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## EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE TO THE SUDAN

## OPERATION LIFELINE SUDAN

Report of the Secretary-General

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## I. INTRODUCTION

1. The present report has been prepared in response to General Assembly resolution 43/8 of 18 October 1988 in which the Assembly, inter alia, requested the Secretary-General, in close co-operation with the Government of the Sudan, to co-ordinate efforts of the United Nations system to help the Sudan in its emergency, rehabilitation and reconstruction efforts, to mobilize resources for the implementation of those programmes and to keep the international community informed of those needs; the Secretary-General was also requested to report to the Assembly at its forty-fourth session on the implementation of the resolution.

2. In resolution 43/52 of 6 December 1988 entitled "Special programme of assistance to the Sudan", the General Assembly, inter alia, welcomed the decision of the Secretary-General to organize a meeting of bilateral donors and pertinent international institutions and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in order to mobilize the resources needed to implement a follow-up emergency assistance programme covering the rehabilitation and resettlement needs of displaced persons, and to report on the results of its efforts to the Assembly at its forty-fourth session.

3. Substantial progress has been made in the implementation of resolution 43/8, which is described in detail in the present report. As regards resolution 43/52, it is reported that because of unforeseen political developments in the country, it has not been possible to convene the envisaged follow-up meeting mentioned therein. Moreover the Government has not been in a position to define its medium- and long-term policies for assistance to the displaced population. Should there be any further developments in this respect, arrangements would be made to bring them to the attention of the General Assembly.

## II. SITUATION IN THE SUDAN

4. With an area of 2.5 million square kilometers and an estimated population of more than 25 million in 1987, the Sudan is the largest country in Africa, but its population density is low. At the time of the last national census, carried out in 1983, it had 22 million inhabitants and a 2.8 per cent annual rate of demographic growth. More recent data indicate that 70 per cent of the population is rural, 10 per cent is nomadic and 20 per cent is urban. More than a million refugees from neighbouring countries have put additional pressure on an already overstretched social infrastructure, particularly in the eastern provinces.

5. The population density of the Sudan ranges from 16 persons per square kilometre in the Khartoum area to about 1 per square kilometre in the northern provinces. In the south, it is currently impossible to make an objective assessment of population density as the escalating civil war has led to a dramatic increase in the numbers of individuals fleeing the conflict. It is estimated that nearly half the 6 million inhabitants of southern Sudan have become displaced from their traditional places of residence.

6. By 1988, following renewed civil war in the south, several years of drought and famine, as well as floods in the north, vast areas of the Sudan had been devastated. Thousands of families had fled to southern garrison towns protected by the Government, to the transitional zone of Southern Darfur, Southern Kordofan and northern Bahr El Ghazal or to Khartoum. Other groups had sought asylum in Ethiopia. This dramatic situation was compounded, on the economic side, by the burden of having to service an external debt of some \$13 billion.\*

7. It was estimated that as many as 3 million people were displaced during the period 1986-1988 and that upwards of 400,000 died from disease and starvation. By mid-1988, reports from NGO field staff and others operating in the affected areas, focused attention on the gravity of the situation and the need for a much more effective and strengthened relief programme for the critically affected population.

8. In view of this situation and further deteriorating conditions, the Government of the Sudan, in June 1988, requested the Secretary-General to appeal to the international community for help in preventing further large-scale starvation and suffering in the affected parts of the country and amongst the large displaced population in Khartoum.

9. In response to the Government's request, the Secretary-General sent a high-level inter-agency mission to review the situation with high government officials and representatives of the donor, United Nations and NGO communities, and to set up detailed terms of reference for a follow-up assessment team. Unfortunately, because of the heavy rains and floods that devastated Khartoum in August 1988, the team was not able to begin its field work until mid-September. It travelled with high-level government officials, donor and NGO representatives to some of the worst affected parts of the transitional zone, notably to the towns of Abyei, Muglad and El Meiram (see map). The findings and recommendations of the mission were approved by the Government and incorporated into a comprehensive report entitled "The Emergency Situation in the Sudan: Urgent Humanitarian Requirements, November 1988".

10. On 27 October 1988, in pursuance of resolution 43/8, the Secretary-General appealed to donors (A/43/755) to provide immediate financial and material support amounting to \$73 million for urgent humanitarian assistance to the affected population. The funding requested included the cost of food aid, relief items, internal transport, and assistance for health, water and other non-food requirements. The latter category included important support to strengthen the Sudanese institutions responsible for the provision and management of relief and rehabilitation activities. The Secretary-General classified the situation in the Sudan as a complex emergency and decided to appoint a Special Co-ordinator for Emergency and Relief Operations to the country as well as to reactivate the United Nations Emergency Operations Group (UNEOG) in Khartoum. Mr. Bryan Wannop, Representative and United Nations Resident Co-ordinator for the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in the Sudan, was subsequently appointed Special Co-ordinator for Emergency Relief Operations in the Sudan and a Special Emergency Unit was established within the UNDP office.

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\* References to dollars (\$) are to United States dollars, unless otherwise stated.

11. The appeal of the Secretary-General was based on the report prepared by the United Nations mission and the Government in October 1988 (see para. 9). It stressed that a key objective of the Government's emergency programme was to reduce famine, starvation and disease in the garrison towns of the south and in the transitional zone by increasing the delivery of food, utilizing all transport means available. To this effect the dispatch of truck convoys from Uganda and Khartoum would be intensified and the use of air transport to supply the displaced population in garrison towns increased. The appeal also emphasized a programme of assistance for the Khartoum displaced, covering urgent needs in all major sectors, as well as a paired settlement programme for the displaced in areas adjacent to the transitional zone.

12. However, owing to various administrative, financial and operational constraints, and to disruptions resulting from civil strife (mined roads, attacks on relief convoys, threats and attempts to shoot down aircraft, as well as restrictions on communications and the movements of relief personnel), the transport of food and other relief supplies into the south and its bordering areas remained severely restricted. Progress in the preparation of mid-term assistance programmes for the Khartoum displaced was also delayed.

