



# General Assembly

Official Records

## Disarmament Commission

**331**<sup>st</sup> meeting

Monday, 1 April 2013, 3 p.m.  
New York

*Chair:* Mr. Grima . . . . . (Malta)

*The meeting was called to order at 3.15 p.m.*

### General debate (continued)

**Mrs. Aitimova** (Kazakhstan): I would like to express my delegation's warmest appreciation, Mr. Chair, for your leadership of the United Nations Disarmament Commission (UNDC) and our wishes for the successful outcome of the 2013 substantive session. Our thanks are also due to Ms. Angela Kane, High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, and her Office for the support provided for our deliberations.

With the Disarmament Commission at a stalemate now for more than a decade, we must seize this opportunity to revitalize the role and effectiveness of the disarmament machinery so as to address the many new threats and challenges facing us today. Kazakhstan affirms its support for efforts to improve the UNDC's working methods, based on resolutions of the General Assembly and other platforms, with a view to consolidating the past.

With regard to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, we support an equal focus on both aspects in the context of recent political developments in some regions of the world. Greater emphasis will have to be given to conventional arms, considering that no treaty was adopted at the Final United Nations Conference on the Arms Trade Treaty. We trust that all Member States will renew their commitment so that such a vital treaty will come into effect. Trust- and confidence-building measures are crucial for all aspects of disarmament and also need to be reviewed.

In the light of the several regional tensions escalating in various parts of the world, my country calls for the universalization of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the additional protocol of the International Atomic Energy Agency. We also call for the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. The need for an enhanced and strengthened verification mechanism and follow-up to the 2010 NPT Review Conference cannot be overstated.

The effective implementation of nuclear-weapon-free zones is imperative. Kazakhstan emphasizes the critical urgency that negative security assurances be granted to nuclear-weapon-free zones, and is committed to working with others in the region to guarantee the physical security of nuclear materials and equipment so as to prevent nuclear proliferation and terrorism. My country will host a nuclear fuel bank with the approval and supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

We support in particular the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and, despite the political turbulence and threats in that region, the holding of a conference on the Middle East at the earliest possible opportunity. To further the goal of disarmament at the global level, President Nursultan Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan has proposed a universal declaration for a nuclear-weapon-free world as the first step towards a convention aimed at the abolition of nuclear weapons.

A well-functioning Conference on Disarmament is a sine qua non. It is clear that we must begin to fully

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implement the key action points emanating from the 2010 NPT Review Conference, draft a fissile material cut-off treaty and a convention against nuclear weapons, and implement the five-point proposal of the Secretary-General.

In addition, the growing possible use of other weapons of mass destruction, including biological and chemical weapons, which violate international humanitarian law, should be averted at all costs. Under the present circumstances, greater support should be given to the work of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.

In the absence of full consensus at the Final Conference on the Arms Trade Treaty, which disappointed all of us, Kazakhstan hopes that it will receive the support of the vast majority of Member States.

The regional efforts of the Office for Disarmament Affairs need to be strengthened and given full recognition, as they contribute to the vision of "One UN" in arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation at the country and regional levels in realizing global policies.

Kazakhstan stands ready to be part of multilateral efforts to break the deadlock and make the disarmament machinery viable again, so that together we can all promote human advancement, peace, justice and human rights.

**Ms. González Román** (Spain) (*spoke in Spanish*): At the outset, I should like to congratulate you, Sir, on your election as Chair of the Disarmament Commission, as well as to congratulate the other members of the Bureau. Spain expresses its will to work closely with you to achieve a satisfactory result in this second session of the Commission's three-year cycle. We should also like to express our appreciation and gratitude for the work carried out by your predecessor, Ambassador Enrique Román-Morey.

My delegation fully supports the statement delivered at the Commission's 330th meeting by the delegation of Ireland on behalf of the European Union and would like to emphasize some points in our national capacity.

Spain recognizes the nature of the Disarmament Commission as the specialized deliberative body within the disarmament machinery of the United Nations that allows for in-depth discussion of specific areas of disarmament. Despite the experience of previous

sessions, with a view to overcoming the obstacles that have prevented the Commission from adequately carrying out its mandate, my delegation stands ready to work with others and make all the necessary efforts to discuss and formulate recommendations in the sphere of nuclear disarmament and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, as well as on practical confidence-building measures in the area of conventional weapons.

With regard to the first agenda item for this session, we would like to underscore that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), based on its three complementary pillars of non-proliferation, disarmament and the peaceful use of nuclear energy, is the unique and irreplaceable framework for maintaining and strengthening international peace, security and stability. In the light of the current challenges to international security, in particular the risk of proliferation, Spain firmly believes that the Non-Proliferation Treaty is more important than ever. An important meeting is to take place in Geneva this April, namely, the second session of the Preparatory Committee for the NPT Review Conference. We must make a joint effort to reaffirm the obligations under that Treaty, which is the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation regime.

Likewise, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty is of crucial importance in nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. Renewed political commitments to attain further ratifications of the Treaty, especially by countries listed under annex 2 countries, and the recent progress made in strengthening its verification regime have breathed new life into our efforts to see this important Treaty enter into force as soon as possible. Until that is achieved, we urge all States to respect the moratorium on nuclear testing and to abstain from any actions that may contravene the obligations and provisions of the Treaty.

Finally, I should like to underscore the importance we attach to issues relating to disarmament and non-proliferation in the region of the Middle East. My delegation views the establishment of an effectively verifiable zone free of nuclear weapons and of other weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery in the Middle East as a means to enhance security and stability in the region and internationally, as nuclear-weapon-free zones in other regions have served to do.

With regard to conventional weapons, Spain is firmly committed to responding effectively to the

threats they pose at the regional and international levels. We have continuously supported efforts to achieve an agreement on an arms trade treaty. We deplore the fact that three countries prevented the adoption by consensus of the treaty text, which we trust will be adopted soon by the General Assembly.

We also believe that that the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects is an important instrument for preventing the proliferation of such weapons, which claim more than half a million victims each year through various forms of armed violence. We support the use of the International Marking and Tracing Instrument, and we will continue to tackle the threats posed by activities related to the illicit tracking of such weapons. Furthermore, in the field of conventional weapons, the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms and information on small and light weapons is a key component in the fight against the unchecked spread of such weapons that fosters an atmosphere of trust and security, which could be further enhanced by greater transparency in military expenditures.

As the delegation of Ireland has announced, the European Union has prepared a working document for the purpose of sharing ideas and thoughts with other delegations on practical measures for building trust with regard to conventional arms.

Spain is firmly committed to strengthening the multilateral system. International organizations, treaties, conventions and other instruments must be the focus of our joint efforts to face threats to international peace and security. We need to universalize and apply those instruments to ensure that all States comply with their respective international obligations. The strengthening of the authority of the United Nations and the regime of legally binding treaties must be a priority for all countries.

We are confident, Sir, that with your experience and expertise you will lead the Commission towards the consensus needed to obtain the results that have eluded us for so long. We agree that business as usual is not an option for the Disarmament Commission. My delegation stands ready to work together with the other delegations present here to debate and formulate recommendations on the items on the agenda.

**Mr. Bravaco** (United States of America): The United States congratulates Malta on its election to

chair the 2013 session of the Disarmament Commission. As you work to facilitate a successful outcome for this important body, Sir, you may count on the full support of the United States delegation. We thank both you, Sir, and High Representative for Disarmament Affairs Kane for the thoughtful remarks this morning (see A/CN.10/PV.330).

We also congratulate the other members of the Commission's 2013 Bureau on their elections and express our gratitude to Peruvian Ambassador Román-Morey for his tireless efforts last year to advance the Commission's objectives.

At this session, we will resume work on two agenda items that have received considerable attention in recent years, namely, in Working Group I, "Recommendations for achieving the objective of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons", and, in Working Group II, "Practical confidence-building measures in the field of conventional weapons". We strongly support the efforts of the Working Group Chairs, Saudi Arabia in Working Group I and, first, Canada and now Norway in Working Group II, and thank all of them for their willingness to serve.

Before addressing nuclear matters, let me mention the importance of conventional weapons confidence-building measures (CBMs). CBMs can enhance security and predictability, foster cooperation and trust among States, and strengthen regional relations among armed forces and security forces. Promoting openness and transparency in military forces and activities helps to enhance mutual understanding and confidence. For those reasons, we believe that the Commission's pursuit of consensus recommendations in this area is a worthwhile effort.

Once again this year, our work takes place just before a session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation on Nuclear Weapons. With that second session set to begin in Geneva on 22 April, the United States reaffirms its commitment to the shared goal of nuclear disarmament. We continue to implement the 2010 Review Conference action plan across all three pillars of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) — disarmament, non-proliferation and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The grand bargain of the NPT — whereby nuclear-weapon States pursue disarmament, non-nuclear-weapon States abstain from the pursuit of nuclear weapons and all countries are able

to access the benefits of peaceful nuclear energy — sets an enduring standard that is as relevant today as it was at the Treaty's inception.

President Obama's 2009 speech in Prague clearly reaffirmed the United States commitment to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons. But it was not a call to unilaterally disarm; nor did it assume that the world would change overnight. It was a road map to the future: a step-by-step, measured strategy that takes into account the changed and changing security landscape of the twenty-first century. The 2010 United States Nuclear Posture Review rightly emphasized that, today, our greatest nuclear threat is no longer a large-scale nuclear exchange, but the danger that terrorists could acquire nuclear materials or, worse, a nuclear weapon.

