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Held at Headquarters, New York,  
on Monday, 9 December 1957, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. ABDOH

(Iran)

The Cyprus question [58]

Statements were made in the general debate on the item by:

Mr. Noble (United Kingdom)  
Mr. Averoff-Tossizza (Greece)

Note: The Official Record of this meeting, i.e., the summary record, will appear in mimeographed form under the symbol A/C.1/SR.927. Delegations may submit corrections to the summary record for incorporation in the final version which will appear in a printed volume.

57-34156

## AGENDA ITEM 58

## THE CYPRUS QUESTION (A/3616 and Add.1, A/C.1/L.197)

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from French): The First Committee will now take up the examination of the Cyprus question. The general debate will begin immediately, and the Committee has before it draft resolution A/C.1/L.197. I shall therefore invite members of the Committee, especially those who wish to take part in the general debate, to refer in their statements to the draft resolution as well; this will permit us to combine the general debate with the debate on the draft resolution.

May I also announce that the Committee will meet this afternoon at 3.45 p.m. There is to be a plenary meeting of the General Assembly this afternoon, and therefore it will be impossible for us to begin our meeting earlier than the time I have stated. At that time, we shall continue with the general debate, and in view of the fact that this morning the representatives of the United Kingdom, Greece and Turkey are to make statements, it appears to me that it will help the work of this Committee if those who wish to take part in the general debate on the Cyprus question would be good enough to speak as soon as possible. I would be more than happy to call on those representatives who are willing to speak this afternoon. We must speed up our work as much as possible, in view of the fact that the deadline for the ending of this session has been set at 14 December, and, therefore, we must conclude all the items on our agenda by 13 December at the latest, so that there will be time for reports to be prepared on the questions that have been submitted to this Committee for consideration by the General Assembly.

May I also point out that in view of the fact that we have to speed up our work I shall be forced to hold at least one night meeting this week. That meeting has been scheduled for Wednesday, but it may well be that we shall have to hold more than one night meeting in order to complete our work. However, for the moment, with the Committee's consent, plans have been made to hold a night meeting on Wednesday, 11 December.

Mr. NOBLE (United Kingdom): In opening this debate I am sensible of the responsibility which falls to me to place this grave matter in the proper perspective of history and practical politics. I should like to stress at once that Her Majesty's Government has special ties of friendship and alliance with the Governments of Greece and Turkey. Understanding and sympathy have grown up between our three peoples over a long period. We value this friendship highly and the United Kingdom greatly regrets that a problem which appears to divide us should, year after year, be a matter of contention in the forum of the United Nations.

At this particular juncture in world affairs it seems to us that three Governments, whose Heads are shortly to meet in Paris, should remember and reassert their ancient links of friendship. Much that seems difficult, even impossible, can be done if it is undertaken in a spirit of amity and co-operation. Accordingly, it is our hope that this debate will avoid acrimony and that it will lead to a better atmosphere for the solution of this difficult question. It would be tragic if anything said here were to damage the prospects of fruitful negotiation and eventual compromise.

What is the dispute about? Some have called it a colonial matter. In the year in which Ghana and Malaya became full members of the Commonwealth and entered the United Nations as sovereign States, it is ironical that Britain should be attacked for repressive colonialism in Cyprus. In fact, the problem is not a straight-forward colonial one. If it were, there would have been steady progress on the lines which have been so successfully developed elsewhere in British Colonies. Although it was not of our seeking, the core of the problem is now international disagreement and its main dangers are to international relations. As is well known, the Greek and Turkish Governments hold widely differing views. The object of Her Majesty's Government is to find a solution acceptable to all concerned.

Although it has become an international question, the problem also has its difficulties and dangers inside Cyprus. Our position on Article 2 (7) is well known. We explained it again in the General Committee this year when the Cyprus item was discussed. The internal aspects of the problem come within my Government's sovereign jurisdiction and are not a matter for international discussion.

(Mr. Noble, United Kingdom)

I have already said that if there is friendship, if there is a will, then surely a way can be found. I should like to emphasize that the right way for friends to resolve a dispute is to discuss it amongst themselves. They should bear constantly in mind that their friendship is greater than their dispute and that it demands from each of them some contribution to a compromise solution which will be satisfactory to each.

I need hardly assure the Committee that this is the spirit in which my Government approaches the problem. We have, after all, had long and wide experience in resolving international problems through discussions. It has even been said that my country has a genius for compromise. We should like the opportunity to prove it in this matter, but it takes two, and in this case more than two, to make a compromise.

I think that the thoughts which I have been trying to express -- the need for a peaceful and friendly atmosphere and for quiet discussion amongst the parties concerned with the object of reaching a compromise solution -- are precisely the thoughts which inspired resolution 1013 (XI) of 26 February 1957 about Cyprus. It has been the whole object of my Government to make progress in the spirit of that resolution. This is still our object. Following upon the February resolution some progress has been made. What is now required is further progress along the same lines.

(Mr. Noble, United Kingdom)

The essence of any solution is that it should be acceptable to the peoples of Cyprus, to Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and to the Greek and Turkish Governments.

Her Majesty's Government has made great efforts to reach such a solution. I will not burden the Committee with all the background to this dispute which has been fully set out in previous debates. But in looking to the future, it is often helpful to see what methods have been tried in the past and with what result.

That is my intention in the summary which I propose to give of events preceding the passage here of the resolution of last February. I am most anxious not to reopen past wounds, and I hope that this summary will be accepted as strictly objective.

The policy of successive British Governments has been to promote self-government in Cyprus. This is what is desired by all sections of the British people, and there is a very widespread feeling of dissatisfaction and distress in my country that the path which so many nations in the Commonwealth have trod should seem blocked by so many obstacles and difficulties in this particular case.

After the war, the Government of the time made proposals for a liberal constitution. These were rejected, not only by the Communists, but also by the nationalist movement headed by the Orthodox Church, whose declared aim had for so long been the union of the island with Greece: what is known as enosis. Although the offer remained open, there was no change in the position until 1954, when the British Government of that day made a new proposal for discussions about self-government. This, too, was rejected.

By 1954 a new factor had come to complicate the position. In spite of the feelings of sympathy which the campaign for enosis had aroused in Greece -- and I may say that I quite realize the strength of these feelings -- successive Greek Governments had over a long period followed a policy of non-intervention in the Cyprus question. But by 1954 this long-standing policy had been reversed, and the Greek Government was openly conducting a campaign for enosis. As part of this campaign, which produced sharp protests from Turkey and led, among other things, to a deterioration in Greco-Turkish relations, the Greek Government brought the Cyprus question to the United Nations in the autumn of 1954, at the ninth session of the General Assembly. After a debate here, which unfortunately did nothing to improve international relations, the General Assembly decided not to consider the Cyprus question further at that session.

(Mr. Noble, United Kingdom)

The next development was the outbreak of the terrorist movement in Cyprus, which began on 1 April 1955. In special broadcasts beamed to Cyprus, Athens Radio had been inciting the Greek Cypriots to violence. The Greek Government admitted that the Athens Radio was under its control, but despite more than twenty official protests nothing was done to prevent continued encouragement to violence. The terrorist leaders arrived in Cyprus secretly from Greece during 1954 and spent the first months of 1955 in building up their organization with arms, ammunition and money, sent from Greece by leading Greek officials.

This is something that I had to go into in some detail at the eleventh session. But the point I want to make now is that the active support from Greece for the enosis movement, and for terrorism in Cyprus, created an international question. Whatever regrets we may have about this, we must face the fact that it is this international question which is at the core of the problem. The union of Cyprus with Greece is an international aim.

Recognizing the international character and dangers of the problem, Her Majesty's Government decided in 1955 to see whether some arrangement could be worked out with the Greek and Turkish Governments for mutual co-operation in promoting the welfare of the peoples of Cyprus. A tripartite conference was held in London in September 1955 at which my Government put forward new proposals. We suggested that the problem should be tackled in two stages. We proposed that the three Governments should immediately form a permanent committee which would, in the first place, consider a constitution for Cyprus, and thereafter try to smooth out any difficulties which might arise in the working of self-government.

Since it was clear that the three Governments did not agree on the ultimate future of Cyprus, we suggested that their co-operation should be without prejudice to the eventual status of the Island. We hoped that the experience of the three Governments working together to promote the welfare of the peoples of Cyprus would gradually bring their viewpoints closer together and thus resolve the problem. We suggested this might be helped if the conference reconvened, when self-government was working, with representatives of the Cypriot communities present to consider the future of the Island.

Unfortunately, this imaginative proposal for sharing responsibility in Cyprus was rejected. It was a real attempt to get to the heart of the problem and bring

(Mr. Noble, United Kingdom)

together all the interested parties, the Greek and Turkish communities in Cyprus and the Greek and Turkish Governments, as well as the British Government.

We urged moderation on all sides, and stressed that if there was to be a solution it must be a compromise. The General Assembly itself recognized the importance of avoiding public acrimony when it voted at the tenth session in 1955 not to include on its agenda an item on Cyprus brought forward by the Greek Government.

