



Agenda item 23: Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples: report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples

DOCUMENT A/6300/REV.1*

Report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples

CONTENTS

		<i>Page</i>
Letter of transmittal		4
<i>Chapter</i>	<i>Paragraphs</i>	
I. Establishment, organization and activities of the Special Committee		
A. Establishment of the Special Committee	1-12	4
B. Opening of the Special Committee's meetings in 1966	13-38	7
C. Organization of work	39-143	9
D. Meetings of the Special Committee and its Working Group and sub-committees	144-178	19
E. Consideration of Territories	179-183	21
F. Question of sending visiting groups to Territories	184-223	22
G. Implementation of General Assembly resolutions 2105 (XX) and 2107 (XX) and pertinent resolutions of the Special Committee: requests to international institutions and specialized agencies	224-262	25
H. Question of the list of Territories to which the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples is applicable	263-269	29
I. Consideration of other matters	270-295	30
J. Relations with other United Nations bodies	296-308	32
K. Review of work	309-324	35
L. Future work	325-336	37
M. Approval of the report	337	38
<i>Annex I. Paragraphs 6 to 13 of the report of Sub-Committee III</i>		38
<i>Annex II. Report of Sub-Committee II</i>	1-16	38
II. Meetings held in Africa		
Introduction	1-17	39
A. Meetings held at Dar es Salaam, United Republic of Tanzania	18-121	41
B. Meetings held at Mogadiscio, Somalia	122-231	50
C. Meetings held at Addis Ababa, Ethiopia	232-305	58
D. Meetings held at Cairo, United Arab Republic	306-439	64
E. Meetings held at Algiers, Algeria	440-594	75
F. Action arising from the Special Committee's visit to Africa	595-626	91
<i>Annexes I and II</i>		95
III. Southern Rhodesia		
<i>Part I</i>		
A. Action taken by the Special Committee, the Security Council and the General Assembly during 1965	1-16	96
B. Information on the Territory	17-335	99
C. Consideration by the Special Committee	336-531	125
D. Action taken by the Special Committee	532-588	146
E. Supplementary information concerning the Territory	589-738	152

* The present version is a consolidation of the text of the following documents as they appeared in mimeographed form: A/6300 (part I), dated 30 November 1966; A/6300 (part II), dated 21 November 1966; A/6300/Add.1 (part I), dated 7 October 1966; A/6300/Add.1 (part II) and Corr.1, dated 7 and 17 October 1966; A/6300/Add.2, dated 20 September 1966; A/6300/Add.3 (part I) and Corr.1, dated 8 and 17 November 1966; A/6300/Add.3 (part II), dated 8 November 1966; A/6300/Add.4, dated 21 October 1966; A/6300/Add.5, dated 19 September 1966; A/6300/Add.6, dated 8 November 1966; A/6300/Add.7, dated 25 November 1966; A/6300/Add.8, dated 24 November 1966; A/6300/Add.9, dated 16 November 1966; and A/6300/Add.10, dated 30 November 1966. For a check list of relevant documents, see *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-first Session, Annexes*, agenda item 23.

CONTENTS (<i>continued</i>)		
Chapter	Paragraphs	Page
F. Further consideration by the Special Committee	739-971	165
G. Further action taken by the Special Committee	972-1098	187
<i>Appendices I-III</i>		197
<i>Part II</i>		
H. Study of the activities of foreign economic and other interests in Southern Rhodesia and their mode of operation	1099-1134	199
<i>Annex. Report of Sub-Committee I</i>	1-103	202
<i>Appendices I and II</i>		211
IV. South West Africa		
A. Action taken by the Special Committee and by the General Assembly during 1965	1-5	260
B. Information on the Territory	6-68	262
C. Consideration by the Special Committee	69-252	268
D. Action taken by the Special Committee	253-308	285
E. Further consideration by the Special Committee	309-379	290
F. Further action taken by the Special Committee	380	296
G. Examination of petitions	381-384	296
<i>Appendix. Report of the Sub-Committee on South West Africa</i>	1-35	297
V. Territories under Portuguese administration		
<i>Part I</i>		
A. Action taken in 1965 by the Security Council, the General Assembly and the Special Committee	1-9	299
B. Information on the Territories	10-244	300
C. Consideration by the Special Committee	245-648	326
D. Action taken by the Special Committee	649-676	366
<i>Part II</i>		
E. Study of the activities of foreign economic and other interests which are impeding the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples in the Territories under Portuguese administration	677-688	370
<i>Annex. Supplementary report of Sub-Committee I</i>	1-91	371
<i>Appendices I-V</i>		378
VI. Aden		
A. Action taken by the Special Committee in 1965 and by the General Assembly at its twentieth session	1-3	457
B. Information on the Territory	4-58	458
C. Action taken by the Special Committee on certain petitions	59-99	463
D. Preliminary action taken by the Special Committee	100-153	467
E. Consideration by the Special Committee	154-336	473
F. Action taken by the Special Committee	337-383	492
G. Further consideration by the Special Committee	384-430	497
<i>Annexes I-V</i>		503
VII. Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland		
A. Action taken by the Special Committee in 1964 and 1965 and by the General Assembly at its twentieth session	1-4	508
B. Information on the Territories	5-135	508
C. Consideration by the Special Committee	136-213	519
D. Action taken by the Special Committee	214-238	527
E. Supplementary information on the Territories	239-326	529
F. Further consideration by the Special Committee	327-389	536
G. Further action taken by the Special Committee	390-398	543
H. Consideration of the report of the Sub-Committee on Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland	399-453	544
<i>Appendices I and II</i>		548
<i>Appendix III. Report of the Sub-Committee on Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland</i>	1-15	549
<i>Annex</i>		550
VIII. Fiji		
A. Action taken by the Special Committee in 1964 and by the General Assembly at its twentieth session	1-2	551
B. Information on the Territory	3-30	551
C. Consideration by the Special Committee	31-98	553
D. Action taken by the Special Committee	99-121	561
IX. Equatorial Guinea (Fernando Póo and Río Muni)		
A. Action previously taken by the Special Committee and the General Assembly	1-3	563

CONTENTS (continued)

Chapter		Paragraphs	Page
	B. Information on the Territory	4-32	563
	C. Consideration by the Special Committee	33-54	565
	D. Action taken by the Special Committee	55-91	567
	E. Further consideration by the Special Committee	92-94	571
	F. Action taken by the Special Committee on the report of the Sub-Committee on Equatorial Guinea (Fernando Póo and Río Muni)	95-114	571
	<i>Annex.</i> Report of the Sub-Committee on Equatorial Guinea (Fernando Póo and Río Muni)	1-311	573
	<i>Appendices I-IV</i>		598
X.	Ifni and Spanish Sahara		
	A. Action previously taken by the Special Committee and the General Assembly	1-3	599
	B. Information on the Territories	4-61	600
	C. Consideration by the Special Committee	62-115	603
	D. Action taken by the Special Committee	116	609
	E. Further consideration by the Special Committee	117-191	609
	F. Further action taken by the Special Committee	192-243	617
	<i>Annex</i>	1-5	621
XI.	Gibraltar		
	A. Action previously taken by the Special Committee and the General Assembly	1-2	622
	B. Information on the Territory	3-22	622
	C. Consideration by the Special Committee	23-54	623
	D. Action taken by the Special Committee	55-66	626
XII.	French Somaliland		
	A. Information on the Territory	1-66	627
	B. Consideration by the Special Committee	67-158	633
	C. Further consideration by the Special Committee	159-218	642
	D. Decision taken by the Special Committee	219	648
	<i>Annexes I-III</i>		648
XIII.	Oman		
	A. Previous consideration and action by the General Assembly	1-5	654
	B. Information on Oman	6-70	655
	C. Consideration by the Special Committee	71-117	662
	D. Action taken by the Special Committee	118	666
	<i>Annexes I and II</i>		666
XIV.	Mauritius, Seychelles and St. Helena		
	A. Action previously taken by the Special Committee and the General Assembly	1-4	670
	B. Information on the Territories	5-152	671
	C. Consideration by the Special Committee	153-203	682
	D. Action taken by the Special Committee on the report of Sub-Committee I <i>Annex.</i> Report of Sub-Committee I	204 1-65	687 687
XV.	Gilbert and Ellice Islands, Pitcairn and the Solomon Islands		
	A. Action taken by the Special Committee in 1964 and by the General Assembly at its twentieth session	1-2	693
	B. Information on the Territories	3-30	693
	C. Consideration by the Special Committee	31-32	695
	D. Action taken by the Special Committee on the report of Sub-Committee II <i>Annex.</i> Report of Sub-Committee II	33-35 1-25	695 696
XVI.	Niue and Tokelau Islands		
	A. Action taken by the Special Committee in 1964 and by the General Assembly at its twentieth session	1-2	698
	B. Information on the Territories	3-17	698
	C. Consideration by the Special Committee	18	699
	D. Action taken by the Special Committee on the report of Sub-Committee II <i>Annex.</i> Report of Sub-Committee II	19-22 1-26	699 700
XVII.	New Hebrides		
	A. Action taken by the Special Committee in 1964 and by the General Assembly at its twentieth session	1-2	702
	B. Information on the Territory	3-19	703
	C. Consideration by the Special Committee	20-21	704
	D. Action taken by the Special Committee on the report of Sub-Committee II <i>Annex.</i> Report of Sub-Committee II	22-24 1-21	704 704

CONTENTS (*continued*)

<i>Chapter</i>		<i>Paragraphs</i>	<i>Page</i>
XVIII.	American Samoa, Guam and the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands		
	A. Action taken by the Special Committee in 1964 and by the General Assembly at its twentieth session	1-4	705
	B. Information on the Territories	5-43	706
	C. Consideration by the Special Committee	44-54	709
	D. Action taken by the Special Committee on the report of Sub-Committee II	55-66	710
	<i>Annex.</i> Report of Sub-Committee II	1-31	711
XIX.	Trust Territory of Nauru, Papua and the Trust Territory of New Guinea, and Cocos (Keeling) Islands		
	A. Action taken by the Special Committee in 1964 and by the General Assembly at its twentieth session	1-6	715
	B. Information on the Territories	7-48	715
	C. Consideration by the Special Committee	49-66	719
	D. Action taken by the Special Committee on the report of Sub-Committee II	67-73	721
	<i>Annex.</i> Report of Sub-Committee II	1-29	722
XX.	Brunei		
	Information on the Territory	1-14	725
XXI.	Hong Kong		
	Information on the Territory	1-23	726
XXII.	United States Virgin Islands, British Virgin Islands, Antigua, Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat, St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, Barbados, Bermuda, Bahamas, Turks and Caicos Islands, Cayman Islands, Falkland Islands (Malvinas) and British Honduras		
	A. Action taken by the Special Committee in 1964 and by the General Assembly at its twentieth session	1-9	728
	B. Information on the Territories	10-324	729
	C. Consideration by the Special Committee	325-449	753
	D. Action taken by the Special Committee	450-469	768
	<i>Annex.</i> Report of Sub-Committee III	1-212	771
XXIII.	Information on Non-Self-Governing Territories transmitted under Article 73 e of the Charter of the United Nations and related questions	1-44	791
	<i>Appendix</i>	1-4	794
	<i>ANNEX</i>		
	List of delegations		796

LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

30 November 1966

Sir,

I have the honour to transmit to you the report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, submitted to the General Assembly in accordance with Assembly resolution 2105 (XX) of 20 December 1965. This report covers the work of the Special Committee during 1966.

Accept, Sir, the assurances of my highest consideration.

(*Signed*) Gershon B. O. COLLIER
Chairman

His Excellency U Thant
Secretary-General
United Nations
New York

CHAPTER I*

ESTABLISHMENT, ORGANIZATION AND ACTIVITIES
OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE

A. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE

1. The General Assembly, at its fifteenth session, by resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960, adopted

* Previously issued under the symbol A/6300 (part I).

the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.

2. At its sixteenth session, the General Assembly considered the situation with regard to the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independ-

ence to Colonial Countries and Peoples and adopted resolution 1654 (XVI) of 27 November 1961, by which it established a Special Committee of seventeen members to examine the application of the Declaration, to make suggestions and recommendations on the progress and extent of the implementation of the Declaration, and to report to the General Assembly at its seventeenth session. The Special Committee was directed "to carry out its task by employment of all means which it will have at its disposal within the framework of the procedures and modalities which it shall adopt for the proper discharge of its functions".

3. At its seventeenth session the General Assembly, following its consideration of the report of the Special Committee,¹ adopted resolution 1810 (XVII) of 17 December 1962, by which it enlarged the Special Committee by the addition of seven new members. It invited the Special Committee "to continue to seek the most suitable ways and means for the speedy and total application of the Declaration to all territories which have not yet attained independence".

4. At the same session, the General Assembly, in its resolution 1805 (XVII) of 14 December 1962 on the question of South West Africa, requested the Special Committee to discharge, *mutatis mutandis*, the tasks assigned to the Special Committee for South West Africa by resolution 1702 (XVI). By resolution 1806 (XVII) of 14 December 1962, the General Assembly decided to dissolve the Special Committee for South West Africa.

5. The General Assembly, at its eighteenth session, following its consideration of the report of the Special Committee,² adopted resolution 1956 (XVIII) of 11 December 1963. In this resolution, it requested the Special Committee "to continue to seek the best ways and means for the immediate and total application of the Declaration to all territories which have not yet attained independence, and to report to the General Assembly not later than at its nineteenth session".

6. At the same session, the General Assembly, in its resolution 1899 (XVIII) of 13 November 1963 on the question of South West Africa, requested the Special Committee to continue its efforts with a view to discharging the tasks assigned to it by resolution 1805 (XVII.)

7. The General Assembly at the same session, by resolution 1970 (XVIII) of 16 December 1963, decided to dissolve the Committee on Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories and requested the Special Committee to study the information transmitted under Article 73 e of the Charter of the United Nations. It also requested the Special Committee to take this information fully into account in examining the situation with regard to the implementation of the Declaration in each of the Non-Self-Governing Territories and to undertake any special study and prepare any special report it might consider necessary.

8. At its nineteenth session, the General Assembly was unable to consider the report of the Special Committee on its work during 1964.³ The Special Commit-

tee, however, continued to discharge its mandate during 1965 in the context of the declaration made by the President at the 1330th plenary meeting of the General Assembly at its nineteenth session, on 18 February 1965, to the effect that the General Assembly should for its own official records note that reports relating, *inter alia*, to the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples had in fact been received and that those bodies which had continuing responsibilities such as the Special Committee should continue to function, subject to the agreed budgetary limits for 1965.

9. At its twentieth session, the General Assembly, following its consideration of the reports of the Special Committee for 1964 (A/5800/Rev.1)⁴ and 1965 (A/6000/Rev.1),⁵ adopted resolution 2105 (XX) of 20 December 1965. The text of this resolution is reproduced below:

"The General Assembly,

"Recalling the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, contained in its resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960, and its resolutions 1654 (XVI) of 27 November 1961, 1810 (XVII) of 17 December 1962 and 1956 (XVIII) of 11 December 1963,

"Recalling also its resolutions 1805 (XVII) of 14 December 1962 and 1899 (XVIII) of 13 November 1963 by which it assigned to the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples tasks relating to South West Africa, and its resolution 1970 (XVIII) of 16 December 1963 by which it entrusted to the Special Committee additional functions relating to information transmitted under Article 73 e of the Charter of the United Nations,

"Having considered the reports prepared by the Special Committee for the years 1964 (A/5800/Rev.1) and 1965 (A/6000/Rev.1),

"Noting with deep regret that five years after the adoption of the Declaration many Territories are still under colonial domination,

"Deploping the negative attitude of certain colonial Powers, and in particular the unacceptable attitude of the Governments of Portugal and South Africa, which refuse to recognize the right of colonial peoples to independence,

"Concerned about the policy of colonial Powers to circumvent the rights of colonial peoples through the promotion of the systematic influx of foreign immigrants and the dislocation, deportation and transfer of the indigenous inhabitants,

"Noting the action taken and envisaged by the Special Committee regarding the list of Territories to which the Declaration is applicable,

"Deploping further the attitude of certain States which, despite the resolutions of the General Assembly and of the Special Committee, continue to co-operate with the Governments of Portugal and South Africa and even to provide them with aid which is being used by the two Governments to intensify the repression of the oppressed African populations.

¹ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Seventeenth Session, Annexes, addendum to agenda item 25, document A/5238.*

² *Ibid., Eighteenth Session, Annexes, addendum to agenda item 23, document A/5446/Rev.1.*

³ At its nineteenth session, the General Assembly adopted resolution 2005 (XIX) of 18 February 1965, authorizing supervision by the United Nations of the elections which were to be held in the Cook Islands in April 1965.

⁴ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Nineteenth Session, Annexes, annex No. 8 (part I).*

⁵ *Ibid., Twentieth Session, Annexes, addendum to agenda item 23.*

"Fully aware that the continuation of colonial rule and the practice of apartheid as well as all forms of racial discrimination threaten international peace and security and constitute a crime against humanity,

"Having adopted resolutions on specific Territories considered by the Special Committee,

"1. *Reaffirms* its resolutions 1514 (XV), 1654 (XVI), 1810 (XVII) and 1956 (XVIII);

"2. *Notes with appreciation* the work accomplished by the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples and congratulates it on the efforts it has made to implement the Declaration;

"3. *Approves* the reports of the Special Committee and again invites the administering Powers to implement the recommendations contained therein;

"4. *Deeply regrets* the refusal of certain colonial Powers to co-operate with the Special Committee and their continued disregard of the resolutions of the General Assembly;

"5. *Calls upon* the colonial Powers to discontinue their policy of violating the rights of colonial peoples through the systematic influx of foreign immigrants and the dislocation, deportation and transfer of the indigenous inhabitants;

"6. *Requests* the Special Committee to continue to perform its task and to continue to seek the best means for the immediate and full application of resolution 1514 (XV) to all Territories which have not yet attained independence;

"7. *Approves* the programme of work envisaged by the Special Committee during 1966, including the possibility of holding a series of meetings in Africa and the sending of visiting groups to Territories, particularly in the Atlantic, Indian and Pacific Ocean areas;

"8. *Requests* the Special Committee to pay particular attention to the small Territories and to recommend to the General Assembly the most appropriate ways, as well as the steps to be taken, to enable the populations of the small Territories to exercise fully their right to self-determination and independence;

"9. *Requests* the Special Committee, whenever it considers it appropriate, to recommend a deadline for the accession to independence of each Territory in accordance with the wishes of the people;

"10. *Recognizes* the legitimacy of the struggle by the peoples under colonial rule to exercise their right to self-determination and independence and invites all States to provide material and moral assistance to the national liberation movements in colonial Territories;

"11. *Requests* all States and international institutions, including the United Nations specialized agencies, to withhold assistance of any kind to the Governments of Portugal and South Africa until they renounce their policy of colonial domination and racial discrimination;

"12. *Requests* the colonial Powers to dismantle the military bases installed in colonial Territories and to refrain from establishing new ones;

"13. *Requests* the Special Committee to apprise the Security Council of developments in any Territory examined by it which may threaten international peace and security and to make suggestions which might assist the Council in considering appropriate measures under the Charter of the United Nations;

"14. *Requests* the Secretary-General to take all necessary measures to promote the large-scale dissemination of the Declaration and of the work of the Special Committee, in order that world opinion may be sufficiently informed of the serious threat to peace posed by colonialism and apartheid, and calls upon all administering Powers to co-operate with the Secretary-General in his efforts;

"15. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue to provide the Special Committee with all the facilities and personnel necessary for the implementation of its mandate."

10. At the same session, the General Assembly adopted a number of other resolutions assigning certain specific tasks to the Special Committee. Among these were the following resolutions concerning the items indicated:

Resolution No.	Adopted on	Item
2023 (XX)	5 November 1965	Aden
2063 (XX)	16 December 1965	Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland
2065 (XX)	16 December 1965	Falkland Islands (Malvinas)
2066 (XX)	16 December 1965	Mauritius
2067 (XX)	16 December 1965	Equatorial Guinea (Fernando Póo and Río Muni)
2068 (XX)	16 December 1965	Fiji
2069 (XX)	16 December 1965	American Samoa, Antigua, Bahamas, Barbados, Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Cocos (Keeling) Islands, Dominica, Gilbert and Ellice Islands, Grenada, Guam, Montserrat, New Hebrides, Niue, Papua, Pitcairn, St. Helena, St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, Seychelles, Solomon Islands, Tokelau Islands, Turks and Caicos Islands and the United States Virgin Islands
2070 (XX)	16 December 1965	Gibraltar
2072 (XX)	16 December 1965	Ifni and Spanish Sahara
2073 (XX)	17 December 1965	Oman
2074 (XX)	17 December 1965	South West Africa
2076 (XX)	17 December 1965	Special educational and training programmes for South West Africa

<i>Resolution No.</i>	<i>Adopted on</i>	<i>Item</i>
2106 (XX)	21 December 1965	International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
2108 (XX)	21 December 1965	Special training programme for Territories under Portuguese administration
2109 (XX)	21 December 1965	Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories transmitted under Article 73 e of the Charter of the United Nations
2110 (XX)	21 December 1965	Offers by Member States of study and training facilities for inhabitants of Non-Self-Governing Territories
2111 (XX)	21 December 1965	Trust Territory of Nauru
2112 (XX)	21 December 1965	Trust Territory of New Guinea and the Territory of Papua
2116 (XX)	21 December 1965	Pattern of meetings and methods of work

11. At the 1408th plenary meeting, on 21 December 1965, the President of the General Assembly announced the nomination of Afghanistan as a member of the Special Committee to fill the vacancy created by the withdrawal of Cambodia⁶ from the membership of the Committee. The Special Committee, therefore, was composed of the following twenty-four members:

Afghanistan	Sierra Leone
Australia	Syria
Bulgaria	United Republic of Tanzania
Chile	Tunisia
Denmark	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Ethiopia	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
India	Ireland
Iran	United States of America
Iraq	Uruguay
Italy	Venezuela
Ivory Coast	Yugoslavia
Madagascar	
Mali	
Poland	

12. This report covers the work of the Special Committee for the period 8 March to 30 November 1966 during which it held ninety plenary meetings, including forty meetings in Africa, and its Working Group and Sub-Committees held over 100 meetings.

B. OPENING OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE'S MEETINGS IN 1966

13. The first meeting of the Special Committee in 1966 (394th meeting), held on 8 March, was opened by the Secretary-General.

Opening statement by the Secretary-General

14. *The Secretary-General* welcomed the members of the Special Committee and particularly the newest member, the delegation of Afghanistan.

15. In the introduction to his last annual report on the work of the organization,⁷ he had observed that, while there had been a few positive developments, the major problems in the field of decolonization had remained without any positive movement towards peaceful solution. At the twentieth session of the General Assembly, the majority of delegations had expressed serious concern about the continued delay in the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. Accordingly, in resolution 2105 (XX), the General As-

sembly had requested the Special Committee to continue to seek the best means for the immediate and full application of the Declaration to all Territories which had not yet attained independence. Inspired by the same considerations, the Fourth Committee had for the first time given separate consideration not only to the more difficult colonial problems but to most of the Territories with which the Special Committee had been concerned. Consequently the General Assembly, on the recommendation of the Fourth Committee, had been able to adopt specific resolutions concerning individual Territories, which had outlined the particular direction, emphasis and action required in each case for the implementation of the Declaration.

16. In his note of 11 February 1966 (A/AC.109/L.260), he had drawn attention to the resolutions adopted by the Assembly at its twentieth session which concerned the work of the Special Committee. He had also made available a note (A/AC.109/L.261) drawing attention to specific points which members would wish to take into account in drawing up the programme of work for 1966.

17. The main problems before the Special Committee had not become more tractable. In particular, the situation in Southern Rhodesia was increasing the grave disquiet already felt by Member States. It might be appropriate to recall recent official statements by the United Kingdom Government to the effect that it would continue to seek a speedy end to the rebellion in the Territory and to help the people of Southern Rhodesia in making a fresh start towards majority rule and the establishment of a just society without discrimination. It was to be hoped that rapid progress would be registered in that regard and that, in conformity with the pertinent United Nations resolutions, the United Kingdom Government would without delay take the necessary measures to enable the people of Southern Rhodesia to determine their own future in accordance with the objectives of the Declaration.

18. With regard to the Territories under Portuguese administration, the Government of Portugal had maintained its disregard of the relevant United Nations resolutions. It had failed to give effect to the principle of self-determination as laid down in those resolutions and there was no sign of a reversal of its policy of political and economic integration of the Territories with Portugal. The situation in those Territories, which the Security Council had described as a serious disturbance of international peace and security, was one to which the Special Committee would probably wish to devote continued attention.

⁶ *Ibid.*, Annexes, agenda item 23, document A/5983.

⁷ *Ibid.*, Twentieth Session, Supplement No. 1 A.

19. The refusal of the South African Government to implement the resolutions of the General Assembly and the Special Committee concerning South West Africa were also a matter for serious concern. Far from discontinuing its policy of apartheid, the South African Government seemed to be taking various steps for the further implementation of that policy, including measures for the establishment of non-European "homelands". That grave situation would no doubt be the subject of consideration by the Special Committee in the light of current developments.

20. In resolution 2063 (XX), the General Assembly had requested the Special Committee to consider, in co-operation with the Secretary-General, what measures were necessary for securing the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland. In transmitting the General Assembly resolution to Governments, he had requested information on the extent to which they would be prepared to make contributions towards the Fund for the economic development of those Territories. The Fund had been the subject of one of the recommendations which he had submitted in 1965 and which had been endorsed by the Special Committee and the General Assembly. A positive response from Governments would be a constructive step towards the achievement of the objectives sought by the Special Committee and the General Assembly.

21. The General Assembly had also requested the Special Committee to pay particular attention to the smaller Territories. Adequate information on the political, economic and social situation in those Territories and on the opinions, wishes and aspirations of the people would facilitate that task. In that connexion, the Special Committee's intention to use visiting groups, which had been endorsed by the General Assembly, was especially relevant.

22. The work of the Special Committee in 1966 would be unusually onerous and the programme of meetings correspondingly heavy. For that reason, he wished to draw attention to General Assembly resolution 2116 (XX) on the pattern of conferences and to express the hope that, in drawing up its programme of work, the Committee would appreciate the need for rational planning to facilitate the provision of the required technical and substantive support.

23. He offered good wishes for the success of the Committee's work and expressed his confidence that it would make a further constructive contribution to the implementation of the Declaration in conditions of peace and harmony. It was to be hoped that the Special Committee would receive all necessary co-operation from the administering Powers concerned.

Statement by members

24. The representative of *Mali* thanked the Secretary-General for having come in person to open the Committee's first meeting in 1966. His statement would be a source of inspiration to the members of the Committee, who saw in him an ardent defender of freedom and justice, tireless in his efforts to ensure respect for the rights of the oppressed peoples.

25. The Special Committee was beginning its meetings at a very troubled time. The international situation was marked by grave crises which might at any moment degenerate into a world conflict. The basic causes of those crises were the numerous violations of the right to self-determination and the numerous foreign interventions in the domestic affairs of other countries. While

the people still under colonial domination were waging national liberation struggles against the colonial forces, the newly independent countries were subjected to an increasingly strenuous onslaught from imperialism and neo-colonialism. The determination of the colonial and neo-colonial Powers to preserve their political and economic domination was a serious violation of the United Nations Charter, which included important provisions on the right to self-determination. The Special Committee should work unrelentingly to ensure that colonial peoples could fully exercise their right to independence and self-determination and should unflinchingly denounce the abuses of the colonial Powers.

26. The representative of *Afghanistan* said that his country regarded membership of the Special Committee as a privilege and an honour. Afghanistan, which had shown whole-hearted support for the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, had always given full approval to the recommendations of the Special Committee. Its devotion to the cause of the abolition of colonialism in all its forms and manifestations was a matter of recorded history. Afghanistan had been the first country in Asia to oppose colonialism from the moment of its appearance. At the cost of untold sacrifices, it had waged a struggle against colonialism and had finally been able to stand among the peoples and nations of the world as a champion of the cause which was enshrined in the mind of man and the conscience of humanity and had been reflected in the Declaration. It was in that spirit that Afghanistan would co-operate fully in the Special Committee in efforts to achieve justice and equality among all nations and peoples. The foremost desire of Afghanistan was that all peoples and nations should achieve their goals and fulfil their aspirations through understanding and by peaceful means.

27. The representative of *Ethiopia* expressed his delegation's appreciation of the wise statement by the Secretary-General, which would help and guide the Committee in its work. His delegation was convinced that, although certain racist minorities were still bent on the futile course of trying to reverse the inexorable tide of history, the Committee would remain firm in the discharge of its duties until all the colonial peoples were emancipated and colonial domination had been replaced by freedom and independence.

28. The representative of *Uruguay*, speaking on behalf of the Latin American countries, which were represented on the Committee by his own delegation and those of Chile and Venezuela, said that the Latin American countries had not always been staunch advocates of law, democracy and freedom but had unswervingly supported the principles upheld by the Committee in its efforts to liberate the oppressed peoples and to eradicate colonialism, so that the rule of law and freedom might be the guiding principle of coexistence between men and nations.

29. The representative of the *United Republic of Tanzania* thanked the Secretary-General for the wise words he had spoken and stated that the United Republic of Tanzania had always appreciated the value of the Committee, for it would not consider that its own independence had been totally achieved until every African in the continent could breathe the air of freedom. His country looked forward eagerly to the day when all those now under the colonial yoke would have achieved independence. Its policies with regard to the evils of colonialism were well defined and it would

never deviate from them. His delegation would work untiringly in the cause of decolonization and would co-operate with all those who were striving to eradicate colonialism and thus to complete the task of the Committee at an early date.

30. The representative of the *Ivory Coast* said that, as the Secretary-General had stressed in his heartening words to the Committee, the task that the General Assembly had assigned to the Committee was one of great magnitude. He was sure that all the members of the Committee would approach that task with the same feelings with which they had always been animated and which had been so well understood by the outgoing officers, whose work had been highly appreciated by his delegation.

31. The representative of the *Union of Soviet Socialist Republics* expressed his delegation's gratitude to the Secretary-General for the unflagging interest he had shown in the work of the Committee. The Secretary-General's statement at the present meeting and the support which he gave the Special Committee would undoubtedly be a source of inspiration to its members to do everything possible within the framework of the United Nations to implement the lofty ideals of the Charter of the United Nations and the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. He welcomed the delegation of Afghanistan as a new member of the Committee and expressed the conviction that Afghanistan, a country whose untiring efforts in the struggle against the forces of colonialism were well known, would make a valuable contribution to the common efforts to bring about the rapid elimination of the remaining colonial régimes.

Election of officers

32. At its 394th meeting, on 8 March 1966, the Special Committee unanimously elected the following officers:

Chairmen: Mr. Gershon Collier (Sierra Leone)

Vice-Chairmen: Mr. José Piñera (Chile) and Mr. John Malecela (United Republic of Tanzania)

Rapporteur: Mr. Ala'uddin Aljubouri (Iraq)

Statement by the Chairman

33. *The Chairman* thanked the members of the Special Committee for the high honour conferred upon his country and his person. He hoped to be able to guide the work of the Committee into productive channels along the lines already laid down by his illustrious predecessor.

34. He also wished to express to the Secretary-General the Committee's gratitude for his having attended the meeting and having made a comprehensive statement on the work and problems of the Committee.

35. The Special Committee had made a remarkable contribution to the process of decolonization throughout the world. Its visit to Africa in 1965 had brought its work nearer to those peoples of Africa who were still suffering under colonial rule and had given publicity to its work. Since millions of people were still struggling for equality and dignity, the Committee should pursue its mandate with increased vigour. It should extend its activities outside New York to reach the victims of colonialism all over the world and particularly in Africa. Only if co-operation was displayed by all members would the Committee's work reflect a real consensus of United Nations thinking and demonstrate that the

Organization was totally committed to the eradication of colonialism. The efforts of the Special Committee would do much to uphold the rule of law and would make a worthy contribution to the ennoblement of the United Nations as the real conscience of the international community.

Statement by the outgoing Chairman

36. Mr. Sori Coulibaly (Mali) speaking as the outgoing Chairman, stated that the progress of decolonization was slow, not because the Committee had spared any effort, but because there were men and Governments that did not believe in the equality of peoples and continued to violate the principles of the Charter. Governments, imperialist companies and men who lived by exploiting others preferred to ignore all humanitarian principles and derive super-profits at the price of the blood and sweat of the patriots of Angola, Mozambique, so-called Portuguese Guinea, South West Africa, Southern Rhodesia, South Africa and elsewhere. The Government of Portugal was murdering and torturing Africans in order to maintain the privileges which kept alive a backward metropolitan country incapable of adaptation. In South Africa and South West Africa, apartheid and a police régime were maintaining a white population in opulence while the Africans were herded into reservations on the soil of their ancestors. In Southern Rhodesia, a white racist minority had proclaimed the independence of the Territory in order to perpetuate its domination over almost 4½ million Africans.

37. The persistence of those anachronistic situations was a threat to international peace and security and a challenge to the United Nations and the Special Committee. The Committee would have an important place in the history of the struggle against injustice, exploitation and humiliation. Colonialism and apartheid should be liquidated as soon as possible, because they were a disgrace to mankind. At a time when man was liberating himself from the laws of gravity and walking in outer space, colonial domination and apartheid were paradoxical, unjust, humiliating and abhorrent. The colonial peoples, which suffered not only from exploitation but also from humiliation, placed great hopes in the Committee. The Committee should go to their countries, live their tragic life and tell the world about them. It should forcefully fight the colonial Powers and exert effective pressure on all States which gave assistance to those Powers as were responsible for the arbitrary activities of the racist minorities illegally in power in certain colonial or semi-colonial territories. The delegation of Afghanistan would no doubt make an important contribution to the work of the Committee.

38. He expressed gratitude to all his friends and colleagues for their confidence and understanding and to the Under-Secretary and the other members of the Secretariat for their assistance. The tributes paid to him by the members of the Committee had shown that the differences of opinion which had from time to time arisen had not affected the deep feelings of friendship and respect which bound them together.

C. ORGANIZATION OF WORK

39. The Special Committee discussed the organization of its work for the year at its 394th, 395th to 397th and 399th meetings, at which general statements were made by members.

Statements by members

40. The representative of the *Union of Soviet Socialist Republics* stated that the Committee should adopt procedures that would enable it to move forward towards achieving the goal proclaimed in the Charter and in the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, namely that of guaranteeing to all peoples, large and small, the right to self-determination and independence. While a decisive part in the struggle for the definitive elimination of colonial régimes would, of course, be played by the peoples themselves, with the support given to them by many States which had adopted an anti-colonialist policy, the Government of the Soviet Union considered that the United Nations, which was the most comprehensive international forum, could and should play a useful role in that struggle.

41. The adoption in 1960 of the United Nations Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, the decisions of the twentieth session of the General Assembly recognizing the legality of the struggle of the peoples for freedom and independence, the appeal by the General Assembly to all States to provide moral and material assistance in that struggle, and the condemnation of colonialism in all its manifestations as a crime against humanity and a threat to peace and security had proved to be of substantial political support in the people's fight to throw off the colonial yoke.

42. The Special Committee had a special role to play in the anti-colonialist struggle by unmasking the colonialists and drawing attention to the situation in colonial territories. In his opinion, the Committee had been right the previous year to decide, on the initiative of the Afro-Asian and socialist States, to hold a series of meetings on African countries. Those meetings had produced positive results; they had enabled the Committee to enlist the participation in its work of many representatives of national liberation movements in African colonies, to work out and adopt more effective provisions which had formed the basis for the decisions of the twentieth session of the General Assembly, to establish contact with the Organization of African Unity and to strengthen the unity of those countries which supported the rapid elimination of the remaining colonial régimes. The experiment should certainly be continued and, in accordance with paragraph 7 of General Assembly resolution 2105 (XX), the Committee should decide to hold a session in Africa in the current year.

43. His delegation had supported that resolution and continued to think that a further session in Africa was essential and would be of great value. At its meetings in Africa the Committee would be able to make a comprehensive examination of the progress made in the implementation of the decisions of the General Assembly, the Security Council and the Committee itself on such important questions as Southern Rhodesia, the Portuguese colonies, South West Africa and other matters connected with the elimination of colonial régimes in Africa. It would also be able to give its views on the action which should be taken by the General Assembly and the Security Council to compel the colonialists to comply with United Nations decisions on those issues.

44. The Soviet Union delegation welcomed the invitation extended to the Special Committee by the Government of Tanzania to visit Dar es Salaam in 1966 and to hold some of its meetings in Africa in close prox-

imity to the places where Africans were waging a struggle for liberation from the colonialist yoke. His delegation would also like to express its support for the idea put forward by several delegations during the Committee's session in Africa that the Security Council should hold a session in Africa to consider the situation in Southern Rhodesia and the Portuguese colonies and to examine the policy of apartheid pursued by the Government of the Republic of South Africa in South Africa and in South West Africa. Such a session would enable the representatives of African countries and the leaders of the national liberation movements to participate in the work of the Council with a view to working out specific measures, in accordance with the Charter, to ensure the implementation of the decisions adopted by the Security Council and other United Nations organs. It would also make it possible to co-ordinate the work of the Security Council and the Organization of African Unity on those questions.

45. During the twentieth session of the General Assembly, the representatives of a number of national and patriotic organizations in South West Africa, as well as the overwhelming majority of the Members of the United Nations, had resolutely condemned the policy pursued by the racist Verwoerd régime in respect of South West Africa and had called for the unconditional implementation of United Nations resolutions concerning that Territory. In particular, many delegations had favoured the adoption by the United Nations of a decision to terminate South Africa's Mandate over South West Africa and to take specific steps to transfer power in the Territory to the legitimate representatives of the people. The Soviet Union delegation entirely shared the views of those delegations. The examination by the Special Committee and the General Assembly of the situation in South West Africa had shown that the Government of South Africa was using the Mandate to serve the interests of international monopolies and to further its annexationist policy in respect of that Territory.

46. In his opinion, the Special Committee would be perfectly justified in pronouncing itself unequivocally in favour of withdrawing the Mandate for South West Africa from the Republic of South Africa and recommending to the General Assembly and the Security Council the adoption of appropriate decisions on the subject. His delegation shared the view held by some Members of the United Nations that a special session of the General Assembly should be convened as soon as the International Court of Justice had completed its proceedings in the case of South West Africa, to consider the question of terminating South Africa's Mandate and of making appropriate recommendations to the Security Council so that the latter could take the necessary action.

47. It was well known that the colonial Powers had recourse to all kinds of manoeuvres to block the implementation of United Nations decisions, in order to preserve their rule in the Territories under their control. They resorted to various kinds of constitutional devices, bribery and conspiracy; they left people to rot in prison; they killed thousands of freedom-fighters and prohibited the activities of patriotic and nationalist parties and organizations. Where those methods of persecution and terror failed to produce the desired results, the colonialists resorted to overt forms of military oppression, using the most modern means of destruction, including napalm bombs and toxic substances. They interfered in the internal affairs of other States and imposed

systems that protected the interests of the imperialist monopolies. It was obvious that, in the face of those colonialist intrigues, the United Nations and all States must take new and resolute steps to bring about the final elimination of the remnants of the colonial system.

48. His delegation therefore considered that at the present stage of the Committee's work primary attention should be given to ensuring the implementation by the colonial Powers of the decisions adopted by the General Assembly at its twentieth session by the Security Council in regard to the granting of independence to Southern Rhodesia, the Portuguese colonies of Angola, Mozambique and so-called Portuguese Guinea, South West Africa, Aden and the entire southern part of the Arabian peninsula. His delegation shared the view expressed by a number of delegations at the twentieth session of the General Assembly that the Committee should seriously examine the question of setting specific dates for the granting of independence to colonial Territories in accordance with the wishes of the peoples. If the colonialists refused to carry out such decisions and failed to grant independence by the date specified, they should be declared aggressors and measures such as those provided in Chapter VII of the Charter should be enacted against them.

49. During the discussion of the report of the Special Committee at the twentieth session of the General Assembly, considerable attention had been devoted to the unsatisfactory situation regarding the implementation of the principles of the Declaration in respect of the smaller colonial Territories. It had been suggested that, in view of the inadequate information available regarding those Territories, visiting groups should be sent to them to establish direct contact with the people and their representatives. That legitimate request of the General Assembly should be fulfilled. If the colonial Powers were really in favour of the self-determination of peoples, they should abandon their position of refusing to allow representatives of the Special Committee to visit those Territories.

50. The General Assembly had adopted a number of important decisions on the consequences of the activities of foreign monopolies in colonial Territories, the liquidation of military bases in those Territories and the withholding of any economic, financial or technical assistance by the specialized agencies of the United Nations, particularly the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the International Monetary Fund, to the Governments of Portugal, the Republic of South Africa and the authorities of the white settler Government in Southern Rhodesia. The discussions in the Special Committee had shown clearly the harmful effects of the activities of the international monopolies and of the presence of military bases in those Territories and the danger which they represented for the cause of the liberation of peoples from colonial oppression. The Committee must do everything in its power to ensure that the decisions which the General Assembly had adopted on those questions were carried out and must call on the colonial Powers to provide it with all relevant information on the progress made in giving effect to those decisions.

51. The Committee should not be content to have submitted to the General Assembly its report on the implications of the activities of foreign monopolies in South West Africa and the Portuguese Territories; it should pursue, in co-operation with the Secretary-General, the study of that problem in respect of those Territories and in respect of Southern Rhodesia.

52. With regard to military bases in colonial Territories, the Committee in co-operation with the Secretary-General, should study the question of the harmful influence of such bases on the cause of the liberation of the peoples of those Territories from colonial oppression and should make recommendations to the General Assembly and the Security Council.

53. In addition, the Chairman or the officers of the Committee should establish direct contact with the specialized agencies and request them to submit information on the action taken or envisaged with a view to implementing the United Nations recommendations concerning the cessation of economic, financial and technical assistance to Portugal, the Republic of South Africa and the white settler Government in Southern Rhodesia.

54. The Special Committee might take the initiative in drawing the attention of other United Nations bodies, in particular the Social Commission and the Commission on the Status of Women, to aspects of the criminal policies of the colonialists which came within the competence of those bodies. He recalled that, on the initiative of the Special Committee, the question of the flagrant violation of human rights in colonial Territories had been included as an important and urgent matter in the provisional agenda of the twenty-second session of the Commission and he hoped that such co-operation among United Nations organs would be continued.

55. In the post-war period, the national liberation movement had dealt a crushing blow to the colonial system of imperialism, oppression and enslavement and dozens of newly independent countries had been built upon the ruins of the old colonialist world. The last vestiges of the colonial system were crumbling but the colonialists continued to offer stubborn resistance and to do everything possible to maintain their domination. It was the duty of the United Nations and of the Special Committee to help the peoples who were fighting for their liberation and to do their utmost to ensure the implementation of the principles of the Charter and the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. The Soviet Union Government's position in that regard was in complete accord with the purposes and principles of the Declaration and his delegation was prepared to co-operate closely with all delegations which supported anti-colonialism.

56. In conclusion, he informed the Committee that the previous day the Soviet Union Government had become one of the first nine countries to sign the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.

57. The representative of *Italy* stated that his delegation was facing the new session of the Special Committee in the firm conviction that the Committee was contributing to an important task, namely, the transformation of the society of nations from an old structure into a new order in which there would be freedom and equal opportunities for all nations, under the rule of law. Although that transformation had already been accomplished to a great extent, the Committee was still called upon to secure the disappearance from the face of the earth of the remnants of colonialism and to ensure that that change was brought about by peaceful means, through the process of self-determination. The General Assembly had requested the Committee to keep the problem of decolonization in the spotlight of world public opinion and at the same time to study all the details and complexities—political, economic, social, cultural—that had prevented the speedy attainment of

independence by a considerable number of Territories still under consideration. He was referring in particular to the subject of small Territories, which was on the agenda and for which his delegation would suggest a high degree of priority.

58. His delegation firmly believed in the value of the methods of conversation, negotiation, conciliation and compromise—not as far as principles were concerned, but with regard to practical measures—and favoured calling the attention of what had been rightly defined as the “world conscience” to specific problems in order to exert all due moral pressure on reluctant parties. His delegation placed great reliance on the role that the Secretary-General could play in facilitating the solution of problems arising out of colonial situations. It hoped that the Special Committee would not be a prisoner of old formulas that were applicable to conventional decolonization but which might be less valid for the special cases on the agenda.

59. The three points to be considered in the organization of the Committee's work were the agenda, the priorities and the methods of work.

60. With regard to the agenda, the resolutions on the subject of decolonization adopted by the General Assembly at its twentieth session gave a clear picture of the work required of the Committee. The papers prepared by the Secretariat (A/AC.109/L.260 and L.261) were also useful and he suggested that document A/AC.109/L.261 could be regarded as the provisional agenda for 1966.

61. With regard to priorities, his delegation regarded all colonial problems as urgent and would accept any recommendation agreeable to the majority of members. He hoped that the Committee would give adequate priority to the problem of so-called small Territories, which were particularly complex and required special attention.

62. As far as methods of work were concerned, the Committee should take a preliminary position on a number of important questions. The first was whether in the weeks to come and in its report to the General Assembly the Committee should consider all or only some of the territories listed in document A/AC.109/L.261. His delegation favoured consideration of them all; whichever policy was adopted, however, it was essential to adhere to it and not change it in mid-session.

63. The second question was whether resolutions should be based on debates held in plenary meetings or on sub-committee discussions and reports to the full Committee. His delegation favoured the sub-committee method, which had proved successful in the preparation of a large part of the Committee's 1965 report.

64. Lastly, the question of a time-table was more urgent than usual, in view of the provisions of General Assembly resolution 2116 (XX) on the pattern of conferences.

65. His delegation appreciated the reasons which had prompted four Member States to invite the Committee to hold part of its 1966 session in their respective capitals, but it felt that a decision on the matter could be taken only after careful consideration of the organizational problems he had outlined. Preliminary consideration of those problems could be referred, as in the past, to an expanded working group consisting of the officers of the Committee and four other members, but it would be necessary to hear the views of as many Committee members as possible before the working group was actually convened.

66. The representative of *Yugoslavia* said that the problems before the Committee were as difficult as ever. Certain colonial Powers, supported by others with identical interests, were doing their utmost to retain their influence in the Territories under colonial rule, to suppress national liberation movements and to halt progressive processes on a wider scale. Such a situation was an evident danger to peace and security, as had been recognized by the great majority of the representatives who had spoken at the twentieth session of the General Assembly.

67. The Committee's session in Africa in 1965 had been of great value. Such visits and contacts with petitioners enabled the members of the Committee to study the situation in certain Territories, the attitudes of the administering Powers towards the problems of the Territories and the extent to which the provisions of certain resolutions had been implemented. A further session of the Special Committee in Africa would be in keeping with the spirit of General Assembly resolution 2011 (XX) on co-operation between the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity and his delegation hoped that such co-operation would become a constant feature of the Committee's activities.

68. He hoped that in preparing the Committee's programme the Working Group would consider the problem of the participation of foreign capital in the economies of colonial Territories, which was closely related to the protraction of the decolonizing process.

69. The problems of so-called small Territories also were significant; visiting missions of the Special Committee to such Territories would help towards the solution of the problem.

70. His delegation regarded the problems of colonialism and peace as interdependent. It was ready to support all measures that would guarantee faster and more effective action by the Committee in speeding the process of decolonization and the implementation of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV).

71. The representative of *India* said that in the planning of the calendar of work it should be borne in mind that the Committee was beginning its session three or four weeks later than in previous years. In spite of the reduced time available, however, the Committee must follow the specific instructions of the General Assembly to keep the various Territories under discussion and to report to the Assembly at its twenty-first session.

72. He hoped that a working group to discuss the Committee's programme would be announced at the next meeting or soon after. The working group could plan which Territories would be taken up during the next three months and make recommendations concerning a possible visit to Africa, which would require a good deal of advance preparation. His delegation had always considered that it was useful for the Committee to visit Africa, for such visits gave the members a more realistic picture of the situation in the Territories.

73. The Sub-Committee on Petitions should be appointed and start functioning soon, since there were a number of petitions awaiting action. Similarly, the Committee should decide whether the three Sub-Committees on the small Territories in the Caribbean and the Atlantic Ocean, in the Indian Ocean and in the Pacific Ocean should be revived or whether their composition should be changed.

74. Lastly, there were important questions relating to the Committee's report to the General Assembly. In

the past the Committee's reports had run to almost 2,000 pages each year and few people, if any, were able to read them in their entirety. In view of the financial problems and the vast amount of work entailed in the preparation and translation of such voluminous reports, he hoped that the Committee would be able to consider, in the early weeks of the session, what could be done to reduce the size of the report while preserving the right of every delegation to make known its views.

75. The representative of the *United Kingdom* said that in its four years of work the Special Committee had virtually completed its examination of the colonial Territories on its agenda and a large number of resolutions had been adopted by the General Assembly on the basis of the Committee's recommendations. His Government had whole-heartedly supported some points in those resolutions, had partially agreed with others and had found others unacceptable. The disagreements in the Committee had been mainly concerned with methods, since in most recent cases there was general agreement on the Committee's objectives. It had been suggested that the Committee should concentrate on seeing that the provisions of all the Assembly resolutions were carried out. He did not think that that was necessarily the right, or the only, approach. It would be more productive to examine carefully the practical problems of the various Territories and the means for overcoming them. This required steady and detailed work, not necessarily by resolution but perhaps more by consensus. The special difficulties and characteristics of each Territory should be considered in greater depth, and perhaps in a more objective manner, than during the first general examination.

76. His Government bore the responsibility for the administration of United Kingdom Territories and for their progress to full self-government and self-determination, but it fully recognized the interest of the international community in those matters and had always willingly co-operated with the Committee in its work. That co-operation would be continued in the future, for the United Kingdom objectives were the same as those often endorsed by the Committee, namely, self-determination, decolonization at all practicable speed, and urgent help to the colonial peoples to enable them to take their place in the modern world with a status that they themselves had freely chosen and accepted.

77. If the Committee was to make a more truly objective study, however, it would have to go beyond those objectives and face the real and varied problem in the remaining colonial Territories. His Government's policies in the Territories it administered were naturally designed to help the people of those Territories to overcome their problems, which ranged from racial divisions and suspicions in some places to economic backwardness or a lack of any feeling of national unity and consciousness in others. His delegation was ready to provide the Committee with information on those policies and would welcome constructive proposals from the Committee. The United Kingdom Permanent Representative and Minister of State in New York would willingly take part in informal discussions of problems or proposals; moreover, the Colonial Secretary in London was prepared to consider any suggestion that representatives of the Committee should visit London to discuss particular cases of special importance or complexity.

78. The United Kingdom's contributions could be made more effective by some adjustments in the Committee's methods of work. First, in the light of

General Assembly resolution 2116 (XX) and of the recommendations of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions,⁸ the Committee should draw up within the next week or two its detailed programme for the entire year, with dates for discussions of particular Territories or subjects laid down from the outset. There might be some loss of flexibility, but that would be far outweighed by the improvement in the organization of the work. The administering Powers, including the United Kingdom, could then prepare more effectively for discussion of their own Territories and could provide the Committee with more information and, where appropriate, bring in specialists and experts from their own countries or possibly from the Territories themselves.

79. The second aspect of the more constructive elaboration he suggested would be increased consultation between the Working Group and the administering Power concerned. His delegation had no doubt whatsoever of the great usefulness of the Working Group and favoured its continuation.

80. Similarly, the preparation and drafting of reports and draft resolutions could be based on a broader cross-section of opinion in the Committee, taking the views of the administering Powers more fully into account; the Committee's work might then be more productive and more objective, and hence of more real value to the people of the colonial Territories themselves. The wishes and views of the colonial peoples, as publicly expressed through their democratically elected leaders and representatives, might be reflected more fully in the Committee's reports and recommendations. Resolutions frequently reflected only the point of view of the majority; the Committee might usefully proceed much more by balanced consensus or by reports which adequately covered all the points of view, even when they were in conflict.

81. The use of small groups or sub-committees within the Committee to deal with particular Territories or areas had obvious advantages: small groups could consider problems in greater depth and perhaps with less formality. In the past, however, some of the advantage had been lost by the subsequent full debates on the same subjects in the plenary Committee. To avoid duplication, the Committee might in appropriate cases refrain from full debates on the reports of small groups and, instead, incorporate those reports in its report to the General Assembly without necessarily endorsing or approving them.

82. While his delegation was grateful to the four African Governments which had extended invitations to the Committee, all he had said about the advantages of small groups and the undesirability of expanded debate by the full Committee applied with even greater force to the suggestion of another visit to Africa. The 1965 visit had already acquainted the Committee better with African problems and personalities; a second visit would not encourage the objective studies which he had suggested and the Committee had little time before the autumn session of the General Assembly to prepare its report. An elaborate and costly tour of several African countries could be justified only if it brought very considerable and tangible advantages unattainable by other means; his delegation did not believe that such justification existed in the present case and it would therefore regard a second African

⁸ *Ibid.*, Twentieth Session, Annexes, agenda item 23, document A/6130, para. 6.

tour by the whole Committee as a waste of time and money.

83. He thought it would be useful to the Committee to have some information concerning his Government's programme for progress in constitutional development and decolonization in its remaining colonial Territories. He would deal first with the four Territories whose course to independence was now mapped out and set. British Guiana was due to become independent on 26 May, Bechuanaland on 30 September and Basutoland, subject to the submission of a formal request by the procedure laid down, later in 1966. It had been decided at the Mauritius Conference in September 1965 that the United Kingdom Government would be prepared to take the necessary steps to declare Mauritius independent if the new Legislative Assembly so requested. There would be six months of internal self-government after the elections which were due to take place after the report of the Electoral Commission had been dealt with.

84. In addition to those Territories, invitations had recently been sent to the parties represented in the Barbados Legislature to attend a conference in London in July 1966 for the purpose of discussing their Government's request for early independence. New constitutional proposals had been put forward and published recently for the Caribbean Territories of Antigua, Dominica, Grenada, St. Kitts, St. Lucia and St. Vincent and would be the subject of conferences in London in spring 1966.

85. As the Committee was aware, South Arabia was due to become independent by 1968. Recent developments affecting that Territory included the publication of the report of the constitutional advisers commissioned by the Federal Government to draw up proposals for a constitution for the whole of South Arabia. Secondly, there had been the announcement by the United Kingdom Government that, as part of its over-all defence review, it intended to withdraw its forces from the Aden base when South Arabia became independent. Thirdly, there had been the decision by the Federal Government to recommend that all orders which for political reasons required South Arabians to live outside their country should be lifted so that those people should be free to return. The United Kingdom Government hoped that all those developments would encourage consultations among all sections of opinion in South Arabia with a view to the reaching of agreement on the necessary constitutional measures for independence.

86. The Territories he had mentioned accounted for nearly 5 million out of the 9.5 million people in all the United Kingdom dependent Territories, not including Rhodesia.

87. In the remaining Territories, constitutional progress was continuing, in almost all cases at an accelerated rate. Most of them were small in area and population and their problems and requirements defied generalization. It was those problems, varied and different in each case, which his Government, in co-operation with the peoples of the Territories, was seeking to tackle in the last phases of the great historical movement towards decolonization. In the Seychelles a Constitutional Commissioner had been appointed to advise on future constitutional advance and had already begun his work. In Swaziland the Constitutional Committee had been considering the next stages of constitutional progress, and it was ex-

pected that final decisions on the form of an internal self-government constitution would be taken later in 1966. The next stage in the constitutional development of the Gilbert and Ellice Islands was now being considered. In Bermuda, the joint select committee of the two houses of the Legislature appointed to consider constitutional changes had recommended, *inter alia*, lowering the voting age from 25 to 21 and abolishing the second vote previously enjoyed by some Bermudians on a property basis. Those recommendations had been put into effect and Bermuda now had an electoral system of one man, one vote.

88. In addition, measures designed to achieve constitutional progress were likely to be taken in the near future with regard to Fiji, the British Virgin Islands, Montserrat, the Cayman Islands, the Falkland Islands and the Solomon Islands.

89. Lastly, there were certain Territories which were the subject of territorial claims by other countries. In the case of Gibraltar, the United Kingdom Government had agreed with the Government of Spain that, following General Assembly resolution 2070 (XX), talks should be held between the two Governments in London. The question of the frontier between Venezuela and British Guiana had been discussed in London and Geneva by the United Kingdom Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and the Foreign Minister of Venezuela, with the participation of the Prime Minister of British Guiana. He was sure that the resulting agreement, which had been signed in Geneva in February, would be welcomed in the Committee.

90. With regard to the Falkland Islands, the Governments of the United Kingdom and Argentina had informed the United Nations of the agreement reached between the United Kingdom Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and the Argentine Foreign Minister that discussions, as recommended in General Assembly resolution 2065 (XX), should be pursued without delay for the purpose of finding a peaceful solution.

91. This heavy programme of decolonization and constitutional progress for 1966 showed that the United Kingdom Government was making every effort to assist the people of its colonial Territories to achieve the objectives which all members sought. He hoped that his delegation's suggestions for making the Committee's work more effective would be fully discussed.

92. The representative of the *United Republic of Tanzania* recalled that while the Committee had been in Addis Ababa the previous year the suggestion had been made that the Security Council should meet in Africa to consider some of the serious questions of colonialism, such as those of the Portuguese Territories. His delegation considered that a meeting in Africa by a body such as the Security Council would be of great value, since for many Africans Portuguese colonialism constituted a threat to the peace and security of the continent, as the Security Council itself had once observed. He therefore hoped that the Committee would do its utmost to make that suggestion become a reality.

93. His delegation felt that the Committee should make greater use of the sub-committee system it had followed the previous year. It should re-establish the sub-committees it had had the previous year, but the composition of those bodies could be left to the officers of the Committee to decide. The Sub-Committee on British Guiana could, however, be abolished, since

that Territory was to become independent during the present year. It could be replaced by a sub-committee that would deal with the small islands to be considered at the present session. Once the sub-committees were re-established, they would be able to draw up their programmes of work and present them to the Committee for approval. The Committee would then be able to prepare a programme of work for the entire year.

94. With regard to the visit to Africa, his delegation had always held the view that the best meeting place for the Committee was the place nearest to areas where colonialism still existed. Since, unfortunately, there were still colonies in Africa, his delegation considered it necessary for the Committee to meet in that continent. It hoped that the Committee's experience in Africa the previous year would be sufficient justification for another visit. If the idea of holding a session in Africa was accepted, all questions concerning that continent should be taken up while the Committee was there. He hoped that the decision would be taken quickly, so that the host countries would have time to prepare for the Committee's visit.

95. While his delegation thought that the question of small Territories should be considered at the current session, it also felt that the Committee should send a group of three or four members to such places with a view to obtaining additional information. In making that suggestion, his delegation was not disregarding the reports of the administering Powers; it merely thought that a report from such a small group would supplement the information submitted by those Powers.

96. With regard to the questions of Aden and Oman, he suggested that it would be useful if the Committee took up those items in Cairo, where it would have an opportunity of hearing petitioners from those areas.

97. The representative of *Syria* said that, despite the optimism which had been expressed with regard to the imminent end of colonialism, there were indications of a recalcitrant attitude on the part of some colonial Powers and of a consolidation of reactionary power to suppress the identity of some indigenous peoples. In one place, it would be claimed that strategic interests were involved—a claim which made the implementation of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) conditional upon other factors; in another place, colonialism would disappear in name only and be replaced by economic ties. In South West Africa, the world was witnessing a gradual and deliberate, although disguised, conquest of an African land by a minority of foreign settlers.

98. The Committee should bring all its energies to bear on those problems, in the hope that it might help to alleviate the sufferings of subjugated peoples. In that spirit, his delegation strongly supported the suggestion that the Committee should visit the African capitals which had extended invitations. Experience had shown that the colonial Powers were often reluctant to furnish a complete picture of the conditions prevailing in the Territories under their administration and it had become a matter of course for them to reject requests for visits by United Nations missions. If the Committee could only convey the message that the majority of peoples followed with deep interest and supported, morally at least, the legitimate struggle of the peoples for independence, its visit

would accomplish a great deal. An early decision by the Committee not only would be a matter of courtesy to the host Governments but would affect the Committee's time-table. If the visit were agreed upon, it would be logical to discuss questions concerning Africa in Africa; the questions of Aden and Oman could profitably be discussed in Cairo, a city which petitioners could reach easily. The Committee could then deal with the other questions on its agenda either before or after its visit to Africa.

99. Sub-committees might be established to assess the present situation in specific Territories, or, in the case of sub-committees dealing with new questions such as that of Oman, to make suggestions about the method of work on the item.

100. There would be no harm in the Committee omitting from its report certain parts that had been included in previous reports, but it should continue to exercise the authority vested in it by the General Assembly and to adopt clear and unambiguous resolutions. If previous resolutions had not been implemented, that was the fault of the colonial Powers and not of the language used in the resolutions. If the colonial Powers had left it to the United Nations to decide what was right and what was wrong, the work of the Committee would have been completed long since.

101. The representative of *Mali* said that, in organizing its work, the Committee should bear in mind the provisions of General Assembly resolution 2105 (XX).

102. As in the past, the Committee should establish a working group which would draw up an order of priority for the various questions before the Committee. The consideration of those questions would require a debate by the Committee itself, but it should be remembered that the phase of denunciation of colonialism was past and that attention should be concentrated on proposing specific means for its eradication. The time had come to fulfil the hopes of millions of people for release from colonial domination. Sub-committees would be able to study more closely certain aspects of colonial exploitation, particularly the economic and military aspects connected with the operations of foreign monopolies and the establishment and maintenance of military bases. The small Territories, in particular, were being used as bases for aggression and his delegation supported the suggestion of the Tanzanian representative that visiting groups should be sent to such Territories. It was because of such economic and military considerations that it was difficult for those small Territories to achieve independence.

103. His delegation welcomed the forthcoming independence of Guiana and Bechuanaland. The Committee should study the Territories under Portuguese domination and propose a deadline for their attainment of independence. The withdrawal of South Africa's Mandate for South West Africa should also be proposed; the International Court of Justice would undoubtedly condemn the policies of apartheid pursued by the racist Government of South Africa against the population of South West Africa, in violation of the very spirit of the Mandate.

104. His delegation was grateful to the Governments of Algeria, Ethiopia, Somalia, the United Arab Republic and the United Republic of Tanzania for their kind invitations to the Special Committee. A

visit to Africa would show members the scope of the struggle for liberation being waged by the peoples of Angola, Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau, Aden and South Arabia. The Committee would obtain information from petitioners and the peoples concerned would realize that the United Nations understood their problems.

105. The Committee's reports should deal only with new developments; for the past history, members could refer to earlier reports.

106. The representative of *Poland* said that the Committee's methods of work should reflect the aims and objectives of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) and the specific tasks and obligations laid down in General Assembly resolution 2105 (XX). The latter resolution had requested the Committee to seek the best means for the immediate and full application of resolution 1514 (XV) to all Territories which had not yet attained independence. The Committee should therefore seek new methods and new approaches to the questions on its agenda, in order successfully to implement all the resolutions adopted on particular Territories. It should consider how the colonial Powers were implementing the decisions already taken by the General Assembly; certain Powers, particularly South Africa and Portugal, were continuing to defy the United Nations. The Polish delegation agreed that the Committee should recommend the withdrawal from South Africa of its Mandate for South West Africa. It therefore supported the idea of convening a special session of the General Assembly as soon as the International Court of Justice had concluded its consideration of the question. It also agreed that the Committee should pursue the idea of the Security Council meeting in Africa to consider the situation in South West Africa, Southern Rhodesia and the Portuguese colonies. The Committee was perfectly entitled to suggest such a procedure, since paragraph 13 of resolution 2105 (XX) authorized it "to make suggestions which might assist the Council in considering appropriate measures under the Charter of the United Nations".

107. Also in accordance with resolution 2105 (XX), the Committee should recommend a deadline for the accession to independence of each Territory in accordance with the wishes of the people. It was obvious that colonial Powers interested in preserving their rule in the Territories under their domination were resorting to all kinds of delaying tactics.

108. His delegation fully supported the idea of a visit to Africa and was grateful to the five Governments which had extended invitations to the Committee. It would be equally important to send visiting missions to certain Territories in order to establish direct contact with the population, ascertain their wishes and aspirations and determine the real situation. The colonial Powers, which called the legitimate struggle of the people for liberation an act of terrorism, could not be expected to take into account the views of the oppressed peoples. It was to be hoped that the administering Powers would abandon their earlier position of refusing to allow representatives of the Special Committee into their Territories.

109. The Committee should follow its established practice of appointing sub-committees. The advantages of such a practice outweighed the disadvantages; above all, it would save time and expedite the Committee's work.

110. With regard to the Committee's reports, it would be logical in future to omit the historical background material, which could be found in earlier reports.

111. The representative of *Sierra Leone* said that, under the resolutions adopted at the twentieth session of the General Assembly, the Committee was required to report to the twenty-first session of the Assembly on the Territories on its agenda; for some of the Territories, particularly the smaller ones, the Committee had to consider new ways of solving peculiar problems; lastly, it had to suggest deadlines for the independence of some Territories.

112. His delegation hoped that the Committee would visit Africa, because it thought that the gains which could result from such a visit would outweigh all other considerations. It was the Committee's duty to make every effort to liberate the Territories on that continent which were becoming "chronic" cases of colonialism. The working group should be established as soon as possible and should start by considering whether or not a visit should be made to Africa. Problems such as those of Southern Rhodesia, the Portuguese Territories, South West Africa, Aden and the Federation of South Arabia should be considered during the visit to Africa.

113. In planning its programme, the Committee should bear in mind the time and the resources at its disposal. Considerations of economy, however, should not obscure the primary aim of ensuring that all Territories still under colonial rule received independence. The time remaining before the visit to Africa could be used to consider the other Territories on the agenda and to establish the sub-committees. In addition, more background material could be prepared for the visit to Africa.

114. The United Kingdom representative had mentioned the possibility of a visit to London by representatives of the Committee. It was regrettable, however, that the United Kingdom would not allow visiting missions into the actual Territories concerned. That attitude left doubt about the sincerity of the United Kingdom. Visiting missions to individual Territories on the agenda, particularly the smaller islands, would allow the same kind of direct contact as had been made during the Committee's previous visit to Africa.

115. The task of the Secretariat would be facilitated if all background material were omitted from future reports of the Committee.

116. The representative of *Bulgaria* said that the statement made by the Secretary-General at the opening of the session (see paras. 14-23 above) had provided guidelines for the Committee's work, in the light of the discussions at the twentieth session of the General Assembly and at meetings of the Special Committee. As the Secretary-General had pointed out, the major problems in the field of decolonization had remained without any positive movement towards peaceful solution and the majority of delegations had expressed serious concern about the continued delay in the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence.

117. Although the majority of delegations agreed on the methods to be followed and thought that the Committee should do everything possible to obtain the implementation of the resolutions of the General Assembly, certain delegations had expressed a differ-

ent view. The United Kingdom representative, for example, had said that it was not necessarily the right or the only approach to concentrate on seeing that the provisions of all the Assembly resolutions were carried out. If it was the policy of the United Kingdom Government not to implement the resolutions of the General Assembly, it was understandable that the views of the United Kingdom delegation on the subject of the Committee's methods of work differed from those of the majority of delegations. The United Kingdom representative had stated that his Government bore the responsibility for the administration of United Kingdom Territories and for their progress to full self-government and self-determination. That, however, did not absolve the United Kingdom from its obligations, since it claimed that there was no disagreement about general objectives.

118. Moreover, the United Kingdom representative had suggested that the Special Committee should not adopt resolutions but should endeavour to arrive at a consensus, for resolutions reflected only the opinion of the majority, whereas the consensus was the common denominator, namely, the maximum that the colonial Powers could give. It was therefore obvious that opinions differed considerably with regard to the policy which the United Nations had thus far followed in respect of decolonization.

119. The Bulgarian delegation agreed with the United Kingdom representative's statement that the Committee should be careful to organize its work in such a way as not to spend United Nations money unwisely. His delegation wished to emphasize, however, that the Committee should not seek to effect economies by leaving entire populations in Africa and other parts of the world to suffer under the colonial yoke. That was why his delegation considered that the Committee should not let the mere desire to save a few pennies prevent it from taking the necessary initiatives in organizing its work. The Committee should go ahead with the proposals made by various delegations for speeding up its work in connexion with the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples.

120. Some delegations, in particular that of the United Kingdom, had categorically opposed the proposal that the Committee should hold meetings in Africa. The Committee's last visit to Africa had been of great value. During that visit those who were fighting for freedom, independence and self-determination in the Territories under Portuguese domination, in Southern Rhodesia, South West Africa and other colonial Territories, had been able to appear before the Committee, and the members of the Committee had been able to live in the atmosphere in which the African peoples were waging their desperate struggle against a powerful enemy helped by all the imperialist and reactionary forces of the world. Direct contact with the representatives of those struggling peoples had had a positive influence on the anti-colonial decisions which the Committee had adopted in Africa. There was no doubt regarding the urgent need for the Committee to hold another session in Africa, for events in Southern Rhodesia and elsewhere were evidence of a new offensive by the forces of imperialism and neo-colonialism. A session of the Committee in Africa would enable the United Nations to bring its full weight to bear at that decisive stage in the fight against colonialism.

121. From time to time certain decisions adopted in the United Nations were not effectively implemented. That was why his delegation supported the idea of the Security Council meeting in Africa. At a time when the racists and colonialists were becoming more and more arrogant in their aggressive policy against the oppressed peoples and the young African States, the United Nations body entrusted with the primary responsibility for maintaining peace and security would be able to take the necessary decisions on the spot and to hear the representatives of the African peoples who were in such desperate straits.

122. His delegation therefore suggested that if the Committee did not adopt a resolution on that subject, the Chairman should get in touch with the President of the Security Council during the year in order to suggest a visit to Africa by the Council.

123. The situation in South West Africa had always been one of the most difficult problems. It was well known that the racist Verwoerd Government intended to annex the Territory of South West Africa. That Government had shown nothing but contempt for the decisions of the United Nations, which was primarily responsible for South West Africa. His delegation supported the idea of a special session of the General Assembly on the subject, to be convened as soon as the International Court of Justice had handed down its decision on the question of South West Africa. The Mandate for South West Africa should be withdrawn from South Africa.

124. The Special Committee should of course devote special attention to the question of Aden and the South Arabian peninsula, Oman and other colonial Territories. Attempts had recently been made by certain circles to deprive the peoples of those regions of the possibility of intensifying their struggle for independence. The Special Committee—and the Security Council, if it went to Africa—should endeavour to help those peoples in their efforts for liberation.

125. The colonial Powers should not be given the impression that the Committee was less interested in the so-called small colonial Territories. Manœuvres aimed at perpetuating colonial domination under new guises had recently been undertaken in some of those Territories and the Committee must be vigilant. The General Assembly resolutions on the Territories in the Caribbean, the Atlantic and the Pacific should be scrupulously implemented. He had in mind particularly the General Assembly decision that visiting missions should be sent to those Territories, a point which had been taken up by the representative of Tanzania in his proposal that groups should visit the small Territories. The States administering those Territories should realize that by receiving such missions they would be giving proof of their goodwill and their recognition of the rights of the peoples of the Territories to independence and self-determination.

126. During the past year the Special Committee had devoted much attention to the role of foreign monopolies in Africa. On the basis of studies made by the Committee and in its Sub-Committee I, the General Assembly had taken important decisions concerning the consequences of the activities of foreign monopolies in South West Africa and the Portuguese colonies. The study on the role of monopolies in Southern Rhodesia should be completed and the Committee should recommend to the Assembly practical action to be taken against the harmful influence of the most

important imperialist and neo-colonialist bodies in Africa.

127. If the considerations he had set forth were taken into account and if the Committee followed the guidelines indicated in the resolutions of the General Assembly, in the Secretary-General's statement at the opening meeting and by most of the delegations which had spoken, it would be able to work constructively to make the current year one of co-operation in the field of decolonization.

128. The representative of *Iraq* recalled that, in his statement to the Committee, the Secretary-General had spoken of the unusually heavy programme with which the Committee was faced. The magnitude of the Committee's obligations and responsibilities was indeed in sharp contrast with some ideas which had been expressed regarding its work, especially the suggestion that its deliberations should be curtailed.

129. The Committee had been entrusted by the General Assembly with the task of helping the peoples still under colonial rule and oppression in their struggle for independence and emancipation. It had been given the responsibility of keeping under review the questions of Aden, Southern Rhodesia, South West Africa, the Territories under Portuguese administration, Oman and all the other colonial Territories. As the Committee was in permanent session, it would always be entitled to take up any question that arose in connexion with United Nations resolutions and the refusal of colonial Powers to give effect to those resolutions. The Committee's prompt action with regard to the repressive measures recently carried out by the United Kingdom authorities against the people of Aden was an indication of the importance of its role and it should be careful not to abdicate its rights and responsibilities.

130. The Committee should of course organize its work in such a way as to make it possible for delegations and petitioners to participate as fully as possible, but it should not adopt rigid rules or set unchangeable dates for the consideration of items. His delegation would like to put forward the following suggestions.

131. First, the Committee might hold a general debate on the questions before it and try to evaluate the progress achieved thus far. It could discuss the items in detail when it met in Africa. His delegation thanked the Governments of Algeria, Somalia, the United Arab Republic, Ethiopia and the United Republic of Tanzania for their kind invitations, which it hoped the Committee would accept. He was convinced that a session in Africa would be of the utmost benefit.

132. Secondly, the Committee should give serious consideration to the question of setting immediate dates for the attainment of independence by various colonial Territories. His country had stressed the importance of that question at the second Conference of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Cairo, and it was glad to see that that idea had gained support.

133. Thirdly, the Committee should consider ways and means of making its work known throughout the world, particularly in the colonial Territories. The Office of Public Information might be requested to study the matter and to submit a report to the Committee on how the public could be better informed of the plight of the people suffering under the colonial yoke and of the efforts made by the Committee and the General Assembly.

134. Lastly, his delegation saw merit in the sub-committee system and was ready to continue to par-

ticipate in the sub-committees. There should, however, be no delegation of powers from the Committee itself to its subsidiary bodies. His delegation also supported the suggestion that visiting groups should be sent to the small Territories.

135. The representative of *Iran* said that in discussing the organization of its work the Committee should bear certain basic factors in mind.

136. First, the Committee should organize its work in such a way as would best accelerate the attainment of the objectives set by the General Assembly. It would accomplish more if it spent most of the time available in helping to expedite the attainment of independence by a number of Territories than if it prepared a report covering all the Territories. His delegation fully supported the suggestion made by the Tanzanian representative that the question of the small Territories should be studied in greater detail. The Committee might send sub-committees to those areas or collect information through other means to supplement the data supplied by the administering Powers. It would then be able to take appropriate action on the question of those Territories.

137. Secondly, it must be borne in mind that the Committee had a heavy agenda and relatively little time available to it. It had been invited by five Member States to hold meetings in Africa. His delegation thanked those countries for their kind invitations and was fully in favour of holding a session in Africa. In organizing its work the Committee must first decide whether it would hold meetings in Africa and, if so, for how long. It must also determine which questions it would deal with during its session in Africa so that other items could be examined in the intervening period.

138. Thirdly, his delegation fully shared the view expressed by the representatives of Italy and Tanzania that greater use should be made of the sub-committee system. The present sub-committees should be re-considered; some might be dispensed with and new ones might be needed. In determining the composition of the sub-committees, care should be taken to maintain adequate geographical representation and to arrange that every member had an equal opportunity to serve in the various bodies.

Decisions

139. On the conclusion of the debate on organization of work, the Special Committee, at its 399th meeting, requested the Working Group to consider and submit recommendations regarding the Committee's programme of work for the current year, taking into account the two notes by the Secretary-General (A/AC.109/L.260 and L.261), and the invitations extended to the Committee by the Governments of the United Republic of Tanzania (A/AC.109/147), the United Arab Republic (A/AC.109/148), Ethiopia (A/AC.109/149), Somalia (A/AC.109/150) and Algeria (A/AC.109/152) to hold meetings at their respective capitals, as well as the views expressed by members during the debate.

140. On the basis of the recommendations contained in the 22nd, 23rd and 24th reports of the Working Group (A/AC.109/L.265/Rev.1, L.270 and L.275), the Special Committee, at its 400th and 409th meetings, took decisions regarding its programme of work for 1966 including the order of priorities for the consideration of the items before it. These decisions, as sub-

sequently modified at the 410th, 462nd and 471st meetings, are reflected in section E of this chapter.

141. In addition, the Special Committee decided to hold a series of meetings in Africa and to accept the invitations from the five Governments to hold meetings at their respective capitals, beginning on 23 May 1966 in Dar es Salaam.

142. It further decided to maintain Sub-Committees I, II and III and requested them to begin their work without delay. In addition to their terms of reference, as laid down in General Assembly resolutions 1514 (XX) and 2105 (XX), the Special Committee requested the Sub-Committees to carry out the specific tasks which are mentioned in the Secretary-General's notes contained in A/AC.109/L.260 and L.261 concerning the items referred to them. It also authorized the Sub-Committees to submit recommendations regarding the sending of visiting groups to the Territories with which they were concerned.

143. In addition, the Special Committee at its 409th meeting, on 26 April 1966, decided to refer to Sub-Committee I for consideration and report the item relating to the activities of foreign economic and other interests in Southern Rhodesia and their mode of operation, pursuant to operative paragraph 9 of the resolution on the question of Southern Rhodesia, adopted at the 328th meeting of the Committee on 22 April 1965 (A/6000/Rev.1, chap. III, para. 292).

D. MEETINGS OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE AND ITS WORKING GROUP AND SUB-COMMITTEES

Special Committee

144. The Special Committee held ninety meetings during 1966, as follows:

First session:

394th to 415th meetings, 8 March to 18 May 1966, United Nations Headquarters

416th to 427th meetings, 23 to 31 May 1966, Dar es Salaam

428th to 432nd meetings, 2 to 4 June 1966, Mogadiscio

433rd to 439th meetings, 6 to 9 June 1966, Addis Ababa

440th to 447th meetings, 11 to 15 June 1966, Cairo

448th to 455th meetings, 17 to 22 June 1966, Algiers

Second session:

456th to 483rd meetings, 6 July to 30 November 1966, United Nations Headquarters

Working Group

145. At the 399th meeting, the Special Committee nominated Ethiopia and India to fill two vacancies in the membership of the Working Group arising from the change in the composition of the Bureau. The Working Group therefore consisted of the four officers of the Committee, namely, Mr. Gershon Collier (Sierra Leone), Chairman, Mr. José Piñera (Chile), and Mr. John Malecela (United Republic of Tanzania) Vice-Chairmen and Mr. Alk'uddin Aljubouri (Iraq), Rapporteur, and the representatives of Bulgaria, Ethiopia, India and Italy.

146. During the period covered by the present report, the Working Group held ten meetings and submitted one oral and four written reports.⁹

Sub-Committee on Petitions

147. The Special Committee, at its 399th meeting, decided to continue the Sub-Committee on Petitions with the same membership as in 1965, except for the replacement of Ethiopia by Syria. The Sub-Committee on Petitions therefore consisted of the following members:

Australia	Syria
India	Tunisia
Madagascar	Venezuela
Poland	

148. The Sub-Committee on Petitions held 23 meetings and submitted 23 reports to the Special Committee.¹⁰ The Sub-Committee on Petitions considered, during the period, a total of 243 communications, including fifty-eight requests for hearings. The petitions circulated by the Sub-Committee are listed in the chapters of the present report dealing with the Territories to which they refer.

Sub-Committee I

149. At its 400th meeting, the Special Committee decided to maintain Sub-Committee I with the same membership as in 1965. The composition of Sub-Committee I therefore was as follows:

Denmark	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Ethiopia	
Mali	United Republic of Tanzania
Syria	
Tunisia	Yugoslavia

150. At its 23rd meeting on 27 April 1966, Sub-Committee I elected Mr. John Malecela (United Republic of Tanzania) Chairman and Mr. Rafic Jouéjati (Syria) Rapporteur.

151. Sub-Committee I held ten meetings and submitted three reports to the Special Committee on the following items which had been referred to it for consideration:

- Activities of foreign economic and other interests in Southern Rhodesia and their mode of operation (A/AC.109/L.332 and Add.1);
- Activities of foreign economic and other interests which are impeding the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples in the Territories under Portuguese administration (A/AC.109/L.334 and Add.1);
- Mauritius, Seychelles and St. Helena (A/AC.109/L.335).

152. Details of the Special Committee's consideration of these reports are contained in chapters III, V and XIV of the present report.

Sub-Committee II

153. At its 400th meeting, the Special Committee decided to maintain Sub-Committee II with the same membership as in 1965, except for the replacement of

⁹ A/AC.109/L.265/Rev.1, L.270, L.275 and L.338. The oral report submitted by the Chairman is contained in document A/AC.109/SR.462.

¹⁰ A/AC.109/L.259, L.262, L.267, L.278, L.291, L.292, L.298, L.299, L.301, L.304, L.307, L.308, L.310, L.311, L.312, L.317, L.324 and Corr.1, L.328, L.331, L.336, L.340, L.349 and L.354.

Cambodia by Afghanistan. The composition of Sub-Committee I therefore was as follows:

Afghanistan	Iraq
Australia	Poland
Chile	Sierra Leone
India	United States of America

154. At its 42nd meeting, on 28 April 1966, Sub-Committee II elected Mr. Kadhim Khalaf (Iraq) Chairman and Mr. C. R. Gharekhan (India) Rapporteur.

155. Sub-Committee II held fourteen meetings and submitted six reports on the following items which had been referred to it for consideration:

- (a) Question of sending visiting missions to the Territories referred to the Sub-Committee (A/AC.109/L.318);
- (b) Gilbert and Ellice Islands, Pitcairn and the Solomon Islands (A/AC.109/L.318/Add.1);
- (c) Niue and the Tokelau Islands (A/AC.109/L.318/Add.2);
- (d) New Hebrides (A/AC.109/L.318/Add.3);
- (e) American Samoa, Guam and the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (A/AC.109/L.318/Add.4);
- (f) Trust Territory of Nauru, Papua and the Trust Territory of New Guinea, and Cocos (Keeling) Islands (A/AC.109/L.318/Add.5).

156. Details of the Special Committee's consideration of the Sub-Committee's reports relating to specific Territories are contained in chapters XV to XIX of the present report and of the question of sending visiting missions in section F of the present chapter.

Sub-Committee III

157. At its 400th meeting, the Special Committee decided to maintain Sub-Committee III with the same membership as in 1965. The composition of Sub-Committee III therefore was as follows:

Bulgaria	Madagascar
Iran	Uruguay
Italy	Venezuela
Ivory Coast	

158. At its 42nd meeting on 5 May 1966, the Sub-Committee elected Mr. Leonardo Díaz González (Venezuela) Chairman and Mr. Mohsen Sadigh Esfandiary (Iran) Rapporteur. From 9 August, following the departure from New York of Mr. Díaz González, Mr. Esfandiary acted as Chairman.

159. Sub-Committee III held nineteen meetings and submitted one oral and one written report to the Special Committee during the period.

160. The report of Sub-Committee III, submitted orally by its Rapporteur to the Special Committee at the 413th meeting, dealt with the question of sending visiting missions to the Territories referred to the Sub-Committee, and was subsequently incorporated in its written report (A/AC.109/L.329 and Corr.1, paras. 6-13). An account of the Special Committee's consideration of the question is contained in section F of the present chapter.

161. The remainder of the Sub-Committee's report (A/AC.109/L.329/Add.1, paras. 14-212) dealt with the following items which had been referred to it for consideration:

- (a) United States Virgin Islands;

(b) British Virgin Islands, Barbados, Antigua, Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat, St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, St. Lucia and St. Vincent;

(c) Bermuda, Bahamas, Turks and Caicos Islands and Cayman Islands;

(d) Falkland Islands (Malvinas).

162. Details of the Special Committee's consideration of the report of the Sub-Committee relating to these Territories are contained in chapter XXII of the present report.

Sub-Committee on Aden

163. At the 401st meeting, the Chairman of the Special Committee nominated Afghanistan to fill the vacancy in the membership of the Sub-Committee on Aden created by the withdrawal of Cambodia from membership of the Special Committee. The composition of the Sub-Committee on Aden therefore was as follows:

Afghanistan	Venezuela
Iraq	Yugoslavia
Ivory Coast	

164. On 10 May 1966, the Sub-Committee on Aden elected Mr. Danilo Lekić (Yugoslavia) Chairman.

165. The Sub-Committee on Aden held five meetings and submitted one written and two oral reports.¹¹

166. An account of the Special Committee's consideration of the reports of the Sub-Committee relating to Aden is contained in chapter VI of the present report.

Sub-Committee on South West Africa

167. By a resolution adopted at its 439th meeting, held in Addis Ababa on 9 June 1966 (A/AC.109/177), the Special Committee decided to establish a Sub-Committee on South West Africa.¹² At the 455th meeting, the Special Committee, on the proposal of the Chairman, decided that the Sub-Committee on South West Africa should be composed of the following members:

Denmark	Poland
Ethiopia	Tunisia
India	Venezuela
Ivory Coast	

168. On 21 July 1966, the Sub-Committee elected Mr. Lij Endelkachew Makonnen (Ethiopia) Chairman, and Mr. C. R. Gharekhan (India) Rapporteur.

169. The Sub-Committee on South West Africa held four meetings and submitted its report (A/AC.109/L.325) to the Special Committee at the 467th meeting on 15 September. Details of the Special Committee's consideration of the report are contained in chapter IV of the present report.

Sub-Committee on Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland

170. By a resolution adopted at its 439th meeting, held in Addis Ababa on 9 June 1966 (A/AC.109/178), the Special Committee decided to establish a Sub-Committee on Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland.¹³ At the 455th meeting, the Special Committee, on the proposal of the Chairman, decided that the Sub-Committee on Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland should be composed of the following members:

¹¹ A/AC.109/L.289. The oral reports submitted by the Chairman are contained in documents A/AC.109/SR.414 and SR.462.

¹² For details, see chapter IV.

¹³ For details, see chapter VII.

Afghanistan
Bulgaria
Iran
Italy

Madagascar
Mali
Uruguay

171. On 27 July 1966, the Sub-Committee elected Mr. Pedro P. Berro (Uruguay) Chairman, and Mr. Matey Karasimeonov (Bulgaria) Rapporteur.

172. The Sub-Committee on Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland held six meetings and submitted its report (A/AC.109/L.326) to the Special Committee at the 466th meeting on 14 September. Details of the Special Committee's consideration of the report are contained in chapter VII of the present report.

*Sub-Committee on Equatorial Guinea
(Fernando Póo and Río Muni)*

173. By a resolution adopted at its 454th meeting, held in Algiers on 21 June 1966 (A/AC.109/186), the Special Committee decided to establish a Sub-Committee on Equatorial Guinea (Fernando Póo and Río Muni).

174. At the 460th meeting, the Special Committee decided that the Sub-Committee on Equatorial Guinea should be composed of the following members:

Chile	Sierra Leone
Denmark	Syria
Mali	United Republic of
Poland	Tanzania

175. The Sub-Committee elected Mr. Gershon Collier (Sierra Leone) Chairman and Mr. Rafic Jouéjati (Syria) Rapporteur.

176. The Sub-Committee visited Madrid and Equatorial Guinea (Fernando Póo and Río Muni) from 17 to 24 August 1966, where it held discussions with officials of the Spanish Government and with a large number of bodies, groups and individuals. It submitted its report (A/AC.109/L.348) to the Special Committee at the 482nd meeting on 18 November. Details of the Special Committee's consideration of the report are contained in chapter IX of the present report.

Sub-Committee on Fiji

177. By a resolution adopted at its 463rd meeting, on 7 September 1966 (A/AC.109/102), the Special Committee decided to appoint a Sub-Committee on Fiji for the purpose of studying at first-hand the situation in the Territory and to report to the Special Committee as soon as possible.

178. At the 483rd meeting, on 30 November 1966, the Chairman informed the Special Committee that he would proceed to the appointment of the Sub-Committee at an early date during the next session of the Committee.

E. CONSIDERATION OF TERRITORIES

179. During the period covered by this report, the Special Committee considered the following Territories:

<i>Territories</i>	<i>Meetings</i>
South West Africa	395, 396, 398 (UN Headquarters), 417, 418, 420 (Dar es Salaam), 433-435, 437-439 (Addis Ababa), 455 (Algiers), 460, 465-468 (UN Headquarters)

<i>Territories</i>	<i>Meetings</i>
Aden	397-401, 413, 414 (UN Headquarters), 431 (Mogadiscio), 436 (Addis Ababa), 441-447 (Cairo), 462, 473 (UN Headquarters)
Southern Rhodesia	401-407, 410 (UN Headquarters), 418, 419, 423-427 (Dar es Salaam), 432 (Mogadiscio), 447 (Cairo), 469, 470 (UN Headquarters)
Fiji	410, 412, 413, 461-463, 469, 483 (UN Headquarters)
Territories under Portuguese administration	418-420, 427 (Dar es Salaam), 436 (Addis Ababa), 450-455 (Algiers), 470, 474, 475 (UN Headquarters)
Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland	421-423 (Dar es Salaam), 437-439 (Addis Ababa), 450, 455 (Algiers), 456-458, 466-468 (UN Headquarters)
French Somaliland	429, 430 (Mogadiscio), 438 (Addis Ababa), 470-472, 475 (UN Headquarters)
Ifni and Spanish Sahara ..	435, 436 (Addis Ababa), 472-475, 478, 479, 481 (UN Headquarters)
Oman	446, 447 (Cairo), 480, 482 (UN Headquarters)
Equatorial Guinea (Fernando Póo and Río Muni) ..	447 (Cairo), 451, 452, 454 (Algiers), 460, 482 (UN Headquarters)
Gibraltar	464, 475, 480, 482 (UN Headquarters)

<i>Territories referred to Sub-Committee I</i>	<i>Meetings</i>
Mauritius, Seychelles and St. Helena	396, 470, 474
<i>Territories referred to Sub-Committee II</i>	
Gilbert and Ellice Islands, Pitcairn and Solomon Islands	468, 473
Niue and Tokelau Islands	468, 473
New Hebrides	468, 473
American Samoa, Guam and the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands ..	469, 473
Trust Territory of Nauru, Papua and the Trust Territory of New Guinea, and Cocos (Keeling) Islands	469, 473
<i>Territories referred to Sub-Committee III</i>	
United States Virgin Islands	476-478, 482
British Virgin Islands, Antigua, Barbados, Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat, St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, St. Lucia and St. Vincent	463, 476-478, 482
Bermuda, Bahamas, Turks and Caicos Islands and Cayman Islands	466, 467, 476-478, 482
Falkland Islands (Malvinas)	476-478, 482

180. Details of the Special Committee's consideration of the Territories listed above and its conclusions and recommendations thereon are given in chapters III to XIX and XXII of the present report.

181. The Special Committee took note of the accession to independence of British Guiana on 26 May 1966 (see A/AC.109/SR.421).

182. Owing to lack of time, Sub-Committee II was unable to consider Brunei and Hong Kong.¹⁴ Information concerning these two Territories is given in chapters XX and XXI of the present report.

183. Sub-Committee III was unable to consider British Honduras owing to lack of time. Information on this Territory is contained in chapter XXII of the present report.

F. QUESTION OF SENDING VISITING GROUPS TO TERRITORIES

184. In operative paragraph 7 of its resolution 2105 (XX) of 20 December 1965, the General Assembly approved "the programme of work envisaged by the Special Committee during 1966, including the possibility of holding a series of meetings in Africa and the sending of visiting groups to Territories, particularly in the Atlantic, Indian and Pacific Ocean areas".

185. In approving the twenty-second report of the working group (A/AC.109/L.265/Rev.1), the Special Committee, at its 400th meeting, on 4 April 1966, authorized its Sub-Committees I, II and III to submit, as appropriate, recommendations to the Special Committee regarding the sending of visiting groups in relation to Territories with which they are concerned.

Recommendation of Sub-Committee III

186. At the 413th meeting, the Special Committee considered an oral report submitted by the Rapporteur of Sub-Committee III concerning the question of sending visiting missions to the Territories referred to it. The recommendation made by Sub-Committee III in this regard, as reproduced below, as well as the statements made by members of the Sub-Committee, are incorporated in its report (A/AC.109/L.329), which is annexed to chapter XXII of the present report. Summaries of the statements made by members during the Special Committee's consideration of the report of the Sub-Committee are given below.

187. In making the report, *Mr. Mohsen Sadigh Esfandiary* (Iran), Rapporteur of Sub-Committee III, stated that at its meeting on 5 May 1966 the Sub-Committee had authorized its Chairman to contact the representatives of the United Kingdom and the United States in order to ascertain their views concerning the request made by the General Assembly in resolution 2069 (XX), operative paragraph 3, on the question of visiting missions.

188. The reply from the United Kingdom representative had been that the question of visiting missions raised difficult problems of principle for his Government and that he could not say anything that might encourage the Sub-Committee to expect any changes in his Government's previously expressed attitude. His delegation would be prepared to transmit to the United Kingdom Government any specific request or suggestion from the Committee for a visit to a particular Territory, but that action could not be taken to imply any commitment that the United Kingdom Government would be able to respond to such a request.

189. The representative of the United States had said that he was not in position to give a reply to the question of visiting missions in general. Any specific proposal from the Sub-Committee for a visit to a Territory for which the United States was responsible would be transmitted to his Government, but he could not offer any encouragement that his Government would change its position.

190. After considering the replies, the Sub-Committee had adopted by consensus the following recommendation:

"The Sub-Committee recommends to the Special Committee that, in agreement with the position adopted on the question of visiting missions by the General Assembly at its twentieth session, as set out in paragraph 3 of resolution 2069 (XX) of 16 December 1965 and in the pertinent part of paragraph 7 of resolution 2105 (XX) of 20 December 1965, it invite the administering Powers, in cases where the Special Committee may decide to send out visiting missions to any of the Territories being considered by Sub-Committee III, to make it possible for such visits to take place and to extend to them their co-operation."

191. The representative of the *United States of America* reserved the position of her Government in regard to the question of visiting missions. Any specific request for a visiting mission would be transmitted by her delegation to the United States Government, but she could not at present offer any encouragement that her Government's position on the matter would change.

192. The representative of *Australia* reserved his Government's position on the matter.

193. The representative of the *United Kingdom* confirmed that his delegation's position had been stated accurately by the Rapporteur of Sub-Committee III. If the Committee decided to approve the Sub-Committee's report, he wished to reserve his Government's position.

194. The representative of *Bulgaria* said that, in order to enable the Special Committee to have some idea of what was happening in the Territories under consideration and to make recommendations to the General Assembly at its twenty-first session, it was essential that visiting missions should be sent to those Territories to obtain information direct from the people. In view of the discouraging replies given by the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom, Sub-Committee III had felt it necessary to recommend that the Special Committee should invite the administering Powers to make it possible for the visits decided upon by the Special Committee to take place and to co-operate with visiting missions. He would point out that the Sub-Committee's recommendation added nothing to what the Special Committee and the General Assembly had already asked.

195. The representative of *India* supported the interim report presented by the Rapporteur of Sub-Committee III.

196. The representative of the *Union of Soviet Socialist Republics* said that on the basis of a cursory study his delegation felt that the report of Sub-Committee III was in complete conformity with the resolutions adopted by the General Assembly at its twentieth session, in particular resolutions 2069 (XX) and 2105 (XX). The General Assembly had specially instructed the Special Committee to consider the question of establishing dates for the independence of colonial

¹⁴ The representatives of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Bulgaria and Poland stated that since the question of Hong Kong was directly related to the People's Republic of China, the United Nations and its organs, including the Special Committee, could not consider this matter until the lawful rights of the People's Republic of China were restored in the United Nations.

Territories in accordance with the wishes of their peoples. It was essential to send visiting missions to colonial Territories in order to ascertain the views of the people concerning their future development and the status they desired for their Territory. The refusal of the colonial Powers to admit visiting missions, even after repeated requests by the General Assembly, must be regarded as a refusal to co-operate with the Committee and with the United Nations. The Committee should therefore adopt the report of Sub-Committee III and thus make clear the concern of its members for decisions of the General Assembly.

197. The representative of *Mali* said that his delegation supported the report of Sub-Committee III and was sure that the Special Committee would adopt it, especially as it included two important provisions from resolutions adopted by the General Assembly at its twentieth session. The sending of visiting missions to small Territories as well as to others, would provide the Special Committee and the General Assembly with information that would enable them to adopt adequate measures leading to the granting of independence to colonial Territories by the administering Powers in co-operation with the United Nations.

198. The representative of the *United Republic of Tanzania* said that his delegation supported the report of Sub-Committee III, which reflected the decisions of the General Assembly. The adoption of the Sub-Committee's report would provide an opportunity for the colonial Powers to give the Committee the co-operation they had always promised it, by allowing visiting missions to go to the Territories.

199. The representative of *Italy* recalled that in the course of the debate in Sub-Committee III his delegation had expressed certain reservations, not about the principle of visiting missions, which it supported, but about the nature of the consensus reached. The Special Committee was only a small body and its pronouncements could not make the resolutions of the General Assembly any more important or more weighty. In addition, it was unrealistic to ask administering Powers to give a positive response to a hypothetical question: whether they would accept visiting missions which the Special Committee might decide to send to the Territories under their administration.

200. The representative of *Venezuela* said that Sub-Committee III was not merely reaffirming General Assembly resolutions but was making a specific recommendation on the basis of the relevant provisions of two Assembly resolutions. It was not asking for a response from the administering Powers; it was appealing for their support and co-operation in the event of the Special Committee's deciding to send visiting missions to their Territories. Venezuela fully supported the consensus and the report of the Sub-Committee.

201. The representative of *Syria* said that his delegation endorsed the report. There was no harm in emphasizing General Assembly resolutions which had still not been implemented.

202. The representative of *Iran* said that the reservations of the Italian delegation had been noted in the records of the Sub-Committee. The consensus had been reached after hearing those reservations and with the consent of the Italian representative.

203. The representative of *Uruguay* recalled that his delegation's views had been expressed during the discussion in Sub-Committee III. He associated him-

self with the remarks made by the representative of *Venezuela* and supported the consensus.

204. The representative of *Tunisia* said that the report should not give rise to lengthy discussion; it was based on decisions taken at the twentieth session of the General Assembly. His delegation supported the report and hoped that the administering Powers would give their full co-operation.

205. The representative of *Sierra Leone* expressed whole-hearted support for the report. Only through visiting missions would the Special Committee be able to gain a first-hand knowledge of the problems of the colonial Territories and to find a speedy solution to them.

206. The representatives of *Ethiopia* and the *Ivory Coast* expressed support for the Sub-Committee's report.

207. The representative of *Afghanistan* said that his delegation endorsed the report. It was not discouraged by the reservations expressed, particularly by the United Kingdom and United States delegations, and it hoped that, when they were requested to do so, the administering Powers would co-operate with the Special Committee for the benefit of the people of the dependent Territories.

208. At the same meeting, the Special Committee adopted the report of the Sub-Committee and approved the recommendation contained therein, on the understanding that the reservations expressed by members would be reflected in the record.

209. By letters dated 17 May 1966, the Chairman, on behalf of the Special Committee, transmitted to the Permanent Representatives of the United Kingdom and of the United States to the United Nations the text of the recommendation thus approved by the Special Committee concerning the question of sending visiting missions to Territories referred to that Sub-Committee (A/AC.109/170).

210. By letter dated 23 May 1966, the Permanent Representative of the United States acknowledged receipt of the Chairman's letter.

211. In a letter dated 26 May 1966 (A/AC.109/171), the Deputy Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom stated as follows in reply:

"... The question of visiting missions raises difficult problems of principle for the United Kingdom Government and I am unable therefore to say anything that might encourage the Special Committee to expect any change in my Government's previous attitude to the question as frequently explained to the Special Committee and its Sub-Committees. The United Kingdom delegation would naturally be prepared to transmit to the United Kingdom Government, and seek instructions on, any specific request or suggestion for a visit to a particular territory that the Committee might consider it appropriate to put forward. This cannot, however, be taken as implying any commitment that the United Kingdom Government would be able to respond to such a request."

Recommendation of Sub-Committee II

212. The Special Committee, at the 468th meeting, considered the section of the report of Sub-Committee II on the question of visiting missions to the Territories referred to it (A/AC.109/L.318), which is reproduced in annex II to the present chapter. Summaries of the statements made by members during the Special

Committee's consideration of the report of Sub-Committee II concerning this question are given below.

213. Following the introduction of the report by the Rapporteur of the Sub-Committee the representative of the *United Kingdom* stated his delegation's reservations concerning the sending of visiting missions to Territories administered by the United Kingdom. The United Kingdom delegation had made clear its position on the question during the Sub-Committee's meetings and he drew the attention of the members of the Special Committee to the summary records of these meetings. With regard to visiting missions, he also drew attention to the comments of the United Kingdom delegation set forth in document A/AC.109/171.

214. The representative of the *United States of America* expressed the reservations of his delegation on the question of the desirability of visiting missions.

215. The representative of *Australia* said that the Australian position on the question of visiting missions was set forth in document A/AC.109/L.318; although in certain circumstances visiting missions could be of great value, it was doubtful whether they would be useful in the case of the Territories under Australian administration, to which the Trusteeship Council had already sent a number of visiting missions. Just as the administering Power had responsibilities, which it did not seek to deny, it also had the right to make decisions and could not agree in advance to any recommendation without having considered its financial implications, especially when there was a possibility of duplication of effort. The Australian delegation was, however, prepared to transmit to its Government any proposal that the Committee might make on the subject.

216. The representative of the *Union of Soviet Socialist Republics* recalled that the majority of the members of Sub-Committee II had recommended, in accordance with General Assembly resolution 2105 (XX), the sending of visiting groups to Territories in the Atlantic, Indian and Pacific Ocean areas, since they considered that those missions would make it possible to obtain first-hand information on the situation in those Territories and on the best means of securing the implementation of the Declaration. Unfortunately it was clear from the summary records and the report of the Sub-Committee that the administering Powers did not share that view and were resorting to pretexts of all kinds in order to obstruct the sending of such missions. The arguments adduced by those Powers did not withstand scrutiny. The United Kingdom delegation said that it was prepared to transmit to its Government any recommendation relating to the sending of visiting missions, but at the same time it made it quite clear that such action did not imply any obligation on the part of the United Kingdom. What could be thought of a Government which sought to ignore the competence of the United Nations and was afraid of the consequences that the Organization's action might have in the economic and political fields? It would seem that the United Kingdom had something to conceal in those Territories. The United States representative, for his part, tried to assure the Committee that the situation in the Territories in the Pacific administered by his Government was so satisfactory that there was no point in sending a visiting mission there. The Special Committee had often heard the fine words of the United States delegation, but

it was clear from the facts that the United States had so far done nothing to implement resolution 1514 (XV) in its Territories. Evidence of that was to be found in the report of the WHO Visiting Mission to the Territory of the Pacific Islands, which revealed the deplorable sanitary conditions in which the people of the Territory lived. Australia, too, had followed the example of its partners by stating that it had the right to refuse to receive visiting missions in the areas under its jurisdiction. The Australian Government seemed to forget that the Charter and the Declaration in resolution 1514 (XV) imposed certain obligations on it with respect to the peoples under its administration. By its refusal, Australia demonstrated its contempt for the right of peoples to self-determination, which had become one of the fundamental rules of international law, and for the will of the majority of the States Members of the United Nations. The attitude of New Zealand was scarcely more satisfactory, since the New Zealand Government stated that it did not object to the sending of visiting missions but would be able to receive such missions only as part of a broader survey of the situation in the region. In view of the negative attitude of the other administering Powers, New Zealand's reply was nothing but a disguised refusal. In fact, those four Powers were seeking primarily to conceal the actual situation in the bastions of colonialism which still existed in the Pacific and which they were using in their struggle against the national liberation movements in South-East Asia, and in particular against the people of Viet-Nam. It sufficed to look at a map to see that all those Territories were situated along the major Pacific Ocean routes and were of extreme importance for military communications. Moreover, before the Second World War, the imperialist Powers had already been vying with each other for possession of the most important bases. Twenty years after the cessation of hostilities, their armed forces were still there and by their presence were contributing to the unbridled exploitation of the Territories. After the collapse of the colonial system in the other parts of the world, the Pacific Islands had become an even greater target for the greed of the colonialist Powers. It was worth noting that since that time gold had been found in Fiji and silver and manganese in the Solomons, while Nauru's phosphates were a tempting prize for foreign monopolies. From the agricultural point of view, the Pacific Territories were no less attractive to the large commercial companies, for their perfect climate made them an ideal site for the cultivation of bananas, copra, citrus fruits, coffee, cocoa and medicinal herbs. Seeking to increase their profits still further, the colonial Powers had adopted a whole series of measures to strengthen their position in the extractive and sugar industries and in tropical agriculture. It was regrettable that the working papers prepared by the Secretariat gave very little information in that regard. That was not surprising, since those documents were based essentially on information made available by the administering Powers, which were seeking to keep world opinion in ignorance of the actual situation in those Territories with regard to public health, social security, land tenure, the conditions governing the engagement and dismissal of employees, and the very small part that the indigenous inhabitants played in the civil service.

217. All those facts prevented the Committee from determining what the true situation was and from

ascertaining the wishes of the people with regard to their future political and social status. The Committee must gain a true picture of the real situation in the Territories as soon as possible. The only way of doing so was to visit the Territories and to have direct contact with the population. There was no justification for a refusal on the part of the administering Powers; any such refusal to comply with resolution 2105 (XX) and to facilitate the activities of such visiting missions would only confirm the fact that their assurances that they wished to co-operate were only empty words designed to deceive world opinion. If the United Kingdom representative was sincere in saying that the Secretariat reports did not adequately reflect the progress achieved in the Territories, why did he not admit that it was only by sending visiting missions there that the true situation could be ascertained?

218. The representative of the *United States of America*, replying to the Soviet representative, said that he would provide detailed information on the United States Territories in the Pacific when the Committee discussed the reports on that area. With regard to the question of United States bases, the Committee was well aware that the United States had been obliged to maintain its military presence precisely because of the attitude of certain Powers and because of the needs both of its own defence and of that of the region. When the situation in that part of the world had returned to normal, the United States Government would make it its duty to devote the resources at present being used for military purposes to other ends. In the present circumstances that was unfortunately out of the question.

219. The representative of *Australia* reserved the right to reply to the remarks of the Soviet representative at the appropriate time. It was well known that no Government was more faithful in discharging the obligations it had undertaken than the Government of Australia. Since the United Nations had been set up, six or seven visiting missions had been able to visit the Territories under Australian administration and their members had been made most welcome. He referred the Committee to the reports of those missions, which gave a detailed account of the situation obtaining in the Territories in question.

220. The representative of the *United Republic of Tanzania* said that his delegation fully supported the conclusions and recommendations in the various parts of the report. At the present time, the essential thing was that the anachronism which the continued survival of colonialism in mid-twentieth century represented should be brought to an end as quickly as possible. The Tanzanian delegation hoped that the administering Powers would place no obstacles in the way of visiting missions and would give them their full co-operation.

221. The representative of the *Union of Soviet Socialist Republics* said that he merely wished to point out that the United States representative's reply confirmed the fact that the Territories in question were being transformed into military bases instead of being developed economically, socially and politically, as laid down in the Charter.

222. As for the large number of visiting missions to which the Australian representative had alluded, most of them had been composed, for the most part, of representatives of administering Powers and their

conclusions were therefore unreliable, since the opinion of the other members had not usually been reflected in their reports.

223. At the same meeting the Special Committee adopted the report of Sub-Committee II on this question and endorsed the recommendation contained therein, it being understood that the reservations expressed by members would be reflected in the record.

G. IMPLEMENTATION OF GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTIONS 2105 (XX) AND 2107 (XX) AND PERTINENT RESOLUTIONS OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE: REQUESTS TO INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND SPECIALIZED AGENCIES

Introduction

224. At its 415th meeting, on 18 May 1966, the Special Committee requested the Secretary-General to communicate with the various international institutions in connexion with the appeals addressed to them by the General Assembly and by the Special Committee in their resolutions relating to the implementation of the Declaration and to the Territories under Portuguese administration and South West Africa. The Special Committee asked the Secretary-General to request these institutions to inform the Committee as a matter of urgency, first, whether the requests and appeals to them had been brought before their respective executive organs for decision, and secondly, what action they had taken or contemplated taking in response to those appeals and requests.

225. The paragraphs of the General Assembly resolutions containing requests and appeals to international institutions read as follows:

[Resolution 2105 (XX)]

"11. *Requests* all States and international institutions, including the specialized agencies of the United Nations, to withhold assistance of any kind to the Governments of Portugal and South Africa until they renounce their policy of colonial domination and racial discrimination;"

[Resolution 2107 (XX)]

"9. *Appeals* to all the specialized agencies, in particular to the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the International Monetary Fund, to refrain from granting Portugal any financial, economic or technical assistance so long as the Government of Portugal fails to implement General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV);

"10. *Requests* the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the specialized agencies concerned and other international relief organizations to increase their assistance to the refugees from the Territories under Portuguese administration and to the people who have suffered from military operations".

226. The Secretary-General transmitted the Special Committee's requests to a number of international institutions including the specialized agencies by letters dated 6 June 1966.

Consideration by the Special Committee

Introduction

227. The Special Committee considered this item at its 464th to 467th meetings between 9 and 15 September 1966.

228. During its consideration of this question, the Special Committee had before it a note by the Secretariat (A/AC.109/194 and Add.1) containing the replies received by the Secretary-General from various international institutions, including the specialized agencies concerning the implementation of General Assembly resolutions 2105 (XX) and 2107 (XX) and pertinent resolutions of the Special Committee.

General statements by members

229. The representative of the *Union of Soviet Socialist Republics* said that he was glad that, at the suggestion of the Working Group, the question of the implementation of General Assembly resolutions 2105 (XX) and 2107 (XX) had been placed on the agenda of the Special Committee.

230. It was the opinion of the USSR delegation—and the same opinion had been expressed many times by various other delegations—that the Special Committee should do its utmost to ensure that the resolutions directed towards the rapid elimination of the colonial régimes were put into effect. The Committee could make no claim to efficiency if it was content to set forth measures that were considered desirable and did not concern itself about the implementation of the United Nations decisions.

231. It was indeed the fundamental task of the Special Committee to keep a close watch on the implementation by the colonial Powers of the General Assembly decisions concerning the manifold aspects of decolonization. That task was all the more important in that those Powers stopped at nothing in their efforts to obstruct the implementation of those decisions; they did their utmost to maintain their domination over the colonial Territories, either directly or through puppet régimes, and even used force in their fight against the national liberation movements of Africa, Asia and Latin America.

232. In view of those manoeuvres on the part of the colonial Powers, it was even more urgently necessary to ascertain how the resolutions of the General Assembly and the Committee were being put into effect by all those concerned, and by the specialized agencies of the United Nations as well.

233. In that connexion, the USSR delegation was sorry to note that some agencies were disregarding the General Assembly resolutions, although they had been directly asked to take steps to put them into effect. The replies of the specialized agencies to the questions of the Secretary-General, who in accordance with a decision taken by the Committee on 18 May 1966 had asked them to inform him what they had done to comply with the resolutions of the General Assembly and the Committee, and in particular to comply with the provisions of paragraph 11 of General Assembly resolution 2105 (XX), could not be considered satisfactory. While some specialized agencies had already considered the General Assembly's request and had taken, or were preparing to take, certain steps in that connexion—UNESCO, for example, was to be congratulated on its decision to place the question of the tasks that devolved upon it in the light of the resolutions on the liquidation of colonialism and racism adopted by the General Assembly at its twentieth session on the agenda of the fourteenth General Conference—some replies showed that a number of agencies were disregarding the decisions of the General Assembly. That was true in particular of the replies of the International Bank for Reconstruction

and Development and the International Monetary Fund. Those agencies had in fact evaded the question. They had not even deigned to state, in reply to the Secretary-General's request, what steps they proposed to take to comply with the General Assembly's decisions. Such an attitude was tantamount to a repudiation of the wishes of the overwhelming majority of Members of the United Nations. In the case of the International Bank, that fact was confirmed by the policy of that agency, which had just approved two loans, amounting to \$30 million, for the expansion of the Portuguese electrical network. That decision was patently contrary to resolution 2107 (XX), and in particular paragraph 9 of that resolution. Moreover, the Bank had repeated that offence by approving a loan of \$20 million to none other than the Government of South Africa, thus bringing the number of loans already granted to the South African Government by the Bank to eleven, with a total value of \$241.8 million. The authorities of the Bank, which was dominated by United States capital, were certainly not unaware of the relevant General Assembly resolutions, which had been brought to their attention as early as March 1966. That action on the part of the Bank was in flagrant contradiction both with the United Nations policy of refusing all assistance to racists and colonialists and with the United Nations resolution asking for sanctions to be applied against the Portuguese and South African colonialists. By granting large loans to the Governments of Portugal and South Africa, the International Bank had simply given further proof of the criminal alliance of international capital and the colonialists, united in their efforts to combat the national liberation movements of the peoples of South West Africa, Mozambique and Angola and other colonial peoples.

234. He urged that the Committee should condemn the decision of the International Bank to grant loans to Portugal and South Africa and demand that the agreements already concluded should be cancelled. The Committee must ensure that the Bank respected the United Nations resolutions condemning colonialism in all its forms, such as racism and apartheid, as a crime against humanity.

235. The representative of the *United Republic of Tanzania* expressed his delegation's appreciation of the replies received from certain international bodies and United Nations agencies on the subject of General Assembly resolutions 2105 (XX) and 2107 (XX). His delegation had noted with particular satisfaction that the WHO Regional Committee for Africa had adopted a resolution suspending Portugal's right to participation in the Committee and suspending any assistance to that country.

236. His delegation wished, however, to record its disapproval of the disregard and lack of co-operation shown by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Although in its reply the Bank claimed to have brought the request before its Executive Directors, it was not only surprising but somewhat shocking to find that the Bank had recently granted the neo-fascist régime of South Africa a loan of \$20 million. The Bank had also granted assistance to the Portuguese colonialist régime for various projects which might increase that régime's power to suppress the African people of Mozambique, Angola and so-called Portuguese Guinea. Since 1963, when the Bank had signed an agreement for a loan of some \$5 million to the fascist Government of Portugal, that

Government had stepped up its aggressive war against the people of those Territories. While his delegation acknowledged that the activities of the Bank were beneficial to some areas, it felt that the extension of any assistance that might in any way alleviate some of the self-created problems of the Portuguese colonialists and South African racists was contrary to the interests and legitimate aspirations of the peoples of Angola, Mozambique, so-called Portuguese Guinea and South West Africa. His delegation called upon all those who cherished freedom and independence to join in the universal struggle against colonialism and its crimes against humanity. There was ample evidence to show that the Portuguese colonialist régime could not continue its policies without the assistance it was receiving from its friends. Similarly, the South African régime was able to go on flouting world public opinion because it received encouragement and assistance from its hypocritical trading partners.

237. In his delegation's view, all international institutions and agencies should act in concert to ensure that the principles underlying the decisions of the General Assembly were respected. Such concerted action was of great importance both materially and morally to the masses of the African people in their struggle to overcome colonialist aggression and apartheid. Any action by an international body contrary to the decisions of the United Nations was a challenge to the Organization and a blow to national liberation movements. It was therefore his delegation's hope that the International Bank would reconsider its position and extend its full co-operation not only to the United Nations but to the heroic peoples of South West Africa and so-called Portuguese Guinea, who were waging a struggle against the forces condemned by civilized humanity.

238. In conclusion, his delegation hoped that all international institutions which had not yet done so would immediately take all the steps called for in resolutions 2105 (XX) and 2107 (XX).

239. The representative of *Syria* said that, when the Secretary-General had been requested to draw the attention of the specialized agencies to the provisions of the United Nations resolutions enjoining those agencies to refrain from extending to South Africa and Portugal assistance which would run counter to the objectives of the United Nations, it had been expected that those agencies would give a clear-cut undertaking that they would comply with the resolutions. Some agencies had done so, but others had given evasive answers, saying, for example, that they had referred the matter to their administrators. Perhaps, having made loans to both South Africa and Portugal, those agencies did not know how to reply or perhaps they considered their administrators above the United Nations. In either case, it was a serious matter. For the time being, however, the Committee might simply say that it expected more thorough replies where the commitment to put the United Nations resolutions into full effect was beyond question.

240. The representative of *Bulgaria*, referring to documents A/AC.109/194 and Add. 1, expressed regret that certain international institutions and specialized agencies forming part of the United Nations family had waited until the Committee's decision of 18 May 1966 and the sending of the Secretary-General's note before reacting to the General Assembly resolutions. That was particularly true of the International Bank and the International Monetary

Fund, which were specifically mentioned in resolution 2107 (XX).

241. Those two bodies had once again submitted a purely formal reply—a procedure which did not reflect a very accommodating attitude towards the United Nations and had been the subject of expressions of disapproval by the General Assembly. It might be supposed that those replies indicated that the two organizations in question had been merely inactive with regard to the task of decolonization being undertaken by the United Nations. In fact, however, even after the decision adopted by the Special Committee on 18 May, the International Bank had approved two loans amounting to \$30 million to enable Portugal to improve its electric supply system. The Bank had thus shown genuine contempt for the decisions of the United Nations, particularly resolution 2107 (XX), which appealed to the International Bank and the International Monetary Fund to refrain from granting Portugal any financial, economic or technical assistance so long as the Portuguese Government failed to implement General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV). The loans granted to Portugal were not an isolated case; the recent \$20 million loan to the Government of South Africa was further proof that it was part of the Bank's policy to co-operate with colonialist and racist régimes. It was to be noted that the Bank had already granted South Africa eleven loans totalling \$241.8 million. The studies made by the Special Committee and by Sub-Committee I had thrown light on the pernicious part played by the international financial interests which were partners of the racist and colonialist régimes in exploiting the natural resources of the colonial countries. The Committee must not permit those interests to pursue their policy of assisting the Portuguese and South African régimes through two bodies which were affiliated with the United Nations.

242. His delegation was pleased to note that a number of international institutions and specialized agencies took a serious attitude towards General Assembly decisions and towards the appeals which the Assembly had addressed to them. Some, such as the International Labour Organisation and the World Health Organization, had not only taken account of United Nations resolutions on decolonization in their general work but had adopted specific measures to implement those resolutions. The World Health Organization and its nineteenth Assembly were to be commended for adopting a resolution which suspended Portugal's right to participate in the Regional Committee for Africa and in regional activities until its Government furnished proof of its willingness to conform to the injunctions of the United Nations and which also suspended technical assistance to Portugal in application of General Assembly resolution 2107 (XX).

243. The representative of *India* said that his delegation had given its full support to the efforts of the United Nations to induce the Governments of Portugal and South Africa to abandon their present policies; in that spirit, it had supported General Assembly resolutions 2105 (XX) and 2107 (XX), which appealed to the specialized agencies to refrain from granting assistance to Portugal and South Africa until they renounced their present policies. Since resolution 2107 (XX) mentioned in particular the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the International Monetary Fund, his delegation had been

disappointed to hear of the recent granting of new loans to South Africa by the Bank. Any such help would only encourage the Governments of Portugal and South Africa in their shameful policies. At the same time, his delegation paid a tribute to the Bank and the Fund for their record in helping developing countries to achieve decent levels of living.

Action taken by the Special Committee

244. At the 466th meeting on 14 September 1966 the representative of the *United Republic of Tanzania* introduced a draft resolution concerning General Assembly resolutions 2105 (XX) and 2107 (XX): requests to international institutions including the specialized agencies (A/AC.109/L.330), jointly sponsored by Afghanistan, Ethiopia, India, Iran, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Mali, Sierra Leone, Syria, Tunisia, United Republic of Tanzania and Yugoslavia.

245. The representative of the *United Republic of Tanzania* observed that the Committee had already examined the report of the Secretary-General based on the replies he had received to his request to international institutions not to give any assistance to South Africa and Portugal. The Afro-Asian group and Yugoslavia had considered the matter further and had agreed that the time had come for concrete action. They had therefore produced the draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.330) requesting those international institutions which were enabling the Portuguese and South African régimes to continue their unjust treatment of innocent Africans to desist from that policy. He read out the text of the draft resolution.

246. The draft resolution asked for nothing more than justice, and the Committee should surely adopt it.

247. The representative of *Iran* stressed the need to deny South Africa and Portugal any assistance, financial or other, so long as they continued their policy of oppressing the African population, as indicated in operative paragraphs 2 and 3 of the draft resolution.

248. The request was addressed, in particular, to the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the International Monetary Fund, which had done much to bridge the gap between rich and poor by helping developing countries but would be doing just the opposite by providing aid to South Africa and Portugal; for such aid would strengthen the régimes of those countries which pursued policies wholly detrimental to the welfare of the African population.

249. He hoped that all the specialized agencies, in particular the Bank and the Fund, would refrain from granting aid to South Africa and Portugal, and that the draft resolution would be adopted unanimously.

250. The representative of *Tunisia* said that he would have preferred the Committee take a decision on the draft resolution by consensus, since, in his view, it was couched in sufficiently moderate terms to gain the support of all members of the Committee.

251. He deplored the fact that the Bank and the Fund had continued to grant new loans to Portugal and South Africa although General Assembly resolutions 2105 (XX) and 2107 (XX) had been communicated to them. The draft resolution now submitted made a further appeal to them to co-operate in implementing resolutions of the General Assembly.

252. The representative of *Bulgaria* stated that his delegation welcomed draft resolution A/AC.109/L.330 because it felt that it was time for the Committee to take a clear, unequivocal stand on the activities of international institutions with regard to colonial problems and particularly with regard to the implementation of General Assembly resolutions. His delegation agreed with the sponsors of the draft resolution that the Committee should express appreciation to those international institutions and specialized agencies which were seriously trying to act on the Assembly's appeals and assist in the process of decolonization, and condemn those which, like the International Bank, were taking action contrary to the Assembly's decisions and continuing to aid the Portuguese and South African colonialists and racists. His delegation shared the view of those speakers who had called upon the International Bank to cancel the loans recently granted to Portugal and South Africa. Although no such provision appeared in the draft resolution, his delegation supported and would vote for the latter, since it expressed the ideas which it was the task of the United Nations to uphold.

253. The representative of *Australia* said that, as an expression of concern regarding important aspects of the present policies of South Africa and Portugal, draft resolution A/AC.109/L.330 was bound to evoke the Australian delegation's sympathy. Despite its opposition to those policies, however, the Australian delegation could not but express its anxiety when efforts were made to control or channel international aid for political purposes, particularly when the limiting of aid might in practice mean deprivation or the elimination of opportunity for innocent people. The observance of agreements was vital to the conduct of human relations. Under the terms of article IV of the Agreement between the United Nations and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, neither organization was to present formal recommendations to the other without reasonable prior consultation with regard thereto and the United Nations recognized that action taken by the Bank on loans should be determined by the independent exercise of the Bank's own judgement. The draft resolution before the Committee did not seem to be in accord with either the spirit or the letter of that Agreement. For those reasons, his delegation could not support the draft resolution as it stood.

254. The representative of the *United Kingdom* recalled that his delegation had reserved its position on the issue of the introduction of political controversy in the specialized agencies in a statement at the last session of the General Assembly.¹⁵ His delegation had accordingly reserved its position on the same matter at the 415th meeting of the Special Committee and wished now to reserve its position on draft resolution A/AC.109/L.330, on which it would abstain.

255. The representative of the *United States of America* reserved the position of her delegation on the draft resolution, in the light of the agreements between the United Nations and the Bank and the Fund; in that regard, she wished to associate her delegation with the reservations expressed by the Australian delegation.

¹⁵ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twentieth Session, Plenary Meetings*, 1395th meeting.

256. The representative of *Uruguay* said that his delegation had voted in favour of General Assembly resolution 2105 (XX) but not of resolution 2107 (XX); in view of that fact, and in the absence of instructions, his delegation would have to abstain on the draft resolution. That abstention did not affect the basic position of Uruguay in condemning the policies of South Africa and Portugal.

257. The representative of *Denmark* said that at the last session of the General Assembly his delegation had either reserved its position or abstained from voting on provisions similar to those in the present draft resolution. It must therefore reserve its position with respect to the present draft resolution also. Its attitude was approximately the same as that expressed by the Australian representative.

258. At its 467th meeting on 15 September 1966, the Chairman, before putting the draft resolution to the vote, informed the Special Committee that in operative paragraph 3 the words "from rendering any financial assistance" had been revised by the sponsors to read "from rendering any financial or other assistance".

259. At the same meeting, the Special Committee adopted the draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.320) as orally revised, by 15 votes to none, with 7 abstentions.

260. The representative of *Venezuela* speaking in explanation of his vote, said that his delegation had been obliged to abstain in the vote, primarily because it had received no instructions. In conformity with the position taken by his delegation on the same matter at the last session of the General Assembly, its abstention should not be interpreted as a change in its position regarding the policies of Portugal and South Africa, a position which was well known to the Special Committee.

261. The resolution (A/AC.109/206) thus adopted by the Special Committee at its 467th meeting, on 15 September 1966, entitled "General Assembly resolutions 2105 (XX) and 2107 (XX): requests to international institutions, including the specialized agencies", reads as follows:

"The Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,

"Having considered the replies (A/AC.109/194 and Add.1) received from international institutions and the specialized agencies on the implementation of paragraph 11 of General Assembly resolution 2105 (XX) of 20 December 1965 and paragraphs 9 and 10 of resolution 2107 (XX) of 21 December 1965, containing requests and appeals addressed to them,

"Noting with appreciation that several international institutions and specialized agencies have undertaken or intend to undertake in the near future measures for the implementation of the above-mentioned resolutions,

"Regretting that the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the International Monetary Fund continue to grant substantial loans and credits to the Governments of Portugal and South Africa in disregard of the above-mentioned resolutions,

"1. Expresses its appreciation to those international institutions and specialized agencies which are

co-operating with the United Nations in the implementation of General Assembly resolutions 2105 (XX) and 2107 (XX) and appeals to them to continue their efforts in this regard;

"2. Expresses its deep disappointment at the granting of new loans and the extension of credits to the Governments of South Africa and Portugal by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the International Monetary Fund;

"3. Urges the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the International Monetary Fund to co-operate in the implementation of General Assembly resolutions 2105 (XX) and 2107 (XX), by refraining from rendering any financial or other assistance to the Governments of Portugal and South Africa until they have renounced their policies of colonial domination and racial discrimination."

262. The text of this resolution was transmitted to international institutions and the specialized agencies by a letter dated 2 October 1966.

H. QUESTION OF THE LIST OF TERRITORIES TO WHICH THE DECLARATION ON THE GRANTING OF INDEPENDENCE TO COLONIAL COUNTRIES AND PEOPLES IS APPLICABLE

263. In its report to the General Assembly at its twentieth session, the Special Committee stated that "subject to any directives the General Assembly at its twentieth session may wish to give for the speedy implementation of the Declaration, the Special Committee intends to continue its consideration of the question of the list of Territories to which the Declaration is applicable" (A/6000/Rev.1, chap. I, para. 66).

264. In the seventh preambular paragraph of its resolution 2105 (XX) of 20 December 1965, the General Assembly noted "the action taken and envisaged by the Special Committee regarding the list of Territories to which the Declaration is applicable".

265. At its 471st meeting, the Special Committee considered a report submitted by the Working Group concerning this question, which is contained in paragraphs 6 to 10 of the latter's twenty-fifth report (A/AC.109/L.338). These paragraphs read as follows:

"6. The Working Group noted that in its report to the General Assembly at its twentieth session the Special Committee had stated as follows: 'Subject to any directives the General Assembly at its twentieth session may wish to give for the speedy implementation of the Declaration, the Special Committee intends to continue its consideration of the question of the list of Territories to which the Declaration is applicable' (A/6000/Rev.1, chap. I, para. 66).

"7. The Working Group was also aware that, in the seventh preambular paragraph of its resolution 2105 (XX) of 20 December 1965, the General Assembly noted 'the action taken and envisaged by the Special Committee regarding the list of Territories to which the Declaration is applicable'.

"8. In this connexion, members recalled that, as stated in its report to the General Assembly at its twentieth session (ibid., para. 65), the Special Committee at its last session had before it a letter from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Cuba requesting the inclusion of the question of Puerto

Rico on the agenda of the Special Committee but that, owing to lack of time, the Committee was unable to examine that request.

"9. Members also recalled that in his address at the opening meeting of the Special Committee in Addis Ababa on 6 June 1966 (A/AC.109/SR.433) the Administrative Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) drew attention to the omission of the Comoro Archipelago from the list of Territories to which the Declaration applies, and requested that the necessary corrections be made.

"10. Following an exchange of views on various suggestions, the Working Group agreed that the question of the inclusion of these Territories, namely, Puerto Rico and the Comoro Archipelago, required further detailed study and that, in view of the lack of time at this session, it should make such a study at an early date during the next session of the Special Committee. It further agreed that, at that time, it would also consider any other Territories which might be included in the list of 'all other Territories which have not yet attained independence'."

266. The representative of the *Union of Soviet Socialist Republics* pointed out that the question of the inclusion of Puerto Rico on the agenda of the Special Committee had already been considered the previous year and it was clear from document A/6000/Rev.1, chapter I, paragraphs 65-66, that the Committee had decided to continue its consideration of the question at subsequent sessions. Since that time, many requests had been received to the same effect, stating that the inclusion of Puerto Rico on the Committee's agenda was fully justified. His delegation was therefore in favour of considering the question during the current session; it was a perfectly clear issue since the people of Puerto Rico had not been given an opportunity to express their wishes freely concerning the future status of their country.

267. The representative of *Bulgaria* said that his delegation would agree with the consensus that the question of the inclusion of Puerto Rico on the Committee's agenda should be discussed early in the next session. The Special Committee was quite competent to consider Puerto Rico as a dependent Territory to which resolution 1514 (XV) was fully applicable. The Declaration in that resolution was the *raison d'être* of the Committee and statements appearing in United Nations documents before that Declaration had been adopted could not be allowed to prevent the Special Committee from considering all dependent Territories. He had welcomed the request made by the Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries in 1964 that the Special Committee should consider the question of Puerto Rico in the light of resolution 1514 (XV).

268. The representative of the *United States of America* explained that the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico was fully self-governing and autonomous, a fact which had been confirmed by the General Assembly, and was therefore not subject to the jurisdiction of the Special Committee. Her delegation would view very seriously any attempt to discuss the matter since that would question Puerto Rico's self-governing status. That status had been established following an overwhelming vote by the people of Puerto Rico in 1952. In view of the adoption of resolution 748 (VIII) by

the General Assembly in 1953, her delegation considered that the subject should not be included in the Special Committee's agenda.

269. At the same meeting, the Special Committee approved the proposals contained in paragraph 10 of the report of the Working Group, it being understood that the reservations expressed by members would be reflected in the records.

I. CONSIDERATION OF OTHER MATTERS

Implementation of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) with regard to colonial Territories considered by the Special Committee during its meetings in Africa (1966)

270. At its 454th and 455th meetings, held in Algiers on 21 and 22 June 1966, the Special Committee considered a draft resolution relating to the implementation of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) with regard to colonial Territories considered by the Committee during its meetings in Africa (1966). The draft resolution was adopted by the Special Committee at its 455th meeting on 22 June 1966 (A/AC.109/188). Details of the Special Committee's consideration of this item are contained in chapter II of the present report.

Report of the delegation of the Special Committee to the international conference concerning South West Africa, Oxford (March 1966)

271. At the 396th meeting, the Special Committee decided to accept an invitation extended to it to send observers to an international conference concerning South West Africa to be held at Oxford, England, from 23 to 27 March 1966. At the 398th meeting, the Committee decided that the delegation of observers to attend the conference on behalf of the Special Committee should consist of Mr. Hans Tabor (Denmark) and Mr. Gershon Collier (Sierra Leone). The Special Committee took into consideration the report of the delegation to the conference (A/AC.109/L.290) in its examination of the question of South West Africa, an account of which is contained in chapter IV of the present report.

Co-operation with the Organization of African Unity and the League of Arab States

272. At the 403rd meeting, the Special Committee decided to accede to a request by cable from the Administrative Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) that the Organization be represented as an observer at the Special Committee's meetings. Accordingly, representatives of the Organization attended the Committee's meetings at United Nations Headquarters, in Dar es Salaam and Addis Ababa as observers.

273. At the 440th meeting, the Committee decided to accede to a request dated 11 June 1966 from the Acting Secretary-General of the League of Arab States (A/AC.109/182) that the League be represented as an observer at the Special Committee's meetings in Cairo. Accordingly, a representative of the League of Arab States attended the Committee's meetings in Cairo in an observer capacity.

274. In a letter dated 20 September 1966, the Chairman of the Special Committee, having regard to section II, paragraph 14, sub-paragraph (c) thereof, transmitted the report of the Sub-Committee

on Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland to the Administrative Secretary-General of the OAU.

Matters relating to Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland

(a) *Appointment of United Nations Special Representatives*

275. The Special Committee, in operative paragraph 7 of its resolution of 9 June 1966 on Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland (A/AC.109/178), requested the Secretary-General, in consultation with the Special Committee, to appoint United Nations Special Representatives in each of the Territories for the purpose of following up the progress towards independence and to report to the General Assembly as soon as possible. The report of the Secretary-General concerning this matter was made available to members of the Special Committee in document A/AC.109/199.

(b) *Operation of the Fund for Economic Development of Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland*

276. In operative paragraph 9 of its resolution 2063 (XX) of 16 December 1965 on the question of Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to appoint resident representatives in the three Territories and to report to the Assembly at its twenty-first session on the operation of the Fund established under paragraph 7 of the same resolution. In operative paragraph 5 of its resolution adopted on 9 June 1966 (A/AC.109/178) the Special Committee addressed a further appeal to all States to contribute to the above-mentioned Fund.

277. In his report to the General Assembly at its twenty-first session (A/6439), the Secretary-General expressed regret that, as the contributions pledged so far were insufficient, it had not been possible to bring the Fund into operation (*ibid.*, para. 6). Specific pledges of contributions received up to that time to the Fund were: Cyprus, £100; Democratic Republic of Congo, \$US2,500; and Liberia \$US6,000. In addition, Denmark and India had indicated that their Governments would contribute to the Fund when it became operational. Since then a further pledge has been received from Kuwait for \$US2,000.

278. As regards the appointment of resident representatives in the three Territories, the Secretary-General stated in his report (*ibid.*, para. 7) that the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) had established separate offices headed by a Deputy Resident Representative in each of the Territories under the general supervision of the Regional Representative of the UNDP in Lusaka, Zambia.

Information on Non-Self-Governing Territories transmitted under Article 73 e of the Charter

279. The General Assembly, by resolution 1970 (XVIII) of 16 December 1963, decided to dissolve the Committee on Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories and entrusted its functions to the Special Committee. The Special Committee accordingly considered, at its 472nd and 473rd meetings on 12 and 19 October 1966, an item on information on Non-Self-Governing Territories transmitted under Article 73 e of the Charter. Details of the Special Committee's consideration of this item are contained in chapter XXIII of the present report.

Activities of foreign economic and other interests in Southern Rhodesia and their mode of operation

280. At its 328th meeting, on 22 April 1965, the Special Committee adopted a resolution on the question of Southern Rhodesia (A/6000/Rev. 1, chap. III, para. 292). In operative paragraph 9 of that resolution the Special Committee decided "to study in co-operation with the Secretary-General and the agencies of the United Nations the implications of the activities of foreign economic and other interests in Southern Rhodesia and their mode of operation in order to assess their economic and political influence".

281. At its 409th meeting, on 26 April 1966, the Special Committee decided, without objection, to refer to Sub-Committee I, for consideration, the item relating to the activities of foreign economic and other interests in Southern Rhodesia and their mode of operation.

282. Sub-Committee I submitted its report on this item to the Special Committee on 29 September 1966. Details of the Special Committee's consideration of the report are contained in chapter III of the present report.

Activities of foreign economic and other interests which are impeding the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples in the Territories under Portuguese administration

283. The Special Committee, in its resolution adopted at its 277th meeting, on 3 July 1964 (A/5800/Rev.1, chap. V, para. 352), requested "Sub-Committee I of the Special Committee, with the assistance of the Secretary-General, to study the activities of foreign economic and other interests, which are impeding the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence in the Territories under Portuguese administration". On the basis of the study by Sub-Committee I, the Special Committee submitted a report on the matter to the General Assembly at its twentieth session (A/6000/Rev.1, chap. V), in which it endorsed the conclusions and recommendations of the Sub-Committee. In its conclusions and recommendations, the Sub-Committee informed the Special Committee as follows:

"278.... In order to enable it to have a more comprehensive view of the effects of foreign economic and other activities in the other major sectors of the economic life of the Territories under Portuguese administration, the Sub-Committee has asked the Secretariat to prepare background papers on the agricultural and allied industries, foreign owned railways and the economic relations of Mozambique with South Africa and Southern Rhodesia. After the Sub-Committee has reviewed the additional information, it will report to the Special Committee and submit such further observations, conclusions and recommendations as may be necessary." (A/6000/Rev.1, chap. V, appendix, para. 278.)

284. Sub-Committee I continued its consideration of this question in 1966 and submitted a supplementary report to the Special Committee at the 470th meeting on 6 October 1966. An account of the Sub-Committee's consideration of this report is contained in chapter V of the present report.

Matters relating to the small Territories

285. In operative paragraph 8 of its resolution 2105 (XX) of 20 December 1965, the General Assembly requested "the Special Committee to pay particular attention to the small Territories and to recommend to the General Assembly the most appropriate ways, as well as the steps to be taken, to enable the populations of those Territories to exercise fully their right to self-determination and independence".

286. In requesting its Sub-Committees I, II and III to carry out the tasks assigned to them, the Special Committee called their attention to the above-mentioned provision of General Assembly resolution 2105 (XX). Further, in arriving at its conclusions and recommendations concerning the small Territories, details of which are contained in the relevant chapters of the present report, the Special Committee took the same provision into consideration.

287. Subject to any directives that the General Assembly at its twenty-first session may wish to give for the speedy implementation of the Declaration in respect of these Territories, the Special Committee will continue to be guided by this and other provisions of General Assembly resolution 2105 (XX).

Deadline for the accession of Territories to independence

288. In operative paragraph 9 of its resolution 2105 (XX), the General Assembly requested "the Special Committee, whenever it considers it appropriate, to recommend a deadline for the accession to independence of each Territory in accordance with the wishes of the people".

289. In requesting its Sub-Committees I, II and III to carry out the tasks assigned to them, the Special Committee called their attention to the above-mentioned provision of General Assembly resolution 2105 (XX). Further in its consideration of specific territories, the Special Committee took the same provision into consideration.

290. Subject to any directives that the General Assembly at its twenty-first session may wish to give in this regard, the Special Committee intends to pursue its consideration of all Territories which have not yet attained independence, and in this connexion will continue to be guided by this and other provisions of General Assembly resolution 2105 (XX).

Pattern of meetings and methods of work

291. In its resolution 2116 (XX) of 21 December 1965 concerning the pattern of conferences, the General Assembly decided, *inter alia*, "that a fixed pattern of conferences to govern the places and dates of the meetings of United Nations bodies shall come into force on 1 January 1966 for a further period of three years". It requested the Secretary-General "to submit to the General Assembly each year a basic programme of conferences for the following year, established in conformity with the present pattern and after consultation, as appropriate, with the organs concerned". It also urged "all organs of the United Nations... to review their working methods and also the frequency and length of sessions, in the light of the present resolution, the growing volume of meetings, the resulting strain on available resources and the difficulty of ensuring the effective participation of members".

292. By adopting the twenty-fifth report of the working group (A/AC.109/L.338), the Special Committee at its 471st meeting on 10 October 1966 decided to hold two sessions in 1967, the first from 20 February to 31 May, and the second from 17 July to 25 August. This will provide for fourteen working weeks during the first session, a recess of six weeks during June and July, and six working weeks during the second session.

293. It was the understanding of the Special Committee in taking this decision that the above meetings programme would not preclude the holding of extra-sessional meetings on an emergency basis if developments so warranted. Further, the decision was based on the expectation that the Special Committee would be able to complete the major part of its work by the end of its first session. Included in the first session would also be any meetings which the Special Committee may decide to hold outside Headquarters. In fixing the closing date indicated above, the Special Committee also took account of the annual Trusteeship Council session which normally begins at the end of May and lasts for about one month. The Special Committee envisaged that the second session which should conclude before the opening of the twenty-second session of the General Assembly would be devoted to the consideration of unfinished business as well as any developments after the close of the first session which the Special Committee may wish to bring to the attention of the Assembly.

294. The Special Committee further decided that any visiting groups it might be able to dispatch to Territories should time their visits so that their reports may be taken up by the Special Committee at the beginning of its second session.

295. Finally, the Special Committee decided that in order to ensure adherence to the programme outlined above, it would, first, decide its programme of work in some detail at the beginning of the first session, and secondly, decide upon the Territories to which it would send visiting groups, in order to allow sufficient time for the necessary negotiations, planning and administrative arrangements.

J. RELATIONS WITH OTHER UNITED NATIONS BODIES

Security Council

296. The General Assembly, in its resolution 1956 (XVIII) of 11 December 1963, invited the Special Committee to apprise the Security Council of any developments in any Territory examined by it which may threaten international peace and security.

(a) *Southern Rhodesia*

297. In operative paragraph 6 of its resolution of 21 April 1966 (A/AC.109/158), the Special Committee recommended to the Security Council "to consider urgently the further measures envisaged under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations to put into effect its decisions concerning Southern Rhodesia". The text of the resolution, together with the records of the debate on the question in the Special Committee, was transmitted to the President of the Security Council on 21 April 1966.¹⁶

298. By operative paragraph 6 of its resolution of 31 May 1966 (A/AC.109/167), the Special Commit-

¹⁶ Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-first Year, Supplement for April, May and June 1966, document S/7263.

tee drew once again "the attention of the Security Council to the grave situation prevailing in Southern Rhodesia with a view to recommending mandatory sanctions under Chapter VII of the Charter and to taking appropriate measures to secure the effective application of sanctions in case of default by any State". In operative paragraph 7 of the same resolution, the Special Committee recommended to the Security Council "that it request the Government of the United Kingdom to take measures provided for in Chapter VII of the Charter in order, by the use of air, sea or land forces, to prevent any supplies, including oil and petroleum products, from reaching Southern Rhodesia". The text of this resolution was transmitted to the President of the Security Council on 14 June 1966.¹⁷

(b) *South West Africa*

299. By operative paragraph 5 of its resolution of 9 June 1966 (A/AC.109/177), the Special Committee drew "the attention of the Security Council to the serious situation prevailing in South West Africa and its aggravation caused by the racist rebellion in Southern Rhodesia and its consequences for international peace and security". The Special Committee, in operative paragraph 6 of this resolution recommended to the Security Council "to make it obligatory for all States to implement the measures contained in General Assembly resolution 1899 (XVIII) of 13 November 1963 and in particular those mentioned in paragraph 7 thereof". It further recommended to the Security Council "to take the necessary measures to ensure the withdrawal of all military bases and installations from the Territory". The text of this resolution was transmitted to the President of the Security Council on 14 June 1966.¹⁸

(c) *Aden*

300. By operative paragraph 10 of its resolution of 15 June 1966 (A/AC.109/179/Rev.1), the Special Committee drew "the attention of the Security Council to the dangerous situation prevailing in the area as a result of British military action against the people of the Territory". The text of this resolution was transmitted to the President of the Security Council on 15 June 1966.¹⁹

(d) *Territories under Portuguese administration*

301. In operative paragraph 6 of its resolution of 22 June 1966 (A/AC.109/187), the Special Committee recommended to the Security Council "to make obligatory for all States to implement the measures contained in General Assembly resolution 2107 (XX), in particular those mentioned in paragraph 7 thereof". The text of this resolution was transmitted to the President of the Security Council on 1 July 1966.²⁰

(e) *Colonial Territories considered by the Special Committee during its meetings in Africa (1966)*

302. In operative paragraph 3 of its resolution of 22 June 1966 (A/AC.109/188), the Special Com-

mittee recommended to the Security Council "to make obligatory the measures provided for under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter against Portugal, South Africa and the racist minority régime in Southern Rhodesia". The text of this resolution was transmitted to the President of the Security Council on 1 July 1966.²¹

Trusteeship Council

303. In accordance with paragraph 8 of General Assembly resolution 1654 (XVI) which requested the Trusteeship Council to assist the Special Committee in its work, the President of the Trusteeship Council, by letter dated 25 July 1966 (A/AC.109/191) addressed to the Chairman, informed the Special Committee that the Council at its thirty-third session examined conditions in the Trust Territories of the Pacific Islands, Nauru and New Guinea. The letter stated that the conclusions and recommendations of the Trusteeship Council, as well as the observations of the members of the Trusteeship Council, representing their individual opinions only, were contained in its report to the Security Council on the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands²² and in its report to the General Assembly on Nauru and New Guinea (A/6304).

Special Committee on the Policies of Apartheid of the Government of the Republic of South Africa

304. The Chairman of the Special Committee has maintained close contact with the Chairman of the Special Committee on the Policies of Apartheid of the Government of the Republic of South Africa as regards matters of common interest relating to the work of the two Committees.

305. By letter dated 14 September 1966 addressed to the Chairman of the Special Committee, the Chairman of the Special Committee on the Policies of Apartheid of the Government of South Africa drew attention to a memorandum received from Mr. Matthew Nkoana of the Pan-Africanist Congress of South Africa, concerning the arrest in Basutoland of Mr. John Myati Pokela, a member of that party (A/AC.109/204). The memorandum, reproduced in document A/AC.115/L.182, was made available to the members of the Special Committee.

Specialized agencies

306. Collaboration of the specialized agencies with the Special Committee has been maintained by the presence of representatives of the International Labour Organisation (ILO), the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and the World Health Organization (WHO) at meetings of the Special Committee.

307. During the period covered by the report, the Special Committee adopted the following resolutions which contained appeals or requests addressed to international institutions, including the specialized agencies:

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, document S/7371.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, document S/7370.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, document S/7372.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, Supplement for July, August and September 1966, document S/7394.

²¹ *Ibid.*, document S/7395.

²² *Ibid.*, Twenty-first Year, Special Supplement No. 1.

<i>Resolution adopted on</i>	<i>Territories concerned</i>	<i>Relevant operative paragraphs</i>
31 May 1966 (A/AC.109/167)	Southern Rhodesia	11
9 June 1966 (A/AC.109/177)	South West Africa	9
9 June 1966 (A/AC.109/178)	Basutoland, Bechuanaland, and Swaziland	6
15 June 1966 (A/AC.109/179/ Rev.1)	Aden	11
22 June 1966 (A/AC.109/187)	Territories under Portuguese administration	8 and 9
22 June 1966 (A/AC.109/188)	Colonial Territories considered during the meetings in Africa (1966)	6 and 8
15 September 1966 (A/AC.109/206)	Territories under Portuguese administration and South West Africa	3

308. The texts of these resolutions were transmitted by the Secretary-General to the specialized agencies and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as well as to the international institutions concerned for their attention. The substantive parts

of the replies received from these organizations concerning the implementation of the above-mentioned resolutions were reproduced and made available to the Special Committee in the following documents during the Committee's consideration of the relevant Territories:

<i>Territories</i>	<i>Organizations concerned</i>	<i>Document symbols</i>
Southern Rhodesia	International Committee of the Red Cross	A/AC.109/192
	Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)	
	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO)	A/AC.109/192/Add.1
	International Labour Organisation (ILO)	
South West Africa	World Health Organization (WHO)	A/AC.109/192/Add.2
	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)	
	International Labour Organisation (ILO)	A/AC.109/193/Add.1
	World Health Organization (WHO)	
Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)	A/AC.109/200
	International Telecommunication Union (ITU)	
	World Health Organization (WHO)	A/AC.109/161
	International Labour Organisation (ILO)	
Aden	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)	A/AC.109/194
	International Labour Organisation (ILO)	
	International Committee of the Red Cross	A/AC.109/194
	League of Red Cross Societies	
Territories under Portuguese administration	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO)	A/AC.109/194
	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), International Development Association (IDA), International Finance Corporation (IFC)	
	International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)	A/AC.109/194

<i>Territories</i>	<i>Organizations concerned</i>	<i>Document symbols</i>
Territories under Portuguese administration (continued)	International Labour Organization (ILO) International Monetary Fund (IMF) International Telecommunication Union (ITU) United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) Universal Postal Union (UPU) World Health Organization (WHO) Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) International Committee of the Red Cross	A/AC.109/194

K. REVIEW OF WORK²³

309. In resolution 2105 (XX), the General Assembly renewed the mandate of the Special Committee requesting it to continue to perform its task and to continue to seek the best means for the immediate and full application of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) to all Territories which have not yet attained independence. The Assembly also requested the Committee to pay particular attention to the small Territories; to recommend a deadline for the accession of each Territory to independence whenever it considered it appropriate; and to apprise the Security Council of developments in any Territory which may threaten international peace and security and to make suggestions which might assist the Council in considering appropriate measures under the Charter of the United Nations.

310. At the beginning of its work in 1966, many members of the Special Committee expressed the feeling that progress in the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples has fallen far short of the expectations aroused by its adoption nearly six years ago. It was noted that generally there had been no abatement in the persistent violation of the right of colonial countries and peoples to self-determination, and in repressive activities by the Powers concerned, in collusion with vested economic and other interests, against the struggle of national liberation movements. The belief was expressed that this anachronistic state of affairs represented one of the basic causes of the prevailing unfavourable international situation. In particular, many members were gravely concerned that, owing to the deliberate opposition or the continuing non-co-operation of the administering Powers concerned, a number of serious and difficult colonial problems had shown no perceptible movement towards peaceful solution within the context of the Declaration, and had attained alarmingly grave proportions, fraught with dangerous possibilities. It was in this context that the Committee approached its tasks at the beginning of 1966.

311. In the course of its work during 1966, the Special Committee continued to examine the implementation of the Declaration with respect to individual Territories. In the case of some Territories, because of new developments concerning them, it was necessary to consider them more than once. The Committee

also completed studies on the activities of foreign economic and other interests in the Territories under Portuguese administration and in Southern Rhodesia, on the basis of which it made recommendations to the General Assembly (see chapters III and V of the present report). The Committee also continued to discharge the additional functions entrusted to it by the General Assembly concerning the question of South West Africa and of information on Non-Self-Governing Territories transmitted under Article 73 e of the Charter.

312. This programme of work placed a great strain on the resources of the Special Committee which it attempted to meet by means of a heavy schedule of meetings both in plenary session and in its sub-committees. However despite the fact that the Committee met from March until November, except for one short break, it was not able to give adequate consideration to a few of the questions on its agenda.

313. During the period under review, the Special Committee noted the attainment of independence of three of the Territories which had been the subject of consideration by the General Assembly and by the Special Committee, namely, British Guiana (Guyana), Bechuanaland (Botswana), and Basutoland (Lesotho). It also noted the setting of 30 November 1966 as the date on which Barbados would become independent.

314. As foreshadowed in its last report to the General Assembly, the Special Committee held a further series of meetings in Africa in 1966. The Committee accepted invitations extended to it by the Governments of Algeria, Ethiopia, Somalia, the United Arab Republic and the United Republic of Tanzania and held a series of meetings in their respective capitals in May and June. The Committee wishes to lay particular stress on the important results achieved by these meetings, which not only underlined the increasing concern of the United Nations for the position of colonial peoples, but strengthened the Committee's own capacity to assist these peoples in their struggle for freedom and independence. Further, the Committee's visit facilitated the appearance before it of representatives of national liberation movements wishing to express their views regarding the future of their countries, who would otherwise have found it impossible to travel to New York.

315. The Special Committee devoted prolonged attention to the question of Southern Rhodesia, the

²³ The views or reservations of individual members reviewed in this section are set out in the relevant chapters of the present report (see chapters II to XXII).

situation regarding which was further aggravated by the illegal declaration of independence by the racist minority régime. The Committee was aware of statements by the United Kingdom Government that it would seek to end the rebellion without delay and to assist the people of the Territory towards majority rule and a society free of oppression and discrimination. The Committee nevertheless noted that the diplomatic and economic sanctions applied against Southern Rhodesia by that Government had not resulted in progress towards these aims. Further, the measures taken by the majority of Member States in response to the relevant United Nations resolutions had had no more than limited impact on the régime, owing mainly to the failure of the Governments of South Africa and Portugal to take corresponding action. In addition, the United Kingdom to the disapproval of the Committee undertook *pourparlers* with the régime without regard to the harmful consequences which these *pourparlers* might entail for the legitimate rights of the African people. It was therefore the considered view of the Committee that energetic action by the United Kingdom Government, including the use of force, was necessary, in order to pave the way for positive progress in the implementation of the Declaration to this Territory.

316. On the question of South West Africa, the continuing disregard of the pertinent United Nations resolutions by the Government of South Africa was further demonstrated by its introduction of further repressive legislation in application of its apartheid policies. It also proceeded with the establishment of the infrastructure considered necessary for the establishment of "homelands", in line with the recommendations of the (Odendaal) Commission of Enquiry into South West Africa Affairs, 1962-1963. Moreover, the Special Committee noted with disappointment that the long-awaited judgement of the International Court of Justice, delivered on 18 July 1966, refrained from pronouncing on the substantive legal issues placed before it for adjudication. While recognizing that the earlier advisory opinions as well as the 1962 judgement of the Court remained unimpaired, the Committee considered that it was the responsibility of the United Nations to achieve a political solution to the problem. In this regard, the Committee reaffirmed that the provisions of the Declaration continued to be applicable to South West Africa and reiterated the right of the people of the Territory to self-determination and independence. It also recommended that the mandate should be terminated and that the United Nations should concurrently assume responsibility for the direct administration of the Territory, with the view of making arrangements for the holding of elections on the basis of universal adult suffrage and the granting of full independence.

317. As regards the Territories under Portuguese administration, the administering Power, maintaining its insistence that they were overseas provinces, took additional measures for their political, economic and administrative integration with Portugal. Continuing to avail itself of assistance from some States, it further intensified its military operations against the African population of the Territories. It also extended its violation of the economic and political rights of the indigenous population by the large-scale settlement of foreign immigrants and by the export of African workers to South Africa. In view of these developments, the Special Committee recommended to the

Security Council to make it obligatory for all States to implement the measures provided for in General Assembly resolution 2107 (XX). The Committee also remained of the opinion that the Security Council should take the steps necessary to implement its own resolutions concerning these Territories.

318. As a result of the special studies it undertook concerning Southern Rhodesia, South West Africa, and the Territories under Portuguese administration, the Special Committee noted the prominent role played in the economic life of these Territories by international economic and financial interests. The Committee was concerned that these interests, in collaboration with one another, had been instrumental in denying the African people the means of effective participation in the economic life of their countries. The Committee therefore considered that the activities of these interests, which were impeding the implementation of the Declaration in these and other colonial Territories, should be urgently inscribed as an item on the agenda of the General Assembly.

319. Concerning Aden, the Special Committee regretted that the United Kingdom Government had not taken the necessary steps to establish normal conditions, including the abolition of the state of emergency, the repeal of laws restrictive of public freedom, the cessation of repressive activities, the release of political prisoners and the return of exiles. A new element in the already grave situation relating to mass arrests and the torturing of political prisoners was also brought to the attention of the Special Committee. The Committee was further concerned at the prospect of the United Kingdom transferring all powers to the unrepresentative régime in the Territory and in conditions which would not correspond to the provisions of the Declaration. It accordingly requested the Secretary-General, in consultation with the Special Committee and the administering Power, to appoint immediately a special mission to Aden for the purpose of recommending practical steps necessary for the full implementation of the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly and, in particular, for determining the extent of United Nations participation in the preparation and supervision of elections. The Committee was disappointed that the United Kingdom Government, while expressing willingness to co-operate with a United Nations mission for the purpose indicated above, had recorded certain reservations in this connexion which created difficulties in the way of the appointment of the special mission. The Committee remained convinced that any hope of arresting the deteriorating situation in the Territory lay in the unqualified acceptance and implementation by the United Kingdom Government, in full co-operation with the United Nations, of the relevant United Nations resolutions.

320. Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland, which had been of special concern to the Special Committee in previous years, were also the subject of extensive consideration. Disturbed, as previously, at their unsatisfactory economic and social situation, the Committee accordingly appealed to all States to contribute to the Fund established by the General Assembly for their economic development. In view of the imminent independence of Bechuanaland on 30 September and of Basutoland on 4 October, the Committee gave urgent attention to the measures necessary to enable them to enjoy complete independence and to secure their territorial integrity and sovereignty.

In addition to requesting the United Kingdom Government to take all appropriate action, the Committee recommended that the General Assembly address a strong warning to the South African Government against any encroachment upon the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Territories and any hindrance to the movement of persons and goods. As regards Swaziland, the Committee maintained its view that steps should be taken by the administering Power to ensure its accession to independence in full compliance with the Declaration.

321. The Special Committee paid particular attention to the small Territories, regarding which there had also been regrettable delays in the implementation of the Declaration. On the question of Fiji, the Special Committee considered that general elections should be held on the basis of universal suffrage for the purpose of forming a constituent assembly which would be responsible for drawing up a democratic constitution. The Committee also urged the United Kingdom Government to ensure the formation of a representative Government, the transfer of full powers to that Government and the fixing of an early date for the independence of the Territory. In addition, it decided to appoint a sub-committee to visit Fiji for the purpose of studying at first hand the situation in the Territory. Regarding Equatorial Guinea, the Committee was appreciative of the co-operation extended by the Government of Spain in permitting a sub-committee to visit the Territory. On the basis of the findings of the sub-committee, the Committee decided to recommend that the Spanish Government should, *inter alia*, convene a conference, fully representative of the people of the Territory, to establish the modalities for the transfer of all powers to the people and to fix a date for independence, which, in response to their wishes, should be no later than July 1968.

322. With regard to the smaller Territories, the Special Committee recognized that their small size and population as well as their limited resources presented peculiar problems. At the same time, the Committee was firmly of the opinion that the provisions of the Declaration were fully applicable to them. Accordingly, it requested the administering Powers responsible for these Territories to ensure, without delay, that the people were enabled, in complete freedom and without any restrictions, to express their wishes concerning the future of their countries. In this connexion, the Committee expressed the belief in the desirability of a United Nations presence during the procedures for the exercise of the right of self-determination. The Committee also noted the urgent need for measures to strengthen the economic base of these Territories and to promote their social and economic development. In a few of these Territories, the Committee was deeply concerned by reports pointing to preparations for their use for military purposes and by the lack of respect shown for their territorial integrity by the administering Power.

323. Having regard to its mandate, the Special Committee once again laid special stress on the importance of sending visiting missions to the smaller Territories referred to above. In view of the inadequacy of the information available to it regarding conditions in these Territories and as to the views, wishes and aspirations of the people, the Committee reiterated its request to the administering Powers to extend their full co-operation by permitting access to the Territories under their administration. The Com-

mittee noted with regret that the responses of the administering Powers concerned to this request were either negative or qualified in character. The Committee, therefore, considered that the General Assembly should again urge them to reconsider their attitudes in view of the vital importance to its work of the sending of visiting missions.

324. The Committee also had before it for consideration a number of Territories which were the subject of either conflicting claims to sovereignty or of special interest to some Member States for geographical, historical, economic and other reasons. Included in this category were the Falkland Islands (Malvinas), French Somaliland, Gibraltar, and Ifni and Spanish Sahara. As noted in a previous report, the Committee was of the view that the provisions of the Declaration fully applied to such Territories and that such disputes or divergent interests as may exist with respect to them should be peacefully resolved through mutual accommodation and goodwill.

L. FUTURE WORK

325. It will be noted from the various chapters of the present report that there still remain a large number of colonial Territories which have not yet attained independence. The Special Committee believes that until the peoples of all of the remaining Territories are enabled to exercise their right to self-determination and independence in accordance with General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), the Assembly would wish the Special Committee to continue to examine the situation in each of these Territories with a view to assisting in the earliest possible application of the Declaration.

326. Subject to any further directives that the General Assembly might give at its twenty-first session, the Special Committee intends in 1967 to continue to seek the best ways and means for the immediate and full application of the Declaration with regard to the Territories already examined. It also intends to take up for consideration those questions to which for lack of time it was not able to give adequate attention. As indicated in paragraphs 263 to 269 above, the Special Committee also intends to give further consideration to the question of the list of Territories to which the Declaration applies.

327. As already indicated in paragraphs 285 to 290 above, the Special Committee, in its examination of Territories, will continue to be guided by the requests contained in operative paragraphs 8 and 9 of General Assembly resolution 2105 (XX). In these paragraphs, the General Assembly requested the Special Committee to pay particular attention to the small Territories and, when appropriate, to recommend a deadline for the accession to independence of each Territory in accordance with the wishes of the people.

328. In the section of this chapter concerning visiting missions (paragraphs 184 to 223 above) and in many of the chapters of the present report relating to specific Territories, the Special Committee has set out its recommendations with regard to visiting missions. It will be clear from these recommendations that the Special Committee continues to place great value on such visits as a means of collecting first-hand information on conditions in the Territories and the wishes of the people, thus assisting it in the implementation of the Declaration. It intends therefore to pursue its recommendations with the utmost vigour and to continue to seek the co-operation of the

administering Powers to enable such visits to take place.

329. Further, considering the value and importance attaching to the series of meetings the Committee has held in past years in Africa, the Special Committee may hold another series of meetings in Africa.

330. In accordance with the provisions of General Assembly resolution 2116 (XX) concerning the pattern of conferences, the Special Committee has already approved a tentative time-table to enable it to carry out its programme of work in 1967. The tentative time-table and related decisions are set out in paragraphs 292-295 of this chapter.

331. In order to assist it in carrying out its tasks in 1967, the Special Committee wishes to offer the following recommendations which the General Assembly may wish to include among the matters it takes into consideration when it examines the question of the implementation of the Declaration.

332. The Special Committee considers that the General Assembly should renew its appeal to administering Powers to implement the Declaration on the Granting of Independence in the colonial Territories they are administering without further delay.

333. The Assembly should again appeal to the administering Powers to co-operate with the Special Committee by facilitating visits to Territories in accordance with the requests contained in resolutions and decisions already adopted by the Special Committee and with any other decisions in this regard that the Committee may find it appropriate to adopt in the future.

334. The Assembly should again request the administering Powers to co-operate with the Secretary-General in promoting large-scale dissemination of the Declaration and of information on the work of the United Nations and, in particular, of the Special Committee in implementation of the Declaration.

335. The Special Committee recommends that the Assembly approve the programme of work as outlined in this section and make adequate financial provision to cover the expenses of the activities of the Committee, including the cost of visiting groups. Further, within the context of operative paragraph 6 of General Assembly resolution 1654 (XVI), the Special Committee may decide to hold another series of meetings in Africa. The Special Committee considers that its activities in 1967 will give rise to expenditure of the order of \$250,000.

336. The Special Committee considers that the Assembly should request the Secretary-General to continue to provide the Special Committee with all the facilities and personnel necessary for the implementation of its mandate.

M. APPROVAL OF THE REPORT

337. The Special Committee approved the present report, as a whole, at its 483rd meeting on 30 November 1966.

ANNEX I

Paragraphs 6 to 13 of the report of Sub-Committee III

IMPLEMENTATION OF GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 2069 (XX), INCLUDING THE QUESTION OF VISITING MISSIONS

[For the Sub-Committee's report, see the annex to chapter XXII below.]

ANNEX II

[A/AC.109/L.318]

Report of Sub-Committee II

Rapporteur: Mr. C. R. GHAREKHAN (India)

INTRODUCTION

1. At its 400th meeting on 4 April 1966, the Special Committee decided to continue Sub-Committee II with the same membership, except for the replacement of Cambodia by Afghanistan.

2. At its 42nd meeting on 28 April 1966, Sub-Committee II elected Mr. Kadhim Khalaf (Iraq) as Chairman and Mr. C. R. Gharekhan (India) as Rapporteur.

3. At its 43rd meeting on 5 May, the Sub-Committee decided first to consider the question of visiting missions, the Territories referred to it, and then take the Territories up in the following order: Gilbert and Ellice Islands, Pitcairn, Solomon Islands, New Hebrides, American Samoa, Guam, Niue, Tokelau Islands, Cocos (Keeling) Islands, Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, Trust Territory of Nauru, Trust Territory of New Guinea (and the Territory of Papua), Brunei and Hong Kong.

VISITING MISSIONS

Consideration by the Sub-Committee

4. The Sub-Committee considered the question of sending visiting missions to the Territories referred to it at its 44th, 45th, 46th, 47th and 48th meetings held on 12 May, 19 July, 2, 8 and 9 August.

5. Regarding the views of administering Powers concerning the sending of visiting missions to their Territories, the Sub-Committee received the following information.

6. The representative of the *United Kingdom* said that the dispatch of visiting missions to the Territories administered by the United Kingdom raised difficult questions of principle and he could not encourage the Sub-Committee to expect that his Government's existing position would change. His delegation was, however, prepared to transmit to the United Kingdom Government any particular request concerning the sending of such a mission to a specific Territory, although this could not be regarded as implying any commitment that such a request would be accepted.

7. The representative of the *United States of America* said that, if the Sub-Committee proposed a visiting mission to Guam and American Samoa in 1966, the United States Government would probably not think that the situation warranted such a journey; the Territories administered by the United States were advancing rapidly towards self-government and should not present a pressing priority for the Special Committee in arranging its crowded work agenda for the year.

8. The representative of *Australia* stated that in certain circumstances visiting missions could be of value. He was doubtful, however, whether this applied to the Committee of Twenty-Four visiting missions to Australian Territories which had been the subject of intense scrutiny by the United Nations over a period of a good many years so that the United Nations had become very familiar with all aspects of development there. A part of this scrutiny had been by visiting missions from the Trusteeship Council.

9. Nevertheless, the attitude of his Government was conditioned in important part by the fact that, just as an Administering Authority had responsibilities in the territories for which it was responsible, so also it had rights—and among these was the right to accept or not to accept a visiting mission.

10. His Government could give no agreement *in vacuo* to accept a mission and would have to consider at any time in relation to any specific request such factors as the appropriateness of any particular time proposed, the convenience of the Australian Government, the convenience of the Territory Administration and the composition of any mission that might be proposed. These considerations, at any given time, would no doubt be conditioned also by particular views which

his Government might have in relation, for example, to United Nations finances involved in any particular proposals and whether duplication and/or overlapping of United Nations effort was involved.

11. His Government could not therefore at this stage give any commitment that it would be able to respond to a request to receive a visiting mission, but his delegation would be prepared to transmit to its Government any specific request that might be put forward by the Committee or Sub-Committee at any particular time.

12. In a letter dated 1 August 1966, the representative of New Zealand stated that his Government had no objection to such a mission although it considered that any visit by a United Nations mission to Niue and Tokelau Islands should be undertaken only as part of a more comprehensive tour of the area.

13. The representative of *France* informed the Sub-Committee that his Government did not encourage the sending of a visiting mission to the New Hebrides.

14. The representatives of *India, Chile, Iraq and Poland* stated that they were in favour of recommending to the Special Committee that visiting missions should be sent to the Territories referred to the Sub-Committee.

15. The Sub-Committee, bearing in mind the remarks of some members, agreed to make a recommendation to the Special Committee concerning the sending of visiting missions to the Territories referred to it.

Recommendation of the Sub-Committee

16. The Sub-Committee recommends that the Special Committee should invite the administering Powers to receive visiting missions to the Territories referred to Sub-Committee II. The Sub-Committee's recommendations regarding the details of the Territories to be visited and the dates of the visits will be decided upon at a later stage.

CHAPTER II*

MEETINGS HELD IN AFRICA

INTRODUCTION

1. In its report to the General Assembly at its twentieth session, the Special Committee envisaged, as part of its programme for 1966, the possibility of holding another series of meetings in Africa during that year, in view of the great importance of the work that its previous visits to Africa had enabled it to carry out. This programme was approved by the General Assembly in operative paragraph 7 of resolution 2105 (XX). Within the context of the programme thus approved, the Governments of the United Republic of Tanzania, the United Arab Republic, Ethiopia, Somalia and Algeria extended invitations to the Special Committee (A/AC.109/147-150 and 152) to hold meetings at their respective capitals during 1966.

2. During the discussions on the organization of work which took place at its meetings held between 8 March and 6 May 1966, a wide measure of support was expressed by members of the Special Committee for the holding of a series of meetings in Africa. Several members expressed the view that the holding of such meetings would enable the members of the Committee to study closely the situation in certain Territories, the attitudes of the administering Powers concerned and the extent to which the provisions of previous resolutions had been implemented. It would, moreover, facilitate the appearance before the Committee of petitioners who would otherwise find it impossible to travel to New York.

3. At its 400th meeting on 4 April 1966, the Special Committee considered and, after discussion, approved, by 20 votes to none with 3 abstentions, a recommendation in this regard which was contained in the twenty-second report of the Working Group (A/AC.109/L.265/Rev.1). By approving this recommendation, the Committee decided to hold a series of meetings in Africa during 1966 and to travel to Africa for that purpose not later than the middle of May.

4. At its 408th and 409th meetings on 26 April, the Special Committee considered further recom-

mendations on the subject which were contained in the twenty-third and twenty-fourth reports of the Working Group (A/AC.109/L.270 and 275). The Committee also had before it a report by the Secretary-General on the administrative and financial implications of the Working Group's recommendations (A/AC.109/L.271). The Committee at its 409th meeting decided to adopt the reports of the Working Group, on the understanding that the reservations expressed by some members would appear in the record. By adopting these reports, the Committee decided that it would accept the invitations extended to it by the five Governments, and that the duration of its meetings in Africa would be for a period not exceeding six weeks. The Committee decided at the same time that these meetings should begin at Dar es Salaam, United Republic of Tanzania, on 23 May 1966, and subject to the convenience of the Governments of Somalia, Ethiopia, the United Arab Republic and Algeria, it would hold meetings thereafter at Mogadiscio, Addis Ababa, Cairo and Algiers respectively. Reservations were expressed by some members regarding the duration of the visit and the number of capitals to be visited.

5. In reaching these decisions, the Special Committee took account of a statement made by the Chairman at the same meeting setting out the recommendations of the Working Group concerning the items to be taken up at the various capitals, subject to the agreement of the host Governments. These recommendations were as follows:

Dar es Salaam: Southern Rhodesia, Mozambique, Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland;

Mogadiscio: French Somaliland, Mauritius and the Seychelles;

Addis Ababa: South West Africa, Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland, Ifni, Spanish Sahara and French Somaliland;

Cairo: Aden and Oman;

Algiers: Angola, Portuguese Guinea, São Tomé and Príncipe and dependencies, the Cape Verde Archipelago, Equatorial Guinea (Fernando Póo and Río Muni).

* Previously issued under the symbol A/6300 (part II).

The Chairman also informed the Committee that in making these recommendations, the Working Group envisaged that the hearing of petitioners would take precedence over the substantive consideration of the above-named items.

6. In a letter dated 7 May 1966 (A/AC.109/159), the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom to the United Nations informed the Chairman of the Special Committee that the United Kingdom Government would not be able to be represented in the Committee at its meetings in Africa. Also contained in the letter was an invitation to members of the Committee to hold informal discussions in London with representatives of the United Kingdom Government, on their way to Dar es Salaam. After a discussion at the 411th meeting concerning the letter, the Chairman of the Special Committee addressed a reply on 13 May 1966 to the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom expressing the regret of the majority of the members at the prospect of the United Kingdom not participating in the Committee's meetings in Africa, and appealing to it to reconsider its decision. The Chairman also informed the United Kingdom that the Committee's itinerary did not provide for travel by way of London and that consequently the opportunity for the proposed discussions in London would regrettably not occur (A/AC.109/160). In a reply dated 17 May 1966, the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom informed the Chairman that the decision of the United Kingdom Government concerning its non-participation in the Special Committee's meetings in Africa had been taken only after the most serious consideration of all the issues involved and that, accordingly, the United Kingdom Government was unable to change that decision (A/AC.109/162).

7. In a telegram dated 3 June 1966, the Permanent Representative of Uruguay to the United Nations informed the Chairman of the Special Committee that his delegation was unable, for reasons beyond its control, to participate in the Special Committee's debates during its visit to Africa. He expressed support for the work of the Committee and gratitude to the various host Governments for their invitation (A/AC.109/173).

8. On 14 May 1966 the Chairman on behalf of the Special Committee issued a *communiqué* on the Committee's meetings in Africa which was widely disseminated in the five host countries. The text of this *communiqué* is appended to this chapter (annex I).

9. Members of the Special Committee,¹ accompanied by the representative of the Secretary-General and other members of the Secretariat, arrived at Dar es Salaam on 22 May 1966. The Special Committee met in Dar es Salaam from 23 to 31 May 1966 at the Msimbazi Community Centre; it arrived in Mogadiscio on 1 June, and met from 2 to 4 June 1966 at the Parliament Building; it arrived in Addis Ababa on 5 June and met from 6 to 9 June 1966 at Africa Hall; it arrived in Cairo on 10 June and met from 11 to 15 June 1966 at the headquarters of the League of Arab States; and it arrived in Algiers on 17 June and met from 17 to 22 June 1966 at the Club-des-Pins Conference Hall.

¹ A list of the representatives present at the African meetings is annexed to this chapter (annex II).

10. During its stay in Africa, the Special Committee held forty plenary meetings, and the Sub-Committee on Petitions twelve meetings. The Special Committee heard thirty-two groups of petitioners and circulated thirty-nine written petitions, excluding requests for hearings.

11. At the opening of its meetings in Dar es Salaam, Mogadiscio, Addis Ababa, Cairo and Algiers respectively, the Special Committee was addressed by H.E. Mr. Rashidi Kawawa, second Vice-President, on behalf of the President of the United Republic of Tanzania, by H.E. Hagi Hussein Abdirizak, Prime Minister, on behalf of the President of Somalia, by H.E. Mr. Ketema Yifru, Minister of Foreign Affairs, on behalf of His Imperial Majesty, the Emperor of Ethiopia, by H.E. Mr. Mahmoud Riad, Minister of Foreign Affairs, on behalf of the President of the United Arab Republic, and by H.E. Mr. Abdelaziz Bouteflika, Minister of Foreign Affairs, on behalf of the President of the Revolutionary Council and Head of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria. The Special Committee also had the honour of being received by the Head of State or Government at each of the five capitals.

12. In accordance with the decision taken by the Special Committee at its 403rd meeting, representatives of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) attended the Committee's meetings in Dar es Salaam and Addis Ababa as observers. On 17 May 1966, the Administrative Secretary-General of that organization addressed a letter to the Chairman in which he welcomed the Committee to Africa and offered it the co-operation and assistance of his organization (A/AC.109/165). Following another decision taken by the Committee at its 440th meeting on 11 June 1966, to grant a request addressed to the Chairman by the Acting Secretary-General of the League of Arab States (A/AC.109/182), a representative of that organization attended the Committee's meetings in Cairo in an observer capacity.

13. In accordance with a decision taken by the Special Committee at its 424th meeting on 30 May 1966, to grant a request addressed to the Chairman on behalf of the Government of Czechoslovakia (A/AC.109/164 and 166), a representative of that Government attended the meetings in Africa as an observer. Following other decisions taken by the Committee at its 428th and 433rd meetings on 2 June and 6 June 1966 concerning requests addressed to it on behalf of the Government of Somalia (A/AC.109/169 and Add.1), a delegation of that Government attended the meetings of the Special Committee in Mogadiscio and Addis Ababa in an observer capacity. Further, in accordance with a decision taken by the Committee at its 440th meeting on 11 June 1966, to grant a similar request from the Government of the United Arab Republic (A/AC.109/180), a representative of that Government attended the meetings in Cairo as an observer. Finally, representatives of the Governments of Algeria and of Spain attended the meetings in Algiers as observers following a decision taken by the Committee at its 448th meeting on 17 June 1966 to grant requests made to it by those Governments (A/AC.109/184 and 185).

14. At its 426th meeting, on 31 May 1966, the representative of Czechoslovakia with the consent of the Special Committee made a statement on the question of Southern Rhodesia. At the 428th and 430th meet-

ings on 2 and 3 June 1966 the representative of Somalia in accordance with a decision taken by the Committee concerning a request submitted by his Government (A/AC.109/172), participated in its consideration of French Somaliland. At the 435th and 436th meetings on 7 June 1966, the representatives of Mauritania and Morocco, in accordance with decisions taken by the Committee to grant requests submitted on behalf of their respective Governments (A/AC.109/174 and 175) participated in the discussions on Ifni and Spanish Sahara. The representative of Spain, whose request for permission to participate in these discussions (A/AC.109/176) was granted by the Committee at the 435th meeting, subsequently submitted a letter withdrawing his request (A/AC.109/176/Add.1). At the 441st to 447th meetings held between 11 and 15 June 1966, the representative of the United Arab Republic following a decision taken by the Committee to grant a request made on behalf of his Government (A/AC.109/181) participated in the discussions on the questions of Aden and Oman. Finally, at the 451st, 452nd and 454th meetings held on 20 and 21 June 1966, the representative of Spain, in accordance with a decision taken by the Committee concerning a request submitted on behalf of his Government (A/AC.109/185) participated in the discussion on the question of Equatorial Guinea (Fernando Póo and Río Muni).

15. Following consideration of the relevant items, the Special Committee adopted resolutions on the questions of Southern Rhodesia (chapter III, paragraph 1097), South West Africa (chapter IV, paragraph 306), Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland (chapter VII, paragraph 237), Aden (chapter VI, paragraph 382), Equatorial Guinea (chapter IX, paragraph 79), and Territories under Portuguese administration (chapter V, paragraph 675), as well as a consensus concerning the question of Ifni and Spanish Sahara (chapter X, paragraph 116). An account of the Special Committee's consideration of these items is contained in chapters III, VII, IX and X of the present report.

16. With regard to the question of French Somaliland, the Special Committee decided at its 432nd meeting held on 4 June 1966 that following the hearing of petitioners and statements by representatives it would conclude consideration of the item upon the resumption of its meetings in New York. As regards Mauritius and the Seychelles, the Committee decided on the proposal of the Chairman at the 447th meeting on 15 June 1966 to defer consideration until the resumption of its meetings in New York. On the question of Oman, the Committee similarly decided at the same meeting, that following the hearing of petitioners it would defer consideration until the resumption of its meetings in New York.

17. In the light of its discussions on the above-mentioned items, the Special Committee also adopted a resolution concerning the implementation of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) with regard to colonial Territories considered by it in Africa in 1966 (see paragraph 619 below). It also adopted by acclamation a resolution expressing its appreciation to the host Governments (see paragraph 626 below).

A. MEETINGS HELD AT DAR ES SALAAM, UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA

Opening of Meetings

Address by the Second Vice-President on behalf of the President of the United Republic of Tanzania

18. The Second Vice-President of the *United Republic of Tanzania* greeted members on behalf of the President and Government of Tanzania and expressed his country's view that the work of the Special Committee was fundamental to the whole purpose of the United Nations. Some considered the Special Committee less important than other United Nations bodies directly concerned with the affairs of peace and war; but Tanzania fully recognized its significance in that it was dealing with colonialism and therefore with the principle of human equality in the world and subsequent threat to universal peace and order. Africans were convinced that peace among peoples based on the injustice of colonialism was impossible. No group of world citizens would agree for ever to be governed by other people. Therefore Africans would resort to arms, if necessary, to achieve their freedom. The role of the Special Committee was to endeavour to obviate the need to fight by fostering a situation in which the peoples of each nation governed themselves in accordance with their own wishes and needs. The members of the Special Committee should therefore be working themselves out of a job.

19. He expressed strong disagreement with the view that it was a waste of money for the Special Committee to travel in Africa when it could not visit the colonial Territories themselves.

20. The depth of African emotion over freedom from all interference was not understood in the sophisticated and developed countries of Europe and America. In Africa, however, the Special Committee could not fail to grasp the importance of its activity, for it would meet people who had to deal with the day-to-day results of colonialism and Tanzanians who were trying, with inadequate resources, to guard their frontier against the colonial forces of Portugal. The Special Committee would also meet many political refugees from colonialism and hear them in their own environment, which would make it easier to judge their conviction and sincerity. Although the Special Committee could not visit the colonial Territories themselves, Africa was so much one in its history and traditions that an understanding of conditions in newly independent Africa was a sound basis for a grasp of the reality of continuing colonialism.

21. Since the Special Committee's previous visit, there had been only limited progress away from colonialism in Africa, and there had been one overwhelming setback to the cause of justice and humanity. That situation could not be allowed to continue and words alone would not put matters right. The Special Committee had come to listen to petitioners; afterwards it would pass resolutions and report to its parent body. If nothing further happened no progress would have been made and the situation would have deteriorated with the passage of time. Action must result because colonialism was a festering sore which, as long as it remained, poisoned the whole body.

22. African States were recovering from a period in which their peoples had been humiliated and denied the most elementary rights to prepare themselves for the efficient service of their country. Africans were

having to learn the arts of administration and economic development as they practised them, since before independence their destinies were decided for them and their training was designed to make them good Englishmen, good Frenchmen or good Belgians. Africans had to eliminate that poison from the body of their society at the same time as they demanded of the people a degree of activity beyond anything needed in the developed countries.

23. Africans did not wish to be obliged to resort to arms. They wanted freedom for Africa to enable it to live in friendship with the whole world, and an orderly transfer of power from the colonial authorities to the peoples of the States concerned.

24. Africans would be very patient, subject to formal recognition by the colonial Powers of the principle that all States under their jurisdiction would attain independence on the basis of majority rule. But if that principle was not conceded and if work did not begin on the transfer of power, Africans would be forced to prepare themselves for a war of liberation. They hoped that the work of the Special Committee would help to make it unnecessary for any African peoples to take up arms.

25. He welcomed the prospect that the British Territories of Bechuanaland and Basutoland would receive their independence during 1966. But he would like the Special Committee to examine the reality of that transfer of power. If the United Nations was satisfied with the situation, then Tanzanians would congratulate those peoples, and the Committee, on that new accession to freedom in Africa.

26. But those countries were almost completely surrounded by the Republic of South Africa. The Special Committee and the United Nations as a whole should therefore be vigilant in order to ensure that those countries maintained their sovereignty. Although the situation in South Africa was not the direct concern of the Special Committee, it was relevant to all discussion concerning the southern part of Africa. The course which South West Africa would take to freedom would be very much affected by the forthcoming judgement of the International Court of Justice and by the subsequent action taken by the Security Council. But no member of the Special Committee could doubt the reality of the oppression under which South West Africa was suffering, or that the situation would be brought to an end. The Special Committee had the responsibility of trying to make the transition to freedom a constructive rather than a destructive one.

27. The problem of the Portuguese Territories was of direct concern to the Special Committee, which had to make the world realize two things: that Portuguese colonialism continued only because of the support which Portugal received from her allies in Europe; and that therefore the whole relationship between Africa and Europe would be affected by developments in the freedom struggles of the Portuguese colonies.

28. In all the colonial Territories to which he had referred the situation was the same as when the Special Committee had visited Africa previously, or a little better.

29. But in Southern Rhodesia the situation was, of course, very much worse. Tanzania wanted Southern Rhodesia to be independent on no other basis than majority rule. It had called upon the United Kingdom Government to defeat the illegal régime and give a pledge that Southern Rhodesia would become inde-

pendent only on the basis of majority rule. In view of the commitments of all members of the United Nations, Tanzania did not regard those demands as unreasonable. But they had not been fulfilled; nor was there any real evidence to suggest that they would be. Instead there had been a gradually increasing list of economic sanctions by the United Kingdom Government, coupled with appeals to the rest of the world not to trade with the illegal authorities. Only after five months had the United Nations been asked to authorize any real action—and that was only with regard to oil shipments to one particular port. Africans were assured only of intense diplomatic activity in which the racist Government of South Africa and the colonial Government of Portugal were asked to co-operate with the United Kingdom authorities. Their willingness to do so was attested by the fact that six months after the unilateral declaration of independence the Smith authorities were still in control. Another serious fact was that the only assurance received from the United Kingdom Government was that it would not grant independence on any other basis than majority rule.

30. He did not believe that Africans minded how the Smith régime was defeated, as indeed it would have been on 11 November 1965 had the United Kingdom Government sent troops to uphold its sovereign rule. But if the British refused to quell the rebellion, then surely the United Nations should act regardless of British wishes. Under Chapter VII of the Charter the Security Council could make economic sanctions mandatory on all Member States. And if some of those States refused to co-operate then the sanctions would be applied against them too. Africans could not agree to leaving four million people under the effective control of a racist and privileged white minority, and whatever the cost they would have to reject that extension of oppression in Africa.

31. In conclusion, he expressed the hope that the Special Committee would have an opportunity of seeing some of the difficulties faced in Tanzania and the great efforts which its people were making to overcome them. He also hoped that members would sense something of the excitement and challenge of developing in independence—for that excitement and that challenge had become part of daily life in Tanzania. He believed that an appreciation of those factors would help the Special Committee to understand the importance of its work, and perhaps to devise some way forward out of colonialism.

General statements

32. *The Chairman* thanked His Excellency Vice-President Kawawa for his very important address. The Special Committee was particularly grateful to the Vice-President for the warmth of his welcome, and had been extremely touched by the hospitality and friendship displayed since its arrival in Dar es Salaam. It was also grateful for the Vice-President's assurances of support in its work.

33. The beautiful city of Dar es Salaam, which had set a shining example in African liberation struggles, was a most fitting background to the beginning of the Special Committee's work in Africa. The achievements of Tanzania since independence had fired the imagination of all men of goodwill.

34. He renewed his thanks to the Vice-President for having taken time from his busy schedule to open

the session, and expressed the hope that the efforts deployed would contribute significantly to the liquidation of the last bastions of colonialism—a problem with which both Africa and the United Nations were most deeply concerned.

35. The representative of the *Union of Soviet Socialist Republics* expressed the thanks of the people, delegation and Government of the Soviet Union to the Government and people of Tanzania for their fraternal welcome. The United Republic of Tanzania was a young and courageous country and was situated close to the Territories where the vestiges of colonialism still prevailed. He expressed his appreciation for the important address made by Vice-President Kawawa and paid a tribute to the courage and dynamism of that young African nation which, together with other fraternal Governments, was struggling to liberate those who were still oppressed in South Africa, Southern Rhodesia, the Territories under Portuguese domination, and the United Kingdom Protectorates. The storm raised by the national liberation movement must continue, for there were unfortunately a number of African Territories where the vestiges of colonialism still existed. The monopolies established in southern Africa sought only to enrich themselves and therefore supported racism. The international monopolies which reaped the profits of such exploitation were therefore equally guilty, since they prolonged an inadmissible situation. The countries of NATO which supported Salazar by providing him with aircraft, weapons, instructors and industrial equipment were thus assisting the racist régimes. During the previous session of the General Assembly important decisions had been taken against colonialism and imperialism: the international monopolies which were hampering the freedom of still dependent Territories had been severely condemned. The Special Committee, which owed its existence to the desire of peoples to achieve freedom, should seek all ways and means capable of bringing about the independence of the oppressed peoples and take energetic decisions that could be rapidly applied. The procedures to be adopted by the Special Committee in order to apply those decisions would be determined by the nature of each particular problem. The Committee should concentrate on questions such as the immediate implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples; the provision of genuine assistance to peoples struggling for independence, and the participation of the United Nations specialized agencies in such efforts; the setting of target dates for the attainment of independence by colonial Territories, and so forth.

36. The Special Committee should emphasize the utilization of military bases by the colonial countries against the peoples, in particular the use of Ascension Island against the people of the Congo, the island of Guam against the Viet-Nameese people, and so forth. A productive and fruitful action should be undertaken in order to put an end to such aggression.

37. He opposed the view that the Special Committee could serve no useful purpose in Africa; on the contrary, he was convinced that the presence of the Special Committee in Africa would give new impetus to the struggle that had been undertaken. The Soviet Union, a socialist State, had eradicated the enslavement of man by man and abolished social classes; it would defend, as it had always done, those who were struggling for freedom and were the victims of the policies of the imperialists. The Soviet Union would support

the freedom fighters by every means at its disposal; it insisted on independence for all countries under foreign domination and would stand by them in order to bring about the final liberation of the African continent.

38. The United Nations must adopt sanctions against South Africa and Southern Rhodesia in order to compel them to comply with the decisions of the General Assembly.

39. The representative of *India* expressed the gratitude and appreciation of his Government, his delegation and himself personally to the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania for its generous invitation to the Special Committee to hold some of its meetings in Dar es Salaam. Members had sensed the warmth and affection of the friendly people of Tanzania, and he extended to them the best wishes of his delegation for their continued well-being and prosperity.

40. Bordering on several Non-Self-Governing Territories, Tanzania occupied a unique position in the brave struggle against colonialism and had a major role to play in helping the freedom fighters of those territories. His delegation was extremely satisfied with the contribution Tanzania had made, and was making, to that worthy cause. The locating of the headquarters of the Liberation Committee of Eleven of the Organization of African Unity in Dar es Salaam was in itself recognition of Tanzania's special position. His delegation wished to pay a tribute to one of the most outstanding personalities of Africa, His Excellency Mwalimu Julius K. Nyerere, President of the Republic, and to his Government and people.

41. India enjoyed the most friendly relations with Tanzania and greatly esteemed Mr. Nyerere for his qualities of leadership, for his devoted efforts to raise the living standards of his people and for his success in building up a truly multiracial society. The signing of the Friendship and Scientific, Economic and Technical Co-operation Agreement between Tanzania and India was, in the words of Mr. A. M. Babu, Tanzanian Minister for Commerce and Co-operation, "not the beginning but the continuation of the age-old friendly relations between India and Tanzania". His country was proud of Mr. Babu's tribute that, through its co-operation, India was aiding not only Tanzania's economic development but also the economic emancipation of colonial Africa.

42. The Second Vice-President had reminded the Special Committee, in his inspiring address, of the continued urgency of the problem of colonialism. Mr. Kawawa's enlightening words would guide the Committee in its discussion. India's attitude towards colonialism had been consistent and forthright. India had always stood for the emancipation from subjection by alien powers of peoples who, for varying periods of history, had not known freedom. India would continue to display the same uncompromising forthrightness fearlessly and disinterestedly. His people's conscience and principles were not for sale.

43. His delegation deeply regretted the absence from the Special Committee of the representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. In view of the clear acceptance which the United Kingdom had already given to the principles underlying the purpose of the Special Committee, it would have been preferable if the United Kingdom representative had remained associated with its deliberations.

44. The representative of *Mali* thanked the Government and people of the United Republic of Tanzania for the very warm and very African welcome which they had given the Special Committee. He also thanked Vice-President Kawawa for his address and for his Government's interest in the work and objectives of the Special Committee. He recalled that General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), which had been adopted in 1960, had given rise to a new hope: the immediate liberation of millions of human beings who were still living under the yoke of colonialism and imperialism. With a view to the practical implementation of that resolution, the Special Committee had already made recommendations to the colonial Powers; but the time for statements of principle was past. The Special Committee should decide on the adoption of specific measures in order to hasten the accession of dependent Territories to freedom, in accordance with resolution 2105 (XX). Mali, for its part, suggested the following: (1) that the Committee should proceed to hear the petitioners from the national liberation movements, since in most cases they were unable to come to New York; (2) that working groups should be set up to consider the agenda items. The working groups would propose practical measures regarding the Territories in question; they might set a target date for the accession to independence of Territories still under foreign domination. That would be in keeping with the spirit of operative paragraph 9 of resolution 2105 (XX), which read as follows:

"Requests the Special Committee, whenever it considers it appropriate, to recommend a deadline for the accession to independence of each Territory in accordance with the wishes of the people".

He thanked the Tanzanian Government for the assistance it was giving to the African liberation movements. In addition, he requested the Secretariat to keep the Special Committee informed of the results of the Security Council debate on the question of Southern Rhodesia, in order to assist the Special Committee in its work.

45. The representative of *Iran* conveyed the greetings of the Iranian people and Government to the United Republic of Tanzania and expressed his country's gratitude to the President for enabling the Special Committee to hold meetings in Dar es Salaam, where it had a unique and important opportunity of meeting and conversing with the representatives of thousands of people who had taken refuge in Tanzania—a land of the free. The location was important because it would help the Special Committee to find ways and means of bringing about the rapid elimination of colonialism. Vice-President Kawawa had been quite right when he had said, in his inspiring statement, that peace was not possible if it was based on the injustices of colonialism. Peace and quiet would come to Africa only when colonialism was completely eradicated from the continent. Then the energies and efforts at present being spent on regaining independence would be released for improving conditions of life in Africa. For under colonialism Africans had been materially and spiritually deprived.

46. The progress made in Tanzania during the year since his previous visit was clear evidence of what a people could do when master of its own destiny. Under the dynamic and wise leadership of President Nyerere, great progress had been made in the economic, social, educational and political development of the country. Of particular significance was its great

experience in democracy, which would serve as a guideline for the newly independent countries.

47. He pledged the full support of his delegation for all measures likely to promote the liberation of the Zimbabwe people, the inhabitants of South West Africa, people under Portuguese subjugation and all other peoples still languishing in colonial bondage.

48. The representative of *Bulgaria* expressed the sincere gratitude of the delegation of the People's Republic of Bulgaria to the Government and people of Tanzania for their invitation and for their contribution to the work of the Special Committee. The young Tanzanian people inspired admiration since they were in the front ranks of those who were struggling against colonialism and neo-colonialism. The address by Vice-President Kawawa was further proof of the Tanzanian contribution to the struggle for the elimination of the last vestiges of colonialism in Africa. The United Republic of Tanzania could rely upon the assistance and friendship of all those who were struggling against imperialism, including Bulgaria.

49. He whole-heartedly endorsed the Special Committee's visit to Africa and believed that the work which the Committee would do during its stay would be the most important of the year. The twentieth session of the General Assembly had adopted resolutions which represented a great step forward. The Special Committee should see to it that they were applied without delay, for the time had come to give full effect to resolution 1514 (XV). In the course of the visit to Africa members of the Committee would make contact with the representatives of the oppressed peoples; they should ask themselves how they could help them effectively. As far as Southern Rhodesia was concerned, for example, the recent debates of the Security Council had shown that the United Kingdom did not hesitate to enter into negotiations with Ian Smith and to work out a compromise with him. Bulgaria, for its part, had supported the draft resolution which had been submitted by the African members of the Council and which had called upon the United Kingdom to use force against the racist Smith régime and upon the Council to apply the measures provided for under Chapter VII of the Charter. The Special Committee should request that the United Kingdom should suspend the 1961 Constitution in order to restore the rights of the people of Zimbabwe, convene a constitutional conference, and set a date for the independence of Southern Rhodesia. As far as Portugal was concerned, Bulgaria had supported all the United Nations resolutions aimed at the application of sanctions against the colonial Salazar régime with a view to restoring the legitimate rights to independence of the peoples of Mozambique, Angola and so-called Portuguese Guinea. The representatives of the liberation movements could be certain of the assistance and co-operation of the Bulgarian people.

50. He thanked Vice-President Kawawa and assured him that the Bulgarian delegation was well aware of the special responsibilities of the United Nations towards South West Africa and the Territories of Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland. Resolution 1514 (XV) should be implemented without delay. The Special Committee should be guided by the noble principles of the United Nations and by the desire to preserve world peace. However, the Bulgarian delegation unreservedly endorsed the wise words of Vice-President Kawawa that "peace among

peoples based on the injustice of colonialism was impossible".

51. The representative of *Yugoslavia* expressed his thanks to the Government and people of Tanzania for inviting the Special Committee to Dar es Salaam. He emphasized the prominent role played by Tanzania in the struggle against colonialism and the policy of apartheid. He stressed that the remaining colonial problems were extremely serious, and more especially so as there were no changes for the better in the positions of the colonial Powers.

52. He expressed his delegation's opinion that the Special Committee's visit to Africa would enable the members to get closely acquainted with the problems, and expressed the belief that this would bring about more effective work by the Committee.

53. He extended the thanks of his delegation to the Vice-President, Mr. Kawawa, for his inspiring address, and expressed the best wishes of Yugoslavia to the Government and people of Tanzania.

54. The representative of *Australia* thanked the Special Committee's kind Tanzanian hosts for their welcome and hospitality. He expressed the respects of the Australian delegation to President Nyerere, vital teacher and leader of a vital people, thanked Vice-President Kawawa for his welcome and thanked Ambassador Malecela for all he had done and was doing.

55. There was a fellow feeling between Tanzanians and Australians as members of the Commonwealth, sharing many common inherited institutions and ideas. His country had also been a colonial Territory. It also had experienced the excitement of the period of transition to and after independence and had found that time was necessary to meet many of its problems. But it was exciting. Round him now in Tanzania he could feel the excitement of new development. Australians did not profess to know a great deal about Africa. But there were Africans in his country—not a great many, it was true, but among some 12,000 other students from developing countries (mainly Asian) they were bringing much that was good to Australia and, he believed, taking much that was good away. Through them Australia had become aware of the fact that the future of Africa was in good hands. As an individual he was conscious of a dream coming true on this his first visit to Africa south of the Sahara, and sensed an atmosphere of new hope in Africa.

56. The representative of *Poland* expressed the thanks and gratitude of his delegation to President Nyerere and the Government and people of Tanzania for the invitation extended to the Special Committee. Indeed, the welcome accorded to it was a token of the country's willingness to assist the United Nations in the struggle against colonialism and racism.

57. He had had the privilege of representing Poland in 1962 on the Committee of Seventeen, which had met in Dar es Salaam, and had again visited the capital in 1965 to serve on the same enlarged Committee. It was gratifying to see the progress achieved by Tanzania in all fields of national development since independence. The Polish Government and people welcomed the political, economic and social attainments of Tanzania and wished them every further success in their aspirations and a happy and prosperous future.

58. Vice-President Kawawa's address would inspire those wishing to hasten the end of colonialism

and racism at a time when concern was deepening over open and disguised forms of oppression by colonial and neo-colonial forces. Poland had always given staunch support to national liberation movements in Africa and other parts of the world. The Special Committee had always sought to adopt recommendations for peaceful solutions to the problems posed by colonialism. Blame for the situation in Southern Rhodesia, in Territories under Portuguese domination, in South West Africa and in Aden, as well as in other dependent Territories, rested with the colonial Powers, which had consistently refused to comply with the decisions of the Special Committee, the General Assembly and the Security Council. The racial discrimination, oppressive measures and direct military action undertaken by Portugal, South Africa and the Smith régime, together with the assistance given them by the United States of America, the Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom and other countries in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), showed that the colonial Powers were determined to preserve white domination in the parts of Africa in question and to further the interests of foreign companies and trusts exploiting the peoples of the whole region. That policy was fraught with tragic consequences and dangers to peace and security. The Polish delegation therefore believed that any decisions or recommendations adopted by the Special Committee with regard to the Territories in question should make concrete provision for early dates for eliminating colonial régimes and dismantling military bases. The time had come to fix, in consultation with the peoples of the dependent Territories, target dates for the granting of independence to every such Territory in line with the freely expressed views and aspirations of the inhabitants. The claim often advanced by defenders of the so-called "free world" that dependent peoples were immature and unready to assume self-government was discordant with the spirit of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), which recognized the right of all peoples to self-determination. Recent developments had made it clear that unless mandatory measures provided for under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter were taken, the existence of colonial régimes would lead to a further deterioration of the international situation and to armed conflict. Finally, he endorsed Vice-President Kawawa's statement that the sooner the United Nations acted, and acted effectively, the better for all concerned.

59. The representative of *Iraq* thanked the Government and people of Tanzania for the cordial and spontaneous welcome extended to the Special Committee.

60. Vice-President Kawawa had rightly emphasized the special position and esteem enjoyed by the Special Committee in Tanzania and in all other freedom-loving countries. In that connexion he quoted an extract from the Vice-President's address to the effect that sooner or later, in default of other ways of achieving their freedom, subjugated countries would fight for it; that it was the role of the Special Committee to obviate such fighting by fostering a situation in which the peoples of each nation governed themselves in accordance with their own wishes and needs; and that the members of the Special Committee should therefore be working themselves out of a job.

61. In the light of what the Vice-President had said, he regretted the absence of the United Kingdom

delegate. Member States had an obligation to abide by resolutions of the various organs of the United Nations. That was especially true of the major Powers, which should continue to demonstrate their good faith to the rest of the world.

62. The struggle undertaken by Tanzanians for the cause of independence in Africa and all over the world had won the admiration of freedom fighters and peace-loving countries. He felt sure that the Special Committee's meetings would further the cause of freedom and hasten the process of decolonization. Nothing would delight his delegation more than the winding up of the Special Committee once the colonized peoples of the world had regained dignity and freedom for the benefit of all mankind.

63. The representative of *Syria* thanked the people and Government of Tanzania for their generous hospitality. In the field of international relations, Tanzania had distinguished itself, under the leadership of its President and the guidance of such able men as Ambassador Malecela, by its constant and vigilant stand against colonialism. Loyal to the principles and resolutions of the United Nations, it ever strove to translate the ideals of that organization into action. The Vice-President of Tanzania, in his address to the Special Committee that morning, had stated that the African continent sought justice above all since only by its attainment would the need to fight be removed. So long as justice had not been secured, the struggle of the freedom fighters was not only a right but a duty and should command the support of every nation professing belief in the principles of the United Nations and in the freedom of all mankind. The Republic of Tanzania was to be congratulated upon its admirable record in that connexion.

64. As the representative of Mali had said, the time had come for the Special Committee, and the United Nations as a whole, to pass from general principles to effective action. Those who still subjugated vast numbers of peoples in Africa and elsewhere, should be made to realize that a clear choice lay before them: either they had to recognize the cause of emancipation or they would be faced with a mortal fight which would ultimately lead to their defeat. The Vice-President of Tanzania, Mr. Kawawa, had rightly described as fundamental the important task of the Special Committee, faced as it was with the explosive situation existing in such areas as Southern Rhodesia, the Portuguese-dominated colonies, Aden and Oman. Those facts should now guide the Special Committee in its action.

65. The representative of the *United States of America* joined previous speakers in expressing her delegation's appreciation for the generous welcome extended to the Special Committee by the Vice-President of Tanzania, Mr. Kawawa, and for the hospitality offered by the Government and people of Tanzania. As he had stated, it was to be hoped that the time would come when the Special Committee would no longer need to meet, having secured the right to self-determination, through universal suffrage, for all the remaining dependent Territories.

66. The United States Government had frequently expressed the view, which she wished to take the opportunity of reiterating at that stage, that only by the expression of a free and informed choice could any people achieve the government it desired. No nation could rest content until the peoples of Southern

Rhodesia, South West Africa, the Portuguese Territories and dependent Territories elsewhere had all, in accordance with the United Nations Charter, freely selected the governments of their choice.

67. It was to be hoped that the Special Committee would take advantage of its proximity to the Territories referred to in its agenda to acquaint itself directly with the difficult and complex problems being experienced daily by the peoples concerned. In view of the unhappy lot of those peoples, the Special Committee should devote itself to reasoned consideration of their problems rather than to provocative accusations or sterile polemics.

68. As the Vice-President had said, the people of Tanzania, unlike those of Southern Rhodesia and other Non-Self-Governing Territories with which the Special Committee was concerned, were able to develop their own society and economic and political institutions. In view of the spirit of enthusiasm with which its people were pursuing those tasks and their pride of achievement, the United States delegation considered that the choice of Tanzania as the starting point for the Committee's African tour had been extremely fortunate.

69. In conclusion, she said that the Government and people of Tanzania were to be congratulated upon the remarkable progress achieved in developing a modern and active economy.

70. The representative of *Tunisia* recalled that whenever the Special Committee went to Africa, the Tanzanian Government always invited it to hold part of its session on the hospitable soil of Tanzania; in spite of all the problems of development faced by it, Tanzania did not lose sight of its duty and responsibility in respect of the liberation of the peoples still under the colonial yoke. He therefore thanked the Government and people of Tanzania for having been kind enough to offer their warm and fraternal hospitality once more to the Special Committee.

71. The Tunisian delegation's views of colonialism had been stated on several occasions in the Special Committee and in other international bodies. The Tunisian Government was in favour of the liberation of all countries still under foreign domination and would spare no effort to carry out the measures which would be adopted with a view to obtaining tangible results in that field.

72. The representative of *Venezuela* thanked the Government and people of Tanzania for the warm welcome which they had accorded the Special Committee. He hoped that the Committee would do constructive work and obtain satisfactory results.

73. The representative of *Ethiopia* associated his delegation with the expressions of appreciation extended by previous speakers to the Government and people of Tanzania. He also wished to pay tribute to the people of Tanzania for their sacrifices and achievements in the struggle against colonialism, both in Africa and elsewhere. It was with satisfaction that he could testify, as Ethiopian Ambassador in Tanzania, to the remarkable progress which that country had made under the able and dynamic leadership of President Nyerere.

74. In his opening address, the Vice-President of Tanzania, Mr. Kawawa, had clearly outlined the tasks which lay before the Special Committee. As he had said, until the septic sore of colonialism had been removed from Africa, there could be no security for

the continent. It was the firm belief of the Ethiopian delegation that the Special Committee could, during its forthcoming tour, do much to bring the eradication of colonialism closer to realization. By helping and encouraging the freedom fighters, now locked in a mortal struggle with the ruthless forces of oppression, the Special Committee could, as the representatives of the moral conscience of all mankind, greatly advance the cause of justice and the rule of law, both of which were the hallmarks of international society.

75. The representative of *Italy* expressed his delegation's appreciation to the Government of Tanzania for their hospitality and thanked the Vice-President, Mr. Kawawa, for his kind words of welcome. The Special Committee, which had already had the privilege of meeting in the congenial atmosphere of Dar es Salaam in 1965, would benefit from its renewed contact with the realities of the African scene and would be enabled to make sure and genuine progress towards the goals on which all were agreed.

76. With regard to the substance of the Special Committee's work, the Italian delegation fully agreed with the Chairman that it should demonstrate the increasing concern of the United Nations with regard to the position of the peoples under colonial administration and strengthen its own capacity to help those peoples in their struggle for self-determination and independence. The statements to be made by the petitioners would be particularly valuable: the information they could furnish on the situation in their respective Territories, as well as their views with regard to the best methods of attaining the objectives set forth in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), would greatly assist the Special Committee in its deliberations and would, at the same time, provide the petitioners with further encouragement. In the light of those factors, the Italian delegation wished to pledge its full and loyal co-operation in the Special Committee's work which, it was confident, would be fruitful.

77. The representative of *Denmark* thanked the Vice-President of Tanzania for his cordial welcome and excellent analysis of his Government's views on the problems of colonialism. The Danish delegation was grateful to the Government of Tanzania for its generous invitation to the Committee to hold a part of its current session in Dar es Salaam. Those who had attended the Special Committee's previous session would remember the warm hospitality already extended to the Special Committee by the Government and people of Tanzania as well as the excellent arrangements which had been made in that connexion. The Danish delegation, which was well aware of the active role played by Tanzania in the fight against colonialism and of the energy and zeal with which it was dealing with the internal problems of a newly independent country, looked forward to learning of the progress made during the past year.

78. As far as the Special Committee's work in Africa was concerned, it was a source of concern to his delegation that little or no progress had been recorded with regard to the situation in Southern Rhodesia, South West Africa and the Portuguese colonies. However, it was to be hoped that the Special Committee, which would have the opportunity of discussing those serious problems in detail, would prove worthy of the confidence of the African peoples, in word and in deed. Both the Chairman and the repre-

sentative of Italy had rightly observed that one of the Special Committee's most important tasks was to demonstrate the deep concern of the United Nations regarding the problem of colonialism. To do so, the Special Committee should agree not only upon the general principle, that colonialism should be brought to an end as soon as possible, but also upon the way in which that objective could be achieved. That would of course necessitate concessions on all sides but, in the opinion of the Danish delegation, it would serve the common cause, namely, the effective fight against colonialism.

79. Lastly, he expressed the hope that the Special Committee's session in Africa would be fruitful and that a spirit of co-operation would prevail between all delegations.

80. The representative of *Madagascar* said that the Malagasy Government was against colonialism; its views on the question had already been stated on several occasions and were well known. He would comment on the agenda items as they were considered.

81. He thanked the Tanzanian Government for having been kind enough once again to invite the Special Committee to hold part of its session in Tanzania.

82. The representative of *Sierra Leone* said that every delegation would certainly wish to study the important and thought-provoking statement made by the Vice-President of Tanzania in his opening address to the Special Committee.

83. The problems of colonialism still remained and every effort was being made to liberate the countries concerned, despite great odds. Sierra Leone had supported those efforts in all the organs of the United Nations and had maintained its stand unequivocally, both in the Organization of African Unity and in other international bodies. He would comment in detail upon his Government's policy as the Special Committee dealt with each Territory in turn. It was to be hoped that those freedom fighters who had had to flee their countries would find succour and that the Special Committee would, as a result of its deliberations, move nearer to a solution of the problem of colonialism.

84. Expressing his delegation's appreciation to the Government and people of Tanzania, he said that their hospitality was well known to the Special Committee which had met in Dar es Salaam the previous year. It was to be hoped that the Special Committee's current session would meet with greater success than it had in 1965.

85. The representative of the *Ivory Coast* expressed thanks to the Tanzanian Government for the kind invitation which it had extended to the Special Committee and for its warm welcome. He expressed his gratitude to the Vice-President of Tanzania for his wise observations, which the delegation of the Ivory Coast would not fail to take into account in the work that the Special Committee was to undertake.

86. The representative of the *United Republic of Tanzania* said that his delegation was gratified that it had been possible for the Special Committee to hold its first meeting in Tanzania's capital city.

87. Since much of his Government's policy with regard to the problem of colonialism had already been outlined by the Vice-President of Tanzania, he merely wished at that stage to assure the Special Committee that their expressions of appreciation would be con-

veyed to those concerned. He also wished, on behalf of the Tanzanian delegation, to welcome all members of the Special Committee to Tanzania. Their presence in Dar es Salaam was a reminder of the work which remained to be done in the struggle to free the African continent. Once independence had been achieved, the talents and ability expended in that connexion—and as exemplified by the Special Committee itself—could be used in other fields of human progress, particularly in Africa which had for so long been exploited.

88. During their stay in Tanzania, members of the Special Committee might experience certain inconveniences. His Government would however make every effort to minimize such difficulties, in so far as the limited resources of a developing country allowed.

89. Lastly, he expressed the hope that all members of the Special Committee would enjoy their stay in the United Republic of Tanzania.

Anniversary of Africa Freedom Day celebrated on 25 May 1966

General statements

90. The representative of *Venezuela* speaking on the occasion of the anniversary of Africa Freedom Day, recalled that the previous year, at Lusaka, he had expressed the hope that there would be no need for the Special Committee to go back to Africa because Africa would celebrate Africa Unity Day a completely free continent; in other words, as President Kaunda had so eloquently expressed the hope, Africa would celebrate the unity of a continent entirely liberated from the colonial yoke. Africa Unity Day had come and that hope was far from being realized. President Kaunda could not yet dry his tears, for millions of his brothers were still suffering under foreign domination. But colonialism had been judged and condemned. Nothing and nobody could prevent the sentence being carried out. The course of history was irreversible. Colonialism must disappear and would disappear from all the places where it still persisted. The peoples of Africa who were still subject to a colonial régime had, like all the peoples of the earth, an inalienable right to self-determination and independence. The day was not far off when that right would be recognized. African unity, which had started so well, could not be completely achieved so long as there were still peoples on the African continent subject to foreign domination. The Latin American peoples, who had paid a very high price in human life and economic well-being for their independence, who were still fighting to eliminate the last vestiges of colonialism in the Americas, unconditionally supported their African brothers in the fight to recover their national dignity and their freedom. They hoped that in the very near future Africa Unity Day could be celebrated in a continent composed solely of free and independent States, where racial inequality had disappeared, where relations between men were founded on respect for human rights, and where harmony, the symbol of unity and prosperity, would prevail.

91. The representative of the *Union of Soviet Socialist Republics*, speaking on behalf of the Bulgarian, Polish and Soviet delegations, greeted the peoples of Africa who were today celebrating Africa Unity Day.

92. At their historic meeting at Addis Ababa in May 1963, the Heads of State and Government of the independent African countries had decided to cele-

brate, on 25 May each year, the anniversary of the liberation of Africa. It had been their intention to remind all the African peoples, whether they were already free or were still subject to the yoke of the oppressor, of the tasks which lay before them. It was for Africans to sweep the last vestiges of colonialism from Africa as soon as possible. For the members of the Conference at the Addis Ababa summit, it had been self-evident that no African people could be considered entirely free so long as any part of the African continent still groaned under the colonialist boot.

93. In the past few years Africa had undergone a radical transformation. Many African countries had acceded to independence. A number of names that the African people had learned to hate had been expunged from the map of Africa. It was now the turn of the countries situated in the south of the continent. It was through their territory that colonialism's last line of defence was drawn, and it was in their territory that colonialism was now digging its own grave. The ever more bitter struggle that the peoples of Angola, Mozambique and so-called Portuguese Guinea were waging for their freedom showed the whole world that the fate of colonialism was sealed.

94. All men of good will rejoiced at the successes scored by the African peoples in their struggle against colonialism and imperialism. The peoples of the Soviet Union, Bulgaria and Poland, like those of the other socialist countries, had proved to the Africans the firmness of their friendship, and were more than ever ready to give them aid and assistance.

95. On that day when the peoples of Africa were celebrating the liberation of their continent, and when all those who were fighting for the freedom and independence of that continent shared their joy, the Soviet, Bulgarian and Polish delegations paid a tribute to the sacred struggle which the Africans had undertaken for the complete liberation of their ancestral land, part of which was still subject to foreign domination, and for the development of their country in peace, freedom and progress. Those delegations hoped that the African peoples and the Organization of African Unity would meet with further successes in their noble enterprise: the union of all the forces of the African continent in the fight against imperialism and colonialism to promote peace and social progress.

96. The representative of *Iran* said that that day—Africa Day—was the third anniversary of the founding of the Organization of African Unity, which was the instrument of African solidarity, and it was the second such occasion on which the Special Committee had had the good fortune to be present on African soil in pursuit of the same aims as the OAU.

97. Speaking on his own behalf and on that of the Asian countries represented on the Special Committee, he extended hearty congratulations to the OAU. During its very short existence it had done much to assist liberation movements everywhere in Africa, and had been instrumental in promoting inter-African co-operation. It was fast becoming a centre for co-ordinating the activities of African nations in solving economic, social, cultural or humanitarian problems, in accordance both with the charter of the OAU and with the letter and spirit of the United Nations Charter. The OAU, unlike many similar organizations, was more than a mere institution: it was a living concept and a reflection of strong African sentiments

for a larger union transcending ethnic and national boundaries.

98. Speaking on his own behalf, he said that Africa, in its drive for unity, was much more advanced and forward-looking than the other continents, since an African, in addition to his loyalty to his own country, passionately regarded himself as an African. Such a sentiment was a vital ingredient for eventual unity on a continental scale, and it was that spirit that had brought the OAU into being. It was the same spirit that would help the organization to surmount the obstacles put in its path by those interested to see it discredited, and finally the same spirit that would in the end root out Smith and his kind, notwithstanding temporary setbacks, and bring about the freedom and independence of all Africans.

99. The representative of *Iraq* on behalf of his own delegation and that of the Syrian Arab Republic, said that he would be expressing the feelings of all Arabs in speaking on that auspicious day, which symbolized the hopes and aspirations of the people of the great African continent.

100. The Arab nation was bound to Africa by innumerable links, more than half the Arab world being in fact on African soil and the remainder geographically near it. Both Arabs and Africans had suffered—and indeed some were still suffering—from colonial domination. They were counting on all the help the United Nations could give to gain their freedom, dignity and independence. History, religion and culture had also brought Arabs and Africans together and moulded their common heritage and common interests.

101. The struggle of the African people in Southern Rhodesia, Mozambique, Angola and the rest of the colonies in Africa was being watched with great interest and admiration in the Arab world, with no less an interest, in fact, than in the liberation of the rest of the Arab world.

102. On that great occasion, he invoked the mood of the great American poet, Walt Whitman, whose belief in the brotherhood and common interests of man had inspired his poem that began with the lines:

“I celebrate myself
And sing myself,
And what I shall assume
You shall assume,
For every atom
Belonging to me
As good belongs to you”.

103. The celebration of Africa Day was not confined to the great continent of Africa, but was shared in by all freedom-loving nations and by humanity and large.

104. The representative of the *United States of America* speaking on behalf of her own delegation and the delegations of Australia, Denmark and Italy, extended the warmest congratulations to the Organization of African Unity and to independent African States. Africa Day was a fitting reminder of the phenomenal development of independent States during the past two decades.

105. It also gave pause to reflect that the right of self-determination and of people freely to express their wishes and govern themselves as they saw fit, had yet to be universally recognized. The Organization of African Unity could make an increasing contribu-

tion to such universal recognition wherever there was repression of those rights. Its role was of the greatest importance to the African countries and to those others, such as hers, which had a strong interest in Africa's future.

106. The African continent had great human and natural resources, and great potential for economic development, and her country, together with others, was privileged to be contributing technical and economic assistance and educational aid.

107. One important key to Africa's economic future lay in increased co-operation between nations, which the OAU was in a position to further. Co-operation in social and cultural affairs was also a significant area in which the OAU was able to make an important contribution.

108. She congratulated those members of the Special Committee who represented African countries, and conveyed to the people of Africa through them the warmest good wishes of all Americans and of all the delegations on whose behalf she was speaking.

109. The representative of *Yugoslavia*, speaking on behalf of his Government, people and delegation, warmly greeted the people of Africa on their historic anniversary.

110. He stressed the importance of the OAU and its international role which had been recognized by the resolution passed by the General Assembly on the subject in 1965. He expressed the hope that there would be a large measure of meaningful co-operation between the OAU and the United Nations. His delegation had supported the proposal for the Special Committee's visit to Africa, and had voiced its expectation that the visit would offer large possibilities for promotion of co-operation between the Special Committee and the OAU.

111. He emphasized that Yugoslavia had very friendly relations with African independent countries, and stood firmly in support of those that had not yet attained independence.

112. He conveyed warmest wishes for the further success of the OAU and for the prosperity and better future of Africa.

113. The representative of the *United Republic of Tanzania* said that for the sons and daughters of Africa, Africa Day was a day on which to celebrate, meditate and resolve. It gave Africans cause to meditate on two aspects: the freedom that had been gained in the liberated States, and their championship of the cause of liberating from colonial subjection and apartheid those States still afflicted by it. Only a decade ago, colonial exploitation had been running roughshod over the continent. The African people had stood with courage, notwithstanding the overwhelming odds against them, to liberate their continent and enjoy their legitimate rights of freedom and independence. Many of their struggles against their well-armed oppressors had been crowned with success. Those countries that had won their independence were now working to consolidate it.

114. The second factor—the cause of liberation of the countries still under subjection—was brought sharply into focus by the Special Committee's presence in Africa. Millions of brother Africans were being oppressed by the racist minorities of Southern Rhodesia and South Africa, who would have been defeated but for the military and economic aid received from their allies in spite of the many resolutions that had been passed by

the United Nations. Free Africans must therefore once again reiterate their unqualified support for the just struggle of their brothers in South Africa, South West Africa, Southern Rhodesia and other countries. The day should be one of rededication and renewed pledge of support for the charter of the Organization of African Unity to enable the final goal of a united Africa to be reached: a day to remind all the colonizers in Africa that their departure was long overdue and there was nothing the free African States could not do to get them out. It was however, the desire of all Africans to live in friendship with the rest of the world, so long as it could be based on freedom and equality.

115. *The Chairman* said that it was not a matter of accident that the Special Committee was meeting in Africa on Africa Day. It was symptomatic of the fact that Africa had arrived in the United Nations.

116. Speaking on his own behalf, as a proud and humble son of Africa, he expressed the hope that the future would be brighter than the past, and that the patience and resilience of the African people would be able to find full expression in the years ahead, enabling them to contribute towards fundamental human values.

Closing of meetings

General statements

117. *The Chairman* said that the Special Committee had come to the end of its deliberations in Dar es Salaam. New ideas and fresh information had been provided by the petitioners; the Committee had had the advantage of co-operation from the OAU, and it had adopted a resolution (A/AC.109/167) representing an important contribution to the solution of the problem of Southern Rhodesia. It had listened with interest to petitioners from Southern Rhodesia, Mozambique and South West Africa, whose testimony would no doubt be of assistance to the Special Committee in its task of hastening their advancement and independence.

118. On behalf of the Special Committee, he expressed his deep gratitude to the Government and people of the United Republic of Tanzania for their cordial hospitality and for their many personal acts of kindness.

119. *The representative of the Secretary-General*, on behalf of the Secretariat, expressed his deep gratitude to the Special Committee's hosts for their generous hospitality and for the many facilities provided. He was particularly thankful to Mr. Malecela, Mr. Fom and other members of the Tanzanian delegation who had gone out of their way to facilitate the Secretariat's work.

120. *The representative of the United Republic of Tanzania* on behalf of the President, the Government and people of Tanzania, said how happy his country had been to play host to the Special Committee. Its action sprang from its sincere belief in the work of the United Nations and in the need for decolonization.

121. He hoped that the Special Committee's work in Dar es Salaam and elsewhere in Africa would prove fruitful and that the resolutions adopted would be implemented. His own country would do its utmost to carry out those decisions so that fellow Africans still under the yoke of colonialism could be freed and enabled to join the United Nations.

B. MEETINGS HELD AT MOGADISCIO, SOMALIA

Opening of meetings

Address by the Prime Minister on behalf of the President of Somalia

122. *The Prime Minister of Somalia* said that he had great pleasure in welcoming the Special Committee to Mogadiscio on behalf of His Excellency President Aden Abdulla Osman and the Government and people of the Somali Republic. The Somali people were especially honoured to be able to serve as the Committee's hosts. Somalia owed a debt of gratitude to the United Nations for, under its trusteeship, it had been able to follow a smooth and steady path from colonial subjection to sovereign independence. If Somalia could in any way assist the Committee in its task of implementing the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, it would have done something towards repaying that debt.

123. The Somali people felt honoured to be the Special Committee's hosts because they had a deep sense of the historic significance of its work in Africa—work which proved that the concept of colonialism had been condemned. Millions of people on the African continent, who had formerly been subjected to humiliation and indignity to serve the economic and political interests of the colonial Powers, were now free to work out their own destinies. As a people ruthlessly divided by the colonial Powers and a nation still suffering from that division, the Somalis were particularly conscious of the importance of the Special Committee's task. They were aware, too, that the struggle against the remaining enclaves of colonialism might prove to be the most bitter of all. The Somali people joined in the Committee's concern for the plight of those who still had to fight for freedom, and the Committee could rest assured of their complete support in its endeavour.

124. *The Special Committee's visit and the presence in Mogadiscio of the petitioners* reminded him of the days when he had himself addressed the United Nations Trusteeship Council as a petitioner. He had spoken on behalf of Somalia at a time when its course towards independence was still being chartered and he therefore knew full well the value of such hearings: they provided an opportunity for viewpoints to be presented personally; they gave encouragement to those who were struggling for their freedom and they stimulated world-wide interest in the cause of liberty. The fact that the Special Committee could hold some of its meetings in Africa had enhanced the value of the hearings. Through its findings, the Committee would be in a position to present to the United Nations General Assembly a more complete picture of the situation prevailing in each of the remaining colonial Territories. Furthermore, the extensive itinerary arranged for its visit enabled petitioners from the remotest areas to obtain a hearing.

125. Ideally, the Special Committee should visit the Territories themselves. The reason why that had not been possible, however, was well known: the Governments administering those Territories had much to hide, and a visit from the Committee would have finally disproved the false propaganda circulated about them. Throughout those areas, and particularly in those controlled by South Africa and Portugal, the colonial Powers would have the world believe that

the indigenous people under their rule were satisfied with their lot and that economic betterment meant more to them than the attainment of political and social equality. Such claims were demonstrably false. A great and unjust gap existed between all African workers and white immigrant settlers—a gap which was maintained by the denial to Africans of their political and social rights.

126. Time and again, history had shown beyond doubt that the search for national identity through the process of self-determination was an inexorable trend followed by all people as part of their natural development. When that natural right was denied, social unrest and turmoil were the inevitable consequences. Unhappily, that unrest had already manifested itself in many colonial Territories and, in some, had led to grave and bloody conflicts.

127. In his opinion, the most important point was that the United Nations General Assembly stood committed, by a majority decision, to ensure the speedy progress towards self-government of all peoples under colonial rule. If Member States were allowed to flout that decision and if they were to be supported and encouraged by powerful industrialist countries, which placed economic interest above the principles of the United Nations Charter, then there would be justification for the charge that the United Nations had failed in its purpose—which would be sad indeed.

128. It was not his intention, however, to end on a pessimistic note. The United Nations had already achieved much for the liberation of the colonial peoples and the Special Committee was continuing to propose practical and far-sighted solutions to the pressing colonial problems of the age. It might take time, and it would certainly take determination on the Committee's part, before its recommendations were implemented. But the irresistible forces of freedom which had radically transformed the map of Africa over the past decade were by no means spent. He was confident that the Committee's presence in Africa would be an encouragement to those forces and would ensure that they would continue to operate with the same degree of intensity until all Africans were free.

General statements

129. *The Chairman* expressed appreciation to the Prime Minister and to the President, Government and people of Somalia for their generous invitation to the Special Committee to hold a part of its session in Mogadiscio.

130. The warm welcome extended to the Special Committee on its arrival at Mogadiscio, which was both a reflection of traditional African hospitality and an expression of the Somali people's uncompromising stand against colonialism, had made its members even more aware of the trust placed in them and in the United Nations.

131. It was gratifying to note the progress which Somalia had made in all fields since it had attained independence, and the Prime Minister had graciously referred to the assistance which the United Nations had rendered in that connexion. In turn the Government and people of Somalia could be assured that, in discharging its mandate, the Special Committee had derived inspiration from the United Nations contribution to Somalia's independence.

132. As the Prime Minister had rightly pointed out, ideally the Special Committee should visit colonial

Territories themselves. Unfortunately, however, that had not been possible owing to lack of co-operation from the administering Powers, and the Committee was therefore holding its meetings in Africa as close as possible to the various centres of the colonial struggle. It hoped in that way to acquire more direct knowledge of the aspirations of the colonial people while at the same time demonstrating once again the Committee's solidarity with them and its determination to spare no effort in assisting their countries to attain independence.

133. It was in that spirit that he wished to inform all representatives of national liberation movements, as well as all African peoples suffering under the colonial yoke, that the Special Committee's visit to Mogadiscio was yet another expression of the United Nations firm determination to liquidate colonialism without delay. Admittedly, despite the efforts made, progress had been slow. However, in keeping with the principles of the Charter, the United Nations sought to achieve its objectives primarily by persuasion. Therefore, if the efforts of the United Nations had not been as fruitful as might be desired, it was the colonial Powers which were to blame, since they refused to co-operate with the Committee.

134. Lastly, reiterating his thanks to the Prime Minister, the President, the Government and the people of Somalia, he said that the Special Committee would make every endeavour to implement the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.

135. The representative of *Italy* associated his delegation with the Chairman's expression of thanks to the Government and people of Somalia, which occupied a special place in the heart of all Italians. The common efforts of Somalia and Italy, during the years of trusteeship administration, had not been in vain, and the task of bringing Somalia to independence had been fulfilled to the satisfaction of the United Nations.

136. As the Chairman had said, the Special Committee had come to Africa to demonstrate the increasing concern of the United Nations for the position of the colonial peoples and to strengthen its own capacity to help them in their struggle for independence. While in Mogadiscio, it would consider the problem which was so important to the people of Somalia.

137. He had been impressed by the idealism and sense of responsibility underlying the words of the Prime Minister of Somalia, which would be borne in mind by the Special Committee when the time came for it to submit its recommendations to the General Assembly. The Committee could not always promise prompt solutions, since that was neither in the nature of the problems themselves nor of the United Nations, which sought to work through conciliation and mediation rather than through force. However, the Government and people of Somalia could rest assured that the Committee's deliberations would be guided by the sense of responsibility and justice which had always characterized its work. The results achieved would not betray the trust which the Somali people had placed in the United Nations.

138. The representative of the *United Republic of Tanzania* thanked the Government and people of Somalia for their timely invitation to the Special Committee to meet in Mogadiscio and expressed appreciation to the Prime Minister for his words of welcome. The enthusiasm with which the Committee had been

received upon its arrival in Mogadiscio had revealed that the spirit prevailing in Africa would ultimately lead to the annihilation of colonialism.

139. The position of Tanzania with regard to colonialism was well known: it was the duty of all Africans to secure the liberation of those Territories which were still being exploited and suppressed by the colonialists and as his delegation had repeatedly stated, there could be no real freedom for Africa until that was done. Tanzania supported the struggle for independence not only of Africans, but of all peoples who, during the course of history, had been subjugated by colonialists. The Committee's meetings in Mogadiscio was a page in the history of the fight against colonialism, just as the struggles in Algeria, Kenya and the Congo had been. Ultimately, the people of Africa would win; they would not only attain their own freedom but would also reinforce that of all men throughout the world, and strengthen the United Nations founded, as it was, upon the Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

140. It was of great value to the Special Committee in its work to be able to meet on African soil, where the immediacy of the problems was felt and for that reason Tanzania had offered to be host to the Committee for a part of its session in Africa.

141. Lastly, he expressed the conviction that the revolutionary spirit would further the interests of African liberation.

142. The representative of *Iraq*, expressing his delegation's appreciation to the Government and people of Somalia, said that from time immemorial, Arabs and Somalis had lived side by side, sharing the same ideals and aspirations. Great spiritual values linked them together and their characteristics had been shaped by a common heritage. In recent years, the struggle against colonialism had bound them even closer together in sympathy and understanding. The Iraqi delegation had been greatly impressed by the warmth with which the Special Committee had been received, by the hospitality and courtesy of the Somali people and by the atmosphere of cordial co-operation which prevailed. It was mindful of the positive role played by Somalia, in close co-operation with the Arab States as well as in the OAU and other bodies, in the decolonization and emancipation of all subjugated peoples.

143. The representative of *Ethiopia* expressed his delegation's thanks and appreciation for the welcome and hospitality extended by the Government and people of Somalia.

144. The people of Ethiopia regarded the people of Somalia as brothers and sisters and entertained the warmest feelings towards them. Consequently, they regarded the differences dividing the two countries as a temporary phase which would pass and be forgotten in time, for the bonds of brotherhood uniting the two peoples were as strong as they were varied.

145. Some six years earlier, he had the honour of attending Somalia's independence celebration as a member of the official Ethiopian delegation, and he remembered the joy which he had shared with the people on their attainment of freedom and independence in the beautiful city of Mogadiscio. The entire Ethiopian nation had shared in the Somali people's happiness, since their Independence Day on 1 July 1960 marked not only the successful culmination of the struggle waged by the peoples of the two countries for the eradication of colonialism in their part of Africa but

also the beginning of a new era in the relations of Somalia and Ethiopia—an era of equal independent status as two neighbouring African States, with all the duties and responsibilities which that involved for the inhabitants of both countries towards each other as well as towards the international community as a whole. Ethiopia took legitimate pride in the humble role it had been able to play, both at the United Nations and in other international organizations, in bringing about that happy situation.

146. However, in all frankness, he felt bound to refer to the events of the previous day. Needless to say, his delegation had been pained and saddened by the demonstrations which had taken place.

147. First of all, he wished to refer to some pertinent parts of the Special Committee's terms of reference, since a certain amount of confusion and misunderstanding seemed to exist in the minds of certain people in Mogadiscio as to the purpose and objectives for which the Committee had been created. Its terms of reference, as contained in General Assembly resolution 1654 (XVI) of 27 November 1961, read *inter alia* as follows:

[*"The General Assembly*]

"1. *Solemnly reiterates and reaffirms* the objectives and principles enshrined in the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples contained in its resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960;

"...

"4. *Requests* the Special Committee to examine the application of the Declaration, ... and to report to the General Assembly ...;

"5. *Directs* the Special Committee to carry out its task by employment of all means which it will have at its disposal within the framework of the procedures and modalities which it shall adopt for the proper discharge of its functions."

148. It was evident therefore that the relations between two independent States, or the disputes that might exist between them, did not come within the purview of the Special Committee. All references and illusions made by the demonstrators to the existing border dispute between Ethiopia and Somalia, or between Somalia and Kenya, therefore, should be dismissed as irrelevant to, and without any bearing on, the work of the Committee.

149. The events at the airport and in the streets of Mogadiscio the previous day were only a small example of what misguided and ignorant people could do when they were actively incited. In his opinion, the demonstrations which had taken place had brought nothing but disgrace to the name of Africa. He said that more in sorrow than in anger. It was to the eternal shame of the leaders of Somalia that such great names as Haile Selassie and Jomo Kenyatta, two illustrious sons of Africa, revered and respected all over the world, had been defiled with impunity in the streets of Mogadiscio. It was also a measure of the distortion and misrepresentation inculcated in the minds of the demonstrators that they had shouted against the name of such a great and outstanding liberal European leader as General de Gaulle, while nothing had been said against Verwoerd, Salazar and Ian Smith, the real enemies and oppressors of the African people.

150. As for the oft-repeated declaration concerning the so-called division of the Somali people and the

reference to the existence of people of Somali origin and the Somali ethnic group in Ethiopia and Kenya, his delegation wished to stress again that it had no intention of being dragged into irrelevant and pointless discussions of that kind.

151. Such worn-out phrases and *clichés* had become so threadbare that they could hardly disguise the real aim and objective of the Government of Somalia—namely, its desire for expansion and for territorial aggrandizement at the expense of neighbouring States.

152. High sounding words, lofty concepts and terms like “self-determination”, “unification”, “independence” and “freedom” were recklessly prostituted in Somalia to mean, in stark reality, territorial expansion and aggrandizement for the realization of which the Somali Government incited innocent nomads and shepherds in remote areas to murder, loot and plunder.

153. That policy of the Government of Somalia had been exposed and condemned by the entire body of African and international public opinion. Formal resolutions and declarations had been adopted by conferences of African Heads of State and by the conference of the Heads of State and Government of Non-Aligned Countries to the effect that all African States should respect the boundaries which they had acquired at the time of independence. His delegation saw no useful purpose, therefore, in bringing up a dead issue during the Special Committee’s visit to Mogadiscio.

154. Instead of obstinately clinging to a bankrupt and discredited policy, his delegation ventured to suggest to the host Government that it should muster enough courage to renounce once and for all its futile ambition for expansion and should clear the way for fruitful co-operation and friendly relations between the two neighbouring African States. He appealed to them from the hall of their own Parliament building which they had so kindly put at the Special Committee’s disposal, to awaken to reality.

155. In that connexion, the Ethiopian Government challenged the Government of Somalia to work as it did for the wider unity of pan-Africanism or even of East Africa, instead of harping on so-called “Somali unity”—a concept which was not only too narrow in scope to be of any use in the requirements of modern Africa, but also contained outmoded and dangerous elements of tribalism and racism.

156. The Ethiopian delegation believed that the two countries had much to gain from co-operative and friendly relations which would be conducive to peace and stability in the area. His Imperial Majesty, Haile Selassie I, had time and again brought that fact to the attention of the Somali leaders but so far to no avail. However, Ethiopians were a patient people and could wait. Time was on their side.

157. The question of Djibouti had been one of the preoccupations of the *Somali News*, the Government newspaper, and to a certain extent of the demonstrators. Since it was on the Special Committee’s agenda, and a matter in which his delegation was vitally interested, he intended to participate fully in the debate when it came up for discussion. The view of his Government on the matter was well known to the Committee and his delegation reserved the right to make a detailed statement on its stand at the appropriate time. At that stage, however, he only wished to make it clear that Ethiopia totally rejected any claim on that Territory by Somalia.

158. With regard to the question of Mauritius and the Seychelles, which were also on the Special Committee’s agenda for its meetings in Mogadiscio, the Ethiopian delegation would have concrete proposals to make when the time came to consider draft resolutions. Until that time, however, his delegation merely wished to welcome the coming independence of Mauritius and to express the hope that the people of Seychelles would be able to follow suit in the near future.

159. In conclusion, he reiterated his delegation’s appreciation to the Government and people of Somalia for their invitation to the Special Committee and for the kind consideration they had shown.

160. *The Chairman* said that he regretted that the representative of Ethiopia had insisted upon making a controversial statement upon matters outside the Special Committee’s purview. It would assist the Committee in its work if, in the future, representatives would confine themselves to questions on the agenda.

161. The representative of *India* thanked the President, Government and people of Somalia for their invitation to the Special Committee to hold some of its meetings in Mogadiscio.

162. India enjoyed most friendly relations with Somalia; both belonged to the group of economically developing countries in the vanguard of the fight against colonialism, and they were joined in the common endeavour to raise the living standards of their peoples. India had, within the limits of its resources, sent such trained technical personnel as doctors, engineers and teachers to help Somalia in its development. His Government’s contribution was a token of the genuine friendship existing between the two countries.

163. The Prime Minister’s fine address was an important contribution to the work of the Special Committee. Recalling Mr. Abdirizak’s personal appearance before the Trusteeship Council years ago as a petitioner, the representative of India stated that his appearance before the Special Committee as Prime Minister of his country showed the interest of the Somali Government in the struggle against colonialism.

164. In conclusion, he extended his delegation’s warm greetings to the people of Somalia and best wishes for their continued well-being and prosperity.

165. The representative of *Afghanistan* expressed his thanks to the Prime Minister for his inspiring address, and his gratitude to the Government and people of Somalia for their warm welcome and for enabling the Special Committee to hold some of its meetings in Mogadiscio.

166. The people of Afghanistan and Somalia were bound by common aspirations and strong spiritual ties, which made it all the more rewarding for his delegation to work in the young republic of great traditions.

167. The representative of *Australia* thanked the Government and people of Somalia for the memorable welcome extended to the Special Committee, and expressed his appreciation of the opening address of the Prime Minister, whose words would provide inspiration and guidance along the road to an Africa free of colonialism and united in human dignity.

168. The representative of *Syria* said that his delegation fully associated itself with the statement made by the Chairman in response to the Prime Minister’s opening address.

169. The first words of welcome the Special Committee had heard on its arrival in Mogadiscio, "*As-salaam aleikum*" (Peace be upon you!), were a symbol of faith in peace built upon justice, human brotherhood, and the eradication of all forms of colonialism and exploitation of man by man, faith in the imminence of absolute equality and justice everywhere, and especially in Africa, and faith in the true emancipation of man and of his assumption of the dignified role long denied him as an active builder of true progress and restorer of values and ideals.

170. The representative of the *Union of Soviet Socialist Republics* expressed his sincere thanks to the President of the Republic of Somalia and to the Somali Government and people for the warm welcome which they had extended to the Special Committee.

171. The Somali Government had once again expressed a desire for the immediate implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples in all countries still under the colonial yoke. Almost all the countries of Africa and Asia had been freed from colonial domination except for a few, particularly in Africa, where millions of human beings continued to be exploited and humiliated. That was why the Special Committee had decided to hold its session in Africa. He was convinced that the Special Committee's work in Somalia would constitute a further step towards the elimination of the last vestiges of colonialism in Africa. The Soviet Union was the friend of the peoples who were struggling for freedom and had always supported the courageous efforts of the African peoples to obtain their independence.

172. The representative of *Tunisia* thanked the President of the Republic of Somalia, the Prime Minister and the Somali people for having so cordially welcomed the Special Committee to Mogadiscio. Their touching hospitality was further proof of the trust which they had placed in the United Nations. He had been particularly impressed by the address of the Prime Minister of Somalia, who had so ably expressed his country's aspirations. The role that Somalia had played on various occasions in the United Nations, the Organization of African Unity and the specialized agencies was a particularly promising sign for its future.

173. The representative of *Sierra Leone* said that his delegation associated itself with the Chairman's expression of thanks to the Prime Minister.

174. Somalia itself had been under United Nations trusteeship and was therefore in a unique position to understand the feelings of oppressed peoples. The invitation to the Special Committee to come to Mogadiscio had been no mere accident, but a symbol of the Somali pledge to uproot colonialism and of the faith of the Somali people in the United Nations. Sierra Leone shared that faith and would continue to exert itself to the utmost in the task of wiping out all forms of oppression in Africa and elsewhere.

175. His delegation thanked the Government and people of Somalia for their invitation to the Special Committee. Awareness that Somalis placed their African above their national identity made his delegation feel at home with close friends with whom it could work steadfastly towards the goal of decolonization and peace in Africa.

176. The representative of *Iran* expressed his delegation's gratitude to the President, the Government

and people of Somalia for their invitation to the Special Committee to hold a part of its session in Mogadiscio. The welcome extended to the Special Committee was an expression of the deep-seated confidence of the people of Somalia in the United Nations.

177. His delegation had been highly impressed by the wise and inspiring statement by the Prime Minister, which was a further indication of the confidence which the Government and people of Somalia placed in the United Nations. The hospitality extended to the Special Committee was symbolic of the high values for which Somalia had been known throughout history; for it was history that bound the peoples of Somalia and Iran in ties of friendship, religion and culture.

178. The representative of the *United States of America*, speaking on behalf of her country, thanked the people and Government of Somalia for their invitation to the Special Committee. The gratifying esteem of Somalia for the United Nations had been demonstrated by the Prime Minister's fine address of welcome and by the arrangements made for the Committee's work in Mogadiscio.

179. Somalia had a long and close association with the United Nations. As the Prime Minister had pointed out in his address, Somalia exemplified the assistance the international community could give towards the orderly transition of government to the people.

180. It was a source of pride that the United Nations was giving technical assistance for the social, economic and educational development of a proudly independent Somalia.

181. As a member of the United Nations Trusteeship Council, the United States was happy to be able to contribute to the development of Somalia's agriculture, port facilities, civilian security forces and—perhaps most important of all for the country's future—schools and teacher-training facilities.

182. In conclusion, she extended the congratulations and best wishes of the United States to the Government and people of Somalia for their further progress.

183. The representative of *Venezuela* endorsed the remarks which the Chairman of the Special Committee had made in response to the interesting address by the Prime Minister of Somalia. He thanked the Government and people of Somalia for the warm and unforgettable welcome they had given the members of the Special Committee. He paid a tribute to the courageous Somali people, who had succeeded in obtaining their independence and were now striving to maintain their position in the international community.

184. Venezuela was familiar with many of the problems that confronted Somalia today, some of them relating to sovereignty and to the inalienable rights of their two peoples. That was the legacy which had been left by the colonial era and which must disappear. The Venezuelan delegation had accordingly welcomed the Chairman's decision to allow members of the Somali delegation to participate as observers in the Special Committee's work. He was convinced that that delegation's participation would help the Special Committee to make progress toward its goal, viz., the final eradication of colonialism.

185. The representative of *Bulgaria* thanked the President of the Republic of Somalia and the Government and people of Somalia for the warm welcome they had extended to the Special Committee. He further expressed sincere thanks to the Prime Minister of

Somalia for his warm words of welcome, which fully demonstrated the trust which the Somali Government placed in the Special Committee. Somalia was in the forefront of the African countries that were waging an effective struggle against colonialism and neo-colonialism. It was actively participating in the work of the United Nations and of the Special Committee, whose principal task was to ensure the full and immediate implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.

186. Since its accession to independence, Somalia had made considerable progress and was endeavouring, despite numerous difficulties, to raise the level of living of its people. There was no need to recall that Bulgaria, as a socialist country, stood solidly behind the African countries in their struggle to eliminate the remaining bastions of colonialism in Africa. Very friendly relations already existed between Bulgaria and Somalia, which day by day were strengthening their economic, cultural and other ties in the interest of their two peoples. He wished the Government and people of the Republic of Somalia every success and thanked them for their active co-operation with the Special Committee as well as for the remarkable manner in which they had organized the Committee's activities at Mogadiscio.

187. The representative of *Madagascar* thanked the Somali Government for having invited the Special Committee to hold part of its session on the hospitable soil of Somalia. He was particularly proud to be able to convey to the Government and people of the Republic of Somalia the good wishes of his own Government, which had always resolutely defended the sacred principle of self-determination and would continue to do so.

188. He was convinced that the attempts being made to suppress the legitimate aspirations of the peoples still under the colonial yoke would boomerang against their authors instead, for the peoples already liberated would not permit their brothers to continue to be exploited indefinitely by foreign Powers. It was not enough to condemn colonialism; in addition, and above all, it must be eradicated from the African continent. Peace and co-operation among the members of the international community would be only empty words so long as the exploitation of one people by another had not completely ceased.

189. He was convinced that the African countries and all those who believed in the value of human dignity would continue to unite their efforts in order to eliminate colonialism completely and promote an era of fruitful co-operation based on equality and objectivity.

190. The representative of *Mali* thanked the Government and people of the Republic of Somalia for the very fraternal and very warm welcome they had given the Special Committee. The Republic of Somalia had confidently and vigorously tackled the difficult problems occasioned by development, and each step was a victory over imperialism and colonialism.

191. The invitation addressed to the Special Committee and the warmth of the welcome extended to it clearly demonstrated the desire of the entire Somali people to co-operate with the United Nations. Moreover, Somalia was endeavouring to hasten the liberation of the millions of Africans still subject to colonial domination and imperialism. Colonialism was already con-

demned; it must disappear from Africa so that all the peoples of that continent could unite their efforts in the fight against under-development.

192. The representative of the *Ivory Coast* wished to add his thanks to those of the speakers who had already expressed their gratitude to the Government and people of the Republic of Somalia for the kind invitation which they had extended to the Special Committee. In spite of all the problems of economic development with which it had to contend, the Republic of Somalia had not hesitated to invite the Special Committee to hold part of its session at Mogadiscio and had spared no effort to make its stay in that beautiful city as pleasant as possible.

193. Somalia thus demonstrated once again the importance which it attached to the United Nations in general and to the Special Committee in particular, and its sympathy with the peoples of the Territories still under colonial administration. For its part, the Ivory Coast was in favour of self-determination for those peoples and of the progressive and orderly transfer of power to their representatives. His country would spare no effort to make the noble ideals set forth in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) a reality.

194. The representative of *Denmark* associated himself with the Chairman's appreciation of the address by the Prime Minister and expressed his delegation's gratitude for the welcome and hospitality extended to the Special Committee. Indeed, that welcome was clear evidence of Somalia's interest and confidence in the United Nations. Smaller countries should recognize in the United Nations the only true prospect for peace and well-being. As the Prime Minister had said, by visiting Africa the Committee was better able to appraise the situation; and the experience would encourage the Committee in its determination to strive for rights and freedom everywhere.

195. The representative of *Poland* associated his delegation with the Chairman's reply to the opening address by the Prime Minister, and thanked the Government and people of Somalia for their invitation to the Special Committee to hold some of their meetings in yet another peace-loving independent African country. His delegation was also deeply touched by the warm welcome, hospitality and facilities extended to the Committee.

196. As Poland and Somalia were bound by ties of friendship and co-operation he was particularly happy to visit Mogadiscio. Somalia had been one of the co-sponsors of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples; and the Prime Minister's address was an expression of the noble aims enshrined in the United Nations Charter and of the firm determination of the people to continue to join in the efforts of the international community, and of the Special Committee in particular, in bringing colonialism to a rapid and unconditional end. Poland considered that the uprooting of colonialism in Africa and elsewhere was an act of historical justice. It had become increasingly clear that the existence of colonialism—which by its very nature was aggressive—and the stubborn persistence of the colonial powers in oppressing, exploiting and subjugating dependent peoples was a flagrant violation of the legitimate rights and aspirations of peoples to freedom and independence, an obstacle in the way of international co-operation and a threat to world peace. Poland had therefore lent consistent support to the

just struggle of dependent Territories to throw off the fetters of foreign domination.

197. In conclusion he renewed his Government's thanks to the people of Somalia for their warm welcome and hospitality and extended to them his most cordial wishes for their well-being and prosperity.

198. The representative of *Chile* said that he wished to add his thanks to those which the Chairman had extended to the Government of the Republic of Somalia. He had been very impressed by the warm welcome which the Special Committee had received upon its arrival at Mogadiscio and by the interest which the Somali people took in the work of the United Nations in general and of the Special Committee in particular. The interesting speech made by the Prime Minister had been further proof of that.

199. The cordial invitation of the Government of Somalia had given the Special Committee an opportunity, on the one hand, to become acquainted with that country, which was striving to improve the living conditions of its inhabitants, and, on the other hand, to continue the Committee's task of decolonization on the occasion of its further visit to Africa. Chile, which at one time had also lived under the colonial system, attached particular importance to the struggle against colonialism and every form of oppression. The Chilean Government was following with interest the progress which Somalia had made since its accession to independence and offered it its best wishes for success.

200. The representative of *Yugoslavia* associated his delegation with the statement made by the Chairman in reply to the inspiring address by the Prime Minister. He also expressed his Government's gratitude to the President, Government and people of Somalia for their invitation to the Special Committee to hold some of its meetings in Mogadiscio.

201. The fact that Yugoslavia enjoyed friendly relations with Somalia enhanced his delegation's satisfaction at being in Mogadiscio. He believed that the Special Committee's work there would lead to further positive results in the process of decolonization in Africa and elsewhere, and that it would enable members of the Committee to become better acquainted with the people of Somalia and their efforts on behalf of economic and social reconstruction.

202. In conclusion, he expressed his country's best wishes to the Government and people of Somalia in the efforts they were making to build prosperity and a better future for their beautiful country.

203. The Minister of Foreign Affairs of *Somalia*, acknowledging the remarks made by members, welcomed the Special Committee as champions of freedom and friends of peace. The people and Government of the Somali Republic wished the Committee success in its search for the truth with regard to the great problem facing the Committee—a problem which in fact was facing the whole world. His Government was aware of the Committee's responsibility, and was fully prepared to assist in the serious task, particularly in the case of French Somaliland, in which it was easier for his Government to express its opinion in detail, since it was one of the three Somali Territories still under foreign domination.

204. The city of Mogadiscio was the capital of two former colonies—Italian Somaliland and British Somaliland. On 1 July 1960, the two Somalilands had achieved their independence and unification. The desire for unity of Somalis living in the two former

colonies had been entirely spontaneous. Having fought for their freedom and unification against Britain and Italy, they had always supported and would continue to support men and women fighting for liberty and justice. It was their belief that unless justice prevailed, there would be no permanent peace for mankind. The causes of injustice must first be eliminated and a solid foundation laid—a foundation based on the principles of equity and self-determination—as a basis for world peace, which, without that basis, would be built on shifting sands. The Special Committee symbolized the dawn of the new era. Its work would contribute to the liberation of millions of human beings who remained under the shackles of colonial rule in Southern Rhodesia, South Africa, Mozambique, Angola, French Somaliland, Southern Arabia, South West Africa, Portuguese Guinea and other parts of the world. The facts of the recent history of the human struggle for freedom, and the events that had taken place in Africa, Asia and Latin America gave great hopes that the world was moving towards liberty and that colonialism in all its forms was doomed.

B. Closing of meetings

General statements

205. The representative of the *United Republic of Tanzania*, speaking on behalf of the Afro-Asian group and Yugoslavia, thanked the Government and people of the Somali Republic for their warm hospitality and above all for having helped the Special Committee to further its aims—the eradication of colonialism and the liberation of man in Africa and elsewhere.

206. While resolution 1514 (XV), adopted by the General Assembly in 1960, had been a positive step forward, none had over-estimated it, and—in the Somali Prime Minister's words—the struggle against the remaining enclaves of colonialism might prove to be the bitterest of all.

207. The problem of colonialism had to be attacked from all angles, but always with a single aim: the defeat of colonialism and the elimination of the exploitation of man by man. The struggle for freedom and independence was also one for peace, for so long as colonialism existed there would be no real peace in the world.

208. The apartheid policy in South Africa and South West Africa, the annihilation policy of Portugal and the butchering of Africans in Southern Rhodesia were crimes against humanity. Yet it was common knowledge that, while the forces committing those atrocities were vile and criminal in themselves, they were the tools of imperialism, which would stop at nothing to plunder Africa's resources and exploit the African working people. The studies made by the Special Committee had shown that foreign financial monopolies were impeding the attainment of freedom and independence by the people of those Territories. It was therefore inevitable that the fight against colonialism should involve a clash of interests, with a resulting threat to peace.

209. The Afro-Asian group and Yugoslavia categorically condemned colonialism. They adhered to the principles of the United Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and would continue their efforts to secure the implementation of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV).

210. There were two main ways by which colonialism could be eliminated. The first way was that of

persuasion, which had been followed, for example, in the case of South West Africa. That had been the course which the United Nations had chosen to follow; it had led to the establishment of the Fourth Committee of the General Assembly, the Trusteeship Council and, finally, the Special Committee. By that method, the colonial Powers were daily urged to give up their colonies and to lay down a programme for their independence; but the conditions for their independence were laid down in resolution 1514 (XV). So far, the method of persuasion had not been very successful.

211. Then there was the second way: a bitter struggle, the history of which would be written in the blood of the freedom fighters.

212. He was sure that all peace-loving people would prefer to take the first course of action, but the colonial Powers would not see reason. Their lack of co-operation had already shaken the faith in the United Nations of many Africans. It would be indeed regrettable if the Special Committee, for example, came to be regarded as merely a resolution-passing body.

213. As experience had shown, the accumulation of frustration eventually left subjugated people with no alternative but to fight to the bitter end. That had happened in Algeria, Kenya and many other parts of the world, and was in fact happening in Mozambique, Angola and elsewhere in Africa at the present time.

214. He was sure that he was expressing the sentiments not only of the Afro-Asian members of the Special Committee and Yugoslavia but also of the peace-loving people of Somalia, when he warned the colonial Powers to recognize the inevitable and to avoid bloodshed. Africans were determined to free their brothers, whatever the cost; they would fight to the bitter end. The colonial Powers could not change the course of history.

215. He assured the freedom fighters who had appeared before the Special Committee of support in their legitimate struggle, and urged them to maintain their unity of purpose and action. As President Nyerere had said, "You, our brothers under the colonial yoke, must fight or else you will be cowards. And those of us who are independent must help you even if this means shedding blood. If we do not do so we will be cowards."

216. He called on the people of Somalia to remember that Africans could not rest until all Africa was free from colonialism. They were determined to defeat the forces of apartheid, wipe out Portuguese colonialism, crush the racist minority régime in Zimbabwe and eradicate French colonialism in French Somaliland. The freedom fighters should continue to wage their wars, and their friends would do everything possible to see that the United Nations helped them to gain their lost freedom. Freedom was indivisible and could not be isolated from peace.

217. In conclusion, on behalf of the Afro-Asian members of the Committee and Yugoslavia, he again thanked the President, the Government and the people of Somalia for their cordial hospitality. Their enthusiasm would serve to remind the colonial Powers how eager Africans were for their continent to be free.

218. The representative of *Chile*, speaking on behalf of the Venezuelan and Chilean delegations, thanked the Government of the Somali Republic for having invited the Special Committee to hold a part of its ses-

sion at Mogadiscio. He assured it that Venezuela and Chile would spare no effort to ensure that the lofty ideals of the United Nations triumphed throughout the world.

219. He also thanked the President of the Somali Republic and the Somali people for having received the Special Committee with a friendliness and warmth which it would never forget.

220. The representative of *Ethiopia* joined the representatives of Tanzania and Chile in thanking the Government and people of Somalia for the hospitality extended to the Special Committee.

221. The words which had been exchanged between himself and the Foreign Minister of Somalia would not interfere with personal and official brotherly relations. Indeed those exchanges were but a demonstration of the open-mindedness with which Ethiopia and Somalia approached their common problems. The differences were only a temporary phase which would be forgotten; for the existing bonds of friendship were eternal. His delegation would take home happy memories of hospitality, new friendships and renewed acquaintances. He hoped that those acquaintances would bloom into a wider and greater friendship.

222. Finally, he expressed his delegation's gratitude to the Somali Government and voiced the hope that Ethiopia and Somalia would flourish in friendship and freedom for the sake of the whole of Africa.

223. The representative of *Poland*, speaking on behalf of the delegations of Poland, the USSR, Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia, thanked the Government and people of Somalia for their kindness and hospitality.

224. The meetings of the Special Committee had always been inspiring, and he felt that progress was being made towards the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. He had been struck by the determination of the African peoples, as borne out in the Prime Minister's stirring address, to strive towards freedom and independence. The stubbornness of the colonial Powers in opposing those just aspirations was fraught with danger. The Special Committee had the obligation to support the right of all peoples to self-determination, and the best way to reminding the imperialist forces of that commitment was to show a united front against colonialist oppression.

225. The representative of *Italy*, speaking on behalf of the delegations of Australia, Denmark and the United States, and also of his own delegation, expressed appreciation to the President, the Government and the people of Somalia for their hospitality and warm welcome. The members of the Special Committee had had the opportunity, during their brief but enjoyable stay in Mogadiscio, to admire the progress made by Somalia during its six years of independence and had also been able to make further progress in the important task entrusted to them by the United Nations, in accordance with the Charter and the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. He extended to the Government and people of Somalia sincere wishes for their future happiness and prosperity.

226. The representative of the Secretary-General, speaking on behalf of all members of the Secretariat, expressed gratitude to the Government and people of Somalia for their generous hospitality and for all the facilities made available during the Special Committee's

visit to Mogadiscio. The Ministers of the Government, the Chief of Cabinet in the Prime Minister's Office and the Somali Ambassadors who had attended the Committee's meetings in Mogadiscio, to name but a few, had been among those who had eased the Secretariat's task and made its stay in Mogadiscio so enjoyable.

227. *The Chairman* expressed gratitude, on behalf of all members of the Special Committee, to the President, the Government and the people of Somalia. The Committee's visit to Mogadiscio, which had been most constructive, had deepened its understanding of the significance of the colonial peoples' struggle to regain their independence and had demonstrated the concern, both of the United Nations and of the Special Committee, for those peoples. Possibly the most important aspect of the United Nations work, as evidenced by the Committee's visit to various African capitals, was its involvement in the question of decolonization. The warm welcome extended to the Committee by the Somali people was of special significance since, as the Prime Minister had so graciously observed, Somalia owed its independence largely to the work of the United Nations. Moreover, as a result of its visit to Mogadiscio, the Committee had been able to gain further information from the petitioners about the situation in French Somaliland and in Aden.

228. He joined previous speakers in expressing the earnest hope that the Special Committee would make a substantial contribution to the speedy attainment of independence by the colonized Territories.

Statement by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Somalia

229. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Somalia, thanking the Chairman and members of the Special Committee for their kind words of appreciation, said that the Government and people of Somalia had been privileged to act as the Committee's host, albeit for only a brief period. During its meetings in Mogadiscio, the Committee had been able to learn of the aspirations of the peoples of French Somaliland and South Arabia, although it was to be regretted that the petitioners from the Seychelles and Mauritius had been unable to appear.

230. The Special Committee's arrival in Mogadiscio had been a cause of rejoicing since it had provided the people of French Somaliland with the opportunity to express their views without fear or favour. Furthermore, all Somalis had a special regard for the United Nations, under whose guidance their country had emerged from trusteeship administration to sovereign independence, and they were grateful for the assistance which that Organization continued to render. Somali people still under foreign rule were confident that their representations would receive full consideration by the Committee which, they believed, would not be influenced by outside pressure but would be motivated only by its awareness of the inalienable right of the people of French Somaliland to self-determination and independence. The Committee's arrival in Africa had been long awaited by the millions who still suffered under colonial domination, since it was a symbol of the freedom and dignity of mankind and represented the principles enshrined in the United Nations Charter.

231. Lastly, he thanked the Special Committee, on behalf of the people and Government of Somalia, for the patience and understanding shown during its de-

liberations in Somalia and wished it every success in its humane endeavours to liberate those still under foreign domination. He also expressed appreciation to the Chairman for allowing observers from Somalia to participate in the Committee's meetings in Mogadiscio and Addis Ababa. Somalia was anxious to contribute to the cause of freedom and would spare no effort to further the liberation of all subjugated peoples.

C. MEETINGS HELD AT ADDIS ABABA, ETHIOPIA

Opening of meetings

Address by the Minister for Foreign Affairs on behalf of His Imperial Majesty, the Emperor of Ethiopia

232. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ethiopia, welcoming the Committee to Addis Ababa, expressed the hope that its deliberations would prove fruitful and constitute a further step towards the liberation of the still-dependent peoples and territories.

233. He read out a message of the Special Committee from His Imperial Majesty Haile Selassie I:

"On behalf of Ourselves, Our Government and the Ethiopian people, We are pleased to welcome once more distinguished members of the United Nations Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.

"The importance of this Committee cannot be over-emphasized. Its intrinsic value lies in its attempt to foster the achievement by the United Nations of one of the fundamental human rights, which is to lead peoples and countries still under colonial yoke to freedom and independence. We are all cognizant of the fact that the struggle for freedom must and will always end in victory. Freedom being the aim of this Committee, it shall be achieved. There is no question as to whether freedom should be attained, but rather how best it should be reached. Thus, the main concern of this Committee becomes to suggest ways and means to achieve this end as best it could.

"It is in its choice of means that the Committee encounters monumental problems. We are conscious that there are opposing forces at work: on the one hand the forces which unceasingly search for freedom, and on the other, the forces of oppression which attempt to deter freedom. A typical example of such conflict of forces is the unlawful Government in Southern Rhodesia. Except for such proponents of injustice like South Africa and Portugal, all freedom-loving States have condemned this racist and minority Government. We trust that a majority rule will take over in Zimbabwe. But how and when? It is here that the Committee has to apply itself and suggest means. Since the measures that have been tried to force down the illegal Government seem to be ineffective, this Committee will have to consider other methods, methods that we can perhaps adopt in concert. No matter how hard the choice may be, We are confident that the members of this Committee will fulfil the noble task entrusted to them.

"We know that as long as there are men who believe that one race is superior to the other and that they can lead the destinies of other men by any means, there shall be no peace. As long as there is going to be groundless irredentism and inter-

ference in other States' internal affairs, there is still not going to be peace. It is only by adhering to the principles set out in the Charters of the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity that we can achieve our aims, and that our unity will grow stronger. On Our part, We assure you that We will never tire in our endeavours to free our brethren who are still under the yoke of colonialism.

"We are aware that the job you are charged with is not easy, but We hope and pray that God will guide you during your deliberations."

234. Adding his own expression of appreciation for the Special Committee's work, he said that Ethiopia—a Member of the United Nations and of the Special Committee since their inception—had always done its utmost to contribute towards fruitful deliberations. Having itself had five years' experience of harsh colonial domination, it had never hesitated to give moral and material aid to peoples struggling for independence, and its delegation would continue to give effective support to the Committee's work.

Statement by the Administrative Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity

235. The Administrative Secretary-General of the *Organization of African Unity* said that he was proud to be able to associate his organization with the many people, who, from Dar es Salaam, via Mogadiscio to Addis Ababa, had welcomed the Special Committee to Africa and expressed, in addition to their own pleasure, Africa's fervent hopes for the full success of its decolonizing mission.

236. At Addis Ababa, where the OAU had its headquarters, the staff of the Organization's Secretariat particularly welcomed the Special Committee's happy decision to make yet another pilgrimage to the source, which would enable it to grasp the extreme gravity of the situation created in Africa by the survival of colonial rule, and the imperative need to put an end to the colonial and racist adventures against which all African people and their leaders had been forced to rise in protest.

237. He wished to express to the United Nations, through the Special Committee, the faith and confidence of the OAU, but also the impatience and legitimate anxiety of the African peoples at the slowness with which the process of peaceful decolonization was taking place under the auspices of the international community. The OAU fully realized that for the United Nations, almost six years previously, the problem of decolonization had been solved in principle by the adoption of the historic Declaration of 14 December 1960 on the granting of unconditional independence to all territories and all peoples still living under foreign domination. The adoption of that Declaration, and the establishment in 1961 of a Special Committee to find the quickest and most effective ways and means of giving effect to the decolonization policy thus defined, had aroused throughout the world, and particularly in Africa, immense hopes and a special fervour which was obviously both sincere and profound.

238. The OAU, an instrument of concerted co-operation among the independent States of Africa, had been conceived and organized in the same spirit of confidence and fervour that typified Africa's feelings towards the United Nations, its Charter, its various agencies and, of course, the Special Committee. The African Heads of State and Government had given ab-

solute priority to decolonization, for liberation was the prerequisite for the fulfilment of all the aspirations of the African Governments and peoples. That profound truth had been solemnly reaffirmed throughout the continent only a few days earlier, on African Liberation Day commemorating the third anniversary of its signing of the OAU charter.

239. Because the task of liberation was one of the OAU's fundamental objectives and constant concerns, and because co-operation between, on the one hand, the OAU and, on the other hand, the United Nations in general and the Special Committee in particular had functioned perfectly in the course of the past year, the OAU proposed to change the form of its contribution to the Addis Ababa deliberations in 1966.

240. He and his staff placed themselves at the Special Committee's disposal, not only for attendance as observers at the discussion that would take place on each agenda item, but also for participation in any other exchange of views that might be thought desirable on matters of common concern to the Special Committee and the OAU. His organization was ready to co-operate with the Special Committee as fully as possible in view of the close solidarity linking Africa to the international community in the task of decolonization, to which the OAU was devoting its best efforts.

241. He was glad that the Special Committee had decided to include in its agenda the question of the liberation of the small Territories that were still dependent, the colonial enclaves scattered all over the African continent. The OAU was as concerned about the fate of those small Territories as it was about the fate of the big colonies, for a question of principle was involved. The decolonization to which the OAU aspired and for which it was working should cover all the African Territories, large or small, rich or poor. The African peoples would not be fully satisfied on that score until the last square inch of African soil had been withdrawn from non-African authority.

242. In that connexion he considered it his duty to bring to the Special Committee's knowledge a fact that had just been pointed out to him by the secretariat of the OAU Liberation Committee at Dar es Salaam: the Comoro Islands had been omitted both from the list of small African Territories on which the Special Committee intended to concentrate its attention, and from the general list of dependent Territories drawn up by the Committee. The OAU was sure that, if such an omission had been made, it could only be the result of a clerical error or an unintentional oversight, and the organization would be grateful if the Special Committee would make the necessary correction. It was quite clear that the Comoros were among the off-shore islands of Africa and, under the Special Committee's terms of reference, its competence extended to all dependent Territories, whatever the legal ties which bound those Territories to the colonial Powers occupying them.

243. The salient feature of the current situation in Africa was the aggravation of the threat to international peace and security constituted by the survival of colonialism and by the strengthening, during the past year, of the alliance formed between Portugal, South Africa and the Rhodesian settlers in order to consolidate their hold over the entire southern part of the African continent and to ensure the perpetuation of colonial and racist domination there. It was

a known fact that that unholy alliance of the most backward régimes of oppression—all three of which had been unanimously condemned, on several occasions, by the United Nations—nevertheless had its accomplices among the powerful. Those accomplices were the forces—individuals, companies or States—which had made investments in the south of the continent, which lived by the exploitation of African wealth in that region, and which thus bore a large share of responsibility for the deterioration of the situation and for the bloody tragedy besetting the peoples of South Africa, Southern Rhodesia and the Territories under Portuguese domination. The need now, so far as decolonization was concerned, was not for resolutions but for solutions.

244. The colonial wars forced on the African peoples, the many acts of oppression, the various forms of vexation and humiliation which almost everywhere, had driven their African victims to take up arms, all went to show how, in the current phase of decolonization, the threat presented by colonialism to international peace and security in Africa had worsened. The situation necessarily raised the question of the responsibility borne by the great Powers which under the United Nations Charter, were the guardians of world peace. The Special Committee should devote a considerable share of its efforts to stressing that responsibility on the part of the great Powers, in order to induce them to extinguish, before it was too late, the fires that colonialism and its allies were busily lighting all over Africa.

245. All the foregoing strengthened the OAU's conviction that the Security Council should act on its specific responsibilities in the drama which was unfolding in Africa, and which might well plunge the world into a blood-bath. It was generally known that the material interests which were directly or indirectly supporting the colonialist and racist régimes in Africa were also paralysing the Security Council and had so far prevented it from meeting the expectations of the oppressed African peoples. Nothing, however, not even the repeated disappointments caused by the recent Security Council debates on Southern Rhodesia, could altogether extinguish the hope of seeing the United Nations face up to its responsibilities in Africa.

246. It should be remembered that complicity and inaction in the face of aggression by fascist Italy against the African people of Ethiopia had started the League of Nations on the fatal down grade which was to bring it swiftly to an inglorious fall. The United Nations should ponder that example, and the Security Council should avoid bringing upon it the fate of the League of Nations.

247. The Special Committee could and should play a great role in that regard by insisting against all opposition that, in view of the scope and gravity of the problems presented by colonialism and racism, the Security Council should come and meet in Africa in order to understand more clearly, in contact with African realities, that it simply must act and act quickly. It was doubtful that academic debates in New York, whatever faith and courage were shown by the Africans and their friends, would make the Security Council change its attitude. Perhaps, however, a session of the Security Council in Africa might bring about the desired change before it was too late.

General statements

248. *The Chairman* expressed the Special Committee's deep appreciation for the encouraging address by the Minister for Foreign Affairs on behalf of His Imperial Majesty, the Emperor of Ethiopia. The long, bitter but successful struggle by His Imperial Majesty and the Government and people of Ethiopia to safeguard the independence of their country, as well as their devotion to the objectives of the United Nations Charter, would be a source of inspiration to the Committee.

249. He also expressed gratitude for the open-handed welcome and hospitality offered to the Special Committee. The history of such hospitality went back to biblical times, and it was truly African in its generosity. Many members had the privilege of visiting Ethiopia on previous occasions, of forming close fraternal ties with its people; their pleasure on the present occasion was shared by those who were visiting Ethiopia for the first time.

250. It had been with whole-hearted gratification that the Special Committee had accepted the invitation of the Government of Ethiopia to hold some of its meetings in Addis Ababa. That that was the third such invitation testified to the importance the Ethiopian Government attached to the Committee's work, while its presence for the third time in Addis Ababa was in its turn evidence of the esteem in which the Committee held the continuing contribution of the Ethiopian Government towards the total and speedy elimination of colonialism.

251. It was fitting that the Special Committee should be meeting in Africa Hall where, in May 1963, the charter of the OAU had been signed, and which had witnessed a large number of important and far-reaching OAU decisions aimed at the liberation of all Territories still under colonial rule in Africa. He was confident that the Committee would be stimulated by the example of the OAU and would in its turn make further effective contributions to the application of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.

252. The work of the Special Committee in Africa had so far been constructive. Further testimony had been heard of the grave deterioration of the situation in Southern Rhodesia and of the reprehensible failure of the United Kingdom Government to take effective steps to end the rebellion of the racist minority régime and to establish democratic conditions on the basis of one man, one vote, with a view to the speedy granting of independence. An important resolution (A/AC.109/167) had been adopted which, if implemented, would lead to the liquidation of the colonial régime in Southern Rhodesia.

253. Further evidence had also been heard of the intolerable conditions under which the peoples of Angola and Mozambique were suffering, of the criminal acts being carried out by the Portuguese, and of their flagrant refusal to apply the principle of self-determination.

254. Valuable testimony had been given concerning Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland, which emphasized the need to ensure that their progress towards independence should be unconditional and in accordance with the aspirations of the people.

255. Petitioners had also been heard concerning French Somaliland and had provided valuable infor-

mation which should assist in objective consideration of the question.

256. He was confident that the Special Committee's deliberations at Addis Ababa concerning South West Airica, Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland, Ifni and Spanish Sahara, and French Somaliland would yield positive and fruitful results.

257. *The Chairman*, replying to the statement by the Administrative Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity, recalled the Special Committee's resolution of 18 June 1965 (A/6000/Rev. 1,² chap. II, para. 463) expressing the hope that the co-operation between it and the Organization of African Unity would be intensified, and General Assembly resolution 2011 (XX) of 11 October 1965 adopted at its twentieth session on the same subject. In the light of those resolutions the Committee could be especially gratified by the presence of the Administrative Secretary-General of the OAU, whose outlining of his organization's position regarding the various problems of decolonization in Africa had been very impressive. The Committee attached great importance to the collaboration with the OAU in the attainment of the common objective of the total and speedy elimination of colonialism.

258. The representative of *Denmark* expressed his delegation's gratitude to His Imperial Majesty and the Government of Ethiopia for having invited the Special Committee to Addis Ababa, the capital of a proud people with a long and glorious history, and centre of the activities of the OAU.

259. Although economic and political unity in Africa was still perhaps a remote goal, the Special Committee had had daily evidence that the free Africans were united in their fight for the freedom of their brothers under colonial rule. He expressed the hope that the long and hard struggle, like that of the world-famous Ethiopian marathon runner, would lead to a successful conclusion, and conveyed the best wishes of his Government for a bright future in peace and prosperity.

260. The representative of *Iran* associated his delegation with the thanks that had been expressed to His Imperial Majesty and the Government and people of Ethiopia. He was greatly impressed by the progress that had been made during the year since his last visit. New buildings and roads had been constructed and, new aerial routes opened up, while political, social and cultural evolution had continued apace. Ethiopia had carried on the struggle for the independence of subjugated peoples in other countries, and was bringing the fruits of liberty to its own people on the principle of justice and prosperity for all. The message of His Imperial Majesty would be a source of great inspiration to the Committee, as would the statement by the Secretary-General of the OAU.

261. The representative of the *United Republic of Tanzania* expressed his delegation's thanks to His Imperial Majesty and to the Government and people of Ethiopia for the cordial invitation extended to the Special Committee, and for the wise inaugural statement.

262. Ethiopia's safeguarding and defence of its independence had been a source of inspiration to the United Republic of Tanzania. Strong bonds of friendship existed between the two countries, stemming from their desire for advancement in their own countries and

from their hopes for the development of the continent. His delegation was happy to be in Africa Hall, the seat of the OAU. He expressed his delegation's appreciation of the statement by the Secretary-General of that organization, its confidence that his endeavours would meet with increasing success, and its strong support for his suggestion that the Comoro question be placed on the Committee's agenda.

263. The representative of the *Union of Soviet Socialist Republics* thanked His Imperial Majesty the Emperor and the Government and people of Ethiopia for their kind invitation. The Special Committee had already met at Addis Ababa the previous year and had adopted some very important recommendations, which had served as a basis for the decisions taken by the General Assembly at its twentieth session. One of the most practical measures had been the establishment of direct contact with the OAU representatives who had participated in the work of the Special Committee. Such contact should be frequent, so that the existing links between the United Nations and the OAU might be tightened, the struggle against colonialism made more effective, and resolution 1514 (XV) applied.

264. He thanked Mr. Diallo Telli for his significant address. He, for his part, hoped that African unity would be strengthened still further in order to wage a more effective struggle against the remaining vestiges of colonialism.

265. The representative of *Afghanistan* associated himself with the thanks expressed by other members of the Committee of His Imperial Majesty and the Government of Ethiopia for their hospitality, and also to H.E. Mr. Diallo Telli for his inspiring address.

266. The representative of *Venezuela* thanked His Imperial Majesty Haile Selassie I and the Ethiopian Government and people, who had once again enabled the Special Committee to get into touch with African realities and to return to Addis Ababa, that bastion of freedom and independence.

267. The representative of *Mali* thanked His Imperial Majesty the Emperor and the Ethiopian Government and people for their invitation and their warm welcome. His delegation was happy to be in Addis Ababa, that great capital and symbol of African unity, which had raised so many hopes. The message from His Imperial Majesty, which the Ethiopian Minister for Foreign Affairs had kindly read to the members of the Committee, would be a source of inspiration to all delegations.

268. He was also glad to have heard the indignant voice of Mr. Diallo Telli, the Administrative Secretary-General of the OAU, who had spoken feelingly about the liberation of millions of Africans now languishing in poverty and oppression.

269. The representative of *India* expressed his gratitude to His Imperial Majesty the Emperor and to the Government of Ethiopia for their generous invitation, and recalled the unique position and significant contribution of Ethiopia in the struggle against colonialism, and the many ties and shared ideals it had with his own country.

270. The representative of *Poland* joined previous speakers in expressing appreciation to the Government and people of Ethiopia for their hospitality and warm welcome. The message delivered by the Ethiopian Foreign Minister, on behalf of His Imperial Majesty Haile Selassie, would guide and encourage the Special Committee in its deliberations.

² *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twentieth Session, Annexes*, addendum to agenda item 23.

271. Poland and Ethiopia were bound by ties of friendship, as evidenced by the official visit in December 1965 of the Chairman of the Council of State in his country to Ethiopia. During that visit, the two nations had reiterated their support for the struggle for freedom of such countries as Angola, Mozambique and Portuguese Guinea. They had also condemned all racial discrimination and had urged the full implementation of the Security Council's resolutions on Southern Rhodesia.

272. He expressed appreciation for the address by the Secretary-General of the OAU and said that it had always been his delegation's firm conviction that the Committee's objectives could best be achieved if it joined its efforts with those of the OAU.

273. The representative of *Tunisia* thanked the Government and the people of Ethiopia for their hospitality and all their efforts to enable the Special Committee successfully to complete its decolonizing mission. He also expressed gratitude to the Minister for Foreign Affairs for his inaugural statement and for the message from His Imperial Majesty, Emperor Haile Selassie I, which he had been good enough to convey to the Special Committee and which would be a source of inspiration to the Committee throughout its deliberations.

274. In addition, he unreservedly supported the ideas expressed in the statement made by Mr. Diallo Telli, the Administrative Secretary-General of the OAU, which reflected the profound aspirations of millions of Africans still groaning under the colonial yoke. The attitude of the Tunisian Government would be moulded by the principles of the United Nations Charter and would be based on the pertinent resolutions adopted on decolonization.

275. He agreed with the Administrative Secretary-General of the OAU, and with other speakers, that it was very unfortunate that the question of the Comoro Islands had not been included in the Special Committee's agenda and he hoped that the omission would soon be remedied. He welcomed the fact that there was close co-operation between the United Nations and the OAU, since both pursued a common ideal, namely, liberation of peoples under colonial domination and improvement of their lot.

276. The representative of *Bulgaria* also thanked his Imperial Majesty, Emperor Haile Selassie I, and the Ethiopian people for their generous invitation to the Special Committee.

277. The Bulgarian Government, which unreservedly supported African peoples in their attempt to storm the last bastions of colonialism, attached very great importance to the Special Committee's current session in Africa. The fact that the peoples of Africa had chosen Addis Ababa, in which the United Nations had also set up several international organizations, as the site for the headquarters of the OAU, clearly demonstrated their gratitude to Ethiopia, a country which had continually fought to free the oppressed peoples of Africa.

278. He was particularly grateful to Mr. Diallo Telli, the Administrative Secretary-General of the OAU, for his confidence in the Special Committee. He agreed with him that the burning colonial problems in Africa called not for resolutions but for solutions, and that effective measures must be taken against the racist, colonialist and minority régimes of South Africa, Portugal and Southern Rhodesia. He also approved of the Administrative Secretary-General's suggestion that

meetings of the Security Council should be held in Africa with a view to settling the dangerous situation prevailing in Southern Rhodesia, South Africa, South West Africa and the Portuguese colonies, a situation which was a threat to peace in Africa and in the entire world.

279. The representative of *Chile* expressed his gratitude to His Imperial Majesty, Emperor Haile Selassie I, for having invited the Special Committee to hold a part of its session in Ethiopia.

280. Chile had welcomed the establishment of the OAU in 1963, and that organization had already achieved very satisfactory results. It was unfortunate that such an organization, which should devote itself solely to improving the economic, social and cultural conditions of the African peoples, had to concern itself with such problems as colonialism, which ought not even to exist in the contemporary world, since freedom belonged by right to all without distinction.

281. He had listened with interest to the Administrative Secretary-General of the OAU, who had given a very comprehensive picture of the situation in his statement. He welcomed the close co-operation between the United Nations and the OAU, which enabled the OAU to participate in the work of the Special Committee. Despite many efforts, the results achieved to date had hardly been outstanding, owing to the resistance of certain Members of the United Nations which did not respect the resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council.

282. The representative of the *Ivory Coast* thanked His Imperial Majesty, Emperor Haile Selassie I, for his wise message which the Minister for Foreign Affairs had transmitted to the Special Committee. That message was further proof of the persevering and conciliatory efforts which His Imperial Majesty had made, both at the United Nations and in the OAU, to foster peace between peoples. He also thanked the Administrative Secretary-General of the OAU for a clear and precise statement which he would certainly bear in mind during the work of the Special Committee.

283. The representative of *Syria* paid a tribute to the Government and the people of Ethiopia for their contribution to the liberation and the unity of Africa, and expressed appreciation of their hospitality.

284. He supported the statement made in the preceding meeting by the Administrative Secretary-General of the OAU and wished that organization success in its task of liberating oppressed peoples.

285. The representative of *Yugoslavia* expressed his delegation's gratitude to His Imperial Majesty the Emperor, to the Government and people of Ethiopia for their hospitality, and to Mr. Diallo Telli for his important statement.

286. The representative of *Sierra Leone* was gratified by the warm welcome extended by His Imperial Majesty the Emperor and by the Government and people of Ethiopia. Addis Ababa was the birth-place and headquarters of the Organization of African Unity and a source of inspiration in the struggle for freedom and independence.

287. The representative of *Iraq*, recalling the long-standing ties of Ethiopia with the Arab world, thanked His Imperial Majesty the Emperor and the Government of Ethiopia for their warm welcome and Mr. Diallo Telli for his statement.

288. The representative of *Italy* said that the presence of the Special Committee in Addis Ababa for the third time in five years constituted a tribute to the people of Ethiopia for their outstanding contribution to decolonization. He thanked His Imperial Majesty the Emperor, the Government and the people of Ethiopia for their generous hospitality.

289. The representative of the *United States of America* deemed it an honour and a privilege to be present in Addis Ababa, and recalled the long-standing ties between her own country and Ethiopia.

290. The representative of *Australia* wished first to offer to His Imperial Majesty, Haile Selassie I, and to the great and ancient land of Ethiopia, the homage of his delegation's deepest respects and its gratitude for the kindnesses extended to the Committee. It was most fitting that the revitalized heart of Africa should pulsate so strongly from a country which had not gone the way of many ancient civilizations, but was building firmly on a magnificent past. A beautiful symbol of that fresh vigour was Africa Hall itself. He had listened with the greatest respect to the message which His Imperial Majesty had graciously sent to the Committee, and had noted the words of the Foreign Minister of Ethiopia and the Secretary-General of the OAU. The Australian delegation would faithfully place all those communications before its Government.

291. Associating himself with those who had expressed appreciation of the statement by the Administrative Secretary-General of the OAU, the representative of *Ethiopia* said that his delegation whole-heartedly shared his view on the need for speedy elimination of the remaining vestiges of colonialism in Africa, and deeply appreciated the tremendous efforts that the OAU was making. That organization and the Special Committee had common aims and objectives, and the forthright statement was an important contribution to the Committee's work.

292. Responding to the representatives' expressions of appreciation of the welcome they had received, he said that, as His Imperial Majesty Haile Selassie I had said, they had only returned to their own home, and it was a great joy for the Ethiopian Government and people to welcome them again. As a country that had had to fight for its very existence against marauding foreign Powers through its long and chequered history, Ethiopia had an interest in seeing colonialism banished from the earth.

293. He hoped that the facilities put at the Special Committee's disposal by his Government would assist in its work.

294. The peoples of Mozambique, Angola, Zimbabwe, South West Africa and other oppressed Territories were awaiting the day of deliverance, and looked to the Special Committee with hope and expectation. The Committee could look back with pride at the successes it had achieved, but as long as colonialism and the exploitation of man continued, there was no room for complacency. His delegation was determined to continue the work with renewed vigour during the Committee's remaining sessions in Africa.

Closing of meetings

Statement by the representative of the Administrative Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity

295. The representative of the *Organization of African Unity* said that he would convey the encouraging

words of the Chairman and members of the Special Committee to his organization's Administrative Secretary-General, who regretted that owing to unavoidable circumstances he was unable to be present at the closing meeting. He was gratified to hear of the Committee's desire for closer liaison with the OAU, whose representative in New York maintained close contact with it, as well as with the Special Committee on the Policies of Apartheid of the Government of the Republic of South Africa.

296. The one important aim of the OAU was the total liquidation of colonialism and racism from the continent—a *sine qua non* for the strengthening of African unity. The struggle would be pursued unrelentingly by Africans until the whole continent was free. History and experience had shown that nothing could hold back the march of freedom: the freedom fighters would overcome all obstacles and win the support of all decent men and women.

297. He regretted that the Committee had been unable to discuss the question of Comoro in accordance with the wishes of the Administrative Secretary-General of the OAU, but hoped it would find it possible to do so during its later meetings. He expressed the hope that the Committee's discussion in the next two African capitals it was to visit would be as fruitful as those in Addis Ababa.

General statements

298. *The Chairman*, on behalf of all members of the Committee, expressed gratitude to his Imperial Majesty and the Government of Ethiopia for their kind invitation to the Special Committee; for all the facilities put at its disposal, which had contributed in such large measure to the success of its work; for their generous and gracious hospitality; and for the privilege of another opportunity to strengthen contacts and friendship with the people of Ethiopia. He also expressed gratification at the collaboration of the OAU through its Administrative Secretary-General, whose participation had been of great benefit.

299. It could be said with assurance that the misgivings of one or two members concerning the advisability of the Special Committee's meetings held in Africa had proved groundless. If evidence were needed, it was only necessary to examine the results so far achieved by the Committee and the resolutions adopted; that morning, for instance, it had adopted a highly important and constructive resolution on South West Africa recommending, *inter alia*, that the Security Council should make it obligatory for all States to implement the measures contained in General Assembly resolution 1899 (XVIII). In so doing it had discharged one of the tasks specifically assigned to it by the General Assembly in paragraph 5 of resolution 2105 (XX), which requested the Special Committee to apprise the Security Council of developments in any Territory examined by it which might threaten international peace and security, and to make suggestions that might assist the Council in considering appropriate measures under the United Nations Charter.

300. The Committee had also adopted that morning a resolution concerning Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland (see chap. VII, para. 237), aimed first at ensuring that the progress of the Territories towards independence should be based on the free expression of the people in conformity with resolution 1514 (XV); secondly, at securing territorial integrity and sover-

eighty; and thirdly, at improving their economic situation. Those resolutions, together with the discussions that had taken place concerning Southern Rhodesia, Aden, Ifni and Spanish Sahara were adequate justification for the Committee's visit to Africa. He was confident that the meetings in Cairo and Algiers would yield similar fruitful and valuable results.

301. Members would leave Addis Ababa with very happy memories of their stay, and invigorated and inspired by the work being done both in the development of the great capital and by the OAU.

302. The *representative of the Secretary-General*, on behalf of all members of the Secretariat, expressed deep gratitude to His Imperial Majesty and the Government of Ethiopia for all the facilities placed at their disposal and for the generous hospitality extended to them. Special thanks were due to Mr. Mekasias, and his colleague Mr. Deressa, for their assistance and personal kindness, as well as to the officials of the OAU and the Economic Commission for Africa for their co-operation.

303. The representative of *Ethiopia* said that his Government was grateful to the Special Committee for having accepted its invitation, and strongly believed that its visit had greatly advanced the cause for which it had been established. The resolutions it had adopted had undoubtedly brought encouragement to the many people all over the world still struggling to win freedom and independence, and the petitioners had been left with no doubt as to where the sympathies of the Committee lay. Those were no mean achievements.

304. Colonialism was a scourge that continued to bedevil humanity, and Ethiopia deplored the situation that had made the creation of the Committee an urgent necessity. The fact that even in the latter half of the twentieth century—a period that had witnessed a high degree of practical human achievement—a large proportion of the family of man was suffering deprivation and indignity, was a sad commentary on civilization. His Government therefore looked forward to the day when the Committee's existence was no longer necessary, when the nations would enjoy equally the fruits of freedom and when the exploitation of man by man would be a thing of the past. The fact that the achievement of that aim might be a slow and frustrating process should serve as a challenge and spur the Committee into making ever greater efforts.

305. He hoped that members had enjoyed their stay in Addis Ababa, and wished them success in their work in Cairo and Algiers. It would be his delegation's pleasant duty to convey their expressions of appreciation to His Imperial Majesty and the Government of Ethiopia.

D. MEETINGS HELD AT CAIRO, UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC

Opening of meetings

Address by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the United Arab Republic

306. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of the *United Arab Republic* said that President Gamal Abdel Nasser had asked him to transmit his greetings to the Special Committee and welcome it to the United Arab Republic. The President also conveyed his best wishes for the fulfilment of the Committee's noble efforts to implement the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples and to end colonialism in the world. The President was confident that mem-

bers would continue their great mission with the persistence and determination they had always displayed. Meanwhile the President wished them a happy stay among the people of the United Arab Republic.

307. It was the Foreign Minister's privilege to welcome the Committee on behalf of the Government and people of the United Arab Republic. He expressed his country's gratitude for the decision to meet in Cairo and appreciation of the Committee's constructive new practice of holding meetings close to Territories still under colonialism in Africa and the Arabian Peninsula.

308. The ending of all forms of colonialism was vital to the maintenance of international peace. The United Arab Republic therefore appreciated the Committee's noble and essential efforts, which had helped to raise the morale of peoples subjected to colonialism and given them fresh hope of freedom amidst the continuing acts of oppression. Those efforts had also consolidated the struggle of oppressed peoples to attain their right to self-determination, develop their political systems and exploit their economic resources in order to reach a dignified standard of human prosperity in complete freedom from discrimination.

309. The Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples represented a landmark in the history of the international Organization and a most constructive step forward. Moreover, the efforts of the Committee had considerably contributed to forming a trend of world public opinion hostile to colonialism. That trend had reinforced the will to struggle and sharpened the awareness of peoples striving to recover their freedom. He wished to assure the Committee of the determination of the Government and people of the United Arab Republic to continue to support peoples struggling against all forms of colonialism.

310. His country had followed with great interest and appreciation the Committee's deliberations in Dar es Salaam, Mogadiscio and Addis Ababa, and had no doubt that the African peoples would attain their noble and legitimate objectives in Southern Rhodesia, Angola, Mozambique and other African Territories still under the yoke of colonialism. The United Arab Republic was equally convinced that the forces of colonialism and racialism would soon surrender in the face of the great African struggle and the values it represented. Meanwhile colonial powers had to recognize the force of the African national struggle and the value, accomplishments and role of the African man. They also had to reckon with the decisions of the Organization of African Unity, which represented both a framework and an instrument of the independent African States for the attainment of the honourable objectives of freedom and construction throughout the African continent.

311. The people of the United Arab Republic attached the greatest importance to the questions of Aden and Oman, which the Committee was to discuss. The question of Aden and the Aden Protectorates had already passed the stage of mere adoption of resolutions. The challenge lay rather in taking the necessary action to carry out the United Nations and Special Committee resolutions; and it was the duty of the United Kingdom Government to abide by and fully implement those resolutions, as well as to embark upon a policy of co-operation with the Special Committee for that purpose.

312. He was confident that the Committee fully realized the extent of the aggression and armed intervention to which the people of Oman had been subjected. The General Assembly had already taken positive steps at its twentieth session, when it had recognized the legitimate right of the people of Oman to self-determination and the withdrawal of foreign forces from their territory. He was also confident that the Committee, in fulfilling its United Nations mandate to examine the cause of the struggling people of Oman, would take the decisions and steps necessary for putting an end to armed aggression against the people of Oman and enabling them to recover true sovereignty and enjoy their inherent right to development and progress.

313. The people of the United Arab Republic stood with all Arab and African peoples in watching the work of the Special Committee with great hopes and expectations. Its meetings in Cairo and other African capitals would surely be crowned with success, thereby crystallizing its noble and vital task of ending colonialism.

Address by the Acting Secretary-General of the League of Arab States

314. The Acting Secretary-General of the *League of Arab States* welcomed the Special Committee to the Arab League's headquarters on behalf of the League of Arab States and thanked it for inviting the League to attend as an observer the meeting of that body, which reflected the noble aims of the United Nations for the liquidation of imperialism and the liberation of humanity from imperialistic aims and dangers.

315. That same aim was also the corner-stone on which the Arab League was founded and for the realization of which it had worked during the whole of its twenty-one years of existence. If the revival of unity was considered to be the ultimate goal of the Arab nation, then freedom could be regarded as the foundation of unity and at its core. That was why the League of Arab States, and its members had struggled for the cause of liberating the Arab nation. Victory for the cause of freedom in Libya, Tunisia, Morocco, Sudan, Kuwait and Algeria had eventually been achieved. Those countries had become full members of the League of Arab States and of the United Nations.

316. With great faith and purpose, the League and its members were now struggling against British imperialism in the Arabian Peninsula. British imperialism had imposed tyrannic rule over the Occupied South, Oman, Muscat and the Emirates of the Gulf, thus flagrantly disregarding the United Nations and violating its Charter and its principles and the resolutions of both the General Assembly and of the Special Committee.

317. Imperialism was still clinging to outdated measures reminiscent of the past two centuries and was resorting to suppression, intimidation and annihilation. In so doing, imperialism disregarded the sufferings, casualties and sacrifices of the people and ignored the fact that that area of the Arab nation embodied one of the oldest civilizations of the world. The Arab nation and the other free nations of the world would in no way agree to the presence of imperialism, which imposed its outrageous exploitation and tied the people to its yoke, thus leading to large-scale ignorance and

poverty in the area. Imperialism also constituted a threat to the security of the region and to the peace of the world. It must be borne in mind, at the present juncture, that imperialism had been liquidated in all Asian countries and only remained in the Arab area. It was high time for imperialism to depart from other African States. Cloaked in new shapes, imperialism desperately tried to resume its former power, but its attempts were doomed to failure for they struck deep at the nature of the evolution of life and the maturity of the human conscience.

318. It might not be out of place, in that connexion, to recall what had been taking place in the Arab areas 140 years ago, when British imperialism aligned itself with backwardness against the Arab people; or to recall the protracted nationalist struggle throughout that dark age, which reached a decisive stage with the inception of the Liberation Front, its sacred war against imperialist aggression and the historic feats of heroism it achieved in the last four years; or of imperialist machinations to subvert those movements. The most outstanding example of such machinations had taken place in 1959, when the United Kingdom had embarked upon the foundation of the so-called "Federation of South Arabia", its puppet and the medium for exercising its imperialist powers in the Occupied South. That was exemplified again by the subversive conferences of the United Kingdom, which that country falsely called constitutional. The next conference of that kind would take place in August 1966 between the United Kingdom on the one hand and its puppet in the area on the other. In reality that will mean a conference between the United Kingdom and itself.

319. Attention should also be drawn to the acts of intimidation and tyranny in Muscat, Oman and the Gulf. Those acts had been exposed and publicized thanks to the Special Committee, which had upheld liberty and would continue to uphold it during the present discussion on the two questions.

320. However, he wished to stress the fact that British imperialist danger in the Arabian peninsula was of the same nature, though it took on different forms. It threatened not only the Arabian Peninsula, but also the whole Afro-Asian world. Imperialism would never be eradicated unless its bases were dismantled in the Arab area.

321. Only a week ago he had read the twenty-sixth pamphlet of the Adelphi Papers, entitled *Sources of Conflict in the Middle East*. There was nothing more significant and eloquent than that paper in revealing the United Kingdom's underlying objective of imperialism in the Arabian Peninsula and in focusing light upon the bases from which aggression was directed against the people.

322. That document needed no comment; it would suffice to quote a few paragraphs from it. For example:

"Britain has bases for land, sea and air forces at Aden and Bahrain, linked by a chain of four air stationing posts and supplemented by smaller landing strips in the South Arabian Federation and the Eastern Aden Protectorates. The bases support a mixed land force of infantry, armour and artillery, a small naval force of escorts, minesweepers and landing craft and an air element including interceptor-ground attack aircraft, reconnaissance bombers, transport aircraft and a few helicopters. Britain

is formally bound to defend the South Arabian Federation (including Aden) as well as the Protectorates which remain outside the Federation. In the Persian Gulf area, Britain is also formally bound to defend Bahrain against attack from within the Gulf, to defend Qatar against attack by sea, to defend the Trucial State of Fujairah against any aggression. . . . In addition to these formal commitments, Britain considers itself, and is widely considered, to have a general moral commitment to defend all those States in the Gulf for whose international relations the British Government remains responsible. The main routes by which Britain communicates with and reinforces the bases in the area are by sea through the Suez Canal or by air over Turkey and Iran to Bahrain. Both routes are also important in sustaining the British military presence in the Indian Ocean area and South-East Asia."³

323. The document contained accounts indicating a rapprochement between the United States and the United Kingdom concerning that imperialist military plan. Reference was also made to the Western strategic belt, which aimed at the containment of the Soviet Union and the countries parties to the Warsaw Pact, thus forming a defensive-offensive force to face Soviet expansion. The document went on to say:

"British bases and commitments in southern Arabia and the Persian Gulf . . . [help to promote Western influence in the Middle East and to deter any local belligerence. . . . They] help to keep open a strategic route to British positions in the Indian Ocean and South-East Asia, and may thus be said to contribute to the containment of any advance by a communist Power into those areas. But their primary purpose is a more local one: to safeguard the flow of Middle East oil, to prevent or check conflict in their own immediate area and to provide a base for British military intervention in other areas close at hand."⁴

324. The document also mentioned the danger originating from Arab nationalism and its power, and uncovered imperialistic plots against the emerging Arab countries in the area. Imperialism feared that force, which constituted a threat to its aggressive aspirations.

325. The document then stated, in a manner reminiscent of the fossilized imperialist mentality, that Curzon's Declaration of 1903, which stipulated that "The peace of these waters must be maintained . . . and the influence of the British Government must remain supreme", still held good in 1966 so far as the Occupied South and the Gulf were concerned, thus completely disregarding twentieth century developments.

326. He begged indulgence for his lengthy quotations, for he regarded them as unequivocal evidence uncovering the latest British machinations directed against the liberation movement of the Occupied South, and evidence of the unyielding British attitude in Muscat, Oman and the Gulf Emirates. Those statements showed the far-reaching effects of the battle and revealed the truth sought after by the Committee.

327. He also wished to disclose three main parallel aspects of the same imperialist policy followed in

South Arabia and to indicate the stand taken by the League of Arab States on those issues.

328. In the cause of the Occupied South, the Arab League, during its first seventeen years of existence, had resorted to every diplomatic means at its disposal to deal with British imperialism, but all its attempts had been in vain. The result was more aggression and repression on the part of imperialism. In 1962 the liberation movement of the Occupied South had initiated a new stage of action, both through an effective nationalist struggle and through the United Nations. During the last four years the Arab countries, through its organs—the League's Councils, Heads of Government and meetings of Heads of State—had pursued the following policies:

They had striven against British imperialism in the Arabian Peninsula by every means at their disposal in order to eradicate imperialism and to consolidate the liberation movement in the Occupied South and Oman. They had also given active aid to the Arabian Gulf to enable it to achieve liberation and advancement.

They had implemented the resolutions of the Special Committee and of the United Nations General Assembly, and in particular the resolutions adopted by the General Assembly on 5 November 1965, regarding the Occupied South, and on 17 December 1965 regarding Oman.

They had taken a firm stand against the British conferences and imperialist manoeuvres which, in a bid to safeguard continued imperialistic presence in a new form, sought to establish puppet régimes which were not the product of the free will of the people of the area. Those attempts and manoeuvres had been condemned by the United Nations.

They had united the efforts of the nationalists in one organization so as to close their ranks against imperialists, which tried to sow the seeds of discord among them.

329. The Nationalist Liberation Movement had recently gained impetus. On 3 March 1966, the Nationalist Front and the Liberation Organization were merged to form a single body: the Front for the Liberation of Occupied South Yemen (FLOSY). The agreement had been ratified on the same day by the Yemen Occupied South Commission of the Arab League and by the League's Council during the same month.

330. The League of Arab States staunchly believed that the Committee would condemn the current attempt by the United Kingdom to hold negotiations with the Federation Government, its tool. It was taking pains to involve the United Nations in its aggressive attempts and taking steps to hold a conference next August which would be a replica of former conferences, which were doomed to failure. It also refused to implement the United Nations resolutions. The United Kingdom should therefore be faced with a decisive confrontation. The nationalist struggle inside the Territory was escalating and becoming more ferocious.

331. But the United Kingdom was persisting in its negotiations and preparations, and was adamant in its insistence on more sacrifices and bloodshed. That was incontestable evidence that current British negotiations were far removed from the aspirations of the people of the area, whose belief in freedom was becom-

³ The Institute for Strategic Studies, *Sources of Conflict in the Middle East*, Adelphi Paper No. 26 (March 1966), pp. 26 and 27.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 27 and 28.

ing stauncher and who were more determined to gain victory than ever before.

332. With regard to the Omani cause, on 17 December 1965 the United Nations General Assembly had upheld the natural right of the Omani people to liberation from British imperialists, and to independence and self-determination; it had further condemned the United Kingdom for refusing to co-operate with the Special Committee on Oman, and called for the withdrawal of British forces from Oman, and for the abolition of British supremacy in all its forms, without restrictions on liberties and with legal rights for the people.

333. But since 1955 the occupying forces of the United Kingdom persisted in defending their presence and were still defying the resolutions of the United Nations and the natural rights of the Arab people of Oman. The Arab League was confident that the Special Committee would uphold the Omani people's right to liberty and independence in a new and effective way.

334. The Gulf Emirates were also fettered by British imperialism, which impeded their progress and deprived them of prosperity. Imperialism further imposed its internal and external guardianship without any basis in international law. This, in fact, was the most heinous form of imperialism, whose liquidation was the primary aim of the Special Committee.

335. In compliance with the League's Pact, which called for "co-operation with the Arab countries non-members of the League's Council in a bid to achieve prosperity and safeguard their future", the League Council on 31 March 1964 had adopted a resolution in which it decided to send a mission headed by the Secretary-General of the League, and whose members were personal representatives of the Heads of Arab States which are immediate neighbours of the Gulf Emirates. The aim of that mission was to conclude an agreement with the Emirs on methods of achieving brotherly co-operation with that area, and to offer economic and technical aid.

336. The mission had departed in October 1964 and was followed by a mission of technicians. Agreements were concluded with the rulers of the Emirates concerning projects for paving roads, agriculture, water, electricity and hygiene, to be financed and implemented by the League. The League earmarked the necessary funds and transferred the balance to the Dobai banks before beginning the work.

337. Since 1964, the United Kingdom had been indifferent to the League's projects aiming to revive the area, but once it realized the effectiveness of Arab aid and the willingness of the rulers and people to accept it, that country had embarked upon a policy of pressure and conspiracy. It was then decided that the Secretary-General of the League should visit the Emirates to obtain ratification of the Arab projects from the rulers. A few hours after his arrival on 10 May 1965, he received the necessary documents. The rulers, especially those of Sharjah and Ras El Khaima, because of their prestige, were then intimidated and threatened with deposition, unless they withdrew their agreement to co-operate with the League. All of them refused to submit to such threats.

338. On 22 June 1965, a mission of Arab experts left for Dubai to begin work there. It was then that British imperialism revealed its odious and outdated methods. When the experts arrived in Doha, the

capital of the Qatar Emirate, on 24 June 1965, they were prevented, by sheer force, from continuing their journey, and were obliged to return to Kuwait on the same day. There followed the detention of Sheikh Sakr Ibn Sultan, the ruler of Sharjah Emirate, and his banishment to Kuwait. Identical cables were sent to the Secretary-General of the League signed by the other rulers informing him that they had withdrawn from their previous agreements. That incident thus demonstrated one of the heinous methods of imperialist despotism.

339. These brief references to British imperialism in the Occupied South, Omani Imamate and the Gulf Emirates clearly demonstrated imperialist planning, which constituted a threat to the security of the whole area and showed the untruthfulness of recent declarations by the United Kingdom.

340. At that time, the United Kingdom had declared its willingness to put into effect projects for construction in the area, but after a year it was still indifferent to those projects. The Arabs, however, had learnt, in their protracted struggle for freedom, not to listen to any imperialist promises, for they were mere lies. Imperialism would presumably never allow progress, its deadly foe, to replace backwardness, its pliant ally.

341. The United Kingdom Government had announced its determination to evacuate the Occupied South by 1968, but had simultaneously engaged in negotiations under a non-constitutional system condemned by the United Nations, and was disregarding the true representatives of the people. It had just concluded a new secret agreement with the ruler of Bahrain. That agreement aimed at enlarging the military base in Bahrain and equipping it with large quantities of offensive arms. It had been further reported that the United Kingdom Foreign Office was taking the utmost pains to keep that agreement confidential, fearing as it did the pressure which the Arab nationalists might exert upon the Bahrain Government to annul its co-operation with the United Kingdom.

342. That situation aroused grave concern. One reason was that the United Kingdom was persisting in its outdated imperialist schemes, and paying no heed to the fact that it was in the second half of the twentieth century. Another reason was that the Occupied South revolutionaries were continuing their heroic struggle for the liberation of their country and the Omani people were engaging in hostilities. Nationalist resistance had spread from the Imamate of Oman to the internal areas of Muscat. The present situation indicated that an explosion was imminent especially after the deposition of Sharjah Emir, and the United Kingdom's persistence in rejecting the League's support for rehabilitation projects.

343. Intimidation activities had escalated in the area and an agreement concerning an aggressive military base in Bahrain had been concluded.

344. The Arab nation and free peoples everywhere looked to the Committee's historic meeting in Cairo, a city which had scored historic victories against the aggressive forces of colonialism and neo-colonialism; for Cairo was the bulwark of the struggle for freedom. Everybody remembered with gratitude its painstaking efforts to meet freedom fighters in their homelands. People would always remember the praiseworthy stands taken by the Committee on the causes of justice and liberty, and had unswerving faith that it would

take a decisive stand in support of the Arab liberation causes.

General statements

345. The Chairman, speaking on behalf of the Special Committee, thanked the Foreign Minister of the United Arab Republic for his inspiring address and for the stirring and remarkable message he had communicated from President Gamal Abdel Nasser. The Foreign Minister had set out important elements which would assist the Committee in its work in Cairo.

346. The Committee's gratitude went out to the Government of the United Arab Republic for inviting it to hold some of its meetings in Cairo and for extending to it hospitality and fine facilities.

347. The position of the Government of the United Arab Republic in the vanguard of the struggle for the liberation of colonial peoples, its devotion to the cause of peace, its dedication to the aims embodied in the United Nations Charter, and its constructive contribution to the work of the Committee, represented an inspiration and a stimulus at the outset of the Committee's work in Cairo.

348. The Chairman also thanked the observer for the League of Arab States for his statement. The special relationship of the League with the United Nations and its contribution to the Special Committee's aims and aspirations made it of particular importance, and due attention would be given to the points raised in the Committee's deliberations in Cairo.

349. It was appropriate that the Committee should be taking up the matters of Aden and Oman while in Cairo. Developments concerning Aden had reached a crucial stage. Fully appreciating the importance attached to the matter by all Arab peoples, he gave an assurance that the Committee would spare no effort to make the contribution expected of it by those peoples and by all freedom-loving peoples everywhere. As the representative of a country which had suffered under colonial domination, he pledged the Committee's unflinching determination to secure the full and earliest possible application of the pertinent General Assembly and Special Committee resolutions. In that connexion, he extended a warm welcome to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Aden, Mr. Omar A. H. Adeel, who was present and would take his seat when the matter of Aden was considered.

350. With regard to the question of Oman the Committee would, with equal determination, endeavour to make an effective contribution towards ensuring for the people of Oman the exercise of their inalienable right to self-determination and independence in accordance with their freely expressed wishes. In that task the Committee would of course be guided by General Assembly resolution 2023 (XX) of 17 December 1965.

351. He concluded by renewing his thanks to the Foreign Minister for his address and, through him, to the Government of the United Arab Republic for enabling the Committee to meet in Cairo. He also wished, through the Foreign Minister, to reiterate his gratitude to President Gamal Abdel Nasser for the inspiring message he had that day communicated to the Committee.

352. The representative of the *Union of Soviet Socialist Republics* thanked the Government of the United Arab Republic for its invitation to the Special Com-

mittee to hold some of its meetings in the capital of the new Arab State which was in the vanguard of the struggle against imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism and for the freedom and independence of all the oppressed peoples of Africa, Asia, Latin America and the rest of the world. On behalf of the USSR delegation, he expressed his deep appreciation to His Excellency Gamal Abdel Nasser, President of the United Arab Republic, and to the Government and people of that country, which had close ties of friendship with the Soviet people. Relations between the two countries and peoples were based on their common struggle for peace, social progress and socialism. The Government of the United Arab Republic had given the Special Committee an opportunity to make an on-the-spot inquiry into the fundamental problems of the peoples of Arabia fighting against colonial régimes and to hear the representatives of nationalist and patriotic organizations of Aden and Oman and of all those engaged in the struggle to liberate those territories. It had also provided an opportunity for the Committee to work out agreed solutions which would facilitate the rapid implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples as well as many other resolutions adopted by the General Assembly on the questions of Aden and Oman.

353. Although five years had passed since the adoption of the Declaration, millions of human beings, for the most part in Africa and East Arabia, were still held in chains under colonial rule, being brutally exploited, subjected to every kind of humiliation, deprived of their human dignity, persecuted and murdered, solely because they refused to remain slaves. The conscience of mankind could not ignore the crimes of the colonialists. Ways must be found to eradicate the last traces of colonialism and its aftermath, apartheid and racism. Although mortally wounded, colonialism refused to die. It was defending itself fiercely. For some time now, in some parts of the world, colonialist and imperialist forces had been attempting to organize counter-attacks against national liberation movements and to undermine the sovereignty of a number of newly independent young States.

354. The ruling circles in the United States were interfering in the internal affairs of other States and waging an aggressive war against the people of Vietnam. The British colonialists were sending punitive expeditions against the peoples of South Arabia, Aden and Oman. Their Portuguese henchmen were pouring fresh troops into Angola, Mozambique and so-called Portuguese Guinea to exterminate the patriots in these Territories. The Verwoerd régime made no attempt to conceal its intention of annexing South West Africa. Ian Smith's unilateral declaration of independence was an act of defiance directed not only against 4 million inhabitants of Zimbabwe, but against all of peace-loving Africa.

355. The criminal plans of Ian Smith, Verwoerd and Salazar, aimed at keeping racist and colonialist régimes in power, could never have succeeded without the military, economic and political support of a number of States members of NATO, foremost among them the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany. The international situation made it imperative for all forces fighting imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism to unite. South Arabia was one of the last bulwarks of British and international imperialism.

It was being used as a major base, which threatened the peace and the security of the peoples of East Arabia.

356. The imperialist monopolies, particularly the United States and British monopolies, had taken possession of the principal resource of South Arabia, oil. The interests of the oil monopolies were carefully protected by land, sea and air forces which threatened the security not only of the people of the area but of the entire Arab world. During the Suez crisis, the Aden and Bahrain bases had served as a spring-board for the air attacks on Egypt. Now, by repeated military provocations, the same bases were threatening the young Arab States. They were being used to combat the national liberation movements in South Arabia and to punish the Arab peoples which had taken up arms to fight for freedom. British airplanes took off from those bases to bomb the villages of South Arabia. British soldiers launched what amounted to colonial expeditions against the patriots of the region and hunted down the Aden freedom fighters. The United Kingdom still had a network of military bases in the Near and Middle East. In the area of Aden and the Gulf, it maintained large contingents of troops which were used both to suppress national liberation movements in South Arabia and to exert pressure on the independent States of East Arabia.

357. On the subject of the importance attributed by imperialism to maintaining military bases in that part of the world, Mr. Julian Amery, former Minister for Air of the last British Conservative Government had recently written that the facts irrefutably proved that the military presence of the United Kingdom east of Suez had considerably helped and was still helping to protect its interests against the hostile local elements. The statement was wholly without guile: the "hostile local elements" were none other than the peoples of Asia and Africa and the peoples of South Arabia, which were resisting British rule and opposing any interference in their internal affairs. The "east of Suez" policy amounted to a sustained effort to protect imperialist interests. It was contrary to the interests of the peoples of Asia and Africa and aimed at strengthening the colonial rule of British imperialism in the southern part of the Arabian Peninsula.

358. However, the monstrous and barbarous methods used by imperialism and colonialism to stifle the legitimate aspirations of the peoples to freedom and independence were doomed to failure. Despite local frustrations and temporary defeats, the liberation forces were steadily increasing in number and their equipment was improving. The last vestiges of colonialism would be unable to withstand an attack by those forces: he could state that with certainty, because all States and peoples which loved freedom, peace and progress were giving increasingly active support to the freedom fighters.

359. The position of the Soviet Union on the question was well known: in order to help to liquidate colonial régimes as rapidly as possible, it had provided and would continue to provide assistance to the peoples which were waging a heroic struggle against colonial oppression.

360. During his recent visit to the United Arab Republic, Mr. Kosygin, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, had said: "Our State and the whole Soviet people are providing decisive support for all those fighting for their freedom and in-

dependence. For many years, the Soviet Union has been pursuing a policy of active support for peoples fighting for their national independence, for the permanent liquidation of capitalism and for the strengthening of peace. You can be sure that we shall continue to pursue that policy."

361. The joint *communiqué* on the talks between the leaders of the Soviet Union and the United Arab Republic setting forth the position of the signatories on colonial questions stated that they condemned the policy of oppression of the colonial Power in Aden and South Arabia. They affirmed that they were prepared fully to support the heroic struggle of the Arab peoples for their freedom and genuine self-determination. They appealed to the United Kingdom Government to implement the decisions of the United Nations General Assembly and pledged their support to the people of Oman in its fight against colonialism.

362. The USSR delegation expressed confidence that during its meetings in Cairo, the Special Committee would adopt decisions aimed at supporting the liberation forces of South Arabia and expediting the liquidation of colonial régimes in that part of the world. The Organization of African Unity and the League of Arab States had an important part to play in the overthrow of these régimes in Africa and East Arabia. In previous years, the United Nations, the Organization of African Unity and the League of Arab States had managed to co-ordinate their activities more and more efficiently. His delegation welcomed that co-operation and expressed the hope that the representatives of the Arab League would work with the Special Committee in an effort to resolve the problems to be discussed in Cairo.

363. On behalf of his delegation, he extended to the people of the United Arab Republic his best wishes for their complete success in building a new life of happiness and prosperity.

364. The representative of *Venezuela* said that he was pleased to have an opportunity, for the first time in four years, to pay a tribute to the United Arab Republic for its co-operation with the Special Committee. At the previous session, he had conveyed his thanks to the United Arab Republic in his capacity as a member of the Sub-Committee on Aden. Now, it was on behalf of the delegations of Chile, Uruguay and Venezuela that he thanked the people and Government of the United Arab Republic for the kind invitation to the Special Committee to hold some of its African meetings in Cairo. The warm welcome the United Arab Republic had given the members of the Special Committee had once again demonstrated its readiness to fight against colonialism and showed that it had taken an unequivocal stand in favour of United Nations action in that struggle.

365. The Venezuelan delegation fully appreciated the valuable assistance given the Special Committee by the United Arab Republic and thanked its Government for having enabled the Committee members to have direct contact with the reality of colonialism in that part of the world. He was confident that the experience gained during the Cairo meetings would be very valuable and would help the Committee to complete its task successfully and thus to carry out the instructions of the General Assembly.

366. The representative of *Iraq* expressed his delegation's profound appreciation and gratitude for the invitation extended to the Special Committee by a

sister Arab country to hold some of its meetings in Cairo. Coming to Cairo was, for Arabs and Africans alike, something in the nature of a long-cherished pilgrimage.

367. The same banks of the Nile had seen the flowering of a great Arab and Islamic civilization that had spread light and justice throughout that part of the world. Since the great revolution of 23 July 1952 the United Arab Republic had come to represent, for Arabs and Africans, the pulsating heart of Arab and African unity, the defiant stand against colonialism and its offshoot, international Zionism, the rallying point in the struggle against all foreign domination and oppression, and a refuge for freedom fighters from all over the world.

368. In 1954, President Nasser had written in his *Philosophy of the Revolution* that it was not in vain that his country lay to the south-west of Asia close to the Arab world, whose life was intermingled with that of the United Arab Republic; neither was it in vain that his country lay to the north-east of Africa, a position from which it overlooked the African continent, wherein was raging the most violent struggle between white colonizers and the black indigenous inhabitants for the possession of its inexhaustible resources.

369. Indeed, the United Arab Republic had played, and continued to play, a leading role in the struggle against Zionist colonialism and its forcible occupation of a very dear part of the Arab homeland as well as in the general fight against all forms of colonialism everywhere.

370. He felt confident that the Committee's deliberations in Cairo would be as successful, constructive and fruitful as those held previously in other African capitals.

371. The representative of *Bulgaria* also expressed his delegation's appreciation to His Excellency Gamal Abdel Nasser, President of the United Arab Republic, and to the people and Government of the United Arab Republic for inviting the Special Committee to meet in Cairo and for the warm welcome extended to the members. The results of the Committee's present session in Africa, since it was already possible to speak of results, had shown how much the Committee owed to the United Arab Republic and the other countries which had invited it to hold meetings in their respective capitals. The United Arab Republic's hospitality was not fortuitous. It was in line with the overall policy of the United Arab Republic on colonial questions. The United Arab Republic was in the forefront of the African countries and the States Members of the United Nations which consistently supported the struggle against colonialism and imperialism. Its contribution to the fight against imperialism and the help it gave to national liberation movements in Africa, the Near East, South Arabia and all other areas of the world where vestiges of colonialism still existed were of the greatest significance. The statement of His Excellency El Sayed Mahmoud Riad, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the United Arab Republic, was further evidence of that fact.

372. The Bulgarian delegation, which represented a people friendly to the United Arab Republic, was gratified to be able to see for itself that the United Arab Republic with its age-old culture and civilization, was forging ahead towards a free and independent existence. Indeed, the few hours spent in the beautiful

capital of the United Arab Republic had already given the Committee members an idea of the enthusiasm and optimism with which the people of the United Arab Republic were building their State under the leadership of their Government. Their economic achievements and improved level of living were a source of inspiration and an example for all peoples which had severed the chains of colonialism. The Bulgarian delegation fully agreed with the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the United Arab Republic that the Committee's work would assume special importance during its stay in Cairo. The Committee was to define the ways and means of ensuring the speedy implementation of the provisions of resolution 1514 (XV) and the resolutions on Oman and the Aden Protectorates adopted by the General Assembly at its last session. Its further task was to frustrate the attempts of the United Kingdom to maintain its military bases in South Arabia with the help of reactionary and corrupt elements and puppet governments and prevent it from continuing to enslave the peoples of those territories.

373. Guided by the anti-imperialist policy of its Government, the Bulgarian delegation could assure the representatives of the Government of the United Arab Republic that it would assist the Special Committee in every way in its efforts to liberate the peoples of South Arabia. To the people of the United Arab Republic, with which the Bulgarian people had close ties of friendship and co-operation which had been reaffirmed by the recent visit of the Chairman of the Council of Bulgaria to Cairo, it extended its most sincere wishes for continued success in building its independent and sovereign republic.

374. The representative of *Ethiopia* wished to associate his delegation with the expressions of thanks and appreciation already voiced for the welcome and hospitality extended to the Special Committee by the Government and people of the United Arab Republic. His country had grown accustomed to that hospitality throughout the long history of common ties between the peoples of Egypt and Ethiopia. The historical, cultural and geographical links existing between the two sister countries were so strong as to reduce the physical distance between them to insignificance. The Ethiopian delegation therefore felt very much at home in the great and ancient city of Cairo.

375. It was fitting that the Special Committee should take up the question of Aden and Oman while in Cairo; for the people of the United Arab Republic had long suffered under ruthless colonialists and imperialists, and rightly expected from the Committee the support and assistance due to them as a people still struggling to win freedom, independence and human dignity.

376. As a neighbour of Aden and South Arabia as a whole, Ethiopia had been keeping a close and sympathetic watch on the struggle that the gallant people of those Territories were waging for freedom, democracy and social justice. He therefore wished to assure the people of Aden of the sympathy of his delegation and its full support for any measure designed to ensure the rapid transition of Aden from its present colonial status to complete freedom and unfettered independence.

377. History testified to the fact that Ethiopia had always stood by the side of the Arab world in times of difficulty. It was therefore only natural for the Ethiopian Government and people to support the aspirations of the struggling peoples in the remaining

pockets of colonialism and imperialism in the Arab world. He warned the United Kingdom that it was high time for it to cease oppression and make the necessary preparations for a speedy and complete withdrawal from the area in question.

378. He concluded by extending his thanks to the President, Government and people of the United Arab Republic for inviting the Special Committee to their country and expressed the hope that its meetings in Cairo would contribute to the complete eradication of colonialism in the Arab world and elsewhere.

379. The representative of *Iran* expressed his delegation's gratitude to the President, Government and people of the United Arab Republic for their invitation to the Special Committee to hold some of its meetings in Cairo. It was a special pleasure for the Iranian delegation to be amongst a people with whom Iran shared immutable ties of friendship and common heritage. Those ties, dating back over two thousand years, had been reinforced by the present common aim to uproot colonialism.

380. His delegation had listened with great attention and interest to the highly important statement made by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the United Arab Republic. The Iranian representative was convinced that that statement would greatly assist the Special Committee in its task.

381. His delegation would do everything within its power to help all peoples languishing under colonial subjugation to regain their freedom and independence. The Special Committee, to a greater extent than any other United Nations body, had been instrumental in strengthening the confidence of those peoples in the United Nations and had been able to gain a direct acquaintance with their wishes and aspirations. He was convinced that the Committee would make a valuable contribution to implementation of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), containing the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.

382. He concluded by reiterating the thanks of his delegation for the friendly welcome and the warmth of feeling extended to the Committee.

383. The representative of *Poland* expressed the gratitude of the Polish delegation to the President, Government and people of the United Arab Republic for inviting the Special Committee to the capital of a country which had become a shining star in the firmament of liberation struggles in the Arab world, as well as playing a leading role in liberation struggles elsewhere. He trusted that the presence of the Special Committee in Cairo would give hope and encouragement to the freedom fighters of Aden and the adjacent Territories which were still suffering humiliation, exploitation and foreign domination under oppressive and abhorrent colonial régimes. The United Arab Republic was making a most important contribution towards the realization of the noble aims of progress, peace and justice, and its dedicated efforts in the cause of its own socialist development were admired by all its genuine friends. The economic, political and social changes in the United Arab Republic, set a visible example to the world. Poland had many ties of friendly co-operation with the United Arab Republic, and both countries had a common approach to world problems. Poland cherished those relations and vividly recalled the warm welcome extended to its Chairman of the Council of State, Mr. Edward Ochab, during

his visit to the United Arab Republic in November 1965. The Polish representative wished to take the opportunity of conveying to the Government and people of the United Arab Republic Poland's warm wishes for further success in their noble endeavours in the cause of peace, progress and a bright and prosperous future. Thanks were also due to the Foreign Minister of the United Arab Republic for his important and inspiring address, which was but a further testimony of the determination of the host country to assist the United Nations in its efforts to uproot colonialism everywhere. He also wished to express his delegation's gratitude to the Arab League for the facilities extended to the Committee.

384. The Polish delegation supported the just and legitimate struggle of the people of Aden and of South Arabia as a whole, and, in expressing his deep appreciation to the Government and people of the United Arab Republic for their invitation, reiterated its most cordial wishes for peace, progress and social justice.

385. The representative of the *United Republic of Tanzania* thanked the President, the Government and the people of the United Arab Republic for their welcome and expressed his appreciation of the statement made on behalf of President Nasser by the Foreign Minister. He assured Mr. Riad that the Committee would give full consideration to the President's words of wisdom.

386. Since the United Arab Republic had emerged as a free State in 1952, its people, under the leadership of President Nasser, had consistently defended human rights, and particularly the right to political independence in countries still under the yoke of colonialism. The spirit of the United Arab Republic had been shown in its acts and not by words alone. It was well known that the United Arab Republic supported the Liberation Committee of the OAU whose headquarters were in Dar es Salaam. It had striven, at great sacrifice, to free peoples exploited by foreign Powers. It had given up trading with South Africa, and had not hesitated to break off diplomatic relations with the United Kingdom because of the Southern Rhodesian question.

387. The work of the United Arab Republic for Africa was beyond praise, and he was happy that the Special Committee could hold some of its meetings in Cairo, for the United Arab Republic was extending the struggle against colonialism to the Middle East, and Aden was of particular concern to it. The United Kingdom had vested interests in those Territories and pretended that its presence enabled the indigenous peoples to make progress. It used that pretext to defy the United Nations resolutions. In that connexion he wished to pay a tribute to the many people who had lost their lives in the struggle for the independence of their country.

388. Tanzania, like the United Arab Republic with which it had long-standing ties of friendship, had always fought against colonialism. He assured it of his Government's strong support and of his conviction that with Committee's help the people of Aden would attain their freedom.

389. The representative of *Yugoslavia* thanked the Foreign Minister and the President for their messages of welcome. He was particularly happy to be in the United Arab Republic. Cairo was a most appropriate meeting place for the Committee. It was well known that the United Arab Republic had played an outstand-

ing role in the process of decolonization and in freeing Africa, and had indeed served as an outstanding example to other countries.

390. His own country had many ties of friendship and co-operation with the United Arab Republic. Both were interested in maintaining international peace and security, in eradicating all forms of foreign domination and in the improvement of international relations on the basis of non-interference. Those ties had recently been reaffirmed by the seventeenth meeting between Presidents Tito and Nasser. His delegation was certain that the Committee's work in Cairo would be successful.

391. The representative of *Syria* felt that no expression of homage and thanks could do justice to the President, Government and valiant people of the United Arab Republic. Hospitality had deep roots in that country and was indeed a matter of everyday life. Colonialism had met with its most humiliating defeats in the United Arab Republic, whose stand against oppression was not a matter of politics but rather a profession of faith. Its defence of subjugated peoples was a sacred duty, not a mere question of choice. The United Arab Republic gave support to the cause of emancipation and justice regardless of race, and was determined to liquidate the last bastions of colonialism as well as the inhuman legacy left behind: under-development, poverty, disease, ignorance, division and degradation. As President Nasser himself had said, colonialism was a basic source of evil. If it were to be eradicated, the instruments that it used must also be eradicated.

392. The United Arab Republic had become an outstanding example of progress, and Cairo had become the meeting place of progressive forces in the Arab world and elsewhere, co-ordinated by the United Arab Republic.

393. The aims of the United Arab Republic were those of the Special Committee. President Nasser's message would be a source of inspiration to the Committee, as the Chairman had pointed out: the present age was too enlightened to be deceived by the puppet régimes erected by colonialism to perpetuate its exploitation of men and resources.

394. On behalf of the Syrian Arab Republic and its people and Government, he expressed his deep gratitude, solidarity and unity of purpose with the United Arab Republic, and wished that country every success in its noble endeavour in the cause of humanity, as well as his sincere thanks to the Arab League for the assistance given the Committee.

395. The representative of *Mali* thanked the people and Government of the United Arab Republic and President Nasser for the kind invitation and warm welcome extended to the Special Committee.

396. Since the sixth century, Mali and the United Arab Republic had been linked by ethnic, historical and cultural ties. Although they had been separated by colonialism for nearly three quarters of a century, after their liberation they had found themselves more united than ever in the final struggle against old and new colonialism and against imperialism.

397. Mali was observing with special attention the real pride the UAR's efforts to strengthen its independence and emerge from under-development. Every success of the Egyptian peoples was a victory for Mali, an African victory over the common enemies

—colonialism and imperialism. Both phenomena were destined to disappear because all peoples would ultimately gain their freedom; as the Administrative Secretary-General of the OAU had said, it was only a matter of time and methods.

398. The very fact that the United Arab Republic had invited the Special Committee to hold part of its session in Cairo indicated that country's interest in the problems of decolonization.

399. He was pleased to have an opportunity in Cairo to hear the true representatives of Aden and Oman speak on behalf of their peoples about the inhumane and intolerable conduct of the United Kingdom in those Territories. The United Kingdom Government must implement the relevant resolutions of the Special Committee and the General Assembly on Aden and the Aden Protectorates. The people of Oman, in particular, had the same right as others to exercise self-determination and achieve independence in circumstances of their own choosing.

400. In conclusion he expressed appreciation to the valiant people of the United Arab Republic for their efforts to combat the reactionary forces of colonialism and the reprehensible régimes of Verwoerd, Salazar and Ian Smith, and he extended to their leaders and to President Gamal Abdel Nasser his best wishes for their happiness.

401. The representative of *Australia* said that he had been doubly touched by the warmth of the reception given to the Special Committee in the historic city of Cairo. Civilization was based on the learning, art and culture which grew up in that city when the rest of the world was still at the barbarian stage. On behalf of his delegation he extended his sincerest thanks to the Government and people of the United Arab Republic and his deepest respects to the great Arab people who were playing such an important role in the modern world. His delegation appreciated the message of President Nasser and would faithfully convey it to the Australian Government; it would be grateful if the Foreign Minister could convey its respectful thanks to the President.

402. The representative of *India* said that his country was no stranger to the United Arab Republic. Links of many different kinds had existed between the two countries for thousands of years. He had been struck by the splendour of Cairo and thought it only fit that the Special Committee should be meeting there. It was indeed a privilege for the Committee to meet there, because of the noble aims of the United Arab Republic and also because of the friendly welcome of its citizens.

403. He recalled that, when the United Arab Republic had suffered the Suez attack, his own country had been one of the first to proffer support; when India had forced the Portuguese out of Goa, the United Arab Republic had given its help. His country had also been the first to establish diplomatic relations with the Arab League. He thanked the Government and people of the United Arab Republic for their hospitality and the President for his kind message.

404. The representative of *Denmark* joined previous speakers in thanking the Special Committee's hosts. His delegation had particular pleasure in meeting in Cairo, the cradle of a great civilization from which Europe had received so much inspiration. The illustrious history of the United Arab Republic was well

known, but that history was also the background to the present work of the country. It was fitting that the Committee should be meeting in Cairo, for the United Arab Republic had for many years pursued a policy of anti-colonialism. In that connexion his delegation wished to thank President Nasser and Mr. Riad for their messages clearly outlining the problems to be discussed.

405. His own country had friendly relations with the United Arab Republic, and he hoped that country would continue to make progress towards a bright future of prosperity and peace.

406. The representative of *Italy* said that the visit to Cairo had special significance for his delegation not only because of the cordial relations of Italy with the United Arab Republic, but also because the two countries' history was so closely linked. The invitation of the United Arab Republic was a symbol of the confidence placed in the work of the Special Committee and in that of the United Nations by a country which was so bravely engaged in building its future. He was grateful to the Government and people of the United Arab Republic for that confidence, and expressed his delegation's admiration for the achievements of the United Arab Republic together with its best wishes for the future.

407. The representative of *Madagascar* wished to express his most sincere appreciation to President Gamal Abdel Nasser and to the Government and people of the United Arab Republic for inviting the Special Committee to hold part of its session in the magnificent capital city of Cairo.

408. He was confident that the Special Committee's stay in the United Arab Republic would help it to solve the problems on its agenda.

409. He paid a tribute to the Government of the United Arab Republic for the warm welcome it had given the members of the Special Committee and for its generous hospitality.

410. The representative of *Tunisia* thanked President Nasser and the Government and people of the United Arab Republic for their kind invitation to the Special Committee. He also paid a tribute to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the United Arab Republic for his address, which would be a source of inspiration to the Special Committee in its efforts to frustrate the schemes of the colonial Powers.

411. It was not enough to condemn colonialism; some way had to be found to render it harmless. The Special Committee should draw the attention of world opinion to that evil of the modern world so that every means would be mobilized to eradicate it once and for all.

412. He would express his delegation's views concerning the situation in Aden and the Aden Protectorates at a later stage. For the time being, he would merely say that foreign influence in those Territories could not be tolerated and that he would spare no effort to see that the resolutions of the United Nations were fully implemented there.

413. The representative of *Afghanistan* associated himself with the thanks expressed by other members of the Special Committee to the Government of the United Arab Republic for its generous invitation to hold some of their meetings in the beautiful city of Cairo on the sources of the great Nile. That hospitality was not only in accordance with the country's fine

traditions but also demonstrated a strong belief in the Committee's work.

414. He had been particularly gratified by the inspiring message received from President Nasser. He was sure that the Committee would give due consideration to the words of wisdom it contained.

415. It was a particular source of joy to his delegation to be in Cairo, for innumerable ties of friendship existed between Afghanistan and the United Arab Republic, which had a common policy of non-alignment as well as a common religion.

416. The representative of the *Ivory Coast* associated himself with previous speakers in thanking the Government and people of the United Arab Republic for their generous invitation to the Special Committee and for their warm and fraternal welcome.

417. The invitation was all the more significant as the United Arab Republic itself was engaged in a struggle to improve the lot of its people and cope with the disastrous effects of under-development. That country was thus demonstrating once again its interest in the Special Committee's work and the importance it attached to the total eradication of colonialism from the world in general and from the South Arabian peninsula in particular.

418. The position of the Government of the Ivory Coast on colonial problems was well known. He would only recall that it supported the self-determination of peoples and the gradual and orderly transfer of all the attributes of sovereignty to the true representatives of the countries still under foreign rule. Accordingly, he would spare no effort during the Special Committee's work in Cairo to seek, together with other delegations, ways and means enabling the Committee to carry out the task assigned to it by the General Assembly.

419. He concluded by extending to the Government and people of the United Arab Republic his best wishes for their happiness and prosperity.

420. The representative of *Sierra Leone* thought it particularly fitting that the Special Committee should be able to meet in the United Arab Republic, for that country represented a geographical and cultural bridge between the Arab world of Africa and of Asia.

421. It was particularly fitting that the Committee should discuss in Cairo problems of interest both to Africans and Asians, including the questions of Aden and Oman. Because of its own opposition to colonialism and neo-colonialism, his country shared the hope and determination of the United Arab Republic to free subjugated peoples from the yoke of colonialism. It would be the Committee's task to ensure that the United Kingdom implemented the United Nations resolutions on Aden and Oman.

422. He thanked the President of the United Arab Republic for his inspiring message. His delegation was convinced that the Committee's stay in Cairo would be both pleasant and fruitful.

423. The representative of the *United States of America* said that it was a particular pleasure for her delegation to visit Cairo in response to the generous invitation of the host country. The representative of Iraq had said that to come to Cairo was a spiritual privilege for Arabs; but it also was a privilege for all the peoples of the civilized world. All the members of the Special Committee were inspired by awe and respect for the continued accomplishments of the people

of the Nile valley, which had begun before the dawn of recorded history.

424. The United Arab Republic had a glorious future now that the people of the country had taken their destiny into their own hands. Her own country had long-standing friendly relations with the United Arab Republic and was especially happy that the Committee could be meeting in Cairo.

425. She thanked the President and the Foreign Minister for their speeches of welcome and looked forward to the important deliberations of the Committee in the beautiful and historic city of Cairo. She was confident that the generosity of the Government and people of the United Arab Republic would contribute to the success of the Committee's meetings in that city.

426. The representative of the *United Arab Republic* wished to convey to the Chairman and members of the Special Committee the very sincere thanks of his Government for the generous and elegant way in which they had referred to his country. Those words were more than mere courtesy; they represented an encouragement to the Government of the United Arab Republic in its difficult path of non-alignment. His Government had reserved for itself the right to judge each world issue on its own merits, and that, he believed, was also the way of the United Nations. The encouraging speeches made that morning would serve to strengthen his country's purpose on its lonely and difficult path.

427. His Government was also happy that the Committee was meeting in Cairo. The United Nations represented the ideals and the dreams of mankind and the Committee's presence in Cairo made those aspirations more tangible.

428. The Committee was one of the most effective organs of the United Nations, and a great deal of hope was placed in its works; he felt sure that that hope would be justified.

429. His own country had worked patiently for solidarity to further the aims of the United Nations, for freedom, justice and lasting peace. It would give the Committee the fullest co-operation so that its work might be fruitful and its stay in Cairo a success.

430. He would ask for permission to address the Committee later on specific points of the agenda, and thanked members for having given him the opportunity of making a statement.

Closing of meetings

General statements

431. The *representative of the Secretary-General* expressed the Secretariat's deep gratitude to the Government of the United Arab Republic for its generous hospitality and for all the assistance it had given in connexion with the Special Committee's meetings in Cairo. The Secretariat was also deeply grateful to the Secretary-General of the League of Arab States and his colleagues for having placed at the Committee's disposal its beautiful conference room and its facilities.

432. The *Chairman* expressed the Special Committee's heartfelt thanks to the Government and people of the United Arab Republic for their generous hos-

pitality during its short stay in Cairo. Their contribution to the cause of freedom and justice for all the oppressed peoples of the world was too well known to require elaboration. It would suffice to say that whether within the Organization of African Unity, the non-aligned world or the United Nations, the United Arab Republic, under the dynamic leadership of its indefatigable and able President, Mr. Gamal Abdel Nasser, had always been the torch-bearer of freedom in a world darkened by the forces of colonialism.

433. For that reason, the Special Committee considered it a special honour to have been invited by the Government of the United Arab Republic to hold its meetings there. That could also be considered as a special recognition of the work of the Committee, since Cairo had come to be considered as an important haven for all freedom-loving peoples the world over. In addition to the constructive contribution of the Government and people of the United Arab Republic to the work of the Committee, they had also found time to lavish on it hospitality in true African and Arab tradition, for which it was very grateful. On behalf of all the members of the Special Committee, he took special pride in extending their gratitude to the Government and people of the United Arab Republic for all the facilities they had offered.

434. He also thanked the League of Arab States for having put its hall at the Special Committee's disposal and for providing it with the necessary conference facilities. It was only proper that it should have discussed there the questions of Aden and Oman, since the League of Arab States was the champion of freedom and justice in the Arab world.

435. The Special Committee had taken significant steps forward with regard to the application of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples as it affected Aden and Oman. The resolution adopted that afternoon on the question of Aden (A/AC.109/179/Rev.1) contained important recommendations which should help in the solution of the problem. Members would recall that operative paragraph 12 of that resolution requested the Secretary-General, in consultation with the Special Committee and the administering Power, to appoint immediately a special mission to Aden for the purpose of recommending practical steps necessary for the full implementation of the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly, and in particular for determining the extent of United Nations participation in the preparation and supervision of elections and of making a report to him as soon as possible for transmission to the Special Committee. It was hoped that the implementation of that important operative paragraph would help the people of Aden to reach their goal of true independence and freedom.

436. Regarding the question of Oman, the petitioners had provided the Committee with very pertinent information which should help it in assessing the situation in the Territory and arriving at appropriate conclusions. General Assembly resolution 2073 (XX) recognized the inalienable right of the people of the Territory as a whole to self-determination and independence in accordance with their freely expressed wishes, and on behalf of the Special Committee he assured the petitioners that it would keep that constantly in mind when giving further consideration to the question of Oman in New York.

Statement by the Deputy Foreign Minister of the United Arab Republic

437. The Deputy Foreign Minister of the *United Arab Republic* on behalf of the people, the Government and the President of the United Arab Republic, expressed appreciation to the Special Committee and its secretariat for their work. The people still struggling to free themselves from colonialism had in the Committee able and articulate champions, and he was confident that its efforts would meet with continued success. He also expressed appreciation to the Secretary-General of the United Nations for having sent a special representative to attend the meetings in Cairo. His Government had unquestioned confidence in U Thant, and knew that he would spare no effort to implement the General Assembly's resolutions and thereby help the just cause for which the Committee was working. The nationalists in that part of the world were well aware that they could expect only moral support from the United Nations, but they were content with and grateful for it in their struggle for freedom and for a legitimate opportunity to achieve progress and happiness.

438. His Government was glad to know that the Special Committee was keeping the question of South Arabia on its agenda, but hoped that it would not have to remain there for too long.

Statement by the Acting Secretary-General of the League of Arab States

439. The Acting Secretary-General of the *League of Arab States* expressed deep appreciation to the Special Committee for its tireless work and valuable support to the cause of freedom. It had been a great privilege for the League of Arab States to receive the Committee and he hoped its work would meet with continued success.

E. MEETINGS HELD AT ALGIERS, ALGERIA

Opening of meetings

Message from the President of the Revolutionary Council and Head of Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria

440. At the request of the Chairman, a message of welcome from the President of the Revolutionary Council and Head of Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria was read to the Committee. The message read as follows:

"On the occasion of the opening of a new session of your Committee in Algiers, I take pleasure in welcoming you to our country and in expressing to you, on behalf of the Revolutionary Council and the Government, our satisfaction, as well as the great pride we feel, in receiving you in Algeria to carry out a task which is in the forefront of our thoughts.

"The struggle against colonial domination, in all its forms and on all continents, is one of the constant factors in our policy and actions. Your presence in Algiers to study the problems of decolonization therefore has symbolic significance for us, and we regard it as an event of the highest importance. You will find in Algeria the greatest sympathy for your work, among a people which feels linked in fraternity with all peoples fighting and suffering to win their freedom.

"We are also glad to be given the opportunity of reaffirming our support for the United Nations and expressing all the hopes we place in it for better understanding among men and sincere friendship among peoples. We are convinced of the importance of its role in maintaining and strengthening peace throughout the world, and we are confident that it will shoulder all the responsibilities of its lofty and noble mission.

"I wish you every success in your work and a pleasant stay in our country, which will strive to give you a worthy welcome, both as guests and as friends."

Address by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria

441. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of the *Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria* said that Algiers was the last stage in the Special Committee's journey through Africa. Its stay in various capitals of the African continent had enabled it to enter into direct contact with several liberation movements and it had thus been able to supplement its information on the problems of decolonization by placing them in their context and by seeing them as they actually were. In its African tour, the method thus applied by the Committee should be pondered, enriched and, if necessary, extended, in order to bring nearer all the solutions likely to rejuvenate, strengthen and consolidate the United Nations.

442. Algeria was happy to welcome the Committee and to help to make its mission a success. Algeria had itself placed great hopes in and had obtained much from the United Nations at the time when it had been engaged in its life and death struggle for its own liberation. It therefore felt duty-bound to give the Committee every support in the discharge of its task, to encourage its deliberations, and to share in the achievement of its objectives which were intimately linked with Algeria's convictions and actions.

443. His country, yesterday still colonized, today independent after a bitter and bloody struggle, endorsed the just and legitimate cause of peoples still fighting against colonial domination. Their liberation movements encountered a natural understanding and support in Algeria among a people who shared their desires and hopes and who sustained them in their efforts and their sacrifices.

444. The Committee would thus have an opportunity to enter into extensive contacts with the leaders of those movements and would find on a land still shuddering from its clash with colonialism a particularly appropriate background for the study of the problems it had to tackle.

445. He therefore welcomed the Committee, brought greetings from the Council of the Revolution, the National Liberation Front and the Government, and thanked the Committee for having chosen Algiers as one of its meeting-places in Africa.

446. As soon as the Second World War had ended, the elimination of colonial domination had become an international objective. The recognition of the right of peoples to self-determination, embodied in the United Nations Charter, had given rise to great hopes among the oppressed peoples and a new era was opening which was to be marked by the final abolition of colonialism.

447. While many countries had indeed recovered their independence during those last twenty years, their liberation had not always been easy and often they had only succeeded in shaking off the colonial yoke at the cost of immense sacrifices. The general upsurge of human brotherhood which had been apparent at the end of the war was gradually dying down, while imperialism, as soon as it was threatened, was recovering its vocation and striving to maintain and strengthen its domination. The very objective of the Committee's mission revealed the extent and difficulty of the task which remained to be accomplished of freeing peoples who were still under the colonial yoke and who were constrained to use violence and to wage an unequal war to establish their most elementary rights to freedom, justice and dignity. The struggle against colonialism continued, marked both by the determination of the imperialist Powers to perpetuate a régime of colonial exploitation and by the increasingly strong determination of the colonized peoples to break that stranglehold. The irreconcilable antagonism between oppressive force and faith in justice and freedom was reflected by successive outbursts of violence. In every place where a colonial régime persisted there was a hotbed of tension which gave rise to the courageous and often heroic action of liberation movements.

448. It was not by chance that the Special Committee had arranged the stages of its itinerary in Africa, for it was mainly in Africa that the fight against colonialism was taking place and that many countries continued to suffer from colonial domination. Whereas the other European Powers who had taken part in the colonization of Africa had, either voluntarily or under pressure from the African people, modified their attitude and their behaviour, Portugal persisted blindly in following its policy of colonial exploitation, completely disregarding the profound aspirations of peoples and flouting all the obligations of international society towards colonized peoples. As a result of that retrograde policy, immense areas of Africa were dominated by one of the last adherents of an anachronistic colonialism and their peoples were at the mercy of Portuguese exploiters. In Angola the Portuguese authorities were increasing their war effort in the face of an armed struggle for liberation which had been going on for more than five years. That had in no way undermined the determination of the Angolan patriots. In the end, Angola would inevitably triumph over the blindness of the colonial Power. The same was true of Guinea and the Cape Verde Islands. Although the armed struggle in Mozambique had been unleashed more recently, it was still no less atrocious and no less violent and could not leave international opinion indifferent.

449. The situation in Southern Rhodesia was the direct responsibility of the United Kingdom which, in spite of its commitments and promises, had paved the way for the advent of a racist régime. The unilateral proclamation of independence by Ian Smith, the logical conclusion of United Kingdom policy, constituted a challenge and a provocation to African opinion and international opinion. It had placed the people of Zimbabwe under the domination of a white minority, thus instituting a régime of racial segregation similar to that of South Africa. That was a serious blow to the freedom of an African people and an inadmissible affront to its dignity. The African conscience could not disregard that new aggression which it had already

denounced before international opinion and against which it would be able to mobilize all the forces of Africa. The seriousness of the Rhodesian problem could not be emphasized enough. It brought dire threats to the African continent and with regard to it each member of the international Committee must consider his responsibilities.

450. In South Africa and Portugal the régime of Ian Smith found its natural allies, that double alliance being based both on racism and colonialism. The policy of apartheid applied in South Africa had been resolutely condemned in international institutions but it was clear now that the Government of Pretoria was maintaining its attitude with impunity and was frustrating the economic sanctions taken against it. That striking example showed how well founded was the scepticism felt by Africans concerning the efficacy of the economic measures taken by the United Kingdom Government against the Ian Smith régime. Nevertheless, the Head of the United Kingdom Government had promised faithfully to take all the necessary steps to restore the situation in Southern Rhodesia and had requested the African countries of the Commonwealth to allow him six months to prove to them that his policy of economic sanctions would be enough to attain the objective apparently sought. That had been at the beginning of 1966 and the time-limit granted to Mr. Wilson had now expired. It was difficult to say that the régime of Ian Smith was on the point of collapsing, a victim of the means of coercion dreamed up by Prime Minister Wilson. Indeed, negotiations were now taking place between the Salisbury racists and the representatives of the United Kingdom Government. Did the United Kingdom really believe that international opinion could be thus hoodwinked? The attitude of the Algerian Government remained clear and the delaying tactics of the United Kingdom could deceive no one. Only a resolute policy could put an end to the Ian Smith rebellion. The present shilly-shallyings were doing nothing to solve the problem; they were paving the way for a period of violence in which all Africans and free men everywhere would find themselves fighting at the side of the Zimbabwe people.

451. It was not only on the African continent that United Kingdom colonialism continued to manifest itself. In Southern Arabia, Aden and Oman peoples were fighting to free themselves from United Kingdom domination and their struggle took on the same character as in the colonized countries of Africa. There again the exploitation of the wealth of the country and the maintenance of strategic positions remained the basic aims of colonial domination. The selfish interests of the colonial Power were obstinately opposed to the fierce determination of the peoples for liberation and thus led to the same bloody clashes.

452. The problem of Palestine also had the same colonial character. By some strange justice, the Arab peoples of Palestine had been forced to pay for the Nazi crimes against the Jews and to abandon their own country and remain deprived of their fatherland. The Powers which had helped to create the artificial State of Israel had perhaps sought to solve a human problem which the sufferings of the Jewish people had certainly imposed on the international conscience. But the terrible situation in which they had plunged millions of Palestinians, who had been transformed into miserable refugees at the frontiers of their country, constituted no less a human tragedy the intensity and

scale of which could not fail to trouble the international conscience. The voluntary contributions—which were becoming more and more modest—by certain great Powers for the Palestine refugees could not dissimulate their responsibility for a problem whose social and humanitarian aspects merely accentuate its political character.

453. For a country had been despoiled, a people had been driven out and dispossessed of their wealth. Therefore, that was indeed a colonial problem. The present situation offered the Palestinians no other hope but for the reconquest by arms of their fatherland. It was for that that they were preparing and it was that objective which the Palestine Liberation Organization had set itself. The United Nations could not much longer ignore the real nature of that problem which threatened the equilibrium of the Middle East and therefore represented a permanent danger for world peace. The injustice which had struck the people of Palestine must be remedied and it was in the general interest that all countries which proclaimed themselves in favour of equality of peoples and the free enjoyment of their inalienable rights should associate themselves in that task.

454. In reviewing the problems of colonial domination and the threats they brought to mankind it was impossible to disregard the war which was raging in Viet-Nam and whose gradual escalation and murderous character directly endangered the peace of the world. The motives for aggression in South Viet-Nam could in no way justify the sufferings of a people whose sacrifices were so great that their right to peace and freedom must be recognized. The warlike attitude of the United States extremists could not be equated with the attitude of the United States people who were deeply perturbed by a war imposed on a small country which was resisting heroically that imperialist adventure. Accordingly, he ventured to state that reason must triumph and that reason made it necessary to take account of facts. It was a fact that the people of South Viet-Nam would continue to fight without respite against the foreign intervention which was being imposed on it. It was another fact that the resistance of the people of South Viet-Nam was supported by the National Liberation Front (FNL) which was canalizing its energies and organizing its struggle and which consequently was alone able to speak for the future of that country. Any sincere search for a solution to a conflict which was condemned by all peoples and primarily by the United States people must necessarily consider the FNL as the only valid spokesman and the authentic representative of the South Viet-Nameese people. Any other approach to the problem was necessarily doomed to failure and could only constitute a delaying tactic or a diversionary operation. Algeria expressed that opinion quite calmly because it felt the suffering of the Viet-Nameese people and because it was convinced that the future of mankind was based primarily upon friendship between free and equal peoples.

455. The task of the Special Committee was certainly difficult and vast in scope. Decolonization remained a problem which weighed heavily over the modern world and its multiple and varied aspects concealed the basic consideration that peoples must have the right to enjoy their freedom and live a more worthy life. Colonial domination, the exploitation of man by man, the maintenance of part of mankind in

a state of moral and intellectual degradation were a blot upon a world where science was daily achieving miracles which enlarged man's horizon and held out hopes of a promising future for peoples. The anachronistic survival of colonial régimes at a time when man was freeing himself from his earthly ties was becoming more and more an international responsibility, since it was obvious that world peace would always remain precarious so long as peoples continued to be deprived of their elementary rights.

456. Nevertheless, decolonization was not merely a political problem and the struggles for liberation to which it led were only one of its most tangible aspects. It was also and above all a state of mind, a new conception of relations between peoples. It must take hold in the minds and customs of men and replace the antagonisms between races and peoples with a feeling of human solidarity and an awareness of the need for real co-operation between human beings. Decolonization of minds must therefore precede and accompany the liberation of peoples.

457. Without that transformation, without that revolution in the rules of international morality, the work of decolonization would remain incomplete and would not succeed in eliminating all the problems it sought to solve. For, to decolonize a people did not mean only to rescue it from direct domination, which was all the more revolting because it was shameless and open. To decolonize a people was also and above all to free it from any foreign intervention, to allow it to manage its own affairs and to enable it to embark unrestrictedly along the path of progress. It was an undeniable fact, unfortunately proved by many examples, that no colonial Power had ever tried to prepare a colonized people for the exercise of its national responsibilities and that, on the contrary, its whole policy had been aimed at keeping the colony in a backward social and cultural state in order to continue its exploitation indefinitely. The difficulties experienced by the newly liberated peoples were thus the primary responsibility of the colonial Powers who often sought to profit from those difficulties by maintaining their political stranglehold and their economic privileges. The achievement of independence did not mark the end of colonial exploitation but rather caused it to reappear in new forms which were no less to be condemned.

458. Decolonization must therefore be applied equally to that kind of colonial domination which potentially had the same dangers as direct and brutal domination. To be complete, decolonization must maintain the patrimony of formerly colonized peoples and enable them to pursue their development without any foreign pressure.

459. Of course, it was primarily the responsibility of the newly independent countries themselves to take stock of their obligations and to ensure that their sovereignty was respected. By uniting their efforts and pooling their resources they could oppose manifestations of neo-colonialism. But the accession to independence of a colonized country must bring about new relationships with the former colonial Power whose responsibility towards it could not cease merely because the colonial régime was at an end. The establishment of those new relationships, if they were stripped of all vestiges of domination and if they were aimed at building a better future, based on solid and durable friendship, could facilitate the changes

that must follow the disappearance of the colonial system and could provide a new and fruitful basis for friendship between peoples. In that way, Algeria without complexes and with an open mind had co-operated with France in a spirit of mutual respect for the essential interests and sovereignty of the two countries. That co-operation, which had developed in spite of difficulties of every kind and which had gradually adapted itself to the realities and aspirations of the two peoples, constituted an enlightening experience not only as regards relationships between a colonized and a colonial Power but also as regards relationships that it had instituted between an under-developed and a developed country. The efforts which were being made by each of the parties to improve that co-operation and triumph over the difficulties that might naturally arise were so many pledges of its success.

460. That experience showed that such co-operation, desirable in itself, became inspiring when friendship and mutual esteem characterized bilateral relations, when the real interests of both partners were judiciously assessed and when there was a common determination to eliminate and transcend all the vestiges of the past in order to consolidate the present and guarantee the future. Such an undertaking was the result of a truly historic view of events because it was inspired by a sincerely shared attachment to the freedom of peoples, to the fruitful relations which could exist between them and to the consolidation of peace and stability in the world. That was one of the most healthy manifestations of decolonization.

461. International opinion had become aware of the importance of the problem of decolonization and it was perfectly legitimate that international organizations had tackled that problem and continued to follow its development. The presence of the Special Committee in Algeria showed the increasing interest that the United Nations was taking in decolonization and the work of liberation movements.

462. While the maintenance of colonial domination was a flagrant and inadmissible violation of the rights of peoples inscribed in the United Nations Charter, that situation also had serious dangers for international equilibrium and for world peace.

463. Undoubtedly, the United Nations had been preoccupied since its establishment with problems of decolonization and with the problem of racial discrimination. At each session of the General Assembly those problems were discussed at length and gave rise to many resolutions. The Security Council had often dealt with those questions and special bodies had been set up to study them. The United Nations was thus clearly determined to help carry decolonization to its completion since colonial domination and racial discrimination were irrevocably condemned by Member States.

464. However, it was unfortunately impossible to assert that the results obtained were commensurate with the good intentions shown. Twenty years after the establishment of the United Nations, vast territories and numerous peoples remained under the colonial yoke. The régime of apartheid continued to be the scourge of South Africa and was now being extended to Southern Rhodesia. It was true that some countries had recovered their independence during that period and had come to take their place in the Organization. Their efforts had always been aimed at the strengthening of United Nations action in the field of decolonization and against régimes of racial

segregation. In spite of that new source of strength for the Organization, few, if any, practical results had been achieved.

465. The only conclusion was that the United Nations must revise its basic organization and its methods of work, for in their present state they were responsible for its ineffectiveness and immobility. It was abnormal and inadmissible that a country, however big, should be able to defy the whole of the Organization and ignore its decisions. As it was now conceived, the Organization allowed such an anomaly which prejudiced its authority. The time had come to give the highest international institution a structure which was more in conformity with the modern world and which would enable it to assume its proper responsibility in the maintenance of good relations between all peoples. The newly independent countries must find their proper place and play their full role in it. Also, the powers and responsibilities of the General Assembly should be reviewed so as to establish a better balance between the Assembly and the Security Council. Finally, the Organization would remain imperfect so long as it failed to acquire the necessary universality. It was impossible much longer to keep outside of the United Nations a nation as important as the People's Republic of China whose population amounted to a quarter of mankind. It was also time that countries which might have had doubts about the value and effectiveness of the Organization should find again their legitimate place in it, for the deficiencies and imperfections which he had just pointed out in no way diminished the importance of the role of the United Nations in the maintenance of world peace and the strengthening of co-operation between peoples. The setbacks, the mistakes, the delays must not obscure all that the Organization had done and the dangers that it had been able to avert. Algeria wished to pay a tribute to the United Nations for its perseverance and would continue to support it in the continuation of those efforts. In that tribute it also included the Secretary-General who had been able to direct the activities of the United Nations with competence and authority. It did so with all the more sincerity and warmth because it could not forget the decisive role he had played as Chairman of the Committee of Solidarity with Algeria at the time when it was waging its struggle for national liberation. U Thant would certainly have been one of the men who had done most to give the United Nations a meaning, a vitality and a dynamism which could make it universally respected.