13. By January 1989, it was evident that implementation of the emergency programme alone would not be sufficient to meet even the most urgent requirements called for by the situation. Emergency needs for areas under control of the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement (SPLM)/Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA) had not been factored in and the overall assessment carried out in September 1988 needed to be updated. Moreover, unless adequate quantities of food aid and other emergency items could be transported without delay to key locations in the south and in the transitional zone, the 1989 rainy season, which would isolate the south by cutting off access by road and air, could result in a repetition of the large-scale human tragedy that had affected the country the previous two years. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), which was to operate in both Government- and SPLA-held areas, finally commenced its field activities in December 1988, after protracted negotiations. These had started in March 1988 and had involved careful situation assessments in six towns in southern Sudan. In accordance with its specific mandate, the programmes of ICRC were designed to cover only populations and areas directly affected by armed conflict. These programmes thus did not meet all the emergency requirements which by then were coming to the fore. It had become clear that massive logistical means involving air, road, rail and river transport as well as all the support of the Government and the donor community would have to be mobilized on an extremely urgent basis.

14. In view of the gravity of the situation, the Secretary-General, in late January 1989, proposed to the Government of the Sudan that a high-level meeting of the country's main aid partners be convened in Khartoum to devise measures for averting what promised to be a disaster in the coming months. The meeting would attempt to formulate and approve a concrete relief policy as well as a strategy to accelerate food and non-food deliveries to key areas before the onset of the rains; devise a plan for monitoring and following up the distribution; and identify and endorse policy decisions required to implement the planned relief activities as effectively as possible. It would also enumerate associated costs and issue an

urgent appeal to the Governments and agencies concerned for their immediate financial and material support.

15. It may be noted that between early October 1988 and the end of January 1989, a period of four months, approximately 11,000 metric tons of food had been delivered to various points throughout the country, largely by airlift from Entebbe, Khartoum and Nairobi. Delivery improved in February, but stockpiled levels in the south were still only 13,000 tons. Additionally, by the end of February 1989, slightly over 100,000 metric tons of cereals, pulses and oils were in the national "pipeline", either being committed for delivery or in unallocated stocks "in country" but needing major additional financing to meet internal transport costs.

### III. THE KHARTOUM MEETING AND EMERGENCY PLAN OF ACTION

16. The Khartoum meeting, jointly convened by the Government of the Sudan and the United Nations, was held on 8 and 9 March 1989. The Sudanese delegation was led by the Prime Minister and included the Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Minister for Social Welfare, Zakat Relief and Displaced as well as the Commissioner for Relief and Rehabilitation. The United Nations delegation was led by Mr. James P. Grant, Executive Director of the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), and included Mr. James C. Ingram, Executive Director of the World Food Programme (WFP) and Mr. Abdulrahim A. Farah, United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Special Political Questions, Regional Co-operation, Decolonization and Trusteeship. Representatives of concerned agencies of the Government of the Sudan, donor Governments, other concerned United Nations agencies, intergovernmental organizations, Sudanese and international NGOs were invited to participate in the proceedings. The Conference secretariat was provided by the UNDP Emergency Unit.

17. The background paper prepared for the meeting noted that of an estimated 2.25 million affected nationals, all of whom would require some kind of emergency assistance during the rainy season, 600,000 displaced persons in the transitional zone, in larger southern garrison towns and in the rural south including areas controlled by SPLM/SPLA, were in imminent danger of starvation. It was estimated that some 120,000 tons of food supplies as well as non-food items (i.e., medicine, vaccines, seeds, tools and blankets) would be required to tide them over the rainy season. As a significant proportion of the most urgent food needs had already been obtained through the donor community's response to the November 1988 appeal and were available as in-country stocks, the principal task was to implement a crash delivery programme to move them to areas where they would be needed during the rainy season. The Government undertook to give priority to loading and returning barges to Malakal and trains to Aweil, and facilitating relief flights. Donors were called upon to support major airlifts to Juba and other isolated towns, to provide funding for road convoys to Wau, Juba, Yei and certain other points and for the procurement of non-food emergency supplies, and to provide technical and advisory personnel as well as additional temporary storage facilities.

18. It was estimated that the total cost of the relief operation would amount to \$133 million, of which \$78 million had already been committed.

19. All participants, including the Government of the Sudan, accepted the following general principles constituting the proposed Plan of Action:

(a) United Nations, donor and NGO personnel would be guaranteed free access to all civilian non-combatant populations in need of emergency relief;

(b) Arrangements would be made to ensure the delivery of relief supplies for pre-positioning at secondary and tertiary distribution points;

(c) Truck convoys and all other forms of transportation would carry only humanitarian relief supplies and staff involved with relief actions;

(d) A month of tranquillity was to be declared beginning 1 April 1989 during which both sides would cease military activities to enable supplies to be transported by road, train, barge and air to all locations in need;

(e) The Government of the Sudan would finalize its plans for the identification and preparation of sites for relocating vulnerable and displaced people;

(f) All participants in pre-existing relief operations would continue their activities;

(g) The mandate of the Sudanese Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (RRC) as well as the office of its Commissioner would be strengthened;

(h) The Government would welcome the participation of NGOs in carrying out relief activities;

(i) Appropriate mechanisms would be established and/or strengthened to assist the monitoring and reporting processes;

(j) The Government would provide the most favourable legal exchange rate for contributions.

20. It was also agreed that RRC would ensure that custom clearance and other formalities would be finalized promptly; the United Nations would provide logistical and field advisers to ensure that transportation, delivery and distribution were carried out as agreed; the Government of the Sudan would guarantee the prompt issuance of entry visas and travel permits, strengthen communication facilities, establish a senior-level Steering Committee under the chairmanship of RRC, process registration permits for NGOs speedily, and make counterpart funds available.

21. The Government also agreed that Mr. James P. Grant, Executive Director of UNICEF, should establish contact with SPLA to discuss the Plan of Action as well as to explain the concept and negotiate with its leadership the modalities of the "Month of Tranquillity". Talks with officials of SPLA took place immediately after the close of the Khartoum meeting during which the concept of eight "corridors of tranquillity", along which supplies could be transported without interference for

the entire duration of the relief operation, was worked out. The concept was immediately thereafter reviewed and approved by the Government.

