



President: Mr. Ismat KITTANI (Iraq)

AGENDA ITEM 8

General debate

1. The PRESIDENT: This morning the Assembly will begin the general debate. I should like to inform the Assembly that I have received requests from a number of Member States that the General Assembly should hear, in plenary meeting, a message which His Holiness Pope John Paul II has graciously addressed to the Assembly and which is to be delivered by His Eminence Cardinal Agostino Casaroli, Secretary of State of the Holy See.

2. May I take it that the General Assembly agrees to those requests?

It was so decided.

3. Mr. KOH (Singapore): Four years ago, amidst much fanfare and enthusiasm on the part of the general public, the United Nations held the first special session of the General Assembly on disarmament. The session adopted a Declaration and a Programme of Action [resolution S-10/2, sects. II and III] which would lead eventually to the goal of general and complete disarmament.

4. As we begin the second special session on disarmament, it is pertinent to ask whether the goals set out in the Programme of Action have been achieved. The answer, one regrets, is no. Has the arms race slowed down during the past four years? It has not. In 1978, total world military expenditures amounted to \$US 400 billion. According to the Yearbook for 1982 of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute [SIPRI], world military expenditures in 1981, at current prices, totalled between \$ 600 billion and \$650 billion. During the past four years, the world's military spending has been increasing at the rate of three per cent per annum, faster than the rate of increase in the preceding four years.

5. In 1978 the United States and the Soviet Union together possessed 14,000 nuclear warheads, sufficient to destroy every city in the world seven times over. During the past four years each of the two super-Powers has augmented and modernized its nuclear arsenal. The latest estimate is that the United States possesses 9,000 and the Soviet Union 7,000 nuclear warheads.

6. A comprehensive test-ban treaty banning nuclear explosions in all environments has not been completed. Indeed, the negotiations among the United Kingdom, the United States and the Soviet Union were adjourned in November 1980 and have not been

resumed. The mutual and balanced force reduction talks in Vienna between North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Warsaw Pact countries are in their ninth year and are making no progress.

7. A review of the past four years leads inevitably to the following conclusion. Not only have we failed to achieve any of the goals set out in the Programme of Action adopted four years ago, but we have actually witnessed an intensification of the arms race. Why have the past four years been a period of regress instead of progress in arms control and disarmament?

8. I think the reason is that arms control and disarmament can prosper only in an environment of political stability and in an atmosphere of mutual trust and confidence. Let me briefly recall some of the events of the past four years which have destabilized the international order and poisoned the negotiating atmosphere. First, in December 1978 Viet Nam invaded Cambodia, and it has continued to occupy that country. Secondly, in December 1979 the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, and it has likewise continued to occupy it. Thirdly, war broke out between Iran and Iraq. Fourthly, Israel attacked Iraq's nuclear reactor. Fifthly, acts of violence between Israel and the Palestinians in southern Lebanon have occurred repeatedly and continue. Sixthly, Argentina and the United Kingdom are at war in the South Atlantic.

9. The major point I wish to make here is that a close nexus exists between international security on the one hand and arms control and disarmament on the other hand. There will be no disarmament if there is no international security. Nations will continue to arm themselves as long as violence is a fact of life and as long as the system of collective security embodied in the Charter of the United Nations has little or no efficacy in practice.

10. I turn now to the nuclear-arms race. The five nuclear-weapon Powers—the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France and China—are said to possess a stockpile of nuclear weapons estimated at between 40,000 and 50,000. The question is: how should we respond rationally to the threat of nuclear war?

11. It can be argued that Europe has been at peace since 1945 partly because of the nuclear deterrence. Is it not safe, then, to assume that none of the leaders of the nuclear-weapon Powers would be so crazy as to plunge the world into a nuclear holocaust? Are those who fear the threat of a nuclear war being unduly alarmist?

12. In chapter 2 of its report entitled "Common Security—a programme for disarmament" the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues, chaired by Olof Palme, reasoned as follows:

“Deterrence based on the existence of large arsenals of nuclear weapons may become increasingly fragile; nuclear war may become more plausible. Three factors contribute to this possibility: first, the cumulative impact of 37 years of accommodation to nuclear weapons may have made policy-makers less sensitive to their dangers psychologically; second, technological developments falsely suggest that it may be possible to limit nuclear war; and third, there is a danger that nuclear war may begin inadvertently during a crisis.”¹

13. Since the atomic bomb was used only twice, in Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, it is difficult for members of the public and even for diplomats who are not specialists to comprehend the effects of a nuclear war. As we are meeting in New York City, let me ask what will happen if a 20-megaton bomb was dropped over this city. A 20-megaton bomb has 1,600 times the explosive power of the Hiroshima bomb. The Soviet Union is thought to have at least 113 20-megaton bombs in its nuclear arsenal. According to Jonathan Schell, in his book, *The Fate of the Earth*, a 20-megaton bomb will transform New York City and its suburbs into a “lifeless, flat, scorched desert in a few seconds”.

14. For those reasons we must all welcome the joint announcement by the United States and the Soviet Union that on June 29 they will begin talks at Geneva on the limitation and reduction of strategic arms. Let us all hope that those talks will lead to agreed and verifiable reductions in the nuclear arsenals of the two super-Powers.

15. During the tenth special session, the first special session devoted to disarmament, expectations were high that the three negotiating parties—the United Kingdom, the United States and the Soviet Union—would complete their negotiations for a comprehensive test ban treaty within a very short time. Contrary to those expectations, the negotiations were adjourned in November 1980 and have not been resumed. In April 1982, the Committee on Disarmament established an *ad hoc* working group on a nuclear test ban [A/S-12/2, para. 38]. Let us hope that it will soon be possible to complete the negotiations and to conclude the comprehensive test-ban treaty. Such a treaty is important for two reasons. First, it would make it difficult for the nuclear-weapon parties to be certain about the performance of new weapons that are developed and, to that extent, would narrow one channel of arms competition among the major Powers. Secondly, it is important because it would reinforce the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [resolution 2373 (XXII), annex] by demonstrating that the major Powers are aware of their legal and moral obligations to bring the nuclear arms race to a halt.

16. I shall now turn to the subject of the military use of space. According to the 1982 *SIPRI Yearbook*, at least 75 per cent of all satellites are used for military purposes. The yearbook, on page xxxi of its introduction, explains the military uses of satellites as follows:

“Satellites are used to obtain precise knowledge of the targets and their locations and are also used

in the command, control and communications systems which transmit targeting information and which direct the actions of the offensive forces.”

17. It is public knowledge that the United States and the Soviet Union have been experimenting with methods of destroying the other side's spacecraft. Such methods include the use of interceptors and of high-energy laser and particle beams.

18. The two super-Powers met once in 1978 and twice in 1979 to discuss the limitation of their anti-satellite systems. We would urge the two super-Powers to resume those negotiations with a view to reaching agreement on banning the deployment of anti-satellite weapons and dismantling all existing systems.

19. I turn now to chemical and biological weapons. During the past few years there have been persistent reports that chemical and toxin agents have been used by the Soviet Union in Afghanistan and by Viet Nam in Laos and Cambodia. In response to such reports, the General Assembly established, in 1980, an expert investigatory group to look into the allegations [resolution 35/144 C]. In its interim report,² submitted in November 1981, the group found itself unable to reach a final conclusion. The group's mandate has been renewed, and we hope that it will be able to give its definitive conclusions to the next session of the General Assembly.

20. On page xxxiii, the 1982 *SIPRI Yearbook* states, “The world is moving to the verge of a chemical arms race that could make impossible any further strengthening of the arms control measures in this field.”

21. We therefore urge the Committee on Disarmament to take up the question of the chemical arms race as a matter of priority. The Committee should work for two objectives: first, for a comprehensive chemical disarmament, and secondly, for an extension of the regime established by the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction [resolution 2826 (XXVI), annex], signed in London, Moscow and Washington on 10 April 1972.