466. Finally, he wished the Committee every success and assured it that the Algerian Government would spare no effort to facilitate the Committee's task and help it in the accomplishment of its mission.

General statements

467. *The Chairman* expressed gratitude to the President of Algeria for his inspiring message, and to the Foreign Minister of Algeria for the important address which he had delivered on behalf of the President and the Government of Algeria. He requested the Foreign Minister to convey to the President and to the Government and people of Algeria the gratitude of the Special Committee for the honour they had accorded them by inviting the Committee to hold their deliberations in Algiers, the capital of a nation that was second to none in its dedication to the liquidation

of colonialism and the attainment of true independence—objectives to which the Committee also was irrevocably committed.

468. The history of Algeria's gallant struggle for independence had been justly acclaimed as a classic and heroic example of the undying quest for freedom by all colonial countries and peoples. It was to the lasting credit of the Government and people of Algeria that in spite of the heavy sacrifices they had made to achieve their independence, they had not, in their moment of triumph, forgotten their brothers in Africa and in the Arab world who were still struggling to attain their legitimate rights and aspirations. The Government and people of Algeria, by deed as well as by example, had kept faith with all the freedom fighters the world over. It was for that reason that the Committee considered it a signal honour to meet in Algiers.

469. The presence of the United Nations in Africa, in the cause of decolonization, was ample evidence of the new emphasis in the work of the United Nations in the 1960s and of the ever growing involvement of the United Nations in the question of decolonization, in accordance with its responsibilities as laid down in the Charter and in response to the challenge of the world, in which, despite the pious pronouncements of many Members of the Organization, the evil cancer of colonialism was still existent.

470. During the course of its meetings in Africa, the Special Committee had held very fruitful discussions in the United Republic of Tanzania, Somalia, Ethiopia and the United Arab Republic. It had examined in detail the colonial situation in various parts of the African continent and the Arab world. In Algeria it would pursue its study of other colonial questions which were still plaguing that continent. The environment of the host country, at once congenial and anti-colonialist, coupled with the inspiration which it had given freedom-loving peoples everywhere, would give impetus to the Committee's deliberations and contribute to the effective and vigorous discharge of its task.

471. On behalf of all the Committee members and the United Nations Secretariat staff, he wished to thank the Government of Algeria for the splendid living and working arrangements which had been so generously made for them. He expressed appreciation of the warm hospitality which in the finest Arab and African traditions had been showered on the Committee and which without a doubt would contribute to the success of their work.

472. The representative of *Mali*, speaking on behalf of the people and Republic of Mali, the Sudanese Union (RDA) and the Government of Mali, expressed his sincere gratitude, to the fraternal people and Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria, and to the leaders of the National Liberation Front, the progressive party which had led that sister State ever since independence. When a Malian stood on Algerian soil for the first time, he was sincerely moved and proud, because he shared the feelings of the Algerian people about the struggle against colonialism and imperialism. The historical ties which had united the two peoples for several centuries had been made possible by the two-way flow of trade, culture and religion across the Sahara; that desert was not an obstacle but a link.

473. One could not speak of Algeria without evoking that people's glorious struggle to end colonial domination and promote a dynamic policy which met the genuine aspirations of the Algerian people. To be sure, Mali had gained its independence easily because of the courage and tenacity of its people, but also because of the courageous sacrifices of the valiant Algerians. He could not express the emotion he felt on remembering the thousands of Algerians who had died on the field of honour in order that Africa might one day recover its independence and dignity.

474. He was convinced that Africa, once freed of the colonial yoke, would conquer hunger and disease and would at last be able to play its rightful historic role. Unfortunately there were still trouble-spots in Africa, places where man exploited man and where apartheid, that baleful system which was no more than a relic of slavery, flourished. It was the Special Committee's duty to demonstrate the complicity of the great Powers, which, by helping the colonialist régimes, were impeding the implementation of resolution 1514 (VX).

475. His good friend, Mr. Bouteflika, the Foreign Minister of Algeria, had drawn attention at the previous meeting to the seriousness of the situation in Africa. The United Nations was morally obliged to support all national liberation movements, since their struggle was just and in conformity with the Charter. Moreover, everyone knew that Portugal, left to itself, could not continue its hateful war of conquest. He paid tribute to the freedom fighters and assured them of the unconditional support of the people of Mali.

476. Before concluding its meetings in Africa, the Special Committee should adopt a general resolution condemning the retrograde policy of the Salazar, Smith and Verwoerd Governments and the financial monopolies which were supporting them, and submitting firm recommendations to that effect to the General Assembly. It should also fix a deadline for the accession to independence of the Territories under Portuguese domination, in execution of its mandate under resolution 2105 (XX), and recommend the Security Council to make the economic sanctions taken against Portugal mandatory. It should also recommend the Security Council to require the administering Powers to apply United Nations resolutions and suspend the operations of their foreign military bases.

477. He was prepared to take part in any discussions for that purpose and reiterated his delegation's fraternal gratitude to the Government and people of Algeria.

478. The representative of *Tunisia* thanked Mr. Bouteflika for his inspiring address. He was sure that it would be a valuable source of encouragement to all the delegations and he associated himself with the Chairman's warm thanks to the Government and people of Algeria for their magnificent welcome. With deep emotion he recalled the ancestral ties which had always linked Algeria and Tunisia, in times of distress as in times of joy. It was a special pleasure for the Special Committee to be in Algeria, that sister country whose brave struggle against colonialism would for ever be an example and a symbol for all oppressed peoples. For eight years, the men, women and children of Algeria had suffered in silence and continued their long campaign of resistance under the guidance of the National Liberation Front. From the start, Tunisia had considered that struggle its own for, like

Algeria, it had promised never to deny its support to peoples sincerely inspired by the sacred desire for liberty. The inalienable right to independence was, of course, guaranteed by the United Nations Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV).

479. At the neo-Destour Congress held at Sousse in 1959, President Bourguiba had suggested that the administering Powers should hold a conference at which they themselves would decide on arrangements for the liberation of the peoples they administered. That suggestion had not been accepted by the administering Powers but the United Nations had responded to it by adopting resolution 1514 (XV). He was glad of the opportunity to express his delegation's great satisfaction at the way in which the Special Committee had carried out its noble mission.

480. At the current meeting the members of the Special Committee were to take up the question of the Territories under Portuguese domination. In population and total area they represented almost a quarter of the African continent. It was quite natural that that grave problem should be dealt with in Algiers, a city which was an exemplar and in which freedom fighters found both encouragement and an unending source of inspiration.

481. Nothing could ever halt Africa's advance towards progress. The family of independent African countries was daily becoming larger and in the near future the whole of the African continent would be independent.

482. In conclusion, he again thanked the Government and fraternal people of Algeria for their warm welcome.

483. The representative of *Iraq* expressed his delegation's gratitude to the Government and people of Algeria for the welcome accorded to the Special Committee. Algeria, which had struggled so valiantly against colonialism, to the admiration of the whole world, was a fitting choice for the Committee's deliberations: the sacrifice made by its people to regain their freedom was an example to all those who still suffered under the yoke of foreign domination. Furthermore, Algeria played a leading role in the Organization of African Unity, in the League of Arab States and in the non-aligned world and had spared no efforts in the cause of peace, freedom and human dignity.

484. His delegation was confident that the Special Committee's meetings in Algiers would meet with the same success as in other African capitals. Important resolutions, aimed at the peaceful granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples, had been, and would be, adopted by the Committee. However, when the Committee's counsel passed unheeded by the forces of colonialism, the oppressed peoples, who looked to the Committee for moral support, had no alternative but to fight for their freedom. As a result of colonialism, many critical situations had arisen throughout the world—for example, in the Portuguese colonies, Southern Rhodesia, South Arabia and Oman. Moreover, as the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Algeria had rightly pointed out, there was also the tragedy of Palestine.

485. The co-operation rendered by the Algerian people and Government to the Special Committee during its meetings in Algiers would provide it with

added impetus enabling it to justify the faith of millions of human beings in the United Nations.

486. The representative of *Poland* expressed appreciation to the President, the Government and people of Algeria for their invitation to the Special Committee to hold the final meetings of its African session in Algiers. His delegation had been profoundly moved by the welcome extended to the Committee on its arrival and was grateful for the inspiring message with which the President had honoured the Committee, and for the address which had been delivered by the Foreign Minister. Those messages, and the invitation to the Special Committee to meet in Algiers, were an expression of the importance which Algeria attached to the lofty principles of the United Nations Charter and to the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. The Committee was privileged to meet in a country which had become a symbol of the peoples' heroic struggle for freedom and independence. As a result of the Committee's visit to Algeria, he was at last able to realize a long-cherished dream and to pay a personal tribute to a courageous people who had fought, and given their lives, for the liberation of their land. The Algerian people's struggle, under the leadership of the National Liberation Front, had been admired throughout the world. The people of Poland had known that theirs was a just cause which had not only aimed at Algeria's liberation but had also paved the way to independence for many other African countries. The Algerian people and their leaders were also to be congratulated upon their remarkable achievements in other fields, for their untiring efforts in the cause of peace and progress and for their outstanding contribution to the eradication of colonialism in Africa and other parts of the world.

487. Conveying his own Government's best wishes to the Algerian people and their Government for the future, he said that his delegation was particularly happy to visit Algeria, with which Poland enjoyed fruitful co-operation.

488. The Special Committee had reached the last stage of its deliberations in Africa, and it was to be hoped that its discussions in Algiers would provide encouragement for the freedom fighters in Angola, Mozambique, Portuguese Guinea and the other Territories to be considered. At that stage, he wished to restate his delegation's stand regarding colonialism, for the benefit of the petitioners who would appear before the Committee. Assuring them of his Government's support for self-determination and independence for all countries still under colonial rule, he said that Poland, by virtue of its historical tradition and social structure, was utterly opposed to any form of national or racial oppression. It viewed the liberation of colonial peoples as an act of historic justice and considered that as long as colonialism existed, there could be no real peace throughout the world. His delegation had always condemned the brutalities committed by colonialists—brutalities which were in direct contradiction of the colonialists' avowed civilizing mission in the Territories concerned. In Southern Rhodesia and South West Africa crimes were being perpetrated against humanity and, as the testimony of the petitioners from Angola and Mozambique had revealed, Portugal was intensifying its war to exterminate the African people. Because it received eco-

conomic, military and political aid from certain NATO Powers, Portugal was able to flout United Nations resolutions and those Powers were responsible for the events in the Portuguese Territories in Africa. They had deeply entrenched economic and financial interests there and were determined to arrest national liberation movements. The perpetuation of apartheid and colonial domination guaranteed huge profits, earned with cheap migrant labour, for the United Kingdom, the United States and West Germany. However, their defiant attitude would have to change radically. Poland, which had been the first victim of Nazism and its creed of the master race, considered that colonialism and racism were not only an affront to human dignity but also a threat to world peace. It would not cease to raise its voice, therefore, to support national liberation movements and it would continue to denounce colonialists as the enemies of peace and international co-operation. The time had come for the Special Committee to take action to remove a danger which would not spare any Power, great or small. For that reason, his Government whole-heartedly supported the total eradication of colonialism and racism.

489. The representative of *India* thanked the President, the people and the Government of Algeria for their hospitality. Algeria was a fitting choice as the venue for the Special Committee's last meeting in Africa, since the lives of over two millions of its people had been lost in its struggle against colonialism. The messages to the Committee of the President of the Revolutionary Council and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Algeria, which had emphasized the urgent nature of the various problems and had drawn attention to the seriousness of the situation in such Territories as Southern Rhodesia and those under Portuguese administration, would make an important contribution to the Special Committee's work.

490. India's struggle against colonialism was well known throughout the world and the names of Gandhi and Nehru would remain for ever enshrined in the hearts of all who cherished freedom. It had always maintained that its own independence would be incomplete while other countries in Asia and Africa remained enslaved since freedom was one and indivisible for all peoples. India therefore joined with all those who fought against the hideous forces of colonialism in Africa.

491. Despite the fact that many of the most powerful countries had at last realized that colonialism could not endure, Portugal still clung to its inhuman domination of certain African Territories. It was living in an age that had since passed by and ruthlessly perpetuated its domination over the African people with the aid of its allies. It was to be deplored that, after hundreds of years of the so-called civilizing Christian mission, barely 3 to 4 per cent of the people in the Portuguese Territories were literate.

492. While the Special Committee could not physically prevent the Portuguese from their ruthless domination in the African Territories, it could speak forth and expose Portugal and its allies for their reprehensible action. His delegation would support all those who endeavoured to expose colonialism. Human dignity and freedom, to have any meaning, had to be one and indivisible for all mankind.

493. Lastly, his delegation extended to the Government and people of Algeria every best wish for their continued well-being and prosperity.

494. The representative of the *United Republic of Tanzania* expressed the gratitude of his delegation to the Government and people of Algeria for their invitation to the Special Committee to hold some of its meetings in Algiers.

495. The warmth of the welcome extended to the Special Committee, despite the lateness of its arrival, was part of an inseparable tradition among Algerians. It was very touching that the Committee should be holding meetings in Algeria only four years after the country had disengaged itself from the claims of colonialism. Never in the twentieth century had a people paid such a price for freedom. Indeed, that should be a lesson to colonial Powers that the just cause always won. A further lesson was provided by Algeria's progress since independence. The country's attainments showed what could be done in an atmosphere of freedom and independence.

496. It was fitting that the Special Committee should discuss the question of Portuguese Territories in Africa. Portugal was refusing to learn from history, but the freedom fighters of those Territories should draw inspiration from what Algeria had achieved. Tanzania would always be on the side of the forces of freedom; for so long as the cancer of colonialism and apartheid subsisted, there could be no true freedom or lasting peace. The Committee was therefore not only performing a task but also carrying out its duty to eliminate colonialism.

497. He was grateful for the encouraging message from the President of the Revolutionary Council and for the inspiring address by the Foreign Minister. As the Committee's tour drew to a close, his delegation was more than ever convinced of the determination of Africans to uproot colonialism from their continent.

498. The representative of *Yugoslavia* associated himself with the Chairman's statement thanking the Government and people of Algeria for their warm welcome. His delegation was happy to be in Algeria, whose struggle for independence had been an inspiration to liberation movements elsewhere in Africa. Since the country continued to play an important role in that respect, various African liberation movements had set up their headquarters in Algeria.

499. The inspiring message from the President of the Revolutionary Council and the statement of the Foreign Minister would provide further impetus for the Special Committee's work. Co-operation and friendship between Algeria and Yugoslavia dated from the time of the Algerian struggle for independence and continued on the basis of non-alignment and peace.

500. He concluded by expressing his thanks for the hospitality extended to the Special Committee and the fine facilities and working arrangements provided, and wished the Algerian people all success, prosperity and progress.

501. The representative of *Afghanistan* associated himself with the Chairman's statement thanking the President of the Revolutionary Council for his inspiring message and the Foreign Minister for his important address and kind words of welcome. His gratitude also went to the Government and people of Algeria for inviting the Special Committee to hold some of its meetings in Algiers.

502. The warm welcome extended to the Special Committee was further testimony of the traditional

hospitality of Algerians, in whose country colonialism had encountered one of its greatest setbacks. Having gained its independence, Algeria was playing a leading role in decolonization.

503. Afghanistan and Algeria were bound in common aspirations and spiritual ties. When the heroic efforts and sacrifices of Algeria had led to independence, the joy of Afghanistan had been immense. He expressed his country's heartfelt wishes to the Algerian people for their happiness, prosperity and progress.

504. The representative of the *Union of Soviet Socialist Republics* expressed the sincere gratitude of the Soviet Union delegation to the President of the Revolutionary Council, the Government and the people of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria for their invitation and very cordial hospitality. The Special Committee's meetings in Algiers would undoubtedly be a source of inspiration to all those who desired the complete elimination of colonial régimes because the heroic struggle of the Algerian people against foreign oppression would always serve as an example to those who were fighting for their liberty.

505. The Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria was in the forefront of the fight against colonialism and imperialism; the struggle being waged by Algeria, in co-operation with sister States and the Organization of African Unity, for the final destruction of colonialism, deserved the admiration and gratitude of all peace-loving peoples.

506. He was particularly happy to be in Algeria, because the Soviet Union's relationship with that country had always been close. That relationship had begun as soon as the Algerian people had set out to resist oppression. On his arrival the previous day he had felt the effect of that friendship. The Soviet Union and Algeria had a common ideal: the building of socialism and of a new life.

507. The message which the President of the Revolutionary Council had addressed to the members of the Special Committee would be a source of inspiration to them, because it encouraged all those who were fighting for their independence. Mr. Bouteflika's address was also most valuable. He was gratified at the position adopted by the Algerian Government on problems of colonialism and on a number of international problems. He fully shared the views of the Algerian Government about the activities of United States imperialism in Viet-Nam.

508. The Soviet Union delegation would do everything in its power to ensure the implementation of resolution 1514 (XV). In due course it would give a detailed account of its position on the problems of putting an end to Portuguese and Spanish colonialism. For the moment, however, he would confine himself to assuring the peoples of those regions of the sympathy and fellow-feeling of the Soviet Union, which had helped and would in the future continue to help the independent States of Africa and the OAU in their noble struggle against colonialism and imperialism.

509. The colonial Powers would have to be compelled to respect the decisions of the General Assembly and the Security Council. That would be an arduous undertaking because those criminal régimes were being helped by the Western imperialist and colonialist Powers. Imperialism presented a united front. A coalition should be formed against those who wished to impede the irreversible process of the libera-

tion of peoples. Peace-loving peoples too, would have to present a united front to them. The Special Committee should make use of the right conferred on it by the General Assembly at its twentieth session to report on any developments which might threaten international peace and security. It should recommend measures in conformity with Chapter VII of the Charter against Portugal, South Africa and Southern Rhodesia. Decisions had to be taken to justify the hopes of the oppressed peoples of Africa. In conclusion, he wished Algeria every success in the course upon which it had embarked.

510. The representative of the *Ivory Coast* said that he considered it an honour and a pleasant duty for his delegation to associate itself with the very sincere thanks which had been expressed to the Government and people of the Republic of Algeria for their friendly invitation and for the brotherly and warm welcome they had extended to the members of the Special Committee. The invitation to visit Algiers, the last stop on its information tour through Africa, would enable the Committee to make contact, as it had at Dar es Salaam, Mogadiscio, Addis Ababa and Cairo, with freedom fighters who were trying to liberate their territories from colonial domination, apartheid and shameful régimes, such as the rebel régime of Ian Smith. Peace was indivisible and the rights of all peoples were universal. He therefore deplored the fact that, nineteen years after the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, millions of human beings were still being deprived of their inalienable rights. Such a state of affairs created trouble-spots which represented a constant threat to international peace. He appealed once more to the intelligence and common sense of the men and régimes responsible for that anachronistic situation. The period of the exploitation of man by man had passed.

511. The Special Committee was responsible for the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. It had to take into account the international background to which the Foreign Minister of the Republic of Algeria had referred in his address at the previous meeting and to concentrate its efforts on the peoples it had been instructed to assist in gaining their independence. Its visit to Africa should be interpreted as a further sign of the links of solidarity between the United Nations and all African peoples still deprived of their inalienable right to freedom and independence and subjected to racial discrimination.

512. He sincerely thanked the President of the Revolutionary Council and Head of the Algerian Government, whose country had already done so much to help solve the problem of decolonization, for the very wise and understanding message he had addressed to the members of the Committee. He also thanked the Foreign Minister of the Republic of Algeria for his clear and most informative statement. Both those statesmen were well aware of the heavy burden their country had assumed by welcoming to its territory the liberation movements of countries under colonial domination. He also paid a well-deserved tribute to the valiant Algerian people, which had itself fought so hard for its independence and was gratified that an Algerian delegation was participating in the Special Committee's work during its visit to Algiers. The Committee would derive valuable inspiration from the message from the President of

the Revolutionary Council and from the words of the Algerian Foreign Minister. He was happy to note that the Algerian people, despite its modest resources, had been able to make useful progress since independence. He wished the Algerian Government and people peace and prosperity.

513. The representative of *Venezuela* said that the Special Committee could have wished for no better place than Algiers in which to complete its work in Africa. Algeria was a living example of what a people filled with an ardent desire to win its independence and recover its sovereign liberty could do. The heroic struggle it had waged was reminiscent in many ways of that of the peoples of Latin America in general, and of Venezuela, in particular. Like the Venezuelan people, Algeria had not been content with obtaining its independence. Since regaining it, Algeria, as a member of the international community, had been pursuing a policy of capital importance within the United Nations, where it had adopted an attitude of unequivocal opposition to colonialism and of assistance to peoples fighting for their independence in Africa. He was certain that the Algerian people, which had not hesitated to sacrifice the lives of over a million of its sons in order to win its independence, would not consider its struggle ended until the millions of Africans suffering under the colonial yoke had regained, with their independence, their dignity as free peoples. The message which the President of the Revolutionary Council, Head of Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria, had addressed to the Special Committee that very morning was proof of that. In his interesting address, Mr. Abdelaziz Bouteflika, Foreign Minister of Algeria, had taken up the same theme. The Venezuelan delegation associated itself with the Chairman of the Special Committee in thanking them both; their words would be a source of inspiration to all members of the Committee. The people of Venezuela had followed every phase of the heroic struggle of the Algerian people and the Venezuelan delegation had made it its duty to defend that people in all circumstances in its statements and by its votes. He was happy and proud to be able to express, on Algerian soil, his admiration and respect for a people which had not only refused to be intimidated by the oppressor but had waged a relentless struggle to regain its liberty and independence.

514. 'It was no accident that the Special Committee was holding its meetings in Algeria at that time. Its journey through the African continent would have been incomplete if it had not included a visit to that sanctuary of anti-colonialism. Neither was it an accident that the Algerian Government had invited it. The Committee had a duty to see the country which had suffered so much and fought so hard against colonialism. That invitation had enabled it not only to come into contact with colonial reality in Africa but to become acquainted with the noble Algerian people which was, in its eyes, a living symbol of anti-colonialism in modern times.

515. Algeria was now free. It had begun a fresh struggle against ignorance and under-development. He had been struck by the country's youth. The streets were full of children and young people going to school or college. Algeria was making a determined stand against illiteracy in order to combat one of the most notable consequences of colonialism: ignorance. On behalf of his delegation, he thanked the Government

and people of Algeria for their cordial invitation and generous hospitality. The work of the Committee could not be concluded in a more propitious atmosphere. He was certain that that work would bear fruit. He hoped that the admirable people of Algeria would find a better future and wished it every success in all its undertakings.

516. The representative of *Syria* said that the fact that the Special Committee's concluding meetings should be held in Algiers was evidence of Algeria's awareness of the paramount role it was destined to play in support of the cause of emancipation everywhere, and to its determination to lead it to full accomplishment.

517. In the defence of freedom, of the right to self-determination and of emancipation from colonialism, that country had sacrificed a million martyrs and had waged one of the most heroic struggles in human history. In the face of its opposition, the myth of colonial assimilation had crumbled, and from that land, with African solidarity, Asian support, and the co-operation of justice-loving nations, would be directed the *coup de grâce* against the remaining pockets of colonialism. It was therefore significant that the plight of Angola should form the main topic of the Special Committee's consideration in Algiers.

518. With total self-denial and universal dedication, Algeria had not stopped at its own achievement, but had gone on to play its part in the solution of international problems at large and in support of the cause of liberation. The brilliant statement by its Foreign Minister had clearly depicted the large perspective of its role in international affairs in general, and above all in the struggle against the remnants of colonialism, a flagrant example of which in a new form was thriving to the detriment and misery of the Arab people of Palestine.

519. The great Algerian revolution had not stopped at the eradication of the physical presence of colonialism. It had been a structural revolution aimed at restoring the value of man, developing his resources, placing his welfare at the centre of endeavour, reviving his true culture and enhancing his contribution to civilization, in human relations based on social justice and equality. Last but not least it had been aimed at stimulating the legitimate tendency of progressive forces towards solidarity, and community of interests, aims and aspirations. It had been a genuine revolution against the concept of master and slave, first and second class citizens, privileged and under-privileged. It had thus a most intimate connexion with the purposes of the Special Committee in helping to implement the granting of independence to innocent peoples who had for long suffered under colonial inhumanities, and with the United Nations objectives of international peace and justice.

520. The gallant people of Algeria were to their brother Arabs of Syria a source of inspiration, and the model they had offered was an embodiment of all that was noble for humanity. He expressed his country's sincere gratitude to them, to their Government and to the President of the Revolutionary Council.

521. The representative of *Italy* associated himself with the thanks expressed by the Chairman, on behalf of the Special Committee, to the President of the Revolutionary Council and to the Foreign Minister of Algeria. His delegation's gratitude went to the Government and people of Algeria for inviting the Com-

mittee to hold its final meetings in Algiers. So close were the ties and so short the distance that Italians did not feel themselves to be abroad when in Algeria. He was indeed most happy to be there and hoped that his visit would give him a closer acquaintance with the country's progress since independence.

522. The Special Committee had to reaffirm its pledge to foster the process of decolonization by peaceful means. All should adhere to that principle, both for moral reasons and because it was a prerequisite for international co-operation in accordance with the United Nations Charter. The invitation extended to the Committee was symbolic of Algeria's confidence in the United Nations, for which the Committee was grateful.

523. He expressed his delegation's deep admiration for Algeria's past and present achievements and extended his best wishes for the country's subsequent prosperity and well-being.

524. The representative of *Madagascar* expressed his delegation's thanks to the Algerian Government for inviting the Special Committee to hold the final part of its session in the wonderful city of Algiers.

525. The task which the Special Committee was performing on Algerian soil was, in his delegation's opinion, of special importance. History had willed that Algeria and Madagascar should have experience of the same master and the same tribulations. The colonial history of Madagascar was bound up with that of the Maghreb countries generally and particularly with that of Algeria; for instance, Mohamed V, Sultan of Morocco, had been exiled to Malagasy territory, and the Queen of Madagascar, Ranaivalona III, had ended her days in exile in Algiers.

526. Like so many other countries, Madagascar desired peace and sought co-operation at all times among the members of the international community, but its Government was convinced that concord among members of that community would be resting on a fragile and precarious foundation as long as any State cherished the ambition to exploit a foreign people, as long as any Government persisted in refusing a subject people the right to self-determination. The accession to independence of a large number of African countries and their awareness of their responsibilities to their brothers who were still oppressed should be a clear warning to those who still clung to the idea of domination and exploitation that they were trying to swim against the tide. The ideals of freedom and independence had gained such strength in Africa that those obstinate Governments would be forced to listen to the voice of reason and accept their defeat.

527. The case of the Algerian people had provided the annals of history with an illustration of the victory of those ideas over arms. An entire nation might be exterminated, but it had never been possible to stifle by force the genuine aspirations of a people, because there would always be others outside its frontiers who shared its ideals. Madagascar had recovered its sovereignty and was aware of its responsibility to peoples still subject to foreign domination. The Malagasy delegation was therefore deeply grateful to the Algerian Government for the generous hospitality it had offered to the Committee of Twenty-four, which would again enable the members of that Committee to meet men still living under the colonial yoke, to gather first-hand information on the situation in colo-

nial territories seeking liberation, to draw practical conclusions from it and to produce better results.

528. The representative of the *United States of America* thanked the Government and people of Algeria for their hospitality and welcome.

529. She regretted to have to place it on record that her delegation took exception to certain remarks of the Foreign Minister of Algeria and the representative of the Soviet Union, both of whom had seen fit to interject and distort a subject which lay outside the purview of the Special Committee.

530. However, she was extremely happy to be in a country which, since the first settlements of Carthage, the sweep of Islam and the contact of Christianity, had played a prominent role in history. It was a pleasure for her to recall that Algeria and the United States had always maintained diplomatic or consular relations. Her delegation was gratified to see the emergence of a new Algeria confidently facing the future, and wished it every success in its difficult task.

531. The representative of *Ethiopia* joined in thanking the Government and people of Algeria for the hospitality and warm welcome extended to the Special Committee. The heroic struggle of the Algerian people against colonialism and imperialism would always remain a landmark in the annals of the Continent, and serve as an example and an inspiration to all those struggling to win freedom and independence.

532. The Special Committee's presence in the brave city of Algiers, whose very name had become synonymous with anti-colonialism, was of great significance. The question of the Territories under Portuguese domination had appropriately been reserved for discussion in that heroic place where the militant atmosphere and revolutionary enthusiasm would undoubtedly provide a suitable setting for consideration of such a burning question. The sacrifices of the people of Algeria in defence of freedom and independence would strengthen the determination of those now engaged in a life and death struggle against Portuguese oppression. They would continue the struggle to the bitter end, knowing that their efforts would be crowned with success and that their sacrifices would not be in vain. The trail of heroism and sacrifice blazed by Algeria had left its indelible mark on the struggling masses of Angola, Mozambique, Portuguese Guinea and other lands. The Committee was grateful to the Government and people of Algeria for having invited it, and for having made it possible for world attention to be focused on such a crucial issue.

533. So far as Ethiopia was concerned, the complete eradication of colonialism and imperialism from the earth was a commitment and a national objective. The fossilized attitude of Portugal in obstinately clinging to its colonies in Africa was not only an affront to world public opinion, but a shame to modern civilization. Ethiopia would not rest until that shame had been obliterated.

534. After a rule lasting for several centuries, the Portuguese colonialists had nothing to show in their favour. Forced labour, torture and oppression were the hallmarks of their civilizing mission in Africa. The inhabitants of Angola, Mozambique and Portuguese Guinea were left with no alternative but to resort to arms to regain their right to decent human existence. They had the full moral and material support of

progressive humanity for their struggle, long and bitter though it might be. As the struggle intensified in the days to come, Portuguese obduracy was bound to collapse under its own weight of cruelty and oppression.

535. His delegation wished to thank the President and the Foreign Minister of Algeria very sincerely for their inspiring messages, and assured the Algerian people that in their efforts for advancing the great cause of freedom and independence they had in Ethiopia a strong and faithful ally, whose aims and objectives were identical. He also assured all the freedom fighters present that Ethiopia, together with all progressive mankind, would leave no stone unturned in seeing that the struggle for justice and democracy was finally crowned with success.

536. The representative of *Chile* expressed the Chilean delegation's very sincere gratitude to the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria for the invitation it had extended to the Special Committee. Like the beauty of the Algerian landscape, the history of the Algerian people's bravery was a source of inspiration to all nations which loved peace and desired the victory of equality and justice throughout the world.

537. Algeria had provided the finest example of total elimination of colonialism. The whole world had followed, minute by minute, the fight waged by its people to emerge from the phase of oppression to that of free exercise of its rights. The Chilean people had always defended that cause. It had unremittingly opposed the colonial system. It had remained aware at all times of its obligations to the rest of the world. It had contributed in every way possible to the liberation of peoples and territories under colonial domination, in order to enable them to exercise as early as possible their basic right to self-determination and to decide their own future.

538. Chile had always greatly admired the Algerian nation and had always supported the liberation movement, through which, at the cost of so much suffering and bloodshed, it had achieved the independence of its territory and its people. It had felt the proclamation of Algeria's independence to be a personal triumph. Its relations with Algeria had always been close and cordial, as it had proved by concluding bilateral agreements with that country and acting in complete harmony with it in the community of nations.

539. The Chilean delegation had listened with great interest to the message from the President of the Revolutionary Council and to the excellent address that morning by the Foreign Minister of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria. It warmly congratulated both those distinguished figures on their brilliant exposition of their Government's point of view on the situation in Territories still under colonial domination.

540. Algeria, like the other States of the world community, well knew Chile's attitude to that type of domination. As a member of the Special Committee, Chile had been able to make an effective contribution to the fight being waged against colonialism in order to secure for men who were still aliens on their own territory the full exercise of their rights. If all States acted in the same way and applied the basic principles of the United Nations Charter, the problem could be solved and a long obsolete system defeated.

541. In conclusion, he reiterated his delegation's thanks to the Algerian Government and people for

their cordial hospitality and the fraternal welcome they had extended to the members of the Committee of Twenty-Four.

542. The representative of *Iran* expressed his delegation's sincere thanks to the President of the Revolutionary Council, the Government and the people of Algeria for their kind invitation to the Special Committee to hold its concluding meetings in Algiers. Although it had come to the final stage of its journey, its task still remained to be accomplished. In the course of its meetings in Africa it had been greatly encouraged by the faith which people everywhere had placed in its work; among the heroic people of Algeria it would draw strength and reinforce its determination to liquidate imperialism.

543. It was through valour, unflagging determination and strength of character that the Algerian people had secured their great success against colonialism. Theirs had been the sweat, blood and toil, while the Special Committee's role was one of persuasion. It could, however, be safely said that in spite of the great odds the Special Committee had to face, it would succeed in the cause of freedom and independence if it always kept in mind the heroic example of Algeria. That country's championship of freedom and justice had not stopped at its own independence, but it had been a torch-bearer to all colonial peoples and had spared no effort to fight for the total liquidation of imperialism everywhere. Its independence had marked the beginning of a new era, from the first day of which its Government had embarked upon a bold policy for the betterment of the life of its people. Its efforts in the fields of education, the fight against illiteracy, industrialization and the mechanization of agriculture had been crowned with success, and would open up the possibility of a richer life for all. He paid homage to the Algerian martyrs, whose sacrifice had not been in vain. They had given their lives so that their brothers and sisters could live in freedom and justice.

544. The Special Committee would derive great benefit from the wise and inspiring words of the President of the Revolutionary Council and the Foreign Minister of Algeria. He expressed the thanks of his country, which had from time immemorial been linked to Algeria by spiritual and cultural ties, for the warm hospitality that had been extended, and its best wishes for the success and prosperity of the Algerian people.

545. The representative of *Sierra Leone* thanked the Foreign Minister of Algeria for his stimulating words on the Special Committee's responsibilities in regard to colonialism, and assured him that his delegation would do all in its power to contribute towards the quest for a just and speedy solution.

546. The questions of Southern Rhodesia, South West Africa and the Territories under Portuguese domination had been described as chronic cases of colonialism. The armed struggle in those Territories called to mind the struggle that had been waged by the heroic people of Algeria for so long, and he was convinced that it too would be successful. The Special Committee was fortunate to be in Algiers for its discussion on those Territories, which would bring new hope to the freedom fighters. Its deliberations and recommendations would rekindle the fire of independence that the colonial Powers had tried to smother.

547. The bondage of colonialism left behind it low economic standards which were a form of oppression that left a lasting wound. Algeria's example, however,

would give strength to its kith and kin still awaiting liberation.

548. The Special Committee had received a warm welcome from the people of Algeria. He was convinced that its stay would be an enjoyable one, and that his country and Algeria would go from strength to strength in their quest for peace, justice and freedom in all parts of the world. His delegation was grateful to the President of the Revolutionary Council and the Government and people of Algeria for their gracious invitation and generous hospitality, and to the President and Foreign Minister for their thought-provoking statements. The Committee would leave no stone unturned in its task of fighting all forms of colonialism.

549. The representative of *Bulgaria* expressed his delegation's sincere thanks to Mr. Houari Boumedienne, President of the Revolutionary Council and Head of Government, the other members of the Government and the people of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria for the warm welcome they had extended to the Special Committee.

550. At that final stage of its discussions, the Committee was in a position to appreciate the true worth of Algeria's generous hospitality. Its work had not been fruitless and its results, good as they were, would be even better, thanks to the welcome it had received.

551. The Bulgarian delegation welcomed the presence at the meeting of the Algerian delegation. The members of the Committee, who had a special role to play in the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, would appreciate the real value of that delegation's co-operation. The active participation in the Committee's work of a country which was in the forefront of the fight against imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism was bound to give fresh impetus to the Committee's decolonization activities. The moving message from President Boumedienne and the excellent address by Mr. Bouteflika, Foreign Minister of Algeria, contained ideas and suggestions which would increase the effectiveness of the Committee's work and be a source of inspiration to all. The Bulgarian delegation associated itself with the Algerian Foreign Minister's moving expression of solidarity and sympathy with the people of South Viet-Nam. The Bulgarian delegation had always ardently desired to be on close terms with the revolutionary people of Algeria, which had been able to break its colonial shackles by its own efforts and had written in blood, at the cost of the lives of almost 2 million of its children, one of the most glorious pages in the history of the armed struggle against imperialism, colonialism and the oppression of man by man. He was profoundly moved at being on Algerian soil for the first time. The Committee's presence in the beautiful city of Algiers, the pearl of the Mediterranean, was deeply significant. He was sure that the Committee would be able to fulfil its task, that it would not disappoint the brave Algerian people which was so generously giving it hospitality, that it would be inspired by Algeria's victorious struggle against colonialism and would spare no effort to help, with the support of the United Nations, in the liberation of colonized peoples.

552. In pursuance of its anti-imperialist policy, characteristic of a socialist State, the People's Republic of Bulgaria unreservedly supported the fight against colonialism and national liberation movements in Southern Rhodesia, South West Africa, South Africa,

Mozambique, Angola, so-called Portuguese Guinea, Aden, Oman and elsewhere, in the same way as it had sided unconditionally with the Algerian people when it was carrying out its heroic fight for liberation. In that city, imbued as it was with a revolutionary and anti-colonialist spirit, the Bulgarian delegation wished to reaffirm the solidarity of the Bulgarian people with peoples still suffering under the colonial yoke. It asked the President to convey to the valiant Algerian people and to his Government the best wishes of the Bulgarian people for success in their task of building a new society founded on freedom and justice. It wished the people of Algeria, to which the Bulgarian people was linked by bonds of friendship and co-operation, further success in consolidating the power of the people and building a popular and democratic Algeria.

553. The representative of *Denmark* sincerely thanked the Government of the Algerian Republic for inviting the Special Committee to hold meetings in Algiers. He had been deeply impressed by the cordiality of the Algerians' welcome and by the traditional hospitality of the country and the people. It was quite natural that the Special Committee should meet in the capital of a country whose fight for independence was an example to other countries under colonial domination. The Danish delegation was convinced that the work of the Committee would be inspired by the spirit of freedom which had been the mainspring of that fight. The same spirit was evident in the message addressed by President Boumedienne to the Committee and in the statement on the colonial problem made by Mr. Abdelaziz Bouteflika, Algerian Foreign Minister. The Danish delegation had been most gratified to note the confidence which Algeria placed in the United Nations, since that Organization could and should play a very important part in the process of decolonization. It had been very happy to note Mr. Bouteflika's statement on the friendly relations which had developed since the liberation between Algeria and France and which proved that the relationship between the dominator and the dominated could be replaced by a more fruitful one based on the principles of sovereignty and equality.

554. The Danish delegation was gratified that its Government maintained excellent relations with the Government of the Algerian Republic. It wished to convey to the President of the Revolutionary Council, and to the Government and people of Algeria the best wishes of the Danish Government and people for their happiness and for progress in the course they had chosen.

555. The representative of *Australia* said that in coming to Algeria his delegation was very conscious of being among people who had suffered greatly, dared greatly and were achieving greatly. It was an honour to be among them, and it had been a particular pleasure to be greeted in their own country by former friends and colleagues of the Algerian Mission to the United Nations in New York. Their offices and his were adjacent, and apart from being good neighbours they had become firm friends.

556. His delegation offered its deepest respects to the President of the Revolutionary Council, and thanked him and the people of Algeria most sincerely for their hospitality. It would faithfully convey to its Government the message with which the President had honoured the Special Committee, together with that of the Foreign Minister.

557. On the last stage of its journey through Africa, the Special Committee had become more deeply conscious than ever of the importance of the people, who were the object of all its efforts. Their rights and their hopes could in the ultimate be realized and their fears overcome only by the common efforts and common understanding of humanity. For free people everywhere, the price of liberty was eternal vigilance to protect their rights and to recognize the changing and sinister forms of aggression against them, so that every man could remain or become the free man he would wish to be.

558. He expressed his delegation's warmest good wishes to the leaders and people of that free country for the future that they had bought so dearly.

559. The representative of *Algeria* said he knew that it was not customary for an observer to take part in the discussion but he wished to say a few words in reply to the friendly remarks made by all the delegations about his country. If, as he would have wished, the whole Algerian people had been able to hear the words of friendship, admiration, confidence and gratitude which had been addressed to his country, it would have found them to be the finest tribute paid to its courage and its heroic sacrifice, and would have discovered that all the members of the Committee were aware of the grandeur and repercussions of its struggle.

560. The statements by members of the Committee were too numerous to allow him to reply individually. The Algerian delegation would therefore thank the members of the Committee collectively, on behalf of the Revolutionary Council, the Government and the whole Algerian people, for their friendly remarks and the unanimous good wishes they had expressed.

561. At the end of a difficult struggle, Algeria was trying to rebuild all its ruins, the inevitable consequences of its desperate fight for liberty, in order to build a strong sovereign State, worthy of its thousand-year past and therefore capable of playing its full part within the community of nations. There was no incompatibility at all between that ambition and the principles by which the Committee was guided. True to the description "Algiers, sanctuary of anti-colonialism", which one of the speakers had used, Algeria was determined to oppose the after-effects of colonialism wherever they were still to be found.

562. The Algerian Government therefore had a binding duty to co-operate as effectively as possible with all forms of anti-colonial struggle, by giving direct and indirect help to liberation movements in their bitter fight. The logical consequence of that attitude was the invitation which had been extended to the Special Committee to hold part of its session in Algeria. He was very pleased that an opportunity was thus being provided to all his brothers-in-arms present in Algiers to obtain a hearing from the Committee, which would in that way be fully informed of the conditions under which they were fighting. He was also gratified to be able to welcome the members of the Committee to a country whose tradition of hospitality had so often been praised and to make available to it all the necessary working facilities and all the tourist resources of his young motherland. He again thanked the members of the Committee for the warm friendliness they had demonstrated towards Algeria.

Closing of meetings

General statements

563. The representative of *Czechoslovakia* said that he had enjoyed the opportunity to attend the Special Committee's session in Africa, if only as an observer. The Committee had accomplished much and had adopted a number of effective resolutions on the Territories it had considered. His Government would pay due attention to those resolutions and would support the Committee's recommendations during the deliberations at the General Assembly. It would, moreover, do its utmost for the cause of freedom and independence of colonial countries and peoples.

564. Certain delegations had expressed concern at the outset that the participation of observers in the Committee's discussions might delay its work. The majority of members would, however, agree with him that that had not proved to be the case and that any obstacles which had hampered the smooth running of the Committee's proceedings came from an entirely different source.

565. Lastly, he extended thanks to the Committee for allowing him to attend its session as an observer and to those Governments which had invited the Committee to meet in their capitals. He wished the Committee every success in its future work for the freedom and independence of colonial countries and peoples.

566. The representative of the *Secretary-General* expressed gratitude, on behalf of the Secretariat and in his own name, to the Algerian Government and people for their hospitality and for all the facilities they had made available and asked the Algerian delegation to convey his thanks to all concerned. The Secretary-General had also asked him to express deep appreciation to the Algerian Minister for Foreign Affairs for the kind words in his opening address to the Committee.

567. He also wished to record the gratitude of all members of the Secretariat for the many personal kindnesses extended to them by the Chairman, Vice-Chairman, Rapporteur and members of the Committee.

568. The *Chairman*, speaking on behalf of the Special Committee, expressed gratitude to the President and the Government of Algeria for enabling the Committee to hold its final meetings in Algiers, and to the Government and people for their warm welcome and hospitality. The facilities provided for the Committee's meetings had been particularly appreciated.

569. The Committee had been most happy to visit Algeria because of the opportunity to strengthen contacts, friendships and links with the brave Algerian people. Their struggle had indeed been a source of inspiration to the Committee and lent impetus to its work. Algeria had won a bitter, long drawn-out struggle for independence with but limited assistance from the United Nations, owing to the unfavourable balance of forces in its political organs. However, the very success of the struggle had given impetus to a process which had somewhat redressed that balance and led to the establishment of the Special Committee. The Committee had also been able to appreciate Algeria's whole-hearted dedication to the cause of the emancipation of all colonial countries and peoples, as attested by its position in the vanguard of countries extending, at great sacrifice, generous material and moral assistance to national liberation movements. It had also sensed the country's attachment to the cause

of true freedom, the purging of all traces of colonialism from its system, and its progress in the consolidation of its hard-won independence.

570. The resolution on Equatorial Guinea (A/AC.109/186) adopted by the Committee in Algiers expressed gratification at the Spanish invitation, which was both a welcome indication of willingness to co-operate with the Committee and an example worthy of emulation by other colonial Powers. However, it should be stressed that those sentiments were based on the expectation that the invitation would lead to the complete and rapid implementation of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV). Only then would the Spanish gesture and the Committee's subsequent action deserve to be regarded as a constructive contribution. With regard to the resolution on Territories under Portuguese administration (A/AC.109/187), the Committee had heard several petitioners whose testimony amounted to a massive indictment of the Portuguese Government's violation of human rights. Members had been horrified and overwhelmed by the irrefutable evidence of the Portuguese atrocities committed against children and old people, in particular. However, the Committee had been heartened by news of the unrelenting struggle being waged by the nationalists in order to free themselves from the yoke of the oppressors, and had gained direct knowledge of their aspirations, needs and difficulties. On the basis of that evidence, the Committee had adopted an important and far-reaching resolution, which contained a number of new elements: concern at the further aggravation of the already critical situation by the racist minority rebellion in Southern Rhodesia; condemnation of the violation of the economic and political rights of the indigenous people by the settlement of foreign immigrants and the transfer of African labour to South Africa; condemnation of the activities of financial concerns in the Territories exploiting the human and material resources and impeding progress towards independence and freedom; an appeal to all States to prevent their nationals from co-operating with the Portuguese authorities, especially in the matter of foreign investment; and a firm recommendation to the Security Council to make the implementation of General Assembly resolution 2107 (XX) mandatory on all Member States.

571. The decision to undertake another African visit had been more than justified by the results achieved. The concern and active solidarity of the United Nations with colonial peoples generally had been further emphasized. Direct contact with peoples under colonial rule had put the Special Committee in a better position to understand and assist them in their legitimate struggle for freedom and independence. Petitioners had found it easier to appear before the Committee in order both to provide confirmation of the iniquitous nature of the colonial system, and to offer fresh ideas and suggestions—thereby adding to the capacity of the Committee to contribute to the rapid liquidation of colonialism. That was illustrated by the resolution adopted that morning concerning the implementation of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) (A/AC.109/188).

572. In that connexion, particular attention should be drawn to the recommendation to the Security Council to make the measures provided for under Chapter VII of the Charter against Portugal, South Africa and the minority régime in Southern Rhodesia,

mandatory on all Member States. That was a worthy response to the request made by the General Assembly to the Committee in its resolution 2105 (XX) to make such suggestions as might assist the Council in its consideration of appropriate measures to counteract threats to international peace and security arising from developments in colonial Territories.

573. In addition to reiterating the legitimacy of the struggle of colonial peoples to exercise their right to self-determination and independence, the Committee had gone further than in previous resolutions by inviting all States to provide material and moral assistance to liberation movements in colonial Territories.

574. Another noteworthy development in the thinking of the Committee was its implied condemnation of military bases in colonial Territories and its request to colonial Powers to dismantle such bases and refrain from establishing new ones in their colonies.

575. Furthermore, the resolutions adopted by the Committee during its visit to Africa showed a renewed emphasis of the importance of economic factors in the implementation of the Declaration. Experience had shown that those factors, in the form of financial and economic interests operating in collusion with the colonial Powers, all too often obstructed progress towards the application of the Declaration.

576. The Committee's deliberations had also clearly demonstrated the need to ensure that independence was based on the freely expressed wishes of the people.

577. He expressed his deep appreciation to the Organization of African Unity and to the League of Arab States for their effective collaboration in the Committee's work and hoped that those links would be strengthened. He also extended the Committee's thanks to all host Governments for their warm welcome and kind co-operation.

578. The representative of *Ethiopia* said that throughout its visit to Africa the Special Committee had sensed the depth of African feeling and the desire to rid the continent of colonialism. The five capitals in which the Committee had held meetings represented a cross-section of Africa. The visit had therefore been very useful, in that it had afforded close contact and had strengthened the confidence of Africans in the Committee and in the United Nations as a whole. That had been attested by the warm and spontaneous welcome extended to the Committee.

579. The speeches delivered and resolutions adopted had given encouragement to all African freedom fighters. The Committee was of course only a moral force, and no panacea; but because of its tenacity of purpose it had gained stature in the eyes of the world.

580. The road to decolonization was long, but the right course had been engaged. Because of the noble, though necessarily modest, efforts of the Committee, colonialism was being driven to bay and would be vanquished if the pressure continued.

581. He wished to associate his delegation with the thanks expressed by the Chairman, on behalf of the Committee, to the President, Government and people of Algeria for their fraternal welcome. The great work of national reconstruction and development under way in Algeria was evidence of what a people could accomplish when master of its own destiny. He concluded by extending the best wishes

of his Government for all further success on the road of progress, democracy and social justice.

Statement by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria

582. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of the *Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria* said that he was addressing the members of the Special Committee in order to tell them, on behalf of President Boumedienne, the Revolutionary Council, the National Liberation Front and the Algerian Government, how much they had all appreciated the goodwill that the members of the Committee had, with one accord, expressed towards Algeria, which had suffered so much during its long and murderous war of liberation. It was particularly encouraging to see that the enormous sacrifices made by the Algerian people on the altar of liberty not only had enabled Algeria to achieve independence but could also be a source of encouragement to the enslaved peoples who were still struggling against colonial domination. He offered his heartiest congratulations to the Committee, which had been unsparing in its efforts to accomplish the lofty mission entrusted to it and which, after fruitful discussion, had achieved such encouraging and positive results.

583. As the Chairman had pointed out, the presence in Africa of the Special Committee, dedicated as it was to the cause of decolonization, revealed the change of heart that had taken place at the United Nations. Indeed, the adoption of the historic Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples marked a decisive stage in the evolution of the United Nations. It was possible to assess the progress achieved and the distance travelled by recalling that not until 1961 had the Special Committee replaced the defunct and ridiculous Committee on Information, whose terms of reference had covered all the problems of the Non-Self-Governing Territories with the exception of the immediate, basic and essential problem of their political situation and their achievement of independence. It was therefore a source of great satisfaction to Algeria, which had struggled for so many years before it had been able to make the long-stifled voice of its revolution heard in various international bodies, that the Special Committee had been able to visit Africa in order to hear representatives of the liberation movements, to obtain first-hand information about the situation in the dependent territories and to establish closer contact with the realities of colonialism.

584. While, however, it thus gave credit to the United Nations for the great progress it had brought about in international opinion in the quest for a solution to the degrading problem of colonialism, Algeria could not fail to note with indignation and deep concern that resolution 1514 (XV) on the granting of independence had remained a dead letter, like so many other resolutions, as was clear from all the petitions which the Committee had heard. The colonial Powers, which were responsible for the future of the peoples placed under their administration, were refusing to co-operate with the Special Committee, defying the United Nations with impunity and displaying utter contempt for international opinion. He could not but deplore once again the negative attitude of the United Kingdom, which had absented itself from the meetings of the Committee but was present at Salisbury, where it was compromising itself with Ian Smith instead of respond-

ing to the appeal of the United Nations and committing itself honestly to a policy of decolonization.

585. That was why Algeria felt that the time for resolutions of which nothing ever came had passed and that immediate and effective measures should be put into effect to abolish colonialism and the exploitation of man by man. The time had come to transfer full powers to the dependent peoples in order to enable them to choose their political status freely, to organize the development of their countries and to pursue their progress in every field, in conformity with the United Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Meanwhile Algeria, faithful to its revolution and to its martyrs who had fallen on the battlefield of freedom, would continue to furnish unstinted material and moral support to all liberation movements in the just and legitimate struggle which colonialism was forcing them to wage for the recovery of their dignity and of their inalienable right to self-determination. Algeria knew by experience that it was idle to hope that Lisbon, Pretoria or Salisbury would allow independence to be achieved by peaceful means.

586. Turning more specifically to the question of the Territories under Portuguese domination, which the Committee had just been studying at Algiers, he would like to compliment the Committee on the calm and serious atmosphere that had prevailed at its meetings and on the unflagging attention which it had given to the petitioners. The resolutions that the Committee had adopted in the light of the information which it had patiently amassed meant that there were still grounds for hoping that the United Nations, thus brought face to face with its responsibilities, would do its duty. By taking the important step of recommending to the Security Council that it should be made obligatory for all States to implement the measures provided for in General Assembly resolution 2107 (XX), the Committee had put its finger upon one of the provisions that was most likely to bring Portugal to its senses if that provision was adopted and consistently followed. Those results responded to the hopes which the liberation movements and the African peoples had reposed in the Committee. They did honour to the United Nations and added lustre to its reputation. The work of the Committee, after its African tour, was really only just beginning. It must be carried on tirelessly within the United Nations, in order to bring all States to a healthier appreciation of the realities of colonialism. Algeria's devotion to the universal principles of the United Nations, the enthusiasm with which it would support any measures calculated to strengthen the Organization, the faith and optimism which it felt with regard to the future of mankind, and, lastly, its passionate thirst for justice and freedom—all those factors showed how closely the aims of the Committee coincided with those of the country which had the honour to be its host.

587. On behalf of the Revolutionary Council and the Algerian Government, he congratulated the Committee most warmly on the hard work it had done both at Algiers and elsewhere, in other capitals of the African continent. That work had brought the Committee's arduous but inspiring task considerably nearer to fulfilment. That the result of the Committee's efforts was encouraging, to say the least, was undoubtedly due to a spirit of healthy rivalry, to the existence of such a widespread and concerted will to hasten the process of decolonization, and to the invaluable, indeed

indispensable, assistance of valiant freedom fighters, full of forceful ideas, imbued with hope and faith, and determined to conquer and radically to transform the future of their peoples, whose subjugation ran counter to the spirit of the age. The Committee had proved, if proof were needed, that the vast majority of its States members, and particularly, in spite of their inevitable growing pains, those that had emerged in recent years, respected the struggle of the peoples who were still oppressed and encouraged their actions, thus putting into practice in the best possible way the principles which most clearly embodied the spirit of the United Nations. The Committee's reaffirmation and renewed demonstration of active solidarity undoubtedly marked a decisive step on the path towards decolonization and the consolidation of the independence of the young States. Algeria, which owed the progress and ultimate victory of its cause to the support it had received from so many quarters during its war of liberation, was today able to appreciate the true value of the Committee's work. Support for liberation movements all over the world was a sacred ethical principle by which the Algerian people and its Government were constantly guided. Algeria gave unconditional support to the peoples of Angola, Mozambique, Guinea (Bissau), Southern Rhodesia, South West Africa, South Africa, Palestine, Oman, Aden and all Territories still under colonial rule in their heroic struggle to shake off the colonial yoke and to regain freedom. Algeria would continue its unstinted support until the day when those peoples were able to resume their rightful place among the family of independent States of the Third World and in the community of nations.

588. Apart from the action undertaken for the assistance of the countries under colonial domination, the Committee's solidarity reflected the efforts made by the recently constituted States to establish their independence on increasingly healthy foundations. Indeed, national independence only became genuine and acquired true meaning as a country gradually shaped and built up its own economic and social framework. Because of circumstances as complex as they were outdated—an inevitable consequence of struggles for influence between exclusively foreign interests—attempts were often made to oppose that type of consolidation.

589. The adoption of the resolution on the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, a resolution which recognized the legitimacy of the struggle—in all its forms, particularly the most effective ones—of the peoples under colonial rule and which invited all States to provide material and moral assistance to the national liberation movements in colonial Territories, constituted a welcome change in the methods of the United Nations. It had been inevitable, in view of the blind obstinacy of certain colonial Powers. The recognition of the legitimacy of the struggle of the peoples under colonial rule put an end to the age in which the efforts of those peoples—oppressed, humiliated and deprived of all their rights, even that of living in freedom—to regain their independence were regarded by colonialists and their natural allies as a violation of established laws. That the dignity of the struggle had today been stressed by one of the principal organs of the General Assembly was a source of considerable encouragement to all national libera-

tion movements. Moreover, the Special Committee's appeal to all States to provide moral and material assistance to the oppressed peoples reduced the scope of all the tendentious and improper interpretations which the colonial Powers applied to the principle of non-interference in the domestic affairs of a State. By providing the sorely needed assistance for which they had been asked, countries that cared for justice, freedom and the preservation of world peace would be able to give effective support to the oppressed peoples in what had now become a world-wide struggle for the abolition of colonialism, which constituted an ever increasing threat to international security. Such a course would also preclude attempts at the use of force by certain States that dreamed of keeping their colonies for ever and by others that longed to recover their lost empires.

590. On behalf of his Government, he congratulated the Committee on having requested the specialized agencies of the United Nations and other relief organizations to increase, in co-operation with the liberation movements of all the Territories under colonial domination, their assistance to the refugees of those Territories. The petitioners who had appeared before the Committee had pointed out the social aspect of the sacred struggle they were waging against foreign occupation, a struggle of the first importance for all leaders of liberation movements throughout the world. The petitioners were aware that the future of their country after independence would depend essentially on the strength of its people and on the fresh sources of energy that would be released. By requesting the specialized agencies to increase their assistance to oppressed peoples and to do so in co-operation with the representatives of those peoples, the Committee was giving due recognition to the men who today were shaping the destiny of their country. The Algerian Government fully supported that decision.

591. Other decisions of equal importance had been taken by the Committee while it had been at Algiers. They marked the firm resolve of the member States to achieve rapid decolonization of the occupied territories. That laudable intention would achieve results equal to the hopes it inspired if it was backed up by the sincere co-operation of the Powers still administering the Territories. By inviting a delegation of the Special Committee to visit Equatorial Guinea, the Spanish Government had adopted a helpful initial attitude. That attitude would not really bear fruit until Equatorial Guinea became a free, independent and sovereign State, as was bound to happen.

592. The positions of other colonial Powers, however, had undergone no change. Portugal, among others, was persisting in its refusal to co-operate with the United Nations. That intransigence was due far more to the assistance given to Portugal by certain Western Powers than to the resources of its own which the Lisbon Government thought it possessed. It was clear that in helping the Portuguese armed forces to resist the legitimate claims of the oppressed peoples those Western States were seeking to safeguard economic and strategic interests of the first importance. And when the last bastions of colonialism had been conquered, those same Powers would want to replace that collusion by indirect action designed to prolong indefinitely the exploitation of the peoples of those Territories by hindering the consolidation of their newly won independence. That new form of colonialism was a potential source of real dangers, the existence

of which it would be idle to deny; hence the work of decolonization, if it was not to remain incomplete, would have to be extended to neo-colonial situations. It was the direct responsibility of the Committee to carry out in full the task which had been entrusted to it. If complete and total independence was to be achieved, that aspect of the problem should not go unanalysed. If it did, decolonization would lose much of its meaning in the eyes of the peoples.

593. That danger loomed even larger when, as in the case of certain colonial Territories already on the road to independence, the administering Power was seen to be installing indigenous elements who represented the economic, and often also the political, interests of the colonialists themselves. That could only result in further exploitation of the peoples of those territories within the framework of the granting of independence. The Special Committee should not think that, once independence had thus been granted, its work was over. It would be useful if commissions representing the United Nations could visit territories about to become independent in order that their peoples might be free to choose genuine leaders under United Nations supervision. The idea of granting independence must be conceived in flexible terms allowing full play to the legitimate aspirations of the peoples concerned. Any restriction would limit the extent of that natural right and run counter to the aims both of the peoples themselves and of the United Nations.

594. In conclusion, he once again conveyed to the Committee the congratulations of the Algerian Government and people on the conclusive results which the Committee had achieved in Africa and wished it every success in the fulfilment of its task. He also thanked all the representatives who had spoken so warmly and kindly about Algeria and the Algerian people and assured them of the deep and sincere feelings of friendship and esteem which Algeria entertained towards all the peoples whom they represented. He asked the indulgence of members of the Committee for the inevitable defects in the organization of the Conference. Whatever efforts were made, they would never fully succeed in expressing the welcome of the Algerian people, who strove to be among the worthiest heirs to the splendid traditions of Arab-African hospitality. What really mattered was that each member of the Committee should have felt himself thoroughly at home during his brief stay and should now enjoy the pleasures of a well-earned rest.

F. ACTION ARISING FROM THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE'S VISIT TO AFRICA

Adoption of resolution concerning the implementation of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) with regard to colonial Territories considered by the Special Committee during its meetings in Africa (1966)

595. At the 454th meeting of the Special Committee on 21 June 1966, the representative of the *United Republic of Tanzania* introduced a draft resolution co-sponsored by Afghanistan, Ethiopia, India, Iran, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Mali, Sierra Leone, Syria, Tunisia, the United Republic of Tanzania and Yugoslavia (A/AC.109/L.315). In view of the interrelation of the colonial problems with which the Committee had dealt, the co-sponsors thought it ad-

visable to supplement and summarize the various relevant resolutions in a general resolution.

596. *The Chairman* noted the following important aspects of the draft resolution: in the fifth preambular paragraph, the expression of the Special Committee's regret had been prompted by its awareness of the United Kingdom's obligation to attend the meetings in Africa, not only as a member of the Special Committee but also as an administering Power. In the sixth preambular paragraph it had been necessary to point out the negative attitude of certain colonial Powers, to which one petitioner after another had testified. Operative paragraph 3 had been a response to Portugal's and South Africa's and Southern Rhodesia's defiance of world opinion and of the international Organization's recommendations. It was based upon the position that had always been taken by the Special Committee and by the African group in the Security Council. Operative paragraph 4 reflected the Committee's concern about the foreign financial interests that not only collaborated with the administering Powers but also provided funds enabling them to continue their wars of oppression. Operative paragraph 5 reflected past statements, but also contained a slight departure from previous resolutions, in its request for material assistance for the national liberation movements. After seeing a documentary film on Portuguese Territories, the Committee had felt all the more strongly the urgent need for aid to be granted not only by the Special Committee but also by organizations the world over. Operative paragraph 7 was of vital importance, in view of the administering Powers' need of military installations in order to continue their oppressive measures. The existence of such bases constituted not only a menace to the population in the Territories but also a threat to neighbouring countries. The recommendation in operative paragraph 8 that assistance should be withheld from the Governments of Portugal and South Africa had been intended to cover only the duration of their colonial rule over the Territories in question. He asked for the entire Committee's support of that paragraph.

597. The representative of *Ethiopia* supported the draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.315) on behalf of the Afro-Asian group and Yugoslavia, and commended the Chairman for his excellent introductory remarks. It could be seen that the document provided a summary of all that the Committee had done in Africa, giving a bird's-eye view of the salient points contained in its debates and resolutions.

598. The last preambular paragraph on colonialism's threat to international peace and security was vitally important but needed no explanation, as the facts were self-evident. In view of the many years that had passed since the adoption of resolution 1514 (XV) it was not out of place to reaffirm in operative paragraph 1 the inalienable rights of the peoples in colonial Territories to freedom and independence.

599. He associated himself with the Tanzanian representative in noting the importance of operative paragraph 5, which laid down a juridical basis for the support of national liberation movements in colonial Territories. Operative paragraph 8 would be instrumental in focusing the world's attention upon the grave threat to peace inherent in the continuation of colonialism. Peoples everywhere must be convinced of the evils rampant in colonial domination and of the urgent necessity to eradicate it. He announced his support

of the draft resolution and strongly recommended it to the Committee.

600. At the 455th meeting, on 22 June, the representative of the *United Republic of Tanzania* said that two changes had been made as a result of consultations held by the sponsors of the draft resolution the previous evening. The first concerned operative paragraph 7, which had been amended to read:

"Requests the colonial Powers to dismantle the military bases installed in colonial Territories and to refrain from establishing new ones."

The second change related to the co-sponsors of the draft resolution: Iran, the Ivory Coast and Madagascar had indicated their wish to withdraw their names.

601. The representative of *Poland* said that the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) were the two agencies which provided most assistance to the colonial Powers. Only the previous day, the Special Committee had been informed that IBRD was to grant further assistance to Portugal. He therefore proposed that operative paragraph 8 should be amended to read:

"Requests all States and international institutions, including the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the International Monetary Fund and other specialized agencies of the United Nations, to withhold assistance of any kind to the Governments of Portugal and South Africa until they renounce their policy of colonial domination and racial discrimination;"

602. The representative of the *United Republic of Tanzania* said that the Polish amendment was acceptable to the sponsors of the draft resolution and would be included in the revised text (A/AC.109/L.315/Rev.1).

603. The representative of *Venezuela* said that he would have preferred the draft resolution, as it appeared in document A/AC.109/L.315/Rev.1, not to have been submitted at that time. He thought that it would have been better to wait until the Special Committee returned to New York. The draft resolution embodied a number of ideas, principles and statements in regard to which his delegation had several times stated its position in detail, and that position had not changed. In order to vote on the draft resolution, his delegation was obliged to seek precise instructions from its Government. Since that could not be done from Algiers, the Venezuelan delegation was reluctantly compelled to take no part in the vote.

604. The representative of *Australia*, expressing agreement with the opening remarks of the representative of Venezuela, said that his delegation was opposed to resolutions of the kind before the Special Committee since they lacked precision on important points of principle. In the first place, the last preambular paragraph of the draft resolution was couched in language which was unacceptable to his delegation. He further wished to restate his opposition to the wording used in operative paragraph 3, in which connexion he had already voiced his delegation's views regarding the use of force in Southern Rhodesia. He wished to point out, however, that his Government had been among the first to refuse recognition of the illegal régime in Salisbury, recalling its representative and initiating far-reaching trade and financial

measures to support those proposed by the United Kingdom Government and the Security Council. For those reasons his delegation would oppose the draft resolution before the Committee.

605. The representative of *Chile* repeated that a draft resolution of such importance could not be voted on hastily. He agreed with most of the ideas in the draft resolution, his reservations being all on points of drafting and terminology. Since, however, the draft resolution summarized the Committee's activities during its tour and defined future policy, it would not be possible for his delegation to take part in the vote without being able to receive instructions from its Government.

606. The representative of *Italy* stated that his delegation had been unable to obtain instructions from its Government and would not, therefore, take part in the vote.

607. The representative of the *United States of America* said that he shared the reservations expressed by previous speakers regarding the introduction at the last minute of a draft resolution which contained new and substantive provisions. His delegation supported many of the basic objectives set forth in the draft resolution but was of the opinion that the interests of the peoples of the Territories concerned, as well as of the administering Powers, would best be served by peaceful co-operation. Since, however, other paragraphs in the draft resolution obscured those objectives, his delegation would vote against it.

608. The representative of the *Ivory Coast* deeply regretted that it had not been possible for his delegation to be one of the sponsors of the draft resolution because of a problem in relation to the wording of operative paragraph 7. Owing to lack of time it had been impossible to reach a compromise. His delegation supported the draft resolution as a whole but had some reservations of principle with regard to operative paragraph 7. He assured the freedom fighters of the full support of the Government and people of his country in their just and noble struggle.

609. The representative of *Madagascar* said that his delegation would vote in favour of the draft resolution, which included a number of ideas and principles which it had always supported in the Committee. Nevertheless, he had serious reservations about operative paragraph 7. In his view the question of the military bases was not within the competence of the Special Committee. The Committee's task was to understand the aspirations of the inhabitants of the Territories under Portuguese domination, but it would be for the inhabitants themselves to decide the question of the bases once they were independent.

610. The representative of *Denmark* said that his delegation did not support operative paragraph 3 of the draft resolution. It could not agree to a recommendation to the Security Council couched in such general terms and based on principles the consequences of which were so hard to foresee. Nor did Denmark support the fifth and eighth preambular paragraphs or operative paragraphs 4, 7 and 8. In the absence of instructions from his Government he would go no further into the question of the draft resolution. The progressive position of Denmark on colonial problems was well known. For the reasons he had just stated, he would be obliged to abstain in the vote on the draft resolution as a whole and would vote against

operative paragraphs 3 and 7 if they were put to the vote separately.

611. The representative of *Iran*, referring to operative paragraph 7 of the draft resolution, said that his Government was opposed to the establishment of any foreign military bases on its territory and had made its views in that connexion abundantly clear in many official statements. It was, by the same token, opposed to the establishment of foreign military bases in principle. However, since the Special Committee was concerned with decolonization, his delegation was of the opinion that the question of such bases could only be considered in the light of their effect upon the local population's aspirations for independence. Otherwise, the matter would not fall within the Committee's purview. For that reason, his delegation had not been able to accept the wording of operative paragraph 7 and had had to withdraw its name from the list of sponsors.

612. The representative of the *United Republic of Tanzania*, replying to points raised on behalf of the sponsors of the draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.315/Rev.1), said that certain delegations had expressed the opinion that the draft resolution had been introduced at short notice. It had, however, in fact been submitted to the Special Committee on the previous day and delegations had therefore had plenty of time in which to make suggestions if they so wished. In any event, the draft resolution contained only one new element, namely, a reference to the United Kingdom's failure to participate in the Committee's work—which had been commented upon by most members when the Committee had opened its session in Africa.

613. With regard to the view held by certain delegations that operative paragraph 7 of the draft resolution did not fall within the Committee's purview, he pointed out that its terms were very similar to those of operative paragraph 12 of General Assembly resolution 2105 (XX), which had been supported by the majority of Afro-Asian members and which, moreover, provided the Committee with a further mandate to continue its work. Although no general reference to the question of military bases had been made in the draft resolution, the sponsors of course agreed that they should only be established with the consent of the people. But, as far as the colonial Territories were concerned, the presence of military bases after independence would, in effect, mean the continuation of colonialism.

614. As for operative paragraph 3, the views expressed in it had always been held by the African members of the United Nations.

615. The representative of the *Ivory Coast*, speaking in exercise of his right of reply, recalled that the General Assembly had indeed adopted a paragraph identical with paragraph 7 of the draft resolution, but it alone was entitled to do so. Moreover, that paragraph had aroused lively controversy even in the General Assembly, as was clear from the fact that it had been adopted by only 49 votes to 37, with 18 abstentions.

616. The representative of the *Union of Soviet Socialist Republics* stated that his delegation would vote in favour of the draft resolution since it accorded with the position which the USSR had always maintained. It also corresponded to the interests of the African peoples.

617. With regard to foreign military bases in colonial Territories, it had always been the opinion of the Soviet Union delegation that they constituted a direct threat to the independence of the indigenous population and the sovereignty of States, as events in Aden, Guam and Ascension Island proved. The same was true of Libya. The Italian and Australian statements were unacceptable. The motives behind the statements of certain Powers were well known. If Italy allowed United States military bases to be established in its territory, that was its own affair. The colonial Territories, however, had never been consulted and foreign military bases were imposed upon them to prevent them from gaining independence.

618. The revised draft resolution was adopted by a roll-call vote of 16 to 2, with 1 abstention, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Bulgaria, Ethiopia, India, Iran, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Mali, Poland, Sierra Leone, Syria, Tunisia, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Republic of Tanzania, Yugoslavia.

Against: Australia, United States of America.

Abstaining: Denmark.

619. The text of the resolution (A/AC.109/188) adopted by the Special Committee at its 455th meeting on 22 June 1966 reads as follows:

"The Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,

"Having held meetings from 23 May 1966 to 22 June 1966 successively at Dar es Salaam, United Republic of Tanzania, at Mogadiscio, Somalia, at Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, at Cairo, United Arab Republic, and at Algiers, Algeria, and having heard the spokesmen of the Governments of those countries,

"Having considered the situation in various Territories still under colonial domination,

"Recalling General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960,

"Recalling further General Assembly resolutions 1654 (XVI) of 27 November 1961, 1810 (XVII) of 17 December 1962, 1956 (XVIII) of 11 December 1963 and 2105 (XX) of 20 December 1965,

"Regretting the failure of the United Kingdom Government to participate in the Special Committee's meetings in Africa,

"Deploring the negative attitude of certain colonial Powers, in particular the refusal of the Governments of Portugal and South Africa to recognize the right of colonial peoples to freedom and independence in accordance with resolution 1514 (XV),

"Deploring further the attitude of certain States which continue to co-operate with the Governments of Portugal and South Africa in the repression and exploitation of the indigenous people,

"Recognizing that the continuation of colonialism constitutes a threat to international peace and security and a crime against humanity,

"1. Reaffirms the inalienable rights of the peoples of colonial Territories to freedom and independence in accordance with resolution 1514 (XV);

"2. Deplores the refusal of certain colonial Powers to co-operate with the Special Committee and their continued disregard of the United Nations resolutions;

"3. *Recommends* to the Security Council to make obligatory the measures provided for under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter against Portugal, South Africa and the racist minority régime in Southern Rhodesia;

"4. *Condemns* the activities of the financial interests operating in these Territories which exploit the human and material resources and impede the progress of the people of the Territories towards freedom and independence;

"5. *Recognizes* the legitimacy of the struggle of the peoples under colonial rule to exercise their right to self-determination and independence and invites all States to provide material and moral assistance to the national liberation movements in colonial Territories;

"6. *Requests* the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the specialized agencies concerned and other international relief organizations to increase, in co-operation with the liberation movement of all the Territories under colonial domination, their assistance to the refugees of these Territories;

"7. *Requests* the colonial Powers to dismantle the military bases installed in colonial Territories and to refrain from establishing new ones;

"8. *Requests* all States and international institutions, including the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the International Monetary Fund and other specialized agencies of the United Nations, to withhold assistance of any kind to the Governments of Portugal and South Africa until they renounce their policy of colonial domination and racial discrimination;

"9. *Requests* the Secretary-General to take all measures necessary to publicize the work of the Special Committee as widely as possible, so that world opinion may be sufficiently informed concerning the grave threat to peace constituted by colonialism."

620. The text of the resolution was transmitted to the President of the Security Council on 1 July 1966.⁵

Adoption of resolution expressing appreciation to host Governments

621. At the 455th meeting, the representative of *Iran* said that he was privileged to introduce, on behalf of twenty members of the Special Committee, a draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.316) expressing appreciation to the Governments which had invited the Committee to meet in their countries.

622. The Committee could be proud of its accomplishments in Africa; it had taken important decisions for the full implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples and had done much to strengthen the confidence placed in the United Nations by those still under colonial domination. The Committee, which had everywhere received an enthusiastic welcome, was particularly indebted to the host countries which, by their invitation, had helped to accelerate independence for all countries. They had also made it possible for the United Nations to establish direct contact with the peoples concerned. In conclusion, he proposed

that the draft resolution should be adopted by acclamation.

623. The representative of *Mali* said that after the admirable statement by his Iranian colleague he had little to add regarding the draft resolution which had just been submitted to the Committee. On behalf of all the sponsors he wished to tender sincere thanks to their brother States of Africa who had invited the Special Committee to hold part of its session in their wonderful countries, thus enabling the members to form an idea of how the struggle against colonialism in Africa was developing. They had found during their stay that, in cases where colonialism still clung to the countries under its domination, the economic factors to which all the petitioners and personalities who had appeared before the Committee, as also the majority of the members of the Committee, had drawn attention were of particular importance.

624. While the Committee was at Addis Ababa, Mr. Diallo Telli, Administrative Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity, had shed light on that aspect of the question when he had stated:

"The salient feature of the current situation in Africa is the aggravation of the threat to international peace and security constituted not only by the survival of colonialism but by the strengthening, during the past year, of the alliance formed between Portugal, South Africa and the Rhodesian settlers in order to consolidate their hold over the entire southern part of the African continent and to ensure the perpetuation of colonial and racist domination there. It is a known fact that that ungodly alliance of the most backward régimes of oppression—all three of which have been unanimously condemned, on several occasions, by the United Nations—nevertheless has its accomplices among the powerful. Those accomplices are the many forces—individuals, companies or States—which have made investments in the south of the continent, which live and prosper from the exploitation of African wealth in that region and which thus bear a large share of responsibility for the deterioration of the situation and for the bloody tragedy besetting the African peoples of South Africa, Southern Rhodesia and the Territories under Portuguese domination. As these accomplices are in large measure responsible for the paralysis which affects all peaceful attempts at decolonization, they are naturally the major obstacles in the way of the Committee's efforts. It is therefore important that you should find an adequate solution to a serious and specific situation, failing which your Committee and all those working for peaceful decolonization cannot hope to achieve any positive result. This is a most important point, for what is needed now in the matter of decolonization is not resolutions but solutions. The obstacles to the solutions are, firstly, the alliance between the régimes of Pretoria, Salisbury and Lisbon; and, secondly, the support which this alliance is receiving from its accomplices in Europe and the United States, especially by way of bilateral assistance or the aid provided by organizations such as NATO. That is the source of the great difficulties which are hampering the efforts to achieve decolonization in Africa. It is to this that the principal efforts of the Committee should be directed."

625. After hearing the petitioners and seeing the film which some of them had made, members of the

⁵ Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-first Year, Supplement for July, August and September 1966, document S/7395.

Committee were surely more convinced than ever that colonialism was a disgrace to mankind and to the conscience of man, a view which had been eloquently expressed by the representative of Denmark. In conclusion, he thanked all the host Governments for welcoming the Committee and for the facilities with which they had provided it for the achievement of its task: they had all proved, if proof were needed, their sincere desire to co-operate with the United Nations. He therefore proposed that the Committee should adopt the twenty-Power draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.316) by acclamation.

626. At the same meeting the Special Committee adopted the draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.316) by acclamation. The text of the resolution (A/AC.109/L.316) reads as follows:

"The Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,

"Having held meetings from 23 May to 22 June 1966 successively at Dar es Salaam, United Republic of Tanzania, at Mogadiscio, Somalia, at Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, at Cairo, United Arab Republic, and at Algiers, Algeria, and having heard the spokesmen of the Governments of those countries,

"Expresses its profound gratitude to the Governments and people of the United Republic of Tanzania, Somalia, Ethiopia, the United Arab Republic and Algeria for inviting the Special Committee to hold meetings in their respective capitals, for providing the Committee with the necessary facilities for its meetings, and for their generous and kind hospitality."

ANNEX I

Communiqué issued on 14 May 1966 by the Chairman on behalf of the Special Committee

In response to invitations extended to it by the Governments of Algeria, Ethiopia, Somalia, the United Arab Republic and the United Republic of Tanzania, the Special Committee of Twenty-Four has decided to hold a series of meetings this year in Algiers, Addis Ababa, Mogadiscio, Cairo and Dar es Salaam.

This decision was taken in the context of operative paragraph 6 of General Assembly resolution 1654 (XVI) of 27 November 1961 which, in establishing the Special Committee, authorized it "to meet elsewhere than at United Nations Headquarters, whenever and wherever such meetings may be required for the effective discharge of its functions". The Special Committee was also aware that the General Assembly, by operative paragraph 7 of its resolution 2105 (XX) of 20 December 1965, had approved "the programme of work envisaged by the Special Committee during 1966, including the possibility of holding a series of meetings in Africa" and had authorized the necessary financial provision in the budget for 1966.

In deciding to hold another series of meetings in Africa this year, the Special Committee was particularly conscious of the positive results achieved by its visit to Africa last year. While the Special Committee was unable, owing to the non-co-operation of the administering Powers concerned, to visit the colonial Territories it considered in Africa last year, it was enabled, by reason of its proximity to these Territories, to establish closer contact with the realities of their situation and to obtain more direct knowledge than hitherto regarding the aspirations of their peoples. The experience of the Special Committee in Africa last year thus made possible the adoption of several important resolutions concerning these Territories, which formed the basis of the relevant decisions taken by the General Assembly at its twentieth session.

The work of the Special Committee in Africa last year also benefited from the co-operation it was able to establish with the Organization of African Unity through the participation of the Co-ordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa as well as of the Administrative Secretary-General of that organization.

The Special Committee notes with grave concern that the renewed hopes of freedom and independence without delay which were inspired in colonial peoples by the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples on its adoption over five years ago have, with but a few exceptions, not been realized. Indeed, owing to the negative attitude or non-co-operation of the administering Powers concerned, very little progress has been made in the implementation of the Declaration in most of the Territories, including the larger Territories in Africa, which engaged the attention of the Special Committee in previous years.

The Special Committee is convinced that its forthcoming visit to Africa will not merely demonstrate the increasing concern of the United Nations for the position of colonial peoples but strengthen its own capacity to assist these peoples in their struggle for independence. This consideration is of special significance in view of the General Assembly's request, contained in its resolution 2105 (XX) that the Special Committee in continuing to seek the best means for the immediate and full application of the Declaration, should, whenever it considers necessary, recommend a deadline for the accession to independence of each colonial Territory. Further, the Special Committee's visit to Africa will facilitate the appearance before it of representatives of nationalist movements wishing to express their views regarding the future of their countries, who would otherwise find it impossible to travel to New York.

The programme of the Committee's meetings in Africa is as follows:

Dar es Salaam, United Republic of Tanzania: between 22 and 30 May 1966;

Mogadiscio, Somalia: between 31 May and 3 June 1966;

Addis Ababa, Ethiopia: between 4 and 9 June 1966;

Cairo, United Arab Republic: between 9 and 16 June 1966;

Algiers, Algeria: between 16 and 22 June 1966.

The items on the agenda of the Special Committee for these meetings will include all the colonial Territories in Africa, Aden, Oman, Mauritius and Seychelles.

ANNEX II

List of representatives who attended the Special Committee's meetings in Africa

Afghanistan

Mr. Abdul Samad GHAUS

Australia

Mr. Dudley McCARTHY, M.B.E.

Mr. John Howard BROOK

Bulgaria

Mr. Matey KARASIMEONOV

Chile

Mr. Hernán SÁNCHEZ

Denmark

Mr. Hans R. TABOR (in Dar es Salaam, Mogadiscio and Addis Ababa)

Mr. Skjold G. MELLBIN

Miss Karen HANSEN (in Dar es Salaam, Mogadiscio, Addis Ababa and Cairo)

Ethiopia

Mr. Getachew MEKASHA

Mr. Berhane DERESSA

India

Mr. Pram BHATIA (in Dar es Salaam)
 Mr. S. SEN (in Addis Ababa and Cairo)
 Mr. R. GOBURDHUN (in Algiers)
 Mr. C. R. GHAREKHAN
 Mr. Frank H. C. JOHN

Iran

Mr. Mohsen S. ESFANDIARY

Iraq

Mr. Adnan PACHACHI (in Cairo)
 Mr. Ala'uddin ALJUBOURI

Italy

Mr. Ludovico CARDUCCI ARTENISIO

Ivory Coast

Mr. Julien KACOU

Madagascar

Mr. Gabriel RAKOTONIAINA

Mali

Mr. Mamadou Moctar THIAM

Poland

Mr. Kazimierz SMIGANOWSKI

Sierra Leone

Mr. G. B. O. COLLIER
 Mr. G. E. O. WILLIAMS

Syria

Mr. Rafic JOUÉJATI

Tunisia

Mr. Moncef KEDADI

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Mr. P. F. SHAKHOV
 Mr. A. V. GRODSKY
 Mr. I. G. NEKLESSA
 Mr. G. I. VEKILOV

United Republic of Tanzania

Mr. J. W. S. MALECELA
 Mr. S. CHALE (in Addis Ababa)
 Mr. Ahmad DIRIA-HASSAN (in Cairo)
 Mr. Mohammad Ali FOUM

United States of America

Mrs. Eugenie M. ANDERSON
 Mr. Richard E. JOHNSON
 Mr. Donald McHENRY
 Mr. Raymond PERKINS

Venezuela

Mr. Leonardo DÍAZ GONZÁLEZ
 Mr. Rafael OSUNA (in Dar es Salaam, Mogadiscio, Addis Ababa and Cairo)

Yugoslavia

Mr. Dimitar JANEVSKI

CHAPTER III

SOUTHERN RHODESIA

PART I*

A. ACTION TAKEN BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE, THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY DURING 1965

1. On 22 April 1965, the Special Committee adopted a resolution (A/6000/Rev.1,¹ chap. III, para. 292) in which, in addition to addressing various recommendations to the administering Power, it drew the immediate attention of the Security Council to the grave situation in Southern Rhodesia.

2. At its 1194th, 1195th, 1197th, 1199th, 1201st and 1202nd meetings, between 30 April and 6 May 1965, the Security Council considered a letter dated 21 April 1965² from the representatives of thirty-five African States requesting the Council to examine the very serious situation existing in Southern Rhodesia.

3. At its 1202nd meeting, on 6 May 1965 the Security Council adopted resolution 202 (1965) by 7 votes to none, with 4 abstentions (France, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of

America). The operative part of the resolution reads as follows:

“[*The Security Council*]

“1. *Notes* the United Kingdom Government's statement of 27 October 1964 specifying the conditions under which Southern Rhodesia might attain independence;

“2. *Notes further and approves* the opinion of the majority of the population of Southern Rhodesia that the United Kingdom should convene a constitutional conference;

“3. *Requests* the United Kingdom Government and all States Members of the United Nations not to accept a unilateral declaration of independence for Southern Rhodesia by the minority Government;

“4. *Requests* the United Kingdom to take all necessary action to prevent a unilateral declaration of independence;

“5. *Requests* the United Kingdom Government not to transfer under any circumstances to its colony of Southern Rhodesia, as at present governed, any of the powers or attributes of sovereignty, but to promote the country's attainment of independence by a democratic system of government in accordance with the aspirations of the majority of the population;

“6. *Further requests* the United Kingdom Government to enter into consultations with all con-

* Previously issued under the symbol A/6300/Add.1 (part I).

¹ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twentieth Session, Annexes*, addendum to agenda item 23.

² *Official Records of the Security Council, Twentieth Year, Supplement for April, May and June 1965*, document S/6294 and Add.1.

cerned with a view to convening a conference of all political parties in order to adopt new constitutional provisions acceptable to the majority of the people of Southern Rhodesia, so that the earliest possible date may be set for independence;

"7. *Decides* to keep the question of Southern Rhodesia on its agenda."

4. During its meetings in Africa the Special Committee adopted two further resolutions relating to Southern Rhodesia (A/6000/Rev.1, chap. III, paras. 471 and 513), as well as a general resolution on the question of the attainment of the objectives of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) in the Territories of southern Africa (*ibid.*, chap. II, para. 463).

5. At its twentieth session, the General Assembly, on the recommendation of the Fourth Committee, adopted three resolutions on the question of Southern Rhodesia.

6. On 12 October 1965, the General Assembly adopted resolution 2012 (XX), the operative paragraphs of which read as follows:

"[*The General Assembly*]

"1. *Condemns* any attempt on the part of the Rhodesian authorities to seize independence by illegal means in order to perpetuate minority rule in Southern Rhodesia;

"2. *Declares* that the perpetuation of such minority rule would be incompatible with the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples proclaimed in the Charter of the United Nations and in the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples contained in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960;

"3. *Requests* the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and all Member States not to accept a declaration of independence for Southern Rhodesia by the present authorities, which would be in the sole interest of the minority, and not to recognize any authorities purporting to emerge therefrom;

"4. *Calls upon* the United Kingdom to take all possible measures to prevent a unilateral declaration of independence and, in the event of such a declaration, to take all steps necessary to put an immediate end to the rebellion, with a view to transferring power to a representative government in keeping with the aspirations of the majority of the people;

"5. *Decides* to keep the question of Southern Rhodesia under urgent and continuing review during the twentieth session and to consider what further steps may be necessary."

7. On 5 November 1965, the General Assembly adopted resolution 2022 (XX), the operative paragraphs of which read as follows:

"[*The General Assembly*]

"1. *Approves* the chapters of the reports of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples relating to Southern Rhodesia and endorses the conclusions and recommendations contained therein;

"2. *Reaffirms* the right of the people of Southern Rhodesia to freedom and independence and recognizes the legitimacy of their struggle for the enjoy-

ment of their rights as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples contained in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV);

"3. *Solemnly warns* the present authorities in Southern Rhodesia and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, in its capacity as administering Power, that the United Nations will oppose any declaration of independence which is not based on universal adult suffrage;

"4. *Condemns* the policies of racial discrimination and segregation practised in Southern Rhodesia, which constitute a crime against humanity;

"5. *Condemns* any support or assistance rendered by any State to the minority régime in Southern Rhodesia;

"6. *Calls upon* all States to refrain from rendering any assistance whatsoever to the minority régime in Southern Rhodesia;

"7. *Requests* that the administering Power effect immediately:

"(a) The release of all political prisoners, political detainees and restrictees;

"(b) The repeal of all repressive and discriminatory legislation and, in particular, the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act and the Land Apportionment Act;

"(c) The removal of all restrictions on African political activity and the establishment of full democratic freedom and equality of political rights;

"8. *Requests once more* the Government of the United Kingdom to suspend the Constitution of 1961 and to call immediately a constitutional conference in which representatives of all political parties will take part, with a view to making new constitutional arrangements on the basis of universal adult suffrage and to fixing the earliest possible date for independence;

"9. *Appeals* to all States to use all their powers against a unilateral declaration of independence and, in any case, not to recognize any government in Southern Rhodesia which is not representative of the majority of the people;

"10. *Requests* all States to render moral and material help to the people of Zimbabwe in their struggle for freedom and independence;

"11. *Calls upon* the Government of the United Kingdom to employ all necessary measures, including military force, to implement paragraphs 7 and 8 above;

"12. *Draws the attention* of the Security Council to the threats made by the present authorities in Southern Rhodesia, including the threat of economic sabotage against the independent African States adjoining Southern Rhodesia;

"13. *Further draws the attention* of the Security Council to the explosive situation in Southern Rhodesia which threatens international peace and security, and decides to transmit to the Council the records and resolutions of the twentieth session of the General Assembly on this question;

"14. *Decides* to keep the question of Southern Rhodesia under urgent and continuing review."

8. In a note dated 12 November 1965, the Secretary-General transmitted the text of resolution 2022

(XX) to States and drew their attention, in particular, to operative paragraphs 6, 9 and 10 of the resolution.

9. On 11 November 1965, immediately after the illegal declaration of independence, the General Assembly adopted resolution 2024 (XX), the operative paragraphs of which read as follows:

"[The General Assembly]

"1. *Condemns* the unilateral declaration of independence made by the racist minority in Southern Rhodesia;

"2. *Invites* the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to implement immediately the relevant resolutions adopted by the General Assembly and the Security Council in order to put an end to the rebellion by the unlawful authorities in Southern Rhodesia;

"3. *Recommends* the Security Council to consider this situation as a matter of urgency."

10. The Security Council, at its 1257th to 1265th meetings between 12 and 20 November 1965, resumed consideration of the situation in Southern Rhodesia.

11. At its 1258th meeting, on 12 November 1965, the Security Council adopted resolution 216 (1965) by 10 votes to none, with 1 abstention (France). The resolution reads as follows:

"The Security Council

"1. *Decides to condemn* the unilateral declaration of independence made by a racist minority in Southern Rhodesia;

"2. *Decides to call upon* all States not to recognize this illegal racist minority régime in Southern Rhodesia and to refrain from rendering any assistance to this illegal régime."

12. At its 1265th meeting on 20 November 1965, the Security Council adopted a further resolution, 217 (1965), by 10 votes to none, with 1 abstention (France). The operative part reads as follows:

"[The Security Council]

"1. *Determines* that the situation resulting from the proclamation of independence by the illegal authorities in Southern Rhodesia is extremely grave, that the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland should put an end to it and that its continuance in time constitutes a threat to international peace and security;

"2. *Reaffirms* its resolution 216 (1965) of 12 November 1965 and General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960;

"3. *Condemns* the usurpation of power by a racist settler minority in Southern Rhodesia and regards the declaration of independence by it as having no legal validity;

"4. *Calls upon* the Government of the United Kingdom to quell this rebellion of the racist minority;

"5. *Further calls upon* the Government of the United Kingdom to take all other appropriate measures which would prove effective in eliminating the authority of the usurpers and in bringing the minority régime in Southern Rhodesia to an immediate end;

"6. *Calls upon* all States not to recognize this illegal authority and not to entertain any diplomatic or other relations with it;

"7. *Calls upon* the Government of the United Kingdom, as the working of the Constitution of 1961 has broken down, to take immediate measures in order to allow the people of Southern Rhodesia to determine their own future consistent with the objectives of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV);

"8. *Calls upon* all States to refrain from any action which would assist and encourage the illegal régime and, in particular, to desist from providing it with arms, equipment and military material, and to do their utmost in order to break all economic relations with Southern Rhodesia, including an embargo on oil and petroleum products;

"9. *Calls upon* the Government of the United Kingdom to enforce urgently and with vigour all the measures it has announced, as well as those mentioned in paragraph 8 above;

"10. *Calls upon* the Organization of African Unity to do all in its power to assist in the implementation of the present resolution, in conformity with Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations;

"11. *Decides* to keep the question under review in order to examine what other measures it may deem it necessary to take."

13. In a note dated 29 November 1965, the Secretary-General transmitted the text of resolution 217 (1965) to States, drawing their attention, in particular, to operative paragraphs 6 and 8.

14. As at 30 April 1966, replies to the notes of the Secretary-General transmitting the above resolutions had been received from sixty-six States. The replies were circulated as documents of the General Assembly or Security Council, or of both organs, and are enumerated in the following list:³

	<i>General Assembly document symbol</i>	<i>Security Council document symbol</i>
Albania	A/6116	S/6972
Argentina	A/6239 and Add.1..	S/7094 and Add.1
Australia	A/6244/Rev. 1	S/7104
Austria	A/6251	S/7115
Belgium	A/6231	S/7052
	A/6271	S/7161
Brazil	A/6256	S/7122
Bulgaria	A/6255	S/7121
Burundi	A/6249	S/7113
Byelorussian SSR	A/6299	S/7053
Cameroon	A/6286	S/7214
Canada	A/6234	S/7082
	A/6272	S/7164
Ceylon	A/6269	S/7157
Chile	A/6297	S/7234
China	A/6258	S/7130
Colombia	A/6247	S/7112

³ For the disposition of the Assembly documents in the above list, see *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twentieth Session, Annexes*, agenda item 23 (documents A/6105 to A/6170); and *ibid.*, *Twenty-first Session, Annexes*, agenda item 23 (documents A/6231 to A/6324). The Security Council documents appear in the following supplements: *Official Records of the Security Council, Twentieth Year, Supplement for October, November and December 1965* (documents S/6923 to S/7055); *ibid.*, *Twenty-first Year, Supplement for January, February and March 1966* (documents S/7056 to S/7228); and *ibid.*, *Supplement for April, May and June 1966* (documents S/7234 to S/7258).

	General Assembly document symbol	Security Council document symbol
Congo, Democratic Republic of ..	A/6275	S/7177
Cuba	A/6112	S/6961
Cyprus	A/6241	S/7099
Czechoslovakia ..	A/6110	S/7167
	A/6273	S/7005
Denmark	A/6153	S/6979
Dominican Republic		S/7141
	A/6264	S/7226
Ecuador	A/6291	S/7101
Finland	A/6243	S/7181
Germany, Federal Republic of ..		S/6986 and Add.1 and 2
Greece	A/6324	S/6923
Guinea	A/6263	S/7140
		S/6951
Haiti	A/6253	S/7119
Hungary	A/6268	S/7156
India		S/6959
	A/6237	S/7092
Iran		S/6971
Iraq		S/7056
Ireland	A/6259	S/7132
Israel		S/6930
		S/7083
Italy		S/7016
		S/7048
Jamaica		S/6969
Japan	A/6133	S/6990
	A/6248	S/7114
Jordan	A/6254	S/7120
Liberia	A/6257	S/7124
Libya	A/6266	S/7144
Luxembourg ..		S/7055
		S/7160
Madagascar ...	A/6285	S/7213
Malaysia	A/6290	S/7225
Mongolia		S/6943
	A/6270	S/7159
Netherlands ...		S/7046
		S/7162
New Zealand ..	A/6238	S/7093
Nicaragua		S/7139
Nigeria		S/6966
		S/7153
Norway	A/6155	S/7008
Pakistan		S/7127
		S/7258
Philippines	A/6293	S/7228
Poland	A/6235 and Add.1..	S/7087 and Add.1
Romania	A/6170	S/7015
Rwanda	A/6260	S/7135
Singapore	A/6282	S/7188
Sweden	A/6156	S/7010
		S/7012
Trinidad and Tobago		S/6946
Uganda		S/6924
Ukrainian SSR	A/6245	S/7110
Upper Volta ..	A/6288	S/7218
USSR	A/6105	S/6940
	A/6232 and Add.1..	S/7068 and Add.1
United Arab Republic	A/6281	S/7187
United Kingdom ...		S/7021
		S/7108
United States of America	A/6236 and Add.1..	S/7088 and Add.1
		S/7170
Venezuela	A/6321	S/7253
Yemen	A/6252	S/7118

Yugoslavia

General Assembly
document symbol

A/6265

Security Council
document symbol

S/6942

S/7143

15. The replies received show a considerable degree of compliance with the resolutions on the question of Southern Rhodesia. All replies specifically stated that the States concerned did not recognize the illegal régime and would have no dealings with it. The replies also show that those States have explicitly or implicitly barred the export of arms, equipment and military material to Southern Rhodesia. The embargo on oil and petroleum products has also been specifically endorsed in replies from producing and exporting countries and has, directly or indirectly, been given general support in the replies from other States.

16. While a substantial number of the replies showed a complete break in all economic relations with Southern Rhodesia, a number of replies have shown a gradual phasing out of economic relations based on the barring of trade in specified products.

B. INFORMATION ON THE TERRITORY

GENERAL

17. Information concerning Southern Rhodesia, as well as an account of action taken in respect of the Territory, is already contained in the previous reports of the Special Committee to the General Assembly.⁴ Supplementary information on developments since then is set out below.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

Statement of the United Kingdom Government on talks with the Government of Southern Rhodesia

18. On 25 May 1965, the Commonwealth Relations Office issued a statement saying that now that the election in Southern Rhodesia was over, the United Kingdom Government intended to explore all possibilities of reaching a negotiated settlement on the constitutional questions at issue between Southern Rhodesia and the United Kingdom. The statement also said that the views of the United Kingdom Government on the negotiations were being communicated to Prime Minister Ian Smith through the United Kingdom High Commissioner in Salisbury.

Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference and Southern Rhodesia

19. A Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference was held in London from 17 to 25 June 1965. In the final *communiqué* of the Conference, the Heads of Government of the Commonwealth countries reaffirmed that they were irrevocably opposed to any unilateral declaration of independence by the Government of Southern Rhodesia and further reaffirmed their insistence on the principle of majority rule in relation to that country. According to the *communiqué*, the Prime Ministers also urged the United Kingdom Prime Minister to convene a constitutional conference at an early

⁴ Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixteenth Session, Annexes, agenda item 97, document A/5124; *ibid.*, Seventeenth Session, Annexes, addendum to agenda item 25, document A/5238, chap. II; *ibid.*, Eighteenth Session, Annexes, addendum to agenda item 23, document A/5446/Rev.1, chap. III, appendix; *ibid.*, Nineteenth Session, Annexes, annex No. 8 (part I), document A/5800/Rev.1, chap. III; and *ibid.*, Twentieth Session, Annexes, addendum to agenda item 23, document A/6000/Rev.1, chap. III.

date, possibly within three months, which all political leaders in Southern Rhodesia should be free to attend, to seek agreement on the question of independence on the basis of majority rule. It was further urged that, should the Southern Rhodesian Government refuse to attend such a conference, and to release detainees, the United Kingdom Government should introduce legislation to suspend the 1961 Constitution and appoint an interim government, which should repeal oppressive and discriminatory laws and prepare the way for free elections.

20. The United Kingdom Government, according to the *communiqué*, informed the Conference that it was actively engaged in discussions with the Government of Southern Rhodesia and that in the process of seeking to reach agreement on Southern Rhodesia's advance to independence, a constitutional conference would, at the appropriate time, be a natural step.

21. On 28 June 1965, the Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia sent a message to the United Kingdom Prime Minister in which he stated that the constitutional conference recommended in the *communiqué* was unnecessary and out of the question, and that if such a conference were to be called the Southern Rhodesia Government would not attend, nor would anyone from the country. He also stated in his message that if the United Kingdom Government attempted to promote such a conference, his Government would interpret this as interference in the internal affairs of Southern Rhodesia.

Visit of the United Kingdom Minister of State for Commonwealth Relations to Southern Rhodesia

22. On 18 July 1965, the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations replied to an invitation from Prime Minister Smith to visit Southern Rhodesia for further talks. In his message, the Commonwealth Relations Secretary stated that he was anxious that these negotiations should be pursued without delay at the ministerial level. However, since he could not proceed to Salisbury as quickly as he would wish to, he proposed to send the Minister of State for Commonwealth Relations, Mr. Cledwyn Hughes, to Southern Rhodesia as his representative to explore further the possibilities of a settlement with Mr. Smith.

23. Mr. Cledwyn Hughes visited Southern Rhodesia for discussions with the Southern Rhodesian Government from 21 to 27 July 1965. On 25 July 1965, Mr. Ian Smith issued a public statement reassuring his followers that he was not departing from any principles in his negotiations with Mr. Hughes. The statement, which was issued through the Rhodesia Front Chairman, also said that whether independence came through negotiations or not, it would be without strings. On 30 July 1965, Mr. Smith described the talks as confidential although he was also quoted as saying that Southern Rhodesia had made specific proposals on the independence issue, and was awaiting the reaction of the United Kingdom Government to the talks. On 2 August 1965, Mr. Smith made a further comment on the visit of Mr. Hughes to Southern Rhodesia. In this report, he was quoted as saying that his Government was trying desperately to negotiate, but if it could not negotiate, there was only one other way to obtain independence and that was to take matters into its own hands.

24. On his return to the United Kingdom, Mr. Cledwyn Hughes gave the Commonwealth Relations Secretary, Mr. Arthur Bottomley, an invitation from

Mr. Ian Smith for him to pay another visit to Southern Rhodesia for further talks. In September 1965, Mr. Bottomley and Mr. Smith exchanged messages for continuing the talks on the question of independence.

Visit of Mr. Ian Smith to London

25. On 30 September 1965, Mr. Smith announced that he would visit the United Kingdom for negotiations with the United Kingdom Government on the independence issue. The announcement said that it had been made clear to the United Kingdom Government that in view of the fact that the independence negotiations had dragged on for more than two years, these talks had to be final and conclusive. On 1 October 1965, Mr. Smith stated that he had decided to go to the United Kingdom because even though Mr. Arthur Bottomley, the Commonwealth Relations Secretary, had agreed to come to Southern Rhodesia for talks, he could not come until the middle of October and that was too long to wait. Since any agreement between him and Mr. Bottomley would require the approval of the United Kingdom Prime Minister, he had decided to go to the United Kingdom instead so that if the negotiations failed he could make a personal appeal to the United Kingdom Prime Minister. Mr. Smith was also reported to have said that if he returned from the United Kingdom empty-handed he and his Government would have to face the question of declaring independence unilaterally. He further stated that no matter what the United Kingdom Government did, Southern Rhodesia would be independent by Christmas of 1965.

26. Mr. Ian Smith visited London from 4 to 11 October 1965 and held meetings with the Commonwealth Relations Secretary, Mr. Arthur Bottomley, and the United Kingdom Prime Minister, Mr. Harold Wilson, on the independence issue. On 8 October 1965 Mr. Smith told newsmen after his third meeting with the United Kingdom Prime Minister that he had made no concessions.

Statement by the Commonwealth Relations Office on 9 October 1965

27. The Commonwealth Relations Office issued a statement on 9 October 1965 on the discussions with Mr. Ian Smith. The statement reiterated the United Kingdom Government's position on Southern Rhodesian independence, as put forward to Mr. Smith, as follows:

1. The principle and intention of unimpeded progress to majority rule, already enshrined in the 1961 Constitution, would have to be maintained and guaranteed.
2. There would also have to be guarantees against retrogressive amendment of the Constitution.
3. There would have to be immediate improvement in the political status of the African population.
4. There would have to be progress towards ending racial discrimination.
5. The British Government would need to be satisfied that any basis proposed for independence was acceptable to the people of Southern Rhodesia as a whole. The statement also summarized the views of Mr. Smith on these five principles as follows:

- (i) The 1961 Constitution provided, in the qualifications governing the franchise, for an increasing number of Africans to be entitled to the vote and the question of guarantees against

retrogression was essentially a matter of providing a suitable mechanism.

- (ii) The Government of Southern Rhodesia proposed the addition of a Senate (to be composed of twelve Chiefs elected by the Chiefs' Council) which would vote with the Assembly at third readings on any question affecting the revision of the entrenched clauses. This would replace the referendum procedure under the 1961 Constitution.
- (iii) The Government of Southern Rhodesia stated that their proposal for a Senate of twelve African Chiefs represented a major advance for Africans. The Southern Rhodesian Government could not contemplate any increased representation for Africans in the Assembly, while so many Africans refused the opportunities offered under the present Constitution but they were prepared to consider the extension of the B roll franchise, for example, by admitting all taxpayers.
- (iv) The Government of Southern Rhodesia stated that they wished to see an end to racial discrimination by an evolutionary process, but they could not agree to the repeal of the Land Apportionment Act.
- (v) The Government of Southern Rhodesia claimed that they had already demonstrated that the majority of the people of Southern Rhodesia desired independence on the basis of the 1961 Constitution. This had been shown by their consultation of tribal opinion and the referendum of the electorate.

28. According to the statement of the Commonwealth Relations Office, the United Kingdom Government did not consider that these proposals provided any positive advancement for Africans and had therefore come to the conclusion that no basis existed on which the United Kingdom Government would feel justified in granting independence to Southern Rhodesia. The statement also reiterated the United Kingdom Government warning of the grave consequences of a unilateral declaration of independence by the Government of Southern Rhodesia.

29. On 11 October 1965, Prime Minister Wilson held another meeting with Mr. Ian Smith in an attempt to break the deadlock on the issue of independence. Mr. Smith stated after their meeting that there had been no change in their respective positions on the independence issue.

Exchange of correspondence on resumption of talks

30. On 12 October 1965, Prime Minister Wilson sent a message to Mr. Smith in Southern Rhodesia in which he suggested sending to Southern Rhodesia a mission of senior Commonwealth Prime Ministers, headed by Mr. Robert Menzies, the former Prime Minister of Australia, to find ways and means of breaking the deadlock on the question of independence. On 18 October 1965, Mr. Smith rejected the suggestion for such a mission on the ground that the Commonwealth had no jurisdiction as far as Southern Rhodesia was concerned. On the same day, Mr. Wilson replied to Mr. Smith's message saying, among other things, that the United Kingdom Government was still open to any new ideas for seeking agreement between the two Governments.

31. On 20 October 1965, Mr. Smith responded to Mr. Wilson's request by suggesting that the United Kingdom Government could grant Southern Rhodesia independence and put the Government on trust to observe and abide by the principles of the 1961 Constitution. To this end he offered to abide by a treaty to guarantee those principles. He also stated that should such a treaty be broken, the United Kingdom Government could then take whatever steps it thought fit.

32. On the strength of the treaty proposal by Mr. Smith, Prime Minister Wilson offered on 21 October 1965 to fly to Southern Rhodesia for further talks on the independence issue.

Visit of the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom to Southern Rhodesia

33. Prime Minister Wilson, accompanied by the Commonwealth Relations Secretary, Mr. Arthur Bottomley, visited Southern Rhodesia from 25 to 30 October 1965 for a fresh round of talks on the independence issue. They were later joined by the United Kingdom Attorney General, Sir Elwyn Jones.

34. While in Southern Rhodesia, Mr. Wilson held meetings with Mr. Smith and his advisers, also with Mr. Josiah Gondo, Leader of the Opposition, other members of the United Peoples Party, a delegation of the Provincial Council of Chiefs, independent members of Parliament, Mr. Garfield Todd (a former Prime Minister who is under restriction), and members of the Asian Community. He also held talks with Mr. Joshua Nkomo, leader of the banned Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU) and the Rev. N. Sithole, leader of the banned Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), who were flown from their restriction areas for the talks. In all, it was estimated that Prime Minister Wilson talked with 126 leading and representative Southern Rhodesians.

Proposal for appointment of royal commission

35. In his discussions with members of the Southern Rhodesian Government, Prime Minister Wilson impressed upon them the dire consequences of an illegal seizure of power and also put to them two propositions. The first was that Mr. Smith's assertion that the Rhodesian people, including a majority of Africans, wanted independence on the basis of the 1961 Constitution should be tested by a referendum of the whole people, or of the present electorate plus all African taxpayers. The second was that a royal commission should be set up under the chairmanship of the Southern Rhodesian Chief Justice, to recommend amendments to the 1961 Constitution which would provide the basis on which Southern Rhodesia might become independent as quickly as possible, give effect to the five principles set out by the United Kingdom Government and which would be acceptable to the people of Southern Rhodesia as a whole.

36. The Southern Rhodesian Government accepted neither of these alternatives, and instead proposed that a royal commission, under the Chief Justice of Southern Rhodesia, with one other member nominated by the Southern Rhodesian Government and another by the United Kingdom Government, working on the basis of a unanimous report, should receive from the two Governments an agreed draft independence arrangement, based on the 1961 Constitution, with such amendments as might be considered necessary, and should then ascertain whether such a document was acceptable to the Rhodesian people as a whole.

37. Mr. Wilson agreed to this proposal, whilst reserving the right to return to the original concept of the commission's powers and duties, if the commission failed to agree. He also felt that the commission should produce an interim report on the methods it recommended for consulting Rhodesian opinion as a whole. On the question of which amendments should be made to the 1961 Constitution, important differences between the two Governments remained, however.

Statement by the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom concerning his visit to Southern Rhodesia

38. In his report to Parliament on 1 November, after his return to London, Mr. Wilson said that the chiefs could not by the widest stretch of imagination be said to be capable of representing the African population as a whole, nor could the United Kingdom Government leave without safeguards a situation which would permit an independent Southern Rhodesia Parliament without check or constitutional hindrance to reduce the "B" roll seats or increase the "A" roll seats and thus postpone majority rule.

39. Regarding his talks in Salisbury with African leaders, Mr. Harold Wilson stated:

"... I should tell the House that in my talks with the African Nationalist leaders, and with African and other M.P.s elected on the "B" Roll, I made clear, with absolute frankness, three things. First, I regarded it as my duty to remove from their minds any idea of hope they might have that Rhodesia's constitutional problems were going to be solved by an assertion of military power on our part, whether for the purposes of suspending or amending the 1961 Constitution, of imposing majority rule tomorrow or any other time—or for that matter dealing with the situation that would follow, an illegal assertion of independence.

"... Secondly, I said that although successive British Governments are deeply and irrevocably committed to guaranteed and unimpeded progress to majority rule, the British Government, who alone, though the British Parliament have the legal power to grant independence, do not believe that in the present and tragic and divided condition of Rhodesia, that majority [rule] can or should come today, or tomorrow.

"... Thirdly, I urge them to unite the at present bitterly divided forces of African opinion, to work the Constitution of Rhodesia in a constitutional manner, to persuade their followers to register and to vote."

Offer to test acceptability of Southern Rhodesian proposals

40. On 3 November, Prime Minister Wilson informed Parliament that, despite further discussions between the Commonwealth Secretary and the Attorney General (who had delayed their departure from Salisbury) and the Southern Rhodesian Government, there was no prospect of agreement on the amendments to be made to the 1961 Constitution as a basis for use by a royal commission. In view of this, the present United Kingdom Government, whilst not moving from the position of its predecessors—in being ready to take account of any views which might be freely expressed by the population on the issues involved, but nevertheless reserving their position—agreed, subject to certain conditions, that the Rhodesian Government's proposals

should be put to the test of acceptability to the Rhodesian people as a whole.

41. The conditions were that it must be known that the United Kingdom Government disagreed with those proposals, that before canvassing the views of the Southern Rhodesian people the royal commission should submit for approval by both Governments a unanimous report on how they would propose to determine acceptability, and that having ascertained the views of the Southern Rhodesian people the commission should submit a unanimous report. The United Kingdom Government could not commit themselves in advance to accept that report since the eventual decision must rest with the British Parliament.

42. As an alternative, the United Kingdom Government was still willing that the Rhodesian Government's proposals should be submitted to the test of a referendum of the whole Rhodesian people conducted without restriction on free political activity.

Reaction of the Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia to the United Kingdom Government proposals for a royal commission

43. On 6 November 1965 Mr. Smith sent a message to Mr. Wilson in which he stated that Southern Rhodesia could not accept the United Kingdom Government's proposals for a royal commission as outlined in the statement of Mr. Wilson in Parliament on 3 November 1965.

Internal developments in Southern Rhodesia

44. On 18 October 1965, the Southern Rhodesian Government issued a twelve months' restriction order against Mr. Garfield Todd, a former Southern Rhodesian Prime Minister, who is reported to be a supporter of African rights. Mr. Todd was restricted to his farm as he prepared to leave for the United Kingdom on 19 October 1965.

45. The restriction order stated that there was reason to believe that Mr. Todd was actively associated with the leaders of an unlawful organization—the banned Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU) and that he had actively associated himself with activities prejudicial to the maintenance of law and order.

46. On 5 November 1965, the Southern Rhodesian Government declared a three-month state of emergency throughout the country. A statement by the Minister of Law and Order, Mr. Desmond Lardner-Burke, said that the state of emergency was necessary because there was a threat to security in Southern Rhodesia. By way of explanation, he referred to what he called the threats posed by numerous trained saboteurs sponsored by prescribed African nationalist organizations who, he claimed, had already returned to the country. He also claimed that many more were undergoing training in sabotage in countries hostile to Southern Rhodesia and that some of these saboteurs were already in countries north of Southern Rhodesia, awaiting directions and the opportunity to return to the country. He also claimed that statements by certain African countries indicated a threat to security and the maintenance of law and order.

47. On 3 November 1965, the Southern Rhodesian Minister of Finance, Mr. John Wrathall, announced the imposition of a control of all imports into Southern Rhodesia. An official statement said that the purpose of the import control was to stabilize the country's external reserves and to maintain a level of imports comparable to that of 1964.

48. These three acts of the Southern Rhodesian Government gave rise to general speculation that a unilateral declaration of independence by the Government of Southern Rhodesia was imminent. Prime Minister Smith had stated on his return from the United Kingdom on 12 October 1965, that it was an even bet that Southern Rhodesia would be independent by Christmas of 1965.

Further attempts at talks

49. On 7 November 1965, Prime Minister Wilson sent Mr. Smith a message asking to meet him in Malta for a further discussion of the Southern Rhodesia issue. He suggested in his letter that Sir Hugh Beadle (Chief Justice of Southern Rhodesia and Chairman designate of the proposed royal commission) visit London first to discuss the workings of the commission in the light of the newly declared state of emergency.

50. On 8 November 1965, Mr. Smith rejected the United Kingdom proposals for a royal commission. He informed Mr. Wilson that the United Kingdom and Southern Rhodesian views on independence were irreconcilable. He objected to a statement in Mr. Wilson's last letter that the United Kingdom Parliament alone could grant independence to Southern Rhodesia, although the commission's report would carry great weight. He also said that the United Kingdom had made it clear it would not permit the commission to submit a majority report and that it would not advocate its acceptance in Parliament.

51. Mr. Smith later announced that Sir Hugh Beadle, the Southern Rhodesian Chief Justice and Chairman designate of the proposed three-man royal commission, would go to London as suggested by Mr. Wilson. He made it clear, however, that Sir Hugh was going entirely at his own initiative. Sir Hugh arrived in London on 9 November 1965 to begin talks with Prime Minister Wilson and the Commonwealth Relations Secretary, Mr. Bottomley.

Final exchanges

52. Prime Minister Wilson, in a further message to Mr. Smith on 10 November 1965, asked the following: If the United Kingdom Government undertook to commend to Parliament a unanimous report by the royal commission to the effect that the 1961 Constitution was acceptable to the people of Southern Rhodesia as a whole as a basis for independence, would the Southern Rhodesian Government give a corresponding undertaking that if the 1961 Constitution was not so acceptable they would abandon their claim in this respect and agree that a royal commission should then devise an acceptable new constitution giving effect to the five principles?

53. In a statement to the House of Commons on 11 November, Mr. Wilson said that he had had a final telephone conversation with Mr. Smith several hours before the illegal declaration in which he had told him that there were no outstanding points remaining and that he was sending a senior minister to Salisbury to sign an agreed minute recording the basis on which the royal commission could be set up that week and start its work. Mr. Smith, however, had persisted in maintaining that the positions of the two Governments were irreconcilable.

Mr. Ian Smith declares independence unilaterally

54. On 11 November 1965, Mr. Ian Smith declared independence unilaterally. The announcement was con-

tained in a proclamation (see appendix I) read by Mr. Smith in a broadcast to the people of Southern Rhodesia.

55. In a subsequent statement after reading the proclamation, Mr. Smith said that Southern Rhodesia would abide by the 1961 Constitution which now included the necessary amendments to adapt it to that of an independent country. Southern Rhodesia would continue in its loyalty to the Queen, the Union Jack would continue to fly in Southern Rhodesia, and the national anthem would continue to be sung. He also said that it was the intention of his new régime, in consultation with the Chiefs, to bring the Africans into the "Government" and "Administration", on a basis acceptable to them.

56. He ended his statement by saying that Southern Rhodesia had assumed its sovereign independence.

Statement by the United Kingdom Government on the illegal declaration of independence

57. On 11 November 1965, Prime Minister Wilson made a statement in the United Kingdom Parliament on the illegal declaration of independence in Southern Rhodesia.

58. He stated, *inter alia*, that the United Kingdom Government condemned the purported declaration of independence by the former Government of Southern Rhodesia as an illegal act and one which was ineffective in law. It was an act of rebellion against the Crown and against the Constitution as by law established, and any action taken to give effect to it would be treasonable. He also informed Parliament that the Governor, in pursuance of the authority vested in him by the Crown, had, on 11 November 1965, informed the Prime Minister and other Ministers of the Southern Rhodesian Government that they ceased to hold office. They were now private citizens in Southern Rhodesia and could exercise no legal authority. He further stated that the United Kingdom Government would have no dealing with the rebel régime. The United Kingdom High Commissioner was being withdrawn and the Southern Rhodesian High Commissioner in London had been asked to leave. (The Prime Minister also announced financial and economic sanctions against Southern Rhodesia which are dealt with in paragraphs 176-178 below.)

59. He went on to state that it was the duty of all British subjects in Southern Rhodesia including all citizens of Southern Rhodesia to remain loyal to the Crown and to recognize the continuing authority and responsibility for Southern Rhodesia of the Government of the United Kingdom.

60. Prime Minister Wilson also informed Parliament that the purpose of the United Kingdom Government's action against the illegal régime in Southern Rhodesia was not punitive but rather to restore constitutional Government in Southern Rhodesia. He further informed Parliament on 12 November 1965 that the only way this could be done was by bringing the rebel régime to an end by making that régime unworkable and creating a situation where, at the earliest possible moment, the people of Southern Rhodesia themselves would wish to see a lawful government in its place.

Southern Rhodesia Act, 1965

61. On 16 November 1965, the United Kingdom Parliament passed the Southern Rhodesia Act 1965 (see appendix II) which emphasizes United Kingdom

jurisdiction over Southern Rhodesia and gives the Government powers for suspending, amending, revoking, or adding to any of the provisions of the Constitution of Southern Rhodesia, 1961. The Act also gives the United Kingdom Government powers to impose sanctions and take any other necessary action against the illegal régime in Southern Rhodesia. It also empowers the Government to declare invalid any laws made by the illegal régime since the unilateral declaration of independence. The Act further empowers the United Kingdom Government to make any Orders in Council which appear to be necessary or expedient in consequence of the illegal declaration of independence. The Act provides that these Orders take effect as soon as they are made, subject to their approval by Parliament which must be given within twenty-eight days of their date of issue.

62. Immediately after the passage of the Southern Rhodesia Act, 1965, the United Kingdom Government issued seven Orders in Council on Southern Rhodesia, among which were the following:

(a) *Southern Rhodesia (Constitution) Order, 1965*

63. Sections 2 and 3 of this Order in effect make illegal any orders issued by Mr. Ian Smith and the former Southern Rhodesian Government since the illegal declaration of independence and gives the United Kingdom Government general power to make laws for the peace, order and good government of Southern Rhodesia. Sections 4 to 6 of this Order also empower a Secretary of State to exercise executive authority in Southern Rhodesia currently with the Governor, in so far as the Governor is in a position to exercise it, or it is to be exercised directly through Orders emanating from the United Kingdom (see appendix III).

64. The executive authority of a Secretary of State under this Order in Council is vested in the Commonwealth Relations Secretary.

65. The United Kingdom Attorney General, Sir Elwyn Jones, stated in Parliament on 24 November 1965 that the Order invalidated in advance any laws which the Legislative Assembly in Southern Rhodesia might attempt to pass and any other business which it might transact. It also freed the Governor from his constitutional obligation to act in accordance with the advice of ministers and authorized the United Kingdom Government to exercise or control the exercise of various functions of officers and authorities of the Government of Southern Rhodesia. The Attorney General also stated that the Order declared invalid the constitution which Mr. Ian Smith and his colleagues purported to have granted to Southern Rhodesia. According to the Attorney General, the Order enabled the United Kingdom Government to keep under its own hand the necessary constitutional powers in Southern Rhodesia and thus enabled it to resist any attempt to set up an alternative government.

(b) *Southern Rhodesia (Fugitive Offenders Act, 1881) Order, 1965*

66. This Order prevents alleged fugitive offenders from being returned to Southern Rhodesia unless the Home Secretary considers their return expedient.

(c) *Southern Rhodesia (British Nationality Act, 1948) Order, 1965*

67. This Order makes it easier for loyal Southern Rhodesian citizens to be granted citizenship of the United Kingdom and colonies.

(d) *Southern Rhodesia (Commonwealth Immigration Act, 1962) Order, 1965*

68. This Order ensures that Southern Rhodesians to whom emergency United Kingdom passports are issued do not thereby become exempt from the provisions of the Commonwealth Immigrants Act.

(e) *Southern Rhodesia (Property in Passports) Order, 1965*

69. This Order enables immigration authorities to confiscate passports issued by the illegal authorities.

United Kingdom Government policy on the use of force

70. Prime Minister Wilson, following his statement on 11 November 1965 concerning the attitude to be taken towards the illegal régime in Southern Rhodesia and on the economic sanctions to be introduced, also informed Parliament that the solution of the Southern Rhodesian problem was not one to be dealt with by military intervention unless troops were asked for to avert a tragic action such as subversion, murder, etc. The United Kingdom Government did not contemplate any national action or international action to coerce even the illegal régime of Southern Rhodesia into a constitutional posture.

71. On 12 November 1965, the Prime Minister elaborated further on the policy of the United Kingdom Government concerning the use of force. He informed Parliament that if the legally constituted Government of Southern Rhodesia, that is the Governor, were to seek help in dealing with law and order, the United Kingdom Government would have to give it the fullest consideration.

Censorship imposed in Southern Rhodesia

72. On 10 November 1965, censorship was imposed on Southern Rhodesia by the Smith régime. The censorship powers, which came into force on 11 November 1965, include regulation, control, restriction and prohibition of printing, publishing, the posts and telegraphs and radio transmission and the entry into and exit from Southern Rhodesia of personnel. In addition, the regulations empower the régime to take over and operate newspapers and can compel newspaper staff to maintain and carry on the production of newspapers.

73. Under these censorship powers, the *Rhodesia Herald* was prevented from publishing a proposed special edition on 11 November 1965, on the Governor's proclamation dismissing Mr. Smith and his ministers from office.

74. On 8 February 1966, the Southern Rhodesian authorities introduced new emergency regulations by which it becomes an offence for newspapers to state expressly or to indicate by leaving blank spaces that they are subjected to censorship. The new regulations give censors powers to order that any material—including headlines—be altered or moved to another page. The issue of any publication which breaks the new regulations can be prohibited and any one who breaks them or obstructs a censor can be fined up to £500 or jailed for two years.

75. Both Southern Rhodesia's newspapers, the *Rhodesia Herald* and the *Chronicle* of Bulawayo had frequently appeared in the past with many blank spaces, indicating that their stories had been censored.

76. On 7 December 1965, Mr. Ian Smith's régime promulgated regulations to prevent people from listening to "subversive and seditious broadcasts" from countries bordering on Southern Rhodesia. Under these regulations any one who causes or permits to be heard in public one of these broadcasts is liable to a fine of £500 or two years' imprisonment, or both. It was reported that the immediate object of this move was to prevent people in Southern Rhodesia from listening to nationalist broadcasts from Zambia. It was further reported that the wording of the announcement of this regulation could well embrace broadcasts from the new British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) station in Bechuanaland.

United Kingdom radio station in Bechuanaland starts BBC broadcast to Southern Rhodesia

77. A new United Kingdom radio station in Bechuanaland was reported to have started beaming broadcasts to Southern Rhodesia on 22 December 1965.

78. The Commonwealth Relations Secretary, Mr. Arthur Bottomley, was reported to have announced on 29 December 1965, that the United Kingdom Government had built the transmitter in the Francistown area near the Southern Rhodesian border to contribute to its efforts to bring about the downfall of the Smith régime. The United Kingdom Government had decided to take this action after news censorship was instituted in Southern Rhodesia. Mr. Bottomley was further reported to have said that the transmitter had been relaying programmes intermittently for a fortnight and that it would relay appropriate programmes from the BBC.

Illegal régime assumes more powers

79. Under the Emergency Powers Act of Southern Rhodesia, the illegal régime, on 11 November 1965, assumed new powers to suspend chiefs, appoint new chiefs and to appoint additional district commissioners. It also assumed powers to requisition vehicles, equipment, buildings or premises and to take over radio stations.

80. The régime also took powers on 11 November 1965, to retain officers in the armed services or the Civil Service, to compel them to undertake any duties and suspend them from duty "notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in the conditions of service". Under the terms of these new powers, any employees who withdraw from their employment or refuse to carry out their duties are liable to two years' imprisonment, a fine of £500, or both.

81. On 10 December 1965, Prime Minister Wilson stated in Parliament that the illegal régime had introduced into Southern Rhodesia police state methods repugnant not only to the 1961 Constitution but also repugnant to all civilized standards.

Ian Smith "Constitution"

82. The so-called Constitution which was annexed to Mr. Smith's illegal declaration follows the general lines and terminology of the 1961 Constitution, with some important changes. The whole section on the Governor is replaced by arrangements for an "officer administering the Government" who is also the Commander-in-Chief. The powers of the "Officer Administering the Government" are the same as the Governor's, without, however, any powers to reserve bills for the assent of the Crown. He is to be either a Governor-General who may be appointed by the Crown on the

advice only of the "Ministers" of the "Government of Rhodesia" or in the absence of such an appointment by the Crown within fourteen days, a Regent appointed by Members of the Executive Council presided over by the Prime Minister.

83. The Legislature, the franchise and the electoral provisions are generally the same as in the 1961 Constitution. The declaration of rights is unchanged except that the whole of the section providing for appeals to the Privy Council is abolished.

Position of the Governor in relation to the illegal régime

84. Immediately following the illegal declaration of independence, the Governor of Southern Rhodesia, Sir Humphrey Gibbs, issued a proclamation stating that Mr. Ian Smith and the other persons holding office as ministers of the Government of Southern Rhodesia or as deputy ministers ceased to hold office. He also called on all citizens of Southern Rhodesia to refrain from all acts which would further the objectives of the illegal régime. Subject to that, he stated that it was the duty of all citizens to maintain law and order in the country and to carry on with their normal tasks. This applied equally to the judiciary, the armed services, the police and the civil servants.

85. The Governor's statement was not given any publicity because of the censorship which had been imposed on Southern Rhodesia.

86. Mr. Ian Smith was quoted as saying on 12 November 1965 that any powers which the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom attributed to Sir Humphrey Gibbs, the Governor of Southern Rhodesia, were fictitious. He was further quoted as saying that the Governor had been advised that in view of the new Constitution which had been given to the people of Southern Rhodesia by the *de facto* Government in control, he no longer had any executive control in Southern Rhodesia.

87. On 14 November 1965 Sir Humphrey Gibbs issued a statement saying that he could not accept Mr. Smith's order that he no longer had any executive authority. He stated that he had been asked to continue in office by the United Kingdom Government and therefore remained the lawful Governor and the lawfully constituted authority. He also stated that he would not recognize the illegal régime or the new Constitution under which Mr. Smith was running the country.

88. On 17 November 1965, Mr. Smith announced the appointment of Mr. Clifford Dupont, former Deputy Prime Minister, as "Acting Officer Administering the Government" to assume the powers of a Governor under the so-called new Constitution. On 4 December 1965, it was reported that the Crown had refused a request from Mr. Smith to appoint Mr. Dupont as Governor-General of Southern Rhodesia.

89. Mr. Dupont was "sworn in" on 20 December 1965 as "Officer Administering the Government". By this action the illegal régime purported to have replaced the Governor, Sir Humphrey Gibbs.

90. Mr. Dupont was to have been made "Regent" under the Smith constitution but Mr. Smith announced on 16 December 1965 that he had decided to amend the original plan and appoint an "Officer Administering the Government" in deference to the British Royal family.

91. On 16 November 1965, an aide to Sir Humphrey Gibbs was reported to have said that the telephone to Government House, the official residence of the Governor, had been cut off. It was later reported that the Governor had been deprived of his official cars and most of his servants by the illegal régime. The Governor was also reported to have been deprived of all but two of the typewriters in his office.

92. On 18 November 1965, Prime Minister Wilson informed Parliament that the Governor of Southern Rhodesia, Sir Humphrey Gibbs, had been appointed by Queen Elizabeth II and could be removed only at her request. He also branded as an act of treason the move by Mr. Smith's régime to appoint Mr. Dupont as a replacement for the Governor.

93. On 26 November 1965, Sir Humphrey Gibbs stated that he intended to remain as the lawful Governor of Southern Rhodesia until such time that constitutional government was restored, which he hoped would be very soon. On 23 December 1965, the Governor also issued a Christmas message to the people of Southern Rhodesia in which he expressed the hope that the country would return to constitutional government.

94. However, none of these statements was communicated to the people of Southern Rhodesia because of the censorship which was imposed by the illegal régime.

95. On 10 December 1965, Prime Minister Wilson, speaking in Parliament, clarified the United Kingdom Government's attitude towards the Smith régime. He stated that the Government could not negotiate with the illegal régime which had perverted, distorted and misused the 1961 Constitution in a way not intended by its authors or by the United Kingdom Parliament.

96. He emphasized that it was for the Southern Rhodesian people, through the Governor, to make clear their desire for a return to their original allegiance and the rule of law. He also stated that Mr. Smith, like any other private individual in Southern Rhodesia, was free to make representations to the Governor and that if the Governor in his discretion forwarded any submissions to the United Kingdom Government, it would be considered. However, he further stated that the United Kingdom Government was not prepared to enter into negotiations with Mr. Smith on any basis which involved dealing with an illegal régime, or under any conditions other than procedural conditions, for a return to constitutional government.

97. On 21 December 1965, Prime Minister Wilson stated in Parliament that the Governor had standing authority to talk to anyone in Southern Rhodesia who could provide a means of returning to constitutional rule. The United Kingdom Government had authorized him to discuss even with the illegal régime the mechanism by which Southern Rhodesia could be returned to constitutional rule. He also stated that there were a number of detailed matters including the transfer of the armed forces and the police to the Governor's authority, and also several administrative matters which could be handled more smoothly if there were discussions.

Prerogative of the Crown challenged

98. On 20 and 21 January 1966, it was reported that the Crown had used its prerogative of mercy in favour of two Southern Rhodesian Africans who had been condemned to death under the mandatory death

sentence of the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act, for attempted arson. It was also reported that since the Southern Rhodesian régime was illegal and the Governor unable to operate, the prerogative was exercised direct from the United Kingdom and that the Governor, the Southern Rhodesian Attorney General and the governor of the prison were informed direct of the Crown's wishes.

99. The Smith régime issued a statement on 21 January 1966, that it regarded the exercise of the royal prerogative in this case as an illegal act. The Commonwealth Relations Office said on 20 January 1966, that it would be an illegal act if the death sentence were carried out in defiance of the wishes of the Crown.

United People's Party and the illegal régime

100. It was reported on 18 November 1965 that Southern Rhodesia's all-African parliamentary opposition party had declared a boycott on any further discussions with Mr. Smith over his seizure of independence. Mr. Josiah Gondo, leader of the United Peoples Party, which has ten members in the Legislative Assembly, said in the statement that there could be no question of his party sitting down with Mr. Smith and his colleagues to discuss ways of furthering independence.

101. Mr. Smith had been previously reported to have stated on 17 November 1965, that he hoped to have discussions with African politicians on Southern Rhodesia's future under independence.

Southern Rhodesia Legislative Assembly

102. When the Southern Rhodesia Legislative Assembly met on 25 November 1965, an African Opposition Member, Mr. Chad Chipunza asked the Speaker for a ruling on whether Parliament was in fact constituted and whether he would read to the House the Southern Rhodesia (Constitution) Order in Council, 1965. Dr. Ahrn Palley, an independent member of Highfield electoral district, asked the Speaker to suspend the sitting because certain members of the House had issued a document purporting to be a new constitution for the country which had no legal validity and was in law an act of rebellion; those who accepted the document as a new constitution were acting illegally. The Speaker replied that the Chair itself was of that number and suggested that any member who found the United Kingdom enactment binding had only one proper course to pursue—to withdraw himself from the transactions of business by the House.

103. After making further attempts to interrogate the Speaker, Dr. Palley was suspended and was removed from the Chamber by the Sergeant-at-Arms. He was followed, it was reported, by nine of the fourteen other members representing the "B" roll electoral districts.

Mr. Smith's message to the armed forces, police and public servants on their loyalty to the illegal régime

104. On 15 November 1965, Mr. Smith sent a message to all government servants, including all officers and other ranks of the British South African police, the Army and the Royal Rhodesian Air Force and prison services, warning them to beware of the efforts of the United Kingdom Government to undermine their loyalty to his régime. Mr. Smith stated in his message that his Government was the Government of Southern

Rhodesia and that they should disregard any claims that might be advanced by the Governor or persons purporting to speak in his name, or officials or members of the United Kingdom Government.

United Kingdom Government's view on the position of public servants in Southern Rhodesia

105. In his statement to Parliament on 11 November 1965, Prime Minister Wilson stated that it was the duty of all British subjects in Southern Rhodesia to remain loyal to the Crown and to continue to recognize the authority and responsibility for Southern Rhodesia of the Government of the United Kingdom.

106. In an interview on the BBC on 17 November 1965, Mr. Wilson was asked what answer he would give to Southern Rhodesian loyalists who wished to know what they should do in answering Mr. Smith's claims on their personal allegiance. The Prime Minister stated that the administering of an oath by the Smith régime was illegal and anyone who sought to administer it would be committing a further act of illegality. He added that it had to be a matter for the conscience of every public servant, that they should do nothing, and in view of their oath to the Crown, they could do nothing to further the purpose of the rebellion. Subject to that, it was the view of the Government that the public servants should continue the ordinary services and help to maintain law and order—particularly the judiciary—but if they were asked to take an illegal oath, this was a matter that they would have to decide against all the circumstances. It could well be that the loyal servants of the Crown, by staying at their posts, provided they were not asked to further the purposes of the rebellion, might be in a position to frustrate the purposes of the rebellion and speed the return of Southern Rhodesians to the rule of law and to their original allegiance. He also stated that those who might lose their positions because of their loyalty to the law were not going to lose their pensions and their accumulated rights.

107. The Prime Minister's statement was reported to have been beamed on the BBC to Southern Rhodesia. The statement was made a day after the African Workers' Postal Union, which has a membership of 4,000, had made an open appeal to the United Kingdom Government for guidance as to whether they should sign a pledge of loyalty to the Smith régime.

Southern Rhodesia High Court and the legality of the Ian Smith régime

108. On 13 January 1966, the legality of the Smith régime was challenged in the Southern Rhodesia High Court by the editor of the *Central African Examiner*. She contended that the censorship regulations order made on 10 November 1965 by the Southern Rhodesia Government had been revoked by an Order in Council made by the United Kingdom Government on 19 November 1965 and had ceased to have any force or effect from that date. The Judge was urgently asked to make a ruling on the validity of the censorship order in view of the severe limitation on the freedom of expression and the fact that the magazine wished to print in its February issue items which should have been in the Christmas issue but had been censored.

109. The editor of the *Examiner* further contended that the present Southern Rhodesia Government even if in fact in control of the country was not the lawful Government thereof. Alternatively, if it was the lawful

Government, it was so by virtue of the 1961 Constitution.

110. The Southern Rhodesian régime contended that the "1965 Constitution" prevailed in Southern Rhodesia and a United Kingdom Act of Parliament and orders made under it were of no force or effect in Southern Rhodesia. It claimed further that it was beyond the jurisdiction of the High Court to entertain a challenge to the authority of the "1965 Constitution", and the present Government which was constituted and appointed under it.

111. The Smith régime also contended that the present Southern Rhodesian Government constituted and appointed in terms of the "1965 Constitution" was fully established as the lawful and effective Government of Southern Rhodesia and the continuance in office of the cabinet ministers was also lawful.

112. It was reported on 14 January 1966, that during the proceedings of the High Court the Attorney General of the illegal régime indicated, as being possible, the total closure of the Courts if they were drawn into a political and constitutional battle on the side of the United Kingdom.

113. On 27 January 1966, the Judge dismissed the case, reportedly saying that the direct question involved—the validity of the Smith régime's censorship regulations—was one that should be decided by a criminal court. At the same time, he was also reported to have stated that no question arose of the Court taking sides in a political struggle between the United Kingdom Government and the Southern Rhodesian Government.

Armed forces of Southern Rhodesia

114. It was reported on 12 November 1965, that the Southern Rhodesia Army had 3,400 men on active duty and 8,400 white reservists. The Army was said to comprise two regular army battalions, the all-white Rhodesian Light Infantry and the white-officered Rhodesian African Rifles. It was also reported that there were eight National Guard battalions, four of which were known to be active and the others believed to be in various stages of readiness.

115. The report further said that the Royal Rhodesian Air Force had 75 aircraft and 900 men which included one squadron of B-57 bombers, one of Hunter fighters, a reconnaissance squadron of armed Provosts, an Alouette Helicopter Squadron and a transport squadron of DC-38 and Canadian North Star aircraft.

116. The report also stated that Southern Rhodesia had a 6,000 strong regular police force—still named the British South Africa Police—of whom 2,000 were white. It further stated that the Reserve Police numbered 28,000 of whom 21,000 were white.

Political demonstrations against the illegal régime in Southern Rhodesia

117. It was reported on 12 November 1965 that 300,000 copies of a statement by the Smith régime were distributed on 11 November 1965 to the African population, warning them that the police and the army were ready to deal with any persons who caused trouble.

118. It was reported that on 15 November 1965, Southern Rhodesian policemen armed with shot-guns had broken up a strike by African workers in Bulawayo who were protesting against the illegal declaration of independence. On 22 November 1965, thousands of Africans in the cities of Bulawayo and Gwelo

staged a strike in protest against the unilateral declaration of independence.

119. On 23 November 1965, one African was reported killed in Bulawayo when police opened fire to disperse an African demonstration. One African was shot in the leg when police opened fire to disperse demonstrators in the African township of Que Que. The police used tear-gas on 24 November 1965 to disband political demonstrators in Bulawayo. On 22 November 1965, the police opened fire to disband a crowd of political demonstrators in Salisbury.

Detainees and restrictees in Southern Rhodesia

120. It was reported on 18 January 1966 that there had been a sharp increase in the number of people under restriction in Southern Rhodesia in the past two months, but that the number in detention had dropped. A spokesman for the Southern Rhodesian régime was reported to have announced on 18 January that there were about 350 restrictees and 20 to 30 detainees in Southern Rhodesia.

121. On 25 November 1965, the "Minister of Justice, Law and Order", Mr. Lardner-Burke told the Legislative Assembly that there were 276 people in restriction and 47 under detention.

122. The latest details of the restriction orders, which were reported to have been listed in the *Government Gazette*, showed that twenty-two people were restricted between 14 and 24 December 1965. Of those, four—including a woman—were restricted for five years, seven for three years, five for two years and six for one year. The spokesman for the Southern Rhodesian authorities was reported to have said that the figure of 350 restrictees included a small number of people being held for two or three weeks only under the emergency regulations.

Population figures

123. It was reported on 21 January 1966 that according to the Government Monthly Statistical Report on Southern Rhodesia for January 1966, the population of Southern Rhodesia had reached an all-time high of 4,330,000. There were 4,080,000 Africans, an Asian community of 8,100 and another 13,000 Coloured (mixed race) people. According to the official figures, Southern Rhodesia's white population was 224,000 in December 1965. It was reported that this was the second time the number of Whites reached 224,000. The number of Whites was reported to have declined from this figure to 221,000 during 1963, at the break-up of the Central African Federation.

Relations between South Africa and Southern Rhodesia

124. On 11 November 1965, the Prime Minister of South Africa, Dr. H. Verwoerd, issued a statement on the unilateral declaration of independence by the Government of Southern Rhodesia. In his statement, the Prime Minister of South Africa said that the problems which had arisen between the United Kingdom and Southern Rhodesia were, and should remain, a dispute limited to those Governments alone. Such limitation was in the interest of world peace. The Government of South Africa had condemned and continuously condemned the fact that other States or organizations had found it necessary, and still found it necessary, to intervene in this domestic matter. The Government of South Africa would continue its policy of non-inter-

vention. In accordance with this attitude, which it had adopted in the course of the dispute both prior and subsequent to Southern Rhodesia's declaration of independence, it would express no views on the arguments put forward by either the United Kingdom or Southern Rhodesia in this matter. The Government of South Africa would, however, continue to maintain the normal friendly relations with both countries.

125. He also stated that, unlike countries separated by great distances, it was of exceptional importance for the Republic of South Africa that normal intercourse with its Southern Rhodesian neighbours should continue as in the past. The measure and character of this course was such that its continuation was unavoidable, irrespective of who exercised effective authority in Southern Rhodesia. It therefore followed that South Africa could not participate in measures such as a boycott.

126. South Africa has continued to maintain relations with the illegal régime. Mr. John Gaunt, the former representative of Southern Rhodesia in South Africa, was reported to have stated on 23 November 1965, that there had been no change in his status since the "declaration of independence". He was also reported to have said that he was still Southern Rhodesia's "plenipotentiary diplomatic representative in the Republic".

Relations between Portugal and Southern Rhodesia

127. On 27 July 1965 the Government of Southern Rhodesia announced the appointment of "a diplomatic representative" in Portugal with effect from 1 August 1965. Mr. Harry Reedman, the representative designate arrived in Lisbon on 15 September 1965 and made a formal call on the Portuguese Minister of Foreign Affairs, on 20 September 1965. A spokesman for the Portuguese Foreign Ministry said that Mr. Reedman had presented "a letter of introduction" and that his status there would be that of "Chief of the Rhodesian Mission". The Foreign Ministry spokesman also stated that Mr. Reedman would deal directly with the Portuguese Ministry of Foreign Affairs concerning all matters of interest to Portugal and Southern Rhodesia.

128. The status of Mr. Reedman was disputed by the United Kingdom Government which has responsibility for the overseas affairs of Southern Rhodesia. The United Kingdom Government wished to have Mr. Reedman accredited to the United Kingdom Embassy.

129. On 1 October 1965, the Government of Portugal issued a statement on the question of Southern Rhodesia's representation in Lisbon. According to the statement the United Kingdom Government had issued a truncated text of a Portuguese note in reply to a United Kingdom Government note of 23 September 1965, asking Portugal to clarify its views on the status of Southern Rhodesia's representative in Lisbon. The Government of Portugal had not the slightest doubt that Southern Rhodesia was not a sovereign country and it was incumbent on the United Kingdom Government to conduct the external relations of Southern Rhodesia that might involve the ultimate responsibility of the United Kingdom Government. On the other hand, the neighbourhood between Portuguese territory and Southern Rhodesia, the long-standing tradition of relations between the two countries and their respective governments and the existence of numerous problems in common provided the justification for Southern Rhodesian representation in Lisbon on a basis corresponding with the status of the territory.

130. There has been no report of any change in the status of Mr. Reedman since the illegal declaration of independence.

131. At a press conference on 25 November 1965, the Foreign Minister of Portugal, Dr. Alberto Franco Nogueira dealt mainly with the position of his Government on the question of sanctions (see para. 268 below). He stated, however, that Portugal would continue to maintain normal relations with what he reportedly described as the "local government" of Southern Rhodesia.

Action taken by the Organization of African Unity (OAU)

132. The Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity, meeting in Accra, Ghana, from 21 to 25 October 1965, adopted two resolutions on Southern Rhodesia.

133. In the first resolution, the Heads of State and Government of the OAU called upon the United Nations to regard a unilateral declaration of independence by the European minority Government of Southern Rhodesia as constituting a threat to international peace, and to take any steps that such a situation required in accordance with the Charter and to help to establish a majority Government in Southern Rhodesia. The resolution also called upon all Governments and international bodies, in the event of a unilateral declaration of independence to withhold recognition of a European minority government and to apply sanctions.

134. The resolution further called upon the United Kingdom Government to take all necessary measures including the use of armed forces to take over the administration of Southern Rhodesia; to release the leaders of the nationalist movements, Mr. Joshua Nkomo, Rev. N. Sithole and all other political prisoners; to hold a constitutional conference with the participation of the representatives of the entire population of Southern Rhodesia with a view to adopting a new constitution guaranteeing universal adult suffrage, free elections and independence.

135. In the event of failure on the part of the United Kingdom Government to take the measures set forth above, all OAU member States were, *inter alia*, to use all possible means, including the use of force, with a view to opposing a unilateral declaration of independence; and give immediate and every necessary assistance to the people of Zimbabwe (Southern Rhodesia) with the view to establishing a majority government in that country.

136. The resolution also empowered the African Group at the United Nations to ensure that the request sent to the United Nations and the Security Council received due consideration.

137. In the second resolution, the Heads of State and Government of the OAU decided to set up a Committee of Five composed of the United Arab Republic, Kenya, the United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia and Nigeria to see to the effective implementation of the above resolution.

138. An extraordinary session of the OAU's Council of Ministers was held in Addis Ababa from 3 to 5 December 1965, to discuss OAU policy in response to the illegal declaration. The Council of Ministers adopted three resolutions on the question of Southern Rhodesia. In the first resolution they agreed, *inter alia*, to implement a total blockade of Rhodesia; suspend all economic relations; "freeze" Rhodesian accounts in

African banks; deny all means of transport to and from Rhodesia, including the overflying of aircraft, ban all cable, telephone, telex and radio-telephone communications with Rhodesia; and to appeal to all countries to enforce an embargo on oil and fuel supplies to Rhodesia.

139. The Council of Ministers agreed to ask all African States to submit to the OAU copies of all legislation implementing the Council's decisions.

140. In a second resolution, the Council of Ministers, requested the Committee of Five to co-opt military experts of the States Members in order to study and make plans for the use of force with a view to assisting the people of Zimbabwe; requested all States Members to grant through the Committee of Five every kind of assistance to the people of Zimbabwe in their national fight against foreign domination; requested the Committee of Five to appeal to States Members to make a military contribution in order to face up to any emergency situation which might be created in the States Members adjacent to Southern Rhodesia without prejudice to the right of those States to appeal directly to any brother African State with a view to such assistance; requested the Committee of Five to see what contribution of military or other nature could be made by the States Members to face up to any emergency situation which might exist if one of the States Members of the OAU adjacent to Southern Rhodesia was in danger of being attacked; and addressed an urgent appeal to all States Members to facilitate in every way the task entrusted to the Committee of Five.

141. In a third resolution, the Council of Ministers instructed the African group at the United Nations to request the execution of the Security Council resolution 217 (1965) of 20 November 1965.

Action taken by other international organizations

142. The secretariat of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) stated on 19 November 1965, that it had severed all contacts with the Ian Smith régime and that it would have no further communications with it, although Southern Rhodesia as such remained a full member of GATT.

143. On 19 November 1965, the Governing Council of the International Labour Organisation (ILO) adopted a resolution on Southern Rhodesia.⁵ In this resolution, the Governing Council requested the Director-General to inform the Secretary-General of the United Nations that the ILO would do everything in its power to contribute in its own sphere to such action as might be decided upon by the Security Council; refrain from having any official or unofficial contact, direct or indirect, with the illegal régime in Southern Rhodesia; and keep abreast of developments in the situation and to report to the Governing Body at its next session.

144. On 17 November 1965, the United Kingdom Government informed the Director-General of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) that in present circumstances it did not wish to proceed with its application for associate membership for Southern Rhodesia. FAO took no action on the application for associate membership for Southern Rhodesia.

⁵ See *Official Records of the Security Council, Twentieth Year, Supplement for October, November and December 1965*, document S/6957.

145. On 29 November 1965, the Director-General of the World Health Organization (WHO) informed all members and associate members that all official communications between WHO and the Territory had been suspended with effect from 11 November 1965.

146. In the course of the last session of the Technical Assistance Committee the question of the application of the Security Council resolution of 20 November 1965 to assistance to Southern Rhodesia within the framework of the Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance (EPTA) was raised. The report of the Committee to the Economic and Social Council recorded satisfaction over the Executive Chairman's statement that no further action was to be taken on contingency authorizations for Southern Rhodesia, and that, since the passage of the Security Council resolution, the participating organizations of EPTA and the executing agencies of the Special Fund had been requested to withdraw to Zambia all experts serving in Southern Rhodesia, pending clarification of the political situation in that country.

147. At the request of the United Kingdom Government, the Director-General of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) has also made appropriate arrangements to suspend official communications with Southern Rhodesia.

Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Meeting in Lagos

148. A meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers was held in Lagos, Nigeria, from 11 to 12 January 1966, to discuss the question of Southern Rhodesia.

149. In the final *communiqué* of the Conference, the Prime Ministers agreed that the goal of future progress in Southern Rhodesia should be the establishment of a just society based on equality of opportunity to which all sections of the community could contribute their full potential and from which all could enjoy the benefits due them without discrimination or unjust impediment.

150. To this end, several principles were affirmed. The first was the determination of all present that the rebellion must be brought to an end. All those detained for purely political reasons should be released. Political activities should be constitutional and free from intimidation from any quarter. Repressive and discriminatory laws should be repealed. The Prime Ministers noted the statement of the United Kingdom Government that a period of direct rule would be needed, leading to the holding of a constitutional conference. This conference, representing all sections of the Southern Rhodesian people, would be for the purpose of recommending a constitution leading to majority rule on a basis acceptable to the people of Southern Rhodesia as a whole.

151. The Prime Ministers reviewed and noted the measures taken by Commonwealth and other countries against the illegal régime. Some expressed concern that the steps taken so far had not resulted in its removal. They called on all countries which had not already done so to act in accordance with the recommendations of the Security Council resolution of 20 November 1965, making at the same time necessary arrangements to provide for the repercussions of such further measures on the economy of Zambia.

152. The Prime Ministers discussed the question of the use of military force in Southern Rhodesia, and it was accepted that its use could not be precluded if this proved necessary to restore law and order.

153. In this connexion, the Prime Ministers noted the statement by the United Kingdom Prime Minister that, based on the expert advice available to him, the cumulative effects of the economic and financial sanctions might well bring the rebellion to an end within a matter of weeks rather than months. While some Prime Ministers had misgivings in this regard, all expressed the hope that these measures would result in the overthrow of the illegal régime in Southern Rhodesia within the period mentioned by the United Kingdom Prime Minister.

154. The Prime Ministers decided on the following measures of Commonwealth action, with immediate effect:

(1) To appoint two continuing committees composed of representatives of all Commonwealth countries to meet with the Secretary-General of the Commonwealth Secretariat in London. The first would review regularly the effect of sanctions and also the special needs which might from time to time arise in honouring the Commonwealth's undertaking to come to the support of Zambia as required. The second would co-ordinate a special Commonwealth programme of assistance in training Rhodesian Africans as set out below.

(2) The Sanctions Committee would recommend the reconvening of the Prime Ministers' meeting when they judge that this is necessary. In any case, the Prime Ministers agreed to meet again in July 1966 if the rebellion has not been ended before then.

(3) The Sanctions Committee would advise the Prime Ministers if it considered action by the United Nations was called for.

(4) Some Prime Ministers indicated that they reserved the right if need arose to propose mandatory United Nations action under Articles 41 or 42 of Chapter VII of the Charter. This statement was noted by the other Heads of Government.

155. The Prime Ministers were agreed that planned assistance to a lawfully constituted government of Southern Rhodesia should begin at once. They therefore approved the establishment of a special Commonwealth programme to help accelerate the training of Rhodesian Africans and directed the Secretary-General of the Commonwealth Secretariat to arrange as soon as possible a meeting of educational and technical assistance experts to consider detailed projects of aid by Commonwealth countries, including the early establishment of an administrative training centre in Southern Rhodesia.

Mr. Ian Smith's statement on resumption of talks with the United Kingdom

156. Mr. Ian Smith was reported to have stated on 17 January 1966 that he was willing to reopen negotiations with the United Kingdom Government. He was quoted as saying that he thought they should try to start negotiations for the sake of Anglo-Rhodesian relations and that if negotiations could resolve existing problems then the time was ripe to start them. It was also reported that Mr. Smith had refused to state his conditions for negotiations lest disclosure weaken his position, but that he would insist that Southern Rhodesia remained independent.

Visit of the Chief Justice of Southern Rhodesia to the United Kingdom

157. Sir Hugh Beadle, the Chief Justice of Southern Rhodesia, visited the United Kingdom from 18-24

January 1966, for talks with the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom and the Commonwealth Relations Secretary. The visit of the Chief Justice of Southern Rhodesia to the United Kingdom was reported to be a substitute for the proposed visit of the Commonwealth Relations Secretary to Southern Rhodesia to see the Governor on 14 January 1966. The proposed visit was cancelled when Mr. Smith imposed conditions for the visit which amounted to a United Kingdom recognition of the illegal régime. Sir Hugh Beadle is still recognized as the Chief Justice of Southern Rhodesia by the United Kingdom Government. However, his position has not been challenged by the illegal régime.

158. Although Sir Hugh was reported to be on a private visit, the purpose of his trip was said to be to report to the United Kingdom Government on developments in Southern Rhodesia and to be briefed by the United Kingdom Prime Minister on further government plans on the Southern Rhodesian question.

159. It was reported that the main points which the United Kingdom Government wished to discuss with the Chief Justice included developments following the Lagos Commonwealth Conference on Southern Rhodesia and United Kingdom plans for development in Southern Rhodesia when constitutional rule was restored. It was also reported that the United Kingdom Government was eager to have Sir Hugh's assessment of the impact of economic sanctions on Southern Rhodesia. The Commonwealth Relations Office was reported to have stated on 18 January 1966, that Sir Hugh's visit had been arranged between the Governor of Southern Rhodesia, Sir Humphrey Gibbs, and the United Kingdom Government.

160. A United Kingdom Government spokesman was reported on 23 January 1966, to have emphasized that Sir Hugh would not carry a message to Mr. Ian Smith. No official statement was issued on the discussions between Sir Hugh and the United Kingdom Government. The Chief Justice returned to Southern Rhodesia on 25 January 1966, and was reported to have had talks lasting ninety minutes with Mr. Smith on 27 January 1966. Spokesmen for the illegal régime refused to confirm or to deny that the talks had taken place. Sir Hugh was believed to have reported separately to Mr. Ian Smith and to Sir Humphrey Gibbs, the Governor, on the United Kingdom Government's attitude towards the Southern Rhodesia crisis.

Statement by the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom in Parliament on 25 January 1966

161. On 25 January 1966 Prime Minister Wilson made a statement in Parliament on the question of Southern Rhodesia.

162. In his statement, the Prime Minister said that the first aim of the United Kingdom Government was to bring the Southern Rhodesian rebellion to an end as quickly as possible, without lasting damage to the country. To this end, it would maintain and, as necessary, intensify economic measures with a view to a speedy settlement. It was equally the purpose of the United Kingdom Government to help the people of Southern Rhodesia in making a fresh start towards establishing a just society without discrimination. This fresh start must begin with an unqualified return to constitutional rule.

163. Southern Rhodesia's future course could not be negotiated with the régime which illegally claimed

to govern the country, although the Governor was authorized to receive from the régime any proposals about the means by which the rebellion was to be brought to an end. But discussion of Southern Rhodesia's constitutional future must be with responsible persons representing all the people. The people of Southern Rhodesia obviously could not proceed at one step from rebellion to independence. The process towards majority rule must be renewed without delay or impediment but it could come only with time measured by African advancement and achievement.

164. Assuming that there was a speedy and peaceful return to constitutional rule, the best provision for the first stage after this return would appear to be for the Governor to form an Interim Government of Southern Rhodesians, responsible to him, comprising the widest possible spectrum of public opinion of all races in the country and constituting a representative government for reconstruction. During this time, the police and military forces would come under the direct responsibility of the Governor. The first responsibility of this Interim Government would be the maintenance of law and order. This would require not only the normal precautions against domestic disturbances and illegality but also guarantees to prevent a repetition of the rebellion and to protect human rights. The United Kingdom Government would need to be assured about the adequacy and effectiveness of these guarantees.

165. The United Kingdom Government would be ready to contribute to the economic needs of the country to restore the Southern Rhodesian economy and, in particular, to assist, in co-operation with other Commonwealth Governments, with schemes for the advancement, education and training of Africans so that they might as soon as possible play their full part in the development of the country's economic and political institutions.

166. Persons restricted or detained for purely political reasons would have to be released, provided they gave guarantees that their political activities would be conducted constitutionally.

167. How long this period of Interim Government might last could not immediately be foreseen; neither could the date on which parliamentary institutions could be restored. The Interim Government would last until conditions could be stabilized and the social and political wounds inflicted on the country could be healed. The views of the people of Southern Rhodesia would have to be sought on the amendments and changes necessary in the 1961 Constitution to secure a resumption of full constitutional government on the basis of the five principles of the United Kingdom Government. To these must now be added a sixth principle, namely, the need to ensure that, regardless of race, there was no oppression of majority by minority or of minority by majority.

168. The Prime Minister ended his statement by saying that it now rested with all responsible Southern Rhodesians who had the true welfare of the country at heart to bring the rebellion to an end before it was too late and to support the representative of the Crown in upholding constitutional law in Southern Rhodesia.

Changes in the illegal régime

169. On 31 December 1965, the Ian Smith régime announced a number of cabinet changes. Lord Graham, "Minister of Agriculture", was moved to the "Ministries of External Affairs and Defence". The two port-

folios had been vacant since the appointment of Mr. Clifford Dupont as "Acting Officer Administering the Government". Mr. George Rudland, "Minister of Transport, Roads and Road Traffic" became "Minister of Agriculture" as well, shedding responsibility for roads and road traffic. Mr. Basil Musset, "Minister of Local Government and Housing", added Roads and Road Traffic to his portfolios.

State of emergency extended for a further three months

170. The "Legislative Assembly" of Southern Rhodesia met on 2 February 1966 and considered the extension of the three months' old state of emergency for a further three months. In introducing the motion to give effect to this, Mr. Lardner-Burke, the "Minister of Justice, Law and Order", informed the "Legislative Assembly" that the original declaration of the emergency on 5 November 1965 had been taken solely to maintain law and order and had nothing to do with the unilateral declaration of independence. The "Southern Rhodesian Government" considered it necessary to extend the present state of emergency for at least a further three months. He also informed the "Legislative Assembly" that it had come to his notice that certain misguided individuals in the country, some in high places who had held political rank or had represented the Government in various capacities, had formed what had been colloquially referred to as a "shadow cabinet". These individuals had met and discussed various matters and were trying to form themselves into a Government so that they could take over if requested by Sir Humphrey Gibbs or Prime Minister Harold Wilson. He stated that these people had been warned that if they continued with their endeavours to overthrow the "Government", it would have no hesitation in dealing with them in exactly the same way as it had dealt with anybody else who had endeavoured to cause bloodshed in the country.

171. On 3 February 1966, the "Legislative Assembly" voted 34 to 13, to extend the state of emergency for a further three months. An opposition amendment to limit the extension to one month was defeated by the same margin. The amendment was offered by an African member, Mr. C. Hlabangana of the United Peoples Party. He was reported to have told the "Legislative Assembly" that the emergency was a smoke-screen behind which the white minority government of Mr. Smith hid ugly things. He was also quoted as saying that without the emergency regulations there would be a civil war, adding that the emergency was a naked form of intimidation of the opposition.

Southern Rhodesia petitions to Privy Council

172. It was reported on 26 January 1966 that petitions had been lodged with the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council by the Southern Rhodesian authorities seeking leave to withdraw appeals from two rulings of the High Court of Southern Rhodesia which had declared invalid restriction and detention orders made in 1964 against Mr. Joshua Nkomo, the African nationalist leader and sixteen other Africans (A/6000/Rev.1, chap. III, para. 57). Mr. Desmond William Lardner-Burke, as "Minister of Justice and Law and Order", had appealed to the Privy Council against that decision and also a finding that orders restricting Mr. Nkomo and 107 others to the Gonakudzinga or Wha Wha restriction areas could not stand.

Twenty-four Africans on trial

173. On 7 February 1966, twenty-three Africans were brought to trial in the High Court in Salisbury, accused of having undergone secret training as saboteurs and intelligence agents in the USSR and the People's Republic of China. A twenty-fourth man was charged with being one of the primary organizers of the training scheme. The prosecution alleged that they were trained on behalf of the banned Peoples' Caretaker Council and the Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU).

174. The prosecution alleged that the twenty-three had been among fifty-two Southern Rhodesian Africans trained between March 1964 and October 1965, in guerrilla warfare, the use of explosives and arms, political science, map reading and radio communications. All twenty-four men pleaded not guilty.

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS

General

175. It will be recalled that on 20 November 1965, the Security Council adopted resolution 217 (1965), which called upon the United Kingdom Government, among other things, to take all other appropriate measures which would prove effective in eliminating the authority of the usurpers and in bringing the minority régime in Southern Rhodesia to an immediate end. The resolution also called upon all States, *inter alia*, to do their utmost in order to break all economic relations with Southern Rhodesia, including an embargo on oil and petroleum products. The replies of Member States to this resolution have been already circulated as official documents of the United Nations (see paras. 12-16 above). Supplementary information on the major developments concerning the economic and financial sanctions, including the embargo on oil and petroleum products, is given below.

Economic and financial sanctions by the United Kingdom Government

176. In his statement to Parliament on 11 November 1965 on the purported declaration of independence by the former Government of Southern Rhodesia (see paras. 57-60 above), the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom also announced economic and financial sanctions against Southern Rhodesia.

177. The economic sanctions announced by the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom covered a total ban on further purchases of tobacco from Southern Rhodesia. Plans to suspend the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement in its relation to Southern Rhodesia and to ban further purchases of Southern Rhodesian sugar were also announced. In addition to these measures, Southern Rhodesia was suspended with immediate effect from the Commonwealth Preference Area and its goods denied preferential treatment in the United Kingdom. The Ottawa Commonwealth Preference Agreements of 1932 governing the United Kingdom's trading relations with Southern Rhodesia were suspended. The export of arms, including spares, was also stopped.

178. Financial sanctions announced involved the cessation of all United Kingdom aid, the removal of Southern Rhodesia from the sterling area and a ban on the export of United Kingdom capital to Southern Rhodesia. Southern Rhodesia was denied access to the London capital market and special exchange control regulations were introduced against Southern Rhodesia.

The Export Guarantee Department also ceased to give cover to exports to Southern Rhodesia.

179. Following the passage of the Southern Rhodesia Act 1965, by the United Kingdom Parliament on 16 November 1965 (see para. 61 above), Orders in Council were published by the United Kingdom Government suspending the operation of the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement in relation to Southern Rhodesia and also removing Southern Rhodesia from the Commonwealth Preference Area. The other economic and financial measures against Southern Rhodesia did not require new Orders in Council as the Government had power to introduce them under previous legislation.

180. On 1 December 1965, Prime Minister Wilson informed Parliament of further economic measures which the Government had decided to introduce.

181. He stated that in addition to the embargoes on tobacco and sugar which represented 70 per cent of Southern Rhodesia's exports to the United Kingdom, the new embargoes covered the following Southern Rhodesian exports: asbestos, copper and copper products, iron and steel ores and concentrates of antimony, chromium, lithium and tantalum, maize, meat and edible meat products and a range of other food-stuffs. The new embargo items, in addition to those of sugar and tobacco which were announced on 11 November 1965, covered 95 per cent of Southern Rhodesia's exports to the United Kingdom.⁶ He further stated that the United Kingdom was reviewing certain items in its export trade to Southern Rhodesia where these were relevant to the objectives of securing a speedy return to constitutional rule in Southern Rhodesia and was also in touch with other countries about them.

182. Prime Minister Wilson also stated that pursuant to the United Kingdom's economic sanctions, the Government was in close touch with other countries that buy significant quantities of imported commodities from Southern Rhodesia. The object of these consultations was to deny Southern Rhodesia as far as possible the export outlets on which the finances of the illegal régime depended.

183. He also announced further financial measures against Southern Rhodesia. In general terms, by these financial measures, a stop was placed on practically all current payments by United Kingdom residents to residents of Southern Rhodesia, except for those arising out of the very limited trade in goods still permitted and on remittances. He went on to say that contractual obligations would not be repudiated, but that they could not be fulfilled in present circumstances. Money due to residents of Southern Rhodesia would be held back for the time being and would be released as soon as constitutional government was restored in Southern Rhodesia.

184. Orders made on 11 November under the Exchange Control Act, 1947, and directions given under the Emergency Laws (Re-enactments and Repeals) Act, 1964, had the effect of excluding Southern Rhodesia from the Scheduled Territories (Sterling Area) and of excluding residents of Southern Rhodesia and their accounts and securities from certain general exemptions and permissions which apply to residents of all other countries outside the Scheduled Territories. Central Banks were advised by the Bank of England of the details of the measures.

⁶ Total domestic exports of Southern Rhodesia in 1964 amounted to £119,465,000, of which £30,509,022 went to the United Kingdom.

185. It was stated that certain current transactions between United Kingdom residents and residents of Southern Rhodesia (e.g. wages, salaries, pensions, interest, dividends) would continue to be allowed for the time being but that Southern Rhodesian accounts in London would be subject to control. Exports of United Kingdom capital to Southern Rhodesia would not be allowed, either in the form of direct investments or by the purchase of Southern Rhodesian securities with investment currency.

186. It was also stated that the proceeds of sale by Southern Rhodesian residents of sterling securities held by them in London could be credited only to a Southern Rhodesian security sterling account and used only for appropriate reinvestment subject to control or sold to other residents of Southern Rhodesia for such investment. Southern Rhodesian security sterling could not be sold for foreign currency on an overseas security market.

187. Further exchange control measures, intensifying the restrictions already applied, were announced on 1 December 1965, by which practically all current payments by United Kingdom residents to residents of Southern Rhodesia, except where these arose out of permitted trade in goods, were stopped.

188. Payments in sterling to and from Southern Rhodesia sterling accounts would continue to be allowed in respect of trade in goods, and freight and insurance connected therewith, directly between Southern Rhodesia and countries of the sterling area, to the extent that such trade was allowed by the Governments of the territories concerned. United Kingdom residents would not be allowed to merchant goods between Southern Rhodesia and any other territory.

189. In general, for current transactions no permission would be given for payments in regard to travel, wages and salaries, and contractual payments such as pensions, interest and dividends, by United Kingdom residents to residents of Southern Rhodesia, until constitutional government was restored in Southern Rhodesia. Money due to residents of Southern Rhodesia for pensions or interest on United Kingdom Government stocks would be held back for the time being and would be released as soon as normal relations could be resumed. British firms and others were advised to adopt a similar procedure. There was no question, the announcement said, of such obligations being repudiated, but they could not be fulfilled in present circumstances.

190. In general, no permission would be given for remittances by United Kingdom firms to subsidiaries or branches in Southern Rhodesia. No United Kingdom bank facilities would be allowed to, or in favour of, firms or individuals in Southern Rhodesia. No facilities for travel to Southern Rhodesia would be allowed except for approved official or business purposes. Gifts of cash from United Kingdom residents to individuals in Southern Rhodesia up to an aggregate of £50 would continue to be allowed until further notice.

191. On 14 December 1965, the United Kingdom Government revised a previous decision of 1 December 1965, and authorized the resumption of payments of United Kingdom pensions to services and civil service pensioners in Southern Rhodesia.

192. On 17 December 1965, the United Kingdom Government imposed further financial sanctions on Southern Rhodesia by insisting that all its purchases of United Kingdom goods and services should be paid

for in hard currencies other than sterling and the South African rand. This replaced a previous regulation of 1 December 1965 which had allowed the use of Southern Rhodesian sterling accounts for a narrow range of payments for United Kingdom and other sterling exports to Southern Rhodesia. The sterling balances can be used only for pensions and other payments. It was reported that the United Kingdom Government had asked other sterling countries also to insist on such payments.

193. By the Reserve Bank of Rhodesia Order in Council, 1965, made on 3 December, the governor and other directors of the Reserve Bank of Rhodesia were suspended from office and deprived of all authority in relation to the Reserve Bank. In their place the Order appointed a new board of directors.

194. A Commonwealth Relations Office statement, issued on 3 December, said that Governments and central banks of other countries were being informed of the making of the Order and of its effects. The new governor of the Reserve Bank, Sir Sidney Caine, was giving appropriate instructions to those banks which hold accounts for the Reserve Bank as to the authority under which they should operate those accounts. The main purposes of the Order, the statement said, were to ensure that the assets of the Reserve Bank of Rhodesia held abroad were safeguarded in the interest of the people of Southern Rhodesia, and to help to achieve the United Kingdom Government's aim of bringing about a return to constitutional government in Southern Rhodesia.

195. It was stated on 9 December that the new board had established its authority over the assets of the Reserve Bank of Southern Rhodesia throughout the world by communicating with central banks. The new governor of the bank was reported to have said on 9 December that the authority of the new board had not been challenged by any central bank or government.

196. Under the Southern Rhodesia (Bank Assets) Order, 1965, which came into operation on 7 December, the Treasury was authorized to require any bank to supply information about any assets which it has held at any of its United Kingdom Offices, at any time since 11 November, on behalf of any Southern Rhodesian Office of any bank.

197. The assets of the Southern Rhodesia Reserve Bank were estimated at £23.5 million at the time of the illegal declaration of independence. Of this amount, it was reported that about £10 million was held in sterling balance in London. This amount is understood to have been effectively blocked in the United Kingdom. It was further reported that at least £3.5 million of the reserve assets were held in Southern Rhodesia at the time the United Kingdom froze the assets of the Southern Rhodesia Reserve Bank. The then governor of the Reserve Bank of Southern Rhodesia was reported to have stated on 17 November that not less than £12 million of the reserves were held outside the United Kingdom in a number of countries.

198. Mr. Ian Smith was reported to have stated on 11 December 1965 that although the United Kingdom had seized £9 million of Southern Rhodesia currency reserves held in London, there was little chance of the United Kingdom Government finding the remaining £13 million.

Oil embargo by the United Kingdom Government

199. The United Kingdom Government imposed a total oil embargo on Southern Rhodesia on 17 December 1965. By the Southern Rhodesia (Petroleum) Order, 1965, which came into operation on 17 December, the United Kingdom, in exercise of powers conferred upon it by the Southern Rhodesia Act, 1965, prohibited the import of oil and oil products into the Territory. It also prohibited United Kingdom nationals from supplying or carrying oil products for Southern Rhodesian use.

200. Prime Minister Wilson made a statement in Parliament on 20 December 1965 on the oil embargo against Southern Rhodesia. He stated, *inter alia*, that the oil embargo was aimed at getting Southern Rhodesia to return to constitutional rule. He said it would mean great inconvenience and hardship, but that it was essential to get a quick solution to the Southern Rhodesian crisis and to avoid the dangers of outside intervention.

Further economic and financial sanctions by the United Kingdom Government

201. On 20 January 1966, the United Kingdom Government assumed powers under the Southern Rhodesia (Prohibited Exports and Imports) Order, 1966, to embargo Southern Rhodesia's trade in any specified product. The Order prohibits the export from Southern Rhodesia or the import into Southern Rhodesia of products specified by the Order. The Commonwealth Relations Office confirmed that it was effective under the laws of both the United Kingdom and Southern Rhodesia and would apply to British exporters. The penalty clause states that any person guilty of an offence under the Order shall be liable on summary conviction to imprisonment for up to six months, or to a fine of up to £500, or both, and the higher penalties stated above are for conviction on indictment. Where a body corporate is guilty, and the offence is proved to have been committed with the consent or connivance, or is attributable to any neglect on the part of a director, manager, secretary or any other similar officer, then that person or persons would be liable to the punishment.

202. Except where authorized by the government regulations, no person is allowed to make or carry out any contract for the export from Southern Rhodesia or the import into Southern Rhodesia of any specified product; or make or carry out any contract for the sale of any specified product which he intends or has reason to believe that another person intends to export from or import into Southern Rhodesia. The Order would also make void any contract for export from or import into Southern Rhodesia of specified goods whether made before or after the commencement of the Order (20 January 1966), and any transfer of property or interest in products in pursuance of any such contract.

203. It was reported that the United Kingdom Government hoped that foreign Governments would recognize its legal authority (under the Southern Rhodesia (Prohibited Exports and Imports) Order, 1966), to impose this embargo—as they have done in the case of the oil embargo.

204. By an Order in Council made on 20 January 1966, the United Kingdom Government made the selling of Southern Rhodesian chrome illegal. A purchaser henceforth would be a party to an illegal act. It was reported that the reason for the immediate ban

on chrome was that some difficulty had been found in preventing purchases by United States importers who buy most of Southern Rhodesia's £2 million worth of exports of chrome ore.

205. On 28 January 1966, the United States Department of State asked United States importers to stop buying Southern Rhodesia chromite. In announcing the request the Department said it was based on a recognition of the legal authority of the United Kingdom Government to prohibit the export of chromite from Southern Rhodesia.

206. On 30 January 1966, the United Kingdom Government imposed a total ban on exports to Southern Rhodesia with the exception of essential humanitarian needs, for the essential requirements of the Joint Central African Organizations and for goods on the quay-side already paid for. The ban on imports of goods from Southern Rhodesia into the United Kingdom was also extended (from the 95 per cent announced in 1 December 1965) to cover all imports from Southern Rhodesia.

207. In 1964, Southern Rhodesia's imports from the United Kingdom amounted to £33,379,446 (or 30.43 per cent of the total imports of Southern Rhodesia) and exports from Southern Rhodesia to the United Kingdom amounted to £31,164,268 (or 21.56 per cent of its total imports) of which tobacco and sugar exports alone amounted to £22 million.

208. On 30 January 1966, the United Kingdom Government issued a warning to people within Southern Rhodesia and to other Governments that it would not be responsible for any money lent to the Smith régime since it declared independence illegally on 11 November 1965. A statement by the United Kingdom Government Treasury said that any person who lent money or otherwise gave credit to the Smith régime did so entirely at his own risk. When constitutional government was restored in Southern Rhodesia, the lawful Government would not be bound to accept responsibility which the illegal régime might have purported to incur and it could not be assumed that it would meet them.

209. The warning appeared to be particularly directed at anyone who might be tempted to invest in the Southern Rhodesian "independence bonds" which the Smith régime issued on 1 February 1966. It was also reported that the warning was aimed at South Africa and some other nations and also any attempts by the illegal régime to raise money outside Southern Rhodesia.

210. On 7 February 1966, the United Kingdom Government made an Order which banned the export of tobacco from Southern Rhodesia and the sale of tobacco in Southern Rhodesia with a view to its being exported. Under the Order, it is now an offence under United Kingdom and Southern Rhodesian law for traders or speculators to buy Southern Rhodesian tobacco and stockpile it until the return of lawful government.

211. In an official statement issued on 7 February 1966, the Commonwealth Relations Office announced that the Order made it illegal for speculators or others to buy tobacco and hold it in Southern Rhodesia or elsewhere in the hope of selling it at a profit when legal government was restored. Purchasers of tobacco in contravention of the Order would have no legal right to it and would also not be able to get their money back. The statement added that from now on

all transactions in Southern Rhodesia that were aimed at the export of tobacco were invalid, whether the export was to take place immediately or in the future.

212. Under the Order, once lawful government was restored, stocks of tobacco that had been illegally transacted would have to be re-auctioned before they could be exported. Only lawfully sold tobacco would be exported, under an export licence system; equally, only lawfully sold tobacco would be allowed into the United Kingdom.

213. It was reported that this Order was clearly intended to be a warning to any traders from third countries who might be planning to buy this year's crop.

Counter-measures taken by Southern Rhodesia

214. On 16 November 1965, the governor of the Reserve Bank of Rhodesia (recognized by the illegal régime) announced that the Bank would buy all the gold production of the country which before the announcement was sold in the United Kingdom. Gold exports in 1964 amounted to over £7 million. It was reported that the Reserve Bank has so far not sold any of its gold which is being used as a backing for the Southern Rhodesian pound.

215. On 30 November 1965, Southern Rhodesia announced the abolition of Commonwealth preferences on United Kingdom imports into Southern Rhodesia. The announcement stated that this would enable Southern Rhodesia to seek friendly trading arrangements with countries which until then had been excluded from participating in special arrangements because of Commonwealth preferences.

216. On 2 December 1965, Southern Rhodesia announced counter-financial sanctions against the United Kingdom. By these financial sanctions, Southern Rhodesia also blocked United Kingdom accounts in Southern Rhodesia. Under the financial restrictions, the payment of interest, rents, dividends, profit and other income as well as repayment of capital to United Kingdom residents would be made into blocked accounts until such time as normal financial relations were restored; payments for the maintenance of relatives in the United Kingdom would be reduced, the reduction depending on the hardship involved; exchange control authority would be required for debits and credits to United Kingdom residents' bank accounts; United Kingdom residents working in Southern Rhodesia on contract up to three years could no longer automatically remit their earnings abroad; and monetary gifts to United Kingdom residents would be limited to £50.

217. On 4 December 1965, Mr. Ian Smith declared that since the United Kingdom had seized Southern Rhodesia's London reserves, it would not be possible for Southern Rhodesia to meet its public debt obligations in London and to the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD). On 8 December 1965, he contended that since the United Kingdom Government had seized Southern Rhodesia's London reserves it should also pay for Southern Rhodesia's external debts.

218. On 8 December 1965, the United Kingdom Treasury stated that the United Kingdom Government was not liable for Southern Rhodesia Government debts.

219. In a broadcast on 8 December 1966, Mr. Smith stated that imports from the United Kingdom, at

present running at the rate of £35 million, would be reduced to a relatively insignificant amount and that this realignment would inevitably be of a long-standing nature. He further stated that Southern Rhodesia was developing payment arrangements to bypass the United Kingdom. He restated in his broadcast that payments of interest, rents, dividends, profits and capital from Southern Rhodesia to United Kingdom nationals had been blocked, causing a loss of "invisibles" of £26 million.

220. A Southern Rhodesian Treasury announcement on 8 December 1965, on exchange control measures, said that all payments to Southern Rhodesia for any purpose from residents of the sterling area excluding South Africa and the United Kingdom could no longer be settled in sterling but had to be made in United States or Canadian dollars or in a West European currency. Payments for Southern Rhodesian exports to Malawi and Zambia must be received in full in an approved currency before goods were dispatched. Exports to countries other than Malawi and Zambia would not be permitted to leave the country until the Southern Rhodesian customs were satisfied on an authorized dealer's certificate that payments had been made or would be made within six months, in an appropriate currency. A Treasury official of Southern Rhodesia was reported to have explained the new regulations by saying that payments made in sterling would only go to swell the accounts of Southern Rhodesia which have been effectively blocked by the United Kingdom Government.

221. On 28 January 1966, the "Ministry of Information" of Southern Rhodesia announced that the Southern Rhodesian pound would now be valued in terms of gold and not sterling as had been the case in the past. The statement said that the new par value of the Southern Rhodesian pound in relation to gold would remain the same as before and that there was no change in the value of the Southern Rhodesian pound to other currencies. The "Ministry" was further quoted as saying that the severance of the ties to sterling meant that the Southern Rhodesian pound was not obliged to follow any adjustments in the exchange parity of sterling.

Internal economic and financial measures introduced in Southern Rhodesia since the illegal declaration of independence

222. The economy of Southern Rhodesia has undergone some internal reorganization since the illegal declaration of independence. Statements made by officials of the illegal régime in Southern Rhodesia have confirmed that these changes have become necessary as a result of the international sanctions which have been imposed on Southern Rhodesia.

223. Intensified import and export controls were announced by the illegal régime on 11 November. It was stated that the immediate issues facing Southern Rhodesia were the securing of adequate supplies of essential commodities (such as wheat, medical and veterinary supplies, petrol, oil and lubricants), the ability to earn foreign currency to pay for the supplies and the ability to sustain economic activity. The purpose of export control was stated to be to safeguard essential supplies which were already in the country. Powers had been taken to introduce rationing if the necessity arose, holiday travel allowances were to be cut from £300 to £100 *per annum*, the sale of Post Office money orders for payment outside Southern Rhodesia was to be discontinued, and the purchase of foreign securities from non-residents by Southern

Rhodesian residents was prohibited. Pension payments to pensioners abroad and other normal remittances abroad (including profits, rents, and the repatriation of capital) were allowed to continue.

224. Increases in excise and customs duty on cigarettes, tobacco, beer, wines and spirits were announced in Salisbury on 16 November. Further increases in taxation were reported to have been forecast on 6 December by Mr. Wrathall, the "Minister of Finance" of the illegal régime, who said that expenditure programmes were being reviewed with the object of creating employment to help cushion the effect of British sanctions.

225. On 18 November it was announced that Mr. Smith had established an organization, in which officials and representatives of business, farming and mining would take part, to contend with the sanctions being imposed on Southern Rhodesia and to assist in controlling the economy. The organization was to have three committees: commerce and industry, agriculture, and mining.

226. On 24 November 1965, the Governor of the Rhodesian Reserve Bank (recognized by the illegal régime) announced sweeping measures to restrict credit and at the same time to provide additional funds for the banking system. The statement of the Reserve Bank said that this should result in an immediate release of cash resources amounting to £2.76 million. The announcement said that this had been done because traditional resources available to the banks in Southern Rhodesia were no longer at their disposal.

227. According to the announcement, the banks were requested to follow a six-point advice aimed at reducing credit to the maximum extent to private persons. In no circumstances were they to make facilities available for the purchase of consumer goods. Credit should also be reduced to the distributive trades, but small traders should be given sympathetic consideration, to prevent closure. On the agricultural question, the Reserve Bank asked that the present credit level be maintained and, in the case of tobacco farmers, that continuing assistance be given to those who had already spent substantial amounts towards raising the 1966 crop. But they were to be asked to reduce their expenses to the lowest possible level and to be encouraged to switch to other crops where this was at all feasible. The statement added that credit facilities should be extended for the production of essential goods which would eliminate or reduce the demand for imported articles.

228. To counteract any adverse effects of sanctions, the "Minister of Commerce and Industry", Mr. G. W. Rudland, on 1 December 1965, announced moves to bolster the sugar industry. He announced a 20 per cent increase in the domestic price of sugar and stated that this measure was to enable Southern Rhodesia to continue with its planned production of 350,000 short tons. He stated that this measure would ensure that full employment was maintained in the sugar industry which employs 30,000 people directly and supports about 150,000.

229. On 16 November 1965, the "Minister of Agriculture", Lord Graham, advised the tobacco farmers that work on tobacco already started or on land irrevocably committed to tobacco, should be continued in the normal way but that where growers still had room to manœuvre they should consult with their local extension officers on the question of putting uncommitted acreage under alternative cultivation.

230. On 24 November 1965, Lord Graham in a further statement said that tobacco producers would be very unwise to disregard his advice to put their uncommitted land into alternative crops. He was commenting on reports that the Southern Rhodesian tobacco-buying companies were launching an intensive marketing drive to overcome tobacco sanctions. He strongly advised growers to hold back enough to reduce the tobacco crop from the original goal of 280 million pounds to 200 million pounds.

231. Emergency regulations published in Salisbury on 7 December 1965, declared the finance, commerce and industry of Southern Rhodesia to be essential services and provided for the control of corporations, including banking and insurance concerns, through a custodian who would be free to discharge or appoint directors or employees.

232. A statement by the illegal régime said that these powers would be permissive and that they were being taken to ensure that where any company operating in Southern Rhodesia, including a subsidiary or branch of an external company, came under undue pressure from external sources, it might be required to act only in the interest of Southern Rhodesia. It was reported on 29 January 1966, that the list of companies controlled under these emergency regulations numbered eight.

233. To meet the incidence of unemployment in Southern Rhodesia as a result of the international financial and economic sanctions, the "Minister of Finance", Mr. John Wrathall, announced on 6 December 1965, new measures to provide additional employment. He stated that the Roads Ministry was planning to substitute labour for machines as far as possible to create 1,500 new jobs. He also stated that building projects were being accelerated with high priority to projects with high employment factors and large local material content.

234. Mr. Ian Smith stated in his broadcast of 8 December 1965, that the various United Kingdom restrictions would inevitably cause unemployment problems among certain sections of the community. He stated that apart from measure, being taken for the direction of the economy, provision would be made for national service schemes to meet the possible unemployment situation. He further stated that workers who could not be absorbed in the national service schemes, and who became redundant as a result of the economic pressure from the United Kingdom would be diverted towards employment at present enjoyed by alien workers and the latter would be replaced and repatriated to their countries of origin.

235. On 17 December 1965, the "Southern Rhodesian Government" ordered the Rhodesia Reserve Bank (recognized by the illegal régime) to stop publishing weekly statements of assets and liabilities, showing the value of foreign assets. A statement from the Bank said they had been ordered to stop publishing them under the emergency regulations. On 22 December 1965, Southern Rhodesia clamped down on publication of details of how it was containing international sanctions. In a statement headed "Secrecy saves lives", the "Ministry of Information" said publication of such reports was detrimental to the national interest. Publicity would aid and encourage Southern Rhodesian opponents to take counter-measures and embarrass the country's friends. He stressed that silence might save the nation.

236. On 19 January 1966, the Rhodesia Tobacco Marketing Board announced new regulations for Southern Rhodesia's tobacco auction sales due to start in March 1966. A statement by the Tobacco Marketing Board said that all tobacco would be pre-classified and a reserve price fixed for each grade. Classification would be carried out by two independent classifiers who would be checked by a senior classifier. During classification the classifiers would be completely isolated. There would be no appeal by buyers or growers against the classification. There would be elaborate precautions to ensure that classifiers had no idea whose tobacco they were grading. Once graded, the tobacco would be vested in a tobacco corporation.

237. The leaf would then be offered on one or two tobacco auction floors at the reserve price or a price above it, and bales not bought would be taken by the corporation at the reserve price. The corporation would hold this in the pool and be responsible for its disposal. It would then be responsible for distributing the proceeds equitably among growers.

238. Even if a grower's leaf was sold above the reserve price, he would only be paid the reserve price in the first instance. The surplus would be credited to a pool and shared among growers. There would be a separate pool for flue-cured and burley tobacco.

239. On 29 January 1966, the "Ministry of Commerce and Industry" of the illegal régime announced that foreign currency available for the importation of goods during the second quota period from 31 April to 31 July 1966 would be increased by 20 per cent. The statement added that the Ministry had made strict preparations for the distribution of currency during this period. The first priority for imports would be given to the procurement of essential supplies. The second priority would be given to materials and supplies for industry, especially those which make the greatest earnings of foreign exchange with the manufacture of capital goods for export. The quota for industry generally, for the re-export trade, and for imports by merchants would be increased.

240. Following the extension of the state of emergency in Southern Rhodesia (see paras. 170-171 above), the Smith régime, on 5 February 1966, gazetted a new set of emergency regulations to strengthen its hold over most aspects of economic activity in Southern Rhodesia. The regulations cover the control of corporations, the investment of blocked funds, the publication of financial statements, control of manpower, control of goods and services, price maintenance, petroleum products distribution, local authority borrowing powers and transport and equipment requisitioning.

241. These regulations include the following:

(a) The Emergency Powers (Control of Corporations) 1966, which in addition to the "Minister's" powers to "designate" a corporation, also enables him to direct a corporation "to submit to him in such manner as he may specify any information relating to the conduct of the business of the corporation that he may consider necessary for determining whether or not the corporation should be designated". The Minister would appoint a "custodian", a senior Treasury official, to administer the power conferred on him by the regulations over a designated company. The regulations empower the custodian to adjust the capital structure of a designated corporation, control its labour and "make such order as he deems necessary

or expedient relating to the conduct of the business of the corporation . . .”.

(b) The Emergency Powers (Control of Manpower) No. 2 Regulations give the “Minister”—in this case the “Minister of Labour”—extensive powers over the labour policy of a controlled industry.

(c) The Emergency Powers (Publication of Financial Statements) Regulations, 1966, give the “Minister of Finance” power to suspend the publication of the regular statements which are required from the Reserve Bank in terms of the Reserve Bank of Rhodesia Act, 1964.

242. On 11 February 1966, the illegal régime published orders extending the closed labour areas to all parts of Southern Rhodesia with the exception of five districts on the eastern border of Southern Rhodesia. These orders make it illegal for employers outside these five districts to engage alien Africans who enter Southern Rhodesia from 11 February 1966. According to an official statement, the purpose of these orders was to make job opportunities available to Southern Rhodesian Africans. The order did not affect foreign Africans who were already working in Southern Rhodesia. It is estimated that there are close to 200,000 foreign Africans, mainly from Malawi and Zambia, employed in Southern Rhodesia.

243. On 11 February 1966, the “Minister of Labour, Social Welfare and Health” made a statement on the employment situation in Southern Rhodesia since 11 November 1965, in which he stated that the over-all position was better than many people believed it would be.

244. He said that the purpose of the new manpower regulations was firstly to ensure that the industries concerned were able to continue to operate in the national interest, and that there was adequate manpower to maintain production at a proper level; and secondly to maintain as many people in employment for as long as possible.

245. Touching on the employment situation, the “Minister” said that it was of course true that there had been many changes in the employment pattern in various sectors of the economy since 11 November 1965. While it was obvious that commerce had suffered to some extent, there were on the other hand developments in industry which were creating new job opportunities. The *status quo* was being maintained whenever possible, and where it was not possible, the redeployment of the resources of manpower in these fields was being undertaken.

246. On 23 February 1966, the Southern Rhodesian régime took further action aimed at combating the effect of sanctions when the Emergency Powers (Industrial Relations) Act was gazetted. These give the “Minister of Labour” the right to suspend specific provisions of industrial agreements made under the Industrial Conciliation Act, at the request of the employers. It covers most aspects of commerce and industry, but excludes agriculture and railways. Employers may now request alterations in conditions concerning hours of work, short time, leave and remuneration laid down in present agreements. The object is to enable employers, for a temporary period, to alter these conditions of service as an alternative to dismissing workers.

Southern Rhodesia and the oil embargo

247. It will be recalled that Security Council resolution 217 (1965) of 20 November 1965, called on all States, *inter alia*, to do their utmost in order to break all economic relations with Southern Rhodesia including an embargo on oil and petroleum products (see paragraph 12 above). It will also be recalled that the United Kingdom imposed a total oil embargo on Southern Rhodesia on 17 December 1965 (see paragraph 19 above) by which it prohibited the import of oil and oil products into Southern Rhodesia.

248. The normal oil consumption of Southern Rhodesia is estimated at 400,000 tons a year, or approximately 300,000 gallons per day, which accounts for only 27 per cent of Southern Rhodesia’s energy requirements. Southern Rhodesian industry and agriculture are worked by coal (63 per cent) and electric power from the Kariba dam (10 per cent).

249. Through 1964, Southern Rhodesian oil requirements were met by product imports, largely from the Persian Gulf. Since then, Southern Rhodesian oil requirements (as also Zambian) have been met by the output of the Central African Petroleum Refineries Ltd. (CAPREF) refinery in Southern Rhodesia at Feruka, near Umtali. Crude oil for the refinery had been delivered for the account of CAPREF at the port of Beira, Mozambique by the several companies that are shareholders in CAPREF, and transported by pipeline from Beira to the refinery. CAPREF is entirely owned by external capital, as follows: 20.75 per cent, Shell Petroleum Co. Ltd. (United Kingdom and Netherlands); 20.75 per cent, British Petroleum Co. Ltd. (United Kingdom); 17.75 per cent, Mobil Petroleum Co. Ltd. (United States); 15.75 per cent, Caltex Ltd. (United States); 15 per cent, American Independent Oil Co. (United States); 5 per cent, Kuwait National Petroleum Co. (Kuwait); 5 per cent, Total Oil Products Rhodesia Pet. Ltd. (France).

250. The refinery’s operations are keyed to the circumstances of its shareholders, who are both marketers of petroleum products within Southern Rhodesia and crude producers in various other areas from which crude supplies for the Southern Rhodesian refinery would be drawn.⁷

251. Following upon the Security Council resolution, all the Governments of the shareholders of Central African Petroleum Refineries Company placed an oil embargo on Southern Rhodesia. Thus, all of the companies participating in normal oil supply operations for Southern Rhodesia are under constraint not to do so in contravention of the embargo—either directly by action or advice of their home Governments, or indirectly in appreciation of the attitude of their home Governments and Governments of oil-exporting countries as expressed through acts of embargo. Among other oil producing countries, Iran, the normal supplier of crude oil to CAPREF has also imposed an oil embargo on Southern Rhodesia.

252. To counteract any immediate adverse effects of the embargo on the refinery, the Smith régime on 21 December 1966, introduced emergency regulations which provided that no employee of the Central African Refining Company or distributive companies might

⁷ With the exception of American Independent, which has crude production but does not market in Southern Rhodesia, and Kuwait National Petroleum Co., which has neither markets in Southern Rhodesia nor crude production.

be discharged or resign without the prior consent of the Minister of Labour.

253. It was reported that the last cargo of crude oil consigned to CAPREF arrived at Beira around mid-December 1965, prior to the United Kingdom embargo. Subsequent refinery operations were limited by the crude in storage at Beira (no crude has been pumped through the pipeline since 31 December), and the crude and unfinished oil in storage at the refinery. Accordingly, the refinery shut down its facilities around mid-January. (The exact date is uncertain since various facilities would be subject to separate operation depending on the internal flow of oil in process.) The start-up of operations would obviously depend on whether arrangements could be made for crude oil receipts from alternative sources of supply.

254. Control over oil distribution was initiated by the Southern Rhodesian régime on 19 December 1965, two days after the British Order embargoed further oil supplies. On that date, oil companies were requested to limit weekly supplies of gasoline and automotive diesel oil to garages and other retail outlets to the average weekly amount delivered over the previous three months.

255. Rationing began formally on 28 December. Private motorists were allowed 3 to 5 imperial gallons weekly per car, according to size of car. Commercial users were limited to between 5 and 20 gallons per week, according to the size of commercial vehicle; no limitation was imposed on automotive diesel oil consumption. Other users were not rationed, and other petroleum products were not then subject to controls.

256. On 4, 11, 18 and 25 January, successively more stringent rationing was imposed on oil consumers. Gasoline rations were sharply reduced; rationing was extended to automotive diesel oil and aviation fuels; and farmers were brought under rationing controls.

257. As of mid-January, it appeared that oil consumption had been slowed to around two thirds the normal rate, or perhaps slightly less. Restrictions on private motorists were most severe; restrictions were minimal or nil in essential end-uses. By late January, however, the impact of rationing was to become much more pronounced as new measures were imposed. Government railway, airways, broadcasting, and power systems are among the remaining exempt users.

258. On 17 January 1966, Mr. Ian Smith said in an interview that oil was still coming into Southern Rhodesia despite the embargo. He would not say how much oil was coming in or how his régime was beating the embargo. He also said that while his régime had been embarrassed for a while about the oil embargo, new plans had been made and he was satisfied that this problem would be resolved as would a number of others.

259. On 31 January 1966, a South African truck delivered 6,000 gallons of motor fuel to Southern Rhodesia. The delivery was described as a private business venture which might develop into a daily shuttle service. On 11 February 1966, it was again reported that gasoline from South Africa had been delivered to the Southern Rhodesian army and police. On 15 February 1966, a consignment of gift gasoline from South Africa was handed over to the "Minister of Defence and External Affairs," Lord Graham, in the City Centre in Salisbury. The gasoline which was estimated at 1,400 gallons was described as a gift from

the townspeople and the Candour League of the South African town of Stellenbosch.

260. In a nation-wide broadcast on 10 February 1966, Mr. Smith stated that the flow of oil to Southern Rhodesia was increasing in spite of the United Kingdom embargo and that the target was to bring in more oil than was actually consumed in Southern Rhodesia. The significant thing was that the flow of oil was increasing not decreasing. He also stated that if all the various schemes which his régime was planning materialized, Southern Rhodesia would beat the United Kingdom embargo.

261. On 16 February 1966, it was reported from South Africa that Southern Rhodesia might be getting 70,000 gallons of fuel daily from South Africa and Mozambique and that more than 35,000 gallons of gasoline, oil and kerosene were passing daily from the Beit-Bridge road border point from South Africa into Southern Rhodesia. The report said that this information was the result of a three-day survey made at Beit-Bridge. The fuel was being taken to Beit-Bridge by South African road tankers, furniture trucks and heavy duty trucks, then transferred to Southern Rhodesian tankers. The report also said that Southern Rhodesia appeared to be getting an equal quantity of oil from Mozambique.

262. On 17 February 1966, a spokesman for the United Kingdom Government acknowledged that petrol was getting through to Southern Rhodesia from South Africa and that this was viewed with concern. But it was emphasized that press reports which had mentioned up to 70,000 gallons a day were greatly exaggerated.

263. Subsequent press reports estimated the inflow of oil from South Africa to Southern Rhodesia at between 35,000 to 40,000 gallons a day for the period from mid-February to the first week of March 1966.

264. An observer in Southern Rhodesia stated on 1 March 1966 that she had counted forty-four rail tankers in five days bringing some 308,000 gallons of gasoline up the railway line from Mozambique to Bulawayo. The observer, who said her watch only covered the daylight hours, estimated the capacity of the gasoline cars she saw at about 7,000 gallons each.

265. On 3 March 1965, the "Minister of Commerce and Industry" announced a relaxation of the petrol rationing to enable Southern Rhodesians to go on holiday. According to this announcement, persons who produced evidence of firm bookings for holidays outside the country of three weeks or more, would be given enough petrol to enable them to reach the border.

Portugal and the economic sanctions against Southern Rhodesia

266. Portugal has only very limited trade with Southern Rhodesia. However, Southern Rhodesia, which is a landlocked territory, depends wholly on Portugal for its rail connexion to the Mozambique seaports which handle most of its foreign trade. Moreover, the Beira-Umtali pipeline which supplies Southern Rhodesia with all its crude oil also passes wholly through the Portuguese territory of Mozambique.

267. The Mozambique railway connects with the Rhodesia railway at Umtali and extends through the Portuguese territory to the Mozambique seaport of Beira which handles the main bulk of the overseas trade of Zambia and Southern Rhodesia. The Rhodesia

railway is also connected with the Mozambique seaport at Lourenço Marques in the south which handles a limited amount of Southern Rhodesia's foreign trade. The Mozambique line thus provides the main outlet to the sea of the Rhodesia Railways which owns the supply line through Southern Rhodesia and Zambia. The Mozambique line is entirely controlled by the Portuguese who do not therefore have to share the revenue or responsibility for the line. With Mozambique under Portuguese administration, both the railway and the seaport of Beira fall completely under the jurisdiction of the Government of Portugal.

268. The Foreign Minister of Portugal, Dr. Alberto Franco Nogueira, held a press conference on 25 November 1965, on the attitude of the Portuguese Government to the question of Southern Rhodesia. He was quoted as saying that to cut Southern Rhodesia's rail communications via Mozambique would be to harm Zambia more than Southern Rhodesia. To carry all Zambia's copper through Angola to Lobito would be to sacrifice Katanga's mineral exports, with serious consequences to the economy of the Democratic Republic of the Congo as the Benguela Railway had not the capacity for both. Portugal, he added, wished to continue her good neighbour policy towards Malawi, Zambia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo besides Southern Rhodesia. He was also quoted as saying that it was easy for some to advocate drastic, violent and theoretical measures. But Portugal must always act with a great sense of responsibility and in a spirit of collaboration with numerous countries without harming the just balance of the collective necessities.

269. Conversely, Portugal was reported on 5 December 1965, to have approved an emergency plan for shipping out the bulk of Zambia's copper through Angola if Southern Rhodesia cuts Zambia's rail link to the Indian Ocean. On the return journey the trains would have ample capacity to carry Zambia's imports. Portugal's approval of the plan was given in October 1965, privately to officials of the Benguela Railway which is controlled by Tanganyika Concessions Ltd., a British firm with many investments in Africa.

Portugal and the oil embargo

270. Southern Rhodesia receives its crude oil at Umtali, which is on the Southern Rhodesian border with Mozambique. The crude oil is pumped through the 184-mile pipeline from the seaport of Beira in Mozambique to Umtali. The Beira-Umtali oil pipeline was opened in late December 1964. The pipeline is owned and operated by Companhia do Pipeline Moçambique-Rodésia. Ownership of the pipeline is held by Lonrho Ltd., a British Company (62.5 per cent) and by Portuguese interests (37.5 per cent). A nine-man board, however, includes five Portuguese directors (of whom one is a Portuguese Government nominee) and four British directors.

271. The Board of Directors of the Mozambique-Rhodesia Pipeline (Companhia do Pipeline Moçambique-Rodésia) met in Lisbon on 5 December 1965, to discuss the question of the oil embargo imposed by the United Kingdom Government against Southern Rhodesia. At the Board meeting, the Portuguese directors (by the Chairman's casting vote), blocked a proposal of the Lonrho directors that the pipeline should stop operating until the United Kingdom Government lifted its oil embargo. But at the same time the directors of the Company unanimously rejected a request, received

from the Smith régime, via the Central African Petroleum Refineries Company, that an estimated 14,000 tons of oil in the pipeline be pumped through to Feruka despite the lack of supplies to replace it. Pumping had been discontinued on 31 December 1965 when supplies at Beira were exhausted as a result of the embargo.

272. In the absence of a guarantee of indemnification for possible damage, the Southern Rhodesian request was rejected by the pipeline company because it was feared that if water or compressed air was used, the pipes would be damaged.

273. Since mid-January 1966, there have been persistent press reports that refined oil products were coming by road and rail from Mozambique into Southern Rhodesia. These press reports stated that the refined oil products were coming from Lourenço Marques in Mozambique where there is an oil refinery and a direct rail link with both South Africa and Southern Rhodesia. On 11 February 1966, the Foreign Minister of Portugal, commenting on press reports that oil was going from Lourenço Marques to Southern Rhodesia, stated that he knew nothing about oil going into Southern Rhodesia from Mozambique. On 13 February 1966, it was reported that seventeen tank cars, carrying about 140,000 gallons of petrol had arrived in Southern Rhodesia the previous week by way of the Mozambique port of Lourenço Marques. The petrol was said to have been shipped by rail from South Africa. A press report from South Africa dated 16 February 1966, estimated that Southern Rhodesia was receiving 35,000 gallons of oil daily from Mozambique.

274. It was reported on 4 March 1966, that the Smith régime was constructing on a high priority basis six prefabricated oil tanks at Beira, each capable of holding 3,000 tons of crude oil. The tanks are in the vicinity of the pipeline and are planned to link direct to the pipeline, bypassing the storage depots owned by the British and United States oil companies which, before the embargo, took delivery of the crude oil for CAPREF. It was reported that the tanks were being built in anticipation of private oil tankers arriving in the near future with crude oil for Southern Rhodesia.

275. On 2 March 1966, the United Kingdom Government expressed serious concern to the Government of Portugal about reports of the supply of oil products from Mozambique to Southern Rhodesia. The Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom, Mr. Michael Stewart, made the representations personally to the Chargé d'Affaires of Portugal in London. Mr. Stewart also expressed concern over further reports about the construction of the storage tanks in Beira for Southern Rhodesia.

276. It was reported from Johannesburg on 9 March 1966, that thousands of gallons of gasoline have been secretly sent to Southern Rhodesia by South African railways, through Lourenço Marques, the capital of Mozambique. According to this report, in a secret operation, with Portuguese trains back tracking and using diversionary tactics, an estimated total of 155,000 gallons of petrol had been sent to Southern Rhodesia to counter the embargo imposed on oil shipments. The report stated that the Smith régime had been getting the bulk of its oil in this way.

277. On 7 March 1966, the Chargé d'Affaires of Portugal in London informed the Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom, Mr. Michael Stewart, that re-

ports that oil products were going by rail from Mozambique to Southern Rhodesia were incorrect. A United Kingdom Government spokesman was subsequently reported to have stated that Portugal had also informed the United Kingdom Government that the new oil storage tanks being built at Beira were for use within Mozambique and not for oil supplies to Southern Rhodesia.

South Africa and the economic and financial sanctions against Southern Rhodesia

278. South Africa is the third most important trade market for Southern Rhodesia after the United Kingdom and Zambia. In 1964, imports from South Africa to Southern Rhodesia amounted to £26,589,447 or 24.35 per cent of the total value of imports. Exports from Southern Rhodesia to South Africa amounted to £12,249,326 or 8.47 per cent of the total value of exports, including re-exports. The balance of trade for Southern Rhodesia was adverse by £14,340,121.

279. In his statement of 11 November 1965 on the illegal declaration of independence by the Government of Southern Rhodesia (see paras. 124-125 above), the Prime Minister of South Africa stated that his Government would continue to maintain normal friendly relations with both the United Kingdom and Southern Rhodesia. He further stated that the Government of South Africa could not participate in measures such as a boycott movement. Its declared policy had always been, whenever boycotts had been directed against it, that boycotts were in principle wrong and that retaliation by the institution of a counter-boycott would not even be considered. His Government could therefore not take part in any form of boycott. By acting thus, South Africa was not only pursuing its own policy, but also acting in accordance with the stand of principle against boycotts which had frequently and unambiguously been the subject of declarations by the world's most important States.

280. On 12 November 1965, the Republic of South Africa announced the suspension of all dealings in Southern Rhodesian currency until the position between the South African rand and the Southern Rhodesian pound was clarified. On 18 November 1965, the Reserve Bank of South Africa announced that financial transactions with Southern Rhodesia would return to normal immediately. A joint statement issued by the Reserve Bank of South Africa and the Central Bank of Southern Rhodesia on 18 November 1965, stated that negotiations had been concluded so that "permissible financial and trade transactions" between South Africa and Southern Rhodesia could be resumed immediately on the same basis as before 11 November 1965.

281. Following this announcement the Reserve Bank of South Africa stated on 18 November 1965 that financial and trade transactions with Southern Rhodesia were resumed forthwith. The rate quoted against the Southern Rhodesian pound was the same as that prior to the illegal declaration of independence. On 22 December 1965, it was reported that South Africa Reserve Bank had frozen Southern Rhodesia's foreign assets as a result of pressures from the United Kingdom Government. Both the Government and Reserve Bank of South Africa were quoted as having declined to comment on this report.

282. The Minister of Finance of the Republic of South Africa, Mr. Donges, was quoted as saying on 5 December 1965, that a statement on South Africa's financial relations with Southern Rhodesia would be

made at the appropriate time if necessary. Since then there has been no further indication of when the statement can be expected.

283. It was reported that trade sources in Southern Rhodesia expected South Africa to be the first country to benefit from the cancellation of Commonwealth preferential tariffs on imports from the United Kingdom. The announcement of the illegal régime on 30 November 1965, abolishing Commonwealth preferences on United Kingdom imports, stated that this action would enable Southern Rhodesia to seek friendly trading arrangements with countries which had been hitherto excluded from participating in special arrangements (see para. 215 above). South African goods were in the past unable to compete on the Southern Rhodesian market with United Kingdom manufactured goods because of the preferential import rates enjoyed by the United Kingdom.

284. It was reported from Johannesburg on 4 December 1965 that South African exporters expected a very considerable increase in South Africa's exports to Southern Rhodesia as a result of these developments. The report further stated that increases in trade between the two countries was expected to be between 20 and 30 per cent, depending on a relaxation of import control restrictions imposed by Southern Rhodesia. The major increases were expected to be in goods essential to the Southern Rhodesian economy, such as machinery, particularly mining machinery, railway rolling stock and telephone equipment. The Southern Rhodesian "Trade Commissioner" in South Africa was reported on 22 November 1965 to have stated that trade between the two countries was already back to the pattern that existed before the illegal declaration of independence.

285. It was reported from Salisbury on 25 December 1965, that a Southern Rhodesian marketing centre was to be opened in Johannesburg on 1 February 1966 for an experimental period of three months. The centre was reported to be designed to push the sales of Southern Rhodesian light industries and to enable them to take full advantage of the quota granted under the 1965 Southern Rhodesian-South African trade agreement.

286. It was reported on 8 January 1966 that South Africa had decided to stop making a distinction between exports and re-exports in its trade figures. As a result of this it was stated that it had become a good deal harder for outsiders to discover whether or not South Africa was acting as a channel for embargoed Southern Rhodesian exports or supplying it with embargoed oil. It was also reported on 30 January 1966 that as a result of this, South African businessmen were left freer to channel what they could to Southern Rhodesia.

287. On 21 January 1966, the President of the Republic of South Africa, Mr. Charles Swart, stated in his speech at the opening of Parliament that South Africa would continue its policy of trying to maintain friendly relations with both the United Kingdom and Southern Rhodesia but would not participate in boycott or sanctions against any country.

288. On 17 February 1966, the "Minister of Transport and Power" for Southern Rhodesia, Brigadier Andrew Dunlop, stated in the "Legislative Assembly" that plans for railroad links between Southern Rhodesia and South Africa had been in existence for many months and could be implemented immediately to deal with any emergency which would arise should Southern

Rhodesia be denied the use of the railway through Bechuanaland.

289. At present the only rail link with South Africa is through Bechuanaland and two possibilities exist for joining up the Southern Rhodesian and South African railway systems. One would be a hundred mile link from Rutenga, on the line to Lourenço Marques down to Beit-Bridge. The other, of similar length and costing approximately the same, would be from the existing Rhodesia Railway Terminal at West Nicholson to Beit-Bridge.

South Africa and the oil embargo

290. Soon after the oil embargo by the United Kingdom, a number of ostensibly private South African "petrol for Rhodesia" movements started, sending quantities of gift gasoline to Southern Rhodesia. An unknown number of private business groups and individuals were also reported to have started a shuttle service of refined oil and petroleum products to Southern Rhodesia.

291. On 17 January 1966, Mr. Smith publicly stated that oil and petroleum products were still coming into Southern Rhodesia despite the embargo (see para. 257 above). He followed this statement up on 27 January 1966, by broadcasting a message of thanks to the people of South Africa, in which he stated that the donations of fuel to Southern Rhodesia were a gesture typical of the traditional friendliness for which South Africans were noted throughout the world. Mr. Smith said in his broadcast that the gifts of oil would fortify his régime for the struggle ahead.

292. On 25 January 1966, the Prime Minister of the Republic of South Africa, Mr. Hendrik Verwoerd, stated in Parliament that his Government would not prevent South Africans from sending gifts of oil or gasoline to Southern Rhodesia. He stated that to ban gifts of any kind would be a form of participation in boycott measures against Southern Rhodesia. His Government, while declining to interfere in the Southern Rhodesian dispute, maintained its position that it would not join in any form of boycott, including an oil embargo against Southern Rhodesia. He was also quoted as saying that if gasoline companies or traders wanted to supply fuel to Southern Rhodesia, the Government would not stop them.

293. On 25 January 1966, the Department of Commerce and Industry in South Africa announced that it had established an inter-departmental committee to study the shipping of gasoline and petroleum products to Southern Rhodesia. The Committee was set up after a group of supporters for Southern Rhodesia in Johannesburg formed an organization to collect money from private individuals to buy gasoline for Southern Rhodesia. In reply to a question as to whether there was anything to stop South African citizens from privately sending a gift of gasoline to friends in Southern Rhodesia, an official of the Department of Commerce and Industry was reported as saying that gasoline and petroleum products were not at present under export control. He was further reported as saying that if people sent petrol to Southern Rhodesia without first approaching the Ministry they would not know about it but that since the matter was now under consideration the advice of the Ministry to people was to do nothing pending a statement by the Committee.

294. Following the statement of Prime Minister Verwoerd on 25 January 1966, the traffic in oil and

petroleum products from South Africa to Southern Rhodesia was reported to have increased considerably, reaching their peak in mid-February.

295. On 27 January 1966, representatives of South African oil companies met in Cape Town to discuss the Prime Minister's statement that the Government would not interfere if private oil companies or individuals sent supplies to Southern Rhodesia. The companies decided to contact the Government on the implications of the Prime Minister's statement in Parliament in order to clarify the position. All the executives attending the meeting declined to comment on its outcome.

296. Later, the United States, the United Kingdom and French oil companies operating in South Africa announced that their head offices had issued instructions that fuel must not be sold to persons and organizations buying it for later transportation to Southern Rhodesia. It was reported on 12 February 1966 that the South African Government had warned the oil companies in the Republic that the conditional sale of oil would not be tolerated. The warning was reportedly made after the foreign oil companies told their depots near the Southern Rhodesian border not to sell oil to Southern Rhodesian buyers. The South African *Financial Gazette* was quoted as saying that the Government saw instructions from head offices to overseas oil companies in the Republic as a direct interference in South African affairs.

297. On 13 February 1966, the South African Oil Company which is locally owned announced that it was selling fuel without restriction but denied that it was under pressure to do so from the Government of the Republic.

298. According to estimates published in Pretoria on 16 February 1965, shipments of oil crossing the South African border to Beit-Bridge in Southern Rhodesia amounted to nearly half of Southern Rhodesia's daily requirements of gasoline and oil products under the rationing plan imposed as a result of the United Kingdom embargo. It was estimated that at least 35,000 gallons of petroleum products were crossing the border daily in a regular shuttle arrangement.

299. According to press reports, these shipments were clearly beyond the means of voluntary organizations in South Africa which had originally initiated the "petrol for Rhodesia" campaign. They were described as large scale commercial shipments of petroleum, organized through a Southern Rhodesian based organization, GENTA, which was sending road tankers to collect petrol in the Transvaal, ostensibly as voluntary gifts.

300. On 16 February 1966, the United Kingdom Ambassador called on the Foreign Minister of South Africa to express concern over the mounting shipment of oil to Southern Rhodesia. The Foreign Minister was reported to have replied that his Government was holding to its announced policy of not supporting boycotts but that it would look into the United Kingdom complaint.

301. On 19 February 1966, Prime Minister Wilson of the United Kingdom had talks with the South African Ambassador in London, Dr. Carel de Wet, on the breach in the oil embargo against the Smith régime. Mr. Wilson was reported to have made a strong protest to the South African Ambassador.

302. On 22 February 1966, the Commonwealth Relations Secretary, Mr. Arthur Bottomley, told Parlia-

ment that refined petroleum was reaching Southern Rhodesia from South Africa in quantities which were causing the United Kingdom Government concern. He also stated that representations on this matter were being made to the South African Government.

303. Subsequent press reports estimated the inflow of oil from South Africa to Southern Rhodesia at between 35,000 to 40,000 gallons a day for the period from mid-February to the first week of March 1966.

304. On 28 February 1966, Prime Minister Verwoerd reaffirmed in an electioneering campaign speech that his Government did not believe in sanctions. If any commodity available in South Africa including oil or petrol was traded with Southern Rhodesia, his Government would be participating in a boycott if it were to stop such trade. In what was considered a direct reference to the current increased volume in sales of oil and petroleum products to Southern Rhodesia, he stated that South Africa's policy of continuing "normal trade" with Southern Rhodesia did not imply continuing to sell the same commodities or quantities as before. "Normal trade" he said, meant that everybody involved in competition tried to sell what and as much as he could. It meant trade without inhibition and without breaks. It often happened that in the course of normal trade some individual gained an advantage over another and that in the course of it, he sold more than he used to. This did not make the trade abnormal.

Zambia, Malawi, and the economic and financial sanctions against Southern Rhodesia

305. Zambia and Malawi together in 1964 accounted for 25 per cent of Southern Rhodesia's exports, including re-exports, while their total exports to Southern Rhodesia amounted to only 5.5 per cent of Southern Rhodesia's imports. Zambia alone absorbed 28.28 per cent of Southern Rhodesia's exports, including re-exports, while accounting for only 4.92 per cent of Southern Rhodesia's imports. Malawi, on the other hand, absorbed 6.31 per cent of the total value of exports of Southern Rhodesia, including re-exports, while it accounted for only 1.45 per cent of Southern Rhodesia's imports. Southern Rhodesian sales to Zambia and Malawi were mainly of manufactured goods.

306. In 1964 the total value of exported goods including re-exports from Southern Rhodesia to Zambia amounted to £40,732,687, while imports amounted to £5,396,453; 39.41 per cent of the entire imports of Zambia in 1964 came from neighbouring Southern Rhodesia; the entire imports of Zambia amounted in 1964 to £78,219,201, of which £30,868,610 of domestic merchandise came from Southern Rhodesia. In particular, electric power and coal are the most vital items for Zambia's economy, since neighbouring Southern Rhodesia is the main supplier of electric power and the only economical supplier of coal to Zambia.

307. The figures of trade with Malawi show that Southern Rhodesia in 1964 had a favourable trade balance of £5,598,637. In 1964, exports amounted to £7,229,550 of the total value of exports, including re-exports, while the imports amounted only to £1,630,913 of the total value of imports; 39.1 per cent of the entire imports of Malawi in 1964 came from Southern Rhodesia.

308. Both Zambia and Malawi imposed trade restrictions on Southern Rhodesia when it declared independence illegally. Zambia removed Southern Rhodesia

from the Commonwealth preference list on 14 November 1965 and Malawi also announced on 17 November 1965, that it had abrogated its preferential trade agreement with Southern Rhodesia with effect from 18 November 1965. Owing to difficulties in finding alternative suppliers and the geopolitics of Central and Southern Africa, both countries have in the meantime continued to trade with Southern Rhodesia in essential goods but have appealed to local importers to find alternative sources of supply.

309. On 8 December 1965, the Smith régime imposed trade restrictions on Zambia and Malawi. The new restrictions forbid Southern Rhodesian exporters to accept sterling in payment for goods sold to Zambia and Malawi. Under the new restrictions, goods shipped to Malawi and Zambia now have to be paid for in advance in United States or Canadian dollars or in a West European currency.

310. In a White Paper published on 26 April 1965, the former Government of Southern Rhodesia stated that if the Southern Rhodesian economy was to suffer as a result of sanctions by the United Kingdom Government, Southern Rhodesia would consider the repatriation of foreign workers and their families to Zambia and Malawi, to protect its indigenous labour force. It estimated that there were 500,000 such persons in Southern Rhodesia (see A/6000/Rev. 1, chap. III, appendix VI).

311. In an obvious reference to Zambia and Malawi, Mr. Smith stated in his broadcast on 8 December 1965, that workers who became redundant as a result of economic pressures from the United Kingdom would be directed towards employment at present held by alien workers and the latter would be replaced and repatriated to their countries of origin.

Other developments between Zambia and Southern Rhodesia

312. Prior to the United Kingdom oil embargo on Southern Rhodesia, the Central African Petroleum Refineries Company in Southern Rhodesia was the normal supplier of oil and petroleum products to Zambia. On 18 December 1965, Southern Rhodesia banned all shipment of oil and petroleum products to Zambia. The Southern Rhodesian "Minister of Commerce and Industry", Mr. George W. Rudland, described the retaliatory embargo on Zambia as temporary. He stated that it would be lifted when Southern Rhodesia had overcome the effects of the United Kingdom embargo. Following the Southern Rhodesia embargo, the United Kingdom, Canada and the United States Governments together, started a regular airlift of oil and petroleum products to Zambia to beat the embargo.

313. On 19 December 1965, Southern Rhodesia imposed additional royalties of £5 a ton on coal and an export tax of £8 a ton on coke exported to Zambia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

314. On 1 January 1966, Mr. Smith announced proposals to resume gasoline supplies to Zambia and cut the royalties charge on coal and the export tax on coke. On 2 January 1966 his offer was rejected by President Kaunda of Zambia, who described it as an empty gesture.

315. On 3 January 1966, the Southern Rhodesian "Ministry of Lands and Mines" announced that the additional royalties on coal and the export tax on coke exported to Zambia and the Democratic Republic of the

Congo had been suspended as of midnight on 1 January 1966.

316. The copper industry of Zambia which accounts for over 90 per cent of its exports is heavily dependent on coal from Wankie in Southern Rhodesia which is shipped through the Rhodesia Railways. In 1964, Zambia imported 1,073,923 tons of coal from Southern Rhodesia for £1,204,449, which accounted for about 95 per cent of the total consumption of coal. The remaining 5 per cent, which amounted to 3,961 tons, was imported from South Africa for £11,013. In addition to this, 72,476 tons of coke and semi-coke of coal and their briquettes were also imported from Southern Rhodesia for £290,019.⁸

Zambia, Malawi, and the common services with Southern Rhodesia

317. Zambia shares three common services—the Central African Power Corporation (the Kariba Dam), Rhodesia Railways and Central Africa Airways—with Southern Rhodesia. Malawi is a third partner in the Central Africa Airways. These common services which were retained after the dissolution of the Central African Federation in 1963, are administered by higher authorities of the government members. The Kariba Dam and the Rhodesia Railway are each under a Zambia-Southern Rhodesia Higher Authority, with two members from each country, which can only make decisions unanimously. The Higher Authority of the Central Africa Airways differs from the others in having one member representing Malawi.

318. When the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland was dissolved on 31 December 1963, the Governments of Northern Rhodesia (now Zambia) and Southern Rhodesia agreed to assume jointly the ownership, control and responsibility for further development of the Kariba hydroelectric scheme. A Higher Authority for Power, composed of two Ministers from each of the two countries (whose decisions must be unanimous) was established to determine policy, and a statutory corporation, the Central African Power Corporation, in which the assets and liabilities of the Federal Power Board were vested, was set up to operate and develop electric power supplies.

319. The Kariba power station now produces the bulk of the electricity generated in Zambia and Southern Rhodesia, the output from thermal power stations having been substantially reduced. By 1963, the Copperbelt was drawing over half its requirements from Kariba, the balance coming from local thermal generators operated by the mining companies and from the Le Marinel hydroelectric power station in Katanga under an agreement which expires in the second half of 1966. The existing single transmission line of the grid—from Kariba to Kitwe on the Copperbelt—is already operating at full capacity and it is estimated that requirements in that area will exceed the capacity of the single line in the latter part of 1966.

320. Although the Kariba Dam site is on the frontier between the two countries the power station for generating the electricity is on the Southern Rhodesian side of the border of the two countries.

321. The Rhodesia Railway extends 3,000 miles from the region of Ndola in the Copperbelt of Zambia to Umtali on the Southern Rhodesian border with Mozambique, and through Bulawayo down into Bechuanaland. It has rail connexions through Southern Rho-

desia to the Mozambique seaports of Beira and Lourenço Marques and through Bechuanaland to the South African seaports. The main bulk of the rail traffic goes to the Mozambique seaport of Beira for shipment overseas.

322. The rail connexions of the Rhodesia Railway in Southern Rhodesia to the seaports of Mozambique and South Africa, make landlocked Zambia dependent on transit rail facilities through Southern Rhodesia to the seaports. Zambia's annual copper exports of 750,000 tons are shipped through the Rhodesia Railways to Beira. Zambia also depends on the Rhodesian rail link for essential imports of food, machinery, coal, petroleum products, cars and trucks and medical supplies.

323. The two common services, jointly owned with Zambia, Kariba and Rhodesia Railways, are vital to the economy of Zambia. The Kariba provides over 66 per cent of the electrical energy needed to work the copper mines which account for over 90 per cent of Zambia's exports. The Rhodesia Railway also handles 99 per cent of all imports into Zambia, including oil. It also carries all the coal needed by the copper mines from Southern Rhodesia to Zambia. The denial of Kariba power and transit railway facilities by Southern Rhodesia would have a major effect on the copper industry of Zambia and also close the rail route to imports to Zambia, including coal from Wankie, Southern Rhodesia, for the copper mines.

324. President Kaunda of Zambia told a press conference on 17 November 1965, that he had asked the United Kingdom to send troops to help Zambian soldiers to defend the Kariba Dam. If the United Kingdom failed to send in troops after Southern Rhodesia cut off the power from the Kariba to Zambia, he would reserve the right to invite any Power to come and help to protect Kariba. He indicated that he would prefer troops to be sent to Kariba before anything happened. President Kaunda repeated his request for troops to the United Kingdom on 27 November 1965, after power from Kariba to Kitwe had been briefly interrupted by saboteurs in Zambia.

325. On 1 December Prime Minister Harold Wilson announced in Parliament that the United Kingdom was willing to send a military contingent to Zambia. He stated that the United Kingdom was willing to fly a squadron of Javelin jet fighters to Zambia with support from the members of an air force regiment. The jets were ready to go to the Zambian town of Ndola and the ground troops would go to Ndola, Lusaka and probably Livingstone. He also stated in Parliament on 1 December 1965, that he had given President Kaunda of Zambia an assurance that the United Kingdom Government would not stand idly by if Mr. Smith used his illegitimate control over the Kariba Dam to cut off power supplies to the Copperbelt in Zambia.

326. On 2 December 1965, Mr. Harold Wilson disclosed that he had received word from the President of Zambia, accepting the dispatch to Zambia of Royal Air Force planes. He said that talks about stationing United Kingdom ground forces in Zambia were continuing. The squadron of Javelin jet fighters and members of the air force regiment were reported to have arrived in Zambia on 3 December 1965.

327. The Commonwealth Relations Secretary, Mr. Arthur Bottomley, was reported on 5 December 1965 to have stated that the United Kingdom had reason to believe that explosives had been planted at the Kariba Dam. Mr. Smith was, however, reported to have said that his régime had no serious plans to blow up the dam. He said the concept existed only in remote con-

⁸ Zambia: *Monthly Report of Statistics*, October 1965.

tingency planning. The contention of Mr. Arthur Bottomley that the Kariba Dam had been mined was denied by both the Zambian Government and the Central African Power Corporation on 6 December 1965.

328. On 9 December 1965, President Kaunda was quoted as saying in the Zambian Parliament that if Southern Rhodesia interfered with any of the common services, it would be a declaration of war and that he would not hesitate to order his country into action. He was also reported to have said that the United Kingdom Government was using Zambia's dependence on Southern Rhodesia for electricity, coal and oil as an excuse for not tightening United Kingdom sanctions against Southern Rhodesia. He was also quoted as saying that Zambia should not be used as an excuse for United Kingdom inaction. It was also reported on 9 December 1965, that President Kaunda had issued a new and urgent appeal to the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom for British troops to protect the Kariba Dam.

329. A United Kingdom military mission led by Major-General Willoughby, the General Officer Commanding United Kingdom Middle East Land Forces at Aden, visited Zambia from 19 to 24 January to consider with Government of Zambia future arrangements for United Kingdom forces in Zambia. During the visit the mission inspected the Zambian side of the Kariba Dam.

330. The "Deputy Minister of Information" of the illegal régime, Mr. Van der Byl, said in Salisbury on 26 January 1966, that Southern Rhodesia would not hesitate to carry out a "scorched" earth policy if the United Kingdom sent troops into Southern Rhodesia. He stated that once the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom knew of this, he would never send United Kingdom or other troops into Southern Rhodesia.

Drought in Southern Rhodesia

331. It was reported on 5 January 1966, that Southern Rhodesia was facing a severe farm crisis as a result of drought in nearly the whole of the south-west province of Matabeleland and part of the Midlands. It was reported that cattle were dying at the rate of 250 a day, much of the maize crop had been lost, dams and rivers were dry and even trees were dying. In an emergency removal scheme announced by the Southern Rhodesia régime cattle were being removed in northern areas where conditions were better.

332. On 8 January 1966, it was reported that a famine relief operation to get grain supplies to the drought-struck countries of Central Africa, including Southern Rhodesia, had been initiated on 7 January 1966 by the United Kingdom Government in collaboration with the Governments of Australia and Canada.

333. It was reported that in the case of Southern Rhodesia, the United Kingdom Government would work through Sir Humphrey Gibbs, the legal Governor of Southern Rhodesia, who would deal with the Smith régime in organizing the emergency supplies of grain to the stricken areas. The United Kingdom Government emphasized that the move on grain did not portend any relaxation of the embargo on oil or the trade and financial sanctions. The United Kingdom Government also stated that this was a humanitarian exercise and that it was not going to use starvation as a sanction. It could hardly help other countries all around and let thousands die in Southern Rhodesia.

334. On 13 January 1966, it was reported¹ that slow progress was being made with the relief operation scheme launched by the United Kingdom because no estimates had been received regarding the amount and type of grain required. In the case of Southern Rhodesia, it was reported that the previous plan whereby the Governor of Southern Rhodesia was to deal with the Smith régime in obtaining information on what was needed and in organizing emergency supplies to the stricken areas, had not been carried out. It was reported that the United Kingdom Government had now apparently asked the Governor to make his own estimate of what was required on the basis of such information that reached him. The report emphasized that so far there had been no dealing with the illegal régime.

335. On 20 January 1966, it was reported that the Governor had submitted a report on the drought situation to the United Kingdom Prime Minister. The report was said to have indicated that although the drought had been severe, the position was far short of famine. Additional help along the lines suggested by the United Kingdom Prime Minister would be welcomed, but it would not be needed on the scale that his original announcement suggested. The report was also said to have suggested that the urgent problem was water and some feed for animals with only some local need of emergency food for the people.

C. CONSIDERATION BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE

Introduction

336. The Special Committee considered the question of Southern Rhodesia at its 401st to 407th meetings between 6 and 21 April 1966.⁹

337. The Permanent Representatives of Ghana and Algeria, by letters dated 12 April 1966 (A/AC.109/155), and 13 April 1966 (A/AC.109/156), respectively, asked to participate in the discussions of the Special Committee on the question of Southern Rhodesia. At its 403rd meeting on 14 April 1966, the Committee decided, without objection, to grant these requests.

338. By letter dated 19 April 1966 (A/AC.109/157), the Permanent Representative of Saudi Arabia also asked to participate in the discussions of the Special Committee on the question of Southern Rhodesia. At its 405th meeting on 19 April 1966, the Committee decided, without objection, to grant this request.

Written petitions

339. The Special Committee had before it the following written petitions concerning Southern Rhodesia:

<i>Petitioner</i>	<i>Document</i>
Mr. Emilio Sereni, Chairman, Alleanza Nazionale dei Contadini Italiani	A/AC.109/PET.435
Mr. Reinhard Fiedler and twenty-one other High School Students at Burgstädt, German Democratic Republic ..	A/AC.109/PET.436
Mr. Nnamdi B. Emetarom, President of the African Students' Association in Israel	A/AC.109/PET.437
Dr. Milnor Alexander, Legislative Secretary of the United States Section, Women's International League for Peace and Freedom	A/AC.109/PET.438

⁹ See sections F and G of this chapter for an account of the Special Committee's further consideration of the question of Southern Rhodesia during its meetings in Africa.

Petitioner	Document
Mr. George W. Brind	A/AC.109/PET.439 and Add.1
Mr. Khalid Aljoundi, Chairman, Confederation of Syrian Workers Trade Unions	A/AC.109/PET.440
FIFITAMA (Council of Youth of Madagascar)	A/AC.109/PET.441
Mrs. A. M. Hughes, State Secretary of the Union of Australian Women	A/AC.109/PET.453

General statements

340. The Chairman said that in view of the recent alarming developments concerning Southern Rhodesia, the main item on the agenda for that meeting, several delegations had urged him to make a statement from the Chair.

341. Many members of the Special Committee had expressed deepening concern at the fast deteriorating situation in Southern Rhodesia. That concern had in no way been alleviated by events of the past few days. Members were all no doubt fully aware of the incident of the Greek tanker *Joanna V* carrying oil, presumably destined for Southern Rhodesia, which had anchored off the harbour of Beira, Portuguese Mozambique. That, according to the news from London, had been in defiance of a United Kingdom frigate's instructions not to proceed to Beira and, according to the British, in issuing those instructions they had been anxious to enforce an oil embargo declared by the United Kingdom against Southern Rhodesia in keeping with United Nations Security Council resolution 217 (1965) of 20 November 1965.

342. That incident, it was generally believed, was far from being an isolated occurrence in the breach or attempted breach of the United Kingdom embargo on Southern Rhodesia. Many and convincing had been the reports of Portuguese and South African activities in getting oil to Rhodesia. What was of the gravest concern to the majority of members of the Committee was that those incidents had demonstrated convincingly the lamentable failure of the United Kingdom Government to bring down the illegal régime of Ian Smith in Southern Rhodesia by the imposition of sanctions.

343. The Committee had been entitled to expect the United Kingdom to restore constitutional legality in Southern Rhodesia, in view of the many statements it had made on the matter in the United Nations and elsewhere, as early in December 1965 and in January 1966, that the measures which it had been imposing by means of sanctions would bring down that illegal régime "in a matter of weeks rather than months". In the circumstances it was quite proper and fitting to hold the United Kingdom Government squarely responsible for the continuing and fast deteriorating situation in Southern Rhodesia. That Government had often made pious statements about its responsibilities in its territories to all sections of the community. And yet, in that crucial test where 200,000 Whites arrogantly and defiantly in the worst traditions of racism had imposed their rule on the 4 million black indigenous inhabitants of Southern Rhodesia in flagrant contempt of democracy and the much vaunted British ideas of justice and self-determination, the British had failed lamentably to honour their commitments and their responsibilities to the black Southern Rhodesians and had also failed to put into effect the United Nations resolutions.

344. It was therefore the duty of the Committee, with that vexed question of Southern Rhodesia on its agenda and in face of the continued existence of the illegal racist minority régime of Southern Rhodesia, to recognize that explosive situation as constituting a threat to international peace and security. The Committee urged all States not to recognize the illegal régime in Southern Rhodesia and not to entertain any diplomatic or other relations with that illegal authority and to desist in every way from aiding and abetting it by whatever means. It condemned the actions of all States which had not complied with the resolutions already adopted by the General Assembly and the Security Council, in particular Portugal and the racist régime of South Africa. In recognizing the inadequacy and the failure of the measures so far undertaken by the United Kingdom Government to bring to an end the Smith régime, the Committee drew the attention of the Secretary-General of the United Nations to the appalling state of affairs in Southern Rhodesia and asked the Secretary-General to alert the President of the Security Council, since the matter was already on the agenda of the Security Council, to take steps to bring it before the Council for the necessary action.

345. In the present circumstances, the Committee believed that the time had come for firm mandatory sanctions to be taken under Articles 41 and 42 of the United Nations Charter, since the measures already adopted had proved inadequate. The Committee solemnly called upon the United Kingdom Government once again to comply with Security Council resolution 217 (1965) of 20 November 1965, to honour its responsibilities to the 4 million black indigenous Southern Rhodesians and to bring to an immediate end the illegal racist régime of Ian Smith in Southern Rhodesia, indeed in keeping with its own undertaking.

346. The representative of the *United Republic of Tanzania* said that the Chairman's statement accurately reflected the views and grave concern of the members of the Special Committee. The so-called sanctions had simply not worked and at the present rate they would continue to fail miserably.

347. The representatives of the United Kingdom had constantly reminded the Committee that the Southern Rhodesian question was the responsibility of the United Kingdom Government. That was quite true: the Southern Rhodesian question was only a continuation of colonialism and responsibility for it lay fully with the United Kingdom Government. The deteriorating situation demanded the application of mandatory sanctions and total economic blockade of southern Africa, including the use of military force to dislodge the illegal racist régime of Ian Smith.

348. From the day of the unilateral declaration of independence, the United Kingdom Government had been warned that mild economic sanctions would not work and that the only way to end the illegal régime was to use force and crush it. Considering that five months had passed since the declaration, it was time to resort to more forceful measures. The economic measures adopted so far had achieved nothing; everyone knew that the Smith régime was obtaining oil from Portugal and South Africa, to mention only two places. An oil tanker had just entered Beira harbour, and his delegation was not so naive as to believe that the ship would not deliver its cargo, despite British assurances. Another oil tanker was now approaching Beira; those ships, of course, were the only two that had been given such wide publicity.

349. South Africa and the Portuguese colonialists were doing all they could to keep the Smith régime supplied with everything it needed. It was no longer possible to consider the question of Southern Rhodesia, economically or otherwise, in isolation from the rest of southern Africa. The area was covered by a system of foreign financial oligarchies which provided an umbrella for the illegal Smith régime. Southern Rhodesia had been quietly but definitely selling its tobacco crop. It had been able to secure a large foreign investment in a milling and maize processing company. It had also been reported to have sold large amounts of iron ore and sugar to certain Japanese firms. An article in *The New York Times* of 5 April referred to the stationing of middlemen in neighbouring countries who purchased and sold for Rhodesian business men without being detected. The only way to stop that traffic was to police the borders of Southern Rhodesia by armed guards who would confiscate goods leaving and entering Southern Rhodesia. Unfortunately, agents of the Smith régime were allowed to carry out open publicity activities in the United States and other countries.

350. What his delegation held to be of paramount importance was the fate of the 4 million Africans and their right to rule their own land. The continued existence of the Smith régime meant a continued threat to international peace and security in the heart of Africa. An armed police State existed in Southern Rhodesia today; the African nationalists were detained, imprisoned, tortured, murdered. In those circumstances, his delegation felt that all the talk about economic sanctions was nothing but a ruse to divert attention from the suffering of the African people of Zimbabwe. It was generally accepted that the Smith régime was a threat to international peace and security, and it was high time that drastic and effective action was taken to bring that régime down and to return the land to its rightful owners. The only way that justice could be done in Southern Rhodesia was by the use of force. He hoped that the United Kingdom Government would shoulder its responsibilities. It had used force to impose its rule in other colonies and there was no reason why it should not use force to restore justice. That would be an exceptional action which would be well applauded. Even the Episcopal Church of Southern Rhodesia and the Primate of the Church of England had called for the use of force. Chapter VII and Article 42 of the United Nations Charter showed clearly what was to be done. Military force was the only means that could crush the Smith régime. It was the Committee's duty to recommend in clear terms to the Security Council that it should take the necessary action under Article 42 of the Charter. His country had always supported the struggle of the people of Zimbabwe against enslavement and colonialism and it considered that struggle part of its own fight for the total liberation of Africa and for development and peace. His delegation would therefore readily co-operate with all delegations which were ready to take action on those lines.

351. The representative of the *Union of Soviet Socialist Republics* thanked the Chairman for his clear statement on the present situation in Southern Rhodesia. The Soviet Union, consistent with its position of principle, supported the right of the people of Zimbabwe to freedom and genuine independence. The Soviet Union Government had condemned the Smith régime and had branded the unilateral declaration of inde-

pendence as a further crime of the colonialists against the suffering people of Zimbabwe. The governing circles of the United Kingdom pretended to oppose the Smith régime and to be working towards its downfall, but the facts showed the very opposite to be true. Through the 1961 Constitution, the United Kingdom had laid the foundation for the present racist régime; it had subsequently armed the Southern Rhodesian racists and encouraged a colonial union between Southern Rhodesia and South Africa and the Portuguese colonies. As a result, Southern Rhodesia had become a police State. The United Kingdom could never rid itself of responsibility for the national tragedy of the people of Zimbabwe.

352. It might be alleged that the present United Kingdom Government did not bear responsibility for past events. He would point out, however, that the Labour Government had taken no steps to abrogate the 1961 Constitution, nor had it declared itself willing to carry out United Nations decisions on the granting of genuine independence to the people of Zimbabwe; judging from various statements by Labour Party leaders, it did not intend to do so.

353. On 11 November 1965 the General Assembly in resolution 2024 (XX) had condemned the unilateral declaration of independence and invited the United Kingdom to implement the relevant United Nations resolutions in order to put an end to the rebellion. On the following day the Security Council in resolution 216 (1965) had called upon all States not to recognize the illegal régime in Southern Rhodesia and to refrain from rendering it any assistance. On 20 November 1965, the Security Council had adopted resolution 217 (1965) calling on the United Kingdom Government to quell the rebellion of the racist minority, to take all other appropriate measures which would prove effective in bringing the minority régime in Southern Rhodesia to an immediate end and to take immediate measures to allow the people of Southern Rhodesia to determine their own future consistent with the objectives of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV).

354. A significant number of States Members of the United Nations had already adopted the necessary effective measures for the implementation of the resolutions of the Security Council. In December 1965 the Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity had decided to implement a total economic blockade of Southern Rhodesia and to sever all communications with that country. Under that decision, aircraft travelling to Southern Rhodesia were denied the right to fly over the African countries concerned. The decisions of the General Assembly and the Security Council had been supported by the overwhelming majority of Member States. By 18 March, communications announcing the adoption of concerted measures against the Smith régime had been received from fifty-eight countries, and communications on that subject were continuing to arrive. The Soviet Union, which systematically supported the peoples struggling against colonial domination, had informed the Secretary-General¹⁰ of its willingness to implement the resolutions of the Security Council. The Soviet Union did not recognize the Smith régime; it had not provided that régime with arms, equipment or military matériel and maintained no economic relations with it. The

¹⁰ *Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-first Year, Supplement for January, February and March 1966, documents S/7068 and Add.1.*

Soviet Union had severed postal communications and telecommunications with the Salisbury régime. It was ready to co-operate with the African countries in extending all possible support to the Zimbabwe people in their struggle.

355. The United Kingdom—which, as the administering Power, was basically responsible for the tragic situation in Southern Rhodesia—had not implemented the decisions of the United Nations. Although it had claimed that the economic and financial sanctions would crush the rebellion within weeks, the ineffectiveness of those sanctions had been recognized by Mr. Smith himself, by the Press in the United Kingdom and the United States, by officials in the United Kingdom and by representatives of African countries. The sanctions had been adopted too late and the racist régime in Southern Rhodesia had been able to prepare for them. The United Kingdom had announced the oil embargo only on 17 December 1965—in other words, five weeks after the unilateral declaration of independence. The total ban on trade with Southern Rhodesia had been imposed by the United Kingdom only on 30 January 1966—two and a half months after the racist mutiny and the Security Council resolution. It was only on 18 March 1966 that the United States had officially imposed a ban on all exports to Southern Rhodesia. The sanctions allowed exceptions, which the United States, the United Kingdom and other Western Powers used in order to continue trade with Southern Rhodesia. Figures published by the United Kingdom Board of Trade showed that in February—after the United Kingdom had imposed a total embargo—the value of United Kingdom imports from Southern Rhodesia had amounted to £523,000 and its exports to Southern Rhodesia to £672,000. Tobacco exports from Southern Rhodesia to the United Kingdom had been to a value of £484,000, although officially imports of tobacco from Southern Rhodesia had been prohibited as from 11 November 1965. Those figures showed the “effectiveness” of the so-called economic sanctions.

356. The Smith régime was being assisted by its partners in the unholy alliance; Portugal and South Africa were undermining the economic sanctions. Mr. Swart, the President of the Republic of South Africa, had stated on 21 January 1966 that the South African Government would maintain normal relations with the régime in Southern Rhodesia and would not take part in any sanctions or boycotts. The Portuguese Minister for Foreign Affairs had announced on 25 November 1965 that Portugal would maintain normal relations with the Government of Southern Rhodesia. As could be seen from press reports and from the Secretariat working paper (paras. 1-335 above), Verwoerd and Salazar were helping their friend Ian Smith to overcome the oil embargo; supplies of petroleum products to Southern Rhodesia each month from South Africa and Mozambique were equal to the monthly consumption of such products in Southern Rhodesia under the current rationing system. The economic life of Southern Rhodesia was not hampered by any lack of petroleum; the railways were operating normally and, despite Portuguese denials, witnesses claimed that oil was going to Southern Rhodesia by rail from Lourenço Marques.

357. With the help of friends in Western countries, the Smith régime was also evading the financial sanctions. After the racist mutiny, the United Kingdom had blocked Southern Rhodesian currency reserves in

London. The racist régime had, however, made its preparations; all reserves, with the exception of £9 million, had been removed from London and placed in banks in South Africa and Europe. As could be seen from paragraph 198 of the working paper, the reserves available to the Salisbury authorities were estimated at £14 million. Moreover, the Smith régime had solid gold reserves. The value of the annual gold production of Southern Rhodesia was £7 million.

358. The embargo on the sale of tobacco was equally ineffectual. On the eve of its declaration of independence, the Smith régime had succeeded in selling its 1965 tobacco harvest. The embargo was being violated not only by South Africa and Portugal but also by the United Kingdom, the United States and certain other Western Powers.

359. The sanctions were also being sabotaged by powerful international monopolies, which were openly helping the Southern Rhodesian racists to overcome the oil embargo. The petroleum products being supplied by South Africa to Southern Rhodesia were produced at installations under the control of the international petroleum monopolies, including Shell, British Petroleum, Mobil Oil and Caltex. They were then taken to Southern Rhodesia in tanks owned by British Petroleum, in which United Kingdom nationals owned 56 per cent of the shares. As stated in *The New York Times* of 26 February 1966, the branches of Mobil Oil and Caltex in Southern Rhodesia had complained to their parent offices that business was slipping away to the big United Kingdom companies, which were bringing oil clandestinely into the country. The oil monopolies in the United Kingdom and the United States were making no attempt to conceal their failure to co-operate in the oil embargo.

360. The subversive role of the monopolies was demonstrated by recent attempts to resume the pumping of oil through the Beira-Umtali pipeline. The pipeline was owned by Companhia do Pipeline Moçambique-Rodésia, whose capital was controlled by Lonrho Ltd., a British company (62.5 per cent) and by Portuguese interests (37.5 per cent). It had been explained that the decision to resume pumping had been carried through by the Portuguese, who were in the majority on the Board of Directors of the Companhia do Pipeline Moçambique-Rodésia. It was difficult to believe, however, that a company which owned two thirds of the shares in that concern had no say in the matter.

361. So far as sales of Southern Rhodesian tobacco were concerned, it was “business as usual” for the monopolies.

362. Although it was aware of those violations, the United Kingdom Government had taken no effective action to ensure the implementation of the sanctions. Despite its diplomatic exchanges with Greece and negotiations with Lisbon and despite constant supervision by United Kingdom armed forces, a tanker carrying oil for the Smith régime had succeeded in reaching the shores of Mozambique and anchoring two miles off Beira.

363. It was thus clear that responsibility for the situation in Southern Rhodesia lay primarily with the United Kingdom and those countries which, by direct or indirect means, were violating the Security Council resolution of 20 November 1965. The Soviet Union delegation agreed fully with the Afro-Asian delegations that the Special Committee should request the Security Council urgently to reconsider the question of Southern

Rhodesia with a view to the adoption of measures under the Charter to ensure the implementation of the decisions of the United Nations, including the Security Council resolution of 20 November 1965.

364. The representative of *Ethiopia* supported the Chairman's statement. His delegation hoped that the statement would be adopted as a consensus of the Committee; otherwise, it would be compelled to introduce a draft resolution.

365. The United Kingdom Government had failed to crush the rebellion, primarily because it did not wish to do so. If it had so wished, it would have dispatched troops as it had done in many parts of Africa and Asia. Only force would crush the rebellion; the failure of the economic sanctions was obvious.

366. The representative of *India* congratulated the Chairman on his clear and concise statement, which reflected the sentiments of a large majority of the States Members of the United Nations. The statement constituted an effective interim pronouncement, which would focus the attention of the world community and of the Security Council on the explosive situation which the United Kingdom Government had allowed to develop in Southern Rhodesia.

367. The representative of *Mali* thanked the Chairman for his statement, which reflected the concern of the majority of the members of the Special Committee.

368. Mali considered Southern Rhodesia a colony and did not recognize the illegal and racist minority régime established at Salisbury. His delegation was convinced of the full responsibility of the United Kingdom Government for the situation in Southern Rhodesia. In Aden and British Guiana, the United Kingdom had not hesitated to suspend constitutions, revoke assemblies and governments elected by universal suffrage and arrest officials against the will of the people. In Southern Rhodesia, however, that same Government was showing complaisance and acting in complicity with a white settler minority which practised discrimination and cynically exploited the large majority of the African population, in violation of human rights and of the principles set forth in the United Nations Charter.

369. He would be glad to learn what the United Kingdom Government intended to do in order to ensure the implementation of the resolutions adopted by the United Nations and to crush the rebellion in Southern Rhodesia.

370. The representative of *Bulgaria* said that the Chairman's statement should, as an expression of the opinion of the Special Committee as a whole, be transmitted to all those who should take effective action to overthrow the racist régime of Southern Rhodesia.

371. The steps taken by the United Kingdom and other countries, which continued to be the mainstay of the racist minority régime in Southern Rhodesia, were deliberately ineffective. Racist régimes, such as that in South Africa, knew that they could count on the support of the United Kingdom and the United States Governments. Although six months had elapsed since the adoption of the General Assembly and Security Council resolutions on Southern Rhodesia, the unlawful Rhodesian régime continued to exist and to violate the most elementary rights of the overwhelming majority of the population. It was encouraging to note that a large number of Member States had responded promptly and positively to the appeals of the Security

Council but the measures adopted by certain Governments—and particularly by the United Kingdom Government—had been ineffective.

372. The representative of *Yugoslavia* said that the Chairman's statement had shown the causes, implications and consequences of the current situation in Southern Rhodesia and the extent to which the United Kingdom Government bore responsibility for that situation. By asking for the application of Article 42 of the Charter, the Chairman had indicated a way out of the problem. For that reason, the Yugoslav delegation fully supported the statement. It was imperative for the Committee to take more vigorous action, if it was to fulfil its duties and continue to be an important and authoritative organ of the United Nations.

373. The representative of *Iraq* said that, when his delegation had referred at a recent meeting to the deteriorating situation in Aden, it had done so not only because the people who were being maltreated there were its kith and kin but also because the cause of freedom and independence was indivisible. If people were allowed to suffer in Aden, those responsible for that suffering would be encouraged to do the same thing in other parts of the world. His delegation therefore strongly condemned the events in Southern Rhodesia, the inactivity on the part of the United Kingdom and the support given to the minority Government of Southern Rhodesia by South Africa and Portugal. The United Kingdom should be pressed to carry out its duty fully and the Security Council should be called upon to consider the situation again.

374. Another reason why his delegation was so interested in the matter was that any discussion of the question of Southern Rhodesia reminded it of a similar case, that of Palestine. There, too, there had been a Mandatory Power, settlers and an embargo. He had warned the General Assembly, at its eighteenth session, that what had happened in Palestine would happen in Southern Rhodesia and his prediction was proving true: in Southern Rhodesia an administering Power was helping a minority to take over the country illegally and was doing its utmost to encourage the settlers and invaders, while 4 million people were suffering under the shackles of colonialism.

375. His delegation therefore supported the clear and strong statement made by the Chairman and would be prepared to support any draft resolution which would request the General Assembly or the Security Council to take stronger action to compel the administering Power to carry out its responsibilities under the United Nations Charter and to ensure that those who were ignoring the decisions and resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council were brought to reason.

376. The representative of *Syria* associated his delegation with those which had expressed support of the Chairman's statement, which reflected the grave concern felt by all members with respect to the problem of Southern Rhodesia.

377. The statements of the representative of the administering Power on the question of Aden and the question of Southern Rhodesia had given the impression that the problems would soon be solved, that independence would come and that the rebel régimes would collapse. Yet the truth of the matter was that colonialism continued to exist. After decisive arguments presented by the representatives of Tanzania and the Soviet Union concerning the United Kingdom Gov-

ernment and the steps that were being taken by the illegal régime in Southern Rhodesia, there was little left to say. The Committee was faced with a serious situation which showed a complete disregard for human rights and United Nations resolutions. No attempt should be made to minimize the Committee's responsibility as a body representing the consensus of the United Nations and there should be no question about the direction which the Committee's work should take.

378. His delegation supported the Chairman's suggestion that the matter should be referred to the Security Council so that Article 42 of the Charter could be invoked with respect to the question.

379. The representative of the *United Kingdom* said that he had been surprised to hear the actual terms of the Chairman's statement in that they appeared to suggest that they reflected a general view, although at that stage no views had been expressed by delegations or by the Committee as a whole. Nor could his delegation be expected to accept the comments which the Chairman and other representatives had made about the Government's actions and policies.

380. His delegation and his Government had of course never underestimated the seriousness of the situation created by the illegal declaration of independence in Southern Rhodesia or by recent events. That had been made quite clear in every statement which the United Kingdom delegation had made in the Security Council or in any other United Nations body.

381. At that very moment in London the United Kingdom Ministers were taking stock of the whole Rhodesian problem in the light of the latest developments. The Commonwealth Sanctions Committee, which had been set up at the Lagos Conference in January 1966, was also meeting in London. Furthermore, the United Kingdom Government was in touch at a high ministerial level with the Portuguese Government about recent developments.

382. He reserved his delegation's position with regard to the statements which had been made during the meeting.

383. The representative of the *United States of America* said that there were certain passages of the Chairman's statement with which his delegation could not associate itself. He consequently reserved his Government's position on the matter.

384. The representative of *Denmark* said that, while his delegation was in full agreement with much of the Chairman's statement, it reserved its position with regard to certain points in the statement until it had had time to study the text more closely.

385. The representative of *Italy* said that his delegation, like other delegations, found itself in agreement with much of the Chairman's statement. There were, however, certain points on which he was obliged to reserve his Government's position at the present time.

386. The representative of *Australia* said that he, too, would like to reserve his position regarding the Chairman's statement. His delegation was not prepared at the present stage to go into details about many of the things that had been said.

387. The representative of *Uruguay* said that his delegation had agreed with the idea that the Chairman should make a statement on the question of Southern Rhodesia because it had thought it necessary to stress the seriousness and urgency of the matter. His dele-

gation generally supported the Chairman's statement, which was, however, one of considerable detail and, to some extent, a substitute for a resolution that would have been adopted after appropriate debate. He therefore reserved his delegation's right to comment on certain aspects of the statement at a later stage, when it had had time to examine the statement carefully and to receive appropriate instructions.

388. The representative of *Chile* said that his delegation's position with regard to the Chairman's statement coincided with that of the representative of Uruguay. While it was in general agreement with the statement, it was unable to commit its Government regarding certain points of detail without receiving instructions. His delegation therefore reserved the right to comment on the subject at a later meeting.

389. The representative of *Venezuela* said that his delegation agreed that the situation in Southern Rhodesia was serious and that effective action should be taken by the Special Committee and other appropriate United Nations organs to put an end to that illegal situation. His delegation had supported the idea that the Chairman should make a statement in order to emphasize the gravity and urgency of the matter. The statement had, however, been much broader than had been expected and there were a number of points which his delegation felt it must consider with great care. It could not take a position on the statement without consulting its Government and accordingly reserved its right to comment at a later stage.

390. The representative of *Afghanistan* said that his delegation was happy to note that there was a wide area of agreement among the members in the Committee regarding the gravity of the situation in Southern Rhodesia and the need for effective measures to remedy that situation. He had been glad to hear the United Kingdom representative say that his Government had never underestimated the gravity of the matter. That representative had also recognized the illegal nature of the actions of the authorities in Southern Rhodesia. The majority of the members, however, had given the clear impression that they did not consider the action being taken by the United Kingdom sufficiently effective.

391. His delegation expressed its appreciation of the Chairman's statement and saw no contradiction between the spirit of that statement and the unanimous concern felt by the members of the Committee. His delegation regarded certain points in the statement as mere recommendations, based on the consensus of members of the Committee that the attention of the Security Council should be drawn to the urgency and gravity of the question of Southern Rhodesia. His delegation therefore whole-heartedly supported the spirit of the Chairman's statement in the light of the discussion in the Committee.

392. The representative of *Poland* said that his delegation whole-heartedly supported the Chairman's statement, which fully reflected the concern felt by his delegation about the grave situation in Southern Rhodesia.

393. The representative of *Tunisia* associated his delegation with all those which had given the Chairman's statement full support. Like other delegations, his delegation had intended to present an interim draft resolution at the present meeting because it considered that the seriousness of the events in Southern Rhodesia and the fact that the administering Power had not taken any effective steps to put an end to the situation

and to the illegal Southern Rhodesian régime required immediate action. It was, however, prepared to accept the Chairman's statement, which reflected its position and which it regarded as the consensus of the views of members.

394. His delegation felt that the problem was so serious as to demand urgent action on the part of the Security Council, which should be requested to adopt effective measures to put an end to the deplorable state of affairs in Southern Rhodesia. His delegation also felt that it would be well to express, on behalf of the United Nations and the Special Committee, the concern that was felt about the situation.

395. The United Kingdom representative's reservations had caused his delegation no surprise. The problem had, however, been debated on so many occasions in the United Nations that the astonishment shown by the United Kingdom representative seemed exaggerated. It was obvious that the situation could not last indefinitely and that the time had come to take further action.

396. The representative of *Iran* associated his delegation with those which had spoken in support of the Chairman's statement. The situation was grave and called for more effective action to implement the resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council. As members were aware, Iran had been one of the first countries to impose a ban on the sale of oil to Southern Rhodesia and that ban had been scrupulously observed.

397. The representative of *Madagascar* expressed his delegation's support of the Chairman's statement, which fully reflected the gravity of the situation and the general concern felt by members of the Committee.

398. The representative of the *Ivory Coast* said that the various reservations that had been made were not likely to detract from the Chairman's statement, which reflected the views of the delegation of the Ivory Coast.

399. It was impossible to think of the Southern Rhodesian question without recalling that a few months previously Ian Smith had requested the United Kingdom to grant independence to Southern Rhodesia and had threatened to declare independence unilaterally should the administering Power not accede to that request. Ian Smith had indeed made good that threat. It seemed that reason no longer prevailed and that the Smith government felt that it had the right to keep 4 million black patriots in bondage, in spite of the appeals made to it and of its condemnation by world opinion.

400. The United Kingdom, which had come to the United Nations to explain the difficulties and to obtain assistance in order to put down the Rhodesian rebellion, had exhausted all means, while Ian Smith's régime stood fast and became stronger with every passing day. All that was in contradiction with the principles enshrined in the Charter. His delegation was surprised at the weakness of the measures which the United Kingdom delegation had allegedly taken to bring down the white minority régime in Southern Rhodesia. It was convinced that, faithful to the idea which had prompted it to bring the question before the Security Council a few months previously, the United Kingdom Government must immediately take further steps to crush the Rhodesian rebellion.

401. His delegation supported the Chairman's statement and hoped that the Security Council would soon

have an opportunity to consider the Southern Rhodesian question in the light of recent events.

402. The representative of *Ethiopia* pointed out that the Special Committee had drawn the attention of the Security Council to the gravity of the situation in Southern Rhodesia as early as April 1965 and had called upon the United Kingdom Government to take urgent measures in that Territory. The Security Council had subsequently adopted resolution 202 (1965) concerning Southern Rhodesia and the provisions of that resolution had been endorsed by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) on 25 October 1965. After the unilateral declaration of independence, the Security Council had adopted resolution 217 (1965), which called upon States to break all economic relations with Southern Rhodesia and to impose an embargo on oil and petroleum products. Notwithstanding all those efforts, there was a greater need than ever for action to restore the rights of the African population and it was a major part of the Committee's duty to use the United Nations forum to keep world opinion informed on the matter and to renew its appeal to the conscience of the United Kingdom Government.

403. Recent developments in Southern Rhodesia might be referred to as a farce, were it not for the human tragedy involved. The only possible conclusion from the sequence of events was that the administering Power had known from the beginning that there would be an illegal seizure of power by the Ian Smith government. That government had rejected the United Kingdom offer to set up a royal commission to amend the 1961 Constitution and its negotiations with the United Kingdom in October 1965 had been followed almost immediately by Mr. Smith's announcement that Southern Rhodesia would become independent by Christmas 1965. The preparations made by the Government in the ensuing weeks had obviously been a prelude to the unilateral declaration of independence on 11 November 1965 and to the assumption of full control by the illegal minority.

404. The United Kingdom Government, on the other hand, had been strikingly reluctant to display its wonted firmness in dealing with disorder and illegality. It had imposed some vague and ineffective sanctions, having already made it quite clear that force would not be used in the event of a unilateral declaration of independence. Mr. Wilson's announcement on 11 November 1965 that his Government did not contemplate any national or international action against the illegal régime of Southern Rhodesia had only helped that régime to entrench itself. It was therefore not surprising that the declaration of independence placed so much stress on "kith and kin". While Mr. Wilson had been telling the world that, if the legal Governor of Southern Rhodesia asked for help, the United Kingdom would fully consider the request, the Governor's proclamation dismissing Ian Smith and his Ministers had been barred from publication in Southern Rhodesia. Even when the Governor had been deprived of all signs of office, Mr. Wilson still had not thought there was enough provocation to justify action. Nor had the mass intimidation of the African population convinced the United Kingdom Government of the urgent need for action.

405. At the meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers at Lagos, Nigeria, in January 1966, Mr. Wilson had finally agreed that the use of force could not be precluded if it proved necessary to restore law and

order. The need to use force to dislodge the illegal régime had been abundantly proved; any further delay would amount to deliberate support of Ian Smith and his fellow rebels. The use of force had been requested by the Organization of African Unity as early as 25 October 1965, by the Episcopal Church of Rhodesia and by the Archbishop of Canterbury.

406. The half-hearted manner in which economic sanctions were being implemented had fully justified Ethiopia's scepticism. Like the United Kingdom assurance that no force would be used, the progressive nature of the sanctions was designed to reduce the effect of each stage and further assist the rebels. The purchase of tobacco was declared illegal only if the tobacco was for sale abroad. Thanks to the embargo, Southern Rhodesia copper could be sold on the open market at higher prices, giving an extra profit of about £3 million a year. Large foreign concerns continued to supply Southern Rhodesia with spare parts and equipment free of charge.

407. The calculated leniency of the United Kingdom Government contrasted with the firm stand adopted by the retrograde Governments of South Africa and Portugal. Both before and after the unilateral declaration of independence, the Verwoerd Government had stated that it would maintain economic and other relations with Southern Rhodesia. Even before the unilateral declaration, Portugal had given the sovereignty of Southern Rhodesia *de facto* recognition by accepting a Mr. Reedman as "Chief of the Rhodesian Mission" to Lisbon.

408. The failure of the oil embargo was catastrophic. The flow of oil into Southern Rhodesia was increasing and not decreasing; 70,000 gallons of fuel were arriving daily from South Africa and Mozambique. Greek tankers had recently defied the United Kingdom and headed for Beira. The depraved Portuguese colonialists had made it clear that oil entering Territories under their subjugation would reach Southern Rhodesia. The reluctance of the United Kingdom to use force in that matter had been explained by a desire to avoid loss of life. The fact, however, that lives were being lost in the racist prisons of Southern Rhodesia and that lives had been lost in Kenya, British Guiana, India and Aden did not appear to cause the United Kingdom any concern. Since Southern Rhodesia depended on oil for only 27 per cent of its energy needs and had all the assistance it required in that regard, the only solution was to use direct, firm and unequivocal force. If economic sanctions were to be effective, the United Kingdom Government would have to use force against South Africa and Portugal, but since the United Kingdom Government had already declined to use force even against the settlers, it would obviously not do so against those two States.

409. The Special Committee should urgently recommend that the Security Council should decide upon enforcement measures under Chapter VII of the Charter to end the highly explosive situation in Southern Rhodesia. The Ethiopian delegation had recommended the adoption of such measures during the consideration of the question in the Security Council in November 1965. Together with many other delegations, it had not been satisfied with the manner in which the Security Council had recently handled the question of Southern Rhodesia. The draft resolution submitted by the United Kingdom and adopted by the Council on 9 April 1966 was limited and inadequate in many respects. The amendments submitted by the

three African members of the Council with the aim of strengthening and broadening the text had unfortunately been rejected. The Special Committee should therefore request an urgent meeting of the Council to consider the question of Southern Rhodesia in the light of Chapter VII of the Charter.

410. The representative of *Australia* stated that there was a serious misunderstanding in some quarters about the Australian Government's policies and actions with regard to the situation in Southern Rhodesia. Yet his Government's position had been clearly explained in many statements and particularly in the note dated 28 January 1966 from the Permanent Representative of Australia addressed to the Secretary-General.¹¹ The Australian Government's economic sanctions against Southern Rhodesia were not merely declarations of principle in the absence of economic ties but actual discontinuance of trade, with consequent economic sacrifices. Although it had been necessary to go through certain parliamentary processes, the action of the Australian Government had been prompt and had been completed by 16 November 1965—in other words, before the Security Council resolution of 20 November 1965. The economic measures detailed in document S/7104 meant that Australia had placed an embargo upon 93 per cent of its imports from Southern Rhodesia.

411. On 29 December 1965, the Australian Prime Minister had stated that his Government regarded the unilateral declaration of independence as illegal and would not grant diplomatic recognition to the new régime. He had affirmed that a settlement of the problem should be achieved on the basis of steady progress towards majority rule and the elimination of racial discrimination. The need for an education programme to prepare for majority rule had been mentioned. The Prime Minister had said that Australia supported the United Kingdom sanctions and had imposed sanctions of its own. Australia believed that economic sanctions would induce a return to the conference table; it opposed proposals for the use of armed force in Southern Rhodesia. It supported the Security Council resolution of 9 April 1966.

412. The representative of *Denmark* said that since the Committee had last discussed the question of Southern Rhodesia the situation had taken a turn for the worse. The Smith régime had declared Southern Rhodesia independent, with the object of establishing yet another State based on racial discrimination in the southern part of Africa. It was continuing in its illegal course, in defiance of the lawful authorities in London and of various United Nations resolutions. In resolution 217 (1965) the Security Council had called upon the United Kingdom to quell the rebellion in Southern Rhodesia and upon all States not to recognize the illegal régime of Ian Smith and to do their utmost to break all economic relations with Southern Rhodesia. His delegation deplored the fact that some Governments did not appear to be willing to comply with that resolution, as had recently been demonstrated when the Security Council had had to call upon the United Kingdom to use force if necessary in order to prevent certain unconcealed breaches in the oil embargo against Southern Rhodesia.

413. In the circumstances, it was clear that the proper United Nations organ to deal with the matter was the Security Council. His delegation considered

¹¹ *Ibid.*, document S/7104.

that, in adopting the resolutions of 20 November 1965 and 9 April 1966, the Council had proved its intention of bringing down the Smith régime with a view to establishing genuine independence with equal rights for all groups of the population in Southern Rhodesia. There seemed to be virtually unanimous agreement about that goal and it would be tragic if differences of opinion regarding the way in which it should be achieved could not be overcome.

414. His delegation would have considered it more suitable for the question to be followed up in the Security Council. The Security Council was the only United Nations organ which had the power to make recommendations or take decisions concerning the measures called for, and his delegation did not think that any other United Nations organ with a limited membership should spell out explicitly what decisions the Council ought to take. The Council's composition and position in the structure of the United Nations were such as to offer the best possible guarantees for a realistic and efficient approach to the problem and the effective implementation of its resolutions.

415. It was encouraging to note that the entire international community—with a few exceptions—had joined forces on the side of the United Kingdom Government in the trial of strength between that Government and the Salisbury régime. The outcome of the action initiated against the Smith régime would have far-reaching repercussions, affecting, *inter alia*, the situation throughout the southern part of Africa. For those reasons, and in accordance with its traditional positive policy vis-à-vis the United Nations, his country had strictly observed the provisions of Security Council resolution 217 (1965) and had informed the Secretary-General accordingly.¹² His Government considered any action contrary to that resolution to be reprehensible, immoral and irresponsible. It could not avert the fall of the Smith régime and the consequences of such behaviour would be grave perhaps not least for those who now played with fire. It had taken note of the repeated declarations of the United Kingdom Government to the effect that that Government would discharge its responsibility for resolving the Rhodesian constitutional problem. It had noted the steps already taken by the United Kingdom to achieve that end and was fully confident that the United Kingdom would take all the necessary action to fulfil its declared intention of bringing down the Smith régime. The fact that that régime had so far been able to remain in power showed that vigorous action was still needed and would only be effective if there was close co-operation between the United Kingdom and the other Members of the United Nations in carrying it out.

416. He suggested that upon the conclusion of its consideration of the question the Special Committee should transmit the official records of the debate to the Security Council.

417. The representative of India said that recent events had shown that urgent and effective action was essential if the rebellious Smith régime was to be brought down. It had become increasingly clear that to attempt to impose sanctions against Southern Rhodesia alone would not help to achieve the common objective of freeing the oppressed African majority in that Territory. As his delegation had pointed out in the Security Council on 12 November 1965, the question

of Southern Rhodesia should not be viewed in isolation from other colonial and racial problems in Africa, since it was intimately and directly connected with the racist and colonial oppression in South West Africa, Angola, Mozambique and so-called Portuguese Guinea. That fact had been demonstrated once again by the collusion between the three racist colonial Governments in southern Africa in perpetuating white supremacy there.

418. The representative of the United Kingdom Government had frequently told members that Southern Rhodesia was their Government's responsibility. His delegation was prepared to accept that statement in so far as it meant that the distressing state of affairs in Southern Rhodesia was the outcome of the policies of the United Kingdom Government. If, however, the implication was that the United Nations had no jurisdiction to discuss the issue and to recommend action, his delegation categorically rejected that contention. In fact, the United Kingdom Government itself had approached the Security Council in November 1965 for endorsement and support of the economic measures it was enacting to deal with the situation. It had been repeatedly affirmed in resolutions of the Special Committee and the General Assembly that Southern Rhodesia was a Non-Self-Governing Territory within the meaning of Chapter XI of the Charter of the United Nations and that the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples was applicable to it. It was therefore the right and indeed the sacred duty of the United Nations to do all in its power to help the suffering African people of Zimbabwe to achieve their goal of political independence on the basis of universal adult suffrage.

419. The United Kingdom Government had from the outset failed to discharge its responsibilities towards the majority population of Southern Rhodesia. For more than forty years it had allowed itself to be threatened and subjected to pressure by a few hundred Whites in the Territory. While it was possible to explain away the mistakes made by the United Kingdom Government from 1923 to 1965 as inexperience or ignorance of the dishonest motives of the Whites in southern Africa, the same view could not be applied to the United Kingdom actions in 1965. The United Kingdom had been told time and time again by the racists in Rhodesia that their sole objective was complete independence from the United Kingdom on their own terms. The United Kingdom Government had always adopted a meek attitude in its negotiations with the illegal Salisbury régime and had encouraged the white settlers in their fraudulent aims by assuring them that force would not be used in any circumstances. After that assurance, nothing could prevent Ian Smith from pursuing his disastrous policy.

420. On 11 November 1965, a few hours after the illegal Government in Southern Rhodesia had seized power, the United Kingdom Prime Minister had informed Parliament that the United Kingdom Government did not contemplate any national or international use of force to coerce the illegal régime of Southern Rhodesia into a constitutional posture. Although the United Kingdom Government had declared the usurpation of power by the Smith régime a rebellion, it had taken no effective steps to quell that rebellion. The failure to restore constitutional rule in Southern Rhodesia would go down in history as the great betrayal by the United Kingdom Government of the trust placed in it by the African people.

¹² *Ibid.*, *Twentieth Year, Supplement for October, November and December 1965*, document S/7005.

421. The oil embargo which had been announced after a crucial delay of five weeks was doomed to failure. The Whites in Southern Rhodesia had not been greatly affected by the embargo and other economic sanctions, since they could rely on oil and other supplies from their racist and colonial neighbours of Portugal and South Africa. The South African Government had lost no time in stating that it would not participate in any economic sanctions against Southern Rhodesia. It was clear from the Secretariat working paper (paras. 1-335 above) that the South African Government had gone out of its way to help its fellow racists in Southern Rhodesia. By 22 November 1965, the Southern Rhodesian "Trade Commissioner" in South Africa had been able to report that trade between the two countries had returned to the level that had existed before the illegal declaration of independence. It was not possible to determine the exact amount of oil and other petroleum products being sent to Southern Rhodesia from South Africa, since the South African Government had stopped making a distinction between exports and re-exports in its trade figures. The estimates, however, ranged from 35,000 to 70,000 gallons of oil a day. In addition, there was a daily inflow of oil, estimated at about 35,000 to 40,000 gallons, from Mozambique. It had been hoped that the ban on tobacco exports would deal a disastrous blow to the Southern Rhodesian economy. The fact was, however, that the Smith government had been able to guarantee the white farmers the sale of their tobacco at the minimum prices fixed by them.

422. It was in that context that the affair of the two oil tankers must be viewed. While the additional supplies of oil from the two tankers would undoubtedly help the settler régime, the Southern Rhodesian economy depended on oil for only 27 per cent of its energy requirements. Moreover, Southern Rhodesia had already accumulated sufficient stocks of oil and Mozambique was not the only, or the most important, source of supply. To attach undue importance to the tankers was to magnify their role out of proportion and thus to divert attention from the most important supply source, namely, South Africa. If the United Kingdom and others sincerely wished to apply pressure on the white extremists in Southern Rhodesia, effective steps must be taken to close all sources from which the country obtained what it needed.

423. His Government's policy in the matter had been clear and consistent. India did not recognize the illegal Smith régime. It had repeatedly called upon the United Kingdom Government to abrogate the 1961 Constitution and to convene a constitutional conference attended by all sections of the population to draft a democratic constitution based on the principle of one man, one vote. It had severed all diplomatic and economic relations with Southern Rhodesia. It had co-operated fully with the United Nations, the Special Committee and the Organization of African Unity in their efforts to help the people of Zimbabwe to attain genuine independence. It was convinced that concrete and effective measures, including the use of force, must be adopted against the rebellious Smith régime.

424. The representative of *Mali* said that the problem of Southern Rhodesia was becoming increasingly disturbing and the need for action was obvious to all. His delegation deplored the persistent refusal of the United Kingdom to implement all the resolutions

of the General Assembly, the Security Council and the Special Committee on that subject. The United Kingdom had recently come before the Security Council in order to give the world the impression that it was concerned and wanted intervention by the Council. It had sought approval of vague measures of dubious effectiveness. In reality, it had come to plead in favour of the security of Mr. Smith and to protect him from any armed intervention by the United Nations. The administering Power had tried to gain time so that Smith and his clique could strengthen their position. A great deal of fuss had been made about one ship, while tons of petroleum were reaching Southern Rhodesia via South Africa.

425. The United Kingdom Government had declared that it would not use troops in Southern Rhodesia; Smith had thus been assured that the United Kingdom would use its influence in the Security Council to prevent any recourse of force. Indeed, it was the United Kingdom Government which, on its own initiative, had under the 1961 Constitution handed over arms and military power to the racists, despite the warnings of the African States. It could not therefore claim that it was unable to disarm the illegal racist clique. If the United Kingdom had governmental authority in Southern Rhodesia, it should restore law and order there immediately, using force if necessary. A rebellion could not be handled with patience, in the hope that the rebels would capitulate. Smith and his clique had said that they would die rather than hand over power to the majority.

426. Months had elapsed since the Security Council resolution of 20 November 1965. The only result was that Smith had been given time to reorganize his economic structure and regain stability after the initial shock. The United Kingdom Government refused to use force, although it had not hesitated to imprison men like Gandhi, Nehru, Jagan, Nkrumah and Archbishop Makarios. It had not hesitated to use force in Nyasaland, Kenya and Aden to massacre defenceless citizens. Admittedly, in those cases the people had been coloured, while in Southern Rhodesia they were white settlers. The only explanation for the inaction of the United Kingdom Government was that it was guilty of racial prejudice and discrimination.

427. The reactionary forces of racism and fanaticism in Southern Rhodesia had long been supported and encouraged by powerful financial circles in the Western world. South Africa and Portugal, in particular, had given direct aid and encouragement; they were acting in concert with the Smith régime to perpetuate white supremacy and the economic exploitation of the Africans. The foreign monopolies rejoiced at the success of Smith and the complaisance of the United Kingdom because they had branches in Southern Rhodesia. By failing to take the necessary measures to crush the Smith régime, the United Kingdom bore a heavy responsibility for the consequences which might ensue. The United Kingdom was making Portugal a scapegoat and was refusing to act or allow any action against South Africa. As was stated in an article in *The New York Times* of 12 April 1966, the United Kingdom and South Africa were, in a sense, "economic hostages of each other" and there was doubt about how far the United Kingdom could support sanctions against South Africa. Such doubt was justified, since the United Kingdom had enormous economic interests in South Africa—its third most important customer.

428. The African countries shared the concern felt in certain United States circles about the need for vigorous action if the Smith régime was to be overthrown in the near future. His delegation would support any resolution requesting the application of Chapter VII of the Charter, particularly Articles 41 and 42, and the use of force to crush the white minority régime in Southern Rhodesia.

429. The representative of *Tunisia* said that unfortunately most of the resolutions on the question of Southern Rhodesia had remained dead letters, while the situation in that country had become increasingly disturbing. Southern Rhodesia was a colonized country, where a handful of settlers, taking advantage of the passivity of the administering Power, had usurped authority for their own benefit and imposed on the indigenous people an oppressive régime which was arousing world-wide indignation. Instead of co-operating with the United Nations, the administering Power had constantly repeated that the problems of Southern Rhodesia came within its own sole responsibility and competence. The deterioration of the situation, the insistence of the United Nations and the stand of the African countries had not persuaded the United Kingdom to admit that its policy was mistaken. Despite its numerous declarations of intention, the administering Power had not implemented the Security Council resolution of 20 November 1965. Contrary to the assertions of the United Kingdom Prime Minister, economic sanctions had not undermined the political strength of Ian Smith or hurt the economy of Southern Rhodesia.

430. The United Kingdom should have foreseen that the sanctions would be ineffective so long as the Smith régime could count on the complicity of South Africa and Portugal. All over the world serious doubts were being expressed about the effectiveness of the sanctions advocated by the United Kingdom Government and there was agreement that the time had come to seek more appropriate and more effective measures. From the outset, the African States had foreseen the ineffectiveness of economic sanctions and had tried to persuade the United Kingdom to use other means, particularly military intervention. Unfortunately that Government had stood by its policy and refused to use force. Only when two tankers had headed for Beira with petroleum for Southern Rhodesia had the United Kingdom asked the Security Council for authority to prevent the tankers from unloading their cargo. The outcome of the Rhodesian crisis did not, however, depend upon the delivery of oil through the Umtali pipeline. The oil embargo would be only partial, so long as Southern Rhodesia could obtain large amounts of petroleum via South Africa. It had so much oil that it had been able to relax the rationing of gasoline in Southern Rhodesia.

431. The United Kingdom was faced with the need to use more appropriate means. Whether it decided to send troops to Southern Rhodesia or to request new action through the United Nations, it was essential for it to show sincere determination to crush the Smith régime and enable the people of Southern Rhodesia to recover their rights and realize their national aspirations. The whole world, and particularly the United Kingdom itself, would gain if the administering Power decided to co-operate with the Organization. *Tunisia* considered that only armed intervention by the United Kingdom or the United Nations would put into effect the resolutions of the Security Council and

the General Assembly and rid Africa of the Smith racist régime.

432. The representative of *Sierra Leone* said that although after years of manoeuvring to ensure the perpetuation of white rule in Southern Rhodesia the United Kingdom had finally heeded world opinion sufficiently to give some token recognition of the rights of the Africans in the Territory, it had made no attempt to map out a path to lead them to independence. In the present crisis it was behaving with lamentable weakness and its only response to Ian Smith's unilateral declaration of independence had been to call for sanctions. Its action in attempting to shift the blame and to avoid the central issue of independence amounted, in fact, to double dealing.

433. The urgency with which the United Kingdom delegation had called for a meeting of the Security Council was in sharp contrast to the rather tardy approach it had suggested the day previously in the Special Committee and raised serious doubts about the sincerity or the motives of the United Kingdom Government. On 6 April the United Kingdom delegation had reserved its right to comment on the consensus of most of the members of the Special Committee as given by the Chairman, in which it had been suggested that the time had come for the Security Council to consider action under Articles 41 and 42 of the Charter. Its reservations had suggested that the United Kingdom considered the issue to be its exclusive concern and not that of the Special Committee. On the next day, however, although the situation of the oil tankers off the Mozambique coast had not changed, the United Kingdom Government had decided that the issue was an urgent one and had requested a Security Council meeting, at which it had presented a draft resolution.

434. The draft resolution had attempted to shift the responsibility from the United Kingdom Government to the Portuguese Government and had been restricted to the subject of an oil embargo. It had requested the Security Council to give the United Kingdom a mandate—which the Council had clearly given it in operative paragraph 9 of resolution 217 (1965). That manoeuvre by the United Kingdom was an attempt to justify its delay of nearly four months in implementing the Security Council resolution. In addition, by putting the focus on oil, it sought to divert attention from the wider issues of majority rule and independence for Southern Rhodesia.

435. If, as the United Kingdom Government maintained, Southern Rhodesia was a colony, it seemed incredible that that Government would want the United Nations to recommend that it should take any action whatsoever against its own colony. In similar cases, such as the so-called riots in British Guiana and the freedom-fighters in Aden, the United Kingdom had used troops, but when it came to the question of Southern Rhodesia the United Kingdom was reluctant to send troops there. It was, however, encouraging to note that the United Kingdom Government had finally come round to the belief that the situation in Southern Rhodesia constituted a threat to peace and had called for mandatory sanctions against Southern Rhodesia under Chapter VII of the Charter. Since the unilateral declaration of independence on 11 November 1965, the greatest sanction imposed by the United Kingdom and other countries had been on oil. It was stated in a report prepared at the request of the Secretary-General, entitled *The Economics and Logistics of an Embargo on Oil and Petroleum Pro-*

ducts of Rhodesia, that the economy could be significantly affected but that, if the question was one of survival, the availability of oil, in itself, would apparently not be the decisive consideration, that apparently little serious thought had been given to the reality of an oil embargo and that continued access to outside oil supplies seemed to have been a basic assumption.

436. That clearly implied that Mr. Smith and his régime had had prior understanding that they would receive oil. Oil accounted for only 27 per cent of Southern Rhodesia's energy requirements and was used primarily for lubrication and for highway transport, its industries and agriculture depending more on coal and on electric power from the Kariba Dam. Mr. Smith himself had said that the flow of oil to Southern Rhodesia was increasing rather than decreasing. It was reliably reported that Southern Rhodesia was receiving most of that oil via South Africa and Mozambique. According to the working paper prepared by the Secretariat (see paras. 1-335 above), South Africa had decided to stop making a distinction between exports and re-exports in its trade figures, so that it had become much more difficult to discover whether or not South Africa was acting as a channel for embargoed Southern Rhodesian exports or supplying it with embargoed oil. That was an attempt by the South African Government to conceal its nefarious dealings with Southern Rhodesia and to avoid the possibility of an embargo against itself.

437. His Government had always stated that sanctions alone would not topple the Ian Smith régime. There were too many loop-holes. For example, Portugal and South Africa had declared that they would not apply sanctions against Southern Rhodesia. Southern Rhodesia could also rely on assistance from some countries which claimed to be planning sanctions but which left loop-holes that made it possible for almost all supplies to be delivered.

438. The Prime Minister of Sierra Leone had stated at various international conferences that, unless the United Kingdom decided to use force in Southern Rhodesia, very little could be achieved. No credence could be placed in the United Kingdom argument that sanctions alone would bring down the Smith régime. Five months had elapsed since Smith had illegally declared independence. He was receiving supplies of oil, the tobacco crop had been sold and he could command foreign exchange through South Africa and other countries. There were business men in Panama, South Africa, London and the United States who were willing and able to circumvent the sanctions, since most of those countries had not made it mandatory upon their citizens to uphold them.

439. When the General Assembly had adopted resolution 2024 (XX) condemning the unilateral declaration of independence, what had mainly shocked Member States had been the fact that over 4 million Africans were under the domination of 220,000 Whites. The States in the best position to help to alleviate that intolerable situation had been the very ones which had tried by all possible means to assist the Smith régime. That was no doubt because they did not consider that situation to be a threat to their way of life.

440. During the debate in the Security Council, Mali, Nigeria and Uganda had submitted an amendment to the United Kingdom draft resolution which would call upon the Government of South Africa to take all measures necessary to prevent the supply of

oil to Southern Rhodesia.¹³ The United States and United Kingdom delegations had found that they could not vote in favour of that amendment, although it would merely have extended the embargo to the only other known route for the supply of oil.

441. The only possible conclusion was that lip service was being paid to an embargo on oil; that the doors were wide open for the supply of oil; and that those Powers were not prepared to put pressure on South Africa and by their negligence were condoning what was happening in South Africa and Southern Rhodesia.

442. In resolution 1514 (XV) and succeeding resolutions the General Assembly had given the Special Committee a clear mandate to liberate all mankind still under colonial rule. The criteria to be used in determining when a country was free were laid down in other resolutions and the conditions obtaining in Southern Rhodesia were the very antithesis of those criteria.

443. It was the clear duty of the Committee to liberate the 4 million Southern Rhodesians and it should call on the United Kingdom to do so with the use of force. All States that were sincere would support any embargo and would assist the United Kingdom in solving the problem by supplying arms where appropriate. The United Kingdom had a duty to the people of Southern Rhodesia as a whole; it should not shirk that responsibility but should proceed with vigour and determination.

444. The 1961 Constitution, which had never been accepted by the majority of the population, should be revoked. The treason of Ian Smith and his régime should be punished and any uprising that might ensue, through the actions of the white Rhodesians, must be put down firmly. A return to the rule of law must be ensured within the next few weeks, if peace and stability were to prevail in the countries of southern Africa. The United Kingdom must immediately implement General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) in respect of the colony of Southern Rhodesia.

445. His delegation would support any draft resolution aimed at strengthening the United Kingdom's determination and at giving the Security Council a clear indication of the action it could take in Southern Rhodesia.

446. The representative of Syria emphasized the gravity of the problem of Southern Rhodesia, which was the consummation of the conquest of the African land of Zimbabwe by a European minority. The reactionary racist character of that situation had grave implications for international peace and security. The argument invoked to justify the subjection of 4 million Africans to oppression and racial discrimination was reminiscent of the darkest days of colonialism. The effectiveness of the United Nations would be completely jeopardized if the situation was allowed to continue. The continent of Africa would not submit to such tyranny; it had so far been patient in order to test the ability of the Organization to honour the principles of its Charter.

447. In the conduct of the administering Power, there were basic contradictions and a wide disparity between words and deeds. The administering Power claimed sole responsibility for Southern Rhodesia, but the measures it adopted to discharge that responsibility

¹³ *Ibid.*, Twenty-first Year, Supplement for April, May and June 1966, document S/7243.

were timid, inadequate and half-hearted. The ban on the sale of Rhodesian tobacco and on deliveries of oil to Southern Rhodesia had been a failure. The United Kingdom had dramatized the case of two oil tankers and had asked the Security Council for a mandate to halt them, yet the regular and abundant supplies of oil from South Africa to the Smith régime evoked only subtle diplomatic remonstrances. The Verwoerd régime considered the whole problem of Southern Rhodesia to be a small domestic affair and cared little about the fate of 4 million innocent Africans. When the policies of apartheid had been discussed at the twentieth session of the General Assembly and sanctions against the Verwoerd régime had been envisaged, the United Kingdom had opposed such sanctions on the grounds that they would not work and had dissented from the overwhelming majority opinion. A boycott was useless so long as South Africa and Portugal continued with impunity to meet the vital needs of the Smith régime, while the administering Power shirked its responsibility on the pretext that it had no jurisdiction over the illegal acts of those two colonial Powers.

448. The measures designed to crush the Smith régime were in fact only hardening its resistance. The administering Power was refusing to use force against that régime, although it had made speedy, efficient and heavy use of force in other circumstances against freedom fighters struggling for liberation from the colonialist yoke. In the logic of the United Kingdom, the use of force was legal against just causes but illegal against unjust causes. When he had referred to the use of troops to avert a tragic action such as subversion or murder, the United Kingdom Prime Minister had presumably been thinking not of subversion by the minority against the majority—which did exist in Southern Rhodesia—but of efforts by the Africans to organize themselves into liberation movements.

449. It had been said that the aim of the sanctions was to induce Smith to negotiate. It was not customary, however, to negotiate with criminals. Negotiations, in the last analysis, meant compromise and there could be no compromise over the rights of 4 million Africans to life, self-determination, independence and dignity. The United Kingdom should be asked whether it intended to fulfil its sacred trust as an administering Power or whether it hoped that, as in other tragic cases, events would sanctify the primacy of force over right.

450. Syria adopted an unequivocal stand; it would support the strongest resolution reminding the administering Power of its duties before it was too late.

451. The representative of *Algeria*, speaking at the invitation of the Chairman, said that fortunately the United Kingdom had not been able to paralyse the activities of the Special Committee by opening an incomplete debate on the question of Southern Rhodesia in the Security Council, just as the Council resolution of 9 April 1966 had been unable to create a diversion in the search for a solution of the problem of Southern Rhodesia. The Security Council had dealt only with certain marginal aspects of the problem and the United Kingdom drew a distinction between different suppliers. In the case of an oil tanker off Mozambique, it was prepared to enforce the embargo but it maintained an embarrassed neutrality towards the road convoys dispatched by South Africa to Southern Rhodesia.

452. The United Kingdom had wanted to forestall any substantial discussion of the problem of Southern

Rhodesia, because it was afraid that a lesson would be drawn from the past five months. Despite the embargo, Southern Rhodesia was receiving large supplies of oil by road and rail and, unless there was a general embargo against South Africa, it was difficult to see how it could have any difficulty in that regard. Southern Rhodesia was able to sell its tobacco through intermediaries who conveyed it to the usual markets. Despite the lack of results, it was still claimed that economic sanctions would bring about the downfall of the *de facto* régime of Salisbury and that graduated action was required. Such action was, however, impeded by a twofold limitation: the economic and financial pressure exerted by South Africa on the United Kingdom and Portugal's membership in the Atlantic Alliance.

453. If Algeria had been convinced that the recent action by the United Kingdom had been aimed at eradicating the root of the evil, it would have given complete and unreserved support to that action. Instead of dealing with the essential aspects of the problem, however, the United Kingdom had diverted international attention to a secondary element of the situation. By limiting action to the external aspects of the problem, the United Kingdom had sought an endorsement from the Security Council of its determination and goodwill in the question of Southern Rhodesia. By diverting attention to action of necessarily limited scope, that manoeuvre only aggravated the central problem.

454. If it had found that its action inside Southern Rhodesia was inadequate, the United Kingdom could have asked the international community for additional assistance in exerting pressure and imposing sanctions on the Salisbury authorities. The United Kingdom had, however, reversed the roles. Having evaded its responsibilities within Southern Rhodesia, it was seeking to shift the centre of its responsibilities outside that country by its recent request for United Nations authorization to take certain actions. That attitude showed that the United Kingdom itself did not believe in the overthrow of the Smith régime by peripheral action and that ultimately only action directed at the Salisbury authorities could be effective and decisive. The action should also be directed against the Pretoria and Lisbon régimes. Unless such action were taken, there would be a repetition in Southern Rhodesia of the tragedy of Palestine and a serious threat to peace and stability in Africa and the rest of the world.

455. The solution to the problem lay in the complete, faithful and immediate application of all the recommendations made by the General Assembly and the Special Committee. In addition, no Member State should have any relations with Southern Rhodesia, which should be completely sealed off from all supplies. An economic blockade was inconceivable except as a general blockade. Sanctions—including, if necessary, the use of armed force—should be applied to all who did not respect the measures decreed.

456. The United Nations should remind South Africa that its obligations under the Charter required it to respect and comply with the decisions of the Organization. After ensuring the survival of the Salisbury régime by meeting its every need, the South African authorities had declared their willingness to mediate between the United Kingdom Prime Minister and Ian Smith. The scene was set for South Africa officially to take its apartheid "techniques" to Southern Rhodesia. It was ironical that the Pretoria authorities

should be offering their assistance in a situation imported from South Africa, which had caused them a cynical satisfaction. Far from giving assistance in abolishing the Smith régime, certain Powers were actually helping to maintain that régime, so that it could join them in a policy based on self-interest and domination.

457. In the opinion of Algeria, to hesitate to take action against Smith was to accept him as a *de facto* authority. Algeria therefore appealed to all the Members of the United Nations to denounce the complaisance of certain Powers towards the Salisbury régime. Members should realize the danger of the situation, which had been aggravated by recent manoeuvres and which might seriously undermine the Organization.

458. The representative of *Ghana*, speaking at the invitation of the Chairman, said that, although the problem which the United Kingdom had faced in Southern Rhodesia was not unprecedented in the history of its colonial administration, the United Kingdom had so mishandled the problem that it defied solution. In international forums such as the Organization of African Unity, the Conference of Commonwealth Prime Ministers and the United Nations, Ghana had constantly drawn attention to the delicate nature of the question and to the tragic repercussions that might be expected should the United Kingdom fail to handle the situation with firmness.

459. His country had spared no effort to place the question of Southern Rhodesia in its proper perspective. In searching for a solution to the problem, in consultation with other African States, Ghana had foreseen the intransigence of the minority settler régime in its efforts to defy world opinion and the principles of the United Nations Charter concerning human rights and the self-determination of peoples. It had drawn attention to the vast conspiracy to create in Southern Rhodesia oppressive conditions similar to those in South Africa and the neighbouring Portuguese colonies. The reason why the United Kingdom Government had failed to react swiftly to the acts of defiance of the Smith régime was that it had considerable interests in Southern Rhodesia and the people involved were its kith and kin. It had therefore hedged behind specious arguments and had not acted as it had in other colonial Territories such as British Guiana, Aden and Kenya. Such vacillation on the part of an administering Power could lead to nothing but the series of events which had culminated in the unilateral declaration of independence by Ian Smith in November 1965. The Smith régime had been confident that by taking advantage of the United Kingdom Government's manifestly docile and indecisive attitude towards its illegal actions it would finally induce that Government to accept and respect the independence and sovereignty which it had unilaterally assumed.

460. At the time of the unilateral declaration of independence, when the illegal régime had done everything possible to prevent the representatives of the Crown from carrying out their administrative functions, there had been only inconsequential statements of condemnation and threats of sanctions from the United Kingdom, which had originally been unwilling to agree to an oil embargo against the rebel régime.

461. Various General Assembly resolutions, as also Security Council resolutions 216 (1965) and 217 (1965), had called upon all States not to recognize

the illegal régime, to break all economic relations with Southern Rhodesia and to impose an embargo on oil and petroleum products. The Government of Ghana and several other Member States had agreed to give the decision to impose sanctions a chance to prove itself. In pursuance of the resolutions, Ghana had refused to recognize the illegal régime in Southern Rhodesia and had broken off all economic relations with that country; it did not recognize travel documents issued or renewed by the illegal régime; all means of transport, including aircraft to and from Southern Rhodesia, were denied facilities, including the right to fly over Ghanaian territory; all communication channels with Southern Rhodesia had been cut off and Ghana did not provide the illegal régime with arms, equipment or military material.

462. His country had enforced the economic sanctions against the Smith régime, although like many countries it had had strong doubts about their effectiveness, especially since Portugal and South Africa had refused to agree to them. It had realized that the racist Southern Rhodesian régime could not be deterred by the adoption of resolutions, since Smith knew that the nations solemnly undertaking to implement those resolutions would not always do so in practice. Experience had shown that, if economic pressure was to be effective, it must be backed by a readiness and determination to enforce it. As the sanctions had been recommended in the face of abstentions by some and the secret or open hostility of others, it was clear that they had been doomed to failure.

463. Recent events had justified his country's fears. It was common knowledge that South Africa had been aiding the white minority régime in Southern Rhodesia in order to enable it to survive the limited embargo and that Southern Rhodesia's tobacco crop was being sold to certain major international concerns. The recent incidents involving the Greek tankers *Manuela* and *Joanna V* were but a few of the many examples that demonstrated the failure of the oil embargo recommended by the United Nations.

464. There appeared to be collusion among several countries to frustrate United Nations efforts to bring the Smith régime to respect the rights of the African majority. In two *communiqués* addressed to the Secretary-General on 7 and 8 April 1966, the Portuguese Government had pointed out that the United Kingdom aero-naval forces had had the means to stop the two tankers from proceeding on their course but had deliberately refrained from doing so. It had also reported that the banking operations for the purpose of payment had been effected through Dutch banks and that the companies involved in the affair were Greek, Panamanian and South African. In the light of those facts, the Portuguese Government had rejected any responsibility for a situation to which a number of foreign Governments had contributed and which could not have developed against the wishes of the United Kingdom.

465. It was clear that the responsibility for bringing down Smith's illegal régime rested with the United Kingdom. Yet, as the African members of the Security Council had said a few days earlier, that country was unwilling to examine the fundamentals of the problem in order to seek a fair, just and rapid solution.

466. His country had shared the sense of urgency with which the United Kingdom had requested a meeting of the Security Council on 9 April 1966 to ask

for a mandate to strengthen its hand in restraining the tanker *Joanna V* from unloading its oil cargo at Beira. The Council should, however, have examined the root cause of the entire Southern Rhodesian problem, instead of merely adopting superficial and *ad hoc* decisions which were not sufficiently far-reaching. That was why the African members had proposed certain amendments to the United Kingdom draft resolution. It was significant that the United Kingdom had refused to have its draft resolution amended so as to call not only on Portugal but also on South Africa to enforce the sanctions, although it was common knowledge that South Africa had been undermining efforts at economic sanctions. Furthermore, the United Kingdom representative in the Security Council had been opposed to any discussion of the wider problems raised by the breaches of the oil embargo, although that had clearly been the most opportune moment to urge the Security Council to decide on mandatory sanctions.

467. His delegation wondered how long the United Nations would be told that the United Kingdom was holding consultations with Commonwealth Governments and that the United Kingdom was making gradual progress, while the situation in Southern Rhodesia continued to deteriorate and the illegal Smith régime was establishing itself. It was reliably reported that the *Joanna V*, which was in Beira, was secretly trying to unload part of its cargo and that the master of the *Manuela* planned to unload its oil in Lourenço Marques. It was now reported that two more tankers were steaming from Venezuela, carrying cargo destined for Southern Rhodesia. The United Nations could still take action to put an end to that state of affairs, and such action could come at the instance of the Special Committee, whose responsibility it was to ensure the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.

468. Ghana called upon the Committee to be guided by the pertinent resolutions adopted by the Organization of African Unity and by the Final Statement issued by the recent eleven-nation African Summit Conference at Nairobi. It was clear that whatever methods the United Kingdom Government had relied upon to crush the illegal Smith régime had failed and that Government should be urged to resort to other measures. The Members of the United Nations must prove their ability to collaborate in a collective effort by agreeing to mandatory sanctions; otherwise the United Nations would fail in its efforts to maintain international peace and security.

469. The representative of *Poland* recalled that at the twentieth session of the General Assembly his delegation had stated that the policy of the United Kingdom Government towards Southern Rhodesia was and always had been inconsistent with the terms of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. Since then, the situation in Southern Rhodesia had deteriorated still further.

470. The United Kingdom delegation had repeatedly given assurances that developments in Southern Rhodesia were well under control and that patient negotiations would bring results. Events had proved, however, that that had simply given Ian Smith time to strengthen his position and prepare for the unilateral declaration of independence. The United Kingdom Government's policy of non-compliance with United Nations resolutions regarding Southern Rhodesia had

therefore been instrumental in paving the way for Smith's usurpation of power. The United Kingdom Government had stated more than once that it was responsible for bringing Southern Rhodesia to independence and the Special Committee was entitled to ask the United Kingdom to fulfil its obligations towards the oppressed people of Zimbabwe.

471. Five months had elapsed since the adoption of General Assembly resolutions 2022 (XX) and 2024 (XX) and Security Council resolution 217 (1965), and it was the Special Committee's duty to review the situation. The working paper prepared by the Secretariat (paras. 1-335 above) enumerated various statements and several United Kingdom Government Orders-in-Council concerning Southern Rhodesia, but it did not provide any particular information about the results of those actions.

472. On 11 November 1965, Mr. Wilson, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, had declared that the Smith régime's unilateral declaration of independence was an illegal and treasonable act. He had, however, ruled out the possibility of United Kingdom military intervention in Southern Rhodesia, unless required for the maintenance of law and order, and had stated that the only way to bring down the Smith régime was to create a situation in which the people of Southern Rhodesia themselves would wish to see a lawful Government in its place. It seemed to the Polish delegation that there was no doubt at all about the wish of the vast majority of the Southern Rhodesian people to see a lawful Government in place of the Smith usurpers. The Secretariat working paper gave many examples of strikes and demonstrations by the African population against the Smith régime.

473. If the United Kingdom Government had really wanted to topple the rebellious Smith régime, it should not have hesitated to act vigorously in its capacity as the administering Power responsible for Southern Rhodesia. The truth was that it was not prepared to carry out its obligations under the United Nations resolutions. It had failed to intervene even in circumstances in which the Smith régime's attitude had been openly provocative to it, and Ian Smith had taken full advantage of its weakness. He had savagely oppressed the African population, changed the Constitution, challenged the British Crown's prerogative of mercy and deprived the Governor of all his powers, yet the United Kingdom Government still contended that there had been no breach of law and order to warrant military intervention.

474. On 1 December 1965 the United Kingdom Government had announced stringent financial restrictions and sanctions against Southern Rhodesia, and on the very next day the Smith régime had announced financial counter-sanctions against the United Kingdom. It might have been expected that Smith's action would cause a stern reaction on the part of the United Kingdom Government; it had indeed caused a reaction but not the reaction expected, for on 14 December 1965 the United Kingdom Government had revised its previous decisions and authorized the resumption of payments of United Kingdom pensions to services and civil service pensioners in Southern Rhodesia.

475. On 11 November 1965 the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom had announced a total ban on purchases of tobacco from Southern Rhodesia, on 1 December 1965 he had extended that ban to almost all Southern Rhodesia's other exports to the United Kingdom, and on 30 January 1966 he had imposed a

total ban on United Kingdom exports to Southern Rhodesia, except for certain goods required for humanitarian purposes. Yet the January edition of the Barclays Bank *Overseas Review* showed that the value of United Kingdom imports from Southern Rhodesia in January 1966 had amounted to £3.814 million, as against a monthly average for 1965 of £2.3 million, and the London *Times* of 31 March 1966 had reported that the value of United Kingdom tobacco imports from Southern Rhodesia in February 1966 had amounted to £484,000, despite the so-called total ban on imports of tobacco from that country which had been in force since November 1965. United Kingdom exports to Southern Rhodesia had amounted to £453,000 in January 1966 and £672,000 in February. Foreign capital was flowing into Southern Rhodesia at an increasing rate, so much so that the *Overseas Review* had reported in March that conditions generally on the Rhodesian Stock Exchange had been quiet, with no market trends discernible.

476. Those facts made the ineffectiveness of the sanctions and restrictions imposed against Southern Rhodesia abundantly clear and gave the lie to the United Kingdom Prime Minister's assurance at the Lagos Conference of Commonwealth Prime Ministers that the cumulative effect of the sanctions might well bring the rebellion to an end within a matter of weeks. It was evident that the Smith régime had used the past five months of British inaction to strengthen its position and readjust its economy to the new circumstances. The Deputy Minister of Mines and Lands of the Smith Government had recently stated that new markets had been found for Rhodesian minerals to replace those lost as the result of trade embargoes. The Rhodesian tobacco crop had been sold and the ban on selling oil to Southern Rhodesia was faring no better than any of the other embargoes.

477. The United Kingdom Government must face its responsibilities and take final and decisive steps for the solution of the problem. Indeed, the need for stern, vigorous and broad measures to topple the illegal Smith régime was widely recognized in the United Kingdom Press.

478. Poland firmly supported the Security Council resolution of 20 November 1965 and the resolutions adopted at the twentieth session of the General Assembly on the question of Southern Rhodesia. Its position on the question was clearly stated in documents A/6235 and Add.1 and S/7087 and Add.1.¹⁴ It firmly supported the right of the Zimbabwe people to independence and self-determination in accordance with the principles set forth in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) and it felt that the rights of those people could not be made a subject for bargaining. For that reason, it would support any resolution aimed at the speedy elimination of the racist Smith régime and the restoration of the rights of the 4 million Zimbabwe people to independence.

479. The representative of *Madagascar* said that reports in the world Press bore witness to the failure of the United Kingdom's economic sanctions to destroy the authority of the illegal Smith régime. Instead of bringing about an acceptable solution, time had made the situation of the 4 million Africans in Southern Rhodesia still more tragic. It was therefore essential that the Special Committee should discuss the new

developments in Southern Rhodesia and make the necessary suggestions.

480. The many resolutions adopted by the Security Council and the General Assembly showed the seriousness of the situation in Southern Rhodesia and the reluctance of the administering Power to intervene in accordance with the wishes of the great majority of the nations. Ian Smith's illegal unilateral declaration of independence had been the logical result of the non-intervention of the United Kingdom in Southern Rhodesia, and it was only right that the United Kingdom should accept responsibility for the fate of the African inhabitants of Southern Rhodesia. The United Kingdom Government's statements of intention must now be translated into action.

481. Security Council resolution 217 (1965) had called upon the United Kingdom Government to take all appropriate measures to bring the minority régime in Southern Rhodesia to an immediate end and had called upon all States to break all economic relations with Southern Rhodesia and refrain from any action which would assist and encourage the illegal régime there. Various financial and economic sanctions had been imposed by the United Kingdom and other countries in implementation of that resolution but they had proved inadequate and Southern Rhodesia had succeeded in selling its tobacco crop and obtaining adequate supplies of oil. Southern Rhodesia's economy was now in a better state than ever, thanks to the criminal complicity of the South African Government. Recent developments had emphasized the role played by the Portuguese Government in undermining the oil embargo, but that role should have been foreseen from the outset for no nation could possibly have expected those two Governments to act in good faith in the matter. Nevertheless, their responsibility for undermining the effectiveness of the economic and financial sanctions did not diminish the responsibility of the administering Power, which had undertaken not only to put down the rebellion but to take steps to enable the people of Southern Rhodesia to decide their own fate on the basis of universal suffrage. So long as the illegal Smith government had nothing to fear from the United Kingdom Government except economic sanctions, it would have no difficulty in overcoming them with the complicity of the Governments of Portugal and South Africa. Indeed, it would even be able to make the Africans who had gone to Southern Rhodesia to work suffer the consequences of those sanctions and the people of Zimbabwe would thus lose all hope of winning their rights.

482. The delegation of *Madagascar* was convinced that partial measures such as those recently adopted by the Security Council were incapable of achieving a real solution of the problem. The administering Power must therefore consider going beyond such provisional measures and taking coercive action under Articles 41 and 42 of the Charter. The delegation of *Madagascar* would support any draft resolution along those lines.

483. The representative of *Venezuela* observed that once again the Special Committee was compelled to consider the abnormal situation prevailing in Southern Rhodesia. Venezuela, for its part, had supported and implemented the various recommendations regarding Southern Rhodesia made by the General Assembly, the Special Committee and the Security Council. It had refused to recognize the racist régime in Southern Rhodesia, had prohibited all acts which might assist

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, Supplement for January, February and March 1966.

or encourage the continued existence of that régime and had prohibited all relations, including economic relations, with it.

484. In particular, the Venezuelan Government had prohibited the supply of petroleum or its derivatives to Southern Rhodesia as long as the Smith régime remained in power. In that connexion, he denied categorically the implication made by the representative of Ghana (para. 467 above). Venezuela did not possess any oil tankers and in no circumstances would the Venezuelan Government permit the sale of petroleum or petroleum derivatives destined for Southern Rhodesia. There were, however, a number of foreign companies operating in Venezuela and obviously once those companies had taken petroleum out of Venezuela and beyond Venezuelan territorial waters the Venezuelan Government had no further control over it and could not be held responsible for sales made by those companies to any specific purchaser. As the members of the Committee were aware, the Geneva Conventions on the Law of the Sea laid down that traffic on the high seas was free, and no State was entitled to interfere with the movements of any ship on the high seas, regardless of its stated or suspected destination.

485. In its reply¹⁵ to the Secretary-General's note concerning the implementation of Security Council resolution 217 (1965), the Venezuelan Government had restated its support for the resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council on the question of Southern Rhodesia and its recognition of the inalienable right of the people of Zimbabwe to self-determination and independence, and had formally declared that it would not engage in any action which would assist or encourage the illegal minority Government in Southern Rhodesia, would refuse to supply any military equipment to or maintain any economic relations with that Government and would refuse to supply any petroleum or petroleum derivatives destined for Southern Rhodesia so long as that Government remained in power.

486. Most of the States Members of the United Nations had promised to comply with the Security Council resolution. It was nevertheless perfectly clear that the measures envisaged in the resolution had proved inadequate and the United Nations should therefore consider applying, in accordance with the provisions of the Charter, more effective and appropriate measures.

487. In the opinion of the Venezuelan delegation, the Special Committee should not allow itself to be diverted from its true objective of ensuring the speedy application of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) to all colonial territories, including Southern Rhodesia. The Venezuelan delegation had always held that the United Kingdom, as the administering Power, was responsible for all matters concerning the people of Southern Rhodesia until such time as those people attained independence. Indeed, the United Kingdom delegation had itself categorically proclaimed its Government's exclusive responsibility in the matter. There were no grounds therefore, for trying to shift that responsibility to other States. It was inadmissible to try to reduce the complicated problem of Southern Rhodesia to a few events of marginal importance, when the administering Power could easily prevent those events from having any real effect.

488. It was the duty of the administering Power to bring all the people of Southern Rhodesia to freedom and independence without distinction as to race or colour, and to do its utmost to enable the people of Rhodesia to exercise their inalienable right to self-determination and independence. It was both the right and the duty of the United Nations to induce the United Kingdom to fulfil its obligations towards the Zimbabwe people. The Committee's objective could not be limited to the overthrow of a régime described as illegal by the administering Power, for that would be tantamount to recognizing the legality of the 1961 Constitution, which had been condemned not only by the 4 million Africans of Southern Rhodesia but also by the General Assembly. Legality lay in the will of the people of Rhodesia, who rightly aspired to regain their sovereignty.

489. The Venezuelan delegation considered that the best way of putting an end to the abnormal situation in Southern Rhodesia was the complete and prompt application of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV). So long as the principles in that resolution were not put into effect in Southern Rhodesia, the situation of the Zimbabwe people would not change.

490. The representative of *Yugoslavia* recalled that the question of Southern Rhodesia had been on the agenda of the Special Committee for years but events there had taken a particularly dramatic turn during the twentieth session of the General Assembly, when the racist Smith régime had unilaterally declared independence. The General Assembly and Security Council had thereupon adopted several important resolutions imposing certain obligations upon the Governments of the United Kingdom and other States, but as in previous years the United Kingdom Government had ignored the provisions of those resolutions because of its special interests in Southern Rhodesia.

491. The United Kingdom Government had asserted that it was responsible for Southern Rhodesia and that the Smith régime could rapidly be overthrown, without the use of military force, by the application of economic sanctions and particularly of an oil embargo. Events had given the lie to the United Kingdom Government's claims, however, and the Yugoslav delegation saw no reason to believe that the rule of law could ever be restored in Southern Rhodesia by those means.

492. The economic sanctions and the oil embargo had proved a complete failure. The colonial Powers had striven to maintain the unity of the racist and colonial régimes in the south of Africa, for any real blow to the Smith régime would have repercussions on the colonialist and racist régimes in South Africa and the Portuguese Territories. Both the South African and Portuguese Governments had stated that they would continue to maintain normal relations with the Smith régime, and they were in fact co-operating closely with it. His delegation had doubted the readiness of the United Kingdom to bring down the Ian Smith régime by economic sanctions and it had proved to be right. Indeed, not only had the United Kingdom failed to put an end to the Smith régime, but its attitude had in fact strengthened that régime even further.

493. It was certain that the continued existence of the Smith régime did not depend on the cargoes of one or two oil tankers. Security Council resolution 221 (1966), which related to that problem, was far from

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, Supplement for April, May and June 1966, document S/7253.

covering the important aspects of the situation in Southern Rhodesia. The United Kingdom had requested and obtained from the Security Council authority to prevent tankers from docking at Beira, but it had not been willing to vote for the amendments proposed by Mali, Nigeria and Uganda,¹⁶ which would have given it even broader authority to prevent the flow of oil and other goods into Rhodesia. The very fact that the United Kingdom Government had had to request the use of force, albeit on a limited scale, indicated that it had recognized the untenable nature of its original stand against the use of force. The limited use of force, however, would not produce results: only the large-scale application of force could overthrow Smith's illegal racist régime.

494. Yugoslavia had followed the development of events in Southern Rhodesia with deep concern. Its position on the problem was stated in two Security Council documents.¹⁷ In keeping with that position, the Yugoslav delegation considered that more determined and broader measures, including the use of force, should be undertaken to put an end to the Smith régime, which was a constant threat to world peace and security.

495. The representative of *Iraq* said that in the past the United Kingdom had always resisted efforts to bring the question of Southern Rhodesia before the United Nations, on the grounds that the Territory was self-governing and that the United Nations had no jurisdiction in the matter. It had opposed the resolutions adopted by the General Assembly and had protected the minority régime in Southern Rhodesia. The fact that it had now turned to the United Nations was not to be interpreted as a change of policy. In calling for an urgent meeting of the Security Council, the United Kingdom had claimed that it wanted a legal international mandate to stop vessels carrying oil reasonably believed to be destined for Southern Rhodesia. It had already had such a mandate, however, by virtue of the various resolutions adopted, in particular Security Council resolution 217 (1965), which, among other things, had called upon the United Kingdom to enforce an embargo on oil. If the United Kingdom was sincere, it was difficult to understand why it had waited so long before coming to the Security Council, a delay that Mr. Smith had used to consolidate his régime. Such a lack of urgency had characterized United Kingdom policy from the beginning.

496. On May 1965 the Commonwealth Relations Office had issued a statement referring to the conclusion of the elections in Southern Rhodesia and the intention of the United Kingdom Government to explore all possibilities of reaching a negotiated settlement of the constitutional question. At a Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conference held in London in June 1965, the Prime Ministers had asked the United Kingdom to introduce legislation to suspend the 1961 Constitution and to appoint an interim government, which was to repeal oppressive and discriminatory laws. The United Kingdom Government had also been called upon to prepare the way for free elections, in the event of a refusal by Mr. Smith, and to introduce democratic rule. Mr. Smith had refused to co-operate. After various negotiations, he had warned the United King-

dom Government in October 1965, prior to another round of talks, that if the talks were not successful he would declare independence unilaterally. He had in fact done so on 11 November 1965.

497. In the face of such defiance, the actions of the United Kingdom Government had been hesitant and useless. The United Kingdom Prime Minister had given an assurance that force would not be used against the Southern Rhodesia régime. According to *The New York Times* of 17 April 1966, he had also promised that he would not blockade the ports of Mozambique and would not refer the Rhodesian issue to the United Nations. Thus Mr. Smith had been able to proceed with his plans unchallenged. The only response of the United Kingdom Government had been to adopt some economic and financial measures and to state that it would give the fullest consideration to any request for help from the Governor-General, a request which did not seem to have been forthcoming. The most the United Kingdom could point to was the fact that it had built a transmitter near the Southern Rhodesian border as part of its efforts to bring down the Smith régime.

498. On 20 November 1965 the Security Council had adopted resolution 217 (1965), which had called upon the United Kingdom Government to quell the rebellion and take immediate measures to enable the Southern Rhodesian people to determine their own future. Five months had elapsed and there was no sign that the rebellion had been quelled. When referring to the economic sanctions, the United Kingdom Prime Minister had said that a few weeks would be needed to bring Mr. Smith to his senses. The economic sanctions, however, had not worked, since they had been rejected by some Member States and ignored or interpreted at will by others. As far as Security Council resolution 221 (1966) concerning the oil tankers was concerned, it was reliably claimed that Southern Rhodesia could manage without oil from that source, owing mainly to the help of South Africa. The Governments of South Africa and Portugal had made it plain that they would not comply with the resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly. Both continued to maintain good relations with the minority régime in Southern Rhodesia.

499. In the circumstances, it was essential that new and drastic measures should be adopted to solve the problem once and for all. Force must now be used to overthrow Mr. Smith's régime and to bring self-determination and democracy to Southern Rhodesia. Effective steps should be taken to prevent South Africa, Portugal and others from assisting the régime. The Security Council should consider the question of Southern Rhodesia again, and in particular the question whether the time had come to invoke Chapter VII of the Charter on the use of force and mandatory sanctions. In his delegation's view, that Chapter should be invoked. Finally, the United Kingdom Government must be convinced that only strong measures, including the use of force, could deal properly with the situation. It had both the authority and the power to take such action and it no longer had any excuse for failing to do so. The General Assembly and the Security Council must demonstrate to the people of Southern Rhodesia that their confidence in the United Nations was justified.

500. The representative of *Chile* said that the grave situation in Southern Rhodesia deserved to be given

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, document S/7243.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, *Twentieth Year, Supplement for October, November and December 1965*, document S/6942; and *ibid.*, *Twenty-first Year, Supplement for January, February and March 1966*, document S/7143.

the most serious attention by the United Nations. It had deteriorated steadily over the past three years, during which time the Committee and the General Assembly had adopted a number of resolutions warning the administering Power of the dangers inherent in the situation and calling upon it to abrogate the 1961 Constitution and other discriminatory laws and to implement the principle of "one man, one vote". The United Kingdom had refrained from complying with those resolutions on constitutional grounds. If it had made an effort to implement them, it would not now be faced with the rebellion of the Smith régime and the responsibility for putting an end to it. However that might be, once the rebellion had occurred, respect for the law could no longer be invoked as a justification for failing to ensure respect for justice and human rights. There was no longer any pretext for maintaining the discriminatory Constitution of 1961. Until it was abrogated, moreover, there would remain a danger that it would be introduced under some legalistic disguise and its application entrusted to an autonomous Southern Rhodesian Government.

501. It therefore seemed to his delegation that the five principles of the United Kingdom declaration of 9 October 1965, together with the sixth principle referred to in the Prime Minister's statement of 25 January 1966, did not adequately meet the desires of the United Nations, but rather restricted the extent of the changes that could be introduced in the Territory by an interim Government. The power to revoke or amend the 1961 Constitution had clearly been acquired by the United Kingdom Government under the Southern Rhodesia Act of 1965 and should now be exercised.

502. With regard to the action taken to put down the rebellion, his delegation wished to make the following points. Firstly, the Chilean Government supported Security Council resolutions 202 (1965), 216 (1965), 217 (1965) and 221 (1966) and General Assembly resolutions 2021 (XX) and 2022 (XX) and had taken the necessary administrative action to apply the measures adopted against the Smith régime. Secondly, it noted that the sanctions adopted by the United Kingdom had not so far achieved their aim of bringing down the régime. Thirdly, information from the Press and other sources indicated that some countries had refused to co-operate in the economic blockade, and particularly in the oil embargo. That made them accomplices of the racist minority in Southern Rhodesia and if they continued thus to defy the United Nations the results would be serious. Fourthly, the Chilean Government considered that the Security Council would be justified in applying Chapter VII of the Charter, since the situation had become a threat to international peace and security and voluntary measures had not produced results. The Council's resolution 221 (1966) on the oil takers was useful but limited. The machinery of Chapter VII must be set in motion so that general and compulsory measures could be decided on which would bring down the rebel régime. Such measures would also show which countries refused to co-operate with the United Nations in accordance with their legal obligations. In many respects, the outcome of the Southern Rhodesia issue would determine whether the United Nations was capable of establishing an international code of conduct or whether it would dwindle into impotence like the League of Nations after the failure of its sanctions against Ethiopia.

503. The representative of *Afghanistan* expressed his appreciation of the statements made by members of the Committee and of the interest taken by delegations such as those of Algeria and Ghana, which were not members of the Committee. He quoted passages from a recent issue of *The Manchester Guardian Weekly* to the effect that no one could be neutral on the Southern Rhodesia issue, that the United Kingdom had retained the right to act by itself and that the people of Africa expected it to do so. That was a reflection of public opinion in the United Kingdom. The Committee was also familiar with public opinion throughout the world, which held for the most part that the measures adopted so far by the United Kingdom were inadequate.

504. His delegation considered that more effective action was required and it regretted the fact that no proposals along those lines had been forthcoming from the United Kingdom. Under the Charter and General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), the people of Southern Rhodesia had an inalienable right to freedom and independence. The United Kingdom had taken no steps to guarantee that right and the situation constituted a threat to international peace and security. His delegation was therefore in favour of a recommendation by the Committee to the Security Council that it should consider the further measures envisaged under Chapter VII of the Charter and put into effect its decisions concerning Southern Rhodesia.

505. The representative of *Saudi Arabia*, speaking at the invitation of the Chairman, said that it was anomalous for the United Nations to be considering the situation in a country which was still a colony and for which the United Kingdom bore primary responsibility. He preferred to ascribe that situation to the difficulties confronting the United Kingdom in the Territory concerned rather than to the application by that Power of different standards to territories inhabited by white and by coloured races. The fact remained, however, that the United Kingdom was not taking effective action to end the situation in Southern Rhodesia.

506. The reluctance of the United Kingdom Government to use force in Southern Rhodesia was understandable; the British would not want their own kith and kin in that Territory to be subjected to force or the imposition of certain measures. The measures adopted by the United Kingdom so far took the form of a boycott. Yet a boycott could not possibly be effective, in view of the vast area covered by Southern Rhodesia, Mozambique and South Africa, even if a costly supervision machinery were established. There would always be smugglers to ensure that the banned goods reached their destination.

507. The adoption of resolutions that would not be implemented would serve no purpose; the time had come to enable the 4 million Africans in Southern Rhodesia to exercise their right to self-determination. It was said that the time was not ripe for action because there were no disturbances in Southern Rhodesia; but oppressed people could not create disturbances in a police State. If the United Kingdom did not want to act, it should ask the United Nations to make Southern Rhodesia a Trust Territory and take over responsibility for it. In addition, there were certain effective measures which could be taken.

508. There should be a collective operation whereby aircraft flying at a high altitude would bombard

Southern Rhodesia—not with bombs but with educational leaflets addressed to both the white and the coloured population. The leaflets would appeal to the conscience of the Whites, not all of whom were on the side of Mr. Smith, and urge the Africans to stand up for their rights. Various Governments would no doubt be prepared to contribute to such an operation. In addition, there could be regular radio broadcasts addressed to the population of Southern Rhodesia; the United Nations might earmark funds for that purpose. Another effective measure would be for all States Members of the United Nations to refuse to grant entry or transit visas to white citizens of Southern Rhodesia. Those citizens would then feel that they were imprisoned in their own country, which would have a great psychological impact.

509. Those peaceful means should be tried for six months or a year. If they failed, other practical and pragmatic measures would have to be adopted, as they had been in the Congo. The Soviet Union and the United States—as the two world Powers with the greatest authority and the most financial resources—should together, as part of the current *rapprochement*, play the principal roles. The Asian States, however, were equally concerned about the situation in Southern Rhodesia and had a responsibility towards all the inhabitants of that Territory.

510. The representative of *Bulgaria* referred to a cable from the German Democratic Republic, which the Chairman had made available to members. He stated that the cable contained an important communication, in which the Government of the German Democratic Republic had expressed its support of the struggle of the people of Southern Rhodesia for liberation. It was clear from the text of the cable that the German Democratic Republic's policy towards Southern Rhodesia was based on the relevant General Assembly and Security Council resolutions.

511. It was regrettable that the United Kingdom delegation had so far not told the Special Committee what action its Government intended to take to bring down the racist régime of Ian Smith. By that strange attitude, the United Kingdom delegation was perhaps trying to give the impression that any examination of the question of Rhodesia at the present juncture would be inappropriate and superfluous, and that it would be logical to await the results of the recent Security Council resolution. The Bulgarian delegation did not share that point of view. It considered, as did the majority of delegations, that the recent meeting of the Security Council, convened in great haste upon the initiative of the United Kingdom delegation, had contributed neither to an understanding nor to a solution of the problem of Southern Rhodesia. During the debates on the question in the Security Council in November 1965 and April 1966, the United Kingdom representatives had stressed that Southern Rhodesia was the responsibility of the United Kingdom and that it lay with that Government to take the necessary steps. The Bulgarian delegation was in full agreement with that statement. Indeed, the present situation in Southern Rhodesia had arisen as a result of the policy pursued by the United Kingdom. It was the United Kingdom which was responsible for the fact that the white minority in Southern Rhodesia had been able to set up a racist régime against the will of the people. His delegation also agreed that it lay with the United Kingdom

Government to take all the necessary action to put an end to that racist régime as soon as possible.

512. It was clear from the statements made in the Committee that the overwhelming majority of members were convinced that the measures adopted so far by the United Kingdom Government were ineffective and would not suffice to bring about the downfall of the racist Smith régime. There appeared to be general agreement that the United Kingdom Government's object in bringing the question before the Security Council in great haste, immediately after its victory in the general election, had been to give world opinion the impression that it had decided to take concrete action, whereas the fact was that the measures it had recommended in its draft resolution could in no way help to achieve the objective sought by earlier resolutions and by the large majority of Member States: namely, the removal once and for all of the racist minority régime and the establishment of a majority Government in Southern Rhodesia.

513. The representative of *Uruguay* said that there was general agreement that the unilateral declaration of independence and the minority régime in Southern Rhodesia should not be recognized and that the United Kingdom bore primary responsibility for the entire institutional progress of Southern Rhodesia. Uruguay could not agree, however, that the United Kingdom bore sole responsibility in the question. The administering Power was responsible to the United Nations for leading Southern Rhodesia to independence in accordance with Chapter XI of the Charter and General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), transferring all powers and attributes of sovereignty to a representative Government freely chosen by the population. Indeed, the competence of the United Nations and the responsibility of the United Kingdom had been clearly defined by the General Assembly when it had affirmed in resolution 1747 (XVI) that Southern Rhodesia was a Non-Self-Governing Territory. The Uruguayan delegation had expressed its views on that matter in the Fourth Committee at the eighteenth session of the General Assembly.¹⁸

514. The United Kingdom therefore had the power and the obligation to use every means at its disposal to lead the people of Southern Rhodesia to independence through a process of genuine self-determination. As a first step, it should crush the minority régime currently in power. In its resolution of 20 November 1965, the Security Council had called upon the Government of the United Kingdom to quell the rebellion and to take all other appropriate measures to that end. The United Kingdom had not, however, been given *carte blanche* and was not authorized to take a certain type of measure. Uruguay approved of the United Kingdom decision to request authorization from the Security Council to detain the oil tankers headed for Beira.

515. Because of the lack of success of the measures adopted so far and because of the responsibility of the United Nations in the question, many Member States had been led to assume responsibilities imposed upon them by the Charter and by international solidarity, in a situation for which they were in no way to blame. International action would succeed whenever the great Powers which had the strength and the necessary

¹⁸ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Eighteenth Session, Fourth Committee*, vol. I, 1440th meeting, paras. 15-27.

means were prepared to find an effective solution to the problem.

516. There was a large measure of agreement that the measures of a practical nature which the United Nations should take were within the purview of the Security Council; that fact had been brought out both in the recent resolutions of the General Assembly and in the draft resolution before the Committee. In paragraph 13 of resolution 2022 (XX), the General Assembly had stated that the situation in Southern Rhodesia threatened international peace and security. In resolution 217 of 20 November 1965, the Security Council, using an unusual wording, had stated that the situation was extremely grave and that its continuance in time constituted a threat to international peace and security. In resolution 221 of 9 April 1966 the Security Council had stated, in connexion with the very specific and limited case then under consideration, that the resulting situation constituted a threat to the peace. It was the determination by the Security Council that a situation constituted a threat to international peace and security which made Chapter VII of the Charter applicable and opened the way to enforcement measures. So far, the Security Council had not determined that the situation in Southern Rhodesia in general constituted a threat to international peace and security but it had taken two steps in that direction.

517. The Security Council would therefore have to determine the character of the question and decide on the consequences of that determination—the possible compulsory application of the measures envisaged in Articles 41 and 42 of the Charter. That would be a complex decision, even in so far as it referred to measures not requiring the use of force and particularly when the use of force was involved. Unfortunately, the machinery envisaged in Article 43 for the use of force had not been established, since the necessary forces had not been constituted. The application of measures of force depended on the provision of armed forces in each case by one or more States, so that the automatic, coercive and irresistible impact envisaged in the Charter was lost.

518. The representative of *Iran* said that, despite United Nations efforts, the situation in Southern Rhodesia had deteriorated to a point where it had assumed new dimensions. The Committee had at first treated the question of Southern Rhodesia like other colonial issues by condemning the continued subjugation of the Zimbabwe people under the oppressive yoke of the racist minority régime and by calling for constitutional conferences and other peaceful means to bring about the freedom and independence of those people. The situation had now changed. It was no longer merely a colonial issue but an actual threat to international peace and security, as had been determined by the Security Council. In view of that finding, the Committee had no choice but to set in motion proceedings for action under Chapter VII of the Charter. It could no longer afford to rely on the goodwill of any particular authority; it must take compulsory action, for the future of the United Nations itself was at stake.

519. More than five months had elapsed since Mr. Smith, in defiance of the United Kingdom, the United Nations and world opinion, had unilaterally declared independence with the avowed intention of perpetuating the white usurper régime and its domination over the Zimbabwe people. Three months had elapsed since the United Kingdom Prime Minister had said that eco-

nomie sanctions would bring down the rebellious régime in a matter of weeks. It was now generally conceded that the sanctions had failed to achieve their objective.

520. Iran had been the first country to respond to the Security Council's call of 20 November 1965 by ordering a ban on the sale of oil to Southern Rhodesia. The importance of that action could be appreciated in the light of the fact that Iran was the largest exporter of oil to the Territory. Iran had not made a similar declaration with regard to a ban on arms shipments because it had never sent or contemplated sending any arms to Southern Rhodesia. Whatever economic relations it had had with the Territory had been curtailed. By that action Iran was not merely responding to the Security Council recommendations but was demonstrating its unflinching support for the independence and freedom of the Zimbabwe people.

521. The experience of the past few months had shown the need for effective action and for the Security Council to consider the further measures envisaged under Chapter VII of the Charter. Although the United Kingdom's action so far had been inadequate, it was to be hoped that it would now take the kind of action which was necessary in order to bring about the downfall of the Smith régime.

522. According to a news report, the Zimbabwe people were carrying out sporadic demonstrations against the Smith régime in various cities in Southern Rhodesia. Although they were at present armed only with stones, there would come a time when they would be organized and armed with bullets. His delegation earnestly hoped that the United Kingdom would respond positively to the Afro-Asian appeal for effective action before the entire Territory was engulfed in a blood bath.

523. The representative of *Italy* said that the debate in the Special Committee had been useful in that it had given a number of members which were not on the Security Council an opportunity to express their views with respect to the situation in Southern Rhodesia.

524. The Italian delegation had consistently condemned the attempt by Mr. Smith and his colleagues to establish in Southern Rhodesia a régime based on minority rule and racial discrimination. It was concerned about the fate of the millions of Africans in Southern Rhodesia who, despite the many resolutions of the United Nations, were still denied a voice in determining the future of their country.

525. His delegation felt that the United Nations should adopt a firm yet cautious approach to the question of Southern Rhodesia: firm in stating the principles and goals, and cautious in taking action through the application of the policies which had been adopted. By and large, the action taken so far by various United Nations bodies and more recently by the Security Council—on which the ultimate responsibility rested—had been in line with that approach.

526. The Italian Government had fully supported the decisions of the Security Council on Southern Rhodesia and had done its utmost to implement them. In addition to the measures described in documents S/7016 and S/7048,¹⁹ the Italian Government had recently decided to submit to licence all imports from Southern Rhodesia, a measure which supplemented the

¹⁹ *Official Records of the Security Council, Twentieth Year, Supplement for October, November and December 1965.*

total ban previously adopted on all imports of sugar and tobacco from that country, and it had suspended and rescinded all forms of insurance provided by Government bodies in connexion with exports to Southern Rhodesia. As early as December 1965, it had imposed a total embargo on exports of oil and petroleum products to that Territory.

527. The Italian Government regretted that the relevant Security Council resolutions had not been fully implemented by all Members and hoped that the countries which had failed to do so would realize that it was in their best interest to co-operate with the United Nations in re-establishing the rule of law in Southern Rhodesia.

528. The central theme of the debate was whether the measures so far adopted by the Security Council were adequate to bring down the Smith régime. Although that régime was still in power, it had been reported that the sanctions imposed by the Security Council and implemented by the overwhelming majority of Member States had seriously weakened the Territory's economy. The day was perhaps not far off when the illegal authorities of Salisbury would be brought to reason. While his delegation shared the feelings of impatience that had been voiced, it felt that some time must elapse before a well-founded judgement could be made on the effectiveness of the measures so far adopted. Simple wisdom and the spirit of the Charter suggested that the objective universally sought should be achieved, in the first instance, by means which were the least destructive. In an increasingly interdependent world, no action should be taken in one area without the repercussions elsewhere having been considered.

529. The representative of the *Ivory Coast* said that since 1960 numbers of resolutions on the subject of Southern Rhodesia had been adopted by the Special Committee, the General Assembly and even the Security Council. There had been so many developments in the situation that there was apparently no longer any profound disagreement on the subject. He used the word "apparently" advisedly, for many delegations which banded together when it came to adopting important decisions against the present régime in Southern Rhodesia did not hesitate to recognize the legitimacy of the Zimbabwe people's struggle against the advocates of discrimination and the enemies of democracy.

530. So just were the claims of the unhappy Zimbabwe people that even the United Kingdom, in a praiseworthy effort of understanding, had twice taken the initiative in asking for a meeting of the Security Council to consider the question of Southern Rhodesia.

531. It was not simply the destiny of a distant African country that was at stake, but the future of the United Nations itself. It was perhaps for that reason, rather than out of compassion, that his delegation had struggled unceasingly to bring about the restoration of justice in Southern Rhodesia and unequivocally condemned all the countries which were trying to nullify the pressure that was being brought to bear on the illegal régime in Southern Rhodesia.

D. ACTION TAKEN BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE

Consensus adopted by the Special Committee concerning recent developments

532. At its 401st meeting, on 6 April 1966, the Special Committee agreed to adopt as its consensus the statement made by the Chairman at that meeting (see

paras. 340-345 above), it being understood that the reservations expressed by some members would appear in the record of the meeting. In the statement, the Chairman drew the attention of the Secretary-General to the appalling state of affairs in Southern Rhodesia and asked him to alert the President of the Security Council to take steps to bring it before the Council for necessary action under Articles 41 and 42 of the Charter of the United Nations. Reservations concerning the Chairman's statement were expressed by the representatives of the United Kingdom, United States, Denmark, Italy, Australia, Uruguay, Chile and Venezuela (see paras. 379-389 above).

Adoption of resolution on the question of Southern Rhodesia

533. At its 405th meeting, Afghanistan, Ethiopia, India, Iran, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Mali, Sierra Leone, Syria, Tunisia, the United Republic of Tanzania, Venezuela and Yugoslavia submitted a draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.272 and Add.1). Subsequently Afghanistan, Ethiopia, India, Iran, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Mali, Sierra Leone, Syria, Tunisia, the United Republic of Tanzania, and Yugoslavia submitted a revised version of this draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.272/Rev.1).

534. Introducing the revised thirteen-Power draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.272/Rev.1), the representative of *Syria* said that the draft resolution reflected the three facts that had emerged from the general debate in the Committee.

535. Firstly, the situation remained grave and had far-reaching international consequences; the problem of Southern Rhodesia was a stubborn and dangerous one arousing the conscience of mankind. Secondly, the United Kingdom Government had failed to deal with the situation. Its recent ambiguous and dubious appeal to the Security Council for a partial mandate to enforce an oil embargo was further proof that a situation for which the United Kingdom bore sole responsibility had been wilfully mishandled. Thirdly, there was an urgent need for more efficient measures to deal with that deteriorating situation, with a view to upholding the principles of the Charter and implementing the resolutions of the United Nations.

536. Operative paragraph 1 of the draft resolution reflected a polarity in the problem of Southern Rhodesia: on the one hand, there was a majority of 4 million Africans with an inalienable right to freedom and independence and, on the other hand, a tyrannical minority of white European settlers completely disregarding that right. The paragraph therefore reaffirmed the inalienable rights of the people of Southern Rhodesia and recognized the legitimacy of their struggle for the enjoyment of those rights in accordance with the United Nations Charter. Operative paragraph 2 recalled resolution 2022 (XX), in which the General Assembly had condemned the policies of racial discrimination and segregation practised in Southern Rhodesia as a crime against humanity. Such a crime called for action. Operative paragraph 3 therefore condemned the failure of certain States to implement the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly, the Special Committee and the Security Council. Operative paragraph 4 called upon the administering Power to take all effective measures, including the use of force. That Power could not argue against the use of force, since it had used force in other circumstances, for example in Aden. Since, as stated in operative paragraph 5, the explosive

situation in Southern Rhodesia continued to constitute a threat to international peace and security, adequate measures to remedy that situation should be sought and the Security Council should consider measures under Chapter VII of the Charter, as was recommended in operative paragraph 6.

537. Basically, the draft resolution was invoking the authority of the Charter to deal with a human situation. It was thus putting into practice the terms and provisions of the Charter, so that they became binding on Member States. By adopting the draft resolution, the Committee would be sharing with the people of Zimbabwe the burden of their tragedy and the suffering of their humiliation.

538. The representative of *Sierra Leone* said that the sponsors of the draft resolution felt that the time had come for the United Kingdom Government to take resolute action and for the United Nations to take a firm decision. The United Kingdom had come to realize that sanctions alone could not crush the rebellion and it had therefore asked the Security Council to authorize the use of force to stop the oil tankers. If the United Kingdom could use force to stop tankers unloading at Beira, it could use force to stop the supply of oil from other areas and to crush the actual rebellion in Southern Rhodesia. The economic blockade was known to be a total failure; the draft resolution condemned certain States, particularly South Africa and Portugal, which had failed to implement the relevant resolutions and had given support and assistance to the racist minority régime.

539. The aim of the draft resolution was to end the tragedy in Southern Rhodesia quickly. It therefore suggested that both the United Kingdom Government and the United Nations should take immediate action to end the policies of racial discrimination and segregation practised in that Territory, to establish the rule of law immediately and to allow the people of Southern Rhodesia to enjoy their rights. He was sure that all true friends of the majority of the people of Southern Rhodesia would support the draft resolution, which asked only that the racist minority should be ousted and that the country should be governed by the people who really constituted the majority.

540. The representative of the *United Republic of Tanzania* said that the sanctions against the Salisbury régime had no real meaning for the African people who were being ruthlessly exploited by that régime. The draft resolution therefore emphasized the need for effective and concrete measures to overthrow the Smith régime. It could be seen from published figures that despite the sanctions trade between the United Kingdom and Southern Rhodesia was increasing and not decreasing. The United States was continuing its tobacco trade with Southern Rhodesia. Southern Rhodesia was receiving large supplies of oil from South Africa. The failure of the sanctions showed that the only way to crush the Smith régime was to use force. That fact was emphasized in the draft resolution, which he commended to the Committee.

541. The debate had brought to light many facts which revealed still further the ruthless nature of the colonial system. The question of Southern Rhodesia would present no great problem if the great Powers were disposed to act in an effective manner in favour of freedom and independence for that country. Time and again delegations had been told not to be impatient but to give the weaker measures time to work. In his delegation's opinion, time was the commodity much needed

by the racist minority régime in Rhodesia to consolidate its illegal and criminal position. The African delegations called upon all their friends to support them in their effort to secure the adoption of effective measures—by which they meant the use of force—to remove the minority régime.

542. It was high time that force was used in order to effect justice and to give the people of Rhodesia their inalienable right to freedom and independence. It had been argued in the Committee that members should be cautious in speaking about the use of force. It was therefore ironical that in the Security Council it had been the United Kingdom which had brought up the question of using some force. He wondered why such half-hearted measures were advocated. It was the United Kingdom that had allowed the Smith régime to accumulate the modern arms which it was using against the African people. There had been reports in the Press of skirmishes with the Smith forces in Salisbury and of brutal acts committed against the African people. Five months had elapsed since Smith had taken power in Rhodesia. As Africans and as members of human society, the Tanzanian people could not agree to wait while human lives were being sacrificed. He had been glad to see that the draft resolution had received the support of one great Power and he hoped that others would follow.

543. The representative of *Bulgaria* said that the action taken so far by the United Kingdom Government had proved ineffective and inadequate was reflected in the moderate and well-balanced draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.272/Rev.1) which a number of countries had submitted and which merely asked the Security Council to consider further measures to put into effect its decisions concerning Southern Rhodesia. The very contents of the draft resolution indicated that the discussion of the question in the Special Committee was but one stage on the way to a more substantial discussion in the Security Council with a view to determining what action must be taken to overcome the serious situation in Southern Rhodesia.

544. The Bulgarian delegation considered that the Committee, and in particular the members which by reason of their geographic situation and fraternal ties with Southern Rhodesia felt themselves closer to the question, should pave the way for a careful examination of the problem in the Security Council, so that the Council could adopt measures to remove the racist white-minority régime in that country as soon as possible and to ensure the establishment of a majority Government.

545. The representative of the *Union of Soviet Socialist Republics* expressed his delegation's satisfaction that the revised draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.272/Rev.1) reflected the views and proposals which had been expressed during the general discussion more accurately than had the original text. For example, operative paragraph 3 was not simply a general condemnation of States which supported and assisted the racist minority régime in Southern Rhodesia but it specifically condemned the South African racists and Portuguese colonialists who through their criminal actions were nullifying the efforts of the countries that were trying to implement the relevant United Nations decisions. The new wording of that paragraph was a considerable improvement and the Soviet Union delegation was prepared to support it, although it considered that the time was long overdue for the Committee to condemn openly and resolutely all those who, directly

or indirectly, had hampered the implementation of the United Nations decisions on the question of Southern Rhodesia, in particular Security Council resolution 217 (1965).

546. The new operative paragraph 4, too, was a great improvement in that it stressed the fact that responsibility for liquidating the racist régime in Southern Rhodesia lay squarely with the administering Power and it implied that power was to be transferred to the people in accordance with the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples and with the United Nations Charter.

547. Like many delegations, the Soviet Union delegation considered that the action of the United Kingdom in convening the Security Council had been simply an attempt to remove from the United Kingdom Government the responsibility for its failure to implement the United Nations resolutions and for the deteriorating situation in Southern Rhodesia. His delegation also considered the decision adopted by the Security Council on 9 April 1966 to be a manifestly inadequate measure because it did not provide for a proper solution of the Rhodesian problem.

548. His delegation favoured the adoption of decisions that would provide for the implementation of a broader series of measures designed to put into effect the Security Council resolutions on Southern Rhodesia, including the application of sanctions under Chapter VII of the Charter. Operative paragraph 6 of the draft resolution was therefore perfectly justifiable; it met the requirements of the situation and was in accordance with the wishes of the great majority of delegations. Although it considered some of the preambular paragraphs inadequate, his delegation would vote in favour of the draft resolution as a whole.

549. The Soviet Union Government had supported and continued to support the struggle of peoples for self-determination, freedom and independence. The Soviet Union stood solidly behind the people of Zimbabwe and was ready to co-operate with African countries in assisting those people in their struggle for independence.

550. The representative of *Italy* said that it was regrettable that the draft resolution before the Committee was worded in such a way as to make it impossible for his delegation to support it. His delegation also regretted that the original text, which might have met with a considerable measure of agreement in the Committee, had been replaced by a new draft which brought up the controversial issue of the use of force. It would be recalled that, during the debate on Southern Rhodesia at the twentieth session of the General Assembly, it had become clear that the Members of the United Nations were deeply divided on that issue. His delegation had reservations regarding the introduction of a paragraph requesting the use of force, although it recognized the great importance of the question of Southern Rhodesia and shared the objective of the African delegations. Its reasons for those reservations were twofold. Firstly, the use of force should be envisaged only as a last resort. Secondly, it found no provision in the Charter empowering the use of force under the terms suggested in the draft resolution. In his delegation's opinion, the introduction of such a dividing issue could only reduce the number of delegations that would support the draft resolution. In addition, the fourth preambular paragraph was misleading, since it did not take into account a number

of circumstances and deeds, in particular the fact that the United Kingdom had taken measures and that those measures had been endorsed by the Security Council and implemented by the overwhelming majority of the Members of the United Nations. In his delegation's view the following formula would have been more appropriate: "Considering that the measures taken by the Government of the United Kingdom and endorsed by the Security Council have failed so far to bring down the régime of the racist minority in Southern Rhodesia".

551. Operative paragraphs 5 and 6 should have been worded in such a way as to avoid confusion between the responsibilities of the Security Council and those of the General Assembly. His delegation agreed, however, on the inner meaning of the two paragraphs, namely, that the situation in Southern Rhodesia was fraught with dangerous potentialities and that the Security Council was the appropriate body to consider the implications of the situation and to take whatever action might be necessary. It was for the Security Council, and not the Committee, to indicate whether such action was under Chapter VI or Chapter VII of the Charter. Moreover, it was not necessarily the legal context that ensured the effectiveness of a political action but rather the nature of the measures adopted and the political will to implement them.

552. In view of those considerations, the Italian delegation would abstain in the vote on the draft resolution. In conclusion, he stressed that the Italian delegation had always advocated and whole-heartedly supported the restoration of law and order in Southern Rhodesia and the recognition of equal rights to every inhabitant of that country. Any differences that might exist between his delegation and the majority of the members of the Committee concerned, not the objectives, but only the methods to follow in order to achieve those objectives.

553. The representative of *Iraq* said that the Italian representative had expressed the view that, had the original draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.272) come before the Committee, it would have commanded a much larger majority than would the revised text. The Iraqi delegation did not consider that the strength of a resolution lay in the amount of support it obtained; it was a well-known fact that in the matter of colonialism weak resolutions usually gained more or less unanimous acceptance, while strong ones did not. His delegation therefore preferred a strong resolution adopted by the majority to a weak resolution adopted unanimously.

554. Secondly, the Italian representative had spoken of the use of force as a last resort. He would point out that five months had already elapsed and he did not think that those who had voted in favour of the various resolutions on Southern Rhodesia had contemplated waiting for years before recommending the use of force. He agreed with the Italian representative that it was the prerogative of the Security Council to recommend the use of force. The reference in operative paragraph 4 of the draft resolution to the use of force was the natural outcome of Security Council resolution 217 (1965), which spoke of "quelling" Ian Smith's rebellion; those who had voted in favour of that resolution had undoubtedly had more in mind than an embargo on oil to "quell" the rebellion. Moreover, operative paragraph 6 of the draft resolution recommended that the Security Council should consider the further measures envisaged under Chapter VII of the Charter, and that Chapter dealt with the use of force.

555. With regard to the Italian representative's comment on the wording of operative paragraph 5, he pointed out that the Security Council had already, in resolution 221 (1966), referred to the situation in Southern Rhodesia as a threat to peace.

556. Although the points mentioned by the Italian representative might prevent that representative from voting in favour of the draft resolution, the Iraqi delegation was convinced that the draft resolution represented the very least that the Committee could adopt.

557. The representative of *Italy*, speaking in exercise of the right of reply, said that he had always been concerned about the use of the words "strong" or "weak" to describe a resolution: the important thing was that the resolution adopted should be consistent with the aims pursued by the Committee and with the context of the situation under discussion. He had certainly not said that he would have preferred the original draft resolution because it was a "weak" resolution; he had only said that it would meet with a considerable amount of agreement in the Committee and there was no denying that, the larger the majority by which a resolution was adopted, the more weight would it carry.

558. In referring to his remark that the use of force should be only a last resort, the representative of Iraq had spoken of the sad five months that had elapsed since the unilateral declaration of independence. He would remind him that Italy had struggled for a hundred years before achieving unity and independence. The situations were not, of course, comparable, but it was well to consider such matters in some kind of historical perspective. In any case, his main objection to the reference to the use of force in the revised draft resolution was that it did not appear in operative paragraph 6, in which action by the Security Council was contemplated, but in operative paragraph 4, in which the administering Power was called upon to use force. Such a request to the administering Power was contrary to the very spirit of the Charter and the Italian delegation could never agree to it.

559. The representative of the *Ivory Coast* said that his delegation, which was a sponsor of the draft resolution, was confident that it would be adopted unanimously. The measures recommended in the draft resolution were those which had already been adopted on other occasions; in calling upon the administering Power "to take all effective measures, including the use of force", the draft resolution was only echoing the Security Council, which twice already had taken similar decisions.

560. The representative of *Mali* said that his delegation hoped that all delegations would support the draft resolution, whose recommendations represented the minimum that the Zimbabwe people were entitled to expect. Operative paragraph 4 merely asked the administering Power to use all the means within its power, including armed force, to put an end to the racist minority régime in Southern Rhodesia. It was the duty of the United Kingdom to take action to safeguard the interests of the Zimbabwe people and to ensure their security. It was to assist the administering Power in exercising its prerogatives that the Malian delegation had co-sponsored the draft resolution.

561. The representatives of the *United States of America* said that, while his delegation disagreed with certain points in some of the statements that had been

made during the debate, and with certain provisions of the draft resolution, it was in general agreement with the objectives sought: namely, democratic government and self-determination and independence for all the people of Southern Rhodesia on a basis acceptable to the people of the country as a whole.

562. The practical steps his country had taken in pursuit of those objectives had been described in detail in the Security Council. His delegation would like to see other countries take similar steps to assist the United Kingdom in discharging its responsibilities towards the people of Southern Rhodesia.

563. His delegation supported those parts of the draft resolution which affirmed the applicability of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) to the question of Rhodesia, attacked the policy of racial discrimination in that country and recognized the legitimacy of the aspirations of the people for the full enjoyment of their rights—rights which it took to include the right of self-determination.

564. On 9 April the Security Council had taken an important step in implementation of the programme of economic measures against Southern Rhodesia. The full impact of that step had yet to be felt and his delegation therefore considered that it was too early to decide as firmly as did the draft resolution what further steps might be necessary. It was therefore unable to concur in the draft resolution and would abstain in the vote.

565. Southern Rhodesia remained one of the most important problems before the Security Council and it was in that forum that the United States would prefer to express its views on policy and the further steps that might be appropriate. It felt that whatever contribution the United States might make to the solution of the problem could best be made there, at the proper time.

566. The representative of *Venezuela* said that it would be seen from his delegation's statement in the general debate that it had been in general agreement with the substance and form of draft resolution A/AC.109/L.272. It had therefore co-sponsored that draft. Following a decision by the Afro-Asian group in the Committee, however, substantial changes had been introduced in the text, which made it impossible for Venezuela to remain a sponsor. It had serious reservations about the changes made and the final wording of the draft resolution.

567. His delegation could not support operative paragraph 3 of the revised text, which went beyond the terms of reference of the Special Committee. Venezuela was not convinced that the Committee could use the word "condemns"; in the language of the Charter, that word had a precise meaning and entailed serious consequences, which could be decided only by the Security Council. In any case, it would be for the Council itself and not for the Special Committee to "condemn" a State for the non-implementation of its resolutions, with all the ensuing consequences. Indeed, the Council resolution only called upon Member States and did not require or oblige them to implement it. His delegation had on numerous occasions stated its views about the need strictly to respect the exclusive competence of each of the organs of the United Nations, in accordance with the provisions of the Charter.

568. With regard to operative paragraph 4, his delegation had already had occasion to explain that

it could not accept the use of force. If some of the great Powers insisted on acceptance of the principle of the delimitation of the competence of United Nations organs, actually refusing to contribute to expenses resulting from decisions taken by an organ they did not consider competent, the small States—including Venezuela—had even more reason to do so. The rights of small States could be effectively defended only if the provisions of the Charter were strictly observed. So far force had been used to impose the will of the strong and take away the freedom of the weak. The Special Committee would not help the people of Southern Rhodesia by assuming the functions of the Security Council. The unilateral use of force would jeopardize the cause of the small States by setting a precedent for a type of action covered by specific provisions in Chapter VII of the Charter. The United Nations was based on the renunciation of the use of force, which was permitted only for individual or collective self-defence, in cases which were strictly specified in the Charter and were to be decided only by the Security Council. Venezuela therefore could not, by its vote, call upon or invite a State to use force unilaterally. It had serious reasons for feeling considerable misgivings about the use of force, even collectively, at the regional or international level. It had even more reason to feel misgivings about any attempt to legitimize the unilateral use of force by any Member State.

569. For those reasons, his delegation would be obliged to abstain in the vote on operative paragraphs 3 and 4 of the draft resolution and it asked for a separate vote on those paragraphs.

570. With regard to operative paragraph 5, for the reasons it had already given, his delegation considered that the Special Committee was not competent to describe any situation as a threat to peace and security. That was a matter within the exclusive purview of the Security Council, under Article 39 of the Charter. The Committee could bring a situation to the attention of the Security Council but it was for the Council to determine the nature of that situation. Venezuela would abstain in the vote on paragraph 5, as it had done in the General Assembly when a vote had been taken on resolution 2022 (XX), to whose paragraph 13 the paragraph in question related. It asked for a separate vote on paragraph 5.

571. His delegation would vote in favour of the draft resolution as a whole.

572. The representative of the *United Kingdom* recalled that his delegation had raised no objection to the discussion of the question of Southern Rhodesia as a matter of priority, because it understood and shared the Committee's deep concern about that question. The United Kingdom Government had never underestimated the seriousness—indeed, the great difficulties and dangers—of the situation.

573. Much that had been said in the Committee had been misleading and some comments, such as the accusations of complacency, lack of determination or collusion, had been wholly misconceived. In rejecting such misguided imputations, the United Kingdom remained convinced that no useful contribution would be made by pursuing any wrangle about facts or motives. As his delegation had stated recently in the Security Council, at its 1277th meeting, the United Kingdom was not seeking to provoke or to answer provocation. It was constantly concerned with the

action needed to achieve purposes on which there was a wide measure of agreement.

574. The action already taken had been extensive and much more effective than many wished to admit. The United Kingdom was grateful to all those who had answered its call to match its own actions in accordance with the Security Council resolution of November 1965.

575. The determination of the United Kingdom Government to end the rebellion and work constantly for a settlement acceptable to the entire people of Southern Rhodesia had been clearly stated and repeatedly confirmed. His Government was persisting and would continue to persist until those declared aims had been achieved.

576. His delegation reserved its position on the substance of the draft resolution, on which it did not wish to comment. In connexion with operative paragraph 4, however, he reminded the Committee that his Government's views on the use of force had been stated on many occasions. With regard to operative paragraphs 5 and 6, its views on the appropriateness of the Committee's making determinations on peace and security were also well known.

577. The United Kingdom would abstain in the vote on the draft resolution as a whole and on any separate paragraphs.

578. The representative of *Uruguay* said that his delegation would vote in favour of the draft resolution as a whole, which was in conformity with basic principles supported by Uruguay in the question of Southern Rhodesia. However, his delegation would not participate in any separate vote on operative paragraphs 5 and 6, which dealt with attitudes to be adopted by the Security Council. His delegation would like that position to be recorded in the Committee's report.

579. Uruguay would abstain in the vote on operative paragraph 4, as it had done in the vote on operative paragraph 11 of General Assembly resolution 2022 (XX), which embodied the same concept of the use of force.

580. With regard to operative paragraph 3, it would have been preferable not to mention by name certain States which did not bear the principal responsibility in the matter concerned. In all cases of racial discrimination and colonization, Uruguay had no hesitation in condemning States which were directly responsible. In the case under consideration, however, it would have been preferable not to dilute the responsibility by referring to secondary responsibilities.

581. The representative of *Denmark* regretted that the revised text of the draft resolution went much further than the original version, particularly by referring to the use of force. His delegation would have been able to vote in favour of the original text with only a few reservations, but it did not think that the Committee should take such a drastic step as to recommend the use of force. In the existing delicate situation, all efforts should be concentrated on the adoption and implementation, by agreement between the United Kingdom and the overwhelming majority of Members of the United Nations, of the strongest possible measures designed to oust the Smith régime.

582. Consequently, although Denmark could support most of the paragraphs in the revised draft resolution, it would have to abstain when it was put to the vote. It was more important to see that resolutions obtained the desired goal by unified action than

to qualify their wording as "weak" or "strong". The original text of the draft resolution had not been weak; it had been better and more realistic. As a result of the changes made, there would unfortunately be less votes cast in favour of it.

583. The representative of *Chile* said that his delegation could support most of the changes reflected in the revised text of the draft resolution but not the inclusion, in operative paragraph 4, of an appeal for the use of force by the administering Power. According to the Charter, the use of force was prohibited except under the authority of the Security Council or in cases of self-defence against armed attack. Although it would no doubt be decisive in crushing the rebellion in Southern Rhodesia, the use of force by the United Kingdom would set a dangerous precedent for other colonial cases. The United Nations should not call for the use of force, except by authorization of the Security Council. His delegation's views on that subject had been expressed in the General Assembly during the discussion of operative paragraph 11 of resolution 2022 (XX). It would abstain in the vote on operative paragraph 4 of the draft resolution.

584. Chile would vote in favour of the other paragraphs and of the draft resolution as a whole.

585. The representative of *Iraq* said that the difference between the original and the revised text was that the revised text condemned the failure of certain States, particularly South Africa and Portugal, to implement the resolutions of the United Nations and called for the use of force by the administering Power. Certain delegations which could not vote for the latter provision might be able to vote for the condemnation of certain States. There should therefore be separate votes on paragraphs 3 and 4.

