming from Chad attacked the town of Markounda (Ouham Province). On 17 May 2014, the *sous-préfet* of Markounda, the secretary-general of the *sous-préfecture* and the director of the public school intended to travel to Chad in search of the town's population. All three were arrested in unclear circumstances and taken to N'Djamena. The Panel has been able to contact one of them and was informed that the three officials, in addition to other Central African citizens, have been detained for an extended period (at least three months) while awaiting trial. According to a minister in Bangui, the Central African Republic has endeavoured to use several diplomatic channels to free the *sous-préfet* but have had no success to date;<sup>31</sup>

<sup>28</sup> Interview with a researcher and expert on rural dynamics in Chad and the Central African Republic, Paris, 3 June 2014.

<sup>29</sup> See the Panel's database on humanitarian incidents.

<sup>30</sup> Interviews with victims in the districts of Bémal, Paoua and Markounda, 23 June and 12 August 2014. These accounts were corroborated by several reports from military sources, the United Nations and human rights organizations.

<sup>31</sup> Interview with a government official who is dealing with this issue, Bangui, 18 August 2014. For more details, see section V.

(b) On 23 June 2014, two members of the Panel were arrested by Chadian defence and security forces at a border post while they were conducting their investigation in the Central African Republic. Although the experts clearly identified themselves and explained their mandate, privileges and immunities, they were forcibly driven from the border post to the town of Goré (Logone Oriental Province, Chad) and detained for four hours, then escorted back to the border and released;

(c) On 20 May 2014, in the district of Mia-Pendé (Ouham-Pendé Province), armed men reported to be Chadian soldiers carried out attacks on three villages close to the Chadian border (Bembéré, Békaye et Bédoua 3) and took three civilians who at the moment of writing remain in Chad and whose whereabouts are unknown.

46. The regularity of violent incidents in the north-west of the Central African Republic and the systematic practice of burning villages not only force local populations out of their homes but make this area of the border a de facto buffer zone between the Central African Republic and Chad.


## **B. Armed groups**

47. The line of separation between anti-balaka militias and the “new” Séléka, also referred to as former Séléka, ex-Séléka and Forces républicaines,<sup>32</sup> has moved slightly east and north since the publication on 1 July 2014 of the interim report of the Panel (see S/2014/452, para. 37) as a consequence of constant pressure by anti-balaka groups against towns considered to be of strategic importance that are still controlled by the former Séléka (see map below). The main development since July 2014 has been the emergence of significant infighting between rival anti-balaka commanders and former Séléka factions of different ethnicities, which has affected their respective strongholds of Boy-Rabe (Bangui) and Bambari (Ouaka Province).

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<sup>32</sup> The term “Forces républicaines” is almost never used, except in some communiqués and declarations issued by Nourredine Adam or FPRC or its spokespersons, and in United Nations documents; for example, an official press release issued by the military wing of the former Séléka in June 2014 still mentioned “ex-Séléka” in the header. Most local and international media still use “ex-Séléka” or “Séléka”.

### Areas of control and influence of armed groups in the Central African Republic on 10 September 2014



48. The Panel was able to monitor the security situation and the activities of the main political and military leaders of the anti-balaka movement as well as the different factions of the former Séléka, in the capital and in the provinces where the Panel travelled. In this connection, the Panel believes that most of the security incidents are related either to disputes over the control of territory between the anti-balaka and the former Séléka, or to internal dynamics within the two armed groups, whether connected to fighting for political or military leadership or the sharing of resources.

49. The Panel also outlines, in section III, a baseline of arms and ammunition currently in use by armed groups in the Central African Republic, while in sections IV and V it lists acts of obstruction of the delivery of humanitarian assistance and violations of international humanitarian law reportedly committed by armed groups.

50. The main flashpoints at the time of drafting the present report are: (a) in Batangafo (Ouham Province), anti-balaka groups under the command of Rodrigue Ngaïbona, also known as “Andilo” (the form used in the present report), “General Andilo”, “Colonel Andjio”, “Angilo”, “Angelo”, “Andjilo”, “Andilou” and “Andiyo”, clashed with the Séléka forces of Brigadier General Mahamat Alkhatim during July and August 2014; and (b) in Bambari (Ouaka Province), tensions between international forces, anti-balaka groups and Séléka factions are high.

51. The situations in Batangafo and Bambari detailed below illustrate how the national dimension of the conflict between the anti-balaka and the former Séléka overlaps with local dynamics, acts of revenge and efforts to control resources. In particular, the Panel collected information demonstrating that the Coordination nationale des libérateurs du peuple centrafricain (CLPC) of Patrice Edouard Ngaïssona, also known as the Mouvement des patriotes anti-balaka, as well as

unknown anti-balaka groups from Bangui, are directly involved in the conflicts in Batangafo, Bambari and Boda (see paras. 201-202 and 215 and annex 63).

### **Batangafo**

52. Tensions in the north-western part of Ouham Province have run high since April 2014, when a series of offensives and counter-offensives were carried out on Bouca and as a result of fighting between anti-balaka groups under the command of Andilo and the Séléka forces of Brigadier General Alkhatim (see S/2014/452, annex 5). On 26 April 2014, Colonel Mahmat Issa, who operates under Alkhatim's command, was soundly defeated by Andilo in Bouca, paving the way for the anti-balaka to attack Batangafo.

53. In June and July 2014, Andilo reinforced his military capacities, mainly by moving to Bouca some pick-up trucks that had been stolen in Bangui<sup>33</sup> and by establishing training camps on the outskirts of Batangafo and his headquarters in Bolom.<sup>34</sup> The main attack on Batangafo was then carried out on 29 July 2014, causing 20 casualties. The Panel estimates that between 100 and 150 anti-balaka fighters were involved in the offensive and learned from international forces that anti-balaka elements had even used a truck to move troops from Bouca to the front line.<sup>35</sup> Information obtained by the Panel indicates that the attack was repelled by Colonel Saleh Zabadi,<sup>36</sup> who was then promoted to the rank of General and assigned to Kabo (see S/2014/452, para. 53 and annex 5.5).<sup>37</sup> Andilo reportedly returned to Bangui on 6 August 2014, leaving "Colonel Simplicie" in charge. Two soldiers of MISCAs were also killed in a separate incident involving a group under the command of Colonel Mahamad Zine, a Séléka zone commander in Batangafo.

54. On 4 August 2014, French forces moving northward to Batangafo to reinforce MISCAs were ambushed 3 km south of the town by experienced Séléka forces. As reported by the Ministry of Defence of France on its website,<sup>38</sup> aerial support, including from French jet fighters based in N'Djamena, was requested during the fighting, in a repeat of the clash that had taken place between Operation Sangaris and forces loyal to Alkhatim on 5 May 2014 on the road between Bémal and Boguila (Ouham Province) (see S/2014/452, para. 52). Despite suffering heavy losses, the next day the Séléka launched a counter-offensive against the mobile command unit of the French forces, which once again led to the intervention of aerial assets.

55. According to *Radio France International*, around 60 Séléka fighters were killed during the fighting; the local Séléka leadership, however, acknowledged the deaths of only seven of their own.<sup>39</sup> French forces subsequently implemented confidence-building measures and attempted to cordon Séléka forces (see para. 177 below and annex 56).

<sup>33</sup> Interview with an anti-balaka military commander, Bangui, 22 July 2014.

<sup>34</sup> Interview with a confidential source with knowledge of the security situation in Batangafo, 27 July 2014.

<sup>35</sup> A meeting was held with international forces in Bouca on 12 August 2014.

<sup>36</sup> E-mail communication from a confidential source with contacts on the ground, 10 August 2014.

<sup>37</sup> Telephone conversation with a confidential source on the ground, 6 September 2014.

<sup>38</sup> See [www.defense.gouv.fr/operations/centrafrique/actualites/sangaris-prises-a-partie-par-des-groupes-lourdement-armes-dans-le-nord-de-la-rca](http://www.defense.gouv.fr/operations/centrafrique/actualites/sangaris-prises-a-partie-par-des-groupes-lourdement-armes-dans-le-nord-de-la-rca).

<sup>39</sup> Meeting with Séléka military leadership, Batangafo, 13 August 2014.



56. Zine too was killed in combat against Operation Sangaris forces. During a meeting with the Panel, Colonel Mohamed Assil presented himself as the new acting zone commander and Colonel Ahmad Ibrahim Ahmad as his deputy. However, another man, Colonel Moussa Maouloud, also introduced himself to the Panel as zone commander for Batangafo and as the person in charge of the negotiations with international forces; he also claimed having been sent to the area by Brigadier General Joseph Zoundeko in June 2014. Despite these claims, Colonel Maouloud is obviously not recognized as a leader by his peers (see annex 6 for photographs of the Séléka leadership in Batangafo).

57. On 14 August 2014, Operation Sangaris decided to implement confidence-building measures among the members of three anti-balaka groups in control of Bouca, two of which fall under the authority of Andilo and one of which is considered to be more of a self-defence militia. The decision was announced to community leaders in the presence of the Panel.

### **Bambari**

58. According to interviews held and observations made by the Panel on the ground during missions to Bambari from 20 to 23 May and from 2 to 4 July 2014, the conflict in Bambari and its surroundings involves different groups of anti-balaka forces, including local self-defence militia, and different factions of the “new” Séléka, in addition to groups of armed ethnic Fulani. It is the opinion of the Panel that not all armed Fulani in Bambari report to General Ali Darrassa Mahamat, also known as “Ali Daras”, who is a member of a subgroup of Fulani, the Ouda, known for raising sheep instead of cattle. More generally, the lack of transparency in the decision-making process within those groups, even for insiders, and the fact that political and/or military alliances shift rapidly, depending primarily on short-term interests and efforts to control revenue generated from natural resources and at checkpoints (see also paras. 111-150 below) complicates the understanding of the local dynamics and external factors fuelling the local conflict.

59. The Panel has nevertheless established from several first-hand testimonies that small anti-balaka groups known either as outsiders or as coming from Bangui have been seen in Bambari (see annex 7). For example, the Panel was told by a prominent community leader while observing a small anti-balaka group that the militiamen came from “outside”. The Panel was also informed by local sources of the presence of at least two anti-balaka commanders from Bangui with a background in the Central African armed forces, known as “*Douze couteaux*” and “*Risqueur*”.

60. These testimonies point to the involvement of Bangui-based anti-balaka elements in what appears, at first glance, to be a local conflict, and might indicate that a national-level strategy against former Séléka forces is being implemented.

61. On the Séléka side, the Panel obtained a letter signed by Darrassa, commander of the fifth military region of the Central African Republic (Ouaka), in which General Zakaria Santiago and Colonel Amadou Bello Hissen were appointed to positions of military leadership (see annex 8).

62. His appointment challenged by rival factions of the former Séléka, Darrassa lost his grip on the capital of Ouaka Province following the decision of the “new”

Séléka to establish its headquarters in Bambari (see S/2014/452, annex 6).<sup>40</sup> General Zakaria Damane, in control of the Goula faction of the Séléka in Bambari and founder of the Union des forces démocratiques pour le rassemblement (UFDR) of Djotodia, came from Bria (Haute-Kotto Province) to Bambari on 22 May 2014, together with Zoundeko, chief of staff of the “new” Séléka and former chief of staff of UFDR, and General Tom Adam, alias “Ben Laden”, a former zone commander before Darrassa’s appointment by Djotodia in 2013 who had previously been in control of the gold mine of Ndassima (see annex 9 for a photograph of Adam).

63. Tensions between those two factions of the “new” Séléka reached a peak on 25 August 2014. The next day, Agence France-Presse and Reuters, among other media outlets, reported the killing of 17 Séléka fighters in clashes between Fulani and Goulas. Depending on the source, the root causes of this conflict range from the desire to control revenues to internal politics, following the merger of the Fulani and “Arab” components of the Séléka and the alliance between Darrassa and Alkhatim (who comes from the Salamat nomadic tribe in Chad and the Sudan).<sup>41</sup> In retaliation, Nourredine Adam would have then ordered the disarmament of the Fulani by the Goulas of Damane, Adam and Zoundeko.

64. The Panel believes that the infighting among former Séléka elements in Bambari is connected to revenue-sharing. A high-level commander of Fulani origin told the Panel that the dissent had erupted after Goula forces tried first to extort money from the local branch of a telecommunications company in Bambari and then to establish a checkpoint to sustain their own forces in the town. Darrassa reportedly endeavoured to remove the checkpoint, which led to the infighting between the two groups. An agreement was reached and, at the time of writing, Goulas and Fulani were jointly controlling the northern checkpoint of Bambari.<sup>42</sup>

65. On 17 September 2014, a communiqué signed by Alkhatim and Ali Darrassa announced the split of the former Séléka and denounced the “irresponsibility and incompetence” of the political leadership of FPRC.<sup>43</sup> The signatories, who intend to create a new political structure, consider that neither the partition of the country nor the return of Michel Djotodia are solutions to the current crisis.

### **Anti-balaka**

66. The structure outlined in the interim report of the Panel (see S/2014/452, annex 5), detailing four different groups within the anti-balaka, still reflects the

<sup>40</sup> The decision was taken during a conclave of the former Séléka held in Ndélé on 10 May 2014, in which Damane played a prominent role while Darrassa stayed in Bambari.

<sup>41</sup> In this context, in a fake communiqué attributed to Alkhatim, it was announced on 21 August 2014 that Alkhatim’s organization supported Karim Meckassoua, the unsuccessful candidate to replace Nzapayéké as Prime Minister. According to rumours, Meckassoua gave a significant amount of money to obtain that support. Alkhatim told the Panel, in a telephone conversation on 25 August 2014, that he was not behind the establishment of the Forces républicaines pour le changement; moreover, he denied having received any money and denounced a political manoeuvre aimed at weakening the “new” Séléka and deepening its current divisions. Rumours about Meckassoua’s involvement in the events in Bambari were still circulating as at 16 September 2014, while the present report was being drafted.

<sup>42</sup> Telephone conversation with Nourredine Adam’s personal secretary, 6 September 2014.


<sup>43</sup> Telephone conversation with a former Séléka leader, 10 October 2014. The press release was also signed by Captain Nedjad Ibrahim Ahamat, former spokesperson of Zoundeko in Bambari, and General Abdoulaye Faya Ahamat, who is known to have been a colonel and who was appointed, on 10 May 2014 in Ndélé, “military adviser” of Zoundeko.

current status of the movement. In fact, the rift and division between the various factions has deepened following the forum in Brazzaville, the second trip to the Congo by Wénézoui and the appointments of Romaric Vomitiadé, secretary-general of CLPC, to the post of Minister for Tourism and Culture and of Robert Namséné to the post of Minister for the Environment in the new transitional Government.

67. Despite the reconciliation initiated before the Brazzaville conference and the signature of a cessation-of-hostilities agreement, the anti-balaka movement remains extremely divided. Even its most structured component, Ngaïssona's CLPC, currently faces several external and internal challenges: (a) competition for political leadership in the anti-balaka movement; (b) division along ethnic lines between the anti-balaka of ethnic Gbaya origin and non-Gbaya groups; and (c) internal conflicts between anti-balaka military commanders.

68. Moreover, the Panel believes that all the efforts made by Ngaïssona to structure the four different components of the anti-balaka, extend the reach of his leadership beyond Bangui and provide his movement with all the attributes of a real organization, including an official command-and-control structure and a political façade, have, on the one hand, strengthened Ngaïssona's legitimacy as the representative of the anti-balaka for the international community but, on the other hand, weakened his grip on his own organization and exacerbated rivalries, jealousies and tensions.

### Structure of the political and military branches of CLPC of Patrice Edouard Ngaïssona



Note: See also the command structure, with the names and signatures of the 32 military commanders and four political leaders of CLPC, set out in annex 10.

69. For example, in Boda, the Panel documented the new local structure of CLPC established by Ngaïssona, headed by Central African armed forces Corporal Soussou Habib (see annexes 11 and 63).<sup>44</sup> In Berberati, the Panel met with Jean-Louis Ngaïzounou, a representative of Ngaïssona on mission to the region to assist with the structuring of CLPC local branches. The Panel incidentally witnessed a meeting between Ngaïzounou at the hotel where he was staying with the anti-balaka zone commander of Berberati, Chrysostome Berba Yapele, his general staff and the zone commander of Gamboula (a town on the border with Cameroon), Nice Demawanessse.<sup>45</sup> In Sibut, the anti-balaka commanders interviewed by the Panel and international forces also cited the presence in Grimari (Ouaka Province) and Dékoa (Kémo-Gribingui Province) of small groups of anti-balaka elements from Bangui.<sup>46</sup>

*Political competition and ethnic divisions*

70. At the political level, Ngaïssona succeeded in sidelining the former Minister of Youth and Sports, Léopold Narcisse Bara, who officially represented the anti-balaka in the first Government of transition, after having challenged his legitimacy during several months. Ngaïssona also accused Bara, who was living in France before his appointment as Minister, of having been imposed by the French authorities to the Head of State of the transition.<sup>47</sup> The climax of this conflict took place in June 2014, when Bara, in his capacity as Minister of Youth and Sports, announced the suspension of the board of the football federation of the Central African Republic, headed by Ngaïssona, who in return published on 24 June 2014 a communiqué dismissing Bara from CLPC, of which Bara was actually not officially a member (see annex 12).

71. Joachim Kokaté and Wénézoui remain strong competitors to Ngaïssona in his capacity as the main representative of the anti-balaka movement. Following a reconciliation meeting organized at the offices of the United Nations Development Programme on 20 June 2014 by the local non-governmental organization Mou-Da,<sup>48</sup> Wénézoui was indeed promoted as deputy general coordinator of CLPC, less than a month after having been expelled from the group and elected coordinator for the anti-balaka by the group from the south (see S/2014/452, annex 5),<sup>49</sup> and was again suspended on 19 August 2014 after having travelled to Brazzaville at the invitation of the mediator, President Sassou Nguesso, instead of Ngaïssona.<sup>50</sup> Following his last suspension, Wénézoui created his own political party, the Mou vance patriotique pour l'avenir.

72. Similarly, Ngaïssona told the Panel that he did not recognize Kokaté as a legitimate representative of the anti-balaka. Kokaté, in his previous capacity as the

<sup>44</sup> Mission to Boda, 9 July 2014.

<sup>45</sup> Mission to Berberati, 10 July 2014.

<sup>46</sup> Mission to Sibut, 23 July 2014.

<sup>47</sup> Interview with Patrice Edouard Ngaïssona, Bangui, 3 May 2014.

<sup>48</sup> In Sangho, “Mou” means “gathering” and “Da” means “family”. Mou-Da is headed by the transitional President’s daughter, Anaketé Samba, and was registered as a non-governmental organization in Bangui on 18 June 2014.

<sup>49</sup> Wénézoui was elected general coordinator of the anti-balaka from the south on 15 May 2014 and as deputy general coordinator of CLPC on 20 June 2014 (see annex 13).

<sup>50</sup> As reported by Agence africaine de presse on 20 August 2014, Wénézoui was suspended from his position for “treason, impersonation and insubordination”, according to a decision taken by Ngaïssona.

Prime Minister's adviser on disarmament, demobilization and reintegration and representative of the anti-balaka of the south, has nevertheless gained some visibility and become a key player, including in mediating between CLPC and the international community.

73. The split between the anti-balaka of the north, mainly of Gbaya ethnicity, and the south, composed mainly of Yakoma and ethnic groups from the Ubangui river like the Banziri of the President of the transition, remains very strong. The group under the command of Alfred Yekatom, known as "Rombhot", however, lost part of its influence, in particular in the area south of the international airport (known as the Boeing neighbourhood), parts of the sixth district of Bangui and the neighbouring city of Bimbo, following violent clashes over the sharing of revenues and Rombhot's arrest by Operation Sangaris on 23 June 2014 and his subsequent release (see S/2014/452, annex 5.4, for more information on Rombhot's group).

74. A smaller group has also endeavoured to secure political representation within the anti-balaka movement. Composed of Danzoumi Yalo, alias "Colonel Daz", his brother Sani, Alain Hassan Donday and Central African armed forces Commander Anatole Ngaya, a controversial, well-known figure of the regime of François Bozizé, the group is known as the Union des forces armées centrafricaines pour le redressement or as the Union démocratique pour la défense et de la patrie. Colonel Daz, known as a Muslim anti-balaka, told the Panel that he represents, at the political level, Rombhot's group.<sup>51</sup>

75. Colonel Daz also told the Panel that he had convinced Rombhot to stop attacking the PK5 neighbourhood of Bangui from the adjacent areas under his control, namely the neighbourhoods of Boeing, Kokoro and Fatima, at that time controlled by Wénézoui and Kamezolaï. The Panel received information from two other independent sources corroborating that Rombhot's group had carried out attacks based on religion on the Muslim enclave of Bangui in February and March 2014.<sup>52</sup> The same sources indicate that all the attacks since April 2014 have been conducted by other anti-balaka groups, associated either with CLPC of Ngaïssona or with former commander of the Armée populaire pour la restauration de la république et la démocratie (APRD) Jean-Jacques Larmassou.

#### *CLPC divisions*

76. Divisions within the military wing of CLPC came to light just before, during and after the peace conference in Brazzaville. More specifically, fighting erupted in the Boy-Rabe neighbourhood, a stronghold of the anti-balaka in the eighth district of Bangui, between the group of Andilo, backed by Central African armed forces Lieutenant Yvon Konaté, and the groups of Guy Mazimbélet, also a lieutenant in the national armed forces, with the support of Olivier Koudémon, alias "Gbangouma", a captain of the armed forces known to have been associated with Eugène

<sup>51</sup> Interview with Colonel Daz, Bangui, 12 April 2014.

<sup>52</sup> Meeting with Muslim representatives, Bangui, 9 April 2014, and interview with an anti-balaka political leader, Bangui, 26 April 2014.

Ngaïkosset.<sup>53</sup> Gabin Inga, anti-balaka commander of the Combatants neighbourhood of the fourth district of Bangui allied with Mazimbélet, was seriously wounded during the fighting on 18 July 2014 and died the next day at the public hospital.<sup>54</sup> He was replaced by “Zanguilo”, who is unknown to the Panel. Konaté’s driver, already the victim of a grenade attack on 27 May 2014 (see S/2014/452, annex 5), was also killed, while Konaté’s house in the Fou neighbourhood of Bangui, where Andilo was reportedly hiding, was destroyed.<sup>55</sup>

77. Koudémon is not officially part of the command-and-control structure of CLPC. The Panel is of the view that Koudémon is one of the most prominent leaders of the third group of the anti-balaka, composed mainly of army and security personnel not necessarily affiliated to Ngaïssona and CLPC. Koudémon claims he is not part of the anti-balaka, despite the fact that his name is widely associated with the movement, but confirmed to the Panel that he played a role in organizing elements of the Central African armed forces in Boy-Rabe against Andilo’s group.<sup>56</sup> Local media have accused him of having been given the task and the funds to lead the fight against Andilo by transitional authorities, while others believe that the Bozizé family is behind his actions.<sup>57</sup>

78. Intense fighting between the two factions, which left two dead, was reported again by local and international media and heard by the Panel on 9 August 2014.<sup>58</sup> According to information from a confidential source, Andilo ceased hostilities after obtaining four vehicles as compensation, following the personal intervention of General Jules Bernard Ouandé, former army chief of staff during the Bozizé regime, as well as of armed forces Commander Charles Ngremangou, a former anti-balaka leader appointed in February 2014 as chief of staff of the Minister of Defence, and of the former security minister.<sup>59</sup> As an anti-balaka military commander explained to the Panel, Andilo needs vehicles and funds to maintain military pressure on the Séléka in Ouham Province.<sup>60</sup>

79. Andilo is currently the most enigmatic, feared and powerful military commander of the anti-balaka. Active on the military front against the former Séléka, he led the offensive on 29 July 2014 against the stronghold at Batangafo, where troops of Alkhatim also confronted French forces. A confidential source in

<sup>53</sup> Interviews and meetings with anti-balaka military commanders, Bangui, July and August 2014. According to the minutes of a reconciliation meeting held in an evangelist church in Boy-Rabe that was attended by Mazimbélet (who was identified by the meeting’s minute-taker as Andilo’s uncle), Koudémon and Olivier Arsène Feïssona (Andilo’s representative), the fighting started after Andilo instructed all anti-balaka officers who were members of the Central African armed forces to give him a military salute and punished a lieutenant of the armed forces called Naminda with push-ups.

<sup>54</sup> Interview with an anti-balaka commander, 17 July 2014. A prominent local journalist challenged this version, however, during a meeting with the Panel of Experts on 25 July 2014, saying that Inga killed himself while playing with his gun.

<sup>55</sup> See <http://apanews.net/news/fr/article-fas.php?id=801681>.

<sup>56</sup> Interview with Koudémon, Bangui, 17 August 2014.

<sup>57</sup> See <http://centralafricanrepublicnews.wordpress.com/2014/08/09/centrafrique-info-weekend-boy-rabe-la-main-cachee-de-samba-panza/>.

<sup>58</sup> Agence France-Presse, “Militia fighters clash in Bangui as thousands march for peace”, 9 August 2014.

<sup>59</sup> Interview with an anti-balaka military leader involved in the negotiations with Andilo, Bangui, 17 August 2014.

<sup>60</sup> Interview with an anti-balaka military commander, Bangui, 22 July 2014.

Bangui reported to the Panel, however, that Andilo was, at the time of drafting the present report, in hiding, that he had been weakened and that he was requesting integration into a disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme.<sup>61</sup>

80. According to an intelligence report obtained by the Panel in April 2014 from a confidential source, Andilo is considered to be the most charismatic leader of the anti-balaka from the provinces of Ouham and Ombella-Mpoko. Andilo, who avoids the media and the international community (except on 16 December 2013, when he spoke to an Agence France-Presse journalist),<sup>62</sup> is reportedly around 25 years old and does not speak French. He comes from Batangafo, where his grandparents still live, while his mother lives in the outskirts of Bouca,<sup>63</sup> and has been known to raid cattle in the area between Bouca and Batangafo.<sup>64</sup> Several organizations with good knowledge of the security situation in the Central African Republic consider him to be the most influential military commander of the anti-balaka. Civilians in the Boy-Rabe neighbourhood of Bangui have been complaining constantly of various abuses, including racketeering and extortion, committed by Andilo and his group of anti-balaka elements.<sup>65</sup>

81. On 30 July 2014, in a press conference, Kamezolaï called upon all army personnel to return to their barracks and leave the anti-balaka movement, in an initiative backed by the previous Prime Minister of the transition (see para. 34 above). According to Kamezolaï, his appeal was followed by some anti-balaka commanders in Boy-Rabe, including some known CLPC commanders.<sup>66</sup> The initiative was condemned by Ngaïssona's CLPC, however, who claimed that Kamezolaï had no authority to dismantle the military wing of Ngaïssona's political movement.

82. This illustrates further how important it is for Ngaïssona to give the impression that the military wing falls under his command in order to justify his role as a key political figure, despite the signature of the cessation-of-hostilities agreement and the nomination of a new Government of national unity. In his letter to the President of the transition in August 2014, Kamezolaï denounced this situation and the appropriation of the self-defence militia by some politicians, and revealed that he had been threatened since the press conference of 30 July 2014.<sup>67</sup>

#### *Security incidents*

83. According to information in the Panel's database, from 5 December 2013 to 14 August 2014, 854 civilians and 7 humanitarian aid workers were killed by groups considered as anti-balaka, notwithstanding the signature by Ngaïssona of the cessation-of-hostilities agreement in Brazzaville and the designation of Salomon Feïganazoui as representative of the anti-balaka within the steering committee

<sup>61</sup> Telephone conversation with a confidential source with knowledge of the whereabouts of Andilo, 6 September 2014.

<sup>62</sup> The resulting article was published on the website of *Jeune Afrique*, among others ([www.jeuneafrique.com/actu/20131216T181246Z20131216T181223Z](http://www.jeuneafrique.com/actu/20131216T181246Z20131216T181223Z)).

<sup>63</sup> Meeting with a confidential source with good knowledge of the security situation in the Central African Republic, Bossangoa, 30 April 2014.

<sup>64</sup> Interview with a confidential source, Bangui, 18 August 2014.

<sup>65</sup> Meeting with a diplomatic source, Bangui, 22 May 2014.

<sup>66</sup> Namely, officers of the national armed forces Hervé Ganazoui and Aimé Abel Denamganäi. See also the command structure of the military branch of CLPC under paragraph 68 above.

<sup>67</sup> Letter from Kamezolaï to the President of the Central African Republic, commander-in-chief of the army, August 2014.


appointed by the new Prime Minister of the transition on 28 August 2014 (see annex 14).

84. In Boda, the anti-balaka have continued to carry out attacks based on religion, kill civilians and attack international forces despite the designation by Ngaissona on 28 June 2014 of a new leadership (see paras. 69, 201, 202 and 215 and annex 63).

**Séléka**

85. The repeated efforts to unify the political representation and military command of the former Séléka have failed to date. The designation of a new military leadership in Ndélé on 10 May 2014, as well as the creation under the leadership of Nourredine Adam of a new political movement in Biraou on 10 July 2014, FPRC,<sup>68</sup> have not brought together the different components of the former Séléka under one single leadership. Rather, the divisions between supporters of the partition of the country and those willing to back the political transition and the reconciliation process, together with ethnic divisions, have deepened since May 2014.

**Structure of the Front populaire pour la renaissance de centrafrrique**



86. In addition, some of the main political and military figures of the former Séléka have continued to promote their own agenda at the expense of the unity of the movement. For example, the Panel considers that Alkhatim, a former rebel from Chad who was integrated into the army and who participated in the Bozizé coup in 2003 as a liberator, was particularly active on the military front before the conclave that was held in Ndélé on 10 May 2014. After the conclave, Alkhatim obtained some form of recognition from his peers when he was nominated first deputy chief of staff

<sup>68</sup> FPRC replaced the Coordination politique provisoire established during the Ndélé conference in May 2014 by another Rounga, Abdoulaye Issène (see annexes 15 and 16).



of the Forces républicaines, as he remains the military commander in control and with influence over the largest area of the Central African Republic (see annex 17 for photographs of Alkhatim's forces).

87. It also appears that various factions of the former Séléka, in particular the ethnic Goulas of Damane, seized the opportunity to establish the military headquarters of the new "Séléka" in Bambari, the stronghold of the ethnic Fulani faction under the command of Darrassa, to challenge the Fulani over control of resources, in particular gold (see paras. 135-143) and coffee (see paras. 144-145). This significant change in terms of the balance of power, control of territory and exploitation of resources is still having an impact on the political and military structures of the "new" Séléka, and has led to serious infighting in Bambari (see paras. 58-65).

88. Control of the territory among the different Séléka factions has been divided as follows:

(a) Brigadier General Mahamat Alkhatim (Salamat): Kabo, where he moved his headquarters, which were previously based in Moyenne-Sido, Batangafo (Ouham Province), Kaga-Bandoro, Mbrès (Nana-Grebizi Province) and Dékoa (Kémo-Gribingui Province). The Panel also established that Alkhatim regularly conducts operations in the regions of Nana-Bakassa, Boguila (west of Ouham Province) and Bémal (Ouham-Pendé Province) (see S/2014/452, paras. 51-53 and annex 6);

(b) General Ali Darrassa Mahamat (Fulani): Bambari, Ippy, Kouango and Ngakobo (Ouaka Province);

(c) General Zakaria Damane (Goula): Bria, Sam-Ouandja (Haute-Kotto Province);

(d) General Mahamat Nourredine Adam (Rounga): Ndélé (Bamingui-Bangoran Province) and Birao (Vakaga Province).

89. In the main economic centres, namely Birao, Ndélé, Bria and Bambari, several factions are present. In Birao and Ndélé, traditional leaders — Ahmad Moustapha Am-Gabo (Kara), Sultan of Vakaga, and Senoussi Ibrahim Kamoun (Rounga), Sultan of Bamingui-Bangoran — also have significant political weight and are always involved in decision-making processes, for example during the conclaves held in Ndélé in May 2014 and Birao in July 2014 (see annex 16).

90. The Panel has learned that Darrassa expanded his military control to Kouango, a *sous-préfecture* of Ouaka Province that borders the Democratic Republic of the Congo and is known as a centre for trading gold (see para. 143). Previously, Kouango was reportedly used by anti-balaka groups from Bangui as a hub from which to launch attacks on Bambari, Grimari and Ngakobo. Logistics and security constraints prevented the Panel from travelling to the area, where there is no international presence.

91. On the political side, the personal ambitions of the main political leaders of the former Séléka have exacerbated tensions within the movement. Those leaders are: Nourredine Adam (Rounga) of the Convention des patriotes pour la justice et la paix (CPJP fondamentale); Abdoulaye Issène Ramadane (Rounga) of CPJP; Mohamed-Moussa Dhaffane (Goula) of the Convention patriotique du salut du Kodro; Herbert Gontran Djono Ahaba (Goula) of UFDR; and Ousmane Mahamat Ousmane (Arab), leader of the Mouvement de révolution armée pour le changement, associated with Darrassa.

92. First-hand testimonies collected by the Panel following the conference in Birao organized and presided by Nourredine Adam on 9 and 10 July 2014 provide interesting insights on how the balance of power between the different political leaders of the former Séléka remains key to understanding the process by which leaders are designated within the movement.<sup>69</sup> According to these leaders, if the congress in Birao establishing FPRC was a clear demonstration of power of Nourredine Adam, the first vice-president of FPRC has not been able to maintain loyalty and discipline within his movement from a distance. Furthermore, the travel ban imposed on Nourredine Adam by the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 2127 (2013) concerning the Central African Republic on 9 May 2014 has affected his capacity to move and, more specifically, to lead the Séléka delegation in Brazzaville.

93. Several press releases issued by Nourredine Adam since the signature of the cessation-of-hostilities agreement in Brazzaville reflect this absence of discipline within FPRC:

(a) Suspension of the second vice-president of FPRC, Mohamed-Moussa Dhaffane, on 6 August 2014, following the signature of the cessation-of-hostilities agreement in Brazzaville, and decision to withdraw FPRC from the agreement;

(b) Exclusion of the third vice-president of FPRC, Mahamat Taïb Yacoub, on 1 September 2014, following his participation in the new Government of Mahamat Kamoun as deputy minister for cattle-raising.

94. In fact, all the statements and decisions made on behalf of FPRC were signed by Nourredine Adam only and approved by the former Séléka leaders associated with him, including General Arda Hakouma and Mahamat Abrass.<sup>70</sup>

95. Therefore, the Panel considers that FPRC is a political movement whose de facto head is Nourredine Adam and that is designed to promote its leader's own political agenda, which includes the partition of the country and, consequently, that it does not represent the former Séléka. In this connection, it is worth noting that the secretary-general of FPRC, Moustapha Saboune, represents the former Séléka in the steering committee established to monitor the implementation of the cessation-of-hostilities agreement (see annex 14).

96. Considering that on 9 May 2014 the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 2127 (2013) concerning the Central African Republic listed Nourredine Adam for engaging in or providing support for acts that undermine the peace, stability and security of the Central African Republic, the Panel is of the view that FPRC meets the same listing criteria. The Panel also takes note of Djotodia's first public statement since his designation as head of FPRC on 3 September 2014 (see paras. 32-33), in which he declared to a newspaper based in Cotonou, Benin, that there were only two options for ending the conflict in the Central African Republic: the return to power of the former Séléka or the partition of the country.

97. As mentioned in its interim report, the Panel considers that any promotion of the partition of the country represents a major threat to the peace, security and

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<sup>69</sup> Interviews and meetings with political and military leaders of the former Séléka, July and August 2014.

<sup>70</sup> Telephone interview with Nourredine Adam, Hakouma, Abrass and two other FPRC members, 23 August 2014.

stability of the Central African Republic (see S/2014/452, executive summary and paras. 44 and 55, and annex 6).

#### *Security incidents*

98. According to information in the Panel's database, the former Séléka have been responsible, between 5 December 2013 and 14 August 2014, for the killings of 610 civilians and 7 humanitarian aid workers.

99. Alkhatim and his 600-strong force remain the main threat to peace and security in the Central African Republic.<sup>71</sup> In addition to the several serious incidents already reported by the Panel, including the killing of civilians and humanitarian aid workers and intense attacks on international forces, the Panel was provided with detailed reports on 3 and 4 September 2014 indicating that Alkhatim forces from Batangafo were again involved in the destruction and looting of property and the killing of five civilians in Nana-Bakassa (Ouham Province) on 2 September 2014.

#### **Révolution et justice**

100. Révolution et justice was founded in October 2013 by Armel Ningatoloum Sayo and François Toussaint. Armel Ningatoloum Sayo, also known as "Armel Bedaya" or "Commandant Sayo", has the rank of Captain in the Central African armed forces. François Toussaint, also known as "General Ngoy", is a Belgian national living in Gabon who was the object of an international arrest warrant for a murder in Belgium and who was accused of training Mai Mai armed groups in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.<sup>72</sup>

101. Sayo and Toussaint crossed the border between Cameroon and the Central African Republic in the region of Baiboon on 1 November 2013 and set up the first Révolution et justice training camp in the outskirts of Paoua, in the region of Boloum. The chain of command was comprised of "Colonel" Waluba Espilodja, a former APRD officer acting as Sayo's deputy, "Colonel" Luther Betuban, a sergeant in the Central African armed forces from Bouar, and "Lieutenant-Colonel" Raymond Belanga. Toussaint was in charge of training and military strategy.

102. According to Toussaint, Révolution et justice started to conduct military operations on 24 December 2014 against groups of Fulani and Séléka forces in the region. At that time, the group had around 1,000 fighters coming from an area extending from Markounda (Ouham Province) to Bang (Ouham-Pendé), a village bordering Chad and Cameroon. Révolution et justice was able, during January 2014, to take control of several villages around Paoua and then force the Séléka to leave Paoua, having previously secured the agreement of the Cameroonian contingent of MISCA that it would not intervene. Toussaint also claims that MISCA provided Révolution et justice with boxes of ammunition in January 2014 to fight groups of Fulani active in an area south-east of Paoua.

<sup>71</sup> Estimation of the Panel of Experts based on its own observation and figures provided by military sources. Of the total, it is estimated that between 200 and 400 members of those forces are in Kaga Bandoro, 100 in Batangafo, 100 in Kabo and 60 in Dékoa, and that the remaining forces are used as mobile units.

<sup>72</sup> Interview with Sayo, Paoua, 23 June 2014; interview with Toussaint, Bangui, 17 July 2014; and meeting with Sayo, Bangui, 18 August 2014. See also <http://kongokinshasa.afrikblog.com/archives/p300-10.html>.

103. Sayo's deputy Espilodja, a former APRD officer, left the group in April 2014 with hundreds of men before being killed on 14 August 2014 during clashes with MISCA forces based in Paoua. According to international forces, in June 2014 Sayo was commanding only 60 men based in Gadoulou (15 km east of Paoua), Bang and Bodjomo.<sup>73</sup>

104. Sayo and Toussaint told the Panel that they had several discussions with Chadian officials. Sayo claimed that Chad had sent several emissaries in order to "buy" his support, while Toussaint stated that Sayo had requested support from Chad and sent Espilodja to Chad in January 2014, where he met with emissaries from the Chadian presidential guard, although no agreement was reportedly reached between the parties. According to Sayo, in April and May 2014 Révolution et justice subsequently confronted, several times, military units of the national army of Chad in the region of Markounda (Ouham Province) (see also paras. 36-46 above). Sayo told the Panel that Révolution et justice had conducted a tactical retreat from Markounda, while, according to testimonies collected on the ground by the Panel, Révolution et justice avoided confrontation and left the town the day before an "unknown" armed group from Chad, described as a combination of Fulani, Chadian and Séléka fighters, took control of Markounda on 1 May 2014.<sup>74</sup>

105. According to the evidence collected and the statement made by Toussaint to the Panel, Toussaint trained and advised Révolution et justice forces between November 2013 and February 2014, becoming the first known western mercenary in the current conflict in the Central African Republic.

106. Toussaint claimed that as many as 1,500 recruits joined Révolution et justice in December 2013. He conducted the physical training of recruits every day and advised Sayo on military tactics and attack techniques. Toussaint claimed to have planned the first major attack by Révolution et justice, which was conducted on Beboura on 24 December 2013 and which he said resulted in the deaths of 45 Séléka fighters. He also advised Sayo on how to seize Paoua in January 2014 and led the discussions with MISCA to negotiate its non-interference. Toussaint then declared having left Révolution et justice after yet another dispute with Sayo on 5 February 2014. Toussaint appears in a video posted on the Internet on 1 January 2014 in front of hundreds of Révolution et justice fighters. In that video, Sayo introduces Toussaint as a general before handing command of Révolution et justice troops over to him (see annex 18). Sayo claimed that Toussaint never participated in combat, however, and acted only as an adviser.

107. On 7 July 2014, Toussaint was arrested by MISCA in Bouar and transferred to Bangui where, at the time of drafting the present report, he was still in detention, awaiting extradition to Belgium.