In addition to working on the prevention of nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism, we have taken steps to reduce the number and role of nuclear weapons in the United States national security strategy. We are not developing, nor are we planning to develop, new nuclear weapons. Moreover, the life-extension programmes for our nuclear weapons will not support new military missions. We have committed not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States that are party to the NPT and are in compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation obligations. And we have clearly stated that it is in the United States interest, and that of all other nations, that the nearly seven-decade record of non-use of nuclear weapons be extended forever.

The step-by-step approach that the United States is pursuing is suited for our security needs and tailored to address twenty-first century global security threats. By maintaining and supporting a safe, secure and effective stockpile — sufficient to deter potential adversaries and reassure United States non-nuclear allies and partners — at the same time as pursuing responsible reductions through arms control and working to stem and prevent nuclear proliferation, we will make the world a safer place.

There is no "quick fix" for achieving nuclear disarmament. The United States remains committed to achieving the safety and security of a world without nuclear weapons. But the only practical path is a careful, step-by-step approach to verifiably reach that objective. The United States will continue to use existing multilateral mechanisms to inform the international

community on the progress we are making and to build support for continued success. Thanks to the important role that civil society plays in providing information to national Governments and the public alike, the United States record of accomplishment on this score is well known.

The United States is devoting its time, efforts, resources and attention to creating the conditions for the further reduction and eventual elimination of nuclear weapons. While we have made significant progress, more hard work remains to be done. In this step-by-step endeavour, the United States values its partnerships with committed States and civil society. Even if we may differ from time to time on the most appropriate road map for moving towards the goal of a world without nuclear weapons, we all share the same vision.

As a contribution to the Commission's ongoing substantive efforts on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, at this session, the United States is pleased to submit a formal Commission Working Group I paper entitled "Preventing the use of nuclear weapons." The document, which should be available shortly from the Secretariat, details the United States record of accomplishment in achieving the safety and security of a world without nuclear weapons and in forestalling their use. We hope that the numerous facts, figures, policies and positions it contains will be taken into account as Working Group I moves to develop consensus recommendations.

Since the darkest days of the Cold War, the United States has fully understood the potential serious consequences that would result from the use of nuclear weapons, for, as President John F. Kennedy said nearly 50 years ago, in June 1963:

"I speak of peace because of the new face of war. Total war makes no sense in an age when great powers can maintain large and relatively invulnerable nuclear forces and refuse to surrender without resort to those forces. It makes no sense in an age when a single nuclear weapon contains almost 10 times the explosive force delivered by all the allied air forces in the Second World War. It makes no sense in an age when the deadly poisons produced by a nuclear exchange would be carried by wind and water and soil and seed to the far corners of the globe and to generations yet unborn".



United States arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament policies are predicated on preventing the use of nuclear weapons ever again. We continue to accord the highest priority to avoiding such use.

Finally, as efforts to develop consensus recommendations in both Working Groups proceed, let me suggest that even a modest, incremental advance is better than no progress at all. As the Commission embarks on its 2013 deliberations, we respectfully urge all delegations to exercise flexibility in national or geopolitical group positions, to the extent possible, and a willingness to consider potential compromise language. The reality is that, absent a genuine, collective effort to forge common ground, the Commission's inability to fulfil its mandate as the arms control and disarmament think tank of the international community will regretfully endure. For our part, the United States delegation pledges its best efforts to promote a successful outcome.

This statement will be made available on the website of the United States Mission to the United Nations.

**Mr. Zhang Junan** (China) (*spoke in Chinese*): At the outset, on behalf of the Chinese delegation, I would like to congratulate you, Sir, on your assumption of the chairmanship of the United Nations Disarmament Commission (UNDC) at this session. I believe that your rich diplomatic experience and wisdom will serve to guide the Commission to positive achievements. The Chinese delegation will fully cooperate with you and other delegations. I would also like to take this opportunity to express my sincere appreciation to your predecessor, Ambassador Enrique Román-Morey, Permanent Representative of Peru, for his outstanding work.

The world today is undergoing profound and complex changes. We are faced with growing and complex international security challenges, where traditional and non-traditional factors have become intertwined. Against such a backdrop, countries are increasingly interdependent and share increasingly common interests. China has always advocated that the international community adopt a new security concept of mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and coordination, and that it work together to address diverse security challenges and settle disputes through diplomatic and peaceful means, so as to create a peaceful and stable international and regional security environment that is

conducive to promoting the multilateral arms control and non-proliferation process.

China has been earnestly fulfilling its nuclear disarmament obligations and actively promoting and making unique contributions to international nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation undertakings. China supports the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons and firmly pursues a nuclear strategy of self-defence. In the development of nuclear weapons, China has always exercised the utmost restraint, has not and will not participate in a nuclear arms race in any form and will maintain its nuclear forces at the minimum level necessary for national security needs.

China has adhered to the policy of no-first-use of nuclear weapons at any time or under any circumstances and has made an unequivocal commitment that it will unconditionally not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States or in nuclear-weapon-free zones.

China is of the view that the international nuclear disarmament process should be actively promoted with the aim of maintaining global strategic stability and undiminished security for all. Countries with the largest nuclear arsenals should continue to make drastic and substantive reductions in those arsenals.

China supports the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and will continue its positive efforts to that end. China will adhere to its commitment to a moratorium on nuclear testing.

China hopes that the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva will reach consensus on its programme of work at an early date so as to start its substantive work as soon as possible, including the conclusion of a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable fissile material cut-off treaty.

China supports the review process of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and hopes that all parties will implement the outcomes of the Review Conferences in a comprehensive and balanced manner. China has actively participated in the previous conferences of the five permanent members of the Security Council (P-5) on the implementation of the NPT and will continue its positive efforts in chairing the P-5 working group on a glossary of definitions for key nuclear terms.

China firmly opposes the proliferation of nuclear weapons, supports upholding and strengthening the international nuclear non-proliferation regime and advocates peaceful solutions to regional nuclear issues through dialogue and negotiations.

Maintaining peace and stability on the Korean peninsula and in North-East Asia is in the common interests of the international community. China urges the relevant parties to remain calm, exercise restraint and avoid steps that could lead to a further escalation of the situation. China calls on all parties to continue efforts on the denuclearization of the peninsula within the framework of the Six-Party Talks. China will make unremitting efforts to that end.

China continues to believe that dialogue and cooperation are the only correct way to achieve a proper resolution of the Iranian nuclear issue. The parties concerned should pursue the path of dialogue and negotiation. In order to make early progress, the parties should accommodate each other's concerns, gradually bridge differences and expand their common ground on the basis of enhancing mutual trust. China is ready to continue to play a constructive role to that end.

China has always supported practical confidence-building measures in the field of conventional arms control and has made ongoing efforts to promote related international and regional disarmament processes and to explore confidence-building measures. China has been devoted to transparency and confidence-building in the field of conventional arms control and has been an active participant in the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms and the United Nations Report on Military Expenditures. China supports the necessary adjustments to the Register in line with the development of the international and regional security situation while taking into account the concerns of all parties. One of the most pressing tasks is to improve the coverage of the Register, that is, to increase the number of participating countries.

China attaches great importance to the fight against the illicit trade of small arms and light weapons and earnestly implements the United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects. China has adopted a series of measures on legislation, law enforcement, capacity-building and international exchanges and cooperation, which have yielded remarkable results. China participated in the

second United Nations Conference to Review Progress Made in the Implementation of the Programme of Action, held in 2012, in a constructive manner and made positive contributions to the success of the Conference.

The current multilateral disarmament machinery, including the First Committee, the Commission and the Conference on Disarmament, were established at the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, and has made a tremendous contribution to safeguarding world peace and promoting the arms control process over the past few decades. As the unique deliberative body of the machinery, the UNDC has played an important role in setting the priority agenda for multilateral disarmament negotiations. China hopes that Member States will view the role and status of the UNDC from a rational and practical perspective and that they will work in a pragmatic manner in order to enable positive progress in this deliberative forum.

Recently, His Excellency Mr. Xi Jinping, China's newly elected President, reiterated at the twelfth National People's Congress that China would unswervingly take the road of peaceful development and continue to work with other countries for the lofty cause of human peace and development. We are ready to join hands with other countries to promote the multilateral arms control process in order to make new contributions to the cause of safeguarding world peace and stability.

**Mr. Moktefi** (Algeria) (*spoke in French*): At the outset, allow me to congratulate you, Sir, on behalf of the Algerian delegation, on your election as Chair of the Disarmament Commission. My delegation has no doubt that, under your active leadership, the Commission will be able to make significant progress. Our congratulations also go to the other members of the Bureau and to the Chairs of the Working Groups. I would likewise express our sincere appreciation to Ambassador Enrique Román-Morey, Permanent Representative of Peru, who, thanks to his tireless efforts, succeeded in ensuring the Commission's adoption of the agenda items for this three-year cycle.

The Algerian delegation associates itself with the statements made on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement and the African Group by the representatives of Indonesia and Nigeria, respectively, at the Commission's 330th meeting.

My delegation would like to reiterate the central role of the United Nations as a multilateral framework for the consideration of disarmament issues. In that regard,

we believe that the revitalization of the multilateral disarmament machinery is crucial. That is why Algeria has never spared any effort in seeking to relaunch the work of the Conference on Disarmament, which is the only multilateral mechanism for negotiations on disarmament matters.