22. The conventional arms race, like the nuclear-arms race, has continued unabated during the past four years. We should be concerned with the conventional arms race for several reasons. First, people are being killed every day in wars being fought with conventional arms. Secondly, scarce economic resources, especially those of the developing countries, are being diverted from productive ends to the purchase of arms. Thirdly, in the case of Europe, there is a close interrelationship between conventional forces and nuclear weapons.

23. Who are the world's major arms exporters? According to the *SIPRI Yearbook* for 1982, in the period 1979 to 1981, the Soviet Union accounted for 36.5 per cent; the United States: 33.6 per cent; France: 9.7 per cent; Italy: 4.3 per cent; the United Kingdom: 3.6 per cent; and the Federal Republic of Germany: 3 per cent of the world's exports of major weapons. Who are the major consumers of those weapons? The industrialized countries accounted for

37.8 per cent; the Middle East: 27.3 per cent; North Africa: 9.2 per cent; the Far East: 8.3 per cent; South America: 6.2 per cent; South Asia: 4.9 per cent; Africa south of the Sahara: 4.8 per cent; and Central America: 1.5 per cent of the world's imports of major weapons.

24. In order to curb the trade in major conventional weapons, action is required by both the suppliers and the consumers. The only instance of action by consumers was a conference held at Mexico City in 1978, attended by 20 Latin American countries, to deal exclusively with the problem of conventional arms control in Latin America. There has, however, been no follow-up to that meeting, probably because of heightened tension in Central America and because some of the countries that attended the meeting at Mexico City have been involved in conflicts between themselves. If the prospects for conventional arms control in Latin America are bleak, the prospects are even worse in the other regions of the world.

25. In a period when the world economy is in serious trouble, the political leaders of the world may be interested in the conclusions of two studies carried out last year by Professors Leontief and Dutchin of New York University concerning the impact of reductions in world military spending on the world economy. The studies show that even modest restraint will bring wide-ranging benefits in almost every part of the world, particularly to the neediest areas. Restraint would also benefit the United States and the Soviet Union.

26. The Group of Governmental Experts on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development, chaired by Inga Thorsson, concluded in its study³ that the world can either pursue the arms race or move with deliberate speed towards a more sustainable economic and political order, but it cannot do both.

27. Speaking at the first special session on disarmament four years ago, I exhorted my colleagues not to turn that session into a typical United Nations exercise in propaganda and collective hypocrisy. I warned the general public not to be carried away by the peace rhetoric from this rostrum, because the representatives of States have a tendency to say one thing at the United Nations and to do the opposite at home. Let us all hope that the representatives who will be speaking in this debate, especially those of the great Powers, will show more fidelity to truth and greater congruence between their words and their deeds than they did four years ago.

28. Mr. TAZI (Morocco) (*interpretation from Arabic*): Allow me at the outset, Mr. President, to extend to you, on behalf of the Government of the Kingdom of Morocco and on my own behalf, our warmest congratulations on your election to guide the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, which has amply demonstrated our confidence that you will conduct our work with responsibility and seriousness. We are sure that our Assembly will find in your efficiency and ability the best guarantee for the success of the present session, a success in which the peoples of the world place their hopes.

29. The Final Document [*resolution S-10/2*] of the tenth special session of the General Assembly held in

1978, affirmed the central role and primary responsibility of the United Nations in this sphere. Paragraph 114 of that document called upon the United Nations to play a more active role in the field of disarmament and that in order to discharge its functions effectively it should facilitate and encourage all disarmament measures—unilateral, bilateral, regional or multilateral. Today's convening of the General Assembly in a second special session on disarmament only four years after the first is a sincere expression of the determination of the Organization to play its important role and fully to assume its responsibilities. The important statements made at the opening of this session by the President, Mr. Kittani, and the Secretary-General, Mr. Javier Pérez de Cuéllar [*A/S-12/PV.1*], affirm the determination and the will to harness all the resources of the United Nations towards this end. We are sure that this session will take into consideration all the constructive ideas and valuable guidelines that were contained in those statements.

30. This subject is by no means foreign to the Organization. The first resolution adopted by the General Assembly in 1946 concerned one of the aspects of disarmament. The international community represented in the Assembly, fully aware of the need to intensify its efforts to save humanity from imminent destruction as a result of the stockpiling of different systems of weapons and of the continuing arms race, is intent on overcoming all the difficulties that have obstructed the realization of its lofty ideal for more than two decades. That ideal is general and complete disarmament under effective international controls.

31. The convening of this special session comes at a time when all the prerequisites have been fulfilled for achieving positive results that will meet the standards and hopes of all mankind. After the elements for an international strategy for disarmament were provided by the first special session on disarmament, the international community, in December 1980, adopted a resolution containing the Declaration of the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade, in which the objectives of that Decade were enumerated [*resolution 35/46*]. This session has been efficiently prepared for thanks to the ceaseless efforts of the Preparatory Committee during the past two years.

32. Morocco, which the international community honoured by electing its representative a Vice-Chairman of the Committee, is happy to express from this rostrum its appreciation of the great competence and wisdom with which Mr. Adeniji of fraternal Nigeria conducted the Committee's proceedings. These facts make us hope that the proceedings of this important session will achieve results that will pave the way for the adoption of concrete and practical disarmament measures.

33. The in-depth analysis undertaken by the first special session on disarmament gave rise to the conviction that disarmament was not a closed circle and that it had a strong relationship with issues of international security on the one hand and problems of social and economic development on the other. In other words, we have reached the common conviction that the disarmament process is bound to be more successful in a world in which everybody feels secure and in which the gap between the developed and the

developing countries is diminished. Therefore, there is an imperative need to create an atmosphere of stability, free from the tendency to use force, in which the desire to co-operate prevails.

34. We cannot but state with regret that this sound approach has been neglected internationally and that since the end of the first special session on disarmament, in 1978, the international community has witnessed a very dangerous deterioration resulting from flagrant violation of the most basic principles of the Charter of the United Nations and of a number of international instruments, including the Final Document of that session.

35. The territorial integrity and sovereignty of several countries, especially those that abide by the principle of non-alignment, have been exposed to occupation and aggression. Many areas in the world, especially our African continent, have witnessed violent upheavals, which have been part of the destabilization planned in the context of exploitation and obstruction of their development. Nor have other countries been free from intervention in their internal affairs. The colonialist and racist policies of Israel and South Africa have continued, as we have seen in the actions to prevent the peoples of Namibia and Palestine from exercising their inalienable rights.

36. Here I should like to express Morocco's denunciation and condemnation of the brutal aggression currently being committed by Israel against Lebanon, and our full solidarity with fraternal Lebanon and its Government in their plight and in their efforts to preserve the territorial integrity and sovereignty of that brother country. I should also like to recall the established position of Morocco of solidarity with the Palestinian people in its struggle for its inalienable rights, under the leadership of the Palestine Liberation Organization, its sole legitimate representative.

37. All that I have described is happening in a world in which the resort to force has replaced the resort to peaceful means to settle conflicts between States, and in which efforts to establish international North-South co-operation have been frustrated. The practices that I have mentioned have destroyed the spirit of détente, which gave the world hope and which we hoped would be deepened so that its dimensions would go beyond the relationship between East and West to include issues of social and economic development. One of the results of those practices is that a climate of distrust and tension has been created, which has had a negative effect on international disarmament efforts.

38. It is not our intention in this brief evaluation of the present situation to justify the lack of progress in disarmament, to be discouraging or to assign responsibility. In view of the unity of all faith, we bear collective responsibility for creating a favourable atmosphere that will guarantee the strengthening of the spirit of détente and the beginning of an authentic process of disarmament. The danger presented by the current stockpiling of various types of weapons, which is increasing with the speeding up of the arms race, does not jeopardize one party alone. It does not discriminate between East and West, North and South. We all face the danger of annihilation. There-

fore, we must all intensify the efforts to stop the arms race and achieve our common aim—the establishment of a world characterized by security, co-operation and solidarity.