108. Armel Sayo was appointed Minister of Youth and Sports on 22 August 2014 by the Prime Minister of the transition, Mahamat Kamoun. His armed group, however, is represented by Laurent Dim-Woei Biti in the steering committee charged with monitoring the implementation of the Brazzaville agreement (see annex 14).

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<sup>73</sup> Interviews with Sayo, Paoua, 23 and 24 June 2014; meeting with international forces, Paoua, 24 June 2014.

<sup>74</sup> Mission to Markounda, 12 August 2014.

### Lord's Resistance Army

109. The Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) remains active in the western provinces of the Central African Republic, specifically in the provinces of Haut-Mbomou, Mbomou, Haute-Kotto and Basse-Kotto. According to information in the Panel's database, LRA has been responsible for 42 incidents from 5 December 2013 to 14 August 2014, including abductions, looting, destruction of property, forced displacement, sexual violence and the killings of two civilians.

110. According to information provided to the Panel, an LRA group under the command of "Captain" Okello Palutaka and a Séléka group under the command of "Colonel" Ahmed Sherif, in the *sous-préfecture* of Nzako (Mbomou Province), have cooperated at the logistical level (see annex 19 for photographs of the commanders).<sup>75</sup> The Panel intends to investigate further links between the two armed groups.

## C. Exploitation of natural resources

### Diamonds

#### *Calls for vigilance on illicit trade*

111. The temporary suspension of the Central African Republic from the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme in May 2013 has led to a rapid increase in the illicit cross-border trafficking in Central African diamonds. In a media interview on 6 June 2014, the former Minister of Mines, Energy and Hydraulics, Olivier Malibangar, estimated that 80 per cent of diamonds produced in the Central African Republic leave the country fraudulently.<sup>76</sup> The Panel estimates that the suspension added about 140,000 carats of diamonds, representing a potential value of \$24 million, to the amount already smuggled out of the country prior to the suspension. This estimate takes into account a slowdown in production<sup>77</sup> and ongoing official purchases by the private companies Sodiam (Société centrafricaine du diamant) and Badica (Bureau d'achat de diamants en Centrafrique) (see paras. 122 and 128).<sup>78</sup> The estimate is calculated on the basis of the rather low export figures recorded during the first half of 2013.<sup>79</sup>

112. In July 2014, the participants in and observers to the Kimberley Process issued an administrative decision aimed at ensuring that diamonds from the Central African Republic would not be introduced into legitimate trade channels.<sup>80</sup> In the administrative decision, reference was made to cases of international shipments

<sup>75</sup> Information based on debriefings by LRA defectors conducted on 11 March 2014 in Obbo (Haut-Mbomou Province) by a regional task force of the African Union.

<sup>76</sup> See [www.france24.com/fr/20140606-reporters-Centrafrique-diamants-maudits-guerre-sangaris](http://www.france24.com/fr/20140606-reporters-Centrafrique-diamants-maudits-guerre-sangaris), accessed on 5 September 2014.

<sup>77</sup> Mining authorities estimate that there has been a slowdown in the mining activity of 35-40 per cent since the beginning of the crisis. The Ministry of Mines, Energy and Hydraulics strategy on the mining sector for 2015-2020 (April 2014) is archived at the United Nations.

<sup>78</sup> About 40,000 carats of diamonds have been stocked in Bangui since the suspension. Official purchasing records are archived at the United Nations.

<sup>79</sup> The Central African Republic officially exported 118,964 carats until the suspension on 23 May 2013. The 2013 annual report of the Permanent Secretary of the Kimberley Process in the Central African Republic is archived at the United Nations.

<sup>80</sup> See [www.kimberleyprocess.com/en/2014-administrative-decision-car](http://www.kimberleyprocess.com/en/2014-administrative-decision-car), accessed on 2 September 2014.

containing diamonds from the Central African Republic presented during an intersessional meeting held in Shanghai, China, from 9 to 12 June. On 30 May 2014, the Chair of the Kimberley Process (China) sent a letter to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 2127 (2013) concerning the Central African Republic encouraging it to call upon those States that were not participants in the Process and that were neighbours of the Central African Republic to enhance their vigilance with regard to the illicit trade in rough diamonds from that country.

113. On 19 June 2014, the Chair of the Committee transmitted letters to the Permanent Representatives to the United Nations of Cameroon, Chad, the Congo, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, South Sudan and the Sudan, expressing particular concern regarding the rough diamonds originating in two diamond-producing areas in eastern Central African Republic, namely Sam-Ouandja and Bria, and one such area in western Central African Republic in Mambéré-Kadéï Province, owing to the activities of rebel groups in these areas.

114. In its letters, the Committee recalled that, in paragraph 37 (d) of its resolution 2134 (2014), the Security Council had decided that the travel and financial sanctions set out in paragraphs 30 and 32 of that resolution should also apply to the individuals and entities designated by the Committee as providing support for armed groups or criminal networks through the illicit exploitation of natural resources, including diamonds and wildlife and wildlife products, in Central African Republic.

#### *Kardiam/Badica*

115. On 23 May 2014, the Belgian federal authorities seized a suspicious shipment of rough diamonds at the Antwerp Diamond Office (see annex 20). After having examined the digital images of the diamonds, the Kimberley Process Working Group of Diamond Experts noted that it was highly probable that the diamonds originated in the Central African Republic (see annex 21). The seizure concerned two shipments certified under the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme coming from the United Arab Emirates and sent to the Antwerp-based company Kardiam.<sup>81</sup>

116. Kardiam is the Belgian branch of the Central African company Badica (see S/2014/452, para. 60). Kardiam confirmed to the Panel that two of its parcels had been seized in May 2014 and provided details of a third parcel seized at the beginning of June (see annex 22).

117. Two companies shipped the diamonds in question from the United Arab Emirates to Antwerp. Ditrex Diamonds exported one shipment consisting of 2,702 carats, valued at \$89,827. Reya Diam exported two shipments: one of 3,397 carats, valued at \$1,596,452, and one of 554 carats.<sup>81</sup> The parcels seized in May 2014 were of gemstone quality and of mixed origin. In relation to the seizures, the Chairman of the Dubai Diamond Exchange stated on 2 July 2014 through a specialized online media outlet on jewellery that Dubai received the parcel from the Democratic Republic of the Congo with a valid Kimberley Process certificate (see annex 23).

118. The authorities of the United Arab Emirates collaborated with the Panel in tracing the (re)exported parcels to shipments imported into the country and provided details available in the accompanying Kimberley Process certificates. The

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<sup>81</sup> Telephone conversations with Kimberley Process participants and observers, 13 and 14 June 2014. Interview with diamond dealer, Antwerp, 24 June 2014.

Kimberley Process office in the United Arab Emirates traced the Reya Diam export back to 10 imported shipments, of which 5 were from the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 3 were from Lebanon, 1 was from South Africa and 1 was from Mauritius. The Ditrex Diamonds export could be traced back to eight imports, of which three were from the Democratic Republic of the Congo, three were from Lebanon and two were from within the European Union. All but one shipment from the Democratic Republic of the Congo, involving the companies Afrogem, Saga and Solidiam, had been exported through intermediary traders in the United Arab Emirates to Reya Diam and Ditrex Diamonds. One Afrogem parcel was shipped directly to Ditrex Diamonds on behalf of Louay Charara (see annex 24). Afrogem is a recreation of Primogem,<sup>82</sup> a sister company of Primo that operated in Bangui until 2008 (see para. 130).<sup>83</sup> Saga's three shipments to Reya Diam were made in the name of Abbas Fakhri, and at least one shipment of Solidiam (to Ditrex Diamonds) was made in the name of Ahmad Ibrahim.<sup>84</sup>

119. The authorities of the United Arab Emirates also provided the Panel with information on all exports from Ditrex Diamonds and Reya Diam to Antwerp, including Kardiam, from January 2013 to August 2014.<sup>85</sup> Since September 2013, Ditrex Diamonds has exported six gemstone-quality diamond parcels to Kardiam. Reya Diam has exported 13 gemstone-quality diamond parcels to Kardiam since June 2013. The 19 parcels are of similar sizes as those seized in Antwerp.

120. Mining authorities in the Democratic Republic of the Congo acknowledge that Central African diamonds may have entered the Congolese formal supply chain but at the same time argue that such diamonds could have been smuggled into the United Arab Emirates with the aim of adding them to exported shipments, thereby replacing inferior stones to make company records of carats sent match the amounts received. An examination of the digital images of the diamonds, which would include a comparison of the images of the Congolese exports and those of seized diamonds, should provide more clarity as to whether the diamonds with morphological characteristics known to the Central African Republic in the Antwerp seizure had been certified in the Democratic Republic of the Congo or not.

121. According to e-mail communications between the Chair of the Working Group of Diamond Experts and Belgian federal authorities (which were provided by the Chair of the Working Group to the Panel), some of the rough diamonds in the pictures of seized shipments display characteristics typical of diamonds originating in Nola (Sangha Mbaéré Province) in the west of the Central African Republic, whereas other diamonds display characteristics typical of diamonds originating in Sam-Ouandja and Bria (Haute-Kotto Province), in the east of the country (see annex 21).

122. By 2 July 2014, Badica had officially purchased a total of 2,896 carats, mostly from Bria and Sam-Ouandja (see annex 25).<sup>86</sup> According to reports following the stocktaking missions carried out by the Central African authorities on 4 March,

<sup>82</sup> Interview with diamond trade expert, Kinshasa, 22 August 2014.

<sup>83</sup> Interviews diamond trade experts, Antwerp, 24-26 June 2014.

<sup>84</sup> E-mail from Congolese mining official, 15 September 2014.

<sup>85</sup> The documentation is archived at the United Nations.

<sup>86</sup> The documentation is archived at the United Nations.

22 April and 2 July 2014, those rough diamonds are stocked in Bangui.<sup>87</sup> Badica transports its diamonds from Bria and Sam-Ouandja on flights operated by its sister company Minair, as well as by the airline company Laparra. Both Minair and Badica are part of Groupe Abdoukarim ([www.groupeabdoukarim.com](http://www.groupeabdoukarim.com)), which is headed by Abdoul-Karim Dan Azoumi. Minair is also regularly chartered by French forces (see annex 26).

123. In its interim report, the Panel noted that prior to the arrival of international forces in April 2014 in Bria, former Séléka forces had levied \$75 in landing taxes at the Bria airstrip (see S/2014/452, para. 66). In Sam-Ouandja, where rough diamond production has, according to satellite imagery, been rapidly increasing in recent months (see annex 27), no international forces are present. Former Séléka forces under zone commander Beya Djouma levy \$100 in aircraft landing taxes.<sup>88</sup> Almost every week, there are commercial flights to Bria and Sam-Ouandja.<sup>89</sup> Taxes are generally paid by the company that charters the aircraft.<sup>90</sup>

124. Collectors (intermediary diamond traders) in Sam-Ouandja also provide daily allowances to former Séléka soldiers guarding their premises.<sup>91</sup> In May 2014, the Panel observed former Séléka soldiers in Bria guarding the premises of principal collectors and businessmen. A commander of the Special Anti-Fraud Unit confirmed that former Séléka forces in Sam-Ouandja benefit from the diamond trade through their security arrangements with collectors.<sup>92</sup>

125. The Panel obtained detailed testimonies from industry and government sources claiming that Badica is also dealing in diamonds from the Central African Republic that are trafficked abroad.<sup>93</sup> According to these sources, an individual named Al Hadj Idriss Goudache traffics diamonds on behalf of Badica. After former Séléka president Djotodia resigned in January 2014, Goudache left the Central African Republic for Cameroon, spent time in Garoua Boulai, Bertoua and Douala and then settled down in Kousseri in the extreme north of Cameroon, near N'Djamena.

126. In addition, according to collectors in Kenzou and Berberati (Mambéré-Kadeï Province), one of Badica's agents, Ali Mahamat, is operating in Cameroon to purchase diamonds trafficked from areas around Nola and Berberati in the west of the Central African Republic on behalf of Badica.<sup>94</sup>

127. The Panel believes that diamonds illegally traded from Bria and Sam-Ouandja, areas under former Séléka control, by or on behalf of Badica have ended up in the shipments seized in Antwerp. Badica's legal and illegal purchases from those areas provided sustainable financial support for the former Séléka, in violation of the

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<sup>87</sup> The reports on the verification of stock held by buying houses in Bangui are archived at the United Nations.

<sup>88</sup> Telephone interview with a collector in Sam-Ouandja, 4 September 2014.

<sup>89</sup> Documentation on flight rotations in the Central African Republic is archived at the United Nations.

<sup>90</sup> Interview with airport official, Bangui, 21 July 2014.

<sup>91</sup> Telephone interview with collector in Sam-Ouandja, 4 September 2014.

<sup>92</sup> Interview with a Special Anti-Fraud Unit commander, Bangui, 21 July 2014.

<sup>93</sup> Interview with a captain of the Central African gendarmerie, Bangui, 22 July 2014; interview with diamond dealer, Douala, Cameroon, 11 August 2014; and interview with diamond dealer, Bangui, 18 July 2014.

<sup>94</sup> Interview with collectors in Kenzou, 12 July 2014; interview with diamond collectors in Berberati, 11 July 2014.



United Nations sanctions regime. Already in April 2014, the Panel had endeavoured to discuss Badica's purchasing policy with its managing director in Bangui, who dismissed the Panel's queries, claiming that the company had ceased purchasing diamonds.<sup>95</sup> In June 2014, the Panel requested a meeting with the Director of Kardiam in Antwerp but its telephone calls were not returned. On 4 and 16 September 2014, Kardiam replied in writing to the Panel's request for information regarding the May 2014 seizure (see annex 22). On the question of whether the company was aware of, or involved in, illicit trafficking in Central African diamonds and/or their insertion into the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme, the company denied any involvement. Kardiam also told the Panel that neither Kardiam nor Badica had ever worked with Goudache, and that Badica's buyer, Ali Mahamat, who had previously been based in Berberati, had been robbed of all his possessions and had then been forced to flee to Cameroon. He now resides in Douala.

### *Sodiam*

128. As the Panel highlighted in its interim report (see S/2014/452, para. 59), Sodiam continues to be the main buying house officially purchasing and stocking diamonds in Bangui, but its purchases are declining. Between the stocktaking exercise in March and 2 July 2014, Sodiam purchased another 7,655 carats, bringing its total stock to 48,231 carats.<sup>96</sup> On two occasions, Sodiam, at the request of the Minister of Mines and Energy, prepared a parcel of diamonds for export, paying its export taxes to help finance the functioning of mining services and thereby assure traceability of its purchases.<sup>97</sup> These diamond parcels remain stocked in Bangui. The preparation of diamonds for export does not constitute a violation of the Kimberley suspension, according to Kimberley Process authorities in the Central African Republic. Sodiam's purchases are concentrated in the west of the Central African Republic.<sup>98</sup>

129. In its interim report, the Panel highlighted the increased presence of anti-balaka elements in the diamond trade along the Boda-Guen-Carnot axis (Mambéré-Kadeï and Lobaye provinces), after having conducted attacks based on ethnicity and religion and targeting diamond collectors (S/2014/452, paras. 63-65). A collector presently buying along the axis, Jacob Moussa, told the Panel he purchases from the anti-balaka leader "Mama Drogba" in Sasele (Mambéré-Kadeï Province).<sup>99</sup>

130. The main diamond collectors in Berberati, Hassan Ali Fawaz and Bassem Bahim, told the Panel that they could not give assurances that their diamond purchases did not benefit armed groups, since anti-balaka forces were present in most mining areas as diggers and intermediary traders.<sup>100</sup> Another collector in Berberati, Ahmed Adnan, told the Panel he never visited any mining site to verify the security conditions.<sup>101</sup> Fawaz was the former manager of the buying house Gemca, while Bassem was a former manager of the buying house Sopicat. Adnan was associated with the buying house Primo.<sup>102</sup> The Government of the Central

<sup>95</sup> Interview with the managing director of Badica, Bangui, 28 April 2014.

<sup>96</sup> Stocktaking reports are archived at the United Nations.

<sup>97</sup> Telephone interview with the general director of Sodiam, 6 September 2014.

<sup>98</sup> The purchasing records are archived at the United Nations.

<sup>99</sup> Interview with Jacob Moussa, Bangui, 24 April 2014.

<sup>100</sup> Interview with Fawaz and Bassem, Berberati, 11 July 2014.

<sup>101</sup> Interview with Ahmed Adnan, Berberati, 11 July 2014.

<sup>102</sup> Interview with a former official of the Ministry of Mines and Energy, Paris, 4 September 2014.

African Republic withdrew the licences from Primo and Gemca in October 2008, after which staff members started to operate as collectors instead of exporters.

131. The collectors Jacob Moussa, Fawaz and Bassem sell to Sodiam (see annex 28). Sodiam's managing director told the Panel that the company's policy is to exclude purchases from military personnel and from members of armed groups and that the company is instructing its collectors to do the same in order to avoid incidents of indirect purchases from alleged anti-balaka members.<sup>103</sup> At the same time, Sodiam's managing director pointed out that any supplier excluded by Sodiam could easily sell the diamonds to networks trafficking diamonds outside the country. The Panel believes that Sodiam's purchases have incidentally financed anti-balaka members, but that the risk of such financing is now being mitigated by the company with the implementation of due diligence procedures.

#### *Trafficking to Cameroon*

132. While diamond collectors in Berberati and Bangui acknowledged that the larger share of diamonds produced in the west of the Central African Republic close to the Cameroonian border is trafficked through Gamboula and Gbiti (Mambéré-Kadéï Province, Central African Republic) to Kenzou and Kette (East Province, Cameroon) and then further on to Batouti, Bertoua, Yaoundé and Douala, those collectors denied their own involvement. Between 20 May and 2 July 2014, Sodiam purchased 442 carats of diamonds in Berberati. According to the regional director of mines and geology in Berberati, this is only a small fraction of the total amount produced in the area.<sup>104</sup> The regional director, in his report for the first trimester of 2014, notes serious security and logistical problems in ensuring control of collectors' purchases and sales.<sup>105</sup>

133. Several sources informed the Panel that a sub-office of the Cameroonian buying house Gems Africa is located in Kenzou and that Patrick Ayandho is one of its buyers.<sup>106</sup> Ayandho was previously associated with the buying house ADR in Bangui, working closely with Socrate Bozizé (see annex 29), the son of former President Bozizé. Ayandho currently purchases diamonds from the Berberati area on behalf of Gems Africa.<sup>106</sup> By 15 August 2014, Gems Africa had officially exported 815 carats of rough diamonds to the United Arab Emirates (see annex 30). Ayandho identifies himself on a professional networking website as a diamond buyer for the company Patson et fils in the Paris area.<sup>107</sup> The Panel attempted to contact Ayandho through this site but received no response.

134. On 3 June 2014, Cameroonian authorities confiscated 23.78 carats of rough diamonds suspected to have come from the Central African Republic.<sup>108</sup> The parcel

<sup>103</sup> Interview with Fawaz and Bassem, Berberati, 11 July 2014.

<sup>104</sup> Interview with the regional director of mines and geology for the south-west, Berberati, 11 July 2014.

<sup>105</sup> The report is archived at the United Nations.

<sup>106</sup> Interviews with diamond collectors, Kenzou, 12 July 2014; interview with transport authorities, Berberati, 11 July 2014; e-mail correspondence with civil society representative in Bertoua, 18 July 2014.

<sup>107</sup> See [fr.linkedin.com/pub/patrick-ayandho/70/70a/196](http://fr.linkedin.com/pub/patrick-ayandho/70/70a/196). Accessed on 24 August 2014.

<sup>108</sup> Interview with the National Permanent Secretary of the Kimberley Process in Cameroon, Yaoundé, 14 August 2014.

was presented, without any chain-of-custody documents, to the Cameroonian Kimberley Process authorities for certification (see annex 31).

### Gold

135. While annual gold production is estimated at some two tons, representing a value of over \$60 million per year (see S/2014/452, para. 68), official gold trade is almost non-existent in the Central African Republic. The main licensed buyer, Dera d'or, purchased over 1 kg of gold in 2014, mostly from Yaloké (Ombella-Mpoko Province) (see annex 32). The company transforms gold into chains weighing 300-500 g so as to expedite the sale of its gold as jewellery rather than as rough ingots, thereby paying a tax of only \$0.6 per gram rather than \$1.3 per gram (the amount levied on exports of rough gold).<sup>109</sup> As a result, the company does not officially export any rough gold.

136. Two companies officially exported rough gold in 2014. In May, Badica exported 827 g of gold produced in Yaloké to the company Djibrilla Abbo in Douala, Cameroon (see annex 33). According to Cameroonian trade statistics, the company officially exported over 7 kg of gold in 2014 (see annex 34). In February 2014, the national union of mining cooperatives of Central Africa exported 889 g of gold produced in Bangandou (Lobaye Province) to Africa Metal in Dakar.

137. In July 2014, the Panel visited the town of Yaloké, which is, together with the Ndassima mine and the town of Bambari (Ouaka Province), one of the main gold trading centres in the Central African Republic. Local authorities and gold traders in Bangui told the Panel that before the Séléka departed from the area at the end of January 2014, three collectors had been active in Yaloké: Djibrine Amine, Idriss Salleh and Ismaila Sylla.

138. Ismaila Sylla used to work for Adamas Swiss, a buying house that suspended its operations when the Séléka took power in Bangui in March 2013. Sylla appears in a *France 24* news story dated 1 April 2013 buying gold and diamonds from a Séléka commander (see annex 35).<sup>110</sup> In July 2013, Dera d'or purchased 731 g of gold from Sylla (see annex 36). In February 2014, Sylla sold 29 carats of diamonds to Sodiam (see annex 37). Several gold traders informed the Panel that Sylla continues to deal in gold and diamonds in the Central African Republic under the guise of a general import and export company and that he travels to Dubai to sell his goods.<sup>111</sup>

139. In January 2014, Amine left Yaloké and settled in Garoua Boulai, Cameroon, to continue trading Central African gold from Yaloké, but also from other areas, including Ndassima, which is estimated to produce about 15 kg of gold per month (see para. 141).<sup>112</sup> Amine's trading partners in Cameroon include Oumarou Sanda in Bertoua and Djibrilla Abbo.<sup>112</sup> Djibrilla Abbo is the official gold trading partner of Badica (see para. 136) in Douala and a former diamond collector for Badica based

<sup>109</sup> Interview with the general director of Dera d'or, Bangui, 7 July 2014.

<sup>110</sup> See [www.france24.com/en/20130401-diamond-trade-central-african-republic-rebels-fund-coup](http://www.france24.com/en/20130401-diamond-trade-central-african-republic-rebels-fund-coup). Accessed on 23 August 2014.

<sup>111</sup> Interviews with gold traders in Bangui, 6 July and 16 July 2014; telephone interview with gold trader in Dubai, 18 July 2014.

<sup>112</sup> Interview with officer of the gendarmerie, Yaloké, 19 July 2014; interview with senior officer of the gendarmerie, Bangui, 22 July 2014; interviews with gold traders in Bangui, 16 July and 22 July 2014.

in Boda (Lobaye Province).<sup>113</sup> Gold is turned into ingots in smelting facilities in Bertoua, Cameroon, and exported through Douala.

140. By July 2014, one licensed collector, Emmanuel Boyembé, was still active in Yaloké. Boyembé told the Panel that he had returned to Yaloké in March 2014 after seeking refuge in Bangui from Séléka abuse of Christian gold traders in Yaloké.<sup>114</sup> He also told the Panel that two anti-balaka commanders, Séverin Richard and a man known as “Le Bleu”, used to supervise artisanal mines from which he purchases gold, but that they had been “demobilized”. According to gold traders in Bangui and a local security officer in Yaloké, Boyembé was part of the anti-balaka rebellion in Yaloké, but nevertheless sells to Muslim collectors in Cameroon, like Amine, who were driven away as a result.<sup>115</sup>

141. In July 2014, the Panel revisited the town of Bambari, where gold from the Ndassima mine, which is an Axmin concession occupied by artisanal miners, is traded. In its interim report (see S/2014/452, para. 70) the Panel had found no evidence of any tax levied by former Séléka forces. In July, however, spokesperson Captain Ahmat Nadjat told the Panel that the fifth military region (Ouaka), which was under Darrassa, had started issuing licences for artisanal miners and authorizations for collectors (see annex 38), receiving \$200 and \$300 in taxes respectively per month.<sup>116</sup> Artisanal miners are in charge of teams of gold diggers at the mine. They sell locally to collectors who transport gold for onward sale. Currently, as many as 50 miners and collectors are active in Ndassima, which could potentially provide the fifth military region with \$150,000 in revenue per year. Former Séléka authorities also appear to be issuing “digger cards” to several hundreds of artisanal miners at Ndassima (see annex 39). On 21 August 2014, at least 25 miners were killed when a pit collapsed owing to heavy rains.<sup>117</sup>

142. According to Nadjat, regularized taxes were introduced to prevent soldiers from looting at Ndassima.<sup>117</sup> In May 2014, miners and traders in Ndassima told the Panel that Tom Adam (see para. 62 and annex 9) ransacked the local mining population in Ndassima early in 2013 and was replaced by Darrassa soon after Djotodia came to power in Bangui in March.<sup>118</sup>

143. Collectors take gold from Ndassima to Bangui and onward to Cameroon (see S/2014/452, para. 70). Part of that gold enters the Cameroonian trading network described in paragraph 139 above. Another part of the gold from Ndassima is traded in Satema and Kouango, both on the Ubangi river along the border with the Democratic Republic of the Congo.<sup>116</sup> Kouango is the southernmost position held by the former Séléka (see paras. 88 and 90).

### **Agricultural goods**

144. The fifth and sixth military regions (Ouaka and Basse-Kotto) of the Séléka have also established a parallel taxation system on livestock, coffee and the transport of agricultural goods and general merchandise. Cattle owners pay a

<sup>113</sup> Interview with senior officer of the gendarmerie, Bangui, 22 July 2014.

<sup>114</sup> Interview with Boyembé, Yaloké, 19 July 2014.

<sup>115</sup> Interview with a gold trader in Bangui, 16 July 2014.

<sup>116</sup> Interview with Nadjat, Bambari, 3 July 2014.

<sup>117</sup> See [www.reuters.com/article/2014/08/22/us-centralafrica-mine-idUSKBN0GM0Q420140822](http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/08/22/us-centralafrica-mine-idUSKBN0GM0Q420140822). Accessed on 2 September 2014.

<sup>118</sup> Interview with miners and traders, Ndassima, 22 May 2014.

security tax of \$10 per head of cattle (see annex 40). Coffee is taxed at \$0.12 per kg. The State office for the regulation, control and processing of agricultural produce used to levy a tax on coffee, but that no longer happens (see annex 41). In addition, phytosanitary taxes are levied on coffee (\$2 per sac), animal skins and hides (\$20), aromatic plants (\$1 per sac) and vehicles (\$40 each) (see annex 42). Moreover a customs tax of \$130 is levied on each truck leaving Bambari,<sup>119</sup> for which a laissez-passer is issued to the driver (see annex 43). None of the above-mentioned tax revenues are returned to Bangui.<sup>120</sup>

145. According to the director of Ouaka Café, a company based in Bambari that transports coffee, the former Séléka impose customs taxes several times along the route to the Sudan, which is the destination of practically all the coffee from both Ouaka and Basse-Kotto. Those taxes amount to \$2,500 per truck, which, in combination with bad road conditions and the poor security situation, is the reason for a decline in coffee exports. Ouaka Café (annex 44), which is the only transporter left in Bambari, has seen its export volumes drop from 7,000 to 1,000 tons in 2014, equal to 40 fewer truck rotations. In July 2014, with the arrival of the rainy season, no more truck rotations were carried out. Given these figures, the former Séléka in Bambari would have earned approximately \$145,000 in tax revenues from the coffee trade in 2014, while former Séléka forces elsewhere along the road to the Sudan may have fetched another \$94,800.

### Cattle

146. In its interim report, the Panel noted that Muslim and ethnic Fulani cattle owners had come under siege from anti-balaka forces and had either been killed or forced to flee (see S/2014/452, annex 13, para. 5). The Panel met with displaced Fulani populations in Yaloké, Berberati and Kenzou, some of whom declared to have lost several hundreds of heads of cattle. Anti-balaka forces have stolen cattle, but also held them for ransom, with the expectation that owners will pay cash to have their cattle returned to them.<sup>121</sup> Victims accused the anti-balaka leader Derbara Seregaza in Berberati of this practice.<sup>122</sup>

147. The anti-balaka have slaughtered, smoked and sold meat in towns, as witnessed by the Panel along the Guen-Carnot axis (see S/2014/452, annex 13, para. 5). In Carnot, the anti-balaka section chief Aimé Blaise Zoworo controls the meat market. Cattle stolen in the area of Berberati is also taken across the Gbiti border to be sold at a weekly market near Kette (East Province, Cameroon). Anti-balaka leaders, including the late Rochael Mokom, was keeping stolen cattle in camps not far from Gbiti in the *sous-préfecture* of Adama Gaza (see S/2014/452, annex 5, para. 4).

148. According to a report by a spokesperson of the Fulani community in Bambari, since the beginning of the crisis Fulani populations too have been attacked and had their cattle stolen by former Séléka factions, including those under Colonel Yaya Scout in Bozoum (Ouham-Pendé Province), now based in Bria, and Tom Adam in

<sup>119</sup> Interview with truck driver, Bambari, 4 July 2014.

<sup>120</sup> Interview with official of the Ministry of Finance, 19 August 2014.

<sup>121</sup> Interview with a Fulani cattle owner from Guen, Kenzou, 11 July 2014.

<sup>122</sup> Interview with Muslim cattle owners in Kenzou, 11 July 2014.

Bambari.<sup>123</sup> Cattle stolen from the Fulani in Bambari have been taken to the Sudan for sale.

### **Wildlife**

149. In its interim report, the Panel mentioned the arrest on 17 February 2014 of elephant poacher René Sangha Zélé inside Dzanga Sangha National Park, for the illegal possession of a .375 calibre Mauser hunting rifle (see S/2014/452, para. 75). In July 2014, Zélé was sentenced to two years of imprisonment and transferred from Bayanga (Sangha Mbaéré Province) to Bangui to serve his time. Zélé told the Panel that he had killed one elephant, but that the ivory had been stolen.<sup>124</sup> He also mentioned that a gendarme in Nola by the name of Narcisse Kotto had provided him with the rifle, and that the .375 ammunition had been sold under the counter at a munitions depot in the FIFA building in Yokadouma, Cameroon.

150. Central African ivory is generally traded through Cameroon for a local selling price of \$180 per kilogram. Cameroonian authorities and conservationists independently confirmed the name of a Cameroonian ivory trader called Fifen Hosni Moubarak, alias “Watt”, who purchases Central African ivory in Yokadouma. In 2012, Moubarak was arrested for ivory trafficking in Djoum, Cameroon; he was then released on bail and apprehended again in December 2013 in Yokadouma.<sup>125</sup>

## **III. Arms embargo**

151. The Panel has continued, since the submission of its 1 July 2014 interim report, to monitor the implementation of the arms embargo by, for example, analysing weapons seized by international forces, directly observing (during field visits) arms held by regular forces and armed groups and analysing situation reports by major actors in the region as well as media reports. The Panel also maintained a transparent and cooperative relationship with the Central African armed forces and the senior leadership of the police and the gendarmerie involved in the implementation of the arms embargo. The Panel has also met, during field visits, almost all the local leaders of armed groups.

152. The Panel interacted on a regular basis with airport authorities in Bangui and the region and visited three crossing points along the border with the Congo and Cameroon, and one closed crossing point along the border with Chad. The Panel has systematically interacted with international forces based at headquarters locations and with field commanders on the ground, which has allowed it to gain a better understanding of the operational environment, the security threats and the circulation of arms and ammunition. The Panel has analysed the list of arms and ammunition seized from the former Séléka by elements of the Uganda People’s Defence Forces (the Ugandan army) that were part of the African Union Regional

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<sup>123</sup> The report, dated February 2014, is archived at the United Nations.

<sup>124</sup> Interview with Zélé, Bangui, 17 July 2014.

<sup>125</sup> Interview with an official of the Directorate General of External Relations, Yaoundé, 13 August 2014.

Task Force, following clashes on 29 and 30 June 2014 in the area of Nzako (Mbomou Province, in the eastern part of the Central African Republic).<sup>126</sup>

153. One major challenge facing the Panel in its efforts to analyse and trace weapons and ammunition in circulation in the Central African Republic is linked to the degree to which Member States and arms manufacturers provide the Panel with relevant information on weapons found or seized in the country.<sup>127</sup> Another challenge is related to the diversity of small arms in circulation in the Central African Republic, many of which were initially supplied legally to Member States and subsequently found their way to the Central African Republic as surplus weapons.

154. For example, the Panel conveyed a list of 120 serial numbers of type 56-2 Chinese assault rifles seized by international forces requesting confirmation of whether and when the weapons had been supplied by China to the Central African Republic. Owing to the cooperation of the Chinese authorities, the Panel learned that only 49 weapons on the list had been transferred legally to the Central African Republic, in 2008, while the remaining amount (60 per cent of the total) may have entered the country illegally as a result of third-party transfers (see annex 45).<sup>128</sup> The Panel sought information and is still awaiting replies from a number of arms manufacturers and Member States in order to identify smuggling networks and to determine how and when weapons were transferred to the Central African Republic, in potential violation of the arms embargo. The Panel also looks forward to receiving a reply from a manufacturer to a request for information on AKM assault rifles whose serial numbers have been deliberately erased by mechanical grinding but that have nevertheless been identified by the Panel.<sup>129</sup>

#### **A. Illicit support and transfer of arms and ammunition to armed groups**

155. Less than a year after the arms embargo was imposed on the Central African Republic on 5 December 2013 by Security Council resolution 2127 (2013), the Panel has yet to observe any transfer of significant supplies of weapons to armed groups in violation of the embargo. The Panel has observed, however, former Séléka fighters using weapons that do not match the baseline data of weapons established by the Panel in its interim report (see S/2014/452, annex 16, and annex 47 to the present report). Likewise, the Panel has identified cases of smuggling of hunting ammunition in areas where anti-balaka groups are active. The Panel has also

<sup>126</sup> In a *Reuters* article dated 2 July 2014, the Ugandan army indicated that, since the Séléka hunt LRA in the Central African Republic, the Séléka were its enemy. See [www.reuters.com/article/2014/07/02/us-uganda-security-idUSKBN0F643520140702](http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/07/02/us-uganda-security-idUSKBN0F643520140702), accessed on 1 July 2014. Upon request by the Panel, Uganda shared a considerable amount of information and invited the Panel to visit the Ugandan contingent of the African Union Regional Task Force in Obo (Haut-Mbomou Province); so far, the Panel has been unable to travel to Obo owing to logistical constraints.

<sup>127</sup> The Panel would like to highlight the timeliness with which information was provided, upon request, by some Member States (e.g., China and Ukraine) and some companies (e.g., Israel Weapon Industries, MAXAM in Spain and ST Kinetics in Singapore).

<sup>128</sup> Other models found in the Central African Republic, such as the SAR 80 rifles made in Singapore, are part of a batch sold to the former Yugoslavia in 1980.

<sup>129</sup> After analysis, the Panel identified that one such assault weapon had the serial number TH1633 and requested information from the manufacturing factory (see annex 46).

documented one case of a Belgian mercenary, François Toussaint, providing technical assistance and training to Révolution et justice (see paras. 100-108 above).

### **Former Séléka**

#### *North-western Central African Republic*

156. The Panel has identified a type of Israeli-made Galil assault rifle not known to be part of the national arsenal in three different locations in the country, namely in Bangui, Berberati and Boguila.

157. One of the Galil rifles (serial number 2066204) was discovered inside a wrecked vehicle destroyed by French forces in the vicinity of Boguila on 5 May 2014. On that day, in the same area, heavy fighting had broken out between former Séléka elements headed by Colonel Mahmat Issa and Operation Sangaris forces. The French forces resorted to air strikes and destroyed the vehicle. Earlier, the same armed group had, for some weeks, gone around the area committing abuses against the local population.

158. The vehicle used by those former Séléka elements, a Toyota land cruiser, had been sold to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in Bangui in March 2002 (see annex 49). The Panel has requested additional details regarding the vehicle, but has not received the requested information to date.<sup>130</sup>

159. The Galil rifle collected by Operation Sangaris forces in Boguila, and those found in Bangui and Berberati, were part of a batch of weapons sold in 2008 to the Ministry of Defence of Chad with end-user certificates guaranteeing that the weapons would not be transferred to another country (see annex 48).<sup>131</sup> The Panel observed similar rifles in Chad carried by the internal security services personnel of the Directorate-General of the State Institutions Security Service.<sup>132</sup> Following the seizure of similar rifles in other areas of the Central African Republic, the Panel sent a letter to Chad on 5 June 2014 requesting additional information on the weapons and proposing a visit to Chad to discuss the subject. The Permanent Mission of Chad to the United Nations acknowledged receipt of the Panel's letter and requested that the deadline be extended by two weeks. To date, no reply has been received.

160. In relation to the above-mentioned attacks, the Panel collected evidence indicating that an unknown armed group originating in Chad has been active inside the Central African Republic, along the border with Chad.

161. On 12 August 2014, the Panel conducted a field visit to the border town of Markounda (Ouham Province). It noted that the town had been completely emptied of its inhabitants and documented a significant amount of destruction. According to

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<sup>130</sup> Two pieces of official correspondence were sent, on 25 August and 24 September 2014, to request more information.

<sup>131</sup> Reply from Israel Weapon Industries, 25 May 2014.

<sup>132</sup> On 23 June 2014, two experts of the Panel were arrested by Chadian security forces while conducting an investigation in the Central African Republic, in the area between the town of Bémal (north of Paoua, Ouham-Pendé Province) and the border with Chad. The experts were transported by personnel of the Directorate-General of the State Institutions Security Service to Goré, Chad, and detained for four hours. On this occasion, the experts observed that Directorate-General personnel were carrying the same type of Galil rifles that had been seized in the wreckage in Boguila.



first-hand testimonies and on-site observations, armed men coming from Chadian territory had allegedly committed a number of attacks against the civilian population; furthermore, since May 2014, these men had prevented the people of Markounda and the surrounding area from returning to their homes.

162. During that field visit, the Panel was able to inspect the wreckage of the vehicle that had been destroyed by French forces in the vicinity of Boguila. The Panel collected a sample of 14 remains of cartridge cases carried by the armed groups and fired during the attack. Six of the cartridges had markings identifying them as ammunition in circulation in the Central African Republic, in line with the baseline produced by the Panel in its interim report, while eight had markings not seen before. The Panel believes that the cartridges with unknown markings may have been introduced recently in the region (see annex 50 to the present report and S/2014/452, annex 16).

#### *North-eastern Central African Republic*

163. The Panel has received information about the operational build-up of former Séléka in Birao under the leadership of sanctioned leader Nourredine Adam, including corroborated reports that Nourredine Adam's forces were able to compel the detachment of the Central African armed forces and Sudanese army units of the tripartite force to leave the town on 26 June 2014. The Panel believes that the redeployment of the tripartite force in the village of Am Dafok, 8 km from the Sudanese border, is a clear consequence of Nourredine Adam's reinforcement. For logistics and security reasons, the Panel could not travel to Vakaga Province.

164. The MISCA force commander, General Martin Chomu Tumenta, who attended the former Séléka congress on 11 July 2014 in Birao, declared to the Panel that he had not seen any indication of the presence of new military equipment in Birao and its airport.<sup>133</sup> Nourredine Adam also denied, during a telephone interview with the Panel, having received or brought military supplies and equipment in violation of the arms embargo.<sup>134</sup> Also, the comparative analysis conducted by the Panel on satellite images taken on 12 January and 18 September 2014 of the area of Birao did not reveal the presence of any heavy military equipment or significant military build-up.<sup>135</sup>

#### **Anti-balaka**

165. From meetings with militiamen and inspections of arms and ammunition seized from anti-balaka groups, the Panel is of the view that anti-balaka combatants have used mainly small arms that were already in circulation in the Central African Republic. In addition to the 12-gauge hunting ammunition seized in violation of the arms embargo in April 2014, 7.62x39 mm hunting cartridges for AK rifles were

<sup>133</sup> Interview, Bangui, 23 August 2014.

<sup>134</sup> Telephone interview with Nourredine Adam and four of his advisers, 23 August 2014.

<sup>135</sup> Satellite imagery purchased by the Panel from commercial providers with the support of the Geo-Operations Unit of the Cartographic Section of the United Nations.

seized by MISCA forces in Boda and inspected by the Panel.<sup>136</sup> As mentioned in the Panel's interim report, anti-balaka groups rely mostly on artisanal rifles and 12-gauge hunting ammunition, which they also modify so as to increase their lethality (see S/2014/452, annex 18).

