



President: Mr. Peter FLORIN
(German Democratic Republic).

AGENDA ITEM 8

General debate (continued)

1. Mr. PAPOULIAS (Greece):* I should like at the outset to express my satisfaction, Sir, at seeing you presiding over this third special session devoted to disarmament. Your well-known skill and experience, amply demonstrated by your inspired presidency of the General Assembly at its forty-second session, provide the best assurances for the successful outcome of the work of this session.

2. On 6 June, from this same podium the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, Mr. H. D. Genscher, will make a statement on behalf of the 12 member States of the European Community. Speaking as the representative of the Greek Government, I wish to make the following remarks.

3. Greece is convinced that the third special session on disarmament constitutes a significant event for the international community. To each of its members the opportunity is offered to assume its responsibility regarding the fate of this planet and to fulfil its obligations for the advancement of disarmament. We believe that our single objective should be the defence and consolidation of international peace and security.

4. The Greek Government has repeatedly stressed the importance it attaches to the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly [resolution S-10/2], the first special session devoted to disarmament, and in particular its fundamental principles.

5. Ten years have elapsed since that session. New realities have emerged. In some areas, remarkable progress has been achieved, in others less, and in some others very little. That is why we must now work out adequate and more concrete measures so that this special session can achieve tangible results and take a new substantial step towards disarmament.

6. It is true that the signals that have reached us from bilateral disarmament negotiations have given us hope. Obviously I refer to the United States-Soviet talks and the agreement on the elimination of all

intermediate- and shorter-range missiles. Although those missiles represent only 4 per cent of the total of operational nuclear weapons, that agreement gives us a small indication of what is feasible in the area of disarmament, provided that the necessary political will exists. We particularly welcome the pertinent political decision of the United States Senate to ratify the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, a decision that reflects the devotion of the American people to the idea of peaceful dialogue leading to disarmament.

7. Greece is following with particular interest the developments in this area. It is worth recalling that since 1984, that is, at a time when the dialogue between the two super-Powers was suspended, Prime Minister Andreas Papandreu participated actively in the Six-Nation Initiative for peace and disarmament along with the leaders of Argentina, India, Mexico, Sweden and Tanzania. The primary objectives of this Initiative are a ban on nuclear tests, the reduction and ultimately the total elimination of nuclear weapons, and prevention of the militarization of space.

8. To this end, the Six have made available to interested parties their national seismological means for the recording of nuclear tests, wishing to contribute to solving the verification issue in the most effective manner. I wish to refer to this issue in more detail because it is of paramount importance to the international community, not only to parties of any given disarmament agreement.

9. One of the recent encouraging and most important developments in the disarmament process is the common acceptance of the fact that efficient verification of compliance constitutes a *conditio sine qua non* of disarmament agreements and that modern technology renders such verification feasible. Since this is an issue of primary importance, we believe that agreed-upon specific measures of bilateral verification should be complemented by measures of international verification. We also believe that the organizational best suited to undertake measures of international verification on behalf of the international community is the United Nations. It is an absolutely representative organization which is in a position to provide impartial observers and experts as well as the required legal framework and infrastructure. Moreover, the means offered by modern technology for the verification of disarmament agreements are indeed enormous.

10. For the aforementioned reasons Greece, along with the other five participants in the Six-Nation Initiative, is proposing to the current special session

*Mr. Papoulias spoke in Greek. The English version of his statement was supplied by the delegation.

the establishment of an integrated verification system within the United Nations framework. Such a system would enhance the multilateral aspect of this important issue and safeguard peace and security, both during the disarmament process and later in a nuclear-weapon-free world. We believe that the Secretary-General could present to the General Assembly at its forty-fourth session an outline, to be prepared with the help of specialized experts, on the technical means which are or would be available to the international community for the verification of disarmament agreements, related either to the destruction of nuclear-weapon systems and chemical weapons or to nuclear-test bans.

11. We believe that the verification issue is a considerable challenge to which the States Members of the United Nations should respond positively, thus enlarging the Organization's role in the prevention of war and the consolidation of peace. I should also like to stress that the role which we propose for the United Nations is to co-ordinate national and international means of verification in order to supplement bilateral agreements, not to substitute itself for them.

12. The special attention which was given by the first special session on disarmament to the limitation of nuclear armaments should continue, because nuclear arsenals in their contemporary forms and dimensions remain the most serious threat. We express again the hope that the two super-Powers will with a sense of responsibility towards mankind continue the efforts they initiated last year for the reduction of nuclear weapons, with the final aim of their total elimination.

13. We are convinced that the political will demonstrated by the conclusion of the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles will continue, so that by the end of the year the 50 per cent reduction of strategic nuclear weapons will also be agreed upon. In this context, the conclusion of a treaty on a complete nuclear-test ban would be of primary importance. The first special session on disarmament gave the proper focus to this issue by placing it in the context of a result-oriented process of disarmament. The current session should, independently of genuine efforts to be pursued concurrently by the two super-Powers, reaffirm the need for the conclusion of such a treaty.

14. My country, Greece, is attached to the principles and provisions of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [*resolution 2373 (XXII), annex*]. My Government would wish all States which have not so far adhered to that Treaty to do so.

15. Further, and in connection with this concept of non-proliferation, my Government from the outset supported the creation of nuclear-free zones. We believe that such zones contribute to stability at the regional level, and that is why we welcomed the Treaty of Tlatelolco,¹ for Latin America, and the most recent one, the Treaty of Rarotonga, for the South Pacific.

16. In this same spirit my country, attached to any measure which would promote confidence at a regional level, has spared no effort to achieve the

closest possible relations with its neighbours. The Balkans constitute today a model of regional co-operation among countries with different political and economic systems. It is in this context that the Greek Government supports consistently and firmly the proposal to render the Balkans a zone free of nuclear and chemical weapons. The meeting of Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Balkan countries, held at Belgrade in February 1988 is the latest outstanding manifestation of regional co-operation in our area.

17. I should be remiss were I not to mention our anxieties stemming from the continuing proliferation and use of chemical weapons—a development which is a blatant violation of existing international rules. The international community is aware that chemical weapons—for long termed weapons of mass destruction—constitute a severe problem. The third special session on disarmament must condemn not only their use but also their production and storage. Negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament have recently advanced along these lines towards the drafting of a treaty. Positive signals are also emerging from the bilateral negotiations now being conducted between the two super-Powers at the margins of the Conference. The current special session must on its own demonstrate its interest in order to seek from the Conference the conclusion of a result-oriented and verifiable treaty for the total ban of chemical weapons.

18. Further, I should stress, our attention has been drawn also to the continuing, rapid increase in conventional armaments. We cannot ignore the enormous price in human life that their development has cost. At the same time, the economic cost has gone beyond all reasonable limits, while their capability of destruction is constantly increasing. It would be a serious omission if the third special session on disarmament ignored this problem and did not examine in an effective way the possibilities of limiting conventional weapons and forces to the lowest possible level. The Greek Government shares with others the conviction that the reduction of conventional armaments would reduce the risks of a nuclear war. Our efforts to reduce conventional weaponry would be a decisive step to the lifting of tensions and the prevention of war.

19. States have been led to adopt confidence-building measures in order to lessen the mistrust that still exists between them and to eliminate it altogether, which is their final aim. An important step in this direction in the European regional framework was the adoption of the Document of the Stockholm Conference on Security- and Confidence-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe. We believe that the European example could initiate similar efforts in other regions. In this spirit, Greece recently initiated an effort to normalize its relations with Turkey. The first important step was the adoption of specific confidence-building measures. These measures, which were adopted during the first meetings of two Greek-Turkish committees, aim at the elimination of points of friction and the establishment of confidence between the two countries.

20. I wish now to refer to another consideration underlining the importance my Government attaches

to the creation of zones of peace. Although the relevant initiatives have not yet made the desired progress, this should not reduce our efforts in that direction. As an example I refer to the Mediterranean sea; my Government is constantly expressing its sensitivity with regard to the situation prevailing there. As I stated from this rostrum at the forty-second session [17th meeting], the Mediterranean should become a sea of peace, of friendship and co-operation among its peoples. In support of efforts to promote peace in this area, my Government is prepared to participate in initiatives to enlarge the co-operation and the unimpeded development of the peoples of the Mediterranean area. In this context, the Greek Government welcomed the proposals made by General Secretary Gorbachev during his recent visit to Belgrade, supporting the idea that the Mediterranean become a sea of peace and of friendship and co-operation between its peoples.

21. But, beyond the progress necessary to establish zones of peace, we consider that similar progress should be made in efforts to eliminate regional centres of friction and of conflict. With this in mind, we welcomed the conclusion in Geneva on 14 April 1988 of the agreements on the situation relating to Afghanistan, which undoubtedly constitute a major success for the efforts made by the United Nations.

22. With regard to regional frictions and conflicts, we consider that the withdrawal of foreign troops from the territory of an independent State constitutes a catalyst—either negatively, if the problem is perpetuated, or positively, if it is solved. We consider that the Soviet Union took a notable decision in deciding to withdraw its troops from Afghanistan. We now turn our eyes to other major regional conflicts and to countries where the presence of occupation forces still continues, as in the territory of the Republic of Cyprus. The withdrawal of those forces in Cyprus is explicitly required by mandatory decisions and resolutions of the United Nations, which so far have not been complied with.

23. The reduction of armaments is an imperative need—in particular, because of the world's limited resources. When hundreds of millions of people on our planet are suffering, the enormous expenditure on armaments becomes a provocation. Allow me to quote from the Stockholm Declaration by the countries of the Six-Nation Initiative, as follows:

“The world's resources are finite. We have to choose. The sufficient manufacture of ploughshares calls for a reduction in the manufacture of swords.”²

24. I wish finally to state that the road to complete disarmament under effective control necessitates, beyond the active participation of all Member States, the proper informing of their public. I believe this should become one of our major objectives in the framework of the information and cultural activities of the United Nations and should be included in the final document of this session.

25. I assure you, Mr. President, that the Greek delegation will approach the third special session devoted to disarmament with a creative spirit so that the session may achieve tangible results for the

consolidation and strengthening of international peace and security.

26. Mr. BARNETT (Jamaica): I begin with a quotation:

“Mankind today is confronted with an unprecedented threat of self-extinction arising from the massive and competitive accumulation of the most destructive weapons ever produced. Existing arsenals of nuclear weapons alone are more than sufficient to destroy all life on earth. Failure of efforts to halt and reverse the arms race, in particular the nuclear arms race, increases the danger of the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Yet the arms race continues. Military budgets are constantly growing, with enormous consumption of human and material resources . . .

“The arms race, particularly in its nuclear aspects, runs counter to efforts to achieve further relaxation of international tension, to establish international relations based on peaceful coexistence and trust between all States, and to develop broad international co-operation and understanding.” [See resolution S-10/2, paras. 11 and 12.]

27. That was from the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, held in 1978. At that time the participants concluded that disarmament had become the imperative and most urgent task facing the international community, and consequently they agreed in the Programme of Action [*ibid.*, sect. III] that priorities and measures for disarmament should be undertaken as a matter of urgency in the area of nuclear weapons; other weapons of mass destruction, including chemical weapons; conventional weapons, including any which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects; and reductions of armed forces. There was also established a comprehensive, phased programme, with agreed timeframes wherever possible, for progressive and balanced reductions of stockpiles of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, leading to their ultimate and complete elimination at the earliest possible time.

28. Today, under your guidance and skill, Mr. President, we begin to look where we ought to be going on the basis of where we know we have been. An appraisal of the international situation and the prospects for substantive progress in disarmament will be in order, taking into account the interrelated factors of security, development and peace.

29. Since 1978 we have had more guns, more bombs, more weapons systems, more sophistication and more wars, but no greater sense of security. If recent trends continue world military expenditure could reach or exceed \$1,000 billion a year well before 1990. This amount rivals the total debt burden of developing countries and the global expenditures needed for reducing the social and economic problems of developing countries.

30. We of course speak from the perspective of a country with neither the capability nor the intention of acquiring any extensive amount of weapons of whatever sort; a country that is part of an interna-

tional society fraught with threats, violations of sovereignty and territorial integrity, aggression, quasi-aggression, violence; a society where we are all in search of peace and stability and development. A persistent yearning for nuclear disarmament and arms control is an essential part of that search for a tolerable life in a tolerable world. Such a world requires a measure of trust that up to now has been sadly missing.

31. The inability of some States to improve their conventional forces in order to confront adequately their perceived adversaries in the field imposes a price on members of the international community. The consequent reliance on nuclear weapons to counter larger ground forces means that the rest of the world is automatically subject to the consequences of nuclear reactions. Chernobyl should be a reminder. There are of course the appropriate strategic doctrines to rationalize the situation. But it must be noted that, given the present attitude of certain Governments with respect to increasing and improving their own conventional forces, the rest of the world provides at the least a moral subsidy. It is therefore a paradox that in certain instances it is necessary to improve conventional forces in order to arrive at nuclear arms control.