586. At its 407th meeting, the Special Committee voted by roll-call on the joint draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.272/Rev.1) as follows:

Operative paragraph 3 was adopted by a roll-call vote of 20 to none, with 4 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Bulgaria, Chile, Denmark, Ethiopia, India, Iran, Iraq, Italy, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Mali, Poland, Sierra Leone, Syria, Tunisia, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Yugoslavia.

Against: None.

Abstaining: Australia, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Venezuela.

Operative paragraph 4 was adopted by a roll-call vote of 16 votes to none, with 8 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Bulgaria, Ethiopia, India, Iran, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Mali, Poland, Sierra Leone, Syria, Tunisia, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Republic of Tanzania, Yugoslavia.

Against: None.

Abstaining: Australia, Chile, Denmark, Italy, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela.

Operative paragraph 5 was adopted by a roll-call vote of 18 to none, with 5 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Bulgaria, Chile, Denmark, Ethiopia, India, Iran, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Mali, Poland, Sierra Leone, Syria, Tunisia, Union of

Soviet Socialist Republics, United Republic of Tanzania, Yugoslavia.

Against: None.

Abstaining: Australia, Italy, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Venezuela.

The draft resolution as a whole was adopted by a roll-call vote of 19 to none, with 5 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Bulgaria, Chile, Ethiopia, India, Iran, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Mali, Poland, Sierra Leone, Syria, Tunisia, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yugoslavia.

Against: None.

Abstaining: Australia, Denmark, Italy, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America.

587. The text of the resolution on the question of Southern Rhodesia (A/AC.109/158), as adopted by the Special Committee at its 407th meeting on 21 April 1966, reads as follows:

"The Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,

"Deeply concerned about the explosive situation in Southern Rhodesia,

"Recalling General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960,

"Recalling further the Security Council resolutions on Southern Rhodesia, including resolutions 217 (1965) of 20 November 1965 and 221 (1966) of 9 April 1966, the relevant General Assembly resolutions and in particular resolution 2022 (XX) of 5 November 1965, and the relevant resolutions of the Special Committee,

"Considering that the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland has failed to take the necessary and adequate measures to bring down the régime of the racist minority in Southern Rhodesia, and to implement the provisions of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV),

"Noting that some States, including States Members of the United Nations, actively encourage the racist minority régime of Southern Rhodesia by their refusal to implement the pertinent Security Council resolutions, including resolution 217 (1965),

"1. Reaffirms the inalienable rights of the people of Southern Rhodesia to freedom and independence in accordance with the Declaration contained in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), and recognizes the legitimacy of their struggle for the enjoyment of their rights as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations;

"2. Reaffirms in particular General Assembly resolution 2022 (XX) which condemns the policies of racial discrimination and segregation practised in Southern Rhodesia, which constitute a crime against humanity;

"3. Condemns the failure of certain States, particularly South Africa and Portugal, to implement the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly, the Special Committee and the Security Council by giving support and assistance to the racist minority régime in Southern Rhodesia;

"4. *Calls upon* the administering Power to take all effective measures, including the use of force, to put an end to the racist minority régime in Southern Rhodesia;

"5. *Considers* that the explosive situation in Southern Rhodesia continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security;

"6. *Recommends* to the Security Council to consider urgently the further measures envisaged under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations to put into effect its decisions concerning Southern Rhodesia;

"7. *Decides* to transmit to the Security Council the records of the discussions of the Special Committee on this question;

"8. *Decides* to keep the question of Southern Rhodesia on the agenda of the Special Committee and to review the situation whenever it considers it necessary."

588. The text of the resolution, together with the records of the debate on the question in the Special Committee, was transmitted to the President of the Security Council on 21 April 1966.²⁰

E. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION CONCERNING THE TERRITORY

ACTION TAKEN BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL IN 1966

589. At its 1276th and 1277th meetings on 9 April 1966, the Security Council resumed its consideration of the question of Southern Rhodesia on the basis of a letter dated 7 April 1966²¹ from the representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, requesting the President of the Council to convene an emergency meeting to consider the situation arising from the arrival in Beira of an oil tanker which might result in substantial supplies of oil reaching Southern Rhodesia in contravention of the oil embargo imposed by his Government in accordance with Council resolution 217 (1965) of 20 November 1965. At its 1277th meeting, the Security Council adopted resolution 221 (1966) by 10 votes (Argentina, China, Japan, Jordan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Uganda, United Kingdom, United States of America) to none, with 5 abstentions (Bulgaria, France, Mali, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Uruguay). The text of the resolution is as follows:

"The Security Council,

"Recalling its resolutions 216 (1965) of 12 November 1965 and 217 (1965) of 20 November 1965 and in particular its call to all States to do their utmost to break off economic relations with Southern Rhodesia, including an embargo on oil and petroleum products,

"Gravely concerned at reports that substantial supplies of oil may reach Southern Rhodesia as the result of an oil tanker having arrived at Beira and the approach of a further tanker which may lead to the resumption of pumping through the pipeline of the Companhia do Pipeline Moçambique-Rodésia with the acquiescence of the Portuguese authorities,

"Considering that such supplies will afford great assistance and encouragement to the illegal régime in Southern Rhodesia, thereby enabling it to remain longer in being,

"1. *Determines* that the resulting situation constitutes a threat to the peace;

"2. *Calls upon* the Portuguese Government not to permit oil to be pumped through the pipeline from Beira to Southern Rhodesia;

"3. *Calls upon* the Portuguese Government not to receive at Beira oil destined for Southern Rhodesia;

"4. *Calls upon* all States to ensure the diversion of any of their vessels reasonably believed to be carrying oil destined for Southern Rhodesia which may be en route for Beira;

"5. *Calls upon* the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to prevent, by the use of force if necessary, the arrival at Beira of vessels reasonably believed to be carrying oil destined for Southern Rhodesia, and empowers the United Kingdom to arrest and detain the tanker known as the *Joanna V* upon her departure from Beira in the event her oil cargo is discharged there."

590. The Security Council at its 1278th to 1285th meetings, between 17 and 23 May 1966, resumed its consideration of the question of Southern Rhodesia on the basis of a letter dated 10 May 1966²² by thirty-two African States which requested the President of the Security Council to convene an immediate meeting of the Council on the situation in Southern Rhodesia, in order to examine, under Chapter VII of the Charter, the necessary measures to establish majority rule in Southern Rhodesia in accordance with the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.

591. On 11 May, Mali, Nigeria and Uganda submitted a draft resolution on this problem.²³ Under its operative part the Council would: (1) determine that the situation in Southern Rhodesia continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security; (2) call upon all States to apply measures with a view to the complete severance of economic relations and communications with Southern Rhodesia in accordance with Article 41 of the Charter; (3) invite the Portuguese and South African Governments, in particular, to take forthwith the necessary measures under Article 41 of the Charter to sever economic relations and communications with Southern Rhodesia; (4) call upon all States, and particularly the Portuguese and South African Governments, to take all necessary measures to prevent the supply of oil and petroleum products to Southern Rhodesia; (5) call upon the United Kingdom to take the measures provided for in Chapter VII of the Charter in order, by the use of air, sea or land forces, to prevent any supplies, including oil and petroleum products, from reaching Southern Rhodesia; (6) reaffirm the inalienable rights of the people of Southern Rhodesia to freedom and independence in accordance with the Declaration contained in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), and recognize the legitimacy of their struggle to secure the enjoyment of their rights as

²⁰ *Ibid.*, Twenty-first Year, Supplement for April, May and June 1966, document S/7263.

²¹ Document S/7235, incorporated in the record of the 1276th meeting of the Security Council.

²² *Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-first Year, Supplement for April, May and June 1966*, documents S/7285 and Add.2.

²³ *Ibid.*, document S/7285/Add.1.

set forth in the Charter of the United Nations; (7) call upon the United Kingdom to hold consultations with the leaders of African political parties with a view to the establishment of a régime consistent with the aspirations of the people of Zimbabwe; (8) draw the attention of the United Kingdom to the harmful consequences which the present negotiations might entail for the establishment of a régime based on universal suffrage; and (9) call upon the United Kingdom Government to take all necessary measures, including the use of force, to abolish the racist minority régime in Southern Rhodesia and to ensure the immediate application of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV).

592. At its 1285th meeting, on 23 May 1966, the Security Council proceeded to vote on the draft resolution. In voting the draft resolution was not adopted. It failed to receive the required majority, receiving 6 votes in favour, 1 against, with 8 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Bulgaria, Jordan, Mali, Nigeria, Uganda, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Against: New Zealand.

Abstaining: Argentina, China, France, Japan, Netherlands, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

Population

593. It will be recalled that the Government Monthly Statistical Report on Southern Rhodesia for January 1966 stated that the population of Southern Rhodesia had reached an all-time high of 4,330,000, with a white population of 224,000 (see para. 123 above). According to the Central Office of Statistics figures released in Salisbury on 28 February 1966, Southern Rhodesia had a net gain of 4,463 white immigrants in 1965, compared with a net loss of 6,722 in 1964.

"Constitutional" developments

594. On 17 February 1966, the Southern Rhodesia "Legislative Assembly" passed the Constitutional Ratification Bill "to ratify the 1965 Constitution" by 48 votes in favour to 2 against. The thirteen-member official opposition, the all-African United Peoples Party, boycotted the vote. The Bill was signed on 18 February 1966 by Mr. Dupont, the "Officer Administering the Government".

595. In a broadcast on 27 March 1966, Mr. Ian Smith stated that he proposed to set up a commission to recommend to his "Government" new constitutional safeguards which would replace in the "1965 Constitution" the provisions governing the alterations to the entrenched clauses.

Emergency Powers Act

596. On 8 March 1966, the Southern Rhodesia "Legislative Assembly" passed the Emergency Powers Amendment Bill by 44 votes to 14. The Bill, which was subsequently signed by the "Officer Administering the Government" purports to widen the circumstances under which the "Officer Administering the Government" may proclaim an emergency, facilitate the issuing of regulations following a declaration of emergency and increase the range of subjects for which emergency regulations can be readily issued.

597. Under the present Act—the Emergency Powers Act of 1960—the Governor can proclaim a

state of emergency if he feels there is a sufficient threat to public safety, public order or the maintenance of an essential service, inside Southern Rhodesia. The Ian Smith régime claims that with the declaration of independence these powers are now vested in the "Officer Administering the Government" in terms of the "1965 Constitution".

598. To these powers the amendment purports to add that the "Officer Administering the Government" can declare a state of emergency if "action has been taken or is immediately threatened by the Government of another country of such a nature as to be likely to interfere with the peace, order and good government of Southern Rhodesia".

599. Speaking in the debate in the "Legislative Assembly", the "Minister of Justice and Law and Order", Mr. Desmond Lardner-Burke, stated that Southern Rhodesia must leave no loopholes that its enemies could seize upon to attack and upset and interfere with good government during what he called this vital and crucial stage of its emergence as a sovereign independent State. He stated that the Bill did not introduce startling changes in the Emergency Powers Act of 1960. The "Government" merely wished to make it perfectly clear to all and sundry that every law, resolution of the House and subsidiary legislation passed and in force since 11 November 1965 in terms of the Emergency Powers Act, chapter 33, was valid and beyond a shadow of doubt the law of the land.

600. Referring to the proposals which would allow a state of emergency to be declared in Southern Rhodesia as a result of the actions of any government of another country, he stated that this was a new concept and an obvious one when the threats aimed at Southern Rhodesia from outside were considered.

601. Many of the new emergency regulations—about twenty different sets of regulations—adopted by the illegal régime since the unilateral declaration of independence have been incorporated into the statutory emergency powers under the Bill. These new regulations relate mainly to the control of manpower, censorship and the control of corporations.

Extension of National Service

602. On 25 March 1966, the Smith régime announced a compulsory scheme of registration for all Europeans, Asians and Coloured males in the country between the ages of 17 and 60. The announcement, which was made by Lord Graham, the "Minister of Defence and External Affairs" declared a doubling of the period of peace-time military training which Europeans, Asian and Coloured youth undertake in Southern Rhodesia from four and a half months to nine months. He stated that the compulsory registration was not a call-up but merely a registration of manpower to be used as and when required in the national interest. The extension of the National Service was designed to give Southern Rhodesia a much more efficient territorial force and to produce more young officers to replace a number nearing retirement.

United People's Party

603. On 25 March 1966, the all African Opposition United People's Party which has thirteen members in the Southern Rhodesian "Legislative Assembly" announced that Mr. Chad Chipunza had succeeded Mr. Josiah Gondo as a leader of the Party.

The University College and the illegal régime

604. Over 100 students, mostly Africans, from the University College of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, staged demonstrations on the college campus from 16 to 18 March 1966. The students were protesting against the illegal declaration of independence and the restriction of university students by the illegal régime. On 17 March 1966, the student demonstrators were supported by over thirty lecturers of the university who issued a statement reaffirming their opposition to the illegal régime and deploring the restrictions of the university students by the Southern Rhodesian régime. On 18 March 1966, the police in Salisbury placed a ban on all non-educational public meetings at the university.

605. The lecturers and about 300 African and Asian students also instituted a complete boycott of lectures at the university. It was reported on 25 March 1966 that both the students and lecturers involved in the demonstrations and boycott of lectures had returned to classes.

606. On 13 April 1966, Dr. Walter Adams, Principal of the University College, submitted his resignation to the college authorities after having defied police attempts to recapture an African student who had returned to classes after escaping from a restriction camp at Gonakudzingwa.

Censorship regulations and the Constitutional Council

607. On 12 April 1966, the Constitutional Council of Southern Rhodesia ruled that three Sections of the Emergency Powers (Control of Publications) Regulations, 1966 were inconsistent with the constitutionally entrenched Declaration of Rights. The sections of the Censorship Regulations which the Constitutional Council ruled as inconsistent with the Declaration of Rights and not alternatively covered by the provisions for emergencies in the Constitution deal with the leaving of blank spaces in publications to indicate where material has been censored; the power of the censor to alter headlines or the positioning of material in the publication; and the power of the Director of Information to prohibit an issue of a publication if these regulations have been breached.

608. It is the responsibility of the Constitutional Council under the 1961 Constitution, to test statutory instruments for violation of the Declaration of Rights. The so-called "1965 Constitution" grants the Constitutional Council the same powers as under the 1961 Constitution.

609. On 21 April 1966, the Southern Rhodesian régime announced that it would revoke the sections of the censorship regulations whose legality was questioned by the Constitutional Council. However, other sections of the censorship regulations would remain in force.

Demonstration in Salisbury against the illegal régime

610. On 19 April 1966, demonstrations against the illegal régime broke out in the African townships surrounding Salisbury. According to reports, cars and public buildings were stoned in Harare and in the townships of Highfield, Mufakose and Kambazuma. A gasoline bomb was reported to have been thrown through the window of a clinic in Mufakose.

611. The riot police were reported to have fired warning shots to disperse the demonstrators. On 20

April 1966, the police reported that all was quiet in the African townships. A police spokesman was reported to have stated that they had no reports of any injuries from the warning shots they fired to disperse the demonstrators. Some of the demonstrators were arrested but the police spokesman could not give the exact number.

State of emergency extended

612. On 21 April 1966, the "Legislative Assembly" of Southern Rhodesia, by 43 votes to 13, extended for a further three months the state of emergency which was proclaimed in Southern Rhodesia on 5 November 1965, by the Smith régime. The state of emergency had been extended for three months at the beginning of February 1966.

613. In introducing the motion for extension, Mr. Desmond Lardner-Burke, the "Minister of Justice, Law and Order" stated that by far the most serious threat confronting Southern Rhodesia at present was the further action the United Kingdom might institute to bring down the "Government". United Kingdom action might be instituted, he said, in the light of the fact, unpalatable to the United Kingdom, that economic sanctions and the oil embargo were unlikely to deliver the predicted *coup de grâce* in the foreseeable future.

Relations with the United Kingdom

614. Mr. N. D. Watson, an Assistant Under-Secretary in the United Kingdom Commonwealth Relations Office visited Southern Rhodesia (and briefly Zambia) from 16 to 28 March 1966. According to United Kingdom Government sources the purpose of the visit was to examine the present organizational structure at the residual office of the United Kingdom High Commission. On 22 March 1966, the Commonwealth Relations Office issued a statement that Mr. Watson was engaged in dealing with harrassments concerning the remaining officials of the United Kingdom High Commission in Salisbury. While in Southern Rhodesia, Mr. Watson held meetings with the "Department of External Affairs" to discuss the position of the United Kingdom High Commission. Mr. Watson also had a number of meetings with Sir Humphrey Gibbs, the Governor, to discuss the United Kingdom Government's policy in Southern Rhodesia and in particular the scope of possible talks with the Smith régime.

615. On 21 April 1966, Mr. Harold Wilson told the House of Commons that Mr. Duncan Watson, the Senior Commonwealth Relations Office Official, who had visited Salisbury in March, had been authorized to meet Mr. Smith to accept representations on his behalf. In spite of repeated inquiries, Mr. Wilson said there had been no response from the Smith régime. A second Commonwealth Relations Office Official, Mr. John Hennings, had since been sent to Salisbury with authority to follow up these moves. He was still there and open to approaches. The major condition laid down by the United Kingdom Government had been that any talks should not imply the recognition of the illegal régime. The United Kingdom, he said, was not prepared to legalize an act of rebellion against the Crown.

616. On 23 March 1966, the illegal régime of Southern Rhodesia announced that the head of the United Kingdom residual mission in Southern Rhodesia, Mr. Stanley Fingland, had been requested to

leave the country. A statement issued by the "Minister of Foreign Affairs", Lord Graham, said that following the unilateral declaration of independence, the United Kingdom High Commissioner in Salisbury and the Southern Rhodesian High Commissioner in London were both withdrawn. According to the statement, the Deputy High Commissioners of both countries were to be withdrawn shortly afterwards. The Southern Rhodesian Deputy High Commissioner left the United Kingdom at the end of November 1965 but the United Kingdom Government changed its mind and wished to leave its Deputy High Commissioner, Mr. Fingland, in Salisbury for an indefinite period. The "Southern Rhodesian Government" was not prepared to allow the disparate representation to continue on this basis and had made a request for Mr. Fingland's departure as originally planned. Mr. Fingland left Salisbury on 13 April 1966 and was replaced by Mr. J. Hennings as head of the United Kingdom residual mission.

617. The Smith régime also requested Mr. N. A. I. French, a First Secretary in the United Kingdom High Commission, to leave the country on the grounds that he had taken part in espionage directed at undermining Southern Rhodesia in economic and security matters. These charges were later denied by the Commonwealth Relations Office. Mr. French left Southern Rhodesia on 24 March 1966.

618. On 16 April 1966, Mr. Smith announced in a broadcast that his "Government" had decided to close down Rhodesia House in London and recall the staff. It had also issued instructions for the "British Embassy" in Salisbury to be closed and for their staff to be repatriated. He stated that the action was being taken as a protest against the United Kingdom Government's action in invoking Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations in order to obtain authority to impose a blockade on Beira to prevent oil from reaching Southern Rhodesia. On 19 April 1966, Mr. Hennings stated that he had received written confirmation of the decision of the illegal régime to sever the remaining links with the United Kingdom Government.

619. On 26 April 1966, Mr. Smith informed the Southern Rhodesia "Legislative Assembly" that he was prepared to reopen negotiations with the United Kingdom in an effort to resolve their differences. He was ready for unconditional negotiations with the United Kingdom at any level, at any time and at any place.

620. He said that there was an erroneous belief that he had adopted an obstinate stand whereby he was not prepared to talk to the United Kingdom Prime Minister, Mr. Wilson, or any other representative of the United Kingdom Government. As far as his "Government" was concerned it had never closed the door and was always prepared to take part in constructive discussions with anybody.

621. On 28 April 1966, the "Ministry of External Affairs" of Southern Rhodesia announced that the United Kingdom and Southern Rhodesia had agreed to suspend the withdrawal of their Missions from each other's country for the time being. The announcement said that this move was being made because of the informal talks due to take place between officials of both countries.

Seven Africans reported killed

622. On 29 April 1966, the Southern Rhodesian police reported that they had killed seven African

"terrorists" in a running gun battle in the Sinoia area, about 85 miles from Salisbury. The spokesman of the police said that all seven were members of the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), one of the two African Nationalist parties which had been banned in Southern Rhodesia. Air Force helicopters supported the police unit in its engagement. According to the statement, some arrests were made and those detained indicated they had undergone terrorist training in the People's Republic of China. The members of the band were said to have crossed into Southern Rhodesia from Zambia. The incident was reported to be the first known clash between nationalist guerrillas and Southern Rhodesian security forces since the illegal declaration of independence.

The Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the question of Southern Rhodesia

623. The Council of Ministers of the OAU met in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, from 28 February to 5 March 1966 to review the situation in Southern Rhodesia and examine the report of its Committee of Five. At the end of its meeting the Council of Ministers adopted a resolution in which it: (1) renewed its appeal to all Member States of the United Nations and all peace-loving nations of the world not to recognize the racist minority régime in Rhodesia; (2) called upon the Government of the United Kingdom to apply such effective measures, including the use of force, that would bring about the immediate downfall of Ian Smith's régime; (3) decided to establish a "Committee of Solidarity for Zambia" composed of five members whose task would be to seek appropriate measures of technical and economic assistance by Member States to Zambia; (4) recommended to the Organization of African Unity and interested Governments not to recognize any party and instead to give aid only to such groups of Zimbabwe fighters who were actively engaged within Rhodesia in the fight to liberate their country from the colonialist and racist yoke; (5) called upon all Member States of the United Nations, who had so far not taken any action, to implement the United Nations Security Council resolution of 20 November 1965 and to intensify their efforts for the adoption of other effective measures, including the release of all Zimbabwe leaders from the Nazi-type concentration camps; (6) decided to recommend to all African delegations to the United Nations to assist the Ministers of Algeria, Senegal and Zambia in their efforts to bear upon the Security Council to examine the situation in Rhodesia under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations.

Portugal and the question of Southern Rhodesia

624. On 13 April 1966, the Prime Minister of Portugal, Dr. Antonio de Oliveira Salazar, in a speech in Lisbon, stated that the Southern Rhodesian problem could set off a vast fire with risks even for those who were far afield. All could still be saved but all could also be lost if passions spoke louder than reason. The Southern Rhodesia case had covered the skies of Africa with the blackest clouds but it was not too late to solve it in agreement with the United Kingdom Government. He stated that the United Nations Security Council resolution of 9 April which had empowered the United Kingdom to use force to stop the tankers with oil for Southern Rhodesia from reaching Beira had internationalized an exclusively internal United Kingdom problem. One more false step in solving the Southern

Rhodesian problem by the responsible powers could set off a vast fire with risks for all those who considered themselves immune because they were far from the field.

South Africa and the question of Southern Rhodesia

625. On 15 April 1966, the United Kingdom Ambassador to South Africa, Sir Hugh Stephenson, arrived in London for consultations with the United Kingdom Government on matters pertaining to relations between South Africa and the illegal régime.

626. On 16 April 1966, the South African Ambassador to the United Kingdom, Dr. Carel de Wet, called on the United Kingdom Prime Minister, Mr. Harold Wilson, to deliver a message from the Prime Minister of South Africa, Dr. Hendrik Verwoerd. No statement was issued after the meeting but it was reported that the meeting was on the question of Southern Rhodesia.

627. The United Kingdom Ambassador returned to South Africa with a message from Mr. Wilson to Dr. Verwoerd. On 21 April 1966, Sir Hugh Stephenson called on Dr. Verwoerd for talks. No statement was issued after the talks.

Prime Minister of the United Kingdom announces informal talks with Southern Rhodesia

628. On 27 April 1966, Prime Minister Wilson made a statement on Southern Rhodesia in the House of Commons. He informed the House that as the Government had repeatedly made it clear over the past five months, anyone in Southern Rhodesia was free to approach the Governor or the British representative in Salisbury with proposals as to the basis on which a solution of the problem could be reached. As a result of a recent report from the Governor, informal talks between officials had been arranged to examine whether such a basis existed.

629. Mr. Wilson said that he had received a report from the Governor in the previous week, at a time when his private secretary, Mr. Oliver Wright, had just left by air for Pretoria to assist the United Kingdom Ambassador in his talks with the South African Government. He was instructed to leave the aircraft at Salisbury for discussions with the Governor before going on to Pretoria. As a result of Mr. Wright's report on his talks with the Governor, Mr. Wright was instructed to return to Salisbury on 22 April. The Governor then arranged a meeting between Mr. Wright, Mr. Hennings, the representative of the United Kingdom Government in Salisbury, and Mr. Smith.

630. A further talk had been held leading to agreed arrangements for the informal talks which would now proceed. They were informal, directed only to see whether a basis for negotiations genuinely existed; and they were without commitment on either side.

631. In answers to questions after his statement, Mr. Wilson stated that the United Kingdom Government had always been willing to have talks. What had been decisive had been the oil sanctions and the action the United Kingdom had taken recently at Beira with the authority of the United Nations. It was these things which had created the situation in which the talks could now take place. The Governor had played a leading part in promoting the meeting which led to this situation. But he made it plain that these were not negotiations. The United Kingdom Government was not negotiating with the illegal régime.

These were informal talks to see whether there was a basis on which proper negotiations could take place. Regarding the principles that would be embodied in a final settlement, Mr. Wilson said that while there was quite a lot the United Kingdom was prepared to forget and forgive, it would not condone, or be prepared to accept, a settlement that condoned an illegal act, or which failed to satisfy the principles which had been laid down by the United Kingdom Government and which had been accepted by Mr. Smith himself in the negotiations last year. He thought the Commonwealth countries, particularly those who were represented in Lagos, would recognize, as he had said in Lagos, that the economic sanctions would work. Many doubts had been expressed then that they would not be effective. He would not want to prejudice the talks by saying how negotiations would be conducted, what kind of machinery might have to be established, either on a bilateral basis between the United Kingdom Government and representatives of Southern Rhodesia, possibly in the widest sense, or whether other machinery—some of the things discussed before the illegal declaration last year—might have to be incorporated. It would all be discussed in informal talks which were to be conducted away from the direct glare of publicity and away from pressures of all kinds.

632. In the course of the independence negotiations last year, the United Kingdom Government laid down "five principles" as a basis for the negotiations to which it added a sixth principle on 25 January 1966. These six principles are as follows:

(1) Unimpeded progress to majority rule would have to be maintained and guaranteed.

(2) There would have to be guarantees against retrogressive amendments of the Constitution.

(3) Also immediate improvement in the political status of the African population.

(4) Progress would have to be made toward ending racial discrimination.

(5) The British Government would have to be satisfied that any basis proposed for independence was acceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a whole.

(6) There was a need to ensure that regardless of race, there would be no oppression of majority by minority or minority by majority.

Statement by Mr. Smith on informal talks

633. On 29 April 1966, Mr. Smith, speaking at the opening of the Central African Trade Fair, in Bulawayo, stated that Southern Rhodesia would enter the informal talks "determined never to surrender". Southern Rhodesia could not, in fact, even lose. There was room for manoeuvre on both sides, without the surrender of basic principles. Southern Rhodesia was not giving up its independence, but neither was the United Kingdom recognizing the unilateral declaration of independence. Neither side was giving ground. The less said about the talks, the better, so as not to prejudice them before they started. He went on to declare that Southern Rhodesia had proved it could take sanctions.

Further developments on informal talks between the United Kingdom and Southern Rhodesia

634. On 5 May 1966, the United Kingdom Government announced that the informal talks with Southern Rhodesia would open in London in the second week of May 1966. The United Kingdom Government

would be represented at the informal talks by Mr. Oliver Wright, private secretary to Prime Minister Wilson (now Ambassador-designate to Denmark) and Mr. Duncan Watson, Assistant Under-Secretary in the Commonwealth Relations Office, who had both been involved in the initial arrangements for the talks. On 5 May 1966, the Smith régime also announced the names of a three-man "delegation" to the informal talks. The "delegation" was to be headed by Sir Cornelius Greenfield, Principal Economic Adviser to Mr. Smith. The other members were to be Mr. Stanley Morris, Chairman of the "Public Service Board" and Mr. Gerald Clarke, Secretary to "the Rhodesian 'Cabinet'".

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS

General

635. In addition to the general censorship in force in Southern Rhodesia, the illegal régime has also imposed censorship on the publication of details on how it is containing international sanctions. By the last week of February 1966, the Central Statistical Office in Salisbury had ceased publishing most of its statistical bulletins on the various sectors of the economy. Included in the list of other specifically banned government publications were the regular bulletins on the state of the mining industry and statements which were required from the Reserve Bank of Rhodesia in terms of the Reserve Bank Act of 1964. Most of the normal and regular sources of information on the state of the Southern Rhodesian economy have not been available since the illegal declaration of independence.

636. It will be recalled that on 5 February 1966, the Ian Smith régime gazetted a new set of emergency regulations to strengthen its hold on most aspects of economic activity in Southern Rhodesia. On 8 March 1966, these new regulations, which relate to censorship, the control of manpower, and corporations were incorporated into the purported amendments to the Emergency Powers Act of 1960. In general terms, these regulations include:

(1) Regulation and control of persons employed or engaged in any trade, business, occupation, profession, calling or industry in Rhodesia.

(2) Taking possession or control on behalf of the Government of any property or undertaking.

(3) Regulation and control of persons or corporations carrying on business in Rhodesia.

(4) Acquisition on behalf of the Government of any property other than land.

(5) Entering and search of any premises.

(6) Payments of compensation and remuneration to persons affected by any regulation or order made under this section.

Provision is made for a maximum penalty of a £500 fine or two years imprisonment or both for breaches of these regulations.

Southern Rhodesia tobacco crop

637. United Kingdom trade figures show that the January 1966 imports of Southern Rhodesian tobacco into the United Kingdom totalled £2,460,000, compared with a monthly average of £1,266,000 for past years.

638. A United Kingdom Foreign Office spokesman was quoted on 3 March 1966 as saying that Southern

Rhodesian tobacco imported into the United Kingdom in January was bought and fully paid for by United Kingdom importers before the illegal declaration of independence in November 1965.

639. According to the United Kingdom Overseas Trade Accounts for February 1966, British imports from Southern Rhodesia were worth £523,000, of which £484,000 was accounted for by tobacco imports. The tobacco was said to have been imported during January but the papers were processed only during February. This left £39,000 unaccounted for.

640. To counteract the United Kingdom Government's ban on the sale and purchase of Southern Rhodesian tobacco, the illegal régime, on 4 March 1966, brought the tobacco packing and buying sections of the industry under the Emergency Control of the Manpower Regulations. The Manpower Regulations purport to give the illegal régime powers to prevent companies from dismissing their employees and can stop employees from resigning and leaving the country without permission. The new regulations pertaining to the tobacco industry also prevent members of the industry from disclosing information relating to the tobacco sales which were scheduled to begin on 29 March 1966. Persons who break the regulations are liable to a fine of £500 or imprisonment for two years or both.

641. By the end of March 1966, all the major consumers of Southern Rhodesian tobacco, namely, the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany, Japan, Benelux, the Scandinavian countries, and Australia, had announced that they would not buy any more tobacco from Southern Rhodesia while the Smith régime remained in power. In terms of the 1964 trade figures, over 90 per cent of Southern Rhodesia's tobacco had already been placed under an embargo by exporting countries before the auction sales of the crop for 1966. The main outlet still openly left to tobacco exports is South Africa. In 1964, unmanufactured tobacco accounted for £39,221,735 or 32.83 per cent of the total value of domestic exports or 28.53 per cent of domestic exports and re-exports of Southern Rhodesia.

642. The tobacco crop for 1966 was estimated at 200 million to 240 million pounds in weight. The State Tobacco Corporation is handling the sale of tobacco this year. On 24 March 1966, the Ministry of Agriculture announced a list of reserve prices for different grades of tobacco. The crop would be classified into 273 grades for each of which a price ranging from 1d. to 48d. was fixed. The announcements emphasized that these prices were those on which payments to growers would be based and did not represent the figure which would be the purchase price to tobacco merchants (see paras. 236-238 above). On the average, the prices would fall around 26d (about 31 cents (US)) per pound. The average price of the Southern Rhodesia leaf last year was 33d. (about 39 cents) per pound. Tobacco not sold in the open market would be bought by the Corporation at the reserve price. Over-all, these prices were reported to be higher than was expected and were estimated to have assured the growing industry of between £20 million to £25 million, depending on the size of the crop. It was further reported that this sum should be sufficient to cover the working cost of producing the current crop over-all, although a number of growers were likely to lose in the season if they

were paid no more than the support prices for their tobacco.

643. On 25 March 1966, the United Kingdom Government again warned the world's tobacco buyers against taking part in the tobacco auctions scheduled to begin in Salisbury on 29 March 1966. The warning was delivered by Mr. Arthur Bottomley, the Commonwealth Relations Secretary. Under an Order-in-Council made on 7 February 1966, the United Kingdom Government made the export of tobacco from Southern Rhodesia a criminal offence under both British and Southern Rhodesian Law. The Order prohibits not only the export of tobacco but also its sale inside Southern Rhodesia with a view to its being exported.

644. On 26 March 1966, the Chairman of the Tobacco Export and Promotion Council, Mr. John Graylin, stated that the United Kingdom Government had already lost the tobacco war. In an address before the Fourteenth Annual Congress of the Rhodesian Guild of Journalists, he stated that the United Kingdom's hopes of bringing Southern Rhodesia to its knees during the next few months had been scotched. He stated that in the short-term aspect, Southern Rhodesia had won the tobacco war by splitting the sales into internal and external aspects. The internal sales would benefit the farmers immediately but the external sales were a long-term prospect which might not be an easy joke. Mr. Graylin said that whether the auctions were a success or not, and the Tobacco Association had to buy the whole crop, farmers would be paid at least the production price of their crop.

645. The Southern Rhodesian tobacco sales opened in Salisbury on 29 March 1966. On 30 March 1966, sources within the tobacco industry were quoted as saying that for security reasons, it had been decided on the night of 29 March to replace the auction system with one of private bargains. The buyer would decide what grade of tobacco he wanted and then make an offer to the Tobacco Corporation. This was reported to be a further move to protect the identity of the foreign buyers. The President of the Rhodesia Tobacco Association, Mr. Carol Heurthley, said that the private treaty selling was strictly a matter of convenience and would not be adhered to throughout the season.

646. When the tobacco auction sales began on 29 March 1966, special guards and police threw a strict security screen around a huge building on the outskirts of Salisbury where the auction sales were being held. The buildings were declared protected places under the Emergency Regulations for the duration of the auction. Only buyers and authorized officials were allowed inside, and, consequently, no one except buyers and officials of the Tobacco Corporation knew how much tobacco, if any, was sold.

647. On 17 April 1966, the Rhodesia Tobacco Marketing Board announced that farmers could step up their weekly deliveries of tobacco for sale in the Salisbury auctions by 25 per cent. The quota increase was reported to have created considerable speculation that Southern Rhodesia was selling its 1966 crop despite the international sanctions. Other sources also suggested that this could mean that the tobacco crop had turned out to be greater than expected and that the "Government" was anxious to get to the farmers as quickly as possible the guaranteed support price payments for delivered tobacco, so that they in turn could wipe out some of their obligations to the banks and commerce.

648. On 19 April 1966, the Rhodesian Tobacco Marketing Board also announced reserve prices for burley tobacco. They ranged from 1d. to 47½d. a pound, covering a wide range of graded tobacco. The announcement emphasized that these prices were those on which payments to growers would be based and did not represent the figure which would be the purchase price to tobacco merchants.

649. As stated earlier, because of the security screen thrown around the tobacco sales, it was not possible for outsiders to know how much tobacco, if any, was being sold. However, it was reported that some merchants might try to export Southern Rhodesian tobacco from South Africa in the guise of South African leaf, although the two could be distinguished by experts. South Africa could, even without re-exporting Rhodesian tobacco, decide to import more of it for its own needs and in turn export more of its own crop.

650. South Africa normally imports only about 2 million pounds a year of Rhodesian tobacco. It was reported that the South African crop for this season was expected to yield a rather low figure of 59 million pounds which should in any case improve the prospect for imports from Southern Rhodesia. Stocks were also down to a low point (67 million pounds last August) so that there was also scope for restocking.

Southern Rhodesia's sugar crop for 1966

651. On 17 March 1966, the United Kingdom Government announced a ban on all exports of sugar from Southern Rhodesia. According to the Order which is effective under both United Kingdom and Southern Rhodesian law, it is now "illegal for speculators or others to buy Rhodesian sugar and hold it in Rhodesia or elsewhere in the hope of selling it at a profit when legal Government is restored". Those who now bought Rhodesian sugar would acquire no legal right to it and would also not be able to get their money back. Furthermore, all transactions that took place in Southern Rhodesia aimed at the export of sugar were invalid whether the export was to take place immediately or in the future.

652. Southern Rhodesia's sugar industry has expanded almost tenfold during the last six years. The 1965 crop before the illegal declaration of independence was estimated at 250,000 tons. It was expected to reach the 350,000 ton mark in 1966. The world price for sugar was quoted as around £20 per ton.

653. The main buyers of Southern Rhodesian sugar, namely the United States, Canada and the United Kingdom have already placed an embargo on sugar imports from Southern Rhodesia. United Kingdom authorities hoped that Zambia and Malawi which have been dependent on Southern Rhodesia for their sugar supplies would co-operate in this latest ban.

654. Eight Japanese trading houses are reported to have contracted to buy 50,000 tons of Southern Rhodesian sugar worth about £1 million. The Ministry of International Trade and Industry of Japan was reported to have stated on 21 March 1966 that this was the only exception to the ban on imports of sugar which was announced by Japan in late January 1966. The sugar was contracted for before the illegal declaration of independence and the existence of the contract had been known to the United Kingdom since December 1965. The Ministry of International Trade and Industry was reported to have stated that the shipment of the sugar due to

take place in April might be postponed. However, the contract was still standing on 22 April 1966.

Mining industry

Chrome

655. On 25 February 1966, a spokesman for the United Kingdom Board of Trade confirmed that a licence had been granted to a United Kingdom firm for the importation of a "consignment" of chrome ore from Southern Rhodesia since the Order-in-Council of 20 January, which prohibited such exports. The spokesman explained that the consignment had been bought and paid for before the Order came into force and was already in a warehouse in Beira awaiting shipment. According to the Board of Trade, although some 9,000 tons of high grade metallurgical chrome ore had been sent to the United Kingdom since 20 January, the shipment was perfectly legal.

656. According to United Kingdom estimates, between 15,000 to 17,000 tons of chrome have been shipped to the United States since the illegal declaration of independence, but like the United Kingdom shipments, all of it was out of Southern Rhodesia before the ban started.

657. On 28 January the United States State Department issued an announcement that the United States Government had requested all United States importers of Southern Rhodesia chromite to comply with the United Kingdom Government's Order-in-Council prohibiting the export of chrome from Southern Rhodesia.

658. As regards the Federal Republic of Germany, chrome is not as yet included in the list of specified items of Southern Rhodesian exports for which import licences are not being granted.²⁴

Copper

659. On 3 March 1966, the "Deputy-Minister of Mines" of Southern Rhodesia, Mr. Dillon, stated in an interview that three new copper mines would probably be opening in the northern area of Southern Rhodesia within the next twelve months. Southern Rhodesia's copper production is about 24,000 tons a year. Mr. Dillon stated that the "Ministry of Mines" was aiming at 30,000 tons within the next two years. If that figure was reached then consideration would have to be given to the installation of a copper refinery. Consideration had already been given to a possible site for the refinery and it was hoped that this would lead to another industry producing copper piping, sheeting and other products.

660. Mr. Dillon also stated that sanctions would not affect Southern Rhodesian sales of copper. The current emphasis on copper mining in Southern Rhodesia was dictated simply by demand and value.

661. The Federal Republic of Germany's list of prohibited imports from Southern Rhodesia does not as yet include copper. The Federal Republic of Germany is reported to have spent £3.3 million on Southern Rhodesian copper in the first nine months of 1965.

Iron ore

662. The Japanese Government announced a ban on imports of Southern Rhodesian pig-iron towards

the end of January.²⁵ These were worth £2.4 million in 1964 and represent nearly 85 per cent of the output of the Southern Rhodesian Iron and Steel Corporation (RISCO). RISCO has been declared a "designated industry" by the Southern Rhodesian régime to prevent it from being closed, and a manpower control order has been issued to prevent dismissals of employees. RISCO has shut down two of its three blast-furnaces and one of its two open-hearth steel furnaces and has abandoned a £7 million expansion and modernization scheme. It is reported that this has made about 400 workers, including 100 Europeans, redundant.

663. It was reported in Salisbury on 2 February that the Japanese steel company of Kobe, in which the Japanese Government holds 20 per cent of the shares, had given notice that its Southern Rhodesian iron ore mine was to be closed. The mine is reported to produce 350,000 tons of ore a year.

664. On 13 April 1966, the United Kingdom Government declared illegal the export of iron ore from Southern Rhodesia. A statutory instrument to that effect was made on 7 April and became operational on 13 April 1966. Under this statutory instrument, it is now a criminal offence under both United Kingdom and Southern Rhodesian law to engage in the export of Southern Rhodesian iron ore.

665. Although Japan imposed a ban on the import of pig-iron from Southern Rhodesia in late January 1966, licences were issued thereafter for the import of at least 84,000 tons of iron ore worth roughly £250,000. According to the Ministry of International Trade and Industry of Japan, these imports were being made under contracts concluded before the unilateral declaration of independence.

666. On 14 April 1966, the Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry held consultations with the representatives of the steel industry on the situation arising out of the United Kingdom ban on the export of Southern Rhodesian iron ore. It was reported that the steel mills had agreed to postpone the imports for the time being.

Asbestos

667. As of April 1966, manufacturers in the Federal Republic of Germany were reported to be still importing asbestos from Southern Rhodesia on the grounds that switching to other sources of the raw material would involve them in heavy extra costs.

668. Japan was also reported on 21 March 1966 to have outstanding licences for the import of asbestos from Southern Rhodesia. Asbestos is not included in the specified list of Southern Rhodesian exports which have been banned by Japan but fall under the general licencing system introduced for imports from Southern Rhodesia.

Gold

669. According to the Barclays Bank, D.C.O. *Overseas Review* for April 1966, the Anglo-American Corporation had sunk three new shafts at its mines on the Felixburg gold belt, near Umvuma. Another, at the Tchangwa mine, which was abandoned some years ago because of water difficulties, was being deepened and developed. It is presumed that Southern Rhodesia has no difficulty in disposing of its gold production, which in 1964 amounted to £7.2 million.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, Supplement for January, February and March 1966, document S/7181.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, document S/7114.

Other developments in commerce and industry

670. On 4 March 1966, the Director of the Salisbury Co-ordinating Centre for Commerce and Industry, Mr. W. Livesey, was reported by a South African newspaper to have stated that he had received requests from overseas countries for huge quantities of Southern Rhodesian goods. The list of requests included 3 million tons of soya beans; unlimited quantities of sunflower seed; 100,000 tons of sorghum; 100,000 tons of mealies; 50,000 tons of cotton seed; about 4 million yards of cotton sheeting; "and all we can produce in the way of bismuth, copper, silver, zinc, lead and other minerals". These requests had come from countries in Europe and America and the Middle and Far East. Some of the requests had come from countries supposed to be backing the trade ban.

671. Mr. Livesey was also reported to have said that some of the countries concerned were also prepared to invest in Southern Rhodesian industry. Most of the local firms in Southern Rhodesia ready to diversify and expand were subsidiaries of British companies.

672. On 18 March 1966, Mr. Ian Smith addressed the annual meeting of the Fort Victoria Chamber of Commerce. In his address, he stated that Southern Rhodesia had beaten the United Kingdom sanctions so far and that it was weathering the storm much better than had been anticipated. Southern Rhodesia could look forward to the future with optimism and confidence provided its affairs were handled wisely. He was aware of the heavy burdens being borne by the commercial sector of the economy. The business sector had been successful on the home front and if this was reflected by other sectors they would win the sanctions war and enjoy the fruits of victory. Southern Rhodesia had problems at the moment and no doubt would have more before the present issue was over.

673. It was reported on 15 March 1966 that, according to figures published by the Central Statistical Office in Salisbury (some of the few remaining statistics still being published), new passenger vehicle registrations in January 1966 were 38 per cent lower than in January 1965. The figure was reported to be the lowest monthly figure for at least four years.

674. In a statement made in Bulawayo on 17 March 1966, the "Minister of Commerce and Industry". Mr. B. Musset, appealed to local retailers to buy Southern Rhodesian goods wherever possible, saying he was disappointed that many concerns were placing orders with local industry on a very short-term basis, giving the impression that they were only too anxious to use imported supplies once again, when sanctions were removed.

675. Mr. Musset also stated that the local motor trade—which was reported to be one of the hardest hit by sanctions—would not overcome its problems until the rationing of petrol was ended. He expected too that many motor companies would have to retrench but said it was important to keep skilled workers in the country.

676. On 31 March 1966, the illegal régime extended the Manpower Regulations to cover four of the major motor vehicle assembly plants in Southern Rhodesia.

677. On 3 April 1966, the President of the Associated Chambers of Commerce of Rhodesia, Mr.

Hughes, stated in Johannesburg that sanctions against Southern Rhodesia were not breaking the country's economy but were helping to create a bigger domestic market for locally manufactured goods. Unemployment in Southern Rhodesia had not reached serious levels although there was a measure of unemployment and a shortage of skilled labour. He also said that Southern Rhodesian industrialists wished to expand their exports to South Africa to replace some of their lost trade with Zambia.

678. On 5 April 1966, Mr. Hughes made a further statement in Johannesburg in which he said that the success Southern Rhodesia had achieved in spite of sanctions was far in excess of the most optimistic hopes held by commerce in the country four months ago. The Southern Rhodesia currency remained strong; exports continued at a high level and new supplies were still coming in. Since "independence", vast new opportunities for investment and development had arisen and new business ventures continued to be established. The Southern Rhodesian economy might require eventual repairs but would not be crippled.

679. The Barclays Bank, D.C.O. *Overseas Review* for April 1966 included a report on Southern Rhodesia's economy. It stated that apart from the Fort Victoria district, retail trading conditions in Southern Rhodesia during February-March reflected buoyant tendencies, with the larger stores experiencing satisfactory turnovers in most departments. Wholesale trade, traditionally quiet at that time of the year, was satisfactory with a slight rise in activity in Bulawayo and turnovers generally comparing favourably with the corresponding period of 1965.

680. A number of small industrial developments to meet local consumer needs were also reported. The Barclays Bank, D.C.O. *Overseas Review* did not, however, refer to oil supplies or tobacco sales.

Employment situation

681. Although no official statistics are available, press reports indicate that the number of Europeans who have lost their jobs as a result of the economic and financial sanctions might run to over a thousand and that these were isolated cases. It was reported however that a large number of Africans had been laid off. In an address to the Fort Victoria Chamber of Commerce on 18 March 1966, Mr. Ian Smith stated that the United Kingdom and foreign sanctions had hit the Southern Rhodesian African hardest.

682. On 6 April 1966, the "Minister of Labour", Mr. McLean, stated that the "Government" was creating employment opportunities. He stated that since last December, 274 Europeans had been taken into government service. He also said that 1,200 school leavers and a further 300 European, Asian and Coloured school leavers had been found jobs in private enterprise. The "Minister" added that so far this year, the government labour exchange had found jobs for more than 8,000 people.

683. Unemployment to a considerable extent has been arrested temporarily at least by the extension of the Manpower Regulations to certain sectors of the economy. The Manpower Regulations empower the illegal régime to prevent companies from dismissing employees and can stop employees resigning and leaving the country without permission. By April 1966, the Manpower Regulations had been extended to cover all the oil companies at CAPREF, tin and iron and steel

industries, the tobacco industry and most of the motor vehicle assembly plants in Southern Rhodesia. Also, the Emergency Powers (Industrial Relations) Act of 23 February 1966 gives the "Minister of Labour" the right to suspend specific provisions of industrial agreements made under the Industrial Conciliation Act, at the request of the employers. It covers most aspects of commerce and industry, but excludes agriculture and railways. Employers may now request alterations in conditions concerning hours of work, short time, leave and remuneration laid down in present agreements. The object is to enable employers, for a temporary period, to alter these conditions of service as an alternative to dismissing workers. It was reported that a number of industries have since cut down on their hours of work to save workers from retrenchment, but no estimates were available.

Related developments in finance and trade

684. The Southern Rhodesian Treasury and Reserve Bank are providing the estimated £20 million-£25 million to finance the purchasing of the tobacco crop by the Tobacco Corporation. The appropriation of this amount, in spite of the credit squeeze by the United Kingdom, has been partly made possible by the availability to Southern Rhodesia of an estimated £10 million-£13 million, in a full year, as the net result of the two-way blockade of interest, dividend and profit payments between the United Kingdom and Southern Rhodesia.

685. According to a statement issued by the "Ministry of Finance" on 15 March 1966, nearly £600,000 of the régime's "independence bonds" which were first issued on 2 February 1966, had been sold in the first six weeks of issue, breaking all previous savings certificate records. Also according to the statement, a medium-term loan of £5 million, which was floated by the "Government" on 28 February, had been fully subscribed by 15 March 1966.

686. It was reported that as a result of these developments, the credit squeeze which the United Kingdom's financial sanctions was expected to impose on the financing of the tobacco crop had not worked as quickly as expected although the commercial banks were still tightly stretched.

687. On 18 April 1966, the "Minister of Commerce and Industry", Mr. B. Musset, stated in Bulawayo that commerce should try to help agriculture in Southern Rhodesia by supplying farmers hit by sanctions or drought with credit over a difficult period. He also urged commerce not to give up franchise for United Kingdom supplied machinery and shipment or this might mean that agriculture would be deprived of vital spare parts. On 19 April 1966, Mr. John Hughes, the President of the Associated Chambers of Commerce of Rhodesia, replied that commerce itself was in no position to carry the agricultural community because it was also affected by the credit squeeze and by the national effort to retain employees in spite of reduced profits and turnover.

688. In his speech on 29 April 1966, at the opening of the Central African Trade Fair in Bulawayo, Mr. Smith stated that Southern Rhodesia had maintained a favourable trade balance since "independence" and the Rhodesian pound had not been devalued as predicted by the pessimists. Since "independence", the "Government" had provided industrialists with foreign currency for more than fifty projects.

689. He also gave economic information not published before. Mineral output last year, he said, was worth a record £32 million and trends in the first quarter of 1966 suggested that this would be bettered. Manufacturing exports amounted to £65 million in 1965—also a record. But he admitted that the index of manufacturing output had fallen 5 per cent in February 1966, because of sanctions. The building plans passed by the local authorities in January and February 1966, were £50,000 higher than in the same month last year. Sixty-five per cent of this was for residential homes.

Economic relations with South Africa

690. On 1 March 1966 the Johannesburg *Star* quoted the latest issue of the *Journal of the South African Foreign Trade Organization* which carried a report on South African exports to Southern Rhodesia. According to this report, South Africa could provide Southern Rhodesia with virtually everything it had been importing from the United Kingdom which in 1964 supplied 30 per cent of Southern Rhodesia's total imports. Payments by Southern Rhodesian importers for goods from South Africa presented a potential problem, however, particularly since almost 45 per cent of Southern Rhodesia's gross national product was accounted for by exports.

691. According to the report, there have been no reports of South African exporters experiencing trouble in obtaining payments for their products. Exports insurance for goods sold on credit to Southern Rhodesia was also no more expensive than it was before the unilateral declaration of independence. The article added that the extension of credit by South African exporters would, on the other hand, probably continue only for so long as it seemed likely that payments would be made within a reasonable period. This could be a crucial point in trading relations between South Africa and Southern Rhodesia during the next few months.

692. On 2 March 1966, the *Cape Times* reported that South African exporters had moved into the trade vacuum caused by the United Kingdom Government's ban on exports to Southern Rhodesia. South African exports of manufactured goods to Southern Rhodesia had risen sharply during the first two months of 1966 and the trend was expected to continue. A strict ban, however, had been placed by the Southern Rhodesia and South Africa Governments on the disclosure of information on the volume of trade and value of trade. According to the report, officials of the South African Department of Commerce and Industry and of the "Rhodesia Trade Commissioners" office in Johannesburg refused to comment on the growing trade. The authorities in Southern Rhodesia were reported to have stated that South African manufacturers were adequately filling the gap left by British manufacturers because of the boycott.

693. It was reported on 8 March 1966 that Southern Rhodesian manufacturers had formed an association to spearhead an export drive into South Africa. Manufacturers with a knowledge of South African conditions and requirements had agreed to pool information for the benefit of the Southern Rhodesian manufacturing industry as a whole.

694. Secretaries to the association, known as the Rhodesia Export Association, had been appointed in Salisbury, Bulawayo and Johannesburg and warehouse

facilities had been established in Johannesburg, Cape Town, Durban, Port Elizabeth, East London and Pietersburg. The association would provide Southern Rhodesian manufacturers with information on market potential, transport depots, customs and tariff problems and would help to arrange marketing campaigns.

695. On 3 April 1966, a five-man delegation of Southern Rhodesian businessmen, led by the President of the Associated Chambers of Commerce of Rhodesia, Mr. Hughes, arrived in Johannesburg to attend the Republic Festival Show in Johannesburg. Mr. Hughes stated on arrival that Southern Rhodesian industrialists wished to expand their exports to South Africa to replace some of their lost trade with Zambia. On 5 April 1966, Mr. Hughes also stated in Johannesburg that South Africa and Southern Rhodesia were more economically interdependent now than ever before. He was speaking as leader of the Southern Rhodesian commercial mission which was visiting the Rand Easter Show. The purpose of the visit was to give South African businessmen and others factual information on the present economic situation in Southern Rhodesia and to correct any misconceptions there might be regarding opportunities for two-way trade.

Economic relations with Portugal

696. On 22 February 1966, it was reported from Salisbury that a Southern Rhodesian trade delegation had left secretly for Angola for talks with the Portuguese Government. The talks were said to be a follow-up to meetings held last year, following the signing of a trade agreement between Southern Rhodesia and Portugal. Under the trade agreement, which is to last for an initial period of five years, the signatories agreed to treat each other's products on a "most favoured nation" basis.

697. On 17 March 1966, it was reported from Lisbon that Portugal had taken delivery of a total shipment of 133 tons of Southern Rhodesian beef on trial basis and would decide if it wished to purchase more after gauging the success and the commercial utility of the Southern Rhodesian product.

698. On 6 and 8 April 1966, the Government of Portugal issued two press *communiqués* in which it reiterated its position of keeping transit facilities from Mozambique open to Zambia, Malawi and Southern Rhodesia. It stated in these *communiqués* that it would not interfere with goods destined to any of those countries (see paras. 715-716 below).

Southern Rhodesia and the international economic sanctions

699. According to United Kingdom Government estimates, by March/April 1966, Southern Rhodesian exports (on the basis of 1964 figures) had been reduced by 60 per cent by international sanctions. Most of Southern Rhodesia's normal major trading partners had banned all, or most of their imports from Southern Rhodesia. Southern Rhodesia's domestic exports for 1964 amounted to £119,465,000. The 60 per cent of Southern Rhodesian exports affected by sanctions included tobacco, sugar, asbestos, chrome, lithium, ferro-alloys, meat, hides and skins, pig-iron, steel and copper.

700. South Africa, which is not participating in sanctions, imported £9 million of domestic merchandise from Southern Rhodesia in 1964. Portugal which is also not participating in the sanctions imported

£700,000 of domestic merchandise into Mozambique from Southern Rhodesia in 1964. It has been estimated that Angola and Portugal took domestic imports from Southern Rhodesia worth £225,000 and £380,000 respectively in 1964.

701. Zambia's imports of domestic merchandise from Southern Rhodesia were valued at £31 million in 1964, most of which were essential items to the national economy. As of April 1966, these imports had declined at an estimated rate of about 30 per cent (or £10 million per annum), following an appeal by the Government to local importers to find alternative supply sources. Malawi, which is in the same predicament as Zambia, since its imports of domestic merchandise from Southern Rhodesia are essential items, also imported £5.6 million worth of goods from Southern Rhodesia in 1964. The Malawi Government has also made an appeal to local importers to find alternative sources of supply (see paras. 305-330 above). There are no current estimates of the impact of this appeal on the trade between the two countries. The Democratic Republic of the Congo, which also imports essential items from Southern Rhodesia, was reported to be in a position similar to that of Zambia and Malawi, although on 1 February 1966 it announced its intention of suspending economic dealings with Southern Rhodesia. In 1964, Southern Rhodesian domestic exports to the Democratic Republic of the Congo were worth £1.5 million.

702. Bechuanaland, which is experiencing serious economic difficulty owing to a prolonged drought, imported £700,000 worth of domestic products from Southern Rhodesia in 1964. No estimates are available as to how far its trade has been affected by the sanctions.

703. Japan has imposed sanctions on about 75 per cent of its imports (by 1964 figures) from Southern Rhodesia. In 1964, Japan imported £5.5 million worth of domestic merchandise from Southern Rhodesia. On 3 December 1965, Japan informed the Secretary-General²⁶ that it was its policy not to import any more tobacco and sugar from Southern Rhodesia except for sugar committed prior to the unilateral declaration of independence. On 1 February 1966, Japan also informed the Secretary-General²⁷ that there would be no further imports of pig-iron from Southern Rhodesia and that hereafter, all imports from Southern Rhodesia would be subject to import licencing by the Japanese Government and that the necessary legal measures had been taken to this effect.

704. It is reported that, according to Japanese officials, the sanctions which were announced in late January 1966, do not cover sugar and iron ore contracts which were negotiated before the unilateral declaration of independence. Accordingly, since the ban was issued, Japan has awarded licences for the import of at least 84,000 tons of iron ore worth £250,000. Most of Southern Rhodesia's iron ore exports go to Japan. It is reported that these exports have continued at a high level since the unilateral declaration of independence. Similarly, Japan has an outstanding contract for 50,000 tons of Southern Rhodesian sugar worth about £1 million. Japan announced further

²⁶ *Ibid.*, *Twentieth Year, Supplement for October, November and December 1965*, document S/6990.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, *Twenty-first Year, Supplement for January, February and March 1966*, document S/7114.

economic sanctions against Southern Rhodesia in June and July of 1966.²⁸

705. Among other Japanese imports from Southern Rhodesia which fall under the licencing system but which have not been banned are copper, asbestos and chrome ore.

706. By December 1965, the Federal Republic of Germany had banned about 70 per cent of its imports from Southern Rhodesia. In 1964, the Federal Republic imported £7.9 million worth of domestic merchandise from Southern Rhodesia. In a note to the Secretary-General dated 4 March 1966,²⁹ it stated that import licences for tobacco and sugar were not being granted. On 24 February, it was reported that the Federal Republic of Germany had decided to extend its ban to include ferro-chrome and pig-iron. The report said that no import licences would be granted in respect of import contracts freshly concluded.

707. Included in the list of imports from Southern Rhodesia which have not been banned by the Federal Republic of Germany are copper, chrome and asbestos.

708. It is reported that the January 1966 import figures, the latest available, show that the Federal Republic of Germany bought Southern Rhodesian goods (including goods of Southern Rhodesian origin purchased from suppliers elsewhere) worth about £1.2 million. That was twice as much as the bill for January 1965. The breakdown for commodities is not available, but it is reported that there may have been a fair amount of stocking up against the possibility of further import bans.

709. It was reported on 22 April 1966, that the United Kingdom had made representations to the Federal Republic of Germany and Japan to tighten their sanctions against Southern Rhodesia.

OIL EMBARGO

Incident of the oil tankers

710. Towards the end of March 1966, a 13,000-ton tanker, the *Joanna V*, owned by the Varnna Corporation of Panama and flying the Greek flag, was sighted heading for Beira with a cargo of 18,000 tons of crude oil for Southern Rhodesia. The tanker was under charter to the South African Company of A.G. Morrisson of Cape Town. Following representations made by the United Kingdom Government, the Government of Greece, between 26 March and 2 April, sent four separate warning messages to the Greek Captain and owners of the tanker ordering them not to unload oil at Beira for Southern Rhodesia.

711. On the night of 4 April 1966, the United Kingdom frigate *Plymouth* intercepted the *Joanna V* off the coast of Mozambique and a United Kingdom officer boarded the ship. The frigate was reported to have been under instructions not to use force. The United Kingdom Foreign Office was quoted as saying that the Master of the tanker had refused a request from the United Kingdom officer that he change his plans to sail for Beira.

712. The *Joanna V* arrived at the Port of Beira on 5 April 1966. On 6 April the Greek Government

cancelled the Greek registration of the tanker and deprived the Master of his licence as a Merchant Navy Master for life.

713. On 5 April 1966, as part of the attempt to prevent the tanker from landing its oil, the Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom, Mr. Michael Stewart, met with the *Chargé d'affaires* of Portugal in London, and the United Kingdom Ambassador in Lisbon also called on the Foreign Minister of Portugal, Mr. Alberto Franco Nogueira. It was reported that at both interviews, the United Kingdom Government underlined the heavy responsibility that would fall on the Portuguese Government if the Greek-registered tanker unloaded its cargo at the Mozambique seaport of Beira.

714. On 5 April 1966, Lord Walston, Parliamentary Under-Secretary at the United Kingdom Foreign Office, arrived in Lisbon for talks with Mr. Nogueira on the question of the oil embargo. Lord Walston had three meetings with the Portuguese Foreign Minister before leaving Lisbon for London on 8 April 1966. He was reported to have stated that he was not altogether satisfied with the talks to get Portugal's backing for an oil ban on Southern Rhodesia.

715. On 6 April 1966, the Government of Portugal issued a press *communiqué* concerning the arrival at Beira of the *Joanna V*. In this *communiqué* the Government of Portugal reiterated its position that it had not taken any initiative tending to ensure the supply of oil to Southern Rhodesia; neither purchasing it in the name of that country, nor transporting it in Portuguese ships. In the second place, the Portuguese Government had given and continued to give the most formal guarantees that it would not permit any consignment of oil to be diverted to a country different from the one for which it was destined. Consignments of oil for Mozambique, Zambia and Malawi were arriving continually at the Port of Beira and the Portuguese Government felt that it ought to reaffirm its position of principle which consisted in guaranteeing that all merchandise coming from or destined for countries in the interior would not be stopped in transit or diverted. It could not take upon itself the responsibility of establishing the precedent of interfering with the free access to the sea of the countries in the interior, at the request of third parties and for the protection of the interests of the latter. This was a duty which was imposed upon it by the unassailable principles of international law, otherwise recognized expressly in conventions.

716. On 8 April 1966, the Government of Portugal issued a second press *communiqué* in which it reiterated its position on the freedom of private companies in Portuguese Territories and rejected responsibility for the docking of the *Joanna V* in Beira.

717. On 11 April 1966, the *Joanna V* pulled anchor into the Mozambique harbour of Beira and moved to the quayside. An official of the Foreign Ministry of Portugal was reported to have said that the *Joanna V* was authorized to dock in the harbour to facilitate the normal movement of the port.

718. On 12 April 1966, the Government of Panama revoked the provisional registry acquired by the *Joanna V*.

719. On 14 April 1966, a Portuguese Government official was reported to have announced that the Captain of Beira Port had boarded the *Joanna V*

²⁸ *Ibid.*, Supplement for April, May and June 1966, document S/7362; *ibid.*, Supplement for July, August and September 1966, document S/7420.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, Supplement for January, February and March 1966, document S/7181.

and taken control of the vessel on behalf of the Portuguese authorities.

720. On 5 April 1966, it was reported that another tanker, the *Manuela*, belonging to the same owners as the *Joanna V*, was heading for Beira with a consignment of 16,000 tons of crude oil for Southern Rhodesia. On 5 and 6 April 1966, the Government of Greece sent two warning cables to the Master of the 11,000-ton tanker *Manuela* warning him not to proceed to Beira.

721. It will be recalled that Security Council resolution 221 (1966) of 9 April 1966, *inter alia*, called upon the Government of the United Kingdom to prevent by the use of force if necessary the arrival at Beira of vessels reasonably believed to be carrying oil destined for Rhodesia.

722. Following the adoption of this resolution, the United Kingdom anti-submarine frigate, *Berwick*, on 10 April 1966, intercepted the Greek-registered tanker, *Manuela*, 150 miles east of Beira and put an armed party aboard. A United Kingdom Ministry of Defence spokesman stated that as a result of the action taken by the *Berwick*, the *Manuela* had now turned away from Beira and was on a southerly cruise.

723. On 12 April 1966, the *Manuela* arrived at the South African seaport of Durban and docked in the harbour. On 16 April 1966, the *Manuela* left Durban for an unknown destination.

Portugal and the oil embargo

724. According to a press report, oil and petroleum products have continued to reach Southern Rhodesia from South Africa by rail through Mozambique. The oil reaching Southern Rhodesia through Mozambique was estimated at about 100,000 gallons daily.

725. The board of directors of the Rhodesia-Mozambique Pipeline Company (CPMR) met in Lisbon on 10 March 1966 to consider a request from the local management of CAPREF in Southern Rhodesia to build a "slip" pipeline to connect the new dockside storage tanks, which were under construction in Beira, to the pipeline for a resumption of crude oil supplies to Southern Rhodesia.

726. At the meeting, the directors of Lonrho Ltd. (the United Kingdom Company that owns 62.5 per cent of the shares of CPMR) presented certain legal documents relating to resolutions passed by the board of directors of CAPREF in London. These resolutions stated that the local management of CAPREF was not in a position to issue instructions in respect of activities outside Southern Rhodesia.

727. According to press reports, the most significant result of the meeting of the board of directors of CPMR was the agreement that another board meeting would have to be held before any connexion could be made between the pipeline and the new storage tanks under construction at the dockside in Beira. The meeting was adjourned *sine die* on the understanding that it could be convened again at twenty-four hours notice.

728. On 31 March 1966, it was reported that work had been completed on two of the six 3,000-ton prefabricated storage tanks which were being built near the pumping station at Beira and that about twenty-four hours would be needed to connect the tanks to the pipeline.

729. On 6 April 1966, the board of CPMR resumed its meeting to decide whether the two 3,000-ton storage

tanks just completed in Beira harbour should be connected to the pipeline so that oil from the tankers could be pumped through to Southern Rhodesia, as well as the 14,000 tons of crude oil that has been lying idle in the pipeline since the beginning of the year. The meeting ended on 7 April 1966, but no official statement was issued. The chairman of Lonrho Ltd., Mr. Alan Ball, was quoted as having said after the meeting that he was personally opposed to pumping oil through the pipeline to Southern Rhodesia, but that he could not forecast how the Portuguese, who are in the majority on the board, would decide.

730. On 14 April 1966, it was reported that the Smith régime had indicated to the representatives of CPMR and CAPREF that they expected facilities to be made ready soon for pumping and refining.

731. On 15 April 1966, it was reported that Portuguese parachute troops had been specially flown from Lourenço Marques to Beira to guard the Mozambique-Rhodesia pipeline. Both the pipeline and all its adjacent buildings are said to be under guard.

South Africa and the oil embargo

732. The Rhodesia Broadcasting Corporation made a series of announcements in the second half of March-April 1966 which show that oil and petroleum products have continued to arrive in Southern Rhodesia from South Africa.

733. The quantity of oil and petroleum products mentioned in these broadcasts as coming from South Africa varied from a few hundred gallons to 4,000 gallons per shipment by road. According to these broadcasts, some of the drivers who brought in shipments ranging between 2,000 to 4,000 gallons were officially received by the Mayors of Bulawayo and Salisbury at their respective City Halls.

734. On 18 April 1966, the *Rand Daily Mail* estimated the extent of the oil flow from South Africa to Southern Rhodesia as being between 140,000 and 160,000 gallons daily. This would be about double Southern Rhodesia's consumption under rationing. According to the *Rand Daily Mail*, the figure was based on a careful survey in the previous week at Beit Bridge and in Mozambique. The daily total was made up of about 45,000 gallons by road tankers via the Beit Bridge and about 100,000 gallons by rail.

735. The paper stated that while the road flow by Beit Bridge had decreased from a weekly peak of 450,000 gallons to some 300,000 gallons (see paragraphs 261-264 above) the loss had been offset by increased rail traffic. Fuelling from road tankers, mostly hauling from the Rand, cost the Smith régime an estimated 6/- per gallon. Rail traffic, mostly from the Rand via Komatipoort to Lourenço Marques and thence via Malvernia to Salisbury and Bulawayo was far cheaper. All the major oil suppliers were said to be participating in the traffic. According to the *Rand Daily Mail*, it was significant that road tanker drivers were reported as saying that storage space in Southern Rhodesia was becoming scarce—frequently they now had to drive from tank to tank looking for space.

Internal developments related to the oil embargo

736. On 14 April 1966, the "Minister of Commerce and Industry", Mr. B. H. Musset, announced that the present method of fuel rationing would end on 9 May 1966 and be replaced by a coupon system. Petrol ration

identification cards which expired on 2 May 1966 would continue to be valid for one more week and the public would be able to draw petrol for the week of 3 May to 9 May as at present. He stated that under the new scheme a more equitable scale of rationing would be introduced. The new scale would be based on a greater number of vehicle weight classifications; consideration would also be given to distance from home to work.

737. In his broadcast of 16 April 1966, Mr. Smith announced that Southern Rhodesia had decided not to use the oil from the tanker *Joanna V* because it was not its intention to involve unnecessarily other countries and people. It had, however, been proved by the incident of the *Joanna V* that Southern Rhodesia could break the blockade and, if it wished, pump the oil to the refinery at Feruka. The fact that Southern Rhodesia would not obtain oil from the *Joanna V* did not concern his régime very much. He said that after all, as the people of Southern Rhodesia knew, the use of the pipeline to transport oil from the coast was a comparatively new development. Prior to that Southern Rhodesia had got on very well using other means, in the same way as many other countries in the world did. Southern Rhodesia would continue by using those other traditional lines of supply.

738. Mr. Smith also stated in his broadcast that his régime was not complacent over the present position. It was now experimenting with a charcoal gas plant for adaptation on diesel engines. He hoped that plans for this would be ready shortly and thereafter available throughout Southern Rhodesia for commercial production and sale to the public. Southern Rhodesia was also working on the development of oil from coal. This exercise continued and in addition a new prospect for oil, both more encouraging and more exciting, was under investigation. For security reasons, however, he was unable to give any further information about this.

F. FURTHER CONSIDERATION BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE³⁰

INTRODUCTION

739. The Special Committee gave further consideration to the question of Southern Rhodesia at its 411th meeting on 10 May 1966 and subsequently at its 418th, 423rd to 427th, 432nd and 447th meetings held in Africa between 24 May and 15 June 1966.

WRITTEN PETITIONS AND HEARINGS

740. The Special Committee also circulated the written petitions listed below concerning the Territory:³¹

³⁰ See also chapter II for an account of the discussions on the resolution adopted by the Special Committee at its 455th meeting on 22 June 1966 concerning the implementation of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) with regard to Southern Rhodesia, and other Territories considered by the Committee during its meetings in Africa.

³¹ The following petitions were circulated after the Special Committee had adopted a resolution concerning Southern Rhodesia (A/AC.109/167) at its 427th meeting on 31 May 1966: A/AC.109/PET.458/Add.2, A/AC.109/PET.476/Add.1, A/AC.109/PET.517, A/AC.109/PET.546 and A/AC.109/PET.548.

Petitioner

Document No.

Mr. G. Pongault, Secretary-General, Union Panafricaine et Malgache des Travailleurs croyants	A/AC.109/PET.456
Mr. David Mpongo, representative in the United Arab Republic, Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU)	A/AC.109/PET.458/Add.2
Mr. Faisal El Haji, President of the National Union of Kuwaiti Students	A/AC.109/PET.466
Mr. E. Backwell	A/AC.109/PET.475
Mr. Irving Brown, representative of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) to the United Nations	A/AC.109/PET.476 and Add.1
Messrs. Laurel Thompson, Christopher Adams and Ronald Brady	A/AC.109/PET.477
Mr. Joseph A. Fallon, President of the United States Youth Council	A/AC.109/PET.517
Dr. Robert John, Chairman, Friends of Rhodesia Committee, New York	A/AC.109/PET.546
Mr. Carl-Axel Valén, Secretary General, World Assembly of Youth (WAY)	A/AC.109/PET.548
741. The Special Committee heard the following petitioners concerning Southern Rhodesia:	
Mr. T. G. Silundika, representative, Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU) (A/AC.109/PET.458)	(423rd and 424th meetings)
Messrs. E. M. Pasipanodya, Chief representative in Tanzania and L. P. Chihota, Assistant representative in Zambia, Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) (A/AC.109/PET.463)	(424th meeting)
Mr. David Mpongo, Cairo Office of the Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU) (A/AC.109/PET.458/Add.1) ³² ...	(447th meeting)

742. Mr. SILUNDIKA (ZAPU) said that since the Committee had held its session in Zambia in 1965, the political situation in Southern Rhodesia had deteriorated. The settler régime had intensified its repression of the African population. It had been pointed out at that time that the aim of the United Kingdom Government was independence for the settler minority régime. The now familiar unilateral declaration of independence by Ian Smith was just a stage in that Government's scheme eventually to create a sovereign settler minority régime in Southern Rhodesia. That view was supported by the fact that the United Kingdom had retained its legal presence in Southern Rhodesia through a Governor, through whom in fact talks had been resumed between London and Salisbury. There was no doubt, therefore, that the so-called unilateral declaration of independence was a probing action by the United Kingdom to test international reaction to the idea of an independent settler minority régime in Africa.

³² This petitioner was heard after the Special Committee had adopted a resolution concerning Southern Rhodesia (A/AC.109/167) at its 427th meeting on 31 May 1966.

743. The unilateral declaration had two immediate purposes: to allow the settlers to consolidate their economy and their military and police forces, and to become so hardened to international condemnation as to be able to defy it to the same extent as the South African Boers. It must be crystal clear to anyone concerned with the Southern Rhodesian situation, as it was to ZAPU, that the United Kingdom had deliberately adopted a stand which prevented others from taking action to eliminate the oppressive colonialist régime while doing nothing itself to bring about order and justice.

744. The régime had continued its repressive activities against the Africans, more than 34,000 of whom were in prison and death cells, or under other restrictions. Scores of people were being arrested daily in nazi-style witch-hunts. Detention camps continued to be established in increasing numbers in the rural areas near the territory of some chiefs who had completely lost the confidence of their people. It was in those circumstances that the leader of the African masses of Zimbabwe, Joshua Nkomo, and other leaders continued to be detained. Conflict between Africans and the Whites continued to be widespread. Although the settlers were well armed and commanded a force of nearly 40,000 men, the Africans were determined not to accept anything less than the total surrender of their country and the total dissolution of the settler instruments of oppression. It followed, therefore, that the deterioration of the situation in Southern Rhodesia was ushering in a dangerous phase of armed resistance, with consequences that were bound to involve areas beyond the country's borders and that could mean nothing less than a threat to international peace. He feared that widespread resistance might develop unless prompt measures were taken to liquidate the Smith régime in the shortest possible time.

745. The United Kingdom had pretended to take steps to bring to an end the illegal régime of Ian Smith as if the question of legality or illegality were the central problem of the situation. It was well known that the United Kingdom had deliberately encouraged the minority régime to anchor itself by promising not to use force if it seized independence. Since the unilateral declaration of independence the United Kingdom had talked of economic sanctions as its measure of bringing the situation to order. Those had not only proved ineffective but, with the resumption of talks between Salisbury and London, had proved to be a sheer bluff. South Africa was supplying more than 100,000 gallons of petrol a day to Southern Rhodesia, whose daily consumption was 83,000 gallons. Japan, the Federal Republic of Germany, France and the United Kingdom continued a flourishing trade with Southern Rhodesia as did United States companies like the Union Carbide Corporation at Selukwe, and the United Kingdom, the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany still had diplomatic missions in Salisbury.

746. German exports to Southern Rhodesia in January and February 1966 had been to the value of £330,000 and £225,000 respectively, while its imports from Southern Rhodesia for December 1965 and January 1966 had been respectively £1,116,000 and £1,170,000.

747. A financial broker from Hamburg, director of a German-Southern Rhodesia trading group, Herr Joachim Seelmaecker, had told a *Daily Express* reporter in Johannesburg at the end of April that the

Rhodesian situation called for business enterprise and he did not see why only the Japanese and French should take advantage of all the opportunities which British action had left open to others.

748. That illustrated that the economic sanctions to which Britain would like to limit the world in opposing the régime were too easily evaded, and therefore completely inadequate to meet challenge of the situation. Herr Strauss, the former German Minister of Defence, had made an effort to pour in more money.

749. While Governments had made pronouncement against trade with Southern Rhodesia, they had not been able to prevent trading by companies based in their countries. Moreover, it had been learnt that a Japanese company had recently sold tear-gas to the Smith régime for use against Africans and that Turkey had not only sold arms, but a Turkish guerrilla expert was training the settler forces in anti-guerrilla warfare. It could well be that companies and nationals involved in assisting the United Kingdom to entrench the settler régime were acting outside their Governments' policies, but the effect was that their countries were abetting an unwanted régime. He believed that the Special Committee had the capacity to investigate that information and, when its truth was established, the countries concerned must be asked why they were taking action in Africa that was against African interests.

750. The action of South Africa and Portugal, in openly assisting the settler dictatorship, was indicative not only of their economic alliance but also of their military alliance for oppressing international African populations and using the Zambezi as the protective line against free and independent Africa.

751. The United Kingdom had resumed talks with its agents in Southern Rhodesia, and was shamelessly telling the world that they were aimed at settling the Southern Rhodesian problem as if that problem was between it and its agents in Southern Rhodesia. Talks that were discriminatory in composition, scope and purpose could not be expected to produce non-discriminatory conditions or results. His organization rejected those talks without reservation. They were a blatant conspiracy to work out a formula for bulldozing the Africans. A peaceful solution of the Southern Rhodesia problem could only be gained by convening a genuine constitutional conference, attended by the representatives of the people, to frame a constitution that would transfer power directly to the African majority.

752. It was common knowledge that the United Kingdom was toying with the idea of a Royal Commission to test the views of the people in the country, with guarantees not to impede majority rule, as a basis for conferring sovereignty on the settler régime. The United Kingdom's so-called six principles for settling the Rhodesian problem had been made vague enough to permit the complete betrayal of the African people. Prime Minister Wilson had sold out South Africa before the unilateral declaration by promising never to use force, and on 27 April he had once again been recorded in *Hansard* as having made the assertion that it would take a very long time before majority rule in Southern Rhodesia could be justifiable. He clearly wanted to transfer to the settler régime the task of guaranteeing unimpeded progress towards majority rule for "that very long time", and that meant virtually destroying any chance of majority rule. The Special

Committee should place on record the fact that ZAPU, on behalf of the struggling masses of Zimbabwe, would accept neither a constitutional device nor a régime other than one based on African majority rule.

753. It was evident that the United Kingdom was not only incapable of but totally opposed to the removal of its settler-dictatorship in Southern Rhodesia. It could not now be allowed to pretend to go along with those who were making efforts to find a just settlement. He therefore proposed to the Special Committee the following conditions for settling the Southern Rhodesian problem:

(a) The United Kingdom, as a colonialist country, should be expelled from the Special Committee as an impediment to the sincere decolonization efforts of the United Nations;

(b) The United Kingdom should be declared the real enemy of the African people in Zimbabwe and of the world's desire for peace in Africa;

(c) All Members of the United Nations should be bound not to recognize or assist in any way any régime in Zimbabwe established by the United Kingdom short of African majority rule;

(d) The United Kingdom should be condemned for conniving with the settler régime in its brutal murders of the African people, whose only endeavour was justice, freedom and the restoration of their country, Zimbabwe;

(e) In considering measures consistent with its role against the Southern Rhodesian régime, the United Nations should openly regard force as the only solution of the Southern Rhodesian problem;

(f) United Nations Members should, individually or severally, assist the African people of Zimbabwe, in every way possible, in their efforts to overthrow minority dictatorship in Southern Rhodesia;

(g) The continuation of activities of certain Members of the United Nations in trade and other relations with the settler minority régime should be prevented.

754. A peaceful settlement could only come about when all leaders and other political prisoners and detainees had been released unconditionally and when the African leaders had unrestricted political freedom to consult with their followers in moving towards a genuinely convened constitutional conference with the specific purpose of transferring power directly to the African majority.

755. In reply to questions, Mr. Silundika (ZAPU) said that the oil embargo had had no significant effect. There had been much talk about the import of oil through Beira but other routes remained open and over 100,000 gallons of fuel entered Southern Rhodesia from South Africa every day, quite apart from supplies received through Mozambique. The increase in the price of petrol was not due to the oil embargo but was merely a provisional arrangement made by the rebel régime. Furthermore, the two oil tankers *Manuela* and *Joanna V*, despite the considerable publicity given to their diversion, were still cruising off the shore of southern Africa and might well discharge their cargo at a South African port or elsewhere.

756. The oil refinery in Salisbury was being expanded, at a cost of £200,000 to receive crude oil arriving through South Africa and Mozambique. Measures had also been initiated for co-operation between Southern Rhodesia and South Africa with a view to ensuring safe and uninterrupted oil supply lines. Oil

rationing had been introduced, but only in order to conserve stocks. As Smith himself had made abundantly clear, Southern Rhodesia had two years' supply of oil. Moreover, South Africa was endeavouring to make use of certain oil deposits within its territory and attempts were also being made with the assistance of the powerful Anglo-American Company to derive other forms of fuel from coal.

757. Mr. CHIHOTA (ZANU) said that he was speaking on behalf of the liberation movement which represented the people of Zimbabwe—or Southern Rhodesia, as it was called by the imperialists. That movement was leading the armed struggle to oust British colonialism from Zimbabwe.

758. He was grateful for the opportunity, on behalf of the 4 million exploited Africans of Zimbabwe, to expose the half-truths and lies uttered by British colonialists at the United Nations in an effort to perpetuate their subjugation of the Zimbabwe people. He expressed appreciation to the President, Government and people of Tanzania both for providing the facilities which had made it possible for the representatives of ZANU to appear before the Committee and for assuming a major role in the liberation struggle of the Zimbabwe people.

759. It was with great satisfaction that he noted the absence from the Special Committee of the representatives of the arch-colonial imperialist Power, the United Kingdom—an absence which it was to be hoped, would be permanent. As stated in ZANU's address to the Special Committee at its meeting in Lusaka in 1965, the United Kingdom was the culprit and Smith the agent in the Rhodesian situation. As a colonial Power it should be expelled from the Committee and, like Portugal and South Africa, it should not be allowed to participate in the Committee's work until it had renounced colonialism.

760. Since the representative of ZANU had appeared before the Committee in Lusaka, Zambia, in 1965, the position had worsened: ZANU's President Mr. Ndabaningi Sithole, and three quarters of the leading members were either under detention or restriction. The three most well-known concentration camps were Sikombela, Wha Wha and Gonakudzingwa where, together with over 20,000 of ZANU's supporters and freedom fighters, its leaders were confined, without trial, under deplorable conditions. The Smith régime had converted disused mines into special gaols to accommodate some of ZANU's leaders, all of whom were under detention for a minimum of five years. Their families and friends did not know where they were. The prison camps were deliberately designed to reduce their African inmates to the level of animals. Those opposed to British colonial rule in Zimbabwe were removed from their homes by night to prisons, where many had died. Only two weeks earlier many prominent Africans including two doctors, Dr. Silas Mundawarara and Dr. Mutasa, had been imprisoned, together with 500 Africans, following the bloody gun-battle at Sinoia between the forces of ZANU and the puppet régime. Thousands more were being arrested daily in various parts of the country. It would take too much of the Special Committee's time to recount the full extent of the atrocities suffered by the Zimbabwe people and he would therefore confine himself to two examples. In the first place, the Land Apportionment Act, dividing land between the British settlers and the indigenous Zimbabwe population, was

being more rigorously enforced so that Africans were deprived of their livestock, farming areas and homes. Colour discrimination was as rigorously applied as in South Africa. Secondly, in the urban areas thousands of Africans were being evicted from their jobs and houses and were thus reduced to the level of beggars. That was being done so that the settlers would have even more and better jobs and a still higher standard of living when they already enjoyed the best in the world. To a great extent such evictions resulted from deliberate British colonial policy rather than from sanctions.

761. On 11 November 1965, the settler Government had declared independence unilaterally. The United Kingdom, which had created the political and economic conditions making that declaration possible, had thus sought to absolve itself of any responsibility for the further denials of the human rights of the Zimbabwe people by the British settler Government, and had been able to pretend to fight that Government through ineffective sanctions. As a result, the settlers had raised the forces of oppression to an unprecedented level. ZANU, which was fighting to regain the land of the Zimbabwe people, was also struggling for their human rights, for democracy and for justice. The unilateral declaration was merely another means used by the British, both in Southern Rhodesia and in Britain, to continue colonial exploitation.

762. From the outset, ZANU had opposed British sanctions which, as they had repeatedly warned would be the case, had failed dismally. They had only inconvenienced, but would never defeat, the British settlers. Since the United Kingdom—a colonial Power with enormous interests in southern Africa—had established itself as solely responsible for their implementation, it had been an error for the Security Council, which danced to the tune of British imperialism, to allow the United Kingdom to police its own evil deeds.

763. ZANU and the people of Zimbabwe had decided to launch an armed struggle which, they were convinced, was the only realistic and effective way of recovering their rights. Any other course would only result in continued colonial exploitation. ZANU had been forced to meet counter-revolutionary violence with revolutionary resistance and, as the Special Committee had been informed by its representatives in 1965, there would be a bloody racial war in Zimbabwe. For the first time since the early wars of liberation in 1890-1896, known in Zimbabwe as Chimurenga and Chindunduma, the masses, led by ZANU revolutionary forces, had fought with the settler security forces near Sinoia on 28 and 29 April 1966. On 16 and 17 May 1966, under the direction of ZANU forces, they had again fought with the settlers near Hartley. At Sinoia at least seven gallant heroes had lost their lives, and many Zimbabwean civilians had been killed by the British settlers. Those battles had breached what had hitherto appeared to be the impregnable security of the settlers.

764. The Rhodesian problem remained a threat to world peace. The battles being fought within the country, the involvement in British sanctions of such countries as Zambia, the threat of military invasion of Zambia and neighbouring territories by the settlers, the support provided by South Africa and Portugal to the settlers in Southern Rhodesia, were all factors contributing to the gravity of the situation and to the

threat to peace in Africa and the world. The United Nations could help Zimbabweans to liberate themselves and could lessen the bloodshed which was bound to result as ZANU's armed struggle developed and intensified. It could help to defeat British colonialism more rapidly by taking the following measures: first, sanctions, to include South Africa, Mozambique and Angola, should be mandatory and should be placed under United Nations supervision. Secondly, all the borders of Zimbabwe should be sealed by a United Nations force. Thirdly, a force which should be composed of nationals from countries selected by the people of Zimbabwe and should operate under the auspices of the United Nations and OAU, would have to be used in Southern Rhodesia.

765. In conclusion, he strongly condemned the current negotiations on independence between the British in Southern Rhodesia and the British in the United Kingdom. The talks were a fraud and were aimed at creating another South Africa to work in close co-operation with Dr. Salazar and Dr. Verwoerd. The United Nations should make it clear, in a resolution, that it would never recognize the decisions reached at any consultations between the United Kingdom and Southern Rhodesia in which Zimbabwe's African representatives, presently under detention or restriction, had not participated.

766. The United Nations, like ZANU, should make it clear that there could be no half measure with regard to majority rule, which it demanded immediately. ZANU rejected outright the United Kingdom's five-point plan, under which the colonialists would determine the pace of African advance. If majority rule in Zimbabwe was not granted forthwith, the racial war would continue and ZANU would not lay down arms until that end had been achieved.

767. Mr. PASIPANODYA (ZANU) said that it was to be hoped that the Special Committee's condemnation of British colonialism, so often repeated, could be given practical effect. It was his organization's view that the United Kingdom would have to be expelled from all United Nations organs if colonialism was to be wiped from the face of Africa.

768. Mr. MPONGO (ZAPU), in the name of the oppressed people of Zimbabwe and all its leaders detained or imprisoned by the Rhodesian rebel régime, expressed his thanks to the Special Committee for having accorded him an opportunity, for the second time during its current tour of Africa, to present its case, which was one that occupied the minds of every freedom-loving nation.

769. In Zimbabwe, Africans were being denied all the rights of free citizens in the country of their birth and the settlers were ruling at gun-point. ZAPU felt that the Committee should keep a watchful eye on the Rhodesian situation, which represented a major threat not only to the security of southern Africa and to Southern Rhodesia's neighbours in the north—the African independent States—but to the security of the African continent as a whole and, indeed, to that of international peace and stability.

770. The colonial history of Southern Rhodesia was a sad one, characterized by illegality, unilateral action and racism. It was a history of illegality because colonialism itself was abhorrent and illegal. There was no contract in existence proving that the African people of Zimbabwe had given away their rights and

country in exchange for British rule and settler domination. The absence of such a document was clear proof that British occupation and colonization were both illegal and unilateral. That was why ZAPU was fighting against colonial rule and its offspring, settlerism and fascism.

771. Southern Rhodesia's oppressive laws had resulted in a situation in which individual freedom was trampled underfoot by the settlers. It had become illegal for an African in Southern Rhodesia to demand his inalienable rights.

772. The laws that governed Southern Rhodesia were, *inter alia*, as follows: any statement imputing any improper motive to the legislature, Government, ministers, officers or any department of the Government was *prima facie* subversive; so was any statement likely (even if not intended) to incite dissatisfaction against the Government or induce any person or persons actively or passively to resist any such laws. Any organization or publication could be banned at the Government's pleasure; any person could be restricted to any area found suitable by the Government for periods up to five years. The police could without warrant enter any home in which they suspected that a subversive statement might be made. The courts of law were obliged to impose minimum sentences for a wide range of convictions: five to twenty years for throwing or threatening to throw an article at a car; two to seven years for boycotts; the death penalty for arson.

773. Under most laws the accused had to prove his innocence. Not satisfied with those laws, Ian Smith's illegal régime had repeatedly imposed emergency legislation which dispensed with the need for trial.

774. Looking back into the history of Zimbabwe, it could be seen that the United Kingdom had committed serious crimes against the African people. The United Kingdom had permitted systematic land robbery and discrimination against the African citizens, while sharing with its kith and kin, the white minority settlers, the proceeds of exploitation. The United Kingdom had never used its so-called reserve powers to stop discriminatory legislation in the periods 1923 to 1953 and 1953 to 1961.

775. Furthermore, the United Kingdom had rejected an eighty-one-nation appeal at the United Nations in 1962 for a "one man, one vote" franchise in Southern Rhodesia, and in 1965, together with the United States, had rejected a demand by the United Nations for the use of force against the unilateral declaration of independence by the Smith régime. However, it should be noted that there had been no hesitation in the use of force in British Guiana and Aden by the United Kingdom.

776. That country's half-heartedly implemented economic sanctions had proved ineffective and futile. The oppressed people of Zimbabwe and all the freedom-loving nations of the world were witnessing the birth of yet another South Africa. Incidentally, that nation had been set on its path by the United Kingdom in 1910.

777. The land and the wealth of Zimbabwe were unequally divided. The settler population of Southern Rhodesia had over 36 million acres of the best land, or 38 per cent of the total land, of which it was estimated they only used 3 per cent.

778. The 4 million Africans in Southern Rhodesia had only 40 million acres, and the average African farmer owned not more than six acres of generally inferior land. White farmers usually obtained better prices for their products, while the African got about 20 per cent of those prices. The average yearly income for a white citizen in Southern Rhodesia was not less than £1,400 while that of an African was £114.

779. The notorious Land Apportionment Act forbade an African to own land and conduct business in the commercial centres of towns. Africans were only permitted to live in those areas as servants. Skilled jobs were barred from African workers.

780. Educational opportunities for Africans were strictly limited, as in the South African Bantu education system. In the present educational system there was "European" education, "Asian" education, "Coloured" education and "African" education. The different types of educational systems were not only administered separately but were also separately budgeted for by the Government. In addition, a kind of apartheid was in practice whereby the different races were split up, preference being given to the European to the detriment of the majority of the inhabitants of the country. These and many other injustices proved beyond any doubt that the political future of Southern Rhodesia was grave.

781. The United Kingdom, supported by those nations which hated the idea of majority rule in Zimbabwe, intended to push ahead with its racist policy of supporting illegal minority rule at all costs. The African people of Zimbabwe still held the view that the United Kingdom could have prevented that tragic event if it had believed in the interest of the majority—the 4 million Africans. With clear knowledge of British imperialist conduct—characterized south of the Zambezi by the continued economic and military aid extended both to South Africa and Southern Rhodesia, the African people of Zimbabwe held no illusion whatsoever as to the tacit complicity of the United Kingdom in the crime committed by the racist minority régime against the indigenous people of Zimbabwe.

782. The past seventy-six years had seen ruthless exploitation of the African people by the settlers, murder, torture and complete denial of their rights. The United Kingdom was responsible for all those injustices and atrocities. The settlers were in fact mere custodians of British economic interests. It was also clear that all the perfidious constitutions which the United Kingdom had imposed upon Zimbabwe since 1923 had been undemocratic and based on the principle of racism and indefinite minority rule.

783. A few examples would show that the United Kingdom's behaviour in Southern Rhodesia was characterized by unilateral action and racialism. The British occupation in 1890 was made without the Africans' consultation or consent; the granting of self-governing status to British settlers in 1923 was done without African participation or consent; the introduction of apartheid under cover of the Land Apportionment Act in the early 1940's was carried out by the British settlers with the support and agreement of the United Kingdom and not of the Africans; the defunct Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland in 1953 was imposed without the consent of the Africans; the racial and undemocratic 1961 Constitution was imposed against the unanimous opposition of the Africans; the shameful white man to white man negotiation between 1961 and

November 1965 had neither African participation nor consent. The unilateral declaration of independence had been imposed by the settlers in defiance of African demands and opposition, and the current Anglo-Rhodesian talks were also being carried out without African participation or consent. In fact the African leaders who should have represented the oppressed Africans were behind Smith's bars. There was no reason why the rightful representatives of the African people should not participate in those talks which concerned the future of their country and heritage, if they were intended to find a genuine and lasting solution to the Rhodesian crisis.

784. The United Kingdom's initiative at the United Nations to keep the Rhodesian question out of international control had resulted in the frustration of any endeavours towards a forceful approach by the United Nations. The recent rejection of a Security Council resolution on mandatory sanctions and the use of force under the circumstances had removed any international platform for the urging of the use of force on Rhodesia.

785. For the United Kingdom, therefore, the danger of international reaction through the United Nations to the independent minority régime in Rhodesia had been completely removed. It felt it could now proceed to give open legal recognition to the régime and enable its allies also to do so.

786. Calculating on that basis, the United Kingdom had resumed talks with the Southern Rhodesian régime to complete the final trick of giving legal status to the Smith régime's independence. A certain pattern of camouflage was being worked out, which must ensure that the territories around Rhodesia acknowledge and recognize the solution the United Kingdom would work out with its kith and kin in their present talks and that by their acknowledgement and recognition of such a solution the neighbouring territories would automatically insulate and secure Rhodesia territorially from any possible base of infiltration against the régime. While the real issue in Southern Rhodesia was majority rule for the population of Southern Rhodesia, that was no longer the issue as far as the United Kingdom was concerned. Its concern was now support of its arrangement for Southern Rhodesia by the majority of the States around Southern Rhodesia, which would mean securing at once international recognition and independence for the régime.

787. The arrangement must be tolerable to South Africa and Mozambique which practically meant majority territorial security for Southern Rhodesia's régime. Should the United Kingdom by that scheme secure a breakthrough to the impasse of recognizing the régime in Southern Rhodesia, it then hoped to handle Southern Rhodesia's neighbouring African States (who would like to see a rapid change to majority rule in Southern Rhodesia) by economic pressures, and in that way try to neutralize any possibility of those countries becoming sources of support of action against the Southern Rhodesian régime.

788. The constitutional camouflage might mean introducing a few Africans in the administration, increasing the seats in parliament for the Africans to a third, and widening the franchise to give privilege to a handful of a certain class of Africans. That would leave Ian Smith securely in power.

789. When Mr. Wilson had first become the opposition leader in the House of Commons, he had

condemned the Tories for their failure to solve the Southern Rhodesian problem. In March 1963, he had told the Commons:

"We have said that the Constitution is indefensible which fails to allow the people of those territories the right to control their own destinies. We have bitterly attacked the Southern Rhodesian Constitution for that, and a Labour Government would therefore alter it. We have made that very, very plain."

790. After the United Nations General Assembly had called upon the United Kingdom to suspend the 1961 Constitution during one of its sessions in 1963, Mr. Harold Wilson had challenged the Conservative leader, Sir Alec Douglas Home, in the Commons as follows:

"Now we must ask the Prime Minister to be utterly unequivocal about this demand he has received. Although our good name has been besmirched by our handling of the Central African question, too much is at stake for Britain's stand in Africa, in the United Nations and in the world for him to evade this issue. Will he give a clear, specific assurance that Her Majesty's Government will not concede independence to Southern Rhodesia until a new constitution is in force which accepts what the present Constitution rejects, the principles of a democratic Government? In view of the inability of the Government to solve this problem... will he tell us that he will convene a Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference for the purpose of an agreed Commonwealth solution to this problem?"

791. But at the June 1965 Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference, Mr. Wilson had adamantly refused to heed the demand by the Commonwealth Prime Ministers that a constitutional conference be held within three months. Reporting in the House of Commons, on 29 June 1965, on his discussions with Mr. Smith, Mr. Wilson had declared:

"...if these discussions did not develop satisfactorily within a reasonably speedy time, the British Government would be ready to consider promoting a constitutional conference in order to ensure progress to independence on a basis acceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a whole." (That statement was contained in *Hansard* of 29 June 1965.)

792. Obviously the discussions had not been satisfactory, but Mr. Wilson had done nothing to see that a constitutional conference was convened. On the contrary, he had committed the United Kingdom Government to the acceptance of the 1961 Constitution as the basis for independence. In a letter to Ian Smith dated 29 March 1965, Mr. Wilson had said:

"What the British Government wish to see is a peaceful transition to majority rule, the principle of which is enshrined in the 1961 Constitution."

793. The claim by Mr. Wilson that the 1961 Constitution "enshrined" the principle of independence under majority rule was untrue because the majority of the Africans were not eligible to become electors, being able to get only fifteen seats against fifty seats of the white settlers.

794. Mr. Ian Smith, who had on several occasions expressed his opposition to majority rule before independence had once stated in a letter to Mr. Wilson that "Since it is our determination not to accept independence under majority rule, the conclusion should be obvious." That statement alone should have been a

pointer to Mr. Wilson that Smith was on the brink of declaring Rhodesia independent unilaterally.

795. Instead of using British powers on Southern Rhodesia Mr. Wilson had flown to Salisbury for further talks with Mr. Smith during the course of which, according to the British Blue Book, he had reminded the Southern Rhodesia Cabinet that that was the first occasion in modern history on which the United Kingdom Government had been prepared to contemplate granting them independence on the basis of less than majority rule. That was a clear retreat on the part of Mr. Wilson. It was no longer majority rule before independence but "guaranteed and unimpeded progress to majority rule", as stated in his broadcast speech on 12 October 1965.

796. The foregoing facts should prove beyond any reasonable doubt that the United Kingdom Government had not the slightest intention of taking any effective steps to ensure African majority rule in Southern Rhodesia. The so-called economic sanctions against Southern Rhodesia had proved to be totally ineffective and the United Nations resolutions on Southern Rhodesia had also been ignored by the United Kingdom Government. In all his declarations, and also in his speeches issued during his talks with Mr. Smith, Mr. Wilson had over-emphasized the fact that "he fully shared Mr. Smith's desire to counter communist influence in Africa". All those and many other moves taken by the United Kingdom Government, which his organization had exposed, clearly showed how the British colonialist Government had given in to its kith and kin, the white settler minority dictatorship in Southern Rhodesia. Mr. Wilson had not only refused to press for the release of all political prisoners, but in defence of the Smith régime he had also categorically made the position clear that Smith would only be prepared to release the African nationalists provided they gave him an assurance that "... they would now resort to purely constitutional means of political activity". He would like to deal with the question of political detainees in detail. The conditions that Mr. Wilson had put forward for the release of the country's leaders were hollow and ineffective, because in the first place, in view of the illegality and unconstitutionality of the present Government administering the country, it automatically followed that the restriction of its leaders under that treasonable régime was immoral and unconstitutional.

797. The African people of Zimbabwe, having sufficient evidence and fears to believe that the continued detention of their leader, Mr. Joshua Nkomo, was illegal and invalid, and posed a danger to his life in the hands of the Rhodesian régime, requested the Committee to take all necessary and legal steps that could result in his being released from detention. Convinced that his continued detention and restriction, aimed at frustrating both his political activity and his personal life, deprived the African people of Zimbabwe of their rightful leader, they had strong reasons to entertain the fear that he might be murdered in the interests of those who considered him their political enemy. Further, international law decreed that nobody should be detained without trial. For that reason the matter should be taken up, and he should be released or brought to trial, thereby possibly establishing a test case for the fate of thousands of political detainees held illegally. It was also questionable whether the virtue of any order deriving from the 1961 Constitution still

held, as that Constitution had been repealed and replaced by the 1965 Constitution of the illegal régime of Ian Smith.

798. ZAPU accused the undemocratic and illegal Smith régime, which should be indicted in the place of Mr. Joshua Nkomo and his colleagues. Its indictment of that régime was supported by millions of the African people in Zimbabwe, who were at present going through untold sufferings at its hands. Because of the illegality of the present régime in Rhodesia, his organization felt strongly that the matter should be raised with the proper authorities in Britain, whose Government bore full responsibility for the present situation in the country. The British Labour Government had stepped up its connivance with its kith and kin by the current historic talks, with a view to finding a basis for negotiation with the rebels. That crowned all the conspiracy, connivance and double dealing in the British venture in the Rhodesian crisis and left no doubt in anybody's mind that the United Kingdom was responsible not only for the unilateral declaration but for the continuity of illegal rule and the perpetration of torture of the African majority by its minority kith and kin.

GENERAL STATEMENTS

799. At the 411th meeting, before the Special Committee resumed consideration of the question of Southern Rhodesia in Africa, the representative of the *United Republic of Tanzania* made a statement on the question. He said that his delegation had noted with considerable anxiety the disposition of the United Kingdom Government to engage in so-called exploratory talks with the rebellious Southern Rhodesia régime of Ian Smith. Before the unilateral declaration of independence, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom had stated that such a declaration would be an open act of rebellion; when that declaration had nevertheless been made, the United Kingdom had argued that economic sanctions would be effective in bringing down the rebellion. Those sanctions had proved a failure and the recent manoeuvres for talks between the United Kingdom Government and the illegal Rhodesian régime raised a number of fundamental points concerning which world public opinion was entitled to an explanation from the United Kingdom.

800. Firstly, was the United Kingdom's contention that the unilateral declaration of independence was a rebellion against the Crown still to be believed? Secondly, in the eyes of the United Kingdom Government, was Smith's action still illegal or had it acquired respectability and legality with the passage of time? Thirdly, was the United Kingdom's stated intention to defeat the rebellion still to be believed? Fourthly, what would be the status of the proposed talks? It might have been supposed that they would be concerned with the rebels' surrender, but Ian Smith had told the world that the talks constituted a victory for him. Fifthly, could United Kingdom officials engage in talks with a rebellious régime without giving the world the impression that they were compounding a felony? Sixthly, was it possible for the Smith régime to negotiate itself out of power now that the sanctions had proved to be a total failure?

801. The United Kingdom Government had ignored not only the indigenous people of Southern Rhodesia but also world public opinion. It was particularly regrettable that it should embark on the dangerous

course of arranging for talks with the rebels after it had been instrumental in defeating every move on the part of the African countries that would have ensured the early crushing of the rebellion, specifically their move for the full application of Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. In 1910, in similar circumstances, the United Kingdom Government had granted independence to a minority group in South Africa, with a so-called safeguard for the South African majority; the sad results of that decision were to be seen today.

802. The major issue in Southern Rhodesia was that of independence under majority rule; by its current moves the United Kingdom Government was turning its back on that issue. Before assuming his present office, Lord Caradon, the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom, had written in an article that European leaders in Africa had failed, when they had had the chance, to win the confidence of the Africans and that the chance of co-operation between Whites and Blacks in Southern Rhodesia had been thrown away by blindness and obstinacy at Salisbury and a lack of political courage in London. He had added that the drift had gone so far that it was difficult to see how it could be stopped short of violence.

803. If the United Kingdom Government had still not abandoned the principle of majority rule and the aim of bringing down the rebellion and returning the country to constitutionality, then his delegation felt obliged to state that the United Kingdom Government was failing to achieve its purpose. Blindness and obstinacy, as well as a lack of political courage, prevailed in London with regard to meeting the demands of Rhodesian Africans and of world opinion, and the drift towards violence was thereby being accelerated. The world was entitled to hear from the United Kingdom Government the nature and the legal status of the so-called talks now being held secretly in London.

804. The representative of the *United Kingdom* said that he wished to correct some of the statements made about the talks being held in London. As the United Kingdom Prime Minister had stated recently in Parliament, informal talks were being held to discover whether a basis for negotiation existed. He also commended to the attention of the members of the Committee the other points made by the United Kingdom Prime Minister in his recent statement (see paras. 628-632 above).

805. The representative of the *United Republic of Tanzania* agreed with the United Kingdom representative about the need for honest and straightforward discussions. It was not honest, however, for the United Kingdom Government to hold talks with a régime which it had declared to be rebellious and treasonous. It was because the statements being made by the United Kingdom delegation did not correspond to the facts that he had raised certain questions, which should be answered in the Committee or elsewhere.

806. The United Kingdom Government, which had preached the gospel of racial co-operation for so long, was sacrificing justice to colour in Southern Rhodesia, where the oppressed majority was African. It was little consolation for the population of the United Kingdom dependent Territories to be told that millions of people in other Territories had been given independence.

807. The representatives of the *Union of Soviet Socialist Republics*, *Mali* and *Ethiopia* expressed their

support for the views expressed by the representative of the United Republic of Tanzania.

808. At its 418th meeting which was held in Dar es Salaam, the *Chairman* directed the Special Committee's attention to a cable from the United Nations Office of Public Information in New York on the latest developments in the Security Council's examination of the question of Southern Rhodesia, copies of which were before the representatives. According to that cable, the Security Council, by a vote of 6 in favour, 1 against and 8 abstentions, had failed to adopt the draft resolution submitted by Mali, Nigeria and Uganda.

809. The *Chairman* said that while the result was disappointing, it should nevertheless be regarded as a moral victory and should provide the Special Committee with the impetus to redouble its efforts in that connexion. The fact that as many as six members had voted for the draft resolution was a source of encouragement, as were the statements of those members who had stressed the need for measures to ensure the African population's right to self-determination and independence.

810. The futility of the measures adopted by the United Kingdom, which were merely an expedient to avoid dealing with the crux of the problem, had long been self-evident. Indeed, instead of undertaking negotiations with a view to implementing the provisions of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), it had engaged in "exploratory" talks with the rebel régime. That could only lead to the legalization of the existing situation and the maintenance of a *status quo* which was totally unacceptable to the majority of the Rhodesian population.

811. It was therefore the responsibility of the Special Committee, in accordance with its mandate and in pursuance of its own decision in that regard, to re-examine the Rhodesian question in the light of recent developments. Thus, it would contribute, in keeping with the expectations of both United Nations and of world opinion, to a solution of the problem.

812. The representative of *India* reviewed the events which had led up to the culminating injury: the United Kingdom Government, after a series of manoeuvres designed to mislead world opinion, had now initiated talks with the Smith régime—having resolutely avowed not to do so only a few months earlier. However, it was underestimating the intelligence of the whole world, and even of its own people.

813. Three salient facts had emerged: first, the sanctions had failed; secondly, the United Kingdom and its supporters did not intend, at least for the time being, to adopt stronger measures against Rhodesia; and, thirdly, the Smith régime was defying world opinion and consolidating its position. While he did not mean to suggest that the United Kingdom Government was deliberately prolonging a régime which had arrogantly ridiculed its authority, it was nevertheless influenced by concern for kith and kin—an attitude which, though understandable, was morally indefensible. The United Kingdom also argued that economic sanctions were preferable to the use of force; but sanctions were surely pointless if trade continued.

814. White Rhodesia's other two partners in the process of consolidation collaborated openly and aggressively. The South African and Portuguese Governments were in the forefront of every movement to re-

verse the course of history. They should be ostracized by the world for their unspeakable conduct; yet there were Governments which continued to associate with them. One major Power in Asia had even increased its trade with South Africa in recent years, despite its avowed concern for the exploited races of the world. Words of comfort from the United Kingdom would no longer suffice, and its pretence of sanctions could not be accepted. If Africa and the rest of the world were to be spared a bloody racial conflict, it would have to take effective action.

815. India's stand against racism was well known. Many years previously, it had taken the lead by forcing the Portuguese colonialists to leave Indian territory when persuasion had failed. As the first country to break off all relations with the Smith régime, it had given tangible proof of its support for the African people in Southern Rhodesia.

816. The Special Committee should call upon the United Kingdom, which was responsible for the situation in Southern Rhodesia, to take effective action. The Committee should also make it clear that its aversion to the use of force could not be used to shield a criminal régime which had to be suppressed, and that all Members of the United Nations should decide whether they wished to support Portugal and South Africa or to join with the vast group of nations which had respect for man and the rule of law.

817. In conclusion, he directed the Special Committee's attention to the six-point programme which the Indian delegation had presented to the Security Council on 17 May 1966.

818. The representative of *Ethiopia* deplored the recent Security Council vote on the Rhodesian question. His delegation had from the outset been greatly concerned at the attitude of the Western Powers, and particularly of the United Kingdom, with regard to Southern Rhodesia; Africans were tired of platitudes, and patience had been exhausted.

819. Time and again, the Ethiopian delegation had stated that a ruthless rebel régime, such as that installed in Salisbury, could only be overthrown by force. However, as Emperor Haile Selassie I had stated in his message on Africa Day, it appeared that no such action could now be expected from the United Kingdom. Under those circumstances, the African people of Zimbabwe had no alternative but to resort to arms in order to gain their freedom. In so doing they would have the support of the Africans and of all freedom-loving people throughout the world.

820. The Rhodesian crisis contained all the elements of a race conflict. Unless it was brought under control, not only Africa but the whole world might be endangered. The United Kingdom and its supporters should be warned that, by sacrificing principles to appease a minority in Southern Rhodesia, they ran the risk of losing the goodwill of the people in Africa, Asia and elsewhere. Time was running short, however, and a choice had to be made between Smith's racist minority and the rest of Africa.

821. His delegation was convinced that the African people of Zimbabwe would soon win their freedom, no matter how brutal the oppression or how hard the struggle which lay ahead. All progressive peoples would support Zimbabwe in the attainment of its objectives, and Ethiopia, like other independent countries in Africa, would not rest until Ian Smith's rebel ré-

gime had been overthrown and the people of Zimbabwe liberated.

822. Lastly, it was to be hoped that, in presenting its recommendations to the General Assembly, the Committee would reach unanimous agreement on effective measures for dealing with the Rhodesian situation.

823. The representative of *Iraq* said that the plight of the Zimbabwe people had a special significance for the Arab world, since it served as a firm reminder of the forceful occupation of Palestine by foreign settlers abetted by international Zionism and colonialism. The tragedy which had befallen the Palestinian Arabs had occurred despite the existence of the United Nations and the conscience of the so-called civilized world. The people of Southern Rhodesia should not be exposed to a similar fate.

824. The petitioners in their statements had revealed the alarming fact that more than 34,000 Zimbabwe people were detained in prisons or camps and that the settlers commanded an army of more than 40,000 men—which constituted a real threat to international peace and security.

825. Economic sanctions had failed dismally owing to the co-operation of such Powers as Portugal and South Africa with the Rhodesian racist régime. The oil embargo imposed by the administering Power had been circumvented by imports of oil from South Africa. The numerous consultations held between the settler régime and the administering Power, both before and after the unilateral declaration of independence, had yielded no positive results. Nevertheless, it had recently been learnt that further secret talks were being held in London which, according to press reports would be resumed in Salisbury during the week.

826. As a result of the manoeuvres of the administering Power and its supporters, a recent resolution submitted to the Security Council by the Afro-Asian members had not received the requisite number of votes. That resolution, which called upon the United Kingdom to act in accordance with the terms of Chapter VII of the Charter, would have assisted the Zimbabwe people in their struggle for freedom and independence.

827. As his delegation had pointed out on a number of occasions, and specifically at the twentieth session of the General Assembly shortly before the unilateral declaration of independence, the administering Power was solely responsible for Southern Rhodesia. Indeed, it had itself made repeated claims to that effect, as in October 1965 when it had been stated that the unilateral declaration was an act of rebellion.

828. The continuation of the abnormal situation in Southern Rhodesia was complicating Africa's political and economic relations with the rest of the world. For example, according to press reports, new regulations had been imposed by the Smith régime on Zambia's copper exports passing through Southern Rhodesia. Zambia had, however, rejected those regulations and an alternative route would have to be found. The racist régime had so far survived the effect of sanctions owing to a lack of firmness on the part of the administering Power. The situation would not, however, be allowed to continue indefinitely: the people of Africa would be forced to prepare for all eventualities, including a war of liberation.

829. The Vice-President of Tanzania had referred to two basic desiderata for solving the Rhodesian problem: the defeat of the illegal régime and a commitment that Southern Rhodesia would only become independent on the basis of majority rule. His delegation believed that the Special Committee, and the United Nations, should make every effort to achieve those objectives.

830. The representative of *Mali* said that the absence of any reply from the United Kingdom Government to the cable addressed to it by the Special Committee the previous Friday was further evidence of that Government's negative attitude to the Rhodesian question.

831. The situation in Southern Rhodesia had always been of concern to the African countries. Since the racist minority led by Mr. Smith had unilaterally proclaimed independence, the problem had assumed alarming proportions and was a serious threat to peace and security in Africa. It was true that the United Kingdom Government had made statements of intention. It had always claimed that it wished to limit the danger and to try to end a situation which did it no credit, but the fact was that that Government had itself created the Rhodesian crisis out of nothing and had deliberately complicated it in the hope of safeguarding British interests and the British presence in that part of Africa. The behaviour of the United Kingdom in Southern Rhodesia could be explained only by its refusal to evaluate the situation objectively. The administering Power would not be able to maintain its presence by aiding and abetting Mr. Smith in his present conduct towards the Zimbabwe people. The Wilson Government was doing nothing to restore law and order in the country, and was going so far as to finance the handful of white settlers that had usurped power in defiance of all human laws and of human rights. Nor could the administering Power safeguard its interests in Africa by appropriating the productive land of the Zimbabwe people or by introducing, through the settlers it had transplanted into the Territory, the hateful system of apartheid and ruthless exploitation of man by man.

832. There was no doubt that the Ian Smith clique could not have stayed in power against the will of 4.5 million Blacks if the United Kingdom had not used its veto in the Security Council to facilitate the transfer of the armed forces and police force to the white settler minority, thus giving the latter the means of attaining independence at the Zimbabwe people's expense. The Special Committee should examine that aspect of the question and ask itself why the United Kingdom was acting in that way, whereas in other territories formerly under its jurisdiction it had brought its military might to bear against leaders beloved by their people who had demanded independence for their countries. The only answer to that question was that the United Kingdom Government allowed itself to be guided by economic and military considerations. All the petitioners who had appeared before the Special Committee had stressed that aspect of the question. Southern Rhodesia possessed wealth, and the United Kingdom, doubtless feeling that it had not exploited the country enough, had found no other way to perpetuate the *de facto* situation than by granting its colony so-called self-government in 1923. That had been the cause of all the trouble. Who had benefited from that self-government? A mere 200,000 white settlers out of a population of nearly 5 million; it made one wonder what had become of law and justice. That policy was deplorable,

and the United Kingdom should promptly restore the rule of law in the country. It was responsible, under Article 73 of the United Nations Charter, for maintaining the security and integrity of the Territory.

833. In a strange way, the case of Rhodesia was paving the way for another South Africa. Having set itself that goal, the United Kingdom was methodically working to attain it. It was a pity that the United Kingdom delegation was not taking part in the Special Committee's work, because it would have been interesting to hear it deny the allegation. Although the United Kingdom knew perfectly well that all States condemned that policy, it had allowed Mr. Smith to contract for Southern Rhodesia an unholy alliance with Portugal and South Africa. The support thus secured for Southern Rhodesia had enabled Mr. Smith to proclaim independence unilaterally on 11 November 1965.

834. The United Kingdom had contented itself with an appeal to the Security Council for an economic blockade of its colony. Since then, Mr. Smith, assured of support from South Africa and in British financial circles, had been able to consolidate his position. The Security Council had, it was true, adopted resolution 217 (1965) of 20 November 1965, calling upon all States to place an embargo on oil, but Rhodesia nevertheless continued to receive a daily supply of petrol from South Africa. According to the *London Times* of 28 February 1966, the *Financial Times* of 21 February 1966 and the *Zambia Times* of 3 March 1966, the GENTA Company was bringing between 30,000 and 40,000 gallons of petrol a day into Southern Rhodesia by road or rail from the northern Transvaal. What specific measures had the administering Power taken to put an end to such violation of the Rhodesian frontier? Furthermore, according to the *Financial Times* of 3 March 1966, the arrangements permitting the importation of Rhodesian tobacco into the United Kingdom under contracts signed on 31 January 1966 had enabled Southern Rhodesian exports to the United Kingdom to attain the record figure of £3.8 million in January 1966 as compared with £3.1 million in January 1965.

835. When Mr. Wilson had sent his emissaries to ask Mr. Smith to resume talks with him, and when Mr. Smith, in complying with the request, had stated that the question of Southern Rhodesia's independence, based on the 1961 Constitution, could not be reopened, the United Kingdom Government had betrayed the 4.5 million Zimbabweans once again. The Special Committee should join President Kaunda of Zambia in condemning the travesty of negotiations which was being enacted in London and which, according to press reports, was to be continued in Southern Rhodesia. The London Government's attitude remained essentially subjective; it was still dictated by anxiety to safeguard British financial interests in Southern Rhodesia and, above all, to perpetuate white supremacy in that part of Africa. There was no doubt that the United Kingdom Government had failed in its duty as administering Power to the Zimbabwe people, who were awaiting their liberation. Those oppressed people now had no choice but to resort to violence in order to free their country. Blood had flowed in Rhodesia, and would flow again unless the United Nations forced the administering Power to intervene and restore the rule of law there. Statements of intention were no longer enough; the struggling people now expected action.

836. It was unfortunate that the Security Council had rejected the resolution submitted by the African States, calling upon the United Kingdom to use force to abolish the iniquitous régime that had been set up in Salisbury. By its action the Security Council had incurred a very grave responsibility, for it was encouraging the establishment in Southern Rhodesia of a régime similar to that in South Africa.

837. Moreover, the United Kingdom Government's attitude was enabling Mr. Smith to harm the interests of a sovereign State—Zambia. According to press reports, Southern Rhodesian trusts were preventing Zambian copper from reaching the port of Beira via Southern Rhodesia. Keeping the Zambian people economically dependent on the monopolies operating in Southern Rhodesia was a further betrayal on the part of the United Kingdom Government. It was intolerable that Zambia should have to suffer the consequences of a retrograde policy which took no account of developments in the world of today. The United Kingdom Government, whose duty it was to maintain security in that part of Africa, should therefore lose no time in taking the necessary measures to restore the rule of law in the Territory.

838. The Special Committee, for its part, should first of all reaffirm the inalienable right of the Zimbabwe people to self-determination and independence, as proclaimed in the declaration made in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV). It should then ask all States to render the Zimbabwe people material assistance in their sacred struggle for independence. It should further recommend the Secretary-General of the United Nations to convene a special session of the General Assembly in order to consider the serious situation which prevailed in the British and Portuguese colonies and which resulted from the régime of apartheid in force in South Africa and Southern Rhodesia.

839. In the meantime it was essential that the Security Council should find a means of compelling the United Kingdom to safeguard the interests of the Zimbabwe people and of the Zambian people. The Malian delegation would support any resolution to that effect.

840. The representative of *Afghanistan* said that the Security Council's rejection of the draft resolution submitted by three African countries had contributed to the deterioration of the situation in Southern Rhodesia. That draft resolution had been perfectly justified, as it had become clear that the recommendations of the General Assembly stood very little chance of being put into effect. Likewise, the oil embargo advocated by the Security Council had proved inadequate. The unilateral declaration of independence—which could have been prevented—put the Smith régime in an even stronger position to oppress the Zimbabwe people, and was incompatible with General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), the United Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

841. The United Kingdom knew that the increasing collusion between South Africa, Portugal and the Smith régime prejudiced the future of the Zimbabwe people and the cause of majority rule. If the administering Power failed to come to grips with the crisis, the situation might suddenly be out of hand. His delegation was not opposed in principle to the current negotiations between the rebel régime and the United Kingdom, which had the legal responsibility and the necessary

means to deal with the abnormal situation; the lack of progress had led to scepticism.

842. It was undeniable that the only solution was the removal of the rebel régime and the granting of independence by the United Kingdom under a democratic constitution guaranteeing majority rule. Anything short of that would be unworkable and incompatible with the right of the Zimbabwe people to self-determination.

843. His delegation hoped that common sense and understanding would prevail, and urged the Special Committee to draw the attention of the Security Council once again to the true state of affairs in Southern Rhodesia.

844. The representative of the *United Republic of Tanzania* said that so long as the Smith régime held out, the Special Committee and the United Nations had to continue their efforts to reach a solution; otherwise the faith which the people of Zimbabwe and Africa placed in the United Nations was bound to waver. Indeed, it had already begun to diminish, and every further blow to it would increase reliance on bloodshed to liberate Africa. The Special Committee therefore bore a great responsibility towards the people of Zimbabwe to restore their faith in the United Nations and to ensure that the principles embodied in the Charter became reality for them.

845. The struggle in Southern Rhodesia was bound to be a bitter one, if only because of two main grievances of the African peoples: the extension of racial discrimination under the minority rule; and the perpetuation of colonialism by the refusal of the United Kingdom to crush the rebellion. The unilateral declaration of independence had in itself been a violation of the 1961 Constitution. The United Kingdom Government therefore had a vacuum to fill, but was shunning its responsibilities. Yet the irony of the matter was that the same Government had been proclaiming its sole responsibility for Southern Rhodesia.

846. The United Nations must act without delay. Such legislation as the Land Apportionment Act and the pass laws was a transplantation of the South African pattern of discrimination.

847. The connivance and acquiescence of the United Kingdom Government, which had gone out of its way to proclaim its sole responsibility for Southern Rhodesia, could not pass unchallenged.

848. Africans charged the United Kingdom with striking a compromise with the minority racialists in Southern Rhodesia and calling the declaration of independence "unilateral" in order to deceive the world and draw international attention away from the real issue, which was colonialism. If in British eyes Mr. Smith was a rebel, he should have been apprehended and put on trial for rebellion. But he had been to London and returned untouched despite the threatened declaration of independence. The United Kingdom claimed responsibility for Southern Rhodesia, yet allowed African nationalists to languish in prison for "terrorism" while Mr. Smith and his cohorts were merely unpunishable rebels. There were only two sides to the issue: the African people of Southern Rhodesia and the colonial Power and the racist settler minority serving foreign interests.

849. The United Kingdom had ignored African demands to crush rebellion, but had not failed to use the Security Council for its own ends. When the Federation had been breaking up in 1963, the African

Members of the United Nations had submitted a resolution aimed at blocking the transfer of the air force to the Southern Rhodesian white minority; but the United Kingdom had used its veto. If Mr. Smith was consolidating his régime, it was because he had the backing of senior army, air force and police officers. Yet those officers had received, or were receiving, government pensions.

850. Even after the unilateral declaration of independence, the United Kingdom and its allies shamelessly blocked the application of mandatory sanctions and the use of force provided for under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. Therefore the Smith régime was being allowed time to consolidate itself, and in so doing it had initiated a rule of terror and massacre.

851. Many well-meaning people had asked why the African people of Southern Rhodesia had not risen against the illegal régime. In fact there was brave opposition, but because of strict censorship scarcely any information reached the outside world. However, the Tanzanian delegation was able to quote a number of incidents confirming active resistance. It had to be remembered that five years and the efforts of hundreds of millions of people had been needed to crush the Hitler régime.

852. The evils of the situation extended beyond the confines of Southern Rhodesia. It was six months since the unilateral declaration of independence and evidence showed that South Africa and Portugal were doing all they could to maintain the régime. That alliance would continue to frustrate the efforts of the United Nations to impose optional or mandatory economic sanctions.

853. The illegal régime also had evil effects on other independent African States. It had tried to hold Zambia hostage, but had been bitterly disappointed by the courageous stand of Dr. Kaunda and his people. The rebel government had threatened to expel all Zambians from Southern Rhodesia; after the failure of that move, it had raised the price of coal and insisted on payment in hard currency; when that too had failed, it had turned to the railways and demanded that all freight charges be paid cash in advance. That too had been frustrated by the gallant stand of Dr. Kaunda. The representative of Tanzania appealed to the rest of Africa to aid Zambia; for he was sure that it was making its current sacrifices for the sake of the people of Zimbabwe and the dignity of Africa. The greatest help that Africans could render Zambia was to overthrow the illegal régime in Southern Rhodesia. As any other course would be but a half measure, his delegation would continue to insist on the use of force as the only means of ending the rebellion. Meanwhile, independent African States could help Zambia to find other outlets for its goods.

854. Africans had foreseen the failure of sanctions. The United Kingdom Government had made a considerable stir over the two tankers at Beira; yet it knew that large quantities of oil were supplied daily through Bechuanaland. If the United Kingdom and the Security Council had been sincere over the sanctions, they would have complied with the African suggestion to seal off the borders of Southern Rhodesia. Sanctions were failing because the British did not want them to succeed, and indeed subverted them by, for instance, importing Rhodesian tobacco via South Africa as a South African commodity.

855. The Zimbabwe people needed practical and sincere friends immediately. Africans had therefore been shocked at New Zealand's vote against the resolution they had submitted to the Security Council. He hoped New Zealand would never need African support.

856. It was the duty of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) to ensure the defeat of the Smith régime and to ensure that the régime did not obtain *de facto* recognition from the United Kingdom.

857. His delegation intended to submit a resolution to the Special Committee during its current session. It would urge:

- (1) The release of all political prisoners;
- (2) Recognition of the legitimacy of the struggle of the Zimbabwe people;
- (3) Suspension of the 1961 Constitution and the cessation of all discriminatory practices;
- (4) Condemnation of the support given to Southern Rhodesia by Portugal and South Africa;
- (5) The formation of a policing force to seal off the borders of Southern Rhodesia;
- (6) The organization by the United Kingdom of a general election on a majority basis, under United Nations supervision;
- (7) An appeal to all countries to aid Zambia;
- (8) Adoption by the United Kingdom of all necessary measures, including the use of force, to crush the racist régime.

858. The representative of the *Ivory Coast* said that there was no point in going over every item in the record of Southern Rhodesia; it was enough to note that Mr. Ian Smith's illegal régime was still in existence and indeed growing in strength. Rhodesia's rebellion had come as no surprise to Africans, who had foreseen it since the adoption of the racist Constitution in 1961 and the break-up of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland in 1963. At that time, of course, the African countries had drawn the United Kingdom's attention to the danger involved in handing over the armed forces, including the air force, to the racist minority in Southern Rhodesia. But the United Kingdom had disregarded those warnings, and for the first time in history a colonial Power had given a colony the means of providing its own defence, thus placing 4 million Rhodesians at the mercy of a handful of racist white settlers.

859. However, the African countries had continued to place their trust in the United Nations. Unfortunately all the efforts made by the United Nations and by friendly countries had remained without effect, and the course of the negotiations between the United Kingdom and Mr. Smith's régime was alarming. Never within the memory of the colonized had a metropolitan government been observed begging its subjects not to proclaim independence and bowing to their demands in such a way. That behaviour could only encourage Mr. Smith to carry on his hateful work. Once again the United Kingdom had deserted the Africans, leaving them defenceless in the hands of a group of fanatics who planned to keep them eternally enslaved in the name of Western civilization. For that reason the Africans who still remembered what had happened at Stanleyville in November 1964 were in duty bound to come to the aid of their brothers. The only reason why they had not yet done so was that they had wished to avoid hampering the action of the United Kingdom, which

had undertaken to put down the rebellion promptly. The fact now had to be faced that it had failed, and that the only course left was to resort to the provisions of Chapter VII, Article 42, of the Charter—in other words, to force, which was apparently the only means of transferring the powers of colonial authorities in an orderly manner to the peoples of the territories concerned. The Archbishop of Canterbury himself had stated that the failure of economic sanctions justified the use of force to restore law and keep order, when that could clearly be achieved by such means.

860. The United Kingdom Government must act quickly if it wanted to avert a race war in Africa, for Mr. Smith's action was not an isolated case. It was part of a general plan for the oppression of Africa, to which the racist régimes of South Africa, Portugal and Southern Rhodesia were parties. The fact that the Security Council had rejected the proposal for the use of force showed that the process of recognizing the fascist régime in Southern Rhodesia had already begun, inasmuch as the United Kingdom had undertaken to negotiate with a private individual who in reality had no legal authority. It was hard to believe that the problem would ever be solved by negotiation. Neither the Zimbabwe people nor the independent African countries could agree to a compromise solution that would amount to *de facto* recognition of the racist régime in Southern Rhodesia.

861. The African countries therefore believed that all available means, including the use of force, should be used to bring down the rebel régime, and they appealed to all democratic and peace-loving peoples to call upon the United Kingdom to take the necessary steps to regain control of the situation in Southern Rhodesia and to prepare for the grant of independence to the Zimbabwe people. The time for statements of intention was past. Action was now necessary, for international peace and security were at stake.

862. The representative of *Tunisia* said that the question of Southern Rhodesia was a matter of concern to the United Nations and would continue to be so until the Organization found an effective means of helping the Zimbabwe people to regain their lawful right to freedom and independence. He drew attention to paragraph 5 of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), which had been adopted unanimously. The many resolutions which the General Assembly and the Security Council had subsequently adopted on the subject had never been implemented, even in part. The United Kingdom had repeatedly claimed all responsibility with regard to Southern Rhodesia; but it was now clear that that attitude had been merely a clever subterfuge for maintaining the *status quo* and encouraging the white settlers to persist in their criminal designs. The United Kingdom—which, it would be recalled, had taken a courageous attitude when power was to be transferred to the majority in other territories—advocated the use of such unsound means as negotiation and economic sanctions in the case of Southern Rhodesia.

863. Thus, in defiance of General Assembly and Security Council resolutions, in defiance of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and of the democratic principle of the majority, in defiance even of international public opinion, a minority was oppressing 4 million people whose only desire was to live in dignity and peace.

864. The United Nations and the Special Committee were in duty bound to ensure, as soon as possible, that that criminal régime was rendered incapable of further mischief, and to expose the devious machinations of those countries which, while professing friendship for peoples struggling for their freedom, were underhandedly delivering arms and ammunition to the retrograde Powers that sought to impose their rule on Africa.

865. But obviously no government, however strong, could stay in power without popular support. Tunisia therefore believed that, despite injustice and military and police oppression, the Zimbabwe people, strong in international backing, should rise up and take back what was rightfully theirs. Tunisia would support them in their struggle, for it knew that no colonialist régime would cease to behave like an absolute master until it felt its security threatened.

866. The States Members of the United Nations should bring pressure to bear on the United Kingdom in order to force it to act; the Special Committee should make specific proposals to the General Assembly, designed to draw public attention to that tragic problem and to help the United Nations out of the impasse. Tunisia would unreservedly support any constructive proposal designed to free the African majority from oppression by the minority and to safeguard peace and justice on the African continent.

867. The representative of *Denmark* expressed his regret that the rebellion in Southern Rhodesia had not been crushed. He well understood the growing impatience of Africans, but it was essential to act in harmony. There was general agreement over the need to halt apartheid in South Africa and remove the Smith régime in Southern Rhodesia. The matter of Southern Rhodesia should be dealt with first as that problem could more readily be resolved.

868. Denmark recognized the United Kingdom's responsibility for a solution to the problem, but the United Nations also bore responsibility since the affair had been internationalized when referred to that body. The immediate aim of the common effort must be to remove the reprehensible régime, but the ultimate purpose was an independent Zimbabwe on the basis of majority rule—probably best brought about by direct United Kingdom rule through a transitional period. Denmark deeply regretted the split in the Security Council over Southern Rhodesia. However, as force could not be a purpose in itself, and would undermine the United Nations, it should be used only as a last resort.

869. Sanctions had been ineffective to date, but it would be unwise to conclude that the instrument was insufficient. It was essential that all States Members of the United Nations apply the sanctions. South Africa would not co-operate unless it were made to realize that by undermining the sanctions it would be the eventual sufferer. As it was, South Africa had a direct interest in that form of sabotage.

870. He reminded the Special Committee that Denmark had voted in favour of General Assembly resolution 2022 (XX) of 5 November 1965, which noted that the increasing co-operation between the authorities of Southern Rhodesia, South Africa and Portugal was designed to perpetuate racist minority rule in southern Africa and constituted a threat to freedom, peace and security in Africa.

871. It was important to maintain confidence in economic sanctions, and the Special Committee should press the United Nations to persuade all Member States to discontinue their economic relations with Southern Rhodesia. If any were unwilling to co-operate, the United Nations might have to intervene to enforce that policy.

872. Finally, he felt it was the duty and wish of the Special Committee to stress that the aim must be rapid independence for the Zimbabwe people.

873. The representative of *Syria* said that the new dimensions reached by the Southern Rhodesian crisis constituted a grave threat to international peace. The principles for which the United Nations stood were being violated by a minority régime based on conquest, motivated by oppression and exploitation, and thriving on discrimination.

874. The administering Power had built up a private company to the status of a conquering leviathan. It had annexed most of the territory to the Crown, distributed the most fertile land to the foreign minority, isolated the African inhabitants from the rest of the world by confining them to the most arid areas, used them for cheap forced labour, denied them access to property by such shameful legislation as the Land Apportionment Act, and prevented them from acquiring skill by such measures as the so-called Labour Conciliation Act. It had continued the process by encouraging white immigration, arming the settlers, extending foreign monopolies over the country's resources, and, finally, proclaiming the colony to be autonomous. There had been one over-all purpose: to usurp permanently the rights of the people of Zimbabwe to their land, their freedom and their independence.

875. However, when the settlers had seen their benefactor compelled to recognize the evolution of human relations that had liberated most of Africa, they had rebelled and declared their independence. They claimed to be free from any restraint that would prevent them from keeping African people in Zimbabwe under constant subjection and denying them their most elementary rights.

876. The administering Power had taken a double stand: on the one hand it had claimed sole responsibility over its colony of Southern Rhodesia, and on the other it had abstained from taking any effective action to quell the rebellion. That flagrant contradiction between words and acts was the object of much comment and regret, particularly among members of the Special Committee. The contradiction was, however, more apparent than real. The claim to sole responsibility had been in order to prevent action by others, and had given an added measure of protection and assurance to the régime it had chosen to call "rebel" in order to appease world opinion. The measures it had taken were those that it had known in advance would be harmless. No embargo could succeed as long as South Africa was able to offer its help. The opposition to sanctions against South Africa by the United Kingdom representative at the last session of the General Assembly had placed the policy of the administering Power in its true perspective.

877. Referring to the statement made by the representative of Denmark at the previous meeting, he said that Verwoerd's régime was well aware that the slightest suggestion to apply Chapter VII of the Charter against South Africa would be met by vehement opposition on the part of the United Kingdom.

Given that advance guarantee of non-action, it would be futile to rely on persuasion. He could only wish that the well-intentioned ideas of the Danish representative could be put into practice.

878. He could speak from bitter experience. The Power that was the trustee of the land of Zimbabwe was the same Power that had been trustee of the Palestine Mandate and had promised alien elements a so-called national home in Palestine at the expense of the majority. Behind the tragedy of more than 1 million Arab refugees expelled from their land and homes were the same manoeuvres, intrigues and claims of sole responsibility, and the same juridical subtleties. An amazing similarity could be drawn. The conquerors might be using time to entrench themselves and another *fait accompli* might be in the making; they would not hesitate to embark on genocide to panic the African masses into fleeing their homeland. The colonial pattern had been thoroughly tested and found to be worth applying again. The conclusions that the petitioners had reached concerning the hopelessness of any measure taken by the administering Power were fully justified, and their appeal for international action stemmed from their sense of realism. That Power that had professed its indignation at Smith's illegal act was now meeting his representatives for negotiations, as though the rights of the Zimbabwe people could be an object of bargaining between essentially alien parties.

879. The record went on endlessly: angry statements, diplomatic contacts, dramatic rehearsals in the Security Council about the oil cargo of two ships while oil was being supplied abundantly by South Africa—negotiations, their suspension for reflection, and optimism succeeding pessimism and vice versa. Meanwhile innocent people were suffering, and another bastion of colonialism was being consolidated.

880. His delegation supported the stand made by the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the struggle of the freedom fighters, and the proposals made by the representatives of Tanzania and Mali.

881. The representative of *Yugoslavia* said that the rejection of the African draft resolution at the recent Security Council meeting was a case for very serious concern. The United Kingdom's responsibility for the situation in Southern Rhodesia was a well-established fact; indeed it had been confirmed by the Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom himself.

882. Since the unilateral declaration the United Kingdom Government had been urged to discharge that responsibility and take the necessary measures, including force, to liquidate the racist régime and grant independence to the people of Zimbabwe under majority rule. Instead of taking adequate action it had given assurances that it would end the régime by economic sanctions within a matter of weeks.

883. His delegation had stated on 19 April 1966 that those who had given credence to such promises had realized that they had been taken in, that the rule of law had not been re-established and that there was no reason to believe the present measures capable of doing so. Despite its promises not to recognize the Smith régime, the United Kingdom Government had now begun talks with it.

884. He emphasized that the situation in Southern Rhodesia was closely connected with that in the other colonies and that there was close interconnexion of interests of colonial Powers and racist régimes in the

southern part of Africa. In the opinion of his delegation, each genuine blow to the Smith régime would have had a more negative effect on the economic and other interests of colonial and some other Powers. That was the reason for lack of adequate action against the Smith régime.

885. The Security Council's failure to act was a matter of grave concern. The way in which the United Kingdom Government was dealing with the Smith régime was not leading to majority rule but to further worsening a situation that already constituted a serious threat to peace.

886. He quoted from the report of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Federal Assembly on 20 January 1966, that the attempt to set up a racist and colonialist stronghold in Central Africa might easily develop into a crisis whose effects might be felt outside the African continent, which reaffirmed the need to put an end to colonialism without delay.

887. He stressed that the situation in Southern Rhodesia since that time had worsened and had indeed become a threat to peace. The Special Committee should recommend appropriate measures to the Security Council. Broader and more determined action, including the use of force, was necessary.

888. He emphasized that Yugoslavia had no relations with Southern Rhodesia. The Yugoslav Government had most severely condemned the unilateral declaration of independence. The Yugoslav Government fully supported the past struggle of the people of Zimbabwe and in co-operation with African and other Members of the United Nations would continue to lend its support to all actions and measures aimed at enabling the people of Zimbabwe to decide freely and independently on their future.

889. The Yugoslav delegation would associate itself with any resolution that would lead to the downfall of the Smith régime and the establishment of majority rule.

890. The representative of *Venezuela* said that Southern Rhodesia, as well as South West Africa and the Portuguese colonies, were chronic cases which tested the international community's capacity for effective action. They were a challenge both to the United Nations and to the validity of the principles of the Charter. The unilateral declaration of independence by Southern Rhodesia was the logical outcome of a crisis which had been allowed to develop through indifference with, it seemed, the connivance and support of the administering Power.

891. Every time that the problem had made itself felt, that Power had adopted a contradictory position, claiming, on the one hand, that it had complete responsibility for everything to do with Southern Rhodesia, while on the other hand, saying that it could not act because of its agreement with the Rhodesian Government. However, the declaration of independence, which was contrary to the provisions both of that agreement and of the 1961 Constitution, by reason of its illegality placed the Government of Ian Smith in a state of rebellion against the British Crown and unilaterally terminated that agreement. Therefore, the United Kingdom Government no longer had any excuse not to intervene and take the necessary steps to restore the rights of the Zimbabwe people.

892. In his view, it was no longer a question of applying sanctions to Southern Rhodesia. The United

Nations must urge the United Kingdom to fulfil its obligations since, by its own admission, it bore sole responsibility in the matter, and to act in accordance with the provisions of the Charter, instead of holding undercover negotiations with the present illegal Government with a view to restoring the 1961 Constitution; the United Kingdom must crush the rebellion; convene a constitutional conference in which all concerned, and above all the Zimbabwe people, should take part, draft a new constitution and hand over sovereign power to those who were entitled to it, namely, to 4 million Africans, the entire people of Southern Rhodesia and not one sector of it. In this connexion his delegation completely endorsed the statements made by the petitioners.

893. Venezuela had not recognized and would not recognize the Smith Government. As its representative had made clear in the note addressed to the Secretariat, the Venezuelan Government had prohibited all trade with Southern Rhodesia, particularly exports of oil and petroleum products to that country, until such time as the Zimbabwe people had been restored to its rights in accordance with the resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council.

894. The Venezuelans, a freedom-loving people and peace-loving people, respected the rights of other peoples and were anti-colonialist by nature and tradition, and they would never consider that the problem was settled as long as the rights of an entire people were ignored and trampled underfoot and as long as the Zimbabwe people had not regained freedom and independence under a democratic system of universal adult suffrage.

895. The representative of the *Union of Soviet Socialist Republics* remarked that the Special Committee was considering an issue which was of deep concern to all progressive men, to all States Members of the United Nations and above all, of course, to the peoples of Africa which were waging a heroic struggle to rid themselves of the colonialist and racist régimes still present on African soil. It was no accident that the future of the Zimbabwe people was being considered. There were only two possibilities: either the Zimbabwe people would obtain their freedom and independence or there would be a triumph of the racist clique which had taken over power at Salisbury with the help of the colonialist and imperialist Powers. Those Powers shrank from nothing to maintain their domination over Southern Rhodesia, or which they wished to make a base of colonialism and neo-colonialism. Supported by the racist régime of Verwoerd, allied to the fascist régime of Salazar and backed by the military and colonialist NATO bloc, Southern Rhodesia had become a bastion of racism and apartheid. All those régimes had a clear objective: they had developed a new colonialist strategy in Africa, the purpose of which was not only to serve imperialist interests in Central and Eastern Africa, but also to assemble a military potential in that region. The imperialist monopolies, the capitals of which were London, Washington and Brussels, to name but a few, were endeavoring to strangle the national liberation movements in South Africa and Southern Rhodesia as they were endeavouring to crush the freedom fighters in Angola, Mozambique and so-called Portuguese Guinea. They wished to force the peoples of those countries to give up their right to independence so that none of the dependent peoples of Africa could achieve advances and free themselves from economic bondage. The imperialist and colonialist Powers were determined not to give up Africa; they

still hoped to place it once again under their political, and in some cases economic, influence so as to recolonize certain African peoples. That the imperialist forces had a hand in the situation in Southern Rhodesia was obvious. The ruling classes in the United Kingdom were pretending to condemn the activities of the present Rhodesian régime, calling it rebellious and proclaiming that they wished to put an end to it. But the facts were clear: the United Kingdom Government, and also the United States Government, which fully supported it, were doing all they could to maintain the Ian Smith régime.

896. The members of the Special Committee were aware of the developments in the Rhodesian question, which they had considered on many occasions, as the General Assembly and the Security Council had also done. All three bodies had adopted many useful resolutions, but the United Kingdom, the United States, the Federal Republic of Germany, Portugal, South Africa and other colonialist countries had refused to take account of the wishes of the peoples as set forth in the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. Those Powers had refused to take account of the many United Nations resolutions condemning the activities of the racists in Southern Rhodesia and calling for the granting of genuine independence to the Zimbabwe people. Initially, the United Kingdom had affirmed the primacy of racist ideology by imposing on the Zimbabwe people—more than 4 million inhabitants of Southern Rhodesia—the racist 1961 Constitution, which had deprived that people of all its political rights. Subsequently, after the break-up of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, and despite the urging of the independent African States, it had allowed the Rhodesian racists to seize the instruments of power, namely, the armed forces and military equipment. The response of the United Kingdom Government to the manifold resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council demanding the abolition of the 1961 Constitution had always been negative. London and Washington alleged that the economic sanctions imposed on the Ian Smith régime were yielding the anticipated results. At the same time, the United Kingdom, the United States, the Federal Republic of Germany and Japan were trading with South Africa. The figures published by the Board of Trade in March 1966 for trade between the United Kingdom and Southern Rhodesia showed that even after the embargo set up by the United Kingdom, that country's imports from Southern Rhodesia had amounted to £523,000 for the month of February 1966, and its exports to Southern Rhodesia to £672,000.

897. The role of some NATO States and primarily that of the United States, in the matter of economic sanctions against the Ian Smith régime was also questionable. According to the 28 March 1966 issue of *International Trade*, the Secretary of Commerce of the United States had placed an almost total embargo on the major share of exports to South Africa. However, that decision dated only from 18 March 1966; moreover, the embargo had not been applied to a sufficient number of goods. It provided, for example, for the granting of export licences for agricultural equipment, many primary commodities, scientific equipment, textiles, etc. The authorization to export agricultural equipment and produce merely strengthened the position of the large stock-breeders and planters who were ruthlessly exploiting the Africans and were supporting the Ian Smith régime. Since agriculture played an ex-

tremely important part in the Rhodesian economy, such exports helped to neutralize the boycott of that basic economic sector.

898. Statistics for the months of January and February 1966 showed that United States trade with South Africa and Southern Rhodesia had not faltered. In addition, exports to Southern Rhodesia also included goods listed as strategic equipment, spare parts for electro-dynamic machinery and construction materials.

899. United States tobacco purchases from Rhodesia since 11 November, the date of the unilateral declaration of independence by Ian Smith, totalled £175,000, an amount equal to the annual average for United States tobacco purchases from Southern Rhodesia.

900. In January and February 1966, exports from the Federal Republic of Germany to Southern Rhodesia had amounted to £55,000, while its imports from Southern Rhodesia for the month of January alone had amounted to £1,170,000. In April 1966, Mr. Strauss, former Minister of Defence of the Federal Republic, had gone to Southern Rhodesia and to South Africa to begin trade negotiations with Ian Smith and with representatives of his régime and of certain Rhodesian trade circles. According to the German newspaper *Die Welt* a desire had been expressed during that visit to expand trade between the Ian Smith régime and the Federal Republic of Germany.

901. According to the *Daily Express* of 20 April 1966, a company was being formed for that purpose in the Federal Republic of Germany which already included five large industrial and export firms. Also according to the *Daily Express*, the management of that company had stated that the company, which had the powerful support of some Swiss banks, would assist German industrial enterprises to the greatest possible extent, despite the prevailing situation.

902. The embargo on petroleum and its derivatives had been a failure. It was an instrument designed to maintain the racist régime of Ian Smith in power. The United Kingdom and the United States kept stressing economic sanctions, which, according to them, should suffice to bring down the Ian Smith régime. Mr. Swart, President of the Republic of South Africa, had told Parliament on 21 January 1966 that his Government would maintain normal relations with the Ian Smith Government and would not apply the sanctions initiated against Southern Rhodesia. In that regard, the Lisbon colonialists echoed the Pretoria racists. Five days after the Security Council resolution calling upon States Members of the United Nations to break all economic relations with Southern Rhodesia, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Portugal had stated that his Government would maintain normal relations with the Ian Smith Government.

903. The Security Council had called on all Member States to cease exporting oil and petroleum products to Southern Rhodesia. However, oil continued to flow and was being delivered to Southern Rhodesia by the Republic of South Africa via Mozambique. At present, oil deliveries amounted to 100,000 gallons daily, while the weekly consumption of Southern Rhodesia was roughly 83,000 gallons. World public opinion agreed that the sanctions, as they were being applied, did not ensure a real embargo.

904. The same was true of the financial sanctions against the Ian Smith Government. On 3 March 1966, *The Times* of London had stated that for the moment, there was no reason to fear a collapse of the financial

system of Southern Rhodesia. There too, the South African racists, together with the capitalist monopolies of the West, were coming to the aid of their bosom friends in Rhodesia. According to *The Economist*, monthly trade credits available to Southern Rhodesia in mid-April 1966 had amounted to \$2.1 million.

905. It would take too long to list every case in which the resolutions aimed at doing away with the shameful Ian Smith régime had not been implemented. The responsibility lay with the Republic of South Africa and Portugal. The Lisbon and Pretoria racists had powerful protectors in the West, primarily among the members of the colonialist and militarist NATO bloc, namely, the United Kingdom, the United States, the Federal Republic of Germany and certain other Western Powers. Discussing the reasons for the policies of the Republic of South Africa and Southern Rhodesia as regards Mozambique and Angola, a *New York Times* journalist had stated that the United States, the United Kingdom and other Western States were increasing their investment in those four countries and that official sources considered that Western public opinion would not be able to react forcefully enough against the fallacious arguments of the financial groups. Thus, the failure of economic sanctions against the Ian Smith régime was to a large extent attributable to the fact that the United Kingdom and the United States had invested capital in Rhodesia and that their main objective was to defend those investments under the cloak of a few limited economic sanctions.

906. The United Kingdom and the United States had made considerable financial commitments in the Republic of South Africa, South West Africa, Mozambique, Angola and Southern Rhodesia, thus demonstrating their readiness to ignore the fact that the Salazar régime was supporting the racist régime of Southern Rhodesia. The ineffectiveness of the steps taken against the Ian Smith régime and its partners, Portugal, South Africa and other NATO Powers, had left the Rhodesian racists free to commit further crimes against the Zimbabwe people.

907. In Southern Rhodesia, anyone who dared to speak up against the criminal machinations of Salisbury was subject to reprisals and to constant persecution. Southern Rhodesia had become a police State, a land of prisons and concentration camps, and its African population lived in terror. There was but one conclusion to be drawn from his remarks: the responsibility for the failure of the sanctions and for the present situation lay primarily with the United Kingdom, as the administering Power, and with its accomplices, the United States, the Federal Republic of Germany, and the Pretoria and Lisbon régimes, as well as with the countries which in one way or another hindered the application of the sanctions adopted by the Security Council. London and Washington had shown their true attitude towards the police State of Ian Smith when they had voted on the draft resolution submitted by Mali, Nigeria and Uganda to the Security Council on 23 May 1966; by refusing to support the proposal of the African States, members of the Security Council, to apply really effective sanctions, to combat the sabotage of the Republic of South Africa and to take practical steps to abolish the racist régime in South Africa, the United States and the United Kingdom had demonstrated that they were the accomplices of the racist Salisbury régime.

908. By defending imperialist interests in Africa, London and Washington had adopted an untenable po-

sition on the question of Southern Rhodesia. In their statements the United Kingdom and the United States pretended to sympathize with the Zimbabwe people, spoke of the right of peoples to self-determination and of their freedom to appoint the government of their choice, but in actual fact they were extending a helping hand to the Salisbury racists. The negotiations initiated by the United Kingdom Government with the representative of the Ian Smith régime had been watched with as much attention as indignation. It was quite clear that the negotiations between London and Salisbury were nothing but a smoke-screen to conceal the plot being hatched against the Zimbabwe people. As recently as 10 December 1965, Mr. Harold Wilson, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, had stated in the British Parliament that his Government would never negotiate with the illegal Salisbury régime. But negotiations were now under way. On 25 January 1966, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom had repeated that the political future of Southern Rhodesia could not be discussed with a régime which illegally claimed to govern the country, and today, that same Prime Minister was sitting down at the same table with the representative of that régime. After having said that the future constitution of Southern Rhodesia would have to be discussed with the accredited representatives of the entire Zimbabwe people, he was now negotiating with the representatives of the régime which he had called illegitimate, illegal and rebellious, while the real representatives of the Zimbabwe people had been prevented from taking part in those negotiations.

909. The United Kingdom Government was negotiating with the Ian Smith régime because it wished to deal with the racists behind the backs of the African people. The colonialist Powers were thus trying to maintain imperialist domination in Africa. The Soviet Union had stated its position clearly and repeatedly in the various United Nations organs. That position was the expression of a firm and coherent policy of defending peoples struggling to free themselves from the colonialist yoke. As always, the Soviet Union defended the sacred right of peoples to govern themselves and freely to choose the methods of their own development.

910. The Government of the Soviet Union had steadfastly supported the struggle of the Zimbabwe people for genuine freedom and independence. It was ready to support any action undertaken by the African nations to guarantee that people's rights.

911. The Special Committee could not remain indifferent to the situation prevailing in Southern Rhodesia, since it constituted a threat to peace and security, not only in Africa, but in the rest of the world as well. Maintaining the white racists in power in Southern Rhodesia was merely helping the imperialist and racist forces which had conceived the criminal idea of setting up a kind of "sanitary cordon" to isolate the peoples of southern Africa, which were still dominated by white colonialists and racists, in the hope of preserving them from the influence of the free African peoples and thus preventing them from freeing themselves.

912. The Soviet Union, the only permanent member of the Security Council to have voted in favour of the draft resolution submitted by Mali, Nigeria and Uganda, supported the just claims of the African countries. It believed that emergency measures must be taken to solve the problem of Southern Rhodesia as soon as possible, in the interests both of the Zimbabwe people and of all African peoples. The claims of the African peoples were entirely clear. Power must be taken out

of the hands of the racists, the racist 1961 Constitution must be abrogated, a final date for granting independence to the Zimbabwe people must be fixed, elections must be organized based on the principle of universal suffrage—"one man, one vote"—and power in Southern Rhodesia must be transferred immediately to a government reflecting the desire of the African majority to see implemented the Declaration of the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.

913. The Special Committee had a duty to condemn the Portuguese colonialists and the South African racists as it had a duty to condemn all those who were assisting the Ian Smith régime in Southern Rhodesia and who, whether openly or covertly, refused to implement United Nations resolutions. It had a duty to issue a new appeal to all Member States to implement immediately and unreservedly the general resolutions relating to the problems of Southern Rhodesia adopted by the Security Council and the General Assembly.

914. The USSR Government advocated, as it had always done, that the most effective and comprehensive measures possible should be taken against the Rhodesian racists. More particularly, it demanded the application of the sanctions provided for in Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, as they alone could protect the interests of the Zimbabwe people and of all other African peoples.

915. The USSR delegation would support any draft resolution taking account of the considerations he had mentioned. It hoped that those conditions as well as the proposals submitted today by the representatives of Mali, Tanzania, India and other countries would be given careful attention and would be embodied in the decisions which the Special Committee would be called upon to take.

916. The representative of *Sierra Leone* said that since the Committee had discussed the question of Southern Rhodesia a year before, Smith had made his unilateral declaration of independence, and the United Kingdom Government had taken no serious action to bring down that rebellion.

917. The petitioners had told of increased oppression and of the imprisonment of over 34,000 people of Zimbabwe because they had dared to speak up for their inalienable political rights. The United Kingdom had said that it could not free them because it was an internal matter. His delegation had never agreed with that point of view. Since the United Kingdom had repeatedly stated that the Smith Government was illegal and that its Governor in Salisbury was the only legal representative, the fiction by which it had shielded itself had disappeared.

918. The United Kingdom had stated in the Lagos declaration that the Smith régime would be toppled by sanctions in a matter of weeks. Yet, after almost seven months that régime continued to exist. It was receiving all the oil it needed and it could fall back on electricity and coal if forced to do so. It was well known that oil supplies went in daily through South Africa and Mozambique. Trade had increased with Japan, the Federal Republic of Germany and France—a clear indication of the ineffectiveness of sanctions.

919. In April 1966, after the United Kingdom had tried to block action in the Special Committee, and had called the Security Council, which had passed its draft, four things had been clearly established: first, the so-

called sanctions were not working. Secondly, there was a tacit agreement that sanctions alone could not work. Force was necessary. Thirdly, the resulting situation constituted a threat to peace; and fourthly, the Security Council resolution had called upon the United Kingdom to prevent by the use of force if necessary the arrival at Beira of vessels reasonably believed to be carrying oil destined for Southern Rhodesia, and had empowered the United Kingdom to arrest and detain the tanker known as the *Joanna V* upon her departure from Beira in the event of her oil cargo being discharged there.

920. By that resolution, the Security Council had authorized the use of force under Chapter VII of the Charter in respect of a single ship of uncertain nationality. By rejecting the African amendment, and the draft resolution of Mali, Nigeria and Uganda which had sought to extend the use of force to the more important issue of the swift removal of the Smith régime, the Council had shown its unwillingness to act in accordance with the wish of the majority of States.

921. Under Chapter VII of the Charter, force could and should be used without delay. Any hesitation or doubt strengthened the Smith régime, which had already begun efforts to strangle Zambia. Coal deliveries and communications had been disrupted; perhaps the next move would be to cut off power to Zambia from the Kariba Dam.

922. The Special Committee must not sit back and refuse to use force while a whole nation was being blackmailed. It must let the United Kingdom know that its non-intervention in Southern Rhodesia was a betrayal of the trust of the African people of Zimbabwe. It was a disgrace for the United Kingdom to have used the Africans in Southern Rhodesia and their brothers in West and East Africa to fight for it in two world wars, and to be now unwilling in turn to fight to liberate Africa. Thousands of Africans had been killed in Burma and hundreds had flown planes over Europe to help the United Kingdom and its allies to maintain their way of life. Yet they were the very people who were now doing everything in their power to prevent any serious action. The United Kingdom could not deny that it had used force in other areas to maintain constitutionality: it was doing so in Aden at that very moment.

923. Two conclusions could be drawn from that indifference to African opinion: first, that the United Kingdom and its allies were content with the *status quo*, their economic interests being best served by keeping the Africans as hewers of wood and drawers of water.

924. The second conclusion was that had there been 200,000 Blacks among 4 million Whites, strong action would long since have been taken if they had dared to usurp power. Yet when the small minority of whites had tyrannized the Africans in their own land, no effective action had been taken.

925. When the United States and United Kingdom Governments had felt that the lives of a comparatively small number of their citizens had been at stake in the Congo, they had promptly organized an air lift for what they had described as a humanitarian mission. At present, they had no regard for the feelings of the African people who were oppressed in Southern Rhodesia.

926. The goal of the African people was to establish majority rule in Zimbabwe, to which end Britain would have to use force to bring down Smith, and

the Security Council must approve that course. The unjust 1961 Constitution must be revoked and the leaders immediately set free. A constitutional conference must then be called to determine the people's wishes. Force had been used in the small matter of one ship; it should now be used immediately to ensure majority rule in the territory and enable the people of Zimbabwe to move swiftly to freedom and independence. Any resolution that expressed those ideas, condemned the United Kingdom for its inaction, and Portugal and South Africa for their help, would find support from his delegation.

927. The representative of *Poland* endorsed the statement made at a previous meeting (A/AC.109/SR.418) by the Chairman concerning the Security Council's failure to adopt the resolution submitted by Mali, Nigeria and Uganda, and supported by Bulgaria, Jordan and the USSR.

928. The blame for that failure must be placed squarely upon the United Kingdom, the United States and their allies. By withholding support for the resolution they had demonstrated that they were prepared to help the racist white settlers when it came to a choice between that régime and the legitimate aspirations of the people of Zimbabwe.

929. The attitude of those Powers was a further encouragement for the Smith régime. The United Kingdom as administering Power of Southern Rhodesia, had consistently abetted the racial minority in that territory, before and after the usurpation of power by Mr. Ian Smith; indeed the fact that it had stated in advance that it would not use force had encouraged the white settlers in their action, and the continuation of such a policy after the unilateral declaration of independence was a mere smoke-screen to allow the illegal régime time to consolidate its position. The Prime Minister of the United Kingdom had predicted that the cumulative effect of economic and financial sanctions would bring down the Smith régime in weeks rather than months; but it was now plain that those sanctions had failed, for the régime had been in power for almost seven months in spite of the resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council and of world opinion. The rebellion was continuing because it derived its strength from outside support.

930. It was becoming increasingly clear that the question of Southern Rhodesia could not be reviewed in isolation, and that it was directly connected with the racist oppression in the Republic of South Africa. That had been amply demonstrated by the evidence of the petitioners who had appeared before the Special Committee; their testimony had shed light on the true intentions of the United Kingdom, the United States, the Federal Republic of Germany and other members of NATO. Far from giving effective help in abolishing the racist minority régime, they were in fact contributing to its maintenance because of their many financial and economic links with Southern Rhodesia and its neighbours — South Africa and Portuguese Mozambique.

931. The working paper prepared by the Secretariat clearly showed that South Africa and Portugal were openly defying the Security Council's resolution by continuing to provide financial and other assistance to Southern Rhodesia, and that companies in the Federal Republic of Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States were still carrying on a flourishing trade with Southern Rhodesia. The oil embargo had

also failed, for South Africa and Portugal had been able to send in supplies. Portugal was maintaining normal relations with Southern Rhodesia, and had even questioned the legality of a recent decision of the Security Council, even though the scope of that decision had been deliberately limited.

932. The true intentions of the United Kingdom, the United States and their allies had also been clearly shown by their abstention from voting on the proposals of the African members of the Security Council, in April and May 1966, which were designed to make the economic sanctions all-embracing and mandatory.

933. His Government sympathized with the concern and the bitterness of African nations in the face of the deliberate attempt to create yet another racist State in Africa, and was convinced that the United Kingdom did possess the means to do away with the Smith régime. Effective measures, including the use of force, must be taken to dislodge that régime. His delegation felt in duty bound to appeal to the Security Council to adopt mandatory sanctions within the framework of Chapter VII of the Charter, so as to enforce its own resolution 217 (1965), and by inviting the administering Power to use all means including force, the Security Council would pave the way for the granting of genuine independence.

934. Poland had always advocated the implementation by peaceful means of the Declaration contained in resolution 1514 (XV). While in favour of the principle of negotiation, it was deeply apprehensive of the secret talks going on between the United Kingdom and the rebel régime in Salisbury, for they implied *de facto* recognition of the régime and encouraged it even further. Instead of negotiating with the Zimbabwe people, the United Kingdom was trying to come to an arrangement behind their backs. A number of proposals had been made with which his delegation was in agreement, in particular those of the delegations of Mali and Tanzania. The statement by the representative of Denmark although well-intentioned and sincere had been worded so as not to mention Portuguese violation of the sanctions. He hoped that omission had been unintentional, and was unconnected with the fact that Portugal was a member of NATO. Adoption by the Special Committee of the method of action proposed by the representative of Denmark would mean a step backwards, for whereas Security Council resolution 217 (1965) of 20 November 1965 called upon all States to apply sanctions, the representative of Denmark had suggested that all United Nations Member States should do so, thus ruling out the Federal Republic of Germany, which was not a Member of the United Nations but continues her support of the racist régimes of Smith and Verwoerd.

935. The representative of Denmark had stressed the need for reason and patience in dealing with the Southern Rhodesia problem, and had tried to persuade the Special Committee not to recommend the use of force. The Polish delegation would be the first to agree with such a policy if a genuine desire existed to grant equal rights, freedom and independence to the people of Zimbabwe; but the United Kingdom was ignoring those rights and supporting a racist régime. The Special Committee could not condone such a policy. Although the Special Committee had been dealing with the matter for six years, the United Kingdom had consistently ignored its views as well as those of the great majority of Member States, including Denmark itself.

936. His own Government had implemented in full all the resolutions adopted by the Security Council and the General Assembly, had consistently supported the right of the Zimbabwe people to independence, and had repeatedly advised the United Kingdom to abrogate the 1961 Constitution. The Committee should set a target date for the transfer of powers, and the United Kingdom should be requested to conduct general elections in the territory and to set up a democratically elected government, which would abolish discriminatory laws, and the state of emergency and release political prisoners.

937. The Special Committee's immediate objective, however, should be to put down the rebellion. It should appeal to the Security Council to take appropriate steps to implement its own decision of 20 November 1965. His delegation would support any proposal on those lines.

938. The representative of *Chile* thanked the Tanzanian Government for once again extending its generous hospitality to the Special Committee, thus enabling the Committee to renew its contacts with the various liberation movements with headquarters at Dar es Salaam which were fighting for the independence of their respective countries.

939. Turning to the question of Southern Rhodesia, he deplored the fact that the administering Power had not endeavoured to prevent, by every means at its command, the unilateral declaration of independence. Now that Mr. Smith had defied the free world by proclaiming a fictitious independence, the United Nations must take the necessary steps to put an end to that minority régime, which refused to grant the just claims of the Zimbabwe people. The economic sanctions had failed because some countries had failed to co-operate and because South Africa and Portugal had ignored the resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council. The Chilean Government, for its part, had applied to the latter General Assembly resolution 2022 (XX), as well as Security Council resolutions 216 (1965) and 217 (1965). If all other countries had done the same, the minority régime of Mr. Smith would certainly have been overthrown.

940. His delegation would firmly support any steps that might be taken, in accordance with the provisions of the Charter, to overthrow the Ian Smith régime and enable the people of Southern Rhodesia to attain their independence and form their own government.

941. The representative of *Bulgaria* said that the position of the Bulgarian delegation with regard to the problem of Southern Rhodesia was well known and had been recently reaffirmed at the last meeting of the Security Council. The Government and people of Bulgaria fully supported the relentless struggle of the Zimbabwe people to rid themselves of a double colonial domination—by the United Kingdom and by the white racist minority.

942. The most recent debates in the Security Council and the rejection of the draft resolution submitted by the African members of the Council had once again turned the spotlight on the policies of the United Kingdom, which was tolerating the criminal acts of the white racist minority bent on depriving the Zimbabwe people of their fundamental political rights and maintaining them in slavery. Succeeding United Kingdom Governments had systematically paved the way for

Ian Smith, who had thus no difficulty in proclaiming independence unilaterally.

943. The secret negotiations which were now being held in London between Ian Smith and the United Kingdom Government and which, it appeared, were to continue at Salisbury, had rightly aroused the indignation of the African countries, since they were tantamount to *de facto* recognition of the illegal régime of Southern Rhodesia. The United Kingdom was more than ever reluctant to use force against that racist régime, while emphatically affirming that it alone was responsible for Southern Rhodesia. That ingenious policy enabled it both to maintain the racist minority régime in power and to hinder the implementation of all the measures adopted by the Security Council to overthrow that régime. The United States and the Western Powers, in particular the Federal Republic of Germany, had increased their co-operation with the Ian Smith régime, either directly or through South Africa. The régime was taking its inspiration from nazi ideas and Hitlerist practices in order to maintain its subjugation of the Zimbabwe people. There were camps in Southern Rhodesia in which prisoners were tortured and in which the anti-communist hysteria of fascism ran riot. Fortunately for the African peoples and for all peoples of the world, there was another German State, and it took the liberation of colonial peoples to heart. As would be recalled, on 20 April 1966, the Chairman of the Special Committee had received a telegram from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the German Democratic Republic in which the Minister stated unequivocally that his Government had refused to recognize the racist Ian Smith régime and that it had no relations with it.

944. He himself shared the view of the African representatives who had pointed out that the United States, the United Kingdom and the other Western Powers were always ready to use force against African freedom-fighters, but never against fascist criminals or white racists. The representative of the Ivory Coast had quite rightly recalled the armed intervention of Belgium at Stanleyville, with the co-operation of the United Kingdom and the United States, against the Congolese troops on the pretext that it was protecting a handful of white nationals. It was regrettable that Western humanitarianism did not extend far enough to protect the lives of human beings whose skin was not white.

945. In its resolution of 21 April 1966 (A/AC.109/158), the Special Committee had recommended that the administering Power should use force against the racist minority in Southern Rhodesia and that the Security Council should urgently apply the measures envisaged under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations so that its resolutions would be put into effect as soon as possible. It was time for the United Kingdom and its allies to stop sabotaging the work of the Security Council. The Special Committee, for its part, now that it was on African soil, should adopt a resolution providing for effective measures to remove the fascist Ian Smith régime and restore the sacred rights of the Zimbabwe people to freedom and self-determination.

946. The representative of the *United States of America* recalled that her country's views on the question of self-determination for the African peoples had been most recently set forth by President Johnson in an address on the occasion of the third anniversary

of the Organization of African Unity (OAU). President Johnson had described the right of self-government through democratic institutions as a basic aspiration shared by the people of Africa and the people of the United States. He had promised that his Government would not support policies abroad based on minority rule or on the idea that men were unequal before the law.

947. The United States Government was therefore in complete agreement with the ideals of the people of Southern Rhodesia. It did, however, consider that the countries of the world must exhaust all the possibilities of achieving the desired objectives by peaceful means before risking bloodshed in Africa. For that reason it was supporting the current efforts of the United Kingdom and the United Nations. The latter was indeed required by its Charter to explore all avenues to a peaceful solution before resorting to others. It was true that the United Nations had not yet achieved its goal, but before the Special Committee concluded that its action had been ineffective an examination of the facts was necessary.

948. In November 1965 the Security Council had voted unanimously in resolution 217 for a stringent programme of measures designed to isolate Smith, politically and economically, and to end his régime. Since then, sixty-six States had volunteered information concerning steps taken to implement that programme.

949. The United Nations action had included a call on Member States not to recognize the Smith régime; and not one State had done so. It was regrettable that certain countries had publicly expressed their intention not to comply with the economic measures called for in resolution 217 (1965), though the majority had supported them. However, a considerable variety of response could be distinguished. Some States, in particular socialist countries with centrally directed foreign trade, had had no significant economic relations with Southern Rhodesia. For those countries, implementation of the resolution was largely a matter of form. But neighbouring countries, such as Zambia and Malawi had suffered acutely; others, including her own, had found the impact less direct but nevertheless substantial. The United States had previously had a wide variety of economic ties with Southern Rhodesia, and had had to take a correspondingly wide variety of steps. Applications for government loans and guarantees for Rhodesian trade had been suspended; effective measures had been taken to discourage the major imports; the 1965 and 1966 sugar quotas had been suspended and indeed the import of a sugar shipment already on its way had been blocked. Exports of military equipment and petroleum products to Southern Rhodesia had of course been embargoed. Almost the only items still being exported were of humanitarian importance, and of no significance to the economy of Southern Rhodesia.

950. Her country had also been able to help in the airlift of petroleum products to Zambia, and in maintaining the Great North Road.

951. The measures taken by various Member States in furtherance of the United Nations resolution were impressive when viewed as a whole, and the process was not yet over. Supplementary replies were still coming in. It was hardly suitable for countries that had had virtually no trade with Southern Rhodesia to belittle the considerable sacrifices of those which had,

while emphasizing their own supposedly total embargoes. It was thus obvious that the accusations made against the United States at that meeting were untrue.

952. The working paper prepared by the Secretariat (see paras. 593 to 738 above) stated that by March/April 1966, Southern Rhodesia's exports had been reduced by 60 per cent as a result of international sanctions, and that all or most of Southern Rhodesia's normal trading partners had banned imports from that country.

953. Her Government had actively tried to make participation in the sanctions programme more complete. Those countries responsible for the important gaps in the programme should remember that in failing to co-operate they were aligning themselves against the majority.

954. The degree of unanimity attained on the present question was largely due to the fact that basic moral issues were at stake, to which no one could remain indifferent. As a Member of the United Nations her Government felt strongly that it had accepted an obligation to uphold important human rights, some of which were at stake in Southern Rhodesia. Remarkable progress had been made in Africa, and her Government pledged that that progress would not be denied to the people of Southern Rhodesia. It would continue to work within the United Nations to bring about majority rule and self-determination for all the Rhodesian people.

955. The representative of *Australia* recalled that in 1965, before the unilateral declaration of independence by Southern Rhodesia, the Australian Prime Minister had declared in Parliament that his Government had been in direct touch with the Government of Southern Rhodesia to try to make it see the inevitable end of its course. The Prime Minister had expressed his belief that:

"... an accelerated movement toward adult suffrage must be completed, or the alternative accepted, of mounting internal disorder, of hostility among neighbours, and of a result finally achieved in an atmosphere of hostility, not friendship, with racial hostilities unfavourable to the continuance of European settlement and out of harmony with those interracial relationships for which the new Commonwealth has come to stand."

Australia was one of the first Governments to take action immediately after the unilateral declaration well before the Security Council's decisions, in refusing to recognize the Smith régime—withdrawing representation, applying immediate embargoes on its limited trade with Southern Rhodesia, and taking the necessary measures concerning international finance.

956. The representative of Denmark had gone to the heart of the matter at the previous meeting in saying that there was no clear proof that sanctions had failed. Insufficient facts were available to support such an allegation. While it was clear that the measures had not been effective as quickly as it had been hoped there was still evidence that acute discomfort had been caused; and the talks in progress were perhaps evidence of that fact.

957. It was also, he thought, wrong not to recognize the far-reaching nature of the United Kingdom action. That country's naval action had certainly prevented a great deal of oil from being imported into Rhodesia, but even more important was the fact that that action, unprecedented as it was in United

Nations history, must have shaken the confidence of the illegal régime.

958. The use of force alarmed and distressed the Australian Government; such a course would not only be hard to organize but would involve limitless suffering for the people of Africa; it advocated patience, though not passivity, to allow world isolation to take its effect. Time was a small price to pay for avoiding further suffering and perhaps widespread bloodshed in Africa.

959. The representative of *Italy* said his Government recognized the right of the peoples of Southern Rhodesia to self-determination, independence and majority rule under universal adult suffrage and deeply sympathized with their struggles. It considered the 1961 Constitution to be unsatisfactory in that, *inter alia*, it did not imply the possibility of evolution towards majority rule. Italy had condemned the unilateral declaration of independence, and had complied with the provisions of the various General Assembly and Security Council resolutions. It had also criticized the lack of action by the United Kingdom Government. By recognizing that Southern Rhodesia was the responsibility of the United Kingdom even when that view was not shared by all the Members of the United Nations, Italy had tried to encourage that country to take bolder and timelier measures, and regretted its failure to do so.

960. However, the Special Committee had been told by the petitioners that the Smith régime had 40,000 armed men at its disposal. That force was a reality, and it had to be taken into full account before further measures to deal with the problem could be adopted. The Italian Government had accepted the method of sanctions even though they involved considerable industrial, commercial and individual sacrifice. He mentioned that not to emphasize the part Italy had played in the sanctions programme but to show how concerned his country was at the accusations that the programme had been a failure and a fraud. The working paper prepared by the Secretariat listed the States which had complied with the measures decided upon by the Security Council; was it to be concluded that all those countries had been victims or accomplices in a fraud, or did the programme not rather represent an interesting example of international co-operation in an effort to reach a peaceful solution of a serious problem?

961. The Security Council's resolution had not been fully implemented by United Nations Members and as a result of that failure and of the limited scope of the sanctions themselves, the results expected had not been attained. However, was the Special Committee to decide that the system itself had failed and that different measures must be adopted? As his delegation had pointed out at a previous debate, the problem of Southern Rhodesia would be a test case for the United Nations; and the representative of Denmark had experienced concern for the future of the United Nations if a generally acceptable method of dealing with the problem could not be found. He had also made some interesting suggestions as to the best way to secure the effective implementation of sanctions, which should be given careful consideration by the Special Committee.

962. The representative of the *United Republic of Tanzania* thought that further measures were needed, since the sanctions would only harm Zambia's econ-

omy, without bringing down the Smith régime. The very countries that said they were applying sanctions were in fact finding ingenious ways of avoiding them. A country such as the United States had a more important part to play than that of a mere supporter of the United Kingdom. The whole of Africa, including Zambia, was completely dissatisfied with the measures taken by the United Kingdom. It was therefore ironical that the United States should only support the United Kingdom, while professing to help Africans. His delegation hoped that the United States would associate itself more closely with the efforts to bring down the Smith régime.

963. The representative of *Czechoslovakia*, speaking at the invitation of the Chairman, and with the permission of the Chairman, thanked the Special Committee for the welcome he had received and for permission to take part in its session as an observer. He also expressed his gratitude to the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania for the hospitality extended to him as a participant.

964. The fact that Czechoslovakia attached great importance to the work of the Special Committee was borne out by the letter from the Czechoslovak Minister of Foreign Affairs, with which the Special Committee was already acquainted.

965. It was most shameful that at a time of unprecedented scientific progress, which held out the prospect of fair living standards for all, colonialism and racist régimes still controlled considerable parts of Africa and other continents and enslaved large sectors of their populations.

966. Colonial Powers and the racist régimes they supported had refused to comply with the provisions of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. Furthermore, they had engaged in feverish preparations to prolong their domination over the colonized peoples, and even intended to start a gradual process of recolonization. It was therefore no surprise that they were moving openly towards a vast colonialist *entente*, as the findings of the Special Committee and the declarations made by representatives and petitioners had confirmed.

967. It was indeed regrettable to perceive beyond that colonialist *entente* a more powerful alliance of the imperialist Powers shielding and sustaining world colonialism. Because of the negative attitude of those Powers, the Security Council had been unable to accept the just demand of African States that the Council should call upon the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to take all necessary measures, including the use of force, to abolish the racist minority régime in Southern Rhodesia. However, his Government was convinced that the Special Committee would adopt a resolution calling for effective measures to restore full constitutional and democratic rights to the people of Zimbabwe. Its competence to act and to set deadlines for an early end to colonialism was indicated in paragraph 5 of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.

968. The representative of *Iran* recalled that at its 407th meeting on 20 April 1966, the Special Committee had recommended to the Security Council to consider urgently the further measures envisaged under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations to put into effect its decisions concerning

Southern Rhodesia; but the Security Council had failed to act.

969. In its resolution 217 of 20 November 1965, the Security Council had called upon the Government of the United Kingdom to take appropriate measures to bring the minority régime to an immediate end. Yet six months later no progress had been made.

970. In its resolution 221 of 9 April 1966, the Security Council had determined that, as supplies of oil would afford great assistance and encouragement to the illegal régime, the resulting situation constituted a threat to the peace. Having once decided that, the Security Council was obliged to take follow-up action. Since oil reached Southern Rhodesia from South Africa as well as through the Port of Beira, the Security Council had no alternative but to act in order to prevent a breach of the peace.

971. Negotiation would only be effective if it resulted in the ending of the régime; but Mr. Smith could hardly be expected to negotiate his own downfall. Force was therefore the only solution.

G. FURTHER ACTION TAKEN BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE

Appeal to the United Kingdom Government concerning Mr. Joshua Nkomo and Rev. N. Sithole

972. At its 423rd meeting, the representative of Mali stated that the Special Committee should go thoroughly into the question of Southern Rhodesia and formulate precise recommendations for submission to the General Assembly and the Security Council. He proposed that the Special Committee should request the United Kingdom Government to allow the acknowledged leaders of the Zimbabwe people to appear before the Special Committee.

973. The representative of the *United Republic of Tanzania* said that he strongly supported the proposal of the representative of Mali, particularly in view of the United Kingdom's insistence that it alone was responsible for Southern Rhodesia.

974. The representative of *Iran* also supported the proposal made by the representative of Mali.

975. The representative of the *Union of Soviet Socialist Republics* supported the Malian representative's proposal; the Special Committee should take a decision on the matter without delay.

976. The representative of *Bulgaria* said that he unreservedly supported the Malian representative's proposal that the United Kingdom Government be requested to release the imprisoned leaders of the liberation movements, in order that they might be able to appear before the Special Committee.

977. The representative of *Iraq* supported the proposal made by the representative of Mali. The presence of the nationalist leaders would greatly benefit the Special Committee's deliberations and would expedite its work for the liberation of Southern Rhodesia.

978. The representative of the *United Republic of Tanzania* said that, following consultations which had taken place, the Afro-Asian members had decided to propose that the Special Committee should request the Chairman to call upon the United Kingdom Government to secure the release of Mr. Nkomo and Mr. Sithole so that they could testify before the Committee. While he was aware that certain members might consider such a move to be impractical, they should re-

member that the United Kingdom claimed sole responsibility for Southern Rhodesia. Moreover, it had given repeated assurances of its readiness to co-operate with the United Nations. It was in the light of those facts that the Special Committee should now make its request.

979. On a request by the representative of *Yugoslavia*, the Chairman said that Yugoslavia would be added to the list of countries making that request.

980. The representative of *India*, supporting the proposal of the representative of Mali and the action suggested by the representative of Tanzania, said that it would be extremely valuable for the Special Committee to hear such outstanding leaders of African public opinion as Mr. Nkomo and Mr. Sithole. It was to be regretted that the United Kingdom Government had not so far seen fit to hold consultations with them.

981. The representative of *Venezuela* said that, in his view, the Malian representative's proposal was fully justified and he would give it his unconditional support. It was important that the decision should be taken by the Special Committee as a whole rather than by a restricted group whose request would carry less weight with the United Kingdom than that of a United Nations committee.

982. The representative of *Madagascar* recalled that the previous year the Special Committee had sent a telegram along similar lines to the United Kingdom which, in rejecting the Committee's request, had invoked the constitutional convention with Southern Rhodesia and had claimed that it could not interfere in that country's domestic affairs. The situation, however, had completely changed now that Southern Rhodesia had unilaterally proclaimed its independence.

983. The representative of *Australia* said that, while his delegation would be most interested to hear Mr. Nkomo and Mr. Sithole, it nevertheless considered that at that time it was not within the power of the United Kingdom Government to secure their release; they were not prisoners of the United Kingdom but of an illegal régime in rebellion to it. The Australian delegation would therefore reserve its position on the practicability of the proposal.

984. The representative of the *United States of America* said that his delegation would have appreciated the opportunity to hear Mr. Nkomo and Mr. Sithole, had it not been for the fact that they were detained by the illegal régime of Southern Rhodesia. The question of the United Kingdom's right to interfere in Southern Rhodesia's internal affairs did not arise in that regard: the existing régime was in rebellion and presumably the United Kingdom would only have the power to bring Mr. Nkomo and Mr. Sithole before the Special Committee when that rebellion had ended. The United States delegation would therefore reserve its position on the matter, for the practical reason that the United Kingdom did not have control in Southern Rhodesia.

985. The representative of *Poland* whole-heartedly supported the proposal of the representative of Mali. As far as the views expressed by the representatives of Australia and the United States were concerned, he did not agree that the United Kingdom Government could not act in that connexion. In his opinion, the contrary was the case since there was now an illegal régime in Southern Rhodesia and, before the United Nations, only the United Kingdom was responsible for that country.

986. The representative of *Mali* pointed out that the United Kingdom had long since warned Southern Rhodesia that any unilateral declaration of independence would be considered as an act of rebellion against the Crown and that there was no question now of whether it was in a position to release Mr. Nkomo and Mr. Sithole. He regretted that the delegations which had raised that objection were the very ones which always rejected African proposals for the liberation of Southern Rhodesia and of the Zimbabwe people. The Special Committee must therefore address to the United Kingdom, as the administering Power for the British colony of Southern Rhodesia, a request for the release of Mr. Nkomo and Mr. Sithole in order that the Committee might grant them a hearing.

987. The Special Committee agreed to the *Chairman's* suggestion to address an appeal on behalf of the Special Committee to the United Kingdom Government, by cable, requesting the release of Mr. Nkomo and Mr. Sithole so that they could appear before the Special Committee during its meetings in Africa, it being understood that the reservations expressed by the representatives of Australia and the United States would appear in the records.

988. At its 432nd meeting on 4 June 1966, the Chairman informed the Special Committee that the United Kingdom Government, in reply to the appeal of the Special Committee to secure the release of Mr. Nkomo and Mr. Sithole in order that they might appear before the Committee as petitioners, had telegraphed that, as the Committee knew, they were held by the illegal régime in Southern Rhodesia.

Adoption of resolution on the question of Southern Rhodesia

989. At its 425th meeting Afghanistan, Ethiopia, India, Iran, Iraq, the Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Mali, Sierra Leone, Syria, Tunisia, the United Republic of Tanzania and Yugoslavia submitted a draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.294) for the consideration of the Special Committee.

990. Introducing this draft resolution, the representative of *Ethiopia* said that the co-sponsors had taken into account the usual practice of allowing twenty-four hours for members to consult their Governments, but in view of the very short time available at Dar es Salaam he hoped that the submission of a draft resolution at that stage would meet with the Special Committee's approval. The draft resolution sought to incorporate the views of all members of the Special Committee in support of the aspirations of the Zimbabwe people. They would welcome any amendments calculated to improve the text, but none that might weaken its substance, for they considered the draft resolution to be the minimum action the Committee could take and would judge the sincerity of its members accordingly.

991. The representative of *Mali* said that the draft resolution reflected the opinions of all the members who had made their views known so far. The measures it proposed were the absolute minimum that the Special Committee could request of the administering Power and he hoped that all delegations would support it.

992. The representative of *Madagascar* said that his delegation had refrained from taking part in the general debate on the question of Southern Rhodesia, but that that attitude should not be interpreted as evi-

dence of a lack of interest in the distressing problem of Southern Rhodesia. On the contrary, that question was of the greatest concern to his delegation, but it considered that, apart from a few recent events, the problem remained unchanged. Hence, the statements previously made by his delegation in setting forth its position in the Fourth Committee and the Special Committee continued to be applicable. At that stage, therefore, he would confine himself to a few brief remarks concerning some of the paragraphs of the draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.294) before the Committee.

993. In the third preambular paragraph, the co-sponsors had considered it necessary to recall the terms of the Security Council resolutions recommending the breaking off of economic relations with Southern Rhodesia, and, in particular, an embargo on oil and petroleum products. As there were, in fact, States which had not complied with the recommendations made by the United Nations, the appeal being made to those States to reconsider their attitude appeared to be fully justified. The Malagasy Republic had, for its part, taken the necessary measures and had informed the Secretary-General of the United Nations about them in a *note verbale*.³³ Furthermore, by virtue of its geographical position in the Indian Ocean, his country had considered itself bound to grant certain facilities on Malagasy soil to the United Kingdom in order to enable it to carry out the aims of the Security Council concerning Southern Rhodesia.

994. In the sixth preambular paragraph of the draft resolution, the co-sponsors sought to emphasize their growing concern over the contacts which had been established between the United Kingdom Government and the Ian Smith régime. Although his delegation would like to state once again that it was in favour of discussions and negotiations to settle problems of any kind, it could not understand how negotiations could take place without the participation of the Zimbabwe people, whose interests the United Kingdom claimed to be safeguarding. By entering into negotiations with Mr. Ian Smith and refusing on the other hand to hold any discussions with the representative of the Zimbabwe people, the United Kingdom was displaying an equivocal attitude which led the Malagasy delegation to wonder about the real aim of the United Kingdom's policy concerning the fate of the Rhodesians.

995. As far as the operative paragraphs were concerned, he would merely point out that his delegation was in agreement in deploring the failure of the United Kingdom Government to bring down the Ian Smith régime. The Committee would recall the statement of the United Kingdom Government to the effect that it would undertake further measures against Southern Rhodesia if economic sanctions proved to be ineffective within a reasonable space of time. Six months had elapsed since Mr. Smith had unilaterally declared independence, but the United Kingdom did not even show any disposition to undertake the further measures of which it had spoken. It would seem that nothing more than a question of delaying tactics was involved.

996. With regard to operative paragraph 9, which called upon the United Kingdom Government to take the necessary measures, including the use of force, his delegation had doubts about the advisability of that recommendation; the result of the recent vote in the

³³ *Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-first Year, Supplement for January, February and March 1966, document S/7213.*

Security Council had confirmed its scepticism. His delegation knew that the United Kingdom would never be prepared to use force to bring down the rebels, who were none other than its own kinsmen.

997. His delegation would have liked the possibilities of reaching a peaceful settlement of the problem of Southern Rhodesia to be further explored, but in view of the short time at the Special Committee's disposal at the present session, it would support the opinion of the majority.

998. The representative of *Ethiopia* proposed that, in the preamble, the second and seventh paragraphs should be deleted, and in the fourth paragraph the word "racist" should be substituted for "white".

999. Operative paragraph 5 should be supplemented to read: "*Considers* that the situation in Southern Rhodesia continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security, as has already been established by the Security Council in its resolution 221 (1966) of 9 April 1966;"

1000. Operative paragraph 6 should be modified to read: "*Draws once again the attention* of the Security Council to the grave situation prevailing in Southern Rhodesia with a view to recommending mandatory sanctions under Chapter VII of the Charter".

1001. The representative of *Denmark* said that operative paragraphs 7 and 9 were unacceptable to his delegation. There was agreement within the Special Committee that the common aim should be to bring down the Smith régime and ensure an independent Zimbabwe on the basis of majority rule. However, operative paragraphs 7 and 9 contained the controversial points concerning the use of force which a number of countries had opposed in the Security Council. The attitude of those countries would not have changed. He therefore considered that although the draft might satisfy emotions, it would not bring a solution any nearer. Furthermore, it constituted a negation of the instrument of sanctions. The Special Committee knew that the draft, as it stood, had no chance of bringing about the desired result; indeed, its only result would be to weaken that instrument and sap confidence in the United Nations. Denmark believed that economic sanctions could remove the Smith régime and eventually combat apartheid in South Africa. However, it was essential to ensure that sanctions were applied by all Member States and to leave the door open for United Nations intervention in cases of non-co-operation.

1002. Referring to the comment of the representative of Poland on his statement of the previous day, he said that he had not mentioned Portugal because it had been his understanding that the main problem was the arrival of oil from South Africa. It should be noted, however, that his delegation had supported mandatory sanctions, which were an innovation. His delegation had wanted to ask all countries to apply those sanctions in accordance with the United Nations Charter, the alternative being enforced compliance.

1003. As immediate action was needed, his Government proposed the deletion of operative paragraphs 7 and 9 and the insertion of the following two new paragraphs:

"7. *Recommends* to the Security Council to request all member countries to confirm without delay that they will apply the sanctions mentioned in paragraph 6 in accordance with their obligation under the Charter of the United Nations;

"8. *Further recommends* to the Security Council, in the event that any State does not comply with the decisions of the Council mentioned in paragraph 6, to consider appropriate measures by the United Nations in accordance with the provisions of Chapter VII of the Charter in order to secure the effective application of the sanctions with a view to the rapid abolishment of the racist régime in Southern Rhodesia;"

Operative paragraph 8 should then be renumbered as paragraph 9.

1004. He regretted the remark of the representative of Ethiopia that the Special Committee would be judged on its vote on the draft resolution. If he had wished to speak in the same vein he would have said that the African and Western countries would be judged on their action in connexion with the Danish amendment (A/AC.109/L.295).

1005. The representative of *Chile* proposed the following amendments (A/AC.109/L.296) to the draft resolution under consideration. After the final preambular paragraph, the following new preambular paragraph would be inserted:

"*Taking into account* the decisions of the Organization of African Unity in respect of the difficult situation facing Zambia as a consequence of the unilateral declaration of independence in Southern Rhodesia,"

After operative paragraph 3, the following new paragraph would be inserted:

"*Calls upon* all Member States to extend all necessary assistance to the people of Zambia to enable them to face the difficult situation arising as a consequence of the unilateral declaration of independence in Southern Rhodesia;"

1006. The representative of *Venezuela* said that his delegation was fully in agreement with the substance of the draft resolution, which contained a number of principles which it upheld. Since, however, the sponsors had clearly said that they would not agree to the draft resolution being amended, he would merely like to make a few comments.

1007. First of all, he supported the two amendments which the representative of Chile had just submitted (A/AC.109/L.296) and which did not call for any explanation. He asked that they should be put to a separate vote by roll-call.

1008. The Venezuelan delegation would like to make it clear that the fact that it honestly supported principles which it considered fundamental did not mean that its position with regard to colonialism had changed. Truth did not belong to a single man or to a single group of men. To say that "anyone who does not accept unconditionally what we decide is against us" was an over-simplification. Although his delegation approved of the substance of the draft resolution, it felt obliged to express certain reservations concerning the methods used to achieve the common goal and concerning the wording of certain paragraphs of the draft resolution.

1009. With regard to the fifth preambular paragraph, it was not for the Special Committee to recommend the use of force. That was a prerogative reserved to the Security Council in cases of extreme gravity. Although the situation in Southern Rhodesia was obviously serious, to resort to the unilateral use of force would create a dangerous precedent. Force

should only be used collectively and under the supervision of the United Nations.

1010. That paragraph also appeared to give much more stress to the restoration of the 1961 Constitution than to the implementation of resolution 1514 (XV), which was in fact the item on the agenda. He referred in that connexion to the statement which he had made during the last general debate on the question in New York (A/AC.109/PV.405, pp. 7-12).

1011. His delegation would only be able to vote for that paragraph if the phrase "including the use of military force" was deleted. It could, however, agree to the insertion of the words "and more energetic" between the word "prompt" and the word "measures".

1012. With regard to operative paragraph 3, his delegation did not think that the Special Committee was competent to condemn the Government of Member States. Only the Security Council was empowered by the Charter to make such a condemnation, the logical consequence of which was the expulsion of the Member State concerned. Venezuela would only be able to vote in favour of that paragraph if the words "the policies of" were inserted between the word "Condemns" and the words "the Governments".

1013. Again, only the Security Council had the power to make a decision such as that mentioned in operative paragraph 7. The Venezuelan delegation could in no circumstances agree that a Member State should be authorized to use force unilaterally. That would create a precedent which would endanger the very existence of the international community. The experience of the Latin American countries of what the use of force by a State could be had been too long and too bitter for them to agree without protest to the Special Committee authorizing by a vote the use of force by a Member State on the basis, moreover, of arguments of doubtful worth. A great Power could always find some justification for its actions, and there was no need for the Committee to provide it with a precedent on which it could reply. That was why Venezuela supported the amendment (A/AC.109/L.295) submitted by the delegation of Denmark. It must also be borne in mind that in approving operative paragraph 7, the States which were members of the Special Committee would be renouncing any right to criticize the United Kingdom's desire to retain its military bases, since those bases would then be essential to it if it was to give effect to United Nations resolutions. Since the idea expressed in operative paragraph 7 was already contained in operative paragraph 6, his delegation asked that paragraph 7 should be deleted.

1014. He expressed the same reservations concerning the phrase "including the use of force" in operative paragraph 9 as he had concerning the fifth preambular paragraph. The expression "all necessary measures" seemed to him sufficient. If the administering Power considered it necessary to resort to force, it should do so on its own responsibility alone and not with the support of the United Nations. His delegation asked that the phrase in question should be deleted, and by the same token it supported the amendment proposed by Denmark.

1015. His delegation requested separate votes, by roll-call, on the fifth preambular paragraph and on operative paragraphs 3, 7 and 9, it being understood that a vote would not be necessary on operative paragraphs 7 and 9 if the Danish amendment was adopted.

1016. The Chairman, speaking as the representative of *Sierra Leone*, thanked the representative of Denmark for his contribution to the debate. *Sierra Leone*, like other African States, had always appreciated the efforts of the Scandinavian countries, and particularly of Denmark, to introduce a fresh approach to the problems of Africa.

1017. The representative of Denmark had stated that the draft resolution before the Special Committee (A/AC.109/L.294) contained the same controversial points as those in the draft resolution recently submitted to the Security Council.³⁴ That was so: they had been included again since they reflected the view not only of African countries but also of a number of others, that the time had come to use force. The representatives of Venezuela, the United States and Australia had all argued against such action, together with the representative of Denmark, who had warned Africans that it would undermine the United Nations instrument of sanctions. In fact, however, that instrument was already being undermined by the countries which, only a month before had supported a United Kingdom resolution before the Security Council invoking Chapter VII of the Charter and advocating the use of force to divert two oil tankers from Beira. Those same countries now refused to support the invocation of the same Chapter in the face of a situation which constituted a grave threat to the peace of the world. Furthermore, the very countries which had taken action in the Congo, without even consulting the Security Council, because they considered a small number of Europeans to be in danger, were now concerned about the use of force in Southern Rhodesia, where 4 million Africans lived in the most wretched conditions.

1018. The existing situation in Southern Rhodesia might well endanger the peace of the whole world. Zambia, for instance, was already affected by it and African States were not prepared to tolerate such a state of affairs any longer. The representative of Venezuela had spoken with considerable feeling of his experience in Latin America with regard to the use of force. While African States respected his views, no other course remained open to them if the illegal Smith régime was to be overthrown.

1019. The representative of Denmark had also considered that the use of force might weaken international confidence in the United Nations. Confidence in the United Nations had already been shaken in relation to several situations in Africa where it remained impotent and unwilling to take action. The representative of Denmark had further stated that the draft resolution before the Committee had no chance of being accepted if it were presented in the Security Council. African States were fully aware of, and realized that, certain countries were prepared to give practical effect to the statements made by their representatives on certain questions of principle. International confidence in the United Nations could not be maintained through debating manoeuvres, particularly on such a question as the Southern Rhodesia situation which, to many people, was a matter of life and death. The fact that many of the battles against colonialism had been won outside the United Nations did little to enhance its dignity and reputation.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, Supplement for April, May and June 1966, document S/7285/Add.1.

1020. Lastly, he expressed the opinion that the question of Southern Rhodesia, which had been debated at length in many places throughout the world, would provide the supreme test of the United Nations and its principles. He appealed to all those who were genuinely interested in its future to examine the question in that light.

1021. The representative of *Ethiopia* said that the representative of Denmark had taken exception to his statement, at the Special Committee's previous meeting, that the sincerity of members and their support for the African people of Zimbabwe would be judged by their reaction to the draft resolution. He did not, however, intend to apologize for that remark. His delegation respected the manner in which the Danish representative expressed himself and expected the same respect in return.

1022. Moreover, the Danish representative had himself used a similar phrase, stating that he would judge the Special Committee by its reaction to the amendments proposed by his delegation (A/AC.109/L.295). But it was important to keep essentials in mind and, as the Chairman had said, Denmark's support on a number of issues affecting Africa, both in the Committee and in other organs of the United Nations, was highly valued. It was gratifying to note that the Danish delegation was prepared to support the draft resolution with the exception of two paragraphs. The Committee had so far conducted its deliberations in a dignified manner. He trusted that in future that high standard would not be lowered by interventions such as that made by the representative of Denmark.

1023. The representative of *Denmark*, referring to the remarks made by the representative of Sierra Leone, said that he did not contest the right of certain members to resubmit to the Security Council the same controversial points as those contained in the draft resolution recently rejected by that body. His only concern was to find a solution which would help the people of Zimbabwe. Since there was little likelihood of a change in the majority view within the Security Council, he had therefore sought another avenue of approach which would be acceptable to all and would result in the removal of the Smith régime.

1024. The representative of Sierra Leone had also referred to his statement that the use of force would undermine the United Nations instrument of sanctions. The Danish delegation agreed that the African States were not responsible for that. If, however, sanctions were replaced by the use of force, that might be taken as a sign that they had failed—an outcome which would only benefit South Africa. In his view, the most effective results would be achieved if the Special Committee recommended mandatory sanctions as proposed in the draft resolution. The Security Council should then be requested to consider intervention if any country failed to comply with such a decision.

1025. In a further point, the representative of Sierra Leone had rightly stated that the Security Council had already approved the use of force in authorizing the diversion by United Kingdom warships of two oil tankers bound for Beira. However, the countries which had voted in favour of that action at the Security Council had in all likelihood considered that it would involve no loss of life, whereas armed intervention, as proposed in the draft resolution, might start a war.

1026. He deeply regretted the remark of the representative of Sierra Leone that confidence in the United Nations in Africa had been shaken and it was considered to be an impotent Organization. The Danish Cabinet, which had met during the previous night to consider the matter, had agreed that mandatory sanctions would have to be applied and that the Security Council should authorize intervention as appropriate, if a decision to that effect were contravened. There could then be no excuse for any country which did not support a Security Council decision to intervene in such instances. That compromise solution, in his firm opinion, offered the best chance of securing agreement within the United Nations and, therefore, of helping the Zimbabwe population.

1027. The Chairman, speaking as the representative of *Sierra Leone*, explained that, in speaking of the impotence of the United Nations in Africa, he had been referring to its activities with regard to the situation in Southern Rhodesia.

1028. His delegation welcomed Denmark's initiative in supporting mandatory sanctions and hoped that it would be able to extend that support to those parts of the draft resolution which related to the use of force.

1029. The representative of *Mali*, speaking as a co-sponsor of the draft resolution submitted by the African-Asian group and Yugoslavia, said that he was very grateful to the representative of Denmark for having proposed an amendment to the draft resolution. He was only sorry that he did not have the French text of the amendment, as that would have enabled him to comment on it with a better knowledge of what was involved.

1030. As far as he could judge, the representative of Denmark appeared to consider that the United Kingdom Government was in no way responsible for the aggravation of the situation in South Africa and Southern Rhodesia. The Danish amendment concerned two essential paragraphs of the draft resolution. Denmark, however, could not approve of the actions of the Ian Smith government, which no country in the world had agreed to recognize, and could only attribute to the United Kingdom Government the full responsibility for the situation which had thus been created.

1031. The African-Asian group and the Yugoslav delegation had agreed that the administering Power should be asked to take all necessary measures to impose an embargo on petroleum and its products so as to prevent them from reaching Southern Rhodesia. They also called for the implementation of resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960 containing the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.

1032. On the basis, however, of the Danish representative's logic, especially with regard to his amendment to operative paragraph 8 of the draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.294/Rev.1), it would appear that it was the other States which had not wanted to implement the provisions of Security Council resolution 217 of 20 November 1965. If the amendment in question had been submitted at the session of the United Nations General Assembly, it would very likely have been applauded and accepted. The fact was, unfortunately, that the United Kingdom had appeared for the last six months to be siding with Southern Rhodesia. Hence, it was the capitalist mono-

polies and the Western countries which should change their position, since there appeared to be no reason for the other delegations to change theirs.

1033. The representative of the *Union of Soviet Socialist Republics* said that although his delegation supported the substance of the draft resolution submitted by the African-Asian group and Yugoslavia (A/AC.109/L.294/Rev.1), it did have some reservations. In its opinion, the fifth preambular paragraph of the original draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.294), which was the fourth preambular paragraph of the revised version, was unnecessary; it was worded in such a way as to distort the situation, since the measures taken by the United Kingdom with regard to its other colonies were quite clearly unlawful. The fact none the less remained that that country had been led to use force against the peoples of its colonies. Consequently, if such a paragraph was to be included in the draft resolution, it should say that the United Kingdom had used force "unlawfully" in some of its colonies. The fourth preambular paragraph of the revised text should therefore speak of the "unlawful" use of military force.

1034. Secondly, a provision should be added to the draft resolution specifying a date for Southern Rhodesia's accession to independence. It was well known that the policy of the United Kingdom politicians towards Southern Rhodesia was based entirely on the racist Constitution of 1961, which barred the Zimbabwe people, or a total of 4.5 million persons, from participating in free elections. It was clear that in the prevailing situation the people of Zimbabwe would be unable under that Constitution to take part in free elections for forty-one years. His delegation therefore supported the Indian representative's proposal for setting a date by which the people of Zimbabwe could attain independence. The resolution would be more forceful if it specified what particular measures must be taken to organize free elections on a basis of universal suffrage, on the understanding that those elections would be held on a date fixed in advance and would be supervised by the United Nations or the Organization of African Unity.

1035. His delegation called for the immediate repeal of the legislation establishing racial discrimination in Southern Rhodesia and, in particular, for the granting to the people of Zimbabwe of the right to freedom of speech and opinion, to freedom of the Press and to political activity. Such a demand was all the more justified as the United Kingdom, having admitted that the Ian Smith régime was illegal, could not plead the principle of non-interference in the country's internal affairs.

1036. The United Kingdom was entirely responsible for the situation as it existed. Under the Security Council resolutions, it was bound to put an end to the Ian Smith régime and to transfer power to a duly elected majority within a clearly defined period of time.

1037. As the draft resolution before the special Committee would be greatly strengthened if it contained provisions to that effect, his delegation appealed to the sponsors of the draft resolution to consider the possibility of including them.

1038. As for sanctions, the members of the Special Committee were asked to wait until they proved their effectiveness against the Ian Smith régime. It was obvious, however, that the principle of sanctions had

not produced the results expected. That was why his delegation hoped that more effective action would be taken and why it fully supported operative paragraph 3 of the revised draft resolution condemning the assistance which the Governments of Portugal and South Africa had continued to give to the racist minority régime of Ian Smith. His delegation reaffirmed its support for the other paragraphs of the draft resolution, although it considered that the adoption of the provisions which it had just proposed would strengthen the draft.

1039. His delegation also wished to give its views on the statement made the previous day by the representative of the United States. It could not but oppose that statement, for the United States representative had attempted to justify the failure of the sanctions applied by the United States Government by arguing that the United States held a very strong position in the economy of the Territories under consideration and that it had to take the views of businessmen into account. According to the United States representative, it was easy for the socialist countries to comply with the provisions concerning sanctions, since their economies were planned; the United States, however, was linked to Southern Rhodesia and South Africa by close economic ties.

1040. The fact was that the socialist countries had taken the side of the peoples fighting for their independence, whereas the aim of the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany was to crush the national liberation movements, to maintain their own positions and to continue to exploit the people of the Territories which they occupied. The United States representative had stated that his Government was not playing a double game, although that had not prevented him from adding that the United States took the side of the United Kingdom in its refusal to alter the 1961 Constitution. It might be asked whether that was not a perfect example of a double game.

1041. The representative of Denmark had stated that he was in favour of making the sanctions mandatory. As operative paragraph 6 of the new draft resolution already provided for that point, the amendment submitted by the representative of Denmark tended to postpone the application of the provisions of that paragraph. That amendment could only be to the advantage of those countries which considered that once sanctions had been applied, the problem would be solved.

1042. The representative of *Tunisia* said that the Chairman of the Special Committee, speaking as the representative of Sierra Leone, had already expressed with eloquence, clarity and precision the sentiments of millions of Africans who, because of the conditions of servitude in which they were kept, were unable to speak for themselves. He himself, therefore, would merely remind the Special Committee that all the petitioners had repeatedly affirmed their unshakable faith in the United Nations. Nevertheless, if the United Nations remained passive, it would forfeit its authority, not through the fault of the African peoples, but through that of certain Member States which, for reasons which would be sought in vain in the Charter, would be only too happy to undermine that authority.

1043. The Tunisian delegation would vote in favour of the African-Asian group's draft resolution and was convinced that the majority of the Special Committee would do likewise.

1044. The representative of the *United Republic of Tanzania* said that he appreciated the spirit in which the representative of Denmark had urged the Committee to exercise restraint in the formulation of the draft resolution. However, his delegation had strong reservations about the motives behind the Danish amendments since it considered that they sought to excuse the actions of the United Kingdom Government. He appealed to the representative of Denmark to withdraw his amendments.

1045. The representative of *Bulgaria* said that during the present series of meetings of the Special Committee, the explosive situation in Southern Rhodesia had entered on a decisive phase. The majority of delegations represented on the Committee had been extremely disappointed by the vote on the resolution submitted to the Security Council.

1046. The Committee should therefore, at the least, draw up an effective draft resolution summarizing the main points of the resolution submitted to the Security Council, since the latter resolution had obtained a majority of the votes of all countries which sincerely desired freedom for the people of Zimbabwe.

1047. He supported the substance of the draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.294/Rev.1), which reflected that majority opinion, and he expressed his admiration for the Chairman's moving statement. The struggling African peoples had reason perhaps to lose confidence in the United Nations. Other members of the Committee had expressed the view of their Governments that everything possible should be done to preserve that confidence. At the previous session of the General Assembly, Denmark had had the courage to vote in favour of the resolution against apartheid. While that stand was certainly heartening, he could not for that reason approve of the Danish amendment.

1048. The representative of *Venezuela* had expressed the point of view of the Latin American countries. It was clear that those countries were opposed to the use of force against popular movements, and they were doubtless thinking of the United States. The intervention of the United States in Latin America could not, however, be compared to the situation in Southern Rhodesia.

1049. The Bulgarian delegation supported the draft resolution. Furthermore, it hoped that consideration would be given to the Indian representative's suggestion that a time limit should be set for the independence of Southern Rhodesia and the downfall of the Ian Smith régime.

1050. The Soviet proposal concerning the fourth preambular paragraph of the new draft resolution submitted by the African-Asian group and Yugoslavia (A/AC.109/L.294/Rev.1) seemed very much to the point. The text of that paragraph did not in its present form seem to be sufficiently clear. His delegation could therefore only suggest to its African and Asian friends who were sponsoring the draft resolution that they should seek a formula which would eliminate the present ambiguity.

1051. He recalled that when the Special Committee had been hearing the statements of petitioners, and in particular those dealing with Southern Rhodesia, his delegation had asked that a report should be made to the Committee concerning the implementation of the resolutions, especially those relating to assistance to refugees and the victims of colonialism, adopted by the competent United Nations bodies. It would appear

that the decisions thus adopted particularly concerned Southern Rhodesia and the Territories under Portuguese domination. The Special Committee was therefore within its rights in asking the bodies in question to assist the refugees and all the victims of colonialism. His delegation accordingly suggested to the sponsors of the draft resolution that they should insert, between operative paragraph 10 and operative paragraph 11, which would then become operative paragraph 12, a new paragraph 11, which might read somewhat as follows:

"Requests the international specialized agencies and other international assistance organizations to grant aid and assistance to the refugees from Southern Rhodesia and to those who are suffering from oppression by the racist régime in Southern Rhodesia."

1052. As it had been pressed for time, his delegation had only been able to submit its suggestion (A/AC.109/L.297) to some of the sponsors of the draft resolution, who had been kind enough to promise their support. He apologized to those whom he had not had time to consult and asked all the sponsors to take his proposal into consideration.

1053. The representative of the *Ivory Coast* said that he supported the comment concerning the draft resolution made at the previous meeting by the representative of Sierra Leone; he would merely add, as a co-sponsor of the draft resolution, that all members of the Special Committee were agreed in considering the situation in Southern Rhodesia to be extremely serious. That was confirmed by the fact that the United Kingdom had twice appealed to the United Nations to ratify the sanctions that had been applied and to authorize it to use force in applying them. The United Kingdom would not have been in that position if it had, in Lyautey's words, "demonstrated its strength in order not to have to use it" immediately after the unilateral declaration of independence in Rhodesia. Proposals were no longer being made for anything other than economic sanctions, and it was a matter of some surprise that the countries recommending them were the very ones that had declared them unworkable in the case of South Africa. In any event, economic sanctions could not produce any effect in less than two years and could not be applied in the absence of logistic and military support.

1054. The representative of *Poland* said that the draft resolution in its general terms accorded with his delegation's views. He hoped, however, that the co-sponsors would agree to include in the preamble a reference to the statements that had been made by petitioners. Paragraph 4 of the preamble should also be reworded to make it clear that the use of force by the United Kingdom Government in the instances referred to had been unjustified.

1055. With regard to operative paragraph 8, it was important not only to rid the country of the Smith régime but to see that the people were able to express their wishes at an early date by means of free elections, and the paragraph should take that into account. In that connexion, he quoted a passage from *The Economist* of 30 April, which recalled a statement by Prime Minister Wilson in November 1965 to the effect that it would take a very long time, based on achievement by African as well as European politicians, to secure the kind of free-working democracy needed in Southern Rhodesia. *The Economist* suggested that such a "realistic" time-table should be made an entrenched

part of any constitutional settlement so that Africans themselves could act in defence of their rights through a "blocking third" of black African parliamentary representatives. His Government was against allowing the racist minority in South Africa, Southern Rhodesia and the Portuguese colonies to gain time to build up their strength and the draft resolution should insist on elections being held immediately after the collapse of the Smith régime.

1056. He was glad that the representative of Denmark had conceded that Portugal played an important role in rendering sanctions unsuccessful, and that the amendment he had submitted addressed itself to all States which would, of course, also include another NATO Power—the Federal Republic of Germany, which was supporting the colonial régimes in the area.

1057. He appreciated the sincere desire of the representative of Denmark to make sanctions mandatory, but considered that a country that did not wish to apply sanctions would not do so even in those conditions. The Security Council should therefore call upon the United Kingdom to use all the means in its power, including the use of force, if necessary, to bring down the Smith régime and enable the people of Zimbabwe to exercise their right to independence and freedom.

1058. The representative of *Denmark*, referring to the contention by the representative of the USSR that the Danish position was inconsistent, pointed out that the question of mandatory sanctions was dealt with in operative paragraph 6, on which he had made no comments. The Danish amendment (A/AC.109/L.295) referred to paragraphs 7 and 9, dealing with the use of force.

1059. In reply to the representative of Tanzania, who had said that Denmark was trying to avoid a strong resolution, he said that what his Government wished to avoid was a resolution that might not lead to practical results. Denmark had, in fact, applied sanctions, but wished them to be made mandatory because some other countries had not so far applied them. Replying to the representative of Poland, who had said that those countries would probably not apply them whether they were made mandatory or not, he said that in the case of mandatory sanctions there was a legal basis for United Nations intervention to see that they were observed.

1060. Speaking in French, he expressed surprise at the observation of the representative of the Ivory Coast about countries which had refused to apply mandatory sanctions to South Africa. That representative must know that Denmark had approved such sanctions. Since, however, no real decision had been made, no one was obliged to apply them. It was in order to compel Member States to withhold their support from the régime in Southern Rhodesia that Denmark had submitted its amendment.

1061. He had noted the questions raised by the representative of Mali; he considered them to be a tribute to the constructive efforts of the Danish delegation and would bring them to the notice of the Danish Government.

1062. The representative of *Ethiopia*, on behalf of the co-sponsors, said that after consideration of the various amendments submitted, they had decided, in a spirit of compromise and understanding, to accept the following:

1063. The words "and to taking appropriate measures to secure the effective application of sanctions in

the case of default by Member States" would be added at the end of operative paragraph 6, in accordance with the proposal made by the representative of Denmark.

1064. A new operative paragraph 11, in accordance with the Bulgarian proposed amendment (A/AC.109/L.297), would be inserted to read as follows:

"Requests the specialized agencies concerned and other international assistance organizations to aid and assist the refugees from Southern Rhodesia and those who are suffering from oppression by the racist minority régime of Southern Rhodesia." The existing paragraph 11 would then become paragraph 12.

1065. The word "unjust" would be inserted between the words "the" and "use" in the third line of the fourth preambular paragraph to take account of the suggestion made by the representatives of the USSR and Poland.

1066. In accordance with the Polish representative's further proposal, the words "a régime" in the third line of the eighth operative paragraph would be amended to read "an elected government", and the words "and to fix an early date for this purpose" would be added at the end of that paragraph.

1067. He asked the representatives of Venezuela and Chile whether they would agree to withdraw their amendment (A/AC.109/L.296), since the specific issue to be dealt with in the draft resolution was the defeat of the Smith régime, from which alleviation of Zambia's problems would naturally follow.

1068. The representative of *Chile* said that the Venezuelan and Chilean delegations, in submitting their amendment concerning Zambia, had considered it essential, in any reference to refugees, to mention also the people of Zambia, who were being oppressed by the Smith régime. He understood the attitude of the Tanzanian representative (A/AC.109/SR.424) and, in a spirit of compromise, proposed that, in the Bulgarian amendment (A/AC.109/L.297) the words, "the people of Zambia" should be added after the words "from Southern Rhodesia". That addition would not change the meaning of the amendment.

1069. The representative of *Venezuela* announced that, at the request of their African friends, the delegations of Chile and Venezuela were withdrawing their amendment (A/AC.109/L.296).

1070. The representative of the *United Republic of Tanzania* said that the words "Member States" in the amendment to operative paragraph 6 should read "any State".

1071. The representative of *Poland* said that account had not been taken of his proposal to include in the preamble a reference to the statements made by the petitioners, which had been the practice ever since the establishment of the Committee of Seventeen.

1072. The representative of the *United Republic of Tanzania* accepted the proposal on behalf of the co-sponsors.

1073. The representative of the *Union of Soviet Socialist Republics* said that his delegation was very gratified to note that the representatives of the African-Asian countries had taken at least some of his country's recommendations into account. He would vote for the draft resolution.

1074. The representative of *Bulgaria* asked the Chilean representative not to press for modification of the amendment which had been submitted by the Bul-

garian delegation and dealt specifically with the question of Southern Rhodesia. Since, as a result of the observations of the Tanzanian representative (A/AC.109/SR.424), the Chilean and Venezuelan delegations had agreed to withdraw their amendment, they could for the same reason withdraw their proposed modification of the Bulgarian amendment.

1075. He said that he would vote in favour of the draft resolution as just amended by the sponsors.

1076. The representative of *Denmark* thanked the authors of the draft resolution for having taken part of his proposed amendment into consideration. He had said earlier, however, that his delegation could not accept operative paragraphs 7 and 9. Since the co-sponsors were unable to accept his alternative proposals, he would withdraw his amendment but would be unable to vote in favour of the draft resolution.

1077. The *Chairman* read out the draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.294/Rev.1) incorporating the amendments that had been accepted by the co-sponsors.

1078. The representative of *Iran* proposed the deletion of the word "assistance" between the words "international" and "organizations" in the new operative paragraph 11; and of the words in the same paragraph "those who are suffering from oppression by the racist minority régime of Southern Rhodesia", for similar reasons to those that had led to the withdrawal of the amendment proposed by the representatives of Chile and Venezuela.

1079. The representative of *Ethiopia* stated that the representative of Iran had agreed not to insist on the points he had raised concerning operative paragraph 11.

1080. The representative of *Australia* recalled his Government's positive and prompt action to implement the kind of measures recommended by the Security Council. His Government was far from sure that such measures had been ineffective; results had been achieved and more could be expected.

1081. His Government was opposed to the use of force and would continue to place its trust in negotiation; that attitude followed from its adherence to the line of action laid down in the Security Council resolution. It did not share the views expressed in the draft resolution concerning the likely outcome of the talks in progress between the United Kingdom Government and the Smith régime; those talks should not be prejudged, and should be supported, at least until their outcome was clear.

1082. His Government shared the view of the representative of Venezuela that the Special Committee should not usurp the functions of the Security Council; to adopt the draft resolution would be to do so, and he would therefore have to oppose it.

1083. The representative of *Poland* thought that "Reaffirming" in the second preambular paragraph of the revised draft resolution should read "Recalling".

1084. The representative of *Ethiopia* signified the co-sponsors' agreement to that change.

1085. The representative of the *United States of America*, explaining her vote after it had been taken, said that since the resolution did not differ greatly from the one rejected by the Security Council the previous week, her delegation, which had abstained from voting on that occasion, had similarly abstained on the present resolution.

1086. Without minimizing the critical nature of the situation in Southern Rhodesia, her Government did

not feel that all the peaceful means of solving the problem had been exhausted. Her own delegation respected the viewpoints of others, and she regretted that some speakers in the debate had at times shown a tendency to view other delegations' positions in a dogmatic way, and that honest differences of opinion had been qualified as collusion.

1087. Her delegation had not requested votes on separate paragraphs; because of its reservations regarding the wording of much of the resolution it had preferred not to take part in them.

1088. The representative of *Chile*, speaking after the vote had been taken, said that the fact that his delegation had abstained on some specific points certainly did not mean that Chile was opposed to the recommended measures as a whole. On the contrary, it had supported all the measures intended to re-establish order in Southern Rhodesia. It was, of course, necessary to respect the principles of the United Nations Charter and at the same time to take care not to hamper the activities of other United Nations organs. It was for that reason that the Chilean delegation had abstained in the voting on the fifth preambular paragraph and operative paragraphs 3, 7 and 9.

1089. He believed that in the fifth preambular paragraph the reference to the use of force should have been deleted. Operative paragraph 3 would have been acceptable if the policies of the Governments of Portugal and South Africa had been condemned, and not the Governments themselves. Operative paragraph 7 was already covered by the previous paragraph and therefore seemed unnecessary. In operative paragraph 9, the phrase referring to the use of force should have been deleted.

1090. Despite those reservations, his delegation had voted in favour of the draft resolution as a whole because it was convinced that the rights of the valiant people of Zimbabwe should be restored.

1091. He added that when his delegation, together with that of Venezuela, had submitted a draft amendment, the intention had been to extend the scope of the draft resolution by mentioning Zambia, which had also been adversely affected by the existence of the Smith régime. Zambia would have to be helped if the Smith régime was really to be weakened. As over 60 per cent of Zambia's imports came from Southern Rhodesia, it was obvious that assistance to that young nation would gradually reduce and possibly eliminate its trade with Southern Rhodesia.

1092. The representative of *Venezuela*, also speaking after the vote, said that as he had explained his vote at the previous meeting, he merely wished to state that his delegation took operative paragraph 10 to mean that the States Members of the United Nations should assist the people of Zimbabwe in conformity with the Charter. Venezuela had, moreover, voted in favour of the draft resolution because action by the Special Committee to find a solution to the serious problem of Southern Rhodesia was imperative.

1093. The Venezuelan delegation nevertheless had some reservations concerning the wording of the draft resolution.

1094. The representative of *Australia*, explaining his vote after it had been taken, said that his Government still believed that there was hope in the measures taken by the United Kingdom Government, the significance of which had not been sufficiently appreciated. Actions such as the blocking of the oil supply to Beira

indicated the determination of the United Kingdom Government to achieve its aim.

1095. He had voted against the resolution because of his sincere belief that better results would have been achieved by a more moderately worded text.

1096. At its 427th meeting, the Special Committee voted by roll-call on the joint draft resolution, as orally revised (A/AC.109/L.294/Rev.2), as follows:

(a) The fifth preambular paragraph was adopted by a roll-call vote of 16 to 1, with 4 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Bulgaria, Ethiopia, India, Iran, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Mali, Poland, Sierra Leone, Syria, Tunisia, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Republic of Tanzania, Yugoslavia.

Against: Australia.

Abstaining: Chile, Denmark, Italy, Venezuela.

(b) Operative paragraph 3 was adopted by a roll-call vote of 17 to none, with 4 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Bulgaria, Denmark, Ethiopia, India, Iran, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Mali, Poland, Sierra Leone, Syria, Tunisia, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Republic of Tanzania, Yugoslavia.

Abstaining: Australia, Chile, Italy, Venezuela.

(c) Operative paragraph 7 was adopted by a roll-call vote of 16 to 2, with 3 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Bulgaria, Ethiopia, India, Iran, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Mali, Poland, Sierra Leone, Syria, Tunisia, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Republic of Tanzania, Yugoslavia.

Against: Australia, Denmark.

Abstaining: Chile, Italy, Venezuela.

(d) Operative paragraph 9 was adopted by a roll-call vote of 16 to 2, with 3 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Bulgaria, Ethiopia, India, Iran, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Mali, Poland, Sierra Leone, Syria, Tunisia, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Republic of Tanzania, Yugoslavia.

Against: Australia, Denmark.

Abstaining: Chile, Italy, Venezuela.

(e) The draft resolution as a whole, as orally revised (A/AC.109/L.294/Rev.2) was adopted by a roll-call vote of 18 to 1, with 3 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Bulgaria, Chile, Ethiopia, India, Iran, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Mali, Poland, Sierra Leone, Syria, Tunisia, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Republic of Tanzania, Venezuela, Yugoslavia.

Against: Australia.

Abstaining: Denmark, Italy, United States of America.

1097. The text of the resolution on the question of Southern Rhodesia (A/AC.109/167) adopted by the Special Committee at its 427th meeting on 31 May 1966, reads as follows:

"The Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,

"Having heard the petitioners during its consideration of the question of Southern Rhodesia,

"Recalling General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960, which contains the

Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,

"Recalling the various resolutions of the Security Council and, in particular, resolution 217 (1965) of 20 November 1965 which, inter alia, called upon all States to do their utmost to break off all economic relations with Southern Rhodesia, including an embargo on oil and petroleum products,

"Recalling further that since the illegal declaration of independence by the racist minority régime in Southern Rhodesia, the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland has, on a number of occasions, declared the racist minority régime to be unlawful,

"Considering that the Government of the United Kingdom has in a number of instances taken prompt measures, including the unjust use of military force in other colonies, to restore or preserve so-called constitutionality as defined by the administering Power,

"Gravely concerned at the consequences which the negotiations between the representatives of the racist minority régime and the United Kingdom Government might entail for the rights of the African people of Zimbabwe to freedom and independence,

"Noting with regret that the administering Power has made no effort to open negotiations with the leaders of African political parties with a view to establishing in Southern Rhodesia a government consistent with the aspirations of the people of Zimbabwe,

"1. Deplores the failure of the United Kingdom Government to bring down the racist minority régime in Southern Rhodesia and to establish democratic rule in this colony in accordance with the various resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly;

"2. Expresses its total disapproval of the negotiations between the United Kingdom and the racist minority régime in Southern Rhodesia and draws the attention of the United Kingdom Government to the harmful consequences those negotiations might entail for the legitimate rights of the African people of Zimbabwe;

"3. Condemns the Governments of Portugal and South Africa for their continued support of the racist minority régime in Southern Rhodesia;

"4. Reaffirms the inalienable rights of the people of Zimbabwe to freedom and independence in accordance with the Declaration contained in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) and recognizes the legitimacy of their struggle to achieve those rights;

"5. Considers that the situation in Southern Rhodesia continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security, as has already been established by the Security Council in its resolution 221 (1966) of 9 April 1966;

"6. Draws once again the attention of the Security Council to the grave situation prevailing in Southern Rhodesia with a view to recommending mandatory sanctions under Chapter VII of the Charter and to taking appropriate measures to secure the effective application of sanctions in case of default by any State;

"7. Recommends to the Security Council that it request the Government of the United Kingdom to take measures provided for in Chapter VII of the

Charter in order, by the use of air, sea or land forces, to prevent any supplies, including oil and petroleum products, from reaching Southern Rhodesia;

"8. *Calls upon* the United Kingdom Government to hold consultations with the leaders of the African political parties with a view to the establishment of an elected government consistent with the aspirations of the people of Zimbabwe and to fix an early date for this purpose;

"9. *Calls upon* the United Kingdom Government to take all necessary measures, including the use of force, to abolish the racist minority régime in Southern Rhodesia and to ensure the immediate application of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV);

"10. *Calls upon* all States to render moral and material support to the people of Zimbabwe in furtherance of their struggle to achieve freedom and independence;

"11. *Requests* the specialized agencies concerned and other international assistance organizations to aid and assist the refugees from Southern Rhodesia and those who are suffering from oppression by the racist minority régime of Southern Rhodesia;

"12. *Decides* to maintain the question of Southern Rhodesia on its agenda and to keep it under urgent and constant review."

1098. The text of the resolution was transmitted to the President of the Security Council on 14 June 1966.³⁵

APPENDIX I

Proclamation broadcast by Mr. Ian Smith on 11 November 1965

A PROCLAMATION

Whereas, in the course of human affairs, history has shown that it may become necessary for a people to dissolve the political affiliations which have connected them with another people and to assume among other nations the separate and equal status to which they are entitled, and

Whereas, in such event, a respect for the opinions of mankind requires them to declare to other nations the causes which impel them to assume full responsibility for their own affairs,

Now therefore, we the Government of Rhodesia, do hereby declare:

That it is an indisputable and accepted historic fact that since 1923 the Government of Rhodesia have exercised the powers of self-government and have been responsible for the progress, development and welfare of their people.

That the people of Rhodesia, having demonstrated their loyalty to the Crown and to their kith and kin in the United Kingdom and elsewhere throughout two world wars and having been prepared to shed their blood and give of their substance in what they believed to be a mutual interest of freedom-loving people, now see all that they have cherished about to be shattered on the rocks of expediency.

That the people of Rhodesia have witnessed a process which is destructive of those very precepts upon which civilization in a primitive country has been built; they have seen the principles of Western democracy and responsible government and moral standards crumble elsewhere; nevertheless they have remained steadfast.

That the people of Rhodesia fully support the request of their Government for sovereign independence and have witnessed the consistent refusal of the Government of the United Kingdom to accede to their entreaties.

That the Government of the United Kingdom have thus demonstrated that they are not prepared to grant sovereign independence to Rhodesia on terms acceptable to the people of Rhodesia, thereby persisting in maintaining an unwarrantable jurisdiction over Rhodesia, obstructing laws and treaties with other States in the conduct of affairs with other nations and refusal of assent to necessary laws for the public good, all this to the detriment of the future peace, prosperity and good government of Rhodesia.

That the Government of Rhodesia have for a long period patiently and in good faith negotiated with the Government of the United Kingdom for the removal of the remaining limitations placed upon them and for the grant of sovereign independence.

That in the belief that procrastination and delay strike at and injure the very life of the nation, the Government of Rhodesia consider it essential that Rhodesia should obtain without delay sovereign independence, the justice of which is beyond question.

Now therefore we, the Government of Rhodesia, in humble submission to Almighty God, who controls the destiny of nations, conscious that the people of Rhodesia have always shown unswerving loyalty and devotion to Her Majesty the Queen and earnestly praying that we the people of Rhodesia will not be hindered in our determination to continue exercising our undoubted right to demonstrate the same loyalty and devotion in seeking to promote the common good so that the dignity and freedom of all men may be assured, do by this proclamation adopt, enact and give to the people of Rhodesia the Constitution annexed hereto.

God save the Queen!

APPENDIX II

Southern Rhodesia Act, 1965 Ch. 76

AN ACT TO MAKE FURTHER PROVISION WITH RESPECT TO
SOUTHERN RHODESIA

(16 November 1965)

Be it enacted by the Queen's most Excellent Majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and Commons, in this present Parliament assembled, and by the authority of the same, as follows:

1. It is hereby declared that Southern Rhodesia continues to be part of Her Majesty's dominions, and that the Government and Parliament of the United Kingdom have responsibility and jurisdiction as heretofore for and in respect of it.

2. (1) Her Majesty may by Order in Council make such provision in relation to Southern Rhodesia, or persons or things in any way belonging to or connected with Southern Rhodesia, as appears to Her to be necessary or expedient in consequence of any unconstitutional action taken therein.

(2) Without prejudice to the generality of subsection (1) of this section an Order in Council thereunder may make such provision—

(a) For suspending, amending, revoking or adding to any of the provisions of the Constitution of Southern Rhodesia 1961;

(b) For modifying, extending or suspending the operation of any enactment or instrument in relation to Southern Rhodesia, or persons or things in any way belonging to or connected with Southern Rhodesia;

(c) For imposing prohibitions, restrictions or obligations in respect of transactions relating to Southern Rhodesia or any such persons or things, as appears to Her Majesty to be necessary or expedient as aforesaid; and any provision made by or under such an Order may apply to things done or omitted outside as well as within the United Kingdom or other country or territory to which the Order extends.

(3) An Order in Council under this section may make or authorize the making of such incidental, supplemental and consequential provisions as appear to Her Majesty to be expedient for the purposes of the Order, and any provisions made by or under such an Order may be made to have effect from any date not earlier than 11 November 1965.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, document S/7371.

(4) An Order in Council under this section may be revoked or varied by a subsequent Order in Council thereunder.

(5) An Order in Council under this section shall be laid before Parliament after being made and shall expire at the end of the period of twenty-eight days beginning with the day on which it was made unless during that period it is approved by resolution of each House of Parliament.

The expiration of an Order in pursuance of this subsection shall not affect the operation of the Order as respects things previously done or omitted to be done or the power to make a new Order; and in calculating the period aforesaid no account shall be taken of any time during which Parliament is dissolved or prorogued or during which both Houses are adjourned for more than four days.

3. (1) Subject to the following provisions of this section, section 2 of this Act shall continue in force for the period of one year beginning with the date of the passing of this Act and shall then expire unless it is continued in force in accordance with subsection (2) of this section.

(2) Her Majesty may from time to time by Order in Council provide that section 2 of this Act shall continue in force for a period of one year beyond the date on which it would otherwise expire; but no recommendation shall be made to Her Majesty in Council to make an Order under this subsection unless a draft of the Order has been laid before Parliament and approved by resolution of each House of Parliament.

(3) The expiration of section 2 of this Act shall not affect—

(a) the operation of that section as respects things previously done or omitted to be done; or

(b) the Constitution of Southern Rhodesia 1961 as in force immediately before the expiration of that section.

4. (1) This Act may be cited as the Southern Rhodesia Act 1965.

(2) This Act extends to Southern Rhodesia, the Channel Islands, the Isle of Man, any colony or protectorate within the meaning of the British Nationality Act 1948, and (to the extent of Her Majesty's jurisdiction therein) to any foreign country or territory in which for the time being Her Majesty has jurisdiction:

Provided that no Order in Council under section 2 of this Act shall extend to any place other than the United Kingdom or Southern Rhodesia as part of the law of that place, except as far as it makes provision with respect to ships or aircraft to which this section applies, or affects the operation of any Act of Parliament which has effect in that place, with or without modifications, as part of its law, or of any instrument in force under any such Act.

(3) This section applies to British ships registered in the United Kingdom or any other country or place to which this Act extends, and to aircraft so registered.

APPENDIX III

The Southern Rhodesia (Constitution) Order, 1965

Made	16 November 1965
Laid before Parliament	17 November 1965
Coming into Operation	
sections 2 and 3	16 November 1965
Remainder	18 November 1965

At the Court at Buckingham Palace, the 16 day November 1965
Present,

The Queen's Most Excellent Majesty in Council

Her Majesty, in exercise of the powers conferred on Her by section 2 of the Southern Rhodesia Act 1965 (a) and of all other powers enabling Her in that behalf, is pleased, by and with the advice of Her Privy Council, to order, and it is hereby ordered, as follows:

1. (1) This Order may be cited as the Southern Rhodesia Constitution Order 1965 and, save as provided by sections 2 (2) and 3 (5) of this Order, shall come into operation on 18 November 1965.

(2) Save where the context otherwise requires, expressions used in this Order have the same meaning as in the Constitution of Southern Rhodesia 1961 (b) (hereinafter referred to as "the Constitution") and the provisions of sections 116 and 117 of the Constitution (other than section 117 (8)) shall apply for the purpose of interpreting this Order as they apply for the purpose of interpreting the Constitution.

(3) Any reference in this Order to a law made before the commencement of this Order shall, unless the context otherwise requires, be construed as a reference to that law as it had effect immediately before the commencement of this Order.

(4) Subject to the foregoing provisions of this section, the Interpretation Act 1889 (c) shall apply, with the necessary adaptations, for the purpose of interpreting this Order and any instrument made thereunder and otherwise in relation to this Order and any such instrument as it applies for the purpose of interpreting and in relation to Acts of Parliament.

2. (1) It is hereby declared for the avoidance of doubt that any instrument made or other act done in purported promulgation of any Constitution for Southern Rhodesia except as authorized by Act of Parliament is void and of no effect.

(2) This section shall come into operation forthwith and shall then be deemed to have had effect from 11 November 1965.

3. (1) So long as this section is in operation—

(a) No laws may be made by the Legislature of Southern Rhodesia, no business may be transacted by the Legislative Assembly and no steps may be taken by any person or authority for the purposes of or otherwise in relation to the constitution or reconstitution of the Legislative Assembly or the election of any person to be a member thereof; and chapters II and III of the Constitution shall have effect subject to the foregoing provisions of this paragraph;

(b) A Secretary of State may, by order in writing under his hand, at any time prorogue the Legislative Assembly; and

(c) Her Majesty in Council, may make laws for the peace, order and good government of Southern Rhodesia, including laws having extra-territorial operation.

(2) Orders in Council made under sub-section (1) (c) of this section may confer powers (including the power to make laws) and impose duties upon persons and authorities as well outside as within Southern Rhodesia.

(3) References in the Constitution or in any other law in force in Southern Rhodesia to a law of the Legislature of Southern Rhodesia or to an Act of that Legislature shall be construed as including references to an Order in Council made under sub-section (1) (c) of this section.

(4) Orders in Council made under sub-section (1) (c) of this section shall, for the purposes of the Statutory Instruments Act 1946 (a), be statutory instruments within the meaning of that Act and shall be laid before Parliament after being made.

(5) This section shall come into operation forthwith and shall then be deemed to have had effect from 11 November 1965.

4. (1) So long as this section is in operation—

(a) The executive authority of Southern Rhodesia may be exercised on Her Majesty's behalf by a Secretary of State;

(b) Sections 43, 44, 45 and 46 of the Constitution shall not have effect;

(c) Subject to the provisions of any Order in Council made under section 3 (1) (c) of this Order and to any instructions that may be given to the Governor by Her Majesty through a Secretary of State, the Governor shall act in his discretion in the exercise of any function which, if this Order had not been made, he would be required by the Constitution to exercise in accordance with the advice of the Governor's Council or any Minister;

(d) A Secretary of State may exercise any function that is vested by the Constitution or any other law in force

in Southern Rhodesia in a Minister or a Deputy Minister or a Parliamentary Secretary; and

(c) Without prejudice to any other provision of this Order, a Secretary of State may exercise any function that is vested by the Constitution or any other law in force in Southern Rhodesia in any officer or authority of the Government of Southern Rhodesia (not being a court of law) or (whether or not he exercises that function himself) prohibit or restrict the exercise of that function by that officer or authority.

(2) Where, in pursuance of sub-section (1) (d) or sub-section (1) (e) of this section, a Secretary of State exercises any function that is vested by the Constitution or any other law in force in Southern Rhodesia in a Minister, a Deputy Minister, a Parliamentary Secretary or any other officer or authority of the Government of Southern Rhodesia, he shall be exempt from any requirement imposed on that Minister, Deputy Minister, Parliamentary Secretary or other officer or authority to consult with, or to seek or act in accordance with the advice of, any other person or authority.

(3) Notwithstanding the provisions of any other law, any function that is vested by this section in a Secretary of State may be exercised by him by order in writing under his hand or in such other manner as he considers appropriate.

(4) References in this section to an officer of the Government of Southern Rhodesia shall be construed as including references to the Governor.

5. So long as this section is in operation, monies may be issued from the Consolidated Revenue Fund on the authority of a warrant issued by a Secretary of State, or by the Governor in pursuance of instructions from Her Majesty through a Secretary of State, directed to an officer of the Treasury of the Government of Southern Rhodesia.

6. It is hereby declared for the avoidance of doubt that any law made, business transacted, step taken or function exercised in contravention of any prohibition or restriction imposed by or under this Order is void and of no effect.

PART II*

H. STUDY OF THE ACTIVITIES OF FOREIGN ECONOMIC AND OTHER INTERESTS IN SOUTHERN RHODESIA AND THEIR MODE OF OPERATION

Introduction

1099. At its 328th meeting on 22 April 1965, the Special Committee adopted a resolution on the question of Southern Rhodesia (A/6000/Rev.1, chap. III, para. 292). In operative paragraph 9 of this resolution the Special Committee decided "to study in co-operation with the Secretary-General and the agencies of the United Nations the implications of the activities of foreign economic and other interests in Southern Rhodesia and their mode of operation in order to assess their economic and political influence".

1100. In its report to the General Assembly at its twentieth session, the Special Committee stated that it hoped to submit a report on this matter to the Assembly in 1966 (*ibid.*, chap. I, para. 61).

1101. At its 409th meeting on 26 April 1966, the Special Committee decided, without objection, to refer to Sub-Committee I, for consideration, the item relating to the activities of foreign economic and other interests in Southern Rhodesia and their mode of operation. On 14 September 1966, Sub-Committee I adopted a report concerning this item which is annexed hereto.

1102. At its 469th meeting on 29 September 1966, the Special Committee considered the report of Sub-Committee I.

Consideration by the Special Committee of the Report of Sub-Committee I

1103. At the 469th meeting of the Special Committee, the representative of *Syria*, Rapporteur of Sub-Committee I, introducing the report of the Sub-Committee (see annex), said that an analysis of the implications of the activities of foreign economic and other interests in Southern Rhodesia and their mode of operation had led the Sub-Committee to conclude, *inter alia*, that foreign economic and related interests played a decisive role in the economic life of Southern Rhodesia and that the foreign enterprises operating there were closely linked with international economic and financial interests in other parts of southern Africa. In common with those interests, those enterprises had been instrumental, directly and indirectly, in denying the African peoples the means of effective participation in the economic life and the enjoyment of the resources of their country. He hoped that the report would be adopted unanimously.

1104. The representative of *Australia* said that he could not in general support the report since he disagreed with many of its aspects and was completely opposed to some, particularly, for example, paragraph 102 (see annex). In saying this, however, he wished his country's attitude towards the present situation in Southern Rhodesia to be clearly understood.

1105. In order to make clear his delegation's position on the question of Southern Rhodesia he recalled that, at the 402nd meeting of the Special Committee, the Australian representative had said that his Government's economic sanctions against Southern Rhodesia were not merely declarations of principle in the absence of economic ties, but meant a substantial actual discontinuance of trade with consequent economic sacrifices. His country not only had acted swiftly, and had been one of the first in the world to institute action through actual parliamentary processes (usually a lengthy and difficult procedure), but its action had been so prompt that these parliamentary processes had been completed by 16 November 1965, i.e., within a few days only of the actual illegal declaration of independence. Furthermore, his country supported the Security Council's resolution of 20 November 1965. He enumerated the substantial action which had been taken and recalled that the Australian Prime Minister had stated that his Government regarded the unilateral declaration of independence as illegal and would grant no diplomatic recognition to the new régime.

1106. The representative of the *United Kingdom* said that his Government's position on the political situation in Rhodesia since the illegal declaration of independence and on the question of economic sanctions had been made absolutely clear in many organs of the United Nations, including the Security Council. In particular, he rejected the recommendation in paragraph 102 (a) of the report (see annex). He reserved his delegation's position on those aspects of the report for the occasions when those matters would arise during the current session of the General Assembly.

1107. With regard to the more general question of the activities of foreign economic and other interests in southern Africa, his delegation's views were well known.

1108. If the report was to be adopted by consensus, he would have to reserve his Government's position and request that it should be so recorded.

* Previously issued under the symbol A/6300/Add.1 (part II) and Corr.1.

1109. The representative of the *United States of America* said that his delegation was opposed to the adoption of the report. The conclusions and recommendations of the report were unfounded and would not help to bring down the illegal régime of Ian Smith. In his delegation's view, the Special Committee should devote its time to seeking a peaceful solution to the problem of bringing about majority rule in Southern Rhodesia.

1110. The representative of the *United Republic of Tanzania* said that, as a member of the Sub-Committee, his delegation supported all the recommendations and conclusions in the report. The aim of the report was not to topple the Smith régime but to publicize the fact that foreign monopolies were ruthlessly exploiting the human and natural resources of Southern Rhodesia. The Sub-Committee's study had shown that most of the foreign capital came from Western Europe and the United States and that the foreign monopolies were an integral part of an enmeshed oligarchy whose purpose was to exploit the vast resources of southern Africa. The responsibility for that situation lay with the administering Power, the United Kingdom, which had enabled legislation to be enacted paving the way to exploitation by foreign financial monopolies. As the Tanzanian representative had said in the Sub-Committee, colonialism had arisen from the accumulation of capital in the industrialized nations of Europe, coupled with the hunger for new sources of raw materials and new markets. It was thus economic interests that had prompted the colonization of Africa.

1111. The Sub-Committee had taken those facts into account in making its recommendations and they were applicable to all colonial countries.

1112. The representative of *Italy* said that the Sub-Committee had exceeded its terms of reference in passing political judgements. His delegation shared the reservations expressed by the Danish delegation, as reported in paragraph 103 of the Sub-Committee's report (see annex). In particular, his delegation did not think that paragraph 102 (a), condemning the colonial policy of the United Kingdom Government, was appropriate; this recommendation attempted to condense too much history, did not fit into the general context and served no useful purpose. Although he agreed that economic factors played an important role in the affairs of men, he could not share the view and the theories implicit in the report as a whole that the so-called "economic and financial interests of the international monopolies and all the forces of reaction" were the sole or deciding factor in political events in Southern Rhodesia. His delegation also had serious reservations concerning the recommendation in paragraph 102 (f), which included a reference to South West Africa, the Territories under Portuguese administration and other colonial Territories. Such a recommendation was outside the scope of the report and would divert attention from the essential problem, which was of a political nature. His delegation would not, however, oppose the adoption of the report.

1113. The representative of *India* congratulated the members of Sub-Committee I on the thorough study they had made. The report described vividly the complicated financial circles which were operating in the area and exploiting the indigenous population and resources. A cursory glance at the report and its appendices was sufficient to explain the reluctance of some to give up their vested economic interests in the Terri-

tory. His delegation supported the report together with its conclusions and recommendations. It was true, as the representative of Italy had said, that the Territories under Portuguese administration and South West Africa were not properly within the scope of the report, but Sub-Committee I's agenda had included a study of foreign economic interests in those Territories also, and it was his understanding that the recommendation in paragraph 102 (f) of the report would not be repeated in the Sub-Committee's reports on the other Territories.

1114. The representative of *Bulgaria*, referring to the conclusions in paragraphs 67 and 68 of the Sub-Committee's report, said that it was important to establish the role of foreign economic interests not only in the development of the situation in Southern Rhodesia prior to the usurpation of power by the white minority, but in particular in relation to the help given by those interests to the racist minority. The Sub-Committee's report proved that they had indeed played a part. There would be nothing new in the Special Committee condemning the United Kingdom's policy in Southern Rhodesia, as recommended in paragraph 102 (a) and it would also be appropriate to condemn the activities of the foreign economic interests in Southern Rhodesia which supported the minority régime in its defiance of world public opinion (para. 102 (d)). The recommendation in paragraph 102 (e) was logical; he agreed that the Special Committee should urge that the necessary steps should be taken by the Powers concerned to ensure that their nationals did not impede the attainment of independence by the people of Southern Rhodesia. Since the Special Committee, through Sub-Committee I, had already discussed the role of foreign economic interests in South West Africa and the Territories under Portuguese administration, it was only appropriate to include a reference to those Territories in paragraph 102 (f). His delegation supported the Sub-Committee's recommendations as a whole, especially the recommendation in paragraph 102 (f).

1115. The representative of *Uruguay* said that his delegation considered the Sub-Committee's report a valuable contribution to the study of the problem and a useful compilation of material which would assist members in forming judgements. His delegation had general reservations, similar to those which had been expressed by the representative of Italy. He agreed with all the recommendations in paragraph 102 of the report, with the exception of that in sub-paragraph (a), on which his delegation had definite reservations. It could not support an explicit condemnation of the colonial policy of the United Kingdom Government which stated that that policy had "resulted in the rise of the present racist minority régime . . .".

1116. The representative of *Syria*, speaking in exercise of the right of reply, said that the United States representative had suggested that a peaceful solution to the problem should be found. He wondered whether the United States would contribute towards this by exerting pressure on foreign enterprises in Southern Rhodesia to treat the Africans on an equal basis with the Europeans and to recognize the legitimate rights of the Africans.

1117. The representative of *Denmark* drew the Special Committee's attention to paragraph 103, which recorded the remarks made by his delegation at the 31st meeting of Sub-Committee I to the effect that it could not support the recommendations in paragraph

102 (a) and (f) of the Sub-Committee's report. The position of his delegation had not changed but, on the understanding that its reservations were recorded, it would not oppose the adoption of the report.

1118. The representative of *Venezuela* said that his delegation agreed in general with the recommendations of the Sub-Committee but had definite reservations concerning the wording of paragraph 102 (a).

1119. The representative of *Chile* said that the Sub-Committee's report underlined the economic factors which impeded the attainment of independence and self-determination by the people of the Territory. He was in favour of retaining the recommendation in paragraph 102 (f). There was nothing to prevent the Special Committee from mentioning South West Africa, the Territories under Portuguese administration and other colonial Territories in that context. His delegation agreed with the recommendations in paragraph 102 (b), (c) and (d) and endorsed the conclusions in the report.

1120. The representative of *Mali* said that his delegation fully supported the report. The recommendations were the minimum acceptable for the assistance of the people of Southern Rhodesia, who were suffering under a régime of racist aggression supported by foreign monopolies. The report showed clearly that Ian Smith's Government was protecting those monopolies.

Action taken by the Special Committee on the Report of Sub-Committee I

1121. At the 469th meeting of the Special Committee, the representative of *India* proposed that the words "Appeal to" in paragraph 102 (e) of the report of Sub-Committee I (see annex) should be replaced by the word "Urge".

1122. The proposal of the representative of *India* was supported by the representative of *Syria*.

1123. At the same meeting, the representative of the *Ivory Coast* suggested that the word "Condemn" in paragraph 102 (a) of the report of Sub-Committee I should be replaced by the word "Deplore".

1124. The suggestion of the representative of the *Ivory Coast* was supported by the representative of *Madagascar*.

1125. The representative of the *United Republic of Tanzania* said that, although his delegation deplored the colonial policy of the United Kingdom Government in Southern Rhodesia, it also condemned it, as did all progressive people, and he was in favour of retaining the word "Condemn" in paragraph 102 (a).

1126. The representative of *Chile* said that he supported the Indian representative's proposal that the words "Appeal to" should be replaced by the word "Urge" in paragraph 102 (e). His delegation was ready to accept the majority view with regard to the wording of paragraph 102 (a), but preferred the use of the word "Deplore". He expressed a tentative reservation concerning the substance of paragraph 102 (a) and reserved the right to state his delegation's definitive views after he had consulted his Government.

1127. The representative of *Uruguay* said that the recommendation in paragraph 102 (a) was implicit and obvious, but his delegation's reservations concerning it were based on its opinion that such a recommendation was not related to the Special Committee's task as set out in the resolution adopted at the Special Committee's 328th meeting. It would have been better

if the recommendations had started with one concerning the subject-matter of the report. If, however, it was agreed to use the word "Deplore" instead of the word "Condemn", his delegation would not object to the adoption of the recommendation.

1128. The representative of *Venezuela* said that if there was agreement on the use of the word "Deplore" in paragraph 102 (a), his delegation would withdraw its reservation.

1129. The representative of *Denmark* said, even with the proposed amendment, his delegation's reservations concerning paragraph 102 (a) would stand.

1130. The representative of the *United Republic of Tanzania* and the representative of *India* said that, for the sake of unanimity, they would agree to the use of the word "Deplore" in paragraph 102 (a).

1131. The representative of *Mali* said that the policy of the United Kingdom Government in Southern Rhodesia should be condemned, but his delegation would accept the use of the word "Deplore" in paragraph 102 (a) in a spirit of compromise.

1132. At the same meeting the Special Committee decided to adopt the oral amendments proposed by the representatives of *India* and the *Ivory Coast* to the recommendations contained in the report of Sub-Committee I, without prejudice to the reservations expressed by some members on the report as a whole.

1133. The Special Committee then adopted the report of Sub-Committee I (see annex), and endorsed its conclusions and recommendations, as amended, it being understood that the reservations expressed by members would be reflected in the records.

1134. The recommendations thus adopted, with amendments by the Special Committee at its 469th meeting on 29 September 1966, read as follows:

The Special Committee recommends that the General Assembly:

(a) Deplore the colonial policy of the United Kingdom Government which resulted in the rise of the present racist minority régime based on the colonial exploitation of the natural and human resources of the Territory in a way detrimental to the rights and interests of the indigenous population of Southern Rhodesia.

(b) Condemn once again the illegal declaration of independence by the white settlers in Southern Rhodesia, who represent the economic and financial interests of the international monopolies and all the forces of reaction.

(c) Reaffirm the rights of the indigenous population of the Territory to self-determination and real independence, and the legitimacy of their struggle to achieve both economic and political liberation.

(d) Strongly condemn the activities and operating methods of foreign economic and other interests in Southern Rhodesia which support the racist minority régime in its suppression of the African population of the Territory and in the defiance of world public opinion.

(e) Urge the interested Powers to exert their influence on those of their nationals who own and operate enterprises in Southern Rhodesia to end their activities which impede the attainment of independence by the people of Southern Rhodesia, and to refrain from giving any support to the colonial policies which constitute a crime against humanity.

(f) Inscribe on the agenda of the General Assembly at its twenty-first session as a matter of urgency the following item:

"The activities of foreign economic and other interests which are impeding the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples in Southern Rhodesia, South West Africa, Territories under Portuguese administration and other colonial territories."

(g) Request the Secretary-General to give the widest possible publicity to the contents of this report and to the decisions of the United Nations on this question.

ANNEX

[A/AC.109/L.332]

Report of Sub-Committee I

Activities of foreign economic and other interests in Southern Rhodesia and their mode of operation

Rapporteur: Mr. Rafic JOUÉJATI (Syria)

CONTENTS

	<i>Paragraphs</i>
INTRODUCTION	1-5
CONSIDERATION BY THE SUB-COMMITTEE	6-103
A. Statements by members	6-65
B. Conclusions	66-101
C. Recommendations	102
D. Adoption of the report	103

Appendices

	<i>Page</i>
I. The economy of Southern Rhodesia, with particular reference to foreign interests	211
II. Recent developments concerning economic sanctions against Southern Rhodesia	255

INTRODUCTION

1. At its 328th meeting on 22 April 1965, the Special Committee adopted a resolution on the question of Southern Rhodesia (A/6000/Rev.I, chap. III, para. 292). In operative paragraph 9 of this resolution the Special Committee decided "to study in co-operation with the Secretary-General and the agencies of the United Nations the implications of the activities of foreign economic and other interests in Southern Rhodesia and their mode of operation in order to assess their economic and political influence".

2. The Secretariat, with a view to assisting the Special Committee in its study of this question, made available to members, on 21 December 1965, a working paper on the economy of Southern Rhodesia, with particular reference to foreign interests (see appendix I).

3. At its 409th meeting on 26 April 1966, the Special Committee decided, without objection, to refer to Sub-Committee I,^a for consideration, the item relating to the activities of foreign economic and other interests in Southern Rhodesia and their mode of operation.

4. The Sub-Committee considered this item at its 24th, 25th, 26th and 31st meeting held on 9 and 12 May, 25 July and 14 September 1966 respectively. The Sub-Committee had before it the above-mentioned working paper prepared by the Secretariat.

5. At its 25th meeting held on 12 May 1966, the Chairman of the Sub-Committee, on the suggestion of the representative of the Soviet Union, requested the Secretariat to prepare a supplementary working paper on the ways in which the activities of foreign monopolies rendered the economic sanctions

against the Smith régime ineffective. Pursuant to that request the Secretariat made available to members on 21 July 1966 a further working paper on recent developments concerning economic sanctions against Southern Rhodesia (see appendix II). This working paper furnished information supplementary to that already contained in previous working papers on Southern Rhodesia prepared by the Secretariat for the Special Committee (A/AC.109/L.327).

CONSIDERATION BY THE SUB-COMMITTEE

A. Statements by members

6. The representative of the *United Republic of Tanzania* thanked the Secretariat for compiling the extensive data in the in working paper, which would be most useful to the Sub-Committee.

7. It should be understood that, far from being a mere adventure, colonialism had arisen from the accumulation of capital in the industrialized nations of Europe, coupled with the hunger for new sources of raw materials and new markets. It was thus economic interests that had prompted the colonization of Africa.

8. Three factors were necessary for a clear understanding of the question under consideration. Firstly, the Sub-Committee's study of the activities of foreign monopolies in South West Africa and the Portuguese Territories had demonstrated that, whereas companies maintained various individual names, they were an integral part of an enmeshed oligarchy whose purpose was to exploit the vast resources of southern Africa; the study of Southern Rhodesia could be expected to provide further confirmation of that fact. The second factor was the establishment of "Crown lands" and white lands, resulting in the dispossession of the African people and the denial to them of their own sources of production, and the entrenchment of the colonialist settlers as the "superior" administrative force in Zimbabwe. Thirdly, the tight hold of the financial empires in southern Africa and the interrelationship of their various branches were an obstacle to effective economic sanctions. Sanctions applied to one branch would affect the others; at the same time, while an attempt might be made to curb the activities of branches operating in Southern Rhodesia, those in other sectors would automatically keep them fully and adequately supplied.

9. The question of land was fundamental. It was through the usurpation of land rights that the white settler minority had been maintained as the tool of colonialism and of the foreign monopolies, that the Africans of Zimbabwe had been denied their natural rights and that the very fabric of African life had been sacrificed at the altar of super-profits. There were twenty times as many Africans as Europeans, yet the distribution of land was such that there were about 168 acres for each European and only ten acres for each African. Furthermore, about 5 per cent of the African land was totally unproductive. Moreover, the larger estates in Rhodesia were owned by companies, above all Lonrho Ltd., a company jointly owned by British financial interests and some settler elements. European settlers were given the best land lying along railway lines and major roads. Although most of them arrived in Southern Rhodesia penniless, they were given land by the Government and directed to credit facilities where they could obtain sufficient capital to carry them through their first harvest. The African labour they employed worked for several months without pay, having to wait until the harvest was sold before receiving their pitifully low wages. Many children, too, from eight to eighteen years of age, were employed in those conditions, a practice both morally reprehensible and contrary to international conventions. Subjected thus to menial labour, the African children were prevented from obtaining education to better themselves and the future of their country. Since farm workers were not allowed to form trade unions, they had no way of safeguarding their interests. The foreign companies engaged in that sector of the economy were therefore actively curbing the rights of the Zimbabwe African workers.

10. The basic source of economic life and foreign exchange in Southern Rhodesia was agriculture. Hence, land was the most valuable asset of the people and the Africans of Southern

^a The Sub-Committee is composed of the following members: United Republic of Tanzania (Chairman), Denmark, Ethiopia, Mali, Syria, Tunisia, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Yugoslavia.

Rhodesia had a natural right to a fair share of the land. The lion's share, however, had been given to the foreign elements of exploitation and their local representatives, the racist settlers. That had been done by the British colonial administration, through the Land Apportionment Act. As far back as 1923, the so-called Legislative Council of Southern Rhodesia, under the direction of the United Kingdom Government, had enacted the necessary legislation in response to a resolution passed by the Agricultural Union Congress calling on the colonial administration to make it impossible for individual landowners "to sell land to Asiatics or Natives among a European community". The legislation, the height of arrogance, had paved the way to exploitation by foreign financial monopolies. Other legislation had followed: legislation giving legal substance to a policy of segregation; legislation (African Affairs Act) prohibiting an African from moving from one district to another; and legislation, under the notorious 1961 Constitution, authorizing the Governor yet further to dispossess the Africans of their land whenever it was required for the purpose of mineral development, defence, etc.

11. While Europeans enjoyed a monopoly of the best and most conveniently situated land—cultivating only about 3.5 per cent of it—they had free access to the so-called "Native Purchase Area", where they could acquire land under the pretext of mining or carrying out projects in the interest of "natives". It might be asked where the exploitation was to stop and what future was in store for the 4 million Africans. The legislation he had described had been so designed as to relegate the African people of Southern Rhodesia to the lowest levels of the economy while benefiting the foreign companies operating in that country.

12. The major agricultural produce of Southern Rhodesia was tobacco. Various companies, mainly British or of British origin, played a major role, both domestic and international, in the tobacco industry. The vast profits reaped by those companies did not of course accrue to the African people of Zimbabwe, but to the British shareholder. The same situation obtained in the sugar and textile industries. There were sharp differences in the wages paid to Africans and Europeans employed in those industries.

13. It was the mining industry, however, that offered the most glaring example of economic exploitation. The British South Africa Company had been established to exploit Southern Rhodesia's mineral wealth, not for the benefit of the indigenous Africans but to fill the coffers of its shareholders thousands of miles away. According to press reports, significant deposits of magnesite had been found in Southern Rhodesia; they were to be exploited by Cullinan Refractories Ltd. and Vereeniging Brick and Tile, both of which were South African companies. The Rhodesian pig-iron industry was virtually under the control of the Rhodesian Iron and Steel Corporation (RISCO), a giant consortium of Anglo-American concerns. Immediately after the announcement of sanctions against the Smith régime, the RISCO group had taken steps to transfer its enterprises and to trade through ISCOR (Iron and Steel Corporation), an institution owned by South Africa. It was obvious that the activities of that group of foreign companies were directed against the interests of the African people of Southern Rhodesia.

14. In the circumstances which had led to expropriation of the land by Europeans, the traditional generosity of the Africans had been exploited to their disadvantage. Chief Lubengula, the King of Matabele, had entered into an agreement with the British South Africa Company for mining rights in return for an agreed rent to be paid to the Africans as the owners of the land; the latter had risen against the Company in 1893 for its failure to honour the agreement, and it was not until 1897, after the settlers had sent for reinforcements, that they had been defeated. That had been taken as a pretext for seizing what was now known as Southern Rhodesia from its rightful owners. From that time forth, the Company had sold land to new settlers with impunity. The business had been so lucrative that the Company had created many subsidiaries registered in the United Kingdom, Southern Rhodesia, Canada and elsewhere. About two thirds of the directors were British subjects and resided in the United Kingdom, which explained why

the United Kingdom Government had refused to put down the rebellious régime. The amount leaving the country every year was colossal: in 1961-1963 alone, about £426 million had been exported.

15. In 1962 a group of experts had studied the economic resources of Southern Rhodesia with particular reference to African agriculture. According to their report, in 1962 Europeans in wage employment had received an average of £1,173 per head, but Africans only £95. While the relatively high income of the European population in part reflected the original scarcity of skill, specialized knowledge and training which could be supplied only by Europeans, it was also in part due to contrived advantages. The lower earnings of the Africans, the report had said, were chiefly due to the restricted opportunities for increasing their productive powers, and the vast majority of the population was wastefully used on largely unskilled work. Such a reflection, coupled with the data in the working paper, testified eloquently to the ruthlessness with which the African was being exploited in Southern Rhodesia.

16. Land played a decisive role in the economic life of Southern Rhodesia. The extensive leases granted to foreign financial interests, and to the settlers, were maintained under the notorious Land Apportionment Act. The people of Southern Rhodesia had categorically denounced that Act as an integral part of the coercive machinery used by the forces of colonialism to deny them freedom. The foreign monopolies operating in Southern Rhodesia, which continued to exploit the human and natural resources of that country through the enforcement of the Act, were a direct impediment to the realization of the African people's legitimate aspirations. The monopolies were aiding and abetting the consolidation of colonial rule in Southern Rhodesia through the white settler minority.

17. The following conclusions could be drawn: the foreign companies operating in Southern Rhodesia were directly instrumental in denying the Africans the basic means of production, thereby subjecting them to outmoded forms of production and curbing their development; they were holding a position openly robbed from the legitimate sons of Rhodesia; they were actively broadening the coercive machinery of the colonial régime; while international opinion apparently supported sanctions against the rebel régime, those foreign companies were working in concert to undermine any such action. It followed that they were a direct hindrance to the attainment by the African people of their liberation. The Sub-Committee should therefore recommend that the nationals of the companies concerned should be restrained by their Governments from pursuing activities which were an impediment to the attainment of freedom and independence by the African people of Southern Rhodesia.

18. The representative of the *Union of Soviet Socialist Republics* said that the Sub-Committee's previous study of the activities of imperialist monopolies in South West Africa and the African Territories under Portuguese administration had clearly shown that United Kingdom, United States, West German and other monopolies which held in their tenacles all of southern and central Africa were a major obstacle to the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. The work of the Sub-Committee and of the Special Committee itself had clearly established that those same international monopolies were operating in the dependent Territories of southern Africa, which they had turned into their private domain and were resolved to maintain as a sanctuary of colonialism in order to continue to receive enormous profits.

19. The decisive role played by international monopolies in suppressing the legitimate aspirations of the Zimbabwe people for genuine independence was apparent throughout the history of Southern Rhodesia, where 80 per cent of capital investment came from abroad. The British South Africa Company, founded in 1889 by Cecil Rhodes, had until 1923 enjoyed unlimited powers over the Territory, including the right to acquire and exploit the land. To install and maintain that clique as the overlords of the indigenous population, it had set up armed forces, units of which still existed. That company had played an important part in the conquest of the Territory by the United Kingdom, the looting of Zimbabwe, its settlement by

white emigrants, the seizure of the best lands and the establishment of the present social and political structure of Southern Rhodesia.

20. Being the largest exploiters of the African continent, the British South Africa Company had long maintained close relations with the largest company in southern Africa, the Anglo-American Corporation. The boards of the two companies had merged in 1965 and the new company, Charter Consolidated, through its Rhodesian affiliate Anglo-American Corporation (Rhodesia) and associated companies, held a major interest in practically every sector of the Rhodesian economy, including mining, forestry, citrus fruit production, tobacco and sugar. The total capital investment of United Kingdom monopolies was estimated at £200 million and of United States companies at \$56 million, the major part being invested in agriculture, mines and real estate. Total investments of South African companies were estimated at £75 million.

21. International monopolies held a particularly powerful position in mining, in which 90 per cent of all private capital was invested, while only 10 per cent went to manufacturing, processing and agricultural industries. The United Kingdom company Turner and Newall, Ltd., which had earned £12.7 million in 1962-1963, controlled 63 per cent of the production of asbestos, of which Southern Rhodesia was the world's largest producer. Chrome reserves were cynically exploited by such foreign monopolies as the London Chrome Company, Ltd. and the Vanadium Corporation of America, and production of lithium, copper, gold and coal were almost exclusively controlled by Bikita Minerals (Pvt.), Ltd., M.T.D. (Mangula), Ltd., companies of the Lonrho group, and Wankie Colliery Company, Ltd., respectively. It was clear that United States-owned companies were taking an increasing part in the exploitation of Rhodesian mineral resources.

22. In the field of ferrous metallurgy, which was largely controlled by Charter Consolidated through its affiliated company The Rhodesian Iron and Steel Company Ltd. (RISCO), there had been a recent increase in the penetration of Japanese capital and two large Japanese firms had been granted concessions for the exploitation of iron ore in the production of pig-iron and for the construction of a new blast-furnace for RISCO. The motor vehicle assembly plant in Salisbury belonged to the Ford Motor Company of Rhodesia, a subsidiary of Ford of Canada, and the Rhodesia Bata Shoe Company produced 90 per cent of all leather footwear.

23. The predominance of foreign monopolies, which owned vast areas of land in the Territory, was particularly striking in agricultural production. Tobacco was grown by European farmers and marketed by three large firms controlled by Imperial Tobacco, Gallaher, British American Tobacco Ltd. and Rothmans Tobacco. Among the monopolies with heavy investments in tobacco plantations was the South African Mutual Insurance Group. Sugar was entirely controlled by international monopolies through the firms of Triangle Ltd., and Hippo Valley Estates Ltd.

24. Those facts clearly demonstrated that the economy of Southern Rhodesia was wholly in the hands of foreign economic interests, which had been largely responsible for transforming the Territory into a colony of white settlers and had led to the division of the economy into distinct European and African sectors, the latter being subjected to ruthless colonialist exploitation by the former. The European sector, which accounted for almost 90 per cent of the national income, included the major foreign companies and the firms of the settler *bourgeoisie*. The domination of the Territory's economy by foreign monopoly with its mercenary interests brought hunger, misery and untold suffering to the millions of African toilers. They were forced to work in enterprises and farms owned by the Whites, barely keeping body and soul together. Europeans, on the other hand, enjoyed a high level of living and had every possible social advantage. All their children could receive not only primary and secondary, but higher education as well; in 1965 the *per capita* allocation of funds for education had been fifteen times higher for Europeans than for Africans. All those advantages lay at the root of the racial prejudice and ideology of apartheid which contaminated most of the European popu-

lation, particularly those born in the Territory and immigrants from South Africa.

25. The white immigrant-colonists had always found land, work and cheap labour in Southern Rhodesia and had always enjoyed the political, social and economic support of the powerful monopolies in their position of dominance. It was therefore not surprising that the white settlers, carrying out the will of their masters—the international monopolies—had, in turn, created the most favourable conditions for continued capital investment by those monopolies. A clear example of economic segregation was the agricultural sector, in which the Europeans, who constituted only 5 per cent of the population, accounted for 45 per cent of agricultural estates, 75.5 per cent of the costs of production and 93.9 per cent of output. The average annual income of African farmers was between £11 and £14, while many Africans lived in the tribal reservations and received no income at all.

26. The merciless exploitation of the vast majority of the population by the foreign monopolies and the white settlers was further strengthened by the notorious Land Apportionment Act, which had led to a situation in which 23 per cent of the population was entirely at the mercy of foreign monopolies and European land-owners, which derived enormous profits by exploiting them and 59 per cent were forced to live in reservations. Thus, first the monopolies with the help of the settlers, and then the settlers with the help of the monopolies, had cleared half the territory of the country of the indigenous inhabitants, and seized the best land in the country, turning millions of Africans into a reservoir of cheap labour. Although trade unions were officially for white and African workers, the majority of trade unions were, in practice, segregated. Wages earned by Africans were much lower than those earned by white workers, since Africans were mostly employed in unskilled work, although as the working paper pointed out, even when the same or similar work was performed by both Africans and non-Africans, different wages were applicable. The vast gap between the earnings of Africans and Europeans was clear even from the official figures, which gave an average annual income in 1964 of £1,241 for Europeans and £121 for Africans. Africans had to work and live in terrible conditions, with no facilities or medical services.

27. The Rhodesian educational system was designed to increase the number of Africans with sufficient primary education to provide manpower for factories and farms and to reduce the number of Africans qualified to exercise effective political leadership. The slightest protests by Africans against the Smith régime were brutally repressed. Thousands of Africans were in custody for an unknown period. The police activities were frustrating attempts to express the discontents of the African population and all activities of that kind, particularly in trade unions, were banned.

28. The monopolies' programme to maintain their supremacy in Southern Rhodesia had been described in the issue of *The Economist* of 13 November 1965. The same issue had outlined a programme of diplomatic, political and economic measures to be enacted in order to maintain colonial control over the Territory. The United Kingdom Government had in fact adopted measures along the lines advocated in *The Economist* but the programme of sanctions had had little effect on the United Kingdom companies operating in Southern Rhodesia. Those companies had had time to prepare for the sanctions and had even increased their profits. The international monopolies were succeeding not only in circumventing but in undermining the economic sanctions. United Kingdom, United States, German and other monopolies were violating the ban on sales of Rhodesian tobacco and evading the oil embargo. South African and Rhodesian and international companies were uniting their efforts in a complex operation to keep Southern Rhodesia supplied with oil. The United Kingdom Prime Minister had mentioned the difficulty of forcing oil monopolies registered in South Africa to participate in the oil embargo but had failed to mention that in South Africa oil products were being produced at plants owned by United Kingdom and United States companies. It was significant that 52 per cent of the shares of British Petroleum were British-owned.

29. A number of United Kingdom politicians had close ties with the international companies. For example, fourteen Conservative Members of Parliament had capital invested in Southern Rhodesia. Mr. William Brown was a director of an office of the United States monopoly, Caltex. A Labour Member of Parliament had proposed an investigation of the ties between Conservative leaders and the Southern Rhodesian racists and said that many Conservatives had directorships in companies with interests in Southern Rhodesia.

30. The Salisbury racists encountered no difficulty in obtaining loans from the international monopolies. In December 1961 a group of Anglo-American companies had given the Government of Southern Rhodesia a loan of £51 million with a repayment period of thirteen years; in May 1962 The Standard Bank, New York, had given it a loan of £1 million; in May 1964 a consortium of firms representing banks in the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy and Japan had made a loan of \$50 million "for development purposes". In 1964-65 the Rhodesian budget had been swelled by external loans amounting to £3.6 million, including £2.5 million from the South African Government. The 1964-65 budget had included an item for the repayment of loans of £2.3 million from the British South African Company and £1.1 million from the Rhodesia Anglo-American Company. There were close links between the Rhodesian government machinery and the monopolist groups. The brother of the deposed Governor was a vice-president of the largest United Kingdom colonial bank, Barclays Bank, DCO.

31. Ian Smith and his henchmen were doing everything possible to convince their masters that they were succeeding in creating stability for the further exploitation of the natural and human resources of Southern Rhodesia. That country was appealing to the United States to join it in an alliance against an alleged communist threat and to invest in the Territory. In return, Southern Rhodesia would expect from the United States a sympathetic understanding of the problems connected with what it described as the perpetuation of the values of Western culture—in other words, the maintenance of absolute domination by the racists—in southern Africa.

32. While outwardly maintaining a position of "neutrality" towards political events in Southern Rhodesia, the large monopolistic groupings had supported the racist upheaval there. Inspired by the powerful international monopolies, the unholy alliance had decided that Smith and his régime could guarantee the inviolability of their position in the south of Africa and therefore sought to transform Southern Rhodesia into a kind of sanitary cordon against the African peoples' independence movement. Smith and his followers could have done nothing without the support of the true masters of the country, who held all the key economic positions. The Southern Rhodesian racists were paying for the support of the large monopolies with a policy of cruel discrimination and repression against the majority of the indigenous population of the country. A comparison of the situation of the European and the indigenous population of Southern Rhodesia showed that Smith was in fact pursuing a policy of apartheid.

33. The dominance of foreign companies in all branches of the economy of Southern Rhodesia was therefore fraught with dangerous consequences for the people of Zimbabwe. The concentration of foreign capital was such that a small number of monopolies had become complete masters in the country. The leading role was played by capital from the United Kingdom, the United States and South Africa but companies from Japan, the Federal Republic of Germany and other capitalist countries were also active in Southern Rhodesia. Throughout the south of Africa, the international monopolies were relying on racist white minority régimes, whose policies were designed to establish the most favourable conditions for the cynical exploitation of the resources of the territories.

34. The international monopolies operating in Southern Rhodesia were closely linked with international financial circles in South Africa, Angola and Mozambique, South West Africa and other colonial Territories in southern and central Africa. Southern Rhodesia therefore had political, economic, military and other ties with South Africa and the Portuguese colonies. The international monopolies were creating a military and in-

dustrial complex designed to exploit the African peoples and suppress the movement for the final liberation of the African continent from colonialism. As they had done in South Africa, South West Africa and the Portuguese colonies, the imperialist monopolies had seized all the natural resources of Southern Rhodesia, so that the indigenous inhabitants could not enjoy the riches of their country or take part in industrial and financial activities. So far as agriculture was concerned, the dominance of the international monopolies had led to economic segregation and the division of the economy into European and African sectors. Foreign companies were the largest landowners and controlled the production and marketing of the major export crops—tobacco and sugar. The indigenous inhabitants were thus subjected to a twofold exploitation—by the foreign companies and by the white settlers.

35. The imperialist monopolies were exerting a decisive influence on the political development of Southern Rhodesia. They had placed the administration of the colony under their control and had connived at the illegal declaration of independence. For the benefit of the monopolies, the Smith régime and its predecessors were following a policy of monstrous racial discrimination in the economic and social fields. In order to prevent representatives of the indigenous population from participating in political life, the racist minority had established property and education requirements which deprived the Africans of the franchise.

36. The strong position of the international monopolies in Southern Rhodesia was enabling the Smith régime to evade the economic sanctions; the monopolies were therefore responsible for undermining those sanctions and preventing the application to Southern Rhodesia of the Declaration on the granting of independence. Until the Zimbabwe people were granted true independence, they would be unable to enjoy their inalienable right to dispose of their country's resources and develop them for the benefit of the majority of the population.

37. The activities of foreign monopolies in Southern Rhodesia were therefore the major obstacle to the implementation there of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. The General Assembly should take the action which the Special Committee had recommended in the case of the activities of foreign monopolies in South West Africa and the Portuguese colonies.

38. The representative of *Denmark* said that his delegation doubted whether it would be proper for the Sub-Committee to try to reach conclusions or make recommendations to the Special Committee within the very limited period of time at its disposal before the visit to Africa. The material was so voluminous and the problems so complex that careful consideration was necessary before the Sub-Committee expressed an opinion. In addition, the material available related to the situation before the unilateral declaration of independence. The situation had since changed considerably and the crucial point was the extent to which the sanctions imposed by the Security Council were being implemented. The Security Council had not given the Special Committee any mandate to investigate that question, nor had the Special Committee given the Sub-Committee any mandate in that respect. He wished, however, to recall that Denmark had severed all economic and trade relations with Southern Rhodesia.

39. The relevant question to be examined by the Sub-Committee was the extent to which the foreign interests in Southern Rhodesia could and in fact did contribute to violations of the sanctions. Further material would be necessary to clarify that matter, however, and it could probably not be provided by the Secretariat. On the basis of the material so far available, no safe conclusions could be reached on whether the foreign interests in themselves had exerted any important influence on political developments. In addition, there was the question whether the considerable United Kingdom investments in Southern Rhodesia could be described as "foreign", since the Territory was a United Kingdom colony and, according to the Special Committee, the United Kingdom was the administering Power. In the opinion of the Danish delegation, what could be concluded from the working paper was that discrimination against and suppression of the African population was also found in the economic sector. That was reprehensible but could

hardly be a surprise to anyone. Notwithstanding the analysis given by the Tanzanian representative of the origin of colonialism, he thought that it was the policies of the ruling clique which had attracted the foreign capital and not the capital which had inspired the current policies of the minority régime. The Sub-Committee should not be side-tracked into concentrating on the alleged responsibilities of the foreign interests instead of on the essential task—to put an end to the existing régime in order to prepare for the establishment of a society based on self-determination and equal rights for all.

40. In view of those considerations and of the delicate situation in Southern Rhodesia, his delegation thought it would be neither possible nor appropriate for the Sub-Committee at that moment to discharge the task entrusted to it. It therefore suggested that the Sub-Committee should make a brief interim report to that effect to the Special Committee.

41. The representative of *Syria* said that distorted words and slogans should not mislead anyone into believing that the plight of over 4 million Africans in Southern Rhodesia had improved. Prosperity was being won for the few at the expense of the African masses; development was achieved by African labour but was not to its advantage; a favourable balance of payments resulted from profits accruing to foreign monopolies and investments that for the Africans meant only more deprivation. The best land had been allocated to the Whites by decree—first by an all-powerful company and then by the colonial Power claiming to bring civilization and democracy. Cattle as well as land had been confiscated from the indigenous people, who were compelled by taxation to seek work in the mines and on farms. The land which had not fallen into the hands of the British South Africa Company had been expropriated by the British Crown; the Crown owned 42 million acres, the minority settler group owned 32 million acres and only 23 million acres of hot and arid land were left for the remaining 94 per cent of the population. The Land Apportionment Act removed any possibility of Africans purchasing land.

42. Racial segregation had not been eliminated but consolidated by the colonial Power. The Industrial Conciliation Act barred Africans from access to skilled posts, while the wages of European workers were protected against any decline: the minority had divine immutable rights, while the Africans had a permanently inferior status. African labour had been responsible for the development of industries but African trade unions had no legal recognition. Denied the fruits of their labour, Africans remained in the increasingly inadequate native reserves. The foreign companies could make their huge profits only by paying the African worker an average annual wage of £121, half of which was spent on accommodation, compared with £1,241 for the European worker.

43. The emphasis on land stemmed from the fact that the land problem had been a fundamental one and that the dispossession of the legitimate owners had been a source of subsequent ills. Neither the settlers nor the colonial Power supporting them had any regard for the property rights or the human rights of the Africans. Discrimination was obvious in the legislation enacted and maintained by the colonial Power. The foreign intruders had come to consider their wealth dependent on the misery, suppression and gradual extinction of the Africans; the independence proclaimed by Smith and his clique was independence to oppress the Africans and impose on them a permanently inferior status. Indeed, Smith had only been continuing in the tradition of his masters. Although ostensibly it condemned the régime, it was the United Kingdom which had created the British South Africa Company and given it unprecedented powers. It was the same colonial Power which had annexed Zimbabwe as its colony and sanctioned the abominable practices of segregation and discrimination. It was not legal considerations or international scruples which prevented the colonial Power from using force against the illegal Smith régime but its close kinship to that régime, its close connexion with the monopolies and its huge vested interests in the Territory.

44. His delegation fully endorsed the conclusions reached by the representatives of the United Republic of Tanzania and the Soviet Union on the activities of foreign economic interests

in Southern Rhodesia. Effective action was imperative in that essentially colonial problem.

45. The representative of *Yugoslavia* expressed his delegation's gratitude to the Secretariat for preparing the working paper, which had provided the Sub-Committee with valuable data.

46. It was well known that the basic objective of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples was to enable those people to exercise their right to self-determination and independence, and freely to determine their political status and pursue their economic, social and cultural development. The Declaration affirmed the right of all peoples freely to dispose of their natural resources and stated that inadequacy of political, economic and social preparedness should never serve as a pretext for delaying independence.

47. Resolutions adopted by the General Assembly and other United Nations organs called for the overthrow, by force if necessary, of the racist Smith régime and the establishment of a majority government on the basis of one man, one vote. Representatives of the United Kingdom Government had frequently stated that their Government was prepared to bring Rhodesia to independence under a majority government. There was, however, no indication that political and economic developments in Southern Rhodesia were leading in that direction. Indeed, the road to majority government and independence in the colonies of southern Africa was proving longer, harder and more complex than might have appeared at first, because the status of those Territories was closely bound up with the political, economic and other interests of the colonial Powers. The white minority, together with outside forces, had monopolized all rights in Southern Rhodesia, and the people of Zimbabwe were mere strangers in their own homeland, completely excluded from the political, economic and cultural life of the country. Although the African population outnumbered the white minority by twenty to one, Africans owned an average of only ten acres of land each, whereas Europeans owned an average of 170 acres each. Moreover, a much smaller proportion of the African-owned land than of the land owned by the white minority and foreign companies was suitable for cultivation. Discriminatory land legislation, too, ran counter to the interests of the African population.

48. Foreign economic interests played a decisive role in the production of tobacco, sugar and other agricultural products, from which they made large profits. Foreign, and particularly United Kingdom, tobacco companies had considerable investments in tobacco processing and exporting facilities in Southern Rhodesia, and in some cases in cigarette factories. Farms owned by Europeans had produced 1,432,000 tons of sugar. Among the companies controlling sugar production were Hippo Valley Estates, the Rhodesian Anglo-American Company and Tate and Lyle Ltd.; Rhodesian Sugar Refineries, an affiliate of Tate and Lyle Ltd., had two refineries in Southern Rhodesia.

49. The dominance of foreign capital and foreign exploitation of human and natural resources was particularly striking in the mining industry, where 75 per cent of mineral production was in the hands of large foreign firms. A prominent role in mining and quarrying was played by such firms as Charter Consolidated Ltd., The Rhodesian Iron and Steel Corporation (RISCO) and companies of the Lonrho Group.

50. According to the report of the Economic Commission for Africa entitled "Economic and Social Consequences of Racial Discriminatory Practices", in 1962 the African population had amounted to 92.2 per cent of the total but its share in personal income had been only 32.3 per cent. The working paper showed that in 1964 the average annual wage of the 86,000 non-Africans in employment had been £1,240, while that of the 662,000 employed Africans had been £121. Educational opportunities for Africans were limited and the amount spent on their education was only one tenth of the amount spent on the education of children of the white minority. In view of the education and income qualifications required for the franchise, the difficulties faced by Africans in attaining the right to vote in Southern Rhodesia were obvious.

51. It was clear that the economy of the country was entirely controlled by the white minority and the network of for-

foreign companies. The people of Zimbabwe had been stripped of their rights and participated in the economic life of the country only as cheap labour bringing profits to others. Education, health and social benefits were beyond their reach and legislation was designed to prevent their benefiting from the political, economic and social development of the country. The Committee was often told that the African population was not ready for independence and must be prepared for constitutional government, but the present situation could scarcely be said to be leading in that direction.

52. The problem of the activities of foreign economic and other interests in Southern Rhodesia was extremely complex. The Special Committee would be discussing the question of Southern Rhodesia in general at its session in Africa. The Yugoslav delegation considered that while there the Committee should hear petitioners on all aspects of Rhodesian problems and thereby obtain a more complete picture of the grave situation in Southern Rhodesia. The new information thus obtained would be of great value in future consideration of the Southern Rhodesian problem. The Yugoslav delegation therefore considered that the Sub-Committee should not conclude its debate on the item before it.

53. The representative of *Nigeria* said that his delegation had been unable to study the working paper prepared by the Secretariat, because it had not yet been issued in French.

54. Surprise had been expressed in some quarters at the fact that the newly independent countries, while appealing for foreign capital for their economic and social development, did not hesitate to criticize the activities of foreign monopolies in countries still under colonial domination. There were, however, good reasons for that attitude. In independent countries, foreign capital could be a factor making for well-being and prosperity, because the companies concerned carried on their activities within the framework of national development plans and under the control of the national authorities. Their activities could thus be directed in such a way as to benefit the people. In countries still under colonial rule, however, foreign capital merely sought profit, to the detriment of the indigenous population. It served the colonial régime, which gave it protection and which in many cases it had helped to establish. To the people it merely brought impoverishment and servitude. That situation had been experienced by all former colonial peoples and was now to be found in Southern Rhodesia, where it was distinguished by even greater social injustice and more scandalous exploitation than elsewhere. The economic and social situation in the country and the activities of the main companies sharing its wealth had been discussed in detail by previous speakers. He would therefore confine himself to a few comments.

55. Firstly, it was to be noted that the whole of the Southern Rhodesian economy was in the hands of foreign monopolies, which were consequently able to control all the administrative machinery, too, and to play a leading role in political affairs. Taking advantage of social legislation which they had fashioned to suit themselves and which made the African population no more than a cheap labour force, they were able to multiply the profits they drew from land and mining concessions generally acquired on a "might is right" basis. It was inconceivable that they would voluntarily surrender their privileges and permit the implementation of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV).

56. Secondly, most of the companies concerned had their headquarters abroad. The result was that most of the wealth was drained away from Rhodesia and there remained in the country only what was necessary for the well-being of the white minority or for a further increase in the profits of the monopolies. The people did not benefit at all.

57. Thirdly, the foreign companies active in Southern Rhodesia were not restricted to that country. They had many affiliates and branches elsewhere, particularly in South Africa and the Territories under Portuguese administration. By acting through those subsidiaries, they could nullify the effect of any economic sanctions.

58. For those reasons, his delegation considered that the Sub-Committee should recommend the Special Committee to re-

gard the activities of foreign monopolies in Southern Rhodesia as a serious obstacle to the liberation of the Southern Rhodesian people and to the implementation of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV).

59. In conclusion, he pointed out that the situation at present prevailing in Southern Rhodesia had nearly come about in Algeria. The settlers and those who drew their profits from foreign enterprises in Algeria had tried at one time to throw off the authority of Paris. France had not advocated vain economic sanctions, but had gone to the root of the matter and used force, with the result that fruitful negotiations with the Algerian nationalists had become possible. The United Kingdom could profitably have followed that example.

60. The representative of *Mali* said that previous speakers had analysed the nature of colonialism and shown its aim to be exploitation of the colonized. His delegation fully shared the views expressed by the delegations of Tanzania and the Soviet Union concerning the crimes committed by the capitalists of the United Kingdom and other countries. The activities of foreign interests in Southern Rhodesia could not be discussed without bearing in mind the role which the administering Power had sought to assign to the Territory. When European countries had built themselves colonial empires in the latter half of the nineteenth century, their aim had not been, as was sometimes claimed, to civilize the coloured peoples, but to create a market for their surplus industrial products, in return for which they would be able to buy cheap raw materials.

61. Southern Rhodesia possessed great natural resources and an ideal climate for Europeans. The United Kingdom had therefore decided from the beginning to colonize it. The indigenous people had been driven out and the land had been distributed to the United Kingdom settlers. As soon as the war of occupation was over, the colonial administration had passed an act placing the Blacks in reservations. The total area allocated to the Zimbabwe people had been 21 million acres whereas the few white settlers had been given 31 million acres. The rest of the Territory, amounting to some 42 million acres, had remained Crown property. In 1930, the United Kingdom Government had passed the first Land Apportionment Act, which introduced a strict system of land segregation. Over 50 per cent of the Territory had been assigned to the Europeans and the Africans had lost the right to acquire land except in a limited area of 7.5 million acres. The soil in that area was poor, and it was difficult to grow cereals without heavy expenditure on irrigation and fertilizers. Since the Africans had neither the capital nor the knowledge to develop the land, they were reduced to poverty. Meanwhile, the settlers were given all kinds of incentives to produce the crops required by United Kingdom industry. Instead of diversifying its food crops, Southern Rhodesia had become a supplier of tobacco and sugar.

62. In 1953, in order to facilitate its plunder of the country, the United Kingdom Government had established the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. Full responsibility for economic affairs had been vested in the federal authorities, representing the interests of the racist settlers and United Kingdom financiers. That showed the sinister intentions of the United Kingdom Government towards a people whom, according to the Charter, it was supposed to prepare for independence. The result of the United Kingdom's policy was that the settlers' standard of living had steadily risen while that of the Africans had stagnated or even declined. Thus between 1954 and 1964 the *per capita* domestic product of the white settlers had risen from £56.1 to £77.4 whereas that of the Africans had declined from £12 to £11. Unable to scratch a livelihood from the soil, the Africans were obliged to sell their labour to companies anxious to exploit them. Between 1954 and 1962, 470 companies operating in many different fields had established themselves in the Federation and their net profits in 1963 had amounted to £72.7 million. The profits were exported to the United Kingdom, thus helping to impoverish Rhodesia. All the sources of true economic wealth remained in the hands of the Whites, creating a disequilibrium which could not but lead to friction.

63. The United Kingdom was not alone in exploiting the natural wealth of Southern Rhodesia. Canadian, Japanese and

United States capital was also invested in the Territory in different ways. The automobile industry was dominated by the Ford Motor Company of Rhodesia, a subsidiary of Ford of Canada. The Wankie Colliery Company mined Rhodesian coal in co-operation with other companies such as Rhodesian Anglo-American Limited, a subsidiary of the Anglo-American Corporation of South Africa. Electricity production was monopolized by the same interests. Rhodesia's great coal reserves and the Kariba Dam made it possible to develop heavy industry, using the country's large mineral deposits. The Rhodesian Iron and Steel Company already had a plant in operation, the profits from which all went to United Kingdom trusts. Precious metals were mined and exported to Europe and the United States, but the revenue thus earned did not benefit the Africans, who still lacked schools, hospitals and housing. Their working conditions were harsh and they were dependent on the goodwill of the administration and the settlers. They had no chance of being admitted to higher posts which would provide them with a decent livelihood. Those who did succeed in accumulating some capital found themselves harassed or evicted from their land with trivial compensation. Since the tripartite agreement between South Africa, Portugal and Southern Rhodesia, the settlers could get rid of such persons easily by turning them over to South African companies.

64. The country's transport system was similarly designed to facilitate exploitation, one result being that Zambia now found itself at the mercy of the white racists in Southern Rhodesia. Southern Rhodesia's principal trading partners, apart from the United Kingdom, were the United States, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Netherlands, Japan and Australia. Despite all the resolutions adopted by the United Nations, Portugal and South Africa continued to maintain normal relations with the Smith régime, to trade with it and to help it keep the power it had usurped.

65. The reason for the United Kingdom's attitude in the Rhodesian affair was thus clear. Its shilly-shallying was prompted solely by its desire to protect the interests of United Kingdom capital. Its claim that it was trying to bring down the Smith government by means of an economic embargo was not to be believed, since it was the great United Kingdom trusts that were behind Smith. The United Kingdom ought to realize that its present policy was not the best way of preserving its interests in Africa. It must restore the rights of the Zimbabwe people and only then discuss with them the terms on which investment might take place for the benefit of both sides. It must discharge its responsibilities under the United Nations Charter and the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. By giving power to Smith and his clique it had violated both of those instruments. The only way open for the Africans to recover their country and their dignity was violence. It was evident from the recently published Rhodesian budget that the economic sanctions were far from having achieved the desired results. There was a persistent rumour concerning the conclusion of an agreement between the United Kingdom Government and the Smith régime. If that rumour proved correct, it would be a heinous betrayal of the Africans and a further demonstration of the community of interests between United Kingdom financial circles and the Rhodesian settlers.

B. Conclusions

66. Having studied the implications of the activities of foreign economic and other interests in Southern Rhodesia and their mode of operation, the Sub-Committee has come to the following conclusions regarding their economic and political influence.

67. Foreign economic and related interests play a decisive role in the economic life of Southern Rhodesia. The major sectors of production are controlled by foreign owned enterprises which between them account for more than 80 per cent of all capital investment in the Territory, and by settlers of European origin, mainly from the United Kingdom and South Africa. These interests hold a dominant position in the highly profitable primary export industries, notably in the mining industry and, with the collaboration of European settler elements, in the production of tobacco and sugar. They also wield

a controlling influence in the field of banking and finance, and in the major manufacturing industries.

68. The foreign undertakings operating in Southern Rhodesia are closely linked with international economic and financial interests in other parts of southern Africa, and in common with those interests, have been instrumental, directly and indirectly, in denying the African peoples the means of effective participation in economic life and the enjoyment of the resources of their country. They have thus subjected the African people of the Territory to outmoded forms of production, hampered their economic, social and educational development, and erected serious obstacles in the way of the realization of their aspirations to freedom and independence.

69. The pattern for the relentless exploitation of the human and material resources of the Territory was set during the last decade of the nineteenth century by the British South Africa Company (BSAC). Armed with the monopoly right, conferred on it by the British Crown, to exploit the mineral wealth of the Territory, and enjoying wide powers of jurisdiction and government, this company employed coercion and physical force to eliminate African opposition to its claims and to expropriate land owned by the African population for the purpose of mineral concessions and for occupation by European settlers. From the exploitation of the land and mineral resources of the Territory, it gradually emerged as a financial trust, with holdings in railways and other undertakings and became a principal source of credit to small and medium-scale European entrepreneurs.

70. With the formal annexation of the Territory by the United Kingdom Government in 1923, political power was transferred from the Company to the European settlers under a system of "internal self-government" which effectively excluded participation by the African population. The new constitutional arrangements paved the way for the influx of other foreign economic and related interests. At the same time the European settlers who originally came to the Territory under the auspices of the BSAC were transformed into collaborators with the incoming enterprises in the exploitation of the land and people of the Territory.

71. In consequence, the interests of foreign undertakings operating in the Territory and those of the European settler elements are closely interlocked and interdependent. Foreign companies depend on the European settler elements to keep the African population in subjection, so as to preserve what they regard as a favourable climate for their investments. The settlers in turn rely on these foreign interests to provide the capital necessary for the exploitation of the natural wealth of the Territory.

72. Foreign interests are predominant in mining, in banking and finance, and in the major manufacturing industries. Though engaged to some extent in the secondary manufacturing industries, the European settlers are mainly preoccupied with the growing of tobacco, which is the principal cash crop and most important export. However, the financing of the tobacco crop in particular, and of agriculture in general, is made possible by capital provided by the foreign interests.

73. The dominance of foreign capital in the exploitation of the human and material resources of the Territory is particularly striking in the mining industry. The mining industry accounts for 90 per cent of all private capital investment in the Territory, and 75 per cent of total production in this sector is in the hands of large foreign undertakings.

74. The major mining and financial interests in Southern Rhodesia include the British South Africa Company which had assets exceeding £80 million in 1964, and the Anglo-American Corporation which is the largest mining financial interest in South Africa. These interests have been connected since 1937.

75. In 1963 the British South Africa Company held investment in Southern Rhodesia in such fields as forestry, ranching, citrus fruit production, flour-milling and baking, as well as iron and steel and ferro-chrome. The agricultural estates totalled 144,000 acres employing 120 Europeans and 3,000 Africans. Its assets in Southern Rhodesia formed, however, only a small proportion of its total assets. Its Rhodesian industrial and other investments were valued by it on 30 September 1963 at

£6.7 million compared with its total investments throughout the world of £66.4 million.

76. The principal share register was kept in the United Kingdom; a Dominion register was kept in Salisbury and in Johannesburg. List of subsidiaries and interests of the Group in 1963 comprised a multiplicity of companies registered in the United Kingdom, Southern Rhodesia, Canada and Switzerland. Under the 1962 amendment to the Company's Charter, not less than two thirds of the Directors, including the President and Vice-President and the company's principal representative in Africa had the status of British subjects.

77. Separate financial accounts of the Company for its operations in Southern Rhodesia are not available. In 1963 the British South Africa Company declared profits of over £8 million, after taxation.

78. On 1 April 1965, the British South Africa Company merged with two other groups, the Central Mining and Investment Corporation and the Consolidated Mines Selection Company, which are linked with the Anglo-American Group, to form the new Charter Consolidated, Ltd. The new company holds assets in excess of £142 million. Consolidated Mines Selection represented an important part of the non-African interests of Anglo-American, and was based in London. Furthermore, both Chartered and Consolidated owned shares in Central Mining which was also a London interest. Under the new arrangement establishing Charter Consolidated, members of the Anglo-American Group are the largest single shareholders in Charter Consolidated (approximately 30 per cent of the capital). The interests of Charter Consolidated are spread as to 39 per cent Republic of South Africa, 16 per cent in the rest of Africa, 23 per cent in North America, and 22 per cent elsewhere. The Chairman of the new company is Mr. P. V. Emrys-Evans (United Kingdom) who was before the merger the president of the British South Africa Company.

79. Following the formation of Charter Consolidated, an agreement has been reached with Zambia-Anglo-American for the merging of their Rhodesian interests within the Amrho Company (AMRHO, Anglo-American Corporation (Rhodesia) Ltd. was formerly known as Rhosouth, Ltd.; it is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Zambia-Anglo-American, Ltd.). As a result of this merger Amrho is enlarged with net assets of some £19.6 million. The Company is held as to 47.7 per cent by Zambia-Anglo-American and 36.9 by Charter Consolidated.

80. Other mining groups include Lonrho, Ltd. which was formerly known as London and Rhodesia Mining and Land Company, Ltd. It changed its name in 1963. At the end of 1964, it had issued almost 5.75 million shares, 54 per cent of which were held by five groups: the British South Africa Company (now Charter Consolidated), the Drayton Group; the Anglo-American Group; Lonrho subsidiaries, and "Standard Bank Nominees". The identity of the last holding is unknown, although a major interest in view of Lonrho's ability to raise large cash sums for many of its purchases. The Company has extensive dealings in South America, Southern Rhodesia and Mozambique. The Company has also made a point of buying into areas of "political risk" in which bargains are to be found. The Company which once made all its profits from gold mining in Rhodesia, now covers many fields: plantations are the largest profit earner; motor trading, ranching, mining, "chibuku" breweries, newspapers, hotels, nail and dried ice factories, railroads (Malawi). The Company's land holdings in Southern Rhodesia exceed one million acres. In 1961, the Company's direct mining interest in Southern Rhodesia comprised 164 gold mining claims, some base metal claims, land holdings covering 873,362 acres and eighteen town stands. Some of the mining properties, such as the Muriel Mine, were tributed to other companies on a royalty basis. Lonrho, Ltd. is also the major shareholder of Companhia do Pipeline Moçambique-Rodésia.

81. The fixed assets of the Company were valued in 1963 at £7,142,000. Separate financial accounts of the Company for its operations in Southern Rhodesia are not available. Since June 1958, the consolidated balance sheet after deducting minority interests has grown from £1,650,236 to £3,657,007; revenues before depreciation, taxation and minority interests have increased from £128,000 to £1,308,011. The Lonrho group has

very substantial minority interests but earning on the parent company's capital have risen from 7 and one half per cent to 29 and one quarter per cent, and the dividend from 5 per cent to 18 and one-third per cent.

82. Another group is the Selection Trust Limited which has interests in Southern and Central Africa over a wide range of mining activity. The most important single holding in the Company is owned by the American Metal Climax (AMAX). Its major interests include Roan Selection Trust, Ltd. which was formerly known as Rhodesian Selection Trust, Ltd. Separate financial accounts of the Company for its operations in Southern Rhodesia are not available. The gross revenue of the company for the year ending 31 March 1965 exceeded £5 million for the first time, being nearly £1 million higher than in the previous year. After expenses, taxation and minority interests, the net profit was £2,490,739 against £1,988,355 a year earlier.

83. There is also the United Kingdom Company Turner and Newhall, Ltd. which earned £12.7 million in 1962-1963, and controlled 63 per cent of the production of asbestos, of which Southern Rhodesia is the world's largest producer. Similarly the production of chrome is largely in the hands of a few foreign companies, including the London Chrome Company, Ltd. which is controlled by the United Kingdom and American interests, and the Vanadium Corporation of America. The Vanadium Corporation of America had a net profit of \$2,494,446 in 1959. The mining of lithium, copper and coal are almost exclusively controlled by Bikita Minerals (Pvt.), Ltd., Messina (Transvaal) Development Company (Mangula), Ltd., and the Wankie Colliery Company, Ltd., respectively.

84. In the field of ferrous metallurgy, the most important concern is the Rhodesian Iron and Steel Company, Ltd., (RISCO). There are many shareholders in this company including the British companies of Lancashire Steel and Stewarts and Lloyds, and Anglo-American Corporation, Rhodesia Selection Trust, British South Africa Company, Messina (Transvaal) Development Company, and Tanganyika Concessions. RISCO reported a net profit for the first half of 1965 of about £450,000 almost as much as for the entire year of 1964. Other developments in ferrous metallurgy include a recent inflow of Japanese capital. Two large Japanese firms have been granted concessions for the exploitation of iron ore for the production of pig-iron and for the construction of a new blast-furnace for RISCO. However, in January 1966, one of the Japanese firms gave notice that its iron ore mine in Southern Rhodesia was to be closed. Significant deposits of magnesite are reported to have been found; they are to be exploited by Cullinan Refractories, Ltd. and Vereeniging Brick and Tile, both of which are South African companies.

85. Many of the above-named companies have branched out from mining into agriculture and the manufacturing industries and now hold a major interest in practically every sector of the economy, including tobacco, sugar, forestry, citrus fruit production, and real estate.

86. As indicated above, foreign economic interests, particularly of United Kingdom origin, play a prominent role with regard to tobacco, the most important export of the Territory. Except for a few plantations in which such firms as the South African Mutual Insurance Group have controlling interests, the cultivation of tobacco is mainly in the hands of the European settlers. However, foreign companies have considerable investment in tobacco processing, exporting and marketing facilities in the Territory and in some cases in cigarette factories. Chief among these are companies controlled by Imperial Tobacco, Gallaher, British American Tobacco Ltd., and Rothmans Tobacco.

87. Sugar production in the Territory is operated by large foreign investors who have established modern and efficient plantations with the co-operation of the Southern Rhodesia authorities which are constructing large dams to irrigate extensive areas for the purpose. Among the principal producers of sugar is Triangle Limited which is a wholly owned subsidiary of Sir J. L. Hulleys and Sons (Rhodesia), Ltd.; this company is in turn owned by Hulleys Sugar Corporation, Ltd., the largest sugar-producing firm in South Africa. Separate financial accounts for Triangle, Ltd. are not available. In 1963

the Huletts Group as a whole had net earnings after taxes of £2.6 million on a total sugar production of 584,000 tons. Another major producer is Hippo Valley Estates, Ltd., the major shareholders of which are the Rhodesian Anglo-American Company, and Tate and Lyle, Ltd., the large British sugar concern. The Company made profits of £146,284 in the year ended 31 March 1963 and £393,605 in the following year. Sugar production on the estate was 37,000 tons during 1964. Rhodesia Sugar Refineries, an affiliate of Tate and Lyle, Ltd., has two refineries in the Territory.

88. European settler elements hold a more important position in the secondary industries than they do in the mining and the major manufacturing industries. Nevertheless they enjoy the active collaboration of various subsidiaries of United Kingdom and South African firms, whose role in this field is not without significance. Apart from the enterprises to which reference is made above, the companies operating in this sector include the Ford Motor Company of Rhodesia, which is a subsidiary of Ford of Canada, the Premier Portland Cement Company (Rhodesia) Ltd., which incorporates an associate of the South African Pretoria Cement Company and the Rhodesian Cement Ltd., and the Rhodesia Bata Shoe Company which produces 90 per cent of all leather footwear in the Territory.

89. The merciless exploitation of the human and material resources of the Territory was reinforced by the Land Apportionment Act passed in 1930. This Act, *inter alia*, legalized the expropriation of African land which had been initiated by the BSAC. Under the Act as subsequently amended, 38 per cent of the total land area is allocated for the exclusive use of the European settler community, numbering about 240,000, and some 45 per cent, in theory, to the 4 million Africans of the Territory. The area allocated to the European settlers includes the best cultivable and conveniently located land. Further, these settlers who in practice have under cultivation only 3.5 per cent of the land allocated to them are eligible to acquire land in these portions of the African area known as native purchase area, on the pretext of carrying out projects in the interests of the "natives". As a result of the pressure on the native purchase area, there are over 7,000 Africans who have undergone training to farm on individually owned land but are unable to obtain plots.

90. The expropriation of 38 per cent of the land of the Territory to the exclusive use of the European settler community and foreign enterprises, on the basis of an apartheid system based on racial discrimination, has inflicted untold economic hardship on the Africans and has given rise to serious political problems in the Territory. By keeping the Africans in reserves and locations, the settlers' community is better able to control their movements and to preclude their enjoying social and welfare amenities, and to prevent their political advancement.

91. The Africans, deprived of their rightful share of the fruits of the land, have not benefited from educational or agricultural extension services which would enable them to make a really purposeful use of their land resources. For instance, between 1954 and 1964, the *per capita* domestic product of the Africans declined from £12 to £11, whereas that of the Europeans rose from £56.1 to £77.4. In 1962 the share of the African population in the total personal income was 32 per cent. Moreover, given their rapid population growth, the Africans are increasingly constricted and much of their land is subject to soil erosion. In consequence, they have been forced to move in increasing numbers from the rural areas to seek work in the European owned plantations and in the mining and manufacturing industries. The African population is thus available as a source of cheap labour for developing the European areas of the Territory.

92. Even in this capacity, the African population received pitifully low wages. The official figures give an average annual income in 1964 for Europeans of £1,214 and for Africans of £121, about half of which was spent on accommodation. The Industrial Conciliation Act in effect barred Africans from access to skilled posts while the wages of European workers were protected against decline. There is gross disparity between the wages payable to Africans and to Europeans for the same work. Moreover, the slackening of the economy in

recent years has resulted in an actual decline of the labour force, giving rise to substantial unemployment among African workers. The majority of trade unions are in practice segregated, and with the exception of Rhodesia Railways African Employees association, African trade unions have no legal rights concerning collective bargaining.

93. Over the years, foreign economic interests have given direct and substantial financial assistance to the Southern Rhodesia authorities. In December 1961, a group of Anglo-American companies granted them a loan of £51 million repayable over a period of thirteen years. In May 1962, the Standard Bank of New York similarly gave them a loan of £1 million. Again in May 1964, the authorities of the Territory received loans amounting to \$50 million "for development purposes" from a group of companies representing financial interests in the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy and Japan. Further, the Territory's budget for 1964-65 showed external loans amounting to £3.6 million, including £2.5 million from the South African Government, as well as an item covering the repayment of loans of £2.3 million from the BSAC and £1.1 million from the Anglo-American Company.

94. Since the illegal declaration of independence, the Ian Smith régime has reacted to the international financial and economic sanctions and the oil embargo by regulating the economy so as to enable it to withstand their impact. To this end, the régime has assumed various emergency powers to control the external and internal trade of the country, with the view of redeploying, where necessary, the economic resources of the country. The private sector of the economy representing agriculture, commerce and industry, and mining, which is almost entirely owned and operated by the European settlers and foreign companies, have put themselves on a war footing in support of the economic measures instituted by the régime.

95. Although, in early 1965, the principal business organizations in Southern Rhodesia, namely, the Association of Rhodesian Industries and the Association of Chambers of Commerce of Rhodesia had expressed concern about the economic consequences of a unilateral declaration of independence, they have since the declaration co-operated with the illegal régime to save the economy of the country from the full impact of sanctions. The manufacturing industries, with the co-operation of the Smith régime, have been engaged in diversifying their production to make Southern Rhodesia self-sufficient in commodities which were previously imported, thus assisting in the elimination of shortages and saving foreign currency for the régime. Consequently, sanctions have merely created a bigger local market for the local manufacturers who have been called upon to meet local consumer needs which cannot now be fully met from abroad. According to spokesmen of the régime, commerce has done so well that it has been in a position to extend credit to the agricultural sector of the economy.

96. While the United Kingdom has specifically declared illegal the export of chrome and iron ore and, subsequently, pig-iron and asbestos from the Territory, there are no indications that any of the companies concerned is anywhere near the breaking point. Copper, nickel, gold and some other metals have not as yet been declared prohibited exports to third countries by the United Kingdom. Consequently, subject to the laws of third countries, these commodities can still legally be exported from Southern Rhodesia. Despite sanctions, new mines are being opened and old ones developed in the Territory, particularly by the Anglo-American Corporation. Up to the middle of 1965, interests in the Federal Republic of Germany were reported to be importing copper and asbestos from the Territory. According to these reports, Japanese interests were also importing asbestos.

97. The economic and financial sanctions imposed by the United Kingdom were aimed, *inter alia*, at denying credit to the illegal régime for the financing of agricultural crops and denying the farmers access to the international markets on which the products depend. In spite of these sanctions, the illegal régime managed to finance the purchasing of the tobacco crop for this year with an estimated £25 million and to pay the farmers sufficient sums to cover the working cost of producing the current crop. The financing of the tobacco crop was largely made possible by the co-operation of finance capi-

tal in Southern Rhodesia as represented by the banking and finance houses in Southern Rhodesia. Accordingly, the indications are that the European settler agricultural community is in a position to survive another year of sanctions without serious consequences.

98. Foreign and local business concerns in South Africa, with the support of the Government of South Africa, have taken advantage of the embargo on Southern Rhodesia to increase their trade with the Territory. The evidence available indicates that South African business and commerce both on the local and international level have not only been trading with South Africa, but have also been providing transit facilities for the clandestine export of Southern Rhodesian commodities produced by their counterparts in the Territory. Further, a Southern Rhodesian confirming house, the Rhodesian Industrial Confirming (Private) Ltd., has established a branch in Johannesburg for the purpose of assisting Southern Rhodesian importers to secure credit and South African and other exporters to find markets in the Territory.

99. Portuguese interests, to a lesser extent, have also taken advantage of the sanctions to expand their trading relations with Southern Rhodesia, and Portugal continues to grant Southern Rhodesia transit rail and labour facilities for exports through Mozambique.

100. The embargo on oil and petroleum products to Southern Rhodesia has succeeded only to the extent that rationing has been introduced and the prices of these products have gone up. However, oil and petroleum products, in quantities far in excess of the needs of the Territory under the rationing system, continue to reach the Territory from Mozambique and South Africa. Since both South Africa and Mozambique are importers of oil and petroleum products and are dependent on international American, United Kingdom, Dutch and Belgian concerns for their supplies, it is difficult to exempt these concerns from responsibility for supplies reaching the Territory.

101. According to spokesmen for the illegal régime, commercial interests in Southern Rhodesia have been able, in addition to overt trade, to maintain covert trading relations with many foreign importers and exporters. Indeed they have claimed that Southern Rhodesia has increased its trade with many countries outside Africa. Considering the relative lack of impact of sanctions on the Southern Rhodesia economy, there is no reason to doubt this claim.

C. Recommendations

102. The Sub-Committee considers that the Special Committee should recommend that the General Assembly—

(a) Condemn the colonial policy of the United Kingdom Government which resulted in the rise of the present racist minority régime based on the colonial exploitation of the natural and human resources of the Territory in a way detrimental to the rights and interests of the indigenous population of Southern Rhodesia.

(b) Condemn once again the illegal declaration of independence by the white settlers in Southern Rhodesia, who represent the economic and financial interests of the international monopolies and all the forces of reaction.

(c) Reaffirm the rights of the indigenous population of the Territory to self-determination and real independence, and the legitimacy of their struggle to achieve both economic and political liberation.

(d) Strongly condemn the activities and operating methods of foreign economic and other interests in Southern Rhodesia which support the racist minority régime in its suppression of the African population of the Territory and in defiance of world public opinion.

(e) Appeal to the interested Powers to exert their influence on those of their nationals who own and operate enterprises in Southern Rhodesia to end their activities which impede the attainment of independence by the people of Southern Rhodesia, and to refrain from giving any support to the colonial policies which constitute a crime against humanity.

(f) Inscribe on the agenda of the General Assembly at its twenty-first session as a matter of urgency the following item:

"The activities of foreign economic and other interests which are impeding the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples in Southern Rhodesia, South West Africa, Territories under Portuguese administration and other colonial territories."

(g) Requests the Secretary-General to give the widest possible publicity to the contents of this report and to the decisions of the United Nations on this question.

D. Adoption of report

103. This report was adopted by the Sub-Committee at its 31st meeting on 14 September 1966. The representative of Denmark stated that his delegation could not support the recommendations contained in paragraph 102 (a) and (f).^b

^b For the statement of the representative of Denmark, see A/AC.109/SC.2/SR.31.

Appendix I

[A/AC.109/L.332/Add.1]

The economy of Southern Rhodesia, with particular reference to foreign interests

Working paper prepared by the Secretariat

CONTENTS

	<i>Paragraphs</i>
I. OUTLINE OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTHERN RHODESIA	
A. Land and people	1-11
B. Natural resources	12-18
C. Outline history of economic development..	19-39
D. Development in recent years	40-52
E. Present situation	53-56
II. LAND	
A. Land legislation	57-90
B. Distribution of land	91-98
III. AGRICULTURE	
A. General description	99-108
B. Tobacco	109-117
C. Sugar	118-134
IV. MINING	
A. General	135-146
B. Gold	147-175
C. Asbestos	176-185
D. Chrome	186-196
E. Coal	197-203
F. Copper	204-213
G. Iron	214-216
H. Lithium	217-222
I. Tin	223-226
V. SECONDARY INDUSTRY	
Introduction	227-231
A. Principal industries and some of the companies operating within them	232-272
B. Association of Rhodesian Industries (ARNI)	273-274
C. Association of Chambers of Commerce of Rhodesia (ACCOR)	275
D. Transport and power	276
VI. FOREIGN TRADE	
A. General	277-279
B. Trade by commodity groups	280-284
C. Origin of imports and destination of exports: selected list	285-286
D. Origin of imports and destination of exports: trade with all countries	287
E. Trade with selected countries	288-304
VII. LABOUR	
A. Labour legislation	305-334
B. Wages	335-340

Annex

	Paragraphs	Page
Finance companies	1-68	250

I. OUTLINE OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTHERN RHODESIA

A. Land and people

1. Southern Rhodesia occupies 150,333 square miles between the Limpopo and Zambezi rivers (15° - 22° S. latitude and 26° - 34° E. longitude), and lies north of the Tropic of Capricorn. It is a part of the great plateau which is a major feature of the geography of southern Africa. Almost the whole of the country lies above 1,000 feet, and more than four fifths are above 2,000 feet, but less than a twentieth is above 5,000 feet. The landscape is undulating, broken only by a few major river valleys, and its outstanding feature is a broad ridge running across the whole country, from which emerges the High Veld, a belt of high plateau land about 400 miles long by 50 miles wide, and between 4,000 and 5,000 feet above sea level.

2. The lowland areas of Southern Rhodesia are the depressions drained eastwards by the Zambezi and Limpopo rivers, and the height of the land falls away from the central ridge towards these rivers, broken in places by steep escarpments overlooking the Middle Veld, a wide plateau surface between 3,000 and 4,000 feet above sea level. Deep river valleys have split the Middle Veld areas into great blocks of fine plateau country. The areas of Low Veld in the depressions of the great watersheds lie generally below 3,000 feet, are relatively unexplored, and are hot and inhospitable.

3. Nearly seven tenths of the surface area of Southern Rhodesia is made up of granite, schists and igneous rocks which are the basis of Southern Rhodesia's mineral wealth. This type of rock formation produces variations in the soils of Southern Rhodesia, and where it underlies the High Veld, usually weathers into sandy or loamy soils. The sandstones of the Low Veld seldom produce good soils as rainfall is irregular, and the sands in the extreme west are generally barren of agricultural or mineral value.

4. The central ridge of Southern Rhodesia forms the main watershed of the Territory, and rivers flow in roughly parallel courses down both sides of it towards the Zambezi, Limpopo and Sabi rivers onwards to the Indian Ocean. The river flow, reflecting the seasonal nature of the rainfall, is for the most part irregular and a drawback to navigation on the great waterways. Generally, the river flow is too irregular for major hydroelectric schemes except in the Eastern Mountains and on the Zambezi.

5. Although north of the Tropic of Capricorn, the altitude of the plateau has given Southern Rhodesia one of the finest climates in the world; temperate to hot, comparable to the Mediterranean or California. Along the central ridge, conditions are pleasant and healthy with an adequate rainfall for agriculture. Generally within Southern Rhodesia, temperature decreases and rainfall increases with altitude, ranging from the cool, wet Eastern Mountains to the hot dry river valleys of the Zambezi, Limpopo and Sabi. The High Veld is the main area of development. The lower areas of the Middle Veld are hot and dry and mostly settled by Africans, and the Low Veld is generally hot and unhealthy. Malaria and sleeping sickness are prevalent in the depressions.

6. Only along the central ridge is the rainfall heavy enough to permit a good growth of savannah and temperate-type grasses. The western and southern regions, insufficiently supported by a good rainfall are semi-arid with tufts of coarse grasses and stunted acacia thorn bush. In the Eastern Highlands, a good rainfall allows the growth of exotic tropical evergreen trees providing a valuable source of hardwoods; in the highest areas, the vegetation becomes montane, and along the banks of the permanent rivers there are forests of evergreens.^a

^a The above description is derived from the *Handbook to the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland* issued by the Federal Department of Information in 1960.

7. Brief reference has already been made to climatic conditions. Despite the fact that the Territory lies north of the Tropic of Capricorn, the general altitude of the plateau so ameliorates the climate that the conditions are actually sub-tropical. Frosts occur during the winter months on the plateau. Rainfall is largely confined to the summer period from November to March, is occasioned by incursions of moist air from the east or south-east, diminishes from east to west and is most plentiful in the higher areas. Some mountainous areas on the eastern border have average rainfalls of up to seventy inches a year, Salisbury in the north-east has thirty-three inches and Bulawayo in the South-west has only twenty-three inches, while Beitbridge in the Limpopo river valley has only twelve inches. The rainfall is somewhat variable and unreliable.

8. The total population of Southern Rhodesia was estimated to be, on 31 December 1964, 4,210,000 of whom 3,970,000 (94.3 per cent) were Africans, 7,900 (0.2 per cent) Asians, 217,000 (5.3 per cent) Europeans and 12,400 (0.3 per cent) coloured.

9. The African population is believed to contain a considerable number (estimated in 1960 at about 300,000) of migrant workers from Zambia, Malawi and other countries, but the number of such workers is now diminishing. The natural rate of increase of the African population is estimated at 3.5 per cent per annum.

10. Up to 1962, the European population was increasing rapidly, mainly by immigration. During 1963 and 1964 there was a loss by emigration of some 12,000 Europeans and a net fall in the European population of 7,000. During the first half of 1965, there was a reversal of the trend and a gain of 2,500 by immigration, mainly from South Africa. It is government policy to continue to encourage, on a selective basis, a high rate of inflow of persons with entrepreneurial ability, with supplies of capital or with skills of where there is a shortage. The European population has come to Southern Rhodesia mainly from South Africa or Britain.

11. On 31 December 1964, the population of the main towns including nearby suburbs was estimated at approximately 690,000, of whom 512,000 were Africans, 164,000 Europeans and 16,000 Asians and coloured.

B. Natural resources

12. From the point of view of agricultural potential, the Territory has been divided by governmental authorities into five regions.

(a) A humid forest region along the eastern border suitable for afforestation, tea and coffee and intensive livestock production (comprising 1.56 per cent of the Territory).

(b) A sub-humid woodland region mainly in the north-east part of the plateau suitable for intensive production of grains and cash crops (mainly tobacco), beef and dairy produce (18.68 per cent).

(c) A sub-arid savannah region mainly in the central and south-western part of the plateau suitable for semi-intensive mixed farming (17.43 per cent).

(d) An arid savannah region comprising mainly land of lesser elevation suitable for semi-intensive beef production with some drought-resistant crops (33.03 per cent).

(e) A sub-desert savannah comprising mainly the low veld areas and suitable in the absence of irrigation only for extensive livestock production (26.20 per cent). Finally 3.10 per cent of the land area of the Territory is regarded as unsuitable for any form of agricultural utilization.

13. Southern Rhodesia possesses only a few scattered relics of true indigenous forest, but has an extensive coverage of savannah woodland of definite, if restrictive, economic significance.

14. Although there has been much reduction in the animal life of Southern Rhodesia, there is still much of scientific, scenic and economic interest in the wild life of the Territory.

15. Because much of the Territory is too dry for agriculture, the possible use of water for irrigation is of importance. Studies have suggested that some 15,000 square miles are

potentially irrigable, mainly low-lying ground in the basins of the Sabi and Limpopo rivers in the south-east of the Territory. Substantial irrigation schemes are already operating in that area and also in the valley of the Zambezi River.

16. The main hydroelectric resource, shared with Zambia, is the flow of the Zambezi, which dammed at Kariba, has a present generating capacity of 705 megawatts and a potential capacity of 1,600 megawatts. While there are no known oil resources in the Territory, there are substantial proved deposits of good quality coal at Wankie in the west of the Territory which have been mined since the earliest days of railway development, but in recent years at a reduced rate because of the increased use of imported oil fuels and the availability of cheaper hydroelectric power.

17. The European colonization of Southern Rhodesia took place in the belief that it was rich in minerals, particularly gold. While there has been a steady production of gold over many years, the Territory has never been a major gold producer nor is it anticipated that it will become so in the future. Nor does Southern Rhodesia have extensive and rich copper deposits as are to be found in Zambia and the Congo. However, there is an appreciable production of copper as well as of asbestos and chrome, for export. Moreover, Southern Rhodesia is said to possess ample reserves of iron ore, coal, lime, sulphur and other minerals necessary for the establishment of heavy industry. Already, *inter alia*, a small iron and steel industry has been established.

18. From the point of view of economic development, the Territory is handicapped by its distance from world markets and the need for exports to world markets to be transported through neighbouring territories before being shipped. The smallness of the population of Southern Rhodesia is another obstacle to the industrialization of the country. However, the natural features of the country offered few difficulties in providing railways links with suitable ports and with neighbouring territories. The larger market thus opened up has facilitated a substantial industrial development.

C. Outline history of economic development

19. In the second half of the nineteenth century, Southern Rhodesia was inhabited by two main groups of African inhabitants, both of the Bantu group of peoples. The longer established group, the Mashona, had been in Rhodesia for a number of centuries. Originally a pastoral people with a loosely developed political system, they also practised subsistence agriculture and had, to some extent, worked the mineral deposits of the area. The second group, the Matabele (Ndebele), were a tightly organized and militarily powerful offshoot of the Zulus who, in the third decade of the nineteenth century, invaded what is now Southern Rhodesia from the south, carried on a purely pastoral way of life in the south-west of the Territory and acquired a military and political hegemony over the Mashona in the north-east.

20. The missionary, Robert Moffat, visited the Matabele King in 1829 and a station of the London Missionary Society was established near his headquarters at Bulawayo in 1857. In addition to missionaries, hunters and prospectors visited the Territory during the succeeding decades and acquired a somewhat exaggerated view of its richness in gold. By 1887 a number of concession seekers were pestering Lobengula, the King of the Matabele, who was persuaded to conclude a treaty with an emissary of President Kruger of the Transvaal, which would have thrown his country open to Boer settlers. The British authorities at the insistence of Cecil Rhodes, then acquiring control of the diamond mining industry in South Africa, sent a representative to Lobengula, who repudiated the earlier treaty and signed a treaty with the British by which he undertook to have no dealings with any foreign power without the sanction of the British authorities. In the following year, C. D. Rudd, a representative of Rhodes, obtained a concession, in which in return for a payment of £1,300 and the delivery of 1,000 modern rifles and 100,000 rounds of ammunition and of an armed steamboat, Lobengula granted Rudd and his associates complete and exclusive charge over all minerals located within his entire dominion together with full power to do all things that they might deem necessary to win

and procured the same. On the basis of the Rudd concession, and combining with other persons who had won concessions from Lobengula, Rhodes organized the British South African Company and obtained a royal charter to develop the region north of the Transvaal and Bechuanaland and lying west of the Portuguese Territories. The company was authorized under the Charter to exercise such powers of jurisdiction and government as it might from time to time acquire by any concession, agreement, grant or treaty.

21. Although the Rudd concession did not grant rights over lands and had in the meantime been repudiated by Lobengula, Rhodes hastened to organize a Pioneer Column of some 187 European settlers and 150 African servants, as well as a few hundred mercenaries given the name of "The British South Africa Police", which proceeded to Mashonaland and established a settlement at Salisbury in September 1890. The original settlers had been attracted by the promise of fifteen gold claims and some 3,000 acres of land for each man. A year later a German named Lippert, acting secretly on behalf of Rhodes, obtained from Lobengula the exclusive right for one hundred years to make land grants to Europeans both in Matabeleland and Mashonaland.

22. In July 1893 following raids by Matabele warriors into Mashonaland, Dr. Jameson, the Administrator of the company's possessions, led a small force against Lobengula and the Matabele. The force was composed mainly of volunteers from among the settlers, who were each promised by the Victoria Agreement over 6,000 acres of land, twenty gold claims and an equal share of half the "loot" and other advantages if they took part in the expedition. The Matabele were speedily crushed and Lobengula died from smallpox while trying to seek peace. After his death, the Company assumed by right of conquest the Matabele lands and confiscated a large part of their cattle. Inadequate land reserves were set aside for the African inhabitants, who continued, as in Mashonaland, to be allowed to remain as "squatters" on the land already alienated from them. However, a hut tax of ten shillings per annum provided an incentive for the adult males to work on the new farms and mining enterprises.

23. African resentment against this situation, which was aggravated by heavy cattle losses during a rinderpest epidemic, led to uprisings in 1896 firstly by the Matabele and then by the Mashona. At a time when the police force of the Company had recently been captured in the abortive Jameson raid into the Transvaal, the uprisings were suppressed with some difficulty and only after the personal intervention of Rhodes in the peace-making process. The Company was thus spared a prolonged period of guerrilla warfare, but even so its finances were in a difficult state. It had not only incurred heavy expenses for administration and military operations, but it was undertaking major development, in particular the construction of a railway through difficult terrain from Beira towards Salisbury and a second railway from the north of the Cape Colony through Bechuanaland towards Bulawayo. It was also establishing itself in what, at that time, was called North-Western Rhodesia and North-Eastern Rhodesia. The hopes for the speedy financial success of the company were based on the discovery of gold in rich deposits, but so far only a very small quantity of gold had been won (in all £20,700 worth by 1898) and studies by the company's geologist were not encouraging. The market for the produce of European farms was limited, because of lack of transport, to the requirements of the miniature gold-mining industry.

24. The Company, whose administrative responsibilities were placed under a somewhat closer surveillance of the British authorities, sold additional shares and pushed forward with its development activities in the hope of long-term results. The railways were completed to Bulawayo in 1897 and to Salisbury in 1899 and were linked three years later. Improved transportation made possible the importation of heavy mining machinery and the output of gold steadily increased. The European farming community benefited from the increased market and from technical assistance provided by the company which, in the decade before the outbreak of the First World War, introduced tobacco as a cash crop suitable for export. The number of Europeans in Southern Rhodesia had increased from

an estimated 1,500 in 1891 to about 11,000 in 1901 and to 23,700 by 1911.

25. The administrative rights of the Company, which, according to its Charter were for an initial period of twenty-five years expiring in 1914, were extended for a further ten years. The Company soon, however, found itself in a dispute with the European settlers, who had had since 1907 a majority in the Legislative Council, and with the British Crown over the question of the ownership of the unalienated land, which meant in the peculiar context of Southern Rhodesia land neither reserved nor granted to the indigenous inhabitants nor granted to companies and settlers. The matter was referred by the British Government to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council which, in 1918, held that ownership of the land had devolved upon the Crown by right of conquest, though the Company, as the agent of the Crown in the work of conquest and subsequent administration, was entitled to sell the land as long as it remained the administering authority, using the proceeds to help cover administrative expenses.

26. Following the decision, the Company refused to make further capital expenditure in developing the Territory and was anxious to divest itself of its administrative responsibilities. At the same time the European settlers had prospered greatly from the expanded demand for exports created by the First World War. Mineral exports had increased only from £3,883,000 in 1914 to £4,451,000, but now included substantial amounts of coal, asbestos, chrome and copper, in addition to gold. Agricultural exports had increased fivefold over the same period to a total of £1,483,000 consisting mainly of beef cattle to South Africa, but also including maize, tobacco and citrus fruits. The settlers pressed strongly for responsible government. After an official inquiry followed by a referendum, in which 8,744 voted for responsible government and 5,989 voted to join the Union of South Africa, Southern Rhodesia was formally annexed as a British Colony on 12 September 1923 and on 16 October was granted a constitution under which the settlers obtained responsible government. The population at the time included about 900,000 Africans, 36,000 Europeans and 3,400 Asians and Coloureds. (Nominally the Legislative Assembly to which the Government was responsible was elected on a non-racial basis, but the income and property qualifications for voting excluded all but a very few Africans.) The political settlement was accompanied by a financial settlement with the British South Africa Company, which relinquished all financial claims against the Crown for its past administrative deficits in return for a cash payment of £3,750,000 by the British Treasury, of which £2,000,000 was contributed by the new Southern Rhodesian authorities. The company's mining rights were guaranteed and it also received specific safeguards with regard to its railway investments.

27. The new Government gave special attention to promoting the interests of the farming community and to encouraging immigration from Britain. In 1924 a Land Bank was established for the purpose of giving easier agricultural credit. At this stage tobacco was becoming an encouraging export crop, with production increasing from 3.9 million pounds in 1923 to 24.9 million pounds in 1928. The tobacco industry benefited from co-operative warehousing and marketing arrangements, from preference in the British market, and from the direct participation of British tobacco companies in the export trade. Mining development was much slower and in fact gold output temporarily declined, while there was some expansion in the production of coal and of other base minerals.

28. In the midst of the increasing agricultural activity, further consideration was given to the land question. In 1920, Native Reserves established at the turn of the century, remained fixed at some 21 million acres or 23 per cent of the land area of the Territory, European-owned land amounted to 31 million acres or 32 per cent and the remaining 42 million acres or 45 per cent was Crown land which could be sold to persons of either race. Despite the low purchasing power of the African population as a whole, and the tradition of communal rather than individual land ownership, Africans had purchased about 45,000 acres by 1925. At this stage opposition arose in the European community to the intermingling of European-owned and African-owned land. Following a report

by a Royal Commission and with the approval of the British Government, the first Land Apportionment Act was passed in 1930 and effected a rigorous territorial segregation under which over 50 per cent of Southern Rhodesia was assigned to Europeans and Africans lost the right to purchase land except in a limited area (7.5 million acres). It may be noted that at the time when the Act was passed more than a third of the African population of the Territory was living on European farms or on the areas of Crown land now allocated for future European purchase. Africans living on farms were now required to move to the reserves unless they entered into contracts to provide labour in return for their right of occupation.

29. European interests in Southern Rhodesia suffered very severely during the great depression. The market for tobacco virtually disappeared, maize production dropped drastically as did that of most base minerals and the railway companies were in serious financial difficulties. Immigration virtually stopped. The Europeans farming community received, however, substantial Government support estimated at about £1 million over the period 1928-1933 by way of loans, debt liquidations, export bounties, etc. Control Boards were also established to keep up prices of agricultural products.

30. The interests of the European trade unionists were protected by the Industrial Conciliation Act of 1934, which gave legal force to the "colour bar". Agreements between employers and employees, a term which excluded "natives", could be made legally enforceable by the Minister of Labour. These agreements in effect blocked access to skilled positions by Africans or undercutting of the wages of European workers in general.

31. The Southern Rhodesian Government took advantage of the depressed position of the mining industry to purchase the mineral rights of the British South Africa Company for £2 million in 1933. This turned out to be good business, as not only did gold mining rapidly recover following the devaluation of the pound in 1931, but the mining industry as a whole recovered and continued to develop steadily, though not so spectacularly as that of Northern Rhodesia.

32. By the mid-thirties a general recovery of the economy was under way, though it was somewhat restrained. Tobacco sales, now occurring at well organized auctions in Salisbury, amounted to 25 million pounds in 1938, less than the 1928 figure, but realizing over £1 million to the 493 growers. A beginning was made with the export of chilled and frozen beef to the United Kingdom. Economic recovery led to increased immigration and the European population increased to some 61,000 in 1938.

33. The Second World War provided a guaranteed market for the Territory's export crops. At the same time, difficulties in importing led the Government to take the first steps in establishing an iron and steel industry and a cotton-spinning industry. Other infant industries developed rapidly so that gross industrial output increased from £5.1 million in 1938 to £31.3 million in 1949. The new industries were largely dependent on a growing urban African labour force. African workers organized trade unions which, however, continued to be denied legal recognition, though a Department of Native Labour and a Native Labour Advisory Board were established. On the other hand a 1945 revision of the Industrial Conciliation Act in effect maintained the colour bar against the entry of Africans into skilled employment. Indeed, with the rapid increase of the African population, the reserves were becoming seriously overcrowded.

34. For those Africans who remained in "Native" areas, the Government organized extension services which, though less elaborate than those provided for European farmers, led to the emergence of a small class of "master farmers", producing cash crops on individually owned land. Attempts under the Native Husbandry Act, 1951, to impose better production methods in the Native Reserves proper did not produce any substantial change from subsistence agriculture.

35. In the immediate post-war years, there was a flood of immigration, mostly from Britain and South Africa actively promoted by the Southern Rhodesian Government. The European population increased from 83,500 in 1946 to 125,000 in 1950 and to 158,000 in 1954. Many new business enterprises

established themselves in the Territory as the prospect of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland appeared to promise a wider market and even more rapid economic development. The great mining company of Rhodesian Anglo-American and its associates, though their main operations were on the Northern Rhodesian Copperbelt, moved their headquarters from London to Salisbury in 1950 and the Rhodesian Selection Trust did the same in 1955. (They have recently moved their headquarters to Zambia). Salisbury thus became an important commercial and financial centre.

36. In 1947, the Government bought out Rhodesia Railways for some £30 million. This event marked the final nationalization of the development activities of the British South Africa Company in South Africa. The Company continued to hold investments in Southern Rhodesia in such fields as forestry, ranching, citrus fruit production, flour-milling and baking, and later iron and steel and ferrochrome. These formed, however, only a small proportion of its total assets. Its Rhodesian industrial and other investments (which presumably included substantial interests in other parts of the Federation) were valued by it on 30 September 1963 at £7.1 million compared with its total investments throughout the world of £66.4 million.^b

37. Though the Railways were acquired by the Southern Rhodesian Government, the system covers both Northern Rhodesia and Bechuanaland and the management was made responsible to a Higher Authority, which, during the Federation was the Federal Minister of Transport and consists now of ministerial representatives of the Governments of Zambia and Rhodesia. The bottleneck at the port of Beira, through which most of the foreign trade of both Northern and Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland passed, was a serious obstacle to the development of the territories in the immediate post-war period. In 1949 construction was begun on a line to link the Rhodesia Railway system near Bulawayo with the port of Lourenço Marques. The new line, together with port improvements at both Beira and Lourenço Marques, and improved rolling stock, removed the congestion. Freight hauled by Rhodesia Railways increased from 2,920,000 tons in 1938/1939 to 5,097,000 tons in 1957/1958. Central African Airways was established as a joint enterprise of the three Governments in 1946.

38. The Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland entered into operation in the concluding months of 1953. In the economic field, it had the effect of transferring to the Federal authorities, with some minor exceptions, full control of the economic life of the combined territories. However, despite some provision for the representation of African interests, the income and property qualifications for the Federal franchise continued to exclude all except a few Africans. Political power therefore resided in the hands of the European voters and the Federal Government followed the same policies of promoting European

immigration and of encouraging foreign investment in the Territory as had the Southern Rhodesian Government before federation. The operation of the Federation seems on balance to have been particularly favourable for the development of the European economy of Southern Rhodesia. By far the most valuable item of production and source of tax revenue in the Federation were the copper mines of Northern Rhodesia. The revenue was, however, spent for the development of the Federation as a whole but in a way which certainly did not short-change Southern Rhodesia. Moreover the broader base and wider market offered by the economy of the Federation as a whole undoubtedly attracted both persons ready to lend money to the public authorities and those ready to invest in private enterprises. Finally, those wishing to establish businesses in the Federation found Southern Rhodesia with its more diversified economy, its better financial services, its more skilled labour force and its larger internal market the natural place to do so.

39. The ten years of the Federation were therefore for Southern Rhodesia years of rapid growth, more remarkably so at the beginning than at the end. The most notable single achievement under the Federation was the Kariba Dam and related hydro-electric installations, the first stage of which, situated on the Southern Rhodesian side of the Zambezi, came into operation in 1960 and has a capacity of 705 megawatts. Transmission lines connect Kariba not only to the Zambian copperbelt, which remains slightly the larger user, but to the main areas of European population in Southern Rhodesia, providing 1,717 millions of the 2,050 million kilowatt-hours consumed in 1964, as compared with 869 million kilowatt hours in 1954. Finance for the project was obtained by loans from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (£28.6 million), from the Colonial Development Corporation of the United Kingdom (£15 million), the Commonwealth Finance Development Company, grouping some of the larger mining interests (£3 million) and from general loans raised by the Federal Government (£34 million). The cheap power thus available has stimulated economic development and has specifically encouraged such projects as the ferro-chrome smelting works at Gwelo and the sugar plantation at Chirundu on the Zambezi, where water for irrigation is pumped by electricity. On the other hand, the decreased use of coal for generating electricity and the gradual dieselization of Rhodesian Railways has resulted in reduced production at the Wankie Coalfield.

D. Development in recent years

40. Since the beginning of the Federal period detailed national income statistics have been available both for the Federation as a whole and for Southern Rhodesia which enabled the development of the economy to be shown in tabular form. Earlier, less statistically detailed estimates of the national income gave figures of £28.9 million in 1939 and £73.6 million in 1949. The figures for the gross national product of Southern Rhodesia in terms of its industrial origin for 1954, 1959, 1963 and 1964 are as follows:

	1954	1959	1963	1964
	£ million			
Agriculture				
(i) Non-African	23.7	33.8	44.2	46.3
(ii) African including subsistence crops	14.6	16.9	19.6	21.4
TOTAL AGRICULTURE	38.3	50.7	63.8	67.7
Mining and Quarrying	14.5	17.2	15.8	16.9
Manufacturing	24.6	41.8	51.2	54.3
Building and Construction	13.2	21.3	13.9	13.5
Electricity and Water	4.0	7.3	13.2	13.7
Distribution	23.4	36.8	40.9	41.5
Transport and Communications	12.3	23.5	28.7	30.9
Public administration and defence	6.5	11.4	15.6	14.6

^b For a more detailed account of the activities of the British South Africa Company, now renamed Charter Consolidated, see annex.

Table — (continued)

	1954	1959	1963	1964
	£ million			
Education and health	4.8	9.2	14.2	14.6
Other	26.3	45.7	51.8	52.7
Gross domestic product at factor cost	167.9	264.9	309.1	320.4
Less net income paid abroad	6.1	10.6	15.1	—14.7
Gross national product at factor cost	161.8	254.3	294.0	305.7
Plus indirect taxes less subsidies	8.1	15.9	22.2	26.0
Gross national product at current market prices..	169.9	270.2	316.2	331.7
Gross national product at 1954 market prices....	169.9	231.7	248.3	252.4

SOURCE: *National Accounts and Balance of Payments of Rhodesia, 1954-1964.*

41. It will be noted that the rate of economic growth was much greater in the period up to 1959 than in the following period. In fact there has been very little economic growth in the national income at constant prices since 1961. Statistics for gross fixed capital formation (about half of which is in the private sector) rose from £46.8 million in 1954 to a maximum

of £84.4 million in 1958 and diminished to £45.8 million in 1963 with a slight increase to £47.1 million in 1964. Some of the earlier investment appears to have been misdirected and political uncertainty has discouraged investment in recent years.

42. The national income in the years in question was distributed as follows:

	1954	1959	1963	1964
1. <i>Wages and salaries</i>				
Non-African	56.9	96.8	107.5	107.6
African	35.6	57.2	70.9	75.4
TOTAL	92.5	154.0	178.4	183.0
2. <i>Gross income from unincorporated enterprise</i>				
(i) European, Asian and Coloured	18.3	25.0	25.6	26.6
(ii) African				
(a) Rural household				
(i) For own consumption	13.4	15.7	20.1	22.0
(ii) For sale	3.7	4.1	3.4	3.6
(b) Other	0.7	1.8	3.8	4.0
TOTAL	36.1	40.3	52.9	56.2
3. <i>Gross operating profits</i>				
(i) Government enterprise	2.6	5.8	7.0	7.4
(ii) Public corporations	3.9	7.5	12.6	13.5
(iii) Companies	26.0	39.8	44.7	46.7
TOTAL	32.5	53.1	64.3	67.6
4. Government income from property	2.0	2.9	3.2	3.4
5. Personal income from property	4.8	8.3	10.3	10.4
Gross domestic product at factor cost	167.9	264.9	309.1	320.4

43. The following tables show the gross domestic product *per capita*, average earnings of non-African and African employees and rural household income *per capita*.

	1954	1959	1963	1964
Gross domestic product (£ million)	167.9	264.9	309.1	320.4
Total population (thousands)	2,990	3,520	4,010	4,140
Gross domestic product <i>per capita</i> (£)	56.1	75.0	77.1	77.4
Gross domestic product at constant prices (£) ..	56.8	65.8	61.9	61.0
Non-African wages and salaries (£ million)	56.9	96.8	107.5	107.6
Number in employment (thousands)	64.4	87.8	88.2	86.8
Average earnings (£)	884	1,103	1,219	1,241
African wages and salaries (£ million)	35.6	57.2	70.9	75.4
Number in employment (thousands)	555	628	608	622
Average earnings (£)	64	91	116	121
Rural household income <i>per capita</i>	12	11	11	11

44. The following table gives details about the net operating profits of companies in Rhodesia over the period 1954, 1959 and 1962.

	1954	1959	1962	Number of companies	Total assets in 1963 (£ million)
Agriculture	0.3	0.8	1.6	59	21.8
Mining and quarrying	5.2	5.9	5.2	37	38.2
Manufacturing	5.2	7.2	7.1	116	42.2
Building and construction	0.6	0.9	0.2	7	0.7
Distribution	4.9	5.6	5.6	97	24.3
Banking and insurance ^a	-0.7	-2.9	-3.7	75	36.0
Real estate	0.4	2.3	2.5	51	6.9
Transport and communications	0.2	0.7	0.7	16	1.3
Services	0.3	1.5	1.3	12	1.2
TOTAL	16.4	22.0	20.5	470	172.6

^a Companies in banking and insurance appear to have losses, because interest payments to them are excluded to avoid duplication in national accounting. Actually, banking and insurance companies had gross profits of £19.5 million in 1962.

45. The slackening in the rate of economic growth over the last year of the Federation showed mainly in a decline in construction activity, a relative stagnation in mineral production and the continued extremely low level of production and income of Africans living in the Reserves. European agricultural production has been affected by the seasons and, particularly in 1965 as regards tobacco, by the prospective market price, but as shown by the following table the general trend for the principal crops has been one of remarkable growth:

VIRGINIA FLUE-CURED TOBACCO

	Area planted (thousand acres)	Production (million pounds)	Value (£ million)
1959	203	191.3	27.4
1963	218	194.8	33.8
1964	256	323.8	35.0
1965	N.A.	245.8	33.8

	Maize		Sugar	
	Area planted (thousand acres)	Production (thousand bags)	Area planted (thousand acres)	Cane produced (thousand tons)
1959	349	3,827	8.7	126.8
1963	361	4,414	30.3	904.3
1964	371	4,361	53.6	1,431.5
1965	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.

46. The sugar industry is the most conspicuous feature of economic development in Southern Rhodesia over the last few years, being carried out by co-operation between large foreign investors who have established modern and efficient plantations and the Southern Rhodesian Government which is constructing large dams to irrigate an extensive area in south-eastern low veld. The Government has established the Sabi-Limpopo Authority to plan and co-ordinate such development.

47. The following table shows the external trade of Southern Rhodesia in 1953, the last pre-Federation year, in 1954, 1959, 1963 and 1964, the first post-Federation year:

£ MILLION

	Domestic exports				Total	Net gold sales	Re- exports	Total exports	Visible balance
	Imports	To Zambia	To Malawi	To other countries					
1953	77.7	7.7	.6	39.1	47.4	6.6	11.5	65.4	-12.2
1954	77.7	7.7	.6	42.9	51.2	6.6	11.5	65.4	-12.2
1959	77.7	7.7	.6	57.4	65.7	6.9	11.5	65.4	-12.2
1963	77.7	7.7	.6	75.1	83.4	7.0	11.5	65.4	-12.2
1964	109.7	30.8	5.6	83.1	119.5	7.1	18.0	144.5	+34.9

The principal commodities exported other than gold were as follows:

£ MILLION

	Tobacco	Asbestos	Meat	Sugar	Copper	Pig-iron	Chrome ore	Ferro- chrome
1954	20.9	6.5	2.9	0	0	0	2.6	0.3
1959	28.1	7.1	3.6	0	0.4	0.5	3.7	1.2
1964	39.2	10.0	5.0	3.7	3.6	2.6	2.5	1.8

48. The main countries to which exports were directed, were in 1964 after Zambia, the United Kingdom (£30.5 million), South Africa (£49.0 million) and the Federal Republic of Germany (£7.9 million).^c The main countries from which imports were obtained were the United Kingdom (£33.3 million), South Africa (£26.7 million), the United States (£7.4 million) and Zambia (£5.4 million).^d Taking into account

^c All figures exclusive of net gold sales.

^d Many of the imports from Zambia are re-exported.

invisible transactions, Southern Rhodesia had an adverse balance of payments on current account in 1964 of £5.3 million. It had adverse balances with virtually all parts of the world except Zambia and Malawi.

49. It is not possible to compare public finances during the years of the Federation and subsequent years because of division of tax revenues and functions. The following table shows the main heads of revenue and expenditure for the first six months of 1964, and for the financial year 1964/1965 and the estimates for 1965/1966:

£ MILLION

Revenue	1964 Jan./June	1964/1965	1965/1966 estimates
Income tax	3.9	23.2	24.7
Personal tax	1.3	2.4	2.5
Customs and excise duties	7.8	16.2	16.7
Sales tax	1.4	2.5	2.7
Other taxes	2.0	4.5	5.2
Interest, rents, profits ..	4.3	9.4	9.6
Posts and telecommunica- tion revenue	2.2	5.2	6.2
Fees	0.9	2.3	2.5
Other	7.5	5.4	3.6
	31.3	71.1	73.7

Expenditure	1964 Jan./June	1964/1965	1965/1966 estimates
Political and external affairs	0.3	0.6	0.7
Defence expenditures ..	2.5	5.9	6.2
Police	2.5	5.0	5.5
Internal affairs	1.0	1.9	2.0
Treasury (including debt service)	6.0	16.1	15.3
Posts and telegraphs ..	1.8	3.5	3.7
Agriculture, conservation, etc.	1.8	3.7	4.0
Mines and land	0.4	1.4	1.5
Roads	1.4	2.8	2.6
Works	1.6	2.6	2.5
Education }	5.8	5.8	6.1
African education }		6.1	6.4
Health	2.9	4.8	5.5
Other	6.6	10.3	11.8
	34.6	70.5	73.8

50. The deficit in the revenue accounts at 1 July 1964 was covered almost in full by a British Government grant of £4 million.

51. During 1964/1965, the Southern Rhodesian Government raised externally £3.6 million, of which £2.5 million was a loan from the South African Government at 5½ per cent, the same favourable rate at which that Government lends to its provincial administrations. Internal loans amounted to £9.2 million. After the repayment of loans to the amount of £6.5 million in the same year, the public debt amounted to £215.7 million which can be subdivided as follows:

	£ million
<i>External borrowings</i>	
Southern Rhodesia Stock (London)	9.5
United Kingdom—International Bank	9.7
Colonial Development Corporation	1.0
Colonial Development and Welfare Fund	3.7
Republic of South Africa	2.5
Other	3.5
	89.9
<i>Internal borrowings</i>	
Southern Rhodesia Stock	76.1
Southern Rhodesia Development Bonds (Kariba) ..	8.8
British South Africa Company	2.3
Rhodesia Anglo-American Company	1.1
Others loans and bonds	10.4
Temporary borrowings	27.1
	125.7
TOTAL PUBLIC DEBT	215.7

52. Expenditure on loan account during the financial year 1964/1965 amounted to £10.9 million, the largest heads being water development, £2.1 million; roads £1.9 million; housing £1.4 million; and local government, £1.2 million. An analysis of net expenditure from loan funds up to 30 June 1965 follows:

Loans

	£ million
Local authorities	30.7
Rhodesia Railways	48.9
Electricity Supply Corporation	20.6
Central African Power Corporation	13.6
Land and Agricultural Bank	10.4
Housing loans	9.9
Cold Storage Commission	4.3
Grain Marketing Board	4.1
African Production and Marketing Development Fund	1.7
Dairy Market Board	1.6
Investments in Rhodesian Iron and Steel Company	4.3
Other loans	6.9

Development expenditures

Public works	29.6
Roads and bridges	21.2
Posts and telegraphs	9.4
Water and soil conservation works	7.5
Development of rural areas, schools, African town- ships, etc.	4.9
Other development	7.4
	237.0

E. Present situation

53. The economy of Southern Rhodesia is remarkable for the coexistence of two economies—a relatively developed and diversified European market economy and a depressed rural African subsistence economy. The first has appropriated the better part of the natural resources of the Territory and is utilizing them scientifically and profitably. Despite the monopolistic circumstances in which the Territory was colonized and despite the continued importance of the interests of such financial giants as the British South Africa Company, recently renamed Charter Consolidated, and the Anglo-American Corporation which have now merged their interests in Southern Rhodesia, ownership of resources is quite widely diffused among the European population of the Territory and those who do not directly own such resources have access to employment and to social services on privileged terms.

54. The Africans in rural areas have not benefited from educational or agricultural extension services which would enable them to make a really purposeful use of their land resources. Moreover, with their continued rapid population growth, they are increasingly constricted and much of the land they hold is subject to soil erosion. In face of obvious population pressure, the amount of land available for African occupation has been increased from less than 30 per cent to over 45 per cent of the total land area of Southern Rhodesia, while the area reserved for non-Africans has been reduced from over 50 to 38 per cent. However, the pressure of population has continued. In particular, the land in the Native Purchase Area has been virtually used up and there are some 7,000 Africans who have been trained to farm on individually owned land, but cannot obtain plots. On the other hand, with only one million acres under crops in 1964, the European area is far from intensively used. Moreover, the Government continues to develop land for European settlement. Moves to secure the abolition of the Land Apportionment Act failed, the present Government being pledged to retain it.

55. Africans have perforce sought employment in larger numbers and the African urban population has swollen over the period from the Second World War. African workers have, it will be noted, received steadily increasing wages and have been employed in a wider range of activities, in part as a result of general development and in part because they were under the Industrial Conciliation Act of 1959 included in the framework of collective bargaining. The average wage of African workers is still, however, less than 10 per cent of that of European workers. Moreover, the slackening of the economy in recent years has resulted in an actual decline in the labour force. There has thus arisen a substantial degree of unemployment amongst urban Africans.

56. The present economic situation of Southern Rhodesia seems thus to reflect the malaise which exists in the political field.

II. LAND

A. LAND LEGISLATION

Main provisions

57. The Land Apportionment Act gives legal substance to a policy of segregation based on the general principle that only indigenous Africans can acquire, lease or occupy land in a Native area but not in any European area except as specially authorized.

58. The Land Apportionment Act, 1941, as amended, classified all land in Southern Rhodesia other than tribal trust land as:

(a) A European area, in which Africans are prohibited from owning or occupying land, subject to exceptions;

(b) A Native area, consisting of a Native purchase area in which only indigenous Africans may own or occupy farms, subject to exceptions, and an African townships area, in which Africans may own land and other property; the African townships area includes any African townships or urban locations established in the Native purchase area, the European area or in Tribal trust land, those established in the European area or in Tribal trust land reverting to those areas if the townships are abolished; in transfers involving the Native area and the European area, expropriations of land or other rights are authorized;

(c) National land, which is reserved for purposes of forestry and nature reserves, the conservation of wild life, and national parks; National land may not be alienated but may be leased for from ten to ninety-nine years;

(d) Unreserved land, which may be leased to non-Africans and to Africans provided the latter are citizens or regarded by law as permanent residents of Southern Rhodesia.

59. All categories of land other than the European area are defined by law; the European area consists of all land not so defined.

60. The Legislative Assembly is restricted by the Constitution (1961) from enlarging the European area, but is authorized to provide for further land to be added to the area subject to the limitation that its total acreage shall not exceed the total acreage of the area at the time of dissolution of the former Assembly.

61. In regard to African land, the Constitution authorizes the Legislature to provide for extensions to the Tribal trust land, without specifying a limitation, and to the Native purchase area, subject to the limitation that the total acreage of land in this area shall not exceed the aggregate of the acreage of the Native purchase area and the Tribal trust land at the time of dissolution of the former Assembly.

62. The Act empowers landowners in both the European area and the Native purchase area to apply to have their land transferred to the category of unreserved land; in that event European-owned land may be sold to an African and African-owned land may be sold to a European. The Act also authorizes the Governor, when he considers it in the public interest, to exchange Crown land in the European area or in the unreserved land for Crown land in the Native purchase area, provided such exchange will not materially affect the total acreage or in any other way be prejudicial to any of the three areas.

African areas

(a) Tribal trust land

63. The Constitution vests all Tribal trust land in a Board of Trustees "for the sole and exclusive use and occupation of indigenous Africans" subject to previously acquired rights and to the proviso that the "dominion in and the right of searching and mining for and disposing of all minerals, mineral oils and natural gases" vests in the Governor.

64. The Board of Trustees is composed of the Chief Justice of the High Court as Chairman, a Chief appointed by the Council of Chiefs, the Chairman of the Natural Re-

sources Board, and three members appointed for five-year terms by the Governor who are required by the Constitution to be persons experienced in financial matters, African agriculture, and local government in tribal areas, respectively. The Board is not entitled to dispose of any Tribal trust land or any right or interest therein save in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Constitution, and is responsible for ensuring that such land is used and occupied solely by indigenous Africans.

65. Save in the exercise of previously acquired rights, persons other than indigenous Africans are prohibited by the Constitution from occupying any portion of Tribal trust land except in accordance with an agreement entered into with the Board of Trustees for any of the following purposes: the administrative purposes of the Government; religious or educational purposes in the interests of indigenous Africans; hospitals, clinics, or other establishments for the benefit of indigenous Africans; cemeteries or burial grounds; the exercise of rights granted in respect of forest produce or other natural resources of the Tribal trust land; the exercise of rights granted by the Government under the mining laws; hotels or other similar establishments for the convenience of travellers; and any other purpose which the Board considers to be either in the interests of indigenous Africans or in the public interest.

66. Indigenous Africans are themselves restricted in their use and occupation of Tribal trust land by the provisions of the Native Land Husbandry Act of 1951, and the African Affairs Act of 1927, as amended. The object of the Native Land Husbandry Act was to provide for the control of the utilization and allocation of land occupied by Africans and ensure its efficient use for agricultural purposes. It restricts the use of Tribal trust land by providing that "no Native shall cultivate any land contained in any prescribed farming land unless he is registered as the holder of a farming right in respect of such land". Such a right may not be given or taken as security or disposed of by will; it expires on the death of the holder and may also, in certain prescribed circumstances, be cancelled by a Native Commissioner or other authorized official.

67. Under the African Affairs Act of 1927, as amended, authority to assign land for huts, gardens and grazing grounds for each kraal in Tribal trust land, as well as to determine the minimum number of adult male Africans composing any kraal, is conferred on the local district commissioner whenever approval is required for an African to move to or from a kraal. The district commissioner may also prohibit the erection of new huts or the cultivation of new gardens.

68. The Act further prohibits an African from moving from one district to another without the consent of the district commissioner. Chiefs, who are appointed and may for just cause be removed with their families and properties from Tribal trust land by the Governor, are also prohibited by the Act from leaving the districts in which they reside without the authority of the district commissioner.

69. The 1961 Constitution introduces a system under clearly prescribed circumstances to provide for the first time for private ownership by indigenous Africans of land in tribal trust areas upon irrigation schemes and in any particular area of Tribal trust land. Freehold rights may be introduced if the Board, after making any inquiries necessary and after consultation with the Chief concerned, is satisfied that it is the general wish of the persons living in any substantial area of the Tribal trust land to have their rights converted into individual freehold ownership; and if the Board is satisfied that this would be in their general interests. The land in question would cease to be Tribal trust land and the individual freehold titles would be subject to such limitations regarding future alienation as might be prescribed by law.

70. The 1961 Constitution further authorizes the alienation of Tribal trust land by the Governor, subject to the consent of the Board of Trustees, if the land is required "for purpose of mineral development, for defence purposes or for the improvement of communications or for any other public purpose". Such land would become Crown land. The Constitution requires that any African dispossessed of his right to occupy the land be assigned alternative land "so far as is reasonable and practicable", or if alternative land is not available, that he

be paid compensation for his removal and for any permanent improvement made on the land, and that additional compensation be paid to the Board of Trustees for the benefit of other Africans in the area concerned. If the land is assigned to an African as compensation, it must be situated in as convenient a position as possible, be sufficient and suitable for his agricultural and pastoral requirements, and be as suitable for his requirements as the land from which he was dispossessed.