166. Official vendors of arms and ammunition, including hunting ammunition, have ceased to operate in Bangui and all the towns visited by the Panel in the Central African Republic. Hunting ammunition has been subsequently smuggled into the country from Cameroon, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Congo. In particular, smugglers have used the border crossing points at Gamboula (Mambéré-Kadeï Province) and Cantonnier (Mambéré Province), which is located near the Cameroonian town of Garoua Boulaï, during the period February-April 2014, as witnessed by the Panel on 27 April 2014, when customs authorities of the Central African Republic seized a box of hunting cartridges smuggled from Cameroon (see annex 51). The Panel noted at that time that the anti-balaka group based in Cantonnier was controlling the smuggling activities north and south of the main route, as well as the supply of ammunition to other anti-balaka groups in the country. MISCA forces in Berberati confirmed that hunting ammunition was being circulated throughout its area of operations, prompting Cameroonian authorities to take measures to stop the phenomenon in May 2014.<sup>137</sup>

167. While in Berberati on 10 July 2014, the Panel learned that a local man who used to sell ammunition had been detained in Cameroon.<sup>138</sup> Cameroonian authorities have confirmed to the Panel that a smuggler named Ousmane Roger had attempted to buy arms and ammunition in Yaoundé, but that his import authorization certificate, which was dated 2011, could not be accepted (see annex 52). The Central African authorities of the Ministry for Water, Forests, Hunting and Fisheries informed the Panel that Roger was not registered as an arms and ammunition dealer, although the certificate shows that he is allowed to sell in Berberati, Bouar and Nola.

168. Statistics on the sale of 12-gauge hunting cartridges communicated by the main importer in Cameroon reflect a net increase of more than 54 per cent in the number of cartridges sold to the five major retailers between February and April 2013 (440,995) compared with the same period in 2014 (681,765) (see annex 53).<sup>139</sup> The Panel contacted two retailers whose sales of cartridges had increased, one more than five-fold and the other by 70 per cent, as well as relevant authorities in Cameroon, who were not able to provide an explanation.

169. The Panel notes that there is a strong correlation between the increase in the sale of ammunition by those retailers in Cameroon and two factors: (a) the peak in activities of anti-balaka groups in the Central African Republic and (b) the increase in seizures of similar hunting ammunition by international forces. Actually, all types

<sup>136</sup> The MISCA detachment in Boda seized an AK rifle and new 7.62x39 mm cartridges with markings that identify them as coming from the Barnaul plant (Russian Federation). The Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the United Nations informed the Panel that the markings are linked to the category of hunting ammunition and that end-user certificates are not issued for such products. It was also mentioned to the Panel that products of the Barnaul cartridge plant are sold not only in the Russian Federation, but also in Germany, the United States, Ghana and Namibia, among other countries. The Panel intends to continue to investigate this case.

<sup>137</sup> Interview with Captain Onana, MISCA detachment chief, Berberati, 10 July 2014.

<sup>138</sup> Meeting with a local official, Berberati, 10 July 2014.

<sup>139</sup> Estimate calculated by the Panel on the basis of statistics provided by the main importer. Archived at the United Nations.

of 12-gauge hunting ammunition sold in Cameroon — in particular Red Star, Flash and Kemen — were seized frequently by international forces in the Central African Republic between February and May 2014.

170. The Panel also inspected 12-gauge ammunition manufactured in Pointe Noire (Congo) by the company MACC, which is not supplied from Cameroon.

171. The Panel was informed on 2 September 2014 that anti-balaka fighters in Bambari were seen for the first time in late August 2014 carrying machine guns and rocket-propelled grenade launchers, representing a significant development in the operational capability of this armed group.<sup>140</sup> The Panel intends to investigate this matter further when it returns to the field.

## **B. Arms proliferation**

172. The lack of progress with regard to disarmament in the country means that armed groups can use arms and ammunition in their possession as bargaining tools and to guarantee personal security. Since the Brazzaville forum, arms and light weapons in the possession of armed groups have become less visible in Bangui and in the western part of the country. Nonetheless, armed groups are able to easily recover their arms, as was demonstrated recently in Bangui and Boda.

173. The anti-balaka and the armed group *Révolution et justice* continue to rely on small arms. Motorbikes and stolen or commandeered light vehicles are used solely for transporting and protecting zone commanders. It is estimated that the anti-balaka hold no more than a dozen vehicles. Elements of the *Front démocratique du peuple centrafricain* and *Révolution et justice* have been observed moving on foot or, more rarely, using motorbikes.

174. While the former *Séléka* used to have more sophisticated weapons and vehicles, their fighting against Operation Sangaris forces appears to have affected their capability to carry out operations and manoeuvres. The Panel recorded the destruction by Operation Sangaris of five pick-up trucks held by former *Séléka* elements: one in Boguila on 5 May 2014, two in Bambari on 24 June 2014 and two in Batangafo on 5 August 2014. In addition, a pick-up truck was seized by the Ugandan contingent of the African Union Regional Task Force in Nzako. The Panel estimates that former *Séléka* elements in Ndele, Bambari and Bria have fewer than two dozen vehicles. The Panel observed former *Séléka* in Bambari and Batangafo employ small arms, light machine guns, grenade launchers and 60 mm mortars against Operation Sangaris forces. Weapons seized by the Ugandan army from former *Séléka* elements in Nzako did not change the baseline number established by the Panel of arms circulating in the country prior to the arms embargo (see annex 54). Photographs from open sources indicate that the former *Séléka* in Birao do not possess significant weapons other than a recoilless rifle mounted on a pick-up truck (see annex 55).

175. Since March 2014, the Panel has observed little progress in voluntary or forced disarmament. Overall, since 5 December 2013 international forces have collected approximately 1,200 military small arms, 1,150 hunting rifles and 180 light

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<sup>140</sup> Telephone conversation with MISCA detachment commander, Bambari, 2 September 2014.

weapons.<sup>141</sup> Of the total number of weapons seized from 5 December 2013 to 28 February 2014, however, 84 per cent were confiscated from former Séléka fighters during their cantonment. From 1 March to around mid-August 2014, international forces seized fewer than 200 small arms and a similar quantity of artisanal rifles. No light weapons were seized from armed groups during that period.

176. On 14 March 2014, MISCA recovered a significant number of arms and ammunition in a storage facility at Mpoko airbase in Bangui.<sup>142</sup> The Panel traced the recovered ammunition (12.7 mm) and learned that it had been transferred by Ukraine to the Central African Republic in December 2012, one year prior to the imposition of the arms embargo, for use on Mil Mi-24 helicopters.

177. Attempts by Operation Sangaris to canton and disarm former Séléka elements in Bambari on 21 June 2014 and in Batangafo on 4 August 2014 were largely unsuccessful. In both towns, the former Séléka challenged the cantonment, which resulted in exchanges of fire. When the Panel visited Bambari in July 2014 and Batangafo in August 2014, combatants were openly carrying their weapons in the streets. Forced disarmament in the PK5 neighbourhood of Bangui also led to armed confrontations between Operation Sangaris forces and Muslim self-defence groups. Muslim combatants in these places are opposed to disarmament and cantonment for fear of anti-balaka attacks. The implementation by Operation Sangaris of so-called confidence-building measures that aim at dismantling armed checkpoints and stopping the movement of armed combatants sparked a popular uprising, instigated by the former Séléka, in Bambari and Batangafo on the above-mentioned dates (see annex 56).

178. The MISCA Force Commander, General Tumenta, informed the Panel that the implementation of confidence-building measures in Batangafo was premature and had not been coordinated with MISCA. In his view, the military capacity of the international forces was too limited to ensure the proper protection of civilians. On 4 July 2014, the Panel observed unhindered anti-balaka movement at a site for internally displaced persons next to the cathedral in Bambari (see annex 7). International forces were not present on a permanent basis and were therefore unable to prevent the confrontation between the former Séléka and the anti-balaka that took place on 8 July 2014.

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<sup>141</sup> Estimates calculated by the Panel on the basis of inventories of arms collected and stored by the European Union Force in the Central African Republic, MISCA and Operation Sangaris. As at the end of August 2014, MISCA had seized 597 small arms, 488 hunting rifles and 117 light weapons and Operation Sangaris had seized 605 small arms, 661 hunting rifles and 60 light weapons, which include items seized by the European Union Force. Small arms are weapons designed for individual use and include revolvers and self-loading pistols, rifles and carbines, sub-machine guns, assault rifles and light machine guns. Light weapons are weapons designed for use by two or three persons serving as a crew and may include heavy machine guns, hand-held under-barrel and mounted grenade launchers, portable anti-aircraft guns, portable anti-tank guns, recoilless rifles, portable launchers of anti-tank missile and rocket systems, portable launchers of anti-aircraft missile systems, and mortars of a calibre of less than 100 mm (see the report of the Open-ended Working Group to Negotiate an International Instrument to Enable States to Identify and Trace, in a Timely and Reliable Manner, Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons (A/60/88), which the General Assembly took note of in its resolution 60/81).

<sup>142</sup> African Union press release of 14 March 2014, available from <http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/misca.com.14.03.2014.pdf>. Accessed on 4 October 2014.

### C. Cases of non-compliance

179. The Panel documented two cases of non-compliance with the arms embargo in which the police and the gendarmerie of the Central African Republic received equipment without prior approval by the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 2127 (2013) concerning the Central African Republic. The first case concerned the handover, in Bangui on 1 May 2014, of a considerable amount of equipment to the police and the gendarmerie by a Togolese official in the presence of local authorities, as reported on Central African national television. The Panel requested additional information from the Permanent Mission of Togo to the United Nations on 6 May 2014. On 16 June 2014, the Permanent Mission responded by sending a note verbale in which it wrote that the Togolese authorities were investigating the case and would provide a reply; to date, that reply has not been received.

180. The second case of non-compliance, reported by the local media, concerns a donation on 21 August 2014 of materiel to a Central African militarized police unit by the Estonian contingent of the European Union Force in the Central African Republic.<sup>143</sup> The Estonian unit commander explained to the Panel that his contingent had donated non-lethal items intended for crowd control purposes, including 88 “flashbang” grenades, 600 rubber ball cartridges calibre 12, and 12 signal cartridges. This donation was not coordinated with the European Union Force and MINUSCA.

181. The Panel has not observed any deployment or employment by the Central African Republic defence and security forces of any significant military equipment, arms and weapons other than individual small arms and assets supplied following exemption requests approved by the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 2127 (2013) concerning the Central African Republic. Operation Sangaris has equipped the police and the gendarmerie with individual arms following the approval of two exemptions by the Committee.

182. For its part, personnel of the Central African armed forces appear to be increasingly equipped with assault rifles, which the Panel has been unable to inspect to date. Armed army personnel conduct static security and close protection tasks for Central African authorities.

183. A senior officer of the Central African armed forces informed the Panel that the armed forces had required military personnel formerly associated with the anti-balaka to hand over their weapons. The Panel learned that the armed forces have recovered some of those weapons, but have not yet been able to inspect any of the weapons. The Panel viewed a list of names of soldiers belonging to the anti-balaka faction of Rombhot and the serial numbers of the weapons to be handed over. Kamezolaï, who was associated with Rombhot, shared with the Panel a letter he wrote to the President of the Central African Republic in which he declared that he was reintegrating into the armed forces with the intention of handing over five weapons in his custody.

184. With regard to technical, training, financial or other assistance related to military activities, the Panel informed a number of Member States that defence and

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<sup>143</sup> See [www.lanouvellecentrafrique.info/centrafrique-les-troupes-estoniennes-offrent-du-materiel-a-la-police](http://www.lanouvellecentrafrique.info/centrafrique-les-troupes-estoniennes-offrent-du-materiel-a-la-police), accessed on 21 August 2014.

security personnel from the Central African Republic continue to attend military institutions in those States, and reminded them of their obligation to request ex post facto approval from the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 2127 (2013) concerning the Central African Republic. The Member States concerned include Cameroon, Côte d'Ivoire, France, Morocco, the Niger, Senegal and the Sudan. To date, only France has taken steps to request an ex post facto exemption from the Committee in pursuance of paragraph 54 (f) of resolution 2127 (2013). The Central African authorities plan to continue training armed forces personnel under existing bilateral cooperation agreements and are presently discussing the possibility of carrying out training programmes with Angola and the Sudan in the future. The Panel officially informed both countries of their obligation to request an exemption to the measures imposed by paragraph 54 of resolution 2127 (2013) should they provide military training to security and military personnel.

185. The Panel is also in possession of a list of 136 candidates designated by the Central African armed forces to take courses in Moroccan military institutions. The Panel believes that these candidates have not undergone a proper vetting process to exclude, inter alia, those responsible for human rights violations.

186. The Panel has yet to be allowed to conduct systematic inspections of military and paramilitary units in the Central African Republic in order to effectively monitor the implementation of the arms embargo. The Panel looks forward to the implementation by MINUSCA of tasks related to the monitoring of the arms embargo mandated by paragraph 31 (d) of Security Council resolution 2149 (2014) that would allow for such inspections, without notice and when appropriate.

#### **IV. Obstructing the delivery of humanitarian assistance to the Central African Republic**

187. By paragraph 37, subparagraphs (b), (c) and (e), of its resolution 2134 (2014), the Security Council decided that a travel ban and an assets freeze shall apply to individuals and entities designated by the Committee as involved in planning, directing or committing acts that violate international human rights law or international humanitarian law, as applicable, or that constitute human rights abuses or violations, in the Central African Republic, including acts involving sexual violence, targeting of civilians, attacks based on ethnicity or religion, attacks on schools and hospitals, and abduction and forced displacement; recruiting or using children in armed conflict in the Central African Republic, in violation of applicable international law; and obstructing the delivery of humanitarian assistance to the Central African Republic, or access to, or distribution of, humanitarian assistance in the Central African Republic. In the present section, the Panel sets out a number of case studies related to each of the above-mentioned criteria for sanctions; the information is based on the Panel's field investigations.

188. The humanitarian situation in the Central African Republic remains challenging and volatile. The country has 4.6 million inhabitants, 2.5 million of whom remain in need of humanitarian assistance. Although international non-governmental organizations and other humanitarian partners have increased their presence and operations, insecurity, logistics and a lack of funding remain some of the principal challenges to moving the country out of the humanitarian emergency situation. From May to August 2014, the rainy season posed constraints on the work of the

humanitarian community. For example, logistical efforts were more difficult to carry out and more expensive because of the poor state of the roads.

189. According to the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, as at 13 August 2014 there were 509,000 internally displaced persons throughout the country. The number of internally displaced persons in Bangui decreased from 135,050 in May 2014 (according to UNHCR) to 84,000 in August 2014 (according to the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs), and were located in one of the more than 40 dedicated sites available to them. An improvement in the security situation in and around the capital is believed to have led internally displaced persons to return to their homes. The events that took place in Bangui's PK5 neighbourhood from 18 to 21 August 2014, which were sparked by confrontations between armed groups and international forces, have demonstrated that the capital is not entirely secured. There has been no significant reduction in the number of internally displaced persons in the rest of the country. (For more details on displacement, see annex 57.)<sup>144</sup>

190. While the number of internally displaced persons has decreased, that of Central African refugees in neighbouring States (Cameroon, Chad, Congo and Democratic Republic of the Congo) has increased. According to UNHCR, neighbouring States were hosting 406,786 Central African refugees as at 15 August 2014. From December 2013 to May 2014, 120,472 new refugees were identified in neighbouring countries and, by August 2014, another 50,801 new refugees were identified in the course of about three months.

Table  
**Number of Central African refugees, per neighbouring country**

<i>Country</i>	<i>December 2013-May 2014</i>	<i>May-August 2014</i>	<i>Change</i>
Cameroon	191 265	231 037	39 772
Chad	100 520	93 305	(7 215)
Congo	16 062	18 232	2 170
Democratic Republic of the Congo	57 608	64 212	4 604

191. Only in Chad did the number of Central African refugees decrease. The reason for this could be the complete closure of the border on 12 May 2014. (For more details, see the map of refugee movements in annex 58.)

192. For the period from 5 December 2013 to 14 August 2014, the Panel documented 247 incidents of obstruction of the delivery of humanitarian assistance in the Central African Republic involving both national and international aid workers. Of the incidents, 131 occurred between 5 December 2013 and 30 April 2014, and 116 incidents occurred between 1 May and 14 August 2014, revealing a slight decrease in the monthly average (see annex 59).<sup>145</sup>

<sup>144</sup> See also [https://gallery.mailchimp.com/9e62930dcaf29260cf72aa7f9/files/CMP\\_hors\\_Bangui\\_IDP\\_movements\\_01\\_09\\_2014.pdf](https://gallery.mailchimp.com/9e62930dcaf29260cf72aa7f9/files/CMP_hors_Bangui_IDP_movements_01_09_2014.pdf), accessed on 2 September 2014.

<sup>145</sup> The Panel entered into its database as much information as was possible for the month of August but time constraints and limited access to specific information hindered the completeness of the data for August.

193. In Ndélé, humanitarian operations have encountered various problems over the past five months. Since 1 May 2014, humanitarian organizations have significantly reduced their operations owing to the overall security situation, difficult relations with local authorities and difficult road access. The Panel documented several incidents in Ndélé and its surroundings, including four incidents in which the bases of international non-governmental organizations were attacked and looted; three incidents in which trucks carrying humanitarian aid were looted and stolen; and one incident in which local authorities impeded the distribution of humanitarian aid (see annex 59). Some international non-governmental organizations have been unable to access areas outside Ndélé for several months.

194. Increasing transportation costs have also hampered humanitarian operations. Some humanitarian organizations have had to increase payments to private contractors to deliver humanitarian goods throughout the country owing to the multiplication of manned roadblocks, in particular by anti-balaka groups that demand payment in exchange for allowing the passage of trucks and vehicles.<sup>146</sup> Even though it is the policy of international humanitarian organizations to refuse to make such payments, their private contractors are more likely to comply with the demands of armed groups.

195. The perpetrators of incidents of obstruction of humanitarian assistance remain unknown in almost 40 per cent (100) of the incidents documented by the Panel; 28 per cent (70) of the incidents were allegedly committed by anti-balaka groups, while 20 per cent (50) were allegedly committed by Séléka groups. The remainder were allegedly perpetrated by Révolution et justice, government forces and MISCA, among others (see annex 60 and the Panel's database).

196. The large majority of incidents of obstruction of humanitarian assistance were reported in Bangui, followed by Ouham and Ouham-Pendé provinces. The 80 incidents in Bangui represent 32 per cent of the total, while the 56 incidents reported in Ouham and Ouham-Pendé provinces represent 22 per cent. The high numbers reported in these three areas reflect the relatively high number of humanitarian organizations and operations located there. (See the Panel's database and, for a complete overview, annexes 60 and 61.)

197. For the period from 5 December 2013 to 14 August 2014, the Panel documented 22 killings of aid workers. Such incidents are included in the total number of incidents cited above. Of that total, 16 occurred between 5 December 2013 and 31 April 2014, and 6 between 1 May and 14 August. The fact that the Panel's interim report documented 14 killings of aid workers during the first period can be explained by better access to information from the humanitarian sector (see S/2014/452, para. 98; for a timeline of the killings of aid workers, see annex 62).

198. For the period between 1 May and 14 August 2014, the Panel documented the following six cases in which aid workers were killed:

(a) On 1 May 2014, anti-balaka groups on the road between Bangui and Damara, at PK 16, killed a UNHCR staff member;

(b) On 3 June 2014, a group of anti-balaka in Sibut (Kémo-Gribingui Province) killed the assistant of a private truck carrying humanitarian aid;

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<sup>146</sup> The Panel held several meetings with heads of agencies, heads of delegations of international non-governmental organizations and logistics personnel of humanitarian organizations.



(c) On 3 June 2014, armed Fulani near Batangafo (Ouham-Pendé Province) killed a staff member of an international non-governmental organization;

(d) On 4 June 2014, a group of Fulani allegedly killed a staff member of an international non-governmental organization while he was travelling around Batangafo;

(e) On 7 July 2014, at a site for internally displaced persons in Bambari (Ouaka Province), a 62-year-old staff member of an international non-governmental organization was killed during an attack. According to the information collected, at around 4 p.m. a group of armed Muslim youths forced their way to the site, St. Joseph's church, and started shooting indiscriminately at the civilians who had sought shelter there. The body of the dead man, which had been mutilated by machetes, was recuperated by his family the following day and properly buried;

(f) On 10 August 2014, at Batangafo hospital, a staff member of an international non-governmental organization was stabbed by an unknown perpetrator.

199. As it observed in its interim report, the Panel found that killings of aid workers do not follow a particular trend or pattern or serve any (military) strategic purpose. Some are random acts of violence, perhaps motivated by economic gain, while others appear to be personal matters (see S/2014/452, para. 98).

200. For the period from 1 May to 14 August 2014, the Panel documented seven incidents in which convoys of trucks carrying humanitarian goods were attacked, ambushed and/or looted:

(a) On 3 June 2014, a convoy of 27 trucks (some privately rented, others belonging to international non-governmental organizations) departed from Bangui with a MISCA escort. After Damara, a group of anti-balaka attacked the convoy, MISCA responded and drove the attackers away. Many of the trucks were hit in the attack. Some were repaired fairly quickly, while others were damaged but still able to continue on their way. One truck, however, which belonged to an international non-governmental organization, could not continue. Its passengers requested MISCA to wait for them but the request was refused and the truck was left behind. After being repaired, the truck was again attacked by the same anti-balaka near Mabo (Kémo-Gribingui Province). Although the driver did not stop, the assailants were able to jump into the back, kill an apprentice with a machete, throw his corpse from the truck and take several bags of food and material from the back of the truck;

(b) On 8 June 2014, in the early afternoon, a humanitarian convoy from Bangui was attacked 60 km north of Damara (Ombella-Mpoko Province) by a group of anti-balaka. The attack wounded two young girls who were assisted by Gabonese MISCA forces;

(c) On 23 June 2014, at around 11 a.m., 15 km south of Grimari (Ouaka Province) a United Nations agency four-truck convoy transporting 100 tons of seeds was stopped by anti-balaka elements who demanded they be transported to Bambari. When the drivers refused, the militiamen shot at one of the trucks, damaging a wheel. The trucks were able to continue on their way;

(d) On 18 July 2014, in Bossangoa, a convoy of trucks hired by United Nations agencies transporting humanitarian supplies was attacked and looted on the road from Bangui to Bossangoa (Ouham-Pendé Province) by unknown armed men;

(e) On 17 July 2014, the bridge located on the main road 10 km before Yaloké (Ombella-Mpoko Province) collapsed, stopping all traffic in the area. The next day, some vehicles tried an alternative route, which was not suitable for trucks. An international non-governmental organization vehicle with three staff decided to take that route to reach Bangui. After passing through a small village called Zaoua, a group of armed men came out of the bush and stopped the vehicle. The armed men took all the valuables and threatened to take the vehicle. The team was able to negotiate its way out;

(f) From 19 July 2014 to the end of August 2014, various local traditional authorities in the provinces of Vakaga and Bamingui-Bangoran blocked a number of trucks carrying humanitarian aid that were travelling from the Sudan to the northern provinces of the country;

(g) On 23 July 2014, at around 3 p.m., in the outskirts of the village of Galafondo (Kémo-Gribingui Province), a convoy of nine privately contracted trucks and an international non-governmental organization truck carrying humanitarian aid to Bambari were stopped at an anti-balaka checkpoint where each driver was asked to pay 50,000 CFA (\$100) in exchange for passage. Two experts from the Panel happened to be at the same location and were able to talk to the anti-balaka. The trucks were permitted to pass without further incident.

201. The Panel monitored the situation of Muslim minorities in the western part of the country. According to an early warning system set up by the Inter-Agency Standing Committee Protection Cluster, the communities of Ndinguri, Djomo, Guen and Gadzi (Mambéré-Kadeï Province) have been identified as enclaves of minorities at high risk.<sup>147</sup> Since March, Boda (Lobaye Province) and then Yaloké (Ombella-Mpoko Province) have also been identified as communities at risk. In addition, the Panel has corroborated that the situation in Boda is one of the most serious of those identified by the Cluster.

202. Although the humanitarian response has improved significantly, the approximately 6,000 Muslims currently living in the enclave of Boda, located in the middle of the village, remains very fragile. The Panel has documented the killings, by different anti-balaka groups, of at least 168 civilians, including five children. Various incidents against humanitarian aid workers have also been documented, and the number of those incidents has in fact increased during the past few months. Although there have been various replacements and changes in the structure of the anti-balaka during the year, documents obtained by the Panel indicate that a new zone commander was appointed by Ngaïssona on 28 June 2014 (see annex 11; in addition, a detailed case study on Boda is included in annex 63).

## V. Violations of international humanitarian law<sup>148</sup>

203. Since 5 December 2013, the Panel has documented the killings of 3,003 civilians by various perpetrators. Of the total, 2,569 were mentioned in the Panel's interim report (see S/2014/452, para. 104). From 1 May to 14 August 2014, 436 additional killings were documented. While there was a clear reduction in the number of civilians killed across the country throughout 2014, it should be noted

<sup>147</sup> See <https://ewarningcar.crowdmap.com/reports/view/14>, accessed on 30 August 2014.

<sup>148</sup> See annex 64 for methodological remarks.

that there is still some underreporting and there continue to be delays in obtaining information.

204. The reduction in the number of civilians killed in the country could be explained by the following: an increase in the presence of international forces, which has ameliorated the general security situation; a decrease in areas contested by the different armed factions; and an increase in the presence of humanitarian organizations, which means that incidents can be documented and therefore reported to national and international organizations that could take legal action against them. (For trends and details, see annexes 65-67.)

205. From 1 May to 14 August 2014, according to the information collected by the Panel related to the killings of civilians, the Séléka were found responsible for committing 34 per cent of the killings and anti-balaka groups for 13.4 per cent. In 23.7 per cent of cases, no perpetrators were reported. Other groups or combinations of several armed groups reportedly committed 13.2 per cent of the incidents (see annexes 65 and 67).

206. Set out below are some of the most serious incidents that the Panel has documented in the past three months:

(a) On 2 June 2014, Séléka elements in two pick-up trucks reportedly raided villages in Bakala and Saboyombo and mine sites around Louba, north-west of Bambari. The *sous-préfet* of Bakala and international non-governmental organizations present in the area gave a provisional death-toll estimate of 50 victims. After the massacre, most of the bodies were thrown into the river. According to the *sous-préfet*, the Séléka kidnapped the pastor of the church of Bakala because he refused to give information about a certain individual. At the time of writing the present report, the pastor continued to be in captivity and was being used as a human shield to prevent attacks;

(b) On 10 June 2014, alleged Séléka elements attacked the villages of Bodjomo and Boguila (Ouham Province). In Bodjomo, it is estimated that there were at least 30 casualties. For the subsequent attack, in Boguila, no record is yet available of the casualties. A motorcycle driver who saw the alleged Séléka attackers in Bodjomo tried to flee to Boguila to warn the population. The Séléka caught up with him and killed him at the northern entrance to the village. Some people fled from Boguila to Paoua (Ouham-Pendé Province) to find shelter. The Protection Cluster reports that, as a result of these attacks, many people have been forcibly displaced;

(c) On 23 June 2014, anti-balaka elements attacked the Fulani village of Liwa, 10 km from Bambari, reportedly killing 17 civilians. The Panel obtained testimonies from community representatives visiting the sites, who showed the Panel photographs of women and children killed and burned in the attack. According to Fulani representatives and Operation Sangaris forces, the anti-balaka assailants involved in the attack operated from the village of Ouabé, which is located only 7 km from Bambari but is inaccessible because fighters destroyed the bridge giving access to the village;

(d) On 29 July 2014, armed anti-balaka elements attacked Séléka positions in the city of Batangafo. After a violent clash, the Séléka elements warded off the attack. This led to many displaced persons seeking refuge in the MISCA base.

Twenty-two people were killed, including two MISCA soldiers, and numerous others were injured, among them civilians.

207. The Panel investigated possible violations of international humanitarian law by MISCA forces in the Central African Republic. The Panel focused on the most serious allegations and met with the human rights team at MISCA to obtain its version of the events and to share information on cases of which it had no knowledge. A summary of the allegations, of where MISCA stands in terms of being investigated and of the allegations that still have to be addressed are contained in annex 68. In addition, the Panel investigated in detail one specific case involving a killing (see annex 69). The investigation, in the course of which information was shared with the MISCA Human Rights Section, was conducted in cooperation with the Office of the Public Prosecutor in Bangui.<sup>149</sup> The Panel has received multiple reports of MISCA targeting anti-balaka commanders. The Panel documented two incidents in which one anti-balaka commander and one Révolution et justice commander were killed, and one incident involving the arrest of anti-balaka elements (see cases 11 and 19-21 in annex 68).

208. During the period from May to August 2014, the Panel recorded 329 abductions. Some of them had actually been committed before May but, because it was not possible to gain access to the site of the incidents, information was only available months later. According to the information gathered by the Panel, the main perpetrators of the abductions were groups of armed men associated with the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), which is present in the eastern provinces of the Central African Republic, as well as in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and South Sudan. Most of the attacks in the Central African Republic took place in the provinces of Mbomou, Haut-Mbomou and Haute-Kotto. Reports provided to the Panel confirm that the general modus operandi of LRA consists of small fragmented cells infiltrating villages and abducting civilians. A number of LRA members have defected in recent months but no exact figures are available.<sup>150</sup>

#### **Attacks on schools and hospitals**

209. According to the information available, 693 schools were affected by conflict in the Central African Republic in 2014. According to data collected by the Education Cluster together with partners, 351 public schools throughout the country were looted or occupied by armed groups or civilians, damaged by various types of explosives or attacked directly. In addition, 342 private schools were subjected to at least one of the above-mentioned crimes. While the date of the verification undertaken by the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) or Education Cluster partners is known, the exact dates of the attacks or the incidents are not available. (For further details on locations and numbers, see annex 70.)

210. According to data gathered by the World Health Organization (WHO) prior to June 2014, 26 hospitals in the Central African Republic were totally destroyed and 198 were partially destroyed. WHO data do not reflect the exact date of the incident or the perpetrator but these details should be available soon.<sup>151</sup>

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<sup>149</sup> Several meetings with MISCA Human Rights Section.

<sup>150</sup> Skype meetings and e-mail exchanges. See also [www.lracrisistracker.com](http://www.lracrisistracker.com).

<sup>151</sup> E-mail communication with WHO staff in Bangui.

### **Sexual violence**

211. In order to establish a baseline for establishing sexual violence in the Central African Republic as a violation of international humanitarian law, the Panel has taken data collected by the Gender-based Violence Subcluster, which operates under the Protection Cluster. According to that information, from 5 December 2013 to 31 July 2014 there were 784 cases of sexual violence in the provinces of Nana-Gribizi (223), Ouham-Pendé (62), Ombella-Mpoko (350), Lobaye (3), Haut-Mbomou (1) and Ouham (9) and in Bangui (132). Of the total number of victims, 651 were women, 5 were men, 107 were girls under 16 years of age and 4 were boys.

212. The Panel investigated one specific case of sexual violence committed by a group of anti-balaka in Bambari (Ouaka Province) (see annex 71). The rules of procedure for this kind of investigation are very strict in terms of providing psychosocial and medical help to victims of gender-based violence. As a result, the Panel has limited its investigation to one case that is of particular concern because of its gravity (three girls of the same family were raped in a single incident) and because the victims were able to have access to medical and psychosocial services (see annex 72).

### **Child soldiers**

213. In June and July 2014, the MINUSCA Child Protection Adviser and a member of the Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism of UNICEF provided the Panel with information concerning child soldiers in the Central African Republic.<sup>152</sup>

214. Between 16 January and 28 February 2014, 236 children were demobilized from former Séléka groups. These children had either been separated from Séléka cantonment sites in Bangui or recuperated along the Damara-Sibut axis. Some of the children had chosen to demobilize, as the Séléka were retreating northward from Bangui. In addition, on 19 June 2014, 43 children (including 1 girl) were released from Séléka groups in Bambari, Ippy and Mbucho (Ouaka Province). The children were taken to the international non-governmental organization transit centre in Bria (Haute-Kotto Province) and are currently reintegrating into civilian life. The total number of children who have been identified as having been involved with the former Séléka, in different functions, is 279.<sup>153</sup>

215. The Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism and the Child Protection Adviser identified 1,114 children associated with anti-balaka groups in Bangui, Boali, Yaloké and Boda. Many of the children in Bangui were unaccompanied children and not originally from Bangui. In Bangui, MINUSCA had, by the end of July, identified 76 children (53 boys and 23 girls) who are currently in a transit camp, but many children still need to be identified. On 18 August 2014, UNICEF issued a press release in which it was stated that 103 children, including 13 girls, had been released from anti-balaka groups and taken to the transit centre of an international

<sup>152</sup> While it was agreed in June 2014 that a number of joint missions would be undertaken with the Panel, such joint visits did not take place for unclear reasons. The Panel also had contact with several other stakeholders, including representatives of international non-governmental organizations and authorities of the Government of the Central African Republic. The Panel visited a transit centre for reintegrated children in Bangui; all the case files inspected, however, were from 2013.

<sup>153</sup> Meeting with Charles Fomunyam, MINUSCA Child Protection Adviser, 17 July 2014.

non-governmental organization.<sup>154</sup> The total number of children identified as coming from anti-balaka groups is 1,114, of whom 179 have demobilized.

216. The Panel observed underage soldiers on one occasion, in Batangafo, where it was meeting with Séléka commanders.<sup>155</sup> Owing to recent fighting between Séléka and international forces, the Panel was not in a position to verify the age of those soldiers.

217. In addition, the Panel has documented three cases in which children were abducted by LRA. The incidents took place in June and July 2014.

## **VI. Implementation of the travel ban and the assets freeze**

218. Following the listing on 9 May 2014 of François Bozizé, Nourredine Adam and Lévy Yakité as individuals subject to the measures imposed by paragraphs 30 (travel ban) and 32 (assets freeze) of Security Council resolution 2134 (2014), the Panel requested from financial institutions operating in the Central African Republic and the region, including global money transfer agencies, information about the accounts and transfers of those individuals and of known family members and associates, to ensure that any funds, financial assets or economic resources be prevented from being made available to or for the benefit of the individuals designated by the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 2127 (2013) concerning the Central African Republic.

219. François Bozizé and Nourredine Adam hold accounts at Ecobank, in the Central African Republic. Bozizé's account balance is \$28,979, which was deposited at the opening of the account; no movements were registered on the account, however, between 1 January 2013 and 26 June 2014. The last movement on Nourredine Adam's account dates to 31 March 2014, before he was listed, when he received \$2,480 from the Central African Republic public treasury in payment of his salary. The closing balance of Nourredine Adam's account was \$5,358. Yakité holds an account at the Central African branch of the Banque sahélo-saharienne pour l'investissement et le commerce. The account, the balance of which is in the negative by \$600, was classified as suspicious and has not been active since December 2013.

220. The Panel also requested information regarding compliance with the travel ban and the assets freeze imposed on the three designated individuals from Member States where these individuals reside or have resided and travelled in the past. These countries are Chad, France, Kenya, Nigeria, Qatar, South Africa, the Sudan and Switzerland.

221. To date, the Panel had received responses only from France and Qatar. The Permanent Mission of France to the United Nations informed the Panel that Yakité is residing in France and that France is studying the measures to be put in place to restrict his movements in the Schengen area, without mentioning the steps taken to freeze his assets. The Permanent Mission of Qatar reported that its authorities had found no business interests of Nourredine Adam in Qatar.

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<sup>154</sup> See [www.unicef.org/media/media\\_74816.html](http://www.unicef.org/media/media_74816.html), accessed on 8 September 2014.

<sup>155</sup> Mission to Batangafo, 13 August 2014.

222. As regards the current places of residence of the designated individuals, the Panel learned from money transfer records prior to 9 May 2014 that Yakité resides in Nantes, France.<sup>156</sup> The Panel met with François Bozizé in Entebbe, Uganda, on 6 June 2014, where the Ugandan Presidency is providing him with personal protection details and a driver.<sup>157</sup> On 23 August 2014, Nourredine Adam informed the Panel over the telephone that he was in Birao, Central African Republic.<sup>158</sup> In July and August 2014, the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) reported to the Panel that it had not received notice of any violation of the travel ban by any of the three designated individuals.<sup>159</sup>

## VII. Recommendations

223. The Panel recommends that:

### *Regional*

(a) The Security Council request MINUSCA, in its next resolution, to prioritize the deployment of troops and intensify patrols in areas of the Central African Republic where there is currently no international presence, in particular in the border regions with Chad, the Sudan and South Sudan, and deploy aerial assets, including drones, to monitor transborder activities;

(b) The Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 2127 (2013) concerning the Central African Republic urge the Governments of the Central African Republic, Chad and the Sudan to implement the tripartite agreement that was signed on 23 May 2011 in Khartoum to enhance security in their common border areas through joint patrols, in cooperation with MINUSCA;

(c) The Security Council consider, in its next resolution, not applying the measures set out in paragraph 54 of resolution 2127 (2013) to supplies intended solely for the support of or use by the tripartite force in cooperation with MINUSCA, and that the Council request the tripartite force to report to the Committee on measures taken in that regard;

(d) The Committee encourage the Government of Cameroon to reinforce the monitoring of import, export and sale of hunting ammunition on its territory;

(e) The Committee encourage the Governments of Cameroon and the Democratic Republic of the Congo to ratify and implement the Central African Convention for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons, Their Ammunition

<sup>156</sup> Documentation archived at the United Nations.

<sup>157</sup> Meeting with Bozizé, Entebbe, 6 June 2014.

<sup>158</sup> Telephone interview with Nourredine Adam and four of his advisers, 23 August 2014.

<sup>159</sup> On 18 June 2014, an agreement between the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 2127 (2013) concerning the Central African Republic, INTERPOL and the Panel of Experts went into force with regard to the sharing of information, including the publication of INTERPOL-United Nations Security Council Special Notices. Special Notices are issued for individuals and entities that are subject to sanctions imposed by the Council. Their principal function is to alert national law enforcement authorities that certain sanctions apply to designated individuals and entities. Special Notices for the three individuals on the Committee's sanctions list are available online from [www.interpol.int/notice/search/un](http://www.interpol.int/notice/search/un).

and All Parts and Components That Can Be Used for Their Manufacture, Repair and Assembly;

(f) The Committee request MINUSCA to support the reinstatement of State authority in provinces bordering neighbouring States, including by the provision of air assets for the deployment of civil servants and logistics, and develop, in cooperation with national authorities, essential transport infrastructures;

#### *Armed groups*

(g) The Committee reiterate its request to the transitional authorities of the Central African Republic that they certify to the Committee that defence and security personnel who have been already identified as being active members of armed groups in the Central African Republic have been removed from their positions in defence and security;

(h) The Committee proceed without delay to consider the designation for targeted measures of individuals and entities engaging in or providing support for acts that undermine the peace, stability or security of the Central African Republic;

#### *Arms*

(i) The Committee reiterate its request to the transitional authorities to report on measures taken to ensure the safe management of arms and ammunition, including their registration, distribution, use and maintenance, and to identify any training and infrastructure needs, in cooperation with MINUSCA;

(j) The Security Council urge MINUSCA to move forward with the implementation of paragraphs 31 (d) and (e) of resolution 2149 (2014) and monitor the implementation of the measures imposed by paragraph 54 of resolution 2127 (2013), in cooperation with the Panel;

#### *Natural resources*

(k) The Security Council request MINUSCA to identify, in cooperation with the Panel, areas of production of natural resources in the Central African Republic, key actors in the exploitation of such resources and supply and export routes in order to prevent armed groups or criminal networks from exploiting natural resources in the Central African Republic;

(l) The Committee request MINUSCA to accompany and support relevant State authorities in carrying out regular inspections and monitoring visits to mining sites, trade routes, airstrips and buying houses as part of its mandate to promote and support the rapid extension of State authority;

(m) The Committee request the six Member States neighbouring the Central African Republic to convey annually, and on a confidential basis, complete statistics on the import and export of natural resources, including diamonds and gold;

(n) The Committee urge exporters, importers, processors and consumers of Central African gold to mitigate the risk of further exacerbating the conflict in the Central African Republic by following due diligence guidance, as it is being implemented through the Regional Certification Mechanism of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region;



(o) The Committee urge exporters, importers, processors and consumers of Central African diamonds to mitigate the risk of further exacerbating the conflict in the Central African Republic, and encourage the larger diamond industry and relevant international bodies to develop similar due diligence guidance applicable to diamond supply chains;

*Humanitarian*

(p) The Committee urge the transitional authorities of the Central African Republic, in cooperation with international partners and with the support of MINUSCA, to establish mobile legal courts in order to bring perpetrators to justice and fight impunity in the provinces;

(q) The Committee urge the Office of the United Nations Commissioner for Human Rights, UNICEF and other international organizations that participate in the Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism in the Central African Republic to cooperate with the Panel in order to improve and increase accountability measures and to identify perpetrators of human rights and international humanitarian law violations, including those involved in the use of children in armed conflict and in gender-based violence.

