

APARTHEID

THE FACTS

UNST
PSCA
CAA
(02)
F2
ENB

UN LIBRARY

MAY 31 1984

UN/SA COLLECTION



APARTHEID THE FACTS

UN LIBRARY

MAY 3 1 1984

UN/CT COLLECTION



International Defence and Aid Fund for Southern Africa, in co-operation with
the United Nations Centre Against Apartheid
London, June, 1983.

7

© INTERNATIONAL DEFENCE AND AID FUND

This book is copyright under the Berne Convention. All rights are reserved. Apart from any fair dealing for the purpose of private study, research, criticism or review as permitted under the Copyright Act, 1956, no part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, electrical, chemical, mechanical, optical, photocopying, recording or otherwise without the prior permission of the copyright owner. Enquiries should be addressed to the publishers.

All photographs are from the photo library of IDAF Research, Information and Publications Department.

Computer graphics produced on the Sunlock Graphics Pack by courtesy of Sunlock Bondain Ltd., London.

The International Defence and Aid Fund for Southern Africa is a humanitarian organisation which has worked consistently for peaceful and constructive solutions to the problems created by racial oppression in Southern Africa.

It sprang from Christian and humanist opposition to the evils and injustices of apartheid in Southern Africa. It is dedicated to the achievement of free, democratic, non-racial societies throughout Southern Africa.

The objects of the Fund are:-

- (i) to aid, defend and rehabilitate the victims of unjust legislation and oppressive and arbitrary procedures,
- (ii) to support their families and dependents,
- (iii) to keep the conscience of the world alive to the issues at stake.

In accordance with these three objects, the Fund distributes its humanitarian aid to the victims of racial injustice without any discrimination on grounds of race, colour, religious or political affiliation. The only criterion is that of genuine need.

The Fund runs a comprehensive information service on affairs in Southern Africa. This includes visual documentation. It produces a regular news bulletin 'FOCUS' on Political Repression in Southern Africa, and publishes pamphlets and books on all aspects of life in Southern Africa.

The Fund prides itself on the strict accuracy of all its information.

This book was prepared by IDAF Research, Information and Publications Department.


ISBN No. 0 904759 49 0

CONTENTS

PREFACE	7
1 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND	9
COLONIAL CONQUEST	9
MINERAL WEALTH	10
WHITE SETTLER GOVERNMENT	12
ENTRENCHING APARTHEID	13
2 SEGREGATION AND INEQUALITY	15
RACIAL CLASSIFICATION AND SEGREGATION	15
DISTRIBUTION OF LAND AND OTHER RESOURCES	16
DISTRIBUTION OF THE POPULATION	19
SEPARATE AMENITIES	21
ADMINISTRATIVE AND LEGAL SEGREGATION	21
INCOME AND OCCUPATION	23
HEALTH AND WELFARE	24
3 EDUCATION, INFORMATION, CULTURE AND BELIEF	27
EDUCATION	27
Schools	27
Technical and vocational education	28
Universities	28
MEDIA	29
CULTURE	29
RELIGION	31
SPORT	32
4 ECONOMIC EXPLOITATION	35
SECTORS OF THE ECONOMY	35
Agriculture	36
Mining	37
Manufacturing industry	38
OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL OF THE ECONOMY	39
BANTUSTANS IN THE ECONOMY	40
MIGRATORY LABOUR	41
DIRECTION OF LABOUR	43
PASS LAWS	43
ENFORCEMENT OF PASS LAWS	44
UNEMPLOYMENT	45
WAGES AND LIVING CONDITIONS	46
LABOUR RELATIONS	47
Determination of wages and conditions	47
Trade unions	48
Industrial action and right to strike	48

5	POLITICAL STRUCTURES	51
	POLITICAL POWER	51
	SEGREGATED POLITICAL STRUCTURES	52
	BANTUSTANS	53
	AFRICANS OUTSIDE THE BANTUSTANS	54
	COLOURED AND INDIAN POLITICAL STRUCTURES	55
	CONSTITUTIONAL PLANS	55
6	REPRESSION	57
	REPRESSIVE LAWS	57
	Laws relating to banning and banishment	58
	Laws relating to restriction on meetings	58
	Laws relating to detention without trial	59
	POLITICAL REPRESSION	60
	Banning and banishment of persons	60
	Banning of organisations and meetings	60
	Detention without trial	61
	Torture and death of detainees	62
	Police violence	63
	Political trials	64
	Death sentences	66
	Political imprisonment	66
7	THE ARMED FORCES	67
	THE MILITARY AND THE STATE	67
	MILITARY FORCES	68
	THE POLICE	69
	MANPOWER AND CONSCRIPTION	69
	THE ARMS INDUSTRY	70
	SOUTH AFRICA'S NUCLEAR CAPABILITY	71
8	SOUTHERN AFRICA	73
	SOUTH AFRICA'S RELATIONS WITH NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES	73
	Economic domination	73
	Strategies for perpetuating domination	73
	'Constellation of States'	73
	Destabilisation	74
	SOUTH AFRICAN AGGRESSION	74
	Angola	74
	Zimbabwe	76
	Mozambique	76
	Zambia	77
	Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland	77
	NAMIBIA	78
9	INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS	81
	APARTHEID'S DEPENDENCE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS	81
	Trade and investment	81
	Immigration	82
	Political and diplomatic relations	82
	INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FOR THE FREEDOM STRUGGLE	83
	Political and moral support	83
	Boycott and sanctions	83
	Material support	84
	Refugees	84

ACTION BY THE UNITED NATIONS	85
OTHER INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS	85
CHRONOLOGIES OF INTERNATIONAL ACTION	86
United Nations action against apartheid	86
Africa and apartheid	87
10 RESISTANCE AND THE LIBERATION STRUGGLE	89
RESISTANCE UP TO THE 1960s	89
Formation of the African National Congress	89
Move to mass campaigns.	89
—Defiance Campaign	90
—Bantu Education	90
—Bantustan authorities	90
—Pass laws	90
Freedom Charter	90
Formation of the Pan Africanist Congress	91
Banning of mass organised opposition	91
RESISTANCE AND THE LIBERATION STRUGGLE FROM THE 1970s	91
Black consciousness	91
Transition to heightened struggle	92
New legal organisations, since 1977	93
—Political, civic and community organisations	93
—Trade union organisations	93
—Youth and student organisations	94
—Women's organisations	94
Popular resistance to aspects of the apartheid system	95
—Housing	95
—Transport	95
—In the workplace	95
—Education	97
—Removals	97
ARMED STRUGGLE	98
Early stages, from 1961	98
Armed struggle since 1975	98
The nature of the armed struggle	100
MOBILISATION IN THE LIBERATION STRUGGLE	100
CHRONOLOGY OF REPRESSION AND RESISTANCE	102
APPENDICES	
I A GLOSSARY OF APARTHEID TERMS	103
II FURTHER INFORMATION ABOUT APARTHEID	105
REFERENCES	106
LIST OF MAPS, TABLES, CHARTS AND GRAPHS	109
INDEX	109



PREFACE

The issue of apartheid has been a matter of international concern since the 1940s. As the struggle for freedom in Southern Africa has progressed, that concern has magnified and become a principal focus of international politics. Two facts explain this.

South Africa's racist system and the means used to maintain it violate the most basic principles of justice accepted by the international community. Secondly, South Africa's armed power, readily used to suppress resistance and to prolong its illegal occupation of Namibia, has been recognised by the United Nations as a threat to international peace since the early 1960s. South Africa's aggression towards neighbouring countries in recent years has confirmed this view.

Since the mid-1970s the regime has faced threats from three directions: from the advancing forces of resistance and liberation amongst the majority denied freedom in South Africa; from the shifts in the balance of power in Southern Africa following the independence of Mozambique, Angola and Zimbabwe; and from the growing strength of the international movement against apartheid.

With its existence threatened the regime has equipped itself with the most powerful armed force in sub-Saharan Africa, including a nuclear capability. Its armed forces have been greatly expanded and military control over government and the economy established. Internally its powers are brought to bear on those who resist and organise for liberation. A campaign of military aggression and destabilisation has been launched against neighbouring countries.

A dual strategy has been adopted in defence of the apartheid system. Along with the increased use of armed force, a number of political moves have been initiated. They are aimed at gaining the

co-operation of a small section of the oppressed majority in perpetuating the system. Presented as reforms, such measures have so far failed to gain more than minority support within the black community, which as a whole has shown that it is prepared to accept nothing short of full equality and freedom for all. While the changes have brought some benefits to a small minority, they are aimed at strengthening and maintaining the system in the face of changing circumstances and increasing resistance. They have had the effect of making the situation of the majority worse.

The purpose of this book is to present the facts about the apartheid system and about the developments described above. *Apartheid: The Facts* is a companion book to two earlier publications by IDAF. It does not attempt to cover the situation in Namibia: that is dealt with in *Namibia: The Facts*. An earlier book *Zimbabwe: The Facts about Rhodesia*, published in 1977 is concerned with the situation before the independence of Zimbabwe was achieved.

A NOTE ON TERMINOLOGY

Two aspects of this book need explanation here: the citing of official statistics and the terminology used.

The term '*apartheid*' was coined when the National Party, after it came to power in 1948, presented its policies in the form of a comprehensive doctrine. However the continuities linking that period with the past and with the present, have led to the term being used to refer to the system of racial segregation and domination throughout its history.

A basic aspect of apartheid is the exclusion of the majority from participation in central government on the basis of colour. They are expected instead

to meet their aspirations in political structures based on the smaller part of the country to which they are assigned. This consists of scattered, poverty stricken and fragmented areas which are officially called their 'homelands'. The regime falsely presents these areas as separate and in some cases independent states. In this book, as is common in South Africa, they are referred to as '*bantustans*'.

In this book '*black*' and '*white*' are used to refer to two groups which together make up the whole population of the country. The apartheid system divides the black community into further groups. It is necessary to refer to them in order to describe the system and its policies and practices.

'*African*' is used, following widespread usage, to refer to that section of the black community, the majority, which is denied participation in central government and is assigned to the bantustan system. (The government, and the white press, currently uses '*Black*' to refer to this group, having substituted this term for the earlier '*Bantu*', which itself replaced '*native*').

The other main sections of the black community which are assigned separate and distinct positions within the apartheid system are referred to as '*Indian*' and '*Coloured*'. The former constitute the great majority of those officially termed '*Asian*'. '*Coloured*' is used by the government to refer to several groups of people, including principally those whom they deem to be of descent that is mixed in terms of the categories of apartheid. Also included are those deemed to be of Malayan extraction, as well as descendants of the original inhabitants of the Cape, the Khoi and the San.

Appendix I, *The language of apartheid* deals more fully with the terminology of apartheid.

STATISTICS AND SOURCES OF INFORMATION

A book such as this, (like many of the sources which were used in writing it), depends heavily on two sources of information which are part of the system itself: the press and the government.

The press in South Africa is predominantly owned, controlled and staffed by whites. Its links with the black majority are limited, and in addition it is subject to extensive censorship and control.

The state produces a very large volume of statistics, but they are full of gaps and distortions. Many

of the services for which such information is necessary are not provided, particularly in the field of health and welfare. Many of the figures which are produced are distorted by the regime's refusal to include in its accounting what happens in the bantustans. Such statistical information becomes increasingly opaque as the bantustan programme is implemented. In many instances the regime conceals its actions by simply stating that 'the figures are not available'.


Nevertheless, partial and inadequate as the available statistical information is, it still gives some idea of the effects of apartheid on the majority who

live under it. For this reason, wherever possible and relevant, statistical evidence is used in this book (the source in each case being made explicit).

Similarly, in spite of the restrictions on the press, it contains enough to convey the essentials of the situation.

However what is contained in statistics or gleaned from the press only illustrates what is spelt out in more direct ways in the writings of the liberation movement. Those writings express what the people of South Africa, the oppressed majority, have come to know through experience and through the struggle for liberation.

Early San hunters.



1 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The system of apartheid in South Africa was established on the basis of colonial conquest. The history of the area began long before the coming of the white settlers. However the history of racial domination and oppression, and of resistance, began at that date.

COLONIAL CONQUEST

White settlers from the Netherlands arrived in the extreme south west of what is now South Africa during the mid-17th century. When they arrived the whole of the country was occupied by various groups of people.



Khoikhoi building their huts.

CAPT. DE. GORDE HOOP.




Khoi settlement at Table Bay.



Dutch and other foreign ships at the Cape.

Those who inhabited the Cape Peninsula were part of the Khoikhoi and the San (called 'Hottentots' and 'Bushmen' by whites). They were soon dispossessed of land and livestock by the settlers, who used their superior armed force to crush resistance. As a result many were forced into being labourers for the settlers, or were driven from the area. Many were killed in the process. The settlers also soon brought slaves to the area: from West Africa and from the East Indies.




The settler society expanded and spread. Its intrusive and aggressive policies led to conflict, as people defended their land. The settlers' advance was slow and was checked by successive wars of resistance. But in the end superior armed force enabled

[The Khoi Khoi] strongly insisted that we had been appropriating more and more of their land, which had been theirs all these centuries, and on which they had been accustomed to let their cattle graze, etc. They asked if they would be allowed to do such a thing supposing they went to Holland and they added: It would be of little consequence if you people stayed here at the fort, but you come right into the interior and select the best land for yourselves...


(From the diary of Jan Van Riebeeck, leader of the expedition which in 1652 established a colonial presence at the Cape).

them to push their way forward and to occupy most of the land. The decisive factor was the arrival of British military forces after Britain took over the Cape from the Dutch in 1806.



It was only around the beginning of this century that armed opposition to colonial and settler expansion was effectively ended. By that time whites had taken over most of the land. Those who had formerly occupied it had been reduced to the status of tenants or wage labourers, or else driven off the land and forced into 'reserves'.

However, by then there had been another major development which was to bring very powerful forces to bear on the further shaping of social relations in South Africa.



MINERAL WEALTH

In the 1860s, on the eve of discoveries of enormous mineral wealth, agriculture was by far the predominant form of economic activity in the territories comprising South Africa. In the area still under effective African occupation, it was still largely carried out on the basis of communal ownership. There was a small sector of individual peasant production arising out of interaction with the settler economy. In the areas under white control, agriculture relied principally on the labour of Africans living as tenants on the land of white landlords. In the eastern part of the country, in Natal, there were sugar plantations depending on indentured labour brought from India.

Mining had been carried on in the region for centuries before the discoveries of enormous diamond and gold deposits in the last part of the nineteenth century. But the operations were on a small scale by comparison with what was to follow. The fact that



Supervising African labourers in the Cape.



African blacksmiths at work.

the newly discovered deposits were so great, and yet contained in low grade ore which required deep-level mining, made a huge impact on economic, social and political relations. Such mining produced urban mining complexes, it required a vast labour force, and it needed a very large amount of finance.¹

Diamonds in deep deposits were discovered in Kimberley in 1870, three years after discoveries of rich alluvial deposits had set off a diamond rush along the Orange and Vaal rivers. Within a few years there were 45,000 people on the diggings.² Not long after, in 1886, the gold bearing reefs of Witwatersrand were discovered, deep in the Transvaal. A decade later there were over 100,000 mine workers in the Witwatersrand gold mines.³

There began a rapid industrialisation of the South African economy, shaped largely by the requirements of the mine owners and the white farmers. There was a massive inflow of foreign capital, establishing extensive foreign economic links which still remain. The most significant effect was the creation of a system of migratory labour on a scale that made it the predominant feature of the labour structure in South Africa.

By the second decade of the twentieth century the basic features of the migrant labour system had been established. The labour system within the white-owned agricultural sector at that



Scenes from early diamond rush, 1872.




Compound for African workers.

time still had many characteristics of feudalism, but it was in time absorbed within the migratory system.

The result of colonial conquest

and the mineral discoveries was white ownership of most of the land and mineral wealth of the country, together with almost total control of African labour.



WHITE SETTLER GOVERNMENT

At the end of the nineteenth century what is now South Africa was comprised of four territories under white settler or colonial rule. Natal and the Cape were British colonies. The Transvaal Republic and the Orange Free State had been established by Boers (Afrikaners) most of whom had left the Cape following the abolition of slavery in 1834.


Black people had limited political rights in the two British colonies, and none at all in the two Boer republics. However in practice those black people who were entitled to a qualified franchise right in Natal encountered administrative obstacles to exercising them. The rights in the Cape were sharply reduced by the white-dominated administration when the number of Africans meeting the conditions of qualification increased significantly.

Following the British victory in the Anglo-Boer War of 1899-1902, British rule was established in all four territories, which were then joined together in 1910 as four provinces in the Union of South Africa. By the Act of Union, Britain handed the administration of the country over to the local white population. The constitution of the Union preserved the *status quo* as far as restrictions on black rights were concerned. It also paved the way for the total removal of all parliamentary rights from black people.



In the three decades following the establishment of the Union, a unitary white minority regime was consolidated throughout the

SUID-AFRIKA VAN DIE KOMMUNISTIESE



Nationalist Party Meeting 1940s. Slogan reads 'Save S.A. from the Communist danger'.

country. The outcome was a racially segregated society with white domination in land ownership, legal system, administration, distribution of wealth and in every sphere of social relations.




Migrant worker.

At the same time industrialisation was producing a black urban working class. The official reaction to this was, as early as 1922, a commitment to maintaining the migrant labour system. In response to growing black worker militancy in the 1940s and expanding black union membership, more effective means of controlling black labour and of maintaining the migrant labour system were devised.

In the course of these developments the National Party came to power in 1948. Articulating its policies in terms of the doctrine of *apartheid*, ('separateness'), it proceeded to create a set of laws to codify and perpetuate the racial segregation and domination which already existed. It also extended the system for regulat-

ing and controlling migrant labour. The separate administrative structure established in the 1920s, and the system of African 'Reserves' given legal embodiment in Land Acts in 1913 and 1936, became the basis of the bantustan system of today.

New measures were introduced to perpetuate the subordinate position in society of the different sections of the black community. In the case of the Coloured and Indian communities, the regime's main instrument was known as the 'Group Areas' policy, while that used against the African people was called the 'Separate Development' policy.



Meanwhile, the closing of all parliamentary avenues for protest and dissent and the growing strength of the black working class led to increasing emphasis on mass action including strikes, protests and demonstrations. The violent suppression of a strike by African mineworkers in 1946 was followed by the enforcement of segregation in trade union organisation and the outlawing of strikes by African workers. The

Communist Party was banned in 1950.

The 1950s were a decade of mass campaigns and protests which culminated in the arrest and detention of many thousands of people and the banning of the mass organisations of resistance.

ENTRENCHING APARTHEID

The apartheid regime's reliance on force of arms to maintain itself in power was given clear expression in 1961, at the time of the foundation of the white-minority Republic of South Africa.

Only one year previously a State of Emergency had been declared in response to mass demonstrations against the pass laws and in protest at the Sharpeville massacre of 69 peaceful protesters. The African National Congress and the Pan Africanist

Congress had been outlawed and thousands arrested and detained under the emergency provisions. Rural resistance to the imposition of the bantustan authorities was being violently suppressed with the declaration of a new State of Emergency affecting the Transkei bantustan.

There were plans for demonstrations and strikes against the foundation of the Republic on 31 May, and a call for a 'sovereign national convention' representative of all in South Africa to draw up a new non-racial and democratic constitution. The regime ordered a massive military mobilisation in the last weeks of May. Thousands were arrested. The first of a long succession of laws for detention without trial was enacted and many political leaders were detained.


These actions led the liberation movement to the conclusion that armed struggle was unavoidable if freedom was to be achieved. A new phase of resistance began. There followed a decade in which severe repression made legal opposition extremely difficult. Great damage was inflicted on the underground structures of resistance. But by the 1970s the regime was again facing serious threats. Externally the long hold of white-minority and colonial rule on the Southern African region was being weakened. Internally, legal opposition and open defiance were being re-established, and the underground structures were expanding.

It is with this period, and particularly the most recent years, that this book is principally concerned.


Sharpeville 1960.



AFRICA



SOUTH AFRICA — PRINCIPAL CITIES AND TOWNS



2 SEGREGATION AND INEQUALITY

Unequal distribution of wealth and great differences in the conditions under which people live, are the most immediately visible aspects of apartheid. White privilege alongside black deprivation and poverty are seen in every aspect of life: in the ownership of land and other economic resources; in the pay received by workers; in the kinds of occupation open to people; in the provision of health and welfare services; and in access to amenities. These inequalities are regulated by a mass of laws expressing the racialism of apartheid. There are laws which define the population as consisting of separate 'races' and laws which enforce segregation of the groups so defined. There are separate departments of state for the control and administration of the principal aspects of the daily life of people in different groups. There is a separate and subordinate legal system concerned with matters affecting the African majority only (such as the pass laws).

I shall not dwell upon the morbid details of South Africa's iniquitous legislation. However, of all manifestations of distorted legislative powers, the institutionalisation of racial discrimination probably deserves the highest ranking on the scale of debasement.

And when one ventures beyond the dogmatic semantics of textbook law and examines the practices which emanate from the statutory law in question, one enters the strange, almost incredible world of legal acquiescence in social misery and human suffering.

(Johan van der Vyver, National President of Lawyers for Human Rights, in a lecture at the University of the Witwatersrand in August 1982).

RACIAL CLASSIFICATION AND SEGREGATION OF PEOPLE


Apartheid divides the population of South Africa into separate groups according to colour, each with a different political and social position within the system. The divisions, the product of

colonial conquest and white minority rule, are maintained by law and force of arms.

Racialist distinctions and the forms of exploitation and oppression from which they arise, have existed in South Africa virtually since the beginning of colonial occupation. The distinctions have been applied, enforced and maintained through a system of regulations and controls which has become increasingly complex and rigid.

Every aspect of people's lives is regulated according to the population group to which they are officially assigned. For black groups there are separate and subordinate political structures, under white control and domination. Where people may live, or work, or own land, or trade, who they can go to school with, or have as a neighbour or friend, or marry — all these things, and many more, are determined by how they are classified in terms of the racial laws of apartheid.

The *Population Registration Act*, passed in 1950, provided for



the compilation of a register of the population and the issuing of racial identity cards. It also laid down a definition of racial categories unifying the various definitions occurring in previous legislation. The Act classified the population into 'White', 'Coloured' and 'Native' (subsequently termed 'Bantu' and then 'Black' and referred to in this book as 'African').

The subdivision of the black majority is extremely complex.¹

The African majority has been subdivided into ten groups by the bantustan policy, basically on linguistic lines.

The Coloured group was initially subdivided into seven subgroups ('Cape Coloured', 'Cape Malay', 'Griqua', 'Indian', 'Chinese', 'other Asiatic' and 'Other Coloured'). But two separate political and administrative structures were imposed. This is reflected in the most common official terminology. The term 'Coloured' now generally refers only to the 'Cape Coloured', 'Cape Malay', 'Griqua' and 'Other Coloured' groups see GLOSSARY. The remaining groups are now referred to as 'Asian', and are almost all of Indian descent. There are only about 10,000 people classified as Chinese: they have no clear status in the apartheid system.

Although the African and Coloured groups are subdivided along linguistic or other ethnic lines, the whites are treated as a single homogenous group in terms of the laws. This is so even though there are two major linguistic communities amongst the whites and several substantial minority groups.


The classification of people is based on appearance, 'general acceptance' and descent. In borderline cases specific tests are applied. Official examinations and investigations have caused many families humiliation, anxiety and sometimes disruption.

The classification of a child is determined by that of the parents: a child is classified the

same way as its father, unless the father is white and the mother is black. In that case the child will be classified as belonging to a black group.

Marriage between whites and members of any of the black groups, and sexual intercourse between them, is outlawed by the *Mixed Marriages Act* and the *Immorality Act*.

The black community — consisting of the African, Indian and Coloured groups — forms the majority of the population — 85 per cent in 1980. The African group forms three quarters of the total population of the country, while the Coloured and Indian groups together make up just over a tenth.



LAND AND OTHER ECONOMIC RESOURCES

White control of land and its unequal distribution are amongst the main bases of the apartheid system and of the wealth and power at the disposal of the white minority.

The scale of the dispossession of those who originally inhabited the country is partly evident in the laws by which land has been apportioned. Together the *Native Land Act* of 1913 and the *Native Trust and Land Act* of 1936 designate 13.7 per cent of the land area of the country as set aside for

Africans. (This was a maximum and the full amount had still not been made available by 1982).

The land apportioned to the Africans consisted of many fragments scattered throughout the country. It was subdivided, in terms of the *Promotion of Self-Government Act* of 1959, into ten groups of land-areas, the bantustan areas.

The process by which the mass of the people who occupied the land were dispossessed of it and excluded from access to it, except as wage-labourers, has been a continuous one. They were driven off the land by force of arms in most of the country, or reduced to the status of tenants on land owned by white farmers for whom they worked. The imposition of taxes which could not be paid without cash income gained from participating in the settler economy, also played a part in forcing people from the land. The legislation of 1936 prevented Africans from acquiring new land outside of the areas allocated to them. Since then African ownership of land outside those areas, or access to it for agricultural purposes, has been largely eliminated. This has been done by a combination of restrictions on the transfer and inheritance of property and policies of forced removal and relocation.³

The implementation of the policies and laws imposing segregated ownership and use of land has meant the forced eviction and relocation of very large numbers of people. Estimates of the number of people relocated since 1950 alone range from two to three million and even higher.⁴

Between 1948 and 1979 over 400,000 people (439,329 according to official statistics) were removed from 'black spots' and forced into the bantustan areas.⁵ ('Black spots' are areas in which African people live and own land, but which the apartheid regime allocates to another group, usually whites).


Legislation adopted in 1956 provided for the outlawing of African tenancy on white owned

farms. This affected both labour tenants and cash tenants (the latter being called 'squatters' by the whites). As a result, between 1960 and 1974 about a million and half tenants and their families were forcibly removed from agricultural land owned by whites and sent to bantustans.⁶ Within the bantustans themselves there has been a concentration of ownership of land into fewer and fewer hands: the government declared in 1973 that it envisaged a reduction of the total number of farmers in the bantustans from 500,000 to 50,000.⁷

The struggle for control of the land has never been concluded. On the one hand the programme of enforced removal and relocation, and resistance to it, continues. On the other hand, white control of the land in rural areas, which has always depended on white farmers, has been weakened by white migration from those areas. By 1981 it was estimated by one researcher that there were up to two million Africans occupying land deserted by white farmers.⁸


The exodus of whites from rural areas has been caused apparently by economic factors such as increasing mechanisation of agricultural production and higher operating costs. It has been viewed by the apartheid regime with increasing concern and anxiety since the late 1950s. From about 1979, with guerilla activity growing, the regime initiated a major programme to promote the repopulation by whites of these areas. This included a combination of financial incentives for white farmers, major investment in the infrastructures of the areas, together with an increased military presence and close integration of farmers in the military structures.⁹

The extent and significance of unequal ownership of the land is only partly contained in statistics of the distribution of areas of land. The allocation of a certain amount of land to the African people, but not nearly enough for




THE BANTUSTANS: The areas which are designated by the apartheid regime as the 'homelands' of the African population of South Africa consist of many small and scattered fragments.

Source: Department of Cooperation and Development.



GROUP AREAS: Segregated residential areas are designated for each of the groups into which apartheid divides the population of South Africa.

Source: Whirlwind before the Storm IDAF 1980.



SUBDIVISION OF TOWNSHIP: Since the 1950's African townships have been laid out on an 'ethnic' basis in accordance with the division of the African population under apartheid into groups based mainly on language. This is the official plan for the division of Daveyton Township (population 90,000 in 1980) near Benoni on the East Rand.

Source: P. Smit and J. Booysen Swart Verstedeliking, Pretoria 1981.

the subsistence of the African population as a whole, has been a principal base of the cheap labour system of apartheid (see *Bantustans in the Economy*).

Outside of the area allocated to

the Africans under the Land Acts, all other land is reserved for white ownership, except for restricted zones for black people in towns and cities, (principally residential areas), and a very

small amount of agricultural land occupied by Coloured and Indian people. The Group Areas Act is used to proclaim zones for Coloured and Indian people, while African residential zones — townships — are established under the *Blacks (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act*.

The granting of freehold property rights (ownership of land) to Africans in urban areas was still against government policy in 1982. During the 1970s schemes were introduced whereby Africans could lease property in the urban areas (a 30-year leasehold scheme introduced in 1975 and a 99-year leasehold scheme in 1978). An extremely small proportion of Africans would have the financial resources to take advantage of such schemes.

Apart from a very small amount of agricultural land, the Coloured and Indian communities — numbering 3.4 million in 1980 — are allocated no land at all except for zones in towns and cities which are proclaimed under the *Group Areas Act* of 1950 as being set aside for residential and trading activities.

Between 1957 and 1981 as many as 600,000 people, almost

all Indian and Coloured, were forcibly removed under the *Group Areas Act* and relocated in areas designated by the government.¹⁰

As in all other matters, racial domination is evident in the unequal distribution of land under the *Group Areas Act*. The area allocated to whites by the beginning of 1980 was almost six times that, per capita, which had been allocated to the Coloured and Indian communities.¹¹ The disparity between white and African residential areas in the towns and cities is greater still.

DISTRIBUTION OF AGRICULTURAL LAND

In 86.3 per cent of the country Africans are excluded from ownership of land. Within that area agricultural land was divided as follows in 1976:

WHITE	COLOURED	INDIAN
97.53%	0.79%	0.08%

Source: Government figures given in Parliament¹²

Like land itself, the other economic resources of the country are predominantly controlled by the white minority, or foreign interests, or a combination of each.

As originally defined, the African 'Reserves' appeared to lack mineral resources. When minerals were found, the areas were simply excised from the reserves or bantustans and returned to white status. More recently discovered mineral resources inside bantustan areas are being exploited by the same white controlled companies which own all the other mines in South Africa, a process which has been facilitated and promoted by the regime's bantustan policy since the 1950s.¹³


The banks, the industries and the commercial enterprises are all in white hands. Until the late 1970s sharp restrictions were placed on the accumulation of wealth by black people whenever it began to occur on a significant scale. Since then encouragement has been given to the development of small-scale black business as part of a process of fostering differences of interest within the black community. This encouragement has been particularly marked since the uprising of 1976. However, the scale of such enterprises is extremely limited and the sum of the capital involved is a small fraction of total investment funds.



DISTRIBUTION OF POPULATION

According to apartheid ideology every African in South Africa belongs to a bantustan. But in 1980, according to the official census, only just over half of those supposed to belong to the bantustans actually lived inside their boundaries.

DISTRIBUTION OF AFRICAN POPULATION OF SOUTH AFRICA IN 1980



Source: C. Simkin's *SALDRU Working Paper No. 32*, using 1980 census figures and previous estimates.¹⁴

The distribution of population is affected by the migrant labour system and the forced relocation of people. (See *LAND AND OTHER RESOURCES* and *BANTUSTANS IN THE ECONOMY* for details).

An official census is conducted every ten years. Even after allowing for inaccuracies, the results show the extent to which the distribution of the African population has been substantially affected by the policies of relocation. The number of African people in the so-called 'white' areas of South Africa has increased, from 7.25 million in 1960 to 9.65 million in 1980. However, the proportion of the African population which is resident in the bantustans has increased from 40 percent in 1960 to 54 per cent in 1980 (or from 4.74 million people to 11.33 million).

Many of those who are resident in the bantustans actually work in the 'white' areas. The proportion of the bantustan population which is urbanised has increased rapidly since 1960. Most of the urbanised bantustan residents live in new townships set up in the 1960s close to 'white' towns or in vast unofficial townships also close to 'white' areas (so-called 'squatter' townships, generally left out of official statistics). The official figures for the urban population of bantustans show an increase from 1.2 per cent in 1960 to over 17 per cent in 1980 (more than 2.2 million).


Most of the urban bantustan residents who are employed work in the 'white' areas, as migrants or 'commuters'. ('Commuter' is the official term for people who work in 'white' areas during the day and return to dormitory townships in the bantustan at night — there were over 700,000

commuters in 1979, according to official figures.¹⁵)

Using the figures given above, along with other official figures, rough estimates for the distribution of the population of South Africa in 1980 in urban and rural areas (ignoring bantustan boundaries) can be made.


Of the rural African population, a considerable proportion lives in what the regime calls 'closer' settlements. These are urban type settlements in remote areas, most of whose residents have no access to agricultural land. The majority of people living in these settlements were put there after being evicted from places where they had access to agricultural land (from white-owned farms, 'black spots' or places inside the bantustans). A leading researcher put the number in 1980 as high as 3.7 million, almost a third of the bantustan population.¹⁷ (see table overpage).

DISTRIBUTION OF POPULATION: URBAN/RURAL 1980



Source: South African Institute for Sociological, Demographic and Criminological Research, using preliminary 1980 Census figures.¹⁶

POPULATION OF METROPOLITAN REGIONS 1979-1980



The figures are estimates based on several sources, mainly official statistics and figures published by academic researchers. The figures for Africans include those in bantustan townships on the edges of metropolitan areas and also 'squatter' or informal townships.¹⁸

1 It is accepted Government policy that the Bantu are only temporarily resident in the European areas of the Republic, for as long as they offer their labour there. As soon as they become, for some reason or another, no longer fit for work or superfluous in the labour market, they are expected to return to their country of origin or the territory of the national unit where they fit in ethnically if they were not born and bred in the homeland.




2 The Bantu in the European areas who are normally regarded as non-productive and as such have to be resettled in the homelands, are conveniently classified as follows:-

(i) the aged, the unfit, widows with dependent children and also families who do not qualify under the provisions of the Bantu (Urban Areas) Act No. 25, of 1945 for family accommodation in the European urban areas;

(ii) Bantu on European farms who become superfluous as a result of age, disability or the application of Chapter IV of the Bantu Trust and Land Act, No. 18 of 1936, or Bantu squatters from mission stations and black spots which are being cleared up;

(iii) Professional Bantu such as doctors, attorneys, agents, traders, industrialists, etc. Also such persons are not regarded as essential for the European labour market, and as such they must also be settled in the homelands in so far as they are not essential for serving their compatriots in the European areas.

(The Secretary for Bantu Administration and Development, General Circular No. 25, 1967, quoted in 'African Population Relocation in South Africa', G Mare, SAIRR, 1980).



SEPARATE AMENITIES

Physical segregation extends not only to the separation of areas in which members of different groups can reside or have property rights, but also governs the use of amenities, located predominantly in 'white' areas. Some easing of restrictions occurred between the early 1970s and 1982, but this affected relatively few people, and took the form of exemptions to the overall rules of segregation without changes in the rules themselves. In 1982 one of the legal restrictions on mixed sport was lifted. Overall, segregation in the use of amenities remains very extensive.

Transport facilities, cultural, sport and leisure amenities, eating and drinking places and hotels are all affected in various ways, as are all public places. Some of the effects are described in more detail in later sections. The principal laws presently regulating access to amenities include the following:¹⁹

—*Reservation of Separate Amenities Act* of 1953: it provides for reservation of public premises and public vehicles (or parts of them) for exclusive use of people belonging to a specific 'race or class'. It also rules that the separate facilities can be 'substantially unequal'. 'Public premises' are widely defined to include not only buildings, rooms or convenience to which the public has access, but also bus stops and any land including the seashore.

—*Group Areas Act* of 1950: This law, repeatedly amended and refined, imposes restrictions on the occupation of land by people according to their racial classification. 'Occupation' is so defined as to allow the following restrictions: no-one excluded under the Act from occupying a particular area may, unless *under permit*, attend any place of public entertainment, or partake of any refreshments ordinarily involving the use of seating accommodation as a customer in a licensed restaurant, refreshment or tea-

room or eating house, or as a member or guest in any club.

—*Liquor Act* of 1928 (as amended in 1977): This law requires that, without a special permit, people of different groups may not be served liquor in the same premises.

—*Motor Transport Act* of 1930 (as amended in 1955). This empowers the National Transport Board to impose segregation in buses and taxis, through the use of certificates specifying which 'race or class' of passenger can be carried.

—*State-Aided Institution Act* of 1931 (as amended in 1957). This allows boards of state-aided institutions to lay down during what hours and under what conditions and restrictions any one, or any people belonging to a particular 'race or class', may visit any such institution or part of it. The law covers, amongst other institutions: libraries, museums, art galleries, public gardens, zoos. Some of these are controlled centrally, others by local authorities.

The bulk of the amenities covered by these laws are in areas declared 'white'. Access by blacks to these amenities is generally under restrictive conditions, and where separate amenities are provided they are in general inferior and inadequate. The overall framework of government policy is that there should be development of separate amenities in separate areas.

Since the early 1970s there has been a degree of relaxation in the rules, either by central government or by local authorities in the case of some amenities under their control, such as public parks. From 1978 the government developed a system of permits for granting exemptions to the Group Areas Act and the Liquor Act listed above. Permits, renewable annually, were granted in the case of libraries, certain forms of entertainment such as theatres, concerts, drive-in cinemas and circuses, cafes, restaurants and some hotels, congresses and exhibitions. Permits concerning

premises with liquor licences were still being issued on an *ad hoc* basis in 1982 and under restrictive conditions (for example, even where a permit allows mixed drinking, mixed dancing is forbidden).²⁰

Given that the laws imposing segregation remained in force, most black organisations pointed to the selective nature of the permits granted as an indication that the permit relaxations were used as window dressing for overseas consumption.²¹

(For an account of the position with regard to specific amenities, see *CULTURE* and *SPORT*).

ADMINISTRATIVE AND LEGAL SEGREGATION

The administrative and legal systems of South Africa are not only used to enforce segregation and discrimination, but are themselves divided and structured on racial lines.

Since the establishment of the Union of South Africa in 1910, there has been a separate department of state for the administration of matters affecting the African population. It is currently known as the Department of Co-operation and Development.

Until 1950, Coloured and Indian affairs were handled together with those of Whites by the government departments responsible for the various aspects of administration. After that date separate Departments of Coloured Relations and Indian Affairs were established. In line with the government's policy of trying to draw these sections of the black community into a closer relationship with the White community, these separate departments were merged into a Department of Internal Affairs in 1981 along with the Department of the Interior. However, the retention of the Group Areas Act and other forms of segregation meant that, to a large degree, separate administrative structures for Coloured and Indian affairs remained.

In contrast to the separate administration of most aspects of daily life, the armed forces and

the system of repressive 'security' legislation are administered by single departments (Defence, Justice and Law and Order).

The law is part and parcel of the apartheid system, an instrument for maintaining the power and privilege of the ruling minority, and for suppressing resistance.

Laws are enacted by the Parliament of the white minority government, or in the case of many of the major laws affecting Africans, simply by proclamation of the President (acting on the advice of the Department of Co-operation and Development). The law regulates, legitimates and promotes the unequal distribution of political, civil, economic and social rights according to the racial classification of those concerned.

In the courts and in the legal profession, white domination and segregation are visible.

The body of legal personnel is overwhelmingly white. In 1977, for example, all of the 87 judges of the Supreme Court were white, as were all but 15 of the 550 advocates and all but 200 out of the 4,200 practising Attorneys. At that time all the magistrates and commissioners (the equivalent of magistrates in the special courts for Africans) were white apart from a handful in the bantustans. The same held for prosecutors.²² As a result of critical staff shortages in the legal system, a few more black magistrates had been

The white man makes all the laws, he drags us before his courts and accuses us, and he sits in judgement over us.

It is fit and proper to raise the question sharply, what is this rigid colour-bar in the administration of justice? Why is it that in this courtroom I face a white magistrate, am confronted by a white prosecutor, and escorted into the dock by a white orderly? Can anyone honestly and seriously suggest that in this type of atmosphere the scales of justice are evenly balanced?

I will tell Your Worship why: the real purpose of this rigid colour-bar is to ensure that the justice dispensed by the courts

should conform to the policy of the country, however much that policy might be in conflict with the norms of justice accepted in judiciaries throughout the civilised world.

I feel oppressed by the atmosphere of white domination that lurks all around in this courtroom. Somehow this atmosphere calls to mind the inhuman injustices caused to my people outside this courtroom by this same white domination.

(Nelson Mandela, in court in 1962 on charges of inciting people to strike illegally (during the 1961 Stay-at-Home) and of leaving the country without a valid passport²³).

appointed by 1982, but the number was very small.