In that context, Algeria attaches particular importance to the Disarmament Commission, which has an irreplaceable role as a body in which reflection can be carried out and proposals made. Its functions provide Member States with an opportunity to deliberate in depth and consider any matter relating to disarmament, including nuclear disarmament.

With regard to ending the Commission's decade-long inability to adopt concrete recommendations by consensus, it is imperative that all Member States together take this new opportunity, under your chairmanship, Sir, to breathe much-needed new life into our deliberations by displaying a genuine spirit of cooperation and mutual understanding. We must, however, highlight that the impasse in the Commission is due primarily to a lack of political will.

As the only specialized deliberative body of the multilateral disarmament architecture of the United Nations, the Disarmament Commission will fully assume its role once all the necessary conditions are met. The Commission could therefore assert its leadership, as it did in 1999, and contribute to relaunching the various United Nations disarmament mechanisms.

Given that it is taking place at the midpoint of the three-year cycle, this substantive session of the Disarmament Commission is of particular importance. This session should allow us to continue the discussions begun last year on issues pertaining to disarmament and non-proliferation and to practical confidence-building measures in the field of conventional weapons. The deliberations should generate momentum leading to the drafting of concrete recommendations during the next session, at the end of the cycle.

On the eve of the second session of the Preparatory Committee for the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in Geneva, which will consider the state of implementation of the final document adopted in 2010 (NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol. I)), Algeria reiterates its principled position on the ultimate goal of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which is the total elimination of such weapons. An

effective and continuous commitment by the entire international community, especially on the part of the nuclear-weapon States, is essential to achieving that goal. The very existence of nuclear weapons poses an ongoing danger to humankind as a whole — something that the continuation of the military doctrines of certain nuclear States tends to perpetuate.

It is therefore important that the nuclear-weapon States comply with article VI of the NPT and the commitments undertaken by those countries during the 1995, 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences. Disarmament measures should be undertaken in that regard in accordance with the principles of transparency, verifiability and irreversibility.

While nuclear non-proliferation is one of the pillars of the NPT, it must go hand in hand with the implementation of the other provisions of the Treaty, in particular those of article IV, on the rights of States to nuclear energy research, development and use for peaceful purposes. Algeria believes that only a balanced approach that ensures the effective and continuous implementation of the NPT's three pillars, which mutually support and reinforce each other, will advance this international instrument and lead to the achievement of its ultimate goal.

Against that backdrop, the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and the conclusion of a fissile material cut-off treaty are a priority. The same applies to the conclusion of a legally binding international instrument under which nuclear-weapon States would provide security guarantees to non-nuclear-weapon States.

In that context, in order to achieve the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, Algeria would like to highlight the need to start negotiations on a nuclear-weapons convention. The Algerian delegation welcomes the convening, next September, of a high-level meeting of the General Assembly devoted to nuclear disarmament. The debates between Member States at that time will, without a doubt, contribute significantly to achieving the ultimate goal of the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

We must also note the need to establish a zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East, which would serve to promote the cause of nuclear disarmament and preserve peace and stability in the region. As a commitment undertaken by the international community, the

implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East is a priority for Algeria. That is the reason that our delegation must express its deep concern at the delay in the implementation of the resolution.

Likewise, my delegation would like to express its deep disappointment at the fact that the conference on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East failed to be convened at the agreed time — a violation of the collective agreement of States parties as set out in the final document of the 2010 NPT Review Conference. Algeria therefore urges the Secretary-General and the three sponsors of the 1995 resolution, in consultation and coordination with the States of the region, to convene that conference without delay.

In conclusion, the Algerian delegation would like to reiterate to you, Mr. Chair, our willingness and preparedness to work in a constructive manner with you and all delegations to ensure a successful outcome to this session of the Disarmament Commission.

**Mrs. Adhikari** (Nepal): Let me join others in congratulating you, Sir, on your election as Chair of the United Nations Disarmament Commission (UNDC) at its 2013 session, as well as the other members of the Bureau on their elections. My delegation is confident that, under your able leadership, the work of the Commission will reach a successful outcome. My delegation assures you of its full cooperation in discharging your responsibilities. I would also like to extend our sincere appreciation to Ambassador Enrique Román-Morey of Peru for his contribution in 2012. I also thank Ms. Angela Kane, High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, for her statement this morning (see A/CN.10/PV.330).

Nepal aligns itself with the statement delivered at the Commission's 330th meeting by the representative of Indonesia on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement.

The Disarmament Commission has a fundamental role in disarmament affairs. It is mandated to shape policies, principles and guidelines and to adopt recommendations on the main disarmament issues. The UNDC has succeeded in delivering many concrete results by formulating consensus principles, guidelines and recommendations on a range of issues. However, the past decade has not been satisfactory, as our deliberations in the UNDC have not been translated into concrete results.

We all know that disarmament is not a choice. It is a compelling security imperative, as global peace and security lies in collective prosperity, not in a race for armaments. A peaceful and stable world will never be achieved amidst grinding poverty and hunger, disease and disparity around the world. Moreover, there is a constant danger of weapons of mass destruction falling into the hands of terrorists and radical extremists.

Less than 60 years ago, there were no nuclear weapons in the world. Today, the world has a large stock of nuclear weapons that could destroy all of human civilization. The world will not remain safe unless the nuclear-weapon States give up their nuclear arsenals. Military expenditures have never ceased increasing, year after year. The production, transfer and trading in conventional weapons, including small arms and light weapons, has increased severalfold. Many conflict-ridden countries have borne the heavy brunt of the impact of small arms and light weapons.

Nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation in all its aspects is essential to strengthening international peace and security. Nepal strongly believes in complete disarmament for all weapons of mass destruction, including biological, chemical, nuclear and radiological weapons, in a time-bound manner. We also support the non-proliferation of small arms and light weapons, while maintaining the position that every State has the legitimate right to acquire such weapons for defence.

As party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, Nepal believes that those treaties form the bedrock of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. We underline the need to make those instruments universal. It is our view that the three pillars of the nuclear disarmament regime — nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy — are equally important and mutually reinforcing. Their sanctity must therefore be fully preserved. We also believe that the ultimate objective of the international community, as set forth at the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, should be geared towards achieving general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

Similarly, as a corollary to nuclear disarmament, universal adherence to the Comprehensive Nuclear-



Test-Ban Treaty is another critical element of nuclear disarmament. In the same vein, a fissile material cut-off treaty remains an absolutely essential step on the path towards global nuclear disarmament.

We strongly oppose the weaponization of outer space and support the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in the various regions of the world, as that is critically important to giving genuine meaning to disarmament.

The United Nations has to play a facilitating role as a truly global forum for maintaining international peace and security. We must fully utilize the General Assembly, the Security Council and other bodies — such as the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Conference on Disarmament and the Disarmament Commission — in which Member States can seek a common approach to the general principle of cooperation in the maintenance of international peace and security, including the principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments.

Similarly, other United Nations mechanisms, such as the Regional Centres for Disarmament and the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, must be mobilized to contribute to the efforts of Member States to achieve disarmament. The Regional Centres have a meaningful role to play in that respect. As host of the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific, Nepal believes that unilateral, bilateral and regional commitments are the building blocks to achieve disarmament at the global level.

Nepal attaches great importance to multilateral negotiations on disarmament and non-proliferation that promote collective ownership, deliberations and responsibility for joint action. The time has come to expand and deepen the collaboration among States for building confidence, trust and stability, which would enable States to free up precious resources for the development of the global commons.

**Mr. Khalil** (Egypt): I would like to congratulate you, Mr. Chair, on your election to chair the United Nations Disarmament Commission (UNDC) at this year's substantive session. Likewise, I would like to extend our congratulations to the other members of the Bureau on their elections, as well as to the Chairs of the Working Groups. I would like to assure you of my delegation's full support and cooperation.

At the outset, I would like to associate myself with the statements delivered at the Committee's 330th meeting by the representatives of Indonesia and Nigeria on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement and the African Group, respectively (see A/CN.10/PV.330).

I shall focus my remarks on three main issues, namely, the contribution of the UNDC to the multilateral disarmament machinery and the items assigned to the Working Groups, that is, "Recommendations for achieving the objective of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons" and "Practical confidence-building measures in the field of conventional weapons".

Egypt believes strongly in the potential of the UNDC as a deliberative body focused on making recommendations on critical subjects in the field of disarmament. The UNDC should be the nurturing ground for new ideas and the launching pad for new initiatives. It should also enable us to continue discussions on unfinished business in a further attempt to bring positions closer in order to reach consensus.

There are many simple ideas that could further strengthen the unique character of the UNDC in the multilateral disarmament machinery. We have proposed a number of such ideas with the aim of enhancing the UNDC's ability to make use of the vast knowledge base that it has built over the years. In that regard, I would highlight developing a portal with links to all the former proposals and working papers discussed at earlier sessions. Such a portal would provide an intellectual institutional memory for the Commission and allow us to build on previous discussions. That would be the case even when the Commission was unable to reach consensus on previous work — which, unfortunately, has been the case all too often and for too long. Another idea is to hold side events on the margins of UNDC meetings, where fresh ideas could be tested and conclusions shared with the Commission. Those are simple ideas, yet they promise to inject some energy into the UNDC with a view to increasing its efficiency and effectiveness.

In order for the UNDC to be able to realize its potential, Member States must exercise the necessary political will to utilize this important mechanism to further the cause of disarmament. That is particularly applicable to the items assigned to the two Working Groups. When considering "Recommendations for achieving the objective of nuclear disarmament and

non-proliferation of nuclear weapons”, we should all be aware of the fact that nuclear disarmament is the highest priority established by the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. That is not sufficiently reflected in the work of the multilateral disarmament machinery.