22. The precise objectives agreed upon for these corridors were as follows:

(a) To send to Aweil, by mid-April, unescorted trains carrying maximum loads of food and relief items with no commercial or military freight, with follow-up trains leaving no later than one month thereafter until agreed delivery targets were met;

(b) To send to Malakal and beyond, also beginning in mid-April, barge convoys carrying similar relief items to agreed drop-off points along the way;

(c) To organize and dispatch relief truck convoys via Raga to Wau;

(d) To organize and dispatch relief truck convoys from Uganda to Yei and Juba to supplement pre-existing WFP and other airlifts from Entebbe to Juba;

(e) To increase the number of relief convoys into the Kapoeta-Torit area from Kenya;

(f) To organize and dispatch truck relief convoys from Ethiopia to the area around Nasir and Pochalla;

(g) To accelerate other air supply operations, such as those of UNDP into Aweil.

23. Although ICRC continued to strengthen its relief and rehabilitation activities in southern Sudan, it was agreed that the United Nations would also expand its activities there. In view of UNICEF's special mandate, which authorizes it to operate as a United Nations entity in rebel-held areas on purely humanitarian grounds, it was agreed that UNICEF would act as the United Nations lead agency in SPLA-controlled areas, opening offices to facilitate implementation of the programme, particularly in the health sector, to monitor distribution and to provide an umbrella for NGO activities. WFP, which would bear a major responsibility for the transport of food aid and other commodities, would also operate in the south. The UNDP Emergency Unit in Khartoum, under the Special Co-ordinator, would, in close co-operation with RRC, continue to organize and co-ordinate relief operations targeted to Government-controlled areas and cities and would also assume responsibility for preparing a weekly report on the execution of the Plan of Action. The variety of activities stemming therefrom would be known as "Operation Lifeline Sudan" (OLS).

24. On 23 March, the Secretary-General appointed Mr. Grant as his Personal Representative for OLS, with a mandate to contact Governments and international organizations at the highest level, to mobilize support and to serve as the point of contact with the Government of the Sudan and SPLA.

25. It was also announced that the Personal Representative of the Secretary-General would work closely with the Special Co-ordinator in managing



OLS. The Special Co-ordinator was further vested with overall direction of the United Nations agencies involved in OLS activities carried out in Government areas, namely WFP and UNICEF; with responsibility for all liaison and interaction with the Government of the Sudan, co-ordination of OLS activities with ICRC as well as for the dissemination of information to representatives of the donor community in Khartoum, Khartoum-based NGOs and representatives of local and international media. Working closely with the Government, the Secretary-General's Personal Representative, donors, ICRC and NGOs, the Special Co-ordinator's office was able to resolve a number of important logistical and political problems confronting the operation, including the opening and continued use of the key all-weather railroad corridor between Muglad and Aweil.

26. The central role played by the Ministry of Social Welfare, Zakat, Relief and Displaced and, in particular, its Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (RRC), during the Khartoum meeting and from the very inception of OLS, with regard to the planning and implementation of its programmes and activities, must be emphasized. Working as a government focal point responsible for the provision of agreed counterpart input as well as acting as a link between, on the one hand, the United Nations, donor and NGO communities and, on the other hand, the technical services and government bodies set up to help manage OLS, the Ministry played and continues to play a key part in all OLS activities.

27. Similarly, after UNICEF had contacted SPLM/SPLA at the Government's request to obtain its support in facilitating the transport of food and other emergency commodities to concentrations of displaced civilians, support and co-operation were regularly extended to OLS by concerned members of SPLM/SPLA and its relief organization, the Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Agency (SRRA).

#### IV. OPERATION LIFELINE SUDAN

##### A. Structuring

28. Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS) was officially launched in Khartoum and Nairobi during the first week of April 1989 although, as previously indicated, its inception had been preceded by a number of important activities related to its objectives and implemented by NGOs, ICRC and the United Nations. With a view to enhancing overall co-ordination and deriving maximum benefit from all the assistance provided, OLS succeeded in linking and intensifying, under one common structure and set of mutually agreed objectives, a number of germane activities and programmes carried out by the Government as well as by different organizations and institutions. While co-ordination remained particularly close between the United Nations entities involved and a group of NGOs closely linked with or implementing some joint activities, ICRC for instance, because of its special mandate, maintained a separate identity for its own emergency assistance programme. However, by the continuous pooling of information, the sharing of transport means and scarce infrastructure, the borrowing of commodities and the loaning of staff among all the active participants involved, the efficiency, homogeneity and impact of OLS was greatly enhanced. Similarly, because overall needs were presented jointly and regularly to the whole of the donor community while each participating

organization pursued its resource mobilization efforts through its own established channels, the donor community was able to respond rapidly, in an informed fashion, to shifting and unforeseen requirements.

29. Because of the need to cover vast areas, some of which were more accessible from the North and some from neighboring countries, it was necessary to operate from two main bases: Khartoum and Nairobi.

30. The Khartoum UNEOG, established in 1988 to co-ordinate the United Nations system response to different emergencies prevailing in the country, met at least weekly under the chairmanship of the Special Co-ordinator to exchange information and reach agreement on the United Nations system response to OLS activities. The expanded UNEOG, also operational since 1988 but bringing together representatives of the United Nations system and major donors, also met weekly to share information and agree on donor action in support of OLS objectives.

31. The Government of the Sudan, at the very beginning of OLS, established a co-ordination and monitoring structure ranging from the highest policy-making level to regular donor, NGO and United Nations system technical committee meetings. A high-level Inter-Ministerial Steering Committee, chaired by the Minister for Social Welfare, Zakat, Relief and Displaced functioned as a policy-making body. It also had the responsibility to inform the Prime Minister and seek his guidance on major problems and developments. The High Technical Committee chaired by the RRC Commissioner, reviewed operational output and problems on a regular basis and gave direction to the operation. Throughout the period under review, the Government, the above-mentioned institutions as well as all other ministries and/or services directly or indirectly involved with OLS gave it, and continue to give it, their full co-operation and support.

32. United Nations/OLS-related operations based in Nairobi have been placed under a Co-ordinator and Chief of Operations in the UNICEF office who is responsible for their overall direction and for liaison with the Government of Kenya, the international donor community, ICRC, the Kenya-based NGOs and the media. It is also through him that contact with SPLA on operational matters is maintained. Lokichokio, near the Eastern Equatoria border, has been developed into a main transit, storage and maintenance base for southern Sudan. WFP, the principal agency for logistics and food delivery, plays a central role in the operations handled from Nairobi and takes responsibility for all related matters; its Director of Operations and staff also manage activities undertaken from Uganda, where a large-scale airlift operation has been underway since October 1988 and where a logistics co-ordination centre and major transit facilities were established in Kampala for the marshalling of road convoys through north-western and north-eastern Uganda.

