



President: Mr. Lazar MOJSOV (Yugoslavia).

AGENDA ITEM 8

General debate (continued)

1. Mr. FRYDENLUND (Norway): Mr. President, let me congratulate you on your election to your important post and express our satisfaction that you have been elected. Your election must also be regarded as a fitting tribute to the nation to which we are all indebted for its major role in the initiative that has resulted in this important special session.

2. The special session on disarmament addresses itself to a problem of urgent concern to all of us. The continuing increase in the level of armaments is a source of great anxiety. Weapons of mass destruction pose a threat to the very existence of mankind. The spending of resources for these purposes restricts our ability to cope with other problems of an economic and social nature, decisive for our future. This diversion of resources is hampering our efforts to bridge the gap between rich and poor countries and the realization of a new international economic order. Therefore, control of armaments and progress in disarmament have become a categorical imperative.

3. But there is a political dimension to this imperative. All nations have a right to national security, and they attach—as experience tells us—the highest priority to asserting that right. Governments appear to have two main choices in their attempts to safeguard their national security interest—either always to have a sufficient military capability and further to increase that military potential whenever required or to achieve, through international agreements on arms control and disarmament, the same or an even higher degree of security at a lower level of armaments.

4. The latter, obviously, is the rational course, the logical, sound and human alternative. But history has taught us that this alternative is feasible only when the necessary confidence exists among nations. The main and underlying task will therefore be to create a political climate in which the need for competitive armaments no longer exists. Greater mutual confidence in the relationship between nations must therefore be created in order to achieve increased security at lower levels of armaments. Therefore arms control and disarmament should constitute an important and integral part of our security policies.

5. Confidence-building measures can influence the way

nations perceive their requirements for protection. That is why my Government attaches such great importance to the confidence-building measures of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, signed on 1 August 1975. Applied in other parts of the world and adapted to regional conditions, similar measures could contribute to a climate of greater international confidence and stability.

6. Europe is still the area with the largest concentration of military forces. We must pursue negotiations for mutual and balanced reductions of armed forces. High level political initiatives are urgently needed to break the present impasse at Vienna. In this connexion I should like to refer to the communiqué from the recent NATO summit meeting in Washington calling for negotiations at the foreign-minister level. As a special participant located outside the area of prospective reductions, Norway attaches particular importance to associated measures of stabilization, verification and non-circumvention. Such measures will provide means to insure the coherence and cohesion of security arrangements in a way that will protect the interests of the small States as well as the great Powers.

7. The special session of the General Assembly provides a unique opportunity for a comprehensive review of measures designed to halt and reverse the arms race. The process that we have gone through in the Preparatory Committee for the Special Session and the activity that has been initiated at the session have established important working habits. In the end we will obtain a set of principles and a programme of action that will guide our future efforts in this field. The activity initiated has a value in itself, and it is important that the dynamic process be given further emphasis. The question of follow-up procedures should therefore be carefully examined. It is likely that the convening of another special session of the General Assembly could be the best way to proceed since that would secure continuous United Nations involvement and provide an opportunity for all member countries to play a role.

8. With regard to the programme of action, priority should be given to efforts to curb and eliminate means of mass destruction. Nuclear weapons constitute a formidable challenge. At the Washington summit meeting of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Norwegian Prime Minister stated that the nuclear-weapon States have a particular responsibility to exercise restraint and to seize upon all opportunities to prevent the further development and deployment of nuclear weapons. In this context the action of the President of the United States in postponing the decision about the production of the neutron weapon is of great importance. It is now up to others to decide if that

decision could inaugurate a new trend based on mutual restraint. The exercise of mutual restraint should result in mutual confidence. We also hope that a new urgency has been introduced with regard to efforts aimed at reducing the arsenals of nuclear weapons.

9. It is regrettable that the process of reaching another agreement on the limitation of strategic arms is taking so long. It is to be hoped that we shall soon be able to welcome that agreement. We urge the parties following its conclusion to initiate further negotiations on nuclear disarmament. It is important that the process initiated not lose its momentum.

10. My country attaches particular importance to halting the further development and spread of nuclear weapons. Therefore we have consistently supported the quest for a complete nuclear test-ban agreement. I urge the parties involved to clear the final hurdles.

11. Norway is prepared to make its contribution to the establishment of a verification system that can monitor compliance with a comprehensive test-ban agreement through NORSAR, the Norwegian Seismic Array. Norwegian scientists have participated in the group of seismic experts established by the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to consider the organization of a global system for the monitoring of seismic events. NORSAR is capable of serving as a data centre for a global system and can assist in the scientific evaluation of data registered by such a network.

12. Efforts must be initiated to strengthen the non-proliferation régime, based primarily on the existing treaty. It is essential that all States ratify the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [*resolution 2373 (XXII), annex*], or at least abide by its provisions. This applies particularly to countries having, or which are on the threshold of acquiring, nuclear-weapon capabilities. In spite of the criticism raised, we still regard the Treaty as the major international instrument in force today that can effectively assist us in our efforts to prevent further proliferation of nuclear weapons. The resilience of the non-proliferation régime depends also rather critically upon the ability of the nuclear-weapon States to fulfil their obligations under the Treaty.

13. Nations have to co-operate on the problem of reducing the danger of nuclear proliferation associated with the growth of the nuclear-power industry. Norway supports the work presently under way in the International Fuel Cycle Evaluation. Pending the outcome of that evaluation all States should restrain further developments towards the plutonium economy. Whenever there is conflict, non-proliferation considerations must take precedence over commercial interests.

14. The impact of new weapons on arms control and disarmament negotiations should therefore be carefully and continuously assessed. In addition, stringent political control of military research and development is of paramount importance. Budget requests for new weapons should be accompanied by an evaluation of their arms-control im-

pact. Such evaluations would provide increased information for politicians and the public and allow arms restraint and disarmament objectives to have a stronger impact on the decision-making process.

15. My Government is deeply concerned about the large increases in conventional arms transfers. We shall support constructive efforts to limit and reduce the international flow of arms and to introduce enlightened codes of conduct. Efforts must be made to arrive at international agreements on the limitation of the production, transfer and acquisition of conventional arms. Such agreements should include restrictions on all parties concerned. We would, further, find it valuable if a register recording all arms transfers under United Nations auspices could be established. We realize, however, that substantial reductions can hardly take place unless the major military States reach mutual understanding to this effect. Norway therefore welcomes the initiation of talks between the United States and the Soviet Union on this matter and hopes that they will lead to positive results.

16. Since armaments consume economic resources on a very large scale, we must be concerned about their impact on the urgent problem of development. This basic observation about a complex relationship is the reason behind the Nordic proposals for a policy-oriented and forward-looking United Nations study of the relationship between disarmament and development, particularly from the point of view of the establishment of a new international economic order.

17. We are encouraged that this project has gained general support. The Norwegian Government is hopeful that this session will adopt the recommendation of the *ad hoc* group on the framework and the terms of reference for the study [*see A/S-10/9*]. The project should lead to a report which can form the basis for concrete decisions regarding reallocation of resources, particularly so as to benefit the developing countries. As one of the countries which initiated the proposal for this study, Norway has contributed to studies preparing the ground for follow-up work. We commit ourselves to continue our active support for this important undertaking.

18. Finally, let me say a few words about the international machinery for disarmament. It is our opinion that the role of the United Nations should be strengthened, and that more countries should be given the opportunity to play an active and continuous role in the disarmament deliberations.

19. At the same time we see the need for retaining at Geneva a single multilateral negotiating forum of limited size and taking its decisions on the basis of consensus. Measures of an organizational and structural character should be taken to facilitate the participation of all permanent members of the Security Council. At the same time a limited expansion of the membership beyond that of the present should be considered. Arrangements should also be made to allow non-member States to participate in the proceedings as well as in the working bodies when they have submitted concrete proposals or when their particular con-

cerns are the subject of discussion. Strengthening of the ties with the United Nations also appears desirable, and concrete measures to this effect should be thoroughly examined.

20. I want to emphasize, however, that sweeping changes that could reduce the efficiency of the existing disarmament forums and degrade their usefulness must be avoided.

21. I also feel that the United Nations Centre for Disarmament should be strengthened in order to enable it to undertake comprehensive research and information activities. In this connexion we should like to support the idea presented by the Secretary-General in his opening statement that an advisory board be established to assist Member Governments and the Secretariat in this matter.

22. I should like to stress the importance of research and information aimed at mobilizing world public opinion for disarmament. Non-governmental organizations and research institutes have an important role to play, and we appreciate their presence at this session.

23. Human talent has produced weapons of a destructive power impossible even to imagine. The same talent should now be brought to bear on the task of reasserting human control. The problem of disarmament calls for rational thinking. The present trend is dangerous. It is up to us to stake out the new course. We should, at this special session of the United Nations, pledge ourselves to such a beginning.

24. The PRESIDENT: The next speaker in the general debate is the President of the Council of Ministers of the Italian Republic. I have great pleasure in welcoming His Excellency Mr. Giulio Andreotti, and in inviting him to address the General Assembly.

25. Mr. ANDREOTTI (Italy) (*interpretation from French*): Mr. President, today the Italian delegation feels gratified for two reasons: first, because we are addressing this august Assembly under the presidency of the eminent representative of a great country linked with Italy by close relations of friendship and co-operation, which have been given recent expression in the Treaty of Osimo,¹ an international instrument generally regarded as having translated into specific programmes the spirit of innovation which should provide a basis for relations between neighbouring peoples; and secondly, because we have the opportunity of working under your most competent guidance. The best recognition of your merits, Mr. President, lies in the very fact of your having been called upon to preside over four sessions of the General Assembly, a record which it will be difficult to beat in the future.