39. It is four years since we adopted by consensus the Final Document of the first special session on disarmament. Morocco, which has more than once expressed its satisfaction with the results of that session, has spared no effort in the machinery for negotiation and deliberation to strengthen the impetus created by that session and to translate it into a concrete reality that will bring us closer to the main aim—general and complete disarmament. We should have liked very much to meet today proud of our great progress towards achieving the aims set by the first special session on disarmament. We cannot but admit that even the more optimistic evaluations present a grim picture and show the great disparity between our aspirations and what the international community has actually achieved during the past four years.

40. A glance at the two special reports made by the deliberative [A/S-12/3] and negotiating [A/S-12/2] bodies shows the lack of real progress in disarmament. A quick reading of the statements and statistics concerning the arms race shows us the obstacles to disarmament faced by the international community.

41. We note that in the field of nuclear disarmament none of the aims in the Final Document have been achieved. This is especially true of those specified in paragraphs 50 to 71 in the Programme of Action contained in that Document. Nuclear tests have not stopped during the period, and the conclusion of an international agreement on the subject still faces various obstacles.

42. This issue was not discussed by the Committee on Disarmament at Geneva in the practical manner required for practical results. The Committee's deliberations were peripheral to the tripartite negotiations of the United States, the United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. In spite of the call by the non-aligned countries and neutral countries in the Committee for the creation of a working group to negotiate a total ban on nuclear tests, the Committee was unable during its first three years to start work on such negotiations either before or after the tripartite negotiations in 1980. But our hopes have been raised by the fact that last April the Committee on Disarmament finally responded to this call, thus paving the way for the initiation of collective negotiations on the most complex problem involved in a test ban, that is, the problem of verification. We hope that when the Committee resumes its work next summer it will overcome the problems obstructing conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty. We hope also that the Committee will achieve a consensus as well on initiating negotiations on all aspects of the general problem of nuclear disarmament, but especially those aspects mentioned in paragraph 50 of the Final Document.

43. We should like to record our complete satisfaction with the important initiative for the holding of bilateral negotiations by the two super-Powers, the United States and the Soviet Union, with a view to achieving a reduction in the level of strategic arms.

The proposal concerning a one-third reduction of the nuclear missiles in the arsenals of those two Powers is bound to make a positive contribution to nuclear disarmament. We should like also to express the hope that the negotiations on medium-range missiles that have been resumed at Geneva will be crowned with success. The development we have witnessed on the problem of international verification measures is bound to help break the deadlock in the negotiations between those two super-Powers.

44. Morocco has always believed in the necessity of taking transitional measures while waiting for general and complete disarmament. Therefore, Morocco still supports the principle of non-proliferation and, for its part, is working towards adherence to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, of 1968, by all States in the world. Morocco has always emphasized the need for respect for all provisions of the Treaty, including provisions on international co-operation in nuclear technology, to enable all States parties, and especially the developing countries, to benefit from the use of nuclear energy for developmental purposes. We regret that the Second Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, held in 1980, was unable to take practical steps to implement all the objectives of that Treaty. Morocco, which is a party to an agreement it concluded with IAEA on 30 January 1973, believes in the right of all non-nuclear-weapon States which have adhered to the Non-Proliferation Treaty to benefit from all results accruing from the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

45. On this occasion I should like to recall that when the Moroccan Government decided to undertake the necessary studies for the establishment of a nuclear centre with a view to fulfilling the country's increasing needs for electric power, and since Morocco's large phosphates reserves make it possible for it to produce uranium, His Majesty the King, in a memorandum dated 25 October 1976, proposed to the United Nations the appointment of a special committee to verify that uranium was not being enriched or used for military purposes, and stated that Morocco would accept such verification once or twice a year. His Majesty wants to show the world that Morocco's goal of establishing a nuclear plan is designed to provide the country with speedy economic development in the interests of its population.

46. The creation of nuclear-free zones is an important disarmament measure that must be encouraged so as to achieve the basic aim of creating a world free of nuclear weapons. In spite of the recognition in the Final Document of the necessity of adopting measures aimed at establishing such zones, nothing has been achieved since 1978 in the zones mentioned in that document, namely, Africa, the Middle East and South Asia.

47. Morocco, a part of the African continent, has spared no effort, along with the other African States, to give effect to the 1964 declaration of the Organization of African Unity concerning the proclamation of the African continent as a nuclear-weapon-free zone. South Africa's intransigence and refusal to adhere to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and to place its nuclear plants under the supervision of IAEA and its continued development of its nuclear military capability still constitute impediments to all efforts to

achieve this lofty aim. Therefore we call upon the Security Council to take the necessary steps in accordance with paragraph 63 (c) of the Final Document.

48. Morocco has worked also with the Arab States towards the declaration of the Middle East as a nuclear-weapon-free zone and, noting the fact that in 1980 the General Assembly adopted its resolution [resolution 35/147] on this subject by consensus for the first time, Morocco cannot but condemn the events that followed the adoption of that resolution, especially Israel's brutal aggression against the Iraqi nuclear reactor in June 1981. Morocco cannot but condemn Israel's persistence in its policy of aggression against the Palestinian people and against Lebanon and its refusal to adhere to the Non-Proliferation Treaty or to place its nuclear plants under the supervision of IAEA; the aggression currently being carried out by Israel against Lebanon is proof of that policy of aggression. The Security Council is called upon, in accordance with paragraph 63 (d) of the Final Document, to undertake a role to facilitate the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.

49. We note with great satisfaction the response by the nuclear States to the General Assembly's call for the ratification of Additional Protocol II of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco).

50. There is no doubt that the most important guarantee against nuclear war and the use of nuclear weapons lies in the complete elimination of those weapons and in nuclear disarmament. The Final Document called upon the nuclear States to take a number of measures in preparation for the achievement of that aim. Morocco attaches great importance to the measures concerning the adoption of effective security provisions by which the nuclear States should undertake not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear States. In our view, that guarantee must be included in an internationally binding instrument which contains a common undertaking.

51. We regret that the Committee on Disarmament has not achieved the desired results, in spite of the fact that none of its members is opposed in principle to the idea of an international treaty in this regard. The disagreement which still exists is on the content of such a treaty, especially on the commitments to be made by the non-nuclear-weapon States in exchange for commitment by the nuclear-weapon States. Morocco has more than once expressed its refusal of any condition which would impose an additional commitment on non-nuclear-weapon States, having already entered into a legal undertaking by virtue of its accession to the Non-Proliferation Treaty by which it undertook not to acquire nuclear weapons. We hope that this special session will achieve results which will help the Committee on Disarmament to fulfil its responsibility on this issue.

52. Paragraph 75 of the Final Document stated: "The complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and their destruction represent one of the most urgent measures of disarmament." Although the international community had achieved progress in this regard

before the tenth special session by banning the use of toxic weapons in war—in the 1925 Geneva Protocol on asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and on bacteriological methods, and the 1972 Convention on the production and stockpiling of bacteriological and toxic weapons—an agreement on the prohibition of chemical weapons has not been achieved.

53. We would like to express our appreciation of all efforts made in the Committee on Disarmament, which managed to achieve some progress in negotiations on the preparation of the international instrument which the whole world is awaiting. We express the hope that the Committee, when it resumes its work next month, will manage to overcome the difficulties which still face it, including difficulties concerning the criterion of toxicity and concerning verification. The fact that there is no international instrument on this issue is disquieting to Morocco, since we know that some reports have mentioned the possible use of such weapons in some areas, such as Afghanistan and Cambodia.

54. We believe it is possible to achieve an agreement to prohibit radioactive weapons, provided that all parties to the current negotiations, in the context of the Committee on Disarmament, display the necessary flexibility. We cannot envisage a vague prohibition or one which is drafted in ambiguous terms, which would deprive it of its basic feature, namely specificity. Morocco has declared more than once that all action conducive to the proliferation of radioactive materials, including attacks on nuclear reactors, must be banned.