71. The 1961 Constitution also authorized the alienation of Tribal trust land for the establishment of townships, villages or business centres for the use of indigenous Africans.

72. The only other form of alienation of Tribal trust land authorized by the 1961 Constitution is by the grant of freehold title to a person or company undertaking a scheme for the irrigation of Tribal trust land for the benefit of Africans; a condition of every such grant is that the occupation of the land shall be reserved exclusively for Africans.

(b) *Native purchase area*

73. The Native purchase area is set aside for indigenous Africans who are defined as "Africans who are descended through the male line from a member of one of the tribes ordinarily resident in Southern Rhodesia".

74. While a European owner of land in the European area may dispose of his land freely, except to an African, an African who owns land in the Native Purchase Area is not entitled to alienate, lease, mortgage or dispose of it unless the Rural Land Board approves both the terms and conditions and the person to whom or in whose favour the land is to be alienated, leased, or encumbered. Moreover, if an African fails to carry out the conditions of his title deed, or "is convicted of treason or sedition or of an incitement to commit such crimes", the Governor may declare his land to be forfeited.

75. Crown land in the Native purchase area may be alienated or leased to an indigenous African by the Governor, on the recommendation of the Rural Land Board, on such terms and conditions as he may prescribe. The conditions fixed include possession of a Master Farmer's certificate or similar document and capital assets of at least £300 in cash or kind. The purchase price of the land is fixed by the Board, in consultation with the Minister of Lands.

76. Africans otherwise require permission to occupy Crown land in the Native purchase area, any African occupying such land immediately before 1 November 1958 being exempt from that requirement. Occupation of Crown land is subject to such terms and conditions as prescribed by the Governor.

77. In special circumstances, the Governor may permit an alien African to acquire, lease or occupy land in the Native purchase area.

78. A European may be permitted under the Act to acquire land in the Native purchase area for educational, religious or such other purposes as he may consider to be for the benefit of Africans. Otherwise, the Governor may permit a European to occupy, or to lease for a maximum of ninety-nine years, land in the Native purchase area for such purposes, or for Government administrative purposes or for hotels and places of lodging for travellers or for trading or other like purposes.

European area

79. The Land Apportionment Act, 1941, as amended, provides that land in the European area may be disposed of to anyone other than an African. Subject to this restriction, a European landowner is free to dispose of his land as he wishes.

80. The Act states that it shall be lawful to lease, alienate or otherwise dispose of Crown land in the European area to a European defined in the Act as "a person who is not an African", although the land was being occupied at the time by Africans. Such Africans, called "squatters", were allowed to remain on the land until such time as they were evicted by the Governor in accordance with the provisions of the Act authorizing the removal of Africans from land in the European area. Africans had also been permitted to remain on Crown land in the European area, on such terms and conditions as were prescribed by the Governor, until a fixed

date, which had been extended and eventually expired on 31 August 1962. Since that time occupation by Africans of Crown land in the European area has been illegal, with the few exceptions mentioned below. Since the coming into operation of the first Land Apportionment Act, hundreds of thousands of African "squatters" have been removed from the land they occupied in the European area.

81. The 1941 Act generally prohibits an African from acquiring, leasing or occupying land in the European area and any owner or occupier of land in that area or his agent from disposing or attempting to dispose of any such land to an African, or from leasing any such land to an African or from permitting or allowing any African to occupy any such land. These prohibitions are subject to exceptions, mainly to permit lawful occupation of land by African employees of a European landowner, to permit Africans to obtain medical attention in the European area, and for educational, religious or other authorized purposes.

82. The Rural Land Act of 1963 (which replaced the Land Settlement Act of 1944) regulates the acquisition and disposal of Crown Lands both in the European area and the Native purchase area. This Act authorizes the Minister to purchase from public funds such private land as he deems suitable for settlement or in need of reclamation prior to settlement. Proposals for the acquisition of such land for the Crown must be referred to the Rural Land Board, an advisory body. The Minister is also authorized to spend up to £5,000 to purchase specified land on behalf of a particular applicant provided the latter is willing to contribute one fifth of the purchase price in cash.

83. Applications for leases of Crown land must be referred to the Rural Land Board. In considering and recommending applicants, the Board is required to have regard to the applicant's age, character, legal competency to hold land, his willingness to make a declaration affirming his intention personally to occupy, work and develop the holding exclusively for the benefit of himself and family, and to consider whether or not he had the necessary qualifications and capital. An applicant company can only be recommended by the Board if it is incorporated under the laws of Southern Rhodesia relating to companies and if a majority of its directors are citizens of Southern Rhodesia. The Minister may nevertheless issue a Crown grant to a company if the majority of directors are not citizens.

84. Under the Rural Land Act, Crown land is assigned on leases for five years, allotted under an annual rental of 5 per cent of the purchase price. If the option to purchase is exercised, previous rent payments are deemed instalments of the purchase price.

85. The Act requires the beneficial occupation of the holding by the lessee, including personal residence thereon, observance of laws relating to the protection of natural resources, farming practice and land management; the proper care and maintenance of improvements; and the practice of sound methods of husbandry. Lessees must carry out farming activities on such a scale and of such a nature as might be approved by the Rural Land Board, and comply with any instructions issued by the Board.

86. A lessee is barred from ceding, assigning, hypothecating or otherwise alienating his lease or from entering into any partnership for the working of his holding, except with the written consent of the Minister given after consultation with the Board.

87. A lessee who exercises his option to purchase his holding is entitled to obtain a Crown grant, provided that he has paid the whole of the purchase price and other moneys due to the Government, that he has complied with the terms and conditions of his lease, and that he satisfies the nationality requirements.

Retention of the Land Apportionment Act

88. The 1961 Constitution authorizes the Legislative Assembly to withdraw from the operation of the Land Apportionment Act, 1941: any land which is set aside under any law for national parks, afforestation purposes, non-hunting areas, game reserves or similar purposes; any land other

than Crown land, at the request of or with the consent of the owner; any land which under the Act is not reserved for or restricted to ownership or occupation by a specified class of persons. The Assembly may also prescribe the conditions subject to which the ownership or occupation of land shall cease to be restricted to persons belonging to any specified class of persons, and, finally, amend or repeal the Land Apportionment Act, 1941. However, it was specifically barred, by an entrenched provision of the Constitution, from imposing any racial limitation on the ownership or occupation of any land in Southern Rhodesia more restrictive than any limitation in the Land Apportionment Act which was already in force.

89. During the December 1962 general election the Rhodesian Front undertook to uphold the principles of the Land Apportionment Act, whereas the Opposition Rhodesia National Party was pledged to repeal the Act which had been consistently opposed by the African political parties. The Southern Rhodesia Constitutional Council expressed severe criticism of the Land Apportionment Act in a report issued in February 1964, describing it as "the embodiment of racial discrimination". In this report, which was unanimous, the Council was concerned only with the Native purchase area and the European area. It asked what value the Declaration of Rights had in protecting rights in the future so long as one of those rights (the right to freedom from discrimination in regard to the ownership and occupation of land) was specifically denied by the Act.

90. On 4 March 1964, Sir Edgar Whitehead introduced a motion in the Legislative Assembly agreeing with the report of the Constitutional Council that the Land Apportionment Act was a highly discriminatory measure and contrary to the

spirit of the Southern Rhodesian Constitution and expressing the opinion that the Act should be repealed. The motion was defeated by 31 votes to 27. The Minister of Mines and Lands, who was charged with the administration of the Act in rural areas, stated in the Legislative Assembly on 30 July that it was not Government's intention to repeal the Act.^e

B. DISTRIBUTION OF LAND

91. A comparison of the distribution of land in 1930, and in 1963, is as follows:

	1930	1963
	(acres)	
African lands		
Tribal trust land	20,820,450	40,170,456
Native purchase area	—	4,215,784
European area	49,469,000 ^a	35,900,000 ^a
National land	590,500	10,540,722
Unreserved land	17,881,840 ^b	5,781,601

^a Approximate.

^b Total of former unassigned area and undetermined area.

92. The following table^f illustrates the relative agricultural potential of land in the European and Native areas:

^e Southern Rhodesia, *Debates of the Legislative Assembly* (Unrevised) Second Session, Tenth Parliament, No. 3, vol. 57, col. 172.

^f Based on tables 34 and 48 of the *Report of the Advisory Committee, 1962, on the Development of the Economic Resources of Southern Rhodesia with particular Reference to the Role of African Agriculture* (C.S.R. 28-1962).

Farming region	Percentage of area		Percentage of Southern Rhodesia
	European	African	
Specialized and diversified farming and intensive crop and livestock farming	27.59	10.58	20.24
Semi-intensive farming (drought-resistant grain and other cash crops; semi-intensive livestock production)	19.56	14.63	17.43
Semi-extensive and extensive livestock farming	50.98	70.07	59.23
Unsuitable for farming	1.87	4.72	3.10
	100.00	100.00	100.00

93. In 1960, there were 7,064 European-owned farms with an aggregate area of 34,484,176 acres, as follows:

EUROPEAN FARMS

Size of farms (acres)	Number of farms	Area (acres)
Under 1,001	2,100	742,462
1,001 - 2,500	1,841	3,202,878
2,501 - 5,000	1,723	5,951,217
5,001 - 7,500	566	3,488,379
7,501 - 10,000	219	1,895,962
10,001 - 15,000	258	3,144,637
15,001 - 20,000	113	1,968,026
20,001 and over	244	14,090,615
	7,064	34,484,176

Only 1,029,130 acres of these farms were under cultivation; in contrast some 360,000 authorized African farmers cultivated three million acres in the Native areas.

94. A number of the larger farms are company-owned. Lonrho Ltd. has land holdings amounting to 1,018,323 acres of which 932,754 are ranch lands; Hippo Valley Estates, Ltd., owns 150,000 acres; Sir J. L. Hulleys and Sons, of Natal, in

1956 acquired the Triangle estate of 91,520 acres lying between the Sabi, Lundi and Mtilikwe Rivers and in association with others control a further 116,510 acres; and the Rhodesian Corporation Ltd., holds 42,806 acres.

95. European-owned farms increased in the next two years to an aggregate of 36,909,000 acres and farm sales in 1963 and 1964 were reported to be as follows:

	Farms	Acres	Average price per acre
1963	398	960,000	£2. 16s.
1964	391	1,078,000	£2. 14s.

96. There was an upsurge in the demand for farms in 1965 with a corresponding hardening of values. Ranchland was reportedly selling at about £1 an acre, maizeland about £7 an acre, and developed irrigated land about £50 an acre. The best tobacco farms were valued at between £8 and £12 an acre.

97. In the Native purchase area, 2,637 farm holdings and plots totalling 573,167 acres had been alienated to Africans by 31 December 1960 and 2,410 further applicants had been recommended. Eleven years later the number of farms and plots alienated to African farm-owners had increased to 6,432 and only 500,000 acres remained to be allocated. It was estimated that these would provide 1,000 additional farms and there were at the time 2,721 approved applicants on the waiting list. In 1964, there were 14,000 African master farmers

eligible for farms, 6,981 of whom owned or leased farm land in the Native purchase area with option to purchase. It was estimated that when the Native purchase area amounted to 8 million acres, the area would provide 17,000 to 18,000 farms and plots. The original purchase prices of the African-owned farms were as follows:

<i>Number of farms</i>	<i>Original purchase price</i>
6,852	Less than £250
31	Between £250 and £349
14	Between £350 and £449
1	Between £450 and £499
3	Between £500 and £999

98. European farmers and African master farmers who are unable to obtain land in the Native purchase area are eligible for farms in the Unreserved Land. Some European owners of land in the European area have also applied for authority to sell land to Africans by having it transferred to the category of Unreserved Land; the total area of land so offered amounted to 144,142 acres on 1 January 1963. No African landowners, however, had applied for authority to sell their land to Europeans under a comparable provision of the Land Apportionment Act.

III. AGRICULTURE

A. GENERAL DESCRIPTION

99. Only about one fifth of the country's land, mostly in the high veld and eastern mountain areas, is suitable for intensive crop cultivation. Moreover, much of this area consists of sandy soil of rather low fertility. Fifteen per cent of the land is suitable, unless irrigated, only for extensive cattle ranching, with as much as thirty acres of range land needed to sustain one large animal. The remaining two thirds is subject to uncertain weather conditions that govern its suitability for producing grain, fodder, drought resistant crops, and livestock. For much of this area at least ten to twenty acres of range land are required to maintain one large animal. More than 75 per cent of the country is then subject to conditions that make crop production a risky venture.

100. Nevertheless, on those areas which are suitable for cultivation high productivity can be maintained by good soil management and by heavy investment in chemical fertilizers. Needless to say, only the European farmers have the capital and the technical knowledge to maintain such high productivity. They also carry out cattle ranching on scientific principles and with proper regard for sales values. The European farming community, as has been noted, disposes of a disproportionately high percentage of the better types of land.

101. European farmers have benefited also from a very high degree of agricultural services and marketing arrangements. During the period of the Federation those services were a Federal responsibility but they have since been resumed by the Southern Rhodesian Government.

102. European agriculture is relatively large-scale. In 1963, there were 6,242 European production units. A little over half the farms were in the 1,000 to 5,000 acre range, but 242

farms or ranches exceeded 20,000 acres in size. There were over 600 ranches of more than 10,000 acres each. A number of large cattle ranches, forest estates and sugar estates are owned by companies, including subsidiaries of the British South Africa Company, Anglo-American and the Lonrho Grant. If these large estates are excluded, the average size of holdings in 1963 was close to 2,500 acres, of which 140 acres were cultivated. In the area of higher rainfall, productive units range from 2,000 to 3,000 acres. In the fertile Mazoe valley, for example, 248 farms occupy 787,000 acres, of which 15 per cent are cultivated.

103. European farmers produce primarily for the market. The official estimates of agricultural production in the European sector in 1964 indicate that the gross value of output was £66.1 million. They marketed all their tobacco output and 75 per cent of their maize output.

104. Although a large part of the European areas are farmed extensively, average output per acre is quite high. In 1958, for instance, the average gross value of output per European production unit was close to £6,000 and it was estimated that net return to management must have been at least £1,000. Between 1937 and 1960 the total value of output in the European areas rose by more than 1,000 per cent and the total volume of output increased by 259 per cent.

105. African farming remains to a very large extent of a purely subsistence type, though the production of cash crops in the reserves is increasing and African landholders in the Purchase Areas produce primarily for sale. Lack of capital and failure to provide a sufficient scale of community development and agricultural extension services have kept the productivity of the African farmer at a low and, in the reserves, at a stagnant level.

106. African farming is still based on the principle of shifting cultivation, and despite the limited acreage land is used extensively. Yields per acre are low, averaging between a quarter and a fifth of those of comparable crops grown in the European area. Fewer than 2 per cent of the producers use fertilizer or select seeds. In the African areas, the main principal crops are grown throughout the country, regardless of climatic conditions. There is very little dairy production in the African areas and official statistics indicate no milk produced for sale by Africans. The contrast between European and African agriculture shows further in the fact that while the farms in the European areas have been surveyed, and include both crop land and grazing land within their boundaries, African holdings are not clearly identified nor do they include grazing; grazing land is communal and at best the size of holdings "associated" with a family can only be estimated. There is no information on the average size of African holdings. By 1950, close to 350,000 African families lived in the African areas. In the Purchase Areas, holdings ranged in size from fifty acres to 1,000 acres in the driest regions. The size of African holdings varies over a wide range within the different African areas; one sample of 473 holdings in all rainfall areas indicated that 5 per cent were smaller than five acres, 53 per cent were between five and ten acres, 25 per cent more than forty acres in size.

107. The following table gives the value of sales of the principal agricultural products from all sources:

£ MILLION

<i>Period</i>	<i>Tobacco</i>	<i>Grains</i>	<i>Sugar</i>	<i>Cattle slaughtering</i>	<i>Pig slaughtering</i>	<i>Dairy products</i>	<i>Total</i>
1963	33.8	6.1	6.9	8.0	1.2	2.5	58.6
1964	35.0	6.3	6.0	7.9	1.2	2.4	58.9
1965 (first 8 months)	32.8	5.3	6.5	6.1	0.9	1.7	53.2
1964 (first 8 months)	(29.5)	(5.5)	(3.5)	(5.6)	(0.9)	(1.6)	(46.6)

The figure for gross sales African agriculture amounted in 1963 and 1964 to £4.1 million and £4.3 million respectively.

108. From the gross income derived from output of European and African agriculture, one gets the following table:

£ MILLION

	1954	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964
European agriculture	23.7	36.0	43.8	42.7	44.2	46.3
African agriculture	14.6	15.7	18.0	19.3	19.6	21.4
TOTAL	38.3	51.7	61.8	62.0	63.8	67.7

This makes agriculture the largest single head in the national income accounts. However, the greater part of the gross income from African agriculture consists of production for subsistence (£17.8 million in 1964). Because of the importance of tobacco and sugar, they are the subjects of separate sections.

B. TOBACCO

109. The following table shows the evolution of the Virginia flue-cured tobacco crop since 1938 at five-year intervals up to 1958 and annually thereafter:

Sale year	No. of growers	Acreage grown (thousand acres)	Total sales (million lb.)	Average yield per acre (lb.)	Net realizations by auction (£ million)	Average price per lb. (d.)
1938	493	45.7	25.0	548	1.1	10.72
1943	741	62.2	30.3	479	2.3	18.05
1948	1,460	112.6	74.7	663	10.1	32.56
1953	2,460	177.1	105.2	594	17.4	42.83
1958	2,821	210.1	152.7	753	23.2	36.45
1959	2,821	203.2	191.3	891	27.5	34.44
1960	2,821	197.1	217.9	1,038	31.0	34.16
1961	2,821	206.3	233.3	1,054	32.9	33.82
1962	2,821	204.3	230.8	1,050	33.6	34.96
1963	2,821	218.2	194.8	820	33.8	41.62
1964	2,821	256.0	323.8	1,152	35.0	25.94
1965	3,000 app.	256.0	245.8	1,082	33.8	33.00

These statistics include tobacco sold on the Salisbury market by European growers in Zambia, whose total production is, however, less than 3 per cent of the total.

110. Other types of tobacco are grown in Southern Rhodesia though on a very much smaller scale. The following table shows tobacco production by types, distinguishing between European and African production, for Burley and Turkish tobacco, giving for purposes of comparison the figures for Virginia flue-cured.

	Burley				Turkish				Virginia	
	European		African		European		African		European	
	Quan. (thousands of lb.)	Value (£ thousand)	Quan. (thousands of lb.)	Value (£ thousand)	Quan. (thousands of lb.)	Value (£ thousand)	Quan. (thousands of lb.)	Value (£ thousand)	Quan. (thousands of lb.)	Value (£ thousand)
1959	22	2	—	—	588	90	226	35	180,350	25,881
1960	—	—	—	—	1,260	N.A.	618	N.A.	207,000	29,463
1961	22	2	—	—	578	87	231	35	219,621	30,948
1962	91	14	—	—	237	36	54	9	215,602	31,410
1963	949	103	11	1	638	107	149	N.A.	180,346	31,276
1964	N.A.	N.A.	303	N.A.	1,140	N.A.	264	N.A.	323,836	35,002

111. Though the units of production are small-scale, the growing marketing and exporting of tobacco constitute a highly organized industry regulated by organizations established by the Government. First, all tobacco growers must register with the Department of Agriculture and take out a licence. By so doing, they join the Rhodesia Tobacco Association, a commodity association closely linked with the Rhodesian National Farmers Union. The Association is financed by a small levy of 1/3d per pound on tobacco sales. The Rhodesian Tobacco Association is represented on and contributes to the finances of the Rhodesia Tobacco Marketing Board, the Tobacco Research Board of Rhodesia and the Tobacco Export Promotion Council of Rhodesia. The Association also finances work studies to guide growers in the use of labour and has organized a Hail Insurance Scheme.

112. The Rhodesian Tobacco Marketing Board was established under the Tobacco Marketing Act of 1936 primarily to organize and run the tobacco auctions at Salisbury. It has since been charged with the registration of growers and the

licensing of graders. The Board consists of a government official as chairman, two representatives of the Rhodesia Tobacco Association and two members of the Tobacco Trade Association of Rhodesia.

113. The Tobacco Export Promotion Council of Rhodesia is a subsidiary of the Tobacco Marketing Board set up to promote the sale of Rhodesian tobacco anywhere in the world. In consultation with the Government, it sends missions abroad and suggests the countries with which trade agreements might be concluded.

114. The Tobacco Research Board of Rhodesia, which is financed both by the Government and by the Rhodesia Tobacco Association and which contains representatives of the Government, of the growers and of the buyers, maintains experimental stations and carries out a programme of research on which £214,354 was spent in 1963/1964. The remarkable increase in yield is due in large measure to the improvements in seeds, use of fertilizers, curing and pest control resulting from the research programme.

115. Finally, mention must be made of the buyer's organization, the Tobacco Trade Association, which promotes the interests of all *bona fide* companies, partnerships or persons engaged in auctioning, buying, handling, packing and exporting tobacco. As noted above, the Association is represented on the Tobacco Marketing Board.

116. The following three companies each operate, directly or through a subsidiary, one of the three tobacco auction floors licensed by the Tobacco Marketing Board: The Rhodesia Tobacco Warehouse and Export Company (1946) Ltd., with assets of £325,656 and profits of £52,390 for the year ended 30 September 1964; Tobacco Auctions Ltd., with assets of £420,411 and profits of £152,547 for the nine months ended 31 October 1963; and Tobacco Sales Ltd., with the capital plus reserve of £320,890 and a net profit of £71,551 for 1964. The directors of all three companies appear to be Rhodesian.

117. As noted in the chapter on industry, foreign tobacco companies, in particular British cigarette manufacturers, have considerable investments in tobacco processing and exporting facilities in Southern Rhodesia and in some cases in factories for manufacturing cigarettes.

C. SUGAR

General

118. The growing of sugar in Southern Rhodesia, virtually non-existent until after the Second World War, has expanded

immensely as a result of large-scale irrigation schemes in the Sabi Limpopo Territory. The following table shows the sugar production in Southern Rhodesia and imports and consumption for the area of the Federation at five-year intervals up to 1957 and annually from 1958 to 1962:

Year	Production	Consumption (including Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland)	Imports
1937	10	11,700	11,700
1942	400	29,000	28,600
1947	500	23,900	23,400
1952	2,000	48,200	46,200
1957	6,800	76,500	69,600
1958	6,300	74,500	68,200
1959	11,700	79,400	67,700
1960	31,000	87,800	56,800
1961	45,000	96,000	51,000
1962	90,900	90,900	—

It will be noted that production and consumption for the Federation as a whole were in balance for 1962.

119. The following table shows the actual and projected production, consumption in Southern Rhodesia and exports for the years 1963 to 1968:

Year	Production	Consumption in Southern Rhodesia	Exports to neighbouring countries	Overseas exports
1963 (actual)	137,600	62,900	25,700	49,000
1964 (actual)	165,600	65,000	30,800	69,900
1965 (est.)	277,500	70,200	50,200	157,100
1966 (est.)	390,000	72,500	45,000	272,500
1967 (est.)	497,500	75,000	30,500	391,500
1968 (est.)	507,000	81,500	8,000	409,500

120. Rhodesian Sugar Refineries, a company controlled by Tate and Lyle Limited, has two refineries in Southern Rhodesia which absorb about 70,000 tons of raw sugar and a further 50,000 tons are exported to neighbouring countries, though this amount will diminish as they expand their sugar production. There remains this year some 157,000 tons to be exported overseas. A rail link has been established from the main line to Lourenço Marques to Triangle and Chiredzi, where new towns are springing up, and bulk loading facilities are being constructed at Lourenço Marques itself.

121. Southern Rhodesia entered the export market for sugar in 1963 at a time when there was a temporary shortage and world prices were unusually high (£105 per ton in November 1963). Since then the world price has fallen sharply (to as low as £22 a ton in February 1965). In both 1963 and 1964, Southern Rhodesia was able to export 10,000 tons to the United States of America, but in 1965 its quota was reduced to 9,200 tons. On the other hand, after prolonged negotiations, the Territory was admitted to the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement on 1 January 1965. A British quota of 25,000 long tons a year was obtained at a price which is negotiated annually at a level well above the world price; for 1965 the price is £46.11.6 per long ton f.o.b. Lourenço Marques. In addition, 100,000 long tons may be sold to Britain and Canada annually at a preferential price which in Britain is £3.15.0 and in Canada is £4.10.0 above the world price. Within the scope of the Commonwealth Agreement, Tate and Lyle Ltd. have entered into an agreement to purchase at least 50,000 long tons per annum over the next five years, of which at least 20,000 long tons are for Canadian delivery. A group of Japanese importers has contracted to purchase Rhodesian raw sugar over a three-year period on similar terms to those applicable to other suppliers; for the year 1965/1966 50,000 long tons will be supplied. Southern Rhodesia is seeking a quota under any new International Sugar Agreement which may be negotiated.

122. External marketing of Southern Rhodesian sugar is carried out by Sugar Sales (Pvt.) Ltd., a company jointly owned by the three producing companies. Sugar is marketed internally by Sugar Marketing (Private) Ltd., a company controlled by Rhodesia Sugar Refineries Ltd., but with a participation by the major producers. Internal sales are subject to price regulation by the Government, which, however, has assured adequate profit margins to producers and refiners.

123. Sugar production has therefore become a major economic activity in Southern Rhodesia, in which the units of production are large-scale companies with important foreign shareholdings. By 1 January 1965, £18.5 million had been invested in the industry, which already employed 21,200 persons, of whom 20,700 were Africans. It is anticipated that by 1968, £34.5 million will have been invested in the industry and that 30,000 will be employed. The Government, for its part, will have contributed £7.56 million for water development, £1.36 million for railways, £1.1 million for roads and £.5 million for other development.

124. The following subsections give details about the principal producers:

Triangle Ltd.

125. Triangle Limited is a wholly owned subsidiary of Sir J. L. Hulleys and Sons (Rhodesia) Ltd., which in turn is wholly owned by Hulleys' Sugar Corporation Ltd., the largest sugar producing firm in South Africa. Three of the fifteen directors of the Corporation are British, including Lord Lyle of Westbourne of the British sugar firm of Tate and Lyle Ltd. Triangle Ltd., wholly owns the Triangle Estate proper of 91,520 acres. Two subsidiary companies formed in conjunction with Imperial Cold Storage Limited control 116,510 acres of the adjacent Nuanetsi Ranch, but the additional land has not yet been developed except for some pilot areas. Triangle Limited produced 115,000 tons of raw sugar during the 1964

milling season and is expected to produce 170,000 tons in 1965 and 200,000 tons in 1966.

126. Total costs in developing Triangle up to the end of 1965 are reported to be £12 million, of which £3 million was raised in 1960 by 6½ per cent debentures.

127. Separate financial accounts for Triangle Ltd. are not available. In 1963 the Huletts Group as a whole had net earnings after taxes of R5.54 million^a on a total sugar production of 584,000 tons and paid dividends of R.30 per share of par value of R1.00. For the financial year ending 30 April 1965 the dividend was unlikely to exceed R.30 per share.

Hippo Valley Estates Ltd.

128. Hippo Valley Estates Ltd. was established in 1956 by Sir Ray Stockil, a former member of the Rhodesian Legislative Assembly, and by six other farmers interested in developing the agricultural potential of the Rhodesian low veld. The initial area of 40,000 acres was increased to 150,000 acres in 1961. The original plan was to grow citrus fruits and by June 1965, 100,000 trees had been planted on the estate. Production in 1964 amounted to 103,000 cases of which 55,000 were exported under the "Outspan" trademark of the South African citrus industry.

129. In 1958 it was decided that sugar should be grown on the estate as soon as water became available from the Kyle-Bangala scheme. A syndicate of Mauritian growers subscribed for shares in the company and agreed to provide technical and managerial services. Sugar was first planted in 1959 and by 1964, 8,400 acres were under cane and a second-hand sugar mill had been installed.

130. A reassessment of the irrigation water available resulted in the company's allocation being increased from 150 to 230 cusecs in 1963. As a consequence, the company embarked on a £5 million expansion scheme in December, 1963, to increase the total sugar acreage to 23,000 acres, 15,800 acres to be planted by the company and 7,200 acres by private growers.

131. Then came nine months of remarkable development. Bush-clearing, land preparation and planting progressed at the rate of sixty acres a day and the construction of a 250-cusec canal to serve the new area was carried out at the rate of .600 feet a day; storage dams and hundreds of miles of small canals were constructed. This programme was completed by the company as planned, in September, 1964.

132. This considerable increase in the sugar acreage has necessitated the construction of a new mill, to be available for the 1965/66 crushing season. This mill, with a crushing capacity of 250 tons of cane an hour, was expected to be commissioned in September, 1965. It will cost £3.5 million.

133. On completion, in 1965, of present expansion plans, Hippo Valley's capital expenditure will amount to £7.75 million.

134. To provide funds for its development, Hippo Valley Estates has taken in as major shareholders, Rhodesian Anglo-American (a subsidiary of the Anglo-American Corporation of South Africa), Rhodesian Breweries (a subsidiary of South African Breweries Ltd., which together own shares with a par value of £261.111) and Tate and Lyle Ltd., which owns shares of par value of £275,000 out of the issued capital of £2,279,247. On 31 December 1964, reserves amounted to £1,442,498. The company made profits of £146,284 in the year ended 31 March 1963 and £393,605 in the following year it

distributed its first dividend of £170,208 at the rate of 6d. per share of par value of 5/-. Sugar production on the estate was 37,000 tons during 1964 and was expected to increase to 100,000 in 1965 and to a maximum of 175,000 tons in 1967.

IV. MINING

A. GENERAL

Development of the mining industry

135. The occupation of Southern Rhodesia was directly due to evidence of its mineral wealth. Prospectors for minerals first entered Matabeleland and Mashonaland from the south after 1865 when gold was discovered by explorers and accounts spread of rich gold deposits in that area. As mentioned in section I, Cecil Rhodes obtained in 1889 a Royal Charter for the British South Africa Company to exploit the mineral wealth of areas north of the Limpopo River. Under the Charter, the Company could make grants of land or mineral rights either on a freehold or on a leasehold basis.

136. The Company proceeded in that first period of its rule (1890-1903) to grant licences to individual prospectors for minerals on a share basis. Expectations of vast goldfields similar to those of South Africa did not materialize, however, and gold output remained on a modest scale (£750,000 in 1901). Other minerals, although known to exist, were not sought after and were not fully developed until the First World War. The emphasis on gold continued with an increasing number of mining claims.

137. Base-metal extraction was slow to develop in comparison with gold production; although several discoveries of base minerals were made before the turn of the century, commercial production was delayed mainly owing to the lack of railways and marketing facilities. With the First World War, however, the attention of producers was turned to these minerals; there was a rapid development in the production of asbestos, chrome and coal; iron, copper, limestone, iron pyrites, magnesite, mica, tungsten, tin, vermiculite, barytes, antimony, arsenic, lead and tantalum were gradually produced in varying quantities and for varying periods of time.

138. It has been estimated that since the Second World War more than £10 million have been spent by companies in the search for mineral deposits. The Southern Rhodesian Ministry of Mines and Lands has to some extent provided plant and equipment and helped in the surveying and sampling of deposits. According to the President of the Rhodesian Chamber of Mines, however, mining has not been so profitable as to generate more than a small part of the capital needed for new ventures, and at least 75 per cent of mineral production has come from mining assets owned by investors outside Southern Rhodesia.

139. Mining is undertaken almost entirely by large, internationally known firms. Prospecting costs are relatively high and capital has mainly been provided by financing houses outside the country. Prior to 1964, much of the capital required for the exploitation of the Territory's mineral wealth originated from profits made on the copperbelt in Zambia. This source is not so readily available as it was. In 1963, the number of companies engaged in mining and quarrying was thirty-seven; their combined assets and liabilities were as follows (£ million):^b

^a One rand = 10 shillings sterling.
^b Central Statistical Office, Salisbury: *Quarterly Bulletin of Financial Statistics*, July 1965.

LONG-TERM ASSETS

Fixed assets	Depreciation	Adjustments	Net book value	Intangible assets	Investments	
					In subsidiaries	Other trade
37.3	13.6	1.5	22.1	1.2	4.2	1.7

CURRENT ASSETS

Stocks and work in progress	Dividends etc.	Debtors	Liquid assets			Total	Total current assets	Total assets
			Group companies	Gilt-edged securities	Cash			
3.0	—	2.5	1.1	1.5	0.9	3.4	9.0	38.2

LONG-TERM LIABILITIES

Shares		Loan capital	Total	Accumulated		Total long-term capital
Ordinary	Preference			Loss	Reserves	
20.6	—	3.5	24.1	3.2	10.8	31.7

CURRENT LIABILITIES

Bank overdrafts and loans	Other short-term borrowing	Creditors	Future taxation	Dividends, profits and interest	Other provisions	Total current liabilities	Total liabilities
0.7	2.3	1.2	1.3	1.9	0.1	6.6	38.2

140. The operations and consolidated accounts of the mining companies were as follows (£ million):

INCOME

Profits less losses	Depreciation	Interests, dividends and profits	Rent	Other current income	Transfers	Total
2.5	1.0	0.5	—	0.1	0.2	4.4

OUTLAY

Depreciation	Interest	Taxation provided	Dividends	Profits paid	Other transfers	Balance of profit
1.0	0.3	0.8	1.8	—	—	0.6

141. The products of mining in Southern Rhodesia were valued at nearly £4 million a year in the early 1920s and at £7.7 million in 1938. Production of minerals rose steadily after the Second World War, notwithstanding fluctuations in prices and temporary setbacks. In ten years the value of output rose by 60 per cent and in 1961 reached a record £27.2 million; in 1962 and 1963, however, both volume and total value slightly declined. Some minerals experienced marketing difficulties, particularly chrome, asbestos and coal.

142. In 1964 favourable markets and expanding activity in the mining industry were reflected in higher outputs of all the principal metals and minerals, excepting copper which nevertheless rose to a new record value. The over-all volume index rose from 91.7 to 98.2 (1961=100). The increases in value ranged from 1.6 per cent for gold, to 12 per cent for chrome, to 14 per cent for asbestos, to 25 per cent for iron ore, to 28 per cent for copper and to 41 per cent for lithium minerals. The total value of mineral output increased by 12.7 per cent from £23.7 million to £26.7 million.

143. During the first six months of 1965 total mineral production amounted to £15.4 million, an increase of 20.4 per cent over the figures for the corresponding period of 1964.

144. Since the occupation of Southern Rhodesia, the value of mineral production has totalled over £530 million, of

which gold accounts for £273 million. Gold mining remained the major industry in terms of production until after the Second World War when it was overtaken by base minerals, the production of which is now nearly three times that of gold. The largest measure of capital invested in mining has been for the purpose of export overseas, although mining for local manufacture is well established, particularly of iron ore for the Que Que steelworks, limestone for steel and cement manufacturing, asbestos in the manufacture of asbestos cement products, etc. Over-all production of raw minerals has therefore been closely affected by world prices and demand.

145. The total number of mines in production in 1964 was forty-five as follows:

Gold	11	Iron pyrites	1
Asbestos	8	Nickel	1
Coal	1	Phosphate	2
Copper	5	Tin	2
Chrome	10	Lithium	1
Iron	2	Tungsten	1

146. The following table shows the quantity and value of principal minerals:

	1954		1962		1963		1964	
	Thousands of	£ million	Thousands of	£ million	Thousands of	£ million	Thousands of	£ million
	<i>Fine ounces</i>		<i>Fine ounces</i>		<i>Fine ounces</i>		<i>Fine ounces</i>	
Gold	536	6.7	555	6.9	566	7.1	574	7.2
	<i>Tons</i>		<i>Tons</i>		<i>Tons</i>		<i>Tons</i>	
Asbestos	80	5.9	142	7.3	142	6.0	153	6.8
Chrome ore	442	2.5	508	2.7	412	1.9	493	2.2
Coal	3,029	2.7	3,115	3.0	3,021	3.1	3,351	3.4
Copper	0	0	15	2.7	18	3.2	18	4.2
Iron ore	0	0	682	0.2	722	0.5	908	0.6
Lithium minerals	54	0.3	45	0.3	50	0.3	67	0.5
Tin	23	0.0	758	0.7	558	0.4	573	0.6
Limestone and dolomite	602	0.1	678	0.3	379	0.3	594	0.3
Other minerals	—	0.6	—	1.0	—	0.9	—	0.7
TOTAL		18.8		25.1		23.7		26.5

SOURCE: Central Statistical Office, Salisbury: *Monthly Digest of Statistics*, July 1965.

B. GOLD

General

147. Southern Rhodesia produced 1.41 per cent of the total world gold production (excluding that of the USSR) in 1964. Out of 40.6 million fine ounces, of which 29.1 million were produced in the Republic of South Africa, total Rhodesian output was 575,000 fine ounces (figures on gold production are given in the table in para. 146).

148. Considerable quantities of gold were extracted by "small-workers" over the years, although their activities declined and have now ceased almost completely. Of the 566,000 ounces of gold produced in 1963, small operators accounted for only 17,000 ounces. In 1964, eleven mines had an output of 10,000 ounces or more. In a few cases small mines were taken over by larger companies, but the vast majority of them were forced to close down. Mines controlled by the large companies now account for over 80 per cent of total gold production. The major gold producers are the same mines which were discovered early in the century and have not ceased production. A few of the closed mines have reopened in recent years, after further exploration at levels deeper than the few hundred feet at which they were abandoned.

149. Total net gold sales since 1954 are shown below:

1954	6,547
1955	6,486
1956	6,483

1957	6,854
1958	6,772
1959	6,931
1960	6,961
1961	7,091
1962	6,845
1963	6,980
1964	7,086

150. Silver has been produced as a by-product of gold. Out put in 1924 was 166,472 fine ounces valued at £22,488; in 1950 it was 85,549 ounces valued at £22,601; in 1963 it stood at 83,742 ounces valued at £38,283. Nearly all production is exported in bullion.

151. There have been reports of recent gold discoveries in Southern Rhodesia. The strikes occurred in a geological formation known as the Limpopo Metamorphic Belt extending across Southern Rhodesia in the south and were unusual and unexpected from a geological point of view. One strike, described as the largest in many years, was made at the Up to Date Mine (owned by Inyati Mining Co.) near Bulawayo; another was at the Ranco Mine 50 miles south of Forth Victoria. In November 1964, a pocket of gold worth £10,000 was located at the Sunrise Mine in the Felixburg gold belt (south-east of Umvuma), one of the oldest fields of Southern Rhodesia. The strike was made by the Anglo-American Corp. which bought the claims from Felixburg Mines Ltd., and the latter still has an option to participate by 50 per cent in the property in 1969. The following list includes the gold mines which have been active in recent years:

Name	Location	Operator
Arcturus Mine	Arcturus (near Salisbury)	Arcturus Mines Ltd.
Bell-Riverlea Mine	Sebakwe	The Globe and Phoenix Gold Mining Company Ltd.
Cam and Motor Mine } Pickstone Mine } Patchway Gold Mine }	Gatooma	Rio Tinto (Rhodesia) Ltd.
Connaught and Bucks Mines		
Dalny Mine		
Queens Mine	Near Salisbury	Mazoe Consolidated Mines Ltd.
Empress Mine	Near Gatooma	Falcon Mines Ltd.
Falcon Mine	Near Bulawayo	Dawn Gold Mining Co. Ltd.
Globe and Phoenix Mines } Golden Valley Mine }	Near Fort Victoria	Mashaba Gold Mines (Pvt.) Ltd.
Kanyemba Hollis Mines } Hepworth Mines }		
Muriel Mine (gold/copper)	Near Gatooma	Falcon Mines Ltd.
Sebakwe Group of Mines	Banket District	The Globe and Phoenix Gold Mining Co. Ltd.
Turk Mine	Que Que	Kanyemba Gold Mines Ltd.
Welconac Mine	Near Gatooma	Homestake Gold Mining Co. Ltd.
	Near Fort Victoria	Consolidated Gold Fields Ltd.
	Felixburg	Thomas Meikle Trust and Investment Co. (Pvt.) Ltd.
		Felixburg Mines (Pvt.) Ltd.

* The deepest mine—its deepest level being about 5,500 feet.

152. Available information on leading companies engaged in gold mining and on their activities is outlined in the following sections.

Lonrho Group

153. The gold mining companies associated with the Lonrho Group (see annex also) are Mazoe Consolidated Mines Ltd., Kanyemba Gold Mines Ltd., Mashaba Gold Mines (Pvt.) Ltd. and Coronation Syndicate Ltd.

154. The Coronation Syndicate was incorporated in the Republic of South Africa in 1902 for the purpose of acquiring options and rights in an extensive area in the Transvaal which were subsequently abandoned. Its capital was £150,000 in shares of £100. In December 1945, it acquired from Hugh Trevis and Partners Ltd., of Southern Rhodesia, the entire issued capital of Homestake Gold Mining Ltd. It also acquired 21 claims in the Eldorado and Banket Group in the Sinoia District, as well as the following interests: (1) the Muriel Mine, in the Sinoia District, comprising 253 gold claims and 20,568 acres of farm lands; (2) M'karadzi Mine in the Darwin District, comprising 40 gold claims;¹ and the entire issued capital of Arcturus Mines Ltd., comprising 227 gold reef claims² and other capital assets.

¹ The operation of this mine have been suspended.

² Arcturus Mines Ltd. owned 377 gold reef claims and one site in 1963.

155. The authorized capital of Coronation Syndicate in 1963 was £600,000 in 4.8 million shares of 2s.6d each; 3,220,000 shares were issued and fully paid, but of this capital, 1,045,280 shares were held by the Lonrho Group. The board of directors consisted of Mr. S. F. Dēnch (South Africa), Chairman, Mr. G. Abdinor (South Africa), Mr. A. H. Ball (United Kingdom), Mr. C. C. Bentley (South Africa), Mr. C. F. Brown (Southern Rhodesia), Mr. H. W. Jones (South Africa), Mr. A. J. B. Ogilvy (United Kingdom), and Mr. R. W. Rowland (Southern Rhodesia). The head office of the company is in Johannesburg, South Africa.

156. In July 1963, all mining interests of the Lonrho Group were transferred and grouped under the Syndicate. Payment received by Lonrho was in the form of 45 shares (of 25c each) of Coronation Syndicate for every two shares of Mashaba Gold Mines; 55 shares of Coronation Syndicate for every four shares of Mazoe Consolidated Mines and 2 shares of Coronation Syndicate for every five shares (of 50c each) of Kanyemba Gold Mines. The Company was expected to issue 2,780,000 shares of 25 cents each, credited as fully paid, in satisfaction of the purchases. After the increase of the authorized capital to 7 million shares, this would leave 1 million shares in reserve. On the basis of the new merger, Coronation Syndicate became a subsidiary of Lonrho which now controls approximately 61 per cent of its capital.

157. The following is a summary of Coronation Syndicate's accounts as at 30 June 1963:

LIABILITIES (R)^a

Capital	Reserves	Total shareholders' funds		Dividend	Creditors	Taxation	Total current liabilities
		Amount	P. share				
805,000	892,950	1,697,950	530	131,458	142,462	91,530	365,450

^a One rand = 10 shillings sterling = \$US1.40.

ASSETS (R)

Fixed	Investments	Stores	Debtors	Cash bullion, etc.	Current assets (excluding stores)	
					Total	Net
858,246	203,429	136,018	58,541	807,116	865,707	500,257

Rhodesian Corporation Ltd.

158. This company was formed in Southern Rhodesia in 1924 in order to acquire the assets, including land holdings, of several other companies. Its authorized capital is £1,511,110 in 9,066,660 shares of 3s.4d. each. The issued capital in 1964 was £1,080,869. The board of directors was composed of Mr. C. J. Burns (United Kingdom) as Chairman, Mr. C. H. Higgins (United Kingdom), Mr. J. F. Ince (United Kingdom), Mr. P. A. Jousse (Southern Rhodesia), Mr. V. W. Whitehead (Southern Rhodesia), Mr. F. L. Wigley (Southern Rhodesia), alternate, and Mr. J. A. Griffiths (United Kingdom). The corporation's head office is in London.

159. The interests of Rhodesia Corporation Ltd., are diversified, but fall into two main categories: in Southern Rhodesia they include farming, building land interests and mining, while in the United Kingdom they are represented by a substantial investment portfolio.^k In Southern Rhodesia, the company owns 42,806 acres of land, its operations extending from farming and ranching to tobacco cultivation¹ and mining. The company owns the Fred Mine and the ad-

joining Redwing Mine.^m In addition, the company has a half-interest with the Globe and Phoenix Gold Mining Co., Ltd., in the John Bull and Phoenix West Parallel blocks of claims. It also has substantial holdings in the Falcon Mines, Ltd., the Rhodesian Brick and Potteries Co., Ltd., and several other companies in Southern Rhodesia and elsewhere. In the Republic of South Africa the company holds 13,362 morgenⁿ of land, of which 10,100 represent mineral rights only.

^m The two mines were closed in 1961.

ⁿ One hectare = 2.47 acres = 1.17 morgen.

160. The Corporation's consolidated accounts for 1963 were as follows:

ASSETS

	1963 (£ thousand)
Current	127.3
Fixed	546.9
Claims and properties	115.2
Stores, etc.	56.5
Investment	518.2
TOTAL	1,364.1

^k On 31 January 1965, the market value of the Corporation's portfolio was £834,719, while the book value stood at £543,839.

¹ For a description of these activities, see section III above.

LIABILITIES AND CAPITAL

	1963 (£ thousand)
Current liabilities	110.5
Reserves	172.7
Capital	1,080.9
TOTAL	1,364.1
Net profit (for the period ended 30 September) ..	78.6
Dividends and interest received	62.6
Dividends paid out	66.2

161. For the year ended 30 September 1964, fixed assets stood at £559,900 and mining claims and properties at £113,300. The company recorded a net profit of £69,162, of which £50,054 was paid out as taxes. Net profit fell by £9,419 over the preceding year due to an increase in United Kingdom taxation charges after past losses had been absorbed. Profit before tax amounted to £119,216, as against £102,244 in the preceding year; dividend payments of 10 per cent (4d. per unit) were maintained.

LIABILITIES (£)

	Capital	Premium and reserves	Provision for renewals	Creditors	Dividend provided	Total assets and liabilities
1963	499,293	242,863	7,347	56,206	87,376	1,984,085

ASSETS (£)

	Properties	Shareholdings		Unquoted	Stores, etc.	Debtors	Cash
		Quoted	Market value				
1963	1,558,282	1,325	103,163	19,431	211,884

165. The operation results in 1963 and 1964 were as follows:

	1963 (£ thousand)	1964
Total revenue	336.7	352.6
Net profit	315.0	328.5
Dividends	174.3	187.2

Globe and Phoenix Gold Mining Co. Ltd.

166. This company was formed in 1895 to exploit the Globe and Phoenix mines at Que Que in the Sebakwe District. It also owns the Bell Group of Mines in the Gwelo District, comprising the Bell, Riverlea, Orchid and Lonrho claims. The total number of claims in 1963 was 1.06. The company

162. Falcon Mines Ltd. was registered in London in 1910. The main source of revenue of the company is the Dalny Mine covering 1,538 claims (including the Pixy and Arlandzer sections);^o other mining properties include the Falcon Mine (30 claims) and the M'tuga Copper Claims in Zambia. The company also owns two farms with a total acreage of 4,978 acres.

163. The authorized capital of Falcon Mines is £600,000 in 2.4 million shares of 5s. each. The issued capital is £499,298. The board of directors consists of Messrs. Wigley (Chairman), Abdinor, Dench (also director of Coronation Syndicate). Ince, Jones, Jousse and O'Brien.

164. The assets and liabilities of the company as at 30 September 1963 were as follows:

^o At 30 September 1964, the ore reserve of the Dalny Mine was estimated at 833,300 tons valued at 7.27 dwt. over a width of 84 inches. Compared with the previous year, the tonnage rose by 12,900 tons, the value by 0.45 dwt. and the width by 2 inches.

maintains a substantial share-interest in the Phoenix Prince Gold Mining Co., Ltd., to which in 1935 it had handed over control of the Prince of Wales gold mining property of 256 claims in the Mazoe District. In addition, the company owns three farms of 6,000 acres each.

167. The authorized capital of the company is £200,000, issued in 800,000 units of 5s. each. The Board consists of Mr. A. Macquisten (United Kingdom), as Chairman, Sir George S. Harvis-Watt (United Kingdom), Mr. J. H. Younger (United Kingdom), Sir R. Snedden (United Kingdom) and Mr. P. Macquisten (United Kingdom).

168. The assets and liabilities of the company in 1962 were as follows:

LIABILITIES (£)

Capital	Reserves	Current	Creditors	Dividends	Total current liabilities	Total assets and liabilities
200,000	485,827	72,950	26,167	50,724	149,841	835,668

ASSETS (£)

Old mining assets	Stores etc.	Debtors	Investments	Cash etc.
92,000	49,293	28,788	155,435	510,146

169. The company's revenue accounts in 1962 and 1963 were as follows:

	1962 (£ thousand)	1963
Revenue	499.8	488.8
Profit	299.1	296.8
Taxation	109.1	110.8
Dividend	171.5	171.5

Rio Tinto Group

171. Rio Tinto (Rhodesia) Ltd. was incorporated in 1956 in Southern Rhodesia and in 1957 purchased for £250,000 the mineral rights of the Empress Nickel claims west of Gatooma, where it carried out diamond drilling for a brief period. In 1959, it acquired Leslie Gold Mines Ltd., which owns the Patchway Gold Mine north of Gatooma; it also

bought the nearby Big Ben Gold Mine and in association with Mr. R. W. Rowland, a Southern Rhodesian financier, acquired full ownership of Sandawana Mines (Pvt.) Ltd., with its emerald deposits and certain other mineral claims in the Belingwe District. Finally, in 1960, it acquired the complete stock of 4.5 million shares of Rio Tinto Rhodesian Mining Ltd., described below.

172. In 1963 the capital of Rio Tinto (Rhodesia) Ltd. was £4 million in 16 million shares of 5s. each, of which £3,613,519 were fully paid. Nearly 99 per cent of the stock was held by Rio Tinto Rhodesian Holding Co., Ltd., Rio Tinto Mining Co. of Canada and Rio Tinto Mining Co. of Australia Ltd. The Board of Directors consisted of Brig. M. A. W. Rowlandson (Southern Rhodesia), Mr. J. N. V. Duncan (Southern Rhodesia), Mr. E. H. T. Thompson (Southern Rhodesia), Mr. J. W. N. Sharpe (Southern Rhodesia), Mr. R. W. Rowland (Southern Rhodesia), Mr. R. W. Wright (United Kingdom), Mr. R. S. Walker (Southern Rhodesia), Mr. R. H. Winters (Canada) and Mr. G. L. Hatherley. No information is available on the accounts of the company.

173. The Rio Tinto Rhodesian Mining Ltd. was previously named the Cam and Motor Gold Mining Co. (registered in 1919). The Cam and Motor Mine is the largest gold mine in Southern Rhodesia, comprising 1,256 claims in the Hartley District. The Pickstone Mine, with 583 claims in the same district, the Bowcop Claims consisting of 90 base mineral claims in the vicinity of Pickstone, a further 140 gold claims and 59 base mineral claims south of the Umsweswe River in Gatooma, are all included in the company's property.

174. The authorized capital of the company is £750,000, in 6 million shares, of which 4.5 million are issued and fully paid.

Dawn Gold Mining Co. Ltd.

175. This company is wholly owned by the important international group, Consolidated Gold Fields Ltd. Its authorized capital is £50,000 in 100,000 shares of 10s. each. In 1963, the directors were Mr. H. D. Hubbard (South Africa), Chairman, Mr. D. J. White (South Africa) and Mr. J. W. A. Wright (South Africa). The company owned seventy-nine blocks comprising 755 gold mining claims in the district of Buli. Consolidated Gold Fields Ltd. has extensive gold mining interests in South Africa and Australia.

C. ASBESTOS

General

176. Asbestos in Southern Rhodesia is mainly of the high-grade variety, although lower grades are also produced. The fibre is of exceptional length and is considered among the best in the world. The Territory ranks as the third world producer of chrysolite asbestos and the first in better-grade long fibre. The largest deposits occur in the Shabani-Belingwe area and at Mashaba in the Victoria District. They vary in thickness from a few feet to more than 300 feet. Originally nearly all the mines were worked by open quarries, but since the Second World War underground mining has replaced quarrying in nearly all the mines. The more important mines are located in the districts of Bulawayo, Victoria, Salisbury, Gwelo and Gwanda.

177. In 1964 Southern Rhodesia produced 153,541 tons of asbestos fibre, a rise of 11,291 over the previous year (worth an additional £851,000). This constituted 4.15 per cent of the total world production. World figures were as follows:

	1964
World	3,690
USSR (estimate)	1,500
Canada	1,377
Southern Rhodesia	153.4

178. The estimated value of sales of Southern Rhodesian asbestos was £6.8 million in 1964 as against £6 million in 1963.

Almost the entire output of asbestos is exported while local use is limited to a few thousand tons per annum in the asbestos cement industry. Exports in 1964 rose to a record level (£10.1 million) mainly because of the sharply increased world demand, particularly by the cement piping and sheeting industry of western Europe. More than fifty countries buy Rhodesian asbestos, the largest importer being the United Kingdom (approximately 30 per cent). A Southern Rhodesian company, the Asbestos Refining Co. (Rhod.) (Pvt.) Ltd. operates a factory which blends fibres purchased from a number of mines and produces a product which has been exported to forty-two different countries. However, marketing difficulties increased in 1964 and a number of the small asbestos mines were forced to shut down.

179. The Pangani Mine at Filabusi, sixty miles south-east of Bulawayo, started production in 1963; it contains ore bodies which yield high quality asbestos and have not previously been exploited. The first two stages of a three-stage mining plan costing £2.7 million have been carried out and production is expected to earn more than £1 million annually.

180. The number of active mines was 22 in 1961, 17 in 1962 and 16 in 1963. The most important producers are controlled by the Turner and Newall group, which owns mines accounting for 63 per cent of the total production of Southern Rhodesia.

Turner and Newall Ltd.

181. This holding company was registered in the United Kingdom in 1920 as a private company, but was converted into a public company in October 1925. Through a number of subsidiaries it manufactures and sells asbestos, asbestos cement products, magnesia and allied products. The raw asbestos is obtained from the company's mines in South Africa, Southern Rhodesia, Swaziland and Canada. The subsidiaries of the company in Southern Rhodesia include the African Asbestos Mining Co. (Pvt.) Ltd., working the Nil Desperandum mine in the Shabanie district; the Rhodesian and General Asbestos Corp. (Pvt.) Ltd., owning mines at Shabanie, Mashaba and Filabusi; and Turners Asbestos Products (Pvt.) Ltd., manufacturing various asbestos-cement products at factories in Salisbury and Bulawayo. In 1958, Rhodesian and General Asbestos Corp. (Pvt.) Ltd., acquired for £1,640,000 the capital of Rhodesian Asbestos Ltd., which operates the Temeraire Mine, adjacent to the Mashaba mines.

182. In 1953, the company acquired a controlling interest in Porter's Cement Industries (Rhodesia) Ltd., and a minority interest in Porter's Cement Industries (Bulawayo) Ltd., ordinary shareholders of each company receiving one Turner and Newall ordinary share of £1 for every two ordinary shares held in the Rhodesia companies.

183. The authorized capital of the company was originally £3 million; several major capital increases were made until, by the Second World War, it had reached £7,250,000. At the present time, the authorized capital stands at £60 million, of which £49,292,135 are fully paid (7 per cent cumulative preference stock and the remainder ordinary stock). The board of directors in 1963 was as follows: Mr. R. G. Soothill, Chairman, Mr. R. M. Bateman, Deputy Chairman, Mr. G. S. Sutcliffe, Mr. N. A. Morling, Mr. Kenneth Neve, Mr. J. A. E. Clogg, Mr. R. H. Turner, Mr. A. Russell, Mr. W. Blakey, Mr. J. H. Thompson and Mr. J. Waddell. The head office of Turner and Newall Ltd. is at Manchester in the United Kingdom.

184. No information on the company's operations and accounts are available, except that the company realized a net profit of £12.7 million (before tax) for the fiscal year ended on 30 September 1963; dividends paid amounted to £3,578,741.

Other interests

185. The following companies also produce asbestos:

<i>Name of company</i>	<i>Head office</i>	<i>Production</i>
Bend Asbestos Ltd.	Bulawayo, Southern Rhodesia	1,664 tons in 1960
Boss Asbestos Mines (Pvt.) Ltd.	Mashaba, Southern Rhodesia	340 tons a month (average) in 1964
Dominion Base Metals (Pvt.) Ltd.	Filabusi, Southern Rhodesia	350 tons a month (average) in 1964
Ethel Asbestos Mines Ltd.	Salisbury, Southern Rhodesia	3,600 tons in 1962
Kilmarnock Asbestos Mines Ltd.	Mashaba, Southern Rhodesia	65 tons a month (average) in 1964
Lanninhurst Asbestos (Pvt.) Ltd. (South African ownership)	Johannesburg, South Africa	803 tons in 1960
Longwood Asbestos Mining Co. (Pvt.) Ltd.	Filabusi, Southern Rhodesia	10 tons a month (average) in 1964
Mashaba Rhodesian Asbestos Co. Ltd.	Mashaba, Southern Rhodesia	3,457 tons in 1962
Rex Asbestos Mines Ltd.	Salisbury, Southern Rhodesia	—
Ross McIntyre and Partners (Rhod.) (Pvt.) Ltd.	Shabani, Southern Rhodesia	500 tons (average) in 1964
Thornwood Asbestos Mines (Pvt.) Ltd.	Bulawayo, Southern Rhodesia	1,392 tons in 1962

D. CHROME

General

186. The Territory has vast reserves of high-grade metallurgical chrome and almost unlimited reserves of refractory and chemical chromite. It has been estimated that in the main deposits alone some 544 million tons of chrome ore remain. The reserves assigned to all known deposits total 608 million tons, of which about 300 million tons are estimated to be of metallurgical grade. There is sufficient variety of grades to support large-scale production of high and low-carbon ferro-chrome for refractory purposes as well as for chemical uses.

187. While in the past five years the market for Rhodesian chrome ore has been depressed, sales and prices rose in 1964 and the first six months of 1965. In 1964 the Territory produced 493,371 tons of chromite valued at £2,218,789, against 412,390 tons the previous years. This constitutes nearly 10.16 per cent of total world production. Over half of the production is of metallurgical grade, about two sixths is chemical grade and one sixth refractory grade.

188. The quantity and value of chrome exports are given in the chapter on foreign trade. Almost 95 per cent of the ore produced is exported. After 1960 the demand for exports declined, thus affecting smaller operators. Exports are directed primarily towards the United States, to which country Southern Rhodesia is the largest supplier of high-grade lump metallurgical ore.

Rhodesia Chrome Mines Ltd. and African Chrome Mines Ltd.

189. Rhodesia Chrome Mines Ltd. was the first producer of chromite in Southern Rhodesia and it still ranks as the major producer of this mineral. The company's mining claims are situated in the Gwelo (Selukwe) and Victoria Districts. The company was registered in London in 1908. Its original capital was authorized at £60,000 but, by 1954, it had increased to £600,000 with the opening of a heavy media separation plant, and by 1961 to £1.2 million. The shares are of £1 each and are all fully paid.

190. African Chrome Mines Ltd. was formed in 1928 to amalgamate certain interests of Rhodesia Chrome Mines Ltd.,

and Rhodesian Chrome and Asbestos Ltd. The claims owned by the company are in the Salisbury Districts. The authorized capital, originally £300,000, was increased to £1 million in shares of £1, which are fully paid. The board of directors is the same as that of Rhodesia Chrome Mines Ltd. The accounts of the company are not published.

191. Both Rhodesia Chrome Mines and African Chrome Mines are associated with a London holding company, Chrome Company Ltd., whose capital in 1961 was £190,000, and whose directors were Messrs. Coward, Bantick, Coulson, Shankin and White. The interests represented by this company are British and American.

192. Rhodesia Chrome Mines Ltd., in 1962, had an output of 233,101 tons while African Chrome Mines produced 42,544 tons.

Rhodesian Vanadium Corporation

193. The Rhodesian Vanadium Corp. is a wholly owned subsidiary of the Vanadium Corp. of America; it operates the Vanad Mine and the Sutton Mine in Southern Rhodesia, whose production in 1964 was some 60,000 short tons of chrome ore, or some 30 per cent of the Territory's total chrome production. It also owns substantial manganese concessions in Zambia. The directors of Rhodesian Vanadium Corp. in 1964 were as follows: Mr. G. L. Weissenburger (United States), Mr. C. A. Bott (Southern Rhodesia), Mr. G. T. McGinnis (United States), Mr. D. A. Shriver (United States), and Mr. J. J. Spollen (United States).

194. The Vanadium Corp. of America was incorporated in the State of Delaware (United States) in 1919. Its capital is \$6.5 million in 40,000 convertible preferred shares of \$100 each and 2.5 million shares common stock (per value \$1).

195. The corporation's accounts for 1959 showed a net profit of \$2,494,445 after providing \$2,380,000 for income taxes; dividends absorbed were \$1,626,741; current assets were \$37,974,007 and current liabilities were \$10,404,049.

Other interests

196. The following companies also produce chrome ore:

Name of company	Head office	Production
Aer Chrome Mines (Pvt.) Ltd. (subsidiary of Cullinan Refractories, Ltd., a South African interest)	Bulawayo, Southern Rhodesia	Average monthly output—800 tons
Divide Chrome Mines Ltd. (a South African interest)	Salisbury, Southern Rhodesia	Operations suspended
Edinburgh Development (Pty.) Ltd. (Bat Mine) ..	Salisbury, Southern Rhodesia	7,500 tons in 1963
Frances Mines (Pvt.) Ltd.	Salisbury, Southern Rhodesia	Average monthly production—250 tons
Mlota Mine (Pvt.) Ltd.	Salisbury, Southern Rhodesia	—
Pons Chrome Mines Ltd.	Gwelo, Southern Rhodesia	On a caretaking basis
Rhodesian Cambrai Mines (Pvt.) Ltd. (includes Swedish and Dutch interests)	Gwelo, Southern Rhodesia	20,160 tons in 1962
Rhodesian Metallurgical and Mining Co. (Pvt.) Ltd. (Umsweswe Mine)	Gatooma, Southern Rhodesia	On a caretaking basis
Rhodesian Mining Enterprises (Pvt.) Ltd.	Salisbury, Southern Rhodesia	Average monthly production of semi-metallurgical concentrate: 1,600 tons
Windsor Chrome Mines (Pvt.) Ltd. Rose Chrome Mines (Pvt.) Ltd. (acquired by Windsor Ferro-alloys (Pvt.) Ltd.)	Que Que, Southern Rhodesia	2,000 tons per month of concentrate

E. COAL

General

197. The first coalfield to be discovered in Southern Rhodesia, and the only one to be exploited so far is at Wankie, about 65 miles south-east of Victoria Falls. It has for many years been the main source of solid fuel for the Copperbelt of Zambia, the Rhodesian Railways, and manufacturing industries in neighbouring territories.^p Increase in production was hindered, however, by insufficient transport facilities. After 1951, coal for the copper mines was allocated each month in accordance with an agreement between the United Kingdom and the United States Governments. The agreement provided for a loan of £5 million by the Economic Co-operation Administration (ECA) for the development of the Rhodesia Railways. ECA was interested in the expansion of copper production and in the agreement Southern Rhodesia undertook to allocate to the copper mines between 21 per cent and 29 per cent of the coal produced at Wankie.

198. Coal deposits in the Territory are vast. Coalfields, fourteen of which are of importance, occupy large areas south of the Zambesi and the Shangani in the north-west, near Beitbridge at Tuli in the south, and across the Sabi River Valley in the south-east. Five of the coalfields have been partially explored and only the Wankie coalfield is being mined. The reserves at Wankie are estimated at 1,264.8 million tons of coking coal and 654.2 million tons of other coal; the other five partially explored coalfields contain approximately 45 million tons of good quality coal and 5,238 million tons of coal of poorer quality.

199. Domestic utilization of coal is for the railways (almost 25 per cent of total production), metallurgical needs (iron and steel ferro-alloys by the Rhodesian Iron and Steel Co.), power generation (in areas not served by the Kariba Dam) and industrial use. The total local consumption is about 360,000 tons a year, of which about 80,000 tons are taken by the tobacco industry. The coke ovens produce about 123,000 tons of coke a year. A by-product plant produces tar (800,000 gallons in 1963), ammonia, benzol (for use as a petrol additive), toluol and xylol (for the plastics and chemical industries), naphthalene and naphthas and anthracene oil.

200. In 1964 total coal production rose to 3,355,170 tons valued at £3,432,176, as compared to 3,020,890 tons valued at £3,077,596 in 1963. Total sales during the year ended 31 August 1964 amounted to 2,893,082 tons, an increase of 12,130 tons over the previous year: this was due to increased sales to general consumers in both Southern Rhodesia and Zambia. The capacity of the colliery is some 5 million tons a year.

^p Sales to the copper mines of Zambia, the Rhodesian Railways and the copper mines of Katanga amounted to nearly 900,000 tons in 1963.

Wankie Colliery Co. Ltd.

201. The company was registered in the United Kingdom on 26 October 1923, as the third reorganization of a company registered in 1899 as Wankie (Rhodesia) Coal, Railway and Exploration Co. Ltd. It was reincorporated in Southern Rhodesia in July 1954. The authorized capital originally was £900,000 and was increased several times until it reached £1.7 million after the Second World War. The issued capital is now £5,277,810, in 10,555,620 shares. The company's property includes approximately 42,000 acres of coal mining rights held under Special Grants dated 10 December 1901 and 29 October 1925, and approximately 29,000 acres of full surface rights in the Wankie District. The Colliery Company also holds about 26,000 acres of surface rights on a leasehold basis from the Southern Rhodesian Government.

202. The directors of Wankie Colliery in 1964 were Mr. H. H. Taylor (Southern Rhodesia) (Chairman), Mr. L. Wishart (Southern Rhodesia), Sir Keith Acutt (United Kingdom) Mr. P. H. A. Brownrigg (Zambia),^a Sir Frederick Crawford (Southern Rhodesia), Mr. N. M. Kenny (Zambia), Sir Albert Robinson (South Africa), Mr. J. W. Shilling (South Africa) and Mr. M. van Weyenbergh (Congo Republic).^b The controlling interest (some 23 per cent) is held by Rhodesian Anglo-American Ltd., a wholly owned subsidiary of the Anglo-American Corporation of South Africa, Ltd. The company holds a 30 per cent interest in Clay Products Ltd., substantial interests in Rhokana Corp. Ltd.,^c and Nchanga Consolidation Copper Mines Ltd., and controls Sandringham Investments Ltd.

203. The following table contains a summary of assets and liabilities and the financial results of the Colliery Company in 1964:

	£ thousand
<i>Assets</i>	
Plant and equipment	5,100
Investments	5,844
Stocks and stores	315
Balances with Anglo-American Co.	594
<i>Liabilities</i>	
Capital	5,278
Reserves	4,354
Debentures	1,793
Taxation	675
Creditors	430
Dividends provided	396

^a Also director of Anglo-American Corporation of South Africa.

^b Also director of Union Minière du Haut Katanga.

^c Interests in Zambia.

Financial results

	£ thousand
Net profit	1,364
Taxation, tax reserves	272
Net earnings	1,092

*F. COPPER**General*

204. Copper ores occur at Mangula the grade of ore containing 1.07 per cent copper and the recovery being 93.4 per cent. There is a copper belt stretching for some thirty-five miles and to the east of it lies the Alaska and Silverside Mines. Copper minerals are occasionally found in gold quartz reefs, such as at the Muriel Mine, but the amount of copper-gold concentrate therein is not large. The total reserves of copper ore are estimated at 31 million tons, with an estimated metal content of 424,000 tons; of these reserves, 17,092,000 tons are owned by M.T.D. (Mangula) Ltd.

205. The production of copper until recently was of very minor value. It now depends to a large extent on the world market and world prices. In 1964, production was approximately 18,000 short tons and was at £4,156,000 due to an improvement in world prices.

206. A new ore-leaching plant was expected to be completed at Mangula by July 1965 at a total cost of \$400,000 and with a capacity of approximately 1,000 tons of ore per day; it should add 250 tons of copper per month when its full output had been achieved. A new copper smelter was installed in 1964 at the Muriel Gold Mine near Mtoroshanga at a cost of \$5,000. In the past the copper extracted from the mine covered the costs of exporting 15-17 per cent copper-gold concentrates, including freight and smelting. The new smelter was expected to start operating by the middle of 1965 and to increase revenue by £3,000 a month.

M.T.D. (Mangula) Ltd.

207. The company was incorporated in 1947 as Rhodesia Copper Ventures, Ltd., to acquire certain mining claims in the area now held by it in the Lomagundi District. The claims now comprise 73 blocks in the vicinity of the Molly Shaft, 51 blocks covering the N'jiri, United Kingdom, Umboe, Muni, Chirom, Beduld, Greenfield and Dumbodzuko copper prospects, and 23 blocks to the east of Molly Shaft on which the Silverside Mine is situated. The company also owns the farm Whindale in extent of 2,964 acres, a lot of the farm Plateau 952 acres in extent, portion of farm Suiwerspruit, in extent 750 acres and 1.43 acres on farm Alfa. A further 252 acres are in Mangula Township. The claims and farms are about forty miles from Sinoia.

208. The authorized capital of the company is £5 million in 20 million shares of 5s. each. In 1964 the board of directors consisted of Commander H. F. P. Grenfell (United Kingdom) (Chairman), Mr. D. E. Cox (Southern Rhodesia), Mr. P. U. Rissik (South Africa), Mr. W. I. Spence (South Africa), Sir Charles W. Meredith (Southern Rhodesia), and Mr. C. M. Stuart (South Africa).

209. The company's assets and liabilities in 1964 were summarized as follows:

	£ thousand
<i>Assets</i>	
Current	365.1
Stores	214.1
Fixed	6,669.1
Investments	295.3
<i>Liabilities</i>	
Creditors	205.1
Loans from parent company	62.7
Provisions	23.9
Reserves	1,877.3
Dividends	375.0

210. The accounts of the company showed a net profit of £1,141,319 or approximately £430,000 more than the previous year; the reasons for this increase were the rise in the price of copper, an added output of 550 tons of concentrates and a lower cost per ton of recoverable copper produced.

211. The controlling interest (over 62 per cent) in M.T.D. (Mangula) Ltd., is held by the Messina (Transvaal) Development Co. Ltd., a South African registered mining company, through its wholly owned subsidiary in Southern Rhodesia, the Messina (Rhodesia) Development Co. Ltd. Its subsidiaries include M.T.D. Copper (Sales) Ltd., Arton Copper Co. Ltd., M.T.D. (Sanyati) Ltd.[†] and the Messina Rhodesia Smelting and Refining Co. Ltd. This last company was formed in 1959 with a capital of £750,000, of which 80 per cent was subscribed by the Messina (Transvaal) and the remainder by M.T.D. (Mangula); a smelting and refining plant was erected at Alaska Siding (west of Sinoia) and production commenced in December 1960. Messina (Transvaal) also owns the Umkondo Mine whose copper ore reserves were estimated at 77,770 tons in 1964. In addition, the company holds 850,000 shares in the Rhodesian Iron and Steel Co. (Pvt.) Ltd., representing 23 per cent of the ordinary share capital of this company.

212. The capital of Messina (Transvaal) Development Co., Ltd., is £2.5 million in 10 million shares. It was registered in 1950 to take over the assets of a United Kingdom company bearing the same name and registered in 1905 to operate a copper mine in the Northern Transvaal.

213. The Rhodesian copper ore production controlled by the company in 1964 was as follows:

	Tons	Copper content (per cent)
Umkondo Mine	74,210	2.68
Alaska Mine	224,120	2.04
Mangula Mine	1,085,120	1.17
TOTAL	1,383,450	

The company produces over 85 per cent of the total copper concentrates in Southern Rhodesia.

*G. IRON**General*

214. Deposits of iron ore are widespread in the Territory. At Que Que, the reserves amount to 11 million tons of proved and 25 million tons of probable ore at a minimum of 55 per cent of iron content. The Beacon Tor Mine (south of Que Que) possesses reserves of some 5 million tons of ore at 60 per cent iron content. The Buchwa deposit in the Ingesi District are estimated to contain 134 million tons of ore at a minimum of 60 per cent iron content. The deposits at Nyuni east of Fort Victoria, contain 60 per cent of iron but have not yet been estimated in tonnage. The Yank and Black Mamba deposits, west of Hartley, are also maintained. Other vast deposits in the form of banded ironstone not quite as rich in iron ore content exist in several other areas. The Kwanesi deposits west of Featherstone contain 33 billion tons of ore at an indicated 40 per cent of iron, and 40 million tons of ore at a minimum of 55 per cent of iron (the latter being held by RISCO) (see section V below). Iron ore exists also near the Mkumvura River and near Mt. Darwin in the north-east, in the Sabi Valley and in the Zambesi Valley. Total reserves are estimated as follows:

	Million tons
High-grade (over 60 per cent iron content)	121
Medium-grade (50-60 per cent iron content)	73
Low-grade (40 per cent iron content)	33,000

215. Until 1961, iron ore production remained small, the ore being primarily needed for the smelting furnaces at Redcliffe. Beginning in 1961, the demand for iron ore increased rapidly, in part because of the needs of the expanded iron and steel industry and in part because of direct exports

[†]This company owns a small property containing copper, lead and zinc; its operations were discontinued in 1961.

of ore to Japan. Thus production rose from 427,600 tons valued at £466,000 in 1961 to 908,200 tons valued at £582,000 in 1964 and 829,300 tons valued at £591,000 in the first six months of 1965.

216. In 1964 exports of iron ore amounted to 315,900 tons valued at £353,000. (In addition 240,700 tons of pig-iron valued at £2.6 million were exported, while there were appreciable exports of finished steel products.) Nearly 107,000 tons of the exported ore came from the Beacon Tor Mine which is owned by Iron and Minerals Dev. Co. (Pvt.) Ltd. According to 1964 reports, the Company intended to carry out further intensive investigations to prove additional ore reserves. At the request of the Rhodesian Government a mission from a major Japanese steel company, Kobe Steel Works, visited Buchwa and Wankie to study the feasibility of building new steel mills at Buchwa in the Ingesi District where deposits have a maximum iron content of 64 per cent. The possibility of building pelletizing plants at the Buchwa Mine was also studied. The Buchwa Iron Mining Co. has been carrying out a £200,000 development programme aiming at producing iron ore at the rate of 2 million tons per annum by the end of 1966. Rhodesia Railways announced in October 1964 that they had received requests to transport large tonnages of iron ore from the same area.

H. LITHIUM

General

217. Deposits of lepidolite and petalite exist at Bikita with 3.6 to 10 per cent of lithium oxide content, compared with 1 to 2 per cent in other fields; these deposits are considered to be among the largest in the world. Other deposits occur in the Salisbury, Umtali and Wankie areas, although their exploitation has remained very limited. Reserves are estimated at 5.9 million tons, averaging 2.8 per cent of lithium oxide.

218. The Territory is the largest producer of lithium ores in the world. A downward trend in production since 1957 was reversed in 1963 and 1964. Owing to rising demands and a steadily increasing market for lithium materials, full-scale operations were resumed at the Bikita Mine. Total output in 1964 was 67,100 tons (valued at £463,000) as against 49,600 tons (valued £328,000) in 1963, an increase of almost 50 per cent. Total world production is more than 112,000 tons, and Southern Rhodesian lithium makes up more than half of this total.

219. All production of lithium ores is exported. In 1964, exports increased by 35 per cent, and their value by 41 per cent. These increases are due to a steady rise in demand for lithium chemicals, in the United States, Europe and in Japan.

Bikita Minerals (Pvt.) Ltd.

220. Virtually the only producer of lithium is Bikita Minerals (Pvt.) Ltd., in the Fort Victoria mining district. In 1963, the board of directors of the company consisted of Mr. A. F. Holmes (South Africa) (Chairman), Mr. A. C. Beatty (United Kingdom), Mr. T. H. Bradford (United Kingdom), Mr. J. Bryn (South Africa) and Mr. D. Lawrie (South Africa).

221. In 1954 Bikita Mines Ltd., and American Potash and Chemicals Corp. jointly formed a company, American Lithium Chemicals Inc., for the manufacture of lithium chemicals from Bikita ore. The plant of this company is near San Antonio, Texas, in the United States.

222. The shareholders of Bikita Minerals include Selection Trust Ltd. (40 per cent owned directly), Treselca Ltd., American Metal Climax Inc., and American Potash and Chemical Corp.

I. TIN

223. The most important tin field is at Kamativi. Output of tin has increased in the last few years, mainly because of a build-up in world demand. While 558 tons of tin metal were marketed for £436,000 in 1963, a total output of 573 tons was sold for £624,000 in 1964. Over 90 per cent of the total production is exported. In November 1964 it was reported that

more tin ore had been discovered in the area of Kamativi and that several prospectors had gone there to open up new claims.

Kamativi Tin Mines Ltd.

224. This company was incorporated in Bulawayo in 1951. Its property includes tinbearing areas near Dett, some forty miles east of Wankie. The company's authorized capital was increased from £700,000 to £3 million in 1956. In 1964, the board of directors was as follows: Mr. Ph. H. A. Zaalberg (Netherlands), Chairman, Mr. H. Ebbinge (Netherlands), Mr. H. P. Oakes, Mr. B. H. G. Sparrow, and Mr. J. W. M. Bellasis.

225. Kamativi Tin Mines Ltd. is the main producer of tin in the Territory. Output in 1963 was 510,000 tons of ore, of which 72 per cent came from open-cast operations. Concentrates are treated at the Company's smelter, where refined tin, solders and white metals are produced. The amounts of tin produced by the Company in 1962, including concentrates purchased from small mines, were as follows:

	In lb.
Concentrates smelted	2,148,003
Refined tin produced	1,520,989
Solder produced	218,500
White metal produced	20,000

226. The Kamativi plant is capable of treating 1,000 tons of ore a day, with a possibility of expansion to 5,000 tons. The aim of the company is to produce enough tin to satisfy the needs of the whole of southern Africa and market the surplus in overseas markets. To this end, the company has carried out active prospecting and has recently completed the second stage of a three-year expansion programme costing £500,000.

V. SECONDARY INDUSTRY

INTRODUCTION

227. The considerable increase in gross production^u of Southern Rhodesia's secondary industry from just prior to the Second World War, when there were a few food processing and other plants until the early 1960s when it began to level off, was achieved despite handicaps including an untrained labour force, the absence of a harbour, the high cost of transport and a small market.

228. A census of manufacturing has been held annually, except in 1964 and 1960, since 1938. The following table indicates the growth of the manufacturing sector of the economy for the period 1938 to 1962:

Year	Number of units	Gross output £ thousand	Net output £ thousand
1938	299	5,107	2,332
1948	473	25,858	10,906
1958	973	109,194	44,661
1962	1,043	148,704	59,630

229. The consumer prices index increased nearly two and a half times between 1939 and 1962.

230. Since the end of the Second World War, manufacturing activities have developed at a remarkable pace^v and are now substantial contributors to money incomes and employment. The most striking expansion has been in the production of the cheaper varieties of consumer goods, such as clothing, textiles, footwear and the processing of food products, as well as in heavier industries such as the metal, iron and steel industries.

231. The following table^w gives a detailed breakdown of production figures in the manufacturing sector in 1962:

^u Federation of Rhodesian Industries: *Survey of Rhodesian Industry, First Interim Report*, February 1954, chap. I.

^v Advisory Committee on Industrial Development, *Report of the Advisory Committee*, 1962, p. 26.

^w Central Statistical Office: *The Census of Production in 1962, Mining, Manufacturing, Construction, Electricity and Water Supply*, Salisbury, October 1964, table 1, pp. 10-18.

	Number of units	Gross output (£ thousand)	Net output (£ thousand)	Net capital expenditure (£ thousand)
Slaughtering, preparation and preserving of meat	5	12,053	1,589	98
Grain mill products	20	7,646	1,448	722
Bakery products	65	5,108	1,656	146
Other food products	34	11,013	2,699	450
Alcohol, beer and spirits	20	4,458	2,530	127
Soft drinks and carbonated waters	17	1,456	773	23
Tobacco manufactures, including commercial tobacco grading and packing	13	7,496	4,216	715
Spinning, weaving and finishing of textiles, knitted products, twine, rope and cordage	26	8,680	3,196	249
Wearing apparel, including footwear	124	10,453	4,247	219
Manufactures of wood and cork, except furniture	39	2,817	1,176	165
Furniture and fixtures	74	2,863	1,259	54
Pulp, paper and products	14	3,726	1,500	212
Printing, publishing and allied industries	62	5,097	3,262	394
Rubber products	15	3,176	1,625	83
Basic industrial chemicals, including fertilizers	6	4,995	1,639	38
Paints, varnishes and lacquers	12	1,523	436	27
Soaps, candles and polishes	9	6,362	2,991	292
Structural clay products (bricks and tiles)	22	784	582	14
Glass, cement and other non-metallic mineral products	39	4,525	2,466	137
Iron and steel, basic industries	13	8,108	4,343	1,022
Non-ferrous metal, basic industries, including smelting	6	1,694	342	40
Metal products, except machinery and transport equipment	150	10,307	4,757	386
Manufacture of machinery except electrical machinery	16	652	326	28
Electrical machinery and equipment	52	3,552	1,616	110
Manufacture of motor vehicles	16	6,128	1,282	217
Motor vehicles and cycle repairs	89	2,775	1,721	28
Manufacture and repair of other transport equipment	10	5,777	3,330	48
Other manufacturing industries	42	1,924	1,022	62
TOTAL MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES	1,043	148,704	59,630	6,466

A. PRINCIPAL INDUSTRIES AND SOME OF THE COMPANIES OPERATING WITHIN THEM

Tobacco manufactures

232. The fact that domestic consumption provides a market for only 4 per cent of the country's tobacco production emphasizes the vital necessity of export markets to the industry. There is hardly any British capital in the tobacco plantations, but Imperial Tobacco has a stake estimated at up to £4 million in processing and other facilities; Gallaher is reported to be putting £500,000 into a new threshing floor, British-American Tobacco has a cigarette factory in Salisbury, and Rothman's Tobacco has been listed as having holdings in the Territory.* There are also a number of smaller British tobacco merchants there. Gallaher Ltd. reported net profits for 1964 at £8,742,000 (£8,448,000), after paying more than £9.9 million in taxation (£9.2 million).† A final dividend of 14 per cent was to be paid on capital increased by a one-for-ten scrip issue, making 18.54 per cent (16 per cent) and taking just over £4 million. The carry-forward was nearly £2.6 million. The Company has also reported a profit before tax

for the first six months of 1965 at £9.7 million* against £8.2 million for the corresponding period of 1964.

233. In June, Gallahers opened a new £500,000 tobacco-processing plant,^{aa} the largest in the Southern hemisphere in Salisbury. The plant is designed to separate the tobacco leaf from the stem, an operation previously done by hand.

234. B.A.T. Central Africa Ltd.,^{bb} formerly The Rhodesian and Nyasaland Tobacco Co. Ltd. authorized and issued £1.5 million in 6 million shares of 5/- each. The company was incorporated on 29 March 1920 as Tobacco Development Co. (Rhodesia) Ltd., and has changed its name from time to time. Originally its activities were confined to leaf tobacco until in 1944 the company purchased a factory for the manufacture of cigarettes and pipe tobacco in Salisbury. Production in a new factory started in 1953. The company, which is associated with British-American Tobacco Ltd., is now conducting its operations in Central Africa through wholly owned subsidiaries which have been established in Malawi, Zambia and Rhodesia. Carlton Cigarette Company became a fellow-subsiary in 1963. On 30 September 1964 the total shareholders' funds

* *East Africa and Rhodesia*, 30 September 1965, p. 72.

^{aa} *The Cape Times* (South Africa), 16 June 1965.

^{bb} R. Beerman, *Financial Year Book of Southern Africa* 1965, vol. I, Rhodesian Section, p. 21.

* *The Economist* (London), 9 October 1965, p. 197.

† *East Africa and Rhodesia*, 8 April 1965, p. 516.

amounted to £3,486,239 while fixed assets and goodwill was £1,997,287. The Chairman was Mr. E. C. L. Cordy.

235. Rothman of Pall Mall (Rhodesia) Ltd. was registered on 20 September 1960 and commenced the manufacture of cigarettes in April 1961.^{cc} The company owns all the shares of Rhodesia Cigarette Distributors (Pvt.) Ltd., which commenced trading on 1 November 1961. It has an authorized capital of £1 million in 3.6 million shares and 400,000 deferred shares of 5/- each. It has issued £0.5 million in 1,600,000 ordinary shares and the 400,000 deferred shares. Its total shareholders' funds on 30 June 1964 amounted to £472,031, its current liabilities stood at £1,288,706 and its combined assets at £1,759,699. The Chairman of the directors is the Honourable Geoffrey Ellman-Brown.

Textile and clothing manufacturing

236. The spinning mills at Gatooma were first established by the Government around 1943 as an insurance for the local production of cotton. Of the bales of lint produced, some two thirds are absorbed by the local manufacturing industry, which also imports about 4,000,000 pounds of rayon staple fibre annually. The yarn produced from these materials supplies about twenty-five factories, manufacturing a variety of bleached and plain-dyed cloths in calico, drill, twill and denim; blankets, carpets, towels and towelling, twine, cordage and knitwear. Besides Gatooma, the industry is also located in Bulawayo, Salisbury and Gwelo.

237. In 1955, the textile industry had sixteen establishments with a gross output of £5.65 million and employed 5,739 people. In 1963 there were twenty-six establishments with a gross output of £9.57 million, and employed 6,412 persons. In 1964, the value of exports was £7.4 million, of which £5.5 million went to Zambia and Malawi. The British cotton textile concern, David Whitehead and Sons (Holdings) has announced an extension to its production in Rhodesia by November 1966.^{dd} New mills are being built now in Gatooma.

238. Rhodesia has about 150 separate garment factories with a total gross output reaching the £20 million mark annually. Rhodesia has recently concluded a trade agreement with the Republic of South Africa which is likely to absorb losses of trade with Zambia which are anticipated.^{ee} The immediate future was reported likely to see many South African garment manufacturers opening up satellite factories in Rhodesia, where there are the advantages of lower factory costs and particularly favourable conditions for the unrestricted import of fabrics. The nearby Democratic Republic of the Congo, Malawi and Zambia are among the most valuable buyers. Clothing exports in 1964 totalled £7 million.

239. Gatooma Textiles Limited^{ff} was registered in Rhodesia in August 1944. It has an authorized capital of £250,000 in shares of £1 each. It has issued £100,000 in shares of £1 each. In addition to the mill buildings, plant and machinery,

^{cc} *Ibid.*, p. 73.

^{dd} *The Star* (Johannesburg), 17 June and 14 August 1965.

^{ee} *The Cape Times*, Rhodesia Supplement, op. cit.

^{ff} Beerman, op. cit., p. 27.

office and trading stores, the company owns approximately a thousand acres of land. There are houses and sports facilities including a swimming pool and tennis court for the European staff, and 250 brick houses in the African compound as well as a school, recreation hall and sports field. Sales declined in 1962 and the company has been developing some new lines. As of 31 March 1964 the total shareholders' funds amounted to £264,894, current liabilities stood at £33,937 and total assets £298,831. The Chairman of the directors was Mr. John Francis Conway.

Cement manufacturing

240. The major producers of limestone and cement have been the Premier Portland Cement Company (Rhodesia) Ltd. (Associated with a South African company, Pretoria Portland Cement Co.) and Rhodesia Cement Ltd. In 1963 the two companies merged their cement business on a fifty-fifty basis into a new company, United Portland Cement Co. (Pvt.) Ltd. (UNICEM). Limestone deposits controlled by Premier Portland include the following: Gomla and Gorge in the Urumgwe Native Reserve; Mbubu in the Maremba Native Reserve; Albany and Hashu near Gwelo; Belingwe and Shabani; Paignton and Cleveland at Colleen Bawn in the Gwanda District. Rhodesia Cement was formed in 1946 to develop limestone deposits on the farm Copthall Block No. 2, Gwanda District and establish a cement factory.

241. The new company has an authorized capital of £2 million, divided into 2 million shares with a nominal value of £1 each. These shares were issued fully paid to Premier and Rhodesia Cement in equal proportions. In return for the issue of 1,000,000 fully paid £1 shares in UNICEM, Premier transferred to UNICEM its fixed assets employed in the company's cement and lime making operations plus ancillary equipment and its limestone deposits in Southern Rhodesia. Similarly, in return for the issue to Rhodesia Cement of one million fully paid £1 shares in UNICEM, Rhodesia Cement (a) transferred to UNICEM the company's fixed assets employed in its cement and lime manufacturing activities plus its limestone deposits and certain other rights in Southern Rhodesia; and (b) provided £222,000 in cash to UNICEM. UNICEM now owns the limestone deposits worked by both companies. The deposit worked by Rhodesia Cement is owned by The Gwelo Land and Minerals Co. (Pvt.) Ltd., and leased to Rhodesia Cement. Agreement was reached whereby UNICEM acquired from Gwelo Land, for £222,000, the land containing this deposit and the £222,000 cash provided by Rhodesia Cement were used for this purpose. The royalties paid to Gwelo Land by the Rhodesia Cement had, during the last ten years, averaged over £11,000 per annum.

242. The board of directors consists of ten members, five of whom are nominated by the Premier and five by Rhodesia Cement. In 1963, the first Chairman of the board was Mr. M. H. Barry (Southern Rhodesia), (former Chairman of Premier Cement) and the first Vice-Chairman was Mr. L. A. Levy (Southern Rhodesia) (former Chairman of Rhodesia Cement).

243. The following tables show the consolidated accounts of UNICEM after the merger in 1963:

LIABILITIES (£)

	Capital	Reserves	Shareholders' funds		Bank overdraft	Creditors	Total
			Total	Per share			
1963	2,000,000	—	2,000,000	20/-	1,051,400	106,000	3,157,400

ASSETS (£)

	Fixed assets	Investments	Stocks and stores	Debtors	Cash	Total current assets
1963	2,484,826	36,907	635,667	—	—	635,667

244. The other producers of limestone and cement in 1963 were as follows:

(a) The Salisbury Portland Cement Co. Ltd.: it is connected with the group of the Associated Portland Cement Manufactures in the United Kingdom. Its cement plant is at Manreso near Salisbury;

(b) Early Worm Mining (Pvt.) Ltd.: it produces high grade metallurgical and agricultural limestone at Postal Bay 3, Concession;

(c) Essexvale Lime Works (Pvt.) Ltd. at Essexvale. Its output was 4,800 tons in 1960;

(d) G.B.N. (Limestone) (Pvt.) Ltd. at Wankie. Its output of metallurgical limestone was 1,900 tons in 1960;

(e) Lomagundi Water Boring and Mining (Pvt.) Ltd. at Sinoia. The company produced 12,000 tons of dolomite in 1961.

Iron and steel

The Rhodesian Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. (RISCO)

245. Only limited surveys of Rhodesia's iron ore reserves have been carried out,^{ss} but five known rich deposits exist and are described at length in section IV above. Rhodesia's demands for steel products have exceeded domestic production and significant quantities of steel have had to be imported from South Africa and the United Kingdom. A steel industry was established by Act of Parliament in 1942 (the Rhodesian Iron and Steel Commission (RISCOM)) and a plant was built at Bulawayo; at the beginning output was confined to production from scrap iron. The Commission next acquired the haematite deposits near Que Que in the Gwelo District, and in 1947 built at Redcliffe the first furnace to smelt iron ore in Southern Rhodesia; the plant came into operation in 1948.

246. The early ore extracted was primarily to meet the demands of the Que Que plant which was producing pig-iron and steel products, nearly all marketed in Southern and Northern Rhodesia. Output of the Que Que plant and of the old Bulawayo plant was 15,200 short tons of finished steel and 30,500 tons of pig-iron in 1949; it rose to 22,300 tons and 39,500 tons respectively in 1953. However, RISCOM's operations were incurring losses. The Southern Rhodesian Government intervened with grants. A commission of inquiry reported that the accumulated losses of £1 million should be written off. It was decided to subsidize the industry at the rate of £150,000 a year. In 1956 the Government negotiated with a consortium of financial houses in the United Kingdom to subscribe £6 million in order to reorganize the industry, and at the beginning of 1957, the Rhodesian Iron and Steel Co. Ltd., (RISCO) took over from the Southern Rhodesian Government the assets of RISCOM. There are many international shareholders in this company including the British companies of Lancashire Steel and Stewarts and Lloyds, and Anglo-American Corporation, Rhodesia Selection Trust, British South Africa Co., Messina (Transvaal) Development Co., and Tanganyika Concessions.^{hh}

247. The assets of the Government Iron and Steel Commission were valued at £4.3 million (excluding the Redcliffe European Township) for which the Government took up shares and stock in the Company. The present value of assets is at £13 million.

248. The initial issued ordinary share capital amounted to £3.1 million. In 1963, the authorized capital was £4.5 million in £1 shares. A total of £3.75 million was subscribed and fully paid. The Messina (Transvaal) Development Co. Ltd., held 850,000 ordinary shares of £1 each, £500,000 subscribed in cash and £350,000 allotted fully paid, partly for the purchase of the Bukwe iron ore deposits. The proved and probable iron ore reserves at Bukwe which have been disclosed to date amount to 134.5 million tons averaging over 60 per cent iron content. Messina also received £250,000 in cash, and for a period of ninety-

nine years a royalty of 6d per ton on all iron ore mined from Bukwe is to be collected by it.

249. The directors consisted of Mr. E. S. Newson (Southern Rhodesia) (Chairman), Mr. D. R. Haysom (South Africa), Mr. P. H. A. Brownrigg (Zambia),ⁱⁱ Mr. T. P. M. Cooran (Southern Rhodesia), Commander H. F. P. Grenfell (United Kingdom), Mr. P. E. Holloway (Southern Rhodesia), Mr. W. N. Menzies-Wilson (South Africa), and Mr. L. Tucker (Southern Rhodesia).

250. In 1956 RISCO initiated a programme of expansion designed to increase production to 150,000 tons of ingot steel, at a capital cost of £8 million, which was later increased to £10 million by the addition of a sheet-rolling mill and other smaller items. The plants now comprise three blast furnaces producing an average output of 900 tons of hot metal daily, two open-hearth furnaces and an electric furnace (together capable of producing nearly 500 tons of ingot steel per day) a blooming mill, a twenty-one-inch heavy section mill and a twelve-ten-inch merchant mill. Also included are gas holders, a gas cleaning plant, a battery of fifty coke-ovens and a by-products plant producing tar and benzol.

251. Today, the RISCO steel works produces basic and foundry grades of pig-iron, steel billets for re-rolling and forging; round, square and flat bars; angles, channels and special sections; round and square reinforcing rods; casting of all types, and forgings to engineers' specifications.^{jj}

252. Production of pig-iron now is at the average rate of 1,000 tons a day. The output of finished steel products is around 120,000 tons per annum. Steel ingots produced in 1962 weighed 97,000 tons. About 65,000 tons of RISCO products were consumed each year in the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland before its dissolution. Exports of pig-iron were valued at £2,756,000 in 1963, and of iron and steel ingots at £6,000. The Rhodesian Steel Sales Company are the distributors for RISCO products.

253. Apparently, the most serious problem concerning the plant is its location. The steel works are situated on a narrow gap, surrounded by large hills on three sides and a river on the fourth. The plant lay-out has been such that it has placed the upper limit of its expansion at about 150,000 tons, so that any expansion beyond this level would probably have to take place on a new site.

254. Another basic problem is the relatively high cost of production, bearing in mind the low cost of the raw material and labour. Although the cost of the Rhodesian-made product is lower than that of imports, it is much higher than the potential costs under large-scale production. These costs would probably continue as long as output remained comparatively low. This is, of course, generally true in most branches of manufacturing in Rhodesia. It should be noted that thousands of tons of steel used at Kariba come from Redcliffe.

255. In July 1964, it was reported that the Rhodesia Iron and Steel Company was considering plans to increase the sale of pig-iron from the present rate of 225,000 tons a year to 665,000 and eventually to 1 million tons a year. At the annual meeting of RISCO held at Redcliffe on 22 June 1965, it was stated that the decision to go ahead with the expansion programme had been taken "after the necessary assurances of suitable long-term markets had been secured overseas". The programme would cost approximately £7 million and take place over a period of two and a half years.^{kk} It was felt that although 1966 might be a year of trade recession, by the time the expansion was completed, the recession would have been overcome.

256. The Southern Rhodesian Minister of Commerce and Industry was reported to have stated in June 1965 in this connexion that it would only be a forerunner of a really large iron and steel industry which had the prospect of supplying world markets with substantial quantities of steel because of

^{ss} W.L. Taylor, "Some Prerequisites for Southern Rhodesia's Economic Growth", in *Optima*, 1 June 1962, pp. 87 et seq.

^{hh} *Handbook to the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland*, chap. 19, p. 379.

ⁱⁱ Also director of Anglo-American Corp. of South Africa.

^{jj} Ministry of Trade, Industry and Development: *Development Opportunities in Rhodesia, 1964, A Business and Investment Guide*, Salisbury, p. 30.

^{kk} *The Cape Times*, 25 and 29 June 1965; and *The Star* (Johannesburg), 27 June and 1 July 1965.

its competitive position. Iron ore production would include an additional 800,000 tons. The second stage of the expansion programme would be completed by 1972 and the total expenditure would be £13 to £14 million.

257. At the same meeting, the chairman reported that the Company had made a net profit of £496,566 for the year ended 31 December 1964, compared with a loss of £242,125 the previous twelve-month period.¹¹ The Company's operations for 1964 reflected a profit on trading and manufacturing of £1,727,296, an increase of £829,618 over the previous year. The net profit, available for appropriation, was arrived at by deducting depreciation, interest and other expenses and adjustments in respect of non-recurring items. The material improvement, said the report, was attributable to the operation of the plant throughout the year at virtually 100 per cent capacity, to the closing down of the Sheet and Plate Mill and to improved operating techniques and procedures.

258. RISCO reported a net profit for the first half of 1965 of about £450,000, almost as much as for the entire year of 1964.^{mm}

259. At the request of the Rhodesian Government a mission from a major Japanese steel company, Kobe Steel Works, visited Buchwa and Wankie recently to study the feasibility of building new steel mills at Buchwa in the Ingesi District whose deposits have a maximum iron content of 64 per cent. The possibility of building pelletizing plants at the Buchwa Mine was also studied.

Ferro-chrome

Rhodesian Alloys (Private) Ltd.

260. Rhodesian Alloys was started with the purpose of producing low carbon ferro-chrome, a vital raw material for special alloy steels.ⁿⁿ The decision to erect a refinery at Gwelo, virtually in the centre of Southern Rhodesia, was taken late in 1949. It would be situated on the main railway connexion from the Wankie Collieries, close to the chrome deposits and on the main lines to the ports, then Beira and later Lourenço Marques. The scheme as a whole was sponsored by John Brown and Co. Ltd., the British South Africa Company and Rhodesian Anglo-American Corporation. Construction work started in 1951 with substantial completion in 1953.

261. The Rhodesian Minister of Commerce and Industry, Mr. G. W. Rudland, has stated^{oo} that the conversion of chrome ore into alloys had probably the greatest future of any industry in Rhodesia. He believes that in ten or fifteen years the industry's expansion will become equivalent to what the Copperbelt is to Zambia—and all because of fairly cheap power from Kariba.

262. Low carbon ferro-chrome is produced by electric smelting in large arc furnaces in which the electrodes are of the Soderberg type. Rhodesian Alloys employs the Perrin Process of the Société d'électro-Chimie, d'électro-métallurgie et des aciéries électriques d'Ugine.

263. Low carbon ferro-chrome smelting operation consumes large quantities of energy and although Rhodesian Alloys operated originally on electricity thermally generated from Wankie coal, it now relies on the Kariba Dam for its energy.

264. Recent production figures have shown a rise in its value to the country to £2.2 million annually.^{pp} Rhodesia Alloys produces 17,000 tons of ferro-alloys annually and exports the low carbon ferro-chrome to the United Kingdom, the Republic of South Africa, Canada, the United States and Australia.

265. A £2 million expansion scheme which would treble output of ferro-alloys^{qq} and make the company one of the

¹¹ In *The Cape Times*, Rhodesia Supplement, 7 August 1965, p. 5.

ⁿⁿ *East Africa and Rhodesia*, 9 September 1965, p. 36.

^{mm} *Handbook to the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland*, 1960, chap. 19, pp. 380-382.

^{oo} *East Africa and Rhodesia*, 14 October 1965, p. 86.

^{pp} *The Cape Times*, Rhodesia Supplement, 7 August 1965, p. 5.

^{qq} *The Cape Times*, 29 August 1965; *The Star* (Johannesburg), 30 August 1965; and *East Africa and Rhodesia*, 23 September 1965.

world's lowest-cost producers was recently announced by Rhodesian Alloys. Three additional furnaces would be installed at the company's Gwelo plant. The whole scheme would take between twenty months and two years to complete.

266. John Brown and Co. Ltd., which owns 48 per cent of the capital of Rhodesian Alloys Ltd., and 50 per cent of the equity and 72 per cent of the preference of F. Issels and Son Ltd., Bulawayo, reported^{rr} group profits after tax for the year ending 31 March 1965 at £1,947,035 (£1,278,217). Ordinary dividends of 11 per cent less tax took £860,776. The amounts carried forward were nearly £1.5 million by the parent company and £4.9 million by the many subsidiaries. Issued capital is £15.5 million. Group fixed assets exceed £18.4 million, investments total £2.8 million, and current assets less current liabilities £16.5 million. Debentures £4 million. Lord Aberconway is the Chairman of the directors.

Motor car industry

267. The leading share in the market^{ss} is held by the Ford Motor Company of Rhodesia, which has a £1.5 million assembly plant at Salisbury. This plant^{tt} is a subsidiary of Ford of Canada. The Company aims at a production rate of 27 units a day which has not yet been achieved, although more than 10,000 cars have come off its assembly line. The needs of the local market have been met, but there has been no stockpiling of new cars. Local content in Rhodesian-assembled cars has been substantial and includes tires (*inter alia*, Dunlop Rubber Co.), glass made in Umtali, paint and batteries.

268. Two other car manufacturers are Rootes (Central Africa) Ltd., and the Rover Company. The latter leads the field in producing tough four-wheel drive "bush" vehicles.

269. Rootes were reported to be getting ready to assemble in their Salisbury factory commercial vehicles for the Chrysler group of the United States.^{uu} In the first year, it was expected that about ninety vehicles, representing a turnover of £100,00 would be handled.

270. Dunlop Rubber Co. Ltd., which has a factory in Rhodesia, reported net profits after tax for 1964 at £8,244,000 (£6,506,000).^{vv} The distribution was raised from 1s. ½d. to 1s. 7d. per 10s. share.

Pipeline and refinery

271. Significant progress was made in March 1965, when the Feruka Refinery, known as the Central African Petroleum Refineries (CAPREF) near Umtali, was opened.^{ww} Small by world standards, it is a highly complex unit with fourteen different processes. Costing about £8 million, it was sponsored by Shell, British Petroleum, Mobil, Caltex, Total, the American Independent Oil Co. (Aminoil) and the Kuwait National Petroleum Company. Principals of the five marketing companies in Rhodesia (the first five named) have put up 80 per cent of the capital and supply 80 per cent of the crude product on a percentage basis equal to the value of purchases by their local companies of the refined product. Aminoil and Kuwait NPC hold 20 per cent of the equity and supply 20 per cent of the crude. The main contractors of the pipeline were The Hume Pipe Co. (South Africa) Ltd.^{xx}

272. Work on the plant at Feruka, about twelve miles from the Rhodesian-Mozambique border, began in May 1963, about the same time as work began on the \$4 million, 179-mile pipeline which feeds the refinery from Beira. When fully loaded, the pipeline has a capacity of approximately 3.5 million gallons. The pumping station delivers about 600,000 gallons a day, but by 1971 it was planned that two more would be built and 1.5 million gallons a day would be deliverable. Distribution is the responsibility of each of the five marketing companies and is made by rail from Feruka to individual company depots through Rhodesia and Zambia, Lonrho Ltd.,

^{rr} *East Africa and Rhodesia*, 26 August 1965, p. 12.

^{ss} *Industry and Commerce of Rhodesia*, 1964/65, p. III.

^{tt} *The Financial Times*, 9 October 1965.

^{uu} *East Africa and Rhodesia*, 1 July 1965, p. 704.

^{vv} *Ibid.*, 8 April 1965, p. 516.

^{ww} *The Cape Times*, Rhodesia Supplement, 7 August 1965, p. 6.

^{xx} *East Africa and Rhodesia*, 8 April 1965, p. 515.

a multifarious British concern, was responsible for laying the pipeline.

B. ASSOCIATION OF RHODESIAN INDUSTRIES (ARNI)

273. The membership of the Association of Rhodesian Industries is made up of manufacturing firms who are normally required to join their local Chambers of Industry. The ARNI constitution provides for individual firms to join as direct members. Various manufacturers' associations are affiliated members of ARNI. In addition, non-manufacturing firms having a vital interest in Rhodesia's industrial activity (banks, mining groups, industrial consultants), may be admitted as industrial members.

274. ARNI has its own secretariat. Much of its time is taken up with personal service to individual industrialists, which includes such matters as the submission of applications for tariff protection; rebates and suspension of duties; application for dumping duties and for import and export permits; information and advice on export markets and the location of suitable agents; investigation of trade licensing problems; interpretation of labour and other regulations; location of sources of raw materials; investigation of railway problems, etc. The secretariat is on constant call to government departments, local representatives of foreign governments, municipalities and other institutions.

C. ASSOCIATION OF CHAMBERS OF COMMERCE OF RHODESIA

(ACCOR)

275. The principal aims of ACCOR which is comprised of eleven individual chambers: Bindura, Bulawayo, Fort Victoria, Gatooma, Gwelo, Hartley, Kuroi, Que Que, Salisbury and Umtali, is "to maintain an atmosphere in which business people can operate at a profit and without unnecessary Governmental control—an atmosphere in which private enterprise can flourish and in which it is able to meet the needs of a growing population and provide jobs for a growing labour force," as well as "to keep the economy dynamic and expanding and to encourage self-reliance and individual initiative. ACCOR does not favour calling on Government for assistance or special treatment. Rather, it seeks to ensure that Government does not frustrate private enterprise in its endeavours to help itself".

D. TRANSPORT AND POWER

276. The three remaining heritages of the Federation, the railways, Central African Airways and Kariba Dam's power stations, are statutory bodies partly owned by the individual Governments and controlled by higher authorities on which the Governments are represented.

VI. FOREIGN TRADE

A. GENERAL

277. The following table is a historical summary of external trade over recent years.

HISTORICAL SUMMARY OF EXTERNAL TRADE
(£ thousand)

Period	Imports	Domestic exports				Net gold sales	Re-exports	Total exports	Visible balance
		To Zambia	To Malawi	To other countries	Total				
1950	58,762	3,442	452	30,371	34,265	6,376	7,500	48,141	— 10,621
1951	85,634	4,647	498	30,762	35,907	5,990	9,776	51,673	— 33,961
1952	88,378	6,028	437	38,021	44,486	6,552	10,101	61,139	— 27,239
1953	77,675	7,682	561	39,115	47,358	6,595	11,484	65,437	— 12,238
1954				42,980		6,547			
1955				45,154		6,486			
1956				47,829		6,483			
1957				52,725		6,854			
1958				49,351		6,772			
1959				57,401		6,931			
1960				61,919		6,961			
1961				71,254		7,091			
1962				72,827		6,845			
1963				75,089		6,980			
1964	109,695	30,825	5,581	83,059	119,465	7,086	17,993	144,544	+ 34,849
1964									
January	8,074	1,497	167	3,411	5,075	574	1,263	6,912	— 1,162
February	8,137	2,131	322	3,369	5,822	556	1,291	7,669	— 468
March	8,620	2,123	326	4,402	6,851	579	1,319	8,749	+ 129
April	9,203	2,748	443	5,810	9,001	557	1,386	10,944	+ 1,741
May	8,992	2,741	473	8,175	11,389	617	1,365	13,371	+ 4,379
June	10,425	2,773	522	8,699	11,994	579	1,323	13,896	+ 3,471
July	10,290	2,539	517	8,988	12,044	562	1,569	14,175	+ 3,885
August	9,445	2,509	607	9,095	12,211	623	1,623	14,457	+ 5,012
September	9,370	3,084	568	10,119	13,771	638	1,738	16,147	+ 6,777
October	9,206	3,149	586	8,694	12,429	523	1,743	14,695	+ 5,489
November	8,597	2,919	508	7,641	11,068	591	1,525	13,184	+ 4,587
December	9,241	2,808	505	5,092	8,405	684	1,728	10,817	+ 1,576
1965									
January	8,429	2,169	385	4,016	6,570	578	1,399	8,547	+ 118
February	8,164	2,528	382	4,239	7,149	572	1,343	9,064	+ 900
March	10,236	3,209	549	5,201	8,959	580	1,552	11,091	+ 855
April	9,691	2,674	570	6,892	10,136	543	1,234	11,913	+ 2,222
May	11,276	3,228	735	8,915	12,878	562	1,414	14,854	+ 3,578
June	11,031	3,436	848	10,170	14,454	519	1,442	16,415	+ 5,384
July	10,690	3,235	693	10,057	13,985	586	1,486	16,057	+ 5,367
August	11,279	3,441	768	10,105	14,314	542	1,519	16,375	+ 5,096
September									
October									
November									
December									

278. It will be noted that as regards imports, exports to Zambia and Malawi and re-exports, the figures for the years 1954 to 1963 inclusive are not available because trade figures were kept for the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland as a whole and no records were kept of movements between the component territories comprising the Federation.

279. During 1964, Southern Rhodesia had a favourable visible balance of trade of £34.9 million. For the first six months of 1965, the favourable visible trade balance was £13.9 million, an improvement of some 60 per cent over the figure of £8.1 million recorded for the same period in 1964

B. TRADE BY COMMODITY GROUPS

Imports

280. Imports into Southern Rhodesia may be classified according to groups of the Standard International Trade Classification (Revised) as follows:

Group	1954	
	£ million	Percentage
0. Food and live animals	9.7	8.8
1. Beverages and tobacco	3.7	3.4
2. Crude materials, inedible, except fuels	5.5	5.0
3. Mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials	6.2	5.6
4. Animal and vegetable oils and fats ..	0.6	0.5
5. Chemicals	11.5	10.5
6. Manufactured goods classified chiefly by material	28.1	25.6
7. Machinery and transport equipment ..	31.2	28.5
8. Miscellaneous manufactured goods	10.7	9.7
9. Commodities and transactions n.e.s.	2.6	2.4
TOTAL	109.8	100.0

SOURCE: *Rhodesia. Annual Statement of External Trade*, 1964, p. xi.

281. The twenty-five principal commodities imported into Southern Rhodesia in 1964 were as follows:

Commodity	1964 £ million
Textile fabrics, in the piece	7.0
Machinery, n.e.s., except electric	6.6
Petroleum products	5.8
Iron or steel, bars, angles, pipes, rails, etc.	5.2
Clothing and haberdashery	3.7
Motor vehicle spares, n.e.s., including parts for assembly	3.6
Fertilizers, manufactured	3.1
Passenger cars	2.9
Tobacco, unmanufactured	2.8
Paper and paperboard	2.6
Agricultural machinery	2.5
Motor trucks and truck chassis	2.2
Power generating machinery, except electric	2.1
Wheat	1.9
Telecommunications apparatus	1.8
Medical and pharmaceutical products	1.7
Railway engines and vehicles	1.6
Copper and copper alloys	1.6
Dips, disinfectants and insecticides	1.6
Chemical elements and compounds	1.5
Electrical machinery and apparatus, n.e.s.	1.4
Textile yarn and thread	1.3
Footwear	1.1
Scientific, medical, optical, etc., instruments and apparatus	1.0
Wood in round, shaped or simply worked	1.0
TOTAL	67.6

This represents 61.5 per cent of all imports.

SOURCE: *Rhodesia. Annual Statement of External Trade*, 1964, p. xii.

Exports

282. Exports from Southern Rhodesia may be classified as follows:

Group	1964	
	£ million	Percentage
0. Food and live animals	11.9	10.0
1. Beverages and tobacco	42.0	35.1
2. Crude materials, inedible, except fuels	16.8	14.1
3. Mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials	6.4	5.4
4. Animal and vegetable oils and fats ..	0.4	0.3
5. Chemicals	4.5	3.8
6. Manufactured goods classified chiefly by material	21.0	17.5
7. Machinery and transport equipment ..	6.3	5.3
8. Miscellaneous manufactured goods	8.9	7.4
9. Commodities and transactions n.e.s.	1.2	1.1
TOTAL	119.4	100.0

SOURCE: *Rhodesia. Annual Statement of External Trade*, 1964, p. xi.

283. The twenty-five principal products exported from Southern Rhodesia in 1964 were as follows:

Commodity	1964 £ million
Tobacco, unmanufactured	39.2
Asbestos fibre	10.0
Clothing	5.3
Copper, refined, unwrought	3.6
Raw sugar	3.4
Meats, fresh, frozen or chilled	3.0
Pig-iron	2.6
Chrome ore	2.5
Meats, canned, and meat preparations, n.e.s.	2.1
Ferro-chrome	1.8
Cigarettes	1.8
Radios	1.7
Coal	1.7
Footwear	1.6
Passenger cars	1.4
Textile fabrics	1.2
Structural steel and finished structural parts	1.0
Rubber tires and tubes	1.0
Copper bar and rod	1.0
Soaps and detergents	1.0
Hides and skins	0.9
Iron or steel bars, rounds, angles, etc.	0.7
Wattle extract	0.7
Fertilizers	0.7
Iron or steel, billets, blooms, etc.	0.6
TOTAL	90.5

These represented 75.6 per cent of the total value of domestic exports.

SOURCE: *Rhodesia. Annual Statement of External Trade*, 1964, p. xiii.

Re-exports

284. Re-exports of imported merchandise from Southern Rhodesia may be classified as follows:

Section	1964	
	£ million	Percentage
0. Food and live animals	0.6	3.4
1. Beverages and tobacco	0.5	2.9
2. Crude materials, inedible, except fuels	0.4	2.1
3. Mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials	0.4	2.0
4. Animal and vegetable oils and fats ...	0.0	0.1
5. Chemicals	1.8	10.2
6. Manufactures classified chiefly by material	3.2	17.7
7. Machinery and transport equipment ...	6.5	36.0
8. Miscellaneous manufactured goods	1.6	9.0
9. Commodities and transactions n.e.s.	3.0	16.7
TOTAL	18.0	100.0

C. ORIGIN OF IMPORTS AND DESTINATION OF EXPORTS:

SELECTED LIST

Imports

285. The selected imports, the origin of which is analysed in this section, are those of which the value, when rounded, amounted to £1.0 million or more in 1964.

MAIN ORIGIN OF SELECTED IMPORTS IN 1964

	Value (£ million)	Percentage
<i>Wheat</i>		
Australia	1.5	81.1
United States	0.3	15.1
Other countries	0.1	3.8
TOTAL	1.9	100.0
<i>Maize</i>		
South Africa	1.0	100.0
Other countries	0.0	—
TOTAL	1.0	100.0
<i>Tobacco, unmanufactured</i>		
Zambia ^a	2.5	88.8
Malawi	0.3	11.1
Other countries	0.0	—
TOTAL	2.8	100.0
<i>Petroleum products</i>		
Iran	3.1	54.4
Bahrein	0.7	12.3
South Africa	0.7	12.3
Saudi Arabia	0.5	8.7
Other countries	0.7	12.3
TOTAL	5.7	100.0
<i>Insecticides</i>		
South Africa	0.5	35.8
United States	0.5	32.6
Israel	0.1	7.3
Kenya	0.1	5.6
Other countries	0.3	18.6
TOTAL	1.5	100.0
<i>Nitrogenous fertilizers</i>		
Federal Republic of Germany	0.5	52.3
Netherlands	0.2	17.4
Portugal	0.2	15.7
Other countries	0.1	14.6
TOTAL	1.0	100.0
<i>Cotton fabrics</i>		
Japan	1.0	37.2
United Kingdom	0.7	28.8
United States	0.2	6.5
Netherlands	0.2	6.5
Other countries	0.5	20.8
TOTAL	2.6	100.0
<i>Rayon fabrics</i>		
Japan	0.9	51.6
United Kingdom	0.3	16.5
China	0.2	8.9
Other countries	0.4	22.8
TOTAL	1.8	100.0

Value
(£ million) Percentage*Copper and copper alloys n.e.s.*

Zambia	1.2	93.4
Other countries	0.1	6.6
TOTAL	1.3	100.0

Internal combustion engine spares n.e.s.

United Kingdom	1.0	67.1
United States	0.2	11.7
South Africa	0.1	7.0
Federal Republic of Germany	0.1	5.5
Other countries	0.1	8.8
TOTAL	1.5	100.0

Tractors

United Kingdom	1.1	74.4
United States	0.4	25.0
Other countries	0.0	0.7
TOTAL	1.5	100.0

Machinery not otherwise specified

United Kingdom	1.7	54.0
South Africa	0.5	15.5
Federal Republic of Germany	0.2	7.5
Other countries	0.7	22.7
TOTAL	3.1	100.0

Railway locomotives

United Kingdom	1.0	97.9
Other countries	0.1	2.1
TOTAL	1.1	100.0

Passenger cars

United Kingdom	1.1	37.9
Federal Republic of Germany	0.5	18.6
Italy	0.3	10.2
France	0.3	8.9
Japan	0.2	8.4
Other countries	0.5	16.0
TOTAL	2.9	100.0

Motor vehicle parts including parts for assembly

United Kingdom	3.0	82.7
South Africa	0.2	5.0
Other countries	0.4	12.3
TOTAL	3.6	100.0

Chassis for trucks and vans

United Kingdom	1.1	69.8
South Africa	0.2	14.6
Other countries	0.2	15.7
TOTAL	1.5	100.0

Outer garments

South Africa	0.6	45.2
United Kingdom	0.4	35.7
Other countries	0.2	19.1
TOTAL	1.2	100.0

^a Zambian tobacco is imported to be auctioned and is mostly re-exported.

Destination of exports

286. The selected commodities or groups of commodities, the destination of which is analysed here, are those of which the total value amounted to £0.5 million or more in 1964.

MAIN ORIGIN OF SELECTED EXPORTS IN 1964

	Value (£ million)	Percentage
<i>Unmanufactured tobacco</i>		
United Kingdom	20.7	52.7
Federal Republic of Germany	5.4	13.9
Netherlands	1.8	4.7
Japan	1.5	3.3
Australia	1.2	3.1
Belgium	0.8	2.1
South Africa	0.6	1.6
Malaya	0.7	1.7
Denmark	0.5	1.3
Switzerland	0.4	1.1
Hong Kong	0.4	1.1
Singapore	0.4	1.1
France	0.3	0.9
Portugal	0.3	0.7
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics ...	0.3	0.7
United Arab Republic	0.3	0.6
New Zealand	0.2	0.6
Norway	0.2	0.6
Italy	0.2	0.6
Jamaica	0.2	0.6
Austria	0.2	0.6
Other countries	2.5	6.4
TOTAL	39.1	100.0
<i>Manufactured tobacco</i>		
South Africa	0.9	42.5
Zambia	0.5	38.8
Persian Gulf States	0.3	13.6
Other countries	0.1	5.0
TOTAL	1.8	100.0
<i>Asbestos, raw</i>		
United Kingdom	3.3	32.5
United States	1.1	11.0
Federal Republic of Germany	0.9	9.3
Spain	0.6	6.0
South Africa	0.4	4.2
India	0.4	4.2
Japan	0.4	3.5
Belgium	0.3	3.3
Sweden	0.3	2.7
France	0.2	2.5
Italy	0.2	2.1
Other countries	1.9	18.7
TOTAL	10.0	100.0
<i>Meats, fresh, frozen and chilled</i>		
United Kingdom	1.2	41.5
Italy	0.6	19.8
Zambia	0.5	18.0
Switzerland	0.3	11.0
Other countries	0.3	9.7
TOTAL	2.9	100.0
<i>Meats, other</i>		
United Kingdom	1.4	68.7
South Africa	0.2	9.5
Zambia	0.2	8.7

	<i>Value (£ million) Percentage</i>	
Canada	0.1	4.0
Other countries	0.2	9.1
TOTAL	2.1	100.0
<i>Copper</i>		
Belgium	1.3	28.6
Federal Republic of Germany	1.2	27.0
United Kingdom	0.7	16.5
Other countries	1.3	28.0
TOTAL	4.5	100.0
<i>Electric energy</i>		
Zambia	4.2	100.0
<i>Sugar</i>		
Canada	1.0	27.7
United Kingdom	0.9	27.6
Zambia	0.9	25.6
Malawi	0.3	9.8
United States	0.3	9.3
TOTAL	3.4	100.0
<i>Chrome ore</i>		
United States	1.7	66.4
South Africa	0.3	12.5
Sweden	0.1	5.8
United Kingdom	0.1	3.8
Other countries	0.3	11.2
TOTAL	2.5	100.0
<i>Motor cars and trucks</i>		
Zambia	1.8	79.2
Malawi	0.4	19.2
Other countries	0.0	1.6
TOTAL	2.2	100.0
<i>Coal and coke</i>		
Zambia	1.5	70.0
Democratic Republic of the Congo	0.4	20.1
Other countries	0.2	9.9
TOTAL	2.1	100.0
<i>Ferro-chrome</i>		
United Kingdom	0.8	44.0
Australia	0.3	15.7
Japan	0.2	13.1
Canada	0.2	11.4
Other countries	0.3	15.8
TOTAL	1.8	100.0
<i>Radios</i>		
South Africa	1.0	59.2
Zambia	0.4	23.9
Malawi	0.1	6.4
Other countries	0.2	10.6
TOTAL	1.7	100.0
<i>Footwear</i>		
Zambia	0.9	57.8
South Africa	0.4	27.8
Malawi	0.1	8.6
Other countries	0.2	5.8
TOTAL	1.6	100.0

MAIN ORIGIN OF SELECTED EXPORTS IN 1964 (continued)

	Value (£ million)	Percentage
<i>Iron or steel billets, ingots, bars, angles, etc.</i>		
Zambia	0.6	42.5
United Kingdom	0.3	24.0
South Africa	0.3	22.3
Other countries	0.2	11.1
TOTAL	1.4	100.0
<i>Paper, cardboard, paper manufacture, etc.</i>		
Zambia	0.8	70.1
Malawi	0.2	17.9
Other countries	0.2	12.0
TOTAL	1.2	100.0
<i>Soap, etc.</i>		
Zambia	1.1	90.9
Malawi	0.1	4.4
Other countries	0.1	4.7
TOTAL	1.3	100.0
<i>Fabrics in the piece</i>		
Malawi	0.6	52.0
Zambia	0.5	43.6
Other countries	0.1	4.4
TOTAL	1.2	100.0
<i>Structural steel</i>		
Zambia	0.7	65.0
Malawi	0.1	9.0
Democratic Republic of the Congo	0.0	3.4
Other countries	0.2	22.7
TOTAL	1.0	100.0
<i>Rubber manufactures</i>		
Zambia	0.7	68.2
Malawi	0.3	25.0
Other countries	0.1	6.8
TOTAL	1.1	100.0
<i>Wattle extracts</i>		
India	0.5	71.1
United Arab Republic	0.1	10.2
Other countries	0.1	18.7
TOTAL	0.7	100.0
<i>Fertilizers</i>		
Zambia	0.5	78.2
Malawi	0.1	15.5
Other countries	0.0	6.3
TOTAL	0.6	100.0
<i>Paints, varnishes, etc.</i>		
Zambia	0.5	78.1
Malawi	0.1	17.2
Other countries	0.0	4.7
TOTAL	0.6	100.0
<i>Tin ingots</i>		
South Africa	0.6	98.8
Other countries	0.0	1.2
TOTAL	0.6	100.0

	Value (£ thousand)	percentage
<i>Lithium ores</i>		
United States	0.3	50.8
Other countries	0.3	49.2
TOTAL	0.5	100.0
<i>Cattle hides</i>		
Italy	0.1	16.9
Iran	0.1	14.5
Portugal	0.1	13.2
Federal Republic of Germany	0.1	9.4
Czechoslovakia	0.0	9.0
Democratic Republic of the Congo	0.0	8.2
Other countries	0.2	28.9
TOTAL	0.6	100.0
<i>Ale, beer and stout</i>		
Malawi	0.3	72.2
Bechuanaland	0.1	16.1
Zambia	0.1	11.6
TOTAL	0.5	100.0
<i>Iron ore</i>		
Japan	0.4	99.8
TOTAL	0.4	100.0

D. ORIGIN OF IMPORTS AND DESTINATION OF EXPORTS:
TRADE WITH ALL COUNTRIES

287. Southern Rhodesia's trade with all countries in 1964 may be summarized as follows:

	Imports	Exports (£ million)	Re-exports
United Kingdom	33.4	30.5	0.7
Zambia	5.4	30.8	9.9
South Africa	26.6	9.0	3.3
Malawi	1.6	5.6	1.6
Australia	2.4	1.6	0.0
India	0.9	1.0	0.0
Bechuanaland	0.3	1.1	0.9
Hong Kong	0.5	0.5	0.0
Other sterling area	2.4	4.3	0.2
TOTAL STERLING AREA	73.5	84.4	16.6
United States	7.4	4.0	0.0
Canada	1.6	1.4	0.0
Other dollar area	0.0	0.1	0.0
TOTAL DOLLAR AREA	8.0	5.5	0.0
Federal Republic of Germany	4.3	7.9	0.0
France	1.7	0.7	0.0
Netherlands	2.4	2.2	0.0
Italy	2.0	1.3	0.1
Europe n.e.s.	4.5	7.2	0.1
Mozambique	1.4	0.7	0.5
Angola	0.1	0.1	0.1
Democratic Republic of the Congo	0.0	1.5	0.2
African countries n.e.s.	0.4	0.6	0.0
Japan	4.4	5.6	0.0
Soviet area	0.4	0.9	0.0
Other countries	5.0	0.7	0.0
TOTAL, REST OF THE WORLD	26.6	28.4	1.0
WORLD TOTAL	108.1	118.3	17.6

E. TRADE WITH SELECTED COUNTRIES

United Kingdom

288. The United Kingdom is the most important source of imports and the second most important export market. The following table gives details of trade:

<i>Imports</i>		£ million
Machinery and transport equipment	17.0	
Manufactured goods chiefly classified by material	7.2	
Miscellaneous manufactured articles	4.1	
Chemicals	2.2	
Other imports	5.0	
	<hr/>	
TOTAL IMPORTS	35.5	
	<hr/>	
<i>Exports</i>		
Tobacco unmanufactured	20.7	
Asbestos, raw	3.3	
Beef and veal, frozen or chilled	1.2	
Meats, canned	1.2	
Raw sugar	0.9	
Ferro-alloys	0.8	
Copper	0.7	
All other exports	1.7	
	<hr/>	
Domestic exports	30.5	
Re-export	0.7	
	<hr/>	
TOTAL EXPORTS	31.2	

Zambia

289. Zambia is the most important market for Southern Rhodesia's exports, particularly its non-agricultural exports, but is comparatively unimportant as a source of imports. The following table gives details of trade:

<i>Imports</i>		
Tobacco, unmanufactured	2.5 ^a	
Copper, electrolytic	1.2	
All other imports	1.7	
	<hr/>	
TOTAL IMPORTS	5.4	
	<hr/>	
<i>Exports</i>		
Electric energy	4.2	
Outer garments	2.0	
Coal	1.3	
Passenger cars	1.2	
Sugar, raw	0.9	
Soap, etc.	0.9	
Shirts	0.8	
Rubber tires and tubes	0.7	
Finished structural metal parts n.e.s.	0.7	
Iron or steel parts, etc.	0.6	
Meats fresh, frozen or chilled	0.5	
Cigarettes	0.5	
Fertilizers	0.5	
All other exports	16.0	
	<hr/>	
Domestic exports	30.8	
Re-exports	9.9	
	<hr/>	
TOTAL EXPORTS	40.7	

^a Presumably for sale at the Salisbury auctions and subsequent re-export.

290. Zambia's dependence on its trade with Southern Rhodesia is illustrated by the fact that in 1964 39.41 per cent of total imports came from that Territory. Electric energy and coal are particularly vital elements in Zambia's economy, for both of which commodities it relies almost exclusively on Southern Rhodesia.

291. The pattern of trade between Southern Rhodesia and Zambia for 1965 shows an increase of imports during the early months of that year. Exports from Southern Rhodesia to Zambia from January-March in 1964 and 1965 were valued at £5,765,000 and £7,906,000, respectively. The imports from Zambia also increased from £886,000 in January-March 1964 to £1,035,000 in January-March 1965.

South Africa

292. The third most important single market for Southern Rhodesia is South Africa; Southern Rhodesia, however, has a considerable unfavourable visible balance of trade with that country. The following table gives details of trade:

<i>Imports</i>		£ million
Manufactured goods classified chiefly by material ..	9.0	
Machinery and transport equipment	4.7	
Food	3.7	
Chemicals	3.6	
Miscellaneous manufactured articles	3.3	
Mineral fuels, etc.	0.9	
Crude materials, inedible (except fuels)	0.9	
All other imports	0.5	
	<hr/>	
TOTAL IMPORTS	26.6	
	<hr/>	
<i>Exports</i>		
Apparel	1.2	
Radios and parts	1.0	
Cigarettes	0.9	
Tobacco, unmanufactured	0.6	
Tin	0.6	
Asbestos, raw	0.4	
Chrome ore and concentrates	0.3	
Steel exports	0.3	
All other exports	5.6	
	<hr/>	
Domestic exports	10.9	
Re-exports	3.3	
	<hr/>	
TOTAL EXPORTS	14.2	

293. The pattern of trade of Southern Rhodesia with South Africa for the first three months of 1965 shows an increase over the 1964 figures. In January-March 1965, Southern Rhodesia imported from South Africa goods to the value of £6,383,000, compared with £5,694,000 during the same period last year.

294. In January-March 1965, the exports amounted to £2,566,000 compared with £1,713,000 during the same period last year.

Malawi

295. Southern Rhodesia had a favourable trade balance with Malawi of £5.6 million in 1964 mainly on the basis of exports of manufactured goods. Malawi drew 39.1 per cent of its total imports from Rhodesia. Although exports from Malawi to Southern Rhodesia were only a very small proportion of Southern Rhodesia's imports, they represented 13.9 per cent of Malawi's total exports. The following table gives details of trade:

<i>Imports</i>		£ million
Cotton fibre	0.6	
Tobacco, unmanufactured	0.3	
Tea	0.2	
Beans, peas, etc., dried	0.2	
All other imports	0.3	
	<hr/>	
TOTAL IMPORTS	1.6	
	<hr/>	
<i>Exports</i>		
Cotton fabrics	0.5	
Raw sugar	0.3	
Ale, beer and stout	0.3	

<i>Exports (continued)</i>	£ million	<i>Exports</i>	£ million
Shirts	0.2	Tobacco, unmanufactured	5.5
Outer garments	0.2	Copper, refined	1.2
Refined sugar	0.2	Asbestos, raw	0.9
Passenger cars	0.2	All other exports	0.3
All other exports	3.7		
		Domestic exports	7.9
Domestic exports	5.6	Re-exports	0.0
Re-exports	1.6		
		TOTAL EXPORTS	8.0
TOTAL EXPORTS	7.2		

United States of America

296. In 1964 Southern Rhodesia had an adverse balance of trade with the United States of £3,404,000, with imports from the United States amounting to £7,426,000 or 6.77 per cent of the total value of imports and exports to the United States amounting to £4,022,000 or 2.78 per cent of the total value of exports, including re-exports.

<i>Imports</i>	£ million
Machinery and transport equipment	3.4
Manufactured goods, classified chiefly by material	1.1
Chemicals	1.1
Miscellaneous manufactured articles	1.0
Food (mainly wheat, rice and milk powder)	0.5
Other imports	0.3
TOTAL IMPORTS	7.4

<i>Exports</i>	
Chrome ore	1.7
Asbestos, raw	1.1
Raw sugar	0.3
Lithium ore	0.3
Copper, refined	0.2
All other exports	0.4
Domestic exports	4.0
Re-exports	0.0
TOTAL EXPORTS	4.0

297. The pattern of trade between Southern Rhodesia and the United States showed a small decrease in the first three months of 1965.

298. The imports from the United States in January-March 1964 amounted to £1,578,000 and £1,492,000 in January-March 1965. The exports of Southern Rhodesia to the United States in January-March 1964 amounted to £905,000 as compared with £654,000 for the same period in 1965.

Federal Republic of Germany

299. The following table shows details of trade with the Federal Republic of Germany, which took 40.8 per cent of Southern Rhodesia's exports to Western Europe and from which Southern Rhodesia obtained 29.1 per cent of its imports from that region:

<i>Imports</i>	£ million
Machinery and transport equipment	1.6
Chemicals (mainly fertilizer)	1.3
Other imports	1.4
TOTAL IMPORTS	4.3

Japan

300. Southern Rhodesia's trade with Japan shows a small favourable balance, which amounted in 1964 to £1,104,000. Exports to Japan in 1964 amounted to £5,583,000 or 3.86 per cent of the total value of exports, including re-exports, and imports amounted to £4,399,000 or 4.01 per cent of the total value of imports.

301. Southern Rhodesian trade with Japan consists mainly of importing Japanese consumer goods and exporting tobacco and minerals, chiefly iron ore. The high iron content and the competitive price of Southern Rhodesian ore have attracted Japanese buyers, especially since the Rhodesian export ore is a high-grade haematite with a low phosphorus content. In general, it has an iron content of 60 per cent and upwards.^{yy} The following table gives details of trade:

<i>Imports</i>	£ million
Manufactured goods classified chiefly by material (mainly clothing)	2.8
Machinery and transport equipment	0.8
All other imports	0.8
TOTAL IMPORTS	4.4

<i>Exports</i>	
Pig-iron	2.5
Tobacco, unmanufactured	1.5
Asbestos, raw	0.4
Iron ore and concentrates	0.4
Ferro-alloys	0.2
Copper concentrates	0.2
All other exports	0.5
Domestic exports	5.7
Re-exports	0.0
TOTAL EXPORTS	5.7

302. The pattern of trade for the first three months of 1965, compared with the first three months of 1964 shows an increase in imports from Japan and a decrease in exports to Japan. In January-March 1964 Southern Rhodesia imports from Japan amounted to £1,023,000 and in January-March 1965 to £1,353,000. In January-March 1964 Southern Rhodesia exported to Japan £1,165,000 worth of goods, as compared with £952,000 for the same period in 1965.

Mozambique

303. Trade between Southern Rhodesia and Mozambique is not substantial. Because of the importance of Mozambique to the communications of Southern Rhodesia and of the fact that the greater part of its foreign trade passes through Mozambique, some details of the trade between the two Territories are given below:

Imports

	£ million
Electric energy	0.3
Feeding stuffs for livestock	0.2
Sleepers, wooden	0.2
Lumber, sawn	0.2
Coconut oil	0.1
Fruits, fresh	0.1
All other imports	0.3
TOTAL IMPORTS	1.4

Exports

Tobacco, unmanufactured	0.1
Machinery and parts	0.1
Maize	0.1
All other exports	0.5
Domestic exports	0.8
Re-exports	0.5
TOTAL EXPORTS	1.3

304. The importance of Mozambique as a channel of trade for Southern Rhodesia increased early in 1965 with the entry into operation of the oil pipeline from Beira to Umtali.

VII. LABOUR

A. LABOUR LEGISLATION

General

305. Industrial conditions are governed by a wide range of legislation. The most important statute of general application is the Industrial Conciliation Act (Cap. 246) of 1959, as amended, which establishes procedures for negotiation, conciliation and arbitration of all matters affecting employment in most industries, trades and occupations. Some of the legislation, such as the Masters and Servants Act (Cap. 247) of 1901, as amended, and the Africans (Urban Areas) Accommodation and Registration Act (Cap. 110) of 1951, is applicable to or affects only Africans.

*Industrial conciliation**(a) Procedures*

306. The first Industrial Conciliation Act, which came into effect in 1934, recognized the principle of collective bargaining by providing for the creation of national and local industrial councils representing employers and employees. Trade unions and employers' organizations were entitled to be registered under the Act. Africans were not included within the scope of the Act; their wage rates were fixed, in certain circumstances, by proclamation of the Governor. These proclamations, which were made at the request of the industrial councils, protected the high level of non-African wages.

307. A second Industrial Conciliation Act, which came into effect in 1945, established procedures for conciliation, mediation and arbitration. Under specified conditions, the agreement reached by an industrial council, in which African labour was unrepresented, could be made applicable to Africans within certain municipalities. In general, the conditions of employment of Africans were governed by the Native Labour Boards Act of 1947, which established a National Labour Board and two Regional Labour Boards; the Boards were designed to prevent and settle disputes between employers and African employees. They made recommendations to the Government concerning the minimum conditions for African workers. In practice, the regulations made under the Act were applicable primarily to Africans employed in municipal and town-management areas. A new policy was inaugurated, with the passage of a new Industrial Conciliation Act in 1959, which repealed the Native Labour Boards Act; the Act made Africans and non-Africans subject to the same conciliation procedures.

308. The Industrial Conciliation Act (Cap. 246) of 1959, as amended, is applicable to all industries, trades and occupations with the following exceptions: farming (including forestry); domestic service in private households; and under-

takings of the Rhodesia Railways.²² The Industrial Conciliation Act establishes industrial councils for organized industry and industrial boards for industries where an industrial council has not been established.

309. In principle, only registered trade unions and registered employers' organizations are permitted to form an industrial council. On the following conditions a trade union or an employers' organization is entitled to be registered: (i) that the constitution of the union or organization is in conformity with the provisions of the Act; (ii) that the union or organization has not been formed for the purpose of furthering the interests of its members on the basis of race, colour or religion; (iii) that the union or organization has a governing body situated in Southern Rhodesia; and (iv) that the union or organization does not allow its funds or facilities to be used for political purposes. Even if a trade union or employers' organization does not meet the requirements enabling it to be registered, it is not removed from the operation of the Act. Thus, an unregistered union or employers' organization must furnish financial information to the industrial registrar and must not use its funds and facilities to further the interests of political organizations.

310. Only registered trade unions, on the one hand, and registered employers' organizations or employers approved by industrial registrars, on the other, may form a registered industrial council. The industrial council system permits trade unions and employers' organizations to negotiate on all questions affecting conditions of employment; the purpose of the council is to settle or to prevent industrial disputes. An agreement made by a council may cover such matters as: the minimum rate of remuneration including the method of computation of such rate; the special conditions of employment governing women, juveniles or apprentices; contributions to the union, to employers' organization or to a council; the establishment of pensions and sick, unemployment or other insurance funds; and safety and health measures. The agreement reached by a council can be made legally binding by the Minister and can be extended to employers and employees who are not members of the trade union or employers' organization.

311. The act also takes account of those industries for which no industrial council has been registered. Industrial boards composed of employer and employee representatives, under a neutral chairman, are established after application by either employer or employee. They may also be established on the instruction of the Minister. On the basis of the recommendations made by industrial boards, enforceable regulations concerning the minimum wage and other conditions of employment are established by the Minister.

312. In case there is no industrial council or industrial board, the Minister is empowered to convene a conciliation board. In general, the procedures and powers of the conciliation board are similar to those of an industrial council.

313. The Act also sets up industrial courts to hear appeals from administrative decisions and, in certain circumstances, to act as an arbitration court.

314. An industrial council, conciliation board or the Minister may decide that voluntary arbitration is necessary to settle a dispute and in that case a mediator, or umpire, may be appointed. Compulsory arbitration can be ordered in the following cases: when a dispute arises concerning certain public utilities; when the industrial council fails to come to an agreement governing the conditions of employment; when there is no agreement by the parties to accept voluntary mediation; or when voluntary mediation has failed. An award of voluntary or compulsory arbitration is binding on the parties to the dispute.

315. Under the Act, strikes or lockouts are prohibited when a dispute arises in industries furnishing essential services, e.g. light, water, power, or sanitation; and the award of compulsory arbitration is final. Strikes and lockouts are permitted only after all of the conciliation procedures are exhausted; in that event, the employers or employees must

²² The second schedule of the Rhodesia Railways Act of 1949, as amended, makes special provisions for industrial councils.

notify the Minister, within a specified period, of their intention not to be bound by an award.

(b) *Trade unions, employers' organizations, industrial councils and industrial boards*

316. Information concerning the number of African trade unions and the extent of their membership, prior to the passage of Industrial Conciliation Act of 1959, is not available. The only African trade union which received statutory recognition was the Rhodesia Railways African Employees Association. Other African workers' organizations earned *de facto* recognition in dealing with employers, but these organizations had no legal rights concerning collective bargaining. In 1951, there were twenty-two non-African trade unions with a membership of approximately 14,000 persons, registered under the Industrial Conciliation Act of 1945. These non-African unions represented skilled occupations or crafts. Included were: building, engineering, motor, printing, mining artisans, railway workers, meat workers, barbers, shop assistants, bank officials, journalists and municipal workers. During the period of economic expansion, namely 1951-1956, non-African union membership did not increase to any considerable extent. By 1958, the total union membership of registered trade unions was reported at 15,592, among the twenty-seven registered non-African unions.

317. One of the immediate results of the Industrial Conciliation Act of 1959 was the increase in the membership of registered trade unions. By the end of 1960, the membership of such unions rose to 25,251, which represented an increase of approximately 8,000 over the preceding year. Most of the new unions, which were registered under the Act, were predominantly African in membership. According to the report of the Industrial Registrar for the year ended 1963, these unions cater to semi-skilled and unskilled labour, in which Africans are the vast majority. Some of the older European unions, such as those in the mining, printing, explosives and steel industries, have organized along non-racial lines. One union, namely the Southern Rhodesia Catering and Hotel Workers' Union, although originally organized by African employees, admitted about forty European employees immediately after registration in 1962. It would appear, however, that the majority of unions have remained predominantly or exclusively of one race.

318. In 1961, 31 unions, 24 employers' organizations and 18 industrial councils were registered under the Industrial Conciliation Act of 1959. During the same year, 54 separate industrial boards were established to fix the minimum working conditions of various unorganized industries.

319. During the years 1962 and 1963, the number of employers and employees using the procedures of the Industrial Conciliation Act increased. The number of trade unions rose from forty-five in 1962 to fifty-eight in 1963. The number of trade union members increased not only with the establishment of new unions but also because the older trade unions increased their membership by broadening their area of jurisdiction or by representing additional interests of various classes of employees. For instance, in 1962, approximately 45,000 African semi-skilled and unskilled employees in the mining industry were brought within the scope of the existing industrial council for that industry as a result of the extension of the registration of the Associated Mine Workers of Rhodesia. Similarly, the Industrial Councils for the Motor Industry in Matabeleland and Mashonaland extended their areas of jurisdiction to include Midlands and Manicaland.

320. The number of employers' organizations rose from twenty-eight to thirty between 1962 and 1963, while the number of industrial councils increased from twenty-two to twenty-six. It is not clear why the number of employees covered by industrial council agreements did not register a proportionate increase. According to figures released by the Department of Labour and Social Welfare, in the year 1962, 150,000 employees and 5,500 employers were under the jurisdiction of industrial councils. The same source states that at the end of 1963, 115,580 employees were covered by industrial agreements. A similar decline is recorded in the number of employees governed by the employment regulations made by industrial boards. The fifty-four industrial boards made regulations

affecting 158,000 employees in 1962. The number of employees covered by such regulations fell to 107,307 in 1963, when the number of boards declined from fifty-four to fifty-three. It is expected that there will be a further decrease in the number of industrial boards as more industries are organized.

Legislation affecting the conditions of African employment

(a) *The Masters and Servants Act*

321. The Masters and Servants Act (Cap. 247) of 1901, as amended, regulates the employment of persons engaged in handicrafts, or "bodily labour" in domestic service, mining, agriculture, husbandry, trade and manufacture. While the Act covers all types of labourers, it specifically excludes skilled workmen. The Act governs employer and employee relations in sectors which are not generally covered by the Industrial Conciliation Act. In rural areas, it establishes the minimum conditions of employment for Africans on European farms and on small European enterprises. The Act also regulates the conditions of African domestic servants in both urban and rural areas.

322. Part I of the Act, which deals with the contract of service, establishes minimum working standards. If the contract is for a period of one year, it cannot provide for more than 313 working days; in case the contract is for another calendar period, a proportionate number of working days may be stipulated. The contract may not provide for more than ten hours of work per day. In the absence of an express stipulation, wages are payable on the completion of thirty working days. Although no special form of contract is required, every contract must specify the date of commencement of the contract, the period of service and the wages. In cases where the employee is to reside on the premises, unless otherwise stipulated, the employer must provide lodging and food. Unless the parties agree, the employee is not entitled to maintain his family on the premises, but the presence of the employee's wife and family on the employers' premises does not automatically give rise to a claim for their services. Penal sanctions are imposed on the employer and employee for contravention of the provisions of the Act. Thus, if an employee without cause absents himself from his place of work, is intoxicated, is neglectful or disobedient or abusive, he may be found guilty of an offence and liable to a fine. Imprisonment may be ordered in default of payment of the fine. An employer is subject to fine or imprisonment for failure to pay wages, or refusal to deliver the property of a servant. An employee who has served a term of imprisonment or is absent without permission may be required to remain in the service of the employer for the period of the imprisonment or the period of absence. Nothing in the Act, if inconsistent, is to be considered as repealing any existing laws or regulations relating to Africans.

(b) *The African Labour Regulations (Identification) Act*

323. The African Labour Regulations Act (Cap. 100) of 1911, as amended, was designed to govern "the recruiting and employment of Africans within Southern Rhodesia and for controlling the removal of Africans for employment beyond its borders, to check clandestine African emigration from Southern Rhodesia...". The Act sets up a system for the recruitment of African labour. In addition to recruitment, the Act also regulates conditions of employment on unskilled labour employed in mining, agriculture, African husbandry, trade or manufacture. Domestic servants and skilled workmen are excluded from the scope of the Act.

324. Only the holder of an employer's recruiting licence or someone working on his behalf may recruit African labourers. Assistants to a licensed agent or employer receive remuneration calculated at a "rate per head of Africans recruited". African chiefs and headmen are prohibited from acting, either directly or indirectly, as recruiting agents.

325. The contract of employment must be written and be attested; and proof of a medical examination of the recruited African labourer is also required. If the contract relates to employment outside of the Territory, it must be registered. Expenses for the transfer of Africans from their home to the place of employment are borne by the employer, or in

some instances, by the labour agent; such expenses include food, drinking water, fuel, cooking utensils, clothing and blankets.

326. When an employer engages 300 or more African labourers, the Act specifies that he must have a "compound manager" in order to supervise the compound or other accommodation used by his employees. The Act also stipulates that the Minister may prescribe certain areas in which an African may enter; such area may not extend more than twenty-five miles from the border of Southern Rhodesia. Inspectors of African labourers are appointed by the Minister to inquire into and to determine minor contraventions of the regulations on the part of Africans. The inspector also is permitted to bring before a court Africans who violate the provision of the Act.

327. In order to carry out the purposes of the Act, the Governor is authorized to make regulations concerning: the issues, form and surrender of licences; the execution, attestation, registration, enforcement or cancellation of contracts; the return of African labourers who do not possess a valid contract of employment; the recruitment of Africans and their conveyance to labour centres or other destinations; the control of African labourers during their sojourn in native districts; the medical examination and vaccination of African labourers; the proper housing and feeding of labourers; the control of compounds; the quarters for married African labourers; and the establishing of recruiting areas and central bureaus to which all Africans are taken for registration and the practices applicable at such bureaus, before allocation to the prospective employer. The administration of the Act is not uniform throughout the Territory and it is specified that different regulations may be made in regard to different districts or areas.

(c) *The Africans (Registration and Identification) Act*

328. The Africans (Registration and Identification) Act (Cap. 109) of 1957, as amended, provides that all Africans must be registered and receive a certificate of registration or a registration book. Certain classes of Africans, who are deemed "fit and proper" are entitled to receive an identity card. The possessor of an identity card is relieved of the obligation of holding a certificate of registration, or a registration book. Moreover, he is relieved of complying with any by-law or regulation made by a local authority requiring an African to be in possession of a pass. An employer must demand from his African employee his certificate of registration, registration book or identity card. These documents are endorsed to indicate the employment status of the holder. The endorsement includes such information as the date of commencement of service and the wages paid. Thus, unless the document indicates that the employee has been discharged and is available for further employment, both the employer and employee may be subject to criminal penalties for hiring or being hired, when the African employee is under contract to another. Criminal sanctions are imposed on both Africans and employers and others who violate the provisions of the Act. For example, fines or imprisonment are imposed for failure on the part of an African to be in possession or to produce the proper documents. Similarly, an employer who, on the termination of the contract, refuses to grant a proper discharge at the request of an African is liable to penal sanctions.

(d) *The Africans (Urban Areas) Accommodation and Registration Act*

329. The Africans (Urban Areas) Accommodation and Registration Act (Cap. 110) of 1951, as amended, was enacted "to make provision for employers to provide free accommodation for their African servants and certain wives of such servants and for purposes connected herewith, and for regulation and control by local authorities of Africans seeking employment in or visiting local authority area". The Act is in force in six municipalities in the Territory.

330. Under part I of the Act, a local authority area may be declared a "designated area" by the Governor. In a designated area the employer must provide accommodation, at his own expense, to an African employee. The accommodation is

either in "a licensed private premise" or in an "African residential area" (an African township or any location so designated under the Native Urban Locations Act). A licensed premise forms part of the premises occupied by the employer and must meet the standards specified in the Act. An African employee may also be accommodated in an "African village settlement" (an African township established under the Land Apportionment Act) and in that case, the employee pays a portion of the rent. When the employee is accommodated in an African residential area, the employer is required to pay rent to the local authority. The rent is the same whether the employee is married or single. If the employee's wages are higher than that which is prescribed by law, he is obliged to contribute a specified portion of his wages for his accommodation in an African residential area.

331. Under part II, a local authority area may be designated a "proclaimed area" if the Governor is satisfied that the authority has set aside an "African township" (an area so designated under the Land Apportionment Act). In an African residential area the local authority must purchase or erect and maintain a hostel for the accommodation of Africans seeking employment or visiting the local authority area.

332. In connexion with proclaimed areas, the local authority is required to keep a statutory account known as the African Reserve Account. Into this account must be paid all rents and other revenues derived from the management and administration of such area or areas. The account is chargeable with the costs of services rendered by the local authority to such area or any hostel maintained therein or other services for the welfare of the inhabitants.

333. Most of the above-cited legislation has been subject to criticism by the Government Departments administering them or by Government Commissions examining the effects of their implementation. For example, when the Africans (Registration and Identification) Bill was introduced, the Minister indicated that the Act did not make the necessary provisions regarding the easing of urban pass control, which the Division for Native Affairs had requested. The Report of the Urban African Affairs Commission of 1958 indicated that the registration system was not operating effectively in any large urban centres. The Commission concluded that the Act could not be implemented efficiently without adding staff costs and "without in effect creating an administrative and police mechanism which would be destructive to personal liberty". The Commission received evidence that the constant obligation to be in possession of identity documents is a cause of frustration and irritation to law-abiding Africans. On the other hand, some persons used documents to escape criminal detection. The Commission endorsed the view expressed by Dr. Sheila van der Horst in her article on "Equal Pay for Equal Work" in which she stated: "We are creating an administrative network and turning into law breakers and statutory criminals many of those who simply seek a livelihood". Similar views were expressed in 1961 by the Commission Appointed to Inquire into and Report on Administrative and Judicial Functions in the Native Affairs and District Courts Departments. The Commission noted that Africans who were arrear in taxes often destroyed their registration certificates or identity cards and received duplicate documents which did not state their tax delinquencies.

334. The African (Urban Areas) Accommodation and Registration Act has also been criticized as being ineffectual. The Secretary of Native Affairs and Chief Native Commissioner in his report to the Legislative Assembly in 1958 stated:

"However well intentioned the legislature was in passing this Act it has not fulfilled its purpose and in most towns there is a demand by Natives for housing. The extent of the unsatisfied backlog varies in seriousness from place to place."

The Secretary for Local Government and Housing, who is now charged with administering the Act, in his report to the Legislative Assembly in 1963 stated:

"There is a growing feeling in many quarters that in the light of present conditions extensive amendments to this Act are necessary—if not its repeal and substitution for new legis-

lation. The question of the consolidation of rent allowances with wages is still under consideration by the Ministry of Labour."

B. WAGES

335. The Industrial Conciliation Act of 1959 is not applicable to agricultural workers and those in domestic service. In 1963, it was estimated that 356,590 persons were employed in these sectors. Of the estimated remaining 339,410 employees who were engaged in other sectors, 222,187 were covered by the wage-fixing apparatus of the Act. It is difficult to assess the effects of the Act on the wage structure of the Territory, because since its passage wages have increased in sectors which are included within the scope of the Act, as well as those excluded. However, as will be indicated below, in the field of private domestic services, and in the agricultural sector (in regard to Africans) the rate of increase in wages has been slower than in other sectors of the economy. There have been substantial wage increases in semi-skilled and unskilled trades and occupations; this has primarily benefited the African worker. There are instances where the rise in wages can be directly attributed to the effects of the Act. For example, in 1961, after the trade unions in the construction industry accepted Africans into their membership, these unions negotiated a new agreement which raised the minimum wage for artisans in African areas from 1s. per hour to 3s. per hour. The following table lists the average statutory wages in industries for the year 1963:

STATUTORY WAGES IN INDUSTRIES

	Average statutory minimum monthly wage *		
	£.	s.	d.
Food: baking, cold storage, food processing, meat processing, milling, sugar, sweets and confectionery	10	4	4
Beverages: aerated water, brewing, distilling	11	11	1
Tobacco (including packing and commercial grading): cigarettes and tobacco, tobacco miscellaneous	10	5	10
Textiles	9	19	5
Footwear and wearing apparel: clothing, leather and shoes	11	6	5
Wood and cork products (except furniture): lumber milling, matches	10	8	6
Furniture and fixtures: furniture and joinery	9	15	0
Paper and paper products: paper	9	2	0
Leather excluding footwear: suitcase and travel goods	9	15	0
Rubber products: Dunlop Limited	13	0	0
Chemicals and chemical products: chemicals, detergents, pesticides	10	12	4
Petrol and coal products: petrol and oil distributors	10	12	4
Non-metallic mineral products: asbestos-cement, cement and lime, quarrying	9	19	4
Basic metal industries: iron and steel	8	13	4
Manufactured metal products (excluding machinery): engineering	8	13	4
Machinery (excluding electrical machinery): engineering	8	13	4
Electrical machinery: engineering	8	13	4
Transport equipment (excluding vehicle manufacture): engineering	8	13	4
Miscellaneous manufacturing: batteries, brushmaking, concrete products, paints, plastics, radio and television, brick-making and clay products, fertilizers	9	11	1
Motor vehicle manufacturing	14	12	6

* To the above monthly wages should be added an accommodation allowance of up to 30s. per month, for employees earning less than £22 per month.

336. There is a great disparity in the wages of non-Africans as compared to Africans. This is in part due to the fact that the large majority of African employees are unskilled. Moreover, there is a large and relatively elastic supply of labour, in relation to the demand for unskilled labour. The fact that African labour did not participate in the general wage-fixing apparatus until the introduction of the Industrial Conciliation Act of 1959, also contributed to their lower wage levels. Several other factors have contributed to the depressed level of the wages of African workers. There is no pool of skilled labour in the Territory, and employees have been imported from the United Kingdom and South Africa for skilled and most of the semi-skilled work. There have been very few attempts on the part of Government or private employers to train Africans for skilled or semi-skilled trades and occupations. Africans and non-Africans have worked in different economic spheres and even when the same or similar type work was performed by both Africans and non-Africans, different wages were applicable. The Secretary of Labour, Social Welfare and Housing, in his report to the Minister for the year 1961, refers to the convention of "white" and "black" jobs. The report cites the construction industry as one where different rates of pay were applicable to the same work, solely because of race. It was noted that Europeans employed by the Federal Public Works Department worked in prescribed areas surrounding towns; African artisans employed by the Southern Rhodesian Engineering and Construction Department did the same work in African and rural areas at considerably lower rates of pay. In one undertaking, namely, the Rhodesian Railway, the distinction between "black" and "white" jobs has been eliminated. As a result of an agreement reached by the National Industrial Council for the Rhodesia Railways in 1960, every job on the Railways was opened to all persons irrespective of race. By the end of 1960, steps were taken to implement the agreement and recruits of all races were attending training schools. According to the Secretary for Labour, Social Welfare and Housing, this "was one of the most outstanding advances ever made in industrial relations in Southern Rhodesia".

337. Although some progress has been made in reducing the wage differential between African and non-African, the table given below indicates that much remains to be done. In the table, earnings include (i) cash wages, salaries, allowances, commissions and bonuses; (ii) employers' contributions to pension funds and medical aid societies; and (iii) the cash value of all income received in kind, e.g., food and housing.

338. The African wage level increased at a compound rate of 6.1 per cent between 1954 and 1962. The European rate of increase was estimated at 3.6 per cent during the same period. The extent of the increase in the earnings of Africans varied in the several sectors of the economy. Whereas the wages in the manufacturing sector and the electricity/water sector rose by more than 100 per cent in the years 1954 to 1960, the wages in the private domestic sector increased by only approximately 40 per cent during the same period. Agriculture recorded the lowest percentage of increase and it was the only sector where the rate of increase was slower among Africans as compared to non-Africans in the years 1954 to 1962.

339. Statistics of average incomes have less significance in a community where wide disparities prevail in living standards among different population groups. It was estimated in 1961 that some 81,500 Europeans in wage employment received £95.6 million, or an average of £1,173 per person. During the same year, 4,200 Asian and coloured employees received wages and salaries totaling £2.4 million or average annual earnings of £573; while 624,000 Africans were paid £59 million, or an average of £95 per person. Non-African employees were paid £98 million, or twice the total wage earnings of African workers. This disparity is striking when it is recalled that the ratio of African employees to non-Africans is more than seven to one.

340. The table given above does not include income of Africans in the rural subsistence economy, as they are classified as self-employed. Figures based on cash earnings only and excluding payments in kind indicate that in 1961 Africans in paid employment received an average of £55 in agriculture

AVERAGE ANNUAL EARNINGS OF EMPLOYEES BY INDUSTRIAL SECTOR

(£)

Year	Agriculture, forestry and fishing	Mining and quarrying	Manu- facturing	Con- struction	Electricity, water and sanitary services	Com- merce	Transport and communi- cations	Services	
								Private domestic	Other
African									
1954	48	83	65	65	71	88	94	71	84
1960	59	115	125	106	121	120	166	94	124
1962	61	124	164	122	147	159	209	102	165
1963	67	132	183	149	156	165	259	105	172
1964	67	144	198	162	168	180	292	110	180
European, Asian and Coloured									
1954	833	1,169	973	1,022	1,118	685	1,042		843
1960	1,156	1,526	1,212	1,291	1,294	995	1,249		1,063
1962	1,166	1,597	1,297	1,289	1,391	1,073	1,302		1,097
1963	1,241	1,627	1,357	1,361	1,506	1,064	1,363		1,139
1964	1,283	1,662	1,394	1,380	1,587	1,107	1,414		1,118

while the annual *per capita* income of African rural households in the subsistence economy averaged £18.

ANNEX

FINANCE COMPANIES

1. Several large financial houses have had such multifarious dealings in the economy of Rhodesia and, indeed, in the economy of East, Central and Southern Africa, that it has been considered proper to annex a separate section dealing with these corporations. Because of its major and singular interest in the Territory, the British South Africa Company, now known as Charter Consolidated, Ltd., merits particular attention and is dealt with first.

BRITISH SOUTH AFRICA CO.

2. On 1 April 1965, the British South Africa Co. merged with two other major groups, Central Mining and Investment Corp. and the Consolidated Mines Selection Company to form the new Charter Consolidated, Ltd. It holds assets in excess of £142 million.^a

3. The British South Africa Co., or "Chartered" as it has been called, existed as a separate entity for seventy-five years, and played a unique and dominant role in the Territory from its formation in 1889 until 1923. On 29 October 1889, a royal charter^b was granted to Cecil Rhodes and six other associates to "Constitute, erect and incorporate into one body politic and corporate by the name of The British South Africa Company". The object of the new company was to exploit the mineral wealth of the Territory "north of British Bechuanaland, and to the north and west of the South African Republic, and to the west of the Portuguese Dominions", an area covering approximately 500,000 square miles, on the basis of the Rudd concession. Another agreement was added to enforce the control of the Company over the Territory, namely the concession which Edouard Lippert had purportedly obtained from Lobengula, the king of the Matabele "to grant lease or rent land" in Lobengula's name.

4. In 1890 an agreement was secured from the Chief of Barotseland (now part of Zambia), Lewanika. By this agreement, the Company became entitled to the royalties on the output of the Copperbelt.

5. The Company was originally incorporated with a capital of £1 million, but more funds had to be raised until in 1923 the paid up capital reached £9 million. However, dividends were paid to shareholders for nearly twenty years. The Company's capital expenditures remained high. The Company was responsible for the administration of the Territory; railways and other communications were built and various forms of development had to be undertaken in opening the new country.

^a *The Cape Times*, 27 January 1965.

^b Supplemental Charters were signed on 8 June 1900, 13 March 1915, 25 March 1924 and 16 August 1954.

For these reasons, the royalties which the Company collected on mineral rights did not offer great profits, particularly since mineral production was slow to develop. In 1893, the Matabele tribes rose against the settlers and a war was fought by the Company to subdue them; the whole of what now constitutes Southern Rhodesia was then occupied. It was not until the end of 1897 that the fighting completely ended.

6. The introduction in 1897 of the first railway (from Kimberley in South Africa to Bulawayo) marks an important date in the economic activities of the Company; in 1899 the railroad from Beira (Mozambique) to Salisbury (via Umtali) was inaugurated. In 1902 Salisbury and Bulawayo were connected by rail; in 1904 the line to Victoria Falls was completed. These developments made mining on a large scale profitable; machinery could be imported more cheaply, ores and agricultural produce could be exported and coal began to be delivered from the Wankie coalfields to the mines. Services of a social nature were also introduced by the Company.

7. The Company, with its extensive rights, sought to attract both miners and farmers into the country. It gradually developed a position as a financial trust, with shares in railways and other undertakings, and became the principal source of credit to smaller entrepreneurs.

8. When the Company realized that gold did not exist in the Territory in the same proportions and concentration as in the Transvaal, it encouraged prospection by small workers by changing the system of levying revenue. Between the Boer War and the First World War the financial position of the Company improved, owing mainly to the advance in gold production, but also the beginning of base metal mining. The Company began to promote land settlement and farming more vigorously; its revenues increased through the sale of land to settlers, and with more settlement, custom receipts and railway proceeds increased.

9. In 1922 a referendum was held in the Territory on the status issue. In 1923, thirty-four years after the grant of the Company's first charter, the Territory was formally annexed to the British Crown and "Responsible Government" was established. This was followed a year later by the assumption by the British Government of responsibility for Northern Rhodesia (Zambia). The British South Africa Company then became a purely commercial enterprise.

Settlement with the United Kingdom Government

10. The Company relinquished all financial claims against the United Kingdom Government arising from its past administrative deficits, in return for a cash payment of £3,750,000, of which £2 million was to be contributed by the settlers. Its mining rights were guaranteed, and, as far as the railways were concerned, specific safeguards were granted to it to protect its investments. The property of all unalienated lands passed to the new Southern Rhodesian Government. In Northern Rhodesia the Company retained extensive areas of freehold property as well as all mineral rights. It also retained a half interest for forty years in the net proceeds of

the disposal of land in north-western Rhodesia: this was computed in 1956 for an annual payment of £50,000, until March 1965.

11. The shareholders of the Company had not received any dividends for thirty-four years. However, the Company's role in British capital investment in Southern Rhodesia had been crucial and dominating. In 1924, the Company paid an initial dividend of 6d. per share to its stockholders. Its financial position henceforth improved quickly.

12. From 1923 to 1933 the average annual income of the Company from mineral royalties in Southern Rhodesia was about £100,000. Permits were granted to large well-financed companies which were under an obligation to spend minimum sums each year on mineral prospection. The Company frequently obtained an interest in these companies, in addition to retaining the right to part of any metals produced. Its railway interests accounted for nearly 80 per cent of the total railways system, and the mineral expansion contributed to extra traffic on and added profits from those interests.

13. In 1937, a refinancing plan relieved the Company of its liability for, such as the debenture capital as it had guaranteed in the railways; while the guarantee existed, the Company held large quantities of government stock; with its disappearance a large measure of the government bond holdings was sold and the money was used to acquire, among other investments, a substantial stake in the Anglo-American Corporation of South Africa. This was the major event which led to the close association between the British South Africa Company and the Anglo-American Group; the recent merger of Chartered with Consolidated Mines Selection, which is the London-based financial company of the Anglo-American Group, is a consequence of that previous association.

14. In 1933, following elections in Southern Rhodesia in which the question of mineral rights was a major controversy, an agreement was concluded between the Company and the Southern Rhodesian Government under which the former relinquished to the Government all its mineral rights in the Territory in return for a payment of £2 million.

15. The railway interests of Chartered were sold to the Governments concerned in 1947 for £3.15 million.

16. Meanwhile, Chartered was expanding its activities in Northern Rhodesia and taking advantage of the rising world demand for copper. New prospecting companies concluded agreements with it to exploit this demand; of these, Rhodesia Concessions Ltd. was the first: it included combined British and American interests, the former represented by Sir Edmund Davis, the latter by Alfred Chester Beatty. Subsequently, the whole Copperbelt came to be developed by two giant and interconnected combines: the Rhodesian Anglo-American Corporation which primarily drew its capital from South Africa and also from the United Kingdom, and the Rhodesia Selection Trust in which American capital was preponderant.

17. The Company's receipts from Zambian copper increased substantially as copper prices and output rose; they became the major part of its income. As a large shareholder in the Rhodesian Anglo-American Corporation and as an associate of Rhodesia Broken Hill, the major zinc producer, its revenues expanded further.^c

18. In 1949, the Company signed an agreement with the Northern Rhodesian Government to relinquish its mineral rights in 1986, in return for the surrender of 20 per cent of the royalty income to the Government and a guarantee that there would be no discriminatory taxation on the balance. The Company invested large amounts in various industries and subsidiary companies in both Southern and Northern Rhodesia: those investments were intended to replace the lost income from mineral rights and to plan for the future when this income would cease completely. On 24 October 1964, the mineral royalties were transferred to the Government of Zambia for a capital sum of £4 million, half paid by the Zambia Government and half, *ex gratia*, by the United Kingdom Government.

^c In 1958, the Company's income from royalties on mineral rights amounted to £6 million out of a total revenue of £9 million.

Property and operations of the British South Africa Company

19. The authorized capital of B.S.A. originally was £1 million in £1 shares. On 1 May 1924, 5s. per share were returned to the holders, thus reducing the share value to 15/-. In 1955, the authorized capital was increased from £6,750,000 to £13,500,000 by capitalizing nearly £6.5 million of reserves and creating 9 million new shares. In 1959, the capital was increased to £14,250,000 by creating 1 million new shares; an agreement was further concluded with the Union Corporation Ltd. Group,^d whereby 455,000 fully paid shares were issued to a subsidiary of the latter and 700,000 fully paid shares of 2s. 6d. each in Union Corp. were issued to a subsidiary of the British S.A. Co.

20. In 1963, prior to its merger with the two other leading mining groups, and in addition to the substantial revenue derived from the mining royalties in Zambia, and from other mining stock, British S.A. derived profits from agricultural estates totalling 144,000 acres in Southern Rhodesia.^e The farming operations carried out by the Group were mostly in afforestation and timber processing and citrus products for world markets. In addition, the Company received annual payments at the rate of £50,000 from the Government of Northern Rhodesia under the agreement of 1956. The principal share register was kept in the United Kingdom; a Dominion register was kept in Salisbury and in Johannesburg.

List of subsidiaries and interests of the Group in 1963

21. *Subsidiaries registered in the United Kingdom.* The British South Africa Co. Citrus Products Ltd., The British South Africa Co. Holdings Ltd., The British South Africa Co. Investments Ltd., The British South Africa Co. Management Services Ltd., Cecil Holdings Ltd., Cecil Investments Ltd. and The Rhodesia Railway Trust Ltd.

22. *Subsidiaries registered in Southern Rhodesia.* Beit Holdings (Pvt.) Ltd., Charter Propertie (Pvt.) Ltd., Indaba Investments (Pvt.) Ltd., Jameson Development Holdings (Pvt.) Ltd., Northern Mining Holdings (Pvt.) Ltd., First Property Co. (Pvt.) Ltd., Varied Investments (Pvt.) Ltd., Rhodesia and Nyasaland Forest Enterprises (Pvt.) Ltd.

23. *Subsidiaries registered in Zambia.* Charter Finance and Investment Co. of Northern Rhodesia Ltd., Ridgeway Finance Co. Ltd.

24. *Other subsidiaries.* Coniarum Holdings Ltd. (Canada).

25. The British South Africa Company holds large interests in Border Forests (Rhodesia) Ltd., Rhodesian Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. and a half interest in The Rhodesian Milling Co. (Pvt.) Ltd. and has substantial investment in many other industrial and financial companies.

26. In 1963 the Group acquired a substantial interest in the Société Internationale Pirelli S.A. of Switzerland.

Investments

27. Details of the various classes of investments held by the British South Africa Company Group are given in the following table:

30 September 1963		
	Quoted investments market value	Unquoted investments directors' valuation
£100		
Northern Rhodesian mining and finance companies	8,581	2,858
Rhodesian industrial and other interests	439	6,705
Other African mining finance companies	24,330	—
United Kingdom and other investments	9,511	4,405
United States of America	6,369	—
Canada	3,012	219
	52,241	14,188
		<u>66,429</u>

^d This international interest has its major investments in the Republic of South Africa.

^e About 120 "Europeans" and 3,000 "Africans" were employed on these estates.

28. Under the 1962 amendment to the Company's charter, not less than two thirds of the directors (including the president and vice-president) and the Company's principal representative in Africa had the status of British subjects. The Company's board in 1963 was composed as follows: Mr. P. V. Emrys-Evans (UK) (President), Mr. L. F. A. d'Erlanger (UK), Mr. R. Annan (UK), Mr. M. F. Berry (UK), Mr.

H. Grenfell (UK), the Viscount Malvern (UK), Mr. H. F. Oppenheimer (S.A.), Mr. W. M. Robson (UK), Sir Keith Acutt (UK), Sir Frederick Crawford (S. Rho.), Mr. H. A. Smith (UK) and Mr. T. P. Stratten (S.A.).

29. The consolidated accounts of the British South Africa Company for the years 1961-1963 are reproduced below:

LIABILITIES (£)

30 September	Share capital	Capital reserves	Revenue reserves	Futures taxation	Debentures		Minority share-holders
					4½% 1978-83	4% 1978-83	
1961	13,482,003	5,455,153	28,878,678	32,975	500,000	500,000	83,138
1962	13,482,003	5,721,010	33,265,725	116,169	500,000	500,000	78,715
1963	13,482,003	8,894,399	37,235,896	116,811	500,000	500,000	80,126
		Provision for pensions	Unclaimed dividends	Interest accrued	Creditors	Taxation	Dividends
1961		81,532	144,884	13,016	911,527	4,678,043	4,128,863
1962		79,339	154,060	13,016	1,009,112	4,319,028	4,128,863
1963	(in "Creditors")		160,698	13,016	1,146,861	4,655,025	4,128,863

ASSETS (£)

		<i>Investments</i>			<i>Unclaimed dividends fund</i>	<i>Stock and stores</i>	
<i>30 September</i>		<i>Fixed assets</i>	<i>Quoted</i>	<i>Market value</i>			<i>Unquoted</i>
1961	5,640,732	31,189,348	36,823,300	12,934,273	144,884	386,187
1962	5,925,616	32,331,706	40,802,706	14,848,322	154,060	877,456
1963	6,176,195	39,367,219	52,241,216	14,906,571	160,698	1,108,662
		<i>Government stock at market value</i>	<i>Debtors</i>	<i>Tax repayable</i>	<i>Short-term loans</i>	<i>Cash</i>	<i>Total assets</i>
1961	2,619,635	1,720,983	327,696	3,291,443	634,631	58,889,812
1962	2,829,967	1,881,569	222,454	3,328,748	967,142	63,367,040
1963	1,071,377	2,500,524	4,233	4,789,994	828,225	70,913,698

RESULTS (£)

		<i>Revenue from</i>			
<i>30 September</i>		<i>Dividends interest</i>	<i>Mining royalties</i>	<i>Realization of investments</i>	<i>Less: depreciation of investments, etc.</i>
1961	4,090,056	10,303,088	1,811,040	1,733,492
1962	4,703,379	10,906,195	144,330	Cr. 167,043
1963	4,812,436	10,618,635	267,349	Cr. 56,408
		<i>Profits</i>	<i>Taxation</i>	<i>Remaining profits</i>	<i>Net dividend amount</i>
1961	13,570,871	5,610,459	7,960,412	4,128,863
1962	14,597,207	6,068,468	8,528,739	4,128,863
1963	14,422,634	6,323,600	8,099,034	4,128,863

Merger of the British South Africa Co. with the Central Mining and Investment Corp. Ltd. and the Consolidated Mines Selection Co. Ltd.

30. At the time of its merger with Consolidated Mines Selection and Central Mining and Investment in 1964, Chartered's total assets exceeded £80 million. As stated above, there had been a connexion between the British South Africa Co. and the Anglo-American Group[†] since 1937. Several companies of the Anglo-American Group later acquired holdings in the British South Africa Co.

31. Consolidated Mines Selection represented an important part of the non-African interests of Anglo-American, and was based in London. Furthermore, both Chartered and Consolidated owned shares in Central Mining which was also a London interest.

[†] Anglo-American is considered to be the largest mining financial interest in South Africa.

32. Under the new arrangement establishing Charter Consolidated, members of the Anglo-American Group are the largest single shareholders in Charter Consolidated (approximately 30 per cent of the capital). The interests of Charter Consolidated are spread as to 39 per cent in the Republic of South Africa, 16 per cent in the rest of Africa, 23 per cent in North America, and 22 per cent elsewhere.[‡]

33. The starting point for the division of the capital of Charter Consolidated between the shareholders of the three companies was that Chartered's holders should receive the same nominal amount of capital, but expressed as three 5s. shares instead of one 15s. share, the latter having been the nominal value since the repayment of 5s. of the original £1 of capital in 1924. Shareholders of Central Mining and Investment Corporation next in order of size, were allocated twenty-

[‡] The non-African interests are held mostly by Hudson's Bay Mining and Smelting, Rio Tinto Zinc, Rhodesia Railways Trust and Société Internationale Pirelli S. A.

three shares in the new company for each £1 share held, while to holders of Consolidated Mines Selection went twenty-one shares of Charter Consolidated's for every ten 10s. share held. These terms were approved by the shareholders and gave Charter Consolidated an initial issued capital of 97,367,579 shares. These terms meant that holders of Chartered received 55.4 per cent of the equity of Charter Consolidated, and those in Central Mining 25.1 per cent, while Consolidated Mines Selection's holders were allocated 19.5 per cent. The authorized capital of the new company was set at 130 million shares. They became operative on 1 April 1965.

34. On a calculation made at the end of 1964, taking the market value of quoted securities and the agreed value for the purpose of the merger for those for which there was no market price, the new company had net assets of £142 million.

35. Following the formation of Charter Consolidated, an agreement has been reached with Zambia Anglo-American for the merging of their Rhodesian interests within the AMRHO Company.^b As a result of this merger AMRHO is enlarged with net assets of some £19.6 million. The Company is held as to 47.7 per cent by Zambia Anglo-American and 36.9 by Charter Consolidated.

36. The authorized capital of the new company is £30 million divided into 120 million shares of 5s. each, of which 93,367,579 shares are issued as follows: to the members of Chartered, 53,928,012 shares, to the members of Central Mining 24,437,500 shares, and to the members of Consolidated Mines Selection, 19,002,067 shares. The Chairman of the new company is Mr. P. V. Emrys-Evans, President of the British South Africa Co.; the Deputy Chairmen are Mr. S. D. H. Pollen and Mr. H. V. Smith; the managing director is Mr. W. D. Wilson; the other directors include Sir Keith Acutt, Mr. A. Chester Beatty (also director of Selection Trust and the British Overseas Mining Association), Mr. C. W. Engelhard, Mr. H. St. L. Grenfell, Mr. H. F. Oppenheimer, Mr. Evelyn de Rothschild and Mr. T. P. Stratten.

37. In January 1965, the boards of the three companies issued a statement expressing the hope that the merger would create a unit of great strength with a wide spread of interests, able to promote and undertake business on a major scale.

38. While there were many similarities in the nature of the businesses and investments of the three companies, they had individually a number of different associations and activities which together they would be able to develop to greater advantage on an international basis. It was intended that the new company, either alone or in association with other institutions, should actively seek new business in mining, commerce and industry throughout the world. The establishment of major new projects called for large technical and financial resources, and the new company would be able to play a more important role and obtain greater benefits than the three companies individually. Furthermore, the integration of the business activities and administration of the three companies should result, over a period of time, in considerable economies.

39. In April 1965, it was announced that the issued capital of the subsidiaries of the British South Africa Co. Group holding Southern Rhodesian interests would be acquired for £6.2 million by Anglo-American Corp. (Rhodesia) Ltd. (AMRHO). Companies in the Charter Consolidated Group would apply the purchase price in subscribing for AMRHO shares.

ANGLO-AMERICAN CORPORATION OF SOUTH AFRICA (LTD.)

40. In his statement to the forty-seventh annual general meeting, the Chairman of Anglo-American Corporation of South Africa (Ltd.), Mr. Harry F. Oppenheimer, said, *inter alia*, that the dissolution of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland had made necessary a reorganization of the Com-

pany's Rhodesian interests.¹ The removal from Salisbury to Lusaka of the head offices of the Northern Rhodesian mining companies of the Group, as well as Rhodesian Anglo-American Ltd., Mr. P. H. A. Brownrigg had moved to Lusaka and taken charge of the office there. A new subsidiary company, Anglo-American Corporation (Central Africa) Ltd., had been registered in Northern Rhodesia with its head office in Lusaka and had taken over the technical and administrative functions previously exercised by the Corporation itself in relation to the Northern Rhodesian companies of the Group.

41. After dealing with the "considerable unrest on the Copperbelt" in the period under review, the substantial rise on the London Metal Exchange of the cash price of copper wirebars and details concerning Northern Rhodesian Copper Mines, he continued that the Salisbury office was headed by Mr. H. H. Taylor who had been appointed chief agent in Southern Rhodesia. The political situation in that Territory had given cause for uncertainty and some anxiety. In spite of this, however, many sections of the economy had continued to make excellent progress. He cited the 1963-64 tobacco crop in this connexion, the sugar and beef industries and went into details concerning the Hippo Valley Sugar Estates and the Wankie Colliery Co. Ltd., in which the Anglo-American subsidiary Amrho Ltd. has a 23 per cent interest. He pointed out the Corporation's contribution in exploring and investigating gold, copper and chromium ores.

42. In his statement prepared for the forty-eighth annual general meeting of the Corporation, Mr. Oppenheimer stated that in 1964 there had been a marked economic recovery in Rhodesia and "a good deal of economic development had taken place".² In April 1965, following the formation of Charter Consolidated Ltd., an integration was arranged of the British South Africa Company's assets in Rhodesia with the Rhodesian assets of Zambia Anglo-American and other companies of the Group. The amalgamated company, Anglo-American Corporation Rhodesia Ltd., now held most of Anglo-American's investments in Rhodesia in the fields of mining, timber, citrus and finance.

43. "Although the economic position of Rhodesia has improved considerably", he said, "it cannot be regarded as satisfactory because the inflow of capital from outside, which is so necessary to a country at Rhodesia's stage of development, is not taking place and, as a result, investment is lagging. This may be attributed very largely to the political uncertainty. . . . Time, patience and economic development are needed and in the meantime there is nothing to be gained for either side by precipitating a crisis."

44. Concerning Charter Consolidated, he said that unlike Anglo-American Corporation, which was a South African company and had, and intended to keep, the great bulk of its business in South Africa, Charter would invest chiefly outside South Africa, and to a certain extent outside the African continent.

45. Rhodesian Anglo-American Ltd. is a wholly owned subsidiary company and registered in Salisbury.³ It was formed on 1 January 1964 to administer interests in that country. It was also registered at the same time in Lusaka.

LONRHO LTD.

46. Lonrho Ltd., registered in 1909, was formerly known as London and Rhodesia Mining and Land Co. Ltd.⁴ It changed its name in 1963. At the end of 1964, it had issued almost 5.75 million shares, 54 per cent of which were held by five groups: The British South Africa Co. (now Charter Consolidated); the Drayton Group; the Anglo-American Group; Lonrho subsidiaries, and "Standard Bank Nominees".

¹ *The Times* (London), 4 June 1964, p. 3; *The New York Times*, 19 June 1964.

² *The Times* (London), 1 June 1965; *African World*, July 1965.

³ *The Economist*, 21 November 1964; *East Africa and Rhodesia*, 26 November 1964; *Southern Africa*, 27 November 1964; and *African World*, January 1965.

⁴ *Africa* 1965, 16 July 1965.

^b AMRHO, Anglo-American Corp. (Rhodesia) Ltd., was formerly known as Rhosouth, Ltd.; it is a wholly owned subsidiary of Zambia Anglo-American Ltd.

The identity of the last holding is unknown, although of major interest in view of Lonrho's ability to raise large cash sums for many of its purchases.

47. The Company has extensive dealings in South Africa, Malawi, Rhodesia, Tanzania, Mozambique and Zambia. It conducts its affairs with constant publicity which is not a tactic of most of its rivals, and has also made a point of buying into areas of "political risk" in which bargains are to be found.

48. The Company which once made all its profits from gold mining in Rhodesia, now covers many fields: plantations are the largest profit earner; motor trading, ranching, mining, "chibuku" breweries, newspapers, hotels, nail and dry ice factories, railroads (Malawi). The Company's land holdings in Southern Rhodesia exceed 1 million acres.

49. In 1961, the Company's direct mining interest in Southern Rhodesia comprised 164 gold mining claims, some base metal claims, land holdings covering 873,362 acres and eighteen town stands. Some of the mining properties, such as the Muriel Mine, were tributed to other companies on a royalty basis.

50. The Chairman of Lonrho Ltd. is Mr. A. H. Hall (U.K.). Other members of the board of directors include: Mr. R. W. Rowland (Southern Rhodesia), Mr. J. Whitehouse (U.K.), Mr. J. N. Kick (U.K.), Mr. J. A. Caldecott (U.K.), Mr. F. E. O. Davies (Southern Rhodesia), Mr. A. J. B. Ogilvy (U.K.), and Mr. C. D. Mackenzie (U.K.). The head office of the company is in London.

51. The registered capital of the Company amounted to £2,000,000 in 8 million shares of 5s. each; the issued capital was £1,430,069, increased in 1963 by 220,278 shares to acquire Hall Holdings Ltd. The Company has a large holding in Henderson's Transvaal Estates Ltd. of South Africa.

52. The fixed assets of Lonrho Ltd. are as follows:

	£ thousand
Farms, ranches and plantations	1,545
Towns, stands and buildings	1,104
Mining properties	1,029
Plant equipment, vehicles and aircraft	1,183
Pipeline development	2,268
Other development projects	13
TOTAL	7,142

53. Concerning the oil pipeline, the following agreements were signed between October and December, 1962:^m

(a) Between the Government of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland and the Company, whereby the Company undertook to construct, maintain and operate a crude oil pipeline from Beira to an oil refinery which, in terms of an agreement between the Federal Government and a consortium of oil companies, was to be constructed near Umtali;

(b) Between the Government of Southern Rhodesia and the Company, whereby the Company was granted a concession to construct and operate a pipeline from the frontier

^m R. Beerman, *Financial Year Book of Southern Africa 1964*, vol. I, pp. 46 and 47.

between Mozambique and Southern Rhodesia to the oil refinery at Feruka, west of Umtali;

(c) Between the Province of Moçambique and the Companhia do Pipeline Moçambique-Rodésia S.A.R.L. whereby the Company was granted a concession to construct and operate a pipeline from Beira to the frontier between Mozambique and Southern Rhodesia; and

(d) Between the Company and a consortium of seven oil companies, whereby the Company undertook to transport through the pipeline, at an initial charge of £3.5. 5d. per short ton, the oil requirements of the consortium's refinery at Feruka.

54. It was necessary to register a Portuguese company for the purpose of holding the Mozambique concession referred to above; this company was named Companhia do Pipeline Moçambique-Rodésia and was to be an indirect subsidiary.

55. The contract for the construction of the crude-oil pipeline from Beira to the oil refinery was awarded in March 1963. The total cost up to the start of pumping operations was estimated at a maximum sum of £3.5 million, of which the major portion was contractor-financed with repayments over the first six years of operations. Further cash commitments from the Company's own resources was not expected to exceed £600,000.

56. In 1964, motor trading accounted for 12 per cent of the group profit.ⁿ With a considerable business in the sales of spare parts for many makes and types of vehicles, through the Consolidated Holdings Group, Lonrho has to some extent a cushion whenever there might be a falling off in new car sales.

57. Since June 1958, the consolidated balance-sheet after deducting minority interests has grown from £1,650,236 to £3,657,007; revenues before depreciation, taxation and minority interests have increased from £128,000 to £1,308,011. The Lonrho group has very substantial minority interests but earnings on the parent company's capital have risen from 7 and one half per cent to 29 and one quarter per cent, and the dividend from 5 per cent to 18 and one third per cent.

58. The following is a summary of the consolidated balance-sheet of the Company at 30 September 1964:

	£ thousand
Fixed assets	7,142
Investment (at book value)	1,984
	9,126
Net current assets	1,167
	10,293
Less:	
Long-term liabilities	1,943
Minority interests	4,693
	6,636
	3,657

59. A summary of the financial results for the years 1962-1964 is given below:

ⁿ *East Africa and Rhodesia*, 8 April 1965, p. 515.

Year Sept. 30	Dividends and interest	Mining profit	Ranching profit	Property revenues	Total revenue	Admin. expenses	Tax	Net profit after minority interests	Dividend
1962...	98,586	53,151	267,978	36,563	630,561	82,855	231,844	192,705	126,328
1963...	102,648	77,719	165,968	35,834	722,327	112,165	252,111	239,130	160,584
1964...	102,668	439,020	119,110	40,802	1,592,428	281,764	460,669	255,699	160,585

60. In recent years, the Lonrho Group has increased the number of economic fields in which it operates, and has extended its activities to territories beyond Central and South Africa. It has also been organizing itself into a more compact unit. Lonrho Ltd. has a very large majority holding

in Willoughby's Consolidated Co. Ltd., interested in ranching. It also holds over 50 per cent of the capital of Henderson's Transvaal Estates Ltd., which in turn has a majority of the capital of Tweefontein United Collieries Ltd., and this in turn holds 62 per cent of the capital of Coronation Syndicate

Ltd. Another major member of the group is the British Central Africa Co. Ltd. which operated in Malawi and controls Central Line Sisal Estates Ltd., East African Sisal Plantations Ltd., Tanga Line Sisal Ltd. and Nyasa Sisal Estates Ltd. It also controls Federal Ventures Ltd. which has mining interests in Tanzania.

61. The Lonrho gold-mining subsidiaries are outlined in the body of the chapter on mining.

SELECTION TRUST LIMITED

62. The Chairman, Mr. A. Chester Beatty, announced that the gross revenue for the year ending 31 March 1965 had exceeded £5 million for the first time, being nearly £1 million higher than in the previous year.^o After expenses, taxation and minority interests, the net profit was £2,490,739 against £1,988,355 a year earlier. The most important single shareholding is in American Metal Climax (AMAX) which originates from the early 1930s. Other interests include Bikita Minerals, Consolidated Selection Trust, Palabora Mining Company, Roan Selection Trust, Sierra Leone Selection Trust, Tsumeb Corporation, Vaal Reefs Exploration and Mining Company, Western Decalta and Western Holdings.

63. The interests of Selection Trust Ltd. in Southern and Central Africa cover a wide range of mining activities, including gold and copper in the Republic of South Africa, copper, lead and zinc in South West Africa, lithium in Rhodesia and copper in Zambia. Together these interests have been valued at £18.3 million equivalent to 22/- per Selection Trust share, and they contributed dividends of £1.7 million or 2/1 per share.

64. The following is a geographical analysis of assets and income:

	Assets per cent	Income per cent
United States of America }	50	23
Canada }		
United Kingdom	6	6
Sierra Leone }	9	30
Ghana }		
Zambia	3	4
South West Africa	12	17
South Africa	18	17
Rhodesia	2	3

65. Its subsidiary, Roan Selection Trust Ltd., which changed its name from Rhodesian Selection Trust Ltd. reported a profit after taxes to 30 June 1964 of £5,899,000 as against £5,929,000 for the previous year. The profit before tax, however, increased by more than £4 million, from £13,290,000 to £17,422,000. Sir Ronald Prain was the chairman.

66. Roan Selection Trust Ltd.^p has an authorized capital of £22 million in 22 million shares of £1 each. It has issued £21,572,004 of these including 1,130,978 shares issued as a capitalization issue, in the ratio of one share for every 5/- share held by shareholders registered at 29 January 1962 and 8,088,720 shares of £1 each issued to Roan Antelope Copper Mines Ltd., for the acquisition of the undertaking, property and assets of that company. During the year ending 30 June 1962, the 5/- shares were consolidated into £1 shares. The issue capital was increased by a million shares to American Metal Climax Inc., and by the issue of 37,409 shares to selected officers and key employees. After 30 June 1964, the company was granted an additional listing in respect of 719 ordinary shares of £1 each.

67. The company announced^q profits after tax for the year ending 30 June 1965 of £8,683,507, of which £1.3 million was retained by subsidiaries. Total dividends of 6/3 net per share (against 4/4.6) would take £6.7 million. After transferring to the general reserve the carry-forward would be £24,788.

^o *The Times* (London), 12 June 1965.

^p Beerman, op. cit., 1965, pp. 71 et seq.

^q *East Africa and Rhodesia*, 14 October 1965, p. 108.

68. Roan Selection is a financial and holding company with interests in copper mines and plants, prospecting and services.

Appendix II

[A/AC.109/L.332/Add.1]

Recent developments concerning economic sanctions against Southern Rhodesia

Working paper prepared by the Secretariat

CONTENTS

	Paragraphs
A. General	1-7
B. Agriculture	8-17
C. Mining industry	18-24
D. Commerce and industry	25-33
E. Finance and trade	34-79
F. Oil embargo	80-92

A. GENERAL

1. At its 25th meeting held on 12 May 1966, the Chairman of Sub-Committee I, on the suggestion of the representative of the Soviet Union, requested the Secretariat to prepare a supplementary working paper on the ways in which the activities of foreign monopolies rendered the economic sanctions against the Smith régime ineffective. The present working paper has been prepared in response to this request and is supplementary to the paper made available to the Sub-Committee on 21 December 1965.

2. Information on the economic and financial sanctions and the oil embargo against Southern Rhodesia is contained in a previous working paper prepared by the Secretariat for the Special Committee (see chap. III, part I). Supplementary information on recent developments is set out below.

Further replies to the Secretary-General's notes verbales on General Assembly resolution 2022 (XX) and Security Council resolution 217 (1965)

3. It will be recalled that by 30 April 1966, sixty-six replies had been received from States in response to the *notes verbales* of the Secretary-General transmitting to States the text of General Assembly resolution 2022 (XX) and Security Council resolution 217 (1965) (see chap. III, para. 14). Since then four additional replies have been received and circulated:

	General Assembly document symbol	Security Council document symbol
Algeria	A/6329	
Kenya	A/6333	
	and Add.1 ..	S/7308 and S/7345 ^a
Mexico		S/7415 ^b
Peru	A/6355	S/7408 ^b

4. Supplementary replies have also been received from the following States:

	General Assembly document symbol	Security Council document symbol
Chile	A/6297/Add.1	S/7323 ^a
Germany, Federal Re- public of		S/7181/Add.1 ^a
Japan	A/6248/Add.1	S/7362 ^a

5. The supplementary replies from the Governments of the Federal Republic of Germany and of Japan relate to additional sanctions which they have imposed on Southern Rhodesia.

^a *Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-first Year, Supplement for April, May and June 1966.*

^b *Ibid.*, Supplement for July, August and September 1966.

Reservations by Portugal and the Republic of South Africa on Security Council resolution 221 (1966)

6. In a letter dated 27 April 1966^c addressed to the Secretary-General, the Government of Portugal set forth certain reservations regarding Security Council resolution 221 (1966) of 9 April 1966 on the subject of Southern Rhodesia. Reservations were also made by the Government of the Republic of South Africa in a *note verbale* dated 22 June 1966^d addressed to the Secretary-General.

7. The Secretary-General informed the Government of Portugal in a letter dated 21 June 1966^e that a detailed study prepared for his information did not in its conclusions support any of the reservations advanced by the Government of Portugal.

B. AGRICULTURE

8. The President of the Rhodesia's National Farmers' Union Congress, Mr. T. Michell, warned last June that the country's agriculture had never been in a worse condition with the possible exception of the depression years of the thirties and the war years. He added that this was not because of sanctions or the recent drought. The crucial issue was said to be the approaching tobacco planting time. Farmers would need to have official guidance on the size of their crops by August and there is very little time for the "Government of Ian Smith" to do so.

9. A statement made by the Salisbury Chamber of Commerce during June also warned that agricultural credit was a burning problem. The statement said that the farming community had traditionally relied upon commerce for much of its credit requirements from year to year. Furthermore, the Salisbury Chamber of Commerce had fully endorsed the early warning of the Associated Chambers of Commerce of Rhodesia to farmers that unless there was some change in the situation, commerce would be unable to provide any significant volume of credit this year.

Southern Rhodesian tobacco crop

10. As indicated in chapter III, part I, the tobacco crop for 1966 was estimated at 200 million to 240 million pounds in weight. The sale of tobacco this year was handled by the State Tobacco Corporation.

11. When the tobacco sales opened in Salisbury on 29 March 1966, the auction system was replaced with one of private bargains. This was reported to be a move to protect the identity of the foreign buyers (chap. III, paras. 637-650).

12. The secret tobacco sales in Salisbury were surrounded with strict security protection. The Rhodesian Government was reported to have committed itself to buy all unsold bales at a set minimum price.

13. According to newspaper reports about 20 per cent of the total usual tobacco traffic passed through the east African port of Beira in April and May.

14. According to the Mozambique figures, Beira handled just under 11,000 tons of outgoing tobacco in April and May, the first months which would reflect sales in the current tobacco selling season, compared with 54,000 tons in the same months of last year. Beira handles Malawi and Zambian tobacco as well as the Rhodesian product but the fall in the figure between the two years was attributed to a drop in Southern Rhodesia exports. There has thus been a substantial reduction in the flow of tobacco exports, through Beira, but not a complete cessation.

15. Beira is traditionally the tobacco outlet port. No figures are available of tobacco traffic through the other Mozambique port of Lourenço Marques or through the South African ports, although it has been reported that some tobacco is being sold to South Africa.

^c *Ibid.*, Supplement for April, May and June 1966, document S/7271.

^d *Ibid.*, Supplement for July, August and September 1966, document S/7392.

^e *Ibid.*, Supplement for April, May and June 1966, document S/7373.

Southern Rhodesian sugar crop

16. The 1965 sugar crop before the illegal declaration of independence was estimated at 250,000 tons. It was expected to reach the 350,000 tons mark in 1966. The principal buyers of Southern Rhodesian sugar, namely the United States, Canada and the United Kingdom have already placed an embargo on sugar imports from Southern Rhodesia.

17. A spokesman for the South African Sugar Association stated recently that South Africa was not buying Rhodesian sugar and was making a point of not doing so. The spokesman reiterated the Association's viewpoint that South Africa could not afford to take the international risks involved in purchasing Southern Rhodesian sugar, particularly as this would jeopardize its quota arrangements with the United States, which had itself imposed a boycott on Southern Rhodesian sugar.

C. MINING INDUSTRY

18. According to the publication *East Africa and Rhodesia*, Southern Rhodesia sold 288,168 tons of coal and 19,025 tons of coke in April. The March figures were 328,982 and 20,681 respectively. The principal importer of coal is Zambia. However, the Government of Zambia announced its intention eventually to cut off all trade ties with Southern Rhodesia and that this would include coal once alternative supplies were available.

19. It was reported that a further £2.2 million a year was expected to be added to Rhodesia's foreign exchange income when the Trojan nickel mine, at Bindura, had been developed to full production. It was further reported that the Anglo-American Corporation had bought an 85 per cent interest in the mine and was to invest £4 million (including the purchase price) to expand mining to 600,000 tons of ore a year. Behind the plan to expand the Trojan mine was the growing world demand for nickel. Last year it rose by 30,000 tons to 365,000 tons and is expected to continue to expand at a steady 7½ per cent a year up to 1975.

20. As indicated in paragraph 669 of chapter III, the Anglo-American Corporation had sunk three new shafts at its mines on the Felixburg gold belt, near Umvuma. Another, at the Tchargwa mine, which was abandoned some years ago because of water difficulties, was being deepened and developed. It was presumed that Southern Rhodesia would have no difficulty in disposing of its gold production, which in 1964 amounted to £7.2 million.

21. *Southern Africa* of 23 May 1966 reported that an exploratory shaft to investigate the possibility of establishing a gold mine was to be sunk by Anglo-American Corporation at the Champion mine property in the Odzi area near Umtali, Rhodesia. This followed an extensive programme of geological exploration which included the drilling of 17,000 feet of core in twenty-six boreholes to prove the Champion Reef and its extensions. The mine property was formerly worked for arsenic and in the early days of Rhodesia was a gold producer. The drill holes sunk in the past six years indicated that gold and silver values were present in sufficient quantities in depth to warrant the sinking of an exploration shaft.

22. It was also reported that according to statistics compiled by the port of Beira authorities, the Southern Rhodesia export performance on minerals in the first five months of the year was uneven, but not discouraging. Exports of chrome ore through the port over the period totalled 94,000 tons, compared with 100,000 tons in the same period last year.

23. The export of "sundry ores" totalled 183,000 tons compared with 202,000 tons in the comparable period of last year.

24. *The New York Times* of 2 July 1966, referred to an official British report which, according to the *Times*, gave detailed evaluation of the effectiveness of the trade embargo and raised questions about shipments of Rhodesian chrome to the United States. The main leakages were stated to be in sales of copper and asbestos to Federal Republic of Germany, asbestos to Japan, meat to Switzerland and sugar and tobacco to Portugal.

D. COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY

25. Developments in Rhodesian commerce and industry are discussed in chapter III (paras. 670-680).

26. According to the *Standard Bank Review* of May 1966, reports from the retail sector as a whole indicated that most business houses were reasonably satisfied with their turnovers during March, with trade showing an improvement over that for January and February. Self-service supermarkets continued to attract considerable customers, although the incidence of petrol rationing had reportedly increased the level of business in suburban areas where shoppers were buying "closer to home".

27. Conditions in the wholesale sector were reported to be quiet, owing to the curtailment of trade with the country's northern neighbours and the effect of the current import controls.

28. Import quotas had, however, been granted for the current period for a wide range of merchandise with a view to maintaining stock at reasonable levels. The curtailment of supplies of consumer goods from traditional sources coupled to a minor extent with public sympathy was resulting in the Rhodesian market being receptive to new ranges of goods. Owing to his close proximity the South African manufacturer was particularly well placed to benefit.

29. As had been stated, Mr. Musset was quoted as saying (chap. III, para. 687) that varied reports had been received regarding the motor trade and that, while some dealers had been able to maintain their business at a reasonable level, there would appear to have been a general reduction in the number of sales of new and used cars. Motor assembly plants continued to operate at a reduced level.

30. In industry the engineering sector was reported to be well employed and the work coming forward would appear to some extent to reflect the drive to manufacture articles which were formerly imported. The spinning and weaving industries were reported to be fully occupied during March and there had been an improvement in the garment manufacturing sector. Furniture manufacturers reported increasing demand for their products and viewed the prospects as favourable. Producers of food-stuffs continued to be busy meeting local demand.

31. The *Financial Times* (London) of 13 May 1966, reported that organized industry in Rhodesia was carrying out a survey of the effect of sanctions on manufacturing industry. About 800 members of the Association of Rhodesia and Nyasaland Industries would have filled in questionnaires, but the details were not available. Commercial sources in Salisbury said that while there was considerable under-employment in the economy, especially in the hard-hit distributive motor sectors, the Government was keeping close control over unemployment proper mainly by taking temporaries into the Government service.

32. However, according to Salisbury radio broadcasts of 2 June 1966, the President of the Associated Chambers of Commerce of Rhodesia, Mr. C. J. Hughes, commented in a foreword to the Chamber of Commerce Annual Report, that while the ingenuity shown by Rhodesian businessmen in their efforts to overcome sanctions was outstanding, it would be unrealistic not to acknowledge that sanctions had had some effect. Mr. Hughes further stated that the distributive sector of the economy had been hardest hit, and that some of the weaker and less efficient organizations in this sector had succumbed.

33. The *London Observer* of 5 June 1966, indicated that according to recent estimates in the industrial centre of Bulawayo, 8,000 Africans were out of work because of a drop in Zambian and home demand. Commercial turnover generally had dropped. Some farmers had found themselves unable to pay their African labour, while others had had to dismiss white farm managers.

E. FINANCE AND TRADE

New Taxes

34. Mr. John Wrathall, the Southern Rhodesian "Finance Minister"—who had already warned the country to expect to

pay higher taxes—announced in early June that he would present his budget on 21 July.

35. Meanwhile, the illegal régime of Southern Rhodesia increased the sales tax (purchase tax) from 4d. to 8d. in the pound on 23 June 1966.

36. An extraordinary gazette announcement on 23 June 1966 also increased duty on whisky, gin, rum and other spirits and liquors by 8s. per imperial proof gallon. A statement issued by Mr. Wrathall on the same day said that the new measures were presented "at this time" because of need for changes to become effective before the beginning of the new financial year on 1 July 1966. Mr. Wrathall had warned earlier this year that some changes in taxation could be expected in order to enable the Government to fill the gaps in revenue caused by international sanctions.

Increase in price of petrol

37. Following an announcement by Mr. Bernard Musset, "Minister of Commerce and Industry" of Southern Rhodesia, the price of petrol was increased by 1s. 3d. per gallon to 5s. 7d. for regular and 6s. for premium grades on 10 May 1966. Diesel oil advanced 7d., power paraffin 9d. and illuminating paraffin 5d. per gallon. The "Deputy Minister of Agriculture", Mr. Lance Smith, announced that the ration of diesel fuel to farmers which was fixed at 50 per cent of last year's consumption has been raised to 70 per cent for the months of June, July and August.

Freezing of import current allocations

38. The illegal régime of Southern Rhodesia decided to freeze all outstanding second period import currency allocations at the end of June. This was announced by the Secretary of the Associated Chambers of Commerce of Rhodesia, Mr. G. Taylor, on 15 June 1966. Mr. Taylor was quoted as stating that the Government's decision did not mean that importers would be deprived of their allocations. During the last month of the current quota period, ending on 31 July, the move would give the Government an opportunity to redistribute currency allocations from those firms who found themselves with a surplus to others who required an additional amount.

Rhodesian loans

39. During June, the illegal régime floated a £4.5 million loan. This followed an announcement on 9 May 1966 by the "Reserve Bank" that the twenty-five-year loan, at 6.5 per cent, was to be issued at par on 1 June. An earlier South Rhodesian £4.5 million loan was due for redemption on 15 July and stockholders who chose to convert the old stock into the new issue were offered a 6.5 per cent interest payable on the old stock, giving for the six-week period of overlap an interest rate of 10.25 per cent.

40. On 3 May 1966, the Chancellor of the Exchequer was asked in the United Kingdom Parliament whether he would make a statement about the guaranteed payment of interest due on loans from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development to Southern Rhodesia. The Chancellor of the Exchequer replied that payments amounting to £535,000 were due on 2 May 1966, in respect of two loans made by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development—one to the Government of Southern Rhodesia and one to the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, of which half was the responsibility of Southern Rhodesia. The Chancellor informed Parliament that the International Bank had not received those payments, and as Her Majesty's Treasury was the Guarantor of the loans he had authorized the payment of the required amount to the International Bank from the Consolidated Fund. According to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, it would be recovered from the Government of Southern Rhodesia when constitutional government was restored.

41. The British Government made further payments in June totalling £759,000 to the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development in respect of interest and capital payments on which Southern Rhodesia had defaulted.

42. On 20 May 1966, the Bank of England announced that no funds having been received before the close of busi-

ness on 19 May, to meet the half-yearly payment of interest due on that day on Government of Southern Rhodesia 6 per cent stock, 1976-1979, interest warrants for that payment had not been dispatched.

43. According to an announcement by a "Reserve Bank" spokesman the Rhodesian Government loan of £4.5 million was fully subscribed when lists opened and closed immediately in Salisbury on 1 June 1966. The proceeds from the long-term loan were intended to finance the Government's development programme and for maturing stock.

44. The "Reserve Bank" spokesman said the result was, as usual, "most satisfactory". He added that a large proportion of people had agreed to convert into an equivalent nominal value of the new stock their holdings in the long-term Southern Rhodesian loan due to mature in July.

45. On 31 May 1966, the United Kingdom Government warned British subjects and residents that the proposed £4.5 million loan the Southern Rhodesian régime hoped to raise was illegal.

46. The Government pointed out that the present illegal régime in Rhodesia was not capable of incurring legal obligations on behalf of the Government of Southern Rhodesia and that any person who lent money or otherwise gave credit to or for the account of the illegal régime did so entirely at his own risk.

Rhodesian reserves frozen

47. The *Times* of London of 21 June 1966 reported that Southern Rhodesia had lost control of its foreign reserves. The balance of the £23 million owned by the Rhodesian Reserve Bank last November and salted away in bank deposits in South Africa, Switzerland and elsewhere, were said to have been frozen. The London based board of the bank, headed by Sir Sydney Caine and appointed by Mr. Wilson last December, had made no attempt to use the money itself to pay off Southern Rhodesian debts to bondholders or to the International Bank.

48. The illegal régime in Southern Rhodesia, however, was equally unable to use the money to pay for imports. In the circumstances, it was expected that it would be increasingly difficult for Mr. Smith's régime to use the balance to raise credit. Sir Sydney's administration was reported by United Kingdom sources to have successfully traced almost all the funds as long ago as the end of January, so that it had been successfully denying funds to Mr. Smith since that time.

49. The funds in question were, in effect, being held in reserve for the Rhodesian people once the future course of administration had been settled. Thus Rhodesia had been able to spend only the sums of money earned by exports, most of which had been going to Zambia and South Africa.

Trade and economic relations between the Republic of South Africa and Southern Rhodesia

50. The Southern Rhodesian drive to accelerate economic relations with the Republic of South Africa has been described in paragraphs 690 to 695 of chapter III. The drive to step up trade between the two countries had continued since the above document was issued.

51. Six members of a powerful South African commercial organization were expected in Southern Rhodesia in June at the invitation of the Rhodesian trade promotion Council. The mission was believed to be for the purpose of examining Rhodesia's economic development and to meet leading personalities in the business and financial sectors in Salisbury, Bulawayo, Umtali, the Midlands and the Low veld.

52. According to a Johannesburg radio broadcast of 7 June 1966, a Southern Rhodesian confirming house (Rhodesian Industrial Confirming (Private) Limited) had established a branch in Johannesburg for the purpose of assisting South African exporters to Southern Rhodesia. The business of the company was to ensure payments in cash to South African exporters and to supply credit to Rhodesian importers. The company was expected also to assist South African exporters to find markets in Rhodesia. The company was a subsidiary of Industrial Corporation of Rhodesia and commenced opera-

tions in April. The Johannesburg manager, Col. R. Jones, said that his company was also interested in guaranteeing trade between Southern Rhodesia and other markets.

53. Mr. Van den Berg, Director of the Handel Institute, stated recently that the delegation of the Institute which visited Rhodesia had submitted a proposal to the effect that factories in Southern Rhodesia should be granted quotas to export goods to the Republic duty free, or under rebate. According to Mr. Van den Berg, one of the purposes of the proposal would be to help Southern Rhodesia to adjust to the loss of the Zambian export market.

54. It was also reported that the three-man commission of inquiry which is to investigate alternative rail routes to South Africa was sworn in on 13 June 1966 by the "Officer Administering the Government". The commission was expected to consider two proposals before it: an extension of the present line from Bulawayo, which ends at West Nicholson, and a line to the Republic of South Africa from Rutenga, a station on the railway line to Lourenço Marques.

Trade and economic relations between Portugal and Southern Rhodesia

55. Under the five-year trade agreement between Southern Rhodesia and Portugal, the signatories agreed to treat each other's products on a "most-favoured-nation" basis.

56. Last March, it was reported from Lisbon that Portugal had taken delivery of a total shipment of 133 tons of Southern Rhodesian beef on trial basis. No report is available regarding further purchases of Rhodesian meat by Portugal.

57. The Portuguese Foreign Minister, Mr. Franco Nogueira, told a press conference in May of this year that Portugal had never taken part in sanctions against Southern Rhodesia. He also stated that the Portuguese Government would not interfere with private transport to and from land-locked countries.

58. The *New York Times* of 3 July 1966 referred to an official report on economic sanctions against Southern Rhodesia, in which mention was made of tobacco and sugar sales to Portugal as one of the main leakages.

Trade and economic relations between the Federal Republic of Germany and Southern Rhodesia

59. The Minister for Economic Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany was reported to have said that German exports to Southern Rhodesia last year amounted to DM54.1 million (£4,060,000). According to reports the figure for December 1965 after the embargo was imposed was DM1.9 million (£171,000). In January it rose to DM3.7 million (£330,000) and in February fell back to DM2.5 (£225,000). German imports from Southern Rhodesia last year were reported to amount to DM140.4 million (£12,636,000). Figures for December, January and February were DM12.4 million (£1,116,000), DM13 million (£1,170,000), and DM6.4 million (£576,000) respectively. Tobacco amounted to more than one third of West Germany's imports from Rhodesia last year.

60. It was reported during May that the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany had enforced a partial embargo on Southern Rhodesia goods such as tobacco. The Cabinet announced on 20 May 1966, that in the future all imports from Rhodesia would require permits and that it was not intended to grant any. But, in the special case of asbestos the actual handling would depend on the cost of alternative supplies from Canada.

Trade and economic relations between Japan and Southern Rhodesia

61. By letter dated 15 June 1966, the Permanent Representative of Japan to the United Nations informed the Secretary-General concerning Japan's policy on trade with Southern Rhodesia as follows:

62. "In compliance with the resolutions adopted by the Security Council the Government of Japan has been doing its utmost with a view to achieving a total ban on imports from Southern Rhodesia.

63. "In addition to the measures which have already been taken, the Government of Japan has now taken the necessary measures to ensure that there will be no further importation of asbestos from Southern Rhodesia into Japan, while expecting that import requirement of asbestos would be met by the supplies from other sources. Furthermore, with the co-operation of the business circles concerned, the importation of chrome from Southern Rhodesia into Japan was suspended a few months ago".

Trade and economic relations between Zambia and Southern Rhodesia

64. The Rhodesia Railways derives its earnings mainly from the transport of Southern Rhodesian coal to Zambia's copper mines and Zambian copper to the Mozambique port of Beira. The Railways' headquarters and main workshops are located in Southern Rhodesia. There are also workshops in the Zambian mining town of Broken Hill.

65. The executive body of the Rhodesian Railways is a Board on which Zambia and Southern Rhodesia have three members each. Mr. A. R. Kemp from Southern Rhodesia is the independent Chairman of the Board.

66. As one of the world's biggest copper exporting nations, Zambia ships by rail through Rhodesia practically the whole output of 700,000 tons a year, which is nearly 15 per cent of the total output of copper on the world market. The most profitable traffic carried by the railways is thus copper. In the last financial year the value of this traffic was just over £10 million almost all of it coming from Zambia and representing about 25 per cent of the railways' total revenue.

67. In May, Zambian Exchange Control took steps not to allow railway funds to be remitted to the illegal régime of Southern Rhodesia. Shortly thereafter, the Southern Rhodesian régime decided as a counter-measure to insist on payment in advance for carrying Zambian traffic through Rhodesia.

68. A statement issued in Lusaka on 14 May 1966, on behalf of the Chairman of Rhodesia Railways, Mr. A. R. Kemp, said that one of the major problems facing the joint system was the refusal by the Zambian exchange control to allow railway funds into Rhodesia. He was commenting on a statement by the Zambian Minister of Finance, Mr. Wina, who maintained that the railways had neither the funds nor the assets to continue smooth operations in Southern Rhodesia. Mr. Kemp said that the position in maintaining the operation of the railways had become difficult because of the action of the Zambian Exchange Control.

69. The Railway Board subsequently decided by a majority of four to three with the three Zambian members dissenting, to uphold the Southern Rhodesian demand for advance payment. Commenting on the Railway Board's decision, President Kaunda stated that it had been taken with the full knowledge of Southern Rhodesia's "Prime Minister", Mr. Ian Smith, by a group of unlawful gangsters who gave themselves authority to run the Reserve Bank of Rhodesia. Mr. Kaunda added that the group had acted illegally, since the Bank had been suspended by the British Government.

70. It was reported on 23 May that the British Government had sent a mission headed by Mrs. Judith Hart, Minister of State, Commonwealth Relations Office, to Lusaka for urgent talks with President Kaunda and his Ministers to meet the crisis which was now developing over Rhodesian-Zambian trade and rail traffic. A statement issued from the Commonwealth Relations Office simply said that by agreement between the British and Zambian Governments, Mrs. Judith Hart, Minister of State for Commonwealth Relations, was flying to Lusaka for discussions with the Zambian authorities.

71. President Kaunda indicated that Zambia officials would be authorized only to discuss alternative supply routes with Mrs. Hart and the members of the British Mission and that there would be no question of Zambia changing its mind on the rail charges issue.

72. It was reported that copper shares fell sharply on 18 May on publication of the news that the Rhodesia Railways was demanding payment in advance for Zambia's copper exports. It is further reported that on 27 May major Zambian producers had invoked the legal clause in their contracts,

which permitted delayed deliveries. The reason invoked by them as being beyond their control was that the Rhodesia Railways had refused permission for Zambian copper to move through the country except on certain terms, such as advance payment. As a result copper prices rose sharply. The cash price of copper wire-bars rose £28.5s to close at £647 a ton, while the three months' forward price put on £25.5s. to reach £608 a ton.

73. A Rhodesia Railway train carrying copper and zinc exports from Zambia crossed the border into Southern Rhodesia on 31 May 1966, without hindrance. A Reuters dispatch from Livingstone, Zambia added that there had been doubts whether the train would be allowed through, following a Zambian High Court ruling of 29 May 1966 temporarily restraining the jointly owned railroad from imposing a new advance payment system for freight.

74. Referring to an order issued on 11 June 1966 by the Southern Rhodesian "Ministry of Transport" in respect of in-transit traffic to and from Zambia, the authorities of the Rhodesian Railways in Bulawayo stated on 14 June 1966: "...all traffic other than excess passenger baggage in any direction, and goods consigned to and from Zambia carriage forward and carriage paid, falls under the provisions of the Government direction. For other traffic the Railways are required to obtain payment in Rhodesia of rail charges earned or to be earned on its lines in Rhodesia and Bechuanaland in a manner acceptable to the Reserve Bank. Before goods are removed from Rhodesia the Railways must satisfy the Reserve Bank that arrangements have been made to pay railage and charges due to neighbouring railways for the transport of such goods on their systems".

75. Furthermore, on 18 June 1966, a Rhodesia Railways' spokesman said in Salisbury that Zambian copper and other goods in transit through Southern Rhodesia would not be moved until agreement on payment of freight charges between Zambia and Mozambique had been reached. The copper, at present being held in Southern Rhodesia because of the deadlock with Zambia, would not be moved until satisfactory pay arrangements had been made. The spokesman added that there were 342 trucks being held in Rhodesia pending a decision between Zambia and Mozambique. He confirmed, however, that Zambia had made available funds to meet the requirements of the Southern Rhodesia exchange control. It was reported that the freight bill, said to be in the region of £150,000 was paid in United States dollars.

76. Two days later, on 20 June 1966, the spokesman for the Railways stated that about 16,000 tons of copper export from Zambia were being held in Southern Rhodesia. The copper, estimated to be worth £10 million, was consigned to Mozambique ports, and was being held as there has been no advice from either Zambian or Portuguese authorities that cash in advance payments have been made for its transit through Mozambique. The spokesman confirmed that the charge for railage through Southern Rhodesia had been met in advance.

77. According to Lusaka radio broadcasts of 22 June 1966, President Kenneth Kaunda referred to the 16,000 tons of copper which had been held up by the régime in Southern Rhodesia and explained that giving the money required by the rebels to clear the copper did not mean that there was a change of policy. He said Zambia had been faced with two alternatives, either to let the copper remain in rebel Rhodesia or pay the amount they were demanding. Zambia according to him had chosen the latter.

78. Further to the announcement of the Zambian Government's intention to cut off all trade with Southern Rhodesia, President Kaunda stated during June that this would include trade in coal as soon as alternative supplies were available.

79. According to Mr. Ian Smith, last year's exports of manufactured goods from Southern Rhodesia to Zambia amounted to about £30 million, representing half of Southern Rhodesia's exports of manufactured goods. As previously indicated, the Southern Rhodesian authorities are studying the possibilities of increased sales to the Republic of South Africa in order to make up for the possible loss of the Zambian market.

F. OIL EMBARGO

Republic of South Africa and Southern Rhodesia: oil embargo

80. Chapter III (paras. 732-735) contains information on the Republic of South Africa and the oil embargo.

81. Reports concerning oil supply reaching Southern Rhodesia indicated that transport of oil from South Africa was continuing mainly by road and rail. It was believed that Southern Rhodesian imports of oil from the Republic of South Africa were in excess of its requirements under the rationing scheme enforced after the illegal declaration of independence. Nevertheless, Rhodesia recently increased the price of gasoline by 25 per cent.

Portugal and Southern Rhodesia: oil embargo

82. Information on Portugal and the oil embargo is contained in chapter III (paras. 724-731).

83. In early May, it was reported that Southern Rhodesia's main source of gasoline, was through Mozambique by rail from South Africa. In clarifying his Government's position, the Foreign Minister of Portugal, Mr. Franco Nogueira, told a press conference that Portugal had never taken part in sanctions against Rhodesia, but that she had undertaken not to play any active part in supplying oil. He is quoted to have stated that Portugal had also guaranteed not to pass on to Rhodesia "any oil arriving in Mozambique that was for us, or Zambia, or Malawi". The Foreign Minister added, however, that Portugal could not "interfere with private transport to and from landlocked countries".

84. Confirming an earlier news account that the United Kingdom has made an agreement with Companhia do Pipeline Moçambique-Rodésia to pay the latter £54,000 a month, presumably on the understanding that the pipeline stays closed to oil for Rhodesia, Mr. Bottomley announced in a written answer in the House of Commons on 17 May 1966 that the Government has agreed to help for the time being with the expenses of the Mozambique pipeline undertaking and in particular the expenses of maintaining and repairing the pipeline and installations since the pipeline was out of use.

Effects of international economic sanctions against Southern Rhodesia

85. During the months of April and May, Southern Rhodesian authorities viewing the Territory's position six months after the unilateral declaration of independence said that Britain's sanctions had had little effect and that the shops were still full of goods. They maintained that, in these circumstances, Southern Rhodesia had begun the London talks from an apparent position of strength.¹

86. At a meeting of the Gwelo Chamber of Commerce on 2 May, Mr. Musset, "Minister of Commerce and Industry", said that Southern Rhodesia had increased her trade with many countries outside Africa since last November's declaration of independence. As a result, he said, it was hoped that those countries which had imposed sanctions against Southern Rhodesia were fully aware of the change in conditions in a

¹ Summary of World Broadcasts, No. 2161, part 4, 14 May 1964.

situation which could only develop towards their detriment. Since "independence", Mr. Musset said, Southern Rhodesia had received many visitors who were interested in making investments in the country and who were ready to reap the rich benefits presenting themselves.

87. On 15 June 1966, Mr. Bottomley, the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, stated in the House of Commons that: "Recent evidence, including some significant admissions by the régime itself, amply justifies the claims I made in April about the effectiveness of our policy, which we are resolved to maintain until Rhodesia returns to constitutional government." Mr. Bottomley added: "We have succeeded in obtaining overwhelming international support for our economic sanctions against Rhodesia, and have now denied to the illegal régime access to nearly all Rhodesia's normal export markets outside South Africa."

88. In response to a remark by Mr. Edward Taylor (Glasgow, Cathcart, C.) that Southern Rhodesia tobacco was reported to be selling in the Dutch and German markets, Mr. Bottomley replied that, "The Hon. Member's information does not coincide with my own judgement". Mr. Bottomley also confirmed that there was no truth in the rumours that the Government was considering lifting the sanctions during the talks.

89. According to *The New York Times* of 3 July 1966, a recent British report states as follows: "Neither the business community nor the régime now believe that sanctions will be short-lived and that a brief period of belt-tightening will suffice to survive them. The realization of this was a major factor in directing Smith to ask for talks. With each week the economic situation gets more difficult. Time is therefore not on Smith's side."

90. Mr. Ian Smith, on the other hand, said at an annual farmers' congress held in Salisbury on 21 June 1966: "The last thing we are going to do is throw in the sponge." He stated that his "Government" intended to keep up its struggle, despite the pressure of international trade sanctions.

91. Mr. Clifford Dupont, the "Officer Administering the Government", stated at the opening of the "Rhodesian Parliament" on 22 June 1966, that the imposition of sanctions had led to the introduction of import controls. He added that the resultant inconveniences to the peoples of Rhodesia, and more particularly to the merchants, had been accepted in a most generous and co-operative manner. These controls had not been without positive advantages, which industrialists had been quick to exploit. While clear evidence was already to be seen of the accelerating development of industry, new products in substitution of imports were constantly coming on the market. Industrialists were continuing to expand and diversify, and were producing goods now which they would not have thought possible to make a few months ago. Planning for early implementation of major new developments in manufacturing industry was proceeding satisfactorily.

92. According to Mr. Dupont's statement, the régime would continue to provide to the maximum extent such foreign currency for capital goods and raw materials as was required for new investment projects. Efforts would continue to be made to expand trade and to establish closer economic relations with other countries on a bilateral basis.

CHAPTER IV*

SOUTH WEST AFRICA

A. ACTION TAKEN BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE AND BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY DURING 1965

1. On 17 June 1965, at its 372nd meeting held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, the Special Committee adopted a resolution on South West Africa in which it reaffirmed the right of the people of the Territory to self-determination and independence and condemned the South African Government for its persistent refusal to apply the resolutions of the General Assembly and the Special Committee. It recognized as legitimate the

struggle of the people of South West Africa for the effective exercise of the rights set forth in the United Nations Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, and appealed to all States to give the African population of the Territory the necessary moral and material support to enable them to accede to national independence and to exercise fully their sovereignty over their country's

* Previously issued under the symbol A/6300/Add.2.

natural resources. By the same resolution, the Special Committee, after having referred to the expressions of concern by the Governments of the African States adjacent to South West Africa regarding the military installations established in the Territory by the South African Government, including the installation of an important military base in the Eastern Caprivi Zipfel, requested the South African Government to withdraw all the bases and other military installations situated in the Territory and to refrain from using the Territory in any way whatever as a base for the concentration of arms or armed forces for internal or external purposes. It recommended to the General Assembly and the Security Council to take appropriate steps to safeguard the sovereignty of the people of South West Africa and the integrity of the Territory and to this end to take the necessary concrete and adequate measures in co-operation with the Organization of African Unity (OAU). It also drew the attention of the Security Council to the serious situation prevailing in the Territory. The Secretary-General was invited to request all States to inform him of the measures they had taken to carry out operative paragraph 7 of resolution 1899 (XVIII) of 13 November 1963; he was further invited to report to the General Assembly and the Special Committee on the application of that paragraph.

2. The text of the resolution was included in the Special Committee's report to the General Assembly at its twentieth session (A/6000/Rev.1,¹ chap. IV, para. 285). That report, as well as the reports submitted by the Special Committee to the General Assembly in 1964 on South West Africa (A/5800/Rev. 1,² chap. IV) and on the implications of the activities of the mining industry and of the other international companies having interests in South West Africa,³ were considered by the General Assembly at its twentieth session. On 17 December 1965, the General Assembly adopted three resolutions relating to South West Africa.

3. In preambular paragraphs of resolution 2074 (XX) of 17 December 1965, the General Assembly, after recalling its resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960 containing the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples and other earlier resolutions of the General Assembly and the Special Committee with respect to South West Africa, noted with regret the policy of the Government of South Africa to circumvent the political and economic rights of the indigenous people of South West Africa through a large-scale settlement of foreign immigrants. In the ninth preambular paragraph, the General Assembly noted "with deep concern the serious threat to international peace and security in that part of Africa, which has been further aggravated by the racist rebellion in Southern Rhodesia". The operative paragraphs of the resolution read as follows:

"[The General Assembly]

"1. Approves the chapters of the reports of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples relating to South West Africa;

"2. Endorses the conclusions and recommendations of the Special Committee contained in its report

on the implications of the activities of the mining industry and of the other international companies having interests in South West Africa;

"3. Reaffirms the inalienable right of the people of South West Africa to freedom and independence, in accordance with General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV);

"4. Condemns the policies of *apartheid* and racial discrimination practised by the Government of South Africa in South West Africa, which constitute a crime against humanity;

"5. Considers that any attempt to partition the Territory or to take any unilateral action, directly or indirectly, preparatory thereto constitutes a violation of the Mandate and of resolution 1514 (XV);

"6. Considers further that any attempt to annex a part or the whole of the Territory of South West Africa constitutes an act of aggression;

"7. Calls upon the Government of South Africa to remove immediately all bases and other military installations located in the Territory of South West Africa and to refrain from utilizing the Territory in any way whatsoever as a military base for internal or external purposes;

"8. Condemns the policies of financial interests operating in South West Africa, which mercilessly exploit human and material resources and impede the progress of the Territory and the right of the people to freedom and independence;

"9. Condemns the policy of the Government of South Africa to circumvent the political and economic rights of the indigenous people of the Territory through a large-scale settlement of foreign immigrants in the Territory;

"10. Condemns the Government of South Africa for its refusal to co-operate with the United Nations in implementing the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples;

"11. Requests all States to take immediate action to carry out paragraph 7 of General Assembly resolution 1899 (XVIII);

"12. Appeals to all States to give the indigenous people of South West Africa all necessary moral and material support in their legitimate struggle for freedom and independence;

"13. Requests the Security Council to keep watch over the critical situation prevailing in South West Africa in the light of the ninth preambular paragraph of the present resolution."

4. By resolution 2076 (XX) of 17 December 1965, concerning special educational and training programmes for South West Africa, the General Assembly expressed its appreciation to those Member States which had made scholarships and travel grants available for the use of South West Africans, and invited them and other States to consider including in their offers scholarships for secondary education and for vocational and technical training. It further invited Member States to give sympathetic consideration to requests by the Secretary-General for the placement in their secondary, vocational or technical schools of candidates awarded scholarships under the Special Training Programme for South West Africans. Once again, the General Assembly requested all Member States, and in particular South Africa, to facilitate the travel of South West Africans seeking to avail themselves of educational opportunities provided under the Programme.

¹ Official Records of the General Assembly, Twentieth Session, Annexes, addendum to agenda item 23.

² Ibid., Nineteenth Session, Annexes, annex No. 8 (part I).

³ Ibid., annex No. 15, document A/5840.

It also called upon South Africa to co-operate with the Secretary-General in implementing the resolution. The Secretary-General was asked to disseminate information concerning the scholarship programmes in South West Africa and elsewhere. He was further asked to consult with the Special Committee concerning the implementation of the Programme and to report thereon to the General Assembly.

5. The draft resolution recommended by the Special Committee with respect to petitions concerning South West Africa (A/6000/Rev. 1, chap. IV, para. 292) was adopted by the General Assembly as resolution 2075 (XX).

B. INFORMATION ON THE TERRITORY GENERAL

6. Information on the Territory is contained in previous reports of the Special Committee to the General Assembly.⁴ Supplementary information on recent developments is set out below.

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

7. The oral proceedings in the South West Africa cases initiated on 4 November 1960 by the Governments of Ethiopia and Liberia against South Africa closed on 15 November 1965. On 29 November, at its 100th public sitting on the cases, the International Court of Justice announced its decision on South Africa's request of 30 March 1965 that the Court make an inspection *in loco* of South West Africa and also visit South Africa, Ethiopia and Liberia and one or two other sub-Saharan countries. By 8 votes to 6, the Court decided not to accede to the request in respect of proposals concerning South West Africa and South Africa, and by 9 votes to 5, in respect of other areas.

8. In a *communiqué* dated 13 December 1965, the Court indicated that it had had a general exchange of views in relation to the various questions which arose in the cases and had then recessed to enable the individual members of the Court to study those questions. The *communiqué* stated that under the established practice of the Court, after the hearing is concluded, a period of time proportionate to the nature of the case is allowed to judges in order that they may study the oral arguments of the parties. It further stated that the extended and complicated nature of this case was such that this study would require a period of time somewhat longer than usual.

9. Members of the International Court resumed private deliberations at The Hague on 3 March 1966 to formulate the judgement of the Court on the South West Africa cases.

STATEMENTS CONCERNING THE FUTURE OF SOUTH WEST AFRICA

10. The strategic relationship between the Territory of South West Africa and South Africa, which had been one of the main considerations advanced by South Africa in 1946 in support of its plea for the incorporation of the Territory,⁵ was again stressed during 1965

by leading spokesmen for the South African Government.

11. The Prime Minister of South Africa, Mr. H. F. Verwoerd, is reported to have said, in an address to a National Party meeting in De Aar, South Africa, on 27 June 1965, that if South West Africa should fall into the hands of hostile nations it could be fatal to South Africa. At the United Nations, it was said that it would be a small matter for South Africa to submit a report on South West Africa or to allow a United Nations presence there, the Prime Minister observed. South Africa had known from the beginning, however, that once interference was allowed it would increase step by step. No one should have any illusions about that. It was because of the potential danger to South Africa, the Prime Minister explained, that Prime Minister Malan had said that South Africa would not allow foreign interference in the Territory, and that was why the Republic had recently been using all its diplomatic power and legal skill to try and prevent that danger from coming to its borders.

12. The South African Minister of Justice, Mr. Balthazar Vorster, addressing a National Party congress in Windhoek, South West Africa, on 31 August 1965, informed the gathering that what affected South West Africa affected the Republic, and *vice versa*. After referring to "the Langa and Sharpeville riots in 1960, not as isolated examples of something spontaneous" but as "part of a coming invasion", the Minister of Justice was quoted as saying:

"My department has a responsibility to keep law and order here, and that order was given the Union at the time of the Mandate. We intend obeying it; we will see that there is peace, law and order here. Do not be lulled into a sense of false security because we have repelled the past. Make sure it does not happen again. The assault on South Africa will come again; it will come from outside and it will be better organized than before. You as citizens not only have a duty—you have a holy right to defend what belongs to you. You must help the police—particularly in the beginning until reinforcements can be brought from elsewhere. I do not say this to frighten you, but because history has shown me that these things only succeed where citizens are weak. It will only happen once and not again. You do not get a second chance to react and defend."

13. In his annual New Year's Day message, the Prime Minister of South Africa, with reference to the cases before the Court, stated:

"Whatever the outcome, which we await with hope, South Africa will not fail in her duty to her principles, to those entrusted to her care, and to the preservation of the safety and integrity of the Republic."

14. Later, in a pre-election speech in Windhoek on 15 March 1966, the Prime Minister appealed to the electorate not to give itself over to wild reaction when the International Court gave its verdict later in the year, whether or not that verdict was in favour of South Africa. He stated:

"I ask you to leave the matter in the calm hands of the government you are about to elect. The government will do what is in our common interest. We shall follow the safe, right and sensible road, and we shall trust in the support of the public of South and South West Africa."

⁴ *Ibid.*, Seventeenth Session, Annexes, addendum to agenda item 25, document A/5238, chap. IX; *ibid.*, Eighteenth Session, Annexes, addendum to agenda 23, document A/5446/Rev. 1, chap. IV; *ibid.*, Nineteenth Session, Annexes, annex No. 8 (part I), document A/5800/Rev. 1, chap. IV; *ibid.*, annex No. 15, document A/5840; and *ibid.*, Twentieth Session, Annexes, addendum to agenda item 23, document A/6000/Rev. 1, chap. IV.

⁵ Official Records of the General Assembly, Second part of first session, Fourth Committee, Part I, annex 13 (A/123).

15. The Prime Minister explained that the issue before the voters was to decide which party could best ensure prosperity, the safety of the country and continued White rule. It was the Government's firm belief, he stated, that South and South West Africa were one country and this had saved the Territory from more interference.

SECURITY LEGISLATION

Criminal Procedure Amendment Act, 1965

16. In its previous report (A/6000/Rev. 1, chap. IV, para. 11), the Special Committee informed the General Assembly that legislation authorizing the detention of individuals for a maximum of ninety days had been suspended in both South West Africa and South Africa in January 1965.

17. Later that year, however, a more severe detention provision, commonly known as the "180-day clause", was brought into force in South West Africa and South Africa by the Criminal Procedure Amendment Act, No. 96 of 1965. This Act authorizes the detention in solitary confinement of State witnesses or potential State witnesses in certain types of criminal proceedings for a maximum of six months if the Attorney-General is of the opinion that they might be tampered with or intimidated, might abscond, or if he deems it to be in their interests or in the interests of the administration of justice. The Act requires that persons so detained be visited in private at least once a week by a magistrate; other visitors are prohibited except with the consent of the Attorney-General or of an officer delegated by him. The specified types of criminal proceedings relate, *inter alia*, to the contravention of various provisions of the Suppression of Communism Act, sedition, murder, arson, kidnapping, treason and robbery, and include any conspiracy, incitement or attempt to commit the specified offences.

18. The Act specifically provides that no court shall have jurisdiction to order the release from custody of any person so detained, to pronounce upon the validity of any regulations made by the Minister concerning such detentions, or jurisdiction over the refusal of consent to a visitor.

Official Secrets Amendment Act, 1965

19. The Special Committee had also referred in its previous report to a proposed amendment to the Official Secrets Act to prohibit the disclosure of any information concerning any military or police matter under penalty of a fine of up to R1,500, or seven years' imprisonment, or both. The disclosure of any information concerning military matters was already prohibited by the original Act. The Bill was passed by the South African Parliament after being amended to insert a definition of "police matter" to mean any matter relating to the preservation of the national security of the Union (including South West Africa) or the maintenance of law and order by the South African Police. It came into force in South West Africa and South Africa as Act No. 65 of 1965.

Police Amendment Act, 1965

20. By the Police Amendment Act, No. 74 of 1965, the South African Parliament has authorized any member of the police force to "search without warrant any person, premises, other place, vehicle, vessel or aircraft, or any receptacle of whatever nature" at any place in the Republic or South West Africa within a

mile of the border of any foreign State or territory and to "seize anything found by him upon such person or upon or at or in such premises, other place, vehicle, vessel, aircraft or receptacle". As explained by the South African Minister of Justice, the Amendment Act is a further security measure, intended to give the police the power to combat as effectively as possible the infiltration of well trained saboteurs trained elsewhere in Africa.

21. The police force operating in South West Africa, including the Special Branch, forms part of the South African Police Force. Apart from the regular police and Special Branch functions, the South African budget also provides funds for "secret services" under the budget headings for police, information services, and Bantu administration, all of which are among the integrated services covering both South Africa and South West Africa.

Other proposed legislation

22. The Emergency Planning Bill referred to in the Special Committee's previous report was not passed by the South African Parliament during 1965, but was to be reintroduced after the election of a new Parliament in 1966. As previously stated, the Bill, which defined sabotage as one of the events which could lead to the declaration of a state of emergency, would give South Africa broad powers to muster men and materials in times of emergency. It would render able-bodied men and women from seventeen to sixty-five years of age who had not had military training and did not fall within specified categories of public service liable to compulsory training to cope with natural emergencies.

23. Another Bill scheduled for consideration during 1966, the Suppression of Communism Further Amendment Bill, would debar anyone listed or convicted under the principal Act from practising as an advocate, attorney, notary or conveyancer.

DEPORTATION OF SOUTH WEST AFRICAN POLITICAL LEADERS

24. *The Windhoek Advertiser* reported on 22 March 1966 that Mr. Sam Nujoma, the President of the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) and another SWAPO official, who was not identified, had landed at the Windhoek international airport on 20 March. After being detained at the airport by the security police, the report stated, they were escorted back to their chartered aircraft the following day, on 21 March, and ordered to leave the Territory. They were reported to have landed in Livingstone and were expected to reach Lusaka on 22 March, *en route* to Dar es Salaam.

25. It should be noted that the deportation of South West Africans from the Mandated Territory has been regarded within South West Africa itself as beyond the legal authority of the State. In this connexion, attention is drawn to the following passage in the judgement of the High Court of South West Africa in the case of *R. v. Skrywer*:⁶

"According to the generally recognized principles of the law of nations a state is entitled to expel at any moment an alien who has been admitted into its territory . . . A corollary to this principle is that a

⁶ *R. v. Skrywer* (South West Africa), 1957; J. P. Claassen and J. Hofmeyr, Judges. This case involved an African born in the Rehoboth Gebiet.

state is by international law not entitled to expel its own nationals."

INCIDENT IN OVAMBOLAND

26. According to another report appearing in *The Windhoek Advertiser* on 17 March 1966, a telegram addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations,⁷ and reading as follows, had been sent from Windhoek on 16 March by an official of SWAPO:

"SWAPO leader Leo Shoopala shot dead by South African Government armed Chief Jacob Ashipala of Ovamboland stop Fedelis Ijabo seriously wounded stop Situation in Ovamboland very tense stop."

27. *The Windhoek Advertiser* quoted the following statement concerning the situation as having been issued by the State Information Department:

"The South African Police are investigating a shooting incident in Ovamboland.

"According to information available, a Bantu man died as a result of a shot fired by an Ovambo headman while another Bantu man was slightly injured.

"Situation by no means tense in the area."

28. No further information could be obtained through the Department, according to *The Windhoek Advertiser*.

GENERAL ELECTIONS

29. General elections were held in South West Africa on 30 March 1966 to select six members of the South African House of Assembly from the Territory and the eighteen members of the territorial Legislative Assembly. Suffrage is restricted in the Territory to Europeans aged eighteen years or older. On 15 September 1965, there were 37,264 registered voters in the Territory.

30. The Nationalist Party, which is affiliated with the governing party in South Africa, and the United National South West Party, which is not affiliated with the opposition party in South Africa, contested all seats. The Nationalist Party candidates won all seats in both houses. The leader of the United National South West Party, Adv. J. P. Niehaus, who had been the only Opposition member of the South West African Legislative Assembly, lost his seat.

31. Unofficial election results gave 21,380 votes for Nationalist Party candidates and 9,808 for United National South West Party candidates for the six seats in the House of Assembly. The results of the Legislative Assembly elections showed a total of 21,240 votes for Nationalist Party candidates against 10,187 for the Opposition Party candidates, compared with 19,360 votes for Nationalist Party candidates and 13,216 for their opponents in the 1961 general elections to the territorial Legislative Assembly.

32. The election and appointment of the four Senators from South West Africa for five-year terms in the South African Senate had taken place earlier. On 26 November 1965, the territorial Legislative Assembly, meeting with members of the House of Assembly from South West Africa, elected two Senators. With effect from 6 December 1965, the State President nominated two other Senators from South West Africa, one of whom is required to be nominated "mainly on the ground of his thorough acquaintance, by reason of his

official experience or otherwise, with the reasonable wants and wishes of the Coloured races of the Territory".

LOCAL GOVERNING BODIES

33. In all of the main urban areas of the Territory, there are local governing bodies composed of Europeans; in Native locations, there are African advisory boards. In 1965, following the establishment of the first of a series of separate townships for Coloureds, the Administrator was authorized by the Legislative Assembly (Ordinance No. 34 of 1965) to establish in each Coloured township either consultative or management committees, composed of Coloured residents, elected, appointed, or partly elected and partly appointed. A consultative committee would serve in a consultative capacity to the European local governing body, whereas a management committee would be charged with some of the functions of the European local governing body with respect to the Coloured township. The Ordinance also contains provisions governing the eventual establishment of separate local governing bodies for the Coloured townships.

OTHER POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

34. During 1965, a series of anonymously issued pamphlets attacking SWAPO, the South West Africa National Union (SWANU) and the National Unity Democratic Organization (NUDO), and supporting the recommendations of the Odendaal Commission, were reportedly distributed clandestinely in Native locations and Native reserves in South West Africa.

35. In September 1965, following a visit earlier in the year by chiefs and headmen from South West Africa to various parts of South Africa, including the Transkei, the Prime Minister of South Africa approved of a further visit to the Republic by a party of about 145 teachers, ministers and nurses of the Ukuanyama tribe of Ovamboland.

36. It will be recalled that, by letter of 1 December 1965 to the Chairman of the Fourth Committee,⁸ the Reverend Markus Kooper, and Messrs. Mburumba Kerina and Nathanael Mbaeva announced the formation of a new organization, the South West Africa National United Front (SWANUF). In a petition dated 11 February 1966 (A/AC.109/PET.474), Mr. Kerina informed the Special Committee that NUDO, SWANU, the South West Africa United National Independence Organization (SWAUNIO) and the South West Africa Workers Union (SWAWU) had united to form SWANUF. According to a statement by the SWANU External Council contained in a petition dated 21 March 1966 (A/AC.109/PET.457/Add.1), SWANU was not and had never been a party to SWANUF.

DEFENCE AND POLICE FORCES

37. During the past several years, the Defence and Police Forces, combined for South Africa and South West Africa, have been reorganized for co-ordinated and complementary operations. Stress has been laid on mobility, to enable both personnel and equipment to reach any point in South or South West Africa at short notice, if necessary, ready for emergency action.

38. Within South West Africa, the first police helicopters and police dog units were brought into service

⁷ Not received by the United Nations.

⁸ A/C.4/660.

during 1965 and early 1966. On two occasions during 1965, on 26 March and 9 and 10 September, coast artillery practice was held, firing seawards within six nautical miles off the coast of Walvis Bay; advance warnings of the military exercises were given in the territorial Gazette and in the Press. Cadet inspection parades were held during the year at various European schools. Whereas in October 1964, air cadets at the English Medium High School in Windhoek had been informed by the Captain of the South West Africa Command that the object of cadet training was not to train soldiers, but to develop qualities of leadership, self-discipline and *esprit de corps*, during 1965 school cadets were being informed by a Commandant at inspections that they formed the basis on which successful military gymnasiums of the future would be built, and that they were the men who would have to defend the country in the future.

CRIME STATISTICS

39. There has been a noticeable increase in crimes of violence and other serious crimes in the Territory during recent years. In the Windhoek District, which had a total population of 50,191 at the end of 1963 (24,450 Africans, 21,817 Europeans and 3,924 Coloureds), published statistics indicate that the number of serious cases, such as murder, rape, culpable homicide and serious thefts perpetrated by Europeans, Coloureds and Africans has risen from sixty-two in 1962 to ninety-two in 1963, 116 in 1964 and 142 in 1965 before the end of the year.

40. During 1963, a total of 5,225 persons appeared before the Windhoek Magistrate's Courts. Of these 4,423 were found guilty; these included 183 on charges of common assault, 119 on charges of assault with intent, 246 on charges of theft, 121 on charges of house-breaking, twenty-five on charges of stock theft, 125 on charges of trespassing, and six on charges of robbery. It is presumed that the great majority of other cases involved offences against the pass laws. During 1964, the Windhoek Magistrate's Courts heard a total of 8,519 cases, and during 1965, before the end of the year, a total of 11,335 cases.

41. In the one other district, for which recent statistics are available, the Okahandja District, which had a population of 10,000 non-Whites and 2,193 Whites according to information published on 9 February 1965, the number of criminal cases increased from 834 in 1964 to 1,047 during the full year 1965; serious crimes in the district rose from nine in 1964 to fifteen in 1965.

FRIENDS OF RHODESIA FUND

42. In February 1966, European business and professional men and farmers in South West Africa formed a branch of the "Friends of Rhodesia" organization to collect donations to be forwarded to the central organization in the Transvaal, where fuel was being purchased and sent to Rhodesia. Stop order form letters were published in the local Press whereby individuals could authorize their banks to make regular monthly payments from their accounts to the "Friends of Rhodesia Fund S.W.A." until further notice.

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE ODENDAAL COMMISSION

43. During 1965 and the early part of 1966, the South African Government and the South West Africa

Administration have proceeded rapidly with the establishment of the infrastructure considered necessary for the establishment of "homelands" in South West Africa. It will be recalled that the Government deferred a decision on the actual constitution of the proposed "homelands" pending the conclusion of the case before the International Court and the acquisition of at least the greater portion of the European-owned farmlands to be included in these "homelands".

44. By 25 October 1965, over R18⁹ million had been spent for the purchase of more than 315 farms, and the Government planned to complete the farm-purchase programme within the next succeeding months. Many of the European farmers have elected to remain on their farms after selling them, paying rental to the Administration. The sales, which took place during a severe two-year drought which was only recently broken by heavy rains, are reported to have saved many farmers from ruin and to have contributed appreciably to the rising cost of living in South West Africa.

45. In the case of one European-owned farm in the Rehoboth Baster Gebiet, one of the proposed "non-White homelands" the owner asked R750,000; the Administration offered R508,000 and later withdrew its offer. The Administration issued a statement explaining that the owners of the farm had been notified that since the purchase of farms under the Odendaal Plan was still taking place on a voluntary basis, they were free to continue their farming activities until such time as the acquisition of the land might become necessary. The farm in question would fall under the Government's definition of a "White spot", meaning European-owned land within an area designated for another group.

46. The policy and practice of the South African Government in such a situation are reflected in the following extract from the official report of the Department of Bantu Administration and Development for the years 1960 through 1962, a report published in February 1965:

"The clearance of both 'black spots' and 'white spots' is one facet of the greater policy of the creation of Bantu homelands. To achieve this object the co-operation of all concerned is needed, since it is not always possible to acquire suitable land adjoining Bantu areas for ethnic grouping. Expropriation is resorted to only as a last and extreme measure."

47. If the Odendaal Plan for the creation of separate "homelands" for non-Whites and of a "White area" should be implemented in South West Africa, it may be expected that the following general policy of the Government, as described in the report of the Department of Bantu Administration and Development for the years 1960 through 1962, will be translated into law as has subsequently been done in respect of so-called "White areas" of South Africa:

"The general policy pursued in respect of the Bantu in the White areas (and *vice versa*) was explained by the then Minister of Native Affairs, Dr. H. F. Verwoerd—now Prime Minister—in a speech as follows:

"In these areas (that is, the Bantu areas or reserves) Whites have no claim to ownership and certain civil rights. There he is merely a temporary inhabitant assisting with the development of the areas, which, however, remain Bantu territories. There the

⁹ One rand = 10 shillings sterling.

rights of the Bantu are secured. There Whites have no permanent rights of any kind. But exactly the opposite applies in the White areas. There Whites have their rightful home and there the Bantu is the temporary inhabitant and guest, whatever the reason for his presence may be . . . the Bantu residential area near the city is only a place where Whites provide a temporary home in their part of the country for those who require it because they are employed by them and earn their living there'."

48. It may be recalled that the so-called "White area" of South West Africa would have a majority of "non-Whites". The Government's classification of a multiracial area as a "White area" reflects a distribution of legal rights rather than the actual composition of the population.

ECONOMIC CONDITIONS AND DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS

49. Some 80 to 90 per cent of South West Africa production, consisting mainly of minerals, fish products, karakul and cattle, is for export.

50. Mineral exports rose to a new high of over R93 million in 1964, of which diamond sales accounted for R60.2 million and base minerals from the Tsumeb Corporation for almost R32 million. The Consolidated Diamond Mines (CDM), a subsidiary of De Beers Consolidated Mines, earned record profits of more than R33.3 million after taxes of over R17.9 million during 1964. CDM estimated that its profits for 1965 would rise to a new high of over R39.7 million, after taxes of R24.8 million. During the first eight months of the year, CDM produced an average of 115,000 carats per month. A new heavy media separation plant, opened in September 1965, was expected to increase production by 10,000 carats monthly. The new plant, operating on a day shift only, has a capacity double that of the old plant, which operated twenty-four hours per day. During 1965, De Beers Consolidated Mines, which had direct or indirect investments in the various offshore mining enterprises, acquired control of the Marine Diamond Corporation operating offshore along the southern coast of the Territory. The net profits of the Tsumeb Corporation, which bought its property for about R2 million after the Second World War, amounted to R7.6 million in 1964, after taxes of almost R3.5 million, compared with a net profit of R5.2 million after taxes of only R14,930 in 1963, when the Corporation was allowed to write off capital expenditure for a smelting plant.

51. Exports of karakul pelts, valued at over R15 million in 1963, reportedly rose to over R20 million during 1964. Fish production increased from R22.6 million in 1963 to R34.3 million in 1964. According to statistics published in January 1966, cattle exports had dropped to 252,000 in 1964 and to 246,000 in 1965, due in part to renovations of South African abattoirs; exports of carcasses fell from 3,822 to 192; and exports of small stock from 150,000 to 107,000 head. In the past, the export market for cattle and small stock has been restricted almost exclusively to South Africa. Toward the end of 1965, however, the South African Government granted a meat canning factory in Windhoek permission to export 250 tons of meat cuts monthly to overseas markets provided the meat was not required by South Africa. South Africa, to make up the loss in its own abattoir facilities, began buying frozen Rhodesian beef in December 1965.

52. There has as yet been no indication of sale of surplus livestock from the northern Native reserves. During the period of South African administration of the Territory, Africans in those reserves, who constitute a majority of the population of the Territory, and who own about two thirds of the cattle owned by Africans in South West Africa, have been prohibited from selling their livestock outside of their own areas, owing to stock diseases. Programmes to control various animal diseases in the northern reserves were being carried out during 1965. The South African Information Service reported in August 1965 that the Bantu Investment Corporation, which had already established a furniture factory in Ovamboland, "is already buying up the products of home industries, such as baskets and mats, for re-sale elsewhere". There is no indication of other exports from the area.

53. As indicated in the previous report of the Special Committee, the implementation of the five-year plan recommended by the Odendaal Commission and other territorial development projects was reflected in the estimates of expenditure beginning in the fiscal year 1964/1965. According to the audited accounts of actual revenue and expenditure for that year, territorial revenue amounted to R71 million, of which over R31 million was derived from income tax and diamond export duty and profits tax, and R17 million represented loans from the South African Government. In 1963/1964, territorial revenue amounted to R39.6 million of which R21.2 million was derived from income tax and the diamond duty and profits tax. Expenditure during 1964/1965 amounted to R63.2 million, including an appropriation of over R20.5 million to the Territorial Development and Reserve Fund, compared with a total expenditure of R33.6 million in 1963/1964, of which 9.3 million was appropriated to the Territorial Development and Reserve Fund.

54. Another record budget for the fiscal year 1965/1966 was approved by the territorial Legislative Assembly. The Legislative Assembly authorized the expenditure of R81,760,200 in 1965/1966, compared with an original appropriation of R71,389,600 in 1964/1965 and R37.2 million in 1963/1964. Of the 1965/1966 expenditure, over R55 million was to be financed from territorial revenue, R23 million from a South African development plan loan, and the balance from funds earlier appropriated from territorial revenue to the Territorial Development and Reserve Fund.

55. During 1964/1965, a R16.6 million administration building programme financed from the Territorial Development and Reserve Fund was being carried out in South West Africa, involving the construction of administration buildings, educational and health facilities and postal, telegraphic and telecommunication facilities.

56. Of a total authorized expenditure of over R8 million for administration buildings, on which expenditure was incurred during the fiscal year, projects in Native reserves accounted for R266,390, as follows: R49,892 for a new police station at Ondangua; R200,490 for a new police station at Runtu; and R16,008 for the construction of temporary buildings at Runtu.

57. Of a R4,769,412 school construction programme being carried out during 1964/1965, R3,315,966 was authorized to be spent for Whites, R799,534 for Africans and R673,912 for Bastards and other Coloureds. Educational facilities under construction for Africans involved an authorized expenditure of R185,225 for

new schools in the Ovamboland and Okavango Native Reserves and an additional R19,083 for various buildings for educational purposes in Ovamboland; R149,000 for schools and hostels in other Native reserves; R45,000 for further additions to the Augustineum secondary and teacher-training school, which is to be abolished in the future; and R14,836 for prefabricated classrooms at Hoachanas, a Native reserve officially classified as "temporary", but which is in fact a part of the traditional homeland of the Rooinasie Namas.

58. School construction for Coloureds involved the expenditure of R406,925 in the Rehoboth Baster Gebiet, R190,625 for a high school and R216,300 for a hostel, and the expenditure of R266,987 for schools for Coloureds in three "White" urban areas, including Walvis Bay.

59. In an address given in September 1965 at the opening of a new prevocational school for European girls in Windhoek, a member of the Executive Committee of South West Africa stated that the Administration's aim was to provide for every child in the Territory—White, Coloured and African—"the opportunity to enjoy education as far as he is able". Referring to new school construction, he stated that in the foreseeable future R5.5 million was to be spent on school buildings for Whites, R2.25 million for Coloureds, and R250,000 for Africans. He said that "comparisons are odious" and that the amount of money spent on African education could not be compared with that earmarked for White education. "Such a comparison is not realistic", he explained. "It rests on another basis and on other principles."

60. In 1965, while temporary extensions were being made to the Augustineum, to enable 100 extra, or a total of 400, students to enter school in 1966, a new Augustineum was under construction near Windhoek, beginning in the fiscal year 1965/1966, at a cost of nearly R1.5 million. The new Augustineum Non-European Educational Centre was due to be completed by April 1967. The Centre was to provide hostel accommodation for 700 boys and girls aged fifteen years and over, and the facilities would include a high school curriculum leading to matriculation, a teachers' training course, a domestic department for girls, and technical training for artisans. However, it was reported that the site of the school was within the new Coloured township and, while the school would initially be open to all non-White groups, it would later be restricted to Coloured pupils. An announcement by the Administration in March 1966 indicated that the first teachers' training college for Whites was to be planned and erected within the Territory as soon as possible.

61. For hospital construction, the normal pattern of expenditure was reversed during 1964/1965, a major portion of the authorized expenditure being for non-Whites, and, for the first time in the history of the Mandate, for construction in Native reserves. Of a total expenditure of R3,661,976 authorized for hospital construction, R3,162,995 was for non-Whites: R2,041,508 for the 444-bed hospital and auxiliary equipment including a power station, laundry equipment, streets, etc., at Oshakati (formerly known as Okatana) in Ovamboland; R712,837 for a new hospital at Runtu, the administrative centre of the Okavango Native Reserve, and R408,650 for hospital construction for non-Whites in "White" urban areas.

62. Posts, telegraphs and telecommunications projects under construction during 1964/1965 involved a total authorized expenditure of R154,604, of which R27,280 was to be spent for a new post office at Runtu, and the balance in "White" urban areas.

63. Toward the end of 1965, the construction of two townships in Ovamboland, at Oshakati and Ondangua, was reported to be well under way, as part of the Odendaal Plan. At Oshakati, residences and other buildings were being built for the Commissioner-General, for the indigenous peoples of South West Africa and for other government officials, and an African township of 152 four-room houses was also under construction. Other townships were to be built at about a dozen other places in Ovamboland.

64. Water development and road construction continued throughout the Territory during 1965 and early 1966.

65. During 1965, South Africa began constructing a jet airfield in the Eastern Caprivi Zipfel, a Native reserve bordering Angola, Zambia, Southern Rhodesia and Bechuanaland. The Odendaal Commission had recommended that the existing airfield at Katima Mulilo, which it described as serviceable for lighter aircraft, should be developed into one of sixteen proposed principal airfields for the use of big aircraft on scheduled services and for commercial and freight flights. Katima Mulilo airfield was built by WENELA, a South African labour recruiting organization. It has a 6,000 foot cement runway, the longest in South West Africa before the completion of the 9,000 foot tarmac runway at the new international airport outside Windhoek. The Katima Mulilo airfield is situated two miles southeast of Katima Mulilo, administrative headquarters of the Eastern Caprivi Zipfel. Reports concerning the new airfield indicate that it is situated some fifteen miles from Katima Mulilo, at Mpacha.

66. The President of Zambia has claimed that the airfield being built at Mpacha is a military air base and warned that any Zambian firms supplying materials for the construction of the airstrip would be severely dealt with. In October and November 1965, the President of Zambia, as well as the SWAPO representative in Zambia (A/AC.109/PET.434), stated that there were fighter planes on the new airfield. South African Government spokesmen have denied that the new airstrip is a military base. The South African Minister of Transport has explained that an airstrip with hardened runways was being constructed at Katima Mulilo to serve as an emergency landing for the South African Airways on overseas flights and to enable civil air contacts between the Republic and the administrative headquarters there to be maintained in times when the roads in the Caprivi Strip were impassable.

67. The WENELA-built airfield has heretofore been used for the latter purpose. South African Airways jet services to Europe include a weekly service via Windhoek, Luanda and Las Palmas. More frequent service to Europe is provided by South African Airways flights from Johannesburg to Luanda (1,344 nautical miles), continuing non-stop to Las Palmas (3,238 nautical miles) and from there to Europe.

68. Other new airfields are under construction in various centres of the Police Zone, at Ruacana, the site of the proposed Kuene power development scheme, and in the Ovamboland and Okavango Native reserves on the northern border of South West Africa.

C. CONSIDERATION BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE¹⁰*Introduction*

69. The Special Committee considered the question of South West Africa at its 395th, 396th and 398th meetings held in New York on 11, 16 and 22 March 1966, and at its 417th, 418th, 420th, 433rd to 435th, 437th to 439th and 455th meetings held in Africa between 23 May and 22 June 1966.

70. At its 396th meeting, the Special Committee decided without objection to accept an invitation extended to it to send observers to an international conference concerning South West Africa to be held at Oxford, England, from 23 to 26 March 1966. At its 398th meeting, the Special Committee decided that the delegation of observers to the conference should consist of Mr. Gershon Collier (Sierra Leone), Chairman of the Special Committee, and Mr. Hans Tabor (Denmark).

71. During its subsequent consideration of the question of South West Africa, the Special Committee had before it the report of its delegation to the International Conference on South West Africa (A/AC.109/L.290).

72. The Special Committee also took into account communications from forty-nine States referred to in the report of the Secretary-General to the General Assembly (A/6332) concerning the implementation of operative paragraph 7 of General Assembly resolution 1899 (XVIII) and operative paragraph 12 of General Assembly resolution 2074 (XX).

Written petitions and hearings

73. The Special Committee circulated the following written petitions concerning South West Africa:

<i>Petitioner</i>	<i>Document No.</i>
Mr. Jackson Kambode, Secretary of Labour, and Mr. Lucas Pohamba, representative in Zambia, South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO)	A/AC.109/PET.434
Mr. John G. Jaotto, Acting Secretary General, SWAPO	A/AC.109/PET.434/Add.1 and 4
Mr. Mueshihange, a representative of SWAPO at Dar es Salaam	A/AC.109/PET.434/Add.2
Mr. Edward Katjivena, chief representative at Algiers, SWAPO	A/AC.109/PET.434/Add.5 ¹¹
Chief Hosea Kutako, National Leader, National Unity Democratic Organization (NUDO)	A/AC.109/PET.450 and Add.1
Mr. Gerard Esperet, Vice-President, Confédération française démocratique du travail	A/AC.109/PET.451
Mr. Duma Nokwe, Secretary General, African National Congress of South Africa (ANC)	A/AC.109/PET.452
Mr. Zedekia Ngavirue, Co-ordinating Secretary and Chairman of the External Council, South West Africa	

¹⁰ See also chapter II for an account of the discussions on the resolution adopted by the Special Committee at its 455th meeting on 22 June 1966 (A/AC.109/188) concerning the implementation of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) with regard to colonial territories considered by the Special Committee during its meetings in Africa in 1966.

¹¹ Circulated after the Special Committee had adopted a resolution on the question of South West Africa at its 439th meeting on 9 June 1966.

*Petitioner**Document No.*

National Union (SWANU)	A/AC.109/PET.457/Add.1
Mr. Thembanani Munangwane	A/AC.109/PET.473
Mr. Mburumba Kerina, Co-ordinating Secretary, and Mr. Nathanael Mbaeva, Financial Secretary, South West Africa National United Front (SWANUF)	A/AC.109/PET.474
Mr. Brendan K. Sumbwaye	A/AC.109/PET.483

74. The Special Committee heard the following petitioners concerning South West Africa:

<i>Petitioner</i>	<i>Meeting</i>
Mr. Sam Nujoma, President, Mr. Solomon Mifima, chief representative in Zambia, and Mr. Peter Nanyemba, chief representative in Tanzania, of the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) (A/AC.109/PET.434/Add.3)	417th
Mr. Andries Booys, chief representative, and Mr. Claudius Kandjou, of the South West Africa National Union (SWANU) (A/AC.109/PET.457)	418th
Mr. Moses Smith, Pan-Africanist Congress of South Africa (PAC) (A/AC.109/PET.484)	438th

75. Mr. Nujoma, speaking on behalf of SWAPO, said that the South African régime had increased its brutal measures of repression against the indigenous population of Namibia, otherwise known as South West Africa. News had recently been received from there that on 11 March 1966 the regional organizing secretary of SWAPO at Ukuambi in the northern region had been shot dead by one Jacob Ashipala, a Government-appointed sub-headman in the area, and that Mr. F. Ijambo, another prominent member of SWAPO, had been shot and seriously injured by Lukas Utoni, also working for the Government. A third member of SWAPO, Mr. Kashumua Nembija, had been arrested on 31 March by the so-called Bantu Affairs Commissioner at Ondangua, accused of wearing the clothes that had been worn by a murderer in Angola. Although he had not been in Angola and knew nothing of the affair, he had been beaten by the police and taken into custody. He had again been beaten and on 3 April 1966 had been found dead of his injuries.

76. It had been discovered that those killings had been secretly organized by the South African police. At the time of the shooting at Ukuambi, a large contingent of armed police from Tsumeb and Otjiwarongo had been rushed to the scene of the disturbances to protect the Government puppets. The Bantu Affairs Commissioner had announced publicly that the Government would supply more arms and ammunition (for further suppression and massacre of people in the area).

77. In violation of the Mandate under which the racist régime of South Africa administered South West Africa, military bases had been established in the country, the largest of them at Walvis Bay, the country's main seaport. There was a military training camp at Windhoek, the capital, and a huge air base had recently been constructed at Singalamwe in the Eastern Caprivi Zipfel, only fifteen miles from the Zambia-Namibia border. Equipment valued at £25 million including guns and heavy artillery was said to have been brought to the Caprivi air base from South Africa via Southern Rhodesia. According to his information, large tanks, such as those that had been used during the Second World War, were massed there and Southern Rhodesian jet fighters were stationed at the air base. It was also

reported that construction of the air base had been carried out by Lewis Construction, a Southern Rhodesian company. Police stations attached to the South African Army had been erected throughout Namibia, and White housewives were being trained in the use of automatic weapons.

78. South Africa had not only imposed upon Namibia its ruthless system of apartheid but had also persistently pursued a policy of colonialism, exploitation and suppression. The system of labour recruitment of African workers from the so-called Native reserves outside the Police Zone endangered the welfare and future growth of the nation. The South West African Native Labour Association (SWANLA)—a Government-sponsored agency authorized to recruit labourers under contract to work on mines, farms and other European undertakings—served to impose inhuman conditions on the African workers. Direct or indirect economic pressure was often imposed upon Africans in their reserves: they were compelled to pay a Government tax, and since there was no other way of obtaining money they had to take up employment through the SWANLA contract system, under which they were recruited for a period of eighteen months or two years and were not allowed to leave. Wages of Africans employed in the mines were about R5 a month, whereas the average White man would consider himself underpaid if he received about R150. At least R100 a month would be necessary for a man to live a decent life. The cost of living in the country was high, and the average wage of R5 a month paid to African workers was barely enough to buy food and left nothing for clothing. A pair of trousers, for example, cost about R10 and a pair of shoes about R8, which represented about two months' wages. On expiry of their contracts Africans were forced to return to their reserves and only allowed to leave in order to work again through the same contract system. Their families were not allowed to accompany them, and a man working for two years could, by the end of his contract, save no more than R30—the maximum allowed by the Government. There were no family allowances or sick pay under the contract system. On returning home, an African could spend only a few days there before proceeding to work again under the same system.

79. Far from being trained as skilled workers, Africans were not allowed to be re-employed in the same factory in order to prevent them from acquiring skills; they were sent some miles away for their subsequent work, where they continued to be exploited.

80. The contract system was a systematic exploitation of man by man which was tantamount to slavery. Large foreign companies exploiting the country's mineral wealth were engaged in that slave trade; some of them, such as the Consolidated Diamond Mines of South West Africa, the Tsumeb Corporation, the fishing industries and the Farmers Union, were even represented on the Board of Directors of SWANLA to make sure of obtaining the necessary cheap labour. The South African colonial administration had thus turned the Mandated Territory of Namibia into a White man's paradise based entirely on cheap African labour. The companies which exploited the workers shared the profits after paying taxes to the fascist régime. Africans had no share in them whatsoever. The economy was entirely in the hands of Whites. Investments by foreign companies—most of them having come originally from South Africa—were continuing. Such investments were responsible for promoting oppression by the racist

régime in South Africa. Mr. Nujoma appealed to the countries involved to prevent their investors from continuing such activities.

81. Mr. Nujoma said that the South African racist régime was incapable of administering the country or of helping it to proceed towards self-determination.

82. Africans had no right to vote and were not represented in any way, the whole governmental machinery being entirely run by Whites. Africans could be employed in government departments only as messengers and cleaners. The South African Government, far from preparing the people of the country for self-rule, was reducing them to slave status. Education for Africans was badly neglected. African children were educated only to standard six, and the secondary schools and technical institutions were not open to Africans at all. There was a teachers' training college, but only about 250 Africans had been able to attend. In parts of the country, there were no schools whatsoever, and in most homelands there were no hospitals or health facilities. He would like the United Nations to appoint a sub-committee to go to the country and see conditions for itself. At a time when advanced countries were exploring outer space and preparing to send men to the moon, the people of his country were scarcely allowed to cross the street without a pass. The country was virtually cut off from the rest of the world. There were harsh restrictions on information media, and no United Nations publications were available.

83. Although the nations of the world had joined forces to oppose German fascism during the Second World War, practical, moral and material support, including armaments, were being supplied to the fascist régime of South Africa to help it to carry out its declared racial discrimination and apartheid policy, and to perpetuate White supremacy and exploitation of the Africans in a most inhuman manner.

84. The *Nairobi Sunday Nation* of 8 May 1966 reported Rhodesia's Hunter jet fighters and Canberra bombers had been using South Africa's Caprivi Strip airfield, that Rhodesian Air Force jets had been using Lourenço Marques as a refuelling point, and that Rhodesia had negotiated an air pact with Portugal and South Africa to give them the advantage in case of any direct armed intervention. According to the article, military liaison between Rhodesia, South Africa and Mozambique had been established along the 700-mile Zambian border shared by the three countries.

85. That report indicated the existence of a military pact between the régimes of Salazar, Verwoerd and Smith in order to maintain White supremacy and to continue the suppression and exploitation of the African masses in southern Africa. The military build-up and the stockpiling of war material in Namibia by those régimes was a threat to the peace and security not only of the people of Namibia and Africa, but of the whole world. The period pending the judgement of the International Court of Justice was being used to speed up that military build-up in exactly the same way as Hitler had done in the early 1930's. It was a deliberate manoeuvre aimed at the large-scale massacre of the African people in Namibia and at the implementation of the Odendaal Commission's recommendations, which had been completely rejected by the African majority.

86. That Commission had recommended the partition of the country into tribal groupings, the so-called Bantustans or homelands, reminiscent of the Nazi concentration camps, from which Africans would only be

allowed out to work as cheap slave labour on farms and mines for the benefit of the White settlers. His organization strongly resisted the Bantustan policy. He recalled that on 10 and 11 December 1959, the South African police had opened fire and killed twelve Africans who had resisted an attempt to move them from the area where they were living. Such resistance had continued among the African population, the majority of whom were still living there. His people were determined to carry the struggle to the bitter end, and fight to the last man, with sticks and stones if need be, against its fully armed oppressors.

87. SWAPO strongly condemned the atrocities committed by the Verwoerd colonial administration. It also wished to place on record its strongest rejection of the unilateral action taken by the régimes of Portugal, Southern Rhodesia and South Africa to use Namibia as a dumping area for war material, and demanded that the United Nations or some other competent international body undertake an on-the-spot investigation to discover exactly what kind of armaments had been installed. He said that poison gases were being developed in South Africa; he had no information in that connexion regarding South West Africa, but his people feared that one day, when they rose up against the régime, poison gas would be used against them.

88. The sentence of life imprisonment imposed upon Mr. Bram Fisher, on 9 May 1966, had proved to the world that the policy of apartheid was similar to Hitler's fascist policy in Europe before the outbreak of the Second World War.

89. After the Sharpeville massacre in 1960, the South African economy had been in a state of panic. Its gold and foreign exchange holdings had fallen below the \$280 million danger point defined by its bankers to the critically low figure of \$216 million, and collapse had been averted only with the help of powerful financial interests in such countries as the United States of America and the United Kingdom.

90. The history of British colonialism clearly showed that the British Government had deliberately granted independence to the South African minority White settlers in 1910, knowing full well that the country belonged to the Africans; and it was the British Government that had transferred the Mandate for South West Africa to the racist régime of South Africa. It was again that Government that encouraged the rebel régime of Ian Smith in Zimbabwe (Southern Rhodesia) to further its colonial aims and continue to suppress and exploit the African people. The reluctance of the United Kingdom Labour Government to take positive action against the rebel régime in Southern Rhodesia had proved to the world that Prime Minister Wilson was still dreaming of the now-diminishing British Empire. That Government had undoubtedly proved to be Africa's enemy number one. While it pretended to support the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the United Nations Charter, the United Kingdom was in fact the largest investor in South Africa, with investments amounting to £1,000 million.

91. On 6 November 1962, the United Nations General Assembly had adopted its historic resolution 1761 (XVII) calling upon Member States to end diplomatic and economic relations with South Africa, stop the supply of arms to it and break communication links with it. The United Nations had passed the resolution with a view to solving the South African situation by peaceful means. Many Member States were still, however,

supplying the minority White régime of South Africa with arms and ammunition.

92. On 7 April 1965, the newspaper *Le Monde* had reported that on his arrival in Johannesburg, Mr. Raymond Schmittlein, Vice-President of the French National Assembly and Chairman of the France/South Africa parliamentary group, had stated that France would continue to sell arms to South Africa and would improve its trade and cultural relations with that country. The *Tanzania Standard* of 14 May 1966 reported the purchase by South Africa of sixteen French Super Frelon helicopters for an estimated £10 million. It had further been reported by the South African pro-Government newspaper, *Die Vaderland*, that the French Government had promised to supply the apartheid Government of Dr. Verwoerd with submarines by 1970.

93. *The New York Times* of 25 March 1966 had reported:

"While the main thrust of Portugal's military activities lies in Africa in what Professor Salazar termed a successful campaign against terrorists, her European defence ties are now entirely on a bilateral basis with Germany, France and Spain. The forthcoming visit here by German Foreign Minister Gerhard Schroeder may lead to the expansion of the arrangements under which a German jet air base with accompanying facilities is being built at Beja in southern Portugal. In exchange for these facilities, Germany is to provide Portugal with jet combat aircraft for the African operations. France, which sells Portugal Alouette helicopters used in Africa and is building frigates for her, has been granted a missile tracking station on the Azores. This week, Portugal's Defence Minister and army Chief of Staff visited France."

94. The *Tanzania Standard* of 12 May 1966 had stated:

"The former West German Defence Minister, Mr. Franz Joseph Straus, said that there was no white-black confrontation. Apartheid certainly contained aspects which were open to severe criticism, but it was wrong to speak of oppression and exploitation of Africans. The achievements of the whites in making economic provision for the Africans were impressive ... Mr. Straus said."

95. It had meanwhile been reported that the former West German Defence Minister was visiting South Africa as a guest of the Government-sponsored South African Foundation, a body with offices in most European capitals whose main purpose was to make propaganda, foster the gospel of apartheid and invite European immigrants to South Africa and Namibia.

96. The influx of large numbers of White immigrants constituted a danger to the future of his country. Namibia had only a small African population, and it was the intention of the Verwoerd régime to speed up the flow of European immigrants so that, when the principle of one man one vote was applied, the White settlers would automatically take over power and permanently dominate the Africans. The South African Foundation was providing money towards the air fares of immigrants to South Africa, when they were transferred to South West Africa. Unless the United Nations took action to prevent it, the country was likely to become completely White.

97. While the slave trade was internationally prohibited, forced labour tantamount to slavery still existed

in southern Africa, where Africans from Mozambique, Angola, Namibia, Bechuanaland and Southern Rhodesia were recruited to work in the gold mines under shocking conditions.

98. According to the United States Department of Commerce, American companies had invested \$353 million in South African enterprises controlled by them at the end of 1962. That year, the *Financial Year Book of Southern Africa* had listed an American, Mr. Engelhard, as Director of the two organizations that recruited black labour for the South African gold mines: the Recruiting Corporation and the Witwatersrand Native Labour Association. Those recruiting companies brought hundreds of thousands of Africans from Mozambique, Angola, Bechuanaland, Namibia and Southern Rhodesia. Mr. Engelhard was also listed as Director of the Chamber of Mines, which set the wages and conditions of the Africans in the mining industry, and which met once a month to co-ordinate the major finance and gold-mining companies in their dealings with the labour recruiting companies and the Government. He was a director of the controlling company of Harry Oppenheimer's famous South African mineral and diamond empire, whose profit before taxes had been estimated at a third of a billion dollars. Engelhard—only one of many Americans who profited as much as the South African Whites from the cheap black labour made possible by apartheid—had announced a record profit by his company of almost \$3 million in 1964, and had declared:

"This progress (in South Africa) in my opinion will be advanced if the rest of the world shows understanding to the problems which exist. Inaccurate reports, whether emanating from well-meaning sources or otherwise, only aggravate the difficulties and play into the hands of communist supporters."

99. In January 1965, the Norton Company of Worcester, Massachusetts, had opened a new abrasive factory near Johannesburg. The Chairman of the company, Mr. Milton P. Higgins, had declared: "I think South Africa is going to remain a strong country, led by White people. I think foreign countries should leave South Africa alone. If they leave you alone, you will get on and do a great job."

100. In February 1965, Mr. J. H. Fulford, President of the Jeffrey Company of Ohio, opening a new factory in Germiston, had said: "We have complete faith in the soundness of the South African economy, full confidence in the stability of your country, and know that the substantial investments that we have made in the past and the further investment we are presently making are all in good care."

101. On 20 March 1965, General Norstad, the retired NATO Supreme Commander, now Chairman of the Atlantic Council of the United States and President of the Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corporation, had flown into Johannesburg to negotiate new investments and had announced: "We have full confidence in South Africa, not only we as individuals, but the United States and the American people as well." Mr. Harold Boeschstein, Chairman of the Owens-Corning Fiberglas Company, who had accompanied General Norstad had added: "Any boycott moves do not reflect the general opinion of the United States or of its businessmen, but we have great appreciation of South Africa's importance as an ally and as an economic force in the free world."

102. An American, a prominent investor both in South Africa and Namibia, Mr. N. G. Banghard, Vice-President of the Newmont Mining Corporation which, in association with American Metal Climax, operated a copper mine at Tsumeb in Namibia, had said in 1962: "We know the people and the Government of South Africa and we back our conviction with our reputation and our dollars."

103. While SWAPO appreciated the action taken by the United States Government in banning the export of arms and ammunition to South Africa, it had noted that an appreciable number of American businessmen were providing massive economic aid to the Verwoerd régime to further the aims of exploitation and suppression of the African peoples in both South Africa and Namibia. It appeared in practice that the colonial régimes of Salazar, Verwoerd and Smith were watching over the interests of monopolies whose headquarters were in New York, Bonn, Paris, London and Washington.

104. His organization called upon the Governments of those countries to stop the supply of arms and ammunition to the South African racist régime, because it believed that suppression of a people by others constituted a constant threat to the peace and security of the world.

105. It had been proved that the apartheid régime of South Africa ruled Namibia with brute force and had totally failed to promote moral and material well-being and the progress of the indigenous population towards self-determination and national independence. His organization therefore called upon the United Nations to take positive action against the South African colonial administration. Mr. Nujoma said that the South African Government had reached a point of no return. It was resolved to continue its policy of suppression, and even contemplated the annexation of the country to its White minority. It was well known that the South African Government had refused to allow a United Nations presence in the Territory. His organization's demand was that the Mandate should be terminated and immediate independence granted. The United Nations had passed many resolutions, none of which had been implemented. It should, if necessary, send a police force to rid the country of the fascist régime.

106. In response to questions concerning his organization, Mr. Nujoma explained that SWAPO was supported by such sectors of the population as workers and teachers. It numbered some 100,000 members, most of whom lived in rural areas, and was the only political party effectively opposing South Africa. The aim of SWAPO was to convince the present corrupt régime that it had no future, and to create a new society in which every person would be equal before the law. White settlers would be welcome. His organization was Pan-African and supported the OAU, which it would join upon the country's accession to independence. Within South West Africa, his organization enjoyed no official recognition and individual members were constantly arrested. He himself had been arrested at the Windhoek airport on 20 March 1966 and kept in a cell throughout the night, whence he had been taken at gunpoint the next morning and deported to Zambia. The régime also subsidized armed bands of indigenous thugs to harass the opposition organizations,

and, as he had already informed the Committee, members of SWAPO had even been killed.

107. As to relations between SWAPO and SWANU, Mr. Nujoma observed that his country believed in democracy and that a choice between the two organizations would rest with the people.

108. *Mr. Booys*, speaking on behalf of the South West Africa National Union (SWANU), said that in view of all that had previously been said by various petitioners regarding South Africa's violation of the Mandate in South West Africa, he would confine himself to a few brief remarks which would bear out those made by previous petitioners. The people of South West Africa did not intend to make a career of petitioning. However, while the energetic efforts of the Afro-Asian countries were appreciated, it was the duty of SWANU to express its misgivings at the failure of the United Nations to implement its resolutions on South West Africa.

109. SWANU had, of course, appealed repeatedly to the international community to intervene in the explosive situation prevailing in South West Africa, or at least to establish a United Nations presence there. It had done so because it held the international community—through the League of Nations, to which, by the decision of the International Court of Justice on South West Africa, the United Nations was the successor—fully responsible for the presence of the South African administration in its country. SWANU expected the United Nations to rectify the situation. The idea of the Mandate as a "sacred trust of civilization" had not been created by the people of South West Africa. If their demands were not justified, then they should be told so; and if the organized international community could not act against the notorious Verwoerd régime or honour its obligations, it should not hesitate to say so. If it failed, SWANU would not, and it was determined to liberate South West Africa by any means at its disposal.

110. While it realized that the United Nations was trying to find a peaceful solution to the question of South West Africa, SWANU wished to issue a very friendly warning that, so long as the Verwoerd régime exploited South West Africa morally, socially and economically, there could be no peace in that country.

111. The South African régime had been greatly assisted by certain major Powers which were themselves Members of the United Nations and of its Security Council and which had demanded legal clarification before taking action against the Verwoerd régime. Dr. Verwoerd had thoroughly exploited that state of affairs and had consolidated his own position by occupying South West Africa and dividing its people into racial, religious and tribal groups. Meanwhile, those same major Powers were looting that country at a rate which, if continued, would, according to United Nations estimates, exhaust South West Africa of all its wealth within the next twenty years.

112. The question of race also had to be taken into account, although he would welcome any evidence that it played no role in the violation of human rights. The Western Powers had intervened when they had considered that White lives were in danger in the Congo, but had done nothing after the massacres of African people in Windhoek and Sharpeville and were ignoring events in Zimbabwe. Instead, the great Powers were paying starvation wages to the people, from their in-

vestments in South West Africa, and were supplying arms to Verwoerd's minority régime.

113. He reiterated SWANU's stand on South West Africa. SWANU strongly believed in the right of self-determination for the people of South West Africa and advocated immediate independence. That was SWANU's message for the Special Committee.

114. In response to a question concerning relations between SWANU and the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO), and the size of his organization, Mr. Booys said that SWANU believed in uniting with all movements which were guided by principles similar to its own. Its present membership was 10,000.

115. *Mr. Smith*, speaking on behalf of the Pan-Africanist Congress of South Africa (PAC), said that he and his colleagues had been granted hearings by the Special Committee in Addis Ababa in 1962 and in Dar es Salaam in 1965. He would, however, be failing in his duty if he did not speak again on behalf of the South West African people who suffered from the monstrous practice of apartheid and who were committed to overthrowing White domination and oppression in their Territory.

116. The South West African issue could not be treated as an isolated case, since the evil policies practised against that Territory also affected the people of South Africa. Despite the fact that, for more than fifteen years, the case of South West Africa had been under consideration by the General Assembly and that numerous resolutions had been passed both by that body and by the Special Committee itself, there had been no change of heart on the part of the South African racists, who clung obstinately to their policy of apartheid in the hope that the South West African case would ultimately become a dead issue in the United Nations. However, he believed that, if the indigenous population of South West Africa pursued their struggle relentlessly, their effort would eventually be crowned with success. The South West African case constituted a challenge to the structure and the ideals of the United Nations. South Africa had violated the Mandate, which should have been transferred to the United Nations Trusteeship System. It was evident that only force would now make the South African racists change their minds.

117. The International Court of Justice had decided, at The Hague in 1950, that it was the duty of the United Nations, to which responsibility for South West Africa had been transferred from the League of Nations, to safeguard the sacred trust of civilization through the maintenance of effective international supervision of the administration of the Mandated Territory. The Special Committee should not be deluded into believing that the South African régime would accept any verdict against it—unless, of course, that verdict was implemented by force.

118. It was not his intention to refer again to the inhuman torture of the indigenous inhabitants of South West Africa, regarding which he had provided the Special Committee with detailed information in 1962. However, he wished to state that apartheid was practised even more intensively in South West Africa than in South Africa itself.

119. The South African Government was building an air base in the Caprivi Strip in South West Africa. If such military developments remained unchecked, the

whole of southern Africa would one day be locked in a mortal struggle for which both the United Nations and those Powers which had supplied South Africa with the necessary equipment and technical information would be responsible. Despite the fact that, according to the terms of its Mandate, South Africa had undertaken not to build military or naval bases on South West African territory, it had nevertheless proceeded to do so. The United Nations should therefore take the necessary steps to deprive South Africa of its Mandate. Without wishing to find fault with the United Nations, he considered that it was hypocritical to adopt numerous resolutions without taking any concrete action. It was evident that further resolutions, however strongly worded, would never move the South African racists. If that fact were accepted, there was then no other alternative but to take up arms. The South African racists had long prepared for such an eventuality and, on the eve of his election campaign early in 1966, Verwoerd had exhorted the White electorate not to panic at the Court's verdict, since South Africa's interests in South West Africa would be safeguarded. There could be nothing more explicit than the statements of such people as John Naser who, as Chief Native Commissioner for South West Africa, had warned the indigenous population that, since the Afrikaners had won that Territory by bloodshed, the only way they would regain it was also by bloodshed. That was not a personal expression of opinion but the official Government view shared by all White racists in southern Africa.

120. Apartheid was no different from Hitler's national socialism and the only difference between the so-called Native reserves and Hitler's concentration camps was their geographical situation. The South African White racists, who had long oppressed the indigenous people of South West Africa, were now haunted by visions of revenge which had no foundation in reality. They should, however, endeavour to behave like human beings or they would one day perish in a bloody revolution.

121. The great nations of the world would have to realize that empires built on subjugation and maintained by force would one day collapse under their own weight. In the end, right would triumph over might.

General statements by Members

122. The representative of *Denmark* observed that the situation in South West Africa undeniably presented a dark picture. More than forty years had passed since the League of Nations had entrusted the Mandate to the Union of South Africa. That country had not been empowered to exercise sovereignty over the Territory, but was expected to promote to the utmost the material well-being and social progress of its inhabitants. It was a tragic fact that the Government of South Africa, far from fulfilling those obligations, had kept the African people in constant political and economic subjection and had ignored all the United Nations resolutions on the subject. Its policy was a flagrant violation of the Mandate, of the United Nations Charter, of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.

123. In approaching the problem of how to secure rapid termination of the Mandate, however, care should be taken not to repulse those whose support was neces-

sary. The General Assembly would of course be competent to cancel the Mandate if the claim that South Africa was violating it was validated. The question had, however, been brought before the International Court of Justice by Ethiopia and Liberia, and it would be contrary to the general principles of law for a political organ like the General Assembly to take a decision pending the Court's judgement, which was expected before the convening of the twenty-first session of the General Assembly.

124. The violation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples and of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was perhaps even more important politically than the case before the International Court. By adopting the General Assembly resolution classifying South West Africa as a Non-Self-Governing Territory, Member States had undertaken a moral and legal obligation to act in accordance with resolution 1514 (XV) and secure the freedom of the people of that Territory.

125. Frequent reference had been made to paragraph 2 of Article 94 of the Charter in calling for the use of force against South Africa if the International Court should find that that country was violating the Mandate and Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, in which event the Security Council might take action. Such measures, however, would not go far enough: it was important also to secure revocation of the Mandate and self-determination for the South West African people.

126. Even in the absence of a clear-cut decision by the International Court, the United Nations could continue its efforts to secure the right of the people of South West Africa to independence. Although a decision on the practical approach should be deferred pending the International Court's decision, there was no doubt about the goals to be pursued. The Special Committee should at its present session confine itself to a general resolution stressing the inalienable right of the people to independence, condemning South Africa's rejection of that right, its denial to the African people of the most elementary political rights, its attempt to annex the Territory, its apartheid policies and its preparations to implement the Odendaal report, and deciding to consider appropriate recommendations to be made to the General Assembly immediately following the International Court's decision. By that course, the Committee would avoid making recommendations that might have to be changed even before they reached the General Assembly. Only by such a step-by-step approach could the Committee be certain of receiving all the support it needed from Member States.

127. The representative of *Denmark* stated that his Government and people were outraged by the arrogant position adopted by South Africa with regard to its obligations under the Charter and to the resolutions of the various organs of the United Nations, and wholeheartedly wished that deplorable situation to be brought to an end in the interests of human dignity and peace.

128. The representative of *Iran* said that the deteriorating situation there was further aggravated by conditions in Southern Rhodesia and in the Territories under Portuguese subjugation, and the situation in the whole of southern Africa was fraught with danger.

129. Developments were moving towards South Africa's total annexation of the Mandated Territory and its stricter application of the policy of apartheid, on the pretext that those measures were necessary for

strategic reasons. The further tightening of oppressive laws by means of the Criminal Procedure Amendment Act, the Official Secrets Amendment Act, the Police Amendment Act and other proposed legislation was designed to repress any action by the African population to secure their fundamental rights. The rapid preparations being made to implement the odious Odendaal report completed that sombre picture.

130. Against such a background the Africans could not be expected to remain passive. Petitioners had warned of the danger of sudden racial conflict, and even Chief Albert Luthuli, the Nobel Peace Prize winner and advocate of non-violence, had said that in the face of uncompromising refusal to abandon a policy which denied oppressed Africans their rightful heritage, no one could blame them for seeking justice by violent methods.

131. South Africa's so-called Minister of Justice had alleged that the Langa and Sharpeville riots in 1960 had been planned by the communists, and that his department had a responsibility to keep law and order in South West Africa. He had then warned that the people should not be lulled into a sense of false security because they had repelled the past. He had finally concluded that the assault would come again; it would be better organized than before. The situation was thus depicted by both sides as set for impending racial conflict.

132. The time had therefore come for the Special Committee to undertake a systematic study of the means of overcoming South Africa's intransigence, and of thwarting the further consolidation of the alliance between Verwoerd, Smith and Salazar. The Iranian delegation was ready to support any action to restore to the African people their inalienable rights to freedom and justice, and to avert a catastrophe in southern Africa.

133. In accordance with the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, the United Nations should do its utmost to revoke the Mandate and thus secure the independence and freedom of the people of South West Africa.

134. The representative of the *United Republic of Tanzania* observed that the Special Committee had heard petitioners on South West Africa and had found that the situation had not improved. The United Nations had passed many resolutions condemning the apartheid régime for its suppression and exploitation of the people of South West Africa, yet that régime continued to flout world opinion.

135. The Special Committee had been informed by Mr. Sam Nujoma, President of SWAPO, that South Africa had increased its measures of oppression against the indigenous population of Namibia, and that the regional organizing secretary of his organization had been shot dead, another member seriously wounded and yet another brutally murdered by the South African police. Those murders were crimes against humanity committed to suppress the struggle for emancipation by the people of South West Africa, and humanity must condemn South Africa for its policy of colonization and exploitation.

136. It was distressing that in spite of all the declarations that had been made, certain countries and influential individuals continued their activities in support of the apartheid régime in Pretoria, to the detriment of the indigenous population. The study on the

implications of the activities of foreign monopolies having interests in South West Africa had shown that the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America, Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany and many other countries had extensive interests in the Territory, and were making immense profits through dispossessing the African people of their natural resources and means of existence. He quoted an extract from the *International Trade Magazine* of the United States Department of Commerce, reproduced in the *New York Herald Tribune* of 24 February 1964, stating that United States exports to South Africa in 1963 had increased by \$30 million over the preceding year.

137. Paragraph 7 of General Assembly resolution 1899 (XVIII) of 13 November 1963 urged all States to refrain from supplying arms, military equipment, petroleum or petroleum products to South Africa. The study of the activities of foreign monopolies had shown that, in giving extensive leases to the financial houses, South Africa derived certain advantages such as the supply to it of some of the items produced, or partial control of their utilization or distribution. One of the active interests was the Gulf Oil Corporation, which helped South Africa to obtain the very items that the General Assembly resolution had urged should be withheld.

138. A still more sinister aspect was the accumulation of military forces and arms by the oppressors. The petitioner, Mr. Nujoma, had, at the Special Committee's 417th meeting, quoted the newspaper *Le Monde* as having reported that the Vice-President of the French National Assembly and Chairman of the France/South Africa parliamentary group, Mr. Raymond Schmittlein, had stated that France would continue to sell arms to South Africa and improve its trade and cultural relations with it.

139. The representative of Tanzania also recalled reports that South Africa had bought sixteen French Super Frelon helicopters at a cost of some £10 million and that France was to supply submarines by 1970, in direct contravention of General Assembly resolution 1899 (XVIII).

140. The existence of the racist minority régime in Southern Rhodesia, and its collaboration with South Africa, further aggravated the serious threat to international peace and security.

141. The time for paying lip-service had passed. It was now time for action. The free African people had made repeated proposals to rid humanity of the scourge of apartheid and colonial suppression. The Tanzanian delegation had always sought the implementation of the various General Assembly resolutions in relation to South West Africa, notably resolutions 1514 (XV) and 1899 (XVIII), which would create the necessary conditions for the attainment of freedom by the African people. The representative of Tanzania expressed the hope that those whose actions were detrimental to liberty and progress would come to be guided by reason and justice instead of by their lust for immense profits.

142. The representative of the *Union of Soviet Socialist Republics* said that the question of South West Africa had already been discussed on many occasions. The reason why it appeared so often on the Special Committee's agenda was that Verwoerd's fascist régime was imposing a reign of terror, practicing exploitation and systematically refusing to apply United Nations resolutions. Furthermore, that régime was con-

stantly taking new measures to oppress the indigenous population, paying no heed to United Nations appeals and recommendations. Measures should therefore be taken to compel the Verwoerd régime to respect United Nations decisions. The situation had recently been aggravated even further by the odious Odendaal Plan for the creation of the ten Bantustans, which were nothing else but ghettos. Immediate decisions were needed.

143. The only reason why the South African Government had been able to violate the Charter and decisions of the United Nations with impunity for twenty years was that it received aid from abroad and even from certain Members of the United Nations. General Assembly resolution 1899 (XVIII) had stressed that the Government of South Africa was receiving support from certain Western Powers. The studies undertaken had proved that all sectors of South Africa's economy and industry were in the hands of foreigners and White settlers. International monopolies were rampant in South Africa, just as they were in Angola or Mozambique. Their head offices were in London or New York. Thus the president of one mining corporation operating in South West Africa and South Africa had recently told a *New York Times* correspondent that his company's annual profits amounted to 27 per cent of the invested capital. The other United Kingdom and United States companies established in South Africa were making profits of the same order. *The Observer* had stressed the fact that those monopolies would redeem their investments in four or five years. If that was so, it was because apartheid gave foreign companies certain advantages in their task of exploiting the country. Such exploitation, far from diminishing, was being intensified from month to month. In November 1964 *The Times* had reported that foreign monopolies had decided to invest \$260 million in South Africa. That had been an open challenge to the United Nations, to the OAU and to world public opinion. General Norstad, the former Commander-in-Chief of NATO, had stated in March 1965, in the course of a visit to Johannesburg on behalf of the industrial company he headed, that he had full confidence in South Africa's future. That confidence, he had said, was not just the confidence of one individual but the confidence of the United States and the American people. Another United States industrialist had declared shortly afterward that the boycott of South Africa did not reflect the opinion of the American people as a whole. No one, therefore, should be surprised that those Members of the United Nations which had interests in South Africa and South West Africa were helping the racist Government and refusing to apply the resolutions of the United Nations.

144. Again, South Africa's Minister of Defence had recently boasted of having received 120 licences for the production of modern armaments. He said that he had obtained all the necessary technical data for assembling such weapons, as well as a licence from the Federal Republic of Germany for the manufacture of an ultra-modern type of bomb. He had added that South Africa no longer needed to buy arms abroad, and that the Western Governments had themselves established armaments factories in South Africa to equip its armed forces. Military co-operation with the Federal Republic of Germany had recently been strengthened still further, particularly in regard to the supply of

nuclear warheads. A technical missiles institute had just been set up near Pretoria. In 1964 experts from the Federal Republic of Germany had built a missile guidance centre in South West Africa. The Aeronautical Institute was financed by the Armed Forces Ministry of the Federal Republic of Germany. Moreover, SWAPO had revealed that South Africa had built poison gas factories in its territory. Against whom was all that activity directed, he asked, if not against the African countries? A member of South Africa's Atomic Energy Board had declared that South Africa should produce nuclear bombs and use them against the African States.

145. In November 1965 the Pretoria military airfield had taken delivery of seven aircraft, making a total of sixteen aircraft purchased from the United Kingdom. On 21 October 1965, *Flight International* had reported that South Africa was to receive ultra-modern Italian jet aircraft, Macchi MB 326, which were capable of a speed of 800 kilometres per hour. At the time, that report had been open to doubt because the British engines for the aircraft should have come under the embargo, but any such doubt had been rapidly dispelled. Italy was going to deliver the aircraft, and their engines were to be assembled on the spot in South Africa. It should be noted that those aircraft could carry six 200 kilogramme bombs as well as rockets and machine-guns. It was thus clear that Verwoerd had aggressive intentions against the African countries.

146. While the United Nations listened to soothing speeches, a number of Western countries were continuing to aid the fascists in South Africa.

147. Resolutions 1899 (XVIII) and 1514 (XV) must, therefore, be applied with all speed. The Special Committee should launch an appeal to States Members of the United Nations and ask them to support the people of South West Africa in their struggle for the inalienable right of self-determination.

148. Some countries, including Denmark, had alluded to the decision which, it was said, the International Court of Justice was going to take; but the study of that case had already dragged on for a long time, and no one knew when a decision would finally be taken. Naturally, all that lost time only helped the Verwoerd régime. There was no justification for waiting any longer, for the situation had already lasted twenty years. Consequently his delegation supported the proposal made at the General Assembly's twentieth session that South Africa's Mandate in South West Africa should be terminated. A date must be fixed for the Territory's independence. The results of the studies concerning the aid which certain Western countries were giving South Africa should be submitted to the Security Council with all dispatch.

149. The Special Committee should recommend that the Security Council take the necessary decisions, under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, to compel all Member States to apply sanctions against the Smith, Verwoerd and Salazar régimes, and to force the three fascist régimes to fulfil their obligations.

150. His delegation would support all decisions that might be adopted to that effect.

151. The representative of *Afghanistan* said that after nearly twenty years of discussion on the South West African problem in the United Nations, no progress had been made. South Africa had not taken

a single step to implement the resolutions of the General Assembly, and had refused to co-operate with the United Nations. The United Nations had a special responsibility in the matter and it was essential that it should find rapid means of ending the Mandate and of helping the people of the Territory to attain independence and freedom.

152. The Government of South Africa claimed that, with the end of the League of Nations, the Mandate had expired. How, therefore, could that Government explain its presence in South West Africa? It was clear that South Africa had no legal claim to the Territory and that its only desire was to make it into a colony for White settlers, thus perpetuating the most abject form of discrimination, using the people as a cheap source of labour and depriving them of their land, wealth and dignity. Such action was a crime against humanity.

153. In claiming that the Mandate had expired, the Government of South Africa was annexing the Territory as its own. Such a trend was extremely dangerous. The unilateral declaration of independence by Southern Rhodesia had clearly shown that racist minority régimes were capable of defying world opinion; in condoning the action of Southern Rhodesia, the United Nations might find itself facing another *fait accompli*.

154. In violation of the provisions of the Mandate, the South African Government had established military bases. The petitioners had mentioned that £25 million sterling of equipment, including guns and heavy artillery, were said to have been brought into the Eastern Caprivi Zipfel via Southern Rhodesia. The reasons for such military action were, it would seem, to repress the people's desire for independence and to resist any external attempt to liberate the country from foreign domination. The establishment of military bases and the collusion between South Africa, Southern Rhodesia and Portugal constituted a threat to international peace.

155. The South African Government was also seeking to prevent the indigenous peoples of the Territory from gaining their lawful political and economic rights by a large-scale settlement of foreign immigrants. The aim of that policy was twofold: to provide the White settlers with land and to ensure that if the "one man, one vote" principle were eventually adopted, the White settlers would outnumber the African population and thus gain legal control of the country.

156. It should also be remembered that the proposals of the Odendaal Commission were being implemented in South West Africa, thus intensifying discriminatory policies in that Territory.

157. The presence of South Africa in the Mandated Territory provided guarantees for mining and other companies. Big interests were at stake, which would obviously benefit from the continuation of South African domination.

158. His Government was anxiously awaiting the decision of the International Court of Justice on the question, but the legal aspect was one of secondary importance. The main issue was political: the termination of the Mandate and the accession of South West Africa to independence, in accordance with the provisions of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV).

159. In resolution 1761 (XVII) of 6 November 1962, the General Assembly had called upon Member States to end diplomatic and economic relations with

South Africa, and to cease to supply that country with arms. Although some countries had severed such relations, the resolution had had no effect on the situation. In order to find an equitable solution by peaceful means, the United Nations should take concrete measures against the minority régime in South Africa; otherwise an explosive situation, leading to terrible racial conflict, would result. The Security Council should again consider the question of South Africa, and examine the economic and commercial relations between that country and others. His own Government condemned the policy of racial discrimination practised by South Africa, had no political or economic relations with that country, and gave full support to the aspirations of the people of South West Africa.

160. The representative of *Venezuela* said that the United Nations had been trying for nearly twenty years to find the means of putting an end to the situation prevailing in South West Africa. Even before the inception of the United Nations, the League of Nations, which had granted South Africa a Mandate for South West Africa, had studied that problem.

161. His delegation had on many occasions stated the position of the Venezuelan Government. In the course of those twenty years, Venezuela had continually raised the question of South West Africa in the deliberations of various United Nations organs. The Venezuelan Government's position had remained unchanged in the Special Committee as it had in the General Assembly or in the Security Council, of which Venezuela had been a member. Indeed, the Venezuelan delegation had submitted a detailed account of the problem to the Fourth Committee at its 1460th meeting during the General Assembly's eighteenth session. That statement had been circulated as an official General Assembly document.¹² It contained a legal, political, humane and practical analysis of the problem; the members of the Special Committee might consult it in order to save time.

162. It was a matter of record that the situation in South West Africa had deteriorated further. His delegation was convinced that the United Nations should now take more vigorous measures. His delegation reiterated the position it had adopted at the General Assembly's twentieth session: the United Nations could not and should not rest content with adding more pious resolutions to the seventy or so which had already been adopted on the subject over a twenty-year period, and which always repeated the same things, without recommending any practical measures.

163. The United Nations must realize that the question fell within its competence. The General Assembly and its subsidiary organs should not have their hands tied on the pretext that the question was *sub judice*. On the contrary, it was the duty of the United Nations to act as the Mandatory, since the South African authorities had stated that they would not recognize the validity of decisions of the International Court of Justice that did not conform to their aspirations. As though to furnish immediate proof of that intention, the South African régime had put into effect the recommendations of the Odendaal Commission and decided to maintain the inhuman policy of apartheid.

164. Again, it had often been claimed that the problem was one of law. That was a pretext used by the

¹² A/C.4/617.

administering Power to gain time and hold up such measures as the United Nations might take.

165. As the Venezuelan delegation had already stated at the General Assembly's twentieth session, it was the duty of the Special Committee to recommend to the General Assembly means and procedures calculated to put an end to the abnormal situation prevailing in the Territory and to give effect to General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV).

166. In his opinion it would be useful to set up a sub-committee whose functions would be:

(1) To study and propose to the Special Committee the most appropriate means of putting an end to South Africa's Mandate for South West Africa;

(2) To study and recommend the most appropriate means of administering the Territory until it attained independence, i.e., until resolution 1514 (XV) had been fully applied.

167. That sub-committee would report on its work to the Special Committee. The Committee in its turn would submit to the General Assembly at its twenty-first session, a report which could serve as a basis for the Assembly's discussions, without prejudice to the Court's decision.

168. He was prepared to make a formal proposal to that effect. Such a proposal would, moreover, be in keeping with General Assembly resolution 2074 (XX) of 17 December 1965, which indicated that the South African Government had failed in its international obligations with regard to the administration of South West Africa and that, by reason of its policy of apartheid, it had defied world opinion and lost all authority to administer that Territory. It was likewise in keeping with the conclusions of Commission I of the International Conference on South West Africa held at Oxford from 23 to 26 March 1966, especially those contained in paragraph 22 of annex I to document A/AC.109/L.290, and with the statements made by the petitioners.

169. The representative of *Mali* said that his delegation had subscribed unreservedly to the resolution which the Special Committee had adopted the previous year, recommending the General Assembly to hasten the liberation of South West Africa.

170. The essential problem in connexion with South West Africa was that of the use of arable land. The working paper prepared by the Secretariat (see paras. 1-68 above), and the testimony of the petitioners had proved that the South African régime had robbed the indigenous population for the benefit of White settlers from South Africa and Europe. The latter held over 47 per cent of the total land area. The Africans themselves only had poor land which did not produce enough. The members of the Special Committee had learned at first hand from petitioners the extent of the cynicism shown by those White settlers, sure as they were of the colonial and imperialist Powers' support. The Verwoerd Government, making its case even worse, was today contemplating the application of the disgraceful Odendaal Plan. As for the Bantustans, they constituted a flagrant negation of human rights.

171. At the General Assembly's twentieth session, the Malian delegation had called for the withdrawal of the Mandate from South Africa. It was the earnest hope of his delegation that the International Court of Justice would condemn the Verwoerd Government.

172. The problem of decolonization had been solved in principle by resolution 1514 (XV). It was now a question of finding practical solutions. The Special Committee should make recommendations to the Security Council and the General Assembly to safeguard the lives of the Africans. The Malian delegation, like that of Denmark, considered that the Mandate should be withdrawn from South Africa and that apartheid should be abolished. In addition the capitalist Powers should be asked not to invest any more capital in South Africa so long as that despicable régime lasted.

173. The petitioners had spoken of military bases established in South West Africa. His delegation declared itself firmly in favour of abolishing all such bases, which constituted a threat to international peace and security.

174. He thought that the General Assembly might hold a special session to consider what practical measures would be most appropriate for suppressing apartheid.

175. The Special Committee should give effect to resolution 2105 (XX) of 20 December 1965, which placed it under an obligation to seek the best means for the application of resolution 1514 (XV). In addition, a terminal date should be set for South Africa's presence in South West Africa.

176. His delegation would support any proposal to that effect.

177. The representative of *India* said that the United Nations had been dealing with the question of South West Africa since 1946, and a number of its organs had adopted resolutions expressing almost unanimous concern at the distressing situation in that Territory. It was a matter of profound regret and shame that in violation of every principle of the United Nations Charter, the pathologically racist Government of South Africa continued its policies, abusing the trust placed in it by the international community. By extending its policy of apartheid to South West Africa, the Government of South Africa was condemning its inhabitants to a life of misery and frustration. Its open support of the rebel régime in Southern Rhodesia was only the latest proof of South Africa's true belief which was racial superiority. That policy was cynically described as "Western civilization", "freedom", "anti-communism", and "uplifting the Native". It had continued for too long and should be ended at once if at all possible.

178. General Assembly resolution 1899 (XVIII) had urged all States to refrain from furnishing arms or military equipment to South Africa, to stop supplying petroleum or petroleum products to that country, and to desist from any action which might hamper the implementation of that resolution and of previous resolutions on South West Africa. His own delegation believed that prompt and faithful implementation of the resolution by all nations would make a peaceful solution probable. However, if certain Member States, in particular South Africa's major trading partners, continued to find specious reasons for refusing to co-operate with the United Nations, the people of South West Africa might well be obliged to use violent means to achieve their legitimate rights. It was madness to believe that superior military and economic progress would prevent such a development.

179. The situation had been aggravated by the report of the Odendaal Commission, the recommendations of

which were already being put into force by the Government of South Africa, and which would have the effect of making South West Africa part of South Africa; segregation and ghetto structure were being extended in the Territory. The Commission's recommendations were based on the dangerous premise that non-White groups should live in separate areas. Such a policy was totally unacceptable to his delegation.

180. He recalled that in a private conversation as early as 1946, General Smuts had made it clear that South Africa would take no account of any United Nations resolutions on the subject of South West Africa. Although the United Nations had already declared that any attempt by South Africa to carry out the recommendations of the Odendaal Commission would constitute aggression, past experience had shown that that warning would carry no weight, since the racist régime in South Africa had with impunity flouted earlier resolutions of the General Assembly, and was engaged in an unholy alliance with Portugal and Southern Rhodesia to perpetuate White supremacy. The Special Committee would therefore have to exercise particular vigilance to defeat such designs.

181. Colonial oppression in South West Africa was only one side of the picture. The economic exploitation of the Territory was another. The study of the implications of the activities of the mining industry and other international companies having interests in South West Africa had shown the close relationship between colonial rule and economic exploitation, of which the petitioners had also given clear evidence. Not only South Africa, but several other countries were plundering the Territory, alleging their contribution to the well-being of the indigenous inhabitants. Such excuses were naive, for conditions in South West Africa were appalling. Political independence was essential if the country was to make progress economically.

182. Governments which had refused to implement the General Assembly's resolutions had often invoked the excuse that sanctions would have the most harmful effect on the people of South West Africa, in whose very cause they would be imposed. That was to sidetrack the issue. The people of South West Africa had many times declared that they would be willing to suffer any hardships to attain their goal.

183. Some members had considered that it was not proper for the Special Committee or for the United Nations to discuss the question of South West Africa because it was being considered by the International Court of Justice. Such an argument was intended to divert attention from the support given by the trading partners of South Africa. The International Court of Justice was dealing only with certain legal aspects of the problem, not with the social, political and economic aspects; it was not expected to rule on the Territory's political future. The United Nations was entitled, and indeed morally obliged, to examine the situation and to study ways of transferring power to the indigenous people. The Special Committee's own task was to ensure speedy implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, and his delegation hoped that it would not be deterred from its aim.

184. The Indian Government had been the first to bring up the issue of South African racist policies before the United Nations in 1945, and had taken effective measures to implement the United Nations resolutions

on South West Africa. It deplored the illegal occupation of that Territory by the South African Government. At considerable sacrifice it had abandoned trade relations with South Africa long before the United Nations had appealed to its Members to do so. Diplomatic relations had also been severed. Similar action by others, and in particular the major trading partners of South Africa, would oblige that country to yield to world opinion. Only if the United Nations resolutions were implemented by as many countries as possible could the desired objective be attained by peaceful means; otherwise violence and bloodshed might become inevitable. He was not opposed to the speedy and orderly progress advocated by the representative of Denmark; but in the case of South West Africa such a policy had not been effective. Patience and restraint had been exercised for more than eighteen years by the United Nations, in the hope of a change. Time was running short, and if the South African racists refused to reconcile their policies with changing conditions in Africa, they would only have themselves to blame for the consequences.

185. The representative of *Poland* said that despite the fact that the South West African question had been under consideration by the United Nations for almost twenty years, the situation was deteriorating continuously. The Special Committee was already aware of the dire conditions in which the population of that Territory had lived for over forty years. But the most alarming feature was the intensification of military preparations, particularly the building up of a military base at the Caprivi Zipfel, the strategic location of which sufficed to indicate against whom they were directed.

186. It was clear from the Secretariat working paper (see paras. 1-68 above) that it was the explicit intention of the South African Government to annex South West Africa permanently and to consolidate its brutal policy of apartheid. South Africa continued to ignore the resolutions of the General Assembly and of other organs of the United Nations, calling for the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. In the view of his Government, therefore, South Africa had violated both the Mandate and the United Nations Charter, thereby failing to discharge its obligations as a Member of the Organization. It had been able to do so since it received the active support of certain influential Powers, primarily the United Kingdom and the United States, which had financial interests in South Africa and South West Africa. The activities of foreign Governments in South West Africa, where labour was cheap and profits high, constituted one of the main obstacles to its development.

187. Moreover, the United States, the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany were all helping South Africa to produce arms and military equipment. Emphasizing the importance of securing world-wide support for any action the Committee might take on South West Africa, he said that it was not by accident that its resolutions calling for material and moral support of the legitimate rights of the people to independence had been addressed to all States. The German Democratic Republic had accordingly made its views known on this question. He then read out the communication which had been received from that country:

"The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the German Democratic Republic welcomes the present session of the twenty-four-nation Special Committee of the United Nations in several African capitals, wishing the Committee meeting good progress. Referring to the discussion of the problem of South West Africa, I have the honour to state the following:

"In accordance with its principle attitude of condemning all forms of colonialism and neo-colonialism and of granting moral and material support to the anti-colonial liberation movements in their struggle for freedom and independence, the German Democratic Republic Government backs resolution 2074 (XX) of the United Nations General Assembly of 17 December 1965. It identifies itself with the rightful demand of the national liberation movement of South West Africa to grant full independence and national self-determination to the people of this Territory, and it considers the attempts of the apartheid regime in South Africa to annex this area an aggressive act which must be stopped with all available means. As early as 1963, the German Democratic Republic Government explained its stand on the apartheid policy of South Africa (document A/AC.115/L.26 of 2 August 1963), and it maintains neither diplomatic and consular nor economic relations with the Verwoerd regime. With particular indignation, the Government and people of the German Democratic Republic have learnt that with the help of the West German Federal Republic rocket bases and training grounds, which are used for military purposes, were established by South African authorities in South West Africa and that West German monopolies participate in exploiting the African population of South West Africa. Indicative of the relations between the West German Federal Government and South Africa, which are becoming ever closer, is not only the expansion of trade between the two States, but also the visit of Strauss, ex-War Minister and Chairman of one of the two ruling parties of West Germany, to South Africa, who, during this trip, expressed himself in favour of West German military aid to the apartheid State. The Government of the German Democratic Republic dissociates itself from this attitude of the West German Federal Republic and declares that it has always supported the struggle of the population of South West Africa for national self-determination and independence and that it will continue to do so in the future.

"Excellency, I request you to bring this position of the German Democratic Republic to the notice of the Committee members."

188. Germany had played a large part in the events that had led up to the present fate of the people in South West Africa, having colonized that Territory before the First World War. Between the two world wars, Nazi Germany had spread the ideology of White supremacy in South and South West Africa, and twenty years after the Second World War, the Federal Republic of Germany was abetting the régime that was following the Nazi policy of racial superiority and discrimination. His delegation was happy, however, that there existed another sovereign independent German State, the German Democratic Republic, that was giving its whole-hearted support to the struggle of the South West African people for their freedom and independence.

189. It was interesting to note that the same Governments which had opposed the imposition of sanctions against South Africa were also against the adoption of effective measures to crush the rebellion in Southern Rhodesia. His delegation had always maintained that the fate of Africans in South Africa, South West Africa, Zimbabwe and other Territories in that area was indivisible, since they were all faced with collusion between the forces of the international industrial combines.

190. The South African Government had so far managed to forestall concerted United Nations action and to destroy African opposition by its policy of fragmentation in South West Africa. The fact that the South West African case was still before the International Court of Justice had also been used as a pretext by the Mandatory Power to delay United Nations action.

191. The South West African question was a challenge to the conscience of mankind. In his delegation's opinion, there could be no exception regarding the implementation of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) and the United Nations should not allow legal technicalities to prevent the people of South West Africa from attaining independence. The Special Committee should realize that South Africa and its allies were doing their utmost to consolidate their industrial and military empire in the southern part of Africa and to perpetuate the exploitation of Africans. His delegation therefore considered that the General Assembly and the Special Committee should agree upon concrete measures to divest South Africa of its Mandate and should demand the withdrawal of all military bases and personnel from South West Africa. It would support any resolution calling for the transfer of power to the people of South West Africa, in accordance with the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. He therefore suggested that the Special Committee should recommend that the General Assembly take the necessary measures to divest South Africa of its Mandate over South West Africa and call upon the Security Council to consider the steps to be taken in order to effect the transfer of power to a representative Government established as a result of general elections held under the supervision of the United Nations.

192. The representative of *Tunisia* emphasized that the question of South West Africa was a specifically colonial problem which came within the purview of the Special Committee and the General Assembly. The people of that Territory had to be freed from the grasp of a State which, although a Member of the United Nations, continued to oppress them politically, as well as economically and socially, despite all the recommendations of the United Nations. The situation prevailing in South West Africa was unworthy of modern times and all men had a duty to put an end to it. The legal arguments adduced by certain delegations, which had taken refuge behind the final decision to be taken by the International Court of Justice, should not stand in the way of the recommendations made by the majority of States Members of the United Nations that the Mandate for South West Africa should be withdrawn from South Africa.

193. In conclusion, he repeated that he would unreservedly support any specific steps which the Special Committee might take to meet the legitimate aspirations of the people of South West Africa.

194. The representative of *Bulgaria* said that the Special Committee had a great deal of evidence that South Africa was continuing to use South West Africa as a military base and was applying the régime of apartheid in it. The sanctions advocated by the United Nations against South Africa had not materialized, because of the co-operation and assistance which the Western countries and the members of NATO were continuing to furnish to that country. In resolution 2074 (XX), the General Assembly had unequivocally condemned the policies of financial interests operating in South West Africa and had denounced the pernicious activities of the imperialist monopolies. However, those very same financial interests were continuing to invest in South Africa and to support apartheid. The moment had therefore come for the United Nations to take steps to put an end to the activities of those large United States and other Western monopolies which were delaying the liberation of the people of South West Africa.

195. He considered that the judgement of the International Court of Justice related to only one aspect of the question and that it was now time to decide on the substance of the matter, namely, the question of releasing the people of South West Africa from colonial domination once and for all by ending South Africa's Mandate for that Territory.

196. Since General Assembly resolutions 1899 (XVIII) and 2074 (XX) had not achieved the expected results, the only course remaining was to request the Security Council to apply the sanctions envisaged in Chapter VII of the Charter to South Africa.

197. The representative of *Chile* observed that the question of South West Africa, with which the United Nations had concerned itself for so many years, had been the subject of countless studies, proposals and resolutions. It was time for effective steps to be taken to remedy the situation in that Territory, in which the people were still being oppressed. He therefore considered that the Special Committee should make an appeal to all countries to refrain from assisting South Africa in any way whatsoever. Moreover, he supported the Venezuelan representative's proposal that a sub-committee should be set up to study methods of ending the Mandate given to South Africa.

198. The representative of the *Ivory Coast* said that he wished to draw attention to certain events which had taken place since the adoption of the last General Assembly resolution on South West Africa. From year to year, the situation in South West Africa remained equally grim. Verwoerd and his henchmen had not given up the idea of implementing the odious plan set out in the Odendaal report. Verwoerd's objective was to annex South West Africa.

199. The indigenous population of the Territory lived under increasingly repressive legislation. Although the ninety-day detention law had been suspended, a new law, the Criminal Procedure Amendment Act, No. 96, which was even more stringent than the previous law, had come into force in 1965. Under the new Act, persons who were to serve or who might possibly serve as witnesses for the prosecution in certain criminal trials could be held incommunicado for six months if the State prosecutor so desired. The Official Secrets Act provided for a fine of R1,500 and imprisonment for seven years. The Police Amendment Act, No. 74 of 1965, authorized the police to search without warrant any person, premises or place, any vehicle, boat or air-

craft, or any receptacle whatsoever. In addition to these strengthened repressive measures, he would also mention the massive deportations of Africans to reserves as well as the installation of military bases by the Government of South Africa against the wishes of the people of the Territory. South Africa had thus violated the commitment it had made as the administering Power of the Territory of South West Africa.

200. Despite the fact that one aspect of the question was being examined by the International Court of Justice, he considered that General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) should be applied to that Territory without delay. He agreed with the representatives of Denmark, Venezuela and Mali that the Mandate should be withdrawn from South Africa as soon as the International Court of Justice had handed down its judgement.

201. In conclusion, he said that his delegation would support any resolution calling for the application of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) to South West Africa, the withdrawal of South Africa's Mandate, and measures to restore the land to the indigenous population.

202. The representative of *Syria* stated that ample proof of the tyranny reigning in South West Africa could be found in the Special Committee's findings, in the legislation and statements of the Government of South Africa, and in the evidence of the discriminatory and inhuman treatment given the indigenous population in that Territory. Despite the condemnation of apartheid contained in General Assembly resolution 2074 (XX), South Africa's course had remained unchanged, and even continued to enjoy the approval of certain profit-seeking visitors.

203. The unilateral annexation of a Territory by a so-called "trustee" would lead to the proliferation of racial discrimination and other social and economic injustices, which would be not only a violation of General Assembly resolutions and of the principles laid down in the United Nations Charter, but also a denial of fundamental human rights.

204. In view of South Africa's persistent refusal to modify its policies, and in view of the time factor involved in awaiting the decision of the International Court of Justice, the Special Committee should immediately adopt a resolution reflecting the strongest possible opposition to South Africa's policies, and providing for the fixing of an early date for the liberation of South West Africa, action to prevent the Territory's annexation, and the application of appropriate sanctions.

205. The representative of *Yugoslavia* said that although the problem of South West Africa had been a matter of concern to the United Nations for twenty years, no change for the better had been perceived. Indeed, conditions had deteriorated. The Government of South Africa had refused to listen to the repeated demands of the United Nations not to extend its racist policies to South West Africa, and was pursuing an increasingly ruthless policy of integrating that Territory into South Africa and subjecting its inhabitants to racial discrimination. The indigenous population was denied basic human rights, and the recent introduction of the measures advocated by the Odendaal Commission was the culmination of an evil and dishonest policy. In the Fourth Committee, the representative of South Africa had denied that those recommendations were

being implemented; but it was common knowledge that large sums had been spent to buy land preliminary to the establishment of so-called homelands for non-Whites and that the Government of South Africa was encouraging large-scale immigration into the Territory by White settlers. The aim of that policy was to ensure the continued supremacy of non-Africans. His delegation could only condemn it. The Special Committee, after studying the implications of the activities of the mining industry and of the other international companies having interests in South West Africa, had concluded that foreign economic activities constituted one of the major obstacles to independence. Large profits, cheap labour and favourable conditions for exploitation explained the desire of foreign investors to preserve the *status quo* in South West Africa.

206. Moreover the existence of military bases in South West Africa violated the Mandate and constituted a challenge to the demands of the United Nations and of world opinion. The action of the Government of South Africa was indeed contrary to the principles of the Charter and the Declaration of Human Rights, and it was only the active support of its allies which enabled it to continue that action.

207. Although time was running short, there was still a possibility of a peaceful solution provided that the measures recommended by the General Assembly were fully and promptly carried out by all Member States, and in particular by South Africa's principal trading partners. The use of force would have consequences which he thought no one, including South Africa's friends, would welcome.

208. It was the duty of the Special Committee and of the United Nations to take rapid action to put an immediate end to the shameful and dangerous situation in South West Africa.

209. The representative of *Sierra Leone* recalled that almost a year before, the Special Committee had adopted a resolution recommending that the General Assembly and the Security Council should take appropriate steps to safeguard the sovereignty of the people of South West Africa, in co-operation with the OAU. The General Assembly itself, in resolution 1899 (XVIII) had urged all States which had not yet done so to refrain from supplying arms, military equipment, or petroleum products to South Africa, and requested them to refrain from any action that might hamper the implementation of the resolution and of previous General Assembly resolutions on South West Africa.

210. However, as the petitioners had stated, arms and military equipment were still in fact being supplied to South Africa, and that country had so much petrol that it could afford to send Southern Rhodesia more than its daily requirements. Nothing had been done by the nations involved that could be construed as "not hampering" the implementation of the General Assembly resolution, and indeed some countries had even increased their trade with or investments in South Africa, thus helping to worsen conditions in South West Africa.

211. South Africa had been charged by the League of Nations to lead South West Africa to independence. Among other duties, it was supposed to promote the material and moral well-being and the social progress of the inhabitants. The International Court of Justice had on several occasions affirmed that South Africa's obligations had not lapsed with the end of the League

of Nations and that it had no right unilaterally to change the status of South West Africa, which remained a Mandated Territory. South Africa had betrayed its sacred trust, for the lives of the indigenous inhabitants were daily being made more miserable; oppressive measures were constantly being introduced to reduce them to the state of animals; and the nations that could help to restore their dignity took no action but only made pious statements. The situation was deplorable.

212. South West Africa was potentially rich, but its economy was operated entirely for the benefit of the White settler minority and of foreign investors. Foreign capital took the highest net profit in the world from the Territory. The report of the delegation of the Special Committee to the Oxford Conference (A/AC.109/L.290) mentioned that in 1962 a White miner earned £1,200 a year, whereas his African counterpart earned only £100. The ratio of Africans to Whites was 7:1; yet White settlers owned twice as much land as Africans. Moreover, the land set aside for the Africans was poor and only afforded its inhabitants a bare subsistence. A deliberate policy of land shortage and enforced poverty obliged Africans to leave their homes and families for the White Police Zone, where they were ruthlessly exploited and lived in appalling conditions. Such a policy could only be described as slavery.

213. While every White child could go to secondary school and later to university, only about 0.3 per cent of Africans received secondary education; the education of most Africans, when they had any at all, ended at the lower level of the primary school. To aggravate matters, South Africa's declared policy was to allow the various communities to finance their education. Educational expansion was thus out of the question in the African reserve areas which were not even self-supporting.

214. It had been stated that South West Africa was not economically viable and could therefore not aspire to independence. However, its mineral and oil resources yielded a larger *per capita* income than that of many independent States; and it was one of the few countries with more exports than imports. All its resources were at present exploited by foreign settlers and monopolies; but if the indigenous people were allowed to govern themselves they would be starting off with a far higher potential than many newly independent States which were themselves making rapid progress. South Africa had used its legislative powers to further its own interests to the detriment of the indigenous population.

215. In contravention of the Mandate, South Africa had set up military bases in South West Africa. They served two purposes: to ensure that any point in the Territory could be reached in half an hour, thus terrorizing the population, and to constitute a threat to neighbouring African States. In that connexion he quoted from paragraphs 11 and 12 of annex III to document A/AC.109/L.290, which stated that the Security Council should be called upon to exercise its powers under Chapter VII of the Charter to restore freedom to the people of South West Africa, and that all States should be prepared to take action to achieve that end.

216. The Special Committee's task was clearly to take the initiative to end the dilatory methods of South Africa and of some Members of the United Nations itself. It should see that General Assembly resolution 1899 (XVIII) was implemented, devise a way of pre-

venting the policy of apartheid from spreading and prevail on South Africa to remove its military bases from the Territory. It should also appeal to the friends of South Africa not to allow their nationals to settle in that country and, through it, in South West Africa. The current legal proceedings in the International Court of Justice should not obscure the Special Committee's political responsibilities. His delegation would support any resolution with those objectives.

217. The representative of *Iraq* recalled that the Special Committee had heard petitioners on the question of South West Africa whose evidence, together with the report of the Oxford Conference and the arguments advanced by the representative of Sierra Leone, showed that South African policies in that area were wreaking havoc on the lives of the indigenous population. Contrary to the Mandate, economic and social progress was being impeded, and in defiance of the United Nations, South Africa had also begun to establish military bases in the Territory. It was outrageous that South Africa should continue to receive military support from certain countries and that foreigners should derive revenues as high as 32 per cent of the gross national product from South West Africa.

218. His delegation deemed it the Special Committee's duty to do away with those evils and would support any resolution to that end. Such a resolution should contain a recommendation to the Security Council that implementation of General Assembly resolution 1899 (XVIII) be made mandatory for all Member States, and a further recommendation concerning the dismantling of military bases in South West Africa.

219. The representative of *Madagascar* said that for twenty years the international community had been desperately trying to find an equitable solution to the problem of South West Africa and had been unsuccessfully seeking to put an end to the racial policy in that country by means of negotiation and persuasion. South Africa was continuing to favour the White minority at the expense of the Africans; it was strengthening apartheid and was stripping the indigenous population of its property, with the support of those States which were refusing to implement United Nations resolutions.

220. For that reason, the Malagasy delegation wished to issue an appeal to all States to reconsider their attitude towards South Africa.

221. It had been stated that the International Court of Justice was about to reach its decision concerning South West Africa. While the question of the Mandate was, of course, an important aspect of the problem, the Committee should have no illusions about the effects of the Court's judgement. A decision by the Court that the terms of the Mandate had been violated would not be enough to free South West Africa. The population of that Territory must be given constitutional means to make its complaints known. That was why the United Nations and the Special Committee had the right and the duty to consider the question of South West Africa and to make appropriate recommendations in order to prevent a whittling down of human values and to ensure peace in the world. His delegation would vote for any constructive proposal which took account of the facts of the situation.

222. The representative of *Italy* stated that South West Africa was a particularly serious problem, with three distinct aspects: non-compliance by South Africa with the Mandate of 17 December 1920, by which the

Territory was placed under its administration; the refusal by South Africa to recognize and apply to South West Africa the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples; and the extension of apartheid to the Territory.

223. It was particularly regrettable that South Africa should disregard its obligations under the Mandate, for its action weakened the whole structure of inter-State relationships. It was also regrettable that South Africa had not realized that the Declaration represented a decisive step towards the establishment of a new international society based on freedom, justice and co-operation. The main cause of the unsatisfactory situation in South West Africa was to be found in the racial discrimination applied in the legal system enforced by the Government of South Africa.

224. The Special Committee's task was to evolve suggestions for submission to the General Assembly as to the best way of dealing with the problem. The Italian delegation shared the view of a number of speakers that the pending judgement by the International Court of Justice covered only one of the three main aspects of the problem of South West Africa, i.e., the violation of the Mandate. The other two aspects fell within the purview of the Special Committee.

225. However, any measure taken by the General Assembly at its twenty-first session would be taken in the light of the judgement of the International Court, which was expected to be delivered before the opening of the session. For that reason, his delegation agreed with the representative of Denmark that nothing should be done that might prejudice action by the General Assembly after the judgement. It also endorsed the proposal of the representative of Venezuela that a sub-committee to deal with the matter should be set up.

226. Although experience had shown that the Mandate had been disastrous, hasty repeal of it might cut off the only link between the Territory and the United Nations, making South West Africa a sort of no-man's land and even justifying South African activity there. His delegation would submit proposals on that question at a later stage.

227. The Special Committee should present a common front on the problem of South West Africa, and when the time came for a decision his delegation would not be unduly influenced by mere drafting detail.

228. Referring to the accusations against the Western Powers and NATO, the representative of Italy stated that his delegation felt that such allegations might divert the Special Committee's attention from the real causes of the problem, which had nothing to do with so-called NATO assistance or the visit of a retired United States general to South Africa. Regarding the contention by the representative of the Soviet Union that Italy had supplied South Africa with military equipment, he stated that that accusation had no basis in fact. Two Italian firms had merely supplied half a dozen airplanes equipped for civil aviation, before adoption of the Security Council resolution on apartheid; after adoption of that resolution further supplies had been prohibited. The two firms were subsidiaries of FIAT, a firm of international repute and one that had concluded a contract to supply half a billion dollars' worth of equipment to the Soviet Union itself. Such allegations were baseless and could be traced to the South African Government, in whose interest it was to sow dissension among the countries of Western Europe.

He hoped the Special Committee would continue to be guided in its deliberations by its desire to establish the truth and not by other motives.

229. The representative of the *United States of America* said that she wished to comment on some specific points raised in the discussion, in particular concerning the pending decision of the International Court of Justice.

230. Before proceeding, however, she pointed out that the right of private United States citizens to express their own opinions was a United States tradition, and repeated references by the representative of the Soviet Union to remarks of former General Norstad and other Americans would not diminish dedication to that tradition.

231. Her country shared the general concern and frustration that so little progress had been made towards a solution of the problem of South West Africa. At the same time, it hoped for positive results from the long-awaited decision of the International Court of Justice. Article 94 of the Charter provided that every Member State should undertake to comply with the decisions of the Court in proceedings to which it was a party and all States Members of the United Nations were therefore obliged to respect the Court's judgments.

232. She did not believe that there had been any feeling against a thorough debate on the problem during the period of the Court's proceedings. There had been a belief that the General Assembly should refrain from taking action or making recommendations relating specifically to the questions before the Court until a judgement was given. United Nations action should rest upon a solid legal foundation. That did not mean that views could not be expressed or that the United Nations could not take constructive action. Her country had always insisted that South Africa must comply with the Mandate and condemned that country's policy of apartheid both in its own territory and elsewhere.

233. As the Special Committee was aware, her country had scrupulously enforced the embargo on the supply of military equipment. That fact could not be obscured by false accusations that NATO was supplying arms to a country that was not even a member of that organization. The United States Government had not supported General Assembly resolution 1899 (XVIII) on the embargo of petroleum products, since it considered that such action could only be taken by the Security Council. Figures on trade with South Africa were not necessarily relevant, but she believed that certain nations whose representatives had mentioned the question were in fact carrying on a flourishing trade with South Africa.

234. Her own country condemned the narrow policy of ruling at the expense of the majority. It had learned from its own experience the sufferings that resulted from such a policy, and it was engaged in a civil rights campaign to extend equality to all citizens of the United States; it therefore could not remain indifferent to the grave problem of South West Africa.

235. The representative of the *Union of Soviet Socialist Republics* replied that it was well known that the members of NATO, in particular the United States, the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany, were assisting the South African régime. No matter how often the representatives of those countries denied that fact, everything pointed to it, including

the statements of the petitioners heard by the Special Committee and even press reports. He reiterated that *Flight International* had stated that South Africa now had Italian-made jet fighter aircraft with a top speed of 800 kilometres per hour. Italy might claim that those aircraft were intended for civil aviation, but it was very easy to change them into military aircraft. Those were facts and not baseless allegations.

236. He considered it sheer hypocrisy for the United States representative, when referring to General Norstad's remarks, which he himself had quoted earlier, to invoke freedom of speech as a tradition of United States democracy. Moreover, in all sincerity, that representative could hardly argue that the United States Government could not prevent increased United States investment in South Africa or that, unless the Security Council decided otherwise, there was no valid reason to halt arms deliveries to South Africa. She seemed to have forgotten the General Assembly resolution on the matter.

237. The United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany were also supplying arms to South Africa. In that connexion, he quoted a passage from the telegram addressed to the Special Committee by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the German Democratic Republic. The Minister of War of South Africa himself had admitted that the Federal Republic of Germany was furnishing military assistance to the régime in power in his country.

238. The policy of the NATO countries was part of a long-term scheme to impede the development of the African peoples and to maintain the bastions of colonialism in South Africa, Southern Rhodesia and the Portuguese colonies. As regards the Soviet Union, it was a proven fact that it was and would remain the true friend and ally of the oppressed.

239. The representative of the *United States of America* reiterated that the United States Government respected and observed the arms embargo, and she asked the representative of the Soviet Union to substantiate the general accusations he had made by citing a specific example of any military equipment supplied to South Africa by the United States in contravention of it.

240. The representative of *Italy* said that the unfounded allegations of the Soviet Union representative had been inspired by South African or Soviet propaganda and he relied on the judgement of his colleagues to dispose of such charges.

241. The representative of the *United Republic of Tanzania* pointed out that South Africa was acting against the United Nations and against the wishes of millions of people who cared for the dignity of man and for the freedom of the people of South West Africa. It was able to continue its policy of oppression because it continued to receive economic and military aid from its allies; had the resolutions of the General Assembly been carried out, that country would have had cause to re-examine its policies.

242. Africans could not remain indifferent, when American respect for the right of the individual and the private businessman was allowed to impede Africa's progress towards independence. His delegation had hoped to be told that the facts it had given concerning the increased trade between the United States and South Africa were wrong. Instead, however, it had been told of relatively unimportant statements by Presi-

dent Johnson about United States support for General Assembly resolution 1899 (XVIII).

243. So long as South Africa continued to enjoy trade with the most influential countries in the world, it would have no cause to change its policies. Evidence had been given to the Special Committee that the people of South West Africa had in many instances been dispossessed of their land by the South African Government in favour of foreign companies and private citizens who wished to exploit the mineral resources; that the people were being systematically grouped into reserves on mainly barren land that could not support decent living standards, and being kept as a reservoir of cheap labour; that as shown in the report of the delegation of the Special Committee to the Oxford Conference (A/AC.109/L.290, annex I, paras. 7 and 8), they were being forced into slave labour and separated from their families; and that the South African Government gave some of the private companies power over the indigenous population in return for the high taxes paid by those companies.

244. The representative of *Bulgaria* said that there were few members of the Special Committee who had not protested against the activities of the Western monopolies which were assisting South Africa. The facts in question were proven facts and were even mentioned in such official United Nations documents as the report of the Special Committee on the activities of foreign monopolies.

245. The representative of *Denmark* referring to the allegation that members of NATO had supplied arms to South Africa, said that NATO was a defence organization whose function was to take measures for the common defence of its members. In the economic and political fields, they acted individually, and to say that any individual actions in those fields were the deliberate policy of NATO was to abuse the Committee's forum for propaganda purposes. His country, a member of NATO, had never supplied arms to South Africa. He entirely agreed with the Tanzanian representative that any countries supplying arms to South Africa should be prevented from so doing. He had taken note with satisfaction of the confirmation by the United States representative that her country was observing the embargo on the supply of such arms, and unless the Soviet Union representative could cite specific examples to the contrary, that assurance should be accepted.

246. The representative of *Chile* noted that according to certain delegations, South Africa owed its military strength to aid from regional military groupings and to bilateral agreements with different countries. The representatives of the States in question said that they were the victims of false accusations. In order to find out the truth, an objective and conscientious study should be made of the question.

247. Drawing the Special Committee's attention to the communications dated 16 June and 6 July 1965 which it had received from the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany (A/AC.109/125 and 142), he observed that the Federal Republic of Germany defended itself against the charge of having established a military base in South West Africa, saying that it was really a meteorological centre constructed under an agreement between the University of Leipzig and the Government of the Republic of South Africa and did not contain any military installations. The Special Committee had been invited to visit the centre in order

to verify the statements made by the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany. On the other hand, a cable from the Government of the German Democratic Republic stated the contrary. There was only one way to resolve such contradictions, namely, to decide to hold an inquiry so that the Special Committee could collect evidence which would enable it to come to a well-founded conclusion and thus discharge its task.

248. The representative of *Australia* stated that his Government held strong views on the question of South West Africa and considered it proper that the Special Committee should address itself to the matter despite the fact that the International Court of Justice had certain aspects under consideration. Australia condemned South African policy in South West Africa and considered that the United Nations had an important role to play. His delegation did not endorse the South African argument that consideration of the question of South West Africa by the General Assembly infringed the *sub judice* principle. On the contrary, Australia thought that the General Assembly had a very important role to play immediately; but the United Nations must satisfy itself entirely of the strength of its legal position before taking action that might be based on purely political considerations. His country would be bound to take full account of the Court's ruling, which it would regard as a definitive legal opinion on the subject. It was true that the Court was concerned only with certain aspects of the problem of South West Africa; but no member of the Committee could predict the judgement or its effects and implications. The circumstances of the case constituted one of the most important developments in the direction of new norms of human behaviour and attitudes. Therefore the Committee should not prejudice or anticipate what could be a historic decision.

249. Australia condemned South Africa's refusal to recognize the processes leading to self-determination and assume its international obligations. His Government was also opposed to the hateful doctrine of apartheid and the repressive methods used to enforce it, and had informed the South African Government clearly and directly of that attitude.

250. To the best of his knowledge, his country had no commercial interests in South West Africa. Even if it had, they were certainly so utterly insignificant as to be of no importance whatsoever in the issues before the Special Committee; and in any case, his Government would never defend any commercial undertakings which might, in pursuit of profit, ride with roughshod inhumanity over the people. The whole industrial system of his country, with its carefully balanced system of Government and private activity, bore out that assertion.

251. Australia, as a former Mandatory Power under the League of Nations, had a special interest in the Mandated Territory of South West Africa. Just as his country had done much towards the formation of the United Nations itself, so also had it been most active in the development of the Trusteeship System, when it had been unhesitating in concluding with the United Nations trusteeship agreements for the transformation into Trust Territories of the Mandated Territories for which it was responsible. It had been, and still was, guided by a clear recognition of the inalienable right of any people to self-determination. Australia did not practise or advocate limitation of the forms of government from which peoples might choose, provided

that they themselves chose in all freedom. Nor did the country view independence itself as being of any unchanging or simple form; for its form could be determined only by the people making the choice.

252. The approach, purposes and ideals of his delegation were those embodied in the United Nations Charter. In the Australian Trust Territory—and former Mandated Territory—of New Guinea, for instance, the people had elected their own parliament with a substantial indigenous majority from a common roll based on the principle of “one man, one vote”, without regard to race, colour or creed. In those advances, Australia had in no way differentiated between the Trust Territory of New Guinea and the Non-Self-Governing Territory of Papua.

D. ACTION TAKEN BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE

253. At the 435th meeting on 7 June 1966, the representative of *Ethiopia* introduced a draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.300) on behalf of Afghanistan, Ethiopia, India, Iran, Iraq, the Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Mali, Sierra Leone, Syria, Tunisia, the United Republic of Tanzania and Yugoslavia.

254. He explained that an attempt had been made to incorporate in the draft resolution the views expressed in the Special Committee. Many of the points mentioned in the text were a reaffirmation of the stand that the Special Committee had taken in the past, and should pose no difficulty. The most important new idea was that contained in operative paragraph 10, which envisaged the establishment of a sub-committee to make a thorough study of the situation with a view to recommending an early date for the independence of South West Africa. The establishment of such a sub-committee was particularly important in view of the impending judgement by the International Court of Justice on the case brought by his country and Liberia.

255. The members of the Afro-Asian group and Yugoslavia, in co-sponsoring the draft resolution, were strongly convinced that its adoption would go a long way towards alleviating the sufferings of the people of South West Africa, and were confident that it would receive maximum support. While the co-sponsors were prepared to accept any amendment that would improve the text, they would be unable to accept anything calculated to weaken it.

256. The representative of *India* observed that, apart from operative paragraph 10, which had been included to take account of suggestions by several delegations, the part most likely to give rise to debate was operative paragraph 6, whereby the Special Committee would recommend to the Security Council to make it obligatory for all States to implement the measures contained in General Assembly resolution 1899 (XVIII), and in particular those mentioned in paragraph 7 of that resolution calling for an embargo on arms and petroleum supplies to South Africa. He stated that South Africa had repeatedly been denounced for its refusal to take cognizance of United Nations resolutions, but if other States were permitted to continue their support of that country, condemnation of it would lose its logical force.

257. The representative of *Venezuela* said that he had studied the draft resolution very carefully. It merely reaffirmed a series of principles for which Venezuela had always voted and his delegation therefore had no objection to voting for them once again. Nevertheless, he thought it advisable to submit, on

behalf of Chile and Venezuela, an amendment (A/AC.109/L.302) which was merely the logical sequel to their statements, and, indeed, to those made by many other delegations during the general debate. The amendment was to replace operative paragraph 10 of the draft resolution by the following;

“10. *Decides* to set up a sub-committee composed of five members appointed by the Chairman to study and recommend to the Special Committee:

“(a) Appropriate ways and means of terminating South Africa's Mandate in respect of South West Africa;

“(b) The most suitable ways and means of administering the Territory until it attains independence, i.e., until such time as the terms of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) have been fully implemented;

“11. *Requests* the Sub-Committee to submit its report before the Special Committee concludes its meetings for the current year.”

258. A study of the proposed new paragraphs would show that they contained positive elements which were consistent with the resolutions already adopted and with the wishes expressed by petitioners. They were also consistent with the decisions of the International Conference on South West Africa held at Oxford in March 1966. He referred in particular to paragraph 22 of annex 1 of the report of the Conference (A/AC.109/L.290). The amendment also reflected the viewpoint of most members of the Special Committee. It simply returned to the principal themes raised in the course of twenty years and had the merit of introducing a slight improvement in the original text of the draft resolution which would bring about some progress and help the General Assembly to thwart South Africa's policy. The ill-treatment to which the people of South West Africa were subjected could not be tolerated any longer and he considered that the time had come to recommend to the General Assembly that a study should be made of the question in order to put an end to the intolerable situation.

259. The representative of *Venezuela* was sure that all the sponsors of the original draft would support the joint amendment in order to enable the people of South West Africa, who had been so maltreated for forty years, to gain their independence at last.

260. The representative of *Bulgaria* said that he agreed in general with the main ideas contained in the draft resolution. He recalled that the representatives of the Soviet Union and Poland had made a number of suggestions which his delegation had supported. Those suggestions were reflected in paragraphs 6, 7 and 10 of the draft resolution. While accepting in principle the basic ideas of the draft resolution, he proposed four amendments jointly sponsored by Bulgaria, Poland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (A/AC.109/L.305), which he thought would strengthen the draft resolution without altering its substance.

261. Firstly, the situation in South West Africa was very dangerous and constituted a serious threat to peace. That idea was not expressed in any of the preambular or operative paragraphs of the present draft resolution, although it was to be found in the last preambular paragraph of General Assembly resolution 2074 (XX). Consequently, the first amendment proposed was to add the following new paragraph at the end of the preamble:

"Noting with deep concern the serious threat to international peace and security in this part of Africa, which has been further aggravated by the racist rebellion in Southern Rhodesia".

262. The second amendment, to operative paragraph 1, would have the Special Committee reaffirm the inalienable right of the people of South West Africa "to freedom, independence and territorial integrity" instead of "to freedom and independence".

263. The third amendment would add the phrase "which constitutes a serious threat to international peace and security" at the end of operative paragraph 5, which provided that the attention of the Security Council be drawn "to the serious situation prevailing in South West Africa and its aggravation caused by the racist rebellion in Southern Rhodesia".

264. The fourth amendment would add the following at the end of operative paragraph 10: "and to request the Sub-Committee to submit its report to the Special Committee by the beginning of the twenty-first session of the General Assembly". After thanking the sponsors of the draft resolution for taking into account the ideas put forward earlier by the delegations of Bulgaria, Poland and the Soviet Union, the representative of Bulgaria expressed the hope that they would accept the joint amendments.

265. The representative of *Chile* said that the text of the draft resolution represented a middle-of-the-road position which the Special Committee could adopt. It recommended methods which had won the support of the United Nations in the past and contained new elements which would surely help to end the painful situation in which South West Africa had languished for so many years. He was very pleased to see that the views he had put forward had been reflected in the draft resolution.

266. He regarded it as most important that another appeal should be made to States Members of the United Nations and to non-member States to stop giving the Government of South Africa any assistance whatever. It was for the Security Council to transform the appeal into an obligation. It was obvious that any support for the Verwoerd régime would strengthen its sectarian tendencies and aggravate the oppression of the Africans who formed the majority of the population in South West Africa. His delegation wished to lay special stress on economic and military aid, which openly gave the régime the upper hand over the indigenous population, eternally oppressed by those with powerful weapons.

267. Operative paragraph 10 of the draft resolution before the Special Committee expressed the idea which the delegation of *Venezuela* had put forward at the previous session of the General Assembly and had repeated during the present session of the Special Committee. His delegation firmly supported the proposal. It considered that the Committee could not remain idle while waiting for the decision of the International Court of Justice, but should devote all its energy to finding some means by which the Mandate over South West Africa entrusted to South Africa by the League of Nations could be withdrawn. His delegation felt that the paragraph should be revised in such a way as to define more precisely the role and objectives of the proposed sub-committee and had therefore joined *Venezuela* in submitting an amendment which he hoped would be accepted.

268. The representative of the *Union of Soviet Socialist Republics*, commenting on the amendment submitted by *Chile* and *Venezuela* (A/AC.109/L.302) to paragraph 10 of the draft resolution, said that the idea of establishing a sub-committee of five members appointed by the Chairman seemed very sound, and he was confident that the Chairman, in consultation with the members of the Special Committee, would ensure that all trends of opinion were represented in the sub-committee. As regards sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) of the amendment, there was no reason why they should not be considered, provided that the principal elements in the original paragraph 10 were kept, i.e., "a thorough study of the situation" and "an early date for the independence of the Territory". He considered that paragraph 10 of the draft resolution should be kept in its original form, save for possible additions proposed by *Chile* and *Venezuela*.

269. At the 438th meeting of the Special Committee, on 8 June 1966, the representative of the *United Republic of Tanzania* introduced a revised text of the joint draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.300/Rev.1), in which the phrase "and its consequences for international peace and security" had been added at the end of operative paragraph 5, and the words "and, among other things, to recommend" had been added in operative paragraph 10. On the suggestion of the representative of *Chile*, the sponsors replaced the word "things" by "matters".

270. The representative of *Tanzania* explained that the sponsors of the draft resolution considered that the revised text of operative paragraph 5 would meet the wishes of the sponsors of the three-Power amendment (A/AC.109/L.305) calling for a separate reference to the "threat to international peace and territorial security". He observed that the insertion of the words "and territorial integrity" in operative paragraph 1 was not really necessary, since the main question was whether or not South Africa would accept its responsibility towards the United Nations. However, if that were insisted upon, the matter could be referred back to the sponsors of the draft resolution.

271. With respect to the amendments calling for the proposed sub-committee to report to the Special Committee before the twenty-first session of the General Assembly (A/AC.109/L.302 and 305), he considered that the normal procedure. However, the sponsors of the draft resolution felt that there could be no real objection to that amendment, if it were insisted upon.

272. He felt that the matter of finding ways and means of terminating the Mandate in South West Africa should be left out, since the question could be dealt with at a later stage. He had been asked by the sponsors of the draft resolution not to press the point.

273. He considered that operative paragraphs 1 and 10 of the revised draft resolution should meet the wishes of *Chile* and *Venezuela* and that operative paragraph 5 would satisfy *Bulgaria*, *Poland* and the *Union of Soviet Socialist Republics*. He regretted the impossibility of meeting all the requests for amendments, but observed that a resolution was inevitably a compromise, and hoped that the Special Committee would recognize that the draft resolution as revised represented the best course in the circumstances.

274. The representative of *Bulgaria*, on behalf of the Polish, Soviet Union and Bulgarian delegations, understood that the sponsors of the draft resolution had not been able to accept changes of substance, and thanked

them for having tried, as far as possible, to take their amendments into consideration. In view of the revised text of operative paragraph 5 they would not insist that their first and third amendments be put to the vote. They regretted that the sponsors of the draft resolution had been unable to accept their second amendment to insert "and territorial integrity" in the first operative paragraph. In view of the observations by the Tanzanian representative, and the fact that the Chairman of the Special Committee, who would appoint the members of the Sub-Committee, would expressly request them to report to the Special Committee no later than the opening of the twenty-first session of the General Assembly, they would not insist that their second and fourth amendments be put to the vote.

275. The representative of *Venezuela* expressed regret that the sponsors of the draft resolution had not found it advisable to accept the amendments submitted by Chile and Venezuela (A/AC.109/L.302), which had been designed solely to defend the interests of the people of South West Africa. The ideas contained in those amendments were in conformity with the statements of petitioners and the opinions expressed in the Oxford conference.

276. He could not accept the administering Power's contention that the question of South West Africa could not be examined by the United Nations because it was under consideration by the International Court of Justice. While the sponsors of the draft resolution wished to consider the question as being exclusively juridical, the Venezuelan and Chilean delegations, for their part, thought that it was a colonial question. The main point was to decide whether the Special Committee could recommend to the General Assembly measures which would make it possible to apply the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples to the Territory of South West Africa. The draft resolution, as it stood, could not give satisfaction to the people of South West Africa and did not take fully into account the terms of reference given to the Special Committee by the General Assembly.

277. The important point was not that a date should be fixed for the independence of South West Africa or that the International Court of Justice should issue a decision concerning the Mandate. The problem arose primarily from the fact that the administering Power did not recognize the authority of the United Nations to intervene in the affairs of the Territory and that the adoption of another resolution simply repeating what had already been said many times would not change the situation at all.

278. Nevertheless, the Chilean and Venezuelan delegations, having heard the explanations of the Tanzanian representative, agreed in a spirit of co-operation to withdraw their amendments.

279. The representative of *Chile* confirmed what the Venezuelan representative had said. The sole purpose of their amendments had been to facilitate the Special Committee's task and to achieve a text representing the views of all the members of the Special Committee and not merely those of a geographical group.

280. The representative of the *United Republic of Tanzania*, speaking on behalf of the sponsors of the draft resolution, thanked the sponsors of the amendments for their co-operation, and expressed agreement with what the Venezuelan representative had said about South Africa's Mandate in South West Africa. The main issue in South West Africa was that of independence,

Mandate or no Mandate, and operative paragraph 1 of the draft resolution left no doubt in that respect. It was quite clear that the principal aim was to implement General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), and those concerned with implementing the resolution should not be slaves to the purely academic aspect of legal considerations.

281. The Venezuelan representative had said that too many resolutions had been adopted, and too little action taken. He was in full agreement. Africans were frustrated before the plethora of resolutions and absence of action. There were two ways of ending colonialism: either through United Nations resolutions and subsequent action by the Special Committee, the Security Council or other bodies; or through an armed struggle, in which case African blood would water the tree of freedom.

282. Africans had waited in the hope that the United Nations would take action. If they were let down by the United Nations, they would have to resort to arms.

283. Referring to the co-operation displayed between Latin America and the Afro-Asian countries, together with Yugoslavia, the representative of Tanzania observed that both groups of countries had been colonized at some time or another, and their common goal was to gain independence for their brothers everywhere. Co-operation was the corner-stone of the work and progress of the Special Committee.

284. The representative of the *Union of Soviet Socialist Republics* said, in reply to the Venezuelan representative's assertion that the Special Committee seemed to consider the question of South West Africa a strictly juridical question, that his delegation, for its part, considered it a political and colonial question.

285. The representative of *India* associated his delegation with all that had been said by the Venezuelan and Tanzanian representatives. They could appropriately have added the word "India" every time they had mentioned Africa.

286. The representative of *Australia* considered that the most important new element in the draft resolution was its operative paragraph 6. Australia had no vested interests in the matters of trade and supply to which that paragraph was directed for it did not supply arms or oil to South Africa. However, his delegation opposed the usurpation by the Special Committee of the functions of the Security Council. It was seriously concerned about paragraph 7 recommending that the Security Council take measures to ensure the withdrawal of military bases and installations from the Territory. His delegation could not support those two paragraphs or paragraph 3.

287. With regard to paragraph 3, he had no hesitation in condemning any financial interests deliberately and shamelessly exploiting the people and resources of the area and impeding progress there. However, he could not agree with the implication that all financial interests were doing that. He believed there were business concerns of repute and integrity, and the development of commercial enterprise was essential to the progress of the Territory.

288. He had reservations about paragraph 10, for Australia had always maintained that the fixing of a date for independence was a matter for the people concerned. Paragraph 10 contained no mention or suggestion of the will of the people and the necessary consultations. The role of the people should not be assumed by anyone else.

289. In conclusion, he wished to pay tribute to the obvious efforts of the co-sponsors to draft a resolution fairly reflecting a variety of views. In so doing they had produced much with which his delegation could agree. He regretted that no instructions had come from his Government to authorize his delegation to participate in the voting.

290. The representative of *Denmark* reiterated his Government's strong reaction to the continued oppression of the South African people and to the stubborn attitude of the Verwoerd régime towards the United Nations. It was in the light of this position the Danish Government had considered the draft resolution. Regrettably it was, however, not a general resolution, which his delegation thought most appropriate in the present situation. Furthermore, his delegation had a few reservations concerning specific paragraphs. The main objection of his delegation concerned paragraph 6, because it went beyond the competence of the General Assembly. He believed that every member of the Committee was as conscious as he of the limits of the competence of the various organs of the United Nations. For that reason Denmark would have to abstain when the draft was put to a vote. Technical difficulties had been as much to blame as differences of opinion for the Committee's failure to reach a satisfactory compromise. He hoped that in future the Special Committee could agree on the goals and on the most effective means of meeting them.

291. The representative of *Italy* agreed that a strong and united stand was needed on South West Africa. Having examined the draft resolution and having brought it to his Government's special attention, he found that although most of it was inadequate, he had reservations concerning several operative paragraphs.

292. The meaning and scope of the expression "a crime against humanity" were not clear. If taken as a general condemnation of apartheid, it would be acceptable to his delegation. If, however, the terms had legal implications, he could not support that paragraph.

293. He suggested that in paragraph 3, the expression "those financial interests" replace "the financial interests", but that if it was too late to make such an amendment, he would be satisfied with a separate vote on that paragraph.

294. Referring to the unconstitutionality of resolution 1899 (XVIII), he said that his delegation would have reservations on paragraph 6.

295. The recommendation to the Security Council contained in paragraph 7 was not entirely in accordance with the United Nations Charter. Moreover, as the Special Committee would be asking the Security Council to do something new, it should give the matter very careful consideration.

296. He asked for a separate vote on operative paragraphs 3, 6 and 7 and stated that if they were adopted as they stood, Italy would have to abstain from voting on the resolution.

297. The representative of the *United States of America* explained her delegation's reservations, which concerned difficulties mentioned in its previous statement as well as in that of the Italian delegation.

298. She specified that her support of the call for an embargo on the shipment of arms stemmed from a rejection of apartheid, and declared that the United States had scrupulously adhered to the arms embargo. If a distinction had been made in the resolution between an arms embargo and economic sanctions, her

Government could have supported it. However, the United States would have to abstain if separate votes were taken on paragraphs 3 and 6. She could not support a blanket indictment of the financial interests, and would have preferred specific indictments of the labour conditions and policies associated with foreign companies in South West Africa.

299. She raised a question concerning the Special Committee's mandate, and felt that it should take no action such as that recommended in paragraph 7, prior to the International Court's decision.

300. Although in agreement with the resolution's condemnation of racial practices, with its appeal for support for the people of South West Africa in their effort to exercise self-determination, and with its implicit condemnation of South Africa for failing to live up to its obligations to the United Nations and to the peoples of South West Africa, the United States would have to abstain from voting on the resolution as a whole.

301. The representative of *Venezuela* explained that his delegation's position regarding the strict delimitation of the functions of United Nations bodies obliged it to abstain in the vote on operative paragraphs 6 and 7 of the draft resolution.