There are special courts for trying cases under laws applicable only to Africans. They are known as Commissioners Courts. Procedures in these courts are even more visibly oppressive than in the common courts. Pass law offenders, who constitute a large proportion of those passing through these courts, are frequently dealt with in a matter of minutes, often without defence or explanation of rights.²⁴

There is also a special kind of Commissioners Court in what are called Aid Centres. The Centres handle about a quarter of a million people a year for alleged pass offences. These courts can impose penalties short of prison sentences, but including fines

and eviction from urban areas. The Aid Centres also investigate and prepare cases against people without the normal restrictions of judge's rules which entitle suspects to refuse to answer police questions.²⁵

The legal status of Africans is still further reduced by the bantustan policy. When a bantustan is declared 'independent' by the regime, all those who are deemed to belong to it are made 'aliens' under South African law. On being made 'aliens' they lose various legal rights. For example they become liable to summary eviction and enforced removal to the bantustan if an official considers that their passes are not in order. By 1982, eight million Africans had been made 'aliens' by the imposition of 'independence' on four bantustans.²⁶



Pass raid.



Mass removals.


INCOME AND OCCUPATION

Corresponding to unequal economic and social power, there is a wide disparity in incomes between black and white. According to the World Bank the distribution of income in South Africa is one of the most inequitable in the world: the poorest 40 per cent of income earners earned only 6.2 per cent of total income in 1970.²⁷

The inequalities in income are based on two main factors: unequal ownership of resources and discrimination in wages and salaries (see *LAND AND OTHER RESOURCES* and *WAGES AND LIVING CONDITIONS*).

The differences in earnings are partly due to paying members of different groups different pay for the same work. There is also racial segregation in the occupational structure. Most of the laws reserving specific jobs for whites had been phased out by 1982. However in particular occupations, black people were still prevented by law from holding positions which involved exerting authority over whites. White power and the effects of apartheid education also ensure that in practice whites generally occupy the more skilled, better paid and more powerful position in the economy.

When jobs are distinguished according to skills required, the differences are even sharper.




INCOME DISTRIBUTION IN 1977

	White	Coloured	Indian	African
Percentage of income	64%	7%	3%	26%
Percentage of population	15%	8.5%	3%	73.5%

Figures cited by South African Institute of Race Relations.²⁸


OCCUPATIONAL STRUCTURE, (excluding agriculture)

Percentage of white collar workers amongst workers in each population group



OCCUPATIONAL STRUCTURE, BY SKILL, (excluding agriculture) 1975

Percentage of workers of each population group working in each category



HEALTH AND WELFARE

Patterns of disease and discrimination in prevention and treatment run along racially demarcated lines. The provision of social services is markedly less adequate for black people. This is particularly so in the case of Africans; children in need of care, the aged and the unemployed have to be provided for mainly by their relatives out of their low wages or from the small amount that can be produced in the bantustan areas.

Every index of health reveals the contrast between the different population groups: life expectancy, infant mortality and the diseases associated with poverty. Official information on these matters is very inadequate. The state does not take on many of the functions for which the collection of information about the lives and health of Africans is necessary. However independent researchers have thrown light on the situation.



OFFICIAL MORTALITY RATES

	White	Indian	Coloured	African
Life expectancy in years (1969-71)	68.4	61.6	52.5	55.1*
Infant Mortality per 1,000 Live Births (1974)	18.4	32.0	115.5	100-110*

Source: *Official Year Book of R.S.A.*, 1980/81.³¹

*Estimates

The infant mortality figures reflect estimates of death up to one year of age. But according to the Head of the Department of Paediatrics and Child Health of the University of Natal, black children are most vulnerable from birth to five years of age. The contrast between black and white is even greater if this age group is considered. He said, in 1981, that African children under five were 16 per cent of the total population, but deaths amongst this age group were 55 per cent of all African deaths. Amongst Whites, under-fives were 11 per cent of the whole group and contributed 7 per cent of mortality.³²

Mortality rates for particular diseases show similar wide disparities. The reason why the same diseases lead more frequently to death in the case of black children than white children, is malnutrition.

Tuberculosis is closely associated with poverty, in particular with malnutrition and inadequate housing. Over 40 per cent of the population had tuberculosis (TB) in 1978, according to Department of Health statistics. It was thought that only a third of the cases reaching the infectious stage each year were reported.³⁴ Of the cases diagnosed nearly all were black people (98.65 per cent in 1979).

You may well ask why chest infections lead to death in these children, when in most of our own children it is usually a minor non-fatal illness. The answer lies in the fact that the vast majority of those who die from these infections are malnourished.

This represents only the severe end of the spectrum. Children with mild malnutrition are not as a rule admitted.

What we see in hospital and on the death certificate is only the tip of the iceberg. A survey from Soweto in 1977 revealed that 45 per cent of 10-12 year olds were undernourished, in Cape Town in 1978 40 percent of school entrants were malnourished and in Durban in Unilazi in 1977 60 per cent of boys 3-4 years old were below expected height and 30 per cent of boys 12 years of age were below expected weight and amongst Indian school children in Durban 50 percent were undernourished.

(A Moosa, head of the Department of Paediatrics and Child Health at the University of Natal, Durban³³).

The health services are segregated, and there are far fewer facilities for the treatment of black people. The provision of hospital beds appeared, in 1980, to be five times as many per thousand head of population for whites compared with blacks.³⁵

The official policy is that black and white patients must be treated in separate hospitals or wards, and by doctors and nurses of the same population group as the patients. In practice however the policy is not always fully implemented, for two kinds of reasons.

The fact that so few resources have been devoted to the training of black medical personnel has meant that white doctors have been involved in the treatment of black patients. Of the doctors graduating from South African Medical Schools between 1968 and 1977, 97 per cent were white and only 3 per cent black.³⁶ Yet at the same time black doctors have not been allowed to treat black patients in provincial hospitals, or in their specialist capacities in large hospitals for the black communities, if this involved their being placed in authority over white medical personnel.

On the other hand an acute shortage of white nurses, from the 1970s, led to the use in some hospitals of black nurses in the treatment of white patients.³⁷




Malnutrition.

The nature of social welfare services reflects the apartheid policy of trying to reduce the number of African children, aged and unemployed in the 'white' urban areas to a minimum.

In contrast to the 82 children's homes run by the state for whites which existed in 1977, there were six subsidised orphanages for African children in the urban areas outside the bantustans providing places for a total of 620 children.³⁸




There were only four old-age homes for Africans outside the bantustans in 1980. They dated from many years before. Official policy has been that the relatives of aged Africans should care for them in the bantustans or that homes should be built for them there. In practice many have had



to rely on voluntary and self-help organisations. During 1980 government permission was given for the building of a home in Soweto, but was withdrawn the next year.³⁹


Old age pensions vary according to the racial classification of people.

OLD AGE PENSIONS (MAXIMUM) 1982



Rands per month

Source: Official Statistics given in Parliament.⁴⁰



3 EDUCATION INFORMATION CULTURE & BELIEF

Education, culture, the media, information and ideas are all subjected to powerful controls within the apartheid system. Racial segregation and discrimination are combined with sharp limits on freedom of expression and extensive action by the regime to inculcate the ideas of apartheid.

Education is used to help perpetuate segregation and domination by preparing black children for economically and politically subordinate positions in society. Cultural diversity is exploited and accentuated in order to create divisions and barriers between people.

As resistance has intensified, the propagation of radically critical ideas has been identified by the regime as a threat and subjected to increasing repression. (See also *REPRESSION*).

EDUCATION

Schools

School education is segregated. There are separate primary and secondary schools for White, Indian, Coloured and African children. There are few exceptions. A number of Coloured and Indian children attend the same schools in areas where there are not enough children to have two separate schools. And there are a very small number of black children with permits to attend a few private white schools.

In 1982 there were still separate authorities administering education for the different groups. White education was con-


trolled by provincial authorities and the Department of National Education; Indian and Coloured schools fell under two divisions within the Ministry of Internal Affairs; and African schools were controlled by the Department of Education and Training and the bantustan authorities. During 1982 there were suggestions that the government intended to create a single department of education.

The government spends much more on white children than it does on education for black children.

Unequal expenditure throughout the whole history of education in South Africa has meant unequal facilities and resources. Many schools for black children are in chronic need of repair. There are shortages of classrooms for black children and disparities in the supply of text books. Teacher training has been unequal, as well as the teacher-pupil ratio. In 1981 the teacher-pupil ratio was 1:18 for whites, 1:24 in Indian schools, 1:27 in Coloured schools and 1:48 in African schools.²

PER CAPITA EXPENDITURE ON EDUCATION (INCLUDING CAPITAL EXPENDITURE) FOR FINANCIAL YEAR 1980-81 (OUTSIDE BANTUSTANS)

Figures for capital expenditure on education in the bantustans are not readily available: estimated current expenditure per head on African education for 1980-81 was R83 inside the bantustans and R91 outside.



Source: Official Statistics given in Parliament and by the Bureau for Economic Research, Co-operation and Development.¹

Sustained protests against apartheid education together with the economic need for more skilled labour have led to increased investment of resources in education for black pupils. However, the scale of inequalities that already existed is so great that far more resources would be needed to close the gap than have so far been invested or appear to be planned. A survey published in 1980 concluded that a threefold increase in expenditure on education would be needed to close the gap (from 4 per cent of Gross National Product to 13 per cent).³

There are wide differences in the numbers of children of each group receiving education. All white children receive education up to the age of 15. A much smaller proportion of African children go to school.

Many of those who do go to school have to leave after only a few years. They have to leave because of the limited number of places or because they have to help support their families. Of the African children who started school in 1967, only 15 per cent stayed on to Form 3, two years short of the final form. A much higher proportion of white school children are in secondary school.

very big increase in technical and vocational education for black people. It was however firmly within the limits of apartheid policy: segregated, discriminatory and biased towards the bantustans.

Government policy on admission of black students to white technikons (technical colleges) is the same as in the case of universities: it can occur only where ministerial permission is granted. The commitment to segregated technical education was reaffirmed when a law was passed in 1981 providing for the establishment of separate black technikons.

Until recently there was virtually no training of Africans as artisans. Although such training of Africans was not against the law, few were actually trained. It was official policy that Africans should be trained in the bantustans and employed there after qualification. In 1979 a government commission (the Wiehahn Commission) recommended increased facilities for black apprenticeships. But it did so in terms which meant segregated and inferior training for Africans. The effect of the recommendation, and the government's implementation of them was mainly to

My department's policy is that education should stand with both feet in the reserves and have its roots in the spirit and being of Bantu society. There Bantu education must be able to give itself complete expression and there it will be called upon to perform its real service. The Bantu must be guided to serve his own community in all respects. There is no place for him in the European community above the level of certain forms of labour. Within his own community, however, all doors are open . . . Until now he has been subjected to a school system which drew him away from his own community and misled him by showing him the green pastures of European society in which he was not allowed to graze.

(Dr H F Verwoerd, Minister of Native Affairs, Senate, 7 June 1954)

The lecturers at universities are overwhelmingly white: in 1981, when the total number of lecturers was 9,378, there were 8,041 white lecturers, 262 Coloured, 325 Indian and 750 African.⁷

Legislation passed in 1959 prevented black people from registering at existing white universities unless they had ministerial permission. Likewise whites were prevented from free access to black universities. Although the number of black students entering white universities increased, and reached 4,700 by 1981, (compared with 84,000 white students) it was still only by permit and only if the courses they wanted to study were not available at black universities. The only exception was the correspondence university, the University of South Africa: of the 56,000 students enrolled with it in 1980 there were 3,000 Coloured students, 5,000 Indian students and just under 11,000 African students.⁸

The 1959 legislation provided for separate universities for black people. In 1981 there were ten white universities and eight black universities, with more being set up. In line with the policies of apartheid, the government intended to establish a university in

SCHOOL CHILDREN IN SECONDARY SCHOOL IN 1979

The figures show what percentage of school children in each group were in secondary school in 1979.

White	Coloured	African
37%	17%	14%

Source: Official Statistics cited by South African Institute of Race Relations.⁵

While the government often claims that there is a uniform curriculum, the fact that the content of education is geared in practice to the needs of the apartheid system has been a principal focus of the struggle of pupils, students, teachers and parents for change.⁴

Technical and Vocational Education

An acute shortage of skilled labour in the South African economy led in the late 1970s to a

increase the number of semi-skilled black workers, while leaving highly skilled work predominantly to whites.⁶

Universities

University education is partly mixed, but predominantly segregated. Access to universities is unequal.

In 1980 three quarters of the 160,000 university students were white. There were 10,500 African students, 12,000 Coloured students and 16,000 Indian students.

each bantustan. In addition the government decided in 1981 to set up a university for urban Africans called Vista University, with campuses in several towns and cities. This decision was taken despite criticisms from established universities over the further proliferation and duplication of facilities.⁹

MEDIA

The media, both press and broadcasting, are either firmly in the hands of the apartheid regime and its supporters or else subjected to extensive controls. Even the newspapers critical of the government are almost all owned by a small number of white controlled companies with extensive interests in the apartheid economy. With few exceptions they are written and edited by white journalists.

Radio and television are run by the state, through the South African Broadcasting Corporation. The broadcasting services are structured according to apartheid policies. Within the SABC there is a comprehensive, separate broadcasting service for Africans, with seven separate radio services for different language groups — (and programmes for another two languages). Separate television channels in African languages were set up in 1982. These services, broadcast in different parts of the country, are used to promote the policies of apartheid and the bantustan system. While Africans work for the SABC in various capacities, whites are placed in the position of control.¹⁰



Soweto — studying by candlelight.



Private school — Winterveld resettlement camp, Bophutatswana.

There is an elaborate system of laws affecting the press, giving the regime far reaching powers to control what is published. There are more than 100 laws restricting the news that can be published, or published without official authorisation.¹²

As the struggle for liberation has intensified, so too have the controls on the press. Several new laws have put further restrictions on what can be reported about police and military actions. The movement of journalists has come under increasing control during police and military operations both in the urban areas and in more remote theatres of operation.¹³

Newspapers written by black journalists were closed on two occasions in 1977 and 1981. Particular issues of several newspapers or periodicals with predominantly black readership have been banned on a number of occasions.

Repressive action against journalists assumed increasing proportions after 1976: between January 1980 and June 1982 alone, 21 journalists were detained under security laws.¹⁴ In 1982 a government commission recommended that journalists, South African and foreign, be controlled by a system of registration.

Censorship of other forms of publication is extensive. Between 1975 and 1980 more than 330

periodicals were permanently prohibited. Altogether over 20,000 publications were prohibited from 1963 to 1980. A large proportion of these were banned because they are critical of apartheid or antagonistic towards the South African regime. They included leaflets, posters, pamphlets and books.¹⁵

CULTURE

The field of culture is exploited by the regime as a means of fostering division and discrimination. Conversely expressions of the culture of resistance and unity are suppressed.

Cultural variety amongst those who inhabit South Africa is falsely presented as involving the existence of groups with cultural traditions which are not only distinct but mutually incompatible. This is then used as part of the whole rationale for physical segregation and 'separate development'. In turn the education system and the control of cultural activity is used to promote further division.

Under apartheid, access to cultural facilities is restricted on racial grounds through the operation of law, custom and practice, and differential wealth. Black artists, writers and performers may be tolerated and even actively promoted as a means of building a more flattering image for South Africa in the international



community. But there is no real freedom for cultural activities and ideas which seriously challenge the fundamental beliefs and assumptions of apartheid, or which would serve to strengthen the unity and identity of the resistance movement.

Access to cultural facilities

As part of its overall programme to reform the face of apartheid, the regime has taken steps in recent years to open selected theatres, cinemas, concert halls, libraries and other cultural facilities to members of all racial groups. However the fact that these are predominantly located in 'white' areas, and require financial means way beyond the pockets of the great majority of black people, makes the changes largely irrelevant. They have, furthermore, been widely criticised as little more than attempts to cushion the effects of apartheid and to give black people a false sense of achievement — an aura of equality which quickly evaporates as soon as they leave the 'non-racial' cinemas or theatres to confront

the police, pass laws and other restrictions of the city streets.

The reforms are in any case very small in scale and hedged about with conditions. Since the end of 1979, as the result of a series of modifications in the permit system, it has been possible for theatres, public halls and other facilities to apply for open-ended permits to admit members of all races to their performances (instead of separate permits for particular performances or limited periods of time). Such permits are granted at the discretion of the local authority concerned. By November 1980, nearly a year after the new open-ended system had been introduced, a total of 37 theatres and halls throughout South Africa had been granted such permits.¹⁶ During 1980 the Minister stated that it would not be the policy to make cinemas generally available for joint attendance by different racial groups. He said that there were felt to be sufficient numbers of cinemas in all areas.¹⁷

The permit system has been widely criticised inside South Africa as confusing and unwieldy.

The Niemand Commission of Inquiry into the Performing Arts, which tabled its report in March 1979, recommended its abolition altogether.¹⁸ While the audiences and performers at theatres and halls which have obtained exemption from normal apartheid laws may appear integrated, their management, direction and control remain firmly in white hands.

Cultural resistance and boycott

Despite enormous difficulties faced by black artists and performers, lack of money, expertise and resources, apartheid censorship laws and a host of official restrictions — including the threat of detention or banning — a rich and vital 'counter culture' has always existed in South Africa. It takes various forms among the different sections of the oppressed but throughout serves as a medium of protests and self-affirmation. While many artists, writers and musicians have been forced into exile, others have remained in the country, where a wide range of black cultural organisations, writers' associations, theatre, dance and drama groups has sprung up. As the liberation struggle has grown and expanded, it has developed its own songs and dramatic representations. Within the black cultural movement as a whole there has been a growing recognition that it is not sufficient simply to challenge the regime's control of cultural expression, but that artists and performers must actively contribute to the mobilisation and organising of resistance.

Action to sever cultural links with South Africa has formed part of the overall international campaign to isolate the apartheid regime.

In the early years, appeals to overseas artists not to visit South Africa tended to dwell on the segregation they would encounter in their audiences, and the privileged access to the performing arts and other cultural facilities enjoyed by the white minority. More recently, the arguments for

a boycott have been developed much further both inside South Africa and internationally. Reference is made to the publicity value for the regime of visits by glamorous or famous personalities, their morale-boosting effect on whites, and the need for apparently frivolous or unimportant forms of collaboration to be sacrificed in the interests of a consistent policy of total boycott.

In March 1981, for example, the Azanian People's Organisation (AZAPO) issued a comprehensive statement in South Africa. It called for a cultural boycott and explained why it was opposed to visits by foreign artists — even those who justified themselves on the grounds that their songs or performances had an anti-apartheid message. 'We have to choose between entertainment for enjoyment's sake and liberation', the statement concluded. 'Certain pleasures must be sacrificed for the greater goal that is liberation'.¹⁹ AZAPO was at the time one of a wide range of community groups and organisations involved in an energetic, and in certain instances successful, campaign inside South Africa to stop scheduled tours by a number of black American groups in particular. While black opinion inside the country is certainly not unanimous in its attitudes to visiting artists, the general trend in recent years has been towards advocacy of the boycott.

A powerful reaffirmation of the need for a cultural boycott came in 1982 when one of the most representative gatherings of artists and other cultural workers ever held met in Botswana for discussions on their role in the liberation struggle. The symposium, entitled *Culture and Resistance*, brought together artists resident and working in South Africa and those in exile, including many members of the ANC.



RELIGION

A very high proportion of people in South Africa belong to religious denominations. More than 80 per cent of the population belongs to one or another of many Christian churches, and there are significant Hindu and Islamic minorities.

Because the country was at different times subject to different colonial powers and influences, missionaries from Europe, in particular from England and the Netherlands, played a major part in shaping religion in South Africa.

Ex-mission churches are today the most wealthy, powerful and best organised. They have a substantial black membership, as well as encompassing almost all whites. These churches include: the Dutch Reformed Churches, the Church of the Province of South Africa (formerly 'Anglican'), the Methodist, Roman Catholic, Presbyterian, Congregational and Lutheran Churches. In 1970, according to the census figures, their total membership of about 13,035,440 included 3,496,800 whites, 7,648,980 Africans and 1,839,050 Coloured members.

A very large and significant grouping is that of the African Independent Churches. These are almost entirely African in membership. The first were founded during the last century when mission converts felt the need to assert their independence from the 'European' denominations. Through these churches traditional forms of worship are interlinked with Christian belief and practice. They vary in size from very large to very small. The precise number of churches, or members, is not known, but there are estimated to be about 3,000 groups. They have a total of somewhere between three and five million members, that is up to a quarter of the African population.²⁰

The adherents to the Hindu religion (nearly half a million) are virtually all Indians. Muslims (a quarter of a million) are almost

equally divided between the Indian and Coloured communities.

The structure of organised religion closely reflects that of South African society as a whole.

Some churches are closely identified with the apartheid system and philosophy. The Dutch Reformed Church formed racially segregated churches for its converts.

Some other mission churches absorbed converts into a single church, but in practice were largely segregated at parish level in consequence of the overall racial segregation in South Africa. This is largely an effect of residential segregation, and partly a result of specific legal restrictions. For example a concession allowing white Christian ministers holding South African citizenship to enter 'African' areas without a permit does not extend to lay Christians. Segregation laws make it difficult for Muslims to preach to the African population in their own areas.

All religious work is subject to government control. Church-run schools, hospitals and welfare programmes are distorted by the need to comply with apartheid regulations: each racial group must be catered for separately.

Individual members of religious denominations have at various times been forceful critics and opponents of apartheid. But developments since the 1950s have gradually led to conflict between the state and several churches. On a number of issues, there has been closer identification of organised religion with the liberation struggle.

The process has been neither uniform nor smooth, and many individuals have found themselves isolated and exposed to state repression. Repressive action against individual church leaders was used in the 1960s, and after, as a way of securing the subservience of the churches.

More organised opposition was largely expressed through interdenominational organisations like the Christian Institute

(banned in 1977), the South African Council of Churches (SACC) and the Alliance of Black Reformed Christians in South Africa (ABRECSA).

Church-state conflicts have occurred over a number of specific issues, such as a degree of church support for conscientious objectors refusing to serve in the military defence of apartheid.

From 1979 onwards, with the rising level of popular resistance, there has been growing co-operation of organised religion in broad mass protests. In campaigns such as the 1980 school boycott, the anti-Republic campaign of 1981 and the campaign against the South African Indian Council elections in 1981, the leadership of a wide range of churches came out in support of resistance to apartheid. These mass campaigns featured a united religious voice by the Muslim, Hindu and large sections of the Christian churches.²¹

A ban on outdoor meetings in force since June 1976 has made church buildings and commemorative services amongst the main kinds of forum for the expression of political resistance.

The evolution of some churches towards clearer opposition to apartheid has been met with repression and threats of further repression. In 1981 a government commission was appointed to investigate the activities of the SACC against a background of threats by the Minister of Police directed at leading figures in the SACC.²² Several church workers were detained under the security laws during 1981 and 1982.

SPORT

As an aspect of South Africa's racially segregated society, sport has been a focus of international attention and debate for many years. The boycott of South African sport has been one of the most successful of the various international campaigns to isolate apartheid. Pretoria, for its part, has responded by instituting a



series of reforms designed to change the face of apartheid sport to a form — it hopes — more acceptable for international consumption. It has allocated extensive resources to a variety of propagandist and public relations exercises intended to retain a place for South Africa on the sports fields of the world.²³

Sport is often described as being part of 'the South African way of life' and sometimes as being almost a religion. Team sports such as rugby and cricket are immensely popular amongst members of the white community. Others such as tennis, golf, horse riding, fishing, swimming and other water sports are well suited to South Africa's warm climate and open spaces. Soccer is the most popular spectator sport among Africans, and boxing and athletics have a sizeable following. Even a casual look around South Africa's townships and residential areas, its schools, holiday resorts and leisure complexes, however, reveals that access to sports facilities is strictly segregated and discriminatory. This is particularly so in the case of facilities for recreational, educational and training purposes as opposed to major national sports events.

For a number of years now, the South African government has claimed that sport in South Africa has been or is being 'normalised'. It has claimed that racial segregation is being abolished through legislative and administrative reforms and that national teams in various sports disciplines are selected on merit on a non-racial basis. The comparative success that South Africa has enjoyed in convincing the overseas sporting world that this is really the position rests partly on the government's misleading and idiosyncratic use of terms. In apartheid parlance, 'multi-racial' or 'inter-racial' sport does not refer to non-racial sport. It refers to the bringing together of the various racial groups for specific sports events in which individuals continue to be identified according to the racial labels which apartheid attaches to each and every person in South Africa. By the same token, 'multi-national' sport refers to sports events involving teams and players selected from the various bantustans and population groups, or 'nations', into which apartheid deems South Africa to be divided. While on the sports field itself such events have the appearance of being integrated,

once they are concluded the players and spectators return to their usual racially segregated milieux.

There is in fact no law or legal clause in South Africa which specifically prohibits non-racial or mixed race sport. However, many laws which remain entrenched in the statute books have an indirect bearing on the provision and use of sports facilities. These include the Group Areas Act, the Blacks (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act, the Reservation of Separate Amenities Act and the Liquor Amendment Act. They can be — and are — utilised by the government, the police and local authorities to permit or to prohibit, to facilitate or to obstruct, particular sporting events as the occasion demands.

The 'permit' system (a term which has in recent years been officially replaced by 'consultation' or 'co-operation') has been used since 1973 to regulate and control the degree of mixing on the sports field through the selective granting of permission for particular events. Towards the end of the 1970s, largely in response to criticism of its apartheid sporting policies both internally and overseas, the South African government shifted the main onus for taking decisions on matters of racial segregation from the state to local authorities, sports clubs, private bodies and individuals. This is a device which, in other contexts besides that of sport, has enabled



A meeting at the University of Natal, called by students to protest against the rebel English Cricket tour of South Africa in March 1982.

the *status quo* to be retained behind a facade of apparent reform.


The South African government itself has made it clear — in statements designed primarily for internal consumption by its own supporters — that opportunities for mixed race sport are to be restricted to organised sport as opposed to recreation and training. It has also made clear that they should be regarded as exceptions which prove the general rules of apartheid society. In 1977, for example, the then Minister of Sport and Recreation stated that '99.9955 per cent' of sport still continued to be played according to the Government's segregated sports policy. He said also that up to June 1977 there had only been 56 cases of persons joining clubs of other racial groups.²⁴ While there have been a number of further reforms, the situation overall has not essentially changed.

Resistance inside South Africa to apartheid in sport developed in the early years of the Nationalist Government. It has centred on

efforts to overcome the racial divisions of a system in which several national bodies have been formed for the control of each particular sport. The South African Council on Sport (SACOS), formed in 1973, is the main non-racial sporting federation, with 17 national affiliated sports organizations. Internationally, the South African Non-Racial Olympic Committee (SAN-ROC), formed in Johannesburg in 1963, has campaigned for a sports boycott of South Africa and demanded exclusive recognition for non-racial teams.

The aims and objectives of the non-racial sports movement inside South Africa can be summed up by the assertion that 'there can be no normal sport in an abnormal society'. It is argued that multiracial concessions on the sports fields themselves and in the arrangements for international visits and exchanges can never be fully adequate or satisfactory while the wider society remains racially segregated and the apartheid system as a whole continues to survive.

Typical playing field for blacks.





4 ECONOMIC EXPLOITATION

A system of migrant labour plays a central part in the very high level of exploitation of black workers in South Africa. A rate of growth and profits higher than those of most other countries have resulted from the policies and practices of apartheid. The economy is controlled by the white minority, to its own benefit and to the benefit of the large number of transnational corporations operating in the country.

The denial of political rights, the pass laws and the bantustan system are key elements in the maintenance of existing economic relations. The areas of the country in which the Africans are denied effective political, property and residential rights are precisely those which contain most of the resources and economic activity. With few exceptions Africans must have a job to be allowed in those areas. The remaining parts of the country, the bantustans, contain so little in the way of resources and are so under-developed as a result of apartheid that there is great poverty and unemployment among the people forced to live there (one half of the total African population of South Africa). The control and direction of African labour and the maintenance of the migrant labour system depends mainly on the bantustans, the pass laws and a vast administrative apparatus backed up by police and prisons.

Although in some ways in a slightly better position than African workers, other black workers suffer many of the same disadvantages.

There are severe restrictions on the rights of black workers to

organise in trade unions, or to take industrial action.

SECTORS OF THE ECONOMY

The structure and development of the economy have been dominated by three sectors: agriculture, mining and, increasingly important, manufacturing industry. The needs and interests of the owners and employers in these sectors have been the principal factors in shaping the apartheid system.

Although domestic service is a shrinking sector, it still employs a substantial number of people, particularly African women. Two thirds of all women employed in 1970 worked in domestic service or agriculture, while a large proportion of women not formally employed were engaged in subsistence agriculture.



Subsistence farming.




Domestic service.

Measures of the relative size of the different sectors vary considerably, depending on the definitions of 'employment' used. The figures in the chart are based on the official Current Population Survey which makes some attempt to account for those who work without being formally employed, such as those engaged in subsistence agriculture or petty trading. The figures probably underestimate to a considerable extent the proportion of people engaged in agriculture.

A comparison of the contribution of different sectors to total output underlines the current importance of manufacturing industry, as well as showing the extent of the change in the structure of the economy in the past 60 years (see table over page.)

SECTORAL DISTRIBUTION OF LABOUR - 1979
Total Workforce



Source: Rough estimates based on official Current Population Survey.¹

The economy depends on black labour, as shown by the proportions of the workforce belonging to black groups and even more clearly by the distribution of the different groups in different levels of work (see *OCCUPATIONAL STRUCTURE*).

Agriculture


Agricultural production ranges from subsistence farming to highly capital intensive commercial farming by big enterprises. Subsistence farming is carried out almost entirely by Africans, both in the bantustans and in 'white' areas where many occupy land deserted by whites and some others continue to live as tenants of white farmers (in spite of such tenancy having been outlawed). There is some commercial farming by Africans, but on a relatively small scale: only 10 per cent of agricultural production in the bantustans is marketed.⁴

The African farming areas were mainly self-sufficient in the nineteenth century, producing a surplus which was successfully marketed at favourable prices. Since then, however, government policies have worked to the great advantage of white farmers and to the detriment of rural Africans. Laws governing access to land, influx control and the programmes of forced removal and relocation, have all contributed to creating a situation of severe and extensive poverty in those rural areas to which African access to agricultural land is legally restricted. Two thirds of those in the bantustans are landless.⁵

The situation in the bantustans along with certain aspects of the system of pass laws and influx control, ensures that white farmers have a supply of extremely cheap labour. There were estimated to be 1,400,000 black workers on white-owned farms in 'white' areas in 1982, mainly African. Conditions for black workers on these farms are generally bad and pay very low (see *WAGES*).


A report submitted in 1982 by the Farm Labour Project to a

CHANGING STRUCTURE OF THE ECONOMY



Source: Dept. of Statistics. and J. Nattrass *The South African Economy: its growth and change*.²

COMPOSITION OF WORKFORCE — 1980



Source: Department of Statistics.³

government commission of enquiry revealed that real wages of farm workers had declined in the past ten years. The report said that in many areas women were forced to steal food for their children and that diseases of

malnutrition were found to be common among black children on white farms. Many children were also forced to work to supplement their family income. Farm workers were in 1982 still not covered by labour laws in effect

We are the people who work on the farms. A white man has become a white man because of us. However much money he has it is we people who do the work. We have made him a big man. But he ignores us. He gives us nothing. (A farm worker from Piet Retief, quoted in a report by the Farm Labour Project submitted in 1982 to the Government's National Manpower Commission looking into farm labour).

in other sectors of the economy.

In spite of the bad conditions workers are tied to farm work by the pass law system. Once categorised by a labour bureau as an agricultural labourer, a work seeker from the bantustans cannot take other work in a 'white' area or go to a town or city. Likewise all Africans in 'white' rural areas are registered as farm workers. Farm workers who retire or lose their jobs must go to a bantustan.⁶

Mining

South Africa has substantial deposits of many minerals and is a major world producer of gold, diamonds, chrome, platinum, uranium, coal, iron ore, manganese, asbestos, antimony and vanadium. A number of other minerals are also mined. By 1982 there were still no known significant deposits of oil, although it was reported towards the end of the year that some oil had been found.⁷

Gold accounted for 60 per cent of all mining output in 1981. Coal has assumed increasing importance for two reasons. The lack of natural oil and the threat of economic sanctions led the regime to develop and use a process for extracting oil from coal (carried out by the SASOL corporation) and more generally to use fuels other than oil-based fuels wherever possible. In addition a world wide increase in demand for coal during the 1980s in the face of the rising oil prices allowed South Africa to export an increasing volume of coal.⁸



Hard hit by unemployment family men are compelled to leave their wives to come and lead bachelors' lives in the so-called free boarding and lodging compounds.

These men have as their assembly point TEBA (The Employment Bureau of Africa Limited) in Johannesburg. Here all mine recruits go through a primitive medical check-up, a kind of medical treatment that has no place in a highly developed society like South Africa.

Men of all ages are made to strip naked and queue for VD examinations which are too quick to be thorough.

When we miners (for I am one as well) arrive at our various mining companies, we are once more subjected to yet another awful TB check-up. The free striptease show continues, followed by a long injection which goes from chest to chest without any sterilisation whatsoever.

Next there is a four hours' acclimatisation session which extends over a period of four days. This is a hot house which prepares underground workers for the bowels of the earth where the precious metals lie hidden.

Then comes the annual July increments. What an anticlimax! Instead of rejoicing we bleed and

mourn. Yes, we are mourning today because we refused to accept the bosses' offer, which we are supposed to accept with two open hands, coupled with a broad smile.

What did we get in return? Deaths by shooting, injuries and repatriations.

According to mine management, production has not been seriously affected nor will be seriously affected. This is quite right. Blacks can be killed and repatriated at will and be replaced with ease. For there are always a lot of idle Africans within the proximity of the TEBA recruitment stations — starving Africans who are prepared to jump into the nearest train heading for the mines.

The truth, which holds good in all South Africa's industries, is that there is nothing as cheap as black labour. Be that as it may, the question is: how long shall a black man endure this torture? Surely he will not endure it for ever?

(*Realistic Mine Employee, Carletonville* in a letter to the Rand Daily Mail in August 1982 shortly after a strike in which some miners were shot dead by police and thousands were sent to the bantustans).

Mineral exports make a substantial contribution to South Africa's balance of trade, roughly 70 per cent of all export earnings. The mining sector, (as indicated in *HISTORICAL BACKGROUND*), has been one of the main-springs of the economic development of

South Africa, and a principal factor in shaping the migrant labour system. From the start the demands of the sector for labour far exceeded the number of people in South Africa prepared to enter into wage labour. Steps were taken to induce more

Africans to leave the land, by imposition of taxes and changes in the structure of land ownership. Workers were recruited from all over Southern Africa, both inside South Africa and from neighbouring territories. To prevent the demand for labour causing a rise in wages, the mine owners centralised recruitment (see *PASS LAWS*).⁹

The mining industry is still largely dependent on the migrant labour system. Employers have also for a long time put obstacles in the way of trade union organisation amongst black miners. When they have taken industrial action the workers have frequently been met with the armed force of the police. During 1982 when nearly 30,000 mineworkers struck over low pay, thousands were simply dismissed and forcibly sent to the bantustans.¹⁰

The mines are almost entirely owned by a few very large private corporations, with a substantial amount of foreign investment.

Manufacturing Industry

The process of industrialisation has taken the South African economy from one with virtually no manufacturing industry at the turn of the century to one with a highly developed and sophisticated industrial sector, producing an increasingly wide range of goods. Profits from mining and from farming provided the finance for industrialisation, together with a high level of foreign investment.


Manufacturing industry is highly concentrated in certain areas of the country. In 1971 over 80 per cent of South Africa's industrial output was produced in the four major metropolitan regions.¹² It has for a long time been the aim of the regime to promote the development of industry in areas where use could be made



Mine workers hostel.



Workers in motor industry.



of black labour without the workers living in or close to 'white' areas. Known earlier as the 'Border Industry' policy, it is currently described as a policy of 'deconcentration'.

The rapid pace of industrialisation in South Africa has been partly promoted by the aim of import-substitution. This long-standing objective of economic policy has been pursued with an increasing investment of resources in recent years in order to reduce the apartheid regime's vulnerability to international economic sanctions. Industries connected with armaments and energy production in particular have been major growth areas.¹³

Electronics is a growth area which has assumed increasing importance. It includes telecom-

munications equipment, computers and weapons systems. It was ranked third in importance in 1982 behind mining and chemicals.¹⁴ This area is heavily dominated by foreign companies, which controlled around 95 per cent of the computer sector in 1982 and more than 80 per cent of total turnover. Local manufacture is still in its infancy and highly dependent on foreign technology.¹⁵

The rapid growth in trade union organisation of black workers which characterised the 1970s and early 1980s was most heavily concentrated in the manufacturing sector, particularly in the metal products and motor industry.

MANUFACTURING — PERCENTAGE CONTRIBUTION 1976

	Food									
	Beverages	Clothing	Wood			Metal	Transport			
	Tobacco	Textiles	Paper	Chemicals	Minerals	Products	Machinery	Equipment	Other	Total
Output	14	10	12	11	17	10	13	7	6	100
Employment	15	19	12	6	14	10	11	8	5	100

Source: J. Nattrass *The South African Economy: its growth and change*.¹¹

OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL OF THE ECONOMY

Control and direction of the economy are in the hands of the white minority.

Production and finance are dominated by a relatively small number of corporations, both private (many of them parts of transnational corporations), and state or parastatal. The integration of private and public sectors was accelerated from the mid-1970s as the regime pre-

pared for more intensive military efforts to defend apartheid and sought to reduce its vulnerability to economic sanctions (see *ARMS INDUSTRY and THE MILITARY AND THE STATE*).

Managerial and supervisory positions are almost entirely occupied by whites, or else are under white control (see *OCCUPATIONAL STRUCTURE*). In addition the state plays a very extensive role in the direction and control of black labour (see *PASS LAWS and DIRECTION OF LABOUR*).



Gold.

SOUTH AFRICAN CORPORATIONS 1981

		Main Sector of Activity	Total Assets Rm
* 1	SATS (South African Transport Services)	Transport	10,186.0
2	Anglo-American	Mining	9,802.0
* 3	Escom (Electricity Supply Commission)	Electricity Supply	8,972.8
4	Barclays Bank	Banking & Financial Services	8,694.8
* 5	SA Reserve Bank	Banking	7,692.6
6	Stanbic	Banking & Financial Services	6,459.0
7	De Beers	Diamonds	5,603.8
8	Nedbank	Banking & Financial Services	5,495.4
9	Volkscas	Banking	4,770.0
10	Bankorp	Banking	4,622.4
11	SA Mutual	Insurance	4,298.5
12	Gencor	Mining	4,091.8
13	United Building Society	Building Society	3,769.7
14	Barlows	Industrial Holdings	3,688.6
*15	Iscor (Iron & Steel Corporation)	Iron & Steel	3,457.0
*16	SA Post Office	Post & Telecommunications	3,190.6
17	Sanlam	Unit Trust/Insurance	3,073.0
18	SA Permanent	Building Society	2,961.3
19	Landbank	Banking	2,691.7
20	Trust Bank	Banking	2,575.7
21	Amgold	Mining Holding	2,537.0
22	Allied Building Society	Building Society	2,189.5
*23	Industrial Development Corporation	Finance	2,006.8
24	Goldfields SA	Mining House	1,649.1
25	SA Breweries	Beverages & Hotels	1,507.6
26	Liberty Holdings	Insurance	1,418.3
27	Liberty	Insurance	1,387.0
28	Anglovaal	Mining	1,249.8
29	Johannesburg Consolidated Investments	Mining	1,241.9
30	Sasol	Chemicals & Oils	1,232.5
31	Remgro (Rembrandt)	Tobacco & Matches	1,221.9
32	Natal Building Society	Building Society	1,189.2
33	Amic	Industrial Holdings	1,168.2
*34	Armcor	Armaments	1,156.9
35	African Explosive & Chemical Industry	Chemicals & Oils	1,103.6

**State or Parastatal Corporations*

Source: Top Companies Supplement to *Financial Mail*, 30 April 1982: p. 50.