Three weeks after the breakdown of the tripartite conference, the Governor of Cyprus began conversations on self-government with Archbishop Makarios on the one hand, and with Turkish Cypriot leaders on the other. These lasted for five months. They concluded in February 1956 when the Archbishop refused to take a stand against violence, insisted that an over-all Greek Cypriot majority in the Assembly should be conceded before safeguards for the Turkish community were discussed, and demanded that Britain should swiftly hand over control of the police to the Greek Cypriots. This last claim was particularly difficult to accept since it had become clear that the terrorists took their orders from the Archbishop. The chief terrorist had recorded in his diary on 1 March 1956:

"I am reporting to Gen" -- which is the codeword for the Archbishop --  
"that I am ready and am waiting orders to begin."

Unfortunately the orders came. This is why the Archbishop was deported and why he cannot be allowed to return to Cyprus at this stage. Her Majesty's Government has, however, made it plain that they are prepared to discuss self-government with a representative group of Cypriots which could of course include the Archbishop.

Members of the Committee will of course be aware that here at the United Nations the campaign for enosis has been conducted in the name of self-determination. The United Kingdom Government has always supported the principle of self-determination, as the development of the Commonwealth proves. In December 1956 we therefore thought it right to reaffirm in an unmistakable way our support for the principle of self-determination which must, of course, apply equally to the Greek and Turkish communities in Cyprus. But in applying the principle of self-determination it is necessary to make sure that this does not create greater problems than it solves. Therefore Her Majesty's Government proposed at the same time in December 1956 that the first step should be the establishment of self-government and that self-determination should not be applied until a greater measure of

(Mr. Noble, United Kingdom)

confidence had been established and the delicate situation in the Eastern Mediterranean had become more stable.

Accordingly, my Government announced that they had accepted the findings of Lord Radcliffe, a distinguished jurist, who made an independent study of a constitution for Cyprus. This scheme provided for a democratically elected Assembly with a Greek Cypriot majority and a Government which would have the confidence of the Assembly. This Government would control all the affairs of Cyprus except those which properly belonged to the Turkish Cypriots and police, defence and foreign affairs, which Britain would retain to keep the balance between the communities and to help in maintaining peace and stability in the area.

As we made clear, our intentions were to discuss the proposed constitution with representative Cypriots of both communities. Before doing so, we attempted to enlist the sympathy of the Greek and Turkish Governments which had asked for advance notice of our intentions. Unfortunately, before we could speak to the Cypriots, Athens Radio announced Greek opposition to the proposals and declared that any Greek Cypriot who showed interest in them was a traitor. The result was that these constructive proposals were rejected without having received the consideration which they merited.

This was the position when this Committee considered the Cyprus question at the eleventh session in February of this year. I apologize for the length of this recapitulation, but I thought it necessary to remind the Committee of the complexity of the problem and of the various methods which United Kingdom Governments had used in trying to solve it, before this unfortunate dispute was considered here ten months ago.

General Assembly resolution 1013 (XI) which was adopted in February, with the support of my Government, declared that the solution of the problem "requires an atmosphere of peace and freedom of expression". It went on to express the earnest desire that:

"...a peaceful, democratic and just solution will be found in accord with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and the hope that negotiations will be resumed and continued to this end."

Her Majesty's Government has sincerely tried to take constructive initiatives in the spirit of this resolution. Within a few weeks of the debate, they released Archbishop Makarios, offered a safe conduct out of Cyprus to all



(Mr. Noble, United Kingdom)

terrorists and as a further gesture of good will began a comprehensive relaxation of the emergency regulations, although we were conscious that intimidation continued and that, in spite of the "truce" which they had declared, the terrorists were rebuilding their shattered organization. Even before this we had accepted unconditionally the offer which the then Secretary-General of NATO had made in March to each of the three Governments concerned to use his good offices for conciliation. Despite the negative attitude of the Greek Government, we hoped that he might be able to make progress and we were therefore careful to do nothing which might damage this prospect. Eventually, however, it became clear that it was unlikely that significant progress could quickly be made by this method alone.

(Mr. Noble, United Kingdom)

Thus in the middle of this summer my Government was faced with the breakdown of yet another initiative. By that time, we had promoted, as the Committee will realize, a wide variety of different procedures. We had, over a long period, held talks with representative Cypriots without bringing in Greece and Turkey. This failed. We then tried talks with Greece and Turkey in the first place and with the clear intention of bringing in representative Cypriots as soon as any broad agreement could be reached. We proposed a bold scheme for partnership in Cyprus. This too was rejected. We then reverted to discussions with representative Cypriots and asked for the sympathetic assistance of the Greek and Turkish Governments. This procedure broke down. Once again, we tried to make progress with self-government coupled with a clear statement on the principle of self-determination. We gave the Greek and Turkish Governments advance warning of this and invited discussions with the Cypriots. Once again this procedure was thwarted. We accepted the good offices of the Secretary-General of NATO. Once again, for reasons beyond our control, this failed to produce a solution.

Despite these numerous rebuffs, which hardly suggested any great desire to reach a compromise, Her Majesty's Government was unwilling to allow the problem to drift on. It decided that another effort to solve the problem should be made.

Previous attempts at international agreement on this problem had shown that the positions of the parties were so far apart that there was no prospect of settling a detailed agenda for discussion. If discussions were ever to begin each of the parties must be assured that it would not be barred from bringing up any consideration which it deemed relevant. Experience had also shown that agreement was likely only if all the parties concerned would consider wider interests and not insist on the complete fulfilment of their aims. In short, each of the parties concerned had to realize that equally strong views were held by others and that a settlement required a willingness to compromise on all sides.

My Government concluded, therefore, that the best and possibly the only hope of making progress was by private discussions between the British, Greek and Turkish Governments. Accordingly, we suggested informally to the Greek and Turkish Governments that we should get round a table and discuss the whole problem with open minds and without insisting in advance on any particular solution.

(Mr. Noble, United Kingdom)

We thought there should be no fixed agenda and that the conference should be free to discuss without prejudice every solution so far mooted. These included enosis, self-determination with a fixed time limit, self-government leading to self-determination at an unspecified time, guaranteed independence, condominium with plural nationality, partition, the maintenance of full British sovereignty and any other suggestions which might be put forward. A discussion on these lines should be without prejudice to the position of any of the parties. The purpose of the conference, the proceedings of which we thought should be in private, was to find a solution of the international aspects of the problem acceptable to all concerned. It would thus pave the way for a subsequent settlement of the internal problems in direct discussion with Cypriot representatives. My Government indicated that if the idea of a conference was accepted it would be prepared to hold preliminary discussions with the other Governments concerned to clear the ground for the meeting. This of course would not have involved any prior commitments, for that would be contrary to the purpose and spirit of the proposed conference.

There was an extensive exchange of communications about the possibility of some such meeting. The Turkish Government accepted this suggestion but the Greek Government, though it did not reject the idea of a conference, insisted that the basic outlines of a solution must first be agreed between the Governments concerned through diplomatic channels.

Thus, unfortunately, we could not get agreement that the conference should be free to discuss any solution which had been or might be put forward. There was no agreement on which solutions to include, or which to exclude. For our part, we wished to discuss all of them with an open mind.

After a great deal of discussion with the Governments of Greece and Turkey, it emerged that, in addition to the difficulty I have just mentioned, there was a problem about timing. In order to make progress as quickly as possible we suggested the conference should meet in early September this year but we offered to consider any other date. Others thought discussions could not usefully be held before the Turkish elections at the end of October and perhaps before this Committee had again debated the question. Although the reasons for this view were understood by my Government, we did not agree with them. We thought the matter was too urgent for delay, and here I must mention once regrettable development. In the

(Mr. Noble, United Kingdom)

last two months, while the Assembly has been meeting, there has been some recrudescence of lawlessness on the Island. There have been at least six murders, two attempted murders, four cases of sabotage and many attempts to intimidate the moderate elements of the population. It is difficult not to associate this renewal of terrorist activity with the fact that a further discussion of the Cyprus question was about to take place in this Assembly. It certainly looks like a form of pressure upon the Assembly.

The underlying tension in the affairs of the Island to which these recent acts of serious violence must be attributed cannot be ignored. Cyprus is once again at the crossroads, and what is said in this Committee may well affect the course of events in the Island. Last February the Committee unanimously recognized that the solution of the problem required an atmosphere of peace and freedom of expression. That is no less true today. This Committee would be doing less than its duty if it did not impress upon those who have dedicated themselves to violence that there is no more certain way of wrecking the prospects of a settlement than by reverting to terrorism. Her Majesty's Government has recently appointed a new Governor, Sir Hugh Foot. He has a reputation for wise, liberal and progressive administration, and he has been asked to report when he has had time to re-assess the situation in the Island. It would be tragic indeed if a resumption of widespread violence was to intervene in the situation at a time when we believe there is a real prospect of making progress towards a solution.

(Mr. Noble, United Kingdom)

Despite the difficulties I have mentioned -- and I do not want to dwell upon them unduly -- exchanges of views between Her Majesty's Government and the Governments of Greece and Turkey have continued. That, I think, is a hopeful sign. In itself it constitutes some progress. These exchanges have been confidential and exploratory, and the Committee will not, of course, expect me to give any indication of their nature. The Turkish elections are now over, and this Committee will soon have completed reconsideration of the Cyprus question. My Government hopes that in these circumstances it will be possible to make progress towards a solution. We still believe that a meeting free to discuss all relevant questions would be helpful. We are sure in any case that the Committee will encourage the Governments concerned to persevere in efforts to find a compromise solution.