**Annex 1: Table of correspondences sent and received by the Panel from 15 February to 17 September 2014**

Country/ Other Entity	Number of letters sent	Requested information fully supplied	Information partially supplied	No answer/ Information not supplied	Pending*
African Union	1			1	
AHS	1	1			
ASECNA	2	2			
Angola	1			1	
Belgium	2	1		1	
BINUCA/MINUSCA	2	2			
BSIC	1	1			
Cameroon	5		1	4	
Central African Republic	3	2		1	
Chad	3		1	1	1
China	2	1			1
Côte d'Ivoire	1			1	
Republic of the Congo	3	1		2	
Democratic Republic of the Congo	1		1		
Ecobank	4	2			2
France	3	2			1
France (Sangaris)	2	2			
Gabon	1	1			
Groupe Bancaire Commercial	1			1	
ICC	1	1			
IWI	3	3			
Kardiam/Badica	2	2			
Kenya	1			1	
KP Chair	1	1			
Maxam	1	1			
MoneyGram	1				1
Morocco	1	1			
Nepal	1			1	
Niger	1			1	
Nigeria	1			1	
Qatar	1	1			
Russian Federation	1	1			
SAMT	2	2			
Senegal	1			1	
South Africa	1			1	
South Sudan	1			1	
Steyr AUG	1	1			
ST Kinetics	1	1			
Sudan	3			3	

Switzerland	1	1			
Togo	1				1
Toyota	1	1			
Tula	1				1
UAE	6	5		1	
Uganda	2	1		1	
Ukraine	2	2			
UNFPA Bangui	1	1			
UNOHCHR Bangui/Geneva	1		1		
UNHCR Bangui/Geneva	1		1		
USA	1				1
Western Union	1	1			
<b>TOTAL</b>	84	45	5	25	9

\* A request pending indicates that the Member State or the entity indicated in a communication to the Secretariat of the Committee that a response to the Panel's request of information is forthcoming.

## **Annex 2: Agreement between former Séléka and anti-balaka facilitated by Pareto (archived at the United Nations)**

### ACCORD DE RECONNAISSANCE ET D'ENGAGEMENT A LA MEDIATION

#### DE L'ONG-PARETO DANS LA CRISE CENTRAFRICAINE PAR

#### LES EX-SELEKA ET LE MOUVEMENT DES ANTIBALAKA

**Considérant** les objectifs de création de L'ONG Nationale de médiation et de sensibilisation **PARETO** (Paix-Réconciliation- Tolérance), au lendemain du début de la crise Centrafricaine, créée en date du 05 Janvier 2014.

**Considérant** la reconnaissance et l'autorisation de l'**ONG-PARETO** par les autorités de la transition comme entité légale, et pouvant exercer sur l'étendue du territoire national, ces activités de médiation et de sensibilisation de la population Centrafricaine sur la paix, le pardon, la tolérance, le vivre ensemble et la réconciliation nationale, par le Ministère de l'Administration du territoire, de la Décentralisation et de la Régionalisation, avec la décision numéro : 028/14, numéro d'enregistrement 14.48/ MATDR. DIRCAB.DGATD.DAPA.SASE du 03.04.201, en date du 07 Avril 2014.

**Considérant** l'initiative prise par L'ONG-PARETO, pour le déclenchement effectif d'une médiation dans la crise Centrafricaine, entre les parties en conflits, en date du 15 Mars 2014 à Bangui et à l'intérieur du pays.

**Considérant** les résultats remarquables et salutaires de L'ONG-PARETO dans sa médiation sur le terrain, et appréciés par les parties en conflit.

**Considérant** les toutes dernières démarches de négociation dans sa médiation (PARETO), pouvant mettre à table et échanger fructueusement pour une sortie de crise des belligérants de la crise Centrafricaine en date du 14 juin 2014 à Bangui, démarche saluée par toutes les parties.

**Considérant** l'engagement naturel d'impartialité et d'abnégation dans cette médiation pris par L'ONG-PARETO représentée par son médiateur en personne, puis sa reconnaissance et respect des démarches de médiation et de pacification de la crise Centrafricaine, entreprises par le médiateur de la C.E.E.A.C, son Excellence monsieur **Denis SASSOU NGUESSO**, Président de la République sœur du Congo.

**Considérant** la volonté affichée pour la recherche de solutions de sortie de crise, par toutes les parties prenantes, de ladite médiation (EX-SELEKA et ANTIBALAKA).


**Nous**, Responsables ou Représentants des entités, **EX-SELEKA** et **ANTIBALAKA**, reconnaissons et acceptons la médiation de l'**ONG-PARETO**, déclenchée depuis le 15 Mars dernier, et nous engageons par le présent à respecter tous les principes et clauses consensuels de ladite médiation.

Le présent accord de reconnaissance et d'engagement à la médiation de l'ONG-PARETO, est signé et délivré par les parties, pour servir et valoir partout ou besoin sera.



Fait à Bangui, le 16 Juin 2014

Représentant EX-SELEKA



Mr ERIC WERS MASSI  
Médiateur Ex-Seleka

Représentant ANTIBALAKA



A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to be "HAGAM".

Mr Patrice Edward NGAISSONA  
Coordinateur National Politique

Pour l'ONG-PARETO



A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to be "Beni-Diogo Iadji Kouyaté".


Mr Beni-Diogo Iadji Kouyaté

Médiateur


Tel +236-72 05 99 79/77 22 82 69/[beni.kouyate@yahoo.fr](mailto:beni.kouyate@yahoo.fr)



### Annex 3: International mediation institutions in the Central African Republic

#### *The international mediation architecture*



#### *The international mediation team*



*International Contact Group/ Group of 8-CAR**Technical Follow-up Committee on the Libreville Agreement*

## Annex 4: Cessation of Hostilities Agreement signed in Brazzaville on 23 July 2014

### ACCORD DE CESSATION DES HOSTILITES EN REPUBLIQUE CENTRAFRICAINE

#### PREAMBULE

**Considérant** les dispositions pertinentes de la Charte des Nations Unies, les Résolutions du Conseil de Sécurité des Nations Unies, notamment les résolutions: 2121 (2013) ; 2127 (2014); 2134 (2014) et 2149 (2014) l'Acte constitutif de l'Union Africaine et les décisions pertinentes du Conseil de Paix et de Sécurité de l'Afrique Centrale (COPAX) ;

**Considérant** la Convention de l'Union Africaine sur la protection et l'assistance des personnes déplacées en Afrique, signée à Kampala le 23 octobre 2009 ;

**Considérant** les résolutions régionales relatives au règlement du conflit en République Centrafricaine : notamment l'Accord de Paix Global de Libreville de 2008 et de 2013, ainsi que les Déclarations de Ndjamena de 2013 et 2014 ;

**Considérant** les initiatives nationales relatives au règlement des conflits, notamment, les Recommandations du Dialogue Politique Inclusif du 20 décembre 2008, la Charte constitutionnelle de Transition de 2013 et la Feuille de Route de la Transition qui en découlait ;

**Conscients** de la nécessité du dialogue pour l'instauration d'une paix durable et de sécurité sur l'ensemble du territoire national, condition essentielle à la reconstruction du pays et à l'édification de la démocratie ;

**Considérant** la volonté constante de Son Excellence Madame Catherine SAMBA-PANZA, Chef de l'Etat de Transition, réitérée dans ses différentes déclarations (Bruxelles, Paris, Oslo, Malabo) et la dernière adresse à la Nation du 04 juillet 2014, de promouvoir le dialogue politique et la réconciliation nationale de tous les fils et de toutes filles de Centrafrique ;

**Considérant** la dynamique nationale, notamment celle des institutions de la Transition, des Forces vives de la Nation y compris la plateforme des autorités religieuses, la société civile et les parties politiques, à construire une société de paix et de concorde nationale, en apportant leur soutien au cadre de l'actuelle Transition ;

**Réaffirmant** leur volonté de contribuer au retour définitif de la paix, de prendre part au Forum de Brazzaville et de signer un Accord de cessation des hostilités ;

**Réaffirmant** leur détermination inébranlable à mettre un terme aux causes profondes de l'état continu de violence, d'insécurité, d'instabilité politique et d'exclusion qui a plongé le peuple centrafricain dans la détresse et la souffrance et qui compromet gravement les perspectives de développement économique, ainsi que la réalisation de l'égalité et de la justice sociale dans leur pays ;





**Répondant** à la Médiation Internationale dirigée par Son Excellence Denis SASSOU NGUESSO, Président de la République du Congo, Médiateur de la crise centrafricaine, appuyée par Monsieur BOUBEYE MAÏGA, Représentant de la Présidente de la Commission de l'Union Africaine et Monsieur Abdoulaye BATHILY, Représentant Spécial du Secrétaire Général des Nations Unies pour l'Afrique Centrale, mise en place lors de la Concertation des Chefs d'Etat et de Gouvernement de la Communauté Economique des Etats de l'Afrique Centrale (CEEAC), en marge du 23<sup>ème</sup> Sommet Ordinaire de l'Union Africaine, tenu à Malabo en Guinée Equatoriale le 27 juin 2014, sur la situation en République Centrafricaine ;

Les ex-combattants et éléments armés centrafricains conviennent de ce qui suit :

**Article 1<sup>er</sup> :**

- Le présent Accord de Cessation des Hostilités est établi entre les belligérants pour prendre effet sur l'ensemble du territoire de la République Centrafricaine ;
- Les belligérants acceptent d'observer la cessation des hostilités dès la signature de l'Accord ;

**Article 2 :**

La cessation des hostilités implique :

- L'arrêt immédiat des hostilités et l'abstention de tout acte militaire ou toute autre forme de violence ;
- La cessation de tous les actes de violences contre les populations civiles et militaires, le respect et la protection des droits humains. Ces actes de violences incluent les exécutions sommaires, la torture, le harcèlement, les incendies volontaires de villages, des biens publics et privés, les destructions des édifices religieux, le pillage, la détention et l'exécution arbitraires des civils et militaires ainsi que le recrutement et l'utilisation d'enfants soldats, la violence sexuelle et l'armement des civils ;
- La dénonciation de tous les actes de violences et des violations des droits de l'homme et droit humanitaire international ;
- L'arrêt et l'abstention de toutes actions et incitations de nature à nuire aux efforts visant à faire valoir l'esprit de fraternité et de concorde nationale ;
- L'engagement des parties à communiquer publiquement et dans un délai de 24 heures à compter de la date de signature du présent Accord, la cessation des hostilités par leurs chaines de commandement respectives ainsi qu'à la population civile.
- La cessation par les parties de toute propagande, discours de haine et de division fondées sur l'appartenance religieuse, tribale ou partisane. Les parties mettent fin aux actes d'intolérance et aux campagnes médiatiques susceptibles de provoquer la confrontation politique ou religieuse.

3 

- L'organisation d'une campagne d'information sur le contenu du présent Accord auprès de leurs adhérents et, en ce qui concerne le gouvernement, la campagne d'information visera toute la population centrafricaine.


**Article 3 :** Dès l'entrée en vigueur du présent Accord :

- a. Les Parties s'obligent à cesser toute entrave à l'exercice de l'autorité de l'Etat dans les zones où elles se trouvent notamment : les barrières illégales et les administrations parallèles.
- b. Les Parties s'engagent à s'impliquer dans le processus global de réconciliation nationale qui se poursuivra en RCA, à s'abstenir immédiatement d'entraver la libre circulation des personnes et des biens sur l'ensemble du territoire, ainsi que le travail des Forces nationales et internationales dans l'exécution de leurs mandats donnés par les différentes Résolutions des Nations Unies.
- c. Les Parties s'engagent à extirper de leurs rangs et à rapatrier tous les mercenaires afin qu'ils regagnent leur pays respectifs avec l'appui de la communauté internationale.
- d. Les parties s'engagent à renoncer à tout projet de partition de la RCA.

**Article 4 :** Tous les ex-combattants et éléments armés signataires du présent Accord doivent être regroupés dans un délai raisonnable, sous réserve de mobilisation des ressources nécessaires sur les sites à convenir d'un commun accord avec le Gouvernement de la Transition et la Communauté Internationale.

**Article 5 :** Les parties s'engagent également à :

- a. Respecter et faire respecter les droits humains ;
- b. Interdire et condamner toute violence contre les populations civiles et militaires, y compris les violences sexuelles ;
- c. Mettre en place au sein de leurs mouvements respectifs, un mécanisme de suivi des ces engagements, en portant connaissance de ces violations aux autorités compétentes, afin de lutter contre l'impunité ;
- d. Mettre fin et prévenir toutes violations commises à l'égard des enfants notamment, les actes de meurtre, de mutilations, d'exploitation des enfants, ainsi que les viols et autres violences ;
- e. Ne pas recruter des enfants comme combattants, en conformité avec la Charte Africaine des Droits et du Bien-être des enfants, la Convention sur les droits de l'enfant et le Protocole Facultatif à la Convention relative aux droits d'enfants concernant l'implication d'Enfants dans les conflits Armés.

4 

**Article 6 :** Les parties s'engagent à :

- a- Respecter la libre circulation en général, des convois humanitaires en particulier, les enclaves humanitaires, et à créer des conditions favorables pour l'assistance aux réfugiés et aux déplacés ;
- b- Promouvoir un environnement socio-sécuritaire favorable en vue de permettre le retour des réfugiés et des déplacés dans leurs communautés.

**Article 7 :** Un programme prioritaire doit être mis en place en urgence dans le but de :

- a. Créer les conditions de retour, de réinstallation et de réinsertion des personnes déplacées en raison du conflit ;
- b. Lutter contre la criminalité particulièrement celle prévue à l'article 2 ;
- c. Réhabiliter les zones affectées par le conflit.

**Article 8 :** Les parties signataires mettent en place une commission de suivi de l'application du présent Accord composée comme suit :

- 1. 01 représentant par groupe politico-militaire ;
- 2. G8 – RCA ;
- 3. 06 représentants des Institutions de la Transition (Présidence, CNT, Gouvernement).

Cette commission devra établir des sous – commissions régionales et locales, chaque fois que de besoin. En cas de nécessité, la commission de suivi de l'application du présent Accord peut faire appel à toute personne qualifiée.

**Article 9 :** En cas de différend ou de difficulté sur l'application du présent Accord, l'une ou l'autre des Parties peut avoir recours à la commission de suivi. En cas de non satisfaction, elle pourra faire recours à la Médiation Internationale.

**Article 10 :** Le présent Accord entre en vigueur dès sa signature.


*Fait à Brazzaville, le 23 Juillet 2014*




## Ont signé

### -Les ex-Combattants et Eléments armés


Pour le Front Populaire pour la Renaissance de la Centrafrique (F.P.R.C),  
Général Mohamed MOUSSA DHAFANE Ex Coalition SEVEKA

  
Pour les anti-Balaka,  
Monsieur Patrice Edouard NGAISSONA

  
Pour le Front Démocratique du Peuple Centrafricain (FDPC),  
Monsieur André Le-Gaillard RINGUI

  
Pour Révolution et Justice (RJ),  
Monsieur Armel SAYO

  
Pour le Mouvement de Libération Centrafricaine pour la Justice (MLCJ),  
Monsieur ABAKAR SABONE

  
Pour l'Union des Forces Républicaines (UFR),  
Monsieur Florian N'DJADDER BEDAY

  
Pour l'Union des Forces Républiques Fondamentales (UFRF),  
Monsieur Dieu-bénit GBEYA KIKOBET

### -En présence de :


Gouvernement de Transition :

Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, de l'Intégration Africaine et de la Francophonie,  
Son Excellence Toussaint KONGO-DOUDOU


Conseil National de Transition,  
Honorable Alexandre Ferdinand N'GUENDET




Alternative Citoyenne pour la Démocratie et la Paix (ACDP),  
Monsieur Enoch DERANT LAKOUE



Ancienne Majorité Présidentielle,  
Monsieur Laurent NGON-BABA




Groupement des Partis Politiques / Républicains Travailleurs Légalistes (GPP/RTL),  
Monsieur Bertin BEA



Union des Partis Politiques pour la Reconstruction Nationale (UPPRN),  
Pierre Abraham MBOKANI



Rassemblement des autres Partis Politiques,  
Monsieur Auguste BOUKANGA




*Président de l'URP/Union des Partis Politiques sans Plateforme*  
Monsieur Henri GOUANDIA




Personnalités Indépendantes :

- Madame Alphonsine BOGANDA-YANGONGO



- Monsieur Stève KOBA



Conseil National de la Jeunesse (CNJ),

- Monsieur Jean Félix Wulfrand RIVA



- Monsieur Abdel-Aziz AROUFAÏ



Organisation des Femmes Centrafricaines (OFCA),  
Madame Marie-Annick SERVICE



Comité Consultatif des Femmes Leaders,  
Dr. SOKAMBI DIBERT BEKOY




Haut Conseil de la Communication,  
Monsieur José Richard POUAMBI



Syndicats des Travailleurs,  
Monsieur Michel LOUDEGUE



Confédération Nationale des Agriculteurs et éleveurs,  
Madame Brigitte ANDARA




Confessions Religieuses

- Monseigneur Dieudonné NZAPALAINGA



- IMAM KOBINE LAYAMA



Conseil Inter-ONG en Centrafrique (CIONGCA),  
Monsieur Célestin NGAKOLA



Groupement Interprofessionnel en Centrafrique (GICA),  
Monsieur Giles POTOLO NGBANGANDIMBO



La Diaspora,  
Monsieur Maurice OUAMBO



Déplacés Internes,  
Monsieur Jean Claude MALABI



Communautés à Risques :

- Monsieur ATAHIROU BALLA DODO
- Madame ADJA ASTA MOUSSA



La Médiation Internationale

Pour les Nations-Unies

Le Représentant Spécial du Secrétaire Général de l'ONU en Afrique Centrale,  
Monsieur Abdoulaye BATHILY




**Pour l'Union Africaine**

**Le Vice-Médiateur,  
Monsieur SOUMAILOU BOUBEY MAIGA**



**Pour la CEEAC**

**Le Rapporteur  
Le Secrétaire Général de la CEEAC,  
Ambassadeur Ahmad ALLAM-MI,**



**Le Médiateur international**

**Le Président de la République du Congo,  
Son Excellence Monsieur Denis SASSOU N'GUESSO**



## **Annex 5: FPRC press communiqué calling for the creation of the independent state of Dar El Kouti and its government (archived at the United Nations)**

### **FRONT POPULAIRE POUR LA RENAISSANCE DE CENTRAFRIQUE**

-----  
Présidence du Bureau Politique

-----  
Secrétariat Général

DECISION N°002-14 portant création d'un nouvel Etat au Nord-est Centrafrique en scission en République Centrafricaine

La Présidence du Bureau politique du Front Populaire pour la Renaissance de Centrafrique (FPRC) ;

Vu le génocide planifié, orchestré et exécuté et la prise en otage des musulmans par les milices chrétiennes en Centrafrique après la démission négociée du Président Michel DJOTODIA lors du sommet extraordinaire de la CEEAC du 10 janvier 2014 à Ndjamena en violation des articles 13,14 alinéa 1 et 15 de la déclaration des droits de l'homme du 10 janvier 1948 ;

Vu la destruction des mosquées, des biens et habitations, les tueries, le cannibalisme, la profanation des cimetières, des corans perpétrés par les milices Anti-balaka ;

Vu l'incapacité avérée des autorités de la Transition avec l'inexistence des forces de défense capables d'assurer un minimum de sécurité et à rétablir la paix et la concorde sur la moindre partie du territoire national en violation grave de la Charte Constitutionnelle de Transition ;

Vu les capacités des nouvelles forces républicaines (Ex-Séléka) hiérarchisées et responsables de rétablir l'ordre et la paix dans sa zone de juridiction ;

Vu l'attitude du gouvernement poussant une partie de la population vers la partition de fait de la Centrafrique ;

Vu que les chrétiens et les musulmans vivent en parfaite symbiose dans les zones sous contrôle des Forces Républicaines ;

Vu la Charte des Nations-Unies et de la déclaration universelle des droits de l'homme pour le Droit de peuple à l'autodétermination de 1948;

Vu la Charte Africaine des droits de l'homme et des peuples de 1986;

Vu le communiqué final des assises de NDELE du 09 au 10 Mai 2014 sur la mise place de l'Etat Major des Forces Républicaines ;

Vu le communiqué final des assises de BIRAO du 06 au 10 juillet 2014 portant la mise en place du bureau politique de Front Populaire pour la Renaissance de Centrafrique (FPRC) ;

#### **DECIDE**

**Article 1er :** Il est créé un Etat laïc, libre et souverain situé au Nord-est de la République Centrafrique dénommé « ETAT DE DAR EL KOUTI » en scission avec la République Centrafricaine.

**Article 2 :** L'Etat de DAR EL KOUTI est dirigé par un Chef d'Etat assisté d'un Gouvernement provisoire.

**Article 3 :** Le Gouvernement provisoire sous la Haute impulsion du Chef d'Etat a pour mission de préparer un Référendum Constitutionnel d'Autodétermination en vue de la proclamation de la République indépendante et démocratique et la mise en place des institutions.

**Article 4 :** La présente Décision qui prend effet à compter de la date de sa signature sera enregistrée, notifiée à la communauté internationale et publiée partout au besoin.

**Fait à Birao le, 14 Août 2014**

Pour le bureau politique, le Vice Président

**Général NOUREDINE ADAM**

**“ETAT DE DAR EL KOUTI**  
-----  
**FRONT POPULAIRE POUR LA RENAISSANCE DE CENTRAFRIQUE**  
-----  
**Présidence du Bureau Politique**  
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DECISION N°003-14 PORTANT NOMINATION DES  
MEMBRES DU GOUVERNEMENT PROVISOIRE DE L'ETAT DE DAR EL KOUTI.  
Vu la Décision n°002-14 de 15 Août 2014 portant création de l'Etat de DAR EL KOUTI ;  
Vu le communiqué final des assises de BIRAO du 06 au 10 juillet 2014 portant la mise en place du bureau  
politique de Front Populaire pour la Renaissance de Centrafrique (FPRC) ;  
Vu le communiqué final des assises de NDELE sur la mise place de l'Etat Major des Forces Républicaines  
;  
DECIDE

**Article 1er :** Les personnalités dont les noms suivent sont nommés membres du Gouvernement Provisoire  
de l'Etat de DAR EL KOUTI.

Il s'agit de :

Chef d'Etat et du Gouvernement Provisoire : **Monsieur Michel DJOTODIA AM-NONDROKO**

Ministres d'Etat

1. Ministre d'Etat à la Défense Nationale et à la Sécurité Publique :

**Gl. NOUREDINE ADAM**

2. Ministre d'Etat à la Promotion Féminine et la Jeunesse : **Madame Elodie Mahamat TABANE**

Secrétaires d'Etat :

3. Secrétaire d'Etat aux Affaires Etrangères et au partenariat au Développement : **Monsieur Mamadou**

**Moussa DANGABO**

4. Secrétaire d'Etat au Développement Rural: **Dr HAMAT MAL-MAL Essène**

5. Secrétaire d'Etat aux Finances et au Commerce: **Monsieur Fotor ABDEL-DJOUBAR**

6. Secrétaire d'Etat à la Santé Publique et aux Actions Humanitaires: **Monsieur Haroun AMALAS**

**AMLAS**

7. Secrétaire d'Etat à l'Administration du Territoire et à la Justice : **Monsieur Marcel NGAO-LOEMBE**

8. Secrétaire d'Etat à l'Education Nationale : **Monsieur Abakar SABONE**

9. Secrétaire d'Etat aux Transports et aux Infrastructures: **Monsieur Abdoulaye ISSENE RAMADANE**

10. Secrétaire d'Etat aux Ressources Naturelles : **Gl. Ousmane Mahamat OUSMANE**

11. Secrétaire d'Etat à la Communication et aux Nouvelles Technologies: **Monsieur Awal HABILA.**

**Article 2 :** La présente Décision qui prend effet à compter de la date de sa signature sera enregistrée,  
notifiée à la communauté internationale et publiée partout au besoin sera.

**Fait à Birao le, 17 Août 2014**

Le Président du Bureau Politique

**Michel DJOTODIA AM-NONDROKO “**

**Annex 6: Photographs of former Séléka military leadership in Batangafo**  
(photographs taken by the Panel on 13 July 2014)

*Zone Commander (appointed by General Alkhatim) Colonel Mohamed Assil (right)*



*Zone Commander (appointed by General Zoundeko) Colonel Moussa Maouloud (right)*



**Annex 7: Photograph of non-local anti-balaka groups in Bambari (Ouaka province)**  
(photograph taken by the Panel on 4 July 2014)



## Annex 8: Appointment letter of former Séléka zone commander in Bambari (Ouaka province) signed by General Ali Darrassa Mahamat



Commandant de 5<sup>ème</sup> région militaire

Général ALI Darrassa Mahamat



MINISTRE DE LA DEFENSE NATIONAL  
DE LA RESTRUCTURATION DE L'ARMEE  
DES ANCIENS COMBATTANTS  
ET DES VICTIMES DE GUERRES

\*\_\*\_\*\_\*\_\*\_\*\_\*\_\*\_\*\_\*\_\*\_\*\_\*\_\*\_\*\_\*\_\*\_\*\*

ETAT MAJOR GENERAL  
DE L'ARMEE

\*\_\*\_\*\_\*\_\*\_\*\_\*\_\*\_\*\_\*\_\*\_\*\_\*\_\*\_\*\_\*\_\*\_\*\*

5<sup>EME</sup> REGION MILITAIRE

\*\_\*\_\*\_\*\_\*\_\*\_\*\_\*\_\*\_\*\_\*\_\*\_\*\_\*\_\*\_\*\_\*\_\*\*

SECRETARIAT GENERAL

N°..... /MDNRAACVG/EMGA/RM5/SG/2014

\*\_\*\_\*\_\*\_\*\_\*\_\*\_\*\_\*\_\*\_\*\_\*\_\*\_\*\_\*\_\*\_\*\_\*\*



### Décision

Décision portant nomination aux postes de responsabilité. Le Général ZAKARIA Santiago, Com-Régiment Militaire de la OUAKA.

Article I : Colonel ALI Moustapha Kotto est nommé Trésorier General à la base cour d'appel.

Article II : Colonel ADAM Mahamat Sadik est nommé Trésorier General Adjoint à la base cour d'appel.

Article III : Colonel AMADOU Bello Hissen Com-Mixte dans la ville de BAMBARI.

Article IV : Commandant YOUSOUF Com-Mixte Adjoint dans la ville de BAMBARI.

En foi de quoi la présente Décision est établi pour servir et valoir ce que de droit.

Fait à Bambari, le29/04/2014

**Le Commandant de la 5<sup>ème</sup> Région Militaire**



Commandant de 5<sup>ème</sup> région militaire

Général ALI Darrassa Mahamat



**Annex 9: Photograph of “Ben Laden” (centre) taken during a meeting with the Panel in Bambari (Ouaka province) on 3 July 2014**



**Annex 10: Names, positions and signatures of the political and military leadership of the CLPC in a document dated 18 May 2014 (archived at the United Nations)**

Les membres de la Coordination du Mouvement Antibalaka			
N°	NOM ET PRENOMS	FONCTION	EMARGEMENT
01	NGAISSONA Patrice Edouard	Coordonnateur Général	
02	NGAYA Alfred Legrand	Conseiller Politique	
03	Commandant MOKOM GAWAKA Maxime	Coordonnateur national des opérations militaires, Chef d'Etat-Major Général	
04	Commandant NAMSIO Emotion Brice	Porte-Parole Général	
05	YAGOUSSOU Sylvestre	Porte-Parole Adjoint	
Tél. : (+236),72.64.80.98 - 72.56.72.80. - 72.50.83.16. - 72.77.56.87. 72.28.46.45.			
06	Lieutenant GANAZOUI Hervé	Chef de Bataillon	
07	Commandant ANDILO NGAIBONA	Chef de Bataillon	
08	Capitaine LEBENE Thierry (12 Puissances)	Chef de Bataillon	
09	Capitaine EMTENOU Eusèbe	Chef de Bataillon	
10	Commandant ZONI Alain	Chef de Bataillon	
11	Commandant ANGA Charles	Commandant de Compagnie	
12	Commandant OUAPOUTOU Benjamin	Chef de Bataillon	
13	Capitaine DEHOLO Marcellin	Chef de Bataillon	
14	Commandant YADJOUNGOU Gustave	Chef de Bataillon	
15	Lieutenant DENAMGANAI Aimé Abel	Chef de Bataillon	
16	Lieutenant YAKOUZOU Bernard	Chef de Bataillon	
17	Sergent BAKAFE Aristide	Chef de Bataillon	
18	Commandant MAHANI Constant	Chef de Bataillon	
19	Sergent YAORE Ange Anicet	Chef de Bataillon	


20	Commandant MAZIMBELET Guy	Chef de Bataillon	<i>[Signature]</i>
21	Commandant YADJOUNGOU Gustave Guy	Chef de Bataillon	<i>[Signature]</i>
22	Lieutenant KONATE Yvon	Chef de Bataillon	<i>[Signature]</i>
23	Commandant BEJOUANE Richard	Chef de Bataillon	<i>[Signature]</i>
24	Commandant BOZANDO Richard	Chef de Bataillon	PO <i>[Signature]</i>
25	Sergent KEANSSEM Séraphin	Chef de Section	<i>[Signature]</i>
26	Sergent MOKPEM Guy Gervais	Chef de Bataillon	<i>[Signature]</i>
27	Lieutenant DONOH Yvon	Chef de bataillon	<i>[Signature]</i>
28	BEOROFEI Sylvain	Chef de bataillon	<i>[Signature]</i>
29	Gend. BERKAI HOURONTI Dieudonné	Chef de bataillon	PO <i>[Signature]</i>
30	Caporal Chef OROFEI Patrick	Commandant de Compagnie	<i>[Signature]</i>


Tel : (+236) 72.64.80.98 - 72.56.72.80. - 72.50.83.16. - 72.77.56.87. 72.28.46.45.

31	Commandant YANOUE Gabin	Chef de Bataillon OCRB Damala	PO <i>[Signature]</i>
32	Lieutenant ANDILOGOA Giscard	Chef de Bataillon	<i>[Signature]</i>
33	Commandant INGA Gabin	Chef de Bataillon	PO <i>[Signature]</i>
34	Capitaine YADOUNGOU Rodrigue	Chef de Bataillon	<i>[Signature]</i>
35	Capitaine SAMI Urbain	Chef de Bataillon	<i>[Signature]</i>
36	Capitaine GOLOKETE Guy	Chef de Bataillon	<i>[Signature]</i>



**Annex 11: Appointment letters signed by Patrice Edouard Ngaïssona of Soussou Abib (a.k.a. Soussou Habib) as acting regional coordinator and Rodrigue Karamokonzi as acting zone commander in Boda on 28 June 2014 (Lobaye province), and confirmation letter of their appointment on 8 July 2014 (archived at the United Nations)**





Messieurs SENDE - Régis - Maurice et Sieur BOKOTO - Maxime  
sont nos portés parole.

Et voici comment le bureau sous-préfectoral des Anti  
BALAKA de Boda est formé. Le bureau général prend vingt  
personnes qui vont être tout de suite cités.

Coordonateur Sous-Préfectoral	SOUSSOU - Habib
Coordonateur S/P adjoint	DOBO - Aimé
Commandant de Zone	KARAMOKONDJI - Vision - Roch
Commandant de Zone adjoint	KOTTE - Aimé - Jacques
Chief d'état Major	BALE - Kossi - Jacques
Chief d'état Major adjoint	NGOUMBARA - Marc
Secrétaire Général	NOUASSOUM - Felix
Secrétaire Général Adjoint	KALOUA - Margos - Eric
Treasorier Général	KEBE - Ibrahim
Treasorier Général Adjoint	YAMINI - Hypolyte
Commissaire aux Comptes	GOUMOURDU - Perpetue
Porte Parole	SENDE - Régis - Maurice
Porte Parole Adjoint	BOKOTO - Maxime
Protocoles	LOSSE - Eric ; BEKAI - Christ SANZE - Paternice
Conseillers	VENETOUGBOU - Patrice ; NGDUI - Thomas ; GRANGALE - Alpha et BELLET - Patrice


Après la présentation faite, certaines remarques ont été faites.  
Chaque chef pour la mauvaise conduite soulignée dans leurs comptes.

Et en fin la parole est donnée au pasteur ancien parois  
pour la prière de clôture de la dite réunion.

Fait à Boda le 08-07-2014

Bureau Sous-Préfectoral des Anti -  
BALAKA de Boda -

le Commandant de zone

  
M. KARAMOKONDI

**Annex 12: CLPC decision number 1 expelling Léopold Narcisse Bara (archived at the United Nations)**



**Annex 13: Press communiqué announcing the appointment of Sébastien Wénézoui as deputy general coordinator of the CLPC (archived at the United Nations)**



**Annex 14: Composition of the steering committee appointed by the transitional Prime Minister on 28 August 2014, as per the cessation of hostilities agreement signed in Brazzaville on 23 July 2014**

**Article 3** : La Commission est composée comme suit :

**I/INSTITUTIONS DE LA TRANSITION**

- **Présidence de la République** :
  - Madame Léonie BANGA- BOTHY, Ministre Conseiller Diplomatique ;
  - Monsieur Léon DIBERET, Ministre Conseiller en matière d'administration du Territoire
- **Conseil National de Transition** :
  - Madame Léa KOYASSOUM DOUMTA, Vice-présidente ;
  - Monsieur Gaëtan Rock MOLOTO KENGUEMBA, Conseiller National ;
- **Gouvernement** :
  - Madame Marie Noëlle KOYARA, Ministre d'Etat en charge des Travaux Publics, de l'Équipement et de l'Aménagement du Territoire ;
  - Général de Brigade MINTEKOE Thierry Marie, Ministre de la Sécurité Publique et de l'Émigration-Immigration;

**II/ GROUPES POLITICO-MILITAIRES :**

- Ex-Coalition Seleka : Moustapha SABONE
- Anti-Balaka : Salomon FEIGANAZOUI
- Front Démocratique du Peuple Centrafricain (FDPC) : ADAM Ousmane
- Révolution et Justice (RJ): Colonel Laurent DIM-WOEI ;
- Mouvement de Libération Centrafricaine pour la Justice (MLCJ): Eloge KOÏ ;
- Union des Forces Républicaines (UFR) : Florian François N'DJADDER BEDAYA ;
- Union des Forces Républicaines Fondamentales (UFRF) : Askin NZENGUE- LANZA

**III/ COMMUNAUTE INTERNATIONALE** : Tous les membres du G8-RCA

**Article 4** : La Commission de suivi se réunit une fois par semaine et chaque fois que de besoin sur convocation de sa Présidence.

**Article 6** : Le présent arrêté, qui prend effet pour compter de la date de sa Signature, sera publié partout où besoin sera.

The image shows the official seal of the Central African Republic, which is circular and contains the text 'REPUBLIQUE CENTRAFRICAINE' at the top and 'UNITE - DIGNITE - PROGRES' at the bottom. In the center of the seal is the national emblem. To the right of the seal is a handwritten signature in black ink, which appears to be 'Mahamat KAMOUN'. Below the signature, the name 'Mahamat KAMOUN' is printed in a bold, sans-serif font.

**Annex 15: Unsigned press communiqué from the *Coordination politique provisoire* of the former Séléka announcing the Birao conference**

RÉPUBLIQUE CENTRAFRICAINE  
UNITÉ-DIGNITÉ-TRAVAIL



Séléka

**COMMUNIQUE 001/CS/CP/AG. 14**

La Coordination Politique Provisoire de la Coalition Séléka tient à informer l'opinion nationale et internationale que la Coalition tient son Assemblée Générale du 07 au 08 juillet 2014 à Birao.

C'est dans l'esprit de solidarité et d'unité, qui caractérise la coalition, que se tiendra ladite assemblée afin de mettre en place un Bureau Politique National, interlocuteur valable et légitime sur les plans national et international.

Ce dernier sera investi de la mission de préparation des différentes mutations internes en vue de participer à la construction de la paix, la sécurité, la bonne gouvernance, la démocratie et la justice sociale, condition sine qua none du développement durable de notre pays, la République Centrafricaine.

Les délégués de Bangui, Bambari, Bria, kagabandoro, Ndélé et ceux de la diaspora sont attendus à Birao dans la journée du lundi 07 juillet 2014.

La Coordination prie tous les destinataires du présent communiqué d'en faire large diffusion.

Fait à Bangui, le 06 juillet 2014  
Pour la Coordination Politique Provisoire



**Annex 16: Final communiqué of the first general assembly of the political leadership of the *Front Populaire pour la Renaissance de Centrafrique* (FPRC – Popular front for the rebirth of the Central African Republic) (archived at the United Nations)**

**COMMUNIQUE FINAL**

**DE LA PREMIÈRE ASSEMBLÉE GÉNÉRALE DES CADRES POLITIQUES DU FRONT POPULAIRE POUR LA RENAISSANCE DE CENTRAFRIQUE (FPRC) TENUE À BIRAO**

Du 06 au 10 juillet 2014, s'est tenue à Birao la première Assemblée Générale du Front Populaire pour la Renaissance de Centrafrique (FPRC) sous la Présidence du Général Mahamat Nouradine ADAM, Premier vice Président de l'ex-coalition séléka.

Ont pris part à ces assises les personnalités politiques ci-après :

Le Général Mohammed Moussa DHAFFANE; le Ministre d'Etat DJONO AHABA Herbert Gontran; le Général DAMANE Zakaria; le Général ISSA ISSAKA Aubin; le Général ABDELKARIM Moussa; le Général BABA Issène, Chef de mission de l'Etat Major des Forces Républicaines ; le Général ACHAFI DAOUD; le Général YAYA Bourma; le Général MAHAMATKER; le Général Nama Hamat DAGACHE; Messieurs les Ministres; les Conseillers Nationaux de Transition; les Sultans de la Vakaga et du Bamingui Bangoran; les leaders communautaires; les Cadres musulmans ; les Conseillers Municipaux.

L'objectif est d'évaluer la crise actuelle et redéfinir une nouvelle orientation politique du mouvement.

Les points suivants ont fait l'objet d'examen :

- 1- Le compte rendu des activités de la coordination politique provisoire ;
- 2- L'adoption des textes de base ;
- 3- La mise en place du bureau politique ;
- 4- Le forum de Brazzaville.

A l'issue de cette Assemblée Générale, il a été arrêté ce qui suit :

1

5



### 1. Du compte rendu des activités de la coordination provisoire

Les participants ont pris acte de ce compte rendu et ont félicité la coordination politique provisoire de leurs efforts.

### 2. De l'adoption des textes de base

L'assemblée générale a entériné la dissolution de la coalition Séléka et a donné le nom du nouveau mouvement qui s'appelle **Front Populaire pour la Renaissance de Centrafrique (FPRC)**. En examinant les textes, les participants ont apporté des amendements tant qu'à la forme qu'au fond. C'est ainsi que la validation des textes a été reportée à une assemblée générale extraordinaire qui sera convoquée par le bureau politique.

### 3. De la mise en place du Bureau politique

Les participants ont passé en revue les maux qui sont à l'origine de la divergence entre les Cadres politiques de FPRC et se sont accordés pour désigner les différentes personnalités aux postes suivants :

- Président : **Michel DJOTODIA AM NONDROKO**
- 1<sup>er</sup> vice-président chargé des questions de défense et de sécurité : **Gl. Mahamat Nouradine ADAM**
- 2<sup>ème</sup> vice-président chargé de logistique et de l'administration : **Gl. Mohamed Moussa DHAFFANE**
- 3<sup>ème</sup> vice-président chargé des questions économiques et financières : **Mahamat TAÏB YACOUB**
- Conseiller chargé Désarmement, Démobilisation Réinsertion (DDR) : **Abdoulaye Issène RAMADANE**
- Conseiller chargé de Défense globale : **Gl. Damane ZAKARIA**
- Conseiller chargé de la culture civique et de la formation : **Ousmane Mahamat OUSMANE**
- Secrétaire Général : **Moustapha SABOUNE**
- Secrétaire Général Adjoint : **Hamat MAL-MAL ESSENE**
- Trésorier Général : **Sélémane Oumar GARBA**
- Trésorier Général Adjoint : **Djouma NDJAHA**
- 1<sup>er</sup> Commissaire aux comptes : **Gilbert TOUMOU DEYA**

- 2<sup>ème</sup> Commissaire aux comptes : **Assane BOUBA ALI**
- Délégué chargé des relations extérieures : **Eric Neris MASSI**
- Délégué chargé des affaires juridiques : **Mamadou Moussa DANGABOU**
- Délégué chargé des affaires politiques : **Mahamat ABRASS**
- Délégué chargé de la mobilisation des ressources financières : **Haroun Amalas AMLAS**
- Délégué chargé des projets de développement : **Rizigala RAMADANE**
- Délégué chargé de la promotion féminine : **Elodie TABANE MAHAMAT**
- Délégué chargé des affaires sociales et culturelles : **Abakar MOUSTAPHA**
- Délégué chargé de la jeunesse : **Ibrahim Sallet HAMIT**
- Délégué chargé des médias et des nouvelles technologies : **Mahamat Ahamat SEID**
- Délégué Adjoint chargé des médias et nouvelles technologies : **Ousmane ABAKAR**
- Délégué Europe : **Sabi MANDJO** :
- Délégué Amérique : **Abidine ABDYOU**
- Délégué Asie : **Ibrahim OUSMANE**
- Délégué Afrique et monde Arabe : **Salehou NDIAYE**
- Porte-parole : **Awal HABILA**

A l'issue de la mise en place de ce nouveau bureau, les participants ont donné des orientations claires aux nouveaux membres afin de prendre leur responsabilité face aux défis qui les attendent.