THE BANTUSTANS IN THE ECONOMY

Almost all economic activity is in the part of South Africa declared 'white'. In 1970 only one quarter of employed Africans lived in the bantustans, and a significant number of them were 'commuters' who worked outside the bantustans. Of the rest of those who lived in the bantustans and were employed, over 60 per cent were engaged in subsistence agriculture. As far as manufacturing, mining, transport and services are concerned, less than one tenth of the country's economic activity (measured in terms of numbers of people involved), took place in the bantustans in 1970.¹⁶


The first results of the 1980 census indicate that there was no success whatsoever in developing the national states to the level where there is a flow of Black labour back to these areas.

(Statistical Survey of Black Development, Bureau for Economic Research, Co-operation and Development, Pretoria, 1980).


In 1975 only three per cent of the country's total Gross Domestic Product was produced inside the bantustans.¹⁷ The income of the bantustans, as recorded in the official accounts, is almost all generated outside these areas. In 1976 for example, over 70 per cent of the Gross National Product of the bantustans came from 'commuters' and migrant workers.¹⁸ Taking into account funds from the central government, only 13 per cent of the income of the bantustans was generated within their boundaries in 1980.¹⁹

The fact that so little economic activity takes place in the bantustans is a reflection of their role in the economy, as suppliers of labour and depositories for the unemployed, the aged and the sick. The function of the bantu-

DISTRIBUTION OF AFRICAN POPULATION BY AGE — 1980



DISTRIBUTION OF AFRICAN MEN AND WOMEN — 1980



stans is apparent from the composition of the population within their boundaries. There is a large number of 'commuters' working in white areas, a large number of unemployed people, a high proportion of children and aged

people, and a high proportion of women confined to the bantustans as a result of governmental policy of keeping the number of African women in the cities and towns as low as possible (see tables above).

MIGRATORY LABOUR

Under apartheid Africans are not treated as part of the permanent population of those parts of South Africa containing most of its wealth and resources. Their presence in those areas is, with relatively few exceptions, made legally dependent on their being employed. Even then their apparent legal rights to remain in such areas are in the form of exemptions to a general ban on their presence. From time to time since the 1920s, as the regime has extended or refined the migratory labour system, apartheid policy has been reaffirmed and clearly spelt out.

In 1922 as the pace of urbanisation quickened, a government commission recommended: 'Natives should only be allowed to enter the urban areas to minister to the needs of the white man and should depart therefrom when he ceases so to minister'.²² In 1975 a government spokesman stated with reference to 'white' areas: 'These people are here, as far as we are concerned, for all time on a casual basis; they are here because they come here to work, but without land ownership and without political rights'.²³ More bluntly still, in 1976 another minister (M. C. Botha, later to become Minister of Labour/Manpower Utilization), declared: 'The basis on which the Bantu is present in the white areas is to sell their labour here and for nothing else'.²⁴

Following the uprising of 1976 the Riekert Commission was appointed to devise 'more effective control over migration than in the past'. It recommended that all, and only, Africans with 'lawful employment and approved accommodation' should be allowed to remain in urban areas.

The migrant labour system was originally created largely in order to meet the needs of the mine owners. It has been extended to manufacturing and other industries in order to reverse the tendency of industrialisation to create a resident urban black

working class. With the attempt to sever the last tenuous hold which Africans had on the land outside the bantustans, it has also been extended to agriculture.²⁵

Nearly a third of African workers in 'white' South Africa are migrant workers. They work on contracts of up to a year in areas away from where their families live. About a quarter of a million came from neighbouring states in 1980, almost all of them working in the mining industry. Over one million are South African workers. They are deemed to live in the bantustans and not in the areas in which they work. In fact, they reside in the areas in which they work for eleven months of every year, in a pattern which is often sustained throughout their working lives.

Migrant workers may not take their families with them to the area in which they work. Workers have no family life and are generally housed in mining or industrial compounds, in single sex hostels in the townships, or in 'servants quarters' if they are domestic workers. Except in agriculture and domestic service, relatively few women are recruited as contract or migrant


workers. The effects of the migrant labour system on the relation between the numbers of men and women in the different parts of the country are described in the previous section.

Unable to prevent the growth of a permanently urbanised black work force, the regime has created a section of 'commuters' alongside the migrants. Great regional townships have been established around major towns and cities, often just inside bantustan boundaries. Sometimes this has been by forced removals, sometimes by simply redrawing bantustan boundaries to include existing townships. In 1980 there were over 700,000 daily commuters, travelling each day up to 70 miles (113 km) in each direction, working in 'white' areas and residing in bantustans. In addition there are weekly 'commuters', travelling up to 400 miles (644 km) each way at weekends.

The migrant labour system is administered through, and enforced by means of, a mass of laws and administrative machinery (see *PASS LAWS*, and *DIRECTION OF LABOUR*).


MIGRANT AND COMMUTERS AFRICAN LABOUR FORCE 1980

The official estimate of the total workforce was 5.4 million.



WHERE EMPLOYED AFRICAN WORKERS WORKED IN 1980

Outside bantustans:
in urban areas 59.2%




Source: 1980 Census figures cited in *SALDRU Working Paper No. 32*.²⁶


AFRICAN TOWNSHIPS IN TWO METROPOLITAN AREAS — 1979/80

The African urban population has been concentrated in regional townships, some of which are very large. Workers travel each day from the townships to work in the areas designated 'white'.

PRETORIA-WITWATERSRAND-VAAL AREA




DURBAN-PIETERMARITZBURG AREA



Sources: Preliminary results of the 1980 Census; publications of research institutes; and the press. For details see notes 15-18 in Section 2 of References.

© International Defence & Aid Fund



Pass book.

We are trying to introduce [the] migratory labour pattern as far as possible in every sphere.

(Deputy Chairman of the Bantu Affairs Commission in Parliament, 6 February 1968).

The words 'farm labourer' stamped into a black man's pass is the stamp of doom. He cannot change his job to that of an industrial worker and thus starts a life-cycle of poverty and often ill-treatment.

(A church worker, in 1980²⁷).

We were all asleep in the hostel when we heard this loud banging on the metal doors. It was four in the morning and we knew it could only be 'them'. They entered and started rounding up all of us. We were made to march outside where there were about 20 police vans waiting to cart us away. There was confusion all round as bleary eyed men, women and children were rudely and most harshly aroused from their slumber to produce their pass books. Many tried to hide because they did not have the required documents. They were the ones that were beaten by the police with their batons.

My wife came from the Transkei to live with me and be in Cape Town so that she could receive medical attention that she cannot get in the barren Transkei. They

did not bother whether she was sick or not, she was treated as badly as everyone else. There were just as many women arrested as were men. We managed to raise the fine of R70 each because we did not want to be imprisoned at Pollsmoor Prison.

We are all angry by this treatment yet what can we do? It seems as if we were meant to always live in misery. I do not possess a pass and it is all because I have made my contribution to the labour force. Now that I am old I have been thrown aside and left to be hounded by the police for not being a holder of a pass. This law is so senseless.

(An elderly watchman, describing pass raids in the Western Cape in October 1982, cited in South African Outlook, November 1982).

DIRECTION OF LABOUR

The direction of African workers and the enforcement of the migratory system is brought about by a network of labour bureaux, in conjunction with the pass laws.

All men of working age (15-65) in the bantustans who are not self employed (as commercial farmers, traders or professionals) must register as workseekers with the labour bureau in their area. Women have to register as workseekers if they want a job.

The entire future of a person is decided on first registering. At that point the labour bureau classifies the person into one of several categories of employment. Once classified workers cannot choose to change, unless it is to change to mine work or farm work. The worker seldom has much choice. Someone born in a rural community outside a bantustan area, for example, will generally remain classified as 'Farm Labour' irrespective of educational qualifications: he or she will not be registered for work in an urban area unless the farmer agrees there is no shortage of farm labour elsewhere.

In such ways workers can be forced to remain for life in very bad working conditions for very little pay. Similarly boys whose fathers are mine workers are themselves classified in the same way when registering. In some areas a labour bureau may be reserved for recruitment to a specific area of the country or occupation.²⁸

Work seekers in a bantustan can only work outside it if employed on contracts registered at a labour bureau in the bantustan. They are also only allowed to take work arising from labour requisitions received from employers by the bureau. The contracts may not be for more than one year. On their expiry the workers are discharged and must return to the bantustan to renew the contract or seek another job.

The use of the labour bureaux, and pass laws, to direct African workers to the lowest paid jobs,

and to prevent them changing their occupation, helps keep wages very low and weakens workers in relation to their employers. The effects of the system are also seen in the widely differing levels of pay in agriculture and mining compared with the rest (see *WAGES*).

There is then a comprehensive, centrally directed and powerful administrative structure for the direction of African labour. The system has been continuously tightened.

Following the recommendations of a government commission (the Riekert Commission) in 1978, it has become even more difficult for workseekers from the bantustans to enter the urban areas outside the bantustans. Official preference is given to the recruitment of Africans already resident in the 'white' urban areas. It has been made much easier for employers to take on such people rather than workseekers from rural areas. The number of labour bureaux has been reduced and concentrated near the bantustans, making them more remote from many people wanting work.²⁹

THE PASS LAWS

The pass law system is one of the key instruments of apartheid and of the economic exploitation of African workers.

Every African outside the bantustan areas who is over the age of 16 must carry a pass book, a booklet containing a set of documents (it may be what the government calls a 'Reference Book', or a bantustan 'Passport'). Pass books immediately identify their holders to any official; they show at a glance whether they have any right to be in a particular area; whether or where they are employed; whether they have paid their taxes. A list of what the pass book contains indicates its scope and power as an instrument of control.

The Pass Book contains sections for the following documents:

A. Residential address; labour

bureau where registered; official permit to remain in, or go to, a specific area; and any referrals or admittals to Aid Centres (see *ENFORCEMENT OF PASS LAWS*).

B. Employer's name and address and signature for each week, as well as endorsements for leave; for students, pupils and scholars there must be a record of the name of the head of the school, university or college and a certificate of enrolment for the quarter.

C.D. Tax receipts.

E. Concessions, exemptions and privileges.

F. Driver's licence.

G. Weapons licence.

H. Identity document with sex, name, ethnic classification, photograph and Reference Book number.

For women from the bantustans there is a section in the pass book for the consent of the commissioner of the district defined as home, and for the consent of parent, guardian or husband to her going to work or live in another district.

The information in the pass book is also kept in a computerised record system in Pretoria with terminals in all the main centres of the country. The fingerprints of each African — contained in the pass book — are filed in a central registry in Pretoria.

Pass books have to be produced at all points of contact with officials and can be used to control every aspect of life. While there have from time to time been various shifts in government policy, and changes in the names of the documents, the basic nature and function of the pass has remained the same. Even those who are exempted from some of the restrictions of the pass laws must carry identity documents proving their exemption.

The pass laws divide the country in two, bantustans and the rest, and the latter is divided again into 'prescribed' areas (currently mainly urban areas) and rural areas. While the pre-

cise details may shift, the basic policy is that Africans are allowed to remain in the urban areas only under the most restrictive conditions.

The position in 1982 was still that no African could remain in a prescribed area for more than 72 hours except under conditions which allowed exemption from the general ban. Exemptions (under Section 10 (1) of the Blacks (Urban Areas) Act) could be obtained by those born in an area or who had lived continuously there for 15 years (not as a migrant, and provided they were in 'lawful employment'); those who had worked continuously (not as a migrant) for one employer for 10 years; wives and dependent children of those entitled to exemptions on the above grounds; and migrant workers who were exempted for the period of their contracts.

A process of imposing more severe pass law restrictions on the majority of Africans, accompanied by some relaxation of restrictions for a minority, has been continuing since 1979. This tightening of the system of pass laws is a consequence of the implementation of a policy recommended by the Riekert Commission, appointed after the uprising of 1976. Central to the policy are measures making it more difficult for Africans outside the 'white' areas to enter those areas, together with other measures which give greater freedom of movement to the minority who do already have rights of residence there.

Riekert also recommended that the implementation of the pass laws should be shifted away from 'public places' where the police carried it out, to the place of employment or accommodation. In 1980 a bill was introduced to replace the exemptions described above by new ones: Only those with 'lawful employment' and 'approved accommodation' could remain in an urban area outside a bantustan. The bill was withdrawn in the face of strong opposition to the severe new

restrictions on the majority which it also proposed. A similar bill was introduced in 1982, again provoking fears of harsh action against pass law offenders; it too was shelved temporarily.³⁰

The pass laws bear even more heavily on African women than on African men. Not only do they need the consent of officials and parent, guardian or husband to leave home to work in another area, but in 1964 a total ban was placed on the further entry of women into the urban areas except on a visitor's permit.³¹

ENFORCEMENT OF PASS LAWS

The power of the pass as an instrument of control rests on the penalties imposed on those who contravene the regulations. Someone who does not have, or cannot produce, a pass that is in order faces a stark set of options: fines that most are not in a position to pay, imprisonment, direction through the labour bureaux to badly paid work (usually on farms), or forcible removal to a bantustan. Those who go to prison may well spend the period of their sentence working for a private employer, usually on a farm with its own prison.

The procedures by which these penalties are imposed allow little chance for people to claim even the minimal rights they might have.

People must produce their pass books on demand. Police raids resembling military operations are carried out in the form of sweeps of areas. Since 1978 they have increasingly involved military personnel.³²

If there is a charge and a trial, it takes place in the Commissioner's Court, the special courts for dealing with laws which apply only to Africans. In only a few cases is there any legal representation, and cases are dealt with in minutes. A prosecutor who resigned in 1980 in protest at the way the courts were used to implement apartheid described how the Pretoria Commissioner's

Court regularly dealt with 120 cases a day, and that none of those tried in 1980 were legally represented.³³

If for any reason the court decides that a person has lost the right to remain in the area, this is indicated by an endorsement stamped in the pass book. In red ink it reads: 'Ordered to leave the prescribed area of . . . within 72 hours'. Unemployment, and being on strike are amongst the conditions that can lead to 'endorsement out'.

The figures for arrest and prosecutions are very high. Between 1948 and 1981 at least 12.5 million people were arrested or prosecuted under the pass laws. People convicted under the pass laws constituted one third of all sentenced prisoners in 1979.³⁴

High as the figures for arrests and prosecutions are, they still understate the position. As the apartheid system has developed alternative ways of dealing with pass law offenders and directing labour, official figures for pass law arrests and prosecutions have fallen from a high point of about 693,700 prosecutions in 1968 to about 165,000 in 1980 and 1981. During that time the machinery for enforcing the pass laws and directing labour was reorganised and centralised. Falling figures for arrests reflect the effectiveness of the new methods of directing labour.

Apart from the development of the labour bureaux and administration boards, Aid Centres were set up to deal with pass law offenders. People picked up by police and 'referred' to Aid Centres are not included in the statistics of those arrested. Special Courts, even further removed from publicity and legal procedure than the normal Commissioner's Courts, can impose orders resulting in the eviction of people from urban areas, without any prosecution. Putting together figures for arrests and prosecutions with those for referrals to Aid Centres gives a closer estimate of the position (*see table over page*).

ENFORCEMENT OF PASS LAWS

No. arrested or prosecuted under pass laws		No. referred to Aid Centres (80-90%) plus No. reporting voluntarily	
1974-75	373,570	191,744	1974
1975-76	381,858	253,312	1975
1976-77	297,374	235,535	1976
1977-78	279,957	274,470	1977
1978-79	162,054	273,601	1978
1980	158,335		
1981	162,024		
1982	206,022		

Source: Official Statistics cited in various publications.³⁵

Of those who were handled by Aid Centres during the latter half of the 1970s, an average of around 20,000 a year were directed to employment, principally farm labour. An average of around 40,000 a year, about one-fifth, were removed to the bantustans, while an average of over 170,000 a year were prosecuted. Many of those given prison sentences under the pass laws (as well as some other black prisoners) spend the term of their sentences working as labourers, mainly for white farmers. (Officially they are said to be 'parolees').³⁶

People assigned by the government to bantustans declared 'independent' by the regime face even more direct use of force if their passes are not in order. Since they are deemed 'aliens' in terms of apartheid law, they can be dealt with under the immigration laws. One of the laws, which allows summary removal without trial, was used in August 1981 to evict over 1,000 people from the Western Cape to send them to the Transkei.³⁷



UNEMPLOYMENT

Just how many people in South Africa are unemployed during any given year is not known, due to lack of adequate statistics about African workers. Independent estimates of unemployment in 1982 by university researchers, put it between 21 and 24 per cent.³⁸ Two things, however, have been consistently clear: the rate of unemployment is high, and Africans are the principal sufferers. Furthermore, although there is considerable unemployment amongst Africans outside the bantustans, it is much higher in the bantustans than elsewhere (almost three times as high for men, and considerably higher for women).³⁹

The principal reason for the difference in unemployment rates in the bantustans and elsewhere is that Africans who are not employed are likely to be forcibly removed from the 'white' rural or urban areas and sent to the bantustans. They join large numbers of unemployed people already there. The situation was underlined by a research paper published in 1979, showing that it was economically worthwhile for a person in a bantustan to go illegally to work in a 'white' area, even if it meant spending part of the year in prison (in some cases as long as nine months).⁴⁰

The number of unemployed people in the bantustans has been increased by various kinds of forced removals from other parts of the country and relocation. Apart from the people evicted from 'black spots' and from white-owned farms on which they lived



Police attack work seekers.

as tenants, over a million and a quarter people were 'endorsed out' of 'white' urban areas between 1956 and 1960. Some were sent to work in 'white' rural areas, but many were sent to the bantustans (see *DISTRIBUTION OF LAND* and *ENFORCEMENT OF PASS LAWS*).

The effect of the policy of relocating the unemployed, evicted agricultural tenants and others in the bantustans has been to create extremely large concentrations of people living under conditions of great poverty, cut off by the pass laws and labour bureaux from opportunities for employment. Many are put in what are termed 'closer settlements' along with great numbers of people dispossessed of land as a result of the regime's policy of reducing the number of small farms in the bantustans (see *LAND AND OTHER RESOURCES*).

Although these settlements are generally in rural areas, they are very dense, with people having only urban-sized plots for the most part. Unemployment is particularly high: one study of eight major closer settlements found that if absent migrant workers were not counted, the unemployment rate, for both men and women, varied around 31 per cent.⁴¹

The seriousness and urgency of the situation was most vividly illustrated during 1981 when thousands of people from the Eastern Cape repeatedly returned to the Western Cape after being forcibly removed. A newspaper reporter investigating the events wrote: 'The theme "If I went to the Transkei I and my children

would starve" appears over and over again among the squatters'.⁴²

WAGES AND LIVING CONDITIONS

The wages and living conditions of workers in South Africa reflect the apartheid system. Housing and transport in particular are frequent points of conflict between workers and the apartheid regime.

Wages

Black workers are paid much less than whites on average. Amongst black workers, Africans as a group are paid lower wages than Coloured and Indian workers, with the lowest wages of all being paid to African women.

Wages in domestic service and agriculture (the main areas of employment for African women) are even lower.

African farmworkers were, according to official figures given in Parliament in 1981, earning as little as R32.00 per month (this included the food provided by the employer — cash earnings of permanent farmworkers were said to

be as little as R23.00 a month).⁴⁴ In evidence to a government commission it was stated in 1982 that some farmworkers were earning as little as R10 a month.⁴⁵ The pay of domestic workers is also very low even in urban areas: one in three domestic workers on the West Rand earned less than R75 a month in 1979.⁴⁶

Housing

Housing for black people is inadequate in contrast to the comfortable and frequently luxurious homes of whites.



Winterveld.


Most African migrant workers live in compounds owned by mining companies or in barrack-like single sex hostels. There is an acute shortage of housing for Africans in urban areas.

As part of its policy of trying to put all African labour on a migratory basis, the government cut back on the building of family housing units in the urban townships from 1968. It was estimated that in 1976 there were over a quarter of a million Africans on the housing lists of the various Administration Boards.⁴⁷ In 1980 the officially acknowledged waiting list in Soweto was for 34,000 family housing units. During that year the West Rand Administration Board built no houses in Soweto, and only 420 were built privately.⁴⁸ In 1980 half a million black people were in need of proper housing in the Pretoria, Witwatersrand and Vaal complex alone, according to a government report.⁴⁹

The consequences of apartheid policies and practices in the field of housing are homelessness, overcrowding and squatting. The number of Africans per house in 10 main urban areas in 1975 was 17.⁵⁰ Vast 'squatter' communities have grown up near some of the main urban centres. Just north of Pretoria, at Winterveld and other nearby areas there are thought to be between a half and three quarters of a million people, and in informal townships near Durban and Pietermaritzburg another half a million.⁵¹

Government policies regarding the financing of housing for Africans outside the bantustans have meant the rents have been very high in relation to wages. Consequently there have been widespread struggles over rents between the people in the townships and the government bodies administering housing in the townships (central government administration boards and the community councils) (see **POLITICAL STRUCTURES: AFRICANS OUTSIDE THE BANTUSTANS and POPULAR RESISTANCE**).

PAY DIFFERENTIALS: 1981 (Monthly Pay)



Transport

The segregated residential townships and settlements in which the black workers must live are situated generally far from the factories and offices in which they must work. Forced removals and relocation of communities often put people even further away from work. African, Indian and Coloured workers have all been affected in this way. A government appointed transport committee said in 1978 that workers in Soweto spent on average over four hours a day travelling between home, work and back again.⁵²

The continually rising transport fares, particularly bus fares, impose a very great burden on black workers. Mass struggles to prevent fare increases, in the form of bus boycotts, have been a major form of action by workers on numerous occasions (see *POPULAR RESISTANCE*).

Transport is mostly segregated, either by law or effectively by cost, and transport facilities for black people usually severely overcrowded.

LABOUR RELATIONS

Representation of African workers in the determination of wages and working conditions has been kept to a minimum in South Africa. At times it has been excluded altogether except under extremely restrictive conditions. Racial segregation and white domination in the officially recognised trade union movement has traditionally been facilitated and during some periods has been imposed by the government. While not illegal, trade unions with African members and non-racial trade unions ('independent unions'), were until 1979 excluded from participation in the official machinery for determination of wages and conditions.

In spite of these restrictions and severe repression of independent trade unionists, there was a resurgence of independent black trade unions and industrial militancy by black workers in the

1970s. This created some scope for collective bargaining by African and other black workers outside the official system. In response the regime attempted to bring the independent black unions into the official system as a means of controlling and weakening them. It created new legislation for this purpose in 1979 and 1981.

Determination of Wages and Conditions

There is an elaborate official system for the determination of minimum wages and working conditions and for the settling of disputes. Official bargaining is primarily conducted through Industrial Councils (see below). Where direct representation of workers in the Councils is possible, it is through registered trade unions. African membership of registered unions, always limited in extent, was restricted in 1937 and outlawed in 1953. Only in 1979 was it again possible. In most plants, industries and trades, wages and conditions are determined with no form of direct representation of the majority of workers.

Several industries and trades are covered by a system of Industrial Councils, in which employers and registered unions negotiate terms. This process of determination removes any negotiation from the shopfloor. Minimum wages and conditions affect all workers in the industry even if they are not represented by the registered unions. This system

covers much of manufacturing and mining.

Alternatively, minimum wages and conditions may be fixed by the employers. A group of employers in any trade not covered by an Industrial Council Agreement can submit proposals to the Minister of Manpower Utilisation with a request to make them binding, which he does if he agrees.⁵³ In addition any Industrial Conciliation agreement can at the will of the Minister be extended to cover any other group of workers.

In a number of industries, pay and conditions are fixed by a Wage Board, or by Ministerial amendments to existing Wage Board determinations.⁵⁴

Many workers — for example, two million domestic and farm workers in 1982 — have not been covered by any arrangements. It was only in 1982 that the government decided to investigate the possibility of machinery for determining their minimum conditions.

The rates and standards fixed by the official procedures are minimum ones. Not all conditions are covered: health, for example, is often not covered. The official procedures and agreements, inadequate as they are, are often used by employers as a reason for refusing to negotiate. As in any system of labour relations, the possibility of increasing actual wage levels beyond the minimum levels depends on the rights and the powers of workers to organise and negotiate and to take industrial action.




African workers demonstration 1930's.

Trade Unions

There is a long history of trade unionism amongst black workers in South Africa starting at the turn of the century. By the 1920s there were as many as 100,000 members in the Industrial and Commercial Workers Union. In 1945 the Council of Non-European Trade Unions had 119 trade union affiliates with a combined membership of 158,000 workers.⁵⁵

Following a wave of industrial militancy, including a major strike by mineworkers in 1946, there was a period of severe repression of black and non-racial unions. In 1953 racial segregation became a condition of union registration: by 1963 only 13 African trade unions with a total of 16,040 members were known to be in existence.⁵⁶

During this period of repression a non-racial trade union federation, the South Africa Congress of Trades Unions (SACTU), was established in 1955. This followed a decision by the white-dominated South African Trade Union Council (TUCSA) to exclude all Africans from membership of the Council. The Council of Non-European Trade Unions dissolved itself and merged with SACTU. From the start SACTU regarded itself as an integral part of the broader movement for national liberation. It underwent severe repression and was greatly restricted in its activities. While the organisation was not banned, its officials and activists were banned and harassed in other ways, and it has been forced to operate underground since the 1960s.



The 1970s was a period of sustained industrial militancy by black workers. There was a resurgence of African and non-racial trade unionism. This included 'parallel' segregated African unions set up by TUCSA, and 'independent' unions (mainly non-racial with a predominantly African membership). By the end of 1981 the independent unions, organised in a number of major groupings, had a total membership of at least 200,000. Manufacturing industry, transport and distribution were the sectors principally covered.

In 1979, following the report of a commission headed by Professor Wiehahn, the government attempted to bring the independent unions under control. Unions with African members were allowed to register, and become involved in the official negotiating machinery.

In 1981 further legislation extended controls to unregistered unions as well, and added further restrictions on their activities. At the same time intense repressive action was taken against active trade unionists. During 1981 over three hundred trade unionists and workers were detained at various times under different security laws. During the same period at least 1,200 people appeared in court as a result of their participation in disputes or trade union action.⁵⁷

During August 1981 representatives of the independent unions held a conference. They resolved to 'resist and reject the present system of registration insofar as it is designed to control and interfere in the internal affairs of the union'.⁵⁸ A subsequent conference in April 1982 rejected the Industrial Council system as an unacceptable means of collective bargaining.⁵⁹

Industrial Action and the Right to Strike

Formally there is a right to strike, but it is so restrictive as to have little practical content. From 1953 to 1973 strikes by African workers were outlawed. From



Police break up a strike. Durban 1973.

1973 there was a right to strike which was so restrictive that only three out of over 1,400 recorded strikes by African workers in the next eight years were 'legal'.

All strikes in 'essential' services are illegal, and these services are very widely defined by law. They include the production of light, power, water, sanitation, passenger transportation as well as the supply, processing, distribution and carrying of perishable foodstuffs, and the supply and distribution of petrol and other fuels to local authorities. Moreover the Minister can declare any service essential if he so wishes.⁶⁰

In addition there are laws which can be used against strikes, even against legal strikes. Picketing and 'incitement' to strike are effectively ruled out by law. In one of the cases of a legal strike by African workers (at Armourplate Glass in 1976) the workers who mounted a picket line were arrested for constituting an illegal gathering under the Riotous Assembly Act.⁶¹ A new law passed in 1982, the Intimidation Act, contained similar powers, and was used against workers striking over pensions within weeks of its adoption by parliament.⁶²

Financial assistance to workers engaged in an 'illegal' strike is also illegal under the Labour Relations Amendment Act of 1981: the Langa Conference of independent unions, mentioned above, resolved also to defy this restriction.

A further restriction on the effective right to strike by African workers is the power the state has over migrant workers. In law African workers become unemployed if they strike, and can be forcibly evicted from the urban areas and sent to the bantustans. In one example, a strike by 10,000 municipal workers in August 1980 was broken when armed police forced striking workers in the municipal compounds into buses which took them to bantustans. During a wave of industrial action by African mineworkers in 1982, over 3,000 strikers were sent to the bantustans.⁶³


The very high level of un-

employment amongst black people, and the power that employers have to dismiss strikers and recruit other workers, also restricts the power of black workers to defend their pay and conditions by industrial action.

Workers have to contend, too, with anti-trade union attitudes on the part of bantustan authorities. This is of particular importance given the growth in the number of 'commuters' who live inside the bantustan boundaries and work outside them and given the role of the bantustan administrations in the supply of labour. One example of what this means in practice was seen in the Ciskei during 1981: the authorities

recruited strike breaking labour for a factory in East London where trade union members were on strike. The recruits were screened by Ciskei police, whose head explained that his department was committed to 'eliminating' strikers from the workforce.⁶⁴ Such involvement of bantustan authorities in anti-strike activities has increased noticeably since 1981.⁶⁵

In the face of such restrictions the readiness of black workers to strike, and the difficulty employers often find in recruiting people to replace dismissed strikers, suggest a high degree of organisation.



THE
PEOPLE
SHALL
GOVERN

BOYCOTT
UNION
FESTIVAL
- I RA

WE
DEMAND
A
NEW

CONSTITUTION

5 POLITICAL STRUCTURES

Political power in the apartheid system is firmly held by the white minority. Changes in the political structures proposed by the government in 1982 were designed to preserve white power while extending limited participation in central government to small sections of the black majority.

The situation in 1982 was that a white government based on a parliament of which only whites could be members and for which only whites could vote, exercised power over the whole country.

Instead of direct representation in Parliament, there were segregated and subordinate political systems for black people. Those which existed in 1982 had been set up in the 1960s following the banning of mass organised black opposition, and were imposed on the groups into which apartheid divides the black majority. They were a means of attempting to involve a small section of black people in the implementation of apartheid policies.

Two fundamental principles embodied in the constitutional structure and consistently reaffirmed by the ruling party and government are those of white domination and the exclusion of Africans, the majority of the population, from participation in the central political structures.

Since 1968 it has been illegal to belong to a party composed of members from more than one of the population groups into which people are divided, or for anyone to assist a party with members belonging to a population group other than their own.

POLITICAL POWER

Parliament consisted in 1982 of 177 white Members of Parlia-

ment (MPs). Of these, 165 were elected in Parliamentary elections (normally held every five years) in which only white adults could vote. Another 12 MPs were appointed by the Prime Minister directly or on the basis of nominations from the parliamentary parties.

A limited right to vote in parliamentary elections on the part of some black men existed in 1910, when the Union of South Africa was formed. This was gradually restricted, then segregated with the creation of separate voters' rolls, and eventually abolished in 1968.

None of the parties represented in parliament advocates universal adult suffrage in a unitary and democratic state, a fundamental goal of the liberation movement and the demand of all but a handful of the black majority.

Following elections in 1981 and the formation in February 1982 of the Conservative Party as a breakaway from the National Party, the MPs were divided as shown below.

come from Parliament, rather than from the black majority.¹

The policies of the New Republic Party might be described as midway between the other two. The Conservative Party has much in common with the Reformed National Party (HNP) and some other small white groups without parliamentary representation. The reason for the break with the National Party appeared to be differences over the interpretation of the constitutional proposals which had been National Party policy since 1977 (see *CONSTITUTIONAL PLANS*). This was an aspect of more general differences concerning the means of maintaining white domination and of containing black resistance to apartheid. In a comment representative of many observers, the *Johannesburg Financial Mail* said in 1980: 'The difference between Botha (the Prime Minister) and Treurnicht (one of those who later formed the Conservative Party) is this: the first is seeking an accommodation with certain blacks — but only on

MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT IN 1982

	Elected MPs	Nominated or elected by MPs
National Party (NP)	114	10
Progressive Federal Party (PF)	26	1
New Republic Party (NRP)	8	0
Conservative Party (CP)	17	1

The ruling National Party is committed to the principle that the African people shall have no political rights outside of the bantustan system. The Progressive Federal Party (the official opposition) advocates a universal adult franchise but with a minority veto power, and it also holds that the initiative for change must

white terms: the second is contemptuous of such an accommodation — it is seen as weak.²

Political power is concentrated to a high degree. When P. W. Botha took office the Prime Minister's power was greatly enhanced, at the expense of Parliament and the Cabinet. The changes put into effect included

not only the power to appoint unelected MPs, but also a re-organisation of the administration and government. This brought about a centralisation of power around an expanded Prime Minister's Office. In particular the State Security Council is extremely powerful and is generally believed to have supplanted the cabinet as the effective decision-making body in Government. These changes were part of a process that has established the control of the generals over strategic sectors of the government, administration and economy.³ Constitutional proposals put forward by Botha in August 1982 and adopted by the National Party included the replacement of the Prime Minister by an Executive President. They would, if implemented, increase this concentration of power.

The laws regulating the lives of the black majority are made in a number of ways. Statutes are discussed in and enacted by Parliament after they have been decided on by the Cabinet. In addition the State President has the power to rule over Africans to a large extent by decree. This power is based mainly on the Black Administration Act, dating from 1927. The power is exercised by the issuing of Proclamations published in the Government Gazette, and they are effectively determined by the department concerned with the administration of African affairs. Within the limits set by apartheid policies and by the power of the apartheid regime, some regulations and laws are also made by subordinate black authorities.

At lower levels of government there were, in 1982, Provincial Councils for the four provinces of Natal, Cape, Transvaal and Orange Free State. Only whites could be members of them or vote for them. Limited black voting rights for them had been restricted and eventually abolished by 1972. Local government structures are described below.

SEGREGATED POLITICAL STRUCTURES

Until the 1960s the administration of black people was directly carried out by white authorities.

A special department (originally called the Native Affairs Department, and now the Department of Co-operation and Development) dealt especially with all aspects of African affairs. In 'white' rural areas the administration of Africans was effectively carried out by Commissioners of the department in conjunction with white farmers. In 'white' urban areas administration of Africans was in the hands of local authorities, as was the administration of Indian and Coloured communities.

From about 1960 the regime began the process of setting up an intermediate layer of racially segregated black political authorities whose task was to administer the black community. At the same time as separating the local administration of white and black groups, steps were taken to ensure central government control over the local authorities. This involved establishing separate administrative departments for dealing with Coloured Affairs and Indian Affairs, and in the creation of a new administrative structure (Administration Boards) for ensuring central control over the administration of urban Africans.

The programme of enforced removals and relocation of people ensured the residential segregation of the different groups. It also had the effect of disrupting existing communities and facilitating the imposition of the regime's new structures (described below). These were set up in the wake of the banning of mass organised political opposition and during a period of intense repression.

However, by the 1980s the structures were undergoing severe strain and the regime was devoting considerable political energy to finding ways of extending their existence and strength-



ening them. The segregated political systems had failed to win support from the communities they were imposed on. An extensive growth of alternative democratic community-based organisations brought the official institutions under further pressure, particularly at local level. It exposed them either as powerless to advance black interests or as agents of the state. The absence of any stable economic base for the bantustan authorities or for the local authority systems was acknowledged by the regime itself.

All Bantu persons in the white area, whether they were born there or not, remain members of their respective nations. In other words, the fact that they work here does not make them members of the white nation — they remain Zulu, Tswana, Venda and so on. The basis on which the Bantu is present in the white area is to sell their labour here and for nothing else...


(The Minister of Bantu Administration and Development, in August 1976).

What hurts is being driven like an animal out of your own home town. I was born in Johannesburg and proud of it. Now they tell me I'm a citizen of an up-country state called Qwa-Qwa — I've never ever seen the bloody place.


(A taxi driver speaking to a reporter from the Sowetan newspaper in February 1981).

ADMINISTRATIVE REGIONS

PROVINCES



ADMINISTRATION BOARD AREAS AND BANTUSTANS



BANTUSTAN POLITICAL STRUCTURES

Apartheid divides the African population into ten groups, principally on linguistic lines. The groups are declared to be 'National Units' or even 'Nations'. The smaller part of the country declared to be the African part, consists of numerous fragments, divided into ten groups. These ten groups of land areas are called 'Bantu Homelands' or 'National States' by the regime. (They are popularly known as bantustans.) All Africans are declared to belong to one of the bantustans according to the regime's division of the population, irrespective of

where they live or have lived all their lives.

Almost half the African population lives outside the boundaries of the bantustans which the apartheid regime declares to be their 'homelands' (see *DISTRIBUTION OF POPULATION*).

The bantustan political system has been set up, and is still being set up, in successive stages. It was built on the foundations of the 'reserves' established by the Land Acts of 1913 and 1936, and on the separate administrative system set up by the Native Administration Act of 1927. The process began in the 1950s, with the Bantu Authorities Act of 1951. Under that Act Tribal Authorities

There's going to be an uprising in the bantustans. The people in the bantustans are identifying themselves with the urban struggle, the struggle of the liberation movement. For the first time, they feel that the only relief, the only redemption, is a revolution, because they are caught up in a situation which is not their own. Because of the violent rule, you have a few blacks on top who are called 'ministers' and who are being pampered by the Pretoria regime.

There is no way that the bantustans are going to be improved because those ministers don't want to see improvements, because every one still gets his money from Pretoria. So the bantustans will never be economically viable.

These are people whom I always refer to as 'supervisors of the death squad'. The bantustan leaders are supervisors of the death squad because they know the people who are immediately behind them. They get no taxes from people in the bantustans, they get nothing because the people have nothing to give. So therefore, what is their job? — to get money from Pretoria and to suppress the people.

(Alex Mbatha, a development worker with the Southern Africa Catholic Bishops Conference until his detention in 1981; interviewed in London by a member of the Research, Information and Publications Department of IDAF).

were set up in bantustan areas. This gave new life to decaying traditional structures, and made the power of chiefs depend on the apartheid regime.

Membership of the Authorities was by government appointment. Chiefs who were not compliant and who sought to genuinely represent their people clashed with the government and many were deposed or banished. There was resistance to the Bantu Authorities on many occasions during the 1950s. It was only with the help of the severe repression of the 1960s that headway was made in extending the system to the stages of 'legislative assemb-

lies', 'self-governing states' and 'independent states'.⁴

By the end of 1981 four bantustans had been declared 'independent': the Ciskei, Transkei, Venda and Bophuthatswana bantustans. In each case the process involved repression of opposition and the use by the regime of its power to appoint compliant chiefs to assemblies. When the Transkei was declared 'independent' in 1976 most of the official opposition were in detention. The Venda bantustan was declared 'independent' in 1979, after the ruling party had lost an election but retained power through nominated members. The Ciskei was made 'independent' in 1981, following a referendum in which a great majority were said to have supported 'independence'. The referendum results clearly contradicted those of an opinion survey conducted shortly before which had shown that 90 per cent of those eligible to vote were opposed to 'independence'. According to an independent academic observer, the referendum took place against a background of boycotts and fear, including 'a veiled threat of possible imprisonment' for anyone voting against 'independence'.⁵



While four bantustans had been declared 'independent' by the end of 1981, others were either still at earlier stages of the process, or were resisting the completion of the process.

One bantustan leader to oppose independence was Chief Buthelezi of Kwazulu, whose Inkatha movement was established in 1975 on a tribal basis. It was subsequently opened, in principle, to all. Its membership

appeared to expand rapidly and by 1978 the English language white South African press was describing it as the most significant black political force in the country.⁶ However black support appeared to be limited by the readiness of its leaders to work within the bantustan system, even if they resisted the final step of 'independence'. According to a survey conducted in 1981, over 70 per cent of Inkatha supporters belonged to the section of the population assigned to the Kwazulu bantustan. But even in Durban where Inkatha enjoyed its strongest support, the popularity of the banned ANC and Nelson Mandela was found to be 'significantly higher than that of Gatsha Buthelezi'.⁷

AFRICANS OUTSIDE THE BANTUSTANS

Between a half and one third of Africans live in and around the urban centres classed as 'white'. Of these, about a million are 'commuters' living inside bantustan boundaries, and as such are administered within the bantustan framework. The rest (about five million in 1980) are administered by Administration Boards under the control of the central government. Certain services are administered on behalf of these Boards and under their supervision and control by local elected African councils. It has long been government policy that these councils should be linked into the bantustan political system, although by 1982 there was still no clarity about how this was to be done. Residents in the bantustan 'commuter' townships are generally administered by township councils which are part of the bantustan structures.