55. The tenth special session also carefully examined the issues of conventional weapons and the reduction of military budgets. In many paragraphs of the Final Document the necessary measures were recommended, especially measures to be taken by the nuclear and militarily significant States. Although the negotiating body has not achieved anything in this field, the deliberative body has taken sound measures to adopt an outline on those two important issues. The continuation of efforts in the Committee on Disarmament is bound to help the international community to establish a sound basis for disarmament in the field of conventional weapons.

56. The position of my country on these two topics is very clear. Ever since its accession to independence, Morocco has worked for success in the work on the control of armaments in the Organization, especially concerning North Africa. This was especially affirmed by His Majesty King Hassan II in February 1967 in the message which he addressed to the then Secretary-General of the United Nations, in which he called for disarmament in our area. In his message, His Majesty said:

“Out of our respect for this principle, and in view of our national responsibilities, we have initiated the comprehensive mobilization of all our resources to ensure the development of our country, its progress, the welfare of our people. For all these considerations, and to make this conviction a concrete reality, we should like our area to be included in the process of disarmament.”

57. It is very clear from this royal message that Morocco has always devoted its potential and its

efforts to development, confining itself in the field of armaments to that which is necessary for the defence of the homeland, its sovereignty and its territorial integrity. Morocco is willing to co-operate with its neighbours in the context of any organization established to achieve disarmament in the area. That is something which will undoubtedly lead to the overcoming of peripheral disagreements, which are the result of regional hegemony, and to paving the way for positive co-operation by all countries of the area to help them improve the living standards of their citizens.

58. Before touching on other topics, I should like to express Morocco's satisfaction at the achievements since 1978 in the field of conventional disarmament. I refer specifically to the Convention⁴ concluded in 1980 at the United Nations Conference on Prohibitions or Restrictions of Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, held at Geneva from 10 to 28 September 1979 and from 15 September to 10 October 1980. That Convention, along with its three additional Protocols, has been signed by Morocco.

59. The Assembly's evaluation at this session of the entire international situation and of the results of efforts to ensure the implementation of the decisions of the first special session devoted to disarmament must not result only in an expression of regret at the lack of progress. It must go beyond that: it must try to learn from past errors and to seek the best means of overcoming the obstacles that we have faced during the past four years. In our view, one of the most important tasks of this session is the preparation of a practical programme in the context of which the elements of the international disarmament strategy may be translated into practical, pragmatic measures. In this context, Morocco attaches great importance to the idea that this session must adopt a comprehensive programme of disarmament.

60. We believe that the preparation of that programme has become less difficult than it was. Since the international community agreed in the Disarmament Commission in 1979 on the elements of the programme,⁵ we have come a long way in the preparation of the programme itself. The Committee on Disarmament deserves our commendation for the energetic work it carried out in this connexion. In spite of the fact that the document transmitted to us by that Committee is a record of differing positions on the various sections of the programme, we believe that we have reached an important stage in the negotiating process and that, thanks to the political will shown by all parties, the Assembly will manage at this session to adopt a comprehensive programme of disarmament.

61. The importance of such a document needs no reaffirmation; its adoption by all parties would indicate the willingness of every State Member to commit itself politically and morally to actual participation in the efforts of the international community to achieve general and complete disarmament. If such a moral and political commitment is to have impact in the international arena, it is necessary, we believe, for the instrument to be given the appropriate legal character, so that it no longer remains a mere declaration of

principle. The programme must specify a time-frame for the implementation of all the measures contained in it.

62. A great deal of the documentation before this session concerns studies carried out by expert groups in the context of the United Nations. We should like to refer, in particular, to two important studies: that on the relationship between disarmament and development,³ and that on institutional arrangements relating to the process of disarmament.⁶ This session must spare no effort to translate the results of those studies into a working reality which will help the international community to achieve the basic aim of general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

63. The last four years have proved the need for two kinds of machinery: a deliberative body comprising all States Members of the United Nations, in which those States may put forward their ideas concerning the various problems and issues of disarmament; and a negotiating body, which will prepare draft agreements and treaties for submission to the General Assembly and adoption by the international community. The positive experience of the preparation of a comprehensive programme of disarmament, which involved close co-operation between bodies of those two types, is encouraging. The elements of the programme were prepared by the deliberative body before the Committee on Disarmament initiated negotiations on the preparation of the programme itself.

64. The role played by the Organization in the field of disarmament is wholly commendable. We must provide the Secretariat, and especially the Centre for Disarmament, all the means necessary to carry out the tasks assigned to it. The additional tasks that will undoubtedly be entrusted to the Centre by the Assembly at this session should lead us to consider strengthening the Centre so that it may reflect the importance we all attach to disarmament and be able to do all that is expected of it.

65. Before I conclude, I should like to declare before the Assembly that because of its geographical position, which makes it a link between three continents and a meeting-place of many cultures, Morocco is determined to continue all its efforts aimed at averting the imminent danger posed by the continuing arms race and at creating a world in which all natural and human potential will be devoted to the development and the welfare of mankind.

66. Mr. TINDEMANS (Belgium) (*interpretation from French*): First of all, Sir, I should like to express to you our great satisfaction at seeing you presiding over this most important session. We appreciated the competence and authority you displayed in presiding over the thirty-sixth session of the General Assembly.

67. I shall first address the Assembly on behalf of the 10 States members of the European Community.

68. This honour which has fallen to me seems also to have imposed an obligation upon me: namely, to recall that the European Community is made up of countries most of which have in the recent past confronted each other in armed conflicts which were among the bloodiest in the world's history. The fact

that they have been able to end their past confrontations and establish harmonious co-operation shows what it is possible to achieve when there is a firm determination to achieve peace and conciliation. It is that very determination that we now place at the service of peace in the world and the security of all the peoples that live in it. It is no doubt for this reason that in recent years the voice of the European Community has been heard more and more clearly at the United Nations and wherever else men of goodwill are working to preserve peace and to lay the foundations for genuine disarmament based on security and trust.

69. We know only too well that peace and security are ideals which are difficult to attain and that seeking them requires unceasing and vigilant efforts by all those who, like us, are convinced that there are political choices other than those of confrontation, armed struggle and the arms race.

70. The first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament was held in response to the feeling of urgency on the part of the international community in the face of the dangers of a world arms race. Its purpose was to establish a basis on which to bring about genuine disarmament and propose a programme of action the implementation of which would ensure to all countries of the world equal security with a lower level of armaments while awaiting general and complete disarmament.

71. That session, which was the most representative ever convened on the subject of disarmament, led to a consensus conferring the highest authority on the Final Document resulting from it. The countries of the European Community reaffirm today the full validity of this Final Document and its irreplaceable value.

72. Mr. President, you have just opened the second special session devoted to disarmament. Our States attach the utmost importance to this session, to the success of which they intend to make a full contribution. We see in it two major objectives: to guarantee the future, bearing in mind the lessons of the past and those of the present, and to give a strong impetus to efforts designed to honour the commitments undertaken four years ago.

73. An analysis of the results achieved in the field of disarmament since the tenth special session obliges us to note that the process begun in 1978 has not brought results commensurate with the hopes that it had aroused. On the contrary, the arms race has continued, and there has not even been any slow-down.

74. Nevertheless, it is more important to look into the reasons for this lack of real progress and the remedies for it rather than to be satisfied with deploring the fact. Disarmament is an arduous and complex undertaking which brings into play all the factors affecting international security and the security of each State. It is difficult to maintain that this security is better ensured today than it was in 1978. On the contrary, the growing number of violations of the Charter of the United Nations, invasions, military occupations, acts of interference in the internal affairs of States and violations of human rights has profoundly impaired the international climate. Confidence has been seriously affected thereby.

75. These unfavourable conditions gravely hamper the process of disarmament. It should already be benefiting from all-round assistance in order to overcome the important technical and political problems inherent in it. The problems to be solved in order to conclude significant disarmament agreements which respect the principle of undiminished security are of the utmost complexity. Appropriate verification of compliance with such agreements is indispensable; it should be based, *inter alia*, on measures of international co-operation. The importance and urgency of the tasks require efforts on the part of the international community sufficient for it legitimately to demand that international law be complied with and that an end be put to situations which violate it.