#### 4. De la participation de Front Populaire pour la Renaissance de Centrafrique (FPRC) au prochain forum de Brazzaville

Les Cadres politiques de FPRC s'adhèrent et se félicitent de l'initiative des Chefs d'Etat au 23<sup>ème</sup> Sommet de l'Union Africaine tenue à Malabo pour la tenue d'un forum à Brazzaville relative à la crise Centrafricaine.

Cependant, le Rapport des Nations Unies soutenu par l'Union Africaine précise en substance : «les milices chrétiennes anti-balaka sont des voyous et des bandits de grand chemin et méritent d'être traitées par les organisations Internationales comme tel..... ».

*A*

Cette question nécessite une large consultation car les véritables victimes sont les populations civiles musulmane et chrétienne assimilées.

Toutes fois, le bureau politique est mandaté pour apprécier l'opportunité de participer à ce forum.

Les participants ont constaté avec amertume la partialité des Nations-Unies à travers le BINUCA et les forces françaises de l'opération SANGARIS qui n'ont pas réagi devant les actes de destruction des habitations, des mosquées et Corans, l'anthropophagie et la profanation des corps des musulmans.

Les participants ont également noté l'incapacité des forces étrangères à protéger les musulmans après la démission du Président Michel DJOTODIA. Cela rejoint la déclaration solennelle de la Présidente de Transition fait au cours de sa visite officielle pendant le mois de février 2014 à Ndjamena qui affirmait « qu'elle n'avait pas les moyens de protéger les musulmans », les persécutions du gouvernement contre les fonctionnaires musulmans et le non-respect des Accords de NDJAMENA.

Après avoir épuisé les points inscrits à l'ordre du jour, l'assemblée générale a adressé ses vifs remerciements à la MISACA, au Président de la Délégation spéciale auprès de la commune de Ridina, à sa Majesté, le Sultan de la Vakaga et aux populations de Birao pour son accueil fraternel et son aimable hospitalité.

Enfin, à l'unanimité les participants ont adopté le présent communiqué final et les recommandations des travaux de la première Assemblée Générale des cadres politiques de Front Populaire pour la Renaissance de Centrafrique (FPRC) jointes en annexe.

Fait à Birao le, 10 juillet 2014

Le Rapporteur Général



Amit IDRIS

Le Président du comité d'organisation



Fotor ABDEL-DJOUBAR

**Annex 17: Photographs of Brigadier General Alkhatim and his forces posted on the Facebook profile of a prominent former Séléka General on 14 August 2014**



*In the photograph below, two fighters, just behind General Alkhatim, are covering up their faces with a traditional headscarf of the nomadic tribes of Chad and Sudan; the green vehicle Nissan Patrol in the back bears registration plates of Bangui*



**Annex 18: Screenshots of a video presenting *Révolution et Justice* during which “General” François Toussaint (wearing black clothes and with white hair) takes over the command of the group from Armel Sayo**



**Annex 19: Photograph of LRA district commander (COMDR) Captain Okollo Palutaka and former Séléka COMDR Colonel Ahmed Sherif allegedly taken on 20 February 2014 in the region of Nzako (Mbomou province)**



LRA COMDR  
PALUTAKA

Col Ahamed Sherif  
SELEKA COMDR

20/02/2014 15:47

## Annex 20: Press release by the Belgian Federal Public Service concerning the seizure of diamonds in Antwerp in May 2014



### FPS Economy discovers shipment of potential conflict diamonds from the Central African Republic

**Brussels, 6 June 2014** – In the Antwerp Diamond Office, the FPS Economy discovered a suspicious shipment of rough diamonds that could potentially originate from the Central African Republic (CAR), where a civil war is raging. Already in June 2013, the Kimberley Process (KP), the global control mechanism on rough diamond production, issued a ban on diamonds originating from CAR.

Two weeks ago, during the physical inspection of imports and exports by the experts of the FPS Economy, a suspicious shipment of rough diamonds was discovered. Upon request of the Belgian KP authority, the FPS Economy, the KP Working Group of Diamond Experts was immediately asked to advise, comparing digital images of the shipment and images of the CAR footprint, concluding there is a high probability that the shipment of rough diamonds originates from CAR. The FPS Economy immediately notified the judicial authorities.

The European Commission appointed the FPS Economy as the official authority charged with controlling the international Kimberley Process Certification Scheme requirements on rough diamonds. The KP is a unique cooperation between governments, industry and civil society controlling the worldwide rough diamond production. One of those requirements states that each shipment of rough diamonds that is exported or imported worldwide needs to be accompanied by a valid Kimberley Certificate, issued by an officially authorized body in one of the KP participating countries.

Apart from physical controls, the Diamond Office also applies increased vigilance towards suspicious shipments of rough diamonds that show resemblance to the so-called footprint of CAR, which is a typology (describing characteristics such as color, assortment and type) compiled by a KP team of diamond experts. Due to this increased vigilance, the FPS Economy was able to detect this suspicious shipment of rough diamonds.

*Press release issued by the Belgian Federal Public Service Economy*

<http://economie.fgov.be/en/>

## Annex 21: Email dated 23 May 2014 from the KP Working Group of Diamond Experts to Belgian Federal Authorities

Dear [REDACTED]  
Dear [REDACTED]

Thank you very much for the enhanced vigilance your services apply to checking parcels of incoming rough diamonds with the CAR footprint that the WGDE has provided. I welcome this request for technical assistance to the WGDE in comparing digital pictures of the diamonds in these parcels with the production footprint of CAR, and we are happy to provide you with our expert opinion on this.

After careful examination and consultation, based on morphological and quality features and size distribution of the diamonds pictured, we come to following observations:

1. The rough diamonds pictured display characteristics typical of alluvial (non-kimberlitic) sources.
2. The rough diamonds pictured are close to an artisanal, alluvial (unsorted) run-of-mine and seem to be arriving from the same or from very similar (proximate) production zones.
3. The rough diamonds pictured coincide with the listed characteristics of the rough diamond production from CAR as represented in the footprint provided by the WGDE and archived digital pictures of parcels of CAR diamonds available from previous legitimate imports (before May 2013).
4. Some of the rough diamonds in the pictures of the apprehended parcels display characteristics typical of Nola in the Western diamond production zone in CAR, whereas other models are characteristic of Sam Ouandja and Bria in the Eastern production zones of CAR.
5. The rough diamonds pictured do not show characteristics typical of a Kisangani-origin (DRC) that could sometimes be mistaken with the CAR footprint.

In conclusion, we believe that the presented digital pictures display rough diamonds that coincide with the characteristics of rough diamonds from CAR as detailed in the CAR production footprint made available by the WGDE. Based on objective scientific scrutiny, it is therefore possible to attribute with a high level of probability, a CAR origin to these pictured rough diamonds.

Hoping that this information proves valuable in your endeavours to stop conflict diamonds from being mixed with diamonds from legitimate sources.

Kind regards,

[REDACTED]



**Annex 22: Letter dated 4 September 2014 from Kardiam in response to information request of the Panel concerning the seizure of diamonds in Antwerp in May 2014**



Hoveniersstraat 30, bus 145  
2018 Antwerpen  
BELGIQUE  
☎ : 32-3-231.05.21  
☎ : 32-3-233.18.39  
E-MAIL : kardiam.bvba@skynet.be

Antwerp, the 4th of September 2014

Through the Secretary of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 2127 (2013) concerning the Central African Republic  
Mr David Biggs  
United Nations Plaza  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

UN Panel of Experts on the CAR  
Attn. Mr Aurélie Llorca  
Coordinator

Kardiam bvba herewith provides the Panel with the required information:

1.  
Diamonds seized in Antwerp by Belgian authorities in May / June 2014 being initially sent to Kardiam:

Ditrex Diamonds DMCC (Dubai – U.A.E.)

Shipment rough diamonds	2.703,46 carat	KPC AE 41061	22-05-2014
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Reya Diam DMCC (Dubai – U.A.E.)

Shipment rough diamonds	3.397,40 carat	KPC AE 41066	22-05-2014
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Shipment rough diamonds	533,69 carat	KPC AE 41205	01-06-2014
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2.  
Kardiam bvba, the company's directors and the company's personnel have had no knowledge and/or have not been in any way involved in (a) and/or (b).

Kardiam bvba and the company's directors are not in a position to give any further comment or explanation on the ongoing judicial investigation.

  
Abdoul Karim Dan – Azumi  
Gérant – Director

**Kardiam** B.V.B.A.  
Hoveniersstraat 30 - bus 145  
2018 ANTWERPEN  
Tel. (03) 231 05 21

## Annex 23: JCK article including statement on the provenance of diamonds seized in Antwerp<sup>1</sup>



### Dubai Under Fire

By Rob Bates, News Director

Posted on July 2, 2014

In the past decade, the growth of Dubai as a diamond center has been phenomenal—more than \$40 billion in diamonds are now traded in the most populated city in the United Arab Emirates, up from \$5 billion less than a decade ago. The reasons are obvious: It offers traders a free-trade zone with no taxes on imports and exports, backed by a government that tries not to interfere with business. By contrast, rival Antwerp has had to cope with now-lifted sanctions on Marange diamonds, [and faces](#) a possible E.U. prohibition on Russian gems. Dubai has none of those concerns.

But in the last month, the desert city known for its 90-degree temperatures has faced a different kind of heat over just how laissez-faire its oversight is. Last month, Antwerp World Diamond Centre, the Belgian industry group, [announced](#) it had seized a parcel of diamonds from the Central African Republic—gems that are banned by the Kimberley Process. That parcel came from Dubai. And while the AWDC did not name its rival in its statement, it pointedly referenced CAR diamonds receiving “forged KP certificates that are insufficiently controlled via other diamond hubs.”

Peter Meeus, chairman of the Dubai Diamond Exchange (and former CEO of the AWDC), tells *JCK* that Dubai received the parcel from the Democratic Republic of Congo with a valid KP certificate. He says local experts perform physical inspections on every parcel but this certificate did not raise questions. And while Antwerp authorities told him the shipment came from a trader known to deal in CAR goods and matched a “digital footprint” of goods from that country (and apparently contained the same volume of goods as previous legal CAR exports by that trader), he is not convinced of its provenance.

“It is not such a clear-cut case,” he says. “We showed the pictures to many people, and it could be Guinea, it could be South Africa, it could be many places.”

He notes his center does not have access to the same digital images that Belgium has, but Dubai is willing to take the lead on developing a digital database to identify problem goods...

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<sup>1</sup> Accessed on 28 August 2014 at <http://www.jckonline.com/blogs/cutting-remarks/2014/07/02/dubai-under-fire>

**Annex 24: Kimberley certificate for a direct shipment from Afrogem to Ditrex Diamonds that entered into the shipment to Kardiam seized in Antwerp in May 2014, and Expertise document showing the name of the trader, Louay Charara, on behalf of whom diamonds were exported**

**REPUBLIQUE DEMOCRATIQUE DU CONGO**

**CD 013720**

**MINISTRE DES MINES**  
**CENTRE D'EVALUATION, D'EXPERTISE ET DE CERTIFICATION**

**Produit : DIAMANT BRUT**

**CERTIFICAT DU PROCESSUS DE KIMBERLEY**  
*KIMBERLEY PROCESS CERTIFICATE*

Nom et adresse du destinataire ..... **DITREX DIAMONDS DMCC** .....  
Name and address of consignee  
 ..... **ALMAS TOWER 34 F DUBAI / U.a.e** .....

Nous certifions que le chargement n° **AP0/039/14** originaire de ..... **R.D. CONGO** .....  
This is to certify that shipment n° ..... originating from  
 exporté par ..... **AFROGEM** ..... détenteur(trice) de la licence  
exported by ..... holder of exporters licence  
 d'exportation n° ..... contenant ..... **24** ..... lots de diamant brut a été  
n° ..... containing ..... parcels of rough (uncut) diamonds was  
 évalué par le CEEC à la date du **25 avril 2014** Date d'expiration: le ..... **09 mai 2014** .....  
valued by the CEEC on: ..... The date of expiry: .....

**SOUS L'AUTORITE DE LA REPUBLIQUE DEMOCRATIQUE DU CONGO**  
Under the Authority of the Democratic Republic of Congo

Code S.H.	TOTAL CARATS	TOTAL DOLLARS US
7102.21	765.586,31	62.455,47
7102.31	2.284,18	102.603,65

Délivré à Kinshasa, République Démocratique du Congo  
Issued in Kinshasa, Democratic Republic of Congo

**DIRECTION GENERALE**  
CEEC

**MINISTRE DES MINES**

The rough diamonds in this shipment have been handled in accordance with the provisions of the Kimberley Process international certification scheme for rough diamonds

Les diamants bruts concernés dans ce chargement ont été traités conformément aux dispositions du système International de délivrance de certificats pour les diamants bruts du Processus de Kimberley

**CD 013720**

**IMPORT CONFIRMATION**  
**CERTIFICATE**  
**CERTIFICAT DE CONFIRMATION**  
**D'IMPORTATION**

This is to certify that the hereby certified product was imported into  
UAE  
 and that the import has been checked and verified in compliance with all rules and regulations concerning the certificate of origin  
DRC  
 For the Importing Authorities,

Other Authority (specify)  
 to be returned to  
 Centre d'Evaluation,  
 d'Expertise et de Certification,  
 17th floor, BCDC Tower,  
 Boulevard du 30 Juin, Kinshasa,  
 Democratic Republic of Congo

# CLEAR DIAMOND SPRL

NRC : KG/9989/M, Id. Nat : 01-118-N61214P, n° Impôt : A1107059L

Siège social : Avenue Mongala n° 3, Kinshasa / Gombe

DATE : 18-avr-14

AFROGEM

LOUAY CHARARA

COLIS N° 272/04/2014

FACTURE N° 1301189

CODE CLIENT : 4100050

Lot	Qualité	Carats	PRIX FC	%	TOTAL FC
1301189	T1 MB -15+11MB	187,35	604	0	113.253
1301189	T1Zs (4/4) (0,90 - 1,19)	17,21	604	0	10.403
1301189	T1 Zs (5/4) ( 1,20 - 1,39)	40,20	604	0	24.301
1301189	T1 ZS ( 6/4) ( 1,40 - 1,79)	21,76	604	0	13.154
1301189	T1 MBS ( 3/4) ( 0,70 - 0,89)	37,74	604	0	22.814
1301189	T1 MB -21+15 MB	114,17	604	0	69.016
1301189	T1 MBS (8/4) ( 1,80 - 2,79)	8,05	604	0	4.866
1301189	T1 Z -11+6	73,45	604	0	44.401
1301189	T1 Z -15+11	29,97	604	0	18.117
1301189	T1 Z -21+15	25,08	604	0	15.161
1301189	T1 -6 GEM	1.177,80	604	0	711.980
1301189	T1 MBS -11+6	534,70	604	0	323.226
1301189	T2 REJECT -6	600,40	260	0	156.344
1301189	T2 REJECT +6-11	700,35	260	0	182.371
1301189	T2 REJECT +11-15	317,48	260	0	82.672
1301189	T2 CLIVAGE ( 3/4)	51,02	512	0	26.097
1301189	T2 INDUSTRIALS -6	899,80	260	0	234.308
1301189	T2 INDUSTRIALS -6	173,90	260	0	45.284
1301189	T2 INDUSTRIALS +6-11	576,15	260	0	150.029
1301189	T2 MIXTE (4/4)	30,79	260	0	8.018
1301189	T3 BOART -6	23.661,20	56	0	1.320.295
1301189	T3 BOART +6-11	226,60	56	0	12.644
1301189	T3 BOART +11-15	23.659,40	56	0	1.320.194
1301189	T3 BOART +15-21	14.732,45	56	0	822.071
Poids total :		67.897,02			

TOTAL FC: 5.731.018

TVA FC: 0

TOTAL A PAYER FC: 5.731.018

VA : Exemption aux exportateurs de diamant

Ref: 6.162,39

Arrêté Ministériel 533/CAB.MIN.MINES/01/2008 et 275/CAB.MIN/FINANCES du 2 décembre 2008

Compte :

[REDACTED]



## Annex 25: Sample of Badica's purchasing records (BECDOR)<sup>2</sup> for Bria and Sam-Ouandja

BADICA RELEVÉ DES BORDEREAUX D'ACHAT DIAMANT								
BUREAU D'ACHAT :				BRIA				
NOM DE L'ACHÉTEUR :				JOSE FERREIRA				
PÉRIODE D'ACHAT :				DU 10-02 au 07-03-2014				
NUMÉRO ET DATE EXPORT :				08/03/2014				
Date	N° Bord	Nom(s) & Prénom(s)	Titre	N° Carnet	Prov	Poids	Valeur en CFA	TAXE 3%
10/02/2014	12366	BASSAM	COL	HK026/13	HK	14,06	400 000	12 000
11/02/2014	12367	MOULAY	COL	HK0100/13	HK	10,85	350 000	10 500
16/02/2014	12368	SOULEYMANE	COL	HK050/13	HK	30,47	600 000	18 000
17/02/2014	12369	GOMEZ	ART		HK	0,75	40 000	1 200
18/02/2014	12370	HAMED MOHAMED	COL	HK024/13	HK	52,10	5 500 000	165 000
	12371	JEAN	ART		HK	2,55	500 000	15 000
22/02/2014	12372	ALI MALAM	ART		HK	1,56	50 000	1 500
	12373	KASSIM	ART		HK	5,00	700 000	21 000
26/02/2014	12374	HASSAN AL SABBAGH	COL	MK015/13	HK	5,94	3 000 000	90 000
	12375	MORDUMA RIGOBERT	COL	BB001/13	HK	16,77	1 000 000	30 000
27/02/2014	12376	MAHAMAT	ART		HK	3,57	250 000	7 500
	12377	HAMED MOHAMED	COL	HK024/13	HK	81,00	4 700 000	141 000
01/03/2014	12378	YAYA	ART		HK	1,10	100 000	3 000
	12379	JEAN	ART		HK	3,60	300 000	9 000
	12380	HASSAN AL SABBAGH	COL	MK015/13	HK	194,24	11 000 000	330 000
03/03/2014	12381	JEAN PIERRE KOLIKO	ART		HK	16,00	800 000	24 000
04/03/2014	12382	MAHAMAT ABDEL	COL	MB07/13	HK	6,57	700 000	21 000
05/03/2014	12383	MORDUMA RIGOBERT	COL	BB001/13	HK	3,16	1 500 000	45 000
	12384	HISSEN ABDELKARIM	ART		HK	4,14	125 000	3 750
07/03/2014	12385	HASSAN AL SABBAGH	COL	MK015/13	HK	19,56	3 300 000	99 000
	12386	NOUR	ART		HK	87,42	5 000 000	150 000
	12387	ABASS	ART		HK	75,57	4 750 000	142 500
<b>TOTAL</b>						633,98	44 445 000	1 333 350

BADICA RELEVÉ DES BORDEREAUX D'ACHAT DIAMANT								
BUREAU D'ACHAT :				SAM				
NOM DE L'ACHÉTEUR :				EPAYE SHERIF				
PÉRIODE D'ACHAT :				DU 14-04 au 18-04-2014				
NUMÉRO ET DATE EXPORT :				20/04/2014				
Date	N° Bord	Nom(s) & Prénom(s)	Titre	N° Carnet	Prov	Poids	Valeur en CFA	TAXE 3%
14/04/2014	15864	DANDARA	ART		HK	8,29	600 000	18 000
15/04/2014	15865	ALI MOUSSA	ART		HK	3,37	1 340 000	40 200
18/04/2014	15866	MAHAMAT	ART		HK	28,75	1 500 000	45 000
	15867	ABEDL	ART		HK	27,93	15 000 000	450 000
<b>TOTAL</b>						68,34	18 440 000	553 200




BADICA RELEVÉ DES BORDEREAUX D'ACHAT DIAMANT								
BUREAU D'ACHAT :				SAM				
NOM DE L'ACHÉTEUR :				SHERIF EPAYE				
PÉRIODE D'ACHAT :				22 - 04 - 2014 au 20 - 06 - 2014				
NUMÉRO ET DATE EXPORT :								
Date	N° Bord	Nom(s) & Prénom(s)	Titre	N° Carnet	Prov	Poids	Valeur en CFA	TAXE 3%
22/04/2014	15868	IBRAHIM ABDERAMANE	ART		HK	4,38	600 000	18 000
02/05/2014	15869	ABOUBAKAR SIDIKI	COL	BG003/14	HK	25,67	2 000 000	60 000
29/05/2014	15870	ALI	ART		HK	2,98	325 000	9 750
29/05/2014	15871	PAPA SYLLA	ART		HK	2,15	400 000	12 000
08/06/2014	15872	ALI	ART		HK	0,62	22 000	660
17/06/2014	15873	IZADINE TAHIR	ART		HK	18,45	1 550 000	46 500
20/06/2014	15874	MAHAMAT	ART		HK	36,06	3 000 000	90 000
<b>TOTAL</b>						90,31	7 897 000	236 910

<sup>2</sup> Bureau d'évaluation et de contrôle du diamant et de l'or.

Annex 26: Flight record from Berbérati airport of Minair flying for Sangaris

(06) FF  
ZCZC  
FEFTZTX 24/0709  
FEFFZPX  
(Dép UN0575H FF 0702 FP) Reg = 0804  
(01) FF  
FEFTZTX 27/0811  
FEFFZPX  
(FPL TLAE i/M  
LAND S/C  
FF 0900  
NO160 F100 DCT FEFO/NO160 F070 DCT FH  
NO160 F080 DCT  
FF 0900 F1/H  
OPR/ MINAIR FOR SANGARIS RMR FO 1045/1045  
FH 1235/1335 FF 1355) Reg = 0905

**Annex 27: Satellite imagery showing increased mining activity near Sam-Ouandja<sup>3</sup>**



<sup>3</sup> Satellite imagery provided by the Kimberley Process participant country, archived at the United Nations.

**Annex 28: Purchasing records (BECDOR)<sup>4</sup> for Sodiam showing diamond purchases from Hassan Fawaz, Bassem Bahim and Moussa (Jacob)<sup>5</sup>**

Relevé de Bordereaux d'achats D'OR  
Bureau d'Achat: Sodiam Exportation 00/00/2014  
Centre: BANGUI-BERBERATI

21/05/2014	14001	Serge	Art	4,13	100 000
21/05/2014	14002	Simon	Art	4,83	200 000
21/05/2014	14003	Alire	Art	4,06	200 000
23/05/2014	14004	Bergé	Art	3,16	1 000 000
24/05/2014	14005	Makata	Mk/004	9,30	1 300 000
26/05/2014	14006	Morez	Art	3,70	300 000
27/05/2014	14007	Makata	Mk/004	4,31	1 000 000
28/05/2014	14008	Wani Gaston	Art	2,16	20 000
28/05/2014	14009	Benjamin	Art	1,02	100 000
30/05/2014	14010	Nakoge	Art	1,40	160 000
01/06/2014	14011	René	Art	2,00	73 000
02/06/2014	14012	Hassan Fawaz	Mk/001	130,20	2 000 000
04/06/2014	14013	Betta Jonas	Art	2,04	140 000
05/06/2014	14014	Moundi	Art	1,04	175 000
06/06/2014	14015	Moundi	Art	6,01	240 000
06/06/2014	14016	Herman	Art	1,04	82 000
07/06/2014	14017	Antoine	Art	1,41	70 000
07/06/2014	14018	Hassan Fawaz	Mk/001	30,14	2 000 000
07/06/2014	14019	Hassan Fawaz	Mk/001	30,25	1 000 000
08/06/2014	14020	Hassan Fawaz	Mk/001	14,34	1 000 000
08/06/2014	14021	Charles	Art	5,82	238 000
08/06/2014	14022	Serges	Art	1,76	90 000
08/06/2014	14023	Moundi	Art	4,10	190 000
09/06/2014	14025	Moundi	Art	5,42	270 000
10/06/2014	14026	Hassan Fawaz	Mk/001	8,46	920 000

Relevé de Bordereaux d'achats D'OR  
Bureau d'Achat: Sodiam Exportation 00/00/2014  
Centre: BANGUI-BERBERATI

13/06/2014	14027	Basem Bahim	Mk/007	25,00	3 000 000
14/06/2014	14028	Jean Claude	Art	0,81	55 000
15/06/2014	14029	Christian	Art	1,30	90 000
15/06/2014	14030	Asiv	Art	1,23	100 000
15/06/2014	14031	Chawa	Art	0,43	20 000
17/06/2014	14032	Bonaventure	Art	2,08	60 000
18/06/2014	14033	Jean Claude	Art	1,27	30 000
24/06/2014	14034	Daco Clivie	Art	4,38	215 000
24/06/2014	14035	GOKARI Hamed	Mk/005	4,04	3 150 000
24/06/2014	14036	Guy	Art	0,92	40 000
24/06/2014	14037	Makata Bienvenu	Mk004	4,30	1 200 000
24/06/2014	14038	Christian	Art	1,26	120 000
25/06/2014	14039	Pierre	Art	1,44	270 000
29/06/2014	14040	Bakari Ahmet	Mk/005	90,11	8 500 000
30/06/2014	14041	Basem Bahim	Mk/007	24,00	1 000 000

<sup>4</sup> Bureau d'évaluation et de contrôle de *diamant* et d'or.

<sup>5</sup> Note that purchasing records concern diamonds not gold, as wrongly stated in the documents.



Relevé de Bordereaux d'achats  
 Bureau d'Achat: Sodiam Exportation 00/00/2014  
 Centre: BANGUI

18/05/2014	11238	Zaburo Pa	ACT	2,13	45 000
19/05/2014	11239	Erica donne	Art	14,80	885 000
23/05/2014	11240	Nana	MB 009	81,00	4 000 000
26/05/2014	11241	Jacob	LB002/2014	172,00	4 000 000
31/05/2014	11242	Erica	Art	2,15	220 000
31/05/2014	11243	Boris	Art	13,97	410 000
05/06/2014	11244	Jacob	Lb 002	15,00	1 350 000
13/06/2014	11245	Maurice	Art	2,86	100 000
21/06/2014	11246	Moulaf	Mk 006	143,24	20 000 000
23/06/2014	11247	Vincent	Art	3,46	1 500 000
23/06/2014	11248	Nana	BG 007	41,70	860 000
30/06/2014	11249	Moulaf	MK006	189,74	25 000 000
02/07/2014	11250	Abdoulay	Art	302,51	200 000

**Annex 29: Patrick Ayandho (left) photographed in Bangui with Socrate Bozizé (right) on 24 December 2012<sup>6</sup>**



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<sup>6</sup> Accessed on 4 September 2014 at <http://centrafrique-presse.over-blog.com/article-invraisemblable-arbre-de-noel-en-bozizie-113747024.html>

## Annex 30: Cameroon's diamond export statistics from 20 January to 15 August 2014

*Au 15 Août*


EXPORTATIONS DU PREMIER TRIMESTRE 2014								
Pays Participant du PK	État	Date	Exportateur	Localité d'origine du lot	Poids-Carats	Nombre de lots	Nombre de certificats	Valeur
CHINA	CHINA	8-Jul-14	ETS NEW HORIZON	WOUNDJIKI, BEKE, ROMA	13,88	1	1	\$ 5 626,00
<b>Sous-Total</b>					<b>13,88</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>\$ 5 626,00</b>
EU	BELGIUM	20-Jan-14	LA GÉNÉRALE DE SERVICE SARL	BATOURI	69,65	1	1	\$ 72 651,00
	<b>Sous-Total</b>				<b>69,65</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>\$ 72 651,00</b>
	GERMANY	28-Jan-14	EUROPE ABSOLUTE SERVICE CAMEROUN	BATOURI	11,04	1	1	\$ 2 992,00
	<b>Sous-Total</b>				<b>11,04</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>\$ 2 992,00</b>
	SWITZERLAND	4-Apr-14	MPOMBO COLETTE (FLM MINING)	MOBILONG	19,26	1	1	\$ 9 209,46
	SWITZERLAND	4-Jun-14	MPOMBO COLETTE (FLM MINING)	MOBILONG	19,28	1	1	\$ 3 972,00
	<b>Sous-Total</b>				<b>38,54</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>\$ 13 181,46</b>
	SPAIN	12-Mar-14	A.A.BOSS GLOBAL CONCEPTS CAMEROON LTD	MOBILONG	23,96	1	1	\$ 3 422,32
<b>Sous-Total</b>				<b>23,96</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>\$ 3 422,32</b>	
<b>Sous-Total</b>				<b>143,19</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>\$ 92 246,78</b>	
TURKEY	TURKEY	3-Feb-14	ETS NEW HORIZON	GAROUA-BOULAI	33,42	1	1	\$ 5 996,00
<b>Sous-Total</b>				<b>33,42</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>\$ 5 996,00</b>	
UAE	UAE	4-Feb-14	NICE HOME SARL	GAROUA-BOULAI, BATOURI	70,46	2	1	\$ 25 561,00
	UAE	4-Feb-14	ETS TBM	BEKE	21,06	1	1	\$ 1 763,00
	UAE	24-Mar-14	GEMS AFRIKA	BATOURI (BEKE, BGALOE, BGITI, OUNDJIKI, ROMA, TAMOUNA)	815,53	2	2	\$ 109 980,85
<b>Sous-Total</b>				<b>907,05</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>\$ 137 304,85</b>	
USA	USA	20-Mar-14	ETS NEW HORIZON	GAROUA-BOULAI	24,93	1	1	\$ 4 150,43
<b>Sous-Total</b>				<b>24,93</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>\$ 4 150,43</b>	
<b>Grand Total</b>					<b>1122,47</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>\$ 245 324,06</b>

**Annex 31: Communication of Cameroonian Kimberley Process authorities to the Chair of the Kimberly Process**



Please, be advised that on June 3rd 2014, a Cameroon national acting on behalf of an Egyptian business man attempted to have a 23.78 cts parcel certified for export. The purchase documents did not include tracking documents used to control our national output and trade for certification purposes. Therefore, this parcel of unknown origin has been seized and will remain in our custody until an investigation and proceedings decide otherwise. A picture of the seized parcel is attached.

Best regards  
National Permanent Secretariat for the Kimberley Process  
Cameroon Republic



**Annex 32: Example of Dera d’or purchasing records showing suppliers in Yaloké**

REPUBLIQUE CENTRAFRICAINE  
 DIRECTION GENERALE  
 DES MINES  
 DIRECTION DE LA COMMERCIALISATION  
 DE L'INDUSTRIE ET DU FICHIER MINIER  
 BUREAU D'EVALUATION ET DE CONTRÔLE  
 DE DIAMANT ET OR (BECDOR)



**BORDEREAU D'ACHAT**  
 D'OR ou DIAMANTS **№ 00331/20**

Nom et Prénom de l'Acheteur ..... *F. RA. NOR*  
 BIJOUTERIE ..... S/Préf. de .....  
 Date d'Achat ..... 20 Lieu d'Achat ..... S/Préf. de .....  
 Provenance du Vendeur ..... *YALOKÉ* S/Préf. de .....  
*6-25/06/2014*

Nom et Prénom du Vendeur	QUALITE		OR Brut	VALEUR en Francs CFA
	Artisan	N° Carnet d'identité de Collecteur	Poids en grs	
<i>APPROXIMATE</i>	<i>X</i>		<i>205</i>	<i>3870000</i>
<b>TOTAL</b>				<i>3870000</i>

Signature de l'Acheteur *[Signature]*

**Annex 33: Export authorization for gold issued to Badica in Bangui to export to Etablissement Djibrilla in Douala, Cameroon**

**Direction Générale  
DES RESSOURCES  
MINÉRALES**

**République Centrafricaine**  
Pour exportation d'Or/Diamant brut  
d'origine artisanale ou industrielle


**LAISSEZ PASSER** No 000417


Société (1) BADICA BP 333 BANGUI R.I.A  
Autorisée à exporter le lot de diamants bruts suivant:  
Provenance du lot: BADICA N°002/19016  
Poids du lot (2): 827,09 grammes  
Poids brut d'achat du lot (3): 42.406.350 FFA  
Lieu d'achat: YALAKE  
Date d'achat: du 05/05/2014  
Destination du lot (4): Etablissement DJIBRILLA A.P.S.D  
Douala (CAMEROUN)

Montant à l'exportation perçue par l'Etat Centrafricain (5)  
22.066 FFA

Certifié exact et sincère  
A Bangui, le 05/05/2014  
Le Représentant de la Société (5)

Visa de sortie  
N° \_\_\_\_\_ du \_\_\_\_\_  
L'Agent des Douanes

Le Chef de Service de Contrôle  
de l'Évaluation de diamant  
  
Philippe POIZONE

Délivré à Bangui, le 05/05/2014  
Directeur de la Commerce, Consommation et de l'Industrie  
  
Philippe POIZONE

Société  
CFA  
Adresse du destinataire  
Signature expéditeur

Imprim. ST Paul BP 798

## Annex 34: Cameroon's gold export statistics for 2014 showing *Etablissement* (ETS) Djibrilla

REPUBLIQUE DU CAMEROUN  
Paix Travail Patrie  
\*\*\*\*\*  
MINISTRE DES MINES, DE L'INDUSTRIE  
ET DU DEVELOPPEMENT TECHNOLOGIQUE  
\*\*\*\*\*  
SECRETARIAT GENERAL  
\*\*\*\*\*  
DIRECTION DES MINES  
\*\*\*\*\*  
SOUS DIRECTION DES ACTIVITES MINIERES  
\*\*\*\*\*

REPUBLIC OF CAMEROON  
Peace-Work-Fatherland  
\*\*\*\*\*  
MINISTRY OF MINES, INDUSTRY AND  
TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT  
\*\*\*\*\*  
SECRETARY GENERAL'S OFFICE  
\*\*\*\*\*  
DEPARTMENT OF MINES  
\*\*\*\*\*  
SUB-DEPARTMENT OF MINING ACTIVITY  
\*\*\*\*\*

N° \_\_\_\_\_/MINMIDT/SG/DM/SDAM/SAMPM

Yaoundé, le \_\_\_\_\_

FICHE - EXPORTATIONS 2014				
	Nom de l'exportateur	Substance exportée	Quantité (g)	Date d'exportation
1	ETS DJIBO	or	1365	07/01/2014
2	<b>ETS DJIBRILLA ABBO</b>	<b>or</b>	<b>1289.7948</b>	<b>24/01/2014</b>
3	ETS DJIBO	or	958	12/02/2014
	ZENITH	or	675.16	07/03/2014
4	<b>ETS DJIBRILLA ABBO</b>	<b>or</b>	<b>1701.44</b>	<b>23/03/2014</b>
5	<b>ETS DJIBRILLA ABBO</b>	<b>or</b>	<b>862.01</b>	<b>24/04/2014</b>
6	<b>ETS DJIBRILLA ABBO</b>	<b>or</b>	<b>1106.02</b>	<b>26/05/2014</b>
7	<b>ETS DJIBRILLA ABBO</b>	<b>or</b>	<b>1196.6</b>	<b>26/06/2014</b>
8	<b>ETS DJIBRILLA ABBO</b>	<b>or</b>	<b>1090.82</b>	<b>02/07/08/2014</b>
9	KISSLING EXPLO	or	2432.18	08/08/2014
10	ETS DJIBO	or	1443	11/08/2014
	<b>Total</b>		<b>14 120.0248</b>	

D'après les documents disponibles au service de l'artisanat minier et de la petite mine, L'établissement **DJIBRILLA ABBO** a effectué **trois (03) exportations d'or** au cours de l'année 2013 soit une quantité correspondant à **6 620.311 grammes**.

Depuis le début de l'année 2014, il en a réalisé **six (06)** équivalant à une quantité de **7 246.6848 grammes**.

**Annex 35: Ismaila Sylla appearing on France 24 on 1 April 2013 (screenshot)**





**Annex 36: Dera d'or purchasing record for Ismaila Sylla**

REPUBLICQUE CENTRAFRICAINE  
 DIRECTION GENERALE DES MINES  
 DIRECTION DE LA COMMERCIALISATION DE L'INDUSTRIE ET DU FICHIER MINIER  
 BUREAU D'EVALUATION ET DE CONTRÔLE DE DIAMANT ET OR (BECDOR)


BUREAU D'EVALUATION ET DE CONTRÔLE DE DIAMANT ET OR - 40  
 L'EXPERT EVALUATEUR

BORDEREAU D'ACHAT D'OR ou DIAMANTS **N° 00306 /20**

Nom et Prénom de l'Acheteur: DERA-DIA  
 BIJOUTERIE: \_\_\_\_\_ S/Préf. de \_\_\_\_\_  
 Date d'Achat: 20 \_\_\_\_\_ S/Préf. de \_\_\_\_\_  
 Provenance du Vendeur: \_\_\_\_\_ S/Préf. de \_\_\_\_\_  
05/07/03

Nom et Prénom du Vendeur	QUALITE		OR brut	VALEUR en Francs CFA
	Artisan	N° Carnet d'identité de Collecteur	Poids en grs	
<u>ISMAILA SYLLA</u>	<u>NON PAYE</u>		<u>731 GR</u>	

### Annex 37: Purchasing records (BECDOR)<sup>7</sup> for Sodiam showing purchase from Ismaila Sylla



28/01/2014	12958	Abdoulaye Dodo	Bq016	9,00	6 750 000
28/01/2014	12959	Djibula Noh	Bq 002	13,68	1 500 000
10/02/2014	12960	Tiddan	Bq 005	2,96	11 000
	12961				
16/02/2014	12962	Ismail Sylla	Bq018	29,29	150 000
17/02/2014	12963	Sylvanus	Art	5,75	180 000
17/02/2014	12964	Nidbaka	Art	0,76	8 000
18/02/2014	12965	Fiak	Art	39,40	200 000
18/02/2014	12966	Bangui Jean	Art	11,80	1 800 000
19/02/2014	12967	Sakho	Art	6,88	1 000 000
20/02/2014	12968	Dawilly Cherubin	Art	1,57	133 000

<sup>7</sup> Bureau d'évaluation et de contrôle de *diamant* et d'or.

**Annex 38: Form for authorization issued to artisans working in Ndassima**

MINISTERE DE LA DEFENSE NATIONAL E  
DE LA RESTRUCTURATION DE L'ARMEE  
DES ANCIENS COMBATTANTS  
ET DES VICTIMES DE GUERRES

REPUBLIQUE CENTRAFRICAINE  
UNITE –DIGNITE –TRAVAIL

\*\_\*\_\*\_\*\_\*\_\*\_\*\_\*\_\*\_\*\_\*\_\*\_\*\_\*\_\*\_\*\*

ETAT MAJOR GENERAL  
DE L'ARMEE

\*\_\*\_\*\_\*\_\*\_\*\_\*\_\*\_\*\_\*\_\*\_\*\_\*\_\*\_\*\_\*\*

5<sup>EME</sup> REGION MILITAIRE

\*\_\*\_\*\_\*\_\*\_\*\_\*\_\*\_\*\_\*\_\*\_\*\_\*\_\*\_\*\_\*\*

SECRETARIAT GENERAL

N°..... /MDNRAACVG/EMGA/RM5/SG/2014

DIRECTION DES MINIERE DE LA OUKA

CHANTIER :

**CARTE D'ARTISAN MINIER**

Nom et Prénom :

Date et Lieu de Naissance :

Nationalité :

Profession :

Domicilié A :

Somme Versée en Lettre.....En Chiffre.....

Fait à BAMBARI le .../.../2014

LE DR

**Annex 39: Form for artisanal miners' authorization issued by former Séléka's 5<sup>th</sup> military region for Ndassima.**

MINISTERE DE LA DEFENSE NATIONALE  
DE LA RESTRUCTURATION DE L'ARMEE  
DES ANCIENS COMBATTANTS  
ET DES VICTIMES DE GUERRES

REPUBLIQUE CENTRAFRICAINE  
UNITE -DIGNITE -TRAVAIL

\*\*\*\*\*

ETAT MAJOR GENERAL  
DE L'ARMEE

\*\*\*\*\*

5<sup>EME</sup> REGION MILITAIRE

\*\*\*\*\*

SECRETARIAT GENERAL

N°..... /MDNRAACVG/EMGA/RM5/SG/2014

DIRECTION DES MINES

ZONE :.....