33. NGOs have played a major role in the definition of OLS and continue to do so in its implementation. Information provided by them on conditions in the transitional zone, some garrison towns and other affected parts of the country was extremely useful at the time when the Khartoum Plan of Action was being formulated. It is, however, in the areas of food aid distribution and monitoring that NGO contributions, either directly through their own programmes or through the

loan of some of their staff to UNICEF, WFP and RRC, have been invaluable. The relief committees, which in the transitional zone, garrison towns and any areas where large numbers of displaced have congregated, carry out and monitor the distribution of food aid and all include NGO representatives. NGO staff on loan to WFP have acted as monitors on the trains to Aweil, the truck convoys in both Eastern and Western Equatoria and the barge convoys bringing food from Kostì to Malakal. Finally, much of the work in the sectors of primary health, water supply and agricultural rehabilitation carried out under the aegis of OLS has been and is being implemented by NGO field staff.

34. OLS could not have started, let alone reach a major part of its objective, if it had not been for the full and generous support which the international donor community extended to it from its very start, during the critical months of June and July 1989 and during the succeeding follow-through period. Facing urgent, large-scale requirements, the donor community responded in a timely fashion, not only with financial resources but also with such key in-kind contributions as aircraft, vehicles, personnel and fuel that were essential for OLS to reach its objectives. The sustained interest which the media and world public opinion maintained vis-à-vis OLS also contributed significantly to keeping alive its sense of urgency, its dynamism and focus as well as to mobilizing donor support.

## B. Operational capacity

### 1. Staff and communications

35. Key to the effectiveness of OLS was the establishment, in agreement with the Government of the Sudan, of an independent communication system in Khartoum to link it with field stations as well as with Nairobi and New York. Special satellite transmission equipment was donated to the operation and installed by early April 1989, providing the Secretary-General's Personal Representative and the Special Co-ordinator with direct global communication capacity. The RRC radio network was significantly enlarged to cover all major food storage and distribution points in the transitional zone and in the garrison towns. A radio communication system was established in the SPLA-controlled areas to facilitate the movement of relief items and monitoring of food distribution.

36. International staff with experience in the Sudan and emergency operations have been reassigned from various United Nations field offices, as well as from Rome and New York (see table 1). National staff has been augmented in Khartoum, Nairobi and Entebbe as well as at transit bases and at distribution and monitoring points. All together, over 170 international and national United Nations staff have been involved full-time in OLS. Food distribution monitors, water technicians and health workers have been placed at sites in Government garrison towns as well as SPLA-controlled centres. Numerous truck drivers have been under direct contract to the United Nations or NGOs.

Table 1. Summary of United Nations personnel assigned to Operation Lifeline Sudan

Agency	Khartoum-based operations	Nairobi/Kampala-based operations	Total
WFP	24	54	78
UNICEF	24	62	86
UNDP	<u>11</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>11</u>
Total	59	116	175

37. Crews of aircraft under the direct control of the United Nations and those on loan from the Governments of the Netherlands, the Federal Republic of Germany and France add another 40-50 personnel.

38. ICRC assigned up to 118 expatriate staff to its operations. These were based in garrison towns and SPLA-controlled centres as well as in Khartoum, Lokichokio, Nairobi and Entebbe. Taking into account air crews under the direct control of ICRC, operating aircraft provided or financed by the Governments of France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Belgium, Switzerland and the United States of America and the European Community, another 60-80 personnel have been involved on a full-time basis.

39. Major steps have been taken by WFP to upgrade transport capacity in the various corridors and to assure "all-weather" use of certain key routes. Both corridors from Kenya and Uganda have undergone extensive improvements which continue. At present an all-weather road runs from Lokichokio to Kapoeta and further repairs are to extend it from Kapoeta to Torit with a separate crew working on the road between Torit and Bor. In Uganda, extensive road work has been done in the often insecure Packwatch area up through the national parks. Additional repairs are to concentrate on the Gulu-Nimule road north of Atiak. Other logistical support provided under OLS includes the installation of a truck ferry across the Nile at Paraalodge; repair of roads and culverts on the Para-Packwatch road section; repair of bridges and culverts on the road from Juba to Yei; supply of heavy-duty, four-wheel-drive trucks for off-loading food and relief supplies from the trains along the Muglad-Aweil corridor; assistance in the repair and equipping of tugs and dumb barges for the Kosti-Malakal water route; hardening or resurfacing air strips at Lokichokio and Lodwar; leasing aircraft to operate from Northern Sudan, Kenya and Uganda. Finally, two small airplanes owned by UNDP and UNICEF were used regularly for transporting small loads of emergency supplies, spare parts, and national and international relief personnel, as required by field operations.

## 2. Air transport

40. Donors responded generously to the appeals for assistance by providing either aircraft and crews or funds for leasing them. Thanks to this, through mid-July, a fleet of some 23 aircraft, 16 of which are managed by ICRC, were operating in the OLS area. These aircraft were in almost continuous use. Of these, eight heavy transports airlifted food from Entebbe, Nairobi and Khartoum to Juba, Kongor, Torit, Yei, Maridi, Malakal, Akon, Ler, Aweil and Wau. An additional transport aircraft was employed by WFP for the purpose of air-dropping food and supplies to isolated areas which lack suitable landing facilities. Throughout the operation, small aircraft have plied the diverse routes delivering small quantities of food, supplies and personnel on a consistent and regular basis. All together, an estimated 2,600 sorties by all United Nations, ICRC and Lutheran World Federation (LWF) aircraft were flown by mid-July delivering 31,285 tons of food, 1,878 tons of seeds and tools, vehicles and spare parts, water well equipment, medical supplies and other relief items, as well as transporting well over 800 RRC, SRRA, United Nations and NGO relief workers and ICRC personnel. In addition, war-wounded personnel were evacuated to the ICRC hospital in Lokichokio.

## 3. Road transport

41. Trucks were leased from many sources inside and outside the Sudan. Convoys from Khartoum, Kosti and other points in the north were carrying supplies to Southern Kordofan and Bahr El Ghazal, while supplies were trucked from various points in Kenya and Uganda to Eastern and Western Equatoria. Three truck convoys took 550 metric tons of food from Kosti to Raga and to Wau, a journey of more than 2,000 kilometres. Trucks also took well over 20,000 tons of food to the displaced camps in Southern Kordofan and neighbouring areas of the transitional zone.