26. I should like also to pay a tribute to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, whose attachment to the cause of our Organization is based on such staunch and profound moral convictions that he has won the trust and

admiration of us all. We in Italy have vivid memories of his official visit to Rome in July 1977, and I myself remember it with special pleasure, as it gave me the opportunity of holding with him constructive and fruitful talks and an exchange of views of the greatest interest on the major problems facing the United Nations.

27. The convening, for the first time, of a special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament is an event whose significance has not escaped the attention of any country, as proven by the participation of many leaders from every region of the world. In a word, this special session reflects a growing awareness of the fact that mankind is now at the crossroads: one path may lead to a nuclear catastrophe, the other to a world of peace and well-being. Of all transitional periods throughout history, ours is the most crucial. For the first time, the technical and scientific revolution has placed in the hands of men the means either of destroying the life of their own kind, or of causing it everywhere to flourish. The symptoms of these two possible developments are all present. On the one hand, seeds of disintegration appear in our national communities and in the international community; on the other hand, a rapid, and sometimes overwhelming, economic and social upsurge, although confined to certain countries or regions, reveals the enormous potential that today can be used by human intelligence. The duty of our Governments is therefore, on the one hand, to channel this development towards objectives of regional and international equilibrium and, on the other, to protect our national entities from threats of disintegration by helping to prevent the spread of disorder across our frontiers. Peace does not mean only the absence of war. We must remind ourselves that the confusion of values and the intensification of political crime nullify the benefits of peace. In order to ensure peace, we feel it essential to undertake far-reaching measures in order to establish a more just and more lasting world-wide equilibrium. It is to achieve this goal that we have gathered together here: to promote disarmament actually means cutting the main Gordian knot of our times and, together with it, the other knots that surround it.

28. When we look back to assess the progress achieved to date in this field, we must admit objectively that it has been inadequate. It would be unfair, however, to assert that nothing has been done and that the results achieved in all these years, whether at Geneva or here at Headquarters, have been negligible. Indeed, the various significant multilateral measures concluded, not to mention the bilateral agreements reached between the two major Powers, are proof of the contrary.

29. And yet, the destructive power of the weapons which exist in the arsenals of the world, already in themselves sufficient to annihilate most of the life on our planet, continues to increase and military technologies are becoming more and more sophisticated. New and intensive efforts by the international community are therefore necessary to accelerate progress along the path of disarmament.

30. This special session offers us a valuable opportunity to discuss realistically, but also with perspicacity, this subject of universal interest. From the very beginning of our work, we have noted to what extent the level and the tone

¹ Treaty between the Italian Republic and the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, signed at Osimo on 10 November 1975.

of our discussions confirm the general determination to halt and then reverse the armaments spiral, thus giving also a fresh impetus to the dialogue between the great Powers and creating an atmosphere of greater co-operation at the world level.

31. In this respect, I should like to thank the Minister of State of Denmark for the effective way in which she summed up the views of the nine members of the European Community on a number of problems of particular interest which will be considered by this Assembly in a few days [7th meeting]. For its part, Italy is firmly convinced that it will continue to co-operate with all other countries in the quest for solutions, which we want to be just and in conformity with the interests of peace and general security.

32. For Italy, the maintenance of peace is, perhaps more than for the other countries, a deeply-felt need. Indeed, whole generations of Italians have not known peace in the best years of their lives, not only because of Italy's participation in two world wars, but also because of a series of conflicts in which Italy was almost permanently involved for some 35 years right up to the war of liberation from nazi-fascist oppression.

33. As a matter of fact, the search for peace and human understanding based on international co-operation and solidarity has for centuries been a characteristic of our culture. Italy therefore has striven constantly throughout the last 30 years to transcend purely nationalist attitudes, with the conviction of thus making an effective contribution to the cause of peace and to the elimination of many of the factors likely to endanger it. In this respect, I should like to stress that the existence of the European Community represents today a valuable and basic contribution to the maintenance of peace on the old continent, as was the intention of its founders.

34. As regards the global aspects of disarmament, Italy has always considered that the maintenance of an adequate level of armaments, and the uncertain balance of forces which derives from them and on which peace is now based, are harsh necessities imposed by our contemporary situation, which, notwithstanding the general efforts to overcome it, has not yet evolved in a more desirable direction. The Italian Government, for its part, has constantly striven, in every forum and on every appropriate occasion, both bilaterally and multilaterally, to improve the basic components of the international situation and to re-establish an atmosphere of co-operation and trust, which are essential conditions for reversing the arms race. By signing the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Italy has renounced the manufacture and acquisition of atomic weapons, thus making a tangible contribution to the achievement of the objective of non-proliferation, both vertical and horizontal, which constitutes one of the imperatives of our time. Furthermore, Italy is playing an active role in the negotiations currently taking place in Vienna for the balanced reduction of forces designed to strengthen stability and security in central Europe through substantial reductions in forces and weapons in that area.

35. Moreover, both at Geneva and here in New York, and more recently in the Preparatory Committee for this special session, the representatives of Italy have contributed ceaselessly and constructively to the efforts made to stimulate the process of disarmament.

36. The Italian Government intends to persevere with and to intensify this policy, without allowing itself to be discouraged by obstacles whose magnitude we can appreciate as a result of our long experience in disarmament negotiations. Our consistent thoughts and actions will continue to be inspired, as they have been during these almost 20 years of discussion, by the Constitution of the Italian Republic which, in article 11, solemnly condemns war as an instrument of aggression and as a means of settling international disputes.

37. Allow me to quote some facts confirming this. In the spring of 1960, we co-sponsored in the Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament a plan for general and complete disarmament in a free and peaceful world.² In 1961, we worked out a series of principles as our Italian contribution to the elaboration of the non-proliferation treaty. These principles established a link between the renunciation of nuclear weapons and the adoption of concrete disarmament measures by the major nuclear Powers. They also established a specific link between the commitment to the renunciation of nuclear weapons and the granting of precise guarantees, so as to achieve an equitable, effective and balanced treaty, like the one which was later adopted by the General Assembly, again with the active contribution of Italy. In 1965, we proposed to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament a unilateral nuclear moratorium,³ designed to allay, at least in part, the anxieties caused by nuclear proliferation and to encourage the nuclear Powers to conclude an agreement which would hasten the process of nuclear disarmament. Later on, we proposed that fissionable materials, to be drawn from the stockpile of the nuclear States, should be set aside for the peaceful uses of non-nuclear States. This initiative was taken in accordance with the philosophy underlying the non-proliferation treaty, which is designed to maintain a constant balance between the free renunciation of nuclear weapons by States and the assurances of broader international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy guaranteeing the non-nuclear States adequate supplies of energy essential for their development.

38. In 1969, we sponsored the draft resolution which proposed the Disarmament Decade [resolution 2602 E (XXIV)], in the framework of which the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament was invited to work out a comprehensive programme aimed at general and complete disarmament and to consider the possibility of setting aside for development purposes a substantial share of the resources thus released. The next year, in 1970, Italy submitted to the Conference a working paper containing the outline of a comprehensive programme of disarmament,⁴ for which the General Assembly expressed its appreciation.

² Document TNCD/3.

³ See *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for January to December 1965*, document DC/227, annex 1, sect. D.

⁴ *Ibid.*, Supplement for 1970, document DC/233, annex C, sect. 38.

39. In view of the widespread hope of achieving further progress towards disarmament, the need for strengthening the United Nations has been rightly stressed. We favour such a strengthening, and not only from the viewpoint of the review of the negotiating machinery. Indeed, we believe it to be essential that States should first of all apply the principles of the Charter, to which they have freely subscribed.

40. A practical example of the application of these principles—if it proves possible to reach a general consensus to this end—might consist in setting aside even a modest percentage of the sums devoted to armaments for the international financing of the struggle against some of the most serious scourges of modern life, such as pollution of the human environment, deforestation, desertification, overcrowding of urban centres and certain areas, and so on. On the contrary, enormous resources continue to be spent on the arms race, in both the nuclear and conventional fields. The figures speak for themselves: \$400 thousand million a year, of which 20 per cent is spent on nuclear weapons and 80 per cent on conventional weapons.

41. This special session should give us the moral impetus to react, to give concrete shape to a serious process of balanced and comprehensive disarmament, and to proceed with the building of an international order truly inspired by the principles of the Charter. In the Italian Government's view, we must lay the foundations for a more peaceful future by working out specific directives for action, aimed at the entire international community, to be embodied in a global strategy for disarmament.

42. Our thinking has been comprehensively presented in five documents, which reflect the specific ideas that Italy has contributed to the preparation of the special session. The first document is the note which Mr. Arnaldo Forlani, Minister for Foreign Affairs, sent, on behalf of our Government, on 18 April 1977, to Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim, in reply to the questionnaire in which Mr. Waldheim had invited Member States' views on the special session [*A/S-10/1, vol. III, document A/AC.187/32*].

43. The second is a working paper [*ibid., vol. V, document A/AC.187/87*] which we and 10 other countries submitted several months ago. It contains ideas for the preparation of the declaration on disarmament, the solemn manifesto, in which the principles and general objectives which should inspire the efforts of the international community in the coming years will be set forth.