**CARTE DE SAISIE**

<b>Nom et Prénom :</b>		
<b>Date et Lieu de Naissance:</b>		
<b>Nationalité :</b>		
<b>Profession : Ouvrier Minier</b>		

Fait à NDACHIMA le.../.../2014

**Le D.R**

**Annex 40: Receipt for security taxes levied by former Séléka's 5<sup>th</sup> military region on possession of cattle**

DELEGUE CHARGE DE LA DEFENSE NATIONALE    REPUBLIQUE CENTRAFRICAINE  
DE LA RESTRICTION DE L'ARMEE                    UNITE- DIGNITE- TRAVAIL  
DES ANCIENS COMBATTANTS  
ET DE VICTIMES DE GUERRES  
ETAT MAJOR GENERALE D'ARMEES

**Taxe de sécurité**

Reçu N°.....

M<sup>r</sup>, M<sup>me</sup>.....

Somme.....

Destination de :.....

**NB** : la somme versée s'élève à 5000f /bovin

**Annex 41: Abandoned office for the regulation, control and processing of agricultural produce in Bambari**

*Photograph taken by the Panel on 3 July 2014*



## Annex 42: Phytosanitary tax rate of former Séléka's 5<sup>th</sup> and 6<sup>th</sup> military region



Commandant de 6<sup>eme</sup> région militaire

MINISTRE DE LA DEFENSE NATIONAL  
DE LA RESTRUCTURATION DE L'ARMEE  
DES ANCIENS COMBATTANTS  
ET DES VICTIMES DE' GUERRES

\*\_\*\_\*\_\*\_\*\_\*\_\*\_\*\_\*\_\*\_\*\_\*\_\*\_\*\_\*\_\*\*

ETAT MAJOR GENERAL  
DE L'ARMEE

\*\_\*\_\*\_\*\_\*\_\*\_\*\_\*\_\*\_\*\_\*\_\*\_\*\_\*\_\*\_\*\*

5<sup>EME</sup> REGION MILITAIRE

\*\_\*\_\*\_\*\_\*\_\*\_\*\_\*\_\*\_\*\_\*\_\*\_\*\_\*\_\*\_\*\*

SECRETARIAT GENERAL

N° ..... /MDNRAACVG/EMGA/RM6/SG/2014

Général OUMAR Assaïd Abass



REPUBLIQUE CENTRAFRICAINE  
UNITE -DIGNITE -TRAVAIL



### TARIFICATIONS

	Capacité /roues	Somme versée
véhicules	6 roues	20000
	10 roues	30000
	18 roues	50000
Plantes aromatique	Un sac	500
Peaux et cuivre	certificat d'origine	10000
Café centrafricain	Un sac	1000
Café zaïre		

**Annex 43: *Laissez-passer* issued by former Séléka's 5<sup>th</sup> military region commander General Ali Darrassa Mahamat to truck driver after payment of taxes**





**Annex 44: Ouaka Café depot and trucks**

*Photographs taken by the Panel on 4 July 2014*



## Annex 45: Third party transfers

### 1. Origin of Chinese rifles type 56-2 seized by international forces in the CAR

Serial number	Supplied by China to CAR	Serial number	Supplied by China to CAR	Serial number	Supplied by China to CAR
1415134	No	3714906	No	5073674	Yes
1416134	No	3715272	No	12000227	No
2077511	No	3715570	No	12001848	No
2623706	Yes	3717153	No	12003305	No
2801719	Yes	3717514	No	12005065	No
2802252	Yes	3718426	No	12005471	No
2802317	Yes	3720804	No	12005612	No
2802711	Yes	3721718	No	12007070	No
2802785	Yes	3723201	No	12007479	No
2803047	Yes	3724756	No	12007732	No
2803496	Yes	3725636	No	12009106	No
2803977	Yes	3732127	No	12009259	No
2804494	Yes	4038028	No	12009272	No
2804769	Yes	4057235	Yes	12010138	No
2804913	Yes	5020855	Yes	12010345	No
2805133	Yes	5031435	Yes	12010522	No
2805167	Yes	5034615	Yes	12010692	No
2805218	Yes	5036411	Yes	12010930	No
2805229	Yes	5041705	Yes	12011547	No
2805646	Yes	5045242	Yes	12011695	No
2806828	Yes	5049645	Yes	12012154	No
2806942	Yes	5051601	Yes	12013024	No
2806974	Yes	5051955	Yes	12013094	No
3083578	Yes	5055396	Yes	12014008	No
3148150	Yes	5058551	Yes	12014050	No
3700410	No	5063050	Yes	12014921	No
3700984	No	5064596	Yes	12015080	No
3701119	No	5064665	Yes	12017806	No
3702027	No	5065023	No	12017977	No
3702269	No	5065486	Yes	12019524	No
3704048	No	5066651	No	12019986	No
3705690	No	5066812	No	12020018	No
3707151	No	5066854	No	12020304	No
3708037	No	5067164	No	12911586	No
3708339	No	5067327	Yes	23708582	No
3712546	No	5070557	Yes	28044044	No
3712939	No	5070815	No	35072021	No
3714547	No	5071063	Yes	37311347	No
3714547	No	5071513	No	48018358	No
3714698	No	5071810	Yes	89030970	No

## 2. Origin of Chinese small arms cartridges seized by international forces in the CAR

Head stamp marking	Supplied to CAR by China (Yes/ No)
41	Yes
61	Yes
71	Yes
81	No
270	No
351	No
539	No
811	Yes
911	No
945	Yes
9121	No
9611	No
9631	No

## 3. Origin of grenades similar to Chinese models

### Grenades 82-2S not consistent with those of Chinese manufacturers

Lots of grenades 82-2 S in circulation in the CAR (photograph taken by the Panel in April 2014)



### Grenades 82-2 of Chinese origin supplied to Nepal and found in the CAR

Label on a wooden box indicating the origin of grenades (photograph taken by the Panel in April 2014)



#### **4- Other rifles transferred to the Central African Republic by a third party**

*SAR 80 manufactured by Singapore Technologies Kinetics and delivered to Yugoslavia in December 1990 (photograph taken by the Panel)*



*AUG 222 Rem semi-automatic rifle sold to a French company in June 1991 (photograph taken by the Panel)*




**Annex 46: Erased serial numbers on AKM rifles**

The Panel is gathering information about a batch of AKM rifles with external markings and serial numbers intentionally removed by grinding to hide traceability of the weapons. The models with slant muzzle devices, present wear and tear signs of recent introduction in service. The Panel has identified three serial numbers on internal compounds **уи2958**, **мн5814**, **тн1633**. The chain of custody of these rifles should give indications about the possible networks which introduced these weapons into the Central African Republic. The Panel is awaiting a reply from the company that has manufactured one of the weapons.

**Serial Number: уи2958****Serial Number: мн5814****Serial Number: тн1633**

## Annex 47: Update to the Panel's profile of arms cartridges found in the CAR

<b>Country</b>	<b>Bulgaria</b>	<b>China</b>	<b>China</b>	<b>Russian Fed</b>
Calibre	7.62x39	7.62x25	12.7x108	7.62x39
1				
Markings	10 99	11 95	11 10	17 74
Area of discovery	Bouar	Not known	Boguila	Boguila
First reported	July 2014	June 2014	May 2014	May 2014
<b>Country</b>	<b>Russian Fed</b>	<b>China</b>	<b>China</b>	<b>S. Africa</b>
Calibre	7.62x39	7.62x54R	9x25	7.62x51
2				
Marking	60 96	71 08	71 11	92 23
Area of discovery	Bouar	Boguila	Not known	Bouar
First reported	June 2014	June 2014	June 2014	July 2014
<b>Country</b>	<b>Russian Fed</b>	<b>China</b>	<b>China</b>	<b>Iran</b>
Calibre	12.7x108	9x19	7.62x39	5.56x45
3				
Marking	188 79	311 09	352	7.62x39 02
Area of discovery	Boguila	Not known	Boguila	Bouar
First reported	May 2014	June 2014	May 2014	July 2014
<b>Country</b>	<b>Iran (prob)</b>	<b>Italy</b>	<b>USA</b>	<b>Belgium</b>
Calibre	9x19	9x19	357	9x19
4				
Marking	9x19 05	CT 95	FEDERAL	FN 76
Area of discovery	Not known	Not known	Not known	Not known
First reported	June 2014	June 2014	June 2014	June 2014

Country	Portugal	Israel	UK	France
Calibre	5.56x45	5.56x45	7.92/8x57	5.56x45
5				
Marking	FNM	IMI 07	KYNOCH	LM 80
Area of discovery	Not known	Not known	Bouar	Boguila
First reported	June 2014	June 2014	July 2014	June 2014
Country	France	France	France	France
Calibre	7.62x51	5.56x45	5.56x45	9x19
6				
Marking	LM 86	LM 1.86	LM. 4.85	LM
Area of discovery	Bouar	Unknown	Unknown	Not known
First reported	July 2014	July 2014	July 2014	June 2014
Country	France	Germany	Sweden	Sweden
Calibre	5.56x45	5.56x45	9.3x62	.44
7				
Markings	LM 06	MEN 06	norma	norma
Area of discovery	Not known	Bouar	Bouar	Not known
First reported	June 2014	July 2014	July 2014	June 2014
Country	UK	UK	UK	France
Calibre	5.56x45	5.56x45	5.56x45	9x19
8				
Marking	RG 02	RG 07	RG 09	SF 72
Area of discovery	Not known	Not known	Not known	Not known
First reported	June 2014	June 2014	June 2014	June 2014

<b>Country</b>	<b>France</b>	<b>France</b>	<b>France</b>	<b>France</b>
Calibre	9x19	5.56x45	9x19	9x19
9				
Marking	SF	SF 1.78	SF 79	SF 82
Area of discovery	Not known	Unknown	Not known	Not known
First reported	June 2014	July 2014	June 2014	June 2014
<b>Country</b>	<b>France</b>	<b>France</b>	<b>France</b>	<b>France</b>
Calibre	9mm	5.56x45	5.56x45	.357
10				
Marking	SF 87	SF 1.89	SF 1-89	SFM
Area of discovery	Not known	Not known	Boguila	Not known
First reported	June 2014	July 2014	June 2014	July 2014
<b>Country</b>	<b>Czech Rep.</b>	<b>France</b>	<b>Israel</b>	<b>USA</b>
Calibre	9x19	9mm	5.56x45	9x19
11				
Markings	S&B	TE F	TZ 24 92	WIN
Area of discovery	Not known	Not known	Boguila	Not known
First reported	June 2014	June 2014	June 2014	June 2014
<b>Country</b>		<b>Russian Fed</b>	<b>Egypt</b>	
Calibre	.45	7.63x39	7.62x39	
12				
Marking	45 AUTO	БПЗ	37 83 ε ρ ζ	
Area of discovery	Not known	Boda	Bouar	
First reported	June 2014	July 2014	July 2014	



## Lists of Markings

Marking	Manufacturer	Head stamp picture
10	Bulgaria	1
11	China	1
17	Russian Federation	1
60	Russian Federation	2
71	China	2
92	South Africa	2
188	Russian Federation	3
311	China probably	3
352	China probably	3
7.62x39	Not known	3
9x19	Not known	4
CT	Italy probably	4
FEDERAL	USA	4
FN	Belgium	4
FNM	Portugal	5
IMI	Israel	5
KYNOCH	UK	5
LM	France	5, 6, 7
MEN	Germany	7
Norma	Sweden	7
RG	UK	8
SF	France	8, 9, 10
SFM	France	10
S&B	Czech Republic	11
TE	France	11
TZ	Israel	11
WIN	USA	11
Star logo		12
ВПЗ	Russian Federation	12
ع ر ع	Egypt	12

**Annex 48: Chadian Galil assault rifles discovered in the Central African Republic**

Three Galil rifles with serial number 2066204, 2063423 and 2065145 were seized on different occasions by International forces. The rifles with serial numbers 2066204 and 2063423 were part of lots of weapons sold in 2008 and 2009 to the Ministry of Defence of Chad with an end-user certificate certifying that the weapons would not be transferred to another country (see End User Certificate below).

*Galil serial number 2063423 and 2065145 seized by international forces  
(photographs taken by the Panel)*

	
<p>2063423</p>	
	
<p>2065145</p>	

*End user Certificate by the Ministry of Chad stating that the Galil Assault rifles acquired from Israel Weapon Industries (IWI) would be used solely by Defence and Security Forces of Chad and would not be sold or transferred to a third party  
(archived at the United Nations)*

REPUBLIQUE DU TCHAD

UNITE - TRAVAIL - PROGRES

PRESIDENCE DE LA REPUBLIQUE

MINISTERE DE LA DEFENSE NATIONALE

N° 560 /PR/MDN/EMP/2007

**CERTIFICAT D'UTILISATEUR FINAL**

Le Ministère de la Défense Nationale de la République du Tchad a acquis de Israël Weapon Industries (IWI) LTD les matériels ci-dessous :

N°	Désignation	Quantités
1	GALIL Assault Rifle	2 000

Le Ministère de la Défense Nationale de la République du Tchad certifie par la présente que les matériels ci-dessus énumérés serviront exclusivement aux Forces de Défense et de Sécurité du Tchad et ne seront ni vendus, ni transmis à une tierce partie étrangère à la République du Tchad.

N'Djaména, le 18 JAN. 2007

Le Ministre de la Défense Nationale a.i.  
Le Ministre d'Etat, Ministre des Infrastructures



**Annex 49: Vehicle used by armed group neutralized by French forces in Boguila**

*Photograph taken by the Panel at a location two kilometres northwest of Boguila on 24 June 2014*



*Detail of the vehicle frame number (photograph taken by the Panel on 24 June 2014)*



The vehicle was a TOYOTA 60-25 SAE H83 DOT frame serial number JTELB71J507021369. The vehicle was previously acquired in 2002 by the office of UNHCR in Bangui (see below).



N.V. Toyota Motor Europe Marketing and Engineering S.A.  
 Represented by Toyota Offshore Services B.V. (Agent of UNHCR)

Our Ref: 20021-1  
07 Mar 2002

---

Po 20021

Dear [REDACTED]

These vehicles will be ready to leave GIB on the 13<sup>th</sup>. d.

Consignee: Office of the UNHCR Charge de Mission/ b. e.  
 Boite Postale 950  
 Rue de L'Universit  
 Bangui, Central African Rep  
 Attn: Mr. Fall Tel: 00 [REDACTED] Fax: 00 [REDACTED]

Shipping Marks: 02IAB/CAR/LS402  
 P.O.: 20021  
 DESTINATION: BANGUI, CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

Payment Terms: Freight Pre-Paid

Chassis #	Engine #	Vehicle Ref and Type	Km	m3	Spares
JTECB01J-401005540	1HZ-0381856	228006 Land Cruiser STD Station Wagon	2250	18.3	N
JTECB01J-201005544	1HZ-0381858	228007 Land Cruiser STD Station Wagon	2250	18.3	N
JTECB01J-001005543	1HZ-0381861	228008 Land Cruiser STD Station Wagon	2250	18.3	N
JTELB71J-007021369	1HZ-0379465	225747 Land Cruiser Pick Up	2040	17.8	N

Location of the wrecked vehicle



Source: Google Earth; wreckage coordinates: N 07.08.47.898; E 016.53.49.024

**Annex 50: Cartridges found in the location of the vehicle neutralized by French forces in Boguila**

Eight types of cartridges found in the spot with markings (SF 1-89 5,56; T 92 Z 24; LM 08; 17 74; SU 1 09 51; 71 08; 188 79; 11 10) are not part of the profile of cartridges found in the Central African Republic, and therefore might have been introduced in violation of the arms embargo. The Panel will continue to investigate the case and update its ammunition profile in the CAR accordingly. The head stamps are the following:

			
5.56x45	5.56x45	5.56x45	7.62x39
			
7.62x39	7.62x54R	12.7x108	12.7x108

Six type of cartridges found in the spot with markings (9121 86; 351 78; 90 12; 188 74; 188 83; SF 1-82 12.7 S) are part of the profile of cartridge of the baseline established by the Panel in its interim report. They are more likely coming from local armed group arsenals existing before 5 December 2014:

			
5.56x45	7.62x39	7.62x54R	12.7x99
			
12.7x108	12.7x108		

**Annex 51: Smuggling of hunting ammunition from Cameroon**

*Box containing 250 cartridges seized by Central African customs in Beloko*




*Modification of hunting ammunition by anti-balaka combatants*



*Head stamp of 12 gauge hunting ammunition seized by international forces*



Smuggling corridors of ammunition along CAR-Cameroon border






**Annex 52: Documents showing an attempt by Ousmane Roger to procure ammunition in Cameroon**

*Letter from a retailer in Yaoundé, dated 27 February 2014, asking the “Ministère de l’administration territoriale et de la décentralization” whether it would be possible to sell arms and hunting ammunitions to Ousmane Roger*

Armes - Munitions - Pêche - Musique et Accessoires divers

---



Yaoundé le 27 Février 2014.

Monsieur le Ministre d'État  
Ministre de l'Administration  
Territoriale et de la Décentralisation  
Yaoundé - Cameroun

Objet : Demande d'une information auprès de votre Ministère avant tout service d'armes et Munitions en faveur de Monsieur Ousmane Roger, ressortissant Centrafricain

Excellence,

Je viens très respectueusement auprès de votre haute autorité solliciter des informations auprès de votre ministère.

Excellence, j'aimerais savoir si la décision de Monsieur Ousmane Roger signée en date du 19 Septembre 2011 par les autorités de la République Centrafricaine qui lui autorise le transfert des munitions et armes de la république du Cameroun pour la Centrafrique est-il possible ? Je me réfère à votre ministère pour avoir la bonne information.

Dans l'attente d'une réponse, veuillez agréer Excellence Monsieur le Ministre, l'expression de mes sentiments dévoués.

Ci-joint :

- Photocopie de la décision de Monsieur Ousmane Roger

Le Gérant :

Decision dated 9 September 2011 of Pastor Josué Binoua, former Minister of territorial administration of the Central African Republic, authorizing Ousmane Roger to import 200,000 cartridges from Cameroon for his ammunition shops in Berbérati, Bouar and Nola.

MINISTRE DE L'ADMINISTRATION  
DU TERRITOIRE ET DE LA DECENTRALISATION  
DIRECTION DE CABINET  
DIRECTION GENERALE DE L'ADMINISTRATION  
DU TERRITOIRE ET DE LA DECENTRALISATION  
DIRECTION DES AFFAIRES POLITIQUES  
ET ADMINISTRATIVES  
SERVICES DES AFFAIRES POLITIQUES



Unité - Dignité - Travail

DECISION N° 022/MATR.DIR.CAL.06/11

LE MINISTRE DE L'ADMINISTRATION DU  
TERRITOIRE ET DE LA DECENTRALISATION

- Vu La constitution du 27 Décembre 2004 ;
- Vu La loi n°10.005 du 11 Mai 2010, modifiant et complétant Certaines dispositions de la constitution du 27 Décembre 2004;
- Vu La loi n°61.213 du 04 Mai 1961, réglementant l'introduction et l'usage des armes à feu en République Centrafricaine ;
- Vu L'ordonnance n° 34.021 du 27 mars 1961, modifiant et complétant la loi n° 61.213 du 04 Mai 1961, réglementant l'introduction et l'usage des armes à feu en République Centrafricaine ;
- Vu Le décret n°11.032 du 18 avril 2011, portant nomination du 1<sup>er</sup> ministre chef du gouvernement ;
- Vu Le décret n°11.034 du 22 Avril 2011, portant nomination des membres du gouvernement et ses modifications subséquentes ;
- Vu Le décret n° 10.268 du 17 Septembre 2010, portant l'organisation et le fonctionnement du Ministère de l'Administration du Territoire et de la Décentralisation et aussi les attributions du Ministre ;
- Vu La demande formulée par Monsieur OUSMAN Roger en date du 28 Juillet 2009.

**DECIDE**

**Art 1<sup>er</sup>** : Est autorisé le transfert de la République du Cameroun en Centrafrique en faveur de Monsieur OUSMANE Roger dans ses dépôts situés à Berbérati, Bouar et Nola.

**200.000 (DEUX CENT MILLE) CARTOUCHES DE CHASSE CALIBRE 12 SOIT 400 CARTON DE 500 CARTOUCHES.**

**Art 2** : L'introduction, le transfert, l'armement et la vente de ces munitions s'effectueront conformément aux conditions fixées par la réglementation en vigueur.

**Art 3** : La présente décision qui prend effet à compter de la date de sa signature sera enregistrée et communiquée partout où besoin sera.

MATRIELLE DE LA SIGNATURE  
 01 M. OUSMANE ROGER  
 02 M. OUSMANE ROGER  
 03 M. OUSMANE ROGER  
 04 M. OUSMANE ROGER  
 05 M. OUSMANE ROGER  
 06 M. OUSMANE ROGER  
 07 M. OUSMANE ROGER  
 08 M. OUSMANE ROGER  
 09 M. OUSMANE ROGER  
 10 M. OUSMANE ROGER

9 SEPT 2011

LE MINISTRE  
 PASTOR JOSUE BINOUA

L'OFFICIER  
 D'ETAT CIVIL

Ministère de l'Administration du Territoire et de la Décentralisation - Sis Avenue des Martyrs-  
Immeuble Ex-Pétroca-3<sup>ème</sup> Etage-Tel : 21611994

*Letter from the Ministère de l'administration territoriale et de la décentralisation of Cameroon to the Cameroonian retailer, dated 29 April 2014, informing that sales of arms and ammunition to Ousmane Roger are not authorized.*



Réf: Votre lettre en date du 27 février 2014.

Objet: vente d'armes et de munitions à un ressortissant centrafricain.

[REDACTED]

Comme suite à votre lettre citée en référence, relative à l'objet susvisé,

J'ai l'honneur de vous faire connaître que la décision en cause, signée des autorités centrafricaines, ne saurait être interprétée comme applicable au Cameroun.

Aussi, je vous demande de ne procéder à aucune vente d'armes et de munitions en faveur de Monsieur OUSMAN Roger, de nationalité centrafricaine.

Veuillez agréer, Madame, l'expression de ma considération distinguée./-

[REDACTED]

29 APR 2014

[Signature]

[REDACTED]

### Annex 53: Statistics of sales of 12-gauge hunting cartridges in Cameroon



On 27 April 2014, the Central African Republic customs, supported by a unit of MISCA, seized a box of ammunition smuggled into the Central African Republic at the Garoua Boulai-Beloko border crossing. The Panel photographed the seized materials *in situ* (see below).

After the discovery of 27 April, the Panel wrote an official letter to the manufacturing company in Europe. The company informed the Panel that the lot of ammunition seized had been shipped in January 2014 to an import-export company in Cameroon. On 9 May 2014, the Panel wrote a letter to this Cameroonian company, copying the Permanent Mission of Cameroon to the United Nations, requesting information on the clients that bought ammunition from the company in 2014. On 16 May 2014, the company communicated sales statistics of 12-gauge hunting cartridges from January to April 2014. Upon the request of the Panel, it later communicated the statistics of 2013.

The company DOLLAH YANKAM from Bafoussam, western Cameroon, with a commerce branch in Batouri, purchased 170,100 cartridges in the first quarter of 2014, compared to 30,650 in the first quarter of 2013. Pierre Ndibi Ze from Eboloa purchased 174,395 units in 2014 and 104,395 units in 2013 (see graph below). Neither of the retailers could provide the Panel with an explanation of the increase in their purchases. The Cameroonian ministry of territorial administration and decentralization that oversees ammunition imports and circulation could not provide any explanation either.

#### *Sales of hunting cartridges by SAMT to five retailers from February to April of 2013 and 2014*

week	Retailer AT		Retailer DO		Retailer MB		Retailer ND		Retailer ON	
	AT13	AT14	DO13	DO14	MB13	MB14	ND13	ND14	ON13	ON14
1	8060	6000	475	0	4625	0	3450	2000	3675	2250
2	11340	9350	3390	0	11230	2325	4480	1500	2875	3400
3	19465	3000	1000	5425	2100	12075	8000	15775	2325	1000
4	11085	5425	575	0	10900	1650	6000	10625	15100	8750
5	11705	12050	5150	250	5850	7400	8305	8400	3975	4375
6	8145	9135	4050	7125	10250	10225	5925	20500	3600	7455
7	6545	10375	575	31150	18160	7900	3000	14875	19000	9900
8	4985	9080	5475	18875	11200	17375	19495	18300	7850	5350
9	4825	14400	2250	31300	2000	10925	3775	11725	18750	15750
10	6750	14900	2775	38450	11250	20900	1000	41500	200	23250
11	4450	7250	1910	1775	5550	19625	1700	16020	14000	4500
12	3535	3500	1125	11625	2750	2750	2950	0	125	8750
13	5110	7625	1900	24125	7875	11550	36300	13175	4750	5750
<b>Total</b>	<b>106000</b>	<b>112090</b>	<b>30650</b>	<b>170100</b>	<b>103740</b>	<b>124700</b>	<b>104380</b>	<b>174395</b>	<b>96225</b>	<b>100480</b>



#### **Annex 54: Seizure of arms by AU/RTF from former Séléka in Nzako**

The Panel sent a letter on 9 July 2014 to the Permanent Mission of Uganda to the United Nations requesting information on weapons, ammunition and military equipment that were seized by the UPDF component of the AU/RTF in the Central African Republic. Uganda replied to the Panel on 24 July 2014, sharing information and inviting the Panel to visit its unit in Obo, Central African Republic. Unfortunately, the Panel has been unable to precede to Obo due to logistics constraints.

Uganda reported that indeed UPDF has collected weapons from former Séléka elements during the two clashes of 29 and 30 June 2014 near a village called Kano and near Nzako, but denied that its soldiers had conducted a disarmament exercise. However, Uganda informed the Panel that following the incidents, other former Séléka elements surrendered their weapons and equipment to UPDF. The Ugandan authorities also denied having collected the amount of weapon declared by former Séléka to the Panel.

Uganda provide a list of arms and equipment seized by UPDF from 29 June to 6 July 2014 which comprised one civilian vehicle, 17 rifles, one propelled grenade launcher, one 60 mm mortar, five propelled grenades, eleven 60mm mortar shells and 1,557 small arms cartridges of different calibres (details in a table below).

Analysis of the items seized gives indications of the arsenal of equipment and arms used by former Séléka in that region. The vehicle seized, registered in Haute Kotto, was commandeered probably by a local in Bria. All rifles seized are AK/AKM, Type 56, Galil, Uzi or ASR models and of the category of small arms, observed by the Panel either in the stocks collected by International Forces or carried by former Séléka combatants in Bambari, Batangafo and Bria. Only two assault rifles Type 56 out of seven have serial numbers 56-22806086 and 56-35044386 which are close to the ones that China confirmed to have supplied to the CAR (see annex 44 Third party transfer of arms).


#### *Arm and ammunition seized by UPDF component of the AU/RTF*



*Vehicle seized by UPDF component of the AU/RTF near Nzako*



*Location of the incident*



*List of items seized by UPDF component of the AU/RTF*

NO.	DESCRIPTION	SERIAL NO.	AMMOS RECOVERED	DATE OF RECOVERY
	<b>Weapons captured in exchange of fire with Seleka</b>			
01	SMG	An 7757		29.06.2014
02	SMG	56- 35044386	39 Rds	29.06.2014
03	ASR RIFLE	35004		29.06.2014
04	MICRO GARIL	G-287859	30 Rds	29.06.2014
05	SMG	EB 3691		30.06.2014
06	SMG	56- 212009401		30.06.2014
07	SMG	56- 23725797		30.06.2014
09	SMG	OT 9919		30.06.2014
10	SMG	HT 19508		30.06.2014
11	G3	EN 2468	72 Rds	30.06.2014
12	G3 MAGS (01)			30.06.2014
13	MICRO GARLIC	G-556-223	35 Rds	30.06.2014
14	ZERO – ZERO (01)		01Rd	30.06.2014
15	60 mm mtor(01)	160022	11 BOMBS	30.06.2014
16	RED BERET (02)			30.06.2014
17	BASE PLATE (01)			30.06.2014
	<b>Weapons surrendered by Seleka</b>			
18	SMG	56- 22806086	204	05.07.2014
19	UZI GUN	E29545	50 Rds	05.07.2014
20	UZI GUN	E69135		05.07.2014
21	ASR RIFLE	31665		05.07.2014
22	RPG PIPE	101173	05 SHELLS	05.07.2014
23	RPG CHARGERS (04)			05.07.2014
24	PKM LOSE AMMO		01 Tin & 925 Rds	05.07.2014
25	SMG	56- 23730842	201 Rds	06.07.2014
26	SMG	56- 212011395		06.07.2014
27	SMG	56- 23711122		06.07.2014
28	SMG EMPTY MAGAZINE (20)			06.07.2014
29	HF RADIO (01)	038TL0308		06.07.2014
30	BUSH NELL HD CAMERA (01)	01		06.07.2014
31	LEOPOLD (sight vision)	01		06.07.2014
31	GRENADES	02		06.07.2014
33	A PAIR OF UNIFORM	01		06.07.2014



**Annex 55: Potential arsenal of former Séléka in Birao (Vakaga province)**

The photograph below was retrieved from Facebook profile of a former Séléka leader; it shows some equipment owned by the armed group, including a recoilless gun type SPG-9 73 mm which is mounted on the pick-up truck vehicle. A similar weapon has been seized by International forces in Bangui.

*Photograph from Facebook profile of a former Séléka General posted on 10 June 2014*



*Photograph taken by the Panel on 10 August 2014 at MISCA compound in Bangui*



## Annex 56: *Mesures de confiance* (confidence-building measures)

### Rationale

The confidence-building measures were approved by FOMAC and Sangaris Force Commanders and transmitted on 4 December 2013 to the Central African ministers of defence, of internal security and to the Chief of staff of the CAR armed forces (FACA). The measures aimed at guaranteeing the freedom of movement of French Forces and FOMAC and the cantonment of armed groups in Bangui and in the regions.

The measures outline that while awaiting implementation of DDR and SSR programmes, “transition forces” were created including FACA and former Séléka. The measures also stipulate that not all transition forces elements should be integrated or reintegrated in a reformed FACA, and that President Djotodia should ensure the departure of mercenaries. The document specified procedures for identification, disarmament, cantonment and guidelines for behaviour.

The measures have been implemented in Bangui and culminated by the cantonment of former Séléka in the three camps of Béal, BSS and RDOT. Attempts by Sangaris to canton and disarm former Séléka in Bambari on 21 June 2014 and in Batangafo on 4 August 2014 were unsuccessful, following strong resistance and mobilization of the local youth in popular uprisings against international forces. The Panel visited the two localities and noted that former Séléka combatants were carrying their weapons openly. Similar forced disarmament in PK5 neighbourhood in Bangui led to armed confrontation by self-defence groups undermining the efforts of Sangaris and EUFOR-RCA.

### Implementation

Confidence-building measures, although initially intended for FACA and former Séléka, were actually also implemented in the western part of the country where anti-balaka groups and *Révolution et Justice* are active. In those areas, international forces have systematically dismantled illegal checkpoints and seized weapons from combatants. The Panel witnessed the implementation by international forces on 15 August 2014 of the implementation of the *mesures de confiance* in Bouca for anti-balaka (see below and also paragraph 57 of the main report).

*Local authorities, MISCA and Sangaris officers explaining the mesures de confiance to the population in Bouca (photograph taken by the Panel on 15 August 2014)*



## Confidence-building measures document distributed by Sangaris in Bouca on 15 August 2014

A document entitled “Mesures de confiance approuvées par les autorités centrafricaines de transition” for the implementation of the confidence-building measures was approved on 19 January 2014 by Sangaris and MISCA Force Commanders, and MISCA Police commander. The document specifies procedures for securing cantonment sites, official buildings and for static and mobile protection of authorities and dignitaries. The *mesures de confiance* aim at dismantling armed checkpoints and restricting movements of heavy weapon and armed combatants.

### MESURES DE CONFIANCE APPROUVÉES PAR LES AUTORITÉS CENTRAFRICAINES DE TRANSITION

#### 1. IDENTIFICATION

• TOUT MILITAIRE DES FORCES DE TRANSITION DOIT ÊTRE EN TENUE, PORTER UN SIGNE DISTINCTIF CONNU DE TOUS ET DÉTENIR UN DOCUMENT L'IDENTIFIANT CLAIREMENT.

#### 2. DESARMEMENT

- SAUF POUR LES ÉLÉMENTS DE PROTECTION DE CERTAINS SITES ET DE CERTAINES PERSONNALITÉS, TOUT ARMEMENT EST PROSCRIT HORS DES CANTONNEMENTS MILITAIRES OFFICIELS OÙ SERONT STOCKÉES MUNITIONS ET ARMES LOURDES.
- LES ARMES PORTÉES ILLEGALEMENT SERONT CONFISQUÉES PAR MISCA OU SANGARIS.

#### 3. CANTONNEMENT

- APPUYÉES PAR MISCA, SANGARIS OU LA FORCE DE GARDE DE L'ONU ; SEULES LA POLICE ET LA GENDARMERIE SONT AUTORISÉES À ASSURER LA SÉCURITÉ EN RCA.
- TOUT PERSONNEL MILITAIRE DE TRANSITION EST RATTACHÉ À UN LIEU DE CANTONNEMENT ET DOIT Y RESTER SAUF S'IL EST OFFICIELLEMENT EN MISSION.

#### 4. COMPORTEMENT

- LES AUTORITÉS CIVILES ET MILITAIRES LOCALES DONT LES FORCES DE TRANSITION DONNE TOUTE FACILITÉ À LA MISCA ET À LA FORCE SANGARIS POUR L'EXÉCUTION DE LEURS MISSIONS.
- TOTALE LIBERTÉ DE CIRCULATION DES FORCES MISCA ET SANGARIS EN TOUT TEMPS ET SUR L'ENSEMBLE DU TERRITOIRE DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE CENTRAFRICAINE.
- LES ONG DEVRONT POUVOIR ACCÉDER AUX POPULATIONS SANS RESTRICTION POUR APPORTER L'AIDE HUMANITAIRE SUR L'ENSEMBLE DU TERRITOIRE CENTRAFRICAIN.
- PAS D'ENTRAVE À LA CIRCULATION À BANGUI OU EN PROVINCE
- SEULES LA POLICE, LA GENDARMERIE OU LES FORCES MISCA ET SANGARIS PEUVENT INTERROMPRE LA CIRCULATION (BARRAGE, FILTRAGE).
- TOUT ACTE HOSTILE ENVERS L'UNE DES FORCES MISCA OU SANGARIS SERA CONSIDÉRÉ COMME UNE AGRESSION CONTRE LES FORCES.

## Cantonment

In June 2014, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) in coordination with national authorities, MINUSCA and international forces identified a total of 2,114 individuals including 444 women and 103 children in three cantonment sites in Bangui. Their total was articulated as follows:

Category /Sites	RDOT	BSS	BEAL	Total
Former Séléka	1,041	257	539	1,837
Former FACA	27	1	5	33
FACA	2	6	0	8
Trained by FACA	24	6	0	30
Civils	116	9	81	206
Total	1,210	279	625	2,114


The cantonment has not been implemented for the anti-balaka groups nor for *Révolution et Justice*.

## Relocation


MINUSCA, in coordination with national authorities and International Forces, and with the support of IOM, from 1 to 5 September 2014, has conducted the first voluntary relocation from cantonment sites in Bangui of 238 cantoned elements including 21 civilians mostly to the towns of Damara, Dékoa, Kaga-Bandoro and Sibut, but also to other localities in the north-eastern part of the Central African Republic.