76. Our 10 countries call for every effort to be made so that the special session will contribute to restoring lost confidence and give fresh impetus to the disarmament undertaking. We wish this session of the Assembly to begin a constructive dialogue directed towards the future.

77. The dynamic we seek could be based on the following fields of action: supporting ongoing efforts, seeking new initiatives, strengthening the institutional organs of the United Nations in the field of disarmament and adopting, finally, a comprehensive disarmament programme providing an adequate framework for all these efforts.

78. Nuclear disarmament is one of our highest priorities. We must look into the means to reach this goal, with the participation of the nuclear States and, in particular, of those which have the largest arsenals. But it is for the two major nuclear Powers to take the first step and effectively live up to the expectations of the international community.

79. We are heartened by the fact that agreement was reached on the United States proposal to resume shortly negotiations between the two main nuclear Powers on strategic weapons. We note with satisfaction that these Powers have agreed to have these negotiations cover not only limitations but also significant reductions in strategic weapons. The scope thus given to the negotiations is a sign of the determination to strengthen international stability by a balanced, verifiable and wide-ranging agreement.

80. We are also pleased that the two Powers have declared their common intention to continue to respect the limitations envisaged in the SALT II agreement, signed on 18 June 1979.

81. We support the negotiations currently being carried out in the same context by the United States and the Soviet Union on intermediate-range nuclear weapons. These weapons indeed constitute a source of major concern for all our countries. Hence we expect these negotiations speedily to lead to concrete results. Their success would make a basic contribution to promoting peace and security and would constitute an important step towards general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

82. The ban on nuclear tests is part of this process. The Committee on Disarmament is now called upon to discharge an important task in this respect by defining the problems linked to verification of such a ban. This work should make it possible to achieve progress towards subsequent negotiations.

83. The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in certain regions of the world can be a major contribution in the field of disarmament, to the extent that all the States concerned would be prepared to participate on the basis of freely concluded arrangements. Accordingly, and in conformity with the provisions of the Final Document on the principles and conditions for the establishment of these zones, this question and the prospects it offers should be borne in mind, as well as that of the establishment of zones of peace.

84. Nuclear weapons constitute the most serious threat hanging over mankind. It is legitimate for States that have renounced such weapons to have guarantees against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. It is important that an effective solution be found to this question, taking into account the diversity of security situations throughout the world.

85. Significant results in these various fields would have a positive impact on the international non-proliferation régime, of which the Non-Proliferation Treaty is an important element and whose scope remains valid.

86. We also attach great importance to the activities of IAEA concerning the application of the relevant provisions of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and other international agreements with the same objective. The States members of the Community recognize the importance of new measures designed to increase the effectiveness of the non-proliferation régime and to assure all States of respect for their inalienable right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy. The work under way within the framework of IAEA, in particular in the Committee on Assurances of Supply and the Expert Group on International Plutonium Storage, together with the United Nations Conference for the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, scheduled for 1983, should lead to the attainment of this objective.

87. As regards the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco), even though its provisions have not yet come into force in all the States of the region, we should like to emphasize that in the field of regional non-proliferation it is of exemplary value.

88. Similarly we attach priority importance to the question of conventional weapons, the only ones used in all the conflicts that have caused bloodshed throughout the world in the past 35 years and which alone represent 80 per cent of total arms expenditures by all countries. Only by making progress in the fields of nuclear disarmament and conventional disarmament simultaneously can the international community hope to move towards the objective of general and complete disarmament.

89. The negotiations under way which most directly affect our region are obviously vitally important for us. They should lead to equitable, balanced and verifiable agreements.

90. We can but deplore the deterioration in the international atmosphere which, for reasons known to all, led to the adjournment of the Madrid meeting of representatives of the participating States of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. We still hope that the resumption of negotiations next

autumn will lead to the adoption of a substantive and balanced document, including the mandate for and the convening of a conference on disarmament in Europe. As a first stage that would seek to establish agreement on binding security and confidence measures that would be militarily significant and verifiable and would cover the whole of Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals.

91. The negotiations at Vienna on the mutual and balanced reduction of conventional forces, with the goal of establishing a more stable situation in Europe at progressively lower, balanced levels of military forces in central Europe, have been bogged down for too long. In particular, those among the European Community who are participating in those negotiations hope that they will soon begin again and will finally lead to an agreement on the reduction of existing forces based on agreed data and accompanied by adequate confidence and verification measures.

92. The question of conventional weapons has not been given its due importance on a universal level. This situation should be corrected. The study to be carried out on the subject, under the auspices of the Secretary-General, could in this respect be a useful contribution, particularly concerning those problems for which the international community has not been able to find solutions.

93. Yet we are convinced that in this field too it is possible to achieve results. The conclusion in 1980 of the Convention on prohibiting so-called inhumane weapons—the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects—was a source of encouragement for us all. We should consolidate this success by encouraging the largest possible number of accessions to this international instrument. We also hope that efforts will be continued to complete the provisions of that Convention, particularly by establishing a mechanism to ensure compliance.

94. In general, we should like to see in future the organs dealing with disarmament, in particular the Committee on Disarmament, devoting more attention to conventional weapons, which constitute the largest part of the arsenals of States.

95. We must also reduce the threat represented by other weapons of mass destruction. It is especially urgent to find a solution to the problem of chemical weapons. The members of the European Community consider it advisable to continue the process in the field of biological and chemical weapons begun by the 1925 Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare and followed in 1972 by the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction. It is therefore with satisfaction that we have seen the Committee on Disarmament begin the preparation of a convention for the prohibition of the development, manufacture, stockpiling and transfer of chemical weapons and for their destruction. The creation of an atmosphere of confidence propitious for negotiations is here more necessary than ever. Recent history has confirmed the

importance which the adoption of adequate international verification measures could have in this field. In this context the European Community recalls that the General Assembly deemed it necessary to proceed to an inquiry on allegations of the use of those weapons.

96. The prohibition of radiological weapons has for several years been the subject of negotiations, which have recently been intensified. We hope that the Committee on Disarmament will, without too much delay, reach an agreement that will reconcile as far as possible the range of divergent views expressed on that subject.

97. The prevention of an arms race in outer space also requires our special vigilance. Weapons that could be used in space, among them anti-satellite weapons, should be the subject of effective and verifiable agreements. We hope that after a thorough exchange of views in the Committee on Disarmament negotiations can begin under appropriate conditions.

98. The international community calls on us to produce results in the various fields I have just mentioned. Those results will be determined by the quality of the hoped-for dialogue in respect of the international verification of disarmament agreements. This is the corollary of the principle of undiminished security and is essential to the creation of confidence among our States.

99. We also believe that international verification machinery should be prepared. The establishment of an international satellite control agency would, in this context, be a powerful adjunct.

100. Another confidence-building measure would be the disclosure and comparability of military expenditures. In any case, this is an essential element in any agreement to reduce military expenditures. This disclosure and comparability of military expenditures can be assured by, *inter alia*, wider use and further improvement of the standardized system of publication of the military budgets of States by the United Nations.

101. The twelfth special session should make it possible not only to stimulate current efforts but also to start new initiatives so as to put an end to the harmful effects of the international arms race and to bring about a real process of disarmament.

102. In this respect the countries of the European Community hope that the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament will be strengthened. By improving the effectiveness of the entire system we can preserve the benefits of the affirmation of the central role of the United Nations by the first special session. In accordance with paragraph 120 of the Final Document of 1978, the members of the European Community are prepared to review the membership of the Committee on Disarmament, taking into account its function as the main negotiating body at the multilateral level. We also wish to promote the role of the Disarmament Commission by entrusting to it specific deliberative functions, particularly in following up the studies prepared by the Secretary-General at the request of the Assembly.

103. The increase in the tasks of the United Nations, and in particular the growing role it is called upon

to play in co-ordinating various disarmament activities, raises the question of the possible rearrangement of its structures. This concerns in particular the Centre for Disarmament, whose status in the Organization should be adjusted to put it in a position more corresponding to the importance of the responsibilities it has assumed.