I can tell the Committee that Her Majesty's Government is willing to discuss with our Greek and Turkish friends any solution for the Cyprus question and that we will give the most sympathetic consideration to any proposal which commends itself to both the Greek and Turkish Governments.

We want to enter into discussions with them to see whether, with equal goodwill on all sides, an agreement cannot be found. We have the welfare of the peoples of Cyprus deeply at heart. We are most anxious to settle the dispute so as to restore the long friendship which is the natural state of relations between our three countries. We are also anxious lest the continuance of this dispute should impair the stability of the area.

Her Majesty's Government bears the responsibility for the government of Cyprus. We must see that any future arrangement provides for good order, internal security and good government, and for the protection of the rights of all the people. We have strategic responsibilities in Cyprus which must be safeguarded effectively in any future arrangement. I need not specify what they are, since everyone knows that we have traditional friendships, alliances and interests in that area and that we are a member of two organizations of collective self-defence in accordance with Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations. But these duties and interests leave us a margin for compromise.

(Mr. Noble, United Kingdom)

If I may sum up the position of Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom on these matters, it is as follows.

Her Majesty's Government has long been trying to move towards self-government in the island. Over the years we have had discussions with Cypriot leaders on this, and the offers of discussion which we have made remain open and can be taken up at any time.

But the Cyprus question is not a straightforward colonial problem of the kind with which we are dealing -- not without success -- in other parts of the world. For reasons which we all know well and which I need not repeat, it has also become an international question affecting the relations between Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom. The solution which we seek is one acceptable to the three Governments and to the people of Cyprus, and to achieve this end we are ready to enter into discussions at the appropriate time with all concerned.

Bearing in mind our own responsibilities, the welfare of the peoples of Cyprus, the legitimate interest of Greece and Turkey in the future of the island and the friendship between our three countries, we are convinced that there is room for compromise. We think that this was the idea underlying the February resolution. We are sure that this is also the most constructive message that can emerge from this debate.

Before I finish, I should like to refer briefly to document A/C.1/803, which I saw for the first time when I arrived in my place at this meeting this morning. I have not had time to study it, and I may well wish to exercise my right of replying to it in due course.

Mr. AVEROFF-TOSSIZZA (Greece) (interpretation from French): When my colleague from the United Kingdom pressed for speaking first today, I hoped that he would communicate to us some good news. This has not been the case, and the disappointment in Greece, and especially in Cyprus, will be all the greater. Disappointment leads to despair, while despair leads to excesses and is the harbinger of worse things to come.

I should like to respond to a number of the fundamental points raised by my colleague from the United Kingdom, but before doing so I must answer a number of specific questions to which my colleague from the United Kingdom saw fit to revert. He reverted to some questions which had been fully discussed last year and which I thought had been disposed of. He repeated the accusations he made last year against the Greek Government as regards the sending of supplies from Greece to the EOKA. At the time, I made a reply and circulated documents proving that there had been at least four attempts by the United Kingdom authorities to send arms to Cyprus in the form of shipments from Greece, and I asked why these attempts should be made to stage fake shipments if there had been true shipments from Greece. The veracity of these documents was questioned. I asked that they be examined as to their authenticity by a suitable committee, and I suggested that, if that committee found that these documents were proved to be false, I would be the first to accept that conclusion.

That great prelate, Archbishop Makarios, whose high moral stature is not questioned by anyone who knows him, is described as leader of the terrorists, and to support this accusation a symbolic paragraph from the so-called diary of Colonel Grivas was read out by my colleague from the United Kingdom. I asked, as some eminent statesmen have asked in the House of Commons: if there were such accusations against the Archbishop, a British subject, why was he not brought before a court martial? Why is it that the man accused of being the head of a revolutionary movement was exiled without being given the right to prove that he had nothing to do with this uprising, which was a popular, spontaneous uprising?

(Mr. Averoff-Tossizza, Greece)

The lack of formal charges is evidence that the accusation was, to say the least, unjust.

I reserve the right to answer, if necessary, other points raised in Mr. Noble's speech after I have had an opportunity to study it. However, I do think that I am in duty bound to respond immediately to two or three specific points.

Mr. Noble spoke about the Radcliffe Constitution, which he characterized as a constructive contribution. I regret to say that, if the United Kingdom Government continues to consider a document such as the Radcliffe Constitution to be constructive, there will be no solution emerging through the will of the United Kingdom Government.

Last year, I had the honour to outline before this Committee the broad provisions of that Constitution. Under that Constitution, the Governor of the colony would have the right of veto in all fields. The Constitution, on its face, suggests that there would be a parliament, but the Governor would have the right to decide what questions are within his purview and what questions would be within the competence of parliament, and this decision "cannot be challenged anywhere".

Having this provision in mind, can one seriously speak in terms of a Constitution? Is this not rather an act designed to cover up the continuation and perpetuation of unadulterated colonialism?

There is one sentence in Mr. Noble's speech which may well be considered as constructive. He said:

"Once again, we tried to make progress with self-government coupled with a clear statement on the principle of self-determination." (supra., p.11)

If this is so, then I am convinced that the people of Cyprus and the Greek Government, which represents that people since that people itself cannot have a free voice, will make their contribution, on one condition: "a clear statement on the principle of self-determination".

The principle of self-determination, as applicable to Cyprus, was clearly enunciated by Sir Anthony Eden until June 1956. But that principle began to be challenged fundamentally in December 1956, when the British Government made it clear that what it had in mind, when it spoke of self-determination, was a



(Mr. Averoff-Tossizza, Greece)

partition of the island. As far as that meaning is concerned, and our attitude to it, the body of my speech will address itself to that question.

Toward the end of his speech, Mr. Noble spoke of "exchanges of views" which "have been confidential and exploratory" (supra., p.16) -- exchanges of views which are said to have occurred over the past month or so -- and he said that he could not give the Committee any additional indication as to the nature of these exchanges.

I can say just one thing about that: In those exchanges of views, we have clearly and unambiguously explained to our British friends that the position of the Greek Government is that the problem, as will be pointed out in the body of my address, is clearly a problem between the British Government and the people of Cyprus, and that no other conversations can be entered into unless that particular basis is recognized and unless an approach is accepted which is in keeping with that premise.

I shall not deal with what Mr. Noble said about the tripartite conversations because I deal with that at length in the body of my speech, on which I shall now embark.

I have come here with a sentiment of profound respect and responsibility -- respect, because it is my honour to address the representatives of almost all the countries of the world, gathered here to work for the greater well-being of mankind -- responsibility, because I am dealing with a question which concerns the freedom, the well-being and the dignity of a half-million human beings. That means that I shall speak of the reassertion of our most noble principles. I am fully aware of the grave task which rests upon me. But the problem is not an abstract one. It relates to people who are suffering, fighting and hoping. Their immediate interests and their future interests, their wills, their psychology, are so many factors which must be taken into consideration.

Moreover, the problem will not stay within its original insular framework. It is more than an insular problem. It is a colonial problem which obtains on the island of Cyprus but which it would be unrealistic to deal with while disregarding its broader political implications. Those broader political implications are apart from the problem in the sense that they cannot alter its form or its substance. But they must be taken into account, especially since

(Mr. Averoff-Tossizza, Greece)

these political influences and implications concern countries with which Greece, as spokesman of the Cypriot people, and the Cypriot people themselves are anxious to maintain close and friendly relations in the future.

Throughout this discussion, I shall be as dispassionate and constructive as possible.

During its past session, the General Assembly took up the question of Cyprus and adopted resolution 1013. More than fifty representatives took part in the debate in this Committee. The discussion was sometimes rather animated, but always profound and meticulous. Therefore, there is no need for me to make a long speech today on the history of the problem.

A useful purpose will be served, however, if the fundamental data of the problem are recalled. It will be a useful purpose because it is necessary to clarify some aspects of the problem which have persistently been erroneously, or perhaps tendentiously, represented in other quarters. This clarification is necessary because the whole problem would change colour, its whole substance would change, if this data were falsified or represented in a manner different from the true one.

(Mr. Averoff-Tossizza, Greece)

Therefore, I shall start with an utterly unfounded allegation. It has been claimed that the majority of the Cypriots are Levantines who do not have the characteristics of an ethnic personality. Persistent facts during the record of centuries have proved that this is absurd. The ethnic homogeneity of Cyprus has not been seriously altered over the past six or seven centuries, when the Island was occupied by various conquerors. According to British statistics -- post-war statistics -- the population is composed of 80 per cent Greeks, 18 per cent Turks and 2 per cent of various nationalities. We may be told that this overwhelming majority of 80 per cent of Greeks is not Greek, but Levantine, and that, on the contrary, the 18 per cent minority is purely Turkish. We could hope that those who maintain this thesis really believe in it, because if they did they would ask for a plebiscite under the auspices of the United Nations, so that this Levantine mass majority deprived of an ethnic personality would be revealed to the world. However, they oppose a plebiscite because they know that not even one-hundredth part of that majority would deny its Hellenic homogeneity in race, language, religion, mores, culture and feelings. The ethnic homogeneity of the population of Cyprus is much clearer than that of the populations of many other countries. That could be proved by the test that we have asked for and which has been refused. I regret to have to prove a truth which is as luminous as the light of the sun. However, to disregard this would challenge the very basis of the problem of Cyprus and would suggest that the case of the Cypriots is not as clear as the light of the sun, when it is.