32. We cannot ignore the need to control the conventional arms race. There is little comfort in the oft-repeated assertion that nuclear deterrence has kept the peace. As we are aware, since 1945 there have been some 150 wars or armed conflicts, mostly among the third world countries, on the territories of the third world, with the people of the third world the victims. Perhaps as many as 20 million have died, with additional immeasurable human suffering, crops damaged, lands scarred, economies destroyed. This is not peace. Yet, trade in conventional weapons continues apace, and there seems to be no end in sight. Regional initiatives can be usefully pursued to make progress on the restrictions of conventional weapons. Clearly these initiatives cannot operate in a vacuum. They require political accommodation and a context of regional co-operation and trust to facilitate the process. Here, as elsewhere, perceptions of security often clash. But all too often outside Powers exacerbate domestic and regional tensions. It cannot be in the interest of peace and stability for the major Powers to be always inserting themselves in these areas. Surely it is high time for a wise exercise of restraint.

33. It is still possible to achieve real security at much lower levels of weapons and weapons systems through concerted efforts to overcome deep-rooted mistrusts and suspicions and to enhance confidence among States and their peoples. Hence the importance of judicious confidence-building measures and agreements whose settled interpretations are not subjected to sudden changes.

34. For some time now a convention on chemical weapons has seemed to be within reach. It is essential. The present use of these weapons affronts us all. There is obviously an urgent need for an agreement on banning the manufacture, acquisition, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons. The more complex they become, the greater is the need for a

verifiable agreement and the less is the ability to verify. Time is not on our side.

35. This paradox is true as we move up the scale of modernization, complexity and miniaturization. The more sophisticated the weapons systems, whether conventional or nuclear, the more persistent is the need for verification, the more necessary is trust, because not everything can be verified or is verifiable.

36. One way or another, one day we will all be forced to confront with high seriousness the implications of the momentum of scientific and technological developments in weaponry and war-making. The undesirability of curbing, or the inability to curb, human ingenuity here cannot excuse failure to manage its consequences. In this area we must avoid an imprudent fascination with technology for its own sake. Nuclear weapons require a new, common and shared sensibility: the reduction, indeed the elimination, of the possibility of nuclear war.

37. But there is now more than a glimmer of hope. The signing of the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles—the INF Treaty—by President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev and their meeting now are illustrative of the emerging environment. The rigidities of the so-called bipolar world are fracturing and with them accumulated assumptions, attitudes and thinking. All sorts of reappraisals are taking place everywhere. The economies of none of the major Powers can further sustain, without serious damage to their societies, continued massive expenditure on sophisticated weaponry, particularly nuclear weapons. There is, therefore, an implicit acknowledgement of a relationship between disarmament and development.

38. In addition, as Lord Zucherman has recently so aptly observed:

“The INF deal also means that both sides now implicitly admit that between them they have wasted billions and billions of dollars on a fruitless effort to outbid each other in nuclear armament. They have discovered that weapons whose unit destructive power is both theoretically variable and for all practical purposes limitless cannot be accommodated within the frame of an arms race that makes logical sense only as it applies to conventional armament that can be precisely counted, and the consequences of whose use are within human control.”

39. So although the INF Treaty affects only 3 per cent of global nuclear-weapons systems or missiles—actually returning the so-called physics packages to their respective stockpiles—we confidently expect that the discussions now going on will lead to a 50 per cent cut in strategic delivery vehicles. Our confidence is not misplaced, because the need has been made stark.

40. A ban on nuclear testing is the logical outcome of all of this. There is no technical obstacle to a comprehensive test-ban treaty that is verifiable. But along the way the arms control process must be

broadened from nuclear delivery vehicles to a total resources constraint on nuclear weapons through limitations on fissionable materials for military purposes, for, we must emphasize, both the INF Treaty and the proposed 50 per cent cut deal with control of delivery vehicles, not nuclear weapons.

41. Jamaica strongly supports the central role of the United Nations in the consideration and adoption of a comprehensive programme of disarmament. The changing environment is opening up new possibilities for the Organization, and they must be used with imagination. Notwithstanding bilateral successes, multilateral underpinnings are essential. In particular, we believe that the United Nations should assume a greater role in the establishment of an institutional verification system. Such a system has to be flexible. No verification régime can be absolutely foolproof. Compliance is more often than not the fruit of shared interest and mutual benefit.

42. Complementary to these measures is the need for more sustained efforts to establish more nuclear-free zones in various parts of the world, as well as to ensure, to the satisfaction of the regional States involved, scrupulous respect by the nuclear-weapon States of existing nuclear-weapon-free zones. The Latin American and Caribbean parties to the Treaty of Tlatelolco¹ and its Protocols prohibiting the presence of nuclear weapons in the area defined in the Treaty have no means of knowing the extent of the compliance by nuclear-weapon Powers, notwithstanding the latter's own insistence on verification elsewhere.

43. The indications from Moscow are that the meeting of the leaders of the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has, according to one of them, raised the level of the relations between the two countries to a new plane. The rest of the world would be grateful for a sustained respite from tensions and quarrels and acrimony between them. The summit seems to hold out great promise, which can be partially fulfilled by what is done here. We shall see.

44. My delegation pledges its full co-operation with a view to the successful outcome to our deliberative efforts at this special session. We conclude by recalling a statement made by the Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs at the regional conference for the World Disarmament Campaign held in May 1986 in the capital of the Georgian Republic of the Soviet Union:

“Peace is indeed more than the absence of war. It is not only the absence of fighting, of weapons, of destruction, but peace is also the enjoyment of a life with dignity and endowed with fundamental human rights. Peace is the feeling of security, the knowledge that life with its endless possibilities will be allowed to run its course. Peace is continuity, the certainty that we are leaving our children what we have built and worked for.”

45. Mr. van den BROEK (Netherlands): Mr. President, my delegation is looking forward to working under your able guidance once again and wishes you every success in your difficult task. You may count on our constructive support.

46. This special session on disarmament is being held against a far more propitious background than the previous one in 1982. Much has changed in those six years. East-West relations have taken a welcome turn for the better and the arms control process has clearly gained momentum.

47. The Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles—the INF Treaty—in our view, was a historic breakthrough. It is gratifying that the Treaty now has also been ratified. A whole category of nuclear weapons will now be dismantled. We all hope that the summit in Moscow between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev has brought us a step closer to a 50 per cent cut in strategic nuclear weapons. Previous arms control agreements, such as SALT, were directed at channelling rather than reversing the arms race. Now, we are moving from arms control to real disarmament. The proposals for major reductions, which were put forward at the beginning of this decade in both INF and the Strategic Arms Reductions Talks [START], are beginning to bear fruit.

48. Another positive development is the increasing acceptance of the principle of parity, and even more important, the acceptance of the practical consequence of this principle: he who has more weapons will have to reduce more, as is reflected, in fact, in the INF Treaty. Balance is also a key to stability. Superiority on one side will always give rise to fear on the other side that one day this superiority might be used against him. There is, however, more to stability. Stability means also a force posture that puts no premium on striking first. Hence the importance of addressing the heavy land-based missiles for multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles, as is being done in START. Hence also the importance for the new conventional stability talks now being prepared in Vienna to look not only at the numbers, but also at capabilities for surprise attack and large-scale offensive operations.

49. Establishing a stable balance at the lowest possible level is clearly a central goal of arms control negotiations. Bringing about such a situation in the nuclear as well as the conventional field is, I am convinced, very much in the interest not only of East and West but of global security.

50. Verification is an indispensable element of arms control. The progress made with regard to verification over the past few years is therefore particularly encouraging. On-site inspection, once a controversial issue, has now become a routine matter in the context of the Document of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe. And the INF Treaty contains the most extensive and intrusive verification provisions so far agreed upon. My own country, where deployment of INF systems was envisaged, will receive inspections by the Soviet Union. All this shows that we have come a long way from the days when we entered into agreements with no verification provisions at all or merely references to national technical means.

51. Progress has also been made with regard to chemical weapons, which pose particularly daunting

verification problems that need to be addressed further.

52. A look at the arms control process in the past few years shows movement on several fronts. The most spectacular results were achieved in the bilateral negotiations between the two major Powers, but at the regional level as well positive developments occurred. I refer to the package of confidence and security-building measures agreed upon for the whole of Europe. In fact it is intended to expand this package and also to start new talks on conventional forces and armaments from the Atlantic Ocean to the Urals. At the world-wide level, serious negotiations have been going on with regard to the banning of chemical weapons, which is indeed becoming increasingly urgent.

53. The progress made in different forums underscores the fact that there is no uniform way of dealing with arms control. Negotiating forums tailored to the specific circumstances and the types of armaments and forces involved offer the best chances of success. Bilateral, regional and multilateral arms control can be complementary and mutually supportive.

54. A time of improved prospects is not a time to lean back but rather a time to redouble our efforts. It is our common task to build on the recent progress. Important as the INF Treaty is in itself, I should like to regard it above all as a promise of further agreements to come. The task of this special session is, in my view, to give a political impulse to the work being done in the various forums.

55. Now that we seem to be moving towards real disarmament, I believe we should ask ourselves whether some of the concepts we discussed in the past have not become outmoded. Has not the freeze concept, for example, been overtaken by events? And what about the indirect strategy of "suffocating the nuclear arms race", now that the direct approach of substantially reducing nuclear weapons is beginning to bear fruit?

56. Another point we have to keep in mind is that arms control is not an end in itself but should serve our security. Arms control on the one hand and legitimate defence efforts on the other are not contradictory but complementary. My country partakes, as is well known, in a regional system of collective defence, which is actively pursuing arms control and better East-West relations while maintaining a credible deterrent. In the present circumstances, which include a serious conventional imbalance in Europe, the nuclear element of deterrence cannot be dispensed with, however much I should like this to be otherwise. The sole purpose of deterrence is to prevent war, any kind of war. Of course, this fact does not, as I have said, stand in the way of substantial reductions of nuclear weapons with the aim of establishing a stable balance at the lowest possible level.

57. The situation, obviously, is quite different in those parts of the world where there are no nuclear weapons at present. There, it is the introduction of such weapons which would have highly destabilizing consequences. This underscores the importance of our efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons

to countries that do not possess them. The non-proliferation régime remains absolutely vital for world peace and security. The aim of preventing proliferation can also be furthered by the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in those regions where nuclear weapons do not yet exist.

58. Allow me one last general remark before I go into some of the specifics of our session. Arms control is not a panacea for all the tensions in the world. Good, solid arms control agreements can and will certainly contribute to the lessening of tensions in international relations but cannot by themselves improve them fundamentally. Real détente and trust require progress across a much broader range, including respect for human rights.

59. Within the framework of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe 35 countries are engaged in a series of co-operative efforts involving, notably, security and human rights. My Government considers it essential that the meeting of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe at present taking place at Vienna achieve substantive and balanced results.

60. In fact some of the concepts for broad co-operation contained in the Final Act of Helsinki might be of use to other regions of the world as well. Central America, southern Africa and the Middle East are examples of regions where, as in Europe, steps to increase confidence in military as well as in political matters would be very welcome.

61. How can the world community encourage further arms control? That is the question we must address at this session. We should lay out our course along the lines of that significant landmark, the Final Document of the first special session on disarmament. In my view, the most important contribution we can make now would be a concluding document that registers what has been accomplished and encompasses a coherent and realistic programme of objectives and points of action for the years ahead. Such a programme would provide the necessary impulse for the ongoing arms control negotiations, in particular those taking place on a world-wide level. The emphasis in this document should be on concrete recommendations and measures rather than on long declarations.

62. In the view of the Netherlands, the following elements should receive due attention at our session and deserve to be included in the final document.

63. In the first place, it is essential to agree that the Geneva negotiations on chemical weapons—which are the type of arms which can be effectively prohibited only on a world-wide basis—should soon be brought to a successful conclusion. We have already made considerable progress towards a comprehensive ban on these weapons. While calling for an even faster pace in these negotiations, I do not underestimate the problems that remain. These are both technically complex, as in the case of the verification of non-production, and politically delicate, as in the case of efforts to seek universal adherence to the convention.

64. Because chemical weapon stocks and production are so easy to hide, verification is of a specific complexity. The principle of on-site challenge inspection has now been accepted, although the details have yet to be worked out. At the same time we should ask ourselves the question: do we need a chemical weapons convention with a completely watertight verificatic system? Or should we aim at effective verification that ensures confidence in compliance? My strong preference is for the latter. Striving for more is not likely to get us nearer to a convention and may even be count-productive. In such a case the better becomes the enemy of the good.

65. We should also, I believe, have another good look at the institutional aspects of the chemical weapons convention. The convention will be a multilateral one, and the machinery to be set up will have to reflect this. It will most likely consist of a general conference, an executive council and a secretariat, including an inspectorate. All this has to be worked out, including a decision as to location. In regard to the latter, I am pleased to announce that as a reflection of the importance my country attaches to making a further contribution in the field of a chemical weapons ban, the Netherlands would in principle be ready to serve as host to the institutions to be established under the chemical weapons convention.

66. We have all been appalled by reports on the recent use of chemical weapons. These reports have been confirmed by the Secretary-General. Such use, needless to say, is clearly in violation of the 1925 Geneva Protocol.³ We have to see to it that this Protocol is strictly applied and that the Secretary-General is equipped with the means to play an active role to this end. I submit that, pending the conclusion of a chemical weapons convention, we should agree, as a matter of urgency, on appropriate procedures for identifying violations of the Protocol. The basis for this work can be found in the report of the Group of Consultant Experts⁴ and in relevant resolutions of the General Assembly. The Secretary-General should be assisted in his task by a standing team or pool of chemical weapon experts to be made available to him on an on-call basis. At this session the Assembly should agree that Member States accept in advance the admission to their territory of experts sent by the Secretary-General in case of the alleged use of chemical weapons. All of this would undoubtedly strengthen the capabilities of the United Nations in this all-important field.