The Administration Boards, took over administration of urban Africans outside the bantustans from white municipalities in 1971. They were set up not to make policy but to carry out central government policy.⁸ There were 19 Boards in 1981, covering all African residential areas outside the bantustans. Although

they are the main administering authority for half of the African population, (over a third of the whole population of South Africa), they are not normally given a central government grant. Nor, as a result of the distribution of property under apartheid, do the areas they administer include industrial or commercial areas on which rates may be levied.⁹ Their main sources of income have been levies on employers for labour supplied by the Boards, rents, liquor sales, fees for services and licence dues.

Some of the functions of the Boards are now carried out by elected councils. These were first set up on the basis of legislation dating from 1961. Initially called Urban Bantu Councils (UBC), they were replaced in 1977 by Community Councils after the UBCs had collapsed in the face of the uprising of 1976. In 1982 legislation was passed making provision for them to become municipal councils, to be called town and village councils.

The powers given to the Community Councils were extremely limited, and amounted to no more than carrying out certain functions of the Administration Boards. Required to be self-sufficient, and depending on rents, liquor and licences as their sources of income, they were quickly seen as being powerless to represent the interests of urban Africans and to be agents of apartheid. The main power of the councils was in the allocation of housing, but this required consultation with the housing director of the Administration Board, and often the approval of the Minister.¹⁰ Participation in elections was low. For example 6 per



Bantu Administration offices burnt down during Soweto uprising 1976.

cent of those eligible voted in the elections for the Soweto Community Council in 1977. Although the government said that by 1981 the average poll in elections was about 40 per cent, this reflected higher polls in small townships in small rural towns. In the townships in metropolitan areas and bigger towns, where most of the voters lived, polls were generally around 20 per cent or less.

By 1981 the system was clearly under a considerable degree of strain, even though 226 councils had been set up, with about 2,000 councillors. An election scheduled for January 1982 was postponed to September 1982, probably because of a growing boycott campaign. At the same time dissension from within the ranks of those participating began to be heard, with a number of resignations of leading figures. Criticisms by those resigning included complaints of the 'dictatorial attitude' of Administration Boards. From outside the system, it was described as 'just a system to make blacks do the dirty work'.¹¹ In July 1982 the elections were again postponed amidst signs of growing support for a boycott of the elections.

The reason given by the government for the postponements of the elections was that time was needed to implement new legislation passed in June 1982 providing for the upgrading of the councils to municipal councils. The legislation had been long delayed as a result of difficulties in formulating a law which would both meet the criticisms of the powerlessness of the councils and at the same time keep them within the framework of apartheid policy.

COLOURED AND INDIAN STRUCTURES

By 1982 the political systems imposed on the Coloured and Indian communities appeared to be in a state of collapse.

At the national level nothing had replaced the Coloured Persons Representative Council

(CRC) which had been dissolved in March 1980. Set up in 1968 with two thirds of its membership elected, it had extremely limited powers which were subject to the policies of apartheid and the approval of the regime. The CRC, most of whose members belonged to the Labour Party, was dissolved by the Prime Minister after it refused (by a one-vote majority) to give its support to the regime's new constitutional plans, and refused to agree to the involvement of Coloured schools in the 1981 white Republican celebrations.¹²

The South African Indian Council (SAIC) was established in 1964 as a nominated and advisory body, and became a fully elected body in November 1981. However the elections were held in the face of a successful and widely supported boycott campaign. Only 10 per cent of the electorate voted and the elected SAIC patently lacked any legitimacy as a representative body. Not even any of the 87 candidates for its 40 seats expressed any support for the SAIC as an acceptable political institution. Most of them stood as independents, reflecting the opposition amongst Indian political parties to the election and to the SAIC.¹³

The system of apartheid local authorities for the Coloured and Indian communities also appeared to be in a weak condition. Until 1962 local administration of Coloured and Indian people was undertaken directly by white municipalities. An amendment in 1962 to the Group Areas Act provided for white municipalities to set up segregated local Coloured and Indian committees to administer certain services under their supervision and control, and subject to the central government departments for Indian and Coloured affairs. The committees, known as Local Affairs Committees and Management Committees, could be upgraded to Municipal Councils.

This system, known as the Management Committee system, came under increasing criticism,

both by those not participating in it and by those who were. The Labour Party itself, which participated in and dominated the system, called for its scrapping and passed repeated resolutions to the effect that unless the municipal franchise was extended, the system would collapse. There were several resignations from committees, and where elections were held, the poll was very low and at times vacancies could not be filled.

The government indicated in 1980 that it had plans for new structures of local and regional authorities for the Indian and Coloured communities, plans which were incorporated in the constitutional proposals of 1982 (*see below*).

CONSTITUTIONAL PLANS

Constitutional proposals put forward by the Prime Minister during 1982 and adopted by the National Party remained faithful to basic principles of apartheid.

In spite of several years of intense discussion and debate in white political forums, they did not differ in essentials from the proposals which had been National Party policy since 1977. Presented as 'reforms' and as a plan for 'a new political dispensation', they offered small concessions to a minority of the black population. But in practice they were a means of entrenching and safeguarding white domination, and were a response to the growing weakness of the subordinate political structures imposed on the Coloured and Indian communities during the 1960s.¹⁴

The structures proposed, at both local and national levels, contained two principal aspects. On the one hand the African majority was to be excluded from participating with non-Africans in political structures. Beyond the local level they would be confined to exercising political rights within the bantustan system and would be made aliens in terms of apartheid law. The African local authorities outside the bantu-

stans were to be linked up, in ways not yet specified, with the bantustans. The second aspect of the proposals was that Whites, Indians and Coloureds would be included in a largely segregated composite structure under white domination.

The proposals for the non-African structures involved the creation of an executive presidency with very wide powers and a reduction in the power of the Cabinet and Parliament. Parliament would consist of three segregated chambers, White, Coloured and Asian. There would be procedures for the election of the president and for the resolution of disagreements within the


legislative system which would guarantee effective control by the white minority. Consequently, giving a Parliamentary vote in the proposed system to the Coloured and Indian sections of the population would pose even less of a threat to the Whites than would be the case under the old system.

There were similar proposals for local and regional government levels. The Group Areas Act would remain and separate White, Coloured and Asian local authorities would exist wherever possible. At the metropolitan or regional level these would be linked by bodies consisting of representatives of local authorities. Their function would be to administer such services and

matters as the government deemed to be of common interest to all three groups.

Although the State Security Council was not mentioned in the proposals, it was reported that it was 'to become the most important functional element of the executive presidency', thereby enhancing the militarisation of decision making which had already taken place under Botha.¹⁵

While the constitutional proposals appeared to have the support of most whites, there was evidence of only minority support within the black community and signs of widespread opposition (see also *MOBILISATION IN THE LIBERATION STRUGGLE*).



6 REPRESSION

South Africa is ruled by force. Whether in actual and direct use or held in reserve as a threat, it is a constant factor in the maintenance of the apartheid system. Resistance has consistently been dealt with by violent means.

As the forces of liberation have grown, the regime has vastly expanded its armed forces and undertaken increasingly harsh repressive action. The regime's readiness to use its armed might against its opponents backs up a vast array of laws which together constitute a comprehensive denial of rights and freedoms. The laws and the legal process in the courts give a superficial legality to the actions of the regime, but their real nature as instruments of oppression has become increasingly visible as the needs of the security police have been given greater play.

This chapter describes the various legislative weapons (which the regime calls 'Security Laws') and administrative practices that have been devised to defend white minority rule against its political opponents. The violent behaviour of the South African police and security services, as seen in attacks on demonstrations and meetings and in the arrest and detention, torture, interrogation and trial, banning and banishment of political suspects, has become known the world over as one of the hallmarks of the apartheid system.

The armed forces and the militarisation of South Africa in defence of apartheid are described in Chapter Seven.

REPRESSIVE LAWS

The regime has at its disposal a wide range of far-reaching powers to act against organisations and individuals opposing it. The widest powers derive from the so-called 'security' laws. These are aimed at people or

organisations whose activities and aims the regime describes as 'furthering the aims of communism', 'terrorism', 'endangering the security of the State or the maintenance of order', 'endangering the public peace' or 'threatening essential services'. The definition of these terms is so loose, and the power conferred by the laws so wide, that the regime is able to use the law to act against any form of effective opposition to the apartheid system. The limits to its capacity to use these powers are not contained in the laws, but are set only by political and practical considerations.

Under the 'security' laws, there are powers to detain people without trial; to ban people, organisations and meetings; to break up meetings; and to imprison people. By the restrictions they place on meetings, the laws license attacks against protesters and demonstrators, which on many occasions have included the police killing people. The laws have also created conditions under which the torture of detainees has become routine.

The security laws have been built up in successive stages as the regime has responded to resistance by increasing its own powers. Arbitrary and unlimited legal powers to banish Africans and to ban meetings have long existed in laws applying to the areas which are now the bantustans.

Step by step the range of prohibited actions has been widened, people's rights under the laws have been narrowed, and the powers of the regime to act and to withhold information about its actions have increased. In general, these laws vest extensive arbitrary powers in the executive and they exclude the jurisdiction of the courts. Consequently a large part of ministerial and police activity is removed from

public or judicial scrutiny. Early in 1982 a government appointed commission (the Rabie Commission) recommended that the security laws should be streamlined to make them more effective, and its recommendations were immediately accepted by the government. In June 1982 the *Internal Security Act (1982)* was passed. It consolidated and repealed most of the previously existing security legislation. The main laws which were repealed in part or in full were the earlier *Internal Security Act (1950)* (before it was amended and strengthened in 1976 it was known as the *Suppression of Communism Act*), the *Terrorism Act* of 1967, the *Unlawful Organisations Act*, the *Riotous Assemblies Act* and the *General Law Amendment Act*.

The new Act embodied all the powers contained in the repealed acts, but also added new ones. The Minister of Law and Order retained the power to declare certain organisations illegal, to compile lists of officers, members and active supporters of organisations declared illegal, to ban individuals or place them under house arrest, to ban meetings and gatherings, to ban newspapers and other publications, to detain witnesses for political trials and to hold people in indefinite preventive detention.

The new *Internal Security Act* introduced a new offence which was not previously contained in South African security legislation, the offence of 'subversion'. 'Subversion' is defined broadly to include actions which are aimed, amongst other things, at 'causing or promoting general dislocation or disorder'; prejudicing the production and distribution of commodities or the supply and distribution of essential services or the free movement of traffic; causing 'feelings of hostility between

different population groups'; encouraging or aiding any other person to commit any of the acts listed. Anyone found guilty of subversion is liable to imprisonment for up to 20 years. If the act for which the accused was sentenced had resulted in the use of violence, a sentence of up to 25 years imprisonment can be imposed.

The offence of 'Terrorism' carries penalties provided for by law for the offence of treason, namely, sentences which can include the death sentence. 'Terrorism' is defined as an act of violence committed with intent to 'overthrow or endanger the State authority'; to bring about 'any constitutional, political, industrial, social or economic aim or change'; 'induce the Government . . . to do or abstain from doing any act or to adopt or abandon a particular standpoint; or 'put in fear or demoralize the General Public' or a particular group of inhabitants. Anyone who encourages, aids or advises another person, or conspires with another, to commit a violent act to bring about any of these objects is also guilty of 'Terrorism'.

The Internal Security Act also contains a section which defines the offence of sabotage (taken from a section of the General Law Amendment Act of 1962). Conviction for sabotage can result in imprisonment for up to 20 years.

Anyone who advocates, advises, defends or encourages the achievement in South Africa of any of the objects of 'Communism' is liable on conviction to imprisonment for up to 10 years.

Another new offence introduced by the new Act is the offence of 'Incitement'. 'Incitement' is defined as any act which encourages or aids another to protest against any law or in support of any campaign for the repeal or modification of any law or for a change in the administration of any law. A person found guilty of this offence is liable to a fine not exceeding five thousand Rand or a period of imprisonment

not exceeding five years, or both.

Many other laws are used to suppress other forms of protest and political opposition. The *Intimidation Act* of 1982 makes it an offence to compel or induce a person to do any act or to assume or abandon a particular standpoint through an act or threat of violence. Penalties of up to 10 years imprisonment can be imposed.

In many trials people have been accused of offences under the common law, such as sedition, treason, arson and damage to property.

All the bantustan areas are covered by some form of 'security' legislation. In several of them, the bantustan authorities have issued their own 'security' laws. These are modelled closely on the chief 'security' laws enacted in the Cape Town Parliament and are applied in the same manner. In other bantustan areas, 'security' laws take the form of emergency proclamations issued by the State President under the Black Administration Act.

Laws relating to Banning and Banishment

Under the Internal Security Act the regime has powers to act against any person by prohibiting them from attending gatherings of any kind or from being in or out of any specified area during specified times.

The restrictions are imposed by the Minister, usually for three to five years, on the basis of secret reports by the Security Police. The decision is made in private and the Minister need not disclose the information which prompted his decision, if he decides this would be against the public interest. A Board of Review, instituted under the 1982 Internal Security Act, may make recommendations to the Minister but these are not binding on him. A banned person has no right to legal representation to challenge the banning order.

There are additional powers of banishment in force in the bantustan areas, deriving from the

Black Administration Act of 1927. Under this law the regime has the power to require any African or group of Africans to move from one place to another, or not to leave any stated area, for a specified time. Powers deriving from this law are embodied in proclamations in force in various bantustans or in laws made by the subordinate bantustan authorities. Under the *Aliens Act* the regime has the power to remove to an 'independent' bantustan any African whom it considers to be a 'citizen' of that bantustan.

Under the Internal Security Act the Minister may ban any organisation he believes is engaged in activities which endanger the security of the State or the maintenance of law and order or which promote the spread of 'communism'. In addition he may ban any organisation he believes is carrying on the work of an unlawful organisation.

Laws relating to Restriction on meetings

Powers to ban meetings are extensive. They are conferred mainly by the Riotous Assemblies Act, the Internal Security Act of 1982, the Black Administration Act and bantustan legislation.

Under these laws the Minister or a magistrate can prohibit any gathering — public or private — which they think 'seriously endangers public peace', or which 'might cause feelings of hostility between Blacks and Whites'. A magistrate can impose such a ban in a place or district for up to 48 hours, and the Minister can impose it for up to a year, in all or any part of the country. It then is an offence to convene, preside at or address a prohibited meeting, or to encourage or promote attendance.

A new power included in the Internal Security Act of 1982 enables a magistrate to impose certain restrictions on gatherings as an alternative to imposing a total ban. This was aimed at events such as funerals which could not realistically be banned altogether. The *Demonstrations in*

or near Court buildings Prohibition Act of 1982 is intended to prevent demonstrations in or outside courts where political trials are being held.

There are also extensive powers to ban meetings in the bantustans, as a result of various proclamations under the Black Administration Act. These include a 1968 proclamation which makes it illegal to hold a meeting of more than 10 people in 'a Bantu area' without official permission. Proclamations delegating these powers to specific bantustan authorities were made at various times (in 1960 (Transkei) and 1977 (Ciskei, Venda, Bophuthatswana)).

Laws relating to detention without trial

Various powers to detain people without trial are conferred by the Internal Security Act. Powers to detain people without trial for up

to 90 days, or longer, are also conferred by proclamations in force in various bantustan areas or have been incorporated in laws made by bantustan authorities.

The relevant sections of the Internal Security Act are listed below. They allow preventive detention, detention for interrogation, and detention of potential witnesses. No court of law has any jurisdiction to pronounce upon the validity of any action taken under these sections.

Section 28 allows the Minister of Law and Order to detain someone to prevent them committing an offence of terrorism or endangering the security of the state or the maintenance of law and order. Orders may be issued for periods of 12 months. A Board of Review can on request monitor the actions of the Minister but he need not act on its recommendations.

Section 29 allows the police to

hold for interrogation anyone they suspect of having committed an act of terrorism or a related offence or whom they believe has information about such offences. No-one except a state official may have access to a detainee or is entitled to information relating to or obtained from such a person. The Act purports to limit the period of detention to six months. In practice the period is indefinite because the Act allows the police to give reasons to a board of review why the person should not be released after six months.

Section 31 allows the Attorney General to detain a person he believes might provide material evidence for the state in a forthcoming trial. Such potential witnesses may be held for the duration of the trial providing charges have been laid within six months of the date of the detention.

Police action at a demonstration outside Supreme Court, Johannesburg, 1976.



POLITICAL REPRESSION

The powers which the government, police and military possess to act against opponents of the regime have been used extensively and in a concerted way. For many years, at least since the major mine strike of 1946 and the adoption in 1949 of the Programme of Action by the ANC, political repression has been on a wide and increasing scale. Having driven the liberation struggle underground in 1960 and caused it to become an armed struggle, the regime has pursued still more extreme methods of repression.

The pattern of repression in recent years has been influenced by a number of factors. These include the emergence of a new layer of legal organisations following the bannings of 1977; a greater degree of unity between different groups and sectors of the oppressed majority; major growth in the organised struggle of trade unions and community organisations; and expanding guerilla action. The regime has attempted to suppress resistance by various means according to its assessment of the threat.



Plainclothes policeman confronts demonstrators.

— Organisations, both formal and informal, have been disrupted by banning the organisations attacking their leadership through bans, detention orders or harassment.

— Mobilisation and organisation of protest has been disrupted by bans on meetings, censorship of publications and direct physical disruption of meetings by police.

— Boycotts, strikes and other forms of collective protest have been broken up by police attacks. Security police have moved against known activists and thousands of those participating in such actions have been charged in the courts.

— Members of underground organisations and combatants in the armed struggle have been detained and charged under 'security' and other laws.

Thus at every level of collective protest and organised resistance the regime acts to disrupt and suppress. The following sections indicate some aspects of this repression and attempt to give an idea of its scale and character.

Banning and Banishment

Since 1948 about 200 people have been banished under the Black Administration Act and related laws, and 1,450 people banned under the Internal Security Act (formerly Suppression of Communism Act).¹

The restriction orders or bans vary in their scope, but most commonly people are prevented from attending any gatherings and are restricted to their homes from dusk to dawn and all weekend. Banned people are generally prevented from carrying out their jobs. Sometimes this is done directly (as in the case of many journalists and teachers), or as a consequence of the restrictions on their movement, or just by being named as banned people.²

The banning orders affect almost every aspect of people's lives. The vagueness of the provisions and the orders makes it virtually impossible for people not to break the law by contravening the restrictions, and prosecutions for contravention are common.

Africans, the only section of the population subject to banishment orders suffer even greater

There are two types of political prisoners in South Africa: there are formal political prisoners and informal political prisoners. The formal political prisoners are those who are directly arrested, directly detained for indefinite periods, charged and sentenced to long-term imprisonment — some indeed to perpetual detention, never to be seen again. Others are banned and banished; prisoners in that category are allowed the privilege of staying with their families but are incommunicado as far as the outside world is concerned.

(Thozamile Botha, a banned trade unionist who escaped from South Africa during 1980³).



Winnie Mandela with daughter after receiving an order restricting her to Brandfort, Orange Free State.

personal and material hardship in that they can be removed from their home, community and livelihood.

The banning order is renewable so that any person may be restricted for much longer than the original order.

Banning of Organisations and Meetings

Both mass organisations of the liberation movement and small organisations have been banned by the apartheid regime. This has had the effect both of forcing the organisations to work underground, and of making it an offence, punishable by imprisonment, to further their aims.

In 1950 the Communist Party of South Africa was banned under the Suppression of Communism Act. It later reconstituted itself as the South African

Communist Party, operating underground.

In 1960 the *Unlawful Organisations Act* was passed and used to ban the African National Congress and the Pan Africanist Congress. The Act was then used, along with the *Suppression of Communism Act* to ban several other organisations during the 1960s. In 1977 the *Internal Security Act* was used to ban 18 black consciousness organisations.

Another form of restriction on some organisations is a prohibition on their receiving funds from outside the country. This has been imposed on the National Union of South African Students (under the *Affected Organisations Act*) and the Federation of South African Trade Unions (under the *Fundraising Act*).

There has been a general ban on all outdoor meetings since June 1976. The ban was imposed with the start of the uprising of that year, and kept in existence by successive annual renewals, most recently in April 1982. Only sports gatherings, indoor gatherings, funerals or meetings for which official permission has been granted, are exempt.

For two and a half months during 1980 as mass protests, education boycotts and strikes gathered force, all gatherings of a political nature of more than 10 people were banned. This covered indoor as well as outdoor meetings.

After the expiry of this ban, the ban on all outdoor meetings was again supplemented by bans on particular indoor meetings and funerals. The meetings prohibited by such bans have included several to commemorate events of resistance and repression, and memorial services for people who were active in the struggle for liberation. They have included meetings of workers on strike, and political protest meetings.⁴

Funerals in particular have become a focus for political protest and the 1982 *Internal Security Act* introduced new measures to restrict this trend.



The funeral of a victim of police shooting at Soweto in 1976 is broken up by police firing indiscriminately at the mourners, resulting in more deaths.



Magistrates were empowered to prescribe the route and mode of transport for a funeral procession and enabled to ban all speeches, flags and posters from the ceremony.⁵

In a move which recognised to what extent political trials had become a focus for resistance, the regime in 1982 banned all demonstrations even by an individual in the vicinity of a courthouse. In September 1982 police used tear gas to clear the public gallery at the end of a Treason Trial at the Pietermaritzburg Supreme Court.⁶

Detention without trial

Detention without trial is characterised by secrecy and lack of accountability by the security police. No detailed statistics of people in detention are provided. Families of detainees are rarely even told at which police station their relative is held. No court can order the release of a detainee. No visits or legal advice are allowed.

The current powers to detain people without trial have been established over a period of more than 20 years.

Emergency powers under the *Public Safety Act* were used in 1960 to detain 11,000 people,⁷ and in the same year over 4,700 people were detained under a

Proclamation under the *Bantu Administration Act* in the Transkei area.⁸ Since then such powers have been 'normalised' through the adoption of successive and increasingly powerful laws.

Twelve-day detention was introduced by a new law in 1961, when between eight and ten thousand people were arrested under that law and others during protests against the establishment of a white minority Republic.⁹ The next stage was 90-day detention introduced in 1963, under which over 1,000 people were detained within two years.¹⁰ This was followed in 1965 by the 180-day detention law which provided for the detention of potential state witnesses. In 1966 a 14-day renewable period of detention for interrogation was introduced in the *General Law Amendment Act*. The following year Section 6 of the *Terrorism Act* allowed indefinite detention for interrogation of suspected 'terrorists'. Provision for preventive detention for up to a year at a time was extended under the *Internal Security Act* as amended in 1976. The same act allowed for the detention of potential witnesses under provisions similar to the 180-day law.


The exact numbers of people detained at any time without trial is not known. The most reliable estimates indicate that in 1980 over 950 people were detained at various times under the various 'security' laws and at least 967 in 1981. In addition an unknown number were detained under laws in force in bantustans. During 1982 the regime introduced new restrictions on the reporting of detentions which have made it even more difficult to compile accurate statistics.

Children are subject to the same powers of detention and interrogation as adults. Of those detained during 1977-81, over 700 were juveniles, that is, under 18 years.¹¹ Some have been held for very long periods. For example, 19 schoolchildren detained in early 1981 were held as potential witnesses in a trial in Kimberley for over 18 months.¹²


Detention was used on a very large scale during 1981, which saw widespread and sustained popular resistance to apartheid, in the form of increasing industrial militancy and trade union organisation, as well as two mass political campaigns (against the celebration of the twentieth anniversary of the white minority Republic and against the elections to the South African Indian Council).

Torture and Death of Detainees

There is extensive evidence of torture of detainees, given by former detainees themselves. It is known that by 3 March 1983 at least 57 people had died while in the custody of security police since 1963, the year in which detention for 90 days without trial was introduced. (Of that number, three people died in detention while in the custody of the security police during the uprising of 1976, although they were reportedly not held under 'security' laws.¹³) The causes of death in detention are officially reported in such terms as 'suicide', 'falling out of a window', 'falling down a stairwell', 'brain injury' and so on.



DEATHS OF PEOPLE WHILE IN THE CUSTODY OF THE SECURITY POLICE
(including bantustan police)



Source: Various sources, cited in *Focus on Political Repression*.¹⁷

Torture of detainees, sometimes so severe as to lead to death, is an integral part of the apartheid regime's practice of detaining people without trial for purposes of interrogation. Justifying detention without trial, a commission appointed by the government to review the security legislation, said in its report published in 1982 that detention without trial was the most important and, to a large extent, the only means the police had of obtaining information about 'subversive' activities. It also noted that information obtained in that way could be used as evidence in trials.¹⁴ Although the report did not say so it is also to a large extent the only source of 'evidence' for trials.

There are powerful incentives to torture detainees in order to extract statements and 'confessions', and to force people to give evidence. In addition, the conditions of secrecy under which people are detained allow the police to subject them to torture without fear of punishment or retribution. In the case of only one of the 57 deaths of political detainees have policemen been charged and in that case none were convicted. However due to the nature of the detention laws and the secrecy involved, it has become virtually impossible for detainees to obtain redress through court action. An additional handicap is that charges must be laid within six months of an alleged assault — a period which often elapses while the detainee is still in custody.

Detainees are kept in solitary confinement which in itself has been condemned by legal experts and psychologists as severe torture by sensory deprivation.¹⁵ Detainees have been admitted to hospital for psychiatric care after suffering severe psychological damage. In other cases political trials have had to be stopped so that defendants could be examined by psychiatrists.

Detainees have described many forms of abuse — days of ceaseless interrogation during which

... they would come in the middle of the night. The last key in the succession of prison doors belongs to security police — all other doors can be opened by prison staff.

So they would come at night.

I couldn't sleep flat by then, I had to elevate myself with the few blankets I had. You just heard someone interfering with your neck, they came with a wire. He says 'I'm going to strangle you, because you don't want to tell the truth or tell me about other people. I will tell the whole world

that you've committed suicide'.

Then he'd walk out.

Some days I'd feel cold steel next to my temple. He would say 'I'm going to shoot you and nobody will ever know about you because I've got the power, the privilege, and the protection, as a policeman'. Then he walks out, just like that.

Some days they would come in and beat me up in the cells...

(Khosì Mbatha, at a press conference in London in November 1982, speaking about her detention).

they were deprived of sleep and forcibly kept standing; electric shock treatment and physical assault. Many reported that they had been hooded and partially suffocated and then revived.¹⁶

The use of torture has been particularly intense and widespread during periods of major repressive operations, and the number of deaths in detention has been highest during such periods. (See table page 62).

These figures refer only to political detainees who have died in the custody of security police. There are many other deaths of people in police custody: 128 in 1977 and 161 in 1978, excluding those who died in detention while held under the security laws.¹⁸

Police Violence

Torture of people in detention and deaths of people in police custody is only one facet of the

violence of the repressive forces of the apartheid regime. Every year an even larger number of people are killed by the police 'in the course of their duties'. The numbers below do not include the people killed by the police while attacking the demonstrations and protests of 1976.¹⁹



Heavily armed railway police.

PEOPLE KILLED AND INJURED BY THE POLICE 'IN THE EXECUTION OF THEIR DUTIES'

(excluding people who died while in detention, or who were killed by police during the protests of 1976-1977).

	KILLED			WOUNDED		
	Total	African	Coloured	Total	African	Coloured
1974	102	88	11	354	288	57
1975	134	106	25	382	299	79
1976	195	165	28	410	345	53
1977	149	128	20	403	321	76
1978	203	173	28	514	373	126
1979	163	133	28	495	398	87
1974-79	946	793	140	2558	2024	478

Source: South African Institute of Race Relations citing official figures.²⁰

The severe restrictions on the freedom of assembly in South Africa mean that most gatherings and demonstrations are illegal or can easily be declared illegal. The police are thereby given a legal licence to disperse and disrupt meetings by physical attacks, and this power has been frequently used. This was particularly marked during the protests of 1976-1977 and those of 1980. Police used a wide range of weapons, including batons, tear-gas, whips and dogs, and on many occasions, guns. Sometimes bird-shot has been fired, sometimes plastic bullets. At least 50 people were shot dead by police during demonstrations in 1980, while some estimates of those killed during the uprising of 1976-1977 are as high as 1,000.²¹

Participation of the army in the suppression of protests has been observed on several occasions in recent years.²²



Child suffering from tear gas — Soweto 1976.

Political Trials

The use of the law and the courts as a means of political repression has meant a large number of political trials, that is trials of people as a result of their participation in activities aimed at changing or ending the apartheid regime and securing freedom for the majority.

In the 20 years after 1961 over 4,400 people were convicted



under the principal 'security' laws (the Suppression of Communism Act, the Unlawful Organisations Act, the Public Safety Act, the Terrorism Act, the General Law Amendment Acts, and the Internal Security Act). A very much larger number of people have been convicted under other laws as a result of participation in protests and other forms of demonstration by which resistance is shown. In the three years from June 1976 there were 44,300 people convicted of charges of Riotous Assembly, Public Violence, Sabotage, Inciting or Promoting Unrest, Arson and Malicious Damage to Property.²³ Following widespread demonstrations and strikes in 1980 many thousands were brought before the courts.

The use of the courts has given a superficially legal appearance to the regime's repression of its opponents. However, the reality is that in addition to meeting every new stage of the liberation struggle with increasingly harsh laws, the regime has also made the legal procedures steadily more biased in favour of the state. In particular the procedures allow the fullest exploitation in trials of the effects of detention without trial and torture, on both defendants and state witnesses.

Amendments since 1977 to the Criminal Procedure Act and the

Internal Security Act have had two kinds of effect.

The legal status of statements made by defendants during detention has been enhanced: conviction is possible on the basis of a defendant's 'confession' alone. All confessions and admissions made during detention or at preliminary legal proceedings are presumed to have been made voluntarily unless proved otherwise. These statements have been made while the defendant was deprived of legal advice, kept in solitary confinement and often physically assaulted. Psychologists doubt the credibility of statements made in this way, but nevertheless they form the cornerstone of the state's case in most trials under the 'security' laws.

The second kind of effect of changes in legal procedure has been to increase the powers to detain potential state witnesses, and to extend the length of their detention. Now they can be held for the duration of a trial providing only that charges have been laid within six months of the date of detention. This could be a matter of years in some cases. Potential witnesses who, despite the pressures exerted on them during a lengthy period in detention, refuse to give evidence against friends or colleagues, face a prison sentence. So do those who make statements in court

which differ from those made to the police during detention.²⁴ In the course of just eight political trials during 1982 there were 24 instances of witnesses refusing to testify or being charged with perjury arising out of conflicting statements. Sentences passed included some of five years.

These moves formed part of the regime's response to the intensification of the armed struggle. From the late 1970's onwards there were a number of trials involving captured members of the armed wing of the ANC, Umkhonto we Sizwe. In 1979 the regime revived the common law charge of High Treason which had not been used in South Africa since the marathon trial of 1956-61 in which all 156 defendants were acquitted. Between 1979 and September 1982 five Treason trials had been completed resulting in ten death sentences. Most of these trials had extremely complex charge sheets which sought to link the defendants in a common con-

You have accused persons who have been in detention incommunicado — without access to anyone — for lengthy periods. They all make statements at one stage or another. You have witnesses in solitary confinement, incommunicado, held away from everyone. They all make statements. And what you then do is put the accused in the dock and you bring up the witness — straight out of solitary confinement — totally disoriented, not knowing what his rights are, usually not knowing what the charges are and sometimes not knowing who the accused are.

And you say to him: 'Speak, and tell us the truth' (which he may have learnt in solitary confinement).

You add to that the legal structure of the crime in which the onus is very often reversed and the accused has to prove his inno-

cence after certain things have been demonstrated. Add to that the whole structure of the trial. And then, as a token to the authenticity of the process add-and-mix one skilful advocate for the defence. Sometimes people are acquitted; sometimes people are convicted. But the process authenticates the repression of the opposition, gives it a stamp of authenticity.

Someone outside of Government has said: This man, this woman is a criminal.

Once you have defined the opposition as criminal you have validated the system.

(A description of trials under the Terrorism Act by Geoff Budlender, a Johannesburg lawyer in a talk to the Detainees' Parents Support Committee during 1982 (published in South African Outlook, September 1982)).

spiracy although they may not have carried out any joint actions.

The regime has been criticised for failing to give defendants

access to adequate legal advice and this has become more critical as legal procedures have become more complicated.

Victim of police shooting in Soweto, 1976.



Death Sentences

In recent years the regime has faced intensified armed attacks and a high level of popular resistance. Its response has been to increase the level of repression. In particular, it has sought to use the death sentence against its political opponents, particularly ANC combatants captured inside South Africa. In April 1979 one of these, Solomon Mahlangu, was hanged — the first political offender to have been executed since the early 1960s. Since 1979 ten more members of Umkhonto we Sizwe, the ANC's armed wing, have been sentenced to death, in each case for High Treason. The regime has, however, been restrained from further executions following campaigns to save the prisoners' lives both inside South Africa and internationally. In one case the appeal court commuted the sentence to 20 years and three others were reprieved by the State President. In early 1983 six men remained under sentence of death.



Solomon Mahlangu.

My blood will nourish the tree which will bear the fruits of freedom. Tell my people that I love them and that they must continue the struggle. Do not worry about me but about those who are suffering.

(Solomon Mahlangu's message to his mother on her last visit before his execution in 1979).

The ANC, recognising that a state of war exists between itself and the state, has indicated its acceptance of the rules of the Geneva Conventions governing the treatment of prisoners-of-war. However, South Africa has so far refused to give prisoner-of-war status to captured combatants of the liberation movement. Evidence in court has indicated that the treatment they receive has been prolonged solitary confinement and severe torture followed by a trial heavily weighted in the state's favour.



Political Imprisonment

Political imprisonment of opponents has been used in South Africa by its rulers since the eighteenth century. The complex web of repressive legislation which exists today, and makes almost all forms of opposition and resistance illegal, is reflected in a large population of political prisoners.

The apartheid regime does not itself recognise the existence of political prisoners in South Africa. It does however periodically give figures for prisoners convicted in the courts for 'serious offences against the security of the State'. These are mainly people convicted under the principal 'security' laws: the Internal Security Act (formerly Suppression of Communism Act), the Unlawful Organisations Act, the 'Sabotage' Act and the Terrorism Act, as well as those convicted of such common law offences as Treason and Sedition.


Prisoners held under the above laws are treated as a group apart from other prisoners. They are subject to special regulations and restrictions. Visits to them are closely monitored. During 1982

the Minister of Justice raised the possibility of parole and remission for some of the prisoners, but in spite of some prisoners being released shortly before the completion of their sentences, it appeared that no significant changes had been made.

Political prisoners are kept in two major prison centres. One is Robben Island, a small island about 10 km off the coast of Cape Town, where at the end of 1981 there were just under 500 black male prisoners, including Namibian prisoners. The other main centre at that time was Pretoria Central Prison where white male political prisoners and some black female prisoners were kept. There are a small number of other prisons where other such prisoners are kept.²⁵

Those convicted under various other laws relating in part or in whole to 'State security' or public order are treated as ordinary criminals. Sentences range from a few months to 15 years imprisonment, or may include fines or whippings of up to ten strokes. The numbers imprisoned under such laws increase dramatically during or immediately after periods of mass protest. For instance, in the period 1960-1967, which saw great turbulence both in the urban areas and in rural areas where there was resistance to the imposition of Bantu Authorities, more than 120,000 people were convicted under these laws.²⁶ In the three years after the uprising which began in Soweto in June 1976, more than 44,000 were convicted under such laws.

Courtyard — Robben Island



7 THE ARMED FORCES & MILITARISATION OF APARTHEID

In order to defend white minority rule and maintain the apartheid system in the face of continually increasing resistance, the South African government has resorted to a build-up of military force and the establishment of military control over the state itself.

During the 1970s white South African society underwent a process of militarisation in which attitudes and outlooks were transformed, authority structures reorganised and all available human and material resources mobilised in defence of the privileged way of life enjoyed by the minority.

The 1980s have witnessed further progression towards an overtly offensive stance on the part of the regime, towards not only its own black majority and the people of occupied Namibia, but also towards neighbouring independent states and Africa as a whole. South Africa is building up conventional military formations, including a nuclear capability, the need for which can only be explained in terms of the regime's commitment to a regional war.

This strategy of military expansionism, both inside South Africa and externally, has required the state to channel massive resources into the apartheid war machine. In order to implement the state's directives, the South African armed forces must be capable of controlling mass popular action in the towns while maintaining and strengthening an efficient military infrastructure in the rural areas. They must be

The gun has played an important part in our history. The resistance of the black man to white colonial intrusion was crushed by the gun! Our struggle to liberate ourselves from white domination is held in check by force of arms. From conquest to the present the story is the same. Successive white regimes have repeatedly massacred unarmed, defenceless Blacks.

And wherever and whenever they have pulled out their guns, the ferocity of their fire has been trained on the African people.

Apartheid is the embodiment of the racism, repression and inhumanity of all previous white supremacist regimes. To see the real face of apartheid we must look beneath the veil of constitutional formulae, deceptive phrases and playing with words.

The rattle of gunfire and the rumbling of Hippo armoured vehicles since June 1976 have once again torn aside the veil.

(Nelson Mandela, in a letter smuggled out from Robben Island and published in 1980).

trained and equipped to sustain South Africa's illegal occupation of Namibia, and at the same time be ready and able to implement the regime's programme of military destabilization of neighbouring independent states. For all this, a highly specialised, sophisticated, efficient, well-equipped and technologically advanced military apparatus is required.

THE MILITARY AND THE STATE

The apartheid regime has itself described the process of militarisation in terms of a 'total strategy'

— a concept originally coined to capture the imagination of the white electorate and to mobilise it behind the war effort. The catchphrase is an apt one, insofar as it reflects the strategic perspective that was spelt out in the 1977 White Paper on Defence and which envisaged the co-ordination of every facet of society. According to the White Paper: 'The resolution of a conflict in the times in which we live demands interdependent and co-ordinated action in all fields — military, psychological, political, sociological . . .'. On the other hand the phrase camouflages the fact that the strategy is not simply one of co-ordination, but one that is being developed, initiated and controlled by a highly centralised, military-controlled power base.

Over the years, South Africa's generals have assumed increasing control over the determination of events. By the early 1980s, the military had become the dominant force in the government.

One of the first steps taken by P. W. Botha's government on taking office was to open the way for the military and security services to participate directly in political decision-making. This involved, amongst other things, the re-involution of the State Security Council, consisting of senior ministers and senior military and intelligence figures, and its apparent transformation into the effective decision-making body in the government. When Botha put forward proposals for constitu-

tional change in 1982, it was reported that the State Security Council was 'to become the most important functional element of the proposed new executive presidency' (see *POLITICAL STRUCTURES*).

The process by which the private sector of the economy has been drawn into a closer alliance with the state, under the dominance of the military, has been clearly visible since soon after the events of June 1976. It has involved a series of seminars and conferences, the incorporation of business leaders into administration and government, and a further integration of the private sector and state economic enterprises in strategic sectors of the economy.²

The close relationship between the military and the private sector of the economy has also been given constitutional shape in the Defence Advisory Board. This body consisted of businessmen drawn from major industrial and financial enterprises and responsible for advising the Minister of Defence on military matters relating to the economy. During the first half of 1982 the Board was restructured into the Defence Manpower Liaison Committee.³

MILITARY FORCES

South Africa's armed forces have expanded rapidly since the 1960s. The expenditure on defence has increased more than 40-fold over the same period. The following table shows the growth in the total establishment of the two main divisions of the armed forces, the South African Police (SAP) and the South African Defence Force (SADF — army, airforce, navy and medical service). (See table).

'TOTAL STRATEGY'

The resolution of a conflict in the times in which we live demands interdependent and co-ordinated action in all fields — military, psychological, political, sociological...

(1977 White Paper on Defence and Armaments Production).