302. Although he would vote in favour of operative paragraph 3, he had some reservations regarding that provision. His delegation was not convinced, as it had previously pointed out, that the activities of the financial interests operating in the Territory constituted the principal, much less the only, obstacle to the freedom and independence of South West Africa. The essential problem was the subjection of the Territory to South Africa. It was out of the question for the Special Committee to condemn all financial interests; it could only consider condemning those which were exploiting the human and material resources of the Territory and impeding its progress.

303. Moreover, in connexion with operative paragraph 8 of the draft resolution which his delegation supported, he took it that the moral and material support requested of Member States was that provided for in the Charter. He added that by voting in favour of a draft resolution which did not satisfy it completely, the Venezuelan delegation wished to give evidence of its readiness to co-operate with its African friends.

304. The representative of *Chile* expressed his gratitude to the sponsors of the draft resolution for their spirit of understanding and co-operation. Although his delegation would vote for the draft, it nevertheless had certain reservations to make. Operative paragraph 3 was much too sweeping. All foreign interests were not necessarily harmful; the text should have spoken of the interests of States which adopted an imperialist attitude. He had earlier expressed his views regarding operative paragraphs 6 and 7 and indicated the limits which the Special Committee should observe in order to abide by the Charter. It was not for the Special Committee to tell the Security Council how it should proceed. Operative paragraph 8, on the other hand, was in full conformity with the Charter.

305. The revised draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.300/Rev.1), as orally revised was voted upon at the 439th meeting on 9 June 1966 as follows:

Operative paragraph 3 was adopted by a roll-call vote of 18 to none, with 3 abstentions. The voting was as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Bulgaria, Chile, Ethiopia, India, Iran, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Mali, Poland, Sierra Leone, Syria, Tunisia, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Republic of Tanzania, Venezuela, Yugoslavia.

Against: None.

Abstaining: Denmark, Italy, United States of America.

Operative paragraph 6 was adopted by a roll-call vote of 16 to 1, with 4 abstentions. The voting was as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Bulgaria, Ethiopia, India, Iran, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Mali, Poland, Sierra Leone, Syria, Tunisia, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Republic of Tanzania, Yugoslavia.

Against: United States of America.

Abstaining: Chile, Denmark, Italy, Venezuela.

Operative paragraph 7 was adopted by a roll-call vote of 16 to none, with 5 abstentions. The voting was as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Bulgaria, Ethiopia, India, Iran, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Mali, Poland, Sierra Leone, Syria, Tunisia, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Republic of Tanzania, Yugoslavia.

Against: None.

Abstaining: Chile, Denmark, Italy, United States of America, Venezuela.

The resolution as a whole, as revised, was adopted by a roll-call vote of 18 to none, with 3 abstentions. The voting was as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Bulgaria, Chile, Ethiopia, India, Iran, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Mali, Poland, Sierra Leone, Syria, Tunisia, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Republic of Tanzania, Venezuela, Yugoslavia.

Against: None.

Abstaining: Denmark, Italy, United States of America.

306. The resolution on the question of South West Africa (A/AC.109/177) adopted by the Special Committee at its 439th meeting on 9 June 1966, reads as follows:

"The Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,

"Having heard the petitioners,

"Recalling General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960 containing the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,

"Recalling further General Assembly resolution 2074 (XX) of 17 December 1965 and other resolutions of the General Assembly, and of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples with respect to South West Africa,

"Noting with concern the policy of the South African Government to suppress and circumvent the political and economic rights of the indigenous people of South West Africa through large-scale settlement of immigrants in the Territory,

"Noting further with deep concern the continued presence of military bases and other military installations in South West Africa, in violation of General Assembly resolutions 1805 (XVII) of 14 December 1962 and 2074 (XX) of 17 December 1965,

1. *Reaffirms the inalienable right of the people of South West Africa to freedom and independence in accordance with General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) and recognizes the legitimacy of their struggle to achieve this right;*

2. *Condemns the policies of apartheid and racial discrimination practised by the Government of South Africa in South West Africa which constitute a crime against humanity;*

3. *Condemns the activities of the financial interests operating in South West Africa which exploit the human and material resources and impede the progress of the Territory and the right of the people to freedom and independence;*

4. *Condemns the policy of the Government of South Africa to suppress and circumvent the political and economic rights of the indigenous people of the Territory through a large-scale settlement of foreign immigrants in the Territory;*

5. *Draws the attention of the Security Council to the serious situation prevailing in South West Africa and its aggravation caused by the racist rebellion in Southern Rhodesia and its consequences for international peace and security;*

6. *Recommends to the Security Council to make it obligatory for all States to implement the measures contained in General Assembly resolution 1899 (XVIII) of 13 November 1963 and in particular those mentioned in paragraph 7 thereof;*

7. *Further recommends to the Security Council to take the necessary measures to ensure the withdrawal of all military bases and installations from the Territory;*

8. *Appeals to all States to give moral and material support to the African population of South West Africa in their struggle for freedom and independence;*

9. *Invites the Secretary-General to approach the specialized agencies and other international organizations concerned, with a view to extending assistance to the refugees from South West Africa;*

10. *Decides to establish a sub-committee to make a thorough study of the situation and, among other matters, to recommend an early date for the independence of the Territory;*

11. *Decides to transmit the present resolution to the President of the Security Council;*

12. *Decides further to maintain the item of South West Africa on its agenda and to keep it under constant review."*

307. The text of the resolution was transmitted to the President of the Security Council on 14 June 1966.¹³

308. At its 455th meeting, the Special Committee decided that the Sub-Committee, established by operative paragraph 10 of the resolution should comprise the following members: Denmark, Ethiopia, India, the Ivory Coast, Poland, Tunisia and Venezuela.

¹³ Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-first Year, Supplement for April, May and June 1966, document S/7370.

E. FURTHER CONSIDERATION BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE

Introduction

309. The Special Committee further considered the question of South West Africa at its 460th and 465th to 468th meetings on 5 August and 12, 14, 15 and 19 September 1966.

310. At its 460th meeting, the Chairman and some members of the Special Committee made statements concerning the judgement delivered on 18 July 1966 by the International Court of Justice on the South West Africa cases instituted by Ethiopia and Liberia against South Africa on 4 November 1960. By the President's casting vote, the votes being divided seven to seven, the Court had found that Ethiopia and Liberia could not be considered to have established any legal right or interest in the subject-matter of their claims and accordingly decided to reject them.

311. The *Chairman* of the Special Committee stated that several members had expressed the wish that, since that was the first substantive meeting of the Special Committee following the judgement of the International Court of Justice, he should make a statement on the recent developments concerning the question of South West Africa.

312. Since the last meeting of the Special Committee, the world had received with shock and dismay the judgement of the International Court of Justice on the South West Africa case. This was particularly so because by that judgement the International Court evaded every substantive legal issue placed before it for decision. It had failed to rule on apartheid, a system of administration which was so clearly a violation of the Mandate and of the Charter of the United Nations. It had failed to rule on the obligations of the Republic of South Africa to submit to the supervisory authority of the United Nations over its administration of the Mandate. Indeed, it had failed even to confirm its previous opinion regarding the very existence of the Mandate. The Court chose the expedient of evading all of the important issues before it on a procedural technicality by ruling that Ethiopia and Liberia had failed to establish any legal right or interest in the subject-matter.

313. One might well ask, as indeed Judge Jessup of the United States in his dissenting opinion asked, why the Court would "tolerate a situation in which the parties would be put to great trouble and expense to explore all the details of the merits, only to be told"—and that after six long years of litigation—"that the Court would pay no heed to all their arguments and evidence because the case was dismissed on a preliminary ground which precluded any investigation of the merits". Indeed, the Court had led public opinion to believe, by its 8 to 7 majority judgement of 1962, that the issue of the parties to the dispute had already been resolved and that it would investigate the merits of the dispute. By an accident of fate, what was the minority of the Court in 1962 became a majority in 1966 by virtue of the casting vote of Judge Spender of Australia, a circumstance allowing the 1962 minority to interpret and, in effect, to reverse the judgement reached by a majority of the Court in 1962.

314. For these reasons, it was not surprising that large sections of international opinion believed that the judgement had diminished the prestige of the Court as a means of settling international disputes, and raised serious doubt about its integrity and usefulness. Nor

was it any wonder that demands were being made for more equitable representation in the membership of the Court and for a closer examination of its operation.

315. It was true that the International Court did not disavow either its judgement of 1962 or its advisory opinions of 1950, 1955 and 1956 which established that the Mandate continued in effect and that South Africa continued to be bound to accept United Nations supervision. However, the fact that South Africa had refused to accept the three previous opinions of the International Court on South West Africa raised serious doubts as to the advisability of further recourse to the International Court on the substantive issues.

316. The outcome of the proceedings of the International Court of Justice had been a bitter disappointment to the African States and other Members of the United Nations that had so long sought a solution to that difficult issue by peaceful means. There were indeed States the representatives of which cautioned against any positive action by the General Assembly or by the Special Committee on the ground that such action might prejudice the case before the International Court. For six years they had urged caution, pending the judgement of the International Court.

317. That long-awaited judgement had now been given. It was an exercise in futility, but not entirely futile, for it was now clear beyond any doubt that there was no further excuse for waiting. The time had come for concrete action by the United Nations.

318. There should now be no doubt that the problem of South West Africa was essentially political and so was its solution. There already existed an irrefutable political and moral basis for action by the United Nations, and while a favourable judgement would have represented additional ammunition, the basis for action was by no means undermined by the Court's judgement.

319. Members of the Special Committee were well aware that, while the International Court had been deliberating the South West Africa case, the South African Government had continued its preparations for the establishment of the so-called "homelands" in South West Africa recommended by its Odendaal Commission. If the scheme were fully carried out, it would result in the partitioning of the Territory and its annexation, in effect, by South Africa. The South African Government had deferred a decision on the actual establishment of the "homelands" and other related measures pending the judgement of the International Court and the completion of its advance preparations. The preparations were already either complete or nearing completion.

320. It might thus be timely to remind South Africa that the General Assembly, by resolution 2074 (XX) of 17 December 1965, had stated that it:

"Considers that any attempt to partition the Territory or to take any unilateral action, directly or indirectly, preparatory thereto constitutes a violation of the Mandate and of resolution 1514 (XV);

"Considers further that any attempt to annex a part or the whole of the Territory of South West Africa constitutes an act of aggression."

321. The Special Committee must therefore be especially vigilant and should seek to ensure that the United Nations took immediate action if South Africa should proceed with the proposed partition of South West Africa and attempt to annex the Territory.

322. The Special Committee was charged with ensuring the implementation in South West Africa of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. It would also be recalled that by resolution 1805 (XVIII) of 14 December 1962 the General Assembly assigned a number of other specific tasks to the Special Committee in relation to South West Africa. By that resolution the Special Committee was asked to achieve the objectives outlined in General Assembly resolution 1702 (XVI) of 19 December 1961—objectives which included: the repeal of all laws or regulations which establish and maintain the intolerable system of apartheid; preparations for general elections to the territorial Legislative Assembly based on universal adult suffrage, to be held as soon as possible under the supervision and control of the United Nations; advice and assistance to the resulting Government with a view to the early granting of full independence and the co-ordination of economic and social assistance to be provided by the specialized agencies.

323. In the light of the foregoing the Chairman was confident that the Sub-Committee on South West Africa would consider and recommend to the Special Committee in the near future the date which should be set for the establishment of those objectives.

324. The representative of the *United Republic of Tanzania* said that his delegation fully endorsed the Chairman's statement.

325. The representative of *Mali* said that his delegation also wished to congratulate the Chairman on his statement. The International Court had shown by its judgement that the problem of decolonization could not be solved by the legal means chosen by the Africans. The African States, therefore, together with the peace-loving States of other continents, must now give serious attention to the problem and consider what was the best method of ensuring that South Africa would not be able to take over the Territory of South West Africa.

326. The Special Committee noted the communications received from the following Members of the United Nations concerning the judgement of the International Court: Bulgaria (A/6372 and Corr.1), India (A/6250), Ivory Coast (A/6371), Kenya (A/6387), Mongolia (A/6407), Nigeria (A/6346), Pakistan (A/6388), Poland (A/6402) and Turkey (A/6413).

327. At its 465th to 467th meetings, the Special Committee considered the report of the Sub-Committee on South West Africa (A/AC.109/L.325) established under operative paragraph 10 of the resolution adopted by the Committee at its 439th meeting on 9 June 1966. The report is annexed to this chapter.

Written petitions and hearings

328. The Special Committee also had before it the following additional petitions concerning the Territory:¹⁴

¹⁴ The following petitions were circulated after the Special Committee had adopted a resolution on petitions concerning South West Africa (see para. 384 below): A/AC.109/PET.434/Add.13; A/AC.109/PET.457/Add.2; A/AC.109/PET.561; A/AC.109/PET.571.

<i>Document No.</i>	<i>Petitioner</i>
Mr. Jackson Kambode, Secretary General of the South West Africa Trade Union Movement and member of the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO)	A/AC.109/PET.434/Add.6
Mr. Gottfried Hage Geingob, representative in the United States of America, SWAPO	A/AC.109/PET.434/Add.7
Messrs. Sam Nujoma, President, and Solomon Mifima, a member, SWAPO	A/AC.109/PET.434/Add.8
Mr. Peter Nanyemba, a member of SWAPO	A/AC.109/PET.434/Add.9
Mr. N. Mahuiriri, Acting President, SWAPO	A/AC.109/PET.434/Add.10
Mr. Ewald Katjivena, representative in Algeria, SWAPO	A/AC.109/PET.434/Add.11
Mr. Sam Nujoma, President, SWAPO	A/AC.109/PET.434/Add.12
Mr. JaOtto, Secretary, SWAPO	A/AC.109/PET.434/Add.13
Chief Hosea Kutako, Leader of the National Unity Democratic Organization (NUDO)	A/AC.109/PET.450/Add.2
Two petitions from the South West Africa National Union (SWANU)	A/AC.109/PET.459/Add.2
Messrs. Mburumba Kerina, Coordinating Secretary, and Nathanael Mbaeva, Financial Secretary, South West Africa National United Front (SWANUF)	A/AC.109/PET.474/Add.1 and 2
Headman Fritz Gariseb on behalf of the Demara Community	A/AC.109/PET.534
Mr. Omer Becu, General Secretary, International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU)	A/AC.109/PET.535
Mr. Irving Brown, representative of the ICFTU	A/AC.109/PET.535/Add.1
Sheik Mostafa Rahnama, editor of "Hayat Moslemin", magazine, Teheran	A/AC.109/PET.536
Mr. M. F. Nouveau-Piobb	A/AC.109/PET.537
Mr. Carl-Axel Valén, Secretary General, World Assembly of Youth (WAY)	A/AC.109/PET.538
Chiefs H. S. Witbooi and I. D. Isaak	A/AC.109/PET.539
Mr. Kanburzada Murad Bey, Movement for Human Rights, Karachi	A/AC.109/PET.540
Mrs. A. M. Hughes, State Secretary, Union of Australian Women	A/AC.109/PET.541
Mrs. Rosa Jasovich Pantaleon, General Secretary, Women's International Democratic Federation (WIDF), Berlin	A/AC.109/PET.542
The International Student Conference, Nairobi	A/AC.109/PET.543
Mr. Louis Saillant, Secretary-General, World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU)	A/AC.109/PET.561
Messrs. Kloppers, Chairman of the Coloured Council, and Phillips, President of the South West African Coloured Organization	A/AC.109/PET.571

329. The petition indicated above as A/AC.109/PET.474/Add.1 contained a request for hearing which was approved by the Special Committee at its 464th meeting on 9 September 1966. However, the petitioners who requested the hearing have not yet appeared before the Special Committee.

Statements made by members on the report of the Sub-Committee on South West Africa

330. The representative of *India*, Rapporteur of the Sub-Committee on South West Africa, introduced the Sub-Committee's report (see appendix). He stated that the Sub-Committee, meeting soon after the verdict of the International Court of Justice of 18 July 1966, had expressed its deep regret at the International Court's decision to dismiss the case filed by Ethiopia and Liberia on technical grounds without adjudicating the substance of the matter. The Sub-Committee had unanimously condemned South Africa's barbaric administration of the Mandated Territory and its intransigent attitude in the face of many United Nations pleas. It was convinced that South Africa, by its unchanging behaviour had disqualified itself from administering the Mandate for South West Africa.

331. The Sub-Committee firmly believed that, if the steps outlined in paragraph 32 of its report were implemented fully and without delay, the prospects of restoring the legitimate rights of the people of South West Africa would be greatly expedited. It hoped that the Special Committee would promptly and unanimously adopt the report.

332. He observed that the reservations of the delegation of Denmark, referred to in paragraph 35 of the report, were purely provisional and related to only two points of the report; they were necessitated by the lack of instructions from the Government of Denmark on the issues involved. He hoped that the Danish representative would soon be in a position to withdraw those reservations.

333. The representative of the *United Republic of Tanzania* said that his delegation fully endorsed the Sub-Committee's conclusions and recommendations. Despite the various United Nations resolutions calling for the progressive development of the Mandated Territory of South West Africa to independence, the South African apartheid régime had only increased its oppression of the African people and the Territory. It had established military installations for the sole purpose of suppressing the African people's legitimate aspiration for liberation. It had dispossessed the African people of their land and had given extensive leases to foreign financial interests originating in Western countries, which were ruthlessly exploiting the Territory's human and natural resources and automatically enforcing South Africa's policies of apartheid. It had instituted oppressive legislation aimed at maintaining slave-labour conditions. Above all, it had enacted legislation calculated to eliminate the African family by such methods as the establishment of the notorious bachelor quarters.

334. South West Africa today was not merely a colony but a concentration camp on the nazi pattern. It was high time for concrete action to eliminate once and for all the gross injustices perpetrated against the people of the Territory.

335. Since the question of South West Africa would be taken up as a matter of priority by the General Assembly, he joined the Rapporteur of the Sub-Com-

mittee in proposing that the Special Committee should unanimously endorse the Sub-Committee's report for immediate submission to the Assembly at that time.

336. The representative of *Mali* said that almost all the members of the Special Committee were becoming aware of the increasing danger inherent in the maintenance of the South African Government's reactionary and barbarous policies founded on the shameful system of apartheid. The White racists of Pretoria, after their vain attempts to annex South West Africa, were employing cruel and oppressive methods in exploiting the mineral and agricultural resources of the country. His delegation deeply regretted the fact that, by rejecting the complaint of Ethiopia and Liberia, the International Court of Justice had encouraged South Africa to pursue its evil policies.

337. Although the knell of colonialism had been sounded by the historic Declaration in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), it remained for the United Nations to compel the administering Powers to comply with its provisions and in particular, to compel the South African Government to heed the seventy-three resolutions adopted by the General Assembly over a period of almost twenty years. South Africa must allow the people of the Territory to achieve self-determination and independence. The imperialistic Powers of Western Europe and the United States were reluctant to take action against South Africa, simply because it offered profitable opportunities for private investment; their support was the only reason for the defiant attitude of the South African Government. His delegation would discuss that aspect of the question further during the coming debate on South West Africa in the General Assembly. Meanwhile, it urged the Special Committee to adopt unanimously the recommendations and conclusions of the Sub-Committee on South West Africa.

338. The representative of *Ethiopia* formally expressed his Government's full support for the report presented by the Sub-Committee on South West Africa and hoped that it would be unanimously adopted by the Special Committee.

339. The report did not deal with the question of how the General Assembly should establish its authority in the international Territory of South West Africa, leaving the matter to be decided by the Assembly itself. It was an objective report, emphasizing certain undeniable facts. Firstly, South West Africa was a United Nations responsibility, a fact repeatedly affirmed even by the International Court of Justice. Secondly, the General Assembly, and indeed the whole of civilized humanity, had appealed to South Africa in respect of that country's responsibilities under the Mandate; not only had South Africa ignored those appeals and the resolutions of the United Nations but it had taken a number of steps clearly contrary to the principle on which the Mandates System of the League of Nations had been based. Since no conciliatory response could be expected from South Africa, it was absolutely necessary for the General Assembly to act in order to ensure the rights of the people of South West Africa to freedom and independence. Unless the United Nations took appropriate action on the South West African problem, which was only part of the larger problem of racial confrontation in southern Africa, the prestige of the Organization itself would be endangered.

340. The representative of *Madagascar* said that during his recent travels he had found that both the people of his own country and the peoples of Asia

and Africa were astonished at the judgement of the International Court of Justice concerning South West Africa, which seemed to deprive the people of that Territory of all hope.

341. His delegation supported the report of the Sub-Committee on South West Africa. He urged the Special Committee to approve the report unanimously and thereby demonstrate to the peoples of South West Africa that in their struggle for freedom, independence and racial equality they were not alone but were supported by all freedom-loving peoples throughout the world.

342. The representative of *Iraq* supported the report of the Sub-Committee on South West Africa.

343. The report pointed out that the question of South West Africa had been dealt with in many resolutions of the General Assembly and that if the present situation continued the prestige of the United Nations would be harmed. His delegation wondered whether, in view of the long record of fruitless debate and unheeded resolutions, there had not already been some reflection on the prestige or authority of at least some organs of the United Nations.

344. In his delegation's view the contents of paragraph 32 (c), sub-paragraphs (i) and (ii), were not true recommendations but merely statements of facts which were known to everyone. The really important passages were sub-paragraphs (iii) to (vii), which asked for the revocation of South Africa's Mandate, the establishment of an organization to administer South West Africa, the exercise of the Mandate by the General Assembly and a request to the Secretary-General to prepare for the exercise of the Mandate.

345. His delegation considered that the wording of parts of paragraph 32 (c) should be amended in order to express a greater sense of urgency. In sub-paragraph (iii), the words "during the twenty-first session of the General Assembly" should be inserted after the words "The United Nations should decide". Similarly, in sub-paragraph (v) some such expression as "not later than the forthcoming General Assembly", would better express the sense of urgency than the words "as early as possible".

346. Subject to those considerations, his delegation supported the report and would vote in favour of it.

347. The representative of *Yugoslavia* said that the South African Government had violated the provisions of the Charter and the Mandate for South West Africa by attempting to partition and annex the Territory and by pursuing a ruthless policy of apartheid. Despite the strong and consistent opposition of the United Nations, South Africa had continued its efforts to put into practice the recommendations of the Odendaal Commission, in flagrant violation of the United Nations Charter, the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples and General Assembly resolution 2074 (XX). The indigenous population of South West Africa was being denied fundamental human rights, while its labour and natural resources were being ruthlessly exploited for the sole benefit of the South African régime and the White settlers.

348. Contrary to the United Nations resolutions on the Territory, military bases and installations had been established for the purpose of suppressing the national liberation movement and of prolonging the advantages which the racist régime of South Africa derived from the existing status of the Territory. Despite the seventy-three resolutions adopted by the General As-

sembly, South Africa had ignored its obligations under the Mandate, had refused to acknowledge the supervisory authority of the United Nations and had persisted in its policy of apartheid. The overwhelming majority of the Members of the United Nations had made valiant efforts to find a peaceful solution to the problem. One such effort had been the complaint submitted by the Governments of Ethiopia and Liberia to the International Court of Justice against the Republic of South Africa. Unfortunately, after a long period of waiting, the international community, which had expected a righteous judgement from the Court, had been disappointed. By ruling out the possibility of solving the problem by judicial means, the Court had placed upon the General Assembly the responsibility of achieving a solution through political action.

349. The Yugoslav delegation fully supported the conclusions and recommendations set forth in the Sub-Committee's valuable report. It was convinced that the implementation of those recommendations would enable the people of South West Africa to achieve complete independence in accordance with the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. It would continue to support any action undertaken by the African and Asian countries and by Members of the United Nations for the purpose of enabling the people of South West Africa to exercise their legitimate rights.

350. The representative of *Syria* said that his delegation whole-heartedly supported the Sub-Committee's report. The question of South Africa was a clear case of annexation and oppression by a conqueror which, despite the many United Nations resolutions condemning its abominable practice of apartheid, was now trying to spread that practice further, in defiance of the principles of the United Nations and of world opinion. He hoped that the report would be adopted unanimously.

351. The representative of *Australia* said that the Australian Government continued to hold the views which it had expressed both privately to the South African Government and publicly on several occasions. Australia regarded South West Africa as a Non-Self-Governing Territory in respect of which there existed specific international obligations. Consequently, Australia believed that the principles applicable to such Territories, in particular the duty to promote genuine self-government and the acceptance of the doctrine of self-determination and of the principle of advancement towards equality of status among all the inhabitants of the Territory, applied to South West Africa. Since, however, the legal and political issues involved had not so far been properly studied either by his delegation or by the Special Committee, his delegation wished to reserve its general position on the report and, in particular, was unable at present to support paragraph 32 (c) (iii) and (iv) or paragraph 33.

352. The representative of the *Union of Soviet Socialist Republics* said that the Soviet Union Government had issued a statement of the judgement by the International Court of Justice, denouncing it as a shameful judgement handed down in the interests of the South African racists and their imperialist protectors and affirming its full support for the people of South West Africa and for the African and Asian States which opposed the Court's illegal action.

353. The Soviet Union, which considered the policy of racial discrimination and apartheid practised by the

South African racist régime shameful, was prepared to support any measures which the African States might consider necessary to ensure the speedy liberation of the South African people from the colonialist yoke and their exercise of the right to decide their own destiny.

354. The Soviet Union delegation had always spoken in favour of the full and unconditional implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples and its application to South West Africa. His delegation had voted in favour of all the United Nations decisions on the subject.

355. It gave its full support to a number of the recommendations in the report of the Sub-Committee, in particular those calling for termination of South Africa's rights and responsibilities as Mandatory Power in respect of South West Africa, the holding of elections based on universal adult suffrage in the Territory, and the adoption of measures by the Security Council in accordance with the Charter in the event that South Africa refused to comply with the Organization's decision on South West Africa.

356. The Soviet Union delegation felt, however, that the direct administration of the Territory of South West Africa by the United Nations would not be the best solution and would be fraught with danger for the national liberation movement of the people of the Territory. While the Soviet Union delegation would support the recommendations as a whole, it wished to reserve its position on those recommendations relating to the assumption of direct administration of the Territory by the United Nations, which in its view might create serious difficulties with regard to the granting of independence to the Territory. What was in effect being recommended was that South West Africa should be placed under trusteeship, even though the trusteeship would be administered by the United Nations as a whole rather than by an individual State or States. Past experience had shown that even when the United Nations adopted positive political decisions, the machinery of the Organization, which was still dominated by representatives of the Western Powers, often implemented those decisions in the interests of imperialist and colonialist forces rather than in the interests of the people concerned. A striking example was the United Nations operation in the Congo, which had not only failed to put an end to colonialist intervention in that country's internal affairs but had given rise to serious difficulties within the United Nations itself.

357. His delegation considered that the preparations for and conduct of elections in South West Africa should be under the supervision of the Organization of African Unity, which might ensure the transfer of power to the people of the Territory and thereby guarantee genuine independence. His delegation also considered that the recommendations should call for OAU participation in the implementation of the measures to be taken against South Africa by the Security Council in the event that that country refused to comply with the United Nations decisions on South West Africa.

358. The Soviet Union delegation hoped that the recommendations which the Special Committee would submit to the General Assembly would take due account of those observations.

359. The representative of *Iran* said that his delegation fully endorsed the Sub-Committee's recommendations. It agreed that the question of South Africa was a political question and that political action should

therefore be taken to settle it. Political means, political procedures and political pressures would be the most effective means of putting an end to South Africa's twenty-year defiance of the recommendations of the General Assembly and its contempt for the United Nations Charter.

360. The representative of the *United Kingdom* said that his delegation would reserve its comments until the question of South West Africa was discussed in the General Assembly. He fully reserved its position on the report and on its conclusions and recommendations.

361. The representative of *Afghanistan* said that, after a careful study of the report, his delegation felt that the situation in the Territory of South West Africa was a serious challenge to the responsibility of the United Nations. After twenty years of discussion, there had been no progress in the problem of South West Africa and the South African Government had not taken a single step to put the General Assembly resolutions into effect. It was therefore essential that the United Nations should find a way of bringing South Africa's mandate to a speedy end and of helping the people of the Territory to obtain independence and freedom through the application of justice and the right of self-determination. The solution of the problem should be in accordance with fundamental human rights and the principles of the United Nations Charter. The Afghan delegation fully supported the conclusions and recommendations appearing in the report of the Sub-Committee.

362. The representative of *Italy* said that his delegation fully endorsed most of the conclusions arrived at by the Sub-Committee, and in particular those appearing in paragraphs 27 to 30 of the report. Moreover, paragraphs 11 to 15, which reproduced extracts from the most recent advisory opinions of the International Court of Justice and from its judgement of 21 December 1962, were of great value, from both a political and a legal point of view. Those advisory opinions, as also the 1962 judgement, had established the legal status of the question beyond any doubt. As the Court's judgement of 18 July 1966 had not in any way modified them, they were still perfectly valid.

363. The Italian delegation did not underestimate the gravity of the situation and it shared the concern of the members of the Sub-Committee, and indeed of all the members of the Special Committee. As, however, the problems of South West Africa would be fully debated at the forthcoming session of the General Assembly, the Italian delegation, while not opposing the adoption of the report, wished to reserve its position until then.

364. In a desire to help the General Assembly in its deliberations on the question, he suggested that the Office of Legal Affairs should be asked to make a summary of the judgement of 18 July 1966, together with the accompanying annexes and records, as far as they were relevant. There were undoubtedly a number of ideas and suggestions in the text of the judgement which could facilitate the deliberations of the General Assembly and which confirmed the fact that, far from invalidating the previous advisory opinions of the Court, the judgement strengthened them.

365. The representative of the *United States of America* said that if the report of the Sub-Committee was put to the vote, his delegation would abstain; if

there was a move to adopt the report without a vote, his delegation would have to reserve its position.

366. The General Assembly would be called upon to take important decisions on further steps to be taken for the solution of that very difficult problem. Meanwhile the United States delegation would continue to study the legal and political aspects of the question and would for the moment reserve its position. The United States Government was publicly committed to stand by the opinions handed down by the International Court of Justice with regard to the status of the Territory and South Africa's obligations under the Mandate. The United States did not consider the practice of apartheid to be conducive to the social progress or material and moral well-being of the inhabitants of the Territory.

367. The representative of *Chile* said that the events of the past twenty years led his delegation to consider that the appropriate solution, from the political and moral point of view, would be to revoke the Mandate entrusted to South Africa by the League of Nations. The legal aspects of the question, however, were really complex and were still being studied by Chile's Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Chilean delegation was consequently obliged to reserve its position and its opinion on the question for the time being, as also on the various consequences that the conclusions in the Sub-Committee's report would entail. It endorsed the report in general and during the debate in the General Assembly it would have an opportunity to make a positive contribution to the efforts made by the international community to solve that difficult problem.

368. The representative of *Uruguay* said that the report of the Sub-Committee clarified a number of essential points. His delegation was quite prepared to vote affirmatively on the substance of the question, as it had done consistently over the last twenty years.

369. Nevertheless, it shared the concern of other delegations, especially with regard to the recommendations in paragraph 32 (c) (iii) of the report that "the United Nations should decide to exercise the right of reversion of the Mandate to itself". On the basis of the moral and political aspects of the question, that would appear to be the only appropriate solution, but from the strictly legal point of view it raised certain fundamental problems which, unless great care was taken, might create an unfortunate precedent. The Uruguayan delegation also felt that the report should not present the General Assembly with such a categorical conclusion. It therefore provisionally reserved the right to state its final position in the General Assembly, when it was in possession of all the relevant information.

370. Furthermore, as a member of the Security Council, he wished to make a reservation with regard to paragraph 33, which referred to Chapter VII of the Charter, a matter which was within the competence of the Security Council. His delegation would therefore abstain if that paragraph was put to the vote, for the simple reason that it did not want to prejudice the position which it would subsequently adopt on the subject.

371. Subject to those reservations, the Uruguayan delegation fully supported the other conclusions set forth in the report.

372. The representative of *Sierra Leone* said that his delegation would support the report of the Sub-Committee in its entirety, for it felt that the report represented a detailed study of the question.

373. The representative of *Ethiopia* said that, as Chairman of the Sub-Committee on South West Africa, he would like to provide clarification on certain points which, judging from his discussions with other representatives both inside and outside of the Special Committee, seemed to him to have given rise to some misunderstanding. He was referring to paragraph 32 of the report and the recommendations appearing in it. First and foremost, contrary to the impression given by some representatives, the Sub Committee had not sought to reject or ignore the legal aspect of the problem or the very useful body of jurisprudence that had been built up on the question of South West Africa. It was obvious that any political decision would have to rest on legal grounds, which fortunately existed. The entire Afro-Asian group was absolutely confident that there were good legal grounds. When Ethiopia and Liberia had submitted the case of South West Africa to the International Court of Justice six years previously, on behalf of the African group, they had done so, not in order to establish legal grounds, but in order to have those legal grounds strengthened. The fact that they had not met with the success for which they had hoped did not in any way invalidate the legal arguments they had put forward in favour of the South West African case.

374. While they were convinced that the struggle had to be waged on political grounds the members of the African group respected legality. They would continue in the future, as they had done in the past, to adopt a line of conduct that best corresponded to the legal aspects of the question. Even the International Court of Justice, which seemed recently to have evaded its responsibilities, had handed down judgments and given advisory opinions which formed the legal basis upon which any political action would be founded. It would therefore be an injustice to think that in drawing up its report the Sub-Committee had disregarded the legal situation.

375. There also appeared to be a misunderstanding on the question of the revocation of the Mandate. Some delegations, as also some observers, seemed to have understood that the revocation of the Mandate would mean the cancellation of the Mandate. There was, however, no question of cancelling the international agreement governing the status of South West Africa: that Territory was and would remain an international Territory until such time as it attained independence. The report did not recommend any action which would lead to South West Africa becoming a sort of "no man's land" into which anyone might be tempted to move. That was not at all what the Sub-Committee had intended when it had declared that the responsibilities of South Africa under the Mandate should be terminated. If the report of the Sub-Committee was not sufficiently clear on that point, the Special Committee was perfectly free to criticize it and to improve the text.

376. The fact was that, faced with South Africa's stubborn refusal to respect its obligations, and since, after six years of waiting for a legal solution, the question was still not settled, the Sub-Committee thought that the time had come to call for action on the part of the General Assembly.

377. For six years the United Nations had refrained from intervening on behalf of the people of South West Africa for fear of prejudicing the case which was pending before the International Court of Justice. The Court had now declared that it could not pass judge-

ment, on the pretext that the plaintiffs had not established the existence of a legal right or interest. Faced with that ridiculous situation, the Sub-Committee had no further recourse but to appeal to the General Assembly. One of the parties to the contract, namely South Africa, had not fulfilled its commitments; the other party, namely the United Nations, must now take a decision on the contract's validity. According to the latest news, it did not appear that the recent change of leadership in South Africa held out the slightest hope of an improvement in the situation. He wondered whether the United Nations was going to wait until South Africa fulfilled its intention of annexing the Territory, a move for which the latest judgement of the Court gave it every encouragement. He could not imagine how the United Nations could justify its existence and its responsibilities unless it took effective and immediate action in the international field.

378. The representative of *Uruguay* said that, while he did not question the quality of the Sub-Committee's work, he regretted that the conclusions of its report were not backed by a solid juridical argument. His delegation recalled that at the eighteenth session of the General Assembly it had supported the proposal made by Venezuela to carry out a legal study of the question. It was fully aware of the sufferings of an oppressed population but felt it would be difficult to justify the revocation of the Mandate for South West Africa before the General Assembly if such legal arguments were lacking. It had no doubt that the position set forth by the Ethiopian representative was justified from a legal point of view but he hoped that that position would be better substantiated. Meanwhile, the Uruguayan delegation would continue to study the question so as to be able to prepare its position for the debates which would take place in the General Assembly.

379. The representative of *Denmark* said that since his Government had not yet completed its examination of the legal and political issues involved, in the report, his delegation had to enter a provisional reservation regarding sub-paragraph (iii) of paragraph 32 (c) and paragraph 33; thus, its position remained as indicated in paragraph 35 of the report. Subject to that reservation, his delegation had no objection to the adoption of the report.

F. FURTHER ACTION TAKEN BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE

380. At its 467th meeting, on 15 September 1966, the Special Committee adopted the report of the Sub-Committee on South West Africa¹⁵ by consensus, it being understood that the reservations expressed by members would be reflected in the records.

G. EXAMINATION OF PETITIONS

381. The petitions concerning South West Africa which were received and circulated by the Special Committee are listed in paragraphs 73 and 328 above. These petitions relate, *inter alia*, to the establishment of military bases in the Territory, the situation of refugees from South West Africa, political organizations, the shooting, arrest and deportation of political leaders in the Territory, the ejection of Africans from urban areas, implementation of the recommendations of the

Odendaal Commission, the situation in Ovamboland, labour conditions in the Territory, the judgment of 18 July of the International Court of Justice, and the future of South West Africa.

382. In operative paragraph 8 (a) of General Assembly resolution 1899 (XVIII), the Special Committee was requested to continue its efforts with a view to discharging the tasks assigned to it by resolution 1805 (XVII). In operative paragraph 3 of resolution 1805 (XVII), the General Assembly requested the Special Committee "to discharge, *mutatis mutandis*, the tasks assigned to the Special Committee for South West Africa by resolution 1702 (XVI), taking into consideration the special responsibilities of the United Nations with regard to the Territory of South West Africa...". One of the tasks accordingly assigned to the Special Committee is that of examining petitions relating to South West Africa.

383. During 1966, the Special Committee examined forty-four petitions concerning South West Africa, which it took into account during its consideration of the situation.

384. Bearing in mind the special responsibilities of the United Nations with regard to the Territory of South West Africa, the Special Committee, on the recommendation of the Sub-Committee on Petitions, decided, at its 468th meeting on 19 September 1966, to recommend to the General Assembly the adoption of the following draft resolution on petitions concerning South West Africa:

"Petitions concerning South West Africa

"The General Assembly,

"Bearing in mind the special responsibilities of the United Nations with regard to South West Africa,

"Noting that the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples has received and examined forty-four petitions concerning South West Africa, in accordance with paragraph 3 of General Assembly resolution 1805 (XVII) of 14 December 1962 and paragraph 8 (a) of General Assembly resolution 1899 (XVIII) of 13 November 1963,

"Noting further that these petitions relate, *inter alia*, to the establishment of military bases in the Territory, the situation of refugees from South West Africa, political organizations, the shooting, arrest and deportation of political leaders in the Territory, the ejection of Africans from urban areas, implementation of the recommendations of the Odendaal Commission, the situation in Ovamboland, labour conditions in the Territory, the judgement of the International Court of Justice of 18 July 1966, and the future of South West Africa,

"1. Notes that the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples has taken these petitions into account in its consideration of the question of South West Africa;

"2. Draws the attention of the petitioners concerned to the report of the Special Committee concerning South West Africa and to the resolutions adopted by the General Assembly at its twenty-first session on the question of South West Africa, as well as the reports of the Secretary-General relating to the Territory."

¹⁵ The conclusions and recommendations contained in this report appear in the appendix, paragraphs 27-34.

APPENDIX

[A/AC.109/L.325]

Report of the Sub-Committee on South West Africa

Rapporteur: Mr. C. R. GHAREKHAN (India)

INTRODUCTION

1. By operative paragraph 10 of the resolution adopted at its 439th meeting on 9 June 1966 on the question of South West Africa (A/AC.109/177), the Special Committee decided to establish "a sub-committee to make a thorough study of the situation and, among other matters, to recommend an early date for the independence of the Territory".

2. At its 455th meeting, on 22 June 1966, the Special Committee decided, on the proposal of its Chairman, that the Sub-Committee on South West Africa should be composed of Denmark, Ethiopia, India, the Ivory Coast, Poland, Tunisia and Venezuela.

3. At its first meeting, on 21 July 1966, the Sub-Committee unanimously elected Lij Endelkachew Makonnen (Ethiopia), Chairman, and Mr. C. R. Gharekhan (India) Rapporteur.

4. In his opening statement at that meeting, Mr. John W. S. Malecela, Acting Chairman of the Special Committee, stressed the determination of the African States to rid South West Africa of colonialism and apartheid. The failure of their efforts to solve the problem of South West Africa in a peaceful manner through recourse to the International Court of Justice confirmed not only that the problem was a political rather than a judicial one, but also that the composition of many organs of the United Nations needed reappraisal in the light of changed conditions. The problem of South West Africa, notwithstanding its complexities which were due in large measure to the support given to South Africa by colonial Powers having vested interests in the area was in essence a simple one: it was a question of decolonizing the Territory. The Acting Chairman expressed the hope that the Sub-Committee would analyse all the factors involved and would recommend the most positive and concrete steps to be taken to liberate the Territory of South West Africa and secure for its African population its right to freedom and independence.

5. The Sub-Committee held three further meetings, on 12 and 19 August and on 8 September 1966.

6. In its study of the situation, the Sub-Committee was guided by the resolutions of the General Assembly and the Special Committee on the question of South West Africa. The Sub-Committee also took into consideration the advisory opinions of 11 July 1950, 7 June 1955 and 1 June 1956 as well as the judgements of 21 December 1962 and 18 July 1966 of the International Court of Justice. Further, the Sub-Committee took account of communications from the following Member States concerning the Court's judgement of 18 July 1966: Bulgaria (A/6372 and Corr.1), India (A/6250), Ivory Coast (A/6371), Kenya (A/6387), Mongolia (A/6407), Nigeria (A/6346), Pakistan (A/6388) and Poland (A/6402).

7. The Sub-Committee noted that, by a letter dated 3 August 1966 addressed to the Secretary-General (A/6386), the representatives of thirty-five Member States requested that the question of South West Africa be considered as a matter of priority by the General Assembly at its twenty-first session.

CONSIDERATION BY THE SUB-COMMITTEE

8. Members of the Sub-Committee expressed the opinion that the Court's judgement of 18 July 1966, by ruling out the possibility of solving the problem of South West Africa by judicial means, had placed upon the General Assembly a serious responsibility to achieve a solution through political action.

9. Members of the Sub-Committee found it regrettable that the International Court of Justice had limited itself to deciding to reject the applications of Ethiopia and Liberia on the ground that they could not be considered to have established any legal right or interest in the subject-matter of their claims; as a consequence, the Court had not pronounced on any of the substantive issues before it.

10. At the same time, it was unanimously recognized that, as regards the existence of the Mandate and the obligations of South Africa thereunder, the earlier advisory opinions and the 1962 judgement of the Court remained valid.

11. Concerning the status of the Territory, the Court, in its advisory opinion of 11 July 1950, unanimously expressed the opinion:

"that South West Africa is a territory under the international Mandate assumed by the Union of South Africa on 17 December 1920";^a and

"that the Union of South Africa acting alone has not the competence to modify the international status of the Territory of South West Africa".^b

12. Concerning the obligations of South Africa under the Mandate, the Court in 1950 expressed its opinion as follows: "that the Union of South Africa continues to have the international obligations stated in Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations and in the Mandate for South West Africa as well as the obligation to transmit petitions from the inhabitants of that Territory, the supervisory functions to be exercised by the United Nations, to which the annual reports and the petitions are to be submitted, and the reference to the Permanent Court of International Justice to be replaced by a reference to the International Court of Justice, in accordance with Article 7 of the Mandate and Article 37 of the Statute of the Court".^c

13. Members also noted that the advisory opinion of 11 July 1950 had been reaffirmed by the Court in its advisory opinions of 7 June 1955 and 1 June 1956 and by its judgement of 21 December 1962.

14. In its advisory opinion of 1 June 1956, the Court itself interpreted the general purport and meaning of its 1950 opinion as follows:

"The general purport and meaning of the Opinion of the Court of 11 July 1950 is that the paramount purpose underlying the taking over by the General Assembly of the United Nations of the supervisory functions in respect of the Mandate for South West Africa formerly exercised by the Council of the League of Nations was to safeguard the sacred trust of civilization through the maintenance of effective international supervision of the administration of the Mandated Territory."^d

15. Again, in its judgement of 21 December 1962, the International Court, after citing a passage from its 1950 opinion relating to South Africa's obligation to accept international supervision over its administration of the Territory, stated:

"The findings of the Court on the obligation of the Union Government to submit to international supervision are thus crystal clear. Indeed, to exclude the obligations connected with the Mandate would be to exclude the very essence of the Mandate."^e

16. In the view of members, it had been established beyond any doubt that South Africa had failed to discharge, and even to recognize, its obligations under the Mandate to accept the supervisory authority of the United Nations and to promote to the utmost the material and moral well-being and the social progress of the inhabitants of South West Africa. Ignoring the repeated condemnation of the apartheid system by the General Assembly, South Africa had continued to apply and to extend that system in South West Africa, in violation of its obligations under the Mandate and the Charter.

17. Members also observed that far from co-operating with the United Nations in the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, South Africa, in contravention of various General

^a *International status of South-West Africa, Advisory Opinion: I.C.J. Reports 1950, p. 143.*

^b *Ibid.*, p. 144.

^c *Ibid.*, p. 143.

^d *Admissibility of hearings of petitioners by the Committee on South West Africa, Advisory Opinion of June 1st, 1956: I.C.J. Reports 1956, p. 28.*

^e *South West Africa Cases (Ethiopia, v. South Africa; Liberia v. South Africa), Preliminary Objections, Judgment of 21 December 1962: I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 334.*

Assembly resolutions, had consistently attempted to annex South West Africa. As early as 1946, during the first session of the General Assembly, South Africa had declared its intention, which was, however, rejected, of annexing the Territory. Further, it had proposed in 1957 to partition the Territory so that a portion would be placed under Trusteeship and the other richer part, containing the Territory's diamond deposits and other major resources, annexed to the Union. This proposal also was rejected by the General Assembly.

18. Despite the strong and long standing opposition to annexation from the world community, South Africa is currently preparing to partition the Territory into separate racial and ethnic areas on the basis of the recommendations of the Odendaal Commission, the full implementation of which would destroy the territorial integrity of South West Africa, alter the status of the Territory and in effect result in its annexation by South Africa. This development would be a most flagrant violation of General Assembly resolution 2074 (XX) of 17 December 1965.

19. A total of seventy-three resolutions adopted by the General Assembly over a period of twenty years had not resulted in compliance by South Africa with its obligations in its administration of South West Africa. On the contrary, South Africa had continued its persistent defiance of the resolutions and maintained its refusal to co-operate with the United Nations in its efforts to enable the people of the Territory to exercise their right to self-determination.

20. In these circumstances, several members of the Sub-Committee considered it essential that immediate and effective action be taken by the General Assembly to find a solution to the question. They emphasized that if the situation were allowed to continue, it would reflect on the prestige and authority of the United Nations. It was also felt that any delay would result in a consolidation of South Africa's position in South West Africa.

21. Since the United Nations bore a heavy and special responsibility in relation to South West Africa, it was the duty of the Organization to bring the South African régime in South West Africa to a speedy end and to enable the people of the Territory without delay to enjoy their inalienable rights to freedom and independence in accordance with General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV).

22. Members recalled that General Assembly resolution 1702 (XVI) of 19 December 1961 outlined certain objectives to be achieved for the speedy implementation of resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960. By General Assembly resolution 1805 (XVII) of 14 December 1962, the task of ensuring the attainment of these objectives was assigned to the Special Committee. In the opinion of members of the Sub-Committee, there was little expectation that these objectives could be achieved while the Government of South Africa exercised uncontrolled authority over the Territory.

23. Some members accordingly proposed the immediate termination of South Africa's Mandate by the General Assembly. In this connexion, it was suggested that the United Nations itself take over the administration of the Territory until the people of South West Africa were in a position to assume control. Another suggestion was that termination of the Mandate be accompanied by the provision of all possible assistance to the people of South West Africa and the imposition of an embargo on all trade with South Africa.

24. Some members also proposed that the Assembly should ensure that South West Africa was not annexed by South Africa and that it should declare null and void any act by South Africa which was inconsistent with United Nations resolutions.

25. A further suggestion was that measures be taken to ensure the removal of all military bases from the Territory and to end the militarization of the area; to stop the provision of military equipment and training to South Africa; and to revoke licences granted to South Africa for the manufacture of arms and military vehicles. It was pointed out in this regard that it was regrettable that some Western Powers had not taken action to implement the recommendations of the General Assembly calling upon States to refrain from

supplying arms or military equipment to South Africa and to refrain from any action which might hamper the implementation of United Nations resolutions on South West Africa.

26. It was suggested that in addition steps should be taken to ensure the strict observance of the embargo on the supply of petroleum and petroleum products to South Africa and to impose an embargo on exports of other specific products to South Africa, notably rubber, certain metals and chemicals, lumber, cotton and other fibres, industrial equipment, and motors and spare parts.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

27. The Sub-Committee, expressing grave concern at the situation prevailing with regard to the Territory following the judgement of the International Court of Justice delivered on 18 July 1966, is convinced that urgent and effective steps must be taken so as to prevent a serious threat to or breach of peace in the area.

28. The Sub-Committee gave careful study to the above-mentioned judgement on the question of South West Africa and particularly to the operative part dismissing the case of the applicants, Ethiopia and Liberia, on the technical ground that they had failed to establish any legal right or interest in the matter. The Sub-Committee deeply regrets that the Court decided to dismiss the case without adjudicating upon the substance of the matter; fears were expressed that the judgement of the Court may have harmful consequences for the respect for and establishment of orderly international conduct in future.

29. At the same time, the Sub-Committee is of the opinion that this judgement does not invalidate the earlier substantive advisory opinions of the Court, which have left no room for any doubt regarding the obligations of South Africa and the supervisory powers of the United Nations.

30. The Sub-Committee is of the unanimous opinion that the problem of South West Africa is a political and colonial issue, the solution of which must be sought in terms of fundamental human rights and the principles of the Charter, particularly those contained in Article 73, and General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960. The fact that the provisions of this resolution are fully applicable to South West Africa, a Non-Self-Governing Territory, has already been recognized in numerous resolutions of the General Assembly. The Republic of South Africa has consistently refused to respect and implement the resolutions of the General Assembly. It has, on the contrary, extended its inhuman policies of racial discrimination to the Territory of South West Africa in clear violation of its obligations under the sacred trust which was entrusted to it in 1920.

31. The Sub-Committee firmly believes that immediate and effective steps should be taken by the United Nations in accordance with its basic responsibilities, with a view to protecting the fundamental rights of the people of South West Africa. The aim of such steps should be to enable the people of the Territory to exercise their right of self-determination in a free and unrestricted atmosphere.

32. In view of the foregoing, the Sub-Committee recommends the following course of action:

(a) That the provisions of the Declaration contained in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960 are fully applicable to South West Africa, a Non-Self-Governing Territory, as has been recognized by several General Assembly resolutions, should be reaffirmed.

(b) The inalienable right of the people of South West Africa to freedom and independence in accordance with resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960, which has been affirmed by General Assembly resolution 2074 (XX) of 17 December 1965 and other earlier resolutions should be reaffirmed in unequivocal terms.

(c) The people of the Territory should be given the opportunity to exercise their right to self-determination as early as possible, since only thus can their legitimate rights and interests be protected. For this purpose, the following steps are recommended:

- (i) The United Nations should recall that it has made all possible efforts to solve the problem by negotiations with South Africa;
- (ii) The United Nations should once again record the fact that South Africa has consistently refused to comply with the resolutions of the General Assembly in respect of South West Africa;
- (iii) The United Nations should decide to exercise the right of reversion of the Mandate to itself;
- (iv) The rights and responsibilities of South Africa as a Mandatory Power in respect of South West Africa should be terminated, along with the assumption of responsibility by the United Nations for the direct administration of the Territory as well as the creation of appropriate machinery for the purpose;
- (v) In order to enable the United Nations to make adequate arrangements for the administration of the Territory, the Secretary-General should be requested to undertake a thorough study of the administrative, financial, personnel and other prerequisites for such direct administration; the Secretary-General should be requested to submit his findings as early as possible;
- (vi) Following the assumption of direct responsibility by the United Nations, arrangements should be made to hold elections on the principle of universal adult suffrage so that the people can decide on the form of

government they desire through their own freely expressed wishes;

- (vii) The Territory should become fully independent following the elections and the formation of a government as provided for in sub-paragraph (vi) above.

33. In the event of South Africa resisting the implementation of the above steps, the Sub-Committee is of the opinion that effective measures, including those provided under Chapter VII of the Charter, should be taken against South Africa.

34. The Sub-Committee is convinced that the implementation of the above recommendations will expedite the achievement by South West Africa of independence and of its rightful place in the community of nations. The Sub-Committee expresses the fervent hope that all the Members of the United Nations, conscious of their responsibilities under the Charter, will extend their whole-hearted co-operation in supporting and carrying out the above recommendations.

ADOPTION OF THE REPORT

35. This report was unanimously adopted by the Sub-Committee at its fourth meeting on 8 September 1966. The representative of Denmark stated that since the examination of the legal and political issues involved had not yet been completed by his Government, the Danish delegation had to enter a provisional reservation regarding sub-paragraph (iii) of paragraph 32 (c) and paragraph 33.

CHAPTER V

TERRITORIES UNDER PORTUGUESE ADMINISTRATION

PART I*

A. ACTION TAKEN IN 1965 BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL, THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AND THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE

1. The Special Committee considered the Territories under Portuguese administration in May and June 1965 during its visit to Africa and again in October at Headquarters.

2. During the first part of its consideration the Special Committee heard a number of petitioners from Angola, Mozambique and Guinea under Portuguese administration. It also considered the situation of refugees from these Territories and measures taken to extend medical and other assistance to them by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and specialized agencies concerned in response to the Committee's resolution of 1964 (A/5800/Rev.1,¹ chap. V, para. 352).

3. The Special Committee on 10 June 1965 adopted a resolution (A/6000/Rev.1,² chap. V, para. 415) in which it reaffirmed the right of the population of the African Territories under Portuguese administration to self-determination and independence and recognized the legitimacy of their struggle to achieve the rights laid down in the United Nations Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples and appealed to all States to grant the African populations of these Territories the moral and material support necessary for the restoration of their inalienable rights. It also requested the High

Commissioner for Refugees and the specialized agencies of the United Nations to increase their assistance to the refugees from those Territories. The Special Committee drew the urgent attention of the Security Council to the continued deterioration of the situation in the Territories under Portuguese administration as well as to the consequences of the threats made by Portugal against the independent African States that border upon its colonies.

4. The Secretary-General transmitted the text of the resolution, together with the records of the meetings held by the Committee on this question, to the President of the Security Council on 17 June 1965.³

5. Continuing its discussions on the Portuguese Territories in October, the Special Committee had before it a report submitted by Sub-Committee I. This report had been prepared in accordance with a resolution adopted by the Special Committee on 3 July 1964 (A/5800/Rev.1, chap. V, para. 352) by which the latter had, among other things, requested the Sub-Committee, with the assistance of the Secretary-General, to study foreign economic and other interests which are impeding the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples in the Territories under Portuguese administration. On 28 October the Special Committee adopted the report of Sub-Committee I and endorsed its observations and conclusions. The Special Committee dealt with this matter in its report to the General Assembly (A/6000/Rev.1, chap. V) to which it appended the report of Sub-Committee I, together with the two background papers prepared by the Secretariat for Sub-Committee I, on mining activities and concession, occupation and land settlement in Territories under Portuguese administration.

* Previously issued under the symbol A/6300/Add.3 (part I) and Corr.1.

¹ Official Records of the General Assembly, Nineteenth Session, Annexes, annex No. 8 (part I).

² Ibid., Twentieth Session, Annexes, addendum to agenda item 23.

³ Official Records of the Security Council, Twentieth Year, Supplement for April, May and June 1965, document S/6460.

6. By letter dated 11 July 1963, the representatives of thirty-two Member States requested the Security Council to take up the question concerning the situation in Territories under Portuguese administration.⁴ The Security Council discussed this question and on 23 November 1965 adopted resolution 218 (1965). Recalling General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960, the Council affirmed "that the situation resulting from the policies of Portugal both as regards the African population of its colonies and the neighbouring States seriously disturbs international peace and security". Once again, it deplored the failure of the Government of Portugal to comply with the previous resolutions of the Council and the General Assembly and to recognize the right of the peoples of the Territories to self-determination. It reiterated an urgent demand to Portugal to take steps towards granting independence to all the Territories under its administration in accordance with the aspirations of the peoples. The Council again requested all Member States to refrain from offering assistance to Portugal which would enable it to continue its repression of the peoples of the Territories, and to take measures to prevent not only the sale and supply of arms and military equipment to the Portuguese Government for that purpose, including the sale and shipment of equipment and materials for the manufacture and maintenance of arms and ammunition to be used in the Territories. It asked all Members to inform the Secretary-General on measures they have taken towards the implementation of this provision.

7. As in its 1963 resolution, the Council requested the Secretary-General "to ensure the implementation of the provisions of the present resolution, to provide such assistance as he may deem necessary" and to report to the Security Council not later than 30 June 1966.

8. The Fourth Committee of the General Assembly considered the question of the Territories under Portuguese administration on the basis of the Special Committee's report (A/6000/Rev.1, chap. V) and two reports⁵ by the Secretary-General on the special training programme for those Territories.

9. On the recommendation of the Fourth Committee the General Assembly, on 21 December 1965, adopted resolution 2107 (XX) by which, in addition to reaffirming its previous resolutions and recommendations, it appealed to all States, "in co-operation with the Organization of African Unity, to render to the people of the Territories under Portuguese administration the moral and material support necessary for the restoration of their inalienable rights"; condemned the policy of the Government of Portugal which violates the economic and political rights of the indigenous population by the establishment on a large scale of foreign immigrants in the Territories and by the exporting of workers to South Africa; requested all States to prevent such activities on the part of their nationals in the foreign financial interests which are an impediment to the attainment by the peoples of their legitimate rights of freedom and independence. The General Assembly urged Member States separately or collectively to take the following actions:

(a) Break off diplomatic and consular relations with the Government of Portugal or refrain from establishing such relations;

(b) Close their ports to all vessels flying the Portuguese flag or in the service of Portugal;

(c) Prohibit their ships from entering any ports in Portugal and its colonial territories;

(d) Refuse landing and transit facilities to all aircraft belonging to or in the service of the Government of Portugal and to companies registered under the laws of Portugal;

(e) Boycott all trade with Portugal.

It also requested the Security Council to consider putting into effect against Portugal the appropriate measures laid down in the Charter for the purpose of carrying out its resolutions concerning the Territories under Portuguese administration.

B. INFORMATION ON THE TERRITORIES

1. The Territories in general

Constitutional and political developments

10. Since the repeal of the Native Statute in 1961 a series of legislative changes has been introduced to complete the institutional framework for the political and economic integration of the Overseas Territories with Portugal. With the publication in 1964 of the decree (No. 45,830, 25 July) increasing the membership of the Corporative Chamber, the envisaged constitutional transformation providing for "greater intervention of the Provinces in the direction of national policy" has been completed.

11. As will be seen below the Portuguese Government considers that Portugal and the Overseas Territories constitute one "pluri-continental and multi-racial nation" and that there can no longer be any discussion of a change in the relationship between them. In an interview on 4 August 1965, Prime Minister Salazar explained his Government's policy as follows:

"We could only agree to self-determination for the Overseas Territories, in the sense in which it is at present understood, if those Territories were to choose their destiny as a nation or their form as a State. The position is, however, that as a result of the integration which has been a principle of Portugal's overseas policy for centuries, those Territories as a whole already form a nation and a sovereign State. To admit at every time of political crisis that a part of a Territory has the right to self-determination in the above sense is to create a factor of instability and national discussion. While the problem may be relevant to dependent Territories or colonies desiring to achieve independence and define their relations with the State which exercised rights of sovereignty over them, it is not relevant in the case of Portugal.

"In the case of Portugal the only thing which matters is to determine whether the laws confer on the citizens of the Territories the same political rights, that is to say, those through which the individual influences the character of the organs of State. If those rights are the same in all the Territories, we do not have citizens and subjects, but only citizens, even though these only participate in certain functions according to their capabilities.

"This, however, is a matter of electoral law and not a political matter. The fomenters of the African

⁴ *Ibid.*, Eighteenth Year, Supplement for July, August and September 1963, document S/5347.

⁵ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twentieth Session, Annexes*, agenda item 71, documents A/5783 and Add.1. and A/6076 and Add.1 and 2.

revolution are attempting to evade the issue by making one man, one vote, the basic demand. No one with a sense of responsibility will accept a thesis which is defended only for the achievement of certain results and not for its truth or justice."

12. In 1965, the most important political events were the presidential elections in July and the elections to the National Assembly in November. As these were the first "national" elections since the Overseas Territories were given wider representation in the central organs of Government under the Overseas Organic Law of 1963, they are described in some detail below.

(a) Election of the Head of State

13. As reported previously (A/6000/Rev. 1, chap. V, para. 5) in 1965 for the first time the Head of State of Portugal was elected through an electoral college, established under Decree No. 43,548 of 21 March 1961. This electoral college, when fully constituted, consists of the acting members of the National Assembly and of the Corporative Chamber, representatives of half the number of the municipal councils in each district or each Territory not divided into districts, and a specified number of representatives nominated by the legislative council of each Territory from among its own members.

14. The electoral college comprises 616 members when fully constituted. These are the 130 deputies to the National Assembly, 205 members of the Corporative Chamber, 211 representatives of municipal councils and 70 members of the legislative councils of the Overseas Territories. The seven Overseas Territories are represented by 135 members. These comprise 26 deputies to the National Assembly, 9 members of the Corporative Chamber, 46 members representing municipal councils, and 60 members from the Territorial legislative councils. The total membership of each of the Territories in the electoral college was: Angola 51, Mozambique 51,⁶ Cape Verde 13, and Guinea under Portuguese administration, São Tomé and Príncipe, Timor and Macau each had five members.

15. Under the Constitution, candidates standing for election to the presidency have to be approved by the Supreme Tribunal of Justice, headed by the Prime Minister. In 1965 the only candidate was Rear Admiral Américo Thomaz, incumbent President, chosen by the National Union as "a candidate of continuity in a period of national emergency". No Opposition candidate was put forward in 1965, because as Mr. Mário de Azevedo Gomez, one of the leaders of the Acção Democrático-Social was reported as saying, his group did not consider the presidential election by the electoral college as "a national act" since the new system of indirect suffrage excluded any possible representation of the Opposition.

16. On 7 July when the electoral college met, 585 members were present. The voting was: 556 for Admiral Thomaz, and 13 against. Sixteen members of the electoral college did not answer the roll-call. Upon assuming office, President Thomaz, in exercise of his powers, appointed Mr. Oliveira Salazar to continue as Prime Minister. In his inauguration speech President Thomaz paid tribute to the armed forces for their intransigent defence of national Territory in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea under Portuguese administration where fighting continued on the borders with

newly independent countries. He emphasized that "the fight must continue until our final victory, which a more realistic understanding of the West can hasten".

17. Although Angola, Mozambique and Guinea under Portuguese administration together had about 20 per cent of the seats in the electoral college, it does not appear that Africans had much voice in the presidential election.

18. Firstly, the deputies in the National Assembly representing the Territories had been elected in November 1961 on the basis of the electoral rolls compiled before the repeal of the Native Statute, and there was no indication that more Africans had been added to those rolls.⁷ Secondly, in each of the legislative councils of the three Territories, apart from the limited number of Africans who qualified to vote in the direct elections under the new Electoral Law of 6 December 1963 (A/5800/Rev.1, chap. V, paras. 54-64), the rest of the African population is represented by only three members out of a total membership of 36 in Angola, 29 in Mozambique and 14 in Guinea under Portuguese administration (*ibid.*, paras. 35-36, and appendix, table I). Thirdly, municipal councils are established only in *concelhos* where there are more than 500 registered voters (Decree 43,730 of 12 June 1961). These councils comprise a president, who is generally the administrator, and four members representing public or private economic interests, moral (religious) or professional interests. Where such groups are absent, the members are chosen from among "individual taxpayers of Portuguese nationality whose direct tax liability is assessed at 1,000 escudos or more". Fourthly, the representatives of Angola and Mozambique in the Corporative Chamber are elected in each Territory by the Economic and Social Council, the members of which are representative of government administrative bodies and economic and professional interests (*ibid.*, para. 23).

(b) Elections to the National Assembly

19. On 28 September, a few weeks after President Thomaz had assumed office for a second seven-year term, the Government announced that elections to the National Assembly would take place on 7 November. The names of candidates standing for election were to be submitted within a week (before 6 October) to the district governors concerned. A period of thirty days (6 October to 6 November) was set for the electoral campaign.

20. As political parties are not recognized in Portugal except for the government organization called the National Union, the only time when any organized Opposition opinion is given public recognition is during the thirty-day campaign period. Opposition groups do exist, however, and include some former government officials. Early in October one such group, under the name of Acção Democrático-Social decided to contest the National Union candidates in five (Lisbon, Oporto, Viseu, Leiria and Braga) of the thirty electoral districts in Portugal. No Opposition candidates were presented in the Overseas Territories.

21. On 14 October the group, referred to in the Press as the Opposition, issued a 5,000-word manifesto in which it protested government censorship of news and the lack of freedom of association and expression. Besides reaffirming the programme for the democratiza-

⁶ The Mozambique Press, however, listed 52 names of representatives.

⁷ Official Records of the General Assembly, Seventeenth Session, Annexes, addendum to agenda item 54, document A/5160 and Add.1 and 2, para. 264.

tion of the country set out in an earlier manifesto issued by opponents of the régime in 1961, the Opposition placed on record its views on the Government's policy in the Overseas Territories (although according to a press report of 12 September, the Minister of Interior, Alfredo Santos, Jr., had warned that the Government would not tolerate disagreement over its policy of continued Portuguese rule in Africa).

22. The Opposition manifesto noted that although the war in Angola had officially ended in 1961, fighting was not only still going on there but had extended to Mozambique and Guinea under Portuguese administration and that there was no longer any expectation of an early end to the war. The manifesto opposed the solution of the problem of the Overseas Territories by military means, pointing out that "the country was exhausting itself by the loss of precious lives to obtain an unforeseeable goal and was risking an economic calamity...". "We maintain", the Opposition stated, "that what is required without delay is a political solution based on the principle of self-determination, exercised through democratic means. This solution is imposed on us by our conscience as free men who... consider decolonization an irreversible phenomenon...". The Government should carry out the process of self-determination in the Overseas Territories in such a way that the results would be accepted internationally so that the Territories would obtain the sympathy and possible aid of the United Nations which had so far been denied them because of the Government's policies.

23. The manifesto in protesting generally against government censorship, cited as a specific example, the Government's action on the background paper on Territories under Portuguese administration which the United Nations Secretariat had prepared for the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples in 1965. The Opposition complained that whereas the Government had given wide publicity to the press release from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs which characterized the United Nations document as containing "tendentious quotations from official texts" and "errors of fact", the document in question had not been made available and therefore the Portuguese people could not even know the facts of the question.

24. When the Opposition manifesto was published in the Portuguese newspapers on 16 October, it was accompanied by numerous articles reporting protests from Angola and Mozambique and other Territories against the Opposition's support of the principle of self-determination for the Overseas Territories. On 17 October the Portuguese Press published a statement by the Minister for the Interior replying to various points raised by the Opposition manifesto and a statement by the National Union which dealt mainly with the question of the Overseas Territories.

25. The National Union took issue with the Opposition's proposals for a "political" solution. The Union observed that although the Opposition was against a military solution because it was exhausting the nation, it had not denied that a military solution was possible. Whatever the price, Portugal would never abandon its legitimate defence of its national Territory against outside aggression.

26. According to the National Union the main reason why a "military solution" was to be preferred was because the so-called "political" solution to the

problem of the Overseas Territories would lead inevitably to their secession from Portugal. Carried out under the auspices of the United Nations which was dominated by the Afro-Asian countries, the process of self-determination of the Overseas Territories could only lead to disintegration of the Portuguese nation and therefore, in the opinion of the National Union, the proposal of the Opposition amounted to treason.

27. On 20 October, the Opposition withdrew its candidates from four of the electoral districts and subsequently also from Braga. According to press reports their withdrawal from the last district was because government censorship and other restrictions denied them freedom to conduct their campaign.

28. In the following two weeks protests from branches of the National Union as well as various government, civic and professional bodies in Portugal and in the Overseas Territories continued to be published daily in the Portuguese Press, expressing support for the Government's policy of political integration and affirming the Portuguese identity (*portuguesismo*) of the Territories and their inhabitants.

29. On 5 November, three other manifestos were published. The Monarchist League repudiated the Opposition's formula for the self-determination of the Overseas Territories and supported the Government's policy of decentralization consistent with the political administrative unity of the nation. The Independent Monarchist Movement protested that the wars in Africa were being continued by certain financial interests, in spite of the fact that a long war was not in the interest of the nation. A third manifesto was issued by over 100 Catholic laymen, not identified with any particular interests.

30. The Catholic manifesto, which had been sent previously to President Thomaz, protested against government censorship, measures taken against missionaries and priests in Angola including their imprisonment and exile,⁸ persecution of those who did not agree with the Government's policy, and "an electoral procedure without dignity or truth", since only one party was permitted. In particular, it protested against the Government's ban on public discussion of self-determination for the Overseas Territories. The Catholic group also criticized the Government for continuing the war, which it said "although supported from outside was not entirely the result of foreign efforts". The group took the position that the Government had failed to give the people of the Overseas Territories an opportunity for free and orderly expression of their views and had thereby pushed them into violence. It expressed support for a peaceful solution to the problem of the Overseas Territories and suggested that a free dialogue should take place between those Territories and Portugal. In this connexion, the Catholic group questioned why the Government did not consult the people as to their views on the Overseas Territories if it were confident, as it claimed to be, that its policy of integration was defended by the great majority of the people.

31. On the eve of the elections Mr. Salazar addressed the people over the radio and replied to the Opposition manifesto which he said merely contained sterile criticisms, as for instance the complaint against the Government's failure to translate the United

⁸ At the time of the uprising in 1961, in Angola eight Roman Catholic priests were arrested. All of them were Negroes or mulattoes. Some were imprisoned in Angola though no formal charges were made. They are now in Lisbon and are prevented from returning to the Territory.

Nations document, since the document was available in the official languages of the United Nations. As regards the Opposition's views on the Overseas Territories, he considered that the overwhelming manifestations constituted a real expression of the people, a plebiscite, showing that national unity was a fact; it was no longer any use to discuss it. He appealed to the people to vote as an affirmation of their Portuguese identity (*portuguesismo*) and a profession of their faith.

32. In the elections which took place on 7 November the National Union candidates were returned to all the 130 seats in the National Assembly. Although fairly detailed electoral results were published for the electoral districts in Portugal, little information is available on the actual number of voters in the Overseas Territories. The most detailed figures are for Mozambique where out of a population of 6.6 million, some 74,000 (about 1.1 per cent of the population) were registered on the electoral rolls and about 64,000 took part in the voting (see below). In São Tomé, out of a total population of about 60,000 some 5,000 (or 8 per cent) were registered on the electoral rolls, and some 3,800 voted. For the other Territories the only figures available are the percentages of the electorate which took part in the vote. From various accounts it appears that in Portugal and the adjacent islands with a total population of under 10 million, probably between 1.2 and 1.5 million people voted;⁹ in the Overseas Territories, with a total population of more than 13 million people not more than 2 per cent took part in the voting.

Military activities and expenditure in the Overseas Territories

33. At the inauguration of the newly elected National Assembly in December 1965, President Thomaz stated that the two main tasks facing Portugal were the defence of the integrity of national Territory and the economic development of the entire Portuguese realm (*espaço português*). Although Portugal found itself in a tragic dilemma, it had no choice but to continue along the path it had chosen for survival and it was not possible to foresee how long all the organs of government and the Portuguese people would be faced with the task of defending the Overseas Territories and their inhabitants. Side by side with this effort, economic development would be accelerated to increase the wealth of the Portuguese realm collectively so as to ensure its defence so long as the world situation made it necessary.

34. These two interrelated objectives are reflected in Portugal's budget for 1966 which provides for a total expenditure of 17,410.3 million escudos.¹⁰ Of this, 11,026.5 million escudos are for the ordinary budget and 6,383.8 million escudos for the extraordinary budget, comprising 4,011 million escudos for overseas national defence expenditure and 2,203.3 million escudos for "other investments". Defence expenditures thus account for 63 per cent of the extraordinary budget in 1966.

35. Overseas defence expenditures have steadily increased since 1961. The table below shows that in

1965 the allocations were 60 per cent higher than in 1961, and for the period 1961-1965 total allocations under this heading amounted to some 17,000 million escudos, or approximately \$US 600 million.

OVERSEAS MILITARY EXPENDITURES, 1961-1965

(Million escudos)

	Budgetary allocations		Total	Total as percentage of GNP at market price
	Initial allocation	Supplementary		
1961 ...	950	1,500	2,450	...
1962 ...	1,500	1,796	3,296	4.1
1963 ...	1,750	1,666.2	3,416.2	3.9
1964 ...	1,750	1,851.4	3,601.4	3.8
1965 ...	2,000	2,043	4,043	4.1

36. In 1965, Mr. Salazar put the cost of defending the Overseas Territories at 3,500 million escudos a year. Commenting on this, an article in *Portugal and Overseas Provinces, Economist Intelligence Unit, Quarterly Economic Review*, April 1965, said: "This is certainly an underestimate and leaves out of account the deflationary effect on the metropolitan economy caused by loss of confidence (as in 1961/62), an increased tax burden and the fact that much of the finance for the war, raised in metropolitan Portugal, is spent in the provinces and abroad. Nevertheless, when compared with the advantages accruing to Portugal in the past from the Overseas Provinces, it can at present be justified, always assuming that a military victory can be secured and that the balance of power in Southern Africa does not alter. Indeed, in the three years 1961-1963 the amount accruing to the escudo area from the provinces' trade accounts and surplus on invisibles (chiefly transport and mining operation receipts) averaged 29.1 million escudos a year."

37. Although the introduction to the budget contains the statement that, in so far as possible, it is intended to finance defence expenditure from budgetary surpluses, almost 50 per cent of the 1966 extraordinary budget (which includes extraordinary defence expenditures) is financed by internal and external loans. In millions of escudos the separate items are: 1,901.1 (30 per cent of the total) from internal loans; 1,058.5 (16.5 per cent) from external loans; 232 from internal development bonds; 78.5 from money coining (*amoedação*); and as in 1965, 100 from the special overseas defence and development tax. There is no information on the source of the external loans envisaged in 1966.

38. As noted last year (A/6000/Rev.1, chap. V, para. 18), both direct and indirect taxes have been increased in recent years to finance the ordinary budget. Since 1961, ordinary revenue has increased by 50 per cent, from 8,238.4 to 12,818.7 million escudos in 1966. Between 1960-1964, direct taxes rose 27 per cent, indirect taxes 33 per cent and special industrial taxes (including consumption taxes on beer and tobacco) increased 66 per cent. In 1966, revenue from direct taxes is estimated at 4,320.4 million escudos, from indirect taxes 4,093.6 million escudos and from industries under a special régime 946.4 million escudos. The total estimated revenue from these three sources is 865.3 million escudos more than in 1965.

39. In 1965, a number of newspaper articles reported that some economists in Lisbon believed that the African war had proved a "blessing" to Portugal,

⁹ The Opposition charged in its manifesto that out of a total population of 23 million people in Portugal and its Overseas Territories, less than 900,000 people were eligible for the vote. In his reply the Minister for the Interior said that this was false, since in Portugal and the adjacent islands alone the electorate was several hundred thousands more than the figure cited by the Opposition.

¹⁰ One escudo = 3.5 cents; \$US1 = 28.5 escudos.

as industries were growing in response to military orders, ranging from munitions to food and textiles, and remittances from troops overseas had injected new money into the economy. Nevertheless the budget shows that while ordinary expenditure increased by 32 per cent between 1961 and 1966 (health and welfare expenditures increased by 26 per cent, national education expenditures increased by 40 per cent), public debt service charges increased 122 per cent. In 1966 the public debt service amounted to nearly one fifth of the total ordinary budget compared with only one tenth in 1961. As reported previously the national debt on 30 September 1964 was already 29 per cent of the gross national product and moreover since the extraordinary defence expenditures are financed to a great extent by internal borrowing, the amount of funds available for development is limited. Part of the Transitional Development Plan is being financed by foreign investments in the Overseas Territories.

International relations of Portugal affecting the Territories under its administration

(a) Participation in international and regional organizations

40. Because of its overseas policy Portugal's right to membership and participation in the activities in various international and regional organizations continues to be challenged by other Member States.

41. In May 1965, the Executive Board of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization approved a resolution inviting "the Director General to carry out, with the authorization of the Portuguese Government, a study, *in situ*, with the aid of either qualified officials of the Secretariat or of appropriate eminent personalities, of the present situation of education in African Territories under Portuguese administration, from the point of view of the aims and general objectives of UNESCO as defined in its Constitution and in relevant resolutions of the General Conference". The resolution further requested the Director General "not to give effect, pending the results of this study and their examination by the Board, to any invitations to Portugal by virtue of decisions of the General Conference or of the Executive Board".

42. Portugal agreed to the education surveys on condition that its rights in UNESCO were restored and similar surveys were undertaken in other member countries. During 1965, however, Portugal was barred from the 28th International Conference on Public Education which was held in Geneva in July last year and the World Congress of Ministers of Education on the Eradication of Illiteracy in September at Teheran.

43. Portugal has since requested that the decisions of the Executive Board should be referred to the International Court of Justice for an advisory opinion. In October 1965 UNESCO's Executive Board decided to postpone discussions of Portugal's request until its meeting in 1966 and Portugal remains barred from UNESCO conferences.

44. The question of Portugal's membership was also raised at the International Telecommunication Union and at the United Nations International Sugar Conference, both of which were held in September 1965.

45. Portugal participates in a number of international and regional activities which are of concern to the African Territories which it claims are its overseas provinces. Thus Portugal is a party to the Long-Term International Coffee Agreement as a producer

country though the producer is Angola. Similarly Portugal was a member of the Inter-African Coffee Organization from its establishment until November 1965 when it was expelled because it is not an African country. It was made clear, however, that Angola would be welcome as a member as soon as it could comply with the obligations of the organization.

46. During the fifteenth session of the WHO Regional Committee for Africa, held in Lusaka, Zambia in September 1965, Portugal's right to participate was raised because of its colonial policy and reference was made to the health problems created by refugees from the Portuguese colonies in Africa. The Regional Committee subsequently adopted a resolution which pledges Member States of the region to do whatever is possible to protect and promote the health rights of the populations of the Portuguese colonies in Africa engaged in their struggle for national liberation. It also invites the African States where they are represented in the organs of WHO to consider every means calculated to lead the Government of Portugal to renounce once and for all its colonial policy of oppression. The resolution was transmitted to the Director General with the request that he bring it to the attention of the Nineteenth World Health Assembly which will meet in May 1966.

(b) Trade relations with Southern Rhodesia

47. On 24 February 1965, a trade agreement was signed between Portugal and Southern Rhodesia. This agreement replaced a former agreement dealing with trade between Mozambique and the now defunct Central African Federation. The agreement covers both Angola and Mozambique and provides that the two parties shall accord most-favoured-nation treatment for goods imported from the other except in so far as concerns: (i) special provisions relating to goods produced and traded within the escudo zone; (ii) special provisions relating to trade between Portugal and Spain or Brazil; (iii) special concessions applied by Southern Rhodesia under the GATT. The agreement also exempts from import duties a list of goods produced in one or other of the three Territories.

48. It may be noted that whereas there is an important transit of Southern Rhodesia trade through Mozambique, it is not an important trading partner of either Mozambique or Angola, which together account for less than 2 per cent of its total trade by value.

49. In addition to the above, however, there are agreements relating to the supply of hydroelectric power and crude oil from Mozambique to Umtali. These are discussed in the section on Mozambique. It is reported that no oil has been pumped through the pipeline from Beira to Umtali since 31 December 1965.

(c) Other

50. In a move towards fostering closer trade relations between Angola and Mozambique with South Africa, the Bank of Lisbon and South Africa Ltd. with an initial capital of R2,000 million was established in Johannesburg in November 1965. The Portuguese interests are the Banco de Angola, the Banco Comercial de Angola and the Banco Nacional Ultramarino, which will each have a 25 per cent interest. The South African interest is the General Mining and Finance Corporation (A/6000/Rev.1, chap. V, annex I, para. 199). General Mining has a one-year option to increase its holding to 25 per cent. Press reports

attach significance to the participation of the General Mining Corporation because South Africa is interested in oil exploration in Angola.

51. During the past year Portugal is reported to have strengthened its relations with Brazil, France, the Federal Republic of Germany and Spain. With Brazil it is in the course of negotiating a new treaty of friendship which would include the African Territories under Portuguese administration. Portugal is also interested in the establishment of a Luso-Brazilian community. France, which in April 1964 granted a long-term loan to Portugal for the construction of naval vessels and submarines (A/5800/Rev.1, chap V, para. 82) was reported in the Press in 1965 to be supplying Portugal with Alouette Helicopters which are said to be used in Africa. Several agreements have been signed between Portugal and the Federal Republic of Germany; the subjects include trade, cultural relations and social security. According to press reports there is also an agreement between the two countries under which the Federal Republic of Germany is building a jet aircraft base at Beja and is to supply Portugal with jet combat aircraft for her African operations.

Economic integration and development

(a) Economic integration

52. Up to 1965 most of the measures that had been put into effect for economic integration of the Overseas Territories with Portugal were mainly of a financial and trading nature. According to the schedule, import and export duties on goods produced and traded within the "Escudo zone" are progressively being removed and are to be entirely abolished by 1972. The reduction of tariffs and lifting of import quotas have already resulted in a marked increase in trade between Portugal and the Overseas Territories. The removal of tariffs in the escudo zone assures to Portugal large and growing markets in the Overseas Territories for her manufactured goods so that some observers consider that the loss of the Territories would be a powerful blow to the Portuguese economy.

53. On the other hand, the liberalization of current invisible operations and the movement of capital which is dependent on the general economic conditions in the Territories, has made less progress. Exchange controls have remained in effect and the local currency of the Territories is not yet freely convertible into Portuguese escudos.

54. With the completion of the institutional framework for political integration, various new measures

were introduced during 1965 to speed up economic integration and development. Among these new measures were: (i) regulations on foreign investments in the Overseas Territories; (ii) provisions for the establishment of Portuguese and foreign credit institutions; (iii) liberalization of conditions for establishing new industries; and (iv) the establishment of a national employment service and the intensification of measures to promote overseas settlement. These measures are described separately below (sections (c) to (f)). When fully implemented they are intended to bring about fundamental changes in the traditional dual role of the Territories as suppliers of raw materials and as captive markets for Portugal's manufactured goods¹¹ by making the Territories more self-sufficient. In the immediate future, as indicated in the Transitional Development Plan for 1965-1967, the main objective is to encourage revenue earning projects.

(b) Financing of economic development in the Overseas Territories

55. As reported previously (A/6000/Rev.1, chap. V, para. 36), for the Overseas Territories as a whole the envisaged investments under the Transitional Development Plan 1965-1967 are to be financed almost in equal parts by the Government (including territorial funds), private investors, and loans from abroad. In the past financial assistance provided by Portugal from the public sector to the Overseas Territories has consisted mainly of Treasury loans and loans by the National Development Bank (Banco de Fomento Nacional)¹² and the Caixa Geral de Depósitos, Crédito e Previdência. The following table, which gives a breakdown of financial assistance from the public sector for the years 1962-1964, shows the recent growth of such assistance. It will be seen that Treasury loans increased from 898 million escudos in 1962 to 1,243 million escudos in 1964, and that loans from the National Development Bank and Caixa Geral from 234 to 502 million escudos. Grants increased from 89 to 214 million escudos and other financial assistance from 500 to 841 million escudos.

¹¹ This traditional relationship was typified by the cotton-growing régime in Angola and Mozambique in the past and the changes that are being introduced are described in appendix I.

¹² The National Development Bank provides financing and guarantees for both the public and private sectors; in 1964 about 76 per cent of the financing approved was for the private sector. Of the total credits granted during 1964 to the Overseas Territories, 649 million escudos was for financing (including Angola 452 million and Mozambique 70 million) and 381 million escudos in guarantees. In 1965, the Bank was authorized to issue bonds for development up to 250 million escudos (Decree 46,663, 23 November 1965).

PORTUGAL'S FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE FROM THE PUBLIC SECTOR TO THE OVERSEAS TERRITORIES,
1962-1964

	1962		1963		1964	
	Million escudos	Percent- age	Million escudos	Percent- age	Million escudos	Percent- age
Total loans	1,132	65.8	1,220	63.7	1,752	62.4
Including						
Treasury loans	898	52.2	1,032	53.9	1,243	44.3
National Development Bank and Caixa Geral	234	13.6	188	9.8	509	18.1
Grants	89	5.1	253	13.2	214	7.6
Others	500	29.1	441	23.1	841	30.0
TOTAL	1,721	100.0	1,915	100.0	2,807	100.0

56. In 1965 the Government of Portugal introduced two measures to mobilize local funds in the Overseas Territories for the purpose of financing projects envisaged in the Transitional Development Plan, 1965-1967. One measure (Decree 46,380) authorized the Territorial Governments to raise loans from the local banks. This is to be done through the issue of special promissory notes (*promissórias de fomento ultramarino*) in the local currency of the Territory, of 1 to 10 million escudos each issue, at 2 per cent interest and redeemable in five years. The decree prescribes the amounts and the conditions under which the local bank of issue and other commercial banks must subscribe to these promissory notes. The other measure (Decrees 46,378 and 46,379, 11 June) was aimed at mobilizing local savings. Under these decrees the Governments of Angola and Mozambique were authorized to issue special Transitional Development Plan, 1965-1967 Treasury bonds (*obrigações do tesouro*)¹³ at 5 per cent interest, up to a maximum of 1,000 million escudos in the former and 500 million escudos in the latter Territory. These bonds are to be in the local currency of the Territory and are to be amortized at the rate of 6.7 million escudos per annum over fourteen years beginning the sixth year after issue. The local Governments may contract the placement (*colocação*) of these bonds by local credit institutions, or offer them for direct public subscription. In the Territory concerned, the bank of issue must guarantee loans when secured by these bonds. Within the escudo zone, the bonds may be used for settling both visible and invisible accounts and when used for this purpose, the payment of interest on the bonds and their amortization outside the Territory of issue will receive priority over other transfers to the same area. During the year, both Territories issued the first series of the new Treasury bonds; the issue in Angola was 200 million escudos and in Mozambique 100 million escudos.

57. Later in December 1965 the Minister of Finance was authorized each year to grant automatically to the Overseas Territories (excepting Macau) loans up to the amount fixed each year by the Council of Ministers for Economic Affairs for the implementation of the Transitional Development Plan. For Angola and Mozambique (Decree 46,750, 16 December) the loans are to be for twenty years at 4 per cent interest; for the smaller Territories (Decree 46,683, 3 December) the period is twenty-four years. For Guinea under Portuguese administration, Cape Verde, São Tomé and Príncipe, these loans will be the only source for the financing of the Transitional Development Plan. Cape Verde is exempt from paying interest so long as its financial situation remains unchanged. In January 1966, it was reported that total loans from the Central Government to the Overseas Territories to finance the Transitional Development Plan amounted to 1,021 million escudos for 1963: 101 million for Cape Verde, 35 million for Guinea under Portuguese administration, 36 million for São Tomé and Príncipe, 370 million for Angola, 423 million for Mozambique and 56 million for Timor.

(c) *Regulations on foreign investments in Portugal and the Overseas Territories*

58. In April 1965 (Decree 46,312, 28 April) new regulations were introduced easing conditions for for-

¹³ In Angola, for instance these bonds are entitled "*Obrigações do tesouro de Angola, 5 por cento, 1965, Plano Inter-calar de Fomento para 1965-1967*".

eign investment in the Overseas Territories. Whereas previously the Government had generally required a measure of Portuguese participation in the capital and in the administration of enterprises established with foreign capital, this will no longer be the case. Enterprises entirely or largely foreign-owned by residents in Portuguese Territory or persons domiciled overseas may now be established in various economic sectors with the same rights to enjoy tax and duty exemptions as national enterprises. As a general rule, however, foreign enterprises will be excluded from public services, activities relating to the public domain, and activities of special importance to national defence. Although mineral resources belong to the public domain, mining in the Overseas Territories is no longer in the restricted category. Foreign companies may not however acquire real rights in land in the Territories except with the authorization of the Overseas Minister. Foreign companies will also be able to remit freely all legally imported capital, as well as earnings from such capital and from other specified activities. National enterprises, on the other hand, may be authorized to contract, with the guarantee of national credit institutions, external loans not exceeding 2,500 million escudos or one third of their capital or their reserve fund.

59. The new regulations for co-ordinating industrial development in Portugal and the Overseas Territories, which are described in a later section, include the following activities in which free participation of foreign capital (either through direct investment, loans or through the purchase of shares) will always be authorized: (i) agricultural improvements, land preparation, including irrigation projects, livestock and cattle-raising and the processing of agricultural products; (ii) improvement and extension of industrial installations and reorganization of industries in accordance with the new law; (iii) development of extractive industries, including petroleum and other energy sources; (iv) fishing; (v) improvement of transport and communications; and (vi) development of tourist trade (Dispatch, 31 September 1965, *Diário do Governo*, Series I, No. 214).

60. In May a group of Portuguese businessmen and government officials visited various countries in the European Economic Community to interest them in opportunities for investment in Portugal and the Overseas Territories. Apart from various industrial and commercial interests, also represented on the mission were the Banco Burnay, the Bank of Lisbon and the Azores, the Banco Totta-Aliança, the Banco Português do Atlântico and the Banco de Angola. In the Overseas Territories the sectors suggested for foreign investments included mining (especially diamonds, petroleum and iron, see below and A/6000/Rev.1, chap. V, annex I) and agriculture (especially coffee, cotton, sisal, tea and fibres). (These activities are discussed in a separate study on the role of agriculture in Angola and Mozambique which is in preparation.)

61. By the end of 1965, some new investments of foreign capital had been announced. These included in Angola new investments by Petrangol and by Mabor in a tire factory (see paras. 117 and 124 below). In Mozambique new investments were announced for production of sugar and cashew (see paras. 163 and 164 below).

(d) *Banking and credit facilities*

62. New laws (Decrees 46,243 and 46,492) were introduced in 1965 to make available to the Territories

more commercial banking and credit facilities and at the same time to mobilize local domestic savings. Minimum capital and reserves required by law for banks or branches of banks established in the Territories have been reduced, and under the new law no Portuguese-owned institutions other than commercial and investment banks will be allowed to establish branches in the Overseas Territories. Foreign-owned credit institutions may operate in the Territories if the capital of the main branch in the Territory is not less than half of the minimum capital requirements specified.

63. In August 1965 an overseas commercial and industrial credit bank was established in association with the Banco Borges e Irmão. The bank will have its headquarters in Angola and a branch in Mozambique. Other partners in the credit bank include Manufatura Nacional de Borracha, Borges e Irmão Comercial, Lda., Star Imobiliária and Industrial Têxtil do Ave. The registered capital is 150 million escudos and can be raised to 200 million escudos. By the end of 1965, 75 million escudos had been paid up and transferred to the two Territories. Thirty thousand shares of 1,000 escudos each have been offered for sale to residents in the Territories. The special function of the bank, a private institution, will be to provide medium and long-term loans for industry and buildings, and short-term credit facilities, such as warrants for not longer than six months. The bank will also undertake economic and financial studies of a regional and technical nature. Up to the time of its establishment this was the third Portuguese bank in Angola; the other two are the Bank of Angola which is the official bank of issue of the Territory and the Commercial Bank of Angola, established over a year ago in association with the Banco Português do Atlântico. The only other Portuguese bank in Mozambique and in the other Territories under Portuguese administration is the National Overseas Bank (Banco Nacional Ultramarino).

64. In January 1966, the Banco Pinto e Sotto Mayor was reported to be establishing branches in Mozambique. Importance is attached to this move as a transfer of large sums of capital for use in the development in that Territory.

(e) *Co-ordination of industrial development in Portugal and the Overseas Territories*

65. In November 1965 new legislation (Decree 46,666) laid down conditions for the establishment of industries in the Overseas Territories and for the co-ordination of industrial development in the Portuguese realm.

66. Industries are divided into two categories: those which are of "national" interest and affect the economy of the entire Portuguese realm, and those which may be regulated by the Territorial Governments. Industries subject to national regulations (*condicionamento*) include the following: foods (including sugar factories but not including drinks and beverages); chemicals, metals, light engineering and metal parts, armaments, machinery, construction and various transforming industries. The Government of each Territory will be free to authorize the establishment of industries not included in the national classification and to lay down plans for their development. Competition among industries is to be avoided and industries must observe health and labour regulations.

67. Conditions for the establishment of industries in Portugal and the Overseas Territories are to be gradually brought into uniformity. For the Territories this will mean that they will have the right to establish various industries (not on the "national" list) using imported primary materials, which previously, under Decree 26,509, 11 April 1936, were only approved after a lengthy process of examination and consideration by various Territorial authorities and competent bodies in Lisbon. Another advantage to the Territories is that they may now authorize the establishment of new industries, even if the products are not lower in price than similar products imported from other parts of the Portuguese realm. In particular, the Territories will no longer be restricted as regards the establishment of cotton textile factories.

68. At the same time, the new legislation introduces wider government control over various industrial activities. Licences are now required for new factory buildings or extensions, and government authorization is required for changes (as for instance of equipment) which affect production or change in location within the Portuguese realm. (In Cape Verde, the change in location from one island to another will also require government approval.) From press reports it appears that the new regulations also enable the Portuguese Government to restrict the establishment of foreign companies in Portugal when this appears necessary as a protective measure for home industries.

(f) *Settlement in the Overseas Territories*

69. As reported previously (A/6000/Rev.1, chap. V, annex II), European settlement of the Overseas Territories, especially of Angola and Mozambique, has always been a cornerstone of Portuguese colonial policy. Following the uprising in Angola in 1961, new emphasis was given to the need for "the creation of multi-racial communities and the implantation overseas of new Portuguese tropical civilizations" as "the sole buttress of the national presence in those lands and a factor for peace..." (*ibid.*, para. 158).

70. New Provincial Settlement Boards were created in both Angola and Mozambique to co-ordinate plans and to accelerate settlement mainly of Portuguese families in the Territories. Though in Angola the Settlement Board was successful in establishing a chain of small nuclear settlements, the average rate of settlement overseas was only about 10,000 persons each year.

71. When the Transitional Development Plan was drawn up last year (A/6000/Rev.1, chap. V, para. 36), it became evident that with the anticipated natural annual increase of the active population by 43,000 persons, the gradual displacement of labour into industry, and the concurrent mechanization of agriculture, one of the main problems would be to find jobs for the surplus labour of Portugal. During 1965 the whole question of overseas settlement was reviewed in the National Assembly and in the Overseas Council and the political, economic, social and administrative aspects were carefully examined.

72. At its October meeting the Overseas Council, which is the highest policy-making body for the Overseas Territories (see A/5800/Rev.1, chap. V, paras. 25-28) emphasized especially the political importance of the settlement of the Overseas Territories from the point of view of both Portugal's internal situation and external relations: settlement of population from Por-

tugal would not only provide the Territories with labour and stimulate economic development but would also play an important role in national defence and the establishment of Portuguese civilization there.

73. Among other aspects, the Overseas Council considered the question of the most desirable "national level" of settlement overseas, the organization of settlement services and the type of settlements, questions relating to the economic and social welfare of the local population arising from such settlements, and the functions of the existing settlement boards.

74. As a first step towards stemming the emigration of labour from Portugal to other European countries, a National Employment Service was established on 11 December 1965 (Decree 46,731). This agency will set up public employment placement bureaux, establish rosters of technical and professional personnel, carry out studies of the needs of the labour market and facilitate transfers within the professions. It will also work with the Overseas Ministry in defining and supervising emigration to foreign countries.

75. Later, in a press conference held on 22 December, the Under-Secretary of State for Overseas Territories explained in some detail the Government's position on this question, which was based on provisions in the Constitution (article 133) and the Overseas Organic Law of 1963 (article LXIX). In recent years out of every four persons emigrating from Portugal only one went to settle in the Overseas Territories. It was therefore necessary to improve conditions in the Territories in order to attract those who were now migrating elsewhere. The Government considered that increased migration would help to accelerate the social and cultural progress of the "less evolved" indigenous inhabitants (*nativos menos evoluídos*) of the Overseas Territories because it would bring them in closer contact with "more civilized" (*mais civilizados*) peoples.

76. Intensified settlement would not be limited to increasing the number of Portuguese in the Territories in Africa, but would include the "fixing" of Africans in agricultural settlements for the dual purpose of replacing shifting agriculture with more modern techniques and of opening up new areas for farming and substantially increased production, especially of some crops now imported from foreign countries. (A more detailed account of recent developments of African agriculture settlements is given in the study on the role of agriculture in Angola and Mozambique which is being prepared.)

77. It was recently reported in the Press that the National Assembly early this year "put new pressure on the authorities to increase the flow of settlers to Angola and Mozambique as a counterpart to the military effort to hold on to the African Territories". One of the deputies from Mozambique (Mr. Moreira Longo) stressed the need "to increase the civilized population" in Mozambique especially in the interior. He also proposed that the Government should encourage soldier settlers in the Territories, a scheme which has been in effect in Angola for some time (A/6000/Rev.1, chap. V, annex II, paras. 181-183). Another deputy from Mozambique, Dr. Henriques Nazaré, took a somewhat different view. Drawing attention to the fact that Africans in urban areas lived largely in sub-standard dwellings on the periphery of urban communities, he believed that first priority should be given to improving African housing in urban areas

and eliminating what amounts to housing segregation (*isolacionismo habitacional*) of the races. He believed that the resentment created by this problem was among the causes of the war and that the importance of its solution had not been sufficiently recognized. He said that he was against "ready-made solutions" among which he included attempts to settle European farmers in Angola and Mozambique.

78. Experience has shown that one of Portugal's main difficulties in increasing European settlement in the African Territories has been the high cost involved. Recently the Vice-President of the Overseas Council, José Bacelar Bebian, was said to have estimated that it costs the Government about 300,000 escudos (\$US10,500) to settle a single family in Africa with the necessary land, housing and general living facilities (see also A/6000/Rev.1, chap. V, annex II, para. 121).

79. In 1965, it was announced in the Press that the Mozambique authorities had offered farms of 5,000 ha. each in the Tete district to farmers from drought-stricken areas in South Africa. The settlers would be required to pay a *foro* of 0.50 escudos per hectare for twenty years and would be required to undertake all costs of development. In November 1965, it was reported that eighty South Africans, mostly from the West Transvaal, had signed contracts.

(g) *Reorganization of technical services in the Territories*

80. Because of the important roles agriculture and mining are expected to have in the future economic development of the Territories, during 1965 the agriculture and forestry services and the geological and mines services in the Overseas Territories were reorganized and strengthened. As noted below, training facilities for agricultural staff are being expanded in both Angola and Mozambique. The two larger Territories will each have a Geological and Mines Department with five divisions, for licences, supervision (*fiscalização*) and geological survey, mining development, applied geology, general services and administrative services. In the smaller Territories there will be Geological and Mines Bureaux.

Education

81. In September 1964 (Decree 45,908, 10 September), following the extension of compulsory primary education to the Overseas Territories, the special adaptation courses for African children which had existed before were formally integrated into the overseas primary school system, which is now the same for all children, except that for those who do not speak Portuguese there is a pre-primary class. The 1964 reform made it mandatory for all schools in rural areas (where they are known as *postos escolares*) to provide not only the pre-primary but also the first three elementary classes. This has made it necessary to upgrade many of the former adaptation classes for Africans which used to be mainly entrusted by the Government to the Catholic missions.

82. During 1965 considerable sums were allocated in both Territories for teacher-training (monitors) and the expansion of school buildings, which are urgently needed if compulsory primary education is to be implemented. Pending the provision of adequate facilities, under the 1964 reform, children of school age may be excused from attending if they live more than 5 km. from a school and no free transportation is provided.

In July the school inspection system for the Overseas Territories was revised and strengthened (Decree 46,447, 20 July) to enable it to better supervise and co-ordinate all educational activities.

83. Greater emphasis is being given to education in general and agricultural education in particular with a view to increased production. Under a decree (46,464) of 31 July 1965, agricultural education in the Overseas Territories has been reorganized. Courses will be provided at three levels: elementary, secondary and vocational (*médio*). Secondary agricultural education is to be provided in *escolas práticas* and in the industrial schools. Vocational training for agricultural officers (*regentes*) will be provided in separate institutions and will include more advanced training in agronomy. Agricultural education at the secondary and vocational levels will be under the supervision of the Education Services as regards administrative and pedagogical aspects and the special departments concerned will be responsible for the technical aspects and the supply of materials and specialized personnel. Special courses are also to be offered to adults working in agriculture.

84. No changes were reported during the year in the organization of the academic secondary schools (*liceus*) which have always been based on the same pattern as their counterparts in Portugal. Further details on educational facilities including the *Estudos Gerais Universitários* and enrolment are given in the relevant sections below.

85. As reported previously (A/5800/Rev.1, chap. V, para. 104) since 1963 more scholarships have been made available to students in the Overseas Territories. In 1964 (Decree 45,769) a system of reimbursable scholarships was introduced consisting of loans granted on the basis of merit and repayable in instalments after completion of the course. A total of 302 outright scholarships and 33 "scholarship-loans" were granted in 1964 to students from the six Territories (excluding Macau). The number of scholarships and scholarship-loans respectively granted to each Territory were as follows: Cape Verde, 27 and 8; Guinea under Portuguese administration, 48 and 4; São Tomé, 15 and 4; Angola, 116 and 14; Mozambique, 37 and 2; Timor, 26 and 1.

86. In May 1965 (Order 21,310) rational awards for secondary education were extended to include students in Guinea under Portuguese administration, São Tomé and Príncipe and Timor. As a result of the increased number of students in the Overseas Territories during recent years, it was reported in March 1966 that the scholarship system for secondary students was being revised. Currently the total value of scholarships is 14.7 million escudos, of which 5 million is for students in Angola, 4.8 million for Mozambique, 507,000 for Guinea under Portuguese administration, 450,000 for Cape Verde, 105,000 for São Tomé and Príncipe and 48,000 for Timor.

2. Angola

Constitutional and political

(a) Election of the Head of State

87. The election of the Head of State occasioned little comment in the Angolan Press. Out of a total membership of 616 representatives in the electoral college, Angola had 51 composed as follows: 7 deputies to the National Assembly, 2 members of the Corporative Chamber, 24 members from the Legislative Coun-

cil appointed from among themselves, and 18 representatives of the municipal councils.

88. It is significant that Angola, with a total population of 4.8 million at the 1960 census and an estimated population of 5.5 million in 1965 had only 18 representatives of municipal councils (out of 51 members) whereas Portugal and the adjacent islands had 158 representatives of municipal councils (out of 438 members). As reported previously, for each district or each Territory not divided into districts, the number of representatives in the electoral college is equal to half the number of municipal councils (when this is an odd number, the number of representatives is half the next even number). Furthermore, under the 1963 electoral law, municipal councils are established only in *concelhos* where there are more than 500 qualified voters. Presumably for this reason less than half the administrative units in Angola (67 *concelhos* and 22 *circunscrições*) were represented.

(b) Elections to the National Assembly

89. In the elections to the National Assembly, there was only one list of seven candidates presented by the National Union. There were no Opposition candidates. An editorial in the Angolan Press said that this showed that there were no differences of political opinion in the Territory on the need for the defence of Portugal's overseas "patrimony". It urged the people "to vote *en masse* to shout to the world that Angola is Portugal, and that it will always be Portugal".

90. Only four of the National Union candidates were persons born in Angola; the other three were born in Portugal. Two out of the seven were persons actually holding government posts in Angola (Provincial Secretary of Education, director of the State Pharmacy in Moçamedes). One was the representative of Angola in the Overseas Council, concurrently a member of the Economic and Social Council in Angola and the director-general of ANGOL. The others included: a lawyer who was president of the Commercial Association in Lobito; a member of the Economic and Social Council elected by the economic interests in the Territory; a journalist who had been on official missions; a director of an important company with interests in coffee, who is concurrently a member of the governing council of the Coffee Institute.

91. The proposal by the Opposition in Portugal that the Overseas Territories should have the right of self-determination was denounced by various public figures and press editorials as traitorous and as an insult to the people of Angola who were giving their lives and fighting for a greater Portugal. For several days the Press carried a message that was also being broadcast calling on all Portuguese of Angola to affirm their loyalty to Portugal on 19 October by covering the whole Territory with the Portuguese flag. The message said that on that day every vehicle, every entrance and every window must fly the Portuguese flag; no one should fail to do so if he were a loyal Portuguese. The Lisbon papers reported the demonstration on 19 October as a spontaneous expression of Angola's loyalty to Portugal and a denunciation of any relationship with Portugal other than complete integration and identity.

92. Press reports of the elections on 7 November described the voting stations as crowded with lines of people and cars drawn up in front. No figures were published of the number of registered voters or of the number of votes cast. The voting results were given

in terms of the percentage of registered voters who voted. The Lisbon newspaper of 8 November carried a report from Luanda saying "We can affirm, without a shadow of exaggeration, that all Angola voted". Preliminary figures published in the Press showed that, in Angola, the voting percentages of the electorate by district was as follows: Cabinda, 84 per cent; Cuando-Cubango, 91 per cent; Luanda, 71.6 per cent; Uíge, 95 per cent; Benguela, 77.8 per cent; and Malanje 89.7 per cent. However, since only about 1 per cent of the total population voted in Mozambique (see paras. 146-147), it is probable that the percentage in Angola was less than 5 per cent of the total population.¹⁴

93. In a statement issued on 11 November the MPLA (Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola) said that the Portuguese Opposition proposal was for self-determination at a fixed date for the colonies, with an autonomous transitional government in which half the members would be Portuguese who would safeguard the interests of their compatriots. This was unacceptable. The MPLA would oppose "any attempt at implanting a neo-colonialist system in Angola". Armed resistance would end only when conditions were established which guaranteed the exercise of power by the Angolan people. These conditions were: (i) recognition of the right to self-determination and independence and to national and international sovereignty for Angola; (ii) withdrawal of all armed forces to their bases of origin; (iii) the safeguarding of the nation's unity and territorial integrity; (iv) unconditional release of all political prisoners and the repatriation to Angola of all political refugees and exiles; (v) guarantees for the exercise of democratic rights and freedom for political and trade union activities; (vi) establishment of principles and guarantees for the election of a national parliament on the basis of universal, direct and secret suffrage; (vii) elections for organs of government in all towns.

(c) Local administration

94. During the year, following discussions in the Economic and Social Council and the Legislative Council, some changes were made in the local administrative structure of the Territory as it was previously reported (A/5800/Rev.1, chap. V, paras. 46-53). Municipal councils and municipal commissions were given identical powers and functions, and the administrative posts (*postos de circunscrição*) were abolished. In December, the *Boletim Oficial de Angola* (No. 50) published a list of the new administrative divisions of the Territory which, it reported, had been "made necessary by population or administrative requirements due to economic and social progress". Over twenty new *concelhos* were created, a number of administrative posts were changed to *circunscrições* and the corresponding municipal councils and municipal commissions were established. New elections will be held to these bodies.

The military situation in Angola

95. From the published reports and statements by Portuguese officials and Press, it is difficult to ascertain what the real situation is in Angola. On the one hand, there are claims that the war in Angola is over. Thus the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Portugal, speaking at the 1253rd meeting of the Security Council on 9 November 1965, cited reports of visitors, one of whom described Angola as a country of "real peace

and progress". On the other hand, the President of Portugal and other officials now emphasize that Portugal is waging a war on three fronts, in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea under Portuguese administration.

96. On one point nearly all reports agree that there are still some 50,000 Portuguese troops in Angola. In January 1966, for instance, it was reported in the Press that "military posts are strung around the perimeter of Luanda, linked in some sections by miles of wire and lit at night by searchlights. Troops man checkpoints on the roads leading inland and special passes are needed to go through areas of strategic importance". Reports also indicate continued concern in the Territory with political security measures. In March 1966, for instance, the Government closed the Cultural Society of Angola (*Sociedade Cultural de Angola*) on grounds that it had allowed "infiltrations" and activities not provided for in its charter.

97. In addition to the regular armed forces, there are now not only the civil defence and volunteer corps, the militia and local troops (*forças de quadrícula*) but since the end of 1964 a new public security police force of over 7,000 men has been created. In 1965, a commando-troop training centre was set up in Luanda which provides a three-month course of specialized training followed by one month of experience.

98. In November, the structure of the Civil Defence and Volunteer Corps, which has grown substantially, was formalized. Under Decree 46,656 the Corps includes permanent, general and special staff. The permanent staff consist of the corps leaders and commanders. The general staff are divided into (a) self-defence and service units, comprising the local population, public servants and employees of private enterprises; and (b) *forças de intervenção* made up of volunteers, whose task is to destroy armed bands of guerrillas.

99. Since early January the *Diário de Notícias* of Lisbon has carried a series of articles entitled "Three fronts in three months. All the truth about the war against terrorism in the Overseas Territories". The articles give descriptions of military actions against "terrorists" both from past accounts and from the author's own observations. There are descriptions of the air force base in Luanda, which has over 1,500 men, of the helicopter force which searches out guerrillas in the forest areas, of the parachute troops who are air-lifted to areas of activity . . . The articles are accompanied by pictures of commando-troops in training, troops returning from a day's action and of wounded soldiers in the military hospital in Luanda. Some of the articles are about the countryside that is said to have been restored to peace since 1961, describing the newly settled villages which have schools in the open air when no school building is available; and describing the activities of the volunteer corps or the soldiers stationed on farms to protect them.

100. For a period during 1965 there appears to have been a lull in military activities; one report said that military action against the terrorists appeared to have reached a stalemate. Later, in August, there was a report by the *Gouvernement révolutionnaire de l'Angola en exil* (GRAE) that poison gas and napalm bombs were being used by the Portuguese troops in a region about eighty miles east of Luanda. A Portuguese Defence Ministry spokesman said, however, that chemicals have not been used in Angola, that there had been no action in 1965 in the region mentioned, and that the

¹⁴ The qualifications for voting are set out briefly in A/6000/Rev.1, chap. V, para. 9

situation in Angola "was now almost completely under control".

101. Towards the end of the year the official military *communiqués*, still issued every week, began to reveal increased activity. The *communiqué* for the week 29 December 1965 to 5 January 1966 was headlined "Intensive activity of the Armed Forces in North Angola". Action was reported (in the region of Bula, Fazenda Riquinha, Camacume, Dongo, Menga, Mifume and Quingina) by land, air and naval forces against groups of guerrillas near the frontier as well as in the Dembos and Uíge regions against "the criminal action of outlaws".

102. Significantly, in May 1965, residents and farmers in the district of Uíge, Zani, Cabinda and Cuanza North were exempted from payment of licence fees for the use and carrying of weapons, for defence, war and recreation (hunting, Angola, Legislative Instrument 3,550 1 May). In July (Legislative Instrument 3,560, 10 July) this provision was extended to Luanda district, the *concelhos* of Ambriz and Nambuangongo, the administrative posts of Ucuá, Quicabo, Barra do Dande and the *concelho* of Dande.

Economic conditions

103. The Lusitania News Agency reported in January that Angola's estimated budget for 1966 at nearly 4,000 million escudos is the highest the Territory has ever had, and there will be a surplus balance of 5.5 million escudos. The total estimated revenue for 1966 is 3,958.9 million escudos, which is only 12.3 million more than that for 1965. There has been only a slight increase in the ordinary revenue from 3,815.2 million in 1965 to 3,829.9 in 1966, but extraordinary revenue dropped from 131.4 million to 128.9 million. In contrast, in 1966 the estimated ordinary expenditure has increased by 20 million escudos, so that the anticipated surplus will be 5.3 million less than that in 1965.

104. In 1966, revenue from State enterprises and participation in private enterprises is expected to increase by 47.3 million escudos and from indirect taxes by 51.7 million escudos. In spite of the fact that the minimum general tax was revised in September 1965 (Governor General's Despatch, 4 September, *Boletim Oficial de Angola*, No. 200) and is levied at an average rate of 200-250 escudos in most districts and 350 escudos in the more economically developed areas, the 1966 estimated revenue from this source is 11 million escudos lower than in 1965.

105. The 1966 Angola budget provides for an estimated expenditure of 626 million escudos for the armed forces which is 30 per cent higher than the original 1965 estimates. Angola's actual share in national defence costs last year for overseas military forces was 554.9 million escudos, or approximately 14 per cent of the total estimated expenditure, with 380.8 million for the army, 52.1 million for the navy and 122.0 million for the air force. Of the total, about one half (282.6 million escudos) was from the Territory's ordinary revenue in accordance with a 1959 provision (Decree 42,559); 14 per cent was from the special tax introduced in 1961 on Territorial services with an "autonomous" budget; about 7 per cent from the Territory's surpluses; 20 per cent from the revised tax on profits introduced at the end of 1964; and the remainder from the Defence Fund and the Territory's extraordinary revenue.

106. The revised defence tax on profits (Decree 46,112, 29 December 1964) which came into effect in

1965 applies to individuals or companies, national or foreign, who have annual profits exceeding 500,000 escudos. It applies to income from trading industries, urban real estate or from exploitation of natural resources. Under the earlier provisions (Decree 45,067, 7 June 1963) which were found to produce insufficient revenue, the tax had applied only to companies established in the Territory for more than five years, earning profits of more than 1 million escudos and which were subject to the industrial or exploitation tax, but did not apply to companies exempt from income tax under their contracts. Reports indicate that companies such as Tanganyika Concessions, which own the Benguela Railway, and which was previously exempt, may now have to pay the profits tax. Another innovation is that the profits tax now applies also to interest and dividends of 500,000 escudos or more, or which, together with earnings from other operations listed above, yield an income over that amount. As a means of ensuring full collection of the new tax, the Angola Government in August ordered (*Boletim Oficial de Angola*, No. 34, p. 1143) that all companies, foreign or Portuguese, operating in the Territory, irrespective of the location of their headquarters, should submit a list of their shareholders together with information on the number of shares held and interest and dividends paid.

107. Defence expenditures in Angola are not limited to the allocations for the three armed forces. The Civil Defence and Volunteer Corps, for instance, which is an integral part of the Territorial defence forces, is supported mainly by special taxes. In addition, much of the development expenditure on infrastructure has been allocated to projects of immediate need for defence, such as airports, radio communications, etc. Although Angola pays for a large share of the defence costs out of its budget, some of the costs are also paid for by the Portuguese Government. In 1964 the Government of Angola loaned 104 million escudos to the Defence Ministry in Portugal for the local military region (Decree 46,760, 20 December 1965).

108. As already reported, under the Transitional Development Plan 1965-1967 for Angola, a total investment of 7,210 million escudos is to be made over the three-year period (A/6000/Rev.1, chap. V, para. 62). About 34 per cent will be from external sources (including a private loan from the General Trade Co., a company with headquarters in Geneva, Switzerland, of \$US35 million for equipment). Of the remaining 4,360 million escudos which is to be financed by "national sources", loans from Portugal will provide 1,000 million escudos, the Government of Angola will provide 750 million escudos from revenue, 600 million will be raised by the issue of development bonds, 200 million will come from financing companies¹⁵ and 1,607.5 million from private investment. The Territory is expected to finance its annual share of 250 million escudos from (a) budgetary surpluses of 100 million escudos, (b) an equal amount from the 2.5 per cent Development Fund tax on exports and (c) 50 million escudos from the *sobrevalorização* export tax, mainly on coffee.¹⁶

109. Full details on the implementation of the Plan during 1965 are not yet available. It was reported in September that an allocation of public sector funds of 955 million escudos was made for development ex-

¹⁵ *Participação privada no capital das previstas sociedades de financiamento e de desenvolvimento* (see Development Plan).

¹⁶ This tax is levied on the difference in the current export price of certain commodities as compared with the 1949 price.

penditure during the year. This is 11 million escudos more than the average annual investment envisaged in the Territorial Development Plan and greater recourse is made to Angola's own finances than was originally envisaged. Despite the tight financial situation and the small surplus in the budget last year, budgetary surpluses will provide 240 million which, together with 60 million from the *sobrevalorização* tax and 20 million from the Development Fund, brings Angola's contribution from its own revenues up to 320 million escudos. The remaining 635 million is to be provided as follows: 370 million by loans from Portugal, 65 million from credit institutions and financing companies, and 200 million by the issue of development bonds.

110. Allocated development expenditure during 1965 amounted to 1,040 million escudos as follows: agriculture and livestock, 14 per cent; roads, railways, ports and airports, 29 per cent; Cunene Valley development and hydroelectric power development, 16 per cent; industries, 14 per cent; health, education, social welfare and radio communications, 13 per cent; studies of natural resources, 8 per cent; fishing, 3 per cent; and improvement of local housing, 3 per cent.

111. In his New Year's speech, the Governor General noted that the economic situation in 1965 had not fulfilled expectations; there had been a drop in prices of agricultural products, exports of petroleum as well as of iron both fell below the 1964 level, and the Territory continued to suffer from the exchange situation (*a pressão cambial*).

112. Detailed trade and production statistics are not yet available for 1965. Reports indicate that compared with the previous year, production of coffee dropped by 16 per cent due to bad weather, sisal remained at the same level but there were some gains in the production of maize, cotton, oilseeds and tobacco, and sugar production was reported to be around 70,000 metric tons, against 68,200 in 1963-1964, and 73,200 tons in 1962-1963. According to some sources, the 1966 harvest is expected to show greater gains as a result of intensified efforts in recent years to increase agricultural production.

113. It may be noted that while the Transitional Development Plan places greater emphasis on the expansion of African agriculture, no large investments are planned in this sector. The Government hopes to stimulate African production of such crops as maize and cotton mainly by improving the price to growers, which hitherto has been low, and by reducing export duties on these crops. As such measures would reduce Territorial income, it was at first planned in July 1965 to raise export duties on coffee and sisal and to introduce certain taxes on consumer goods to compensate for the anticipated loss but these were later withdrawn when the exports of those two crops proved to be less encouraging than had been expected. A new tax on consumer goods has however been reintroduced.

114. In the mining sector, increased diamond production in 1965 is expected to compensate for the lower output of iron, petroleum and salt. Diamond production totalled 1,149,068 carats in 1964, and the Angola Diamond Company reported a profit of 192.3 million escudos out of which a dividend of 110 escudos per share was paid. (The shares have a nominal value of 170 escudos.) The value of diamonds produced in the first ten months of 1965 was reported to be 74 million escudos more than in the corresponding period of 1964.

115. There is continued interest in diamond prospecting. In the first nine months of 1965, twenty-five new requests for prospecting concessions were filed. A new concession was granted to the Sociedade Angolana de Pedras Preciosas e Diamantes (DIPETRA), a Portuguese company. The concession granted to the South African Angola Exploration Company was revoked in April (Order 21,220, 14 April) for having failed to meet the required conditions.

116. Crude petroleum production increased from 800,000 tons in 1963 to 905,000 tons in 1964, but fell short of the previously anticipated 1 million tons (A/6000/Rev.1, chap. V, para. 55). Exports of crude oil totalled 361,000 tons (compared with 318,000 in 1963), of which 292,000 went to Portugal where a new refinery has been established, and 70,000 tons to foreign countries. Early in 1965, the Government ordered that all excess fuel oil produced by the refinery in Luanda should be absorbed by the Portuguese domestic market. However, output of crude oil during the year was reported to have dropped to 700,000 tons, due to technical reasons.

117. At the end of 1965 Petrangol signed a new contract with the Portuguese Government (Decree 46,822, 31 December). This contract replaces all previous ones, and it is reported that, in consequence, Petrofina's contract with Petrangol as an associated concessionary company will also be cancelled.¹⁷ Petrangol is authorized to increase its capital from 150 to 900 million escudos and the duration of its contract is extended to 1970. Petrangol will undertake to invest 1,250 million escudos in prospecting and development of new deposits, with an annual average of 100-150 million escudos to be spent in the Cuanza district concession, and 50 million in its concession in the Congo district. It may reduce the annual expenditures only with the approval of the Government and provided discovered reserves are not less than 75 million tons. The Government will receive a 12.5 per cent royalty on surface value of oil extracted, and 50 per cent of the profits of Petrangol and of such companies operating with it on a "joint venture" basis. The Government controls the choice of such companies. The Government will receive a bonus of 30 million escudos on the signing of the contract, an annual sum of 1 million escudos which will be paid into the Mining Development Fund which is being set up, and it will also receive two loans, one of 250 million escudos at 4 per cent interest for three years, and another of 40 million escudos at no interest for ten years.

118. During the year there were conflicting reports as to the ability and possibility of Angola supplying oil to South Africa and Southern Rhodesia. In October 1965 the *Diário de Notícias* in Lisbon carried a report from Lourenço Marques that a well-informed source in Johannesburg had revealed that negotiations for the supply of Angolan oil to South Africa were in progress and that supply would start soon. In November, an official of Petrofina in Brussels said that Petrangol "for technical and contractual reasons" would not be able to supply Southern Rhodesia with oil if sanctions were imposed. The participation of the General Mining Corporation in a joint banking enterprise with Portugal (see para. 50 above) is reported to indicate Federale Mynbou Beperk's continued interest in Angolan oil since the two companies are closely connected.

¹⁷ For details of relations of Petrangol with Petrofina, see A/6000/Rev.1, chap. V, annex I, paras. 179-181.

119. During the year, Alfred Krupp made a visit to Angola where his company is participating in the development of the Cassinga iron mines operated under concession by the Companhia Mineira do Lobito (A/6000/Rev.1, chap. V, annex I, para. 207). Machinery and equipment for use at the Cassinga Mines have been granted special tariff privileges and a new government body has been established to co-ordinate the development of road, rail and port facilities at Moçâmedes in connexion with the Cassinga Mine project. In June 1965 (Decree 46,372) the Portuguese Government gave its guarantee to the 1,300 million escudo loan previously contracted by the Companhia Mineira do Lombige and the Sociedade Mineira do Lombige with the consortium headed by Krupp (of Essen, Germany). The Yawata Iron and Steel Company of Japan is reported to have already concluded an agreement for 6 million tons of iron ore to be delivered in six years, at an agreed price of \$US 8.14 per ton C.I.F. Japan. In 1965, it was reported that Japanese industrialists, with the backing of the Bank of Japan, were ready to invest up to \$US 120 million in Angola for the establishment of a metal industry.

120. Following reports in 1964 of the discovery of new deposits of manganese, nickel and platinum at the Bay of Tigers, copper deposits were discovered in 1965 near Mina River in the Benguela district. Because the copper deposits are relatively near the Benguela Railway, the ore could be easily exported.

121. A new mining company has been formed to exploit the manganese deposits in the Moxico district. The newly established Sociedade Mineira do Cassai, Lda. will co-operate with the Spanish Steel Group and expects to produce 100,000 tons annually for ten years. The Spanish interests will finance the equipment, construct a 70 km rail link and provide the rolling stock. Various companies in the United States of America, South Africa and the Federal Republic of Germany are reported to be interested in the purchase of the manganese ore.

122. Apart from the mining sector, several other new foreign investments were reported during the year. One is an investment of 130 million escudos by the Interamerican Capital Corporation of New York for the hydroelectric power station at Alto Catumbela. Interamerican has financed other projects in Angola, including roads, the Luanda Airport and factories. It has also financed the Sal Airport in the Cape Verde Islands. The president of Interamerican is Frederick J. Evans, who is also president of Evans and Dell Company which has supplied all the equipment and construction materials used.

123. During the first six months of 1965, traffic on the Benguela Railway through Lobito port was equal to that of the entire previous year. As a result of increased loads, early in 1966 Tanganyika Concessions Ltd. announced a plan to double the Benguela Railway's westward capacity from 1.5 million tons to 3 million tons annually within two years, at a cost of £5 million. The plan involves the construction of a second line between Cubal and Lobito. At present the Benguela Railway is a single-track line with wood-burning engines. The Company's concession on the railway has thirty-five more years before it expires.

124. From 1962 to 1964 an average of some 1,300 new transforming industries have been registered each year. The capital invested annually has averaged around 150 million escudos, providing employment for an additional 3,500 persons each year. By the end of 1964

there were a total of 17,316 establishments with a combined investment of 2,560 million escudos, employing some 58,000 persons. New investments in transforming industries already made or planned include 200 million escudos by the Companhia de Celulose mainly for paper pulp; 138 million escudos for the manufacture of ferrous ingots (*ferro-ligas*); 250 million escudos for a foundry and sheet metal works; and the aluminium industry already reported which was established with a capital of 10 million escudos, but may increase this to 500 million escudos. New industries reported established in 1965 include a 30 million escudo sisal rope factory, Companhia de Fiação e Cordoaria de Angola (COFIANG) by a group of sisal interests in the Benguela district; the investment by the Companhia do Açúcar de Angola of 95 million escudos to increase the capacity of its factories at Donde and Loge; the establishment of a new tire factory, Mahor, with a registered capital of 60 million escudos which may be increased to 150 million; a new plant to build farm tractors and other agricultural machinery; a new bicycle and motor-cycle manufacturing factory; a match factory (15.7 million escudos); a yeast factory by a Dutch group which already has interests in Portugal; a Swedish car assembly plant; a joint French-Angolan wine bottling and manufacturing plant; a fertilizer plant (50 million escudos); a battery factory (300 million escudos); a factory for making mining explosives; and a cotton spinning mill.

125. The largest increases in output of the transforming industries were beer (with an increase of 3.7 million litres in the first ten months), flour, biscuits and soft drinks. These gains, mainly of non-essential consumer goods could be due to a rising standard of living, and could be due, at least partially, to the increase in the number of troops from Portugal and the European settlers. (In 1965 it was estimated that the total population of Angola was 5.5 million and there were 300,000 Europeans.) There were increases in the output of textiles and refined petroleum, which account for respectively one tenth and one third of the total industrial output. There were also increases in the output of chemicals and cement.

126. Despite these increases Angola remains dependent on Portugal for a large range of imports of both durable and non-durable goods. During the first nine months of the year the adverse trade balance was 1,000 million escudos higher than in the corresponding period in 1964, due to a simultaneous increase in imports and a drop in exports. As a result, Angola's balance of payments deteriorated. Towards the end of the year a series of editorials appeared in the Angolan Press suggesting that curbs should be reintroduced on imports.

127. In November, in a speech at the opening of the new sisal factory, COFIANG, the Angola Provincial Secretary of the Economy took the opportunity to explain that the balance of trade had deteriorated mainly due to essential imports, that any restrictions on imports would necessarily have an impact on the standard of living in the Territory and have an adverse effect on the economy of Portugal and the taxable capacity of the nation (*capacidade tributária da Nação*).

128. At the beginning of this year, the Angola Government issued a more detailed statement on the trade situation. It pointed out that under the existing legislation, regulating the economic integration of the Portuguese realm (*espaço português*) it was not possible for Angola to take measures to restrict imports from

other "national" Territories; such measures can only be made by the Council of Ministers for Economic Affairs in Lisbon for limited periods, after consulting the competent organs, especially the Monetary Fund of the escudo zone (Fundo Monetário da Zona do Escudo). Nor could Angola take measures against foreign countries with which Portugal had special trade agreements, as for instance the EFTA and GATT countries.

129. The official statement showed that during the period from January to August 1965, as compared with the same period in 1964, imports of essential consumer goods increased by 205 million escudos, non-essential consumer goods by 71 million, and production goods by 440 million. Of the essential consumer goods only 37 million had been for durables, mainly refrigerating units, and of the non-durables, almost two thirds had been for clothing, about one fifth for food, and 12 per cent for drugs. Of the production goods, 55 per cent was for equipment and 45 per cent for various primary materials, intermediate or semi-manufactured goods. The Government stated that as the adverse balance of trade was due mainly to production needs, the effect on the balance of payments was a small price to pay for the future economic growth of the Territory. With the new industries which the Territory would be able to establish under the new regulations, including textile factories, Angola would in a few years' time become more self-sufficient and would be able to improve its balance-of-payments situation.

130. According to the study on the Transitional Development Plan, 1965-1967, Angola's invisible transfers amounted in 1962 to 576 million escudos (of which 121 million represented transfers of profits, and 455 million private transfers). In 1965, according to one report, invisible transfers to Portugal of rents, profits and office maintenance costs, which alone amounted to some 808 million escudos, had contributed to the balance-of-payments difficulties. It was reported in July 1965 that new exchange control measures were envisaged on all transfers of over 60,000 escudos including transfers within the escudo zone; these would have to be submitted to the Exchange Council (*Conselho de Câmbios*) in Luanda.

Land concession and settlement

131. As has already been reported (A/6000/Rev.1, chap. V, annex II, paras. 73-79), with the influx of new settlers from Portugal from the mid-1950's onwards, procedures for granting land concessions broke down. One of the main causes was the lack of adequate staff to survey the areas to be concessioned. The geographical and cadastral survey services of the Territories have since been reorganized and in October 1965, a new Inspector of the Cadastral Survey was appointed in Angola. On that occasion, the Provincial Secretary for Rural Development noted that during the ten-year period 1950-1959, there were over 13,000 requests for concessions, and that at the end of December 1964, there were 14,769 requests for concessions pending action. He stated that while some of the delays had been due to the applicants themselves who failed to reply to requests for further information, government measures were needed to deal with the situation. The inspection teams had an important role to play in helping the concessionnaires fulfil their obligations. They would be particularly important in the rural areas where noncompliance with the law was often due to the fact that the inhabitants had hardly any means of knowing it, and strict enforcement would only be possible when they

were better informed. In urban areas it was also important to speed up the process of granting charters to the local government bodies in respect of the land within their competence.

132. As noted above (paras. 72-77) the whole question of intensifying settlement in the Overseas Territories, the reorganization of the settlement services and the role of the Provincial Settlement Boards in Angola and Mozambique, have been under discussion in Lisbon. On his visit to Lisbon in February, the Governor-General of Angola said that, in spite of its defects and mistakes, the Angola Provincial Settlement Board was in fact the most experienced body in the whole country in matters concerning population, reorganization (*reordenamento*) and settlement of persons from various parts of the nation. While Angola did not have the most fertile soil, there was plenty of work for all who came. (For 1966, however, the estimated budget for the Angola Provincial Settlement Board is only 145 million escudos, compared with 160 million in 1965.)

133. Because of recurrent earthquakes in the Azores, the Portuguese Government has drawn up plans for settlement of families from the islands in Angola. A new group of sixty families with some 356 persons is being settled in Angola. Twenty of the families will be settled at Cela and forty will be in the area of Bela Vista. These families will engage in dairy farming.

134. A new proposal for the establishment of soldier-settlers in "defensive settlements" in Angola appeared in an official publication in 1965. The principal areas suggested for these settlements include the northern frontier and other strategic locations linked by major lines of transport. Estimated costs of settlement of each family is 200,000 escudos.

Education

135. A pamphlet published by the Angola Provincial Education Services describes in some detail the present school system and the organization of the Territorial Education Services. Statistics given in the pamphlet show that between the school years 1960-1961 and 1962-1963 the number of official and private primary schools increased from 2,011 to 2,329; the number of teachers from 2,890 to 3,356; pupils from 105,781 to 123,641; expenditures on education increased from 35.5 million escudos in 1961 to 62 million in 1963. For 1966 the estimated expenditure of the Education Services is 242 million escudos. In addition 22.5 million escudos is allocated for the *Estudos Gerais Universitários* and 31.2 million as a subsidy to the Catholic Missions.

136. The latest school statistics for the school year 1963-1964, which was before the unification of the primary system (see A/6000/Rev.1, chap. V, paras. 37-41), are given below.

137. The new "unified" primary school system was introduced in 1964-1965; no detailed statistics are yet available. During 1965, 485 school "posts" (*postos escolares*) were established in twelve of the districts. (The school post provides the first three primary grades and the preparatory language instruction class.) In addition, eleven school posts were raised to the elementary primary level (with four out of the five primary grades). The school posts are located by districts as follows: Benguela, 35; Bié, 45; Cabinda, 56; Cuando-Cubango, 12; Cuanza North, 64; Cuanza South, 39; Huíla, 14; Lunda, 56; Malenje, 3; Moxico, 28; and Uíge, 23.

ANGOLA SCHOOL STATISTICS, 1963-1964

Type of school	Number	Number of teachers	Number of pupils	Expenditure (million escudos)
Adaptation	1,241	1,954	98,615	...
Primary	50,000 ^a	...
Elementary professional	7	100	2,094	...
Technical primary	24	460	10,205	27.7
Liceu (secondary)	51 ^b	542	10,403	20.9
Post-primary vocational training (médio):				
Industrial and commercial	4	53	208	...
Primary teacher training (escolas de magistério primário)	3	...	97	...
Estudos Gerais Universitários	—	...	273	...

^a Based on the 1964 information that total primary enrolment was around 150,000.

^b Nine official, 42 private.

138. With the expansion of the rural school posts as a means of eliminating illiteracy, there is a re-crudescence of interest in the training of an "élite", and the provision of the necessary facilities. A number of new post primary and secondary schools were established during the year. Up to September 1965, these included one *liceu* (academic secondary school); two elementary technical schools at Henrique de Carvalho and at Cubal; the elementary technical school at Novo Redondo was up-graded to an industrial and commercial school, as was the commercial school at Lobito.

139. According to the information contained in the Transitional Development Plan, the average rate of increase of secondary school enrolment including both academic and technical schools during the period 1953-1962, was 16 per cent per year. It was envisaged that with the expansion of primary education, the number of secondary pupils would be 26,000 in 1967-1968, 46,000 in 1972-1973, and 82,000 by the school year 1977-1978. Of this total it is expected that about half of the students will be in the academic secondary schools. The Transitional Development Plan therefore envisages that the Territory will require 58 secondary schools by 1967-1968, increasing to 102 and 136 respectively in the two following quinquennial periods. Assuming the total population of Angola to be 5.5 million in 1967-1968, the secondary enrolment will then be approximately one per 2,000 population.

140. The main objective of the *Estudos Gerais Universitários de Angola* begun in 1963 (A/5800/Rev.1, chap. V, para. 102), as the Minister of National Education noted in 1965 when he visited the Territory for the opening of the new school year, is to create a teaching staff at the higher level for the preparation of the qualified technical personnel needed. Courses are provided at three centres. The medical and surgical training, and a wide range of engineering courses are at Luanda, where there is also a National Laboratory for Civil Engineering. The higher school for veterinary studies and the higher institute for agronomy are at Nova Lisboa, and during the year new courses in agronomy were added. The courses for the training of technical professional teachers, including those in agriculture and forestry are at Sá da Bandeira. A centre for the study of Humanities is to be added later.

Public Health

141. Under the Transitional Development Plan 1965-1967 for Angola, while provision is made for the extension of available medical facilities, emphasis is

mainly on preventive medicine and other measures for improving public health. These include special campaigns, increased training of technical personnel, public health education, and measures against communicable diseases. Annual expenditure envisaged under the Development Plan amount to some 80 million escudos.

142. During 1965 work was begun to enlarge the hospital in Luanda. The first phase involves an expenditure of 23 million escudos and an increase of 300 beds; the second phase will cost 50 million escudos and raise the total capacity to 1,000 beds. Two new rural hospitals are being built, one in Vila General Machado, the other in Vila Teixeira de Sousa.

143. The 1966 budget for Angola shows that Government medical services consisted of 2 central hospitals, 13 regional hospitals, 3 sub-regional hospitals, 57 rural hospitals, 97 health *delegacias*, and 258 sanitary posts. The estimated expenditure of the Public Health Services amounts to 200.4 million escudos.

3. Mozambique

Constitutional and political

(a) Election of the Head of State

144. Although a local press report lists the names of fifty-two persons, Mozambique was officially represented by fifty-one members in the electoral college which elected the Head of State (see paras. 13-17 above). They were the seven deputies to the National Assembly, two members of the Corporative Chamber, twenty-four members of the Legislative Council, chosen by election within that body, and eighteen representatives of the municipal councils.

145. It is significant that Mozambique, with a total population in 1960 of 6.6 million had the same number of representatives as Angola, with a population of 4.8 million whereas Portugal and adjacent islands, with a population of 8.9 million, had 438 representatives.

(b) Elections to the National Assembly

146. In the election of Mozambique's seven deputies to the National Assembly, held on 7 November 1965, 64,034 persons voted, representing 87.17 per cent of the registered electorate.

147. The qualifications for voting in the elections to the National Assembly are briefly set out in the previous report of the Special Committee (A/6000/Rev.1, chap. V, para. 9), where it was pointed out that

the two alternative requirements, literacy in Portuguese or payment of a minimum amount of certain taxes, would restrict the numbers of the indigenous people eligible to vote. The results show that out of an estimated population of over 6.6 million (including about

97,000 Europeans and 31,000 *mistos*),¹⁸ only 1.1 per cent were registered and less than 1 per cent actually voted. The following table shows the number of voters in each district, compared with the estimated population in 1960:

POPULATION^a

District	Number of voters	Total	Europeans	Voters as percentage of population
Cabo Delgado	2,979	542,165	1,482	0.5
Gaza	5,652	675,150	7,422	0.8
Inhamitane	3,982	583,722	1,913	0.7
Lourenço Marques	17,892	441,363	48,182	4.0
Manica e Sofala	14,801	781,070	19,668	1.9
Moçambique	9,016	1,444,555	8,074	0.6
Niassa	1,512	276,810	992	0.6
Tete	2,663	470,100	2,169	0.6
Zambézia	5,546	1,363,619	7,436	0.4

^a Population figures are for 1960 (provisional).

148. As in Angola, the results of the elections, in which there were no Opposition candidates, were hailed as "a reaffirmation of the people's confidence in the policy of intransigent defence of national Territory". The pre-electoral campaign period had been mainly devoted to public discussion of the manifesto published by the Opposition in Portugal, in particular the proposal for self-determination of the Overseas Territories, which had been denounced as "a traitorous attempt to disintegrate the Portuguese nation" in numerous press commentaries, statements by public figures and organized bodies and at mass public rallies.

149. Of the seven candidates of the Government organized National Union who were elected without contest, only three were born in Mozambique, three of the others having been born in Portugal and one in Macau. Three were re-elected as deputies, a fourth was already a member of the Overseas Council. By occupation, they included a businessman and sisal producer, a secondary school teacher, a lawyer, a doctor of medicine, two company directors, one of them a director of the Companhia do Boror, the Sociedade de Estudos e Investimentos de Moçambique and the Companhia Industrial de Fundição e Laminagem (CIFEL) and also a member of the Legislative Council, and the seventh a former executive of the Sociedade Hidroeléctrica do Revue and now president of the municipal council of Beira.

The military situation in Mozambique

150. As noted in the report of the Special Committee for 1965 (A/6000/Rev.1, chap. V, paras. 83-86), there has been fighting between the Portuguese armed forces and insurgents led by the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO) since September 1964 when the latter declared an insurrection in the Territory.

151. The fighting is of a guerrilla nature and it is difficult to ascertain the real situation because of conflicting reports. According to Portuguese military bulletins, the hostilities have been confined to clashes with small armed groups of guerrillas in restricted areas of the northern and north-western parts of the Territory; near the frontier of Tanzania and more recently in the Tete district on the border with Zambia. According to these reports, the principal areas of insurgent activity are the Maconde plateau, between the Rovuma and Mas-

salo rivers and the country adjacent to Lake Nyasa. Early in 1965, fighting was reported in the region of Milange, but it is reported that insurgent forces in this area have been liquidated. FRELIMO sources, in contrast, stated in October and December that the fighting was widespread and that large areas in Northern Mozambique were under their control.

152. It appears from reports that the fighting, consisting mainly of small-scale clashes, was sporadic at the outset but grew more frequent after mid-1965 when Portuguese forces, numbering 20,000 under a newly appointed commander, Brig. Gen. António dos Santos, began extensive military and air operations from a chain of combined air and land bases established since 1961 near the northern borders of Cabo Delgado and Niassa districts. It appears that Portuguese forces were reinforced during the year. In August, the Portuguese military commander stated in a press interview that the armed forces in the Territory, presumably including military, mobile police and militia, numbered between 40,000 and 50,000, a substantial increase over the 25,000 troops reported a year earlier. In November 1965 and February 1966 there were press reports of further large reinforcements, the latter report being denied in Lisbon.

153. From about September 1965 onwards Portuguese forces, including parachutists, special fusiliers (an élite corps of specially trained commandos), police and militia, supported from the air, have been engaged in a series of combined operations to track down groups of guerrillas in the Messalo River area, near the Tanzania border, and in the Maniamba area near Lake Nyasa. The local population is being grouped in specially constructed village settlements (*aldeamentos*) defended by military units, while, at the same time, camps of "recuperated" Africans suspected of aiding the guerrillas are being established near military centres. As a result of the increased military operations, the number of clashes has become more frequent as can be seen from the conflicting reports of casualties from both sides. According to Portuguese official sources, Portuguese military casualties between the outbreak of hostilities in 1964 and March 1966 were eighty-five while in the month of January 1966 alone it was claimed that

¹⁸ These figures are provisional estimates for 1960 published in the *Anuário Estatístico* of 1963. It is unofficially estimated that the European population had increased to 150,000 in 1965.

187 insurgents had been killed, wounded or captured. A FRELIMO *communiqué* on the other hand claimed that in January 100 Portuguese troops were killed or wounded against eight insurgents.

154. The disturbances in these northern areas were accompanied during late 1964 and early 1965 by large movements of African refugees, first across the Rovuma River into Tanzania and later, in smaller numbers, into Malawi and Zambia. As reported previously (*ibid.*, para. 86), the refugees in Tanzania were being cared for in camps by the Tanzanian authorities with supplementary assistance from the UN/FAO World Food Programme. In July 1965, it was announced by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees that a tripartite agreement had been signed with the Government of Tanzania and the Tanganyika Christian Refugee Service for settling 10,000 refugees at Rutamba in Southern Tanzania. The project would take three years to complete and would cost a total of \$US1.8 million. The Government of Tanzania would make available at least three acres per family unit and would supply goods and services to the value of \$US43,000. The UN/FAO World Food Programme would supply \$US500,000 worth of commodities. The High Commissioner had been asked to contribute \$US412,300 and \$US278,000 would be made available by religious and other sources.

155. In July 1965 it was reported that about 2,000 refugees from Niassa district had taken refuge at a missionary centre on Likoma island in Malawi and subsequent information indicated that their numbers had increased to over 3,000 by September, although many refugees had already returned to Mozambique. In February 1966, it was reported in the Press that about 3,500 refugees were housed in two government camps in eastern Zambia.

Security measures

156. In early 1965, a number of non-Portuguese newspapers carried reports suggesting that there had been widespread arrests for political reasons in Mozambique. These reports were officially denied by the Government, which, however, admitted that eight persons, among them the former editor of a local newspaper and three other well-known intellectuals, had been arrested for political activities. In August 1965 the chief of the political police PIDE (Policia Internacional de Defesa do Estado) was quoted in the Press as stating that these arrests were part of an action taken to eliminate a subversive group established by FRELIMO in southern Mozambique. It was reported that a number of other arrests had been made in connexion with the case and that in consequence the Centro Associativo dos Negros da Provincia de Moçambique, a cultural and educational association and centre for Africans in Lourenço Marques, with a membership of 15,000 had been closed. It was later disclosed that the association had been banned because members of its directorate were accused of subversive political activities but that, after an interruption, the centre would be permitted to resume its educational activities.

Economic conditions

157. Mozambique's defence expenditures continue to rise as the result of the hostilities which began in 1964. The amount allocated in 1965 to the armed services was 578,730,000 escudos,¹⁹ of which 437.7 million

was for the army, 108 million for the air force and 33 million for the naval forces. The bulk of this, 510 million, was to be paid by the Territory, to be derived from (a) ordinary revenue (195.8 million); (b) the receipts of autonomous parastatal bodies (205.2 million); (c) the Government's share in the receipts of the Beira Railway (48 million); and (d) a public loan (61 million).²⁰ The remaining 68.7 million escudos was to be derived from the Overseas Military Defence Fund in Portugal. It may be noted that these military expenditures, which represent only part of the total cost of defence, comprise about 12 per cent of the Territory's budget and are increasing at the rate of about 80 million escudos yearly. In 1965 (Legislative Instrument No. 2,614, 10 July) a new National Defence Stamp tax was introduced, payable on all receipts over 100 escudos and on all other legal documents. It was estimated that the new tax would yield about 16.5 million escudos from automobile licences alone. Apart from increased taxation, however, the main source of defence funds are additional appropriations from the receipts of the "autonomous services", particularly the government-controlled railways, ports and harbours which derive their revenue largely from the important transit trade of Mozambique's neighbours. The fact that this major sector of Mozambique's economy is controlled by the Territorial Government permits a degree of flexibility in public financing which is not obtainable in Angola where revenue increases must come primarily from increased taxes or contributions from the private sector.

158. Increased contributions from the "autonomous services" and, to a lesser extent, increased revenues from direct and indirect taxes resulting from the growth of economic activity, have enabled total government expenditure to grow more rapidly than expenditure on defence and so have not prevented increased expenditure in other sectors. Thus, the estimates of ordinary revenue and expenditure for 1966, amounting to 4,143 million escudos, show an increase of 293.6 million over the preceding year and nearly 400 million over 1964. The main sources are: receipts from "autonomous services", 1,695.4 million (an increase of 176.2 million over 1965); indirect taxes, mainly customs duties, 731.3 million escudos (an increase of 32.6 million); and direct taxes, 648 million (increased by only 4.9 million). It may be noted that direct taxes yield less than one sixth of ordinary revenue.

159. Under the various headings of ordinary expenditure for 1966, the following allocations may be noted: public debt servicing, 240.5 million escudos (increased by 34 million over 1965); national defence, 549.4 million (increased by 80.2 million); ports, railways, and transport, 1,340 million (increased by 120 million); agriculture and forestry, 33.7 million (increased by 0.2 million); and health and welfare, 175.1 million (increased by 17.8 million). For education the 1966 allocations included: government education services, 158.2 million (increased by 14.5 million); assistance to Portuguese Catholic missions, 69.5 million; and *Estudos Gerais Universitários*, 19 million. Thus, despite increases, expenditure on education represents less than 6 per cent of the ordinary budget, health and welfare about 4 per cent and agriculture and forestry less than 1 per cent, not including expenditures from separate funds which exist for certain regulated crops.

¹⁹ Orders Nos. 21, 243-5, 26 April 1965.

²⁰ Decree No. 46,236, 18 March 1965.

160. The Transitional Development Plan, 1965-1967 (see A/6000/Rev.1, chap. V, paras. 89 and 90), provided in the case of Mozambique for an investment target of 5,400 million escudos over the three-year period, to be financed as follows: external loans, 1,500 million escudos; Government of Portugal, 1,120 million; Territorial funds, 750 million; private sector, 1,980 million; and credit institutions, 50 million. The division by major sectors was: transport and port facilities, 1,771 million; industries, 1,436 million (including 1,350 million for transforming industries); agriculture, 760 million (including 500 million for irrigation and settlement schemes); education and health, 500 million; electricity, 400 million; fisheries, 328 million; and housing and tourism, 144 million.

161. Under the Plan the yearly target contribution from the public sector amounts to about 624 million escudos, of which 250 million was to be furnished by the Territory and about 374 million by the Government of Portugal. In 1965 public expenditure under the Plan amounted to 611 million escudos, only slightly less than the target. Of this total, 423 million consisted of loans from Portugal and 100 million was obtained from an issue by the Territorial Government of treasury bonds at 5 per cent interest. The bond issue was made under a general authorization announced in July permitting the Mozambique Government to issue bonds up to a maximum of 500 million escudos. As yet no information is available on Portugal's contribution under the Plan for 1966, but in February it was announced that the Territorial Government had been authorized to borrow 200 million escudos at 2 per cent interest from the Banco Nacional Ultramarino, which will be used mainly to finance the development of transport communications. It was also announced that credits amounting to 23 million escudos had been opened for agricultural, irrigation and settlement schemes to be financed under the Development Plan.

162. As may be expected, a large part of the public funds are being used to improve the Territory's road, railway and port facilities. The opening in late 1964 of the Swaziland railway, increasing transit trade and tourism, which are Mozambique's main source of foreign exchange, and also continuing growth of its own foreign commerce, have placed a heavy burden on the existing port and transport facilities. This is reflected in the volume of goods handled at Mozambique ports and by the volume of traffic on the railways, which in both cases was more than 15 per cent greater during the first eight months of 1965 than during the corresponding period of 1964. To cope with this extra burden, 140 million escudos were spent during 1965 on additional port facilities at Beira and substantial sums on similar improvements at Lourenço Marques. At the latter port work was begun on the construction of large loading and storage installations which will handle Rhodesian sugar exports and eventually exports of sugar to be produced in the Lourenço Marques area. The cost of the project which includes storage capacity for 80,000 tons of sugar, will be 66 million escudos. Work was also completed on a new mineral ore loading quay designed to handle iron ore from Swaziland, on the construction of a new railway terminal at Beira (costing 50 million escudos) and contracts were issued (totaling 64.7 million escudos) for the purchase of new rolling stock for the Mozambique railway where existing wood-burning locomotives are also being replaced by diesel at a cost of 125 million escudos. A major undertaking, which is being financed under the Develop-

ment Plan, consists of a crash programme of road development, including especially the construction of an important road linking Lourenço Marques and Beira, for part of which contracts totalling 200 million escudos were announced in 1965, and the extension and improvement of roads in the north.

163. According to reports, Mozambique is entering upon a period of significant expansion in several sectors of its domestic economy. In the field of sugar production, three new companies, involving capital investments in the region of one half billion escudos each, have been, or are being formed. This combined output should, within a few years, increase the Territory's sugar production (totalling 181,775 tons in 1963/64) by about half. Two of these are Portuguese companies, the third, located in the lower Zambezi Valley, being a subsidiary of the Anglo-American Corporation of South Africa (which also has interests in cashew processing, fishing and prospecting for diamonds at Pafuri). In addition, the Sena Sugar Estates, Ltd., which is the largest of the existing producers, began in January 1965 a capital investment programme involving approximately 360 million escudos, which will increase its output by about 25 per cent. (Details of these developments will be contained in a separate study on the role of agriculture in Angola and Mozambique which is in preparation.)

164. The most notable development in the past few years has however been the growth of cashew production and processing. For the first time cashew exports assumed first place among the Territory's exports in 1964, producing an export revenue of 608 million escudos compared with 565 million for raw cotton which was formerly Mozambique's leading export. This represented a 38.5 per cent increase in the value of cashew exported over 1963. Because the export value of cashew is about twice that of the unprocessed nut, recent investment has centred on the establishment of processing factories. In 1965 work was begun on the construction of an important decorticating factory in the district of Gaza with funds (20 million escudos) provided jointly by South African (mainly Anglo-American Corporation), Italian and local Portuguese interests. The factory is linked with a large-scale project for the development of cashew farming in an area of 30,000 ha. to be allocated to European settlers and Africans. Also in 1965, a subsidiary of the Companhia União Fabril of Portugal obtained authorization for the construction of three processing factories, at Nacala, Nampula and Porto Amélia, with a combined processing capacity of 70,000 tons of raw cashew.

165. Although manufacturing and transforming industries play only a minor role in what is predominantly an agricultural economy, these sectors also show signs of increasing activity. Most notable were a 29 per cent increase in building construction from 1963 to 1964, increases of 26.7 and 23.3 per cent in the values respectively of non-electrical and electrical machinery imported and a marked increase in the number of new industrial enterprises registered (from 431 to 647) in the two years. Much of the new investment is, however, in consumer goods, notably clothing and textiles, breweries, flour milling and other food-stuffs, furniture and light metal and electrical equipment. Among the most important new investments announced during 1965 was a fertilizer factory to be constructed near Nova Sofala at a cost of 200 million escudos, the contractual work being undertaken by a French firm, Sodeix. French contractors are also engaged, on behalf of local financial interests, in the construc-

tion of a bicycle factory which will produce 35,000 bicycles and 3,000 motor-bicycles yearly. Other new investments include a brewery (70 million escudos), a meat processing and dairy products factory (20 million escudos), a bedding factory (30 million escudos) and a flour mill (25 million escudos). Negotiations are in process for the construction of factories to produce automobile tires and light aluminium goods.

166. In the more basic sector of electricity supply, it was announced in December 1965, that contracts had been signed for the construction of a thermal electricity plant to supply the town of Nacala, the work to be completed by the end of 1966 at a cost of 150 million escudos. Investigational work is proceeding on a proposed hydroelectric project on the Elefantes River, one of the main tributaries of the Limpopo, from which power would be supplied to Lourenço Marques. The Sociedade Hidroelétrica do Revuê is also increasing its productive capacity at Vila Pery by constructing a new dam at Chicambe to cost 80 million escudos. In December, a new agreement was signed between Portugal and Southern Rhodesia extending until July 1971 the existing arrangement whereby part of the power produced by *Revuê* is supplied to Umtali.

167. Also in 1965, the pipeline constructed to supply crude oil from the port of Beira to the Rhodesian refinery at Feruka (Umtali) came into operation. As noted in the Special Committee's report for 1965 (A/6000/Rev.1, chap. V, para. 93), the pipeline is owned by a mixed company in which British interests hold 62 per cent of the stock, but which has, under Portuguese law, a majority of Portuguese directors. Following the "unilateral declaration of independence" in Southern Rhodesia, supplies of oil through the pipeline ceased owing to the embargo on oil shipments destined for Southern Rhodesia imposed by the United Kingdom on its nationals and also by other Governments acting in pursuance of Security Council resolution 217 (1965). Though reports indicate that no oil has been delivered to the pipeline terminal since December 1965, press reports in March 1966 noted the construction of new petroleum storage tanks at the port of Beira. Portugal is reported to have informed the United Kingdom Government that these tanks are being built by a Portuguese company as a precautionary measure to avoid dependence on existing facilities which are owned by foreign interests. There have also been reports of the passage of petroleum products in railway tank cars from South Africa to Southern Rhodesia through Lourenço Marques. (For more detailed information on this matter, see chap. III, paras. 270-277.)

168. Mozambique, as has been noted before, suffers from a chronic deficit both in its balance of trade and in its balance of payments with the exterior. Despite substantial increases in the export value of cashew and wood products, which increased by 38.5 and 48.9 per cent respectively in 1964, the value of exports increased by only 5.1 per cent, from 2.9 billion escudos in 1963 to 3.0 billion escudos in 1964, whereas imports increased by 10.2 per cent, from 4.1 billion escudos to 4.5 billion escudos, leaving a net deficit of 416 million escudos. This growing trade deficit was partly attributable to a sharp decrease in sugar exports due to adverse weather conditions and to the re-equipping of the Sena plantations, as well as the continuing low level of cotton exports since 1961. The main cause, however, was a marked increase in the importation of industrial equipment and

consumer goods. Preliminary statistics for the first eight months of 1965 show a similar pattern in the relative growth of imports and exports. Commenting on this situation, the writer of an article in a Mozambique newspaper observed that one of the reasons for the slower increase in the value of exports was the failure of some of the main agricultural producers to take advantage of the higher export prices which they could obtain by further processing of their products locally. He referred in particular to the absence in the Territory of any industrial processing of sisal²¹ coconuts and sugar by-products.

169. The increased deficit in the balance of trade for 1964 was partly offset by greater revenue derived from the transit trade of neighbouring territories. As a result the deficit in the balance of payments decreased from 386 million escudos in 1963 to 223 million in 1964. Data for the first four months of 1965 indicate that this trend was continuing.

170. On the other hand, Mozambique's exports in 1966 will probably show the effects of a severe cyclone accompanied by flooding which struck the Territory in early January. Newspaper reports indicate widespread and severe damage, particularly to cashew plantations in the district of Gaza and to banana and wheat crops in the districts of Inhambane and Lourenço Marques.

Educational conditions

171. An analysis of the educational situation in Mozambique presents certain difficulties owing to the limited information available and to the redefinition of the term "primary school" according to Decree-Law 45,908 of September 1964 (see paras. 81-86 above) whereby the term is now restricted to schools which provide at least the pre-primary class and the first three elementary classes (*postos escolares*). In Mozambique many rural schools provide less than this minimum and hence since 1964 are not included in the statistics of primary enrolments.

172. On the basis of the earlier definition, it can be seen that in the past five years there has been a large relative increase in education at the primary level. Thus, in 1963, there were 3,600 officially recognized primary teaching establishments of all kinds, with 5,600 teachers and a pupil enrolment of 400,000. Compared with 1955, this represents an increase of 1,400 establishments, 3,200 teachers and 130,000 pupils.²²

173. Statistics published by the Government of Mozambique,²³ compiled presumably on the basis of the new definition of primary schools contained in Decree-Law 45,810, show a primary school enrolment of 44,725 in 1963-1964. The following table shows their composition by major ethnic groups in comparison with population figures for the respective ethnic groups in 1960:

<i>Ethnic group</i>	<i>Primary enrolments</i>	<i>Percentage of population group</i>
African	23,093	0.35
Chinese (<i>anarclos</i>)	294	14.0
European	10,358	10.6
Indian	2,412	13.9
Mestiços	7,020	22.3
Not specified	1,548	—

²¹ It has been reported in the Press that the construction of a sisal rope factory at Nacala is under consideration.

²² *Boletim Geral do Ultramar*, January-February 1965.

²³ Mozambique: Serviços de Estatística Geral, *Estatística do Ensino*.

174. According to the same source, the number of pupils enrolled at the secondary level in 1963-1964 was 18,415. The following table shows their composition by ethnic group in comparison with the population figures for the same groups in 1960:

<i>Ethnic group</i>	<i>Primary enrolments</i>	<i>Percentage of population group</i>
African	2,781	0.04
Chinese (<i>anarelos</i>)	794	37.8
European	10,914	11.2
Indian	1,381	8.0
Mestiços	2,291	7.2
Not specified	254	—

175. It may also be noted that in relative terms, the rate of increase has been greater for secondary than for primary education. Thus enrolments at grammar (*liceal*) schools increased from 1,106 in 1956-1957 to 4,124 in 1963-1964, while enrolments in technical professional schools (i.e., including commercial and trade schools and training institutions for the public service) increased from 2,285 in 1955-1956 to 8,639 in 1963-1964.

176. There is very little information concerning the development of primary and secondary education during 1965, though it may be noted that under the Transitional Development Plan for 1965-1967, 220 million escudos were allocated for the construction of new schools and teacher training. It was reported in the Press at the end of 1964 and in January 1965 that the building of five new primary schools and one elementary technical school had been authorized, at a total cost of nearly 8 million escudos. Later in 1965, it was announced that two new secondary schools (*liceus*) were being constructed at Vila Cabral and Nampula.

177. Particular emphasis is apparently being given to the expansion of agricultural training as a result of Decree 46,464 of 31 July 1965 (see paras. 81-86 above). In early 1965 the Territory possessed one school of agriculture at the secondary or technical level (*escola prática de agricultura*) in the Limpopo Valley and three training institutions run by the Agricultural Department; in addition, three elementary agricultural schools were being established and one post-secondary vocational training centre for agricultural staff (*regentes*) was in the planning stage.²⁴ It was subsequently reported in the Press that as a first step in implementation of Decree 46,464, measures were being taken to institute courses in agriculture and agricultural mechanics in the industrial (secondary) schools.

178. Progress was made during 1965 in the development of the General University Studies (*Estudos Gerais Universitários*) at Lourenço Marques which has a planned enrolment of more than 3,000 students by 1970-1975 and an ultimate target of 8,000 by 1980. Opened in November 1963 with an enrolment of 282 students, it now has, according to press reports, a student body of nearly 600. In the last academic year, 1964-1965, the enrolment totalled 329 (of whom 75 were training as secondary school teachers, 167 were studying engineering, 53 medicine, 19 veterinary science and 15 were in the institute of agronomy and forestry, these being the only departments then functioning). The institution has so far been housed in temporary quarters and the pace of expansion depends mainly on the availability of funds for construction and equipment. Capital expenditure up to 1965 amounted to 132

million escudos and included the construction of laboratories for agronomy, biology and chemistry. In 1965 the teacher-training courses were extended to include the training of assistant teachers for the eighth (agriculture) and eleventh (forestry) groups in the technical professional schools.

179. Admission to the *Estudos Gerais Universitários* requires a two-year course beyond the level available at present in the secondary schools and students who do not obtain a scholarship (of which there are about 100) pay fees at a standard rate of about 1,500 escudos yearly. It may be noted that, of 291 students undertaking higher studies (*Estudos Gerais Universitários* and Institute of Social Assistants) in 1963-1964, 269 were reported to be Europeans, 15 Indians, 5 Africans and 2 mestiços.

4. Guinea under Portuguese administration

Constitutional and political

(a) *Election of the Head of State*

180. For the election of the Head of State, held in July 1965, Guinea under Portuguese administration was represented in the electoral college by five members as follows: the deputy to the National Assembly; the member representing the Territory in the Corporative Chamber; one representative of municipal councils; and two numbers from the Territory's Legislative Council.

(b) *Elections to the National Assembly*

181. Dr. Pinto Bull, the Secretary-General and incumbent deputy in the National Assembly, was again the National Union candidate. He was re-elected. The Portuguese Press reported that 85 per cent of the registered voters took part in the election.

The military situation in the Territory

182. Fighting, which first broke out in 1963 (A/5800/Rev.1, chap. V, paras. 180-181) continued in 1965, and in fact most news reports speak of the Territory as being in a state of war. As in Angola and Mozambique, there are conflicting accounts of the actual military situation, but all accounts seem to indicate that the guerrilla war will not end soon.

183. Almost every Portuguese military bulletin issued in 1966 refers to fighting on the northern, eastern and southern borders of the Territory with descriptions of the operations of the army, navy and air force. North of the Cacheu River, there is almost continuous guerrilla activity, around Susana, S. Domingos, Bigene and Farim. Activities are also reported around Bissorã and Mansabá and other communities which lie some 30 to 50 km. inside the border; but Bissorã is not much more than 100 km. in a straight line north-east of Bissau, the capital of the Territory. Similarly along the eastern and southern frontiers, almost every week there are reported activities of Government forces in many locations against "bandits". In the south, however, there is also activity around Catió and Buba, which are not along the border. From the frequency of reports of canoes seized, it seems that the rivers and other waterways are also important areas of fighting.

184. During 1965, PAIGC (Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde) claimed that a significant proportion of the Territory's estimated 800,000 population is now included within the "liberated

²⁴ *Boletim Geral do Ultramar*, January-February 1965.

areas" where it is setting up villages with widened self-rule on democratic lines and economic and social services are being organized. In November 1965, a spokesman for the Portuguese Defence Ministry denied that guerrillas controlled the regions of Bué in the north-east and S. Domingos in the north-west.

185. In a recent newspaper article, a British Member of Parliament said that reports of "rebel domination of two thirds of the Territory" were unfounded, and that Bissau Island and Bijagós archipelago have been immune from fighting. "Elsewhere", he said, "deep penetration by land or water is hard to stop". After describing the medical and educational work by the Portuguese troops in the villages, the article goes on to say "The scale of warfare has grown on both sides", and reports the existence of a "people's army" larger than previous guerrilla groups, with main bases in Como Island and the Central Oió region. The guerrilla fighters are reported to be well armed. (There have been frequent Portuguese reports of arms captured from them.) The Portuguese, on the other hand, have "distributed thousands of mausers and grenades to village volunteers, and sub-machine-guns to their leaders. Villages are wired and fortified . . .".

Economic conditions

186. For 1965, expenditures on the armed forces in Guinea under Portuguese administration were: 31.3 million escudos for the army, of which 4.6 million came from the Territory's revenue, 24.5 from complementary payments by Portugal under the extraordinary budget; and 2.1 million for the Overseas Defence Fund; 16 million escudos for the navy; and 20.6 million for the air force. The Territory's total share in these expenditures was 30.6 million escudos (Orders 21,216, 21,215 and 21,218, April 1965). This was almost 20 per cent of the Territory's estimated revenue for 1965 which was 151,750,079 escudos (A/6000/Rev.1, chap. V, para. 105), and as estimated expenditures totalled 151,750,791 escudos, no surplus was anticipated.

187. Since 1957 the Territory's budget has remained around this figure (150.1 million in 1957; 150.9 million in 1958; 151.1 million in 1959; 141.0 million in 1960). As noted by the Governor and Commander-in-Chief of the Territory, General Arnaldo Schulz in 1965, because of its small budget, the Territory cannot afford the necessary staff and administrative services it needs, including education. He said that what the Territory required to consolidate a military victory was more staff, private investments, industrial development and more education. He was confident that better days lay ahead when Portugal would give greater support to the Territory.

188. As stated in the Special Committee's report for 1965 (*ibid.*, para. 108), an allocation of 180 million escudos is made to the Territory under the Transitional Development Plan 1965-1967. Because of the tight financial situation of the Territory²⁵ and the uncertainty of any definitive private investments, the entire allocation

is to be financed from public funds from Portugal (*Projecto de Plano Intercalar de Fomento para 1965-1967*).

189. There is very little information on the extent of the implementation of the Transitional Development Plan. During the year two allocations totalling 19 million escudos were made to the Territory from the Portuguese Treasury (under Decree 43,519, 28 February 1961. This amount is to be included in the extraordinary budget for 1965 of the Overseas Ministry, but is in fact a loan at 4 per cent interest repayable in twenty years). More than half of the 19 million escudos is for development of transport and communications (9.1 million) and ports and harbours (2.5 million). The remainder is for development of fishing, 1.8 million; industries, 0.5 million; education, 2.2 million; water supplies, 2 million; and tourism, 1 million.

190. In December 1965 the Ministry of Finance was authorized (Decree 46,683) (see para. 57 above) to grant the Territory each year loans up to the amounts determined by the Council of Ministers for Economic Affairs for the implementation of the Transitional Development Plan. According to a report of January 1966 loans from the Central Government to the Territory for the Development Plan amounted to 35 million escudos in 1965. This represents a little over one half of the average annual investments envisaged in the Transitional Development Plan.

191. A new contract has been signed between Portugal and Esso Exploration Inc. of New York which is to take over the concession for petroleum prospecting formerly held by the now extinct Esso Exploration Guinea Inc. The former company is reported to have spent close to 250 million escudos (\$US8.5 million) in prospecting but has not located any commercially exploitable deposits.

192. The new contract grants the New York company a concession of about 50,000 km² which includes all the land area of the Territory (33,700 km²) and the sea, lake and river shores. The initial period of the contract is for five years. The company undertakes to spend in prospecting 24 million escudos in the first year, 59 million in the second year, 78 million in the third year and 68 million in each of the last two years. Within three months of the signing of the contract the company will pay the Government of Guinea under Portuguese administration a sum of \$US40 million, constituting an advance payment of the first year's rent and a 25 per cent advance payment of the rent of the four subsequent years. If the area as later determined is greater, the Territory will be entitled to receive an additional payment. If, however, the area is smaller, no refund will be made.

193. Among other developments during the year were the establishment of a Technical Commission for Economic Planning and Co-ordination and the establishment of a new agriculture and livestock credit fund to provide long-, medium- and short-term loans for agriculture, livestock, industry or property. As reported previously (A/6000/Rev.1, chap. V, paras. 35 and 109), under the Transitional Development Plan 1965-1967 about 15 per cent (33.2 million escudos) is for special projects for the production of rice, manioc, oil palms, bananas and cashew.

194. There are no recent trade statistics or information on agricultural production for 1965. In December 1964 the main exports to Portugal were 280 tons of coconuts, valued at 896,000 escudos; hides and skins, 300,000 kilos, valued at 222,893 escudos;

²⁵ According to the study made in the preparation of the Transitional Development Plan, it was envisaged that the Territory would have a surplus balance totalling 19 million escudos during the period 1965-1967, and a surplus of 4 million escudos at the end of 1964. From this 23 million, however, 12 million were to be allocated for other extraordinary expenditures and only 11 million escudos would be available to finance the Plan. As seen above, the 1965 budget had no surplus. Details of the 1966 budget are not yet available.

unshelled peanuts, 32,028 kilos, valued at 140,603 escudos; and 6,866 kilos of beeswax, valued at 122,353 escudos. Main imports during that month were 1.2 million litres of gasoline, 226,994 kilos of sugar, 229,900 kilos of potatoes, and 214,102 litres of wine. The Territory, which since 1960 has had to import rice, was authorized in 1965 to import up to 10,000 tons from any source, free of import duty. Rice prices were also revised, and the purchase of hand-processed rice was permitted in four *concelhos*.

Education

195. The latest available school statistics for the Territory are for 1963, when there were 163 government primary schools with 212 teachers and 12,000 pupils. (Total population of the Territory at the 1960 census was 530,380, of which about 40 per cent are Moslems.) In addition there was one academic high school with 20 teachers and 272 students; one commercial and industrial (vocational) school with 26 teachers and 308 students; an elementary professional school with 4 teachers and 19 students and 79 other (Koranic) schools with 81 teachers and 718 students. There were 105 persons in government-training programmes: 65 studying land survey and topography (*agrimensura e topografia*) and 40 undergoing technical training for work in the ports and harbours.

5. Cape Verde

Constitutional and political

196. For the election of the Head of State, held in July 1965, Cape Verde was represented in the electoral college by thirteen members as follows: two deputies to the National Assembly, one member of the Corporative Chamber, six representatives of the municipal councils and four from the Legislative Council of the Territory. Cape Verde has two representatives in the National Assembly and there were only two candidates of the National Union. The Portuguese Press reported that 86.5 per cent of the registered voters took part in the elections.

Economic and financial

197. For 1965, expenditure on the armed services for Cape Verde amounted to 23.8 million escudos. This included an allocation of 10.4 million for the army of which 1 million was from the Territory's ordinary budget, 7.6 million from Portugal, and 1.8 million from the Overseas Military Defence Fund; expenditure on the navy amounted to 2.1 million escudos and on the air force to 1.3 million escudos. The Territory's share of total defence expenditure was 1.7 million escudos, including 400,000 escudos for the navy and 300,000 for the air force (Orders 21,157, 21,158, 21,159, 10 March 1965).

198. Cape Verde's estimated budget for 1965 was balanced at 84,673,000 escudos, compared with 70.9 million in 1963, 65.0 million in 1962 and 61.2 million in 1961. Whereas ordinary expenditure has been increasing there has been a marked decline in extraordinary expenditures, for which the budget estimates allowed only 2,690,000 escudos in 1965. This may be compared with the allocations of 38.7 million in 1963, 67.3 million in 1962 and 71.6 million in 1961.

199. Estimated ordinary expenditure for 1965 included the following allocations: 2.9 million escudos for servicing the Territory's public debt (the same amount as in previous years); 27 million escudos for

administrative services (including approximately 10 million for education, in contrast to 9 million in 1963); 3.5 million for national defence, 9.2 million for maritime services and 13.4 million for various general expenditures.

200. As reported previously (A/6000/Rev.1, chap. V, paras. 35 and 113), a total of 500 million escudos is to be invested in Cape Verde under the Transitional Development Plan 1965-1967. The Plan originally envisaged that about half of the total investments would be from external sources, mainly for the development of fisheries. It appears that for 1965 at least, the only source of investments was from funds provided by Portugal.

201. In February 1965 (Order 7,224, 27 February), Portugal made available to the Territory a "reimbursable subsidy" (*subsídio reembolsável da Metrópole*) of 73 million escudos for various projects under the Transitional Development Plan. Of the total, more than half (43 million escudos) was for improvement of transport and communications. The other main items were: agriculture, 8.5 million; industry, 5.5 million; health and welfare, 6 million; education, 2.5 million; housing and local improvements, 3.3 million; and energy, 2 million escudos. Fisheries, in which Krupp of the Federal Republic of Germany is still reported to be interested but has not yet committed any investments, was allocated 1.5 million escudos.

202. In July 1965, Cape Verde also received a loan of 3,075,000 escudos from Portugal under the provisions governing the Territory's budget (Decree 40,712 of 1 August 1956). This was allocated as follows: roads, 2,008,000; ports, 20,000; airport, 764,000; education, 224,000; and health, 54,000.

203. At the end of the year the Ministry of Finance in Portugal was authorized to grant the Territory loans needed for the implementation of the Transitional Development Plan; such loans were to be without interest (see para. 57 above). In January 1966 it was reported that total loans to Cape Verde for 1965 amounted to 101 million escudos.

204. Cape Verde chronically suffers from drought and in the past has experienced serious famines. Under the Transitional Development Plan investments in the agricultural sector are concentrated on irrigation, reafforestation, and reorganization of farms so as to make the best use possible of the available water supplies. During 1965 the special team which had been set up to improve agriculture was replaced by a temporary *Brigada Técnica de Fomento Agrário* with increased staff. This new team is to promote agricultural co-operatives, draw up plans for land use, ensure the maximum use of existing and new irrigation installations, and encourage reafforestation and soil conservation. The team comprises three agricultural officers, one veterinary doctor, thirteen technical personnel and other administrative staff. In August (Order 21,473, 17 August) a special credit of 690,000 escudos was made for setting up a large irrigated collective farm.

205. The traditional crops of the Territory are maize, beans and sugar cane. The only export crops of any importance are *purqueira* (physic-nut), coffee and bananas. In 1959 (Decree 42,390, 15 July) coffee growing was made compulsory in certain irrigated areas on the islands of Santiago, Santo Antao and Fogo to increase the Territory's exports. At the time the measure led to a protest to the Overseas Ministry that this interfered with the food production of the

Territory; this protest was rejected by the Overseas Ministry as groundless because in the case of Santiago and Santo Antão the compulsory measures applied only to one quarter of the irrigated farming land in the areas marked for coffee growing; in the case of Fogo where rain is more plentiful, although all designated areas had to be planted with coffee, the farmers none the less were able to grow food crops between the coffee trees.

206. According to available information, in 1965 the Territory imported rice and was authorized to import 12,000 tons of maize from Angola free of import duties (Order 7,209, 13 February).

207. Since 1962, the Portuguese Government has sponsored the settlement in Angola of a considerable number of people from Cape Verde, partly as a means of solving the problem of over-population in the islands. The present population of Cape Verde is estimated to be approximately 215,000 and is expected to increase to about 268,500 by 1970. According to official information, the latter figure would be 100,000 persons more than the Territory could support. As reported previously (A/6000/Rev.1, chap. V, annex II, paras. 178-180), the settlers are chosen from rural workers in Cape Verde with special aptitudes for farming and the conditions for their settlement are different from those for farmers migrating from Portugal. The Cape Verde heads of family migrate first; they may not be more than forty-five years old and are organized into groups under a *cabo chefe*. The rest of the family may proceed to Angola only after the head of family has been able to provide for their installation. Some of the migrating groups are settled as peasant farmers, but others are apparently sponsored as rural workers, of whom the authorities in Angola consider the Territory to be in need.

208. There are no trade statistics available for 1965. During the first three quarters of 1964, the main exports, comprising mainly *pozzuolana* earth (agglomerated silica-containing earth used for cement and concrete manufacture), salt, fresh, canned and brine pickled tuna, amounted to 1.7 million escudos. Imports for the same period comprised mainly fresh, condensed and evaporated milk, 1.1 million escudos; butter, 1.4 million escudos; and potatoes, 1.2 million escudos.

Education

209. The latest available education statistics for the Territory are for 1963 (*Boletim Geral do Ultramar*, May 1965). In that year, there were 307 primary schools (183 government and 124 private) with 378 teachers and 18,593 pupils; five secondary schools (2 *liceus* and 3 technical professional schools) with 75 teachers and 1,491 students, of whom 1,076 were in the two *liceus*. In addition there were 2 elementary vocational schools with 7 teachers and 83 students. There were also 185 civil service personnel in training.

6. São Tomé and Príncipe

Constitutional and political

210. For the election of the Head of State in July 1965, the Territory was represented in the electoral college by five members as follows: the deputy to the National Assembly, the member in the Corporative Chamber, one representative of municipal councils, and two members from the Territory's Legislative Council.

211. For the elections to the National Assembly, which were by direct suffrage (see para. 32), the number of registered voters was 5,024 or about 10 per cent of the total population. Of these, 3,804 persons voted, representing 76.6 per cent of the electorate.

Economic and financial

212. For 1965, total expenditure on the armed services for São Tomé and Príncipe was 8.8 million escudos. This included an allocation of 5.9 million escudos for the army, of which 2 million was derived from the Territory's own budget, 2.7 million from Portugal and 1.2 million from the Overseas Military Defence Fund; expenditure on the navy and air force amounted to 2.3 million and 627,100 escudos respectively. The Territory's share in these defence expenditures was 3 million escudos.

213. The new airport in São Tomé, which was completed in 1964 and can be used by jet planes in an emergency, is jointly maintained and operated by funds from Angola, Mozambique and São Tomé and Príncipe (Decreto 45,745, 1 June). In 1964 the share of costs was 1 million escudos each for the larger Territories and 300,000 escudos for the islands. For 1966 the cost is estimated at 4 million escudos, of which Angola and Mozambique are each to pay 1.7 million escudos and the Territory 600,000 escudos.

214. There is no information on the 1965 budget or the estimated budget for 1966. As in the case of Cape Verde, whereas ordinary revenue increased from 59 million escudos to 67 million escudos between 1960 and 1963, the total budget, including extraordinary revenue, showed an opposite trend, decreasing from 117 million escudos in 1961 to 111.7 million escudos in 1962 and 104.5 million escudos in 1963.

215. Although there was a budgetary surplus in each of the years 1961-1963, development expenditures under the extraordinary budget decreased from 51.8 million escudos in 1961 to 40.4 million in 1962 and 34.5 million in 1963. Between 1961 and 1963 the public debt servicing charge rose by 30 per cent from 6.1 million to 7.8 million escudos. Expenditure on public education services rose from 6.2 per cent to 6.8 per cent of the ordinary budget but public health services dropped from 22.8 per cent to 11.8 per cent.

216. As reported previously (A/6000/Rev.1, chap. V, paras. 35, 120 and 121), a total of 180 million escudos is to be invested in the Territory under the Transitional Development Plan 1965-1967. However, as the Territory has no financial resources of its own, the Plan envisages that the total amount is to be financed from the Central Government of Portugal.

217. During 1965, special allocations amounting to some 21 million escudos were made to finance various projects under the Transitional Development Plan. Of this total, 7.1 million escudos was for ports, navigation and transportation; 2.9 million escudos for electric power; 5.7 million escudos for housing and local improvements; over 2 million escudos for cartography; 1.1 million for health and welfare; and 750,000 for education.

218. At the end of the year the Ministry of Finance was authorized to grant the Territory each year the necessary funds for the implementation of the Transitional Development Plan. In January 1966 it was reported that loans to the Territory amounted to 36 million escudos for the year 1965. Among other measures, a Technical Committee for Planning and

Economic Integration was set up to co-ordinate development projects, and the Territorial Government was authorized to establish a special loan fund (Caixa de Crédito de São Tomé e Príncipe) (Decree 46,358, 28 May 1965) to provide loans for agriculture, industry (including fishing and mining) and building construction, including housing. This fund is to be financed from the Territory's own resources and it is also hoped that it will provide a channel for mobilizing local savings. One of the main objectives of the fund is to encourage the introduction of new crops for export, especially bananas and pineapple, in view of the continuing drop in world market prices of the traditional export crops of the Territory.

219. The Territory's principal export crops are cocoa, coffee, palm oil, coconuts and copra. However, as reported in the Transitional Development Plan, cocoa production, grown on about 27,000 ha. remained almost stationary between 1953 and 1962; coffee which is grown on some 2,500 ha., slightly decreased, especially during the period 1960-1962; coconuts (grown on 4,000 ha.) and palm oil production in 1962 were 66 per cent and 38 per cent respectively of the volume produced in 1953. Although about 90 per cent of the production is from large plantations, output has remained low partly because of exhaustion and an insufficient rate of renewal of the palms.

220. In 1965, three lectures in the University Extension course in Lisbon on the Overseas Territories drew attention to the urgent need in São Tomé and Príncipe to improve the agricultural situation and to reorganize land use in order to increase productivity and reduce costs of production. The possibility of large-scale banana growing is under study, but it is not yet certain that it would be sufficiently profitable.

221. The islands also have a population problem. The Transitional Development Plan estimates that only 3,500 persons are employed on the plantations and about 20,000 persons are engaged in agriculture on their own account. As the population of the Territory is expected to increase from an estimated 50,200 in 1965 to 66,500 in 1975, and the active population from 28,100 to 37,200, the Transitional Development Plan envisages opening up new opportunities in agriculture through changes in the labour regulations. There is also a project for settling 200 families over the period 1965-1967 on available land on the island of São Tomé. The cost of settling each family is estimated at 70,000 escudos.

222. In March 1966, one of the deputies told the National Assembly in Lisbon that, despite the loans made by the Central Government, the Territory was finding it difficult to implement the Development Plan, and might not be able to fulfil the targets because of the financial burden involved. It was suggested that the Central Government should relieve the Territory of the interest charges on the loans granted to it for development.

Education

223. The latest available statistics concerning education in the Territory are for 1963. School facilities then included 30 primary schools (14 government and 16 private) with 120 teachers and 4,992 students; one secondary school (*liceu*) with 37 teachers, and 583 students; and one elementary vocational school with 9 teachers and 91 students. The total school enrolment was 5,732, including 66 pupils in kindergarten.

7. Macau

Constitutional and political

224. At the presidential elections in July, the Territory was represented by five members in the electoral college; the deputy to the National Assembly, the member in the Corporative Chamber, one representative of municipal councils and two members from the Territory's Legislative Council.

225. Macau has one member in the National Assembly. There is no information on the results of the election to the National Assembly in November.

Economic and financial

226. For 1965, total expenditure on the armed services for Macau was 24.7 million escudos. The allocation for the army was 23.9 million escudos, of which 13.3 million was from the Territory's own budget, 1.3 million escudos from 'autonomous services', 4.7 million from Portugal and 3.2 million from the Overseas Military Defence Fund. The allocation for naval forces was 829,800 escudos from the territorial budget (Orders 21,077, 21,179, 21,180). The total share of these costs borne by the Territory was 14.2 million escudos. In September 1965 it was reported that there were some 4,000 troops from Angola and Mozambique in the Territory. There is no information on the 1965 budget and the 1966 estimated budget. In contrast to Cape Verde and São Tomé and Príncipe, both the ordinary and extraordinary revenues increased during the period 1960-1963. The ordinary revenue increased from 113.1 million escudos in 1960 to 195.1 million in 1963 and the extraordinary revenue from 12.5 million to 42 million escudos. During this period ordinary expenditure rose from 103.4 million to 167.2 million escudos; public education expenditure doubled, and public health expenditure increased by more than 50 per cent, from 7.6 million escudos to 11.6 million escudos. In 1963, the Territory's public debt service charge was slightly over one per cent of the ordinary expenditure, education was 3.3 per cent and public health about 7 per cent.

227. During 1965 the defence tax in Macau was abolished (Decree Law 46,167, 20 January) and in its place 25 per cent of the *imposto complementar* was earmarked as a receipt of the Overseas Military Defence Fund.

228. As reported previously (A/6000/Rev.1, chap. V, paras. 35 and 126), a total of 660 million escudos is to be invested in the Territory, with almost one third allocated to develop tourism. In contrast to the other smaller Territories, the Transitional Development Plan envisages that the Territory will be able to finance the entire programme without recourse to external sources. Eighty per cent of the total is expected to come from private sources and 18 per cent (120 million escudos) is to be financed from the Territory's budget (20 million from the ordinary budget and 100 million from the extraordinary budget).

229. In recent years tourism has increased; in 1964 the Territory had over one million visitors. A considerable number of new industries have been established in Macau, and though it is reported that foreign trade has increased and exports exceeded 600 million escudos in 1964, there are as yet no detailed figures available. Gold remains an important item in Macau's trade, and in 1966 it was reported that 1.4 million ounces were imported. The tax on gold was increased in 1965 and now provides the Government with a

guaranteed minimum revenue of \$US1.4 million a year. In 1965 total imports, including gold, were valued at \$US46 million, and exports at \$US21 million. The main exports are textiles and fish.

Education

230. The latest available school statistics are for 1963. There were 43 primary schools (14 government and 29 private) with 403 teachers and 13,775 students; 13 academic secondary schools (one government and 12 private) with 258 teachers and 4,705 students; 3 technical vocational schools with 34 teachers and 521 students. In addition the Chinese Community had 158 primary schools with 36,737 students, 35 secondary schools with 5,205 students and one special school with 18 students. The total school enrolment in 1963 was 59,714 which included 3,977 children in kindergarten and 105 civil service personnel in training.

8. Timor

Constitutional and political

231. At the presidential elections in July, the Territory was represented by five members in the electoral college: the deputy to the National Assembly, the member in the Corporative Chamber, one representative of municipal councils and two members from the Territory's Legislative Council.

232. Timor has one representative in the National Assembly. There is no information on the size of the electorate or the number of persons who voted in the November elections to the National Assembly.

Economic and financial

233. For 1965 total expenditure on the armed services for the Territory was 27.8 million escudos. The allocation for the army was 26.1 million escudos, of which 3.5 million was from the territorial budget, 22 million from Portugal and 534,500 from the Overseas Military Defence Fund. The allocation for the navy was 1.7 million, of which the Territory's share was 1 million escudos. The total cost to the Territory for the armed forces was 4.5 million escudos.

234. There is no information available on the Territory's 1965 budget or the estimated budget for 1966. In 1964, the ordinary budget was 70 million escudos compared with 66.5 million in 1963, 65.2 million in 1962 and 54.6 million in 1961. However, in 1964 only 59 million escudos was from the Territory's own revenues and the balance was made up from budgetary surpluses of previous years and subsidies from Angola, Mozambique and Macau.

235. In each of the years 1961-1963 the Territory's extraordinary revenue, which was nearly all used for basic development projects, was almost as much as the total ordinary revenue. The Territory has very little public debt and the debt servicing charge in 1963 was less than 1.5 per cent of the ordinary expenditure. The Governor of the Territory stated at the opening of the session of the Legislative Council in 1965 that the Territory's small resources are insufficient to provide adequately for its administrative and development needs. Without outside subsidies, the Territory could only afford the most basic administrative services.

236. In 1963 the cost of maintaining armed forces in the Territory was 5.1 million escudos, about 8 per cent of the total ordinary expenditure; direct expenditure on public education services was 2 million escudos and subsidies to the Catholic Missions for education

to 3.1 million escudos. Public health expenditure was 6.4 million, or just over 10 per cent of the total ordinary expenditure.

237. As reported previously (A/6000/Rev.1, chap. V, paras. 35 and 129-132), under the Transitional Development Plan 1965-1967, a total of 270 million escudos is to be invested. When the Plan was drawn up it was originally envisaged that the Territory would have a 5 million escudos budgetary surplus at the end of 1964 and an additional 27 million escudos from surpluses between 1965 and 1967, but because of prior commitments on these funds, only 11 million escudos would be available for development projects. It was accordingly decided that the entire amount of 270 million escudos would have to be financed by the Central Government of Portugal.

238. In June 1965 a special allocation of 12 million escudos was made in the form of subsidies from the Central Government to the Territory for various projects under the Transitional Development Plan. Of the total, 10 million was for transport and communications including: roads, 1.3 million escudos; ports and navigation, 4 million; telecommunications, 4.8 million; 711,000 for agriculture, forestry and livestock development; 526,000 for industries; 272,000 for education; and 73,000 for public health projects.

239. Legislation authorizing the Minister of Finance to grant loans to the Territory for the Transitional Development Plan was approved at the end of 1965 (see para. 57 above). In January 1966 it was reported that Portugal had made a loan to the Territory of 56 million escudos for the implementation of the Transitional Development Plan in 1965. This represented less than two thirds of the average annual investments envisaged under the Plan.

240. The Territory's major exports are coffee, copra and rubber, which respectively made up 73, 11 and 9 per cent of the value of the total exports in 1962. Because of increased imports, especially for construction, in 1964 the Territory had a trade deficit of 22 million escudos. A contributory cause of this trade deficit was the drop in coffee exports to 1,332 tons, compared with 2,523 tons in 1963. In addition, due to bad weather and a poor harvest, the Territory had had to import some 1,000 tons of maize and 40 tons of rice.

241. As was pointed out in the Transitional Development Plan, the Territory has very few industries and other enterprises apart from those engaged in trading, and as a consequence only some 3,000-6,000 persons (out of the total population of 517,000 at the 1960 census) are in paid employment outside the traditional sector. To encourage agricultural development, in 1965 the land concession legislation of 1961 (see A/6000/Rev.1, chap. V, annex II) was extended to Timor (Order 21,283 of 11 May). Land concessions may now be granted free of charge to settlers as well as to military personnel on indefinite leave (*militares licenciados*) even if they are not stationed in the Territory.

242. In November 1965 the Timor Government was authorized to set up a special farm credit fund (Caixa Agro-Pecuária de Timor) to promote medium and long-term loans for agriculture and livestock schemes. Exceptionally, the Fund may also grant short-term loans as working capital. The Fund is also to provide other services such as rentals of farm equipment and breeding stock.

243. In December 1965, one of the deputies told the National Assembly that although subsidies and loans from the Central Government had provided the Territory with certain facilities, including the international airport at Baucau, which is reported to have cost \$US5 million, the expansion of the port at Dili, electricity supply for the capital of the Territory and new roads, the Territory was still faced with serious economic problems. He suggested that greater efforts were needed, especially, for instance, to increase tourism.

Education

244. In 1963 there were 165 primary schools (120 government and 45 private) with 494 teachers and 16,500 students; there was one secondary school with 23 teachers and 368 students. In addition there were 18 primary and one secondary schools outside the official school system, with 1,423 pupils. The total enrolment in 1963 was 18,426 which included 12 pupils in kindergarten, 79 civil service personnel in training, and 44 ecclesiastical students.

C. CONSIDERATION BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE

INTRODUCTION

245. The Special Committee considered the Territories under Portuguese administration at its 418th, 419th, 420th, 427th, 436th, 450th-455th meetings held in Africa between 25 May 1966 and 22 June 1966.

246. On the question of refugees from the Territories under Portuguese administration, the Special Committee had before it a note by the Secretariat (A/AC.109/L.293 and Add.1) concerning the situation with regard to refugees from Angola, Mozambique and Guinea under Portuguese administration, and the measures taken to extend material and other assistance to them by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, specialized agencies concerned, and Member States in response to operative paragraph 5 of the resolution on the Territories under Portuguese administration adopted by the Special Committee on 10 June 1965 (A/6000/Rev.1, chap. V, para. 430) and resolutions 2107 (XX) and 2040 (XX) adopted by the General Assembly on 21 December 1965 and 7 December 1965 respectively.

247. During its consideration of this item, the Special Committee had before it, as its 452nd meeting, a document (A/AC.109/168) containing a note dated 7 June 1966 from the Permanent Mission of Portugal to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, transmitting comments on the working paper prepared by the Secretariat on the Territories under Portuguese administration.

248. Following a statement by the Representative of the Secretary-General concerning the circumstances in which the note was circulated as an official document, the representative of the United Republic of Tanzania proposed that the Special Committee should request the Secretary-General to withdraw from circulation the document in question and that in future similar communications be not circulated as official Committee documents without prior consultation with the Committee.

249. Speaking in favour of the proposal, several representatives pointed out that in its note the Portuguese Government had again advanced arguments regarding the status of the Territories under Portu-

guese administration which had been specifically rejected by the United Nations organs concerned. They also stated that addressing the Secretary-General instead of the Special Committee was an expedient by the Portuguese Government to divert attention away from its repeated violations of Charter principles and United Nations resolutions concerning the Territories. Further, by accusing the Secretariat of inaccuracies, misleading statements and political bias, the Portuguese Government was in effect attacking the Committee while at the same time refusing to acknowledge the validity of its work and to co-operate with it. One of these representatives suggested that the Committee should also recommend that the General Assembly adopt the procedure proposed by the representative of the United Republic of Tanzania with regard to similar communications.

250. In opposing the proposal, some other representatives stated that they believed in the right of every Member State to have its communications circulated as official documents regardless of the acceptability to other Member States of the views contained therein. In their opinion, to depart from established practice in this respect would constitute a dangerous precedent which could operate to the disadvantage of all delegations.

251. At the same meeting, the Committee adopted the proposal of the representative of the United Republic of Tanzania by a roll-call vote of 15 to 4, with 2 abstentions.

WRITTEN PETITIONS AND HEARINGS

252. The Special Committee circulated the following written petitions concerning the Territories under Portuguese administration:²⁶

Document No.	Petitioner
<i>Angola</i>	
Mr. Nzoimbengene, Information Bureau, Mouvement de défense des intérêts de l'Angola (MDIA)	A/AC.109/PET.427
Messrs. Lukoki Lunzinga, Munanza Fernandes, Tshingani Mingie li, Nto-Bako Angola Party	A/AC.109/PET.428
Mr. Lukoki Lunzinga, Nto-Bako Angola Party	A/AC.109/PET.428/ Add.1
Messrs. Matondo Afonso-Proença, President, Makumbi Edouard, Secretary-General, Putuilo José Milton, Director of Foreign Affairs, Front patriotique pour l'indépendance du Kongo dit Portugais (FPIKP)	A/AC.109/PET.429
Mr. José Paulo Chiringueno, President, Partido Nacional Africano (PNA)	A/AC.109/PET.430
Mr. Carlos Pinto Nunes Vunzi, General Chairman, União Progressista Nacional de Angola (UPRONA)	A/AC.109/PET.447

²⁶ The following petitions were circulated after the Special Committee had adopted a resolution concerning Territories under Portuguese administration (see para. 675 below) at its 455th meeting on 22 June 1966: A/AC.109/PET.428/Add.1, A/AC.109/PET.549, A/AC.109/PET.550, A/AC.109/PET.567 and A/AC.109/PET.568.

<i>Petitioner</i>	<i>Document No.</i>	<i>Petitioner</i>	<i>Document No.</i>
Messrs. Carlos Pinto Nunes Vunzi, General Chairman, David Muanza, General Secretary, União Progressista Nacional de Angola (UPRONA)	A/AC.109/PET.447/Add.1	<i>Territories under Portuguese administration</i>	
Mr. Daniel Julio Chipenda, representative, Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA)	A/AC.109/PET.460	Mr. J. D'Assunção, União de Portugueses Anti-Colonialistas en Marrocos	A/AC.109/PET.549
Mr. Luis d'Almeida, representative in Algeria, Mouvement populaire de libération de l'Angola (MPLA)	A/AC.109/PET.460/Add.1	<i>São Tomé and Príncipe</i>	
Messrs. François Lele, General Chairman, Fernando António, Deputy Chairman, Kuta François, Secretary for Education, Nto-Bako Angola Party	A/AC.109/PET.471	Mr. Virgílio Sousa Carvalho, Comité de Libertação de S. Tomé e Príncipe (CLSTP)	A/AC.109/PET.512
Mesdames Anne Mfidi, President General, Marie Luyindula, Vice-President General, Rose-line N'Simba, Secretary-General, Ida Mavinduanga, representative, Union des Femmes Angolaises (UFA)	A/AC.109/PET.472	Mr. Mário de Andrade, Conferência das Organizações Nacionalistas das Colônias Portuguesas (CONCP)	A/AC.109/PET.510
Mr. José M. E. B. Ervedosa	A/AC.109/PET.509	253. The Special Committee heard the following petitioners concerning Angola, Mozambique and Portuguese Guinea:	
Mr. Mário Moutinho de Pádua, Frente Patriótica de Libertação Nacional (FPLN)	A/AC.109/PET.513	<i>Angola</i>	
Mr. Manuel Sertório, Junta Revolucionária Portuguesa, Frente Patriótica de Libertação Nacional (FPLN)	A/AC.109/PET.513/Add.1	Mr. Daniel Júlio Chipenda, Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA), representative in Mar es Salaam (A/AC.109/PET.460)	420th
Mr. Johnny Eduardo, representative, Gouvernement révolutionnaire de l'Angola en exil (GRAE)	A/AC.109/PET.514	Mr. Luis d'Almeida, Mouvement Populaire de Libération de l'Angola (MPLA), representative in Algiers (A/AC.109/PET.460/Add.1)	453rd-454th
Messrs. Luis Ranque Franque, President, and Antonio Eduardo Sozinho Zau, Secretary for Foreign Relations, Front pour la libération de l'enclave de Cabinda (FLEC)	A/AC.109/PET.567	Mr. José M. E. B. Ervedosa, Frente Patriótica de Libertação Nacional (FPLN), (A/AC.109/PET.509)	450th
Associação dos Conguenses da Expressão Portuguesa, Ngwizani A Kongo (NGWIZAKO)	A/AC.109/PET.568	Messrs. Mário Moutinho de Pádua and Manuel Aligre, Frente Patriótica de Libertação Nacional (FPLN), (A/AC.109/PET.513 and Add.1)	454th
<i>Mozambique</i>		Mr. Johnny Eduardo, Gouvernement révolutionnaire de l'Angola en exil (GRAE), (A/AC.109/PET.514)	454th
Mr. Uria T. Simango, Vice-President, Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (FRE-LIMO)	A/AC.109/PET.459	<i>Mozambique</i>	
Mr. Narciso Mbule, Secretary for External Affairs, Union Démocratique Nationale de Mozambique (UDENAMO)	A/AC.109/PET.481	Messrs. Eduardo Mondlane and Marcelino dos Santos, Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (FRE-LIMO), (A/AC.109/PET.459)	418th-419th
Mr. R. M. Mjumbe, Secretary-General, Mozambique African National Union (MANU)	A/AC.109/PET.550	Mr. Narciso Mbule, União Democrática Nacional de Moçambique (UDENAMO), (A/AC.109/PET.481)	436th
<i>Guinea, called Portuguese Guinea</i>		<i>Guinea, called Portuguese Guinea</i>	
Mrs. Dulce Almada-Duarte, Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde (PAIGC)	A/AC.109/PET.511	Mr. Amílcar Cabral, Secretary-General, Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde (PAIGC), and four associates: Mrs. Joyce Lussu, Messrs. Justin Vieyra, Isídio Romeco, and Piero Nelli (A/AC.109/PET.511 and Add.1)	451st-452nd
Mr. Abílio Duarte, representative, Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde (PAIGC)	A/AC.109/PET.511/Add.1	<i>São Tomé and Príncipe</i>	
Mr. Gard Chaliand	A/AC.109/PET.516	Mr. Thomas Medeiros, Comité de Libertação de São Tomé e Príncipe (CLSTP), (A/AC.109/PET.512)	454th
		<i>Other</i>	
		Mr. Mário de Andrade, Conferência das Organizações Nacionalistas das Colônias Portuguesas (CONCP), (A/AC.109/PET.510)	450th

Petitioners concerning Angola

254. Mr. Chipenda, speaking on behalf of MPLA, stated that in the present phase of the struggle for the immediate and complete independence of Angola, the whole Angolan population looked to MPLA for its salvation. MPLA was the only nationalist movement directing the armed struggle in Angola to destroy the colonial system, to defend the people against the atrocities of the Portuguese army and establish a régime controlled by the working peasant masses who constituted the overwhelming majority of the population.

255. It was true that MPLA's principal field of action was the national territory. The whole orientation and planning of its activity reflected the demands of the liberation struggle.

256. The MPLA leaders having given priority to the development of activities inside rather than outside the country, a systematic campaign was being waged to mobilize and politicize the masses. To hasten the process, MPLA had created the Centre d'instruction révolutionnaire (CIR) to provide its members with politico-military training and a thorough knowledge of their country with a view to training revolutionary cadres and winning over more of the masses to their cause. Depending on their aptitudes, the persons thus trained would be called on to undertake university studies, would continue their secondary studies only, or would become direct participants in the politico-military struggle. The MPLA had also established political commissariats to work in its guerrilla units and co-operate with the traditional authorities of the people.

257. As the illiteracy rate in Angola was 99 per cent, in fighting for the total and complete independence of their country MPLA was also trying to eliminate illiteracy as soon as possible. It had procured textbooks, established schools and planned to give higher education to those best qualified to benefit from it in MPLA itself. MPLA had already sent almost 350 young Angolans to secondary and higher educational establishments abroad to ensure the training of its future cadres. The revolution proposed to transform all structures set up by colonialism. Only by eliminating illiteracy among the Angolan people could that objective be attained.

258. Despite the prohibition of all political and revolutionary activity imposed by the repressive forces of Portuguese colonialism on the Angolan population, MPLA had succeeded in establishing and dispersing throughout the national territory numerous action committees which engaged in the clandestine work of mobilization, politicization, sabotage, reporting the movements or manoeuvres of the colonialist army and supporting the guerrillas.

259. The military action proper was going on mainly in the Cabinda district, in the north of Angola, where MPLA units were engaged in guerrilla operations, harassment and sabotage to hold down the Portuguese Forces. In the Cabinda district the guerrillas completely controlled almost 30 per cent of the territory, including the zones situated between Miconge and Luali. There were also outposts deeper in the interior, particularly in the Nambuangongo and Dembos regions, where commandos tried to intercept new enemy columns and supplies on their way to the Portuguese forces operating in the Cabinda region.

260. During the past year, the MPLA guerrilla units had carried out over 300 actions against the

colonialist troops in the Cabinda district; 2,165 enemy soldiers had been killed and more than 300 wounded; 7 traitors who had served the Portuguese colonialist forces as guides in the bush had been eliminated, and 53 military and civil vehicles had been completely destroyed. P-19 radios of United States make, G3 and FN weapons of Belgian make, UZI machine-guns of Israel make²⁷ and other weapons manufactured in the Federal Republic of Germany, as well as a large quantity of war matériel of various origins, had fallen into the hands of the MPLA fighters.

261. It was estimated that there were 50,000 Portuguese forces in Angola including Africans, but the disarray in the enemy ranks was growing daily, as was proved by the numerous desertion attempts, which forced the enemy security police to keep a very strict watch. Several Angolans had succeeded in deserting from the colonialist army and were now serving among the MPLA revolutionary troops. Only five more African soldiers of the Portuguese army had been reported as deserters.

262. In an attempt to stop the gradual escape of the Angolan people to the liberated zones under MPLA control, the Portuguese army was now trying to settle the people around its military barracks, which to some extent impeded the MPLA troops. MPLA was making successful efforts to overcome that difficulty.

263. As a result of MPLA's guerrilla activities, the Portuguese colonialists had been forced to abandon their forestry operations at Cabinda, and this had seriously affected their economic situation. The saw-mills were at a standstill, and their operatives were now looking for work in the large towns of Angola.

264. The Angolan populations integrated in the liberated zones and the refugees took an active part in the struggle, either by constituting people's militias, or by participating in agriculture in those zones. Other groups helped the information networks and took part in the sabotage of colonialist enterprises.

265. To meet the requirements of the liberation struggle, MPLA was doing everything possible to step up the military training of new members both in the liberated zones and in friendly countries, thanks to which its military strength was growing considerably. The essential conditions and the material means required for that purpose more or less existed. But the lack of freedom of action in the countries bordering on Angola and the impossibility of transporting weapons and men through those countries were preventing the creation of new battle areas and, in consequence, the extension of the national liberation struggle to the whole of Angola.

266. The Portuguese colonialists had recently strengthened their repressive measures. They had stepped up their military training with the aid of their allies, already well known in Angola by the acts of banditry perpetrated against the local population.

267. Press and radio continued to appeal to the settlers to take part in training, repeating the proverb: "Forewarned is forearmed". The training of civilian volunteer paratroopers, intended to protect the Portuguese settlers, had also been stepped up.

268. At the same time Portugal was still trying to implement a policy of settlement in Angola, Mozam-

²⁷ See letters dated 12 September and 25 October 1966 from the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations addressed to the Chairman of the Special Committee (A/AC.109/212).

bique and so-called Portuguese Guinea. Its aim was to turn each of those countries into a sort of new Brazil. A law enacted in 1961 made provisions for European families to go and settle the overseas territories. Numerous nationals of other countries were to be or already had been settled alongside the Portuguese settlers. According to some estimates, about 10,000 Portuguese left Portugal every year for Angola, Mozambique and so-called Portuguese Guinea. Settlers sent to Angola were offered land and all the necessary facilities to farm it. In the two principal settlement regions, thousands of settlers had seized the best lands by force, leaving wretched Angolan areas which were far from sufficient to sustain the indigenous population. The settlers were established mainly in Madale and Ansela and were assisted by foreign technicians. Portugal had concluded an agreement to that effect with the Federal Republic of Germany, whose nationals enjoyed very great influence in Angola.

269. Although elections had been held in 1965 to the National Assembly, in view of the way elections were conducted in Portugal and Angola no importance should be attached to the results. In every case they were a Portuguese manoeuvre designed to give a false idea of stability of the Salazar régime. Actually all forms of struggle and political organization were forbidden in Angola. The fascist police (PIDE) had been introduced in Angola, where it infiltrated the people to spy on them and to try to learn the secrets of their activities on behalf of liberation.

270. In the towns, the prisons were filled with Angolan patriots; the colonialists had recently arrested 400 Angolans in the towns of Luanda, Lobito, Benguela and Nova-Lisboa. In April five boys and two girls accused of being MPLA members had been arrested and tried. Three of them had been given prison sentences ranging from three and a half to eight and a half years. It was the same in Portugal. Blood flowed in Salazar's prisons. Two freedom fighters had had to be committed to psychiatric hospitals. Three others had been condemned to prison sentences ranging from three and a half to eight and a half years. The crimes of PIDE, as they cruelly persecuted the people to prevent them from taking part in the struggle for independence, were beyond reckoning.

271. All those repressive measures had had no influence on the Angolan people, who were only too well aware of the enemy's intentions. The Angolan people continued to fight vigorously for the national independence of Angola.

272. There was another extremely important aspect of the struggle which went beyond the purely national framework: the close co-operation between MPLA and the revolutionary organizations of the other Portuguese colonies in the Conferência das Organizações Nacionalistas das Colónias Portuguesas (CONCP). That body, to which only truly revolutionary organizations genuinely representing the peoples of the Portuguese colonies belonged, now constituted a powerful force in the fight for the liberation of Angola, so-called Portuguese Guinea, Mozambique and São Tomé and Príncipe. CONCP acted as a catalyst, prompting the popular forces to unite in the struggle against Portuguese colonialism and at the same time strengthening domestic unity. For the first time in the history of the liberation movements, MPLA, PAIGC, FRELIMO and CLSTP presented a solid and united bloc.

273. It seemed strange that a small country like Portugal could maintain so vast a colonial empire,

where it was now fighting on three fronts. In fact, the situation was explained by the massive support which the imperialist countries of NATO were giving the Portuguese Government. As was known, the Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom, France, Belgium and the United States were interested in exploiting the wealth of the Portuguese colonies, particularly Angola. The Portuguese colonial domination enabled them to continue and even intensify their policy of plundering the country's wealth.

274. The imperialist countries' assistance to Portugal took two principal forms: direct assistance to Portugal in its policy of repression, and sabotage of the national liberation movement.

275. The direct assistance, which enabled the Portuguese Government to confront the national liberation struggle in its colonies, took three principal forms: military support, political-diplomatic support and economic support.

276. The war *matériel* (aircraft, napalm bombs, tanks, weapons of all kinds, etc.) used by Portugal came from the Federal Republic of Germany, the United States, the United Kingdom, France and Belgium. In part that assistance was provided through NATO, since Portugal as a member of NATO has a right to military assistance from that organization; in part it was provided under bilateral agreements between Portugal and its allies. Under cover of assistance to a member country of NATO, the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany were thus providing large quantities of *matériel* to the Portuguese colonialists.

277. The politico-military support given Portugal by its allies could be seen, for example, in the United Nations, where the United States, France and the United Kingdom sabotaged the resolutions, adopted by an overwhelming majority, which condemned Portuguese colonial policy; it was also displayed in the international organizations where those Powers sought to prevent the adoption of measures against Portugal; it was further revealed by the powerful pressure brought to bear on the countries adjacent to the Portuguese colonies to impel them to prohibit the activities of nationalist movements in their territory.

278. As an example, he recalled the hostile attitude adopted by the Democratic Republic of the Congo towards MPLA. Since July 1963 the Congolese authorities had shown by the difficulties they made for MPLA that they took no account of the resolutions adopted by the Organization of African Unity. That organization, meeting in regular session at Accra from 21 to 25 October 1965, had adopted a resolution asking all States bordering on the Portuguese colonies to grant greater freedom of action and movement to the men and *matériel* necessary for the rapid success of the liberation movements.

279. Replying to questions, the petitioner said that the military and political co-operation between the African colonialist Powers was becoming ever closer. A tripartite pact had been signed between Portugal, South Africa and Southern Rhodesia. Portugal had been the first country in the world to allow the Government of Ian Smith to establish diplomatic representation in its territory. That fact alone sufficed to show that there actually was an alliance between South Africa, Portugal and Southern Rhodesia. Southern Rhodesia could get petroleum from Angola because Portugal had concluded an alliance with Southern

Rhodesia which enabled it to assist the Government of Ian Smith. Moreover, the Portuguese Minister for Foreign Affairs had recently stated that every State Member of the United Nations was free to apply the decisions of the Security Council and the specialized agencies as it thought fit.

280. Moreover, Portugal's allies, including the Federal Republic of Germany, were continuing to give Portugal material and military assistance. The MPLA was in a position to prove the collusion which existed between the Federal Republic of Germany and Portugal, since it had undertaken a thorough study of the question and could point to specific cases of co-operation between those two Powers. The co-operation revealed itself in all spheres. The Federal Republic of Germany had recently given Portugal \$40 million. It had sent it sixty military aircraft. It supplied Portugal with large quantities of weapons. It had built a large military base in Portugal, where the instructors were German. It had built hospitals in Portuguese territory where the wounded of the Portuguese army were cared for, and also a large munitions factory near Lisbon whose technicians were German. He would give the Secretariat a document setting forth all those facts, and showing that the Portuguese army received direct technical assistance from the Federal Republic of Germany. The Portuguese Government was able to send troops to Angola to the degree that the Federal Republic of Germany sent German troops to ensure the security of Portugal. The strength of the German forces was difficult to evaluate.

281. As far as economic support was concerned, it was given to the Portuguese Government in exchange for important concessions. That support enabled Portugal to overcome many obstacles, while foreign capital was invested in Portugal and in its colonies. Portugal did not only seek military aid from its allies with which to fight the liberation movements; it was also trying to develop the settler economy.

282. As to the sabotage of the national liberation movement by the imperialist forces, it revealed itself in two principal ways: struggle against the action of the authentic nationalist forces, and support of political groups or individuals attracted by the neo-colonialist compromise and hostile to the armed revolutionary struggle. Imperialism in its multiple forms sought particularly to destroy MPLA or to prevent it from intensifying its struggle for the liberation of Angola.

283. He was convinced that all the international organizations would one day be obliged to support the struggle of his people. He paid a tribute to the efforts of the United Nations and the Special Committee to help the liberation movements. He hoped that the Fourth Committee of the General Assembly would continue its work and oblige States Members of the Organization to comply with the resolutions of the General Assembly. It was true that for the moment certain international organizations were hostile to the liberation movements. The reasons for that hostility were well known and had been described. On the other hand, the Angolan people received the unconditional support of the OAU, the Organization of Afro-Asian Peoples and, since recently, the Tri-continental Conference. The higher deliberative bodies of Africa had come out in favour of MPLA. Thus, the Conference of the Organization of Afro-Asian Solidarity had recognized MPLA as the only valid representative of the Angolan people fighting for national liberation. The same position had been taken by the Tri-continental Conference,

which again confirmed that MPLA was recognized as the only revolutionary force in Angola.

284. On 10 June 1965 the United Nations Special Committee on Colonialism had adopted at Dar es Salaam a resolution calling upon all States Members of the United Nations, and "in particular the military allies of Portugal" in the Atlantic Alliance, to refrain from supplying that country with arms and munitions "so long as the Portuguese Government fails to renounce its policy of colonial domination". That resolution had been adopted by 18 votes to 2 (United States and United Kingdom) with 3 abstentions (Australia, Denmark and Italy).

285. As the Portuguese Government continued, MPLA was obliged once again to appeal to the members of the Special Committee to see to it that the decisions of the United Nations concerning the sanctions applicable to Portugal were complied with.

286. MPLA dedicated itself to defending the interests of the peasant and working masses of Angola. MPLA considered that its duty was to intensify the armed struggle, which was the only way of bringing the Angolan people to total and complete independence. It therefore asked the United Nations Special Committee to see to it that all countries bordering on the oppressed territories received material and assistance enabling them to give effective support to all the liberation movements.

287. *Mr. D'Almeida*, speaking on behalf of MPLA, said that, as the previous petitioners had said practically all that there was to be said about the present situation in Angola, he would not speak at any length on the subject, especially since a draft resolution on the question had already been submitted to the Special Committee.

288. On behalf of his people under arms, however, he wished to express his joy and pride at appearing before the Special Committee on the eternally illustrious soil of Algeria. The Angolan people and MPLA were among those who had derived the greatest benefit from Algeria's devotion to the ideal of national liberation.

289. A people's liberation must, above all, be the work of the people themselves. Liberation from the criminal grip of colonialism and imperialism depended on their spirit, their revolutionary ability and their confidence in themselves. The time for lamentation was past; it was useless to denounce the oppressive régimes, because they paid no heed. The only way of countering colonialism was to inflict mortal blows upon it. The Angolan people did not like war but they would continue to fight to the end, until every inch of Angolan territory was free.

290. Some days earlier, the freedom fighters had extended their front and taken it to the centre and the east of the country. So far the Portuguese forces had met armed resistance in the north only, since the previous May, Angolan troops had blown up several strategic bridges and inflicted serious losses on the Portuguese colonial army. In particular, the freedom fighters had inflicted terrible blows on the Salazar army in the regions where the great foreign mining companies' exploitation of the indigenous people was at its harshest. Those companies maintained Belgian, Portuguese, South African and West German mercenary troops, which terrorized the peasant population.

291. He wished to draw the Special Committee's attention to the permanent danger of South African intervention in Angola. A military pact had been

concluded between Verwoerd, Salazar and Ian Smith, all champions of fascism. The pact provided for direct intervention by the signatories in the event of revolutionary activity spreading. The South African daily newspaper *The Star* of Johannesburg had stated in November 1964 that the defensive system of South Africa on the ground depended at present on the possibilities of local defence in Mozambique, Angola and Southern Rhodesia, and that Africa would certainly not remain inactive if one of those bastions were to be threatened.

292. As if to illustrate the military pact between imperialist criminals, groups of armed police from South West Africa had recently crossed the southern frontier of Angola and carried out massive arrests among the political and military personnel in the area. It was probable that those arrested had subsequently been massacred by the Verwoerd police.

293. His party hoped that, in order to put an end to Portuguese aggression, the Security Council would decide to place a complete embargo on the sale and provision of arms and ammunition to Portugal by its allies and friends. Recently two villages in the Republic of the Congo had been bombed by Portuguese aircraft as a reprisal: in fact, the brother countries on Angola's borders which harboured the leaders of revolutionary movements—Senegal, Guinea and the Republic of the Congo—were all threatened by the Portuguese criminals. For example, in February 1966 Salazar, infuriated that Zambia, Tanzania and Malawi were giving support to the revolutionary movements, had threatened those countries with military intervention.

294. The MPLA also hoped that the United Nations and its specialized agencies, such as UNICEF, WHO, UNESCO and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, would give refugees and the people of the territories which were already liberated assistance in health, education and economic and social development.

295. In conclusion, he affirmed his faith in the future of the Angolan people, who in the prisons, the bush and the forests of Angola were already building the Angola of tomorrow—a free, democratic and fraternal Angola.

296. *Mr. Ervedosa*, a member of the Patriotic National Liberation Front of Portugal, speaking as a petitioner from Angola, said that he had spent exactly 663 days in Angola, from 21 April 1961 to 10 February 1963, as an officer of the Portuguese air force. During that time he had acted as assistant operations officer at the headquarters of the Second Regional Air Command (Angola) and, during the last two months of that period, as commander of squadron 91 of Lockheed "Harpoon" PV-2 tactical bombers (Luanda). Although he was, like the overwhelming majority of Portugal professional army staff, apolitical, his awakened conscience had led him into active opposition to the colonial war. Having been denounced by one of his comrades, he had been illegally discharged from the army and kept in custody for eight and a half months in the Aljube political prison at Lisbon during the inquiry. As the political police had been unable to discover political motives for his act of rebellion, he had not even been tried.

297. The Patriotic National Liberation Front of Portugal was an organization which was composed of Portuguese opponents of fascism and colonialism of varying political views. He had not joined that or-

ganization until he had emigrated clandestinely from Portugal with the intention of actively opposing the colonial war and bearing witness to all the facts which had led him to put into practice the grave decisions which had ended his army career.

298. He would confine himself to the facts he had ascertained directly, without going into detail. Nevertheless, in the day-to-day contact he had had with the social environment in which he had lived, the evidence he had been able to gather was both varied and eloquent; it was, generally speaking, in the form of personal confidences and such testimony was both convincing and necessarily anonymous.

299. He wished to present to the Committee the testimony of people who had experienced the war in Angola and had learnt in Angola to detest war.

300. It was true that all the horrors, all the crimes committed in Angola by the Portuguese fascists could not be described otherwise than in statements in which subjective considerations and the weight of the evidence were contradictory, but the internal revulsion, the implicit or explicit rejection of complicity, the pure horror of oneself, acquired a most important documentary value. The evidence he had been able to collect in Angola led to the following three major conclusions, which the supreme tribunal of the United Nations could not ignore: in the Portuguese Territories a war was being waged which the generality of the Portuguese nation condemned; an inhuman and anti-national political régime forbade the Portuguese nation to express that reprobation; and, in the middle of the twentieth century, the States united under the United Nations banner could not achieve unanimity in condemning Portuguese fascism and bringing it to an end, despite the fact that the methods and objectives of that political régime differed only in scope from those of nazism, which had plunged the world into the most murderous war mankind had ever experienced.

301. Turning to the facts that he himself had verified, he said that, according to a report by the information section of the headquarters of the Second Air Region (Angola), the number of Angolans killed as a result of military, police and civil repression from 16 March to 30 June 1961 was between 50,000 and 80,000.

302. During the same period the mission instructions issued by the Second Regional Air Command had ordered attacks on and the destruction of the people in the rebel area. Attacks had been launched against and destroyed almost all the villages in that area.

303. From the end of June 1961 onwards the mission instructions had ordered attacks on people camouflaged in the jungle, which had been carried out methodically and systematically in the form of "armed reconnaissance" (patrol flights over specific areas, with attacks on clandestine villages discovered during the mission) and "localized attacks" (attacks by groups of aircraft against targets of the same type).

304. On the subject of the equipment used and its origin, he said that reconditioned Lockheed "Harpoon" PV-2 tactical bombers from the 1960 NATO allocation, sold at a nominal price to the Portuguese Government, were permanently stationed in the Territory. There were also North American "Harvard" T-6 training aircraft, adapted for tactical support, Dornier DO-27 communications aircraft, with 37 mm rocket launching systems, and Republic "Thunderjet" F-84

tactical support aircraft, which again were recently re-conditioned aircraft from the NATO allocation sold at a nominal price to the Portuguese Government.

305. Lockheed "Neptune" P2V-5 long-range patrol aircraft from the NATO allocation assigned to air base 6 at Montijo, Portugal, had been used for regular missions.

306. The weapons had included containers of napalm, mainly of United States origin, and 20-lb., 100-lb., 500-lb. and 750-lb. high-power bombs, some originally supplied by NATO, some of local manufacture and some supplied by the Republic of South Africa. The Portuguese air force also had depth charges (which had replaced napalm in attacks on the people in the jungle, since they were the only effective weapon in areas of dense vegetation), which were part of the NATO allocation and were stored at air base 6, at Montijo, Portugal.

307. On the subject of alliances, he stated that in February 1962 two working meetings had been held, one at Salisbury and one at Luanda, between the headquarters staff of the Second Air Region and the Command of the Royal Rhodesian Air Force. Those meetings had led to the exchange of operational information, the planning of joint co-ordination arrangements and the study of methods of operational co-operation, the sole purpose of which was the repression of nationalism in both Territories.

308. The operational orders given by the High Command to the Second Regional Air Command in the period from 16 March to 30 June 1961 had been to crush every sign of rebellion and annihilate all Angolans found in the rebel area.

309. In conclusion, he said that he was prepared to provide the members of the Special Committee with any additional information on the facts he had described and on any other matter relating to Angola in the period from 21 April 1961 to 10 February 1963.

310. Describing the weapons used, the petitioner said that he had never seen the brand on the recoilless guns at close quarters but he presumed that they were of United States origin. Generally speaking, however, the weapons were manufactured outside Portugal, since that country was not equipped for arms production on a large scale. There was, however, a small arms factory at Luanda.

311. All the information he was in a position to supply related to the period from April 1961 to February 1963 and concerned air force operations. The order had been to attack and destroy any group of Angolans found outside the areas controlled by the Portuguese. The weapon used had generally been napalm, but when people had taken refuge in the jungle that weapon had become ineffective and had been replaced by depth charges.

312. He did not know the exact procedure as to the allocations of NATO weapons granted to Portugal. Some of the aircraft were not based in Angola. The Portuguese had resorted to the subterfuge of using them in rotation as if for manoeuvres. The same observation applied to the F-86 aircraft in so-called Portuguese Guinea, which were also part of the NATO allocation. Some depth charges from the NATO allocation had been supplied by a NATO country, but he did not know which. He had also noted the presence of Lockheed "Neptune" P2V-5 long-range patrol aircraft, which were of United States manufacture. The propagation of shock waves from depth charges was

less violent on land than on sea. That type of bomb, however, caused internal haemorrhages and killed all persons within a radius of twenty metres. It was, however, not possible to estimate the number of persons actually killed in bombing operations. No check could be made on the spot, because the nationalists carried off the bodies of all those killed. In areas of dense vegetation, however, that type of explosive caused considerable damage.

313. At the first meeting of air staff officers at Salisbury, the general staff of the Royal Air Force had tried to obtain information on the type of weapons used and on existing means of co-ordination.

314. Some fifty diagrams had been brought to Salisbury and the officers responsible for security services at the bases had been briefed on the defence systems of the bases, the type of weapons and the smallest details of the whole defence system.

315. At the time when he had been on a tour of duty in Angola, there had been twelve twin-engined Lockheed "Harpoon" PV-2 bombers at the air base and six at Luanda, and four of those aircraft had later been sent to Beira, in Mozambique. There had also been some twelve or fourteen Republic F-84 "Thunderjets" and about twenty North American T-6 aircraft, in addition to Lockheed P2V-5 "Neptune" patrol aircraft.

316. He had no information after 10 February 1963 as to the extent NATO countries had trained Portuguese army officers and pilots for combat duty. Up to that time some Portuguese army officers had received training in the United States under a NATO co-operation programme. He thought, however, that Portugal was in a position to train its own air personnel for the purpose of repression. The Portuguese were present in Angola in sufficient numbers and did not need reinforcements from outside. Portugal did, however, receive considerable financial assistance from its allies which was far more valuable to it than assistance in manpower.

317. As to air attacks the method had varied according to the type of weapon used. In the case of some bombs there had been a compulsory safety altitude; for the depth charges, the altitude had been slightly lower; machine-gun attacks had been made at a fairly low altitude and for the dropping of napalm bombs the aircraft had skimmed two or three metres above the tallest obstacle.

318. There had been indiscriminate bombings except in the controlled zones. Up to 30 June 1961 the north of Angola had been entirely controlled by the nationalist forces, except for a few very small centres of population. After 30 June 1961 the Portuguese had increased their forces by about 50,000 men. Some of the people had taken refuge in the forests and others had surrendered to the Portuguese. The zone not controlled by the nationalists was jungle. Nevertheless, the heavy bombardments had had no effect on the morale of the freedom fighters. Nothing could now damage the morale of the nationalist forces and they were prepared to fight to the end to obtain independence for their country.

319. Asked whether he thought that, after the Salazar régime, there would be a more liberal régime in Portugal, particularly with regard to colonial matters, and that that régime would grant the Portuguese Territories the right to self-determination, the petitioner said that there was already a very strong anti-

colonialist opposition in Portugal. Thousands of political detainees in Salazar's gaols were anti-colonialists and there were also clandestine movements working against the present Government.

320. If the Salazar Government continued to receive all manner of assistance from its allies, the existing fascist apparatus might be able to retain power. If such assistance were eliminated immediately, the Government which succeeded the Salazar Government would probably adopt a different attitude. Sufficient proof of that was provided, in his opinion, by the number of Portuguese who emigrated daily and the rebellion of some soldiers who refused to leave on operational duties, not to mention the many deserters who took refuge in France, Belgium and the Federal Republic of Germany.

321. *Mr. de Pádua*, speaking as a member of the Frente Patriótica de Libertação Nacional, stated that he had been a medical officer with the rank of second lieutenant in the Portuguese army. He had been sent to Angola about the end of April 1961 and had deserted in late October 1961. He was a member of the Portuguese FPLN and had been engaged in anti-fascist activities in Portugal long before going to Angola. His purpose in testifying was to supply the members of the Special Committee with some facts concerning the beginnings of the war in Angola and the terrible repression inflicted on the Africans in that country.

322. He was also making a written contribution concerning that war, in the form of a work entitled *Guerre en Angola*, which had been published in Brazil in 1963 and had recently been translated into Russian in the Soviet Union. The greater part of the book, in diary form, had been written in Angola with a view to publication abroad. Some apparent contradictions in the book were in fact clarifications due to a better knowledge of the facts. In view of the limited time allotted to him for his statement, he would not dwell on a description of the tortures he had witnessed, on the course of the war or on the feelings of the settlers and of the troops. Instead, he wished to give the members of the Committee a brief account of the beginnings of the Angolan revolution which he had witnessed.

323. A knowledge of how the war had begun in Angola was very important. The workers in the Baixa do Cassange, a plateau where cotton was grown as the single crop, had gone on strike. Their annual wages had been about 150 escudos, or approximately 30 new francs. While it was true that the purchasing power of 150 escudos in Angola was greater than the purchasing power of 30 new francs in Paris, those figures gave some idea of the extreme financial straits of the Angolan workers. The fascist colonialist rulers had responded to the strike by bombing villages with napalm. On 4 February 1961, Angolan nationalists had attacked a police barracks and a military fortress at Luanda. During the following days, while the police and military casualties were being buried, the settlers, with the support and approval of the army, had attacked the Angolans and, according to the most moderate estimates, had killed 3,000 of them.

324. It was difficult to imagine the atmosphere which had prevailed in Angola at that time among the settlers and the fascist colonialist authorities, especially following the operations of 15 March in northern Angola. The atmosphere had been one of homicidal mania

and complete lack of respect for the lives of the African people or for their most elementary rights. He had himself been able to gauge the extent and the systematic nature of the devastation which had been ordered when he had been sent into the heart of the area of military operations in the north. His unit command, for instance, had received orders, on entering the area in revolt, to "kill every living creature, including animals". He had seen villages bombed, or rather razed, with napalm, after being ransacked. He had seen settlers furiously brandishing the severed heads of Angolans on pikes; he had seen and heard things which would trouble the sleep of any normal man anywhere in the world. Those members of the Special Committee who would like to know the facts might refer to his book. He wished, however, to stress the assistance given by the army to the settlers, its accomplices.

325. The colonialist army was obviously racist despite all the statements made by self-proclaimed "multi-racialists". No further proof was needed than the talks which had been given to the Portuguese troops on board the transports taking them to Angola. They had been commanded to fight the Angolans on the pretext of preventing the loss of markets, not to mention statements designed to give them a superiority complex.

326. The weapons used by the parachutists and special troops which he had seen with his own eyes had formed part of the armaments of the Portuguese NATO division. Some of the napalm bombs had come from South Africa through NATO. According to some senior officers—as Manuel Alegre could confirm—Israel, acting as an intermediary for the Federal Republic of Germany in that instance, had supplied the Portuguese with USI sub-machine-guns. Bomb fragments found in the encampments of the fighting units bore inscriptions in English. A colonialist and fascist régime capable of using such methods for the avowed purpose of genocide would never, if left to itself, come to its senses and embark seriously on a process of decolonization. It was therefore necessary to take extremely strong measures, which alone might force the Portuguese Government to relinquish the Territories it occupied.

327. Referring next to the case of the Portuguese people, he pointed out that it was too often forgotten that the régime in Portugal was a particularly savage fascist régime which imprisoned Portuguese by the thousand, that the régime did not give even the Portuguese the right to elect their representatives freely and democratically, and that young Portuguese were not asked whether or not they wanted to go to war. As the Committee was already aware, most Portuguese soldiers had little enthusiasm for the idea of going to their deaths in Africa to defend the interests of Portuguese or foreign monopolies. That had been demonstrated by the Portuguese people on a number of occasions. The Portuguese army numbered thousands of deserters who had been forced to leave their country. Lastly, it appeared beyond any doubt that the Portuguese Government was a government of traitors to the Portuguese people and a growing threat to the whole of mankind. He emphasized that he was not the only deserter from the Portuguese army—far from it. In Algiers itself, other deserters or servicemen who had revolted against fascism were taking advantage of revolutionary Algeria's very generous welcome. They included his colleague, Manuel Alegre, who would address the Committee with a view to informing its members of the living conditions of Angolan and Portuguese

patriots detained in Angolan prisons towards the end of 1963.

328. *Mr. Manuel Alegre*, speaking as a member of the Frente Patriótica de Libertação Nacional, said that the colonial war was an outgrowth of fascist oppression in Portugal. The bombings with napalm, the massacre of women, children and old people, the concentration camps, the tortures, and all the atrocities committed in Angola, Mozambique and "Portuguese" Guinea were the corollary of the tortures and political murders perpetrated day after day in Portugal by the forces of repression of the Salazar régime. Everything which occurred in Angola was simply the extension, in a colonized country, of the activities of the fascist régime which had been oppressing the Portuguese people for forty years.

329. He had been a law student at the University of Coimbra when he had been inducted into the fascist army in 1961. Before that date, he had participated in the students' struggle to gain freedom of association and he had taken a militant part in the clandestine democratic organizations fighting against fascist power in Portugal. He had arrived in Angola on 19 July 1962. Everything he had seen there had confirmed his belief that the colonial war was a crime, not only against the peoples of the colonies, but also against the Portuguese people.

330. Two days after his arrival, a settler born in Angola had told him how he had violated an Angolan girl with his knife. In the officers' mess of the infantry regiment at Luanda, he had often heard war criminals boast of their exploits. Second Lieutenant Machado Querido, for instance, had used a special method for interrogating prisoners by sinking his knife very slowly into their heads. Second Lieutenant Linhares had practised what he called political culture by trying to strike off the heads of the prisoners at one blow. He had also seen Lieutenant Mendonça walk the streets of Luanda wearing a belt decorated with human ears. That was an odious symbol of a frightful war. On the road from Luanda to Nambuangongo, all the villages through which he had passed had been destroyed. He had seen only Portuguese soldiers. The Angolans had been dead. At Nambuangongo, a Portuguese captain had explained to him that chemical warfare must be used, expressing the view that that was the only effective solution. A few days later, the soldiers under the command of the same captain had refused to continue waging war. The captain had found no way of forcing them to obey except by killing one of them. The troops had then mutinied. The PIDE had accused him (the petitioner) of having been the ringleader of the mutiny, but that was not true. The soldiers who had mutinied had done so as a violent expression of their dissatisfaction and despair.

331. At that time, he had been working with his commanding officer and other comrades in organizing a military revolt to overthrow fascist power in Angola. He had succeeded in recruiting many comrades and in establishing a revolutionary military junta to co-ordinate the actions of all the clandestine groups inside the armed forces themselves. The military junta had, of course, been set up with the participation of some senior officers. Unfortunately, some indiscretions had been committed, and the commanding officer and several other officers had been sent back to Portugal, where they had been dismissed from the army and then arrested by the PIDE.

332. On 17 April 1963, he had been arrested at Luanda, in defiance of all civilian or military law. The

fascist military authorities had demobilized him and handed him over to the PIDE at Luanda itself. He had been imprisoned in the São Paulo fortress, where he had been interrogated for fifteen days and fifteen nights without a break. He had spent two and a half months alone in a cell. Nevertheless, he considered his situation relatively privileged, since the São Paulo fortress had housed other prisoners who were neither Whites nor Portuguese. They had been treated like animals. Day and night, from his cell he had heard the cries of tortured prisoners. The torturers had not even made an attempt at secrecy. To them, the Angola prisoners had not been human beings. They had not realized that he (the petitioner) would one day tell the world all he had seen in the living hell of the São Paulo fortress. To the PIDE agents, nothing had been more normal than to torture an Angolan. For instance, while walking in the prison yard, he had seen a man lying naked on the ground, with his feet and hands tied, while the PIDE agents burnt him with cigarette-ends. They had asked him, laughing, whether he would like to join in the fun. His reply had been that the only way in which he could imagine joining in was by taking the place of his Angolan comrade.

333. Three Angolans—Luandino Vieira, António Jacinto and António Cardoso—had been imprisoned in the cells next to his own. They had been completely isolated from the other prisoners. They too had been tortured, and they had been awaiting trial for twenty-nine months. One day, they had succeeded in passing to him the following message: "Take heart, comrade! We are in this struggle together. Our peoples will overcome. Long live free Portugal! Long live free Angola!" That letter had given concrete proof of the solidarity of the Portuguese democrats and the Angolan patriots, fighting for one and the same cause.

334. Luandino Vieira, António Jacinto and António Cardoso had been sentenced to fourteen years' imprisonment. They were now serving their sentence in the Tarrafal concentration camp in the Cape Verde Islands.

335. By the admission of the prison warden himself, about 2,000 Angolan prisoners had been rotting in the government gaols at Luanda in 1963. After being tortured, those prisoners had been sent, without ever being brought to trial, to concentration camps in southern Angola. In December 1963, he himself had been taken back to Portugal, where he had been placed under restriction at Coimbra. Five months later, he had left Portugal secretly, in order to avoid being rearrested and deported to Angola, where he would have been tried by a military tribunal.

336. He would not conclude without emphasizing that the true representatives of his homeland were not the delegates of Salazar. Those delegates represented no one but the boards of directors of certain monopolies. The true representatives of his country were in Portugal, in the political prisons, where they were being tortured by Salazar's police tormentors. They were the Portuguese men and women who were fighting for freedom, the deserters, and the thousands of emigrants living in every country of the world except Angola, Mozambique and "Portuguese" Guinea.

337. A régime which had never respected the most elementary rights of its own people could hardly respect the right of the colonized peoples to independence. The oppression of the peoples of Angola, Mozambique and "Portuguese" Guinea was an outgrowth of the oppression of the Portuguese people themselves. The men in-

licting tortures in the Portuguese colonies were the same men who were inflicting tortures in Portugal, and that was why all the natural allies of the Portuguese people in their fight for freedom were the sister peoples of Angola, Mozambique and "Portuguese" Guinea. The Portuguese people could not be free so long as the peoples of the colonies were not free. The fight which the Frente Patriótica de Libertação Nacional (FPLN) was waging against the colonial war was a matter not only of solidarity, but also of patriotism. In fighting for recognition of the right of the colonized peoples to independence, FPLN was at the same time fighting for the national independence of its homeland.

338. By an overwhelming majority, the Portuguese people were opposed to the colonial war. Those feelings found expression in many desertions, in demonstrations at railway stations and instruction centres, in the fact that thousands of workers refused to contribute part of their wages to military expenditures, and in political statements by representatives of the opposition ranging from Catholics to communists. On 1 May 1962, in the streets of Lisbon, 100,000 persons, courageously defying the forces of the police, had shouted: "Peace in Angola!"

339. The fascist Government had dissolved the Association of Portuguese Writers because it had awarded the highest Portuguese prize for literature to Luandino Vieira. The members of the governing body of that renowned institution had been arrested and accused of betraying their homeland. Yet who were the traitors? Those who were fighting for freedom and human dignity, or those who for so long had daily been doing freedom and dignity to death in Angola, Mozambique, "Portuguese" Guinea and Portugal itself?

340. Those who lent their assistance to Salazar to enable him to retain power should not forget that they were making themselves the accomplices of an unlawful régime, condemned by history, and that a day would come when the Portuguese people and the peoples of the colonies would be able to distinguish between those who had been the friends of Salazar and those who had been with the Frente Patriótica de Libertação Nacional in its fight for freedom.

341. Replying to a question, one of the petitioners reaffirmed that at the time when he had deserted in 1961 he had seen some sub-machine-guns which, according to a colonel in his unit, were of Israel manufacture. It would appear that, in that instance, Israel had served as an intermediary for the Federal Republic of Germany.

342. *Mr. Eduardo*, speaking on behalf of the Gouvernement révolutionnaire de l'Angola en exil (GRAE), said that, since 1961, the problem of Angola had been given particular attention by the United Nations and was one of the problems that were almost permanently on the agenda of the Organization's sessions. Consequently, the historical background of the question had been recounted on a number of occasions by, among others, petitioners from his movement (immediately before and ever since the beginning of the armed insurrection by the Angolan peasants and workers) before the various United Nations bodies, and he would confine himself to highlighting the systematic refusal of the Portuguese colonialists to comply with United Nations recommendations.

343. The Portuguese colonialists, flouting all the Organization's recommendations concerning the granting of independence to the peoples under their colonial

domination, were continuing their massacres, particularly in Angola, where villages were continually being razed and burnt and old people, women and children were being murdered. That was the reason for the ever-increasing exodus of Angolans to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, as indicated by a recent report by the United Nations Secretariat, which noted that the number of Angolan refugees in the Democratic Republic of the Congo since the beginning of the war in Angola was more than 220,000 and that 20,000 refugees had arrived in the Congo during 1965 alone. However, the figure of 600,000 Angolan refugees given by the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo was much nearer the truth.

344. The colonialists, not content with dropping waves of napalm bombs which caused unspeakable havoc among innocent people, had from time to time since May 1965 (as reported by the Angolan Press and Information Agency on 8 June 1965) been using poison gas which spread death far and wide.

345. The Angolan refugees constantly streaming into the Democratic Republic of the Congo bore in their flesh the traces of the atrocities committed by Salazar's "Christian" army, and it was regrettable that the Special Committee had not visited the area in order to assess the depth of the grief and misfortunes heaped on the most numerous and most sorely tried refugees at present to be found in Africa (if not the world). Nevertheless, he hoped that the United Nations would no longer be satisfied simply to record the movement of the Angolan refugees into the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and that in the near future those hundreds of thousands of human beings would be assured of the actual and effective material assistance and support of the Organization.

346. He therefore categorically denied the allegations by Portuguese officials that conditions in Angola were "normal"; for conditions which were claimed to be "normal" did not justify the constant dispatch of military reinforcements, massacres of the population, regular weekly *communiqués* on the war in Angola by the high command of the Portuguese colonialist army or the award of decorations for their crimes (which were called "heroism") to the Portuguese troops who had so woefully distinguished themselves in the savage slaughter of defenceless human beings.

347. According to the reactionary Portuguese newspaper *O Primeiro de Janeiro* of 7 May 1966, the Portuguese Minister for the Armed Forces had decorated the following soldiers: António Júlio Salgueiro Gonçalves, José Francisco de Oliveira, António Coelho da Silva, Jorge Cláudio Cabrita, João Manuel de Carvalho Margarido and Desidério Trindade Vilas (to mention only those) for "services rendered to the (Portuguese) nation in defence of its territorial integrity". Salazar himself, speaking at Braga on 28 May 1966 on the occasion of the fortieth anniversary of what the Portuguese called the "national revolution", had reaffirmed: "I have no intention of relinquishing power, since such a decision would be interpreted as a relinquishment of the policy which Portugal has hitherto pursued to safeguard its territorial integrity." He had added: "Such a decision might jeopardize the position which Portugal has been able to establish overseas through the combat waged by thousands of anonymous heroes."

348. All those gestures, all those statements, required no comment.

349. It sufficed to say that the Portuguese troops, with such encouragement, were redoubling their savagery, in the knowledge that decorations would in future be awarded to them on the basis of the number of Negro heads they collected "in defence of the Portuguese homeland". The exact number of Negro heads sent by Portuguese soldiers each week to their relatives and friends back in Portugal would never be known. The Angolan National Liberation Army had captured hundreds of letters from Portuguese soldiers giving evidence of that macabre traffic which, in many cases, was carried on through official channels, namely, by ordinary mail. GRAE would provide the General Assembly of the United Nations with some specimens at its forthcoming session.

350. The number of summary executions committed in cold blood could not be counted. On 18 November, for instance, the Angolan Press and Information Agency had reported the odious execution by Portuguese "paras" (on 15 November 1965) in the stadium at Carmona (Uíge) of some thirty Angolan patriots who had been arrested on the day following violent clashes between Angolan resistance forces and Portuguese troops. The victims of that act of barbarism had included Ambrósio H. D'inganga, Carlos Pinto Abreu, Simão B. de Vasco, Júlio Ginga, Silva Luhando, Dionísio de Vicente, and an eighteen-year-old girl, Formosinha Artur.

351. In addition, no one now knew exactly how many Angolan patriots were huddled together and dying in the countless colonialist prisons. He would not mention any names, for the names, in his view, were not important. Thus, there could be no distinguishing between the many heroic brethren who were suffering and dying in Salazar's gaols for having demanded their right to freedom. He would simply state forcefully that he demanded the release of all of them, whether one or ten, one thousand or ten thousand. He was not begging for their release, since he knew that the colonialists could not refuse it indefinitely; the struggle which the freedom fighters were waging would inevitably lead to the release of those brethren in the not very distant future. However, he had constantly denounced in the past, and would never cease to denounce, the dastardly murders and other cruelties inflicted on such political prisoners or prisoners of war by the Portuguese colonialists.

352. GRAE, while placing its trust in the United Nations and expressing its deep gratitude for all the steps taken by sister non-aligned countries and by all the other friendly countries in support of the Angolan people's right to self-determination, would continue the armed struggle with unshakable determination for as long as it was forced to do so by the rulers at Lisbon. The Angolan National Liberation Front (the parent body of GRAE), which was the movement of the exploited masses in Angola and the guarantor of their unity of action in the armed struggle, intended to liquidate the colonial past and to open the way to a genuinely national future. The Angolan people would therefore fight to the end or, in other words, until colonialism and its vestiges were completely eliminated.

353. It was for that reason that the Angolan people, through the voice of their combat organization, rejected the Portuguese schemes for the introduction of spurious social and economic "reforms" in Angola, such as the bogus abolition of native status—which would be tantamount to making the integration of Angola into Portugal a fact—the wage "increases" for Africans,

the spurious ending of forced labour, the construction of schools, hospitals and roads, and the inclusion in some administrative bodies of Africans who were tools of colonialism.

354. All such transparent schemes deceived no one but their authors, the Portuguese colonialists; for the Angolan masses were not fighting to "reform" colonialism or to sit, symbolically, side by side with their tormentors in institutions set up precisely for the purpose of subjugating them. The Angolan people knew that colonialism did not "reform"; it did not improve. Consequently, the Angolan people would never fall into that absurdity, into that trap. The Angolan masses were fighting for the freedom of every Angolan, because they would never be granted freedom under any colonial administration, whether traditional or reformed. The reform to which the Angolan people aspired was self-determination, which meant the return of Angolan soil to the Angolans. As everyone was aware, however, such reform was not possible under colonial law.

355. The Portuguese colonialists described the use of poison gas and the systematic slaughter of innocent people as "legitimate" because, as they put it, that was part of their policy of defending their "historic rights". GRAE had taken up arms on 15 March 1961 in order to have the right to life, for there should be no other right in Angola than the right to life, liberty, dignity and self-determination. Injustice could not be legitimate. What was legitimate was a people's refusal to allow itself to be exterminated, a people's refusal to continue to live in slavery; what was legitimate was, in short, its resistance in the face of the aggressor; hence the legitimacy of its fight.

356. Taking advantage of the present opportunity, he wished vehemently to denounce the assistance given to Portugal in its colonial war by imperialism. Day after day, dozens of innocent Angolans were being savagely cut down by Salazar's horde of killers with the help of United States sub-machine-guns and dollars, French and German bombers and tanks, Belgian rifles, and the material and political support of several other NATO countries. The experience of five years of resistance showed that, without help from those countries, Portuguese colonialism would long since have succumbed to the blows struck by the Angolan freedom fighters.

357. He wished to denounce with equal force the racist alliance between Salazar, Verwoerd and Ian Smith. That alliance constituted a serious threat to peace in Africa and a great danger to millions of human beings. The problems of Southern Rhodesia, Angola, Mozambique and South Africa were now inseparable, since only concerted action aimed at those countries together, and not separately, would determine the final success of the struggle against racism and colonialism in the southern part of the African continent.

358. In a speech to the Sociedade Histórica da Independência de Portugal on 11 May 1966, the President of that society, Abel de Abreu Sotto-Mayor, after paying tribute "to the ability of the Portuguese soldier, his high racial qualities—superior to those of any other people—his courage and his discipline", had stated: "Our soldiers are not fighting for Portugal alone; they are fighting for the West also . . . for Portugal is today in Africa one of the last bastions of Western freedom and civilization. With South Africa and Rhodesia, we constitute a defensive bloc against Russian and Chinese cupidity in Africa . . ." (the

Portuguese newspaper *O Primeiro de Janeiro* of 12 May 1966).

359. In the minds of the Portuguese colonialists, as could be seen, the right of peoples was a legal fiction, or rather a passport for communism.

360. The United Nations, exercising its moral force, must bring Portugal to its senses, or it would stultify itself. For that reason, the United Nations must show greater firmness in 1966. Portugal must not continue to flout the Organization's recommendations and to scorn the almost universal censure of its policies.

361. He reaffirmed that he was categorically opposed to the sending to Angola—as requested by the Portuguese Government—of a United Nations commission to “appraise” what the colonialists called the “imposing work” accomplished by Portugal over five centuries. He was aware, and the world was aware, that a guided tour of that kind would not enable any such commission to see what really was to be seen—the misery of the people, their aspirations, the areas where showers of napalm bombs were falling continually, the villages razed to the ground, the concentration camps, all the political prisoners and prisoners of war, and the common graves heaped with the bones of hundreds of thousands of Angolans foully murdered by soldiers who proudly received decorations from Salazar for their actions.

362. Moreover, GRAE felt that world opinion did not need to send a commission to Angola in order to know that the Angolans did not enjoy fundamental freedoms, as enunciated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

Petitioners concerning Mozambique

363. Mr. Mondlane, speaking on behalf of the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO), said that the people of Mozambique welcomed the opportunity to address the Special Committee again and thanked the Government of Tanzania for inviting the Committee to meet again in Dar es Salaam, thus demonstrating to the whole world its determination to fight for the complete elimination of colonialism and imperialism in Africa.

364. FRELIMO considered the Special Committee an important vehicle for imparting the views of the peoples of non-independent Africa to the United Nations. Consequently, it was very eager to present all the information which might be of some use in the preparation of the resolutions which had to be adopted by the United Nations before the necessary steps could be taken to force Portugal to stop its criminal activities in Africa.

365. He recalled that, in June 1965, the representatives of the United Nations had been informed of the situation, problems and needs of FRELIMO. The reasons for launching an armed struggle against the Portuguese army and police in Mozambique had been explained and reference had been made to the privations which the people of Mozambique were suffering under the ruthless Salazar. The Special Committee had also been informed of the difficulties faced by the ordinary African citizens of Mozambique and of the fact that the Portuguese authorities were forcing hundreds of thousands of Mozambican men to seek employment in the neighbouring racist States of South Africa and Rhodesia, leaving their wives and children alone and, earning only a bare living wage, to work for the white settlers and the international economic

interests which were making huge profits. The Committee had learnt that thousands of Mozambican men and women were being herded monthly into forced labour (which the Portuguese Government cynically termed *contratados*) to work for European and Asian settlers in private homes, factories, railways and harbours, and on farms and plantations. Mention had been made of what some foreign observers of Portuguese colonialism had called “modern slavery”, whereby the Portuguese Government, in collusion with concessionary companies, forced African peasants to produce cotton, rice, ground-nuts and other marketable crops and to sell them ultimately to those companies at a price far below the cost of production. As a consequence of those practices, hundreds of thousands of Mozambican men had had to leave to seek employment in the neighbouring countries. Representatives might recall hearing two African elders, one a farmer and the other a school teacher and radio transmission specialist, who had presented evidence from their own personal experiences corroborating those charges against Portuguese colonialism. Lastly, the Committee had been told of the steps which the people of Mozambique had been forced to take to correct the situation: they had to form a single national liberation movement, the Mozambique Liberation Front, or FRELIMO, and had pledged themselves to seek redress.

366. That had been in June 1964. At that time the African people of Mozambique had still believed, however mistakenly, that the United Nations, through its trusteeship system, would bring about the final emancipation of the colonial peoples peacefully. Since then, however, they had learned an unhappy lesson. After sending their representatives to every session of the United Nations General Assembly to present their views and getting no action except platitudinous resolutions, they had decided to take direct action. Thus, in September 1964, an armed insurrection had been launched in Mozambique against Portuguese colonialism.

367. Since December 1965, when the United Nations had been presented with information on the atrocities perpetrated by the Portuguese against the people of Mozambique, the armed struggle of its Liberation Front had been developed. The number of trained and armed freedom fighters had been increased from a few hundred to a few thousand. They had been able to force the Portuguese army and police into a defensive position in at least two fifths of the country and the people of Mozambique could now boast of semi-liberated areas covering about one fifth of the country. In those areas, the people were, for the first time in more than seventy years—and in some areas for more than a hundred years—able to handle their own affairs without the haunting persecution of the Portuguese police and administration. Thus, in spite of the frequent attacks of the Portuguese air forces, the people were now organizing their own schools, clinics, courts and, where possible, even marketing their own produce. Unfortunately, those who were unable to provide sufficient military protection for their crops and stock had been forced to migrate to more uncomfortable sections of the country, and some had even had to emigrate to neighbouring independent African States, such as Tanzania, Zambia and Malawi, in tens of thousands, thus causing them to seek international humanitarian assistance, as representatives would recall from the annual reports of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

368. Of course, the Portuguese were not alone in their determination to maintain white supremacy in southern Africa. They were supported by the settler-controlled Republics of South Africa and Rhodesia which, together with the fascist Salazar régime of Portugal, had formed a racist alliance, intent on keeping the white man in power. Late in 1965, an agreement had been signed between Portugal and South Africa, allegedly to settle several thousand South African white farmers in the Tete Province of Mozambique. That information had been publicized, in South African and Portuguese papers, as an arrangement to help to relieve South Africa of population pressure by sending white farmers to Mozambique. However, it had been discovered that the real intention of the two Governments was to cover up a much more sinister scheme, namely, to provide the Portuguese army with South African white mercenaries to help to stamp out the Mozambican liberation struggle. The Committee's attention was called to that situation in Mozambique because, in the opinion of FRELIMO, it was a violation of international law and constituted interference in the internal affairs of Mozambique.

369. In that connexion, the Committee might be interested to know that Mr. Ian Smith had been quoted by the BBC towards the end of the previous week as having boasted of the intimate co-operation existing between the three racist Governments of the alliance: Portugal, South Africa and Rhodesia. According to the report, he had thanked the Portuguese Government specifically for continuing to provide transportation and other facilities to Rhodesia in an effort to frustrate any effect which the so-called oil blockade by the United Kingdom Government might have. It was, of course, obvious that under the present circumstances the Mozambique Liberation Front had no alternative but to take the necessary steps not only to destroy the Portuguese colonialists within its own territory but also to do everything in its power to support the struggle of the people of Zimbabwe and South Africa in their efforts for national liberation.

370. Referring again to the role being played by a member of Western European and North American Powers, members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), in the question of colonialism, he said that under the guise of participating in an alliance for the defence of democracy, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America, France, the Federal Republic of Germany and a few other Powers were supplying Portugal with some of the most deadly modern weapons and training her soldiers in the techniques of counter-guerrilla warfare. When convincing arguments against that anti-democratic alliance with a fascist régime such as Salazar's Portugal were presented, the answer given was that there was a clause in the NATO Agreement stipulating, *inter alia*, that no weapons acquired through the NATO Agreement should be used for the maintenance of a colonial Power anywhere in Africa south of the Tropic of Cancer. Yet, in the same Agreement, nothing was said about the deployment of military personnel trained and/or maintained under NATO auspices in colonial Africa; nothing was said about prohibiting the same NATO Powers from giving or selling their own weapons to Portugal outside the NATO Agreement, nor about an outright exclusion of a State whose attitude towards self-determination, self-government and independence was as fascist as that of Portugal. The Mozambican people often asked them-

selves, in view of that situation, what kind of democracy the Western Powers intended to defend. In the absence of any satisfactory answer, its people could only conclude that the United States, the United Kingdom, France, the Federal Republic of Germany and their allies in NATO were aware of and agreed with Portugal's anti-democratic position on her colonies, and knowingly wished to maintain their support for the continuation of colonialism in Africa.

371. Finally, since those same Powers, with the exception of the Federal Republic of Germany, were Members of the United Nations and consequently subscribed to the principles guiding the world body, which stood for the complete emancipation of all peoples from colonialism, the Mozambique Liberation Front appealed to them to consider their role vis-à-vis their ally, Portugal. While nothing on earth would deter the people of Mozambique from continuing to struggle for their complete liberation, they wished to appeal to the United Nations to try to find a formula which would force those NATO Powers to withdraw their support from Portugal.

372. Mr. dos Santos, speaking on behalf of FRELIMO, described the development of the struggle for national liberation in Mozambique during the past six months.

373. He said that the struggle for national liberation was growing and the areas controlled by FRELIMO were increasing in extent and importance. Large areas of the provinces of Cabo Delgado, Niassa, Zambézia and Tete were outside Portuguese control. In the first two provinces, the greater part of the population lived under the control of FRELIMO guerrillas. In the provinces of Zambézia and Tete, the areas under the authority of FRELIMO were not so great. In those semi-liberated areas, FRELIMO was engaged in reconstruction activities. It had increased agricultural output and established hospitals where combatants and the civil population were cared for. The literacy campaign was progressing satisfactorily.

374. There had been much fighting, particularly in the regions of Mueda, Diaca, Muidumbe, Chai, Macomia, Muembe, Valadim, Catur, Nova Freixo, Marupa and Massangulo. In the course of those engagements Portuguese troops had suffered heavy losses: several hundreds had been killed or wounded, while the guerrillas had seized a large number of arms, machine-guns, rifles, offensive and defensive grenades, mines, motor vehicles and other military equipment. One aircraft and one helicopter had been shot down, bridges and railways had been sabotaged and lorries destroyed. In addition, many African soldiers had deserted to join FRELIMO.

375. The campaign of oppression by Portuguese forces had compelled several thousands of people to take refuge in Tanzania, Malawi and Zambia. Their situation remained difficult, particularly in Malawi, where they were bereft of everything, or almost everything.

376. In the face of the popular struggle, Portuguese colonialism was reacting like a wounded beast. The army and the PIDE (political police) worked in close co-operation, in particular during military operations. The Portuguese troops received precise and official instructions: they had orders to massacre the population of the villages or to intern them by force in concentration camps built for the purpose near military and administrative posts. Peasants' houses were sys-

tematically burnt and crops and livestock were stolen or destroyed.

377. In the previous January, the *Régulo* (traditional chief) of Maniamba had been arrested because he had been found carrying a FRELIMO membership card. The soldiers had buried him alive up to his neck. When interrogated, he had refused to speak. After two days, he had decided to do so, but only to say "Yes, I am a member of FRELIMO and I supply FRELIMO guerrillas with food. FRELIMO will free Mozambique." That brave man died. The Portuguese had cut off his head.

378. The Portuguese often practised another kind of torture, which consisted in bursting the ear drums and putting out the eyes of persons they suspected of supporting the fighters. The soldiers then abandoned their victim in a lonely place, saying "Now go back to FRELIMO and get your eyes and ears back". They murdered pregnant women, opened their stomachs and tore out the foetus. In order to force prisoners to speak, they used a special apparatus which crushed their fingers one by one. Since the beginning of May, 7,500 soldiers had arrived from Portugal in three troop ships to reinforce those already there.

379. He assured the Committee that the many atrocities committed by the Portuguese army and PIDE would never lead the Mozambican militants to follow their example that was neither naïveté nor idealism on their part. If FRELIMO held to its principles, if it declined to confuse the colonialist or fascist Portuguese Government with the Portuguese people, to murder civilians or torture prisoners, that was because its cause was just and its action revolutionary. In Mozambique, it was the Mozambican people who were defending the great principles of humanity and not the fascist and colonialist Government of Portugal, even if that Government enjoyed the support of NATO. FRELIMO was sure of winning. It intended to continue its fight, to develop its activities and to improve its methods in order to liberate its country and its people once and for all.

380. In reply to questions, Mr. Mondlane and Mr. dos Santos said that the Portuguese medical services in Mozambique were unsatisfactory, to say the least. In a country whose population totalled more than 7 million, the first medical training programme, for Europeans and Asians alone, had been established three years previously. However, it only provided training at the lower level, and would not reach the standard of a full medical school for another ten to fifteen years. Assuming that Mozambique was a province of Portugal, as claimed by that country, the treatment it received differed considerably not only from that of the internal provinces, where both medical training and hospitals were provided all over the country, but also from that in such overseas provinces as Goa where, despite the fact that it had a population of only half a million, the Portuguese Government had established a medical school some twenty years previously.

381. Throughout the whole of Mozambique, there was not one African doctor. Of the 200 European doctors, two thirds were concentrated in the capital, where over half the European population was to be found. While two or three hospitals existed for the training of nursing assistants, there were no plans to train African nurses.

382. In areas where the armed struggle for independence was taking place, there were only mission

clinics and, when they were closed because communications had been cut, FRELIMO had to set up its own clinics. In that connexion, the Mozambique Liberation Front had drawn up in Dar es Salaam a programme for training nurses outside the Portuguese system. The first class would be graduated that month and the nurses would be sent to serve the civilian population in clinics throughout Mozambique.

383. The Portuguese Government's assimilation policy was a bluff. There was no assimilation and there never had been. It was enough to recall the nature of Portuguese colonization and of colonization in general to realize that any idea of assimilation was alien to it. In the mind of the colonizer, there could be no question of absorbing the colonized people, of whom nothing was asked but to be slaves and to produce. Until the past few years, Portuguese statements of policy had laid down a policy of assimilation. According to those texts, a Mozambican who aspired to become Portuguese must know how to read and write, have a job compatible with Portuguese citizenship (i.e., a job which enabled him to be well dressed, to eat in the Portuguese manner, etc.), and forget his African traditions in favour of a culture imported from Portugal. He was asked, in short, to stop being Mozambican, without being offered anything in exchange but the assurance of complete depersonalization. The present policy went still further. The idea was to make all Mozambicans Portuguese without going through the intermediate stage. Only the liberation struggle could put an end to that intolerable situation.

384. According to statistics compiled towards the end of the previous decade, only 4,500 Africans had been assimilated out of a total African population of 6.5 million. It was hardly likely, therefore, that the existing African population of 7 million would be absorbed by 150,000 Europeans. In his opinion, assimilation, to which constant reference was made in Europe and elsewhere, was merely an instrument of propaganda. A journalist of repute, in a serious article in *The New York Times*, had even referred to Portuguese policy in that connexion as the one hopeful sign among all the problems in southern Africa. Such a statement did not deserve to be taken seriously.

385. There was in fact no material difference between South African apartheid and the racial discrimination practised by the Portuguese Government, since so long as a person was not Portuguese he was not a citizen and so long as he was not a citizen he had no rights. In Mozambique there was no law on race, but the inhabitants were regimented in the same way as in South Africa. There were practically no cultural amenities for Africans. The Portuguese advocated intermarriage to solve the race problem but there were only 150,000 Europeans out of a population of 7 million. He observed that wherever there were white minorities they were bound to establish systems of segregation. For instance, the whole of the capital city was segregated into luxury European, mediocre Asian and slum African quarters. All professional positions were occupied by Europeans, and Asians kept the shops and did clerical work. There was no sincerity of intention in the invitation extended to the United Nations. Although the Portuguese had invited the United Nations to make an on-the-spot inspection, any mission it sent would be guided and given a false impression.

386. Subsequently, with reference to an extract quoted from *The Economist* of 23 April 1966 which

commented on the difference between Portuguese rule in Africa and that of South Africa, the petitioners said that, while *The Economist* generally presented a truer analysis than many other newspapers, the campaign of the Portuguese to make propaganda out of those facts had caught on among many people abroad, including those responsible for such an objective newspaper as *The Economist*.

387. An important factor in the colonial situation was the system of exploiting the production of marketable products. Up to 1942, more than half the country had been in the hands of concessionary companies, which had controlled not only the land but the people living on it, who had to work at wages set by them. In 1942 the Portuguese Government had decided to take direct control. Its policy from that time had been to give Africans the nominal ownership of the land but to stipulate what must be grown on it. A number of concessionary companies had been set up to determine what land was most suitable for various crops and the local population was forced to grow those crops and sell to the companies at prices fixed by the Government. The result was a system of modern slavery.

388. Answering a question on FRELIMO's activities, the petitioners said that their organization was carrying out extensive programmes in the social field. Much of the support received in that connexion had been contributed as a result of information it had circulated to representatives at the General Assembly and contacts made, through the Organization of African Unity (OAU), with the Afro-Asian countries.

389. FRELIMO's programme of general education was divided into three parts. In the first place, it was educating people to prepare them for civil service and administrative posts when the country gained its independence. Most of the students were sent abroad for their higher education.

390. Secondly, it was endeavouring to provide secondary education for the population: a secondary school, currently attended by more than 120 Mozambican students, had been established in Dar es Salaam. In Mozambique, there was not even one secondary school for Africans, whose only chance of such education was, therefore, to gain admission to a European school. Out of a total African population of 7 million, fifteen had completed their secondary education. The only institutions which made any efforts in that direction were Roman Catholic seminaries for training priests, and it was there that most of the students sent abroad received their earlier education. Apart from the medical school, to which he had already referred, FRELIMO was also planning to establish a school for teachers.

391. Thirdly, programmes had been initiated in the bush areas of Mozambique to deal with the problem of illiteracy and primary schools had also been set up. However, there was no permanency about such establishments, which had to be moved according to the position of the Portuguese army.

392. At the basic level, which was the literacy level, progress was still weak owing to lack of qualified personnel and premises. However, foreign appeals had been launched. Secondary and technical education was available and schooling was provided by United Nations Member States in all parts of the world. The third level of education could only be obtained abroad. Some forty Mozambique pupils went abroad annually, mostly for technical education. The Patrice Lumumba Friendship University in Moscow had special arrange-

ments to enable students to complete their secondary education before beginning university courses. Similar arrangements were made by three United States universities, but it was impossible for those pupils to enter Western European universities. The country needed more scholarships abroad and would be able to engage all graduates on their return. It could also provide students for short training courses of one to six months in any country that was willing to help Mozambique.

393. FRELIMO required extensive aid in the establishment of literacy programmes but, despite the resolutions adopted by the General Assembly, assistance did not appear to be forthcoming from the specialized agencies. They offered various excuses but, since the United Nations had pronounced itself on the matter, they should have no difficulty in providing such assistance. It would also be valuable if the Special Committee could encourage States Members of the United Nations to offer FRELIMO facilities for training its members in the techniques of teaching.

394. Asked whether students from Mozambique who went abroad to study did in fact return to provide the leadership for which they had been trained, the petitioners said that no problem had arisen in absorbing Mozambique students who had returned after graduating. The country was in dire need of teaching staff; it had already received teachers from various European countries and had appealed for more. There was also a great need for medical staff: there was as yet no African doctor in the country, but the first medical student was in the process of finishing his studies. Economists also were badly needed. There was therefore no reason for any Mozambique student to fail to find his place in the country on finishing his studies, and the Governments of the countries in which the students had been working were willing to help them to return. He did know of one case of a student in the United States who had had psychological problems, and on whose behalf an appeal had been made that he be allowed to remain in that country to receive the mental treatment that was not available in Tanzania, but that was a special case.

395. In reply to a question regarding the attitude of the churches in Mozambique, the petitioners observed that Portugal considered itself a bastion of Christianity. A new agreement between Church and State further strengthened the Church, which handled all education of African children. They were even obliged to attend school at different times of the year from European and Asian children, to whom the stringent regulations did not apply. The Portuguese Government gave a little money for the education of African children, and since the Church wanted the exclusive right to handle education it had no alternative but to support the Government. It was, however, to their credit that there was currently a more liberal policy in the Vatican and that missionaries now showed less enthusiasm for maintaining colonialism.

396. As to the concrete assistance that could be provided by the Special Committee and the United Nations, the petitioners felt that the terms of the resolutions adopted by the Special Committee and the General Assembly respectively expressed many of the wishes of the African people in Mozambique. However, there was no clear indication of any action having been taken to implement those resolutions, and the countries which had voted against them continued to support Portugal, South Africa and Rhodesia. Also, apart from the

United Nations scholarship programme, no positive contribution had been made by other agencies, with the sole exception of the office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. They hoped the specialized agencies would be requested to indicate what action they were prepared to take.

397. The situation of refugees in Malawi was desperate. For more than a year, since the arrival there of the first group of refugees, the problem had been increasing. FRELIMO had done everything it could to make the plight of the refugees known to the Government of Malawi, and although that Government was doing what it could, no clearly defined plans had been made to relieve the situation. Most of the refugees had gone to the islands in the Lake of Malawi, the waters of which were officially considered to belong to Mozambique, although the islands themselves were Malawi territory. There were now over 8,000 refugees, most of them still on the two islands, with a few also in the border area of south Malawi.

398. With regard to possible further help from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the Special Committee itself should ask the High Commissioner what approach the Malawi Government had made to him, what relationship, if any, had developed, and what problems had prevented the refugees in Malawi from being given the same assistance as those, for example, in Tanzania. Religious and other humanitarian bodies were not being given the same facilities to help refugees in Malawi as they were in other countries. The petitioners appealed to the Special Committee to see that such facilities were made available.

399. In reply to a question as to how the United Nations could also help to spread the truth on the behaviour of the Portuguese and of the countries which supported Salazar, the petitioners said that, although a number of excellent publications on the Portuguese colonies had been issued by the United Nations, they were not made available to the public. The working papers prepared by the Secretariat for the Special Committee were thorough and factually accurate, but the annual reports which were issued to the public included only a few references to those Territories. They therefore suggested that the United Nations should draw up a document, for distribution either to the general public or to the General Assembly, to include all the relevant facts and to demonstrate why so many Members of the United Nations had condemned Portuguese policy.

400. In spite of General Assembly resolution 2107 (XX) the United States, the United Kingdom, France, the Federal Republic of Germany and Belgium were supplying weapons to Portugal either through NATO or through other channels. FRELIMO had been able to establish with certainty, and had a list of weapons captured from the Portuguese army with serial numbers to prove it, that the Portuguese army was in possession of weapons (rifles, automatic rifles and machine-guns) originating in Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, the United States and the United Kingdom. In addition, the Portuguese forces had recently taken delivery of Italian aircraft built in the Federal Republic of Germany.

401. Before General Assembly resolution 2107 (XX) could be implemented, those Powers would have to withdraw their support to Portugal. They would also have to put a stop to the training of its officers under NATO auspices, which they alleged was carried out in the normal process of their programme for

defending Europe. However, it could safely be assumed that all Portuguese senior staff officers had received special training at NATO, especially in view of the known concern of certain Western Powers at the extent of guerrilla warfare throughout the world.

402. Although the official position of the NATO Powers was that they undertook no activity south of the Tropic of Cancer, there was evidence of indirect aid; according to the testimony of a Portuguese prisoner, there were Portuguese paratroops in Mozambique which had been equipped by NATO. The reason for their presence was unknown; but the Portuguese Government would certainly never admit publicly that they were there to fight. The prisoner had also said that the construction of air bases was continuing, and eight jet airplanes had been bought from the Federal Republic of Germany. It was evident that NATO aid alone enabled Portugal to foot its military bills.

403. The tactics of the Western Powers were camouflaged; had they been genuinely opposed to colonialism and sympathetic to the people's struggle for liberation, they would at least, in the light of resolution 2107 (XX), have withdrawn all aid tending to strengthen Portugal's position.

404. A further violation of the terms of resolution 2107 (XX) was the financial assistance rendered by Western European and United States banks to Portugal, which could not otherwise have continued the war in Africa since it already absorbed over half of its national budget. The Western Powers should therefore withdraw their aid to Portugal.

405. In reply to a request for details of Portuguese atrocities in Mozambique, which should be drawn to the attention, in particular, of those countries represented in the Special Committee which still afforded indirect assistance to Portugal, the petitioners said that the Portuguese Government had to resort to torture in order to maintain its colonial rule in Mozambique. FRELIMO intended to submit a detailed report to the Special Committee on the tortures to which the people of Mozambique were subjected by the Portuguese.

406. As to Portugal's attitude to the rebel régime in Rhodesia, it had not been unexpected in view of the arrangements made earlier to establish an embassy in Lisbon and to continue traffic communications between Beira, Lourenço Marques and Salisbury.

407. The petitioners said that the situation in Rhodesia would only be changed by a force from within, and the Mozambique Liberation Front would do its utmost to effect that change, as soon as its material resources permitted. The Europeans in Rhodesia were well aware that FRELIMO intended to demolish the oil pipeline as soon as possible and, for that reason, it was kept under constant surveillance, both on the ground and from the air. FRELIMO would support the Africans in Rhodesia in every possible way, since no real freedom could be gained for Mozambique while Rhodesia and South Africa remained in the hands of foreign Powers.

408. There was also co-ordination among South Africa, Southern Rhodesia and Portugal with regard to their political policies for control of the African populations. There was also military co-ordination. Every six months Portuguese officers went to Salisbury for discussion, and a high-ranking officer paid regular visits to Mozambique. Further, South Africa was committed to support Mozambique.

409. The three countries aided one another economically. For instance, Mozambique provided Southern Rhodesia and South Africa about 300,000 labourers each year under contract.

410. The economic relations between Portugal and Mozambique constituted an obstacle to the liberation of the people of Mozambique. One of the objectives of FRELIMO's struggle was to break up the old economic structures imposed by colonialism and to replace them with others which would permit the people of Mozambique to develop their potentialities freely.

411. The flow of capital from the Western world to Portugal and its colonies continued. In addition to the Colonial Bank of Portugal, there were two other well-known banks still operating in the country: the Standard Bank of South Africa and Barclays Bank, both of which had very close links with South Africa and Southern Rhodesia.

412. Although the Portuguese Government had established an import-export organization in Mozambique, such activities had for many years been in the hands of foreign companies. Portuguese participation had developed only since the Second World War.

413. The import-export business of Mozambique was linked directly with the hinterland of South Africa and Southern Rhodesia. There was an agreement between Portugal and South Africa under which nearly 50 per cent of the goods exported from the Witwatersrand area had to go through Mozambique, in exchange for which 150,000 Mozambique labourers were sent each year to work as cheap labour in the mining and other industries in South Africa. The Portuguese Government in Mozambique was also, under that agreement, given financial assistance by South Africa for running its railways. A similar situation prevailed vis-à-vis Southern Rhodesia.

414. Under the present circumstances, opening the Territories further to foreign companies would only be detrimental and delay independence. In the past three years some western European companies had also obtained large concessions, particularly in Angola. The people of the country should be given freedom to use their energies to satisfy their own basic needs. If foreign companies were to be invited it must be by a government freely elected by majority. They disagreed strongly with the views of the anti-Salazar Portuguese white settlers, who only wanted freedom from Portugal in order to gain control themselves.

415. Recalling operative paragraph 5 of General Assembly resolution 2107 (XX) which "condemns the policy of the Government of Portugal which violates the economic and political rights of the indigenous population by the establishment, on a large scale, of foreign immigrants in the Territories and by the exporting of workers to South Africa", the petitioners said that the question of white settlement affected Angola—which was nearer to Portugal and more wealthy—to a greater degree than Mozambique, which did nevertheless have thousands of European settlers.

416. The question of exploiting the land for the benefit of European companies was exacerbated by the fact that when Africans had developed certain areas of the country from forest swamp the Government took them for so-called civilized settlement, mostly by Europeans. There was one such area in which, among a total of more than 15,000 families, no more than fifteen to twenty were Africans. The policy of the Portuguese Government was to bring in more Euro-

peans so that it could be claimed that the area was preponderantly white. In June 1960 when the peasants in the north of Mozambique had disputed the right of the Portuguese authorities to repossess by force the fertile lands of the Macondes plateau, they had been massacred by the Portuguese administration. It was Portugal's policy to settle a white population in those territories, particularly in the Limpopo valley. It seized land from the Africans and drove out the local inhabitants, replacing them with white settlers.

417. In reply to a question the petitioners said that recent estimates put the number of Portuguese soldiers in Mozambique at approximately 50,000. That did not, however, take account of a further 7,500 men who, according to Portuguese information agencies, had arrived in the past month, nor of a further 6,000 who were known to have arrived in Mozambique only a few days previously. At that rate, the number of Portuguese soldiers could be expected to reach 75,000 by the end of 1966.

418. The Portuguese had issued propaganda statements throughout the world in which they claimed to have closed all borders to prevent infiltration. They had then, however, apparently contradicted themselves by stating, according to the article in *The New York Times* to which he had referred earlier, that any terrorists who were caught while endeavouring to cross the border between Tanzania and Mozambique were sent back to Tanzania by the police. That would hardly have been possible if their first claim was true. However, every effort was being made by the Portuguese forces to guard all borders between Mozambique and neighbouring countries.

419. The Portuguese Government had also been conscripting Africans, but many of them had deserted. Ninety-five per cent of them were mere youngsters unaware that they were going to a war. Whenever there was an armed clash they were threatened with execution if they did not fire on their own people. It was therefore difficult to assess the morale of the Portuguese, but as their army was adequately replenished and equipped it was probably fairly high. Nevertheless, how long Portugal could continue, despite support from its allies, was an open question. Since 1961, increasing proportions of its national budget had been devoted to military expenditure. At the same time, vast sums accrued from the companies operating in the colonies.

420. He asked to comment upon the allegation of the colonial Powers that the imposition of sanctions would harm Africans most of all, the petitioners said that there was an apparent lack of sincerity on the part of the colonial Powers; the suggestion that Africans would be harmed most by the imposition of sanctions was not to be taken seriously. So far as Mozambique was concerned, the European population would be most affected by such action since they were the consumers of the goods concerned. The African population produced its own goods in sufficient quantity and ultimately, it was even intended to export such produce to neighbouring countries.

421. The allegations of Portugal, South Africa and Southern Rhodesia that all African liberation movements were communist inspired had not affected the popularity of FRELIMO abroad. Such statements carried weight only in Europe and America. The Portuguese efforts to brand FRELIMO as communist would only result in increased popularity in some African countries. Furthermore, such efforts provided

the communist States with excellent propaganda since FRELIMO, which was fighting for the freedom of the people, was identified within Africa with the ideology and goals of world communism. In the mind of the average Mozambican, therefore, the peoples of the communist nations were genuine fighters for the cause of freedom in Mozambique. Whether FRELIMO was communist or not was immaterial to the African people, who did not question its ideology or principles but only the attitude of those who supported Portugal.

422. Asked whether information on FRELIMO's activities reached the occupied zone in Mozambique, thus forming a core of passive resistance throughout the whole population, the petitioners said that FRELIMO gave the people as much information as possible, in order to encourage them to prepare for passive resistance. Thus the bulletin *La Voix de la révolution* was distributed throughout the country, as were numerous tracts. Use was also made of the radio services of independent African States to disseminate as much news as possible. Furthermore, in Africa, the "bush telegraph" still operated and messages travelled fast by word of mouth to all parts of Mozambique. FRELIMO was making every effort to provide the people with the facts, particularly since it wished to counter the Portuguese allegation that its members were merely terrorists bent on slaughter.

423. FRELIMO's activities were carried out by both civilian and military personnel. All non-military programmes, whether educational, economic or administrative, were carried out primarily by civilians. The main role of the military, which were engaged in an unemotional and rational fight, was to protect the population from the Portuguese army.

424. Replying to a question as to the possibility of a significant increase in the number of eligible voters under the prevailing system, the petitioners said that new legal measures were intended to favour white settlers, whose average age was higher than that of the African population. Those settlers therefore had a far greater proportion of eligible voters on that score alone. However, that did not fully account for the figures of 2,000 African votes out of a total vote of 64,000. Even if there were to be a rapid increase in the number of African voters under the present system, FRELIMO rejected the idea of unity with Portugal. The people of Mozambique wanted a parliament in their own country and not in Lisbon. What was needed was a radical change of direction in legislation.

425. *Mr. Mbule*, speaking on behalf of UDENAMO, said that when the Portuguese settlers had arrived in Mozambique five centuries ago, they had introduced a policy of "divide and rule" by creating misunderstandings amongst the various tribes.

426. It was well known that Portugal was a small, poor, backward and militarily weak nation, which had been under British protection since 1173, as a safeguard against Spanish ambitions. That alliance had also served to protect Portugal's colonies in Africa, although Portugal had never done anything for the benefit of the African population in those Territories except to exploit them. Despite condemnation by world opinion that situation still prevailed. Not being content with setting tribe against tribe, they had gone one step further by introducing in 1928 Salazar's infamous policy of "assimilation"—the division of the people by class. That policy had crushed the morals and integrity of the people and was aimed at a small elite of Africans with a limited knowledge of Portu-

guese. Those people isolated themselves from the masses and tried to lead a Portuguese way of life by attempting to adopt Portuguese customs and habits; they were even ashamed to speak their mother tongue. They thus acquired the status of Portuguese *assimilados*, which entitled them to discriminatory salaries and special privileges designed to make them feel true "black" Portuguese citizens. It was in the hands of the *assimilados* that Portugal had placed her last hope of remaining in Africa. Their presence made any attempt to liberate the country useless, and they were more dangerous than the Portuguese themselves in the struggle for freedom and independence.

427. By means of that system Portugal intended to set up another white racist State along the lines of South Africa and Southern Rhodesia, and it was with that end in mind that in 1951 they had revised the Constitution by changing the word "colony" to "overseas Portugal". However, it had not brought about the desired change in the lives of the people; on the contrary, Portugal had persisted in its defiant attitude and had continued to deprive the population of their human rights and legitimate aspirations for freedom and independence.

428. In an attempt to appease world opinion and deceive the United Nations, Portugal had in 1961 proclaimed some reforms, but those reforms not only failed to meet the aspirations of the people but put the white settlers in a better position to assume political responsibility if Portugal was eventually forced to accede to the people's demand for self-determination.

429. On announcing those reforms in 1961, the former Minister for Overseas Provinces, Mr. Moreira, had said that his Government believed it necessary to increase the settlement of the African Provinces by European Portuguese who would make their home there and that measures were being taken to deal realistically and firmly with that problem, which was of the highest priority. The influx of settlers and the efforts made to decentralize the internal administration were all part of the scheme to turn the colony into countries like South Africa and Southern Rhodesia. Portugal's "multiracial integration" policy was aimed at deceiving the world; Portugal had no wish to be on close terms with the African people—it was only interested in making its home there by force and in denying the people their right to the land it had acquired by perfidy and treachery.

430. Portugal's idea was, by abolishing the 1954 Native Statute, to suppress the people's claim for independence; it intended to interpret Chapter XI of the United Nations Charter as it wished and refused to co-operate with the United Nations. It was therefore somewhat surprising that Portugal was still a full Member of the United Nations.

431. Since 1961 the African population had been facing systematic extermination, designed to enable the Portuguese settlers to take possession of their property and settle in their homeland. For that purpose a terrorist racist organization, similar to the OAS in Algeria, had been established in connivance with the Government. What, then, had been the use of abolishing the Native Statute and declaring Mozambique an Overseas Province whose inhabitants were automatically Portuguese citizens, if the people were to be persecuted and exterminated?

432. One of the methods used to scatter the people in densely populated areas was to instil fear and terror. In August 1964, 20,000 people from Muede

had fled to Tanzania; again in March and August 1965 refugees had fled from Niassa to Malawi; many thousands had been arrested, among them Dr. Domingos Arono José Craveirinha a well-known journalist; the Portuguese had sent 3,000 soldiers to crush a nationalist demonstration at Tete which had resulted in the massacre of many hundreds of innocent people, the arrest of many others and the fleeing of some 12,000 to Zambia. Those were but a few examples of the atrocities which were occurring daily. The number of refugees was constantly increasing and would continue to do so as long as the Portuguese were allowed to sabotage and suppress the liberation struggle in Mozambique. Portugal preached equality but practised discrimination.

433. In 1961, after the uprising in Angola, fearing its repercussions in other Territories, especially Mozambique, Portugal had taken preventive measures by forming, in April, the *Polícia Internacional da Defesa do Estado* (PIDE). That organization was composed of murderers, bandits and ex-criminals to whom Salazar had granted pardons on condition that they co-operate with his criminal policy. The headquarters of PIDE was set up in Laureço Marques and Beira. Many people, including Dr. Agostinho Illunga, Dinis Mondlane and Tomás Nyatumba, had been charged with high treason against the Government. In 1962 they had been sentenced to five years' imprisonment in Lisbon plus fifteen years' residence in Portugal and deprived of all political rights.

434. Innumerable arrests were planned by the "black" Portuguese and their network of informers and executed by the white man. PIDE was a terrorist organization modelled after the Gestapo. Some PIDE members succeeded in joining liberation movements for the purpose of betraying them. They tried to expel freedom fighters from the Party and even from the host country; they had gaols where nationalists were kept indefinitely; with the money they obtained from Portugal they enticed nationalist leaders to return to their homeland where they faced immediate arrest, as in the case of Daniel Mahlayeye, Matias Mboa, Bomba Tembe, José Cavane and many others. They called themselves the "Mozambique Liberation Front" and three years ago had proclaimed a fictitious armed struggle to confuse world opinion. Recently they claimed to control two thirds of Mozambique, yet they were reluctant to unite with the people. That situation was a major obstacle in the struggle for liberation but it did not lessen the determination of the oppressed people of Mozambique to fight colonialism, racism and neo-colonialism to the bitter end.

435. Southern Rhodesia provided a concrete example of imperialist manoeuvres; Ian Smith would never have dared to proclaim the unilateral declaration of independence had he not been assured of the support of the "Unholy Alliance"—Verwoerd, Smith and Salazar.

436. Since 1961, when Portugal had announced its intention to encourage the immigration of white settlers, there had been a large increase in the white population, especially in the north. A substantial number of troops had settled there after the Angola uprising. That was part of a plan to make it virtually impossible for nationalist forces trained outside the country to penetrate into Mozambique.

437. Although Portugal was a poor country, it boasted of being able to resist 12 million Africans.

That was thanks to the material support of NATO, which was encouraging the creation of a racist empire in southern Africa.

438. In Mozambique, the Portuguese forces consisted of divisions of the regular army, with artillery, engineers, and army medical corps, infantry, cavalry and an army service corps, a special army of hunters, a volunteer corps, an air force, a police force and a reserve force. All those forces were well equipped with modern weapons and unlimited supplies of ammunition. In the previous year they had numbered 45,000 men, but that figure had been increased to 60,000 last December.

439. As a result of Portugal's colonial policy, Mozambique had become a police State, a land of gaols and concentration camps and a battlefield where the African people lived in terror.

440. As for the authentic opposition groups, UDENAMO had been the first party of the kind formed outside Mozambique.

441. In 1962 a liberation front had been created. In 1963, however, several members of the front had been expelled and had gone to Cairo and formed UDENAMO. In spite of meetings in Cairo with FRELIMO leaders in 1963 and 1964, UDENAMO had not rejoined FRELIMO. UDENAMO members, like those of FRELIMO, were freedom fighters; but to liberate Mozambique through an armed struggle would be impossible without unity.

442. On behalf of UDENAMO the petitioner appealed to the Special Committee, since all possible means of moral pressure and persuasion had been exhausted and since all the United Nations resolutions concerning Portuguese administration in Mozambique had been ignored by Portugal, to place the problem before the Security Council. The Security Council should adopt strong measures to prevent Portugal from terrorizing and exterminating the African population from Mozambique and should force Portugal to implement all previous United Nations resolutions in order to restore peace and respect for the lives and property of the people.

443. He also renewed UDENAMO's protest against Portugal's violation of the Declaration of Human Rights and requested the Special Committee to bring the case before the Security Council.

Petitioners concerning Guinea under Portuguese administration

444. Mr. Amílcar Cabral, speaking on behalf of the Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde (PAIGC), said that the situation in Guinea had developed considerably in the past year, but the crucial problem unfortunately remained unchanged. The armed struggle was continuing in Guinea and the Cape Verde Islands. The people of Guinea hated war, but war was being forced upon them by Portugal's refusal to recognize their most elementary rights. Moreover, by their struggle the people of Guinea were defending the cause of the United Nations, which was the cause of all mankind. Three years of armed combat had convinced the fighters that they were fighting not only Portuguese oppression but all régimes in which man was still being oppressed by man.

445. He was appearing before the Special Committee as a freedom fighter and not as a politician. His country's struggle, however, was a political struggle: its purpose was not to kill all the Portuguese soldiers

or to win a war, but just to be free, and that was a political objective.

446. In order to assist the Committee in its work, he had brought with him several impartial witnesses who had no special connexion with so-called Portuguese Guinea and who were prepared to testify. He had also brought with him, as in the previous year, some documentary films which would do more to enlighten the members of the Special Committee on what was really happening in his country than any oral testimony.

447. The Chairman of his party had again been sentenced to solitary confinement, other leaders had recently been tortured and arbitrary arrests were still increasing.

448. On the morning of 5 June, ten bombers and four jet aircraft had bombed a small village in Guinea where a meeting of active leaders had been held the previous day. The village had been completely destroyed, seven persons had been killed and fifteen seriously wounded. The aircraft had been American B-26s and Fiats manufactured in the Federal Republic of Germany. Portugal, which was an underdeveloped country ranking last among the European nations, did not manufacture aircraft. Why, then, were the Western countries helping to bomb the people of Guinea? He did not understand the contradictions in the attitude taken by the United States, which proclaimed itself the friend of Africa but continued to help Salazar and the Portuguese criminals. The legitimate aspirations of the people of Guinea were in no way incompatible with those of the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany.

449. He expressed the hope that the Special Committee—since it could not provide arms for the people of Guinea—would use its influence to see that they received international assistance for purposes of strengthening their economy and improving public health and education. The areas of the country which had already been liberated were in urgent need of such assistance.

450. The PAIGC had already liberated almost half the Guinean territory, so much so that the enemy forces were obliged to keep to the confines of their barracks. All that the eye-witnesses who were with him had seen of the Portuguese had been their aircraft. Throughout the liberated regions, the people were in no danger of being arrested or massacred by Portuguese troops. It was only the air-raids that claimed victims.

451. In the rest of Guinea, large areas were outside Portuguese control. Some people regarded them as liberated. The PAIGC was less categorical, because it was not yet in control of them. The actual situation was that in the south the liberated regions were Catió, Fulacunda, about half the Xitoli region and the Boé region; in the north, the PAIGC controlled the Oio and Farim regions, about half the São Domingos region, approximately 30 per cent of the Canchungo region and approximately 25 per cent of the Gabu region. At Bissau the Portuguese no longer exercised any political or military control. In fact, all they held now was their own towns.

452. In reply to questions, he said that the PAIGC did not yet control a single inch of the territory of the Cape Verde Islands. It was confining itself at present to consolidating its local organization in order to launch the armed struggle as soon as possible, since Portugal's attitude left it no other choice. Starvation and the brutality of the occupying Power had in fact become intolerable.

453. The administrative problems of the Territories of which he was the spokesman were, indeed, fundamental issues. The Portuguese had been in so-called Portuguese Guinea for five centuries, and for five centuries the Portuguese had systematically acted in such a way as to prevent the local people from administering their own affairs. The population was 99.7 per cent illiterate. The problem of key personnel was therefore crucial. Efforts were being made to solve it with the help of the few national elements available and the experts supplied by African nations. The liberated regions had been divided into zones administered by the PAIGC. At the regional and zonal levels, the party was endeavouring to settle the administrative, health, education, economic and other problems.

454. In the public health field the main problem was that of doctors and medical supplies. During the last session of the Special Committee, the petitioners had asked the United Nations to intervene with the International Red Cross and other competent organizations to obtain medical assistance from them. They had also requested that the World Health Organization (WHO), either directly or through the agency of the neighbouring African countries, should find the means of sending doctors to their liberation movement. At present, the situation with regard to doctors and medical supplies was still very grave. His party was trying to solve the problem. It had set up health centres at its bases for treatment of the less serious casualties and the general population. It had established a military hospital in the south and another in the north. Some medical orderlies who had been trained by the Portuguese at Bissau were in turn giving medical training to young volunteers of both sexes.

455. With regard to education, the party had established nearly a hundred schools in the liberated regions; it now had four times as many primary schools and pupils as under the Portuguese: there were over 8,000 children enrolled at school as against 2,000 at the time when education had been the responsibility of the occupying Power. The party was engaged in training cadres, both inside and outside the country. It was receiving foreign aid for that purpose. For the coming July it had organized a teachers' finishing course in Guinea. The country's universities had all been mobilized to ensure the development of literary and scientific education. The problem of teachers was acute, since for language reasons there could be no question of making use of foreign instructors. The lack of textbooks and school equipment was also a very serious problem. The party had published reading books, out of its own resources, and had bought some scientific works and mathematics textbooks, but its requirements in the way of books and educational equipment were still considerable. If UNESCO, for which he had the greatest admiration, could help his movement in that field, it would thereby be making a most effective contribution to the struggle against illiteracy.

456. As far as the country's economy was concerned, it could not even be called under-developed. It was not developed at all. Portugal had made Portuguese Guinea a colony whose business was slaves first and then factories. Monoculture had been the rule until now. Efforts were now being made to encourage new crops, in particular ground-nuts. Up to the present he himself had been the only agricultural expert in

the country but was awaiting the arrival of three colleagues from abroad.

457. The economy of so-called Portuguese Guinea was basically agricultural. The party had drawn up a report on the possibilities for the development of that economy and was starting to put the conclusions of its report into effect. Besides ground-nuts, the cultivation of other oil-bearing crops, manioc and sweet potatoes was being developed. There were now some people's shops where they could obtain manufactured goods from abroad in exchange for the agricultural products at their disposal. It was a barter system into which money did not enter. The manufactured goods of prime necessity came mainly from gifts.

458. The school children were going to carry out a tree-planting programme. Furthermore, the Territory possessed unexploited petroleum and bauxite resources. The party was counting on the co-operation of foreign countries and the United Nations to help it to exploit its resources and thus gradually to raise the level of living of the population, which was at present extremely low.

459. In reply to questions he said that Portuguese reprisals mainly took the form of bombing isolated villages from the air, while in the big centres, the Portuguese settlers were still arresting and torturing patriots. One of his associates who had been on an assignment for *Jeune Afrique* in the north of the country and had gone into a bombed village near the Farim River after some aircraft had flown over and would later describe his experience to the Committee.

460. The morale of the Portuguese troops was very low. They were taking part in the war because they did not know how to get out of it. Many soldiers deserted and turned up with the forces of the liberation army. More recently, one of the deserters had said that at least 60 per cent of the soldiers in his barracks were tired of the war and wanted only to see the end of it. In that atmosphere there were constant conflicts between soldiers and men. For at least a year and a half the Portuguese had been on the defensive. In fact, their only offensives were directed against the civilian population, whom they bombed relentlessly. The liberation army, on the other hand, had made a point of constantly taking the offensive. That was the very principle of its struggle. His country would fight to the end to achieve independence.

461. He quoted an extract from an article by the Portuguese journalist, Martinho Simões, that had appeared in the *Diário de Notícias* for April 1966:

"I think 'sad' is the word that best describes the mission of the men who make up the mobile fighting units. Indeed, they must expect the most hostile living conditions. Clearing the way for themselves through the *capim*, tearing their flesh on the rough *tarraço* (tamarisk), getting bogged down in the mud which covers large areas of the Guinean soil (how many times are they not forced to advance hand in hand or else 'swim' over the viscous substance), they have only themselves to rely on.

"They know that the enemy is on the watch for them, hidden in the dense vegetation. They know that the attack will come at any moment—or rather, in the worst circumstances: when some obstacle immobilizes them or when some mishap lowers the efficiency of their security system. They know that if the terrorists decide to take the offensive, it is because they have calculated beforehand that the situation is favourable to them, either because of their numerical superiority,

or because of the quantity and quality of the arms at their disposal, or else because they occupy a favourable position. They know that ambush is an imminent danger. They know that they will not have a single moment of rest, however long the expedition lasts. . . .

". . . Meanwhile, in the barracks, the garrisons must constantly keep on the alert. The '*bandoleiros*' (brigands) are cowards. They come, under cover of silence and the dark of night, hurl the instruments of death supplied to them in abundance by the Communists and flee back to their encampments in the neighbouring countries."

462. To supplement the information he had provided he asked the Committee to hear his four associates, Mrs. Joyce Lusso, Mr. Justin Vieyra, Mr. Isidro Romero and Mr. Piero Nelli, whom he had included in his request for a hearing (A/AC.109/PET.511 and Add.1) and who would each describe what he had personally seen in Guinea. Two of them were film-makers, one French and one Italian, and two were Italian journalists.

463. Mrs. Joyce Lusso said that she had recently returned from a journey to the southern part of so-called Portuguese Guinea. She had been mainly interested in the civil organization of the region. The war there was a harsh necessity and it was proceeding, all things considered, in circumstances which gave every ground for hope. It was still necessary, however, to establish a society capable of administering its own affairs in those areas. The Portuguese had so far prevented that. The 99.7 per cent of the population who were illiterate were *ipso facto* deprived of their civil rights. Under Portuguese law, Guinea was not a colony but a province, the inhabitants of which had the same rights as Portuguese citizens provided that they fulfilled the required conditions, which it was quite impossible for them to do. In fact, in order to vote, every Guinean citizen had to know Portuguese, be familiar with Portuguese custom and culture and submit financial guarantees. That being so, the vast majority of the population were actually governed by a colonial statute which had quickly reduced them to slavery, inasmuch as they were forced to accept inadmissible work contracts and in some cases were liable to deportation.

464. With the support of the population, the liberation army had managed to keep Portuguese troops out of the liberated zones. The occupying Power had no recourse but bombing. In fact, reconnaissance aircraft and bombers were the only vestiges of mechanization that the country owed to the Portuguese. Those towns and villages were bombed, either once or repeatedly, and rather than seeking safety in flight the local population was persisting in rebuilding them, with admirable tenacity.

465. The administration of the liberated regions was entrusted to two interregional administrative committees, subdivided into four regional committees in the north and six in the south. The regions were subdivided into sectors or provinces, each covering a certain number of villages or communes and administered by five party members and five representatives elected by the people. The whole population, men and women, took part in administrative activities and in the organization of production and distribution at the village level.

466. At the interregional and regional committee levels, the administrative heads were appointed by the party. At the sectoral and communal levels, some administrators were appointed by the party, while others

were elected according to democratic procedures. The relationship between the administrative services, the armed forces and the party was an extremely flexible one. There was no hierarchical crystallization, but constant osmosis between the military life and civilian life. It was an extremely interesting phenomenon to observe, to which men and women contributed equally. The regular army had been formed with the help of foreign countries. It was supplemented by groups of partisans in the *maquis* and by popular militias. Justice was dispensed by democratically elected committees, except in cases which called for the establishment of a special court.

467. The local economy was still a subsistence economy, which sufficed to feed the population. Each committee organized communal work in the territory under its jurisdiction. There, as elsewhere, the women worked side by side with the men.

468. Education at all levels was one of the prime concerns of the committee, which was building schools in the forests to try to protect their pupils against enemy bombing, for it should be stressed that the Portuguese showed a predilection for attacking school sites.

469. She had visited several schools in the liberated regions. The buildings were primitive: roofs of foliage and branches, tree trunks for tables and benches. Text-books were lacking. The whole village, however, was taking part in an amazing way in the literacy campaign that had been undertaken. The teachers were very young people who had just completed their secondary education and were devoting two years to teaching before leaving for advanced study abroad.

470. She appealed to all to help those bush schools to obtain school equipment, paper and cotton fabric to make pinafores for the children.

471. To sum up, she had been able to see for herself that the foundations of a future democratic society were already laid and that that society was developing coherently, on the basis of exchanges between doctrine and experience.

472. Replying to a question, the petitioner said that there was no lack of food. The people of the southern regions were industrious and despite the lack of modern equipment they used highly advanced methods. Rice was cultivated as in Italy and production was so abundant that it was possible to build up stocks in the people's shops and the silos. The rice might be used as trading currency if the lack of communications did not make it impossible to transport. The country also produced ground-nut oil and palm oil. There was an abundance of livestock and poultry. The people were well fed, strong and healthy. The party was planning the country's agriculture in order to replace the monoculture system established by the Portuguese by a subsistence economy.

473. The liberation army had at its disposal a more than satisfactory supply of arms and, in particular, anti-aircraft batteries, bazookas and very efficient mortars, which enabled the fighters to drive off enemy bombers. The army was very well organized. It was closely linked with the population and there was no trace of hierarchical crystallization in it. The fighters had no ranks. They were not professional soldiers. The cadres were locally recruited and there were no foreign volunteers in the liberation army. Its advance was rational and coherent. Around the liberated zones, the popular army had the upper hand and the Portuguese avoided engagements. The Portuguese bases had been reinforced, but they were completely isolated and cut off, so much so that

their provisions were brought by helicopter. The regular army, with the help of advance actions carried out by the partisans, made frequent forays into enemy territory. It should not be forgotten that the war had started only four years ago. Soon the liberation army would pursue its advance and seize the large towns; that would present not only military problems but political problems which all the forces of democracy would have to help in resolving.

474. Mr. Justin Vieyra said that he had spent three days in the Guinean *maquis*, from 5 to 8 June 1966. He had been with some *maquis* leaders when, at about 5 o'clock on the morning of 5 June, his friend Nino had told him to run and lie down in the grass to escape the bombers. His terror had been such that he had been able to count only four bombers, but there had certainly been more of them. An hour later, he had gone into the bombed village. He had counted seven dead or dying, one of whom had been disembowelled. He had seen the corpses of a four-year-old child, a young woman and so forth, and a village devastated by bombing, for the aircraft had returned to the attack several times. While he was on the river, in the open, he had seen two jet aircraft machine-gunning the bombed village. The next day the same village had been looted.

475. During the four days he had spent on Guinean territory, it had been the atrocities which had struck him most of all. He appealed to those Africans who were unaware that war was at their door. A mistake was all that was needed for Dakar or any of the Guinean towns to suffer the same fate as the martyred village he had passed through. It should be noted above all that the Portuguese were not attacking soldiers but the civilian population in the villages, which showed the atrocity of that inhuman war.

476. Mr. Isidro Romero, a French film-maker, said that he had travelled through northern and southern Guinea. In the southern part of the Territory he had been able to take some interesting shots. The group he was with had been waiting for a column coming to get arms. The column had arrived bearing on a stretcher two wounded, a man and a child, the sole survivors of a village that had been attacked by the Portuguese. The child had tried to run away. He had been shot down by a bullet in the heel, and then a Portuguese officer had come and given him what he had thought was the finishing stroke. The deadly bullet, passing through the child's ear, had torn out his cheek, but unfortunately for the Portuguese the child has survived to bear witness to their atrocities. The film that was to be shown to the Committee would illustrate that story.

477. He recalled the case of the wounded man he had seen beside the child of whom he had already spoken. The man, who was middle-aged, had received bazooka splinters in his leg ten days earlier. As the liberation army had no anti-gangrene serum, the man's leg was slowly rotting and the wound was crawling with huge worms. The members of the Special Committee would be able to see in the film that was to be shown to them some pictures that were not easy to stomach, dramatically illustrating the fighters' lack of medical supplies.

478. As a film-maker, he had taken part in an ambush organized by the detachment of the liberation army which had launched an attack on the Portuguese town of Mançoa. The detachment had taken a road that some African workers were repairing under the supervision of Portuguese soldiers. At about 1 p.m. it had attacked the lorries taking the Portuguese soldiers back

to their barracks and had set fire to eleven enemy lorries and two automatic machine-guns. It had, of course, spared the lorry carrying the African labourers.

479. *Mr. Piero Nelli*, an Italian film-maker, said that he and his team had made their first stop in a village which the Portuguese had bombed immediately after their departure. The bombing had left a number of dead, including five girls. During its northward march, the team had passed through another village that had been completely destroyed by the Portuguese. While shooting the film they had seen aircraft bombing a third village a few miles away and had managed to film the bombing. They had later gone to the headquarters of the army of the north and had visited field hospitals there, where the wounded partisans were given treatment. It was true that the sight of soldiers wounded in a war had shocked him less than seeing the deliberate butchering of innocent women and children, so implacable were the laws of war.

480. Describing the films that were to be shown to the Committee which had been shot during fifteen days in the *maquis*, he said that he had managed to take some shots inside a field hospital in the north which was devoted mainly to the treatment of war casualties. He had seen some amazing things there: the morning was devoted to the medical care usually given to the wounded, injections, dressings and so forth. Then, young student nurses attended in rotation two-hour courses dealing not only with nursing and first aid but also with general therapy. He himself had been present at a clinical lecture on angina pectoris. On the night of 2-3 February 1966, immediately after he had crossed the frontier between Senegal and so-called Portuguese Guinea, he had seen a school in a forest where a sixteen-year-old youth was teaching soldiers and children to read.

481. The aspirations of the people had been expressed in very simple and naive terms by a peasant woman during a meeting held at the northern headquarters of the Guinean liberation army: "We want to open people's shops in the north of the country where purchases can be made by barter. We want our men to come back and work the land. We want the war to end, but we also want to win it, because this war is a just one, because this war has given us hospitals, schools and freedom, because this war gives us back the land that belongs to us."

482. Replying to a question on the morale of the Portuguese troops, he recalled two episodes at which he had been present in person. Firstly, he had taken part in the fighting near Mansoa, where the Guinean army had laid an ambush for the Portuguese troops. The troops had arrived. All their heavy fire had been concentrated on the liberation army detachment facing them, but they had confined themselves to remaining on the defensive. A group of about thirty freedom fighters had attacked a hundred men, four armoured trucks and two tanks. They had destroyed two trucks and put thirty to forty men out of action. The reason for the Portuguese failure to counter-attack was that they were not sure of the morale of their troops. Secondly, he had seen Portuguese troops disembarking on the other side of Farim and embarking in a gunboat guided by a helicopter. The soldiers had made their way through the bush, shooting at random. They had advanced in disarray, but had made no attempt to attack.

483. In reply to further questions the petitioner, *Mr. Cabral*, said that the question of the Territories under Portuguese domination should be brought before

the Security Council and that the United Nations specialized agencies should give the nationalist liberation movements assistance. It was essential that the Security Council should declare the sanctions against Portugal obligatory and place an embargo on the supply of arms, if the resolutions were to be really effective. It should also be recognized that the nationalist movements were creating the necessary conditions for the implementation of the principles of the Charter, the Declaration on Human Rights, self-determination and independence. Assistance from the specialized agencies, such as UNICEF, UNESCO, WHO and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, could be provided through the intermediary of CONCP.

484. The nationalists' various movements were already preparing themselves to take over responsibilities of government after independence and a new experiment was in progress in Guinea and Cape Verde. The planning had to be by progressive stages, taking account of the economic, social and cultural situation of the region. Although extensive areas had been liberated, there was no question, for the moment, of setting up a provisional government; nevertheless, in all the liberated regions administrative organs were being created and gradually separated from the party structure. As an example, he mentioned the establishment of a civil registry office and health services, and arrangements for a census during the current year. All the leaders of the struggle and all educated people were devoting themselves to economic, social and cultural studies, in order to be able to assume all responsibilities after independence.

485. In the years since 1950 the patriots in the different territories had begun to become aware of their position as men and Africans. They had first of all created combined movements for the common struggle. From 1956 onwards, national organizations had been set up in each Territory. In 1961 the first conference of nationalist movements had been held in Casablanca, following which it had been possible to establish a Secretariat. The second conference, which had been held at Dar es Salaam, in 1965, had made it possible to establish concrete bases for co-ordination at the political and military level with a view to the reconstruction of the countries. At that conference it had been decided, among other things, that one person would represent the Portuguese Territories at international conferences in future. Another meeting was to be held at Brazzaville in the near future with a view to strengthening that co-ordination. A military commission was engaged in co-ordinating military activities in the various countries and a social commission was dealing with questions of education and health assistance. There was also a joint programme for primary schools. Other bodies had been established to promote the exchange of experience, for the struggle was the same for all; every nationalist was aware of himself as an African and was fighting for the liberation of his country and his people.

486. Not only the Portuguese Territories but all the African States and all peace- and freedom-loving States throughout the world were concerned about the establishment of a fascist régime in South Africa and in Southern Rhodesia. The consequences were in part subjective and in part objective. From the subjective point of view, the fact that a racist régime was developing with impunity in Africa strengthened the hopes, the illusions and the machinations of the Portuguese colonialists. From the objective point of view, it was clear that Portugal, Southern Rhodesia and South Africa were taking practical steps to persecute, arrest and

massacre the African. In Guinea, for example, Portugal in agreement with South Africa, was building a large airport on an island, to replace the African airports from which South Africa was barred. The airport would also give Portugal a secure base from which to bomb the people of the Cape Verde Islands and Guinea.

487. After three years of struggle, the people had discovered the secret of the colonial war being waged by Portugal, a poor and backward country. Portugal was in fact using American arms, as a journalist had written in *The Washington Post*. The people had realized that Portugal was receiving aircraft, napalm bombs and automatic weapons from its NATO allies. The States members of NATO replied that they did not authorize Portugal to use those weapons. If, however, you gave a knife to a madman bent on killing, how could you expect him not to use it? He also pointed out that the ESSO Company had renewed a contract with Portugal. At the start of the war of liberation the company's technicians had been dismissed, but after three years of fighting, when it was realized that the struggle would continue, the American company had concluded a new contract. He had asked a United States Embassy representative in Conakry the reason for that and had been told that the company was no doubt anxious to keep its leading position. In the present situation, that act was regarded as an unfriendly one, since it put more funds at Portugal's disposal for the continuation of its struggle.

488. As to the reported delivery of Italian FIAT aircraft by the Federal Republic of Germany to Portugal, that was because within the framework of the Common Market and the agreements between Italy and the Federal Republic, FIAT aircraft were being assembled in the Federal Republic of Germany. There were twenty of those aircraft operating in Guinea. Thus aircraft designed by Italian brains and built by German manpower were being delivered for use in the Territories under Portuguese domination to exterminate the people, whose sole desire was to build their country in peace, like the Italian people.

489. Besides the aircraft and arms from the Federal Republic of Germany and the United States, other arms had been found, such as machine-guns and grenades, for example, made in Italy and Belgium. Furthermore, it was almost certain that the helicopters being used in Guinea were French-manufactured Alouettes.

490. Up to four months earlier the total strength of the Portuguese troops in the Territory had been about 20,000 men but, following the many losses it had suffered, Portugal had raised that figure to 25,000. He could not say whether there were any mercenaries among them. With respect to aviation, there were technicians at Bissau hidden in a villa some distance from the town who were probably not Portuguese, for they did not look Portuguese and did not speak that language. He did not know what their nationality was but he supposed they were South Africans. It was quite likely that the countries which were supplying planes to Portugal were also sending it technicians to look after them.

491. The Portuguese had on several occasions violated the air space of Guinea and Senegal, and both countries had brought complaints of the violation of their frontiers before the Security Council. Such violations were a common occurrence. The previous month, on 6 May 1966 if he was not mistaken, the Portuguese had crossed the Guinean frontier in order to go and set fire to a village and to capture the chiefs

of the village because the nationalist forces had made a mortar attack on one of their barracks in Buruntuma. There had followed an exchange of fire between the Portuguese troops and the Guinean troops, but Guinea had not brought that incident before the Security Council for it considered it to be part of the daily struggle. He understood that Portuguese aircraft had been brought down in the Congo (Brazzaville), too. Portuguese troops had also repeatedly crossed the Senegalese frontier to burn down villages.

492. Replying to a question on armaments used by his movement, he said that every national liberation struggle had its own laws. The arms used had to correspond to the actual needs of the struggle. At the beginning the fighters had had only traditional and primitive weapons, lances and pistols. Subsequently, they had managed to obtain rifles, machine pistols and even small cannon. Aircraft and sophisticated weapons would be necessary, but technical staff able to use them would also be needed. Although the nationalist forces had captured some tanks they did not keep them, because they were unable to use them. They therefore destroyed them with mines or bazookas. The tanks were usually of American origin or from the Federal Republic of Germany. In the fighters' day-to-day struggle it was the men who counted above all, and there were many ready to sacrifice their lives for the triumph of their cause.

493. The system of colonial justice in the Territory was the same as in all colonial countries. Guinea was regarded as a *comarca*, i.e., as a division of the Portuguese judicial system, subject to the authority of Lisbon. There was one system of justice for the Europeans and the *assimilados* and another for the indigenous population. The latter were dealt summary justice by the local administrator. They were arrested and given no possibility of defence, and their fate depended on the arbitrary wishes of that administrator. In general they were sentenced to prison, corporal punishment or forced labour. He suggested that for fuller information on that question the representative of Sierra Leone might consult the report which had been submitted to the Special Committee on Territories under Portuguese administration at Conakry in 1962. The report, entitled "The People of so-called Portuguese Guinea before the United Nations" gave some very precise details on the way in which justice was administered in that Territory.

494. PAIGC did not consider that there were really any Guinean representatives in the Portuguese National Assembly. The Portuguese Government chose the representatives of so-called Portuguese Guinea itself, in order to be able to claim that there were representatives of that country in the National Assembly. There were at present four so-called Guineans among the members of that Assembly but only one of them was really a Guinean and the PAIGC regarded him as a traitor. There were no real elections in so-called Portuguese Guinea.

495. As to the attitude of the PAIGC, if Mr. Salazar no longer held power and Portugal's colonial policy subsequently changed and became favourable to independence for Guinea called Portuguese Guinea, the petitioner said that his party was not struggling against the Portuguese people, but against Salazar's fascist régime. It was not certain whether the disappearance of that régime would necessarily lead to a change of attitude on the part of the Portuguese Government. If, however, such were the case, the PAIGC

would be ready to collaborate with the Portuguese Government if that Government recognized its just claims. The Guineans did not like war; they had been impelled to fight, against their will.

496. PAIGC was at present making efforts to spread the idea of liberty among the Portuguese soldiers, so that they might appreciate the liberation movement and ultimately defect and enlist in its ranks, and it had already achieved some results. In fact, a good many of the Portuguese troops were illiterate and understood nothing about the struggle they were forced to engage in. Portugal was trying to keep them in ignorance, to prevent them revolting. The Political Commissioner of the nationalist army had prepared leaflets for the Portuguese soldiers, to be planted on the route the soldiers were to take. The leaflets, however, never included any words of hatred of the Portuguese. Some leaflets had been planted in the north of the country encouraging the Portuguese soldiers to desert.

497. One deserter, a twenty-year-old Portuguese, who had been in Guinea for ten months, when asked whether he knew why he was fighting a war, had replied that the Portuguese officers told their troops they were to go and disperse the bandits. The deserter had said, moreover, that the exit of his barracks was guarded and that the supply of provisions was very bad. On being asked whether he thought the nationalists had any chance of winning the war, the soldier had replied in the affirmative, pointing out that the Portuguese did not know the terrain well and that that was why they always put their African recruits in forward positions.

Petitioners concerning São Tomé and Príncipe

498. Mr. Medeiros, speaking on behalf of the Comité de Libertação de São Tomé e Príncipe (CLSTP), said that the fact that the Special Committee, in the closing stage of its journey, had included the question of the Portuguese Territories in its agenda signified that the struggle of those peoples was now one of the most important events in the African continent.

499. That event, which was unprecedented in the history of Portuguese colonialism, showed that in the present circumstances the people of São Tomé and Príncipe, regardless of their geographical situation, the size of their Territory and the number of their population, was determined to liquidate colonial domination completely.

500. It caused him particular joy to see, in the Special Committee, delegates representing peoples of Africa, Asia and Latin America which, in equally difficult circumstances, were waging a struggle to consolidate their political and economic independence.

501. Three years had elapsed since the last contact between the representative of São Tomé and Príncipe and the Fourth Committee of the United Nations.

502. An understanding of the various problems created by the Portuguese presence in that country revealed that the relationship between colonizer and colonized continued to be dominated by a pattern in which the colonizer was the landowner and the African a mere instrument of production.

503. While the *roça* (a huge agricultural property) was still the nucleus of agrarian activities in the island, which were tied to the exploitation of the productive land, great changes had been made in its physiognomy for the purpose of concentrating everything in the

hands of two large Portuguese monopolies, Banco Nacional Ultramarino and Companhia União Fabril.

504. Those huge agricultural properties occupied 93 per cent of the arable land, and their internal configuration gave the archipelago the appearance of a collection of "micro-states" in which the periphery was occupied by the indigenous population. Their economic activities were quite limited, and they entailed subsistence agriculture in an area representing 7 per cent of the arable land and monopolizing 52 per cent of the population of the archipelago.

505. The annual national income of the inhabitants of São Tomé and Príncipe was about \$US25. The standard of living of the population was one of the lowest in the world, and the infant mortality rate was 42 per thousand. In addition, tropical diseases, illiteracy, which was about 85 per cent, and malnutrition were facts of everyday life; hence the conflict which was daily becoming more bitter owing to the scarcity of manpower.

506. The emergence of a revolutionary spirit, resulting from the conditions in which the Portuguese presence had been imposed (colonization, slavery, oppression and resistance to oppression), and the patient action of the Comité de Libertação de São Tomé e Príncipe had caused Portugal to strengthen its military apparatus; a complete war machine had been established and was being perfected, in order to stifle at birth the aspirations of the people of São Tomé and Príncipe to independence.

507. In December 1965, a group of seventeen patriots in São Tomé, including the very well-known poetess Alda de Espírito Santo, had been arrested.

508. The PIDE (political police) were using unhappily traditional methods of torture on them. In particular, a young student, António Lamba, had had to be admitted to a psychiatric clinic because of the ill-treatment inflicted on him.

509. The historical perspective and the importance of the struggle of the people of São Tomé and Príncipe might not be appreciated if geographical size alone was considered. Whereas in the past the islands of São Tomé and Príncipe, owing to their geographical situation, had functioned as depots for slaves, the archipelago was now actually becoming, in view of the expansion of the struggles for liberation in Angola and Mozambique, a military base against the nationalist movements in those countries, as well as in São Tomé and Príncipe.

510. The archipelago was gaining importance in the context of air communications between Portugal and its Territories, especially since the independent African countries had closed their harbours and airports to the Portuguese colonialists.

511. The archipelago functioned as a supporting and supply base for aircraft flying from Lisbon to Angola and Mozambique. In addition, the struggle by the imperialist Powers for the reconquest of Africa made the archipelago a supporting base for any future punitive operations against neighbouring countries. For instance, the Bonn militarists and *revanchistes* were toying with the idea of establishing a military base in the island of São Tomé.

512. It was for that reason that the airport at São Tomé had been improved in the light of new military needs. As a result of the improvements, Angola and Mozambique were required to contribute 1.7 million escudos each, and São Tomé 600,000 escudos, to the

operational budget of the airport, under the terms of Decree No. 45,745 of 1 June 1965.

513. Armed struggle was the only solution to the colonial conflict in São Tomé and Príncipe, and CLSTP was fully aware of the risks involved in that solution. Portugal's attitude both towards the peoples of the archipelago and towards the neighbouring African States were such that the Portuguese Government must be regarded as an aggressor. That being so, the Security Council must apply obligatory sanctions against Portugal and, in particular, must place an embargo on the supply of arms and military *matériel*.

514. He was glad that that point and others raised by all the representatives of the peoples of the Portuguese Territories had been included in the draft resolutions of the Special Committee (A/AC.109/L.315 and A/AC.109/L.313).

515. The people of São Tomé and Príncipe had been living for five centuries under the weight of Portuguese colonial domination, and the history of their struggle showed that decolonization could be achieved only by the will of the people, guided exclusively by the revolutionary ideal.

516. In conclusion, he wished to pay ardent tribute to the Algerian people, whose struggle for liberation was a lesson to all and formed part of the heritage of progressive men everywhere.

Petitioner concerning other Territories under Portuguese administration

517. Mr. de Andrade, speaking on behalf of the Conferência das Organizações Nacionalistas das Colónias Portuguesas (CONCP), said that the formation of the Committee on Decolonization was the culmination of a prolonged struggle within the United Nations to have colonialism condemned, one of the most significant landmarks of which had been the adoption of resolution 1514 (XV) on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples.

518. The time had passed when reports of the violence practised by the colonial administration were drowned by the many other conflicts in which the great imperialist Powers were involved. The whole world was now aware that Portugal was exploiting its colonies and rejecting the demands and aspirations of the indigenous populations. The reports drawn up by the Fourth Committee of the General Assembly described, not a "Portuguese oasis of peace", but battlefields of national liberation wars.

519. The spirit and letter of the United Nations Charter provided a legal basis and moral support for the war of liberation being waged by the peoples of the Portuguese colonies. The General Assembly resolution of 20 December 1965 recognized the legitimacy of the means employed to make the right to self-determination and independence prevail. It was for that reason that one of the leaders of the nationalist movements had rightly declared that those who were fighting were anonymous United Nations fighters. In confronting that just people's war, Portugal had the advantage of the complicity and the diplomatic, military and economic support of the members of NATO. Those countries were contravening the principles of the Charter, of which they were signatories.

520. The Conferência das Organizações Nacionalistas das Colónias Portuguesas described itself as a unified fighting front for the elimination of Portuguese colonialism. It had grown out of the need to

co-ordinate the efforts of various existing organizations with a view to enabling them to attain their immediate objective: the conquest of national independence. The Conference had reorganized itself in December 1965 in order better to co-ordinate the political and military action of its member nationalist movements. The Conference played the part of a catalyst of the popular forces and organized concerted action at the international level. Since the meeting at Casablanca in April 1961 at which it had been formed, CONCP had been in touch constantly with the United Nations, OAU and the African States. It had been lobbying for an economic and diplomatic boycott of Portugal. The adoption by the General Assembly of resolution 1514 (XV) had placed the problem of eradicating colonialism in a new light and provided wider scope for international action by nationalist movements. The CONCP mission which had visited New York in November 1965 had submitted to the Fourth Committee specific proposals, the spirit, if not the letter, of which was reproduced in the resolutions adopted by the General Assembly at its previous session.

521. The national liberation movement in Portuguese colonies had always had a dual aim. Firstly, it sought to destroy the Portuguese colonial structures and to gain effective control of vast regions of Angola, Mozambique and Guinea; secondly, it was engaged in national reconstruction in all spheres of political, administrative, economic, social and cultural life. Where terror and arbitrary rule, ignorance and disease had formerly prevailed, it established the democracy inherent in the nature of nationalist movements and set up schools and health centres. That factor introduced a new dimension into the task of decolonization. From the moment when armed struggle had come to be seen as the only means of securing the right to self-determination, nationalist movements had had to alter the emphasis of their efforts. Decolonization should, in fact, deprive Portugal of any opportunity of establishing another type of domination after independence was achieved. It should be noted, in that connexion, that the Portuguese Government had never shown any inclination for a negotiated solution to the problem of its colonies on the basis of the right to self-determination. There was abundant proof that Portugal did not recognize the principle that the interests of the inhabitants of the Territories under its domination were paramount; the nationalist movements had therefore had to undertake the responsibility of themselves administering the peoples in wartime. The liberation movements played a peaceful part in that sphere: they respected the culture of the peoples and provided for their political, economic and social advance. The international consequences of that state of affairs were obvious. By speaking the language of justice, law, democracy and culture, the liberation movements were helping to strengthen international peace and security. In the light of that new information on the situation in the liberated areas, Chapter XI, and particularly Article 73, of the Charter relating to Non-Self-Governing Territories no longer appeared to have any meaning.

522. He expressed appreciation of the work done by the High Commissioner for Refugees. That problem was sufficiently important to form the subject of a seminar in which the leaders of the nationalist movements could participate.

523. CONCP, which acted on behalf of the Comité de Libertação de São Tomé e Príncipe, the Frente de

Libertação de Moçambique, the Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola and the Partido Africano da Independência de Guiné e Cabo Verde, considered that the question of the Territories administered by Portugal should not only appear on the agenda of the twenty-first session of the General Assembly but be brought before the Security Council. The implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples could have no meaning unless the Special Committee took into account the new situation created by the nationalist movements, which already controlled extensive areas. The nationalist movements considered that, in accordance with the spirit and the letter of General Assembly resolution 2105 (XX), operative paragraph 10, they were entitled to recommend the Special Committee to determine, in agreement with the national liberation movements, the types of priority assistance to be given to the struggling peoples. Although the practical help which might be given by the specialized agencies to nationalist movements would have to be discussed, he thought the most effective help would undoubtedly be that affecting education and would be provided by UNESCO and the High Commissioner for Refugees. In this connexion he hoped that the Committee would endorse the idea of holding a seminar on the refugee problem. A number of African countries were accepting refugees and nationals of countries which were fighting against Portugal. It would be desirable for the nationalist movements and CONCP to take part in the organization of the seminar and to contribute to it by providing information.

524. On the other hand in pursuance of operative paragraph 11 of the same resolution, he felt that the Committee should recommend the expulsion of Portugal from the specialized agencies of the United Nations.

525. The United Nations, and the Special Committee in particular, had aroused immense hopes among the peoples under Portuguese administration and had created an atmosphere of confidence among the leaders of the political movements. In appealing to the Committee, CONCP had been prompted by the desire to help, however modestly, in making international peace, justice and co-operation prevail throughout the world.

526. In reply to a question, the petitioner said that CONCP, comprising the organizations he had named before, had been established in April 1961, two months after the start of the armed struggle in Angola. The Union des populations de l'Angola was not a member of the unified organization, although it had been invited to the constituent assembly of CONCP in April 1961. The Union had said at that time that it was materially impossible for it to send a representative to Casablanca. CONCP had repeated its appeal and had stated that it was prepared to welcome any movement which was fighting to achieve specific aims.

527. CONCP was the catalyst of the peoples' forces and its role was to co-ordinate all political and military action, in order to hasten the defeat of the common enemy. Each nationalist organization had to make a contribution to it. CONCP was headed by the Conference, which met every two years. Between meetings of the Conference, the Governing Council, composed of the leaders of the four political parties which were members of CONCP, was responsible for interpreting the resolutions of the Conference and putting them into effect. The executive body, which acted as a permanent secretariat, comprised four sections, under the direction of officials of the nationalist

movements. CONCP had its own sources of information. It had drawn up a programme of action, approved by the Council, which was divided into two parts: the political and military struggle, and national reconstruction. Action to promote national reconstruction was the responsibility of a special committee for education and culture, and was carried out both in areas which had been wrested from the colonial administration and in the frontier areas which gave shelter to the nationalist movements.

528. Many areas were already controlled by the nationalist movement; in Cabinda, for instance, the area controlled represented 30 per cent of the territory. The administrative system set up in those areas reflected the structure of the parties.

529. In order to make the Conference better known, it had drawn up a plan of action and propaganda. The Governing Council was at present strengthening the permanent secretariat, which would have an information section large enough to cover various regions. As the nationalist movements were having difficulties in connexion with their information services, particularly in countries which were hostile to them, the information and propaganda section was going to try to arrange for the various supporting committees of the nationalist movements to represent it in Latin America and even in Western countries.

530. In his opinion it was not true that sanctions would cause most suffering to the Africans, and the policy of sanctions against Portugal should be continued. He expressed satisfaction with the efforts of the Special Committee and of all peace-loving Members of the United Nations to make sanctions against Portugal and the commercial and political boycott of that country a reality. With regard to operative paragraph 7 of resolution 2107 (XX), approaches had been made to the African States which were best placed to respond favourably. It was encouraging to note that many recommendations made to the Fourth Committee had been included in draft resolutions submitted to the General Assembly. In the matter of the commercial boycott the role of the great Western Powers was obviously decisive. That boycott was linked with the alliance between Portugal and its NATO partners. That important problem might be reviewed, not only by the General Assembly, but also by the Security Council.

531. Although the United States and other Western Powers had rejected allegations that they were providing assistance to Portugal through NATO, there was ample proof that help existed, in the form of military equipment and weapons captured by fighting members of the nationalist movements. That evidence required no comment. Other petitioners from nationalist movements which operated in the *maquis* would provide material proof. Those movements had prepared several reports on the matter. It was well known that German instructors were being sent to Portugal under the co-operation arrangements between Portugal and the Federal Republic of Germany.

532. The Federal Republic of Germany was also providing military, political and economic assistance to Portugal. The pact between the Federal Republic of Germany and Portugal showed that the fascist spirit which still prevailed in that country was in harmony with the fascist tendency of the Portuguese Government. That problem would be difficult to solve except by intensifying the struggle, which would eventually

make it possible to break the alliance between the Federal Republic of Germany and Portugal.

533. In reply to a question he said that he had no exact figures of loans and investments made by the Federal Republic of Germany. The representatives of the nationalist movements which had documents available on the subject would, however, willingly supply them. He assured the Committee that those documents would be placed before it in the near future.

534. Summing up CONCP's position he said that it hoped the Security Council would continue to keep the question of the Territories under Portuguese administration before it, because Portugal's attitude was a threat to international peace. Since the Security Council was the only international body which could adopt resolutions of a mandatory nature, it was the Council's responsibility to deal with that question and to decide, if appropriate, to expel Portugal from the United Nations. The second demand submitted concerned the development of the conflict between CONCP and the administering Power. As matters stood, it was the nationalist movements which should direct the work of decolonization; for that they needed assistance from the United Nations and the specialized agencies. It was the opinion of CONCP that the assistance which, in accordance with resolutions of the United Nations, should be refused to Portugal should logically be transferred to the liberation movements.

GENERAL STATEMENTS BY MEMBERS

535. The representative of *Ethiopia* said that the problem regarding the question of Territories under Portuguese administration had never been and never would be lack of clarity in the objectives and intents of those interested, but rather want of rigour in the measures adopted to make Portugal realize its folly and to force it to respond favourably to the demands of the indigenous people of its Territories and to civilized world opinion.

536. The conditions of the unfortunate millions of African brothers in Angola, Mozambique, so-called Portuguese Guinea and other Territories under the yoke of Portuguese colonial domination were too well known to require detailed treatment. Portuguese tyranny and the cruelty with which the African majority in the Portuguese Territories was being repressed was a well-known tragedy that had shocked the conscience of mankind. The Committee at a previous meeting had had a first-hand account of the methods of repression used by the Portuguese fascists against innocent people struggling for freedom. His delegation wished to express once again its appreciation to Mr. Ervedosa who, because of lofty humanitarian motives and high moral conscience, had resigned from the ranks of the Portuguese Army in protest against the barbarous acts perpetrated by Portugal. He hoped that the world would see more Portuguese of his calibre and sense of dedication taking the side of justice in the future.

537. He had no intention of repeating the atrocities of the crime Portugal was committing against humanity. Neither would it be necessary for him to review the various concrete recommendations made by the Committee and various other organs of the United Nations on the matter. Nevertheless, inasmuch as it was the Committee's duty to make constant use of that forum to keep concerned world opinion informed on the developments of those Territories, he felt obliged to recall some salient features of the measures so far adopted.

538. In recognition of the large-scale human tragedy involved in the problem of Portuguese colonial administration, the General Assembly of the United Nations and its various organs had on several occasions considered and made clear proposals and recommendations concerning those Territories which were mercilessly being exploited by Portugal. There was no doubt in anybody's mind that those Territories were non-self-governing within the meaning of Chapter XI of the United Nations Charter. Therefore, the claim made by the Portuguese authorities that Portugal and its so-called overseas Territories constituted one "pluri-continental and multi-racial nation" was without any foundation and had been rejected beyond doubt. The situation resulting from the highly unrealistic position held by Portugal, both as regards the African population of its Territories and the neighbouring States, seriously disturbed international peace and security.

539. Prime Minister Salazar, explaining his Government's policy regarding its Territories, said that in the case of Portugal the only thing that mattered was to determine whether the laws conferred on the citizens of the Territories the same political rights, i.e., those through which the individual influenced the character of the State.

540. If one asked whether that had been achieved in Portuguese Territories, the answer was a definite no. Judged by any moral standard, Portugal could not escape condemnation for the outmoded policy it was perpetrating in its Territories.

541. The General Assembly, the Security Council and the Special Committee had time and again requested the Government of Portugal, among other things, to recognize the inalienable rights of the people of the Territories under its administration to self-determination and independence in accordance with the provisions of the Charter and resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960, which solemnly proclaimed the necessity of bringing to a speedy and unconditional end colonialism in all its forms and manifestations.

542. From what the Committee had heard from the petitioners and from the various reports in the Territories, it was obvious that the situation in the Portuguese Territories had taken a turn for the worse. Each passing day marked atrocious crimes committed against humanity. Each day more and more Africans were exiled from their homes, imprisoned and tortured. Thousands were put to death by one of the most brutal military forces the world had ever known.

543. For that cruel and inhuman operation, Portugal was spending millions of dollars to maintain its overseas army. During the period 1961-1965, its expenditure had amounted to about \$US600 million. For a country as poor and backward as Portugal, that was not a small sum to raise. It was clear how and from what sources Portugal drew its supply to carry out the shameful war it was conducting against the African people in its Territories. A number of resolutions had been passed by the Committee requesting all Member States to refrain from offering assistance to Portugal which would enable it to continue its repression of the peoples of the Territories, and to take measures to prevent not only the sale and supply of arms and military equipment to the Portuguese Government for that purpose, including the sale and shipment of equipment and materials for the manufacture and maintenance of arms and ammunition to be used in the Territories. It was his delegation's earnest hope that all Members would com-

ply with that request and, as recommended, inform the Secretary-General of the United Nations on measures they had taken towards the implementation of all the recommendations.

544. Years had passed since the Portuguese had begun their open colonial war in Angola, Mozambique and so-called Portuguese Guinea. In that conduct, they had proved themselves to be most cruel and merciless in brutally suppressing all manifestations of national sentiment among the populations.

545. Nevertheless, the outcries of the millions of Africans would not remain unheeded for much longer. The sooner Portugal realized that it could not reverse the course of history, the better for its own good. No matter how barbarously the Portuguese instrument of oppression was intensified, no matter how generous its allies, no matter how well calculated its social, economic and psychological warfare against the African people, Portugal could not endure the might of the wave of history and the awakened African spirit. Moreover, systems of human oppression such as that set up by Portugal were doomed to collapse by the forces of their own evil.

546. The representative of *Afghanistan* recalled that over five years had elapsed since the adoption by the General Assembly of resolution 1514 (XV), but that Portuguese Territories were still being subjected to the most ruthless form of colonial exploitation. Portugal's action in holding to those Territories by force of arms had aroused world-wide indignation. It had shown that it had no intention of implementing the resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly or even of preparing the Territories for self-determination, giving as an excuse that they were part of metropolitan Portugal. However, similar policies followed in the past by other colonial Powers had always failed.

547. Portugal itself was a poor country and was striving to attain a higher level of development. But for five years it had been carrying on an expensive colonial war. It was obvious that Portugal could not wage that war alone and that it was receiving assistance from its allies, in particular from South Africa and Southern Rhodesia.

548. Paragraph 8 of General Assembly resolution 2107 (XX) of 21 December 1965 requested all States, and in particular Portugal's NATO allies, to desist from supplying it with arms; if that resolution was implemented it would help to paralyse Portugal. Collusion between Portugal, South Africa and Southern Rhodesia had, however, assured impunity for Portugal.

549. The petitioners whom the Committee had heard in Dar es Salaam had testified to the fact that several thousand Whites had been settled by South Africa in Mozambique and that Portugal was forcing thousands of Mozambicans to seek employment in South Africa and Southern Rhodesia. The economic implications of such action were revolting: those three countries were forming a sort of common market of cheap mobile labour.

550. There was a spark of hope in that desperate situation: the freedom fighters, who had not only liberated large tracts of Portuguese-dominated Territories but were even administering them. That was significant in view of the fact that Portugal was maintaining that the liberation movement was not an organized force but a band of foreign agents. Another important fact was that the Conferência das Organiza-

ções Nacionalistas das Colónias Portuguesas (CONCP) grouped all the nationalist movements.

551. The Committee had to decide upon the best course of action for it to adopt. His delegation believed that, because of the explosive situation in the Portuguese Territories, and because of Portugal's non-compliance with the United Nations resolutions, the Committee should recommend that the Security Council make implementation of resolution 2107 (XX) obligatory and should also urge the High Commissioner for Refugees and the specialized agencies to do their utmost to assist refugees and others in the Portuguese Territories. That was the least the Committee could do to help the valiant people of those Territories.

552. The representative of *Mali* said that the petitioners had given the Special Committee an objective account of the inhuman behaviour of the forces sent by the Portuguese Government to subdue Angola, Mozambique and so-called Portuguese Guinea and also convincing proof of the conspiracy hatched against the African people by the big international financial monopolies supporting the reactionary Government in Lisbon. His delegation denounced such support and vigorously condemned it, because it was contrary to the United Nations Charter and ran counter to the resolutions already adopted by the Security Council, the General Assembly and the Special Committee asking all States to break off economic relations with Portugal and to refrain from giving it financial aid so long as it failed to respect the United Nations resolutions.

553. In the working paper prepared by the Secretariat (paras. 1-244 above), reference was made to a statement by Salazar that the Territories of Angola, Mozambique and Guinea were an integral part of Portugal and there could be no question of self-determination for the inhabitants. He rejected such allegations. Geographically, those Territories could not be an integral part of Portugal, which was situated in Europe. The legal tie binding those countries to Portugal must be sought; to that end he quoted a statement by Mr. Ramani of Malaysia, who had said in the Security Council on 9 November 1965:

"Therefore, if the substance of this relationship can be established between Portugal and its Territories in Africa and Asia, it matters not the slightest whether you call it a colony or an overseas territory or an overseas province. Anyone who takes the trouble to examine the Portuguese constitutional documents I referred to a short while ago will have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that the Territories about which we are concerned in this debate are, in the commonly accepted parlance, the colonial Non-Self-Governing Territories of Portugal.

"If I may illustrate: in part II of the Portuguese Constitution, chapter VI carries in its title the term 'Metropolitan Portugal'. Chapter VII is entitled 'Overseas Portugal'; article 133 is extremely significant, and with your permission, I shall read it out to you:

"It is intrinsic in the Portuguese Nation to fulfil its historic mission of colonization in the lands of the Discoveries under their sovereignty and to diffuse among the populations inhabiting them the benefits of their civilization, as also to exercise the moral influence enjoined upon it by the Patronage of the East."

And there you find that dreadful word "colonization" nakedly and unashamedly standing out.

"Article 134 states that the overseas Territories of Portugal described in sub-paragraphs II to V of article 1, shall be known as 'provinces' and that 'their politico-administrative organization shall be on lines best suited to their geographical situation and their social standards'. That nomenclature alone—calling them provinces—will not in fact and in truth make the overseas Territories provinces of metropolitan Portugal, even though they form, in constitutional terms, an integral part of the Portuguese State for the purposes of the Constitution, as Article 135 provides."²⁸

554. If it were accepted, then, that the Territories of Angola, Mozambique and Guinea (Bissau) were colonies, they came under Chapter XI of the Charter and should be examined in the light of Article 73 of the Charter, which made it an obligation for administering Powers to lead the peoples under their administration towards the management of their own affairs. It was the duty of the United Nations to take action against the Portuguese Government and to oblige it to respect the Charter. A date should be set for Portugal to liberate all its colonies and withdraw its military bases. He denounced the conspiracy between the Governments of Portugal, South Africa and the United Kingdom, on account of the iniquitous régime they had deliberately set up in Salisbury. Those forces of evil were helping one another by ruthlessly repressing the slightest impulse of the African people towards independence. In the elections that had just taken place, for example, Portugal had provided by law for one deputy for every 80,000 inhabitants in the national Portuguese territory, one for every 650,000 in Angola and one for every 900,000 in Mozambique. Such arbitrary distribution not sufficing, the law further stipulated that to vote in the elections the indigenous inhabitants must fulfil the following conditions: under the legislation in force, the people entitled to vote were male Portuguese citizens who had attained their majority and who (a) had been emancipated and could read and write Portuguese; (b) although unable to read or write, nevertheless had legal and political capacity and contributed to the State or to the administrative bodies a sum not less than 100 escudos in payment of any of the following taxes: property tax, industrial tax, professional tax or tax on the use of capital. Thus, although the Portuguese Government maintained that the right to vote was granted to all under conditions of equality, there were still at least two barriers—one relating to personal competence, the other to property assessment—which deprived the majority of the indigenous population of the right to vote. The same law existed under different names in Rhodesia and South Africa, in all its arbitrariness and iniquity. In such circumstances the indigenous people had no choice but armed struggle to recover their legitimate right to be men.

555. Driven back to the wall, imperialism was supporting Salazar's fascist régime with all its forces, in order to perpetuate a domination condemned by history and doomed to failure. Mr. Salazar had excluded the possibility of a "political solution" to put an end to the fighting in the Territories under Portuguese administration in Africa. He had stated, moreover, that the prosecution of the military effort was the only

means of ensuring order in those Territories and the peaceful advancement of their inhabitants.

556. The Secretariat's report showed a progression in the military allocations in the Portuguese budget. Some taxes had been increased. It was clear, however, that those resources were insufficient, for nearly all the imperialist Powers were giving financial support to the Portuguese Government. Their assistance was not confined to the financial domain but also took the form of armaments, within the framework of NATO. It mattered little whether the NATO countries supplied arms to the Portuguese Government on a multilateral or a bilateral basis; what should be denounced was the use that the Salazar Government was making of them in Africa. Thousands of Africans were falling under the murderous blows of those arms. Portugal and its allies should be condemned, because the war being waged against the population of the Territories under Portuguese administration was unjust and ran counter to human rights. The reason for those heinous crimes was to be found in the conclusions of Sub-Committee I, which had studied the economic aspect of Portuguese colonization in the African Territories. Sub-Committee I had concluded that, by their material and financial support of the Portuguese Government, the foreign economic activities and financial interests in the Territories under Portuguese domination were preventing the various Territories from attaining independence. Thus, under the cover of laws promulgated in Lisbon, for the sole purpose of boosting the Portuguese economy, it had been declared that the mineral resources and natural wealth did not form part of the patrimony of the Overseas Territories. That wealth was being cynically exploited and dispatched to Portugal or other European countries which, through the Portuguese Government, had acquired mining concessions with the power of life and death over the peace-loving African inhabitants. Thus the indigenous inhabitants, robbed of their land, were reduced to slavery by the settlers who had moved from Portugal to Africa. Various European companies had been formed for plundering the Angolan subsoil. The political aspect of that exploitation was obvious: it enabled the Portuguese Government to realize substantial profits, while sparing it any reverberations at the social level and opening outlets for it in Europe and the United States. Petroleum extraction had not been overlooked; it involved not only Portuguese capital, but also a whole conglomeration of trusts. It was odd that the petroleum companies had only become interested in petroleum extraction there at the moment when the liberation movements had started their struggle.

557. There seemed reason to think that Portugal by itself had neither the resources nor the economic potential needed to resist for long the revolutionary movement unfolding in the countries that were still subject to its domination. Those examples showed the evils of the investments made by the monopolies to the profit of the Portuguese Government.

558. The capitalists should be made to realize that they must give fresh thought to their method of investment in the Territories under Portuguese domination while waiting for the peoples of Angola, Mozambique and Guinea to rid themselves of the Portuguese colonial yoke. They must respect the various resolutions adopted by the General Assembly and the Security Council and tell their ally, Portugal, to withdraw its military forces and liberate its colo-

²⁸ Official Records of the Security Council, Twentieth Year, 1254th meeting, paras. 34-36.

nies, in implementation of the Declaration appearing in resolution 1514 (XV).

559. Unfortunately, it was not possible to believe the statements of the imperialist Powers when they were daily offering 10 million escudos to Portugal, thus enabling it to finance its genocidal war against the African people. It was not possible to believe the United Kingdom's statements when, according to the *Johannesburg Star*, the special brigade of the Southern Rhodesian secret police was co-operating with the Portuguese Secret Service in tracking down rebels passing through the country on their way to Tanzania and repatriating them to Mozambique. Mr. Mondlane and the newspaper agreed on that point. In his statement, Mr. Mondlane had said that a truck carrying seventy-five persons had disappeared on the Swaziland border. It was obvious that the secret police had done their work and no one should be surprised to learn that the seventy-five persons were in South Africa in some reserve, or even that they had been sold in the coal mines, enabling Portugal to collect the 50 per cent profit on deals involving Mozambican workers handed over to the South African racists by the Portuguese administrators.

560. It was the disgrace of the mid-twentieth century that a State that was economically poor, the poorest State in Europe, should hang on desperately in Africa, robbing the inhabitants, plundering the wealth of the subsoil and leaving the natural and rightful owners sunk in poverty and ignorance. Human rights were scoffed at, the United Nations Charter was trampled under foot by the very people who had drawn it up to prevent any fresh crime against humanity.

561. The Special Committee should make definite recommendations to the General Assembly and the Security Council; the latter should enforce the sanctions that had already been adopted against Portugal. Mali, for its part, was already implementing all the resolutions adopted by the United Nations.

562. A recommendation should be made to the Secretary-General to give and increase aid to the nationalists, who had freed a large part of their country and were devoting themselves to the task of national reconstruction. He assured the nationalists of the unconditional support of the people and Government of the Republic of Mali. The struggle for liberation was a just one and was in step with the march of history. His delegation would give its support to any resolution setting forth such measures, which represented the minimum that could be done pending the complete liberation of the Territories under Portuguese domination—which could not be long in coming.

563. The representative of the *Ivory Coast* said that the information given by the petitioners showed that the situation in the Territories under Portuguese domination had not improved and was still extremely serious. Those Territories were the scene of an armed struggle imposed on peace-loving inhabitants by Salazar's fascist régime. The people of the Territories in question had for hundreds of years been suffering poverty, affliction and ignorance.

564. For years the United Nations had been trying, by means of appropriate resolutions, to persuade the Portuguese authorities to abandon their anachronistic concept of self-determination and acknowledge the right of the people in the Territories under their

domination to freedom, to self-determination as universally defined, in particular in United Nations resolution 1514 (XV), and to independence. To those efforts should be added the collective or individual approaches made by States friendly to Portugal. Unfortunately, the Portuguese authorities replied only with disdainful refusals; what was more, they were continuing and intensifying the armed struggle with the help of the equipment they received through NATO. It would therefore be desirable for NATO members to take practical steps to prevent Salazar using the arms placed at his disposal and stored in Portugal.

565. The testimony of journalists and films provided further proof of the atrocities that Portugal was inflicting on the peoples under its domination. In the eyes of his delegation, those crimes were more shocking than those of the Nazis, who in their day aroused the indignation of the whole world.

566. He considered that the States and financial monopolies which were enabling Salazar to continue his war of extermination should be denounced.

567. After being informed of the mass exodus of the inhabitants of Mozambique, Angola and so-called Portuguese Guinea, the Committee should press for increased aid to be given to the refugees.

568. Portugal, which wanted to identify itself with a certain civilization, should realize that the course of history was irreversible and that, despite the perfection of the arms it possessed, its colonial empire would suffer the same fate as all the other colonial empires.

569. His delegation was ready to give its support to any resolution reaffirming the inalienable right of the peoples of the Territories under Portuguese domination, condemning the barbarous actions of the Salazar-régime and urging all States, and in particular Portugal's allies, to refrain from giving Portugal military and financial aid. The Security Council should make the sanctions that had been adopted against the Lisbon Government compulsory. If such measures were applied, Salazar's régime would be unable to survive.

570. He repeated his appeal to the great Powers, in particular the NATO Powers, to refrain from helping Portugal. In turning a deaf ear to the Africans' appeal, they were conniving in the genocide committed in the Territories under Portuguese domination. He hoped that after the direct and precise evidence that had been produced there would be no more abstentions in the ranks of the Committee and that Portugal would finally be isolated.

571. The Ivory Coast, in unison with all the other States that loved peace and freedom, would do all in its power to free Angola, Mozambique and so-called Portuguese Guinea from Salazar's iniquitous régime.

572. The representative of *Iraq* said that, among the various colonial problems with which the Special Committee and the United Nations were faced, that of the African Territories under Portuguese administration presented special aspects which had far-reaching consequences. Portugal continued to deny the African people's right to self-determination and independence, at the same time refusing to recognize that the Territories in question were in fact colonies for which it was accountable both before the United Nations and before the world. Unlike the Verwoerd

régime in South Africa, which openly advocated the evil policy of apartheid, Portugal professed to practise no policy of discrimination against the indigenous population and endeavoured to dismiss the whole matter under the guise of assimilation. Portugal's assertion that the nationalist struggle in the Territories under its domination was instigated from abroad was completely belied by the fact that, in Angola, the African people had been fighting heroically for independence for more than five years—a fight for which Portugal had had to obtain help from its friends, including Israel. As the petitioners in Dar es Salaam had informed the Committee, the armed struggle was spreading to the remaining Portuguese Territories, including Guinea and Cape Verde. But Portugal's desperate efforts to maintain a foothold in Africa would ultimately collapse before the rising tide of African nationalism. Every United Nations Member State, and particularly those with special relations with Portugal, would have to shoulder their responsibilities by helping to bring about the speedy liquidation of the Portuguese colonial empire in Africa.

573. The representative of *Poland* said that the question of the African Territories under Portuguese administration had been under consideration by the United Nations for over a decade, and many recommendations had been made on the subject. Nevertheless, Portugal, like the racist régimes in South Africa and Southern Rhodesia, persisted in refusing to implement the terms of the relevant United Nations resolutions and to comply with the provisions of the Charter and the Declaration of the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.

574. Portugal's attitude was unique, since it was the only administering Power which still maintained that its Territories were overseas provinces forming an integral part of the metropolitan country. That attitude was, however, dictated by economic interests, since the Territories earned foreign exchange, and particularly hard currency, which Portugal used to offset its balance-of-payments deficit. The export of coffee and diamonds provided the main source for such earnings, which were further increased by the revenue received from the railways in Angola and Mozambique, and from the services rendered by the East African ports of Beira and Lourenço Marques. The significant fact about Angolan coffee was not that it was the largest exported commodity but that, since it was purchased mainly by the United States, it earned US dollars and other foreign exchange. As for Angola's next largest exported commodity—diamonds—in 1962, total production amounted to approximately 986,000 carats, which had been sold to the United Kingdom at an average price of less than \$US22 per carat. Even in the Portuguese Press there had been indignant comments, since that was far below the world market price at which diamonds were sold by South West Africa. Furthermore, Angola and Mozambique supplied raw materials such as oil, iron ore, gold and uranium, and Portuguese companies were making huge profits from their sale as well as from the sale of copper, cocoa, sugar, cotton, meat, textiles and glass. The Portuguese Government even derived a considerable income from the sale of African labours in South Africa, where workers were forced to migrate to work in the mines. Most of the industries in Angola and Mozambique were subsidiaries of parent companies in Southern Rhodesia and South Africa. From the Special Committee's study in that

connexion, it was evident that the monopolies to which Sakkar had granted concessions for the exploitation of Angolan and Mozambican wealth, were reaping huge profits at the expense of the local population. Such companies included the Angola Diamond Company, the Belgian Petrofina Trust, the Gulf Oil Corporation of America, the Mozambique Gulf Oil Company, the Rockefeller Trust, Standard Oil of New Jersey and the West German Krupp Trust. Portuguese colonialism had powerful allies in those monopolies which controlled the economy of southern Africa from the Cape to Katanga. To protect the interests of the monopolies and to maintain white supremacy and colonialism in Africa, certain Western Powers were providing Portugal with financial, political and military aid so that it was able to defy United Nations resolutions. Mr. Luís Almeida, the representative in Algeria of the Mouvement populaire de libération de l'Angola (MPLA), had recently revealed that the large American, West German, Belgian and British companies had even established private armies of mercenaries to protect their interests.

575. The fact that Portugal continued to receive aid from its allies, and was thus enabled to withstand a war on three fronts, had been unanimously confirmed by the petitioners who had appeared before the Committee. The petitioners had considered that the United Nations could contribute most to the liberation of the suppressed African peoples under Portuguese rule by requiring the United States, the Federal Republic of Germany and the United Kingdom to withhold all military and economic support from Portugal. The Committee had heard evidence, time and again, that Portugal had used weapons manufactured in those countries in Angola, Portuguese Guinea and Mozambique, which further went to prove that it was intensifying the war of extermination against the African people. In the Portuguese Territories, the most inhuman conditions existed: tens of thousands of Africans had died either from ill-treatment or from bombing and other attacks with modern arms. The Committee had heard from Mr. Cabral, the leader of the Partido Africano da Independência de Guiné e Cabo Verde (PAIGC), of an air attack carried out by bombers and jets of American and German make against the innocent and peaceful inhabitants of a village. Dr. Mondlane, the leader of FRELIMO, had also informed the Committee that West Germany not only supplied Portugal with weapons but had also established a military base in Portugal where armed forces of the NATO Powers were trained in guerrilla warfare. All appeals by the various organs of the United Nations, requesting States to withhold from the Portuguese Government any assistance which would enable it to continue its suppression of the African people in the Territories under its domination, had been ignored by West Germany and other members of the NATO alliance.

576. A letter had been addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the German Democratic Republic on 23 March 1966. It referred to resolution 218 (1965) adopted by the Security Council, in accordance with which all States were required to report upon the measures taken to implement operative paragraph 7 of that resolution. He would quote the following paragraphs from that letter:

"Proceeding from its principled attitude, the Government of the German Democratic Republic has

always strictly adhered to all decisions taken by the United Nations with regard to the Portuguese colonial policy. On this point the German Democratic Republic is fundamentally different from the West German Federal Republic, whose moral and material support for Portuguese colonialism was sharply condemned during the debates of the Fourth Committee of the twentieth session of the United Nations General Assembly.

"The German Democratic Republic maintains neither diplomatic nor consular relations with the Portuguese colonial régime.

"It does not grant any assistance that could be used by Portugal to suppress the people in the territories under its administration.

"Nor has it, in the past, ever sold or delivered to Portugal weapons, ammunition, military equipment or other material for the production and maintenance of weapons and ammunition, nor will it in the future supply the Portuguese colonial régime with any such objects.

"Moreover, in instructions issued by the Ministry of Foreign and Inter-German Trade on 5 April 1965, all foreign trade enterprises of the German Democratic Republic were directed that no deliveries whatever, neither direct nor indirect, of the German Democratic Republic be made to Portuguese enterprises in the territories still under Portuguese colonial rule."

577. Portugal not only stubbornly refused to implement United Nations resolutions but was actually stiffening its policy of oppression and using military force to prevent the people from attaining their inalienable right to self-determination and independence. His Government has consistently condemned Portugal's colonial policy and had, on many occasions, denounced those Western Powers of the NATO alliance which continued to provide Portugal with active political, moral and military support. It was the view of his Government that Portugal's NATO allies were responsible for its continued domination over vast tracts of the African continent. The existing explosive situation in the Portuguese Territories, which constituted a threat to peace, originated in the community of interests among a group of neo-nazi countries which were opposed to the independence and development of Africa. The questions of the Portuguese-dominated Territories in Africa, of Southern Rhodesia and of South Africa could not be dissociated from one another; and the situation in each would have been very different had the United States, West Germany and the United Kingdom complied with the relevant United Nations resolutions.

578. Long-term action was required: the United Nations in accordance with the principles of freedom and justice enshrined in the Charter and in the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, should take effective measures. The time had come to isolate Portugal, economically, politically and militarily so that it would be forced to abandon its intransigent and defiant policy. It was the Special Committee's duty to ensure that positive action was taken to put an end to the inhuman suffering of the unhappy peoples of the Portuguese-dominated Territories in Africa who, for almost 500 years, had lived in virtual slavery, a prey to poverty, disease and ignorance. The Polish people considered the struggle of the peoples of Angola, Portuguese Guinea and Mozambique to be

just and right, and those people and their leaders were to be congratulated for having already liberated a part of their homeland. It was to be hoped that the various national liberation movements would join their efforts in the heroic struggle against Portugal and its allies.

579. He agreed with the suggestion made by the petitioners that the Committee should request the Security Council to examine General Assembly resolution 2107(XX) and Security Council resolution 218 (1965) with a view to making the action envisaged therein mandatory, in accordance with Chapter VII of the Charter. He also wished to reiterate his request that the specialized agencies should be asked to increase their assistance to the national liberation movements in the Territories under Portuguese domination and to the people who had suffered, and were still suffering, from the war waged by the Portuguese colonial forces.

580. The representative of the *United Republic of Tanzania* expressed his delegation's gratitude to the petitioners for the information which they had provided to the Special Committee both in Algiers and in Dar es Salaam and which had thrown further light on the atrocities perpetrated against the African people in the Portuguese-dominated Territories. The Committee had rightly always considered those Territories in conjunction since colonialism, no matter where it existed, inevitably meant subjugation and oppression. The African people who were resisting the Portuguese aggressors, striking blow for blow, waged a struggle which would not only liberate their homeland but which would also, in his delegation's opinion, uphold and strengthen the United Nations Charter and the aims of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.

581. Analysing the general situation, he said that the fact that Portugal was a poor and backward nation helped to explain the origin of its colonial aggression. With the support of powerful allies, it had been able to maintain its policy of subjugating African peoples. Despite the terms of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) and of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, the Portuguese imperialists persisted in denying independence to the Territories under their domination and had in fact increased their aggressive and criminal activities against the people who had, as a result, been forced to take up arms to defend themselves and to free their lands.

582. Referring to an extract from Mr. Ronald Segal's foreword to Professor James Duffy's book *Portugal in Africa*, he said that it illustrated the futility and inhumanity of Portuguese colonialism in Africa and served as a warning to Portugal's allies.

583. In considering the question of the Territories under Portuguese administration, three basic factors had to be taken into account: first, the atrocities committed by the Portuguese armed forces; secondly, the support Portugal received from regional groupings abroad and which it used, with the knowledge of those who supplied such support, against the African people; and thirdly, the role played by foreign elements and financial monopolies in the Territories concerned.

584. With regard to the first factor, while colonial oppression was always to be condemned, that perpetrated against the people of Angola, Portuguese Guinea and Mozambique was in a class by itself. The petitioners who had appeared before the Committee had revealed that entire villages had been razed by Por-

tuguese bombers, and had furnished documentary evidence of the dismemberment of children. Furthermore, Mr. Ervedosa had informed the Committee that the Portuguese air force in Angola were under orders to bomb African villages indiscriminately. The objective was obviously to annihilate the heroic African people who were resisting colonial oppression. Needless to say, as a result of such brutal crimes, Mr. Ervedosa had revolted against the Portuguese régime. That same petitioner, who had only provided information on events to which he himself had been an eye-witness, had also stated that between March and June 1961 thousands of Africans had been killed, the majority women and children. It was to be hoped that such scandalous facts would stir the conscience of those nations which still refused to recognize the evils perpetrated by Portugal.

585. The fact that Portugal, poor and backward as it was, could afford to continue to wage an aggressive war against the African people brought him to the second basic factor to be taken into account. As the Committee had been informed by the petitioners both in Dar es Salaam and in Algiers, Portugal received arms from NATO members. The petitioners had even been able to name their make. While it was undoubtedly true, as the United States representative had stated at the time, that those arms were obsolete weapons from the Second World War, they were nevertheless instruments of destruction, capable of taking a heavy toll of lives. Moreover, in an article in *The New York Times* of 25 October 1964, reference had been made to the fact that the Federal Republic of Germany was selling arms and equipment to Portugal and Mr. Cabral, one of the petitioners, had informed the Committee only the day before that the Federal Republic of Germany was also assembling Italian-designed FIAT 91 aircraft, under licence, for Portugal to use in its war against the African people. In a further article in *The New York Times* of 16 March 1965, it had been stated that France was to sell sixty jet fighters to Portugal and was negotiating the construction of warships for that country. All the petitioners from the Portuguese-oppressed Territories in Africa had testified to the presence there of many types of weapons, including tanks, aircraft, rockets and bombs.

586. Despite the denials which would undoubtedly be heard, all evidence pointed to the fact that certain members of NATO, for example, the United States, France and the Federal Republic of Germany, materially aided the aggressive forces of the Portuguese colonialists. Nevertheless, those countries repeatedly asserted that, under the NATO pact, such armaments were intended only for Portugal's use in Europe. They should not delude themselves, however; the Portuguese régime would never honour a commitment not to use such weapons against the African people and, in fact, was flouting world opinion simply because it had the support of Western countries. Ironically enough, arms supplied under NATO auspices were also used within Portugal against those who opposed not only colonialist wars but also Salazar's fascist régime. Certain Western countries, while loudly proclaiming their support for democracy, were therefore nevertheless helping to strengthen that totalitarian régime. The only conclusion to be drawn by Africans was that such countries were prepared to support Portugal so long as it remained white and anti-communist; a crime against the African people was not so serious as a crime against their financial interests. Thus it was

evident, as clearly demonstrated by the representatives of the peoples of Angola, Portuguese Guinea and Mozambique who had appeared before the Committee as petitioners, that Portugal was only able to pursue its war against the African people because it received a vast amount of material support from its allies. And such support was granted because Portugal co-operated in the exploitation of Africa's rich natural resources.