67. I have already alluded to the significant nuclear reductions envisaged by the two major Powers. Further progress should be encouraged at this session. A nuclear cut-back is also most relevant in view of the obligations undertaken by the nuclear Powers in article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. But measures in the nuclear field are by no means the exclusive responsibility of the nuclear Powers. The non-nuclear States should live up to their responsibilities as well.

68. One of the most significant contributions to be made is in the field of non-proliferation. The twentieth anniversary of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons will occur in a few weeks' time. This Treaty, in our view, continues to provide a

sound basis for prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons. Clearly, the proliferation of nuclear weapons would adversely affect stability. The vast majority of Member States have by their adherence recognized the significance of this Treaty. The accession of Spain, and Saudi Arabia's intention to this effect, are positive developments to note. I hope that at this session also the General Assembly will express strong support for the objective of maintaining an effective world-wide non-proliferation régime. Such a régime could include appropriate regional measures as well, such as a test-ban agreement. Regional conflicts would clearly be exacerbated if nuclear weapons and their means of delivery were introduced in the regions concerned. Furthermore, the regional context would be a suitable one in which to consider nuclear-free zones as a further means of strengthening non-proliferation. Our final document could welcome past achievements in this respect and express the hope that in other regions, notably the Middle East and the Indian sub-continent, such a zone would be established as well.

69. For the first time in years there are again some signs of progress on the issue of nuclear testing. A nuclear-test ban remains an important objective of the Netherlands Government. Given the stalemate in recent years, this objective would at this juncture, in my view, best be served by a step-by-step approach, linking reductions in nuclear weapons to reductions in the number and size of tests. To be credible, this process of steps on the road towards a comprehensive test ban must retain its momentum. We are encouraged by the ongoing bilateral negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union on this matter. We very much hope that it will soon be possible to ratify the threshold test-ban Treaty⁵ as well as to take concrete steps towards a reduction of tests, and at the same time the Conference on Disarmament should take up its work on such concrete matters as the verification provisions for the multilateral test-ban treaty, in compliance with the commitment undertaken by the nuclear Powers in the partial test-ban Treaty of 1963⁶ and the Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968. These commitments remain fully valid, of course.

70. In our final document we should also address the subject of arms control in outer space. When speaking about arms control in this connection, we have to recognize the fact that not every military use of outer space is, by definition, destabilizing. On the contrary, certain types of satellites do provide for stability, and again, it is stability that matters.

71. With regard to the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems,⁷ it is gratifying to see that the major Powers are getting closer to an agreement on a fixed period of non-withdrawal. This would be of great significance, as it would create a more predictable strategic environment. In the meantime, the Conference on Disarmament could identify and examine possible gaps in the legal régime applicable to outer space. It could also investigate whether certain measures for increasing stability, such as the protection of satellites in high orbits, are possible. In our view, a strengthening of the Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space [*resolution 3235 (XXIX), annex*] should be given serious consideration as well.

72. The great amount of attention that many of us will want to devote to nuclear issues should not prompt us to overlook the importance of conventional disarmament. This is certainly a matter of great concern to Western Europe in view of the serious conventional imbalance prevailing on our continent. Outside Europe the issue of conventional weapons would seem equally pressing. In many regions of the world modern conventional warfare with its devastating consequences has become a tragic part of everyday life for so many people. Large sums of money are spent on conventional weaponry, even by countries struggling to develop their economy. In Europe, new negotiations on the reduction of conventional forces and armaments are being prepared, in an effort to achieve a stable balance at lower levels. I can only express the hope that in other regions of the world also countries will seek ways and means of lowering the spiralling levels of conventional armaments. At this session the Assembly should clearly address issues of conventional disarmament as well.

73. There are two related developments in arms control which are relatively new but nevertheless essential and deserving of our attention. The first is that of confidence-building through greater transparency and openness in military matters. Here the United Nations has a role to play. The United Nations reporting instrument for military budgets comes to mind, but we should promote a broadening of the network of confidence-building measures on a global scale. The Conference on Disarmament did useful work in its recent session by agreeing on a set of principles for these measures. Meaningful confidence-building measures are also being added retroactively to older treaties such as the 1972 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction [*resolution 2826 (XXVI), annex*]. I would hope that these measures, agreed upon within the framework of the 1986 Second Review Conference of the Parties to the biological weapons Convention, can be further expanded through the voluntary provision of information by Member States.

74. The second development concerns verification, which plays an increasingly prominent part in arms control—and we took note with great interest of the remarks made by the Secretary-General in his address yesterday [*1st meeting*]. As I have mentioned, we are witnessing the increasing importance and increasing acceptance of sometimes stringent measures of verification. Verification is, of course, treaty-specific; yet, I do see a need for strengthening the overall role of the United Nations in this field in a practical manner. Rather than devising a new machinery or imposing a supervisory United Nations role, I believe that we should look to the United Nations for the fostering of the exchange of information and the provision of practical assistance in this field. Here, too, I should like to make a concrete proposal. The United Nations—and notably the Department for Disarmament Affairs—could act as a data bank or service centre for verification. Data, technical facilities and perhaps manpower could be made available at the request of Member States. Together with Canada, my delegation has submitted a paper on this issue [*A/S-15/25, annex*]. In operational terms we propose that this special session

request the Secretary-General, assisted by a group of qualified governmental experts, to undertake an in-depth study on the subject of the existing and possible activities of the United Nations in multilateral verification and to submit a comprehensive report to the General Assembly.

75. In conclusion, let me express the hope that this special session will carry forward the current momentum of the arms control process, that it will give a political impulse to the work in the various negotiating forums, the Conference on Disarmament in particular, and that it will produce a final document which may be concise in volume but rich in substance. To fail to do so would be inconsistent with the objectives of the United Nations and would do no small harm to the cause of arms control and security.

76. Mr. AGUILAR (Venezuela) (*interpretation from Spanish*): Permit me at the outset to congratulate you, Sir, on your election to preside over this third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. Your qualities and your diplomatic experience, which we valued throughout the forty-second session, will help the work to be done here to yield positive results for disarmament and world peace. We wish also to convey our congratulations to the other officers of the Assembly and wish them every success in their tasks.

77. This special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament is taking place at a time when the international situation with regard to disarmament contains clearly contradictory signals.

78. After a long period of stalemate, bilateral negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States have in the last two years taken a positive turn, which has brought deep satisfaction and peace of mind to the rest of the world. The signing and subsequent ratification of the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles constitutes an historic event which has undoubtedly had a beneficial impact on the international political environment. It has also renewed faith in the efforts for disarmament and hopes that it will be possible to free the world from the threat of a nuclear holocaust.

79. The Washington agreement, modest with regard to the volume of arsenals to be eliminated, is however of the utmost importance as the first nuclear-disarmament measure to be adopted since the beginning of the nuclear age, given the complex and novel provisions on verification it contains and, above all, since it marks a point of departure towards the achievement of new and more significant results in the field of nuclear disarmament. We trust that the agreements on a 50 per cent reduction in strategic nuclear arsenals may be concluded shortly and that that step may be followed by a further agreement whereby all nuclear-weapon States may agree to the total elimination of nuclear weapons and the prohibition of any other similar weapons of mass destruction.

80. The sense of realism which has prevailed in relations between the two super-Powers makes us feel optimistic and fosters hopes that the process which has begun is irreversible and that the other nuclear Powers will shortly join in the agreements intended to free the world for ever from the nuclear threat with which it has lived throughout the last four decades.

81. The situation with regard to multilateral disarmament efforts faces us with a different and rather discouraging picture. Ten years have gone by since the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, and throughout that time it has not been possible to register a single truly concrete result in the framework of multilateral negotiations on this matter. That is discouraging indeed, but we feel that it is better to acknowledge facts as they are. No one doubts today that disarmament has a multilateral dimension. Thus, despite the absence of results, the international community cannot fail to persevere in the quest for formulas leading to agreement on real and effective disarmament measures through multilateral action. Indeed, one of the main tasks to be performed by the General Assembly at this special session will be that of remedying this situation and finding ways and means by which to reactivate and strengthen the common efforts of the international community towards disarmament.

82. The world's military expenditures continue to mount, having reached during last year the alarming level of approximately \$1,000 billion, which represents 6 per cent of the world's total production. As was pointed out by my delegation at the International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development, held from 24 August to 11 September 1987 in New York, in the last five years the rate of growth of military expenditures has been greater than that of the world's production of goods and services, which means that the military industry is absorbing an ever-increasing share of the world's resources of all kinds.

83. The arms race in its two manifestations, nuclear and conventional, as well as in its two dimensions, horizontal and vertical, has not only served to increase world military expenditures but also, instead of increasing the security of countries, brought about greater insecurity.

84. At the same time, the process of economic development is at present in a state of unprecedented crisis. In most developing countries we are witnessing an impressive reduction, and in some cases a clear recession, in the rate of economic growth. The general picture in the developing world from any standpoint shows alarming characteristics: per capita income has fallen below levels attained in the past decade; capital accumulation has fallen to the lowest levels ever; investments in infrastructure and human resources are at a virtual stand-still; and the levels of education, health and nutrition have been dropping drastically practically all over the world.

85. All this is compounded by the heavy burden on developing countries of the problem of foreign debt. For many of our countries the obligations that stem from that debt exceed the capacity of their economies, and that may lead them, in the absence of

appropriate solutions, to a disruption in their own political and social structures. As stated by the Venezuelan head of State when addressing the forty-second session of the General Assembly:

"It confirmed once again the obvious fact that in the midst of the economic-financial crisis which the developing countries face it has now become imperative that measures be taken which will make possible a rechannelling of substantial financial resources, which would undoubtedly facilitate the solution of some of the grave problems confronting our countries."⁸

Among these measures, no doubt first and foremost, is a reallocation to development of important resources that are today devoted to military expenditure, resources which could effectively contribute to easing the economic, social and cultural backwardness in which many of the world's peoples live.

86. The link between disarmament and development will once again be emphasized in the up-dated report on the economic and social consequences of the arms race, to be issued shortly by the Secretariat of the United Nations.⁹ We are awaiting that document with interest and we are certain that we will fully share its conclusions.

87. This is an appropriate occasion for my country to reiterate in this universal forum its unconditional commitment to the efforts of the international community for disarmament and, in particular, its full adherence to the Programme of Action of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament and to the disarmament priorities it contains [*resolution S-10/2, sect. III*]. On this occasion, we also wish to underscore the position and attitude of Venezuela on the main priority items which are being discussed in the main multilateral disarmament forums, in particular in the Conference on Disarmament.

88. For Venezuela, as well as for the vast majority of countries represented here, nuclear disarmament continues to be the highest objective. While the danger of nuclear war has been reduced considerably since the leaders of the two super-Powers enunciated the slogan that a nuclear war cannot be won and therefore should never be fought, the risk nevertheless persists that mankind may perish as the result of a nuclear holocaust. That danger will not disappear completely while nuclear weapons still exist anywhere in the world. Venezuela earnestly hopes that the Conference on Disarmament, which includes all nuclear-weapon States and a representative group of countries of all regions of the world, will undertake, without further delay, the urgent task entrusted to it by the international community in the field of nuclear disarmament, bearing in mind that bilateral and multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament complement each other, can develop in parallel fashion and should contribute together to the attainment of the common objective they pursue.

89. In this context Venezuela wishes at this time to pay a sincere tribute to the efforts being made in this field by the six leaders who were the authors of the Six-Nation Initiative for peace and disarmament. We have heard with interest the statements made by the

spokesmen for that Initiative, and we hope that the content of it will help to bring about the adoption of concrete measures for nuclear disarmament, bilaterally and multilaterally.

90. Intimately related to the efforts to achieve nuclear disarmament is the imperative need to conclude a broad agreement on a comprehensive nuclear test ban. That measure, in our view, is the most effective way to put an end to nuclear proliferation, horizontal and vertical, as it is also the best way in which to impede the replacement of the nuclear weapons that are to be eliminated as a result of disarmament agreements. We consider that the prohibition on nuclear testing must be comprehensive, meaning that it must put an end to all nuclear testing of any magnitude in any environment and for all time. Venezuela rejects the thesis according to which the prohibition on nuclear testing is conceived of only as a long-term objective which can be attained only after having agreed on important reductions in existing nuclear arsenals. On the contrary, we believe that the Conference on Disarmament must act as soon as possible in drafting an international instrument to bring about the cessation of nuclear testing.

91. In this context I wish to recall the initiative promoted by a group of countries, including my own, which is aimed at amending the partial test-ban Treaty⁶ in order to turn it into a comprehensive test-ban treaty. We trust that among the decisions adopted by the Assembly at this special session an important place will be given to the recommendation attaching the highest priority to efforts directed at turning into reality this aspiration of the international community, which has been hampered for so many years for no good reason.