THE GROWTH OF MILITARY EXPENDITURE AND PERSONNEL

	1961	1974	1977	1981
SAP	27,000	59,000	72,000	77,000
SADF (includes all active reservists)	79,000	269,000	367,500	515,000
Total armed forces	106,000	328,000	439,500	592,000
Total number under arms at any time (est)	39,000	90,000	150,000	255,000
Military spending (excludes police)	R72m	R707m	R1,940m	R3,000m

Source: *The Apartheid War Machine*, IDAF and Focus on Political Repression.⁴

The regime has been engaged over the period in developing the largest armaments industry in the southern hemisphere (see below). Despite the United Nations arms embargo (made mandatory in November 1977), it has been able to obtain sophisticated military equipment, armaments and ammunition for the wide range of conventional military formations and counter-insurgency units within its armed forces.⁵

The main thrust of the military's daily operations is directed towards suppressing mass action, sabotage attacks and guerilla activity, inside South Africa and Namibia. By early 1981, an estimated 100,000 troops were deployed in Namibia to maintain the regime's illegal occupation. Inside South Africa the roles of the SAP and SADF have converged. Joint police-military operations have become frequent and routine in and around black townships during periods of protest and demonstration.⁶ Senior military officers are playing the central role in the establishment of 'crisis committees' in areas in which worker, student and community resistance have reached particularly intense levels, such as the Eastern Cape during 1980.⁷

In rural areas, strategically located along South Africa's borders, an extensive programme for the development of military infrastructures was launched in the late 1970s, involving the construction of major army bases in the Transvaal and Natal. In some of these areas, particularly in the northern and eastern Transvaal

border areas there were indications of considerable military activity by 1981, apparently in response to increasing guerilla activity and infiltration (see also sections on *DISTRIBUTION OF LAND* and *SOUTHERN AFRICA*).

Meanwhile, resources and energy have also been channelled into the development of conventional military formations. By 1980, two divisions comprising about 40,000 troops and including heavy armour and artillery were being held in a permanent state of semi-mobilisation for conventional operations. During 1981, two South African brigades were involved in an invasion of Angola known as Operation Protea. It amounted to the largest military operation ever conducted on southern African soil. Even so, only one third of South Africa's conventional capacity was deployed in this offensive.

The SADF has also concentrated in recent years in the build-up of 'special forces' — elite unconventional warfare squads. Relying to a large extent on mercenaries (see below), units such as the Reconnaissance Commandos, 44 Parachute Brigade and 32 Battalion, have played a crucial role in SADF operations. They have been responsible for a large proportion of the atrocities perpetrated by the apartheid armed forces in Namibia and other neighbouring states in recent years. These 'special forces' are also responsible for the training and operational direction of South Africa's surrogate forces operating in

neighbouring states: UNITA in Angola, MRN in Mozambique and LLA in Lesotho.⁸

THE POLICE

During the 1970s, the South African Police (SAP) was transformed into a force which functions to all intents and purposes as a fifth arm of the SADF. Most of the SAP's energies are nowadays directed towards containing the rising level of mass struggle.

The modern apartheid police force is built around two pillars of political repression: intelligence and 'riot control'. The South African Police is divided into a 'uniformed branch' (about 80 per cent) and a 'detective branch', which includes the Security Branch. Apart from the SAP there are various other specialised police forces, including the Administration Board police (a kind of municipal police whose prime function is the enforcement of the pass laws); the Railways and Harbour Police; Traffic Police and various bantustan police forces trained by, and integrated with, the SAP.⁹

A large section of the uniformed police of the SAP is organised into paramilitary groups deployed in all potential 'trouble spots'. Only when there are lulls in mass resistance are

these forces returned to crime prevention and implementation of the pass laws (the latter responsibility being shared with the Administration Board police).

The Security Branch is in reality the political police force. It identifies and acts against individuals and organisations seen to be a 'threat to the security of the State'. It exercises the powers of arrest, detention and interrogation under the security laws. Most reported cases of torture of detainees have been carried out by members of the Security Branch.

All members of the SAP are trained for counter-insurgency operations — this training is almost identical to that of the infantry in the SA army. The arms, equipment and uniforms used by the SAP in 'riot squads' and counter insurgency operations clearly show the paramilitary nature of this force.¹⁰

MANPOWER AND CONSCRIPTION

To provide the manpower needed by the armed forces, compulsory conscription for adult white males was introduced in 1967, initially for nine month periods. In 1977 the call-up period for national servicemen was increased to 24 months, followed by operational and training commit-

ments of up to 90 days annually for the following eight years. Legislation passed in 1982 has drastically increased the service requirements of conscripts. From January 1983 all white males were liable at the age of 16 to 2 years national service, 720 days over 12 years in the Citizen Force, 5 years on standby in the Active Citizen Force Reserve, and finally emergency service in the Commandos. (regional militia) until the age of 55. Furthermore all those who had previously not been conscripted (mainly men of 35 years and older) were required to register on a controlled national reserve and could be conscripted into the Commandos. It was estimated that these new measures would result in the SADF doubling its strength between 1982 and 1987.¹¹

The prospects of eventually conscripting Coloured and Asian men, white women and recent immigrants, have aroused heated debate. The question of whether or not to call upon the African population in defence of apartheid has also preoccupied the regime. It has had to try to balance the armed forces' potentially conflicting requirements of numerical strength and loyalty to the aims and methods of the apartheid state. A significant shift in attitude occurred after 1970,



as the SADF began to recruit black South Africans in increasing numbers. This process has been carried to its fullest extent in Namibia, where conscription for all groups was introduced in January 1981 and a supposedly autonomous Namibian army and police force created. Both in Namibia and South Africa, black recruits are deployed in a manner which is clearly aimed at distorting the character of the liberation struggle and obscuring the real issues at stake. While black soldiers represented less than five per cent of total SADF strength in 1981, they constituted over 20 per cent of operationally deployed forces. Blacks comprise almost 50 per cent of the regular South African Police (excluding reserves).¹²



Inspection of black recruits at camp in Northern Transvaal.

The regime's intention to place a growing share of its defence and security requirements on the shoulders of the black majority is seen most clearly in the bantustans, where a number of nominally independent military forces have been created. The 'Transkei Defence Force' was formed in 1975, for example. The 'Bophuthatswana Defence Force', the most advanced of these bantustan armies, is under the control of the local SADF territorial command and forms an integral part of the regime's military infrastructure along the Botswana border. A similar relationship exists with the SADF in Venda, on South Africa's north-eastern border,¹³ and in the Ciskei bantustan in the Eastern Cape.¹⁴

Other sources of manpower to be called on include the civilian



Displaying the new uniforms for the SWA Territorial Force, set up by South Africa.

population themselves. Increasing emphasis has been given by the military to the establishment and development of a 'civil defence' system, to add to the defence of white areas and property. By 1981 over 600 civil defence units already existed and the further development of the system was presented as a priority by a military spokesman.¹⁵


The South African armed forces also contain personnel recruited overseas. The regime denies that these are 'mercenaries' on the grounds that they are integrated into its regular forces, but in this it diverges from a majority of world opinion. At the time of Zimbabwe's independence many individuals previously serving in the Rhodesian armed forces, including overseas recruits, transferred to South African military units.

THE SOUTH AFRICAN ARMS INDUSTRY

Prompted by the need to surmount the United Nations arms embargo (made mandatory in November 1977), the South African government has invested large amounts of money and resources in the development of its own domestic military-industrial-complex. The co-operation that it has received from the private sector in this endeavour, together with international assistance in the form, *inter alia*, of injections of technological know-how and the expertise, patent and licensing rights, parts and materials, has

helped South Africa to become a substantial manufacturer of arms.

The South African state munitions manufacturers, Armscor, set up in the mid-60s, is now one of the country's largest industrial groupings, incorporating 15 factories and having assets totalling around R1.2 billion.¹⁶ Armscor has dealings with up to 3,000 private sector contractors and sub-contractors, including the local subsidiaries of many western corporations. Electronics and engineering companies are particularly important. By 1982 it was estimated that a total of about 100,000 people were earning their living through the arms industry.¹⁷



WE MAKE THEM OURSELVES !



The close links between Armscor and the private sector are apparent in the composition of its Board. Although the names of Board members are not publicly announced it is known that most of them are businessmen and industrialists. Senior executive personnel from Barlow Rand, one of the major South African companies involved in arms manufacture, have been seconded to Armscor to fill top positions.¹⁸

By the early 1980s, Armscor and the state propaganda claimed to have achieved self-sufficiency in production of a wide range of

munitions, including short range guided missiles, mine detectors, mini-computers, artillery guns and rockets. A wide range of other weapon systems was being manufactured by 1982 and South Africa was aiming to become a major exporter of armaments. The value of its arms exports totalled R10 million in 1981. The regime hopes to raise this to R150 million annually and to use the argument that its arms products have been 'operationally tested' in Namibia as a major selling point.¹⁹

SOUTH AFRICA'S NUCLEAR CAPABILITY

It is generally recognised that South Africa has succeeded in developing an advanced nuclear industry, which includes the capacity to produce its own nuclear weapons.²⁰ Inputs of strategic materials, technology and scientific know-how from Western countries, notably the United States, Britain, West Germany and France, have played — and continue to play —

a crucial facilitating role in this process.

South Africa, the United States and Canada are the world's largest producers of uranium — the raw material for nuclear warheads. Besides sources within South Africa itself, the regime's illegal administration in Namibia also exercises ultimate control over the output of the Rio Tinto-Zinc Corporation's Rössing mine near Swakopmund — the largest open-cast uranium mine in the world.


Research and development of the various stages involved in converting the ore into weapons-grade enriched uranium have been in progress in South Africa since the 1950s. The regime has evolved its own enrichment process. South Africa's eventual aim is to produce enough enriched uranium to supply its two large nuclear reactors at Koeberg, near Cape Town, and for export. The Koeberg plant was due to come into commercial operation in early 1983, some months behind its original schedule. Official South African sources forecast in

1982 that 25 per cent of the country's energy needs would be met by nuclear power within the next two decades.²¹

South Africa's refusal to sign the international Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty has fuelled fears that it intends to use its nuclear power sources to manufacture weapons. In July 1977, preparations by the regime to detonate a nuclear device were detected in the Kalahari Desert.²²

Two years later, on 22 September 1979, a US Vela satellite detected an intense double flash of light in the south Atlantic off the South African coast. Subsequent investigations revealed that this had most likely been caused by a nuclear warhead fired from the G5 155mm extended range artillery system.²³

There have also been reports pointing to a joint project between South Africa, Israel and Taiwan which is currently developing and producing a 'cruise' missile which would undoubtedly have a nuclear capability.²⁴





8 SOUTHERN AFRICA

The struggle for the liberation of the oppressed majority in South Africa is closely bound up with developments in the whole of the Southern African region. As one country after another in the region has achieved its independence from colonial domination and minority rule, the hold that South Africa has exerted over the region since the early days of colonialism has been weakened. The power of the white minority in South Africa has been increasingly undermined by these developments. Each advance by the forces of liberation elsewhere in the region since the late 1960s has in turn provided inspiration and encouragement for those in South Africa resisting apartheid.

For its part the South African regime has adopted changing strategies aimed at limiting the transformation of social and economic relations in the newly independent states surrounding it, strengthening its illegal occupation of Namibia and ensuring the maintenance of the apartheid system in South Africa itself.¹

SOUTH AFRICA'S RELATIONS WITH NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES

Economic domination

The whole of the Southern African region has depended economically on South Africa since the early period of colonial rule. The transport system and the patterns of trade have reflected and perpetuated the relations of dependence. The rail transport system spread out from, and has remained dependent on, South Africa. Trade has always taken manufactured goods from South Africa into the region and brought back minerals and migrant labour.

Migrant labour has been the most visible aspect of dependence. While very greatly reduced from the former level of even the mid 1970s, there were still over 327,000 African migrant workers from neighbouring states in South Africa in 1979, working mainly on the mines.

Many large South African corporations, some of them with financial resources greater than those of most of the states in the region, have extensive investments in the surrounding countries.

As the struggle for liberation has intensified inside South Africa and Namibia, its relations with the rest of the region have taken on a more aggressive character. The scope of its ambition to shape the region's economic, social and political relations has also expanded.

Strategies for perpetuating domination

South Africa has endeavoured for a long time to maintain the structures of dependence.

In the 1960s the South African Prime Minister Dr. Verwoerd had put forward the idea of an Economic Community of Southern Africa. The white-dominated states of South Africa and Rhodesia were to be the nuclei around which a number of economically dependent 'black' states would be grouped under South African hegemony. In the late 1960s an 'outward looking policy' under J. Vorster as Prime Minister, and in the early 1970s a 'detente policy', were similarly aimed at bringing African states into alliance with South Africa.

The means by which the goal was to be achieved was economic penetration. The necessary condition for the pursuit of the strategy was an alliance of South

Africa with the Caetano regime of Portugal (exercising colonial power in Mozambique and Angola) and the white minority Smith regime in Rhodesia. The alliance would also facilitate co-ordinated action to resist the liberation movements. The Caetano and Smith regimes were anxious to enlist South African power against the movements fighting guerilla wars in their respective territories.

With the collapse of Portuguese colonial rule in 1974, the strategy of economic penetration and domination came to be accompanied by more direct use of military power. Aggression by South Africa, and while it existed, the Smith regime, was directed against the rest of the region. The initiation of a state of war throughout the region and internationalisation of the conflict appeared to be the aims.

A few days ago, the South African regime alleged that Mozambique is threatening it by concentrating sophisticated weapons on its border. What are these sophisticated weapons? We do not represent a threat to anyone, neither militarily nor economically. No sensible person could think that an underdeveloped and poor country like ours, with so many wounds of war still bleeding could threaten the sovereignty, territorial integrity of any state, especially a power like South Africa.

The sophisticated weapon that really threatens apartheid is the alternative civilisation that our society now represents.

(President Machel of Mozambique in a speech to the Central Committee of Frelimo on 22 August 1982)

'Constellation of States'

Simultaneously with the escalation of military aggression, South Africa intensified other efforts towards maintaining economic

domination of the region. The idea of a 'Constellation of States', first mentioned by the South African Prime Minister J. Vorster in 1975, was presented as an urgent priority in 1979 as the end of the Rhodesian regime approached. It was reported that 'South Africa has a blueprint for a new policy which aims to draw into its orbit all Southern African States, up to and including Zaire'.²

It was believed by South Africa that its economic strength and domination of the region, together with the need of other states for development finance, would provide sufficient conditions for the plan to work.³

However the independence of Zimbabwe altered the balance of power in the region beyond what had been allowed for in the South African plan. An independent regional grouping was established in the form of the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC). Its function is to co-ordinate efforts for economic development and to reduce economic dependence on South Africa. One of its first priorities is to provide for a transport infrastructure which would break the hold of South Africa over most of the region's transport system.

One consequence of the establishment of the SADCC was that the 'Constellation of States' project had in practice, for a period at least, to be scaled down

from its original ambitious plan to a much more restricted one for restructuring relations between Pretoria and the bantustan authorities.⁵ A further consequence was the adoption by South Africa of an even more threatening stance and a much more concerted and active pursuit of the strategy of regional destabilisation which had been initiated as early as 1975.

Destabilisation

By 1982 there was abundant evidence of the existence of a co-ordinated strategy being pursued by South Africa throughout the region. The tactics differed from one area to another, with varying use of military, economic or political pressures, and varying degrees of openness. An overall trend towards more direct use of force was evident, above all in Angola.

The means by which economic destabilisation was pursued came to include military attacks on transport and fuel distribution facilities.⁶

There was also an increasing incidence of attacks on ANC personnel or refugees in each of the countries and on SWAPO supporters in refugee settlements in Angola.


SOUTH AFRICAN AGGRESSION

The nature and extent of South Africa's aggressive actions against neighbouring states and the extent to which they form part of a regional strategy, is evident from even a brief and incomplete summary.⁷

Angola

The People's Republic of Angola, despite the fact that it does not even share a common border with South Africa, has borne the brunt of the apartheid regime's military aggression. During the closing months of 1975, as Angola was approaching its independence from Portuguese colonialism, it was invaded by a force of 6,000 South African troops and foreign mercenaries, in an attempt to prevent the MPLA national libera-

SOUTH AFRICAN AGGRESSION



STATES OF THE SOUTHERN AFRICAN REGION BELONGING TO THE SADCC

Population in 1979
(million)


Angola	6.9
Botswana	0.9
Lesotho	1.3
Malawi	5.8
Mozambique	10.2
Swaziland	0.5
Tanzania	18.0
Zambia	5.6
Zimbabwe	7.1

Source: Catholic Institute for International Relations, *Comment 43*⁴

© International Defence & Aid Fund

tion movement from coming to power as the country's first independence government. The invading force succeeded in penetrating almost as far north as the Angolan capital, Luanda, 1,000 km into the country, before being finally repulsed in March 1976.


Since that time, using the illegally occupied territory of Namibia as its military spring-board, South Africa has launched a continual series of raids and attacks on Angola. The statistics reveal the escalating character of this aggression. During the period 27 March 1976 to 11 June 1979 (just over three years), South African forces were responsible for material damage totalling US\$293.3 million to Angola's economic and administrative infrastructure. Over the next 18 months, from 11 June 1979 to 31 December 1980, the damage came to nearly the same figure — US\$231.0 million.



South African troops crossing into Angola.

Including the effects of the 1975 invasion, by the end of 1982 the total damage was estimated at US\$10 billion. During 1981, operations against Angola by South African forces averaged five per day over the year, compared to approximately three per day over the preceding 18 months.⁸

In Angola, South African aggression has moved through the stages of hit-and-run cross-border raids combined with reconnaissance flights and various kinds of espionage, through large-scale incursions by conventional forces supported by jet fighter bombers, to the creation of what have amounted to cleared zones in the southern part of the country, constantly patrolled by South African troops



Results of S.A. attacks.

in a state of more or less permanent military occupation.

In August 1981, in an operation codenamed 'Protea' by the South African Defence Force, southern Angola was invaded by an estimated 11,000 South African troops (representing the largest mobilisation of military forces in Southern Africa to date). During 1982, approximately 50,000 square kilometres of Kunene province remained under occupation. The administrative, governmental, transport and economic structure throughout this region had been suspended or destroyed, making every-day life impossible. An estimated 150,000 Angolans had been displaced from their homes.

Following a series of warnings by both the Angolan government and the South Africans themselves, and indications of a sub-

stantial new build-up of South Africa military force on the northern Namibian border, it became apparent during mid-1982 that the SADF were endeavouring to extend their zone of influence in Angola into the provinces of Huila, Moxico, Kuando Kubango and Namib (Mocamedes), as well as Kunene itself.

South Africa's purpose, while ostensibly to eradicate SWAPO from Angola by destroying alleged guerilla bases and personnel, has been ultimately to render Angola incapable of supporting the South African and Namibian liberation struggles. The SADF has tried to do so by terrorising and intimidating its population and by forcing the Angolan government to divert a large proportion of the state budget (50 per cent by 1981) from the tasks of social and economic reconstruction to defence and security. In pursuing its strategy of destabilisation in Angola, South Africa has made use of UNITA, which is portrayed as an independent organization of dissident nationals. In fact, UNITA is trained and operationally directed by the SADF.⁹

ARMED FORCES IN SOUTHERN AFRICA — 1982

These are estimates based on figures given in *The Military Balance 1982-3* (International Institute of Strategic Studies, London) (IISS). The figures have in some cases been adjusted to make

them comparable (for example the IISS counted Zimbabwe's obsolete Vampires, but not South Africa's, and it omitted combat aircraft attached to SA's Training Command).

<i>Armed Forces</i>		<i>Combat Aircraft</i>	<i>Armour*</i>	<i>Armoured personnel carriers</i>
Angola	37,500	68	575	150
Botswana	3,000	—	not av.	30
Mozambique	21,600	25	235	200
Zambia	14,300	51	164	13
Zimbabwe	60,000†	17	56	20
TOTAL	136,400	171	1,030	413
SOUTH AFRICA	404,500	274	1,650	1,200

The IISS gives no figures for Lesotho and Swaziland which only have small paramilitary forces.

*Includes tanks and armoured fighting vehicles.

†To be reduced to 42,000.

Zimbabwe

During the first two years of Zimbabwe's independence, from April 1980 onwards, military aggression by South Africa was mostly of a covert nature. It involved acts of sabotage, bomb explosions and attacks on individuals, rather than overt operations by conventional or at least recognisable South African forces. The close relationship between the illegal Smith-Muzorewa regime and South Africa, (amounting in fact to the former's dependence on apartheid support for its survival), have made it very difficult for the Zimbabwe government to take effective precautions against the operations of South African agents and saboteurs.

The evidence of South African involvement became increasingly clear through a series of incidents in 1981. This included the assassination in Harare of the Chief Representative of the ANC, the detonation of one of the Zimbabwe National Army's main arsenals, destroying nearly R50 million worth of weaponry, munitions and equipment, and an explosion at the headquarters of the ruling party ZANU (PF), resulting in the death of six people.

The covert forces deployed by South Africa against Zimbabwe include former members of the Rhodesian security forces now working within or in collaboration with South African defence forces; former supporters of Bishop Muzorewa who have been regrouped and trained inside South Africa; mercenaries from abroad and agents recruited within both South Africa and Zimbabwe. Military destabilisation by South Africa took a more open form in the second half of 1982. A number of South African military personnel were apprehended, and in some cases killed, by Zimbabwean security forces.

Zimbabwe has also been affected by South Africa's use of the Mozambique National Resistance Movement (*see below*). At the end of 1981 the Zimbabwe Prime


Minister accused South African planes of violating Zimbabwe air space in the course of ferrying supplies to the Mozambique Resistance Movement.¹⁰

Mozambique

Prior to Zimbabwe's independence, Mozambique was the target for a whole succession of raids and attacks by forces of the illegal Rhodesian regime. Many of these were of an extremely serious nature, causing the deaths of hundreds of Zimbabwean refugees and Mozambican civilians. They did extensive damage to the country's economic and administrative infrastructure. Direct collaboration between the Rhodesian and South African armed forces was also apparent in many instances.

From April 1980, aggression by South Africa itself was manifested, in particular, through the activities of the 'Mozambique National Resistance Movement'. Set up in 1976 by South African Military Intelligence and the Rhodesian Special Branch, MNRM is a surrogate force of the SADF which, like UNITA, is portrayed as an independent movement of dissident nationals. It is supplied and directed from bases in the Northern Transvaal where there is also a radio transmitter broadcasting in its name.¹¹

The Resistance Movement claimed responsibility, for example, for a number of sabotage attacks on key economic targets such as the Beira-Mutare oil pipeline and road and rail links with Zimbabwe, which were fully consistent with South Africa's strategy of economic destabilisation.



The South African Congress of Trade Unions residence at Matola after attack.

On 30 January 1981, South African forces attacked Mozambique directly, when a group of commandos raided residences in Matola, a suburb of Maputo, and killed 13 members of the African National Congress and the South African Congress of Trade Unions who had been accommodated there. The Matola raid took place at a time of intensifying apartheid aggression throughout the Southern African region, and prompted action by the Mozambique government to strengthen the country's security and civil defence arrangements. President Samora Machel, speaking on 14 February 1981, described the Matola attack as a declaration of war against the people of Mozambique.

The months that followed saw an increasing number of border incursions, air space violations and other open attacks on Mozambique by the South African armed forces. Over a five-week period from December 1981 to January 1982, for example, the Mozambique authorities reported a total of 11 recorded airspace violations of the South African aircraft ferrying weapons, supplies and reinforcements to the Mozambique Resistance Movement, and for purposes of aerial espionage and reconnaissance.¹²

In August 1982 a letter bomb sent to the Centre for African Studies at the University in Maputo killed Ruth First, a prominent member of the ANC who had been living and working in Mozambique since 1979. It was generally believed outside South Africa that agents of the apartheid regime had been responsible.



Young members of the African National Congress killed at Matola by South African Commandos.

Zambia

Zambia suffered particularly acutely from the economic side-effects of sanctions against the illegal Smith regime, combined with air and ground raids by Rhodesian armed forces. The brunt of these were directed against Zimbabwean refugee settlements in Zambia, but two years after Zimbabwe's independence, the task of dismantling minefields laid by the Rhodesian forces and making good the damage caused by their attacks still remained to be completed.

Many of the Rhodesians' methods, furthermore, have continued to be employed by the South Africans. Operating from their bases in the Caprivi area of northern Namibia, they have infiltrated into Zambia's Western province in particular. Transport, food distribution and other services have been adversely affected by landmines laid by South African forces or agents, and a number of Zambian civilians and military personnel have been killed. South African aircraft have also violated Zambian airspace en route to attack villages and other targets in Angola.

The apartheid regime also operated inside Zambia in a covert fashion. At the end of 1981, the Zambian government

put a figure of at least 500 on the number of Zambians being trained by South Africa to undertake subversion and sabotage inside their own country.¹³ Such activity appeared to be manifested through various kinds of armed robbery and gangland crime, both in Lusaka and other Zambian towns, and in the rural areas. The 'Mushala Gang', in particular, whose members appear to have been recruited in Zambia and trained by South African forces in the Caprivi Strip, operated in Zambia's Western province for a number of years.

The Zambian authorities have also made allegations of South African involvement in at least two unsuccessful conspiracies to overthrow the government.¹⁴

Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland

The former British Protectorates of Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland are in a particularly vulnerable position within the Southern African region. Lesotho, a sparsely populated mountainous country with relatively few natural resources, is completely surrounded by South Africa. It is very heavily dependent on the apartheid migrant labour system for its financial survival. Due to the close integration of their economies and transport systems

with those of South Africa, their geographical proximity to the apartheid regime, relatively small populations and national budgets, and (except for Botswana) small size, all three countries have only the most limited scope to defend themselves against South African domination. Their capacity to give overt practical assistance to the South African and Namibian freedom struggles, and to the liberation movements, is likewise very restricted.

All three governments have nevertheless consistently shown themselves to be at one with the rest of Africa in expressing their political and diplomatic support for the anti-apartheid struggle and the overthrow of the regime. The price has been exposure to destabilising activity of a particularly insidious and pervasive kind.

South African military aggression has taken the form in Botswana of a succession of border violations and exchanges of fire with Botswana Defence Force personnel, by South African troops operating usually from the Caprivi area of Namibia. The Botswana government and defence authorities have also referred on several occasions to infiltration by South African agents or spies, often in the guise of refugees. A number of Botswanan nationals were also believed to have been recruited into the South African armed forces.¹⁵

In Lesotho, an increasing number of acts of sabotage and bomb attacks on economic and military targets were attributed by the Lesotho authorities in 1981 to forces operating from South African territory and supported by the apartheid regime. There was evidence that the Lesotho Liberation Army, a group of Lesotho exiles based in the Qwa Qwa bantustan and other parts of South Africa, had been deeply infiltrated by the South Africans with a view to using it as a front for destabilising activity.



South African equipment captured at Matola — with Nazi insignia on helmet.

In both Lesotho and Swaziland, a succession of assassinations, abductions and other attacks on individuals appear to be attributable to agents of the South African regime.¹⁶

In December 1983 the SADF carried out an attack on Maseru, killing 42 people. Of those killed 30 were ANC and SACTU members, and 12 were Lesotho Nationals.

NAMIBIA

South Africa's illegal occupation of Namibia,¹⁷ which by 1982 involved more than 100,000 troops in the territory, has been a crucial element in its strategy of regional domination. Continued control over Namibia, through a white minority client regime, provided a buffer against encroaching majority rule north of the Orange River, and a springboard for aggression against neighbouring countries, particularly Angola.

South Africa's presence in Namibia began in 1915, when German colonial rule of the territory was terminated. Under the terms of a Class C Mandate of the League of Nations, conferred in 1919, South Africa's duty was to prepare the territory for eventual self-determination. In practice, South Africa proceeded to replicate its own apartheid institutions in Namibia, promoting a bantustan system and entrenching white minority rule.

In October 1966, the United Nations terminated South Africa's Mandate on the grounds that South Africa had failed to fulfil its obligations to ensure the moral and material well-being



South African paramilitary police in Windhoek.

and security of the people. Namibia was placed under the direct responsibility of the United Nations (UN General Assembly res. 2145 (XXI)). In 1969 the UN Security Council declared South Africa's occupation of the territory illegal and called upon the South African government to withdraw its administration immediately from the territory. This was backed up in 1971 by the International Court of Justice, which in an advisory opinion judged South Africa's continued occupation of Namibia illegal.

South Africa pursued its aim of retaining control over Namibia and preventing genuine independence by adopting several parallel strategies. One aim of its strategy was repression directed at supporters and leaders of the South West Africa People's Organisation (SWAPO of Namibia). SWAPO was recognised in 1973 by the UN General Assembly as the authentic representative of the Namibian people.

Having failed to impose an apartheid constitution through the Turnhalle Constitutional Conference called for this purpose in 1975, the regime agreed in 1977 to enter into negotiations for Namibian independence with five Western members of the UN Security Council, known as the Contact Group (Britain, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, the United States and Canada). At

each stage of these protracted negotiations, including a renewed effort by the Contact Group in 1981/82, South Africa raised objections, demanded more concessions and manoeuvred for further delays, while speeding up its own 'solution' for Namibia.

This took the form of increased suppression of political opponents in Namibia, a sharp escalation of its military presence and activity in the country and the promotion of an 'internal settlement', based on its original bantustan blueprint.



Police break up a SWAPO rally, Windhoek.

In the face of increased guerilla activities by SWAPO the South African Defence Force has virtually transformed the north of Namibia into a vast military camp, building numerous bases, removing large sections of the population, fencing in villages and imposing emergency regulations and curfews throughout the region.¹⁸



South African soldiers on patrol in Northern Namibia.

Parallel to its military escalation in Namibia, South Africa embarked on an apparent 'transfer of power' to local institutions and forces loyal to the apartheid regime. In December 1978, having objected to various provisions of a Western Plan for Namibian elections under United Nations supervision and control (endorsed by the United Nations Security Council Resolution 435) South Africa unilaterally held elections in Namibia. It installed the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance, a grouping made up of tribal elements and controlled by whites, and proceeded to transfer a semblance of power to this body, establishing a National Assembly in 1979 and a Council of Ministers in 1980. A South African-appointed Administrator General, installed in Namibia in 1977 ostensibly to prepare the ground for internationally supervised elections, became the *de facto* authority, acting in liaison with the South African regime.

Efforts to sell this 'internal government' to the Namibian people as their genuine representative failed in the face of clear evidence that the black majority continued to suffer racial discrimination in all spheres.

In January 1983 South Africa formally resumed direct control



over Namibia, dissolving the Council of Ministers and National Assembly, thereby ending any pretence that the Namibian people had a say in their own political affairs.

In an attempt to present the war in Namibia as an indigenous one against SWAPO, South Africa created tribal armies which, in August 1980, were amalgamated into the SWA Territory Force (SWATF). South Africa however retained full power over Nami-

bia's defence and security. To build up SWATF, compulsory military service was extended to black Namibians in January 1981, causing many young men to flee their country to avoid having to fight against SWAPO.

Through the years of negotiation for Namibian independence, it became evident that South Africa regarded a SWAPO government in Windhoek as a danger to its own apartheid system.





9 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

South Africa, like any other country, is located within a complex web of economic, political and diplomatic relations, which stretch far beyond the borders of Africa, in particular to Western countries. These relations have been built up over many years and have their origins in the colonial period. Since the time when the former colonies began to achieve independence, the issue of apartheid has been a constant focus of attention. Parallel with the struggle inside South Africa, a many-sided campaign has developed which is aimed at transforming the international relations with South Africa into ones of support for the struggle for freedom.

A long-standing campaign to isolate South Africa and to exclude the regime's representatives from all international forums has won growing support, but is still a matter of disagreement, particularly amongst Western countries. Other major forms of action include political and material support for the armed liberation struggle, and humanitarian aid for the victims of the apartheid system.

APARTHEID'S DEPENDENCE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Considerable efforts have been made by South Africa for many years, and especially since the early 1970s, to reduce the country's reliance on external sources of supply and assistance. However the apartheid regime remains heavily dependent on its foreign connections in a number

of important respects, both economically and politically.

Trade and Investment

The South African economy is highly dependent on economic relations with other countries, both in trading and investment. A high level of exports has been needed to sell its products and also to pay for the technology, finance, capital goods and oil required by the economy.

The importance of foreign participation has if anything been enhanced by a massive programme aimed at self-sufficiency, undertaken by the regime from the early 1970s to lessen vulnerability to sanctions. Emphasis has been placed on the development of major infra-structural projects in strategic economic sectors such as transportation, communications, energy and steel production, as well as the building of military armaments and stockpiling of oil.

This programme and its objectives are reflected in the patterns of trade and investment.

South African exports are headed by primary commodities such as gold, base metals and minerals, diamonds and semi-precious stones, and agricultural products. In return South Africa receives vital capital goods imports including machinery and electrical equipment, computers, transport equipment and chemicals and allied products.

Imports and exports have since the 1960s each fluctuated around a level equivalent to a quarter of the gross domestic product.¹ The value of imports and the balance of trade has depended significantly on the price of gold, because of the importance of gold as an

export. During 1981, when the gross domestic product was R66,000 million, the value of exports was R18,100 million.² The balance of trade for that year showed a deficit of R4,000 million, a consequence largely of a falling gold price and increasing imports of oil and arms.³

South Africa's principal trading partners in 1981 were (in order of importance) the United States, Great Britain and West Germany, followed by Japan and Switzerland. Until recently Britain had traditionally been the leading trading partner. Since the 1970s trade with Israel, Taiwan and Latin American countries has shown the fastest growth.⁴

South Africa also seeks to use its productive capacity, particularly in the field of agriculture, as a means of exerting pressure on countries in Africa. Food has developed into an important political weapon in the Southern African region, a fact explicitly acknowledged by a government minister during 1982.⁵

The development of the apartheid economy has historically been, and continues to be, heavily dependent on extensive foreign investment. Such investment, both direct and indirect, is not only of financial importance. As the Minister of Finance stated in 1979, "Apart from the balance-of-payments aspects, foreign investment in the Republic is important for development purposes in an expanding economy and for the technical know-how which normally accompanies such transactions". As South African industries have internalised foreign technology, foreign investment has consistently shifted to new industrial sectors. In the

late 1970s and early 1980s such investment was concentrated on the fields of energy production (both oil and nuclear), as well as computers and electronics, all of great strategic importance in the regime's defence of the apartheid system.⁶

Foreign investment in 1979 totalled R22.8 billion. Out of total direct investment amounting to R10.2 billion in 1979, R6.4 billion, about two-thirds, was provided by countries in the European Economic Community, notably Britain; R2.5 billion by countries in North and South America, notably the United States; and the remaining R1.4 billion by other countries.⁷

Between 2,000 and 2,500 transnational corporations have been identified as having subsidiaries or associated companies, or other investments in South Africa.

NUMBER OF COMPANIES IN S.A. BASED IN OTHER COUNTRIES — 1980

Britain	1,200
West Germany	350
USA	340
France	50
Netherlands	50
Australia	35
Belgium	20
Italy	20
Switzerland	12
Sweden	10
Spain	6
Canada	5

Source: Apartheid and Business; Business International Multiclient Survey.⁸

Loans from overseas banks comprise the most important component of non-direct investment in South Africa. Over the nine years 1972-1980 inclusive, South Africa borrowed a total of nearly \$US7 billion from banks based in Britain, the United States, West Germany, France, Switzerland, Belgium and elsewhere — a total of 186 separate loans.⁹

A major capital spending programme for several years was announced in 1980. Oriented

largely towards expanding coal output and shifting the economy away from dependence on oil as a source of energy, it contributed to a marked increase in foreign borrowing.¹⁰ Together with a rapid increase in imports during the same period, this helped produce a major deficit in the balance of payments.¹¹ To finance the deficit South Africa borrowed \$1070 million from the International Monetary Fund in 1982, underlining the dependence on international support of the regime's strategy for defending the system. Previous large loans by the IMF included \$464 million during 1976-7 and \$547 million in 1978.¹²

Immigration

Apartheid creates a skilled labour shortage which South Africa tries to meet by a programme of encouraging immigration of whites. The shortage is created in two ways, by restricting access of black people to jobs beyond a certain level of skill, and by restrictions on the training of skilled black people.

The existence of a skilled labour shortage is a constant focus of concern on the part of both government and business, and has been identified as a

principal obstacle to the large-scale programmes of import substitution, particularly in the fields of energy and electronics.¹³

The programme to recruit white skilled workers is implemented by offices of the Department of Immigration attached to diplomatic and other official missions in many countries. In some countries the South African government subsidises private organisations to recruit skilled workers. Advertisements for jobs in South Africa appear very frequently in newspapers in many Western countries.¹⁴


The flow of immigrants to South Africa has been maintained for many years, fluctuating according to the situation inside South Africa and reversing during periods in which resistance to apartheid has taken forms which made it clear that the ability of the regime to maintain its existence is limited.

Political and Diplomatic Relations

In order to maintain and make use of its economic relations with the rest of the world, South Africa attaches great importance to the maintenance of political and diplomatic relations. Con-

Thousands

WHITE MIGRATION 1975 to 1981



versely, following the Sharpeville Massacre in 1960, the United Nations General Assembly requested Member States to break off or refrain from establishing diplomatic relations with South Africa. Several states complied with the request. Upon gaining independence, African states, with the exception of Malawi, refused to establish diplomatic relations with South Africa and closed South African consulates in their territories.¹⁶

However, in spite of the growing diplomatic isolation of South Africa, several states continued and some actually increased official relations with South Africa. Although in a minority, some of them have been able through their veto power to prevent moves within the United Nations Security Council to adopt measures to impose mandatory economic sanctions against South Africa. Britain, the United States, France and Western Germany have been the principal countries using the veto power in this way. (see below).

Apart from enjoying such tangible benefits, the regime is also quick to exploit any policy shifts in foreign countries which can be interpreted as support for its activities, and to try to identify its aims with those of the West. For example, when defending the raid into Mozambique in January 1981, in which 13 ANC members were killed, General Malan, the South African Defence Minister, referred to a major foreign policy statement by President Reagan only days before the raid: General Malan spoke of 'happy signs that the West was becoming more conscious that stronger action had to be taken against terrorism'.¹⁷

More generally, acceptance by foreign governments of the claim that the apartheid regime is engaged in 'sincere efforts to change' and in reform has the effect of encouraging and sustaining it in the pursuit of its own strategies.¹⁸

INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FOR THE FREEDOM STRUGGLE

The support within the international community for the struggle for freedom in South Africa takes various forms: political and moral condemnation of the apartheid system and of the repressive actions of the regime; recognition of the right to resort to armed struggle to achieve liberation; support for the campaign to isolate South Africa; material support for the struggle in all its aspects; and humanitarian aid to the victims of oppression.

Political and moral support for the freedom struggle

From the late 1940s, as the former colonies achieved independence from colonial rule, the international community moved gradually from condemnation of South Africa and calls for reform, towards proclaiming the illegitimacy of the regime. This included recognition of the right of the people of South Africa, led by their liberation movements, to use whatever means they could to resist and overthrow the regime. This process has involved the expulsion of South Africa from various world bodies, and the recognition of the national liberation movements as authentic representatives of the people of South Africa (see *CHRONOLOGY OF UN ACTIONS*).

Boycott of South Africa

Appeals to the international community to boycott South Africa, in particular through the imposition of mandatory economic sanctions, have been repeatedly issued from inside the country since the mid-1950s.

In 1958, following a year of mass action which included the launching of bus boycotts to prevent fare increases, the ANC called for a nationwide economic boycott of business houses dominated by National Party members. Chief Albert Lutuli,

then President of the ANC, extended the call to the international community in a speech delivered on 26 June 1959: 'The economic boycott of South Africa will entail undoubted hardship for the Africans. We do not doubt that', he conceded. 'But if it is a method which shortens the day of bloodshed, the suffering to us will be a price we are willing to pay'.

Since then the view that sanctions are an effective means of cutting off the regime from its external sources of supply and sustenance, thereby reducing its capacity for repression and aggression, has won increasing and widening support inside South Africa and outside. However, there is still substantial and powerful opposition to sanctions. Opponents of sanctions give varying reasons for their opposition. Some declare that they have interests which would be threatened by the end of the apartheid regime. Others express the view that change in South Africa could come through processes (such as reform of the regime from within) which would be jeopardised by sanctions.