587. The third basic factor to which he had referred concerned the economic exploitation of the Territories under Portuguese domination. There would, of course, be much talk of the value of investments and of the need for free trade in the development of such Territories. However, no matter what advantages might be involved, there was no doubt that investments in colonized Territories, and the activities of the financial monopolies there, would act as an impediment to the attainment of freedom and independence by the peoples of those Territories. That fact had been clearly demonstrated in the study carried out by Sub-Committee I—a study which had been adopted by the Committee and upheld by a majority in the General Assembly. The working paper prepared by the Secretariat in that connexion had also shown that the foreign companies operating in the Portuguese colonies contributed a part of the profits for the "defence" of those Territories; in effect, that meant the criminal war waged against the African people by the Portuguese colonialists in their futile attempt to cling on to African lands. But Portugal only needed to defend itself against the Salazar régime. In Africa, neither Portugal nor its allies had anything to defend, since the resources of that continent belonged to the Africans alone.

588. Quoting an extract from the book *Mission to Portugal* by a former Brazilian Ambassador to Portugal, he said that it illustrated the exploitation by a minority group of Portugal's riches which by right belonged to the people. Similarly, it was the lust for the rich resources of the African Territories under Portuguese domination which drove certain financial monopolies to attain their ends at any price. According to the information bulletin "Free Angola" No. 3 (1965), such financial monopolies included the Angola Diamond Company, a branch of the Anglo-American Diamond Corporation Ltd., the Teresa Berman Company, associated with Lay Frères and the Sociedade Comercial João Fernandes, which dealt in manganese production. That ore was entirely monopolized by the Companhia Mineira do Lobito, Krupps of Essen, Germany, Jojgaard and Schultz A/S, Denmark, and Lagos e Irmao, Portugal. It was further stated in the information bulletin that the complicity of such financial interests in the Portuguese colonial war in Angola was unquestionable, as would be seen upon an examination of the aims and tax policy proclaimed by the territorial Government in 1962, in which reference was made to a defence tax payable by all firms established for over five years with a net profit of 1 million escudos and over. Those facts, collected by the people of Angola, were further documented in other records and had been corroborated by the freedom fighters from Mozambique and Portuguese Guinea.

589. It was the opinion of his delegation that there were only two ways in which a solution to the problem could be found. Either Portugal, and all those countries which had not hitherto done so, should accept and implement the provisions of the relevant United Nations resolutions, and those who claimed to oppose Portugal's colonial policies, yet nevertheless assisted it

materially, should withdraw all such support; or, alternatively, force should be used. Portugal was intensifying its criminal policy with the support of its allies and, in the face of that situation, the gallant people had had to take up arms to defend themselves and to free their land. African people did not want war but it had been forced upon them, and their legitimate struggle would ultimately be crowned with victory.

590. Lastly, his delegation considered that the Security Council should meet in Africa to hear the views of the freedom fighters who had appeared before the Committee during its current session.

591. The representative of the *Union of Soviet Socialist Republics* said that each time the questions of Angola, Mozambique and so-called Portuguese Guinea were considered by the Special Committee, reference was made to new crimes perpetrated by the colonizers against the population. The cruel oppression to which the people of the Territories under Portuguese domination were subjected did not merely affect Africa: it was also a threat to world peace and security. The police régime of the colonialists could be compared to the hateful Hitler régime. The responsibility for that criminal policy lay not only with the Salazar régime but also with its NATO allies, who were providing substantial assistance of various kinds to Portugal. Thanks to that assistance, Portugal, which was one of the poorest and most backward countries in Europe, was able to go on sending armed forces equipped with ultra-modern weapons to its Territories. According to the information provided by the petitioners, Portugal, in a desperate effort to avoid defeat, had increased its military forces in Guinea. Mr. Mondlane had stated that the number of troops in Mozambique had been increased by 7,500 and that Portugal planned to have a total of 70,000 men there. Thus Portugal had more than 100,000 men with modern equipment in its Territories. Furthermore, Portugal had embarked on the construction of military bases, aerodromes and strategic roads which threatened the independence of other African States. The facts which the petitioners had laid before the Committee proved that the States members of NATO were helping the Portuguese régime. In recent years the United States had given Portugal financial and military aid amounting to several hundred million dollars. United States aircraft had been used and were still being used to bomb the indigenous people in the Portuguese Territories.

592. There was also the aid given by the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany, which was constantly increasing. Mr. Cabral had referred to the delivery of FIAT aircraft to the Portuguese Government and there had recently been a newspaper report that Bonn planned to deliver forty jet fighters, built in Italy under United States licence. The States belonging to NATO continued to deny that they were helping Portugal and alleged that Portugal promised not to use the weapons and equipment that it was given. The Portuguese colonies were a source of profit not only to Portugal but also to the international financial monopolies with headquarters in New York, London and Frankfurt. In return for privileges which enabled them to amass enormous profits, the financial monopolies were supporting Portugal by granting it large sums of money. Thus the international monopolies had openly concluded an alliance with Portugal in order to stamp out the nationalist movements. The monopolies were the main obstacle on the road to the liberation and independence of the people suffering

under the colonial yoke. The strategic position of the Portuguese colonies was also one of the reasons underlying the behaviour of the States members of NATO. In that connexion, he recalled a statement by the United States Secretary of State to the effect that Portugal was the only ally which had made and was making an important contribution to mutual security. That statement had been quoted in a Portuguese newspaper, which had written that the frontiers of the United States and the Western countries passed through the Azores, Angola, Mozambique and Guinea. There was more assistance, however, than that of NATO. Portugal was receiving more and more effective assistance from Southern Rhodesia and South Africa. Those facts showed that the reactionary forces of colonialism and racism, united in an unholy alliance, were constantly increasing, with the support of their Western allies. In the hands of Portugal and its partners, the African Territories were being used as fortresses and military strongholds. The representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany were trying to influence their young allies to prevent them from taking steps against the Verwoerd, Salazar and Ian Smith régimes. In the above-mentioned statement the United States Secretary of State had also said that to sacrifice the interests of Portugal by supporting, in one way or another, the attacks on Portugal in the United Nations was productive only of disaster. An article had appeared in the newspaper *Le Monde* concerning a statement by the Minister of Justice of the Federal Republic of Germany to the effect that the Portuguese policy in its overseas Territories had always been and still was the most modern policy pursued by a European country. *The New York Times* had recently published a statement by the Portuguese Minister for Foreign Affairs pointing out that, following negotiations with United States statesmen, everything seemed to indicate that the United States had adopted a more realistic attitude to Portugal's policies in its African Territories.

593. No assistance could prevent the collapse of the Portuguese colonial empire, as was shown by the increasingly relentless struggle of the African people under the Portuguese colonial yoke to achieve recognition of their inalienable rights. He welcomed the victories gained during that just struggle and the liberation of certain areas, where a new life based on democracy, independence and freedom was being established. The United Nations and all countries which opposed colonial régimes should give all possible moral and material assistance to those fighting for peace. The specialized agencies should be asked to provide multi-lateral assistance to nationalist organizations and movements, in such matters as education and health, for example. The Special Committee should denounce the colonialist bloc consisting of Portugal, Southern Rhodesia and South Africa, as also the NATO members who were assisting Portugal. It should ask the Security Council to take specific steps to ensure the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples and to make the sanctions envisaged compulsory. The Security Council should insist upon Portugal withdrawing its armed forces from the Territories under its domination and dismantling its bases and military installations. The Special Committee should also recommend to the Security Council and the General Assembly that they should set a date for the independence of the Portuguese colonies. The Soviet Union would support the draft

resolution if it took those comments into account. Lastly, he gave the Committee a very important piece of information which he had just received from New York. The United Nations Secretariat had announced in a press release that the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development had granted Portugal two loans amounting to \$30 million to enable it to expand its network of electric power stations. That decision ran counter to the decisions of the Committee and the General Assembly and to resolution 2107 (XX), which appealed to the Bank to refrain from granting Portugal any financial, economic or technical assistance so long as the Government of Portugal failed to implement General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV). The Special Committee should examine the Bank's decision and ask for it to be cancelled.

594. The representative of *Denmark* noted with regret that the situation had scarcely changed since 1965. The party responsible for that deplorable situation was Portugal, which was stubbornly pursuing a disastrous and anachronistic colonial policy. The Danish Government absolutely condemned Portugal's policy, which was unworthy of the present day. Denmark had always complied with the request in the Security Council resolution of 31 July 1963 for an arms embargo. He deplored the fact that not all countries had done the same. Apart from any moral considerations, all countries in the world should realize that the situation in the Territories under Portuguese domination could have extremely serious consequences.

595. There was no need to dwell any further on the activities of the Portuguese colonialists. The members of the Committee were already fully informed on that subject. It was indeed a matter for astonishment every time that the Lisbon Government repeated that everything was calm in the Portuguese Territories. There was much evidence to enlighten world opinion on what was going on in the Territories administered by Portugal; furthermore, the Portuguese Government had itself confirmed that the indigenous populations were putting up serious resistance. In December 1965 Salazar had stated that one of the main problems facing Portugal was the defence of its national territorial integrity and that it was not possible to forecast for how long the Portuguese Government and people would have to defend their overseas Territories. That was tantamount to stating that the Africans were still being deprived of their most elementary rights and that the armed struggle of Portugal against the indigenous people would be continued. That was a dead end, for the course of history was in the direction of self-determination.

596. The representative of *India* said that the situation in the Territories under Portuguese domination had long been under consideration in various organs of the United Nations. When the United Nations had had a preponderance of colonial Powers and of countries supporting them, Portugal had evaded any critical examination of its policies. In the late 1950's, and particularly since 1960, the situation had changed with the emergence to independence of many countries in Africa and Asia and their admission to the United Nations. Thereafter Portugal could no longer be protected, at least in discussion, by its allies.

597. It was a matter of great regret, however, that in spite of continuous exhortation by the United Nations to Portugal to alter its policies and to recognize the inevitable success of the freedom struggles of all colonial peoples, the lot of the subject peoples in Por-

tuguese Territories had remained unchanged. Indeed, from the testimony given by the petitioners in Dar es Salaam and in Algiers, it was clear that the situation in the Portuguese Territories had worsened and that repression had become more ruthless. One could only marvel at the ingenuity of the colonial authorities in devising new and more inhuman methods of suppressing the legitimate struggle of the people under Portuguese domination. Words could scarcely express the suffering of those brave people; and Indians could well appreciate that anguish through their own experience of the tyranny of Portuguese colonialism.

598. Though a small and backward country, Portugal was able to defy the United Nations in oppressing the people of its Territories, which were many times the size of Portugal. Two factors explained that state of affairs.

599. The first was the notorious unholy alliance between the forces of colonialism and racism in southern Africa, where the dictatorial régimes of South Africa, Southern Rhodesia and the Portuguese Territories were acting in concert to perpetuate white supremacy in that part of the world. The rulers in those Territories fully realized that their strength lay in unity. The readiness with which the authorities of Portugal and South Africa had gone to the rescue of the racist régime in Southern Rhodesia was clear evidence of collusion among the three bastions of colonialism, which had to be dealt with as an entity.

600. The second reason was the direct and indirect help which Portugal continued to receive from its allies and friends. Without such assistance, it would never have been able to maintain the massive military operations which it had to mount in order to keep its colonies in check. A study made by Sub-Committee I of the Special Committee had clearly brought out the close relationship between colonial rule and economic exploitation by foreign interests. Several countries apart from Portugal had joined in the bid for substantial but unjust returns. It had been asserted in certain quarters that the economic activities of those foreign interests only contributed to the well-being of the indigenous inhabitants. Those who proffered such flimsy justification certainly counted on the ingenuousness of others. There had been great reluctance on the part of those friends and allies of Portugal to co-operate with the United Nations in practical measures. They clearly satisfied themselves with mere pious expressions of high principles.

601. The dictator of Portugal had frequently made it clear that he would never relinquish the stranglehold over its Territories. The ruling National Union had declared that, whatever the price, Portugal would never abandon the legitimate defence of its national territory against outside aggression. The Portuguese dictator had said in an interview on 4 August 1965 that "the position is, however, that as a result of the integration, which has been a principle of Portuguese overseas policy for centuries, these Territories as a whole already form a nation and a sovereign state. . . . While the problem may be relevant to dependent territories or colonies desiring to achieve independence and define their relations with the State which exercises rights of sovereignty over them, it is not relevant in the case of Portugal". The reasons for that desperate clinging to its overseas colonies were clear. The African war had proved a blessing to Portugal as its industries were growing in response to military orders ranging from ammunition to food and textiles, and remittances from

troops overseas were injecting new money into the Portuguese economy.

602. General Assembly resolution 2107 (XX) had condemned Portugal's violation of the economic and political rights of the indigenous population through the large-scale settlement of foreign immigrants in the Territories and the transfer of workers to South Africa. European settlement had been the cornerstone of Portugal's colonial policy. The Portuguese authorities believed, and would have the world believe, that increased white immigration would help to accelerate the social and cultural progress of the "less evolved" indigenous inhabitants by bringing them in closer contact with "more civilized" peoples. The pressure in the Portuguese National Assembly on the authorities to increase the flow of settlers to the overseas Territories, in conjunction with the military effort, had increased. A deputy from Mozambique had proposed that the Government should encourage soldier settlements in the Territories. In 1965, the Mozambique authorities had offered 5,000-hectare farms in the Tete district to farmers from drought-stricken areas in South Africa. It had been reported in November 1965 that eighty South African farmers had already signed contracts. All that was in open defiance of General Assembly resolution 2107 (XX). Therefore Portugal should once more be strongly condemned on that score.

603. There was poverty and misery among Africans in the Portuguese Territories, where forced labour continued to be used. Starvation and famine were rife, and educational opportunities for Africans were virtually non-existent. In Mozambique, for example, only .35 per cent of the African population was enrolled in primary schools, and only .05 per cent of the population had been admitted to secondary schools. The evident policy of the colonial Power was to keep African people in economic and social servitude.

604. An excuse frequently put forward by some Governments which had refused to implement United Nations resolutions on Portuguese Territories had been that sanctions would hurt the Africans more than anyone else. That argument was just an attempt to evade the issue; for the people of Portuguese Territories had constantly declared their readiness to suffer any hardships in order to attain independence. If the allies of Portugal were sincere in their professed concern for the interests of the indigenous people in Portuguese Territories, they should implement the General Assembly resolution fully and promptly so that the oppressive rule of Portugal might be ended without delay. The history of colonialism and the experience of the newly independent countries showed political independence to be a prerequisite for economic progress.

605. His delegation had warned the Special Committee several years previously that if the people of the Portuguese Territories were not granted their right to freedom, they would have no alternative but to resort to violence. It was unfortunate that the only language which Portugal understood was that of force. In Angola, the nationalists had declared an open revolt in March 1961; in Mozambique the nationalist fighters had opened their armed struggle in September 1964; and in so-called Portuguese Guinea the forces of freedom and progress had made substantial gains in their fight against the colonial authorities. The Portuguese authorities themselves admitted the presence of some 50,000 Portuguese troops, including army forces, mobile police and militia, in Mozambique alone. Those troops,

fully trained and equipped with the most modern weapons, were combating ill-fed and ill-equipped people. Yet those imperialist forces were unable to make much headway against freedom fighters with justice and truth on their side.

606. His delegation had supported and co-sponsored all the resolutions on the problem of Territories under Portuguese administration in the past and would continue to do so because it believed that a peaceful solution to the problem could be found if the entire international community joined forces against that stubborn and ruthless dictatorial régime. The Security Council had an important role to play, having already established, in its resolution 218 (1965) of 23 November 1965, that the attitude of Portugal towards the African populations of its Territories and the neighbouring States constituted a threat to international peace and security. It therefore had to follow up its earlier decision and to take such measures as mandatory economic sanctions against Portugal. His delegation would like to see such a provision included in the draft resolution to be submitted to the Committee.

607. India condemned the brutal methods of repression used by the Portuguese authorities and recognized the legitimacy of the independence struggle of the brave people in the Portuguese Territories. It had offered its full co-operation to the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in ending Portuguese colonialism, and would dutifully do all in its power to help those valiant soldiers of freedom. The Foreign Minister of India had said "We have, in a very persistent and consistent manner, always worked for ending these last vestiges of colonialism, and we think that having ourselves attained independence from colonial rule, it is also our duty—and we would not consider any sacrifice too great—to discharge our responsibilities and our obligations to those brethren who are still groaning under foreign domination."

608. The representative of *Bulgaria* said that the evidence from the petitioners of Mozambique, Angola and so-called Portuguese Guinea had clearly shown the imperative need for the Special Committee to hold sessions in Africa regularly.

609. The Bulgarian delegation had been greatly impressed by the new impetus in the struggle of the peoples still subjected to foreign domination. He had been touched by the conviction and determination with which the freedom fighters, not content with carrying on a courageous armed struggle, were starting to build the basis of their future independent State. It was inspiring to hear the petitioners speak of the efforts which they were making in the parts of the Territory already liberated to fight illiteracy and disease and to build, on the foundations of the ancient cultural values of their people, a new civilization and society based on democracy, justice and social progress.

610. The representatives of the Territories under Portuguese domination had movingly expressed their thanks to the Governments and peoples who were helping them. The Bulgarian delegation had greatly appreciated the thanks of Mr. Cabral, the Secretary-General of the Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde (PAIGC), who, speaking of the assistance given by the socialist countries, had said that the solidarity of those countries with the peoples fighting against Portuguese domination gave a new dimension to the concept of solidarity between peoples. He thanked the petitioners for the feelings which they had

expressed concerning Bulgaria's assistance to them and assured them of the sympathy and unconditional support of the entire Bulgarian people.

611. It was only the assistance which Salazar received from the United States, the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany and other Western countries, including, of course, the members of NATO, that enabled him to continue his criminal fascist activities. The indignation of the oppressed peoples was all the more justified in that those countries made hypocritical statements of sympathy towards them and nevertheless continued actively to aid the colonialist régime of Salazar. It was impossible to over-emphasize the abominable role played by the Federal Republic of Germany, which had apparently not learned the lesson of the Second World War, as the world had been entitled to hope it would. Fortunately, there was another Germany, the German Democratic Republic, a peaceful democratic State which could be proud to count itself among the most faithful friends of the peoples fighting against colonialism and imperialism.

612. The petitioners' suggestion about the role of the United Nations seemed to him particularly important. The petitioners appeared to realize the importance of resolution 2107 (XX) but they had been disappointed by the practical results of the adoption of that resolution. The petitioners were unfortunately correct: colonialism was being unleashed anew; it had allies and openly declared that it did not intend to comply with a single provision of resolution 2107 (XX), especially operative paragraphs 7 and 8. It was therefore quite clear that the Security Council's appeals were no longer enough.

613. The representative of *Yugoslavia* said that the situation in the Portuguese Territories remained unchanged, despite exhortations from the United Nations in the form of resolutions and concrete demands on Portugal. The most regrettable fact was that the people continued to be denied their fundamental rights to freedom and independence. In Dar es Salaam petitioners had said that in a short space of time the number of Portuguese troops in Mozambique alone had increased from about 35,000 to 50,000 and that the figure was likely to reach 75,000 by the end of 1966. Likewise, Portuguese troops in Guinea were using new and better weapons. The additional troops, new weapons and intensified repression showed Portugal's intention to hold on to its Territories. Indeed, it had declared that it would never abandon the defence of its legitimate Territories against outside aggression.

614. However, to maintain its military operations Portugal relied on its friends and allies, who flouted United Nations exhortations by continuing to help Portugal in order, principally, to maximize their own investment yields. It was therefore in their interest to maintain the *status quo*.

615. All Portugal's efforts to crush the steady progress of the nationalist forces had failed. It was the responsibility of all, and especially of Portugal's allies, to make it change its short-sighted policy; and it was the duty of the Special Committee to recommend measures to the General Assembly and the Security Council. The draft resolution reflected Yugoslavia's views and deserved the unanimous support of the Committee.

616. The representative of *Syria* said he would not dwell upon the atrocities which Dr. Salazar's reactionary régime was committing against the innocent peoples of Mozambique, Angola and Guinea. The evidence given by the petitioners, the objectively thorough working papers of the United Nations Secretariat and the testimony of African and European, including Portuguese, personalities whose consciences rebelled against injustice, made it clear that Portuguese colonialism was growing in its ruthlessness, its defiance of world opinion, and its anti-African, inhuman fanaticism. Portugal cynically claimed that Mozambicans, Guineans and Angolans had become—by decree no doubt—Portuguese. By what miracle could people with their own history, their own geography, their own society and their own traditions and culture be transformed into another? That colonization of human souls flouted the essential principles embodied in the United Nations Charter. A perverted régime was shamelessly professing to speak on behalf of civilization; yet on behalf of civilization it was dropping napalm bombs from the most modern military aircraft on innocent African villages. On behalf of civilization it kept 99.7 per cent of Guinean Africans illiterate, and on behalf of civilization it installed Portuguese settlers to usurp African lands and property. The strongest condemnation of those acts was naturally a primary duty to which no member of the Committee could logically object.

617. In the life-and-death struggle of those brave African peoples, there could be only one fundamental choice: to be a friend or a foe of Africa. Those who befriended Portugal could not possibly be friends of Africa. Once that axiom was translated into action, a satisfactory solution would be brought nearer. Only then would the declared or tacit supporters of Portugal know that their alliance necessarily entailed losing the friendship of Africa. The Salazar régime would then either be isolated, in which case its days would be numbered, or it would retain the staunch support of many loyal friends. In either case, the demarcation lines of that legitimate struggle would become crystal clear.

618. The representative of *Tunisia* said that the Tunisian Government had compiled a voluminous dossier on the Territories under Portuguese domination since 1963, when the Tunisian Minister for Foreign Affairs, together with his counterparts from Liberia, Madagascar and Sierra Leone, had been duly entrusted by the Conference of Heads of African States and Governments with the task of following closely the question of the Territories under Portuguese domination.

619. The Tunisian Government, faithful to the resolutions adopted by the Organization of African Unity and the United Nations, had also used its influence with the countries diplomatically accredited to Tunisia to draw their attention to the explosive nature of the situation in those Territories. Finally, both through its deep conviction and in order to implement the various resolutions adopted on the question, Tunisia had never hesitated to provide substantial and unconditional assistance to all the liberation movements which appealed to it, and it was prepared to go on doing so.

620. During the Special Committee's third series of meetings in Africa, the Tunisian delegation had been particularly struck by the seriousness, clarity and moderation of the petitioners. It wished to express to

them the deep solidarity of the Tunisian Government and people and to assure them of its full support. In their replies to the questions put to them by members of the Special Committee, the petitioners had shown themselves to be worthy people, devoid of any bitterness or hatred. They had given further proof of the maturity of the genuine representatives of the African people fighting for independence. Mr. Mondlane, for Mozambique, and Mr. Cabral, for so-called Portuguese Guinea, were living examples of the dignity to which he was referring.

621. The colonial problem of so-called Portuguese Guinea was of a very special nature. The Special Committee should therefore find special means to combat the morbid stubbornness of the Portuguese Government, which continued to reject any peaceful solution calculated to lead the people of those Territories to independence. The Tunisian delegation was convinced that the draft resolution before the Special Committee included some particularly constructive elements for safeguarding the interests of the African inhabitants of the Territories under Portuguese domination. There was not a single delegation which could deny the truths set forth in the draft resolution. If those truths appeared bitter to some delegations, that was unfortunate, but if it was to be faithful to itself and to the task which had been entrusted to it the Special Committee could not pass over them in silence, for in so doing it would be failing in its duty and disappointing the millions of human beings who had placed all their hopes in the United Nations.

622. Tunisia would continue to demand specific and realistic steps to give effective assistance to the oppressed African inhabitants. It had always acted in that spirit and would continue to do so as long as Portugal persisted in opposing the complete implementation of the United Nations resolutions and as long as a single piece of African territory remained under foreign domination.

623. The representative of *Iran* said that the situation in the Portuguese Territories had gone from bad to worse. Oppression, poverty and exploitation were increasing daily, and Portuguese financiers thrived on African misery. Famine was widespread, and health measures virtually non-existent; and an atmosphere of tension and insecurity prevailed.

624. Portugal was trying to perpetuate subjugation in concert with South Africa and Southern Rhodesia. Only through repression was Portugal able to refuse the right of Africans to independence; otherwise, it would be voted out of the Territories. However, as Africans did not have the use of the ballot box, they had to resort to arms in order to defend their dignity and reassert their identity. The majority of the Portuguese people were opposed to their Government's policies, and the opposition party had advocated the principle of majority rule in the overseas Territories. At any event, Portugal's days in Africa were numbered.

625. He concluded by suggesting the provision of aid to all nationalist movements from such specialized agencies as UNESCO and WHO.

626. The representative of *Venezuela* said that his country did not accept the contention that the Portuguese Territories in Africa were overseas provinces of Portugal and an integral part of its Territory. General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) was entirely applicable to those Territories. Venezuela condemned

Portugal's colonial policy, its intransigent attitude, its obstinate refusal to implement the resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council, its indefensible position in denying the inalienable rights of the people to self-determination, and its colonial war, which had already been responsible for thousands of deaths. It unreservedly supported the aspirations of the people still under that country's colonial domination, and would continue to give its support to any action directed towards the ending of the anachronistic situation prevailing in the Territories. Conversely, it would oppose any action that would limit the Special Committee's mandate or the powers of other competent organs, or that was not in accordance with the terms of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV).

627. Commenting on the draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.313), he said that his delegation was in full agreement with most of its paragraphs. It could accept only with reservation the sixth paragraph of the preamble and operative paragraphs 4 and 5, and would be unable to vote in favour of operative paragraphs 6, 7 and 8. His delegation's position in that respect had been explained on previous occasions, particularly in connexion with the vote on General Assembly resolution 2107 (XX) of 21 December 1965. He would accordingly appreciate it if those three operative paragraphs could be voted upon separately, to enable his delegation to support the remainder of the draft resolution. He also requested a roll-call vote.

628. The representative of *Italy* said that one wondered, when considering the problem of the Portuguese Territories, how in 1966 there could still exist a European Government and a European public opinion which believed it possible to maintain a colonial relationship between a metropolitan country and Territories geographically, ethnically, economically and politically so remote from it.

629. The policy in question was an outmoded one which could only have negative consequences and entail countless sufferings for all concerned, whether for the colonial peoples forced to take up arms in defence of their rights or for the families in the European country whose sons were sent to Africa to fight an unpopular, unjust and hopeless war. It was for that reason that whenever the question of the Portuguese Territories had been considered in the United Nations his delegation had protested against the Portuguese Government's colonial policy. It was for that reason also that the Italian Government had informed the Portuguese Government that it was very concerned at developments in the Portuguese Territories and deplored its refusal to co-operate with the United Nations in the matter.

630. In addition, the Italian Government had prohibited any exports of arms to Portugal and it was refusing any form of economic or technical assistance to that country. He wished to state, in that connexion, that any arms of Italian origin which might have been found in the Territories under Portuguese domination had arrived there without the consent of the Italian Government and, indeed, in violation of the prohibition which it had imposed.

631. There were some who advocated such radical measures as the expulsion of Portugal from the specialized agencies, the application of economic and military sanctions and the breaking-off of all relations with Portugal within NATO and outside it. While he ap-

preciated the motives and shared the views of those who advocated such measures against Portugal, he felt obliged to express reservations with respect to measures which would contravene the provisions of the United Nations Charter; for, in his view, the Organization was not yet sufficiently developed to put an end to injustice wherever it prevailed or to re-establish law and order where it had ceased to exist.

632. He would give an example to clarify his meaning. In 1965, at the twentieth session of the General Assembly, a resolution on the Portuguese Territories had been adopted although only 58 votes had been cast in its favour and there had been almost as many negative votes or abstentions. The countries which had voted against the resolution or had abstained had included Argentina, Mexico, Austria, Chile, Finland, Jamaica, Norway and Sweden, which no one could say were joined to Portugal by an alliance or by bonds of sympathy. As a result of the adoption of that resolution, the impression had been created that the Portuguese Government received support from certain Western and Latin American Powers, which was far from the truth. In fact, Portugal, despite its membership of NATO, to which it represented a considerable burden, was isolated in the world, and its only real allies were South Africa and Southern Rhodesia.

633. What could the Special Committee do to facilitate the implementation of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) in the Territories under Portuguese administration? Firstly, it should continue to draw the attention of world public opinion to the problem which the maintenance of an outdated colonial system in Africa constituted. Secondly, the United Nations should not only supply the peoples of the Portuguese Territories with material aid in the form of medicines, food and clothing, but should also help them to train the personnel who would lead them after the Territories became independent. Thirdly, those countries which, for historical or geographical reasons, still maintained relations with Portugal must be urged to express to the Portuguese Government once more their serious concern at conditions in its Territories. Fourthly, those same countries should be urged to adopt effective measures to prevent the armaments supplied to Portugal within the framework of NATO and for defensive purposes in Western Europe from being used to repress nationalist liberation movements in the Portuguese colonies.

634. Before concluding, he wished to make some comments concerning the role which NATO, according to some speakers, was playing in the Portuguese problem. The attacks which had been made on NATO at the current session of the Special Committee were simply the result of a propaganda campaign designed to discredit an alliance that had played an essential role in the maintenance of international peace. He hoped that the African members of the Special Committee would be able to draw a distinction between the condemnation of Portuguese colonialism which was on the Committee's agenda and the petty polemics against the Atlantic alliance. He deplored the fact that some speakers had seen fit to make use of such a forum and of the debate on so serious a subject as conditions in the Portuguese Territories to raise problems which were related to the military and political balance in Europe and had nothing to do with the matter currently under discussion.

635. The representative of *Australia* said that his Government's attitude was one of rejection of Por-

tugal's present policies and of support for the principle of self-determination. It was concerned about Portugal's failure to meet its obligations under the Charter and its refusal to submit information to the United Nations on the Territories under its control. His Government had not hesitated to express to the Portuguese Government its concern and disagreement. Australia did not supply arms or military equipment to that country. It was implacably opposed to forced labour, restriction of civil liberties and limitation of franchise, as perpetuated by Portugal.

636. During the Special Committee's meetings in Dar es Salaam and Algiers, he had put certain political questions to the petitioners, and had been impressed by the answers, the import of which had been substantially the same in both places. He had been left with the feeling and the hope that there was much fertile ground that the Portuguese Government could cultivate for the happiness and prosperity of the countries and people concerned.

637. The representative of the *United States of America* recalled that in Dar es Salaam, when the Special Committee had last discussed the question of the Territories under Portuguese administration, she had summarized the major elements of United States policy on the question. That policy had been fully and frankly stated in the General Assembly, the Security Council and the Committee, and in Washington and Lisbon directly to the Portuguese Government.

638. Her Government had made it clear that it did not agree with Portugal's policy towards its Territories. It upheld the view that the Territories were clearly non-self-governing and were subject to the provisions of Chapter XI of the United Nations Charter. The United States of America had repeatedly urged Portugal to fulfil its obligations as an administering Power in respect both of the territorial administration and of the submission of information to the Secretary-General of the United Nations. It supported the right of the people of the Territories to full and genuine self-determination: they should be free to choose the kind of institutions and forms of government under which they wished to live. It did not believe that self-determination meant the agreement and consent of the population only to a particular political or administrative structure, or to a certain type of State, and it had urged Portugal to accept the principle of self-determination and give it practical effect. There was no conceivable step that would contribute more than that to the peaceful solution of the problem: it would break a stalemate that was fraught with danger, and that would indeed be broken, if not by consent, then by violence. It was the Committee's task to explore realistic means whereby that process could take place peacefully.

639. One step that the Security Council had recognized as desirable was to prevent the export of arms to the administering Power for use in its African Territories, and the question had been subject to extensive discussion in the Committee. Since Portugal was a member of NATO, the discussion had provided a convenient opportunity for some members who, for reasons unconnected with the well-being of the peoples of the Territories, wished to attack that organization. So far as her Government was concerned, she could state unequivocally that NATO as an organization did not supply arms to Portugal for use in the Territories. She also stated that the United States, in accordance with operative paragraph 6 of the Se-

curity Council resolution of 31 July 1963, neither supplied nor permitted the export of arms or military equipment to that country for use in the Territories. It had for many years forbidden such provision without the specific assurance that the material would not be so used. That was the firm and publicly stated policy to which her country would continue to adhere.

640. A number of petitioners had cited Portugal's use of military equipment allegedly of United States manufacture. She had made it clear in Dar es Salaam that the weapons concerned were of Second World War vintage, available all over the world, and had been part of existing arms stocks in a number of countries for many years. She repeated that they were not available in the United States for use in the Territories.

641. Her delegation deplored the resort by Portugal to violence in the area, and particularly its bombing of defenceless villages and people. She pointed out, however, that the period of time cited by the former Portuguese pilot—21 July 1961 to 10 February 1963—had been prior to the adoption of the Security Council's resolution on the subject. She also pointed out that, despite the attempt by some delegations to persuade that petitioner to indict certain countries as having co-operated with Portugal in its colonialist policy, he had failed to do so.

642. The representative of the *United Republic of Tanzania*, commenting on the statements made by the Italian and other delegations with regard to the question of financial interests, said that for Africans the question was not one of ideological differences: they were interested only in being Africans and in independence. The reference to financial interests had been made because the petitioners had stated repeatedly that those interests contributed towards the war and provided the Portuguese with the necessary funds to buy weapons. It was regrettable that an attempt had been made by certain delegations to inject ideological arguments. He would have preferred to hear them deny that American and West European companies were contributing to the war that was responsible for the massacre of the African people. Evidence had been given, even by the Portuguese themselves, regarding the activities of such financial monopolies.

643. The representative of Italy had stated that the NATO alliance had played an important part in keeping the peace of the world. He pointed out that there had been no conflict in any part of the world since the Second World War in which NATO had stepped in to defend world peace. As long as there was evidence that NATO arms were being used against the African people they would continue to raise objections. The petitioner who had appeared before the Special Committee the previous day had given evidence that NATO arms had been supplied to Portugal at a nominal charge, and as he had himself been serving at that time in the Portuguese army, there was every reason to believe that what he said was true.

644. The reassertion by the representative of the United States that her Government agreed with the principle of self-determination was not enough: what was wanted now was implementation of that principle. The African people considered it a contradiction to claim to agree to that principle while at the same time helping the Power concerned to undermine it.

645. He quoted from an Indian newspaper a passage under the headline "Military Weapons to Salazar",

which stated that at the beginning of May 1966 the United States customs authorities had discovered a large quantity of arms illegally destined for Portugal, and had arrested the pilot of the aircraft on which they were to have been carried, who had defended himself by saying that he was acting not for individual but for national interest. He had declared in court that he was an agent of the CIA charged with the carriage of arms to Angola and Mozambique, and that he had also delivered to Portugal seven B-52 bombers and other equipment.

646. What his delegation was interested in was not the declaration of an arms embargo but of actual effective control of arms to Portugal. The representative of the United States had stated that the arms her Government supplied to Portugal were only for the defence of Europe. After a lapse of twenty years since the Second World War there was no threat of war in Europe, yet it was being said that Portugal was being given arms for its defence.

647. His delegation would have been glad to hear NATO members in the Committee state categorically that NATO arms would never be used by Portugal against the African people.

648. The representative of the *United States of America*, commenting on the statement made by the representative of Tanzania, said that he himself had shown that measures had been taken by the United States of America to prevent the export of arms to the Portuguese Territories. The fact that the persons concerned had had to resort to illegal acts showed that her Government did enforce its declared policy and that any violation of it was subject to prosecution in its courts. Regarding the claim that United States agencies had collaborated with the pilot of the aircraft concerned, she was authorized by her Government categorically to deny that allegation.

D. ACTION TAKEN BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE²⁹

649. At the 452nd meeting, Afghanistan, Ethiopia, India, Iran, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Mali, Sierra Leone, Syria, Tunisia, United Republic of Tanzania and Yugoslavia, submitted a draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.313).

650. Introducing the draft resolution on behalf of the sponsors, the representative of *India* said that operative paragraph 4 reflected the viewpoint expressed by a large majority of members of the Special Committee and by the petitioners who had appeared before it. It was well known that the assistance Portugal received from such financial interests was one of the main props for its obduracy, and the drafters of the resolution had considered it necessary to express strong disapproval of them.

651. The other new idea was that contained in operative paragraph 6 which recommended that the Security Council should make it obligatory for all States to implement the measures contained in General Assembly resolution 2107 (XX) of 21 December 1965,

²⁹ Action taken by the Special Committee on the question of Territories under Portuguese administration in connexion with General Assembly resolutions 2105 (XX) and 2107 (XX) is contained in chapter I of this report. See also chapter II (paras. 595-619) for an account of the discussions on the resolution adopted by the Special Committee at its 455th meeting on 22 June 1966 concerning the implementation of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) with regard to Territories considered by the Committee during its meetings in Africa.

and in particular, those in paragraph 7 of that resolution, which he read out to the Committee. The enforcement of those measures on a voluntary basis had been urged for a long time, but the response of some Member States had been bitterly disappointing. The Security Council must now assume the vital role with which it had been entrusted under the United Nations Charter. If it made such measures obligatory, the excuse of Portugal's friends and allies that they could not compel action by their nationals would be removed.

652. Some delegations might have misgivings about the sixth preambular paragraph. He would point out, however, that the threat to international peace and security as a result of Portugal's policy had already been confirmed by the Security Council, and the reference to aggravation of the situation as a result of the racist rebellion in Southern Rhodesia was merely a recognition of the facts.

653. It had been argued by some delegations that it was unrealistic for the Special Committee to recommend measures that were unlikely to be accepted and implemented by everyone. The co-sponsors believed, however, that the Committee should not be discouraged by the obstacles put in the way of implementing effective measures against Portugal, and that it was its duty to continue its attempt to induce those who had not so far found it possible to support the measures envisaged to realize their mistakes and fall into line. With regard to the suggestion that those measures would encroach upon the Security Council's authority, he pointed out that the Special Committee was merely recommending the enforcement of mandatory sanctions in regard to the threat to international peace and security already confirmed by the Security Council in its resolution 218 (1965).

654. The situation in the Territories under Portuguese rule was a grave and deteriorating one. The brave people suffering under it were carrying on their fight against heavy odds, but Portugal was bound to lose in the end. The co-sponsors hoped that it would realize that fact and mend the situation before too much blood had been shed, and it was in that spirit that they had presented the draft resolution. He hoped all members of the Committee would find it possible to support it and to implement it fully and promptly. The sponsors would welcome any suggestions for improving the draft, but must reject any that would be likely to weaken the text.

655. The representative of *Madagascar*, speaking on behalf of the Afro-Asian sponsors and Yugoslavia, said that the draft resolution endeavoured to sum up, in a few words, what the African countries thought they were entitled to expect from the international community in order to confront the danger threatening the Territories administered by Portugal, and hence threatening Africa and the whole world. The sponsors had wanted to demonstrate once again their uneasiness and concern about the situation in those Territories. They considered the situation "critical" and "explosive", for they were convinced that if it went on it could constitute a serious threat to peace and security, which were the objectives and the *raison d'être* of the United Nations. The Special Committee had been able to hear evidence about what was happening in the Territories under Portuguese domination: those Territories were the daily scene of military operations and repressive measures, which claimed many victims among the civilian population. Portugal had acquired the habit of repeating constantly that there was no war in the

Territories it occupied. In so doing, it not only denied the truth but encouraged bloodshed, and no one could remain indifferent in face of the ever-increasing number of victims shot down by Portuguese bullets. The draft resolution also expressed the sponsors' concern about the presence of certain financial interests which were operating in the Territories under Portuguese domination, to the sole advantage of Portugal and not of the African population.

656. It was not as a matter of routine that the sponsors of the draft resolution had wished to reaffirm the inalienable right of those people to self-determination and independence. The Committee knew what definition of the term "self-determination" Portugal sought to impose. That question had been the subject of lengthy debates both in the Security Council and in other United Nations bodies. He need merely recall that the States Members of the United Nations were unanimous in recognizing that Portugal's thesis was characterized by the bad faith that prompted it.

657. In view of Portugal's persistent refusal to conform to reason and good sense, the sponsors of the draft resolution had made a point of reaffirming their position on the legitimacy of the struggle which the inhabitants of those Territories were being forced to wage, solely with a view to recovering their sovereignty and independence. It went without saying that the sponsors of the draft resolution did not thereby intend to give the green light for violence and bloodshed, but merely to point out that the peoples of those Territories had been compelled to resort to force to face a war that Portugal had imposed on them. Before taking up arms, their representatives had tried every means of finding a basis for agreement with Portugal. Not only had Portugal met them with total intransigence but it had launched military and repressive operations against the local population. In that connexion, and in view of the intensification of the attacks on the civilian population, the sponsors of the draft resolution had been led to express their concern over the assistance and arms which Portugal was receiving from its allies and was using against the people of the Territories under its domination. That was why they were appealing once more to Portugal's allies to reconsider their attitude and to take the steps set forth in paragraph 7 of the draft resolution. Moreover, practically all the petitioners whom the members of the Committee had heard in the course of the present session had confirmed that Portugal was indeed using the arms and war material it received from its allies.

658. Similarly, the sponsors of the draft resolution had not wished to pass over in silence the occupying Power's odious policy of encouraging foreign immigration into those Territories for equally reprehensible ends. That settlement policy showed clearly that Portugal was firmly resolved to maintain its hold over the Territories under its domination, to perpetuate its policy of atrocities and to continue to persecute innocent people who had committed no crime but that of demanding freedom and independence.

659. In the light of the Indian representative's comments and the observations he himself had made on behalf of the members of the Afro-Asian group and Yugoslavia, he considered the draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.313) fully justified. He hoped that all the members of the Committee who were against war and bloodshed, who professed tolerance and valued freedom and sought to promote understanding and brotherhood among peoples, would be willing to make their con-

tribution to the joint effort by isolating Portugal from the rest of the world until such time as the Government of that country renounced its contemptible colonial policy.

660. The representative of *Iraq* said that in co-sponsoring the draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.313) on the Portuguese Territories which was before the Committee, it was the hope of his delegation that it would be adopted unanimously. The Committee's moral support for the cause of the African people in those Territories would contribute to the liberation of millions who had long suffered from inhuman treatment and countless indignities.

661. The representative of *Denmark* said that, to its great regret, the Danish delegation could not vote in favour of the draft resolution. It found several paragraphs unacceptable. In particular, operative paragraph 6 was not acceptable, because paragraph 7 of resolution 2107 went far beyond the General Assembly's competence. Furthermore, the situation did not seem to justify such radical measures. Finally, the seventh preambular paragraph and operative paragraph 4 exaggerated the role played by foreign interests.

662. In conclusion, he doubted whether measures as radical as those recommended in the draft resolution could effectively assist the indigenous peoples.

663. The representative of *Bulgaria* said that his delegation had often expressed the opinion that only if compulsory sanctions were adopted against Members of the United Nations which contravened United Nations resolutions would it be possible to put Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter into effect. He was glad that the draft resolution reflected that urgent necessity. Operative paragraph 6 in particular was a notable example because it stressed the obligation of all States, whether or not they were Members of the United Nations—he had in mind the Federal Republic of Germany in particular—to implement the measures set forth in paragraph 7 of resolution 2107 (XX), which provided among other things for the rupture of diplomatic and consular relations and the boycott of all trade with Portugal.

664. All the petitioners had stressed the fact that the United Nations, and more particularly the specialized agencies, could give them effective assistance. The Special Committee had therefore been justified in asking those agencies how they had complied with the General Assembly resolutions.

665. In the draft resolution before the Committee, the specialized agencies, and in particular the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the International Monetary Fund, were asked to refrain from granting Portugal any financial, economic or technical assistance. The specialized agencies were also asked to increase their assistance to the refugees and to the victims of military operations. He was glad that the draft resolution included such provisions, for some of the specialized agencies were showing little enthusiasm for the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. For that reason, it might perhaps be useful to prepare a still more explicit text.

666. He considered that the draft resolution would represent a step forward and would make it possible to give those who were fighting against Portuguese colonialism more effective aid. The Bulgarian delegation thanked the sponsors for their efforts and would whole-heartedly support the draft resolution.

667. The representative of *Syria* said that because it was not enough to condemn Portugal the draft resolution rightly recommended to the Security Council to make the implementation of measures provided for in paragraph 7 of General Assembly resolution 2107 (XX) mandatory on all Member States. Equally crucial was paragraph 7 of the draft resolution requesting all States, and particularly the military allies of Portugal, not to supply the régime with arms, not to provide it with material designed to facilitate its own production of arms, and not to assist it in any other way. The grounds for that request had been the clear evidence given that Portugal did receive, directly or indirectly, arms and equipment from certain States which, however, publicly condemned the régime. That contradiction was at the heart of the tragedy, which was further aggravated by the enthusiastic support tendered to the régime by financial concerns in a bid for quick and illicit profits.

668. The representative of *Italy* said that in the light of considerations he had stated previously and in view of the instructions which he had just received from his Government, he would be unable to support the draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.313). He had already expressed his views of foreign economic interests, and he was obliged to make very serious reservations concerning operative paragraphs 6 and 7. Paragraph 6 referred to a General Assembly resolution which many Members of the United Nations considered unconstitutional. Moreover, he did not believe that the General Assembly or any of its committees could recommend definite measures to the Security Council. The wording of paragraph 7 was tantamount to the imposition of sanctions, and any such decision was the sole prerogative of the Security Council.

669. The representative of *Australia* said that his delegation was unable to support the draft resolution in its entirety. The last three paragraphs of the preamble did not give an adequate and sufficiently balanced description of the facts to sustain the operative paragraphs that followed. Operative paragraph 4 had the same defects to which he had referred in Addis Ababa concerning the resolution on South West Africa, in that it made no attempt to differentiate between those commercial interests that exploited the people and those that did not.

670. Operative paragraph 6 contained a new element with regard to the Portuguese Territories, but one with which the Committee had become familiar in other contexts. His delegation was bound to oppose its form of words, which usurped the Security Council's authority and would give rise to a set of circumstances to which Australia was strongly opposed.

671. The same remarks applied to operative paragraph 7, which was perhaps even more important, since there were far-reaching implications hidden in it that went beyond the tragedy of the Portuguese Territories. His delegation would therefore abstain from voting on the draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.313).

672. The representative of the *United States of America* said that her delegation did not believe that the language used or the measures called for in the seventh paragraph of the preamble and in operative paragraph 6 of the draft resolution were justified even in the serious situation existing in the Portuguese Territories. Nor could it agree with the generalized and doctrinaire statements in regard to foreign investment in the eight paragraph of the preamble and

in operative paragraph 4. Her delegation would be unable to support the draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.313).

673. The representative of *Chile* said that the position of Chile had not changed. For years Chile had condemned the colonial policy of Portugal and unconditionally supported the nationalist movements whose object was to establish decent government in the Territories under Portuguese domination. The Chilean delegation did not object to the sixth preambular paragraph, although it had some reservations about the wording. It would abstain in the votes on operative paragraphs 6, 7 and 8 for reasons which had already been stated many times in the General Assembly and in the Special Committee.

674. At its 455th meeting the Special Committee voted on the draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.331) as follows:

(a) Operative paragraph 2 of the draft resolution was adopted by a roll-call vote of 20 to none, and no abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Australia, Bulgaria, Chile, Denmark, Ethiopia, India, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Mali, Poland, Sierra Leone, Syria, Tunisia, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Venezuela, Yugoslavia.

Against: None.

(b) Operative paragraph 6 of the draft resolution was adopted by 15 votes to 3, with 2 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Bulgaria, Ethiopia, India, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Mali, Poland, Sierra Leone, Syria, Tunisia, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Republic of Tanzania, Yugoslavia.

Against: Australia, Denmark, United States of America.

Abstaining: Chile, Venezuela.

(c) Operative paragraph 7 was adopted by a roll-call vote of 16 to 2, with 3 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Bulgaria, Ethiopia, India, Iran, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Mali, Poland, Sierra Leone, Syria, Tunisia, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Republic of Tanzania, Yugoslavia.

Against: Australia, United States of America.

Abstaining: Chile, Denmark, Venezuela.

(d) Operative paragraph 8 of the draft resolution was adopted by a roll-call vote of 16 to none, with 5 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Bulgaria, Ethiopia, India, Iran, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Mali, Poland, Sierra Leone, Syria, Tunisia, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Republic of Tanzania, Yugoslavia.

Against: None.

Abstaining: Australia, Chile, Denmark, United States of America, Venezuela.

(e) The draft resolution as a whole (A/AC.109/L.313) was adopted by a roll-call vote of 18 to 1, with 3 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Bulgaria, Chile, Ethiopia, India, Iran, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Mali, Poland, Sierra Leone, Syria, Tunisia, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Republic of Tanzania, Venezuela, Yugoslavia.

Against: United States of America.

Abstaining: Australia, Denmark, Italy.

675. The text of the resolution on the question of Territories under Portuguese administration (A/AC.109/187) adopted by the Special Committee at its 455th meeting on 22 June 1966, reads as follows:

"The Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,

"Having examined again the question relating to Angola, Mozambique, so-called Portuguese Guinea and other Territories under Portuguese domination,

"Having heard the statements of the petitioners,

"Recalling General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960 containing the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,

"Recalling also Security Council resolutions 163 (1961) of 9 June 1961, 180 (1963) of 31 July 1963, 183 (1963) of 11 December 1963 and 218 (1965) of 23 November 1965,

"Recalling further General Assembly resolutions 1807 (XVII) of 14 December 1962, 1819 (XVII) of 18 December 1962, 1913 (XVIII) of 3 December 1963 and 2107 (XX) of 21 December 1965,

"Deeply concerned at the critical and explosive situation which is threatening peace and security arising from the intensification of the measures of repression and military operations against the African people of these Territories, which is further aggravated by the racist minority rebellion in Southern Rhodesia,

"Noting with deep concern that the activities of the foreign financial interests in these Territories which impede the African people in the realization of their aspirations to freedom and independence continue undiminished,

"Further noting with deep concern that Portugal continues to use the aid and weapons that it receives from its military allies against the populations of these Territories,

"1. Reaffirms the inalienable right of the peoples of the African Territories under Portuguese domination to freedom and independence in accordance with General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) and recognizes the legitimacy of their struggle to achieve this right;

"2. Condemns the colonial policy of Portugal and its persistent refusal to carry out the resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council;

"3. Condemns the policy of the Government of Portugal which violates the economic and political rights of the indigenous population by the settlement on a large scale of foreign immigrants in the Territories and by the exporting of workers to South Africa;

"4. Condemns the activities of the financial interests operating in the Territories under Portuguese domination which exploit the human and material resources and impede the progress of the people of the Territories towards freedom and independence;

"5. Appeals to all States to give the people of the Territories under Portuguese domination the moral and material support necessary for the restoration of their inalienable rights and to prevent their nationals from co-operating with the Portuguese authorities, especially in the field of foreign investment;

"6. *Recommends* to the Security Council to make it obligatory for all States to implement the measures contained in General Assembly resolution 2107 (XX), in particular those mentioned in paragraph 7 thereof;

"7. *Requests* all States and, in particular, the military allies of Portugal within the framework of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, to take the following steps:

"(a) To desist forthwith from giving the Government of Portugal any assistance which would enable it to continue its repression of the African people in the Territories under its domination;

"(b) To take all the necessary measures to prevent the sale or supply of arms and military equipment to the Government of Portugal;

"(c) To stop the sale or shipment to the Government of Portugal of equipment and materials for the manufacture or maintenance of arms and ammunition;

"8. *Appeals* once again to all the specialized agencies, in particular to the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the International Monetary Fund, to refrain from granting Portugal any financial, economic or technical assistance so long as the Government of Portugal fails to implement General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV);

"9. *Requests* the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the specialized agencies concerned and other international relief organizations to increase their assistance to the refugees from the Territories under Portuguese domination and to the people who have suffered and are still suffering from military operations;

"10. *Decides* to maintain the question of the Territories under Portuguese domination on its agenda."

676. The text of the resolution was transmitted to the President of the Security Council on 1 July 1966.³⁰

PART II*

E. STUDY OF THE ACTIVITIES OF FOREIGN ECONOMIC AND OTHER INTERESTS WHICH ARE IMPEDING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECLARATION ON THE GRANTING OF INDEPENDENCE TO COLONIAL COUNTRIES AND PEOPLES IN THE TERRITORIES UNDER PORTUGUESE ADMINISTRATION

Introduction

677. At its 277th meeting, on 3 July 1964, the Special Committee adopted a resolution on Territories under Portuguese administration (A/5800/Rev.1, chap. V, para. 352). In operative paragraph 7 of this resolution it requested "Sub-Committee I of the Special Committee, with the assistance of the Secretary-General, to study the activities of foreign economic and other interests, which are impeding the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence in the Territories under Portuguese administration".

678. Sub-Committee I considered this question in November 1964 and at meetings held between 19 August and 12 October 1965. On the basis of information available to it, which included two working papers prepared by the Secretariat (A/6000/Rev.1, chap. V,

annexes I and II), the Sub-Committee drew up conclusions and recommendations which were subsequently adopted by the Special Committee and included in chapter V of its report to the General Assembly at its twentieth session.

679. Sub-Committee I continued its consideration of this question at meetings held in August and September 1966, when it had before it additional working papers prepared by the Secretariat (see annex, appendices I to V). On 14 September 1966, the Sub-Committee adopted a supplementary report concerning this item which is annexed hereto.

680. At its 470th meeting, on 10 October 1966, the Special Committee considered the report of Sub-Committee I.

Consideration by the Special Committee of the supplementary report of Sub-Committee I

681. At the 470th meeting of the Special Committee, the representative of *Syria*, Rapporteur of Sub-Committee I, introduced the supplementary report of the Sub-Committee.

682. The representative of the *United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland* noted that the Sub-Committee confirmed all the recommendations which it had made in its main report on the question (A/6000/Rev.1, chap. V, appendix, para. 280). His delegation had reserved its position on that report when it had been discussed the previous year and did so once more.

683. The representative of *Italy* recalled the views expressed by his delegation regarding the main report (*ibid.*, chap. V, paras 454-459). He reserved his delegation's position on the recommendations in paragraphs 89 and 90 of the supplementary report. On the understanding that those reservations would be recorded, his delegation would not oppose the adoption of the report.

684. The representative of the *United States of America* reserved his delegation's position on the report, for the reasons it had already stated in the earlier debate on the subject.

685. The representative of *Australia* recalled that his delegation had informed the Special Committee that his Government had been in unilateral touch with the Government of Portugal and that it did not agree with the Portuguese Government's theory regarding the question of self-determination and allied matters. As his delegation had explained its attitude on previous occasions, he reserved its position on the report.

686. The representative of *Denmark* drew attention to his delegation's position as stated at the thirty-first meeting of the Sub-Committee (see annex, paragraph 91) and said that those reservations were still valid.

Action taken by the Special Committee on the supplementary report of Sub-Committee I

687. At its 470th meeting, on 10 October 1966, the Special Committee adopted the supplementary report of Sub-Committee I (see annex), it being understood that the reservations expressed by members would be reflected in the records.

688. In so doing, the Special Committee reaffirmed all the recommendations contained in the main report on this subject which it had submitted to the General Assembly in 1965 (A/6000/Rev.1, chap. V, sect. D) and decided to recommend to the General Assembly that it inscribe on the agenda of its twenty-first session as a matter of urgency the following item:

³⁰ Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-first Year, Supplement for July, August and September 1966, document S/7394.

* Previously issued under the symbol A/6300/Add.3 (part II).

"The activities of foreign economic and other interests which are impeding the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples in Southern Rhodesia, South West Africa, the Territories under Portuguese administration and other colonial territories".

ANNEX

[A/AC.109/L.334 and Add.1]

Supplementary report of Sub-Committee I

The activities of foreign economic and other interests which are impeding the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples in the Territories under Portuguese administration

Rapporteur: Mr. Rafic JOUÉJATI (Syria)

CONTENTS

	<i>Paragraphs</i>
INTRODUCTION	1-3
CONSIDERATION BY THE SUB-COMMITTEE	
A. Statements by members	4-68
B. Conclusions	69-88
C. Recommendations	89-90
D. Adoption of report	91
Appendices	
	<i>Page</i>
I. Agriculture and processing industries in Angola and Mozambique: organization and government policy	378
II. Agriculture and processing industries in Angola ..	391
III. Agriculture and processing industries in Mozambique	411
IV. Foreign-owned railways in Angola and Mozambique	435
V. Mozambique's economic relations with South Africa and Southern Rhodesia	446

INTRODUCTION

1. On 3 July 1964, the Special Committee adopted a resolution on Territories under Portuguese administration (A/5800/Rev.1, chap. V, para. 352) whereby in paragraph 7 it requested "Sub-Committee I of the Special Committee" with the assistance of the Secretary-General, to study the activities of foreign economic and other interests, which are impeding the implementation of the Declaration on the granting of independence in the Territories under Portuguese administration".

2. The Sub-Committee first considered this question in November 1964 and further at meetings held between 19 August and 12 October 1965. It had before it two working papers prepared by the Secretariat, one concerning mining in Angola and Mozambique and the other concerning the concession, occupation and settlement of land in Angola and Mozambique (A/6000/Rev.1, chap. V, annexes I and II). In addition, the Sub-Committee also had before it excerpts of statements made and communications submitted by petitioners from Territories under Portuguese administration during the Special Committee's visit to Africa in 1965. On the basis of the information available the Sub-Committee drew up conclusions and recommendations which were subsequently adopted by the Special Committee and included in chapter V of its report to the General Assembly at its twentieth session.

3. The Sub-Committee continued its consideration of this question at its 27th, 28th and 31st meetings held on 5 and 12 August, and 14 September 1966. The Sub-Committee had before it a series of working papers prepared by the Secretariat,

* The Sub-Committee is composed of the following members: Denmark, Ethiopia, Mali, Syria (Rapporteur), Tunisia, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Republic of Tanzania (Chairman) and Yugoslavia.

in compliance with the request contained in its previous report (A/6000/Rev.1, chap. V, appendix, para. 278), on agriculture and processing industries in Angola and Mozambique, on foreign-owned railways in those two Territories, and on the economic relations of Mozambique with South Africa and Southern Rhodesia. These working papers appear as appendices I to V of the present annex.

CONSIDERATION BY THE SUB-COMMITTEE

A. *Statements by members*

4. The representative of the *United Republic of Tanzania* said that Portugal was a primitive and uncivilized colonial Power which was engaged in robbing the peoples of Angola, Mozambique and so-called Portuguese Guinea. It was a small, under-developed country, the poorest in Europe, with a population of 8 million people; yet, with the help of its allies, it was oppressing and impoverishing the African countries which, by an accident of history, were under its administration, using methods of which any other nation would have been ashamed. Other colonial Powers—for instance, the United Kingdom, France, and, to a lesser extent, Belgium—had been able to conceal their exploitation of subject peoples by establishing economic systems which, on the surface, had appeared to be for the benefit of the people. They had encouraged the development of a small but significant African middle class which had helped them to keep control of the African peasants and workers. Portugal, however, had failed to develop any such economic system to camouflage its interests, despite the highly publicized Portuguese theory of Luso-tropicalism, which was a system intended to help the Portuguese to fuse with all races, cultures and religion to form one nation. The Portuguese claim that a class of *assimilados* had been established, with sufficient Portuguese culture to be indistinguishable from the European settlers, was a myth.

5. Portugal's colonial economic policy was centred on the production of high-priced cash crops for export. Assistance was given mainly to European or so-called civilized producers, although the Africans were responsible for most of the agricultural production, either as cheap labour or as the principal growers of cotton, rice, maize and cashew nuts. Africans interested in making a living through cash agriculture were governed by a whole series of restrictive legal measures. For example, all able-bodied Africans were obliged to work on public projects unless they could prove that they had hired themselves out as farm hands for six months (in Angola, for nine months) a year, that they qualified as independent native farmers, or that they kept a minimum number of cattle. Such restrictions had made the Africans virtually slaves of the European and Asian entrepreneurs and farmers and, with the system of concessions granted to certain monopolies for the marketing of agricultural produce, had eliminated any economic advantages which might have resulted from the abundance of arable land still accessible to the African peasant. The less able-bodied members of his family were left to look after his farm during the time he was forced to work elsewhere.

6. In both Angola and Mozambique an African had no right to any piece of farmland unless he kept it permanently cleared and cultivated. He could be expelled from his land if he went away and did not take care of his plot for more than a total of four months in a year, if after three years he did not show that he was increasing the value of his cultivated areas and livestock, or if he did not build a brick house on or near his plot within five years. Since the Africans spent most of their time on forced labour and were only free to look after their own land during the dry season, it was impossible for them to maintain their status as independent farmers by fulfilling all the Portuguese requirements. Consequently, the ownership and use of arable land in the Territories was a privilege enjoyed by Europeans, Asians and a very small proportion of the so-called civilized Africans. The reason for such a discriminatory agricultural system was clearly to enable the Portuguese settlers, the Portuguese colonial industries and foreign interests to exploit both the land resources and the cheap African labour. The fact that none of the laws regulating agriculture and labour in Angola and Mozambique mentioned African participation in business enterprises was evidence that no Africans were ex-

pected to engage in them except as cheap labourers. They were only allowed to engage in barter amongst the indigenous community or at occasional markets set up under government supervision to sell primary products to European or Asian middlemen or to concessionary companies.

7. Investment in the agricultural and processing industries in Angola and Mozambique also favoured Europeans and Asians. In 1960, out of a total of 2,423 agricultural enterprises in Mozambique, 2,246 were Portuguese, 45 Asian, 34 German, 26 Greek and 14 British. In Angola most of the important export crops were controlled by European investors, although nearly all the production on European farm estates and plantations was by African labour.

8. One of the most distinctive features of Portuguese colonialism was the system of concessionary companies. Large European monopolies were licensed by the Government to control the purchase, export and distribution of certain export and cash crops which were mainly produced by the Africans. The Africans had no alternative but to sell their produce to the monopolies, and were forced to accept the low prices offered, while the Portuguese tax collectors waited at the buying centres to collect taxes after the farmers had sold their produce. As a result, the farmers often returned home empty-handed.

9. The production of coffee in Angola was so profitable that between 1955 and 1961 the number of European coffee-growers had increased from 600 to more than 2,000 and the total area under cultivation on European-owned farms had more than doubled. Because of intense competition for land in the coffee-producing areas, land on which Africans had been growing coffee for many years was often expropriated and given to new European settlers.

10. The processing industries in Mozambique and Angola were controlled by Europeans and other non-Africans, while the Africans were employed as cheap labour. European workers were much better paid than the Africans. In 1960, for example, the Colonial Cotton Development Company of Mozambique paid an average of \$1,460 a year to European workers and an average of only \$87 a year to African workers. Even allowing for the differences in skill between European and African workers, it was a very discriminatory system.

11. The bulk of the cotton output from Mozambique had to be exported to Portugal under the compulsory quota system for which export prices were officially fixed at about 60 per cent below international quotations. In order to limit the development of textile industries in Mozambique and Angola and thereby keep the Territories as steady markets for Portuguese processed goods, the Portuguese Government restricted the local production of textiles. If imports of textile goods from Portugal were to be replaced by goods produced locally, Mozambique might be able to reduce its trade deficit with Portugal and make its economy more self-sufficient. That, however, would be contrary to Portuguese economic interests.

12. It was obvious that Portugal's desire to stay in Africa as a colonial Power was directly related to its economic interests. When the African peoples of Mozambique and Angola began to organize themselves to fight for their independence in the early 1960s, Portugal started to invite foreign capital investments. The recent increase in the taxes paid by the large concessionary companies was clearly being used to buy weapons and equipment and to maintain a large European army.

13. Various sources had reported on Portugal's labour policy in its Territories. In 1947, Mr. Henrique Galvão, a member of the Portuguese National Assembly and an ardent supporter of Salazar, was sent to inspect the Portuguese Territories in Africa and, on his return, drew up a report which was never officially published, although it subsequently came to light in other countries. Mr. Galvão, who was subsequently dismissed, described the situation of the African workers as worse than slavery. Secondly, according to an article by a United States reporter in the *New York Herald Tribune* of 15 February 1948, when an Angolan plantation owner required labour, he notified the Government, which passed the demand to the village chiefs who had to supply fixed quotas of labourers. If the required number was not forthcoming, police were sent to round them up. Thirdly, a British expert on African questions, Basil Davidson, visited the Portuguese Territories in 1954 and in his book *The African Awakening* (1965) described the system of

forced labour practised there. According to him, country roads were built and maintained by compulsory and unpaid African workers, forced labour was practised in the European plantations, and the Africans in Lunda Province, who had no other means of earning money to pay taxes, were forced to work for the Diamond Company of Angola.

14. The Portuguese Administration had also arranged with foreign countries to supply African labour. For example, the Mozambique Convention of 1928 (modified in 1934 and 1940) provided for the recruitment of up to 100,000 workers a year from Mozambique to the mines of the Transvaal. This was an important source of income for the Portuguese authorities which charged fees for the issue of passports and the registration of contracts and which also received 2s.9d. per man per month from the Transvaal mines. Under the 1928 Convention, South Africa had agreed to send through the port of Lourenço Marques 47 per cent of the traffic to and from the district of Johannesburg. There was a similar agreement with Southern Rhodesia, dated 1934.

15. Portugal's ability to control her African Territories in spite of United Nations resolutions and military uprisings was due to the support of several major Western Powers; those Powers must be persuaded to change their attitude. The United Nations must implement its decisions against Portugal before any more resolutions were passed, and positive steps must be taken to provide financial, technical and educational support for the people of the Territories who were struggling for their independence. Those countries which could afford it should be encouraged to give direct material support to the nationalist forces.

16. The aim of the Sub-Committee's work, whatever the wording of its terms of reference, was to help African peoples to achieve independence and to analyse the economic factors which impeded their progress towards independence. In spite of the diligent study of the subject carried out by the Sub-Committee the previous year, not enough attention had been paid to it by the Fourth Committee and the General Assembly during the twentieth session. He therefore suggested that the General Assembly might be asked to consider it as a separate item at the twenty-first session. He would be interested to hear the views of other members of the Sub-Committee concerning his suggestion.

17. His delegation was aware that colonialism would not be eliminated from Africa by mere resolutions, but by the united action of the African peoples and all the peace-loving countries and peoples of the world. He hoped that the study on which the Sub-Committee was engaged would help to defeat colonialism and bring freedom and peace to Africa. The whole continent of Africa would inevitably one day be free. France and the United Kingdom had been forced to leave Africa, and Portugal should realize that it, too, would suffer the same fate.

18. The representative of the *Union of Soviet Socialist Republics* said that, pursuant to a decision of the Special Committee, the Sub-Committee was currently engaged in a study of agriculture, the processing industry and railway transport in Portugal's colonies. Having commented generally on the question at an earlier stage, his delegation would confine itself to the new Secretariat working papers on the subject.

19. In 1965 the Sub-Committee and the Special Committee had reached the conclusion that the activities of international monopolies in Portugal's colonies were a major obstacle to the achievement of freedom and independence by the colonial peoples and a serious impediment to the implementation of the Declaration in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV).^b It had been found that Portugal had granted vast concessions to foreign investors without the consent of the African inhabitants. By giving those investors privileges and guarantees of every sort, Portugal had fostered their ruthless exploitation—a joint endeavour with the Portuguese colonialists—of the Territories' natural and human resources. The monopolies made vast profits and repaid Portugal not only through taxes but also through loans, expenditure on the maintenance of "peace and order" and other services. That assistance was used by Portugal to

^b The conclusions and recommendations of the Sub-Committee appear in document A/6000/Rev.1, chap. V, appendix, paras. 260-280.

stifle resistance and keep colonialism alive in Africa. The partnership between the Portuguese colonialists and the international monopolies had a twofold aim—to exploit the colonies and to ensure the permanence of the system. The monopolies shared with Portugal responsibility for the African's suffering and for the non-application of the aforesaid Declaration to the Territories.

20. It had also been determined that the monopolies active in the Portuguese colonies originated in the States which gave Portugal its greatest support. They brought influence to bear on the Governments of their countries to help Portugal maintain its colonial standing, and thus they encouraged the continued non-compliance with the Charter and General Assembly resolutions. It had also been found that the monopolies were fostering the one-sided development of the Territories' economy. Their aim, like that of Portugal, was profit and not the satisfaction of the people's needs. Indeed, the people lived in the direst poverty and had virtually the status of slaves. It had been further noted that the interests of the monopolies and Portuguese colonialists were interwoven with the military and strategic interests of the NATO bloc, which for its own purposes fostered the union of Portugal with South Africa and Southern Rhodesia.

21. The new documents prepared by the Secretariat confirmed these earlier findings. Under Portugal's economic policy, the colonies were totally dependent on the metropolitan country. They were used as a source of raw materials and cheap labour and as a profitable field of investment for international capital. As stated in the working paper entitled "Agriculture and processing industries in Angola and Mozambique: organization and Government policy" (appendix I, para. 16), the Portuguese Constitution itself established the colonies' dependence on the metropolitan country. Salazar had openly stated that the colonies were "to produce raw materials to sell to the mother country in exchange for manufactured goods" (appendix I, para. 17). To that end, Portugal had established extensive regulations and controls over the production, processing and marketing of agricultural products needed for Portugal's domestic market or to earn foreign exchange, and the Territories had been prohibited from establishing industries which would compete with those of Portugal (appendix I, para. 18). To obtain additional support, Portugal had taken various steps to increase the flow of foreign capital into the colonies (appendix I, para. 23). Thus the international monopolies were growing increasingly powerful and tightening their grip on the resources of the Territories.

22. In the Portuguese colonies, the colour bar was absolute. Government legislation recognized only Europeans as producers to be registered with the colonial export boards, and the main concern of the authorities was to secure adequate African labour for European-owned enterprises (appendix I, paras. 42-43).

23. The study on agricultural and processing industries in Mozambique referred to Sena Sugar Estates, Ltd., the largest sugar company in Mozambique, with 90 per cent of its shares held by British capital (see appendix III, para. 56); net profit in 1963 had totalled \$1.5 million (appendix III, para. 63). The working paper on foreign-owned railways in Angola and Mozambique revealed that the Trans-Zambezia Railway Company in Mozambique, which was British, had had a net revenue of £226,691 in 1964 (appendix IV, para. 91). The Benguela Railway in Angola belonged almost entirely to the Tanganyika Concessions Company, in which a leading role was played by United States capital, including the Rockefeller group, and the net revenue of the railway from 1960 to 1963 had been approximately 1,000 million escudos (appendix IV, para. 30); over the same period the Portuguese Government had received some 120 million escudos from the railway's operation (appendix IV, para. 32); in 1963 it had obtained from the Company a loan of 60 million escudos at an annual interest rate of 1 per cent (appendix IV, para. 34). Their contributions to the support of police and *gendarmerie* alone were an example of how a railway could impede the granting of independence to a colonial Territory, since those forces were specifically concerned with the repression of national liberation movements.

24. In agriculture, Portugal sacrificed the interests and freedom of the Africans to enrich the colonialists and monopolies. The working paper on government policy and organization of

agriculture and processing in Angola and Mozambique stated that by 1960 about 87 per cent of Portugal's cotton imports were from its colonies (appendix I, para. 76), saving Portugal an enormous amount of foreign exchange which it used to build up the metropolitan textile industry. By fixing cotton prices below international market levels, Portugal gained additional advantage (appendix I, para. 120). The same price-fixing technique was applied to coffee. The result for the African inhabitants, however, was a life of near starvation. In recent years, various United Nations bodies had gathered evidence showing the exceptionally harsh living conditions of the indigenous people in the Portuguese colonies. The Special Committee had gathered fresh information during its session in Africa, and the Secretariat's new material shed further light on the situation. The working paper indicated that the average *per capita* income of African cotton growers was 634 escudos a year, and in some areas less than 200 escudos, or \$7 (appendix I, paras. 71 and 127). The material on agriculture presented to the Sub-Committee allowed a new conclusion to be added to those the Sub-Committee had reached the previous year concerning forced labour and transfers of workers "under contract" to South Africa and Southern Rhodesia. A horrible plight was reserved for the vast number of Africans engaged in agriculture. An African woman in agriculture had to work without remuneration for her white master. Agricultural assistance was virtually non-existent. A systematic policy of impoverishment was enforced through severe taxation and the obligation to cultivate prescribed crops for which the grower received a mere pittance. To pay their taxes, the Africans often had to work for white farmers, at a rate of pay that allowed them to do no more than meet their tax debt. Thus, in fact, they worked without earning. To keep them from starving, the authorities allowed them to grow enough food to subsist on. The important conclusion to be drawn was that agriculture in the Portuguese colonies was divided into two antagonistic sectors—European and African—the first ruthlessly exploiting the second.

25. Another important new conclusion that followed from the material presented to the Sub-Committee was that the exploitation of the colonies had helped Portugal to accumulate foreign exchange which it used to finance various branches of the metropolitan country's economy and particularly its textile industry, the leading economic sector. Thus the wealth of the colonies, mercilessly exploited to the detriment of the indigenous people, was used to strengthen the economy of the colonial Power.

26. His delegation supported the opinion expressed in the Sub-Committee that the Special Committee should recommend to the General Assembly that it should give special consideration to the implications of the activities of international monopolies in southern and central Africa and should act to put a stop to those activities in order to pave the way for the implementation of the Declaration in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV). He also whole-heartedly supported the suggestion just made by the Tanzanian representative. The Special Committee should be asked also to recommend the General Assembly to include those questions in its agenda and consider them as matters of priority.

27. The representative of Syria said that the effects of the activities of foreign economic interests which were impeding the implementation of the Declaration in the Territories under Portuguese administration had been the subject of lengthy study during the previous session of the Sub-Committee. The working papers recently prepared by the Secretariat reinforced the opinion then expressed by the majority that foreign interests and monopolies were pursuing a course which obstructed any attempt by the African population to gain independence, inasmuch as they collaborated with the colonial Power in the exploitation of African human and natural resources. Even such apparent improvements as permanent housing for plantation workers or the bonus system were merely an excuse for more intensive exploitation of African workers and the nominal abandonment of compulsory recruitment was worthless, since those workers had no option but to seek employment with foreign concessionary companies.

28. A typical instance of the exploitation of African labour by foreign enterprises was that of the predominantly British-

owned Sena Sugar Estates in Mozambique. The total average cost to that company of an African worker was approximately \$US5.43 per month in 1952, for wages, food and medical care—which was probably generous in comparison to the expenditure on an African worker on the sisal and cotton plantations. Nevertheless, in 1960 that company had made profits, before taxation, which far exceeded its total expenditure on African labour. The benefit to the Portuguese economy took the form, not only of tax revenue from the company, but of purchasing sugar well below world market prices and without any loss of hard currency.

29. Similar examples could be given of the activities of foreign interests in almost every sphere of economic activity. All of them, however, shared the common characteristic of exploiting African human and natural resources and of ensuring a continuous flow of profits by keeping Africans in a state of subservience and thus impeding their progress towards independence. The Governments which bore such a heavy responsibility and which pleaded that they had no jurisdiction over the activities of private enterprise would not long remain passive if the African population of the Territories resorted, in desperation, to violent methods.

30. His delegation supported the suggestion of the representative of the United Republic of Tanzania. The time had come for a full debate in the General Assembly and for all Member States to be given an opportunity to state their attitude to the tragic exploitation of the Portuguese Territories.

31. The representative of Denmark, referring to the working papers prepared by the Secretariat (see appendices to this annex), said that his delegation was doubtful to what extent the material showed that there were any interests which met the requirements of the Sub-Committee's terms of reference. It was required to study the activities of foreign interests which impeded the implementation of the Declaration.

32. The working paper on agriculture and the processing industries, for instance, showed that, with one important exception, almost all the economic interests in those sectors were Portuguese. There was, however, certain foreign investment in the railways in Angola and Mozambique, but it was difficult to see how a railway could be said to impede progress towards independence.

33. His delegation was, of course, firmly opposed to exploitation of any people by a colonial Power and it confirmed that there was a high degree of economic collusion between the diehard colonialists in southern Africa. Although his delegation was not convinced that the subject came within the terms of reference of the Sub-Committee, he would not oppose a reference in the Sub-Committee's report to economic relations between the Territories under Portuguese administration and South Africa and Southern Rhodesia.

34. His delegation could not agree with the Soviet representative's view that the economic activities of foreign interests in the Territories under discussion were the chief obstacle to their achieving independence. The political line followed by the colonial Power concerned was a far more significant factor, since it was that which allowed exploitation and impeded national liberation movements, and it was that kind of colonial policy which should be brought to an end.

35. His delegation agreed that there was exploitation of Africans in the Portuguese Territories and condemned it. He believed, however, that the facts of the situation did not warrant the conclusion that the activities of foreign—as distinct from Portuguese—economic interests constituted the main obstacle to the granting of independence to those Territories. His delegation was therefore unable to support the suggestion made by the representative of the United Republic of Tanzania that the Sub-Committee should recommend that the subject under discussion should be included in the agenda for the forthcoming General Assembly as a separate item.

36. However, should the Sub-Committee decide to ask the Special Committee to recommend the General Assembly to include in its agenda the question of the activities of foreign interests in the African Territories, it would be better for it to appear as a single item so as to facilitate the task of the General Assembly and the Fourth Committee, which already had a very heavy agenda.

37. The representative of Ethiopia thought that, by considering the activities of foreign monopolies and other foreign interests in the Territories under Portuguese administration as a separate item on the agenda, the General Assembly would be treating the question with the urgency and importance which it deserved and would bring out the factors which were hampering the struggle of the African peoples for independence.

38. Despite the many meetings devoted to the Portuguese Territories, the resolutions adopted and the appeals addressed by the United Nations to the Portuguese Government, Mr. Salazar continued to turn a deaf ear to all the appeals of the United Nations and of the Organization of African Unity (OAU).

39. Portugal's refusal to abandon its anachronistic policy was easily explained by the profits which it derived from those Territories. It was well known that Portugal was neither rich nor militarily powerful. There was no need to ask what forces were helping it to continue its hopeless struggle against the irresistible forces of African nationalism. It was clear that the activities of foreign economic and other interests were impeding the implementation of resolution 1514 (XV). Portugal's policy had always been inspired by a determination to exploit the abundant resources of its colonial Territories to the detriment of the indigenous population.

40. Angola was a very rich country, both in agriculture and minerals. Since 1950, agriculture had been mainly concerned with the production of coffee and sisal. In 1950, coffee had accounted for more than 30 per cent of the Territory's total exports; by 1964 that figure had risen to 50 per cent. Angola had thus become the third largest producer of coffee in the world, with a production of 180,000 tons.

41. Sisal production had likewise doubled and in 1965 had reached 62,000 tons, which, again, had made Angola the world's third largest producer of that fibre. The country was also rich in diamonds, iron ore, crude petroleum, etc.

42. Mozambique, too, was a country rich in natural resources, as was clear from the working papers submitted to the Sub-Committee. It produced considerable quantities of cotton, sugar and cashew nuts for export. Most of the cotton was exported to Portugal under the compulsory quota system, at prices 60 per cent below world prices.

43. Portugal's policy of land ownership was appalling. In a book entitled *Angola and Mozambique*, Anders Ehnmark and Per Wästberg had pointed out that in districts where the Africans were allowed to cultivate the soil, they rarely owned it. Even if they did, their farms could be confiscated "in the public interest", which was a most elastic concept, and often they were reduced to the status of agricultural workers on their own land. Those who left were sent to less fertile regions which were unsuitable for farming.

44. On the other hand, generous concessions were granted to foreigners, whether companies or individuals. The situation was continuing to deteriorate. On 1 July 1966, the Government had introduced a new tax of 7 per cent on a wide range of goods to help finance its military operations and to increase the salaries of State officials.

45. The main economic groups operating in the Territories were the Belgian company, Petrofina, the Union Minière du Haut-Katanga, the Wankie Colliery Company, a company founded in Southern Rhodesia and financed by British capital, the British company Tanganyika Concessions, the American Oil Company, the Standard Oil Company, the Gulf Oil Company, the Sena Sugar Estate, the Petrangol Company and the South African company Mynbu. Naturally, those companies exported their profits to Portugal and other Western countries, which meant that the amount left over for the development of the Territories and for improving the conditions of the Africans was shamefully low.

46. Portugal was attempting to maintain the *status quo* by exploiting as much as possible the wealth of its African colonies, while strengthening its army to subjugate the nationalists who were struggling for their freedom. It could hardly be denied that the foreign companies, which abided by the laws and regulations of the colonial Power, as they must, were operating against the political and economic interests of the African population.

47. Her delegation did not object to foreign investment as such, quite the contrary, but it could not tolerate a situation in which enterprises financed by foreign capital helped to perpetuate a political climate which was contrary to the legitimate aspirations of the population. Despite the views expressed by some Western countries, her country maintained that such foreign investment was the very instrument by which the colonial Powers, such as Portugal, perpetuated their oppression. Accordingly, those companies should be told by their countries of origin to consider the welfare of the population, in accordance with United Nations principles.

48. Portugal and its supporters should have realized long before that the immigration of Europeans into the African Territories and the adoption of repressive measures against the indigenous population could not solve the problem. On the other hand, respect for the Charter and for world public opinion would yield fruitful results without loss of human lives.

49. In view of those considerations, her delegation reaffirmed its support for the proposal of the delegation of the United Republic of Tanzania and, when the question came before the General Assembly, would make a fuller statement of its views on such an urgent and vital problem.

50. The representative of *Tunisia* said that the leading role played by foreign interests in establishing and maintaining the colonial system, especially in the Territories under Portuguese administration, and the relentlessness with which those interests fought against the national movements in order to preserve their excessive privileges could not be emphasized too strongly. Consequently, it was hard to understand how certain representatives could be surprised that the newly independent countries, while appealing for foreign capital to promote their economic and social development, had no hesitation in criticizing and even condemning the activities of foreign monopolies in the countries which were still suffering under the colonial yoke. In fact, in the newly independent countries, foreign capital, freely negotiated and freely accepted, contributed towards progress and prosperity, since it operated within the framework of national development plans and remained under the control of responsible nationals. But, in countries which were not autonomous, foreign monopolies ignored the needs of the people and only sought the financial gain which the colonial system offered. Thus, instead of helping the people to advance, foreign capital exploited and enslaved them. That was the case in the Territories under Portuguese administration, where the situation was perhaps more scandalous than anywhere else.

51. He had a few observations to make about the economic and social situation as well as the activities of foreign monopolies. In the first place, the economy of the Portuguese Territories was essentially colonial. Those Territories represented a vast market for foreign manufactures as well as an abundant source of raw materials. According to the policy defined by Mr. Salazar, the Prime Minister of Portugal, in 1936, the colonies produced raw materials and sold them to the mother country in exchange for manufactured goods, a policy which involved serious losses for the indigenous population and made any economic and social development impossible. Secondly, the economy of the Territories under Portuguese administration was closely linked to that of Portugal and was designed mainly to suit the needs and interests of the mother country. Thus, the Government had forbidden the Territories to establish industries which could compete with those of Portugal and had adopted a special system which ensured that the Portuguese cotton industry was supplied with raw cotton at prices far lower than those prevailing on the world market. Thirdly, most of the companies involved in exploiting the resources of the Territories were based in foreign countries and the profits were necessarily channelled abroad. It should be noted, moreover, that the foreign monopolies controlled the whole economy of the Territories. Only the Europeans had the right to be listed as producers with the colonial export boards, which enabled them to add to their privileges, to control all the wheels of administration and to play a leading political role. Thanks to social legislation which turned the Africans into a vast pool of cheap labour, the foreign monopolies found in those Territories further means of swelling their profits. It was unthinkable, in the circumstances, that the monopolies should agree to the emancipation of the enslaved

peoples. Consequently, the Special Committee must consider the activities of foreign interests in the Territories under Portuguese administration as a serious obstacle to the emancipation of the people and to the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (resolution 1514 (XV)). The monopolies had numerous ramifications in Southern Rhodesia and South Africa and formed a common front in that part of the continent. The failure of economic sanctions against Southern Rhodesia was proof of their power. Accordingly, his delegation supported the proposal that the question should be included on the General Assembly's agenda as a separate item.

52. It would be a good idea to follow the same procedure for the activities of foreign monopolies in Southern Rhodesia, in view of their role in recent events. Such a study would be an important contribution in the search for really effective means of implementing resolution 1514 (XV) and of realizing the aspirations of the African countries. He agreed with the Soviet representative that it would be better for the question of foreign monopolies to be included in the General Assembly's agenda as a single item but suggested that each Territory should be discussed separately.

53. The representative of *Yugoslavia* observed that, according to the Portuguese Government, the principle of integration which had been a feature of Portugal's overseas policy for centuries had made the Territories as a whole a nation and a sovereign State, and the only question which arose was to determine whether the law conferred the same political rights on the citizens of the Territories as on those of the metropolitan country—rights which would enable them to influence the character of organs of State.

54. In order to illustrate what the essential rights of the indigenous population really were, some examples must be given of the way in which natural and human resources in the Territories (particularly in Angola and Mozambique) were exploited by Portugal.

55. The economy of Mozambique, Angola and so-called Portuguese Guinea was based essentially on agriculture, which accounted for 60 per cent of Angola's exports and 80 per cent of Mozambique's. That fact alone showed that Portugal was using its colonies exclusively as sources of raw materials and appendages to its industry.

56. In spite of the vastness of the Territories, only 2 to 3 per cent of the total arable land was tilled, which clearly indicated the lamentable state of affairs. The means of production were under-developed, agriculture was primitive and the economy functioned only because of the use of cheap labour.

57. Considering that agricultural products were responsible for 60 per cent of exports and that coffee represented 50 per cent of the total value of exports, obviously, the remaining agricultural products accounted for only 10 per cent. Thus Angola had become virtually a single-crop country, in which all the profits went to the small minority of European settlers, while the Angolans were reduced to the status of cheap labour. In 1964 the European farmers, whose holdings ranged from 100 to 300 hectares, made an average profit of \$280 per hectare, or \$28,000 profit on 100 hectares, whereas the Africans who generally owned only one or two hectares, for the most part made only \$170 annually. All evidence showed that the natural and human resources of the Territories were exploited unscrupulously and that Portuguese policy benefited only the foreign settlers and the metropolitan economy. Little thought was given to the producers themselves, the indigenous population. According to data for 1961, the non-African population of Mozambique owned approximately 1.7 million hectares, of which 85 per cent of the arable land was in private hands. Of a total of 2,432 agricultural enterprises, 2,246 were owned by Portuguese and 177 by other non-Africans. In Mozambique over 93 per cent of the employed population worked in agriculture, and agricultural produce represented 81 per cent of the value of exports. The sugar industry was in the hands of British, Portuguese and South African capitalists. Moreover, the conditions in which an African owned and worked his land were highly unfavourable. Expropriation was possible if certain conditions were not fulfilled and African farmers were obliged to work on the land or enterprises of Portuguese settlers. It was difficult for them to register officially as farmers

and, instead of exporting their products themselves, they had to rely on the services of settlers, who gave them low prices.

58. As a result of the policy of exploiting the Territories as sources of raw materials, the Portuguese textile industry had boomed. In 1960 Portugal had been ranked twelfth among European producers of cotton, thread and cloth, with 419 factories and a total output valued at approximately 4,000 million escudos. In 1963 Portugal had made a profit of 1,500 million escudos on its cotton exports, which was about one eighth of the total value of its visible exports. Mention should also be made of the profits reaped by the Portuguese from exports of coffee, cashew nuts and other agricultural products and from the production of various sectors of the economy, particularly the sugar industry, which were poured into the coffers of Portuguese and foreign companies.

59. He would dwell briefly on the economic relations between Mozambique—which meant Portugal—and South Africa and Southern Rhodesia.

60. Economic relations with South Africa were governed by the Mozambique Convention, concluded in 1928, which contained provisions on the recruitment of labour, transit traffic and trade between South Africa and Mozambique. In 1964 it had been amended to ensure closer economic co-operation, particularly in planning and investment. The Convention included a most-favoured-nation clause and granted reciprocal concessions for a list of commodities sold by the exporters—non-African, of course—of Mozambique. In 1963, 150,000 Mozambicans had been working in South Africa for extremely low wages. South Africa obviously derived substantial profits from the exploitation of that cheap labour. The Portuguese authorities in Mozambique also profited from it through the collection of various taxes (34.6 million escudos in 1963) and the foreign exchange earnings (108.4 million escudos in 1963) they obtained from the system of compulsory deferment pay. Under the Mozambique Convention, 50 per cent of the imports of certain areas of South Africa passed through the port of Lourenço Marques. In 1963 the total volume of goods imported through Lourenço Marques was 600,000 tons and that of goods in transit to or from South Africa through that port was 3.9 million tons. In the same year the profit made by the railway was 210 million escudos.

61. South African capital, of course, represented a large share of investments in Mozambique.

62. Similar relations existed between Mozambique and Southern Rhodesia with regard both to labour and to trade. Since the adoption of Security Council resolution 217 (1965), oil products from South Africa had been transported by railway from Lourenço Marques to Rhodesia. The supply of oil through the Beira-Umtali pipelines had also continued. The trade of the port of Beira alone had reached the record figure of 511,537 tons in August 1965, some time before the unilateral declaration of independence.

63. There was no need to specify to whom the profits of those activities were going. Undoubtedly, they were not going to the indigenous population, which barely earned enough to live, and part of them were used to finance the war against liberation movements and the population of the colonies, in order to maintain the *status quo* and the policy of exploitation. The economic relations between Portugal, South Africa and Southern Rhodesia, however, were only one link in the chain of efforts to preserve the supremacy of the racist system in the southern part of Africa.

64. The United Nations was bound to take measures to put an end to that state of affairs and to help the peoples of the Portuguese colonies. The Yugoslav delegation therefore supported the proposal that the question should be put on the General Assembly agenda as a separate item.

65. The representative of *Mali* recalled that after examining the Secretariat reports on the activities of foreign economic and other interests in the Territories under Portuguese administration and the information collected on the subject, the Sub-Committee had concluded that, without the assistance of its Western allies and of foreign economic interests, Portugal would have been unable to oppose the wishes of the peoples of Angola, Mozambique and Guinea (Bissau) for any length of time and prevent them from exercising their right to self-determination and independence. By supporting the Salazar

régime, those interests were encouraging Portugal to persist in its refusal to implement the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.

66. The most recent report prepared by the Secretariat clearly showed that Portugal's policy had reduced its African colonies to mere producers of raw materials for the industries of the metropolitan country, the other countries of Western Europe and the United States. Furthermore, Portugal had adopted discriminatory legislation with a view to curtailing the role which agriculture might have played in the development of the Territories. Article 1 of the Statute of National Labour proclaimed that the Portuguese nation constituted a moral, political and economic entity whose goals and interests took precedence over those of the individuals and groups comprising it. The economic organization of the overseas Territories was to be integrated into that of the Portuguese nation and thus contribute to the development of the metropolitan country, which was the sole concern of the Portuguese colonialists. As early as 1936, Mr. Salazar had stated that the role of the colonies was to produce raw materials for sale to the mother country in exchange for manufactured goods. That was the whole philosophy of colonialism. Once the structural foundation of the Territories' economy had been laid, Portugal had started by promoting industrial crops at the expense of food crops. Then it has encouraged Europeans to settle in the Territories by offering them every possible facility, while the Africans had been deprived of their land, expelled from their villages or even made liable to forced labour up to the age of 55 or 60. In order to reduce the cost of transporting the products of its colonies, Portugal, with the aid of British, South African and Belgian capital, had built the Mozambique and Angola railways, which served only the industrial centres and the export ports. The Secretariat's report on foreign-owned railways in Angola and Mozambique clearly showed the close links between Belgian, British and Southern Rhodesian interests and Portugal (appendix IV, para. 28). All those foreign interests contributed a share of the profits earned from the exploitation of the African peoples to Portugal, which used them to increase its war effort in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea (Bissau).

67. Since there was no doubt that the activities of foreign interests served as a brake on the progressive development of the African Territories under Portuguese administration towards freedom and independence, Mali would fully support the Tanzanian proposal that the question of the activities of foreign economic and other interests in those Territories should be included in the agenda of the twenty-first session of the General Assembly as a separate item. His delegation also supported the Tunisian proposal that the General Assembly should be requested to examine the activities of foreign interests in Southern Rhodesia as well.

68. The *Chairman*, summarizing the discussion, said that the Sub-Committee had decided to ask the Special Committee to recommend the General Assembly to include in its agenda as a single item the question of the activities of foreign economic and other interests in the Territories under Portuguese administration, Southern Rhodesia and South West Africa; he asked the Rapporteur to record that decision in his report together with the reservation made by the representative of Denmark.

B. Conclusions

69. The Sub-Committee finds that the conclusions it drew up in 1965 that the Portuguese colonial system and foreign economic interests are impeding the independence of the Territories under Portuguese administration are confirmed by new information provided to it in 1966 by petitioners from the Territories and the Secretariat working papers on agriculture and agricultural processing industries, foreign-owned railways and relations of Mozambique with South Africa and Southern Rhodesia.

70. The situation obtaining in agriculture and agricultural processing industries in Angola and Mozambique affords a classic example of the effect of Portugal's colonial policy under which the colonies produced raw materials to sell to the metropolitan country in exchange for its manufactured goods. In the implementation of this policy extensive regulations favouring Europeans and highly capitalized or monopolistic enterprises have controlled the granting of land concessions, pro-

duction, processing and marketing of agricultural products needed by Portugal. At the same time other legislation has restricted Africans from owning land and engaging in agricultural and trading activities on the same basis as Europeans with the result that Africans have only an insignificant share in the wealth derived from the natural resources and the efforts of their own labour.

71. The information before the Sub-Committee shows that all the important cash crops are controlled by non-African interests. In Angola, for instance, most of the coffee and sisal plantations are owned by settlers from Portugal, while in both Angola and Mozambique cotton and sugar remain controlled mainly by a few large monopolistic shareholder companies. The concentration on the production of European controlled cash crops for export, either under fixed quotas to Portugal, as in the case of cotton and sugar, or for the purpose of earning foreign exchange, as in the case of coffee, has seriously affected the economic and social life of the African inhabitants of the Territories.

72. Apart from the practice of compulsory labour under the Native Statute and Native Labour Code of 1928, nothing more exemplified Portugal's traditional colonial policy than the régime under which cotton was produced and marketed in Mozambique and Angola. To supply Portugal with the raw material for one of its key industries, hundreds of thousands of Africans were once involved in forced cultivation of cotton and monopolistic concessions were established over vast areas with the support of administrative measures. In 1961, for instance, there were 520,000 Africans engaged in cotton-growing in Mozambique and 47,000 in Angola. Of the large cotton concessionary companies the most important are the Companhia Geral dos Algodões de Angola, commonly known as COTONANG, which in 1960 controlled two thirds of the cotton growers in Angola, and the Companhia dos Algodões de Moçambique with concessions covering half the district of Zambézia and Moçambique. By setting controlled prices for raw cotton below the world level and by compulsory quotas for the supply of cotton to Portugal, the Portuguese textile industry was able to gain a competitive advantage in world markets and a monopoly of the markets of the overseas territories where textile production was limited by law. Thus by 1960, with Angola and Mozambique together supplying 87 per cent of its raw cotton imports, Portugal, with 70,000 workers employed in its textile industry, ranked twelfth among European producers of cotton thread and cloth, and its textile exports accounted for one eighth of the country's visible exports by value.

73. The cost of the cotton régime in terms of African labour is well known. Africans living in areas designated as cotton zones had little choice but to grow a specified area as required, and evidence shows that strong pressure was brought to bear on Africans to grow cotton even on marginally suitable land at the expense of food crops and barely providing any income for a year's work. In 1959-1960, for instance, the average annual income to African growers in northern Mozambique was 634 escudos (approximately \$US20) and individual incomes ranged from 129 escudos upwards.

74. In Angola, more than any other development since the end of the Second World War, coffee as a new source of wealth has attracted increasing numbers of Portuguese settlers to the Territory. From 1950 to 1960, the European population in Angola more than doubled, with an increase of over 100,000, and large areas of land suitable for coffee farming were conceded to European farmers. By 1961, some 2,000 European owners had coffee farms and plantations totalling over 420,000 hectares. Coffee growing by Africans, however, remains subject to strict controls and supervision and those who are permitted to grow coffee generally average only between 1 and 2 hectares per family. In 1965 it was estimated that as compared with 175,000 Africans employed in agriculture, including over 120,000 employed on coffee farms, only 60,000 Africans were able to grow coffee on their own account.

75. With government measures providing financial and technical support, coffee has become Angola's leading export crop; in the 1963-1964 seasons, production averaged 180,000 metric tons and coffee accounted for almost 50 per cent of the total value of the Territory's visible exports. As the United States

of America is the principal customer (it purchased about 53 per cent of Angola's coffee exports in 1964) followed by the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany, Angolan coffee has become an important source of foreign exchange for Portugal.

76. In both Angola and Mozambique sugar production is the monopoly of a few large companies. In Mozambique, the largest is the British-owned Sena Sugar Estates Ltd, with 90 per cent of its ordinary stock held in the United Kingdom. In recent years there has been renewed interest in the sugar industry in Mozambique where it is coming to be regarded as one of the great economic resources of the Territory and as an effective means of colonizing areas with Portuguese settlers, including ex-soldiers. Of the three new sugar companies formed since 1963, the potentially largest is being developed by a subsidiary of the Anglo-American Corporation of South Africa. Another will be partially financed by the Industrial Development Corporation of South Africa. South African interests have also entered cashew production, one of the Territory's newest industries.

77. Copra, which is one of Mozambique's six leading export crops, is also mainly controlled by three large European companies: Companhia do Boror, which was at one time primarily German-owned and which is one of the largest sisal producers, Sociedade Agrícola do Madal, primarily Norwegian-controlled, and the Companhia da Zambézia, of which the Portuguese Government has a controlling share and the remaining shares are owned by South African, French, German and British interests.

78. The information before the Sub-Committee shows that while exports of cash crops controlled by European interests have increased to the profit of Portugal, Portuguese settlers, British, South African and other interests, production by the traditional sector had been left to decline. Though millions of escudos have been spent on European settlement schemes, hardly any assistance has been provided to African farmers. As a result of past neglect, inequitable taxes, and government-fixed prices which provided no incentive, in Angola for instance, exports of maize, beans, rice and peanuts have not increased in the last fifteen years.

79. In spite of recent government concern with the serious decline in food crop production, the Transitional Development Plan for 1965-1968 makes no specific provisions for investment in African agriculture. In Angola, where a total investment of 7,210 million escudos is to be made over the three-year period, instead of allocating funds to improve African farming, the Government's policy is to encourage increased production by improving prices to African growers and reducing taxes and levies.

80. The study shows that the agriculture of the Territories under Portuguese administration is divided by the colonizers into two antagonistic sectors—European and African, the latter being unmercifully exploited by the former.

81. In both Angola and Mozambique foreign-owned railways have served mainly to open up the Territories to increased European settlement and to evacuate from the Territory valuable minerals and other resources. In Angola, the Benguela Railway, which is controlled by British, Belgian, American and South African interests, as the only railway that operates with a profit, also contributes to the revenue of the Territorial government. In Mozambique the earnings of the railways are an important source of foreign exchange.

82. Partly because of its strategic location, Mozambique has close and special relations with both South Africa and Southern Rhodesia. Economic relations between Mozambique and South Africa have for many years been governed by the Mozambique Convention of 1928, which provided for the recruitment of workers from Mozambique for the South African gold mines and under which the Mozambique treasury received annual payments in the form of fees and taxes and benefited from the foreign exchange from deferred wages. In return for the right to recruit workers, South Africa guaranteed the transport through Lourenço Marques of a fixed percentage of its seaborne imports into the Transvaal area. Although revised in 1964, the basic provisions of the Mozambique Convention remain substantially the same, though the area in which re-

cruitment may be undertaken has now been extended to include the Orange Free State as well as the Transvaal.

83. The already close and interdependent relationship between Mozambique and South Africa has been further strengthened by a noticeable movement of South African investment capital to Mozambique, some examples of which are noted above. Also the economic agreement between Portugal and South Africa of 13 October 1964 provides, among other things, for special consideration to be given to any application for South African financing of road building and any other enterprise of particular interest to the Portuguese Government in Mozambique and Angola.

84. Mozambique has been traditionally closely linked with Southern Rhodesia both by transit trade and a source of migrant labour. Until 1960 about 20 per cent of the African workers in Southern Rhodesia came from Mozambique, some recruited under contract as in the case of those of the Transvaal mines. Although the numbers have decreased, there are still over 100,000 migrant workers from Mozambique in Southern Rhodesia.

85. As reported in the Secretariat working paper on Mozambique's economic relations with South Africa and Southern Rhodesia (appendix V, para. 46), co-operation in the economic field between Mozambique and Southern Rhodesia has received a strong impulse from the political situation preceding and surrounding the unilateral declaration of independence by the Southern Rhodesia régime. Under a trade agreement signed between Portugal and Southern Rhodesia the two parties accord each other "most-favoured-nation treatment" on goods traded between Southern Rhodesia on the one hand and Mozambique and Angola on the other, and complete exemption from import duty in respect of certain goods. Another important development affecting the economic relationship of Mozambique with Southern Rhodesia has been the construction of the Beira-Umtali pipeline with 62.5 per cent British capital and 37.5 per cent Portuguese capital.

86. The study proves that the exploitation of the natural and human resources of the Territories under Portuguese administration, the contractual sale of manpower, the exploitation of the African sector by the European sector, and the supply of cheap raw material to Portugal from Mozambique and Angola contributed to the growth of currency reserves of Portugal to finance various branches of its economy, particularly the textile industry which is dominant in the Portuguese economy. Thus, with the help of the wealth received from its colonies at the price of exploitation of their indigenous population, Portugal, like other colonial Powers, developed its own economy.

87. The Sub-Committee finds that the new information available to it confirms that foreign economic interests are directly and indirectly supporting Portuguese colonial policy which results in the exploitation of the natural resources of the Territories for their own profit and also in the neglect of the welfare of the African inhabitants. Through a relationship of mutual dependence and mutual profit with Portuguese colonialism, foreign economic and other interests are seriously impeding the implementation of the Declaration in the Territories under Portuguese administration.

88. As the foreign interests in Southern Rhodesia, South West Africa and the Territories under Portuguese administration are closely linked, their effects in one Territory have implications in the others. For these reasons the Sub-Committee believes that it is necessary to consider as one problem the activities of economic and other interests in all these Territories.

C. Recommendations

89. The Sub-Committee confirms all its recommendations contained in its main report on the activities of foreign economic and other interests which are impeding the implementation of the Declaration in the Territories under Portuguese administration (A/6000/Rev.1, chap. V, appendix).

90. The Sub-Committee further considers that the Special Committee should recommend to the General Assembly that it inscribe on the agenda of its twenty-first session as a matter of urgency the following item:

"The activities of foreign economic and other interests which are impeding the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples in Southern Rhodesia, South West Africa, the Territories under Portuguese administration and other colonial territories".

D. Adoption of report

91. This report was adopted by the Sub-Committee at its 31st meeting on 14 September 1966. The representative of Denmark stated that the reservations of his delegation on the subject, as reproduced in paragraphs 281 to 283 of the report of the Special Committee to the General Assembly at its twentieth session covering its work during 1965 (A/6000/Rev.1, chap. V, appendix) were still valid. Further, his delegation could not support the recommendation contained in paragraph 90 above.

Appendix I

Agriculture and processing industries in Angola and Mozambique : organization and government policy

Working paper prepared by the Secretariat

CONTENTS

	Paragraphs
<i>Introduction</i>	1-5
PART ONE. GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND POLICY	
I. <i>Principles of economic organization in the Portuguese Corporative State</i>	6-19
A. General	6-15
B. The Overseas Territories	16-19
II. <i>Regulation and control of agricultural activities in the Overseas Territories</i>	20-41
A. General	20-36
B. Crops developed under special concessions ..	37-41
III. <i>The role of Africans in agriculture</i>	42-69
A. General	42-43
B. Legal restrictions on African agricultural activities before 1961	44-63
C. Developments after 1961	64-69
PART TWO. COTTON IN THE OVERSEAS TERRITORIES	
I. <i>General</i>	70-78
II. <i>Regulation and control of raw cotton, 1926-1961</i> ..	79-96
III. <i>Regulation and control of raw cotton after 1961</i> ..	97-109
IV. <i>Cotton textiles in Angola and Mozambique</i>	110-116
V. <i>Implications of the cotton régime</i>	117-128
A. Economic importance to metropolitan Portugal	117-122
B. Economic and social importance to the Overseas Territories	123-128

Tables

	Page
1. Metropolitan Portugal: Imports of raw cotton	390
2. Mozambique: Official prices of seed cotton	390

INTRODUCTION

1. Although much attention has been given to the role of mining in Angola and to the revenue derived by Mozambique from its important transit trade, the fact nevertheless remains that the domestic companies of both Territories are essentially agricultural and the overwhelming majority of the inhabitants derive their livelihood from agriculture and related activities. No data is available to indicate the contribution of this sector to the gross domestic product of either Territory but its importance is shown by the statistics of visible exports. Vegetable products account for over 80 per cent of Mozambique's total exports by value and 60 per cent in the case of Angola.

2. The present study outlines the general principles and policies applied by Portugal in regard to this important sector, including the policies in respect of foreign investment. As the study reveals, these policies have changed since 1961. Before that year Portugal tended to regard the Overseas Territories primarily as suppliers of raw materials and as markets for manufactured products from the metropolis, any surplus earnings of foreign exchange being used to strengthen Portugal's balance of payments.

3. Since 1961, however, Portugal has intensified measures for the economic integration of the Overseas Territories with the Peninsula. As a result, government policy now gives greater emphasis to the economic development of the individual Territories (*parcelas*) within what is called the Portuguese realm (*espaço português*) and some of the restrictive controls are being abandoned. Of particular importance is the relaxation in 1965 of restrictions on the establishment of industrial capacity, including especially cotton textiles.

4. Part One of this study contains information on the economic structure of the Corporative State, in so far as it concerns the Overseas Territories, and the policies and legislation governing African and non-African agriculture. Part Two contains a more detailed review of the so-called cotton régime which illustrates several aspects of Portuguese policy and which constitutes an important segment of the economies of both Territories.

5. This study is supplemented by separate studies describing in greater detail agricultural and processing activities in each of the two Territories (appendices II and III).

PART ONE. GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND POLICY

I. PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION IN THE PORTUGUESE CORPORATIVE STATE

A. General

6. The general principles underlying the economic organization of the Portuguese corporative system are contained in the Political Constitution and the basic laws governing the corporative organization of the State, including, in particular, the Charter of National Labour (Decree Law 23,048, 23 September 1933).^a

7. Article 29 of the Political Constitution^b states that "The economic organization of the Nation must provide the maximum production of wealth for the benefit of society and shall create a collective existence from which shall flow power to the State and justice to its citizens." While private enterprise is recognized as "the most prolific instrument of progress and of the economy of the Nation" the State has the responsibility for the higher (over-all) co-ordination and regulation of the economic and social life, and for setting the economic and social goals. The State may not undertake trading or establish industries except, however, when it considers that such activities will result in "social benefits superior to those otherwise obtainable".^c

8. Article 1 of the Statute of National Labour lays down the principle that the Portuguese nation constitutes a moral, political and economic unity and the interest of the nation dominates that of individuals, or groups of which it is constituted. In order to ensure that economic activities are in the higher interest of the nation, the State has the right and duty to establish the balance of production, professions, employment, capital and labour, and to protect the national economy from agricultural, industrial or commercial undertakings of a parasitical character or which are incompatible with the higher interests of human life.^d

9. Under the corporative system it is the responsibility of the State to secure the harmonious co-operation of all elements of

production, and to promote the corporative organization of the economy in which each element may achieve its own legitimate goals and those of society. This economic organization must however avoid conflicts of interest (as for instance between capital and labour) and undesirable competition (as for instance between the same industries).

10. In principle, the corporative system seeks to secure what has been called "the self-government of each branch of production"^e through the organized co-operation of the "factors of production". Under the Constitution (article 16), it is the duty of the State to authorize the establishment of "all corporative, collective, intellectual or economic bodies, and to promote and assist their formation". The primary or elementary corporative bodies are the *grêmios*^f of producers, employers, or self-employed persons such as farmers and fishermen, and syndicates of industrial office workers and professionals. *Grêmios* are usually organized on a geographical basis corresponding to the area of an administrative unit called the *concelho* with sub-units known as *casas* at the parish level. The *grêmios* representing farmers or producers of agricultural products are known as *Grêmios de Lavoura*. These *grêmios* are usually concerned with all agricultural products in the area of their competence; exceptionally, however, a *grémio* may be established for a particular product or crop. *Grêmios* may be established voluntarily with the permission of the Government,^g or may be established by government order. Once formed, the *grémio* is considered to represent all the producers of the area, even though some may not be members.

11. Among their other functions, the *grêmios* are responsible for developing the spirit of co-operation and solidarity of all elements of production, capital, technology (or management) and labour, for the realization of the maximum good of the community. They are to contribute, by the means at their disposal, to the economic development and the technical improvement of agricultural production, with a view to improving economic and social conditions; they are to enforce regulations emanating from higher corporative bodies or economic co-ordinating bodies; and to provide services to their members as necessary including services to help them sell their products and to help them purchase collectively goods and machinery needed.

12. Within each branch of production, there may also be regional associations of the *grêmios* and syndicates. At the national level each major branch of production is organized into a "corporation" comprising the producers (both capital and labour), processors or manufacturers, and traders. A government representative participates in the administration and decision-making of each of the corporations.

13. In addition to the "corporations" which are expected to regulate the activities of their particular sector of production in the interest of the nation, the Government exercises co-ordinating functions through especially established bodies. Under Decree Law 26,757, 8 July 1936, three types of co-ordinating bodies were envisaged as part of the corporative structure: regulatory commissions (*comissões regularadoras*) for the purpose of controlling imports, prices and distribution in accordance with the needs of production in Portugal and the Overseas Territories; national boards (*juntas nacionais*) for the purpose of improving production and commerce of national products with a view to stimulating exports; and institutes (*institutos*) for the purpose of co-ordinating all activities in relation to those commodities which are mainly for export, which already have fully developed corporatively organized production and commerce sectors, but which, because of their importance, require official guarantees as to quality and type of product.

14. The corporative bodies representing factors of production are essential elements of the Corporative State. They take part

^a The other basic laws are: Decree Law 23,049 on compulsory *grêmios*; Decree Law 23,050 on National Syndicates; Decree Law 24,715 on voluntary *grêmios*; and Decree Law 26,757 on economic co-ordinating bodies.

^b Quotations in this study of the Constitution are from the English text of the Political Constitution of the Portuguese Republic, SNI, Lisbon 1957.

^c Article 7 of the Statute of National Labour.

^d *Ibid.*, sub-para. 1 and 2.

^e Marcello Caetano, in the Preface to *Economic Planning in Corporative Portugal* by Cotta Freppal, London, 1937.

^f Often translated as guilds. As these bodies, however, are not free associations but are essential elements of the Corporative State, the original term is retained to underline the distinction.

^g Voluntary *grêmios* may be established whenever at least 50 per cent of the individual or collective producers of a branch of production in a given area together represent at least 50 per cent of the average value of the transactions in that area.

in the election of Municipal Commissions and Councils, and through the Corporative Chamber participate in the formulation of government policy. In principle, they constitute the basic structure for the self-regulation and control of the different branches of production. As such, the *grêmios* differ both in purpose and in structure from what are generally known as employers or producers associations, producers or consumers co-operatives, or workers trade unions, which are concerned primarily with the welfare of their own members and have no regulatory functions outside their own membership. The difference between a corporative body such as the *grémio* and a producers co-operative is further underlined by the fact that under Portuguese law, the co-operative society is regulated as a special form of commercial society under a separate section of the Commercial Code.¹

15. From the foregoing, it is clear that under the corporative system the economic goal is the higher interest of the nation, and as it is the responsibility of the Government to interpret and to determine this interest, the Government has the right to intervene in private economic activities, to set quotas and to control production, prices and the distribution of wealth.

B. The Overseas Territories

16. The economic relationship of the Overseas Territories with Portugal is defined in articles 158-164 of the Constitution. These provide that "The economic organization of the Portuguese Overseas Territories shall form part of the general economic organization of the Portuguese Nation and shall thereby take its place in the world economy"; the economic system of the Territories "shall be established in harmony with the needs of their development and the well-being of their population, with fair reciprocity between them and the neighbouring countries, and with rights and legitimate advantages of the Portuguese Nation"; furthermore, it is "for Metropolitan Portugal to secure, through measures taken by the competent bodies, a proper balance in the interests which . . . should be considered as a whole, in the economic systems of the Overseas Territories".

17. Although the general economic organization of the Overseas Territories has not followed the corporative pattern¹ outlined in the foregoing section, the application of the principles of the Corporative State to the Overseas Territories has in the past ensured an integration of the economies of the Territories which in effect orientated their development in the interests of Portugal. Explaining the role to be played by the Overseas Territories (which were then still known as colonies) in 1936, at the inaugural session of the Economic Conference of the Portuguese Colonial Empire, Prime Minister Salazar said that it was a logical solution to Portugal's problem of overpopulation, to settle Portuguese nationals in the colonies, and "for the colonies to produce raw materials to sell to the mother country in exchange for manufactured goods".²

18. In the implementation of this policy, in the period up to 1961, the Government established extensive regulations and controls over production, processing and marketing of agricultural products needed for Portugal's domestic market or to

¹ Nevertheless, some of the *grêmios* in the Overseas Territories are, in fact, more like producers co-operatives. See footnote 1 below.

² Vicente Loff, *Estudo de base sobre o ordenamento e coordenação dos serviços e organismos executivos da política económica nacional de âmbito ultramarino* (Lisbon, 1960), p. 11. The only *grêmios* of agricultural products were: (a) in Angola, a *grémio* of maize exporters, a *grémio* of tobacco producers in Malanje district, a *grémio* of fruit and vegetable producers in Malanje, and a *grémio* of rice millers in Bié, Mexico and Lunda; (b) in Mozambique, a *grémio* of cereal producers in Beira, a *grémio* of vegetable oil processing industries, a *grémio* of tea growers in Zambézia and a *grémio* of tobacco growers in North Mozambique (pp. 14-15). Some of these *grêmios*, however, are in practice more in the nature of a commercial society in the form of a producer's co-operative (such as those of tea and tobacco producers) and with primarily financial interests (such as the *grémio* of fruit and vegetable producers), pp. 68-69.

³ António de Oliveira Salazar, *Doctrine and Action, International and Foreign Policy of the New Portugal 1928-1939*, translated by Robert E. Broughton (London, 1939), pp. 300-304, quoted in document A/AC.108/L.7, para. 30.

earn foreign exchange. A special cotton régime was introduced to guarantee an economic supply of raw cotton to Portugal's textile industry, and the Territories were prohibited from establishing industries which would compete with those of Portugal. While these measures secured an increase in agricultural production for export (especially of cotton, coffee, sugar and sisal), output of the subsistence sector remained stagnant in the 1950's, partly due to the lack of assistance to African agriculture, and partly due to the restrictions on African activities imposed by the Native Statute³ and the labour regulations.

19. As reported in chapter V, part I, since the repeal of the Native Statute in 1961, Portugal has aimed at securing the closer political and economic integration of the Overseas Territories in a single entity, and changes have been introduced to provide for a measure of participation of local interests in the economic and social life of their respective Territories. Since 1965, it has become Portugal's declared policy that economic development of the Overseas Territories is to be accelerated "to increase the wealth of the Portuguese realm collectively" (chap. V, para. 33). Regulations on foreign investments have been eased, banking and credit facilities have been expanded, the establishment of industries of local interest is no longer restricted, and settlement from Portugal will be intensified to provide additional manpower. When fully implemented, these measures are intended to bring about fundamental changes in the role of the Territories as defined by Prime Minister Salazar in 1936 (see para. 17 above). The following section outlines briefly the way in which the former policy and subsequent changes are reflected in government measures for the regulation and control of agricultural activities in the Overseas Territories. The role of the African in agriculture is described in a separate section.

II. REGULATION AND CONTROL OF AGRICULTURAL ACTIVITIES IN THE OVERSEAS TERRITORIES

A. General

Control over foreign investments

20. Under the Nationalization of Capital Law (Law 1,994, 13 April 1943), it was the general rule that half the capital of any incorporated company had to be Portuguese. Foreign investments were excluded from certain specified activities, including public services and activities of vital importance for the defence of the State or the national economy.¹ This Law, however, did not apply to the Overseas Territories, where the regulations governing foreign investments were much more liberal.

21. Nevertheless, as reported previously in the study on mining in Angola and Mozambique (A/6000/Rev.1, chap. V, annex I), the Government usually required participation of Portuguese capital in foreign owned companies, the registration of the companies under Portuguese law, and the appointment of Portuguese nationals on the boards of directors. Usually, however, less than half of the capital had to be Portuguese.

22. The only sector in which 51 per cent Portuguese ownership of capital applied was in the use and exploitation of land concessions, but this provision was only made applicable to the Overseas Territories in Africa in 1947 (by Decree 36,330, 6 June 1947). In Angola and Mozambique nearly all the non-Portuguese companies with large land holdings came into existence long before this date, and the extent of Portuguese participation is unknown. Provisions have always existed, however, whereby the Minister for Overseas Territories could, in special cases, waive the requirement of a majority of Portuguese capital.

23. As already reported in paragraph 58 of chapter V, in April 1965 restrictions on foreign investments were eased, and

¹ Decree Law 39,666 of 20 May 1954 on the Status of Indigenous Persons of Portuguese Nationality in the Provinces of Guinea, Angola and Mozambique (*Estatuto dos Indígenas Portugueses das Províncias do Guiné, Angola e Moçambique*).

² Only "national" companies were permitted to own and operate enterprises in these sectors and, for the purpose of the Law, only companies constituted under Portuguese law, with their head offices in Portugal, and the absolute majority of whose capital was Portuguese were deemed to be national.

the new regulations now apply equally to the whole Portuguese realm (*espaço português*). Enterprises entirely or largely foreign-owned by residents in Portuguese Territory or persons domiciled overseas may be established in various sectors with the same rights as national enterprises to enjoy duty and tax exemptions. As in the past, foreign capital may not be invested in public services, in activities relating to the public domain, or in activities of special importance to national defence. Foreign companies may not acquire real rights in land in the Territories under Portuguese administration except with the authorization of the Overseas Minister. The new regulations guarantee the transfer of all legally imported capital and earnings from such capital or from other activities. The scheduled activities for which authority will always be granted for the participation of foreign capital (either through direct investment, or through the purchase of shares or granting of loans) include, in particular, agricultural improvements, land preparation and irrigation projects, livestock and cattle raising, and the processing of agricultural products.

Land concessions

24. Conditions relating to the granting of land concessions for agricultural and other activities are described in the study on land concession and settlement in Angola and Mozambique (see A/6000/Rev.1, chap. V, annex II). In general large concessions, over 5,000 hectares, in the case of *aforamento* concessions, may be granted only by the Overseas Minister. Smaller concessions may be granted by the Territorial authorities usually by *aforamento* under which ultimate ownership of the land is conditional on its effective utilization and the payment of a quit rent over a number of years.

Establishment of industries

25. Until 1965 the installation of industries in the Overseas Territories was regulated by Decree 26,509 of 11 April 1936. Under this decree authorization for the establishment of industries was to be granted in the following order of priority: (a) industries using raw materials of local origin and whose products are consumed in the Territory; (b) industries using materials of local origin whose products have an assured market in other Portuguese Territories or in foreign countries; (c) industries using imported raw materials producing goods which have an assured local market; and (d) industries using raw materials and whose production exceeds the local consumption needs. The establishment in the Overseas Territories of any industries using imported raw materials had to be approved by the Overseas Minister; all other cases required the approval of the Governor General. However, due consideration was to be given to the needs of metropolitan Portugal for raw materials it did not possess, as for instance cotton, and the competitive price of the goods to be produced as compared with similar imports. Presumably because of these considerations, textile factories were not established in Angola and Mozambique until after 1944 (see part two below).

26. Furthermore, Decree 985 of 28 October 1914 provided that where new industries were established, or plants employing new productive processes, the industrialist could, under certain conditions, be granted an exclusive right to manufacture his product or employ his process either within the Territory or a region thereof. Such an exclusive right was limited normally to a period of ten years but in the case of a new industry requiring substantial capital investment it could be extended to twenty years. The industrialist could also be exempted for a limited time from import duties on capital equipment and raw materials not produced in the Territory as well as from direct taxes levied on his industrial operations and land. Examples of such exclusive concessions were the textile industries in Mozambique and Angola and the jute industry in Mozambique.

27. As reported in paragraphs 65-68 of chapter V, many of the previous restrictions have been removed, and the Territories may now freely establish industries which are mainly of local interest, and which do not affect the economy of the whole Portuguese realm. In particular, the Territories will no longer be restricted as regards the establishment of cotton textile factories.

Economic co-ordinating bodies affecting agricultural activities in the Overseas Territories

28. In 1937, the legislation setting up economic co-ordinating bodies within the corporative system was extended to the Overseas Territories (Decree 27,552, 25 March 1937). The Minister for the Colonies was authorized to establish in each Territory import regulatory commissions, export boards and institutes to co-ordinate and regulate the economic and social activities directly related to products imported and exported. Such co-ordinating bodies could serve a single Territory, or a group of Territories or the whole national Territory. When functioning in respect of a single Territory the co-ordinating body was to have its headquarters in the capital of the Territory and act under the authority of the Governor; in the two other cases, it was to be located in Lisbon and acted under the authority of the Minister for the Colonies.

29. Following the pattern in Portugal, co-ordinating machinery to regulate the trade of the Overseas Territories was created in the form of separate bodies to regulate imports (*comissões reguladoras de importações*) and exports (*juntas de exportações*).²² Since these bodies were concerned only with external trade and had no special functions in relation to agricultural production they are not discussed in this study. In addition, special bodies were established to promote and regulate exports of certain crops, which because of their importance to the national economy required special government action. Colonial Export Boards with their headquarters in Portugal were set up to regulate cotton, coffee and cereals (wheat and maize). These Boards were composed entirely of members appointed by the Minister for the Colonies (later Minister for the Overseas Territories) with representatives from the Ministry of Agriculture, and representatives of producers (European) and traders (importers in Portugal), as well as exporters of the overseas products. The main functions were (a) to regulate exports from the Territories by registering exporters and European producers; establishing export quotas and prices, and where necessary, directly undertaking purchases and exporting, and by regulating the internal markets in the Territories; and also (b) to ensure supplies to Portugal, in consultation with the appropriate metropolitan authority, through the establishment of quotas and differential prices for imports from the Territories and from other foreign sources.

30. Because the production of cotton, coffee and cereals in the Overseas Territories was not corporatively organized, the Colonial Export Boards were also made responsible for promoting production through the distribution of selected seed, the provision of financial and technical assistance and services to producers in selling their products (including the establishment of grading services, warehouses and transportation) functions which, as described above, are, in principle, attributed to *grêmios* of producers. However, as will be seen below, the Colonial Cotton and Coffee Export Boards mainly represented Portugal's interests and not those of the Territories producing these crops, even though the Boards had branches in the Territories through which some services to growers were provided.

31. Although the main objectives of the three colonial export boards were similar, the way in which they discharged their functions varied, on the one hand, according to Portugal's economic interest in and need for the particular crop, and on the other, according to the degree of organization of related interests in Portugal (the importers, distributors, processors and manufacturers). In general, the greater the importance of the product to Portugal's domestic economy, the more extensive was the regulation and control over its marketing, distribution and use. As Portugal has always had to import all the raw cotton needed for its textile industry, which is one of the key sectors of its economy, in addition to the Colonial Cotton Export Board, there existed also a separate

²² According to a Portuguese study by Vicente Loff (*Estudo de base sobre o ordenamento e coordenação dos serviços e organismos executivos da política económica nacional de âmbito ultramarino*, Junta de Investigações do Ultramar, Lisbon, 1960, pp. 51-52), these bodies were in effect part of the public services of the Territories.

Regulatory Commission for Trade in Raw Cotton^a whose functions were to regulate imports, prices and contribution of raw cotton to processors and manufacturers. As will be seen in part II below, the Colonial Cotton Export Board therefore was concerned mainly with the promotion of production in the Overseas Territories to meet Portugal's needs for cheap cotton.

32. In contrast, as coffee is important to Portugal mainly as an export crop earning foreign exchange and the Overseas Territories have no difficulty in supplying the consumption needs of Portugal's domestic market for coffee, and furthermore there are no industries in Portugal dependent on coffee, the Colonial Coffee Export Board's main activities in the early years were concentrated on promoting increased production and on helping producers to sell their coffee to foreign markets.

33. The role of the Colonial Cereals Export Board differed from both the Cotton and Coffee Boards because Portugal itself produces cereals and it was necessary to co-ordinate imports and import prices, especially of maize, from the Overseas Territories with domestic production and consumption.

34. In 1961, following the uprising in Angola, as part of the general policy of administrative decentralization, the Colonial Export Boards in Lisbon were abolished and replaced by Cotton and Cereals Institutes in both Angola and Mozambique and a Coffee Institute in Angola. As described above (para. 13), in principle an institute is for the purpose of co-ordinating all activities in relation to commodities which are mainly for export and which have corporatively organized production and commerce sectors, but which because of their economic importance require official guarantees as regards quality and type. In Angola and Mozambique the production of cotton, coffee and cereals is not yet organized corporatively^b and the respective Institutes are as yet essentially government bodies (executive power is in the hands of the Director who is appointed by the Overseas Minister) in which the interests of local producers and exporters are represented.

35. The establishment of the Cotton, Coffee and Cereals Institutes in Angola and Mozambique is intended to enable the Territories themselves to have more responsibility for regulating and controlling the production, distribution, prices and export of these crops. In particular, greater emphasis is placed on the duty of the Institutes to help the small producer, especially through the provision of financial and technical help. The Institutes are also to promote the formation of producers' co-operatives in order to facilitate the sale of the products of the small farmer and to provide a channel through which investments in farm machinery and irrigation projects can be made.

36. The activity of the Colonial Cotton Export Board and the new Institute are described in greater detail in part two below.

B. Crops developed under special concessions

37. As mentioned above, where a specific crop is important to Portugal's own economy or where it is important to satisfy the needs of the Territory concerned, it has been the practice to establish detailed governmental regulation and control over all aspects of marketing, distribution and use. These controls have extended to the fixing of official prices both to producers and exporters and to the setting of compulsory quotas for supplies to Portugal and to the domestic market. In the case of three crops grown mainly by Africans, these measures have in the past been supplemented by the grant of purchasing monopolies to private concessionary companies. Such monopolies were, however, established only in respect of African produce and did not extend to the same crops when produced on European farms.

^a As noted above, regulatory commissions are economic co-ordinating bodies and are therefore part of the basic corporative structure. In Portugal, regulatory commissions have been established also for certain essential commodities which it has to or in the past has had to import, including coarse flour and rice.

^b The organization of the agricultural sector of production on a corporative basis is however envisaged and measures to this end were introduced in Angola in 1963 (Legislative Instrument 3,386, 6 July 1963, provides for the establishment of *grêmios* and *casas da lavoura*).

38. The outstanding example of the use of exclusive purchasing concessions supported by administrative measures as a means of developing a specific crop is the so-called "cotton régime" which was in force in Mozambique and Angola between 1926 and 1961 and which is described in detail in part two below. Under this system the areas considered suitable for cotton growing were divided into concessions within each of which a single processing company was given the exclusive right and obligation to purchase and gin all African-grown cotton. The concessionaires supervised the African growers and were supported by the local administrative officials. Within the area of each concession Africans not otherwise employed were expected to cultivate cotton, the area to be cultivated depending on the age, sex and marital status of the individual. In Angola, specific legislation existed making it obligatory for Africans in designated zones to grow cotton. Though no similar legislation was enacted in Mozambique, the obligation nonetheless existed, deriving presumably from the general provisions relating to African labour and farming (see paras. 45-48 and 54-57 below).

39. The system of exclusive purchasing concessions was also applied in 1944 to castor seeds (Decree 33,925) and, in the case of Mozambique, to rice (Legislative Instrument 754, 16 June 1941) in order to satisfy the Territory's consumption needs. Since, however, neither Mozambique nor Angola are important producers of castor seeds, which are mainly collected from uncultivated plants, no exclusive purchasing concessions were granted for this purpose in Mozambique and only one in Angola, in the Bié area, which was granted in the early 1950's and revoked some ten years later because of insufficient production. As regards the rice concessions, in Mozambique, the régime affected fewer Africans than did the cotton régime which involved over one half million growers in both Territories and moreover concerned what was already a staple food crop of the subsistence farmer.

40. The cotton régime was the object of severe criticism, especially abroad, mainly because of the element of forced cultivation and the use of the administrative machinery to support private enterprise but also because efforts to extend the cultivation of cotton led to its being grown in marginal areas resulting in hardships to growers, who in some cases earned less than 200 escudos per year from cotton, and the disruption of other activities. Other criticisms related to the accumulation of concessions over vast areas by a few companies and to the generally low level of prices.

41. In 1961, following the outbreak of disturbances in Angola, cotton growing was declared to be no longer obligatory and steps began to be taken to abolish the exclusive concessions. Legislation was enacted in 1961 abolishing exclusive concessions for rice and castor seeds and for cotton in 1963. Although the latter decree does not become fully effective until 31 August 1966 it appears that many companies have already surrendered their concessions, some however not without protest. The new system, which is described in part two below, continues to provide for an exclusive right to purchase cotton in any given market which, however, is granted annually on competitive bid to the dealer or processing company which undertakes to pay the highest prices.

III. THE ROLE OF AFRICANS IN AGRICULTURE

A. General

42. As a result of Portugal's economic policy, agricultural production in the Overseas Territories has traditionally concentrated on the higher priced cash crops (*culturas ricas*) for export and most government measures to assist production have been directed mainly to European producers. As the foregoing section has shown, government legislation recognized only Europeans as producers to be registered with the Colonial Export Boards, even though in practice Africans were responsible for the major share of the production, either in terms of labour provided through paid employment on plantations or as the principal growers of such crops as cotton and maize, and were responsible for the largest share of cashew production.

43. Studies published by Portuguese authors relating to the period before 1961 show that apart from the distribution of improved seed to African growers, which however had to

repaid in kind, very little government assistance was provided to the subsistence sector which was virtually neglected, except to ensure that Africans produced enough food-stuffs to feed themselves. Government policy as reflected in the Constitution, the Overseas Organic Law of 1953, the Native Statute and the Native Labour Code of 1928, was concerned above all with securing adequate African labour which in Angola and Mozambique mainly meant labour for European owned and operated agricultural activities.

B. Legal restrictions on African agricultural activities before 1961

44. In Angola and Mozambique, until the repeal of the Native Statute in 1961, the role of Africans in the economic life of the Territory in general, and in agricultural activities in particular, was prescribed by various legal restrictions deriving from the Statute and the concepts on which it was based.

The obligation to work

45. In the section entitled "Special guarantees to Natives" the Political Constitution of Portugal lays down the following principles concerning African labour: payment for all contract labour performed for public authorities, prohibition of forced labour for the benefit of private employers, the limitation of forced labour for specified purposes, freedom of choice of employment, and public encouragement for Africans to improve their condition through work. Article 146 provides that "The State may only compel natives to work on public works of general interest to the community, on tasks of which the finished product will belong to them, in the execution of judicial sentences of a penal character or the discharge of fiscal liabilities".

46. Article 32 of the Native Statute underlined the traditional Portuguese attitude to the necessity for Africans to work by providing that "The State shall endeavour to teach the natives that work is an indispensable element of progress, but the authorities may not impose labour except in cases explicitly prescribed by law". The principle of what has been called "the freedom of work" was defined in the Native Labour Code of 1928 as follows:

"The Government of the Republic shall ensure the natives of its colonies full liberty to choose the work which suits them best, whether on their own account on their land, or on the land which the Government assigns to them for this purpose or under contract to serve another if they prefer this, provided that the Government shall reserve to itself the right to encourage them to work on their own account to a reasonable extent in order to improve their means of subsistence and conditions of life, and to exercise benevolent supervision and tutelage in respect of their work under contracts of employment."

47. As pointed out by some Portuguese writers, although the 1928 Labour Code did not specifically refer to a legal obligation to work, this nevertheless seems to have been admitted by the law since the State continued to enforce the fulfilment of the "duty to work." Furthermore, the freedom of choice of work did not include the legal right to choose to work or not to work, because the second alternative contradicted the principle of the moral obligation to work.^a

48. As a result of the right of the State to impose forced labour for public purposes and the implied requirement of Africans to work, while in theory Africans could freely engage in agricultural activities of their own choice, in fact, they could only do so under specified conditions which are outlined below.

^a J.M. da Silva Cunha, "A Reforma do Código de Trabalho dos Indígenas" contained in *Questões Ultramarinas e Internacionais*, Lisbon n.d., vol. I, p. 74.

^a António dos Santos Labisa, "Interpenetração das economias", *Colóquios de política ultramarina internacionalmente relevante*, E.C.P.S. 1958, pp. 125-126; also José Carlos Ney Ferreira and Vasco Soares de Veiga, *Estatuto dos Indígenas Portugueses das Províncias da Guiné, Angola e Moçambique*, Anotado, Lisbon 1957, p. 63, note 3A; and p. 65, note 4B, which comments on the moral obligation to work, makes the point that the freedom to work cannot be confounded with the freedom to be idle.

Conditions under which Africans could engage in agricultural activities

(a) Agricultural worker

49. The conditions under which an African could obtain exemption from the liability to work for public purposes were regulated by Territorial legislation in Angola and Mozambique. In both Territories he could fulfil the requirements either by hiring himself out as an agricultural worker for a specified period, or if he qualified as a native farmer, or if under specified conditions he cultivated a certain area of land, or kept a minimum number of cattle. In Angola, according to the Indigenous Labour Regulations of 1956, a non-specialized worker had to work for an employer for at least nine months of the year, and "workers in specialized services", living near enterprises and working for these enterprises had to do so for at least a minimum of 180 days.

50. In Mozambique, every able-bodied male indigenous person between 18 and 55 was required to prove that he lived by his own work. Among others this requirement could be met by anyone who worked for at least six months in each year as a day labourer in the services of the State, administrative bodies or private persons.

(b) African farmer

51. As reported previously by the Sub-Committee on the Situation in Angola,^a before 1961 under the Native Statute and land concession legislation, Africans living in the rural areas in a traditional way of life were not Portuguese citizens and could not acquire individual title to land on the same basis as Europeans. Article 35 of the Native Statute established the basic principle of land ownership for Africans living in tribal societies: they were assured the joint use in accordance with customary law of the land necessary for their settlement and for growing of their crops and grazing of their cattle.

52. This provision enabled Africans in the rural areas to engage in subsistence farming. In Angola, however, subsistence farming alone did not exempt adult male Africans from the liability to public recruitment, and in Mozambique it was not accepted as adequate proof that he was living "by his own work" (see paras. 47 and 48 above). In both Territories, therefore, the able-bodied men were generally absent from their villages for 180-270 days a year in recruited employment, and during this time other members tended the family plot.

53. An African could engage in full-time farming only if he qualified as a registered farmer in his own right, or if he formed part of a government settlement or production scheme.

54. In Angola under an Order (No. 88) of 30 April 1927, an African *indígena's* land rights were recognized only if (i) the land had been cultivated with permanent crops; (ii) the land was kept permanently cleared, and the person holding the title continued the cultivation and gathered all fruits on the land; and (iii) the owner progressively transformed spontaneous growths into systematically cultivated crops by replanting with proper spacing. The size of the area to which an African could obtain title under this regulation was always limited to that actually cultivated by the title-holder and his family (A/6000/Rev.1, chap. V, annex II, para. 44).

55. Once an African had obtained authority to cultivate a plot of land with individual rights, he could retain his plot only if he met the various conditions laid down by the Department of Agriculture. In Angola under the Indigenous Labour Regulations of 1956, to qualify as an African farmer he had to:

(a) Maintain his permanent residence for more than three years in an improved dwelling on or alongside the land he cultivated or in a nearby village;

(b) Cultivate the minimum area prescribed for him by the agricultural services;

(c) Maintain in good condition for more than three years the perennial plants which he had been instructed to cultivate;

(d) Keep cattle, where possible, for breeding and work, caring for them in the manner prescribed by the veterinary services;

^a Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixteenth Session, Supplement No. 16 (A/4978), paras. 319-342.

(e) Protect the soil from erosion and follow the other essential technical instructions relating to the cultivation, preparation and presentation of the produce."

56. In Mozambique on the other hand, to be registered as an African farmer under article 42 of the 1944 statute (Legislative Instrument 919), an African was required to:

(a) Cultivate permanently one or more plots which must conform with the requirements for land cultivation;

(b) Be the main and permanent worker of the various activities in connexion with his holding in which he may have the help of his relatives and paid employees or exchange services with other workers;

(c) Reside with his family on one of his plots or nearby;

(d) Have paid all taxes;

(e) Maintain his activities in accordance with the instructions of the Governor General.

57. He could be expelled if, among other things (a) he was away and not taking care of his plots for more than a total of four months in a year; or (b) after three years, he did not show that he was "achieving the agricultural development as evident from the growth and increased value of his cultivated areas and livestock"; or (c) did not build, within five years, a masonry house on his plots or close to them.

(c) Other

58. As mentioned above, Africans could also engage in full-time agricultural activities if they formed part of a government agricultural settlement or production scheme. For a description of the African settlement schemes introduced before 1961, reference should be made to the study on the concession, occupation and settlement of land in Angola and Mozambique (A/6000/Rev.1, chap. V, annex II).

59. Among the special agricultural production schemes, the most important was the cotton régime which is described in greater detail in part two below.

Processing and marketing of agricultural products

60. The Native Statute was silent on the ownership and operation of business enterprises by Africans of *indigena* status. Regulations on independent home industries and other legislation on processing and transforming industries only applied to Portuguese citizens and Africans who had opted to be governed by Portuguese civil law. Nevertheless, it may be assumed that Africans living in traditional societies could process agricultural products for their own use. The marketing of agricultural products in whatever form was, however, subject to restrictions.

61. Article 49 of the Native Statute provided that "the sale to non-indigenous persons of agricultural produce grown by indigenous persons may be made subject to conditions, or be limited, or prohibited by the administrative authorities" in the following cases:

"1. Whenever the sale of such produce may result in a local food shortage;

"2. Whenever the product offered is far below the usual standard for the type concerned on the market because of untimely harvesting, deficient preparation, poor state of conservation or any other reason conducive to deterioration;

"3. Whenever such action is required in order to comply with the law providing for a special purchasing régime for the direct benefit of the grower, or in order to improve production or to promote the general interest of the economy."

62. The same article also provided that:

"When circumstances make it advisable to do so, indigenous products may be authorized for sale to non-indigenous persons only at periodic fairs or at markets under the supervision of the authorities and at prices controlled by them in order to safeguard the interests of the growers." (Quoted in A/AC.108/L.6, para. 100.)

63. The law left free the trading by Africans among themselves, but whereas under certain conditions they could sell

their products to European middlemen, they could not export cotton, coffee or maize since Africans were not recognized as "producers" of these crops for purposes of registration with the Colonial Export Boards. It appears that as a general rule, government price fixing did not affect African producers except for those crops (such as cotton and, in the case of Mozambique, rice) for which a special purchasing régime was in force or for crops sold at periodic markets held under government supervision.

C. Developments after 1961

64. Since the repeal of the Native Statute in 1961 various other changes have been introduced which affect, or which can increasingly influence, the role of Africans in agriculture in Angola and Mozambique. Among the most important measures are (a) the new Rural Labour Code of 1962; (b) the measures taken for the closer integration of the Territories with Portugal; (c) the changes in African land rights, the increase in European settlement, and the new schemes for rural reorganization which are described in the study on the concession, occupation and settlement of land in Angola and Mozambique (A/6000/Rev.1, chap. V, annex II); and (d) the revision of the cotton régime which is described in part two below.

65. It may be pointed out, however, that as previous studies and reports have shown, many of the new laws introduce changes which are more apparent than real.

66. The Rural Labour Code of 1962,^{*} for instance, applies to "all workers whatever the ethnical or cultural group to which they belong". But as the term "rural worker" is defined in the Code as "any manual worker of unspecified trade, engaged in activities connected with the sowing of land and harvesting of produce or in activities designed to make such farming possible or to ensure that it is done", in effect, since there are very few Europeans in this category, it is mainly Africans who are affected by its application, especially since the Code also provides under article 150 that "It shall be the duty of the State to ensure socially balanced evolution of the subsistence and market economies". Furthermore, although the Rural Labour Code contains no reference to the obligation to work, there has been no change in the Government's position that all citizens must earn their livelihood by their own efforts and that vagabondage and idleness must be suppressed.

67. Similarly, the land concession legislation retains provisions previously contained in the Native Statute and, as reported in the study on the concession, occupation and settlement of land in Angola and Mozambique (*ibid.*, paras. 47-57), continues to distinguish between land rights of Africans who have chosen to be governed by Portuguese civil law and those who live in traditional societies.

68. Thus it is apparent that whether or not the measures introduced since 1961 will bring about a change in the role of Africans in agriculture in Angola and Mozambique will depend to a great extent on how the laws are interpreted and applied.

69. Recent government measures to assist African agriculture in these Territories include the provision of farm credit, storage and transport facilities, and the establishment of a system of regular supervised rural markets. These developments will be described in the separate studies on the role of agriculture in Angola and Mozambique, which show the pattern of production, processing and marketing of the major crops, including available information on the capital investment in these activities, government regulations and controls and the economic significance of each crop to the Territory and its inhabitants.

PART TWO. COTTON IN THE OVERSEAS TERRITORIES

I. GENERAL

70. Apart from the practice of compulsory labour under the Native Statute nothing more exemplified Portuguese policy towards the Overseas Territories and their indigenous inhabitants prior to 1961 or was more widely criticized abroad than the régime under which cotton was produced and marketed in

* *Ibid.*, p. 27, foot-note 60. According to an Order of the Governor General, an African who cultivated more than one hectare of coffee or 3,000 plants was also entitled to receive the African Farmer's certificate known as a *título*.

* Decree 44,309, 27 April 1962; English text quoted is from ILO Legislative Series 1962, Por.1.

Mozambique and Angola. Introduced specifically to develop within the shortest possible time an assured supply of raw material to one of Portugal's key industries, it involved the forced cultivation of cotton by hundreds of thousands of Africans, the application of most detailed governmental regulation and control and the establishment of monopolistic concessions over vast areas.

71. By 1961, when cotton growing by Africans was made no longer obligatory, there were 520,000 registered African cotton growers in Mozambique and nearly 47,000 in Angola, earning an average *per capita* income from their output of less than 1,000 escudos per year and in some areas less than 200 escudos.^a

72. The development of cotton production in the two Territories took place within the thirty-five years beginning in 1926. Although cotton had long been grown as an African crop and sporadic attempts to develop it commercially had been made, especially in Angola, during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, it was the disruption of world supplies during World War I which provided the first major impetus to organized production. In Mozambique, particularly, European investors turned to cotton as a plantation crop. The stimulus was, however, of short duration; after the war, the normalization of world markets and high costs resulting from the need to concentrate labour on the plantations, induced European farmers to abandon cotton for more profitable forms of investment.

73. As explained in part one above, Portugal, prior to 1961, regarded the Overseas Territories primarily as producers of raw materials for the metropolis. In the case of cotton, however, Portugal's textile industry had relied traditionally on supplies from the United States and Brazil. Consequently, except for the brief interlude during the war, there was until the mid-1920s no systematic effort by government to develop cotton production in the Overseas Territories. In the changed world economic situation after the war, this heavy reliance on foreign sources of supply, together with the growing volume of cotton imports and rising world prices, added substantially to Portugal's balance-of-payments difficulties. In 1925, it was officially estimated that Portugal's annual requirement of raw cotton was approximately 17,000 tons of which only 800 tons came from Mozambique and Angola. The need to purchase the bulk of its cotton from sources outside the escudo area involved for Portugal a yearly outflow of foreign exchange in the region of 150 million escudos.

74. In order to eliminate this drain of foreign exchange and bearing in mind the experience in other colonial territories where cotton had been successfully established as an African peasant crop, the Portuguese Government in 1926 instituted a régime of forced cultivation in Mozambique and Angola with the declared intention of achieving within the shortest possible time self-sufficiency of the escudo area in regard to cotton supplies. The basic features of the régime were, on the one hand, the grant of purchasing monopolies to concessionary companies who, in return for their exclusive rights, were made responsible for developing cotton growing by Africans in their concessions and for acquiring and processing all cotton so produced, and on the other hand the establishment of detailed government regulation and control over all activities relating to the production, processing and disposal of cotton, including the fixing of prices both to exporters and growers.

75. In broad outline, the principles underlying the legislation pertaining to cotton in the Overseas Territories from 1926 to 1961 are illustrative of Portuguese economic policy at that time. Since cotton was an essential raw material for an important metropolitan export industry, it became an obligatory crop for Africans living in areas designated as cotton producing and the local administration officials were required to co-operate with the concessionaires in inducing Africans to produce it. At the same time, through controlled prices and compulsory quotas for the supply of cotton to Portugal and by limiting the production of textiles in the Overseas Territories, Portuguese policy was aimed both at providing an assured supply of cotton to the metropolitan industry at prices which gave it a competitive advantage in world markets and at retaining most of the market in the Overseas Territories for Portuguese textiles.

76. Although the régime achieved its principal objective, namely that by 1960 about 87 per cent of Portugal's raw cotton imports were supplied by the Overseas Territories, it was the object of widespread criticism, especially outside Portugal. Among the reasons for this criticism were the pressures imposed on Africans to grow cotton, the use of the local administrative machineries to support private industrialists, the privileged position of the cotton concessionaires several of whom acquired exclusive rights over enormous areas, and the compulsory supply of cotton under quota to Portugal at prices below those prevailing in world markets. It may be noted that after 1956, the price advantage to Portugal diminished owing to an easing of the world supply of cotton and subsidization of cotton exports by the United States.

77. From 1961 to 1965, Portugal completely revised the legislation governing cotton in the Overseas Territories by a succession of decrees. These replaced the previous régime by a more liberal one in which cotton growing by Africans is no longer obligatory, the concessions are abolished and the export of cotton will eventually be freed of quota restrictions and price controls. The new régime reflects Portugal's changed policy towards the economic development of the Overseas Territories which is inherent in the movement towards integration of the escudo zone and also in the relaxation of restrictions on capital investment and establishment of certain industries, including textiles, in the Territories. The new régime, although transitional in that it retains the compulsory quota system for the supply of raw cotton to Portugal as well as other controls for a further period of five years, opens the way towards the greater industrialization of cotton in the Overseas Territories and their eventual access on a competitive basis to world markets for cotton products.

78. The following sections describe the evolution of the cotton régime and its implications both for the Territories concerned and for Portugal.

II. REGULATION AND CONTROL OF RAW COTTON, 1926-1961

79. Starting in 1926 a succession of decrees and legislative instruments were enacted regulating the production, trade and processing of African-grown cotton in the Overseas Territories. In order to promote the establishment of cotton ginneries and processing plants, Decree 11,994 (28 July 1926) restricted all purchases of African-grown cotton to licensed buyers (European and *assimilados*) who, to obtain a licence, were required to possess equipment and storage facilities sufficient to process the amount of cotton which they were authorized to buy. Where ginning and processing plants satisfied specified standards of capacity and efficiency, they were termed "cotton factories" and for each factory the licensee was given the exclusive right to purchase all African-grown cotton within a concessionary zone not exceeding 50 km², which limit was increased in 1932 (Decree 20,881, 13 February) to 120 km². There was no restriction on the number of factories and concessionary zones held by one company and in Angola and Mozambique certain large companies acquired a number of concessions (see separate studies on Angola and Mozambique). As a further incentive, license holders were exempted from import duties on equipment and supplies, were exempted from all but a nominal statistical tax (0.01 per cent *ad valorem*) on cotton entering Portugal, and were charged minimum rates for rail transport and port handling in the Territories.

80. In order to supply these ginneries, Africans were forbidden to sell their cotton except to licensed buyers and at supervised markets. In concessionary zones they could sell only to the concessionary factory or its agents. Under article 19 of Decree 11,994 the prices to be paid for African cotton in each region were fixed annually by the Governor of the Territory concerned "taking into account conditions of labour" as well as transport and other charges "so that the cotton should sell on European markets at prices not higher than cotton produced in the neighbouring colonies".

81. The success of the régime depended primarily on inducing Africans to grow cotton. Decree 11,994 provided (article 13) for concerted action on the part of the territorial authorities, including local administrators and chiefs in cotton-producing regions, to promote the cultivation of this crop

^a One escudo = 3.5 cents; \$US1 = 28.5 escudos.

among Africans by propaganda, distribution of seeds, technical assistance and supervision and "by such other means as may be appropriate". In concessionary zones this work was to be undertaken by the agents of the factories, who held official status, with the collaboration of the local administrations. In fact, since the principal cotton-growing areas soon came under concession, it was the agents of the concessionary companies, including technicians and promoters (*propagandistas*), who had the principal role of determining what land should be devoted to cotton and how it should be cultivated, the local administrators and chiefs having responsibility to supervise the growers in carrying out the various phases of the annual cotton campaigns drawn up by the concessionaires, observe compliance with regulations and ensure that the official prices were paid to growers, oversee the marketing of cotton, hear complaints and carry out other related duties, such as seeing that service roads were constructed and maintained by local labour.

82. As the above implies, the object of the régime was to develop cotton growing as the principal African activity in the selected regions through the efforts of commercial entrepreneurs assisted and supported by the territorial administrations. However, partly owing to the effects of the world economic depression and the consequent drop in cotton prices, the new régime did not produce the expected increase in output and after a brief initial upsurge the supply of cotton to Portugal's textile industry declined again until by 1931 it had returned to about the same level as in 1925. In the light of this situation further measures were introduced to stimulate increased production. Thus, in 1932, Decree 21,226 (10 May 1932) instituted an export bounty payable to exporters of all colonial cotton shipped to Portugal on Portuguese ships. The decree also (article 14) prohibited the recruitment of Africans in cotton concessionary zones for work outside those zones, which prohibition was later reiterated in Decree 35,844 (31 August 1946). Both decrees required the administrative authorities in the cotton-growing regions to "devote persistent efforts" with the object of achieving the maximum development of cotton cultivation. Although the metropolitan legislation did not contain any specific mention of compulsion,^{*} local enactments in Angola did in fact require Africans in specified areas to grow cotton according to rules which set forth the minimum areas to be cultivated depending on the age, sex and marital status of the individual, the observance of these rules to be supervised by the agents of the concession holders, who were to report any non-compliance to the administrative authorities for appropriate action.^{*} In Mozambique, no such legislation was enacted but cotton growing was none the less obligatory in concessionary zones since (a) Africans had a duty to work and pay taxes, and (b) the land was officially designated for cotton growing.

83. A third measure introduced in 1932 (Decrees 20,935 and 21,226) was the creation of a fund to be used for the improvement of African production. The revenue of this fund was derived from a 15 per cent surtax on all cotton yarn and cloth imported into Mozambique and Angola from countries other than Portugal.

84. Between 1932 and 1937 supplies of cotton to Portugal from Mozambique and Angola increased nearly sixfold, accounting in the latter year for 36.6 per cent of Portugal's cotton imports even though these had nearly doubled over the corresponding period. With production and trade now having reached substantial proportions, steps were taken to complete the economic organization of the industry by establishing regulatory bodies in accordance with the general principles of the Corporative State (see part I above).

^{*} The only reference to this is article 6 (b) of Decree 40,405 (4 November 1955), which reads "The improvement of methods of production continues to be an essential obligation of all entities concerned with cultivation, it being now permissible to establish obligatory programmes".

^{*} Angola, Legislative Instruments 638, 24 September 1927; 5, 6 September 1928; 242, 13 January 1930; and Order 6,619, 5 January 1949. Under the last-mentioned Order, Africans were divided into cotton farmers (i.e. able-bodied men from 18 to 55 years of age) and cotton cultivators (men from 56 to 60 years of age, spinsters, widows and divorced women). Depending on their classification, Africans were required to cultivate from 0.25 to one hectare as directed by the agents of the concession holder.

85. The first body to be established (by Decree 27,702, 15 May 1937) was the Regulatory Commission for Trade in Raw Cotton (*Comissão Reguladora do Comércio de Algodão em Rama*) whose function was to control the import of cotton into Portugal and to ensure that all cotton from the Overseas Territories was marketed, if necessary by compulsory distribution to importers on a quota basis^{*} and at prices fixed by the Commission. As constituted in 1937, the Commission was composed of a president and vice-president designated by the Minister of Commerce and Industry and three members, one representing the cotton importers, one representing the cotton textile industry and, from 1938, one representing the Cotton Export Board (see below). The revenue of the Commission was derived from a tax of 7 centavos per kilogramme of cotton imported into Portugal from the Overseas Territories and 10 centavos per kilogramme imported from other foreign countries. Under Decree Law 28,699 of 1938 the Commission, in agreement with the Cotton Export Board, was required to fix minimum c.i.f. prices, established biennially, to be paid to exporters of cotton produced in each of the Overseas Territories taking into account the different costs of production and transportation and other charges. The correspondence between these prices and the actual market prices of Overseas cotton, which were also fixed officially, was maintained by a stabilization fund derived from a special levy of 50 centavos per kilogramme on cotton imported from other countries.

86. In 1938, Decree 28,697 (25 May) established the Colonial Cotton Export Board (*Junta de Exportação do Algodão Colonial*) with headquarters in Lisbon to (a) co-ordinate activities related to the production and distribution of cotton in the Overseas Territories; (b) supervise the production and marketing of cotton and ensure that purchases from African growers were made in accordance with legal requirements and at the officially fixed prices; and (c) promote improvements in the quality and quantity of the cotton produced. Its specific responsibilities included: advising the governors of each Territory with regard to the official purchase prices for African cotton and the issuance of licences and concessions; designating regions for cotton growing; making loans to producers and traders; grading; and issuing export permits. In addition, it acted itself as a purchaser and exporter thereby ensuring that all available cotton was exported.

87. The Board was under the authority of the Minister for the Colonies and consisted of a president, vice-president and three members representing the metropolitan dealers in overseas cotton and the producers (concessionary companies and non-African farmers) in each of the two Territories; all were appointed by the Minister. In Mozambique and Angola it was represented by "delegations" with inspectors and other technical staff. In principle the agents of the Board were required to supervise the work of the concessionaires and approve their annual cotton campaigns, particularly as regards the selection of land for cotton growing. According to one source,^{*} however, which describes the situation in northern Mozambique, the Board did not always have sufficient staff to supervise the campaigns in all concessions and "in practice the selection of land for cotton growing was more likely to be done by the agents of the concessionaires".

88. Under the decree of 1938, the Board's revenues were derived from: (a) a special tax of 3 centavos per kilogramme on all cotton imported into Portugal from the Overseas Territories; (b) an equal amount deducted from the tax on cotton imports into Portugal from other countries (see para. 85 above); (c) special allocations for cotton development; (d) licence fees, fines and interest on capital; and (e) special taxes imposed by the Board with authorization from the territorial governments. In 1946 the Board's revenues were increased by the imposition of a tax of 50 escudos per ton of cotton purchased from Africans payable by all concessionaires and traders (Decree 35,844, article 38).

^{*} These quotas were established by the *grémio* of cotton importers (see part one above).

^{*} Nelson Saraiva Bravo, "A Cultura Algodoeira na Economia do Norte de Moçambique", *Junta de Investigações do Ultramar, Estudos de Ciências Políticas e Sociais*, No. 66 (Lisbon 1963), pp. 112-122.

89. Between 1937 and 1946, cotton production in Mozambique and Angola more than doubled, but owing to a progressive increase in consumption, it still accounted for only 65 per cent of Portugal's cotton imports. In the meantime, however, the pressure on Africans to grow cotton led to neglect of other crops with the result that in 1942 and later serious food shortages occurred in Mozambique, especially in the north where cotton was most extensively cultivated. Furthermore, the cultivation of cotton had been extended to areas relatively unsuitable to the crop at the expense of other productive activities.

90. In order to remedy these defects and at the same time to foster increased output, Portugal revised the basic cotton legislation in 1946. The new decree (Decree 35,844, 31 August 1946) reorganized the cotton concessions to correspond with administrative divisions (*concelhos* or *circunscrições*) which henceforth became known as "cotton zones", the significance of this change being that it enabled the Cotton Export Board to assume a more direct supervisory role over agricultural activities within the zones by requiring the local administrative authorities to carry out its instructions. Under the new decree the Board was given the functions of selecting cotton zones and eliminating areas which it considered unsuitable for cotton growing, determining what areas within the zones should be devoted to cotton and directly supervising the work of the concessionaires. In addition to drawing up standard instructions (*bases*) which concessionaires were required to follow, the Board also approved the annual work programme of each concessionaire, which had to include plans not only for the cultivation of cotton by Africans but also for the supervised growing of food crops in rotation with cotton. Moreover, in drawing up their work programmes, concessionaires were required to concentrate areas of cotton cultivation so as to permit, among other things, the communal use by the growers of equipment supplied by the concessionaire, and also to promote the stabilization of the African population in rural settlements (*aldeamentos*).

91. The 1946 decree also extended the responsibilities of the concessionaires in regard to the processing of cotton. Whereas previously their obligation had been limited to the purchase and ginning of African-grown cotton, they were henceforth additionally required to gin cotton on behalf of autonomous (mostly European) farmers and dealers in their zones in return for a fixed commission and to undertake the processing of all surplus cotton seeds either for export or for local sale.

92. Finally, the decree imposed two additional taxes on cotton purchased from Africans: (a) a tax of 50 escudos per ton to be used to defray the increased expenditures by the Board, and (b) a tax of 10 escudos per ton to finance a Cotton Fund to be used for the provision of health, educational and welfare services in the cotton zones. Both taxes were technically payable by the concessionaires and dealers, but in practice they were discounted from the increase in cotton prices passed on to the growers.

93. The decree of 1946 extended the duration of the cotton concessions for a period of ten years and they were accordingly due to expire in 1956. By 1953, the combined production of Mozambique and Angola already exceeded Portugal's requirements of those grades of cotton which the Territories produced* and by 1955 it was approximately 60 per cent more than in 1946. The surpluses were either exported to other foreign countries or were absorbed by small textile industries in the Territories, the development of which was however restricted by legislation apparently designed to protect the interests of the metropolitan mills (see section IV below).

94. In 1955 the basic legislation governing the cotton régime was again revised (Decree 40,405, 24 November 1955). Among the changes, the new decree provided for the establishment of compulsory quotas, to be determined annually in the light of the requirements of the metropolitan textile industry, which each Territory was required to supply to Portugal before any exports to other countries could be made; the

Portuguese importers none the less having a right of option on any cotton exported in excess of the quotas. For cotton exported under the quotas, the export prices were officially fixed taking into account "a just remuneration for the producers and industrialists, the degree of reorganization attained in the national (textile) industry" and the shipping costs. Cotton exported elsewhere was sold at free market rates and was subject to higher export duties, which were likewise levied on cotton supplied to local textile manufacturers in the Territory.

95. A second change made in 1955 was the expansion of the Cotton Fund created in 1946 into a development fund for the cotton zones. As redefined the fund's purposes included (a) provision of medical and welfare services for the African cotton growers; (b) rural development; (c) financial relief to cotton growers in bad crop years; (d) cotton research and the supply of farming equipment; (e) clearing of land for settlements; and (f) financing part of the operations of African co-operatives (see below). To enable the Fund to fulfil these increased functions, in addition to the surtax on imports of foreign textiles (see para. 83 above), the tax paid per ton of cotton purchased from Africans was raised from 10 to 20 escudos and a new levy, equal to the export duty, was imposed on all cotton exported to countries other than Portugal. This additional levy was also imposed on cotton used for local textile manufacture, thereby increasing the price differential between these two categories of cotton on the one hand and cotton supplied to Portugal under quota.

96. A third innovation was the inclusion of a provision in the 1955 decree permitting the establishment of co-operative societies of African cotton growers (Decree 40,405, articles 34-36), subject to the limitation that they could engage in cotton ginning only if they were outside cotton zones, where processing was a monopoly of the concessionaires. Since most areas of any size considered suitable for cotton had been designated as cotton zones and were therefore under concession, this in effect restricted the field open to African co-operatives to the actual growing of cotton and the group ownership of farming equipment. A significant advantage arose, however, from the fact that the co-operatives could sell their produce, as could autonomous (European and *equiparado*) farmers, at free market rates which, according to one source, averaged in Mozambique about 20 per cent higher than the officially fixed prices paid to African growers.^{aa}

III. REGULATION AND CONTROL OF RAW COTTON AFTER 1961

97. The purpose of the cotton legislation described above had been to mobilize all available resources to bring about the maximum development of cotton production within the shortest possible time. In 1960 this goal seemed to have been attained for during that year the output of raw cotton in the Overseas Territories reached a peak of about 160,000 tons (140,000 tons in Mozambique and 20,000 tons in Angola). In 1961 and 1963, changes were made in the cotton régime, paving the way for the elimination of the concessionary system and its replacement by a system described as "controlled competition" (*concorrência equilibrada*).

98. The first major change was introduced by Decree 43,639 (2 May 1961) which (a) put an end to all intervention by administrative authorities in the production and trade of cotton, and (b) declared that within cotton zones, the cultivation of cotton was voluntary (*livremente praticada*) subject only to technical guidance by the Cotton Export Board.

99. Later the same year Decree Laws 43,874 and 43,875 (24 August 1961) abolished the Cotton Export Board and replaced it by separate Cotton Institutes in Mozambique and Angola. This change, which coincided with similar action in respect of the export boards for coffee and maize (see part one) was in conformity with the policy established in 1937 (Decree 26,757) whereby regulatory boards for important export commodities should eventually be replaced by corporative institutes.

* In 1953 Portugal derived 97 per cent of its cotton imports from the Overseas Territories, the increased volume being about forty-seven times the quantity supplied in 1925.

^{aa} Bravo, op. cit.

100. One result of this change was that it provided greater control at the territorial level, for though ultimate authority remains with the Overseas Minister, each institute is immediately responsible to the Governor-General of the Territory who appoints its council, consisting of a director, assistant director and three members, representing local producers, exporters and the government services. Only in regard to the fixing of prices do the councils report automatically to the Minister, since this involves co-ordination between the Territories.

101. In general the functions entrusted to the institutes in 1961 were the same as those of the Board. Decree Law 43,875 specifies, however, that one of their objectives is to "develop corporative organization and solidarity" among the various sectors of the industry, and they are required to "defend the interests of small producers by ensuring the observance of legal requirements and prices and by promoting organizations through which the economic and social well-being of those small producers may be realized". Furthermore, whereas only European producers were required to register with the Board, the new decree law requires that in Angola all producers whose farms (*lavouras*) exceed a specified area must register.

102. With the establishment of the Cotton Institutes, the Cotton Development Fund, derived mainly from taxes discounted from the amounts paid to Africans for their cotton, was abolished. In its stead separate cotton development funds were set up in each Territory, the revenues of which were derived under the 1961 legislation principally from: (a) taxes paid by the concessionaires and calculated on the basis of the C.I.F. price of cotton imported into Portugal; (b) increments in the price of raw cotton in Portugal; (c) a tax of 35 per cent of the export value of cotton seed or of its wholesale value when supplied to local industry; and (d) certain receipts of the institutes. In each Territory the taxes are fixed annually by the Governor-General.

103. The new cotton development funds were given broader functions than their predecessors. Under article 35 of Decree Law 43,875 they are used for: (a) subsidization of official bodies engaged in technical and social assistance to cotton producers; (b) the grant of subsidies and loans to cotton co-operatives; (c) development of agriculture and livestock in the cotton regions; (d) technical research; (e) maintenance of official prices and financing of the trading activities of the Institutes; (f) the grant of subsidies to cotton producers in case of crop failures; and (g) the clearing of land for cotton farming.

104. The creation of separate cotton institutes and development funds did not alter the basic features of the cotton régime, but it paved the way for more radical changes introduced in 1963.

105. Decree Law 45,179 (5 August 1963) and the regulations for its application (Decree 45,550, 30 January 1964) provide a complete revision of the cotton régime. Under it the cotton concessions are being progressively eliminated and will be suppressed on 31 August 1966. Where concessions cease to exist, purchases of raw cotton may be made by registered dealers (individuals or companies) and the Cotton Institutes themselves; to obtain registration with one of the Institutes a dealer must possess the necessary funds, organization and technical capacity to carry out operations and pay an annual membership fee of 10,000 escudos.

106. The new system requires that each year the Cotton Institutes fix minimum purchase prices for seed cotton, based on the export prices of raw cotton (lint). Once these prices have been fixed, dealers are invited to bid for the right to buy seed cotton at each authorized market, the dealer who offers the highest prices obtaining the sole right to purchase cotton at the specified market together with the obligation to buy all cotton offered at the prices which he has contracted to pay.

107. A licence to gin cotton may be obtained by any individual or company which possesses one or more ginneries and is a registered member of the Institute, paying an annual membership fee of 10,000 escudos per ginnery. Ginneries are required to process cotton on behalf of dealers, producers

or the Institute, on payment of a commission fixed by the Governor-General of the Territory. There is, of course, nothing to prevent a single individual or company from being registered both as a dealer and as a ginner.

108. Under the new system, the Cotton Institutes have become the sole regulating agency in their respective Territories, taking over the field staff of the former concessionaires and their functions vis-à-vis the cotton growers as each concession is eliminated. The Institutes derive their revenue from (a) licence fees; (b) the proceeds of their own commercial operations; (c) participation in the receipts of the Cotton Development Funds which derive their revenue from: (i) a tax on the price of each kilogramme of seed cotton purchased; (ii) a tax on exports of raw cotton, which may vary between 3 and 5 per cent of the c.i.f. price; (iii) a tax of 35 per cent of the export value of cotton seed, or the warehouse price if it is consumed locally. The first two taxes are determined annually by the government of each Territory.

109. As regards export controls, the new system retains the earlier provisions relating to the establishment of territorial quotas for the supply of raw cotton to Portugal, these quotas being determined annually by the Overseas Minister and the Minister of Economy on the advice of the Regulatory Commission. The supply of cotton to local industry and exports to other foreign countries are regulated by the respective Institute. In this respect the new system is a transitional one, for article 18 of Decree Law 45,179 provides that "within a maximum period of five years, the trade in overseas cotton shall be carried out according to norms similar to those practiced in the international market".

IV. COTTON TEXTILES IN ANGOLA AND MOZAMBIQUE

110. A description of the cotton régime would not be complete without reference to the legislation governing the development of textile industries in the Overseas Territories. Since the purpose of the régime was originally to furnish a supply of raw cotton to the metropolitan mills which were important contributors to the export sector of Portugal's economy, no authorizations for local manufacture of textiles were made during the early years of the régime. As explained in the introduction to a decree (No. 26,569) of 1936, Portuguese official policy, which has changed since 1961, was to regard the Overseas Territories mainly as suppliers of raw materials to metropolitan industries on the grounds that they were at a comparative disadvantage in respect of the availability of skilled manpower. According to that decree, local manufacturers should be restricted to products which utilized local raw materials and for which there was either a guaranteed local market or which could be produced for export at less cost than in Portugal.

111. In 1944, with cotton production rapidly increasing and already accounting for about 60 per cent of the industrial needs of the metropolis, the Portuguese Government enacted Decree Law 33,924 which authorized the manufacture of cotton textiles in the Overseas Territories subject to restrictions on output designed to protect the metropolitan industry. The decree law provided that the output of cotton textiles for consumption in each Territory should not exceed the difference in weight between that Territory's average annual import of cotton textiles during the three years 1936-1938 and the same average plus 20 per cent of cotton textiles imported from Portugal.

112. The decree law contained two exceptions to this limitation: (a) the limit should not apply to textiles produced for export to non-Portuguese countries; and (b) each Territory could supply the other Overseas Territories in so far as the latter did not fill their own production quotas. In effect, however, these provisions were nullified in the following year by Decree Law 34,643 (1 June 1945) which prohibited the authorization of new cotton textile factories in any Overseas Territory which had already reached its allotted capacity.

113. One of the considerations mentioned in connexion with the 1944 legislation was that it would assist the moderni-

zation of the metropolitan industry by permitting the transfer of existing equipment to the Overseas Territories. Indeed, the decree law required that existing textile companies in Portugal should be given preference in the granting of authorizations to operate in the Overseas Territories. If they did not exercise this privilege, they had the right to purchase 40 per cent of the registered stock of any new company at the nominal price. The new industries were to enjoy exemption from local taxes and import duties on equipment and supplies for an initial period but, in order to protect metropolitan producers, the local price of raw cotton was to be the same as that paid in Portugal. To this end cotton sold to local industries was subject to the same taxes as were levied on exported cotton.^{bb}

114. Since 1944 several cotton textile factories have been established in Mozambique and Angola. Only two of these are large, however, one in each Territory, and both are operated by the same company, the *Sociedade Algodreira de Fomento Colonial*, which has its headquarters in Lisbon and is owned jointly by the Portuguese State and by metropolitan textile interests (details of the textile industries are given in the separate studies on agriculture and processing in each Territory).

115. In both Territories cotton textiles still remain the second most important import by value. In 1964, imports of cotton textiles accounted for 370 million escudos (8.0 per cent of imports) in the case of Angola and 334 million escudos (7.4 per cent of imports) in the case of Mozambique. Owing to protective duties the majority of these imports came from Portugal. At present, only Mozambique exports cotton textiles and the value of these exports amounted to only 1.5 million escudos in 1962.

116. With the new policy in regard to economic development within the escudo zone, which is described in part one above, Portugal's official attitude towards the regulation of the cotton textile industry in the Overseas Territories has undergone a fundamental change. In November 1965, a decree law was enacted which revoked the previous legislation of 1944 and 1945 and provided that henceforth the authorization of additional cotton textile manufacturing capacity should be the responsibility of the authorities in each of the Overseas Territories to be determined solely on the basis of that Territory's development needs.

V. IMPLICATIONS OF THE COTTON RÉGIME

A. Economic importance to metropolitan Portugal

117. In 1960, Portugal ranked twelfth among European producers of cotton thread and cloth. Its cotton textile industry encompassed 419 factories employing over 70,000 workers, and the value of its output was about 4 billion escudos. Cotton thread and cloth are Portugal's leading export. In 1963 it produced an export revenue of 1,500 million escudos, or approximately one eighth of the country's visible exports by value.

118. The rapid growth of the industry after the Second World War can be seen from the increasing volume of raw cotton imported (see table 1). During the years 1929-1931, the average consumption of cotton was only 17,000 tons; in 1942-1945 it averaged 24,000 tons but by 1964 it had increased to nearly 77,000 tons. In 1963 the raw cotton imported by Portugal cost 1,328 million escudos, or more than 6 per cent of Portugal's imports by value.

119. Access to supplies from Mozambique and Angola has helped the growth of the metropolitan industry in two ways. First, it reduced the demand for foreign exchange, especially during and after World War II when cotton was in short supply on world markets and prices were consequently high. Thus, during the decade 1946-1955, an average of 87 per cent of Portugal's cotton requirements was supplied by the

two Territories under the compulsory export quota system. After 1956, when world supplies increased and prices declined sharply, Portugal was able to expand its consumption by turning to foreign sources. From 1956-1963 the percentage of total cotton imports supplied by the Overseas Territories averaged only 70 per cent and in 1964 it was only 41 per cent.

120. Second, by fixing the official quota prices below those obtaining for cotton imported from other countries, Portugal was enabled to reorganize and re-equip her textile industry during the post-war period during most of which the world prices of cotton were high. That cotton supplied by the Overseas Territories was cheaper than cotton imported from other countries can be seen by comparing columns 9 and 10 of table 1. It must be pointed out, however, that whereas a large part of the shipments from the Overseas Territories consist of low-quality fibres, cotton obtained from other countries is composed largely of higher grades. A more accurate picture can be obtained by comparing similar grades. According to data published by the Regulatory Commission for Trade in Raw Cotton, the average price c.i.f. Portugal of cotton imported from Mozambique during the crop years 1947-48/1954-55 was 14.08 escudos per kilo, whereas the same cotton if sold on the basis of international quotations would have fetched an average price of 27.12 escudos.^{cc} According to one source^{dd} the cotton supplied to Portugal from the Overseas Territories in 1955 would, if sold at international quotations, have fetched an additional 400 million escudos or 68 per cent more than it fetched under the official quota prices.

121. After 1956, when the United States began to subsidize exports of high grade fibre, world prices, especially of lower grade cotton, dropped sharply. In the crop years 1955-1956 the average c.i.f. price of Mozambique cotton was 16.06 escudos compared with 18.84 escudos for comparable foreign cotton and in the calendar year 1960 the average prices were respectively 17.78 and 18.50 escudos. Although the quota prices of higher grade cotton (grades 1-3) from the Overseas Territories remained slightly below international quotations between 1956 and 1960, the quota prices of inferior cotton were significantly higher. In mid-1958 for example the c.i.f. import prices of grades 5 and 6 under the quota were 14.60 and 13.60 escudos respectively, whereas the corresponding prices for United States cotton f.o.b. Houston, Texas, were between 8.50 and 10 escudos.

122. The following table showing Portugal's imports of raw cotton by quantity and value is based on data published under the auspices of the official *Junta de Investigações do Ultramar*.

B. Economic and social importance to the Overseas Territories

123. Prior to 1961, when compulsory cultivation was abolished, cotton was grown in Angola and Mozambique under a system which amounted to forced cultivation. In Angola, local legislation enacted from 1908 to 1949 required Africans living in certain areas and not otherwise employed, to grow cotton. The most comprehensive enactment was an Order of the Governor-General, dated 5 January 1949, which provided that within cotton zones the minimum areas to be grown with cotton and with food crops should be fixed each year by the Governor-General, on the proposal of the Cotton Export Board, and that all Africans of working age (i.e., between the ages of 18 and 60) should cultivate cotton and food crops as directed.^{ee} The Order further provided that cultivation should be in accordance with the rules prescribed by the Cotton Export Board, the observance of these rules to be supervised by the agents of the concessionary companies who were to report any non-compliance

^{cc} Portugal: Comissão Reguladora do Comércio de Algodão em Rama, *Boletim*, 1948-1960.

^{dd} Bravo, op. cit.

^{ee} For the crop year 1948-1949 the minimum areas to be cultivated varied from 0.25 hectare to one hectare of cotton and an equal area of food crops depending on the age, sex and marital status of the individual.

^{bb} Official policy in this respect appears to have varied. Thus, Decree Law 35,844 (article 59) of 1946 provided that the special tax on cotton exports should also be levied on cotton supplied to local industries; Decree Law 37,523 (article 10) of 1949 exempted the latter from all export duties; and Decree 40,403 (article 59) of 1955 reimposed the tax.

TABLE 1. METROPOLITAN PORTUGAL: IMPORTS OF RAW COTTON

Year	From Angola		From Mozambique		From other countries		Total imports		Percentage from Overseas Territories	
	Thousand tons	Million escudos	Thousand tons	Million escudos	Thousand tons	Million escudos	Thousand tons	Million escudos	Volume	Value
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
1946-1950 ^a	5.4	65.9	24.4	280.1	3.8	88.7	34.0	436.5	88.6	80.0
1951-1955 ^a	5.4	84.0	30.7	469.3	6.5	209.6	42.6	762.9	84.7	73.2
1956	5.5	89.7	21.1	339.2	13.2	290.3	39.8	719.1	66.8	59.6
1957	7.1	127.6	22.1	379.8	17.9	377.7	47.2	885.0	62.0	57.3
1958	6.1	109.8	35.4	619.2	6.5	140.6	48.0	869.6	86.5	83.8
1959	5.7	102.7	29.2	510.1	14.2	267.8	49.1	880.5	71.1	69.6
1960	8.8	155.4	37.7	706.0	9.0	179.1	57.5	1,040.5	84.3	82.8
1961	4.9	87.5	42.1	755.3	20.2	407.8	67.3	1,252.9	69.9	67.3
1962	3.9	71.1	29.1	523.8	32.2	631.5	65.3	1,226.4	50.6	48.5
1963	5.7	106.1	36.3	648.5	30.0	573.5	72.0	1,328.1	58.4	56.8
1964	3.1	54.0	28.5	525.8	45.2	846.7	76.8	1,426.4	41.2	40.7

SOURCE: Data up to and including 1961 from N. S. Bravo, op. cit. Data for 1962 to 1964 from Portugal, *Comércio Externo*.

^a Yearly average.

to the administrative authorities for appropriate action.^{ff} In Mozambique no legislation of this nature was enacted, but Africans in cotton zones were none the less obliged to grow cotton since under the Native Statute they had an obligation to work and pay taxes and within these zones cotton was the prescribed cash crop. Furthermore, under the Native Farmers' Statute an African farmer could be deprived of his land if he failed to cultivate it as required by the Government. The evidence shows that strong pressure was brought to bear on Africans to grow cotton even on marginally suitable land, with the result that income to the grower was sometimes exceedingly low (see below) and that it became necessary to supervise the rotational growing of food crops in order to prevent food shortages. Although the metropolitan legislation did not specifically authorize compulsion, the exercise of strong official pressure on the African grower may be inferred from the obligation placed on local administrative authorities to devote persistent efforts to develop cotton growing, to supervise its cultivation by Africans (Decree 21,226) and to assist the concessionaires by propaganda (Decrees 35,844 and 40,405). Moreover, the prohibition of recruitment of Africans in cotton zones for work outside their zones (Decrees 21,226 and 35,844) although not affecting the right of voluntary migration, made it difficult for Africans to find alternative means of gainful employment in order, among other things, to pay their taxes. These matters were subject to detailed examination by a commission of the International Labour Organisation, 1961-1962, and reference is made to its report.^{gg} As previously stated, the Native Statute

and all legislation providing for the compulsory cotton growing, or for intervention by administrative officials was revoked in 1961.

124. In economic terms, the importance of cotton for Mozambique and Angola derives not only from its prominence as an export commodity, particularly in the case of Mozambique, but also from the fact that it is the main cash crop of a very large number of African producers. In 1961, the value of African seed cotton produced in Mozambique was 379.9 million escudos and the number of growers was approximately 520,000. Hence the average *per capita* value was about 720 escudos. In Angola the average *per capita* value was 950 escudos for a total of 46,676 growers.

125. Until 1963 the prices of ginned cotton and the prices paid to African growers for seed cotton were fixed officially. In 1963 as a first step towards the eventual removal of price controls,^{hh} it was decreed that only minimum prices should be fixed for seed cotton, so as to permit competitive bidding. In 1964, however, about 40 per cent of the Mozambique cotton crop was purchased by the Cotton Institute at the official minimum prices owing to the absence of competitive bidding by dealers.

126. The official prices paid to African growers for seed cotton are determined by deducting transportation, processing and other costs from the export price, and vary according to grade and locality. The following table shows the official prices effective in different years in the north of Mozambique.

by the Government of Ghana concerning the observance by the Government of Portugal of the Abolition of Forced Labour Convention, 1957 (No. 105), Geneva, 1962.

^{hh} The decree of 1963 envisaged that the controlled export prices would be eliminated after a five-year transitional period. Thereafter cotton would be exported at free market quotations.

TABLE 2. MOZAMBIQUE: OFFICIAL PRICES OF SEED COTTON

(Escudos per kg.)

Year	Maximum		Average		Minimum	
	1st grade	2nd grade	1st grade	2nd grade	1st grade	2nd grade
1947-1948	1.60	1.20	1.50	1.10	1.40	1.00
1949-1950	1.90	1.50	1.80	1.40	1.70	1.30
1951-1955	2.80	2.10	2.70	2.00	2.60	1.90
1956-1960	3.10	2.40	3.00	2.30	2.90	2.20
1961	3.70	2.30	3.60	2.20	3.50	2.10

SOURCE: Bravo, op. cit.

127. Prior to 1961, taxes on behalf of the Cotton Fund were discounted from the prices paid to African growers. These taxes amounted in 1960 to 0.20 escudos per kilogramme of first quality seed cotton and 0.30 escudos per kilogramme of second quality. With the abolition of the Cotton Fund in 1961, these discounts were eliminated. In 1962, there were only two official prices for African-grown cotton applicable throughout Mozambique, namely 3.70 escudos for first quality and 2.30 escudos for second quality seed cotton. Co-operatives and European farmers, who were not subject to controls, received an average of 20 per cent more than African producers. According to one source,¹¹ the average yearly income from cotton of African growers in northern Mozambique was 634 escudos in 1960.¹²

128. Cotton contributes to the public revenue of the Territories through a number of taxes and export duties. In 1963 these various charges were reported to amount to a total of 0.77 escudos per kilogramme of seed cotton produced in Mozambique, or about 92.4 million escudos. Most of these taxes and duties derive from metropolitan legislation and therefore apply also to Angola although the level of the taxes may differ. The majority, including in the case of Mozambique a tax of 20 escudos per ton on purchases of seed cotton, a tax of 0.80 escudos per kg. of ginned cotton produced, together with various export duties and other charges, are used to finance the cotton development funds in each Territory. The proceeds of these funds may be used for general development purposes in any cotton-growing region, which in Mozambique means about half the area of the Territory. It is worthy of note that between 1955 and 1961 when it was replaced by separate cotton development funds in each Territory, the Cotton Fund, which was used for the same purpose, received a total of over 156 million escudos from Mozambique alone.

Appendix II

Agriculture and processing industries in Angola

Working paper prepared by the Secretariat

CONTENTS

	Paragraphs
I. GENERAL OUTLINE	
A. Role of agriculture in the economy of the Territory	1-9
B. Pattern of production	10-21
II. PRODUCTION, PROCESSING AND MARKETING OF MAJOR CROPS	
A. Coffee	22-72
B. Sisal	73-90
C. Sugar	91-113
D. Cotton	114-154
E. Maize	155-181

Tables

	Page
1. Regions of principal crops and estimated areas cultivated	392
2. Angola: coffee production	398
3. Angola: growth of coffee production in main districts, 1955 and 1960	398
4. Angola—coffee: exports and principal destinations, 1955-1964	398
5. Angola—sisal: exports and principal destinations, 1955-1964	400
6. Angola sugar companies: Area, factory capacity and output, 1960	402

¹¹ Bravo, op. cit.

¹² The average conceals wide variations. Thus in 1959-1960 income per grower ranged from 129 to over 3,300 escudos in northern Mozambique.

	Page
7. Angola's sugar quota for export to Portugal, by factory	402
8. Angola: sugar production, consumption and exports	402
9. Angola—sugar: local consumption, exports and principal destinations, 1955-1964	403
10. Angola: seed cotton output by regions	404
11. Angola: African production of seed cotton	404
12. Angola: African cotton growers, area and production under the supervision of the Cotton Institute, 1961-1964	406
13. Angola: local production and import of cotton textiles and other cotton products	407
14. Angola: export of cotton seed oil and other by-products	407
15. Angola: cotton lint output and exports	408
16. Angola: maize exports and destination of exports	410
17. Angola: agricultural exports, 1955-1964	410
18. Angola: agricultural exports percentage of value of total exports, 1955-1964	410

I. GENERAL OUTLINE

A. Role of agriculture in the economy of the Territory

1. The economy of Angola remains basically agricultural despite the increased mineral production of recent years. During the period 1956-1964 agricultural commodities accounted on an average for more than 60 per cent of the total value of visible exports. In 1964 mineral exports represented only 20 per cent of the total and included diamonds, which accounted for 12.7 per cent, iron ore 4.0 per cent, and crude petroleum and petroleum products 3.4 per cent. Next in importance are fish products.

2. Since the early 1950s coffee and sisal have dominated the agricultural sector in Angola. Coffee, which is now the Territory's leading export crop, accounted for almost 50 per cent of the total value of exports in 1964, as compared with 30 per cent in 1950. With an annual production of some 180,000 metric tons in the 1963 and 1964 seasons, Angola has become the third largest world coffee producer after Brazil and Colombia, its output representing about 5.7 per cent of the world's supplies.

3. As a result of favourable prices sisal production doubled during the period 1950-55, and by 1965 with an annual output of some 62,000 tons, Angola became the third largest sisal producer in the world, after Tanzania and Brazil.

4. The Territory's third export crop is maize, which for many years was the most important export in terms both of value and of the volume exported. In 1964, however, it accounted for less than 3 per cent of the total value of the Territory's visible exports.

5. In contrast to Mozambique, sugar and cotton no longer play an important role in the Territory's export trade, and increased output is mostly absorbed by local consumption. Other agricultural exports include manioc (*crueira*), manioc flour, palm-oil, coco nuts, beans, peanuts and tobacco. Since the mid-1950s, however, these crops have accounted for less than 8 per cent of exports by value.

6. The principal markets for Angola's coffee are the United States of America, the United Kingdom, Netherlands, France and the Federal Republic of Germany. Portugal is the main customer for sisal and most of the other crops, some of which are supplied to it exclusively (cotton and sugar) or partially under fixed quotas.

7. As described in the previous working paper (appendix I), the Government fixes the export of most agricultural products, and supervises and controls their grading and marketing. Export duties and special taxes levied on agricultural products leaving Angola ports, contribute a substantial share to the public revenue of the Territory. In addition to the normal export duties there were, in 1962 for instance, special levies

consisting of a 1.5 per cent *ad valorem* tax and a 10 centavos per kilogramme surtax on coffee exported; 3 escudos per ton for maize, 10 centavos per kilogramme for sugar; and 25 centavos per kilogramme for cotton.^a There is also an additional tax (*imposto de sobrevalorização*) on coffee which is assessed on the difference between the actual export price and that prevailing in 1949.^b In 1962 when export tariffs on all products amounted to 241 million escudos and contributed about one tenth of the total ordinary revenue, the additional special levies on agricultural products amounted to 45.5 million escudos, of which 41.9 million was from coffee, 3.9 million from sugar and the rest from maize, beeswax and cotton.

8. While part of the funds collected as export and other taxes on coffee, cotton and maize are allocated to the respective commodity institutes to finance their activities, including research and extension work, most of the foreign exchange earned by Angola's exports has to be handed into the common Foreign Exchange Fund, and in this way Angola's dollar and sterling earnings help to reduce Portugal's own balance of payments deficit.

9. There is no recent information on the proportion of the population engaged in agriculture. According to statistics compiled by the Angola Labour Institute and published in 1964, wage earners make up 24 per cent of the labour force and "independent" workers 86 per cent; by sector, 95.3 per cent are engaged in the primary sector, which includes some 30,000 persons employed in the extractive industries, and 58,000 in other industries; 2.4 per cent are in the secondary sector and 2.3 per cent in the tertiary sector. The statistics gathered concerning labour migrating within the Territory showed that 78.9 per cent were engaged in agriculture and 6.6 per cent in livestock.

B. Pattern of production

10. Angola, with an area of 1,241,700 square kilometres (481,226 square miles), is about fourteen times the size of Portugal. It has a varied rainfall and topography and is suitable for growing both tropical and temperate crops. It is estimated that about 2 to 3 per cent of the land is under cultivation.

11. The pattern of agriculture varies from the north to the south. Cabinda, which is 727,000 square kilometres in area, forms a distinct region not only because it is geographically separated from the rest of Angola, but because of its predominant importance in timber production which accounts for about 65 per cent of the value of its local exports. Coffee,

^a Agricultural products subject to a special export régime included, in 1956, cotton, coffee, manioc, flour, beans, maize, palm and palm kernels oil, sisal, sisal tow, leaf tobacco, manufactured tobacco, wheat and wheat flour. In contrast, minerals exported from the following companies were exempt from export duty: the Angola Diamond Company, the Companhia dos Betuminosos de Angola, the Companhia de Combustíveis do Lobito, the Empresa do Cobre de Angola, the Sociedade Mineira de Lombige and the Companhia Mineira de Lobito (see A/6000/Rev.1, chap. V, annex I).

^b In 1957 and 1958, when coffee prices were at their peak, receipts from this tax amounted to about 5 per cent of the Territory's ordinary revenue (see para. 62 of this appendix).

palm products and other tropical crops make up the remaining 35 per cent.

12. The northern region of Angola, from the border of the Republic of Congo (Leopoldville) to the Cuanza valley, is the main coffee producing region. It also produces almost all the cotton and about half of the sugar exported. This region consists of a relatively undeveloped low coastal plain from which the land rises to the east to form a sub-plateau of 1,300-3,000 feet, with a gradual ascent to highlands in the interior with elevation between 3,000 and 5,000 feet. Coffee is grown mainly on the Uíge plateau and around Gabela, inland from Porto Amboim. The two main cotton growing areas are located in the coastal plain south of Luanda, with Icolo and Bengo as the centre, and along the Luanda Railway, principally in the Catete and Malanje *concelhos*. Kenaf and *abroma* fibre are grown inland from the coast and the Portuguese-owned *Companhia União Fabril* has a 75,000 hectare plantation in the M'Bridge River basin area where these are the main crops. The Cuanza and Bengo river valleys (as reported in A/6000/Rev.1, chap. V, annex II, paras. 136-140) and the area round Malanje are being developed to supply fruits, vegetables and other crops to the Luanda market and for export. Around Malanje some tobacco is grown by both Europeans and Africans. This region, which is responsible for the main share of agricultural exports, also produces small quantities of palm, cassava and other tropical produce mainly as African subsistence food crops.

13. In the central region of Angola, the main producing area is the Benguela-Bié plateau which lies inland from the port of Lobito. Sisal is the major export crop. About 95 per cent of the export maize and most of the manioc also come from this region. Some wheat, tobacco, peanuts and beans and other subsistence crops are also grown here. Sugar, the only other important export crop from this region is produced along the lower reaches of the Catumbela and Coporola rivers. Some *Arabica* coffee is produced around Ganda and Bié.

14. The southern region is mainly suitable for cattle raising. It is estimated that there are already more than one and a quarter million head of cattle in this area, most of which are African owned. In recent years government measures have been introduced to build up a livestock industry. A refrigerated packing plant has been established at Moçamedes, veterinary services and research have been expanded, concessions of land for cattle ranching are being encouraged through provision of government loans. It is reported that a German-owned firm has established a ranch to raise cattle for corned beef.

15. Due to the arid conditions there is little agricultural activity in the extreme southern part of Angola which borders on South West Africa. However, since 1953 the Government has been engaged in developing the Cunene River valley and under an agreement concluded with South West Africa in 1964 the generating and storage capacity at the Matala Dam is being increased and will be used for irrigation purposes (A/6000/Rev.1, chap. V, paras. 66-68 and *ibid.*, annex II, paras. 124-135).

16. The following table shows the principal crops by districts and the estimated areas of production.

TABLE 1. REGIONS OF PRINCIPAL CROPS AND ESTIMATED AREAS CULTIVATED

	Main districts ^a	Estimated area (hectares)
Cotton	Malanje, Luanda; Cuanza South	36,400 (1963)
Coffee	Uíge, Zaire, Cuanza North, Cuanza South, Cabinda	327,000 (1965)
Sugar cane	Luanda, Malanje, Benguela	10,500 (1964)
Sisal	Cuanza North, Benguela Bié	125,000 (1964)
Wheat	Benguela, Bié, Huambo	17,000 (1942)
Maize	Congo, Luanda, Huambo, Bié, Huíla	560,000 (1942)
Manioc	Congo, Malanje, Benguela, Bié	125,000 (1955)
Coco-nut and palms	Cabinda, Cuanza South, Benguela, Congo	30,000 (1955)
Beans	Malanje, Benguela, Bié, Huíla	100,000 (1955)
Peanuts	Congo, Malanje, Benguela, Bié	6,000 (1955)
Rice	Congo, Malanje	14,000 (1955)

^a The Congo district was divided into Uíge and Zaire in 1961.

17. Most of the important export crops are controlled by European capital, with a predominance of individual settlers or private companies in sisal and coffee and large shareholder companies in cotton and sugar. However, as there is little mechanization in Angola, nearly all the production on European estates and plantations is by African labour. Latest estimates (1965) show that there are probably some 175,000 African wage earners employed in agriculture, including 123,000 in coffee, 25,000 in sisal and 15,000 in sugar. In addition, to producing almost all the traditional food crops, maize, manioc, sweet potatoes, oil palm, beans and peanuts, some 36,000 Africans grow almost all the cotton, and 60,000 Africans produce on their own account about one quarter of the coffee exported.

18. There are no accurate production figures available for export crops or food crops. However, the relatively small quantities of the export crops retained in the Territory are either fixed by quota (cotton and sugar) or are relatively insignificant (coffee, and sisal up to 1965). For African-produced food crops, on the other hand, exports generally represent surpluses purchased, but usually only from areas accessible to transportation lines. Nevertheless, these are the only data available on the activities in the African subsistence sector.

19. Since the end of World War II the pattern of production has been characterized by a sharp increase in export crops, especially of coffee and sisal (see table 17). While this change was stimulated in the 1950's by favourable world prices, it has always been the Government's policy to encourage production and export of high unit-price crops, and as reported previously (A/6000/Rev.1 chap. V, annex II), to increase European settlement. This change in the pattern of production has had two important results. First, the major part of Angola's export trade is now oriented towards foreign markets. (In 1964, for instance, over half of the Territory's coffee exports and about one quarter of the total exports by value went to the United States of America). Second, because of the low unit price on the world market of traditionally African-grown food crops, these crops have lost their importance both in the Territory's external trade (see table 18) and as a source of Territorial revenue, so that African agriculture has been almost neglected in government planning.

20. Available statistics show, for instance, that between 1944 and 1960, the average annual volume of exports of six traditionally African-grown food crops (peanuts, rice, manioc, palm products, maize and beans) increased by some 50 per cent, from 135,000 tons to 208,000 tons, but exports of cash crops (comprising sugar, cotton lint, coffee, coconut and sisal) doubled, rising from an annual average of 98,000 tons to 206,000 tons. On the other hand, whereas in 1944 the value of the food crops exported was approximately two fifths that of the cash crops (147 million and 241 million escudos respectively), by 1960 the former was only one fifth of the latter. This trend has become even more marked since 1960. By 1964, the value of the exports of the six food crops was only about one tenth of the value of the five cash crops (364 million compared with 3,527 million).

21. Since the introduction of the Transitional Development Plan 1965-1967, greater emphasis is being given to stimulating increased African production by reducing export tariffs and by raising the prices paid to producers who are now required to sell their crops in government supervised rural markets (see paras. 153 and 178 below).

II. PRODUCTION, PROCESSING AND MARKETING OF MAJOR CROPS

A. Coffee

General

22. Coffee growing in Angola dates back to the last century and the first exports were made around 1830. After the First World War government protective measures were introduced and production rose steadily. Except for the period of the 1930s when the world coffee market was generally affected by price fluctuations, coffee exports from Angola have continued to increase. In 1963-1964, with an annual production of some 180,000 tons, Angola became the third largest coffee

producer after Brazil and Colombia accounting for 5.7 per cent of the world's coffee exports.

23. The earliest coffee plantations were in Ambriz, Massango and Ambaca. The main coffee growing areas lie in the north-western quadrant of the Territory and about 100 km. inland from the coast in a band varying from 50 to 200 km. in width and between 400 and 1,200 metres above sea level. As seen in table 2, the districts of Uíge, Cuanza North and Cuanza South produce almost all the coffee and in 1960 accounted for over 92 per cent of the total production.

24. Almost all the coffee grown in Angola is of the *Robusta* type. *Arabica* coffees make up less than 1 per cent of the total and are mostly grown along the Benguela Railway at heights of about 1,200 to 1,400 metres with Ganda and Bié as the most important centres.

Organization of production

25. Coffee is grown on European-owned plantations with African labour and by individuals, both European and African. From 1955 to 1961 the number of European growers increased from about 600 to over 2,000, the total area under cultivation on European-owned farms increased from 198,000 to 420,003 hectares, and total production (Europeans and Africans) from 69,000 to 169,000 tons (see table 2).

26. In 1963 almost three quarters of the European-owned coffee farms were 100 hectares or more in size, 43 per cent of the coffee farms were more than 300 hectares in area, 30 per cent were between 100 and 300 hectares and 27 per cent were under 100 hectares. The African coffee farms averaged between one and two hectares. In 1964, the area under coffee was reported to be 500,000 hectares, including 130,000 hectares reported to be under African cultivation.

27. As reported previously (A/6000/Rev.1, chap. V, annex II, paras. 68-80), between 1956 and 1961 European land holdings in the main coffee-growing districts increased by almost one half million hectares, and the area under coffee by 150,000 hectares. With the influx of new settlers, land especially suitable for coffee became so valuable it was often occupied by force, leading to complicated litigation, not only between parties claiming the land and marking their own boundaries, but also disputes involving land rights of Africans. Land on which Africans had grown coffee was sometimes expropriated, creating grievances which the Sub-Committee on the Situation in Angola considered had contributed to the 1961 uprising.^c

28. There is no recent data on the total investment in coffee in Angola by Portuguese and other foreign interests. Data for 1945 showed that of the 206 million angolars^d then invested, about two thirds was Portuguese owned, with an average investment of 326 angolars per hectare. Investments by non-Portuguese foreign interests averaged 1,152 angolars per hectare. In 1957 it was estimated that for each hectare of coffee on European farms the capital needed was 2,830 escudos. Based on this figure, the capital investment in 1957 would have been approximately three quarters of a billion escudos (\$US24 million).

29. At present the largest coffee-producing company is the Companhia Angolana de Agricultura, commonly known as CADA.^e (See para. 67 below.) According to information published in 1963, the company had a registered capital of 225 million escudos; it owned eighteen coffee plantations including *Boa Estrada*, which has an area of about 60,000 hectares and employed 280 Europeans and 11,580 Africans. In 1964 the company was reported to have raised its capital to provide for the participation of foreign interests concerned with the manufacture of soluble coffees. In that year the company produced 11,000 tons of coffee. CADA also owns palm and coconut plantations.

^c Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixteenth Session, Supplement No. 16 (A/4978), paras. 336-342.

^d The angolar was the local currency at that time and was officially equal to one escudo in value.

^e According to Kavalam Madhu Panikkar (in *Angola in Flames*, London 1962, p. 59), the Companhia Angolana de Agricultura was originally a British controlled firm which occupied 17,000 square kilometres and which was taken over under the nationalization law of 1948.

30. There is no detailed information on the ownership of the coffee plantations and processing plants in Angola. Most of the large plantations also produce other export crops. According to the Angola Industrial Guide of 1961, coffee factories and processing and decortication plants in Angola included:

Name of company or owner	District	Other information
Companhia da Africa Occidental Portuguesa (C.A.O.P.)	Cuanza North	Capital: 50 million escudos
Companhia de Cabinda	Cabinda	Capital: 40 million escudos
Sociedade Agrícola do Lucala	Cuanza North	Capital: 18 million escudos. It has 4,500 hectares of coffee and other plantations. The company is part of a group known as Organizações Chibera, which is also owner of sugar plantations at Bom Jesus
Companhia do Ambriz S.A.R.L.		Capital: 11.5 million. This company was also a cotton concessionaire
Sociedade Cafeicultora Soual	Luanda	Capital: 10 million escudos
Sociedade Agrícola do Encoge-Micula Mário Cunha	Luanda	Capital: 10 million escudos. The company has 1.5 million coffee trees which were reported to produce 500-600 tons of coffee annually. It also owns palm and banana plantations. Total operations in 1960 amounted to 21.5 million escudos
Mário Cunha	Novo Redondo	Capital: 10 million escudos
Sociedade Algodoeira de Fomento Colonial (Textang)	Cuanza North	(See section D). The Sociedade Algodoeira de Fomento Colonial owns a controlling interest of 10 million escudos in the Cooperativa dos Produtores e Exportadores de Café
Sociedade Comercial e Agrícola Rimaga	Uíge	Capital: 4 million escudos. In 1960 the company's operations amounted to 67.9 million escudos, with 859,000 escudos profits; in 1961 its operations amounted to 66.7 million escudos and profits were 739,000 escudos. In 1963 operations dropped to 55.8 million escudos and the company reported a loss of 3.2 million escudos
Empresa Agro-Industrial de Angola (Emangola)	Cuanza North	Owns coffee and sisal plantations and cotton concessions

31. The Colonial Coffee Export Board (*Junta de Exportação do Café Colonial*)¹ reported that in 1941, out of a total of 23,742,262 kg. of coffee produced, African production accounted for 6,646,000 kg. or approximately 39 per cent of the total. Subsequently, with assistance, European production increased by 70 per cent in the next four years, and in 1945 amounted to 29,232,000 tons. In the same period African production increased only 27 per cent, and in 1945 accounted for only 28.5 per cent of the total. From 1945 to 1961, the proportion of African production remained between 25 and 30 per cent.

32. To encourage African coffee growers, the Governor-General in January 1956 issued an order which an African *indígena* who owned more than 3,000 coffee plants² was considered to be a coffee grower and was exempt from the labour requirement. The Coffee Export Board was made responsible for registered indigenous growers who either had more than 3,000 plants, or who had a coffee farm of more than one hectare in area. Africans meeting these conditions received what was known as a "título M/J". If, because of the quantity and value of the crop he produced, an African became liable to pay the tax on agricultural enterprises (*imposto sobre explorações*),³ he was then exempt from the annual personal tax levied on Africans. There are no statistics showing how many Africans were officially recognized as coffee growers as a result of those procedures. The number of Africans employed on coffee farms increased from 45,000 in 1954 to almost 90,000 in 1959. In 1965 it was reported that there were 130,000 Africans employed in coffee and 60,000 growers, each with an average of about 2 hectares.

¹ Ramos De Sousa, Angola, *Junta de Exportação do Café Colonial em Angola, Cinco Anos de Actividade* (Luanda, 1954).

² African growers usually plant some 1,500 coffee trees per hectare, as compared with approximately 1,000 trees per hectare on European plantations.

³ Also levied on livestock, forestry and fishing enterprises.

5 in Luanda, 1 in Cabinda, 50 in the Congo district (which has since been divided into Uíge and Zaire districts), 74 in Cuanza North, and 14 in Cuanza South. Apart from CADA the large companies growing coffee are the following:

Government regulation and controls

33. As reported in the previous paper on organization and controls, coffee as a major export crop earning foreign currency was also subject until 1961 to detailed government regulation and control through the Colonial Coffee Export Board (*Junta de Exportação do Café Colonial* (JEC)) which was set up in 1940 with headquarters in Lisbon (Decree 30,714, 29 August 1940). Under the authority of the Ministry for the Colonies as regards activities in the Territories and under the Ministry of Commerce and Industry as regards its activities in Portugal, the Board was responsible for: (a) production of coffee in all the Overseas Territories; (b) co-ordination and production and marketing through the regulation of prices and control over import and export quotas; (c) supplies for Portugal's domestic market; and (d) Portugal's external coffee policy.

34. In the Territories, the Board had the authority to promote or to restrict the production of coffee; to fix the price of purchase from indigenous growers and other prices relating to the various stages of marketing and exporting of coffee; and to regulate the quantities and quality of coffee exported to Portugal, the other Overseas Territories and foreign countries. It was responsible for grading coffee, for improving the quality produced, and for providing financial assistance to growers either directly or through private banks. In Territories where no special bodies had been established the Board was responsible for the regulation of coffee imports.

35. The Colonial Coffee Export Board was composed of a president and vice-president designated by the Minister for the Colonies, and three members, one representing colonial coffee exporters, one representing coffee importers in Portugal (designated by the *Grémio dos Armazenistas e Retalhistas de Mercadorias*) and one representing the Corporative Technical Council of Commerce and Industry. The Junta had its head-

quarters in Lisbon, but its main activities were in Angola where its local "delegation" (*delegação*) had a staff of over 150 persons in 1960. It also had local "delegations" in São Tomé and Cape Verde. The Colonial Coffee Export Board derived its revenue from: special taxes on exported coffee; import duties consisting of 6 centavos per/kg. on *Robusta* coffee, 25 centavos per/kg. and *Arabica* coffees and 25 centavos on foreign coffees; export duties; special allocations for coffee development; and fines and interest on initial capital. In 1959, the last year for which such data are available, the Coffee Export Board's receipts from levies on coffee in Angola was over 16 million escudos, and it received another 10 million escudos for the Coffee Propagation Fund. Its total operating budget was more than 58 million escudos.¹

36. The Board's functions in Portugal corresponded to those of an import regulatory commission (described in the paper on organization and Government policy). It was responsible for establishing the annual quotas of coffee to be supplied to Portugal from the Overseas Territories and from foreign sources; authorizing the export of coffee from Portugal; fixing consumer prices for all coffee (according to grade and type) in all national Territory, and regulating the coffee prices in industry and commerce in co-operation with the *Grémio dos Armazenistas e de Retalhistas de Mercadorias* (Grémio of Warehouse Owners and Retail Grocers).

37. In Portugal, coffee imported from the Overseas Territories had to be sold on the commodity market in Lisbon in accordance with the regulations and minimum prices set by the Board. Only those members of the *Grémio* of Warehouse Owners and Retail Grocers who dealt in coffee were permitted to buy coffee from the market and retail it. However, if there was any coffee left over on the commodity market, it was allocated among the grocers, who had to take up amounts in the same proportion as their annual estimated sales quotas.

38. Almost all of the coffee consumed in Portugal is imported from the Overseas Territories, with Angola supplying more than 90 per cent of the total. The quota of coffee that Angola exporters must ship to Portugal is set each year. In the 1940s exporters had to reserve 25 per cent of their coffee exports for Portugal, of which 50 per cent had to consist of first class coffee, 30 per cent of second class and 20 per cent of third class coffee. Since 1955, in order to increase exports of first class coffees to foreign destinations, Portugal's quota has been limited mainly to second and third class coffees. In 1958, for instance, exporters had to deliver to Portugal 5 per cent of their quota in the form of first class coffees, 15 per cent of the second class, and 25 per cent of the third class.

39. As with other agricultural products of the Overseas Territories (e.g. cotton), the price of Angolan coffee for Portugal was fixed for many years at a level considerably below world market prices and often also below the Angolan F.O.B. prices for exports to other countries. In 1954-1955, for instance, when international coffee prices were at an all-time high, the price quoted on foreign markets for first class Ambriz coffee being 475 escudos per 15 kg., the price in Lisbon was only 300 escudos, which was 10 per cent lower than the f.o.b. price in Angola, and 37 per cent lower than the foreign market price. In recent years, however, coffee for domestic consumption in Portugal has been sold on the Lisbon market subject only to a maximum price.

40. Under the regulations promulgated in 1941 (Decree 31,221, 16 April) all European coffee producers in the Overseas Territories and traders (exporters, re-exporters and consigners) of Portuguese or colonial coffees, as well as all enterprises concerned with import, wholesale and distribution of coffee had to register with the Coffee Export Board. Registration fees were 1,000 escudos for exporters; 2,500 escudos for producer-exporters; 250 escudos for producers who were not exporters and 100 escudos for all others in retail activities. In addition to the Board itself, only registered European producers and traders were permitted to export coffee from the Territories or import coffee into Portugal. The Board

could however, with the approval of the two Ministries concerned (see para. 33 above), temporarily suspend all exports by private concerns and become the sole agent for such activities (Decree Law 30,715, article 5).

41. One of the special tasks of the Coffee Export Board was to determine officially the areas to be recognized as African coffee lands and register Africans who qualified as African coffee growers (see para. 32 above). In the 1940s special teams or *brigadas cafeícolas* were established by the Board which went from village to village to count the number of coffee trees and register the African growers who either cultivated a minimum area or grew a minimum number of coffee plants. As a general rule the Board did not recognize as coffee growers those who merely grew some coffee on widely separated plots, an African coffee grower being defined as one to whom the Board assigned, under an agreement, a piece of land of a certain size on which he had to grow coffee and other approved crops so that the land provided a living. A recognized coffee grower was given a card certifying him as such; this exempted him from recruitment and guaranteed his remaining on the land and also entitled him to technical and financial assistance from the Board.

42. Among its other powers, the Board was authorized to occupy any State lands when necessary for carrying out its functions, or for the purpose of establishing demonstration farms. It also raised and distributed coffee plants, distributed insecticides and fertilizers and provided technical advisory services to coffee growers.

43. Although the actual production and trading of coffee remained in the hands of private enterprise, in effect, through the Colonial Coffee Export Board, the Government controlled all coffee trading activities in the Territories. Each year the Board fixed the minimum export prices (both f.o.b. Angola and c.i.f. Lisbon) for different grades of coffee, taking into account domestic and foreign production, internal consumption needs and conditions of the world market.

44. As a general rule, the Coffee Export Board only fixed the minimum prices, and exporters were allowed to sell to foreign countries at whatever price they could obtain, provided it was not below the minimum. In practice, since the fixed export prices of coffee supplied to Portugal were usually set at a discount, exporters usually had to obtain a better price than the minimum set by the Board for their foreign exports in order to cover the difference.

45. Apart from its regulatory functions the Colonial Coffee Export Board also assumed the functions of a marketing board in order to help producers. In 1960, when world coffee prices dropped to a new low, the Board instituted a system of warrants under which growers, while retaining title to the coffee, were paid up to 70 per cent of the export value of coffee they delivered for storage in special warehouses (Decree 42,693, 2 December 1959, and Angola, Order 11,305, 3 August 1960). For this purpose the Board contracted a loan of 50 million escudos from the Bank of Angola (Legislative Instrument 3,057, 17 August 1960). In 1961, following the uprising in northern Angola which affected almost the entire coffee growing region, in order to provide coffee growers with ready cash and to ensure continued exports, the Board borrowed 150 million escudos from the Bank of Angola to make direct purchases of coffee (Ministerial Legislative Instrument No. 1, 1 April 1961). To prevent exporters from selling below the official minimum, heavy fines were imposed for such violations. Temporary measures were introduced whereby exporters who failed to fill their export quotas for two successive months could be removed from the register, and if they did not deliver their foreign earnings to the Exchange Board they could lose their export quotas. A special consultative group of local exporters and producers was established to advise the Board on these matters and the annual registration of new exporters was limited to half the vacancies resulting from withdrawals.

46. In August 1961, the Colonial Coffee Export Board was replaced by the Coffee Institute, with headquarters in Angola (Decree 43,874 and 43,877, 24 August). The Coffee Institute, like that for cotton, is purely a territorial body and it has

¹ Nunes Barata, "Localização da Sede dos Organismos de Coordenação Económica no Ultramar", *Estudos de Ciências Políticas e Sociais*, No. 54 (Lisbon 1961), pp. 70-73.

no functions concerning the import and sales of coffee in Portugal where an inter-ministerial committee has been established to co-ordinate general policy, to assume responsibility for general controls and over matters pertaining to the International Coffee Agreement. This committee comprises one member representing the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, two members representing the Secretary of State for Commerce, and one member representing the Overseas Investigations Board (*Junta de Investigações do Ultramar*). It is responsible for deciding on the amount of coffee to be supplied to Portugal each year, for fixing the consumer prices of overseas coffee in Portugal, as well as the prices to industry and the trade.

47. The Institute is in charge of a director and a deputy director, appointed by the Minister of the Overseas Territories. They must have received higher education in fields related to the work of the Institute. The Institute also has a general council, which comprises, the director and deputy director, and three other members representing interests of the producing and export sectors and the economic services of the Territory.

48. As an economic co-ordinating body, the Institute is required to supervise coffee production, with a view to improving the quality and regulating production so as to meet the needs for economic development and equilibrium. It is responsible for: (a) regulating coffee trade and prices within the Territory to ensure a fair share of profits to producers and traders and to maintain the Territory's "economic equilibrium"; (b) protecting and advancing the economic and social welfare of small producers and promoting organizations such as producers co-operatives; (c) grading coffee for export, fixing export prices and assigning quotas for different grades of coffee to each exporter; and (d) providing improved seeds, insecticides, tools and other services to producers to increase the level of productivity.

49. Whereas previously only European producers were registered with the Coffee Export Board under the regulations of the Coffee Institute (Angola, Order 13,112, 1 February 1964), all producers whose farms (*lavouras*) exceed one hectare now have to register. Registration fees for coffee growers have been lowered. For growers with one to five hectares no fee is charged; for those with six to ten hectares the fee is 25 escudos; from eleven to twenty hectares, 50 escudos and above twenty hectares it is 250 escudos. Each year all growers must report their production to the Institute.

50. All exporters and traders are required to register with the Institute and to revalidate their status annually. The registration fee is 1,000 escudos. In addition to the Institute itself only registered traders and exporters may engage in such activities. Under a new provision, co-operative societies of producers, or other types of associations of producers, are exempt from payment of the registration fee.

51. In order to ensure uniform quality, all coffee destined for export has to pass through the Institute's warehouses where it is examined, its grading is checked and a certificate is then issued for export. As before, minimum export prices of different grades of coffee are established by the Governor-General on the advice of the Institute and published from time to time.

52. Exporters must comply with regulations and other measures established by the Institute and infractions are subject to penalties. Traders who export coffee below the established minimum prices are fined not less than half the value of the total transaction. The amount of the fine depends on the gravity of the infraction and the effect on the internal and external markets; the volume of the transaction and whether the act was to the benefit of foreign interests or detrimental to the economy of the Territory.

Production, exports and destination of exports

53. Coffee production in Angola has increased steadily over the past twenty-five years. Since 1955, however, Angola's production has increased more rapidly than the world output, and as a result, Angola's share in world production rose from 2.61 per cent in the period 1955-1959 to 4.54 per cent in 1963.

54. Traditionally most of the coffee produced in Angola has been exported. The volume of annual exports has increased

with production, rising from an average of 22,463 tons in the period 1941-1945 to 78,546 tons in the period 1956-1960. Since then exports have almost doubled, reaching 136,000 tons in 1963.

55. Since the early 1950's the United States of America has been the principal buyer of Angolan coffee. Over the past ten years, average annual purchases by the United States have accounted for more than half of the total exports, and in 1964 were valued at more than \$US50 million. The Netherlands accounts for an average ranging between 7 and 12 per cent. In 1964, the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany and Belgium with Luxembourg together account for about 12 per cent (table 4).

The economic role of coffee

56. Before the Second World War, over 40 per cent of Angola's visible exports (by value) went to Portugal which in turn supplied the same proportion of the Territory's visible imports. At that time, sugar, nearly all of which went to Portugal (see section C below) held the first place in value of the Territory's exports. In the post-war period, coffee has far outstripped all other exports in importance, accounting for an average of 35-40 per cent of the combined value of exports in the period 1956-1961 and almost 50 per cent in 1964 (see table 18).

57. The growing importance of coffee as its major export has changed the pattern of the Territory's external trade by orienting it more towards the United States of America and European countries other than Portugal. In 1963, for instance, by value 22.3 per cent of Angola's exports went to Portugal, 47.4 per cent to Western European countries and 19.5 per cent to the United States. This has made Angola an important source of foreign exchange. As most of the foreign exchange is retained in Portugal through the exchange control regulation in force, Angola's coffee makes a substantial contribution to Portugal's balance of payments outside the escudo zone.

58. Initially in 1931 (Decree 19,773) when the Exchange Fund was first established, 75 per cent of the value of goods exported to foreign countries had to be paid into the Fund. The same regulations applied to goods exported to Portugal since the local currency of Angola, theoretically on par with the metropolitan escudo, was not (and is not now) freely convertible. In 1932 (Decree 20,694) the proportion was raised to 90 per cent. Although there are no details as to the exact foreign currency earnings from coffee, data published in 1960 showed that between 1948 and 1957 Angola's exports amounted to 27 million contos, of which the equivalent of 18.3 million contos (\$US600 million) were paid into the Exchange Fund.¹

59. Apart from the ordinary export duties,² coffee has also been subject to various taxes from time to time. Since 1936 (Decree 27,294, 30 November) there has been a 1.5 per cent *ad valorem* duty on coffee for the Angola Development Fund, and after 1952 coffee became subject to a tax (*imposto de sobrevalorização*) based on the increase in value over the 1949 level. This tax is set each month by the Customs Technical Council and varies with the world prices; it also varies according to destination. In July 1960, for instance, for first class *Arabica* coffee the special tax (*imposto de sobrevalorização*) on 15 kg. was 36 escudos when exported to foreign countries, 54.70 for exports to other Territories and 34.5 to Portugal. For *Robusta* coffee from Cazengo it was 8.8 escudos, 20.60 escudos and 6.5 escudos respectively.

60. In 1957 (Order 16,396, 2 September 1957) the surtaxes on exports of coffee were altered to encourage more exports of first quality coffees. The new rates established were 9.5 per cent *ad valorem* for first class coffee; 11.5 per cent for second class coffee; and 15.5 per cent for third class coffee and coffees for industrial use. In addition there was a surtax of 10 centavos per kilogramme levied on all coffees which went into a special Coffee Propagation Fund.

¹ "A Questão Cambial", *Actividade Económica de Angola*, Jan./Aug. 1961, p. 85.

² In 1956, the normal export tariff was 1 per cent *ad valorem* plus 11.5 per cent *ad valorem* surtax for coffee exported to foreign ports; for coffee exported to Portugal the normal duty was 8 per cent *ad valorem*.

61. Following the establishment of the Coffee Institute, the Coffee Propagation Fund was renamed the Coffee Development and Propagation Fund and placed under the Institute to provide the Fund with more revenue, the customs paid it 20 centavos per each kilogramme of third class coffee exported (Order 18,729, 15 September 1961).

62. In 1962 (Legislative Instrument 3,326, 31 December 1962) a further 25 centavos per kilogramme tax was levied on coffee to provide revenue for the Civil Defence and Volunteer Corp. Because of the continued drop in coffee prices, in 1963 (Legislative Instrument 3,334, 26 January 1963), all coffee below first and second qualities was exempted from the surtax as well as from the 1.5 per cent Development Fund tax and the 10 centavos Coffee Propagation Fund tax. Nevertheless, for 1963, revenue from the special taxes on coffee (excluding the normal export duty) totalled more than 100 million escudos (\$US2.5 million), which included 14 million escudos from the 10 centavos surtax, 27 million escudos from the special 1.5 per cent *ad valorem* tax, 21.4 million escudos from the *sobrevalorização* tax, and over 39 million escudos from the 25 centavos tax for the Civil Defence and Volunteer Corp. When coffee prices were at their peak in the mid 1950s, the territorial revenue from the *sobrevalorização* tax alone averaged some 80 million escudos annually.

63. Part of the revenue derived from coffee is used for the ordinary operating expenses of the regulatory body. In 1965, the Coffee Institute of Angola had a total budget of 635 million escudos. Of this amount, its ordinary revenue was 52.4 million escudos, comprising 4.4 million from the previous budgetary year, 1 million escudos from the customs refund of 20 centavos per kilogramme third class coffee and 12 million escudos from other statutory levies on coffee. Extraordinary receipts totalling 583 million escudos include 300 million escudos from sales of coffee, a loan of 200 million escudos and coffee warrants valued at 80 million escudos.

64. More than any other single development coffee, as a new source of wealth, has attracted increasing numbers of Portuguese settlers to Angola. Census figures show that during the ten-year period 1950-1960, the European population increased by over 100,000. In Uíge district it increased by 569 per cent, in Cuanza North by 230 per cent, in Cuanza South by 211 per cent and in Benguela by 119 per cent. From 1956 to 1962 the number of coffee farmers increased from 638 to over 2,000. More significantly, as described previously (A/6000/Rev.1, chap. V, annex II), in this period large areas of land were conceded to non-African interests in the major coffee growing regions: 157,000 hectares in Cuanza North, 113,000 in Cuanza South and 146,000 in the former Congo district. In addition, over 100,000 hectares of concessions were granted in the district of Luanda. Some of the government sponsored new settlements are based on coffee as the major cash crop. These include settlements at Loge Valley, Banga (with settlers from Cape Verde) and Balongongo. As will be seen below, coffee has made it possible for Portuguese settlers in Angola to earn a much higher income than the average farmer in Portugal. Coffee has also contributed to the earnings of absentee estate owners and shareholders in coffee companies. Coffee profits are reported to have contributed, for instance, to real estate development in Lisbon, including much of the construction along the Avenida de Roma, one of the modern arteries of the city.¹

65. There are various estimates of the average income from coffee. In 1957, the net income per acre under normal conditions of coffee growing in the north was \$US30 per acre or \$US75 per hectare at 1957 prices.² A Portuguese study published in 1957³ cited two different calculations of the cost of production per kilogramme of coffee. Assuming a capital cost

of 2,830 escudos per hectare, with an annual average production of 300 kg., the cost per/kg. was found to be 10.32 escudos comprised as follows: 4 escudos for labour, 32 centavos for hulling and preparation of coffee, 30 centavos for packaging and labelling, 4.85 escudos for salaries of European personnel, and 85 centavos representing interest on capital. In this calculation 80 per cent of the cost is for labour and presumably part of this is for the European farm owner himself. The other calculation arrived at an ex-farm cost of 8.4 escudos per kilogramme based on an assumption of an annual operation cost of 2,778 escudos per hectare.

66. In order to calculate the return to the producer and/or exporter, it is necessary to add the additional costs prior to export. Taking the lower estimate of costs ex-farm as a basis and adding the transportation cost of 60 centavos per/kg., the export tariff of 15.04 per cent *ad valorem* on market value and additional levies totalling 60 centavos per/kg., the f.o.b. Angola cost per/kg. became 15 escudos. At the 1957 average f.o.b. price of 19.7 escudos per/kg. the net profit would have been 5 escudos per/kg. or 2,000 escudos per hectare. For the average European farm owner with at least 100 hectares, the net income was 200,000 escudos, or approximately \$US7,000.

67. In 1964, the average export price per ton of coffee was 20,600 escudos, so that on European farms producing an average of 400 kg. per hectare, the gross income per hectare was 8,000 escudos or approximately \$US280. An average European farmer with 100 hectares of coffee under cultivation would therefore have an annual gross income of \$US28,000. As already noted above, in 1963 almost three quarters of the European coffee farms had 100 hectares or more under cultivation. At the average export price of 20,600 escudos, for a company such as CADA exporting 10,000 tons, its gross income from coffee alone would amount to over 200 million escudos or about \$US65 million. CADA's net profits in 1964 from all operations was 39.6 million escudos and dividends paid out amounted to 28.5 million escudos.

68. According to figures published in 1965, at Loge Valley the settler families each received an income of 40,000 escudos from coffee alone and at Balongongo, 20,000 escudos.⁴

69. For Africans coffee has opened up a new, though not unlimited, source of income since even under the new land concession legislation (see A/6000/Rev.1, chap V, annex II) Africans living in the *regedorias* cannot own land on the same basis as Europeans, and moreover, they generally cannot export their produce themselves⁵ but have to sell to trader-exporters in supervised rural markets. According to a Portuguese source, in 1965 African coffee growers received an average gross return of 5,000 escudos per hectare when the price paid was 10 escudos per kilogramme.⁶ This figure seems high as most Portuguese writers estimate that Africans produce an average of 350 kg of coffee per hectare, and the price Africans receive for their coffee depends on the quality, size and grade of the coffee beans they market, and on the price paid by the trade-exporters.

Recent developments

70. Since 1958 Portugal has been a party to the International Coffee Agreement which includes thirty-two exporter countries covering 95 per cent of the world *Robusta* coffee output, and twenty-two importers covering 94 per cent of world consumption. The basic total world quota is fixed at 45,898,183 sacks⁷ (2.85 million tons) and Angola's basic quota is 4.77 per cent, i.e., 2,188,648 sacks. As a developing country, Angola's quota since 1962 has increased slightly each year, rising from 1,904,678 sacks in 1961-1962 to 2,045,213 sacks in 1964-1965 and to 2,064,127 in 1965-1966. With the

¹ Irene S. Donegan, "Coffee Trade, Coffee regions and Coffee ports in Angola", *Economic Geography*, vol. 37, No. 4 (October 1961), p. 36.

² *Ibid.* Information provided by the head of the Colonial Coffee Export Board's Experimental Station at Carmona.

³ "Aspectos económicos da cafeicultura angolana", *Revista Portuguesa do Café*, No. 13 (March 1957), quoted in Alfredo de Sousa: "Ensaio de análise económica do café", *Estudos de Ciências Políticas e Sociais*, No. 17 (1960).

⁴ *Actualidade Económica de Angola*, 7 October 1965.

⁵ This is because Africans usually cannot meet the requirements to register as exporters. Most of them, also do not produce more than one ton of coffee whereas in the 1965-1966 season, for instance, the Coffee Institute decided to issue export quotas only to those whose deliveries were expected to total more than 150 tons or 2,500 sacks.

⁶ *Boletim Geral do Ultramar*, June 1965, p. 219.

⁷ 60 kg. each.

exception of the last year, Angola's exports to traditional markets have exceeded its quota and at the same time additional amounts have been sold in "new" markets, i.e., markets not covered by the Agreement, which still hold potential for expansion. In 1965, for instance, Portugal concluded an agreement with South Africa increasing Angolan coffee exports from 300 to 3,500 tons annually to replace the *Robusta* coffees which South Africa had formerly imported from Uganda.

71. According to recent information, Angola's 1966-1967 production is expected to reach 3,100,000 sacks. As its quota is 2,214,000 sacks, after deducting its own consumption (50,000 sacks), its exports to Portugal (300,00 sacks) and exports to the other Overseas Territories (10,000 sacks),^a it will have a surplus of 526,000 sacks. Because of this

^a Because Portugal is party to the International Coffee Agreement, its own consumption and exports to the other Territories under Portuguese administration are not charged against Angola's quota.

anticipated surplus, in January 1966 the Government introduced measures (Legislative Instrument 3,606) granting tariff rebates in respect of second quality and unspecified coffee exported to new markets. The still increasing output has also given further impetus to the establishment of a soluble coffee industry. The Sociedade Comercial e Agrícola Maria Celeste which was authorized in 1963 to establish a soluble coffee factory capable of processing 10,000 tons of green coffee annually (equivalent to a production of 2,740 tons of soluble coffee), was reported in 1965 to be seeking investment from United States coffee interests.

72. While coffee has brought increased prosperity to the Territory, it has also created problems. One of the most serious results due to the over concentration on coffee has been the decline in production of important food crops, traditionally grown by Africans. Some measures were introduced in 1965 with a view to stimulating increased production from the traditional sector; and early in 1966 (Legislative Instrument 3,623, 7 February) the Government decided to prohibit the planting of new areas with *Robusta* coffee.

TABLE 2. ANGOLA: COFFEE PRODUCTION

Year	Number of European growers	Number of indigenous employed by Europeans	Total area cultivated	Output				
				Quantity (tons)			Distribution	
				Total	Europeans	African	Percentage European	Percentage Africans
1954	418	44,773	258,047	44,723	30,971	13,752	69.25	30.75
1955	597	54,583	197,517	68,565	49,640	18,925	72.40	27.60
1956	638	85,467	251,671	84,893	63,200	21,693	74.45	25.55
1957	1,490	90,883	255,646	78,016	58,080	19,936	74.45	25.55
1958	1,679	86,360	257,962	87,993	65,772	22,221	74.45	25.55
1959	2,012	89,545	266,185	97,307
1960	90,000	378,050	168,552
1961	90,000	420,003	168,558

SOURCE: Angola, *Anuário Estatístico*, 1954-1962. The 1962 volume repeats the data for 1959.

TABLE 3. ANGOLA: GROWTH OF COFFEE PRODUCTION IN MAIN DISTRICTS, 1955 AND 1960

	1955				1960			
	Area		Yield		Area		Yield	
	Hectares	Per cent	Tons	Per cent	Hectares	Per cent	Tons	Per cent
Territory total	197,517	100	68,565	100	378,050	100	160,000	100
Uige ^a	57,143	29	20,000	29	93,682	25	30,800	19
Cuanza North	91,428	46	32,000	47	128,148	34	50,100	31
Cuanza South	40,043	20	14,000	20	125,272	33	74,600	47
TOTAL OF THREE DISTRICTS	188,614	95	66,000	96	347,122	92	155,500	97

^a The data for 1955 are for the Congo district, which then comprised the present Uige and Zaire districts.

TABLE 4. ANGOLA—COFFEE: EXPORTS AND PRINCIPAL DESTINATIONS, 1955-1964

Year	Total exports			Destinations						
	Value			Portugal		United States	Netherlands	Fed. Rep. of Germany	Belgium-Luxembourg	United Kingdom
	Quantity (thousand tons)	Million escudos	Percentage of total exports	Tons	Per cent	(per cent)	(per cent)	(per cent)	(per cent)	(per cent)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
1955	37.0	856	30.50	3,282	8.88	67.07	14.56	1.43	1.13	1.31
1956	66.5	1,243	37.78	4,452	6.69	45.92	20.42	1.69	2.94	0.40
1957	72.2	1,421	42.24	7,164	9.92	58.95	17.85	1.51	2.48	0.54
1958	77.3	1,506	40.82	13,073	16.91	52.55	20.23	0.97	2.22	1.57
1959	89.0	1,388	38.68	9,710	10.91	59.66	20.24	1.65	1.98	0.90
1960	87.2	1,264	35.45	12,200	13.99	52.19	21.16	2.09	1.71	0.82
1961	118.1	1,399	36.10	13,882	11.75	55.54	23.35	2.69	1.75	0.30
1962	156.9	1,864	43.71	11,997	7.65	54.67	20.45	3.68	3.06	1.65
1963	136.4	1,895	40.45	14,485	10.62	44.33	25.66	4.71	4.75	1.07
1964	138.7	2,859	48.73	8,682	6.62	52.97	21.53	3.45	2.51	6.06

SOURCE: All data for 1955-1963 except column (3): Angola: *Comércio Externo*. Column (3) and 1964: Banco de Angola: *Relatório e Contas* (1961 and 1964).

B. Sisal

General

73. Sisal is one of Angola's two most valuable export crops. It first gained importance around 1929 when exports totalled 569 tons. Production increased through the 1930's and by the early 1940's annual exports were around 4,000 tons. Since 1944 there has been a sharp rise in production and sisal, which once ranked below maize, sugar, coffee and beans, now holds second place among the Territory's export crops. In 1963 Angola was the fourth producer of world sisal with exports of some 62,000 tons valued at 476 million escudos or about 12 per cent of the Territory's total visible exports. In 1965 Angola ranked third among world producers after Tanzania and Brazil.

74. The main sisal growing areas are on the Benguela plateau, and especially at Ganda and Cubal along the Benguela railway. Sisal is also grown near the lower reaches of the Catumbela River, in the *Bocóio concelho*, at Quibala and Gabela and also at Libolo and Calulo in Cuanza South district. Between 65-75 per cent of all production is from the Benguela district.

75. The average life of the sisal plant *agave sisalana peruviana* is about eight years. In some years the area harvested has reached about 80 per cent of that cultivated, but it is usually less. The sisal plant produces about fifty leaves weighing about 1 kilo each, with a 3 per cent fibre content. The fibre yield in main producing countries is about 1 ton per hectare, but in Angola the average has been until recently less than half a ton per hectare due to insufficient replanting. In addition to the fibre the other products are sisal tow and sisal residues all of which are exported.

Organization of production

76. In Angola, sisal is grown exclusively on European-owned plantations, which require substantial investments in equipment, including transport of the sisal to the factory. From 1930 onwards, British and German interests were mainly responsible for developing the sisal industry. During the period 1949-1953, when world prices were high, sisal growers enjoyed a measure of prosperity and were able to pay off previous debts and invest their profits in new equipment and further expansion. By 1957, however, as sisal prices had dropped to 4.09 escudos per kilogramme from the 1951 high of 14.51 escudos per kilogramme, most of the sisal plantations were again operating at a loss.

77. In 1960 there were some 170 growers, with 100,500 hectares of sisal plantations of which 51,307 hectares were in production. Total investment in the plantations and decorticating plants was estimated to be over 1,000 million escudos (Order 10,058, Angola *Boletim Oficial*, 2 January 1958) with about half of this in the Benguela district alone. About 47 per cent of the sisal growers are located in the Ganda *concelho* and have 57 per cent of the total area under cultivation. Of the rest of the sisal producers, eleven are in the Huíla district, twelve in Bié, eight in Zaire and Uíge (former Congo district) and ten in Malanje, and the plantations vary from 100 to 2,000 hectares in size. In 1965 there were 200 growers with 125,000 hectares of sisal plantations, employing some 25,000 workers.

78. Little is known of the various sisal producing companies. Among the large agricultural companies which also have sisal plantations are (a) Sociedade Agrícola do Cassequele with about 7,500 hectares; (b) Companhia do Açúcar de Angola S.A.R.L. (CAA) with 7,000 hectares; and (c) Empresa Agro-Industrial de Angola (EMANGOLA).

79. Up to 1965 the only sisal processing in the Territory consisted of drying and decortication. In Angola, an area of 500 hectares is generally considered to be the smallest economic unit for such purposes and most plantations have factories. Producers who do not own factories sell their sisal to others for processing. The number of decorticating factories increased from 69 in 1955 to 115 in 1961, and the amount of capital invested in these factories from 71.9 million to 150.6

million escudos. About 70 per cent of the factories are located in the Benguela district. In 1959 there were four in Luanda, five in Cuanza North, eleven in Cuanza South, three in Malanje, seventy in Benguela, four in Huíla and one each in Bié, Moxico and Huambo. There are no details on the nationality of ownership, however.

80. The processing factories vary in size; most are in the capacity range of 300 kg to four tons per eight hours. The larger plants generally employ between 50 and 100 Africans with several European personnel. The registered capital of these companies varies from 500,000 to 3 or 4 million escudos.

Government regulation and controls

81. Except for regulating f.o.b. prices, export duties and other taxes, in the past there have been no special measures for the control of sisal production and export. Although officially fixed f.o.b. export prices have generally followed the world market trends, no stabilization measures have been introduced.

82. Exports of sisal are subject to: (a) a normal 1 per cent *ad valorem* export duty; (b) a 5 per cent *ad valorem* surtax under the 1948 provisions (Decree 37,214, December); and (c) a special tax of 5 centavos per kilogramme for the development fund established in 1936 (Decree 24,294, 30 November 1936). Unlike the larger mining companies which enjoy tax privileges, sisal plantations and factories also pay the *imposto sobre explorações*^{*} and a complementary tax on income (*imposto complementar*).

83. The combined effect of the three levies on exports resulted in a tax burden on sisal producers that was in inverse proportion to the export price: it amounted to 7 per cent at a price of 5 escudos/kg., 6.7 per cent at 7 escudos/kg. and 6.5 per cent at 10 escudos/kg. In normal times this system was intended to encourage production for export of the better grades (as in the case of the revised coffee tariffs described above). However, the system is complicated by the fact that export levies on sisal are based on an official customs value (*valores aduaneiros*) fixed each month by the customs authorities, while the actual f.o.b. prices are set by the External Trade Board and revised every few days to keep pace with world market conditions. When f.o.b. prices drop below the monthly fixed export values, the export levies become higher than the market prices warrant; on the other hand, when the f.o.b. prices rise above the export values, it is the exporters who benefit. Thus the whole system penalizes the producer in a falling market instead of helping him.

84. With the fluctuation of world sisal prices the Government has on different occasions adjusted the export levies on sisal to provide relief to producers and exporters. In 1953, for instance, the various levies on sisal were adjusted in such a way as to provide the greatest relief for sisal exported at a price below 5 escudos/kg. by making it exempt from all levies whatsoever (Decree 39,409, 30 October). At this price the tax relief amounted to 350 escudos per ton. For sisal prices between 5 and 6 escudos exporters were exempted from the special development tax of 5 centavos per kilogramme. Thus at a price of 6 escudos/kg., an exporter paid only the 1 per cent *ad valorem* export duty. At prices over 6 but not exceeding 7 escudos the exporter paid the 1 per cent *ad valorem*, the 5 centavo tax, and the *ad valorem* surtax on a sliding scale. The effect of this was that at 7 escudos/kg. an exporter received a tax reduction of 70 escudos from the total of 470 escudos per ton which he would otherwise have had to pay.

85. By 1955 these measures were inadequate and all export levies on sisal in both Angola and Mozambique were suspended until prices improved (Decree 40,104, 24 March). Then in 1958, as a special measure in Angola the *imposto sobre explorações* and the complementary tax on sisal income was reduced by 75 per cent.

^{*} See foot-note h above.

SISAL: AVERAGE F.O.B. PRICES OF EXPORTS

Year	Price	Year	Price
1950	8.96	1958	4.13
1951	14.51	1959	5.40
1952	10.87	1960	6.48
1953	5.83	1961	5.36
1954	5.36	1962	5.91
1955	4.79	1963	9.21
1956	4.90	1964	8.32
1957	4.09	1965	5.0-5.25

86. In 1961 (Decree 43,566, 28 March) sisal levies were again revised; the 5 centavo development fund tax was suspended, various exemptions were provided for prices under 7.40 escudos, and as before sisal exported at less than 5 escudos/kg. was exempt from all duties and taxes. However, in 1962 (Legislative Instrument 3,326, 31 December 1962) a special tax of 15 centavos per kilogramme was placed on sisal exports to provide revenue for the newly created Civil Defence and Volunteer Corp. It has been calculated that on 100 tons of third quality sisal exported at 5.15 escudos/kg., export duties were 5,900 escudos and the defence tax was 15,000 escudos. At the 1965 prices, a sisal producer exporting 1,500 tons had to pay 225,000 escudos in defence tax for the Civil Defence and Volunteer Corp and, if his profits exceeded 1 million escudos, he had to pay a further 32,000 escudos under the excess profits defence tax on companies (see chap. V, para. 104). With an average yield of 400 kg. per hectare, net returns of sisal were estimated to vary between 15 and 30 per cent of costs, or an average of some 660 escudos (\$US23.00) per ton, after paying all taxes and duties. Net income per ton to producers paying the excess profits tax was 20 escudos less.

87. In November 1965 the 15 centavo defence tax on sisal was abolished and further adjustments made in the export levies following the same pattern as the 1953 measures described above; furthermore, the price at which sisal became exempt from all export levies was raised to 6 escudos.

Production, exports and local consumption

88. Between 1940 and 1950 sisal exports increased from 4,358 tons to 20,644 tons. In the next five years exports doubled and by 1960 were almost 58,000 tons, representing 15.4 per cent of the sisal output of Africa, and 7.4 per cent of the world output. In 1962 exports reached 69,000 tons but have since declined and were only 58,000 tons in 1964 (see table 5).

89. Until very recently almost all the sisal fibre, tow and waste was exported. In the 1940's the United States, France and Belgium were the main clients, but since the mid 1950s Portugal has replaced them. In 1964 it accounted for almost 29,000 tons of sisal or about half of the total exported. The next most important client in 1964 was the Netherlands, accounting for 13.4 per cent (see table 5).

90. Since 1964 there has been an increased demand for sisal as a result of new uses including packing hay in bundles instead of storing it in bulk. In 1965 a sisal rope factory COFIANG (Companhia de Fiação e Cordoaria de Angola, S.A.R.L.) was established in the Benguela district, through the initiative of fifteen sisal producers. The company has an initial registered capital of 30 million escudos and is authorized to increase this to 60 million escudos. The company is expected to employ some 500 persons and have an output of various types of industrial ropes to a total of 3 million contos. The sisal rope section is expected to absorb 30 per cent of the district's sisal production and up to 50 per cent after two years.

TABLE 5. ANGOLA—SISAL: EXPORTS AND PRINCIPAL DESTINATIONS 1955-1964

Year	Exports			Main destinations						
	Thousand tons	Million escudos	Percentage of total export value	Portugal		Federal Republic of Germany (per cent)	Belgium-Luxembourg (per cent)	United States (per cent)	France (per cent)	Netherlands (per cent)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	Tons	Per cent	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
1955	40.7	195.2	6.96	3,712	9.12	16.01	7.92	4.16	27.57	9.50
1956	37.3	182.6	5.55	6,677	17.90	7.82	4.95	1.46	37.14	7.56
1957	46.4	190.0	5.65	7,917	17.06	10.31	2.91	7.54	35.56	3.51
1958	51.9	214.0	5.80	10,927	21.05	11.82	2.40	4.25	38.04	3.85
1959	53.5	289.6	8.07	13,186	24.65	8.91	2.65	8.50	22.48	4.01
1960	57.9	375.5	10.53	21,000	36.27	6.76	1.86	1.32	13.71	5.16
1961	58.9	316.1	8.16	21,122	35.86	4.67	1.57	7.88	6.90	6.28
1962	68.9	408.3	9.58	37,249	54.06	3.04	1.23	2.00	4.36	5.81
1963	62.0	577.5	12.33	25,526	41.17	...	3.46	...	9.97	15.27
1964	57.2	479.1	8.17	28,660	50.11	...	4.57	...	4.80	13.62

SOURCES: Figures for 1963 and 1964 are from Banco de Angola: *Relatório e Contas*, 1964. All other data Angola: *Anuário Estatístico*, 1962.

*C. Sugar**General*

91. Sugar was introduced into Angola in the sixteenth century from Iran and China, and until the end of the nineteenth century was grown in the Territory mainly to produce alcohol. New investments in sugar plantations from Portuguese and foreign sources were made in Angola at the beginning of the twentieth century after sugar from the Overseas Territories was given preferential treatment and a guaranteed market in Portugal.

92. From 1930 onwards Angola's sugar production increased more rapidly, rising from 11,000 tons to 52,000 tons by 1945. During this period Angola supplied about 50 per cent of Portugal's sugar consumption and sugar ranked as one of the Territory's main exports, accounting for about one eighth of their total value. Between 1945 and 1955, Angola's sugar production remained at some 50,000 tons annually, but has gradually increased in recent years. However, sugar is no

longer an important export. In 1963 it accounted for less than 2 per cent of the total value of visible exports; out of 68,000 tons of sugar produced in Angola, 42,000 tons were retained for domestic consumption, and only 18,000 tons went to Portugal, accounting for approximately 20 per cent of that country's sugar consumption.

93. Most of the sugar cane grown in Angola is a hybrid type of the Java variety. The main sugar plantations are located along the banks of the Dande River near Caixito, the Cuanza River near Catete, the Quissol region in southern Malanje the Catumbela e Cavaco and the Coporola Rivers in Benguela.

Organization of production

94. In Angola, sugar is produced only on factory owned plantations. Because of the large capital required, production has remained principally in the hands of three European owned multi-activity companies, the Companhia do Açúcar

de Angola, the Sociedade Agrícola de Cassequel and the Sociedade de Comércio e Construções. There is also a small sugar factory with its own plantations at Quissol. In 1958 a licence was granted for the establishment of another sugar factory and plantation in Cuanza Sul which, however, never came into operation.

95. The area of sugar plantations, which was just under 11,000 hectares in 1953, (of which 8,700 hectares were fully producing), has not increased in the last decade. Lack of capital and manpower are reported to have restricted expansion, so that, instead, the companies have concentrated on increasing yields. In 1960-1961 the average sugar production was about 85 tons of cane per hectare, with a 5.8 tons/ha. yield of sugar. These yields are considered to be low compared with Java's average production of 120 tons of cane per hectare some years ago. Some Angolan authorities consider that higher yields cannot be obtained in Angola under the existing system of spaced plantations and without the use of fertilizers.^u

96. In 1962 investment in sugar factories and plantations was reported to be 500 million escudos,^v of which about 290 million was in the five sugar factories and a new refinery built in 1958. The sugar companies employed 15,000 Africans and 370 Europeans in 1962.

(a) *Companhia do Açúcar de Angola, S.A.R.L. (CAA)*

97. The company as it is presently known dates back to 1920 when several smaller plantations were merged under the control of Antonio de Sousa Carneiro Lara (known as Sousa Lara) with an initial capital of 10 million escudos. By 1939 the company had a registered capital of 22.5 million escudos. In addition to 3,500 hectares of sugar plantations it also owned oil palm, sisal and cotton plantations and factories for processing oil seeds and sugar. In 1939 the company's operations yielded 8 million escudos in profits of which 5.6 million were distributed as dividends.

98. The company has its headquarters in Luanda. In 1960 its registered capital was 337.5 million escudos. It had 4,709 hectares of sugar plantations of which 2,410 hectares were at Dombe Grande in the Benguela district, and 2,299 hectares at Tentativa, Dande in the Malange district. The company produces about two fifths of the Territory's total output of sugar; in 1965 it produced 29,075 tons. The company also has 7,000 hectares of sisal plantations and 250,000 oil palms. To irrigate its plantations the company has built a large dam on the Dande River and another on the Coporolo. There are 65 major canals, 2,180 km. of secondary canals and 68 km. of drainage works. There are also 165 km. of plantation rail tracks, 15 locomotives and 980 wagons.

99. In 1960 the company employed 8,500 indigenous workers and 450 Europeans. It had four chapels, three hospitals and maternity clinics.

(b) *Sociedade Agrícola do Cassequel*

100. The Sociedade Agrícola do Cassequel, commonly known as Cassequel, has its headquarters and sugar factory near Catumbela, on the Benguela Railway line, thirteen miles from the port of Lobito. In 1960 the company had a registered capital of 175 million escudos. In addition to its Cassequel sugar plantations of 9,723 hectares, the company has plantations at Chimbóia in the Ganda *concelho* (10,730 hectares of sisal and coffee), Loge, in Ambriz *concelho* (8,778 hectares of oil palms), and in the Cavaca Valley (1,100 hectares of sugar.) It has a concession of 50,000 hectares at Chaimbambo in the Ganda *concelho* which is used for timber and cattle ranching. The company produces about 40,000 tons of sugar and 3 million litres of alcohol annually. It is the only concern licensed to produce alcohol.

101. Cassequel, as it now exists, was established in 1927 as a result of a merger of the Sociedade Agrícola de Ganda and the British financed Loge Sugar Company. When it first

started, it had a factory with an annual capacity of 12,000 tons of sugar. By 1929 Cassequel had a capital of £270,000 (21.6 million escudos) half of which was Portuguese owned and the other half owned by a Briton, Harry Winton, known as the sugar king of Madeira. The company's machinery was also British manufactured. It had 6,000 indigenous workers and had 5,000 hectares under production. According to a report of that period, sugar which would have taken two years to mature in Madeira only took eleven months in Angola.

102. The company has built a large dam at Catumbela to irrigate the plantations, on which most of the work is done mechanically. In 1962 it had 108 km. of plantation rail lines, servicing 1,302 wagonettes, 72 high-powered tractors and 59 ploughs, bulldozers, etc.

(c) *Sociedade de Comércio e Construções, S.A.R.L.*

103. This company has its headquarters at Bom Jesus in the Luanda district, where its sugar plantations and factory are located. The company is part of the Organizações Chibera, which comprises also the Sociedade Agrícola do Lucala (see above) and the Companhia de Benguela. Little is known of the ownership and history of the Sociedade de Comércio e Construções. The Bom Jesus sugar plantations, located on the banks of the Cuanza River, date back to the early part of this century and up to 1930 were part of the Companhia Angolana de Cazengo. In the mid-1950's new investments amounting to 25 million escudos were made to renew equipment. By 1956 the company had a registered capital of 60 million escudos which it was authorized to raise to 80 million escudos.

104. The Bom Jesus sugar plantations cover an area of 1,400 hectares. The factory capacity is 600 tons per 24 hours and its annual sugar output is around 300 tons.

(d) *Quissol*

105. The Quissol plantations are located about 15 miles from the town of Malanje in the Maianje district. The plantations also date back to the early part of the century and became the Fábrica Açucareira do Quissol in 1936 under the ownership of António do Couto Pinto. In 1954, the Fábrica became the Sociedade Agrícola do Quissol, S.A.R.L., by which name it is now known, with a registered capital of 15 million escudos. There appear to have been some changes in its organization and registered capital, which in 1961 was 18 million escudos.

Government regulation and controls^w

106. Under the legislation regulating sugar, Angola and Mozambique are guaranteed an equal share of Portugal's domestic market for sugar and each year are allocated quotas based on Portugal's requirements and the anticipated production. Up to 1945 Angola supplied an average of about 50 per cent of the sugar consumed in Portugal. Angola's yearly exports to Portugal, which averaged around 33,000 tons in the recent decade, have not kept pace with Portugal's rising consumption. The share supplied by Angola has dropped from 36 per cent in 1950 to 26 per cent in 1960, 20 per cent in 1963 and 14 per cent in 1964.

107. The Territory's quota is divided between the three larger companies taking into account their anticipated production. Each company is allowed to supply one third of its share in white sugar, with the balance in raw sugar.

108. Local wholesale and retail prices are officially fixed in harmony with the established c.i.f. Lisbon base price. From 1952 to 1963 when the c.i.f. Lisbon prices for white and raw sugar were fixed at 3.75 escudos and 2.85 escudos per kilo, retail prices in Luanda were 3.70 escudos and 3.00 escudos respectively. Following the increase in the c.i.f. Lisbon prices to 4.40 escudos per kilo for white sugar and 3.35 escudos for raw sugar, the Luanda retail prices were also adjusted upwards to 4.35 escudos and 3.50 escudos respectively which maintained the same margin of difference in the local and the c.i.f. Lisbon prices.

^w Government regulation and control of sugar is described in greater detail in the paper on Mozambique (appendix III).

^u Alberto Diogo, "Rumo à industrialização do Angola", *Junta de Desenvolvimento Industrial* (Luanda, 1963).

^v Angola, Serviços de Economia. "Regime Açucareiro", *Actividade Económica de Angola*, Nos. 61-63 (Angola, 1962), p. 182.

TABLE 6. ANGOLA SUGAR COMPANIES: AREA, FACTORY CAPACITY AND OUTPUT, 1960

Name	Location	Registered capital (million escudos) ^a	Area (ha.)	Cane output		Factory capacity ^b (daily m/tons)	Raw sugar output	
				Thousand tons	Tons/ha.		Thousand tons	Yield ^c
Companhia do Açúcar de Angola	Dambe Grande (Benguela)	337.5	2,400	105	61	800	11.4	6.7
	Tentative (Luanda)		2,299	165	74.7	1,500	15.5	6.7
Sociedade Agrícola de Cassequel	Catumbela (Benguela)	175.0	4,200	316	85	2,400	29.8	10.5
Sociedade de Comércio e Construções	Bom Jesus (Luanda)	60-80	1,400	56	39.8	600	5.9	10.6
Quissol	Quissol (Malanje)	30 ^d	230	40	715	100	0.7	—
TOTAL		603-623	10,529	682		5,400	63.3	

^a Registered capital of the company and not only of the sugar factory and plantation.

^b Except for Bom Jesus all factories produce white sugar for consumption or raw sugar for export.

^c Number of tons of cane to produce one ton of sugar.

^d Capital in 1958 reported to be 20-30 million escudos but also reported to have increased from 18 to 28 million in 1961.

TABLE 7. ANGOLA'S SUGAR QUOTA FOR EXPORT TO PORTUGAL, BY FACTORY
(Thousand tons)

	Territorial total	CAA	Cassequel	SCC	Actual exports to Portugal
1954/55	32,767	13,000	16,000	3,767	29,488
1955/56	25,500	6,000	17,000	2,500	25,526
1956/57	33,500	16,000	15,000	2,500	31,023
1957/58	36,202	11,194	21,864	3,144	39,262
1958/59	34,379	11,956	19,521	2,902	34,341
1959/60	35,412	16,106	15,500	3,806	35,294
1960/61	33,489	12,000	18,000	3,489	33,603
1961/62	33,064	15,000	14,000	4,064	33,064

109. Sugar exported to foreign destinations is subject to a surcharge of 16 per cent on its fiscal value. There is also a surtax on sugar exported to Portugal, which varies according to the polarimetric reading. In 1960 territorial revenue from sugar amounted to 2.6 million escudos from the export duty and 4.5 million escudos from the domestic consumption tax.

Production, exports and local consumption

110. Traditionally sugar production in Angola has been protected and subsidized in order to meet the needs of Por-

tugal's domestic consumption. Between 1935 and 1939 annual production increased by more than 40 per cent from 28,200 to 40,300 tons. But by 1944, production levelled off and in the next decade the yearly average was less than 50,000 tons. Although between 1955 and 1964 output increased by 50 per cent, this rate was much slower than that of Mozambique. In this period consumption in Angola more than doubled and white sugar production tripled. By 1964 two thirds of the output of the factories consisted of white sugar (table 8).

TABLE 8. ANGOLA: SUGAR PRODUCTION, CONSUMPTION AND EXPORTS
(Thousand tons)

Crop year	Production ^a				Consumption	Exports
	Total	Raw	White	Other		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
1955/56	46.0	24.9	14.2	7.2	20.0	30.5
1956/57	58.6	35.4	12.1	11.2	20.0	31.8
1957/58	60.4	34.3	16.0	10.2	20.0	40.8
1958/59	50.3	30.5	17.0	9.6	21.5	34.0
1959/60	65.0	36.2	16.6	14.7	25.0	29.9
1960/61	62.6	38.2	22.6	4.9	26.0	46.4
1961/62	62.1	32.4	38.6	—	27.6	36.6
1962/63	73.2	29.0	35.6	—	29.7	36.5
1963/64	68.2	23.6	41.8	—	42.0 ^b	23.8
1964/65	—	...	24.6

SOURCES: Columns (1) and (5); Decree Law 45,691, 28 April 1964. Columns (2), (3), (4) and (6): Reports of the Bank of Angola for the respective years.

^a Because of the different sources used there are discrepancies between the totals from columns (2), (3) and (4) and the figures in column (1).

^b Of which 15,000 tons raw sugar and 27,000 tons white.

111. Between 1935 and 1942 sugar accounted for about 12 per cent of Angola's total exports by value but by 1950 this was less than 5 per cent. With the increase in exports of other higher priced crops, especially of sisal and coffee, sugar has gradually lost importance in Angola's external trade, and in 1963 accounted for less than 2 per cent of the total exports by value, ranking seventh place among agricultural exports.

112. For many years more than 90 per cent of Angola's sugar exports went to Portugal with the remainder going to other Territories, namely Cape Verde, Portuguese Guinea and São Tomé and Príncipe. Since 1955 Angola's export to other Overseas Territories has steadily increased; in 1964, 22 per cent of the sugar exports went to these Territories and 78 per cent to Portugal (table 9). The sugar companies are free to export any surpluses in excess of the amounts to be supplied to the local market, to Portugal and to the other Territories. Under the International Sugar Agreement, Portugal has an allowance of 20,000 tons annually which was originally assigned to Mozambique but now may be used by

any sugar producer in the Portuguese space. In recent years Angola has not had any surpluses for such exports.

Recent developments

113. In August 1960 the Government authorized the establishment of a new sugar company, the Companhia Açucareira do Cuanza. The company was to have an initial registered capital of 80 million escudos, which could be increased to 200 million escudos. Portuguese and Angolan interests were to have equal shares in the capital with government and private interests at a ratio of 5 to 3 and the Government of Angola's investment was to be 25 million escudos. Foreign interests were expected to provide a loan of 200 million escudos for the purchase of equipment and the Development Bank of Portugal was authorized to guarantee the loan. A provisional concession of 15,000 hectares was set aside in the Muxima region. The objective was to double Angola's annual sugar production. In 1962, however, the concession was cancelled and the Government was reported to be planning to use the area to establish settlements based on sugar. There is no recent information on these settlements.

TABLE 9. ANGOLA—SUGAR: LOCAL CONSUMPTION, EXPORTS AND PRINCIPAL DESTINATIONS, 1955-1964

Year	Local consumption (thousand tons)	Exports			Main destinations			
		Thousand tons	Million escudos	Percentage of total export value	Portugal (percentage)	Cape Verde (percentage)	Portuguese Guinea (percentage)	São Tomé and Príncipe (percentage)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
1955	20.0	30.6	83.1	2.96	92.52	4.19	1.10	2.05
1956	20.0	31.8	84.5	2.57	91.10	5.38	1.37	2.03
1957	20.0	40.7	104.1	3.10	92.60	3.90	1.66	1.79
1958	20.0	34.0	87.6	2.38	88.95	6.99	1.86	1.97
1959	21.5	29.9	77.8	2.17	89.52	5.56	1.60	3.19
1960	25.0	46.4	124.0	3.48	88.74	8.13	1.33	1.76
1961	26.0	36.6	98.3	2.54	87.23	8.52	1.93	2.31
1962	27.6	37.5	99.9	2.34	87.10	6.42	2.28	1.46
1963	29.7	23.9	60.0	1.28	79.20	12.95	3.54	3.32
1964	42.0	24.7	72.4	1.23	76.62	13.51	5.49	2.96

SOURCES: Data for years 1955-1962 are as follows: column (1)—Portugal: Decree-Law No. 45,691 of 28 April 1964; columns (2), (3), (5), (6), (7) and (8)—Angola: *Anuário Estatístico*, 1962; column (4)—Calculated from Angola: *Comércio Externo*, 1963.

Data for 1963 and 1964 are from Banco de Angola: *Relatório e Contas*, 1964. These figures do not include molasses.

D. Cotton

General

114. Although cotton was grown and used in Angola before the arrival of the Portuguese and its production was the object of many government measures for more than half of this century, it has never had as important a role in the Territory's economy as it has had, and still has in Mozambique. Throughout the period 1940-1955 Angola's average annual exports of raw cotton remained around 6,000 tons. In 1960, the peak year, Angola exported 8,894 tons of raw cotton (compared with 44,398 tons from Mozambique), accounting for just over 10 per cent of Portugal's cotton imports from the Overseas Territories and about 4 per cent of the value of the Territory's visible exports. As an export crop cotton has continued to lose ground, and in 1964 only 4,286 tons of raw cotton were exported which by value represented less than 1 per cent of the visible exports.

115. Cotton is grown in the districts of Zaire (which with Uíge formerly constituted the Congo district), Luanda, Malanje, Cuanza North, Cuanza South and Lunda. The most important areas are Cambo, Bondo and Bangala in the Baixa do Cassange area of the Malanje district,^{*} and Catete (formerly known as Sunginge) Icolo e Bengo in the Luanda district.

^{*}The Baixa do Cassange cotton zone includes also part of the Luanda district.

In 1963, these two districts accounted for approximately 92 per cent of the total output, of which 75 per cent was from Malanje and 17 per cent from Luanda (table 10).

116. Most of the cotton grown is of the medium staple variety with some long-staple cotton grown along the coastal areas. Though efforts have been made to extend the cultivation of long-staple cotton, production of this variety has not increased partly because it requires special care, including artificial irrigation, and partly because the prices set heretofore have been insufficient to stimulate interest.

Organization of production

117. As described previously (see appendix I, part two), until recently cotton was grown mainly by Africans under a special régime on small plots of land of an average size of one half of two hectares per family. (In 1952 there were only forty-nine European cotton growers with 521 hectares; they produced 349 tons of seed cotton.) In Angola this special régime was based on legally enforced compulsory cultivation and the division of the cotton growing areas into "cotton zones" in which exclusive rights to purchase cotton was granted to licensed European or *assimilado* traders with ginning factories. In practice, most of the concessions were held by companies.

[†]Walter Marques, *Problemas do Desenvolvimento Económico de Angola* (Luanda, 1964), p. 202.

TABLE 10. ANGOLA: SEED COTTON OUTPUT BY REGIONS^a
(Metric tons)

Year	Territorial total (tons)	Malanje (and Lunda)		Luanda (and Cuanza North)		Cuanza South		Congo (Zaire) ^b	
		Tons	Percentage of total	Tons	Percentage of total	Tons	Percentage of total	Tons	Percentage of total
1958	21,762	19,107	87.80	1,581	7.27	1,069	4.91	5	0.02
1959	23,717	13,570	57.98	7,467	31.48	2,194	9.25	486	2.05
1960	19,139	9,612	50.22	6,220	32.50	2,894	15.12	413	2.16
1961	13,099	8,080	61.68	3,019	23.05	1,865	14.24	135	1.03
1962	22,500	15,200	67.56	3,650	16.22	3,000	13.33	650	2.89
1963	13,697	10,479	76.51	2,587 ^c	18.89 ^c	631	4.61
1964	13,609	12,878	94.63	530	3.90	200 ^d	1.47	2	0.02
1965 ^e	19,070	11,854	62.16	4,144	21.73	3,010 ^d	15.78	61	0.32

SOURCE: Banco de Angola, *Boletim Trimestral and Relatório e Contas*.

^a The principal cotton companies active in these regions are:

Malanje and Lunda ..Cotonang
LuandaCompanhia do Ambriz
Lagos e Irmão
Rocha e Coelho

Cuanza SouthAlgodoeira Colonial Agrícola
Zaire (Congo)Sociedade Agrícola do Cassequel

^b Data for 1958-1960 refer to Congo (Ambrizete) district. Data for 1961 onwards refer to Zaire district. Congo district was divided into two districts: Zaire and Uíge.

^c The figure for Luanda-Cuanza North includes Zaire output.

^d This figure includes Benguela district output.

^e Estimate.

118. In Angola, compulsory cultivation of cotton dates back to 1908 (Order of 21 November) when inhabitants of Icolo e Bengo *concelho* were required to cultivate 2,500 plants per hut (*cubata*). Then in 1927 (Legislative Instrument 638, 24 September) this requirement was extended to inhabitants of Luanda, Ambriz, Quiçama, Porto Amboim and Novo Redondo. In 1931 (Legislative Instrument 239, 4 June) women and minors over 14 years of age were required to cultivate at least one hectare of cotton.

119. In 1930 (Legislative Instrument 242, 18 January) a special Cotton Supervision Office was established in the Malanje district, in parts of which compulsory cotton growing was in force. As the number of taxpayers had dropped from 11,490 to 5,660 in the two previous years, the Cotton Supervision Office was to promote the increase of the number of growers and improve cotton production by "persuasive propaganda" and by bringing about the permanent settlement of Africans in greater numbers living under improved conditions. The authority of the Cotton Supervision Office was extended in the following year (Legislative Instrument 276, 5 November 1931) to other adjacent areas and a system of bonuses was established payable to government officials, based on the value of the cotton produced in the area of their authority, the *chefe de posto* receiving 4 centavos per kilogramme and the administrator 2 centavos.* In 1947 (Governor-General's Dispatch, 28 May) cotton concessionary companies were authorized to recruit workers through the help of government officials.

120. In 1949 (Order 6,619, 5 January) the regulations governing the area of cotton which each African had to cultivate were revised. The new provisions divided African *indígenas* into cotton farmers (able-bodied men from 18 to 55 years of age) and cotton cultivators (men from 56 to 60 years of age, widows, unmarried and divorced women).

121. Each year the concessionary companies were required to fix the minimum area for the head of family and his first wife, for each subsequent wife, and for each son of working age; areas for cotton cultivators were to be similarly fixed individually. For the 1948-1949 season, cotton farmers were required to cultivate 0.85 to one hectare of cotton and one hectare of food crops; cotton cultivators had to cultivate from 0.25 to 0.35 hectares of cotton and equal areas of food crops (Governor-General's Order of 5 January 1949).

122. Although in Mozambique close to 1 million persons were at one time engaged in cotton growing, in Angola, according to official statistics no more than 75,000 persons were ever involved. In 1955 at the height of the system, there were just under 60,000 growers and 54,000 hectares under cotton.

* In 1957-1959, for instance, the bonuses paid to administrative authorities for helping to promote cotton production amounted to over 300,000 escudos annually. Nunes Barata, *Localização da Sede dos Organismos de Coordenação Económica do Ultramar* (Lisbon, 1961), p. 43.

As the average area per cotton grower was 0.90 hectares it appears obvious that many probably cultivated between 1.5 and 2 hectares (see table 11).

123. The provisions described above remained in force until 1961 when cotton growing was declared free (Decree 43,639, 2 May 1961). The Report of the ILO Commission of 1962 appointed to examine the observance by the Government of Portugal of the Abolition of Forced Labour Convention, 1957 (No. 105)^{aa} shows that the representative of the Bank of Angola and the representatives of the largest concessionaire, COTONANG (see below), admitted freely that cotton cultivation had been compulsory, but that after May 1961 it had become free, and Africans could grow cotton or not as they liked.^{bb} The COTONANG representatives, however, stated the view that while cotton cultivation was no longer compulsory, Africans were obliged to engage in some form of approved activity as "they were not allowed to remain idle".

^{aa} International Labour Office, *Report of the Commission appointed under Article 26 of the Constitution of the International Labour Organisation to examine the complaint filed by the Government of Ghana concerning the observance by the Government of Portugal of the Abolition of Forced Labour Convention, 1957* (No. 105), Geneva, 1962.

^{bb} *Ibid.*, paras. 408 and 431.

TABLE 11. ANGOLA: AFRICAN PRODUCTION OF SEED COTTON

Year	Volume (tons)	Value (thousand escudos)	Production	
			Number of growers	Area cultivated (hectares)
1954	17,292	45,892	57,435	53,708
1955	20,438	55,274	57,763	54,087
1956	21,005	65,959	55,479	52,372
1957	19,581	59,950	56,552	53,526
1958	21,762	67,482	56,724	52,795
1959	23,718	72,054	54,852	51,190
1960	19,139	59,199	54,842	50,515
1961	13,099	44,690	46,673	38,654
1962	20,567	72,645	45,480	36,365
1963 ^a	13,700	46,458	46,790	36,691
1964 ^b	11,955	47,041	41,526	30,196

^a Angola: *Anuário Estatístico*.

^b Governo Geral de Angola, Secretaria Provincial de Fomento Rural: *Síntese da Actividade dos Organismos e Serviços, 1963-1964*.

124. In 1960, there were ten cotton concessionary companies. In 1954 these companies owned twenty-three ginning factories. The following table lists the concessionary companies, the location of their concessions and information on their other activities.

ANGOLA: COTTON CONCESSIONARY COMPANIES, 1960

(Ginning factories as reported in 1955)

Company	Location		Details
	Concession district	Ginning factories (concelho or circunscrição)	
Algodoeira Colonial Agricola	Cuanza South	Porto Amboim and Seles (at Hote)	
Companhia do Ambriz	Luanda	Ambriz (at Tabi)	Headquarters: Tabi. Capital (as of 1962): 11 million escudos. Main activity: coffee. Other activities: cotton, palm oil, coconut and salt
Companhia Geral dos Algodões de Angola, SARL (COTONANG)	Malanje	Ten ginning factories which are all in the Malanje district.	Largest concessionaire. Headquarters: Lisbon. Capital (as of 1962): 42 million escudos
Empresa dos Tabacos de Angola	Luanda	Dande (at Icau)	Owned by same group as Empresa Agro-Industrial de Angola (Emangola)
Lagos and Irmão	Luanda	Icolo e Bengo (at Catete)	Concession cancelled by <i>Portaria</i> (Angola) No. 12,923 of 28 September 1963
Marques Seixas and Ca. Lda.	Cuanza South	Novo Redondo	Other production: rice
Rocha and Coelho	Luanda and Cuanza South	Quiçama	Concession cancelled by <i>Portaria</i> (Angola) No. 12,862 of 10 August 1963
Sociedade Agricola do Cassequel, SARL	Zaire (3 zones)	Ambrizete (at Loge)	Established in 1927. Headquarters: Catumbela (Lobito); registered capital: 175 million escudos. Main activity: sugar. Other activities: cotton, vegetable oils, sisal, ramie, alcohol and fishing
Sociedade Comercial do Ambriz, Lda.	Zaire Cuanza North (4 zones)	Ambrizete Cambambe	Headquarters: Lisbon
Mota and Irmão	Luanda	Dande	In 1960 the ginning factory was listed as Sociedade Comercial Motas, Limitada (SO-COMOL). In 1955 Mota was also engaged in cotton processing in Congo district and vegetable oil in Luanda district

125. The largest cotton concessionaire is Companhia Geral dos Algodões de Angola, SARL-COTONANG. It was established in 1926 by the Companhia Fomento Geral de Angola, and its activities include cotton growing, industrial processing and marketing. COTONANG is registered as a Portuguese company and up to 1962 had its headquarters in Lisbon; it also had a permanent committee in Brussels the members of which were chosen by the board of directors. In 1926 its initial capital was 6 million escudos divided in 100 escudos shares. Members of the first board of directors were: Messrs. Arno S. Pearse, Baltasar Freire Cabral, Conde Jean de Hemp-time, Ernesto de Vilhena, João Henrique Ulbrich, José de Melo Breyner, José Alard, Pierre Clynans, Robert Mees, Tomás de Aquino de Almeida Garret. Each member of the board of directors held at least 100 shares of the company's capital.

126. The Company's capital was raised to 40 million escudos, and in 1962 it was reported to be unchanged.

127. COTONANG held the cotton concessions in the Baixa do Cassange region, which is the most important cotton producing area. In 1960 it had 33,000 cotton growers cultivating 30,000 hectares in the company's concession area. In 1961 it had 30,000 growers cultivating 23,000 hectares, and the company anticipated that the number of growers might drop further to 25,000. In the period 1954-1960, annual production of seed cotton within its concession averaged approximately 12,000 tons, for which, according to its annual reports, it paid 40 million escudos to the growers.

128. In 1955, COTONANG owned cotton ginneries at Cuale (Duque de Bragança *concelho*), Milando (Cambo *circunscrição*), Massango (Forte República *circunscrição*), Caombo (Combo *circunscrição*), Quelo (Bondo e Bângala *circun-*

scrição), Xandel (Bondo e Bângala *circunscrição*), Quinta (Songo *circunscrição*), Marimba, Jonga and X. Muteba.

129. COTONANG also operates in other fields such as vegetable oils, carpentry and metal-working. All its factories are located in Malanje district. The oil mill for the industrial processing of oil, cake and linters was built in 1954, at a cost of 20 million escudos; its daily capacity is 40 tons of cotton seed.

130. After cotton growing became free and the government-fixed purchase price of seed cotton was raised, COTONANG decided to grow its own cotton instead of purchasing cotton from African growers. In 1962 it began mechanized cotton growing on 400 hectares. It plans to cultivate 10,000 hectares at an investment of 50 million escudos. However, until harvesting of cotton is mechanized, the company will still be dependent on African labour.

131. Lagos and Irmão received its concession in Catete in 1936. Its annual production of seed cotton is approximately 5,000 tons for which it paid growers 15 million escudos annually. The company owns shares in Companhia do Manganês de Angola and in the cement factory known as Secil and also produces coffee.

132. As already described in appendix I, part two, the 1928 Labour Code and the labour regulations (including the obligation to work) were repealed in 1962. The special legislation of 1961 and 1963, put an end to compulsory cultivation and to all intervention by government officials in cotton growing; it provided for the abolition of cotton concessions by 31 August 1966, and established a Cotton Institute of Angola to supervise the cultivation and purchase of cotton from growers. (For details on the Cotton Institute, see appendix I, part two).

133. By 1964 only four cotton companies still held concessions. These four companies were the Sociedade Colonial Algodoeira de Angola (SCAL), Cassequel, Companhia do Ambriz and Mota e Irmão, but as seen from the table below,

together they held only 1,198 hectares, and were responsible for the supervision of 1,706 African growers. All other cotton-growing areas were under the direct supervision of the Cotton Institute.^{cc}

TABLE 12. ANGOLA: AFRICAN COTTON GROWERS, AREA AND PRODUCTION UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF THE COTTON INSTITUTE, 1961-1964

Year	Total			Cotton Institute		
	African growers	Area cultivated (hectares)	Seed cotton production (tons)	African growers	Area cultivated (hectares)	Seed cotton production (tons)
1961	46,673	38,654	13,099	—	—	—
1962 ^a	45,480	36,365	20,950	8,467	7,455	3,993
1963	46,790	36,690	13,726	7,199	5,188	1,127
1964	41,596	30,193	11,955	39,890	28,988	11,764

^a In 1962 the Catete cotton zone was under the direct supervision of the Cotton Institute but reverted to the concessionary company in 1963.

134. The total number of cotton growers in Angola dropped by 15 per cent from 54,842 in 1960 to 46,673 in 1961 and 41,596 in 1964. The area cultivated decreased by 22 per cent between 1960 and 1961, from 50,515 hectares to 38,654. According to the report of the Angola Provincial Secretariat for Rural Development,^{dd} between 1963 and 1964 the total area cultivated dropped from 43,000 to 39,000 hectares and production of seed cotton from 16,711 tons to 13,609 tons. In 1963 Africans accounted for 85 per cent of the area cultivated (37,000 hectares) and 82 per cent of the production.

135. It may be recalled that the legislation of 1955 (Decree 40,405), which has been described in the previous appendix, provided for the establishment of co-operatives of African cotton growers outside concessioned areas. The regulations provided that such a co-operative could be established upon the request of at least 100 growers and approved by the Territorial Government. Each co-operative is administered by a three-member council with a representative of the Cotton Institute.

136. In 1961 there were five co-operatives of cotton growers: four in the Luanda district with a total area of 900 hectares, and one in Cuanza South, with 120 hectares. In 1962 three more were established, of which two were in the Catete region, and one at Jimba in Cuanza South with 300 members and an area of 300 hectares.

137. In addition to African growers, in 1963 there were 112 registered cotton producers. Of these only 61 actually grew cotton cultivating 6,364 hectares and producing nearly 3,000 tons. The average production in kilogrammes per hectare by these independent growers was 383 in Luanda district, 160 in Cuanza North, 499 in Cuanza South and 520 in Malanje. Among the independent growers in the Luanda district are the special government-sponsored cotton settlements. In 1964 there were 66 independent producers, cultivating 8,757 hectares; however, their production totalled only 1,654 tons due to a poor season.

Cotton textile industry

138. Portuguese policy regulating the establishment of industries in the Overseas Territories and the legislation providing for textile industries in Angola and Mozambique have been described in the previous study. It may be recalled that (under Decree 33,924, 5 September 1944) in order to prevent competition with Portuguese interests, the textile factories in Portugal were given priority rights to establish local textile industries in the Territories or in acquiring shares; the price of cotton to the local industries was fixed at the same level

^{cc} The Cotton Institute's estimated total budget for 1965 was 52 million escudos, including 14.5 million escudos of the Cotton Development Fund. Estimated cost of purchasing seed cotton, transportation and storage was 23,760,000 escudos for which it expected to receive 28.5 million escudos (Angola: *Boletim Oficial*, Series I, No. 13, 27 March 1965).

^{dd} Angola, Secretaria Provincial de Fomento Rural, *Síntese da Actividade dos Organismos e Serviços, 1963-1964* (Luanda, 1965), p. 79.

as that to Portuguese industries; and the annual local textile output in each Territory was carefully limited to 20 per cent of its own average imports of such products from Portugal over the three years prior to 1939.

139. Under the authorization of the above-mentioned legislation, the Sociedade Algodoeira de Portugal was formed soon after with Portuguese capital to operate in Mozambique, and the Companhia de Fomento Colonial in Angola which had previously been engaged in agriculture in the Territory began to make cotton textiles its main activity.

140. The Luanda textile factory began production in 1946. In 1950 (Decree Law 37,847, 3 June) the Government approved the merger of the existing textile companies in the Overseas Territories, and as a result, the Sociedade Algodoeira de Portugal which was in financial difficulties and had not yet started producing textiles in Mozambique, joined with the Companhia de Fomento Colonial and became the Sociedade Algodoeira de Fomento Colonial, now the major textile producer both in Mozambique and in Angola where it is known as Textang.

141. The Sociedade Algodoeira de Fomento Colonial is jointly owned by the State (which was authorized by Decree 37,847, 3 June 1950, to invest up to 40 million escudos) and Portuguese textile interests. In 1963, this company had a registered capital of 200 million escudos, but the total capital actually invested by the end of 1964 was 514 million escudos.

142. In 1964, the company reported a surplus of more than 12 million escudos from its operations in Mozambique, more than 5 million escudos from Angola, and a deficit amounting to 322,000 escudos in Lisbon where it has its headquarters. The company produces about 18 million metres of textiles annually valued at 150 million escudos but with a capacity to raise this to 200 million escudos. According to the Chairman of the Board of Directors, the Company's operations in 1964 were affected by the higher prices it had had to pay for cotton, limited markets in Angola and Mozambique, and difficulties of competing in the international market. The activities of this company are described in greater detail in the study on Mozambique (see appendix III).

143. Textang had a registered capital of 50 million escudos in 1955 and employed 600 workers. Its production has increased in recent years. In 1962, its capacity was reported to be 1,200 tons per annum but it had not reached that maximum.

144. The only other cotton textile factory in Angola is owned by Fábrica Imperial de Borracha Limitada (FIB). It was set up in 1957 with a registered capital of 3.3 million escudos. In 1962 this factory had a capacity of 1,250 metres of textiles per day.

145. Both textile factories also produce cotton blankets and socks. In addition, in 1963 there were two factories producing absorbent cotton which had a combined capital of 2.6 million, their output being valued at 1.6 million escudos. There are also four factories producing cotton woven goods which have a total capital of 1.2 million escudos.

146. The total output of cotton textiles and other cotton products is shown in the following table together with the volume of cotton textile imports from Portugal.

TABLE 13. ANGOLA: LOCAL PRODUCTION AND IMPORT OF COTTON TEXTILES AND OTHER COTTON PRODUCTS

	Local production		Imports ^b	
	Volume (metres) ^a	Value (thousand escudos)	Volume (tons)	Value (thousand escudos)
1955	4,219	258,756
1956	3,121	...	5,404	319,649
1957	3,403	...	5,910	349,318
1958	3,299	40,812	6,075	345,365
1959	3,112	39,562	5,903	317,018
1960	3,251	38,500	5,020	276,513
1961	3,842	48,100	2,999	176,775
1962	4,394	61,000	4,210	268,941
1963	6,871	66,772	5,434	383,498
1964	...	71,031	5,708	403,854

SOURCES: Imports, Angola: *Anuário Estatístico, Comercial especial por classes e secções*.

Local output and data for 1963 and 1964: Banco de Angola, *Relatório e Contas*.

^a All cotton products, including blankets which usually amount to more than 10 per cent of the total value of the production.

^b Cotton textiles and cotton yarn.

Other cotton by-products

147. Until 1952, there was no factory producing cotton seed oil. In 1954 COTONANG established an oil seed factory in the Malanje district. There are two other oil seed factories, Induve and Comgeral.

148. Cotton seed oil production was 1,241 tons (10.2 million escudos in 1960); 916 tons (7.7 million escudos) in 1961 and 933 tons (8.3 million escudos) in 1962. In 1961, 220 tons of cotton seed oil were exported which was 487 tons less than in 1960. In 1962 none was exported.

TABLE 14. ANGOLA: EXPORT OF COTTON SEED OIL AND OTHER BY-PRODUCTS

	Cotton seed		Cotton oil		Bagacos	
	Value (tons)	Value (thousand escudos)	Volume (tons)	Value (thousand escudos)	Volume (tons)	Value (thousand escudos)
1960	607
1961	220
1962
1963 ^a	1,599	22,016	330	1,877	3,991	8,114
1964 ^a	909	1,182	2	16	1,651	3,300

^a SOURCE for 1963 and 1964: Angola Secretaria Provincial de Fomento Rural: *Síntese da Actividade dos Organismos e Serviços 1963-1964* (Luanda 1965), p. 78.

The economic role of cotton

149. Throughout the period from 1926 until 1961, cotton was grown in Angola under forced cultivation to meet the needs of the Portuguese textile industry so as to save the foreign exchange that would have been needed to purchase cotton from other sources. Nevertheless, cotton growing never became widespread in Angola, and annual production of seed cotton during the mid-1950s averaged only about 20,000 tons. Since cultivation became free in May 1962, cotton growing has declined, and in 1964, production was only 60 per cent of the average annual output during the 1950s.

150. Although cotton has never accounted for a significant part of Angola's visible export trade, it has been subject to heavy taxes.^{ee} On the other hand, the forced cultivation system

^{ee} In 1965, for instance, taxes and duties on raw cotton amounted to 3 escudos per kilogramme when the average f.o.b. price was 17.3 escudos (Legislative Instrument 3,569, 31 July 1965).

and the low purchase price fixed by the Government created hardships for the African growers,^{ff} and as reported by the Sub-Committee on the Situation in Angola,^{gg} led to many complaints.

151. It may be recalled that the ILO Commission reported that in 1961, cotton growers in the Cambo region received an average of 1,230 escudos.^{hh} As this was gross income before paying the personal tax which then averaged around 100-150 escudos, the average net monthly income after tax would have been less than 100 escudos, or approximately \$US3.50. In contrast, the gross income per hectare of coffee was probably between 3-5,000 escudos per hectare per year (see para. 69 above.)

152. Under the system prevailing before 1961, Angola exported to Portugal almost all the raw cotton produced, and up to 1960, the local textile industry's production was less than 10 per cent of the value of the Territory's cotton imports from Portugal (see table 13). Local output of cotton textiles which remained around 3.2 million metres between 1956 and 1961, increased in 1962 to 4.4 million metres. In 1964, Angola's textile imports from Portugal including cotton yarn totalled 5,709 tons valued at 404 million escudos, or just over \$US14 million, and were the second largest import by value after wine.

153. According to a 1965 report (see foot-note ^{ff}), owing to the drop in cotton production in Angola and to a lesser extent in Mozambique, during the period 1963-64, Portugal had to import a total of about 75,000 tons of raw cotton from foreign sources at a cost of about 1,520 million escudos. In order to make cotton production more attractive, in July 1965, (Order 13,858, 31 July) the Government of Angola increased the minimum purchase price of seed cotton sold by Africans in rural markets outside concessionary areas, and suspended the tax that had been levied since 1963 on seed cotton for the revenue of the Cotton Development Fund (see appendix I, para. 108).

154. Under the new industrial control legislation, conditions for the establishment of industries in the Overseas Territories have been liberalized and in the future new textile factories may be established in Angola so long as they do not compete with those established in Portugal or other Overseas Territories. However, since import duties on goods from Portugal and other parts of the Portuguese realm have been abolished, as reported previously (see chap. V, para. 129) it is expected that it may be a few years before Angola's own industries will be developed sufficiently to meet the Territory's needs.

E. Maize

General

155. Maize is the principal food crop of the plateau and coastal regions of Angola; in the other areas the main staple is manioc. From the beginning of this century until before World War II, maize was the Territory's principal export both in volume and in value. During the period 1936-40 for instance, average annual exports of maize were over 110,000 tons and represented almost 57 per cent of the value of total visible exports. As already indicated above (paras. 2-3), since the 1950s coffee especially and to a lesser degree sisal have dominated Angola's exports and as a result the volume of maize exports has remained almost stationary, with 104,000 tons exported in 1964. Although by value maize still ranks third among the Territory's agricultural exports in 1964 it accounted for less than 3 per cent of the value of the total visible exports.

156. The most important areas of production are: (a) the Benguela plateau and especially along the Benguela railway, between Ganda and the Cuanza River, and extending to about

^{ff} In fact as one article has recently described it, the producer was the one who received the least profits when there were any and he bore all the losses. ("Novos rumos para a cultura algodoeira", *Actualidade Económica*, Luanda, 9 September 1965, p. 9).

^{gg} Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixteenth Session, Supplement No. 16 (A/4978), paras. 266-271.

^{hh} International Labour Office, op. cit., p. 267, foot-note 2.

100 kilometres on each side of the railway; (b) the Huambo-Bié plateau where it is produced mainly by European settlers; (c) the Malanje plateau; and (d) the *concelho* of Icolo e Bengo near Luanda. Some maize is also grown in the interior but there are no production statistics. The only statistics available are the quantities purchased annually which do not necessarily bear a direct relation to annual production, but which are more often influenced by the purchase price set by the Government for reasons explained below.

TABLE 15. ANGOLA: COTTON LINT OUTPUT AND EXPORTS

Year	Output volume (metric tons)	Exports		Percentage total exports value
		Volume (metric tons)	Value (thousand escudos)	
1950	5,202	7,028	81,393	3.75
1951	4,996	4,058	56,765	1.78
1952	7,098	6,186	92,183	2.89
1953	6,064	5,473	82,037	2.32
1954	6,001	5,871	89,415	3.02
1955	7,073	6,266	93,039	3.32
1956	7,302	5,908	94,070	2.86
1957	6,823	7,363	124,385	3.70
1958	7,503	5,033	85,000	2.30
1959	8,268	6,356	104,662	2.92
1960	6,636	8,894	146,376	4.11
1961	4,980	4,120	69,033	1.78
1962	7,205	5,712	99,018	2.32
1963	5,592	4,286	79,604	1.68
1964	4,553	3,194	52,919	0.90

SOURCES: Cotton lint output: *Diário de Lisboa, Portugal* 1964, p. 197, table "Output of cotton-fibre". The figures for 1962 and 1963 are reported to be subject to revision.

Exports: Angola, *Anuário Estatístico* (tables: "Exportação Agrícola" and "Evolução do Movimento Comercial").

For years 1963 and 1964 all data from Banco de Angola, *Relatório e Contas*.

Organization of production

157. Most of the maize is produced by Africans on small plots of about one hectare per family. Some maize is also grown on European farms and on the government sponsored African settlements. In 1942 there were an estimated 563,444 hectares under maize; the average annual output in the 1940s and 1950s was estimated to be 300,000-400,000 tons. The average yield on African plots is between 300 and 400 kilogrammes per hectare, which is about half of that produced on European farms in Angola, and about one third of the average output in the leading maize producing countries. The low yield and fluctuating output are officially attributed to the fact that African farming is still based on simple traditional methods and the harvest is entirely dependent on the weather.

158. As described in the previous study on the concession, occupation and settlement of land in Angola and Mozambique (A/6000/Rev.1, chap. V, annex II), although after 1950 the Government began to organize permanent African settlements with a view to improving traditional farming techniques, these settlements involved only an insignificant proportion of the total population and up to 1964 had not contributed to raising exports of maize and other traditionally grown African food crops.

Government regulation and controls

159. As maize was one of the earliest crops exported from Angola it has been the object of various government measures since 1914 aimed at improving the quality and increasing exports. Up to 1961, as described in the previous study on the organization of agriculture and government policy, the labour regulations and the native tax, as it was then known, were used to induce Africans to higher productivity. In Angola, however, these measures were reinforced by legally instituted compulsory cultivation of cotton (see section D above) and, for certain periods, also of food crops, as is explained below.

160. In 1931 (Angola, Legislative Instrument 239, 26 May) forced cultivation of food and other crops was introduced. All able-bodied Africans *indigenas* were required to cultivate at least one hectare of ordinary food crops (such as maize, beans and wheat) or plantation crops (such as palms and coffee) or annual crops (such as cotton, castor oil plant (*ricino*) and manioc). Polygamous Africans were required to cultivate an extra half hectare, or the equivalent for each additional wife. Able-bodied boys, 14-16 years of age, were required to cultivate not less than one quarter of a hectare.

161. The administrative officials were to exert "all legal means" to make Africans comply with this order, and they were to provide Africans with seeds when necessary, which had to be repaid at harvest time with the best quality available and increased by 5 per cent over the original amount. Africans who failed to cultivate the area and crops required were subject to a maximum punishment of ninety days of correctional labour.

162. It is not clear how long these measures for compulsory cultivation by the entire population were in force. It may be noted, however, that officially compulsory cultivation could only be imposed to guarantee food supplies. From this time onwards, however, average annual exports of maize increased from 67,000 tons in the period 1931-1935 to 133,000 tons in the period 1936-1940.

163. One of the main difficulties in increasing maize production in Angola has always been the low prices fixed by the Government. In 1930, for instance, according to an article in *African World*,¹¹ the purchase price was 400 escudos per ton along the railway line, and the actual purchase price to Africans about 1.5 angolars per 15 kilogrammes. At this price, an African growing one hectare of maize, with an average yield of not more than 600 kilogrammes per hectare, could not meet his tax obligations (which in some regions was 104 angolars) even if he sold his entire maize crop.

164. In order to concentrate maize trading and regulating activities under one authority, the *Grémio* of Portuguese Colonial Maize (*Grémio do Milho Colonial Português*) was set up in Lisbon in 1933, comprising maize exporters from the colonies and importers in Portugal. The *Grémio* was given responsibility for the sale of all maize produced in the colonies and placed at its disposal. It was to: (a) organize the marketing (distribution) of maize in such a way that it did not exceed the normal requirements of the market in Portugal; (b) control prices by stabilizing the amount paid to indigenous growers and by controlling transport costs from the place of production to the place of consumption; (c) fix the sale price of maize in Portugal and in any other areas under its authority; (d) help raise the quality of the maize exported from the colonies by distributing selected seed to growers, setting up immunization chambers, organizing maize processing and standardization and providing loans to members of the *Grémio*.

165. The legislation also provided that in fixing the purchase price to be paid to African growers, the *Grémio* was to be guided by the rule that the net profit to the trader should not exceed 5 per cent of the actual expenses from purchase to sale.¹²

166. The governing board of the *Grémio*, comprising a president, vice-president and three members, had to include at least three members chosen from among the eight largest importers of maize over the two previous years. A representative of the Ministry of Colonies, whose salary was paid by the *Grémio*, sat on the board. This representative had the right to suspend, and the Minister for the Colonies had the right to annul, any decisions taken by the board.

167. In practice, the main responsibility of the *Grémio* was first, to see that Portugal received an adequate supply of maize from the colonies and second to make arrangements for exporting the remainder to the other Territories and foreign countries. Since maize prices were higher in Portugal than

¹¹ *African World*, 19 July 1930, p. 537.

¹² As pointed out by Marcelo Caetano in *O Problema do Nativo*, by setting it this way the price paid to African growers did not take into account the exchange value of maize in the local economy.

than on the world market, profits earned from the sales to Portugal were used to subsidize exports to other countries. To finance these operations, in 1934 (Decree 24,653, 15 November) a special reserve stabilization fund was created from a percentage levy on the profits from maize sales.

168. By 1936, however, the *Grémio's* reserve fund was exhausted, and because of disagreement with the government representative, the members of the governing board resigned. As a result the board's functions were taken over by a special government-appointed committee.

169. The apparent need for closer government co-ordination and control of maize trading activities led to the establishment of the Colonial Cereals Export Board in August 1938 (Decree Law 28,899, 5 August). This Board was set up along the same lines as the other economic co-ordinating bodies for cotton and coffee and had its headquarters also in Lisbon. Although it was intended to have authority eventually over other cereals, its initial competence was limited to maize and wheat (and flour) produced in the colonies. Its main functions were to: protect cereals producers; supervise the production and trade of maize and wheat; regulate exports to Portugal and foreign destinations in such a way that the production in the Overseas Territories was complementary to that of Portugal; guarantee the supply of these cereals to the colonial and metropolitan markets; fix the sale price of cereals in Portugal except when otherwise fixed by law, taking into account the interests of the inhabitants in Portugal and in the colonies. The Board also was made responsible for standardizing maize and furnishing to European and indigenous producers seeds, insecticides, fertilizers and other assistance to improve the quality of maize exports. Furthermore, it was authorized to purchase maize at a fair price from European producers or exporters who were not producers.

170. With the establishment of the Colonial Maize Export Board, half of the *Grémio's* former export stabilization funds were assigned to the Board as capital to acquire machinery, warehouses, materials and equipment, and the *Grémio* was again allowed to elect its own governing board (Decree Law 28,900, 5 August 1938). As a result of the changes, the *Grémio* which retained its headquarters in Lisbon, became mainly a trading association for purchasing maize from Overseas Territories and exporting it under the supervision of the Colonial Cereals Export Board.

171. Although both the *Grémio* and the Colonial Cereals Export Board established in 1938 were intended to function in all the Overseas Territories, their main activities were in Angola. Therefore, in 1961 (Decree Law 43,640, 2 May 1961) when the *Grémio* was re-organized into a "voluntary *grémio*" retaining its purchasing functions, its headquarters were transferred to Angola. Later in the year (Decree 43,876, 24 August 1961), the Colonial Cereals Export Board was abolished, and in Angola it was replaced by a newly established Cereals Institute.

172. The Angola Cereals Institute was made responsible initially for maize, wheat and rice, to which beans, peanuts and castor seed have since been added. All cereal exporters and importers have to be registered with the Institute, and all cereal producers, traders and processors come under its authority, even though they are not required to register with the Institute. In addition to the functions of the former Colonial Cereals Export Board, the Institute is also responsible for protecting small producers. Whereas previously the Board could only purchase cereals from European producers, this restriction has been removed, and the Institute is authorized to purchase cereals offered by producers and traders who are not exporters, after establishing a price stabilization fund. In 1965 the Institute had an estimated budget of 125 million escudos.

173. The quantity of maize to be supplied to Portugal each year is determined by the Committee for Economic Co-ordination and the Overseas Ministry on the advice of the National Institute of Bread and the National Federation of Wheat Producers, taking into account Portugal's own production and that of the Overseas Territories (Order 18,930, 29 December 1961).

174. When import and export quota restrictions were abolished in the Portuguese realm in November 1961 (Decree

Law No. 44,016, 8 November), quotas were retained on a limited number of commodities, including maize and maize flour, peanuts and peanut oil, and manufactured tobacco. For Portugal the annual quota of maize imports from the Overseas Territories (i.e., mainly from Angola) was provisionally set at 25,000 tons (Decree Law 44,507, 14 August 1962). That amount has since been established as the annual minimum and additional requirements above it are to be determined each year (Order 20,112, 12 October 1963).

Production, consumption and exports

175. There are no reliable data on the total local maize production, which is estimated to be around 400,000 tons, but exports are usually between one third and one quarter this amount.

176. As described above, Angola's maize can only be exported to foreign destinations after the requirements of Portugal and the other Overseas Territories have been met. Although the minimum annual quota of maize to be supplied to Portugal from Angola was fixed at 25,000 tons in 1961, in recent years supplies have usually been closer to double this amount or more, amounting to 49,000 tons (or 30 per cent) in 1961, 56,000 tons (48 per cent) in 1962, 79,000 tons (92 per cent) in 1963 and 71,000 tons (68 per cent) in 1964.

177. Maize exports to the other Overseas Territories also depend on their needs and fluctuate from year to year. From 1957 to 1960 Mozambique received an average of 10 per cent of Angola's maize exports, Cape Verde 5 per cent and São Tomé and Príncipe approximately 2 per cent (table 16).

Recent developments

178. The stagnation of the traditional agricultural sector was brought to a focus in the Transitional Development Plan 1965-1967. In particular, statistics showed that in the period since 1950 exports of traditionally grown African crops had generally declined. For maize, as noted above, exports reached a peak of 190,000 tons in 1950; for beans the maximum was 28,000 tons in 1950; for rice, 8,000 tons in 1952; and peanuts, 4,000 tons in 1949. The report on the Transitional Development Plan contained the opinion that while this decline in exports of traditional crops was due in part to increased local consumption and processing (as in the case of peanuts), nevertheless, to a great extent, it reflected the disinterest of the producers because of various factors, the most important of which was the low purchase price. To stimulate exports it was proposed that (a) the price paid to growers should be increased; (b) the taxes and duties on maize and other African grown crops should be reduced; and (c) better storage facilities should be made available to reduce losses.^{kk}

179. According to official information, the total levies on maize leaving Angola amounted, in 1965, to 17 centavos out of each escudo paid to the producer (Legislative Instrument 3,569, 31 July 1965).^{ll} In 1964, the *Grémio* purchased 153,000 tons and exported 104,500 tons valued at 172.2 million escudos. Assuming a purchase price of one escudo per kilogramme, the total levies, at 17 centavos in the escudo, would have amounted to 17.8 million escudos.

180. In July 1965, anticipating reduced revenue resulting from the revision of export levies on maize and other traditionally grown African crops in general, the Government of Angola decided to compensate the loss by increasing various consumption taxes on luxury goods and imposing special levies on exports of lumber, palm oil, coffee and sisal. However, because of special difficulties involved, in September the consumption taxes were revised and the special taxes on other agricultural exports were repealed (Legislative Instrument 3,580, 30 September).

^{kk} Portugal. Presidência do Conselho, *Projecto de Plano Intercalar de Fomento para 1965-1967*, vol. II (Lisbon, 1964), p. 161.

^{ll} A dispatch of the Department of Commerce in Lisbon dated 6 April 1965 (*Diário do Governo*, Series I, No. 78) reduced levies on maize from Angola to those that had existed before the establishment of the Cereals Institute, amounting to 15 centavos per kilogramme exported.

181. In May 1966, in order to ensure that maize producers receive a better return, the Government further raised the c.i.f. Lisbon price, bringing the total increase to 200 escudos per ton since 1964. (Currently type-three maize, for instance,

is quoted at 1,450 escudos per ton.) At the same time the previous levies on maize have been reduced to a single 5 per cent duty on the customs value of the maize exported, and maize prices were raised by 10 centavos per kilo for various grades.

TABLE 16. ANGOLA: MAIZE EXPORTS AND DESTINATION OF EXPORTS

Year	Exports			Main descriptions (percentage of export volume)				
	Thousand tons	Million escudos	Percentage of total export value	Portugal	Other Overseas Territories	Federal Republic of Germany	Belgium-Luxembourg	Netherlands
1955	53.5	86.9	3.09	39.29	9.19	16.59	24.88	0.62
1956	130.7	191.9	5.83	19.97	4.66	15.58	34.95	24.33
1957	31.0	42.6	1.27	64.29	25.92	0.32	0.32	0.32
1958	167.8	218.4	5.92	15.20	13.41	21.43	10.70	3.30
1959	149.2	215.0	5.99	25.21	18.20	15.58	2.04	3.51
1960	117.1	165.0	4.63	17.42	27.30	30.02
1961	161.6	224.8	5.80	30.32	6.62	3.09	0.86	...
1962	116.7	151.7	3.56	47.72	8.90	0.19	2.03	...
1963	86.2	124.5	2.66	91.91	6.41
1964	104.5	172.2	2.93	67.73	16.14	—	—	—

Maize: percentage of total exports to other Overseas Territories

Year	Cape Verde	São Tomé and Príncipe	Mozambique	Year	Cape Verde	São Tomé and Príncipe	Mozambique
1955	1.65	6.69	0.85	1960	15.32	3.22	8.76
1956	2.12	2.54	...	1961	4.76	1.58	0.28
1957	6.37	10.00	9.55	1962	7.11	1.79	...
1958	1.18	1.70	10.54	1963	4.76	1.64	0.01
1959	4.78	2.26	11.16	1964	6.16	1.36	8.61

SOURCES: All data except column 3 and 1964 Angola: *Comércio Externo*. Column 3 calculated with figures from Angola: *Comércio Externo*. Data for 1964 from Banco de Angola: *Relatório e Contas*.

TABLE 17. ANGOLA: AGRICULTURAL EXPORTS, 1955-1964
(Metric tons)

Year	Coffee	Sisal	Sugar	Cotton lint	Maize	Manioc (cruzeira)	Beans	Coconut	Palm oil	Tobacco ^a
1955	36,948	40,716	30,567	6,266	53,533	24,845	12,311	10,307	8,294	517
1956	66,543	37,283	31,789	5,908	130,721	34,275	17,796	9,384	8,790	628
1957	72,225	46,414	40,696	7,363	30,964	24,397	12,554	12,615	9,128	591
1958	77,318	51,870	33,998	5,033	167,821	35,710	8,864	13,736	9,041	259
1959	88,999	53,539	29,872	6,356	149,184	35,702	10,806	7,523	8,747	488
1960	87,217	57,941	46,899	8,894	117,112	58,421	11,789	5,181	13,004	1,010
1961	118,122	58,900	36,615	4,120	161,585	57,365	9,492	10,214	12,582	1,065
1962	156,887	68,856	36,491	5,712	116,681	58,041	10,162	11,610	12,595	947
1963	136,437	61,947	23,849	4,286	86,189	24,378	11,009	18,001	14,877	1,468
1964	138,700	57,228	24,609	3,194	104,475	47,435	4,026	16,693	17,809 ^b	1,850

SOURCES: 1955-1963: Angola, *Comércio Externo*; 1964: Angola, *Boletim Mensal*, December 1964.

^a Includes manufactured and unmanufactured tobacco.

^b Includes refined palm oil.

TABLE 18. ANGOLA: AGRICULTURAL EXPORTS PERCENTAGE OF VALUE OF TOTAL EXPORTS, 1955-1964

Year	Total exports (thousand escudos)	Coffee (per cent)	Sisal (per cent)	Sugar (per cent)	Cotton lint (per cent)	Maize (per cent)	Manioc (cruzeira) (per cent)	Beans (per cent)	Coconut (per cent)	Palm oil (per cent)	Tobacco ^a (per cent)
1955	2,804,665	30.50	6.96	2.96	3.32	3.10	1.45	1.08	1.21	1.52	0.25
1956	3,289,026	37.78	5.55	2.57	2.86	5.83	1.75	1.05	0.94	1.41	0.23
1957	3,362,763	42.24	5.65	3.10	3.70	1.27	1.24	0.73	1.22	1.46	0.26
1958	3,688,516	40.82	5.80	2.38	2.30	5.92	1.48	0.62	1.27	1.35	0.19
1959	3,587,418	38.68	8.07	2.17	2.92	5.83	1.55	0.94	0.82	1.36	0.26
1960	3,565,492	35.45	10.53	3.48	4.11	4.63	2.18	0.94	0.62	2.00	0.45
1961	3,874,116	35.86	8.16	2.54	1.78	5.80	2.32	0.74	0.85	1.78	0.43
1962	4,264,294	43.71	9.58	2.34	2.32	3.56	2.58	0.69	0.84	1.40	0.38
1963	4,683,873	40.45	12.33	1.28	1.64	2.66	0.91	0.71	1.34	1.61	0.59
1964	5,867,713	48.73	8.17	1.23	0.92	2.93	1.32	0.21	1.06	1.39 ^b	0.55

SOURCES: 1955-1963: Angola, *Comércio Externo*; 1964: Angola, *Boletim Mensal*, December 1964.

^a Includes manufactured and unmanufactured tobacco.

^b Includes refined palm oil.

Appendix III

*Agriculture and processing industries in Mozambique**Working paper prepared by the Secretariat*

CONTENTS

	<i>Paragraphs</i>
I. GENERAL OUTLINE	
A. Role of agriculture in the economy of the Territory	1-8
B. Pattern of production	9-17
II. PRODUCTION, PROCESSING AND MARKETING OF MAJOR CROPS	
A. Cotton	18-45
B. Sugar	46-91
C. Cashew	92-132
D. Copra	133-169
E. Sisal	170-198
F. Tea	199-234

Tables

	<i>Page</i>
1. Mozambique: non-African agricultural holdings in 1960-1961	412
2. Mozambique: production of cash crops, 1950-1951 and 1960-1961	413
3. Mozambique: African production of seed cotton ..	416
4. Mozambique: production, local consumption and exports of cotton lint	416
5. Mozambique: local production and import of cotton textiles	417
6. Mozambique sugar companies: area, factory capacity and output, 1960-1961	419
7. Mozambique: sugar quotas for export to Portugal by company	419
8. Mozambique: sugar production	420
9. Mozambique—sugar: local consumption, exports and principal destinations, 1955-1964	420
10. Influence of industrialization on the value of cashew exports	422
11. Mozambique: production of shelled cashew and cashew liquor	424
12. Mozambique: exports of shelled cashew nuts and shell liquor	424
13. Mozambique—cashew: exports and principal destinations, 1955-1964	425
14. Copra production	428
15. Mozambique—copra and copra oil: exports and principal destinations, 1955-1964	428
16. Sisal: average f.o.b. prices of exports	430
17. Mozambique—sisal: exports and principal destinations, 1955-1964	431
18. Mozambique: tea companies, their location and production, 1962	432
19. Mozambique—tea: exports and principal destinations, 1955-1964	434
20. Mozambique: agricultural exports, 1955-1964	434
21. Mozambique: agricultural exports percentage of value of total exports, 1955-1964	435

I. GENERAL OUTLINE

A. *Role of agriculture in the economy of the Territory*

1. Mozambique depends heavily on its geographical location with respect to the highly productive regions of the hinterland for which it provides the principal access to the sea. Consequently, an important branch of economic activity consists in the provision of port, railway and related services for the transit traffic of neighbouring countries. From this, it derives

about one fourth of its foreign exchange earnings and a substantial part of its public revenue. Other invisible receipts come in the form of remittances and fees in respect of migrant workers in South Africa and Southern Rhodesia and from the growing tourist industry.

2. These invisible receipts help to counterbalance a chronic deficit in the Territory's balance of trade which reflects the present weakness of its domestic economy. With comparatively little mineral production or manufacturing, though both these segments are growing, the economy is predominantly based on agriculture and the production for export of agricultural commodities in a raw or semi-processed state. Vegetable products account for over 80 per cent of total exports by value and about 93 per cent of all actively engaged Africans are agricultural workers or farmers, mainly in the subsistence sector. Likewise, about 60 per cent of private industrial investment is in processing industries based on agricultural products. As explained in the previous study dealing with economic organization and policy, the development of manufacturing has been restricted partly by government policy and partly, though to a lesser degree, by the smallness of the domestic market and lack of available finance.

3. The most important export crops grown in Mozambique are cotton, sugar and cashew. Until recently cotton and sugar were the two leading exports, both of them oriented towards supplying Portugal's needs, but since 1957 exports of cashew have nearly trebled in value making this the Territory's principal export crop. In 1964, raw cotton and cashew together accounted for more than one third of Mozambique's visible exports by value while sugar had fallen temporarily to fourth place, contributing only 8.1 per cent of export revenue, a situation which may soon change when current projects for increased sugar production (see section II B below) are completed. Of lesser importance are sisal, accounting in 1964 for 9 per cent of exports by value, copra which accounted for 6.9 per cent, and tea, accounting for 5.4 per cent. Apart from these six crops which together made up 68 per cent of the Territory's export earnings, other agricultural products, which together represent about 7 per cent of exports by value, are vegetable oils and cakes, fruit, tobacco, rice, coffee and horticultural products.

4. Except for cashew, of which Mozambique has in the past few years become the leading producer, accounting for almost half the total world exports of unshelled cashew, the Territory is not a major world producer of any other crop. It ranks fifth among African countries in the production of cotton and although it possesses the largest copra plantation in the world, its output of copra represents only 1 per cent of the world's supply and it produces only 0.6 per cent of the combined world output of sugar.

5. About one third of the agricultural exports go to Portugal or other Territories under Portuguese administration, including practically all the cotton, sugar and vegetable oils, which are exported under compulsory quotas and at fixed prices. The other major crops are exported mainly to foreign countries, the principal destinations being, for cashew India and the United States of America, for sisal France and the United States of America, for copra Spain, Norway, Israel and Denmark, and for tea the United Kingdom.

6. Mozambique's agricultural exports are all subject to various forms of government control. In the case of cotton and sugar government policy has been to direct practically all exports to Portugal at officially regulated prices, the object being to ease the burden on Portugal's balance of payments and, as concerns cotton, to provide an assured supply of raw material to the metropolitan textile mills at prices which, for many years, were below those prevailing in world markets. Similar controls apply to oil seeds although in most cases priority is given to the oil mills in the Territory. Other crops are subject to different forms of regulation and all are subject to exchange control.

7. Export tariffs and special taxes on agricultural products contribute to the general revenue of the Territory and to the financing of agricultural and allied forms of development. Thus, for cotton, special taxes, varying from 3 to 5 per cent *ad valorem* on exported raw cotton and 35 per cent on all cotton seed produced, are used to defray the expenditure of the Cotton Institute on the development and regulation of the

cotton industry and also for general agricultural development, including settlement, in cotton growing areas. In the case of sugar there is, in addition to the standard export tax of 1 per cent *ad valorem*, a surtax of 10 centavos per kilogramme. Crops which are exported to foreign countries usually pay a surtax and, where appropriate, an additional tax, *imposto de sobrevalorização*, calculated on the basis of the increase in price over that prevailing in 1949. For unshelled cashew, the special export taxes in July 1965 were a 2.5 per cent *ad valorem* surtax and a *sobrevalorização* tax varying from 479 escudos to 551 escudos per ton depending on the district of origin. For copra and sisal, tax rates have varied, depending largely on the conditions of the export market. At present, sisal is subject only to the standard duty of 1 per cent *ad valorem*, plus a surtax of 5 per cent.

8. Mozambique's main source of public revenue remains, however, its ports and railways which, together with other autonomous services, yielded 1,897 million escudos in 1965. In contrast, export duties yielded only 68.4 million, the *imposto de sobrevalorização* 11.8 million, and cotton taxes 33.7 million.

B. Pattern of production

9. Possessing a land area approximately seven times the size of Portugal with wide variations of climate and topography which make it possible to grow both tropical and temperate zone crops, Mozambique's agricultural potential still remains largely untapped. Though some areas, specifically the inland country between the Limpopo and Save rivers, the southern part of the Tete district and parts of Niassa district, suffer from aridity and poor soils, it is estimated that approximately one third of the total land area is suitable for tillage agriculture. Of this, less than 3 per cent is actually cultivated.

10. The exact extent of the area under cultivation is difficult to assess, mainly because much of African agriculture is still based on shifting cultivation. According to rough calculations it is believed that Africans cultivate an average of about 500,000 hectares, nearly half of which is devoted to subsistence food crops such as sorghum, maize, millet, manioc, beans and a variety of vegetables. Among cash crops, African farmers grow almost the entire cotton crop, most of rice, sesame and ground-nuts. They also produce, mainly from uncultivated trees and plants, about half the cashew crops, about 29 per cent of the Territory's copra, as well as castor seeds, mafurra and mangrove bark. These cash crops are sold to dealers at controlled markets and, in some cases, at officially fixed prices.

11. Most of the important export crops are, in fact, controlled by non-African capital since they are produced on European-owned farms and plantations or are purchased by non-Africans who control the processing factories. Certain cash crops, specifically sugar, sisal, jute, copra, tea, tobacco, maize, citrus fruit and bananas are solely or mainly grown on organized plantations and farms by Europeans using African labour. Likewise, cashew and rice are also being cultivated increasingly on European holdings. In 1961, the latest year for which such information is available, there were 2,707 non-African holdings totalling 1.7 million hectares of which, however, only 365,249 hectares were actually under cultivation. About 85 per cent of the holdings were owned by individual farmers in addition to which there were some thirteen large companies, mainly concerned with plantation-type crops such as sugar, sisal, copra, jute and tea, which require substantial capital investment. Table 1 shows the number and distribution of non-African agricultural holdings by districts in 1961, information on more recent developments being contained in the separate sections on the major cash crops.

TABLE 1. MOZAMBIQUE: NON-AFRICAN AGRICULTURAL HOLDINGS IN 1960-1961

District	Number of farms	Holdings		Area under cultivation (hectares)	Total labour force
		Total area (hectares)	Average area (hectares)		
Lourenço Marques	404	201,440	499	34,061	17,000
Gaza	830	171,282	206	18,046	8,300
Inhambane	165	112,829	684	15,567	1,652
Manica e Sofala	340	526,919	1,550	56,265	25,268
Tete	31	7,446	240	1,721	758
Zambézia	314	315,210	1,004	110,425	57,980
Moçambique	480	303,949	633	113,225	23,222
Cabo Delgado	103	47,449	4,607	23,897	4,374
Niassa	40	17,199	430	1,038	927
TOTAL	2,707	1,703,723	630	374,246	139,481

SOURCE: Mozambique, *Estatística Agrícola*, 1961.

12. Compared with ten years previously, this represents an increase of about 30 per cent in the total area of holdings; the proportion under cultivation remaining fairly constant at about 22 per cent. The largest relative increases were in the districts of Manica e Sofala, Lourenço Marques and Niassa where the area of holdings more than doubled.

13. It may be noted that out of a total of 2,423 agricultural enterprises existing in 1960, 2,246 were Portuguese owned. Of the remainder, 45 were owned by Indians, 32 by Germans, including several sisal estates, 26 by Greeks and 14 by British interests, including the largest sugar company.

14. The principal region of agricultural production is the area north of the Zambezi River and including most of the districts of Zambézia, Moçambique and Cabo Delgado. Long under-developed except for sisal and copra plantations along the coast, it now produces about three quarters of the Territory's cotton, four fifths of the cashew and peanut sales, most of the copra and sisal, much of the rice and tobacco and all the tea, in addition to a variety of other crops, including bananas, jute and vegetables. The principal zones of cultivation consist of (a) a low-lying coastal belt which is the main producing area for copra, sisal and cotton; (b) the interior highlands, particularly around Milange, Tacuane, Gurue and Malema where are located the principal tea and tobacco estates; and

(c) the interior of Cabo Delgado district which, in addition to the coastal belt, is the main cashew producing area. Elsewhere, particularly in the district of Niassa, there are large areas of untapped land, partly due to lack of communications and partly to poor soils and aridity. The district of Tete also remains relatively undeveloped, except near the border of Southern Rhodesia and on the highlands of the Angónia plateau in the north, which is predominantly a cattle-ranching area.*

15. In the central region, comprising the district of Manica e Sofala, agricultural development is mainly centred in the rich alluvial soils of the river valleys, and the interior highlands of the Chimoio *concelho*, adjacent to the Beira-Salisbury railway. The Zambezi and Buzi river valleys are the present centre of sugar production, while kenaf is grown industrially in the Púnguê river valley which is also the site of a proposed sugar development. In addition, the Zambezi, Púnguê and Revué valleys and the Chimoio uplands around Vila Pery are the

* Although the national herd numbers about 1.1 million head of cattle, production is almost entirely for the domestic market. Cattle ranching is restricted to tsetse free areas and, except for the Angónia region, is mainly undertaken by big agricultural enterprises to feed their own workers.

scene of colonization schemes based on maize, tobacco, cotton and rice. Elsewhere the Manica e Sofala district is sparsely populated and little developed despite the availability of an estimated 6 million hectares suitable for agriculture..

16. In southern Mozambique, which comprises the area south of the Save River, the most fertile agricultural zones are found in the valleys of the Limpopo, Incomati, Umbeluzi and Maputo rivers. Dairying, market gardening, rice and cotton cultivation are carried on near Lourenço Marques and the Incomati Valley produces sugar and bananas. The European and African settlement schemes in the Limpopo Valley (A/6000/Rev.1, chap. V, annex II) are important producers of food crops and the area is also notable for cattle raising and cashew production.

17. Complete production statistics are available only in respect of "organized" crops produced on non-African holdings. For African production, data are available only in respect of the quantities sold to traders or in licenced markets and do not include subsistence production. Since, however, sales of most crops to non-Africans must be made in licenced markets, this is probably a fair representation of the volume of cash crops grown by Africans. Table 2 A, below, shows the output on non-African holdings for the years 1950-1951 and 1960-1961, from which it can be seen that the value of output nearly doubled over the decade and that the largest proportional increases were in sugar, rice and cotton. Table 2 B, giving comparable data for crops purchased from Africans, shows an increase in value of only about 20 per cent.

TABLE 2. PRODUCTION OF CASH CROPS, 1950-1951 AND 1960-1961

A. Crops grown on non-African holdings						
Crop	Area under cultivation (hectares)		Production (metric tons)		Value (thousand escudos)	
	1950/51	1960/61	1950/51	1960/61	1950/51	1960/61
Cane Sugar	24,900	38,578	84,884	165,134	160,414	482,065
Tea	10,729	14,795	2,970	8,099	45,193	149,140
Sisal (fibre)	53,701	56,973	18,888	28,252	150,804	138,438
Copra	69,037	82,622	25,803	32,806	85,924	87,816
Rice	2,036	16,435	1,789	32,261	3,313	70,386
Tobacco	1,606	3,979	908	2,100	12,433	31,268
Fruits	8,747	10,705	31,843	31,080	25,726	29,310
Maize	38,687	29,379	23,871	23,447	34,061	28,859
Potatoes	1,010	2,570	4,201	10,040	8,895	24,679
Horticulture	1,065	1,924	8,545	10,570	9,158	13,158
Cashew (nuts) ...	37,026	59,937	3,320	5,829	7,811	12,232
Cotton (seed cotton)	830	3,286	190	1,110	216	3,450
Others	43,500	53,060	24,694	77,163
TOTAL	292,874	374,243	568,642	1,147,937

B. Crops purchased from Africans				
Crop	Production (metric tons)		Value (thousand escudos)	
	1951	1961	1951	1961
Rice	12,896	18,654	12,298	25,276
Sorghum	7,072	4,129	7,182	4,712
Maize	31,001	42,731	31,723	40,890
Wheat	535	4,231	1,072	10,577
Peanuts	15,157	17,111	21,699	31,374
Cashew nuts	38,313	34,563	81,879	59,951
Copra	13,696	9,958	62,626	26,587
Seed cotton	89,316	110,651	236,886	379,960
Manioc	30,722	12,341	24,198	8,658
Others	11,645	8,110	24,117	14,761
TOTAL	250,353	262,479	503,680	602,746

SOURCE: Mozambique, *Estatística Agrícola*, 1951 and 1961.

II. PRODUCTION, PROCESSING AND MARKETING OF MAJOR CROPS

A. Cotton

General

18. Cotton is probably one of the oldest exchange crops in Mozambique, having been introduced by Arab traders long before the colonial era. For various reasons, however, the Territory did not become an important producer of cotton until after the First World War when Portugal, faced with a need to conserve foreign exchange, introduced the special régime described in the preceding study for the purpose of supplying its textile industry. Between 1926 and 1932, the rate of development was slow partly because of the effects of the world economic depression and partly because the Territory lacked skilled agricultural technicians, but from about

1936 onwards production increased rapidly and by 1942 Mozambique had already established itself as Portugal's principal source of supply. In 1961, the Territory furnished over 62 per cent of Portugal's cotton imports by volume, accounting for about 3.7 per cent of the total value of all Portugal's imports.

19. Compared with major producing countries such as the United States of America or India, Mozambique's output is small. During the triennium 1960/61 to 1962/63 its share in world production amounted to only 0.3 to 0.4 per cent, and it accounted for less than 5.4 per cent of the combined output of Africa. In terms of Mozambique's own economy, however, cotton plays a major role. For the twenty years up to 1964, when for the first time it was surpassed by cashew exports, it was the Territory's leading export commodity, contributing in recent years about 30 per cent of the value of all visible

exports and engaging an average of over 500,000 African growers.

20. Cotton is cultivated throughout most of Mozambique, except in the interior highlands and the coastal marshes. The main productive region lies north of the Zambezi River, in the districts of Cabo Delgado, Niassa, Moçambique, and Zambézia which together produce more than two thirds of the total crop. Other important areas are the Limpopo and Umbeluzi river valleys in the south, the coastal area from the Limpopo northward to Vilanculos, and, in Manica e Sofala, the high land of the Gorongosa plateau.

21. The cotton cultivated is a long-fibre variety producing fibres of 28-34 millimetres. The crop is mainly exported as raw (ginned) cotton, predominantly to Portugal, although a small part (about 4 per cent in 1960) is used for the local manufacture of cotton thread and textiles. Cotton by-products such as oil and seeds are also processed locally and exported.

Organization of production

22. Cotton is predominantly an African crop grown on small plots of one or more hectares depending on the size of the family. Production by Europeans and others on a larger scale is relatively unimportant. In 1960/61, the last year for which detailed statistics are available, there were only 95 non-African farms with a combined area under cotton of 2,649 hectares producing only 1,010 tons of seed cotton, or less than 1 per cent of the Territory's output. A limited quantity of high-grade cotton is grown under irrigation by European settlers in the Limpopo Valley settlement and it is proposed to make irrigated cotton one of the basic crops of the 120,000 hectares settlement scheme in the Zambezi Valley which was included in the Transitional Development Plan for 1965-1967 (see A/6000/Rev.1, chap. V, annex II). The overwhelming bulk of cotton is produced, however, by Africans without irrigation.

23. The special régime for African-grown cotton has been described in a previous study. Prior to 1961 this involved directed cultivation supervised by the agents of concessionary companies with the support of the local administrative services and under the over-all guidance of the Cotton Export Board. The Board designated the areas where cotton was to be grown and determined the amount of land which Africans in the cotton zones were expected to cultivate. According to general instructions (*Bases para a Campanha Algodoeira*) drawn up by the Board and approved by the Governor-General in 1948, able-bodied African males between the ages of 18 and 55 were designated as cotton farmers (*agricultores*) and were each expected to cultivate one hectare of cotton, increased by one-half hectare for each wife after the first, plus an equal area of food crops. Single women, if able-bodied and between 18 and 45 years of age, and men between 56 and 60 years, were called cotton cultivators and were expected to cultivate one half hectare each of cotton and food crops.

24. As explained in the previous study, the African growers were under the supervision of the agents of the concession holders, who also distributed seeds and furnished tools. Within the cotton zones, the concessionary companies allocated the land to be devoted to cotton cultivation, subject to approval by the Board, and were required by legislation to group these areas into concentrations to permit the communal use of machinery and the balanced cultivation of food crops in conjunction with cotton. According to one report, however, efforts to bring about the regrouping of producers led to complaints from the African growers and in many cases were abandoned.^b

25. The number of Africans registered as cotton growers reached a peak figure in 1944 of 791,000,^c cultivating an area of 267,000 hectares and producing approximately 64,000 tons of seed cotton during the year. The rapid extension of cotton growing, however, added to other factors, had already given rise to serious food shortages in the cotton zones, amounting on occasion to famine proportions in some of the main cotton-

growing areas in the north. Consequently, from the early 1940s onwards efforts were made to eliminate marginal areas and to concentrate on increased yields while, under the legislation of 1946, concessionaires were given the additional responsibility of supervising the growing of food crops in their concessions. As a result the number of growers diminished until by 1949 it attained relative stability at approximately 520,000. In 1960, a year of peak production, there were 529,000 African growers cultivating an area of 297,000 hectares, or only 37,000 hectares more than in 1944. Their combined output of 139,740 tons was, however, more than double the earlier figure.

26. With the expansion of cotton production, the area controlled by some concessionary companies grew to immense proportions, one of them, for example (see below) holding twenty-three concessions covering about half of two administrative districts. According to one report,^d the possession of monopoly rights in such vast areas gave rise to many complaints that, despite the legal safeguards, concessionary companies were able to exercise pressure on Africans to grow cotton and to pay prices below the officially fixed minima.

27. The legislation of 1961 and 1963 put an end to compulsory cultivation and to all intervention by administrative officials in the growing of cotton. It also provided for the progressive abolition of the exclusive concessions, to be completed by 31 August 1966. The decree of 1963 which provided for the abolition of the concessions in effect separated the three functions which the concessionaires previously performed, namely (a) supervision of cultivation; (b) purchase of cotton from the growers; and (c) ginning and processing. The first function, including the selection of land, supervision of growers and distribution of seeds and tools became the sole responsibility of the Institute while the right to purchase cotton in any given market was to be allocated by competitive bidding to the licenced dealer who undertook to pay the highest prices above the official minima; where no dealer came forward, the Institute itself would purchase the cotton at the official prices. The former concessionary companies would continue to gin and process cotton, but would do so on behalf of dealers or the Institute on payment of an officially fixed commission. There was nothing, of course, to prevent a company owning a ginning factory from also being a licenced dealer.

28. During the present transitional period before the complete abolition of all concessions on 31 August 1966, it is not known which concessions are still extant and which have been abandoned. It appears, however, that many concessions were surrendered after 1963 which, on account of drought, was an unusually bad year for cotton production. Thus, one concessionaire, the Companhia da Zambézia, abandoned its concession in the district of Tete after reporting that it had incurred a net operating loss of over 4 million escudos in 1962/63 due to the fact that its cotton output had dropped from 1,249 tons in 1960 to only 340 tons in 1963.

29. Another indication of the extent of the changeover is a recent report that in 1964 the Cotton Institute purchased 40 per cent of the total cotton crop. It may be noted that the Institute was obliged to do this because of the absence of competition from licenced buyers in many markets. According to one source, the failure of licenced buyers to bid for the 1964 crop was due to resistance on the part of the former concessionaires to the new system.

30. Following the revision of the cotton régime, attention appears to be directed now towards more intensive cotton farming, either with irrigation, as in the Limpopo and Zambezi Valley Settlement Schemes, or in organized settlements for dry-land cultivation. Since 1963 the Cotton Institute has begun the organization of *colonatos* in the district of Moçambique, using the Cotton Development Fund, derived from taxes, licence fees and other revenue of the Institute, to provide housing, cleared land, transportation and communal depots of farm machinery. By the end of 1965, however, only two such *colonatos* had as yet been established, at Muíte and Cabo Antonio (*circunscrição of Imala*).

31. As stated above, the present position in regard to the concessionary companies is not clear. In 1960, however, there were 12 concessionary companies owning 17 ginning

^b Nelson Saraiva Bravo, "A Cultura Algodoeira na Economia do Norte de Moçambique", Junta de Investigações do Ultramar, *Estudos de Ciências Políticas e Sociais*, No. 66 (Lisbon, 1963).

^c This figure relates only to registered growers and may well understate the total number of Africans, including children, who were involved.

^d Bravo, op. cit.

factories and nine subsidiary ginneries with a total of 5,385 industrial employees. The largest of these companies, Companhia dos Algodões de Moçambique, with a registered capital of 150 million escudos, held a purchasing monopoly in 23 zones covering about half the area of the districts of Zambézia and Moçambique. In 1960 it purchased nearly one third of the total African crop. The second largest, Sociedade Agrícola Algodoeira, with a registered capital of thirty million escudos,

controlled nine cotton zones, including the whole district of Cabo Delgado, while the Algodoeira do Sul do Save, Lda. controlled most of the output in the districts of Inhambane and Gaza. Other companies held much fewer concessions and some, such as Sena Sugar Estates, Ltd. and the Companhia do Buzi (see section B) were primarily engaged in other activities. A list of concession holders registered in 1960 appears below.

MOZAMBIQUE: COTTON CONCESSIONARY COMPANIES IN 1960

<i>Company</i>	<i>District</i>
Algodoeira do Sul do Save, Lda.	Gaza and Inhambane
Companhia do Buzi, S.A.R.L.	Manica e Sofala (one zone)
Companhia Nacional Algodoeira	Manica e Sofala
Companhia da Zambézia, S.A.R.L.	Tete (one zone)
Sociedade Algodoeira de Tete, Lda.	Tete
Companhia Agrícola e Comercial Lopes e Irmãos	Zambézia (one zone)
Sena Sugar Estates, Ltd.	Zambézia (two zones)
Monteiro e Giro, Lda.	Zambézia (two zones)
Companhia dos Algodões de Moçambique	Moçambique, Cabo Delgado and Zambézia (23 zones)
Companhia Agrícola e Comercial João Ferreira dos Santos	Moçambique (6 zones)
Sociedade Algodoeira do Niassa	Niassa and Moçambique (5 zones)
Sociedade Agrícola Algodoeira (SAGAL)	Cabo Delgado and Niassa (10 zones)

Cotton textile industry

32. Legislation regulating cotton textile manufacture in the Overseas Territories is described in part two of appendix I above. It may be recalled that until June 1965 the establishment of cotton textile factories was governed by decrees of 1944 and 1945 limiting the amount of cotton textiles which each Territory could produce.

33. In 1963 there were five cotton textile factories in Moçambique, of which three were small producers of cotton goods for local consumption and a fourth, the Companhia Industrial Algodoeira, which produces only cotton-wool and bandages, was only slightly larger. The combined output of these four companies was valued at only 2.3 million escudos in 1960.

34. By far the largest cotton textile producer in both Moçambique and Angola is the Sociedade Algodoeira de Fomento Colonial (SAFC) which was formed in 1950 (Decree Law 37,847, 3 June) as the result of a merger of two textile companies, the Sociedade Algodoeira de Portugal in Moçambique, and the Companhia de Fomento Colonial in Angola. The present company has its headquarters in Portugal and has a factory in Moçambique (Textafrika) and one in Angola (Textang). The company is owned jointly by the Portuguese State and by metropolitan textile interests. Its board of directors, all Portuguese, consists of A. Magalhaes (chairman), J. Sobral Meireles, J. R. Machado Pinto, A. Pimental and J. C. Barbosa. The company's registered capital is 200 million escudos, but actual capital investment was reported to be 514.4 million escudos on 31 December 1964. In addition to its cotton textile factories, the company holds controlling interests in: the Sociedade Hidro-Eléctrica do Révúê which furnishes electric power to its Moçambique factory (19.5 million escudos); the Empresa Moçambicana de Malhas, a knitted goods factory in Moçambique (6.8 million escudos); the Companhia de Seguros Ourique, an insurance company (0.974 million); and the Cooperativa dos Produtores e Exportadores de Café of Angola (10 million).

35. The company's output of cotton textiles has been expanding rapidly in recent years, as is indicated by the growing value of its sales which, for both factories combined, rose from 22.5 million escudos in 1955 to 73 million escudos in 1960 and more than doubled between 1960 and 1964. The company's combined net profit amounted to 12 million escudos in 1961 and 16.1 million in 1964. The latter figure was made up of profits of 12.2 million and 5.2 million escudos in respect of its operations in Moçambique and Angola respectively, less a deficit of 375,000 escudos incurred in Portugal where it has its headquarters. In 1964, it distributed 10 million escudos to shareholders in the form of a dividend at 5 per cent.

36. The company's results for 1964 show that it was producing 18 million metres of textiles annually valued at 150 million escudos. The largest share of production, about three quarters of the company's total output comes from the Moçambique factory (Textafrika) located at Vila Pery in Manica e Sofala district. This factory was reported in 1961 to be equipped with 460 automatic looms and 14,460 spindles and to consume an average of 2,000 tons of cotton lint each year (representing about 5 per cent of the volume exported). The factory produces between 40 and 50 per cent of the cotton textiles consumed in Moçambique (see table 5). According to the chairman of the board of directors, reporting on activities in 1964, the company's operations had been affected by, among other things, the high prices which it had to pay to acquire cotton (owing to the export quotas and because cotton sold to local industry is subject to the same taxes as that exported to Portugal) and the limited markets in Angola and Moçambique. In 1960, the company's labour force at both factories consisted of 172 Europeans and 1,845 Africans whose wages totalled respectively 7.5 million escudos and 4.8 million escudos, the Africans receiving food and lodging in addition to their wages. By 1965 the total labour force had increased to 3,000.

37. Exports of cotton textiles amounted to only 29 million escudos in 1962, going almost entirely to Angola. The insignificant volume of cotton exported was apparently due to the production limit which was rescinded by the decree of June 1965. During the same year, the Territory imported, mainly from Portugal, 3,379 tons of textiles valued at 227.1 million escudos.

Other cotton by-products

38. Before the Second World War, cotton seed which was not required for replanting was destroyed. During the late 1940s, however, rising world prices justified the cost of export and cotton seed began to be exported, reaching a peak in 1949 of 26,470 tons, valued at 36.6 million escudos. Thereafter, exports of unprocessed seed rapidly declined as local oil mills began to be established. Under local legislation enacted in 1954 (Despatch of 31 May 1954) no exports of cotton seed are allowed until the quotas for the local oil mills are filled.

39. The vegetable oil industry includes three factories which manufacture cotton seed oil besides other oils. Two of these belong to the Companhia Industrial do Manapo, a subsidiary of the Companhia Industrial Portuguesa, and the third to the Moçambique Industrial, S.A.R.L. which has a registered capital of 21 million escudos. Most of the cotton seed oil produced, amounting to 6,571 tons (valued at 57.5 million escudos) in 1960, is consumed in the Territory and only an insignificant surplus is exported. The residue from oil milling likewise has

a value as fodder for livestock. Most of this produce is exported to countries in northern Europe. In 1962 it produced an export revenue of 43 million escudos.

The economic role of cotton

40. Since 1926 cotton production in Mozambique has been closely regulated in order to meet the needs of Portugal's textile industry. Supplied to Portugal under compulsory quota and produced until 1961 by forced cultivation, cotton has for the past twenty-five years been Mozambique's principal export product and the foremost economic activity of its inhabitants, engaging over one half million producers.

41. The main period of production increase dates from 1941. Prior to 1936 African production of seed cotton rarely exceeded 4,000 tons in any year and from 1936 to 1940 the average yearly output was under 20,000 tons. In 1941, however, it increased sharply to 51,000 tons and thereafter continued to increase, except for occasional bad crop years, as follows:

TABLE 3. MOZAMBIQUE: AFRICAN PRODUCTION OF SEED COTTON

Year	Production		Area cultivated (thousand ha.)	Number of growers (thousands)
	Volume (thousand tons)	Value (million escudos)		
1941-1950* ..	64.6	89.3	261	613
1950-1955* ..	99.6	262.8	266	504
1956	65.2	182.6	293	518
1957	108.2	309.5	300	513
1958	91.5	260.2	301	516
1959	134.9	393.6	312	536
1960	139.7	405.2	297	529
1961	110.1	379.9
1962	120.0

SOURCE: Cotton Export Board to 1960, thereafter *Estatística Agrícola*.

* Yearly average.

42. As may be seen from the above table, output remained fairly stable during the period 1941-1950, but showed sharp increases during the next quinquennium and again during the period 1957-1960, each increase being accompanied by a marked rise in the official prices (much of which was not however passed on to the grower since it was discounted to pay higher taxes). It is also noteworthy that the area under cultivation increased only slightly while the number of growers actually declined.

43. Between 1953 and 1962 raw cotton accounted for between 20 and 33 per cent of Mozambique's visible exports by value. Since 1960, however, its relative importance has declined rapidly to only about 18 per cent in 1963 and 1964 due partly to a falling off in production and prices but mainly to the rapid increase in exports of other commodities, particularly cashew. About 89 per cent of all the raw cotton produced in Mozambique is exported to Portugal and about 5 per cent is consumed in the local manufacture of textiles. Exports to other countries are insignificant, the largest foreign buyer in 1960 being Japan which received only 4 per cent of exports. Table 4 below shows the production and export of cotton lint.

44. It may be noted that the bulk of Mozambique's output of cotton lint is still exported to Portugal under the compulsory quota system for which export prices, c.i.f. Lisbon, are officially fixed although the decree of 1963 provided that this system should be terminated within a maximum time-limit of five years. As has already been pointed out in the previous study, these prices were until about 1956 substantially below international quotations for comparable grades of cotton. According to one source,^o the cotton exported to Portugal from Mozambique in respect of the crop years 1947-1955 would, if sold freely on the world market, have fetched about 6.9 billion escudos, or 60 per cent more than the 4.1 billion escudos paid by Portugal.

45. The same policy is reflected in the legislation relating to cotton textile manufactures, which was however revoked in June 1965. Under the legislation prior to that date, the local production of textiles was restricted by a maximum supply

TABLE 4. MOZAMBIQUE: PRODUCTION, LOCAL CONSUMPTION AND EXPORTS OF COTTON LINT

Year	Production (thousand tons)	Local consumption (thousand tons)	Portugal (thousand tons)	Exports		Percentage of total exports
				Total		
				Thousand tons	Million escudos	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
1955 ...	32.4	0.8	31.0	32.7	430.9	28.0
1956 ...	21.6	1.0	21.2	22.7	308.8	20.1
1957 ...	34.9	0.9	30.0	31.6	477.1	25.1
1958 ...	31.8	1.8	34.8	36.0	549.1	27.5
1959 ...	38.7	1.8	32.8	35.0	540.6	28.5
1960 ...	47.8	1.9	39.2	44.4	681.5	32.5
1961 ...	37.1	2.1	38.9	42.6	696.0	27.1
1962 ...	41.4	1.9	34.7	36.3	612.9	23.2
1963	31.6	33.0	527.8	18.0
1964	33.4	33.6	568.2	18.5

SOURCES: Columns (1) and (2): Mozambique, *Estatística Industrial, 1955-1962*; columns (3) to (6): Mozambique, *Comércio Externo, 1955-1962* and *Economia de Moçambique*, October 1965.

quota and by the requirement that raw cotton be sold to local manufacturers at the prices obtaining in Portugal. As is shown in table 5 below, imports of cotton textiles, mainly from Portugal, represent about 7.4 per cent of the total value of visible imports. It has been estimated by one source in Mozambique,² that were these imports to have been replaced by December 1964. Columns (3) to (5): Portugal, *Anuário* local production, it might have resulted in a reduction of the trade deficit and a corresponding increase in domestic product of about 251 million escudos in 1964, or about 1,361 million escudos over the years 1958 to 1964 inclusive.

^o Bravo, op. cit.

² *Economia de Moçambique*, Lourenço Marques, October 1965.

B. Sugar

General

46. The growing and processing of sugar cane constitutes one of the largest agro-industrial activities in Mozambique. Among the oldest crops cultivated in the Territory, its commercial exploitation began only at the end of the nineteenth century when the first big sugar enterprises were established under sub-concessions granted by the Moçambique and Zambézia companies. With a limited local market, sugar has been produced mainly to supply the needs of metropolitan Portugal and has been the object of government regulation and protective measures since 1901.

47. Approximately 65 per cent of the sugar produced in Mozambique goes to Portugal under quota, about 5.5 per cent

to other Portuguese Territories and about 29.6 per cent is consumed locally. Very little has been exported elsewhere. Mozambique supplied about 75 per cent of Portugal's sugar imports up to 1963, mostly in the form of raw sugar, and accounts for around two thirds of all sugar produced in Portuguese Territories. In 1964, however, Portugal imported 34 per cent of its requirements from foreign countries.

TABLE 5. MOZAMBIQUE: LOCAL PRODUCTION AND IMPORT OF COTTON TEXTILES

Year	Local production		Imports ^a		From Portugal (million escudos)
	Thousand tons	Million escudos	Total		
			Thousand tons	Million escudos	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
1955	1.1	37.3	5.7	362.3	294.9
1956	1.5	47.9	5.1	339.8	271.6
1957	1.3	41.8	5.0	335.9	263.6
1958	1.4	59.9	5.0	324.2	248.0
1959	3.1	70.7	5.3	330.5	241.5
1960	3.6	70.4	5.5	361.0	267.1
1961	4.1	109.3	3.4	210.4	161.8
1962	3.7	131.8
1963	3.2	147.6
1964	3.9	131.9	5.3	360.7	...

SOURCES: Columns (1) and (2): Mozambique, *Estatística Industrial, 1955-1962* and, for 1963 and 1964, *Boletim Mensal*, December 1964. Columns (3) to (5): Portugal, *Anuário Estatístico do Ultramar, 1955-1963*.

^a Includes cotton thread and cotton cloth.

48. Production has increased rapidly in recent years, particularly during the second half of the 1950's when average output was 66 per cent higher than in the preceding five years and double the pre-war average. Until 1961, when for the first time it was surpassed by rapidly growing cashew exports, sugar was Mozambique's second most valuable export crop equal to about half the export value of cotton. During the last decade it has contributed between 8 and 16.8 per cent of the total value of the Territory's exports.

49. In 1963-1964, Mozambique produced 181,775 tons of sugar. This represented about 0.6 per cent of world production and slightly more than 6 per cent of all sugar produced in Africa. Current development programmes, which are described in the following sections, will however greatly increase the Territory's output within the next few years.

50. Sugar is grown exclusively in the southern part of Mozambique in the river valleys where the alluvial soils and moist climate are reported to be capable of producing high yields. The cane is mostly a hybrid variety, producing in 1960-1961 an average yield of 6.1 tons of sugar per hectare. The crop is capital-intensive, grown mainly under irrigation and at present on factory-owned estates although recent developments indicate a trend towards a system of outgrowers. Up to 1961 all production was in the hands of three old-established companies, with estates in the valleys of the Zambezi, Incomati and Buzi rivers. The total area under cultivation at that time was 38,578 hectares. Since then, however, three new companies have entered the field, with plans which, if fully realized, will increase the area by an additional 121,000 hectares (see paras. 83-91).

Organization of production

51. At the present time, sugar production is in the hands of three companies: the Sena Sugar Estates, Ltd., which produces sugar on two factory estates at Luabo and Marromeu, in the delta of the Zambezi River; the Companhia do Buzi, S.A.R.L., which operates at Vila Guilherme in the Buzi Valley, south of Beira; and the Sociedade Agrícola do Incomati, with its estate at Xinavane, in the Incomati Valley, north of Lourenço Marques. In addition, three new companies have recently been established, but have not yet begun production. These are described separately below.

52. The Sena and Buzi companies have their origin in sub-concessions granted by the Moçambique and Zambézia chartered

companies at the end of the nineteenth century. The Incomati Company was formed in 1914. Of the three, Sena is by far the largest sugar producer, accounting for about 62 per cent of the Territory's sugar output, while the Incomati and Buzi companies produce respectively about 19 and 13 per cent.

53. The processing of sugar cane takes place in company-owned factories located near the plantations. The sugar is processed only to the extent of producing white sugar for local consumption and raw sugar (*ramas amarelas*) for export, since Portugal's import regulations have required that at least two thirds of the quotas supplied by the Overseas Territories take this form. Little use is made of the by-products of sugar because of the high cost of transportation. In 1961 about 28,000 tons of molasses were produced mainly for yeast factories in the Territory, while the Incomati Company produced 2 million litres of alcohol.

54. The area of sugar plantations was 38,577 hectares in 1960-1961, of which about 26,500 hectares were harvested during the year. This represents an increase of nearly 50 per cent over 1950-1951. During the same decade sugar production nearly doubled, rising from 89,000 tons to 165,000 tons, the difference being mainly due to higher yields per hectare which rose from an average of 4.9 tons of sugar per hectare to 6.2 tons in 1960-1961. With the introduction of improved systems of irrigation, it is expected to increase present yields, which compare unfavourably, for instance, with yields in Indonesia (8.5 tons per hectare).

55. In 1962, industrial investments by the three companies referred to above amounted to over 1,000 million escudos, 800 million of which was invested in plant and equipment and 133 million in housing for their personnel. Their combined registered capital was 488 million escudos.

(a) Sena Sugar Estates, Ltd.

56. A predominantly British-owned company, Sena Sugar Estates, Ltd. is the most highly capitalized agricultural enterprise in Mozambique. Its issued share capital on 31 December 1964 was £3,521,250 (about 300 million escudos), of which £3,071,250 consisted of ordinary stock, 90 per cent of which was held in the United Kingdom. Its total assets amounted to £5,277,205.

57. The company, in its present form, dates from 1920 and results from an amalgamation of properties the most important of which was the former Sena Sugar Factory founded at the beginning of this century. It has its headquarters in London and its board of directors, all British, is under the chairmanship of Lt. Col. J. D. Hornung, a relative of the original founder. The company has a wholly owned subsidiary, Sociedade Industrial do Ultramar, S.A.R.L., which operates the largest sugar refinery in Portugal, processing all Portuguese imports of the parent company, together with sugar manufactured by other producers.

58. The company's properties in Mozambique include 72,200 hectares of freehold land, about one fourth of which is used for sugar cultivation. Sugar is grown on two estates, one at Luabo on the northern bank of the Zambezi River in the district of Zambézia, and the other at Marromeu, on the southern bank of the river, in the district of Manica e Sofala. In 1958-1959, 10,865 and 9,762 hectares were under cultivation previously used for sugar growing, was converted into a cotton concession in 1936.

59. Like the other sugar estates, the company processes its own cane, owning two of the four sugar factories in Mozambique. These are located near the plantations at Marromeu and in the two estates respectively. A third estate, at Mopeia Chinde (Luabo). In 1963, the factories were reported to have a daily cane processing capacity of 3,200 and 2,900 metric tons respectively, representing 57.5 per cent of the total processing capacity in the Territory. During the past ten years, the production of sugar has fluctuated between about 91,000 tons and 126,000 tons, the peak year being 1962 when 126,486 tons of sugar were manufactured. In 1964, total production was 96,794 tons, of which about 56,000 tons were produced at Marromeu and about 40,000 tons at Luabo. In January 1965, the company announced the commencement of a major development pro-

gramme, details of which are given separately below (see paras. 83-91 below).

60. The existing installations owned by Sena Sugar Estates, Ltd. include 350 km. of small gauge railway linking the estates to the factories and an 88 km. extension from Marromeu joining the Trans-Zambézia Railway at Caia. In addition, the company operates a small river fleet on which it transports sugar to the port of Chinde where the company has its own loading installations.

61. Apart from its sugar producing activities, Sena until 1962 held a cotton concession centred on its Mopeia estate, where it operates a cotton processing factory. It also owns a small copra plantation near Chinde, where some 100,000 palms yield about 600 tons of copra annually, forestry concessions and a cattle ranch near Luabo. Industrial and commercial

activities of the company include cement manufacture, the processing of timber for export, and operation as a shipping agency.

62. In 1952-1953, the last year for which such information is available, the company employed 21,000 Africans and 397 Europeans. According to its own estimates, the company's total contribution to the Mozambique economy in the form of wages, taxes and local expenditures during the period 1932-1952 amounted to nearly 661 million escudos. In 1952, it expended 20.4 million escudos on African wages, plus 18 million escudos on the feeding of African workers and 2.7 million escudos on medical services.

63. Earnings from the various enterprises controlled by Sena cannot be deduced separately from the annual financial statements. The profits, tax provision and dividends paid annually over a four-year period are set out below:

	1960 £	1961 £	1962 £	1963 £
Net profit before taxes (including SIDUL)	654,169	244,466	637,117	540,429
Tax provision	278,295	159,986	288,716	264,271
Liquid profit	361,402	84,474	348,401	276,658
Dividend	199,632	122,850	122,850	122,850

(b) *Sociedade Agrícola do Incomati, S.A.R.L.*

64. The company was formed in 1914 under the name of Incomati Sugar Estates. Originally British-owned, it changed its name in the early 1950's when it apparently became wholly Portuguese. The company has its headquarters and sugar factory at Xinavane, near Lourenço Marques. In 1964, its authorized capital was 100 million escudos, of which 90 million escudos were paid up. It is the second largest sugar producer in Mozambique. In 1960-1961 it had 8,821 hectares under sugar cultivation from which it produced nearly 38,000 tons of sugar. Its output in 1962 amounted to 30,400 tons of sugar (consisting of 15,800 tons of white sugar and 14,600 tons of raw sugar) and 8,200 tons of molasses.

65. The only other known activity of the company is cattle-ranching which is carried out around Xinavane.

(c) *Companhia do Buzi, S.A.R.L.*

66. Constituted in 1898 to exploit a sub-concession granted by the *Companhia do Moçambique*, the company has its headquarters in the Territory and in 1964 had a registered capital of 110 million escudos. It is a multi-activity company and has been described as "the most important and most complete of all the agricultural and industrial organizations of Portuguese nationality in Mozambique." The original land concession, which expired in 1942 when the *Companhia do Moçambique* ceased to exist, covered 312,500 hectares. Although it is not known how much land is held at the present time, it is probably in excess of 150,000 hectares.

67. Engaged primarily in sugar production, the company is the smallest of the three sugar producers in Mozambique. In 1960-1961 it had 7,982 hectares under sugar cultivation from which it produced 33,200 tons of sugar (including 19,000 tons of white sugar), 10,900 tons of molasses and 2 million litres of alcohol. The company began large-scale sugar production in 1920 when it purchased the former British-owned Illovo Sugar Estates. Its alcohol distillery was installed in 1934.

68. The Buzi company was the first company in Mozambique to introduce sugar cultivation by outgrowers. In 1955 it allocated a portion of the land under its control to ten settler farmers who sell their sugar crop to the company in return for payment of a fixed percentage of the factory price. By 1964 these farmers were responsible for about half the company's sugar cane crop of nearly 209,000 tons. In 1965 it was reported that the company planned to install an additional twenty settlers.

69. In addition to sugar, the *Companhia do Buzi* formerly held a cotton concession which it relinquished in 1962 and is

engaged in forestry, cattle-ranching, the manufacture of ceramic tiles and the operation of flour mills, mainly producing maize flour for its own African employees.

70. In 1964 it was reported that the company's sugar factory, at Nova Lusitânia, was being remodelled by a British contractor at a cost of £300,000 (24 million escudos).

Government regulation and control

(a) *Historical survey*

71. Sugar is produced in the Overseas Territories mainly in order to supply Portugal's requirements and thereby save foreign exchange. For this reason since 1870, and more particularly since 1901, sugar from the Overseas Territories has been admitted to the Portuguese market under a heavily protective tariff and with quantitative guarantees. In 1930 when world prices slumped, it was decreed (Decree 18,021, March 1930) that all of Portugal's sugar imports should be reserved for the Overseas Territories, in so far as they were able to supply it, and a *grémio* of overseas sugar producers was created to determine Portugal's annual requirements and to allocate them among its members. There were no penalties attached to failure to meet quotas, which, combined with stabilized prices, were primarily intended to offer producers enough security to expand their production. As a result of this protection, the Overseas Territories were able to supply nearly all of Portugal's sugar imports from 1930 to 1945.

72. After the Second World War, however, sugar consumption in Portugal increased sharply and as this increase was not accompanied by an equivalent rise in the output of the Overseas Territories, Portugal was again forced to import from other sources, this time at prices far in excess of those paid to producers in the Overseas Territories. To remedy this situation, Portugal in 1949 (Decree 37,456, 24 June 1949) established fixed prices for overseas sugar and introduced penalties for producers who failed to meet their quotas. This policy was continued in Decree 38,701 (28 March 1952) which remains in force until 1967 and constitutes the legislative basis of the present régime described below. In 1965 a commission was established to study and make proposals concerning the new régime which will come into effect on 1 May 1967.

(b) *Present situation*

73. According to Decree 38,701, Mozambique and Angola are each guaranteed until 1967 the right to supply 50 per cent of the sugar consumed in Portugal. The actual amounts to be imported from each Territory, which may be more or less than half the total, are determined in advance for each crop year. These allocations and also any revision of the fixed prices, c.i.f. Lisbon, are decided by the Portuguese Government on the advice of the *grémio* of overseas sugar producers, taking into account the anticipated production, the needs of

* Mozambique, *Documentário Trimestral*, No. 32, December 1942.

TABLE 6. MOZAMBIQUE SUGAR COMPANIES: AREA, FACTORY CAPACITY AND OUTPUT, 1960-1961

Location	Registered capital (million escudos) ^a	Area (hectares)	Cane output		Factory capacity ^b (daily m/tons)	Sugar output	
			Thousand tons	Tons/ (hectares)		Thousand tons	Yield ^c
Sena Sugar Estates, Ltd.							
Marromeu (Manica e Sofala)	288 ^a	11,286	472	53.8	3,200	46.4	10.2
Luabo (Zambézia)		10,460	453	59.7	2,900	47.8	9.5
Sociedade Agrícola do Incomati	100	8,821	316	37.5	2,400	37.7	8.5
Xinavane (Lourenço Marques)							
Companhia do Buzi ..	110	7,982	287	43.2	2,100	33.2	8.6
Vila Guilherme (Manica e Sofala)							
	498	28,549	1,528		10,600	165.1	

^a Registered capital of the company and not only of the sugar factories and plantations.

^b All factories produce white sugar for consumption and raw sugar for export.

^c Number of tons of cane to produce one ton of sugar.

^d Authorized capital.

local consumption and the requirements of other Overseas Territories. Once these global amounts have been determined, the *grémio* allocates a quota to each of its member companies, the quotas being fixed on the basis of the amounts supplied by each company during the preceding two years. Companies are permitted to export to Portugal in excess of their quotas, but if they fail to fill their quotas because they have sold their sugar on the world market, they are liable to penalties; there is no penalty when the failure to meet the quota is due to unforeseeable circumstances. Provided that quotas are filled, producers may export any surpluses freely to other countries.

74. Mozambique in fact supplies about 75 per cent of Portugal's sugar imports. Over the past decade (1954-1955 to 1964-1965) its global allocation has increased from under 58,000 tons to nearly 132,000 tons. Table 7 below shows the

quota distribution by companies in each of eight crop years. Information is not available for the two subsequent years, but in 1964-65 Mozambique's global quota was 131,547 tons, distributed among the three companies as follows: Sena Sugar Estates, Ltd., 82,861 tons; *Sociedade Agrícola do Incomati*, 24,914 tons; *Companhia do Buzi*, 23,773 tons.

75. Producers in the Overseas Territories may supply up to one third of their quotas in the form of white sugar, the remainder being raw sugar (*ramas amarelas*) for refining in Portugal. Producers have not, in fact, taken full advantage of this concession and normally supply about four fifths in the form of raw sugar.

76. The import prices, c.i.f. Lisbon, are fixed by the Portuguese Government under the terms of Decree 38,701 which provides for the revision of prices if the *grémio* can show that

TABLE 7. MOZAMBIQUE: SUGAR QUOTAS FOR EXPORT TO PORTUGAL BY COMPANY
(Thousand tons)

	Territorial total	Sena	Incomati	Buzi	Actual exports to Portugal
1954-1955	57,880	41,880	8,000	8,000	46,529
1955-1956	82,850	53,650	15,800	13,400	82,707
1956-1957	82,900	53,877	14,002	15,021	84,950
1957-1958	93,030	62,804	15,626	14,600	93,028
1958-1959	100,621	65,369	18,066	17,186	100,221
1959-1960	106,588	70,253	19,281	17,054	106,518
1960-1961	105,784	64,500	22,941	18,343	105,710
1961-1962	101,976	57,000	23,961	21,015	98,594

costs of production, transportation charges, etc. have increased. In 1952 these prices were fixed at 2.85 escudos per kilogramme for raw sugar and 3.75 escudos per kilogramme for white refined sugar. These prices remained in effect until 1964 when (by Decree 45,691, 29 April 1964), the prices were raised to 3.35 escudos and 4.40 escudos respectively.

77. Sugar from the Overseas Territories is subject to an import tax in Portugal of 1.16 escudos per kilogramme for raw sugar and 1.45 escudos per kilogramme for white refined sugar (Decree 45,555, 8 February 1964). In addition a "national salvation tax" of 0.04 escudos per kilogramme is levied. This tax was originally introduced in 1928 during the world economic depression (Decree 15,814) and was essentially a luxury tax to increase public revenue. Its continuance to the present day is a cause of major grievance to sugar producers.

Production, exports and local consumption

78. The regulation and protection by Portugal of the sugar industry in the Overseas Territories has undoubtedly benefited

the producers, particularly during the long period of depression lasting from 1929 until the outbreak of the Second World War. On the other hand, it is claimed by some industrialists that, by gearing the development of the industry to Portuguese demand, it tended to inhibit expansion after the war when world prices were higher than those paid by Portugal.

79. In fact, Mozambique's sugar output has corresponded roughly with the growth of the Portuguese market. Between 1935 and 1939 average annual production amounted to 74,000 tons and thereafter it rose slowly to 76,000 tons in 1945-1946 and 89,000 tons in 1950-1951. During the next five years it remained fairly static because, despite a sharp rise in Portugal's consumption, production capacity, having been depleted during the pre-war and wartime years, was unable to meet the demands. By 1955-1956, however, the industry had been re-equipped and over the next eight years output more than doubled as is shown in the following table.

TABLE 8. MOZAMBIQUE: SUGAR PRODUCTION
(Thousand tons)

Crop year	Sugar production ^a			Molasses
	Total	Raw	White	
1955/56	124.1	66.0	58.1	26.8
1956/57	139.4	79.7	59.8	28.0
1957/58	164.0	89.2	74.8	31.8
1958/59	153.2	84.8	68.5	30.4
1959/60	165.7	82.2	82.8	33.3
1960/61	165.0	78.2	87.0	33.0
1961/62	165.1	78.2	87.0	33.0
1962/63	186.3	103.3	82.9	19.8
1963/64	181.8

SOURCES: Column (1)—Decree Law 45,691, 28 April 1964; columns (2), (3) and (4)—Mozambique, *Estatística Industrial*, 1956-1963.

^a Because of the different sources used there are discrepancies between the totals from columns (2) and (3) and the figures in column (1).

80. Although *per capita* sugar consumption in Mozambique is still low (7.9 kilogrammes in 1961) compared with many other countries, the amount of sugar consumed in the Territory has increased at a faster rate than production and exports during the past thirty years. In 1934-1938 the yearly average of local consumption was 5,400 tons. This increased to 27,677 tons for the period 1951-1955 and 40,318 tons for the

period 1956-1960. In 1961 the amount of sugar retained for the local market was 50,801 tons, or 30.8 per cent of total production.

81. Between 1946 and 1955 sugar accounted on an average for slightly less than 12 per cent of Mozambique's total domestic exports by value. In 1957 it reached a peak of 16.8 per cent, thereafter declining in relative importance despite a continuing increase in exports, to only 7.1 per cent in 1962. This relative decline is, of course, attributable to the more rapid increase in the export value of other products. In 1964, sugar ranked fourth among agricultural exports, after cashew, raw cotton and sisal. As the following section shows, this relative importance will probably change when current development projects come to fruition.

82. In the past about 86 per cent of Mozambique's sugar exports went to Portugal. Of the remainder, between 3 and 8 per cent were exported to India, about 9.5 per cent to the former Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland and small quantities to other Territories, including Timor and occasionally Macau. Since 1958, largely owing to the increased consumption in Mozambique, exports of sugar to non-Portuguese Territories in Africa have ceased, except for small quantities of molasses (8,000 tons in 1962). Under the International Sugar Agreement, Portugal has an allowance of 20,000 tons annually which may be used by any sugar producer in the Portuguese space. Up to 1962 Mozambique has not had any surpluses for such exports. The following table shows the amounts consumed locally and exported since 1955.