The second argument which has been advanced to impress those who have not had sufficient time to profoundly study the problem is based on the Lausanne Treaty. In order to suggest respect for treaties, it has been stated that the Lausanne Treaty forbade a change in the status of the Island of Cyprus, because it granted certain rights to Turkey. However, a decision on this point was given here about nine months ago, and, in view of that and in view of the official documents, a detailed reference to the documentation is not necessary. The Lausanne Treaty, just as any other treaty concerning Turkey, in no way precludes the self-determination of the peoples of Cyprus. None of the clauses of that Treaty, either explicitly or by interpretation, can be construed as constituting an obstacle to that. I shall revert to this argument only if it is absolutely necessary to do so,

(Mr. Averoff-Tossizza, Greece)

but I wish to make one observation because I have just studied some of the records of the Lausanne Conference. The Lausanne Treaty was drafted very carefully. It concluded one era and opened another. The statesmen who presided over the world's destinies at that time -- for Greece it was Venizelos and for Turkey it was Kemal Atatürk, who were great statesmen -- were fully aware of the fact that this Treaty was of special importance and that matters should not be left in a twilight of ambiguity. They felt that everything should be clear, and everything was made clear, thus facilitating the application of a principle we have always meticulously observed, the principle of respect for treaties. But this respect cannot be confined to some provisions, according to whether or not they are pleasing to the person concerned.

It has been argued that Cyprus is of strategic importance and that that, therefore, raises questions of national security for other countries. We would be very happy if those who championed that argument sincerely believed in it, because that argument could be answered easily and well. To begin with, a number of countries can invoke reasons of strategy or security to demand the occupation of Cyprus or to dictate its form of government. Some countries might well have invoked this by advancing indisputable proof in support of their thesis. It is not possible to consider the strategic interests of one party and ignore similar and equally valid interests of others, particularly if those are of equal validity.

On the other hand, to recognize that the use of brute force can deprive thousands of human beings of their freedom and dignity for strategic reasons would lead us to the worst excesses of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. After so much human suffering, after so much bloodshed for the cause of freedom, it cannot be argued that a people should live in subjugation, as the slave of another people, because strategic reasons called for this. That would lead us very far indeed along a path that would be perilous to travel, and the lives of a number of small peoples would be endangered.

What a sinister precedent, indeed, we would create if we adopted this thesis. Everyone could fully invoke his own strategic interests. Everyone, especially the great Powers, whose interests are far more widespread and whose responsibilities are heavy and cover the whole world, could, under this theory, have the right to occupy certain areas which they felt had strategic interests for them. Such

pretensions have always miscarried and they have never been recognized. Security problems sometimes are worthy of attention. Certain areas, from the strategic point of view, may well justify the interests of neighbouring countries. There is not yet at our disposal an effective machinery for the defence of peace, and it is therefore understandable that protection against possible springboards of attack should be sought, but in the case of Cyprus it has been recognized that, for a number of reasons, the island is so defective as a military base that it can never seriously be used as such. This has been proved in a number of cases, and I shall cite just one.

It may be said that during the four years of the first world war Great Britain and its allies pressed Turkey on a number of fronts, including the front in the Palestine area, but the southern Turkish shore was never attacked from the British base on Cyprus, at a time when the British naval forces were supreme in the Mediterranean. This proves, if proof is necessary, that Cyprus cannot seriously endanger anyone, but I shall not dwell on that argument.

I should like to deal with the question more generally and more seriously than that, and that will be rather easy. International practice has frequently recognized that certain regions in the world should not become hotbeds of alarm and anxiety. Various means have been used to neutralize such situations. Such questions have been settled by bilateral treaties or by multilateral treaties which imposed international servitudes which occasionally went so far as to seek the complete demilitarization of certain areas. If Cyprus is of such great strategic importance that a country may feel endangered by it, what would be more reasonable than to ask for a military status for the Island which would make such a danger impossible. International treaties have established the complete demilitarization of several Greek islands close to Turkey's shores, but in the case of Cyprus nobody has asked for this, nobody has asked for anything like it. What has been asked is that Cyprus should continue as a colony that should be occupied by a certain Power for the needs or convenience of the strategy of some. This makes one recognize that the argument of the strategic importance of Cyprus is advanced only to support the imperialistic and colonialist thesis. Cyprus threatens no one; others may threaten Cyprus, and this is the only "strategic" aspect of the question which is valid. But I do not wish to discuss anew all the arguments against the just cause of the Cypriots, but I will deal with the substance of the matter and revert to these arguments if they are later raised.

Cyprus is inhabited by a civilized people. For many years, this people has been demanding and striving to obtain its freedom and, through us, asks for United Nations support. Can the United Nations say to the Cypriots that they are not the real owners of the island, that they are the property of another people? Were the United Nations to do that, it would not be the supreme temple of liberty; it would be a mere slave market. This the United Nations surely cannot do. On the contrary, the United Nations has settled the legal question by declaring itself competent and it has endeavoured, if not to give an immediate solution, at least to support an equitable one. Thus, during its last session, the General Assembly adopted resolution 1013 on 26 February 1957.

From the juridical point of view this was perhaps the most important act in the evolution of the Cyprus question. From the political point of view, the resolution constituted an important act the proper value of which, however, hung on the attitude of the parties concerned. Alas, it is all too well known that this Assembly is not a tribunal, that it is not invested with executive powers and that it does not possess the means to apply its desires and recommendations. Their application depends upon the degree to which the parties concerned prove ready and willing to abide by them. In the case of Cyprus, the United Nations has done its duty. The United Nations has given a first opinion. We must see how those whom the United Nations has addressed have responded. Resolution 1013 of 26 February 1957 reads as follows:

"The General Assembly,

"Having considered the question of Cyprus,

"Believing that the solution of this problem requires an atmosphere of peace and freedom of expression,

"Expresses the earnest desire that a peaceful, democratic and just solution will be found in accord with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and the hope that negotiations will be resumed and continued to this end."

It will be seen that the resolution has two distinct parts. According to the usual procedural ritual, every resolution has a preamble and an operative part.

In this case, I see a distinction of substance. I find that in voting the resolution the General Assembly sought, first, to pacify the island -- that is, to restore a normal situation by re-establishing conditions of freedom of expression and suspending recourse to violence. This recommendation was addressed to the Cypriots as well as to the British authorities alike, for a return to conditions of non-violence could only be effective if the active resistance of the Cypriot patriots ceased at the same time as the arbitrary acts of repression by the British.

But under this resolution pacification was not the objective; it was the preliminary condition. The goal was the resumption of negotiations between Cypriots and British with a view to finding an equitable and democratic solution in keeping with the principles of the Charter.

Let us see how the Cypriots responded to the Assembly's appeal with respect to pacification and to the resumption of negotiations. We shall soon see what has been the British Government's attitude on these two points, and we shall thus be able to draw a parallel between the two parties and assess responsibilities. I shall cite the facts; the conclusions will emerge by themselves.

After the adoption of resolution 1013 on 26 February 1957, the Ethnarchy of Cyprus in an official communique expressed its satisfaction at the action taken by the United Nations. A few days later, on 4 March 1957, the Mayors of Cyprus, the elected representatives of the people, published a similar communique. On 14 March 1957, the National Cypriot Liberation Movement (EOKA) circulated the following proclamation:

"Our Organization, complying with the spirit of the resolution of the United Nations, expressing the desire for a peaceful and just solution of the question of Cyprus in accord with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and in order to facilitate the resumption of negotiations between the British Government and the real representative of the Cypriot people, Archbishop Makarios, declares that it is prepared to order the suspension of all operations as soon as the Ethnarch, Archbishop Makarios, is released."

Note the first words: "Our Organization, complying with the spirit of the resolution of the United Nations...". Since that day, EOKA's action has been halted completely. My colleague, Commander Noble, has just questioned whether this armistice still continues. He cited eight incidents said to have occurred during the past two months. I wonder whether these incidents can in fact be imputed to EOKA. I am thinking of one of them which surely cannot be attributed to EOKA. In fact, it cannot be attributed to Greeks at all. A bomb blew up in front of the offices of the British newspaper on Cyprus, The Times of Cyprus. Please note how well everything was done to attribute the incident to EOKA, an outbreak, mind you, against the British newspaper. It so happens, however, that The Times of Cyprus has always defended the cause of the Greeks of Cyprus, the cause of the application of the principle of self-determination on Cyprus without partition. By a coincidence, the building occupied by The Times of Cyprus belongs to the Orthodox Archbishop of Cyprus. And this bombing attempt against the British language newspaper is then attributed to EOKA. How can this be so? Permit me, my British colleague, to cast doubt on the suggestion that EOKA broke the unilaterally declared and unilaterally respected armistice.

On 22 March 1957 Archbishop Makarios, still detained in the Seychelles, made an appeal to the Cypriot combatants and to the British Government calling for the re-establishment of peaceful conditions on the island. On 29 March 1957, the Archbishop, before leaving his place of exile, reiterated during a Press conference his hope that EOKA would suspend its activities and that the British Government would abolish its emergency measures in order to restore an atmosphere of peace and confidence that would permit the resumption of negotiations. What more could the people of Cyprus and their banished chief do to create the atmosphere of peace for which the Assembly had called?