44. We have also, together with nine other countries, submitted a paper [*ibid., vol. VI, document A/AC.187/96*] for use in the preparation of the other basic document which will be adopted by this special session, namely, the programme of action. This paper contains a series of proposals for practical and reasonable measures of disarmament and arms control, which could be adopted over a period of a few years. These measures would serve to facilitate agreement on further progress to be achieved, for example, at other special sessions of the General Assembly and, possibly, when the necessary conditions have materialized, within an *ad hoc* world conference, as proposed by certain States.

45. In proposing these initial short-term measures, we considered it useful to confirm that, in our opinion, a disarmament programme, both structured and comprehensive, should be outlined at the same time. Accordingly, Italy has submitted a document containing suggestions for a global disarmament programme [*ibid., document A/AC.187/97*]. These suggestions are not designed to be superimposed on the short-term proposals but, rather, to complement them and to develop them harmoniously. We have acted with the conviction that, even in the preparation and application of partial disarmament measures, we must keep clearly in mind the final objectives we wish to achieve.

46. We have therefore suggested a series of measures to be implemented gradually, so as to bring about a process which will be, above all, continuous: the total prohibition of nuclear tests; the strengthening of the system of vertical and horizontal non-proliferation, and the consequent limitation, reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons; the banning of chemical weapons, in which regard we consider the proposals for a system of verification, which were submitted to us a few days ago, as a highly important contribution to the establishment of a valid and effective draft treaty; the conclusion of specific agreements on radiological weapons and other clearly identifiable weapons of mass destruction, based on new scientific principles; the initiation of a process to reduce conventional weapons and armed forces, which should be negotiated, and which should proceed in parallel with the efforts for nuclear disarmament within a framework in which all the components of the situation, as well as the need to maintain a balance between the various measures envisaged, would be taken into account. In this context, we have also proposed a system to tackle the disquieting problem of the growing international transfers of conventional weapons, which is reflected in an increase of tension in various geographical areas and in an intolerable economic and financial burden on many countries.

47. We have also stressed the need to prevent the extension of the arms race to outer space and the sea-bed.

48. To complete our ideas we have presented another document [*ibid., document A/AC.187/110*] concerning the review of disarmament machinery. It is obvious, however, that any improvement in that machinery would yield very meagre results if, in the meantime, we did not all strengthen our resolve and commitment to increase our efforts to reduce the arms race.

49. Finally, since no disarmament measures can be truly effective unless they are properly controlled through an adequate system of verification, we, together with certain other delegations of countries particularly close to us, have contributed pertinent suggestions to be examined within the framework of discussions on the programme of action. We will also take into consideration any other suggestions made in this regard by previous speakers and study them with all the attention they deserve.

50. My Government has noted with satisfaction the elaboration of the draft programme of action for disarmament [*ibid., vol. I*]. We consider it to be the first step in the co-

herent planning of a structured peace policy, which is our common goal. Besides short-term disarmament measures, the draft contains certain guidelines for future negotiations, the final objective of which is the effective and total elimination of armaments. These guidelines will be developed by the authors of the global medium-term and long-term plan, discussion of which, also on the initiative of Italy, has already started at Geneva, in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament.

51. This global plan, which envisages a series of stages without rigid time-limits, would, in our view, allow us to move forward gradually and in a balanced manner along the path of nuclear and conventional disarmament, without the present interruptions and deviations, each stage being designed to create the conditions of security and trust which are essential for the initiation of the next stage.

52. Many speakers have stressed the importance of nuclear disarmament. While naturally sharing this concern, I would like to draw attention again to the problem of conventional weapons. This is a particularly delicate field because nearly all countries are directly involved in it; some have gone so far, in seeking to equip themselves with modern weapons, as to divert irreplaceable material and human resources from the essential priorities of development.

53. Italy considers that the maintenance of common security can be guaranteed only by a balanced reduction of both nuclear and conventional weapons, to be sought by means of bilateral or multilateral agreements—both global and regional—aimed at reducing the volume of armaments in all regions, without exception, to the lowest possible level. The main aim is to avoid losing sight of the unitary concept of the disarmament process, which is divisible for functional purposes but not from an ideological angle.

54. I should like to reiterate our conviction that, in order to make effective progress on the path towards disarmament, every concrete measure should be accompanied by the parallel adoption of adequate procedures to guarantee collective security, so that all countries feel truly and adequately protected. In other words, each stage of disarmament should correspond to progress in seeking methods for the peaceful settlement of disputes, in building peace and in organizing international security forces. At first sight, this latter objective, set forth in Article 43 of the Charter, would seem to constitute the culmination of a fairly advanced stage in the processes of disarmament and in the establishment of a new international economic order more suited to the needs of our time. In our opinion, however, it would not be superfluous to start work now on this aspect of the problem because any rapprochement of our respective viewpoints can make it easier to resolve the substantive issues with which we are faced.

55. A number of speakers have mentioned the link between disarmament measures and development aid. Unfortunately, the economic inequalities between the various parts of the world have become more marked in recent years despite the efforts made to increase economic co-operation with the developing countries. The profound and serious imbalances which exist continue to constitute an

obstacle to the economic and social progress of mankind. Obviously, there is a link between development and disarmament; significant progress in disarmament will naturally result in the future in the mobilization of considerable resources and energies which can be used to improve the social and economic conditions of all people.

56. The technical and scientific progress of the twentieth century, the aspirations of peoples, the obvious need for integration, and the planetary challenges of our time have now linked the destiny of each nation to the destiny of all the others.

57. Mankind is witnessing the dawn of a unity which would have been inconceivable in the past because the need for it had never been felt before and the means of achieving it had never been available. Today each people must act in the conviction that only in unity lies the salvation of one and all.

58. It would be ingenuous to conceal the difficulties and obstacles of every kind which have to be surmounted, particularly as their origins go back thousands of years into the history of mankind. And it is impossible to eradicate these difficulties by an operation such as a modern surgeon might make in order to save a life. If, however, as I pointed out at the beginning of my statement, we recognize the need for a growing awareness of the alternative facing mankind, this session can make a substantial contribution in extending and consolidating this awareness by means of a clear proclamation of the dangers which threaten us and of the need to close ranks as members of the same family linked by a unity of aspirations and efforts.

59. This is the message which I bring to the whole world on behalf of the Italian Republic.

60. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): On behalf of the General Assembly I wish to thank the President of the Council of Ministers of the Italian Republic for the important statement he has just made.

[*The speaker continued in English.*]

61. The next speaker in the general debate is the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. I have great pleasure in welcoming His Excellency The Right Honourable James Callaghan, and in inviting him to address the General Assembly.

62. Mr. CALLAGHAN (United Kingdom): Mr. President, first I should like to congratulate you on your election which is a fitting tribute not only to yourself and to your qualities but also to Yugoslavia's important role, under the leadership of President Tito, in bringing about this special session. I also salute the energy of the non-aligned movement, which has pursued the idea to its realization. And I am particularly pleased to be speaking in the presence of our distinguished Secretary-General who has for so long taken a profound interest in the role of the United Nations over disarmament.

63. In this special session the leaders of 145 nations are

once again addressing themselves to a problem whose solution has eluded the world for generations, a problem which is increasing geometrically in complexity as developing military technology exposes the world to new horrors. This generation would be failing in its responsibilities if it did not take up the challenge of how to reduce the vast armoury of military power, even if realistically we see no early prospect of complete abolition.

64. The essential task of the special session is to provide the stimulus and the framework to set us on the road of stabilizing and reducing the world's armaments, in place of the present escalation. I express that view with a conviction which is made stronger by my participation in the meeting in Washington of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

65. Our discussions in the alliance showed that we are united in the belief that we are most likely to preserve the peace if there is a military balance of strength between East and West. But it also showed that there has grown up a major concern over the need to restore the Western side of that balance in the face of military improvements in the arms of the countries on the Eastern side, particularly in massive conventional force, which threatens to upset that balance. Now, this may be denied, but this is our conclusion, backed by a great deal of evidence, and it is sincerely held by the West. Now I emphasize this, but let it be clear that our deeply-held preference is for both sides to replace the attempts to achieve a balance through ever increasing and ever more costly armed forces by a balance based on mutual restraint: restraint not competition; better still—reduction.

66. Armaments of themselves do not breed security: ultimately, by proliferation and competition they breed insecurity. We know this and we therefore prefer balanced disarmament under international inspection, where each Government reduces its armaments as it perceives its adversary reducing his. This will not only make for national security, but will also increase security in a wider sense, by releasing skilled human and material resources for redeployment on economic and social projects—for the real benefit and well-being of our own people, but also of the people of the developing world.

67. But even before we come to this we can straightaway, now, seek by the influence of this special session to achieve a second kind of restraint: a restraint upon the use of armed force—restraint in behaviour between nations. Countries will not renounce the further build-up of military power, still less will they take the first steps to reductions in armaments, if they see others, whether directly or by proxy, using existing military force as an instrument of foreign policy to seize advantage wherever they can.

68. The great continent of Africa is faced with some stubborn problems. Some may see the use of military force as a convenient short-cut to quick solutions. But history has surely taught us that such a policy almost always creates as many problems as it is intended to cure. The withdrawal from Africa of my country and other European States has left the continent with frontiers and borders

which criss-cross peoples of the same families and tribes, and some of these frontiers and borders show scant regard for either geography or ethnic origin.