The implementation of the programme to isolate South Africa has been gradual and partial. India, whose government terminated trade and diplomatic relations with South Africa as early as 1946, soon after India's independence, was the first UN Member State to take significant public action to implement sanctions. Since then a large number of governments, international and national organisations, and a wide range of non-governmental bodies throughout the world, have taken practical steps to cut links with South Africa. The United Nations has moved towards more and more concerted encouragement of this process. But enforcement of the breaking of links (except in the supply of arms) has been prevented by vetoes in the Security Council by a minority of Western countries, notably the three permanent members, Britain, France and the United States. (Consensus is re-

quired within the Security Council to give measures the force of law.)

In spite of the partial nature of the implementation of the programme, the cumulative effect of the small steps has been significant in several fields. Many states have no diplomatic links with South Africa, there is a compulsory arms embargo, Arab countries impose an oil embargo, there is a wide and effective consensus that sporting links with South Africa should be cut. In a number of countries there are restrictions on trade and investment.

Material support and humanitarian aid

Support for and recognition of those fighting for freedom is expressed in many programmes for the provision of material aid to the liberation movements. The range of support varies widely, according to the nature of the organisations giving it.

The Organisation of African Unity provides aid for all aspects of the struggle. This includes assistance in the conducting of the armed struggle, and some member states have provided military training facilities. The OAU also decided in 1976 to increase aid to the Front Line States around South Africa which are subject to aggression by South Africa.

In March 1982 a summit meeting of leaders of the Front Line States, attended by the presidents of the ANC and SWAPO, resolved to increase their assistance to the ANC and SWAPO to enable them to intensify the armed struggle, as well as reinforcing their own co-ordinated action of defence against South African aggression.

Conducting a struggle for national liberation involves many aspects of work including education, health, publicity and care of refugees, to name only some of the principal ones. Material aid is given by governments, international agencies and non-governmental organisations for all these purposes, as well as aid

specifically given to help victims of the apartheid system and their families.

Refugees

Much of the practical support forthcoming from the international community for the freedom struggle takes the form of material assistance to South African refugees. The majority of such refugees, whose numbers are growing all the time, are located in various independent African countries, where they face the prospect of unspecified years of exile, until South Africa is freed.

Ever since the National Party came to power in 1948 (and even before that) a more or less continuous stream of South Africans, have decided that an uncertain future abroad is preferable to living under the apartheid system.


South African exiles are today scattered across the globe, often having lived in their countries of adoption for many years and having established careers, homes and families. Many left South Africa after personally experiencing apartheid oppression through arrest, detention or imprisonment. Some have left South Africa openly through recognised channels (even if concealing their real motives), while others have escaped across the borders surreptitiously.

In recent years, however, and particularly since the uprising of 1976 a growing number of black South Africans have fled the

country to escape police and military repression, or have been forced out by growing pressures of the liberation struggle. A large number of such refugees, particularly young people, have made the conscious decision, either before leaving South Africa or following their arrival in some neighbouring state, to commit themselves to participation in the freedom struggle in whatever way deemed most appropriate.

Substantial numbers of South African refugees are today found in the former British protectorates, the Front Line States, and in other African countries whose governments have undertaken to provide hospitality and assistance of various kinds. A number of accommodation, educational and training schemes have been established by the liberation movements in co-operation with the governments concerned and with the help from various international aid agencies.

One of the most ambitious of such schemes is located near Morogoro, in a mountainous region of Tanzania, where the African National Congress has established a residential, educational, training and agricultural centre for South African refugees on land donated by the Tanzanian government. The Solomon Mahlangu Freedom College, a complex of classrooms, workshops, sports and other facilities, is developing ambitious programmes to ensure that 1,000 or



more young South Africans are not merely cared for in exile, but will also receive an education that will enable them to contribute to the struggle for liberation, and to one day return to a free country, mentally and physically equipped to contribute to the construction of a new and non-racial society.

Another significant trend in recent years has been the growing number of young white South African war resisters in exile abroad. Some have left the country after experiencing military service in the apartheid armed forces, while others have fled in advance of being conscripted. A limited number have been granted political asylum in various Western countries, including Sweden, the Netherlands, Britain and the United States.

ACTION BY THE UNITED NATIONS

The question of racial discrimination in South Africa has been on the agenda of the United Nations since the very first session of the General Assembly in 1946. In 1952, the UN formally took up the broader issue of apartheid, and since 1962, it has considered both questions under the heading *Policies of apartheid of the Government of the Republic of South Africa*.¹⁹

South Africa's policies have always been unanimously regarded by the UN membership as violating both the Charter of the UN itself and the 1948 International Declaration of Human Rights. UN action has been directed towards achieving racial equality in South Africa through, if possible, non-violent means, i.e. the termination of collaboration and the isolation of the regime through sanctions.

From the beginning of the 1960s onwards, the General Assembly and the Security Council began to recognise the situation in South Africa and in the region under South Africa's influence as a threat to international peace and security. This

development culminated on 4 November 1977 in the imposition by the Security Council of a mandatory arms embargo against South Africa (Security Council Resolution 418 (1977)). This is the first and only occasion on which mandatory sanctions have been imposed by the UN against a member state).

Between 1946 and 1980, a total of 158 resolutions on South Africa were adopted by the General Assembly and, between 1960 and 1980, 12 by the Security Council.²⁰ Some of the major landmarks include: the adoption in 1976 of a detailed General Assembly *Programme of Action* against apartheid; the declaration by the General Assembly of an *International Anti-Apartheid Year* from 21 March 1978 to 20 March 1979; and the declaration of 1982 as *International Year of Mobilization for Sanctions against South Africa* (see *CHRONOLOGY OF UN ACTIONS*). A number of specialised UN agencies and inter-governmental organisations have been set up to deal with various aspects of the world body's anti-apartheid programme or have actively concerned themselves with the South African issue. They include the UN Special Committee against Apartheid and its related body, the UN Centre against Apartheid; the UN Trust Fund for South Africa and the UN Educational and Training Programme for Southern Africa (both concerned with the channelling of humanitarian and educational assistance to the victims of apartheid); the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO), the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO); the International Labour Organisation (ILO); the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR); and the UN Development Programme (UNDP). The Ad Hoc Working Group of Experts of the UN Commission on Human Rights has systematically collected information on human rights violations by the South African regime. Other UN bodies have been established to deal with the issue of Namibia.

Even though South Africa formally remained a member of the UN General Assembly in 1982, its standing has been effectively minimised. Its delegates have not participated in General Assembly proceedings since November 1974, when the regime was expelled from the 29th session. Since October 1976, representatives of the ANC and the PAC have participated in the debates on apartheid in the plenary meetings of the General Assembly. Both liberation movements were invited to address the UN Security Council after the latter's adoption of the mandatory arms embargo in November 1977. The UN General Assembly has in successive years reaffirmed its recognition of the ANC and PAC as the authentic representatives of the people of South Africa.

OTHER INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS

Many other international bodies have expelled or refused to admit South Africa, and declared their support for the liberation struggle. Examples include the labour movement and sporting organisations, professional federations, religious bodies and cultural associations.

The Organisation of African Unity (OAU), from its inception in 1963, recognised the ANC and PAC as Liberation Movements, and as authentic representatives of the people of South Africa and as therefore having the right both to employ armed struggle and to receive assistance in conducting the struggle from the OAU. In 1981 the OAU summit commended the liberation movements, particularly the ANC, for intensifying the armed struggle against the regime.

The developments which have taken place at the UN and the OAU have occurred to varying degrees in every field of international relations and in every aspect of national life within countries. While there are many who are prepared to recognise

the legitimacy of the South African government or of bodies approved by the regime, the number of those who take the opposite view and who recognise and support the liberation struggle has grown steadily and gained increasing weight.

CHRONOLOGY OF UNITED NATIONS ACTION AGAINST APARTHEID

1946 The General Assembly considers for the first time the question of racial discrimination in South Africa at the request of the Government of India.

1948 Adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

1952 General Assembly begins to consider the broader question of apartheid.

1960 Following the Sharpeville massacre, Security Council calls on the South African Government to initiate measures aimed at bringing about racial harmony based on equality and to abandon its policies of apartheid and racial discrimination (Security Council Resolution 134 (1960), adopted 1 April 1960, nine votes for, none against and two abstentions).

1961 General Assembly recognises apartheid as a danger to international peace and security (Resolutions 1598 (XV), adopted 13 April 1961, and 1663 (XVI), adopted 28 November 1961).

1962 Following the declaration of a State of Emergency in South Africa and the suppression of protests against the founding of the apartheid Republic, the General Assembly calls on Member states to take action and requests the Security Council to impose sanctions. General Assembly Resolution 1761 (XVII) adopted on 6 November 1962, calls for the breaking of diplomatic relations, the termination of trade including the supply of arms and ammunition, the closure of ports to South African vessels and the boycotting of South African goods.

The General Assembly also establishes the Special Committee against *Apartheid* — to keep the situation under review between Assembly sessions so that continuous attention might be given to the problem, and to report to the General Assembly and to the Security Council as necessary.

In 1980, the mandate of the Special Committee was extended to include:

a. Reviewing all aspects of the policies of *apartheid* in South Africa and its international repercussions;

b. Promoting the widest possible dissemination of information on the evils of *apartheid* and the legitimate struggle of the oppressed people of South Africa;

c. Encouraging full implementation of the relevant resolutions of the United Nations by all governments and organisations;

d. Promoting public action and campaign supporting the national liberation movement of South Africa, in accordance with the relevant resolutions of the United Nations;

e. Promoting concerted action by Governments and intergovernmental organisations in the international mobilization against apartheid.

The Special Committee is currently composed of the following 18 Member States:

Algeria
German Democratic Republic
Ghana
Guinea
Haiti
Hungary
India
Indonesia
Malaysia
Nepal
Nigeria
Peru
Philippines
Somalia
Sudan
Syrian Arab Republic
Trinidad and Tobago
Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic

1963 Voluntary arms embargo instituted by the Security Council,

with Britain and France abstaining (Resolution 181 (1963), adopted 7 August 1963 — this recognises that the situation in South Africa is seriously disturbing international peace and security).

General Assembly takes up plight of political prisoners, detainees and restrictees and considers humanitarian assistance to persecuted people and their families.

Adoption by the General Assembly of the *UN Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination*.

1965 General Assembly for the first time requests the Security Council to take action under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, on the grounds that the situation in South Africa constitutes 'a threat to international peace and security' (Resolution 2054A (XX) adopted 22 December 1965).

The General Assembly in subsequent years repeatedly requests the Security Council to adopt mandatory sanctions and calls on member states to comply with the voluntary arms embargo.

Adoption by the General Assembly of the *International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination* (came into force in 1969).

1966 General Assembly condemns apartheid as 'a crime against humanity' (Resolution 2202A (XXI), adopted 6 December 1966, subsequently reiterated on numerous occasions). General Assembly also condemns South Africa's main trading partners, including three permanent members of the Security Council (Britain, France and the USA) for their collaboration.

1967 General Assembly requests all states to commemorate 21 March, the *International Day for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination* and the anniversary of the 1960 Sharpeville massacre (Resolution 2307 (XXII) adopted 13 December 1967).

1968 General Assembly declares that freedom fighters against apartheid should be treated following arrest as prisoners-of-

war in line with the 1949 Geneva Conventions (Resolution 2396 (XXII), adopted 2 December 1968, subsequently reiterated).

1969 General Assembly recognises the South African struggle as one for self-determination and majority rule, as well as for human rights and fundamental freedoms (Resolution 2506 (XXIV), adopted 21 November 1969).

1970 A move in the Security Council to impose mandatory sanctions is defeated by the triple veto of Britain, France and the USA (Resolution 282 (1970), adopted 23 July 1970).

1973 Adoption by the General Assembly of the *International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid* (Resolution 3068 (XXVIII), adopted 30 November 1973).

1974 South Africa suspended from General Assembly. A draft resolution in the Security Council to expel South Africa from the United Nations is defeated on 30 October 1974 by a triple veto from Britain, France and the USA.

1976 ANC and PAC invited by the General Assembly to participate in the debate on apartheid in its plenary meetings (October 1976 onwards).

General Assembly declares 11 October as the *Day of Solidarity with South African Political Prisoners* and 16 June as the *International Day of Solidarity with the Struggling People of South Africa*. It also adopts a detailed *Programme of Action against Apartheid* (Resolutions 31/6 C, I and J, adopted 9 November 1976).

1977 Mandatory arms embargo, including a ban on co-operation in the manufacture and development of nuclear weapons, imposed against South Africa under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, by unanimous vote in the Security Council (Resolution 418 (1977), adopted 4 November 1977, in invoking Chapter VII, the Security Council recognised South Africa's acquisition of arms as a

threat to peace).

General Assembly proclaims 21 March 1978 as the beginning of *International Anti-Apartheid Year* (Resolution 32/105B adopted unanimously on 14 December 1977). It authorizes the UN Special Committee to organise a *World Conference for Action against Apartheid*, held in Lagos in August 1977 together with the OAU and the Federal Government of Nigeria, and subsequently adopt the *Lagos Declaration*, proposing a programme of sanctions against South Africa (Resolutions 32/105M, adopted unanimously 14 December 1977).

General Assembly adopts and proclaims the *International Declaration against Apartheid in Sports* (Resolution 32/105M, adopted 14 December 1977).

1978 *International Anti-Apartheid Year* (21 March 1978 — 20 March 1979).

1981 International Conference on Sanctions against South Africa convened at UNESCO House, Paris, by the UN Special Committee against Apartheid and the OAU. Attended by 124 governments together with UN and other international agencies, national liberation movements and non-governmental organizations. Adopts the *Paris Declaration of Sanctions against South Africa* (27 May 1981) calling for comprehensive mandatory sanctions under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter.

1982 *International Year of Mobilization for Sanctions against South Africa* (proclaimed by the General Assembly through Resolution 36/172 B, adopted 17 December 1981).

(Resolution 36/172 B was opposed by eight Member states (Belgium, Britain, Canada, France, Luxembourg, Portugal, the United States and West Germany), with eight abstentions. Earlier that year, on 30 April 1981, Britain, France and the United States had used their triple veto in the Security Council to block the imposition of a range of sanctions against South Africa, including an oil embargo. The

sanctions had been intended to compel South Africa to agree to the implementation of the United Nations Independence Plan for Namibia (for details of other UN actions on Namibia, see *Namibia — The Facts*, IDAF 1980).

CHRONOLOGY: AFRICA AND APARTHEID

Independent African states have taken the lead in denouncing apartheid, calling for action to be taken against the South African regime, and extending support for the liberation struggle.

As early as 1952, 13 Asian and African states requested the UN General Assembly to concern itself with the apartheid question.

Over the years to follow, independent Africa's call for a programme of comprehensive and mandatory sanctions has become progressively clearer and stronger, hand in hand with the growth of solidarity with and assistance to the liberation movements.

Although the liberation of states in Southern Africa has been followed by increasing South African aggression, it has strengthened the forces supporting the liberation struggle in South Africa. This has been manifested both in terms of assistance to the liberation struggle and in terms of co-ordinated action by independent states to defend themselves from South African aggression and to achieve independence from South African economic domination of the region.

December 1958 The All-African People's Conference in Accra, Ghana, endorses the boycott campaigns in progress inside South Africa since the previous year by calling on all independent states, all United Nation members and other democratic countries to impose economic sanctions against the regime.

June 1960 The Second Conference of Independent African States, the forerunner of the Organisation of African Unity, adopts a resolution in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, calling on member states to take a range of

measures against South Africa, including severing diplomatic relations, boycotting South African goods and withholding all facilities from South African ships and aircraft. The same resolution invites the Arab states to prevent Arab oil from being sold to South Africa.

January 1962 ANC invited to attend a conference of the Pan African Freedom Movement for East and Central Africa (PAFMECA, which became PAFMECSA (including Southern Africa) and one of the predecessors of the OAU) in Addis Ababa. Nelson Mandela leaves South Africa clandestinely to attend this meeting and make contact with African leaders on the continent.

September 1970 Adoption of the *Lusaka Declaration* — the Third Conference of Non-Aligned Countries held in Lusaka, Zambia, and attended by representatives of 32 African states, denounces South Africa's 'outward looking' foreign policy, through which the regime is aiming to create a buffer zone of puppet states around itself. The Declaration also pledges its signatories to impose trading, transport and diplomatic sanctions against South Africa and to give support and material aid to the liberation movements through the OAU.

November 1973 Africa and the Arab states impose their own oil embargo on South Africa — the OAU Council of Foreign Ministers, meeting in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, calls for a total economic boycott of South Africa, including an oil embargo. The oil embargo is endorsed a few days later in Algiers by 16 Arab countries, who also resolve to break all diplomatic, consular, economic and cultural ties with South Africa.

June 1975 Independence of the People's Republic of Mozambique under Frelimo.

November 1975 Independence of the People's Republic of Angola under MPLA after the successful repulsion of an invasion by the apartheid regime's armed forces, including foreign mercenaries.

April 1978 Economic Commission for Africa Conference on Migratory Labour in Southern Africa requests the UN Secretary General to 'mobilise financial and manpower resources to assist countries affected by migratory labour system practised in South Africa' by reducing their dependence on the regime.

July 1979 First Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC) is held in Arusha, Tanzania to plan the implementation of a programme of regional co-operation between the Front Line States of Southern Africa (Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia).

April 1980 The Front Line States are joined in Lusaka by the representatives of Lesotho, Malawi, Swaziland and (soon to be independent) Zimbabwe at the signing, on 1 April 1980, of the Declaration *Southern Africa: Toward Economic Liberation and a Programme of Action*. From now on the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC) is formally composed of these nine Southern African states in its efforts to reduce economic dependence on South Africa and promote regional co-operation.

November 1980 Second Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC 2) is held in Maputo.

June 1981 The 18th OAU summit meeting in Nairobi, Kenya, endorses the programme of comprehensive sanctions adopted in Paris in May 1981 by representatives of 124 governments and designating 1982 as *International Year of Mobilisation for Sanctions against South Africa*.

March 1982 Leaders of the Front Line States (Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe) meeting in Maputo, Mozambique, at a meeting attended by the Presidents of SWAPO and the ANC, resolve to increase support for the armed struggle, and to reinforce their own co-ordinated action of defence against South Africa aggression.

January 1983 Third SADCC conference meets in Maseru Lesotho, shortly after an SADF attack in which 30 ANC and SACTU members and 12 Lesotho nationals had been killed. The conference, attended by representatives of a number of Western countries, condemns South Africa's destabilisation policy.



10 RESISTANCE & THE LIBERATION STRUGGLE

The history of resistance is as old as the history of colonial intrusion and white minority rule. Repression, domination and military power have never succeeded in breaking the tradition of struggle. They have only altered the conditions under which it has been conducted and the forms which it has taken.

The outlawing of mass organised opposition in 1960 and the decade of severe repression that followed, drove the liberation movement underground and led it to armed struggle. By the mid-1970s the situation both inside South Africa and in the southern African region as a whole had changed fundamentally. Inside the country there was an upsurge of popular resistance, most visible in the form of workers' militancy and action by the youth against apartheid education. There were signs of renewed guerilla activity. In Mozambique and Angola colonial rule had collapsed in 1974 and 1975 and the Zimbabwean liberation struggle was moving towards independence. In Namibia the armed struggle of SWAPO was putting increasing pressure on the South African armed forces.

The sections below outline briefly some principal stages in the history of resistance and the liberation struggle until the beginning of the 1970s. They focus on the 1950s, a period which was formative of some major aspects of resistance during the current period. A second section describes in more detail how, since the early 1970s, the initiative has passed more and

more into the hands of the oppressed majority in South Africa. It attempts to give some indication of the scope and the depth of resistance. It outlines the developments which suggest that the uprising of 1976 was the outward and visible expression of a transition. It marked a change from protest and reaction to oppression, to a concerted, conscious attempt to defeat the apartheid regime and take power.

RESISTANCE UNTIL THE 1960s

Armed resistance to colonial intrusion and appropriation of land was eventually subdued, even though it was sustained over a long period. The arrival of British military forces in South Africa at the beginning of the nineteenth century proved decisive. Military opposition was effectively ended in 1906 with the defeat of an armed uprising in Natal. That marked the end of a first, 250-year long phase of resistance and the beginning of a new phase.

Formation of the African National Congress (ANC)

Concrete steps towards the formation of a national political organisation of the African people of South Africa were taken around the turn of the century during the decade preceding the formation of the Union of South Africa under white minority rule.

During that period African political organisations were formed which aimed at uniting and representing all Africans.

They sought to cut across the divisions of tribal structures which had weakened resistance to colonial conquest.

In 1909 a South African Native Convention was held, with delegates from each colony. It sent a deputation to England which sought, unsuccessfully, to secure changes in the draft of the legislation by which the British Parliament was to establish the Union of South Africa as a white minority regime. The Act of Union was passed unchanged and then ratified by the South African Parliament on 31 May 1910.

Two years later, on 8 January 1912, the African National Congress (ANC) was formed. It was dedicated to forging national unity amongst the Africans in South Africa and defending their rights. During the next 30 years the ANC established itself and its influence throughout the country. It led a series of campaigns against the pass laws, against the Land Act, and against further restrictions on the already severely limited political rights of Africans and other black people.

Based on the rejection of tribal divisions amongst Africans, the ANC also worked closely with the political organisations of the Indian and Coloured communities.

Move to mass campaigns

In the early 1940s there began a move towards greater militancy than in the past. The change was marked by the formation of the ANC Youth League in 1943 and strengthened by growing mili-

tancy amongst workers. In 1949 the ANC adopted a Programme of Action along the lines advocated by the Youth League. The emphases of the programme were on self-determination of the African people and the need for them to take the leading role in the struggle for liberation. It embodied a rejection of white domination, and a call for mass action in the form of protests, strikes and demonstrations.

The adoption of the Programme of Action coincided with the coming to power of the National Party after the white election in 1948. The 1950s were turbulent years of mass action in opposition to the imposition by the regime of forms of segregation and white domination which were even more rigid and powerful than those already in existence. There were many campaigns, some of them initiating methods of struggle which have been taken up again under the very different conditions of the current period.

Apart from what is listed below, boycotts were used in campaigns over increases in bus fares and over extremely bad conditions of work on potato farms in the Eastern Transvaal.

DEFIANCE CAMPAIGN AGAINST UNJUST LAWS This was launched on 26 June 1952, South Africa Freedom Day, by the ANC together with the South African Indian Congress. More than 8,500 volunteers or 'defiers' were imprisoned for peacefully refusing to obey apartheid laws. The campaign, which carried on through 1953, attracted thousands who became politically involved in the struggle.

CAMPAIGN AGAINST BANTU EDUCATION Following the passing in 1953 of the Bantu Education Act (see *EDUCATION*), a campaign was launched against the implementation of the Bantu Education system which was designed to prepare black children for subordinate roles in society. The campaign involved

parents and teachers in rural as well as urban areas. Many teachers resigned rather than teach in the Bantu Education system, and for a period alternative schools were run by the ANC.

RESISTANCE TO THE IMPOSITION OF BANTUSTAN AUTHORITIES In the bantustan areas the campaigns of the period became bound up with resistance to the new Bantu Authorities (see *BANTUSTANS*). In a number of areas conflict broke out between the people and the authorities. Resistance in the Transkei culminated in a major revolt which was only suppressed after the declaration of a State of Emergency in 1960, and the use of considerable violence, followed by several years of intense repression.



CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE PASS LAWS The campaign against the pass laws involved protests, demonstrations and the burning of pass books, as well as other forms of action. On 9 August 1956, now celebrated as South Africa Women's Day, over 20,000 women marched to the Union Buildings in Pretoria in protest at the extension of the pass laws to women. On 21 March 1960 police opened fire on men, women and children who were peacefully protesting against the pass laws at Sharpeville in the Transvaal. The police killed 69 people. A week later amid mounting protests and demonstrations, a State of Emergency was declared.

Freedom Charter

The 1950s saw progress towards greater unity between different sections of the liberation movement. The process of unifying all forces of opposition into a single liberation movement under the leadership of the ANC took concrete organisational form in the building of the Congress Alliance. By 1953 it consisted of 'congress' organisations of the African, Coloured and Indian communities. There was also a small white congress organisation (Congress of Democrats). In 1955 the newly formed non-racial South African Congress of Trades Unions (SACTU) became part of the Alliance.

The Freedom Charter embodied a programme for a non-racial unitary democratic state. It was formulated through a campaign in which volunteers collected 'freedom demands' at meetings throughout the country. The charter was adopted at the Congress of the People on 26 June 1955, a gathering at Kliptown near Johannesburg of nearly 3,000 accredited delegates drawn from all over the country.

The regime regarded the Freedom Charter as a treasonable document, and 156 people were charged with Treason in a trial (known as the Treason Trial) that lasted from 1956 to 1961. The State failed in its attempts to prove the Charter treasonable, and all 156 accused were acquitted.

Demonstrations of support — Treason Trial 1956.



Formation of the Pan Africanist Congress

In 1959 a group of members who had broken away from the ANC the previous year formed the Pan Africanist Congress of Azania (PAC). The differences with the ANC were expressed at the time in terms of an opposition to the collaboration of the ANC with the other organisations in the Congress Alliance and around the Freedom Charter.² Many of those involved adhered to an 'Africanist' position, feeling that Africans could best negotiate with other groups 'from a position of strength'. A first priority was thought to be the building up of African bargaining power.³

Robert Sobukwe, the first President of the PAC, explained the organisation's objective as 'government of the Africans by the Africans, and for the Africans, with everybody who owes his only loyalty to Africa and is prepared to accept the democratic rule of the African majority being regarded as African'.⁴

In the year between its founding and its being banned in 1960, the PAC came to prominence through its involvement in the campaign against the pass laws, in which it advocated the use of passive resistance methods. Robert Sobukwe was one of those who handed in his pass and gave himself up for arrest. He was subsequently charged with incitement, convicted and imprisoned. After completing his three year sentence he was detained in prison for a further six years before being released.

Banning of mass organised opposition

In March 1960 the police killed people at Sharpeville when they were taking part in a peaceful demonstration against the pass laws organised by the PAC. There were protests, demonstrations and strikes all over the country. The government declared a State of Emergency, arresting 20,000 people and detaining a further 2,000 without trial. Within a fort-

night the Unlawful Organisations Act had been passed and used to ban both the ANC and the PAC. Both organisations went underground rather than comply with the ban. The Communist Party, dissolved after its banning in 1950, announced that it was functioning underground.

In May 1961, in anticipation of demonstrations and strikes in protest at the establishment of a white-minority Republic, there were further mass arrests and detentions of leaders together with a very large military mobilisation.

The liberation struggle entered a new phase in which organisation was principally underground, and which included the new tactic of armed struggle. The banning of the ANC and the PAC and the mass arrests were followed by severe repression over several years. In response to the initiation of armed struggle, the regime passed even harsher laws. Detention without trial, torture and imprisonment were widely used. By the late 1960s the known leadership of the liberation movement was in prison, banned or in exile and serious damage had been done to the underground structures.

The regime was able as a result to make some headway in imposing apartheid political structures on the black community. Nevertheless, as subsequent developments have shown, the tradition of organised resistance was maintained and developed in spite of the difficult circumstances.

Burning passes.



RESISTANCE AND THE LIBERATION STRUGGLE FROM THE 1970s

The period since 1970 has seen the level of popular resistance rising rapidly, and an expanding campaign of armed action closely linked to political and other struggles. There has been an increasingly open identification with the aims and the methods of the liberation movement, despite its illegality. In a number of respects the capacity of the regime to administer the apartheid system has come under serious challenge and the whole of the apartheid system has been militarised in order to defend it.

The major challenges to the regime have included widespread strikes in 1973, and protests against the education system which developed into a general uprising in 1976-1977. These were followed from 1979 by a period of sustained activity on several fronts.

There have been temporary setbacks. In 1977, for example, the banning of all the main legal organisations opposing apartheid resulted in major changes in the forms of legally organised opposition. However, actions such as these have only touched the surface of a broad and deeply rooted movement of liberation which has again shown itself in open action after a short period.

Black consciousness

Beginning in the late 1960s there emerged a new layer of legal

organised opposition, to fill the vacuum of legal opposition left by the banning of the ANC, PAC and other organisations in the early 1960s. The new organisations were loosely united by their varying adherence to a set of ideas described as 'black consciousness'. The black consciousness organisations made a notable contribution to conscientising black people, particularly the youth, and in encouraging a defiance of repression and a denunciation of apartheid institutions. The notion of 'working within the system' was totally rejected. The organisational expression of the black consciousness movement was swept away by the regime on 19 October 1977 when it banned 18 organisations.

The first of the black consciousness organisations, and the driving force of the movement was the South African Students Organisation (SASO). One of its early leaders was Steve Biko, who died while detained by the security police on 12 September 1977. SASO was founded in 1969 by black students who had concluded that they should not be organised within the National Union of South African Students (NUSAS) which was formally non-racial but in practice dominated by white students.

Both to students, and generally to black people, SASO emphasised the ideas of black self-determination and the restoration to black people of pride in their historical and cultural identity. It mobilised the majority of black university students in active struggle against the apartheid education system with its objective of producing a docile and submissive black intelligentsia.

Although formally a student organisation, SASO identified itself with and spoke for the oppressed people as a whole. It generated ideas through poetry, drama, theology, education and community work. It was the most active and organised element in the maintenance of opposition to the bantustans and other separat-

ist apartheid institutions (see *POLITICAL STRUCTURES*).

SASO nevertheless felt the limitations of its student base, and in 1972 founded the Black People's Convention (BPC). By 1973 the BPC had 41 branches nationally. It helped, through its Black Community Programme, to initiate many of the cultural and community projects which were a noted feature of the black consciousness movement.

The limitations of legal existence prevented the black consciousness organisations from taking up or discussing major issues of black liberation, in particular the question of armed struggle. From early on numbers of its members were led to go beyond the limits of legal struggle and seek out the underground organisations, a process accelerated by the experience of the uprising of 1976-1977.



Transition to heightened struggle

The early 1970s saw a marked rise in militancy and the defiant rejection of apartheid, especially amongst black workers and youth. There was an upsurge of trade union activity with a wave of action in 1973 in defiance of anti-strike laws. The ideas of black consciousness bore fruit in the uncompromising rejection of apartheid institutions and growing militancy within education. The collapse of Portuguese colonialism and the victory of Frelimo in Mozambique and the MPLA in Angola was received with evident support. At the same time, from about 1975 there were indications that preparations were being made by underground organisations for increased armed struggle.⁵

When protests about education developed into a sustained uprising during 1976 and 1977, resistance to apartheid took open and defiant form and signalled that a period of more intense struggle had begun.⁶

The protests were sparked off by the enforced use of Afrikaans as a medium of instruction in African schools, but they were shaped by the rejection of the Bantu Education system as a whole. They quickly developed into a protest against the apartheid system in general, and took on the character of an uprising. The whole country was affected, both urban and rural areas. In spite of brutal police action the protests were sustained for over a year. They broadened beyond education, and drew in sections of the black community beyond the youth. Major strikes involving hundreds of thousands of workers in protest at police killing of demonstrators indicated the extent to which workers supported the actions of the youth.

Little was gained in 1976 in the way of educational reform, but conclusions from the experience of that year were soon being applied. This was particularly so in relation to the need for unifying different sectors of the struggle, and concerning the limits to what could be achieved in the field of education as long as the apartheid system remained.



Death of Hector Petersen — first victim of police aggression — Soweto 1976.



Students march demanding release of detainees — Soweto 1976.

During 1977 while the protests still centred on education, they became much broader. The Soweto Student Representative Council (SSRC), which had become the most powerful political body in Soweto, led a successful campaign against the Soweto Urban Bantu Council, first preventing a rent increase and then against the council itself as a collaborationist institution, causing its collapse.

In September 1977, as a school boycott by both pupils and teachers gathered force, news that Steve Biko had been killed in detention further intensified the defiance and demonstrations. Within a month, on 19 October 1977, the regime took drastic action, detaining scores of people and banning 18 black consciousness organisations as well as two newspapers with a black readership.

It was less than two years before popular resistance and protest again assumed open and defiant form on a widespread scale. In the intervening years thousands of young people left the country for military training, and some were soon returning to engage in guerilla actions.⁷

New legal organisations

The banning in 1977 of all the main legal organisations prompted the formation of new organisations, on an even larger scale and of a wider range, with an emphasis on grassroots, community-based action. Police harassment and detentions limited the extent to which this occurred during 1978, and at first restricted the effectiveness of the new organisations.

But by 1979 many were being established and were functioning. The process included a major growth in trade union organisation. A very large number of local community-based organisations were established, serving as democratic organs in opposition to, and as alternatives to, the apartheid institutions such as Community Councils and Management Committees (see **POLITICAL STRUCTURES**).

There were major developments also among women and youth, as well as the formation of broad umbrella organisations to co-ordinate specific campaigns.

POLITICAL, CIVIC AND COMMUNITY ORGANISATIONS

Steps were taken in 1978 to form a new political organisation inspired by the philosophy of black consciousness, the Azanian People's Organisation (AZAPO).⁸ However, detentions of some of the people involved caused a delay in the inaugural conference, which was not held until September 1979. In the first years of its existence AZAPO was involved in several struggles against increases in rents and bus fares, during which numbers of its members were detained. The organisation committed itself to a stance of non-negotiations with apartheid institutions, and also advocated a cultural boycott of South Africa (see **CULTURE**).

Issues affecting people in the townships, in particular massive rent increases, the cost of transport and the establishment by the regime of Community Councils, gave a powerful impetus to the growth of residents' associations, civic associations and similar community-based organisations. This was especially marked from the beginning of 1979.

They ranged from very large civic associations, like the Soweto Civic Association founded in 1979 with 30 branches, to small residents' or housing associations. In some areas the small organisations linked up to form larger and more effective bodies, such as Port Elizabeth Black Civic Organisation (PEBCO) formed in 1979, and Housing Action Committees formed in Durban in 1980 and in Cape Town in 1981.

With few exceptions the civic and community organisations were set up on a basis of non-negotiation with apartheid institutions.

TRADE UNION ORGANISATIONS

The expansion of black trade union membership which had been taking place since the early 1970s, increased rapidly from about 1979. New trade union centres were set up for the first time since SACTU had been forced underground in the early 1960s. The Federation of South African Trade Unions (FOSATU) was formed in April 1979. Based on the principles of non-racialism, FOSATU had 12 affiliates claiming 45,000 members. Other independent trade union centres were set up, or expanded, at about the same time. They included the South African Allied Workers Union, The General



Municipal workers on strike — Johannesburg, 1980.



Police attack demonstrators.

Workers Union and the Council of Unions of South Africa. By 1981 steps were being taken to move towards greater organisational unity of the various independent trade union centres, which by then represented some 200,000 trade union members. The principles of democratic non-racial trade unionism, on the basis of which SACTU had been formed in 1955, were gaining increasing support.

Repressive action against trade unions and trade union activists was extremely intense throughout 1980 to 1982. New legislation aimed at restricting the powers of the independent union movement was introduced and a very large number of trade unionists and prominent organisers were detained (see *TRADE UNIONS*).

YOUTH AND STUDENT ORGANISATIONS A large number of new youth and student organisations were formed from 1979 on, including educational, cultural and religious bodies. The Congress of South African Students (COSAS) was founded in June 1979, in order to reorganise and represent black pre-university pupils and students. Shortly afterwards the Azanian Students Organisation (AZASO) was set up to organise black university students. Both organisations had a presence in most parts of the country from the start, and they extended their structures and influence in the course of education boycotts and other campaigns.

COSAS was subjected to particularly severe repression: between its foundation in June 1979 and January 1983, 90 of its members were known to have been detained. Youth organisations in general were attacked with particular determination by the police, reflecting the activity of the youth in resistance.

WOMEN'S ORGANISATIONS A number of new women's organisations have been formed in recent years, notably the Women's Federation of South

Africa (Soweto), the United Women's Organisation (Western Cape) and Federation of South African Women (Witwatersrand). There appeared to be continuity in various ways between these organisations and the Federation of South African Women (FSAW) which was formed in 1954 by women in the Congress Alliance, and whose activities were severely restricted in the 1960s by bans and other measures against its leadership.

The women's organisations, along with others, have played an active and often leading role in community struggles over rents, bus fares, housing and education, as well as in the political campaigns of 1981. Examples include the campaigns against the pass laws; against rent increases; for improvement in conditions of domestic workers. Material aid has been raised for families of ANC guerillas sentenced to death by the regime. Several organisations have been giving assistance to victims of rape.

In recent years there has been growing public participation of women in the celebration of South Africa Women's Day, commemorating the historic march of 20,000 women to Pretoria in protest at the pass laws.



March to Soweto Council Chambers in protest against rent increases, 1980.

Popular resistance to effects of apartheid system

From 1979 on, along with the formation of new legal organisations there developed widespread, sustained and in many cases intense campaigns against specific manifestations of apartheid: against the denial of trade union rights and low pay; against high and rising rents and other housing costs; against crippling increases in the transport fares which black people have to pay in order to travel to the shops, factories and offices in 'white' areas; against racially segregated and inferior education; against forced removals and resettlement in both urban and rural areas.

These struggles have not been isolated from each other. Links between them have grown stronger in the course of each campaign. The identification of the apartheid system as a common cause of the different problems has been expressed with increasing clarity and openness.

HOUSING The shortage and inadequacy of housing for black people and its high cost have been major causes of conflict (see **REMOVALS** below).

The cost of housing in the form of rents and tariffs for services imposes a heavy burden on black people. The central government for a long time resisted financing housing for Africans in 'white' areas. The local Administration Boards and the Community Councils imposed on the people in the townships have depended heavily on rents as one of their major sources of finance. The cost of housing for Indian and Coloured communities has been a focus of conflict in related ways.

Threats of massive rent increases during 1979 (rises of 100 to 200 per cent were common), did much to promote the formation and growth of democratic community organisations in opposition to administration boards and Community Councils. Threats of further large increases in the following years sharpened the conflict between the people in



the townships and the apartheid administration.

Campaigns involving refusals to pay increases, demonstrations and legal action, were often successful in causing increases to be delayed, reduced or withdrawn. This created a sustained financial crisis for the apartheid administration.

The campaigns were conducted in the face of repressive action. Meetings of community organisations on housing issues have on a number of occasions been banned or broken up by police with teargas, and several people active in anti-rent increase campaigns have been detained without trial.⁹

TRANSPORT The siting of residential townships for black people far away from areas of employment and from major shopping centres means that fares for transport tend to be very high in relation to the low wages paid to black workers.

Organised resistance to increases in bus fares has at times taken the form of legal representations to the official bodies responsible for setting them. Boycotts of services have, however, been the principal means. Used to great effect during the 1950s, bus boycotts again occurred on a large scale in 1979

in Natal. During the following year there were protracted and bitter boycotts in several parts of the country.

Initiated and co-ordinated by broad representative committees mobilising whole communities, the boycotts were widely supported and in several cases the proposed increases were not implemented or were delayed.

Repressive action against bus boycotts took the form of detentions of organisers, restrictions on meetings and arrests of private car owners or taxi drivers who had provided alternative transport for commuters free or at very low fares.¹⁰


IN THE WORKPLACE The low wages paid to black workers, racial discrimination at work and restrictions on the freedom of black workers to organise and to take industrial action, make the workplace a major focus of resistance to apartheid. The rapid growth of independent unions during the 1970s, itself a serious challenge to the regime, went with a readiness of workers to take industrial action over a wide range of issues.

The rising level of militancy is clearly evident in the sheer numbers of strikes by black workers and their increase (see *graph and maps over page*).

STRIKES AND WORK STOPPAGES IN SOUTH AFRICA 1970 — 1982



The great majority of workers taking part in recorded strikes and workstoppages in South Africa are black — of more than 141,000 in 1982, not one was white.

Workers



STRIKES

The growing militancy of workers during the early 1980s is reflected in the maps showing the location of strikes reported in the press during 1980 and 1981.



Large dots
represent 10 strikes

© International Defence & Aid Fund

The kinds of issue motivating the strikers have been significant. The immediate causes have often been low wages. But many strikes have been over demands for recognition of unions or of workers committees elected under union auspices (as opposed to the officially approved committees or councils). Many strikes have been in defence of victimised workers, in pursuit of equal treatment or, in 1981, in opposition to a new state pension scheme. In 1980, during the school boycott, as in June 1977, many workers marked the commemoration of the uprising of 16 June 1976 by staying away from work, and in 1982 a large number of workers stopped work in protest at the death in detention of a trade union organiser, Dr. Neil Aggett.