42. Owing to the large quantities of fuel that were needed for trucks and airplanes, fuel shortages eventually occurred, causing delays, flight cancellations and other problems. Arrangements were made with government and private sources to ensure availability of the quantities of fuel needed.

43. While the first truck convoys moved through the Lokichokio-Kapoeta corridor, an alarming outbreak of armed attacks on clearly marked United Nations vehicles, with trucks destroyed, material damaged or stolen, and worst of all, lives lost, led to a decision to seek more secure routes. This corridor was never abandoned. Rather, further travel over the route was limited until the security situation had improved. WFP therefore shifted its road operations to the Kampala-Nimule corridor through which the bulk of food has since passed. As recently as late July, two convoys of 55 and 25 trucks respectively, carrying over 2,000 tons of food, passed through this corridor to Torit. From Torit, as has been the case elsewhere, smaller transport units provided by the United Nations subsequently distributed the food to town and rural areas. However, the security situation has shifted again and it now appears that the Lokichokio-Torit-Bor road axis may, with additional road maintenance, will be used increasingly.

44. As of mid-July, over 11,000 metric tons were delivered by road to southern Sudan from Kenya and Uganda. To a great extent, this successful achievement has

been due to the remarkable courage and determination of the drivers, their support crews and the United Nations/NGO escort teams. They have been confronted with mines, rocket attack and automatic weapons fire, all aimed at clearly marked United Nations convoys. The images of drivers killed and wounded, United Nations escort leaders targeted for assassination, and abandoned, burned-out relief vehicles offer a sobering appreciation of the human cost OLS has incurred in some of its humanitarian efforts.

#### 4. Rail transport

45. After numerous delays, the rail corridor began operating in May 1989. A train of 49 wagons loaded with 1500 metre tons of grain left Muglad on 20 May unloading 500 tons at each of three points: Malwal, Mabior and Aweil. ICRC and United Nations personnel were monitoring the off-loading and subsequent storage or distribution in Mabior and Malwal. This first trip was fraught with technical problems. The wagons carrying food were preceded by a maintenance train which repaired the tracks as the convoy advanced slowly. In spite of this, two major derailments occurred, one involving a locomotive which took three days to repair. In addition, the train was attacked by armed bandits who robbed the train workers at gun point and threatened to execute the Special Co-ordinator and two international monitors on the spot. Only the intervention of the on-board United Nations national staff and the train workers saved their lives.

46. A second train consisting of 50 cars left Muglad on 13 June 1989 and reached Aweil on 19 June. However, 16 wagons were looted en route through SPLA and government territory by groups of hungry villagers and armed men. After negotiations with all parties involved to avoid a repetition of earlier incidents, a third train reached Aweil on 19 August 1989 without major incidents. Arrangements are being made for further train convoys.

#### 5. River transport

47. A continuing series of problems delayed use of the Nile route. Although discussions had started in early April 1989 with all the government authorities concerned, namely, the military, RRC, the Ministry of Transport, the management of the River Transport Unit and the Trade Union leadership, it was only on 14 July 1989 that barges, part of a flotilla of some 60 boats and tugs which had been anchored at Malakal since 10 February 1989, began the voyage back to Kosti for reloading. This necessitated several trips by air to Malakal by teams composed of representatives of the Government, the United Nations, trade unions, the River Transport Corporation, NGOs and a succession of high level meetings in Khartoum.

48. At the time of the Khartoum meeting it had been expected that the first convoy up river would be sent at the latest by early May 1989. Owing to protracted negotiation involving, inter alia, safety for the barge workers, it was only on 22 July that a convoy, made up of five barges and two tugs mobilized by OLS with the help of the Government, was able to leave Kosti for Renk and points beyond. It was

however further delayed in Renk and not given authorization to proceed beyond that point until on 3 August. Because of the delays, the barges and crews had to re-stock fuel and food; and arrangements for monitoring the distribution of food at three drop-off points in SPLA-controlled territory had to be renegotiated. The voyage resumed in early August.

49. This pilot barge convoy transported 1,850 tons of food to the south. A second convoy, made up of the larger Malakal barges, left in late August to drop off 5,750 tons of food at five points along its journey to Malakal in both Government and SPLA locations. After agreement is reached on how to transport food aid south and east of Malakal to displaced people that have gathered in up-stream towns and localities along both the Nile and Sobat rivers, further convoys will be organized from Kosti. Agreement in principle has been reached on the use of the Nile between Juba and Malakal. In this context, tugs and both motorized and dum barges, currently located at Juba and Golok, are being reconditioned and refitted.

### C. Non-food assistance

50. Although the bulk of supply and service delivery by OLS was food-aid related, one of its important components dealt with non-food assistance. A significant part of the ICRC programme is devoted to these activities which also make up the bulk of the UNICEF contribution. The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) has been directly involved in the assessment of needs and provision of seeds and agricultural implements. The World Health Organization (WHO) and the Ministry of Health in Khartoum have similarly assisted in the assessment of requirements for supplementary foods, basic medication and primary health care for the displaced. The implementation strategy followed for the use of non-food inputs has been to pre-position the supplies in population centres from whence they can be distributed farther afield to large groups of displaced. This has largely been accomplished with depots for essential drugs, supplementary foods and spares for hand-pump maintenance, seeds and tools in the garrison towns and in Muglad, Babanusa, El Meiram and Abyei in the transition zone, as well as towns located in SPLA areas. The distribution of seeds and tools and a critical cattle vaccination programme implemented by ICRC also form part of non-food sector activities. Attention also focused on activities aimed at increasing the supply of water which included borehole drilling, well rehabilitation, hand-pump repair and water systems rehabilitation. Drinking water was trucked to needy locations. Finally, local people were encouraged to resume or increase fishing in the Nile and its tributaries, and in ponds. Fishing gear and related equipment were provided at selected locations.

51. By agreement with RRC, most United Nations assistance in Government areas has been channelled through 26 NGOs currently operating in the garrison towns and in the transitional zone. The arrangement results not only in an economical deployment of existing human and other resources, but taps the experience and dedication of personnel already committed to relief in their operational areas. A similar approach is being followed in SPLA-controlled territories where ICRC and NGOs provide the great majority of staff involved in health, water and other rehabilitation activities.