69. We can be grateful now that the leaders of the newly established independent African States in the 1950s showed such wisdom and foresight in recognizing that the best hope for Africa lay in the recognition of existing frontiers, arbitrary though some might be. Further, those same leaders committed themselves to the peaceful settlement of disputes and to a rejection of outside interference in Africa's internal affairs. They were wise to lay down those principles. Now it seems they may be superseded by new developments. But this will not necessarily be in Africa's interest, nor will it right Africa's wrongs. Those of us who played a tiny part in helping Africa over the years to emerge from colonialism are not content to see it misused by a new imperialism or become—as it might—a new breeding ground for discord between East and West. The old principles of non-interference and the peaceful settlement of disputes are best for the struggling people of Africa. I urge them to speak out clearly, for it will soon be too late, and they will find themselves caught up in an arms race, with growing instability for their countries and increasing danger of wars.

70. I wish to reaffirm the pledge that the United Kingdom is willing to play a central role in the search for disarmament. In the past we were active in the negotiation of the partial test-ban treaty and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and in the achievement of a convention to abolish biological weapons. At the present time we are negotiating for a further major advance—namely, the completion of a comprehensive ban on testing nuclear weapons.

71. Britain's approach is step by step—namely, to persevere in placing the building blocks of peace one upon the other. In our view it is over-ambitious and leads to disillusion to make general and complete disarmament an immediate objective. But, equally, we do not believe that our activities in the various fields should be disconnected. The building blocks must be put in place, each of them, so that they fit together, strengthen each other and provide a new base for further co-ordinated advance. If in this special session we can provide a clear framework on which to build, we shall accelerate the rate of construction.

72. Last February the United Kingdom put forward specific ideas in the draft programme of action submitted by us with other Western countries [*ibid.*, vol. VI, document A/AC.187/96]. I now wish to put before the special session some further proposals for a framework within which we can make real progress in a short but realistic time-scale.

73. First, of course, we should make renewed efforts to bring existing negotiations to fruitful conclusions.

74. I have already referred to the current negotiations for a comprehensive test-ban treaty. Such a treaty would help to curb both vertical and horizontal proliferation, by preventing the development of nuclear arms to yet higher levels of sophistication and by preventing the extension of

existing nuclear weaponry to States that do not already possess it.

75. Our purpose in the negotiations is clear: to ban all nuclear explosions in all environments, and to back this up by agreeing on provisions that will enable all of the participants to check that the agreement is being adhered to. This will establish universal confidence that no party will conduct clandestine tests. We hope that as many States as possible will adhere. The treaty will be entirely non-discriminatory. It will apply to nuclear and non-nuclear States alike.

76. It is no secret that there have been difficult issues to resolve. But I am glad to be able to tell the Assembly that in the interests of achieving early agreement, we are now ready to put forward new proposals at the tripartite negotiations at Geneva. We believe that they are practical and that they should be acceptable.

77. I trust that this initiative will open the way to speedy progress on the outstanding issues, including verification. I emphasize that verification is an essential ingredient of this and other arms control agreements. Inspection under agreed rules will be necessary. So will seismic monitoring of various kinds. An international system of seismic stations would not only provide further assurance: it would enable a number of non-nuclear-weapon States to contribute directly to the effectiveness of a ban, as the Foreign Minister of Norway said this morning.

78. The three of us who have been engaged in these negotiations have been negotiating seriously throughout. I should like to assure the Assembly of that. We have narrowed the differences between us. I am confident that an early agreement is within our grasp, and then another brick would be in place.

79. I come next to the strategic arms limitation talks, for which the leaders of the world's foremost nuclear Powers—President Carter and President Brezhnev—carry a special and awesome responsibility. It is within the framework of these talks that they can slow down the pace and then reverse the nuclear arms race. Early agreement in the negotiations upon which the United States and the Soviet Union are now engaged is in the interests of us all, and certainly in the interests of the two principal participants.

80. The agreement on the limitation of strategic arms which seems to be emerging from the second round of negotiations will have Britain's full support and will, I hope, in due course receive the political endorsement of both parties to the negotiations. It would formally establish a strategic parity and maintain stability. These are not only highly desirable objectives in themselves: they are essential steps to be taken if the world is to be spared the risks, and the United States and the Soviet Union are to be freed from the colossal costs, of an uncontrolled and ultimately futile strategic nuclear arms race.

81. It is not too soon to begin to look ahead to a third round of negotiations. Such talks should take place once a second agreement has been reached. These new talks

should aim to reduce significantly the numbers of strategic systems and to constrain the development and refinement of such systems. I am encouraged that both the United States and the Soviet Union have spoken so clearly in this sense to the special session.

82. But existing and prospective negotiations, promising as they may be, are not enough. New initiatives are called for; we must seek out new components for a wide-ranging programme of disarmament agreements. On nuclear weapons themselves, the strategic arms limitation talks cannot be the whole story.

83. All nuclear weapons are weapons of terror—not only those that can reach America from the Soviet Union, or the Soviet Union from America. In Western Europe, for example, including my own country, we are concerned about those Soviet weapons which are targeted specifically upon our countries. As this session has already heard, there are a great many such systems in various parts of the Soviet Union and aboard Soviet ships and submarines whose range is less than strategic, as defined in the talks on strategic arms limitation, but is still sufficient to reach the countries of Europe as well as the Middle East, India, China, Japan and elsewhere. No doubt, on the other side, the Soviet Union and its allies have equal concerns about us.

84. We are now considering how Europe can work towards further restraint of these nuclear armouries. There are formidable problems about this, not least because of the inequalities and asymmetries built into the present situation. But these will have to be solved if we are to achieve the objectives of reducing tension and improving trust, while maintaining the security of the States concerned—the prerequisites of genuine disarmament. In conjunction with our allies, this matter is being and will be studied with very great care.

85. Then there is the question of undertakings to limit the use of nuclear weapons. This question has been much discussed here. It is my country's long-established policy that these weapons should never be used except in self-defence under the most extreme circumstances. President Carter's statement to this effect in the General Assembly last October⁵ was most welcome, and Britain endorsed it at the time.

86. We recognize, however, that States which have renounced nuclear weapons are entitled to look for some more specific assurance that nuclear weapons will not be used against them. My country acknowledges these expectations and wants action to meet them. In February we proposed that the matter should be considered here, at this special session.⁶

87. I place on record now that the United Kingdom will be prepared to take part with other nuclear Powers in firm, far-reaching and permanent assurances to the non-nuclear

⁵ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-second Session, Plenary Meetings*, 18th meeting.

⁶ *Ibid.*, *Thirty-third Session, Supplement No. 27*, vol. II, document CCD/549.

States. We will support the establishment of further nuclear-weapon-free zones, where all States concerned are in agreement. Britain, I may say, was the first nuclear-weapon State to adhere to the Protocols to the Treaty of Tlatelolco⁷ establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Latin America, thereby undertaking not to use nuclear weapons against the members of that zone. We are glad that all nuclear Powers have now adhered to that Treaty: let there be more such treaties.

88. Lastly, in the field of nuclear armaments I turn to the issue of non-proliferation. How can all nations secure the benefits of nuclear energy without the future of the human race being endangered? We need to reach acceptable agreements that will strengthen the technical barriers to the spread of nuclear arms, while making it possible for all countries which so desire to have access to nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

89. The keystone of our efforts is the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, to which over 100 States are now parties. Although we hope that more will adhere we recognize that some countries have reasons of their own for preferring not to do so: it is open to them to renounce nuclear weapons in other ways, in particular by accepting the International Atomic Energy Agency's full-scope safeguards on their nuclear facilities.

90. We believe that these full safeguards make a major contribution to international confidence, in a way which is non-discriminatory, and Britain continues to urge its friends in the non-aligned countries to look at them in that light. I have already spoken of the efforts by the nuclear-weapon States to curb and then reduce so-called vertical proliferation: we should also be making real progress if we could match that with a general acceptance of the safeguards on all peaceful nuclear facilities.

91. I now turn to conventional arms and to the problems of regional imbalances. The countries of Europe and North America are making a serious effort to reduce tension and to wind down the level of military confrontation through talks on mutual and balanced force reductions at Vienna. These talks are the first major attempt at regional and mutual reductions in conventional forces. A successful conclusion of these long-drawn-out negotiations will be valuable, not only for the furtherance of the disarmament process itself, but also as a practical demonstration that détente has meaning.

92. In this context I welcome the statements in the joint declaration issued by President Brezhnev and Chancellor Schmidt during Mr. Brezhnev's recent visit to the Federal Republic of Germany. They said that approximate equality and parity are adequate guarantees of defence; and that measures of arms control in keeping with that principle would be of great importance. I understand that the equality and parity which are referred to in the statement are intended to apply to both nuclear and conventional weapons.

93. We and our allies have already proposed in these ne-

gotiations the elimination of the existing disparities by establishing a common collective manpower ceiling on each side and a reduction in the present imbalance in main battle tanks. We recently put forward important new proposals in the negotiations. They were designed to meet concerns expressed by the Warsaw Treaty countries. We await their response after they have examined the proposals.

94. I acknowledge that the road to disarmament lies through detailed and complex negotiations of this nature. But we believe that it also needs the political will to succeed and to generate the energy that will finish the job. I therefore suggested at the meeting of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization heads of Government that we should propose that Foreign Ministers themselves from both sides should meet to give some political impetus to these talks. I am glad to inform the Assembly that that was agreed and we shall in due course be approaching the Soviet Union with this proposal.