92. My country attaches special importance to efforts related to the prevention of an arms race in outer space. Venezuela's interest in this question is clearly seen from its active participation in the Conference on Disarmament in the consideration of this item. At present Venezuela has the privilege of chairing the *Ad Hoc* Committee conducting the negotiations on this matter. From this position we intend to promote the work of the Conference towards the adoption of concrete measures to prevent an arms race in space. There is no doubt that this is another aspect of disarmament in which, while the main responsibility rests with the countries which have advanced space technology, it is also a responsibility of those countries which, while not claiming to make an active use of outer space, cannot remain indifferent to the prospect of that environment becoming another arena for military competition.

93. We trust that this special session of the General Assembly will give the Conference on Disarmament the support it needs to make steady progress towards achieving effective agreements to prevent an extension into space of the frenzied arms race that we see throughout the planet.

94. Another question to which Venezuela attaches special importance is that of the conclusion of a treaty on a comprehensive prohibition of chemical weapons. We are pleased to note that the work of the Conference on Disarmament on this item is proceeding in the right direction, although we would prefer to

see more rapid progress being made towards overcoming the remaining obstacles so that the Conference could come to the international community with the first tangible fruit of its work.

95. We wish to take the opportunity provided by this universal disarmament forum to declare solemnly that Venezuela has no chemical weapons of its own or through third parties and that it does not intend to procure for itself in the future any of those abhorrent instruments of mass annihilation. This statement has to be understood in the context of the obligation in this regard which should be established by the future convention.

96. We also wish to state in this forum our concern over the fact that in the recent past chemical weapons have been used. We join with all those countries which have repeatedly insisted on the imperative need to give full compliance to the obligations embodied in the 1925 Geneva Protocol.³

97. In connection with the work of the Conference on Disarmament on the convention on chemical weapons, we have expressed our concern over the complex nature of the verification mechanism being devised and over the high cost that its operation will certainly entail. Normally, a disarmament measure should result in the freeing of financial resources. The way in which the verification mechanism is envisaged in the convention on chemical weapons, it will very probably absorb considerable resources, which will exact heavy contributions from the States parties. This will no doubt have a negative effect on the universality which we wish for the instrument. We trust that our concern will receive due attention at the Conference.

98. The item on conventional disarmament is not yet on the annual agenda of the Conference on Disarmament. In this regard, we share the view expressed by the Secretary-General in his inaugural statement to the effect that

“The time has also come for us to recognize the need to deal squarely with the mounting toll of death, destruction and human suffering inflicted by the use of conventional weapons in conflicts around the world.” [See *1st meeting, para. 50.*]

This need is all the more urgent given the present trend according to which conventional weapons are becoming increasingly destructive and lethal as weapons of war. The problem of the application of new technology to the production of weapons must receive special attention to ensure that so-called modernization does not produce weapons that are more deadly and destructive than those now being eliminated. In view of the foregoing, we think that this question should begin to receive immediate attention, without ousting the item of nuclear disarmament from its position of top priority.

99. Another question on which we hope that the Assembly at this special session will take action is that of promoting progress on the comprehensive programme of disarmament. This question, which has been the object of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament since 1982, has recently met with serious difficulties which have prevented completion

of its consideration by the deadline set by the General Assembly. We trust that all member States of the Conference will co-operate to overcome existing differences and to harmonize divergent positions so that the programme may finally be adopted as soon as possible.

100. As we said before, the picture with regard to multilateral efforts for disarmament is not so bright or hopeful as that of bilateral negotiations. Exactly 10 years have gone by since the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, the results of which, as may be recalled, led to so many expectations. The Final Document emanating from that meeting embodies the feeling and spirit of the international community faced with the agonizing problem of the arms race. That document, which has been termed the "Bible of Disarmament" and whose authority increases with the passing of time, has not led to concrete realizations.

101. It will be precisely up to the Assembly at this special session to analyse the reasons why the multilateral disarmament efforts have not yielded results in spite of our having as valuable an instrument as the Final Document and in spite of the fact that we have the instruments and mechanisms with which to implement the Programme of Action set forth at the first special session devoted to disarmament.

102. Among the ideas mentioned for remedying this situation is that of improving existing mechanisms, including the Conference on Disarmament. In this regard we should like to recall that when, at the first special session devoted to disarmament, the General Assembly adopted the important decision to create a single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum limited in composition, it was careful enough to select its members based on the criterion of political and geographical balance, which we must preserve. As is known, that body, which bears the name of Conference on Disarmament, includes the five nuclear-weapon Powers, seven countries which are members or identified with the interests of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, seven countries which are members or identified with the interests of the Warsaw Pact, and 21 non-aligned or neutral countries. Any decision aimed at changing this delicate balance, far from contributing to improving the effectiveness of the Conference, will no doubt hinder its functioning.

103. In assessing the work of the Conference, we must not lose sight of the fact that, as with any other multilateral institution, this body cannot do more than what its members wish it to do. This is all the more obvious in the case of a body which must adopt decisions by consensus. In our view, in the field of disarmament the rule of consensus should not be replaced if we want the measures adopted to be truly effective. Our own experience with the work of the Conference leads us to say that the absence of concrete results in that body bears no relationship either to its membership or to its methods of work. That situation arises from one simple fact: the absence of political will. Just as at the level of bilateral negotiations the recent display of political will made it possible to overcome the most difficult obstacles and facilitated the solution of the most delicate and complex problems, in the same way, I

repeat, an effort of true political will at the Conference would suffice to get that mechanism going and to achieve progress on all the items under its consideration.

104. No one claims that progress in the field of disarmament should be made in disregard of the complexity of the elements and factors which exist for any disarmament measure, however simple it may seem. We are aware of the fact that among the aspects requiring special consideration in that field, we have those that have to do with the security of the States involved, appropriate verification of agreements and strict compliance with obligations entered into by the parties. All these are elements which can be perfectly well met within the framework of multilateral negotiations if there is the necessary readiness to do so.

105. We therefore hope that this special session will lead to a statement in support of the work of the Conference and a commitment on the part of all States members of it to endeavour, in a genuine spirit of co-operation, to undertake the necessary efforts to promote its task towards the achievement of the substantive and concrete results that the international community has been awaiting for the 10 years that have passed since the first special session on disarmament.

106. In our statement we have wished to refer to aspects of the multilateral problems of disarmament which we consider to be the most immediate and urgent. Our silence with regard to other items does not denote lack of interest, much less indifference. We will devote due attention to them during the work of the various bodies of the Assembly during the special session.

107. In conclusion, we wish to state that we endorse completely the final communiqué of the special ministerial meeting devoted to disarmament of the Co-ordinating Bureau of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Havana from 26 to 30 May 1988 [A/S-15/27, annex I]. We also fully join in the appeal made by that meeting to this special session of the General Assembly. In particular, we wish to emphasize that we share the view, contained in the Havana Appeal issued at that meeting, that this special session of the Assembly

"should promote broad international backing for the measures aimed at halting and reversing the arms race. It should promote implementation of the 1978 Programme of Action and the priorities established in the Final Document of the first special session and it should reaffirm the central role and primary responsibility of the United Nations in the sphere of disarmament, namely, in the field of nuclear weapons, other weapons of mass destruction including chemical and conventional weapons and for the prevention of an arms race in outer space." [*Ibid.*, annex II, para. 7.]

108. Lastly, we wish to reiterate our conviction that problems related to disarmament questions, although difficult and complex, can and should be resolved whenever there is present the firm political will of all States, whether or not they possess nuclear weapons. The future of mankind largely depends on our

solution of those problems. In that process the United Nations continues to be the most appropriate forum in which to pool our efforts and free mankind from the threat of destruction.

109. We trust that this special session will become a landmark in the Organization's history, giving new momentum to the international community's efforts to put an end to the arms race and to achieve general and complete disarmament.

110. Mr. HAYDEN (Australia): I congratulate you, Sir, on your election to the high office of the presidency of the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. We face a difficult and truly significant task, and we know that we shall benefit from your deep experience as you guide us through our work.

111. Forty-three years ago, when the General Assembly met for the first time, the representatives of 51 sovereign States were present. Today 159 such States are Members of the Organization. The great movement of freedom and independence which is so clearly reflected in the membership of the United Nations today is one of the more significant events in recorded history. In the lifetime of the United Nations some 700 million persons have found their freedom. The Charter's insistence on the right to independence and freedom of all peoples is and has been in practical terms one of its crowning achievements. Simply put, today's world community is the community of States established through the Charter of the United Nations.

112. But if the Charter has another central purpose, it is the maintenance of international peace and security. We are called to international co-operation for that purpose. We are enjoined to refrain from the threat or use of force and to settle international disputes by peaceful means. The Charter recognizes the right of self-defence, but it also speaks of the need for the regulation of armaments.

113. In the journey we have made together in the United Nations for nearly half a century, we have been faced by two predominant challenges: the atom and, in the words of the Charter, the need "to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom." If we are to meet both of those challenges there must be effective measures of disarmament.

Mr. Matos Proença (Portugal), Vice-President, took the Chair.

114. The arms race that has characterized the period since the establishment of the United Nations has threatened both the maintenance of international peace and security and our ability to meet the demands of development. Nuclear weapons, in particular, have brought us to the situation where measures of arms control and disarmament must now be viewed as an integral part of international relations and as essential to the maintenance of international peace and security. There is the additional reality that any use of nuclear weapons would have devastating global ecological consequences. Recognition that we have come to live in the most heavily armed age of all times has also grown.

115. The first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament constituted a special moment at which we all agreed to set a course towards disarmament more far-reaching and more determined than ever before. The Final Document of that session remains unique in the Organization's history.

116. This third special session on disarmament takes place 10 years following that first special session on disarmament. The intervening decade has been mixed, to say the least. It was a source of universal disappointment that in the earlier part of this period, just when we had recognized that disarmament must play a basic part in our international relations, work on all disarmament fronts slowed and, in some cases, stopped. The second special session on disarmament took place in those difficult circumstances and as a result barely survived.

117. Today, however, our circumstances are vastly different. The spring summit, the Moscow summit, signifies the end of a long, cold winter in nuclear disarmament efforts. We are on the move again in this and other important disarmament fields. But let me emphasize: more is still required. This current special session should be able to constitute a moment of renewal at which we will set the course for the period ahead, a course in which increasing achievements in arms control and disarmament prove to be its signposts.

118. In Australia's view, the agenda for the years ahead which should emerge from this special session should start with major goals in the field of weapons of mass destruction.

119. The two major nuclear-weapon States are committed to the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons. They have concluded the first of what we believe will be a series of agreements. Their action in taking that first step is to be applauded. The next steps will clearly be harder, but they must be taken deliberately, because they can lead to a world which is stable, secure and, ultimately, free of nuclear weapons.

120. The Government of Australia has sought to encourage those two Powers, particularly during the past few years while they forged the intermediate-range nuclear forces agreement. We have not seen it as our role to lecture them or to make unrealistic demands, but we have made clear, as have many others, that the nature of nuclear weapons is such that we are all involved. We have been heard.

121. Australia cannot sit at their negotiating table because it does not have nuclear weapons. But it participates daily in the business of nuclear arms control because of the promise it has made never to acquire nuclear weapons and through the support it gives to the régime of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, including the support of our own national system of safeguards on any uranium exported from Australia.

122. Furthermore, we consider that the multilateral system can and should deal with matters relating to the prevention of nuclear war and the halting and reversing of the nuclear arms race. In a situation

where it is now clear that an exchange of even less than half of the arsenals of the super-Powers could lead to millions of direct casualties and probably billions as a result of the consequent climatic and other effects, it becomes even more obvious that nuclear-weapon issues cannot be the sole domain of the possessors of those weapons.

123. It is in fact because of the dangers of nuclear war and the unthinkable consequences of any nuclear exchange that Australia serves as host and will continue to be host to joint facilities with the United States of America, the purposes of which are to provide early warning and verification of arms-control and disarmament agreements. They thus ensure increased stability and security in the international environment. Australia accepts that these facilities may be nuclear targets but willingly takes on that risk for the contribution they make to the prevention of war.

124. Our national commitment to nuclear arms control and disarmament is also expressed in the priority we attach to an end to all nuclear test explosions by all States in all environments for all time. Nuclear testing is a militarily significant activity, and an early end to all such tests would be an important step towards the elimination of all nuclear weapons and to the continued maintenance of a strong nuclear non-proliferation régime.

125. In this context, Australia has proposed the immediate establishment of a global seismic monitoring network to monitor such a treaty, and Australia is one of the countries now contributing to the experimental monitoring network which is laying the groundwork for such a system. Accordingly, we noted with keen interest Prime Minister Takeshita's announcement today [2nd meeting] of an international conference, to be held in Japan under joint Japanese-United Nations auspices, devoted to the development of measures to verify nuclear testing by seismological means.

126. A significant multilateral negotiation on another category of weapons of mass destruction—chemical weapons—is under way. Australia does not possess any such weapons and will not possess any. As is the case with some others, we have experienced their use. Indeed, that experience is inscribed, indelibly, in our memory.

127. We know that what is at issue in a universal chemical weapons convention is, in some respects, a potentially more comprehensive surveillance of a major global industry than has ever been seen before. But we believe we can institute such controls in a way which will both allow us all to be confident that chemical weapons have been removed and are not being produced again and allow the continued production and use of chemicals in our industries and agriculture in ways beneficial to economic and social development.