52. To cope with the large volume and tonnage of essential drugs, cold chain (refrigeration) equipment, supplementary foods and water-related equipment (over 420 tons received since March 1989), UNICEF enlarged its warehousing operations and used mobile storage facilities provided and erected by WFP. With RRC, it developed a logistics plan to supply strategic locations on the basis of identified advantages and constraints such as inaccessibility by road after heavy rain, proximity to rail depots and presence of all-weather airstrips.

53. Shortages of basic field data are being gradually overcome with the establishment of a standardized monitoring system relying on periodic field reports. Training programmes have been organized to strengthen management capacity in field operations.

54. Health-related activities have included supplying medication and other health material and equipment to various health centres, pharmacies and hospitals; rehabilitation and re-staffing of same; training of health workers and other staff; and vaccination against various diseases. A UNICEF Health and Nutrition Officer had also been posted to RRC, to help identify new emergency requirements in the non-food sector and, in collaboration with the Ministry of Health, to strengthen the vaccination cold chain, ensure quick delivery of vaccine and supplies and implement the jointly developed vaccination plan. Incentives have been provided to Expanded Programmes of Immunization (EPI) personnel to provide immunization services throughout the transitional zone and in the towns of Wau, Raga and Aweil; in spite of extreme transport and communication difficulties, it is estimated that more than 40 per cent of all children under five years in those towns as well as in the transitional zone have received BCG (Baccillus Guerin/Calmer) measles and the first DPT (diphtheria/pertussis/tetanus) vaccination. NGOs have been very active in the implementation of these activities.

55. In Juba, where there is already good immunization coverage, operations are being strengthened so that the already achieved coverage of 76 per cent of all children under five years can be further improved; this type of coverage is gradually being extended to the rural populations of Juba, Yei, Maridi, Tambura and Yambio. Although shortage of diesel fuel creates recurrent problems for running the cold chain, small quantities have been airlifted or trucked to all the above locations. An innovative inducement has been the linking of food distribution to immunization coverage, so that mothers with fully immunized children get a higher priority in receiving food supplies. This has been successful in Wau and Aweil and is being attempted in other locations.

56. In SPLA-held areas, health activities included the supplying of medication for 250,000 people for three months, largely through health centres and a small number of serviceable hospitals. As hospitals were gradually rehabilitated and reopened, training programmes were set up for health staff and extension workers. In a joint effort involving ICRC, the United Nations, numerous NGOs and locally available personnel, more than 51,000 children, mostly in rural areas, have been vaccinated against such preventable childhood diseases as measles, pertussis (whooping cough) and polio. In addition, more than 19,000 women of child-bearing age have received injections of tetanus toxoid.



57. Essential drugs, including those needed for oral rehydration therapy (ORT), and supplementary foods are also being distributed by ICRC and through NGOs. Sufficient quantities are generally available until September. However, with more arrivals in camps than had been anticipated and possible additional population movements, reserve stocks may have to be rushed to various locations by October 1989. The situation is being closely monitored.

58. With regard to the provision or improvement of drinking water supplies, several programmes have been initiated or reactivated under OLS. Building on an established infrastructure, a hand-pump maintenance and rehabilitation programme is successfully providing water supply in the transitional zone, as well as through a variety of additional means, including the use of water tankers and the establishment of three water yards in Muglad and Babanusa, where a hydrogeologist has already been stationed to supervise the contracted borehole drilling. A number of pumps have been reconditioned and put to use in the Akon, Yirol, Kongor and Ler areas by ICRC. Also, in the resettlement area of Um Chak in Southern Kordofan, new pumps are being installed and a government drilling rig used to clean existing boreholes and increase their yields. In Wau, 37 hand pumps have been repaired and a training course for hand-pump maintenance workers is under way at Aweil. A 500-kva generator set has been procured to rehabilitate and improve the Malakal water supply. Technical assistance and fuel has been provided to the Juba municipalities to re-start the generators powering water pumps with a view to alleviating the severe drinking water shortage affecting a large number of its displaced population. In SPLA-held areas, nearly 100 hand pumps were repaired and 11 new boreholes drilled. At the same time, locally available personnel were given training or retraining in water-pump installation, maintenance and repair.

59. Special emphasis was given to the recovery of a measure of self-sufficiency in agricultural production by the local and displaced populations in the south and in garrison towns. To achieve this objective, by mid-July 1989, approximately 1,400 tons of seed and agricultural implements had been distributed by NGOs and ICRC. While it is recognized that this is far short of even minimal requirements, the experience gained will be extremely useful in late 1989 and early 1990. Also, as mentioned previously (para. 50), local people were systematically encouraged to resume or increase their fishing in the Nile and its tributaries, and in ponds. Fishing gear and related equipment were provided at selected locations.

#### D. Administrative arrangements

60. As agreed at the Khartoum meeting, the Government of the Sudan authorized the application of the most favourable rate of exchange between the Sudanese pound (LSd) and the United States dollar (\$) (LSd 12.2 = \$1, instead of LSd 4.4 = \$1) for all activities encompassed under OLS. In-country travel permits for NGO and United Nations OLS relief workers have been expeditiously processed in one to three days by the Government. Similarly, customs clearances at ports and airports for OLS-consigned supplies and equipment have been processed at an accelerated rate. The strengthening of RRC presence in, for example, in Babanusa, Wau, Aweil, Abyei and Malakal significantly facilitates internal transport, storage and handling operations.

61. As an immediate and extraordinary expression of support to OLS, the Government of Kenya, in early April 1989, established an interministerial "Operation Lifeline Sudan Support Group". This group, which is chaired by a senior official within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, meets on a regular basis to ensure quick resolution of any obstacle facing OLS. The Ministerial Committee includes representatives of not only such technical ministries as Finance and Customs, but also the President's office. Its members facilitate the purchase of commodities, the import of equipment to be used by OLS, the clearance of OLS personnel and issuance of visas as well as the movement of aircraft and truck convoys.

62. The Government of Uganda has similarly co-operated in the movement of truck convoys, aircraft and relief personnel and has been extremely supportive of OLS.