95. Mutual and balanced forces reduction is of course concerned only with a limited area of central Europe. But we can build on it, and I believe we should welcome and consider very carefully France's proposal for extending the geographical scope of negotiation about military forces in a wider area in Europe [*3rd meeting*].

96. We can positively increase confidence in one another, in parallel with our other efforts for disarmament, by establishing a pattern of measures that will themselves build confidence by reducing the scope for suspicion of a nearby country's military intentions.

97. Europe has gained experience in this since the Conference on Security and Co-operation held at Helsinki three years ago. The United Kingdom took the lead in proposing last February that measures such as giving advance notification of military movements and manoeuvres, exchanging observers at manoeuvres, and exchanging military visits should be adopted in regions where confidence needs to be fostered.

98. We have also proposed that the United Nations should study how the modern means of surveillance that have been installed in the Sinai Peninsula with great effect could be applied in other regions in order to help build confidence and verify arms control agreements.

99. The acceptance of methods of verifying that arms control agreements are being observed is in itself a form of confidence-building. The United Kingdom has voluntarily accepted international inspection of its civil nuclear facilities. We are willing, as part of the comprehensive test ban agreement, as soon as it is reached, to play a full part in an international system of seismic monitoring. In compliance with any chemical weapons convention to which we become a party, we are willing to accept inspection of relevant chemical manufacturing plants in Britain. I should like today to pledge my country to accept on our territory whatever further measures of verification, including international inspection, are needed to underpin future arms control agreements.

⁷ Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 634, No. 9068, p. 326).

100. I mentioned a moment ago a question which is well within the grasp of every State to deal with—chemical weapons. My country has no offensive chemical-weapons capability. We call on all States to join us in rejecting these exceptionally horrible weapons. We put forward a draft convention at Geneva in August 1976⁸ which I hope has helped to focus attention on the problem. The United States and the Soviet Union are discussing the matter and Britain asks that it should soon be remitted for multilateral negotiations in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament.

101. We recognize that a special responsibility rests on those countries which have the capability to supply arms to others. We in Britain continue to show restraint in the sale of arms. At present we supply no more than 5 per cent of total world sales. But unilaterally to cut off arms supplies to one country can itself potentially be a threat to peace: only by acting in concert can the risk of proliferation be restrained. The United Kingdom is prepared to work with others to that end.

102. The time is opportune for the United Nations as a whole to consider ways of restricting the sale of conventional arms. The world needs an agreed basis that would enable us to slow down the spiral of competitive armaments buying by neighbouring countries and prevent the introduction of sophisticated weapons systems which may add to regional instability. One approach would be to tackle the problem regionally and multilaterally with the involvement on an equal footing of both suppliers and recipients. That could be particularly apt in areas of tension, where it could accompany political moves to reduce the risk of war.

103. I ask therefore that this session decide as a first step to launch a United Nations study on ways of limiting the growth of conventional weapons throughout the world. Britain will co-operate fully in such work.

104. In preparation for my visit here, I read the reports of earlier contributions to the special session and noted that several speakers have referred to the link between disarmament and development. The United Kingdom has decided to increase its aid programme by 6 per cent per year over the next four years. But it would not be helpful to the developing countries to make those increases contingent upon major advances in disarmament. Such linkage could work to their disadvantage.

105. None the less, the relationship between disarmament and development needs thorough investigation and we support the Nordic proposal for a United Nations study. One aspect in which we are particularly interested is the problem of converting arms production facilities to civil purposes.

106. To talk in terms of such conversions is an incentive to us to make progress in other areas. One such unresolved issue is how to measure and compare military budgets.

107. Openness breeds confidence. For too long some States have continued to publish defence budget figures which the world knows to be very incomplete. I appeal to them to take the opportunity offered by this special session of the Assembly as the occasion on which to end this practice. The United Kingdom urges that the system of measuring and reporting, which has been devised under the auspices of the Secretary-General, should be tested by a representative sample of States and, if found satisfactory, it should be implemented internationally without delay. The United Kingdom is willing to participate in such a test by providing a full breakdown of its defence budget. We hope that this study will provide a fair and firm basis of knowledge and confidence, which would make it easier to reach agreement to reduce our expenditures.

108. I also propose that the United Nations should study security matters and peace-keeping.

109. I should like to commend the suggestion made by Vice-President Mondale at the 2nd meeting of the special session for the establishment of a United Nations peace-keeping reserve force. My country believes that the various peace-keeping endeavours mounted by the United Nations have been among its most important and positive activities. We have been proud to contribute to them, as we still do today; we have front-line contingents in Cyprus; we furnish logistics support for the whole of the United Nations Force in Cyprus and more recently we have begun to do this for the Lebanon force; and we provide transport, as we are doing for the contingent which Fiji is sending to the Lebanon. The idea of a permanently-earmarked standby force is an imaginative one, and we should approach it with a view to overcoming the practical problems. Of course, certain of those problems will need consideration, and I note some: the composition of a force and the nations that take part in it may have to be adjusted to the facts of geography and political background; it may be that a particular country should on one occasion contribute troops and on another occasion, say, supply transport aircraft.

110. Those matters should be examined, but the general idea of standing commitments to render help is an invaluable aid to planning, to confidence and to quick reaction. For our part, we are very ready to look further at this concept in a constructive spirit.

111. The role of negotiating multilateral agreements belongs to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament at Geneva. It has done excellent work. Its practice of operating by consensus is admirable, but its structure could be improved. It is time to reform the co-chairmanship system. I should like very much to see France and China playing their rightful roles. There may also be a case for adding some members to make the Conference more representative. We should seek a closer relationship between it and the United Nations and make much fuller arrangements for non-members to participate in its work.

112. I urge an increasingly important role too for the United Nations Secretariat. The Secretariat collects admirable statistics on subjects such as agriculture and educa-

⁸ Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-first Session, Supplement No. 27, vol. II, document CCD/512.

tion, so why should the United Nations Centre for Disarmament not become the repository of data on disarmament?

113. When I visited India four months ago, the Prime Minister of India, Mr. Desai, who will shortly be coming here to address this special session, and I talked at length about disarmament, about the failure of past efforts that we have seen and about what we must do next. We agreed that disarmament concerns all Governments and all peoples and that it cannot—and, as he pointed out to me very forcefully, will not—be imposed by the strong on the weak. Now we have assembled at this special session of the General Assembly for the first time together all the five nuclear-weapon States; India, and other important nuclear-capable States; and all those States that can only fear—and yet endeavour to purchase—the weapons of modern war. We are here to talk about, and I hope to commit ourselves to, a real disarmament programme.

114. Our deliberations will have no lasting value unless we proceed by consensus. We must try to settle our differences and fix our sights on a short-term programme of action that we know we can achieve. We should distinguish between those measures which can be dealt with quickly and those which need to be considered over a longer term. We should set ourselves a realistic time-table, and Britain will support the calling of another special session on disarmament in three years' time to assess the progress which has been achieved and to work out then a further programme of action for the succeeding period.

115. This, the greatest disarmament conference in the world's history, must be determined to transform our aspirations into action. We must not disappoint or disillusion mankind by failing to make progress. We must bring to a successful conclusion the discussions which have already begun; we must support fresh initiatives that will open up new aspects of disarmament for the benefit of the whole world.

116. Recently, that remarkable annual publication, *World Military and Social Expenditures*,⁹ has brought together once again a new set of striking comparisons to emphasize the diversion of resources to military activities.

117. We are all here in the debt of Ruth Sivard for the work that she does. She points out that the world's scale of priorities is now such that the average family pays more in tax for defence than to educate its children. Governments spend 60 per cent more on defence than they spend on protection against the everyday ravages of illness, disease and injury. Developing nations invest more public revenue in military forces than in education and health combined. One dollar out of every six in government budgets goes on defence.

118. It is no wonder that Kenneth Galbraith says that there can be few more seemingly unequal political contests in the world than that between military spending on the one hand and social needs on the other. But, he adds, "the contest, if dangerously weighted towards disaster, is not

wholly unequal. Reason has power. So has compassion. People do wish to survive."

119. I am glad to take that as the text for our work. I ask that we regard that as a stimulus and a challenge. Let us resolve to meet again in 1981 so that the world, through the United Nations, can call all of us to account for what we can achieve between this special session and the next, and when the time comes let us render that account not in the fine words we have just spoken but in the action we have taken.

120. The PRESIDENT: On behalf of the General Assembly I wish to thank the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland for the important statement he has just made.

121. Mr. VAN DER KLAUW (Netherlands): Mr. President, I am pleased and honoured to speak here under your presidency. The excellent relations that exist between our two countries heighten that pleasure. There is one perspective that is almost constantly under discussion in my country, namely, the perspective of the continuing build-up of armaments potential, a potential which, after two world conflagrations within only one generation, may lead to a final catastrophe.

122. This perspective is under full discussion in my country, not merely in terms of strategic concepts and technology, not even as a problem of power politics, but as a matter of conscience. The matter is raised in our churches. It is constantly under discussion within the organized groups of our country, and by political parties in our parliament. Subjects such as the danger of nuclear proliferation, both horizontal and vertical, are at the very heart of the dialogue between our parliament and my Government.

123. Disarmament, the dangers of a spiralling accumulation of armaments and the consequences of the possible use of nuclear weapons are problems on which the voice of reason should be heard, but on which the voice of conscience cannot remain silent. This is not a matter of mere sentimentality, nor a dutiful demonstration in favour of non-violence as an ethical ideal. It goes beyond those notions.