The Conference on Disarmament remains stalled due to a lack of political will. This year, however, the United Nations will witness an important initiative, which the Non-Aligned Movement brought before the General Assembly. The convening of a high-level meeting of the General Assembly on 26 September should galvanize support and mobilize political will behind global nuclear disarmament efforts. Given the UNDC’s deliberative role, we expect the work of Working Group I to provide creative and concrete ideas on a phased programme for the total elimination of nuclear weapons, which can then be carried to the high-level meeting for endorsement by Heads of State and Government.

It is equally important for the Working Group to highlight the need to implement multilateral commitments in the field of nuclear disarmament. In that regard, there is no priority higher than meeting the deadlines set by the final document of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol. I)). The first such deadline pertained to the convening of the 2012 conference on the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East, which was not met. Non-compliance with the 2010 commitments will undermine the review process of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Despite the confirmation of participation by all States in the region except one, the conference was not held by the agreed date. The League of Arab States has continuously urged the conveners to fulfil their commitments. That is the only way to restore the credibility of the non-proliferation regime and ensure success for the 2015 review cycle. Egypt is closely watching the developments in that regard and will act accordingly. This issue should occupy the place it deserves in the work of the Commission. We expect a conclusion by the Working Group highlighting ways to ensure the implementation of the 2010 Review Conference commitments.

The issue of practical confidence-building measures in the field of conventional weapons is now

even more relevant in the light of the outcome of the United Nations Conference on the Arms Trade Treaty. Any serious confidence-building process needs to address the following issues.

First, with regard to the overproduction and ever-increasing stockpiles of conventional weapons in the hands of major arms exporters and producers, every effort must be exerted to bring production and stockpiles in major arms-producing States under international scrutiny.

Secondly, mutual international accountability is the only way to guarantee that the existing imbalance between major arms producers and the rest of the world not succumb to potential abuse.

Thirdly, with regard to addressing protracted threats to international peace and security, there is no more profound threat to peace and stability, to international law, international humanitarian law and human rights law and to the core principles of the United Nations Charter itself than the crimes of aggression and foreign occupation. The role of the UNDC is crucial in developing confidence-building measures that go beyond the traditional sense of a term, which is often used to restrict the agenda in order to protect the narrow interpretation that is preferred by a limited but privileged group of countries.

We have presented a number of ideas that reflect our desire to think outside the box with respect to the most salient issues on the multilateral disarmament agenda. By doing so, we hope to make the UNDC more pertinent, as it allows for a free, open-minded reflection that is relevant and timely in relation to other processes. Such cross-fertilization will enhance the Commission’s impact on the rest of the United Nations disarmament machinery, a task that we are confident we will be able to take undertake successfully.

**Ms. Abdullah** (Iraq) (*spoke in Arabic*): First of all, Mr. Chair, allow me to express our pleasure at seeing you elected to chair the Disarmament Commission at its 2013 substantive session. Our congratulations also go to the other members of the Bureau. We wish all of you every success. We are convinced that, thanks to your experience and skill, Sir, we will work towards the success of this session.

My delegation supports the statement made at the Commission’s 330th meeting by the representative of

Indonesia on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement (see A/CN.10/PV.330).

My delegation would like to reaffirm the importance of the role of the Disarmament Commission as a specialized deliberative body within the multilateral United Nations disarmament framework. The Commission allows for substantive discussions on disarmament and has led to recommendations in that respect.

My Government affirms that preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons can be achieved only if all States accede to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and if they place their installations and programmes under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards to ensure that they are used for peaceful purposes. Furthermore, the implementation of the IAEA additional protocol is encouraging States to strengthen the role of the IAEA in terms of verification.

In that respect, on 9 October 2012, Iraq's Council of Representatives adopted a law on the ratification of the country's accession to the CTBT. On 24 October 2012, we ratified the Additional Protocol annexed to the general IAEA safeguards, which has brought the number of States parties to the Treaty to 119. My country reaffirms the importance of resuming negotiations on a general treaty on nuclear weapons and legally binding arrangements concerning negative security assurances in order to ensure that non-nuclear-weapon States and States parties to the NPT are not threatened by the use of nuclear weapons by nuclear-weapon States. My delegation also reaffirms that the only guarantee of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is the comprehensive non-selective implementation of the NPT.

Iraq reaffirms the importance of renouncing nuclear weapons. Following our own example, we have taken all the necessary steps to create nuclear-weapon-free States, particularly in the Middle East. In that respect, my delegation reaffirms the strategic importance of the Middle East. The establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in that part of the world is essential to strengthening regional and international security and for confidence-building measures among States of the region. In that respect, we express our regret with regard to the postponement of the 2012 conference on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the

Middle East, which was to be held at the end of 2012 in Helsinki. We call on the States that were responsible for convening the Conference in accordance with the Final Document of the 2010 NPT Review Conference (NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol.I)), including States of the Middle East and depositary States, including the United States of America, the United Kingdom and the Russian Federation, to hold a specialized conference on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone this year with the participation of States of the region.

As the preparations for the holding of the NPT Review Conference in 2015 are going well, particularly with regard to implementing other commitments contained in the programme of action adopted in 2010, it is also important to make every possible effort to hold a successful conference on a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. That would have a positive impact on security and stability in the region and would bring us closer to the ultimate goal, namely, the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security. My delegation reaffirms the importance for the United Nations, and for Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon in particular, to play an active role in ensuring that the conference takes place.

Concrete and effective measures in the field of conventional arms are also important. Comprehensive efforts to address certain disarmament issues, particularly with respect to small arms and light weapons, are important as well, as are initiatives to prevent the accumulation of excessive amounts of weapons, which would have a negative impact on regional and international security, with disastrous consequences for economic, social and human development. My delegation affirms the importance of the guidelines adopted by the Disarmament Commission designed to limit conventional weapons and rid the world of excessive amounts of weapons, while acknowledging the legitimate interests of States in weapons for self-defence.

My Government attaches great importance to confidence-building measures. We have established a national commission on conventional weapons and have designated a focal point for small arms and light weapons management. Furthermore, on 15 October 2012, the Council of Representatives adopted the Convention on Cluster Munitions. It also adopted a law enabling Iraq to accede to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention.

I would like to underscore that my Government is on the right path towards adopting legal measures enabling Iraq to accede to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects. Furthermore, as part of our efforts in the clearance of mines and explosive remnants of war that were put in place under the inhuman and irresponsible policies of the previous regime, our Government, in coordination with the United Nations Development Programme, is establishing a programme of action involving the participation of a large number of ministries designed to rid us of those weapons, provide assistance to the victims thereof and to work for their reintegration into society.

Lastly, we are prepared to take every possible step to cooperate with you, Mr. Chair, with a view to producing conclusions and recommendations that would take into account the concerns of all Member States so that similar progress can be made on disarmament and non-proliferation issues.

**Mr. Koller-Lenhardt (Austria):** Allow me, at the outset, to congratulate you, Mr. Chair, on your assumption of the chairmanship of the Disarmament Commission at its 2013 substantive session. Building on last year's successful start under the inspiring chairmanship of Ambassador Román-Morey of Peru, we are fully confident, Sir, that under your stewardship this year the Commission will continue its deliberations on the two items on its agenda in a constructive manner, with a view to fostering consensus on recommendations to be eventually agreed upon in the course of the current triennial cycle.

Given the specific mandate of the Disarmament Commission as a deliberative body and subsidiary organ of the General Assembly working under the consensus principle, as set forth in paragraph 118 of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to Disarmament (resolution S-10/2), Austria encourages delegations to focus on potential elements of recommendations that are acceptable to the United Nations membership at large. As disarmament is among the key priorities for Austria in the context of the United Nations, allow me to make a few remarks in addition to the statement made this morning by the observer of the European Union (see A/CN.10/PV.330).

In the context of the Organization, our collective efforts towards disarmament are directly guided by Article 11, paragraph 1, of the Charter of the United Nations. In that spirit, Austria sponsored resolution 65/93, in 2010, following up on the high-level meeting convened by the Secretary-General on revitalizing the work of the Conference on Disarmament. In 2011 and 2012, Austria, together with Norway and Mexico, pursued an initiative leading to the introduction of resolution 67/56, on taking forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations, which was adopted with a solid three-quarters majority. The open-ended working group set up by that resolution held its organizational session in Geneva last month. We count on the continued constructive engagement of the entire membership in the months ahead. Likewise, Austria looks forward to the high-level meeting on nuclear disarmament to be held by the General Assembly on 26 September in New York.

Today, we are witnessing an increasing awareness among States and civil society that the nuclear-weapons debate should and must go beyond the narrow scope of military security concepts. Due to the catastrophic global effects resulting from any potential use of nuclear weapons, more emphasis should be placed on taking into consideration their humanitarian, economic and ecological consequences. From a legal perspective, we must continually remind ourselves of the unanimous conclusion in the 1996 advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the *Legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons* (see A/51/218), which clearly stated the obligation to pursue in good faith and to bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control.

In 2008, the Secretary-General presented a five-point proposal on nuclear disarmament, which, in our view, provides pertinent guidance for the achievement of a world without nuclear weapons. In that context, the Secretary-General also warned of the contagious doctrine of nuclear deterrence, an approach that makes non-proliferation more difficult, which in turn raises new risks that nuclear weapons will be used. Following the reasoning of the Secretary-General, the concept of nuclear deterrence turns out to be a catalyst for insecurity for all, including the nuclear-weapon Powers.