	Civilian	Combatants	Total
<b>Damara</b>	1	16	17
<b>Dékoa</b>		12	12
<b>Fere</b>		2	2
<b>Guiffa</b>		1	1
<b>Kabo</b>	1	43	44
<b>Kaga-Bandoro</b>	14	92	106
<b>Liby</b>		1	1
<b>Malo</b>		3	3
<b>Patcho</b>		3	3
<b>Sibut</b>	5	44	49
<b>Total</b>	21	217	238

# Annex 57: Tendencies of the displacement of population in the Central African Republic from 14 August to 1 September 2014



# Annex 58: UNHCR map of refugee movements as of 22 August 2014



### Annex 59: Table of incidents of obstruction of humanitarian aid, Central African Republic, from 1 May 2014 to 14 August 2014

	Date	Prefecture	ATT	K	W	D	LT	T	Summary	Source
1	May	Bangui	anti-balaka	1,0	0,0	0	0	0	On 1 May 2014, anti-balaka murdered a national staff member of the United Nations and left his dismembered body behind a house that serves as the anti-balaka checkpoint in the area of PK16, on the route between Bangui and Damara.	UN Reports
2	May	Nana-Gribizi	former Séléka	0,0	0,0	0	1	1	In May 2014, the compound of an INGO was looted by former Séléka fighters. They took computers and other things. The INGO decided to suspend its activities in Kaga-Bandoro and relocate its staff to Bangui.	INGO
3	May	Bamingui-Bangoran	Unknown	0,0	0,0	0	1	0	In May 2014, an INGO base in N'Délé was looted by armed men. The guards were hit but were not seriously hurt. They took five telephones, three chargers, two torches, and one guard's bag with 26,000 CFA (51 USD) and other small things. They wanted to continue to loot the place but two former Séléka elements fired into the air and the looters ran away.	INGO
4	May	Nana-Gribizi	anti-balaka	0,0	0,0	0	1	0	In May 2014, the anti-balaka stopped two INGO vehicles and took the opportunity to accuse other INGOs of transporting Muslims with their convoys. All valuables from staff members were taken.	INGO
5	May	Nana-Gribizi	former Séléka	0,0	0,0	0	1	0	Former Séléka operatives broke in to an INGO office in Kaga-Bandoro. The INGO guards escaped the scene. During the incident, there was no INGO staff present in the office. No missing items were reported. The INGO decided to relocate their staff from Kaga-Bandoro to Bangui. During the relocation on 8 May 2014, at around 13:00 hours, an INGO convoy to Bangui was stopped by the anti-balaka operatives in Guifa village. The anti-balaka elements took mobile phones and other small items from the INGO staff. No injuries or casualties were reported.	INGO

6	May	Kemo Gribingui	Various	0,0	0,0	0	1	0	From 6 to 8 May 2014, one contracted transporter was hired to bring medicine from Bangui to Alindao. He was constantly harassed at checks points. At Libi (close to Sibut) its cargo was searched by the anti-balaka who suspected him to transport weapons. At Grimari he met 25 armed former Séléka who forced him to transport them to Bambari (contracted lorry without visibilities). The transporter was also obliged to pay 50,000 CFA (98 USD) for "formalities". Upon arrival in Alindao, two local former Séléka forced him to follow to an unknown direction and sub field manager was obliged to call the sous-préfet to get the vehicle back. Then, when unloading the lorry, four other former Séléka showed up and began to open the boxes "to check if an INGO was not transporting weaponry." They stopped when the local former Séléka leader went to the scene and ordered them to stop.	INGO
7	May	Kemo Gribingui	anti-balaka	0,0	0,0	0	1	0	In May 2014, an INGO convoy was stopped and looted by armed anti-balaka a few km. before arriving to Sibut. Mobile phones, money and personal valuables were stolen from the INGO staff present at the moment. No injuries or casualties were reported.	INGO
8	May	Kemo Gribingui	anti-balaka	0,0	0,0	0	1	0	An INGO vehicle had a flat tire right after passing the anti-balaka checkpoint in the route Sibut – Dekoa. Eight INGO staff members were in the vehicle. While they were changing the tire, a group of armed men approached them and looted all their valuables at gun point. No injuries or casualties were reported.	INGO
9	May	Kemo Gribingui	anti-balaka	0,0	0,0	0	0	0	The anti-balaka accused the United Nations of transporting Muslims with their convoys. Threats had been transmitted several times.	UN reports
10	May	Mambéré-Kadéï	former Séléka	0,0	0,0	0	1	0	An INGO was threatened by a group of six armed former Séléka, asking for four tires for pickup trucks. The INGO was forced to give them.	INGO
11	May	Nana-Gribizi	former Séléka	0,0	0,0	0	1	0	The compound of an INGO was looted by former Séléka fighters. They took computers and other things. The INGO has decided to suspend its activities in Kaga-Bandoro and relocate its staff to Bangui.	INGO



12	May	Bangui	anti-balaka	0,0	0,0	0	0	0	On 12 May 2014, two children who were accused of witchcraft by the anti-balaka, were welcomed at the INGO Child Protection workshop at M'Poko IDP Camp. However, anti-balaka wanted to take them away and put them on trial through "traditional justice" One of the girls was transferred by an INGO staff to the nearest police station for protection. The other one was wounded but managed to escape, most likely to Saint Joseph Mukasa IDP Camp where her mother lives. The anti-balaka was furious with the INGO staff since they did not permit them to take the girls and proceeded to threaten the INGO staff. The INGO Security Officer intervened and safeguarded the staff and the educational material.	INGO
13	May	Haut-Mbomou	Others	0,0	0,0	0	0	0	On 13 May 2014, a CNR (National agency for the refugees) while ensuring security at a non-food items distribution site, threatened the Head of Field Office of the United Nations with a loaded weapon. United Nations staff members and police officers intervened and disarmed the perpetrator who was escorted to the Gendarmerie. The reason and motives of intimidation are unknown.	UN Report
14	May	Kemo Gribingui	anti-balaka	0,0	0,0	0	0	0	An INGO convoy of two vehicles was heading towards Sibut. When the convoy arrived at Kangamote (11km. from Sibut), it was stopped by the anti-balaka group shooting in the air. The anti-balaka has demanded to be picked up to go to Sibut. A violent dispute occurred between the driver and anti-balaka. One anti-balaka member broke the windscreen. Then, one of their leaders decided to let vehicles go to Sibut. When vehicles proceeded again towards Sibut, six anti-balaka jumped into the back of one pickup vehicle. The vehicle stopped after few hundred metres and anti-balaka jumped off the vehicle.	INGO
15	May	Bangui	anti-balaka	0,0	0,0	0	1	0	On a mission from Bangui to Sibut, a rental car, carrying four INGO national staff members, broke down due to a flat tire at Damara. A second vehicle was deployed from Bangui to tow back the broken down vehicle and the staff to Bangui. However, at	INGOs

									around 00:00 hours, at PK12, the mission was blocked by a patrol of anti-balaka. The anti-balaka threatened the staff, took their cell phones and kept them imprisoned during the night. The next morning the team was released and their cell phones were returned. No violence or torture was exerted on the team at any point. Another vehicle had to be sent to repair the first vehicle.	
16	May	Bamingui-Baingoran	former Séléka	0,0	0,0	0	1	0	Two INGO vehicles, transporting products from the water distribution foundation Sodeca, were intercepted by armed men at the village of Yambala, on the road between Mbres and N'Délé. The armed men forced the drivers of the vehicles to drive them to the city of N'Délé. At N'Délé the armed men descended from the vehicles and disappeared in to the bush. As a result of this attack, a INGO has decided to suspend all its activities outside the urban centres of central and north-eastern part of the CAR.	INGO
17	May	Ouham	anti-balaka	0,0	0,0	0	1	0	The anti-balaka fighters, located at the corridor of the northern exit to Paoua, intercepted the United Nations vehicle and threatened to take five bags of rice from it. Subsequently, the United Nations security officer and the local chief of the anti-balaka fighters went to the scene and convinced the anti-balaka fighters to return the bags of rice to the United Nations crew. Upon persuasion from the security officer and the chief of the anti-balaka ordered his men not to interfere or attack vehicles bearing the United Nations logo.	UN Reports
18	May	Haut-Mbomou	Various	0,0	0,0	0	1	0	A truck rented by an INGO, traveling from Bangui to Zemio, was subject to harassment and attacks by armed men along its route. At PK 26 in Bangui, four motorcycles and Income Generating Kits were stolen by the anti-balaka elements. Further, at Sibut, more of the income generating kit disappeared. Finally, in Alindao, the truck was held for two days by former Séléka who half-emptied the entire truck of its contents before releasing it.	UN Reports

19	May	Bangui	anti-balaka	0,0	0,0	0	1	0	Attempted robbery by three armed anti-balaka men on the residence of one of the national staff members of the United Nations. The staff member informed the Radio Room that her house was under attack. Security team (Moroccan guard force) was deployed to her house. Upon arrival of the security team, the attackers fled over the back wall of the house. The gatekeeper of the house had been tied up by the perpetrators.	UN reports
20	May	Ouaka	Various	0,0	0,0	0	0	0	In the morning of 22 May 2014, Sangaris forces received the order to disarm the new former Séléka headquarters located in Bambari. Former Séléka refused to be disarmed and began to fight. All expats went into hibernation and stopped operations for weeks.	INGOs
21	May	Bangui	Unknown	0,0	0,0	0	0	0	A young man, armed with grenade, approached INGO base/premises in Bangui and threatened to throw the grenade stating that the INGO was "hiding Muslims in the base." The individual finally left with no explanation. The INGO staff was non-operational during the day.	INGO
22	June	Ouaka	Unknown	0,0	0,0	0	1	0	In June 2014, in Bambari, an INGO motorbike was stolen by unidentified armed men while intense combats were taking place in the village.	INGO
23	June	Ouaka	Unknown	0,0	0,0	0	1	0	In June 2014, at night, an INGO office was robbed by unknown armed men. The perpetrators entered the building by breaking a window. All valuables were taken including the safe.	INGO
24	June	Haut-Mbomou	Others	0,0	0,0	0	1	0	An INGO base in Mboki has been completely looted. A crowd made up of the inhabitants of Mboki, pillaged a truck that was loading equipment at the INGO base. After completely emptying the truck, they moved onwards into the base and emptied the entire compound. Amongst the things that were looted were computers, printers, documents, cash money, satellite phones and many other items. The INGO has declared that it has now been forced to suspend its activities in Mboki.	INGO, RJDHRCA0 60614; France24060 614

25	June	Bamingui-Bangoran	Unknown	0,0	0,0	0	1	0	In June 2014, in N'Délé, approximately four armed men entered the INGO base. No report on items stolen/looted. No injuries were inflicted. The INGO relocated its staff. Operations suspended.	INGO
26	June	Nana-Gribizi	Unknown	0,0	0,0	0	1	0	An INGO base in Kaga-Bandoro was attacked and robbed by a group of armed men in turbans. They took six mobile and satellite phones and money from the safe. No physical violence reported.	INGO; RNL040614
27	June	Ombella M'Poko	Not attributable	0,0	1,0	0	0	0	An INGO vehicle ran over a four-year-old child by accident in a village close to Yaloké. One vehicle was taken to the anti-balaka headquarters in town, while another vehicle took the injured child to the hospital. Staff members who were in the first vehicle were searched by the anti-balaka. All their valuables were taken. After extensive discussion and violence the vehicle was released with two anti-balaka and the family of the injured child. The vehicle met the rest of the team in Yaloké and took the child to Bangui. The anti-balaka charged approximately 100,000 CFA (197 USD) to help the vehicle exit the village. Few km. after Yaloké, anti-balaka left the vehicle. The child was taken to Bangui and released the next day.	INGO
28	June	Bangui	Others	0,0	0,0	0	1	0	On 3 June 2014, at around 23:00 hours, the United Nations national staff member was the victim of an armed robbery, conducted by six perpetrators who were posing as anti-balaka. The alleged perpetrators were in possession of two AK-47 assault rifles and four machete knives. They demanded the sum of 400,000 CFA (790 USD). Once a staff member declared he did not have that amount of money in his possession, they took his work phone and some of his clothes. The incident lasted for about an hour. No physical violence was exerted.	UN Reports
29	June	Ouham-Pende	Others	1,0	0,0	0	0	0	One INGO staff member was shot and killed in Kambakota near Batangafo. Reports indicate that the murder was committed as a settlement of personal account (the agent was FACA military officer before joining the INGO). Fulani knew he was from the village and waited for his return to kill him.	INGO

30	June	Bamingui-Bangoran	Unknown	0,0	2,0	1	1	0	Four armed men in military attire (each carrying AK-47 assault rifle) forcibly entered an INGO warehouse in N'Délé (located around 50 miles from the INGO base). After finding nothing to steal, they proceeded towards the INGO base. They climbed the outside wall and using their weapons hit two guards on duty (the guards were not injured). They took five mobile phones, three chargers, two flashlights, an INGO T-shirts, 26,000 CFA (50 USD) and other things. Then the assailants requested to see the expats house. The guards complied. While the armed men tried to break in by force, the former Séléka patrol was passing by and heard the noise. The patrol fired a shot to the air and called the guards of the base. The armed men ran away before the former Séléka patrol entered the base.	INGO
31	June	Kemo Gribingui	anti-balaka	1,0	0,0	0	1	0	On 3 June 2014, a convoy, composed of 27 trucks carrying humanitarian material (some privately rented, others belonging to the INGOs), was going to Kaga-Bandoro (17 trucks) and to Bambari (10 trucks). The convoy left Bangui early in the morning, escorted by the Rwandan MISCA soldiers, and arrived to Damara at around 18:00 hrs. In Damara the convoy was met by the Gabonese MISCA soldiers who continued the escort. Gabonese MISCA soldiers said that Damara was too dangerous to spend the night there, the truck drivers followed instructions. The convoy left Damara at 19:00 hours. At around 21:00 hours the convoy was stopped by a group of armed anti-balaka, next to the village of Mabo (40 km. south of Sibut). Some armed men started shooting at the last four trucks of the convoy and threw a grenade towards the same direction. MISCA responded by shooting at the assailants who retreated to the forest a short while after. Many of the trucks were affected by the clash. Some of them were either repaired fairly quickly, or continued while damaged, except for one INGO truck which could not continue. The passengers in the truck requested MISCA to wait for them; MISCA refused and left the truck alone in the road. After the reparations the truck continued its way. While passing	UN Reports

									by the town of Mabo, same armed men attacked again. The driver did not stop but the assailants were able to jump into the back of the truck. They killed the apprentice with a machete and threw his corpse from the truck. They have also looted several bags of food and material that were in the back of the truck.	
32	June	Ouham-Pende	Others	1,0	0,0	0	0	0	In June 2014, the Fulani killed an INGO national staff member, in Dokaba village located 35 km. north of Batangafo.	INGO
33	June	Bangui	anti-balaka	0,0	0,0	0	0	0	The driver of INGO vehicle was abducted by the anti-balaka element. The vehicle and driver were released few weeks after.	INGO
34	June	Nana-Gribizi	Unknown	0,0	0,0	0	1	0	Roughly ten armed people went to the project site of an INGO and threatened the guard. They opened about 20 boxes full of toys and equipment, took plastic sheeting and empty drums. Some toys were destroyed.	INGO
35	June	Kemo Gribingui	anti-balaka	0,0	0,0	1	0	0	On 3 June 2014, an INGO convoy was being escorted by MISCA (firstly by Rwandese and then by Gabonese soldiers). At PK 40 the convoy was attacked by the anti-balaka. Fire exchange between the attackers and MISCA followed. Several vehicles were hit by the bullets, including the truck rented by another INGO.	INGO
36	June	Ouham-Pende	anti-balaka	0,0	0,0	0	1	0	On 5 June 2014, anti-balaka elements from Bocaranga have allegedly intercepted a truck that was carrying merchandise from N'Gaoundere (Cameroon) to an INGO in Paoua. The anti-balaka elements insisted that they had received instructions from their commanding officer to intercept the truck and drive it to Bocaranga, if they had not succeeded, to set the truck on fire. The inhabitants of Ndim persuaded the anti-balaka elements to take 50,000 CFA (100 USD) and let the vehicle proceed. The anti-balaka eventually agreed.	UN Reports
37	June	Ouaka	Unknown	0,0	0,0	0	1	0	On 5 June 2014, armed men with a machete entered the new INGO compound and stole communications equipment. No physical violence reported.	INGO
38	June	Ouham-Pende	anti-balaka	0,0	1,0	0	1	1	On 5 June 2014, in the road from Bocaranga to Ndim, a private truck carrying material for the INGO's projects, was stopped at the checkpoint by the anti-	INGO

									balaka from Bocaranga. The driver had to pay 85,000 CFA (167 USD) to release the truck. Meanwhile, the owner of the truck was informed about the incident and took the road to recuperate the truck. When the truck arrived to Paoua, the driver found that the owner of the truck, who is a Muslim, had been kidnapped and tortured by the same anti-balaka. The family of the owner had to pay 450,000 CFA (888 USD) for the release of the individual.	
39	June	Ouaka	Unknown	0,0	0,0	0	1	0	On 6 June 2014, at around 12:40 hours, a group of four armed men with hunting rifles and one AK-47 assault rifle stopped and searched an INGO vehicle that was on the way to the town of Goussiema. They took all personal belongings from four staff members (three nationals and one international), including three mobile phones.	INGO
40	June	Lobaye	anti-balaka	0,0	0,0	0	1	0	On 6 June 2014, the food distribution in Boda was stopped by the anti-balaka elements who threatened the INGO staff, stole rice, peanut seeds, corn and hoes. The distribution was being undertaken by an INGO.	INGO
41	June	Ombella M'Poko	anti-balaka	0,0	2,0	1	0	0	In the early afternoon of 8 June 2014, 60 km. north of Damara, a humanitarian convoy coming from Bangui was attacked by the anti-balaka. The convoy (17 trucks) departed from outside the United Nations offices going to two locations: one to Kaga-Bandoro and another one to Bangassou. The convoy, heading to Kaga-Bandoro, was escorted by Gabonese MISCA soldiers on the Bangui-Sibut axis, when it was attacked by the anti-balaka. The escort responded to the attack. Young girls aged nine or ten-year-old were wounded by a gunshot (two fingers were cut off). The nurse from Gabonese MISCA took care of the girls, Sangaris doctor performed the surgery. The girls were being observed at the Sibut hospital. One damaged truck was picked up by Gabon Batallion.	UN reports, Panel of Experts
42	June	Nana-Gribizi	Unknown	0,0	0,0	0	0	0	On 8 June 2014, several threats were addressed to the United Nations national staff member using telephone communications. Neither the person who is threatening nor the reasons of threats are known. The United	UN Reports

									Nations security officers are closely following the situation.	
43	June	Ouham-Pende	anti-balaka	0,0	0,0	0	0	0	On 10 June 2014, an INGO driver was threatened by a group of about 20 armed anti-balaka members.	INGO
44	June	Ouham-Pende	anti-balaka	0,0	0,0	0	1	0	On 11 June 2014, in Danga, the distribution of food supplies by an INGO was disrupted by the anti-balaka. Three tons of bags of rice were pillaged. The distribution of supplies was suspended.	UN reports
45	June	Bangui	anti-balaka	0,0	0,0	0	0	0	On 11 June 2014, at around 11:00 hours, a medical team that departed from the Ndjojo IDP site was intercepted by two anti-balaka elements, who accused the driver of the vehicle (a non-UN member) to be a Muslim. They asked his identity card for verification. The driver was Christian. The anti-balaka elements told him that he was lucky, because they would have killed him if he had been a Muslim. There were three passengers present in the vehicle, including two UN staff members.	UN reports
46	June	Ouham	RJ	0,0	1,0	0	0	0	On 12 June 2014, an INGO convoy was stopped by Revolution et Justice elements 2 km. from Benamkouna asking for part of the goods that were being carried in the trucks. During the incident MISCA from Paoua arrived. The INGO convoy left the area as soon as the clashes started. Two wounded (one RJ element and one civilian young man) were taken to the INGO hospital.	INGO
47	June	Ouaka	Unknown	0,0	0,0	0	1	0	On 13 June 2014, at around 01:00 hours, one armed man in turban, who only spoke Arabic, entered an INGO warehouse. During the robbery, he made the guards take their clothes off and lie on the floor while he stole what he could.	INGO
48	June	Bangui	Unknown	0,0	0,0	0	1	0	On the night of 13 to 14 June 2014, the Child Friendly Spaces (CFS) ran by an INGO in the IDP camp of M'Poko was attacked by armed anti-balaka men who stole some buckets, recreational items and plastics. They were looking for food but did not find any. After the incident, the INGO team met with the anti-balaka leader in M'Poko to sensitize. They agreed not to attack the site anymore.	INGO



49	June	Bangui	anti-balaka	0,0	1,0	0	0	0	On 15 June 2014, in Bangui, an INGO vehicle was brought to the Malmaka neighbourhood (5 <sup>th</sup> <i>arrondissement</i> ) for cleaning. The vehicle was left there. The person in charge of cleaning the vehicle was kidnapped and taken to the Combatant neighbourhood by young anti-balaka members. The vehicle is now in the Senegalese neighbourhood of Baidi, where Rwandese MISCA soldiers are stationed.	UN Reports
50	June	Ouham-Pende	anti-balaka	0,0	0,0	0	1	0	On 16 June 2014, in Balone village, around 3 km. from Batangafo, the anti-balaka seized a vehicle belonging to an INGO for unknown reasons. Upon arrival in Batangafo, the vehicle was seized by the former Séléka. On 17 June, Congolese MISCA soldiers intervened by seizing the vehicle and returning it to the INGO.	UN Reports
51	June	Nana-Gribizi	former Séléka	0,0	0,0	0	1	0	On the night of 17 to 18 June 2014, there were further attempts of thefts at the INGO compound in Kaga-Bandoro. This action was allegedly led by armed men identified as former Séléka. The absence of punitive action against former Séléka favours the current insecure situation, and is worrying both the population and the INGOs.	UN Reports
52	June	Bangui	anti-balaka	0,0	0,0	0	0	0	On 18 July 2014, in the 8 <sup>th</sup> neighbourhood (Martir's Avenue) the INGO vehicle was stopped at the anti-balaka checkpoint and was threatened to be hit with a grenade if passengers did not hand over their valuables. The vehicle was held for around 40 minutes. The passengers explained to the armed men that they were humanitarian workers and they were let go without further harm.	INGO
53	June	Nana-Gribizi	former Séléka	0,0	0,0	0	1	0	On the night of 18 to 19 June 2014, in Kaga-Bandoro, there was an attempted robbery by the former Séléka in the concession belonging to an INGO. The absence of punitive action against former Séléka favours such incidents.	UN Reports
54	June	Nana-Gribizi	Unknown	0,0	3,0	1	1	1	On 18 June 2014, at around 21:00 hours, five armed men wearing uniforms forcefully entered the house of an INGO staff member. Men were armed with an AK-	INGO

									47 assault rifles, some had machetes as well. Upon hearing people outside the door, the house residents tried to stop the entry, but the door was kicked open. Upon entering, the house residents tried to fight the men off, but each received blows from the armed men. One received a hit at the back from a machete and also received a hit on the right side of the chest (lower rib cage) from the butt of an AK-47 assault rifle. The other two also received blows at the back from machetes. The INGO Security Manager was informed about the incident at 23:00 hours. By that time, three injured men were brought to an INGO hospital, where they spent the night and received care. Items stolen: three phones, three suitcases, clothes, one mattress, 178,000 CFA (350 USD). An INGO staff lost: two phones, one suitcase, clothes, one mattress, 90,000 CFA (177 USD). During the fighting, one armed man lost his AK-47 bayonet, which the INGO recovered and handed over to the United Nations.	
55	June	Nana-Gribizi	Unknown	0,0	0,0	0	1	0	On 19 June 2014, at around 22:00 hours, two armed men entered the residence of an INGO national staff. Two staff members were beaten, ordered to take off their clothes and robbed. Money, mobile phones and other valuable were taken. Only males were present at the moment of the incident.	INGO
56	June	Bangui	anti-balaka	0,0	0,0	0	1	0	On 19 June 2014, at INGO projects' site at the 4 <sup>th</sup> <i>arrondissement</i> , there were clashes between MISCA and the anti-balaka. Once the clashes began, an INGO staff members took one of their motorbikes to the chef de Quartier where it had to be guarded. However, the armed group of the anti-balaka intercepted and took the motorbike.	INGO
57	June	Ouaka	anti-balaka	0,0	0,0	1	0	0	On 23 June 2014, at around 11:00 hours, 15 km. south of Grimari, an INGO four-truck convoy, transporting 100 tonnes of seeds, were stopped by the anti-balaka and demanded to be transported to Bambari. The drivers refused, the anti-balaka shot at one of the trucks damaging the wheel. Tthe trucks continued their way without further damage.	INGO

58	June	Ouaka	Unknown	0,0	0,0	0	1	0	On 23 June 2014, in Bambari at 19:30 hours, three INGO national staff members, who live in the Sica neighbourhood, were victims of hold-ups in their residences. A group of four armed men stole from one of the victims all his personal belongings, including a bag containing 50,000 CFA (50 USD). The other two INGO staff members had all their personal effects stolen as well.	UN Reports
59	June	Nana-Mambere	Unknown	0,0	0,0	0	0	0	On the night of 23 to 24 June 2014, in Bouar, a group of armed men went to the residence of an INGO national staff member, planning a hold-up. However, they were unable to go through with the operation because of the noise of saucepans that woke up the entire neighbourhood.	UN Reports
60	June	Ouaka	Unknown	0,0	0,0	0	0	0	On 23 June 2014, the anti-Balaka attacked a village 10 km. south-east from Bambari. Security situation was very tense. Some INGOs in Bambari went to the United Nations for shelter and other INGOs went into hibernation until security situation was clear. This situation lasted until 27 June. On 27 June, one INGO evacuated/re-located four staff members from Bambari to Bangui. Eight remain there with one vehicle and one ambulance. Programs and operation were minimized to only some parts of Bambari and now they are re-thinking of re-opening the programs.	INGO
61	June	Ouham-Pende	Unknown	0,0	1,0	0	1	0	On 26 June 2014, in Batangafo, approximately 10 armed men wearing military clothes arrived to an INGO staff member's house. They were threatening, beating and looting him.	INGO
62	June	Lobaye	MISCA	0,0	1,0	0	0	0	In June 2014, at around 16:00 hours, MISCA opened fire towards the population for unknown reasons close to the health centre ran by an INGO in Boda. One guard of the health centre was wounded and received treatment. The operations of the INGO had to be stopped for few days due to the tensions in town.	INGO

63	June	Bangui	Unknown	0,0	0,0	0	1	0	On 28 June 2014, at around 20:00 hours, close to PK0, an INGO vehicle was stopped by another vehicle from which three armed men descended, approached the INGO vehicle, shot to the air (clearly to create some panic) and asked the driver to get down from the vehicle. The driver accepted without resistance. The INGO contacted the United Nations asking for help. However, the vehicle was not retrieved.	INGO
64	June	Bangui	Unknown	0,0	0,0	0	1	0	On 28 June 2014, at around 19:55 hours, on the road between the stadium and Bangui University (1 <sup>st</sup> <i>arrondissement</i> ), an unidentified group of armed men fired shots into the air and hijacked an INGO vehicle. The robbers forced the INGO staff out of the vehicle and left towards unknown destination.	UN Reports
65	June	Nana-Gribizi	anti-balaka	0,0	1,0	0	0	1	On 28 June 2014, the mayor of Kaga-Bandoro was with an INGO team. The team stopped to talk to the anti-balaka ComZone and his men. The ComZone and others got angry and aggressive and claimed that the mayor was in fact a traitor working for the former Séléka and that he could not leave with the team. Tensions increased and other members of anti-balaka started verbally and physically abusing the mayor, throwing him to the ground and beating him. While this unfolded the anti-balaka ordered the INGO team to turn off the vehicles, get out of their cars, and stop all communications. After an hour of discussion and pleading the anti-balaka agreed to let the team and the mayor depart, but not without again beating and threatening him.	INGO
66	June	Bangui	Unknown	0,0	0,0	0	1	0	On 28 June 2014, six armed men came to the INGO compound taking one vehicle, two handsets and two mobile phones.	INGO
67	June	Nana-Gribizi	anti-balaka	0,0	0,0	0	0	0	On 28 June 2014, in Botto (Kaga-Bandoro prefecture), an assessment team of an INGO had a confrontation with the anti-balaka elements who contested the presence of the Deputy Mayor of Kaga-Bandoro as part of the assessment team. The Deputy Mayor was kidnapped by the anti-balaka elements and released later on following the intervention of the INGO's Head of the Mission.	UN Reports

68	June	Ouham-Pende	Unknown	0,0	0,0	0	1	0	On 30 June 2014, in Bambara, an INGO team was threatened by three heavily armed men after a food distribution for civilian population had finished. The INGO team decided to give them some goods that were meant for other vulnerable populations.	INGO
69	June	Haute Sangha	Unknown	0,0	1,0	1	1	0	On 30 June 2014, in Berbérati, an INGO team chose the Barthelemy Boganda Stadium to undertake the food distribution for the beneficiaries in the 4 <sup>th</sup> and 5 <sup>th</sup> <i>arrondissements</i> . The distribution had been delayed since additional security measures had to be put in place. Eighty people, including the INGO staff, drivers, security guards and daily workers participated in the distribution. The distribution started at 10:00 hours and was stopped at 12:00 hours to collect more goods from the warehouse. At 15:00 hours it was re-initiated. During the break a group of young armed men entered the stadium unnoticed. When the group of beneficiaries arrived (mainly composed of young men) they forcibly threw down the gates of the stadium and occupied the place creating panic. The group of armed young men approached the staff present and forced them to give away the keys of the trucks. The staff complied. Meanwhile, drivers of the bigger trucks moved to block the entrance that prevented armed men from leaving. During the confusion, the armed men left the stadium after severely injuring one of the daily workers and taking with them 20 bags of rice and 50 kg. of other goods (NFIs). They have also left the gates of the stadium damaged.	INGO
70	June	Ouham	former Séléka	0,0	0,0	0	0	0	On 29 June 2014, after mid-day, an INGO national staff member with his personal motorbike went to the market in Koki (north-east of Bossangoa). According to the information gathered, he was taken to the north by a group of the former Séléka when he was leaving Koki. The Panel facilitated the release of the victim.	INGO
71	July	Ouham-Pende	Unknown	0,0	0,0	0	1	0	On July 2014, armed men arrived to the residence of the INGO national staff member, threatened the residents with a grenade and looted the house. All valuables were taken, including 30,000 CFA (59 USD).	INGO

72	July	Ouham-Pende	Unknown	0,0	0,0	0	1	0	In July 2014, the residence of the INGO national staff member was visited by a group of armed men. During the incident, the staff member was absent but his family was present. Reports of looting.	INGO
73	July	Bangui	Unknown	0,0	0,0	0	0	0	On 1 July 2014, at around 13:00 hours, there was a shooting around the area of the medical centre (a tent, established by the INGO) at the M'poko IDP site. The medical centre had to be closed all afternoon due to the fragile security situation.	INGO
74	July	Ouham	former Séléka	0,0	0,0	0	0	0	On 1 July 2014, an INGO convoy found a non-detonated grenade on its way that allegedly belongs to former Séléka elements patrolling the Kabo – Moyen-Sido axis.	INGO
75	July	Ouham	Unknown	0,0	0,0	0	1	0	On 2 July 2014, around 12:00 hours, at 20 km. from Kabo, five INGO vehicles which were returning to Sido, were ambushed by unidentified gunmen who shot at and immobilized the vehicles. They robbed the passengers taking their mobile phones and an undetermined amount of money. No physical damage was exerted during the attack.	UN Reports
76	July	Bangui	Various	0,0	0,0	0	0	0	On 2 July 2014, at around 12:45 hours, an INGO vehicle was attacked by a group of young men protesting in the street. No major damage was caused. The vehicle was clearly marked as belonging to the INGO.	INGO
77	July	Bangui	Unknown	0,0	1,0	0	0	0	On 2 July 2014, in front of the university in Bangui, an INGO vehicle was attacked by a group of armed young men. At around 12:30 hours, three INGO staff and one the United Nations staff member on board of the vehicle were attacked with sticks and stones by the group of young men. The vehicle was completely surrounded at some point. The assailants were able to break two windows; one INGO staff member was injured. No further consequences reported.	INGO
78	July	Ouham	Others	0,0	0,0	0	1	0	On 3 July 2014, at around 15:00 hours, an INGO convoy of four vehicles carrying around 20 staff members were attacked by two armed men (carrying two AK-47 assault rifles) in civilian attire. The assailants were speaking a	INGO

									combination of Arabic and local language. The convoy was returning from Moyen-Sido to Sido, incident took place about 19 km. south of Moyen-Sido. The two armed men suddenly went out of the bush to the road and obliged the first vehicle to stop, one armed man approached the driver and demanded two million CFA (3,900 USD) and all the valuables. After a few seconds the second assailant shot at the first vehicle, the bullet went through the vehicle without harming any of the passengers. Later other three bullets were shot to the ground. Due to the clear threat the passengers started to hand over all their valuables and money. After no more than 10 minutes the assailants had taken all they could. They also intended to take vehicles, but for the unknown reason, they have changed their mind and disappeared into the bush carrying all stolen valuables. The convoy continued to drive. After 20 minutes of driving, the convoy stopped to check if anyone had been injured and if vehicles were damaged. Everything was ok. Upon arrival to Sido, the team reported the incident to the local former Séléka authorities, MISCA and the rest of the humanitarian community. The former Séléka authorities said they had tried to catch the assailants without success. Since then all humanitarian operations to Moyen-Sido have been stopped due to the security reasons. Humanitarian operations have not yet been renewed until the writing of the final report on 8 August 2014.	
79	July	Bangui	Unknown	0,0	0,0	0	0	0	The driver in a rented vehicle (pickup truck) wanted to drop-off an expat at the airport. The airport road was blocked by demonstrators. MISCA African peacekeepers told the driver to wait as they were about to clear the road. After clearing the road block (which included MISCA firing in the air) and as soon as the vehicle passed, demonstrators jumped into the road and pelted the vehicle with half-bricks and other large projectiles. The driver kept driving and did not stop. Three windows were shattered and both the driver and expat passenger were hit by flying glass and rocks. None sustained serious injuries.	INGO

80	July	Bangui	anti-balaka	0,0	0,0	0	0	0	On 5 July 2014, the INGO team that works in the Boy-Rabe area had to relocate due to repeated verbal threats from the anti-balaka in the area.	INGO
81	July	Ouaka	Various	1,0	0,0	0	0	0	On 7 July 2014, at St Joseph's IDP site in Bambari, 62-year-old INGO national staff member was killed during the attack at the IDP site. According to the information collected, at around 16:00 hours, a group of young Muslim armed men forced their entry to the church and started shooting indiscriminately to the civilians who sought shelter at the church after the shooting was heard. Allegedly staff member's body had been chopped in pieces with a machete. His body was recuperated by his family the day after and properly buried. Information from different sources indicates that the armed young men were supported by the former Séléka elements. However, this has to be further investigated.	INGO
82	July	Ouaka	Various	0,0	0,0	0	1	0	On 7 July 2014, at St Joseph's IDP site in Bambari, the same armed men, who have attacked the church, attempted to hijack INGO vehicle. The vehicle was not stolen due to the intervention of the former Séléka men who arrived at the site after some hours of clashes. During the attack, all the construction material that the INGO had in stock in the site was looted and the latrines and all WATSAN work done destroyed. Information from different sources indicates that the armed young men were supported by the former Séléka elements.	INGO
83	July	Ouaka	Unknown	0,0	0,0	0	1	0	On 7 July 2014, in Bambari, the residences of two United Nations staff members, who were staying at the Bishop IDP site, and one staff member staying at the Centre Pastoral Abbé Lazare, were completely looted after the attacks earlier that day.	UN Reports
84	July	Bangui	Unknown	0,0	0,0	0	1	0	On 9 July 2014, at around 13:00 hours, an INGO vehicle was approached by two young men who tried to force their way into the vehicle. They did not succeed because the staff locked the vehicle from the inside. The two men then took a mobile phone through the window of the driver's seat, but later threw it back into	INGO



									the vehicle. After they shouted at the driver to leave the location as soon as possible if not they were going to harm them. No further damage was reported.	
85	July	Ombella M'Poko	anti-balaka	0,0	0,0	0	0	0	On 9 July 2014, at around 08:00 hours, a convoy of humanitarians were temporarily held up by the anti-balaka elements in Boali. There were five vehicles, carrying approximately 21 staff members from the United Nations agencies and an INGO, who were going on a mission in the interior of the country. The anti-balaka was holding them up to demonstrate against the fact that one of their comrades was killed by MISCA soldier. They temporarily kidnapped three western women and took them to the river where they sat them down and gave them food, and returned with the women shortly after. However, there was a very clearly stated threat to execute the three western women in revenge if any more of the anti-balaka group were killed by MISCA. Back at the main site, it was announced that there was MISCA convoy approaching from the north and the anti-balaka group anticipated a firefight. However, a negotiation between the United Nations field officer, MISCA troops and the anti-balaka avoided a firefight. All persons were released unharmed. The incident was concluded by 13:15 hours.	UN Reports, INGO
86	July	Bangui	Unknown	0,0	0,0	0	0	0	Reports of several staff members receiving threatening phone calls.	INGO
87	July	Bangui	Unknown	0,0	0,0	0	1	0	On 11 July 2014, at around 14:00 hours, an INGO vehicle was a victim of an attempted car hijacking in Bangui. The INGO security officer was attacked by a group of four armed men who stopped the car by threatening to shoot at the vehicle. The vehicle was going out of the United Nations office and heading back to the INGO compound. The INGO staff stopped the vehicle and negotiated with criminals. After 30 min. of negotiation, the INGO staff was released unharmed. According to the information gathered, the perpetrators were the anti-balaka.	Panel of Experts
88	July	Kemo Gribingui	former Séléka	0,0	0,0	0	0	0	Two expats were returning by road from Bangassou to Alindao. At the Kongbo checkpoint 60 km. south of	INGO

									Alindao, drunk former Séléka soldiers harassed them about transferring a pregnant woman to Alindao. The soldiers got angry and threatened the staff. Long discussion ensued and the ComZone (local former Séléka commander) eventually let them go, but not until asking for money and drugs, which were not given.	
89	July	Ouham	former Séléka	0,0	0,0	0	0	0	An attempted forced entry into an INGO base by five heavily armed former Séléka elements.	INGO
90	July	Ouham	Unknown	0,0	0,0	0	1	0	On the night of 15 July 2014, unidentified armed men broke into an INGO compound in Batangafo. Following this attack, on 17 July 2014, the INGO decided to suspend its activities and send the international staff back to Bangui.	UN Reports
91	July	Ouham	Unknown	0,0	0,0	0	1	0	On 18 July 2014, in Bossangoa, a convoy of trucks (hired by the United Nations and an INGO) transporting humanitarian supplies was attacked and looted on the road from Bangui to Bossangoa.	UN Reports
92	July	Ouham-Pende	Unknown	0,0	0,0	0	0	0	In the afternoon of 18 July 2014, a doctor of the INGO hospital in Paoua was walking back to his house when he was stopped by a man armed with a rifle and two grenades. Two passers-by saved the doctor and the armed man fled into the bush.	UN Reports
93	July	Ombella M'Poko	anti-balaka	0,0	0,0	0	1	0	On 17 July 2014, the Yaloké bridge broke and several INGOs were stuck with their vehicles in the northern side of Yaloké on the road to Bangui. On 18 July, some vehicles tried an alternative route not suitable for trucks to pass. An INGO vehicle, with three staff members on board, decided to take that route to reach Bangui. After passing through a small village called Zaoua, an armed individual came out of the bush and made the vehicle stop. Few seconds after, 15 more men went out of the bush (most of them were armed with artisanal weapons but two of them had AK-47 assault rifles). Armed men took all the valuables from the staff. They have also threatened to take the vehicle, but after negotiation, the INGO team was released.	INGO; UN Reports

94	July	Bamingui-Bangoran	Government Forces	0,0	0,0	0	1	0	<p>On 19 July 2014, 20 trucks of food and goods arrived from Sudan to Birao for an INGO to undertake the humanitarian distribution in N'Délé. The trucks were carrying one INGO's goods but marked as a different INGO. The trucks were escorted by a group of armed men who were commissioned by the Sultan of Birao to provide security to the convoy. Upon arrival to N'Délé, the trucks were taken to the INGO base as planned, unloaded and stocked in the INGO warehouse. However, the keys of the warehouse were kept by the Sultan and no access was given to the INGO staff.</p> <p>On 20 July, the INGO delegations arrived to N'Délé to talk to the Sultan (he is 23-years-old) and he agreed to give the keys of the place where the goods were being kept. The distribution was planned to start right after but there was some tension in the village caused by the list of beneficiaries. The INGO and implementing partners have a list of households in need but some of the authorities in the village were advocating for a general distribution in the entire <i>sous-préfecture</i>. Another delegation from the INGO returned to N'Délé to explain that this was not possible and that the INGO was already assisting returnees and there could not be duplication. The Sultan agreed. At this point some of the goods that had arrived from Sudan and which were being kept under the control of the Sultan could be seen in the local market for sale.</p> <p>The INGO staff had received several threats by then, some because of the delay in the distribution, some because of the situation that was taking place. The INGO head of delegation travelled to N'Délé to sort out the issue. He was called by one of the three COMZONE in the village, who spoke to him and to the Sultan, but they could not arrive to an agreement. The INGO Head of Delegation was threatened that he would not be able to leave N'Délé unless he accepted the conditions required by the authorities. Due to the tense situation he went back and slept and the Sangaris base (this was the second night in N'Délé, the first</p>	INGOs
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									<p>night he slept in the INGO base). One of the national staff members was attacked in the streets of the village, with no mayor consequences. The humanitarians proceed to tell the authorities that they were prepared to stop all operations. The Sultan then sent a letter to the INGOs explaining that he would cooperate.</p> <p>Finally, INGOs delegation went to N'Délé to talk with all relevant stakeholders and the Sultan finally accepted to give back the keys and permit the distribution to take place as agreed. The distribution had not started at the time of writing of this incident on 7 August 2014.</p>	
95	July	Bangui	anti-balaka	0,0	0,0	0	1	0	<p>On 20 July 2014, at around 14:00 hours, an INGO vehicle, that had departed from Bozoum with five INGO staff members, was stopped at the anti-balaka check point 45 km. north of Bangui. Three armed men requested for all the valuables, including some empty Jerry Cans (JC) in the back of the vehicle. The driver explained that the Jerry Cans were empty and one of the three men shot at the ground in a threatening way. Finally, the armed men took all the JC from the vehicle, took all personal valuables from the staff and let them leave the location. The staff present reported that they had seen Sangaris and MISCA patrols in the road several times.</p>	INGO; UN Reports
96	July	Haute-Kotto	former Séléka	0,0	0,0	0	0	0	<p>On 20 July 2014, an INGO team arrived to Bria to undertake an assessment. Few hours after they arrived they were called by the former Séléka authority in town (to be determined) who forced them to leave the town. The team was given two hours to depart back to Bangui. They had to leave without having undertaken the task. No further harm was reported.</p>	INGO
97	July	Bangui	Unknown	0,0	0,0	0	1	0	<p>On 22 July 2014, at around 14:00 hours, an INGO truck was stuck in the mud in Boy-Rabe – Bangui axis when armed men attacked and looted the truck.</p>	UN Reports

98	July	Kemo	anti-balaka	0,0	0,0	0	0	0	On 23 July 2014, at around 15:00 hours, in the outskirts of the village of Gafondo, a convoy of nine INGO private contracted trucks and one INGO truck carrying humanitarian aid to Bambari were stopped at the anti-balaka checkpoint, where each driver was asked to pay 50,000 CFA (100 USD) for passage. Two experts from the Panel happened to be on the spot at the time of event and were able to talk to the anti-balaka and explain the "criminal" nature of such act. The trucks were permitted to pass without further consequences.	Panel of Experts
99	July	Bangui	Unknown	0,0	0,0	0	1	0	An INGO vehicle was close to the office when another vehicle came up from behind, suddenly overtook the car, and cut off the vehicle. Three armed men jumped out of the vehicle, two ensured a perimeter and one threatened the INGO driver. The driver got out of the vehicle holding his hands up. The attacker took the INGO's vehicle while the other two returned to their vehicle and left without injuring anybody. Two shots were fired into the air to dissuade the driver and bystanders from interfering.	INGO
100	July	Bangui	Unknown	0,0	0,0	0	0	0	On 28 July 2014, at around 20:00 hours, the residence of the United Nations staff member was intruded by five armed men. The owner of the residence arrived before any harm was done and the men escaped. The Moroccan Unit and the United Nations security responded to the incident in less than an hour. A homemade weapon was recuperated by the United Nations.	UN Reports
101	July	Bangui	Unknown	0,0	0,0	0	0	0	On 31 July 2014, at around 00:45 hours, unidentified individuals attempted to enter the residence of the United Nations staff member. Warned by the noise, the United Nations staff alerted the neighbours and the robbers fled. No injuries or stolen property was reported. The Security Officer of the United Nations gave support to the staff member.	UN Reports
102	August	Ouham-Pende	Unknown	0,0	0,0	0	1	0	In August 2014, in Bouar, an INGO national staff member was robbed by unknown armed men, who took all valuables from the residence. All residents were present at the time of the incident.	INGO

103	August	Ouham	Various	0,0	0,0	0	0	0	In the morning of 1 August 2014, an INGO received information that Bouca village might be attacked in the afternoon. No more information was available. Therefore, from 1 to 3 August, the INGO has moved six staff members (out of 16) to the hospital. The other 10 were supporting vaccination programme in Bossangoa and returned back to Bouca on 3 August.	INGO
104	August	Nana-Gribizi	Unknown	0,0	0,0	0	0	0	On 1 August 2014, an INGO reported the detention of a staff member, the Ouandago post chief, who was being accused of spying and not paying at the checkpoints, even though INGO staff is exempted from paying at check points.	INGO
105	August	Ouaka	Unknown	0,0	0,0	0	1	0	On the night of 2 August 2014, a group of unknown armed men entered an INGO warehouse in Bambari. They were not able to enter through the front door, so they went to the back and climbed the walls. According to the first assessment, some bags of corn, some "house" and documents were stolen. The INGO is expected to provide more information.	INGO and UN Reports
106	August	Ouaka	Unknown	0,0	0,0	0	1	0	On 3 August 2014, in Bambari, an INGO warehouse was vandalized by unidentified individuals who stole hoes, seeds and other agricultural products.	UN Reports
107	August	Bangui	Unknown	0,0	0,0	0	1	0	On 3 August 2014, in front of the bank in Bangui, an unidentified individual stole an ID-card and an unknown amount of money from the United Nations staff member. The staff member sustained no injuries during the incident.	UN Reports
108	August	Bangui	anti-balaka	0,0	0,0	0	0	0	On 3 August 2014, in Bangui, the son of the United Nations staff member was arrested by the anti-balaka in the Damala area. He was released four hours later following the intervention of the United Nations Security officers.	UN Reports
109	August	Haute Sangha	Unknown	0,0	0,0	0	0	0	On 4 August 2014, an INGO received threats (written and verbal) from a group of young men who said they would attack any INGO that entered the distribution centre. The operations have been stopped in the region until further notice.	INGO

110	August	Vakaga	former Séléka	0,0	0,0	0	1	0	On 5 August 2014, at around noon, in Birao, two INGO national staff members were riding a motorcycle to the hospital when they were stopped by two former Séléka armed men (armed with AK-47 assault rifles) They were forced to descend. Their motorcycle was taken towards Sam-Ouandja. The COMZONE and Prefect were informed and said they would look for the assailants. The situation will be monitored further.	INGO
111	August	Ouaka	Unknown	0,0	1,0	0	0	1	On 6 August 2014, at around 23:00 hours, unknown armed men kidnapped an INGO national staff member and took him to a location close to the river. The international forces patrol passed by the location and made the assailants leave. The individual was released. According to the reports received, he was tortured and was badly wounded.	INGO; UN Reports
112	August	Ouaka	Unknown	0,0	1,0	0	0	1	On 7 August 2014, an INGO national staff member was abducted in the street by a group of armed men. They took him to the river and started to cut his throat. At that time Sangaris patrol arrived. The staff member is ok.	INGO
113	August	Bamingui-Bangoran	Unknown	0,0	0,0	0	0	0	On the night of 11 August 2014, unidentified armed men attempted to rob an INGO compound. They tried getting in through the gate. The staff called ComZone. By the time he arrived, armed men were gone. Later they came back and tried to climb the wall, but the guards' presence persuaded them to leave.	INGO
114	August	Ouaka	former Séléka	0,0	0,0	0	0	0	On 12 August, in Bambari, an INGO driver, travelling from Bangui to Bria, was intercepted by the former Séléka elements on the Bria- Bambari axis. They threatened him and forced him to return to Bangui with his truck.	INGO
115	August	Bamingui-Bangoran	former Séléka	0,0	0,0	0	1	0	On 14 August, at around 14:00 hours, a humanitarian truck, bringing fuel to N'Délé, was ambushed by armed former Séléka. Staff members had no choice but to give away all their valuables. The truck remained in Kaga-Bandoro.	INGO

116	August	Ouham	Others	1,0	0,0	0	0	0	In August 2014, in Batangafo, an INGO staff member had a fight with armed men who allegedly wanted to attack the hospital. The staff member was killed by stabbing.	INGO
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
Source: Panel of Experts — Database of Incidents.