128. The chemical weapons negotiations are at a crucial stage. They must not be permitted to falter. Let us make this special session the occasion on which the whole international community commits itself, unambiguously, to the abolition of these weap-

ons and to the earliest possible conclusion of a chemical weapons convention.

129. Weapons of mass destruction demand our priority attention, but we would depart from reality if we did not also recognize that conventional arms have come to play an unacceptably large part in international political and economic relations. It is conventional weapons which have been and are being used repeatedly in regional conflicts and which thus constitute an integral part of threats to peace and security. The agenda which should emerge from this session, the agenda which is appropriate to the years immediately before us, is one which includes the negotiation of substantial reductions in conventional weapons.

130. Greater transparency is required. All States should support the removal of unnecessary secrecy by using the United Nations standardized instrument for annual reporting of military budgets.

131. We should also open up the question of how we might together regulate international arms transfers in both their overt and covert forms. The spectacle of States attempting to solve political or foreign policy problems through arms transfers is seen too often and is clearly revealed as providing no solution at all.

132. It is also clear that arms exports should not be turned to as a way of solving domestic economic problems. Arms transfers must not become a new cash crop. It should also be recognized, especially by those whose development needs are great, that the purchase of arms is at the cost of the purchase of the investment goods essential to the creation of employment and economic growth.

133. As we look further into the future we are compelled to recognize that our common efforts to maintain peace and security here on Earth and to integrate arms control and disarmament into those efforts could fail unless we ensure together that an arms race in outer space does not occur. At least 10 States already have space-launch capability, which will clearly continue to develop. They will be joined by others in the future, and many States already undertake related scientific work. The benefits of the utilization of space for communications, for example, are already immense and have transformed our world. But the potential exists for outer space to constitute an arena of competition in arms. Surely the outcome of any such significant competition would be to erode our ability to maintain peace and security and to develop our world.

134. This special session must constitute a turning-point. We must emerge from it with a new disarmament agenda, one which will form an integral part of the conduct of relations between States in the future. Work on this agenda can and must take place in a variety of ways.

135. Clearly, there are issues and goals in disarmament which, in the first instance, are most appropriately pursued by the two major nuclear-weapon States. They must be joined soon by the other nuclear-weapon States in the attainment of the goal of the elimination of nuclear weapons.

136. In other contexts, a regional approach to the negotiation of arms control and disarmament agreements is the appropriate one. There has been significant progress in Europe and the northern hemisphere through the utilization of that approach.

137. In the region of which Australia is a member, the South Pacific, we achieved in 1986 a major arms-control measure through the agreement of and entry into force of the Treaty of Rarotonga, providing for the South Pacific nuclear-free zone. To our south, the Antarctic Treaty has guaranteed the demilitarization and denuclearization of Antarctica for more than a quarter of a century.

138. Australia also continues to be actively supportive of the implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace [*resolution 2832 (XXVI)*].

139. Those are but a few examples. There are clearly others in which the negotiation of a range of measures affecting a particular region would contribute to the maintenance of peace and security. Measures of disarmament and arms control are fundamental, but associated confidence-building measures are also required and are often ideally suited to a regional approach.

140. Because of the global character of some of the problems of disarmament, such as chemical weapons, the role which can be played by the United Nations and other multilateral disarmament forums is vital. Those forums are truly representative, and they alone can achieve agreements which will be implemented globally.

141. All our efforts—bilateral, regional and multilateral—should be complementary. It must not be the consequence of progress in one field of negotiation, such as the bilateral, that legitimate and wider multilateral interests are ignored or negated.

142. What is fundamentally required for renewal of our work in disarmament is acceptance of the complementarity of our various efforts and a multilateral disarmament agenda which addresses the issues of today and the future, not those of yesterday. Such a renewal will also require some changes in philosophy, because our inability to make sufficient progress in the field of disarmament has been determined, to some extent, by prevailing basic philosophies.

143. Clearly, disarmament would have a limited future under any return to a cold-war philosophy. It is surely also true that our prospects will be improved under circumstances of greater degrees of openness with each other.

144. Again, progress in arms control and disarmament is rarely assisted by strident statements of demand, even if made in the name of a significant group of States. We are all able to express more or less stridently the way in which we would prefer the world to look, but that is less significant than a deeply rooted commitment to co-operate even with those whose world view we may not entirely share.

145. Simply, we should take heart for the future, remembering the past.

146. Although war has never originated in Australia, the Australian people have been brought into war, including a war soon after our unification as one free country. We have acted in what we believed was the defence of decent values. We have paid dearly for this. So, as in many other countries, there is an enduring commitment amongst the Australian people to peace.

147. When my Government was elected five years ago we responded immediately to the wishes of the people of Australia and to their deeply felt anxiety about competition in arms and the lack of progress in disarmament. We greatly elevated—in our region and in our foreign policy in particular—the priority we attach to disarmament, and we increased our own activity in the fields of arms control and disarmament. We believe we have made an important contribution, and the experience of these last five years has left us more convinced than ever that the common cause of disarmament and the work of multilateral institutions on arms control and disarmament are amongst the most vital of contemporary tasks.

148. We are realistic people and we know how very deeply difficult those tasks are. But we have come to this special session determined to see it succeed, determined to ensure that it constitutes a point of renewal and that in the years ahead the efforts of the community of nations to maintain peace and security and to foster human development are suffused with and supported by concrete achievements in arms control and disarmament.

149. Mr. VELAYATI (Islamic Republic of Iran):* It gives me great pleasure to be afforded this opportunity to participate in this international Assembly and to elaborate upon the views and positions of the Islamic Republic of Iran regarding disarmament, which is closely related to international peace and security. I should also like to congratulate Mr. Florin of the German Democratic Republic on his election to preside over this special session and I wish him every success in this important task. I assure him of our full co-operation in ensuring the success of the Assembly in reaching its objective: a safer world through disarmament.

150. Prevailing global circumstances have given a new definition to the concepts of international peace and security, which go beyond the absence of war. They mean, rather, prevention and resolution of international conflicts on the basis of justice and equity. To achieve this objective, it is necessary to embark upon an endeavour to establish and strengthen peaceful relations among nations based on equality and co-operation. In other words, the means of limitation and reduction of weapons and enhancement of political, economic and cultural co-operation should be directed towards augmenting international peace and security.

151. Security is an indivisible concept, and one cannot gain security by depriving others of it. This is

*Mr. Velayati spoke in Persian. The English version of his statement was supplied by the delegation.

what is meant by collective security. Governments should consider and respect the legitimate security concerns of others. And this can be achieved only through an all-inclusive and comprehensive effort to prevent aggression and secure universal commitment to international rules and regulations. The international arms race and the increase in military forces are not the only causes of conflicts in the international arena. It is rather the lack of political confidence in international relations that is the root cause of the prolongation of conflicts and the creation of new controversies.

152. Regrettably, the law of "might is right" continues to maintain its predominance over international law. There is no central global authority comparable to the authority of nation-States capable of ensuring justice in international relations. Concerned about such shortcomings, each country resorts to equipping itself with material requirements of power in order to guarantee its own security. In this way, lack of confidence has become an inevitable cause of escalation of the global arms race. Therefore, global disarmament may be achieved only when this lack of confidence is overcome.

153. Afflicted with the policies of the two super-Powers, who have based the security of their military alliances on nuclear weapons, international security has become rather fragile and unstable. If the present trend continues, the development of new means of mass destruction by the super-Powers will certainly lead to a more complex situation. Seeking military superiority by trying to gain security at the cost of depriving others of the same is the root cause of the arms race at the global level. This precludes the possibility of any stable international political relations. Therefore, agreement among the super-Powers on a substantial reduction of nuclear and conventional weapons is the prerequisite for the establishment of security instead of the present horror of mutual assured destruction. Such a general understanding would reduce the current global reliance on armaments and would enable the United Nations to embark on a new endeavour to establish the collective security mechanism envisaged in its Charter.

154. It is evident that the security of the two super-Powers and their military alliances depends upon global security. The super-Powers, therefore, cannot in their bilateral relations solve all issues related to international security. They must acknowledge that their security is intertwined with the security of the rest of the world. They should refrain from trying to maintain their dominance over international politics and should consider and respect the security concerns of third-world nations.

155. The third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament is being convened at a very crucial and sensitive stage in the course of the negotiations on this issue. Last year the first International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development was convened. At that Conference, despite the doubts and pessimistic views of some delegations, the reality emerged that development and disarmament are two immediate concerns of our contemporary world and two important pillars of stable international peace and security. The intensive debates at the Conference revealed the

relationship between security, disarmament and development and made it clear that mere military hardware could not guarantee security.

156. Prospects for other positive developments became apparent during the preceding year. Within the framework of bilateral disarmament negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union, the agreement on the total elimination of medium-range nuclear missiles constitutes a small but nevertheless a positive step on the path of nuclear disarmament.

157. Undoubtedly, since the convening of the second special session on disarmament we have witnessed many developments in the world. In the meantime, issues such as the prevention of a nuclear arms race, the establishment of effective control and monitoring mechanisms for disarmament-related agreements, the prevention of an arms race in outer space, reorganization of the international arms trade in order to prevent the escalation of the arms race, and the establishment of nuclear-free zones are all important issues which merit discussion in this international forum. But certainly the most important issue, which deserves serious international attention, is the proliferation of the use of chemical weapons by Iraq against the people of Iran and Iraq.

158. This is a horrible development which has increased the possibility of the future massive use of these deadly weapons even on a global scale. Since the use of chemical weapons by the Iraqi régime has inflicted on my country the greatest suffering and damage in the current century, I feel obliged to dedicate most of my statement to this issue. We are convinced that this behaviour by the Iraqi régime is not only a threat to our security and that of the oppressed people and groups inside Iraq, but also a widening threat to international peace and security.

159. Resort to chemical weapons by the Iraqi régime, which began as a sporadic tactic against the Iranian troops on 13 January 1981, continued and intensified in subsequent years. I shall give only some examples of the total of 253 documented instances of the massive resort to chemical weapons by Iraq. On 20 December 1981, chemical bombardment of Khorramshahr by Iraqi artillery. 22 December 1982, chemical bombardment of Abadan by Iraqi artillery. 9 August 1983, chemical bombardment of Piranshahr, twice by Iraqi airplanes. Martyred and wounded, 130 people. 25 October 1983, chemical bombardment of the city of Marivan by Iraqi artillery. 27 February 1984, aerial chemical bombardment of Hour Alhoveyzeh. Martyred and wounded, 1,100 people. 28 April 1985, aerial chemical bombardment of Hamid Base. Martyred and wounded, 1,100 people. 13 February 1986, aerial chemical bombardment of Faw-Basra road. Martyred and wounded, 8,500 people. 25 May 1986, aerial chemical bombardment of the city of Mehran. Martyred and wounded, 750 people. 25 December 1986, Aerial chemical bombardment of Khorramshahr. Martyred and wounded, 1,160 people. 7 January 1987, aerial chemical bombardment of the city of Sumar. Martyred and wounded, 200 people. 10 January 1987, aerial chemical bombardment of Khorramshahr road. Martyred and wounded, 3,000 people. 28 June 1987, aerial chemical bombardment of 4 civilian areas of Sardasht. Martyred and wounded, 8,025

innocent civilians. 22 March 1988, chemical bombardment of Ghalehji village around Marivan. Martyred and wounded, 450 people. And finally, in the tragedy of Halabja, thousands of innocent civilian inhabitants of this Iraqi Kurdish city became the latest victims of Iraqi genocide with the help of chemical weapons.

160. The horrifying details of these and other similar instances of flagrant violations of the 1925 Geneva Protocol³ were brought to the attention of the United Nations through at least 153 letters from our Government, which requested immediate, effective and serious measures in order to prevent and halt these crimes. Regrettably, to date, we have not witnessed any effective measure in this regard. In the course of seven years of persistent Iraqi use of chemical weapons, the United Nations, following repeated requests from the Islamic Republic of Iran and after undue delays and procrastination, attempted to respond to our official complaints on only five occasions. Even then, it merely dispatched technical teams to investigate the extent of the Iraqi crimes. And despite the reports of these teams, no constructive measure for the prevention of the repeated use of chemical weapons or punishment of Iraqi war criminals was adopted.

161. In 1984, the United Nations team of experts, after visiting the area and following extensive investigations, clearly declared in its report¹⁰ that Iraq had used chemical weapons. The Security Council, in its statement of 30 March 1984,¹¹ merely condemned the use of chemical weapons, in total disregard of the findings of the mission identifying the culprit.

162. In 1985, the experts once again substantiated the Iraqi use of chemical weapons, noting the escalation of their use. The Security Council, in its statement of 25 April 1985,¹² with inexplicable insistence on protecting the aggressor and war criminal, once again refrained from naming Iraq as the culprit.

163. In 1986, the team of experts unequivocally confirmed the widespread use of chemical weapons by Iraq. Following three years of silence, the Security Council for the first time named Iraq for its responsibility in using chemical weapons. However, instead of condemning the criminal, it merely condemned the crime.