63. The Nairobi-based SRRA office serves as a focal point for OLS. It has been responsible for co-ordinating and clearing the movement of supplies and relief workers in SPLA areas. Plans for the distribution of food and non-food supplies, identification of target groups, resolution of security problems along the "corridors of tranquillity" are facilitated and cleared through this office. Arrangements for the joint monitoring of food aid distribution through SRRA, UNICEF and NGOs are also worked out through SRRA. United Nations/NGO monitors are currently stationed in Kapoeta, Torit, Chukudum (near Torit), Nimule, Pachala, Boma, Pibor Post, Waat, Ayod, Nasir, Ler, Narus and Bor. ICRC maintains delegations in Akon, Yirol, Kongor and Ler.

#### E. Co-ordination at Headquarters

64. Under the direction of the Personal Representative of the Secretary-General, a Headquarters Operations Group, including representatives of the United Nations Department for Special Political Questions, Regional Co-operation, Decolonization and Trusteeship, UNICEF, UNDP, WFP, the Office of the United Nations Disaster Relief Co-ordinator (UNDRO), FAO and WHO and with the participation of ICRC, was established in March 1989. The role of the Operations Group is to co-ordinate inter-agency activities, to help mobilize financial and personnel resources, and to provide information to the general public, the media and the international donor community. The Director of Special Emergency Programmes, Department for Special Political Questions, Regional Co-operation, Decolonization and Trusteeship, was appointed Executive Secretary of the Operations Group. Eight New York Headquarters staff members have been involved in co-ordination, resource mobilization and information dissemination activities.

#### F. Reporting arrangements

65. The Offices of WFP and of the Special Co-ordinator in Khartoum as well as the offices of UNICEF and WFP in Nairobi have prepared weekly situation reports on food and relief supply deliveries by air, road, rail and water as well as on issues related to logistical, security and resources constraints. The Personal Representative of the Secretary-General has issued five consolidated situation reports to the international community, based on the above field-office accounts

and other sources of information. These situation reports include a summary of the general progress towards implementing the Khartoum Plan of Action, constraints to relief deliveries in each of the "corridors of tranquillity", the status of donor contributions, and the volume of food and non-food deliveries by region and town.

### G. Delivery and distribution of supplies

66. By the end of August 1989, 97,465 tons of food and non-food supplies had been delivered to the various areas covered by OLS, as shown in table 2.

Table 2. Summary delivery of food and non-food assistance

(Metric tons)

Location	Food	Non-food	Total
<u>A. Government areas</u>			
Kordofan	22 549	23.3	
Darfur	3 018	2.5	
Bahr El Gazal	11 399	712.4	
Equatoria	24 018	1 107.5	
Upper Nile	7 928	479.7	
Khartoum	963	1.8	
Central	<u>733</u>	<u>6.4</u>	
Subtotal	<u>70 608</u>	<u>2 333.6</u>	<u>72 941.6</u>
<u>B. SPLA areas</u>			
Bahr El Gazal	6 331	291.3	
Equatoria	13 146	169.7	
Upper Nile	<u>4 354</u>	<u>231.4</u>	
Subtotal	<u>23 831</u>	<u>692.4</u>	<u>24 523.4</u>
Total	<u>94 439</u>	<u>3 026.0</u>	<u>97 465.0</u>

67. Since its inception, OLS has attached special attention to the need for proper monitoring of distribution of supplies. Very early, agreement was reached with RRC to establish local relief committees. Their agreed membership consists of local chiefs, RRC and local officials, United Nations and/or NGO representatives. The local relief committees are responsible for registering the population in need and distributing supplies. United Nations/NGO monitors help to supervise and

participate in the distribution. Similar arrangements were worked out at a somewhat later stage with SRRA. Contrary to the situation in most Government controlled areas, where adequate monitoring was already established at the start of OLS, few such facilities were available in SPLA-controlled areas. A complete absence of infrastructure at many places posed great difficulties to monitoring. However, at most locations, it proved possible to have monitors in place before the first food arrived. With the exception of a few incidents, monitors have been able to perform their duties satisfactorily. By early August, 19 United Nations/NGO monitors were in place at nine locations in SPLA-held areas.

68. Because one of the main purposes of OLS was to pre-position supplies in anticipation of the rainy season, proper storage facilities for those supplies were important. Sixteen temporary warehouses were erected in different areas, and additional warehousing capacity was made available in suitable buildings wherever OLS activities required it.

#### H. Funding

69. It was estimated in the Plan of Action that some 120,000 metric tons of food and non-food supplies were to be pre-positioned at various points in the Sudan. The cost of this operation was estimated to be \$133 million, out of which an estimated \$78 million was available, leaving a balance outstanding of \$55 million.

70. Throughout the existence of OLS, the response of the donor community has been excellent. By the end of May 1989, the initial balance of \$55 million was almost totally covered. Donors additionally made cash contributions of approximately \$28 million to NGOs participating in OLS operations and, since March 1989, provided food assistance valued at over \$40 million (not including over \$60 million worth of food in the pipeline before March). Donor provision of aircraft and crews was valued at over \$7 million.

71. However, as OLS progressed, its estimated overall cost increased due to newly identified needs and necessary action as well as to the fact that some costs - particularly internal transport, storage and handling costs - were higher than originally projected. United Nations agencies as well as ICRC had to revise their appeals upwards to meet the changing situation by an additional \$48 million in cash needs, raising the total cash appeal for OLS to \$103 million. By the end of August, a total balance of \$37 million remained unfunded (WFP, \$4 million; UNICEF, \$6 million; FAO, \$1 million; and ICRC, \$26 million). The international community has been requested to make additional contributions to cover this balance. Reports on use of funds contributed by various donors will be provided in due time by individual United Nations agencies to their respective donors.

## V. FUTURE ACTIVITIES

### A. Adapting Operation Lifeline Sudan for the current rainy season

72. At the time of writing of this report, most roads leading into the areas where large numbers of displaced people are concentrated had been closed because of the rains, and several air strips had been forced either to shut down or to accept only small aircraft. OLS, therefore, has had to rely on all-weather means of transport to deliver emergency supplies where they are still needed. Thus, security conditions permitting, the use of the Nile corridor and its outreach through the Sobat River, of the railroad to Aweil and, if the rains are not excessively heavy, of the all-weather roads from Kenya and Uganda into Eastern Equatoria should continue. Airlifting and airdropping will be used to prevent starvation in remote, inaccessible areas whenever necessary.