From 1979 onwards support in the townships for striking workers has played a significant part in several disputes. There have been a number of major consumer boycotts in support of workers on strike or who have been dismissed, as well as collections of money for strike funds. Support in the townships as well as unity amongst the different sectors into which apartheid divides workers, has often made it more difficult for employers to use some of the usual methods of breaking strikes. In spite of very high levels of unemployment, firms did not always find it easy to replace striking workers from amongst the unemployed.¹²

Conversely, unions have been more ready to take up broader issues. Some unions, amongst them those with the most rapid growth in membership, explicitly declared their interest in other problems affecting the black community on the grounds that under apartheid 'unions cannot be isolated in the factory'.¹³

During 1981, after a claim by the Minister of Defence that labour unrest was being promoted by the ANC through 'front organisations', over 300 trade unionists and workers were detained under security laws,

including a large number of leading organisers. One of them, Neil Aggett, died in detention in February 1982 and others were tortured or suffered long periods of detention. In spite of these actions trade union activity continued to expand, with even more strikes in 1982.¹⁴

EDUCATION The inferior education given to black children under apartheid, and the way in which it prepares them for subordinate roles, has been the object of a campaign sustained at a high level over a long period. In 1976 and again in 1980 it took an open character with mass action in the form of boycotts of classes in schools, colleges and universities.

After the countrywide school boycotts of 1977 there was only sporadic action in isolated schools during the next two years, but in 1980 there were again class boycotts affecting schools, colleges and universities throughout the whole country. Hundreds of thousands of African, Indian and Coloured pupils and students were involved.¹⁵

The effectiveness of the 1980 school boycotts owed much to the unity between African, Coloured and Indian pupils and students, to the support of parents and many teachers, and also to the ways in which the education struggle was linked to other current struggles. The basis for this unity and breadth of the campaign lay in the understanding, clearly spelt out during the campaign, that the roots of the education system lay in apartheid itself and in the oppression of the black community as a whole. A pamphlet published by the boycotters stated: 'The whole educational system against which we are rebelling stems from the fact that we are denied basic political rights and thus political power'. A statement by the committee leading the boycott in the Cape said: 'They are training people for a cheap labour market. This protest is against all educational systems and is not confined to colour or creed'.¹⁶

The whole educational system against which we are rebelling stems from the fact that we are denied basic political rights and thus political power.

(From a pamphlet published in South Africa during the 1981 school boycott).

During 1982, a year after the ending of the 1980 boycott, the organized support for the campaign against apartheid education continued to grow in strength. One of the most significant developments was the decision of AZASO to draw up an Education Charter after consultations with trade unions, community organisations and educationalists.¹⁷

The role of the youth in resisting apartheid through the campaign against education, and more widely as well, is reflected in the large number of young people detained without trial and the very large number charged under the various 'security' laws (over 8,000 juveniles in the three years after June 1976).

REMOVALS Enforced removals and uprooting of communities have affected millions of black people in South Africa, and if the regime's plans are implemented, many more will be affected (*for more information see IDAF Briefing Paper No. 5*). The conditions under which removals are carried out make effective resistance difficult. Nevertheless almost every removal appears to have been resisted in one way or another: communities have refused to co-operate in their removal; campaigns have been conducted to enlist support for threatened communities; legal action has been taken to prevent evictions or removals; on some occasions people have simply returned to the places from which they had been forcibly evicted.

One of the best publicised cases of resistance to removals is that of the community at Crossroads near Cape Town. This was one of several 'squatter' town-

ships which grew up around the major urban areas (see *LIVING CONDITIONS*). These are the homes of people not 'qualified' under the pass law system to be in a 'white' urban area or who for other reasons (such as the housing shortage) were unable to find accommodation. After bulldozing one Cape Town township, making 20,000 people homeless, and evicting 10,000 from another one, the government announced in July 1978 that it would move in on Crossroads. The residents resisted in the face of police action. They won support both locally and internationally and although some were moved, the removal of others was postponed. In March 1981 the government promised 'residence status' to 20,000 Crossroads residents but it was still unclear what the final outcome would be.¹⁸

Another example of resistance, also in the Western Cape during 1981, was that of people who had come to the Western Cape from the bantustans of the Eastern Cape, in order to seek work or to be united with members of their families already in the area. The police destroyed the accommodation the people had erected themselves and put them on buses which took them back to the bantustans. Many people simply came back and many were finally only prevented from returning again by the police erecting road blocks to stop buses coming from the bantustans.¹⁹ Nevertheless, some people still managed to return, and continued their campaign of protest and refusal.²⁰

Communities in the rural areas threatened with removal tend to be isolated and vulnerable. Nevertheless they resist removal, generally in direct opposition both to the police and the bantustan authorities. A notable example of rural resistance to removal was that of the Batlokwa community in the Soekmekaar area in the Northern Transvaal on the edge of the Lebowa bantustan. Their determined resistance prevented the implementation of the plans to move them and most of

those who were moved later came back. Following participation by police from the Soekmekaar police station in the forced removal of some of the people, guerillas of the African National Congress attacked the police station.²¹ In 1982 the government announced that the plan to relocate these people (part of the planned 'consolidation' of the Lebowa bantustan) had been dropped.

Although resistance is widespread, and sometimes successful, the regime has in most cases used the force at its disposal to dispossess people of their land, or in other cases used the powers of detention under security laws to undermine organised resistance.²²

ARMED STRUGGLE

In 1961 the liberation movement reached the conclusion that the regime's suppression of all effort to achieve peaceful change made armed struggle inevitable. The decision came after decades of petitions and deputations, mass campaigns of non-violent protest and passive resistance. It was finally precipitated by the outlawing of the mass organisations and by the regime's violent suppression of resistance and protest. The continued violence of the regime since then has led successive generations to the same conclusion that was drawn in 1961. Thousands of young people have joined the ranks of the armed wing of the liberation movement.

Early stages of armed struggle

During the initial phase of armed resistance after 1961, for about three years, the actions were carried out mainly by members of the banned ANC, PAC and various other organisations. The actions ranged from sabotage to attacks on police stations or on tribal chiefs who were felt to be collaborating with the regime. This phase ended after the regime took action by enacting harsh new laws and using them extensively, with mass arrests, detention without trial, torture and many political trials.

During the first phase, Nelson Mandela secretly left the country to seek facilities for military training in case guerilla war should become necessary.

It is . . . well known that the main national liberation organisations in this country have consistently followed a policy of non-violence. They have conducted themselves peaceably at all times, regardless of Government attacks and persecutions upon them, and despite all Government-inspired attempts to provoke them to violence. They have done so because the people prefer peaceful methods of change to achieve their aspirations without the suffering and bitterness of civil war. But the people's patience is not endless.

The time comes in the life of any nation when there remain only two choices: submit or fight. That time has now come to South Africa. We shall not submit and we have no choice but to hit back by all means within our power in defence of our people, our future and our freedom.

(Umkhonto We Sizwe (Spear of the Nation). Flyer 'issued by command of Umkhonto We Sizwe' and appearing on 16 December 1961).

From 1965 onwards the ANC and PAC concentrated on organising military training abroad, on restoring the underground structures in the country and on infiltrating trained freedom fighters into the country. The latter proved difficult and success was limited until after 1974. Until then South Africa was almost entirely surrounded by territories under colonial domination or white minority rule.

During 1967-68 ANC guerillas, in joint action with Zimbabwean guerillas of the Zimbabwean African People's Union (ZAPU) crossed into northern areas of Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) from Zambia. There were several engagements against the forces of the illegal Smith regime, which sought the assistance of the South African police. A number of ANC freedom fighters died in the battles. About twenty were captured and imprisoned by Rhodesian courts. Those who survived were released in 1980 following Zimbabwe's independence. Some of the ANC fighters appeared to have succeeded in infiltrating into South Africa.

The PAC were also apparently attempting at this time to infiltrate guerillas into South Africa. Twelve South Africans who were alleged to be adherents of the PAC were reported to have been killed or captured by Portuguese security forces in Mozambique between June and August 1968.

Despite the difficulties of this period evidence from trials indicated that, especially from the late 1960s on, the work of building the underground structures was proceeding. Numbers of people were charged with leaving the country for military training or recruiting others to do so.

Armed resistance since 1975²³

During 1975 and the first half of 1976 there were indications that increasing numbers of people were leaving South Africa to seek military training, mainly under the auspices of the ANC.²⁴ The context within which this occurred was one of increasing



Cadres of Umkhonto We Sizwe, the armed wing of the ANC, in training.

militancy inside South Africa, and the victories of Frelimo in Mozambique and the MPLA in Angola.

The uprising of 1976 and 1977 gave a powerful impetus to this trend. The number of people leaving the country increased very rapidly. The events of this period had the effect of increasing support for armed struggle and led to a greater readiness to engage in direct conflict with the armed forces of the regime. Such actions grew organically out of the confrontation with the police. Weapons were improvised, initially for protection. Selective targets symbolising authority were attacked, and later the police, police vehicles and other targets. There was no apparent pattern in these incidents, suggesting that most were spontaneous acts inspired by a sense of outrage at police violence.²⁵ (Similar forms of action were seen again in a number of areas during the mass protests of 1980, particularly in townships in Bloemfontein and in Port Elizabeth).

Since 1976 the number of instances of armed actions, acts of sabotage and clashes with the armed forces increased rapidly. The trend has been towards organised forms of armed attack involving ever more sophisticated operations by well-trained and well-armed combatants, operating within the framework of structures which has been established in the years before 1976. Incidents of armed attack have become more clearly and effectively integrated with struggles on other fronts. Popular support for the armed struggle has been evident in various ways.


In almost all cases since 1976 in which there is evidence of the organisation responsible for the actions, it has been Umkhonto We Sizwe, the armed wing of the African National Congress.

From 1976 to early 1979 there were many actions by organised groups, most frequently attacks on railway lines, explosions of 'pamphlet bombs', and shooting


ARMED STRUGGLE

The spread of armed struggle is reflected in the maps showing the locations of armed actions by the liberation movement reported in the press since 1976.

1976 — 1979



1980 — 1982



© International Defence & Aid Fund

of former guerillas who were collaborating with the security police. On at least twelve occasions during 1977 and 1978 the police claimed to have discovered guerilla arms caches.

A third phase began in May 1979 with an attack on a police station by three ANC combatants armed with automatic rifles and grenades. Leaflets left at the scene said that the attack was in retaliation for the execution of Solomon Mahlangu (see *DEATH SENTENCES*). Prior to this attack armed actions had been carried

out without direct and deliberate confrontation with the police. Since then several police stations have been attacked, and, in 1981 and 1982, at least two military bases.²⁶

Since the beginning of 1981 there has been a big increase in the number of incidents. Many were co-ordinated with campaigns on other fronts. The attacks have been directed partly at the machinery of the administration of apartheid (police stations, administration boards and so on) and partly at the tran-

sport and energy distribution networks.

Fragmentary press reports from the end of 1981 indicated considerable activity by the South African army in the areas in the north and east of the Transvaal. These are the areas in which the exodus of large numbers of white farmers has left large districts with little or no presence of white civilians, and in which those who remain have been closely integrated into the military structures (see *DISTRIBUTION OF LAND and ARMED FORCES*). Claims by the police to have discovered large arms caches and reports of clashes between guerrillas and security forces in various parts of the region suggest that guerilla action was expanding there.²⁷



ANC guerilla attack on Sasol oil refineries — 1980.

Characteristics of armed struggle in South Africa 1976-1982

The pattern of incidents relating to the armed struggle indicates that the actions of armed freedom fighters are not isolated acts, but are firmly integrated within the overall struggle for liberation.

The operations of armed freedom fighters have shown increasing co-ordination with other struggles. Attacks on administration board offices have been made during campaigns against rent increases and during resistance to eviction of people from urban areas. A co-ordinated series of operations in 1981 was part of the campaign of protest against the celebration of the apartheid Republic.

I elected to be a soldier . . . primarily I had to fight to have the people at home freed. I regarded myself as a soldier, a person who was fighting for the freedom of his people.

We decided that it was pointless taking examination papers and making placards, because one would be shot whilst doing so. I decided to go out of the country. I decided to go out of this country to go and get myself a gun to fight against these people, because they would not have given me a gun. The only person who is given a gun in South Africa, is the person who defends the apartheid policy. I knew that I was an adversary of apartheid and I had to go out of the country.

(From a statement in the dock in August 1982 by Thelle Simon Mogoerane, on the day he and two others were sentenced to death for participating in armed attacks against police stations and economic targets).

Combatants are trained to avoid loss of civilian life wherever possible. This has been explained by captured freedom fighters during trials.

There is widespread and powerful support for the armed struggle within the black community as a whole. This is demonstrated by the success of most freedom fighters in evading capture after combat action in spite of massive follow-up operations by the security forces, including extensive use of roadblocks. Mass participation in funerals of combatants and the nature of memorial and commemorative services are more direct indications of support (see *MOBILISATION IN THE LIBERATION STRUGGLE* below).

The existence of many arms caches in both urban and rural areas indicates that increasingly guerillas have a base inside the country for operations and are not dependent on sanctuary across the borders.

The scale and the spread of actions across the country has

been acknowledged by the regime's security forces as a serious challenge, even in the absence of major direct confrontations of a conventional kind.²⁸ This is confirmed by the extent to which the regime has been obliged to militarise every aspect of society and by its emphasis on building 'areas forces', that is, forces integrated with and depending on structures in localities, including civil defence structures and a greatly expanded commando system.²⁹

MOBILISATION IN THE LIBERATION STRUGGLE

Hand in hand with the expanding armed struggle and the rising level of popular resistance to particular aspects of the apartheid system, there has been increasingly open expression of the demand for liberation and support for the goals and methods of the liberation movement.

The heightened political consciousness and militancy has been manifested in many ways, through whatever restricted, and often unexpected, avenues of expression which have remained open. It has been shown in the course of campaigns over specific grievances; at the few kinds of political gatherings open to black people; in the funerals and memorial services commemorating those who have died in the struggle; at political trials; in mass political campaigns.

In the campaigns over education and housing, transport and so on, the understanding that the grievances have their origin in apartheid has been clearly spelt out in leaflets and slogans and in the demands made. So too has the knowledge that any gains which can be achieved are limited as long as the apartheid state with its massive powers of repression remains.

Following the banning of outdoor meetings in June 1976, memorial services and funerals for political activists, as well as commemorations of major events of political repression and resis-

tance, became the main forums for public political expression. Such gatherings became occasions for remembering the sacrifices of the liberation struggle and for rededication to the struggle. It was for these reasons that in 1982 the regime took new legal powers to impose restrictions on an even wider range of gatherings including funerals (see *POLITICAL REPRESSION*).

The attempt by the regime to use the law to brand the liberation struggle as 'terrorist' and freedom fighters as 'terrorists' has been defiantly and unequivocally rejected by the people. This has been demonstrated at funerals of political activists and combatants, at which thousands have gathered and those taking part in the procession have chanted 'He was not a terrorist. He was a hero'. The same attitudes have been displayed in memorial


services and in demonstrations inside and outside courtrooms in which political trials are taking place.

Open manifestation of support for the ANC was reported on an increasing number of occasions from 1980 onwards, in spite of the banning of the organisation and the laws against promoting its aims. ANC colours were shown at funerals and flags were raised at meetings and demonstrations.

Two major mass political campaigns during 1981 provided occasions for clear expression of the demand for national liberation. These were the campaigns for a boycott of the celebrations of the twentieth anniversary of the apartheid Republic, and the campaign against the elections for the regime's South African Indian Council. Both campaigns were distinguished by the

breadth of support for them and by the militancy of the demand for political equality for all in a unitary democratic state. They were also significant for the degree of unity displayed. Broad committees consisting of representatives of many organisations gave concrete form to, and promoted, joint political campaigning across the lines which are drawn by the apartheid system.

The Freedom Charter, which press reports indicated had been widely circulating during 1980, (the 25th anniversary of its adoption at the Congress of the People), was used as a vehicle for the expression of the political demands of these two campaigns. In the case of the anti-SAIC campaign, the co-ordinating committees were explicitly and formally constituted with reference to the Freedom Charter.



CHRONOLOGY OF REPRESSION AND RESISTANCE

1652 The Dutch East India Company sets up a trading station at the Cape.

1659 First battles by the Khoi in defence of their land against the settlers.

1702 First major military clash between settlers and Xhosa people near the banks of the Fish River.

1806 Britain takes over the Cape from the Dutch.

1845-75 The system of segregation introduced throughout Natal under British colonial rule.

1860 Indentured labour begins to be brought from India to Natal to work in the sugar plantations.

1867 Discovery of major diamond deposits begins.

1886 Discovery of gold on the Witwatersrand.

1899-1902 Anglo-Boer War.

1906 Suppression of the Bambata rebellion marks the end of the first phase of armed resistance to colonial conquest.

1910 Britain formally transfers power to the white minority in South Africa, and the Union of South Africa is established.

1912 January 8 Founding of the African National Congress.

1913 Land Act prevents Africans acquiring land outside of 'reserves', amounting to 7 per cent of the total land area of the country, as a 'temporary' measure.

1936 'Native Trust and Land Act' increases the land set aside for Africans to 13 per cent of the total area of the country, fixing 'once and for all' the distribution of land. The increase in land was presented as compensation for eliminating African Parliamentary voting rights.

1946 A strike by 100,000 African miners closes many mines. The strike is broken by armed police. At least 12 miners are killed, 1,200 injured and many trade unionists arrested.

1949 ANC adopts Programme of Action, ushering in a period of mass campaigns.

1950 Group Areas Act passed as a powerful measure for the continuation and extension of racial segregation.

1950 June 26 On this day, subsequently known as Freedom Day, demonstrations and strikes are held in opposition to the Suppression of Communism Bill. The bill became law, outlawing the Communist Party of South Africa (founded in 1921) and many forms of opposition to apartheid.

1951 Legislation introduced to remove the Coloured people in the Cape Province from the Parliamentary Voters Roll.

1951 Bantu Authorities Act provides for setting up bantustan structures.

1952 June 26 Launching of Defiance Campaign against Unjust Laws by the ANC and SA Indian Congress.

1953 Segregation of trade unions made a condition of registration. Exclusion of Africans from official negotiating machinery, and consequent outlawing of strikes by African workers.

1955 Formation of South African Congress of Trade Unions, the first non-racial trade union centre, and a subsequent member of the Congress Alliance.

1955 June 26 Freedom Charter adopted by the Congress of the People, jointly organised by the members of the Congress Alliance.

1956 August 19 In protest at the extension of passes to African women, 20,000 women marched to the Union Buildings in Pretoria.

1956-1961 Treason Trial in which 156 leaders of the Congress movement were charged, and acquitted, of High Treason.

1959 April Pan Africanist Congress formed by people who had left the ANC.

1960 March 21 Police kill 69 people in the Sharpeville Massacre, during a peaceful demonstration against the pass laws organised by the PAC.

1960 March 30 A State of Emergency is declared, and 22,000 people detained or arrested. The

Unlawful Organisations Act is passed and used to ban the ANC and the PAC.

1961 May 31 Foundation of the apartheid republic, with a military mobilisation to prevent protests and demonstrations. Eight to ten thousand people arrested and many detained under the '12-day law', the first law allowing detention without trial. By the end of the year armed resistance had been initiated.

1961 December 16 First operation of Umkhonto We Sizwe ('Spear of the Nation') formed by leaders of the ANC and allied organisations to undertake armed resistance.

1962 Nelson Mandela secretly visits several countries to seek facilities for military training and returns to South Africa to continue working underground.

1967-8 Joint actions by ANC and the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) against the Smith regime in Rhodesia.

1969 South African Students Organisation (SASO) formed.

1973 Wave of strikes by black workers.

1974 Rally in Durban organised by SASO to celebrate independence of Mozambique under leadership of Frelimo. Several organizers of rally arrested and imprisoned.

1975 Trials indicate increasing numbers of people leaving the country for military training.

1976 Internal Security Act passed, to introduce even harsher repressive measures than already existed.

1976 June 16 Soweto massacre as police shoot at school children protesting against apartheid education. The protests develop into a general uprising.

1977 September 12 Death in detention of Steve Biko.

1977 October 19 Banning of 18 organisations, including most of the black consciousness organisations, and two newspapers with black readership, (the *World* and *Weekend World*).

1979 April 6 Solomon Mahlangu, ANC combatant hanged.

1980 March 21 Launching of campaign for the release of

Nelson Mandela by the *Sunday Post* newspaper (successor to the banned *Weekend World*).

1980 Countrywide boycotts against apartheid education, a wave of industrial militancy, protests against rent increases and bus boycotts combine in a period of sustained popular resistance. In June ANC guerillas sabotaged the Sasol oil-from-coal complex in a major action. Over 900 people detained during the year.

1981 January 30 The South African Defence Force attacks houses in Maputo killing 13 ANC and SACTU members.

1981 May 31 The apartheid regime celebrates the 20th Anniversary of the founding of the apartheid republic, in the face of a countrywide campaign of protest and boycott of the celebrations.

1981 November 4 A massive boycott of the elections to the regime's South African Indian Council shows that the Indian community rejected segregated political structures.

1982 During the year the regime streamlines and strengthens its 'security' laws and amends the Defence Act in order to greatly expand its armed forces. Two more people die in detention and several are admitted to psychiatric wards as a result of their treatment while in detention.

In December the SADF attacks Maseru in Lesotho, killing 30 ANC and SACTU members and 12 Lesotho nationals.

There are new protests against apartheid education in the first part of the year, the number of strikes continues to grow, guerilla actions occur in several areas of the country and a campaign begins to resist and boycott new apartheid political structures.

APPENDIX I A GLOSSARY OF APARTHEID TERMS

One aspect of apartheid is a set of terms for people, institutions and practices which constitute the language of apartheid. It both reflects the division of the people of South Africa into segregated groups under white domination and at the same time helps obscure the real nature of social and economic relations. Its extremely complex and shifting terminology does much to obstruct understanding.

It is necessary to make some use of official terminology in describing the system and its effects. The regime has the power to create and maintain institutions and to impose laws. These institutions and laws are part of the reality of apartheid, even while they mask other aspects of the reality. They do in fact divide the population into groups whose lives are regulated and constrained in different ways.

Nevertheless the limitations of the regime's powers to suppress resistance are also manifested in language. In part they are shown in the constant alteration of words for key relationships and practices. For example, the majority of the black section of the population has been successively called *Native*, *Bantu* and now *Black* by the government, while the name for the basic policies of the system has shifted from *apartheid* to *separate development* to *plural relations* to *co-operation*. The limits of the regime's power are also shown in the existence, and in the increasingly open and assertive use, of sharply divergent words and phrases, terms which both describe things for what they are and express the rejection of apartheid and its ideas. For instance, while the regime uses the law and the courts to brand its opponents as 'terrorists', demonstrators outside courtrooms where political trials are held, or at funeral and memorial

services for combatants, have proclaimed, 'They are not terrorists, they are heroes'.

The nature of the apartheid system and the sharpness of the struggle has the consequence that many words, in particular those used to refer to various social groups, are often inconsistent in their usage. They shift in meaning as the struggle for liberation alters the relations between the groups divided by apartheid, or as the regime is forced to substitute new words for old. Some words may have two quite different meanings, such as the word 'black'.

Wherever possible, in this book the language of apartheid is avoided, although as noted above and in the Preface, it is not possible to describe the system without making some of its own distinctions among people. In order to refer to the principal groups into which the population is divided under apartheid, and the corresponding separate political and administrative structures, the terms 'Africans', 'Coloured', 'Indian' and 'White' are used. They are the terms most widely used in South Africa, although the first three are increasingly being rejected in favour of the unifying term 'black'. (The government and most of the press use the term 'Black' to refer only to Africans.)

The power of the regime is such that the language of apartheid is to a large extent reproduced in the press, including the foreign press. The glossary below contains some of the principal terms which might be used in press reports or other literature about South Africa without it being evident to readers that they are part of the official language, or that the meaning which they have in the context of the apartheid system is different from what would normally be expected.

AFRIKANER The Afrikaans-speaking section of 'white' South Africans.



ASIAN/ASIATIC 'Asians' belong to communities originating from India, China and other Asian countries. However, the Cape Malay community which originates from Asia is not classified as 'Asian' but as COLOURED.

BANTU Used by linguists to refer to the family of African languages spoken throughout most of sub-Saharan Africa, 'Bantu' was used by the apartheid regime to refer to Africans from about 1948 to 1976 replacing the word NATIVE. Its use was closely bound up with the ideology of segregation and the bantustan policy. In the face of the uprising of 1976 with its total rejection of Bantu Education, Urban Bantu Councils and Bantu Administration Boards, the regime abandoned the word for BLACK.

BLACK 'Black' is the current official apartheid term for those formerly named BANTU and NATIVE (and referred to in this book as Africans). Opponents of apartheid use the word 'black' in a wider sense, so that 'black' and 'white' refer to two groups which together make up the whole population.

BLACK SPOT Areas of land occupied and owned by Africans (usually surrounded by white-owned land) which the government has designated for another group, usually white. The occupants of black spots are forcibly removed and relocated in bantustans.

BLACK STATE
See HOMELANDS.

BORDER INDUSTRY As part of its policy of trying to prevent the growth of a settled African population in the 'white' urban areas, the regime has promoted the establishment of industries near the borders of the bantustans. An early phase of this policy was known as the Border Industry policy. Currently it is incorporated within policies described as 'deconcentration', 'regional development' and 'decentralisation'.

COLOURED The term is used to refer to several groups of people, including principally those who are deemed to be of descent that is mixed in terms of apartheid classifications, as well as people descended from Malay slaves imported in the early days of the Cape Colony, and those descended from the original inhabitants of the Cape (the Khoi and the San).

CONSTELLATION OF STATES

This is supposed to refer to a grouping of states with common interests and developing mutual relationships, between which a clear desire to extend areas of co-operation exists. It is used to include any country in the sub-continent. In practice it means a recognition by the regime that bantustan 'independence' is a myth and that these areas will have to 'co-operate' because they are an integral part of the apartheid economy.

See BANTUSTANS,
HOMELANDS, RESERVES.

CO-OPERATION The use of this term indicates how the apartheid regime would like its rule of the African majority to be seen, namely as a benevolent relation towards a politically and socially separate population, instead of the relation of oppression which really exists. The very large and powerful department of state responsible for administering the African population is called the Department of Co-operation and Development.

See DEVELOPMENT.

DECONCENTRATION
See BORDER INDUSTRY.

DEPORTATION People who are deemed by the regime to belong in a bantustan said to be 'independent', and who infringe the pass system regulations, and are forcibly sent to the bantustan, are said to be 'deported'.

See ENDORSED OUT.

DEVELOPMENT The apartheid regime has consistently sought to present its policies regarding the bantustan areas as aimed at promoting the development of those

areas. In reality the practices of segregation and apartheid have promoted underdevelopment and poverty has grown.
See CO-OPERATION.

ENDORSED OUT This means being expelled from an urban area if not entitled to be there under the pass laws. An endorsement is stamped in the pass book to this effect and the person is either sent to work in a 'white' rural area or sent to a bantustan.
See PASS.

EUROPEAN A term previously used to refer to 'white' people.

GROUP AREAS Group Areas are segregated zones in towns and cities set aside for residence, commercial activities and industry for members of WHITE, COLOURED and ASIAN groups.

HOMELANDS One of the official apartheid terms for the bantustans. The term implies that those allocated to a particular bantustan originated from that place.
See NATIONAL STATES, RESERVES.

IMMORALITY Immorality means sexual relations across the colour bar, that is, between blacks and whites. This is made illegal by the *Immorality Act*.

INFLUX CONTROL Influx control is the system which prevents Africans living in the bantustans from moving to and living and working in the urban areas except under very restrictive conditions. See PASS.

INTERNAL According to official policy the affairs of the WHITE, COLOURED and ASIAN groups are 'internal' affairs in contrast to those of Africans. The Department of Internal Affairs deals with certain matters relating to these three groups.

MIGRANT LABOUR People who 'reside' in one of the bantustans but work in 'white South Africa' on contract through labour bureaux are migrant labourers. They may only remain in 'white South Africa' for the duration of their contract. After that they must return to their bantustan

and re-apply at a labour bureau if they want further work. There are also migrant labourers from other countries in Southern Africa.

NATIONAL STATES The latest official apartheid term for bantustans. It applies both to 'independent' and to 'self-governing' but 'non-independent' bantustans. See BANTUSTANS, RESERVES, HOMELANDS.

NATIVE One of the earliest official terms for Africans. Its use predates BANTU and BLACK.

NON-WHITE Non-European predates 'non-white'. Both terms mean the same and refer to blacks in general. The latter is now the only form officially used and is usually applied where all but whites are concerned.

PASS (DOMPAS) This term is no longer used officially. The pass, commonly referred to as the 'dompas', is the common name of the 'Reference Book'.

'PASSPORT' Africans living in the 'independent' bantustans have 'passports' instead of passes but in practice they serve the same function. They are only valid for 'entry' into South Africa. See PASS.

REFERENCE BOOK Reference Book is the official name for a 'pass'. See PASS, PASSPORT.

REMOVALS & RESETTLEMENT Coloureds, Indians and, on occasions, whites, who are displaced when the area in which they are living is declared a 'group area' for another group, are 'removed' from that area to another. Africans living in areas zoned for other racial groups are removed from those areas and dumped — 'resettled' — in one or other bantustan.

RESERVES The term 'reserves' is an alternate name for bantustans. It is no longer an official apartheid term but derives from the 'Native Reserve Areas' which were the areas set aside for African occupation by the 1913 Land Act. See HOMELANDS.

RESETTLEMENT CAMP When Africans are removed from the proclaimed areas and dumped in one of the bantustans they are generally placed in 'resettlement camps' which consist of the barest essentials for life and sometimes not even that.

SQUATTER This term is used to imply that the people referred to have no right to occupy the land on which they are living. Two major groups have been so described.


Black tenants on white-owned farm land who paid cash to their landlords were officially called squatters: this practice was outlawed by legislation passed in 1956, and officially terminated in 1980. 'Squatters' and their families either became wage labourers or were relocated in the bantustans.

People who occupy land for residence without official permits are called squatters. Vast 'squatter' townships have grown up near major urban areas, largely because of the shortage of housing for Africans in urban areas.

SOUTH AFRICA The apartheid regime uses this in two ways, both to refer to that part of South Africa which excludes the 'independent' bantustans, and to refer to the *status quo*, which includes the bantustan system.

TOTAL ONSLAUGHT & TOTAL STRATEGY The apartheid regime declares that it is being assailed from all sides, physically and ideologically. To counter the 'total onslaught' the regime has developed a 'total strategy' which is meant to mobilise every citizen in every possible way.

WHITE 'White' is the term applied to all those who are non-black. It is an official term and does not recognise any division within the 'white group' despite the existence of major language and cultural differences.



WHITES/BLANKES

APPENDIX II FURTHER INFORMATION

Both the United Nations Centre Against Apartheid and the International Defence and Aid Fund publish a wide range of material about apartheid.

A list of the UN Centre's publications is contained in 'Publications of the Centre Against Apartheid (1969-1982), *Notes and Documents, Special Issue, August 1982*. This is obtainable from United Nations Information Offices or direct from the Centre (United Nations Centre Against Apartheid, United Nations, New York, NY 10017, USA).

A catalogue of the publications and audio-visual resources of IDAF can be obtained from Publications Department, International Defence and Aid Fund for Southern Africa, Canon Collins House, 64 Essex Road, London N1 8LR.



REFERENCES

The following abbreviations are used:

BBC	<i>British Broadcasting Corporation Summary of World Broadcasts</i>
CT	<i>Cape Times</i> , Cape Town
DD	<i>Daily Dispatch</i> , East London
Debates	<i>House of Assembly Debates (Hansard)</i>
FM	<i>Financial Mail</i> , Johannesburg
FOCUS	<i>Focus on Political Repression in Southern Africa</i> , International Defence and Aid Fund, London
FT	<i>Financial Times</i> , London
GN	<i>Guardian</i> , London
Obs	<i>Observer</i> , London
Post	<i>Post</i> , Johannesburg
RDM	<i>Rand Daily Mail</i> , Johannesburg
S	<i>Sowetan</i> , Johannesburg
SA Digest	<i>South African Digest</i> , Pretoria
SAIRR	South African Institute of Race Relations
SAIRR Laws	<i>Laws Affecting Race Relations in South Africa 1948-1976</i> , SAIRR, Johannesburg, 1978
SAIRR Surveys	<i>Survey of Race Relations in South Africa</i> , Annual Surveys 1948-1981, SAIRR, Johannesburg
SALDRU	South African Labour and Development Research Unit, Cape Town
SA Outlook	<i>South African Outlook</i> , Lovedale
SASPU	South African Students Press Union
ST	<i>Sunday Times</i> , Johannesburg
Star	<i>Star</i> , Johannesburg
UNCTC	United Nations Commission on Transnational Corporations
UN Special Committee	United Nations Special Committee Against Apartheid

SECTION 1

1. Norman Levy, *The foundations of the South African cheap labour system*, Routledge & Kegan, London, 1982.
2. M. Wilson & L. Thompson (eds), *The Oxford History of South Africa*, Vol. II, 1870-1966, Oxford University Press, 1971.
3. W. R. Bohning (ed.) *Black Migration to South Africa: a selection of policy oriented research*, ILO, Geneva, 1982.

SECTION 2

1. *Laws affecting race relations in South Africa 1948-1976*, South African Institute of Race Relations (SAIRR), Johannesburg, 1978, (Subsequently referred to as SAIRR Laws).

2. *Survey of Race Relations in South Africa*, 1980, South African Institute of Race Relations, Johannesburg, p.67 (Subsequently referred to as SAIRR Survey). C. Simkins, 'The distribution of the African population of South Africa by age, sex and region-type: 1960-1980', SALDRU Working Paper No. 32, SALDRU, Cape Town, January 1981, p.3.
3. SAIRR Laws, pp.85-90.
4. 'Removals and Apartheid, The enforced relocation of black people in South Africa', IDAF Briefing Paper No. 5, IDAF, London, July 1982.
5. *House of Assembly Debates*, Cape Town, 22.4.1980. (Subsequently referred to as *Debates*).
6. *Johannesburg Advice Office Report 1980*, Black Sash, Johannesburg, 1980; G. S. Maré, *African population relocation in South Africa*, SAIRR, Johannesburg, 1980.
7. *Review of African Political Economy*, No. 7, 1976, Sheffield, p.73.
8. RDM 14.9.81.
9. *Debates* 4/11.6.79; RDM 14.8.80, 18.2.82, 17.9.82; *Star* 19.1.80, 2.2.80, 11.7.81.
10. FOCUS No. 37 p.12.
11. SAIRR Survey, 1980, p.350.
12. *Debates*, 2.9.81.
13. B. Rogers, *Divide and Rule: South Africa's Bantustans*, IDAF, London, 1980.
14. C. Simkins, 'The distribution of the African population of South Africa by age, sex and region-type: 1960-1980', SALDRU Working Paper, No. 32, SALDRU, Cape Town, January 1981.
15. P. Smit and J. J. Booysen, *Swart versedeliking, Proses, patroon en strategie*, University of Pretoria, 1981, p.95.
16. P. Smit and P. C. Kok, *Bevolkingsherverspreiding in die RSA, 1970-1980: Ontledings van die voorlopige 1980 — sensus gegewens*, South African Institute for Sociological, Demographical and Criminological Research, October 1981, p.6; FM 25.2.81.
17. SAIRR Survey, 1980.
18. Figures for population outside bantustan boundaries from Smit and Kok, *op. cit.*, p.19; figures for residents of bantustan townships from *Statistical survey of black development*, Bureau for Economic Research: Co-operation and Development 1980, Tables 26 and 32; figures for informal townships from FM 4.9.81, 27.8.82; DD 6.10.81; DN 8.7.82; *Grassroots May 1981*.
19. SAIRR Laws, Chapter XIV.
20. SAIRR Survey, 1980, p.367.
21. SAIRR Survey, 1979, p.439.
22. J. Dugard, *Human rights and the South African legal order*, Princeton University Press, 1978, pp.10-13.
23. M. Benson, *The sun will rise: Statements from the dock by Southern African political prisoners*, IDAF, London, 1976, p.8.
24. ST 22.3.81.
25. GN 23.3.80.
26. FOCUS No. 42, September-October 1982, p.7; *Sash*, Vol. 25, No. 1, March 1982.
27. David Dewar & Vanessa Watson, *Unemployment and the informal sector*, Urban Problems Research Unit, University of Cape Town, 1981, p.22.
28. SAIRR Survey, 1978, p.161.
29. Dewar & Watson, *op. cit.*, p.7.
30. *ibid.*, p.7.
31. *Official Year Book of RSA*, 1980/81.
32. *Sash*, Vol. 24, No. 4, January 1982, p.20.
33. *ibid.*, p.21.
34. SAIRR Survey, 1979, p.563.
35. SAIRR Survey, 1980, p. 568; *Memorandum to the World Medical Association, signed by 15 health organisations in South Africa*, Anti-Apartheid Health Committee, London, 1981.
36. *South African Medical School Trust and University of Cape Town Survey*, Cape Town, 1980.
37. SAIRR Laws, p.372.
38. SAIRR Survey, 1979, p.578.
39. SAIRR Survey, 1978, p.184, 1980, p.579.
40. *Debates*, 24.3.82.

SECTION 3

1. *Debates*, 2.4.82, 30.4.82, 28.5.82, 29.3.82.
2. SAIRR Survey, 1981, p.334.
3. 'South Africa: 1980 School Boycott', IDAF Briefing Paper No. 1, IDAF, London, March 1981.
4. *ibid.*
5. *ibid.*
6. *South African Labour Bulletin* (SALB), Durban, October 1979, p.60; *Work in Progress*, Johannesburg, 21.2.1982, pp.34-41.
7. SAIRR Survey, 1981, p.379; *Statistical Survey of Black Development 1980*, Bureau for Economic Research: Co-operation and Development (BENSO) Pretoria; *Supplement to Development Studies Southern Africa*, October 1982, BENSO, Pretoria.
8. *ibid.*
9. *Star*, 1.2.82.
10. *South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) Annual Reports*.
11. *ibid.*, 1976, 1977, 1980.
12. RDM, 18.7.80.
13. FOCUS, No. 31, November-December 1980, p.11.
14. FOCUS, Nos. 26-41. (January-February 1980 — September-October 1982).
15. SAIRR Annual Surveys.
16. SAIRR Survey, 1980.
17. *ibid.*
18. SAIRR Survey, 1979.
19. 'AZAPO calls on foreign artists to boycott South Africa', *UN Centre against Apartheid Information Note* 51/81, 6.10.81.
20. *South Africa Yearbook*, 1980/81, Official Yearbook of the Republic of South Africa, Chris van Rensburg, Johannesburg, 1980.
21. FOCUS Nos. 34-37, May-December 1981.
22. CT 9.5.81; S 2.12.81.

23. Sam Ramsamy, *Apartheid, the real hurdle: Sport in South Africa & the International Boycott*, IDAF, London, 1982.
24. *Star* 10.9.77.