TABLE 9. MOZAMBIQUE—SUGAR: LOCAL CONSUMPTION, EXPORTS AND PRINCIPAL DESTINATIONS, 1955-1964

Year	Local consumption (thousand tons)	Exports ^a			Main destinations ^a			
		Thousand tons	Million escudos	Percentage of total export value	Portugal		Goa	Rhodesia and Nyasaland
					Tons	Percentage	(percentage)	(percentage)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
1955 ...	30.0	85.8	213.6	13.98	76,254	88.87	1.45	9.52
1956 ...	35.0	98.2	248.5	16.40	84,704	86.26	3.69	9.75
1957 ...	35.0	122.3	316.0	16.88	100,138	81.88	7.57	9.45
1958 ...	35.0	132.4	337.2	16.62	108,338	81.83	6.66	11.31
1959 ...	44.0	114.1	289.6	15.21	105,048	92.07	5.76	—
1960 ...	45.0	111.3	278.2	13.25	103,862	93.32	6.53	—
1961 ...	50.0	113.8	324.9	12.75	105,219	92.46	7.21	—
1962 ...	55.0	129.9	345.1	13.19	128,690	99.07	—	—
1963 ...	60.0	...	327.5 ^b	11.3 ^b
1964 ...	66.0	...	245.7 ^b	8.1 ^b

SOURCES: All data except column (1): Mozambique, *Comércio Externo*; column (1): Portugal: Decree Law No. 45,691 of 28 April 1964.

^a These figures do not include molasses.

^b Data derived from *Marchés Tropicaux*, 1 January 1966.

Recent developments

83. During the past five years there have been reports of considerable expansion in the sugar industry, which is coming to be regarded as one of the great economic resources of the Territory and as an effective means of colonizing previously unsettled areas of the country. Apart from the development programmes of the existing companies (see below), three new companies have been, or are in process of being established.

84. The first of these is the Açucareira de Moçambique, S.A.R.L. which was formed in 1964 and received a provisional concession of 15,000 hectares on the Púnguê River, about 35 km. from Beira, as well as authorization to construct a sugar factory with an annual capacity of 30,000 tons of sugar. The company had an initial registered capital of 8.5 million escudos, which was increased to 100 million escudos in March 1966 when it had completed its financial structure. According to information received in mid-1965 the company was endeavouring to obtain up to 70 per cent of its capital by local subscription in Mozambique, its shares being offered at prices accessible to small investors. The remainder of its share capital was to be made available to foreign financial interests which would furnish technical support. The French firm Compagnie pour

l'étude et le développement des échanges commerciaux (COMPADEC) was reported in 1965 to have expressed interest in subscribing a minority holding.

85. The company plans to allocate its entire land concession among 150 settlers with preference going to Mozambique residents already experienced in sugar growing and to young ex-soldiers from Portugal. Each family will receive sufficient land to produce 3,000 tons of sugar cane annually; the cost of land preparation, installation, buildings and equipment will be financed by the company to be repaid by the settler from the sale of his crops. Once repayment has been made the settlers will have freehold ownership of their farms. The plan provides for the formation of a growers' co-operative. It was estimated in early 1965 that the company's total investments would amount to 570 million escudos, of which 365 million would be for industrial equipment, and 206 million for the production of sugar cane.

86. The second company is the Marracuane Agrícola Açucareira, S.A.R.L. (Maragra) which was formed in 1963 by the Marracuane Agrícola e Comercial, Lda. with the aid of a loan of 220 million escudos from the Banco de Fomento Nacional and the Industrial Development Corporation of South

Africa.^h The new company is entirely Portuguese-owned and has a registered capital of 130 million escudos. Shares worth 30 million escudos were reserved for subscription in the Territory. The company estimated that total investments would amount to 430 million escudos.

87. The company received a land concession of 6,000 hectares at Manhica in the Incomati Valley. Part of the estate (2,800 hectares) will be managed directly by the company and the remainder (3,200 hectares) will be cultivated by settlers who will be assisted by the company and will sell their cane to it in return for a percentage (55 per cent) of the factory price. The Provincial Settlement Board is in charge of developing the settlement and of selecting and installing the settlers, chosen from among persons already in Mozambique. The settlers will be grouped in villages and the whole settlement will be provided with schools, hospital and recreational facilities. During the first phase of development, 100 European families and 3,200 African workers will be settled in the area.

88. The company has been authorized to construct a sugar factory which when fully developed will have an annual capacity of 60,000 tons of sugar. In addition, it has been authorized to establish a sugar refinery capable of fully refining up to 60 per cent of the sugar produced, one third of the output to be exported to Portugal, the remainder destined for local consumption.

89. The third new enterprise, potentially the largest sugar producer in any Territory under Portuguese administration, is being developed by the Portuguese Development Corporation, a subsidiary of the Anglo-American Corporation of South Africa. In 1964, the Corporation received from the Government of Portugal a land concession of 100,000 hectares located in the lower Zambezi Valley within a triangle bounded by Quelimane, Chinde and Vila Fontes. According to reports the investment capital is of South African and Australian origin. Half the concession will be exploited by the Corporation itself, the remaining 50,000 hectares to be allocated among 500 settlers, each receiving 100 hectares. The land to be distributed to the settlers will be prepared by the Corporation which will also render technical assistance to the growers. The irrigation system is being constructed under contract by a Japanese firm. Sugar production is expected to begin in 1966 or 1967. The Corporation has announced that its ultimate long-range target is an annual output of one million tons of sugar cane.

90. Finally, in January 1965, the Sena Sugar Estates, Ltd. announced the commencement of a major development programme on its existing estates, involving total investments of approximately 360 million escudos. The project includes the construction of a new irrigation system intended to increase the sucrose yield of the existing plantations and a corresponding improvement in factory capacity to bring the company's total output of sugar to about 160,000 tons in 1969 and to an ultimate target of over 200,000 tons by 1970. Of the estimated total investment, 136 million escudos (£1.7 million) will be spent on the installation of an overhead sprinkler irrigation system to be constructed over a period of three years and covering approximately 11,600 hectares of the existing plantations. The funds for this capital investment were being raised mainly in London and the contract for the irrigation work was awarded in January 1965 to a British firm, Wright Rain, Ltd.

91. In 1960-61 the total area devoted to sugar cultivation in Mozambique was 38,577 hectares which produced 1.5 million tons of sugar cane. It is evident therefore that the new developments described above will revolutionize sugar production in the Territory if all plans are fully realized.

C. Cashew

General

92. The cashew tree, indigenous to Brazil, was introduced into Africa and the Indian subcontinent during the sixteenth century. In Mozambique, where conditions are especially suited to its growth, it became widely disseminated by spontaneous reproduction and has long been utilized by the indigenous population as a food and for the manufacture of a fermented

drink.^k Its commercial exploitation did not begin, however, until after the First World War when India, which had a virtual monopoly on the processing and export of cashew nuts, began importing unshelled nuts from Mozambique for processing and re-export.

93. During the 1920s and early 1930s, exports to India were small, ranging from 1,000 tons to about 7,000 tons. In 1935, however, India's purchases of cashew from Mozambique rose sharply and, except during the Second World War, continued to increase until 1958 when exports reached a peak of over 97,000 tons valued at 278 million escudos, making cashew one of Mozambique's four major export crops.

94. India's rapidly growing purchases of cashew from Mozambique, which were accompanied by a threefold increase of prices between 1945 and 1958, was due to the opening up of a large world market which Indian production alone could not supply. Even today, the market, especially in the United States of America, is continuing to expand and Mozambique's exports, both in volume and unit value, have grown, the total receipts from cashew exports more than doubling between 1962 and 1964.

95. At the present time Mozambique produces about 150,000 tons of unshelled cashew yearly and accounts for almost half the total of world exports.^j In 1964, Mozambique's exports of cashew amounted to nearly 128,000 tons, valued at 608.4 million escudos and, together with cashew nut shell liquor (11 million escudos), accounted for 20.4 per cent of the Territory's visible exports by value. In 1964, for the first time, the value of cashew exports exceeded that of cotton by nearly 55 million escudos.

96. Although intensive efforts have been made, especially since 1959, to develop industrial processing of cashew in Mozambique, about 97 per cent of the exports in 1964 still consisted of raw cashew sent to India for processing and re-export. The reason for this is that the Indian industry is highly organized and is able to operate large-scale manual decortication at substantially lower cost than elsewhere. In Mozambique, where large concentrations of workers are not readily available and production costs are higher, attention has concentrated on a search for suitable mechanical equipment, both to decorticate the nut and utilize the by-products. A number of techniques have been developed and factories are being rapidly equipped. Though these are still partly experimental, the amount of capital involved suggests that technical problems are being finally overcome. If world consumption continues to increase, cashew may become an outstanding source of wealth and foreign currency for Mozambique. It is estimated that at market prices, the cashew exported in 1964 would, if fully processed, have earned more than 900 million escudos.

97. The cashew tree grows spontaneously over large areas of Mozambique, particularly in light sandy soils in the coastal regions, the heavy clay soils of the Zambezi River delta being the only coastal region where it is not found. It is especially prolific in the Moçambique and Cabo Delgado districts where trees not uncommonly reach a height of up to forty feet, with a spread of over fifty feet. In 1961, the last year for which such information is available, about 60 per cent of the output came from Moçambique district, the most important producing area being around Nampula. The district of Cabo Delgado, although rich in cashew trees, produced only about 20 per cent of the total output owing mainly to difficulties of transportation. The regions next in importance are the districts of Inhambane and Gaza with 18 per cent of total production in 1961. The district of Manica e Sofala, although well-suited to cashew, at present produces only a little because of measures taken at the beginning of this century to reduce the number of trees in order to restrict the manufacture of alcoholic liquor from cashew (see foot-note j above).

^j In 1909 a tax on cashew trees was imposed in Manica e Sofala district in order to limit the number of trees and thereby the amount of alcoholic drink consumed. A former governor, Antonio Enes, writing in 1893 described the cashew as a "tree of vice and ruin", which it would be well to eradicate.

^k Statistics of world production are not available. India, which is the next largest producer, exported 80,000 tons in 1964.

^h In 1966 it received additional loans, totalling 50 million escudos from the Banco Nacional Ultramarino and the Banco de Fomento Nacional.

98. The cashew tree requires about five to six years of growth before it begins to produce fully and it attains its maximum productivity at about twelve years. The tree produces a fruit, commonly known as the "pear", to which the nut is attached. The fruit, which has an astringent taste and is rich in vitamin C and glucose, is commonly eaten or used to produce a fruit juice and an alcohol; in some countries, especially Brazil, these have been developed commercially. The kernel of the nut, which is the main product, can also be used for the extraction of cashew oil. From the husk can be extracted cashew nut shell liquor, which has many industrial uses as a varnish or lacquer or in the manufacture of synthetic rubber and insecticides,^k and in some countries the wood of the tree and the resins extracted therefrom are also used commercially. In Mozambique, so far the only by-product being developed commercially is cashew nut shell liquor.

Organization of production

99. Cashew is predominantly an African crop, more than 87 per cent of the total output coming from sales by Africans. Most of this is obtained from uncultivated trees although, as prices rise, Africans are increasingly growing cashew in combination with other crops and plans have recently been made for settlements based on cashew in the districts of Moçambique and Gaza (see para. 130 below). The African produce is sold to traders, who export the unshelled cashew directly to the processing companies in India with which they have connexions. Until 1964, when the Government began to fix minimum prices to be paid to producers in various areas, the prices depended solely on the available supply and the import prices set in Bombay. The traders being usually also the purveyors of consumer goods to African trading posts, storekeepers offer credit against supplies of cashew. According to a Portuguese source,^l prices are usually high at the beginning of the harvesting season, thereafter dropping as the supply continues. In 1961-1962 for example, in the area of Antonio Enes, the initial price was 2 escudos per kilogramme, falling to 1.5 escudos, thereafter increasing briefly to 2.50 escudos as the supply decreased and then dropping to one escudo per kilogramme. Prices vary according to the quality and size of the nuts, those coming from the northern regions, especially in the area of Nampula, being larger and more valuable, and also according to transportation costs.^m It may be noted that the average export price of the unshelled nut was 3.6 escudos per kilogramme in 1960 and 3.7 escudos in 1961.ⁿ Since the establishment of new processing factories in the Territory, Africans have been able to sell some of their produce directly to the factories at officially fixed prices.

100. The actual number of Africans engaged in the growing or collection of cashew nuts varies from year to year. In the agricultural census of 1962, it was estimated that in the district of Moçambique, which accounted for nearly two thirds of African production, some 279,114 Africans were engaged in collecting nuts from about 10.6 million trees. In Cabo Delgado district, 96,332 Africans were reportedly collecting from over 3 million trees and in the district of Niassa, it was reported, 4,535 Africans were involved in collecting from about 26,500 trees. If the first two districts are taken as the standard it may be seen that the average number of trees per producer was 35 which, at an estimated yield of 20 kilogrammes per tree, would have yielded an average income of 700-1,400 escudos at the prevailing prices.^o

101. Cashew grown on non-African holdings is sold at approximately the same or slightly higher prices depending on quality. Until the mid-1930s very little cashew was produced on non-African farms and it is only recently, with the rise in prices and the establishment of processing factories that it has

begun to increase significantly. As late as 1960-61, production on non-African farms amounted to only 6,718 tons, or about 8.3 per cent of the total output. Nevertheless, in that year 59,963 hectares, or one sixth of the cultivated land controlled by non-Africans was planted with cashew, the number of trees being estimated at about 5 million, of which 3 million were in production. Most of this area, 50,610 hectares, was located in the district of Moçambique.

102. Although most large agricultural companies grow some cashew, non-African production is mainly on small or medium-sized farms, where the trees are interspersed with other crops. In 1960-1961 there were 199 farms producing cashew, 191 of which were reported to be owned by Portuguese or companies of Portuguese registration. Two of the large multi-agricultural companies, José Ferreira dos Santos and the Companhia Agrícola de Angoche have recently established their own processing factories (see following section).

Processing industry

103. In 1964 about 97 per cent by weight of all cashew exported from Mozambique consisted of unshelled nuts, nearly all of it going to India for decortication and re-export. The reason for this virtual monopoly by India of cashew processing is the availability in that country of an abundant and experienced labour force which makes it possible for Indian producers to operate large-scale manual decorticating factories at a cost per kilogramme of output about one third of that in Mozambique.^p Besides higher costs of production, Mozambique industrialists also have difficulty in recruiting in any given area the large number of workers which such a factory requires, since the population is dispersed and there are relatively fewer African women compared with men seeking employment.

104. Nevertheless, the local processing of cashew before export offers clear economic advantages to Mozambique, partly because it would reduce the Territory's dependence on India, which is also its principal competitor, but more especially because the export value of the shelled nuts and the liquor contained in the shell is roughly 50 per cent higher, depending on price changes, than that of the unshelled nuts. The following table, based on data prepared under Government auspices,^q shows the difference between the actual value of the unshelled cashew exported and the value which the shelled nut and liquor content would have had if the crop had been processed before export.

TABLE 10. INFLUENCE OF INDUSTRIALIZATION ON THE VALUE OF CASHEW EXPORTS

Year	Actual exports of unshelled cashew		Estimated export value of shelled nut and liquor content ^a (million escudos)	Difference (million escudos)
	Tons	Million escudos		
1951 ..	44,100	88.7	179.1	90.4
1952 ..	47,350	134.1	196.6	62.5
1953 ..	55,843	176.6	218.6	42.0
1954 ..	58,892	145.4	186.6	41.2
1955 ..	49,060	127.4	194.6	67.2
1956 ..	37,974	126.4	227.4	101.0
1957 ..	68,231	223.3	389.7	166.4
1958 ..	95,973	253.3	485.6	232.3
1959 ..	61,903	177.0	311.3	134.3
1960 ..	55,848	199.9	339.3	139.4
1961 ..	84,582	315.0	489.9	174.9
1962 ..	80,748	230.9	462.6	231.7

^a Estimated value at prevailing market prices.

105. From 1932 onwards efforts were made to discover effective techniques for the mechanical processing of cashew which would offset the competitive advantage enjoyed by the Indian industry. The most difficult technical problem, although

^p In 1961-1962 it was estimated that in Goa skilled female workers could produce more than twice the output of unskilled workers in Mozambique.

^q A. Ramalho Correia, "A industrialização da castanha de Caju", Direcção dos Serviços de Economia e Estatística Geral (Mozambique, 1963).

^k In the United States it is classified as being of strategic importance.

^l J. do Amparo Baptista, *O cajueiro em Moçambique* (Lourenço Marques, 1959).

^m In 1963 the average price to the grower fell to only 1.5 escudos per kilogramme. Since then it has averaged 3 escudos.

ⁿ In 1964 the average export price of unshelled cashew rose to over 4.5 escudos per kilogramme.

^o At the present price of 3 escudos per kilogramme, average income would be 2,100 escudos.

not the only one, was to devise a machine for removing the shell without too frequent damage to the kernel. Between 1932 and 1954, the Government received thirty-two requests to establish experimental decorticating plants, but most of these were rejected as impractical or failed after a brief experience. During World War II, when exports to India were interrupted, there was a limited amount of manual decortication, mainly to supply the South African market. In 1954 the Government adopted a policy of authorizing only small decorticating plants in scattered locations for experimental purposes so that the field should be kept open for new inventions and so that the overseas market should not be adversely affected by the premature export of inferior produce.

106. By 1959, except for a small cottage industry based on manual decortication in northern Mozambique, only two companies were actually operating, although more than thirty applications were pending. The two companies, both at Lourenço Marques, were Caju Industrial de Moçambique, S.A.R.L. established in 1950 and the Industrial Nacional de Caju e Derivados, S.A.R.L. later known as the Sociedade Cajueira Moçambicana, S.A.R.L. Both were originally founded by a Portuguese settler, Colonel Baldini Vissenjou. These two companies were small, producing between them a maximum of 1,900 tons of shelled cashew yearly by manual decortication and both were primarily concerned with the development of mechanical processing.

107. In 1959, because of the failure to perfect mechanical processing, the Government changed its policy and decided to grant all applications on an experimental basis. Between 1959 and 1962, a total of twenty-nine new companies received licences authorizing them to process yearly from 3,000 tons to 100,000 tons of cashew each.

108. Of the companies authorized up to 1962 few are still operating and only one on the scale originally intended, the exception being Caju Industrial de Moçambique, which absorbed several other companies during the 1950s. In 1962 there were five separate companies in operation, three of them mechanized to some degree, the other two engaged in manual decortication on a small scale. Of these five companies, the largest employed about 4,000 women and the next largest employed 500 and 200 respectively. The combined output was only about 2,000 tons of shelled nuts and 1,340 tons of cashew nut shell liquor.

109. After 1962, with the world market for cashew expanding rapidly and prices generally rising, efforts to develop local processing were intensified. A final breakthrough in the technological field appears to have been accomplished within the past two years and it is now reported that several mechanical processes, Italian, South African and Portuguese, have been developed which are considered to be satisfactory. One of these, a Portuguese invention announced in 1965, is said to be able to process 90 to 100 kilogrammes of unshelled cashew per hour, its output during a twenty-four-hour period being equivalent to that of seventy-two manual operators. The proportion of unbroken kernels is said to average 65 per cent. These new inventions pave the way for a substantial development of the industry which is now taking place (see paras. 128-132 below).

110. In July 1965 there were eleven companies holding licences to process cashew, their combined authorized capacity amounting to 260,000 tons of raw nuts annually, or nearly double the actual output. In fact, however, only five were in operation. These are described below.

(a) *Caju Industrial de Moçambique*

111. This is the oldest cashew processing company in the Territory, having been formed in 1950 by the partners Baldini Vissenjou and Jiwa Jamal Tharani to exploit a mechanical process invented by the former. During the first ten years of its existence the company pursued an ambitious programme of expansion, absorbing several of its competitors when they became insolvent, with the result that it also encountered financial difficulties. It was able to continue, however, by obtaining the financial support of the Banco Nacional Ultramarino, which is now its principal shareholder and has a controlling interest in its administration.

112. The company has its headquarters and main factory at Lourenço Marques. In addition, because of a shortage of female workers in the urban area, it operates seven satellite

factories engaged in shelling cashew both manually and mechanically in the vicinity of Lourenço Marques, and nearby at Manhiça and Marracuene. Caju Industrial also controls three other small companies in the Lourenço Marques area which, although not owned outright by Caju Industrial, sell all their output to it at fixed prices. These are the Fomento Industrial de Caju Lda., the Sociedade Cajueira Moçambique, S.A.R.L. and Fábrica Nacional de Caju, Lda. These three companies are in effect subsidiaries of Caju Industrial, having entered into their agreements with it because of financial difficulties.

113. In 1961 Caju Industrial had total fixed assets worth 26 million escudos. Its authorized maximum capacity is 15,000 tons of unshelled nuts,^{*} which was already nearly reached in 1964 when it processed more than 14,500 tons. It is reported to employ a total of 4,000 manual workers and eighty technicians and to have paid 18 million escudos in salaries and wages during 1963. The wage rate paid to women manual workers in the satellite factories was 345 escudos per month, out of which 15 escudos (\$US.50) was deducted every six months for the purchase of overalls.

(b) *Sociedade Industrial de Caju e Derivados (CAJUCA)*

114. This company was established in 1962 to exploit machinery invented in Italy. The company was organized by Italian interests and has a registered capital of 15 million escudos. At present it has three factories located at Machava (near Lourenço Marques), Antonio Enes (Moçambique) and Mocimboa da Praia (Gabo Delgado). The three factories have a combined authorized capacity of 45,000 tons of unshelled cashew but in 1963 it was reported that the company's actual consumption was only about 6,000 tons. It has recently requested a licence to establish another factory at Machava, near Lourenço Marques.

(c) *Companhia Agrícola e Comercial João Ferreira dos Santos*

115. This company, which is one of the largest agro-industrial companies in Mozambique (see para. 183) obtained a licence in 1960 to operate a manual decorticating factory at Mossuril (district of Moçambique) with a capital investment of 3.5 million escudos. In February 1966 it was reported in the Press that the company, in partnership with other Portuguese interests, had obtained a licence to establish four factories for mechanical processing with a combined capacity of 100,000 tons in the north of the Territory (see para. 131 below).

(d) *Companhia de Culturas de Angoche, S.A.R.L.*

116. Also one of the major sisal producers (see paras. 180-182 below), the company in 1960 requested licences to establish two factories at António Enes and Moma (Moçambique district). The company was authorized to process up to a maximum of 10,000 tons of unshelled cashew at each of these factories. Production is at least partly mechanized, the equipment used being the same Italian machinery introduced by CAJUCA. There is no available data concerning output, which consists of both shelled cashew and cashew nut shell liquor.

(e) *Spence and Pierce, Lda.*

117. This company, which received its licence in 1962, is largely owned by a British firm, Pierce Leslie and Co., Ltd., which has cashew factories in India. The company had a registered capital of 3.2 million escudos in 1962 and had one factory located in the suburbs of Inhambane with a maximum authorized capacity of 2,000 tons of unshelled nuts. In 1963 it was reported to have invested about 1.5 million escudos and to be employing 600 workers. Its authorized capacity has since been increased to 25,000 tons and in 1964 it planned to open another factory at Maxixe, near Inhambane.

118. Apart from the above, nine other licences to operate cashew factories were extant in 1963 but there is no information to indicate that they have since begun operations or, in some cases, that the companies have even been formed.

^{*} Recently increased to 25,000 tons.

119. It may be noted that up to August 1965 when important new projects for cashew development were announced (see paras. 128-132 below) none of the existing companies, except for Caju Industrial, was operating at a level sufficient to fill its authorized quota. The following table shows the output and value of shelled nuts and shell liquor.

TABLE 11. MOZAMBIQUE: PRODUCTION OF SHELLED CASHEW AND CASHEW LIQUOR

Year	Production (tons)		Value (million escudos)	
	Shelled nuts	Shell liquor	Shelled nuts	Shell liquor
1955	980
1956	1,043	366	22.2	2.0
1957	1,221	783	26.7	4.3
1958	1,215	614	23.5	3.4
1959	1,249	488	29.9	1.7
1960	1,566	441	38.0	2.3
1961	1,442	1,064	34.4	5.4
1962	1,937	1,341	43.9	3.0
1963
1964	2,988	...	84.7	...

SOURCE: Mozambique. *Estatística Industrial*, 1956-1963, and *Boletim Mensal de Estatística*, 1964.

Government regulation and controls

120. Government regulation has aimed primarily at fostering the infant processing industry. On the one hand it was the policy of the Government up to 1959 to limit the durations of licences for cashew processing as well as the volume which each company could process so as to keep the field open for new mechanical discoveries. On the other hand, the Government took steps to ensure that the processing companies received a sufficient supply of raw cashew at controlled prices.

121. Between 1951 and 1961 it was the practice to require each exporter to reserve a percentage of his exports to be made available to the existing companies according to fixed quotas.* The Government established a maximum price to local industry, providing that if the export price was lower, the price to the industry should be the f.o.b. export price, less all expenses and duties connected with exportation. The maximum price was in some years below the average export price and in 1956 it was decided that the maximum should be the fiscal export value (which is less than the real export price), thus giving a marginal price advantage to local industry.

122. In 1961, the system was modified by giving local industry the right of option to buy any cashew from exporters if it could be shown that the net price offered by local processors was not less than the net export price. This was to enable the processing companies to select higher quality cashew and to purchase at times when export prices were low.

123. Finally, in 1964 it was decided that all unshelled cashew was in principle reserved to local industry and that exports would be authorized only if local processors had not declared within a time-limit of twenty-four hours, their intention to acquire it at the option price, which was fixed at 20 centavos per kilogramme above the net export price.

124. Until February 1955 the local processing industry enjoyed no special tariff protection. Under a decree of 1950 (Decree 38,146, 30 December) both shelled and unshelled cashew were subject to the same export levies, consisting of a 1 per cent *ad valorem* duty and an 8.5 per cent surtax. In 1955 the surtax on shelled nuts was reduced to 6 per cent *ad valorem* while the surtax on unshelled nuts was increased to 10 per cent (Order 15,272, 12 March 1955). In 1960 (Decree 43,081, 19 July) shelled cashew was exempted from all export taxes while unshelled cashew remains subject to a 2.5 per cent surtax and the *sobrevalorização* tax imposed on the difference between current prices and those in 1949. In July 1965, the *sobrevalorização* tax ranged from 479 to

551 escudos per ton according to the prices at the ports of embarkation.

Exports and destinations

125. The total value of cashew exports has increased from only 41 million escudos in 1946 to over 608 million escudos in 1964. This represents an increase in value over twenty-eight years of 1,383 per cent while volume increased by 245 per cent, the difference being accounted for by an approximately fourfold rise in prices. As is shown in table 13, the sharpest increase both in value and tonnage occurred after 1962 and has brought cashew to first place among Mozambique's exports by value. Among the reasons for this remarkable growth is the expansion of the market in the United States and the successful efforts by India to diversify her exports by developing markets in other countries.

126. As yet, local industrialization is only beginning and processed products constitute only a small proportion (10.6 per cent in 1964) of the total value of cashew exports. On the basis of prices prevailing in 1963, however, it is anticipated that by processing the entire crop before export it would be possible to increase its export value by 30 to 50 per cent. Recent developments suggest that the proportion of processed cashew exported may increase substantially in the years to come. To what extent this will affect prices depends on the elasticity of supply in other countries and the growth potential of the world market, neither of which can at present be accurately predicted.

127. Table 13 shows the combined exports of shelled and unshelled cashew in recent years and the main countries of destination. Table 12 contains data on the exports of shelled nuts and cashew nut shell liquor. It may be noted that over 90 per cent of the processed products are exported to the United States.

TABLE 12. MOZAMBIQUE: EXPORTS OF SHELLED CASHEW NUTS AND SHELL LIQUOR

Year	Export volume (tons)		Export volume (million escudos)		Percentage of total exports
	Shelled nuts	Liquor	Shelled nuts	Liquor	
1955	996	304	16.1	1.0	8.5
1956	1,029	377	25.3	1.6	10.1
1957	1,127	639	26.1	3.0	13.5
1958	1,227	230	24.9	1.1	13.8
1959	1,130	485	22.8	2.4	10.6
1960	1,355	990	33.5	4.7	11.3
1961	1,058	963	24.8	4.9	13.5
1962	1,900	1,405	43.4	8.4	10.8
1963	2,685	1,022	61.3	6.5	14.5
1964	3,193	1,263	83.2	11.1	15.5

SOURCES: Mozambique. *Comércio Externo*, 1956-1963, and *Boletim Mensal*, 1964.

Recent developments

128. Until 1965, the cashew processing industry was still in an experimental phase and, apart from the three leading producers, Caju Industrial, Spence and Pierce and the Companhia de Angoche, was mainly concerned with the development of machinery which would permit large-scale production at a later stage.

129. News reports in 1965 appear to indicate that this phase is coming to an end. Several mechanical techniques are reported to have been evolved which are said to be suitable for large-scale processing and new factories are being built to exploit them.

130. In August 1965, a new company, Indústrias de Caju Mocitas, was constituted with an initial registered capital of 20 million escudos, which may be increased to 85 million escudos. The controlling interest is held by the Anglo-American Corporation of South Africa, which subscribed 11 million escudos of the initial capital, and subsidiary interests by Tiger Oats and National Milling Co., Ltd. of South Africa (5 million escudos) and Indústria Prodotti Alimentari da Bologna (4 million escudos). The company is building a

* Circular of 27 October 1951 issued under the general authority of Order 10,077, 24 April 1947. The percentages, quotas and prices were adjusted from time to time by subsequent orders.

TABLE 13. MOZAMBIQUE—CASHEW: EXPORTS AND PRINCIPAL DESTINATIONS, 1955-1964
(Shelled and unshelled nuts)

Year	Exports			Main destinations (percentage of export volume)			
	Thousand tons	Million escudos	Percentage of total export value	India	United States	South Africa	Portugal
1955	50.1	143.4	8.46	98.00	1.81	0.13	—
1956	39.0	151.6	8.74	97.26	2.21	0.31	0.02
1957	69.1	249.4	12.29	97.93	1.35	0.18	—
1958	97.2	278.2	13.71	98.73	1.09	0.13	0.01
1959	63.0	199.7	10.49	94.34	1.47	0.27	0.02
1960	57.2	233.4	11.12	93.71	1.92	—	0.01
1961	85.6	339.7	13.33	97.54	0.99	0.21	0.01
1962	82.4	274.3	10.49	97.59	1.93	0.25	0.01
1963	121.9	465.4	16.07
1964	127.8	608.4	19.99	95.50	1.88	0.19	1.39

SOURCE: 1955-1963: Mozambique, *Comércio Externo*; 1964: Mozambique, *Boletim Mensal*, December 1964.

factory at Vila de João Belo (Gaza district) with an initial capacity of 15,000 tons to be increased to 30,000 tons. The factory will be entirely mechanized, using Italian machinery, and it is reported that the total investment will amount to 85 million escudos during the first phase of development and ultimately to 170 million escudos. According to press statements the company is weighing the possibility of participation by the Agricultural Association of Gaza. The latter has prepared a plan, based on the new factory, to develop 30,000 hectares of cashew plantations in the Gaza region. One third of this would be distributed among European members of the Association, who would receive 100 hectares each and would be required to develop it at their individual expense. A further 10,000 hectares would be distributed among soldier-settlers, who would receive 50 hectares each, and an equal area would be reserved for African settlement in lots of 25 hectares per settler. Both soldier-settlers and Africans would receive a monthly financial allocation until production commenced. All cashew produced would be sold to the Mocita factory and on the basis of one ton per hectare, it is estimated that the crop would be worth 3,000-escudos per hectare and that the African settlers would each earn 75,000 escudos yearly. The plan also provides for the building of medical centres, churches and primary schools. A similar plan has been proposed, centred in the district of Moçambique, which calls for the allocation of 20-hectare plots among Africans, preference being given to those already living in the region. In this second project, African settlers would receive technical guidance in the planting and cultivation of cashew and would be assisted to form co-operatives and acquire tools.

131. It was also reported in February 1966 that the Companhia Agrícola João Ferreira dos Santos had entered into partnership with the Companhia Têxtil do Púnguê, a subsidiary of the Companhia União Fabril of Portugal, and the Companhia de Seguros Império, a Portuguese insurance company, to extend its present operations. The company is reported to have received a new quota of up to 100,000 tons and to be establishing factories at Porto Amelia (Cabo Delgado district), Nampula and Nacala (Moçambique district), and also at another location in Cabo Delgado.

132. Finally, the Indústria e Laboração de Produtos Agrícolas (ILPA), a Portuguese company with Italian participation, has established a processing factory in Portugal, which will have an ultimate capacity of 20,000 tons. In September 1965 the company announced its intention of establishing a similar factory in Mozambique.

D. Copra

General

133. Sugar and coconuts are the two oldest plantation crops in Mozambique having been introduced during the time of the large chartered companies. Copra has been exported since the 1880's and oil extraction from copra was one of the first industries established in the Territory. Cultivated both on European plantations and by Africans, who produce about one third of the copra output, coconut plantations

account for over 25 per cent of the total area of non-African land holdings under cultivation and until the development of cashew were the most important permanent African cash crop. The Territory is estimated to have 12 million coconut palms, valued at 1,500 million escudos. Apart from an unknown quantity of coconuts which are retained by Africans for their own consumption, the main product is copra, part of which is reserved for the local oil mills and soap factories, the rest being all exported, principally to western Europe. There is also a very limited production of coir fibre for the local market.

134. Because statistics of sales by Africans are reported by calendar year and production on non-African holdings by crop year, it is difficult to calculate the total output of the Territory. If the volume of exports plus the amount sold to local industry is taken to represent production, then Mozambique in 1962 ranked seventh among copra-producing countries, although its share in world production and exports amounted to only 1 per cent and 4.3 per cent respectively. In the 1940s copra was Mozambique's third most valuable export crop. It now ranks fifth owing both to the recent growth of cashew and sisal and to the continuous decline in world copra prices since 1959. In 1964 copra exports accounted for 208.3 million escudos, or 6.9 per cent of the Territory's visible exports. The value of copra oil exported increased from 16 million escudos in 1960 to 62 million escudos in 1961, the declining market for raw copra having led to an increase in the export of oil.

135. Coconut palms are grown along the coast to a depth of 15 to 20 km inland from Inhambane northwards almost to the frontier of Tanzania. The most important producing area lies between the mouth of the Zambezi River and António Enes in the district of Cabo Delgado, with some of the largest plantations in the world being found around Quelimane and in the *circunscrições* of Namacurra, Maganja da Costa and Pebane. Over half the area of plantations owned by Europeans and other non-Africans is located in the district of Zambézia, the remainder being mostly in the districts of Moçambique and Cabo Delgado. Most of the palms owned by Africans are in the district of Zambézia.

Organization of production

(a) General

136. The coconut palm is grown on both European and African holdings, the former producing at present about 70 per cent of the copra and the latter about 30 per cent. These proportions have varied in the past because production on European holdings has followed more closely the broad trends of the world market. Thus, owing to the world economic depression, European plantations decreased from 67,152 hectares in 1929-1930 to 56,066 hectares in 1939-1940 and during that period aging palms were not renewed. After 1940, when prices regained, planting began anew and the area under cultivation increased to 69,035 hectares in 1950-51 and 82,622 hectares a decade later. In 1958-1959 European

production of copra was only 25,735 tons. By 1960-1961, however, it had increased to 32,806 tons.

137. African production of copra appears to be less influenced by prices than by the alternative demand for coconuts as a food crop. During the 1930s, African planting and harvesting is reported to have continued despite the fall in prices and to have increased steadily until the mid-1950s. At present, Europeans are reported to own close to 8 million palms and Africans between 5 and 5.5 million, representing an increase over 1930 of about 2 million trees for Europeans and 1,500,000 trees for Africans. In 1950, it was estimated that European and African holdings together covered some 120,000-130,000 hectares.

(b) *Production on European holdings*

138. Of the 8 million palms on European holdings, about 1 million are on medium-size farms and the rest are owned by large companies. About 86 per cent of the area under coconut cultivation in the district of Zambézia, or close to half the total area planted by Europeans, is reported to belong to three major companies, the Companhia do Boror, S.A.R.L. with approximately 2.1 million palms in production; the Sociedade Agrícola do Madal, S.A.R.L. with 1.3 million palms and the Companhia da Zambézia with approximately 800,000 palms.

139. The ownership of these companies is mixed, including French, German and Norwegian capital as well as Portuguese.

140. Plantations are generally large because of the considerable distance needed between trees. The copra is dried on the plantations either in hot-air kilns or in the sun and is classified as either "extra fair middling" or "hot air dried" (H.A.D.), being well-dried, with low percentage of humidity, without impurities, and of consistent quality. An increasingly large number of cattle are employed on plantations for purposes of fertilization, keeping the land between trees cleared (important in preventing brush fires), transportation within the plantations and ploughing. To a large extent the superior quality of European plantation-grown coconuts is attributed to this fertilization and clearing by cattle. While in 1944 there were only 22,000 head of cattle registered in the region between Chinde and Pebane, by 1960 the Companhia do Boror alone was reported to own 22,000 head, the Sociedade Agrícola do Madal, 13,000 and the Companhia da Zambézia, 6,500.

(i) *Companhia do Boror, S.A.R.L.*

141. There is no information concerning either the present capital or ownership of the Companhia do Boror, although at least until the end of the Second World War the ownership was primarily German.

142. Among the oldest agricultural companies in Mozambique, the Companhia do Boror is the largest producer of both copra and sisal (see section E below), and has 27,000 hectares of palm plantations. Recently its production has averaged approximately 11,000 tons of copra annually, approximately one third of the total production on European holdings. In addition, the company is the largest cattle rancher in Mozambique and until recently the sole producer of coir fibre, of which it manufactures a small amount sold locally, principally for use in the production of mattresses.

143. The seat of the company is in Macuse (Zambézia) and its plantations are in Namacurra, Maganja da Costa, Pebane, Quelimane (all in the district of Zambézia), Moma and António Enes (district of Moçambique).

144. The company received its original concession in 1898 from the Companhia da Zambézia. The size of the original grant, comprising the former *prazos* of Boror, Tirre, Name-duro, Macuse and Lecungo, is unknown. At present, in addition to its coconut plantations, one of which is the largest in the world, the company has 11,000 hectares devoted to sisal. In 1948 the company employed 5,000 Africans out of the 20,000 living on its concessions.

(ii) *Sociedade Agrícola do Madal, S.A.R.L.*

145. The Sociedade Agrícola do Madal with a registered capital of 85 million escudos, primarily Norwegian-controlled,

is the second largest producer of copra in Mozambique. Founded in 1904 by Portuguese and French investors, the company received a 280,000 hectare concession in the Zambézia region consisting of the former *prazos* of Madal, Tangalane, Cherengeme and Mahendo. Between 1912 and 1946 the company underwent several changes of ownership and in 1946 was reorganized and converted into a stock company under its present designation.

146. In 1940 the company was reported to have holdings of 21,078 hectares in the district of Zambézia, of which only a portion is devoted to coconut palms. [In 1948 it was reported that the companies of Madal and Zambézia (see below) jointly had 13,000 hectares of coconut plantations.] Its 1.3 million coconut palms are distributed among twenty-eight plantations in Quelimane, Chinde and Maganja da Costa. In 1962 two new concessions, totalling 3,400 hectares were granted in Chinde. The company employs 5,000 Africans and 200 Europeans.

(iii) *Companhia da Zambézia*

147. The Companhia da Zambézia, successor to the chartered company established in 1892, was reconstituted into a limited stock company primarily dedicated to agriculture in 1940 and presently has a registered capital of 60 million escudos. The Portuguese Government, controlling 135,000 shares, is the largest single stockholder; the remaining shares are thought to be owned by South African, French, German and British interests. In addition, the company produces tea (see section F) and salt, owns 6,500 head of cattle and until 1963 had a cotton purchasing concession in the district of Tete (see paragraph 28 above).

148. At present, the company is thought to be the third largest producer of copra in Mozambique. In 1965 it was reported to have plantations totalling 4,500 hectares. Its copra output was 3,014 tons in 1960, 3,081 tons in 1962, 3,388 tons in 1963 and 3,355 tons in 1964.

149. The company operates coconut plantations in Angoase and Andone (500,000 palms) and in Bajone (210,000 palms), the latter being the newest and becoming more profitable. In 1962 and 1963 profits from the Angoase and Andone plantations (including salt and cattle) amounted to 1,975,051 escudos and 1,863,513 escudos respectively; profits on the Bajone plantation in these two years came to 136,369 escudos and 1,153,274 escudos.

150. Despite profits from its production of copra and tea, the company sustained a working loss on its combined operations in Africa in 1962 and 1963 due primarily to losses incurred by its cotton concession. In 1964 after the cotton concession had been surrendered, the company reported an over-all net profit of only 959,000 escudos. The results of its copra operations in 1964 are not specified.

151. Total labour costs for the Zambézia company's plantations (including tea) amounted to 12,979,175 escudos in 1962 and to 13,033,005 in 1963. The company operates its own twelve-room hospital and pharmacy and provides free medical services for its employees and their families.

(c) *African production*

152. According to one writer, African interest in coconut palm growing is an off-shoot of the European industry and dates from the establishment of the big plantations. In the early days of development, the areas chosen by Europeans for growing coconut palms were lands previously uncultivated and scantily populated. To encourage African settlement in areas bordering the plantations and thus to obtain an adequate supply of labour, the European enterprises offered young coconut palms to the indigenous population for them to transplant on their own. It appears that the practice still continues, with Africans receiving saplings furnished by the companies from nurseries especially maintained for this purpose. The copra produced by Africans is normally sun-dried and sold to traders, though a certain amount may be sold to the plantations before drying.

153. In 1965 it was reported that 300,000 Africans were engaged in copra production, producing on their own about one third of the export crop. Since 1950, African production

of copra has averaged about 12,000 tons yearly, ranging from 16,000 tons in 1956 to 10,227 tons in 1963. These figures relate only to documented sales and, according to an article in the *Revista do Centro de Estudos Económicos* of Mozambique, published in 1958, may understate the actual volume of African copra production.[†]

154. The number of coconut palms owned by Africans increased steadily until the 1950s. According to the 1929-30 agricultural census Africans owned 3,676,372 palms; in 1939-40 their holdings were estimated at 4,771,588 palms; and by the mid-1950s they were reported to own between 5 and 5.5 million, which is roughly the figure estimated today.

155. A halt to new planting was anticipated as far back as 1940 when it was officially reported that the "choice regions for the easy planting of the palm are already in use or more or less occupied". It was also observed that the density of the African population in the coastal zone north of the Zambezi River was constantly increasing and had attained a higher index than non-copra-producing regions. In 1958 it was again reported that the number of palms owned by Africans was limited only by the shortage of suitable land, since in Zambézia Africans were always attempting to increase the number of their trees by planting whenever they had available land.[‡] To provide more room for palm plantations it was proposed in 1940 to drain vast areas of marsh along the coast of the Zambézia district, a project considered to be easy and not too expensive. The land thus salvaged could be parcelled out for Africans to occupy and plant. In 1959 drainage of these areas was included in the budget of the Second Development Plan along with drainage of areas in Gaza and Inhambane, a total of 100 million escudos being allocated for work in all three areas.

156. African methods of cultivation are reported to be less scientific than those of the large European-owned plantations. In contrast to the holdings of the large companies where palms are widely spaced and aligned and cattle are grazed for fertilizer and to keep down undergrowth, African holdings are often planted closely and at random, making upkeep of the area difficult; the number of cattle grazed is insignificant and fires, starting in the undergrowth, are not uncommon.

157. Most of the copra produced by Africans is dried either in the sun or directly over fire. Such copra is classified as fair middling (F.M.), "*selecionada*", or second grade, and is said to contain a higher degree of humidity and more impurities than copra produced on the large company-owned plantations, losing weight through evaporation and being subject to moulding. In 1944 it was reported that traders buying copra from Africans sometimes redried the copra in their own drying ovens.

158. Tables 14 A and B show the production of copra on European holdings and documented sales of African-produced copra in so far as this separate information is available.

Copra oil and coir fibre

159. In 1962 there were fifteen companies engaged in the extraction of vegetable oils with a combined capital investment of 80,358,000 escudos. These companies extract oil from various oilseeds, mainly cotton seeds and peanuts, and produce both edible and non-edible oils and oil cake. The companies are organized in a corporative body, the *Grémio dos Industriais de Óleos Vegetais* created in 1949.

160. The amount of copra which is used for oil manufacture in Mozambique has varied significantly with the export price of raw copra, the volume of copra oil produced ranging from 10,200 tons in 1957 to only 3,100 tons in 1960. The copra used consists mostly of F.M. grade which is mainly

produced by Africans and normally represents about half the total amount purchased from Africans (8,000 tons of raw copra produce 5,000 tons of copra oil). Almost all the oil is exported, a small amount being reserved for local use and sale to soap manufacturers.

161. As explained in the following section, from 1954 to 1961, higher export taxes were levied on F.M. grade copra than on other grades in order to ensure its supply to the oil milling industry. In practice, however, less oil is produced from copra than from other oilseeds. In 1964, 8,400 tons of copra oil, valued at slightly more than 62 million escudos, were exported (see table 15 B).

162. There is also a very limited production of coir fibre, which is mainly used in the manufacture of mattresses for the local market. Until recently the only producer was the *Companhia do Boror* but in 1965 it was announced that a factory was to be established in Inhambane and would be followed by three more at other locations. The first factory is being financed partly from South Africa and South African interests have guaranteed to purchase half of its output.

Government regulation and controls

163. Government regulation of copra exports has been intended mainly to guarantee an adequate supply of raw copra to the local and metropolitan oil milling industries. Prior to 1954 all exporters were required to sell a percentage of their foreign exports by quota to local and Portuguese oil mills at officially fixed prices which were below international quotations. This system proved satisfactory to the local oil industry until 1949 when oil mills in Europe having recovered from the effects of World War II, Mozambique oil exporters began to be confronted with a decrease in demand. To sustain itself the Mozambique oil industry called for greater price benefits on the purchase of copra locally. This led to the tax differential introduced in 1954 which is described below.

164. Under legislation of 1950 and 1953 (Decree 38,146, 30 December 1950; Decree 39,265 and Order 14,447, 6 July 1953), all copra exports were subject to a standard export duty of 1 per cent *ad valorem*, a surtax of 7 per cent, and an *imposto de sobrevalorização* of 25 per cent of the excess of actual prices over those prevailing in 1949. Copra oil exports were subject to the standard duty of 1 per cent *ad valorem*, plus a surtax of 4.5 per cent.

165. New legislation in 1954 (Order 14,892, 31 May) introduced the régime which remained in force for six years, namely of levying higher taxes on exports of F.M. copra, mainly produced by Africans, than on the other grades produced on European plantations, thereby ensuring that F.M. copra would be used almost exclusively to satisfy the requirements of the local oil mills. Under this legislation all F.M. copra was exempted from the *imposto de sobrevalorização*, but the surtax was increased to 10 per cent *ad valorem*, or 3 per cent more than that paid on other grades of copra. In 1960, when surtaxes on copra exports to Portugal were suspended (Order 7,797, 6 July), the surtax on F.M. copra going to foreign countries was increased to 11.3 per cent *ad valorem*.

166. The export tax differential between F.M. and other grades of copra was finally abolished in 1961. The legislation effecting this (Order 18,203, 28 January 1961) specified that the surtax on exports of F.M. copra should be reduced to the extent necessary to ensure that the sum of export levies on F.M. copra should not exceed the sum of levies, including the *imposto de sobrevalorização*, on other grades of copra.

167. In 1965 (Ministerial Order 2, 11 December), copra was excluded from payment of the *imposto de sobrevalorização*.

Production and exports

168. As explained above, the copra industry has been affected adversely over the years by the instability of world markets, especially since the coconut palm is slow maturing and production cannot respond rapidly to price changes. During the 1930s when world prices tumbled, production and replanting on European plantations was severely curtailed. Between 1940 and 1963, the price of H.A.D. copra more than doubled and the industry again expanded only to find prices

[†] The article points out that between 1953 and 1955, annual exports of copra were about 6,174 tons more than combined European production and reported sales by Africans would allow, while average exports between 1941 and 1953 were 3,949 tons more. The writer attributes this to undocumented sales by African growers. If this is true, then the value of copra sold by Africans in 1951, for instance, would have been 90,858,000 escudos, instead of the 62,626,000 escudos actually reported.

[‡] *Revista do Centro de Estudos Económicos* (Loureço Marques, 1958).

fluctuating severely. Reflecting these changes, the pattern of production and exports has been irregular. Reaching 46,874 tons in 1949, exports of copra dropped to 36,554 tons in 1954, rising again in 1957 to 45,507 tons and, after a further slump, to 60,070 tons in 1960. After 1959, international quotations

again dropped and exports decreased to only 43,812 tons in 1964. Tables 14 A and B below show the pattern of copra production in recent years both for European-owned plantations and for copra purchased from Africans. Information is so far available only for certain years up to 1960-1961.

TABLE 14. COPRA PRODUCTION

A. Production on European holdings				
Crop year	Area cultivated (hectares)	Number of palms	Production (tons)	Value (million escudos)
1955/56	77,341	7,347,309	28,742	79.4
1956/57	79,848	7,605,298	28,691	79.1
1957/58	26,966	...
1958/59	82,362	7,693,189	25,735	69.4
1959/60	83,288	7,603,641	28,943	78.8
1960/61	82,622	7,804,639	32,961	88.2

B. Documented sales by Africans							
	1955	1956	1957	1958	1959	1960	1961
Tons	16,362	16,395	14,078	10,556	10,413	9,958
Value (million escudos)	47.8	47.2	...	44.3	36.3	26.6

SOURCE: Mozambique, *Estatística Agrícola*, 1955-1963.

169. Only a fraction of exports of copra and copra oil normally go to Portugal, the year 1960, when Portugal bought 25 per cent of copra exports, being a great exception. Chief markets for copra in recent years have been Norway, Israel, France, Spain and West Germany. In 1961, for example, when 60,070 tons were exported, 13,445 went to Denmark, 12,095 to Norway, 8,113 to Israel and 5,736 to Italy. Oil is

purchased primarily by South Africa, West Germany and Southern Rhodesia. Residues from oil extraction (*bagaços*) are also exported in small quantity, about 2,000 tons annually, primarily to northern European countries where they are used for cattle fodder. Information on exports and destinations is contained in table 15 A and B below.

TABLE 15. MOZAMBIQUE—COPRA AND COPRA OIL: EXPORTS AND PRINCIPAL DESTINATIONS, 1955-1964

A. Copra										
Year	Exports			Main destinations (percentage of export volume)						
	Thousand tons	Million escudos	Percentage of total export value	Norway	France	Portugal	Denmark	Spain	Federal Republic of Germany	Israel
1955	34.8	140.2	8.26	19.56	39.24	16.47	—	8.61	8.40	—
1956	41.4	166.3	9.58	30.69	23.03	11.98	—	13.67	12.41	—
1957	45.5	172.8	8.51	31.31	25.48	16.83	4.06	5.00	7.39	—
1958	44.4	189.3	9.33	33.32	10.58	3.40	1.79	7.55	16.04	5.45
1959	37.6	211.0	11.08	27.86	8.77	8.66	11.30	3.30	6.10	3.99
1960	40.7	194.3	9.26	24.78	7.62	25.94	5.31	4.11	2.54	13.74
1961	60.1	266.9	10.47	20.13	6.80	5.32	22.40	8.18	3.50	13.51
1962	52.8	204.5	7.82	20.38	10.47	4.93	21.35	11.66	8.30	8.33
1963	46.4	204.0	7.04
1964	43.8	208.3	6.84	13.69	12.10	15.65	14.38	17.84	3.29	14.83

B. Copra oil ^a									
Year	Exports			Main destinations (percentage of export volume)					
	Thousand tons	Million escudos	Percentage of total export value	South Africa	Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland	Portugal	Netherlands	Malawi	
1961	3.2	22.9	0.90	33.82	15.32	10.12	7.78	—	—
1962	3.2	21.1	0.81	65.40	32.31	2.16	—	—	—
1963	7	63.9	2.21
1964	8.4	62.1	2.04	35.99	12.75 ^b	1.19	—	—	0.71

SOURCES: 1955-1963: Mozambique, *Comércio Externo* and *Anuário Estatístico*; 1964: Mozambique, *Boletim Mensal*, December 1964.

^a Data available only for 1961 onwards.

^b This figure refers only to Southern Rhodesia.

E. Sisal

General

170. Sisal was introduced into Mozambique from Tanganyika at the beginning of the twentieth century. Though 34 tons were exported in 1910, the industry did not really get under way until the 1920s. By 1938, exports had increased to 24,000 tons, representing 7.8 per cent of world output and making Mozambique the fourth largest producer. During the Second World War, sisal was in strong demand but, despite this, Mozambique's exports in 1942 were at only half their pre-war level because seven of the largest plantations, being German owned, were refused shipping certificates by the allied Powers. Though the Export Board (Junta de Exportação) succeeded in arranging a contract with the United States Commercial Company effective from 1943 to 1945 for the purchase of sisal from the plantations previously unable to obtain "navicerts", Mozambique was thereafter unable to regain her prominent position. Angola and Brazil, formerly smaller producers, had both moved permanently ahead of Mozambique in production during this time, pushing Mozambique back to sixth place among producing countries, the position she holds at present. Production did not surpass its pre-war level until 1955 when output totalled 27,103 tons, and has not expanded much since then, sisal being a crop subject to great price fluctuations on the world market, especially because of competition from other hard fibres.

171. At present Mozambique produces about 30,000 tons of sisal yearly, less than half the output of Angola and about one tenth of the sisal produced in Africa. So far, except for a very small quantity reserved for local rope manufacture (79 tons in 1962), almost all the sisal is exported, going mostly to markets outside the escudo zone. In 1965, however, a new company was formed for the large-scale industrialization of sisal, the long-term objective being to supply the Territory's requirements of rope and to export only the manufactured product. In 1964 sisal exports, amounting to 31,581 tons, were valued at 274 million escudos or 9 per cent of the combined value of the Territory's visible exports.

172. Except for one isolated plantation located inland near Vila Pery (district of Manica e Sofala), sisal is cultivated within a low-lying belt along the coast. Though most of the plantations are in the district of Moçambique (between António Enes and Moma) and Zambézia (between Namacurra and Macuba), they are found as far north as Cabo Delgado (mainly between Porto Amélia and Mocimboa da Praia) and as far south as Inhambane. The total area under cultivation in 1961-1962 was 56,403 hectares, of which 50 per cent was in the district of Moçambique, 28 per cent in the district of Zambézia and 13 per cent in the district of Cabo Delgado.

Organization of production

173. Owing to the heavy capital investment required, sisal has so far been grown exclusively on non-African holdings, consisting of large-scale plantations. The area under sisal in 1961-1962 (see above) represented 15 per cent of the total area of cultivated land on non-African agricultural holdings. Eighteen companies are reported to be in operation, the largest being the Companhia do Boror, the Companhia de Culturas de Angoche, S.A.R.L. and the Companhia Agrícola João Ferreira dos Santos. All three companies are also engaged in other forms of agriculture, the first being the

^v Large plantations are necessary for the economic production of sisal, each leaf producing only 3 to 6 per cent of fibre by weight. To produce 2,000 tons of sisal, for example, requires a plantation of some 2,000 hectares, while plantations under 1,000 hectares are considered to be uneconomical. In 1957 it was estimated that the investment required per plantation of 2,500 hectares before production was 38 million escudos. The greatest expenses are the internal transportation system, a large labour force (1,400-1,500 workers), warehouses, and the decortivating plant. In addition, because of the short lifespan of the sisal plant, about eight years, approximately one tenth of the area under cultivation must be replanted annually in order to maintain a constant level of production. (According to the 1939 sisal regulations, only growers who produced more than twenty-five tons could be licenced exporters.)

largest producer of copra and the other two being also engaged in cashew production; these activities are described in the appropriate sections of the present study. The eighteen sisal companies operated in 1962 a total of nineteen decortivating plants, located on the plantations for converting the leaf into sisal fibre and exportable by-products (such as tow and waste). In 1959 it was estimated that 400 million escudos were invested in decortivating plants.

174. The real ownership of these companies cannot be readily ascertained. Originally a large proportion of the capital was held by German, Swiss and British interests, but this situation has partly changed since the Second World War. In 1960-1961, 76 per cent of the plantations were reported to belong to Portuguese nationals or to companies registered in Portugal but not necessarily with all their capital in Portuguese hands. This represented an increase in nominal Portuguese ownership of 3 per cent over the previous year and seems to confirm reports that at least since the 1950's there has been a movement to introduce more Portuguese ownership into the sisal industry. Thus, according to a press report, a Legislative Instrument was enacted in 1965 authorizing the Governor-General to guarantee loans to small Portuguese sisal growers (*sisaleiros nacionais*) recently installed in the district of Moçambique in an attempt to "take the sisal monopoly away from big companies, mainly foreign or having foreign capital".

175. In 1951 it was reported that 29,285 Africans were employed on sisal plantations, about 6,000 less than the number required. One of the difficulties said to impede the recruitment of an adequate labour force is the arduous nature of some aspects of the work, among them the cutting of the leaf and the manual transportation of large bundles of leaf to transportation facilities. Unlike Angola and Tanganyika where contracts range from twelve to eighteen months, in Mozambique contracts are only for six months, presenting an additional problem in maintaining an adequate supply of labour.

176. In an attempt to stabilize the labour force and to provide an incentive for workers to exceed their daily or weekly quotas various arrangements have been instituted, including the provision of permanent housing for Africans and their families on the plantations. In 1961 it was reported that all workers received some kind of housing and that workers who chose to settle permanently on a plantation received a house worth 24,000 escudos, together with two hectares of land for their own use, and free seed. The six months of the year not worked under contract are left completely free for private farming.

177. Another feature of the sisal industry is the bonus system under which Africans receive cash bonuses if they produce more than their task requires.

178. Apart from the labour force employed on the plantations, 4,737 Africans were employed in decortivating plants during 1962 and earned a total of 15,591,309 escudos in wages.

(a) *Companhia do Boror, S.A.R.L.*

179. The organization of this company is described in section D above (paras. 141-144). In addition to its extensive palm plantations, the company has 11,000 hectares planted with sisal, probably only a portion of which are in production, since its annual output of sisal is about 3,000 tons. In terms of the area devoted to sisal, the company is the largest in the country, occupying about 35 per cent of the total area planted with the crop. The plantations are located in the district of Zambézia, primarily at Naciaia where, in 1961, 10,500 hectares were under cultivation.

(b) *Companhia de Culturas de Angoche, S.A.R.L.*

180. A leading producer of sisal, the Companhia de Culturas Angoche, S.A.R.L. is one of the more important companies in the district of Moçambique. Its plantations, located in the areas of António Enes, Moma, and Monapo, are known to cover at least 68,700 hectares (18,700 hectares at Angoche and 50,000 at Moma), of which some 7,800 hectares were planted in sisal in 1957-1958. The company also operates

cashew deshelling factories (see section C above). In 1956 the company employed 5,000 Africans on its Netiri, Sawara and Mecuco plantations. Total production is unknown. The Mecuco plantation, opened in 1948 at a cost of 50 million escudos, produces about 3,800 tons annually.

181. Originally known as the Companhia Colonial de Angoche, Lda., the company was transformed into a limited-liability stock company with capital of 50 million escudos in 1962, the parent company retaining shares valued at 48,745,000 escudos. It is reported that the company is mainly Swiss owned.

182. The profits of the company in 1962 amounted to 2,794,071 escudos, of which 2,500,000 was distributed to shareholders in the form of a dividend at the rate of 5 per cent.

(c) *Companhia Agrícola João Ferreira dos Santos*

183. The third largest sisal producer in the country, the Companhia Agrícola João Ferreira dos Santos was founded in 1897 by the dos Santos family which still controls it. The company is entirely Portuguese and based in Mozambique. Until 1965, the João Ferreira dos Santos organization

was known as the Companhia Agrícola e Comercial João Ferreira dos Santos and had a registered capital of 100 million escudos. It was a multi-purpose company, combining agriculture with the processing of agricultural products (sisal, cotton and rice factories) and general trading. In 1965, however, the organization was divided into three parts, the Companhia Comercial João Ferreira dos Santos, with a registered capital of 100 million escudos, taking over the trading activities, the Companhia Agrícola João Ferreira dos Santos with a registered capital of 10 million escudos, dedicated primarily to sisal, and the Companhia Industrial João Ferreira dos Santos, with a registered capital of 7.5 million escudos, dealing mostly with cotton ginning and shelling of rice. No other information is available concerning its finances.

184. The headquarters of the company are in the district of Moçambique and its sisal plantations are located in Muchelina and Geba.

(d) *Other sisal companies*

185. Other sisal companies registered in 1961 were:

Name	Locality (and district)
Rodrigues Pestana	António Enes (Moçambique)
Vuervia Baptista e Cia.	Mocimboa da Praia (Cabo Delgado)
Sisal Aktiengesellschaft	Porto Amélia (Cabo Delgado)
Cia. Colonial de Nangororo, Lda.	Porto Amélia (Cabo Delgado)
Rufigya Pflanzungs Gesellschaft	Porto Amélia (Cabo Delgado)
António Moreira Longo	Porto Amélia (Cabo Delgado)
Empresa Agrícola de Monapo, Lda.	Moçambique (Moçambique)
Empresa Agrícola de Meserepane	Meserepane (Moçambique)
Namagoa Plantations	Quelimane (Zambézia)
Sisal Sul do Save	Inhambane (Inhambane)
Zemba Plantations	Chimoio (Manica e Sofala)

186. No other information is available concerning any of these companies.

Government regulation and controls

187. There is no special régime governing the production and export of sisal in Mozambique. Exports of sisal are subject to a standard export duty of 1 per cent *ad valorem* and an *ad valorem* surtax, the rate of which has varied (Decree 38,146, 30 December 1950). Sisal producers are also subject to the usual levies on large-scale agricultural enterprises, namely the *imposto sobre explorações* (a tax on agricultural, livestock, forestry and fishing companies), and the *imposto complementar* (a complementary tax on income).

188. The export taxes have been adjusted from time to time because of the instability of sisal prices. In 1950 (Decree 38,146) the surtax was set at a rate of 2.5 per cent *ad valorem*. In 1954 legislation enacted in Angola to mitigate the effect of falling world prices (Decree 39,408, 30 October 1952) was extended to Mozambique (Order 15,042, 2 October 1954). Under this legislation sisal was exempted from all export levies when the f.o.b. price was below 5 escudos per kilogramme; when the f.o.b. price was between 5 and 6 escudos only standard export duty of 1 per cent *ad valorem* was paid; and when the price was between 6 and 7 escudos, an additional surtax was imposed, adjusted upwards on a sliding scale from 1 to 4 per cent *ad valorem*.

189. All export taxes were suspended between 1955 and 1960 because of the collapse of sisal prices. In 1961 (Decree 43,566, 27 March), the duty and surtax were restored.

Production and exports

190. As explained above, the sisal industry has suffered from the instability of world markets due to competition from other hard fibres and underwent a long period of crisis from 1955 to 1961. Because of this and the experience of the Second World War production increased only a little between 1938 and 1955 (from 23,000 to 27,000 tons). After 1955 the increase was somewhat more rapid, reaching a peak in 1958.

This increase was primarily due to improved yields (which rose from 703 kg. to 956 kg. per hectare). In fact, world prices remained very low during this period and there is no increase in the area under cultivation.

TABLE 16. SISAL: AVERAGE F.O.B. PRICES OF EXPORTS^a

Year	Price	Year	Price
1955	4.52	1960	6.36
1956	4.52	1961	5.70
1957	3.94	1962	5.62
1958	4.49	1963	8.82
1959	5.18	1964	8.67
		1965 ^b	5.67

^a Prices derived by comparing volume and value of exports.

^b First eight months only.

191. In 1958 sisal ranked sixth by value among the Territory's major export crops. Although in 1959 prices began to improve, production decreased until 1963 and 1964 when a sharp advance of prices accompanied by increased output brought the value of sisal exports to fourth and then third place among export crops. During the first eight months of 1965, however, exports were only 18,057 tons, worth 102.4 millions escudos, representing a 10 per cent drop in volume and a 50 per cent loss in value compared with the corresponding period in 1964.

192. Until now, except for a small amount of fibre reserved for local rope manufacture (79 tons in 1962), the entire sisal output of Mozambique has been exported, the principal markets being the United States of America, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Portugal and the Netherlands. In 1962, the United States purchased over 10,000 tons of sisal, or about 33 per cent of the Territory's export; Portugal, in contrast, purchased only 1,300 tons. It is reported that between 1950 and 1952 sisal was responsible for 82 per cent of Mozambique's dollar earnings; in 1959 it

accounted for 40 per cent by value of the Territory's total exports to the United States.

193. Portugal, for several reasons, is a small purchaser of Mozambique sisal. Except for the period 1957-1959, when about 20 per cent of the volume exported went to Portugal, annual exports were no more than 10 per cent. After 1960, Portuguese imports of sisal from Mozambique were even smaller while imports from Angola increased, mainly because of the difference in freight costs. Between May 1958 and October 1959 there was a 40 per cent preferential difference in costs to the Portuguese rope manufacturing industry. This benefit having expired in 1959, Portugal's imports of sisal from Mozambique fell about 50 per cent, the normal

freight cost from Angola being about 200 escudos less per ton.

194. Another reason is that Mozambique sisal is reportedly of higher quality than that required by the Portuguese rope industry, which prefers to buy cheaper fibre from Angola, Brazil and Mexico. Between 1952 and 1960, 66.4 per cent of Mozambique sisal was first quality and only 26.4 per cent second quality. On the other hand, Portuguese imports of first-quality fibre amounted to only 49.4 per cent of its total imports of sisal.

195. The following table shows Mozambique's exports of sisal from 1955 to 1964, by quantity and value and by country of destination.

TABLE 17. MOZAMBIQUE—SISAL: EXPORTS AND PRINCIPAL DESTINATIONS, 1955-1964

Year	Exports			Main destinations (percentage of export volume)						
	Thousand tons	Million escudos	Percentage of total export value	United States	France	Portugal	Netherlands	Federal Republic of Germany	South Africa	Belgium-Luxembourg
1955	26.9	121.4	7.16	30.82	15.20	7.80	10.91	6.76	3.97	8.55
1956	27.9	127.0	7.31	22.47	14.77	12.54	7.52	2.25	6.57	5.24
1957	32.4	127.6	7.29	22.95	23.87	15.89	9.89	4.19	6.64	4.05
1958	32.4	131.4	7.48	22.35	13.17	24.31	9.35	4.68	5.20	4.23
1959	30.6	158.4	7.32	24.92	15.87	24.76	7.44	5.73	2.25	2.84
1960	27.9	177.9	8.47	30.60	11.97	10.90	6.71	11.16	2.84	4.69
1961	28.4	162.1	6.36	35.90	13.55	8.93	9.26	10.16	4.82	2.06
1962	25.6	166.7	6.37	36.13	10.95	6.21	4.93	13.40	2.68	2.26
1963	29.7	261.6	9.03
1964	31.6	274.4	9.02	7.37	17.27	8.48	11.52	13.77	12.18	6.31

SOURCES: 1955-1963: Mozambique, *Comércio Externo* and *Anuário Estatístico*; 1964: Mozambique, *Boletim Mensal*, December 1964.

Recent developments

196. As mentioned above, a new company was established in 1965 for the large-scale manufacture of rope and other sisal products. The new company, known as the Companhia Industrial de Cordoarias de Moçambique, has a registered capital of 10 million escudos, which may be raised to 20 million escudos. The largest stockholder is the Companhia União Fabril of Portugal, which will control a total of 45 per cent of the shares, 33 per cent in the name of the Companhia Têxtil do Púnguê, 10 per cent in the name of the Companhia de Seguros Império and 2 per cent through its Lourenço Marques agency, Bryner and Worth. Other stockholders are the Companhia Agrícola e Comercial João Ferreira dos Santos (11 per cent); the Companhia do Boror (10.5 per cent, plus an additional 0.5 per cent in the name of its administrator, Dr. Elisio da Costa Vilaça); the Empresa Agrícola do Monapo (11 per cent); the Companhia Agrícola do Nangororo (11 per cent); and José Rodrigues Pestana (11 per cent).

197. It is reported that the company, to be located in Nacala, will transform 80 per cent of the sisal into rope for binding grain bags; the rest will be all-purpose cord, sisal cloth and mooring ropes. As of May 1965 the production of the first three months was already sold, although the factory was not to begin full-scale production until the beginning of 1966.

198. According to a newspaper report, the factory's production will be mainly for export, there being little demand for sisal cord in Mozambique.

F. Tea

General

199. Tea is the youngest of the six major export crops of Mozambique and, except for cashew, has developed most rapidly in recent years. Predominantly an integrated plantation crop, it was first planted by European farmers on an experimental basis in 1919 in the Milange area, in the highlands of Zambézia district. The first plantation and factory were established in 1925 and 1929 respectively. By 1939-1940

almost 3,000 hectares were under cultivation. Favoured by the Second World War, when traditional supplies from Asia were interrupted, the area under cultivation increased to 9,706 hectares by 1949-1950 and 1962-1963 it had further increased to 15,227 hectares.

200. The production of tea similarly doubled in successive five-year periods between 1924 and 1961 when it reached a peak of 10,000 tons, of which exports amounted to 9,900 tons, valued at 235.7 million escudos. Between 1961 and 1963 only an additional 250 hectares were planted, while exports fell to 8,400 tons. This is reportedly attributable to falling prices which began to recover in 1964, exports in that year rising again to 9,000 tons, valued at 163.9 million escudos. It is reported that production is increasing steadily because of increasing yields per hectare.

201. Since the mid-1950's tea has ranked variously as fifth or sixth of Mozambique's major export crops by value, depending on the fluctuations of world prices. In 1964 it accounted for 5.4 per cent of the total value of visible exports. In terms of world output, Mozambique ranks twelfth among producing countries, accounting for only 0.8 per cent of world production. Among African producing countries it ranks third, after Kenya and Malawi.

202. The tea produced is a standard quality Indian-type, similar to that grown elsewhere in East Africa and is classified primarily as "filler" and used for blending with the more expensive teas from India and Ceylon because of its non-distinctive taste. It is grown exclusively in the interior highlands of the Zambézia district, the principal areas of cultivation being the regions of Guruê, Milange, Sacone and Tacuane. Guruê is the most important producing area, comprising about 62 per cent of the land under tea cultivation and producing in 1962 about 64 per cent of the total output. In 1962-63, out of a total of 15,227 hectares planted with tea, 9,475 hectares were in the Guruê *concelho*, 2,658 hectares in Milange *circunscrição*, 1,175 hectares in the area around Socone (Ile *circunscrição*), and 1,919 hectares near Tacuane (Lugela *circunscrição*). It is estimated that about 150,000 hectares in the Territory are suitable for tea growing.

Organization of production

203. Owing to the large amount of capital investment needed to establish a tea plantation, which does not begin to show returns until after the seven to ten years it takes the tea plants to mature and which normally require the establishment of a factory in the vicinity, tea is primarily a company-owned plantation crop, about 90 per cent of the output being so produced. In 1961-62 there were 36 tea plantations in existence; 17 of these were between 400 hectares and 1,700 hectares in size, 9 were between 100 and 399 hectares, and 10 were under 100 hectares. The farms under 100 hectares formed part of a government-sponsored settlement scheme (described in paras. 214-216 below); it may be noted that the 10 settler farmers had increased to 28 in 1965.

204. The green leaf is almost all converted into black tea in company-owned factories, the only exception being the tea produced by small settlers which accounts for only 10 per cent of the harvest and which is processed at a factory set upon the *Guruê concelho* by the Government as an aid to small farmers. Recent information is lacking concerning the total capital investment in the tea industry, but it may be noted that in 1955 the capital invested in processing factories was reported to be 242 million escudos and the capital invested in plantations was reported to be 1,000 million escudos. Since then the area planted in tea has increased by 26 per cent and production by 74 per cent from which it is possible to deduce

a substantial increase of capital invested. There is similar difficulty in ascertaining the number of workers and their wages. According to one source,^w it was estimated in 1963 that about 36,000 workers, including non-Africans, were employed on tea plantations and factories and that their total wages and salaries amounted to between 60 million and 65 million escudos. Official data give the number of administrative, technical and clerical workers in tea factories as being 206 in 1961 and the number of manual workers as 3,512. Their total earnings were reported to be 14.4 million escudos and 8.2 million escudos respectively, not including allowances for food, clothing and medical services.

(a) Tea companies

205. In 1961-1962 more than 80 per cent of the land under tea and about 89 per cent of the green tea produced was controlled by seventeen companies. Because green tea deteriorates if transported long distances, each of these companies has its own factory located near the plantations. The following table shows the companies operating in 1962, indicating for each its location, the area under cultivation and the volume of black tea produced.

^w Domingos José Soares Rebelo, "O Chá na economia de Moçambique", Sociedade de Estudos da Província de Moçambique, *Boletim*, Vol. 32, No. 137 (October-December 1963).

TABLE 18. MOZAMBIQUE: TEA COMPANIES, THEIR LOCATION AND PRODUCTION, 1962

Company	Location	Area under cultivation 1961-1962 (hectares)	Production 1962 (tons)
Chá Moçambique, Lda.	Guruê	1,660	1,551
Plantações M. Saraiva Junqueiro, S.A.R.L.	Guruê	1,222	847
Cia. da Zambézia, S.A.R.L.	Guruê	992	676
Chá Guruê, Lda.	Guruê	907	713
Sociedade Chá Oriental, S.A.R.L.	Milange	810	1,037
Chá Montemuli, Lda.	Socone	652	401
Sociedade Agrícola do Madal, S.A.R.L.	Tacuane	638	622
Empresa Agrícola do Mococha, Lda.	Guruê	616	434
Chá Montebranco, Lda.	Guruê	606	382
Sociedade Agrícola do Napeia, Lda.	Socone	603	21
Chá Montualasse, Lda.	Socone	553	735
Duarte e Nunes, Lda.	Guruê	550	394
Empresa Colonial de Chá, Lda.	Guruê	540	331
Quinta Montessocone	Socone	531	
Metilile Agrícola, Lda.	Guruê	531	221
Empresa Agrícola de Chá, Lda.	Guruê	440	299
Liazi Agrícola, Lda.	Milange	400	396
Chá Tacuane, Lda.	Tacuane	...	195
Chá Luso, Lda.	Guruê	...	129

206. As can be seen by comparing the areas under cultivation with the production figures for each company, the yields per hectare vary considerably. The average yield per hectare increased from 422 kg. per hectare in 1956-1957 to 618 kg. per hectare in 1961-62 which is still only half that attained in some other parts of Africa. According to one source this is mainly due to the youth of the plantations.^x

207. Little is known about the individual companies themselves. Some, like the Companhia da Zambézia and the Sociedade Agrícola do Madal, are large agricultural companies which produce primarily copra and sisal. (These have already been described in preceding sections.) Others, such as Chá Moçambique, the largest producer, are apparently exclusively dedicated to tea. Some miscellaneous information about the large companies is as follows:

(i) *Companhia da Zambézia* (see also paras. 147-151 above).

208. Among the three largest tea producers in Mozambique, the Zambézia Company's output of black tea was 800 tons

in 1965 while the area under cultivation was 1,061 hectares. About 4,800 African workers are employed, receiving, in addition to their salaries, food, clothing and lodging. A modern hospital has recently been built staffed by several nurses and a doctor. The capacity of the factory is 40 tons per day.

209. The company's profits from tea amounted to 3,790 contos and 2,147 contos respectively in 1962 and 1963. In 1964 it was reported that although production was superior to the previous year, profits were smaller, among other things because of a 37 per cent increase in African labour costs; a corresponding increase in the cost of rations, and a decrease in the export price of tea.

(ii) *Chá Moçambique, Lda.*

210. Although this is the largest producer of tea in Mozambique, with an output of 1,551 tons in 1962, very little is known about it since it is a private company and as such is not required by law to publish its reports. It is apparently expanding, having received an additional concession of 4,800 hectares in the Angónia *circunscrição*, Tete district, in 1962.

^x Rebelo, op. cit.

(iii) *Sociedade Chá Oriental, Lda. and Sociedade Agrícola do Milange*

211. The Sociedade Chá Oriental, Lda. is the oldest existing tea producer in Mozambique and the second largest in terms of factory output. Originally known as the Empresa Agrícola do Lugela, it was founded in 1919 by the Gusmão family which introduced tea growing in the Territory. Its present board of directors, all Portuguese, consists of António Corrêa de Sá (chairman), João de Castro Pereira and António José Lucas. The company is in partnership with the Sociedade Agrícola do Milange and is represented on the board of directors of the latter, which is entirely Portuguese, consisting of D. Cacano de Lancastre (chairman) and Abel Daniel da Costa Dias, in addition to Mr. de Castro Pereira representing Chá Oriental.

212. The Sociedade Agrícola do Milange has an issued share capital of 20 million escudos and the results of its operations in 1963 amounted to 385,761 escudos, compared with 655,383 escudos in 1960. The Sociedade Chá Oriental has an issued share capital of 5 million escudos and fixed assets of 16.5 million escudos. Its gross profits in 1960 were 93,660 and in 1963 it incurred a loss of 23,839 escudos. Both companies were apparently adversely affected by bad crops in 1963.

(iv) *Plantações Manuel Saraiva Junqueiro*

213. The second largest producer of leaf in Mozambique, the company has a capital of 10 million escudos and is still controlled by the original founder, M. S. Junqueiro. Profits in 1964 amounted to 20,826 escudos.

(b) *Small growers and settlements*

214. Since the 1920s the Portuguese authorities have regarded tea as a good basis for the settlement of small-scale European farmers, both because it is a highly profitable crop and because it grows best in healthy highland regions.

215. The first settlement plan was conceived in 1927 when the charters of *prazos* in the region of Gurue expired. Under the proposed plan the area would be divided into small properties for distribution to settlers who would work them with the help of the State. The State would construct factories at its own expense and the factories would eventually be bought by the settlers, organized in co-operatives independent of the large companies.

216. In 1931 the *circunscrição* of Milange, excluding Molumbo and the *circunscrição* of Gurue, excluding Lioma, were reserved for Portuguese settlement (Legislative Instrument 304, 9 May 1931). The maximum size for a concession was set at 1,000 hectares, confirmation of the concession being conditional on developing one third of the area within five years. In mid-1938 concessions in these regions were discontinued after a report by the Survey Department that 1,000 hectare concessions were too large to be handled by small farmers. It was suggested that 60-80 hectares would be the ideal size for a small farm.

217. In 1939 a survey of Gurue showed that 8,000 hectares of good tea land were occupied by five companies. The successful settlement of Gurue by small independent farmers was therefore considered to be threatened by competition from the larger farms which held the best land and the colonization plan was abandoned. By the end of 1944 there were thirty-seven farms in the area, all but twelve devoted to tea. At that time it was believed that the development of the tea industry by large farmers was preferable to small-scale colonization.

218. In 1954 under the First Development Plan, interest in tea colonization was reawakened and a committee was established to investigate suitable areas for settlement (Mozambique Order 14,763, February 1954).

219. According to an unofficial source the committee in 1957 recommended the following:

It processes the leaf produced by the Sociedade Agrícola do Milange in addition to its own leaf.

(1) Demarcation of suitable lands for settlement schemes in the district of Zambézia and in the Mossurize region of Manica e Sofala;

(2) Establishment of co-operatives in such areas;

(3) Suitable financing facilities to be made available to all planters and factories wherever necessary;

(4) Establishment of a governmental experimental station to conduct experiments in tea cultivation and advise all planters in their work.

220. In 1959, 75 million escudos were allocated under the Second Development Plan for the demarcation of suitable areas and for the development of a settlement scheme. Expenditures amounted to 14 million escudos by the end of 1962 and an additional 5 million escudos were appropriated for 1963.

221. By 1961 an experimental project had been set up at Vila Junqueiro Gurue, comprising nine European families and one African (see A/6000/Rev.I, chap. V, annex II, paras. 309 and 310). Eight of the Europeans were soldier-settlers; the African family was installed largely to attract other Africans, who had previously shown reluctance to participate in tea growing because of the seven years waiting period between planting and the first harvest.

222. Each European family received 50 hectares, of which twenty were for tea and the rest for food crops, pasture and forests. The African farmer was to develop four hectares of tea with the technical and financial assistance of the *Brigada de Chá*. Under the guidance of the *Brigada*, these small producers have been formed into a co-operative which uses joint funds to provide housing, agricultural equipment and other needs. It was reported that the project was already producing 980 tons of green leaf by 1961.

223. A factory with an initial processing capacity of 1,000 tons, capable of being increased to 2,000 tons was put up by the Government during the 1960's, partly financed by a 2 million escudos loan from the Banco Nacional Ultramarino. Tea was first processed in the factory in 1965. The factory is being acquired by the growers' co-operative on a long-term loan.

224. According to original estimates, it was expected that eventually the European farmers would each earn 70,000 escudos annually.

225. Later reports from the *Brigada de Chá* have apparently discouraged further governmental involvement with tea settlements. According to one source the cost of setting up the minimum size tea farm of 15 hectares is about 600,000 escudos, on which no return can be expected for at least the seven-year period it takes the plants to mature. Government money, it was suggested, could be more profitably employed in the form of financial aid to larger companies. While at one time plans envisaged the setting up of similar colonization projects in Milange and Tacuane, no progress seems to have been made in this respect.

226. According to one source,* 5,928 hectares in Gurue were occupied by settlers in 1961, of which 800 hectares were under cultivation. An additional 1,670 hectares was to be opened up shortly. In 1965 it was reported that the number of small planters in Gurue had risen to twenty-eight and was rapidly increasing.

Government regulation and controls

227. Apart from the measures to assist the development of tea production described above, the industry is not subject to any special government regulation or control. Since tea is exported mainly to destinations outside the escudo zone, it is an important foreign exchange earner and, under the exchange control regulations in force, makes a valuable contribution to Portugal's balance of payments position.

228. Tea exports are subject to a standard export duty of 1 per cent *ad valorem*, plus an *ad valorem* surtax of 3 per cent. In the case of exports to Portugal it is subject to a special reduction of 25 per cent of the total tax.

* C. F. Spence, *Mozambique* (Cape Town, 1963).

Exports and destinations

229. Except for a small amount reserved for home consumption, amounting to only 330 tons in 1961, all tea produced in Mozambique is exported. Traditional markets for Mozambique tea are the United Kingdom, South Africa and Portugal, which absorbed respectively 60.52 per cent, 8.25 per cent and 5.53 per cent of Mozambique's total exports of tea between 1925 and 1962. The United States and the Netherlands, although they accounted for 12.05 per cent and 6.26 per cent of sales during this period, are not considered completely reliable markets. The United States has not been a big purchaser since 1950. The Netherlands has bought Mozambique tea only since 1950.

230. The United Kingdom being the major buyer of Mozambique tea, producers are subject to the British marketing system which, according to one source^{aa} has certain disadvantages for the producers. Under this system tea is auctioned at a central exchange which handles 80 per cent of the total of world transactions. The day that tea arrives from Mozambique the producer is informed of what price he would receive if it were marketed on that day. Generally, however, since two or three months elapse between the time of the original quotation and the time the tea is marketed, producers have no way of knowing or controlling the actual sale price. In the meantime the producer has to bear the entire expense of production and shipping and should the price have dropped

^{aa} Banco Nacional Ultramarino, *Boletim Trimestral*, No. 43, 30 September 1960.

cannot afford to postpone his marketing to a future date. To improve this condition, the Banco Nacional Ultramarino, in collaboration with the Anglo-Portuguese bank, instituted a special system whereby the producer could ship his tea in care of the bank which would give him in advance a percentage of the anticipated market price. The sale itself would be made by the Anglo-Portuguese bank which would wait for an appropriate time to sell.

231. Despite this help offered by the Banco Nacional Ultramarino, Mozambique is still in an unfavourable position in the United Kingdom market. Because the tea is generally classified as "filler" it receives only about one half to one third of the price of better quality teas, and usually receives the lowest price of all African teas.

232. In addition, Mozambique producers are obliged to pay an import duty, generally higher than 1.4 escudos per/kg., levied on tea imported from non-commonwealth countries.

233. During the early 1960s Mozambique producers attempted to find a market at the Nairobi auction. In 1961, 222 cases of tea were sold in this way, increasing to 1,326 cases in 1962. By 1963, however, sales fell to 420 cases and in that year it was reported that Mozambique would no longer participate in these auctions.

234. Current export prices of Mozambique tea are not known. In recent years, the highest price was offered in 1959 (23 escudos per/kg.) after which it declined in 1960 and 1961. Since 1962 it has been reported that prices are again improving. The average price in 1962 was 20 escudos per kilogramme.

TABLE 19. MOZAMBIQUE—TEA: EXPORTS AND PRINCIPAL DESTINATIONS, 1955-1964

Year	Exports			Main destinations (percentage of export volume)					
	Thousand tons	Million escudos	Percentage of total export value	United Kingdom	United States	Netherlands	Portugal	Federal Republic of Germany	Australia
1955	5.5	155.1	9.15	66.14	11.82	8.63	2.04	1.57	—
1956	6.3	120.5	6.94	83.27	2.82	7.79	2.71	0.94	0.03
1957	5.9	118.2	5.83	83.28	3.24	6.76	2.28	1.24	0.12
1958	6.9	145.6	7.18	81.55	2.36	9.53	2.48	0.54	0.74
1959	8.0	154.5	8.11	72.07	5.81	10.57	1.94	1.73	2.14
1960	8.1	176.4	8.40	79.33	5.36	3.19	1.98	3.67	1.86
1961	9.9	235.7	9.25	72.67	8.95	1.69	1.60	3.36	1.28
1962	9.0	179.6	6.87	80.52	5.26	2.94	2.07	1.96	0.44
1963	8.4	155.4	5.37
1964	9.0	163.9	5.39	53.48	8.62	9.44	2.16	1.53	6.42

SOURCES: 1955-1962: Mozambique, *Comércio Externo*; 1964: Mozambique, *Boletim Mensal*, December 1964.

TABLE 20. MOZAMBIQUE: AGRICULTURAL EXPORTS, 1955-1964
(Metric tons)

Year	Cotton-lint	Cashew ^a	Sugar	Copra	Sisal	Tea	Vegetable oils	Fruits ^b	Tobacco ^c
1955	32,687	50,056	85,820	34,823	26,896	5,540	13,346	12,235	379
1956	22,677	39,003	98,176	41,377	27,940	6,276	13,828	16,283	96
1957	31,578	69,358	122,321	45,507	32,374	5,869	15,793	24,906	410
1958	35,974	97,200	132,387	44,368	32,450	6,904	11,976	17,341	540
1959	35,051	63,033	114,108	37,639	30,596	7,987	8,422	16,342	454
1960	44,406	57,203	111,249	40,753	27,950	8,066	6,385	23,012	514
1961	42,631	85,641	113,843	60,070	28,427	9,905	9,588	17,170	1,147
1962	36,301	82,378	129,931	52,794	29,643	8,989	7,919	23,215	1,210
1963	31,564	121,895	124,896	46,433	29,680	8,438	14,963	25,550	1,017
1964	32,445	127,796	83,347	43,812	31,581	9,017	17,893	27,217	696

SOURCES: 1955-1962: Mozambique, *Comércio Externo*; 1963: Mozambique, *Anuário Estatístico*; 1964: Mozambique, *Boletim Mensal*, December 1964.

^a Includes husked and unhusked nuts.

^b Includes bananas and citrus.

^c Includes manufactured and unmanufactured tobacco.

TABLE 21. MOZAMBIQUE: AGRICULTURAL EXPORTS PERCENTAGE OF VALUE OF TOTAL EXPORTS, 1955-1964

Year	Total exports (thousand escudos)	Cotton (per cent)	Cashew ^a (per cent)	Sugar (per cent)	Copra (per cent)	Sisal (per cent)	Tea (per cent)	Vegetable oils (per cent)	Fruits ^b (per cent)	Tobacco ^c (per cent)
1955	1,695,766	25.41	8.46	12.60	8.26	7.16	9.15	5.27	0.34	0.37
1956	1,735,674	17.79	8.74	14.32	9.58	7.31	6.94	6.28	0.42	0.13
1957	2,029,294	23.51	12.29	15.57	8.51	6.29	5.83	6.03	0.53	0.37
1958	2,028,566	27.07	13.71	16.62	9.33	6.48	7.18	4.43	0.43	0.63
1959	1,903,988	28.39	10.49	15.21	11.08	8.32	8.11	3.97	0.42	0.73
1960	2,099,250	32.47	11.12	13.25	9.26	8.47	8.40	2.43	0.52	0.65
1961	2,548,126	27.31	13.33	12.75	10.47	6.36	9.25	2.83	0.77	1.10
1962	2,615,832	23.43	10.49	13.19	7.82	6.37	6.87	2.24	1.27	1.24
1963	2,896,355	18.06	16.07	11.31	7.04	9.03	5.37	3.96	1.23	1.21
1964	3,042,973	18.56	19.99	8.07	6.84	9.02	5.39	4.92	1.15	0.95

SOURCES: 1955-1962: Mozambique, *Comércio Externo*; 1963: Mozambique, *Anuário Estatístico*; 1964: Mozambique, *Boletim Mensal*, December 1964.

^a Includes husked and unhusked nuts.

^b Includes bananas and citrus.

^c Includes manufactured and unmanufactured tobacco.

Appendix IV

Foreign-owned railways in Angola and Mozambique

Working paper prepared by the Secretariat

CONTENTS

	Paragraphs
INTRODUCTION	1-2
I. ANGOLA: THE BENGUELA RAILWAY	
A. The railway system of Angola	3-15
B. History of the Benguela Railway	16-19
C. Terms of concession	20-25
D. Organization and finances of the Company	26-35
E. Operations of the Railway and its economic role	36-61
II. MOZAMBIQUE: THE TRANS-ZAMBEZIA RAILWAY	
A. The railway systems of Mozambique	62-71
B. History of the Trans-Zambezia Railway	72-79
C. Terms of the concession	80-87
D. Organization and finances of the Company	88-92
E. Operations of the Railway and its economic role	93-97

Tables

	Page
1. Benguela Railway: goods and service traffic, 1954-1963	439
2. Benguela Railway: domestic and transit traffic by principal commodities, 1961-1963	440

ANNEXES

I. Angola: railway facilities	445
II. Mozambique: railway facilities	446

INTRODUCTION

1. Railways represent an important branch of economic activity throughout southern Africa and have played a major role in the development of industries and of European settlement. Mozambique particularly, because of its geographical location vis-à-vis the rich mining and industrial regions of the interior, depends heavily on its railways as a source of invisible foreign exchange earnings which until recently more than offset the substantial deficit in its balance of external trade. In Angola, where only one railway connects with those of neighbouring countries, this factor is of relatively lesser importance and the railways may be said to have played a comparatively greater part in opening up the country to European settlement and industries.

2. This paper contains an outline of the railway systems of both Territories and describes their economic role. It deals primarily however with the two foreign-owned railways, giving details of their history, ownership and operations. Of the two, the Benguela Railway is by far the most important, in terms of its economic significance and its earnings, as well as the revenue which the Government derives from it. The two railways illustrate yet another facet of the role played by foreign economic interests in the Territories under Portuguese administration.

I. ANGOLA: THE BENGUELA RAILWAY

A. The railway systems of Angola

3. Compared with those of Mozambique (which are described in section II below), Angola's railway facilities are less developed and do not play as important a role in the economy of the Territory. Although in area Angola is half a million square kilometres larger than Mozambique, it has almost the same total length of railways, resulting in a railway density of 2.4 kilometres of track per thousand square kilometres compared with 4.2 in Mozambique.

4. Angola's rail facilities consist of three unconnected main lines which run almost parallel to each other inland from the ports of Luanda, Lobito and Moçâmedes. One of these, the Benguela Railway, which is the only non-Portuguese-owned line, traverses the whole Territory and links with international lines, while the other two railways, which are State-owned, reach only about half-way between the coast and the Territory's eastern frontier with Zambia. In addition, there is a small privately owned line of 129 kilometres between Amboim and Gabela.

5. Though limited, Angola's rail facilities have nevertheless continuously operated below capacity. Despite substantial increases on all three lines after the Second World War, Angola's traffic in 1959, expressed in terms of ton-kilometres per kilometre of route, was less than one tenth of that of Mozambique. In recent years the expansion of the network of roads serving inland points has further diverted domestic traffic away from the two internal railways, and in 1963 estimated receipts of the autonomous Roads Board were almost 10 per cent higher than those of the Direcção de Portos e Caminhos de Ferro which administers the State-owned railways.

6. The northern part of Angola is served by the Luanda Railway which is the oldest in the Territory. It was originally built, mainly with British capital, by the Royal Trans-Africa Railway Company (Companhia Real dos Caminhos de Ferro Através de Africa) under a ninety-nine-year concession granted to it by the Portuguese Government in 1885. The first section of this railway, then known as the Luanda-Ambaca line, was opened in 1889, but construction of the remaining section was slow and only reached Ambaca, the provisional terminus 276 kilometres from the coast, in 1901. The final stretch of 140 kilometres to Malanje was completed in 1909

by the Government.* Because of recurring difficulties between the company and the Government, the latter in 1914 exercised the right to redeem the entire line and in 1918 took possession of it (Decree 4,600, 13 June 1918).^b

7. The Luanda Railway now comprises a total length of 615 kilometres. In addition to the main line of 516 kilometres, between Luanda and Malanje, there are two branch lines, one of 55 kilometres to Dondo and another of 33 kilometres to Golungo Alto. A further branch line, known as the Congo district line, is under construction. Serving the Luanda, Cuanza North and Malanje districts, the Luanda Railway has increased in importance with the growing European settlement and development in this region. As reported previously (A/6000/Rev.1, chap. V, annex II, table 2), the European population in these three districts has more than doubled since 1950, and in 1960 was more than one third of the total European population of the Territory. The principal products of the region include palm oil, coffee, cotton, sugar, some sisal, manganese, asphalt and mica, which are exported through the port of Luanda. Although the Luanda line has for many years operated at half capacity, it is potentially of great importance to the future development of the Territory as it serves an area which already contains some of the most important industrial activities in the Territory and is continuing to attract new industries.

8. Enterprises served by the Luanda line in 1964 included the Bom Jesus sugar plantation and factory, PETRANGOL, COTONANG, and the major cement plant of the Territory, SECIL, which in 1963 had an annual production of 290,000 tons. As the main manganese deposits lie between Galungo Alto and Pungo Andongo the Luanda line was the main line of evacuation of manganese ore in the 1950s (*ibid.*, annex I, paras. 67-69). At present coffee comprises a large part of the Luanda railway's outward traffic, especially along the Galungo Alto branch, which serves the area of Dembos. Most of the inward traffic consists of consumer and durable goods, including machinery and equipment for the European enterprises and plantations. The Congo district line, which is being extended into the heart of the coffee-producing region in the Uíge plateau, is expected to greatly increase the value of the Luanda Railway by opening up the northern part of the Territory to more intensive development (*ibid.*, annex II, para. 70). When completed, the Congo district line is expected to carry 600,000 tons annually serving points as far north as S. Salvador, Quicoxe, Vale do M'Bridge and Quimba where the Companhia União Fabril has its main fibre plantations.

9. Since the mid-1950s the Luanda Railway has carried an average of about one quarter of the Territory's total passenger traffic. Reflecting the development of the region served goods traffic on the line has increased by more than 50 per cent since 1960. In 1964 the Luanda Railway accounted for about 25 per cent by weight of the total goods traffic of the Territory.

10. The southern third of the Territory is served by the State-owned Moçâmedes Railway which runs almost parallel to the border with South West Africa. The original concession was granted in 1886 to the Moçâmedes Company. As Portugal at that time was engaged in colonizing southern Angola and increasing its influence in that region^d the railway was built to facilitate troop movements into the Huila plateau and the settlement of Portuguese nationals there (*ibid.*,

para. 93). The terms of concession, therefore, required the Company's management, the majority of the employees and the major share of the capital to be Portuguese. The line is now State-owned.

11. Begun in 1905 the first section of 249 kilometres to Sá da Bandeira on the Huila plateau was not completed until 1923. Although at various times plans were proposed for extending the railway to the southern border to serve South West Africa and to the eastern border to provide a second westward outlet for what is now Zambia, Sá da Bandeira remained the southern railway's terminal point for the next twenty years.

12. The Moçâmedes Railway was built before the hinterland was sufficiently developed to provide enough paying traffic, so that during most of its existence this railway operated at a sizable deficit. Between 1942 and 1950 the annual deficits fluctuated between 25 and almost 70 per cent. Although the volume of both goods and passenger traffic increased after 1950, and the railway's revenues rose from 5.4 million escudos in 1952 to 31.2 million escudos in 1962, the financial situation of the railway improved only slightly, the ratio of operating expenses to revenues having fallen from 1.6 to 1.3 in this period.

13. As in the case of the Luanda Railway, the Moçâmedes Railway has become increasingly important in recent years due to the growth of Portuguese settlement especially in the Cunene Valley, the development of cattle ranching and, more particularly, the opening up of the Cassinga iron mines to which a new rail link is being built (see below and A/6000/Rev.1, chap. V, annex I, paras. 210 and 211). This new link was expected to make it possible to export 1 million tons of ore annually by 1965 and 3 million tons annually by 1967^e to the port of Moçâmedes where the Government is building a new mineral wharf.

14. The Benguela Railway which starts from the port of Lobito about half way down the coast between Luanda and Moçâmedes serves the central area of Angola and extends to the eastern frontier where it connects with the railway system of Katanga. Although originally built for the purpose of carrying ore from the Katanga mines to the coast, as will be seen below, the Benguela Railway became and has remained an important factor in the settlement of the Benguela and Bié plateaux and in evacuating agricultural products from these areas and the hinterland. It is also the only railway in Angola that has operated with a profit and contributed to the revenue of the Territorial Government.

15. The history, operations and economic role of the Benguela Railway which are described below illustrate another facet of the part played by foreign economic interests in the Territory.

B. History of the Benguela Railway

16. The Benguela Railway runs from Lobito Bay down to Benguela about 35 kilometres south and then across Angola to Vila Teixeira de Sousa (Dilolo) where it connects with the Congo-Bas Katanga Railway (generally known as the BCK Railway). The length of the railway from Lobito to the eastern frontier is 1,348 kilometres and there are 182 kilometres of spurs, sidings and yards.

17. The idea of building a railway from Lobito across Angola dates back to 1825 when a special commission was appointed to survey the area between Lobito and the Cubango River up to Caconda, then an important settlement centre (A/6000/Rev.1, chap. V, annex II, para. 147). A railway of 23 kilometres was subsequently built from Lobito to Catumbela, midway to the town of Benguela, by the Companhia Portuguesa do Caminho de Ferro Africano. In August 1899 the Portuguese Government authorized the building of a railway towards the frontier of what is now the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and in the following year set up a Benguela Railway Administrative Board (Junta Administrativa do Caminho de Ferro de Benguela) (statutes approved 23 June 1900) composed of government staff and representatives of banking, commercial and industrial interests in

* Some Portuguese writers attribute the slow rate of construction to the liberal terms of the concession contract which gave the company a guaranteed annual income of 6 per cent on its capital invested calculated on the basis of 999 réis per kilometre.

^b During one period the line was placed under a Portuguese company called the Ambaca Company which was finally dissolved in 1938.

^c The zone served by the railway is generally considered to extend about 150 kilometres on each side of the line.

^d After the Berlin Conference of 1885 a secret Anglo-German agreement had been signed designating the south of Angola Benguela and Lobito as a German sphere of influence (José D'Almeida, *A historical outline of the Benguela Railway*, London, 1954, pp. 24 and 32).

^e *Actualidade Económica de Angola*, 2 September 1965.

Portugal and of commercial and agricultural interests in Angola. It was intended that the railway would be financed with the help of customs surtaxes, certain additional taxes, receipts from operations of the railway during construction and revenue from the produce of the hinterland served by the railway. However, in 1902, the Government decided to grant the concession to build the railway to Robert Williams on behalf of the Tanganyika Concessions Company (established in London in 1899) which having obtained extensive copper mining concessions in Katanga and Rhodesia, was a leading promoter of railways to serve these areas. The Benguela Railroad Company was established on 26 May 1903 and the railway concession was transferred to it. A British firm, S. Pauling and Company, was engaged to build the railway.

18. As originally conceived, the Benguela Railway was to traverse Angola with a major part running parallel to the frontier with the Congo where it would connect with the Congolese railway system. Agreement was reached between the Benguela and the Congolese railway companies (the BCK and the Katanga Railway Companies) for the construction of a branch from the Katanga mines to link up with the Benguela Railway when it reached the frontier. Receipts from the traffic carried were to be divided between the three companies in proportion to the length of their respective lines.

19. Because of the difficulties of the terrain, involving steep gradients of 2.5 per cent in the climb from the coast to the Benguela plateau, work on the railway proceeded slowly. The first section of 197 kilometres from Lobito to Cubal was opened in 1908, the second section to Cuma in 1910, and the third section to Chinguar, a total distance of about 517 kilometres from Lobito, was opened in 1913. Work on the railway ceased during World War I because of difficulty in obtaining materials. As the BCK had in the meantime built an internal line from the Katanga to Port Francqui, after the war the previous agreement with the Congo railway companies had to be revised.¹ In 1928, following a revision of the border between Angola and the Congo the Benguela Railway had to be extended 104 kilometres beyond the original plan and it became necessary for the Benguela Railway Company to raise additional capital.² After the First World War, the Tanganyika Concessions, which then held five sixths of the shares in the Benguela Railway Company, received a British loan of £1,250,000 and the railway was completed to Dilolo on the Angola border in 1929.³ The link of 520 kilometres from Tenke in the Congo to Dilolo was finally completed in 1931.

C. Terms of the concession

20. The concession for the Benguela Railway was granted to Robert Williams by an agreement dated 28 November 1902. This agreement together with subsequent modifications granted by the Portuguese Government constitute the legal basis for the Benguela Railway Company's operations.

21. Under the terms of the contract, the concession is for a period of ninety-nine years (terminating in 2001 A.D.), and as in the case of the Trans-Zambezia Railway described below, on expiration of this term, the railway, with all its permanent way and rolling stock, buildings and accessories will revert to the State without payment. However, the contract also provides that, once twenty-five years had elapsed from the date on which the railway reached the frontier, that is to say from 1954 onwards, the Government may redeem the railway with its equipment after giving six months notice to that effect. If it does so, the Government must make an annual payment to the Company during the remaining period of the concession of an amount equal to the average net revenue of the railway during the previous five years, which, according to the contract, was not to be less than

¹ Lionel Werner, *Les chemins de fer coloniaux* (Brussels, 1930), pp. 154 and 155.

² Because of the secret convention referred to above (see foot-note d), it had at one time been thought that Germany might share in financing the railway (Hailey, *An African Survey*, Oxford, 1945 edition, p. 1595).

³ Hailey, *op. cit.*

700 réis per kilometre (article 56). In the event of total or partial interruption of work the Government may take over the operation of the railway and after three months, if the Company is still unable to continue the working, it *ipso facto* incurs the penalty of rescission.

22. The contract granted Robert Williams and his Company (then yet to be formed) the right to construct and work a railway from Lobito Bay to the eastern frontier, approaching at the terminal point the twelfth parallel south latitude. The Company was given the right, during the first ten years of the concession, to prospect for minerals within an area of state land 120 kilometres on either side of the railway line; its right to work such mines was subject to the mining law of 1898. It was also granted the use of timber in the same areas for the duration of the concession as might be necessary for construction and working of the railway; the right to build a pier in Lobito Bay as an extension and integral part of the railroad for its own use in connexion with its railway operations; and the right (subsequently amended) to construct hotels, restaurants and stores along the railway.

23. During the period of the concession the Company was exempted from "any taxation, whether general or municipal", relating to the working of the railway. It was exempted from duty on ores transported by the railway, including ore mined alongside the railway or coming from adjoining countries; such ores were, however, subject to export duty as specified in the mining legislation. It was also exempt from import duties on specific goods needed, including coal or other fuel for the railway.

24. The Government undertook not to construct or grant concessions for the construction of any other parallel railway within 50 kilometres on each side of the railway; but it reserved the right to grant concessions for the construction of railways or other means of communications crossing or joining the railway.

25. The concession contract provided that the railway's tariffs had to be approved by the Government and were not to exceed a fixed maximum. The tariff schedule divided goods into different classes with the maximum tariffs on high-priced agricultural products such as sugar, and coffee set at 20 per cent higher than those for cereals (including wheat, maize and flour), cotton wool, palm oil, pig-iron and copper, lead and other raw metals.

D. Organization and finances of the Company

26. The Benguela Railway Company was required under the original contract to have a capital of not less than £2 million sterling. In 1926 (Decree 11,732, 29 May), this was increased to £3 million, equivalent to 13.5 million gold escudos. To provide additional working capital the Company was later authorized to issue under Portuguese law debentures of a face value equivalent to three times the amount of share capital already realized (article 15 of the Statutes as amended by: Decree 11,732, 29 May 1926; Law No. 1,011, 18 July 1920; and Law of 23 June 1913). The Company had to be registered under and subject to Portuguese law, and its Board of Directors had to include three members freely appointed by the Portuguese Government but paid by the Company. In addition, a Government Commissioner, also paid by the Company, sat on the Board.

27. In 1963 the Board of Directors was composed of: Dr. Alexandre Pinto Basto, President; Dr. Ruy Ennes Ulrich, Vice-President; Colonel Arthur Mendes de Magalhães, Government Director; Vice-Admiral José Augusto Guerreiro de Brito, Government Director; Dr. Manuel António Fernandes, Managing Director; D. António de Almeida Correa de Sá, Assistant Managing Director; Dr. Luís Supico Pinto; A. V. A. de Spirlet; Rt. Hon. Lord Clitheroe, P.C.; M. T. W. Easby, F.C.A.; S. G. Watts.

28. The Benguela Railway Company is closely associated with Tanganyika Concessions Ltd. which holds 90 per cent of its share capital and since 1933 all the debenture capital. In 1964 Tanganyika Concessions Ltd. had a total authorized capital of £10 million. In addition to its controlling interest

in the Benguela Railway Company, it also held a 14 per cent interest (179,760 shares valued at £15,176,880) in the Union Minière du Haut Katanga; 50 per cent of the capital (£40,000) of Tanganyika Holdings; all of the capital of Tanganyika Properties (Rhodesia) Ltd; and 60 per cent of the capital (£2,250,000) of the Commonwealth Timber Industries. In November 1964 Tanganyika Concessions Ltd. moved its headquarters from Southern Rhodesia to the Bahamas. Stockholders in Tanganyika Concessions include Rhodesia Anglo-American, which in 1952-53 was reported to have acquired a 7 per cent interest, and an American group, including Rockefeller interests, which since 1950 have been reported to control about 600,000 shares.¹ The Comité Spécial du Katanga was originally a shareholder receiving 30,000

¹ T. Gregory, *Ernest Oppenheimer* (Cape Town, 1962), p. 457; W. A. Hunton, *Decision in Africa* (New York, 1957), p. 147.

shares. Harry F. Oppenheimer, the Chairman of the Anglo-American Corporation, is a member of the Board of Directors.

29. At 31 December 1963, the Benguela Railway Company's total assets amount to 3,049 million escudos including 2,500 million escudos in fixed assets. The company's registered share capital was 660 million escudos divided into 3 million shares at 220 escudos each. Total reserves amounted to 1,436 million escudos, of which 81.7 million was legal reserves, 548 million was general reserves and 21.6 million was dividend equalization reserve.²

30. The Company's results for the years 1960-1964, the latest years for which information is available, were as follows:

² Tanganyika Concessions Ltd., *Report and Accounts*, 31 July 1964, pp. 26 and 27; Benguela Railway Company, amalgamated balance-sheet.

	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964
	(Million escudos)				
Gross receipts	596.5	599.9	596.5	551.0	563.8
Working expenses	304.9	337.3	344.9	336.7	354.7
Net revenue of railway	287.3	260.8	250.7	214.3	207.0
Net revenue for distribution	246.1	220.5	207.6	171.6	170.8
Dividends	82.5	82.5	66.0	66.0	66.0
Share of Portuguese Government ...	26.7	22.9	23.5	17.1	17.1
Legal reserve	9.4	8.3	8.4	6.7	6.7
Debentures: redemption and interest	108.6	79.4	30.1	30.6	30.2
Share of Board of Directors and Staff ^a	18.9	16.5	16.9	20.1	20.1

^a The Board of Directors and Board auditors together receive 5 per cent of net revenue after deduction of values destined to redemption of and interest on debentures and part of the Portuguese Government share. The staff profit-sharing participation used to be an equal value, but, in 1963, it was raised to 10 per cent on net revenue after the same deductions indicated above.

31. Under the original concession, the Government received 10 per cent of the total shares fully paid up. In addition to dividends on its shares, the Government was to receive 5 per cent of the net receipts.

32. In 1926 (Decree 11,732, 29 May), when the capital of the company was raised from £2 to £3 million, the Government's financial participation was also increased. In addition to the shares already held the amended provisions entitled

the Government to 15 per cent of any new shares issued and 7.5 per cent of all dividends paid on share capital in excess of 5 per cent. A subsequent amendment again increased the Government's participation by giving it another 5 per cent of all dividends above 2.5 per cent. The Government now holds 300,000 shares (10 per cent of 3 million shares issued) at a nominal value of 220 escudos each. The amounts received by it, in the form both of dividends and participation in net receipts, are shown below.

GOVERNMENT SHARE IN PROCEEDS OF THE BENGUELA RAILWAY COMPANY, 1960-1964
(Million escudos)

	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964
A. Dividends on shares held (300,000 shares)	8.2	8.2	6.6	6.6	6.6
B. Participation in net receipts					
1. 5 per cent of net receipts	9.9	8.7	8.9	7.0	7.0
2. 7.5 per cent of all dividends paid on share capital in excess of 5 per cent	9.6	8.0	8.3	5.6	5.5
3. 5 per cent of all dividends above 2.5 per cent	7.2	6.2	6.3	4.5	4.5
Sub-total	26.7	22.9	23.5	17.1	17.0
GRAND TOTAL	34.9	31.1	30.1	23.7	23.6

33. Over the ten-year period from 1955-1964, excluding dividends, the Government received more than 200 million escudos (about \$US7 million). From the Company's point of view, however, since all installations will revert to the Government when the concession expires, all investments made are a contribution to "the patrimony of the nation".

34. As in the case of the Angolan Diamond Company, the Benguela Railway Company has also helped the Portuguese Government by providing low interest funds for development (see A/6000/Rev.1, chap. V, annex I, paras. 84-166). In 1963 (Decree 45,062, 5 June 1963) it contracted a loan of 60 million escudos (\$US2 million) to the Portuguese Gov-

ernment for the implementation of the Angolan section of the Second National Development Plan. The interest rate is at 1 per cent and the Government plans to repay the loan from its share of the railway profits, supplemented if necessary from the Territory's ordinary revenue. It is not clear to what extent the Benguela Railway Company earns foreign exchange for the Territory but the reports of accounts show each year an exchange loss, which amounted to over 470,000 escudos in 1960; over 763,000 escudos in 1961; 1,059,608 escudos in 1962; and 680,736 escudos in 1963.

35. Although under the terms of its concession the Benguela Railway Company is exempt from any taxation, "whether general or municipal" (see para. 23 above), the Company was assessed £200,000 in 1965 for the special graduated income tax levied by the Angolan Government (see chap. V, above, para. 106). The Company has appealed against this assessment. There are no details as to what other taxes are paid by the railway to the Government.

E. Operation of the Railway and its economic role

36. Up to the end of 1965 the Benguela was still a single-track line. It had over 100 steam locomotives, four diesel engines and more than 1,500 four-axle wagons. Most of the locomotives are wood-burning and to supply them the company has developed eucalyptus groves along both sides of the railway with more than 93 million trees. Coal is used mainly on short stretches where the gradient is steep. Although in terms of weight, the railway's service traffic, which is non-revenue producing, annually accounts for about half of the total, in terms of tons per kilometre; however, service traffic amounts to less than 10 per cent.

37. Built with the intention of evacuating copper ore from the Katanga mines, the Benguela Railway provides the shortest route to Europe from railhead ports in the southern part of Africa. It is 3,000 miles shorter than the sea route from Beira and 2,353 miles shorter than the Cape Town route. Nevertheless, for various reasons, among them stiff competition from other lines (see paras. 51-54 below), the Benguela Railway has never been used to full capacity for transit traffic and for many years domestic traffic in Angola was the main source of the railway's revenue.

38. According to the original financial estimates the railway would have to carry 40,000 tons of copper per year from Katanga to enable it to show a profit on the capital invested. When the Benguela Railway was finally completed in 1929, it was anticipated that the line would carry annually an average of more than a quarter of a million tons (260,000 tons) of traffic comprising 100,000 tons of Katanga exports, 70,000 tons of Katanga imports, 60,000 tons of Angola exports and 30,000 tons of Angola imports. In 1938, after almost ten years of working, the total revenue-earning traffic amounted to 324,000 tons, but transit traffic accounted for less than a quarter of the total traffic.

39. Total paying goods traffic carried by the railway almost doubled between 1938 and 1948, rising from 324,000 to 692,000 tons, and again doubled by 1958. In this twenty-year period, transit traffic increased eightfold, rising from 76,000 tons to 569,000 tons, and in terms of percentage of the total from 23 per cent to over 40 per cent. The growth of transit traffic and domestic paying goods traffic over the period 1954-1963 is shown in table 1 below.

TABLE 1. BENGUELA RAILWAY: GOODS AND SERVICE TRAFFIC, 1954-1963

A. By weight						
	Domestic		Transit		Service ^a	Total (including service traffic)
	Tons	Percentage of total	Tons	Percentage of total	Tons	
1954	534,308	25.28	593,202	28.07	(986,083)	2,113,593
1955	579,613	25.53	630,394	27.77	(1,060,018)	2,270,025
1956	703,170	27.55	720,942	28.25	(1,127,623)	2,551,735
1957	737,939	26.44	652,763	23.39	(1,400,584)	2,791,286
1958	797,627	28.30	569,021	20.19	(1,451,962)	2,818,610
1959	852,007	31.12	622,662	22.74	(1,263,146)	2,727,815
1960	1,067,593	29.56	754,962	20.90	(1,789,237)	3,611,792
1961	1,063,836	30.33	763,695	21.77	(1,679,594)	3,507,125
1962	883,852	27.35	754,937	23.36	(1,592,547)	3,231,336
1963	999,330	35.75	670,538	23.99	(1,125,211)	2,795,079

B. By ton/kilometres						
	Domestic		Transit		Service ^a	Total (including service traffic)
	Tons/km.	Percentage of total	Tons/km.	Percentage of total	Tons/km.	
1954	184,900,420	17.11	799,635,953	74.00	(96,007,689)	1,080,544,062
1955	217,607,538	18.68	849,771,323	72.97	(97,238,342)	1,164,617,203
1956	254,309,675	19.22	971,830,660	73.43	(97,240,634)	1,323,380,969
1957	248,532,483	19.97	879,924,577	70.72	(115,853,667)	1,244,310,727
1958	327,704,649	26.71	767,041,138	62.51	(132,258,892)	1,227,004,679
1959	364,838,921	28.07	839,348,693	64.58	(89,467,328)	1,299,654,942
1960	469,806,501	29.38	1,017,689,733	63.65	(111,429,321)	1,598,925,555
1961	488,890,581	29.70	1,029,460,878	62.55	(127,443,167)	1,645,794,626
1962	416,356,994	26.86	1,017,654,566	65.64	(116,291,702)	1,550,303,262
1963	476,774,893	32.57	903,885,186	61.74	(83,280,223)	1,463,940,302

SOURCE: Eduardo Gomes de Albuquerque e Castro, *Angola, Portos e Transportes*, Luanda 1964 (not paginated).

^a Non-revenue earning.

40. The factors affecting the Benguela Railway's domestic and transit traffic are discussed in the following sections.

Domestic traffic

41. Within Angola the Benguela Railway traverses the districts of Benguela, Bié, Huambo and Moxico, and it has

played an important role in their settlement and development. It has also been responsible for the increased activity of the port of Lobito. When the railway was begun, there were few settlements in the hinterland of Lobito. By 1960, there were more than 45,000 Europeans settled in the Benguela and Huambo districts, with important European centres

at Ganda, Nova Lisboa and Silva Porto which are on the railway line.

42. As described in the study on agriculture and processing industries in Angola (see appendix II), the Benguela-Bié plateau is at present the principal centre for growing sisal, exports of which account for more than 8 per cent of the Territory's total exports by value. Also about 95 per cent of the maize, the Territory's leading export by tonnage, and most of the manioc are also produced in this region. The existence of the railway has stimulated African production of maize and manioc on both sides of the line. From 1920 to the early 1940's maize accounted for 30 to 50 per cent of the total goods traffic on the Benguela Railway.^k This proportion has decreased substantially in recent years as seen in the following table.

TABLE 2. BENGUELA RAILWAY: DOMESTIC AND TRANSIT TRAFFIC BY PRINCIPAL COMMODITIES, 1961-1963

	1961 (metric tons)	1962 (metric tons)	1963 (metric tons)
Minerals	1,002,491	843,278	794,374
Maize	156,390	77,919	97,921
Timber (<i>madeiras em bruto</i>)	18,690	40,216	75,116
Fuel oil	43,137	46,292	47,430
Cement	25,216	30,450	41,545
Fibre (mainly sisal)	40,456	43,258	40,754
Petroleum	41,040	40,492	40,568
Stones and gravel	17,564	26,197	30,095
Wine and beer	16,573	18,243	24,162
Salt	16,048	14,872	18,463
Sugar	22,574	20,469	17,742
Fertilizer and chemicals..	19,293	11,945	13,053

SOURCE: Eduardo Gomes de Albuquerque e Castro, *Angola, Portos e Transportes*, Luanda 1964 (not paginated).

43. Imports up the line include a wide range of consumer durable and non-durable goods for communities along the railway and as far distant as Dondo in the Lunda district where the Angola Diamond Company is engaged in mining (see A/6000/Rev.1, chap V, annex I, para. 105). Although there are no detailed figures on the nature of the inbound traffic carried by the railway some indication can be obtained from the breakdown of the Lobito Port imports. As might be expected, in 1954 for instance, imports consisted mainly of petroleum products (21 per cent), coal (15 per cent, but mostly retained at port), cement (13 per cent), alcoholic beverages (13.7 per cent), and construction materials and machinery (7.14 per cent and 3 per cent respectively).¹

44. Although maize and other agricultural products continue to account for a substantial part of the Benguela Railway's outbound domestic traffic, mineral ore has become a new feature since the opening, in 1957, of the Cuíma iron mines of the Companhia Mineira do Lobito, which have been described in a previous study (*ibid.*, paras. 200-211).

45. As the Cuíma mines are located only forty-one miles from the Robert Williams Station on the Benguela Railway, the iron ore was for several years transported by trucks to this point. In 1961 formal agreements were signed with the Companhia Mineira do Lobito (22 March 1961)^m and the Portuguese Government (Decree 43,601, 14 April) for the construction of a new rail link from the Cuíma mines to the Benguela railway.

46. Under the terms of that contract with the Government, the Benguela Railway Company received the right

to construct and operate a link between Robert Williams and Cuíma and to extend the line to new mineral deposits as they were opened. The line was to be constructed within fifteen months and was to be considered an integral part of the original concession of 1962 redeemable by the Government under the same conditions.

47. The new link was a part of an over-all plan for the development of the Cassinga and Cuíma iron mines formalized by an agreement between the Portuguese Government and the two mining companies, Companhia Mineira do Lobito and the Sociedade Mineira do Lombige.ⁿ The main purpose of this agreement was to secure the construction by the two companies involved of rail links from their mines to the Moçâmedes railway and provide the rolling stock to transport 1.5 million tons of ore annually (or about 5,000 tons daily). The investment by the companies was to be repaid by the Government on the basis of 60 escudos per ton of ore transported, until the entire sum had been completely amortized. Since the Moçâmedes line is State owned, the Government undertook to give iron ore priority on that railway at an agreed tariff. The Benguela Railway was authorized to transport up to 500,000 tons of ore annually with a guarantee of a minimum of 250,000 tons^o provided that the Cuíma traffic on the Moçâmedes line did not fall below 700,000 tons annually.

48. The Benguela-Cuíma link which cost 30.4 million escudos was opened to traffic on 9 August 1962. Ore traffic from Cuíma carried on the Benguela since 1957 is as follows: 88,357 tons in 1957; 197,110 tons in 1958; 245,728 tons in 1959; 439,887 tons in 1960; 380,627 tons in 1961; 231,847 tons in 1962; 288,931 tons in 1963 and 310,198 tons in 1964.^p

49. Originally it had been envisaged that ore from the Cuíma mines would account for two thirds of the mineral traffic guaranteed to the Moçâmedes and Benguela Railways but by the end of 1965 the development of the Cassinga mines was expected to lead to the eventual abandonment of the Cuíma mines^q where the total iron ore reserves are probably less than one tenth of the almost 300 million tons estimated to exist at Cassinga (A/6000/Rev.1, chap. V, annex I, para. 59).

Transit Traffic

(a) Factors affecting transit traffic

50. Originally built with a view to providing a direct route for the evacuation of ore from the Katanga mines, through its connexion with the BCK Railway, the Benguela Railway subsequently became part of the only trans-Africa system providing a westward exit for the mines on the Copperbelt. For various reasons, however, the Benguela Railway has never been used to full capacity for transit traffic from either the Katanga or the Copperbelt despite the advantages it offers as the shortest route to European ports.

51. Before the Benguela Railway was completed, it had been intended that through rates would be established with the BCK Railway link to the Angolan frontier and in 1927 an agreement was signed between the Belgian and Portuguese Governments to this effect.^r However, partly because of the Belgian Congo Government's policy to divert traffic to its own railways and partly because of opposition by the Rhodesian Railways, through rates were not adopted except for two brief periods between 1931 and 1939.

52. According to the report of the Central and Southern Africa Transport Conference held in Johannesburg in 1950^s on the two occasions when through rates were introduced on the BCK and Benguela Railways in 1931 and 1936, the

ⁿ *Ibid.*, 26 November 1958.

^o *Boletim Geral*, August 1962, p. 253.

^p Figures for 1957-1960 and 1964 are from the *Boletim Geral*; 1962 and 1963 figures are from the Benguela Company's 1963 report.

^q *Boletim Geral do Ultramar*, December 1965, p. 196.

^r League of Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. LXXI, 1928, p. 439.

^s CCTA, *Central and Southern Africa Transport Conference, Final act and related documents* (Johannesburg, 1950), p. 130.

^k Portugal, Instituto Nacional de Estatística, I Congresso dos Economistas Portugueses, *V Secção-Utilização do Solo* (Lisbon 1945), p. 98.

^l Hance and Van Donegan, "Port of Lobito and the Benguela Railway", *Geographical Review*, Vol. 46, 1956, p. 477.

^m *Diário do Governo*, Series II, 22 March 1961.

Rhodesian Railways, as the customary carrier of the Copperbelt traffic, petitioned and secured the withdrawal of through rates on the Benguela Railway. In 1938, the Rhodesian Railways concluded an agreement with the four major producers to safeguard its share of the traffic from the Copperbelt.[†] Under this agreement which remained in effect until 1956, the producers agreed to consign all copper exports and all imports via the Rhodesian Railways in exchange for a reduction of 12s. 6d. per ton of copper exported via Beira, and they agreed to use coal from the Wankie Collieries in Southern Rhodesia at a specially reduced rate. As a result, except for a few emergency supplies of coal imported via Lobito, no Copperbelt traffic was carried by the Benguela Railway during the period of the agreement.[‡]

53. After the expiration of the above-mentioned agreement, tariffs on the Benguela and the BCK Railways were brought to approximate parity, taking into account the greater cost of shipping via Matadi. Although these rates were still higher than those of the Rhodesian Railways, an agreement was reached between the three railways concerned permitting a maximum of 20 per cent of exportable copper from the Copperbelt to be transported by the Benguela Railway.[¶] This agreement which was valid for four years from 1 January 1957 also removed limitations on imports to the Copperbelt via Lobito and restrictions on other exports by this route. Inward rates from Lobito for all goods except coal were to be the same as those from Beira and outward rates on all goods, except for copper, were to be the normal non-through rates composed of three separate tariffs. The outward rates on copper were to be through rates, and not less than those from the Copperbelt to Beira or Lourenço Marques.

54. In 1960, the Government of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland partly abrogated the Tripartite agreement, and although it permitted the mining companies to export up to 36,000 short tons via the Benguela Railway, rates on the Rhodesian Railways were reduced by £4 per ton (from £18 to £14) with the result that shipments from the Copperbelt via Lobito dropped from 81,000 tons in 1959 to 63,000 tons in 1960 and to 20,000 tons in 1961 after which outward shipments practically ceased though inward traffic to the Copperbelt continued at some 12,000 tons annually.

(b) Pattern of transit traffic

55. As the foregoing paragraphs have shown, transit traffic on the Benguela Railway from the Congo and Rhodesian mines has not been allowed to develop freely, but it has been limited mainly by inter-line competition. Before 1960 the Benguela Railway appears to have carried all the manganese ore and about 20 per cent of the annual copper output of some 300,000 tons from the Katanga mines with the copper rates to Lobito and Matadi at an artificial parity. (In this period the Rhodesian Railways carried 30 per cent of the Katanga copper and charged low rates.) Between 1960 and 1963, owing to transportation difficulties in the Congo Republic, the Benguela Railway carried 65 per cent of the Katanga copper at more or less the same rates as those on the Rhodesian Railways which carried the remaining 35 per cent. The Benguela Railway's share of the traffic of the Copperbelt was substantially less. It carried none during the period 1938-57. From 1957 to 1960 it was authorized to carry up to 20 per cent, but in fact never exceeded 14 per cent of the total, and from 1961 until the end of 1965 it carried only a very small share. An important factor which contributed to the diversion of Copperbelt traffic away from the Benguela Railway was the higher rates fixed

by the shipping conference for sea freight from Lobito to European ports compared with rates from Lourenço Marques, despite the fact that shipment by the latter route took 30 to 35 days longer.[¶]

56. Transit traffic carried during the period 1955-1959 fluctuated around an average of about 650,000 tons annually. Most of this consisted of mineral traffic from Katanga. In 1959, for instance, of the 622,662 tons carried, 449,249 tons were from Katanga, comprising 59,511 tons of copper, 34,426 tons of zinc, 12,507 tons of cobalt, 331,402 tons of manganese and other minerals, and 6,117 tons of cotton. Imports consisted of 33,916 tons of fuel, 13,562 tons of iron and steel, and 9,475 tons of heavy equipment.[¶]

57. Events since 1960 further illustrate the way in which the international role of the Benguela Railway is affected by the outside factors. From 1960-1962 when as a result of the disturbances in the Democratic Republic of the Congo a greater part of Katanga traffic was diverted to the Benguela Railway, the company's net revenue reached an all-time high (see para. 30 above). In 1963, following the reopening of the Congolese lines, transit traffic on the Benguela line dropped by 85,000 tons and with it the Company's revenue decreased by more than 15 per cent.

(c) Recent developments

58. As a result of the deterioration of Zambia's relations with Southern Rhodesia following the latter's unilateral declaration of independence, greater use has been made of the Benguela Railway by the mines on the Copperbelt. Early in 1966 these copper shipments were reported to be at the rate of 5,000 tons a month and were expected to rise to 10,000 tons a month by mid-year. The Company's receipts for the first quarter of 1966 showed a 40 per cent increase over 1965.

59. As already reported in paragraph 123 of chapter V, early in 1966 the Benguela Railway announced its decision to double the line's present 1.5 million tons capacity (in one direction) by constructing a new link between Lobito and Cubal at a cost of about £5 million including additional rolling stock. According to some reports the Company considers that its investment would be repaid during the remaining period of its contract only if the Benguela Railway were guaranteed 20 per cent of the Zambian copper traffic amounting to about 120,000 to 140,000 tons annually.

60. The new link is expected to take two years to complete. In the meantime, as Zambia wishes to divert its copper exports from the Rhodesian Railways, the entire rail capacity from the Copperbelt to various exit ports is being reviewed. In June the Government of the Democratic Republic of Congo announced its intention of re-routing all Katanga traffic to its own railways so as to free the Benguela Railway for Zambian copper shipments. It was hoped that, with additional rolling stock made available from the Congolese railways, the Benguela Railway could begin to carry 20,000 tons of copper a month increasing to 38,000 tons, which would have provided exit for over half a million tons of Zambian copper.

61. In July, the Government of the Congo announced, however, that Katanga traffic would continue to use the Benguela Railway, the reason being that the Congolese railways did not have sufficient rolling stock to handle the additional burden. Nevertheless, it is evident that at its present rate of operations the Benguela Railway has surplus capacity available for transit traffic. The extent to which this capacity will be used in the future will depend on the outcome of the negotiations among Governments and mining interests to find alternative routes for Zambian copper, as well as on the level of the agreed railway tariffs and any adjustments which may be made in the conference freight rates from Lobito to western European ports.

[¶] For copper, these rates to European ports were one third higher from Lobito as compared to those from Lourenço Marques.

[¶] Belgium, Ministère des affaires africaines, *La situation économique du Congo belge et Ruanda Urundi, 1959*.

[†] Rhokana Corporation, Roan Antelope Copper Mines, Ltd., Mufulira Copper Mines, Ltd., and N'Changa Copper Mines, Ltd.

[‡] Although the expansion of traffic in the post-war period and the resulting congestion of some of the southern African ports led to recommendations by the 1950 Johannesburg Transport Conference for rerouting of some traffic over the Benguela Railway, these recommendations were not adopted.

[¶] Tripartite Agreement between the Companhia do Caminho de Ferro do Benguela, the Compagnie du Chemin de Fer Bas-Congo au Katanga and the Rhodesian Railways relating to the passage of goods traffic between Lobito and the Rhodesian Railways, 1956.

II. MOZAMBIQUE: THE TRANS-ZAMBIAN RAILWAY

A. The railway systems of Mozambique

62. As stated elsewhere (see appendix I above), Mozambique derives substantial economic benefit from its geographical location vis-à-vis the landlocked regions of the interior. With a coastline of 2,795 kilometres and some of the finest natural harbours in southern Africa, it constitutes logically the only gateway to the sea for Southern Rhodesia and Malawi, and for Zambia, the Transvaal and Swaziland it provides the shortest of alternative routes. Because of this natural advantage, a large part of the capital invested in economic infrastructure has gone into railways and port installations. At present, Mozambique obtains about one fourth of its foreign exchange earnings from the transit trade of its neighbours, a vital factor for a Territory which is chronically deficit in its balance of visible trade.⁷ In addition, the autonomous Harbours, Railways and Transport Administration, with an annual budget of 1,009 million escudos in 1965 is a major employer and contributor of both ordinary and extraordinary public revenue. Apart from this, the port cities of Lourenço Marques and Beira owe much of their economic activity to the transit trade.

63. While much capital has gone into the development of rail and port facilities handling transit traffic, less has been done to develop internal communications, partly because early development was mainly near the coast and in view of the length and narrowness of much of the Territory, a good deal of the transportation needs were filled by coastal and river shipping. Though there are seven separate railway systems or lines, none is as yet inter-connected.

64. The two most important systems are those which radiate from the ports of Lourenço Marques and Beira and link up with the railways of South Africa, Southern Rhodesia and Malawi. The Lourenço Marques system, which handles the largest part of the transit trade, consists of two major international lines, the first running directly from Lourenço Marques to the Transvaal border at Ressano-Garcia, a distance of only about 91 kilometres, where it connects with the South African railway. This line was constructed by the Portuguese Government in the late 1890s at the instance of the Transvaal and, under the terms of the Mozambique Convention, is guaranteed 40 per cent of the sea-borne goods traffic to and from a specified area which includes the mining and industrial heart of the Transvaal.⁸ Another major international line branches off to the north-west through the Limpopo Valley, a distance of 530 kilometres, to Malvernia on the Southern Rhodesian border where it connects with the Rhodesian Railways. This line was constructed in 1955 to relieve congestion at Beira by providing an alternative route for the transit traffic of Southern Rhodesia and Zambia. The line is in fact an extension of an earlier branch line to Guijá in the Limpopo Valley which was built to facilitate the opening up of the rich agricultural land in the Valley for European farming. The Limpopo Valley is the site of the largest settlement scheme in Mozambique and produces food crops, cashew, cotton and rice (see A/6000/Rev.1, chap. V, annex II, paras. 275-285). Apart from these two main lines, the Lourenço Marques system includes a branch line to Goba, on the Swaziland border, which connects with a recently constructed single track line in Swaziland and is used particularly for the outward transit of Swaziland iron ore, asbestos and sugar and for Swaziland imports, mainly consumer goods and petroleum products from Lourenço Mar-

ques. Finally, a branch line to Manhica and Magade serves the Incomati Valley which is an important banana and sugar producing area and was until 1955 intended to become the scene of a large-scale European settlement scheme (*ibid.*, para. 267). The line serves the Incomati sugar company and will also serve the recently formed Marracuene sugar company which is currently developing 6,000 hectares for sugar production by European settlers (see appendix I above).

65. The second major railway system, radiating from Beira, originated with a trunk line to Southern Rhodesia completed in 1900 under an agreement between Portugal and the United Kingdom and originally constructed by British interests which owned and operated it until 1949. This line extends directly from the port of Beira to Umtali, on the Southern Rhodesian border, where it connects with the Rhodesian Railway. Until 1955 it constituted the only eastern gateway to Southern Rhodesia and, because of favourable tariff rates and shipping agreements, carried nearly all the mineral exports of Zambia (including about 700,000 tons of copper yearly) as well as part of the copper exported from south-east Katanga. With the construction of the Limpopo line, which reduced the haulage distance from the Zambian Copperbelt by about 16 kilometres, plus the congested conditions at the port of Beira, it was expected that much of the Zambian and Katanga trade would be diverted through Lourenço Marques. In fact, the advantages have been offset by higher charges at the latter port^{9a} and until very recently about 80 per cent of the copper exported yearly from the Copperbelt continued to pass through Beira. In late May 1966, however, following a dispute with the illegal régime in Southern Rhodesia concerning railway transit, the Zambian Government announced its intention of re-routing its mineral exports through Lobito in Angola to avoid payment to the illegal régime under an arrangement whereby it was hoped to divert Katanga traffic through Matadi. Difficulties have arisen in this connexion, however, and in July 1966 negotiations were taking place to agree upon an alternative route (see para. 61 above).

66. From Dondo, on the Beira-Umtali line, another railway line extends northwards crossing the Zambezi River at Sena and connecting with the Malawi railway. At present, this line provides the only rail access to the sea for Malawi's foreign trade. Between Dondo and Sena the line, built between 1919 and 1922, is owned and operated by the Trans-Zambezia Railway Company, with headquarters in London. From Sena a short stretch, entering Mozambique to a depth of about 38 kilometres, which is operated by a subsidiary of Malawi Railways, connects with the main Malawi line at Port Herald. North of Sena a branch, completed in 1949 and operated by the Mozambique Railway Administration, runs to Tete and is at present used mainly for hauling coal from the Moatize fields to Beira.

67. Although constructed originally to meet the transit needs of neighbouring territories, the Beira system also serves an important domestic hinterland, especially the Chimoio uplands centred on Vila Pery (on the Beira-Umtali line), which owes its development largely to the existence of the line. It is the centre of the tobacco industry, kenaf production (Companhia Têxtil do Púnguê), and cotton textile manufacture (Sociedade Algodoeira de Fomento Colonial), as well as the site of a major European settlement scheme in the Revué Valley (see A/6000/Rev.1, chap. V, annex II, paras. 286-292). Maize is the leading crop of small and medium-sized European farms which occupy a total of 211,000 hectares in the Chimoio *circunscrição*, but sizable quantities of oilseeds, fruit, vegetables and sisal are also shipped. The Trans-Zambezia line on the other hand passes through sparsely inhabited country devoted mainly to forestry and timber concessions. The 100 kilometre Tete branch (originally built to transport coal from Moatize) was intended to open up the regions of Angónia, Macanga and Maravia for European farm settlement, but except for the Angónia plateau and the highlands near

⁷ For 1965, Mozambique's trade balance showed a deficit of 1,242 million escudos. This was largely offset by surpluses of 1,125 million escudos in transport earnings derived essentially from transit receipts and of 917 million escudos in invisible transfers, mainly by enterprises involved in the transit trade.

⁸ Convention of 1928 as amended by Agreements of 17 November 1934 and 13 October 1964. Article XXXII provides that the Government of South Africa undertakes to secure to the port of Lourenço Marques not less than 40 per cent of the total tonnage of commercial sea-borne traffic imported into the "competitive area". This area is defined as the area bounded by lines drawn between the goods traffic depots serving Pretoria Springs, Vereeniging, Klerksdorp, Verveldiend, Krugersdorp and Pretoria.

^{9a} Port handling charges at Lourenço Marques are tied by the Mozambique Convention to port charges at South African terminals and are *ad valorem* rates whereas rates at Beira vary according to commodity and in some cases have been fixed by agreements.

the border of Southern Rhodesia; the district of Tete still remains relatively undeveloped.

68. The third major railway system consists of a line from the seaport of Nacala extending westward some 720 kilometres to Catur in the district of Niassa; it is currently being extended through Vila Cabral to the shores of Lake Nyassa and will provide an alternative route for Malawi's transit traffic, thereby reducing congestion at the port of Beira. This line, which was begun in 1924, is potentially one of the most important for Mozambique's domestic economy. It was built for the purpose of facilitating the evacuation of cotton, sisal, maize, tobacco and tea from the interior and to attract further European settlement, mining and ranching in the region around Lake Nyassa and up to Vila Cabral.

69. Besides the three main railway systems, there are three small railways for the evacuation of agricultural products. The largest of these extends inland from the seaport of Quelimane to Namacurra and Mocuba, a distance of some 145 kilometres, and serves to transport the cotton, sisal and other products of that region, as well as the tea from Milange, Tacuane and Gurue. The area between Namacurra and Mocuba contains about 28 per cent of the area under sisal plantations (about 15,800 hectares), while nearly all the European tea plantations (in 1962-1963 there were 17 companies with 15,227 hectares) are located in the vicinity of Gurue, Milange and Tacuane. In the south there are two isolated lines, the first from the seaport of Inhambane, extending southwards to Inharrime, a distance of 99 kilometres, and the second from Vila de João Belo, on the north bank of the Limpopo River, to Chicomo, a distance of 140 kilometres. These two lines, built originally to serve sisal estates and cotton concessions before the development of adequate road transportation, are nowadays more relics of the past than efficient units of a modern transportation network.

70. Except for two lines of the Beira system, all the railways were constructed by the Portuguese authorities and are owned and operated by the Mozambique Harbours, Railways and Transport Administration, an autonomous body. That part of the Beira system south of the Zambezi River, namely the Beira-Umtali line and the Trans-Zambezia railway, however, were built by British companies, sub-concessionnaires of the Moçambique Company which held the charter for all the territory between the Zambezi and Save Rivers, including the port of Beira.^{bb} In 1949, after the charter of the Moçambique Company had expired, the Portuguese Government purchased the Beira-Umtali line from the concessionaire, the Beira and Mashonaland Railway Company, for £4 million sterling. Although it is now operated by the Mozambique Railway Administration, ownership resides with the Ministry of Finance of Portugal, the Mozambique Government receiving only a share of profits. No steps were taken to purchase the Trans-Zambezia Railway, probably because it is not a very profitable line. Except for the brief stretch from Sena to the Malawi border, which is operated by a subsidiary of Malawi Railways, this is the only foreign-owned railway in Mozambique.^{cc}

71. It may be noted that of the seven railway systems only those carrying transit traffic for neighbouring States show a net profit. In the case of the Trans-Zambezia line this profit is almost entirely absorbed in the payment of interest and amortization of loan capital (see below). The most profitable systems are those of Lourenço Marques and Beira, which

serve South Africa and Southern Rhodesia. These two systems subsidize the other state-owned railways which operate at a substantial loss.

MOZAMBIQUE RAILWAYS: RESULTS OF OPERATIONS, 1963

	Gross receipts (million escudos)	Working expenses (million escudos)	Coefficient of operations (2 as per- centage of 1)
	(1)	(2)	(3)
A. State-owned railways			
Lourenço Marques	561.9	248.6	44.25
Beira ^a	375.5	196.2	52.32
Moçambique	39.3	61.1	155.63
Tete	21.7	30.8	141.77
Quelimane	14.0	26.9	191.96
Gaza	10.2	14.5	142.55
Inhambane	5.5	12.8	243.20
B. Privately owned railways			
Trans-Zambezia	97.3	85.1	87.49

SOURCE: Mozambique, Administração dos Serviços dos Portos, Caminhos de Ferro e Transportes, *Relatório*, 1963.

^a Owned by Ministry of Finance, Portugal.

B. History of the Trans-Zambezia Railway

72. As explained above, the Trans-Zambezia Railway extends from Dondo, approximately 29 kilometres west of Beira, to Sena on the south bank of the Zambezi River, a distance of 289 kilometres. In the north it connects with the Central Africa Railway which operates a short stretch (69 kilometres) between Sena and Port Herald in Malawi where the line joins the Malawi Railway. In the south, at Dondo, the Trans-Zambezia Railway connects with the Beira Railway which links Beira with Umtali in Southern Rhodesia.

73. Intended primarily to evacuate traffic from Nyasaland, now Malawi, the concession for the railway was first granted by the Moçambique Company in 1898 to a Belgian, M. L. A. H. Porcheron, who immediately transferred his rights to the Compagnie du Chemin de Fer de Beira au Zambéze, a company formed for the purpose with British, French and Belgian capital, and registered in Brussels. However, although surveys were made in 1905 and 1906, the building of the railroad was delayed pending the construction of a connecting railroad in Nyasaland. The guarantee of transit traffic was considered essential since the area in Mozambique traversed by the proposed route, being then as now occupied primarily by forestry concessions, was not sufficiently developed to sustain a railroad.

74. By 1912 the Shire Highlands Railway (now Malawi Railways) had been built from Blantyre to Port Herald in Nyasaland and in that year contracts were concluded between the two Governments and the British Central Africa Co., Ltd., for the construction of an extension from Port Herald to Chindio on the north bank of the Zambezi River.^{dd} With this problem resolved, attention again turned to the building of the Trans-Zambezia line, and, on 11 October 1912, a new concession contract was signed between the Mozambique Company^{ee} and the existing concessionaire, which replaced the contract of 1898 and provided for the transfer of all rights to a new company of the same name to be formed with a capital of 21 million Belgian francs. The new company was to have the right to build and exploit the line for a period of 99 years and was to receive certain concessions of land and mineral rights (see following section).

^{dd} For the 38 kilometre stretch running through Mozambique, a concession was granted (*Diário do Governo*, 15 August 1912) valid for 99 years after which time the railroad and its equipment will revert without payment to the Portuguese Government. The concession also included the right to build and operate a bridge over the Zambezi River. The Central African Railway, which operates the line, is now a wholly owned subsidiary of Malawi Railways.

^{ee} The contract with certain modifications was approved by Decree 240, 26 November 1913.

^{bb} One of the provisions of the East African Convention of 1891 between Portugal and the United Kingdom was that Portugal should construct a railway linking Mashonaland, then controlled by the British South Africa Company, with the bay of Púnguê (where Beira is now located). The obligation to build the railway was passed on to the Moçambique Company when, in the following year, the latter received a charter from the Portuguese Government granting it concessionary rights in what is now the district of Manica e Sofala.

^{cc} The Sena Sugar Estates, Ltd., owns an 88 kilometre small gauge line from its factory at Marrromeu to the Trans-Zambezia Railway at Caia. This is solely for the company's own use and is not a commercial railroad in the proper sense of the term.

75. By 1913 a syndicate had been formed consisting of two Belgian financiers, M. C. Morresseaux and General Thuys, who together subscribed 14 million francs, the remainder being subscribed by the Banque d'Outremer, the Crédit Liégeois and a British group linked with the Beira railways. The outbreak of World War I prevented any work from beginning, however, and General Thuys having died in 1915, the control of the company passed into British hands.

76. After the First World War, pressure to build the railway was revived. By then the funds available to the company were no longer sufficient to finance the capital cost and, the Moçambique Company having refused to participate beyond guaranteeing a 3 per cent dividend in case the company's profits were insufficient, as well as the financing of repairs once the railway was built, the company had to seek other assistance in raising the necessary initial capital. Accordingly, in 1919, the Belgian minority shareholders transferred their rights with permission of the Portuguese authorities (Order 2,039, 4 November 1919) to the Nyasaland Government in return for the latter's guarantee of interest payments and amortization of a bond issue of £1.2 million to finance the construction of the railway. One month later, the Trans-Zambezia Railway Company was formed. Work began on the railroad the following year and was completed in 1922.

77. By 1922 the Trans-Zambezia Railroad had established its northern terminal at Sena, on the southern bank of the Zambezi River, and traffic was transported across by boat to join the Central African Railroad at Chindio on the northern bank. The company had in the preceding year entered into a further agreement with the Nyasaland Government to guarantee a fresh issue of bonds for the purchase of a river fleet, in return for which the Nyasaland Government, Central Africa Railways and Shire Highland Railways obtained the right to nominate half the directors on the Board of the Trans-Zambezia Company.

78. Additional Nyasaland Government support was required for the construction of the Zambezi Bridge and for the southern abutment. Built between 1930 and 1935, the bridge is 4.5 kilometres long and crosses the Zambezi between Sena and Chindio. Since none of the three railway companies was able to finance the construction, the Shire Highlands Railway went into voluntary liquidation, its stock, as well as a controlling share of the Central Africa Railway Company stock, being taken over by the newly formed Nyasaland Railways. Work on the bridge was undertaken in the name of the Central African Railway supported by Nyasaland Railways which received a £3 million loan from the Nyasaland Government in return for a controlling interest. For the construction of the southern abutment, the Trans-Zambezia Company received an advance of £399,000 (31.9 million escudos) in exchange for income bonds secured on the earnings of the railway approach.

79. Present ownership and finances of the company are discussed in greater detail below. It is sufficient to note that until 1964, 25 per cent of the issued shares and nearly all the loan capital were held successively by the Nyasaland Government and the High Commissioner of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. Following the dissolution of the Federation, these were transferred to Four Milbank Nominees, Ltd., a British holding company.

C. Terms of the concession

80. The original concession of 17 May 1897, together with the contract of 11 October 1912 as amended by an agreement of 7 November 1913 and approved by Decree 240 (*Diário do Governo*, 26 November 1913), constitute the legal basis for the Trans-Zambezia Railway Company's operations. The concession and contract, which name the company's predecessors, were amended to apply to the latter when the new company was formed in 1918 (Agreement dated 10-26 April 1918). The contract was further amended by Order 2,039 of 4 November 1919 which incorporated modifications necessitated by the conditional contract of 6 August 1919 between the Nyasaland Government and the promoters of the Railway (see para. 76 above).

81. The concession and contract, as well as the subsequent agreements, were all signed by the Moçambique Company by virtue of the exclusive rights granted to it under its Royal Charter. On the expiration of the Charter in July 1942, the Portuguese Government succeeded the Moçambique Company as grantor.

82. Under the terms of the contract of 1912, the concession is for a period of ninety-nine years (ending in the year 2018 A.D.) after which time the railroad and all fixed and movable equipment will revert to the grantor without payment. Moreover, at any time after the first twenty years from the date of the contract, the grantor may terminate the concession by redeeming the railroad and its equipment for a price calculated on the basis of the liquid profits of the company over the previous seven years. In the event of services being wholly or partially interrupted, the grantor may take over the operation of the railroad and if, after three months have elapsed, the company is still unable to resume its responsibilities, may terminate the concession.

83. The contract granted to the Trans-Zambezia Railway Company the right to construct and operate the existing line and all necessary installations, together with the use of strips of land fifty metres wide on either side of the line. It also granted the right of first refusal for the construction of a branch line to Tete, a right which the company did not exercise, the Tete line being eventually built by the Government. The contract contained a guarantee that during the term of the concession no other railroad would be constructed within 100 km of the Trans-Zambezia line.

84. In addition, the contract granted to the company the use of blocks of land of 2,500 hectares each to be located alternately on either side of the railroad at intervals of twenty kilometres. The company was given the right to establish plantations, industrial enterprises or lumber companies and to prospect for minerals thereon. In the event that minerals were discovered, the company could retain mining rights over 10 per cent of the surface, ceding the remaining 90 per cent to the grantor. In fact, apart from cutting timber for its own use, the company does not appear to have taken advantage of these privileges.

85. Both the original concession and the contract of 1912 forbade the establishment of differential freight rates. The contract contained a schedule of the rates to be charged and required the company to obtain the approval of the grantor for any modifications thereof.

86. The financial provisions of the contract provided that the grantor should receive 30 per cent of the annual liquid profits¹² and should have the right to nominate its own representatives on the Board of Directors (see below). The grantor undertook to guarantee payment of a 3 per cent dividend on the company's shares and also the amortization of bonds issued to finance repairs on the railroad required by *force majeure*. Financing of the actual construction of the railway was to be the sole responsibility of the company.

87. The Trans-Zambezia Company's concession extends only to the Zambezi River and does not include either the bridge completed in 1935 or the thirty-eight kilometre stretch from the Zambezi to the Nyasaland frontier, which lay outside the territory of the Moçambique Company. The concession of 15 August 1912 granted to the Central Africa Railway Company in respect of this stretch is similar to that of the Trans-Zambezia Company except that: (a) the railroad and bridge will revert to the Portuguese Government in the year 2011 A.D.; (b) it includes no land or mining rights except in respect of the line and a strip of fifty metres on each side of the line; and (c) rates charged within Mozambique territory may not exceed similar rates charged in Nyasaland (now Malawi).

D. Organization and finances of the Company

88. The Trans-Zambezia Railway Company is a British company with headquarters in London and operating under

¹² Liquid profits are net profits, i.e., after deduction of working expenses, general expenses (*encargos sociais*), taxes and amortization of bonds.

Portuguese law. The issued share capital is £600,000 in 600,000 shares of £1 each, fully paid. Shareholders are the Government of Portugal, 200,000 shares; Apcob Nominees, Ltd. (London), representing the founders of the company, 200,000 shares; Four Milbank Nominees, Ltd. (London), 150,000 shares; and the Companhia de Moçambique, 100 shares. Prior to 1964, the shares now owned by Four Milbank, Ltd. which, like Apcob, Ltd. is a holding company, were held successively by the Nyasaland Government and the High Commissioner of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. They were transferred to British ownership following the dissolution of the Federation.

89. Under the terms of the company's Statutes of 3 March 1921, as later amended, out of ten directors four are nominated by the Portuguese, three by Malawi and one by Malawi Railways. In 1965, the Board of Directors consisted of V. L. Oury (Chairman), A. H. Ball, J. F. Harrod, I. R. Hayward, J. R. Pike, P. A. Clarke Vincent, and the following Portuguese members: J. B. Correa da Silva, M. da Cruz Alvura, A. R. Portier and J. B. Schiappa de Azevedo. The company has a working agreement with Malawi Railways and its subsidiary, Central Africa Railways, and until 1964 the three companies had a common management.

90. The construction costs of the railroad were largely financed by bonds guaranteed by the Nyasaland authorities and a loan from the Nyasaland Railways. In 1965, the outstanding loan capital consisted of £2.8 million in debenture stock and income bonds, all held by Four Milbank Nominees, Ltd. Fixed assets, at cost, amounted to slightly more than £5 million, of which the railroad and related installations accounted for approximately £3 million, the southern approach to the Zambezi bridge for £401,600 and rolling stock for £1.6 million. In 1964, the company began a programme of reorganization, including the progressive transfer from steam to diesel locomotives. The first step in this direction consisted in the purchase in 1964 of three diesel electric locomotives at a cost of £34,913.

91. The company's results for the years 1962 to 1964 were as follows:

	1962	1963	1964
	£	£	£
Gross receipts	1,358,523	1,216,394	1,237,113
Working expenses	1,061,464	1,064,189	1,010,422
Net revenue	297,059	152,205	226,691
Other costs ^a	46,681	58,860	53,648
Mozambique income tax and defence taxes	119,437	53,802	77,423
Interest on bonds and debentures	65,463	61,180	62,034
Surplus to reserve	79,851	—	43,946

^a Includes interest on the hire purchase of rolling stock and on a temporary advance of £285,476 from the Government of Malawi.

92. As can be seen from the above, the railroad has not been a highly profitable enterprise, its net receipts being barely sufficient in most years to cover the interest payments on its capital loans. In 1963 it suspended payment of interest on part of its income bonds and in 1964 its accrued disposable surplus was only £90,480. This is partly due to lack of agricultural or other development in the region which it traverses, and partly to the high ratio of working expenses to gross receipts (81.68 per cent in 1964) and to a tariff structure which was reported in 1963 to be among the highest in southern Africa and which encouraged competition from road haulers. In 1965 the company negotiated a revision of its earlier working agreement with Malawi and Central Africa Railways, providing for a change in the pattern of rates and fares to improve its competitive position.

E. Operations of the Railway and its economic role

93. The domestic hinterland served by the Trans-Zambezia Railway, consisting of the region between Dondo and Sena, and the area served by the branch line to Tete is sparsely populated and comparatively under-developed. Apart from the Moatize coal-field near Tete, the principle economic activities

are those of the Sena Sugar Estates (which, however, exports much of its produce by river to the port of Chinde), lumber mills, cotton production and on the Angónia plateau, a nucleus of European farmers and ranchers. The railway therefore depends heavily on transit of goods and passengers to and from Malawi. Plans for large-scale development of the mineral and agricultural potential of the Zambezi Valley, which have been under study since the early 1950s may eventually reduce this dependence (see A/6000/Rev.1, chap. V, annex II, paras. 293-295).

94. High operating costs as well as the burden of interest payments and amortization of loan capital, especially for the Zambezi bridge, make it necessary for the three companies operating the line to charge rates which are reported to be the highest in southern Africa. Consequently, freight is mainly restricted to low-bulk, high-value goods. Traffic to Beira is composed primarily of coal from Moatize, and agricultural exports, mainly sugar, groundnuts, tobacco, tea and timber: in addition, since 1954, limestone has been carried from Malawi to the cement factory at Dondo. Inward traffic consists mainly of imports of general merchandise, neither Malawi nor the interior of Manica e Sofala being sufficiently developed to import sizable quantities of heavy equipment or construction materials. The total tonnage of goods carried yearly increased from slightly under 100,000 tons before the Second World War to an average of 750,000 tons during the 1950s, reaching a peak of 873,483 tons in 1962, the down traffic being approximately double the volume of inward traffic. In 1964, the latest year for which such information is available, it amounted to 801,906 tons, the chief export items being tobacco (15,372 tons), tea (14,272 tons), groundnuts (22,751 tons) and maize (20,508 tons) from Malawi, and timber products (84,649 tons), sugar (17,304 tons), cotton lint (7,493 tons) and unginned cotton (7,112 tons) from Mozambique. Major imports consisted of general merchandise (100,530 tons), petrol and paraffin (32,977 tons), cement (3,775 tons), and fertilizer (18,090 tons). The railway also carried 53,584 tons of limestone and 120,936 tons of coal and ooze from Moatize.^{ss}

95. As explained previously, the branch line to Tete was built in 1949 primarily for the purpose of enabling the newly formed Companhia Carbonífera de Moçambique to undertake large-scale exploitation of the rich coal deposits at Moatize. In fact, as with low-value agricultural products, the high cost of transportation has hampered both the export of coal and its sale to the Lourenço Marques area where it is unable to compete with cheaper coal from the Transvaal. Until the recent introduction of diesel locomotives, the coal was used mainly as fuel for the Beira and Trans-Zambezia railways, the provision of free fuel to the Beira line being a condition of the mining concession (see A/6000/Rev.1, chap. V, annex I, paras. 261 and 262).

96. The high level of fares, together with competition from cheap air transport has also diverted much of the potential passenger traffic away from the railroad. As a result, the number of passengers carried dropped from 190,300 in 1954 to 153,614 two years later and by 1964 only slightly exceeded the level attained ten years earlier.

97. Information concerning labour conditions on the railway is lacking. It may be noted, however, that the company operates both an apprenticeship programme and a three-year training scheme for the promotion of Africans to responsible positions as engineers, mechanics and assistant station-masters.

^{ss} As a result of Zambia's decision to divert its traffic from the Rhodesian Railways, a part of Zambia's imports and exports is now carried by the Trans-Zambezia Railway. Statistics are not yet available, however.

ANNEX I

ANGOLA: RAILWAY FACILITIES

Kilometres

A. State-owned railways

Luanda Railway:

Luanda to Malanje 516

615

	Kilometres
Dondo link (Zenza do Itombe to Dondo)	55
Golungo-Alto link (Canhoca to Golungo-Alto)	33
Congo District line, under construction	
Port and station	11
Moçâmedes Railway:	924
Moçâmedes to Sá da Bandeira ..	276
Sá da Bandeira-Vila Serpa Pinto	518
Chibia link (Sá da Bandeira to Chiange)	130
TOTAL, State owned	1,539
B. Privately owned railways	1,588
Benguela Railway	
Lobito to the Eastern frontier ..	1,348
Spurs, sidings and yards	182
Amboim Railway:	129
Amboim to Gabela	129
TOTAL, privately owned	1,717
GRAND TOTAL	3,256

SOURCE: Angola, *Anuário Estatístico*, 1963, p. 233.

ANNEX II

MOZAMBIQUE: RAILWAY FACILITIES

(Excluding small gauge)

Kilometres

A. State-owned railways	1,119
Lourenço Marques Railway:	
Lourenço Marques to Ressano Garcia	98
Lourenço Marques to Goba	58
Moamba to Malvéria	527
Lourenço Marques to Xinavane ..	94
Branch lines	27
Spurs, sidings and service roads ..	315
Beira Railway:	497
Beira to Machipanda	318
Spurs, sidings and service roads	179
Tete Railway:	281
Dona Ana to Moatize	255
Spurs, sidings and service roads	26
Quelimane Railway:	159
Quelimane to Mocuba	145
Spurs, sidings and service roads	14
Moçambique Railway:	734
Nacala to Nova Freixo	646
Monapo to Lumbo branch	43
Spurs, siding and service roads	45
Inhambane Railway:	108
Inhambane to Inharrime	92
Branch roads	7
Spurs, sidings and service roads	9
TOTAL, State owned	2,898
B. Privately owned railways	360
Trans-Zambezia Railway:	
Dondo to Sena	333
Spurs, sidings and service roads	27

ANNEX II (continued)

	Kilometres
Central Africa Railway:	43
Sena to frontier of Malawi	43
TOTAL, privately owned	403
GRAND TOTAL	3,301

SOURCE: Mozambique, *Anuário Estatístico*, 1963, p. 509.

Appendix V

Mozambique's economic relations with South Africa and Southern Rhodesia

Working paper prepared by the Secretariat

CONTENTS

	Paragraphs
INTRODUCTION	1-2
I. MOZAMBIQUE'S ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH SOUTH AFRICA	
A. General	3-6
B. The Mozambique Convention	7-13
C. Supply of labour to South Africa	14-22
D. Trade relations with South Africa	23-33
E. South African investment in Mozambique	34-41
II. MOZAMBIQUE'S ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH SOUTHERN RHODESIA	
A. General	42-52
B. Trade relations with Southern Rhodesia ..	53-70
C. Migrant labour	71-79

Tables

	Page
1. Mozambique: special trade with neighbouring countries (by value and percentage)	454
2. Mozambique: value of special trade with South Africa by principal commodities	455
3. Mozambique: value of special trade with Southern Rhodesia by principal commodities	455
4. Transit trade of South Africa through Mozambique by principal commodities	456
5. Transit trade of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland through Mozambique by principal commodities	456

INTRODUCTION

1. Recent political developments in southern Africa have focused attention on the relationships between South Africa, Southern Rhodesia and Portugal. In 1964, the Prime Minister of South Africa, Mr. Verwoerd, was reported to have called for positive co-operation between South Africa and its neighbours to the north and to have suggested a plan for economic aid and possibly the eventual creation of a free trade area. This suggestion, which was followed by reports of an alliance between South Africa, Portugal and Southern Rhodesia, has been reiterated on a number of occasions by politicians and in newspaper articles, especially in Southern Rhodesia and South Africa.

2. The present paper seeks to document the nature and evolution of the economic relationships between Mozambique and its neighbours. The paper shows the importance of the transit trade on which Mozambique depends for nearly one fourth of its foreign exchange receipts. It also shows other forms of economic co-operation, in particular the recent growth of South African investment in Mozambique.

I. MOZAMBIQUE'S ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH SOUTH AFRICA

A. General

3. Mozambique's economic relationship with the Republic of South Africa hinges on its proximity to the Transvaal which is the most important industrial region of the Republic. The area of Witwatersrand, together with that of Pretoria and the southern Transvaal, is the Republic's main producer of base minerals, gold and coal, and accounts for about half the industrial output of South Africa. It contains about 40 per cent of the European population of the Republic and about 45 per cent of workers engaged in industry. The Transvaal is also an important producer of maize, wheat, tobacco and citrus, and there is extensive ranching near the Southern Rhodesian border.

4. For this highly productive region, the adjacent area of Mozambique, far less developed economically, serves both as a reservoir of unskilled labour (see section C) and as a natural gateway to the sea. Lourenço Marques, which is acknowledged to possess the finest natural harbour on the east coast of Africa, is 100 miles closer to Johannesburg than the nearest major South African port,^a is connected directly by rail, and the longer sea route to European ports is partly offset by lower shipping rates set by international shipping conference agreements. Under the terms of the Mozambique Convention (described below), the port of Lourenço Marques is guaranteed not less than 40 per cent of the commercial sea-borne goods traffic imported into a specified area of the Transvaal, known as the "competitive area", which includes the industrial heartland of the region. As a result, Lourenço Marques ranks high among the major ports serving the Republic. It currently handles about 12 per cent by volume of total tonnage handled at ports serving South Africa.

5. In terms of direct trade, South Africa ranks second after metropolitan Portugal among Mozambique's trading partners. The volume is however comparatively small, amounting in 1964 to only 11.42 per cent by value of the Territory's total external trade, the balance being markedly in favour of South Africa (see table 1). This is partly due to protective policies traditionally pursued by both Governments; Portugal, for example, imposed quantitative controls, tariffs and other devices to give preference in Mozambique to trade with the metropolitan country and other territories within the escudo zone. It is also indicative of the much higher level of industrialization and diversification of South Africa's economy which is largely self-sufficient in most of the agricultural products which Mozambique exports.

6. In October 1964, the two Governments signed agreements^b ending the Mozambique Convention and providing for closer economic co-operation between them, particularly in regard to planning and investment. These agreements resulted, *inter alia*, in steps being taken in both countries to stimulate the investment of South African capital in Mozambique, the results of which are already apparent in a number of large undertakings described in section E below. At the same time, Portugal has invested heavily in the new SONAREP petroleum refinery at Lourenço Marques, part of the produce of which is intended for sale in South Africa. Apart from these developments, there was up to the end of 1965 little change in the volume of trade between the two countries as reported in official statistics; this trade has been increasing steadily over the past five years.

B. The Mozambique Convention

7. Mozambique's economic relations with South Africa are based mainly on the provisions of the Mozambique Convention of 1928 which was revised and extended in 1934, 1936, 1939, 1940, 1952 and 1964. The Convention is in three parts

^a Distances by rail of the major ports from Johannesburg are as follows: Lourenço Marques, 395 miles; Durban, 494 miles; Port Elizabeth, 714 miles; and Cape Town, 956 miles.

^b Agreements of 13 October 1964 between the Government of the Republic of South Africa and the Government of Portugal. *Republic of South Africa Treaty Series*, Nos. 8, 10 and 11. 1964.

dealing respectively with the recruitment of labour for the mines in the Transvaal, transit traffic, and trade between the two countries. The 1928 Convention was preceded by agreements dating back to 1875, the most important being a convention of 1 April 1909 between Portugal and the Transvaal Republic, which was the precursor of the Mozambique Convention.

8. The earliest agreements between the Transvaal and Portugal concerned trade and the construction of the railway to Lourenço Marques (then Delagoa Bay), the purpose of the Transvaal government being to avoid dependence on the British colonies to the south. It was not until after the discovery of gold on the Witwatersrand in 1886 that the need for imported African labour arose. Thereafter, as demand for workers increased, the supply of labour from what is now Mozambique became a bargaining point used by Portugal to obtain concessions for its railway line in the face of intense competition from the railways of the Cape and Natal. Between 1903 and 1910, which was a period of reconstruction following the Boer War, up to nearly 89 per cent of African workers employed by the mines came from Portuguese East Africa. It was because the mines depended on Mozambique for cheap labour that Portugal was able to negotiate the convention of 1909 with the Transvaal, the terms of which were so favourable to Portugal that their revelation nearly disrupted the Convention of South African States then meeting to found the Union. Under the convention, Portugal, in return for permitting the recruitment of Africans in Mozambique, obtained a ten-year guarantee that 50 per cent of the Transvaal's overseas trade would pass through Lourenço Marques, plus an undertaking establishing unrestricted freedom of trade between the two partners. Until this agreement was denounced by South Africa in 1922, approximately 29 per cent by value of Mozambique's exports went to the Transvaal free of duty.

9. Among the considerations which probably influenced South Africa to terminate the agreement was the lessening dependence of the Transvaal mines on Mozambique labour as recruits became available from other sources. By 1922 Mozambicans accounted for only 40 per cent of the labour force employed by the mines and by 1958 the figure had dropped to about 26 per cent.

10. The termination of the agreement became effective in 1923, and thereafter ensued several years of intensive negotiations between the two Governments culminating in 1927 when Portugal brought the matter to a head by severely restricting the emigration of Mozambique labourers to the mines (Decree 13,657, 21 May 1927). A year later, on 11 September 1928, the Mozambique Convention was signed. Although less favourable to Portugal than the 1909 agreement as regards trade between Mozambique and South Africa, it none the less included a "most-favoured-nation" clause and reciprocal concessions in respect of a list of commodities, which was more advantageous to Mozambique exporters than the terms which South Africa had previously offered.

11. The 1928 Convention established the framework for the future economic relations between the two countries. Part I of the Convention fixed the maximum number of Africans from Mozambique to be employed in the Transvaal mines, stipulated working conditions and provided that recruitment, allotments and repatriation should be entrusted to an organization approved by both Governments. Part II dealt with railway traffic and rates, guaranteeing the passage through Lourenço Marques of a fixed percentage of commercial sea-borne goods imported into a defined area of the Transvaal. Part III dealt with customs and commercial intercourse.

12. Subsequent agreements, for the most part, merely modified the details of this Convention. Thus the maximum number of workers who could be recruited, which was fixed at 80,000 in 1928, was raised to 100,000 in 1940 when the South African Government agreed to export 340,000 cases of citrus fruits each year through Lourenço Marques. Likewise the guaranteed percentage of sea-borne imports into the "competitive area" of the Transvaal (see para. 23) which must pass through Lourenço Marques varied from 50 per cent in 1928 to its current level of 40 per cent.

13. Details of the Convention and related agreements are given in the following sections.

C. Supply of labour to South Africa

14. The recruitment of Mozambique workers for the gold and coal mines of the Transvaal began as long ago as 1896 under the auspices of the Transvaal Chamber of Mines. Regulations to control the migration of workers were first enacted in Mozambique in 1897 and were followed by further legislation and agreements leading to the Convention of 1 April 1909 referred to above. In 1913 (Order 757, 27 May), recruitment was restricted to the area south of latitude 22° South, namely the area south of the Save River. From 1928 until 1965, when it was replaced by a new agreement (see below), recruitment was regulated by part I of the Mozambique Convention, the provisions of which remained basically unchanged throughout. Since 1903, all recruitment of mine workers from Mozambique has been the monopoly of the Witwatersrand Native Labour Association (WNLA), a co-operative association of the Transvaal mines which was established in 1901 to eliminate competition for labour among the several mines. The Association describes itself as a non-profit organization which, besides recruiting workers, arranges contracts, provides medical examinations and transportation, and handles wages and deferred pay.

15. The Convention of 1928 provided, in effect, that Africans could legally go from Mozambique to work in South Africa only for the purpose of working in the Transvaal mines and only if recruited on contract by WNLA under prescribed conditions.^c The Convention, in its original form, limited the number who could be so employed to 80,000,^d a figure which was raised to 90,000 in 1936 and to 100,000 in 1940 (see para. 12). Contracts were for an initial period of twelve months, with possible re-engagement for a further six months, after which the worker had to be returned to Mozambique for not less than six months before he could be re-engaged. Mozambique Africans working in South Africa otherwise than under WNLA contracts, as well as those who overstayed the period of their engagement, were to be returned to Mozambique as prohibited immigrants. Only in very special cases were African women to be given passports to visit South Africa and those found there without valid passports were to be immediately repatriated.

16. Recruitment in Mozambique was undertaken by salaried representatives of WNLA who were licensed by the Mozambique authorities. The recruits were medically examined and provided with free transportation to their place of employment. On completion of their contract, the recruiting organization repatriated them to the Mozambique frontier, the return fare having been deducted in advance from their wages. The recruiting organization could allot them to any mine for which it was recruiting, except that the Government of Mozambique could, under certain circumstances, prohibit recruitment for a mine which failed to comply with the requirements of the Convention. There being no provision to the contrary, contract workers were subject to the laws of South Africa which include penal sanctions for breach of contract.

17. The Convention also provided for the office of Curator of Portuguese Natives in Johannesburg, staffed by Mozambique officials (later, representatives of the Mozambique Institute of Labour) whose task was, *inter alia*, to register the contract workers, issue passports, inspect conditions in the mines and cantonments, look after the interests and welfare of the workers and generally perform the functions of a consular official in regard to them. The employers were required to pay registration and monthly fees to the Curator in respect of each contract worker. Fees for passports, also payable to the Curator, were deducted from wages.

^c Under certain circumstances, the Government of Mozambique could authorize the emigration of Africans to work in the mines without the intervention of WNLA.

^d In 1928, the number working in the mines was 106,000. The Convention provided for a progressive reduction to 80,000 over a period of five years. The agreement of 1934, while retaining the maximum of 80,000 also guaranteed a minimum of 65,000 workers.

18. A feature of the 1928 Convention was the provision that after the first nine months of the contract, half of the workers' wages were withheld to be paid to them upon their return to Mozambique. This money was paid to the Mozambique authorities (initially in gold and later in South African currency) through the Curator, and together with voluntary remittances, fees and other payments made a significant contribution to Mozambique's foreign exchange earnings.

19. The agreement of 13 October 1964, which replaced part I of the Convention with effect from 1 January 1965, extended the area for which recruitment was to be undertaken to include gold and coal mines in the Orange Free State as well as the Transvaal, and provided that the number of workers from Mozambique to be employed in the mines should be mutually agreed upon between the two Governments. The office of Curator was replaced by both the Consul-General of Portugal and the delegate of the Mozambique Institute of Labour in Johannesburg, assisted by Portuguese personnel stationed in all areas where there are Mozambique workers. In addition to the functions previously performed by the Curator, the delegate is required to act as adviser to the workers in civil cases if they so request. The new agreement contains more detailed provisions in regard to recruitment and conditions of service. In particular, the contracts, which must be written in the vernacular as well as Portuguese, must clearly indicate the place of employment, nature of work, minimum guaranteed salary and other conditions, and must be attested by an agent of the Institute of Labour at the recruitment centre. The agreement further specified that, notwithstanding the provisions of their contracts, the recruits shall not be treated less favourably than South African workers.

20. The provisions of the Mozambique Convention concerning the supply of workers to the South African mines have been widely criticized both as a barter of African workers in return for economic concessions and as a form of compulsory labour. These complaints were examined both by the United Nations *Ad Hoc* Committee on Forced Labour in 1953^e and by an investigatory commission of the ILO in 1961-1962,^f and reference is made to the reports of these bodies.

21. In 1963, the latest year for which such information is available, there were reported to be 151,933 migrant workers from Mozambique registered with the Curator in Johannesburg, of which 80,469 were employed in the gold and coal mines of Witwatersrand. The difference between these figures is accounted for by the fact that despite the provisions of the Convention a large number of Africans from Mozambique entered South Africa clandestinely in search of employment. Although sporadic efforts were made after 1928 to repatriate them as prohibited immigrants, it was later decided to permit them to work on contract in the mines and in rural areas provided that they register with the Curator and fulfil the other conditions. The following table shows the number of migrant workers registered on 31 December of the respective years:

MOZAMBIQUE WORKERS REGISTERED WITH THE CURATOR IN THE TRANSVAAL

Year	Total number registered	New WNLA recruits	Re-engaged	Clandestine ^a
1963	151,933	74,011	17,285	95,207
1962	166,144	83,867	17,632	64,645
1961	178,539	96,074	19,743	62,722
1960	173,976	89,243	21,298	63,435
1959	175,064	93,451	26,484	66,967

SOURCE: Mozambique, *Anuário Estatístico*, 1959-1963.

^a Includes only clandestine migrants known to the authorities. About half are employed under contract outside the mines.

^e E/2815/Add.5.

^f International Labour Office, *Report of the Commission appointed under Article 26 of the Constitution of the International Labour Organisation to examine the complaint filed by the Government of Ghana concerning the observance by the Government of Portugal of the Abolition of Forced Labour Convention, 1957 (No. 105)*, Geneva, 1962.

22. In respect of these migrant contract workers, the Mozambique treasury receives annual payments in the form of passport fees, registration fees, emigration and other taxes. In addition, it earns foreign exchange from voluntary remittances by migrants and from the compulsory deferment of pay. The following table shows the amounts of taxes, fees and other official receipts, transfers of wages and pay received by workers in South Africa:

PAYMENTS IN RESPECT OF MIGRANT WORKERS REGISTERED IN THE
TRANSVAAL

(Million escudos)

Year	Taxes, fees, etc.	Wages			Paid in South Africa
		Total	Deferred	Remittances	
1963 ..	34.6	130.6	108.4	3.3	18.9
1962 ..	57.6	137.1	107.1	3.1	26.9
1961 ..	56.7	130.4	101.3	3.2	25.9
1960 ..	58.6	143.5	114.9	5.7	22.9
1959 ..	57.2	114.3	105.7	1.6	12.0

SOURCE: Mozambique, *Anuário Estatístico*, 1959-1963.

D. Trade relations with South Africa

Transit trade

23. It is part II of the Mozambique Convention from which Mozambique derives most economic advantage. Though Lourenço Marques is the most natural outlet to the sea for the Transvaal, it faces competition from the ports and railways of South Africa. Under part II of the Convention, however, Lourenço Marques is guaranteed a percentage of the total tonnage of commercial seaborne imports into what is referred to as the "competitive area",^{*} namely the industrial heart of the Transvaal. In 1928 the guaranteed percentage was between 50 and 55 per cent, but it was subsequently reduced to 47.5 per cent in 1934 and 40 per cent in 1964. In the event that the actual percentage imported via Lourenço Marques and the Lourenço Marques Railway should fall below this guaranteed minimum, the South African Government undertook to compensate the loss of railway revenue according to an agreed formula. This has happened in only three years since 1928.

24. As a corollary to this agreement, the Convention provides (a) that Mozambique may not tax goods in transit at rates higher than the duties which would be paid in South Africa; and (b) that port and harbour dues and charges must be levied in the same form and, unless otherwise agreed, must not exceed similar charges at South African ports. Finally, rail freight rates between Lourenço Marques and the "competitive area" are slightly lower than for other ports (e.g., Durban) and are calculated on a throughout basis, the receipts being divided between the two railways in an agreed proportion. A working agreement between the two railway administrations provides for joint use of rolling stock and personnel.

25. Transit traffic (imports) to the "competitive area" averaged a little more than 383,000 tons during the years 1932-1945 and 654,000 tons from 1946 to 1963, representing an average of 52.3 per cent of total seaborne imports to the area over the whole period. It may be noted, however, that the guarantee relates to tonnage and not to value. In fact, a large proportion of the imports consists of low-value goods, for which the disadvantages of a long sea-haul are offset by the lower cost of railage. Since 1934, the proportion of high-value imports has progressively decreased and in 1963 only 2.4 per cent of goods in class 1 of the tariff (i.e., those paying the highest freight rate) imported to the "competitive area" passed through Lourenço Marques.

* The "competitive area" is defined as the area bounded by a line drawn between Pretoria Springs, Vereeniging, Klerksdorp, Verveldiend, Krugersdorp and Pretoria.

26. The following table shows the tonnage of commercial seaborne imports to the "competitive area" by main ports of entry:

Port of entry	1963 (tons)	1962 (tons)	1961 (tons)
Lourenço Marques	596,139	579,132	627,438
Durban	502,032	461,256	487,922
East London	60,210	60,024	65,293
Port Elizabeth	70,116	70,116	68,490
Cape Town	7,574	5,484	5,732
TOTAL	1,236,071	1,176,012	1,254,875

Percentage through Lourenço Marques..	43.19	51.08	51.08
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SOURCE: Mozambique, Direcção dos Serviços dos Portos, Caminhos de Ferro e Transportes, *Relatório*, 1963, p. 40.

27. In recent years, imports under the Mozambique Convention have constituted only a minor part of the total transit traffic of South Africa which passes through Lourenço Marques. In 1963, for instance, it amounted to only about two thirds of the inward traffic and one sixth of the total transit in both directions.

28. The total transit trade of South Africa passing through Lourenço Marques increased from 2.8 million tons in 1955 (including direct and indirect transit) to 3.7 million tons in 1963. Nearly three fourths of this (2.7 million tons) consisted of exports, the principal commodities being base minerals, coal, maize, sugar, fresh fruit (mainly citrus), semi-processed metal products and chemical products. Exports of base minerals totalled 1,225,415 tons in 1963,^h or nearly half the tonnage exported and consisted mainly of the following: chrome (756,648 tons); manganese (109,945 tons); vermiculite (84,745 tons); iron ore (73,402 tons); and asbestos (61,347 tons). Exports of coal totalled 320,248 tons, maize 219,791 tons,ⁱ sugar 35,000 tons and fruit 30,209 tons, the last-named destined mainly to Rotterdam and Trieste.

29. Imports of South Africa via Lourenço Marques railway totalled 998,539 tons in 1963, consisting predominantly of gasoline and other petroleum products and railway materials. Data on transit traffic by commodities are given in table 4.

30. Separate data for earnings derived by the Railways and Ports Administration from this transit traffic are not available. It may be noted, however, that the receipts of the Lourenço Marques-Ressano Garcia railway line, which carries all the transit traffic of South Africa, representing 90 per cent of the total freight, amounted to over 211 million escudos in 1963. This does not include port receipts at Lourenço Marques.

Trade between Mozambique and South Africa

31. Part III of the Convention of 1928 provided for reciprocal "most-favoured-nation" treatment in respect of trade between Mozambique and South Africa subject to certain reservations. Besides the usual reservation concerning dumping duties to protect domestic industries against unfair competition, exceptions were made in regard to (a) special rates or rebates accorded by South Africa to products of the United Kingdom, its dominions, colonies or possessions or under customs and other agreements with neighbouring British-administered Territories; and (b) customs privileges accorded by Mozambique to products of Portugal and Portuguese-administered Territories. In addition, certain specified commodities were to be admitted free of duty. In the case of goods produced in South Africa and imported by Mozambique, these included coal, vegetables, fruits, fish and dairy products. In the case of Mozambique products imported into South Africa, they included vegetable oils, timber, sisal, copra and fruits. This last-mentioned provision was, however, deleted from the Convention in 1934 and was replaced by an undertaking on the part of both Governments not to impede the mutual trade

^h Data obtained from statistics of railway traffic.

ⁱ Calculated by deducting Mozambique imports from total volume carried by railway.

between them. The agreement of 13 October 1964 did little to change the existing situation, merely providing for certain measures to promote trade in bananas, maize, railway sleepers, and butane gas manufactured in Mozambique.

32. Although South Africa ranks second after Portugal among Mozambique's trading partners, the volume of trade remains quite small, accounting for less than 12 per cent of Mozambique's external trade. As can be seen from table 1, the balance is heavily in favour of South Africa, from whence Mozambique obtains certain essential products, particularly for the Lourenço Marques area, which is the main urban and industrial centre of Mozambique. Important among these are semi-processed iron and steel products, including containers, valued at 69 million escudos in 1964, coal valued at 36 million escudos, and food-stuffs, including maize (46 million) and fresh vegetables (14 million). Coal is imported from South Africa because of the high cost of shipping coal to Lourenço Marques from the mines at Moatize, in the district of Tete. South Africa's purchases from Mozambique consist mainly of petroleum products from the SONAREP refinery at Lourenço Marques which began production in 1962 (90 million escudos in 1964), timber products, especially mining pit props and railway sleepers (107 million escudos), and vegetable oils (13 million escudos). Mozambique's exports of bananas and citrus, whether sold in South Africa or not, are marketed on consignment by the respective South African marketing organizations. It may be noted that the value of Mozambique's exports to South Africa will probably increase, apart from other reasons, as a result of the expansion of production by the SONAREP refinery which is currently engaged on a 130 million escudos investment programme aimed at increasing its total capacity to 800,000 tons of crude petroleum. In June 1965, it was reported that the company was establishing a network of retail outlets in South Africa.

33. The value of goods exchanged between South Africa and Mozambique is shown in table 2 below.

E. South African investment in Mozambique

34. Possibly stimulated by South Africa's policy or closer economic co-operation with immediate neighbours, there has in very recent years been a noticeable movement of South African investment capital into Mozambique.

35. The economic agreement between Portugal and South Africa of 13 October 1964¹ provided for (a) the supply by South Africa to Portugal of economic information which may be of interest for planning purposes in Portuguese Territories; (b) sympathetic treatment by the South African authorities of all applications for the investment of capital as well as for any financing arrangements; and (c) special consideration to be given to any application for South African financing of roadbuilding and any enterprises of particular interest to the Portuguese Government in Mozambique and Angola.

36. It had already been announced in 1963 that the Anglo-American Corporation of South Africa, through a newly formed subsidiary, Mozambique Development Corporation, with assets of R2 million, had acquired the share capital of Mozambique's only sizeable fishing enterprise, *Indústrias de Peixe Nossa Senhora de Fátima (INOS)*. This enterprise, which had a capital of 3.4 million escudos, operated a small factory at Inhassoro and specialized in the fishing and commercialization of shrimp. The plans of Anglo-American are to develop large-scale commercial fishing for export, but at present the company is still engaged in scientific study of the off-shore resources and has not yet begun any large development. In May 1966, the company received authorization to postpone its original plans for establishment of a fishmeal factory at Porto Amélia and to reduce the factory's eventual capacity from 30,000 tons to 5,000 tons yearly.

37. In 1964 the Anglo-American Corporation, through another subsidiary, obtained a 100,000 hectare land concession in the lower Zambezi Valley near Quelimane to be used for sugar production. The project involves a capital investment in the region of 500 million escudos and is financed jointly

by the Anglo-American Corporation and Australian interests. The plan is for half the concession to be developed by the company and half to be allocated among settlers, each receiving 100 hectares. The Corporation has announced that its long-term target is a yearly output of 1 million tons of sugar cane. The Anglo-American Corporation is also involved, together with Tiger Oats and National Milling Co., Ltd. of South Africa, in the development of a cashew factory at João Belo in the Gaza district. This company, in which Anglo-American holds a majority interest, was established in August 1965 with an initial capital of 20 million escudos, which may be increased to 85 million. The company, which is described in detail in paragraph 130 of the study on agriculture and processing industries in Mozambique, is eventually expected to process 30,000 tons of raw cashew annually.

38. Apart from these investments, Anglo-American is reported to be engaged in a diamond-prospecting operation for which an extensive concession in the area of Pafuri near the border of Southern Rhodesia was granted in 1964 (see A/6000/Rev.1, chap V, annex I, paras. 284-290). It is also participating financially in the construction of loading and storage facilities for sugar exports at the port of Lourenço Marques, the cost of which is estimated at 66 million escudos.

39. A second South African firm recently investing in Mozambique is the Industrial Development Corporation of South Africa which is reported to have made a capital loan to the Marracuene Agrícola Açucareira which was formed in 1963 and is potentially the largest Portuguese-owned sugar producer in Mozambique. This company, which is described in appendix III above (paras. 86-88), envisages an eventual investment of 430 million escudos, to be derived mostly from Portuguese sources, and an ultimate production capacity of 60,000 tons of sugar yearly.

40. In November 1965, the South African Central Mining and Finance Corporation joined with three Portuguese banks (*Banco de Angola, Banco Comercial de Angola and Banco Nacional Ultramarino*) in founding the Bank of Lisbon and South Africa, Ltd., with offices in Johannesburg and an initial capital of R2,000 million. The purpose of the bank, in which General Mining and Finance Corporation holds a 25 per cent interest with an option to increase its holdings, is to foster closer economic relations between South Africa and Mozambique and Angola.

41. More recently there have been newspaper reports that South African capital might be made available for the development of the Zambezi River basin which is the largest single multi-purpose development project in Mozambique, involving some 34,000 square kilometres and estimated to cost eventually 5,350 million escudos (see A/6000/Rev.1, chap. V, annex II, paras. 293-295). There have also been reports of the settlement of South African farmers in the Angónia region of the Tete district on land made available by the Mozambique authorities.

II. MOZAMBIQUE'S ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH SOUTHERN RHODESIA

A. General

42. A glance at the map of southern Africa is sufficient to reveal Mozambique's vital economic importance to Southern Rhodesia. Its geographical location makes it the natural outlet for most of Southern Rhodesia's overseas trade, the only alternative routes being the railway line through Bechuanaland to Cape Town and Durban, both ports approximately four times as distant by rail from Salisbury as Beira and roughly twice as far as Lourenço Marques, and the railway to Lobito which, besides being distant, passes through Zambia and is now denied to Rhodesian trade.

43. The traditional outlet for Southern Rhodesia, as for the two other former members of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, is Beira, which is only 602 kilometres from Salisbury. Until 1948-1949 when they were expropriated by Portugal, the port and railway of Beira were controlled by British interests, the railway being under joint management with the Rhodesian Railways. In 1955 a railway link to

¹ *Republic of South Africa Treaty Series*, No. 8, 1964.

Lourenço Marques was built by Portugal to cope with the rapidly growing volume of transit trade. Special agreements exempt goods in transit from payment of duties and shipping conference rates are adjusted to offset the long sea haul from Beira to European ports.

44. Whereas this transit trade is vital to Southern Rhodesia, its importance to Mozambique cannot be underestimated. In 1963 goods in transit from the Federation accounted for 49 per cent by volume and 78 per cent by value of all goods in transit through Mozambique ports. It was thus the main contributor to Mozambique's invisible foreign exchange earnings from transit trade, which in turn accounted for about one quarter of its total foreign exchange earnings.

45. In addition, it furnished over one half of the revenue of the Territory's railways and ports, amounting in 1965 to 1,009 million escudos, and is a major source of commercial activity at both Beira and Lourenço Marques. Although statistics are not available which show what proportion of this trade was attributable to Southern Rhodesia, it may be noted that under the terms of a long-standing convention only a small percentage of Southern Rhodesia's overseas trade, which was valued at over £200 million in 1965, was carried through South Africa.

46. Apart from this important transit trade, Mozambique has been traditionally linked with Southern Rhodesia both as a trading partner and as a source of migrant labour. Until the 1960s about 20 per cent of the Africans employed in Southern Rhodesia came from Mozambique, some of them recruited under contract as in the case of those recruited for the Transvaal mines. Although the number has been substantially reduced in recent years, there are still over 100,000 migrant workers from Mozambique in Southern Rhodesia, mainly on farms and in the industrial centre of Umtali, close to the Mozambique border. Direct trade between the two Territories was never large, accounting for only 2.4 per cent by value of Mozambique's visible external trade in 1964, but if trade within the escudo zone is excluded, it will be seen to amount to nearly 5 per cent of Mozambique's trade with non-Portuguese countries. Other economic links are the oil pipeline between the Feruka refinery and Beira, in which the Portuguese Government has a joint interest (see below) and the arrangements whereby electricity produced by the Sociedade Hidroeléctrica do Revuê, a largely government-owned enterprise, is furnished to Umtali. When the agreement was recently extended to run from 1967 to 1971, it was stated that the expected revenue to Mozambique would amount to 120 million escudos over the four-year period. Finally, in 1964 a proposal was made in the Southern Rhodesian legislature that Southern Rhodesia should participate in the 5,350 million escudos plan for the over-all development of the Zambezi River basin which has been under study by Portugal since 1957, and on which work began in April 1966. The project involves the construction of a major dam at Cahora Bassa and the opening up of some 34,000 square kilometres to agricultural settlement (see A/6000/Rev.1, chap. V, annex II, paras. 293-295). Southern Rhodesia's interest lies mainly in the possibility of improved navigation on the Zambezi River. So far, however, there have been no reports of any formal agreement or negotiations with a view to Southern Rhodesian participation.

47. Co-operation between the two Territories in the economic field has received a strong impulse from the political situation preceding and surrounding the unilateral declaration of independence by the Southern Rhodesian régime. The political influence was already evident in February 1964 when a trade agreement was signed between Portugal and Southern Rhodesia whereby the two parties agreed to accord "most favoured-nation-treatment" to each other to goods traded between Southern Rhodesia on the one hand and Mozambique and Angola on the other and complete exemption from import duty in respect of certain goods. This agreement, which was intended to increase the trade between the two parties, was accompanied by discussions on possibilities of closer economic co-operation between them. Reporting on these discussions, which took place in Salisbury in December 1964, a Southern Rhodesian spokesman stated that the discussions

had been cordial and that complete agreement had been reached and the ground prepared for further negotiations. The intention was expressed to convene a conference to examine in detail the various fields of activities where both countries would benefit from a sharing of technical facilities and expertise.

48. Since that time there have been a number of bilateral conferences in the economic field between the two Governments. Thus in February 1965, a mission, described as a trade and technical mission, comprised of Portuguese representatives from Lisbon, Mozambique and Angola, held a ten-day conference in Salisbury to discuss co-operation in regard to transport, the common use of rivers, agriculture, veterinary problems and tourism. Since then there have been visits by individual officials, including a visit to Salisbury of the Governor-General of Mozambique in August 1965.

49. During 1965, proposals were made in Salisbury for an economic alliance to include Mozambique, Angola, South Africa and Southern Rhodesia in line with the suggestion originally made by Mr. Verwoerd. This proposal was first made by the South African Minister of Agriculture, Economics and Marketing in a statement in Salisbury in June 1965 when he urged the building of an "enduring economic commonwealth in these southern parts of Africa". It was subsequently taken up in newspaper articles and by a number of individuals in public life. Nevertheless, although it has been advocated in Portuguese newspapers, Portuguese authorities have refrained from official comment, referring only to Portugal's "sincere wish to maintain the best relations with its neighbours" in Africa.

50. Following the adoption of Security Council resolution 217 (1965) of 20 November 1965, charges were levelled to the effect that the Lourenço Marques Railway had been used to deliver petroleum products from South Africa to Southern Rhodesia. The Portuguese Government, while officially denying this charge, made clear its position that it would not take part in sanctions against Southern Rhodesia and would not "interfere with private transport to and from land-locked countries". The same position was taken in regard to the transport of petroleum through the Beira-Umtali pipeline. On several occasions, the Portuguese Government has described its position as one of "neutrality", emphasizing that while it would not take exceptional measures to assist the Southern Rhodesian régime, it would not interfere with normal economic intercourse.

51. Nevertheless the refusal of other States to maintain economic relations with the Southern Rhodesian régime has greatly affected the transit trade through Mozambique ports. Most important has been the interruption of the transit trade from Zambia, especially exports of copper which in 1964 averaged over 62,000 tons monthly. (In July 1966 it was reported that an agreement had been reached to transport 12,000 tons monthly via Malawi to Beira and a subsequent newspaper report stated that Zambia would resume the export of limited quantities through Southern Rhodesia.) In June 1966 it was also reported in the Press that during the two preceding months the volume of tobacco, Southern Rhodesia's most valuable export which passed through Beira was 80 per cent below the normal quantity.

52. The following sections contain further details concerning Mozambique's economic relations with Southern Rhodesia in so far as data are available.

B. Trade relations with Southern Rhodesia

Transit trade

53. Southern Rhodesia's dependence on Beira as its main outlet to the sea has its origins in the East Africa Convention of 1891 which stipulated the construction by Portugal of a railway from the bay of Púnguê to the border of what is now Southern Rhodesia. Completed in 1896, the Beira Railway as well as the port of Beira and the linking Beira Junction Railway, were owned and operated until 1948 and 1949 by British companies in which the former British South Africa Company had a majority interest. In 1948 Portugal expropri-

ated the port and in 1949 it purchased the Beira Railway for £4 million.

54. Until 1949 the Beira Railway was under joint management with the Rhodesian Railway. Following its expropriation, an agreement was entered into between the British and Portuguese Governments (Beira Convention of 17 June 1950) which provided *inter alia* for (i) the establishment and maintenance of preferential railway rates in favour of Beira over the ports of South Africa, (ii) exemption from transit dues on goods exported or imported by what were then Northern and Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, (iii) establishment of a working agreement between the two railways, and (iv) creation of a free zone in the port of Beira. This agreement, which remains in effect until 1970, in fact merely continued the situation which had existed when the port and railway were British-controlled; indeed, transit dues, restricted to 3 per cent *ad valorem* under the 1891 convention, had not been imposed by Mozambique after 1920.

55. In addition, preferential shipping rates between Beira and European ports largely offset the long sea-haul. Until September 1965, outward shipping rates from the United Kingdom to Beira were actually lower than those to Lobito, despite the much greater distance (3,000 miles). It was mainly because of those preferential rates that nearly all Zambia's overseas trade and part of Katanga's (amounting to 195,803 tons, worth 1.6 million escudos in 1963) were secured to the Rhodesian Railway as well as to the railways and ports of Mozambique.

56. By 1955 the volume of transit trade passing through Beira became so great that, in order to avoid over-saturation of the port, an alternative railway outlet was constructed from Bannockburn in Southern Rhodesia joining the Lourenço Marques line at Guijá. In 1964 a further branch was constructed inside Southern Rhodesia to permit the export through Lourenço Marques of sugar produced in the Hippo Valley and "Triangle" area of Southern Rhodesia.

57. The following table shows the volume and value of the transit trade (direct and indirect) of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland which passed through Mozambique in comparison with that of South Africa.

TRANSIT TRADE THROUGH MOZAMBIQUE PORTS BY VOLUME AND VALUE

Year	South Africa		Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland	
	Tons	Thousand escudos	Tons	Thousand escudos
1963	3,227,025	4,557,024	3,116,189	23,491,008
1962	3,424,376	4,095,585	3,302,329	22,896,171
1961	3,240,001	3,889,347	3,042,049	23,085,711
1960	3,756,197	3,907,754	2,766,677	22,025,628
1959	3,125,887	3,917,539	2,678,363	20,312,381

58. The above table, which does not include transit trade of the Democratic Republic of the Congo passing through Beira via the Rhodesia Railway (see above), shows that though the volume of the Federation's trade was roughly equal to that of South Africa, it was nearly five times as valuable. Since higher priced goods generally pay higher freight rates, the significance of this can be seen. It may be noted that in 1962, the latest year for which this information is available, out of 2.7 million tons of freight carried on the Beira Railway, 2 million consisted of traffic to or from the Federation, and that of the total operating receipts of the Railway, amounting to 332 million escudos, 319 million came from the transit traffic. The proportion is even higher for the Limpopo branch of the Lourenço Marques Railway which, in 1962 earned receipts totalling 293 million escudos of which 283 million was derived from transit traffic. In 1963, it was reported that after only eight years of existence, the earnings of the Limpopo branch between Guijá and the frontier, a distance of 320 kilometres, had been sufficient to repay the construction cost of 800 million escudos, leaving a surplus profit of 300 million escudos.

59. In the absence of statistical data for the years after 1963, it is difficult to determine what proportion of the transit trade was attributable to Southern Rhodesia, nor is it possible to glean much information concerning recent developments. In 1964, however, Southern Rhodesia's external trade was valued at £247 million, of which £7 million consisted of gold exports and £84 million was trade with neighbouring countries. Assuming that not more than one quarter of overseas goods went through South African ports, it may be guessed that the value of Southern Rhodesian transit trade through Mozambique was about £117 million, or 9,360 million escudos. Malawi's overseas trade, practically all of which passes through Mozambique, was valued at £16.9 million, or 1,352 million escudos. The proportion of Zambia's trade which passed through Mozambique in 1964 is more difficult to estimate but it may be noted that Zambia's exports of copper, most of which went via Beira, amounted to 681,700 tons, valued at £148.4 million, or 11,872 million escudos.

60. Apart from the overseas transit trade through the ports of Beira and Lourenço Marques, it should also be noted that much of Southern Rhodesia's trade with Malawi was transported by the Beira and Trans-Zambezia railways. In 1964 this trade between the two countries, excluding re-exports, amounted to £7.2 million, or 576 million escudos.

61. Between 1960 and 1965, the volume of cargo handled at the ports of Lourenço Marques and Beira increased by nearly 48.8 per cent, while between 1964 and 1965 the total for all Mozambique ports increased by 18.4 per cent, the tonnage handled at Beira alone reaching an all-time peak of 511,537 tons in August 1965. Because of this rapid and impressive increase, due largely to transit traffic, the Portuguese Government has spent large sums for the development of port and railway facilities, including 140 million escudos spent in 1965 on the port of Beira (see chap. V, above, para. 162). Over one fifth (1,771 million escudos) of the expenditure under the Transitional Development Plan, 1965-1967, was earmarked for the transportation sector.

62. The effect of the unilateral declaration of independence by the Southern Rhodesian régime and the action taken by other countries under Security Council resolution 217 (1965) has been to reduce this transit trade substantially as has already been noted in paragraph 51 above.

The Beira-Umtali pipeline

63. An important development affecting the transit trade was the construction of a petroleum pipeline from the port of Beira to Southern Rhodesia's only refinery at Feruka, Umtali. Because of the prominent attention which it has received in recent months, details concerning this installation are already well known and it will be dealt with briefly.

64. Opened on 21 December 1964, the pipeline covers a distance of 184 miles, of which 169 are in Mozambique. It is owned by the Companhia do Pipeline Moçambique-Rodésia which is registered under Portuguese law and is an indirect subsidiary of Lonhro Ltd., the authorized capital (10 million escudos) being 62.5 per cent British and 37.5 per cent Portuguese. The pipeline, which cost some £4 million, was built under contract by Hume Pipe Company (South Africa) Ltd., in association with Costain and Press (Overseas Services) Ltd., and Morris-Knudson of Africa Ltd. The principal contractor advanced the majority of the construction costs, which are to be repaid over a six-year period, beginning in September 1965. The pipeline was constructed with an initial capacity of 600,000 metric tons of crude petroleum, which it is planned to increase to 835,000 metric tons by 1970.

65. Under the terms of its contract (Decree 44,769, 5 December 1962) the company holds a twenty-five-year concession to own and operate the pipeline, renewable for two additional twenty-five-year periods after which the pipeline and all concessions revert without payment to the Portuguese Government. The latter may, however, expropriate it after fifteen years have elapsed, provided it gives the company twelve months' notice and pays compensation. The company is exempted from all taxation for the first ten years of operation and has a guarantee from the Government that during the

first twenty-five years no competing pipeline may be built from Beira to Feruka. The contract further provides that the company shall compensate the Beira Railway for the loss of revenue resulting from its operations.

66. Although the majority of the capital is British, in accordance with Portuguese law, five of the nine members of the board of directors are Portuguese, one of them being officially appointed by the Government of Portugal. In accordance with the action taken by the United Kingdom and other Member States to stop supplies of petroleum to Southern Rhodesia after the illegal régime in that territory had unilaterally declared independence, the minority of directors proposed suspension of operations; the Portuguese majority, however, took the position that since their Government was not a party to the embargo, normal commercial relations should be maintained.

67. As reported in chapter III, the supply of petroleum to the pipeline has been interrupted since December 1965. From May 1966, the United Kingdom Government has been paying a monthly sum of £54,000 to the company, part of which is in turn paid to the Government of Mozambique in respect of lost revenues.

Trade between Mozambique and Southern Rhodesia

68. Separate statistics relating to trade between Mozambique and Southern Rhodesia are not available for the years 1954 to 1963 when Southern Rhodesia formed part of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. As can be seen from table 3, the pattern of trade between the two has changed considerably since 1950 when the total value of their trade was only 44.4 million escudos. By 1964 it had increased to 180.9 million escudos and, although it still represented only 2.4 per cent of Mozambique's total external trade, Southern Rhodesia was nevertheless second in importance among Mozambique's African trading partners, after South Africa. As can be seen, the balance of trade was heavily favourable to Mozambique, the principal export items being wood and wood products (£417,705), electricity supplied by the Revue hydro-electric station to Umtali (£293,928) and feedstuffs for livestock (£240,014). Imports from Southern Rhodesia consisted mainly of tobacco (£105,984) and a variety of manufactured goods.

69. During 1964, trade between the two Territories continued to be governed by a trade agreement between the Federation and Portugal concluded in 1958. On 24 February 1964, however, the Governments of Southern Rhodesia and Portugal concluded a new agreement which came into force on 1 April 1965 and which is designed to expand trade between their respective territories. As did its predecessor, the agreement provides for "most-favoured-nation" treatment subject to certain exceptions: (i) that Southern Rhodesian goods should not enjoy the special preferential treatment accorded by Mozambique to goods produced in other Portuguese territories, or under any special agreements, to goods produced in Spain or Brazil; (ii) that Portuguese goods should not enjoy preferential treatment accorded by Southern Rhodesia to certain countries within the framework of the GATT; and (iii) that neither party should be entitled to benefit from privileges granted by the other under any agreement constituting a customs union or free trade area. In addition, there was provision for reciprocal duty-free admission of a wide variety of commodities including livestock, fish and vegetable products. More important, however, the agreement provided for the establishment of a permanent joint trade and economic liaison committee with the task of examining ways and means of increasing trade between Southern Rhodesia, on the one hand, and Portugal and Portuguese-administered territories, on the other.

70. It is still somewhat too early to determine what effect this new co-operation will have. Although the volume of trade did not increase, except for a few months, during 1965, the signing of the agreement was followed by renewed contacts between officials of the two Governments and interest in closer co-operation has certainly been evident in Salisbury. Recent unconfirmed newspaper reports have suggested that

there has been an expansion in the re-export by Mozambique of goods from Southern Rhodesia, but this is too recent to be confirmed or denied by official statistical data.

C. Migrant labour

71. Although not as closely regulated or as well documented as in the case of South Africa, there has been over the years a greater flow of African migrant workers from Mozambique to Southern Rhodesia. From 1946 to 1958, when the Rhodesian authorities began to restrict immigration, Mozambique workers were the largest immigrant group, representing, according to Rhodesian statistics, 20 per cent of the total labour force. According to Mozambique statistics, which are based on the number of migrant workers registered with the delegation of the Mozambique Institute of Labour in Salisbury, the number of migrant workers in Southern Rhodesia reached a peak of 218,577 at the end of 1959.^k By December 1963 the number had dropped to 119,871, or about 30,000 less than those registered in the Transvaal.

72. The majority are clandestine migrants, mainly from the districts of Tete and Manica e Sofala, who legalize their status by obtaining Portuguese passports and registering with the delegation in Salisbury after they have entered the country and obtained work. Only a small proportion, 6,387 in 1963, are employed in mining, the majority being engaged in agriculture, industry and private service. Because most are clandestine migrants, the sums flowing to Mozambique in the form of passport fees and foreign exchange (resulting from deferred pay) is much less than for contract workers going to the Transvaal.

73. Until 1961, there were two organized channels by which workers went to Southern Rhodesia, apart from the purely illicit and unorganized movement across frontiers: recruitment on contract at recruiting centres in Mozambique and a free transportation service furnished by the Rhodesian Migrant Labour Service (known as ULERE). The latter provided free transportation with food and accommodation for the workers and their families from the frontier to Wankie and Umtali where they were registered and allowed to proceed to the employers of their choice. After completing at least one year of employment, they were entitled to free return transportation. In 1956, a total of 78,279 migrants from Mozambique and Zambia chose the services of ULERE and only about 18,000 were recruited in their home countries.

74. Of the two organized channels, recruitment in Mozambique was the only one not technically regarded as "clandestine" by the Mozambique authorities. This was regulated by successive agreements between the Governments from 1913 to 1961. Under these agreements, known collectively as the Tete Agreement,¹ the terms of which were similar to part I of the Mozambique Convention, the Government of Mozambique authorized the recruitment of up to 15,000 contract workers in the district of Tete, without restriction as to the type or duration of employment. Recruiting was done by licensed representatives of approved recruiting organizations at fixed recruiting centres. Each contract was subject to approval by an official of the Mozambique Institute of Labour. The recruiting organization was required to pay the fee (£1) for the worker's passport and to provide transportation to and from the place of employment. The agreement provided for an office of Curator of Portuguese Natives in Salisbury with functions similar to that in Johannesburg. An amount equivalent to the whole of the native tax (£1 annually) collected from Mozambique Africans in Salisbury and half the tax collected from

^k There are substantial discrepancies between the figures published by the Southern Rhodesia Labour Bureau and the Mozambique Institute of Labour. Thus, in 1951, Rhodesian statistics show 101,618 migrants whereas the number registered with the delegation of the Institute of Labour in Salisbury was 148,935.

¹ In particular, agreements of 31 July 1925 and 19 October 1934 (cf. Southern Rhodesia: Government Notices 340 of 1925 and 620 of 1934).

those elsewhere,^m was to be paid to the Curator who was also to act as agent for remittances and transmittal of deferred pay.

75. From 1948 onwards, recruitment was handled by two organizations: the Rhodesian Native Supply Commission, an official body established in 1946 (Act No. 36 of 1946), and the Agricultural Native Labour Limited, a service agency similar to WNLA, which was licensed in 1948.

76. In fact, however, very few workers were recruited by the above method, the yearly average during the 1950s being under 4,000 for the Commission and under 400 for the Agricultural Native Labour Limited. A somewhat larger number made use of the facilities provided by ULERE but even these were apparently exceeded by the number of clandestine migrants travelling by their own means.

77. In 1958 the Southern Rhodesian authorities began to restrict the immigration of foreign labour. Under the Foreign Migratory Labour Act, 1958, the Minister of Labour, Social Welfare and Housing was empowered, when satisfied that the supply of local labour in an area exceeded demand, to declare that area closed to migrants seeking employment. In March 1959 both Salisbury and Bulawayo were declared closed areas and in the following months the Act was extended to other urban areas until by the end of 1959 Umtali, where nearly half the African workers were from Mozambique, was the only municipality remaining open to immigrant workers. It was reported that these measures resulted in a 34 per cent decrease in the number of immigrants entering Southern Rhodesia from outside the Federation. By 1960 the free trans-

^m The 1925 agreement provided that if the total of fees and tax paid to the Curator was less than £4,500 annually, the difference should be paid by the Southern Rhodesian Government. This provision was dropped from the 1934 agreement.

portation service furnished by ULERE was discontinued and in 1961 the Tete Agreement ceased to be operative, the Southern Rhodesian authorities having given notice of its termination in July 1960. To further discourage immigration, the Employment Tax Act, 1961, imposed a tax of £1 per month payable by employers in respect of each foreign employee. This Act was, however, repealed one year after it came into effect.

78. One of the effects of these measures was to reduce the revenue, never very large, derived by Mozambique from passport fees and taxes in respect of migrant workers. From a total of 6.5 million escudos in 1957, these receipts dropped to 269,400 escudos in 1963, derived exclusively from passport fees.

79. At the same time, the number of Mozambique workers registered in Southern Rhodesia decreased substantially, as can be seen from the following table. This may, of course, be partly due to fewer clandestine migrants acknowledging their Mozambique origin.

MOZAMBIQUE WORKERS REGISTERED IN SOUTHERN RHODESIA

Year	Registered total	Mines	Other occupation	New registration	
				Recruited in Mozambique	Others
1963	119,871	6,387	113,484	—	5,142
1962	202,863	6,873	195,990	—	12,379
1961	199,191	8,532	190,659	—	9,984
1960	193,578	1,787	191,791	402	44,404
1959	218,577	2,876	215,701	751	33,998

SOURCE: Mozambique, *Anuário Estatístico*, 1959-1963.

TABLE 1. MOZAMBIQUE: SPECIAL TRADE WITH NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES
(By value and percentage)

Year	South Africa		Southern Rhodesia ^a		Zambia ^a		Malawi ^a		Congo (Léopoldville)	
	Thousand escudos	Percentage of total	Thousand escudos	Percentage of total	Thousand escudos	Percentage of total	Thousand escudos	Percentage of total	Thousand escudos	Percentage of total
A. Imports										
1950	230,625	13.1	18,935	1.1	99	0	1,824	0.1	2	0
1960	439,281	12.0	—	—
1961	399,666	10.7	—	—
1962	481,241	12.3	—	—
1963	492,325	12.1	—	—
1964	571,203	12.7	77,035	1.7	309	0	24,170	0.6	—	—
1965 ^b	414,062	10.4	75,362	1.9	1,528	0	2,028	0	—	—
B. Exports										
1950	222,120	18.2	25,479	2.1	29	0	12,455	1.0	1,014	0.1
1960	61,614	2.9	—	—
1961	93,772	3.7	1,145	0
1962	230,672	8.8	7,612	0.3
1963	303,961	10.5	2,598	0.1
1964	324,351	10.7	103,820	3.4	32,697	1.1	8,224	0.3	—	—
1965 ^b	281,904	11.2	78,361	3.1	14,251	0.6	11,561	0.4	1,499	0.1
C. Balance										
Year	South Africa (thousand escudos)		Southern Rhodesia ^a (thousand escudos)		Zambia ^a (thousand escudos)		Malawi ^a (thousand escudos)		Congo (Léopoldville) (thousand escudos)	
1950	—	8,505	+	6,544	—	70	+	10,631	+	1,012
1960	—	377,667	—	—
1961	—	305,894	+	1,145
1962	—	250,569	+	7,612
1963	—	188,364	+	2,598
1964	—	246,852	+	26,785	+	32,388	—	15,946	—	—
1965 ^b	—	132,158	+	2,999	+	12,723	+	9,533	+	1,499

SOURCE: Mozambique, *Comércio Externo* and *Boletim Mensal*.

^a Malawi, Rhodesia and Zambia constituted the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland from 1954 to 1963. Trade between

Foot-note a (continued)

Mozambique and the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland in the period 1960-1963 was as follows:

Year	Imports		Exports		Balance
	Thousand escudos	Percentage of total imports	Thousand escudos	Percentage of total exports	Thousand escudos
1960	69,496	1.9	80,470	3.8	+10,974
1961	77,149	2.1	121,436	4.8	+44,287
1962	136,401	3.5	135,702	5.2	-699
1963	92,469	2.3	115,062	4.0	+22,593

^b January through October only.TABLE 2. MOZAMBIQUE: VALUE OF SPECIAL TRADE WITH SOUTH AFRICA BY PRINCIPAL COMMODITIES
(Million escudos)

	1950	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965 ^a
A. IMPORTS							
Iron and steel ^b	6.9	64.7	64.5	87.8	94.5	69.4	48.8
Coal	23.5	27.5	29.9	33.0	31.3	36.5	34.6
Maize	—	—	0.1	12.7	30.2	45.9	33.0
Fresh vegetables	10.1	6.9	12.7	21.0	20.0	14.0	15.5
Disinfectants, insecticides, fungicides, etc.	1.3	7.9	6.8	9.6	11.3	9.8	10.1
Dairy products ^c	3.1	12.7	16.2	19.3	9.8	10.9	9.8
Lubricants	0.4	18.3	21.7	20.3	15.7	11.0	7.3
Agricultural machinery and tools	1.0	5.6	3.0	3.0	4.1	4.0	5.6
Fish ^d	1.4	3.5	3.8	4.5	4.8	6.3	4.5
Medicines	1.4	2.8	2.4	3.1	3.5	3.5	3.8
Cotton textiles	4.6	8.9	3.3	4.0	4.1	3.8	1.1
Vehicle parts ^e	5.2	8.0	3.5	8.2	8.0	4.2	3.7
Fruits	5.2	12.6	11.8	14.4	14.2
B. EXPORTS							
Bananas	1.7	4.0	8.8	15.1	15.6	...	9.0
Tea	6.0	2.1	1.4	0.9	0.7	2.9	9.3
Copra oil	12.6	9.3	7.6	13.9	14.3	24.2	13.2
Shelled cashew nuts	—	5.8	4.9	5.5	5.9	7.6	10.0
Gasolene	—	—	—	66.7	75.6	60.1	54.6
Gas oil and diesel oil	—	—	—	53.3	60.7	30.4	46.5
Timber ^f	20.9	13.7	38.5	54.9	87.4	118.1	107.5
Sisal	2.1	5.3	7.7	4.7	13.6	30.1	12.8

SOURCE: Mozambique, *Comércio Externo*, 1950 and 1960-1963; *Boletim Mensal*, 1964 and 1965.^a January through October.^b Includes iron and steel ingots, profiles, sheets, wire and tubes, and containers.^c Includes milk, butter and cheese.^d Includes fresh and preserved fish.^e Parts of automobiles, motor bicycles and bicycles, etc.^f Includes sawn timber, railway sleepers and flooring.TABLE 3. MOZAMBIQUE: VALUE OF SPECIAL TRADE WITH SOUTHERN RHODESIA BY PRINCIPAL COMMODITIES
(Thousand escudos)

A. Imports								
Year	Maize	Coal	Copper	Iron ^a	Tractors	Vehicle parts ^b	Fertilisers	
1950	—	4,416	9	124	5	41	510	
1964	2,130	3,075	4,205	1,623	5,481	1,854	2,337	
1965 ^c	14,245	3,168	3,830	3,731	1,867	1,326	1,088	
B. Exports								
Year	Timber ^d	Cotton-seed bagasse	Gasolene	Copra oil	Banana	Gas-oil and diesel oil	Cotton-seed oil	Ground-nut oil
1950	2,483	—	—	—	893	—	—	113
1964	33,261	18,315	8,121	8,735	...	9,125	...	—
1965 ^c	20,174	10,022	2,421	5,143	5,095	2,006	9,805	5,610

SOURCE: Mozambique, *Comércio Externo* and *Boletim Mensal*.^a Includes iron and steel ingots, profiles, sheets, wire tubes and containers; and railway supplies.^b Parts of automobiles, motor bicycles, bicycles, etc.^c January through October.^d Includes sawn timber, railway sleepers and flooring.

TABLE 4. TRANSIT TRADE OF SOUTH AFRICA THROUGH MOZAMBIQUE BY PRINCIPAL COMMODITIES^a

Commodity (metric tons)	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963
A. Outgoing					
Base metals	513,201	1,207,966	1,071,608	1,032,009	763,139
Coal	488,009	413,816	440,665	592,598	448,561
Maize	—	10	30,484	227,702	294,688
Asbestos	90,490	98,049	108,165	106,398	108,793
Fresh and preserved fruits and fruit juices	32,415	44,196	37,642	38,188	43,125
Timber and wood products	12,776	12,222	8,785	25,072	67,832
Unworked and worked iron or steel	2,366	3,374	27,297	13,166	80,650
Chemical products (inorganic)	14,906	34,919	19,656	14,028	21,111
Unworked copper	13,163	12,283	13,054	9,029	16,565
Other	598,363	119,424	299,041	328,818	367,680
TOTAL, outgoing metric tons	1,765,689	2,026,259	2,056,397	2,387,008	2,212,144
Million escudos	1,727.2	1,816.3	1,906.5	2,173.8	2,675.7
B. Ingoing					
Gasolene	410,837	414,432	424,377	381,603	342,890
Combustible oils	180,908	199,184	230,189	205,906	202,687
Petroleum	113,426	129,755	86,779	143,153	134,284
Timber and wood products	83,187	80,685	73,992	59,004	74,099
Paper	31,828	41,299	29,605	13,801	14,229
Chemical products	35,852	22,596	20,090	19,948	20,314
Lubricating oils	15,922	14,822	15,826	14,402	12,929
Agricultural and industrial ma- chinery	8,496	4,430	5,262	5,042	4,757
Other	544,621	279,574	340,681	238,354	247,120
TOTAL, ingoing metric tons	1,425,077	1,186,777	1,226,801	1,081,213	1,053,309
Million escudos	2,409.4	2,295.7	2,164.0	2,079.7	2,028.2

SOURCE: Mozambique, *Comércio Externo*, 1959-1963.

^a This table includes direct and indirect transit trade listed in the source. Because of technical difficulties, no distinction is made for re-imports or re-exports. Data are based on the Standard International Trade Classification only since 1961.

TABLE 5. TRANSIT TRADE OF THE FEDERATION OF RHODESIA AND NYASALAND THROUGH MOZAMBIQUE BY PRINCIPAL COMMODITIES^a

Commodity (metric tons)	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963
A. Outgoing					
Basic metal	626,491	671,312	504,373	624,265	636,024
Unworked copper	468,692	514,998	524,187	537,826	561,141
Maize	106,976	32,078	240,898	389,887	99,829
Asbestos	93,818	113,051	123,821	106,314	124,767
Unworked and worked iron or steel	85,407	32,872	147,302	138,126	150,852
Tobacco	84,911	96,433	99,136	106,468	99,163
Copra and oil seeds	20,152	25,022	27,684	48,460	66,568
Tea	11,530	13,415	14,969	14,405	13,699
Unworked zinc	11,520	4,680	6,432	17,557	14,619
Sugar	—	—	—	1,260	47,265
Leather and skins	8,688	6,666	8,651	8,609	8,421
Preserved meat	3,873	2,959	4,547	6,782	7,448
Cotton lint	2,806	4,629	3,140	2,695	4,162
Others	135,794	147,576	190,354	214,937	156,731
TOTAL, outgoing metric tons	1,660,658	1,664,691	1,895,494	2,217,591	1,990,689
Million escudos	14,763.5	15,941.2	16,927.6	17,365.4	17,935.9
B. Ingoing					
Gasolene	243,821	252,046	264,180	247,359	224,054
Fertilizers	164,903	181,709	206,098	176,704	157,689
Combustible oils	151,196	168,232	179,162	180,055	189,041
Petroleum	53,293	62,688	69,170	73,831	73,159
Timber and wood products	64,059	71,483	48,900	47,185	41,344
Sugar	38,619	30,650	36,899	32,633	8,824
Paper	17,155	22,093	25,255	22,377	20,783
Lubricating oils	17,073	17,615	12,000	12,490	10,256
Others	480,865	538,882	506,194	493,201	568,587
TOTAL, ingoing metric tons	1,230,984	1,345,398	1,347,858	1,285,835	1,293,737
Million escudos	6,135.8	6,888.5	6,907.1	6,210.1	6,140.8

SOURCE: Mozambique, *Comércio Externo*, 1959-1963.

^a This table includes direct and indirect transit trade listed in the source. Because of technical difficulties, no distinction is made for re-imports or re-exports. Data are based on the Standard International Classification only since 1961.

CHAPTER VI*

ADEN

A. ACTION TAKEN BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE IN 1965 AND BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AT ITS TWENTIETH SESSION

1. The Special Committee considered the question of Aden at its meetings in 1965. The Sub-Committee on Aden submitted two reports to the Special Committee, one in April 1965 and the other in September 1965 (A/6000/Rev.1,¹ chap. VI, appendices I and II). Following its consideration of the first report, the Special Committee adopted, on 17 May 1965 (*ibid.*, chap. VI, para. 300), a resolution by which, *inter alia*, it deplored the refusal of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to implement General Assembly resolution 1949 (XVIII) of 11 December 1963, and the recommendations of the Special Committee, and noted with deep concern that military operations against the people of the Territory were still being carried out by the administering Power. It reiterated previous recommendations and called upon the United Kingdom to convene immediately a conference of representatives of all sectors of public opinion of the whole Territory, with a view to deciding on the necessary constitutional measures for the holding of immediate general elections on the basis of universal adult suffrage and with full respect for fundamental human rights, to be followed by the establishment of representative organs and government for the whole of the Territory and for the granting of immediate independence; it requested the Secretary-General to arrange for an effective United Nations presence before and during those elections. It also drew the attention of the Security Council to the grave situation prevailing in the Territory.

2. On 16 September, the Special Committee endorsed the conclusions in the second report of the Sub-Committee and decided that the Sub-Committee should keep the question of Aden under constant review and report to it as necessary.

3. At its twentieth session, the General Assembly considered the reports of the Special Committee covering its work in 1964 (A/5800/Rev.1,² chap. VI) and in 1965 (A/6000/Rev.1, chap. VI) and adopted resolution 2023 (XX) of 5 November 1965, the operative paragraphs of which read as follows:

[The General Assembly]

"1. Approves the chapters of the reports of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples relating to the Territory of Aden and endorses the conclusions and recommendations of the Sub-Committee on Aden;

"2. Endorses the resolutions adopted by the Special Committee on 9 April 1964, 11 May 1964 and 17 May 1965;

"3. Deplores the refusal of the administering Power to implement the resolutions of the General Assembly and the Special Committee;

"4. Further deplores the attempts of the administering Power to set up an unrepresentative régime in the Territory, with a view to granting it independence contrary to General Assembly resolutions 1514 (XV) and 1949 (XVIII), and appeals to all States not to recognize any independence which is not based on the wishes of the people of the Territory freely expressed through elections held under universal adult suffrage;

"5. Reaffirms the inalienable right of the people of the Territory to self-determination and to freedom from colonial rule and recognizes the legitimacy of their efforts to achieve the rights laid down in the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples;

"6. Considers that the maintenance of the military bases in the Territory constitutes a major obstacle to the liberation of the people of the Territory from colonial domination and is prejudicial to the peace and security of the region, and that the immediate and complete removal of these bases is therefore essential;

"7. Notes with deep concern that military operations against the people of the Territory are still being carried out by the administering Power;

"8. Urges the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland immediately to:

"(a) Abolish the state of emergency;

"(b) Repeal all laws restricting public freedom;

"(c) Cease all repressive actions against the people of the Territory, in particular military operations;

"(d) Release all political detainees and allow the return of those people who have been exiled or forbidden to reside in the Territory because of political activities;

"9. Reaffirms paragraphs 6 to 11 of resolution 1949 (XVIII) and urges the administering Power to implement them immediately;

"10. Appeals to all Member States to render all possible assistance to the people of the Territory in their efforts to attain freedom and independence;

"11. Draws the attention of the Security Council to the dangerous situation prevailing in the area as a result of British military action against the people of the Territory;

"12. Requests the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the specialized agencies and the international relief organizations to offer all possible assistance to the people who are suffering as a result of the military operations in the Territory;

"13. Requests the Secretary-General to take such action as he may deem expedient to ensure the implementation of the present resolution, and to report thereon to the Special Committee;

"14. Requests the Special Committee to examine again the situation in the Territory and to report thereon to the General Assembly at its twenty-first session;

"15. Decides to maintain this item on its agenda."

* Previously issued under the symbol A/6300/Add.4.

¹ Official Records of the General Assembly, Twentieth Session, Annexes, addendum to agenda item 23.

² *Ibid.*, Nineteenth Session, annex No. 8 (part I).

B. INFORMATION ON THE TERRITORY³*Introduction*

4. Information on the Territory is already contained in the previous reports of the Special Committee to the General Assembly (A/5800/Rev.1 and A/6000/Rev.1). Supplementary information on recent political and constitutional developments and on economic, social and educational conditions is set out below.

*Political and constitutional developments**Suspension of the Aden Constitution*

5. On 25 September 1965, the United Kingdom Government issued an Order-in-Council⁴ which suspended the operation of the provisions of the Aden Constitution relating to the Council of Ministers and the Legislative Council. The Order empowered the British High Commissioner to make laws for Aden and provided for the establishment of an Advisory Council to be appointed by him. However, it did not affect the Constitutions of the Federation of South Arabia or of the other States in South Arabia.

6. The effect of the Order was to dismiss the Government headed by Mr. A. Q. Mackawee. In explaining the reasons for its action, the United Kingdom Government stated that it had been necessitated by the rapid deterioration in the security situation in Aden. In a statement issued by the British High Commissioner in Aden, it was pointed out that although the High Commissioner remained the ultimate source of authority, that authority had been exercised through, and with the advice of, the Council of Ministers; that advice he was required in most cases to accept. But Aden was still a British Colony, and if the British Government felt that the responsibilities entrusted to ministers were being improperly used it still had the power to take matters out of the ministers' hands. The High Commissioner accused the Aden ministers of conducting a campaign of obstruction, culminating in their open endorsement in the Legislative Council of terrorism as an instrument of policy. The Aden Government, he added, "had expressed sympathy with the use of the bazooka, the bomb and the assassin's bullet as a method by which the future constitutional position of South Arabia should be decided".

7. At the twentieth session of the General Assembly, Mr. Mackawee stated in the Fourth Committee that he and his ministers had met with obstruction from the United Kingdom High Commissioner from the time they had taken office. The statement of the High Commissioner that they were responsible for the deterioration of security in Aden was misleading, since security was the responsibility of the High Commissioner and the police and military were under his control. The new emergency regulations introduced by the High Commissioner in June 1965 had only made the situation worse.

8. A general strike was organized by the Aden Trades Union Congress on 2 October 1965 in protest against the suspension of the Aden Constitution. Riots broke out on 2 and 3 October, being particularly violent in the Crater District of Aden. A curfew was imposed and British troops were called in to help

³ The information presented in this section has been derived from published reports and from the information transmitted to the Secretary-General by the United Kingdom under Article 73 e of the Charter, on 31 August 1965, for the year 1964.

⁴ The Aden (Temporary Provisions) Order, 1965.

restore order. More than 760 persons were reportedly arrested and around 300 Yemenis expelled during the rioting. Among those arrested was Mr. Muhammad Saleh Aulaqi, Secretary-General of the Aden Trades Union Congress and seven other trade union leaders.

Constitutional proposals for South Arabia

9. In September 1965, the Government of the Federation of South Arabia requested two British constitutional advisers, Sir Ralph Hone and Sir Gawain Bell "to consider and recommend suitable amendments to the Federal Constitution bearing in mind that the amended Constitution should:

"A. Be appropriate to the whole of South Arabia;

"B. As a result of consultation with all major interests in South Arabia, prove acceptable as far as possible to those interests and satisfy their aspirations;

"C. Assume that British sovereignty over Aden is withdrawn."

10. The report of the constitutional advisers was submitted to the Chairman of the Supreme Council of the Federation on 28 January 1966.⁵

11. In a note to the Secretary-General dated 25 February 1966 (A/6274), the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom, on behalf of the Government of the Federation of South Arabia, transmitted copies of a letter addressed to the Secretary-General by Mr. Mohamed Farid, Minister of External Affairs in the Government of South Arabia, and a statement by the Supreme Council of the Federation concerning the report of the constitutional advisers. In its statement, the federal Government pointed out that it had agreed to the immediate publication of the report so that everyone in South Arabia might be aware of its contents. It emphasized that the changes proposed in the report were only suggestions and reserved judgement upon it until it had been fully considered.

12. The United Kingdom representative, also on behalf of the Government of the Federation of South Arabia, requested the transmission of the report of the constitutional advisers to all permanent missions to the United Nations. This was done on 9 March 1966.

Changes in the federal Government

13. The Supreme Council of the Federation was reportedly expanded on 14 February 1966. Two new ministers from Aden were appointed to the Council, thus raising its membership from ten to twelve. The new ministers are Mr. Abdul-Rahman Girgrah, who took over as Minister of National Guidance and Information, and Mr. Husain Ali Bayoomi, who became Minister of Civil Aviation. The two ministers are respectively the President and Secretary-General of the United National Party.

14. It is also reported that the British High Commissioner has appointed five new members from Aden to the Federal Council (the Legislature), including the two ministers referred to above. Since the resignation in July 1965 of the Aden members of the Federal Council, their seats have remained vacant. Under the existing Constitution, Aden is entitled to twenty-four seats in the Federal Council.

⁵ Federation of South Arabia, *Constitutional Proposals for South Arabia*, 1966.

Nationalist organizations

15. On 14 January 1966, leaders of the National Front for the Liberation of Occupied South Yemen and the Organization for the Liberation of the Occupied South (OLOS), Messrs. Aly al-Salamy and Abdullah al-Asnag respectively, issued a *communiqué* stating that their two organizations had agreed to merge into "one revolutionary, national organization called the Front for the Liberation of Occupied South Yemen" (FLOSY). The new organization proclaimed its adherence to the measures advocated in General Assembly resolution 2023 (XX) as the "only basis for ending the bloody engagements between the people and the imperialist British authorities", and vowed to continue the struggle against British colonialism until victory. A statement issued by the Assistant Secretary General of the League of Arab States pointed out that the merger was in response to the call made by Arab kings and heads of state and government to get all the national forces in the south combined into one effective organization.

16. The General Secretary of FLOSY, Mr. A. Q. Mackawee, announced on 4 March that a revolutionary council would be established: it would consist of twenty members, of whom eight would be "representatives of battle fronts". Furthermore, a national council representing freedom fighters and civilian sectors in all areas of the South would be formed within two months. A committee of the revolutionary council had been set up to draft a charter of national action.

17. In a memorandum addressed to the conference of Arab Premiers on 16 March 1966, the Front for the Liberation of Occupied South Yemen (FLOSY) stated that the constitutional proposals prepared by the two United Kingdom experts would, if implemented, strengthen the imperialist domination of the South "after disguising the rotten conditions in the area with formal independence". The memorandum continued, "FLOSY will fight against any independence granted to the area which does not include the transfer of authority directly to the people of the South and the implementation of all the measures mentioned in the United Nations resolution adopted last November".

18. The Revolutionary Council of FLOSY was formed in March and held its first meeting at its headquarters in Taiz, Yemen, on 16 April 1966. The Revolutionary Council decided to form four committees: the first to draw up a plan of action; the second to draw up a charter; the third to prepare for elections to a National Council; and the fourth for military affairs. Mr. A. Q. Mackawee, stated that the Front wanted a government for the entire South with its eastern and western protectorates and its towns, and that the scattered areas of the South should be transformed into big provinces. This would lead to the frustration of the imperialist plan to divide the South. The constitution should be drafted by an elected council representing the people and not by the British Colonial Office.

19. A new organization was reported to have been formed early in April 1966 following a conference held in Asmara, Ethiopia, between leaders of the South Arabian League, a number of independent politicians and some members of the former Organization for the Liberation of the Occupied South (OLOS). The group was called the Command of Nationalist Forces in South Arabia (CONFISA). It criticized the policy of FLOSY and described it as "sham and unrepresentative". The

aims of the new organization were listed as follows: unity of South Arabia; independence; transfer of power to the people; recognition and safeguarding of human rights; an independent judiciary; and general elections under neutral supervision. It called for direct talks between the United Kingdom and representatives of South Arabia. It also called upon all nationalist forces to draft a constitution incorporating the peoples' demands and stated that only a constituent assembly elected prior to independence had the right to ratify a constitution.

20. Two members of FLOSY, Mr. Ahmed A. Al-Fadhli and Mr. Jaabal bin Hussein al Audhali, were expelled from the Front for holding talks in Beirut with Ministers of the South Arabian Federation Government. The two ex-members are the brothers, respectively, of the Minister of Justice and the Minister of Internal Security. Mr. Muhammed Ali Al-Gifri, President of the South Arabian League, and other leaders of CONFISA also met with the Federal Ministers in Beirut on 3 April 1966. The ministerial delegation was composed of Sultan Saleh bin Husain al-Audhali, Minister of Internal Security, Sultan Nasser bin Abdullah al-Fadhli, Minister of Justice, Mr. Abdul-Rahman Girgrah, Minister of National Guidance and Information, and Mr. Ahmed Abdul-Illah al-Darwish, Minister of Commerce. In a statement following the talks, the Ministers said that they had exchanged views with the other side "in an atmosphere of understanding and comprehension of the true nature of the stage through which South Arabia was passing".

Incidents in Aden and military operations

21. Reports have continued to be published in the Press about incidents and disturbances in Aden. On 1 September 1965, Sir Arthur Charles, the Speaker of the Aden Legislative Council, was assassinated. On 11 January 1966, an assistant political officer at the British High Commission's office, Mr. Husain M. Al-Wazir, was shot dead. On 17 January, another member of the British Administration, Mr. Robin H. Thorne, was injured when a parcel he had received through the mail exploded in his hands. Several grenade explosions and shooting incidents were reported in February and March. A large number of persons were reported to have been arrested for questioning by the security authorities. Strong protests against these arrests were made by various organizations, including former ministers of the Aden Government, the Graduates' Congress and the Civil Service Association of South Arabia (see A/AC.109/PET.443-445). A curfew was imposed on sections of Aden on 21 March, following the shooting of a British civil servant and the wounding of a British soldier. The curfew was lifted three days later.

22. Demonstrations and strikes have also been reported, particularly in December and January, chiefly by workers in oil companies and military establishments. One of the strikes was in protest against the dismissal by an oil company of eighty-five workers in a reduction of its operations. On 27 February, a general strike was held in Aden in protest against the assassination of the President of the Aden Trades Union Congress, Mr. Ali H. al-Qadhi. A reward of £1,000 was reportedly offered by the Aden police for information leading to the conviction of the person or persons responsible for the assassination. Anti-British student demonstrations broke out between 26 February and 6

March; a large number of demonstrators were reportedly arrested.

23. On 14 April a one-day general strike was called by the Trades Union Congress in protest against "the entry of British soldiers into a mosque in Aden suburbs, the violation of human dignity, the torturing of prisoners, and the closing down of schools in Aden". The British High Commissioner promised an investigation of the incident and stated that British security forces were under strict orders to accord the highest respect to Islamic holy places and customs.

24. Since June 1965, further emergency measures have been decreed by the British High Commissioner in Aden; they include road checks and searches, the fencing off of areas and access roads surrounding the quarters of British Forces' families and the supply of small arms to government officers when so recommended by the Commissioner of Police. Additional guards have been provided at certain key points, government offices and individual quarters of British troops.

25. The Front for the Liberation of Occupied South Yemen has continued to issue *communiqués* on military operations in the Territory. The areas in which the operations are reported to be taking place include West Radfan, Yafei, Fadhli, Beihan, Lahej, Subbaihah, Dhala-Shu'aib, Eastern Haushabi and Audhali. There have been reports of armed attacks on British military camps, army convoys and patrols, mine explosions and various other acts of sabotage.

Return of exiles

26. On 1 March 1966, the Government of the Federation of South Arabia recommended to the British High Commissioner that the ban on the return of all persons who had been exiled or deported for political reasons be lifted. The British High Commissioner has already rescinded the Order prohibiting the return to Aden of certain political leaders, including leaders of the South Arabian League and three deposed Sultans.

Other developments

27. On 22 February 1966, the United Kingdom Government announced in its White Paper on the general review of British defence policy that British troops would be withdrawn from the Aden base when South Arabia becomes independent not later than 1968.

28. According to press reports, the decision to close the Aden base was conveyed to the South Arabian Federal Government by the British Under-Secretary of State for Colonial Affairs during a visit to the Territory prior to the announcement. Ministers of the federal Government were reported to have expressed anxiety over the decision of the United Kingdom Government to terminate the treaty obligations with the Federation at the same time as the base was closed and the British troops withdrawn. A mission was to be sent to London to seek British assistance in strengthening the armed forces of the Federation. The Under-Secretary of State reportedly informed the federal Government that the United Kingdom would be ready to continue economic aid to South Arabia after independence (see para. 48 below).

Economic conditions

Agriculture

29. Owing to better irrigation in 1964, the total cotton acreage increased from 51,000 to 68,000 acres. The

total yield of cotton lint was estimated at 42,000 bales, as against 37,700 bales in 1963; cotton seed production amounted to 16,000 tons, as against 11,000 tons during the previous year. Total sales of fruit and vegetables went up to nearly £755,000, an increase of nearly £255,000 over 1963.

30. Government expenditure on agriculture, irrigation and veterinary services in the Federation of South Arabia was approximately £215,800. New irrigation works were reported to have started in Ahwar, Nisab and Beihan, while improvements were being made in Abyan and Lahej. Funds available to the Agricultural Loan Board were increased by £120,000 to £165,000.

Trade

31. The value of goods imported through the port of Aden in 1963 rose from £86,113,692 to £96,980,000, while the value of exports and re-exports rose from £68,770,480 to £69,660,000. The value of *entrepôt* trade in hides, skins, tobacco, gums, grain, coffee, textiles and cotton amounted to £15,758,464, as against £16,530,000 in 1962. In 1964, the value of petroleum products accounted for over 40 per cent of import values, and with ship bunkers for over 75 per cent of export values. The total value of Aden trade rose more than 15 per cent over the previous year.

Public finance

32. On 1 April 1965, a new currency, the dinar, was introduced in the Federation of South Arabia. The dinar is equivalent to £1 sterling and is divided into 1,000 fils. The new currency, which is convertible into sterling at a fixed rate, is issued by the South Arabian Currency Authority. Under the provisions of the Federal Currency Law, 1964, the South Arabian Currency Authority is required to maintain a reserve of external assets consisting of gold or sterling to an amount of not less than 75 per cent of the value of the Authority's notes and coins in circulation and other demand liabilities; this minimum reserve may be reduced only with the approval of the Supreme Council of the Federation on a unanimous recommendation of the Authority's Board. For an initial period both the East African shilling and the new South Arabian dinar will be valid in the Federation. The dinar will also be used in the Qu'aiti and Kathiri States of the Eastern Aden Protectorate, which will have one representative on the Currency Board, as well as in the Kamaran and Perim Islands.

33. Revenue from customs and excise duties amounted to nearly £2 million in 1964. This was supplemented by income tax levied on federal ministers and officials, licence fees and fines, contributions from member States and by grants from the United Kingdom. Federal revenue from 1 April 1964 to the end of February 1965 amounted to £9,041,988, which included a United Kingdom grant of £5,499,000, £71,057 from direct taxes and £2,017,945 from indirect taxes. Expenditure for the same period amounted to £7,305,364, including £1,604,967 for the Federal Regular Army, £1,172,471 for Federal Guards, £962,802 for rural and urban education and £847,948 for health.

34. The revenue of Aden State for the period 1 April 1964 to 28 February 1965 amounted to £3,355,966, of which £1,714,443 was derived from direct taxes. Expenditure for the same period was £3,315,496 of which £750,000 was allocated to the Development Plan (see para. 43 below).

35. The revenue and expenditure of other States in the Federation for the year 1964-1965, including grants from the United Kingdom, are set out below:

State ^a	Total revenue	United Kingdom grants and subsidies (pounds sterling)	Expenditures
Amirate of Beihan ..	84,109	76,500	47,734
Upper Aulaqi Sheikhdom	83,725	76,400	49,156
Audhali Sultanate	128,951	75,900	96,836
Amirate of Dhala	102,616	76,000	61,160
Lower Yafai Sultanate	135,610	72,000	111,493
Fadhli Sultanate	242,577	72,000	225,699
Abdali Sultanate	314,260	72,000	...
Aqrabi Sheikhdom ..	15,235	4,000	12,047
Lower Aulaqi Sultanate	114,425	62,200	49,265
Dathina State	104,476	75,800	54,446
Wahidi Sultanate	120,253	73,164	76,685
Shaibi Sheikhdom ...	33,455	26,000	43,885

^a The States listed do not include the Sultanate of Haushabi and the three States which joined the Federation in 1965, namely Alawi, Mufiahi and Upper Aulaqi.

36. Outside the Federation, budget figures are available for Qu'aiti and Kathiri. Estimated revenue for Qu'aiti for the year 1964-1965 amounted to £869,213, of which £455,700 was raised from customs duties. Estimated expenditure for the same year amounted to £854,235, including £177,306 for education, £129,229 for the military, £108,982 for the Armed Constabulary, £62,112 for public health and £58,741 for public works.

37. The estimated revenue in Kathiri for the year 1964-1965 amounted to £76,962, including £37,800 from customs duties and £15,964 from United Kingdom grants and loans. Estimated expenditure for the same year amounted to £72,548, including £13,164 for the Armed Constabulary, £9,990 for education and £8,566 for public health.

Development plans

38. According to its current development plan (1963-1966) the Federal Government is planning to spend £9.75 million on economic development.

39. The financial provisions of the plan are summarized as follows:

	Recurrent (Pounds sterling)	Capital
(a) <i>Economic</i>		
Agriculture and fisheries	266,383	813,608
Commerce and industry	—	41,470
(b) <i>Social</i>		
Education	584,516	502,560
Health	195,630	245,000
National guidance and information	34,823	60,250
(c) <i>Infrastructure</i>		
Civil aviation and shipping	17,500	450,000
Interior	271,045	5,668,135
Posts and telecommunications	13,000	300,000
TOTAL	1,382,897	8,081,023
Reserve		286,080
GRAND TOTAL		9,750,000

40. Allocations from Colonial Development and Welfare funds towards the plan amounted to £3,670,000 as at 31 March 1965. The breakdown of these allocations for approved or projected commitments was as follows:

	Recurrent (Thousand pounds sterling)	Capital
(a) <i>Economic</i>		
Agriculture and irrigation	128	521
Fisheries	45	91
Co-operative and marketing ..	55	44
	228	656
(b) <i>Social</i>		
Education	620	557
Health	300	223
Information	7	1
	927	781
(c) <i>Infrastructure</i>		
Roads	15	641
Public works	121	255
Civil aviation	—	14
	136	910
Administration	32	
TOTAL	1,323	2,347

41. As at 31 March 1965, approximately £1 million of this allocation had been spent.

42. Certain individual member States of the Federation have their own development plans. A total sum of £1.5 million has been allocated to member States of the Federation from Colonial Development and Welfare funds for the period 1963-1966.

43. The development programme started in Aden in 1960 was completed in 1965: total outlays amounted to almost £6 million. A new five-year plan (1965-1970) has been planned roughly as follows:

	Thousand pounds sterling
Industrial and economic development	1,100
Education	1,640
Health	695
Social welfare	135
Municipal/township/village development	588
Sports stadium	150
Roads, land and housing	2,655
New airport and terminal building	700
Public utilities	4,690
Government buildings	475
	12,828

44. In the Eastern Protectorate, allocations for development in 1964-1965 were distributed as follows: 47.2 per cent for education, 14 per cent for health, 13 per cent for agriculture, 7.2 per cent for roads, 6.5 per cent for fisheries, 5.2 per cent for co-operatives and marketing and 5.2 per cent for water supply.

45. In Qu'aiti, allocations from State funds for development amounted to £100,000 in 1964-1965. Expenditure was allocated as follows: 39 per cent for water supply, 23.9 per cent for education, 15.3 per cent for health, 13.3 per cent for roads, 5 per cent for electricity supply and 3.5 per cent for fisheries. At the end of March 1965, the unspent balance in the Qu'aiti Development Fund was £193,046. Qu'aiti State Special Funds for Harbour Development and Coastal Works totalled £300,000 in 1964-1965. Expenditure under the Fund was £50,000 in the same year.

46. Some projects in Qu'aiti are financed jointly from United Kingdom and local sources. In Kathiri no local resources are available for development.

47. Under the United Nations Development Programme (Expanded Programme sector) (EPTA), the

Territory will receive advisory services amounting to £20,500 in 1965-1966. In the previous year, UNICEF provided aid totalling approximately £22,400 for educational services and £24,000 for medical supplies and stipends. The United Nations Special Fund has approved a four-year scheme for an investigation into the fisheries potential of the Territory; the scheme which was due to begin in 1965 will cost £250,000.

48. In a statement issued in London following talks with Ministers of the Federation, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations gave an assurance that United Kingdom aid to the Territory would not end on independence. The form and extent of that aid would be decided nearer the time of independence.

Social conditions

49. The total labour force in Aden State was estimated at 80,404 in December 1964, distributed as follows:

Port workers	7,550
Building and construction	12,629
Industrial undertakings	13,296
Retail and wholesale trades	10,694
Government police force and other services	17,860
Domestic servants	17,000
Miscellaneous	1,375
	<u>80,404</u>

50. The Employment Exchange of the Ministry of Labour recorded 4,616 placements in 1964. At the end of the same year the registered unemployment figure was 3,668, approximately the same as in 1963. There were eighteen registered trade unions and four employers' organizations, with an approximate membership of 21,869 and 29 respectively.

51. In September 1963, an Aden Joint Advisory Council was set up to advise the Government on labour policies, labour legislation and all matters of common interest. The Council includes representatives of the trade union movement. It has recommended that both employers and trade unions should endorse and subscribe to a National Industrial Relations Code, setting out, *inter alia*, the agreed responsibilities of management and unions in industrial relations matters, and methods of settling trade disputes.

Public health

52. No developments have been reported in the field of public health.

Educational conditions

53. In 1964, within the Federation there were 152 government primary schools (22,181 pupils) 12 government-aided and 5 private primary schools (4,732 pupils). Intermediate education was provided at 20 government (5,555 pupils), 10 grant-aided and 5 private schools (2,709). There were 6 government (1,617 pupils) and 8 grant-aided and non-aided secondary schools (975 pupils).

54. Estimates of expenditure by the Federation on Education for the year 1964-1965 were: recurrent, £1,297,991 and capital, £37,872. Approximately 13 per cent of expenditure on all forms of education was met by the United Kingdom Government. Implementation of the two educational development plans which were prepared by the Federal Ministry of Education for Aden State (1963-1969) and for the rural states (1963-1966) was delayed owing to the unavailability of funds. However, some building progress from previous development plans was achieved.

55. The policy of the Ministry of Education is to provide intermediate school places for 50 per cent of the primary school leavers; only some 25 per cent of those leaving intermediate schools, however, gain entry to secondary schools. In Aden State formal secondary education is provided for about 60 per cent of the boys and 20 per cent of the girls.

56. In 1964 there were seventy scholarships awarded for study overseas. Of these, fifty-two were for study in the United Kingdom.

57. During 1964-1965, there were approximately 15,935 children in primary schools in the non-federated states, an increase of approximately 20 per cent over 1963-1964. In one large area of Mahri there is virtually no public education yet. Owing to increased building activities and the subsequent shortage of labour, the construction of four new day schools for Bedouin children had to be postponed. Allocations for scholarships by the United Kingdom to Eastern Aden Protectorate students for intermediate and secondary schools amounted to £12,837 in 1962-1963; £17,106 in 1963-1964 and £36,254 in 1964-1965. During this last school year there were fourteen Eastern Aden Protectorate students abroad on government scholarships, ten of whom were studying in the United Kingdom. Twelve were from Qu'aiti and ten from Kathiri. The number of schools, teachers and pupils in these two States is set out below:

PRIMARY

			<i>Pupils</i>		
	<i>Female</i>	<i>Male</i>	<i>Schools</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>Teachers</i>
<i>Government:</i>					
Qu'aiti	74	8,968	1,904	10,872	218
Kathiri	4	878	168	1,046	26
<i>Government-aided:</i>					
Qu'aiti	5	765	58	823	17
Kathiri	22	2,216	260	2,476	68
<i>Private:</i>					
Qu'aiti	—	—	—	—	—
Kathiri	9	695	—	695	19
	<u>114</u>	<u>13,522</u>	<u>2,390</u>	<u>15,912</u>	<u>348</u>

INTERMEDIATE

	Schools	Pupils		Total	Teachers
		Male	Female		
<i>Government:</i>					
Qu'aiti	10	1,847	92	1,939	104
Kathiri	4	335	—	335	16
<i>Government-aided:</i>					
Qu'aiti	—	—	—	—	—
Kathiri	1	51	—	51	3
<i>Religious</i>	5	218	—	218	9
	20	2,451	92	2,543	132

58. There was a secondary school for boys in Qu'aiti with 133 pupils on the rolls.

C. ACTION TAKEN BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON CERTAIN PETITIONS

59. At the 397th meeting of the Special Committee on 18 March 1966, the representative of *Iraq*, speaking on a point of order, referred to a number of telegrams from government officials in Aden (A/AC.109/PET. 443-445), who had been detained and imprisoned and whose homes had been invaded at night, which called for immediate action, even for the dispatch of a commission of inquiry. His delegation had consulted other delegations on the question of what interim action could be taken and had prepared a draft resolution relating to the urgent matters mentioned in the communications. In his statement at the 396th meeting, the United Kingdom representative had said that his delegation would continue to co-operate with the Special Committee and to provide information concerning its policies. The three petitions under consideration gave some indication of the way in which the United Kingdom was carrying out its objectives.

60. He read out the text of a joint draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.263) submitted by his delegation, together with the delegations of Mali, Syria, Tunisia and the United Republic of Tanzania. The draft resolution, which did not enter into the substance of the question of Aden, deplored the action of the administering Power in effecting mass arrests of the Adeni people and requested the Secretary-General to convey to the administering Power the grave concern of the Special Committee. The least which the Special Committee could do at that juncture was to adopt that draft resolution.

61. The representative of *Syria* said that the petitions proved that the United Kingdom had not complied with the provisions of paragraph 8 of General Assembly resolution 2023 (XX) by ceasing all repressive actions against the people of Aden. The evidence before the Special Committee showed that there had been midnight arrests and physical and mental torture. The draft resolution, which should be adopted immediately, was in full harmony with resolution 2023 (XX). If there was any doubt about the facts described in the petitions, a United Nations presence should be established in Aden to ascertain whether the facts were true. His delegation was sure that they were true and that an urgent situation existed, which required immediate action on the part of the Special Committee. The least that Committee could do was to request the administering Power to desist from its acts.

62. Speaking at the 398th meeting, the representative of *Afghanistan* suggested the deletion of the words "physical and mental torture" in the first preambular paragraph of the draft resolution and the addition at the end of operative paragraph 2 of the phrase "and cease all repressive actions against the people of the Territory". If those amendments were accepted, Afghanistan, Ethiopia, India, Iran, Sierra Leone and Yugoslavia would become co-sponsors.

63. The representative of *Tunisia* accepted the amendments on behalf of the sponsors of the draft resolution.

64. The representative of *Ethiopia* supported the draft resolution, as amended, because its adoption would be an interim measure until such time as the question of Aden could be discussed appropriately. Although the draft resolution did not formally request him to do so, the Secretary-General would no doubt report to the Committee on the measures taken for its implementation.

65. The representative of the *United Kingdom* said that on four occasions, from 24 February to 14 March, a total of thirty-eight persons of various occupations had been arrested by the security authorities in Aden and questioned under section 3 (1) of the Federal Emergency Decree. Three had been released.

66. Contrary to the allegations made in the petitions before the Special Committee, the security authorities made arrests only when they had evidence of complicity or intended complicity in acts of violence on the part of the persons arrested; nobody was arrested and held because of his political views. An impartial tribunal met regularly to review all cases and recommended releases whenever possible. The questioning was conducted under internationally recognized procedures; since it had provided considerable new information concerning plans for criminal violence in Aden and had led to the discovery of a considerable quantity of arms and ammunition, it was clear that the persons interrogated had been involved in acts or plans of terrorism. There had been no arbitrary arrests but only arrests based on positive information and made in the interests of the safety of the population as a whole. A small number of those arrested were civil servants and students but such persons, if found to be implicated in violence, could not expect different treatment from others.

67. With regard to the allegations of torture, he recalled that similar allegations had been heard at the last session of the Fourth Committee. His delegation had rejected them, pointing out that an investigation had been made and that no evidence of torture

had been found. He again categorically stated that the detainees were neither tortured nor ill-treated and that the allegations which the Special Committee was examining were completely unsupported. Indeed, a representative of the International Red Cross was just then visiting the Aden detention centre; such a visit would hardly be permitted if the allegations of ill-treatment were true.

68. He recalled the efforts made by his Government to stop the acts of violence and terrorism which had been common in Aden for the past two or three years and which were hindering the Territory's progress towards independence. His delegation had given the Special Committee evidence that violence was inspired and organized from outside South Arabia. On 2 September 1965, his delegation had quoted in the Committee a statement by the Colonial Secretary affirming that the Secretary would gladly consider any proposals concerning the state of emergency which were consistent with the safety of the population and of the Aden military base. On 19 October 1965, it had stated in the Fourth Committee that the United Kingdom Government would lift the emergency measures which it had had to take in order to preserve order in the Territory as soon as the acts of terrorism ceased, and it had also demonstrated that allegations of mass arrests had been greatly exaggerated, since there were at that time fewer than ninety persons in prison in Aden and the rest of the Federation. On 14 March 1966, seventy-five persons had been under detention in Aden and fifteen elsewhere in the Federation. On 5 November 1965, at the 1368th meeting of the General Assembly, Lord Caradon had stated that the United Kingdom Government's purposes of self-determination and independence were delayed and prevented by the campaign of violence; and that the measures taken to deal with violence would readily be lifted when that violence ceased. Recently, on 3 February 1966, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary in the Colonial Office had reaffirmed in the House of Commons that the emergency measures would be lifted immediately; this could be done without prejudicing the safety of law-abiding citizens.

69. Contrary to what had been said by certain delegations which condemned the security measures taken by the United Kingdom Government, the acts of violence were in no way helping South Arabia to obtain earlier independence; on the contrary, they were hindering the constitutional processes of consultation and discussion which must precede independence. Moreover, the majority of the victims were Arab civilians who had nothing to do with the United Kingdom administration: for example, since Christmas 1965, three times as many Arabs as Europeans had been killed and injured by terrorists. In fact the violence had no conceivable purpose. The United Kingdom Government, far from resisting independence, had set the deadline of 1968 for it.

70. There had been encouraging developments in recent weeks, which gave hope of a new climate in which all shades of opinion could meet and settle their differences, so that a united country could be put on the road to independence. Firstly, the Federal Government had recommended that the exiles should be allowed to return to Aden. Secondly, the constitutional proposals drawn up by two experts commissioned by the Government of the Federation had been published in February 1966 and circulated to all Members of the United Nations at the Federal Govern-

ment's request; those proposals, although no one was committed to accept them in whole or in part, could serve as a basis for constructive discussion and action. Thirdly, the United Kingdom had announced in its White Paper on its defence policy that it intended to withdraw its troops from the Aden base when South Arabia became independent, not later than 1968. He hoped that the Special Committee would address itself to those constructive features of the situation and would not be distracted by the fact that the authorities in Aden had been obliged to arrest thirty-eight persons in the process of trying to stop the violence which hindered consideration of the constitutional issues.

71. Finally, he wished to comment on draft resolution A/AC.109/L.263/Rev.1 in the light of the facts he had just described. He welcomed the deletion from the first preambular paragraph of the reference to physical and mental torture, since that allegation was completely unfounded and unsubstantiated. He drew attention to the fact that General Assembly resolution 2023 (XX), mentioned in the second preambular paragraph, had proved unacceptable to twenty-one delegations even though its sponsors had agreed to a Latin American request, and in order to take account of facts set out by the United Kingdom delegation, to delete from the text certain words which were tantamount to an incitement to violence.

72. In operative paragraph 1, the sponsors claimed that there had been mass arrests in Aden—a charge which he had shown to be factually wrong—but omitted to refer to the reasons for the arrests which had been made as a result of a series of attacks and murders, one of the victims of which had been Mr. Ali Hussein Quadi, the President of the Aden Trades Union Conference, who, although a supporter of the liberation movement, had been opposed to violence. An Arab who was a former prison warder, a British garage superintendent and a West German businessman had also been murdered in recent weeks. The Special Committee could hardly condone these murders and yet the draft resolution appeared to do so by condemning the measures taken to deal with violence without referring to the violence that made them necessary.

73. Operative paragraph 2, as amended, was unacceptable because it implied that the measures taken by the United Kingdom Government and the Federation and Aden Governments were directed against the people of the Territory. He had already shown that, on the contrary, those measures were aimed at protecting the population against the campaign of violence in the Territory, and represented the action which it was the duty of any government to take in such a situation.

74. The United Kingdom delegation therefore considered the draft resolution unacceptable, even in its amended version. The Special Committee's right course, in the cause of decolonization was to use its influence to persuade all those who sponsored violence, whether inside or outside Aden, to abandon pointless brutality and to join those who were seeking a peaceful and rapid transition to independence by 1968. His delegation invited the sponsors to withdraw their draft resolution; if it was put to the vote, his delegation would oppose it. He observed that the information and explanations he had given to the Special Committee showed that it paid to hear both sides of the case rather than to take ill-considered and precipitate action.

75. The representative of *Iraq* noted that the United Kingdom representative had counseled the Special Com-

mittee not to take any hasty measures in respect of the situation in Aden, although repression was continuing in the Territory, and people were being arrested, detained and tortured. The Iraqi delegation had agreed to delete the words "physical and mental torture" from the text of the draft resolution only in order to make it possible for a larger number of delegations to support it.

76. The information which the United Kingdom representative had given concerning the number of persons detained—about forty—was not very convincing. If the administering Power had not resorted to mass arrests or torture, why did it not agree to have a commission go to Aden, as requested by some of the petitioners? The United Kingdom had always refused United Nations intervention, saying that it alone was responsible for the maintenance of order in the Territory and that it was attending to the task of pacification. The Iraqi delegation, which had doubts concerning the nature of that pacification, had always insisted that measures should be taken against any administering Power that ignored the resolutions of the United Nations and the Declaration of Human Rights and did not take the wishes of the people concerned into account.

77. The Special Committee had been informed that the administering Power was at present engaged in consultations on constitutional amendments. But the solution proposed by the United Nations recommended that the Territory should first be evacuated so that the people could then decide on their own Constitution. He noted, in paragraph 16 of the document which had been circulated by the United Kingdom delegation and which concerned constitutional proposals for South Arabia, that the consultations had been limited to two meetings with the High Commissioner and to discussions with seven members of the community, seventeen officials, three diplomatic representatives and a number of well-known personalities.

78. In view of the urgency of the situation, he appealed to the Special Committee to adopt the draft resolution and drew attention to the fact that the Secretary-General was also being asked to inform the Special Committee of the measures taken by the administering Power to implement the resolution.

79. The representative of the *United States of America* noted that during the past several years South Arabia had moved steadily towards self-determination and independence. The United Kingdom had clearly indicated its intention to grant independence by 1968 at the latest; all members of the Special Committee hoped that independence would be achieved in peace and tranquillity. It did not seem, however, that draft resolution A/AC.109/L.263/Rev.1 would contribute to peaceful progress and the United States delegation would therefore vote against it. The draft had been originally submitted on 18 March 1966 and an attempt had been made at that time to have it put to the vote without giving the representative of the administering Power an opportunity to consult his Government concerning the facts alleged in the text. Fortunately, wisdom had prevailed and the Special Committee had just heard the United Kingdom representative explain that an upsurge of terrorism had led the administering Power to arrest a number of individuals suspected of complicity in the acts of violence.

80. In explaining its negative vote on resolution 2023 (XX) at the twentieth session of the General Assembly, the United States delegation had pointed specifically to the fact that the resolution had ignored the question of terrorism and failed to take into account the efforts made by the United Kingdom to solve the problem. The present draft resolution suffered from the same defects. Instead of being constructive, it was more likely to encourage the disorders which would inevitably retard the orderly processes by which the Territory should achieve independence.

81. As the date of that event was drawing near, the Special Committee owed it to South Arabia to contribute effectively to that end, in a spirit of goodwill and understanding, by offering practical and constructive counsel for those who were genuinely seeking the welfare of the people and the peace of the area.

82. The representative of *Syria* said that the procedure followed at the preceding meeting had been made necessary by the suddenness of the repressive measures taken by the colonial Power. It was, moreover, not the first time that such a procedure had been followed in the United Nations.

83. In explaining his Government's position, the United Kingdom representative had given the impression that legality was on his side, but many United Nations Members which had seen their countries devastated and their peoples uprooted know on which side legality lay. Moreover, resolution 2023 (XX) left no doubt whatsoever in that regard and reaffirmed, in operative paragraph 5, the inalienable right of the people of the Territory to self-determination and to freedom from colonial rule, and recognized the legitimacy of their efforts to achieve the rights laid down in the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. Did legality consist in militarily and forcibly occupying the Territory? The representative of the United Kingdom had also referred to the Federal Government of South Arabia. He would merely remind the United Kingdom representative that paragraph 4 of the same General Assembly resolution deplored the attempts of the administering Power to set up an unrepresentative régime in the Territory, with a view to granting it independence contrary to General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) and 1949 (XVIII), and appealed to all States not to recognize any independence not based on the wishes of the people of the Territory freely expressed through elections held under universal adult suffrage.

84. With regard to the draft resolution, of which *Syria* was a sponsor, it was clear from the statement of the United Kingdom representative that people had been imprisoned because they were conducting a liberation movement, which was fully legitimate. Indeed, with the existence of a military base on its territory, it was the entire population of Aden that was in prison. The text before the Special Committee was therefore a very moderate one.

85. The representative of *Poland* stated that the Polish delegation had supported General Assembly resolution 2023 (XX), which had explicitly requested the administering Power to abolish the state of emergency and to cease all repressive actions against the people of the Territory. However, only five months after the adoption of that resolution, communications

received from Aden and the Press in the United Kingdom had reported new arrests which left no doubt whatever regarding the gravity of the situation in the Territory. The Polish delegation considered that the Special Committee should express its concern over the recent developments in Aden and that draft resolution A/AC.109/L.263/Rev.1 should be adopted as a matter of urgency. His delegation fully supported and would vote in favour of the draft resolution.

86. The representative of *Italy* expressed reservations regarding a procedure which had interrupted the orderly course of the Special Committee's work and brought about a debate on the draft resolution concerning Aden, the more so as, three months after the conclusion of the previous session of the General Assembly, the Special Committee had still not been able to organize its session or agree on its methods of work. In his opinion, the atmosphere of violence that prevailed in Aden seemed amply to justify full and urgent consideration of the matter as a whole, even before a decision was reached on the Committee's visit to Africa.

87. In considering draft resolution A/AC.109/L.263/Rev.1, the Committee should make sure of two facts, namely, that mass arrests had been carried out by the administering Power, and that they were not justified either by the situation or by the circumstances and were therefore illegal and contrary to the resolutions of the General Assembly. The revised version of the draft resolution was, admittedly, an improvement, but it broadened the scope of the problem so far as its substance was concerned by mentioning "all repressive actions against the people of the Territory", which no longer referred simply to the events which had given rise to the submission of the draft resolution, but to the situation in Aden as a whole, and that had not been the sponsors' intention. He was afraid that the Special Committee might be setting itself up as a court, when it had neither the authority nor the facilities to give an independent and impartial judgement.

88. As long as a country was responsible for a Territory as its administering Power, it had the right and also the duty to take whatever action was necessary to maintain order and protect the population. The facts which had been brought to the Special Committee's attention did not prove conclusively that the administering Power had overstepped its rights in maintaining order in Aden. Finally, his delegation did not think that the draft resolution was likely to further the common aim of the administering Power and Special Committee, namely to explore all the ways and means of leading the Territory to self-determination and independence by 1968 at the latest. For all those reasons, his delegation would not support draft resolution A/AC.109/L.263/Rev.1.

89. The representative of *Bulgaria* said that it was clear from the United Kingdom representative's statement that it was necessary for the Special Committee to adopt a draft resolution of the kind before it. That representative had not refuted the facts mentioned in the petitions and had not denied that those petitions had come from various sectors of the population or that the administering Power had taken repressive measures. It was regrettable that the administering Power considered that it had acted legally and that it was for the colonial authority to decide on the date and methods of granting independence to the Territories under its administration. In the case of Aden,

the United Kingdom representative had stated that the granting of independence to the Territory had been delayed because the population, instead of co-operating with the administering Power, was fighting against it and trying to impose its own conditions. The population of the Territory was subjected to repressive measures by the United Kingdom, and had a very clear idea of the régime and the Constitution which it wished to adopt; the situation would therefore be improved if the United Kingdom were to give the population an opportunity to express its views. For all those reasons, he supported the very moderate revised draft resolution which had been submitted.

90. The representative of the *Union of Soviet Socialist Republics* said that the United Kingdom representative had added nothing to what the Committee already knew. He had not refuted any of the facts mentioned in the cables, but had simply tried to justify the arrests.

91. The USSR delegation categorically rejected the United Kingdom representative's statement that the action taken by the United Kingdom had been directed against acts of terrorism allegedly committed by people encouraged and assisted from outside the Territory and but for which great progress would have been made towards the independence of Aden. The representatives of the United States and Italy had asked the Special Committee not to come to a hasty decision, claiming that the best way to help the population of Aden was to leave the matter to the United Kingdom. He pointed out that every time the United Kingdom Government had wanted to take certain action in the Territory of Aden it had carried out arrests and repressive measures: that had happened when the Federation of South Arabia had been created, when the Aden Constitution had been introduced, and when elections had subsequently been held. Once again the United Kingdom representative had confirmed that certain people in South Arabia did not approve of the steps which had been taken towards the constitutional development of the Territory and had asked for the implementation of United Nations decisions; once again, there was repression and a wave of arrests. That could not be a coincidence, and he was convinced that there was a definite policy behind the recent events. The Committee should act resolutely and adopt the draft resolution before it. There was nothing in the draft resolution which could give rise to objections; by adopting it, the Committee would prove that it could resist the pressure of the colonial Powers and was still a militant body of the United Nations, and it would be a warning to those Powers that the United Nations would not remain passive when confronted with unlawful situations.

92. The representative of *Denmark* said that his delegation wished to stress that in the present instance, as on previous occasions, the United Kingdom had proved its willingness to co-operate with the Special Committee in providing information about the Territories under its administration. The Committee should appreciate the fact that the United Kingdom Government had made an urgent and thorough investigation of the recent arrests in Aden.

93. His country strongly supported the right to self-determination in Asia, Europe or anywhere else in the world and therefore supported the people of South Arabia in their efforts to obtain independence. His delegation did not, however, see how the draft resolution under consideration could further the pro-

cess of decolonization in that Territory; on the one hand, it did not take into consideration all the factors connected with the arrests, and on the other hand it touched upon the broader political issues involved in the question of Aden on which there had been no real debate. His delegation would therefore abstain when the draft resolution was put to the vote.

94. The representative of *India* said that whereas the United Kingdom representative had stated that only thirty-eight persons had been arrested in Aden since 24 February 1966, according to information which his delegation had received, considerably more than that number had been arrested in Aden during the previous week or ten days alone and most of the arrests had been made at night. Moreover, he understood that the situation in Aden was at present very tense indeed.

95. The representative of the *United Republic of Tanzania* said that the United Kingdom representative's statement only confirmed where the crux of the matter lay. The cables referred to arrests and torture. Most of the members of the Special Committee had at one time lived under a colonial régime; they knew what it involved and spoke from experience. Any suspicions which they might have had had been confirmed by the United Kingdom representative. In fact, his own delegation would have been the last to expect anything else from the United Kingdom representative's reply. The latter had, moreover, not denied that the petitioners were reliable people and had all occupied high posts in the Aden Government.

96. The United Kingdom representative had merely stated that his Government acted as it did in Aden because it had a responsibility and, as his own delegation knew, that responsibility was to maintain a colonial system in the Territory. Secondly, the United Kingdom representative had tried to minimize the problem by saying that his Government had already set a date for the independence of Aden; his own delegation felt strongly that Aden should have been given independence long since. Thirdly, the United Kingdom representative had said that his Government was interested in negotiations and a peaceful settlement but that its efforts were being hampered by acts of violence; those so-called acts of violence, as those who had lived under colonial rule knew, were in fact only an expression of the struggle of the people for independence. The United Kingdom representative had failed to mention its own bombing of defenceless villages in Aden. The strength of the freedom movement in Aden could be judged from the fact that senior civil servants and employees of the air line, which was not an independent organization, had been among those arrested.

97. His delegation fully supported the draft resolution, although it would have preferred to retain the original wording and include a reference to the physical and mental torture to which those who had been arrested in Aden were undoubtedly being subjected. His delegation had nevertheless accepted the amendments which had been introduced by the representative of Afghanistan, since they had made it possible for other delegations to support the draft resolution. He hoped that it would be adopted unanimously. Compared with previous resolutions which the Special Committee had adopted on the question of Aden, it represented the minimum demands that the Committee could make. He hoped that delegations which tended to support the administering Power simply for the

sake of doing so would reflect and realize that they should always take into account the interests of the people for whose protection the Committee had been established, including the defenceless people of Aden who were suffering under colonialism.

98. The Special Committee then voted on the draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.263/Rev.1) at its 399th meeting on 22 March 1966. The draft resolution was adopted by 19 votes to 3, with 2 abstentions.

99. The resolution adopted by the Special Committee (A/AC.109/153) read as follows:

"The Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,

"Having received and examined the petitions (A/AC.109/PET.443-445) concerning the detention and imprisonment carried out by the administering Power against the population of Aden,

"Recalling General Assembly resolution 2023 (XX) of 5 November 1965,

"1. Deplores the action of the administering Power in affecting mass arrests of the Adeni people;

"2. Calls upon the administering Power to desist from these acts and cease all repressive actions against the people of the Territory;

"3. Requests the Secretary-General to convey to the administering Power the grave concern of the Special Committee regarding the deteriorating situation in the Territory."

D. PRELIMINARY ACTION TAKEN BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE

100. At the 414th meeting of the Special Committee, on 16 May 1966, the Chairman drew attention to a report submitted by the Secretary-General in accordance with General Assembly resolution 2023 (XX) on the question of Aden, which is reproduced as annex I to this chapter. At the 415th meeting, on 18 May, the representative of Yugoslavia, speaking as Chairman of the Sub-Committee on Aden,⁶ introduced a report of the Sub-Committee which is reproduced as annex II to this chapter.

101. The representative of the *United Kingdom* said that, in a statement made in the House of Commons on 16 May, the United Kingdom Foreign Secretary had referred to the announcement made on 13 May 1966 by the Government of the Federation of South Arabia to the effect that it accepted the United Nations resolutions and intended to convene a conference of all Governments and political groups in South Arabia to consider ways and means of implementing those resolutions. The Foreign Secretary had stated that his Government had always made it clear that it would accept any solution of the constitutional problem in South Arabia which was capable of achieving a wide measure of agreement in the Territory. It accordingly welcomed the Federal Government's intention to hold a representative conference and shared the hope that all South Arabians with the interests of their country at heart would find it possible to participate. The Foreign Secretary had added that, since other political groups had also called for acceptance

⁶ At the 401st meeting the Special Committee decided, without objection, to appoint Afghanistan to the vacancy created in the Sub-Committee by the withdrawal of Cambodia.

of the United Nations resolutions, there was a wide measure of agreement about future objectives; all should be able to co-operate in working out the practical implications of their policies. The Foreign Secretary had stated that the United Nations recommendations relating to the Aden base were already met by the announcement that United Kingdom troops would be withdrawn from the base not later than 1968, by which time South Arabia would have achieved independence. The United Kingdom would be prepared to implement the recommendations concerning the state of emergency and the release of detainees, provided there was satisfactory evidence that terrorism in Aden had ended. The Foreign Secretary had announced that the Federal Government had handed the High Commissioner in Aden, for transmission to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, a letter inviting him to appoint a United Nations observer to attend the proposed conference. Lastly, the Foreign Secretary had told the House of Commons that he had requested the United Kingdom Permanent Representative to inform the United Nations of the Federal Government's announcement and to discuss the whole matter with the Secretary-General.

102. That new development, which was an initiative of major consequence, should be welcome to the Special Committee. It held out a real hope for general agreement among all sectors of opinion in South Arabia, so that the Territory could advance towards full independence in an atmosphere of peaceful negotiation. Many problems, including the problem of timing, remained to be considered. The Federal Government had made it clear that the purpose of the conference was to reach agreement on a programme for the implementation of the United Nations resolutions. The Special Committee itself had long recognized that a conference would be needed as a first step; that had been made clear in paragraph 78 of the report of the Sub-Committee on Aden approved by the Committee in September 1965 (A/6000/Rev.1, chap. VI, appendix II).

103. The United Nations had advocated various stages in the solution of the difficulties facing South Arabia: a general conference attended by all the people of South Arabia who wished to participate; free elections to establish a representative body and a provisional government; and a United Nations presence before and during the elections. As a result of the initiative taken by the Federal Government, those three requirements could be accepted by everyone. Certainly, time would be needed to work out exactly how the programme should be executed and the conference would have a heavy task. The purposes, however, were clear. The United Kingdom Government welcomed the decision to convene a conference on the basis of the Federal Government's acceptance of the United Nations resolutions. So far as the constitutional aspects of the resolutions were concerned, the United Kingdom Government supported the provisions calling for elections to a representative organ and the establishment of a provisional government for the whole of South Arabia. The decision to withdraw from the base and to allow exiles to return removed other obstacles to the implementation of the resolutions. The recent developments, however, were of far-reaching consequence; they called for an effort on the part of all concerned to reach a full agreement which would lead to the happiness and freedom of the people concerned.

104. The representative of *Iraq* pointed out that the announcement by the federal Government, which was reproduced in paragraph 6 of the Secretary-General's report (see annex I), referred to "the unification of our beloved homeland" and described the foundation of the Federation and the accession to it of further States as vital and practical steps towards the establishment of one central Government. The Federal Government had endorsed the principles of self-determination and independence underlying the United Nations resolutions. The United Nations resolutions, however, referred not to the Federation nor the Federal Government but to three parties: the people of the Territory, the administering Power and the United Nations. So far as the United Nations was concerned, independence meant something very different from the existing Government. What mattered was whether the United Kingdom, as the administering Power of a Non-Self-Governing Territory, accepted the implementation of the United Nations resolutions.

105. The Federal Government had asked for a United Nations observer to attend the proposed conference. What the General Assembly wanted, however, was a United Nations presence in the Territory. Such a presence could be established by a visit to the Territory by the Sub-Committee on Aden before, during or after the discussions. The representative of the United Kingdom should say whether his Government would agree to such a visit.

106. Certain requirements had been mentioned by the United Kingdom representative. The only requirements were those laid down in the resolutions of the United Nations: the release of detainees, freedom of expression for the people and the removal of the military base. Those prerequisites should be fulfilled before the negotiations mentioned by the United Kingdom delegation could profitably be held.

107. The representative of the *United Kingdom* said that the position of the Federal Government had been made extremely clear; it had stated that it had decided to accept the United Nations resolutions relating to South Arabia. So far as the attitude of the United Kingdom Government was concerned, shortly after the announcement by the Federal Government it had made declarations which were of maximum importance and paved the way for the advance which all desired. In connexion with the question of United Nations participation, all hoped that the Organization would play an effective role in the difficult task of bringing a number of States to full independence in unity. The United Kingdom Government welcomed the fact that the Federal Government had proposed that a United Nations observer should be appointed at the initial stage. That in no way precluded the presence of United Nations observers during and after the elections or other arrangements to associate the United Nations with the advance of the Territory. The United Kingdom Government would welcome the presence of United Nations observers at the elections, in accordance with paragraph 9 of General Assembly resolution 1949 (XVIII). He looked forward to holding further consultations on that matter with the Secretary-General.

108. The representative of *Iraq* said that his delegation considered that the administering Power was the party concerned in the question, whereas the United Kingdom spoke always of the Federation and the Federal Government. There was no mention of the Federation or the Federal Government in any United

Nations resolution. It was not for the United Kingdom Government to welcome the plans of the Federal Government; the United Kingdom itself was responsible.

109. The representative of *Yugoslavia* drew attention to the recommendations contained in paragraph 17 of the report of the Sub-Committee (see annex II), and expressed the hope that the Special Committee would find it possible to take a decision on the report at that same meeting.

110. The representative of *Denmark* commended the Sub-Committee on its work. The apparently complete lack of contact on the most vital issues between the parties concerned with the future of South Arabia had hitherto been the most serious obstacle to any real progress towards the creation of an independent State based on the principle of self-determination. His delegation therefore welcomed the announcement by the Government of the Federation of South Arabia that it accepted the United Nations resolutions concerning the Territory, in the hope that it might create a basis for the establishment of contacts between all concerned. With regard to the convening of a conference on the constitutional issues, his delegation supposed that what was envisaged was a truly representative conference in which all political factions of any significance would be represented.

111. His delegation supported the proposal that there should be a United Nations presence, in the form of a representative of the Secretary-General, from the very outset of the renewed efforts to build a unified, independent State. His delegation appreciated the fact that the United Kingdom supported the convening of the constitutional conference and the principle of a United Nations presence.

112. He hoped that the initiative now taken marked the end of the long-standing political stalemate in South Arabia. In that situation the efforts of all concerned, including the Special Committee, should be aimed at ensuring that the new initiative led to progress towards the creation of an independent State in South Arabia based on democratic principles and in accordance with the wishes of the entire population. With these considerations in mind, he would support the adoption of the Sub-Committee's report.

113. The representative of *Iraq* welcomed the report of the Sub-Committee on Aden. His own delegation's attitude to recent developments in the Territory remained unchanged. The so-called Government of the Federation of South Arabia did not exist as far as the United Nations was concerned. There were only three parties concerned in the implementation of the pertinent resolutions: the people of Aden, the United Nations and the administering Power. The Special Committee could not accept the administering Power's statement that the so-called Federal Government accepted the resolutions of the United Nations. The truth was that the United Kingdom was using the archaic tribal institutions of South Arabia to impede the development of Aden and to perpetuate its influence in the area. The United Kingdom Press itself had stated as much. The United Kingdom was the administering Power and it alone was responsible for carrying out the resolutions of the United Nations. There was only one question of importance: was the United Kingdom prepared to implement those resolutions?

114. The hollowness of the so-called Federal Government's claim to represent the people of the Territory was further revealed by cables received recently from the Front for the Liberation of Occupied South Yemen (FLOSY), members of the Aden Municipal Council, and others, calling for the liquidation of all institutions set up by the colonial Power, including the so-called Federal Government, and the immediate implementation of the United Nations resolutions.

115. The Sub-Committee had recommended that the United Kingdom Government should again be urged to make it possible for the Sub-Committee to visit the Territory, in accordance with its mandate. He would like to know whether the United Kingdom Government would now agree to that.

116. The Sub-Committee had also recommended that the Secretary-General should be asked to ascertain what action the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the specialized agencies and the international relief organizations proposed to take in response to the request in paragraph 12 of resolution 2023 (XX). According to the report of the Secretary-General (see annex I), the most that any of those organizations had so far done was to "take note" of the resolution. It was clear that something more was needed. For example, many of those who had suffered under the emergency measure were workers; the International Labour Organisation (ILO) should accordingly see to it that they received assistance. The matter could perhaps be raised at the forthcoming International Labour Conference.

117. The representative of the *Union of Soviet Socialist Republics* said that the Iraqi representative was fully justified in once again questioning the willingness of the administering Power to implement the resolutions of the United Nations. Neither the United Kingdom Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs nor that country's representative in the Special Committee had clearly stated that the United Kingdom Government, as the administering Power, accepted those resolutions and was prepared to apply them without reservation to Aden and South Arabia as a whole. The United Kingdom representative had side-stepped the question at the previous meeting, taking refuge in the familiar formula that his Government would accept any solution of the constitutional problem which was capable of achieving a wide measure of agreement in the Territory. To conceal its true position with regard to Aden, the United Kingdom put forward the so-called Government of the Federation of South Arabia as representative of the people, inviting all other groups to endorse whatever it chose to do.

118. The United Kingdom representative had spoken at length of the so-called Federal Government but had said not a word about whether the administering Power accepted the resolutions of the United Nations, or intended to abolish the state of emergency, release the political detainees and thus establish the proper atmosphere in which the resolutions could be implemented. Instead, he had posed a series of conditions, among them the cessation of "terrorism". It was clear that those whom the United Kingdom accused of terrorism were none other than those fighting for the freedom and independence of their homeland. The conditions posed by the United Kingdom Government did not correspond to the resolutions of the United Nations, which constituted the only basis for a just solution. The United Kingdom representative should give a clear answer to the Iraqi representative's question

whether his Government intended to implement those resolutions.

119. Since it was clear from recent developments that the administering Power was seeking to undermine the resolutions of the General Assembly on the question of Aden, the Special Committee must follow events in the Territory with redoubled vigilance. The report of the Sub-Committee on Aden reflected the views frequently expressed by the Special Committee and its recommendations should be approved at the present meeting as provisional measures pending more detailed consideration of the question in Africa.

120. His delegation attached particular importance to the recommendation that the Secretary-General should be requested to ascertain from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the specialized agencies and the international relief organizations what action they proposed to take in response to the request made to them in paragraph 12 of resolution 2023 (XX). As yet, the Special Committee had received no information on what steps the specialized agencies intended to take to implement the resolution. It was inadmissible that the agencies should merely inform the Secretary-General that they had "taken note" of the resolutions.

121. The representative of *Syria* said that, not only had the administering Power not taken the steps outlined in paragraph 78 of the report submitted by the Sub-Committee on Aden in September 1965 (A/6000/Rev.1, chap. VI, appendix II), but the situation had actually deteriorated since that time. Recent statements by the administering Power showed that it was not implementing General Assembly resolution 2023 (XX), which had deplored its attitude. Nor was the so-called Federal Government following the wishes of the General Assembly. The United Kingdom had reached an understanding with that phantom Government and was strengthening its hold on the Territory behind the façade.

122. At the preceding meeting, the United Kingdom representative had said that there was a wide measure of agreement in South Arabia about future objectives; responsible former leaders of the Territory were, however, in exile or in prison and unable to express their views. In an emergency resolution adopted on 22 March 1966 (A/AC.109/153), the Special Committee had deplored the mass arrests of the Adeni people and called upon the administering Power to desist from those acts and cease all repressive action against the people of the Territory. The administering Power, however, was continuing its repressive actions aimed against the struggle of the people of the Territory, whose legitimacy had been recognized in paragraph 5 of the General Assembly resolution 2023 (XX). It was the administering Power that was responsible for the terrorism in the area. Because of the importance of the United Kingdom military base and the oil interests in the area, it was being claimed that there was an improvement in the situation.

123. The specialized agencies had an obligation to take steps to implement resolution 2023 (XX) and their failure to act was a cause for concern. The authority of the United Nations to enforce its resolutions was at stake. It was to be hoped that in time all the Powers concerned would implement the resolutions freely and not under duress.

124. The representative of the *United States of America* welcomed the acceptance by the Federal Government of the United Nations resolutions relating to South Arabia. The United States sympathized with the aspirations of the peoples of South Arabia for self-determination and independence. The recent announcement by the Federal Government showed that there was clear and steady movement in the right direction.

125. It was to be hoped that the United Nations would be able to play a valuable role in that movement. The proposed conference should lead to progress, and the request for a United Nations observer at the conference should be welcomed by all sides. In a spirit of moderation and compromise, all should unite their efforts to seek a basis for unity in South Arabia and advance towards national independence with the full support of the United Nations. The terrorism in the area was regrettable and its cessation was an essential step in the orderly movement towards independence, which should be accomplished in a spirit of harmony and goodwill and without violence. In the task of nation-building, it was important to have an atmosphere based on trust, confidence and stability. The United Nations should do everything possible to help create such an atmosphere.

126. The representative of *Tunisia* said that the resolutions of the United Nations were addressed primarily to the administering Power and not to the so-called Federal Government. Only the United Kingdom had the power to implement those resolutions and it could not be replaced by the Government of the Federation. His delegation supported the Sub-Committee's report and hoped that the United Kingdom would implement the resolutions of the United Nations and allow a visit to Aden. The Secretary-General should continue to take such action as he might deem expedient to ensure the implementation of resolution 2023 (XX) and arrange for an effective United Nations presence in Aden.

127. The representative of the *United Republic of Tanzania* said that the recent announcement by the Federal Government, which the United Kingdom had hailed as an important initiative, was in fact a futile exercise. Only the United Kingdom Government had authority to speak on the question of Aden in the United Nations. That Government had made no clear statement on whether it accepted and was implementing the resolutions of the Organization. United Kingdom soldiers remained in Aden and the Front for the Liberation of Occupied South Yemen (FLOSY), which represented the people of the Territory, was still banned. The proposed constitutional conference would therefore not be fully representative. Mention had been made of certain prerequisites for progress; those prerequisites would not be fulfilled while repressive measures continued against the people of the Territory. His delegation agreed that a United Nations presence was needed; the United Kingdom should allow the Sub-Committee on Aden to visit the Territory.

128. The Sub-Committee had noted with concern the lack of response by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. He supported the Soviet Union proposal on that subject.

129. The report of the Sub-Committee, which should be endorsed by all those who wanted real progress in Aden, should be adopted as an interim measure.

130. The representative of *Ethiopia* said that the Special Committee should at once adopt the report of the Sub-Committee. The proposal of the Soviet Union representative was perhaps covered by the recommendation in paragraph 17, sub-paragraph (v), of the report.

131. The representative of *Bulgaria* endorsed the conclusions and recommendations of the Sub-Committee. The Federal Government's acceptance of the United Nations resolutions was of no significance, since those resolutions were addressed to the administering Power and opposed the existence of the Federation. It was odd that the United Kingdom Government should be expressing its views through the mouthpiece of a puppet Government of its own creation. The statement by the United Kingdom gave no clear answer to the question whether it was prepared to implement the relevant resolutions of the United Nations. Because of the dangerous events in Aden and the relevant response of the United Kingdom, the Special Committee should reiterate the relevant provisions of the United Nations resolutions and stress that the United Kingdom Government was responsible for their implementation and for leading the Territory to independence in accordance with the freely and democratically expressed wishes of the people.

132. It was not enough for the specialized agencies to note the appeals addressed to them; they should give a clear account of what they were doing in response to those appeals.

133. The representative of *India* supported the recommendations in paragraph 17 of the Sub-Committee's report, which should be adopted at once. The recommendation in sub-paragraph (v) was particularly important.

134. The representative of *Australia* said that there were three important factors in the situation under consideration: the oft-repeated intention of the United Kingdom to leave Aden and the base by 1968; the announcement by the Federal Government of its acceptance of the United Nations resolutions relating to South Arabia and the attitude of the United Kingdom towards that announcement. The situation, which was becoming less a colonial situation and more a question of adjusting differences between various Arab groups, should be approached warily.

135. New and hopeful signs had appeared in the still troubled situation. Progress should not be jeopardized by hasty and unconsidered action and the recent statements should be carefully weighed. His delegation was therefore not in a position to take a far-reaching decision on the question of Aden. With these reservations, it would support the adoption of the Sub-Committee's report.

136. The representative of *Madagascar* said that she could support the recommendations made in the report, which was a necessary complement to the report of the Secretary-General (annex I) and the statements made by the United Kingdom delegation.

137. The representative of *Poland* said that the report raised no controversial issues. The administering Power should have no doubt about the views of the Special Committee on the status of the Government of the Territory, where events were following a similar course to that followed in Southern Rhodesia. The only proper course was that outlined in the United Nations resolutions, which were addressed solely to the United Kingdom. There could be no progress towards

independence in the Territory until the United Kingdom accepted its responsibilities and implemented the resolutions of the United Nations. The steps to be taken were enumerated in paragraph 17 of the Sub-Committee's report, which the Committee should adopt.

138. He supported the Soviet Union representative's remarks about the response of the specialized agencies.

139. The representative of the *United Kingdom* said that in commenting on the Sub-Committee's report (annex II), he would cover many of the points raised by previous speakers but would not seek to deal with their statements in detail. His delegation regretted the apparent inability of some speakers to rise to the opportunities provided by recent developments and their tendency to take refuge in old, discredited accusations which bore no relation to present realities and reflected their unwillingness to move with the times.

140. Some members of the Committee seemed to feel that the Federal Government's decision to accept the United Nations resolutions as a basis for a general settlement leading to independence was irrelevant and that the only matter of concern was whether the United Kingdom Government itself was prepared to accept and implement those resolutions. His Government was, of course, an important party to all the major discussions and decisions affecting South Arabia and, as the administering Power, it was responsible for such questions as the timing of independence and the way in which it should be achieved. It could not, however, take unilateral decisions and impose them on the whole of South Arabia. It was a basic principle of United Kingdom colonial policy, which was generally accepted in the United Nations, that the transfer of power was a gradual process; legal authority and real political power were first shared and then transferred and, by the time independence was near, the main decisions affecting the future of the territory concerned were in the hands of the local government and people. That was a basic feature of the principle of self-determination. Issues such as whether a particular government or group was or was not fully representative should not now arise since everyone agreed that the main decisions affecting South Arabia must be taken by all the parties, groups and governments in the country in a fully representative conference leading to nation-wide elections.

141. That was consistent not only with the principle of self-determination and United Kingdom policy, but also with the legal and constitutional position. The United Kingdom Government's direct authority in the South Arabian Protectorate outside Aden was limited to matters of defence, external affairs and public service. Consequently, in legal terms also, the decisions and intentions of the Federal Government, which wielded the real authority over many issues, were crucially important. Aden was part of the Federation and everyone in the Territory and in the United Nations agreed that Aden's future was bound up with the future of South Arabia. In any case, under the Federal Constitution many of the most important aspects of the administration of Aden, including internal security, were the responsibility of the Federal Government. Consequently, his delegation could not agree that implementation of the United Nations resolutions was a matter to be settled between the United Nations and the United Kingdom alone, or that (as the Sub-Committee's report asserted) the Federal Government

had no standing in the matter. The Special Committee would remember the statement made at the 1535th meeting of the Fourth Committee on 22 October 1965 by the former representative of Iraq, who had said that those questions could not be decided from afar by the administering Power but must be decided locally on the basis of proper consultative procedures, and had called for the convening of a conference representing all shades of opinion in the territory.

142. The acceptance of the United Nations resolutions by virtually all shades of opinion in South Arabia called for action of various kinds by a number of different parties and authorities. The statements made on 16 May by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and by the United Kingdom Permanent Representative at the previous meeting (see paras. 101-103 above) had shown that his Government's attitude to those aspects of the resolutions was a wholly positive one. Such reservations as it had concerned the timing of implementation rather than the principle, but timing was an important factor and implementation in some respects inevitably depended on the cessation of terrorism and subversion, which were completely pointless and self-defeating.

143. The United Kingdom Permanent Representative had made it clear that his Government accepted any solution of the constitutional problem capable of achieving wide agreement in the Territory and favoured the United Nations recommendations for elections to a representative organ and the establishment of a provisional government for the whole of South Arabia. Other forms of practical acceptance of the United Nations resolutions by the United Kingdom Government were represented by its decisions concerning withdrawal from the base and the return of exiles. Furthermore, the United Kingdom had repeatedly expressed its readiness to implement the provisions relating to the emergency and the detainees as soon as there was satisfactory evidence of the end of terrorism. The United Kingdom welcomed the Federal Government's proposal that a United Nations observer should attend the conference, as also the proposal for a United Nations presence before and during the elections. Before the conference (which was to begin on 1 August) the United Kingdom Permanent Representative would confer with the Secretary-General to determine whether there were other ways in which he could take action to ensure the implementation of the General Assembly resolutions, as requested by the resolution itself.

144. The Federal Government's announcement represented a genuine effort to move forward on the lines advocated by the United Nations and as such should be welcomed. It was now important that all those in South Arabia with a genuine interest in a solution reached within the constitutional framework of the United Nations resolutions should consult together on how this should be achieved. The proposed conference was clearly designed to serve that purpose and his Government earnestly hoped that all parties concerned would take part in it.

145. With regard to the Sub-Committee's visit to Aden, that was a separate issue which if pressed at the present stage would not help in the smooth working out of the implications of the new situation created by the Federal Government's decision. The whole question of such a visit was in any case one aspect of the larger questions that would no doubt be considered at the proposed conference.

146. His delegation would raise no formal objection to the adoption of the Sub-Committee's report if that was the wish of the rest of the Special Committee. Since much of the report involved recommendations addressed to his Government on which he had no opportunity to seek instructions, he would transmit them to his Government if they were approved. Meanwhile, he must reserve his Government's position on the report.

147. The representative of *Iraq*, speaking in exercise of the right of reply, said that, in the statement to which the United Kingdom representative had referred, the Iraqi representative had indeed advocated the convening of a conference, but his delegation and the United Nations had intended that the conference should be organized, not by the Federal Government, but by the United Nations itself, with the United Kingdom assuming special responsibility as the administering Power.

148. The United Kingdom representative had said that the United Kingdom Government's direct authority in the South Arabian Protectorate outside Aden was limited to defence and external affairs and that the internal security of Aden itself was the responsibility of the Federal Government; that was inconsistent with his assertion that his Government would be willing to end the emergency and release detainees when satisfactory evidence was forthcoming that terrorism had ended.

149. The United Kingdom representative had said that independence must be achieved gradually. All opponents of colonialism knew what that formula really meant; moreover, in resolution 2023 (XX) the General Assembly had urged the United Kingdom to take certain important steps "immediately". The Australian representative had said that the problem was basically one of adjusting differences between various Arab groups, but in fact all Arabs agreed that independence must be achieved immediately, and not in 1968. He welcomed the United Kingdom representative's remarks concerning the Permanent Representative's consultations with the Secretary-General and concerning the United Nations presence at the conference and before and during the elections, but the United Kingdom delegation should not forget that the Special Committee and the Sub-Committee on Aden also had a role to play. He supported the USSR and Ethiopian proposals.

150. The representative of *Iran* reaffirmed that in his delegation's view the administering Power should take the steps called for in General Assembly resolutions 1949 (XVIII) and 2023 (XX), with a view to the holding of elections leading to the establishment of a truly representative government which would enjoy the confidence and support of all the peoples of the Territory. He would support the adoption of the Sub-Committee's report on the understanding that the substantive issues would be fully discussed at a subsequent meeting.

151. The representative of the *United States of America* did not oppose adoption of the report which had just been received but expressed his delegation's reservation.

152. The representative of *Italy* said that his delegation had not had time to study the report, but would support its adoption on the understanding that it reserved the right to comment on it at the appropriate time. He agreed with the Danish representative that

the latest developments in Aden, especially the acceptance of a United Nations presence and the convening of a constitutional conference, augured well for the future.

153. The Special Committee decided without objection to approve the report of the Sub-Committee (annex II) and endorsed the recommendations appearing in paragraph 17 thereof, on the understanding that the reservations expressed by members would appear in the record of the meeting.

E. CONSIDERATION BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE

Introduction

154. The Special Committee considered the question of Aden at its 431st, 436th and 441st to 447th meetings held in Africa between 3 and 15 June 1966.

155. In accordance with the provisions of General Assembly resolution 2023 (XX), the Secretary-General submitted a further report to the Special Committee on the question of Aden, on 9 June 1966 (see annex III). The Special Committee had also before it a letter

dated 17 May 1966 from the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland transmitting the text of a statement on South Arabia made by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in the House of Commons (see annex IV).

156. At its 441st meeting, held in Cairo, the Special Committee received a letter dated 11 June 1966 from the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the United Arab Republic (A/AC.109/181) in which he asked to participate in the discussions of the Committee on Aden and South Arabia. The Special Committee decided without objection to accede to that request. The discussions on this item in Cairo were also attended by Mr. Omar A. H. Adeel, special representative of the Secretary-General on the question of Aden (see annex III).

Written petitions and hearings

157. The Special Committee had before it the following written petitions concerning Aden:

<i>Petitioner</i>	<i>Document No.</i>
Nineteen Arab students at the University of Oklahoma	A/AC.109/PET.426
Nine Aden "Ministers of Government suspended by British authorities"	A/AC.109/PET.443
Mr. Hasson I. K. Khan and others	A/AC.109/PET/443/Add.1
"Ex-Ministers and Legislative Council Members" ...	A/AC.109/PET.443/Add.2
Managing Committee of the Civil Service Association of South Arabia	A/AC.109/PET.444
Graduates Congress	A/AC.109/PET.445
Mr. A. M. Nasser, President, Aden Graduates Congress	A/AC.109/PET.445/Add.1
Mr. Mohamed Awad Bin Ladin and others "on behalf of the sons of people of Hadramout residing in Saudi Arabia"	A/AC.109/PET.454
Mr. Faisal El-Haji, President, National Union of Kuwaiti Students	A/AC.109/PET.466
"Families of Detainees"	A/AC.109/PET.467
The Students Union, Aden	A/AC.109/PET.468
Mr. Abdul Qawi Mackawee, General Secretary, Front for the Liberation of Occupied South Yemen (FLOSY)	A/AC.109/PET.469 and Add.1
President and members of Aden Municipal Council..	A/AC.109/PET.470
Two petitions from the Occupied South Arabian Community in Somalia	A/AC.109/PET.478
South Arabian League (SAL)	A/AC.109/PET.480
Mr. Muhammed Ali Al-Gifri, President, South Arabian League (SAL)	A/AC.109/PET.480/Add.1
"Sons of the Arab South at Giamama", Somalia	A/AC.109/PET.482
Mr. O. A. Barnahsoon, Secretary, South Arabian Students Organization (SASO)	A/AC.109/PET.486
Mr. Mohamed Almed Nesf El-Leil, Vice-President, Bihan Youth	A/AC.109/PET.487
Mr. Hussein Omar Ben Sahl, President, South Arabia Youth Organization	A/AC.109/PET.488
Mr. Elwi Omar Ahmed, Representative of the Youth of Dathina in South Arabia	A/AC.109/PET.489
Mr. Ahmed Abdel Hamid on behalf of the Youth Club of the Sultanate of Lahej in South Arabia ..	A/AC.109/PET.490
Mr. Abu Bakr Mohamed Farid Al-Aulaqi, Secretary, Al Awaleq Youth Union in Cairo	A/AC.109/PET.491
Mr. Abdel Wahab Wali, representative of the Sub-beiha Association	A/AC.109/PET.492
Mr. El Sayed Ali Mohamed El Saqqaf, President, Arab Arts Association	A/AC.109/PET.493

<i>Petitioner</i>	<i>Document No.</i>
Mr. Abdullah Abd Rabbo Al-Aulaqi, representative of the Sons of South Arabia in Kuwait	A/AC.109/PET.494
Mr. Awad Abdulla Arashani on behalf of the Southern Yemen Students in Cairo	A/AC.109/PET.496
Mr. Mohamed Abdullah Ogeil, President, Salvation Organization in Aden	A/AC.109/PET.497
Mr. Said Bin Issa Al-Amoudi, representative of the Sons of the Arab South in Hyderabad, India	A/AC.109/PET.498
Mr. Ali A. R. Aswadi, Vice-President, Aden Trades Union Congress (ATUC)	A/AC.109/PET.499
Mr. Abdulla Bakerman, representative of the Arab Socialist Party of Hadramout	A/AC.109/PET.504
Graduates Congress, the Association of Arab Women, the Arab Merchants and the Arab Pioneers Organization	A/AC.109/PET.505
Students League, Belgrade	A/AC.109/PET.506
Movement of Socialist Pioneers	A/AC.109/PET.507
Association of Arab Women	A/AC.109/PET.508

158. The Special Committee heard the following petitioners concerning Aden:

<i>Petitioner</i>	<i>Meeting</i>
Mr. Yislam S. Naashir of the Occupied South Arabian Community in Somalia, accompanied by Mr. Addaini, Mr. Alyafa, Mr. Bamakhramah and Mr. Bin-Gidnan	431st
Mr. Mohamed S. Bawazir of the South Arabian League (SAL), accompanied by Mr. Jamil Y. Abdul-Galil	436th
Mr. Abdul Qawi Mackawee, General Secretary, Front for the Liberation of Occupied South Yemen (FLOSY), accompanied by Mr. Salami, Mr. Magli and Mr. Urregi	441st and 442nd
Mr. Muhammed Ali Al-Gifri, President, South Arabian League (SAL)	442nd and 443rd
Mr. Ali A. R. Aswadi, Vice-President, Aden Trades Union Congress (ATUC)	444th
Mr. Abdullah A. R. Al-Aulaqi, representative of the South Arabian Community in Kuwait	444th
Mr. Mohamed A. Ogeil, President, Salvation Organization in the South of Yemen and Aden Protectorate	444th
Mr. Hussein Omar Ben Sahl, President, South Arabia Youth Organization	444th

159. *Mr. Naashir* said that the Occupied South Arabian Community in Somalia (OSACS), numbering some 25,000 persons, were determined to continue their struggle, by all means, for the sake of the freedom and independence of their country. They were convinced of their right to live a free and honourable life shaped by themselves, to collaborate with their brothers still under the yoke of British imperialism in South Arabia, and to adhere to the lofty principles embodied in the United Nations Charter.

160. In accordance with those objectives, the Community had adopted a resolution on 27 May 1966. That resolution merited favourable consideration, as it concerned the destiny of a whole people, and a problem whose solution would render a great service to the promotion of peace, security and stability in South Arabia.

161. The resolution declared the Community's adherence to General Assembly resolution 2023 (XX) of 5 November 1965 concerning occupied South Arabia, and appealed to all free Member States to take the necessary measures to implement it; emphasized the imperative need for immediate evacuation of the British forces in Aden base and the complete expulsion of the imperialists from South Arabia; strongly

rejected the constitutional proposals presented by the British authorities and opposed the idea of a South Arabian Republic based on them; condemned the imperialistic attempts to disintegrate their homeland by severing the Eastern Protectorates (Qu'aiti, Kathiri and Mahra) from South Arabia and confirmed that they were people belonging to an indivisible nation; denounced imperialistic attempts to terrorize the inhabitants of the Eastern Protectorates by disbanding the nomadic army; appealed to world conscience to do its best to remove political suppression and military terrorism prevalent in occupied South Arabia and to thwart the imperialistic plans to maintain that zone under British domination; declared that there was only one front representing all South Arabian citizens, namely the Occupied South Arabian Liberation Front, which had won the confidence and absolute support of those citizens, and declared that any agreement concluded with any other political body was invalid; confirmed their determination not to recognize any agreement concluded between the governing authorities in the zone and the British authorities, or between either side and alleged dignitaries of the country or so-called chiefs of tribes; strongly opposed any political talks between the heads of nomads or the chiefs of

tribes and any reactionary government or opportunists; demanded the right of self-determination; and fully supported the Somali Republic in its just demands for the return of the occupied Territories, and for the right of self-determination of its people who were under foreign rule.

162. In reply to questions, he said that although the Government of the Federation had declared its acceptance of the United Nations resolutions on South Arabia, nothing had been done to implement them, in spite of the wishes of the people of the country. Political repression existed all over South Arabia but in Aden the population was particularly exposed to danger from the United Kingdom authorities since the town was directly governed by that country. The freedom fighters operated mainly in the mountains.

163. The Aden base was used not only against the people of Aden but also to terrorize other neighbouring Arab countries. In accordance with the principle of "divide and rule", the administering Power was trying to disrupt the unity of the South Arabian people in order to prevent them from attaining their just rights. Citizens of the Territory were forbidden to visit certain areas, where it was believed that bases were being established. In order to stay as long as possible the administering Power was trying to strengthen the position of the puppets of imperialism so as to make them appear as the real rulers of the country.

164. There was only one South Arabian liberation front, representing all the people of the Territory, in which that people had placed its confidence. That was his own party. All parties had combined in the Occupied South Arabian Community in Somalia.

165. *Mr. Bawazir* said that the South Arabian League (SAL), the leading political party in South Arabia, wished to record its gratitude to the United Nations and its Special Committee for their interest and efforts, as well as to the Government and people of Ethiopia for their hospitality.

166. The representatives of SAL had already presented their views on the situation in South Arabia to the Special Committee and to the General Assembly, both of which had adopted a number of resolutions calling for the independence and complete unity of South Arabia and for the transfer of power to the people of that Territory through a freely elected and representative assembly. It was to be regretted that, despite the resolution adopted by the General Assembly on South Arabia on 5 November 1965, the situation in that Territory remained unchanged. The United Kingdom Government—which alone was empowered to implement the resolution under United Nations supervision—had failed to do so, although the resolution had received general acceptance from all other parties concerned. The Federal Government had issued invitations for a conference to be held in August 1966 to study ways of implementing the resolution. However, the United Nations had requested the United Kingdom Government, and not the Federal Government, to implement that resolution. In the name of the South Arabian people, he therefore demanded that the United Kingdom Government accept and implement the terms of the resolution and requested that the United Nations should exercise continuous pressure on the United Kingdom Government to that end. Delay would only result in a bloody conflict, the victims of which would be the South Arabian people. That situation would in turn affect the peace of the

world, and the United Nations would be faced with another crisis which might well require the Security Council's intervention.

167. The state of emergency, imposed in South Arabia on 10 December 1963, still existed. The prisons were full of political detainees and thousands of South Arabians were in exile. Aden, many sections of which had been made restricted areas, had been turned into a military camp for the British Army. South Arabians were living in a state of war, and there was no trace of either democracy or freedom. The United Kingdom had done nothing to create truly representative institutions or to lead South Arabia towards independence. It had kept South Arabia divided, on every plane. For example, the South Arabian army was weak and divided under separate commands. The United Kingdom, as the ruling authority, had even refused to allow qualified military graduates from colleges in Arab countries to serve in it.

168. Expressing the view that a United Nations presence would be essential in South Arabia, both before and during elections, he appealed to the Special Committee to maintain its support for the people of South Arabia in their quest for unity and independence.

169. In reply to questions, he stated that both his party and the Front stood for the same aims and sought the implementation of General Assembly resolution 2023 (XX). All the groups concerned in South Arabia stood for independence.

170. There was unemployment throughout South Arabia. There was mass unemployment in the hinterland of the Protectorates, and a few thousand were jobless in Aden owing to the lack of factories and commercial firms. Although the United Kingdom had held Aden for 125 years, it had not built up a network of schools and colleges to provide graduates for the civil service. Aden would look forward to United Nations help.

171. Since 10 December 1963 British troops had been carrying out arrests and checks among the local population and interning people in prison camps. There had also been air raids on the Amirate of Dhala.

172. *Mr. Bawazir* affirmed that practically the whole population of the Protectorates consisted either of members or of supporters of SAL. In Aden there were over 20,000 members, most of whom were government employees unable to engage in political activities under the present regulations.

173. The Federal Government had been imposed in 1959 and was unpopular. However, the Federal Government had accepted the United Nations resolutions. The United Kingdom should announce its acceptance of the resolutions first, since it was more directly concerned than the Federal Government. His organization considered the United Kingdom Government to be responsible for the South Arabian problem. The Federal Government, which represented only one quarter of the Territory, had sent out invitations to attend a conference starting on 1 August 1966, but it had ignored three quarters of the Territory. Qu'aiti State and the Mahra Sultanate had maintained that the United Kingdom was the only party concerned with the United Nations resolutions and that if the United Kingdom sent them invitations they would send representatives to the conference.

174. *Mr. Mackawee*, speaking on behalf of the Front for the Liberation of Occupied South Yemen (FLOSY), expressed appreciation of all efforts under-

taken by the Special Committee to assist the people struggling for their liberty in South Arabia, in Aden, in the Eastern and Western Protectorates and in the islands of Perim, Kuria Muria, Kamaran and other coastal islands. The geographical boundaries of the Territory, as defined under the United Nations resolution of November 1965, had been of concern to the United Nations since 1952.

175. His people's struggle against foreign domination and against the puppet government backed by the United Kingdom Government in collusion with the sultans and sheikhs, known as the Federation of South Arabia, had the support of local inhabitants, and had forced the régime in power to alter its tactics. FLOSY represented the people of the area, and therefore sought to draw the Special Committee's attention to developments in their situation which had recurred after the adoption of the United Nations resolutions.

176. Emergency rules had been in effect since 10 December 1963, and had been marked by detentions, searches and pillaging. United Kingdom army forces had surrounded whole districts more than ten times in the past year, and had imprisoned people for as long as three months without a trial. Air raids and bombings had left 130,000 women, children and aged men homeless. The children of Rafdan, Dhala, Yafei and Haushabi were deprived of education and medical care. Proof of that tragic situation had been furnished by an eyewitness report after the visit of Algerian, Jordanian and Arab Red Crescent workers.

177. Repressive laws, such as the Industrial Relations Law of 1960, were still in effect, and penalties had been doubled, with dire effects on workers and students. Newspapers had been threatened with the withdrawal of their licences if they published articles showing the sultans or the Federation in an unfavourable light.

178. The National Liberation Front (NLF), the Organization for the Liberation of the Occupied South (OLOS) and many independents, united under the banner of the National Liberation Front with the support of the Arab League, appealed to the Special Committee to take note of the administering Power's incomplete application of the United Nations resolutions, and to use forceful means to procure their implementation. The United Kingdom had only promoted the Federation's acceptance of the resolutions after pressure had been created by the escalation of nationalist activities, after moves had been made by FLOSY to set up a provisional nationalist government, and after widespread support had become known. The Federation's acceptance had been rejected by the Special Committee on the grounds that the United Kingdom was responsible for implementing the United Nations resolutions. In 1965, FLOSY announced its support of all United Nations resolutions and requested that they should be implemented immediately. Evidence to justify that request had been provided by Mr. Harold Wilson before he had become the United Kingdom Prime Minister, by the representative of the Soviet Union (A/AC.109/SR.333), and by the representative of the United Kingdom (A/AC.109/SR.335). The United Kingdom had not announced its unconditional acceptance of the United Nations resolutions, and had not empowered the Special Committee to choose the best measures for implementing them, but had rather insisted upon conducting negotiations with the puppet Federal Government, which was a means of by-passing the resolutions. The sultans who expressed

their adherence to the resolutions thereby manifested their alignment with the administering Power, which sought recognition for them as a *de facto* government.

179. The Minister for Information and Education in the so-called Federal Government had stated in Beirut on his way to London to attend the conference there that he would not discuss any matters concerning defence. On his arrival, however, he had said that he was authorized to state that the true attitude of the Federal Government was that expressed in a letter from Sultan Saleh to Lord Beswick. He read out some extracts from that letter, in which it was stated that it had been agreed that the United Kingdom Government would assist the Federation in its defence. It went on to request that as soon as practicable the United Kingdom Government should convene a conference to fix a date for independence and conclude a defence agreement under which the United Kingdom would retain its military base in Aden.

180. FLOSY urged that the United Kingdom should declare its full adherence to the United Nations resolutions and start implementing them, and that the emergency laws should be cancelled, political detainees released and exiles allowed to return; that the United Kingdom should begin immediate negotiations with the Liberation Front and plan to hold elections under United Nations supervision in the whole area on the basis of direct universal suffrage, in order to form a truly representative provisional government; and that the United Kingdom should negotiate with the forthcoming provisional government and parliament on the eve of their formation in order to surrender its powers to the people.

181. FLOSY requested the Special Committee to condemn the London talks as unfaithful to the will of the people and to the provisions of the United Nations resolutions; to oppose any meeting such as the August 1966 conference which the United Kingdom and the Federal Government aimed to convene under the cover of the United Nations resolutions; to emphasize its condemnation of the existing Constitution which had been imposed in 1959 against the will of the people, and which had been rendered invalid by last November's resolution calling for the abolition of any institutions running counter to the people's free will; to condemn the draft constitution prepared by United Kingdom experts Bell and Hone, whereas the independence constitution should be drawn by true representatives of the people. In that connexion, the speaker referred to the speech of the representative of Iraq before the Fourth Committee at its 1535th meeting on 22 October 1965, and to the United Kingdom experts' report, which stated (in paragraph 18 of the Arabic text) that the existing Constitution did not provide for a representative government. The Liberation Front pledged its respect for and continued adherence to the United Nations resolutions, and considered their application and implementation to be a sound basis for safeguarding the real interests of the people of Aden. It further requested the Special Committee to release a provisional statement condemning the London talks, the proposed August conference, the existing Constitution and the British constitutional proposals.

182. In reply to questions, Mr. Mackawee stated that only 400 out of 1,200 eligible students in Aden had been enrolled in secondary schools in 1965. Medical facilities were confined to one government hospital in Aden State, which was inadequate for the needs of

the whole community. Physicians from other Arab countries had been refused entry permits, for no understandable reason. In the hinterland disease was rampant, and many deaths could be attributed to the lack of proper care. Over 50,000 British military personnel occupied 50 per cent of the area's arable land, without paying for it, and the country's loss was the United Kingdom's gain. The expenditures which might have contributed to Aden's economy went into imported products, depriving local tradesmen of possible profits. The administering Power had not developed local industry or commerce during its 150 years of occupation: the area's natural mineral wealth and harbour facilities had not been exploited for the benefit of the population.

183. He requested that a United Nations mission, not just an observer, be sent immediately to Aden to ensure the implementation of the United Nations resolutions before, during and after popular elections. If a conference was held, it should make preparations for the elections and not merely seek ways and means of implementing the resolutions of the Special Committee or of the United Nations.

184. The acceptance by the Federal Government of the United Nations resolution of 5 November 1965 was in fact a mere dilution of it. There were three parties to the question: the people, represented by the Front for the Liberation of Occupied South Yemen (FLOSY), the United Nations, and the United Kingdom Government as the administering Power. The present so-called Government represented nobody but itself, having no mandate from the people to speak on their behalf. The idea of an observer representing the Secretary-General would be a complete violation of the United Nations resolution, which called clearly for a United Nations mission in the area. He did not see the need for a conference at the present stage, though it might arise later when the administering Power had fully accepted the United Nations resolution, discontinued its repressive actions and released all political detainees. The settling of constitutional questions and the handing over of sovereignty to the people could not be done until after the holding of elections under the supervision of the United Nations mission. The question of studying ways and means of implementing the United Nations resolution was not a matter for the Federal Government but for discussion between the United Nations and the real representatives of the people.

185. The United Kingdom Government, by favouring a conference, wanted to make sure that their friends, with whom they shared mutual interests, entered office. To that end, the participants in the conference had already been "bought" by the United Kingdom Government. It further wished the conference to sanction the constitutional proposals made by the two United Kingdom experts. If that was done, elections would only be held in the State of Aden and not in the hinterland, where indirect elections, through the tribal chiefs, would be held. The result would be that approximately two thirds of those elected would be sultans representing the interests of the United Kingdom Government. Furthermore, a sultan would be appointed as Head of the Republic and would have the right to appoint a Prime Minister of his choice. However, such a conference, even if imposed by the United Kingdom Government, would never meet with success. If sovereignty was transferred to the sultans in the area, there would be much bloodshed. The aim of the na-

tionalist forces in the period 1966-1968 was to dissolve the existing Federal Government, in accordance with the provisions of the United Nations resolution adopted in November 1965. Thereafter, an interim government would be appointed with the approval of the people, until the United Nations mission entered the area and elections were held. The United Kingdom Government's intention was, of course, to guarantee its own interests and those of its traditional friends.

186. The situation had deteriorated since the United Nations resolution of 5 November 1965. About 150,000 United Kingdom troops were scattered all over the country, terrorizing the people, arresting them without reason in the middle of the night, using pressure of all kinds, and in general, creating chaos. The provocations had widened the gap between the United Kingdom and the people of the Territory. The situation could hardly improve unless the General Assembly or, even better, the Security Council, took steps to implement their resolutions. In the State of Aden alone, 159 people had been arrested since 27 August 1964. In the whole area, however, thousands had been detained. In that connexion, he would place at the Special Committee's disposal two documents referring, respectively, to the people concerned and to the treatment meted out to them during their detention.⁷ The number of refugees on the borders between occupied South Arabia and Yemen amounted to 50,000, all of whom were assisted by FLOSY, with the material and financial aid of the United Arab Republic. Assistance was also being sought from other Arab countries and would undoubtedly be forthcoming in the near future.

187. The Industrial Ordinance was still in force and the United Kingdom had so far refused to abolish it. That Ordinance deprived workers of the right to strike, and also of the right to free negotiation with employers. The United Kingdom was attempting to set up splinter movements so as to bring about dissension in the labour movement.

188. Before elections could be held in the Territory, the present puppet régimes must be dissolved. The United Kingdom would then have to accept the United Nations resolutions freely and unconditionally. In that connexion, he drew attention to a statement by the so-called Minister of External Affairs on 14 May, announcing that he and his colleagues would continue in office and would not give up their positions until a fully elected central government came into power. That statement was in flagrant violation of the United Nations resolutions. The Front could not agree to elections taking place under an unrepresentative government. In the past, people had been made to vote under duress and inducements to vote had been offered by United Kingdom officials. The Front insisted that any elections should be carried out under the supervision of the United Nations, not of a representative of the Secretariat, but of a mission from the Special Committee.

189. The question of a truce between the nationalists and the United Kingdom did not arise at that juncture. The people of South Arabia were fighting in self-defence and any advice on ceasing terrorism should therefore be addressed to the United Kingdom; the people of South Arabia could hardly be expected not to defend themselves. If the United Kingdom was serious in

⁷ The above documents have been placed in the files of the Secretariat and are available to members on request.

its desire to reach an amicable solution, the Front would be very willing to co-operate, but for the time being the ill intentions of the United Kingdom were manifest. The struggle of the people could not end until the people's aspirations were fulfilled. The Front desired a peaceful solution, but nothing could be done until the United Kingdom implemented the resolutions of the United Nations.

190. The Federal Government was a complete farce. The Eastern Protectorate had preferred to remain outside the Federation, had refused to attend a Conference called by the Federal Government to be held in August 1966 and had sent a letter saying that they considered it to be unrepresentative. The United Kingdom Government was interested in oil and wished to maintain its interests after independence, and was therefore trying to keep the various parts of the Territory where oil was found outside the Federation. The United Kingdom also wished to keep Aden apart from the rest of the Federation. It might be forced to give independence to Aden, thus splitting the Territory into three, whereas the Front considered it should be unified.

191. The Liberation Front refused compromise solutions. The United Kingdom Government knew that the Front had certain socialist trends which were unacceptable to it, that the Front was progressive, that it would only negotiate on equal terms, and unconditionally, and that it would not accept any future political economic treaties with the United Kingdom. The Front wished for genuine independence and not false independence such as the kind the United Kingdom Government was trying to impose. The Front would continue its fight, and believed the United Nations would help it, because its cause was just.

192. With reference to operative paragraph 12 of resolution 2023 (XX), no assistance had been given by international agencies to the victims of British assaults in the area. It was necessary to have a report submitted in order to know of any progress in the matter, which was so urgent that there should be a resolution including a request for immediate action. He regretted to say that the United Nations shared responsibility for the situation, but was sure that his words would be taken in the right spirit.

193. As to the meaning of "effective presence" of the United Nations in the Territory, he was sure that the Special Committee would help to decide on the details, but the United Nations resolutions called for an effective presence before, during and after the formation of a provisional government. The Federal Government should be abolished before any serious discussion of effective presence. United Nations representatives should effectively take part in all significant occurrences through a transitional period to complete independence in order to obviate any manoeuvres by the United Kingdom Government. Observers alone would not suffice; only an effective presence could foster the free and favourable climate.

194. *Mr. Al-Gifri*, speaking on behalf of the South Arabian League (SAL), welcomed the Special Committee as a body in which oppressed peoples could voice their grievances and relate the story of colonialism in their lands. Those peoples had found in the Committee and in the United Nations General Assembly international support for their just struggle.

195. The historic Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples had

been a turning point in the struggle to eliminate the effects of colonialism and build a better world in which mankind might enjoy freedom, equality, stability and prosperity.

196. It was a source of gratification to him to address the Special Committee again, having done so in Cairo in 1963 and 1964. The Secretary-General of SAL had also addressed the Committee in New York at its session of April-May 1963 and had explained the cause of the Arab South, the true objectives of its people and the history of the liberation struggle of all sectors of the population. The petitioner had also headed the SAL delegation when the case of the Arabian South had been debated during the 1965 session of the General Assembly; and one of his colleagues, Shaikhan Alhabshi, had spoken on behalf of the League before the Fourth Committee, together with representatives of other nationalist movements in the Arab South. At that session the latest resolutions on the Arab South had been adopted by the Fourth Committee, on 3 November 1965, and by the General Assembly with an overwhelming majority, on 5 November 1965.

197. The people of the Arab South were grateful to the Special Committee and the Sub-Committee entrusted with studying the case. The Sub-Committee had presented the case ably and clarified a number of vague points. Its reports, recommendations and suggestions submitted to the Committee had left nothing to be desired from the standpoints of accuracy and sound judgement.

198. The South Arabian League had found great satisfaction in being the first body in that part of the world to have recognized the importance of the United Nations. It had continued its contacts and sent delegations to the United Nations Headquarters since 1959. Moreover, the memorandum submitted to the Special Committee in May 1962 had been the first to be prepared on the case. The League was also gratified that the relevant resolutions adopted by the Committee and the General Assembly had been in perfect accord with the demands of the League.

199. The resolutions adopted by the United Nations approved the aspirations of the South Arabian people to independence, territorial integrity, the transfer of sovereignty and government to the people, and the evacuation of the British base in Aden; and they included a series of steps to be taken to ensure attainment of those objectives.

200. The United Kingdom had adopted a number of measures which the League welcomed as conducive to a satisfactory solution to the problem of the Arab South. Those steps had been the declaration of its intention to grant independence to the Arab South by 1968; annulment of the previous decisions to deport South Arabian nationals; and its declared agreement to the full evacuation of the British military base and the immediate withdrawal of British forces on the proclamation of independence.

201. The people of the Arab South had insisted upon the latter step, since maintenance of the base would prove a stumbling block in the way of an acceptable settlement. However, the United Kingdom had adopted a vague attitude towards the two essential aims of the liberation struggle.

202. The first of those aims was the territorial integrity of the Arab South with full guarantees against any possibility of dismemberment or partition. The

Arab South should therefore consist of Aden, the Eastern and Western Protectorates, and the islands. At present, however, the Arab South was divided into five zones, and the League suspected that the United Kingdom had a hand in the attempts being made in some zones to obstruct South Arabian unification. If the United Kingdom Government had nothing to do with those developments, there remained the undeniable fact that some British officers with direct influence in the area were engaged in activities clearly aimed at obstructing the cherished unity of the Arab South. As long as its actual goal was not dismemberment, the United Kingdom Government should act in such a manner as to dispel any fears that it might be relinquishing moral and international obligations with regard to the unification of the Arab South. The League was afraid that the United Kingdom Government might be aiming to establish a federation of the South Arabian regions in order to maintain the sultanates and sheikhdoms, or a federation consisting of three member states—Aden, the Western Protectorate and the Eastern Protectorate.

203. The second of those aims was that the people should gain sovereignty and the right to hold the reigns of government. The United Nations resolutions had laid down the necessary measures to be taken to attain that. However, the United Kingdom was holding fast to what it called the traditional powers or methods concerning elections, which lent weight to the view that the real objective of the administering Power was to aid its supporters and allies in the Arab South in order to ensure control over the government and the destiny of the country.

204. The United Kingdom's attitude towards those two principal aims was suspicious; and its delay over approving United Nations resolutions was due to its reserve regarding those two important points, as well as its hesitation over the proclamation of full public liberties. The League was inspired with the unshakable faith that the only satisfactory solution in the interests of the South Arabian people was adherence by the United Kingdom to the United Nations resolutions. While considerable progress towards a solution had been made over the previous six months, the decisive factor remained, the question of whether or not the United Kingdom would recognize the United Nations resolutions and its obligation to put them into effect.

205. In March 1965 the petitioner had visited Yemen, which was the centre of the principal commands and sectors of the armed struggle in the Arab South, and a series of small conferences had been held in which those commands had taken part.

206. The outcome of the conferences had been that a popular and democratic basis. There was also unanimous support for the South Arabian League with regard to its political objectives and its plans for bringing the national struggle to a successful issue. The League's political aim was the establishment of a liberated and united South Arabian Republic on a popular and democratic basis. There was also unanimous support for the United Nations resolutions.

207. The commands engaged in the struggle in Rolfan, Dhala, Subbeilha, Upper Yafai and the Sheikdom of Muflahi and Dathina had joined the League and proclaimed their decision in a statement to the Press. It was also noteworthy that the armed commands in Upper Aulaqi, Lower Aulaqi and Lahej

had previously joined the League, while large groups of volunteers had joined in May 1965 from the regions of Dathina, Wahidi and Eastern Radfan. To that could be added the armed command, in the Sultanates of Fadhli and Audhali. It could be said that all the main political and armed commands engaged in the struggle in the Western Protectorate had proclaimed their allegiance to the League.

208. The main item on the agenda of the Asmara conference, which had been attended by most of the organizations invited, had been the cause of the Arab South with reference to the measures to be taken to enable it to attain independence. The conference had also discussed the transition period and had resolved to recognize the United Nations resolutions. The Asmara conference had marked a new and constructive stage in the struggle of the South Arabian people.

209. In March 1965 the representatives of the Government of the South Arabian Federation had consulted with the leaders of the League Party and those of the Front in the border area between the sultanate of Lahej and the Republic of Yemen, the purpose of the Federation Government having been to gain the consent of the League and the Front to the principle of informal meetings in Beirut. The representatives of the League Party and of the Front had agreed to the proposal, but the Front had gone back on its agreement shortly before the date fixed for the conference.

210. The League Party had been in favour of holding such talks for a number of reasons:

(a) The League Party had invariably pursued a positive policy and attacked any negative attitude.

(b) The League Party considered the struggle not as an end in itself but rather as a means of achieving the objectives for which the struggle had been undertaken.

(c) Although the so-called South Arabian Federation consisted of people whose self-attributed status the League did not recognize, it nevertheless represented tribal elements that could not be completely ignored in the quest for a solution to the South Arabian problem.

(d) The task of the League, which was in the vanguard of the people's struggle and was seeking every possible way in which it might succeed in convincing those who had gone astray, or had been misled by others, should induce it to adopt a positive attitude so that, even if it failed to win them all over to its side, it might at any rate convince some of them of the validity of its standpoint.

(e) The League Party, while consenting to hold talks with the so-called South Arabian Federation, had declared in several statements that its consent did not imply recognition, since at that stage the talks were of an informal nature, and also since the United Kingdom, and not the Federation, represented the real force opposed to the nationalist movement in the region.

211. The meetings had continued for a few days with extremely satisfactory results, and agreement had been reached between the League Party and two representatives of the Liberation Front over the need to insist upon full implementation of the United Nations resolutions. At the same time the two Parties had agreed to the principle of further meetings after consultation with the organizations they represented. The League was then able to induce the Gov-

ernment of the South Arabian Federation to declare its agreement to the United Nations resolutions adopted on 5 November 1965, and a statement to that effect was issued on 12 May 1966.

212. At the second Beirut talks the League had warmly welcomed the agreement of the Federal Government to recognize the United Nations resolutions. The only section of South Arabian nationals to oppose them had been the members of the South Arabian Federation Government. With their subsequent agreement, unanimity had been reached and the way to a satisfactory solution was open. The League naturally attached no importance to intentions or motives, but rather to legal rights and to opinions publicly expressed, which were therefore binding.

213. Further meetings and consultations had taken place, and the representatives of the South Arabian Federation had given their formal agreement to a number of points:

(a) The decision taken by the Federation Government corresponded to the unanimous wishes of all sectors of the South Arabian population.

(b) Every effort should be made by all parties to impose upon the United Kingdom its obligation to recognize and implement the United Nations resolutions.

(c) What was said about any vacuum likely to result from the British evacuation of the region was completely groundless, since any such vacuum would be filled by the people of the Arab South themselves.

(d) The matter of signing a defence pact with the United Kingdom did not fall within the jurisdiction of the Federation Government and was a matter to be decided by the national government appointed by the elected constituent assembly. A statement to that effect had been issued by the Federation Information Minister during the talks in Beirut. As representative of the nationalist movement in the Arab South, the League had declared its objection to the idea of having any such pact signed with the United Kingdom.

214. The first and second Beirut talks had secured important gains for the nationalist movement. Those talks, in addition to the Asmara and subsequent Taiz conferences, had constituted a decisive turning point in the cause of the Arab South and the attainment of its nationalist aspirations.

215. The League Party warmly welcomed the decision taken by the United Nations Secretary-General to appoint a personal representative to advise him on matters concerning the Arab South, and fully approved of the appointment of Mr. Adeel. That was a further step in favour of the cause of the Arab South and paved the way for a United Nations presence before and during the forthcoming elections. At the same time, it showed the intention to provide an essential guarantee of the proper implementation of the United Nations resolutions. Furthermore, the choice of Mr. Adeel was a wise one, since he was a national of a sister Arab country; Sudan had deep insight into the cause of the Arab South and was not involved in any of the dissension prevalent there. There were also similarities between Sudan's struggle for independence and the present situation in the Arab South.

216. The League Party represented the nationalist movement in the region and had been in existence for seventeen years. It had been the first body to call for the independence and unification of the Arab South on a popular and democratic basis. It had organized

the people's struggle to attain those objectives, and colonialism had been bringing most of the weight of its attacks against it since 1956 in the form of deportation and oppression.

217. The second nationalist party to be established—the United Nationalist Front—had been founded in 1955 and dissolved in 1957. The third party had been the Aden People's Socialist Party, founded in 1962 and dissolved in 1965. The fourth party had been the National Liberation Front, founded in 1964 and dissolved in 1966. The Front for the Liberation of Occupied South Yemen (FLOS Y) had been founded three months previously by the group represented by Mr. Mackawee.

218. The League Party had passed through most difficult periods in its long life but had invariably emerged firm and strong. It currently represented the most effective force in the Territory. Mr. Mackawee's assertion that FLOS Y was the sole body representing the cause of the Arab South was groundless. The body to represent the Arab South had obviously to be chosen by the people through elections, and it was certainly unwise to make any such premature statement. A previous speaker had said that the Arab League Council and the Arab South Committee of the Arab League had recognized the new Liberation Front as the sole representative of the people of the Arab South. That assertion had been re-echoed by Mr. Mackawee. However, there was no truth in the allegation that the Arab Summit Conferences, the Arab League Council or the Arab South Committee of the Arab League had recognized the new Front as the sole representative of the South Arabian people. As for the reported welcome by the Arab League Committee to FLOS Y, it should be borne in mind that the Arab League naturally welcomed any new participant in the nationalist struggle. Such praise was one thing and recognition of a specific group as the only representative of the people was certainly another.

219. As the Arab South was passing through the decisive pre-independence period, it was incumbent upon the United Kingdom to lend true support to the cause of the Arab South and to avert the danger of civil war by putting the United Nations resolutions into effect. Any attempt to ignore them would meet with the strongest opposition on the part of the League Party.

220. In reply to questions put to him by Members, Mr. Al-Gifri added that the real conflict was between the people of South Arabia and the United Kingdom Government, which should itself convene the conference. The United Nations resolutions were directed against the United Kingdom and not the Federation Government. The SAL believed in unity and had set out its views in a memorandum to the Special Committee in May 1962. Colonialism should be opposed by one front, and any differences should be set aside until later. FLOS Y had been created only a short time previously and had not consulted SAL. SAL opposed the name of "Liberation Front for South Yemen", and held that it was necessary to set up a South Arabian Republic. It did not reject future union with Yemen, but the most important aim was independence. Unification would come later. With regard to the choice between the names of "Arab South" and "South Yemen", FLOS Y had rejected the SAL appellation of "Occupied South", though that name would be acceptable as a temporary compromise solution. A FLOS Y condition for the setting up of a common

front had been the dissolution of political parties. However, those parties had not been set up haphazardly and their abolition would entail a unified ideology. Therefore SAL could not agree to the dissolution of the parties. What was needed was a unified front retaining the parties, and he thought that agreement could be reached before long.

221. He said that he had studied the constitutional proposals submitted by the two British experts. Although skilfully drafted, many of them were not in accordance with the wishes of the South Arabian people. He reiterated that the constitution should only be drawn up by the people's elected representatives.

222. Britain had to declare its acceptance of, and to implement, the United Nations resolution adopted in November 1965. Secondly, an interim government should be appointed for the ensuing transitional period to deal with administrative matters; a provisional constitution would be drawn up for the purpose. Thirdly, the United Nations should play an effective role: a start had already been made with the appointment of Mr. Adeel as the Secretary-General's Special Representative on the Aden question, but the League would like the United Nations to send observers to the Territory to supervise the elections. Lastly, both the police and the armed forces should be represented in the interim government. The League was opposed to any military base or defence agreement and the Federation's representative in Beirut had been informed to that effect. The League had had nothing whatever to do with the London talks, which it considered the Federation Government should not have undertaken.

223. He said that no leadership had been set up in Asmara; steps had been taken to co-ordinate the leadership of nationalist forces in the South, and a group of organizations, which did not in itself constitute an organization, had been formed.

224. The appointment of a United Nations supervisor would ensure a more effective United Nations presence. A further proposal, to be agreed upon by the parties concerned, would be a transition period with a neutral or a coalition government, whose functions would be defined by a provisional constitution. The United Nations presence would guarantee freedom of expression and correct electoral procedures. The final South Arabian constitution should be a progressive, appropriate instrument for a republic; the elections should be direct and general; and the executive, legislative and judicial powers should be clearly defined, as in any democratic and progressive country. As it was not the time for working out details, it sufficed to say that, in general, the constitution should be based on the will of the people. The United Kingdom claimed that there could be no direct elections in the tribal South because the people were illiterate. That, however, was not true. The nationalists opposed the elections based on tribal traditions, and insisted that they should be based on universal suffrage. They would never allow the United Kingdom to succeed in its plans.

225. The League had sent a great number of students to the universities of various Arab countries, which had taken on their training. The League had, in particular, awarded around 500 scholarships to enable students to attend military academies in Cairo and Iraq, whereas the administering Power, in

130 years, had done almost nothing to help students and had enabled scarcely more than fifty of them to obtain diplomas. He hoped that the country's economic activity would not suffer a slump. Every country which acceded to independence had to face economic problems, and South Arabia would be no exception to the general rule. The main thing for the League was to prepare solutions, and it was attending to that. There was in Aden a committee of university graduates and economists which was already engaged in working out the necessary measures. Aden port should remain a free port in the interest of the country's economy. Incidentally, the Territory derived no revenues from the United Kingdom military base in Aden.

226. The South Arabian League was distributing to the population pamphlets on the economic problems, which brought out the fact that the United Kingdom had done nothing to change the current situation. The south of the country could probably be self-sufficient. The whole of the Territory and the Protectorates would still, however, need the assistance of United Nations experts and technicians. The Organization had already promised its assistance in developing the local fisheries, a step which the League welcomed. Again, the League planned to develop the activity of the port and the long-fibre cotton industry. The country would thus be able to face its immediate economic problems upon its accession to independence.

227. *Mr. Aswadi* stated that the Aden Trades Union Congress (ATUC) had 30,000 members, on whose behalf he expressed gratitude for the Special Committee's efforts to end imperialism and to bring independence to the people of South Arabia. He begged the Committee to continue its efforts and to see that the United Nations resolutions were implemented in letter and spirit. The working classes in Southern Arabia were suffering from oppression; the United Kingdom was trying to deprive them of the means of self-expression, and they were not allowed the right to strike. In addition, the United Kingdom was trying to sow dissension among the workers and, indeed, to create a new Palestine.

228. Replying to questions, the petitioner stated that the Aden Trades Union Congress comprised eight unions, representing communications, including naval and air personnel, light industry, shipbuilding, public utilities, central and local government workers, workers at British bases, teachers, bank officials and employees, and workers in the petroleum industry. Since its foundation, the Congress had led the struggle for the liberation of Aden because it had been the only group sufficiently powerful to do so. The Congress had done much in the region to oppose all forms of colonialism. It had foiled conspiracies, held public meetings and demonstrations, and had brought certain problems to the attention of the appropriate authorities. It had certainly not confined its activities to Aden but had been active throughout the Territory. Under the leadership of the Congress, the working class had relentlessly continued its struggle. The Congress had joined the National Liberation Front after the Front had merged with other movements.

229. The administering Power had attempted to launch fictitious trade unions, but had not been successful and those phantom trade unions had not been able to show that they really existed. The Congress was the only representative and responsible trade union organization in the Territory; its influence extended not only to the working class but also to other social

classes and its influence was increasing, despite the machinations of the administering Power and the atmosphere of terror created by that Power. The most powerful trade union movement was in Aden.

230. As soon as circumstances allowed, the Trade Union Congress intended to set up co-operatives and to that end it had sought the advice of a number of experts, mostly from Sweden. It hoped to benefit from United Nations technical assistance. Aden had already been visited by technical assistance specialists. The Congress also wished to establish chemical industries and some Arab and socialist countries had promised that they would help it to do so. In addition the Congress intended to conduct a land survey to determine which areas were suitable for cultivation and could be farmed under a co-operative system. However, although ATUC had already prepared many plans to promote the best interests of the population, it was still waiting for the country to be freed from foreign domination before putting them into effect.

231. The aims of the ATUC and FLOSY were identical: in expressing views of a political nature, always consulted its colleagues in FLOSY; its stand had always been the same as that of FLOSY.

232. *Mr. Al-Aulaqi* said that he represented 10,000 South Arabians in Kuwait, who awaited with interest the Special Committee's recommendations concerning the implementation of the United Nations resolutions. His own organization supported the South Arabian League, which it considered was dealing with its cause wisely and justly. The League was inspired by three principles: liberation of South Arabia from the United Kingdom; unity; and government by the people.

233. *Mr. Ogeil*, speaking for the Salvation Organization in the South of Yemen and Aden Protectorate, thanked the Special Committee for its efforts on behalf of still-colonized peoples. He recalled that, when the United Kingdom had realized that the people of occupied South Yemen were prepared to fight for their rights, it had intimated that it would implement the resolutions of the United Nations. It had not in fact done so.

234. He appealed to the Special Committee to ensure the complete evacuation of the area by imperialists and the dismantling of all military bases, to abolish puppet régimes and colonial structures imposed on the people against their will; to release political prisoners; to abrogate emergency laws; and to express its condemnation of conferences between the Federation Government and the United Kingdom.

235. He had at one time been a member of the South Arabian League, but had resigned from it when that organization began to support puppet governments. Since then he had given his full support to FLOSY.

236. *Mr. Hussein Omar Ben Sahl*, speaking on behalf of the South Arabia Youth Organization wished merely to point out that the protracted struggle of past years could in the future turn into violence. Despite its announcement that independence would be granted in 1968, the administering Power had continued to use repressive methods in South Arabia. It had bypassed part of the United Nations resolutions, which should have served not only as preparation for independence, but also as a solution to the many problems facing the area. The students in South Arabia therefore protested against the Federation Government as a puppet of the United Kingdom. It was not representative of the people, nor was it a real

party in the conflict, but rather a tool. The students of South Arabia believed the area's true representative to be the South Arabian League, which upheld their struggle to promote the independence and peaceful development of all South Arabia.

General statements

237. The representative of the *United Arab Republic* congratulated the Special Committee on the serious and effective manner in which its deliberations were proceeding. He had been greatly impressed by the penetrating questions and intelligent answers which he had heard. His delegation had listened very carefully to the petitioners, all of whom had shown that they wished for an immediate end to United Kingdom rule in the region and for the implementation of General Assembly resolutions 1949 (XVIII) and 2023 (XX). They were aware that the United Kingdom was trying to perpetuate its rule through those elements to which it gave its support in return for services to British interests, and they wished to put an end to those manoeuvres. The petitioners had his delegation's full support, together, he was sure, with that of the Committee and of the United Nations.

238. It had long been obvious to his Government that the administering Power was not only hesitant to co-operate but was actively working to defeat the resolutions on the subject and to perpetuate its domination of the region, for the reasons so clearly given in the statement by the observer for the Arab League.

239. He particularly wished to bring to the Special Committee's attention an item that had appeared in that day's newspapers, according to which the United Kingdom Government had announced in the House of Commons on the previous day a five-year programme of military assistance to the so-called Federation Government in South Arabia. That announcement was the result of conversations concluded the day before with the so-called Federation Government. According to the Press, the British would pay in kind to that Government the equivalent of a sum of \$US50 million over a period of five years. The announcement, made while the Special Committee was studying the question of the occupied South, was not only a challenge to the Committee, but also shed great light on the United Kingdom's plans in the area. It was, of course, necessary for the Special Committee to have first-hand information, and not merely press reports.

240. His delegation considered that the United Kingdom Government, as administering Power, should without delay announce its acceptance of the United Nations resolutions concerning the question of the occupied South, and its willingness to co-operate with United Nations organs in implementing them. That could not be done by welcoming their acceptance by the so-called Federation Government, or by encouraging it to hold a conference in August at which a representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations would be present. The United Nations resolutions did not recognize the Federation Government, but demanded the establishment of a government on the basis of free and general elections. That meant that the present arrangement imposed by Britain in the area should be dissolved to enable the people to lay down a solid foundation for independence and development. The administering Power should desist from trying to force on the region a restrictive agreement such as the so-called defence agreement.

241. The question of the effective presence of the United Nations had been raised during the Special Committee's meetings. It was his delegation's opinion that such effective presence implied United Nations participation in all the steps necessary for the attainment of independence and the transfer of power to the real representatives of the people. It was up to the Committee to determine the freedom of the people, the release of political prisoners, the return of exiles, the ending of the state of emergency, the preparation of voters' lists and the supervision of elections for a temporary government. The United Nations role should also extend to the following up of developments in the region until a government truly representative of the people had been established and all powers had been transferred to it. That was the minimum required to show the United Kingdom's goodwill in dealing with the question. If the United Nations resolutions appeared unclear, the Special Committee could no doubt clarify them by adopting new resolutions.

242. Since the establishment of the effective presence of the United Nations required contacts and discussions with the administering Power, perhaps it would be useful for a sub-committee to undertake such contacts, taking into consideration the views of the nationalists as representatives of the people of the region. For an understanding to be reached, the United Kingdom must announce its unconditional acceptance of the United Nations resolutions and its willingness to co-operate in their implementation. If such an agreement were reached, then concrete proposals for an effective United Nations presence could be drafted; to be effective, that must be done before the next General Assembly.

243. The representative of *Iraq* stated that the Special Committee had often been presented as one of the brightest examples of the success of international effort in the cause of freedom, and its visit to Africa had demonstrated that truth very clearly. Its achievements would perhaps be particularly remembered in connexion with the question of Aden. When it had first been brought before the United Nations three years before, very little had been known about the conditions prevailing in the Territory, the aspirations of its peoples and the hope they placed in the United Nations to deliver them from colonial rule. The Committee had risen to the task, and had been able in a very short time to prove the efficacy of United Nations work in the cause of freedom. A sub-committee had been established to gather sufficient information about the Territory to enable the necessary decisions to be taken. Although it had not been allowed to go to the Territory itself, it had travelled extensively in neighbouring countries and met hundreds of petitioners. The results of its deliberations had been conveyed to the General Assembly in its report and recommendations, which had led to the adoption of General Assembly resolution 1949 (XVIII)—the corner-stone of United Nations action on the problem. It had not confined itself to a mere enunciation of principles regarding the Territory, but had established a system of priorities and dealt with specific questions and details of how the Territory should proceed on the road to independence.

244. That resolution had been reaffirmed and further clarified in General Assembly resolution 2023 (XX) of 5 November 1965; the two resolutions were unique in the annals of the United Nations as a means of providing a rallying cry for the fighters for

freedom. They had been unanimously accepted by all sections of the population of the Territory—a fact that did honour to the Committee and provided proof of its far-sightedness in dealing with the problem.

245. In all such questions, however, the attitude of the administering Power was of paramount importance, and unhappily the attitude of the United Kingdom Government had been less than helpful to the Special Committee. It had prevented the Sub-Committee on Aden from going to examine the situation at first hand, and had resolutely refused to declare unequivocally its acceptance of the United Nations resolutions and its readiness to implement them loyally as a Member of the United Nations. It had not lifted the state of emergency enforced since 1963, it had not abolished the repressive laws and practices that had been condemned repeatedly by the United Nations, and had continued its military actions with great loss of life and property. The Committee's first duty should therefore be to call once again on the administering Power to declare in a clear-cut and straightforward manner its unqualified acceptance of the United Nations resolutions and its readiness to co-operate loyally in implementing them to the full. It was useless to say that the fictitious régime it had set up had now accepted them. As far as the United Nations was concerned, the United Kingdom Government was alone responsible and alone accountable to the international community for its stewardship of the Territory.

246. The United Kingdom Government had stated that it was its policy to grant independence by a certain date, but the problem was what type of independence it would be, and under what conditions it would be granted: would the colonial Power leave behind it a government made up of its friends, who would be at its beck and call and execute its policy, or would it hand over independence to genuine representatives, whose interests were those of the people and not of the colonial Power?

247. Now that the people of the Territory had signified their acceptance of the United Nations resolutions, it was the Special Committee's solemn duty to see that they were fully and properly implemented, and that the independence to be given as a result of them would be a genuine one in which the people of the Territory could enjoy unfettered freedom. It was not enough merely to reaffirm the right of the people to independence and freedom, but it was necessary to find practical measures to ensure that independence was achieved in the best possible circumstances. That could best be done under the terms of the original resolution, which had stipulated that the holding of general elections under United Nations supervision should be preceded by the immediate lifting of the state of emergency, the abolition of the various repressive laws and regulations, the halting of the military operations against the people of the Territory and the abolition of the present constitutional institutions, with a view to establishing a provisional government during the transitional period.

248. Referring to the reported defence agreement mentioned by the representative of the United Arab Republic, between the United Kingdom Government and the Government of the South Arabia Federation, he said that the question was a very serious one that merited the Special Committee's attention, since there was a danger that the liquidation of the military base in Aden might be nullified by the linking of the newly independent State to the United Kingdom in

defence matters, thus perpetuating British influence in the Territory. It was important for the Committee to follow the matter closely, since it might have the most serious consequences on the future of the Territory.

249. The representative of *Tunisia* stated that by reason of its history, its intensity and its effects, the problem of Aden and the South Arabian Protectorates was a purely colonial problem. In deciding to give all its moral and material aid to peoples struggling to obtain independence, Tunisia, which had itself suffered under colonialism at one time, had no ulterior motives of ambition or expansion. It was merely carrying out what it held to be the urgent duty of every State worthy of the name.

250. Furthermore, the Tunisian delegation had always maintained that it was in the interest of the administering Powers themselves to promote decolonization. Everyone knew that no Power could maintain a government, however strong, for long, if that government was not supported by the mass of the people.

251. To most people, the mere mention of Aden brought to mind the presence of the United Kingdom military base. A military base implied a situation of force, with all the repression, destitution and total lack of progress which that involved. For that reason, he wished to thank the Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs for his important statement and to assure the population of Aden of Tunisia's fraternal support.

252. The representative of the *United Republic of Tanzania* said that once again the Special Committee was called upon to deliberate on the question of the very serious and dangerous situation existing in Aden, or rather South Arabia. The very fact that it was discussing the problem again spoke volumes for itself, as it revealed the belligerent and persistent manner in which British colonialism was trying to cling to the land of the Arab people. Hence, while the pertinent facts of the situation in South Arabia would be taken into full perspective, it was necessary to proceed with deep analysis of the situation in its entirety.

253. The question of colonialism was a classic question. The problem of the specific question before the Special Committee, that of British colonialism in South Arabia was thus no less classic than in all other parts of the world, and it must therefore be approached from all the angles.

254. The question of colonialism was a classic one because of the many manoeuvres it tried to adopt. Those, however, could be seen in South Arabia in the form of dividing the anti-colonial forces. Thus the British colonial forces were trying to exploit the feudal forces so as to remove the feudal rulers from the legitimate desires of the masses of the people, and found it convenient to align themselves with their people, who were fighting for the legitimate independence of their Territory.

255. But in order to attract those feudal forces, the colonial authorities had tried to create fictitious enemies for them. By doing so the colonial authority sought to isolate the people of South Arabia from the rest of Arab nationalism. That had been tried in Africa, and it was still going on. But he wished to assure the people of Aden that their future hopes and security would definitely lie in their co-operation with the rest of the Arab world. For while his delegation admitted that colonialism was nothing but a passing phase, it could not see how South Arabia would remain a

water-tight enclave in a sea of Arab nationalism. It wished to reaffirm that history had not provided examples of that nature; on the other hand, however, there were several examples to show how necessary it was for the people of South Arabia to be in line with the rest of the Arab world. For example, in Africa that necessity had been shown by the creation of the Organization of African Unity (OAU). Thus, any attempt to isolate an African country from the OAU would be almost the same as an attempt to isolate South Arabia from the rest of the Arab world. Both of those attempts are doomed to failure. The desire for regional unity was prevalent in many parts of the world. It was seen in Africa, in the form of OAU, in Latin America, and in Europe. It would therefore be folly on the part of the South Arabian people if they allowed themselves to be isolated from the rest of the pan-Arab world.

256. From the evidence at hand, it was clear that the situation in South Arabia since the adoption of General Assembly resolution 1949 (XVIII) had been deteriorating at a very rapid pace. That was, of course, factually so despite the declarations by the United Kingdom Government that South Arabia would gain its independence not later than 1968. It was hence imperative to analyse why, despite such sweet-sounding declarations, the United Kingdom Government had been continuing its repressive colonial policies.

257. *The Washington Post*, on 1 January 1964, had stated that British policy in Arabia was based on two interrelated factors—those of oil and so-called defence. That was the crux of the question. As his delegation always maintained, colonialism and the subjugation of lands did not arise on the adventurist whim of some person. Colonization of lands arose out of calculated economic aims. The Middle East was one of the richest oil-producing areas in the world. It was perhaps in their lust for that important product that the British forces had committed aggression and colonized South Arabia to use it as a vantage point.

258. With regard to the aspect of so-called defence, the United Kingdom had found in Aden a strategic point. Due to the heroic stand of the people of the United Arab Republic, the British had been forced out of Suez and had retreated to the colony of Aden. It was also because of the gallant struggle of the people of Iraq that the British had been forced to move out of that area. And again they had retreated to their colony of Aden. In both cases the freedom and peace-loving peoples of those lands, pursuing their correct and legitimate desire for peace and the continuation of their liberty, had refused to allow the British to use their sovereign lands as staging areas and consequently to place their own freedom and peace in jeopardy.

259. He had drawn that illustration to afford better appreciation of the legitimate struggle of the heroic people of South Arabia to defeat the forces of British colonialism in their motherland. The struggle that that gallant people was waging was a necessary struggle, fully in keeping with the gigantic efforts of the freedom-loving people of the world to achieve freedom and peace with dignity. The evidence at hand showed that increasingly the United Kingdom, while making sweet-sounding declarations regarding the future of the Territory, was at the same time taking further suppressive measures against the nationalists of South Arabia.

260. By the adoption of resolution 1949 (XVIII), and later of resolution 2023 (XX), the General As-

sembly, correctly considering that the maintenance of the military bases in that Territory was a major obstacle to the liberation of South Arabia and prejudicial to the peace of the area, had called upon the United Kingdom Government to effect their immediate removal. His delegation had supported General Assembly resolution 1949 (XVIII) which, among other things, had called for the removal of the military bases in Aden. Its support for that resolution stemmed from a basic fundamental principle—that in the world today the installation of military bases in other people's lands was not only outmoded, but indeed created a danger to the very people among which such a base was installed; and above all it created a danger to the neighbouring States. For that reason, his delegation, both in the OAU and in the United Nations, had opposed the creation of a military base in the Indian Ocean adjacent to the coast of East Africa.

261. That was the principle that guided his delegation on the question of military bases. It had welcomed the declaration by the United Kingdom Government of the removal of the military base in Aden, and had seen in it a great amount of wisdom on the part of the United Kingdom Government, although of course, it would have liked to see the implementation of it much earlier than 1968. It was, however, dismayed to learn that the removal of the base in Aden would indicate a transfer of it to another part of the Arab world within the region of South Arabia. It could not see the reasoning for the removal of a base in Aden followed by its installation within that same region. To put it in simple language, it was like taking the number plate of a car from the front and installing it at the back. He appealed to the United Kingdom Government to listen to world public opinion. His delegation sincerely believed that the same reasons that had made it remove the Aden base should be those that should prevent it from restoring such a base within that area. It further strongly believed that the sooner the British realized that fact the better would be their relations with the pan-Arab world. The whole basis of the United Nations Charter was for the people of the world to live in peace and friendliness with one another, with mutual respect and understanding.

262. There were, however, those who argued on the economic importance of the base to the area. To those he would simply say that it was the end that justified the means and not the means that justified the end. After all, it could not be denied that that base had been responsible for many military operations, as stated by the petitioners, resulting in the death of many innocent citizens. Furthermore, if the people of South Arabia had been able to live before that base had been installed, they would certainly do so with even better prospects after its removal.

263. It was true that the United Kingdom Government had stated that South Arabia would achieve independence by 1968. His delegation was strongly in favour of the independence of South Arabia, and strongly opposed to the criminal subjugation of a people by any colonial Power. His country knew full well how cruelly it hurt. From its own experience as well as from the experience of the gallant people of South Arabia, it was still wary despite such declarations. It must be realized that the best disposed to call for independence of South Arabia were the true people of that country, who had very eloquently stated their position: independence without delay.

264. Analysing the actions of the United Kingdom since it had made that declaration on the future of South Arabia, he said that the working paper prepared by the Secretariat (see paras. 4-58 above) showed that on 25 September 1965 the United Kingdom Government had wanted only to suspend the Constitution of Aden, and had vested virtually omnipotent powers in the colonial Governor. That meant that the United Kingdom Government, while declaring itself to be preparing to leave South Arabia, was at the same time seeking all possible means to create the conditions for controlling the Territory in the future.

265. That fact has been clearly recognized by the majority of Members of the United Nations, as shown by the adoption of General Assembly resolution 2023 (XX). Operative paragraph 4 of that resolution was a clear-cut expression that needed no explanation, and it led to the very important question of what was to happen to Aden or South Arabia after independence. All repeated that the future of South Arabia inevitably lay in the unity of the people freely expressed within the meaning of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV). Thus, any attempt to divide the people of Aden through the use of feudal and traditional rulers would certainly lead to future troubles. Therefore, independence under a régime that did not fully recognize the resolutions of the United Nations was bound to lead to future instability in the area.

266. That brought him to the question of the attempt on the part of the United Kingdom Government to deceive world opinion. The United Kingdom Government had publicized a so-called declaration of intention (see annex IV) by the local unrepresentative régime to adhere to the various United Nations resolutions on South Arabia. That was the height of hypocrisy and cynicism on the part of the United Kingdom Government. So far as the United Nations and the United Republic of Tanzania were concerned, the United Nations resolutions on South Arabia were to be respected and implemented by the United Kingdom Government as the administering Power, and not by a régime installed by the administering Power through the suppression of the genuine representatives of the masses of the people struggling for independence.

267. His delegation had been very surprised to see that the Aden authorities had made themselves the laughing-stock of world public opinion. The resolution did not in any way or in any paragraph indicate either directly or indirectly its recognition of the Aden authority, so that while that authority might be the transitional authority the fact remained that only the United Kingdom was responsible for the implementation of the United Nations resolutions. He failed to see the motives behind such ill advice from the administering Power to the authorities in Aden on such a simple and obvious matter. It was therefore equally unfortunate that the authorities in Aden should have fallen victims of the obvious.

268. His delegation would be quite happy to welcome a declaration showing that the United Kingdom Government was fully and faithfully implementing the provisions of General Assembly resolutions 1949 (XVIII) and 2023 (XX), which contained the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. It was his delegation's strong belief that it was by the faithful implementation of those resolutions that favourable conditions would be created for the achievement of genuine and unfettered independence of South Arabia.

269. There were today two major ways in which colonialism could be eradicated from the world: first, the road of persuasion and of world public opinion, which was the road that the United Nations had chosen to follow. That road had led to the establishment of the Fourth Committee and the Special Committee. Thus, the colonial Powers were daily urged to give up their colonies and to lay down a programme for their independence, subject to the conditions laid down in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV). That was what was needed for the people of South Arabia. The second road was that of a bitter struggle—a struggle whose history had to be written with the blood of the freedom fighters. Those were the two ways open to the cause of decolonization. He was sure many peace-loving people of the world would prefer the Special Committee's work accomplished by the first method. But the United Kingdom seemed not to see reason, and forced the people of Southern Arabia to resort to an armed struggle. The accumulated frustration of the colonized people left no alternative but to fight to the bitter end. That had happened in Algeria, Kenya and many other parts of the world. It was happening now in Aden because of non-cooperation of the United Kingdom Government.

270. He gave solemn warning to the colonial Powers to listen to reason and thus avert the shedding of blood. But it was his belief that there was no price that the people of Aden would not pay to free their country from colonialism. He was sure that he would be expressing the sentiments not only of the United Republic of Tanzania but also of the peace-loving peoples of the world in saying that they would be free; the colonial Powers could not change the course of history. History was on the side of the people of Aden and victory would be theirs.

271. He would like the freedom fighters who had appeared before the Committee to know how strongly the Special Committee supported their struggle as a moral and legitimate one entitled to moral and material support. Colonialism was a dying horse and it had to kick hard. It must be faced by the united force of the masses of the people of South Arabia. The adage "divided we fall, united we stand" was a universal one, and very common among the Arab people. They were a common people, with a common and legitimate goal, the complete liberation of South Arabia. The Special Committee would do its part, and was certain they would do theirs. Because the struggle they were waging was a just struggle, it would be crowned with victory, in which would be achieved the elimination of the system of exploitation of man by man, for the progress of the nation in unity, liberty and peace.