124. We are now talking about matters where humanity is compelled to consider the continued existence of its world, of creation, of life itself. That is the importance of this special session, in which the whole world community both through Governments and non-governmental organizations is taking part.

125. My country has a strong tradition of independence, of freedom and peace. We will not submit to threats to that heritage and we are, and remain, prepared to defend it with vigour and conviction. But we realize that science and technology are now capable of making arms of such awesome power that they will not merely defend what is dearest to us, but will threaten the very survival of mankind.

126. We are aware of the fact that a single Government

⁹ R. Sivard, WMSE Publications, Leesburg, Va., 1974 and 1976.

cannot by itself create and maintain the peaceful conditions where safety reigns and dangers evaporate. The Netherlands has therefore joined with other countries in a defensive alliance, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, from whose summit meeting I have just returned. In that alliance, as in this Assembly, we speak frankly about the problems of an increasingly dangerous world.

127. Our endeavours to safeguard freedom, peace and security are obviously not limited to the alliance which I have just mentioned. We make our voice heard in all multilateral discussions on peace and security, at Geneva, at Vienna and now in New York, Mr. President, under your distinguished presidency.

128. This is the double awareness in my country: the voice of reason rules out a new war as unacceptable; the voice of conscience commands that it is inadmissible; both reason and conscience tell us that peace and security must be guaranteed by collective arrangements and by the common determination of all peoples.

129. In our common efforts to make our planet a safer world to live on, we have to diminish the role of nuclear weapons. The halting and reversal of the nuclear arms race deserve our prime attention. In a nuclear war there would only be losers in a completely disintegrated world.

130. The nuclear-weapon States, in particular the two main Powers, must start reducing their nuclear arsenals, and thereby initiate the process towards nuclear disarmament. We consider the strategic arms limitation talks as a very important step in the right direction, and we welcome the fact that concrete negotiations are under way. Unfortunately, the result of these negotiations has so far been limited to placing certain controls on the nuclear arms race. It is a saddening fact that there has been a manifold increase in the nuclear arsenals of the two negotiating Powers since the start of the talks in 1969.

131. Another treaty, resulting from the second round of talks, has to come into force in the near future. Its chief merit is the halting of the present nuclear arms race. Even more important is that it be the foundation for wider and more comprehensive restrictions and substantial net reductions in the nuclear arsenals at the third round of negotiations.

132. Obviously, the need for progress towards real nuclear disarmament is growing every day, particularly when we take into account the qualitative developments in nuclear weaponry. These developments are complicating the present negotiations. Nothing should happen that makes them hopeless.

133. A necessary complement to the negotiations is the early conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty banning all nuclear explosions in all environments. It is a cause of regret that the general expectation raised by resolution 32/78, adopted last year by the General Assembly, was not met. That resolution called for the submission of a draft treaty to the special session. However, I am fully aware that notable progress has been made in negotiations

between the United States, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom. The obstacles to on-site verification and peaceful nuclear explosions seem to have been removed. I remain confident that a solution to the remaining problems will be found in the near future.

134. A comprehensive test ban, in addition to closing the road to further nuclear weapons development, would have the advantage that the nuclear-weapon States assume the same restraints as non-nuclear-weapon States. It would remove an element of inequality between nuclear and non-nuclear weapon States. This inequality lies at the heart of the discussion on the further proliferation of nuclear weapons. The whole world has an interest in halting the emergence of more nuclear-weapon States. An increase in their number would increase the danger of nuclear disaster. But it is also clear that non-proliferation efforts cannot succeed in the long run if the present nuclear-weapon States do not accept substantial net reductions and manifestly set out upon the road towards nuclear disarmament. One cannot stabilize a fundamental inequality between "haves" and "have-nots" for ever.

135. One of the main purposes of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is to stop the further spread of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices. The nuclear-weapon States would, according to the Treaty, start the process of nuclear disarmament. The Treaty is consequently an instrument to reverse the process towards nuclear anarchy. Therefore, it is in the interests of all States to accede to it. I make an urgent appeal to them to do so. I sincerely welcome the announcement made in this session by the Government of Indonesia that it will seek ratification of the Treaty.

136. The non-proliferation régime can also be strengthened by the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones. These should be actively pursued wherever possible.

137. In this connexion, I am happy to note that the Soviet Union, France and Argentina have announced their decision to accede to the Treaty of Tlatelolco. I strongly hope that soon the Treaty will enter fully into force.

138. In a broader context than that of nuclear-weapon-free zones, nuclear-weapon States should consider seriously and urgently security guarantees to increase the confidence of non-nuclear-weapon States in their own security from nuclear attack. I noted with great interest the remarks that have just been made by the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom. I hope that this matter will be actively pursued. We regard such undertakings as a highly desirable incentive for non-nuclear-weapon States to forgo the nuclear option.

139. The non-proliferation treaty also provides for the promotion of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, especially in non-nuclear-weapon States party to it, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world. However, the development of nuclear technology, by which we are moving towards a so-called plutonium economy, and the increased use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes require a new international consensus on

the peaceful uses of nuclear energy to strengthen the present non-proliferation régime.

140. Such a consensus can develop only on the basis of non-discriminatory access and self-restraint by all concerned. Only such an international consensus can eventually lead to more harmonious relations between suppliers and recipients of nuclear materials, equipment and technology.

141. Therefore I regard the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation exercise as a most welcome contribution towards solving the problem of giving adequate access to nuclear energy for peaceful purposes while minimizing the risk of a further spread of nuclear weapons. I do not deny that it is an intricate problem. In this Evaluation we are in search of a universally acceptable solution. The Netherlands plays an active role in it.

142. All countries engaged in the field of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes should accept international safeguards by the International Atomic Energy Agency on all their nuclear activities. Such safeguards do not in any way hamper the application of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. On the contrary, by dispelling possible causes of mistrust they can only be conducive to further international co-operation in this field. Safeguards applied through the Agency have so far proved to be an important and effective safety net. The international community should continue to probe whether those safeguards can be improved in scope and effectiveness.

143. There is, for instance, an immediately available instrument to improve those safeguards and to make nuclear energy production inherently safe. What I have in mind is the establishment of regional nuclear fuel cycle centres with comprehensive facilities. In this connexion I should like to express my full support for the activities of the Agency in this field.

144. Another field of action would be the establishment of an international plutonium storage régime. The Netherlands will actively co-operate in initiatives to further develop and to put into effect current ideas on these matters in the various working groups of the International Evaluation or in any other context. Their basic rationale is not to be found in hampering access to much needed nuclear energy supplies but in making them accessible under circumstances of international trust and co-operation.

145. To solve the long-term problems in the field of nuclear co-operation it is necessary to look for safer methods of nuclear energy production so as to avoid as much as possible the dangers associated with a further spread of nuclear materials and technologies. A growing need for nuclear energy and a growing awareness of the dangers associated with the proliferation of nuclear weapons can and should go hand in hand if we have the political will to harmonize seemingly contradictory concepts. In the meantime it should not be forgotten that a fundamental factor for a long-term successful non-proliferation policy lies in the creation of an international system in which the motivation to acquire nuclear weapons is no longer present and in

which the role of nuclear weapons has been curtailed to a minimum or preferably has disappeared completely.

146. Turning to another weapon of mass destruction, I sincerely hope and expect that the international community can soon move towards the complete elimination of chemical weapons.

147. In spite of the priorities being set on nuclear disarmament, one should not forget that some 80 per cent of world military expenditure is on conventional forces and armaments—that is, nearly \$1 thousand million a day. All armed conflicts since the end of the Second World War have been fought with conventional weapons. These two facts should make it clear that we are faced not only with a nuclear problem but also with serious problems in the field of conventional arms. There is need for measures to limit and reverse the build-up of conventional weapons.

148. A matter of grave concern is the continuous increase in international transfers of conventional weaponry. I recognize that most countries are dependent on external sources for their armaments. One of the principles involved here is, of course, the sovereign right of States to acquire those means they deem necessary for their self-defence. But, looking at the ever increasing volume of weapons trade, which could rapidly become a new source of instability on its own, one has to conclude that international consultations are urgently needed.

149. One approach that recommends itself would be for States within a certain region to consult among themselves on the regulation of the flow of armaments into the region. During such consultations all aspects should be taken into account if generally acceptable measures of restraint are to be arrived at, and full use should be made of studies undertaken within the United Nations framework. Supplier States should assist in these efforts.

150. The relationship between disarmament and development needs particular attention in view of the considerable demands on human and material resources arising from military expenditures. A reduction in those expenditures may release additional funds for social and economic development. The Netherlands considers disarmament and development two separate objectives to whose realization it contributes according to its ability. Nevertheless, the Netherlands is of the opinion that the possibility of establishing a new international economic order based on more equality for mankind will be increased considerably if substantial progress is made in the field of disarmament. And, considered from this perspective, this tenth special session may be supportive of the results of the sixth and seventh special sessions. Military expenditures, which currently run at the rate of approximately \$400 thousand million a year, consume a considerable proportion of the human and material resources available to mankind. The conversion of these resources from military to peaceful purposes in developed countries is of course a complicated matter. However, I am convinced that the realization of disarmament measures could support development by creating a more stable and more secure international situation and by re-

leasing funds which could be used for peaceful purposes, in particular for economic and social development. The Netherlands therefore supports the timely initiative of the Nordic countries aimed at an in-depth study of the link between disarmament and development.