104. The Centre could, *inter alia*, within the framework of an adequate and carefully studied mandate, constitute one of the appropriate means of informing public opinion on disarmament questions, the objectives and what is at stake. The countries of the Community will support any initiatives designed to ensure impartial and objective information, devoid of any spirit of propaganda.

105. The United Nations studies on disarmament constitute a source of information of which the international community should be able to make full use. The countries of the Community have actively participated in several of them, particularly in the field of regional disarmament, confidence-building measures, the relationship between disarmament and development, the links between disarmament and international security, the international satellite monitoring agency, and disarmament institutions. The countries of the Community will also contribute to the study on conventional disarmament which will soon be begun and to which they attach special importance. Likewise they will take other initiatives in the course of this session.

106. We hope that these studies will receive careful consideration and that as far as possible they will lead to tangible results.

107. In this context, UNIDIR should play an important role in independent research, particularly in regard to long-term problems. The European Community notes with satisfaction the establishment of that Institute at Geneva and recalls that it is for the second special session on disarmament to define its final status.

108. The adoption by consensus of the comprehensive disarmament programme should at one and the same time indicate our common will to resume disarmament efforts and constitute an important contribution towards guiding our future activities in this field.

109. We should like this programme to be a realistic and flexible framework for negotiation measures designed to limit and reduce armaments. These measures should take into account the principles and priorities the basis for which was established in the Final Document. Thus they should be balanced and sufficiently verifiable. They could be integrated in stages without, however, prejudging the specific modalities which only the negotiators can define in order to ensure their implementation.

110. We do not conceive of the comprehensive disarmament programme as a substitute for the Final Document. On the contrary, it seems to us to be an instrument designed to ensure implementation more concretely and reiterate the commitment of the international community in that regard. The international community should be able periodically to examine its implementation without, however, setting deadlines which would lead to depriving the nego-

tiations of the flexibility needed for arriving at the results we all hope for.

111. The contribution which the countries of the European Community wish to make to the success of this session reflects our will to give a new impetus to disarmament efforts and our desire to respond to the aspirations of the peoples of the world to live in peace and security.

112. You have just heard the position defined by the 10 countries of the European Community. It goes without saying that my country, Belgium, associates itself with it fully and unreservedly. However, I should like to add, on behalf of my own country, some thoughts inspired by the anxiety that at present increasingly encompasses us.

113. The public in our countries is worried. People are afraid. The possible consequences of a world conflict have reached such a point today that they affect the very survival of mankind. In fact, with the coming into being and development of nuclear weapons, it is not, as in the past, a question of a greater or lesser degree of death and destruction, but of the possible annihilation of the human race.

114. The fear that this situation arouses has mobilized minds, has brought demonstrators out into the streets and has shaken our political parties. This means that there are great expectations held by our populations with regard to this second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, the proceedings of which, Mr. President, you launched yesterday. The fact that it is opening at the very time when several conflicts are ravaging various regions of the world and becoming more alarming than ever and that it is starting in an atmosphere of anxiety only makes this session more important.

115. Yesterday, Mr. President, you solemnly launched the World Disarmament Campaign. This is a first result which is encouraging for the special session. We hope that this Campaign will be addressed impartially and in a non-discriminatory manner to all nations. That is why we attach particular attention to the definition of the modalities of this enterprise.

116. Beyond disarmament, what our peoples desire is peace and security. Need I recall that the guaranteeing of peace and security is the subject of the first preambular paragraph of the Covenant of the League of Nations and that it is the primary objective of the Charter of the United Nations? Security should be one of the essential concerns and the full responsibility of each Government. Belgium is particularly aware of that.

117. Some believe that this can be guaranteed by weapons, and by weapons alone. Others hope that it will be achieved by general and complete disarmament, which obviously Belgium wholeheartedly desires; but the problem is not confined to the military level or to a question of arms. It is, above all, in the minds of men that war is prepared, just as it can be the result of political tensions and economic imbalances. Thus we have seen the most heavily armed nations of the world living in peace for 35 years, whereas often devastating wars have ravaged poor and badly armed countries.

118. The arms race in itself could be a cause of international tension, but more frequently it is the result. We must cure the disease, not only its symptoms. Our tireless efforts must be concentrated on the arduous task of lessening tension throughout the world, wherever peace is threatened or breached.

119. Let us begin by defining the concept of true and lasting détente, so that it will be the same everywhere in the world and so that it can be pursued wherever human beings live, because if détente is confined to a single region or a single continent, it is but a façade, and peace remains very fragile. Détente should bring men closer together and thereby Governments. On the basis of increased confidence, disarmament measures will automatically follow.

120. It is from this point of view that we must consider the many efforts we are making for disarmament or for arms control. Every successful negotiation in this field, every limitation accepted by both sides, every mutually agreed reduction strengthens the confidence of the parties and paves the way for new rapprochements, new concessions and a further lessening of tensions. However, as long as tensions persist, adequate defence will remain necessary to ensure our security.

121. The experience of my country, which, to its misfortune, was drawn into two world wars when it thought that it had found security in neutrality, has taught us that security does not come with unilateral disarmament or the secret hope that a reduction in the defence effort, accompanied by a lack of provocation, might discourage the ambition of an adventurous Power. Belgium has therefore sought its safety within a defensive alliance. That choice has proved correct, because we have had peace since 1949.

122. More than ever, in this time of universal crisis, the limitation of military budgets to what is strictly needed for essential security is a duty, a duty for the peace of the world and for our own populations and those of the developing countries, whom the excesses of the arms race deprive of potentially important aid. Belgium generally associates itself therefore with the recommendations of the important United Nations study on the relationship between disarmament and development,³ which emphasizes in particular that social injustice and the economic gap between poor countries and rich countries are an important part of the concept of security in its broad sense.

123. As I said earlier, security for Belgium is a result of two inseparable and complementary elements: appropriate defence and a genuine policy of reducing tensions. These two inseparable factors form the cornerstone of the policy stated by one of my predecessors, Mr. Pierre Harmel. Some years later those principles made it possible to prepare a process of détente which took form in the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, signed at Helsinki on 1 August 1975. Even though we have been cruelly disappointed in that area, I consider that the key ideas of the Harmel policy remain completely valid and that détente remains topical in spite of everything. Disarmament in all its aspects is one of the essential parts of the reduction of tension in so far as it contributes to mutual confidence and lessening the risks of conflict.

124. All of this requires a context in which the balance of forces, the assurance that commitments will be honoured, even an authority that can impose compliance, will ensure that confidence and effectively limit the risks of conflict. Only the United Nations can fulfil that crushing role, but it must be given means more adequate than it has today to be able to take on that role.

125. I should here like to quote the English philosopher Hobbes, who said two centuries ago: "Covenants without the swords, are but words and of no strength to secure a man at all."

126. I have just stated some of the principles on which we believe our security to be based, as well as the objectives that disarmament might achieve in this framework. Belgium has always wished to make an effective contribution to the attainment of those objectives.

127. We have in particular worked to encourage the regional approach in disarmament. I note with satisfaction that the United Nations has shown a growing interest in this question in the past few years. I hope that this special session will confirm the importance and effectiveness of the regional approach and that it will see to it that specific measures are taken in this field.

128. Belgium will submit a memorandum on the subject as well as a draft resolution which would, if it were carried by consensus in the Assembly, make it possible to organize the participation of the United Nations in the implementation of regional disarmament measures.

129. The verification of agreements on arms control and disarmament constitutes, as I have just emphasized, another field to which we attach the highest importance. We believe that we could do useful work in respect of the control and prohibition of the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons in combat. That would meet a need that has been more and more widely expressed in recent history.

130. On this subject, too, we intend to submit a memorandum at this special session. Belgium's aim is to stimulate a thorough exchange of views on the question and, if the case arises, to enable the international community to equip itself with a new instrument that would strengthen both the Geneva Protocol of 1925 and the 1972 Convention on prohibiting bacteriological weapons. That initiative should also support the efforts under way for the negotiation of a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons.