#### TERMS OF REFERENCE


Abbreviation	Definition
ATT	Alleged Perpetrator
K	Number of Civilian Killings
W	Number of Civilian Wounded
D	Destruction of Property. 1 - Positive. 0 - Negative
LT	Looting. 1 - Positive. 0 - Negative
T	Torture. 1 - Positive. 0 - Negative
Summary	Summary of Events
Source	Source of the information




## Annex 60: Reported incidents of obstruction of humanitarian aid by perpetrator from 5 December 2013 to 14 August 2014




Source: Panel of Experts — Database of Incidents.

**Annex 61: Incidents of obstruction of humanitarian aid from 5 December 2013 to 14 August 2014**

Source: Panel of Experts — Database of Incidents.



Source: Panel of Experts — Database of Incidents.

**Annex 62: Killings of aid workers per month from 5 December 2013 to 10 August 2014**

Source: Panel of Experts — Database of Incidents.

### **Annex 63: Case study concerning violations of international humanitarian law in Boda as of August 2014**

1. The Panel has been closely following the situation in Boda throughout its mandate since it is one of the examples of Muslims enclaves in the western part of the country. This case study is a combination of the follow-up that the Panel has been undertaking together with information from secondary sources consulted on a regular basis to monitor the situation.
2. Boda is located approximately 160 kilometres southwest of Bangui in the Lobaye province. The town and small surrounding villages have approximately 45,000 inhabitants. The centre of Boda originally counted approximately 6,000 Muslims and 30,000 non-Muslims. Since the end of January 2014, most of the Muslim population left Boda. Those who remained are “locked” in the centre of town, while the non-Muslim population resides in five IDP sites and in the forest or non-urbanized areas surrounding the town. Some of the Muslim population might still be living outside the town, but the Panel could not verify this information.
3. In its interim report (S/2014/452, annex 23: Case Study II: Boda – Obstructing the delivery of humanitarian assistance and attacks against humanitarian organization), the Panel reported that the commander of the anti-balaka in Boda was an individual called “8-8” or “Général 8-8”. Since then, the Panel has learned that this individual has been killed under unknown circumstances. A few weeks after his death, the head of the anti-balaka movement, Patrice Edouard Ngaïssona, decided to address the situation of Boda. On 28 June 2014, a document was distributed appointing new leadership for the province and town (see **annex 11**). The document refers to Soussou Abib and Aimé Dogo, being appointed as provincial coordinator and deputy provincial coordinator respectively. Rodrigue Karamokonzi and Aimé Kotté were appointed respectively as zone commander and deputy zone commander. As indicated in **annex 11**, they are under Ngaïssona’s structure, command and control, and their appointment was confirmed locally on 8 July 2014.
4. The situation in Boda has not improved since the Panel’s interim report, apart from increased presence of humanitarian organizations. Muslim population remains locked in the centre of town, not able to leave their neighbourhood. Targeted killings and attacks continue on a weekly basis.
5. The Panel documented the following incidents since 28 June 2014 (when the anti-balaka appointment letter was signed by Ngaïssona):<sup>8</sup>
  - During the night of 5 July 2014, a 15-year-old arrived to the health centre in the Muslim enclave of Boda. He had two gunshot wounds in one of his legs. He was allegedly close to the red line<sup>9</sup> when he was shot, he could not see where the shots were coming from. He was transferred and treated by Sangaris due to the seriousness of the wounds and recovered.

<sup>8</sup> Panel of Experts Database of incidents

<sup>9</sup> The red line marks the division of the village of Boda between Muslims and Christians.

- On 5 July 2014, at around 17:30 hours, a 25-year-old man arrived to the health centre at the Muslim enclave of Boda injured by two bullets in the chest by the anti-balaka sniper who had shot him when trying to cross the red line. He died from the injuries several hours later.
  - On 11 July 2014, in Boda, one Muslim herder passing by the zone was killed by anti-balaka elements.
  - On 13 July 2014, near the red line of the town of Boda, a young Muslim was shot with an AK-47 assault rifle and wounded in his shoulder by an anti-balaka sniper at around 10:00 hours. He was in the eastern side of the red line trying to tell his children to return to the inside of the enclave after collecting wood. Sangaris received notice of the incident, picked him up and took him to the health centre in the inside of the enclave. He was released after two days of medical treatment.
  - On 15 July 2014, in Boda, a Muslim who was going to visit a relative in a non-Muslim neighbourhood was killed. The local authorities had announced the cancellation of the red line the day before.
  - On 20 July 2014, near the anti-balaka headquarters, a young Muslim was killed.
  - On 21 July 2014, a Muslim man of around 25-years-old was killed by an anti-balaka when approaching the red line at around 18:00 hours.
  - On 21 July 2014, at around 10:00 hours, a middle aged Muslim man was killed by an anti-balaka sniper while inside the enclave. He was apparently targeted because he had been cultivating his land the day before outside the enclave.
  - In the afternoon of 26 July 2014, an anti-balaka youth tried to throw a grenade into the Muslim neighbourhood. The grenade exploded on the red line that divides the Muslim enclave from the rest of the village. Some destruction was reported but there were no injuries. The perpetrator escaped.
  - On 26 July 2014, at around 13:00 hours, a Muslim civilian was injured by an anti-balaka shooter while INGO food distribution was taking place inside the Muslim enclave. He received medical treatment and left the health centre same day.
6. The above-mentioned July incidents amount to six unlawful killings of civilians, three severe injuries and one case of destruction of property, all allegedly committed by anti-balaka elements.
  7. During the month of August 2014, the Panel focused on monitoring the escalation of violence, starting 21 August 2014:

- In the morning of 21 August 2014, a young man was killed by a group of anti-balaka while trying to exit the Muslim enclave. In retaliation, a group of armed Muslims left the Muslim enclave and attacked the IDP site located at the Saint Michele church. The figures available at the time of writing were 13 individuals killed (12 Christians and one Muslim, it is not yet clear if the victims were civilians or combatants) and six Christians wounded.
- On the same day at around 20:00 hours, a group of anti-balaka attacked the base of one INGO present in Boda with machetes and threatened to kill all staff, since they were providing humanitarian aid to the Muslim population. Since the incident, almost all INGOs present in Boda requested staff to be relocated to Bangui with MISCA escort. Only two INGOs remained in Boda.
- Later on the night of the 21 August 2014, a small group of anti-balaka youths once again approached the Muslim enclave and started shooting. The response from the Muslim enclave was robust, killing one of the anti-balaka that started the attack.
- On 22 August 2014, at around 06:00 hours, the anti-balaka re-started the attack on the Muslim enclave but stopped after a few hours due to the intensity of the Muslim response. After this, the situation in the village was relatively calm. At around 17:00 hours, the tension increased once again, when a Muslim self-defence group occupied the primary school located next to the Saint Michele IDP site, and the neutral zone dividing the town that had been set in place months ago by Sangaris. An exchange of fire followed, killing one anti-balaka.
- On 23 August 2014, at around 17:00 hours, the anti-balaka took the ambulance of the hospital, telling an INGO staff who run the hospital that the ambulance was being taken “on loan” to bring more troops to the village. Until the time of writing of the report, the ambulance had not been returned.
- On 24 August 2014, the exchange of fire restarted and was initiated by the anti-balaka with light weapons towards the Muslim enclave in an attempt to take over the area. The Muslim armed groups retaliated and drove away the anti-balaka, killing two.
- On 25 August 2014, the situation was relatively calm. The two anti-balaka killed the day before were buried. Reinforcements from international forces arrived. At night, unknown armed individuals looted and robbed the warehouse of one INGO that supplies the hospital and health centres in town. The warehouse is located on the Christian side of the town. Since the INGO that owns the warehouse had no staff there at the moment, no information is available about what was looted and destroyed.

- On 27 August 2014, international forces started initiating dialogue with different parties. Market activities re-started in the Muslim part of the town, while the Christian part of the town remained largely empty, its population having fled to the bush.
  - On 28 August 2014, at around 14:00 hours, tensions rose again in Boda. Shootings were heard from 06:00 hours onwards as the anti-balaka attempted to take over the enclave for the second time. The confrontations involved weaponry on both sides, killing two anti-balaka and wounding one woman in the Muslim enclave.
  - After few days of relative calm, international forces on 1 September 2014 negotiated with all parties, which agreed to start a pacification programme.
8. At the time of drafting, the situation remains calm. However, two more killings of Muslims were reported on 6 and 7 September 2014, details of the incidents are not yet available.




## Annex 64: Methodology

1. Throughout the mandate, the Panel compiled a database of security and criminal incidents that could be classified as violations of international humanitarian law (IHL), international human rights law (IHRL) and other sanctionable acts listed in paragraph 37 of Security Council resolution 2134 (2014). Other security-related incidents have been included as well to gain an overview of the security situation in the country and, if relevant, pursue further investigations.
2. Documented incidents include: killings, kidnappings and rapes of aid workers; attacks or threats against humanitarian organizations, staff members and criminal incidents.
3. The database does not contain all of the incidents that took place in the country during the reporting period (from 5 December 2013 to date) due to limited staff resources and underreporting, particularly of incidents of violence against women, killings of civilians, hindering/hampering of humanitarian aid and attacks against humanitarian actors. Underreporting is largely due to the lack of presence of humanitarian and human rights organizations in large parts of the country, particularly in rural areas.
4. The database relies on primary and secondary sources of information. Primary sources convey direct and immediate knowledge of the relevant facts, e.g. direct witnesses, victims, pictures, video or audio records of the criminal fact, original documents, direct media records of instigation or other incriminating actions or objects of forensic significance. Secondary sources convey indirect knowledge of the relevant acts, such as indirect witnesses (hearsay, witnesses by reference) or indirect media reports.
5. Incidents that are reported by a primary sources are immediately included in the database, while incidents reported by secondary sources go through a source evaluation and corroboration process before being included. The source evaluation process takes in consideration the reliability of the source, the credibility of the information, the completeness of the report and the corroboration of the information.
6. For the collection of primary source material, the Panel met with Heads of UN Agencies, Programmes and Funds, Heads of Delegations of INGOs and Directors of NGOs to the largest extent possible. The Panel requested a compilation and a detailed description of every incident where staff had been victim of attacks, threats or other incident that could fall under the pre-determined violations mentioned above. Meetings with victims and witnesses also resulted in the inclusion of certain incidents.
7. There is a gap of information from local NGOs, mainly due to time constraints as well as the fact that local NGOs do not systematically register the incidents that they have been victims of.
8. The Panel also profited from cooperation with the United Nations agencies that already document different types of incidents in their own databases.
9. A few methodological clarifications that apply to Sections IV and V of the interim report of the Panel (S/2014/452) are important to highlight:


10. Killings of aid workers have been counted without consideration whether targeted individuals were on duty or not. In one of the incidents documented in this report, three non-staff victims (one driver and two assistants) who were carrying humanitarian aid goods have been considered as humanitarian victims since they were part of a humanitarian operation.
11. It is important to note that sexual violence is highly under-reported in the Panel's security incident database and more research and investigation will be undertaken on this subject during the second half of the Panel's mandate. The Panel has already established relations with various humanitarian actors that document acts of sexual violence in the Central African Republic.

## Annex 65: Reported killings of civilians per prefecture from 5 December 2013 to 14 August 2014



Source: Panel of Experts — Database of Incidents.


### Annex 66: Reported killings of civilians per month



Source: Panel of Experts — Database of Incidents.



# Annex 67: Reported killings of civilians per prefecture and per perpetrator from 5 December 2013 to 10 August 2014

**CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC : Reported Killings of Civilians per Prefecture per Preperator (05 december 2013 to 10 august 2014)**







**ANALYSIS OF REPORTED KILLINGS OF CIVILIANS IN CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC PER PREFECTURE**



Reported average killings	Various	Anti-Balaka	Ex-Seleka	Unknown	Others	MISCA	FPR	ANT	Not attributable	RJ	Sangaris	LRA	FACA	Endtotal
Bangui	862	251	72	138	44	20				6			1	1 392
Ouham-Pende	5	136	132	28	33			25	20	15	5			399
Nana-Mambere	107	111	66	8								1		293
Ombella M'Poko	128	50	9	2	3									192
Ouaka	19	31	89	1	21	0						3	0	163
Lobaye	61	83	2	2	0									148
Ouham	0	90	4	44	4			5						146
Mambere-Kadei	96	19	4	16										135
Kemo	23	23	12	1										58
Nana-Gribizi	4	5	15	1	11			0						36
Mbomou	0	10	6	4	0	0						1		11
Haute-Kotto			4	0	0							0		10
Bamingui-Bangoran			8											8
Haut-Mbomou			3	2								1	0	6
Sangha Mbaere	2	0		0	1									3
Basse Kotto		0										0		0
Haut Mbomou												0		0
Endtotal	974	861	615	259	180	28	25	25		21	5	4	2	1 3063



Reported average killing in CAR Presumed author = Anti-Balaka



Reported average killing in CAR Presumed author = Ex-Seleka

## Annex 68: MISCA incidents

The list of incidents below corresponds to a number of investigations, queries and meetings that the Panel held with various numbers of interlocutors, including first and second hand sources. The list was compiled and shared with MISCA human rights section, who gave their points of view and also shared with the Panel the incidents that they had investigated. Many other incidents were reported to the Panel but due to lack of complete information they are not reflected in the table.

NUMBER	DATE	SUMMARY	REPLY OF MISCA OR OTHER SOURCES
1	22 December 2013	On 22 December 2013, four anti-balaka detainees in Bossangoa were allegedly tortured to death by Congolese (Brazzaville) MISCA soldiers.	At the time of the event, the human rights section of MISCA had not been deployed in the country.
2	28 January 2014	On 28 January 2014, in Bangui, the younger brother of Nourredine Adam was allegedly killed by MISCA during a disarmament operation to which he tried to resist.	At the time of the event, the human rights section of MISCA had not been deployed in the country.
3	4 February 2014	On 4 February 2014, in Yaloké and Bossembélé, Chadian elements of MISCA, who had come to pick up their nationals, spread terror by shooting at the Christian population. A few hours later, at the end of the day, they arrived in Boali. At least three civilians died.	According to the human rights section of MISCA, Chadian MISCA contingent at Yaloké and Bossembélé killed three civilians in Boali.
4	16 February 2014	On 16 February 2014, a Chadian MISCA soldier in Bossangoa, visibly under the influence of drugs and alcohol, opened fire on his comrades who were sleeping. The incident ended with the death of a Chadian soldier and four wounded civilians. The perpetrator was arrested and sent to Bangui.	The human rights section of MISCA received information about the case, but due to logistical and security constraints the case was not fully investigated.
5	23 February 2014	On 23 February 2014, a member of the Chadian MISCA contingent was chasing his girlfriend through the <i>Combattant</i> neighbourhood of Bangui because he suspected her of stealing his laptop and phone. This led to clashes between anti-balaka and Chadian MISCA soldiers. The confrontations resulted in three civilians shot dead and one Chadian MISCA soldier in question dead as well.	The human rights section of MISCA received information about the case, but due to logistical and security constraints the case was not fully investigated.
6	27 February 2014	On 27 February 2014, in Nola, during a patrol by Congolese MISCA, soldiers arrested several people carrying small arms and white arms. One boy aged 17 was killed for having pointed his gun at elements of MISCA.	The human rights section of MISCA had no knowledge of the case.

7	5 March 2014	On 5 March 2014, in the 5 <sup>th</sup> <i>arrondissement</i> of Bangui, two civilians and one Lieutenant from the CAR national police were killed in clashes opposing Chadian MISCA soldiers and civilians.	The human rights section of MISCA heard about the incident. According to Con Ops, no Chadian troops were present. However, the case was not duly investigated due to security constrains. The families of victims were displaced and not reachable by the human rights section.
8	17 March 2014	On 17 March 2014, six anti-balaka elements were killed by Burundian MISCA soldiers while attempting to enter the Central Mosque at IDP site in Bangui.	The human rights section of MISCA had no knowledge of the case.
9	23 March 2014	On 23 March 2014, three Chadian MISCA soldiers allegedly raped a woman in Bouca. The victim underwent a medical exam which showed many lesions on her body. The exam also indicated a psychological trauma. The panel was provided with an identification number of one of the alleged perpetrators: 4CTS6S.	The human rights section of MISCA had no knowledge of the case.
10	20 March 2014	On 20 March 2014, in Fode, Bangui, Burundian MISCA soldiers from their post on a building in PK5 killed a man. Anti-balaka opened fire towards the building in reciprocation.	The human rights section of MISCA had no knowledge of the case.
11	24 March 2014	On 24 March 2014, in Boali, according to testimonies collected by HRW, a group of MISCA soldiers from the Republic of the Congo encircled a mission belonging to a Christian anti-balaka leader, and captured at least 11 persons, including four women. The peacekeepers detained men and women after the anti-balaka attacked a Congolese vehicle the same day, killing one Congolese MISCA soldier and wounding four others. According to HRW, those detained have disappeared. Their families have inquired about their whereabouts at MISCA base and local police stations. "The African Union needs to divulge what happened to this group of people who were arrested and taken away by Congolese army-men supposed to maintain peace," declared Peter Bouckaert, director of the Emergencies division at HRW. "Soldiers of peace are here to protect the civilian population, not to make it suffer from further abuses."	The human rights section of MISCA took action and investigated the case. According to the information provided, MISCA has taken disciplinary measures.



12	29 March 2014	<p>On 29 March 2014, a convoy of Chadian MISCA soldiers was returning to the Force Headquarters at Mpoko. They were transporting weapons seized from militia groups in and around the city of Kaga-Bandoro, in the northern part of the CAR. At around 15:00 hours, they fell into an ambush by armed elements at PK12. They sustained a grenade attack and were caught under heavy fire from the attackers. Attackers operated from civilian residential areas, Chadian MISCA soldiers had to fire back and shoot into the air in order to escape. Initial assessments reported four dead and 21 injured. Two Chadian soldiers were wounded. Vehicles of the contingent sustained heavy damages as a result of machine gun fire. Thereafter, MISCA team of human rights observers conducted an investigation which revealed the following: the Chadian contingent of MISCA fell into an ambush by members of anti-balaka groups who had taken position in the area before the arrival of the military convoy. The anti-balaka elements deliberately fired on the Chadian elements, who responded in self-defence to protect themselves. As information from various sources indicates, there were from 6 to 13 civilian deaths.</p> <p>The Panel had a telephone interview with Colonel Souleiman who joined MISCA in mid-March 2014 as a battalion Commander. He was on convoy that opened fire in PK12 on 29 March 2014. He declared that on 29 March anti-balaka using civilian people as human shield ambushed his convoy in PK12. His convoy came under fire and was obliged to return fire for self-defence purposes. He was returning to Mpoko after a reconnaissance visit to his various detachments and to survey newer locations for his deployment. He declared that he had a movement order signed by MISCA FC and was coming back to debrief his mission and coordinate his redeployment. He declared that his convoy joined another administrative and logistic convoy coming to Bangui to get monthly supplies. He also indicated that the two convoys joined because MISCA FC had</p>	Case investigated by MISCA and report submitted to hierarchy.
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		informed him that the situation in Bangui was tense and that the risk of being ambushed by anti-balaka around PK12 was high. General Tumenta was later interviewed by the Panel and confirmed the information provided by the battalion Commander and also that the convoy was part of MISCA, and that the response was coherent with the mission's rules of engagement.	
13	21 May 2014	On 21 May 2014, a convoy of commercial trucks escorted by MISCA from Bangui to Cameroon stopped for an overnight in Yaloké. While <i>in situ</i> , some of the truck drivers negotiated with a group of Fulani who wanted to be driven to the border. However, MISCA escort complied with orders from Bangui and did not permit Fulani to board the trucks. This was done mainly due to the security situation because no special protection measures were taken to secure the Fulani. It was reported by open sources that MISCA had hindered movement of civilians.	The human rights section of MISCA investigated the case thoroughly and shared the information with the Panel.
14	27 May 2014	On 27 May 2014, a 37-year-old married woman in Bria was sexually assaulted by Congolese (DRC) MISCA Sergeant. The time of the attack was not mentioned in the report. The perpetrator was identified but his name is held confidential until further investigation by relevant authorities.	The human rights section of MISCA had seen reports of the case but due to the lack of access they have not fully investigated.
15	27 June 2014	On 27 June 2014, at around 20:00 hours, shooting was heard in the centre of Boda. After a day of festivities Congolese MISCA soldiers went to the only bar in the village, where they were drinking beer. The terrace of the bar faces the market. Six civilians (three women and three men) were approaching one of the shops close to the bar and passed in front of the bar. One MISCA soldier opened fire towards civilians alleging that they were carrying a grenade. Two injuries reported.	MISCA informed the Panel that the soldiers shot after seeing a grenade in the hands of individuals suspected to be anti-balaka.
16	27 June 2014	On 27 June 2014, at around 16:00 hours, MISCA soldiers opened fire towards the population for unknown reasons, close to the health centre in Boda. One guard of the health centre was wounded and received treatment.	The victim has reported the incident by writing a letter to MISCA. No response yet received.
17	12 – 18 July 2014	On 24 July 2014, the Panel interviewed four civilians, who were part of a group of individuals victims of illegal detention, torture, sexual violence and extra	The human rights section of MISCA was not aware of the case. The Panel spoke to victims and transmitted the information to

		judicial killing, committed by the Cameroonian and Congolese MISCA in Bossemptélé and Yaloké from 12 to 18 July 2014 (see annex 69 for further details).	MISCA for further investigations.
18	15 August 2014	On 5 August 2014, open source indicates that women in IDP camps in Bambari area are often subject to sexual abuse from Gabonese MISCA soldiers. They enter their huts at night demanding sexual favours. Sometimes forced, sometimes for as little as 500 CFA (1 USD) or a biscuit.	The human rights section of MISCA has been informed of the case and is in process of conducting investigations.
19	20 April 2014	On 20 April 2014, the Panel was informed by MISCA that “Zaparo”, former anti-balaka chief of the area of Batalimo, had been killed by MISCA forces based in Batalimo due to his relation with criminal activities in the region and constant misbehavior against civilians. MISCA captain declared that they had been some protests from the population in the town but the Mayor of the town had diffused. The Panel was later informed by local sources that “Zaparo” had been tortured by Congolese (Brazzaville) MISCA soldiers before being killed.	The case is to be submitted to MISCA
20	9 May 2014	On 9 May 2014, in the village of Bozoum, Cameroonian MISCA soldiers killed the anti-balaka commander Richard Béjouane and his son. Béjouane arrived the same day to the village, started shooting in the air and causing problems. When MISCA arrived, they tried to arrest them both, they refused and they were shot. A group of 30 civilians from the village went to MISCA base to protest against killing. MISCA threatened to kill them if they continued to protest.	The case is to be submitted to MISCA
21	14 August 2014	On 14 August 2014, the <i>Révolution et Justice</i> commander “Waluba” was killed in the church of the village of Gadoulou (nine kilometres west of Paoua) by MISCA contingent in Paoua. His deputy and another two of his men were badly wounded. All three were taken to the hospital in Paoua. One died of his wounds on 15 August.	The case is to be submitted to MISCA

Source: Panel of Experts — Database of Incidents, MISCA Human Rights Section and secondary sources.

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**Annex 69: Case file of illegal detention, torture, extra-judicial killing and sexual violence in Bossemptélé and Yaloké (Ombella-Mpoko province).**

1. For the investigation of this case, the Panel interviewed half of the individuals who were present during the incident, including civilians, members of the anti-balaka movement, the Deputy Public Prosecutor of Bangui, individuals from MISCA who were involved in the incident, and individuals of INGOs who work in both locations and who were informed about the incident.
2. On 24 July 2014, the Panel interviewed four civilians who were witnesses and/or victims of illegal detention, torture, sexual violence and extra judicial killing allegedly committed by the Cameroonian MISCA contingent based in Bossemptélé and the Congolese (Republic of Congo) MISCA contingent in Yaloké during the period between 12 and 13 July 2014. Other interviews took place in the months of July and August to complete the investigation.
3. According to the testimony of these four individuals, on Saturday 12 July 2014, two vehicles (one brown pickup truck and one Grey Toyota Prado) left Garoua Boulai at around 16:00 hours towards Bangui after purchasing merchandise to bring back to Bangui and sell. The vehicles belonged to an anti-balaka commander known as “Américain”, who charged each person per seat and per kilo of merchandise. The day of the incident, there were a total of 16 persons in the two vehicles: eight men, six women and two children.
4. At around 20:00 hours, the two vehicles approached the village of Baoro and stopped in front of a truck. The driver of the pickup, “Américain”, descended from the vehicle with his weapon (a 9 mm automatic pistol), alongside “Faustin”, one of his personal guards, and both approached the truck driver to ask for fuel. The driver said that he had none to spare and so he gave them money in exchange. Those who did not descend from the vehicle had no knowledge of how much money was taken from the truck driver but said that it had been clearly a robbery. The witnesses interviewed reported that they believe the truck driver called MISCA and alerted them of the incident which MISCA sources confirmed.
5. At the same time, MISCA and Sangaris were searching for a man called John Mulabe, who was allegedly very dangerous, had a pending arrest warrant and was moving from the Cameroonian border to Bangui in two vehicles.
6. Around 22:00 hours the Prado arrived at the MISCA Cameroonian check point at the entrance of Bossemptélé. The vehicle was briefly checked by MISCA, which requested the documents of the vehicle, and allowed to continue. The pickup arrived around 15 minutes after; eight passengers were ordered to descend from the vehicle and lay down on the floor. The driver, “Américain” was likewise ordered to descend from the vehicle, and then to walk away from the passengers towards another group of MISCA soldiers. While he was walking, MISCA soldiers shot him twice in his back. Two of the witnesses laying on the floor, eye-witnessed the events. As soon as the shooting took place, another anti-balaka called “Frederic”, who was in the group, took the chance and ran away to the forest. The MISCA soldiers shot to the air but did not pursue him. “Frédéric”’s whereabouts are unknown at the time of writing of this report.

7. Seven individuals left lying on the ground were ordered to stand up and walk to MISCA base in Bossemptélé, approximately 150 meters from the checkpoint. Once at MISCA base, they were all ordered to take off all their clothes at gunpoint, including women. MISCA soldiers proceeded to tie their hands and feet, some of them in pairs, some individually. During this time, MISCA soldiers kept shouting at them, accusing them of being anti-balaka and responsible for the recent killing of MISCA soldier in Bozoum. Witnesses report that from 23:00 hours to 07:00 hours the next day, they were constantly beaten, subjected to cold water being poured on them, insulted, not permitted to sit down, nor given water or food (see exhibits 1 to 3 below with photographs of marks on one of the victims). During the night, the individuals detained saw MISCA soldiers taking goods from the pickup truck, drinking beer and eating food.
8. Upon arrival to the base, women were taken to a separate room (men stayed in the base but outside the building). Women were ordered to take off their clothes, their hands tied, and they were verbally abused and according to the testimonies there was constant shouting coming from the room where women were being held. The Panel interviewed two of the women concerned. One of them, girlfriend of “Américain” said that she had not been raped but that she had been harassed and sexually assaulted. She was touched, searched in unnecessary intimate places, while her companion was equally abused but not searched.
9. In the meantime, the Prado continued its route towards Bangui, its passengers unaware of the pickup truck having been stopped at Bossemptélé. Upon arrival at Yaloké, the Prado was stopped at a Gendarmerie checkpoint. The passengers were held there for some time without explanation. After around 30 minutes, Congolese (Republic of the Congo) MISCA soldiers arrived at the checkpoint and notified them that their companions in the pickup truck had been arrested in Bossemptélé. They were also informed that they were now arrested in connection to the robbery of the truck driver in Baoro. Seven adults (two men and five women) and two children were in Prado. All the passengers in Prado were ordered to descend from the vehicle, and lay on the floor. They were checked, beaten and then taken to the Gendarmerie in Yaloké. The two children in the vehicle were taken away to an unknown location.
10. Upon arrival to the Gendarmerie at Yaloké, two men were taken to a room, hands and feet tied with ropes in pairs. Five women were taken to a separate room. They all spent the night in Yaloké.
11. On 13 July 2014, at around 14:00 hours, seven individuals, who had been detained in Bossemptélé, arrived in Yaloké with MISCA vehicles. The pickup truck and goods purchased in Cameroon were left in Bossemptélé. Seven adults and two children, who spent the night in Yaloké, were forced to board MISCA truck and were taken to Bangui.
12. Around 19:00 hours, they arrived at MISCA base at Mpoko, Bangui. Still handcuffed with ropes, women and children were taken to one room, and men to another. Later during the night, one Cameroonian MISCA soldier arrived to the room where the men were being held and offered them food. Since they were handcuffed they explained to soldiers that they could not eat without their hands and requested their hands be untightened. The MISCA soldiers laughed

and said that they were animals and that they were expected to eat as such. The detainees reported during the interview that they could not eat until they were handed over to MISCA Police. Women and children were held in a room next to the men. They all slept on the floor without a cover, and were not given access to bathrooms.

13. In the morning of 14 July 2014, Colonel of Congolese (Republic of the Congo) MISCA Police arrived at the location where the individuals were being held and ordered Cameroonian soldiers to transfer the detainees to Congolese camp. The Colonel mentioned that the conditions in which they were being held were inhumane and complained to Cameroonian soldiers. Cameroonian soldiers followed the order and 16 individuals were taken to Congolese camp at Mpoko. According to their testimonies, once at Congolese camp they were given food, permitted to clean up and asked what had happened.
14. Later on the same day, at around 16:00 hours they were transferred to the SRI unit of the Gendarmerie in Bangui, where they spent the night.
15. On 15 July 2014, they were all interrogated by the Gendarmerie and informed that an investigation of the events had been opened. In the afternoon, a Prosecutor started to take statements from each of the individuals. By next day all testimonies had been taken and in the morning of 18 July, all the individuals except three were released without charges.
16. The last three individuals (two men and one woman) were held and transferred to the prison by a decision of the Prosecutor. They were presented to the Judge on 30 July 2014. The judge ruled that the woman should be in domiciliary detention for 12 months, reporting to the police once a week. The other two men were sentenced to three years in prison for carrying illegal weapons. The Panel has withheld the names of the majority of witnesses and victims to protect their identity. The ones (partially) disclosed gave their approval.
17. The Panel met with Cameroonian battalion commander and another Cameroonian Colonel. The Panel reached the Captain, who was still in Bossemptélé at the time of the incident, by phone. The Captain was requested to give his version of events. He denied that they had tortured the individuals in question, raped or harassed women or stole any goods. However, when questioned about the individual who was killed, he explained: "We had been warned that the man inside the vehicle, whose name was John Mulabe, was dangerous. When he descended from the vehicle we sensed danger and then shot him." The weapon of "Américain" was collected after the shooting but it remains unknown whether it was found inside the vehicle or not. Cameroonian contingent interlocutors dismissed the question and did not provide a clear answer. According to the two commanding officers in Bangui, MISCA soldiers did not realize that they had not killed John Mulabe but someone else only until several days after the incident.
18. The individuals that were released presented a complaint to the Prosecutor's Office in Bangui who requested goods confiscated by MISCA to be returned. On 30 July 2014, MISCA returned the two vehicles, but they were both empty. A follow-up claim is to be submitted to the Prosecutor and to the human rights section of MISCA in order for the victims to be compensated for their damages.

*Exhibit 1 – Eye wound of one of the victims.*



*Exhibit 2 – Leg wound of one of the victims.*



*Exhibit 3 – Wrist wounds of one of the victims*





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**Annex 70: Locations of schools affected by the conflict from 5 December 2013 to 31 July 2014<sup>10</sup>**

1. 23 in Bangui – private and public
2. 8 in Bamingui-Bangoran – all public
3. 26 in Basse-Kotto – private and public
4. 12 in Haute-Kotto – all public
5. 10 in Haut-Mbomou – private and public
6. 18 in Kémo – all public
7. 27 in Mambéré-Kadeï – private and public
8. 20 in Mbomou – private and public
9. 12 in Nana-Gribizi – all public
10. 28 in Nana-Mambere – private and public
11. 37 in Ombella M'Poko – private and public
12. 31 in Ouaka – private and public
13. 49 in Ouham – public and private
14. 78 in Ouham-Pendé – private and public
15. 11 in Sangha Mbaere – private and public
16. 8 in Vakaga – all public

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<sup>10</sup> Information provided by the IASC Education Cluster for the Central African Republic.

### **Annex 71: Case study of killing, rape, displacement of a family in Bambari**

1. On 25 June 2014, at around 22:00 hours, in the town of Bambari, Toumbazou I neighbourhood, four armed anti-balaka youths entered the house of Oumar Ousman, a 84-year-old FAO consultant in Bambari. Mr. Ousman was not present at the moment of the incident; in the morning he had been evacuated by Sangaris to the UNICEF compound in town, together with all other United Nations staff in the village due to the volatile security situation.
2. According to his testimony and other interviews conducted by the Panel,<sup>11</sup> the anti-balaka men were looking for him. Nine family members of Ousman were in the house at the time of the incident, including sons, daughters and granddaughters of Ousman.
3. Four men entered the house, demanding the whereabouts of Ousman. One of his daughters responded that he was not in the house. Four men proceeded to ask for men in the house. At that moment, Oumar Boukar Ousman (35-year-old son of FAO consultant) ran away through the back of the house suspecting that his life was in danger. Three men proceeded to chase the young man towards the river and once they caught him, killed him with machetes and knives. Neighbors found the body later that night by the riverside.
4. Then three men returned to the house and raped three of five women present in the house. The youngest was 13-years-old and the eldest was 32.
5. Due to the shouting and the noise caused during the incident, neighbours went to the house. Three of the assailants ran away without being caught. However, one was caught and interrogated by neighbours and the neighbourhood chief.
6. According to the testimony of the neighbours and the information gathered from the caught assailant, an individual named Bada Yade had hired four anti-balaka members to kill Ousman. They were hired from Grimari and not from Bambari. His father Gustave Yade, is a former colleague of Ousman, with whom he had worked in 2011. Back then, they had had a work-related misunderstanding. The neighbours released the anti-balaka member after they had obtained his confession. He was not handed over to the police, supposedly because it was too late and the neighbours could not reach anyone on the phone.
7. Valuables stolen from the residence included 180,000 CFA (355 USD), a sewing machine, a manioc mill, a generator and all doors inside the house. The anti-balaka commander in the neighbourhood called

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<sup>11</sup> Interviews conducted in Bambari on 3 July 2014 and in Bangui on 26 June, 17 and 18 July 2014.

“Risqueur”, who supposedly was very upset with the perpetrators, recuperated most of the valuables.

8. The incident was reported to MINUSCA Security and to the competent NGO for women and girls to receive medical treatment. On 26 June 2014, all Ousman’s family members were evacuated to Bangui. Ousman is submitting an official complaint to the Judicial Authorities in Bangui. The Panel is following the matter. No judiciary measures have been taken.


*House of FAO consultant occupied by anti-balaka elements  
(photograph taken by the Panel on 3 July 2014)*



*Inside the house of FAO consultant looted and occupied by anti-balaka  
(photograph taken by the Panel on 3 July 2014)*



*Location of the house where incident occurred*



**Annex 72: Gender-based violence sub cluster data on rape cases in the Central African Republic from December 2013 to July 2014**

**PERIODE DES INCIDENTS DU 5 DECEMBRE 2013 A JUILLET  
2014  
DONNEES ONG - RCA**

<b>VIOLENCES SEXUELLES PERPETREES PAR DES HOMMES EN ARMES /ACTEURS ARMES NON ETATIQUES + PREFECTURE D'INCIDENT ONG (Préfectures : Nana Gribizi, Ouham Pende, Ombella MPoko)</b>				
<b>FEMMES</b>	<b>HOMMES</b>	<b>FILLES</b>	<b>GARCONS</b>	<b>TOTAL</b>
518	02	83	00	<b>603 CAS</b>
<b>REPARTITION PAR PREFECTURE</b>				
				<b>Nana-Gribizi : 223 cas</b>
				<b>Ouham-Pendé : 62 cas</b>
				<b>Ombella-Mpoko : 318 cas</b>
<b>VIOLENCES SEXUELLES PERPETREES PAR DES HOMMES EN ARMES /ACTEURS ARMES NON ETATIQUES + PREFECTURE D'INCIDENT ONG (Préfectures : Ombella MPoko, Lobaye, Ouham Pende)</b>				
<b>FEMMES</b>	<b>HOMMES</b>	<b>FILLES</b>	<b>GARCONS</b>	<b>TOTAL</b>
34	00	05	00	<b>39 CAS</b>
<b>REPARTITION PAR PREFECTURE</b>				
				<b>Ombella-Mpoko : 32 cas</b>
				<b>Lobaye : 03 cas</b>
				<b>Ouham-Pendé : 02 cas</b>
<b>VIOLENCES SEXUELLES PERPETREES PAR DES HOMMES EN ARMES /ACTEURS ARMES NON ETATIQUES + PREFECTURE D'INCIDENT ONG (Préfectures : Haut Mbomou, Ouahm, Bangui)</b>				
<b>FEMMES</b>	<b>HOMMES</b>	<b>FILLES</b>	<b>GARCONS</b>	<b>TOTAL PAR PREFECTURE</b>
00	00	01	00	<b>Haut-Mbomou : 01 cas</b>
08	01	01	00	<b>Ouham : 09 cas</b>
91	20	17	04	<b>Bangui : 132 cas</b>
				<b>142 CAS</b>

Source: GVB CLUSTER – Central African Republic