With regard to pacification, what has the action of the British Government been? On 27 February 1957, Lord Home, Secretary of State for the Commonwealth, speaking for the Government in the House of Lords, declared, as can be seen from the official reports:



(continued in English)

"The Indian delegate also made a most constructive intervention. Indeed a welcome breath of realism came into the United Nations Assembly and carried the day, that the British Government and the people of Cyprus should be left to settle between themselves the future of the island of Cyprus, without external pressures and intervention."

(continued in French)

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This was a clear recognition of a sound and unique basis for negotiations between the British Government and the people of Cyprus. It was a clear indication to the Cypriots to respond to those intentions, and two days later, on 13 March 1957, the Minister for Colonies, Mr. Lennox Boyd told the House of Commons that "it would be quite wrong to assume that the British Government would do nothing in pursuance of the United Nations resolution."

But alas, those hopes soon wilted. Next day, Governor Harding honoured these declarations of his Ministers by having Evagoras Pallikarides hanged. This was a young man of eighteen years of age who had been condemned to death solely because he possessed a weapon which, in fact, was not in a fit state to be used. This abominable crime of hanging a man because he possessed a useless weapon stirred the indignation of the civilized world, and I will quote only one example. Representations were made by an American whose moral stature is high in the United States. I am speaking of Senator Fulton. Profoundly moved by this drama, he tried in vain to save the young man from the hangman's noose. He made a number of representations, spoke to Harding on the telephone and implored him not to commit an act so unworthy of the civilization of the British people. He offered further to do anything in his power to provide sanctuary for Pallikarides in the United States, but the Marshal was implacable. Despite the decision of the United Nations, despite the spontaneous and immediate acceptance of that decision by the Cypriots, Pallikarides was, in the words of the sentence, "to be hanged by the neck until death occurred" and death did occur from the hangman's noose. A few days before his execution the hero wrote to his mother "I regret to have nothing more than my eighteen years to offer to my fatherland."

I have mentioned this tragic episode because it illustrates the state of mind in which the Governor and his Administration responded to the United Nations resolution. Small wonder, therefore, that the British authorities fail in their duty to pacify the island by the restoration of normal order and of freedom of expression as provided for by the resolution. The only reason for the improvement in the situation is that EOKA ceased hostilities; it should be known, especially by the United Nations, that pacification has only come about in Cyprus because of the decisions of EOKA, which has conformed to resolution 1013 of the General Assembly and has accordingly stopped hostilities.

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On the contrary, colonial oppression has weighed even more heavily on the shoulders of the people. One might be tempted to believe that the victor of the war against the Mau-Mau, who was the Governor, and his assistants may well have received the message of pacification from the United Nations with fury in their hearts. The intrepid warrior Dighenis might have been on the point of finally escaping the army of police and of the thousands of specialists who were doing everything possible to defeat him and punish the people for having resisted, and once again the so-called forces of order bore down on the people so that none who resisted might go unpunished.

I must needs deal more thoroughly than I have before with the most poignant aspect of the Cyprus drama, the one dealing with certain practices resorted to by the organs of colonial repression. I know that the subject is a painful one for some of you, perhaps in fact for all; believe me, it is equally painful for me and I shall not rackle it out of sheer malice. It is for the sake of justice and objectivity that I must begin by declaring, as I have on other occasions in the United Nations and outside, that the British nation can surely not be regarded as responsible for the dreadful acts I have referred to. Great Britain is the dearest friend of my country; we have been friends with the United Kingdom in good and in bad days, and better than all others we know the nobility and liberalism of its great people. We are therefore entitled to say that the policy with regard to Cyprus is not worthy of the soul of the British people, and by the same token the atrocities perpetrated in Cyprus are not willed or consented to by the bulk of the British people. But alas, it is nonetheless true that these deeds have occurred and have been perpetrated by men wearing British uniforms, which so many thousands of Britishers are still wearing with honour. This distinction which I am drawing between the British people and the British torturers -- and I have mentioned the close traditional bonds with the United Kingdom, bonds which I hope and desire may be revived -- may have induced me not to speak of these sinister activities of the colonialist monsters in Cyprus if the said activities were all in the past. No one would have been happier than I if atrocities and tortures in Cyprus had stopped the day after the adoption of General Assembly resolution 1013. But this was not the case; the same methods were used thereafter and I should be remiss in my duty if I passed over them in silence. I should be remiss in my duty for a number of reasons, for so long as colonialism remains in Cyprus these

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practices, which despite everybody continued to be resorted to, may well become a permanent line of action and policy in order to prolong the present situation.

It may be argued that since 26 February 1957 a number of emergency measures have been revoked, and Commander Noble has mentioned that point, and that the man considered as the principal culprit, Field-Marshal Harding, is no longer in Cyprus but has been replaced by a man who enjoys an excellent reputation both in England and abroad. I recognize with pleasure that all of this is true, but I add with some apprehension that all this is not sufficient as a safeguard for the future to cause our anxiety and alarm to subside, or to cause to subside the alarm of hundreds of thousands of our Cypriot brothers. While some emergency measures have been revoked, others remain and they make it possible for the colonial authorities in Cyprus even at this time to arrest anyone they deem fit and let such persons rot in prison and concentration camps, or to hand them over to the tender cares of the torturers without any judgement or judicial inquiry.

We do not question the liberal personality and attitude of the new Governor. We know that he has a good reputation which was not created without deeds to bolster it, but what is required is not a mere change of personality but a change of policy, for if colonialism persists and if the struggle for liberation which was unilaterally suspended is resumed, and if repression is resorted to by the same methods, what will the new Governor be able to do? In the last analysis, he will have to submit or resign. It is more than doubtful that he would alone have the power to change the situation if all the conditions determining the situation remain the same and if colonialism continues to dominate it.

In asking the United Nations to act for the abolition of colonialism in Cyprus we are at the same time obliged to ask the United Nations to take interim measures to preserve the lives, the well-being and the elementary human dignity of the population. It is not for purposes of phrase-mongering that I use these words life, well-being and elementary human dignity, because these are precisely the things that are at stake. Faced with so grave and serious a case, I must needs weigh my words carefully.

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For purposes of objectivity, I will recognize that since the Pallikarides case the hangman's noose has been idle. A number of victims have been spared; not all, because some were killed under the pretext of having tried to escape, but there have been fewer casualties. This is surely due to the unilateral cease-fire proclaimed by EOKA, but in candor I must also say that nothing has changed in regard to everything else. The number of specific cases is smaller, which is natural in view of the fact that the armed struggle has been suspended, but the cases are there. There are many of them, which is inadmissible in an atmosphere of calm and peace. What are these cases?

Let me cite only a few to give you an idea of what is going on. Here is one dreadful case relating to the curfew which concerned a fairly large village called Millikouri. A curfew was imposed and, unbelievable as it may seem, it lasted for almost two months -- fifty-four days and nights -- during which no one was authorized to leave his house and troops were liable to enter at all hours to search.

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Some victuals were distributed by the British authorities during the first two days, but they were quite inadequate and the people of the neighbouring villages were obliged to come to their assistance and to feed them. But the crops were irretrievably lost and the cattle decimated. The sick, the children and old people were completely isolated from the outside world for fifty-four consecutive days. Doors and windows were closed to the light of day and the souls of men were cut off from light and liberty.

You may say that it is not possible. You may wonder what can be the reason for this fifty-four days of sadism. There was a reason, and a strong reason. It was thought that Dighenis and his lieutenants were hiding in Millikouri. And when it was found that numerous unannounced searches were still without result, houses were razed and their foundations excavated on the supposition that Dighenis and his chiefs were hiding in subterranean crypts. It was said some weeks later by a popular poet, a Cypriot Homer who has remained unknown: "Their thought was so sick that they believed the eagles of Cyprus were building their nests in the dark recesses of small village caves rather than on the high, luminous peaks of the island's great mountains."

If I cited the Millikouri case in more detail than the others, it was not only because it is a particularly poignant case, but because it shows that when a cause is just, repression frightens no one. I wish to show that when colonialism fights against the sentiments of the people, even during an armistice, those who apply it always find reasons to show inhumanity towards their fellowmen.

Alas, there have been several cases of such inhumane treatment, and of a different nature: long detentions without judgement, searches in villages, endangering crops and causing the loss of cattle, even when such operations have no result; collective punishments doing harm to the innocent peasants or the small, peaceful artisans; tortures during inquiries. A great number of such acts have been described, even after the adoption of resolution 1013 (XI), and after the cease-fire proclaimed by EOKA.

I have said "tortures during investigations". This is a bold assertion; bold, because one may well question it and because it is difficult to prove it. We ourselves questioned it until the day when we had irrefutable proof. But the men who have suffered those tortures have written and signed detailed depositions.

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At the bottom of their testimonies we have their signatures, their civil status and their addresses. Thus they have accepted to be punished again, perhaps even more severely, for having openly accused their torturers. This is no fiction; these are facts. Subsequently, they found means of getting those documents into our hands. Some of these cases consist of tortures which a hardened police might describe as "light"; others are embarrassing even for a professional; still others are monstrous and of a horrible cruelty. One might suppose that those who applied these tortures were sexual perverts since the tortures usually consisted of attacks on the genital organs. Not even the priests were spared tortures of this variety. Detailed documentation on this score is in the possession of the permanent mission of Greece to the United Nations and will be utilized according to the decision which the United Nations may take.