164. The report of the team of experts in 1987¹³ exposed a new dimension of Iraqi behaviour, namely, the resort to chemical weapons against civilians. Witnessing the indifference of the Security Council *vis-à-vis* persistent Iraqi crimes, and cognizant of the fact that the Iraqi policy of resort to chemical warfare was a matter of international record, the team of experts declared in its report that there was no need for further technical investigation, but rather, a concerted political effort was needed to halt the use of chemical weapons. Ironically, this time the Security Council even failed to consider the report of the team and took no action.

165. The publication of these reports was taken very seriously by international public opinion, which considered this an alarming prelude to the spread and large-scale use of chemical weapons in the world.

But, as briefly summarized, the failure of the United Nations, particularly the Security Council, to take resolute and effective measures encouraged and emboldened Iraq to continue its crimes to the extent that it resorted in the summer of 1987 to chemical warfare against the innocent civilian inhabitants of a city.

166. The resort to chemical weapons by Iraq against the innocent people of Sardasht in the Kurdistan province of Iran was brought to the attention of the United Nations—as in the other cases—with a request for the immediate dispatch of an investigative mission. In my statement of 28 July 1987 at the 425th meeting of the Conference on Disarmament, I informed the Conference of this horrifying tragedy and named Sardasht as the first city to fall victim to chemical warfare. It was imperative to direct the attention of the Conference and of the international public to the depth of the tragedy that had occurred. Regrettably, not even the slightest reaction on the part of the United Nations could be registered.

167. This indifference and this irresponsible attitude led to an even more devastating tragedy on 17 March 1988 in Halabja, a Kurdish Iraqi city. Today the international public is aware of the sufferings of the innocent people of Halabja. The Iraqi régime, in a savage attack unprecedented in history and constituting a disgrace to humanity, resorted to a chemical bombardment of that city. In the bombardment, a mixture of three of the most lethal chemical agents was used, which caused the deaths of more than 5,000 innocent civilians and injuries to thousands more of the inhabitants, including children, women and men.

168. Following this horrifying crime, as in previous cases, the Islamic Republic of Iran brought the situation to the attention of the United Nations, requesting the dispatch of a mission to investigate the extent of the tragedy. The reaction of the United Nations to this painful tragedy, which deserved the most immediate and most compassionate attention, came regrettably late, following extensive undue delay. It should be noted that General Assembly resolution 42/37 C in several of its paragraphs expressly requests the Secretary-General immediately to dispatch experts to investigate in response to allegations by any Member State concerning the possible use of chemical, biological or toxin weapons and immediately to report the conclusion of these investigations to Member States. Yet it was not until two long weeks following the official requests of the Islamic Republic of Iran that the United Nations decided to dispatch to the area an incomplete team of experts which lacked the crucial military experts. Consequently, the report of the team of experts,¹⁴ which was circulated after extensive delay, some 40 days after the incident, did not add anything to what the world public had already learned through the mass media.

169. It became apparent in the course of events following that tragedy that, despite constructive and positive efforts by some members of the Security Council, behind-the-scene manoeuvring by others prevented the United Nations from discharging its obligations in the face of such a genocide, a tragedy

which threatens to affect other parts of the world and spread the use of chemical weapons, which have heretofore been considered anti-human weapons of mass destruction.

170. The Halabja genocide, which brought death and suffering to thousands of innocent people, added yet another dark page to the record of Iraqi atrocities. The people of the world should be aware that those Powers which continue to provide covert and overt support to the anti-human régime of Iraq are accomplices in this crime. Their disruption of the fulfilment of the responsibilities of the United Nations is a direct assault on the whole of human society, because eventually the time will come when those countries with no means of security against such weapons will reluctantly resort to retaliation in kind, and then we will inevitably have to confront the horror of similar tragedies in different parts of the world.

171. Should the international community not desist from turning a blind eye to internationally known facts and prevent once and for all manipulations by hegemonic Powers which seek to enable themselves to continue relying on anti-human weaponry such as chemical weapons?

172. The tragedy of Halabja clearly illustrated that there is a need for immediate measures on the international level for the prevention of such atrocities. It is evident that the General Assembly, entrusted with surveying disarmament-related issues, is the best and the most suitable organ to adopt necessary measures in this regard. In our view, the authority and integrity of all decisions of the United Nations and particularly those in the field of disarmament are contingent upon firm and resolute decisions against flagrant violations of international rules and regulations.

173. It is necessary to refer here to Security Council resolution 612 (1988) of 9 May. This resolution was the first of its kind, adopted after several years of persistent resort to chemical weapons by Iraq. It was expected that the Security Council would take a serious position against the repeated use of these deadly weapons by Iraq and unequivocally condemn Iraq for its genocide in Halabja despite manipulations by its supporters in the Council. However, regrettably, manipulating tactics on the part of the same parties that directed Iraq to initiate an act of aggression against the Islamic Republic of Iran, and those that have continuously provided Iraq with the necessary materials and know-how for the production of these satanic weapons, gave the Iraqi régime the audacity to use chemical weapons repeatedly even after the adoption of resolution 612 (1988), thereby completely disregarding even that resolution.

174. In view of the measures envisaged in the Charter of the United Nations and the provisions of resolution 612 (1988), there remains no excuse for the failure to adopt preventive and punitive measures with regard to resort to chemical warfare. Considering the precedence and the sensitivity of the issue as well as Iraq's persistence in resorting to such weapons, and the public confessions by the highest officials of the Iraqi régime regarding the purchase and use of chemical weapons, the Security Council must immediately condemn Iraq in the strongest and

most unequivocal terms. It should also take effective, serious and immediate measures to prevent the sale to Iraq of the necessary materials and technology for the production of chemical weapons and to establish mechanisms to inspect chemical-weapon-producing facilities in Iraq.

175. In our opinion, the establishment of permanent teams of experts in the region will have an important deterrent result. I regret to inform the Assembly that the latest instances of the Iraqi use of chemical weapons, which were brought to the attention of the United Nations on 19 May 1988, have once again faced procrastination and are yet to be investigated by a complete United Nations team of experts.

176. In this important and historic Assembly of the representatives of all Governments, the Islamic Republic of Iran proposes that, in view of the serious violations of the 1925 Geneva Protocol,³ the participants renew their commitment to observe this instrument.

177. The continuing consultations for the preparation of a new convention have achieved some progress. The Islamic Republic of Iran has presented its constructive views on this convention in the course of negotiations. I will briefly refer to some of them. However, it ought to be borne in mind that the international community should not remain aloof and stand idle in the face of the task of preventing the use of chemical weapons, awaiting the adoption of a comprehensive convention on the prohibition of the production, development and stockpiling of chemical weapons and their destruction. Currently the 1925 Geneva Protocol has the necessary power and legal authority. The universal opinion concerning the applicability of this Protocol was clearly shown in the unanimous adoption of General Assembly resolution 42/37 C in 1987. Furthermore, in the same resolution, the necessary mechanism for the investigation of violations has been envisaged, which, if applied meticulously, could prove effective. Therefore the only missing element in the present Protocol is the establishment of a system of inspection and control to be applied in suspect cases.

178. The Islamic Republic of Iran, conscious of the sensitivity of the issue and the imminent threat of the inevitable spread of chemical weapons, proposes that this special session adopt measures for cases where a country is charged with resort to chemical weapons and investigation by United Nations experts conclusively establishes the use of such weapons by the said State. In such cases, with a view to preventing the continuation of the use of chemical weapons, the United Nations should dispatch inspectors to suspected chemical-producing facilities in the culprit State and commission permanent inspectors in those facilities to perform necessary monitoring duties.

179. With regard to the conclusion of the convention on chemical weapons, the Conference on Disarmament should expedite its endeavours by holding special sessions. It should also be mindful of the following elements in order to arrive at a universal and effective multilateral agreement.

180. First, the universality of the convention should be regarded as a cardinal principle. Therefore, efforts should be directed towards ruling out the exemption of any country from the obligations of the convention. In this connection, we have suggested that incentives be provided for accession to the convention. Those incentives could be envisaged especially within the framework of assistance to a country which is the victim of the use of chemical weapons. Also, measures should be envisaged to be applied by parties to the convention against those refraining from accession, which might include embargoes on the sale of some chemical agents to States not party to it. In more serious cases, when violations are committed by non-party States, the embargo should become more comprehensive.

181. Secondly, in order to ensure conformity with the provisions of the convention and owing to the existing shortcomings of the Geneva Protocol, it is necessary to establish a viable system of control and verification. The issue of control and verification is fundamental to the authority of all multilateral agreements. This should be the subject of more serious attention.

182. Thirdly, the other element which is related to the universality of the convention is the issue of withdrawing from the convention. In many multilateral agreements, there are provisions which clarify the conditions under which a State party may withdraw from that agreement. The right of States to withdraw from agreements or to terminate their obligations under agreements is considered to be a prerogative of national sovereignty. However, it can be argued that in view of the requirements of the international community a country may voluntarily and indefinitely commit itself to principles which are universally recognized as foundations of contemporary human civilization. Therefore, the inclusion of a provision to prevent unilateral termination of the obligations undertaken by States parties to the convention would create general confidence, encouraging countries which are subjected to threats to accede to the convention. Also, by increasing the number of States parties to this convention, the foundation of international peace and security would be further strengthened.

183. How can the Security Council and relevant international authorities justify the contradictory behaviour of the United Nations with regard to the issue of chemical weapons and prevention of their use? Allow me to clarify this question by outlining the following contradictory events.

184. Sixty-three years have passed since the conclusion of the 1925 Geneva Protocol. This Protocol was observed even in the Second World War and was identified as one of the inviolable principles of international law governing the conduct of war.

185. The Conference on Disarmament has for years striven to strengthen the Geneva Protocol in addition to the ban on the production of chemical weapons, and since 1982, through establishment of an *ad hoc* committee on chemical weapons, has actively sought conclusion of a convention on prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons.

186. The General Assembly has adopted numerous resolutions leading to resolution 42/37 C, maintaining continuing interest in the field of prevention of the use and production of chemical weapons.

187. Since 13 January 1981, Iraq has resorted to chemical warfare on more than 253 occasions.

188. The international community was outraged by the tragedy in Halabja, which was a turning point in Iraqi criminal behaviour in this field.

189. Every year since 1984, the United Nations team of experts has produced reports about the use of chemical weapons, warning about the upward trend in the use of such weapons by Iraq and its spread to large-scale civilian targets.

190. The Secretary-General of the United Nations, the European Community and many countries have repeatedly condemned Iraq for using chemical weapons.

191. Even the Security Council, in statements made on 30 March 1984,¹¹ 25 April 1985¹² and 21 March 1986,¹⁵ condemned the use of chemical weapons and, in its latest action in resolution 612 (1988), which is presumably binding, explicitly demanded a halt in the use of chemical weapons and requested strict controls on the export by third parties of materials used for the production of chemical weapons. The Security Council has therefore obligated itself to monitor continuously the implementation of the resolution.

192. Despite all these facts, Iraq has continued without shame its declared policy of resorting to chemical warfare in the imposed war, and, less than 10 days after the adoption of resolution 612 (1988), it deployed chemical weapons against several Iranian targets. Regrettably, Iraq's total disregard for the rules of international law and decisions of the United Nations has not motivated the United Nations to adopt any resolute and practical measures against these Iraqi war crimes. This contradiction between political slogans and practical measures by the United Nations in the field of chemical bombardments and chemical disarmament is not justifiable. I hope that this session can find a practical response to this fundamental question.

193. Another issue of great importance for disarmament is that of naval disarmament. It should be mentioned that the presence of foreign naval forces in the vicinity of littoral States for the purpose of imposing pressure and humiliating those States has seriously jeopardized peace and security in those areas. The Persian Gulf, afflicted by the policy of widening the scope of the conflict pursued by Iraq in its initiation of attacks against merchant shipping in 1984, and of drawing other countries into the conflict, has regrettably become a victim of the expansionist policies of the big Powers.

194. The military forces of the United States and its allies, in clear violation of paragraph 5 of Security Council resolution 598 (1987), which they themselves had advocated, invaded the Persian Gulf and, under the guise of maintaining the security of this international waterway, caused its increasing insta-

bility. In the less than a year since the dispatch of foreign forces to the Persian Gulf there has not been a single day without an incident, and the overall number of ships that have been attacked has doubled. Damages incurred by oil installations have imposed great monetary losses on the littoral States.

195. Those who have found their short-sighted political gain in feeding the source of tension instead of striving for stability will have to bear complete responsibility for the consequences of their action. The American military forces, in order to increase their presence in the region and under the pretext of allegations of mining of the Persian Gulf by Iran, attacked Iranian oil platforms which had no military capability on 18 April 1988. This occurred in violation of all international rules and regulations.

196. Unfortunately, the lack of effective action on the part of the United Nations gave them the audacity to continue their illegal policies and even to attempt to revive their gunboat diplomacy. The American mining of international waters during the Second World War and the judgement of the International Court of Justice against the United States for its mining of territorial waters of Nicaragua illustrate the fact that interventionist policies around the globe have become the cornerstone of American foreign policy.