It should be emphasized that the majority of the United Nations membership already categorically



outlawed nuclear weapons in setting up nuclear-weapon-free zones. The Disarmament Commission contributed to that goal by crafting a consensus text in 1999 on the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned. Given the intrinsic link between nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, Austria deems the item “Recommendations for achieving the objective of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons”, assigned to Working Group I, to be highly topical and more than timely.

Due to the potentially uncontrollable risks inherent in any use of nuclear power, be it for peaceful energy purposes or military explosive devices, a constitutional law in Austria categorically bans both nuclear weapons and facilities whose purpose is to produce energy by nuclear fission in the country. That position was reiterated at the highest political level by the Federal President of Austria at the Security Council summit on nuclear non-proliferation, disarmament and security on 24 September 2009, which took place in the context of the adoption of resolution 1887 (2009) (see S/PV.6191). My delegation explained our position on the matter in detail last year in Working Group I, on nuclear disarmament. I would therefore simply like to emphasize that Austria fully acknowledges the right to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, but will not subscribe to any promotion of such uses for power generation. That principled position will be upheld by our delegation throughout the current triennial cycle and beyond, consistent with our policy pursued in other relevant forums.

Turning to conventional weapons, the disarmament community just concluded intense negotiations in the context of the Final United Nations Conference on the Arms Trade Treaty. The President of the Conference will report to the General Assembly tomorrow. Austria looks forward to a swift and successful finalization of that important process. In that context, it is worthwhile noting that the preamble of the draft treaty to be adopted refers to the guidelines for international arms transfers drafted by the Disarmament Commission in 1996. That shows the potential of the Disarmament Commission in considering and making recommendations consistent with its mandate on various problems in the field of disarmament that might eventually contribute to the crafting of other instruments. “Practical confidence-building measures in the field of conventional weapons”, which is on the agenda

for Working Group II, is therefore a topic worthy of diligent discussion. In that context, Austria hopes that the European Union working paper mentioned this morning will be considered as a constructive input for our collective deliberations.

Austria notes with great appreciation the constructive tone with which many delegations addressed the Commission today. As you, Mr. Chair, and the High Representative have rightly pointed out, progress is possible if our focus is shifted towards common ground where consensus is achievable. Let me conclude by stressing that Austria, as a delegation to the Disarmament Commission and as a member of its Bureau, will do its utmost to contribute to the successful outcome of our collective deliberations.

**Mr. Ri Tong II** (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea): Allow me, first of all, Mr. Chair, to congratulate you on your election to the chairmanship. We express our wish for the success of this substantive session under your able stewardship. Allow me also to associate myself with the statement made at the 330th meeting by the representative of Indonesia on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement.

Last year, the Disarmament Commission adopted an agenda for its three-year cycle, freeing itself from a three-year stagnation. What can be considered to be a success of last year’s session was its reflection on the issue of recommendations for achieving the objectives of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, which was the first of its agenda items to be discussed.

Nuclear disarmament remains the most important and pressing issue of disarmament, as it is directly related to world peace and security and the very survival of humankind. The ongoing lack of progress in the field of nuclear disarmament is due to the strong-arm policy based on the increased role of nuclear weapons, which are being built and modernized openly and robustly. Furthermore, the global missile defence system under development is inevitably inviting a nuclear arms race between nuclear-weapon States. As that reality unfolds before our eyes, the prospect of nuclear disarmament becomes ever harder to achieve. It is therefore imperative that the Disarmament Commission pay close attention to the demand of non-nuclear-weapon States that a treaty be concluded on the total elimination of nuclear weapons. Accordingly, the Commission’s

recommendation on nuclear disarmament should duly reflect that relevant point.

The situation on the Korean peninsula is representative of the pressing need for global nuclear disarmament. The touch-and-go situation in which the danger of nuclear war threatens the Korean peninsula today is due to the blackmail tactics increasingly being used by the United States, the largest nuclear-weapon State. In that regard, the delegation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea would like to clarify its position as follows.

First, the so-called North Korean threat or North Korea's supposed acts of provocation on the Korean peninsula are notions intentionally being spread by the United States, but are nothing but a ridiculous sophism — exactly the same as saying, "The slave turns on the master with a cloud".

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea has issued no threats or provocations, but the United States has. The United States Senate and its followers have committed ferocious hostilities by drafting a brigandish Security Council sanctions resolution, taking issue with our peaceful satellite launch conducted last year and thereby attempting to delegitimize the exercise of a sovereign State's legitimate right to a satellite launch. It is none other than the United States, which is notoriously the top-ranking country in terms of military and intelligence satellite launches into outer space — the common province of humankind — and thereby militarizing it. Therefore, questioning the satellite launch of another country is the unmatched height of shamelessness and an extraordinary provocation. In this situation, we had no other option but to conduct a third underground nuclear test in order to safeguard the sovereignty and security of our country.

However, the United States, although it is the one that pushed us to undertake nuclear tests, brought our test to the Security Council as a basis for drafting another sanctions resolution. Not fully satisfied with that, the United States has gone so far as to open dangerous joint military exercises with South Korea involving over 200,000 troops and different types of strategic nuclear-strike delivery means. Those exercises started on 1 March and will continue for a period of two months. In particular, for the first time in the history of joint military exercises, the United States has brought strategic B-2 stealth bombers into South Korea, driving

the situation to the brink of nuclear war by intensifying its nuclear blackmail. Those realities therefore prove that the United States is the source of provocations and threats of war, exposing its true colours as a cancer to be removed by the reunification of Korea and the establishment of regional peace.

Secondly, the military counteractions being taken by our Republic are just acts of self-defence in the face of provocations of war coming from the United States. On 11 March, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea nullified the Korean Armistice Agreement in response to the entrance into the full-scale stage of Operation Key Resolve by the United States and South Korea on the very same day. In addition, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has taken crucial steps to nullify the non-aggression pact and the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula signed by North Korea and South Korea.

On the other hand, the Korean People's Army supreme command has put on highest alert all field artillery units, including strategic rocket units and long-range artillery units, which are assigned to strike United States bases on its mainland and on Hawaii and Guam and other operational zones in the Pacific, as well as all enemy targets in South Korea and its vicinity. At the same time, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea openly informed the Security Council that the Korean peninsula is now in a touch-and-go situation due to the nuclear-war provocations of the United States and South Korea, while declaring that inter-Korea relations are henceforth in a state of war.

The touch-and-go situation on the Korean peninsula is a product of the extreme hostilities of the United States which are implied in its rejection of the legitimate right of a sovereign State to a satellite launch, pushing the situation towards a state of full-scale war against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The objective being pursued by the United States is to disarm the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and bring about regime change at any cost. However, what the United States will eventually learn is that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is neither Iraq nor Libya.

As long as the United States, the largest nuclear-weapon State, continues to pose an ongoing threat to us, we will steadfastly cling to the almighty sword of nuclear weapons and expand and beef up our nuclear

forces qualitatively and quantitatively until the denuclearization of the world is realized.

Yesterday, 31 March, the plenary meeting of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea set forth a new strategic line for simultaneously carrying out economic development and building our nuclear armed forces to respond to the current situation. That line is a revolutionary and people-oriented approach aimed at directing more energy to the national economy, strengthening the nuclear armed forces for the purposes of self-defence and making that defensive power rock solid, thereby establishing a striving and powerful socialist State.

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea's nuclear armed forces represent the nation's life, which will never be abandoned as long as the imperialist nuclear threat looms over us. Those forces are a treasure of our unified country that can never be traded away, not even for billions of dollars. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea's position on nuclear weapons is fixed by law. The Korean People's Army will perfect our methods and operations of war in all their aspects, in particular with respect to war deterrence and strategy, with special attention being given to the pivotally important nuclear armed forces, which will round out our national combat posture.

As a responsible nuclear-weapon State, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea will make positive efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation, ensure peace and security in Asia and the rest of the world, and realize the denuclearization of the world. The delegation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is of the view that under the current agenda item of nuclear disarmament, special attention should be given to the serious impact of nuclear blackmail by the largest nuclear-weapon State and be followed by substantial restoration of the path leading towards the denuclearization of the world.

**Ms. Mehta** (India): Please accept our congratulations, Sir, on your election as Chair of the United Nations Disarmament Commission (UNDC) at its 2013 substantive session. I would also like to congratulate the other members of the Bureau on their election. Let me assure you, Mr. Chair, of my delegation's fullest support in the discharge of your responsibilities. I would also like to place on record our appreciation for the work done by the Chair of

the UNDC last year, as well as the Chairs of the two Working Groups.

The Indian delegation associates itself with the statement made by the representative of Indonesia on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement this morning.

We attach high importance to the UNDC, which is the deliberative leg of the triad of disarmament machinery put in place by the tenth special session of the General Assembly. In our view, the Commission plays a unique role as the only body with universal membership for in-depth deliberations on relevant disarmament issues. We cannot overemphasize the role of this body at a time when both the disarmament agenda and the disarmament machinery face numerous challenges.

The UNDC offers an opportunity for Member States to make progress collectively on important disarmament issues by instilling coherence and consensus into the disarmament debate. That is extremely important if we are to address the security challenges of our times. We continue to believe in the inherent value of this forum, even while we share the disappointment at the UNDC not having been able to adopt substantive recommendations for more than a decade. It is up to us Member States to realize the value of the UNDC by attaching importance to its work and by showing a greater political commitment to disarmament issues.