131. The world is today embarked on a spiral that defies reason. Insecurity brings about rearmament and over-armament, which themselves create insecurity, which in turn starts the arms race again, and so on *ad infinitum*, until our economies can no longer bear that senseless burden or until the holocaust destroys us. Let us see where the evil resides. Is it not in the fact—deplorable, no doubt, but nevertheless real—that arms remain because of the fear that they inspire or the power that they confer, the *ultima ratio regum*?

132. In the United Nations, the source and guarantee of international order, we must also in our reflections concentrate on the decline of the ideas of

conciliation and arbitration, on the causes of this decline, but above all on the means to make these ideas vigorous and prestigious. In so doing, we should not only be paying a tribute to the wisdom of our predecessors but usefully serving the cause of peace and disarmament.

*Address by His Excellency Mr. Thorbjörn Fälldin,
Prime Minister of Sweden*

133. The PRESIDENT: The Assembly will now hear a statement by the Prime Minister of Sweden. I have great pleasure in welcoming Mr. Thorbjörn Fälldin and inviting him to address the General Assembly.

134. Mr. FÄLLDIN (Sweden):* Let me first, Mr. President, extend my good wishes to you personally. I am convinced that under your experienced and skilful guidance the second special session on disarmament will be able to bring its work to a successful conclusion. I should also like to congratulate the Secretary-General on his election to his high office and to assure him of the full support of my Government in his difficult and responsible tasks.

135. This second special session of the General Assembly on disarmament is taking place at a time when more overt acts of war are occurring in various parts of the world than has been the case for a long time, while the call for disarmament is growing in strength. Behind this call stands a strong and world-wide peace movement.

136. This opinion is a genuine expression of the anxiety people feel about war of a magnitude never experienced before. But it is also inspired by a firm stand against human and material resources being used so widely for the production of means of destruction and not for the sustenance and welfare of mankind. Fundamentally the demand is that war should not be an acceptable method of solving conflicts.

137. Already existing stockpiles of nuclear weapons bear within them the possibility of destroying the whole of mankind several times over. Continued rearmament, whether it is aimed at producing a larger number of weapons or at improving their capability, is an enormous waste of skill, manpower, natural resources and industrial capacity.

138. There are few today who believe that new nuclear weapons lead to added security. On the contrary, these weapons are increasingly regarded as an imminent threat. The claim that the nuclear-arms buildup helps to maintain deterrence and a balance of power is devoid of any credibility.

139. Many scientific studies confirm the fears that the effects of a nuclear war cannot be limited. Those directly involved in the hostilities would suffer enormous material and human losses. A nuclear war would also claim victims in a wide surrounding area. It would affect us all in some way or other, wherever it might break out. The radioactive fall-out would spread death and destruction far from the actual theatre of war long after the last charge had exploded.

140. The combined effect of explosions and fall-out would entail unimaginable destruction and suffering beyond all human comprehension.

141. A nuclear war would also cause an economic collapse. In the aftermath of war there would be hunger, lack of the necessities of life and shortage of usable water. This in its turn might even cause more victims than the actual hostilities. The natural environment and human society would suffer irreparable damage. Indeed, the very prerequisites for human life would be extinguished over large areas of our earth.

142. The only possibility of diminishing the risk of having this terrifying vision transformed into reality is the initiation of a disarmament process. This requires a determined will to set a new course.

143. Unfortunately, however, the climate for disarmament has deteriorated in recent years. The direct hotbeds of war have increased in number. Old conflicts between individual nations and peoples have been accentuated in many cases. Suspicion about the intentions of other States has increased. In many countries, régimes are subjecting the populations to force and oppression without respect for human rights and freedoms. In many cases the territory of independent States is entirely or partly occupied by foreign troops.

144. The process of détente between East and West has been superseded by sharper antagonism. Military expenditures, both within and outside the military blocs, are spiralling. At the same time the gap between the rich and the poor nations is widening. The relationship between disarmament and development has been established by the United Nations' own group of governmental experts, whose report will be discussed at this session. The world finds itself at a crossroads. Either we continue the arms race, or we choose to move towards a more sustainable economic and political world order.

145. Rising unemployment, high inflation, non-existent or low economic growth are today setting their stamp on the advanced industrialized countries as well as on countries in the third world. A factor contributing to this situation is the ever-heavier burden that armaments impose on the peoples of those countries. This is true of both West and East, North and South.

146. In such circumstances the aim should be not to seek to acquire the strongest possible war-machine, but to put to good use all human knowledge and material resources for the improvement of people's material and social living conditions. It is an expression of misdirected priorities when the super-Powers and other economically advanced countries vie with each other in the acquisition of the most advanced weapons of destruction while at the same time they are not capable of providing their own citizens with work and a tolerable economic and social existence.

147. The two super-Powers have the incomparably largest arsenals. This is true of both nuclear arms and conventional weapons. With their great military power, they hold the fate of this earth and of mankind in their hands. Therefore they bear the primary responsibility for ensuring that a change of course takes place.

* Mr. Fälldin spoke in Swedish. The English version of his statement was supplied by the delegation.

148. Therefore we have every cause to repeat emphatically the call to the super-Powers to take the lead in the disarmament process.

149. The United States and the Soviet Union are acting today on the basis of opposing ideological and economic interests. Suspicion about each other's intentions has time and again paralysed the disarmament process. But there are questions that can never be settled by confrontation, however strong the antagonism may be. This is true above all of the control of the development of nuclear weapons. That question can be solved only by co-operation. The political systems and national interests that the nuclear weapons are intended to defend will be without meaning for those who survive. The control over nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction can never be considered to be the sole concern of the super-Powers.

150. Developments in the field of disarmament have not followed the guidelines that were adopted unanimously by the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament in 1978. Very little regard has been paid to the goals, priorities and principles on which the participating nations were then agreed. No disarmament has been attained. Instead an additional impetus has been given to armament, and military expenditure has increased sharply.

151. Many industrialized countries have at the same time experienced their strongest economic setback in the post-war period.

152. At this session it will be an important task to try to ensure that the decisions taken at the first special session are really implemented and that fresh negotiating initiatives can be taken. We must be forward-looking. Decisions and recommendations must have action as their aim, their objective being to see how agreed measures, principles and priorities can be implemented in practice.

153. One of the most important tasks of this session is to elaborate and adopt a comprehensive programme of disarmament which is intended to be the basis of the disarmament endeavours up to the end of this century. I appeal to all States to participate in a constructive way in the negotiations concerning this programme so as to make it realistic and meaningful, thereby furthering its important purpose. In this way we can meet the deeply felt longing for peace and disarmament among all peoples.

154. Nuclear weapons are a threat to mankind that overshadows all others. Accordingly, the question of nuclear disarmament must be given supreme priority.

155. Although SALT II admittedly did not bring about true disarmament in the nuclear field, the talks were none the less a significant stage in the efforts to obtain control over the development of strategic arms. The failure to ratify it constitutes a serious reversal for those efforts.

156. The decision by the super-Powers to enter shortly into new disarmament negotiations on strategic weapons must be regarded as a step forward. They have now stated that they are willing to follow the SALT II provisions. This constitutes a good basis for those talks.

157. It is also imperative that the current negotiations on nuclear weapons in Europe should produce results, primarily in regard to medium-range missiles and other weapons systems with a similar range. It is also high time for discussions to be started on all other nuclear weapons intended for Europe—the many so-called battlefield weapons, including the neutron bomb. The Swedish Government is of the opinion that such discussions should take place as soon as possible, within the framework of the Geneva negotiations or in some other suitable context.

158. For obvious reasons, Sweden regards developments in Europe as being of crucial importance. The enormous buildup of nuclear weapons in that part of the world fills us with deep concern. The fact that there are nuclear-armed naval units in large numbers in our immediate vicinity, that is, in the Baltic, illustrates how exposed even a peaceful neutral country can be in the era of the arms race. Sweden is working for the convening of a special European disarmament conference within the framework of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe and has offered to host such a conference.