SECTION 4

1. C. Simkins, 'The demographic demand for labour and institutional context of African unemployment in South Africa: 1960-1980', *SALDRU Working Paper* No. 39, SALDRU, Cape Town, August 1981, p.57.
2. Jill Nattrass, *The South African Economy: its growth and change*, Oxford University Press, Cape Town, 1981.
3. *Bulletin of Statistics*, Department of Statistics, Pretoria, September 1981.
4. J. Nattrass, *op. cit.*, Chapter 6.
5. *RDM* 17.9.82.
6. *S. Trib.* 21.2.82; *RDM* 17.9.82.
7. *GN* 6.10.82.
8. *FT* 23.2.82.
9. M. Lacey, *Working for Boroko: The origins of a coercive labour system in South Africa*, Rowan Press, Johannesburg, 1981; N. Levy, *op. cit.*
10. *FOCUS* No. 43, November-December 1982, p.1.
11. J. Nattrass, *op. cit.*, p.174.
12. *ibid.*, p.181.
13. 'Developments in South Africa since the uprising of 1976', Report submitted by the Research Department of the International Defence and Aid Fund for Southern Africa (IDAF), International Conference on Sanctions against South Africa, Paris, 20-27 May 1981, *United Nations General Assembly, A/CONF. 107/3*, 20 April, 1981; see also Chapter VII.
14. *ST* 28.3.82.
15. *ibid.*, *FM* 16.10.81.
16. C. Simkins, 'The economic implications of African resettlement', *SALDRU Working Paper* No. 43, SALDRU, Cape Town, September 1981.
17. C. Simkins, *SALDRU Working Paper* No. 39, *op. cit.*
18. C. Simkins, *op. cit.*, August 1981, p.31.
19. *S.A. Digest*, August 1981.
20. 'Urban Blacks', *Focus on key economic issues* No. 19, November 1977, Mercabank.
21. C. Simkins, *SALDRU Working Paper* No. 32, *op. cit.*
22. D. Davis, *African Workers and apartheid*, IDAF, London, 1978.
23. A. Brooks & J. Brickhill, *Whirlwind Before the Storm: The origins and development of the uprising in Soweto and the rest of South Africa from June to December 1976*, IDAF, London, 1980, p.169.
24. *ibid.*, p.170.
25. A. Baldwin, *The Section Ten People: A Study of the Urban Africans in South Africa*, Africa Publications Trust, London, 1975.
26. C. Simkins, *SALDRU Working Paper* No. 32 *op. cit.*

27. *RDM* 10.9.80.
28. D. Davis, *op. cit.*, p.10.
29. *FOCUS* No. 32, January-February 1981, p.10, No. 34, May-June 1981, p.12, No. 43, November-December 1982, p.7.
30. *FOCUS* No. 42, September-October 1982, p.7.
31. D. Davis, *op. cit.*, p.6.
32. *FOCUS* No. 36, September-October 1981, p.5.
33. *FOCUS* No. 32, January-February 1981, p.5.
34. *FOCUS* No. 36, September-October 1981, p.7.
35. Brooks & Brickhill, *op. cit.*, p.189; *SAIRR Surveys* 1976-1979, IDAF Briefing Paper No. 5 *op. cit.*
36. A. Cook, *Akin to Slavery*, IDAF, 1982.
37. *FOCUS* No. 42, September-October 1982, p.6.
38. *RDM* 20.10.82, 14.12.82.
39. C. Simkins, *SALDRU Working Paper* No. 43, *op. cit.*, p.4.
40. *FM* 12.10.79.
41. C. Simkins, *SALDRU Working Paper* No. 43, *op. cit.*, pp.7.18; *South African Outlook*, January 1982, p.1.
42. *GN* 1.9.81.
43. *Bulletin of Statistics*, *op. cit.*, March 1982.
44. *Debates*, 8.9.81; 1980 Department of Statistics (1981).
45. *RDM* 17.9.82.
46. *Workers Unity*, *op. cit.*, June 1981.
47. Brooks & Brickhill, *op. cit.*, p.178.
48. Johannesburg Advice Office Report 1980, *op. cit.*
49. *Star* 28.1.82.
50. Brooks & Brickhill, *op. cit.*, p.178.
51. *FM* 4.9.81, 27.8.82; *DD* 6.10.81; *DN* 8.7.82; *Grassroots* May 1981.
52. *Workers Unity*, *op. cit.*, No. 14, March 1979.
53. D. Davis, *op. cit.*, pp. 20-23; *South African Labour Bulletin*, *op. cit.*, September 1981.
54. D. Davis, *op. cit.*, p.21.
55. *ibid.*, p.31.
56. *ibid.*, p.111.
57. *FOCUS* No. 41, July-August 1982, p.11.
58. *South African Labour Bulletin*, *op. cit.*, September 1981, pp.3-4.
59. *Workers Unity*, *op. cit.*, August 1982.
60. D. Davis, *op. cit.*, p.31.
61. *ibid.*, p.30.
62. *FOCUS* No. 42, September-October 1982, p.3.
63. *FOCUS* No. 43, November-December 1982, p.1.
64. *Star* 10.11.81.
65. *Work in Progress*, *op. cit.*, No. 21, February 1982.

SECTION 5

1. *RDM* 30.5.81.
2. *FM* 23.5.80.
3. 'South Africa: Entrenchment of White Domination. A Review of Current Constitutional Proposals', *IDAF Briefing Paper* No. 3, IDAF, London, November 1981.

4. G. Mbeki *South Africa: The Peasants' Revolt*, Penguin African Library, 1964.
5. *SAIRR Survey*, 1980, p.404.
6. *DD* 21.6.78; *ST* 9/16.7.78.
7. *Star* 23.9.81.
8. Brooks & Brickhill, *op. cit.*, p.171.
9. *ibid.*, p.172.
10. *RDM* 15.7.81.
11. *S* 10.8.81; *RDM* 13.10.81.
12. IDAF Briefing Paper No. 3, *op. cit.*
13. *FOCUS* No. 38, January-February 1982, p.12.
14. IDAF Briefing Paper No. 3, *op. cit.* *FOCUS* No. 43, p.8.
15. *ST* 1.7.82.

SECTION 6

1. *SAIRR Surveys*, *op. cit.*; *SAIRR Laws* *op. cit.*; *FOCUS* No. 31, p.35.
2. S. Parry, *Outcasts from Justice*, Centre for Applied Legal Studies, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, 1981.
3. *FOCUS* No. 32, January-February 1981, p.5.
4. *FOCUS* No. 30, September-October 1980 p.1, No. 35, July-August 1981, p.1, No. 36, September-October 1981, p.11.
5. *FOCUS* No. 43, November-December 1982, p.5.
6. *ibid.*, p.3.
7. *SAIRR Laws*, pp.440, 467.
8. G. Mbeki, *op. cit.*, p.117.
9. M. Benson (ed), *The Sun will Rise, Statements from the dock by Southern African political prisoners*, IDAF, London, 1981, p.46; *SAIRR Survey* 1961, *op. cit.*, p.36.
10. *SAIRR Laws* p.440.
11. *FOCUS* No. 35, July-August 1981, p.2, No. 38, January-February 1982, p.7.
12. *FOCUS* No. 42, September-October 1982, p.4, No. 44, January-February 1983.
13. *FOCUS* No. 43, November-December 1982, p.5.
14. *RDM* 4.2.82.
15. *RDM* 13.6.80, 11.2.82.
16. *FOCUS* No. 43, November-December 1982, p.5.
17. *ibid.*
18. *ibid.*
19. Brooks & Brickhill, *op. cit.*, p.256.
20. *SAIRR Surveys*.
21. J. Seidman, *Facelift Apartheid*, IDAF, London, 1981, p.5.
22. *FOCUS* No. 36, September-October 1981, p.5.
23. *SAIRR Survey* 1977, p.93.
24. *FOCUS* No. 34, May-June 1981, p.11, No. 38, January-February 1982, p.7.
25. *FOCUS* No. 37, November-December 1981, p.7.
26. *Prisoners of Apartheid, a biographical list of political prisoners and banned persons in South Africa*, IDAF, in co-operation with United Nations Centre against Apartheid, London, New York, October 1978, p.3.

SECTION 7

1. IDAF Briefing Paper No. 3, *op. cit.*; ST 11.7.82.
2. 'The first special report of the Special Committee against Apartheid', Implementation of United Nations resolutions on apartheid by Governments and inter-governmental organisations, *United Nations General Assembly, A/35/22/Add.1*, 22 October 1980.
3. IDAF Briefing Paper No. 3, *op. cit.*; S. Ramsamy, *Apartheid, The real hurdle, op. cit.*, pp. 77-8.
4. *The Apartheid War Machine, The Strength and Deployment of the South African Armed Forces*, Fact Paper No. 8, IDAF, London, April 1980, Tables I, VII and VIII; 1981 figures extrapolated from tables VII and VIII. 1981 budget from FM 21.11.80; FOCUS No. 35, July-August 1981, p. 7.
5. These are described in detail in two IDAF publications, *The Apartheid War Machine, ibid.*, and *Apartheid's Army in Namibia: South Africa's illegal military occupation*, Fact Paper No. 10, IDAF, London, January 1982.
6. FOCUS No. 36, September-October 1981, p. 5.
7. DD 15.10.80; FOCUS No. 36, September-October 1981, p. 12.
8. *Apartheid's Army in Namibia, op. cit.*
9. BBC 4.7.81; RDM 10.8.81.
10. *The Apartheid War Machine, op. cit.*, Chapter 6; FOCUS No. 36, September-October 1981, p. 5, No. 40, May-June 1982, p. 7.
11. FOCUS No. 40, May-June 1982, p. 1; *Resister*, Bulletin of the Committee on South African War Resistance, No. 20, London, June-July 1982.
12. United Nations General Assembly Document A/CONF.107/3, 20.4.81, *op. cit.*, p. 39.
13. *The Apartheid War Machine, op. cit.*, p. 69.
14. DD 16.11.81.
15. FM 15.1.82.
16. FT 14.9.82.
17. BBC 13.9.82.
18. FT 11.9.81; *Workers' Unity, op. cit.*, August 1982.
19. FT 14.9.82.
20. 'Impact upon US Security of a South African nuclear weapons capability', SRI Project 1200, *Technical Note SSC-TN-1200-1*, Arlington, April 1981.
21. RDM 9.7.82; BBC 6.7.82.
22. *South Africa's nuclear capability*, World Campaign Against Military and Nuclear Collaboration with South Africa in co-operation with the UN Centre Against Apartheid, London, February 1980, p. 7.
23. A. Perlmutter, M. Handel, U. Bar-Joseph, *Two minutes over Baghdad*, Corgi, London 1982, p. 50.
24. *ibid.*, p. 51.

SECTION 8

1. United Nations General Assembly Document A/CONF. 107/3, 20.4.81, *op. cit.*, pp. 42-44. See also 7 below.
2. RDM 14.5.79.

3. 'The Constellation of Southern African States: A New Strategic Offensive by South Africa in the Region', *Analysis No. 2*, Centro do Estudos Africanos, Mozambique 29.4.80.
4. 'Southern Africa under threat', *Comment 43*, Catholic Institute for International Relations, London 1982, p. 3.
5. RDM 28.2.81; D. Geldenhuys, *op. cit.*, p. 20.
6. 'Southern Africa under threat', *op. cit.*, p. 11.
7. Detailed reports and evidence can be found in successive issues of FOCUS especially on p. 12 of issues since FOCUS No. 39. See also "Southern African Aggression: A review of recent developments in Southern Africa" *Briefing Paper No. 7* March 1982, IDAF, London.
8. 'Angola: Fighting Apartheid', FOCUS Special Issue No. 2, IDAF, London, April 1981; Evidence submitted by the Angolan government to EEC/ACP mission, February 1982; FOCUS No. 44, January-February 1983, p. 4.
9. *Apartheid's Army in Namibia, op. cit.*, pp. 22-23.
10. Obs 3.1.82.
11. *Southern Africa*, December 1982.
12. *Communique from Mozambique Information Agency*, 18.1.82.
13. BBC 19.12.81.
14. FOCUS 40, May-June 1982, p. 12.
15. BBC 22.5.81; RDM 24.6.81; S 14.10.81; FOCUS No. 41, July-August 1981, p. 12.
16. T. Gifford, *South Africa's record of international terrorism*, Stop the War Against Angola and Mozambique (SWAM) and Anti-Apartheid Movement (AAM) in conjunction with the UN Centre against Apartheid, London, September 1981.
17. For further information on Namibia, see *Namibia: The Facts*, IDAF, London, September 1980.
18. See *Apartheid's Army in Namibia, op. cit.*

SECTION 9

1. J. Nattrass, *op. cit.*, p. 268.
2. *Central Statistical Services*, Pretoria, July 1982, pp. 21, 31.
3. GN 6.10.82, quoting the *Standard Bank Review*, October 1982.
4. RDM 18.1.82; *Anti-Apartheid News*, May 1982, citing figures from the *South African Abstract of Monthly Trade Statistics*.
5. GN 22.1.82.
6. UN Special Committee Report 1980, A/35/22/Add.1, *op. cit.*, p. 77.
7. *South African Reserve Bank Quarterly Bulletin*, Pretoria, June 1981.
8. 'Apartheid and Business', *Business International Multiclient Study*, Geneva, October 1980.
9. *Studies on the effects of the operations and practices of transnational corporations: Transnational corporations in Southern Africa: update on financial activities and employment practices*, United Nations Commission on Transnational Corporations (UNCTC), UN Economic and Social Council, 9.7.81.

10. *Standard Bank Review, op. cit.*, November 1979.
11. UNCTC Study, *op. cit.*, 9.7.81., pp. 6, 22.
12. T 5.11.82; UN Special Committee Report 1980, A/35/22/Add.1, *op. cit.*, p. 81.
13. *Standard Bank Review, op. cit.*, November 1980 and June 1981.
14. UN (Special; Committee) Report, A/35/22/Add.1, 22.10.80, *op. cit.*, pp. 57-58.
15. *Bulletin of Statistics, op. cit.*, March 1982.
16. UN (Special Committee), A735/22/Add.1, 22.10.80, *op. cit.*, p. 3.
17. BBC 3.2.81.
18. Deon Geldenhuys, *Some foreign policy implications of South Africa's Total National Strategy with particular reference to the '12 point plan'*, Special Study, South African Institute of International Affairs, Johannesburg, March 1981, p. 25.
19. UN (Special Committee) Report, A/35/22/Add.1, 22.10.80, *op. cit.*
20. Özdemir A. Özgür, *Apartheid — The United Nations and Peaceful Change in South Africa*, Transnational Publishers Inc., New York, 1982, p. xx.

SECTION 10

1. G. Mbeki, *op. cit.*
2. SAIRR Survey 1959, p. 11.
3. *ibid.*, pp. 10-11.
4. *ibid.*, p. 15.
5. UN General Assembly Document A/CONF. 107/3, 20.4.81, *op. cit.*
6. Brooks & Brickhill, *op. cit.*
7. RDM 2.6.78.
8. Post 1.10.79.
9. FOCUS Nos. 34, May-June 1981, 35, July-August 1981.
10. FOCUS No. 31, November-December 1980, pp. 5, 12, No. 33, March-April 1981, pp. 2, 3.
11. SAIRR Survey, 1980, p. 187; RDM 5.2.82 RDM 8.4.83.
12. FM 11.1.80.
13. RDM 31.10.80.
14. FOCUS No. 43, November-December 1982, p. 1.
15. IDAF Briefing Paper No. 1, *op. cit.*
16. ST 20.4.80.
17. SASPU, March 1982; FOCUS No. 41, July-August 1982, p. 5.
18. Star 7.3.81.
19. FOCUS No. 36, September-October 1981, No. 37, November-December 1981.
20. ST 22.3.82.
21. FOCUS No. 33, March-April 1981, p. 12.
22. *South African Outlook*, February 1982.
23. United Nations General Assembly Document A/CONF. 107/3, 20.4.81, *op. cit.*, Section I.A.2, Annex.
24. *Work in Progress*, No. 15, p. 15.
25. Brooks & Brickhill, *op. cit.*, pp. 150-157.
26. RDM 14.8.81; S 29.8.82.
27. RDM 21.1.82.
28. RDM 22.8.81; FM 15.1.82.
29. FOCUS No. 40, May-June 1982, p. 1.

LIST OF MAPS, TABLES, CHARTS AND GRAPHS

MAPS

Countries of Africa	14	Education: Per capita expenditure — 1980-81	24
South Africa: Principal towns and cities	14	Children in secondary school — 1979	25
Territorial and residential segregation	17	Labour force in main economic sectors — 1979	26
African townships in two metropolitan areas	42	Changing structure of the economy — 1911, 1980	36
Administrative divisions of South Africa: (i) Provinces;		Composition of workforce in mining and manufacturing — 1980	36
(ii) Administration Board Areas and Bantustans	53	Manufacturing: Contribution of different industries — 1976	38
Southern Africa: South African aggression	74	Assets of largest corporations — 1981	39
Strikes — 1980 and 1981	96	African population inside and outside bantustans: by age and by sex — 1980	40
Armed struggle — 1976-82	99	Migrants, commuters and resident workers — 1980	41

STATISTICAL TABLES, CHARTS & GRAPHS

Population of South Africa — 1980	16	Deaths of people in custody of Security Police — 1963-82	62
Agricultural land outside bantustans — 1976	18	People killed and injured by police — 1974-79	63
African population inside and outside bantustans — 1980	19	Military expenditure and personnel — 1961-81	64
Rural/urban population of South Africa — 1980	19	Population of countries of Southern Africa belonging to SADCC — 1979	74
Population of metropolitan regions — 1980/81	20	Military forces in Southern Africa — 1982	75
Income distribution — 1977	21	Companies in SA based in other countries — 1980	82
Occupational structure: White-collar workers — 1960, 1975	21	Immigration and emigration — 1975-81	82
Occupational structure by skill — 1975	21	Strikes and work stoppages — 1970-82	96
Pensions: maximum monthly levels — 1982	23		

INDEX

Administration Boards 52, 53, 54, 95, 100	Bantustans <i>continued</i>	Churches <i>see</i> religion
African National Congress (ANC) 31, 54, 60, 74, 76, 84, 85, 87	in the economy 17, 35, 40-2	Ciskei 49, 54, 59, 70
activities of 83, 84, 85, 88, 89-90, 98-9 <i>passim</i> , 101-3 <i>passim</i>	forced removals to/in 16-17, 45-6, 49, 58, 97-8	civic associations 93
banned 13, 61, 91, 102	as a labour source 40, 49 (<i>see also</i> migrant labour)	'closer settlements' 19, 45
combatants 65, 66, 94, 98, 103	military forces of 70	colonial conquest and rule 9-13, 102
agriculture 10, 35, 36-7, 40	political structure 7, 51, 53-4, 55-6	Coloured Persons Representative Council (CRC) 55
wages 43, 46	population of 19, 35, 40	Coloured 7, 12, 16, 31, 89, 95, 102, 104
<i>see also</i> tenants (agricultural)	repression in 53, 54	administration 21, 52, 55
Aid Centres 22, 44-5	resistance in/to 13, 53, 54, 90, 92	education 27
Alliance of Black Reformed Christians in South Africa (ABRECSA) 32	'security' legislation in 58, 59	land ownership 18
ANC <i>see</i> African National Congress	unemployment in 35, 45-6	political structures 55-6
Angola 7, 88, 89, 92	Biko, Steve 92, 93, 102	'Communism' 58
SA aggression against 68, 74-5, 78	Black consciousness 61, 91-2, 93	Communist Party of South Africa (<i>later</i> South African Communist Party) 12-13, 60-1, 91, 102
apartheid:	Black People's Convention (BPC) 92	Community Councils (<i>formerly</i> Urban Bantu Councils) 54-5, 93, 95
defined 7	'black spots' 16, 45, 104	community organisations 31, 52, 60, 93, 95
terminology 7, 103-5	Bophuthatswana 54, 59, 70	'commuters' <i>see under</i> labour system
<i>see also</i> political system of apartheid	Botswana 77	Congress Alliance 90, 94, 102
armed struggle 13, 60, 68, 83, 84, 85, 89, 91, 92, 93, 98-100, 102, 103	boycotts and sanctions 32, 54, 60, 83, 85, 86-8 <i>passim</i>	Congress of South African Students (COSAS) 94
arms industry 38, 70-1	bus 47, 83, 90, 95, 103	conscription 69-70
arrests, mass 13, 91, 98, 102	Community Council elections 55	constitutional plans 51, 55-6, 67-8
Asians (term), defined 7, 104	consumer 96	Council of Non-European Trade Unions 48
Azanian People's Organisation (AZAPO) 31, 93	cultural 30-1, 93	Courts 22, 44, 57, 58-9, 64
Azanian Students Organisation (AZASO) 94, 97	economic 38, 83-4 <i>passim</i>	Crossroads 97
	education 61, 97, 103	culture 27, 29-31, 92, 93
	Republic Day 55, 62, 100, 101, 103	
	South African Indian Council elections 55, 62, 101, 103	Death sentences and executions 58, 65, 66, 102
	sport 32, 33, 84	'deconcentration', policy of (<i>formerly</i> 'Border Industry' policy) 38, 104
Banning/banishment 52, 57	Buthelezi, Chief Gatsha 54	Defence Act (1982 amendment) 103
of individuals 48, 53, 58, 60		Defence Advisory Board (<i>later</i> Defence Manpower Liaison Committee) 68
of meetings 58, 59, 60, 61, 95	Campaigns, mass 12-13, 89-90, 95, 100-1, 102	Defence Force (SADF) 22, 57, 64, 68, 78, 103
of newspapers 29, 102	censorship 8, 29, 60	manpower 69-70
of organisations 13, 58, 60-1, 91-4 <i>passim</i> , 102	children:	mercenarys in 68, 70
legislation 58	detained 62	<i>see also</i> military
Bantustans 7, 13, 16, 17, 18, 19, 52-4	as farm workers 36	
agriculture in 36	health and welfare 24, 36	
bans/banishment in, laws relating to 58, 59	racial classification 16	
and citizenship 22, 45	in urban areas 25	
detentions in 62	Christian Institute 31-2	

Defence Manpower Liaison Committee 68
 demonstrations and protests 12, 61, 90,
 91, 101, 102
 convictions resulting from 64
 police attacks on 57, 63-4, 90, 91, 92,
 102
 suppression of 58-9
 Department of Co-operation and
 Development (*formerly* Native Affairs
 Department) 21, 52
 Department of Education and Training 27
 Department of Internal Affairs 21
 Department of National Education 27
 destabilisation 7, 74-8
 detention(s)/detainees 13, 48, 54, 57, 60,
 61-3, 91, 93-8 *passim*, 102
 deaths in 62-3, 92, 93, 96, 103
 laws relating to 13, 57, 59, 61
 torture of 62-3, 69, 91, 97, 98
 domestic service 35, 46, 47, 94

Economy:

and bantustans 40
 in bantustans 18, 35
 composition of workforce 35-6
 historical background 9-11, 37-8
 and military 68
 and neighbouring countries 73-4, 81-2
 ownership and control 18, 35, 38, 39
 sectors 35-8
 trade and investment 81-2
 education 27-9, 92-3
 resistance 89-95 *passim*, 97, 102
 employment:
 African labour force 41-3
 living conditions of workers 46
 wages 36, 43, 46, 47
 energy 37
 exiles *see* refugees and exiles

Federation of South African Trade Unions
 (FOSATU) 61, 93
 Freedom Charter 90, 91, 101
 Front Line States 7, 88
 OAU aid to 84
 refugees in 84
 support for armed struggle 88
see also individual countries

Group Areas Act (1950) 17-18, 21, 33, 55,
 56, 102
 'Group Areas' policy 12
 guerillas *see under* African National
 Congress; armed struggle

Health and welfare 8, 24-6, 36
 hospitals 25
 housing 46, 54, 94, 95
 associations 93
 rent increases, protests against 46, 93,
 94, 95, 100, 103
 Housing Action Committees 93

Immigration 82
 Immorality Act 16
 'incitement', definition of 58
 income, distribution of 23
see also wages
 Indians 7, 12, 16, 31, 89, 95
 administration of 21, 52, 55
 education 27
 land ownership 17-18
 political structures for 55-6

Industrial and Commercial Workers
 Union 48
 Industrial Councils 47
 'influx control' *see* Pass laws
 Inkatha 54
 International Relations 81-88
 Southern Africa 73-8
 international organisations, support for
 liberation struggle by 85-6
see also United Nations

Journalists, restrictions on 29

Kwazulu 54

Labour Bureaux 37, 43
 Labour Party 55
 labour relations 47
 labour system:
 children in 36
 'commuters' 19, 40, 41, 49, 54
 farm 9, 10, 16, 36-8, 40, 43, 45, 46, 47
 migrant 11, 12, 19, 35, 37-8, 40, 41-2,
 43, 46, 49, 73, 88, 104-5
 prison 45
 other 9, 10, 35, 102
 direction and control of 11, 35, 38, 39,
 43 (*see also* pass laws)
 historical background 9-11, 12, 16, 17

land:

control and distribution of 11, 16-18,
 36, 102
 dispossession of 9, 16, 37-8, 45, 98
 struggle for 9, 17, 102

legal profession and system 22, 57

legislation:

Bantustans:
 Aliens Act 58
 Bantu Administration Act 61
 Bantu Authorities Act (1951) 53, 102
 Black Administration Act (1927) 52,
 58, 59, 60
 Land Acts 12, 53, 102
 Native Administration Act (1927) 53
 Native Land Act (1913) 16
 Native Trust and Land Act (1936) 16
 Promotion of Self-Government Act
 (1959) 16

labour:

Intimidation Act (1982) 48, 58
 Labour Relations Act (1981) 48
 Riotous Assemblies Act 57, 58

pass laws:

Aliens Act 58
 Blacks (Urban Areas) Consolidation
 Act 18, 33, 44

repression:

Affected Organisations Act 61
 Criminal Procedure Act 64
 Defence Act (1982 amendment) 103
 Demonstrations in or near Court
 Buildings Prohibition Act (1982)
 58-9

Fundraising Act 61
 General Law Amendment Act 57, 58,
 61, 64

Internal Security Act (*formerly*
 Suppression of Communism Act):
 (1950) 57, 58, 60, 61, 64;
 (1982) 57, 58, 59, 61, 64, 66
 Intimidation Act (1982) 48, 58
 Public Safety Act 61, 64

legislation *continued*

repression *continued*

Riotous Assemblies Act 57, 58
 'Sabotage' Act 66
 Suppression of Communism Act (*later*
 Internal Security Act) 57, 60, 64, 66
 Terrorism Act (1967) 57, 61, 64, 66
 Unlawful Organisations Act (1960)
 57, 61, 64, 66, 91

segregation/racial classification:

Group Areas Act (1950) 18, 21, 33,
 56, 102; amendment (1962) 55

Immorality Act 16

Liquor Act (1928) 21

Liquor Amendment Act 33

Mixed Marriages Act 16

Motor Transport Act (1930) 21

Population Registration Act (1950)
 15-16

Reservation of Separate Amenities
 Act (1953) 21, 33

State-Aided Institution Act (1931) 21
 legislation as an instrument of apartheid

12-18 *passim*, 21-2, 28-9, 36, 52, 55, 57,
 61, 64, 91, 94, 102-3 *passim*

campaign against 89-90, 101, 102

see also pass laws; 'security' laws; and
under individual legislation

Lesotho 69

SA aggression against 77-8, 88, 103

liberation struggle *see* resistance and the
 liberation struggle

Management Committee System 55

Mandela, Nelson 54, 88, 98, 102; *quoted*
 22

Release Campaign 102-3

manufacturing industry 35, 38, 47, 48
 media 27, 29

see also press/newspapers

meetings/gatherings/funerals 100-1

bans on 57-61 *passim*, 95, 100

police attacks on 57, 64, 95

restrictions on 57, 101

migrant labour *see under* labour system

migration (white), from rural areas 17

military 7, 13, 17, 67-9, 91, 100

expansion of 7, 67, 68

operations 68-9

and the state 7, 52, 67-8, 91

see also arms industry; Defence Force
 (SADF)

mineral resources 10-11, 18, 37, 102

mining industry 10-11, 18, 35, 37-8, 41

wages in 43, 47

Ministry of Internal Affairs 27

Mozambique 7, 88, 89, 92, 98

SA aggression against 76, 103

Municipal Councils 55

Namibia 7, 68, 70, 71, 73, 75, 78-9, 89

National Party 7, 12, 51, 55, 90

National Union of South African Students
 (NUSAS) 61, 92

Native Affairs Department (*now*
 Department of Co-operation and
 Development) 52

OAU *see* Organisation of African Unity

occupational structure 23, 35-7, 39, 43

<p>Organisation of African Unity (OAU) 84, 85, 87-8</p> <p>organisations 60, 93-4, 101</p> <p> banned 13, 57, 58, 60-1, 91, 93, 94, 102</p> <p> see also Black consciousness; trade unions</p> <p>Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) 13, 61, 85, 87, 91, 98, 102</p> <p>Pass laws/influx control 35, 36, 43-4</p> <p> arrests and prosecutions, figures for 44</p> <p> enforcement of 44-5, 69</p> <p> offenders 22, 44</p> <p> resistance to 13, 90, 91, 94, 102</p> <p>passes (Pass book) 43, 90, 105</p> <p>pensions 25</p> <p> opposition to 96</p> <p>Police (SAP) 38, 57-61 <i>passim</i>, 68, 69, 70, 94</p> <p> attacks on demonstrations/meetings 63-4, 90, 91, 102</p> <p> deaths at hands of 62, 63, 90, 91, 92, 102, 103</p> <p> specialised forces within 69</p> <p>political parties (parliamentary) 51</p> <p> see also National Party</p> <p>political rights, denial of 7, 12, 35, 51</p> <p>political structures:</p> <p> 'reforms' 51, 55-6</p> <p> segregation of 15, 52-6, 91, 103</p> <p> white domination 51-2, 55-6</p> <p>political system of apartheid:</p> <p> Africans outside the bantustans 52, 54-5</p> <p> bantustans 53-4</p> <p> Coloured and Indian systems 55-6</p> <p> constitutional plans 51, 55-6</p> <p> denial of rights 512, 52</p> <p> parliament 51-2</p> <p> 'reforms' 7, 21, 30, 32-3, 51, 55-6, 83</p> <p> white parties 51</p> <p>population:</p> <p> classification and segregation of 15-16</p> <p> distribution of 16, 19-20, 40, 53</p> <p> Provinces 19</p> <p> statistics 16</p> <p> urban areas 19</p> <p>Port Elizabeth Black Civic Organisation (PEBCO) 93</p> <p>press/newspapers 8, 29</p> <p> banned 29, 102</p> <p> controls/restrictions 29</p> <p>prisoners, political 66</p> <p>prisoners of war 66, 86-7</p> <p>prisons 66</p> <p>Proclamations 52, 58, 59, 61</p> <p>Provinces 53</p> <p>Provincial Councils 52</p> <p>Rabie Commission 57</p> <p>race classification 7, 15-16</p> <p>Reference Books see Pass laws</p> <p>refugees and exiles 30, 74, 84</p> <p>religion 31-32</p> <p>removals and resettlement 16, 18, 19-20, 36, 38, 41, 44, 45-6, 47, 49, 52, 58, 97-8.</p> <p>repression 7, 9, 13, 27, 31, 32, 47, 57-66, 91</p> <p> see also under legislation</p> <p>'reserves' 9, 12, 53, 105</p> <p>resistance and the liberation struggle 9, 13, 57, 60, 89-103</p>	<p>resistance and the liberation struggle</p> <p> <i>continued</i></p> <p> in bantustans 13, 54, 90, 92</p> <p> cultural 30-1</p> <p> education 89-95 <i>passim</i>, 97, 103</p> <p> religious 31-2</p> <p> sport 33</p> <p> international support for 7, 81, 83-8</p> <p> mobilisation of 7, 30, 52, 60, 100-1</p> <p> history 102-3</p> <p> development of 89-91</p> <p> underground 60, 91</p> <p> renewal and intensification of 91-101</p> <p> see also armed struggle</p> <p>Riekert Commission 41, 43, 44</p> <p>Robben Island 66</p> <p>Sabotage 58</p> <p>SACC see South African Council of Churches</p> <p>SACTU see South African Congress of Trade Unions</p> <p>'security laws' 22, 29, 57-9, 61-2, 64, 66, 91, 98, 102-3 <i>passim</i></p> <p> see also legislation</p> <p>separate amenities 12, 15, 21, 92</p> <p> culture 27, 29-30</p> <p> education 27-9</p> <p> health and welfare 24-5</p> <p> legal and administrative 21-2</p> <p> media 29</p> <p> religion 31-2</p> <p> sport 32-3</p> <p> transport 47</p> <p> legislation effecting 21</p> <p> see also political structures</p> <p>'Separate Development' policy 12, 29</p> <p>settlers 9, 12, 102</p> <p>Sharpeville massacre 13, 86, 90, 91, 102</p> <p>Sobukwe, Robert 91</p> <p>South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) 29</p> <p>South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU) 48, 76, 90, 93, 94, 102, 103</p> <p>South African Council of Churches (SACC) 32</p> <p>South African Council on Sport (SACOS) 33</p> <p>South African Indian Congress 102</p> <p>South African Indian Council (SAIC) 55</p> <p> elections to, boycott of 101, 103</p> <p>South African Non-Racial Olympic Committee (SANROC) 33</p> <p>South African Students Organisation (SASO) 92, 102</p> <p>South African Trade Union Council (TUCSA) 48</p> <p>South West Africa People's Organisation (SWAPO of Namibia) 74, 75, 78, 79, 84, 89</p> <p>Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC) 74, 88</p> <p>Soweto Civic Association 93</p> <p>Soweto Student Representative Council (SSRC) 93</p> <p>sport 21, 32-3</p> <p>'squatters' 17, 19, 45-6, 97</p> <p>State Security Council 56, 67-8</p>	<p>strikes and industrial action 12, 38, 48, 61, 62, 90, 91, 92, 95-7, 102-3</p> <p> convictions resulting from 64</p> <p> right to strike 48</p> <p> suppression of 35, 44, 48-9, 60</p> <p>'subversion', definition of 57-8</p> <p>SWAPO see South West Africa People's Organisation</p> <p>Swaziland 78</p> <p>tenants (agricultural) 9, 10, 16, 17, 36, 45, 105</p> <p>'terrorism', definition of 58</p> <p>torture and death of detainees 57, 62-3, 66, 69, 91, 92, 93, 96, 98, 103</p> <p>townships 17, 19, 41, 42, 46, 47, 54, 55, 93, 95, 96, 97, 99</p> <p>trade and investment 81-2</p> <p>trade unions and unionists 12, 35, 38, 47, 48, 60, 62, 92-6 <i>passim</i>, 102</p> <p>Transkei 13, 54, 59, 61, 66, 70, 90</p> <p> forced removals to 45</p> <p>transport 47, 48, 73, 74</p> <p> fares increases, protests against 47, 93, 94, 95</p> <p>trials, political 57, 58, 59, 61, 64-5, 98, 100, 101</p> <p>Tribal Authorities 53</p> <p>Unemployment 44, 45, 49</p> <p> in bantustans 35, 45</p> <p>Union of South Africa 12, 89, 102</p> <p>United Nations 7, 68, 78-9 <i>passim</i>, 83-4 <i>passim</i>, 85</p> <p> agencies and intergovernmental organisations 85</p> <p> chronology of action against apartheid 86-7 (Special Committee against Apartheid 86)</p> <p>urban Africans 12, 19, 41, 42, 43, 44</p> <p> inside bantustans 19, 41, 42, 46, 54</p> <p> see also 'commuters'</p> <p> outside bantustans:</p> <p> Administration Boards 52, 54, 95, 100</p> <p> Community Councils 54-5, 93, 95</p> <p> housing 46, 54</p> <p> and property ownership 18</p> <p> universities 28-9</p> <p> see also pass laws</p> <p>Urban Bantu Councils (UBC) (now Community Councils) 54</p> <p>Venda 54, 59, 70</p> <p>Wages 23, 36, 43, 46, 47, 95-6 <i>passim</i></p> <p> see also strikes</p> <p>witnesses 59, 61, 64-5</p> <p>women 36, 40, 42, 93</p> <p> occupations of 35, 41</p> <p> organisations of 94</p> <p> and pass laws 43, 44, 90, 102</p> <p> unemployment among 45</p> <p> wages 46</p> <p>Zambia, SA aggression against 77</p> <p>Zimbabwe 7, 89, 98</p> <p> SA aggression against 76</p>
---	---	--

OTHER PUBLICATIONS FROM INTERNATIONAL DEFENCE & AID FUND FOR SOUTHERN AFRICA

FOCUS On Political Repression in Southern Africa

(ISSN 0308-3586)

Published 6 times a year, this news bulletin, by IDAF Research, Information and Publications Dept., provides authoritative coverage of political trials and imprisonment, detentions, bannings and 'security' measures in the escalating conflict in South Africa and Namibia.

Our office wishes to convey its sincere gratitude and high appreciation for the valuable information you regularly send us with *FOCUS*.

SWAPO Chief Representative, Brazzaville, Congo

Readers interested in a regular updating on the political trials, banning and detentions in South Africa will find *FOCUS* the most comprehensive source for this information.

AFRICA TODAY (USA)

Subscription is for one calendar year £6
£10 airmail

BRIEFING PAPERS are produced 3 times a year as a supplement to *FOCUS*

Very useful having information on a specific issue, ranging over a wider period of time, all in one place and in journal size and format.

THE INSTITUTE OF RACE RELATIONS

Back copies still available:

No. 1 South Africa: 1980 School Boycott — a review of a year of protest against apartheid education. *March 1981*

No. 2 Namibia: The Constitutional Fraud — a review of recent legal and administrative changes introduced under South African occupation. *July 1981*

No. 3 South Africa: Entrenchment of White Domination — a review of current constitutional proposals. *November 1981*



No. 4 Apartheid In Namibia Today — recent data on poverty, living conditions and racial segregation. *March 1982*

No. 5 Removals And Apartheid — the enforced relocation of black people in South Africa. *July 1982*

No. 6 Namibia: The Elusive Settlement — update on negotiations since 1981. *November 1982*

No. 7 South African Aggression — review of recent developments in Southern Africa. *March 1983*

NAMIBIA: The Facts

by IDAF Research, Information and Publications Dept. (1980)

100pp. Illustrated. Price £1.50

(ISBN 0 904759 41 5)

BOOK NO. D045.

Reveals the bitter fruits of South African rule.

A detailed account of the exploitation of a country and its people.

A splendidly compressed outline of facts and figures, history, economy, the liberation struggle ... an easy guide to a complex situation.

Did you know that:- the United Nations General Assembly terminated South Africa's Mandate over Namibia in 1966 — two multinational corporations control 90% of all mining production in Namibia — only 1% of black children go to secondary school in Namibia, compared to 68% of white.

Provides further details on the migrant labour system, industrial legislation, suppression of human rights, the South African military machine, and the development of the armed struggle.

*SOUTH
THE LEVELLER
LIBERATION*



STANDING ORDERS FOR IDAF PUBLICATIONS

The bulk of IDAF publications consist of paperbacks and Fact Papers priced at UK £4.00 or less. Fact Papers have the standard price of UK £0.50.

Readers interested in receiving these as they appear may take out a Standing Order, either for both paperbacks and Fact Papers, or for Fact Papers only.

An invoice is sent with each item but readers need only pay on receipt of their statement sent at the beginning of each year.

Readers outside the UK will be charged postage.

Should you wish your books to be sent by airmail, please specify.

Items priced at over £4.00 will not normally be sent on standing order unless requested.

Please send orders or requests for a complete list of publications to:
IDAF Publications, Canon Collins House, 64 Essex Road, London N1 8LR.

APARTHEID THE FACTS

Since the 1970s the South African regime has faced challenges from the advancing forces of resistance and liberation; from the shifts in the Southern Africa following the independence of its neighbouring countries; and from the growing strength of the international movement against apartheid.

The regime has adopted a dual strategy in order to maintain the apartheid state. On the one hand its armed forces have been greatly strengthened, and military power has been used against those who resist and organise for liberation. A campaign of destabilisation and military aggression has been launched against neighbouring countries. On the other hand, a number of reforms have been initiated. Presented as far-reaching reforms spelling the end of apartheid, such measures have gained little support within the black community. While they may bring some benefits to a tiny minority, the situation of the majority in all important respects, steadily deteriorating.

Apartheid the Facts is the first comprehensive handbook on the current situation in South Africa. It brings together detailed, up-to-date information in an easily accessible format, much of it with the help of maps, graphs and photos. The book covers: the background of apartheid; the distribution of wealth and resources; the economy, trade unions and unemployment; repression; the denial of political rights; education, health and media; culture, religion and sport; the police force, prisons, the army and military aggression against the Front Line States; international relations; and the liberation movement and the armed struggle.

Cover photograph by Nancy Durrell McKenna



International Defence & Aid Fund for Southern Africa
Canon Collins House, 64 Essex Road, London N1 8LR

£3.00