Today I shall avoid reading the testimony of the tortured persons. Their numbers are mentioned in a chapter of the document which I have circulated with the help of the Secretariat and which contains only statements of facts. In addition, I can refer to a book which the Ethnarchy of Cyprus has published and which has been made available to all delegations. I shall only say that, unfortunately, the dates covered in this book do not include those of the latest tortures. There have been, alas, even more recent cases. Since coming to New York, I have received news of two recent cases since the departure of Marshal Harding. One is that of Pantelis Katémaris who, on 27 October, was tortured, and another, that of Theodoros Papandréas who, on 9 November, was the victim of equally atrocious torture, the evidence of which we have in our hands. Papandréas was tortured by two abnormal characters whose names were Lingwood and Dear, torturers who have become notorious in Cyprus and whose names often appear in testimonies. I am convinced that the United Kingdom Government is unaware of these facts. Marshal Harding is no longer there; but colonialism is there, and its organs must have recourse to repression in order to survive.

These are the facts. In view of the documents which have been circulated, I think that it is unnecessary to read out these testimonies and to take advantage, at the close of the General Assembly, of the precious time which remains. Moreover, since the documentation exists, I can dispense with reading them to the Committee, since I would risk creating the impression that my Government is attempting to utilize them for anti-British propaganda.

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Nothing could be further from our minds. We do not engage in anti-British propaganda since it is we ourselves who announce that these atrocious acts are certainly contrary to the will of the British people. Where is the propaganda, when eminent British people have themselves strongly protested the practice of torture? If necessary, I can quote texts to show how thoroughly the British have been moved by this aspect of the drama. This is not our emotion; it is a human sentiment to which the British people are a party as well as everybody else.

During the discussion regarding the inclusion of the Cyprus question in the agenda of the present session, I went so far as to say that not only the people, but also the Government of the United Kingdom, even while bearing responsibility for these acts, surely cannot have authorized them. I said, however, that in refusing to recognize the validity of these accusations, the United Kingdom Government indirectly fosters their perpetration. In addition to its responsibility of law, it therefore assumed the responsibility and onus of fact. But it is not our intention to exploit this painful question for political purposes or to use it for purposes of propaganda. If this had been our intention, the United Kingdom Government knows that we would have acted otherwise. Our only purpose for the time being is to stop the colonial torturer in his atrocious business by casting light on him and on his acts. Falsehood and darkness are the accomplices of crime. Perhaps light may protect the victims.



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We have no other way at our disposal except to ask the United Nations to act against Cyprus colonialism and deal with his painful aspect of the problem and remedy it. Everybody knows that just by doing this, the United Nations may, by its moral weight, relieve the plight of the Cyprus people.

I come now to the question of negotiations, which Mr. Noble discussed at some length. My speech will provide an answer to this. What I have innocently mentioned as emergency measures in Cyprus become secondary if we look at the substance of the question. The substance of the question is the abolition of colonialism on Cyprus. The evil has to be rooted out. It is an evil which affects the life of the entire people, which represents a great danger and a constant threat to the peace of the world. In this essential field, it is sad to note that despite the appeal of the United Nations, no serious move had been undertaken by the British Government to advance a political solution of the problem.

It is true that the British Government has discontinued the deportation of Archbishop Makarios, the great prelate, who is the spiritual and political elected chief of the Greeks on Cyprus. But even though the Archbishop has been liberated, he is still in exile, condemned to live far from his people. This reduces considerably the political scope of the gesture of the United Kingdom. In addition to the question of fairness, there is also a question of usefulness. By his moral prestige, by his firmness and wisdom, the Archbishop would not only be a factor of stability but also one of normalization if he were in Cyprus, because by the will of the people he is the only one who would make contacts possible and who would make understandings valid.

More generally speaking, it would be **interesting** to note the attitude of the two parties, the British and Cypriots, towards the recommendation which concerns the immediate resumption of negotiations. On the side of the Cypriot people the following moves were recorded. On 26 May 1957, Archbishop Makarios sent a letter to the British Prime Minister asking: (a) the abolition of emergency measures; and (b) the resumption of negotiations on the application of the right of self-determination. On the other hand, in official correspondence between Mr. Zenon Rossides, a member of the Ethnarchy Council, speaking on behalf of the Archbishop, and the British Ambassador in Athens, the Archbishop's position was

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clarified in a letter of 16 July 1957 which reads as follows:

(continued in English)

"The Archbishop's concern is that the minority should not, in participating in talks on the future of Cyprus, be impliedly given a voice equal to that of the majority whose will would be thus frustrated. The Archbishop, therefore, does not thereby refuse the Turkish Cypriots the right to have a voice as a minority proportionately to their ratio of the population."

(continued in French)

On 30 June, the Free Trade Unions of Cyprus adopted a resolution pressing the need of immediate resumption of negotiations for a settlement of the question. Finally, the Greek Mayors of the Island have on a number of occasions asked the Government to resume negotiations with the representative of Archbishop Makarios. It is to be noted, for that matter, that the National Liberation Front in Cyprus, EOKA, in its proclamation, which I mentioned above, declared that the suspension of hostilities had been decided upon for the purpose of facilitating the resumption of negotiations. It may therefore be noted that the Cypriot side has exhausted all moves, all initiatives, so that the negotiations undertaken in the autumn of 1955, between the Governor and the Archbishop, which were severed and led to the deportation of the Archbishop, should be resumed for the application of the resolution of the General Assembly.

Parenthetically, I should like to note at this point that Mr. Noble characterized the negotiations between Governor Harding and Archbishop Makarios as negotiations concerning self-government for Cyprus. To my knowledge these negotiations had the purpose mentioned on page 8 of Mr. Noble's speech, to make progress with self-government, coupled with a clear statement of the principles of self-determination.

We think that in all good faith we must pay tribute to the Cypriot people's attachment to the cause of a peaceful settlement. We must pay tribute to the Cypriot people's confidence in the United Nations. A people in revolt, a people which has fallen victim to the worst exactions and tortures, declares itself prepared to negotiate with those who dominate it in order to seek a friendly

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solution. At which point I must draw attention to the importance of the armistice unilaterally proclaimed by EOKA. The Greek Government has always refused the least contact with this liberation army because it cannot be in contact with an organization acting with armed might against the authorities of a friendly and allied country, from which we are only separated by the Cyprus question.

However, even while it has never had such contacts, the Greek Government has always, frankly, voiced its admiration for this liberation struggle, which is as heroic as it is unequalled. This admiration today also applies to the fact that EOKA has proved capable of proclaiming armistices.

Those among us who have been involved in under-cover activities -- and the man who speaks to you now has engaged in such activities, together with his British friends, during the Second World War -- those amongst us who have engaged in clandestine activities, under-cover activities, know how great is the peril incurred by a secret organization once it stops acting. Loss of prestige, even discredit of the chief, discouragement, even defection by the members, weakening or even disruption of the secret machinery -- these are the mortal dangers entailed in idleness by an under-cover army. However, Dighenis has twice proclaimed truce tests. The first was in August of 1956. This armistice only lasted for ten days because the Marshal of the Empire refused to accept it. His answer, worthy of an Empire, worthy of the most beautiful days of colonialism, was, for ten days, "terms of surrender" -- an answer which proud men will nowhere accept. The second armistice proclaimed by Dighenis was nine months ago, in response to you, gentlemen, because you had implicitly asked for it in your decision of General Assembly resolution 1013 (XI). I can only bring out the strength, the beauty of these two armistices. Isolated on a remote island, besieged under forcible occupation, EOKA calmly offered twice to the British the very cease-fire which the French are asking the Algerians to grant, but in vain; and this in order to be useful to peace, and at the cost of great peril.

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Unfortunately, after the second truce, after the decision taken by the United Nations in its resolution 1013 (XI), the attitude of the British Government changed superficially, but not substantially.

To all Cypriot overtures the British replied by taking a negative attitude. They refused all offers of negotiation. In a letter addressed to Archbishop Makarios on 30 May 1957, the United Kingdom Ambassador to Athens rejected the Archbishop's proposals for the revocation of emergency measures in Cyprus and the opening of negotiations. At the end of his letter the British Ambassador even made the threat that the United Kingdom might proceed to the partition of the Island. This threat was repeated in the House of Commons on 6 July 1957 in similar statements made by the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Mr. Lennox-Boyd, and his Under-Secretary of State, Mr. Profumo.

To sum up, we are, to our great regret, obliged to note that the British Government has replied "No" both to the Cypriots and to the United Nations. It is a "No" which is not far removed from a "Never" -- a "Never" which was pitted against all the peaceful demands of the Cypriots and of the Greek Government alike.

I come now to a point to which -- since Mr. Noble has spoken brilliantly in this connexion -- I wish to draw the Committee's particular attention. It is the tripartite formula of negotiation.