151. With regard to the way in which disarmament agreements should be negotiated, one overriding consideration forces itself upon us. I am convinced that the absence of agreements in preceding years was due not so much to a lack of negotiating machinery as to a lack of political will. I recognize that criticism has been voiced concerning the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and its structure. But it is my conviction that it remains necessary for a comparatively small body to be entrusted with disarmament negotiations. In my view there is no need for an entirely new negotiating body, and the Conference should continue to function as a forum in which the major Powers actively participate. I am certainly prepared to consider some modifications to enhance its effectiveness and its general acceptability. For instance, I could go along with the replacement of the present system of co-chairmanship by some other system. I also favour the participation of the two nuclear-weapon States that have so far remained outside disarmament negotiations, but not at the price of sacrificing the existing negotiating machinery.

152. I certainly welcome the indication given by the French President that France is prepared to participate in a multilateral negotiating forum if certain conditions are met. By necessity a negotiating body should not be too vast; for its practical functioning a limited membership is indicated. This does not mean that countries not represented in the Conference should not have the opportunity to come forward with proposals and comments of their own. Indeed, all United Nations Member States must have the opportunity to participate in the disarmament process. Apart from the annual deliberations on disarmament in the First Committee, they should be enabled to participate in working groups of the Conference when their proposals of working documents are under discussion. The role of the United Nations Secretariat could also be strengthened.

153. I wish to conclude my statement by now making a formal proposal.

154. I propose that, in due course, we establish an international disarmament organization to deal with verification and implementation of present and future disarmament treaties.

155. As is well-known, some disarmament agreements require rather elaborate permanent consultative machinery among parties and contain substantial implementation and verification procedures.

156. My purpose in presenting this proposal on an international disarmament organization is to create an operational framework for consultation and verification of disarmament agreements, as well as a clearing house for information on these matters. At present there exists an international organization for the verification of one world-

wide disarmament treaty, the non-proliferation treaty, and that is the International Atomic Energy Agency at Vienna. No comparable machinery is available with respect to, for instance, a chemical weapons treaty or a nuclear-test ban. Hopefully, we will see in the not too distant future multilateral disarmament treaties as the one I have just mentioned. It is essential and timely to give some thought to the implementation machinery for such multilateral agreements. This could avoid the establishment of all kinds of consultative commissions and the like, some of them with permanent staffs. I do hope that the suggestions I have made on an international disarmament organization will gradually mature and that in due course the idea will be accepted by the international community.

157. Disarmament and survival have become almost synonymous and this meeting could well have been called a special session of the General Assembly of the United Nations on survival. In order that humanity may survive, we must take action. Let us take those actions, which are long overdue, in the interest of disarmament, security and peace; in short in the interest of our survival.

158. Mr. OREJA AGUIRRE (Spain) (*interpretation from Spanish*): Mr. President, for the third time this year you have been elected to guide our work, and this, together with your presidency in 1977 during the thirty-second session, makes you our President for the fourth time. I know not whether I should congratulate you or whether we owe you an apology for the burden we have imposed on you. Be that as it may, I believe that the task entrusted to you is a particular honour because the General Assembly, as the resolution convening us states, "Mindful that the continuation of the arms race endangers international peace and security and also diverts vast resources needed for economic and social development", is devoted to achieve precisely these objectives.

159. During this century two major world conflagrations have occurred separated by barely 20 years. Besides other conflicts which have taken place throughout the century and, as though mankind had not learned from experience, weapons with an increasing destructive capacity are accumulated daily. Apparently there is no end in sight to this arms race since every weapon is superseded by another.

160. Some have sought to see in the stockpiling of such quantities of weapons a guarantee for security, and in the balance of terror the means which prevented the outbreak of a third world war. We cannot agree with this view.

161. No one can question the fact that all peoples of the world desire peace, disarmament and development. But have we the will to apply the means needed to attain these ideals?

162. I take the floor before this forum with this concern and with the responsibility of stating the point of view of Spain, which shares with other peoples the conviction that disarmament affects the vital interests of all and conditions the maintenance of international peace and the strengthening of security.

163. I insist on this key word and basic concept, peace, because I believe that any thinking on disarmament lacks credibility and far-sightedness unless it is directly related to the problem of peace. Ultimately, with all its contemporary complexity, the two problems of the arms race, on the one hand, and the need for general and complete disarmament under effective international control, on the other hand, are directly conditioned by the way in which we see the organization of peace.

164. How can one then not feel rebellious towards the irritating existing situation? How can we not be aware that justice, right thinking and the very feeling of human dignity, urgently and inexorably demand an immediate halt to the arms race? How can we fail to be aware that mankind, at once in pain and dreaming its illusions, weighed down in fear but also borne aloft by hopes for change and justice, cannot allow the tragedy of a world war to befall the human species a third time in this century, with all its horrendous political, social and economic consequences?

165. When expressing myself in these terms, I am expressing the feelings of the people of Spain, which, I am certain, coincide with the feelings of all the peoples of the world. A proof of this is the unprecedented event in the history of the United Nations of the holding of this special session which Spain sponsored at the time and in the preparatory work for which it participated. Accordingly, the Government of Spain includes the question of disarmament among the main sectors of its policy, on an equal footing with other major sectors which make up the new guidelines of its international programme. Strengthening security, the advancement of peoples and respect for human rights are our priority objective.

166. In stating our view on the question of disarmament, we do so with the sincerity and independent thinking made possible for us by the fact that Spain is not a country which has embarked on the arms race, neither in the quantity of arms it possesses, not in what it produces, not in its share of the arms trade.

167. This sincerity and independence of opinion will be the source of our contribution to the present special session. Consistent with this, we cannot confuse measures of effective disarmament, even though they may be modest in scope, with provisions to channel arms development, which, while they might be convenient or even essential to improve security or as a prior step to disarmament, are essentially provisions to turn the arms race in a given direction, but are insufficient to halt it or to reverse its course.

168. It has taken many years and much effort to arrive at this session, which has rightly been described as unique. But it so happens that in regard to disarmament the world lost its innocence a long time ago. Eighty years are about to elapse since the invitation to the First Hague Conference and with it the beginning of the era of disarmament plans. It is only right that we should remember this event and duly acknowledge its importance. It is likewise right to note that that meeting resulted in very few disarmament measures.

169. That is a fact. We must acknowledge it as a legacy

of the past. As we look ahead, its lessons are useful. The first lesson is not to repeat the errors of the past lest we embark on a course doomed to failure.

170. Given the importance of this special session and of the items that it is dealing with, our peoples are entitled to feel hopeful as to what we do here. We should not disappoint them by letting this unique opportunity slip away.

171. Yet, we are bound to recognize that, along with these expectations, there are grounds for doubt regarding the prospects for success in containing the arms race. The very meagre results obtained so far and the difficulties facing us justify our reserve.

172. We believe that the main aim of this session should be to avoid arousing glimmering hopes only to see them dashed later and to be careful not to diminish the credibility of disarmament even further. Since the goal of general and complete disarmament under international control will take a long time to achieve, it is now up to us to broaden the basis in so far as possible and not to make the task more arduous.

173. On the basis of this premise, we must proceed towards the objective of disarmament. While speculation based on groundless hopes is not a good method, neither is it a good method obstinately to adhere to past concepts and procedures which produced very few results and are no longer in accord with present-day circumstances. In brief, what is needed is a change in our approach to the disarmament question, seeking new and more effective terms which will duly take into account the political, strategic, technological and economic circumstances of our present-day world.

174. Hence, our proposal is that the special session devoted to disarmament should not be considered another chapter in the ancient history of disarmament but as a take-off for a new stage, in fresh and present-day terms.

175. Three kinds of circumstances justify this. The first is that the topic of armaments is being considered for the first time by all countries of the world at a world-wide level. Secondly, we have the knowledge and experience which enable us to assess the problem of disarmament in unprecedented breadth and depth. Finally, we should encourage this fresh effort because of the very gravity of the problem, since failure to alter the course of the arms race would have consequences which cannot be underrated.

176. This renewed effort cannot be carried out in a vacuum or on the basis of assumptions. Solid basic criteria are needed. Briefly, here are some of these criteria.

177. First of all, we have to establish the essential criterion for security. Many delegations have pointed out that this is a key matter. Basically, what is at stake in the question of disarmament is the security of one and all, which no one is prepared to renounce. Flowing logically from this is the need to view disarmament measures in terms of confrontations and relaxation of tensions. Among the multiple facets of this concept, we should like to refer to one

which seems to us to be particularly useful, namely, a regional approach to disarmament, taking into account the regional nature of conflicts and their repercussions on world security.

178. The initiatives submitted in this respect seem to us, therefore, to be very constructive. We believe in particular that the application of regional criteria is useful for Europe because of the level of confrontation there. I should add that, in our opinion, there are obvious reasons why the European region cannot stand aloof from events in the Mediterranean area, although the problems there are specific in nature.

179. As we see it, the reduction of focal points of tension, the increased co-operation among the coastal States and the search for a stable security are essential factors which will have a positive effect in the area.

180. Secondly, armaments are an instrument for the use of force. But they are also instruments of pressure or influence on political action. Therefore, provisions on the non-use of force will remain half-measures or fail to provide for a full measure of security unless they also take into account the role of armaments as instruments of pressure or political influence. The Government of Spain proposes that this matter be considered with a view to drafting adequate measures that will guarantee the security of countries when armaments are used as a means of pressure.

181. Thirdly, the criteria applied in defining armaments are inadequate. This is due to their changeability as well as to the relative difference, in many cases, between what is considered to be a weapon and what is not.