73. It is possible that because emergency food, seeds and hand tools had been stockpiled in several garrison and SPLA-held towns, people living in places of extreme deprivation will travel to areas where they know food is available and safety prevails. A clearer picture of the situation and the responses it calls for was expected to emerge in mid-to-late August, a period when, in 1987 and 1988, severe and widespread starvation began. Donors and OLS should be prepared to meet such contingencies, should they occur again this year.

### B. Post-rainy season activities

74. It is now generally recognized by all who assist countries in dealing with complex, deep-seated emergencies that it is extremely difficult to determine where emergency support activities end and rehabilitation work begins.

75. During the early phases of OLS, priority was rightly given to the transport of emergency food and non-food items to all areas where civilians faced potential starvation, with less emphasis being placed on rehabilitation activities. However, a large part of the non-food programme, i.e., the distribution of seeds and tools, the vaccination of people and cattle, the refurbishing and stocking of dispensaries and the rehabilitation or improvement of drinking water sources, implicitly addresses some of the rehabilitation needs of displaced people and provides infrastructural improvements in areas where they are undertaken.

76. OLS should therefore aim, during the latter part of the rainy season, to promote rehabilitation systematically within the scope of its programmes, in preparation for the massive reconstruction effort which should be undertaken nation-wide as soon as political conditions permit. The growing of secondary crops, training in primary health techniques, resumption of basic education, food-for-work programmes and amelioration of habitat through improved traditional housing and sanitation techniques will be encouraged whenever possible. The reinstallation of some of the displaced persons in environments where they can recover self-sufficiency in basic food production and have access to essential social services, and the improvement of logistical facilities should be among the top priorities of any rehabilitation and recovery programme.

## VI. CONCLUSIONS

77. OLS has set an important and historic precedent among complex relief operations, from more than one point of view. For the first time, in what is essentially a civil war situation, the two major parties to the conflict:

(a) Have agreed to one common, complex and large-scale plan of action to provide urgently required relief assistance to civilians on both sides of the conflict;

(b) Have agreed to "corridors of tranquillity" down which unescorted relief convoys have been allowed to pass freely, alternating between areas under the control of one side or the other;

78. In addition, when one compares the broad scope of OLS objectives with its short time-frame, the extraordinary complexity of the logistics involved, as well as the serious security problems it faced, OLS has been one of the most difficult of relief operations implemented by the United Nations and other parties mentioned in the report, in recent years.

79. OLS has taught several lessons:

(a) The combined efforts of the concerned parties in a given country, the United Nations system, ICRC, the donor and NGO communities, together with genuine commitment and good will, allow the attainment of far-reaching and ambitious humanitarian goals;

(b) Assistance to populations in distress can and should transcend political and military considerations and situations;

(c) Humanitarian programmes undertaken by neutral and impartial parties can be catalysts for peace;

(d) The vital role of the media and world public opinion in compelling action and support for urgent humanitarian requirements was reaffirmed in the Sudan.

80. It is vital that a repetition of the 1987 and 1988 disasters in southern Sudan be averted. This will require, first and foremost, an honest monitoring of conditions in all affected areas, the full co-operation of parties to the conflict and the maintaining of an effective national emergency response capability. OLS was an extremely complex but absolutely necessary operation to save more than 200,000 innocent lives. While it is unrealistic to believe that an operation of the scope and cost of OLS could be supported year after year, the conditions prevailing in the Sudan will nevertheless require, for at least the next two or three years, the provision of emergency and rehabilitation assistance on a large scale. A long-term solution must therefore be found as soon as possible to avoid a recurrence of crises requiring such massive outside intervention.

81. It is clear that the Sudan is in urgent and great need of a major reconstruction effort. Such effort requires advance planning, high-level policy

decisions and input from all parties concerned, substantial assistance from the international donor community and, by definition, peaceful and secure conditions in the country. The planning of the necessary activities should none the less go forward immediately so that no time is lost when it becomes possible to implement them.

82. It is hoped, therefore, that the parties to the Sudan conflict will soon reach an agreement or arrangement resulting in an environment which would make it possible to undertake a major rehabilitation effort. The follow-up donors' meeting, envisaged earlier and mentioned in General Assembly resolution 43/52, should be seen within this context. The Government has recently resumed work on the elaboration of a policy framework, as a prerequisite for preparation of a programme addressing the rehabilitation and resettlement needs of displaced people, under the leadership of the Minister for Relief and Displaced People Affairs. It has also been agreed that the United Nations would field a number of international experts, familiar with the many recurrent problems arising in the context of resettlement activities, to assist in this task.

83. A resolution of the policy issues centring around the displaced will also have a bearing on some of the activities to be implemented under the Emergency Flood Reconstruction Programme (EFRP) of the World Bank. EFRP was elaborated in October 1988 by a World Bank-led multi-donor mission with a view to assisting in the reconstruction of those areas of the country affected by the floods and rains of August 1988. EFRP was subsequently funded at a level of \$360 million, including a \$75 million contribution by the International Development Association (IDA). As large sections of Khartoum were virtually destroyed by the torrential rains, including many areas where the displaced have concentrated, parts of the resources made available under EFRP for the reconstruction of Khartoum will address some of the needs of the displaced. A multi-sectoral team of Bank staff and consultants, partly funded by UNDP, has carried out a first mission to the Sudan to assist the Government with implementation of the IDA credit as well as to co-ordinate other donor support. As of July 1989, donor funding for the programme remained firm at \$285 million. Some donors have begun to implement their assistance while others have made firm commitments and moved into the procurement stage. On the whole, donor financing is following the outlines of the EFRP proposals of October 1988 and the components are fitting together in a complementary and consistent manner.

84. The present report is based on information available up to the end of August 1989. Further information on the operations of OLS will be presented at a later date. As of 1 October 1989, full responsibility for the management of OLS passes from Mr. James P. Grant, Executive Director of UNICEF and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General, to the newly appointed Special Representative of the Secretary-General in the Sudan, Mr. Michael Priestly, who will continue to assist the Government of the Sudan and its people in dealing with the emergency and rehabilitation needs that are likely to persist for some time to come.

Annex

# MAP OF SOUTHERN SUDAN