In its decision 52/492 of 1998, the General Assembly decided that nuclear disarmament would constitute one of the UNDC annual agenda items each year. However, it was only after considerable deliberations last year that the Commission was able to adopt an agenda for its 2012-2014 cycle of meetings, with nuclear disarmament as one of the agenda items. Nonetheless, we now have two agenda items for this cycle, on which a large amount of ground has already been covered in previous years. We believe that the elements on which substantial agreement was reached among Member States in the past should be preserved.

At this stage, we would like to share some thoughts on the two issues on our agenda for the current year. We will further elaborate our positions in the meetings of the two Working Groups in the coming three weeks. We attach high importance to the agenda item entitled "Recommendations for achieving the objective of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons". The complete elimination of nuclear weapons is a long-cherished goal of the international community.

In its very first resolution 1 (I), adopted unanimously in 1946, the General Assembly sought the elimination of national armaments of atomic weapons and all other major weapons adaptable to mass destruction. The Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly (resolution S-10/2), adopted by consensus by the international community, also accorded the highest priority to nuclear disarmament.

India attaches the highest priority to global, non-discriminatory and verifiable nuclear disarmament — a principle that has strong and consistent domestic support in our country. India is convinced that the goal of nuclear disarmament can be achieved through a step-by-step process underwritten by a universal commitment and an agreed multilateral framework that is global and non-discriminatory. There is a need for a meaningful dialogue among all States that possess nuclear weapons in order to build trust and confidence and to reduce the salience of nuclear weapons in international affairs and security doctrines. In the current international climate, there is greater support for progressive steps towards the de-legitimization of nuclear weapons. Measures to reduce the nuclear danger arising from the accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons are pertinent in that regard.

India's draft resolutions in the First Committee give expression to some of the ideas that I have mentioned and which have found support from a large number of States. Our working paper presented to the Disarmament Commission in April 2007, which was developed in the spirit of the 1988 Rajiv Gandhi action plan, also suggested specific measures, including a global no-first-use agreement and a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. We believe that the UNDC must send a strong signal of the international community's resolve to achieve the goal of global, non-discriminatory and verifiable nuclear disarmament. Member States should use this forum to intensify dialogue in that regard. We can demonstrate our commitment by adopting consensus recommendations on the objective of nuclear disarmament and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

As regards the second agenda item, entitled "Practical confidence-building measures in the field of conventional weapons", let me state that India supports practical initiatives for confidence-building measures (CBMs), whether unilateral, bilateral, regional or global. We believe that CBMs can build trust and

confidence and enhance transparency to minimize misunderstandings and misperceptions, thereby promoting an environment that is conducive to peace and security among States. India has initiated several CBMs with the countries in our neighbourhood.

We believe that the initiation of a confidence-building process must be decided upon by States freely and in the exercise of their sovereignty. Confidence-building must be a step-by-step process and should evolve at a pace that is comfortable to all participating States. CBMs in specific regions should take fully into account the political, military and other conditions prevailing in that region. CBMs in a regional context should be adopted at the initiation and with the agreement of the States of the region concerned. In elaborating practical CBMs in the field of conventional weapons, we should take advantage of the guidelines on CBMs endorsed by the General Assembly at its forty-first session on the recommendation of the UNDC.

We believe that a significant amount of work needs to be accomplished on this agenda item in our meetings in the UNDC this year and next. The discussions last year were sketchy, perhaps in anticipation of the results of the arms trade treaty negotiations and the United Nations Conference to Review Progress Made in the Implementation of the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects. We also believe that discussions on CBMs in the field of conventional weapons should not become a tool for pursuing political agendas or for promoting instruments that do not enjoy universal support.

Being the second year of this cycle of United Nations Disarmament Commission meetings, this year is crucial to us being able to adopt substantive recommendations at the conclusion of the cycle next year. Since we have only two items on our agenda, as opposed to three in the past cycle, there is a possibility for an in-depth exchange of views on all aspects related to the agenda items this year. We are therefore hopeful of good progress in our work under your direction, Sir.

**Mr. Wensley** (South Africa): Allow me to congratulate you, Sir, on assuming your position as Chair of the 2013 substantive session of the United Nations Disarmament Commission (UNDC). We also wish to extend our congratulations to the members of your Bureau on their election. We assure you of South Africa's full support. We also express our appreciation



to Ambassador Enrique Román-Morey, Permanent Representative of Peru, for his unstinting efforts as Chair of the UNDC last year.

South Africa wishes to align itself with the statements delivered this morning by the representatives of Indonesia and Nigeria on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement and the African Group, respectively.

Multilateralism, with the United Nations and the Charter at its centre, remains central to our efforts to find sustainable solutions to the challenges to international peace and security. South Africa therefore continues to attach great importance to the work of the Disarmament Commission with its mandate as the sole deliberative body of the multilateral disarmament machinery.

With regard to the agenda item on recommendations for achieving the objective of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, Africa remains concerned about the slow rate of progress in achieving the goals of nuclear disarmament. My delegation wishes to reaffirm its commitment to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) as the foundation of the nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation regime. As the only legally binding international instrument that establishes a universal norm against the further proliferation of nuclear weapons, it contains a legally binding commitment by the nuclear-weapon States towards the elimination of their nuclear arsenals, while recognizing the inalienable right of States to pursue nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. We remain fully committed to promoting full compliance with all its provisions and their universal application.

While we welcome the significant progress made towards realizing the non-proliferation objectives of the Treaty, we continue to be concerned about the lack of progress towards nuclear disarmament in accordance with article VI of the Treaty, particularly following the unequivocal undertaking towards nuclear disarmament made by the nuclear-weapon States in 2000.

For South Africa, the outcome of the 2010 Review Conference of the States Parties to the NPT was therefore of particular importance. Significantly, the 2010 Final Document (NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol. I)) reaffirms the validity of the agreements reached in 1995 and 2000, including the unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals. In that context, it

also contains a number of important measures aimed at achieving our goal of a world free from the threat posed by nuclear weapons.

South Africa continues to support the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in other parts of the world, including the Middle East. As stated by the representative of Indonesia on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) this morning, South Africa, as one of the NAM States parties to the NPT, expresses its profound disappointment at the delay in the implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East and at the decision of the 2010 NPT Review Conference on the convening of a conference to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. We urge the organizers to convene the conference as a matter of urgency.

The first meeting of the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 NPT Review Conference, which took place last year, ensured a smooth start to the review cycle. It is imperative that we build on the success of that meeting, which laid the groundwork for monitoring the fulfilment by all States parties of their commitments in the 2010 Review Conference action plan, including those of the nuclear-weapon States to accelerate concrete progress on the steps leading to nuclear disarmament.

With regard to our conventional arms agenda item on practical confidence-building measures, this year sees an opportunity for the Group of Governmental Experts on the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms to review the operation of the Register and its possible further expansion. We believe that the momentum built in the arms trade treaty (ATT) process will serve as much food for thought in the work of the Group of Governmental Experts in ensuring the relevance of that instrument in the field of confidence-building. Likewise, we believe that the UNDC's consideration of that agenda item could further stimulate the work of the Group.

As far as the ATT process is concerned, we are disappointed that our seven-year deliberations did not yield any tangible results at the end of last week but we are confident that all is not lost. While the 27 March 2013 ATT text is not perfect in the eyes of all delegations, it represents a good basis for a treaty on the regulation of conventional arms transfers. Under the ATT, the States parties will be required to take a number of concrete measures at the respective national levels, thereby

further enhancing practical confidence-building measures in the field of conventional weapons.

During the current session of the General Assembly, South Africa had the honour to introduce, on behalf also of Colombia and Japan, the annual so-called omnibus small arms and light weapons draft resolution. That followed the successfully concluded second United Nations Conference to Review Progress Made in the Implementation of the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects. We believe that, together with the practical measures set out in the United Nations Programme of Action and through the regular submission of national reports, the resolution also contributes to building confidence among States in the field of conventional arms.

In conclusion, the UNDC has faced the challenge of not being able to make any progress for several years now. We hope that all delegations are able to display the necessary political will and that we may be able to make real progress during this session.

**Mr. AlAjmi (Kuwait)** (*spoke in Arabic*): I should like to congratulate you, Sir, on your election as Chair of the current session of the Disarmament Commission. We firmly believe that, with your experience and wisdom, you will contribute to the success of our work this year. We wish to take this opportunity also to say that we will support you in order to help you carry out your work. We also congratulate the members of the Bureau.

We associate ourselves with the statement made by the representative of Indonesia earlier today on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement.

Kuwait once again affirms the importance of the United Nations and its noble message to safeguard international peace and security despite the many challenges in our path, including the threat of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. They are a real danger to international peace and security and to all humankind. That is why we acceded to the relevant international conventions, such as the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. We also joined the Early Notification Convention and the Additional Protocol to the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement. We believe that such instruments, in particular the Non-Proliferation Treaty, are especially important in

the context of disarmament and international peace and security.

With regard to the three main treaties and their balanced review and the right of countries to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in accordance with the safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Kuwait has signed all such conventions, treaties and protocols. We in Kuwait do not produce any such weapons. We place our trust in humankind and aspire to a world free of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons. We look to social and political goals and increased resources to achieve them.