According to a method which is dear to and almost traditional in British policy, the Government of the United Kingdom has once again had recourse to tactics designed to create confusion and to shift its own responsibilities on to the shoulders of others. It has tried to use the tripartite formula. This tripartite formula is aimed at eliminating the people of Cyprus as the principle and essential factor in the problem in order to say that the problem cannot be solved except by negotiations between the parties concerned, which would be the United Kingdom, Greece and Turkey. I must point out to the Committee that, besides setting aside the people of Cyprus as a factor, the tripartite formula -- invented in London, adopted in Ankara and naively given a blessing by certain foreign ministries -- seems intended to isolate Greece so as to compel it either to betray the Cypriots, whose spokesman Greece is, or else to take upon itself the responsibility of the breaking off of relations.

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The tripartite formula gave rise in 1955 to the London Conference, to which Greece went in all good faith only to discover immediately the atmosphere of isolation which had been prepared for it. That dismal Conference ended in a complete stalemate and was followed by the anti-Greek outbreaks in Constantinople on 5 and 6 September 1955, events which profoundly affected Greek-Turkish relations and on which the Greek Government has never wished to publish the documentary information which it has -- information which is as copiously as it is frightful. One might have thought that in this tragic experience London would find sufficient reason for abandoning thenceforth the unfortunate tripartite formula. Unfortunately, that was not the case.

The British Government did not prove to be sensitive to such considerations. What it is still demanding today is the prolongation of its colonial presence in Cyprus and the avoidance of recognition of the right of self-determination for the Cypriots. Incomprehensible as this may seem to be to those who know the liberal policy of the United Kingdom in other colonies, nevertheless it is quite true in the case of Cyprus. Furthermore, the British Government has not hesitated to use the tripartite formula again, this time with certain variations -- which have been listed by Mr. Noble -- if one can call variations offers of mediation or conferences whose two principle characteristics are:

- (1) That they constantly disregard or relegate to second place the chief interested party, namely, the people of Cyprus;
- (2) That they place emphasis on factors whose interests certain must be taken into consideration but which, in no case, can be regarded as more important than or prior to the interests of the people of Cyprus

On this point, which is important, I feel it my duty to dwell -- in all sincerity, without any hidden motives and without any desire to poison the atmosphere -- on the position of Greece.

Our attitude is clear, and no person of good faith could cast doubt upon it. In connexion with the Cyprus question, Greece has received the mandate to present and defend the cause of the liberation of the people of Cyprus by means of the application of the principle of self-determination. Greece has accepted that mandate, not only because four-fifths of the population of Cyprus is Greek by origin, language, religion and culture -- which alone would justify our action -- but also because that is not all that is at stake. Greece has accepted the mandate because, over and above all, the cause is a just cause.

(Mr. Averoff-Tossizza, Greece)

Note must be taken of the fact that Greece speaks today in the name of the Cypriots because that subject people is unable to plead its own cause here. The fact that that is so does not mean at all that their rights can be ignored and that we, having our mandate, can fail to pay heed to those who have rights. The right of the people of Cyprus to self-determination and equality, and its right to live in freedom and dignity are recognized in the relevant articles of the Charter. It is our duty to defend those rights. It is not our right to set them aside. The Cypriots may set aside anything they like for themselves, but we may not.

It is true that British and Turkish propaganda accuses us of nourishing expansionist ambitions and of desiring to enlarge our own country by wresting away a territory that belongs to a friendly Power. We shall never know to what extent the Turkish arguments are English or the English arguments Turkish. But, whatever their origin, it is not difficult to recognize that they are false. In the first place, Cyprus belongs to no one but its own people. The United Kingdom does not risk losing anything that belongs to it. The people of Cyprus, despite its colonial dependence, does not belong to the United Kingdom.

I wish to point out to the Committee that Greece is the only party which proclaims that it has no claim on Cyprus and that it is invoking no rights on that Island, whereas the United Kingdom is trying to press its own colonial rights while Turkey, on the basis of the Turkish minority and strategic arguments, is trying to insist on rights much greater than any justified by the existence of such a minority or by such strategic arguments. Against invalid and outdated colonial rights, and against unjustified covetousness, we oppose the total and exclusive right of the Cypriots. In the Cyprus question Greece is not seeking profit to itself, booty or recompense. It is demanding everything for Cyprus, nothing for itself.

But, we are asked, alas very often, what will happen if, on the day the people of Cyprus becomes free, it decides to unite with Greece? We know that enosis is displeasing both to the British and to the Turks. But allow me, in the first place, to say that we are here to do what is just and reasonable, even if what is just and reasonable is displeasing to some among us. However, even if we were to accept the desire of the Anglo-Turkish holy alliance as representing

(Mr. Averoff-Tossizza, Greece)

international law, it would still be monstrous to say that, simply to prevent enosis in the future, the people of Cyprus must be condemned to perpetual servitude.

One sees there the evil pretext of colonialism, which cleaves to its prey. The people of Cyprus is and must be the main factor in the problem before us.

(Mr. Averoff-Tossizza, Greece)

The entire people of Cyprus may decide in favour of independence. They may decide in favour of partition of the island. They may decide to remain in the Commonwealth. They may decide to establish links of close co-operation with Turkey, with its Arab neighbours and with Greece. They may serve as a rallying point, instead of being the apple of discord, if we allow them to base their future upon their great civilization and their great wisdom. Greece is willing in advance to accept any decision that the Cypriot people may take freely. This is an official declaration that we have often made.

Among other solutions, I have just mentioned the partition of the island. We know very well that partition is not a solution. Wherever partition has been utilized, it has created greater problems than those which gave rise to the partition. Furthermore, the strange intermingling of the Turkish minority with the mass of the population excludes the application of this type of formula in Cyprus. There is not one town, not one district, no matter how little, where the Turks are in a majority. In the history of the application of the right of self-determination and of international plebiscites, there is no precedent for a partition on the basis of the decision of the majority and the decision of the minority. Wherever it was decided upon, it was done so on the basis of the will of the majority.

Each of the representatives present here represents a State, and all of them know full well that there is not in the world an entirely homogeneous State without any minorities. Therefore, we can imagine what might occur as regards the peace of the world if we decided to set up a precedent of this nature, even though we agreed to discuss a solution which recognizes to a minority the right to shatter national unity and carry with it the territorial substratum to which it laid claim. Despite that, despite all the arguments, our main objection to partition is that it is contrary to the will of the people, who must be recognized as the sole masters of their future. It is this capital argument that forces us, above all, not to accept tripartite negotiations.



(Mr. Averoff-Tossizza, Greece)

In the fulfilment of our mandate, which is to aid the people of Cyprus along their path towards self-determination and political emancipation, the Greek Government has left no stone unturned. We shall oppose no initiative; we shall discourage no one. The only thing that Greece will never do is to traduce the mandate that has been entrusted to it, substitute itself for the people of Cyprus in taking decisions that are not up to us to take, or act in the place of the Cypriots in deciding upon their future fate. This is the basis of the Greek policy regarding the Cyprus question, and it is upon this basis that we considered resolution 1013.

In point of fact, there is only one party concerned: the people of Cyprus. The United Kingdom is not so much a party concerned as a party responsible, it being the holder of the liberties of the Cypriots. All the rest is marginal to the problem of the liberation of Cyprus and the abolition of the colonial regime in the island. At the very centre of this problem there are only the British and the Cypriots. Perhaps on this or that point certain Powers may have certain specific considerations to make known. Turkey may be concerned with the fate of the Turkish minority, and this is perfectly understandable. Perhaps Turkey, Greece, Syria, Lebanon and even the great Powers may also be concerned regarding certain aspects of the problem concerning national security in the geographical region of the island, and this also seems legitimate. We must also recognize that the people of Cyprus should be given the possibility of exercising their right of self-determination and that they should make known their views. It is then and only then that we can truly and fully consider the possible incidences on the international level and seek the way of satisfying the legitimate concerns of the other parties. But there, too, we must be frank and objective and we must declare quite clearly that, as we see it, this concern, no matter from what quarter, if well-founded, must be fully satisfied. But these concerns on the part of others cannot and should not in any way be turned into a veto upon which the fate of an entire people may rest. Furthermore, the ideas of the parties concerned, in the absence of the truly interested group, cannot for one minute stand a careful analysis.

(Mr. Averoff-Tossizza, Greece)

I have explained above the reasons for which this stand of theirs was taken. I would add that, as I said a few moments ago, when the only basis of the problem is abandoned, that is, Cyprus and its people, it would be naive to believe that the number of parties concerned could be limited to two or three, that is to say, that it could be narrowed down to the partners that you want to include in this group. On the international level, all parties have an equal right to present their points of view, and the rights of all are equal.

Though the Turks, the Greeks and the British have their words to say, they are not the only ones. To deal with a subject on an international level is to submit for international consideration a problem upon which all parties concerned may make known their views. Otherwise it might give the impression of being a plot or conspiracy destined to act for the benefit of some and to the detriment of others. On this point, I think it might be edifying for the Committee to note the reply given by the representative of India, Mr. Krishna Menon, in the Indian Parliament to certain questions that were asked him on 26 March 1957. This is what he said: (continued in English)

"We initiated in the United Nations the conception that the people mainly concerned are the Cypriot people, and that Cyprus was not to be bargained off between Turkey, Greece and Britain. A few others are now looking in. The Syrians said, while Turkey is only forty-five miles from Cyprus, Syria is only thirty-seven miles. What is more, they said, we can see the Cyprus coast from our coast. Next year, there may be other people. We did not consider that the issue of Cyprus is a matter of the country being sliced up between various people...