197. The Islamic Republic of Iran has repeatedly announced that the Persian Gulf must not become the scene of super-Power rivalry and domination. International peace and security imperatives dictate that this region be free of super-Power competition and free of any foreign military presence. The world is dependent on this region for the supply of its energy needs, and therefore any domination by a group or by a country cannot be accepted. The security of the Persian Gulf is the sole responsibility of the littoral States; and the Islamic Republic of Iran, having the longest borders in those waters, is more than any other country seeking peace and stability in that waterway. The Islamic Republic of Iran is of the opinion that immediately after the termination of Iraqi attacks on merchant ships, tankers and oil installations, security will return to the Persian Gulf. However, it is evident that the tension-generating policies of the Iraqi régime and the expansionist policies of the United States and other big Powers have become intertwined in this region, precluding any possibility of security in that vital waterway.

198. The Islamic Republic of Iran, hoping to guarantee the security of the Persian Gulf, responded positively to the Secretary-General's eight-point plan. However, that plan, which could indeed restore security to the Persian Gulf, was rejected by Iraq. In the same vein, on 8 May 1986 we proposed a regional security arrangement based on the co-operation of all the littoral States of the Persian Gulf, and during the past year we have declared our readiness to participate in an international mine-sweeping operation, an offer which was rejected by proponents of tension in the region and particularly by Iraq, which is responsible for mining the Persian Gulf.

199. The current situation in the Persian Gulf is volatile and explosive. The spread of tension has

made the attainment of the goal of having the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace much more difficult. The Islamic Republic of Iran hopes that at this session the General Assembly will show a sense of responsibility in dealing seriously with future developments in the Persian Gulf, taking effective measures for naval disarmament.

200. Our world today has become a complex and intertwined unit, in which most phenomena have taken on global characteristics. Without the attainment of global confidence any attempt towards disarmament is bound to fail, because countries will not refrain from any endeavour in order to guarantee their own security. Moreover, the atmosphere of mistrust will further exacerbate the competition for acquisition of more military hardware, escalating the arms race, and as I have elaborated in my remarks, security cannot be attained in the absence of a just world order.

201. Mr. LONCAR (Yugoslavia): Let me begin by expressing my warm congratulations to Mr. Peter Florin, a representative of the friendly German Democratic Republic, on his election as President of this important session. I wish to assure him of the readiness of my delegation to co-operate closely with him during the session. I wish also to recognize particularly the outstanding and dedicated contribution of the Secretary-General to the efforts of the United Nations in the field of disarmament.

202. In our multidimensional approach to international security, which derives its main inspiration from the philosophy of non-alignment, we have constantly been aware of the correlation between the state of international affairs and the arms race. Distrust and rivalry of all kinds have always fed the arms race. The constant stockpiling and sophistication of ever more destructive weapons have inevitably increased the level of fear and aggravated existing divisions. This has resulted in a vicious circle, which we feel can and must be broken. That is why we have always steadfastly, and without considering it Utopian, supported the initiation of the disarmament process and the strengthening of confidence and understanding among all countries, irrespective of ideological, political, economic or other differences.

203. Seen in that perspective, international security emerges as a component part and a result of the democratization of international relations, whose major premise is the equality of all countries in world affairs.

204. We have never considered that there was a contradiction between full respect for the special role, obligations and responsibilities of the super-Powers in the field of disarmament and the constant efforts to create the conditions necessary to enable the United Nations, as the protagonist and champion of the interests of the whole international community, to be an active and irreplaceable factor in that process.

205. We have never considered that there was any conflict between recognizing the fundamental importance of halting the arms race and initiating the disarmament process in the nuclear and all other

fields with an adequate and necessary system of verification, bilateral or multilateral, and the constant reminder that peace and security can be truly stable and lasting only if efforts are made towards reducing and overcoming dangerous discrepancies in economic and technological development.

206. We have fought for the achievement of global security as a condition for the survival and prosperity of mankind. We have worked towards the consolidation of regional and national security, convinced that the right to peace and life belongs to all equally.

207. In that context, the meeting of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Balkan countries held at Belgrade in February has in our view been a significant contribution to co-operation and stability, not only in the Balkans but also in Europe as a whole.

208. We have supported general and complete disarmament but also a sober, realistic appraisal of what, at the specific political moment in time and in accordance with the atmosphere and constellation in international relations, can actually be done at each stage, leading gradually to the realization of that ultimate goal.

209. All these are mutually connected links in a world in which no one can be self-sufficient, in which the interests of all should become a fundamental asset of civilization.

210. The fact that we are holding the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament within ten years is a clear indication of the significance which the halting of the arms race and its reversal leading towards the initiation of the disarmament process have for the world as a whole. We can note with satisfaction that the atmosphere at this session greatly differs from the one that prevailed not so long ago. We are witnesses to positive trends in the world in general and, in particular, to the relaxation of tensions between the super-Powers and the initiation of dialogue on numerous important issues, especially in the field of disarmament and resolving some hotbeds of crisis, which are consonant with the promotion of peace. Many problems remain, however. The resolution of some can no longer be delayed; the solutions for others are possible immediately, provided that we capitalize on the present positive momentum in international relations and provided that we have the wisdom to be forward-looking. In this context it is necessary, for this Organization in particular, to make efforts to end the war between Iraq and Iran.

211. The talks in Moscow between the President of the United States and the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and the agreements already reached or expected, merit the full support of the entire international community, and of the world Organization. They are both encouraging and inspiring, clearly indicating that the much-desired new orientation in international relations—the one that is in the interests of all, the weak and the strong, the developed and the developing—is gaining momentum.

212. The non-aligned countries have been contributing significantly to the disarmament process, em-

phasizing the concern of the whole international community that international peace and security cannot be anyone's monopoly. One more confirmation of the importance attached by the non-aligned countries to disarmament is the special ministerial meeting devoted to disarmament of the Co-ordinating Bureau of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries held at Havana from 26 to 30 May 1988.

213. After decades of the continuous escalation of the arms race, especially the nuclear one, we have now reached a phase of long-awaited agreements on launching a genuine process of disarmament. We commend the historical agreements on the elimination of an entire category of nuclear weapons and the understanding in principle to reduce strategic offensive arms by half, hoping and expecting, as does the entire international community, that other, more comprehensive and more significant agreements will follow. Of particular importance is the widespread acceptance of the conviction of the non-aligned countries—which they have advocated since their emergence on the international scene—that a nuclear war means the annihilation of mankind and that, consequently, it must never be fought.

214. The contribution by the leaders of Argentina, Greece, India, Mexico, Sweden and Tanzania to efforts to halt the arms race, especially the nuclear one, and their proposal to enhance the role of the United Nations in the verification of future agreements in this field, deserve recognition and encouragement.

215. In addressing, on behalf of my country, this timely, representative and competent gathering, I wish to reiterate Yugoslavia's vital interest in initiating and carrying out the disarmament process. On the threshold of the twenty-first century, the international community faces new and encouraging prospects, as well as dangerous challenges. Consequently, the promotion of co-operation among all countries, based on equality and interdependence, is indispensable today if we want to ensure maximum security for all with minimum weapons. In that context, the demand for the democratization of global disarmament negotiations is becoming an imperative of our time.

216. Disarmament and security depend in great measure on political relations and the level of organizational ability of the international community to cope with global international problems. Security concepts relying exclusively on military strength, as well as the expectation that security can be achieved through the accumulation of arms, have demonstrated their weaknesses and, as such, have no future. The contemporary world cannot seek solutions in opposing strategic formulas and doctrines. Fully aware of this fact, the international community, at the tenth special session of the General Assembly, the first special session devoted to disarmament, for the first time in history achieved consensus on a comprehensive disarmament strategy. It has rightly been pointed out, therefore, that the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session [*resolution S-10/2*] has enriched and updated the Charter of the United Nations. However, much still remains to be done.

217. Nuclear weapons represent the most serious threat to the survival of mankind. The question of nuclear disarmament must, therefore, be dealt with on a priority basis.

218. The question of conventional armaments and armed forces requires urgent attention as well. The role of these weapons and forces is growing. They are becoming highly sophisticated and their destructive power approaches the destructive capability of nuclear weapons. These weapons are also used increasingly in so-called local conflicts, and more and more sophisticated weapons of the conventional type have spread throughout the world. If the international community wants to curb the arms race, it must in the future—much more than it did in the past—become preoccupied with conventional weapons at global, regional and subregional levels.

219. We also believe that the international community must do its utmost to prevent an arms race in outer space. As the common heritage of mankind, space should be used only for peaceful purposes and in the interests of all humanity.

220. The process of confidence-building among States is an essential prerequisite for taking further steps in the direction of disarmament and in the strengthening of international security. The positive experience of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, in particular the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe, should be utilized, for it could encourage similar efforts in other regions of the world. It is also important that confidence-building measures and those measures restricting military activities on the ground should be broadened to include naval activities, especially in those regions in which the fleets of the nuclear Powers are present, as is the case in the Mediterranean.

221. The disarmament process is of enormous importance for the developing countries because the resources released through disarmament measures would have a positive impact on their overall development, in particular their economic development. The developing countries have persistently stressed the need for a substantive North-South dialogue. They have also pointed to the fact that their continual impoverishment and lagging behind constitute a serious danger to international peace and security. Bearing in mind the correlation between disarmament, development and security, they have resolutely supported the International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development, held in New York from 24 August to 11 September 1987.

222. The question of verification has posed insurmountable obstacles in the negotiations on measures relating to arms limitation and disarmament. It is therefore particularly gratifying to note significant breakthroughs achieved in this respect, first in the Document of the Stockholm Conference and then in the intermediate-range nuclear forces treaty. These breakthroughs provide a solid ground for progress in other areas of disarmament efforts.

223. In this connection we strongly believe that the role of the United Nations in the area of verification of future multilateral agreements on disarmament should be strengthened and that it deserves universal support. We also feel that the role of the United Nations could be meaningfully strengthened by giving an additional role to the Security Council, in accordance with its responsibilities under the Charter of the United Nations, and we believe that the Secretary-General could and should play a greater role in this field.

224. In our opinion, special attention must be given to the Conference on Disarmament, the only global multilateral negotiating forum entrusted with the task of negotiating disarmament agreements and an irreplaceable instrument of the international community.

225. Proceeding from the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session, this session should, in our view, make an assessment of the current international situation, point to its essential problems and stimulate a comprehensive dialogue, which should be transformed into an on-going negotiating process.

226. Taking into account the current positive situation in international relations, in particular the recent results achieved in the field of arms reduction and disarmament, and existing disarmament negotiating machinery, especially the role of the Conference on Disarmament, my Government considers that this session should direct the efforts of the international community in the immediate future towards the following goals. Existing stockpiles of nuclear weapons should be further reduced, with the eventual participation of all nuclear-weapon States. In view of the changed emphasis of the arms race from the quantitative to the qualitative aspect, an agreement on the comprehensive prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests in all environments should be concluded at an early date. The use of other weapons of mass destruction should be prohibited and such weapons destroyed, and as the most immediate task, a comprehensive convention on chemical weapons should be concluded at an early date.

227. As technological developments are increasingly confined to a smaller number of countries, there is a growing need for agreement to redirect new technological discoveries to peaceful purposes and for the benefit of mankind as a whole.

228. For its part, Yugoslavia proposes that the following decisions be adopted at this session: to convene an international conference in 1989, under the auspices of the United Nations, for the purpose of signing a comprehensive convention on chemical weapons; to address an appeal to all nuclear Powers to consider an agreement on a moratorium on nuclear tests or to introduce it unilaterally, commencing 5 August 1988, the date of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the signing of the partial test-ban Treaty,⁶ pending conclusion of a treaty on the comprehensive banning of nuclear tests; and to address an appeal to all States unilaterally to reduce conventional weapons and armed forces by 10 per cent by the year 1990 as an indication of their readiness to join the disarmament process. Yugoslavia has already done so.

229. In conclusion I wish to express the belief of my delegation that the international community is on the threshold of a new phase of more productive and better organized efforts in the field of disarmament. What is needed, in our view, is a new approach to the problems of war and peace. To the challenges of the twenty-first century we can adequately respond only if we overcome and discard obsolete theories, strategies and practices and contribute to the creation of conditions facilitating profound changes in international relations. This is the essence of both the policy of non-alignment and the actions of non-aligned countries. In this context the strengthening of the role of the United Nations is of crucial importance.

230. We all bear great responsibility for the successful outcome of this session. I sincerely hope that the results of this session will be a significant contribution to the goal we all share—a world with fewer weapons and greater security for present and future generations.

231. The PRESIDENT: Several representatives have requested that they be allowed to exercise their right of reply and I shall now call on them. May I remind members that, in accordance with General Assembly decision 34/401, statements in exercise of the right of reply are limited to 10 minutes for the first intervention and to five minutes for the second and should be made by representatives from their seats.

232. Mr. FRIEDERSDORF (United States of America): The Foreign Minister of Iran has, regrettably, repeated discredited accusations against my Government. The United States Government has consistently rejected these baseless accusations.

233. On 18 April United States forces had to exercise their inherent right of self-defence under international law and specifically in accordance with Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations. They took defensive action in response to an attack by the Islamic Republic of Iran against United States naval vessels in international waters of the Persian Gulf.

234. In this case the United States took action subsequent to damage caused by a mine to the *USS Samuel B. Roberts* on 14 April in international waters, approximately 60 miles east of Bahrain. The United States has conclusive evidence that this mine and others laid with it were manufactured recently in Iran. The mines were laid in shipping lanes known by Iran to be used by United States vessels and were intended by Iran to damage or sink such vessels. This mine-laying was but one in a series of offensive actions and provocations that Iranian naval forces have taken against neutral shipping in the international waters of the Persian Gulf.