The world faces serious problems. International and regional cooperation are necessary. The economic and political situation is deteriorating in the Middle East owing to the current environment and Israel's possession of weapons of mass destruction in defiance of the international community. We call on that country to join the Non-Proliferation Treaty, as required by the international community, and to place its weapons under IAEA inspection.

We very much regret that situation and the failure of the Helsinki initiative to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in accordance with the Final Document of the 1995 Review Conference of the States Parties to the NPT (NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol. I)). We call on the international community to continue seeking implementation of the outcome of that Conference in order to achieve specific results and real tools that will help us in line with the principles outlined in that area from the beginning, namely, putting an end to nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East.

We note our regret that the Final United Nations Conference on the Arms Trade Treaty was not able to achieve consensus on the text submitted by the President of the Conference in March. We would like to congratulate the President on his capable and transparent conduct of the Conference. However, we once again regret that it was not possible to take into account the concerns of the Arab countries put forward in informal consultations and official meetings chaired by the facilitators. We trust that our concerns will be taken into account so that the Treaty can reflect a greater balance and prove more acceptable in order to put an end to the dreadful consequences of the illicit trade in conventional weapons.

In conclusion, I would say that my delegation hopes that the Commission can move forward in the course of this substantive session by drawing up guidelines and recommendations in line with the agenda. The State of Kuwait fully supports all efforts to that end.

**Mr. Dehghani** (Islamic Republic of Iran): I would like to congratulate you, Mr. Chair, and the other members of the Bureau on your election and assure you of the full cooperation of my delegation for a successful meeting.

I also fully associate myself with the statement made earlier today by the representative of Indonesia on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM).

Although nuclear science is among humankind's greatest achievements and can and should be used to serve the well-being of all human societies, it is equally associated with the most appalling event in history and the greatest genocide and misuse of humanity's scientific achievements. Since the horrendous nuclear attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, nuclear disarmament has always been the highest global priority. The very first resolution adopted unanimously by the General Assembly at its first session on 24 January 1946 (resolution 1/I) called for the total elimination of the atomic bomb.

Unfortunately, the continued existence of thousands of deployed and non-deployed strategic and non-strategic nuclear weapons around the world seriously threatens international peace and security and the very survival of human civilization. In considering the agenda item on recommendations for achieving the objective of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, the Disarmament Commission should set as a principle that there is no legal, political or security reason to justify the possession of nuclear weapons by any country and their total elimination is the only absolute guarantee against the threat posed by such weapons.

As the Secretary-General has recently put it, "There are no right hands for wrong weapons". We need to make every effort to materialize the commitment made by the States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) to undertake effective measures to achieve nuclear disarmament. It is a source of grave concern that certain nuclear-weapon States still continue to allocate billions of dollars to conduct nuclear-weapon tests, no matter which means they choose for such tests, in order to develop new types

of nuclear weapons, to build new nuclear weapons production facilities and to modernize and replace such weapons.

Equally, those countries, in contravention of their obligations under article VI of the NPT, continue to resort to an obsolete nuclear deterrence policy and to promote the role and status of nuclear weapons in their security doctrines. That is also applicable to the Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of NATO, which justifies the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. It maintains unjustifiable concepts on international security based on promoting and developing military alliances and nuclear deterrence policies.

We strongly call upon all those States to comply with their explicit legal obligations under the NPT and to exclude completely the possession, use or threat of use of nuclear weapons from their military and security doctrines. It is worth mentioning in that context that, despite the repeated claims of certain nuclear-weapon States in regard to compliance with their legal obligations on nuclear disarmament, the latest facts and figures fully call into question the validity and credibility of such claims.

In that regard, we strongly believe that limited bilateral and unilateral arms reductions and the mere decommissioning of nuclear weapons are far short of real and effective steps for the total elimination of nuclear weapons. They can never be a substitute for the obligation of nuclear-weapon States for the complete elimination of all their nuclear weapons in an irreversible, transparent and internationally verifiable manner.

We also believe that the lack of progress in nuclear disarmament is not the only challenge as some nuclear-weapon States, in clear non-compliance with their legal obligations, are proliferating nuclear weapons horizontally and vertically, including by continuing nuclear-weapon-sharing arrangements with non-nuclear-weapon States, as well as other nuclear-weapon States.

The Islamic Republic of Iran, along with the overwhelming majority of States, maintains its principled position that the total elimination of nuclear weapons, as the highest priority, is the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of such weapons. In that regard, we emphasize the high priority and urgency of starting negotiations on nuclear

disarmament and a nuclear-weapons convention to prohibit the possession, development, production, acquisition, testing, stockpiling, transfer and use or threat of use of such weapons and to provide for their destruction.

Likewise, we call for starting negotiations, without any further delay, on a universal legally binding instrument on effective, unconditional, non-discriminatory and irrevocable security assurances by all nuclear-weapon States to all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons under any circumstances.

The Islamic Republic of Iran believes that the best way to guarantee the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, in addition to the full and non-selective implementation of all provisions of the NPT, is to assure its universality, in particular in the Middle East, where the nuclear-weapons programme of the only non-party to that Treaty, assisted by certain nuclear-weapon States, seriously threatens regional and international peace and security.

To overcome the problem, Iran proposed the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East in 1974. Nevertheless, despite the adoption of numerous resolutions by the General Assembly and the resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the NPT, efforts to establish such a zone have not yet succeeded due to the persistent refusal of the Israeli regime to join the NPT and to place all its nuclear facilities under the comprehensive safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

In that regard and as an important development, I would refer to the cancellation of the 2012 conference on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. Although, in its relevant statement, the United States claimed that States in the region had not reached agreement on acceptable conditions for a conference, the truth is that the Islamic Republic of Iran and all Arab countries had already announced their readiness to participate in the conference.

The Islamic Republic of Iran strongly rejects any precondition whatsoever and by whomsoever regarding the conference, including the participation therein. We stress that there should be strong pressure on that regime to participate in the conference without any precondition.

We fully associate ourselves with the relevant statement issued on that occasion by the Non-Aligned Movement, in which NAM strongly rejected the alleged impediments presented by the conveners for not convening the conference on schedule and urged them to convene the conference in accordance with the mandate entrusted to them by the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol. I)) in order to avoid any negative repercussions on the relevance and credibility of the NPT, its 2015 review process, and the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime as a whole.

The Islamic Republic of Iran would like once again to make it clear that the decision on the 2012 conference was adopted by consensus by the NPT States parties and, accordingly, not only shall any decision on that be made by the NPT Review Conference itself, but also the rules of procedures of the NPT Review Conference shall fully apply to the Middle East conference, including its preparatory process.

In the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament (resolution S-10/2), the General Assembly strongly emphasized the need for the removal of the threat of nuclear weapons and their total elimination, as well as the prevention of the proliferation of such weapons, and by identifying nuclear disarmament as the highest priority mandated the Disarmament Commission to follow up the relevant decisions and recommendations of that session, including on nuclear disarmament.

Despite the many achievements of the Commission, it is regrettable that, during its lifetime, this body has not been able to formulate an exclusive set of recommendations on nuclear disarmament and the total elimination of nuclear weapons. The Commission therefore is highly expected to accord priority to and focus on nuclear disarmament and the total elimination of nuclear weapons as the long-delayed part of its mandate. For that obvious reason, the UNDC agenda item on nuclear disarmament, as decided by the General Assembly, is of outmost relevance and importance.

The Islamic Republic of Iran stands ready to fully cooperate with other delegations during the current cycle of the Commission to overcome the existing stalemate in the Commission, which in our view is rooted in the lack of genuine political will on the part of certain countries. We also look forward, Mr. Chair,



to working with you and all delegations to have a successful session of the Commission.

**The Chair:** We have heard the last speaker in the general exchange of views today.

I shall now call on those representatives who wish to speak in exercise of the right of reply. In that connection, I would recall that, in accordance with paragraphs 9 and 10 of annex V of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly:

“The number of interventions in the exercise of the right of reply for any delegation at a given meeting should be limited to two per item.

“The first intervention in the exercise of the right of reply for any delegation on any item at a given meeting should be limited to 10 minutes and the second intervention should be limited to five minutes.”

**Mr. Bravaco** (United States of America): I will be brief. With regard to the situation in North-East Asia, the United States is committed to maintaining peace and security in the region. North Korea should stop its provocative threats and instead concentrate on abiding by its international obligations. North Korea’s pursuit of nuclear and missile programmes does not make it more secure, but only increases its isolation and seriously undermines its ability to pursue economic development.

In response to North Korean threats, we are taking a range of prudent measures to enhance both homeland and allied security. Our actions have been important steps to reassure our allies, demonstrate our resolve and reduce the chance of miscalculation and provocation. The belligerent rhetoric coming out of North Korea, which follows a familiar pattern, only deepens its isolation and raises tensions. If North Korea takes steps to come into compliance with its international obligations, it will begin to find real security.

**Mr. Lim Sang Beom** (Republic of Korea): I would like to exercise the right of reply in response to the totally unacceptable remarks of the representative of North Korea. We reject all of them. They are baseless. Let me just raise a few points.

First, Security Council resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009) made it clear that North Korea is not entitled to undertake any launch using ballistic missile technologies. The Security Council further spelled out,

through its presidential statement S/PRST/2012/13, issued in April 2012, that North Korea’s launches are serious violations of relevant Security Council resolutions, even if characterized as a satellite launch or space launch vehicles.