159. The goal is a Europe free from nuclear weapons. The Swedish Parliament has unanimously stated that the Swedish Government should keep in close contact with the other Nordic Governments on the issue of a Nordic nuclear-weapon-free zone and explore whether there is common ground between the Nordic countries for this purpose. This is an element of the work for a nuclear-weapon-free Europe.

160. Comprehensive nuclear disarmament is the long-term goal. This goal cannot be attained from one year to the next. Therefore, parallel with the disarmament efforts, steps must be taken to reduce the risk of the outbreak of a nuclear war, but such steps must not be regarded as a substitute for disarmament measures proper: they are supplementary arrangements.

161. The attitudes of the super-Powers are based on the theory of the need for a military balance to maintain mutual deterrence. According to this way of thinking, the balance is nullified if one of the parties acquires more weapons of a certain type or improves existing systems. From this view it follows that every measure adopted must be met with counter-measures. There is then a danger that the arms race will continue *ad infinitum* in a vicious spiral. Nothing in the way of an equilibrium that is accepted by both parties can ever be achieved in this manner.

162. The super-Powers must realize this and reach agreement on freezing nuclear-weapon arsenals and the number of delivery vehicles. Such a freeze could constitute the starting point for negotiations on balanced and verifiable reductions of various kinds of nuclear weapons, as well as on limitations on the development and production of new types of nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles.

163. Undertakings on the non-first-use of nuclear weapons have been discussed in this context as a conceivable way of affecting the disarmament efforts positively. Neither of the two Power blocs has forsworn the possibility of the first use of nuclear weapons. In order to make such an arrangement in

Europe possible, agreements on the conventional side must obviously also be reached.

164. It is high time that the nuclear-weapon States endeavoured—parallel with the central disarmament negotiations—to take steps of the kind I have indicated in order to prevent a nuclear disaster. The agreements reached so far with a view to diminishing the risk of a nuclear war being unleashed by mistake, misjudgement or error in communications are a fragile and incomplete safeguard. It is of vital interest that the nuclear threshold be kept high.

165. As weapons systems become ever more complex, the hazards of technical or human error also increase. Additional steps must be taken to counter these hazards. It is important that the nuclear-weapon States inform this session what preventive measures they are prepared to take in this respect.

166. Even though efforts have for a long time been made to achieve a comprehensive ban on all nuclear-weapon tests, such tests are taking place to an undiminished extent. Some 50 are observed annually. The super-Powers are responsible for the majority of them. For a long time there has been practically a deadlock on the test-ban question. It is therefore encouraging that the nuclear-weapon Powers have at last been prevailed upon to enter into concrete negotiations on a test-ban treaty in the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva. A generally accepted ban on all nuclear explosions would help decisively to check the development of nuclear weapons and prevent their further proliferation.

167. It is a serious shortcoming of the Non-Proliferation Treaty that many important non-nuclear-weapon Powers are missing from the parties to the Treaty and that two of the nuclear-weapon States have not acceded to it.

168. We must not ignore, either, the connexion between the peaceful uses of nuclear power and the potentiality to develop nuclear weapons. Technical developments are diminishing the technical and economic threshold which a State must pass before it can make its own nuclear weapons. In a joint statement to this meeting [*A/S-12/21, annex*] the Nordic countries have underlined the importance of strengthening even further the barriers to the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

169. The possibility for IAEA to apply safeguards must be strengthened. All States must participate in these endeavours. Full-scope safeguards on all peaceful nuclear-energy activities should be one of the preconditions accepted by all nations for international co-operation in the nuclear field. Special attention is needed in regard to enrichment and reprocessing and the use of plutonium, where new techniques, such as laser-processing, are presenting disquieting perspectives.

170. One special hazard is the risk of a conventional attack in war on a nuclear-power station, resulting in the spread of radioactive material over the surroundings. This would entail a massive discharge of radioactive radiation. It is therefore imperative that any attack on such installations be prohibited.

171. We are experiencing an increasingly uncontrolled exploitation of science and technology for military purposes. This trend must be halted. One way to achieve this would be to prohibit the introduction of new weapons and warfare into new environments, as has been done at least partially in regard to the Antarctic, the sea-bed and outer space. The treaties we have in those fields must, however, become more comprehensive and the loopholes must be removed.

172. The arms race in outer space provides a striking example of how the military exploitation of science and technology leads to the militarization of new areas. Most of the satellites that have been deployed in outer space are intended for military use. They often constitute integrated parts of the war machines of the great Powers in the air, on land and at sea.

173. As States become dependent upon such space installations, the risk of war, even in outer space, arises. If that trend cannot be halted, it will lead to a new phase of costly and destabilizing armaments. The time factor is of crucial importance. It is, therefore essential that we should enter without delay into international negotiations on this important question.

174. It is also important that the United States and the Soviet Union uphold the 1972 Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems.

175. As a result of the first special session on disarmament, several institutional reforms were introduced in the field of disarmament. The most important change was the creation of the new Committee on Disarmament. It has all the prerequisites for functioning as an effective multilateral negotiating body. Progress has been achieved with regard to certain questions, among others, the negotiations on chemical weapons.

176. It will be important for us to try to strengthen even further the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament. Claims on the United Nations will increase substantially in regard to negotiations, the implementation and verification of agreements concluded and in the field of information activities.

177. Several of the questions I have just referred to have been touched upon by the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues, the so-called Palme Commission. Representatives from different political systems—although in a personal capacity—have been able to agree in that Commission upon a number of valuable recommendations in the field of disarmament. They are worth study and discussion at this special session. They relate, among other things, to nuclear weapons, chemical weapons and the European arms situation. I ascribe particular interest to those proposals which aim at increasing the possibilities for the Secretary-General and the Security Council to intervene in order to prevent an outbreak of hostilities. This is true not least in regard to the third world, where most wars and conflicts have occurred in the period since the Second World War.

178. I have dwelt mainly on developments in the nuclear field. That does not mean that the arms race with conventional weapons is to be underrated. Its claims on human and economic resources are enormous. It is obvious that modern conventional

weapons too cause tremendous devastation to man and his environment. It is now exactly 10 years since the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment was opened in Stockholm. Now as then, there is reason to bring to mind how war and armaments consume national resources and destroy the environment.

179. Along with foreign policy, military defence has always been regarded as the prime means of security policy, and we must expect this to continue in the future. Nevertheless, it is becoming increasingly apparent that the buildup of military forces and the steadily growing destructive capacity cannot offer any acceptable solutions to the security problems of our age. Questions of international peace and security must be seen in a perspective encompassing economic, social and cultural aspects.

180. The arms race and increased militarization mean that the principles of international law and of the Charter of the United Nations are becoming more difficult to uphold in international politics. This is a disquieting development for all States, particularly for the small ones.

181. International peace and security can be obtained only through détente and greater co-operation among States. Lasting peaceful development also presupposes a reduction in the gap between the rich and the poor countries, and a fairer distribution of the world's resources.

182. Opinion against war and armaments and in favour of peace and disarmament is gaining ground. We politicians have reason to listen to that opinion and to try to transform this longing for peace into practical action. The World Disarmament Campaign deserves our support.

183. As individual human beings we have the right to live in a just and peaceful world. But we also have a responsibility and an obligation to work together to create such a world.

184. The PRESIDENT: On behalf of the General Assembly, I wish to thank the Prime Minister of Sweden for the important statement he has just made.

The meeting rose at 1.05 p.m.

NOTES

¹ A/CN.10/38, p. 41. See also A/CN.10/51.

² A/36/613, annex.

³ *The Relationship between Disarmament and Development* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.82.IX.1).

⁴ A/CONF.95/15 and Corr.2, annex I. For the printed text of the Convention and its Protocols, see *United Nations, Disarmament Yearbook*, vol. 5: 1980 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.81.IX.4), appendix VII.

⁵ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 42 (A/34/42)*, para. 19.

⁶ A/36/392.