"I suppose that does represent a degree of the success of the process of conciliation, and the basis of it was that the parties involved in it were the United Kingdom as a metropolitan power and the Cypriot people as the people who were not free, and therefore if they wanted to remain as part of the sisterhood of nations of the Commonwealth, as we hope they would, it is up to them. We have always taken the view publicly and privately that the remedy lies in recognizing before it is too late, and by not giving too little, the demand of the Cypriot people for independence..."

(Mr. Averoff-Tossizza, Greece)(continued in French)

Nothing could be clearer. It is not necessary to remind the Committee here that Mr. Krishna Menon was the author of the draft resolution which, when unanimously adopted by the General Assembly, became resolution 1013 (XI). It is also unnecessary to remind the Committee that Mr. Menon, as well as a number of other representatives, spoke in the same way, equally categorically and equally explicitly.

However, outside of the basis for this idea, let us suppose for one moment that we were to accept the theory of the "interested parties" as the framework for negotiations. Let us suppose for one moment that Greece, for some reason or other, forced to betray its mandate, accepted a compromise based upon the giving up of the rights of the people of Cyprus. How could anyone impose on the Cypriots a solution contrary to their will? Should we use force and violence again? We do not see any other way. The United Kingdom administration and the colonial torturers would then be supported by Turkish and Greek gendarmes. This alliance of jailers that is proposed to us here, on the basis of a tripartite agreement, is offered us in the United Nations as a way of bringing peace and liberty to the people of Cyprus. This argument ad absurdum lights up clearly the underlying problem and should sweep away all doubts.

So we come to the intransigent attitude of the British Government. This is the official policy of the United Kingdom, and there can be no doubt about that. However, it is true that in a democratic country, such as is the United Kingdom, public opinion, the state of mind of the people, is a determining factor.

(Mr. Averoff-Tossizza, Greece)

But now that the policy of the British Government in Cyprus is as we described it before, the British people in their great majority recognize the rights of the Cypriots and, to judge from the press, the British people in their great majority have rallied to the Cypriots. This is true of the British people, independent of their political affiliations. The great majority of the publications in England, many of them with Conservative leanings, have stated their understanding of, and at times their sympathy for, the Cypriot cause. But this cause has found its deepest echo, has been adopted in all its just and reasonable scope, in the Labour Party itself. At its latest congress, held in Brighton on 27 November 1957, the Labour Party, in the course of an official declaration made by its leader, adopted an official position on Cyprus which was stated as follows: (continued in English)

"The Labour Party has insisted, since the crisis began in 1954, that the people of Cyprus, like all other peoples, have a right to determine their own future. We have also emphasized our view that this right should be exercised after an agreed interim period of self-government. Such a procedure obviously requires the creation of representative institutions in which both Greek and Turkish Cypriots would play their respective parts; but proposals for a Constitution have hitherto been unacceptable in Cyprus because they have not included firm guarantees of self-determination after an agreed period, and we now call on Her Majesty's Government to give such guarantees. We do not include partition within our definition of democratic self-determination.

"The National Executive Committee of the Labour Party demands that the Government now break the deadlock by inviting representatives chosen by the Greek and Turkish communities in Cyprus to take part in discussions. The object of such discussions should be to reach agreement on the functions and powers of the interim government, arrangements for its election, safeguarding of minority rights. In entering into such a discussion the British Government must recognize that the major responsibility for the affairs of the island will rest in the hands of the Greek Cypriots, but that the legitimate rights of the Turkish minority must be safeguarded. The establishment of representative government in Cyprus is a necessary first step towards the fulfillment of the principle of self-determination in a democratic way."

(Mr. Averoff-Tossizza, Greece)

(continued in French)

It is my duty -- and a pleasant duty -- to express here my feelings of admiration and appreciation and to say that this resolution produced great rejoicing in Cyprus and Greece. My admiration and appreciation are addressed to all those in the world who want to promote democracy and freedom. This admiration and these thanks are addressed not only to the Labour Party, one of the two great political parties in England, but also to the British people as a whole, because it is in keeping with the liberal tradition of that great people, which allows such gestures to be made under free political institutions, the horizons of which are not only British but human. It is an honour to the Labour Party that it thus proves that the liberalism of Britain is a decisive factor in the evolution of the world toward an international society in which arbitrariness will disappear and justice will reign. On an international level, the prestige of the British Labour Party has been maintained. In fact, men and women whose feelings have thus found expression in the Labour Party resolution have done more to conquer Cyprus than the activities of Mr. Harding and the thoughtless refusals of the Colonial Office.

We are told, however -- and, unfortunately, so often that it is somewhat frightening -- that the Labour Party is the opposition and that it is therefore easy for it to make promises today that may not be kept tomorrow, that may not be kept when the Labour Party becomes the Government. We know what part of this statement is true and what part is exaggeration. But what is important here is that the resolution of the Labour Party in Brighton is a resolution of principle. It is an expression of political faith, and we know full well that the Labour Party respects principles, because the British people as a whole is attached to principle. We here discuss principles recognized and set forth in the Charter; we do not talk about their ways of implementation. And now I should like to ask you a question: Can we do less for the people of Cyprus than that which half of the British people has solemnly committed itself to do on a level of principle? Can we do other than recognize the right of self-determination which the Labour Party has recognized as applying to Cyprus? What logic, what political considerations, could be invoked on our part to justify a negative vote on the principle which lies at the very basis of that policy which

(Mr. Averoff-Tossizza, Greece)

will be applied in Cyprus some day on behalf of the British Government? What would our refusal mean today, since ultimately the Government concerned will not refuse that principle?

And so I come to the conclusion of my statement. We are confronted with facts which cannot be overlooked or set aside. Since 1954, the people of Cyprus has painfully followed its via dolorosa. Its suffering is great and its rights are great. What the Cypriots ask us to do is to recognize those rights -- those rights which are the cardinal points in our Charter. The people of Cyprus are an overburdened colonial people. Have they, or have they not, the right to live like any other people, free and equal to the rest of us? Is there in this hall, or is there not, a place for Cyprus? That is the question that the draft resolution which my delegation has the honour to submit asks of the General Assembly.

In the course of the eleventh session, we accepted a resolution proposed by India and we expressed the hope that that resolution, which was adopted unanimously by the General Assembly and which sprang from the great political and spiritual and moral power inherent in the Indian nation, a nation which is a member of the Commonwealth, would lead to a true change in the situation and would open the road to the liberation of the people of Cyprus. That was why I did not press to a vote the resolution which we submitted last year. However, I did declare that I would not withdraw our draft, that it would still stand, and that it would be revived if the solution provided for in resolution 1013 was not implemented by the time of the next regular session. These were the last words that I spoke to this Committee in the course of the eleventh session of the General Assembly.

The statement that I have just made proves that the hopes and the aspirations of the Cypriot people have been ignored. Tyranny still reigns in Cyprus. I am therefore forced to revive our draft resolution, which has been held over from the last session. In doing so, I am fulfilling the mandate of the Cypriot people. But I would be inaccurate if I did not add that there is also a mandate from the Greek people as a whole, with no exceptions whatever, because, through its sacrifices for freedom and liberty, which concern us all, the people of Greece have also the right, on their own behalf, to demand the liberty of the Cypriots.

(Mr. Averoff-Tossizza, Greece)

In 1940, when the whirlwind of the Nazi and Communist forces had swept practically all over Europe, and when heroic Great Britain was all alone and on its knees, Greece did not hesitate for one moment but went into the unequal fight because liberty was at stake. Hundreds of thousands of soldiers and civilians were wounded and killed, and thousands of villages were destroyed, while others suffered worse atrocities. That is the true balance of our efforts.

Then, in 1945, Greece again had to undergo a costly guerilla war lasting for three and one-half years in order to maintain liberty and to guarantee democratic principles and to see that they were not destroyed or abolished on Greek soil. Our sacrifices at that time were much heavier. Then, after almost eight years of war, the United Nations invited us to fight for the freedom and liberty of Korea. In proportion to our population, we played a part that was no less than that played by others. Greek soldiers and airmen distinguished themselves as much as those of other nations. Our sacrifices were no greater than those of others, but they were no less.

Therefore, the Greek people have the right to ask the United Nations no longer to allow the people of Cyprus to live under a colonialist regime, and we have this right because of our 700,000 dead between 1940 and 1949, practically one-tenth of our population, and those dead also have the same right to demand this.

But, besides the living and the dead on whose behalf I speak here, I speak also on behalf of principles. Does anyone dare to give me one case where the fundamental principles of our democratic age have been more clearly betrayed than in Cyprus? Can anyone for a minute think that these people have not suffered enough to be allowed their liberty? Can anyone doubt that it is their will to be free? Can anyone question their degree of civilization and their ability to be free? What, then, would be left of our faith in those principles whose value, importance and beauty we have never ceased to proclaim if we did nothing to help these martyred people to recover their freedom?

Something specific must at least be done, and that lies in the adoption of the draft resolution which the Greek delegation has the honour to submit. It is with a feeling of overwhelming responsibility to the quick and the dead, on whose behalf I speak, and it is with a feeling of anxiety for my suffering brethren who believe in the United Nations, that I appeal to you all to vote in favour of this draft resolution.

The meeting rose at 1.05 p.m.