Secondly, joint exercises between the Republic of Korea and the United States, such as Key Resolve, have been conducted annually for decades. They are designed to enhance our combined readiness against North Korean military actions and are purely defensive in nature and conducted within the Republic of Korea’s area of control with the presence of members of the United Nations Command, as well as military supervisors from neutral nations’ supervisory commissions. Moreover, the United Nations Command component of the Military Armistice Commission has notified North Korea in advance of the exercise stage and of their defensive nature every year.

Those exercises have contributed to the deterrence of war for the past several decades on the Korean peninsula. North Korea has issued a trite yet inflammatory statement on the joint exercises on an annual basis. In the meanwhile, over the past 60 years, North Korea has committed innumerable violations of the Armistice Agreement.

Thirdly, the Armistice Agreement has played a central role in the main tenets of peace and stability on the Korean peninsula for the past six decades and cannot be nullified unilaterally. The legality and validity of that Agreement has been stressed by the Secretary-General, as well as by the United Nations Command. If North Korea is a Member of the United Nations, it must honour the Agreement, which was concluded in accordance with international law.

Fourthly, as to the relevant Security Council resolutions and the Joint Statement of the Six Parties, issued in September 2005, North Korea has the obligation to abandon all nuclear weapons in existing nuclear programmes, including its uranium-enrichment programme. The recent adoption of Security Council resolution 2094 (2013), on 7 March, made it even more clear as an unmistakable fact. North Korea should abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear-weapon programmes in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner, in accordance with those resolutions and obligations.

Finally, North Korea has a habit of blaming others for its illicit activities and provocations. North Korea’s

argument is nothing more than an irresponsible pretext. The international community has repeatedly made it clear that North Korea cannot have the status of a nuclear-weapon State. Relevant Security Council resolutions, the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol. I)) and the many resolutions of the International Atomic Energy Agency clearly reaffirm that. North Korea should wake up from the delusion of becoming a nuclear-weapon State. North Korea should realize that it cannot achieve anything by developing its nuclear and missile programme and undertaking provocative acts.

**Mr. Ri Tong Il** (Democratic People's Republic of Korea): I listened carefully to the statement made by the representative of the United States. First, let me say that the delegation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea totally rejects his remarks as ridiculous. They make no sense at all. He is trying hard to mislead delegations and the international community.

The United States is the source of the threats and provocations. The United States started the escalation of the ongoing tension and is now driving the situation to the brink of nuclear war, as I said earlier. The United States created the situation. The starting point was Security Council resolution 2087 (2013), which sought to delegitimize the legitimate right of a sovereign State to a satellite launch. That was a clear, flagrant and open violation of international law. The United States misused the order to infringe upon the legitimate right of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to undertake a satellite launch.

The issue of a satellite launch has never been raised in the history of the Security Council. Why does it apply only to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea? I pose that question to the United States. Why does it apply only to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea? I am asking that question seriously. The United States does not have any legal grounds. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea is a State party to the Outer Space Treaty, to which it acceded in March 2009. It is an international multilateral treaty, but the Security Council was misused as a political tool of the United States. The United States is interested in stifling the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to bring about regime change and remove the sovereignty and dignity of the country and people of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, thereby angering the entire Korean population.

Secondly, the United States is the source of nuclear proliferation on the Korean peninsula. The United States introduced the first nuclear weapons at the time of the Korean War. The Korean War began in 1950, and in August of that year the United States ordered the deployment of nuclear weapons to the Korean peninsula. At the end of 1950, the United States publicized its readiness to use 30 to 50 nuclear weapons along the opening border area between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and China.

In 1957, the first nuclear weapon was introduced into South Korea. Coming into the 1970s, the number of nuclear weapons reached over 1,000 and was later expanded to include the neutron bomb, which was recognized by the international community as an evil weapon. That is how the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has been exposed to nuclear threats. Coming into 2002, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea was listed as part of the axis of evil and as a potential target of a nuclear pre-emptive strike. That is how the United States has been trying hard to expose the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. We have been compelled to acquire nuclear weapons. We have no domestic reason for nuclear weapons; it is an external factor that has caused us to make very expensive nuclear weapons at the expense of the national economy. We have to defend our country. We have to defend our people. We could not allow bombs to be dropped on civilians, as they were in Iraq, Libya and Afghanistan. Never would that occur on the Korean peninsula.

The United States is now bringing the B-2 aircraft from its mainland, carrying nuclear weapons. It flew across the Pacific from Whiteman Air Force Base on the United States mainland to South Korea. Yesterday on CNN, I saw the practice exercise simulating the dropping of live munitions and carpet-bombing targeting the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. B-52s have conducted flights several times from the island of Guam in the same type of simulated bombing. Nuclear-powered submarines and nuclear-powered aircraft carriers are all carrying live nuclear weapons for the first time ever in history since the division of the country. They already have a plan to attack the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

With regard to South Korea, it has no power. It has no sovereignty. It has military sovereignty for their own troops through the hands and the power of the United States Command there. It has no legal authority there. Furthermore, the representative of

South Korea elaborated on the unilateral nullification of the Armistice Agreement by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. It is not a State party to that Agreement. Therefore, he cannot say anything with regard to that.

Concerning the Armistice Agreement, I want to make this clear to South Korea. In 1953, the Korean War came to an end. The first violation started with the agreement between the United States and South Korea allowing United States troops to remain in South Korea. Actually, there is one paragraph obliging the United States to withdraw its troops. But South Korea went ahead and concluded an agreement, a so-called alliance pact, with the United States. Under that pretext, the United States did not withdraw its troops. That was the first very clear, crucial and dangerous violation.

As I said, the United States has brought in nuclear weapons. That is also another flagrant violation. I can name all the violations on the list I have here. However, since time is limited, it is the United States that, since the beginning of the ceasefire, made the Armistice Agreement null and void on its own and by itself by violating its provisions one by one. Now, we cannot let ourselves get tied up in that. The United States only misused the Korean Armistice Agreement as an opportunity and a loophole to contain the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and to bring about regime change with its increasingly hostile policy against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

With regard to the satellite launch, South Korea cannot say anything. The launch by South Korea of the Naro satellite was conducted after our launch and after Security Council resolution 2087 (2013) was adopted. We can see in this the double standards of the Security Council. The United States defended South Korea's satellite launch by saying it was a responsible launch. That is nonsense.

With regard to the Japanese allegation about the missile, again Japan was busy going around asking for a resolution, and a few days after the adoption of resolution 2087 (2013), on the satellite launch by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, it demonstrated a different position by launching its own satellite. But the United States kept quiet. Why? That is another question. The Security Council kept quiet. Why? After the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's satellite launch and the adoption of the resolution, the United States deployed long-range interceptor missiles. And

the Security Council is quiet. So all three parties launched missiles or satellites. That is a double standard of the Security Council and it will go down in history as a crime.

**Mr. Lim Sang Beom** (Republic of Korea): From the statements of delegations, it seems to be evident who is threatening peace and security on the Korean peninsula and beyond. All the rights that the representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea mentioned can be enjoyed by countries that are implementing all their international obligations in accordance with relevant international law and Security Council resolutions. I advise North Korea to read Security Council resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013) and 2094 (2013). North Korea is not entitled to nuclear development or to undertake launches using ballistic missile technologies.

With regard to the Armistice Agreement, it is very clear that the Republic of Korea is a party to that Agreement. So, without the agreement of the Republic of Korea, it could not be scrapped. We strongly urge North Korea to listen to the unified voice of the international community and heed the unequivocal warning of the international community.

Finally, I would like to repeat once again that North Korea should wake up from the delusion of becoming a nuclear-weapon State. It should realize that it cannot achieve anything by developing and continuing its nuclear weapon and missile programme.

**Mr. Ri Tong Il** (Democratic People's Republic of Korea): Again, I totally reject the remarks of the representative of South Korea as nonsense and ridiculous. First, he talked about Security Council resolutions. Once again, I raise the question to the representative of the United States. Why do those resolutions apply only to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea? I did not pose that question to the representative of South Korea. And South Korea launched a satellite. That is a double standard on the part of the Security Council. Can the representative of the United States not answer that question?

We totally reject the statement made by the representative of South Korea with regard to the Security Council resolution because the Democratic People's Republic of Korea was the only country targeted. Last year alone, 50 countries launched satellites. And out of the launches by 50 countries in 2012, how many of those launches were brought before

the Security Council? None, except for that of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

With regard to what he said about the Security Council resolution, I kindly advise him to look at our Defence Commission's statement totally rejecting that resolution and how seriously we take the flagrant violations of the sovereignty, security and dignity of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. That was the starting point. South Korea is responsible for the creation of that programme. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea will never tolerate such violations. That was the starting point for the United States to raise the sovereignty issue in violation of international law.

Secondly, the representative of South Korea talked about the Armistice Agreement. He said that South Korea is a party to that Agreement. The international community is sitting here. I advise him to show his signature to the representatives here. It was the United

States that signed. He cannot say anything about that. He does not have any legal power.

Thirdly, he again repeated that we should wake up from our delusion. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea is not sleeping. He cannot tell the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to wake up. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea woke up when the United States nuclear weapons were brought into South Korea in 1957. That is when we woke up. South Korea allowed United States nuclear weapons to come into the Korean peninsula, putting the threat of the disastrous annihilation of the entire Korean nation into the hands of a foreign Power. Therefore, I kindly recommend that South Korea wake up and look at the nuclear weapons of the United States in South Korea and how disastrous it would be should war break out or if North and South Korea were in a state of war. So I seriously recommend that South Korea wake up.

*The meeting rose at 5.35 p.m.*