182. Technology is the determining factor in this, with grave consequences which cannot be confined to the limited sector of armaments but have a broad impact on the peaceful development of peoples. While technology is essentially a means of development and not an instrument of conflict, it would be unfair for disarmament and arms limitation measures to have an adverse effect on the normal access of peoples to technological progress. To this end, the Government of Spain proposes that criteria be adopted to ensure that the technological progress of peoples is not hampered by disarmament measures.

183. A fourth fundamental criterion is the relationship between disarmament and co-operation for development. While one of the major negative consequences of the arms race is that it absorbs resources that could better be devoted to the progress of peoples, it is logical to affirm the view that disarmament should redound to the benefit of the less developed countries. The Government of Spain supports this view fully and unreservedly, but there are no measures to give it practical effect.

184. We shall pay particular attention to any proposals made along these lines, but we would be lacking in sincerity and realism were we not to recall that investments in armaments are very large in not a few developing countries. To the extent that these percentages are not in line with genuine security needs, the countries concerned are

depriving themselves of substantial resources for their own development.

185. These are some of the basic criteria in regard to disarmament which we submit to delegations for their consideration. No doubt there are many others which we would welcome.

186. For concrete disarmament measures to become a reality, sufficient motivation is needed. The objective need of States, which is becoming increasingly urgent, of guaranteeing their peace and security in face of the risk of arms expansion, should be the most powerful incentive. In this respect, we appeal to all countries to consider arms reduction measures as something which serves their own self-interest, and not just something that is sacrificed or given up. We must recall that some initiatives, at times of great scope, initially put forward as agreed obligations and rejected as such, were later acted upon by way of unilateral decisions taken without any compulsion simply because the self-interest of the States dictated that course of action.

187. In the same way we should like to point to the case of countries which, on their own decision, maintained their armaments at a comparatively low level without any commitment to do so.

188. This leads us to believe that efforts to reduce armaments should be related to the various measures adopted unilaterally, without obligation, to restrict arms as well as the collateral measures to ease tensions and to strengthen confidence.

189. Last, but not least, we consider that the countries which have joined the international community in recent years are in a special position to generate a new impetus for disarmament, because they were not parties to the failures of the past.

190. I shall refer now to disarmament machinery. The problem of halting the arms race affects us all; it has a global impact. Accordingly, the measures to be adopted are the responsibility of all. But there can be no responsibility without participation. In other words, the great undertaking of disarmament must be open to participation by all. In our opinion, that is the basic principle of disarmament machinery.

191. However, if responsible participation is to be effective we will have to take into account the actual world situation, as well as the practical rules which govern the proper functioning of any working body.

192. The existing arms situation in the world is not homogeneous, but has many elements. In the first place, there are the two major nuclear arsenals. Because of the unique character of nuclear weapons and the volume of those arsenals it seems to us logical that the two States which have them should maintain a bilateral dialogue. Because of their special responsibilities and capabilities the dialogue should not go beyond the bilateral level but, in so far as the presence of the two nuclear arsenals on such a large scale has an effect on the entire world, other countries too have a right to be heard.

193. In addition to this specific bilateral forum, the international community needs a general disarmament negotiation forum sufficiently broad and resilient to enable all countries wishing to do so to make a contribution, but sufficiently limited to function effectively. Above all, it should be a forum which is not relegated to a subordinate role. The Geneva Conference of the Committee on Disarmament does not meet these needs. In addition to its rigidity and limitations, there are the restrictions and lack of effectiveness, due to its peculiar system of co-chairmen. It arose in different circumstances, and we believe that it is not in accord with the facts of life today. We support the many speakers who have said that the Conference should be radically altered or replaced by another negotiating body able to meet the requirements we have indicated.

194. Finally, there is the United Nations. As the representative of the international community it cannot refrain from dealing with that community's problems, including, of course, disarmament. Far less can it continue to be left out when its own Charter includes certain responsibilities in this field. That being the case, the United Nations should proceed to exercise fully its competence in the field of disarmament, and that is, to a far greater extent than it has done so far.

195. That is the tripartite scheme which we believe could provide that basis for disarmament machinery in the future, without prejudice to an eventual world disarmament conference.

196. At the heart of our concern over the arms race is the existence of the nuclear arsenals. The attitude of Spain, like that of many other countries, is clear: we do not want nuclear arms for ourselves or for anyone else.

197. From this standpoint there are two kinds of countries—nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States. Spain belongs, and always will, to the latter group. We do not want nuclear proliferation. If this is our common objective, it should be attainable by means of equitable provisions. However, it would be a reversal of all logic for countries which are and wish to remain non-nuclear States to be stripped of their security, inhibited in their technological and economic development, and subjected to discriminatory rules.

198. It is not for the nuclear Powers, in their privileged position, to call to account the countries which follow a strict policy of non-proliferation.

199. With the full justice, firmness and freedom which non-possession of nuclear weapons affords us we say to those who do possess such weapons and are still improving them that, so long as they are not able effectively to guarantee the security of countries that do not wish to become nuclear Powers, and so long as they do not provide those countries with sufficient access to the benefits of nuclear economics and technology for peaceful purposes, they are blocking the way to genuine non-proliferation measures.

200. We know all too well the circumstances which prevent not merely the elimination of, but even any substan-

tial reduction in, nuclear arsenals. Since at present the scope for action is limited to talks on arms limitation, we hope that the present talks will conclude with effective agreements. Such measures, apart from being insufficient, may become meaningless with the passage of time. For several reasons, above all because of the permanent technological revolution in the field of nuclear weapons, it appears that negotiations such as the strategic arms limitation talks have ceased to be even a means of limiting arms and are turning into a permanent process of the management of nuclear power, carried along by a technological revolution which threatens to overwhelm it.

201. In contrast, we must recognize the positive achievements of some non-nuclear-weapon States in applying in their region the concept of nuclear-weapon-free zones. The Treaty of Tlatelolco is a unique instrument of its kind and deserves to be described as exemplary.

202. As regards conventional weapons, we shall confine ourselves to recalling some factors which determine their development at present. They are conditioned by advances in technology which promptly make them obsolescent; their growing complexity results in increasingly vast arms systems; the great vulnerability of many of them condemns them to rapid destruction as soon as hostilities break out; it is difficult, if not impossible, for even the most advanced States to ensure self-sufficiency, which means that ultimately the possession of arms depends on the political will of other countries; and, above all, the costs of new arms are soaring.

203. All this lead us to the conclusion that at present—and this will be even more so in the future—modern conventional arms contain an inherent ingredient of self-destruction. Perhaps that might be a positive stimulus to the reduction of conventional weapons, even as a matter of the self-interest of States.

204. An essential complement of disarmament, and to the measures of confidence which promote it by increasing security, is represented by reporting and monitoring measures.

205. There is nothing to prevent the international community from using the most modern technological procedures for monitoring and reporting, and initiatives to that end should be welcomed.

206. While verification is essential, it is logical that it should begin with that which the States themselves carry out within their own spheres of sovereignty as regards the production, possession of and trade in arms. The Government of Spain proposes that each State should adopt the necessary provisions to this end as a preliminary step towards specific measures for the reduction and control of the trade in arms.

207. Among the fundamental principles which should guide disarmament negotiations, as stated in the document which the Preparatory Committee submitted to this Assembly, there is one which has attracted the special attention of the Spanish delegation. According to this principle, the maintenance of foreign military bases on the territory of

any State without that State's consent is a permanent threat to the establishment of genuine and effective national and regional security and, consequently, to the strengthening of international peace and security.

208. As my delegation sees it, that barrier to security occurs mainly because the military risk is not accompanied by the consent and control of the Government of the country which suffers the consequences. As is well known, there remains on the territory of Spain a colonial enclave to which my country lays claim and on which the military base of Gibraltar has been established.

209. I believe it will come as no surprise to any delegation here that I have to mention the danger to the security of Spain and to its 36 million inhabitants represented by the imposition of that military base, and the serious danger of its nearness. We have been maintaining bilateral talks with the United Kingdom on the various aspects of the problem. We trust that a satisfactory solution will be reached, but we must affirm that in the present context the military base is a factor which considerably increases the complexities of the matter which we must face, and we hope that all parties are aware of this.

210. Disarmament, security, human rights and economic development are inextricably linked in the world of today, as they are in the tenets of the United Nations. And they apply also to Gibraltar. Let us have the courage to make of the solution of that problem an example to be followed in other cases, so as to break the barriers of useless confrontation which are kept in place only by fear and mutual distrust.

211. Spain comes to this special session of the Assembly with the utmost goodwill and readiness to make every effort so that we may arrive at fruitful results. As we have already said, respect for human rights, including the right to life, liberty and security, inspires my country's action and we have firmly supported the holding of this special session.

212. We fervently trust that the final document which will be approved will be consistent with the importance of the subjects we are dealing with, on a par with the expectations aroused by this session and with the objective of global and complete disarmament under effective control. My country will spare no effort to this end.

213. The requirements of political morality in the international society of our times imply the need to go beyond the affirmation made by Machiavelli in "The Prince" as a rule of government: "The bases for all States are good laws and good weapons; but there can be no good laws where there are no good weapons." The so-called political realism of that affirmation is devoid of meaning in our contemporary world, if we are to be faithful to the aspirations for change and greater justice.

214. We must aspire to a new concept of order, because where there is a just order no weapons are needed to safeguard peace.

The meeting rose at 1.15 p.m.