235. Through diplomatic channels the United States has informed the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran on at least four occasions that the United States will not accept Iran's mine-laying in international waters or in the waters of neutral States. The United States Government has indicated that it will take appropriate defensive measures against such hostile actions.

236. In conclusion, let me reiterate what the United States Government has repeatedly stated in response to Iran's baseless charges. The United States does not seek a confrontation with Iranian forces. The United States is neutral in the conflict between Iran and Iraq and will remain so. The United States will continue to work for the earliest possible negotiated settlement of the conflict in accordance with Security Council resolution 598 (1987).

237. Mr. KITTANI (Iraq): When the head of my delegation speaks in the general debate he will have the opportunity to reply in full to the falsehoods and distortions contained in the statement of the Foreign Minister of Iran. However, despite the lateness of the hour, I cannot let his statement pass without making just a few comments to put things in their proper context.

238. It is audacious indeed for the foreign minister of a régime which has from its inception adopted aggression, expansion, terrorism and hostage-taking as the foundation of its relations with the rest of the world and which has consistently demonstrated its utter contempt for international obligations and morality; it is audacious, I say, for the representative of such a régime to come to this Hall and lecture us on our obligations and the norms of international behaviour and conduct. Indeed, at the end of Mr. Velayati's statement he seemed to have gone beyond the bounds of audacity; he went so far as to accuse Iraq of not obeying the decisions of the United Nations and to accuse Iraq of laying the mines in the Arabian Gulf. If there is a greater insult to the intelligence of this Assembly we cannot imagine it.

239. "International obligations"—these are selected for the propaganda purposes of covering up Iran's insistence on carrying on its aggression, expansion, destabilization and intimidation in the entire region. May I remind the representatives present here that Iran has the singular distinction of being the only Member in the 43 years of existence of this Organization to actually boycott the Security Council, the United Nations organ which has been charged by all of us with the primary responsibility for international peace and security. Not even the racist régime of South Africa or even Israel has had the audacity to boycott the Security Council. Iran has done so for nine years.

240. About 10 months ago, to be precise, on 20 July 1987, the Security Council adopted yet another resolution—Iran having rejected and Iraq having accepted all previous resolutions—which was heralded as a comprehensive, obligatory resolution. Two days later my Foreign Minister, the Deputy Prime Minister, came and handed the Secretary-General an official document unequivocally and unconditionally accepting that resolution as the basis for a comprehensive, lasting and honourable peace between Iran and Iraq. We are in the eleventh month after the adoption of that resolution, and we are still awaiting Iran's acceptance of it. The entire diplomacy of Iran and its friends has been mobilized to circumvent that resolution and to prevent its paragraph 10 from being implemented and sanctions imposed upon Iran.

241. Only last week, none other than Khomeini himself in his message to the new Majlis, read out by his son Ahmed Khomeini, clearly stated—and I have sent the text of that to the Secretary-General so that anyone who wants to see it in full can do so—in plain Persian, I suppose: “We will not settle this through negotiations. We will settle this on the battlefield, and there is no question of entering into any kind of compromise.” Yet Iranian diplomats, from Mr. Velayati down, circle the globe saying different things at different times to different people—all with only one purpose, that is, to cover up Iran’s real position and prevent the Security Council from imposing sanctions against Iran for its non-compliance with the Council’s mandatory resolution 598 (1987). It is part of Iran’s war strategy; it has nothing to do with the establishment of peace and security.

242. To conclude, I wish to say simply that there are two parties to this tragic conflict: one party, Iraq, from its inception has accepted every resolution of the Security Council and indeed of the other international forums; the other, Iran, as I said, has consistently refused these or even to accept the mandate of the Security Council.

243. When the Iranians speak about international obligations, we remind everyone present that the Charter of the United Nations is the keystone of the edifice of international law, morality and legality, and the Charter says that Member States undertake to accept and to implement resolutions of the Security Council. Where is Iran’s reply? Why does it not accept its obligations under the Charter?

244. As I have said, one party has clearly accepted its obligations, and we have said in good faith that we are ready, as soon as the other party also accepts its obligations, to enter into negotiations under the auspices of the Security Council and the Secretary-General fully to implement the resolutions. The other party, Iran, has chosen to continue its aggression, its expansion and the war and to settle it on the battlefield. That is the fact of the matter. All other statements, including that of Mr. Velayati, are designed simply to divert attention and to go into byways that have nothing to do with the re-establishment of peace between the two countries.

245. Mr. MAHALLATI (Islamic Republic of Iran): I do not know how much time I have, Mr. President, to respond to what the representatives of the United States and Iraq have said. Do I have 20 minutes, Sir?

246. The PRESIDENT: The time allowed is 10 minutes, as with every right of reply in the first round.

247. Mr. MAHALLATI (Islamic Republic of Iran): I wanted to bring a very important matter to the Assembly’s attention. Unfortunately, in those 10 minutes I have to respond to both the United States and Iraq. That is symbolic of the realities in the region, where the United States has been collaborating with the Iraqi régime since the outset of the imposed war. The United States has pursued in the Persian Gulf a policy of perpetuating the war of aggression, and since the outset of the war Iraq has been pursuing a policy of spreading the war to other countries of the region. It is no secret that the Islamic

Republic of Iran has always favoured a total and unconditional cease-fire in the Persian Gulf. It is no secret that Iraq has spread the war, spread the fire, in the Persian Gulf, by attacking unarmed civilian shipping. It has done so since the war’s inception. We have numerous times made proposals to the Secretary-General and to many international forums for bringing about peace and security in the Persian Gulf. Unfortunately, the United States has objected in deed and in words in the Security Council and elsewhere at the United Nations and everywhere else.

248. The United States has failed to comprehend that the Persian Gulf is definitely not an American lake. What is the United States doing thousands of miles from its own shores? Since the increase of the presence of American forces in the Persian Gulf, the number of ships attacked and the number of persons killed has doubled. That was emphatically brought to the attention of even the American public very recently.

249. If the United States has resorted to Article 51 of the Charter, as it says, to defend its cause, why has it failed even to raise a finger against the Iraqis, who attacked their frigate, the *Stark*, a year ago and later a destroyer, the *Chandler*? The United States has always been opposed to the Islamic Republic of Iran’s bringing about peace and security in the Persian Gulf. Why has the United States been against the Secretary-General’s eight-point plan?

250. The main question the Assembly should concentrate on is the use of chemical weapons by the Iraqis, which has been continued even since the adoption of Security Council resolution 612 (1988). Now Iraq talks about the binding nature of Security Council resolution 598 (1987). The very fact that only a few days after the adoption of resolution 612 (1988) Iraq used chemical weapons against Marivan and Sardasht on three occasions proves how much respect the Iraqi régime has for the Security Council and for the binding nature of its resolutions.

251. There is no doubt that it is Iraq that has always sabotaged the efforts of the Secretary-General, particularly his efforts since the adoption of resolution 598 (1987) to implement that very plan. Only three weeks ago the Prime Minister of Iraq, Tariq Aziz, declared that the Iraqis had no more trust in the Security Council and the United Nations as a whole, and they should make their decision on the battlefield.

252. Only very recently when the Secretary-General made a proposal to set up a working group to implement resolution 598 (1987), it was Iraq that rejected that effort. The Islamic Republic of Iran accepted the Secretary-General’s proposal. That is well known to all representatives present. That by itself shows that it is Iraq that has been against the implementation of resolution 598 (1987) and against any just political solution pursued by international organizations.

253. The representative of Iraq happens to be a member of the Kurdish minority in Iraq, and he observed the massacre in Halabja. I wonder how he can defend here the massacre carried out by the Iraqi régime, which was a violation of the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime

of Genocide. How can he defend a policy that has resulted in the annihilation of the Kurdish minority in his own country?

254. The Assembly's main task at this session should be to take effective measures to prohibit and prevent the further use of chemical weapons against civilians. It is well known that the report of the latest expert mission dispatched to the region proved, and said very openly, that more than 50 per cent of the innocent people in Iran subjected to the use of chemical weapons had been women and elderly people. That in itself makes clear the criminal nature of the Iraqi régime and the criminal policy it is pursuing.

255. It would take a long time to go into every detail of the story of the war, which is well known to representatives. What is important for the Assembly at this third special session devoted to disarmament is to prevent abrogations of relevant conventions.

256. Mr. KITTANI (Iraq): I should like to make three quick points. First, Mr. Mahallati once again avoids the central issue, which is who is responsible for the continuation of the war and for every Iranian and Iraqi who is killed—indeed, some non-Iraqis and non-Iranians as well. I again submit that it is the party that refuses to comply with the resolutions of the Security Council. As long as the war continues—at the insistence, and only at the insistence, of Iran, and against the wishes not only of Iraq but of the international community as a whole—Iran must bear the full responsibility for every casualty in the war: Kurdish, Persian, Azerbaijani, Arab, American and Kuwaiti.

257. It is not a question of who is from what ethnic group. It is a question of international obligations and how to end conflicts. We are sitting in the United Nations and the representative of Iran represents a régime which is at odds with the international community and the whole world. It makes up its own rules of conduct and wants the international community to accept them.

258. Mr. Mahallati is referring to some confidential conversations with Mr. Pérez de Cuéllar. I wish Mr. Pérez de Cuéllar would speak for himself. But can Mr. Mahallati simply say now—even if he does not go to the Security Council—that the Government of Iran will accept unconditionally Security Council resolution 598 (1987), which contains all the elements, including chemical weapons? Can he say these simple words, "Iran accepts unconditionally, without reservation, unequivocally, officially, Security Council resolution 598 (1987) as the basis of an honourable, permanent settlement of the Iran-Iraq conflict"? Can he say that?

259. Mr. FRIEDERSDORF (United States of America): I do not want to prolong this but the Iranian spokesman has repeated more false accusations against my Government and the United States Government has categorically rejected these baseless accusations, most recently in a letter to the Secretary-General circulated as Security Council document S/19896.

260. I wish to reiterate that the United States is neutral in the conflict between Iran and Iraq. The United States will continue to work for the earliest possible negotiated settlement of the conflict, in accordance with Security Council resolution 598 (1987).

261. Mr. MAHALLATI (Islamic Republic of Iran): As a matter of fact, the United States, by virtue of Article 33 of the Charter, was obliged to inform either the Secretary-General or the President of the Security Council about the action it was going to take in the Persian Gulf. As a matter of fact, a country which has been condemned by the International Court of Justice for its invasion and acts of aggression against Nicaragua is in no position to resort to such inhuman acts and somehow justify them as self-defence.

262. Everyone remembers that the United States itself mined international waters in the Second World War. In point of fact, this is also no justification for the accusation that it makes against Iran, that we are laying mines—which is a lie—or for the United States to commit its unilateral act of aggression against our territory, against civilian targets in the Persian Gulf—oil rigs. I should like to bring to the Assembly's attention that it has not provided any evidence to any international body to prove its accusation that we have been laying mines in the Persian Gulf.

263. The United States says that it is neutral. It is not neutral, because even the United States press has criticized the Secretary of State of the United States for preventing the Security Council from taking any action against the use of chemical warfare by Iraq, and that is not a secret.

264. The United States says it is neutral, yet they are supporting the Iraqis in the Persian Gulf in spreading the war of aggression there and creating every obstacle possible in the way of a cease-fire.

265. As to what was said by the representative of Iraq, we are here to respond to the proposal of the Secretary-General and definitely not to respond to proposals of Iraq. The Secretary-General is well aware of the facts. His very recent proposal has been rejected by Iraq and accepted by Iran. This speaks for itself and shows that what Iraq is doing is leading the Secretary-General into a stalemate situation in order to bring the question of resolution 598 (1987) to the Security Council and, with the complicity of the United States, to work for a sanctions resolution against the Islamic Republic of Iran. That is exactly why Iraq does not want the Secretary-General's efforts to be continued. My question is: can Iraq rise here and say that it can go along with the efforts of the Secretary-General?

The meeting rose at 7 p.m.

NOTES

¹Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) (United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 634, No. 9068).

²See A/43/125, annex, p. 9.

³Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925 (League of Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. XCIV (1929), No. 2138).

⁴A/39/488, annex.

⁵Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapons. *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-ninth Session, Supplement No. 27*, annex II, sect. 13, document CCD/431.

⁶Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water (United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 480, No. 6964).

⁷*Ibid.*, vol. 944, No. 13446.

⁸See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-second Session, Plenary Meetings*, 5th meeting, para. 13.

⁹A/43/368.

¹⁰*Official Records of the Security Council, Thirty-ninth Year, Supplement for January, February and March 1984*, document S/16433.

¹¹*Ibid.*, *Thirty-ninth Year, Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council, 1984*, p. 10.

¹²*Ibid.*, *Fortieth Year, Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council, 1985*, p. 6.

¹³*Ibid.*, *Forty-second Year, Supplement for April, May and June 1987*, document S/18852.

¹⁴*Ibid.*, *Forty-third Year, Supplement for April, May and June 1988*, document S/19823 and Add. 1.

¹⁵*Ibid.*, *Forty-first Year, Supplement for January, February and March 1986*, document S/17932.