272. He reaffirmed to the petitioners that whatever resolutions the Special Committee might adopt, it would be guided by the wishes of the people of South Arabia expressed through their leaders who had appeared as petitioners. He wished the people of South Arabia God-speed in their struggle towards independence.

273. The representative of the *Union of Soviet Socialist Republics* stated that the USSR steadfastly maintained its position of support for the colonial peoples' struggle for liberation. Proceeding from that position of principle, the Soviet Union supported the just claims of the population of Aden and South Arabia to freedom and independence and also their right to decide for themselves the question of their future governmental structure. The Soviet Union delegation had

supported General Assembly resolutions 1949 (XVIII) and 2023 (XX), both of which set forth specific ways of leading to independence the peoples of South Arabia, who were now under colonial oppression.

274. It was quite clear that the interests of the administering Power and those of the inhabitants were diametrically opposed: while the United Kingdom was concerning itself with the interests of imperialistic international monopolies and was also pursuing its own strategic military aims, the people of Aden were suffering cruel oppression. They were fighting for independence under the direction of the Liberation Front, which had been recognized by a great many national and international organizations. While the Liberation Front was fighting for the interests of the people of Aden and the entire Arabian Peninsula, the so-called Federal Government was selling out the people's interests and trying to arrange an agreement with the United Kingdom colonialists. The disgraceful spectacle performed in Aden had been written in London. The so-called Federal Government, which now asserted its intention of accepting United Nations resolutions had been silent for two and a half years. It was not for that Government, which represented nobody, but for the administering Power, to accept the resolutions of the United Nations.

275. According to the information provided in the statements of the Acting Secretary-General of the League of Arab States and in the statement made by the Chairman of the Liberation Front on 11 June, the Federal Government was committing new crimes and had entered into secret negotiations with the United Kingdom Government in order to protect itself through the assistance of the United Kingdom against the wrath of the people and, in return, to help the United Kingdom retain its influence in Aden and the Protectorates.

276. In resolution 2023 (XX), the General Assembly had deplored the attempts of the administering Power to set up an unrepresentative régime—the Federal Government. The methods used by the United Kingdom colonialists in Aden could be compared to those which they were using in Southern Rhodesia. The United Kingdom Government was trying to impose a government of puppets in Aden and South Arabia, as it had done in Southern Rhodesia.

277. The constitutional conference which was to take place in Aden at the beginning of August was simply a further manoeuvre through which the United Kingdom hoped to evade its responsibilities and obstruct the implementation of the United Nations resolutions. How could that conference take any decisions in the interests of the population of Aden when all those taking part were lackeys and henchmen of the United Kingdom? The Special Committee should vigorously express its opposition to that conference and declare that it ran counter to paragraph 4 of the General Assembly resolution on Aden. It should demand that the administering Power should suspend the state of emergency in the Territory, evacuate the military bases at Aden and in other parts of South Arabian territory, release the detainees and give the people the opportunity to express themselves freely concerning their future governmental structure.

278. The United Kingdom representative had stated on 16 May 1966 in New York that the abolition of the state of emergency depended on the disappearance of what he called "subversion" within the Territory. How could the just activities of patriots fighting to defend the interests of the entire people be described

as "subversion"? Their actions were lawful, while the actions of the United Kingdom violated the Charter of the United Nations and international law. United Kingdom policy in the area was based on a desire to safeguard the United Kingdom's economic interests, particularly the interests of the petroleum monopolies, and to retain control of Aden, which was a strategic base of the highest importance. The facts made it clear that the United Kingdom's assertion that it would evacuate the base of Aden after granting what it called "independence" to the Territory in 1968 was insincere and that the United Kingdom was sure of being able to sign the necessary agreements with the puppet Government to enable it to retain its influence in the area.

279. The Special Committee should request the General Assembly to include in its agenda and give serious consideration to the question of military bases, which the colonialists were using practically all over the world in order to continue their imperialistic policies and to oppress the peoples that opposed their imperialistic actions.

280. The representative of *Mali* said that the question of Aden and the Protectorates was one of the most serious of the colonial problems which had been before the Special Committee for several years. He thanked the Government of the United Arab Republic for having enabled the Special Committee to enter into contact with the true sons of Aden and the Protectorates and he pointed out that, if the administering Power had been more co-operative and had not prevented the implementation of the resolutions of the Special Committee and of the General Assembly, the Special Committee would in fact have met in Aden.

281. The Government of Mali regarded Aden and its Protectorates as a colony and remained convinced that the responsibilities of the United Kingdom Government to the people of the Territory were those set forth in Chapter XI of the United Nations Charter.

282. That primary responsibility of the United Kingdom Government had been demonstrated with specific examples by the petitioners who had appeared before the Special Committee from the Liberation Front and the South Arabian League. Their statements had shown the negative aspects of traditional colonialism with all its consequences, which were creating continuous tension in the area of South Arabia. The foreign presence in Aden represented a danger to the neighbouring States, and in particular to the sovereign State of Yemen. He wondered how the United Kingdom could justify the maintenance of its military base in Aden other than as a means of aggression against the Arab States.

283. Every time the Special Committee considered the situation in a territory under United Kingdom domination, it encountered the same difficulties: the maintenance of aggressive military bases against the will of the population of the territory, the frenzied exploitation of the country's natural resources and often, as in Southern Rhodesia and Aden, the setting up of a police régime backed by puppets representing only United Kingdom interests.

284. Instead of co-operating with the United Nations and complying with General Assembly resolutions 1949 (XVIII) and 2023 (XX), which urged in particular the dismantling of the military base at Aden, the administering Power was establishing illiterate feudalists, sheikhs and sultans, who did not even know how to sign their names, in the Territory.

285. He shared the view of most members of the Special Committee that resolution 1514 (XV), which set forth the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, should be implemented forthwith in Aden and the Protectorates. The people of Aden had a right to the support of the Special Committee, whose duty it was to reaffirm their inalienable right to self-determination and independence.

286. He supported the petitioners' demands regarding the steps which the administering Power should take to restore the situation in the Territory to normal. Those steps were: to abolish the state of emergency, to repeal the laws providing for exceptional measures and all laws restricting public freedom, to cease all oppressive actions against the people of the Territory, to end the bombings, to release all political detainees and to allow the return of political exiles. Those steps were the minimum required to restore normal conditions in the Territory. In addition, the United Kingdom as the administering Power should hold free elections under United Nations supervision. It would then rest with the representatives of the people, elected by universal suffrage, to choose and draw up a constitution. He was opposed to the convening of the constitutional conference that was scheduled for August, since the preparation of a constitution for the people of Aden was not a matter for United Kingdom experts, and such a conference would not serve the interests of the population.

287. The petitioners had stressed the need to abolish the micro-States known as "sheikhdoms" and had asked for the establishment of a genuinely unitary modern and democratic State. He supported that idea and considered that the United Kingdom should be invited to change the present political system in Aden and to grant immediate independence to the Territory. It should also abolish the micro-States and dissolve the Federal Government, which consisted of sultans, since that Government represented nothing.

288. The representative of *Bulgaria*, summing up the situation, said that, firstly, the United Kingdom had not responded positively to General Assembly resolution 2023 (XX) and was trying to impose a puppet government in Aden and the Aden Protectorates in order to maintain its influence in the area. Secondly, the nationalist and patriotic forces fighting for the independence of their country had closed their ranks and were carrying on a stubborn struggle against colonialist oppression. Thirdly, the petitioners of the Liberation Front had stressed the importance which they attached to an effective United Nations presence during the period of the elections, so that the elections would take place in an atmosphere of freedom and would lead to the transfer of power to the representatives of the people, elected by universal suffrage. Fourthly, the petitioners had drawn attention to the danger which the existence of military bases in Aden and in the territory of South Arabia represented to international peace and security, a danger to which the Special Committee should draw the attention of the Security Council.

289. He had been impressed by the wise statement of the representative of the United Arab Republic, who had given a remarkable analysis of the dangerous situation in the Aden area and had made some realistic and extremely sensible suggestions to the Special Committee. He agreed with the representative of the United Arab Republic that the United Kingdom's attitude to the United Nations resolutions

was a challenge to the Organization and that the Special Committee should ask the United Kingdom to comply with those resolutions at once and to co-operate in the restoration of the legitimate rights of the people of Aden. Furthermore, the Special Committee should give close consideration to the detailed and specific proposals put forward by the representative of the United Arab Republic, for they could serve as a basis for the organization of an effective United Nations presence before, during and after the elections and until power had been transferred to a representative government elected by the people of Aden.

290. The representative of *Sierra Leone* recalled that in August 1965 the United Kingdom had pledged independence for Aden by 1968 and dismantlement of the military base. However, it was important to know what sort of independence was contemplated; for the petitioners had pointed out that nothing was being done to implement General Assembly resolutions 1949 (XVIII) and 2023 (XX) calling for the abolition of the emergency regulations and consequent restrictions and repression, as well as for the release of political prisoners and the return of exiles. The petitioners had also spoken of the need for a United Nations presence, which should be brought out in any resolution drafted by the Special Committee on the question of Aden. Observers should be sent to ensure that no puppet régime usurped the right of the people to choose their political course in freedom. The Committee had to remind the administering Power of its duty to the inhabitants and to the United Nations. The United Kingdom should, if it had no manoeuvres to conceal and nothing to fear, declare its acceptance of the relevant United Nations resolutions in accordance with the wishes of the people. Since the administering Power was signing agreements which would set a virtual stranglehold on the political and economic life of the area after "independence", the time for action had come.

291. The representative of *Denmark* said that the main problem was that of securing for the people the exercise of self-determination, which in nearly all cases would be a natural adjunct of independence. The situation in Aden and South Arabia was, however, an atypical one; for all those concerned, including the administering Power, had agreed that South Arabia would be independent. However, the petitioners and many representatives on the Special Committee had expressed fears that it might be an independence without self-determination and under a régime not enjoying the confidence of the majority of the people. His delegation held that South Arabia should be independent and, anxious to see genuine independence, was in full agreement on the essential points with the representatives of the nationalist movements, and, he was sure, with all members of the Special Committee.

292. The representative of *Poland* said that, although the question of Aden had been dealt with on a number of occasions by the General Assembly and the Special Committee, the situation in the Territory had deteriorated considerably and continued to be a source of tension throughout the region. That was due to the policy of the administering Power, which consistently disregarded the aspirations of the people of Aden and the South Arabian Peninsula for genuine independence, and failed to co-operate with the United Nations and the Special Committee in the faithful implementation of the General Assembly resolutions on Aden. The United Nations wished to put the relevant resolu-

tions into effect and enable the people of Aden to decide upon their country's future.

293. The members of the Special Committee were aware that General Assembly resolutions 1949 (XVIII) and 2023 (XX) not only set forth the principle of self-determination and independence in accordance with the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, but also outlined the procedure to be followed. Moreover, it was apparent from the statements of the petitioners who had appeared before the Committee in Mogadiscio, Addis Ababa and Cairo, that the United Kingdom was refusing to comply with the decisions of the United Nations. In fact, the state of emergency was still in force, public liberties had been virtually abolished and the number of political prisoners had increased, as had repressive action, military expeditions, the bombing of villages and the killing of innocent inhabitants. Furthermore, in committing all those brutal acts against the legitimate owners of the land, the United Kingdom was trying to present the national liberation movement in the Territory as a terrorist group. There was nothing new about that; for the history of colonialism had shown that repressive measures adopted against nationalist movements or democratically elected governments were always self-defeating and that the colonial Powers tried to represent all genuine freedom fighters as terrorists. Many of the present leaders of newly independent countries had once been considered terrorists by the United Kingdom and had even served prison sentences. The Polish people had no doubts about the ultimate victory of the liberation struggle being carried on in Aden and the South Arabian Peninsula, and wished to express their solidarity with the aims of the Front for the Liberation of Occupied South Yemen (FLOSY) and to congratulate its members on their achievements in uniting all the patriotic forces of the Territory genuinely interested in the freedom and independence of their motherland.

294. Mr. Mackawee had described the threat to politicians who refused to collaborate with the administering Power and obey instructions running counter to the interests of the people. The petitioner had also explained how the United Kingdom, in refusing to allow general elections, intended to rely on its traditional servants—the sheikhs and sultans, to ensure its hold over the country after the ostensible granting of independence.

295. The policy of the administering Power could not deceive anyone. The United Kingdom was trying to maintain its colonial rule in the face of United Nations resolutions, since it considered the area to be of vital importance to its selfish economic, political and strategic interests. It was particularly anxious to protect the large oil refinery in Aden and to keep control over the existing and potential resources of the Territory, and particularly to prospect for oil in the eastern Protectorate. It was in order to safeguard those interests that the administering Power used force to suppress national resistance and resorted to such other manoeuvres as the imposition of the so-called Federation of South Arabia, which was, of course, a puppet régime.

296. In declaring that the Federal Government accepted the United Nations resolutions on Aden, the administering Power wished to point to the existence of a government representative of the country as a whole. However, his delegation fully shared the opinion already expressed in the Special Committee that, so

far as the United Nations was concerned, the Government of the so-called Federation of South Arabia was not a proper constitutional government. Indeed, General Assembly resolution 2023 (XX) rejected that Government in deploring, in operative paragraph 4, the attempts of the administering Power to set up an unrepresentative régime in the Territory with a view to granting it independence contrary to General Assembly resolutions 1514 (XV) and 1949 (XVIII), and appealed to all States not to recognize any form of independence not based on the wishes of the people of the Territory freely expressed through elections based on universal adult suffrage. In fact, the resolutions of the General Assembly and the activity of the Special Committee were directed precisely against the existence of the Federation. It was the duty of the Special Committee to denounce the convening of a conference by the Federal Government ostensibly to study the United Nations resolutions and agree upon the best means of putting them into effect. It was for the United Kingdom to accept those resolutions and implement them without further delay. It was also incumbent on the United Nations and the Special Committee to ensure that sovereignty was transferred to the people and the unity of the Territory preserved after 1968. Furthermore, independence should be preceded by general elections under universal adult suffrage and conditions of freedom, which could best be ensured by a United Nations presence before, during and after the elections.

297. The representative of *Iran* welcomed the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the question of Aden, Mr. Adeel, whose appointment was the first essential step towards the establishment of an effective United Nations presence in the Territory of Aden. His delegation wished to express its appreciation to the Secretary-General for taking that important step in implementing General Assembly resolution 2023 (XX) of 5 November 1965.

298. It appeared that imperialism had once again succeeded in driving a wedge between various nationalist movements in South Arabia. It was regrettable that the many elements which, until a few months previously, had appeared before the Fourth Committee at the twentieth session of the General Assembly as a united front, should subsequently have become divided into various splinter groups. The fight against colonialism required all the strength that a nation could muster, and division despite unity of purpose and despite the approach of independence was a sorry reflection of the deteriorating situation in Aden since the revocation of the Constitution in September 1965. Iran had been a co-sponsor of General Assembly resolution 2023 (XX), which had deplored the attempts of the administering Power to set up an unrepresentative régime in the Territory with a view to granting it independence contrary to General Assembly resolutions 1514 (XV) and 1949 (XVIII). However, the United Kingdom had gone a step further in consolidating the position of a régime which did not enjoy the support and confidence of the people.

299. His delegation maintained that the full realization of the inalienable right of the people of South Arabia to freedom and independence could be attained only through the establishment of a truly representative government and firmly believed that it should be left to the people in the Territory to decide freely who should represent them. Therefore, a United Nations presence to supervise the elections was of the utmost importance

If the people were to express themselves freely, it was essential that conditions favourable to a peaceful transition should be established in the Territory long before the holding of elections. The United Kingdom should take immediate steps to abolish the state of emergency, repeal all laws restricting public freedom, cease all repressive action against the inhabitants of the Territory, release all political detainees and allow the return of political exiles. Only under such conditions could the various political parties attempt to enlist public support. Without the freely expressed wishes of the population, no group, party or front could claim to be the sole representative of the people. While it was the responsibility of the administering Power to create the conditions necessary for all political parties to enjoy freedom of expression, it was also the duty of the responsible Adeni leaders and parties to inform the public of their views, plans and objectives.

300. He wished to associate his delegation with the plea for unity made to the petitioners and freedom-fighters by the representative of the United Republic of Tanzania, and to reassure the people of South Arabia of the full support and sympathy of the Iranian Government for their just cause. He concluded by wishing them every success in the establishment of a truly representative government capable of securing and guaranteeing the independence and freedom of the people of South Arabia.

301. The representative of *Venezuela* said that, during its first visit to Cairo four years earlier, the Sub-Committee on Aden had heard an impressive number of petitioners. It might have been thought at that time that the administering Power would have bowed to the facts and implemented the United Nations resolutions. Four years later, the situation in Aden had not improved; it might even be said to have deteriorated. That situation was characterized by what might be called a dialogue of the deaf: on the one hand, the United Nations made recommendations relating to the implementation of resolution 1514 (XV), and, on the other, the administering Power continued to carry out measures which were in direct contradiction with those recommendations. Contrary to the unanimous wish of the people and despite the recommendations of the General Assembly, the administering Power had set up a so-called Federal Government which excluded most of the territories dominated by it. It had refused to hold free elections and was concerned only with its own interest. In response to the appeals made to it to restore calm, the administering Power merely intensified its military operations and continued to imprison citizens of Aden. The Special Committee was therefore forced to conclude that the administering Power took no account whatever of the General Assembly's resolutions.

302. In a letter of 25 May 1966 addressed to the Secretary-General, the so-called Federal Government stated its intention of accepting the United Nations resolutions relating to South Arabia. In his view, the only purpose of that letter was to delude the United Nations and world public opinion into believing in the legitimacy of that Government. To accept that letter would be to give implicit recognition to that Government and to divest the United Kingdom of its responsibilities. The General Assembly, however, had always addressed itself expressly to the United Kingdom and not to that Federal Government.

303. Like all other peoples who were or had been subjected to colonial domination, the people of Aden and the Protectorate had a right to self-determination.

They must not, however, be granted a spurious independence through the transfer of power to a Government which was merely a creature of the administering Power. That Government in no way represented the interests of South Arabia. In order to determine who were the legitimate representatives of that Territory, numerous consultations would have to be held between the representatives of all shades of public opinion and the Special Committee.

304. He was convinced that the General Assembly and the Special Committee could not change their attitude at the present stage. The United Nations must call upon the United Kingdom to discharge its obligations and to protect the people of the Territories under its administration, in accordance with resolution 1514 (XV).

305. The representative of *India* said his delegation had hoped that after so many United Nations resolutions the United Kingdom would have paid attention to international opinion. He had been disappointed in his expectation that after the general election in the United Kingdom the situation might have changed for the better. The British styled themselves as champions of democracy, but the absence of the United Kingdom representative revealed the true worth of that assertion.

306. He was naturally gratified that Aden was to receive its independence, but that gladness was tempered by his fear of manoeuvres on the part of the administering Power and by his awareness of the ruse of puppet régimes. The Arabs had not had justice over Palestine, and the situation in Aden was a fresh setback. If the administering Power had nothing to conceal, there could surely be no objection to letting the United Nations make an on-the-spot investigation.

307. The representative of *Syria* said it was clear that the administering Power was not only ignoring United Nations resolutions on Aden but was, in many instances, acting contrary to them. It had not set the immediate date for independence requested by the United Nations, but the date that suited its sinister purpose of further sowing division in the country, and further consolidating its grip over its vital interests through a totally unrepresentative, subservient, so-called Federal Government that was a government only in name.

308. It was not releasing political prisoners but increasing their number, and the modest figures given by the United Kingdom representative in New York had been belied by the concrete testimony of the petitioners. It was not lifting the state of the emergency, but aggravating its aspects. The arrest of nationalists, ex-ministers, dignitaries, and of other innocent patriotic people, during the night, the ruthless manner in which their homes were searched, and their families treated, were by now legend.

309. It had been convenient for the administering Power to justify its repression by what it called terrorism and violence. The conquest of the Territory, subjection of its people, plundering of its resources, the sinister policy of keeping the population poor and ignorant, all this is not violence in the eyes of the administering Power, but a civilizing mission. But when patriots struggled to attain their freedom, questioned the imposed foreign rule, or denounced puppet tribal oddities collaborating with the invaders, they became gangsters and terrorists.

310. He did not consider that the conduct of the United Kingdom was an isolated instance, or motivated

by special circumstances. Rather, it was a long-standing, deliberate policy not applicable to Aden alone, but to the whole Arab world. For long ago, and this has not changed through the years, the United Kingdom had inflicted disaster upon disaster on the Arabs, freely disposing of sacred portions of their lands, impeding their renaissance, obstructing their unity, strengthening, as in South Arabia, certain outdated tribal dispositions to keep them in complete ignorance and subjection. The United Kingdom made the permanence of its imperialist interests and the guaranteed control of the Arab resources conditional upon keeping the Arabs in an inferior status—ignorant, confused and divided.

311. As to the promise of independence in 1968, the official spokesman of the administering Power made it conditional upon a return to normal conditions. Slogans such as "normal conditions" and "public safety", so often reiterated by representatives of the administering Power mean only that the Arabs of South Arabia should forget about foreign intrusion into their area, acquiesce to the dictates of the British Governor, declare their allegiance to the local Government he chooses, not the one they choose, accept foreign exclusive monopolies of resources and prospection for resources, collaborate in the maintenance of military bases in their area, serving purposes contrary to their vocation for peace and brotherhood, and if such bases are dismantled, acquiesce in the construction of new bases at their proximity, in the land of their brothers and cousins. If they fulfil all this, they would be independent by 1968. If such were the conditions of independence, the South Arabians had better gain their independence by their struggle than accept it as charity from suspicious hands. His own country was not deceived by the promise of independence for Aden by 1968, which it considered would be colonialism in yet another disguise. It was resolved to resist the setting up of further basis in Arab lands, which was contrary to the spirit of the United Nations Charter.

312. The representative of *Yugoslavia* recalled that the question of Aden had been on the agenda of the General Assembly and of the Special Committee for several years and that both bodies had adopted a number of resolutions requesting the administering Power to implement General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV). That Power had over a year before been requested by the Special Committee to convene a conference of representatives of all sections of public opinion to decide on the necessary constitutional measures for holding elections by universal adult suffrage. The General Assembly, in resolution 2023 (XX), had deplored the administering Power's refusal to implement its previous resolutions and its attempts to set up an unrepresentative government in the Territory.

313. The evidence of the petitioners showed that the situation in the Territory was still explosive: the state of emergency was still in force, the population continued to be repressed, discriminatory laws were still practised and the number of persons arrested and detained was increasing.

314. It was true that the administering Power had declared its intention of granting independence by 1968 and of dismantling its military bases. However, such declarations, if unaccompanied by concrete measures to set up a representative government, were in vain; and no evidence of such measures was forthcoming. On the contrary, the administering Power was encouraging the so-called Federal Government to con-

vene a conference, and it had been reported that it was also signing a defence agreement with the Federation. Such a step could only lead to further tension in the area.

315. In the opinion of his delegation, the United Kingdom Government was alone responsible for implementing the United Nations resolutions. As the latest report of the Sub-Committee on Aden had pointed out, the so-called Federal Government had no standing in the matter. If the United Kingdom sincerely wished for a solution of the problem, it should convene a conference of representative sections of the population to decide upon methods of transferring the power to the people. However, before that could be done the necessary climate must be created by ending the state of emergency, releasing political prisoners and repealing discriminatory laws.

316. The representative of *Chile* said that his delegation had, as always, followed the discussion on the question of Aden with the greatest interest. The Chilean position regarding the desire of the people to liberate themselves from the colonial yoke and to form a government representing the majority was well known.

317. He noted that in questioning the petitioners, the Special Committee had been primarily concerned with finding new means of ensuring the prompt implementation of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV). There had been no recent progress in the situation in Aden and the Protectorate; on the contrary, all indications were that if the administering Power did not attempt to give effect to that resolution, the situation in the Territory would inevitably deteriorate further.

318. By announcing that it would grant the Territory independence by 1968, the administering Power had, on the whole, complicated the problem for the Special Committee, which found itself obliged to redouble its efforts in order to prevent an imminent catastrophe. The members of the Committee would all recognize that it was impossible to grant independence to the Territory in its present situation. There was no question of putting off the date of independence, but it was important to ensure that everyone had an opportunity of taking part in elections based on universal suffrage, concerning the Territory's future. General Assembly resolution 1949 (XVIII) specified the role that the administering Power should play in that respect, but the latter had not been as co-operative as it would have to be if the impasse was to be resolved.

319. He assured the petitioners and, through them, the people of South Arabia as a whole, that his country continued to be interested in their cause and that it hoped the plan of action decided upon by the Special Committee would produce the desired results.

320. The representative of *Ethiopia* stated that the real interest of the people of Aden could only be ensured if the United Nations moved to avert the disaster of British colonialism. The era of colonialism was past, and the United Kingdom should make preparations for speedy withdrawal.

321. Ethiopia had many links with that area, for the Gulf of Aden had been a point of confluence for migrants for thousands of years. For that reason the question of Aden was of particular concern to his delegation, and it had listened with interest to the petitioners' statements. However, individuals, prominent though they might be, were no substitute for a nation, and he wished to emphasize that it was not the

Special Committee's function to choose leaders; that would be the prerogative of the people of Aden in free elections. Victory could only be achieved by a co-operative effort, and he hoped that victory could be attained without further bloodshed.

322. The representative of *Australia* said that, although his delegation had tried to isolate the facts of the Aden situation, it remained confused not only with regard to the situation but even with regard to the area involved, which seemed to vary according to the person talking about it. He therefore wished to make it clear that he was talking of the area of the Federation itself, including Aden, and those Protectorates or smaller units that had not joined the Federation.

323. The elements of the situation seemed to be the presence of the United Kingdom, principalities and powers of varying sizes, conflicting claims by Arab elements in the Territory; violence; a unified State said to be sought by all the parties concerned; an understandable desire on the part of the Arabs for cohesion with the larger Arab world; and a firm pledge by the United Kingdom to grant independence by 1968. To those elements should be added the announcement by the Federal Ministers of their acceptance of the Special Committee's resolutions; an admittedly not unequivocal declaration by the United Kingdom in that connexion; and recent reports of a defence agreement between the United Kingdom and the Federation.

324. General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) had emphasized self-determination or independence in accordance with the freely expressed wishes of the people. It was not the Special Committee's task either to seek to perpetuate the rule of the various sovereigns or to try to end it; that was a matter for the people concerned. His delegation accepted the United Kingdom's assurance of independence by 1968 and viewed the interim task as one of preparation for that independence. However, factions with differing objectives had emerged, and his delegation could not at that stage decide which of those factions was representative of the wishes of the majority of the people in the area. It could not reject the recent declaration by the Ministers of the Federation that they wished to implement the resolutions of the United Nations. It also accepted the reality of the Federation, whose Ministers were not, it considered, the faceless men that some of the petitioners had suggested.

325. The representative of the *Ivory Coast* recalled that the question of Aden had been on the Special Committee's agenda for several years and that the General Assembly had adopted several resolutions on the subject. He deplored the fact that the administering Power had paid so little attention to the resolutions calling for the abolition of the state of emergency, the repeal of repressive legislation, the cessation of military operations against the people of the Territory and the return of political exiles. Instead of holding elections based on the principle of universal suffrage, which would have made possible a restoration of law and order, the administering Power was supporting a régime spurned by the population as a whole, as had been pointed out by the petitioners.

326. His country could not lend its support to a régime that was hostile to the people. His delegation therefore reaffirmed the right of the people of Aden and the Protectorate to self-determination and independence, and urged the administering Power to give

effect as speedily as possible to the General Assembly resolutions, which all sections of the population had approved. It also appealed to all the nationalists of Aden to unite in the struggle against the common enemy and thus ensure the triumph of justice and freedom.

327. The representative of the *United States of America* expressed her Government's sympathy for the legitimate aspirations of the people of South Arabia to govern themselves, and wished them success in the difficult task of building their future.

328. The last statement made to the Special Committee left little room for optimism, as terrorism and violence, instead of constructive preparations for independence, prevailed in the area. However, there were now some prospects for solving the differences and achieving a greater degree of unity. All the petitioners had stressed the imperative necessity for political unity, without which independence would be meaningless. However, that unity could not be imposed by any outside government or by the United Nations but had to be achieved by the people themselves.

329. The United Nations could facilitate progress towards that goal, and it was encouraging to learn that the Secretary-General had appointed a special representative on the question of Aden to assist him in carrying out that task.

330. The discussions on the question of Aden had provided further evidence of the serious political and economic problems to be solved, and the United States welcomed the fact that the people would soon be able to tackle those problems themselves—a development for which a large measure of credit was due to the administering Power. The responsibility of the United Nations was, first, to help the people achieve political unity in a democratic and representative framework and, secondly, to seek ways and means of ending the violence and bloodshed. The United States had no preconceived notions of how these objectives should be arrived at; its primary concern was that the solution should reflect the interests of all the people in the area.

331. In conclusion, with the date of independence for South Arabia approaching, its Government believed that all should work to bring about the birth of the new State in peace and tranquillity. The Special Committee could make an important contribution towards that goal by maintaining a fair and objective view of the situation and offering practical and constructive counsel to those who were seeking the welfare of the people and peace in the area.

332. The representative of *Italy* stated that his delegation had been led, by the experience it had acquired through its long association with the Special Committee, to conclude that the problems of decolonization could be divided into three categories: first, cases where the methods and objectives of the administering Power differed from those set out in the United Nations Charter and in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), and which consequently conflicted with the practices of the Special Committee—as in the case of South West Africa; secondly, cases where the administering Power agreed with the Special Committee on the long-term objectives but differed on the short-term objectives and the best means to achieve them—as in the case of Southern Rhodesia; and, thirdly, cases where the administering Power and the United Nations shared the same long-term and short-term ob-

jectives, but differed on the practical measures to implement them. In his delegation's view, Aden fell into the third category.

333. All were aware of the decision reached by the United Kingdom to grant independence to the Territory by 1968, and of its intention to dismantle the military bases, although the removal of the bases was not an indispensable factor in the process of decolonization.

334. The situation in Aden, so far as the constitutional development was concerned, did not appear as dark as some speakers had depicted it. All were agreed that the elections before independence would have to be free and organized in such a way as to reflect the main trends of opinion, and that a United Nations presence would be necessary to act as a stabilizing influence in order to avoid any outbreak of violence and assure genuine independence. Extensive consultations and negotiations would be necessary so that all sections of the population might agree on their future constitution. Finally, the country would also need economic and technical assistance from the United Nations. There was very little disagreement on those points.

335. The representative of *Syria*, in exercise of the right of reply, said that the United States representative had alluded to the great problems and complexities surrounding the Aden question and had gone so far as to give credit to the administering Power, despite the fact that no solution had been reached and that there had been no general elections to set the country on the path of democracy. A high tribune of wisdom and moderation was of no avail without action.

336. The representative of *Iran*, speaking in exercise of the right of reply, said that in the course of the Special Committee's proceedings on the question of Aden reference had been made to Bahrein as being an Arab land. In the interest of the smooth conduct of the Committee's proceedings he had, with great difficulty, refrained from availing himself of his right of reply. Since the Special Committee had then reached the end of its work, he wished to reserve his delegation's right with respect to both the future status of the Territory and to the right of reply which his delegation would use in due course. For the moment he wished merely to say that such claims on Bahrein, which happened to be an integral part of Iran, had no basis in international law, history, or the ethnic origin of the inhabitants of the Territory.

F. ACTION TAKEN BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE

337. At the 445th meeting, the representative of *Iraq* introduced a draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.309), co-sponsored by Afghanistan, Ethiopia, India, Iraq, Mali, Sierra Leone, Syria, Tunisia, the United Republic of Tanzania and Yugoslavia.

338. In introducing the draft resolution, he drew particular attention to operative paragraph 11 as the key point of the resolution.

339. The representative of the *United Republic of Tanzania* said that the best way in which the Special Committee could express its sentiments was to formulate them in a resolution like the one before it.

340. The present authorities in Aden did not represent the opinion of the people, and his delegation supported the opposition expressed in the draft resolution to any move by the administering Power to support a non-representative Government.

341. Operative paragraph 1 of the draft resolution sought to reaffirm the inalienable right to freedom and independence. To fortify that paragraph his delegation also strongly supported operative paragraph 8. Operative paragraphs 4 and 5 made it clear that the Special Committee would be opposed to anything the United Kingdom Government might do to circumvent the United Nations resolutions. So far as his delegation was concerned, the conference proposed to be held in Aden in August 1966 would be null and void, because the authorities there were incompetent to implement the resolutions. With regard to operative paragraph 11, his delegation expressed its gratitude to the Secretary-General for having appointed a special representative on the question of Aden, and hoped that on his return he would convey to the Secretary-General the Special Committee's view that the action envisaged in operative paragraph 11 should be taken with all the urgency it deserved. He hoped it would be possible to report to the General Assembly at its twenty-first session with regard to the Special Committee's recommendations.

342. The representative of *Bulgaria* stated that the draft resolution would have the support of his delegation, since it openly condemned the constitutional conference scheduled for August. In particular, he supported paragraph 11, which was an important step towards defining the part which the United Nations would be called upon to play in the Territory.

343. At the 446th meeting, an addendum to the draft resolution was circulated on behalf of the co-sponsors (A/AC.109/L.309/Add.1).

344. The representative of *Denmark* stated that his delegation was not convinced that the approach recommended in the draft resolution was the best, nor was even appropriate. He disagreed with the description of the situation given in the fifth paragraph of the preamble and in operative paragraph 10. The situation was not so serious, as far as its implications for the peace of the area were concerned, as to justify the call upon the Security Council. Operative paragraphs 2 and 6 gave a somewhat one-sided picture of the situation. He did not see what was to be gained by such a procedure. His delegation could not support the appeal made in operative paragraph 9, since it might apply to assistance in acts of violence. The struggle for freedom and independence in South Arabia could still be carried on round the conference table, rather than in the street or in the mountains. Therefore, his delegation could not agree with operative paragraph 5.

345. Operative paragraph 12 had to be considered in conjunction with operative paragraph 8 of General Assembly resolution 1949 (XVIII) and operative paragraph 13 of resolution 2023 (XX). In the first resolution, the Secretary-General was requested to arrange, in consultation with the Special Committee and the administering Power, for an effective United Nations presence before and during elections; but in the second, the Secretary-General was requested to take such action as he might deem expedient to ensure implementation of the resolution. The General Assembly had thereby laid the main responsibility on the Secretary-General, whose first step had been to appoint Mr. Omar Adeel as his Special Representative on the question of Aden. His delegation welcomed the choice of Mr. Adeel. Furthermore, the Secretary-General, in his report (see annex III), had stated that in the light of the report which his Special Representative would submit on the Special Committee's present discussions, he would consider the further steps to be

taken in consultation with the Special Committee and the administering Power, all in accordance with the General Assembly resolutions. His delegation was therefore of the firm opinion that the Special Committee neither could nor should try to anticipate and influence the further measures to be taken and thereby bind the hands of the Secretary-General. The directives given to the Secretary-General in operative paragraph 12 could also be taken to imply a lack of confidence in him. That certainly could not have been the intention of any of the co-sponsors of the draft. In view of all those considerations his delegation would be unable to support the draft resolution.

346. However, it fully associated itself with the appeal for unity among the nationalist movements in South Arabia made by the representative of the United Republic of Tanzania on the previous day. That appeal was far more responsible than the expressions of support for one political faction given by a few delegations. It could never be to the advantage of the people of South Arabia to play up differences, which should be ironed out as soon as possible.

347. Although his delegation would have preferred the Special Committee to have made a more positive and imaginative approach than the draft represented, Denmark still had faith in the effective role which the United Nations could play in the attainment of genuine independence by South Arabia. Provided that there was goodwill on all sides, the United Nations could, through co-operation between the Secretary-General, the Special Committee and the administering Power, work out arrangements which would lead to the attainment of genuine independence by South Arabia in an orderly and peaceful manner. His delegation would do its utmost towards that end.

348. The representative of *Poland* said that his delegation welcomed the inclusion in the ten-Power draft resolution of operative paragraph 11, and attached particular importance to the steps to be taken by the administering Power as set out in operative paragraph 7. The military base should be dismantled in order to foster a climate of freedom and do away with that springboard for aggression against the Territory and other countries. The announcement by the United Kingdom Government that it would dismantle the Aden base was inconsistent with the new so-called defence arrangements that the administering Power contemplated, or had already concluded, with the unrepresentative régime. His delegation strongly opposed any such arrangements and could only consider them as a serious impediment to the free exercise of sovereignty in liberty. It would therefore welcome the inclusion in the draft resolution of a new paragraph dealing with that particular aspect of the problem. His delegation agreed with the aims of the draft resolution and would vote in favour of it.

349. The representative of *Iran* said that his delegation would have been glad to sponsor the draft resolution before the Special Committee. Indeed, it had been a sponsor of the original draft distributed on the previous day. Although it had some reservations about operative paragraphs 5 and 11, it had refrained from taking a strong stand because it wished to give priority to the views of the Arab representatives. However, since his delegation felt that operative paragraph 5 reflected the views of only one set of petitioners at the expense of the other major group, it could not adhere to it.

350. He wished to submit formally two amendments to operative paragraph 11: to insert the words "and such personalities as he may deem fit" after the words "... special mission to Aden composed of member States of the Special Committee ..."; and to amend the last phrase to read "and to report back to him as soon as possible". Those amendments would bring the resolution into line with General Assembly resolutions 1949 (XVIII) and 2023 (XX). Otherwise, his delegation fully supported all the provisions contained in the draft resolution.

351. The representative of *India* was puzzled that some people had said that the draft resolution contained nothing positive. For one thing, it appealed to all States to render all assistance to people of the Territory in their efforts to attain freedom and independence. One delegation had opposed the principle of aid by all States; yet it raised no particular objection to the assistance afforded Southern Rhodesia.

352. The conference mentioned in operative paragraph 5 certainly was not that contemplated in the United Nations resolution. However, the manoeuvres of the United Kingdom would not succeed. The Special Committee had confidence in the Secretary-General, and meanwhile the only possible measure was to adopt the resolution. He hoped that the petitioners would therefore be patient and not resort to other means.

353. The representative of *Afghanistan* said that Aden was a purely colonial issue and the administering Power was solely responsible for unconditional implementation of the United Nations resolutions and for guaranteeing the Territory's progress towards self-determination. It must cease military operations and ensure democratic elections; those elections could, he thought, best be supervised by the United Nations, as called for in paragraph 11 of the draft resolution.

354. The representative of *Yugoslavia* stated that his delegation considered that the Special Committee's duty was to suggest appropriate measures to find a peaceful solution to the difficult problem of Aden, and for that reason it had co-sponsored the draft resolution.

355. The representative of *Chile* stated that his delegation had carefully examined the draft resolution, particularly paragraph 11. A United Nations presence in the Territory, as requested by all the petitioners, was the only means, as everyone recognized, of inducing the administering Power to take measures consistent with the genuine participation of the people in the electoral consultation recommended by the United Nations. The other elements of the draft resolution were not new; all of them had already been included in previous resolutions on the question and expressed the Special Committee's concern at the administering Power's failure to respond to the resolutions already adopted by the United Nations. Therefore, prompted by a sincere desire for an end to the colonization of the Territory, the Chilean delegation would support the draft resolution.

356. The representative of *Australia* said that his delegation considered the words "... arising from the policies pursued by the administering Power of the Territory" in the fifth preambular paragraph of the draft resolution to be at the least an over-simplification. While admitting that United Kingdom statements on the question of Aden following the recent declarations of the Federal Ministers were not unequivocal, it felt that the sixth preambular paragraph, which read as follows: "*Deploing* the refusal of the administering

Power to implement the resolutions of the General Assembly concerning the Territory of Aden and Aden Protectorates", was premature at that time.

357. Concerning operative paragraph 2, his delegation could not agree with the statement that the administering Power had set up an unrepresentative régime with a view to granting it independence contrary to the provisions of the General Assembly resolutions, and reiterated its belief in the paramountcy of the wishes of the people as freely expressed through elections held under universal adult suffrage. It was also in disagreement with operative paragraph 5, and considered operative paragraphs 6, 7, 8 and 9 to be an over-simplification of a complicated matter. It was deeply interested in operative paragraph 11, while doubting whether it was rightly worded.

358. At the 447th meeting, the representative of *Iraq* introduced a revised text of the draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.309/Rev.1), which contained two changes. After operative paragraph 5, a new paragraph had been inserted which began, "*Deplores* any defence arrangement that the United Kingdom Government might enter into ...". That paragraph would prove useful in stipulating that such arrangements should be entered into only by sovereign States, and not by an administering Power and unrepresentative Governments. It would have served no purpose to bind the Territory to a Power that had ruled it for nearly 130 years.

359. The second change appeared in operative paragraph 12 (formerly paragraph 11). The revised text did not specify the composition of the special mission to Aden, as it had been felt that the Secretary-General should not be limited to the States members of the Special Committee in determining the membership of the mission but should be given greater latitude. The change had been made on the basis of the provisions of General Assembly resolution 2023 (XX) which, *inter alia*, urged the Secretary-General "to take such action as he may deem expedient to ensure the implementation of the present resolution and report thereon to the Special Committee"; and had also taken into account the intentions of the Secretary-General as expressed in paragraphs 6 and 7 of his report (see annex III). In carrying out the mandate given to him under the relevant resolutions, however, it was felt that it would be useful for the Secretary-General to be given some guidance by the Special Committee in the new task he was to undertake.

360. It was also essential, in order to assure the success of the special mission envisaged in operative paragraph 12, that before it started its work in the Territory, the United Kingdom Government should comply with the provisions contained in operative paragraph 3, and co-operate with the United Nations in the implementation of the relevant General Assembly resolutions. In that connexion, it was hoped that the Secretary-General would underline the imperative necessity for the administering Power to pave the way for the special mission by declaring its acceptance of the relevant resolutions and its willingness to implement their provisions. The mission's work would otherwise be seriously hindered and hampered.

361. In appointing the special mission, it was hoped that the Secretary-General would consult the Special Committee and convey its views and observations to the special mission, as the future of the Territory would depend upon the success of the work achieved. It was also hoped that the Secretary-General, in ap-

pointing the members of the special mission, would include members of the Special Committee, whose experience would be invaluable. In discharging its task the special mission should not limit its consultations to the administering Power but should attempt to consult as wide a cross-section of the population as possible, choose the best ways and means for undertaking such discussions, and extend these consultations outside the Territory wherever possible. It was hoped that when the special mission had accomplished its task and submitted its report, the Secretary-General would include his own observations and recommendations in transmitting it to the Special Committee. The special mission should be set up as soon as possible and proceed to the Territory without delay. In spite of the little time available, it was hoped that the report would be made available before the forthcoming session of the General Assembly, while it was, of course, left to the special mission to determine when and how it could submit its report.

362. Finally, the Sub-Committee on Aden would maintain its *status quo*, since no decision had been taken to dissolve it; its terms of reference would remain unchanged. The special mission's task was very different and of a particular nature, with a well defined mandate to determine United Nations participation in the forthcoming elections in the Territory. The Sub-Committee on Aden would continue to provide the Special Committee with information concerning any new developments in the Territory.

363. The representative of *Madagascar* said he regretted not having been in a position to co-sponsor the draft resolution, which had been submitted by ten members of the Committee, particularly since the text was broadly in accordance with his delegation's position on the question of Aden. His delegation had always warned the United Kingdom against holding elections which would not bring into power a government reflecting the popular will. It had appealed to the United Kingdom to implement resolution 1514 (XV), and it favoured the transfer of power to a government elected by the people. For all those reasons, it fully endorsed the provisions of paragraph 8 and the text of the draft resolution as a whole, although it had some reservations regarding paragraph 5. That paragraph took a position on a matter which could be regarded as purely private. The Special Committee should consider whether the conference referred to in paragraph 5 was at odds with the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly. Presumably it was not, except that the invitation was not issued by the administering Power. The Special Committee could protest to the United Kingdom Government and stress that it was not acting in accordance with United Nations resolutions, but it could not take a position favouring private groups. His delegation found the other provisions of the draft resolution satisfactory.

364. The representative of the *United States of America* stated that in the past her delegation had been unable to support a number of resolutions because it had considered that they lacked balance and failed to reflect the true situation. Those resolutions had condemned the United Kingdom for taking measures to suppress the acts of terrorism and violence without condemning the acts themselves. Also, they had called for immediate independence but had not mentioned the progress made towards that goal.

365. Her delegation was unable to support the present draft resolution for similar reasons. It ap-

pealed to the United Kingdom to end the military and civil measures but failed to deplore the acts of terrorism and violence which caused the United Kingdom to take such action. There was no mention of the progress already made towards independence nor recognition of steps taken by the Secretary-General in carrying out the mandate with which he had been entrusted.

366. Her Government welcomed the efforts made by the United Kingdom and the Federation Government and their willingness to accept the United Nations resolutions. It did not accept the argument that all those who disagreed with a certain course of action should be defined as true patriots and those who agreed as mere puppets, and it therefore could not dismiss as "mere British manoeuvres" actions aimed at the peaceful and democratic settlement of differences.

367. The representative of *Italy* considered that in the draft resolution the situation had been assessed through a certain perspective, with which his delegation was unable to agree. The United Kingdom had been shown as violating the United Nations resolutions, engaging in terrorism in the area and endangering world peace. It was not the Special Committee's task to apportion right or wrong, to establish who was responsible for the situation of unrest, to determine whether the United Kingdom had exceeded its lawful powers in maintaining law and order in the Territory, or to decide on the status of the wars of national liberation within the framework of the United Nations Charter, the essence of which was the solution of political differences by peaceful means. Those were highly controversial issues on which it would be difficult to arrive at a generally acceptable solution. However, his delegation felt that the draft resolution did not reflect the realities of the situation and would reserve its position.

368. Secondly, his delegation did not think that the Special Committee was empowered to or that it ought to take sides on matters of detail, for example, by recommending that a specific course of action should be followed in the implementation of the General Assembly resolutions or that certain consultations take place. In the past the Special Committee had often heard that the independence to be granted to a certain territory was not "genuine". The Special Committee had not interfered in the internal affairs of those Non-Self-Governing Territories and would be well advised to adhere to that practice in considering the question of Aden.

369. His delegation could not support operative paragraph 5, which ran contrary to the necessity to secure a large measure of agreement by all sections of the population. They had to be satisfied with the fact that the general elections would be held under United Nations guarantee and it should be left to the members of the National Assembly to prepare a new constitution without insisting on prerequisites and preconditions.

370. Thirdly, his delegation believed that it would be necessary for the United Nations, through the Secretary-General, to play a vital role in the peaceful attainment of independence by South Arabia. It did not think, however, that operative paragraph 11, even in its proposed revised form, would facilitate that task. He very much doubted the Special Committee's competence to give guidance to the Secretary-General and to indicate specific ways and means of implementing

the task assigned to him by the General Assembly. He also feared that the paragraph might be interpreted as intended to limit the scope of action by the Secretary-General, and as an implied lack of confidence in his judgement.

371. Although there was a remarkable measure of agreement concerning the merits of the matter under consideration, his delegation regretted that it would be unable to support the draft resolution for the reasons he had given.

372. The representative of the *United Republic of Tanzania* felt duty-bound as one of the co-sponsors of the draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.309/Rev.1) to explain his delegation's position. Neither of the two representatives who had opposed it had been able to support any other resolution dealing with the independence of Territories under foreign administration. Strong words had been exchanged: certain delegations had condemned the refusal of others to support the draft, and two representatives had in turn found fault with the resolution, and hence with its co-sponsors, for aspects that they had deemed inappropriate. Firstly, they had regretted the lack of a paragraph thanking the Secretary-General. That had been an unfair criticism, as every member of the Special Committee had expressed appreciation of the Secretary-General's action and had welcomed Mr. Adeel to the Committee room. It had been impossible, however, to incorporate that appreciation and that welcome into the resolution, because the Secretary-General's Special Representative was there only to hear the Committee's deliberations and to report back to the Secretary-General. His presence was for the moment but a partial measure, and for that reason any recognition or thanks would have to be given when the measure undertaken was completed. It was sufficient recognition for the Committee to request further action on the part of the Secretary-General, which reflected their confidence in him. That request and that confidence could be shown in the Special Representative's report.

373. It had also been pointed out by the delegations opposing the resolution that the term "puppet government" was excessively strong. He had expected at that juncture that someone would attempt to show that the Government in question had really been elected by the people. It had been proven, however, that the sultans of South Arabia had been appointed by the Governor, who was so powerful that a stroke of his pen could wipe out or reinstate an official like Mr. Mackawee. When such a pen was wielded by a colonial Power, the Government concerned was obviously a puppet régime. The speakers who had opposed the resolution represented countries with a long tradition of democracy, and should understand that a régime thus established without free elections by the people was indeed a puppet government.

374. It had been suggested by the representative of Italy that a request for specific action was not within the Special Committee's terms of reference, whereas it had in fact been stipulated in the General Assembly's resolution, in operative paragraph 6 regarding the Special Committee, that the Committee should continue to perform its task and seek the best measures for implementing the relevant resolutions. Operative paragraph 6 had further authorized the Committee to continue to give particular attention to small Territories. The Special Committee was therefore acting within its terms of reference in recommending that the Secretary-General take certain actions, i.e., appoint a special

mission whose report would be submitted through the Committee to the General Assembly.

375. One of the resolution's opponents had objected to giving status to wars of liberation. There had been widespread disagreement with him, in that Aden's revolution constituted a justified reaction against colonialism, which was itself a form of aggression.

376. Lastly, the delegations opposing the resolution had spoken of their past inability to support resolutions on Aden. Had the co-sponsors heard from the petitioners that the Special Committee's proposed action was not in the best interests of Aden, or had all the rest of the Committee not accepted the resolution *in toto*, there might have been some doubt as to its justification. The unqualified support of the petitioners and the rest of the Committee, however, had given the Committee a moral victory—in other words, complete assurance that it was doing the right thing.

377. In addition, the willingness shown by the puppet régime to seek means through a conference to implement the United Nations resolutions, was substantial proof of the general acceptance of the measures proposed. It was inconceivable that when even the puppet régime and the administering Power were seeking ways to implement the United Nations resolutions, countries with no colonial interests at stake should oppose the draft resolution.

378. If the same delegations thought that the United Nations was going too far, the co-sponsors would have to reply that they had not proposed drawing up a constitution for Aden, an initiative which belonged solely to the people of that Territory. The United Nations sought merely to set up circumstances which would be conducive to proper elections for a government by the people, an effort that had been successfully undertaken in the past, for example in Ruanda-Urundi.

379. It would have been preferable for non-supporters to avoid using words like "wise", which denoted an ill-founded value judgement. Had not democratic principles left it to the majority to decide what and who was wise? The United Republic of Tanzania, a country which certainly could not be called a "big Power", preferred to take its stand as one among many active supporters of the inalienable rights of man. As such, it had upheld the right and recognized the ability of Aden's people to govern themselves, even before the year 1968.

380. The representative of the Secretary-General said it would be noted that the request to appoint immediately a special mission to Aden, addressed to the Secretary-General in operative paragraph 12 of the revised draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.309/Rev.1) involved financial and other implications. However, in the absence of precise information such as the number of members to be included in the special mission, the Secretary-General was not in a position to submit a statement of financial implications as required under regulation 13.1 of the Financial Regulations of the United Nations. At the present stage he wished to inform the Special Committee that the Secretary-General would give consideration to the request addressed to him in operative paragraph 12, having regard to the responsibilities entrusted to him in General Assembly resolutions 1949 (XVIII) and 2023 (XX), and would bring to the attention of the Special Committee at the appropriate time any matters that might arise in that connexion.

381. The Special Committee then adopted the joint draft resolution, as revised (A/AC.109/L.309/Rev.1), by a roll-call vote of 18 to 2, with 2 abstentions as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Bulgaria, Chile, Ethiopia, India, Iran, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Mali, Poland, Sierra Leone, Syria, Tunisia, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Republic of Tanzania, Venezuela, Yugoslavia.

Against: Australia, United States of America.

Abstaining: Denmark, Italy.

382. The text of the resolution (A/AC.109/179/Rev.1) adopted by the Special Committee at its 447th meeting on 15 June 1966 reads as follows:

"The Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,

"Having considered the question of Aden,

"Having heard the petitioners,

"Recalling General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960 containing the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,

"Recalling further General Assembly resolutions 1949 (XVIII) of 11 December 1963 and 2023 (XX) of 5 November 1965.

"Deeply concerned at the critical and explosive situation which is threatening peace and security in Aden and Aden Protectorates, arising from the policies pursued by the administering Power in the Territory,

"Deploing the refusal of the administering Power to implement the resolutions of the General Assembly concerning the Territory of Aden and Aden Protectorates,

"Recalling the various statements and declarations made by the administering Power concerning the Territory,

"1. Reaffirms the inalienable right of the people of the Territory to freedom and independence in accordance with General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV);

"2. Deplores the setting up by the administering Power of an unrepresentative régime in the Territory, with a view to granting it independence contrary to General Assembly resolutions 1514 (XV) and 1949 (XVIII) and appeals to all States not to recognize such independence as is not based on the wishes of the people of the Territory freely expressed through elections held under universal adult suffrage;

"3. Calls upon the administering Power to declare unequivocally its acceptance of the relevant General Assembly resolutions and its readiness to co-operate with the United Nations in their implementation without delay;

"4. Reaffirms the view that the responsibilities which devolve on the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland as the administering Power cannot be shifted or circumvented through any action by an unrepresentative régime referred to in paragraph 2 above;

"5. Declares, consequently, that the conference envisaged in document A/AC.109/161/Add.1/Rev.1 or

any other conference of a similar nature is not in accordance with the terms of the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly;

"6. Deplores any defence arrangement that the United Kingdom Government might enter into with the unrepresentative régime in the Territory and considers such arrangements as inconsistent with the objectives of the relevant General Assembly resolutions and a serious hindrance to the future free exercise of the right to freedom and sovereignty by the people of the Territory;

"7. Notes with deep concern that military operations against the people of the Territory are still being carried out by the administering Power;

"8. Urges the administering Power immediately to:

"(a) Abolish the state of emergency;

"(b) Repeal all laws restricting public freedom;

"(c) Cease all repressive actions against the people of the Territory, in particular, military operations;

"(d) Release all political detainees and allow the return of those people who have been exiled or deported for political reasons;

"9. Appeals to all States to render all assistance to the people of the Territory in their efforts to attain freedom and independence;

"10. Draws the attention of the Security Council to the dangerous situation prevailing in the area as a result of British military action against the people of the Territory;

"11. Again invites the Secretary-General to enter into consultation with the specialized agencies and other international organizations with a view to providing assistance to the refugees from the Territory of Aden and Aden Protectorates;

"12. Requests the Secretary-General, in consultation with the Special Committee and the administering Power, to appoint immediately a special mission to Aden for the purpose of recommending practical steps necessary for the full implementation of the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly, and in particular for determining the extent of United Nations participation in the preparation and supervision of elections and of making a report to him as soon as possible for transmission to the Special Committee;

"13. Decides to maintain the question of Aden on its agenda."

383. The text of the resolution was transmitted to the President of the Security Council on 15 June 1966.⁸

G. FURTHER CONSIDERATION BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE⁹

Introduction

384. The Special Committee further discussed the question of Aden at its 462nd and 473rd meetings on 16 August and 19 October 1966. It had before it the report of the Secretary-General dated 5 August 1966,

⁸ Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-first Year, Supplement for April, May and June 1966, document S/7372.

⁹ See also chapter II (paras. 595-619) for an account of the discussions on the resolution adopted by the Special Committee at its 455th meeting on 22 June 1966 concerning the implementation of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) with regard to Territories considered by the Committee in Africa.

which is appended to this chapter as annex V, relating to the appointment of a special mission under the terms of operative paragraph 12 of the resolution adopted by the Committee at its 447th meeting on 15 June 1966 (see para. 382 above). During the course of these discussions, the Chairman of the Sub-Committee on Aden, the representative of Yugoslavia, submitted an oral report containing the views of that Sub-Committee on the report of the Secretary-General.

Written petitions

385. The Special Committee had before it the following additional written petitions concerning the Territory:¹⁰

¹⁰ The following petitions were circulated after the Special Committee had further considered the question of Aden at its 462nd and 473rd meetings: A/AC.109/PET.470/Add.1; A/AC.109/PET.564-566.

<i>Petitioner</i>	<i>Document No.</i>
Mr. Awadh Abdulla Arashani on behalf of students in Occupied South Arabia	A/AC.109/PET.496/Add.1
Mr. Abdulla Bakerman, Administrative Secretary, Arab Socialist Party of Hadhramaut	A/AC.109/PET.504/Add.1
Mr. Awad Bin Saleh, Sultan of the Qu'aiti State of the Hadhramaut	A/AC.109/PET.518
The Office of the President, Conference of the Tribes of the Western Region, Hadhramaut	A/AC.109/PET.519
Mr. Dagobert Krause on behalf of the Trade Unions International of Public Employees, Frankfurt	A/AC.109/PET.520
Mr. Khaled Aljundi, Chairman, Conference of Solidarity and Support for the People and Workers of Aden, Damascus	A/AC.109/PET.521
Two petitions from the Front for the Liberation of Occupied South Yemen (FLOSY)	A/AC.109/PET.469/Add.2
Mr. Abdul Qawi Mackawee, General Secretary, FLOSY	A/AC.109/PET.469/Add.3
President and members, Aden Municipal Council	A/AC.109/PET.470/Add.1
Mr. S. A. Alhabshi, Secretary-General, South Arabian League (SAL)	A/AC.109/PET.480/Add.2
Mr. Salim Alsafi, Vice-President, SAL	A/AC.109/PET.480/Add.3
South Arabian League (SAL)	A/AC.109/PET.480/Add.4
Sheikh Hussein Mansour, President and Ruler of Dathina State	A/AC.109/PET.522
Mr. Ahmed Fadhli Saidi and others "on behalf of Dathina Citizens in Aden"	A/AC.109/PET.523
Messrs. Ahmad Abdulla Alfadhli and Jebel Hussein Alaudali	A/AC.109/PET.524 and Add.1
"People of South Arabia in Riyadh"	A/AC.109/PET.564
"Spearhead of Farmers in Abyan"	A/AC.109/PET.565
"People of Dhala Emirate"	A/AC.109/PET.566

General statements by members

386. The representative of *Iraq* observed that the resolution which the Special Committee had adopted on 15 June 1966 (see para. 382 above) contained three important points. First, operative paragraphs 2 and 4 noted that the existing régime in the Territory was unrepresentative, and therefore could not be recognized as valid by the Special Committee or the United Nations. Secondly, operative paragraph 3 called upon the administering Power to declare unequivocally its acceptance of the relevant General Assembly resolutions and its readiness to co-operate with the United Nations in their implementation without delay. Thirdly, operative paragraph 12 requested the Secretary-General to appoint a special mission for the purpose of recommending practical steps for the full implementation of those resolutions.

387. The letter addressed to the Secretary-General by the United Kingdom delegation (see annex V, para. 6) had welcomed the assistance and participation of the United Nations in achieving its declared policy of bringing South Arabia to independence; in other words, the United Kingdom still intended to grant independence to the unrepresentative régime at present in power. The letter stated that the United

Kingdom had no power to impose changes in the Federal Constitution, something which he himself could not accept. The letter spoke of treaties which, as the Special Committee well knew, were nothing but treaties between the conqueror and the conquered and could not be considered as international obligations; moreover, Article 103 of the Charter made it clear that, in the event of a conflict between obligations under the Charter and obligations under any other agreement, the former would prevail. In its letter the United Kingdom Government claimed that its responsibilities were restricted to external affairs, defence and the "public service", a term which could have a very wide range of meaning. Under Article 73 of the Charter, however, the United Kingdom Government had an obligation to transmit information to the Secretary-General relating to economic, social and educational conditions in the Non-Self-Governing Territories for which it was responsible; it could therefore hardly argue that its responsibilities were confined to external affairs and defence.

388. The final paragraph of the letter obviously sought confirmation that the mission appointed would operate subject to the conditions set forth previously and could hardly be termed unequivocal acceptance of the relevant General Assembly resolutions, as called

for in operative paragraph 3 of the latest resolution adopted by the Special Committee (see para. 382 above). That resolution had qualified the existing régime in the Territory as unrepresentative and yet the United Kingdom Government was now insisting that any mission would have to co-operate with that régime. In addition, the United Kingdom letter referred only to the operative paragraphs of General Assembly resolutions 1949 (XVIII) and 2023 (XX) and failed to mention resolution 1514 (XV), presumably because acceptance of that resolution would interfere with their own ideas about granting independence to the people of Aden.

389. Some members of the Special Committee might think that the Committee should agree to appoint a special mission without further delay but the mission would be useless if the conditions laid down by the United Kingdom were accepted. All the relevant texts had referred to the full implementation of United Nations resolutions and of the unequivocal acceptance by the United Kingdom of those resolutions; it would therefore be pointless to appoint a mission until the United Kingdom was prepared, first, to accept unequivocally the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly and the Special Committee and, secondly, to agree to the full implementation of those resolutions without preconditions.

390. The representative of *Denmark* said that the paramount question before the Special Committee was whether it would prove possible for the Secretary-General to send a United Nations mission to South Arabia. So far, the Secretary-General had held private and informal consultations with the members of the Special Committee and with the United Kingdom. It was clear from the United Kingdom letter that important advances had been made on two essential points. The United Kingdom had now accepted the operative parts of two General Assembly resolutions, thereby meeting the demands made by several delegations; admittedly it had accepted with reservations, but it was not certain that those reservations would in fact stand in the way of the mission. Furthermore, it had, possibly for the first time, welcomed the sending of a United Nations mission to one of its dependent Territories other than a Trust Territory. His own delegation welcomed the United Kingdom initiative and hoped that all members of the Committee would do likewise. He also hoped that such a promising development would not be nipped in the bud; public discussion of the question, in which no concessions were likely to be made, was hardly likely to lead to a fruitful conclusion. He was therefore firmly convinced that the matter would best be discussed through informal consultations between the Secretary-General, the United Kingdom and the Chairman of the Special Committee.

391. The Special Committee should, however, make clear, perhaps through a statement by the Chairman, that its primary objective was to ensure that a United Nations mission was sent to Aden in order to assist in the processes leading to independence and that it hoped all the parties concerned would co-operate towards that end. His delegation would also appeal to all members to support the view that further consultations should be held in private, until it was established that agreement was possible on the question of sending a mission to Aden; only then would public debate on the subject be appropriate.

392. The representative of *Yugoslavia*, speaking as Chairman of the Sub-Committee on Aden, said that the Sub-Committee had met and reviewed the situation in the Territory in the light of the latest developments. It had taken note of the readiness of the United Kingdom to co-operate with the special mission to Aden. However, it considered that the reservations of the United Kingdom, as they appeared in paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of its letter to the Secretary-General (see annex V) were not in accordance with the resolutions of the General Assembly and the Special Committee. The United Kingdom's attitude was not acceptable as a basis on which a special mission to Aden could be appointed or could operate. The special mission must be formed and must operate only under the terms of the relevant General Assembly resolutions as well as the resolution adopted by the Special Committee at Cairo on 15 June 1966, and after the unequivocal acceptance by the United Kingdom of those resolutions.

393. The representative of *Bulgaria* opposed the United Kingdom view that the question before the Special Committee should only be discussed in private consultations. The United Kingdom delegation itself had addressed a letter to the Secretary-General which was now before the Committee; moreover, it had raised the question of Aden in the Security Council, in the form of a rather vaguely worded complaint, and had made a similar request for the appointment of a special mission, in the hope that its own position would be confirmed. It could hardly contend, therefore, that the matter should not be discussed publicly. If the Special Committee agreed only to discuss questions when it was convenient to the United Kingdom, it might well solve the United Kingdom's problems but it would hardly solve the problems of the peoples concerned. The Chairman had therefore been right in allowing the discussion to proceed.

394. The first paragraph of the United Kingdom letter (see annex V, para. 6) stated that the United Kingdom Government welcomed the assistance and participation of the United Nations in achieving its declared policy of bringing South Arabia to independence. However, if the implication was that the United Nations accepted the policies of the United Kingdom in the matter, he would point out that all the relevant resolutions adopted by the Special Committee itself and by the General Assembly indicated disagreement with those policies. It would be rather excessive to assume that the Committee was offering to assist the United Kingdom in carrying out a policy which had been unequivocally rejected by the General Assembly.

395. Furthermore, the letter stated that the United Kingdom Government was bound by existing treaties with the Federation of South Arabia; that was clearly contrary to the statement that the United Kingdom accepted the operative clauses of General Assembly resolution 1949 (XVIII) and, in particular, resolution 2023 (XX) which had deplored the attempts made by the administering Power to establish an unrepresentative régime in the Territory. The United Kingdom Government was therefore asking the Special Committee and the General Assembly to repudiate its own resolutions, and its avowed policy of decolonization. It was asking the United Nations not only to accept the existence of an unrepresentative régime but also to endorse all the military and other treaties which it had concluded with its puppet Government.

in South Arabia in order to perpetuate its domination of that country. It was quite obvious that neither the General Assembly nor the Special Committee could accept that request.

396. The United Kingdom Government, however, went even further, and declared that it was constitutionally unable to give directions to the Federal Government except in matters of external affairs, defence and the Public Service, and had no power to impose changes in the Federal Constitution. That statement implied that acceptance of the Federation and its régime was a pre-condition for United Kingdom co-operation. The reservations expressed by the United Kingdom were not acceptable since they would constitute an abandonment of the most important provisions of the relevant General Assembly resolutions, and its offer to co-operate with a United Nations mission should be viewed merely as a manoeuvre.

397. The terms of reference of the special mission had to be clearly defined since it had a definite purpose, namely, to ensure the full implementation of United Nations resolutions. If the United Kingdom really wished to co-operate with a United Nations mission to Aden, it should accept unconditionally and unreservedly the relevant General Assembly resolutions and the resolutions of the Special Committee. Only if that were done could the mission operate adequately; if no such acceptance was forthcoming, a mission to Aden would be pointless.

398. The representative of *Syria* pointed out that the terms of reference of the proposed mission to Aden were clearly defined in operative paragraph 12 of the Special Committee's resolution (see para. 382 above). The mission was to recommend the practical steps necessary for the full implementation of the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly, to determine the extent of United Nations participation in the preparation and supervision of elections and to make a report to the Secretary-General as soon as possible for transmission to the Special Committee. Those terms of reference could not be subject to any conditions or reservations which would limit their scope or restrict their field of action.

399. The consultations mentioned in the same operative paragraph should be concerned solely with the question of appointment of the special mission, as was made clear in paragraph 5 of the Secretary-General's report (see annex V). The administering Power was entitled to be consulted on the membership of the mission, but it should not issue any conditions or reservations which would limit the terms of reference of the mission.

400. The representative of the *United Republic of Tanzania* said that the fact that the question of Aden was still on the Special Committee's agenda demonstrated the failure of private diplomacy to settle it. Moreover, in an Organization with 117 Members and in a Committee with twenty-four members, private diplomacy could not begin until the views of all had been heard. Public debate had led the United Kingdom to accept the idea of a mission, and he hoped that more such debate would induce it to accept all the Committee's conditions. His delegation fully endorsed the Iraqi representative's analysis of the letter from the United Kingdom Government and supported the views expressed by the representatives of *Yugoslavia*, *Bulgaria* and *Syria*.

401. The Special Committee, in operative paragraph 12 of its resolution of 15 June 1966 had clearly stated the purpose of the proposed special mission to Aden. He welcomed the statement by the United Kingdom Government that it would be glad to co-operate with such a mission, but he wondered why it had found it necessary to specify, in the second paragraph of its letter, that its "responsibilities for security cannot be limited or abandoned". It was not the Committee's intention to limit those responsibilities or to ask the United Kingdom Government to abandon them. His delegation did not question the United Kingdom's responsibility to maintain security until such time as the colony of Aden attained its independence; all it asked was that the United Kingdom Government should not misuse that responsibility by killing the people of Aden. Secondly, the United Kingdom Government stated that it was "bound by . . . existing treaties with the Federation of South Arabia". However, since Aden was a colony, such treaties did not qualify for recognition by the United Nations, and any reference to them was irrelevant to the purpose of the Special Committee's resolution.

402. The United Kingdom Government's references to "external affairs" and "defence" were equally irrelevant. The United Republic of Tanzania refused to recognize the local Government of Aden on the grounds that it was unrepresentative. Moreover, the division of power between that Government and the United Kingdom Government was none of the Special Committee's concern except that, if it meant that the United Nations mission would have to deal with more than one authority in the Territory, its work might well prove fruitless. It should be clearly understood that when the mission went to Aden it was to deal with one Power alone, namely the administering Power.

403. The United Kingdom Government spoke of agreement on the composition of the mission. The reference in operative paragraph 12 of the resolution to consultation with the administering Power should cover that point; it was to be hoped that the United Kingdom Government would not insist that its consent must be secured for the appointment of each and every member of the mission by the Secretary-General. The United Kingdom Government also said that it had "no power to impose changes in the Federal Constitution". It was not the purpose of the proposed special mission to engage in constitutional talks; the constitution was a matter for the people of Aden to decide with the United Kingdom Government, and the role of the United Nations could only be that of a peace-maker.

404. His delegation appealed to the United Kingdom Government to refrain from pressing those minor points, so that the special mission could go to Aden and the Special Committee could proceed with its work, the aim of which was to secure the goodwill of the people of Aden and to help them to gain independence under the best possible conditions. Since all parties in Aden now accepted the role of the United Nations and did so unconditionally, it was to be hoped that the United Kingdom would not insist on conditions which would prevent the Organization from carrying out that role.

405. The representative of *India* said that since the views of the administering Power had been published officially, his delegation was in favour of public and formal discussion of the Secretary-General's report. His delegation agreed with the Sub-Committee's findings that the reservations of the administering Power were

not in accordance with the resolutions of the General Assembly and the Special Committee and that the attitude of the British could not be acceptable as a basis for the formation of a visiting mission. However, the willingness of the administering Power to co-operate with the United Nations, although qualified by certain conditions, was an important point of departure, and every possible effort should be made to ensure that a mission was sent to Aden. The situation in the Territory was developing rapidly and it would be most useful to have a first-hand account of the state of affairs obtaining there. At the same time his delegation agreed with the representative of Iraq and the Sub-Committee on Aden that such a mission could not function if its authority was fettered in advance by unacceptable conditions. India therefore shared the Tanzanian representative's hope that the United Kingdom Government would not insist on the reservations mentioned in its letter. It was to be hoped that the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom would return to New York with new instructions which would make it possible for a visiting mission to be appointed on terms acceptable to the Secretary-General, the Special Committee and the administering Power alike.

406. The representative of the *Union of Soviet Socialist Republics* considered that it was the Committee's duty to follow developments connected with the problem of liquidating the colonial régime in Aden and South Arabia, and hence to hold a public discussion of the Secretary-General's report. His delegation was grateful to the Secretary-General for the efforts he was making to implement the General Assembly resolutions on Aden and the Special Committee resolution of 15 June 1966.

407. His delegation, too, endorsed the Iraqi representative's analysis of the United Kingdom Government's letter, from which it was clear that the United Kingdom still refused to accept the decisions of the United Nations on Aden and was striving to keep its puppet régime in power and to deprive the people of Aden and South Arabia of their right to genuine independence in accordance with the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.

408. Among the reservations expressed by the United Kingdom Government on the question of co-operation with a United Nations mission was one amounting to a demand for recognition of the United Kingdom's existing treaty with the so-called Federation of South Arabia and certain other sultanates. The tactical aim of United Kingdom diplomacy at the present stage was to secure United Nations recognition for the puppet "Federal Government", which it had forced on the people of the Territory but which did not represent anyone. That was why the United Kingdom spoke in its letter only of the General Assembly resolutions and was completely silent concerning the Special Committee's resolution, which deplored the setting up of an unrepresentative régime in the Territory and reaffirmed the view that the responsibilities of the United Kingdom as the administering Power could not be transferred or circumvented through any action of an unrepresentative régime. The same resolution also deplored any defence arrangement entered into with the unrepresentative régime as a serious hindrance to the free exercise by the people of Aden of the right to freedom and independence.

409. The United Kingdom Government further stated that it was unable to give directions to the Fed-

eral Government except in matters of external affairs, defence and the Public Service and had no power to impose changes in the Federal Constitution. In other words, it sought to disclaim any responsibility for the future development of the Territory's internal affairs and illegally to confer on the Federal Government broad powers, obviously including powers to organize and hold elections in the colony. At the same time, it claimed that it could make no change, without the consent of the Federal Government, in the unjust constitution it had forced on the people. That assertion could not be taken seriously, since the United Kingdom, as the administering Power, was responsible for the Territory. The reservation concerning the United Kingdom's responsibilities for security, like the rest, was designed to keep the puppet régime in power and to suppress the national liberation movement in the Territory.

410. The general purport of the reservations was plainly incompatible with the requirements of the United Nations resolutions on Aden. The United Kingdom had the duty to fulfil, without conditions or reservations, the requirements of General Assembly resolutions 1949 (XVIII) and 2023 (XX) and thus discharge its obligations to the people of Aden. The inference was that the United Kingdom's new "initiative" was nothing but a manoeuvre calculated to lull world public opinion and to gain the time it needed in order to impose a false independence on the people of South Arabia as a means of preserving its economic and strategic interests in that important part of the world.

411. The United Nations should take part in the process of decolonizing South Arabia only on the basis of strict compliance with its resolutions. If the United Kingdom was really prepared to co-operate with the United Nations, it should withdraw its reservations and unequivocally state that it fully accepted the United Nations decisions on Aden and was ready to apply them. If it did not do so, the sending of a special mission to the Territory would not achieve the declared goal of the United Nations in respect of Aden, namely, the accession of the people of Aden to genuine independence.

412. The representative of *Australia* said that, in his delegation's view, the United Kingdom Government was sincere in attempting to give South Arabia independence as a united, sovereign State by 1968, but the atmosphere in the Territory was such that the British Government had been unable to take the steps necessary for the establishment of such a State. Australia therefore welcomed the United Kingdom Government's agreement to accept a visiting mission, subject to certain entirely reasonable conditions. The Special Committee would be doing the United Nations a disservice if it failed to accept the United Kingdom's offer; it should seize that opportunity as an important step towards the end of violence, fear and assassination and towards the creation of a new, independent Arab State.

413. In his view, private discussion was usually more rewarding than public debate in which emotions could become inflamed and the interests of the people—the party most concerned—might be overlooked.

414. The representative of *Iran* expressed his Government's belief that the problem of Aden could be solved only on the basis of the Special Committee resolution of 15 June 1966 and the General Assembly resolutions which had preceded it; that the provisions of those resolutions could not be changed by any Power; and that a representative government was the only

proper authority to which power should be transferred on the attainment of independence. His delegation noted with appreciation the steps taken by the Secretary-General to discharge his task under paragraph 12 of the Special Committee resolution. In its opinion, the Secretary-General would do well to extend his consultations to those members of the Special Committee whom he had not yet consulted, and in particular those from countries in the same area as Aden.

415. Although the United Kingdom's position represented some progress, its reservations were not in keeping with the resolutions he had mentioned, and his delegation too endorsed the Iraqi representative's analysis of the United Kingdom Government's letter. Iran could not accept any reservations which would impede the establishment of a representative government.

416. In his opinion, the Secretary-General could make his task easier by seeking clarification of the United Kingdom reservations. If, as a result, it became clear that they would indeed prevent him from carrying out his appointed task, the Secretary-General should then inform the Special Committee accordingly. If, on the other hand, those reservations represented merely a preliminary position and the United Kingdom did not attach such importance to them as to preclude the successful dispatch of a mission to the Territory, then every effort should be made to achieve a solution. In short, although the reservations were not acceptable, no opportunity should be lost to establish a United Nations presence in Aden. He joined the representative of Tanzania in appealing to the United Kingdom delegation not to insist on its reservations.

417. The representative of *Italy* noted that the report of the Secretary-General was only an interim one and that the letter from the Deputy Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom represented a considerable advance. Every effort should be made to reach an agreement acceptable to all parties and his delegation had full confidence in the Secretary-General to carry out the necessary negotiations. If a United Nations mission was sent to Aden it would be the first such mission to a non-autonomous Territory and that would be a useful precedent. The best course would be to continue informal consultations, since public discussions were sometimes likely to jeopardize negotiations. The Chairman was already in a position to convey the views of the Special Committee to the Secretary-General. Although there had been differences of opinion, there had also been a unanimous feeling in favour of making possible the sending of a mission to Aden. It would be better to await the outcome of further negotiations before the Committee came to a conclusion.

418. The representative of *Mali* said that he could not help wondering what the United Kingdom's real intentions were. On 2 August 1966, the United Kingdom Government had asked the Security Council to investigate certain incidents in South Arabia. Yet, on 1 August 1966 it had sent a letter to the Secretary-General placing unacceptable conditions on the sending of a special mission to the Territory, conditions which constituted a veiled rejection of United Nations resolutions. He hoped that the United Kingdom Government had not closed the door on negotiations and that the Sub-Committee on Aden would continue its efforts so that an agreement could be reached. It should be left to the Chairman of the Special Committee and to the Secretary-General to decide on the method of approach.

419. The representative of the *United States of America* said his delegation had always expressed interest in self-determination for the people of South Arabia and gratification over the steps taken by the United Kingdom towards that end. The Special Committee, which was concerned with implementing the principles of self-determination, could not fail to welcome the decision to grant independence to South Arabia by 1968. It was important that independence should be brought about in conditions of peace and with the agreement of all groups in South Arabia and should not be imposed from outside. The United Kingdom Government had accepted the operative clause of the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly, subject to recognition of its continuing legal responsibilities in the area, and was ready to co-operate with a mission sent to recommend steps to implement those General Assembly resolutions and to make suggestions concerning the role of the United Nations in the election process. His Government welcomed, in particular, the prospect of the United Nations playing a role in South Arabia. He was confident that the Secretary-General would work out, with the United Kingdom Government, appropriate conditions for sending such a mission.

420. The representative of *Tunisia* said that the mandate given to the Secretary-General in operative paragraph 12 of the resolution adopted by the Special Committee at its 447th meeting (see para. 382 above) was clear and he thanked the Secretary-General for the efforts he had made to carry it out. The letter dated 1 August 1966 from the Deputy Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom to the Secretary-General was the first instance of the United Kingdom agreeing in principle to the sending of a United Nations mission to a Territory under its administration. He deplored the reservations expressed by the United Kingdom in that letter, but hoped that they were no stronger than those usually expressed by the United Kingdom whenever the Special Committee discussed the question of Aden and that they were not intended to render a United Nations mission ineffective. He therefore urged the Secretary-General to continue negotiations with the United Kingdom in order to find a way to implement the Special Committee's resolution. The sending of a mission would afford a opportunity for useful co-operation between the administering Power and the United Nations and would facilitate the realization of the aspirations of the people of the Territory. He supported the appeal made by the Tanzanian representative to the United Kingdom and hoped that the United Kingdom would give the mission all the help it needed to fulfil its mandate.

421. The representative of *Uruguay* thought that the reservations expressed by the Deputy Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom in his letter to the Secretary-General did not affect the basic position either of the Uruguayan delegation or of the Special Committee. It was highly desirable that a mission should be sent to Aden and that it should be given complete freedom of action and an opportunity to secure all the information it needed and to reach its own conclusions. That should be borne in mind when the members of the mission were being appointed. Negotiations concerning the sending of a mission should continue. It was not necessary for the United Kingdom first to accept all United Nations resolutions *in toto*. The sending of a mission to Aden might be an important contribution to the Special Committee's efforts to secure full independence for the Territory.

422. The representative of *Venezuela* shared the concern of other members of the Special Committee regarding the letter from the Deputy Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom to the Secretary-General. It was necessary for the well-being of the people of Aden that a mission should be sent and he hoped that the United Kingdom would agree that the work of such a mission would not be objective if its mandate was restricted. He hoped that a reasonable agreement would be reached so that it would be possible to send a mission to Aden.

423. The *Chairman* stated that he would convey the views expressed by members at the meeting to the Secretary-General.

424. On the same day, the Chairman informed the Secretary-General of the views expressed by members of the Special Committee at its 462nd meeting.

425. At the 473rd meeting, the representative of *Iraq* recalled that several delegations had found unacceptable the conditions laid down by the United Kingdom Government concerning the implementation of the General Assembly resolutions on Aden and in particular the sending of a special mission there. The Sub-Committee on Aden, along with many delegations, had considered that no mission should be appointed until the United Kingdom had accepted the relevant resolutions without any conditions or reservations. He wondered whether the Secretary-General or his representative could inform the Special Committee about the latest developments on this question.

426. The representative of *Iraq* expressed the hope that nothing would be done about the appointment of the special mission before the United Kingdom Government had withdrawn its reservations in a clear and written declaration.

427. The *Chairman* said that he had already brought the views of the members of the Special Committee to the attention of the Secretary-General and had had conversations with him concerning the implementation of the Special Committee's resolution. Those conversations were still going on.

428. The *representative of the Secretary-General*, in response to the statement of the representative of *Iraq*, informed the Special Committee that the Secretary-General was continuing his consultations concerning the request addressed to him in operative paragraph 12 of the resolution on the question of Aden adopted by the Special Committee on 15 June 1966.

429. In so doing, the Secretary-General had taken fully into account the views expressed by the Chairman of the Sub-Committee on Aden, on behalf of that Sub-Committee, and by the members of the Special Committee at its 462nd meeting, on the letter dated 1 August 1966 from the United Kingdom Government (see annex V), and in particular on the reservations stated in that letter. The Secretary-General had had several consultations on the subject with all concerned, particularly with the Chairman of the Special Committee and the representative of the administering Power.

430. The Secretary-General would report on the outcome of his consultations as soon as possible.

ANNEX I

[A/AC.109/161]

Question of Aden

Report of the Secretary-General (16 May 1966)

INTRODUCTION

1. In resolution 2023 (XX) on the question of Aden, which the General Assembly adopted on 5 November 1965, the Secretary-General was requested "to take such action as he may deem expedient to ensure the implementation of the present resolution, and to report thereon to the Special Committee".

2. The Secretary-General transmitted the text of the resolution to the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations by letter dated 10 November 1965. The text of the resolution was also transmitted to all States and to the following specialized agencies and international relief organizations; the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, the International Labour Organisation, the World Health Organization, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the League of Red Cross Societies and the International Committee of the Red Cross.

3. The present report contains a brief account of the Secretary-General's consultations with the United Kingdom as well as the replies received from Governments, specialized agencies and international relief organizations.

I. CONSULTATIONS WITH THE UNITED KINGDOM

4. In response to a request made in the Special Committee, the representative of the Secretary-General informed the Committee, at its 401st meeting, on 6 April 1966, that the Secretary-General had been in communication with the representative of the United Kingdom in connexion with the implementation of the resolution. He stated that the Secretary-General would be holding consultations with the representative of the United Kingdom regarding the various matters covered by General Assembly resolution 2023 (XX) and that he would report to the Special Committee as soon as possible.

5. Since that date, the Secretary-General has had further discussions with the representative of the United Kingdom.

6. On 13 May 1966, the United Kingdom Permanent Representative and Minister of State for Foreign Affairs informed the Secretary-General that the Government of the Federation of South Arabia had announced, on that day, its acceptance of the United Nations resolutions relating to South Arabia and its intention to arrange as soon as possible a conference representative of all States in South Arabia, together with political groups and others to consider the ways and means whereby the United Nations resolutions could be implemented. The full text of the Federal Government's announcement is reproduced below:

"The Federal Government has been considering in the light of recent developments what further action is required in pursuance of its policy to realize the unification and independence of South Arabia. As is well known the Federal Government has repeatedly and consistently pressed both publicly and in private for the unification of our beloved homeland. The foundation of the Federation and the accession to it of further States, until it now embraces seventeen States, were vital and practical steps towards the bringing of all South Arabia under one strong, central Government. At the 1964 Conference the Federal Government obtained a promise that South Arabia would be granted independence not later than 1968 and an invitation was then issued to the States remaining outside the Federation to join us. At the 1965 Conference the Federal Government stated that it considered it of the utmost importance that all States in South Arabia should participate in all future discussions of constitutional matters, and endorsed the principles of self-determination and independence underlying the United Nations resolutions. More recently there has been a number

of new developments. The Federal Government brought about the removal of the legal obstacles to the return of South Arabian political exiles and has had useful unofficial discussions in Beirut and elsewhere with representatives of the South Arabian League and other political personalities. The Federal Government appointed constitutional advisers to study the practical problems involved in a constitution for the whole of South Arabia and their report has been made available to the public. In the light of all these developments and in response to the wishes of the people of South Arabia, the Federal Government has decided to accept the United Nations resolution relating to South Arabia. The Federal Government has accordingly decided to arrange as soon as possible a conference representative of all States in the Federation of South Arabia, the Qu'aiti, Kathiri, Mahr and Upper Yafa'i States, the political groups and others who care for their homeland, to consider the ways and means whereby the United Nations resolutions can be implemented and to create an atmosphere conducive to bringing about constitutional changes which will unify South Arabia in preparation for the time when it will take its place as a sovereign independent Arab State."

7. On 16 May 1966, the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom further informed the Secretary-General that the United Kingdom Government had welcomed the Federal Government's decision to invite the States, political groups and others to consult together about their future. He also informed the Secretary-General that in a statement made on 16 May in the House of Commons in London, the United Kingdom Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs had made it clear that the United Kingdom Government welcomed the decision of the Federal Government in connexion with the United Nations resolutions and had referred to the intention of the Federal Government to communicate to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, through the United Kingdom Government, a request for the appointment of a United Nations Observer at the conference which it is intended to convene for the purpose of agreement on laying down a programme according to which the United Nations resolutions could be implemented.

8. The Secretary-General understands that the Federal Government's request may be expected to reach him shortly.

II. REPLIES FROM GOVERNMENTS

Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic

[The reply, dated 27 December 1965, from the Permanent Mission of the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic to the United Nations is reproduced in document A/6317.]

India

[Original text: English]
[7 January 1966]

The Government of India has taken note of resolution 2023 (XX) of 5 November 1965 concerning the question of Aden which had been co-sponsored by the delegation of India in the Fourth Committee.

Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic

[The reply, dated 2 March 1966, from the Permanent Representative of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic to the United Nations is reproduced in document A/6276.]

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

[The reply, dated 14 December 1965, from the Permanent Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the United Nations is reproduced in document A/6179.]

III. REPLIES FROM SPECIALIZED AGENCIES AND INTERNATIONAL RELIEF ORGANIZATIONS

International Labour Organisation

[Original text: English]
[23 November 1965]

I have the honour to inform you that the request addressed in that resolution to the specialized agencies, to which you have drawn our attention, has been duly noted.

International Committee of the Red Cross

[Original text: English]
[2 December 1965]

We have duly taken note of resolution 2023 (XX) adopted by the General Assembly at its 1368th plenary meeting on 5 November 1965.

League of Red Cross Societies

[Original text: English]
[7 December 1965]

We have taken particular note of the request formulated in the resolution under reference, that the international relief organizations offer all possible assistance to the people who are suffering as a result of the military operations in the Territory of Aden.

ANNEX II

[A/AC.109/L.289]

18 May 1966

Report of the Sub-Committee on Aden

Chairman: Mr. Danilo LEKIĆ (Yugoslavia)

1. The Sub-Committee on Aden was established by a resolution adopted by the Special Committee on 9 April 1964 (A/5800/Rev.1, chap. VI, para. 166). The Sub-Committee's terms of reference, as set out in that resolution, are as follows:

"(a) Study and keep under constant review the situation in the Territory and to report thereon to the Special Committee;

"(b) Establish contacts with the administering Power at such time and place as may be agreed upon, with a view to implementing resolutions 1514 (XV) and 1949 (XVIII);

"(c) Arrange in consultation with the administering Power, for visits to the Territory;

"(d) Make such other visits as may be deemed necessary".

2. The Sub-Committee has already presented three reports to the Special Committee. The first (*ibid.*, chap. VI, annex) was submitted in November 1964, the second (A/6000/Rev.1, chap. VI, appendix I) in April 1965 and the third (*ibid.*, appendix II) in September 1965.

3. Following the submission of the last report of the Sub-Committee, the Special Committee decided at its 386th meeting on 16 September 1965 to take note of the Sub-Committee's report, endorse the conclusions in that report and transmit it to the General Assembly together with the report already prepared for 1965 on the question of Aden (*ibid.*, chap. VI, sections A-C). The Special Committee also decided that the Sub-Committee on Aden would, in accordance with operative paragraph 12 of the resolution adopted by the Special Committee on 17 May 1965 (*ibid.*, chap. VI, para. 300), keep the question of Aden under constant review and report to the Special Committee as necessary.

4. At the 401st meeting of the Special Committee, on 6 April 1966, the Chairman of the Special Committee announced that Afghanistan would fill the vacancy on the Sub-Committee on Aden created by the withdrawal of Cambodia from membership of the Special Committee. Accordingly, the Sub-Committee on Aden is composed of Afghanistan, Iraq, the Ivory Coast, Venezuela and Yugoslavia.

5. The Sub-Committee has held four meetings in 1966, on 10, 16, 17 and 18 May.

6. At its first meeting, on 10 May, the Sub-Committee unanimously elected Mr. Danilo Lekić (Yugoslavia) as Chairman.

7. Following the meeting of the Sub-Committee on 16 May, the Chairman, on the same day, introduced an oral report to the Special Committee at its 414th meeting. The text of the report was as follows:

"At its meeting of 16 May 1966, the Sub-Committee on Aden considered the question of the implementation of General Assembly resolution 2023 (XX). The Sub-Committee noted that among the recommendations and requests made by the General Assembly was a request to the Secretary-General:

"... to take such action as he may deem expedient to ensure the implementation of the present resolution, and to report thereon to the Special Committee."

"At today's meeting of the Sub-Committee on Aden, I reported that I had seen the Secretary-General, who had informed me that, as a result of his consultations with the representative of the United Kingdom, he expected to be able to present a report to the Special Committee this afternoon. As already mentioned, copies of that report in English have been made available to the Special Committee. The Sub-Committee decided to request the Chairman of the Special Committee to hold another meeting of the Special Committee before it leaves for Africa in order that it may continue its consideration of the Secretary-General's report."

8. At the same meeting, the Special Committee decided to hold another meeting on the question of Aden before its departure for Africa, it being understood that, if the Sub-Committee considered it necessary, it would submit a further report to the Special Committee.

9. At its meeting on 17 May 1966, the Sub-Committee considered the report of the Secretary-General presented in accordance with paragraph 13 of resolution 2023 (XX) (see annex I), the statement made by the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom at the 414th meeting of the Special Committee on 16 May, and the statement made by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in the House of Commons on 16 May to which the Permanent Representative referred (see annex IV).

10. In making the following comments on these statements, the Sub-Committee wishes to make it clear that the points it has raised are in the nature of preliminary observations and should not be considered as exhaustive.

11. At the outset, the Sub-Committee would point out that in making its comments on these statements, it has based itself on the resolutions of the General Assembly on the question of Aden, namely, resolutions 1949 (XVIII) of 11 December 1963, 1972 (XVIII) of 16 December 1963 and 2023 (XX) of 5 November 1965, which have been adopted in the context of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples contained in resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960.

12. The Sub-Committee notes that, in the statements made on behalf of the Government of the United Kingdom, there are references to the attitude of the so-called Government of the Federation of South Arabia to the United Nations resolutions on Aden. The Sub-Committee would draw attention to the fact that these resolutions and the requests contained in them are directed to the Government of the United Kingdom, which, in its capacity as administering Power, the United Nations holds responsible for implementing the resolutions in the Territory. Accordingly, it is the attitude of the Government of the United Kingdom which is of concern to the United Nations. The so-called Government of the Federation which, as the Sub-Committee has previously shown, does not represent the people of South Arabia, has no standing in the matter.

13. With regard to the attitude of the Government of the United Kingdom, the Sub-Committee has been unable to find in the statements made by the Permanent Representative and the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs any clear acceptance of the United Nations resolutions. On such important matters as the ending of the state of emergency and the release of political prisoners, which are among the measures called for by the United Nations, these statements indicate only a qualified acceptance. Furthermore, they fail to show that the Government of the United Kingdom has agreed to take the steps outlined in the United Nations resolutions and in the sequence set out therein. These steps and the sequence to be followed were clearly outlined in the report of the Sub-Committee on Aden presented to the Special Committee in September 1965, as follows:

"78. The Sub-Committee is convinced that the administering Power's immediate objective should be the holding of general elections throughout the Territory and that it should direct all its efforts towards arranging for them

without delay. The immediate steps should be those outlined in General Assembly resolution 1949 (XVIII) and in the resolutions of the Special Committee, namely, the holding of a conference for the purpose of deciding on the necessary constitutional measures for holding such elections and the establishment of the proper atmosphere in which elections could be held through the abolition of the state of emergency, as well as the repeal of all laws restricting public freedom, the cessation of all repressive actions against the people of the Territory, the release of political detainees and the return of exiles. At the same time, the steps outlined in resolution 1949 (XVIII) should be taken to arrange for an effective United Nations presence before and during these elections. After elections have been held and a representative government has been formed conversations should be opened without delay with that Government for the purpose of fixing the date for the granting of independence and making the arrangements for the transfer of power." (A/6009/Rev.1, chap. VI, appendix II).

14. The Sub-Committee wishes to emphasize the importance of an effective United Nations presence in the Territory once these steps are taken. It would also recall that the General Assembly, in paragraph 9 of resolution 1949 (XVIII), requested the Secretary-General to arrange for an effective United Nations presence "in consultation with the Special Committee and the administering Power".

15. The Sub-Committee is convinced that the conference to which reference is made in the statements, should have been called by the administering Power in accordance with the conditions set out in General Assembly resolutions 1514 (XV), 1949 (XVIII) and 2023 (XX).

16. On the broader aspects of the implementation of resolution 2023 (XX), the Sub-Committee notes with concern from the Secretary-General's report (see annex I) the lack of response by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the specialized agencies and the international relief organizations to the General Assembly's request that they offer all possible assistance to the people who are suffering as a result of the military operations in the Territory.

17. While the Sub-Committee is aware that the Special Committee will be giving the question of Aden full consideration in Cairo in the course of its meetings in Africa, it recommends to the Special Committee that, as preliminary action on the question of Aden, it:

- (i) Emphasize that it is the Government of the United Kingdom as administering Power, which the United Nations regards as the authority responsible for implementing the United Nations resolutions in the Territory;
- (ii) Urge the Government of the United Kingdom to implement immediately the steps outlined in the United Nations resolutions on the Territory so that the people of the Territory may accede to independence in accordance with their freely expressed wishes and without further delay;
- (iii) Further urge the Government of the United Kingdom to make it possible for the Sub-Committee to visit the Territory in accordance with its mandate;
- (iv) Express its appreciation to the Secretary-General and request him to continue to take whatever action he may deem expedient to ensure the implementation of General Assembly resolution 2023 (XX), bearing in mind, in particular, the request to him to arrange for an effective United Nations presence as set out in paragraph 9 of resolution 1949 (XVIII);
- (v) Request the Secretary-General to ascertain from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the specialized agencies and the international relief organizations what action they propose to take in response to the request made to them in paragraph 12 of resolution 2023 (XX);
- (vi) Further request the Secretary-General to report to the Special Committee during its current session on the matters referred to in sub-paragraphs (iv) and (v) above.

ANNEX III

[A/AC.109/161/Add.1/Rev.1]

Question of Aden

Report of the Secretary-General (9 June 1966)

1. In his last report to the Special Committee (see annex I) of 16 May 1966, the Secretary-General stated that the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland had informed him that the Government of the Federation of South Arabia intended to request the Secretary-General to appoint a United Nations Observer to the conference which it intended to convene. The Secretary-General also stated that he understood that the Federal Government's request might be expected to reach him shortly.

2. In a letter dated 25 May the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom transmitted a letter dated 15 May from the Minister of External Affairs of the Government of the Federation of South Arabia to the Secretary-General.

3. The letter from the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom reads as follows:

"I have the honour to transmit to you a letter from the Minister of External Affairs of the Federation of Southern Arabia to Your Excellency, enclosing the Federal Government's statement of 13 May and requesting Your Excellency to appoint an observer to the conference being convened on 1 August to consider ways and means whereby the United Nations resolutions on South Arabia can be implemented.

"The United Kingdom Government endorses this request and hopes that Your Excellency will feel able to agree to it."

4. The letter from the Minister of External Affairs of the Government of the Federation reads as follows:

"You will have heard of the statement made on 13 May 1966 in which my Government announced its acceptance of the United Nations resolutions relating to South Arabia, and of its decision to arrange as soon as possible a conference representative of all South Arabian States and political groups to consider ways and means whereby the United Nations resolutions can be implemented. A copy of the statement is attached.^a

"Invitations to attend the Conference at the federal capital, Al Ittihad, starting on Monday, 1 August 1966, are now being issued. My Government, being fully aware of the heavy responsibility it bears to the people of South Arabia to take every possible step to ensure a successful outcome to the Conference, has instructed me to approach Your Excellency with the earnest request that a United Nations Observer be appointed to attend the Conference. The Observer, whom we feel should be an Arab, will assist us in our discussions, and report to Your Excellency on their outcome.

"My Government is very hopeful that Your Excellency will find it possible to accede to its request for the appointment of an Observer, whose presence at the forthcoming Conference will not only do much to ensure the success of the Conference but will associate the United Nations with the drawing up of detailed proposals giving effect to its own resolutions and which are likely to have far-reaching effects for the future of the people of South Arabia."

5. It will be recalled that the General Assembly, in paragraph 9 of its resolution 1949 (XVIII) of 11 December 1963, requested the Secretary-General "in consultation with the Special Committee and the administering Power, to arrange for an effective United Nations presence before and during the elections referred to in paragraph 8 above". Further, the General Assembly, in paragraph 13 of its resolution 2023 (XX) of 5 November 1965, requested the Secretary-General "to take such action as he may deem expedient to ensure the implementation of the present resolution, and to report thereon to the Special Committee". The Secretary-General has had discussions with the Special Committee's Sub-Committee on

Aden and with the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom in connexion with the carrying out of these tasks.

6. In order to assist him in the discharge of the responsibility entrusted to him by the above-mentioned resolutions, the Secretary-General has decided to appoint Mr. Omar A. H. Adeel as his Special Representative for the question of Aden. The Secretary-General's Special Representative will attend the meetings of the Special Committee during its forthcoming consideration of the question of Aden.

7. Following the Special Committee's consideration of the question, and in the light of the report of his Special Representative, the Secretary-General will consider the further steps to be taken in consultation with the Sub-Committee on Aden, the Special Committee and the administering Power, in the carrying out of his tasks.

ANNEX IV

[A/AC.109/163]

Letter dated 17 May 1966 from the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations addressed to the Chairman of the Special Committee

In accordance with my undertaking at the 414th meeting of the Special Committee on 16 May 1966, I have the honour to transmit the text of the statement made on the same day in the House of Commons by the Right Honourable Michael Stewart, M.P., United Kingdom Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, on South Arabia.

The full text of the announcement by the Government of the Federation of South Arabia on 13 May, to which the Foreign Secretary referred, is included in paragraph 6 of the report of the Secretary-General to the Special Committee circulated as document A/AC.109/161.^a

I should be grateful if Your Excellency would arrange for the text of this letter and its enclosure to be circulated as a document of the Special Committee.

(Signed) CARADON

FEDERATION OF SOUTH ARABIA

Text of a statement by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, the Rt. Hon. Michael Stewart, M.P., in the House of Commons on 16 May 1966

With permission, Mr. Speaker, and that of the House, I wish to make a statement on South Arabia.

Hon. Members will have seen reports of the statement made by the Government of the Federation of South Arabia on the 13th of May that they have decided to accept the United Nations resolutions on South Arabia and intend to convene a conference, open to all state governments and political groups in South Arabia, to consider the ways and means whereby the United Nations resolutions can be implemented. I have now received the full texts of the Federal Government's statement and I am arranging for a copy to be placed in the Library of the House.

Her Majesty's Government have always made it clear that they will accept any solution of the constitutional problem in South Arabia which is capable of achieving a wide measure of agreement in the territory. We accordingly warmly welcome the Federal Government's intention to hold a representative conference and we share their hope that all South Arabians who have the interests of their country at heart will find it possible to participate.

Other political groups in South Arabia have also called for acceptance of the United Nations resolutions. There thus now exists a wide area of common ground between them and the Federal Government about their future objectives. This should enable them to co-operate in working out the practical implications of their policy.

Some of the recommendations in the United Nations resolutions raise problems of timing which will call for careful consideration. Those relating to the Aden base are already

^a See annex I, para. 6

^a See annex I.

covered by Her Majesty's Government's announcement in the Defence White Paper that British troops will be withdrawn from the base when South Arabia achieves its independence not later than 1968. There are others, such as the requirements that the emergency should be brought to an end and that all detainees should be released, which we should be prepared to implement provided that satisfactory evidence was forthcoming that terrorism in Aden had ended.

I have today learned that the Federal Government have handed to the High Commissioner, for transmission to the United Nations Secretary-General, a letter inviting him to appoint a United Nations observer to attend the proposed conference. I am asking my noble Friend, Lord Caradon, to inform the United Nations of the Federal Government's announcement and invitation and to take an early opportunity to discuss these generally welcome developments with the Secretary-General.

ANNEX V

[A/AC.109/101/Add.2 and Corr.1]

Question of Aden

Report of the Secretary-General (5 August 1966)

1. In his last report to the Special Committee on the question of Aden (see annex III), submitted in accordance with operative paragraph 13 of General Assembly resolution 2023 (XX) of 5 November 1965, the Secretary-General informed the Committee that his Special Representative for Aden, Mr. Omar A. H. Adeel, would attend the meetings of the Special Committee in Cairo during its consideration of the question of Aden. The Secretary-General also stated that, following the Special Committee's consideration of the question, and in the light of the report of his Special Representative, he would consider the further steps to be taken in carrying out his tasks in consultation with the Sub-Committee on Aden, the Special Committee and the administering Power.

2. At its 447th meeting, held in Cairo on 15 June 1966, the Special Committee adopted a resolution on the question of Aden (see para. 382 of chapter VI). In operative paragraph 12 of the resolution the Special Committee requested the Secretary-General, "in consultation with the Special Committee and the administering Power, to appoint immediately a special mission to Aden for the purpose of recommending practical steps necessary for the full implementation of the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly, and in particular for determining the extent of United Nations participation in the preparation and supervision of elections and of making a report to him as soon as possible for transmission to the Special Committee".

3. The Secretary-General transmitted the text of the resolution to the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations by letter dated 20 June 1966.

4. At the conclusion of the Special Committee's consideration of the question at its meetings in Cairo, the Secretary-General's Special Representative immediately returned to Headquarters and submitted a report to the Secretary-General. In his report, the Special Representative informed the Secretary-General of the discussions in the Special Committee leading to the adoption of its resolution.

5. In the light of the Special Representative's report and on the basis of the resolution adopted by the Special Committee, the Secretary-General, assisted by his Special Representative, began consultations on the appointment of the special mission. In the course of these consultations, the Secretary-General met and discussed the question with the Chairman of the Special Committee, the members of the Sub-Committee on Aden, and with the representative of the United Kingdom.

6. On 1 August 1966 the Deputy Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom addressed the following letter^a to the Secretary-General:

'Her Majesty's Government welcome the assistance and participation of the United Nations in achieving Her Majesty's Government's declared policy of bringing South Arabia to independence as a united sovereign state by 1968.

"Her Majesty's Government accept the operative clauses of General Assembly resolutions 1949 (XVIII) of December 1963 and 2023 (XX) of November 1965, subject to its being recognized, first, that Her Majesty's Government responsibilities for security cannot be limited or abandoned; and secondly, that Her Majesty's Government are bound by their existing treaties with the Federation of South Arabia and the unfederated South Arabian States until these treaties terminate. In particular, Her Majesty's Government are constitutionally unable to give directions to the Federal Government except in matters of external affairs, defence and the public service, and have no power to impose changes in the Federal Constitution.

"Her Majesty's Government will be glad to co-operate with a mission appointed by the Secretary-General, subject to agreement on its composition, for the purpose of recommending practical steps necessary for the full implementation of the above-mentioned resolutions of the General Assembly and, in particular, for determining the extent of United Nations participation in the preparation and supervision of elections, subject only to the two reservations noted in the preceding paragraph.

"I should be grateful for your confirmation that any mission appointed will operate on the above basis."

7. The reply of the Secretary-General,^a dated 5 August 1966, reads as follows:

"I have the honour to refer to your letter dated 1 August 1966 concerning the Question of Aden.

"I am pleased to note that your Government welcomes the assistance and participation of the United Nations in bringing South Arabia to independence as a united sovereign state by 1968, and that, subject to the reservations stated, it accepts the operative paragraphs of General Assembly resolutions 1949 (XVIII) of 11 December 1963 and 2023 (XX) of 5 November 1965.

"I also note with appreciation that your Government would be glad to co-operate with a mission appointed by the Secretary-General, subject to agreement on its composition, for the purpose of recommending practical steps necessary for the full implementation of the above-mentioned resolutions of the General Assembly and in particular for determining the extent of United Nations participation in the preparation and supervision of elections subject only to the reservations stated in your letter.

"As you are aware, this matter was the subject of operative paragraph 12 of the resolution adopted by the Special Committee at its 447th meeting on 15 June 1966, which requested the Secretary-General to appoint a special mission, for the purpose stated in that paragraph, in consultation with the Special Committee and the administering Power. I am accordingly in a position to inform you that the appointment of the special mission under the terms of the above-mentioned resolution will be made in consultation with your Government.

"When I undertake the necessary consultations with the Special Committee in this connexion, I shall bring to its attention the reservations recorded by your Government."

8. The Secretary-General is continuing his consultations in accordance with the Special Committee's resolution and will submit further reports as necessary.

^a Circulated in document A/6374.

CHAPTER VII*

BASUTOLAND, BECHUANALAND AND SWAZILAND

A. ACTION TAKEN BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE IN 1964 AND 1965 AND BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AT ITS TWENTIETH SESSION

1. Following its consideration of the question of Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland at its meetings in 1964, the Special Committee adopted a resolution (A/5800/Rev.1,¹ chap. VIII, para. 365) setting forth recommendations concerning these Territories. Among these recommendations was a request to the Secretary-General to undertake, in consultation with the administering Power, a study as to the ways and means of ensuring the economic independence of these Territories vis-à-vis the Republic of South Africa and to submit a report to the Special Committee and the General Assembly.

2. In compliance with this request, the Secretary-General submitted a report concerning these Territories to the Special Committee and to the General Assembly.² Annexed to the Secretary-General's report was the report of an economic and technical assistance mission which visited the Territories in May and June 1965. This mission, which was established after consultation between the Secretary-General and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, consisted of three members: the Chairman and one member nominated by the Secretary-General, and one member nominated by the United Kingdom Government.

3. The Special Committee again considered the question of Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland at its meetings in 1965. After discussion, the Special Committee adopted two resolutions (A/6000/Rev.1,³ chap. VII, paras. 292 and 364) on this question.

4. On the recommendation of the Fourth Committee, the General Assembly adopted resolution 2063 (XX) on 16 December 1965, the operative paragraphs of which read as follows:

[*"The General Assembly"*]

"1. *Approves* the chapters of the reports of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples relating to the Territories of Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland, and endorses the conclusions and recommendations contained therein;

"2. *Reaffirms* the inalienable right of the peoples of Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland to freedom and independence;

"3. *Once again invites* the administering Power to take urgent steps to implement fully General Assembly resolutions 1514 (XV), 1817 (XVII) and 1954 (XVIII) in conformity with the freely expressed wishes of the peoples of the three Territories;

"4. *Renews* its request that the administering Power should take immediate steps to return to the indigenous inhabitants all the land taken from them, whatever the form of or pretext for such alienation;

* Previously issued under the symbol A/6300/Add.5.

¹ Official Records of the General Assembly, Nineteenth Session, Annexes, annex No. 8 (part I).

² Ibid., Twentieth Session, Annexes, agenda item 23, document A/5958.

³ Ibid., Annexes, addendum to agenda item 23.

"5. *Requests* the Special Committee to consider, in co-operation with the Secretary-General, what measures are necessary for securing the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland, and to report to the General Assembly at its twenty-first session;

"6. *Expresses its satisfaction* to the Secretary-General for his efforts and endorses the recommendations contained in his report;

"7. *Decides* to establish a Fund for the Economic Development of Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland, to be made up of voluntary contributions and to be administered by the Secretary-General in close consultation with the Governments of the three Territories and with the co-operation and assistance of the Special Fund, the Technical Assistance Board, the Economic Commission for Africa and the specialized agencies concerned;

"8. *Considers* that the efforts to provide economic, financial and technical assistance, through United Nations programmes of technical co-operation and the specialized agencies, should continue in order to remedy the deplorable economic and social situation of the three Territories;

"9. *Requests* the Secretary-General to appoint resident representatives in the three Territories, as recommended in paragraph 22 of his report, and to report to the General Assembly at its twenty-first session on the operation of the Fund established under paragraph 7 above."

B. INFORMATION ON THE TERRITORIES⁴

5. Information on Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland is contained in the reports of the Special Committee to the General Assembly at its seventeenth, eighteenth, nineteenth and twentieth sessions⁵ and in the reports of the Secretary-General to the Special Committee in 1964 (A/AC.109/98) and 1965.² Supplementary information on recent political developments concerning the Territories and economic, social and educational conditions is set out below.

1. Problems common to the three Territories

Political developments

6. An indication of South Africa's policy with regard to future relations with the Territories was given in the Special Committee's report to the General Assembly at its twentieth session (A/6000/Rev.1, chap. VII, para. 5). On 5 June 1965, after taking into account the recent statements of the three Governments regarding the future of the respective Territories,

⁴ This section is based on information collected by the Secretariat from published sources. Information transmitted under Article 73 e of the Charter by the United Kingdom (for the year ending 31 December 1964) on 1 June 1965 for Bechuanaland, on 1 October 1965 for Swaziland, and on 5 November 1965 for Basutoland has also been taken into account.

⁵ Official Records of the General Assembly, Seventeenth Session, Annexes, addendum to agenda item 25, document A/5238, chap. V; *ibid.*, Eighteenth Session, Annexes, addendum to agenda item 23, document A/5446/Rev.1, chap. IX; *ibid.*, Nineteenth Session, Annexes, annex No. 8 (part I), document A/5800/Rev.1, chap. VIII; and *ibid.*, Twentieth Session Annexes, addendum to agenda item 23, document A/6000/Rev.1, chap. VII.

South Africa's Foreign Affairs Minister, Hillgard Muller, was reported to have said that his Government welcomed the forthcoming independence of these Territories, and would continue to co-operate with them in the economic and technical fields without interference in their internal affairs or political system.

7. A *communiqué*, issued at the close of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers Meeting which took place in London between 17 and 25 June 1965, welcomed the assurance of the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom that it remained the objective of his Government to lead to independence, on the basis of democratic government and the principle of universal adult suffrage, such of the British dependencies as desired it and could sustain it. The *communiqué* also recorded the view expressed during the meeting that such economic assistance and guarantees of territorial integrity as were necessary to maintain the Territories of Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland as independent States should be forthcoming.

8. At a joint meeting of the Royal African Society and the Royal Commonwealth Society in London on 1 July 1965, Mrs. Eirene White, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies, said in the course of her address that constitutional development in these Territories was proceeding with some rapidity. But, she added, none of them was economically independent, or likely to be for some time. For their professional and technical services they depended at present to a very substantial degree upon expatriate public servants from the Republic. She wondered, therefore, whether political independence combined with economic and administrative dependence would not lead to "a very severe headache" in the future.

9. Politically, Mrs. White observed, time was getting very short. This meant that it was a very great challenge to the United Kingdom and the people in the three Territories themselves, as well as to other well-wishing people in the world, to try to help make good some of those deficiencies which otherwise would make the political future of these Territories extraordinarily difficult and put a tremendous burden on their political leaders.

10. In discussing the position of the three Territories vis-à-vis South Africa, Mrs. White stated that this fact had to be recognized and that the people of these Territories had to work out for themselves some scheme of coexistence.

11. She further stated that the philosophy of Bantustan was not one which appealed to her Government or the Governments of the Territories. The United Kingdom would look with very great interest on the relationship to be worked out. She considered it incumbent upon her Government to see that in the intervening period remaining before independence, and also after independence, the people of the Territories had a fair chance to work out their own future.

12. Addressing a National Party meeting at Upington in South Africa on 30 September 1965, Mr. Verwoerd was reported to have said that the three Territories were of great importance to South Africa because of their proximity. That there should be peace, prosperity and progress in them was in South Africa's interest and the Republic was prepared to assist in bringing this about.

13. During the second session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) held in Accra, Ghana, from

21 to 25 October 1965, the question of Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland was discussed. A resolution was then adopted (see appendix III, annex, resolution AHG/RES.36), in which the Assembly expressed its desire to prevent the absorption of these Territories by South Africa and re-emphasized the importance of securing the application of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) and a guarantee by the United Nations for the territorial integrity, independence and sovereignty of these Territories.

14. On 7 February 1966, South Africa's Deputy Minister of Bantu Administration and Development, Mr. M. C. Botha, was reported to have confirmed in the House of Assembly that his Government was contemplating land dealings with the three Territories. He stated that his Government would be prepared to help these Territories to regain by purchase or exchange land currently occupied by Europeans, but that it was dependent on South Africa being able to play a part in guiding the future political and economic development of these Territories.

Economic conditions

15. As stated in paragraph 2 above, an economic and technical assistance mission visited the Territories during May and June 1965, the report of which was subsequently submitted to the Special Committee and the General Assembly.

16. A further economic mission from the United Kingdom Ministry of Overseas Development visited Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland between October and December 1965 with the agreement of the Governments of the three Territories. The terms of reference of the mission were:

"To examine, in consultation with the Governments of Basutoland, the Bechuanaland Protectorate and Swaziland, the measures required for the development of their economies, and for the reduction of their dependence on external aid for recurrent expenditure, and to estimate the extent and phasing of external assistance needed to achieve these ends."

The report has not yet been made available.

17. According to the information supplied by the United Nations Technical Assistance Board, projects for the three Territories approved under the Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance indicate a substantial increase between 1963-1964 and 1965-1966, from \$437,874 to \$848,948 (including contingency allocations of \$52,900 which have been authorized since 1 January 1965). The current projects continue to cover a broad range of development activities.

18. An office of the United Nations Development Programme, covering the three Territories, has been set up in Gaborone, Bechuanaland. This office is headed by an Assistant Resident Representative who is directly responsible to the Representative for Central and Southern Africa.

Educational conditions

19. In the course of the speech given by Mrs. Eirene White in July 1965 (see paras. 8-11 above), she expressed concern over the great gaps in the educational provision of these Territories. She said that there was no denying that there was the most tremendous lack of adequate educational facilities in each Territory. It was very difficult to see how in the short run this lack could be made good.

University of Basutoland, Bechuanaland Protectorate and Swaziland

20. In March 1965, the University of Basutoland, Bechuanaland Protectorate and Swaziland (UBBS), established eight "schools of study" to take the place of orthodox faculties. Among the subjects covered by these schools are African studies, biological and earth sciences, economics and administration, education, history, language and literature, law, mathematics and physics. As part of its expansion programme, the University created new lectureships in education, chemistry, physics, law and administration.

21. Following its establishment, the School of Education took an important step towards attracting recruits to the teaching profession. Instead of spending an extra year at the University studying education, students can now continue this subject with their four-year course leading to a bachelor's degree. Courses are also arranged for practising teachers, who are now allowed to register as part-time students for the post-graduate certificate in education, and to pursue their studies without interrupting their teaching jobs.

22. In July 1965, the Carnegie Corporation of New York announced that it would give a grant of some £34,000 to the School of Education to further its teacher education programme in all three Territories.

23. In October 1965, the Dulverton and Leverhulme Trusts of the United Kingdom made a grant of £43,000 to the Extension Department of UBBS to finance its development programme for the three years 1965-1968.

24. At the close of a meeting of the UBBS Council held in Swaziland during October 1965, it was disclosed that a University Grants Committee had been formed to deal with grants from different Governments and foundations. The University had secured some support from foundations in the United States and the United Kingdom, but it would require much greater support from both governmental and private sources in implementing its capital programme of £1.5 million for the period 1966-1970.

25. It was also disclosed that the Swaziland College of Agriculture was to be opened very shortly. The University had agreed to establish an organic link with the College, so that a one-year course for a diploma in agriculture, offered by the University, might be instituted in 1967. Certificate-trained candidates from the three Territories would be eligible for selection for this diploma course. Other matters discussed included the University's plans for increasing its contributions to teacher training, training for the legal profession, government officer training, co-operative institutes and general education throughout the three Territories.

26. In January 1966, the University decided to launch an urgent building project designed to increase student enrolment to 300 by 1967. The project, costing £150,000, would be financed by the United Kingdom Ministry of Overseas Development and the Inter-University Council for Higher Education Overseas.

27. In March 1966, it was reported that if the aim of this project were achieved, the University would probably face a financial deficit of about £600,000 in 1967. Financial support for the University had already been approved by the United Kingdom Government and other sources.

2. Basutoland

Political and constitutional developments

By-election on 1 July 1965

28. Chief Leabua Jonathan, leader of the ruling Basutoland National Party (BNP), who was defeated in the general election held on 29 April 1965, won a by-election at Mpharane on 1 July 1965. The sitting member, Mr. John Mulupe Mothepa, resigned to give Chief Jonathan a chance to lead his party in the National Assembly. Chief Jonathan received 2,873 votes and Mr. Philip Lebona of the Basutoland Congress Party (BCP), 1,055 votes.

29. On 5 July, Chief Jonathan was sworn in as Prime Minister. Immediately afterwards, Chief Sekhonyana Maseribane, who had resigned as Prime Minister, was appointed Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Internal and External Affairs.

Relations with South Africa

30. On 4 May 1965, immediately after the general election, Chief Leabua Jonathan stated that, while emphatically rejecting any idea of Basutoland's incorporation in South Africa and condemning apartheid, Basutoland would like to establish diplomatic relations with the Republic and would negotiate with it to obtain all material benefits for the Basotho.

31. The following day it was reported that the South African Government welcomed the election victory in Basutoland by Chief Jonathan's party and that it expected to start preparing the ground for future relations with that Territory. In view of Chief Jonathan's slender majority, the South African Government was said to have considered it important to bolster his authority with economic aid.

32. The Basutoland Government's policy of co-operation and friendly relations with South Africa was the main issue debated during the first session of the new National Assembly on 19 May 1965. According to reports, this policy was vigorously attacked by the BCP. Chief Sekhonyana Maseribane, the then Prime Minister, was reported to have said at the close of the debate that Basutoland had always co-operated with South Africa and that there were no other neighbours with whom matters of common interest could be worked out.

33. On 20 May 1965, after rejecting a no confidence motion proposed by Mr. Ntsu Mukhehle leader of the BCP and of the Opposition, the National Assembly approved a motion of confidence in the Government.

34. On 26 May 1965, Chief Maseribane said that his Government was prepared to hold discussions with South Africa and the United Kingdom on the utilization of the mountain rivers of Basutoland, the Territory's main economic asset. He was interested in the proposal made recently by the Chamber of Commerce of the Orange Free State that the South African Government should consult Basutoland on the Ox-Bow hydroelectric scheme, the biggest single project under consideration in the Territory, the development of which would depend on the sale of power and water to the Republic.

35. On 9 June 1965, Mr. Verwoerd announced that the South African Government was sending 100,000 bags of grain (a bag contains 200 pounds), worth about £160,000 to Chief Leabua Jonathan in response to the latter's urgent appeal for assistance in relieving starvation in Basutoland. According to reports, no ap-

proaches had been made to the United Kingdom in respect of famine relief.

36. In the three and a half months following Mr. Verwoerd's announcement, the gift became the centre of controversy in Basutoland. The Opposition BCP accused the Prime Minister of trying to win the by-election, held on 1 July 1965, by means of a "cheap trick", and expressed the fear that the gift might be used as a lure to "incorporate the Territory into the Republic".

37. On 23 July 1965, Chief Jonathan was reported to have said in the National Assembly that the gift was a generous gesture in a time of serious drought and that, as leader of the BNP, he was giving the grain to the Government for distribution to needy and destitute people regardless of their political affiliation.

38. The Opposition then tabled a motion asking that the National Assembly should dissociate itself from the gift and that the Government should not handle the grain in any way.

39. The debate was interrupted when the Assembly was abruptly adjourned on 28 July 1965, after the High Court of Basutoland had unseated two members of the BNP, following the submission by the BCP of petitions alleging irregularities in the last general election. The effect of the Court's decision was to reduce the BNP over-all majority to nil.

40. On 18 August 1965, a Government spokesman was reported to have said that it was hoped soon to accelerate distribution of South Africa's gift of grain.

41. According to reports, Chief Jonathan issued a policy statement on 27 August 1965, announcing that he was formally seeking early discussions with Mr. Verwoerd on such matters as the Ox-Bow hydroelectric scheme and the improvement of conditions for Basotho employed in South Africa. He reiterated that his Government desired to live on good neighbourly terms with other States, including South Africa with whose economic future Basutoland's was necessarily intertwined.

42. Ten Basotho, who were all members of the BCP, were stranded in London during August 1965 as a result of the South African Government's refusal to grant them transit visas to return to Basutoland. A statement by South Africa's Foreign Affairs Minister alleged that the men left Basutoland to train as saboteurs and guerrillas, an allegation which was denied by the BCP. The Minister stated that his Government would reconsider its decision if it was given conclusive proof that the men were *bona fide* students.

43. The Colonial Office expressed the view that "people who live in Basutoland should be able to go freely into and out of the country". This matter formed one of the subjects of discussion between the Secretary of State for the Colonies and Chief Jonathan, during the latter's visit to London at the end of August 1965. Chief Jonathan was reported to have said that he did not concede South Africa's right to deny access of nationals to their homeland or to grant it only on conditions.

44. Early in September 1965, it was reported that the Colonial Office had authorized the Basutoland Government to open discussions with South Africa on matters of common interest, and that the extent of and the timing for such discussions would be worked out between the Governments of Basutoland and the United Kingdom in further talks.

45. In the same month, the South African Government was said to have imposed restrictions on the dispatch of certain printed materials to Basutoland. Two London magazines complained that issues disappeared before reaching the Territory, and the South African police at a border post seized 2,000 copies of a Basutoland document from the car of Mr. B. M. Khaketla, a member of the Paramount Chief's Privy Council, who was also a leading member of the Marema-Tlou Freedom Party (MTFP).

46. Following talks with the Basutoland delegation between 22 November and 1 December 1965, the Colonial Office was reported to have agreed that, provided that the United Kingdom Government was kept informed, Basutoland might open negotiations with South Africa on access, extradition, cultural matters, diplomatic representation after independence, labour and employment, the Ox-Bow hydroelectric scheme, and commercial matters, with the exception of the revision of the customs union agreement. There was, however, no indication that the talks covered the question raised early in November 1965 in the Basutoland National Assembly by the BCP, namely, that of the reincorporation into Basutoland of an area of South Africa in the Orange Free State, Natal and Eastern Cape Province.

47. With regard to this question, government spokesmen in the Assembly said that it would be given top, but not immediate, priority. The Government felt it necessary to wait until it had assumed full powers so that it could negotiate with South Africa directly, while the BCP demanded that negotiations be held with the Republic through the United Kingdom Government.

The question of independence

The question of independence

48. As noted in the last report of the Special Committee, the state of the political parties in the National Assembly as a result of the general election held on 29 April 1965 was: the Basutoland National Party (BNP), thirty-one seats; the Basutoland Congress Party (BCP), twenty-five; and the Marema-Tlou Freedom Party (MTFP), four.

49. Immediately after the general election, Chief Leabua Jonathan, leader of the BNP, said that he would claim independence at the earliest date permitted under the present Constitution, which was based on the agreement reached at the 1964 Constitutional Conference, namely that the United Kingdom Government would grant independence to Basutoland a year after the general election, provided it received a request from the Basutoland Legislature to that effect.

50. On 19 July 1965, Mr. Ntsu Mokhehle, the BCP leader, said that his party would ask for postponement of independence for Basutoland unless a new election was held before 29 April 1966. On 19 August 1965, he requested the Paramount Chief to dissolve the Basutoland Legislature and appoint a caretaker government until new elections could be held. He claimed that the BNP had lost its majority in the Legislature as a result of the recent decision of the Basutoland High Court to void the election results in two constituencies.

51. The BNP was subsequently reported to have recaptured these two constituencies in by-elections. With the pledged support of a member of the MTFP, the BNP thus had a majority of four in the National Assembly. It was also reported that the governing party was assured of a working majority in the Senate

as twenty-one of the twenty-two principal chiefs, who formed the majority of the thirty-three-member Senate, now pledged their support to the Government. Before the general election, eighteen of these chiefs had favoured the MTFP. Three of the remaining eleven senators belong to the BNP.

52. Early in September 1965, after discussions with the Secretary of State for the Colonies on the question of independence, Chief Jonathan issued a statement in which he said that the United Kingdom Government had unreservedly agreed to take steps forthwith to enable his Government to start solving the problems which it shared with South Africa, as well as to get on with day-to-day administration. The statement added that the talks had covered a wide range, including the delegation of powers within the field of external affairs and internal security, the granting of executive powers to the Civil Service Commission, and the Africanization of the Civil Service.

53. During his second round of constitutional talks with the United Kingdom Government in November/December 1965, Chief Jonathan confirmed that his Government would ask for independence immediately after 29 April 1966. For the United Kingdom Government, Mrs. Eirene White, accepted Chief Jonathan's statement of intention and "his assurance that the stipulated conditions were likely to be fulfilled".

54. In February 1966, the opposition parties in the Basutoland Legislature were reported to be against the independence of the Territory under Chief Jonathan's administration, contending that his party's majority was too slender to give him a sufficient hold on power to lead Basutoland to independence.

Economic conditions

55. The natural resources of Basutoland are limited, the principal ones being its agricultural land, water and manpower. The economy is primarily a subsistence one, with exports consisting chiefly of wool and mohair. The main effort of the Basutoland Government has been directed towards improvement in farming, but the Territory is not yet self-sufficient in agricultural produce. During recent years drought and famine have been experienced in parts of the Territory. On 7 January 1966, the United Kingdom, Australia and Canada agreed to an emergency plan to send grain to drought-stricken areas of central and southern Africa, including Basutoland. This plan, however, ran into difficulties and was not implemented.

56. In October 1965, the Basutoland Government was reported to have started a crash programme aimed at making the Territory agriculturally viable within three to ten years by means of progressive farming schemes and land tenure reforms.

Land

57. On 3 August 1965, Basutoland's Prime Minister, Chief Jonathan, was reported to have said that ownership of land in Basutoland would continue to remain the common property of the Basuto Nation. However, the Government had agreed in principle that limited leases could be granted through a government-sponsored development agency. He added that the Government did not contemplate such a serious departure from the traditional land tenure system as the granting of unconditional private ownership rights to any occupier, African or European.

United Nations assistance to the Territory

58. Details of projects approved for 1965-1966 under the Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance (EPTA), including contingency allocations, are as follows:

Approved category I Programme	Cost (\$US)	Experts		Fellowships	
		No. Months		No. Months	
UNTA statistics	19,200	1	12		
UNTA economic programming and projections	31,000	1	19		
ILO co-operation and small-scale industries	19,200	1	12		
FAO nutrition	12,800	1	8		
FAO rural institutions and services	24,600	2	16		
FAO animal production and health	19,200	1	12		
UNESCO science teaching ...	38,400	1	24		
WHO tuberculosis control	99,612	6	96		
<i>Sub-total, category I</i>	<i>264,012</i>				
Contingency projects	Cost (\$US)	Experts		Fellowships	
		No. Months		No. Months	
UNTA public administration..	2,500			1	2
UNTA natural resources development and power	6,400	2	4		
<i>Sub-total, contingencies</i>	<i>8,900</i>				
TOTAL	272,912				

59. A statistical expert, appointed on 1 March 1964 under the Regular Programme of Technical Assistance, was transferred to EPTA on 1 January 1965; he completed his assignment in Basutoland at the end of February. Another expert was also sent to the Territory early in August 1965 for one year to assist in the implementation of a community development programme.

60. In its programme for 1967-1968, UNESCO proposes to send to Basutoland one expert in educational planning for eight months, one expert in teacher-training (science) for twenty-four months, and one expert in teacher-training (education) for sixteen months. During 1965, it awarded six fellowships to persons from the Territory, five for a period of three and a half months in adult education and literacy teaching, and one for a period of nine months in home economics. It also proposes to award in 1968 a one-year fellowship to a Basotho for the study of educational planning. Travel grants were given to a member of the Basutoland Homemakers Association, who started a study programme in Canada during July 1965, as well as to a Basotho member of the World University Service for training abroad in student welfare techniques during 1965-1966.

61. In the past six years (1960-1965), UNICEF has allocated a total of \$503,700 for three projects in Basutoland, namely, maternal and child health, tuberculosis control and applied nutrition.

62. During 1965, WHO provided two fellowships for study abroad, in laboratory technology and radiology. It has set aside \$18,000 for its 1966 fellowship programme in medical education and training.

*Social conditions**Labour*

63. The latest information available on the subject of Basotho workers in the Republic of South Africa is contained in the Secretary-General's report to the General Assembly at its twentieth session.⁶

64. During 1964, 1,253 persons (1,779 in 1963) were registered at the employment exchange in Maseru of whom 247 were placed in employment. The drop in registration during the year did not necessarily indicate a reduction of unemployment; many persons were believed to have failed to patronize the employment exchange after learning that registration was not synonymous with obtaining employment.

65. The total number of trade unions in the Territory was eight in 1964, an increase of one over the previous year. Their main activities centred around negotiations with individual employers over dismissals. There were no trade disputes of any significance.

66. The minimum wage for unskilled workers of either sex in government employment was raised to 6s. per day in April 1964. No important changes occurred in the wages of labour privately employed; employers concluded no formal collective agreements concerning wages with any trade union.

67. Among the labour legislation passed in 1964 was a new employment bill. One of its requirements is the imposition of a similar minimum wage, applicable to private undertakings. The bill received sharp criticism from the employers' organizations.

*3. Bechuanaland**Political and constitutional developments**Relations with South Africa*

68. After his visit to Zambia in April 1965, Bechuanaland Prime Minister Seretse Khama said that he had discussed with the President of Zambia closer co-operation between the two countries as well as the improvement of communications. Bechuanaland was trying to reduce its heavy economic dependence on South Africa by expanding trade with Zambia and other African States, but his country's main cash product, beef, worth £5 million annually, would continue to be exported to South Africa and would not be diverted to Zambia.

69. On 6 July 1965, Mr. Khama stated that drought and famine would cause great hardship in Bechuanaland during 1965, but that with the assistance of the World Food Programme (WFP), jointly established by the United Nations and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), the Government could meet the challenge. However, although famine conditions were becoming critical, the first shipment of the WFP food did not arrive until September 1965. Meanwhile the United Kingdom Government authorized the Bechuanaland Government to spend up to £35,000 per month on emergency supplies. Orders for such supplies were placed in South Africa.

70. In his recent address to a National Party meeting at Upington, South Africa, Mr. Verwoerd stated that although Bechuanaland had not asked for food, it had asked that the transport of supplies from other countries via South Africa be expedited and had also asked for concessions in respect of import duties. Mr.

Verwoerd stated that the Republic had met both these requests.

The question of independence

71. On 9 July 1965, Mr. Phillip Matante, leader of the Opposition Bechuanaland Peoples Party (BPP), which holds three of the thirty-one seats in the Legislative Assembly, introduced a motion of no confidence. The motion, which was later rejected, criticized the Government for failing to deal adequately with the drought position and alleged that the general election held on 1 March 1965 was won unfairly. He was reported to have said that he would ask the United Kingdom Government to call a referendum if the motion was defeated.

72. On 15 July 1965, Mr. David Morgan, Bechuanaland Minister of Works and Communications, was reported to have stated that the sooner Bechuanaland achieved independence, the sooner it could start seeking desperately needed development capital. He added that the United Kingdom Government was slow in providing financial assistance to Bechuanaland, which was faced with its worst drought in thirty years.

73. During the week ending 17 July 1965, the Prime Minister informed the Legislative Assembly that his Government was holding talks with the United Kingdom on the date for independence. In reply to a question, he said that he had "a mandate from the people of Bechuanaland" to take the Territory into independence without another general election.

74. On 13 October 1965, the Colonial Office announced that the United Kingdom had agreed in principle to independence for Bechuanaland by 30 September 1966. Proposals for the independence Constitution would be worked out in Bechuanaland; thereafter there would be a constitutional conference in London in the first half of 1966 to work out the actual Constitution.

75. On 13 December 1965, Mr. Khama addressed the Legislative Assembly in regard to constitutional proposals which the Government had completed. Under these proposals the Territory would adopt a republic form of government while remaining within the British Commonwealth as the new State of Botswana.

76. The Prime Minister in office would automatically become the Republic's first President with full executive power and command of the armed forces. The Legislative Assembly would be renamed the National Assembly which, with the President, would constitute Parliament.

77. The life of the Assembly would be limited to periods of up to five years. All adult citizens would have the right to vote. The future election of the President would be associated with the election of members of the Assembly whose majority support would be necessary to enable him to retain office. He would not be a member of the Assembly and would have the power to summon, prorogue or dissolve it at any time.

78. Provision would be made for the appointment of the Chief Justice by the President and of puisne judges and magistrates by a Judicial Service Commission.

79. The decision that Bechuanaland should become the independent Republic of Botswana on 30 September 1966 was announced by the Secretary of State for the Colonies at the end of a Constitutional Conference held in London from 14-20 February 1966 and attended by representatives of the political parties in the Bechuanaland Legislature. The Secretary of State said that

⁶ *Ibid.*, Twentieth Session, Annexes, agenda item 23, document A/5958, annex, chap. IV, paras. 8 and 9.

the Constitution which had been agreed on was substantially drawn up in Bechuanaland and that it had been endorsed by the Legislature of the Territory before the opening of the Conference. According to reports, the Opposition representative, Mr. Phillip Mante, refused to attend the last two meetings because he maintained that the Conference should have been postponed until further consultations had taken place.

Economic conditions

80. The cattle industry is the mainstay of Bechuanaland's economy and the majority of the people subsist on their own crops. The Territory suffered a serious economic setback in 1965 which was brought about by the country's worst drought in several decades. On 8 April 1965, the Bechuanaland Government declared the Territory drought-stricken and introduced schemes to combat drought and famine. On 6 July 1965 it stated that food crops had been completely devastated, that the number of destitute people was increasing and that cattle mortality would be heavy.

81. According to reports, imports of maize were expected to reach 350,000 bags in 1965, compared with an average of 56,000 for the past ten years. During the same period the Territory had exported an average of 51,000 bags of sorghum; 100,000 bags would have to be imported during 1965. Cattle losses could reach 250,000 in the east of the Territory alone, i.e., half the total cattle population in that area.

82. In May 1965 the World Food Programme (WFP) agreed to provide the Territory with emergency aid at a cost of \$420,000. This agreement was revised to furnish additional aid totalling \$1.3 million in July and some \$2.8 million in October. Food supplies from the WFP were distributed to more than 100,000 people.

83. On 7 January 1966, the United Kingdom, Canada and Australia agreed on an emergency plan to send grain to Bechuanaland to mitigate the effect of its prolonged drought. This plan, however, ran into difficulties and was not implemented.

84. Mrs. Eirene White (see paras. 8-11 above) stated recently that despite a series of disastrous droughts, Bechuanaland could achieve considerable economic progress. She did not believe, however, that for the immediate future the Territory would be able to sustain itself without substantial assistance from external sources. A similar view was subsequently expressed by the Prime Minister who stressed that there was a great need for development funds for improving agriculture, education and social services in the Territory.

Agriculture and livestock

85. Among the drought relief schemes introduced in 1965 were the drilling of new boreholes in emergency grazing areas and the improvement of borehole maintenance; the use of the Odiakwe veterinary camp for grazing, and the supply of vitamin A and phosphorous to enhance the chances of cattle recovering after the drought. The Government also promoted self-help among African farmers and supplied them with selected corn seeds at subsidized prices.

86. Furthermore, the Government gave every encouragement to farmers to expand cotton production. The Agricultural Department introduced dry-land cotton for most regions and irrigable cotton for flood areas in Ngamiland. Nearly 1,000 bales were produced and

exported to South Africa during the 1964/65 season; expectations for the 1965/66 season were in the region of 3,000 bales. It was hoped to produce enough to justify the establishment of a ginnery in the Territory. The Department found that African farmers showed great enthusiasm for cotton, and expressed the opinion that Bechuanaland might become an important producer within ten years. It stated that the problem was to prevent farmers from putting too much land under cotton, which would reduce essential food crops and make reaping difficult. Finally, it advocated a large number of very efficient small units.

Mining

87. In November 1965, the Bechuanaland Government was reported to have approved an application by Messrs. W. J. Engelbrecht and G. van den Brink to prospect for diamonds in an area covering about 4,460 square miles south-west of Maun in the Batawana Tribal Territory.

Communications

88. The railway line from Cape Town to Bulawayo passes through the length of the eastern region of Bechuanaland. The section within the Territory, upon which the cattle industry is wholly dependent, forms part of the undertakings of the Rhodesia Railways, which is a statutory body. The Rhodesia Railways are at present operated jointly by Southern Rhodesia and Zambia. By the terms of an agreement concluded in 1959 between the Rhodesia Railways and South African Railways each system operates approximately half the length of the 394-mile-long track within the Territory. In February 1965, it was announced that South African Railways had given six months' notice of a decision to end the agreement, a step which means that Rhodesia Railways would take over the whole route.

United Nations assistance to the Territory

89. Reference has already been made to the emergency relief aid given to the Territory by the World Food Programme. Details of projects approved for 1965-1966 under the Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance (EPTA) including contingency allocations, are as follows in the table on page 515.

90. The 1964 Regular Programme of Technical Assistance provided for the award to persons from the Territory of seven fellowships (six for four months each and one for ten months) in the field of community development. Arrangements were also made to enable an official of the Bechuanaland Government to participate in the Group Training Programme in Technical Assistance. Under the 1965 Regular Programme, an expert was sent to the Territory, on an initial assignment of one year, to advise the Government concerning community development.

91. UNESCO's 1965-1966 programme provides for the services of two experts in infant methods-teaching, two in arts and crafts teaching, and two in mathematics teaching, each for a period of twelve months. In its 1967-1968 programme it proposes to provide one expert in educational planning for eight months and three experts in teacher training for seventy-two months. It also proposes to award one fellowship in educational planning for 1967 and another in teacher training for 1967-1968. Travel grants were made to the Boy Scouts Association to enable a Scout from Bechuanaland to

Approved category I Programme	Cost (\$US)	Experts		Fellowships		Equipment and supplies (\$US)
		No.	Months	No.	Months	
ILO manpower organization	4,800	1	3			
ILO co-operation and small-scale industries	24,000	2	15			
FAO animal production and health ..	51,000	1	24	3	18	1,800
UNESCO teacher training	115,200	3	72			
WHO midwifery education	24,000	1	24			
WHO trypanosomiasis control	45,000	2	48			1,000
<i>Sub-total, category I</i>	264,000					
<i>Contingency projects</i>						
WMO meteorology	15,400	1	9			
UNTA statistics	8,100	1	4	1	6	
UNTA economic programming and projections	10,000	1	4	1	6	
<i>Sub-total, contingencies</i>	33,500					
TOTAL	297,500					

receive training abroad during 1965-1966. On his return, he will be employed at the Youth Training Centre in Gaberones.

92. In 1965, UNICEF made an allocation of \$65,000 towards educational development in Bechuanaland and WHO awarded a fellowship in malaria eradication to a person from the Territory. It also proposes an expenditure of \$18,000 in the fellowship programme for 1966.

Social conditions

Labour

93. In 1964 the number of persons employed in the Territory, apart from those engaged in cattle-raising and agriculture, was approximately 13,850 (compared with 8,950 in the previous year), with the Government as the most important employer. A further 35,000 Botswana worked in South Africa.

94. The minimum rates for pay per hour for government manual workers were 7d. for unskilled, 1/- for semi-skilled and 1/7 for tradesmen.

95. The trade union movement is still at an early stage of development. A provisional programme for future labour legislation has been drawn up with the object of bringing existing laws up to date and introducing certain new measures.

96. The emergency measures which were taken early in 1965 to alleviate the famine conditions prevailing in the Territory included the acceleration and expansion of public works programmes to make available 950,000 days of work for which wages would total £210,000 and the recruitment of Botswana for work both within the Territory and abroad.

Public health

97. After famine struck the Territory in 1965, there was a steady rise in the number of deaths related to malnutrition. In order to remedy this situation, the Government decided to supply vitamin-rich food to an estimated 10,000 pregnant women, 15,000 nursing mothers, 110,000 children from one to seven years of age and 71,000 school children.

4. Swaziland

Political and constitutional developments Relations with South Africa

98. In February 1965, it was reported that despite representations made by the Swaziland Government, South Africa had prohibited Mr. Allen Nxumalo, Chairman of the Swaziland Democratic Party, from passing through the Republic to Tanzania.

99. On 30 March 1965, South Africa's Minister of Agricultural Technical Services said that, with the approval of the Swaziland authorities, inspectors and veterinarians were being sent to the Territory to help combat foot-and-mouth disease, adding that the outbreak was a serious threat to the Republic.

100. On 11 June 1965, the Ngwenyama was reported to have sent a mission to the heads of all the major African countries. He instructed the mission to establish the friendliest possible relations with African States and to impress on them that Swaziland wanted to work with them to ensure real independence. He gave African States an assurance of total rejection of apartheid and his opposition to any South African interference in Swaziland's affairs. The mission also was instructed to explain that Swaziland's geographical position in regard to South Africa and Mozambique made it economically dependent on these neighbours.

101. On 4 November 1965, a Swaziland police spokesman was reported to have stated that two South African policemen had crossed the border into the Territory and had taken an African prisoner from a Swaziland police station to stand trial in the Republic; neither the commanding officer nor the Swaziland Government had sanctioned this action.

Question of independence

102. At a Public Meeting of the Swazis held on 22 July 1965, the Ngwenyama stated that his Government had asked the Colonial Office for early talks on the question of independence for Swaziland. In a statement issued on the same day, Prince Makhosini Dlamini, leader of the Imbokodvo Party, criticized the "delaying tactics" of the United Kingdom Government and emphasized that Swaziland was ready for in-

dependence and wanted to end foreign supremacy and colonialism "once and for all".

103. Towards the end of August 1965, a local committee was appointed to review the present Constitution of Swaziland and to make detailed recommendations to the Secretary of State for the Colonies on a new constitution. The Committee was composed of Her Majesty's Commissioner (Chairman), two official members (the Chief Secretary and the Attorney-General) and twelve unofficial members (eight from the Imbokodvo Party and four from the United Swaziland Association) of the Legislative Council. In a statement to the Legislative Council, the Chief Secretary said that political parties and groups not represented in the Council would be given an appropriate opportunity to present their views to the Committee.

104. In March 1966, the proposals for a new constitution which the Committee had completed were submitted to the Secretary of State for consideration and were tabled in the Swaziland Legislature for discussion. Under the proposed new constitution, Swaziland will assume internal self-government some time in 1966 on the British monarchical pattern under United Kingdom protection. The Paramount Chief will be recognized as King and Head of State by all the inhabitants, both African and European. There will be a bicameral Parliament. The Lower House, or the House of Assembly, will consist of a Speaker, twenty-four members elected by universal adult suffrage, six other members (nominated by the King) and the Attorney-General. The Upper House will have a Speaker and twelve members, half chosen by the House of Assembly and the other half appointed by the King. Subject to the acceptance by the United Kingdom Government of these constitutional proposals, it is believed that Swaziland will become an independent kingdom within the Commonwealth by 1970.

105. Following the establishment of the Constitutional Committee, several political leaders, including Mr. O. M. Mabuza, Chairman of the Joint Council of Swaziland Political Parties, protested against the exclusion of representatives of opposition nationalist parties from that committee. The Joint Council had previously submitted a memorandum to the Colonial Office calling for the holding of a fully representative conference in London as soon as possible to make constitutional arrangements for independence on the basis of universal adult suffrage and the full integration of the Swazis into the Territory's administrative and economic systems. The Joint Council also deplored the infiltration of South African policies into the major spheres of the life of the Territory.

Localization of the Civil Service

106. In his speech to the Legislative Council on 12 October 1965, Her Majesty's Commissioner stated that the problem of localization of the Public Service would be investigated by a commission, whose report should be ready early in 1966. (The Commission, consisting of a Chairman (Mr. T. C. Luke of Sierra Leone) and two Swazi members, was appointed in October 1965.) He stated further that considerable progress had already been made in the sphere of training for the Public Service with the opening recently of the Staff Training Institute at Mbanane and the Police Training College at Matsapa. He felt that while well-organized public service training could go far to expedite localization, the basic solution to the problem

lay in the development of the educational system to provide an adequate flow of well-educated candidates.

Economic conditions

107. In recent years progress has been achieved by European-owned and managed industries, principally irrigation farming, forestry and mining, the Territory's main foreign exchange earners. An important investor in these industries is the Commonwealth Development Corporation, whose total commitment rose by some £3 million to about £23 million in 1964. The total value of exports in the same year increased by some £250,000 to £11,165,000. The growth of modern economy has so far had little effect on the traditional economy.

108. In a statement made on 22 July 1965, the leader of the Imbokodvo Party is reported to have said that the colonial Powers had accentuated the disequilibrium between the living standard of the Europeans and the colonized Swazis, and that the problem was the reluctance of those in power to give opportunities to the Swazi.

109. Her Majesty's Commissioner stated in his speech to the Legislative Council on 12 October 1965 that the Government proposed to concentrate in the Development Plan for 1966-1968 on raising living standards, particularly for the rural Swazi population, and on reducing the gap between the Government's annual expenditure and revenue. A corollary to these objectives would be to train an increasing number of Swazi so that they might play an increasingly responsible role in both the public and private sectors of the Territory's economy. The Government was fully confident that Swaziland had the potential human and physical resources to enable it to become a contented, economically viable, self-governing country. The Government was conscious, however, that the Territory did not at present have sufficient capital or technical skills to develop that potential. It must accordingly continue to look outside for assistance.

110. Her Majesty's Commissioner also said that the United Kingdom Government was likely to make a grant to Swaziland to meet development expenditure for the three-year period beginning 1 April 1965, which would be larger than the Territory had received in the past. (On 8 February 1966, it was announced that Colonial Development and Welfare allocations totalling £3,900,000 had been made for 1965-1968, representing an increase of £1,238,000 over the previous three years.) He hoped that financial and technical aid for development would also be made available from sources other than the United Kingdom during this period. He pointed out that an economic mission from the Ministry of Overseas Development was to visit the Territory at the end of November 1965 and hoped that, on the basis of its findings, the United Kingdom Government would provide additional capital assistance. He added that the Government was giving consideration to ways in which internal revenue could be increased.

Agriculture and livestock

111. Agricultural commodities accounted for 75 per cent of Swaziland's visible export trade during 1964, most of which was produced on irrigated land under European ownership. Plans were made by European farmers for rapid expansion in the production of certain irrigated crops, notably sugar and citrus.

112. The Territory is not entirely self-sufficient in foods-stuffs such as maize, the staple diet of the Swazi. The Agricultural Department accordingly embarked during April 1965 on a campaign to encourage farmers to adopt the improved method of growing maize developed by the Malkerns Research Station.

113. On the subject of the development of agriculture and livestock, Her Majesty's Commissioner said in his recent speech to the Legislative Council that:

"The Government looks primarily to its agricultural policy to raise living standards, particularly of the rural population. The aim will be to stimulate Swazi production, and to develop it as far as practicable from a subsistence to a cash economy basis. Efforts will be concentrated in selected areas through sound land use planning for rural development projects.

"The possibilities will be explored of introducing pilot settlement schemes on individual leasehold tenure for the production of higher value cash crops and improved livestock.

"The establishment of the Swaziland Credit and Savings Bank providing farmers with supervised credit will be a vitally important complement to that policy. Private enterprise development, for example, the new meat works and cotton ginnery, will also play a major part.

"Agricultural development has been handicapped by the lack of adequate instructional facilities for the smaller farmers, but the opening next year of the Agricultural College at Malkerns will go far to overcome that problem, both in the training of self-employed farmers and of extension staff for the Department of Agriculture.

"The proper utilization of our water resources will be an important feature in any economic development in Swaziland. The United Nations is providing us with technical assistance to enable us to apply to the United Nations Special Fund for the financing of a comprehensive survey of the Usutu basin . . . The Water Laws Commission . . . is now engaged on drafting its report and proposals for new legislation. . . .

" . . . After a period of basic preparation for a co-operative movement, eight producers' societies are expected to have been formed by the end of the year."

Industry

114. In the course of his speech Her Majesty's Commissioner stated that mining continued satisfactorily and that there was hope of expansion in coal mining. Progress had been made on the Matsapa industrial estate. Certain undertakings, including the Territory's first cotton ginnery and meat works, had recently been opened and sites sold for further secondary industries.

Communications

115. The United Kingdom Government has approved a grant of £50,000 for construction of an access road from Sidvokodvo to Grand Valley to open up a hitherto largely inaccessible part of the Territory. Within the limitations of available finance it is the Government's intention to expand its roads programme.

United Nations assistance to the Territory

116. Details of projects approved for 1965-1966 under EPTA, including contingency allocations, are as follows:

<i>Approved category I Programme</i>	<i>Cost (\$US)</i>	<i>Experts</i>		<i>Fellowships</i>		<i>Equipment and supplies (\$US)</i>
		<i>No.</i>	<i>Months</i>	<i>No.</i>	<i>Months</i>	
UNTA statistics project	38,400	1	24			
UNTA economic programming and projections	25,900	1	16			
ILO manpower organization	4,800	1	3			
FAO rural institutions and services	33,100	1	11			
WHO tuberculosis control	148,236	6	144			1,000
<i>Sub-total, category I</i>	268,036					
<i>Contingency projects</i>						
UNTA public administration	2,500			1	2	
FAO land and water development	8,000	2	4			
<i>Sub-total, contingencies</i>	10,500					
TOTAL	278,536					

117. Under the 1965 Regular Programme of Technical Assistance an expert has been recruited, on a one-year appointment, to advise the Swaziland Government on community development organization and training.

118. In June 1965, the Special Fund provided \$462,900 to meet part of the cost of the aerial geophysical survey of the Territory.

119. During 1965, FAO awarded fellowships for one year to two persons from the Territory, in the fields of agricultural extension and horticulture.

120. UNESCO awarded a fellowship in 1965 in the field of educational planning. It also proposes to recruit one expert and award one fellowship in the same field during 1967-1968. A member of the Swaziland Trade Union Congress received a travel grant to enable him to undertake a study programme in Uganda from February to May 1964.

121. During the period 1961-1965, UNICEF made an allocation of \$186,900, which was used to establish projects concerning basic health services and applied nutrition.

122. WHO awarded a fellowship in malaria eradication in 1965. It proposes an expenditure of \$16,000 on fellowships under the education training programme for 1966.

Social conditions *Labour*

123. In 1964, 25,470 Africans (including 5,680 foreign Africans) were employed, representing 17 per cent of the working-age population (15-64 years). According to the Labour Commissioner, the main problem confronting his Department is the need to find 2,100 new jobs annually, rising to 2,500 by 1970, to accommodate the expected increase in the working-age population. Allied to this is the urgent need for vocational and industrial training to fit the local population for full participation in existing and future employment.

124. Measures already taken or contemplated to combat this problem have included the establishment of employment exchanges, stricter control of immigration, training and the institution of a manpower planning unit to keep detailed statistics and to advise development planners of employment needs and manpower resources.

125. The average monthly wages of African workers continued to rise, but were still much lower than those of European workers. The total number of registered trade unions was fifteen during 1964 (an increase of seven over the previous year). Thirteen new agreements were negotiated covering 5,000 workers.

126. The National Joint Consultative Council, composed of employer, employee and Labour Department representatives, held its inaugural meeting in July 1964. The Council's principal function is to promote effective co-operation between both sides of industry. In the following month, Swaziland's first wages council (the Wholesale and Retail Distributive Trades Wages Council) was established.

127. There were nine trade disputes involving 572 workers and resulting in a loss of 4,130 man-days. Among recently enacted legislation governing industrial relations was the Industrial Conciliation and Settlement (Amendment) Proclamation, 1964. It amends the principal law so as to make compulsory the registration of negotiated industrial agreements on wages and working conditions.

Public health

128. In his recent speech to the Legislative Council, Her Majesty's Commissioner stated that the Medical Department was experiencing considerable difficulty in recruiting medical officers, thus hindering its efforts to meet the increasing calls on the medical services. It was intended soon to improve the hospital services by additions to Hlatikulu Hospital and by building new clinics. The work of the WHO/UNICEF-assisted Tuberculosis Control Project would continue its efforts towards finding the most effective methods of dealing with Swaziland's main health problem.

Educational conditions

129. The new Education Proclamation which was promulgated on 8 May 1964 repealed the African Coloured and European School Proclamations and created the non-racial Central Education Advisory Board and four non-racial District Education Advisory Committees.

130. Public expenditure on education amounted to £721,572 in 1963/64, an increase of £42,772 over the previous year. Grants for education from the Colonial Development and Welfare Fund totalled £148,595 and expenditure by missions £148,000.

131. Enrolment in primary, secondary, teacher-training and technical and vocational training schools in 1964 was as follows:

	<i>Schools</i>	<i>Enrolment</i>	<i>Teachers</i>
Primary education ^a	342	47,894	1,487
Secondary education ^b	32	2,783	168
Teacher training ^c	3	131	19
Technical and vocational training ^c	3	96	10

^a Including 325 African schools with 46,038 students and 1,402 teachers.

^b Including 25 African schools with 2,247 students and 119 teachers.

^c For Africans only.

132. During 1964 the age of first entry into primary schools was lowered to nine years and admission to such schools was confined to children of parents resident in Swaziland. Strict limitation was placed on the entry of non-Swazilanders into post-primary schools and colleges.

133. The policy of integration of the various races at primary level continued, and over fifty children of other races were enrolled in the English-medium schools. The introduction of a common syllabus for all races reached third-year level (Standard I). The "English Scheme" was operating in over thirty African schools. There was a demand for general introduction of this scheme throughout the primary system, but this has not yet proved possible owing to the lack of suitable teachers and finance.

134. Examination results obtained by students in the primary, secondary and teacher-training schools in 1964 were as follows:

	<i>Entries</i>	<i>Passes</i>
Standard VI	2,074	1,024
Form I	436	289
Junior Certificate	463	292
UBBS entry standard or South African Matriculation	109	46
Primary Lower Certificate	26	19
Primary Higher Certificate	30	8
Domestic Science Teachers' Certificate ...	6	5

135. With regard to educational development, Her Majesty's Commissioner stated in his recent speech to the Legislative Council that:

"The ultimate aims are to ensure that primary education in suitable accommodation is available to every child seeking that education; that the secondary school system, receiving the best possible entry from the primary schools, meets the needs of the individual child and the country; that sufficient qualified teachers are produced; and that there are enough opportunities for higher post-secondary education or training to meet the territory's needs.

"The long-term aims of educational policy have, however, to be considered in the light of our financial and physical resources, and concentration for the next year or two will, we feel, best be focused on secondary education, teacher training and technical training.

"... The Department of Education now faces a very serious staff shortage. Ways and means of overcoming this will be sought as a matter of urgent importance."

C. CONSIDERATION BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE

Introduction

136. The Special Committee considered Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland at its 421st to 423rd, 437th to 439th, 450th and 455th meetings held in Africa between 26 May and 22 June 1966.

Written petitions and hearings

137. The Special Committee had before it the following written petitions:

<i>Petitioner</i>	<i>Document No.</i>
<i>Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland</i>	
Mr. P. Raboroko, Secretary for Education, Pan-Africanist Congress of South Africa (PAC)	A/AC.109/PET.461
<i>Basutoland</i>	
Mr. Ntsu Mokhehle, President of the Basutoland Congress Party (BCP) and Mr. Seth Makotoko, President of the Marema-Tlou Freedom Party (MTFP)	A/AC.109/PET.515
<i>Swaziland</i>	
Mr. J. J. Nquku, President, and Mr. A. W. M. Nxumalo, Secretary-General, Swaziland Progressive Party (SPP) ...	A/AC.109/PET.442 and Add.1 and 2
Mr. S. J. Zwane, External Representative, Ngwane National Liberatory Congress of Swaziland (NNLC) External Office, Dar es Salaam	A/AC.109/PET.462

138. The Special Committee heard the following petitioners:

<i>Petitioner</i>	<i>Meeting</i>
<i>Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland</i>	
Mr. P. Raboroko, Secretary for Education, and two other members (Messrs. P. K. Leballo and A. B. Ngcobo), Pan-Africanist Congress of South Africa (PAC) (A/AC.109/PET.461)	421st-423rd
<i>Swaziland</i>	
Mr. S. J. Zwane, External Representative, Ngwane National Liberatory Congress of Swaziland (NNLC) External Office, Dar es Salaam (A/AC.109/PET.462)	423rd

139. Mr. Raboroko, speaking on behalf of the Pan-Africanist Congress of South Africa (PAC), said that it was a liberation organization of the African people of South Africa, committed to the liberation of South Africa in particular and of the rest of colonial Africa in general. The South Africa Act of 1909, enacted by the United Kingdom Government, laid down the constitutional basis of what was currently known as the

Republic of South Africa. Section 151 of that Act envisaged the incorporation of the former High Commission Territories of Basutoland (Lesotho), Bechuanaland (Botswana) and Swaziland (Ngwane) into the political framework of South Africa. The PAC and the African people of South Africa were accordingly interested parties in the constitutional development of these Territories. The South Africa Act gave expression to the economic alliance of Boer feudal, and British mining and financial interests.

140. Reinforced by the myth of racial superiority and the attendant imperialist myth of cultural superiority, those alien vested interests had turned South Africa into the world's major looting ground and the majority of the South African population into the world's most oppressed, exploited and degraded people. That phenomenon went by the name of apartheid. More correctly, however, it should be termed fascist colonialism.

141. The Pan-Africanist Congress and the African people of South Africa held that the Territories would only become genuinely independent when the so-called Republic of South Africa was. For that to be accomplished, the prevailing fascist colonialist society of South Africa would have to be changed into a non-racial socialist democracy.

142. It was his intention to demonstrate the collusion between British imperialism and South African fascist colonialism designed to ensure the subjugation of the people of South Africa and the Territories.

143. The Territories were colossal reservoirs of cheap labour for the vested foreign interests operating in South Africa. It was mainly for that reason that the United Kingdom Government, which was the political representative of British imperialism, colluded with the South African authorities—the political representatives of the local feudo-capitalists—with a view to the incorporation of those Territories.

144. The Transvaal and the Orange Free State gold mines employed 380,000 African mine workers, 20 per cent of whom came from these colonies. South Africa recruited those workers through the Native Recruiting Corporation. All were termed indentured labourers. The indentured labour system was the twentieth century's form of slavery. The workers had to pay their own return fares out of their accumulated wages and at the mines they lived under wretched conditions. Each compound had about 200 single rooms, twenty feet by thirty feet in area. Each house accommodated at least sixteen workers who, for the most part, used cement bunks for beds.

145. The average pay of African mine workers, which was 3/- a day in 1896, had only increased by 4d. a day in 1964, sixty-eight years later. During that time, the mine owners had reaped huge dividends from their labour. Between 1886 and 1932, gold-mining companies had invested £200 million in sterling, receiving dividends of £255 million. By 1945, after sixty years of gold mining, the share-holders had received dividends of £479 million. In 1964, the "gold producers" committee had increased the pay of mine workers by only 10 per cent. Even then, the African mine worker in the Zambian copper belt earned more than six times his African counterpart in South Africa. The African mine workers were virtually denied the right of collective bargaining.

146. The forces of British imperialism and South African fascist colonialism had also emasculated the economy and social life of the Territories. The United

Kingdom Government had allowed many South Africans to buy landed property, to engage in commercial and industrial undertakings and to serve in the civil service of the Territories, against the interests of the indigenous inhabitants. As a part of the same trend a new role was being carved out for the traditional chiefs. Under colonialism, their function was that of agents whose task it was to collect taxes, recruit labour and generally assist in the oppression of the people. The surging tide of the forces of African nationalism had forced the British imperialists and South African colonialists to adapt the role and function of the chiefs to new and changing circumstances. They were now encouraged to stand for election with the support of the régime. The attitude of the new authorities towards political fugitives was similar to that of the Bantustan chiefs. The practice of rigging elections was prevalent in the Territories. The chiefs had been held to reflect consent for South Africa's incorporation of these Territories without any consultation of the people themselves, who abhorred apartheid.

147. It was taken for granted that, in addition to the 12.5 per cent of land allotted to African use in South Africa, the Government would be able before long to declare to the world that its generosity had given the African people of Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland an area equivalent to that of the rest of the Republic. He would welcome an on-the-spot investigation in those Territories by the Committee to determine the people's attitude towards the neo-apartheid policies of the régime there.

148. The Pan-Africanist Congress and the African people of South Africa recommended that the Special Committee should recognize the basic unity and indivisibility of freedom and independence for the peoples of these three Territories and of the settler Republic of South Africa. The territorial integrity of these colonies should also be guaranteed and the South African racists should be debarred from controlling the right of entry and exit in respect of the Territories. All persons in transit to and from the Territories should be guaranteed immunity from apartheid laws. The Territories should be guaranteed political freedom and economic development without interference from the forces of reaction in the Republic of South Africa. Resolute support should be given to the cause of freedom, genuine independence and democracy in South Africa as a prelude to the solution of the colonial problems in the Territories.

149. In reply to questions, *Mr. Raboroko* and *Mr. Ngcobo* said that the situation of the three Territories in relation to South Africa was such that they would find it very difficult to survive economically; they were in a position of economic, political and social servitude.

150. This situation, they stated, was aggravated by South Africa's intensified efforts to control the electorate. They cited many instances to show that the recent elections in these Territories had been rigged, and stated that the present régimes were not representative. The outcome of the elections had also been influenced by British troop movements and police intimidation. Therefore, they urged the Special Committee to do everything within its power to have these elections declared null and void. Fresh elections should be held without propaganda radio broadcasts from South Africa and under reliable supervision. The PAC did not want independence to be delayed, but wanted genuine elections to be held first.

151. The grave implications of South Africa's interference in Basutoland affairs could be seen from a letter written by Chief Leabua Jonathan to Papenfus, the Verwoerd régime's Bantustan administrative agent in the Orange Free State, on 18 November 1964; the letter stated:

"... You have promised that if we become the Government of Basutoland after the elections with the assistance of your Government, and also if we subscribe to your policies, your Government will give us back Witzieshoek, Mataliele, Herschel and part of the Orange Free State bordering on Basutoland, from Fouriesburg to Wepener, so that we should form a greater Basutoland and enable your Government to put right past wrongs... and to show our thanks for this generous offer we shall place this country and its people under the wise guidance of the Government of the Republic of South Africa economically, politically and socially, so that you can lead us to true independence.

"You said you did not like the support which the Catholic Church is giving me, because you said it is strongly opposing the good education policy of your Government for the Bantu people. You even told me that it had worked wonders in the Transkei. I repeat that you must not fear anything from me. When I control the Government after the elections we shall find a good way of dealing with this Roman Catholic danger, but at present it is wise to use them to get the overwhelming support of the Catholics in this country."

The Catholic Church was regarded as a danger, however, not so much because of political considerations as because of the fear that Basutoland might become less economically dependent on South Africa.

152. The petitioners said that South Africa violated normal international etiquette concerning transit to landlocked countries. People were blacklisted, and persecuted, while aeroplanes using South African air space had to land for inspection. There was an urgent need for legislation to secure unhampered transit.

153. The alliance between South Africa, Portugal and Southern Rhodesia made conditions very difficult in the three Territories. For example, the people of Bechuanaland, after they had been debarred from passing through South Africa, had become accustomed to crossing to Zambia by way of Southern Rhodesia. Now that that had also been forbidden, they had to use the Caprivi Strip, which was infested with wild animals and without communications. The removal of the Smith régime in Southern Rhodesia and of the Salazar régime in Mozambique would give Bechuanaland and Swaziland access to the north.

154. The three Territories were subjected to the economic system of South Africa. The inability of the African population in these Territories to stand on its feet economically was due to long years of colonist exploitation.

155. The undertakings registered in South Africa but operating in the three Territories were Anglo-American firms. A sinister role was being played by Mr. Carl Todd, who was associated with the Chamber of Mines in South Africa and who controlled mining interests, cattle ranches and sugar plantations in Swaziland. He was now also associated in a new British venture with the firm of Yarrow (Africa) Ltd., which normally engaged in ship-building and engineering but which intended to build an apartheid navy and to

manufacture arms in South Africa. That would of course nullify the effect of the steps taken to prevent armaments reaching that country. Colonel Jack Scott, the head of a South African mining house, also had diamond mining interests in Basutoland. The Machine Company, a South African concern, mined asbestos and manganese in the Bangwaketse Region in Botswana. The de Beers Anglo-American group (Oppenheimer's) prospected for diamonds throughout Botswana. The Vacuum Oil Company of South Africa, which originally prospected for oil in Botswana, had now transferred that operation to Mobiloil. Swaziland's railway line, which ran through Mozambique, had been established with South African capital. The Swaziland Iron Ore Development Company, which was a joint venture of the Anglo-American Corporation and the British industrial firm of Guest, Keen and Nettlefolds, had a twelve-year contract to supply iron ore to the Yawata and Fuji iron and steel group, a Japanese concern.

156. Some of the international companies in South Africa which practised apartheid were financed by local capital. However, those which engaged most intensively in such exploitation were financed by international capital from the United Kingdom and the United States of America. A case in point was Engelhard, a citizen of the United States of America and a patron of the Democratic Party, who had vast controlling interests in South Africa, particularly in the mining field. Both the First National City Bank of New York and the Chase Manhattan Bank, whose Chairman was David Rockefeller, had increased their own investments in South Africa. Furthermore, when in 1960, following the Sharpeville massacres, the South African economy was on the verge of collapse, it was those two banks which had lent the money to re-establish it on a sound basis. The British firm of Imperial Chemical Industries, which employed a large number of people throughout South Africa, had of late embarked upon a venture extremely dangerous for Africans, namely the manufacture of explosives and other materials of war. Although there was an embargo upon the import of arms from the United Kingdom and the United States, they were in fact being manufactured locally. Apartheid was reinforced by the international combines which were certain to render ineffective the resolutions of the United Nations and of the Organization of African Unity regarding the export of arms to South Africa. General Norstad, formerly of NATO, had recently arrived in South Africa to set up another company which would also manufacture arms and ammunition.

157. In Swaziland, 55 per cent of the land—the most fertile in the country—was owned by Whites, mainly South Africans. However, a plan had been set up in 1955 to collect funds so that the African people could buy their own land. In Bechuanaland, which had some of the best grazing areas, it was the same; large combines operating in South Africa had bought vast tracts of land and now controlled the market. The position in Basutoland was different because all land was nationalized and belonged to the Basuto nation. No foreign combine was therefore allowed to buy land. The system of land tenure in the Territories was similar to that obtaining in South Africa, where the poorest 12.5 per cent of the land was allocated for African use. Paragraph 17 (e) of the report of the Swaziland Constitutional Committee guaranteed "protection from deprivation of property". Foreign interests would thereby maintain their hold

under a paper independence. The Special Committee should urge the United Nations to send observers and ensure that the land was returned to the people as a prelude to independence.

158. Large numbers of workers entered South Africa in search of work both because there were not sufficient employment opportunities in the Territories and because wages were very low. These workers were recruited by South African firms, one of whose practices was to withhold the wages of an employee until the end of his contract, without interest. Such migrant workers were subjected to all the indignities of the apartheid system.

159. The health conditions in the three Territories were deplorable; medical services were inadequate. Educational establishments existed. However, the percentage of the population able to benefit from these institutions was very low. Furthermore, most of the teaching staff came from South Africa and they brought with them the attitude and mentality prevailing in South Africa. The situation was deplorable and the standard of education extremely low. The question of education was a vicious circle. It was necessary first to gain political power and independence, without which a proper system of education was impossible.

160. Thus far, no action had been taken to safeguard the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the three Territories. Whether or not there was a United Nations resident representative in each Territory, the Special Committee should urge the General Assembly to see to it that independence was not granted without prior genuine elections and settlement of the land problem. There should also be international provision to guarantee the transit right.

161. The Territories would join the Organization of African Unity upon independence. It was therefore vitally important that nationalist elements should gain power to prevent a puppet government from enjoying immunity.

162. Mr. Zwane, speaking on behalf of the Ngwane National Liberatory Congress (NNLC), said that his party had charged him to appear before the Special Committee and present the plight of the African masses of Swaziland.

163. The NNLC was a liberation organization of the African people of Swaziland, the policy and programme of which was, *inter alia*, to work unceasingly for the immediate achievement of independence for the people of Swaziland; to work for the complete emancipation of the Swazi people from political, social and economic enslavement; and to fight for the overthrow of white domination and for the implementation of the right of self-determination.

164. The NNLC and the African people of Swaziland held that British imperialism and the South African fascist colonialists had plotted to keep Swaziland as their colony in perpetuity. For instance, the Swaziland Constitutional Committee which had drafted the latest proposals for constitutional advancement had been appointed by a colonial officer, Her Majesty's High Commissioner, who had also presided over it. The Committee had included two other members of the colonial administration: the Chief Secretary and the Attorney General. The remaining members had been picked from the self-styled traditionalists, the Imbokodvo National Movement, all members of the Swazi National Council and advisers to the King—and from the racist United Swaziland Association,

a white political party that did not accept members of other races.

165. In their recommendations, the Swaziland Constitutional Committee had submitted the undemocratic proposals that: (a) Swaziland should be divided into eight constituencies, each returning three members to the House of Assembly (paragraph 37 of its report); (b) the King should appoint six members to the House of Assembly (paragraph 27); six members of the Senate were also to be appointed by the King and six elected by the House of Assembly (paragraph 32); and (c) the land should be vested in the Ngwenyama's (the King's) trust for the Swazi Nation and the King should retain the right to make grants, leases or other dispositions in respect of minerals and mineral oils vested in him (paragraphs 68 and 69).

166. The NNLC and the people of Swaziland were of the firm opinion that such proposals, if accepted by the United Kingdom Government as a basis for granting self-government to Swaziland, would only serve the interests of the white settlers and their imperialist bosses. The reason why Imbokodvo and the United Swaziland Association feared the democratic principle of accepting the return of one member of Parliament from each constituency was that they knew that they would be faced with hopeless defeat; and NNLC insisted on adopting the practice that had been followed all over Africa in former British colonies and in Britain itself: one constituency, one member, on the basis of one man, one vote. It also maintained that just as Queen Elizabeth II had no right to fill the House of Lords and the House of Commons with her own nominees, the King of Swaziland had no right to fill the Houses of Parliament in Swaziland with nominees numbering about a third of a joint session of the Houses.

167. NNLC and the people of Swaziland were aware that only the settlers and their imperialist bosses stood to gain if their land was to be put in the trust of the King, whose dealings with the apartheid-oriented United Swaziland Association were dubious. NNLC had in its possession copies of correspondence between C. F. Todd, Chairman of the elected members of the European Advisory Council of Swaziland, and the King which it was prepared to circulate upon request. It also had background material on Mr. Todd and his apartheid background in South Africa.

168. The Swaziland people maintained that the struggle for emancipation was based on land, which together with minerals, should be collectively owned, as in the past, by the people, with the government elected by them as trustee.

169. The Imbokodvo had so far proved itself to be a tool of the settlers, who in turn were the agents of world imperialism. Should their schemes materialize Swaziland would become a neo-colonial State and the present tranquillity between races would disappear with the rights of the African people.

170. Having realized that the 1966 report of the Swaziland Constitutional Committee proposed pseudo-independence—indepenence with strings—NNLC had asked the Government of the United Kingdom to summon a duly representative constitutional conference in which the long-term interests of the African people of Swaziland would be recognized and safeguarded. He appealed to the United Nations to exert pressure on the United Kingdom Government and to stress the im-

portance of convening such a conference in the interests of a peaceful transition to independence.

171. The Imbokodvo could not be trusted to represent the African people because it was clearly a puppet organization serving interests other than those of the Swazis. Willie Meyer, leader of the whites-only United Swaziland Association, had revealed to the *Rand Daily Mail*, a Johannesburg newspaper, that his party had actually helped Imbokodvo to its feet and that when Imbokodvo had recently tried to exercise some independent policy, Meyer had said that it appeared as if the child wanted to become father of the man. Meyer had told the reporter: "I want fifty-fifty parliamentary representation for whites for the next five to ten years. I won't settle for less." That was the man who was an ally of an organization that purported to be representing the Swazi people.

172. His party also wished to bring to the attention of the Special Committee the victimization its members and other Swazis suffered at the hands of the Verwoerd régime, which employed desperate methods in an attempt to jeopardize the interests of the people and imposed such hardships as refusing transit visas to African nationalists from Swaziland wishing to travel to other parts of the world. The Acting Secretary-General of NNLC had been denied such a visa for the past year, and the President of the party, Mr. Ambrose Zwane, had been arrested and charged in South Africa on trumped-up charges of wrongful entry. A sizable number of Africans from Swaziland were working in the South African gold mines, where they were denied the elementary right of forming trade unions and the right to bargain collectively. NNLC could not abandon those workers without abandoning the reason for its own existence.

173. Against that background, NNLC requested the Special Committee to help the people of Ngwane to get immediate independence, to help the forces of African nationalism to safeguard the vital interests of the African people of Swaziland, to ensure that the administration of Mr. Verwoerd and his National Party ceased meddling in the affairs of Swaziland, to prevent that administration from taking unfair advantage of the land-locked position of Swaziland in any way, and to force the United Kingdom Government to allow a genuine non-racial constitution for Swaziland.

174. In reply to questions, Mr. Zwane said that when he had asked a member of Imbokodvo in the Legislative Council why it was working with South Africa, the latter had warned him that he must be very careful, it was dangerous to ask such questions. When members of NNLC had been painting slogans demanding higher wages for the workers, they had been stopped by South African security forces and threatened with arrest. He recalled the case of a South African refugee, Mrs. Wentzel, who had been taken by the South African security forces; yet the authorities had denied their presence. The South African police sent shorthand writers to take notes at meetings of his party, and their security men had authority to arrest people and send them to Mozambique. All the inhabitants of South African origin, numbering about 8,000, had dual nationality. In spite of all these facts, the Secretary of State for the Colonies had denied that there was collusion with the South African police. Although NNLC had asked for an investigation nothing had been done. During the election of the Legislative Council, the South African Government had sent a member of Parliament to supervise the Imbokodvo.

NNLC had protested to the British Administration, but had heard nothing.

175. The United Kingdom Government had not granted the NNLC's request for holding a constitutional conference, and therefore he asked the Special Committee to exert pressure on that Government to call such a conference. He also asked the United Nations to send observers to Swaziland when elections were held. He agreed that genuine independence for Basutoland and Bechuanaland would have a beneficial effect on developments in Swaziland.

176. He said that in the Territory 45 per cent of the land was occupied by Africans and 55 per cent by Europeans. The Swazi National Council had introduced a scheme to buy back from the settlers land that had been allocated to them by the Paramount Chief. Swaziland produced asbestos, gold, iron ore, sugar and wood pulp. Most of the products were processed outside the Territory, a practice which was followed to prevent Africans from learning how such processing was done.

General statements by members

177. The representative of the *United States of America* said that the United States was in full agreement with what it believed to be the basic political objectives of the people of Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland: the right of the people freely to express their wishes and govern themselves.

178. As she had stated at the beginning of the meetings in Dar es Salaam, the Special Committee's aim should be the reasoned consideration of the complex problems before it. In her opinion some of the statements which had been heard tended to result from hasty generalization and to imply guilt by association. For example, a private American citizen, General Norstad, had expressed an opinion some time ago which had been referred to by a petitioner. That opinion had already been quoted extensively during the Special Committee's last visit to Africa. As had been stated by the United States representative at that time, Mr. Norstad was a private citizen entitled to express his own views, which should in no way be associated with those of the United States Government. The United States Government rigidly enforced the policy forbidding the sale of arms and military equipment to South Africa, in accordance with the Security Council resolution of December 1963, as well as the export to South Africa of any machinery or equipment for their manufacture.

179. The United States Government was cognizant of the relationship existing between the Territories and South Africa and was also fully aware of the effect of the abhorrent apartheid policy of the South African Government on those Territories. It had always condemned the racist, brutal and inhumane policies practised within South Africa and the effect of those policies on neighbouring countries. Nevertheless, the people of those Territories would shortly be guiding their own destiny in spite of the geographic and economic restraints. Bechuanaland would become independent on 30 September 1966, with Basutoland following shortly, and it was hoped that in the near future Swaziland would also attain independence. As Governments based on universal adult suffrage and racial equality, all three Territories would stand in sharp contrast to the racist policies of South Africa and perhaps provide a new demonstration of the fact that it was possible for racial groups to live in harmony

provided that men and women were treated equally and justly. The United States Government looked forward to those political developments.

180. The United States had extended a programme of assistance to the Territories in the form of scholarships and grants and it hoped to contribute to their future leadership resources. The United States had for each of the past two years granted \$100,000 to the University of Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland. In addition, there were twenty-five full scholarship territorial students in United States schools and universities. Another seventeen had received partial maintenance at United States universities. It also supplied funds for a chair at the University. Finally, the United States had granted over \$2 million worth of food to Bechuanaland since mid-1965, under the United Nations World Food Programme, to help meet the famine caused by drought.

181. However, serious problems still faced those Territories. The economic difficulties should not be minimized, and the United States Government looked forward to continuing to help the people of the Territories to overcome them.

182. The representative of the *United Republic of Tanzania* said that the aggressive threats facing the Territories of Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland, which might mean the continuation of colonialism, called for definitive action by the Special Committee. Those Territories were geographically placed within the grasp of the South African apartheid régime, and worse still, they continued to be victimized by the continuing collaboration between the Government of South Africa and the administering Power, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland six years after the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (resolution 1514 (XV)). During the meetings in Dar es Salaam, petitioners had given the Special Committee specific evidence of daily incursions into those Territories by the police of South Africa, which were carried out with the knowledge of the administering Power and aimed at intimidating the nationalists who were justly opposing plunder and exploitation.

183. Although some form of constitutional progress had been made, a need persisted for proper machinery to enable those peoples freely to found their own government. Some type of supervisory body was required in all three Territories, in order that the provisions of resolution 1514 (XV) might be faithfully implemented. The necessity of such a measure was heightened by the grave situation created by the rebellion of the racist minority group in Southern Rhodesia. Africans knew that if the exploitation of those countries' resources by foreign companies, chiefly those from South Africa, should continue, the colonial forces could revert to the use of the discredited *indabas*. It had been shown in the working paper (para. 87 above) that the administering Power had granted the Engelbrecht and G. van den Brink firms rights to exploit the diamond potential of Bechuanaland, in an area covering some 4,460 square miles.

184. Land, as the chief means of production and existence of the African people, was of the utmost importance. Despite the General Assembly's renewed request (resolution 2063 (XX)) that the United Kingdom take immediate measures to return the land that had been taken away from the African people, petitioners had informed the Committee in Dar es Salaam that those people continued to be dispossessed of their

natural property. A typical example was Swaziland, where white settlers comprising less than 4 per cent of the population controlled more than 55 per cent of the arable land. Such forms of exploitation had forced the Africans to go as slave labour into the gold and diamond mines of apartheid South Africa.

185. The United Republic of Tanzania, considering freedom to be indivisible, supported the proposals presented for the establishment of measures to ensure the territorial integrity and economic development of Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland. Their concern deepened as aggressive threats by the South African régime increased. One alarming case had been South Africa's shipment of maize to designated members of one political party in Basutoland in order to influence elections in that Territory, and the kidnapping of several candidates. In view of such evidence, the United Nations had the obligation to provide for elections free of any manipulation or intimidation.

186. The representative of *Ethiopia* said that the territorial integrity and future political and economic independence of the three Territories were endangered by their geographical position. Bechuanaland was hemmed in on three sides by South West Africa, South Africa and Southern Rhodesia, while Swaziland was between the Portuguese-held Territories and South Africa. Basutoland was in an even more perilous position, being completely encircled by Territories in which the apartheid policy was applied. It was that obvious threat that had led the General Assembly to adopt resolution 2063 (XX) of 16 December 1965, operative paragraph 2 of which reaffirmed the inalienable rights of the peoples of Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland to freedom and independence. Verwoerd was reported to have said at the end of September 1965 that the three Territories were of great importance to South Africa because of their proximity; left to itself no doubt South Africa would find the whole continent important to it for the same reason. Botha, the South African Deputy Minister of Administration and Development, was reported to have said that the return to the Africans of land at present occupied by Europeans would be dependent upon South Africa's being able to play a part in guiding the future political and economic development of the Territories. A glance at the miserable conditions in South West Africa would suffice to show how well the South African Government would discharge such responsibilities. A number of economic agreements had been concluded in October 1965 between South Africa and Portugal, and in November between South Africa and Southern Rhodesia.

187. European politicians in the Territories were doing all they could to make them economically so dependent on South Africa that political domination by it would inevitably follow. Mrs. Eirene White, the British Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies, had pointed out in July 1965 that there was a tremendous lack of educational facilities in the Territories. They were in fact so inadequate that the Territories had to depend for their professional and technical services on expatriates from the Republic of South Africa. One of the major factors hampering industrial development was the lack of trained personnel.

188. In June 1965, South Africa had sent Basutoland 165,000 pounds sterling worth of grain to relieve starvation. It might be asked why it had not been the administering Power that had come to the rescue. The Opposition Party had presented a motion asking

the Basutoland Assembly to decline the gift. Even though the Territory was under the so-called protection of the United Kingdom Government, students returning home from their studies abroad had been stranded in London because they had been unable to obtain South African transit visas. The South African Government had also taken upon itself to censor communications destined for the Territories.

189. He was deeply concerned about the Territories' heavy economic dependence on South Africa. The mainstay of Bechuanaland's economy was beef, 5 million pounds sterling worth of which was exported annually to South Africa.

190. Since the racist Government had made no attempt to conceal its policy towards neighbouring Territories, it was the responsibility of the administering Power to ensure that the granting of independence did not mean the handing over of the Territories by the old colonialists to ruthless new imperialism. It was virtually necessary that United Nations representatives should be present to see that South Africa did not once again defy United Nations recommendations by a *fait accompli*.

191. None of these three Territories was economically self-sufficient. Although the United Nations and other international organizations had tried to alleviate human misery, much more would have to be done.

192. The representative of *Denmark* said that the Government in Basutoland and Bechuanaland were determined to proceed to independence without further delay, while the opposition parties desired certain changes to be made first. Some delegations had expressed concern that the independence might not be a genuine one, and his delegation fully agreed with the importance of ensuring that it was genuine and free from foreign interference. He emphasized, however, that independence was the main point in colonial issues, and that that concept had been well expressed in paragraph 3 of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, which stated that inadequacy of political, economic, social or educational preparedness should never serve as a pretext for delaying independence. He was convinced that, once the Territories had obtained their independence, they would, like other free African countries, be capable of facing their own internal problems.

193. The situation was somewhat different in Swaziland, where progress towards independence had been less speedy. Arrangements had been made to begin to establish self-government during 1966, but the Territory was not expected to become fully independent before 1970. His delegation had noted that there was strong pressure for independence before that time on the basis of a more democratic constitution than the one that had been drawn up.

194. A gloom was cast over the picture by the difficulties the three Territories, because of their geographical position, would face vis-à-vis South Africa when they became independent. It was therefore most important that they should be made economically viable to an extent that would enable them to resist pressure from that country. The United Kingdom Government was giving them extensive economic assistance, and might be expected to continue to do so after independence. The United Nations had decided to establish a fund for their economic development, and his Government had given a pledge that it would contribute when it seemed likely that the Fund would become large enough to be

workable. An overwhelming number of Member States had emphasized the need for such assistance on a large scale, and his delegation was disappointed that only three countries had so far pledged contributions.

195. The representative of the *Union of Soviet Socialist Republics* said that the General Assembly and the Special Committee had discussed on various occasions the situation in Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland and the measures which the United Kingdom ought to have taken to guarantee the peoples of those Territories true freedom and independence based on the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. The General Assembly had recommended, among other things, that democratic elections should be organized to that end. The constitutional development of the Territories showed clearly, however, that in its desire to protect the interests of United Kingdom capitals in South Africa, which amounted to more than £1,000 million, the United Kingdom had done everything possible to delay such elections. To quote an article which had appeared in an African newspaper, the latest elections had proved that the methods of economic pressure, intrigue and corruption had triumphed.

196. On 29 April 1965, elections had been held in Basutoland. The conclusion drawn by the *Rand Daily Mail* in its issue of 20 November had been that the National Party had come first with Chief Jonathan, having won thirty-one seats out of sixty, thanks to considerable financial aid from the Republic of South Africa and the Federal Republic of Germany. Thus, although it itself had used and encouraged others to use underhand methods during the elections, the administering Power had been unable to assure the party it favoured of more than an insignificant majority.

197. The constitutional development of Swaziland was taking place in the same undemocratic atmosphere. The United Kingdom had set up a committee to review the Constitution before giving the Protectorate its independence. Many political parties had not been allowed access to it. On the other hand, Europeans who declared themselves openly hostile to the principle of "one man, one vote" played a leading role in it. In the light of those facts, it was easy to see why the petitioners heard by the Special Committee had asked that all political parties should be represented in the constitutional committee and that elections should be held on the basis of universal suffrage and supervised by the Organization of African Unity (OAU).

198. It would thus be vain to try to hide the fact that the administering Power had taken no account of the General Assembly's recommendations and that instead of preparing for the people of its Protectorates to achieve independence, it was perpetuating the existing situation. The three Territories it administered were economically dependent upon the Republic of South Africa and were victims of pernicious activity by foreign monopolies. Another example could be cited of the United Kingdom's contempt for the General Assembly's resolutions. The Assembly had recommended the administering Power to take steps to ensure that the land stolen from the people was restored to them. Four years had passed since the General Assembly's decision on that matter, but the situation remained unchanged: in Bechuanaland, 62 per cent of the land belonged to the Crown and to Europeans, while in Swaziland the white population had more than 50 per cent of the land. As a result of the administering Power's policy, the economic situation of the three

Protectorates was such that it was impossible to improve the level of living of the people and to create the necessary conditions to ensure the economic development of the Territories once they had gained independence.

199. His delegation considered that the Special Committee should ask the administering Power to apply the General Assembly resolutions concerning the constitutional development of the Protectorates, in order to ensure democratic representation of the population based on universal suffrage and on the principle of "one man, one vote". The Committee should also recommend the administering Power to withdraw its troops immediately from the Protectorates, since their presence prevented the organization of truly democratic elections. Finally, the Committee should adopt a resolution calling for the restitution to the indigenous population of the land belonging to it.

200. In addition, regarding the fund provided for in General Assembly resolution 2063 (XX), he considered that in the conditions of the colonial administration and the activity of foreign monopolies it is unlikely for this fund to play any part in providing the economical independence of the three Territories. Only the political independence based on the democratic election, the restitution of the land to its rightful owners and the redistribution of the means of production among the people could create favourable conditions for economic independence of the three Territories.

201. The representative of *India* said that he had listened with the greatest attention to all the views expressed on the question of Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland and agreed that had the United Kingdom been represented at the meeting, the land issue could have been cleared up then and there. It would have been unfair to criticize the United Kingdom Government in the absence of its delegation, and yet it was essential that proper conditions be provided for achieving and maintaining the independence and development of the three Territories under discussion. Although constitutional and other problems lay ahead, elections should not be delayed. It was to be regretted that nothing had been done for Swaziland in that connexion; and if the administering Power did nothing the Special Committee should take prompt action.

202. So long as the three Territories were under pressure from their neighbours, their pattern of life would resemble that of Southern Rhodesia and South Africa: the supremacy of a white minority and the exploitation of the African population. Although independence was in sight, the Special Committee and other organizations had to continue efforts to put an end to white domination, a problem that would persist so long as the policies of Portugal, Southern Rhodesia and South Africa remained unchanged.

203. His delegation was discouraged by the lack of adequate response among members to contribute to the Economic Development Fund. Only two, Cyprus and Liberia, had announced their contributions, and Denmark had stated its intention to contribute once the Fund became operational. The importance of the Fund, stressed by the Chacko Commission's excellent report, had led his delegation to pledge an appropriate contribution, payable in the Fund's operational stage. He hoped that other members would give generous support to that measure, which would safeguard the territorial integrity of those Territories by making them less dependent economically on neighbouring States.

204. The representative of *Poland* said that his delegation supported General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) and wished to see the three Territories attain genuine independence under majority rule. Poland was aware of the manoeuvres of the administering Power and South Africa, and the petitioners had cited many instances proving interference with elections. It was evident that the United Kingdom would endeavour to continue its control behind a façade of independence.

205. The administering Power had done very little, since it went on the assumption that the destiny of the three Territories was incorporation in South Africa, which was indicated by the fact that they came under the Commonwealth Relations Office, which dealt with South Africa. The United Kingdom had therefore neglected its obligation to grant independence under the best possible conditions. That had increased the dependence of the three Territories on South Africa, and in fact they were in a position of economic servitude. All responsible posts in the Civil Service were held by whites, and especially South Africans. In particular, the administering Power had failed to implement General Assembly resolutions urging the United Kingdom to return all land to its rightful indigenous owners.

206. The representative of *Australia* said that the question of Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland, to which the Special Committee had often given careful and anxious attention, assumed even greater importance because in four months' time Bechuanaland would become the independent Republic of Botswana, and because new talks were taking place between the administering Power and the delegation of Basutoland about the timing of the Territory's accession to independence under the name of Lesotho, in accordance with the decisions of its popularly elected Parliament. Both Bechuanaland and Basutoland had their own Governments, elected by full universal suffrage, i.e., one-man-one-vote, while Swaziland was on the road towards sovereign independence.

207. His delegation had voted in favour of the resolutions on those Territories adopted in 1965 by the Special Committee and later by the General Assembly, and had watched with satisfaction the efforts undertaken to bring the Territories to independence. With the independence of two of them imminent, it was time for the Committee to make a further assessment of the realities of the social, political and economic situation in which those countries found themselves. He recalled the statement made by the representative of Australia at the 1549th meeting of the Fourth Committee on 8 November 1965: "... experience has made us wary of the establishment of special and separate funds for special purposes in special and particular areas ..." (which) "... in an age of many-sided developmental enterprises being carried out through such organizations as the United Nations, has obvious disadvantages. Furthermore, it is difficult to say, in a world which is beset by so many problems, marked by want in a hundred thousand forms ... that one particular small part of one particular group of people should be accorded some sort of preferential selection for the purpose of relief and development. Nevertheless, my delegation has a very sincere appreciation of the humanitarian motives underlying the proposals now before us".

208. In connexion with the question of constitutional development, he cited the statement made to the

Special Committee by the Australian Ambassador on 2 November 1964:

"So far as the problem of constitutional advancement is concerned, my delegation would like to record that the Administering Authority, bearing in mind the hard realities of the situation, seems to us to be going about the discharge of its responsibilities in a sensible way. . . . Constitutional development . . . is not a simple problem . . . all of us are aware of the problems which the British Government, as Administering Authority, has had to face. It is trying to move peacefully forward by reconciling interests, and that commends itself to my delegation. I believe that results are already beginning to flow."

209. He reiterated his delegation's rejection of apartheid and its application in the Republic of South Africa. In order that its influence be prevented from extending to other countries, the latter needed help from the United Nations to strengthen their internal structures. However, the inescapable facts of their geographical situation could not be ignored. As Basutoland was an enclave within South Africa, its whole existence was tied up with South Africa's; and its resources were so limited that a large proportion of its population would be unable to live if they could not work in South Africa.

210. Bechuanaland's economy was dependent at most important points upon that of South Africa and Southern Rhodesia. Its only railroad was administered from those countries, without whose trade and assistance it could not continue to operate. Swaziland, although economically stronger, was also land-locked.

211. The basic problem facing the United Nations was how to express in a realistic way its willingness to assist in setting up relations between independent sovereign States. Any consideration of the problem should begin from the firm basis of a well-established precedent. That matter had recently been the subject of codification at an important conference with which the United Nations had been associated. Such long-standing rules could give certain rights to a land-locked State and its neighbours, rights which if they were to be fully exercised had to depend upon mutual self-restraint and respect by each side for the independence and integrity of the other.

212. The representative of *Bulgaria* noted that the situation in Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland remained unchanged. The petitioners had demonstrated that the people of the three Territories continued to be afflicted by the repugnant policy of apartheid. Their situation was scarcely different from that of their brothers in South Africa and South West Africa. The responsibility for that state of affairs lay undoubtedly with the United Kingdom, which had left the racist régime of South Africa a free hand. The peasants had been deprived of their lands, and the workers were toiling under very harsh conditions. There again, the great international monopolies had connived in a system of shameful exploitation. The names cited by the petitioners were sadly familiar to the members of the Special Committee: Rockefeller, the Chase Manhattan Bank, and the First National City Bank of New York were names that recurred frequently in any discussion of South Africa or the three Protectorates.

213. He then said that genuine independence was acquired at the political level. Free elections must be organized in the Territories in question.

D. ACTION TAKEN BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE

214. At the 437th meeting, the representative of the *United Republic of Tanzania* introduced a draft resolution on the three Territories (A/AC.109/L.303) co-sponsored by Afghanistan, Ethiopia, India, Iran, Iraq, the Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Mali, Sierra Leone, Syria, Tunisia, the United Republic of Tanzania and Yugoslavia.

215. He pointed out that the new factor presented in paragraphs 4 and 6 was the need for United Nations assistance in following up the progress towards independence in each of the three Territories. Recalling that a constitutional conference on Basutoland was currently in progress in London, he hoped that fair elections might be held before independence, under the supervision of a United Nations representative.

216. With regard to paragraph 3, it would be remembered that paragraph 5 of General Assembly resolution 2063 (XX) had requested the Committee in co-operation with the Secretary-General to consider what measures were necessary for securing the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland, and to report to the General Assembly as its twenty-first session.

217. Paragraph 2 dealt with the important question of land to which attention had been drawn earlier.

218. He assured the Special Committee, on behalf of the co-sponsors of the resolution, that its contents reflected their deep concern, and that they would welcome not only the Committee's full support but also any amendments or additions which might strengthen the resolution.

219. The representative of *Sierra Leone* drew attention to three main concerns reflected in the draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.303): firstly, the question of land distribution, which should be stressed more strongly than it had been in resolution 1514 (XV); secondly, the problem of transit to and from those land-locked Territories; and thirdly, the poor social and economic conditions existing in the three Territories.

220. Paragraphs 1 and 2 of the operative part reflected the co-sponsors' concern about the conditions under which independence would be granted; paragraphs 3 and 6 their concern about the influence, interference and ambitions of South Africa; and paragraphs 4, 5 and 6 their concern about the social and economic plight of those Territories.

221. The representative of *Denmark* said that, with regard to operative paragraph 2 of the draft resolution, the Special Committee did not have at its disposal all the information necessary to enable it to express an opinion on the land problem. With regard to operative paragraph 3, he considered that a reference should be made to the co-operation between the Special Committee and the Secretary-General envisaged in operative paragraph 5 of resolution 2063 (XX). However, he would not insist on those points, and would be prepared to support the draft resolution at it stood.

222. The representative of *Poland* stressed the importance of truly democratic elections, which was the spirit behind operative paragraph 2. His delegation welcomed paragraph 3 and, aware of the threat of South African expansion, endorsed the idea embodied in paragraph 4.

223. He firmly believed that United Nations representation in the three Territories would establish per-

manent links and enable the United Nations to keep a close watch on the political situation. Only under genuine independence would the Territories be able to make up for cumulative neglect on the part of the United Kingdom and stand on their feet politically and economically. His delegation would therefore vote in favour of the resolution.

224. The representative of *Australia* observed that the fourth and sixth preambular paragraphs did not fairly reflect the facts. Operative paragraph 3 could not be applied without reversing the trend of events towards the independence of Basutoland and Bechuanaland, in respect of which the administering Power had surrendered its power to the Parliaments of these countries. Those legislative bodies could themselves take any necessary action to arrange the return of land owned by Europeans, subject to the need for economic development.

225. Operative paragraph 4 reflected the need for a deep and sympathetic understanding of the problems raised by the coming to independence of the three Territories. He had no objection to the setting up of a sub-committee for that purpose, but shared the apprehension of the representatives of Denmark and Italy about the standing of that sub-committee and about the continuation of its work in any Territory after independence. Decisions taken in 1965 concerning the rapid completion of that work should be reviewed. He suggested that the Committee might consider the precedent of the help which the Secretariat had been able to offer in its mission to the Territories in 1965.

226. As he had asked earlier, did such a small part of one people merit particular attention, as provided for in operative paragraph 6? Although the Australian delegation appreciated the purpose of the proposal, it could not pledge a contribution to the Fund, and would therefore support the resolution as a whole, but would maintain reservations concerning operative paragraph 5. It also understood that the action envisaged in operative paragraph 7 would be taken in the closest consultation with the administering Power.

227. The representative of *Italy* feared that the day of independence would come without the Special Committee's having adopted a firm stand on the serious problems confronting the three Territories.

228. Despite the discouraging lack of results in the past, he supported the draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.303), though he would state two specific reservations: firstly, paragraph 2 reflected the Special Committee's discussion during its 1965 session, which meant that no solution had been found for the land problem. There was no reason why the Parliaments themselves should not have their own legislation concerning land. Action by the Committee might be considered as interference. In that connexion, he referred to the summary record of the 372nd meeting held on 17 June 1965 (A/AC.109/SR.372). Secondly, he shared the opinion of the representative of Denmark concerning the need to clarify the meaning and the scope of paragraph 3. He was not sure whether the Committee should continue to apply the measures referred to after the establishment of independence in the three Territories. Also, in some part of the resolution, mention should be made of Bechuanaland's forthcoming independence. He suggested inserting a new operative paragraph for that purpose, which might read "*Welcomes* the fixing of a firm date for Bechuanaland's accession to independence". He subsequently submitted

to the Committee a formal draft in writing (A/AC.109/L.306).

229. The representative of the *Union of Soviet Socialist Republics* suggested the insertion of the phrase "in consultation with the Special Committee" between the words "appoint" and "United Nations special representatives".

230. At the 438th meeting, the representative of the *United Republic of Tanzania*, introducing a revised text of the draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.303/Rev.1), said that both requests for amendments made by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and by Italy had been met. He wished to thank them for their co-operation. The Italian amendment improved the text, as it was important to take cognizance of a fixed date for independence whatever one's opinion of the sincerity behind it.

231. The representative of *Italy* thanked the co-sponsors for accepting the substance of his amendment. He would therefore not press it to a vote. However, since there was some uncertainty as to whether or not a date had recently been fixed for the independence of Basutoland, it was preferable merely to indicate the Special Committee's regret that no date had been fixed by the administering Power for the independence of Swaziland.

232. The representative of the *United Republic of Tanzania* said that his delegation had given serious consideration to the information concerning Basutoland contained in the working paper (see para. 53 above), and had noted that for the United Kingdom Government, Mrs. Eirene White had accepted Chief Jonathan's statement of intention and "his assurance that the stipulated conditions were likely to be fulfilled". Use of the word "likely" made the assurance worthless. On the radio in the morning of 8 June 1966 he had heard that representatives of Basutoland were in London for constitutional talks; but at present the Special Committee had no definite dates for the independence of Basutoland and Swaziland. He regretted the absence of the United Kingdom representative, who might have been able to throw some light on the matter.

233. The representative of *Italy* said that there was a difference of opinion over the interpretation of the paragraph cited. His point was that the Special Committee did not know whether any requests had been made between 29 April and 8 June 1966. Therefore there was factual doubt, but his delegation would not insist in the matter.

234. The representative of *Bulgaria* welcomed the fact that the sponsors of the draft resolution had accepted the suggestion of the USSR delegation that the Secretary-General should be requested to consult the Special Committee before appointing a special representative in each Territory.

235. The representative of the *United States of America* said that although the Territories were beset by difficulties, they had made great progress. Her Government would have liked the resolution to contain broader acknowledgement of such progress. Her second major exception lay in the appeal for contributions to a voluntary fund. At the time of its establishment, her Government had stated that it considered aid through existing multilateral programmes preferable, except in special circumstances. That did not, however, mean that the United States wished to discourage other countries from contributing. She again drew

attention to the United States assistance to the Territories referred to above. She also expressed reservations concerning the requirement that the United Nations special representatives should be appointed in consultation with the Special Committee. Her delegation would prefer to leave the matter to the Secretary-General's discretion. Finally, she emphasized that her Government shared the concern embodied in the resolution for the future political and economic development of the Territories, beset as they were with the problems inherent in their proximity to South Africa.

236. At the 439th meeting, the draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.303/Rev.1) was adopted by 20 votes to none, with 1 abstention. The representative of *Chile* regretted that he had been unable to participate in the vote on the draft resolution; his delegation would have voted in favour of the draft. It fully approved of all the provisions of that text and hoped that they would be implemented in every detail.

237. The text of the resolution on Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland (A/AC.109/178) adopted by the Special Committee at its 439th meeting on 9 June 1966 reads as follows:

"The Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,

"Having heard the petitioners,

"Recalling General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960 containing the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,

"Recalling further General Assembly resolutions 1654 (XVI) of 27 November 1961, 1817 (XVII) of 18 December 1962, 1954 (XVIII) of 11 December 1963 and 2063 (XX) of 16 December 1965 concerning the situation in Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland,

"Noting with concern the growing interference by the racist Government of the Republic of South Africa in the economic, financial and military fields in the three Territories and the assistance received by that Government from certain countries,

"Deeply concerned at the economic and social situation prevailing in the three Territories and their urgent need for United Nations assistance,

"Gravely concerned at the serious threat to the territorial integrity and economic stability of these Territories created by the racist régime of the Republic of South Africa,

"Having regard to the various declarations made by the administering Power regarding the independence of these Territories,

"Considering that the presence of United Nations special representatives in each of these Territories is necessary for the purpose of following up their progress towards independence,

"1. Takes note with satisfaction of the date for the independence of Bechuanaland and regrets that no dates have so far been fixed by the administering Power for the independence of the other two Territories;

"2. Calls upon the administering Power to ensure that the independence to be granted to Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland should be based on the

free expression of all the people in fulfilment of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV);

"3. *Renews its request* that the administering Power take immediate steps to return to the indigenous inhabitants all the lands taken away from them;

"4. *Decides* to establish a sub-committee with a view to studying and suggesting all necessary measures for securing the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the three Territories as requested by the General Assembly in paragraph 5 of its resolution 2063 (XX);

"5. *Appeals* to all States to contribute to the Fund established by the General Assembly in paragraph 7 of its resolution 2063 (XX);

"6. *Considers* that the efforts to provide economic, financial and technical assistance through United Nations programmes of technical co-operation and the specialized agencies should continue in order to remedy the economic and social situation of the three Territories;

"7. *Requests* the Secretary-General, in consultation with the Special Committee, to appoint United Nations special representatives in each of the three Territories for the purpose of following up the progress towards independence and to report to the General Assembly as soon as possible;

"8. *Decides* to keep the question of Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland under constant review."

238. On the proposal of the Chairman, the Special Committee, at its 455th meeting on 22 June 1966, appointed Afghanistan, Bulgaria, Iran, Italy, Mali, Madagascar and Uruguay as members of the Sub-Committee established in accordance with paragraph 4 of the above-mentioned resolution.

E. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION ON THE TERRITORIES

1. Problems common to the three Territories

Political developments

239. Speaking at a South African Nationalist Party election rally in Springs on 28 March 1966, Prime Minister Hendrik F. Verwoerd said that the United Kingdom and the United States were trying to gain influence in the former High Commission Territories, among other things, through the officials they appointed there to exclude and undermine the friendship with South Africa. He wished to ask the two countries whether for once they would not act wisely and, instead of the chaos they left behind elsewhere in Africa, they would not allow southern Africa to develop naturally.

240. Mr. Verwoerd also said that South Africa neither wanted to incorporate nor to dominate the three Territories, but was willing to grant them everything it wished for itself and to live with them as good neighbours. It desired good economic relations with them without outside interference.

Economic conditions

241. On 29 March 1966, the Swedish Government was reported to have allocated a total of £236,000 for projects in Basutoland and Bechuanaland. Although it would take a decision later on the form of aid, Sweden was expected to participate in such projects as the expansion of the agricultural training centre in Basutoland and the improvement of teacher-training facilities in Bechuanaland.

242. According to reports, hitherto, Swedish action in southern Africa has been mainly in the form of assistance to anti-apartheid organizations and help towards the education of refugees from South Africa and South West Africa. Now the emphasis is to be on aid programmes within the framework of Sweden's policy of neutralizing through the United Nations the effects of the policy of apartheid of the South African Government.

243. According to the information supplied by the United Nations Development Programme, the 1967-1968 programme of technical assistance for the three Territories is being prepared. Allocations for 1965-1966 amounted to \$848,948, representing a substantial increase over the preceding two-year period. Steps are being taken with a view to the establishment of offices of the United Nations Development Programme in Basutoland and Swaziland, to be headed by Assistant Resident Representatives directly responsible to the Representative for Central and Southern Africa. These are additional to the office already established at Gaborone, Bechuanaland.

Educational conditions

244. Early in March 1966, Swaziland's Director of Agriculture, Mr. A. C. Venn, announced that the agricultural training complex at Malkerns, containing the nearly completed £300,000 agricultural college and short-course centre, was to be enlarged soon to accommodate the department of agricultural and other extension activities of the University of Basutoland, Bechuanaland Protectorate and Swaziland. The complex, to be renamed the Swaziland Agricultural College and University Centre (SACUC), would cater for 134 full-time students and up to thirty-two short-term students.

245. Mr. Venn also said that four full-time courses would be offered, three of them leading to the government certificate and the other, a three-year course for students from the three Territories, leading to the award by the University of a diploma in agriculture. The first two-year courses in general agriculture, forestry and home economics would start in June 1966, the first university diploma course in 1967.

246. It was reported that in August 1966 the University probably would begin to conduct an external diploma in law of two years' duration, designed primarily to meet the needs of public servants in the three Territories who required legal training, but not at degree level.

2. Basutoland

Political and constitutional developments

Relations with South Africa

247. On 11 February 1966, Chief Leabua Jonathan, Basutoland's Prime Minister, who is also the leader of the Basutoland National Party (BNP), was reported to have strongly denied opposition claims that he wanted to make his country a "Bantustan appendage of South Africa". He added that his Government stood for an independent Lesotho (the new name for Basutoland) and envisaged a future of friendly coexistence with South Africa.

248. Addressing the closing session of the annual conference of his party on 13 March 1966, Chief Jonathan said that on the question of apartheid and relations with South Africa, the attitude and policy of his Government were dictated by the geographical, eco-

conomic and political realities of Basutoland's position in southern Africa. Repeating that he rejected the policy of apartheid as practised in the Republic, he said that he would like to meet Mr. Verwoerd in South Africa to thank him for his recent gift of grain and the provision of employment for Basotho, as well as to discuss peace and coexistence on the basis of two independent sovereign States. Finally he said that his Government would not tolerate any country giving subversive training to Basotho.

249. A major subject of the projected talks was expected to be the Ox-Bow hydroelectric scheme, the biggest single project under consideration in Basutoland, the development of which would depend upon whether an agreement could be reached concerning the sale of power and water to the Republic. Meanwhile, an international consortium showed a willingness to finance and build the scheme, estimated costs of which ranged from £12 million to £30 million, and a grant of £160,000 from the Commonwealth Development and Welfare Fund was made available to the Basutoland Government for an investigation, on which the final dam design would be based.

250. Another main subject for discussion between the Governments of Basutoland and South Africa was known to be transit rights for Basotho. Mr. Verwoerd was reported to have indicated that he might be willing to grant transit to all *bona fide* travellers from Basutoland. It was also reported that he might allow South African refugees in Basutoland to pass through the Republic provided that his Government did not want them for sabotage offences or planning subversion against the State.

251. On 25 March 1966, Mr. G. M. Kolisang, Secretary-General of the Basutoland Congress Party (BCP), was reported to have said that he had not been allowed to return to the Territory through South Africa and had been deported to Nairobi, mainly because he had refused to divulge the plans of African countries against the Republic and had made no promise that the BCP would be less critical of the policy of apartheid.

252. On 18 April 1966, when he introduced a motion dealing with the independence of Lesotho in the National Assembly, Chief Jonathan said that future treaties between South Africa and independent Lesotho must be concluded without any interference from the United Kingdom or any other third power. He maintained that in the past the United Kingdom and South Africa had entered into many treaties binding on Basutoland without adequate regard to the real wishes and interests of the Basotho. With respect to the contention that independence would bring the danger of Lesotho being swallowed up in the South African apartheid system, Chief Jonathan stated that so long as Lesotho was under colonial rule, that danger would be more possible.

253. The question of future relations with South Africa constituted a significant obstacle to the reaching of unanimous agreement on Basutoland's independence constitution at the constitutional conference held in June 1966. Soon after the conference, Chief Jonathan and Mr. Verwoerd were expected to meet for talks on this question.

Question of independence

254. As noted previously by the Special Committee, the last general election took place on 29 April 1965

under the constitution based on the agreement reached at the 1964 constitutional conference. The agreement stipulated that minimum changes might be made in the constitution for purposes of independence, but that the provisions relating to the status and functions of the Paramount Chief could not be altered except at the request of the Basutoland Parliament, expressed by a resolution of each House. The agreement also stipulated that if the people of Basutoland, not less than one year after the last general election, asked for independence by resolution of both Houses of Parliament, or by referendum if the two Houses differed, the United Kingdom Government would seek to give effect to their wishes as soon as possible, provided that conditions in Basutoland were such as to enable power to be transferred in peace and order. While the agreement was signed by all political leaders from Basutoland attending the conference, several of them, including Chief Leabua Jonathan of the BNP and Mr. Ntsu Mokhehle of the BCP, were reported to have expressed strong criticism regarding the powers to be reserved to the United Kingdom Government under the constitution.

255. As also noted previously by the Special Committee, in the course of the discussions between the Governments of Basutoland and the United Kingdom during November and December 1965, Mrs. Eirene White, Parliamentary Under-Secretary for the Colonies, accepted the Basutoland Prime Minister's statement that this Government would ask for independence immediately after 29 April 1966, as well as his assurance that the stipulated conditions were likely to be fulfilled.

256. Early in February 1966, just before the opening of the pre-independence session of the National Assembly, it was reported in the Press of South Africa that Basutoland was "almost in a state of siege". According to the reports, units of the Mobile Security Force were carrying out daily exercises and members of the Basutoland Mounted Police patrolled the streets day and night. Many men and women were said to have been detained under the Police Offences Act. The accounts in the Press stated that the extra security measures had been taken because there was a strong rumour that some members of the opposition parties were plotting the massacre of members of the Cabinet in order to thwart independence under the Basutoland National Party Government.

257. A Government spokesman said that a company of the Gloucestershire Regiment would arrive in Basutoland from Swaziland on 15 February 1966 and would stay till 4 March to carry out training, principally on a platoon basis in the districts of Basutoland.

258. A later press report stated that on 21 February 1966, when the pre-independence session of the National Assembly was opened, police stood guard in the Assembly Chamber and searched several Members of Parliament as they entered the building. Two days afterwards a motion was introduced by a member from the Basutoland Congress Party (BCP), Mr. S. R. Mokhehle, condemning the police intervention as "a grave infringement of the privileges of this House and its members".

259. Subsequently, the BCP representative in Cairo, Mr. R. Tsinyane, was reported to have protested against the sending of troops to Basutoland by the United Kingdom and mass arrests which took place immediately after their arrival. He demanded the im-

mediate withdrawal of these troops and the release of all the people arrested. He also condemned the United Kingdom, the United States, South Africa and West Germany for their manoeuvres in Basutoland and demanded that the people of Basutoland be left alone to determine their destiny.

260. On 7 March 1966, Mrs. Eirene White stated in reply to a question in the United Kingdom House of Commons that if a request for independence backed by resolution of both Houses of the Basutoland Parliament was received, a constitutional conference would be held during May, at which, she expected, a date for independence would be fixed, probably in the autumn.

261. During the week ending 12 March 1966, the Government White Paper containing the proposals for Basutoland's independence constitution was published. Under the proposed constitution, the Paramount Chief would become the Head of State. The constitution would also contain entrenched provisions concerning the position of the Paramount Chief, the land of Lesotho, the franchise, the position and powers of the National Assembly and the Senate, and the bill of human rights. According to the White Paper, the Basutoland Government would negotiate with the United Kingdom Government to resolve various financial matters, treaty rights and obligations inherited from the United Kingdom Government, and membership of the Commonwealth and of international organizations.

262. On 18 April 1966, Chief Jonathan introduced a motion in the National Assembly calling on the United Kingdom Government to grant Basutoland independence in terms of the agreement reached at the 1964 constitutional conference and the Government White Paper referred to above. When the motion was seconded, the entire Opposition left the Assembly Chamber. The following day, Mr. Ntsu Mokhehle, the leader of the Opposition, who is also the leader of the BCP, challenged the Government to show a two-thirds majority support in the Assembly for its constitutional proposals. An amendment to this effect proposed by Mr. Mokhehle was not adopted, however, and after nearly four weeks of debate, the Assembly on 11 May 1966 approved the Government's motion by 32 votes to 28.

263. The Senate was reported to have begun its discussions of the Prime Minister's independence motion on 19 April 1966. According to the Press, police with tear gas grenades stood by during the Senate's meeting on 2 May 1966, which was adjourned in an uproar. This incident was reported to have been the sequel to the serving earlier in the day on Mr. S. P. Makotoko, the Senate president, who is also the leader of the Opposition Marema-Tlou Freedom Party (MTFP), of an urgent interdict restraining him from carrying out a directive from the Paramount Chief to depose five pro-Government senators. The Paramount Chief nominated in their place five supporters of the MTFP, an action which he took under the terms of the constitution empowering him to appoint eleven of the thirty-three senators. The interdict, issued by the Basutoland High Court, however, allowed the five dismissed senators to retain their seats until 12 May 1966, when the Court would give judgement.

264. Their dismissal by the Paramount Chief occurred on 29 April 1966 after they had voted against Opposition amendments. The amendments were to

the effect that the Paramount Chief should assume control over the Army, police and security forces and have veto powers over any important constitutional changes or national legislation.

265. On 5 May 1966, the Senate with a temporary president in the Chair, after its president had walked out, approved the independence motion. Of the 33 senators, 22 voted for the motion, 8 voted against and one abstained. The Senate's vote was made valid by the Court on 12 May 1966 when it reinstated the five dismissed senators. The Court found that the Paramount Chief was empowered to appoint senators in his sole discretion, but that the constitution did not specify that he could dismiss them.

266. On 17 May 1966, the Senate deposed its president and deputy president by 23 votes to 9. In introducing the motion for the removal of the president, Mr. Charles Molopo, Minister of Economic Development and one of the five senators who had been dismissed by the Paramount Chief but reinstated as a result of the Court's ruling, said that the president had conducted the business of the Senate in a "disgraceful" manner during the independence motion debate. After adopting the motion, the Senate elected Senator N. I. Qhobela as president and Chief S. S. Matete as deputy president.

The constitutional conference of 1966

267. A constitutional conference was held in London from 8 to 17 June 1966 with a view to making constitutional arrangements for granting independence to Basutoland. It was attended by the Paramount Chief and delegates of all the political parties in the Basutoland National Assembly, namely, the BNP led by Chief Leabua Jonathan, the Prime Minister; the BCP, led by Mr. Ntsu Mokhehle; and the MTFP, led by Mr. S. P. Makotoko. The BNP, which now holds thirty-two out of the sixty seats in the Assembly, gained 42 per cent of the votes in the 1965 election, as against 56 per cent for the two Opposition parties.

268. During the debate at the conference, Chief Jonathan said that all the conditions laid down in the agreement reached at the 1964 constitutional conference for granting independence to Basutoland had been fulfilled in the spirit and letter. Nothing remained but for the United Kingdom to grant independence not later than 4 October 1966. The position of the Paramount Chief was settled. These views were firmly supported by the Secretary of State for the Colonies.

269. On the other hand, the two Opposition parties rebutted Chief Jonathan's contention that the conditions for independence had been fulfilled. They pointed out that at the 1964 constitutional conference, the then Secretary of State for the Colonies, Mr. Duncan Sandys, had refused to discuss the fate of the reserved powers of the United Kingdom Government and had given a firm assurance that this matter would be considered at a final independence conference. They proposed that the reserved powers should not be given to the present Basutoland Government; that a measure of discretion in certain matters, notably relations with South Africa, should be left to the Paramount Chief; and that any final constitution should be placed before the people of Basutoland, by means of a new general election, before independence.

270. Following the rejection by the Secretary of State of these proposals, the leaders of the two parties issued two joint statements on 14 and 15 June 1966 respectively. In the first statement, they warned of "the very unhappy consequences as in Zanzibar" if the United Kingdom gave independence under a Government "not representative of the majority of the electorate". (For further details, see appendix I.) The second statement, made after the two parties had withdrawn in protest from the conference, contained a warning that "in the name of the majority of the Sotho people, we announce that we are unwilling to accept as binding on us any constitution for the independence of Basutoland which is signed between the British Government and Chief Leabua Jonathan's minority Government". (For further details, see appendix II.)

271. At the final session of the conference on 17 June 1966, the report⁷ containing the agreement on Basutoland's independence constitution concluded between the United Kingdom and the Basutoland Government delegation was completed. The Opposition delegation did not attend that session and did not sign the report. The Paramount Chief attended but did not sign the report. Earlier, he had given a warning against independence for the Basotho "as a divided nation, in conditions of incipient or actual violence, and unable to defend their proper interests against foreign interference". He said that he was alarmed by "the manner in which Basutoland is being hustled into independence and the apparent unconcern about the principles needed to provide modern Lesotho with a constitution that fits its needs".

272. Chief Jonathan, at the final session, stated that his Government's policy would be based on pan-Africanism and the Organization of African Unity, and would give asylum to refugees, but would not be a base against South Africa, with which it hoped to have an agreement for mutual respect of sovereign rights.

273. Immediately after the conference, the two Opposition parties appealed to the United Nations, the Commonwealth and the Organization of African Unity to have the above-mentioned Basutoland's independence constitution abrogated.

Independence constitution

274. Under the independence constitution, Basutoland will become independent within the Commonwealth on 4 October 1966 under the name of Lesotho. The Paramount Chief will be the Head of State and a constitutional monarch. The powers at present reserved to the United Kingdom (external affairs, defence, internal security and public service) will be transferred to the Basutoland Government, not to the Paramount Chief for delegation to his ministers. According to the report completed at the final session of the conference, "the form of the constitution agrees with the agreement reached in 1964, signed by all parties and leaders, and the expressed desire of the Basutoland Parliament".

275. The report also recorded the view of the United Kingdom Government that "there is little widespread dissent in Basutoland to the relatively minor changes now made in the constitution for purposes of independence", and that "if law and order, which is

now well maintained, is disturbed, those who simply seek personal power will be responsible".

276. The independence constitution will also provide for a court-enforced bill of human rights, with features affording an exceptionally strong safeguard for individual liberties. However, it will not include the precise terms of an extradition treaty with South Africa as proposed by the Opposition.

Economic conditions

277. On 4 February 1966, the International Development Association (IDA) approved a credit of £1.5 million to Basutoland, which will be used for the improvement of a seventy-six-mile section of the main north-south road and of a seventeen-mile connecting feeder road. The project will be aimed at reducing transport and road maintenance costs, and improving economic conditions in the Territory by converting subsistence agriculture to a cash basis. Its cost is estimated to be about £1.9 million, of which £1.5 million will come from the IDA and the remainder will be provided by the Basutoland Government.

278. On 22 February 1966, the Basutoland Government declared "a state of drought emergency" to combat the effects of the worst drought in the Territory for more than thirty years. Chief Leabua Jonathan said that he foresaw a shortage of food during the winter and spring, and had created a drought emergency department to co-ordinate relief. An assessment of the situation was being made in all districts. Negotiations had been opened with the United Kingdom Government and international organizations for food, money and transport.

279. On 1 March 1966, Finance Minister Benedict Leseteli announced in the National Assembly that the Government's Economic Planning Unit and the National Economic Planning Board, which had been formed during the preceding month, would consider his proposals for new taxation designed to reduce Basutoland's unfavourable balance of payments. Under these proposals, special levies would be imposed on petrol, diesel fuel, spirits, wines and beer. There would also be an increase in fees for trading and drivers' licences, and motor vehicle registration.

280. Mr. Leseteli also announced that the Territory's public revenue and expenditure for 1966-1967 had been put at £2.17 and £4.92 million respectively and that the United Kingdom had agreed to grant £2.75 million to enable Basutoland to balance its budget for the year.

281. In June 1966, at the Basutoland constitutional conference, Chief Jonathan made an unsuccessful attempt to have future financial assistance discussed before the completion of the agreement on the independence constitution.

3. Bechuanaland

Political and constitutional developments

Relations with South Africa

282. Early in February 1966, an agreement was reported to have been concluded on the operation of an air service between Bechuanaland and South Africa, by the Government-subsidized Bechuanaland National Airways, established in November 1965. The airline also has flights to Salisbury, Southern Rhodesia, and Livingstone, Zambia.

⁷ *Report of the Basutoland Independence Conference, 1966*, Cmnd 3038 (London, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1966).

283. On 22 February 1966, after the close of the constitutional conference on Bechuanaland's independence, Mr. Seretse Khama, the Prime Minister, said that he did not think it likely that South Africa would want to exchange diplomatic representatives with Botswana (the new name for the Territory), indicating that Botswana's affairs would continue to be handled by the representative of the United Kingdom in South Africa. He also said that Botswana would not be overstrict in applying passport regulations to those entering the country, especially refugees from South Africa.

284. In April 1966, the annual conference of the Bechuanaland Democratic Party (BDP), of which Mr. Khama is the leader, was held at Mochudi. The conference confirmed Mr. Khama's plan to join the Commonwealth, the Organization of African Unity and the United Nations, and to maintain friendly relations with Basutoland and Swaziland. The conference stressed the importance of maintaining the Government's policies of non-interference in the internal affairs of other States, and of good neighbourliness with border countries. The conference nevertheless made it clear that non-interference and good neighbourliness did not mean that Bechuanaland would not condemn "in the strongest possible terms any inhuman policies which may obtain in such States".

285. In May 1966, after the Public Service Commission, formerly an advisory body, had assumed executive powers, Mr. Khama stated that localization of the public service would continue, but not at the expense of efficiency, and that he wanted all expatriate public servants to stay on for as long as the country needed them. Earlier, the Government had denied that there was discrimination against South Africans in the public service.

Other developments

286. Despite reported opposition from Mr. Khama and several other political leaders, including Mr. Motsamai Mpho of the Botswana Independence Party (BIP), the United Kingdom Government, following the unilateral declaration of independence in Southern Rhodesia, built a radio station at Francistown to relay news and programmes to Southern Rhodesia and elsewhere, and has sent about 120 British soldiers to help protect the station.

287. The BDP won an overwhelming victory in Bechuanaland's first local government elections held on 14 June 1966. With returns reported for 139 out of the 165 seats on three new townships and nine new district councils declared, the party was reported to have won 117 seats against 22 secured by the combined opposition parties.

288. On 23 June 1966, it was announced that Mr. J. S. Gandee would be the first British High Commissioner to Botswana, upon Bechuanaland's accession to independence under the name of Botswana on 30 September 1966.

Economic conditions

289. Following five years of low rainfall, Territory-wide famine conditions have existed in Bechuanaland since early 1965. By the end of the year, some 105,000 destitute persons were being given food supplies by the World Food Programme (WFP). On 1 February 1966, Mrs. Eirene White, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies, stated in a written

answer to a question in the United Kingdom House of Commons that the Bechuanaland emergency food programme was being expanded to cover over 300,000 people during 1966 and that a request for supplementary assistance had been made to the WFP. The United Kingdom Government, she added, had provided £350,000 for the relief programme during the financial year 1965-1966 and had approved an expenditure of £250,000 from the Colonial Development and Welfare Fund on projects designed to mitigate the effects of the famine. On 11 February 1966, it was announced that another £200,000 would be allocated towards these projects.

290. At the opening of the constitutional conference on Bechuanaland's independence on 14 February 1966, the Secretary of State for the Colonies said that the famine situation in the Territory would continue through 1966 and into 1967. A tremendous effort would clearly be needed to broaden the economy, develop agriculture, water and other resources, and promote education. The United Kingdom Government would be ready to consider what it could do to help the Territory's development. Earlier, it had been announced that Bechuanaland would receive development grants of £1.3 million for each of the two financial years 1965-1966 and 1966-1967, compared with an average of £1.3 million a year for the previous five financial years.

291. According to a spokesman for the Department of Agriculture, more rain fell in the Territory during February and March 1966 than had fallen in the previous two years. Grazing had improved considerably and emaciated stock were fast putting on weight, thus brightening their prospect of lasting through the 1966 winter. Cattle deaths, estimated earlier this year at more than 400,000 out of a national herd of 1.3 million, had virtually stopped in nearly all areas. The rain had also given farmers the opportunity to plant fast germinating crops for human and animal consumption. Nevertheless this would have little impact on the accumulated food shortage resulting from five years of drought, which had been severely aggravated by the almost complete failure of the 1966 crop.

292. On 21 April 1966, after having increased its famine relief commitment to some \$3.3 million two months previously the World Food Programme approved Bechuanaland's request for aid totalling \$13 million to help reconstruct its agrarian economy. The World Food Programme agreed to assist in carrying out three projects relating to feeding livestock, community development and a five-year supplementary feeding programme for children, expectant and nursing mothers.

4. Swaziland

Political and constitutional developments

Report of the Swaziland Constitutional Committee

293. As previously noted, the proposals for a new constitution contained in the *Report of the Swaziland Constitutional Committee*⁸ were submitted to the Secretary of State for consideration and were tabled in the Legislative Council for discussion in March 1966.

294. In its report, the Committee stated that its proposals had been made after careful examination of constitutional practice in many other territories and of memoranda and suggestions submitted by members

⁸ Swaziland Printing and Publishing Company, Limited, Mbabane, Swaziland, 24 March 1966.

of the public and interested bodies. These bodies included the Joint Council of Swaziland Political Parties, the Ngwane National Liberatory Congress (NNLC) and the Swaziland Progressive Party (SPP).

295. At an early stage in its deliberations, the Committee had represented to the Secretary of State that the new constitution should be based on a monarchical form of government with the Ngwenyama recognized as King of Swaziland and that Swaziland should move from the status of a Protectorate to that of a Protected State as a transitional stage before independence.

296. In his reply the Secretary of State had said that Her Majesty's Government proposed to grant Swaziland internal self-government in 1966, and that if it were so desired Her Majesty's Government would be willing to arrange for the conclusion of an agreement with the Ngwenyama which would have the effect of turning Swaziland into a Protected State, with certain powers, notably in regard to external relations, defence and other matters specified in the constitution reserved to Her Majesty's Government. Her Majesty would also retain the power to amend or replace the constitution. All powers except those specified in the agreement would be renounced.

297. The non-official members of the Committee had repeatedly affirmed their desire for complete independence as soon as possible and the Secretary of State, in accepting the principle, had made it clear that this should not be later than the end of 1969. It was the Committee's belief and intention that the proposed constitution would in principle be the final constitution for an independent Swaziland, with only minor amendments required at the stage of complete independence within the Commonwealth.

298. Under the new constitutional proposals, the Ngwenyama would be recognized as King and Head of State. The succession would be governed by Swazi law and custom.

299. The King would appoint the Prime Minister and other ministers and would have the right to be informed and consulted by his ministers on all matters of government. He would act on ministerial advice except where the proposed constitution specifically provided otherwise. However, he would have the right to require the Prime Minister to reconsider in the Cabinet any matter submitted to him.

300. Provision would be made for the office of Her Majesty's Commissioner. Assisted by a deputy, Her Majesty's Commissioner would retain responsibility for external affairs, defence and internal security. He would be empowered, however, to delegate any part of these responsibilities to a minister designated by the Prime Minister; such delegation might be made subject to conditions and might be revoked.

301. Her Majesty's Commissioner would have certain powers of financial control, for the purpose of ensuring proper financial administration or securing compliance with a condition attached to a financial grant made by Her Majesty's Government to the Swaziland Government.

302. Her Majesty's Commissioner would also be empowered to require the Swaziland Government to introduce and secure the passage of legislation which he considered necessary or expedient in the discharge of the responsibilities reserved to him. If the Government should fail to do so, he might himself make an order which would have the force of law; in this

event he might require the Government to take necessary executive action or, if it should fail to do so, he might himself exercise any lawful function of the Government for that purpose.

303. A consultative council, consisting of a limited number of local representatives of Her Majesty's Government and representatives of the Swaziland Government, would be established for the purpose of consultation between the two Governments on the exercise of the reserved powers by Her Majesty's Commissioner.

304. The Swaziland Parliament would have two Houses: a House of Assembly and a Senate. The House of Assembly would consist of a Speaker, twenty-four elected members, six nominated members, who would be appointed by the King to represent interests not otherwise adequately represented, and the Attorney-General, who would have no vote.

305. The Senate would consist of a Speaker and twelve members, half elected by the members of the House of Assembly and the other half appointed by the King to represent interests not otherwise adequately represented.

306. Swaziland would be divided into eight three-member constituencies, to be delimited and kept under review by a Delimitation Commission consisting of a judge of the High Court of Swaziland as Chairman and two other members appointed by the Judicial Service Commission.

307. Subject to certain exceptions concerning such persons as convicted criminals and the insane, all citizens of Swaziland, or citizens of the United Kingdom and Colonies satisfying a three-year residence qualification, who had attained the age of twenty-one years, or whose husband had attained that age, would be qualified to register as voters.

308. Subject to the provisions of the proposed constitution, the Parliament would have full power to make laws for the peace, order and good government of Swaziland, exercisable by bills passed through both Houses and assented to by the King.

309. The House of Assembly would have exclusive power to initiate legislation on taxation and financial matters and would generally be responsible for initiating legislation on other matters, but would have no power to legislate in respect of Swazi law and custom, unless authorized by the Swazi National Council. The Senate would have power to initiate legislation on matters other than taxation and finance, and Swazi law and custom.

310. Each House would be empowered to refer a bill back to the other House for further consideration, but the Senate would not be able to delay the passage of an appropriation bill. In the case of a "money bill" other than an appropriation bill, if the Senate should fail to pass the bill within thirty days from the date it left the House of Assembly, or pass it only with amendments unacceptable to the House of Assembly, the House of Assembly would be able to submit the bill to the King for his assent.

311. Each Parliament would last for five years, unless dissolved earlier. The power to prorogue or dissolve Parliament would be vested in the King who would normally act on ministerial advice, but who might act in his discretion if the House of Assembly passed a vote of no confidence in the Government or if, in the event of the office of Prime Minister falling vacant, there was no reasonable prospect of finding

a person for appointment who could command a majority in the House of Assembly.

312. Subject to the powers conferred upon Her Majesty's Commissioner, executive authority would be vested in the King. There would be a Cabinet consisting of the Prime Minister, the Deputy Prime Minister and up to six other ministers. There would also be assistant ministers. The function of the Cabinet would be to advise the King in the Government of Swaziland, and it would be collectively responsible to Parliament for any advice given to him. The King would appoint as Prime Minister the leader of the political party, or the coalition of parties, enjoying the support of the majority of the members of the House of Assembly. The Deputy Prime Minister, other ministers and the assistant ministers would be appointed by the King in accordance with the advice of the Prime Minister.

313. The prerogative of mercy would be vested in the King acting in his discretion. There would, however, be a committee consisting of the Attorney-General and three ministers appointed by the King to advise him on the exercise of this prerogative.

314. The Swazi National Council would continue to advise the Ngwenyama on all matters regulated by Swazi law and custom, and connected with Swazi traditions and culture. Swazi Nation land and mineral rights would be vested in him on behalf of the Swazi Nation.

315. The Committee also proposed the establishment of separate commissions, with executive power, for the public and judicial services. An independent judiciary and an integrated judicial system for the Territory were also recommended.

316. The proposed constitution would contain a code of fundamental rights and freedoms, enforceable by the High Court.

317. Provisions relating to the position of the King, the code of fundamental rights, the judicature, the Public Service and Judicial Service Commissions and the procedure for amending the constitution would be entrenched and alterable only by a referendum supported by 75 per cent of all votes validly cast at the referendum.

318. Certain other important provisions would also be entrenched and could not be altered unless supported by 75 per cent of the members present and voting at a joint sitting of both Houses of the Parliament. These would include, *inter alia*, the composition and powers of the Parliament and the maintenance of the existing status and powers of the Swazi National Council.

319. Two of the twelve non-official members of the Committee, both representatives of the United Swaziland Party, expressed certain reservations, one of which was that there should be, for an interim period, two separate electoral rolls with equal representation for Europeans and Africans. This proposal was later defeated in the Legislative Council which, on 5 April 1966, voted unanimously for a motion by Prince Makhosini Dlamini, leader of the Imbokodvo Party, endorsing the majority recommendations of the Committee.

320. Subsequently, however, it was reported in the Press that the Ngwane National Liberatory Congress (NNLC) and the Swaziland Progressive Party (SPP) had rejected the Committee's proposals and had called for the holding of a "fully representative conference". Their main points of protest were reported to be that

(a) the mass of the people had not been consulted about the proposed constitution; (b) under Swazi law and custom, which the constitution would entrench, the King cannot be disputed or officially challenged; and (c) the introduction of three-member constituencies was designed to perpetuate the existing régime.

Economic conditions

321. Swaziland's economy in 1965 proved to be reasonably buoyant despite the outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease and drought conditions. In the agricultural sector, production of canned fruit, citrus, cotton, forest products and sugar all exceeded the output of previous years. The 1965 cotton crop amounted to 6,518 short tons (an increase in value of 60 per cent over 1964), of which 19 per cent were produced by Swazi farmers. Sugar continued to be the Territory's most valuable export, with the production worth over £5 million. The development of the cattle industry received impetus from the establishment in the second half of 1965 of the Swaziland Meat Corporation. In January 1966, the Corporation was reported to have sent to the United Kingdom 1,750 cases of tinned products and 100 tons of frozen meat. Negotiations were being conducted with importers of certain other European countries.

322. The 1965 mineral output, valued at more than £5 million, was almost twice that of 1964. Iron ore production, totalling 1,124,310 short tons, worth over £2 million, accounted for most of the increase.

323. Mr. A. C. Venn, Director of Agriculture, said in mid-March that his Department had launched a massive programme for training farmers and departmental staff. Between March and the end of August, no fewer than 22 short courses, involving some 700 people, would be held. A similar programme for the remainder of the year had been planned.

324. In his budget speech to the Legislative Council on 25 March 1966, Mr. Frank Essex, Secretary for Finance and Development, stated that the agricultural sector of the economy had performed well in 1965 and that as a result of the campaign for a more concentrated effort instituted by the Agricultural Department, the Territory should be at least self-sufficient in maize during 1966. In regard to other sectors, he noted that the development of the Matsapa industrial estate had progressed encouragingly and he believed that the mining industry would play an even larger role in the economy as time went on.

325. Mr. Essex pointed out that the investment made by the various enterprises had not yet been fully reflected in government revenue. Revenue for the financial year beginning on 1 April 1966 was expected to be about £3 million, £1.2 million short of the estimated total expenditure; this deficit would be met by a grant-in-aid from the United Kingdom. Noting that urgent items of capital works had been cut from the expenditure programme, he considered that the Government should implement without further delay the proposal set forth in the 1965 budget for graded income tax.

326. In early 1966, the Swazi Air and Portuguese D.E.T.A. Airways inaugurated a joint service linking Matsapa and Lourenço Marques. Steps are also being taken to improve the railway line to Lourenço Marques with a view to increasing mineral exports.

F. FURTHER CONSIDERATION BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE⁹

Introduction

327. The Special Committee gave further consideration to the question of Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland at its 456th to 458th meetings held in New York between 6 and 8 July 1966.

Written petitions and hearings¹⁰

Basutoland

Messrs. Chazi M. W. L. Mapefane and Ntsi C. A. Mohale, representatives of the Basutoland Congress Party (BCP) A/AC.109/PET.515/Add.1

Messrs. S. P. Makotoko and Edwin Leanya, Marema-Tlou Freedom Party (MTFP) and Messrs. G. M. Kolisang and G. Ramoreboli, Basutoland Congress Party (BCP) A/AC.109/PET.515/Add.2

Bechuanaland

Mr. Bobby Mack, Chief Representative at Cairo, Bechuanaland People's Party (BPP) A/AC.109/PET.526
Mrs. D. Henderson A/AC.109/PET.527 and Add.1

Swaziland

Mr. D. C. D. Nxumalo, representative at Cairo, Swaziland Progressive Party (SPP) A/AC.109/PET.442/Add.3

Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland

Mr. J. J. Nquku, President, Swaziland Progressive Party (SPP) A/AC.109/PET.525

Hearing of petitioners

328. At its 456th and 458th meetings, the Special Committee heard two petitioners concerning Basutoland, namely, Mr. Seth Makotoko, President of the Marema-Tlou Freedom Party (MTFP), and Mr. Kolisang, Secretary-General of the Basutoland Congress Party (BCP) (A/AC.109/PET.515).

329. Mr. Makotoko (MTFP) said that the BCP and MTFP had submitted to the Committee a petition (A/AC.109/PET.515) protesting against the attitude adopted by the United Kingdom Government, at the recent Constitutional Conference in London, concerning the terms on which Basutoland would attain its independence. To elucidate certain questions referred to in paragraphs 5 and 9 of that petition, a supplement had been prepared, but had not yet been circulated to Committee members. At the Conference, the question of the disposal at independence of the reserved powers of the United Kingdom Government, which covered foreign affairs, defence and internal secur-

ity, and the position of the Paramount Chief had been considered. The representatives of Basutoland, who had taken a unanimous position at the 1964 Conference, had expressed divergent views at the Conference just held, because the United Kingdom Government was attempting to impose on the Basotho people a Constitution which they could not accept. According to the 1963 Basutoland Constitutional Commission's report,¹¹ all political parties had agreed that the executive authority would be vested in the Paramount Chief as Head of State, to be exercised not by him but by the responsible ministers. That had meant that the reserved powers would be vested in the Paramount Chief on the accession to independence. However, the United Kingdom Government now wished responsibility for foreign affairs, defence and internal security to be vested directly in the Prime Minister. That was contrary to the original position. In addition, the people of Basutoland wished the Paramount Chief to possess the power to refer to them, by referendum, any agreements which might endanger the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Basuto Nation.

330. Moreover, the people had not been given an opportunity to state their position concerning the change in the policy of the minority party now in power. If the Constitution did not contain a clause permitting the Head of State to consult the people on any agreement entered into with South Africa, Basutoland might be at the mercy of South Africa. He cited an article which had appeared in the *Star*, a South African newspaper, in January 1966 and in which South Africa's intention to annex Basutoland was reported.

331. To ascertain the views of the people on that question, the Paramount Chief had held a series of traditional assemblies or *pitsos* from 28 May to 5 June 1966, and he had been enjoined not to sign the Constitution unless it guaranteed the sovereignty and integrity of the Territory after independence. In his own view, the United Kingdom was endeavouring to abdicate its responsibilities on the eve of independence and was continuing to subordinate the interests of the people of Basutoland to those of the Republic of South Africa. Economically, the United Kingdom had done nothing to free Basutoland from dependence on South Africa and did not even seem prepared to help Basutoland financially, although it had utilized the revenue surpluses in Basutoland for the Development of other Territories, particularly Swaziland.

332. He quoted paragraph 15 of the White Paper¹² on the proposals of the Basutoland Government concerning the advent of independence, which forcefully illustrated that point. Whereas, in Ghana, the Gambia, Tanganyika and Zanzibar, the United Kingdom had insisted on the need for a broadly based Government, it continued to ignore the interests of the people of Basutoland by encouraging the division of the Territory. The parties, desiring to ensure national unity on the eve of independence, had attempted after the general elections in 1965 to bring about the formation of a national government, but the Government had refused. Similarly, a few weeks before the Constitutional Conference had been held in London, the Basutoland Government had

⁹ See also chapter II (paras. 595-619) for an account of the discussions on the resolution adopted by the Special Committee at its 455th meeting on 22 June 1966 concerning the implementation of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) regarding Territories considered by the Committee during its meetings in Africa.

¹⁰ The written petitions were circulated after the Special Committee had adopted a resolution concerning Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland (see para. 237 above) at its 439th meeting on 9 June 1966 and a consensus (see para. 390 below) at its 458th meeting on 8 July 1966.

¹¹ Basutoland Council, *Report of the Basutoland Constitutional Commission* (Maseru, 1963).

¹² See Annex B of the *Report of the Basutoland Independence Conference, 1966*, Cmdd 3038 (London, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1966).

rejected the offer of the MTFP and the BCP to co-operate in drafting a Constitution to which all the people could agree.

333. He noted with concern that many government departments, particularly the police, were now controlled by South African white expatriates. The leaders of the opposition political parties were restricted in their movements in South Africa, while the members of the party now in power had free access to that country. Moreover, the South African Government and the mining companies facilitated the holding of political meetings by the latter for the Basotho who worked in South Africa.

334. The MTFP requested the United Nations to assist the people of Basutoland to obtain a Constitution which would guarantee the sovereignty and integrity of their territory; to that end, the United Nations might assist in organizing a referendum which would be supervised by international observers. The United Kingdom, which had not discharged all its responsibilities to the people of Basutoland under the United Nations Charter, should apply resolutions 1817 (XVII) and 2063 (XX), in particular.

335. He concluded by quoting excerpts from articles in South African newspapers from which the Committee, contrary to the assertions of the United Kingdom Government, could see that peace and quiet did not prevail in Basutoland. According to those articles, the people of Basutoland might be compelled to express their dissatisfaction in a more virulent manner, for the South African Government's annexationist designs were evident.

336. In reply to questions, *Mr. Makotoko* and *Mr. Kolisang* made the following statements.

337. An alternative contained in section 79 of the 1963 report of the Basutoland Constitutional Commission had been that sovereignty should be transferred in its entirety to the people of Lesotho, and that Motlotlehi (the Paramount Chief) should exercise the powers of Head of State in accordance with the Constitution. This alternative had been unanimously agreed on by the Basotho people; but at the 1964 Conference, the United Kingdom Government had not accepted it. Accordingly, discussion of the conditions in which the Paramount Chief should exercise executive powers, including the reserved powers, had had to be postponed to the final conference before independence.

338. At the 1966 Conference, all executive powers had been entrusted to the Prime Minister, without allowing a discussion. That position taken by the Basutoland Government and the United Kingdom Government represented a departure from the agreements of 1963 and 1964.

339. The dispute had centred on the transfer of the reserved powers. When it had become clear that there would be no discussion of this matter, the Opposition had walked out of the 1966 Conference, disappointed in its hopes.

340. The statement issued by his party in London had contained a warning to the United Kingdom because of its persistence in excluding the views of the representatives of the majority of the people from consideration. The Basotho people were unable to identify themselves with a Constitution which had been imposed upon them. The United Kingdom Government itself had more or less hinted that it expected trouble, and it was, in advance, placing the blame upon the opposi-

tion parties. That proved that the United Kingdom clearly realized that it had created a situation in Basutoland in which there could be no peace.

341. There was a great deal of demonstration by the people of Basutoland against the Constitution and the Prime Minister had called upon the Paramount Chief to resign. Thus, one consequence of imposing the Constitution was to create dissension among the people. During 1965, the BCP had lived in an undeclared state of emergency whereby the United Kingdom had barred the political parties belonging to the Opposition from meeting freely. An extension of that undeclared state of emergency could therefore be foreseen. A further consequence of imposing the Constitution would thus be the repression of the natural aspirations of the people.

342. To have elections or a referendum before independence would create certain difficulties. In any event, independence should not be delayed longer than was absolutely necessary to obtain the verdict of the Basuto Nation on what kind of independence it preferred. Such a delay would be worth while if it ensured the emergence into independence as a united nation and without the loop-holes by which that independence could eventually be destroyed.

343. The two opposition parties had made unsuccessful attempts to bring about unity between the leaders of Basotho public opinion. But it could never be too late to make further attempts of this kind. In forming an alliance these parties were not trying to set up a united front against the Basutoland National Party (BNP). If that alliance could be augmented so as to include the governing party, most of the dangers threatening Basutoland would have been defeated.

344. The position in Basutoland had always been that any negotiations with a foreign Power should be conducted by the Paramount Chief and the leading members of the nation together and that in such negotiations the Paramount Chief would occupy a leading position. No agreement had been made concerning the invitation of the Paramount Chief to the 1966 Conference solely as an observer. The Governments of Basutoland and the United Kingdom had sought to exclude him from that Conference completely. Only on the insistence of the opposition parties had it been possible for him to attend it as an observer.

345. At present certain Basotho who did not enjoy the approval of the South African Government were prevented from leaving Basutoland and returning there. Special attention was drawn to the cases involving the President of MTFP and ten Basotho students, all belonging to BCP. That Government was also refusing the nationals of independent countries the right of transit when it disapproved of them. Such actions were taken despite the United Nations resolutions expressly providing for this right. The leaders of the two opposition parties had been banned from South Africa without being given any reasons, and among some 200,000 Basotho who were working in South Africa, anyone who was known to be an active member of one of the two parties was immediately victimized and repatriated. It was, as a result, impossible for the two political parties to work among the Basotho in the Republic of South Africa, while a third party was given free rein and its meetings took place with the approval of the municipal authorities and mining companies.

346. As far as the last general elections were concerned, South Africa had sent large numbers of Basotho home to vote, telling them that it did not matter for which party they voted, but adding that if a certain party should lose the elections they must not come back to work in the Republic. The most notorious example of South Africa's interference had been when Mr. Verwoerd had made a personal gift of 100,000 bags of grain to the Prime Minister, then facing a by-election in Basutoland. Those 100,000 bags, which, if officially offered to the Government, would have served as a famine relief fund for the whole nation, had been given to the Prime Minister to use as he pleased, with the obvious purpose of ensuring him a majority in his constituency. Other examples had included the provision of £10,000 by the South African Government to bring the present Government of Basutoland to power and the participation of South Africa nationals in Basutoland elections.

347. About half of the original national territory had been handed over to South Africa by the United Kingdom about ninety years ago, and even now the Basotho still hoped that they would be able to recover the land so fraudulently taken away from them. In the remaining territory, there was no foreign ownership of land.

348. At the appropriate time the MTFP would submit to the Sub-Committee on Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland suggestions concerning safeguarding the sovereignty of Basutoland. It was emphasized, however, that any guarantee which the Special Committee could give the Basotho people for their territorial integrity and independence could be nullified by agreements entered into by a minority government, if a constitution was allowed to come into existence which did not correspond to the real interests of these people. The paramount need, therefore, was that the Special Committee should try to persuade the United Kingdom to formulate a constitution which would enable Basutoland to express its wishes with regard to any treaty concluded with a foreign country.

349. The Special Committee's attention was also drawn to the economic aspect of the question. The United Kingdom had allowed the economy of Basutoland to be geared completely to that of South Africa, with a consequent threat to the integrity of the country. If the United Nations could provide such financial aid as would make Basutoland less dependent on South Africa, the Basotho people would do a great deal by themselves to improve their economy.

350. Subsequently Mr. Kolisang submitted to the Special Committee some additional information on the situation in Basutoland. In its statement (see para. 362 below), the administering Power had claimed that the initiative in the direction of constitutional advance in Basutoland had been taken by the United Kingdom in 1956; in fact, it was the Basutoland National Council which, in 1955, in motion No. 90, had asked the United Kingdom to institute constitutional changes. As indicated in a memorandum submitted by the BCP circulated to members of the Fourth Committee in December 1962, the Secretary of State for the Colonies had replied in 1956 that the Basotho would not be granted a constitution empowering them to make laws applicable to the white population in Basutoland. Regarding the first four stages of constitutional development in the Territory, it was true that all parties had

given their agreement, for they had been anxious to negotiate in a spirit of mutual understanding. However, no agreement was reached at the 1964 Constitutional Conference on the transfer to the Prime Minister of Basutoland, upon independence, of the reserved powers formerly exercised by the United Kingdom Government, since that question had not even been discussed.

351. Referring to sections 76 and 79 of the 1963 Basutoland Constitutional Commission's report, he drew the Committee's attention to the fact that the political parties had agreed to the transfer of the reserved powers inasmuch as they envisaged that, during the pre-independence period, Basutoland's status would be that of a protectorate linked to the United Kingdom by a treaty under which independence would be granted automatically. It should be recalled that, in 1962, when a Constitutional Commission had been appointed to draw up a report, all the political parties had agreed that the Paramount Chief should not be given absolute powers such as those exercised by the High Commissioner in Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland with regard to foreign affairs, defence and internal security. The framers of the Constitution confined themselves to indicating that the Paramount Chief would exercise only certain powers. Sections 30 and 62 of the 1963 report were explicit in that regard. The United Kingdom representative had quoted only the last two paragraphs of section 65 and had thus distorted its meaning.

352. Thirdly, the delegation of powers in the field of foreign affairs meant that Basutoland and the United Kingdom would share the responsibility during the pre-independence period in order to give the Territory the necessary experience. Such a sharing of powers did not mean that ultimate authority was transferred from the Head of State to the Prime Minister, as was clear from sections 54, 56, 91, 94 and 97 of the report.

353. To avoid any misunderstanding, he wished to make it clear that when he and Mr. Makotoko had referred to the minority Government they had not wished to dispute in any way the legality of that Government; the fact that they themselves represented the Opposition showed that they regarded the Government as the legal Government of Basutoland.

354. Lastly, since the question as to how the reserved powers would be disposed of at independence had never been made an election issue, it was essential that new elections should be held. As pointed out in section 13 of the petition which had been circulated, the unity of the Basuto Nation must be preserved, especially at a time when it was threatened by a neighbouring country. In section 16 of the same document, the petitioners appealed to the United Nations to persuade the United Kingdom to change its present policy and, in particular, to agree to the holding of immediate elections in the presence of international observers.

355. In conclusion, he quoted sections 76, 79, 54, 56, 91, 94, 97, 30 and 62 of the 1963 report. He stressed again the refusal of the United Kingdom Government, in 1964, to agree that, as the framers of the Constitution had envisaged, the powers relating to foreign affairs, defence and internal security exercised by the High Commissioner should be transferred to the Head of State of Basutoland in a modified form. If the United Kingdom Government had acceded at that

time to the unanimous wishes of the people of the Territory, the existing difficulties in Basutoland would not have arisen.

356. In a further statement Mr. Makotoko said that he wished to comment on certain passages of a statement by the United Kingdom Secretary of State for the Colonies in which the latter had outlined the background to the present constitutional dispute in Basutoland. Firstly, there had indeed been five progressive stages of constitutional development in Basutoland, and certain principles had been established after consultation among all the leaders of Basotho public opinion. It was not until June 1966 that a departure had been made from those principles, and that was the only reason for the present unhappiness in the Territory; it was that situation which the petitioners were seeking to correct. The second point related to the pledge given by the Basotho leaders in 1964 that there would be minimum change at the time of independence. It was obvious that if residual powers concerning foreign affairs, internal security and defence were to remain in the hands of the United Kingdom Government, such a change, even if it was "minimum", was by no means minor. The interpretation that "minimum" meant "minor" could not be accepted. The term could not exclude the right of the Territory to dispose of the residual powers in a manner giving the nation maximum protection. Thirdly, all the leaders of Basotho public opinion had agreed on the framework of the pre-independence constitution in 1964. That agreement could not automatically be taken to cover the final form of the independence Constitution, in 1966, for certain very important national matters such as foreign affairs, defence and security had been left outstanding.

357. The Basuto Nation should be allowed to make known its views regarding the residual powers. It was true that there had been unanimity of opinion, but it was important to know to what the unanimity related. He hoped to submit to the members of the Committee verbatim quotations from statements of all the members of the present Government demanding the very conditions which the opposition parties were advocating and which had caused them to be accused of wishing to create trouble. When the elections had been held, the leaders of the Government and of the main opposition party had been in agreement that the residual powers should devolve upon the Paramount Chief.

358. It should also be made clear that the Constitutional Commission's report, known in Basutoland as the Green Book, had not in fact been the legal document on which the Commission and the United Kingdom had based their agreement in London. The book which had now been used as a basis for that agreement was a draft report of the Commission which had become the legal document only after it had been extensively amended in Parliament. The amendments had mainly related to the reserved powers and the position of the Paramount Chief. After the document had been legalized and amended, the United Kingdom officials in Basutoland had refrained from including the amendments in the book. Consequently, when the Secretary of State for the Colonies quoted from that document now, he could quote certain passages which gave incorrect information. Had the amendments been made it would have been clear that the Basotho people and their Parliament did not want the Paramount Chief to become an absolute monarch upon independence.

The amendments which had been made could not be called "slight", as they had been by the Secretary of State for the Colonies, and that fact was clear evidence of a manoeuvre directed against the Basotho people.

359. With regard to the question of the delegation of powers, the Basotho leaders had agreed that the United Kingdom's reserved powers should be transferred to the Ministers of the Basotho Government, subject to the supervision of the Paramount Chief whose responsibility it was to ensure that those powers were not exercised in such a manner as to undermine the sovereignty of the Territory. The United Kingdom Government today held that that agreement was tantamount to depriving the Paramount Chief of the right to inherit the United Kingdom Government's authority. That was another manoeuvre directed against the Basuto Nation. Furthermore, at the London Conference, the Basotho leaders had requested that the United Kingdom should be authorized to amend the Constitution but not the position of the Paramount Chief during the period preceding independence; that was a guarantee of security since, throughout the history of Basutoland, it was the Paramountcy which had saved the Nation from extreme disasters. Today, that request was apparently being interpreted as meaning that the Basotho leaders had intended that what the Nation had asked for should not be granted even at independence.

360. It should be pointed out, in conclusion, that the United Kingdom Government had pledged itself at the 1964 Conference to grant independence to Basutoland in conditions of peace and order. Furthermore, the Special Committee recently adopted at Addis Ababa a resolution to that effect. Basutoland wanted the United Kingdom Government to fulfil its promise and implement the resolution adopted by the Committee. The surest safeguard of peace lay in the implementation of that resolution which declared that the granting of independence should be in accord with the people's wishes. There was no peace today in Basutoland. The sending of a British regiment was no substitute for the surer way of maintaining peace, which was to allow the Basotho people to express their wishes by means of elections or by a referendum concerning the form of independence which they desired. Then there could be no reason for disagreement or disturbances. The verdict of the referendum would be fully respected.

General statements by members

361. The representative of the *United Kingdom* said that following the statements made by the two petitioners he would like to offer some clarifications regarding the constitutional matters raised in connexion with Basutoland.

362. In 1956, the United Kingdom Government had invited the Basutoland National Council to submit detailed recommendations for constitutional advance. In 1962-1963, at the request of the Council, the Paramount Chief had appointed a Constitutional Commission representing all the main political parties. In 1964, at the Constitutional Conference held in London, which had been attended by the Paramount Chief and the leaders of all the political parties in the Territory, the Constitutional Commission's report had been considered. Full agreement had been reached among all the political parties, including those represented by the present petitioners, on the proposed Constitution. Three points in the report of the Conference were noteworthy: first that it defined the position of the Paramount Chief

as a constitutional Head of State; secondly that the Basutoland delegation had stated that it looked to the future with confidence in spite of present economic difficulties, that it was not asking the United Kingdom for an assurance of continued military protection of the Territory after independence, that it recognized the need to live at peace with South Africa and that it was confident that South Africa entertained the same sentiments towards Basutoland; lastly that the Secretary of State for the Colonies had undertaken that, if at a date not earlier than one year after new elections the people of Basutoland by resolutions of both Houses of their Parliament should ask for independence, the British Government would seek to give effect to their wishes. That undertaking had been given on the assumption that conditions in Basutoland would be such as to enable power to be transferred in peace and order. That procedure had been accepted by all concerned.

363. The elections of April 1965, whose validity had been questioned by some, had taken place on the basis of the new Constitution and of universal adult suffrage. At the opening of the 1966 Constitutional Conference the Basutoland National Party had thirty-one seats, the Marema-Tlou Party one seat, the Basutoland Congress Party twenty-five seats, and the Marema-Tlou Freedom Party three seats, thus giving thirty-two seats to government supporters and twenty-eight seats to the Opposition. Of the eleven persons appointed to the Senate by the Paramount Chief, eight were drawn from the opposition parties. Seeing that the elections had taken place and a year had passed since those elections, one of the conditions contained in the undertaking given by the Secretary of State for the Colonies had been fulfilled. The second condition had been that resolutions should be passed by both Houses of the Basutoland Parliament, or, in the event of disagreement between them, by a majority in a referendum. That condition too had been fulfilled. In consequence, the Basutoland Government had requested the United Kingdom Government to fix 4 October 1966 as the date for independence.

364. At the opening of the June 1966 Conference, attended by delegates of all the main political parties, the position had been as follows. The question of independence had been settled in principle in 1964, the essential framework of the Constitution had also been accepted in 1964, the role of the Paramount Chief had been defined and the date of the elections agreed upon. Lastly, the parties had agreed on the procedure to be followed after the elections.

365. Taking up one of the comments made by Mr. Kolisang which concerned the residual powers and was thus relevant to the position of the Paramount Chief, he said that paragraph 65 of the 1963 Constitutional Commission's report seemed to him more relevant than paragraph 79, which had been quoted by the petitioner. Under the recommendations made in that paragraph, which had been given effect in the 1965 Constitution, the Paramount Chief was the Queen's representative and exercised the powers of a constitutional monarch. It should be recalled that all parties had accepted that clause in the Constitution. As to the transfer of powers relating to the public service, foreign affairs, defence and internal security, paragraph 12 of the report of the 1964 Conference¹³ made it clear that the reserved

powers were to be transferred to the Basutoland Government rather than to the Paramount Chief. Furthermore, in 1965, at the request of the Prime Minister of Basutoland, arrangements had been made to transfer to the Government of the Territory responsibility in the field of internal security and external affairs. It would surely be difficult to take away from the Basutoland Government powers which had been delegated to it already before independence. It was also stated in paragraph 11 of the report of the 1964 Constitutional Conference that the Paramount Chief was to be a constitutional Head of State.

366. He wished also to mention a speech made in the House of Lords on 21 June 1966 by Lord Beswick, in which the latter had referred to a letter from Mr. Mokobi, the leader of one of the opposition parties, expressing the view that it would be inconsistent with the views of the majority in Basutoland unless the constitutional Head of State had only restricted powers, and also to a message sent to the Secretary of State for the Colonies by seventeen of the twenty-two principal Basutoland chiefs saying that the Paramount Chief was the Head of State and ought to be constitutional ruler and the symbol of national unity. For the reasons set out in paragraph 15 of the 1966 report, the United Kingdom Government had felt unable to accept the Basutoland Opposition's proposals in view of their inconsistency with previous agreements and the danger that they would lead to a division of responsibility.

367. The question of relations between Basutoland and South Africa clearly gave rise to much anxiety and charges had been made regarding the intentions of the Basutoland Government. It was suggested that that Government might decide, for reasons which were not clear, to alienate territory to South Africa or to enter into some relationship with South Africa which would not be acceptable to the people of Basutoland. The Prime Minister of Basutoland had himself categorically refuted those charges, and declared himself to be bitterly hostile to apartheid. Moreover, the Constitution designed to come into force after independence would provide that no action which might derogate from the independence and sovereignty of the new State could be adopted without the support of a majority vote in a referendum. In other words, the Lesotho Government would be unable to convert the country into a "Bantustan" without the support of the majority of the people.

368. On the other hand, the Basutoland Government recognized realistically that coexistence with South Africa was a prerequisite for the economic viability of the country; that had been accepted by all parties and the necessity of coexistence had been reaffirmed in the report of the 1964 Conference, which had received the support of all concerned. It should be added that membership in the Commonwealth and in the United Nations constituted an important assurance of Basutoland's independence.

369. Finally, he did not see any justification for the holding of new elections, which the petitioners considered necessary; there was no evidence that circumstances had changed or that there had been a shift in public opinion since the earlier elections, and there was therefore no reason to suppose that new elections would give a different result. The elections had been properly held and, up to that time, all concerned had been agreed on the issues; it was only later that the leaders of the

¹³ *Basutoland Constitutional Conference*, Cmnd 2371 (London, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1964).

parties to which the petitioners belonged had changed their minds and reopened certain issues. The Basutoland Parliament had asked for independence and it had been decided that Basutoland should become independent under the name of Lesotho on 4 October; there was therefore no justification for further elections before independence.

370. It was to be hoped, as the Secretary of State for the Colonies had said in a recent broadcast after the Conference, that all those in Basutoland would now work together in the best interests of their country. He added that the Basutoland Government had not yet heard what had been said in this debate; no doubt there would be a future opportunity for them to be heard if necessary.

371. In a further statement, the representative of the United Kingdom said that in his statement the previous day his main contentions had been, first that the essential framework of the Constitution, designed to be carried over with a minimum of change into independence, was agreed by all at the 1964 Conference, and secondly that pre-independence elections had been held on a basis of universal adult suffrage, and held properly, on terms agreed by all. Referring to the petitioners' comments on the question of the reserved powers and their claim that no agreement had been reached on the question at the 1964 Conference, while the documents which had been quoted in that connexion referred to the pre-independence Constitution and not to the Constitution by which the country would be governed after independence, as he had already stated, the pre-independence Constitution, which had been approved by all the parties concerned, had been drawn up on the advice of the Basutoland Constitutional Commission as something which could be carried over as the independence Constitution with a minimum of change. Provision for the transfer of the reserved powers to a Basotho authority was made expressly in the pre-independence Constitution, under which as stated in the 1964 Constitutional Report the British Government representative, who would retain responsibility for external affairs, defence and internal security, would be empowered to delegate any part of those responsibilities to a minister of His Highness's Government designated by the Prime Minister; such delegation might be made subject to conditions and would be without prejudice to the British Government representative's power to revoke the delegation at any time.

372. Was it conceivable that, once those powers had been delegated, as some of them had been after the entry into force of the 1965 Constitution, it was intended that they should be transferred to the Paramountcy after independence? Had that been so, was it conceivable that there should not be the slightest mention of it in any of the documents which had been laid before the 1966 Conference? Had it been the intention of all concerned that those powers should go to the Paramountcy, it was inconceivable that it should not be mentioned in any of the documents.

373. With regard to the powers of the Paramount Chief as the Head of State, he drew the Committee's attention to chapter 3 of the 1963 Constitutional Commission's report, concerning specifically the Head of State. As the Commission itself had said, no aspect of its work had given it more anxiety than that of devising the appropriate status for the Paramount Chief, and it had come to the conclusion that his powers

must be carefully defined. The full citation was to be found in the verbatim record of the 457th meeting of the Special Committee. It was doubtful whether the minutes of the 1964 London Conference would substantiate the general conclusions drawn by the petitioners. What was certain was that Mr. Ramoreboli, a distinguished member of the Basutoland Congress Party, explaining why the Paramount Chief had not been given powers other than those specified in the report, had argued that his powers must be in accord with the accepted principles of a constitutional monarchy. It had seemed natural to Mr. Ramoreboli that the definition of those powers should be based on the example of the United Kingdom whose monarchy went back a thousand years, and he had concluded that if a monarchy was to survive it should be isolated from political controversy and the king should reign as a constitutional monarch.

374. On the question of holding new elections, it must be pointed out that on 4 December 1963, when it had been a question of whether the Constitutional Commission's report should be referred back to the people of Basutoland for their approval, Mr. Khaketla, a member of the Basutoland Congress Party, and Mr. Kolisang had not questioned the validity of the views expressed in the report which they considered, as they had stated in writing, an acceptable basis for negotiations for the improvement of Basutoland's Constitution at that time. Mr. Khaketla had also stated that his constituents had passed a resolution declaring that the Basutoland Constitutional Commission's report truly reflected the views which they had expressed before the Commission when they had been consulted in 1962, that they accepted the report in its entirety and urged the Basutoland National Council to pass it without delay, and that they did not agree with those who had suggested that the report should be referred back to the people since they were satisfied that it expressed the true feelings of the Basotho. Moreover, as he himself had pointed out at the previous meeting, the Constitution which was to go into effect after independence derived almost exactly from the framework drawn up by the Constitutional Commission of 1962-1963 and approved by successive constitutional conferences, including that of 1964 in which the representatives of all political parties and the Paramount Chief of Basutoland had participated.

375. Furthermore, if the question whether the reserved powers should go, on independence, to the Paramount Chief or to ministers of the Basutoland Government had not been settled at the 1964 Conference, it was inconceivable that it would not have been an issue at the 1965 elections, and the petitioners themselves had said it had not been an issue at those elections. The electorate had been fully aware of the independence issue; there had been no disagreement about the question of reserved powers, since it had already been agreed that the position of the Paramount Chief should be that of a constitutional monarch. If the fate of the reserved powers had not been settled beforehand and agreed in principle at the 1964 Conference, it was inconceivable that it would not have been an issue at the elections. It had only been after the elections that those powers had been called into question by the two parties represented by the petitioners. Up to the time when the results of the election had been known, a carefully thought-out plan for bringing Basutoland to independence had been agreed to by all concerned.

376. The representative of *Iraq* drew attention to paragraph 2 of resolution A/AC.109/178, which the Special Committee had adopted on 9 June 1966 and in which the Committee called upon the administering Power to ensure that the independence to be granted to Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland should be based on the free expression of all the people in fulfilment of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV). It could be argued that the Committee might have been thinking of new elections when it had used the words "free expression"; that was why, in his opinion, the petitioners had referred to that possibility. He wondered whether the United Kingdom representative perceived any contradiction between what the petitioners had said the day before and what the Special Committee had decided in the resolution to which he had just referred and which might be taken as a call for new elections.

377. The representative of *Uruguay* said that the information the United Kingdom representative had given the Committee showed that the independence shortly to be granted to Basutoland had been prepared properly and with the support of all the parties involved.

378. It could only be a source of satisfaction to learn that the Government which had emerged from the 1965 elections reflected the wishes of the majority—a majority which knew what it was doing. It was with great pleasure that the Committee had heard the United Kingdom representative confirm the announcement that Basutoland would accede to independence on 4 October; that country, which would not be born without pain, would soon take its place as a sovereign nation and play its part in the world.

379. It was particularly gratifying that Basutoland's forthcoming independence would be a truly constitutional independence. It was clear from the United Kingdom representative's statement that the three parties were agreed on the ways in which independence would be achieved and on the Constitution under which the new State would be governed.

380. With his republican convictions, he could not endorse the arrangements relating to the constitutional powers to be reserved to the Paramount Chief, but he realized that those arrangements reflected the choice made by the people in the exercise of their fundamental right to self-determination.

381. The representative of the *United Republic of Tanzania* stated with regard to the statement just made by the Uruguayan representative, that the Latin American countries had given Africa many good examples, especially during their struggle for their independence. However, he did not believe that democracy was now coming to Africa. The history of that continent had always been marked by bloodshed and what was now taking place in Africa was a process of decolonization. It was therefore not really a question of democracy coming to Africa but a question of the restoration to the Africans of the rights of which they had been robbed by the colonial Powers. The fact that African petitioners were appearing before the Special Committee caused him sorrow because it showed how Africa today was still being oppressed and how human freedom was still being infringed in the world. The Africans were not so much interested in the idea of independence *per se* as in the kind of independence achieved. For example, Ian Smith had declared himself independent; however, that type of independence could not be recognized because it was inimical to African interests. The same applied to South Africa. Its

independence was not true independence because it rested in the hands of a minority which exploited the rest of the people. His delegation was therefore mainly interested in the nature of independence; the evidence of the petitioners must therefore be taken into consideration, because, despite certain obvious contradictions, they represented the people and spoke on their behalf. Contradictions could also be found in the statements by the administering Powers; he might mention, for example, the position taken by the United Kingdom Government on Southern Rhodesia and the very different attitude it had taken in the case of Aden, even though the populations in question were similar. As far as the assurances given by the United Kingdom Government were concerned, he recalled that often such assurances had remained a dead letter.

382. Basutoland was a case where the administering Power was concerned and the petitioners had already pointed out what should be done. Thus, while the Committee should weigh the evidence given by the administering Power, it should also pay great heed to the statements of the petitioners, in the interest of the African people of Basutoland.

383. His delegation did not see how the question of the reserved powers could be said to have been disposed of when the Constitution of 1964 had left those powers in the hands of the representatives of the United Kingdom Government in the Territory. It was clear from the petitioners' statements that the majority of the people of Basutoland rejected the argument that that question had already been disposed of. After all, the powers relating to defence, external affairs and internal security were so important that they could not conceivably have been disposed of without serious consideration at the constitutional talks. Another important point was that even the Paramount Chief, who, it could be assumed, had always worked closely with the representatives of the United Kingdom Government in the Territory, should come to disagree with the United Kingdom on that matter. The best way of settling the matter would therefore be to consult the people of Basutoland. In the interests of peace and good government, the Basotho people should be given a chance to express their views on the question by way of elections.

384. Another point was the question of the delegation of powers. What the Basuto nation wanted was not for the Paramount Chief to become an absolute ruler but merely for him to have a say regarding the manner in which such powers would be exercised. The essence of the matter was that the Head of State should be able to delegate powers with regard to defence, internal security and external affairs in the same way that the United Kingdom representative in Basutoland had been given authority to do so in the 1965 Constitution. Because the Constitution was silent on that matter and because the Paramount Chief of Basutoland would on independence become the Head of State, the Tanzanian delegation would have assumed that those powers which had been exercised by the United Kingdom representative would have gone to the Head of State, who would, in turn, have delegated them to his ministers.

385. The Special Committee must not forget that the interests of the Basotho people were its main concern. It was in their interests that the Territory should be able to accede to independence in a peaceful and orderly manner. Therefore, if some of the decisions taken at the most recent Constitutional Conference

seemed to bring some degree of instability, then the United Kingdom should hold new elections in order to give the Basuto Nation a chance to say in what ways they wished the reserved powers to be disposed of after independence.

386. He urged the Basotho people to come together so as to prove to the world that even though they were attaining independence under difficult circumstances, they were nevertheless capable of overcoming their difficulties.

387. The representative of *Uruguay* stressed that there was no difference of view between the representative of the United Republic of Tanzania and himself. The concept of democracy was different from the concept of independence. One thing was true: all peoples must pay a price for their freedom. In struggling against various forms of domination, Latin America had also suffered much bloodshed. Hence it understood the problems of Africa and Asia. The solidarity of the Latin American representatives with those of Africa and Asia in the Committee of Twenty-Four was to some extent a question of sympathy and all spoke the same language of democracy. The struggle which Africa was now waging evoked memories of Latin America's earlier struggle.

388. The representative of *Mali* expressed the view that the constitutional problem raised by the administering Power was less important than the relations that should exist between South Africa and Basutoland and the guarantee offered to the Territory in order to safeguard its integrity vis-à-vis South Africa. He would be happy to hear the United Kingdom representative's explanation of the measures his Government had taken or intended to take to safeguard Basutoland's independence. The representative of the administering Power had stated that the Prime Minister of the present Government in Basutoland was realistic because he intended to co-operate very closely with the Government of South Africa. Paragraph 43 of document A/AC.109/L.273 stated that "people who live in Basutoland should be able to go freely into and out of the country". Did that mean that Basutoland was in the power of the Government of South Africa, which could at will authorize or refuse to authorize persons to enter or leave its territory? Was it under those conditions that the United Kingdom Government wished to grant independence to Basutoland?

389. The representative of the *Union of Soviet Socialist Republics* said that his delegation had carefully studied the petitions submitted to the Special Committee and had listened attentively to the submissions of the petitioners. They had particularly stressed the fact that the policy of the United Kingdom, as the administering Power, was incompatible with the genuine independence, unity and territorial integrity of Basutoland. Proof of the Basotho people's disagreement with the policy of the administering Power lay in the many mass rallies taking place all over the Territory in protest against United Kingdom policy. The United Kingdom representative, however, had tried to give the impression that the administering Power's policy was in keeping with the interests of Basutoland. If that was so, why were mass rallies being held? United Kingdom policy in Basutoland, as in other colonies, was guided only by the interests of the administering Power and the British monopolies. The administering Power had obliged Basutoland to contend with an extremely difficult economic and social situation. The United Kingdom representative had told the Committee that the

elections of 29 April 1965 had been democratic in character. It was to be noted, however, that the Republic of South Africa had interfered directly in the conduct and results of the Basutoland elections. Thus, the petitioners had cited examples of direct financial assistance on the part of the Republic of South Africa and the Federal Republic of Germany. Moreover, South Africa had exerted economic pressures on the voters and had engaged in blackmail and threats. If it was borne in mind that such pressure and blackmail had affected 43 per cent of the country's working population—the number of Basothos working in the Republic of South Africa—the importance of such electoral blackmail was only too clear. In view of the illegal votes by persons living in the Republic of South Africa and the forging of ballot papers, the United Kingdom's attempt to represent the 1965 elections as democratic would not bear examination. Furthermore, the elections had not satisfied one of the principles of the Declaration on the granting of independence, namely the principle of "one man, one vote". Thus, the party which had obtained 41.6 per cent of the votes, thanks to undemocratic activities, had actually won 31 out of the 60 seats in Parliament, i.e. almost 52 per cent of the total seats. Such a disparity clearly showed that the elections had not been genuine and had been held in violation of the standards laid down by the United Nations for elections in colonial Territories. Could a situation in which those who had won a majority in the elections were not represented in the Government be regarded as democratic? It was obvious that the United Kingdom, despite the holding of elections, was stubbornly pursuing a policy which prevented the people of Basutoland from freely expressing their wishes and deciding their future. The United Kingdom Government was trying above all to safeguard the interests of the British capitalists in Southern Africa. The Special Committee should very carefully analyse the situation prevailing in Basutoland and take all necessary measures to ensure the observance of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. His delegation would support any decision taken by the Special Committee for that purpose.

G. FURTHER ACTION TAKEN BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE

390. At the 458th meeting on 8 July 1966, in compliance with the request from several delegations, the *Chairman* made the following statement, setting forth a consensus of the views expressed in the Special Committee:

"The members of the Special Committee had, in the course of the debate, expressed concern regarding the recent developments in Basutoland and had all expressed the desire that Basutoland should accede to independence without delay. Many members had expressed the hope that all the political parties in the Territory would unite in their efforts to achieve common objectives because it was only through a united approach that the problems of Basutoland could be solved. It was generally agreed that the independence of Basutoland should be based on the principles expressed in operative paragraph 2 of the resolution concerning Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland (A/AC.109/178), adopted by the Special Committee at its 439th meeting held at Addis Ababa on 9 June 1966. In addition, many delegations had expressed the hope that guarantees would

be provided for the preservation of the territorial integrity of Basutoland."

391. This consensus was adopted, without objection, by the Special Committee at the same meeting.

392. The representative of the *United Kingdom* said he was glad that the Chairman had decided to proceed by consensus. As, however, he had not had time to seek any instructions from his Government on that point, he wished to enter a general reserve on the actual phraseology of that consensus. Furthermore, since, up to a point, the consensus touched on the internal affairs of Basutoland, the future independent State of Lesotho, he also wished to make a general reserve on behalf of the Basutoland Government.

393. With regard to the reference to operative paragraph 2 of the resolution A/AC.109/178, which provided that independence should be based on the free expression of all the people in fulfilment of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), it was the view of the *United Kingdom* that the elections that had been held in the Territory met that requirement.

394. With regard to the last sentence of the Chairman's consensus, which concerned the question of guarantees, he said that as it was not clear to him how or by whom such guarantees should be established, he could not commit his Government in respect of any details in that regard.

395. The representative of the *United States of America* said that her delegation was pleased that it had been possible for the Committee to arrive at a consensus. Her delegation wished, however, to register a reserve in connexion with that part of the Chairman's consensus relating to operative paragraph 2 of resolution A/AC.109/178, because it believed that the views of the people of Basutoland on that subject had already been expressed in the recent elections.

396. The representative of *Mali* said that his delegation was happy to endorse the consensus just stated by the Chairman. It could not, however, undersatnd the position taken by some delegations with regard to operative paragraph 2 of resolution A/AC.109/178 adopted at Addis Ababa. The petitioners had said that they had left the London Conference because no clear decision had been taken there regarding the fate of the so-called reserved powers. Thus, it was evident that, under the existing conditions, independence would not be based on the free expression of all the people.

397. As to guaranteeing the territorial integrity of Basutoland, there could be no doubt that the *United Kingdom*, as the administering Power, was responsible for guaranteeing the integrity of that Territory against the threat represented by South Africa.

398. The representative of *Australia*, recalling that his delegation had voted for resolution A/AC.109/178, said that his country's position with regard to operative paragraph 2 of the resolution was similar to that of the *United States*. It was his country's understanding that the independence shortly to come to Basutoland was in fact based on the free expression of the people within the meaning of the Australian interpretation of that paragraph.

H. CONSIDERATION OF THE REPORT OF THE SUB-COMMITTEE ON BASUTOLAND, BECHUANALAND AND SWAZILAND

399. At its 466th and 467th meetings, the Special Committee considered the report of the Sub-Committee

on Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland, established under the terms of operative paragraph 4 of the resolution adopted by the Committee at its 439th meeting on 9 June 1966.

400. During its consideration of the Sub-Committee's report the Special Committee also had before it a letter addressed to it by the Chairman of the Special Committee on the Policies of Apartheid of the Government of the Republic of South Africa (A/AC.109/204). The letter drew attention to a memorandum received from Mr. Matthew Nkoana, of the Pan-Africanist Congress of South Africa, concerning the arrest in Basutoland of Mr. John Nyati Pokela, a member of that party.

Statements by members of the Special Committee on the report of the Sub-Committee on Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland

401. The representative of *Bulgaria* (Rapporteur of the Sub-Committee), in introducing the report, explained that the members of the Sub-Committee were aware of the complexities and the unprecedented nature of the subject in the United Nations. At the same time, the members of the Sub-Committee realized that they did not have the necessary time to carry out a thorough study and that their recommendations had to be made as soon as possible. That is the reason why the Sub-Committee tried to suggest certain measures to the Special Committee which were in keeping with the urgency of the moment and which could be achieved immediately, in order to counter the overt aims of the South African régime which seeks to absorb these Territories and to interfere in their internal affairs.

402. Firstly, because of the precarious situation in which the three Territories found themselves at the time when two of them were about to accede to independence, the Sub-Committee had recommended that the Special Committee should take the necessary steps to ensure that they attained independence in the manner prescribed in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV).

403. Secondly, the Sub-Committee thought that the Special Committee should re-recommend that the General Assembly should again solemnly warn the Republic of South Africa that any attempt to encroach upon the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the three Territories should be considered as an act of aggression and a flagrant violation of the Charter, with all the attendant consequences, including recourse to the Security Council. The General Assembly should also draw the Security Council's attention to the matter. Furthermore, in view of the favorable attitude which certain Powers had shown to the South African apartheid régime and the help they had given it, the General Assembly should appeal to all Member States to refrain from any action which might encourage the designs of South Africa.

404. The Special Committee should consult the Organization of African Unity which had a special responsibility for African problems.

405. Finally, the Sub-Committee suggested that the General Assembly should give the matter priority in order to reach a decision before the imminent accession to independence of two of the three Territories.

406. The representative of the *United Republic of Tanzania* said that Bechuanaland, Basutoland and Swaziland were in a difficult position because of the threatening presence of South Africa and the colonial attitude of the *United Kingdom* Government, which

had merely maintained the three Territories as reservoirs of cheap labour for the gold mines and other enterprises of financial monopolies which carried on their activities in South Africa. At a time when the colonial system was about to disappear, the economic situation of the Territories gave rise to serious preoccupations. It was true that geography made them dependent on the South African economy, but the Committee must recognize that it was mainly the colonial practices of the United Kingdom which lay at the root of their economic weakness. The African people had been dispossessed of most of the arable land which now belonged to settlers and foreign enterprises.

407. The petitioners whom the Committee had heard during its visit to Africa had given evidence that the United Kingdom authorities had allowed the South Africans to become entrenched in the civil service of the Territories and it was a fact that some of the agents of apartheid played a dominant role in the police force. Those authorities had thus sought, in the face of the surging tide of African nationalism to keep hold on their possessions and lay the ground-work for neo-colonialism.

408. At the political level, the colonial authorities had collaborated with the South African racists to throttle national liberation movements and to interfere with elections. The petitioners whom the Committee had heard had stated that the South African régime had forced African workers to cross the frontier and vote for chosen candidates. Despite such manoeuvres, the opposition parties, which demanded real independence, had obtained the majority of the votes. Nevertheless they still formed the "opposition".

409. In various resolutions, including resolution 2063 (XX), the General Assembly had drawn attention to the dangers which the South African régime of apartheid signified for the economic life, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland. In resolution 1954 (XVIII), it had warned South Africa that "any attempt to annex or encroach upon the territorial integrity of these three Territories shall be considered an act of aggression". For its part, the Organization of African Unity had requested that steps should be taken to protect them.

410. Recently, the situation had merely become worse. The recommendations of the Sub-Committee were prompted by an awareness of the dangers which he had stressed. His delegation hoped that the report would be adopted unreservedly and that the recommendations it contained would serve as the basis for the full implementation of the historic Declaration contained in resolution 1514 (XV). The United Kingdom Government must co-operate with the United Nations to ensure that the provisions of that resolution were observed and that the people of the three Territories were not victims of racial hatred and the exploitation of man by man.

411. The *Chairman* of the Sub-Committee said that all members of the Sub-Committee had been in agreement on the substance of the question, namely, that the three Territories should enjoy sovereignty based on firm foundations and should not run the risk of being placed under the yoke of apartheid by their dangerous neighbours. Nevertheless, there had been differing views: some had thought, *inter alia*, that the Sub-Committee was not competent to formulate recommendations on the political conduct of the administering Power. However, the Sub-Committee had succeeded

in achieving unanimity in condemning the racist system of apartheid and contemplating practical solutions which could be applied during the short period between the establishment of the Sub-Committee and the date on which it was to submit its report.

412. Two of the Territories were to accede very soon to independence, Bechuanaland on 30 September and Basutoland on 4 October. It was therefore impossible to invite the administering Power to take long-term measures. Nor was there any question of retarding the process of accession to independence to allow the administering Power to provide new guarantees.

413. The Sub-Committee's work, as reflected in the report, was perhaps imperfect but under the pressure of circumstances speed was vital.

414. The representative of the *United Kingdom* said he would not deal at that stage with the questions raised by the representative of Tanzania but, on behalf of his delegation, categorically rejected the assertions that representative had made.

415. Turning to the substance of the report, he had the most serious doubts about the wisdom of adopting it at the present juncture. He did not consider that the Sub-Committee had taken sufficient account of the facts of the situation or of what had been done. Nor did he consider that the procedures proposed were the most appropriate to the situation. In particular, nowhere in the report, apparently, was it proposed that the views of the Governments concerned should be sought before action was taken.

416. The economy of the Territories and that of South Africa were inevitably interdependent. Furthermore, the Governments of Basutoland and Bechuanaland were fully aware of the need to make a distinction between economic interdependence and political interdependence. To illustrate that point he quoted statements made by the Prime Ministers of both Territories. Speaking on 27 June the Prime Minister of Basutoland had said:

"Lesotho is intimately related to South Africa geographically, historically and economically. At the same time, we are very well aware that we are part of the new Africa... We will not interfere with South Africa and we do not expect South Africa to interfere with us, but no less important is our determination to ensure that Basutoland is not used as a pawn in the hands of those who have interests to secure other than the immediate interests of Basutoland. This is not parochialism; this is elementary common-sense."

After becoming the first Prime Minister of Bechuanaland on 3 March 1965, Dr. Seretse Khama said that his country would continue to trade with South Africa as long as this proved beneficial to Bechuanaland and that countries which differed politically could have good economic relations.

417. He noted that certain members of the Sub-Committee as reflected in paragraph 8 of the report had felt that the present Government of Basutoland did not enjoy the support of the majority of the people. In that connexion he recalled that elections based on universal adult suffrage had recently been held in Basutoland and Bechuanaland. The Committee had gone into that question exhaustively, so far as Basutoland was concerned, at its 457th meeting, as the record showed. Although the party in power had not obtained an over-all majority in the elections, it had gained more seats than the other two parties combined. That could happen in

a democratic system and it should not be forgotten that during the elections agreement had been reached on the main issue, namely, that the country should ask for independence. Independence would be obtained on 4 October 1966.

418. As for Bechuanaland, elections under universal adult suffrage had been held in March 1965. The Bechuanaland People's Party had gained 80 per cent of the seats, and 75 per cent of the electorate had voted. Consequently, the Government of that Territory had the full support of the people.

419. The two Territories of Bechuanaland and Basutoland had Governments democratically elected by universal adult suffrage in accordance with the freely expressed will of the people. The Governments of those Territories had agreed on terms for independence with the United Kingdom, and no one could say that those terms had not been based on the will of the people. The same principles would apply to Swaziland.

420. Consequently, his delegation rejected the implications of paragraph 8 of the Sub-Committee's report and of the recommendations in paragraph 14 (a) (i) and (ii). In his delegation's view, those two recommendations were quite superfluous. The United Kingdom Government had carried out its responsibilities and had brought Bechuanaland and Basutoland to the threshold of independence.

421. Paragraph 14 (a) (iii) stated that the United Kingdom Government should protect the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Territories against interference from South Africa. The position was quite clear: until independence, the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Territories remained the concern of the United Kingdom Government and the Governments of the Territories in question. After independence, it would be for the Governments of the Territories themselves to see to that task; if at that stage they wanted assistance from the United Nations, they themselves would have to enter into the necessary negotiations to obtain it. The United Kingdom Government had not been requested to enter into any defence agreements with Basutoland and Bechuanaland after independence.

422. At the same time, however, United Kingdom economic aid would continue after independence. Such aid would be additional to that provided by the United Nations. During the period 1946-1966, the Territories had received about £42 million in budgetary grants and in Colonial Development Welfare Fund grants and loans. Since publication of the Morse Report in 1961, the figure was £33 million in five years. In addition, the Commonwealth Development Corporation had invested nearly £22 million in the Territories. There was no doubt that that aid had decreased the Territories' economic dependence on South Africa. That was the result which had been aimed at. For instance, more than one half of Bechuanaland's meat exports went northwards; Swaziland's iron ore was sold to Japan and its asbestos and wood-pulp to Europe, and its sugar was bought by the United Kingdom under the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement on terms which were very advantageous to the Territory. However, the extent to which it was wise to divert the products of the Territories away from a very prosperous market on their doorstep and towards other areas which were not so prosperous and were further away was questionable. As he had said, and as was recommended in the report, such economic interdependence would remain.

423. Turning to the recommendation contained in paragraph 14 (c), he emphasized that the Governments of the Territories should have full responsibility for participating in any consultations between the Special Committee and the Organization of African Unity (OAU).

424. The United Kingdom Government was anxious to ensure that the independence shortly to be attained by the Territories should be respected and that they should take their rightful place as States in the international community. Two of them would shortly be applying for membership in the United Nations, and the Commonwealth Conference had agreed to their becoming members of the Commonwealth.

425. In the view of his delegation, however, it was essential to work closely with the Governments, and it had serious reservations on the wisdom of the procedure proposed in paragraph 14 (d) of the report. It seemed doubtful whether it was wise to rush through business of that kind, which concerned the affairs of States soon to become independent, even before their Governments had had an opportunity to express their views.

426. If the report was adopted without a vote, his delegation would have to enter the strongest reservations in the terms of the statement he had just made. If the report was put to the vote, his delegation would abstain for the reasons it had already indicated.

427. The representative of *Uruguay* said he would like to point out that the report reflected the consensus of the Sub-Committee, although that did not mean that divergent views had not been expressed on secondary issues.

428. One of the points, with which the Sub-Committee had had to deal had been to find steps to ensure the independence of the three Territories in a part of southern Africa where non-African minorities were in power. The original draft recommendations had contained provisions which, in the view of some members, had exceeded the Sub-Committee's powers. Certainly, the Sub-Committee could not have dealt with questions not referred to it by the Committee which had appointed it.

429. The Sub-Committee had not neglected to study all the various questions including those which concern the responsibility of the administering Power both before and after independence. With respect to those parts of paragraph 14 which laid down norms for the administering Power, he believed that any statement concerning possible democratic measures relating to elections which had already been held and Governments which were preparing to take office within a few weeks would seem out of place and ineffective a few weeks before independence. The Committee must either recommend that the Territories should not become independent on the scheduled dates—which would cause disagreement concerning the powers of the administering Power over the constitution which was to enter into force in a few months—or agree that the subjugated peoples concerned should finally become members of the sovereign community of nations on the dates specified, leaving them to make the necessary changes in the systems which had existed in the past.

430. To his delegation, the choice was clear: there should never be any delay in the date of independence for a colonial people, which should be liberated as soon

as possible from a system condemned by the whole world. That did not mean that an attempt should not be made to take as much action as possible at the international level in order to ensure the political stability and territorial integrity of the new independent nations.

431. As he had stated in the Sub-Committee, Bechuanaland and Basutoland had not asked the administering Power for military protection after independence, and the United Kingdom would withdraw its forces immediately at that time. Yet the two Territories could only enjoy guarantees if these guarantees could be implemented by their own freely elected Governments. Furthermore, as the United Kingdom had promised, the Territories would continue to receive economic aid from it after their independence.

432. He had also pointed out that economically the relations between the three Territories and South Africa gave the Territories considerable benefits, as could be seen from the figures contained in the information considered by the Sub-Committee (see appendix III, para. 5). The parties in all three Territories recognized that it was necessary to maintain those relations, despite the existing political differences.

433. Bechuanaland and Basutoland would be applying for membership in the United Nations. Once they had become independent, such membership would provide them with legal and political safeguards. When the new independent Governments requested specific safeguards, economic co-operation with South Africa might become even more difficult.

434. It was also possible that the Governments of the two countries would not wish to make recommendations to the United Nations and would leave it to others to take action relating to them in the United Nations as soon as they became sovereign States. It would be a mistake, if clear and simple formulae were to be found, to accept any plan which theoretically would assuage consciences but at the same time, in practice, would create greater difficulties that would have to be overcome, since the independence of the peoples of the three Territories should be the first concern of the members of the Committee.

435. Accordingly, his delegation wished to support all the conclusions in the report which referred to guarantees and to steps to protect the Territories which might be taken by the United Nations in the various spheres of its activities.

436. He felt that it was impossible to adopt any other solution, owing to lack of time and because a *fait accompli*, such as the dates scheduled for independence, had to be accepted.

437. The free exercise of self-government would give the expected results, and the protection provided by the United Nations to the new sovereign States would be effective if the Organization had the support of Member States and if the latter placed respect for law above political considerations.

438. Two factors had been involved—the firm intention of the Sub-Committee not to delay independence, and the geographical situation of the Territories which were surrounded by South Africa and would be unable to preserve their autonomy because they would not be economically self-sufficient.

439. For instance, one of Basutoland's main problems was the manpower which it supplied to South Africa. Without the administering Power's subsidy,

more than 50 per cent of the Territory's income would depend on the supply of such manpower. Obviously, economic problems of that kind were not easy to resolve, and they could not be resolved simply by decisions taken in the United Nations. Strenuous efforts would be necessary because, as the United Kingdom representative had said, there were ethnic problems which would have to be taken into account and solved.

440. The members of the Sub-Committee had made concessions in the interests of unanimity, so that the Territories could become independent, while at the same time having an assurance that they would not be crushed by the enemy surrounding them.

441. The representative of the *Union of Soviet Socialist Republics* said that the Soviet Union considered that the provisions of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples were fully applicable to the three Territories under consideration.

442. His delegation shared the view of those members of the Sub-Committee who had emphasized the United Kingdom's responsibility for the situation in which a constant threat existed to the territorial integrity and political independence of the three Territories. It also agreed that the United Kingdom should be called upon to fulfil its responsibilities under the Charter and General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) so as to ensure that the independence of Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland was based on the free expression of all inhabitants of the Territories. It further agreed that the United Kingdom should take measures to ensure the establishment of governments fully representative of the wishes of the people, which would be in a better position to resist pressures from South Africa.

443. His delegation fully supported the Sub-Committee's recommendation that the Special Committee should recommend the General Assembly to convey a solemn warning to the Government of the Republic of South Africa that any attempt to encroach upon the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the three Territories following independence would be considered by the United Nations to be an act of aggression. It also supported the recommendation that the General Assembly should draw the Security Council's attention to the threat which South Africa's annexationist policy would pose to Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland upon their attainment of independence. Of particular importance was the recommendation that the General Assembly should appeal to all States to refrain from any action which might encourage the Government of the Republic of South Africa to encroach upon the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the three Territories or to interfere in their domestic affairs. His delegation also welcomed the recommendation calling for consultation between the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity on the problem of ensuring the territorial integrity, independence and sovereignty of the three Territories after they became independent.

444. In view of the foregoing, his delegation supported the Sub-Committee's conclusions and recommendations and would vote for their adoption.

445. The representative of the *United States of America* said that her delegation, which had carefully reviewed the Sub-Committee's report, regretted that it was unable to support many of the report's conclusions and recommendations. The United States was in agree-

ment with the basic political objective that the people of the Territories should have the right to express their wishes freely and govern themselves without outside interference; it was also aware of the relationship which existed between the Territories and the Republic of South Africa as a result of their geographical position and of the effect which that relationship could have on their political status. However, it felt that the report failed to take account of certain important elements in the present situation. As the Committee was aware, two of the Territories would become independent in a few weeks' time, and they would have to seek a formula for maintaining their independence in the face of serious economic and political problems. As the Committee had already been informed, the United Kingdom would provide those Territories with substantial assistance when they became independent. However, it seemed to her delegation that once the Territories were fully independent States, with Governments elected on the basis of universal adult suffrage and racial equality, those Governments would have the right to obtain as much additional assistance as might be required from whatever source they chose. Accordingly, her delegation would have to reserve its position on the Sub-Committee's report.

446. The representative of *Denmark* said that, in the view of his delegation, some of the recommendations contained in paragraph 14 of the report, and particularly those contained in sub-paragraph (a), did not take sufficient account of the fact that Basutoland and Bechuanaland were to become independent States in a matter of weeks. His delegation was therefore obliged to reserve its position on the report; however, it did not object to adoption of the report by consensus.

447. The representative of *Australia* said that, in view of the geographical position of Basutoland and Bechuanaland in relation to South Africa, they would have to establish some sort of *modus vivendi* with the latter when they became independent in the near future. The United Kingdom representative had put the situation in very clear perspective at the previous meeting. Of particular importance was the information which he had again provided regarding the legislative majority held by the present Government of Basutoland despite the not unusual circumstance that it had polled fewer votes than the opposition, and regarding the situation in Bechuanaland, where the governing party had won 80 per cent of the seats. It should be noted that the elections which had produced those results had been conducted in accordance with the principle of "one man, one vote". His delegation therefore could not accept the implications contained in paragraph 14, sub-paragraph (a) (i) and (ii), of the report.

448. With regard to sub-paragraph (a) (iii), his delegation did not see what the United Kingdom could do in relation to the Territories in question beyond what it had already done and was planning to do.

449. With regard to sub-paragraph (c), he agreed with the United Kingdom representative that it would be unusual—and, indeed, perhaps improper—for the proposed action to be taken without reference to the Governments of the Territories.

450. In conclusion, he noted the Committee's agreement that, despite the anxiety felt with regard to the Territories, the time-table for independence should not be set back. Accordingly, it was his delegation's view that the Governments of the Territories should be given all appropriate assistance in developing their

independent existence along whatever lines they themselves sought through democratic processes on the basis of racial equality.

451. His delegation therefore could not support the report as it stood.

Action taken by the Special Committee on the report of the Sub-Committee on Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland

452. At its 467th meeting, on 15 September 1966, the Special Committee adopted the report of the Sub-Committee on Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland¹⁴ by consensus, it being understood that the reservations expressed by members would be reflected in the records of the Special Committee's meetings.

453. In letters dated 20 September 1966, the Chairman of the Special Committee, having regard to section II, paragraph 14, sub-paragraphs (a) and (c) thereof, transmitted the report of the Sub-Committee on Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland to the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom and Northern Ireland to the United Nations and to the Administrative Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity.

APPENDIX I

Joint statement issued on 14 June 1966 by the leaders of the Basutoland opposition parties

The joint statement included the following key passages:

"Our two parties which together represent the vast majority of Basotho are prepared to enter fresh elections in coalition to ensure the election of a Government having the confidence of the majority.

"By granting independence to an unpopular minority Government and on terms bitterly opposed by the vast majority of the people, the British Government will in fact be creating a ready-made trouble spot in the very heart of South Africa, a country which for many years has been waiting for that very opportunity.

"We can quite understand that Chief Leabua Jonathan cannot face any new election as his party will suffer inevitable defeat. But the attitude of the British officials is strange, to say the least. It seems the British Government with unwonted speed is determined to hand over the country to a minority Government."

The leaders also warned of "the very unhappy consequences as in Zanzibar" of Britain giving independence under a Government "not representative of the majority of the electorate", and contrasted this with Britain's introduction of proportional representation in British Guiana.

APPENDIX II

Joint statement issued on 15 June 1966 by the leaders of the Basutoland opposition parties

In this joint statement, the leaders gave the reasons for the withdrawal of their parties from the constitutional conference. They said:

"We were not prepared for a conference whose conclusions were agreed in advance between the minority party governing Basutoland and the Colonial officials backed by the Colonial Secretary.

"The role we have been allocated in this conference is that of puppets in a carefully rehearsed pantomime. We are therefore forced to protest in the only way open to us, by dissociating ourselves completely from this travesty.

¹⁴ The recommendations contained in this report appear in appendix III, para. 14.

"Today, in the name of the majority of the Sotho people, we announce that we are unwilling to accept as binding on us any constitution for the independence of Basutoland which is signed between the British Government and Chief Leabua Jonathan's minority Government.

"There can be no certainty that the Basotho will quietly submit to Government under a constitution which not only weakens our traditional institutions but entrenches power at the centre in the hands of a minority Government.

"Britain still has a chance—her last chance—of avoiding the internationalization of this issue, by insisting on the constitutional conference being adjourned, to enable it to be resumed in conditions that allow for the essential unifying process needed to produce a strong, independent nation to emerge and to survive in the cockpit of southern Africa."

APPENDIX III

[A/AC.109/L.326]

Report of the Sub-Committee on Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland

Rapporteur: Mr. Matey KARASIMEONOV (Bulgaria)

INTRODUCTION

1. The Sub-Committee on Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland was established by the Special Committee by the resolution adopted at its 439th meeting on 9 June 1966 (A/AC.109/178). In operative paragraph 2 of that resolution, the Special Committee decided "to establish a sub-committee with a view to studying and suggesting all necessary measures for securing the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the three Territories as requested by the General Assembly in paragraph 5 of its resolution 2063 (XX)".

2. The Chairman of the Special Committee appointed Afghanistan, Bulgaria, Iran, Italy, Mali, Madagascar and Uruguay as members of the Sub-Committee.

3. The Sub-Committee held six meetings between 27 July 1966 and 9 September 1966.

4. At its first meeting, held on 27 July 1966, the Sub-Committee elected Mr. Pedro P. Berro (Uruguay), as Chairman, and Mr. Matey Karasimeonov (Bulgaria), as Rapporteur.

I. CONSIDERATION BY THE SUB-COMMITTEE

5. In considering the question referred to it by the Special Committee, the Sub-Committee took into account the various political and economic factors relevant to the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Territories, information regarding which is contained in the reports of the Special Committee to the General Assembly at its seventeenth to twentieth sessions^a and in the report of the Secretary-General to the General Assembly at its twentieth session.^b

6. The preliminary observations by members on this question showed that there was a wide area of agreement on the urgency of the problem and the grave necessity for measures to be taken as soon as possible for securing the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the three Territories.

7. All the members of the Sub-Committee shared the view that as Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland were either completely or largely surrounded by the Republic of South Africa there was a real danger that South Africa would in the near future attempt to annex them as it had long intended. Furthermore, past incursions by South African police forces into the Territories without the consent of the local governments had served to underline the ever-present threat to the

territorial integrity of the three Territories. Nor was the danger to the three Territories, however, limited to direct annexation. A very serious danger lay in their vulnerability to economic pressures from South Africa which for instance could at any time unilaterally impose restrictions on the transit of persons and goods to and from the Territories.

8. Several members of the Sub-Committee pointed out that, as the administering Power, the United Kingdom was responsible for the economic development of the Territories and for ensuring their attainment of a real independence with governments which were genuinely representative of the will of the people. In the view of some members, the present Governments of the Territories did not enjoy the full confidence of the majority of the people and that these Governments were another factor increasing the Territories' vulnerability to pressures from South Africa. One delegation expressed the view that in its opinion, problems of a constitutional nature were outside the terms of reference of the Sub-Committee set forth in paragraph 4 of the Special Committee's resolution of 9 June 1966 (A/AC.109/178).

9. The majority of the Sub-Committee therefore considers that, in the first instance, it is necessary to reaffirm the United Kingdom's responsibility for the situation in which a constant threat exists to the territorial integrity and political independence of the three Territories. Secondly, as a matter of urgency, the United Nations should again call on the United Kingdom to fulfil its responsibilities under the Charter and General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) to ensure that the independence of Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland should be based on the free expression of all inhabitants of the Territories. It was therefore suggested by some members that the United Kingdom should take measures to ensure the establishment of governments fully representative of the wishes of the people, which would be in a better position to resist pressures from South Africa.

10. In the course of its discussion, it became evident to the Sub-Committee that the problem before it had no historical precedent and that while there existed examples of various treaty provisions and declarations guaranteeing territorial integrity and political independence of States, none of these contained all the elements necessary to meet the needs of the three Territories. As two of these Territories will become independent within a few weeks—Basutoland on 4 October 1966 and Bechuanaland on 30 September 1966—the Sub-Committee considers it urgent that the United Nations take measures with a view to ensuring the territorial integrity and political independence of the Territories. Decisions by the General Assembly along those lines would be a logical sequel to the warning it issued in resolution 1817 (XVII) of 18 December 1962, and again in 1954 (XVIII) of 11 December 1963, that "any attempt to annex Basutoland, Bechuanaland or Swaziland, or to encroach on their territorial integrity in any way, will be regarded by the United Nations as an act of aggression violating the Charter of the United Nations".

11. The Sub-Committee also discussed the special problems of the three Territories, including the right of transit of persons and goods, which will affect the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Territories after independence. It considered that if the Territories were to enjoy real independence it was necessary to ensure that after they had become sovereign States there would be no disruption in transit and trade arrangements. In the Sub-Committee's view, therefore, these should be a matter of concern to the General Assembly.

12. In this connexion, some members of the Sub-Committee recalled that in 1964 the Organization of African Unity (OAU) had also adopted resolutions on the question of the territorial integrity of Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland (see annex) in which the Assembly of Heads of State had requested the member States of the OAU to consider the necessary steps to secure a guarantee by the United Nations for the territorial integrity, independence and sovereignty of these Territories. In addition, the Assembly of the Heads of State of the OAU had also authorized the African group at the United Nations to take the necessary measures to bring the question of a guarantee before the appropriate organs of the United Nations. In view of the interest of the OAU, it was

^a Official Records of the General Assembly, Seventeenth Session, Annexes, addendum to agenda item 25, document A/5238, chap. V; *ibid.*, Eighteenth Session, Annexes, addendum to agenda item 23, document A/5446/Rev.1, chap. IX; *ibid.*, Nineteenth Session, Annexes, annex No. 8 (part I), document A/5800/Rev.1, chap. VIII; and *ibid.*, Twentieth Session, Annexes, addendum to agenda item 23, document A/6000/Rev.1, chap. VII.

^b *Ibid.*, Twentieth Session, Annexes, agenda item 23, document A/5958.

suggested in the Sub-Committee that the Special Committee should consult that organization on the problem of Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland.

13. As to the measures to be taken by the General Assembly, the Sub-Committee considers that, as a first step, it is necessary to draw the attention of the Security Council to the threat to the territorial integrity and sovereignty posed by the policy of the Government of the Republic of South Africa and that an appeal should also be made to all Member States to refrain from any action which would encourage the Government of South Africa in furthering that policy.

II. RECOMMENDATIONS

14. The Sub-Committee recommends the following:

(a) The Sub-Committee makes the following recommendations to the Special Committee:

- i) That it should reaffirm the responsibility of the administering Power, which must take the necessary steps to ensure that the three Territories attain independence in the manner prescribed in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV);
- ii) That it should accordingly urge the administering Power to ensure that the peoples of the three Territories are able to express their desires freely and to choose their representatives and their government freely and democratically;
- (iii) That it should furthermore request the administering Power to take all appropriate action, before the Territories attain independence, to enable the three Territories to enjoy complete independence and to protect their territorial integrity and sovereignty in the face of the unconcealed intentions of the racist régime in the Republic of South Africa to continue interfering in their political, economic and social affairs.

(b) The Sub-Committee recommends that the Special Committee make the following recommendations to the General Assembly:

- (i) That it reiterate its resolutions 1817 (XVII) and 1954 (XVIII) and again solemnly warn the Government of the Republic of South Africa that any attempt to encroach upon the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the three Territories following independence shall be considered by the United Nations to be an act of aggression; and that any interference in their domestic affairs, including their economic affairs, and any hindrance of the movement in transit of persons and goods shall be considered a flagrant violation of the United Nations Charter, with all the attendant consequences;
- (ii) In that regard, that it draw the attention of the Security Council to the threat which the policy pursued by the racist régime of the Republic of South Africa poses to the independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty of the three States upon their attainment of independence;
- (iii) In addition, that it appeal to all States to refrain from any action which might encourage the Government of the Republic of South Africa to encroach upon the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the three States, or to interfere in their domestic affairs.

(c) The Sub-Committee recommends that the Special Committee, through its officers, should consult the Organization of African Unity on the problems of the three Territories, inasmuch as that organization adopted resolutions in 1964 and 1965 instructing African States and the African group in the United Nations to submit to the appropriate bodies of the United Nations the question of guarantees to ensure the territorial integrity, independence and sovereignty of the three States.

(d) Considering that Bechuanaland will attain independence on 30 September and Basutoland on 4 October, the Special Committee should recommend that the General Assembly consider as a matter of priority the item of its agenda relating to the three Territories, instructing the Fourth Committee to discuss the question at the opening of the twenty-first session.

III. ADOPTION OF THE REPORT

15. This report was unanimously adopted by the Sub-Committee at its sixth meeting on 9 September 1966.

Annex

RESOLUTIONS OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY (OAU)

A. Resolution AHG/Res.12 (I). The Territorial Integrity of Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland

The Assembly of Heads of State and Government in its first ordinary session in Cairo, United Arab Republic, from 17 July to 21 July 1964,

Having examined the likely situation that would face Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland on attainment of independence,

Noting that the Government of the United Kingdom has agreed to grant independence in the immediate future to these Territories,

Noting further resolution 1954 (XVIII) of the General Assembly of the United Nations solemnly warning the "Government of the Republic of South Africa that any attempt to annex or encroach upon the territorial integrity of these three Territories shall be considered an act of aggression",

1. *Requests* the Member States of the Organization of African Unity in consultation with the authorities of Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland to take the necessary steps so as to secure a guarantee by the United Nations for the territorial integrity, independence and sovereignty of these Territories;

2. *Authorises* in particular the African group at the United Nations to take necessary measures, in consultation with the Committee of Liberation and the nationalist movements in these Territories, to bring the question of guarantee before the Security Council at the appropriate time.

B. Resolution AHG/Res.36. High Commission Territories, 25 October 1965

The Assembly of Heads of State and Government meeting in its second ordinary session in Accra, Ghana, from 21 to 25 October 1965,

Having examined the report of the Administrative Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity,

Being concerned that parties which have openly declared that they would closely co-operate with the Pretoria régime have assumed control of the governmental machineries in these Territories,

Being desirous to prevent the absorption of these Territories by the Pretoria Government,

1. *Reaffirms* the various decisions taken by the Organization of African Unity;

2. *Takes note with satisfaction* of the continuous efforts made by the African Members of the United Nations to secure the application of resolution 1514 (XV) concerning the granting of independence to colonial countries and to encourage them to continue their efforts until complete independence is attained;

3. *Decides* to continue to support those movements which have so far been supported by the Organization of African Unity;

4. *Renews its request* to the Member States of the Organization of African Unity to take the necessary steps to secure a guarantee by the United Nations for the territorial integrity, independence and sovereignty of these Territories;

5. *Requests once again* the African group at the United Nations to take the necessary steps to bring the question of such a guarantee before the appropriate organs of the United Nations.

CHAPTER VIII*

FIJI

A. ACTION TAKEN BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE IN 1964 AND BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AT ITS TWENTIETH SESSION

1. After considering Fiji at its meetings in October and November 1964, the Special Committee, at its 302nd meeting on 5 November 1964, adopted a resolution in which it requested the administering Power to implement without further delay the provisions of the General Assembly resolutions, and in particular operative paragraph 2 of resolution 1951 (XVIII) which invited the administering Power to work out, together with the representatives of the people of Fiji, a new constitution providing for free elections conducted on the principle of "one man, one vote" and the creation of representative institutions; to take immediate steps for the transfer of all power to the people of the Territory, in accordance with their freely expressed will and desire, without any conditions or reservations; to endeavour, with the co-operation of the people of Fiji, to achieve the political, economic and social integration of the various communities. (A/5800/Rev.1,¹ chap. XIII, para. 119).

2. At its twentieth session, the General Assembly, after considering the parts of the reports of the Special Committee concerning Fiji, adopted resolution 2068 (XX), of 16 December 1965, the text of which reads as follows:

"The General Assembly,

"...

"Recalling its resolutions 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960, 1654 (XVI) of 27 November 1961, 1810 (XVII) of 17 December 1962 and 1951 (XVIII) of 11 December 1963 and the resolution adopted by the Special Committee on 5 November 1964,

"Noting with regret that the administering Power has not yet taken effective measures to implement the resolutions of the General Assembly,

"Taking into account the fact that any further delay in the implementation of those resolutions would create further hardships for the people of the Territory,

"Considering that the constitutional changes contemplated by the administering Power would foment separatist tendencies and stand in the way of the political, economic and social integration of the people as a whole,

"1. Approves the chapters of the reports of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples relating to the Territory of Fiji, and endorses the conclusions and recommendations set forth therein;

"2. Reaffirms the inalienable right of the people of Fiji to freedom and independence in conformity with the provisions of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples

"3. Invites the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, as the administering Power, to implement immediately the resolutions of the General Assembly;

"4. Requests the administering Power to take, as a matter of urgency, measures to repeal all discriminatory laws and to establish an unqualified system of democratic representation based on the principle of 'one man, one vote';

"5. Further requests the administering Power to report to the Special Committee and to the General Assembly on the implementation of the present resolution;

"6. Invites the Special Committee to keep the question under consideration and to report thereon to the General Assembly at its twenty-first session;

"7. Decides to include the question of Fiji in the provisional agenda of its twenty-first session."

B. INFORMATION ON THE TERRITORY²*Introduction*

3. Information on Fiji is contained in reports to the General Assembly at its nineteenth and twentieth sessions (A/5800/Rev.1, chap. XIII; A/6000/Rev.1,³ chap. XII). Supplementary information on recent developments is set out below.

4. At the end of 1964, the total population was estimated to be 456,390, consisting of Fijians (41.5 per cent), Indians (50 per cent), and others (9.5 per cent).

*Political and constitutional developments**Fiji's present Constitution*

5. An Order-in-Council early in 1963 made provision for a new Constitution for Fiji, including an expanded Legislative Council and an extended franchise. The present Legislative Council consists of a Speaker, up to nineteen official members (the number has, in practice, been reduced to ten), and eighteen unofficial members (six Fijians, six Indians and six Europeans), most of whom are directly elected.

6. A change, not involving any amendment to the Constitution, was effected in July 1964 when a "membership" system of government was introduced. At that time the Executive Council was reconstituted, and it now consists of four official and six unofficial members (two Fijians, two Indians and two Europeans), of whom three are directly associated with the supervision of groups of government departments and with the formulation and presentation of government policy for particular subjects.

Fiji Constitutional Conference

7. As previously reported (A/6000/Rev.1, chap. XII, para. 4), a Constitutional Conference was due to take place in London early in 1965. In April 1965,

² The information presented in this section has been derived from published reports. The information transmitted to the Secretary-General by the United Kingdom under Article 73 e of the Charter, on 9 June 1965, was used in the preparation of the chapter on Fiji in the Special Committee's report to the General Assembly at its twentieth session (A/6000/Rev.1, chap. XII).

³ Official Records of the General Assembly, Twentieth Session, Annexes, addendum to agenda item 23.

* Previously issued under the symbol A/6300/Add.6.

¹ Official Records of the General Assembly, Nineteenth Session, Annexes, annex No. 8 (part 1).

the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies visited Fiji and held discussions with the representatives of the various communities in order to ascertain their views, especially those of the minorities who would not be directly represented at the Constitutional Conference, where participation was to be confined to the eighteen unofficial members of the Legislative Council.

8. In July 1965, the Secretary of State for the Colonies outlined the objectives of the Conference. He suggested that it would need, amongst other things, to consider the development of the membership system; a strengthening and broadening of the elected element in the Legislative Council; and matters affecting the franchise. It would also no doubt wish to consider the adoption of provisions concerning human rights, the Public Service and the judiciary.

9. Before the Conference opened, it was agreed that independence was not an issue to be discussed at the London Conference. It was also agreed that minority communities not at present enfranchised should be brought on the electoral rolls, the principal ones being the Rotumans, the Chinese and other Pacific Islanders.

10. The Fiji Constitutional Conference 1965 was held in London from 26 July to 9 August, and a report containing its recommendations was published on the latter date.

11. The Conference recommended, *inter alia*, that Fiji should have an elected majority in the Legislative Council; that the practice of having nominated unofficial members should be discontinued and the number of nominated official members should be reduced; that the minority groups in the population (mainly Chinese and immigrants from other Pacific Islands) should be enfranchised, thus achieving full adult suffrage; and that a ministerial system should be introduced.

12. The report noted that during the discussions there were certain matters on which the views of the delegation from Fiji were not unanimous. They were principally: the proposed method of election; the representation of the various communities on the Legislative Council; and the powers of the Executive Council.

13. The report stated that the Indian group wished to replace the existing system of elections on communal rolls with a straight common roll with neither communal qualifications for electors nor communal reservation of seats for candidates. The Fijian and European groups could not agree to the introduction of a system of elections on a common-roll basis at the present stage or in the foreseeable future, and no agreement was reached on when such a system should be introduced.

14. The United Kingdom Government considered that election on a straight common-roll basis was not practicable for Fiji until a greater degree of integration of its communities had been achieved. It considered it important, however, that a system be introduced whereby some members would be both elected by and responsible to voters drawn from all communities. To this end it put forward proposals for a cross-voting system whereby some members would be both elected by, and responsible to, voters drawn from all communities. These proposals were eventually accepted by the Fijian and European groups who emphasized that the proposals would be brought before the communities in Fiji affected by them, through a debate in the

Legislative Council. The proposals were not accepted by the Indian group—except partially, by one Indian delegate, who would have preferred the adoption of elections on a common-roll basis, but was prepared to accept the proposals in so far as they related to the method of election. When it became clear that their proposal for full common-roll elections was not acceptable, the Indian group offered an alternative which would increase the number of members elected under the system of cross-voting. This was not accepted by the Fijian and European groups. The Indian group then indicated that in these circumstances they would wish to take their stand on full common-roll elections.

15. The Indian group unanimously rejected the proposal that there should be two more Fijian members than Indian members in the Legislative Council. They considered that, as the Indians constituted a majority of the population, they were entitled to at least parity of representation with the Fijian community.

16. In the discussions on the provisions of the Constitution dealing with executive powers, the Indian group, with one dissident, considered that the stage had been reached where full internal self-government should be introduced forthwith. The remainder of the Fiji delegation considered that it was still necessary for the Governor to retain a substantial measure of discretionary power.

Legislative Council

17. The Conference recommended that the Legislative Council should comprise thirty-six elected members together with not more than four official members nominated by the Governor. Non-official members would consist of the following: fourteen Fijians: nine elected on the Fijian communal roll, two elected by the Fijian Council of Chiefs, three elected according to a new cross-voting system; twelve Indians: nine elected on the Indian communal roll, three elected by the cross-voting system; ten Europeans: seven elected on a communal roll, three elected by the cross-voting system.

18. The communal roll for Fijians would also include Rotumans and other Pacific Islanders. Chinese and any other minority communities formerly not entitled to vote would be included on the communal roll with Europeans. For the election of the nine members by the cross-voting system, Fiji would be divided into three constituencies, each returning one Fijian (or Rotuman or other Pacific Islander), one Indian and one European (or Chinese or member of another minority group), each member being elected by persons of all communities. The Conference abolished some qualifications and disqualifications concerning candidates and electors. These included the requirements relating to property or income for candidates and the literacy tests for voters. A non-voting Speaker would be elected by the Legislative Council either from within the Council or from persons qualified to be elected to the Council. The Council would also be empowered to appoint a Deputy Speaker from among its members. The maximum life of the Council would be five years.

19. Subject to the restrictions imposed by the Colonial Laws Validity Act, 1865, and by any provisions of the Constitution itself, such as a Bill of Rights, the Constitution would give the Legislative Council full power to make laws on any subject. There would be a provision to prevent bills from being introduced without the consent of the Governor if their effect would be to impose taxes or to increase expenditure

or alter terms and conditions of service of public officers. The Governor would have power to refuse assent, to reserve legislation, and to ensure that bills were passed by certification. Certain subjects specified by reference to particular laws would be dealt with by special procedure in the Legislative Council. Under this procedure, bills affecting the laws concerned would require the support of more than two thirds of all the elected members of the Legislative Council. A similar requirement would apply to any resolution, the effect of which would be to recommend any change in the Constitution.

Executive Council

20. The Conference recommended that executive authority should remain formally vested in the Governor, who would continue to appoint the unofficial members of the Executive Council. These would be drawn from among the elected members of the Legislative Council, and the Governor would ensure appropriate representation of the various communities in Fiji. The Constitution would provide that at the appropriate time, the Governor might appoint members of the Executive Council to be ministers with executive powers, and at that time the Executive Council would become a Council of Ministers.

21. The Governor would be required to consult the Executive Council and, in general, to accept its advice, except when he considered it necessary to act against this in the interests of public order, public faith or good government. Certain subjects, including defence, external affairs, internal security and public service, would be reserved to the Governor.

22. Recommendations were also made for the establishment of a Supreme Court and a Court of Appeal; for the setting up of an advisory Judicial and Legal Service Commission, Public Service Commission and Police Service Commission; and for a Bill of Rights to be included in the Constitution.

Legislative action on constitutional proposals

23. On 16 December 1965, the proposals were approved by the Fiji Legislative Council by a vote of 12 to 5, with 7 abstentions. Official members did not take part in the debate and abstained in the vote. The new Constitution is expected to be brought into force during 1966.

Elections

24. A general election for the new Legislative Council (see para. 17 above) is to be held in Fiji in the fall of 1966. This will be on the basis of universal adult suffrage. It is estimated that about 182,500 persons will be eligible to enrol as voters. There were 94,000 persons registered in the 1963 election when women voted for the first time. The election will shorten the life of the current Legislative Council by two years, whose unofficial members were elected in 1963 for five-year terms.

Political parties

25. The Fijian community in Fiji has three political parties: the Fijian Association, the Fijian Democratic Party and the Fijian Advancement Party. The main party, the Fijian Association, was formed in the late 1950s. No information is available concerning the size of its membership. The Fijian Democratic Party is approximately three years old and claims to have about 4,000 "financial" members. The Fijian Advancement

Party was formed in 1965, but no further information is available concerning it.

26. The Indian community in Fiji has a number of political parties or groupings which include the Federation Party, the National Congress Party, the Fijian Western Democratic Party, the Fiji Minority Party and the All-Fiji Muslim Political Front. The largest party is the Federation Party. Although information is not available concerning its present membership, its members held four seats in the Legislative Council in 1965. These were directed by the party in April 1965 not to hold any discussions on constitutional matters with other members of the Legislative Council in Fiji, but "to make all such representations and submissions which they may think fit and proper in their absolute discretion on all matters to be discussed" at the London Conference. The party, *inter alia*, advocates a common roll and is opposed to a communal roll in Fiji.

27. The National Congress Party was formed in 1964. It is reported to be in opposition to the Federation Party. In a memorandum issued in 1964, it declared that the United Kingdom Government should give Fiji internal self-government without delay. No information is available concerning the size of its membership.

28. The formation of the Fijian Western Democratic Party was noted in 1963.⁴ No recent information is available concerning it.

29. The Fiji Minority Party, in a memorandum to the United Kingdom Secretary of State for the Colonies, supported separate representation for Muslims in the Legislative Council and retention "for the time being" of communal electoral rolls. After the London Conference, the party is reported to have considered the latter a victory for reason and co-operation and to have urged Muslims to accept the new Constitution for Fiji and to give it their undivided loyalty and support. Information is not available concerning the membership of the party.

30. At the end of 1965, a new political party was formed calling itself the All-Fiji Muslim Political Front. Membership in the party is open to all Muslims in Fiji. The party is reported to be in opposition to the terms of the new Constitution which discontinues the practice whereby the Governor nominated a Muslim representative to the Legislature. In a resolution passed in December 1965, it called on Muslims generally to refrain from enrolling on the Indian communal roll and to protest to the United Kingdom Government through the Governor of Fiji on behalf of the Muslims of Fiji that their rights and interests be protected and recognized as distinct from that of the Indian community of Fiji, and that constitutional provision be made to entrench an electoral system guaranteeing Muslim representation in Fiji's Legislature.

C. CONSIDERATION BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE⁵

Introduction

31. The Special Committee considered the question of Fiji at its 410th, 412th, 413th, 461st, 462nd, 463rd,

⁴ *Ibid.*, Eighteenth Session, Annexes, addendum to agenda item 23, document A/5446/Rev.1, chap. VII, para. 19.

⁵ The following petition was circulated after the Special Committee had adopted a resolution concerning Fiji (see para. 120 below) at its 463rd meeting on 7 September 1966: Mr. A. Razaak, Secretary, Fiji Muslim Political Organization (A/AC.109/PET.599).

469th and 483rd meetings between 6 May and 30 November 1966.

General statements by members

32. The representative of the *United Kingdom* said that there was not a great deal to add to his delegation's statements on Fiji in the Fourth Committee in November 1965.⁶ On that occasion, the United Kingdom delegation had described the decisions taken at the Constitutional Conference held in July and August 1965, which were briefly summarized in the Secretariat working paper (see paras. 7-16 above). The agreed objectives of the Conference had been to evolve a constitutional framework for Fiji which would preserve a continuing link with the United Kingdom and within which further progress could be made towards internal self-government. Under the new arrangements, there would be universal suffrage. Almost all members of the Legislative Council would be elected and there would be more elected representatives for each of the three main communities in Fiji. The Indian community would have the same proportion of the total membership as before. The Fijian community would have proportionately more seats than before, at the expense of the Europeans, to take account of new voters who would vote on the Fijian roll. A very important innovation from the point of view of Fiji's future political development was that an element of the membership of the Legislative Council would for the first time be elected by all three communities. The object was to encourage the emergence of political leaders appealing to all sectors of the population and not to any single community. Experience elsewhere had shown that such a system could be very effective in bridging divisions between different communities and promoting a single national loyalty. It was the declared purpose of the United Kingdom Government to help achieve that goal in Fiji. Lastly, the new constitution would include a bill of rights and provisions to make possible the introduction of a ministerial system.

33. Those new electoral measures went further than the Fijian and European representatives at the Conference would have wished and not as far as the Indian representatives had wanted. The Fijians and Europeans had recognized that elections with a straight common roll, as proposed by the Indian representatives, were a desirable long-term objective but had not been able to agree to the introduction of such a system at that stage or in the foreseeable future. In view of those conflicting attitudes, it should be clear that the decisions of the United Kingdom Government at the Conference, taken after the fullest discussion and most earnest thought, were steps in the direction advocated by the great majority in the United Nations and in the Special Committee. The decisions did not represent a victory for any one group of the Fijian people over any other. The constant aim of the United Kingdom had been to encourage co-operation and trust among all the people, whatever their ethnic origin. The decisions of the Conference were designed to help achieve that aim, while maintaining progress in the direction of internal self-government.

34. The necessary steps were being taken to implement the decisions of the Conference. The Order-in-Council to enable elections to be held had been promulgated at the end of November 1965 and the new electoral regulations had been published the fol-

lowing month. The registration of electors had taken place during the first four months of 1966 and about 84 per cent of the potential electorate had been registered. The provisional electoral rolls were being prepared on the basis of that registration and would be ready for publication later in the summer. There would then be a period for decisions on any objections which might be raised to the rolls, which would then be published in final form. The existing Legislative Council was to be dissolved towards the end of August 1966; 12 August would be the nomination day for candidates for the new Council; polling would take place from 26 September to 8 October and the new Legislature was due to meet early in the following month.

35. There was no disagreement in the Special Committee about aims and objectives. All recognized that the different communities in Fiji—which had separate cultures, different ways of life and a good deal of mutual mistrust—must be encouraged to co-operate in an atmosphere of trust and harmony. All agreed that the process of healing divisions must be carried forward with continued constitutional advance towards more representative and responsible government in Fiji. If there was disagreement, it was only over the best ways of achieving those goals. In the opinion of the United Kingdom Government, a moderate course was most likely to succeed: the permanence of divisions and safeguards should not be accepted but nor should the pace be forced to the point of arousing more fears. In September 1965, the then United Kingdom Colonial Secretary had declared that co-operation in the new constitution would lead to political integration and racial harmony and show that interracial voting did not adversely affect the interests of any race.

36. He hoped that, in the Committee's discussions, there would be a wide measure of agreement on the nature of the situation and the direction in which it should be encouraged to develop. If the Committee was to play the positive role for which it had been established and to serve the true interests of the people of Fiji, it should define the extent of common agreement and the common goals, and endorse the aims and directions he had just described.

37. The representative of the *United Republic of Tanzania* said that, judging by the statement of the United Kingdom representative (see paras. 32-36 above), the situation in Fiji, as far as decolonization was concerned, remained virtually unchanged. The representative of the administering Power had claimed that steps could not be taken to implement General Assembly resolutions 1514 (XV) and 1591 (XVIII) until full integration of the various communities had been achieved. It was, however, the United Kingdom Government itself that was seeking to accentuate communal separation by the introduction of communal representation. If there was "mutual mistrust" among the people of Fiji, it was the administering Power that had brought it about. The United Kingdom representative should not, therefore, imagine that his views could command the collective endorsement of the Special Committee.

38. In General Assembly resolution 1951 (XVIII), the administering Power was invited "... to achieve the political, economic and social integration of the various communities". Yet the system of tripartite representation would encourage rather than diminish disunity, exemplifying the colonialist maxim of "divide and rule". The administering Power was seeking to

⁶ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twentieth Session, Fourth Committee, 1558th and 1570th meetings.*

accentuate the ethnic origin of the various sections of the population. Of the so-called Indian community, however, 92 per cent had been born in the Territory. They were thus as much indigenous inhabitants of Fiji as any other group. The purpose of such distinctions was to ensure that the European minority, comprising less than 9 per cent of the population, was enabled to continue its exploitation of the resources of Fiji. The example of Southern Rhodesia was still fresh in the Committee's mind.

39. The United Kingdom representative had suggested that the Special Committee should seek the highest common denominator. The highest common denominator among freedom-loving nations was to be found in the pertinent resolutions of the General Assembly. If the administering Power would apply the principles there enshrined, a free Fiji would arise.

40. The representative of *India* said that the statement of the representative of the United Kingdom did not add materially to the description of the situation in Fiji and had avoided altogether the responsibility of the administering Power to report on the implementation of the resolutions of the General Assembly. He quoted from a statement of the Secretary-General of the United Nations which, while praising the achievements of the United Kingdom in the field of decolonization, also pointed out the exceptions like Southern Rhodesia which dimmed this record. While agreeing generally with this assessment, his delegation considered that events in Fiji also were a disturbing element which tarnished the record of the administering Power. The lack of any constitutional progress in Fiji, and the apparent determination of the administering Power to avoid its responsibilities under the various resolutions of the General Assembly, constituted—like the situation in Southern Rhodesia—an unhappy exception to the otherwise commendable record of the United Kingdom in the field of decolonization. The recent statements by the United Kingdom representative in the Special Committee showed that the administering Power was unwilling and had failed to implement the provisions of Assembly resolutions 1514 (XV), 1951 (XVIII) and 2068 (XX). It was this essential and crucial failure which prevented the administering Power from making a full and complete statement on the situation in Fiji.

41. In resolution 1951 (XVIII), the administering Power had been invited to work out a new constitution providing for free elections conducted on the principle of "one man, one vote" and the creation of representative institutions. Instead, even after three years, the administering Power had introduced an electoral system which divided the people of Fiji on communal and racial lines and provided certain entrenched interests, particularly the Europeans, with greater voting powers than the rest of the population—a system reminiscent of that introduced in Southern Rhodesia, and which had enabled the white racist minority to seize power illegally, at the expense of the majority. Hitherto, the Europeans in Fiji had governed in the most absolutist manner. After the so-called electoral reforms, which purported to introduce limited internal self-government, the Europeans and their racial allies, who constituted about 4 per cent of the total population, would hold as many as 30 per cent of the elected seats in the Legislative Council, whereas more than 50 per cent of the population would hold just twelve seats. Again, the complicated cross-voting system was reminiscent of a similar feature in the 1961 Constitu-

tion of Southern Rhodesia. Thus the "reforms" were an all too familiar stratagem to perpetuate European minority rule through constitutional devices.

42. The representative of the administering Power had made much of the "conflicting attitudes" of the Fijian and Indian communities—from which the Europeans, as the master community, stood aloof. As the Tanzanian representative had pointed out, however, all the inhabitants of Fiji, irrespective of their racial origins, were Fijians. Thus, it was not proper to refer to the people of Indian origin living in Fiji as the "Indian community". They were Indian only in the sense that their ancestors had been brought to Fiji from the Indian subcontinent, to work there as indentured labour on the European-owned plantations. It was typical of colonial policy that Europeans settling in Rhodesia became Rhodesian, while persons of Indian origin going to Fiji remained Indians. Use of the term "Indian community" was designed to stir up communal hatred, which happily did not exist at the roots.

43. The General Assembly had also invited the administering Power to create representative institutions. The restricted internal self-government granted to a clearly unrepresentative and impotent Legislative Council could scarcely be considered "representative institutions" within the meaning of resolution 1514 (XV). Not only had the people of Fiji neither the shadow nor the substance of real democratic control; the administering Power had announced that there was no possibility of any such developments in the foreseeable future.

44. In the same resolution, the General Assembly had invited the administering Power to endeavour to achieve the political, economic and social integration of the various communities. The scanty information supplied by the administering Power showed that very little had been done in that all-important field. On the contrary, much had been done to divide the people of Fiji on communal and racial lines. That policy, which was nothing new in the history of British colonial administration, could be summed up by the maxim "divide and rule". Wherever the United Kingdom had reluctantly given up control, it had deliberately planted discord to create future difficulties for the newly independent States. It was no accident that, as the Secretary-General had pointed out, all the current peace-keeping operations pertained to problems arising from the process of British decolonization. Yet the administering Power, while applying those time-worn methods to the people of Fiji, wished the Special Committee to believe that the apparatus of division created in the Territory was designed to encourage co-operation and trust among all the people, whatever their ethnic origin, and that experience had shown that such a system could be very effective in bridging divisions between different communities and promoting the growth of national unity. The truth was that such communal differences as did exist had been artificially created and sustained by the administering Power, which was exploiting the tensions thus created in order to cling to its dominions. The history of British colonialism was littered with the experience of broken nations and artificially divided peoples. In Fiji also, the administering Power had created educational institutions and governmental organs based on communal and racial doctrines. In this connexion he referred to the statements of the representative of Chile in 1963 to the Special Committee and of the representative of

Ceylon to the Fourth Committee at the twentieth session of the General Assembly.

45. The best way of ascertaining the facts would be for the Special Committee, or one of its subcommittees, to visit the Territory and hold conversations with the rulers and the ruled at all levels. If the administering Power was sincere in wishing the Committee to learn the facts, it should have no objection to such a visit. His delegation, for one, would abide by the findings of such a visiting mission.

46. The Special Committee's report to the General Assembly on the question of Fiji might perhaps be delayed until after the return of the visiting mission. The Committee might also accede to the request of the United Kingdom representative for longer notice of the Committee's intention to report to the General Assembly on the implementation of resolution 2068 (XX), so that the administering Power could arrange for people with special knowledge of the Territory to participate in the Committee's discussions; the Committee might accordingly take the matter up again after its return from Africa.

47. In conclusion, he stressed that there was no agreement between the Special Committee and the administering Power in the basic assessment of the situation in Fiji. If the Special Committee was indeed to "serve the true interests of the people", it should refuse to condone the administering Power's failure to implement the pertinent resolutions of the General Assembly or endorse the reactionary colonial policy, but should recommend measures for the speedy and complete implementation of resolution 1514 (XV).

48. The representative of the *Union of Soviet Socialist Republics* said that his delegation's attitude towards the question of Fiji reflected its policy of universal support for peoples fighting for freedom and independence. An objective analysis of the situation in Fiji showed that the administering Power was resorting to all kinds of manoeuvres in order to thwart the implementation of the relevant United Nations resolutions.

49. Contrary to the assertions of the representative of the administering Power, an electoral system based on communal rolls and cross-voting did not guarantee equal suffrage or follow the democratic principle of "one man, one vote" and ignored the requests of the General Assembly in that regard. The Constitutional Conference, convened almost five years after the adoption of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, had completely disregarded the purposes and principles of that Declaration and the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly. As stated in the Secretariat working paper (see para. 9 above), it had been agreed "that independence was not an issue to be discussed at the London Conference". Since the aims of the Conference were limited, it could not yield any positive results.

50. The Conference had made the representation of the various communities even more unequal. For example, it had recommended that the Legislative Council should include twelve elected Indians and ten elected Europeans, although Fijians of Indian origin constituted 50 per cent of the population and Europeans only 9.5 per cent. It could thus be seen that the aim of the so-called "constitutional progress" was to give the European voter an advantage over other voters and help him to preserve the interests of the European minority in Fiji. The system of cross-voting,

whereby an equal number of seats on the Legislative Council was allocated to communities of differing sizes; was also designed to protect the interests of the European minority. Such an inequitable system of suffrage and representation actually increased the political differences among the communities. The only possible conclusion to be drawn was that the Legislative Council was not elected on a democratic basis, as required by the United Nations resolutions on the question of Fiji.

51. The powers of the Legislative Council, as described in paragraph 19 above, were clearly inadequate and the United Kingdom Governor was all-powerful in legislative matters.

52. The Conference had recommended that executive authority should remain formally vested in the Governor, who would continue to appoint the unofficial members of the Executive Council. In addition, the Governor could refuse the advice of the Executive Council if such a refusal was "in the interests of public order, public faith or good government". Thus he also had unlimited executive power.

53. The administering Power was therefore quite wrong to ascribe any positive significance to the Constitutional Conference, which had done nothing to enable the people of the islands to exercise their right to freedom and independence in accordance with the provisions of the Declaration. It was no coincidence that in resolution 2068 (XX) the General Assembly had requested the administering Power to take, as a matter of urgency, measures to repeal all discriminatory laws and to establish an unqualified system of democratic representation based on the principle of "one man, one vote" and had invited it to implement immediately the resolutions of the General Assembly. By a bitter irony of fate, on 16 December 1965—the date of the adoption of that General Assembly resolution—the recommendations of the Constitutional Conference on Fiji had been approved.

54. The economy of Fiji was characterized by the dominance of foreign monopolies which, having seized key positions, were continuing to plunder the natural resources and mercilessly exploit the people of the Territory. It was the policies of those monopolies which had produced the one-sided agrarian economy of Fiji. All profit from the Territory's minerals went into the coffers of the foreign monopolies—mainly United Kingdom, United States of America, Australian and New Zealand companies. The large plantations were owned by United Kingdom and other companies, the most important of which were the Colonial Sugar Refinery, the Copra Board and the Banana Board. As a result, the population's level of living remained very low. Workers earned only £3 to £3.5s. a week, with a working day of ten to twelve hours. There was no system of social insurance in the colony and educational and health services were in a sorry state.

55. The system of land tenure had made the agrarian problem one of the most burning issues in Fiji and was acquiring increasing political overtones. Most of the land was in the hands either of landowners, who rented it at high prices, or of the powerful foreign companies. Those who worked directly on the land were forced to rent it on exceedingly unfavourable terms. As a result, less than 10 per cent of the land was being used for agriculture, although as much as 72 per cent of the land could be made arable. Since the European sector of the population and particularly the

monopolies owned about 375,000 acres of land, the colonial authorities were doing nothing to solve the land problem or to allot land to those who worked it. Both the indigenous Fijians and the Fijians of Indian origin were interested in the speedy solution of that problem. By creating artificial obstacles to a solution, the administering Power was trying to cause new friction between the communities in order to maintain its supremacy in the archipelago. Only a just solution of the agrarian problem would enable the people of Fiji to develop the islands in the interest of the entire population and to fight against the influence of the foreign monopolies. Any delay in that respect would greatly harm the interests of the people of Fiji as a whole and the administering Power would have to bear the responsibility.

56. The colonial Powers had recently come to appreciate still more the value of the Territory. Fiji was of strategic significance, since it was situated at the cross-roads of the transport network in the southern part of the Pacific Ocean. It had well-equipped harbours and first-class airports, which were attracting the attention of the aggressors waging a bloody war against the national liberation movement in South-East Asia.

57. None of the measures recommended by the General Assembly had been implemented by the administering Power. The Special Committee should condemn the attitude of that Power as a violation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence and of subsequent decisions of the General Assembly on the question of Fiji. It should request the administering Power unconditionally to implement all the United Nations recommendations and thus enable the people of Fiji to exercise their inalienable right to freedom and independence.

58. The representative of *Sierra Leone* recalled that on 5 November 1964 the Special Committee had adopted a resolution on Fiji inviting the administering Power to implement, *inter alia*, General Assembly resolution 1951 (XVIII), which invited it to work out a new constitution providing for free elections on the principle of "one man, one vote" and the creation of representative institutions, to take immediate steps for the unconditional transfer of all power to the people of the Territory and to endeavour to achieve the political, economic and social integration of the various communities. General Assembly resolution 2068 (XX) had further requested the administering Power to take, as a matter of urgency, measures to repeal all discriminatory laws and to establish an unqualified system of democratic representation based on the principle of "one man, one vote". The administering Power had not stated whether all discriminatory laws had now been repealed.

59. Although the Constitutional Conference held in 1965 had accepted the principle of "one man, one vote", it was regrettable that it had been decided before the Conference that independence was not an issue to be discussed. The fact that all adults in Fiji, regardless of background, were to be enfranchised represented some progress, but that advance was diluted by the fact that there would still be official members nominated by the Governor in both the Legislative Council and the Executive Council. The *Sierra Leone* delegation would have liked the elections which were to take place later in the year to produce a completely representative Legislative Council, without the four official members nominated by the Governor, and the Council of Min-

isters, which was later to replace the Executive Council, to be chosen by the elected members themselves rather than by the Governor.

60. In his statement (see paras. 32-36 above), the United Kingdom representative had referred to the divisions between the different communities in Fiji, and had seemed to imply that the unification of the communities could proceed only at a snail's pace. He himself would have appreciated further information on the "racial disharmony" and "mutual mistrust" which allegedly prevailed in Fiji.

61. The objectives towards which the administering power should work were quite clear: namely, the speedy implementation of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), with particular reference to the provisions of resolution 1951 (XVIII).

62. Three principles had guided the Special Committee's approach to colonial questions: the granting of universal adult suffrage, the affirmation of the indigenous peoples' rights and the adoption of all necessary measures to grant freedom and independence at an early date. Those same principles should guide the Special Committee in the question of Fiji and genuine efforts should be made to overcome any communal divisions and to speed up the process of independence, rather than hampering it by allowing the Governor to place men of his choice in the Legislative Council and the Executive Council. Every effort should be made to unify the population of the Territory, by political, social and educational means, and constitutional barriers to democratic representation should be removed.

63. The representative of the *United Kingdom*, replying to points raised during the debate, said that he had to reject the entirely false argument advanced by the representatives of Tanzania, India and the Soviet Union that the United Kingdom Government was encouraging communal differences in Fiji for various selfish motives. The truth was precisely the opposite: every endeavour of the United Kingdom Government was directed towards bringing the communities together on a sound basis and preparing a political and constitutional structure which would enable them to live and progress in harmony. The differences between the Indian and the indigenous Fijian communities were a feature of the situation which no administering Power could ignore in preparing the island for constitutional advance. If what he had said earlier about the racial disharmony was insufficient, the detailed information requested by the representative of *Sierra Leone* was to be found in the working papers for the present and previous years. The United Kingdom Government could not disregard the plain facts of the situation, nor should the Special Committee.

64. With regard to the constitutional position, he had already explained the new system of cross-voting for nine of the thirty-six seats in the Legislative Council. That innovation was an important step towards racial harmony and a unified electoral system and would not accentuate communal divisions, as had been suggested. On the contrary, nothing was more certain to exacerbate communal divisions than the immediate adoption of a single common roll, as had been proposed by the Indian and Tanzanian representatives. Any anomalies in the representation of the different communities did not result in the domination of any one community over the others. The United Kingdom's policy of working towards political integration by encouraging co-operation and trust between the

communities was obviously the right one and his Government intended to pursue it. With the help of all those concerned in Fiji and the goodwill of all those outside Fiji, progress could be made; conversely, partisanship, obstruction and ill will could only be harmful.

65. The allegation that the administering Power was pursuing a policy of "divide and rule" in order to exploit the islands' resources was totally unfounded; on the contrary, its policy was to unite the communities and help them to live together in peace. As for the motives attributed to it, he could only say that the aid and assistance which it willingly provided to Fiji far outweighed any benefit which it might receive from trade or investment in the Territory. Far from exploiting Fiji, commercial firms performed an essential service and were welcomed by all the communities; indeed, it was difficult to imagine the economy of Fiji without them.

66. The representative of the Soviet Union had made the curious allegation that Fiji was of some sinister strategic significance to the United Kingdom Government. Certainly the island possessed a good airport and good harbours, of which the representative of the Soviet Union would surely not disapprove, but the United Kingdom had no troops, no naval ships, no military aircraft, bases or installations of any kind in Fiji. The Soviet Union representative had also reversed his usual line by suggesting that, by failing to develop mineral resources and by encouraging the development of agriculture, foreign interests had somehow exploited the people. The fact was that both agriculture and mining were being developed for the benefit of all the people of the islands and the gold exports were a valuable contribution to foreign exchange earnings.

67. He wished to assure the Indian representative that there was no ulterior motive of any sort behind the use of the term "Indian community" to describe that part of the population which was of Indian origin; unfortunately, there was no term which described an inhabitant of Fiji without at the same time describing his ethnic origin. The United Kingdom's objective was to promote political and constitutional progress as rapidly as possible, in order to diminish such emphasis on ethnic origin.

68. The Indian representative had been mistaken in stating that the administering Power had announced that there was no possibility of any "democratic control" in the foreseeable future; the United Kingdom Government's objective was the exact opposite of that. Nor had the United Kingdom announced that it did not intend to accelerate the process of granting freedom and independence to the people of Fiji, that interpretation of the United Kingdom Government's policies was quite unacceptable.

69. The Indian representative's use of the slogan "divide and rule" was completely inapplicable to present or past United Kingdom policies; there were many countries formerly under United Kingdom administration, of which India was one, which clearly demonstrated that different communities could and did live side by side in harmony. The United Nations, and in particular the Special Committee, should look to those as examples to emulate rather than to the few exceptions.

70. The United Kingdom Government's policy was clear, firm and consistent. It was a policy of encouraging co-operation and removing obstacles to trust between

the different communities. It was incumbent on those who accused the United Kingdom of secretly pursuing the opposite policy to suggest some credible reason why that should be so. The United Kingdom's objectives in Fiji could not be achieved overnight, but they were clearly defined as progress in the direction of self-government, together with political integration and harmony.

71. The representative of India said that he was glad that the United Kingdom representative had admitted the existence of anomalies in the representation of the various communities; that was the crux of the whole problem. He therefore felt justified in stating that it was the United Kingdom policy to encourage communal differences where they had not existed and to magnify and exploit them where they did.

72. The United Kingdom representative's statement had placed an unfortunate emphasis on communal differences rather than on constitutional reform. The system of cross-voting, which supposedly encouraged communal harmony and would ultimately lead to a unified nation, was not new and had been introduced in other Territories under United Kingdom administration. The United Nations experience of that system in other Territories had not been happy and there was no indication that it would be any different in Fiji. Furthermore, he could not accept the United Kingdom representative's implication that it was wrong to advocate a single electoral roll, since the straightforward principle of "one man, one vote" was the demand, not merely of India alone, but of practically all Members of the United Nations.

73. Because of its appreciation of the commendable record of the United Kingdom in the field of decolonization, the Indian delegation had been reluctant to use the term "divide and rule", but unfortunately past history, including that of his own country, testified to the fact that the United Kingdom had followed a policy of encouraging and exploiting differences between communities in almost all its Territories. With regard to the terms used to describe the various communities in Fiji, he was aware of the unfortunate fact that there was no other way of describing them, but the United Kingdom representative must surely know who was responsible for that fact.

74. With regard to the United Kingdom representative's rejection of his statement that the United Kingdom Government had announced that there was no possibility of democratic control in the foreseeable future, he referred the Committee to the United Kingdom representative's first statement (paras. 32-36 above).

75. If the United Kingdom was really sincere in its belief that communal differences in Fiji had existed from time immemorial, that it was doing its best to promote communal harmony in the islands and that the introduction of an electoral system on the straightforward basis of "one man, one vote" would have disastrous consequences for the people, then it should agree to a United Nations visiting mission, which would consult representatives of all the communities in Fiji and report its findings to the United Nations. India would be prepared to accept the findings of such an impartial body and he hoped that the United Kingdom Government, too, would agree to do so, since that might be the only means of satisfying the United Nations that its policies were for the good of the

people of Fiji. Unfortunately, there were indications that the United Kingdom Government would not agree to any visiting mission; that refusal spoke for itself.

76. The representative of the *Union of Soviet Socialist Republics* said that his delegation continued to hold the views it had expressed at the previous meeting, since they were based on well-known facts which the United Kingdom representative had not even tried to deny in his statement at the present meeting.

77. His delegation could not regard the United Kingdom statement otherwise than as an attempt to distract the Committee's attention from the main question, namely, how the administering Power was implementing the General Assembly resolutions on the question of Fiji.

78. The United Kingdom representative had tried to give the impression that only he was right and all others who had spoken on the question of Fiji were wrong. It was clear, however, from the proceedings of the General Assembly at its twentieth session that other delegations considered that the administering Powers, particularly the United Kingdom, were resorting to various subterfuges to avoid implementing the Declaration on the Granting of Independence and other General Assembly resolutions on the question of Fiji.

79. If all was well in Fiji, he wondered why the United Kingdom representative did not invite the Committee to send a visiting mission to the Territory to see for itself the political, economic and social conditions prevailing there.

80. The representative of the *United Kingdom* said that the Indian representative's remarks seemed to be a mere repetition of the earlier Indian statement; a careful reading of the United Kingdom statement might convince the Indian representative that the two countries' objectives in the matter were identical. The Indian accusation that the United Kingdom Government was exploiting communal differences in Fiji to its own advantage was groundless, since the United Kingdom did not and could not derive any advantage from those differences.

81. As for the Soviet Union representative's remark that the United Kingdom seemed to say that it was right and everyone else was wrong, he had studied the three statements made at the 412th meeting of the Special Committee but had failed to find one fact that could support the arguments against the United Kingdom.

82. The United Kingdom was trying to move in a direction which fell within the points of view of two communities which themselves were not going in opposite directions. His Government's aim was to bring those two communities together in the same direction, and he was convinced that the Committee, on reflection, would consider that direction the right one.

83. The representative of *Bulgaria* expressed regret that the United Kingdom had not complied with General Assembly resolution 2068 (XX), particularly operative paragraph 4 requesting it to take measures to repeal all discriminatory laws and establish an unqualified system of democratic representation based on the principle of "one man, one vote". The Assembly had found it necessary to make that recommendation because the results of the Constitutional Conference held in the summer of 1965 had been diametrically opposed to all its resolutions on the subject and, in particular, operative paragraph 2 of resolution 1951

(XVIII). The question of the independence of the people of Fiji, as affirmed in operative paragraph 1 of resolution 1951 (XVIII), had been expressly excluded from the agenda of the Conference, and mention not only of independence but even of any idea of internal self-government had been prohibited. The purpose of the Conference and of the recommendations adopted by the participants had been, not to open the way to independence, but simply to make certain adjustments in the United Kingdom colonial system. The participants representing the people of Fiji had been designated on the basis of the old legislative system which favoured one community at the expense of the others and which it was the very purpose of the Conference to amend.

84. The electoral system worked out at the Conference, in violation of the General Assembly's recommendations, divided the population on the basis of community and race and gave the Europeans, who constituted 4 per cent of the population, 30 per cent of the elected seats in the Legislative Council, while the official members to be appointed by the administering Power would also be Europeans. As in Southern Rhodesia and elsewhere, the administering Power had but one goal: to perpetuate political and economic domination by the white minority. The experience of South Africa and Southern Rhodesia had demonstrated that in such cases the European minorities had the same interests as the metropolitan country and that the latter could use those minorities to exploit the wealth of the countries concerned for its own strategic and other purposes. His delegation could not accept the statement made by the United Kingdom representative at the 410th meeting to the effect that there was no disagreement between the administering Power and other members of the Committee about aims and objectives; the disagreement between them was very considerable and it would persist until the United Kingdom applied the relevant recommendations of the General Assembly, in particular that concerning the principle of "one man, one vote".

85. As the information which the Committee had received about the Territory so far had come almost entirely from the administering Power, he supported the suggestion made by the Indian representative that the possibility of sending a visiting mission to the Territory should be considered.

86. The representative of the *Syrian Arab Republic* observed that Fiji was one of those Territories on which the United Nations had taken an unequivocal stand in accordance with the provisions of that milestone in contemporary international relations, General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV). Yet the administering Power arrogated to itself the right to administer the Territory as it saw fit, regardless of the wishes of the United Nations. The situation raised many fundamental issues, not the least of which was the question how far a Member State—particularly a great Power which had taken an active part in founding the United Nations, had adhered voluntarily to its principles and had pledged without reservation that it would fulfil its obligations—could go in ignoring decisions taken by the world body. Resolution 2068 (XX) had not appointed the administering Power to mediate alleged communal differences in Fiji but had called upon it to repeal all discriminatory laws and establish an unqualified system of democratic institutions based on the principle of "one man, one vote". An unqualified system of democratic representation was urgently

needed, not the appointment of an omnipotent foreign Governor holding executive power, appointing members of the so-called Executive Council as he saw fit and having authority to dismiss that Council whenever, in his sole judgement, it acted against the interests of public order, public faith or good government. The Committee would recall that, in a case which was still before it, innocent people had been imprisoned in the name of a similar slogan, i.e., "public safety". In that context safety had clearly come to mean safety to perpetuate colonial rule and the privileges of foreigners. The representative of the administering Power claimed that his Government's policy in Fiji was aimed at enabling the communities to live and progress in harmony, but the cross-voting system and the division of the electorate on a communal basis might well produce the opposite result.

87. A further point of divergence between the administering Power and other members of the Committee was the possibility that port facilities in Fiji might be turned into military bases. The representative of the administering Power had given solemn assurances that they would not be used for military purposes, but other members of the Committee were justifiably anxious on that score.

88. In view of those divergencies, he supported the Indian representative's suggestion that a visiting mission should be sent to the Territory to ascertain what the situation really was. The kind of welcome given it by the administering Power would be the true test of the latter's intentions.

89. The representative of *Uruguay* said that, while he fully agreed with the position of principles taken by the representatives of Bulgaria and Syria and supported the provisions of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), it was essential for the Committee to agree on the facts of the situation in Fiji before it could proceed to debate the legal interpretation of those facts. More specifically, the Committee should base its further discussion on the fullest possible knowledge of the measures taken by the administering Power in pursuance of the resolution on Fiji adopted by the Committee on 5 November 1964 (A/5800/Rev.1, chap. XIII, para. 119). Only when the Committee had unmistakable evidence of the constitutional developments which had taken place in Fiji to prepare the people for self-determination and independence would it be in a position to assess the future prospects of the Territory. It should ensure that the independent status to be accorded Fiji under its constitution was not merely theoretical, as was the case in Cyprus, which was governed by a constitution imposed on the people as a result of a treaty signed by other Powers. The people of Fiji should be enabled to state in free elections what constitution they desired as the instrument of their self-determination. Since there appeared to be a difference of opinion between the representatives of Bulgaria and Syria and the representative of the administering Power concerning the constitution being proposed by the latter, the Committee would be well advised not to take hasty action and to clarify the facts of the situation.

90. The representative of *Poland* said that his country had always supported peoples struggling to liberate themselves from colonial domination. Despite the efforts of the General Assembly and of the Special Committee, the situation in Fiji had not changed much. The administering Power had not implemented General Assembly resolutions 1514 (XV) and 1951 (XVIII).

On the contrary, it was using many devices to delay Fiji's independence and to create a governmental structure which would safeguard British economic and military interests in the future.

91. The main issue at the London Constitutional Conference in 1965 had not been Fiji's independence but how to preserve the inequalities in the representation of the various communities in the Legislative Council. In Fiji, one European vote was equal to six non-European votes and the privileged position of the European minority was further strengthened by the cross-voting system and by the dominant position of the United Kingdom Governor in the Executive Council. The result would be racial antagonism rather than the "social integration of the various communities" recommended in operative paragraph 2 (c) of General Assembly resolution 1951 (XVIII). The United Kingdom representative had stated at the 413th meeting that the administering Power was "preparing the island for constitutional advance towards more representative and more responsible government" but it had shown no sign of implementing the provisions of operative paragraph 2 (b) of General Assembly resolution 1951 (XVIII).

92. He supported the Indian representative's suggestion that a visiting mission should be sent to Fiji to study the situation at first hand. He was prepared to support any other proposals which would speed up the process of decolonization in Fiji.

93. The representative of *Chile* noted that some progress had been achieved in Fiji, particularly with respect to the introduction of universal adult suffrage. There remained, however, obstacles to full democracy particularly in the form of official members appointed by the Governor both in the Legislative Council and in the Executive Council. Furthermore, there would be a large number of elected representatives in the main communities and one of the members of the Legislative Council would be elected for the first time by all three communities. The new Constitution contained a declaration of rights as well as provisions for the establishment of a ministerial system. However, it was to be regretted that a system of democratic representation based on the principle of "one man, one vote", had not been established in accordance with the provisions of General Assembly resolution 2068 (XX). The continued presence of official members appointed by the Governor both in the Legislative Council and in the Executive Council would impede progress towards democracy in Fiji.

94. His delegation hoped that the United Kingdom would fully implement General Assembly resolutions 1514 (XV) and 1951 (XVIII). Vigorous action was required to reconcile the existing differences between the various communities. A solution might be found in the establishment of an electoral system based on proportional representation in which all the inhabitants would elect their representatives on a common roll. That would tend to eliminate the differences and animosities and would create, in a more democratic way, a national conscience and a common purpose.

95. It was clear from the results of the Constitutional Conference of 1965 that the administering Power was trying to establish a constitutional framework to give the people of Fiji their internal self-government while at the same time maintaining their ties with the United Kingdom. He hoped that Fiji would achieve unification and integration into a single nation which

could properly exercise its inalienable rights to self-determination and independence.

96. The representative of *Madagascar* said that Fiji had all the qualifications required for the attainment of independence. It was a distinct geographic entity with a population of about 455,000 people. Some countries in Europe, Asia and Africa with a population of like or even smaller size enjoyed their sovereignty, for example, Luxembourg, Iceland, the Maldives Islands and Gabon. Fiji also possessed the economic potential to enable its population to achieve a fair standard of living. Its highly developed administrative and political structure included a Legislative Council, largely elected by direct suffrage, and an Executive Council.

97. It was surprising therefore that the 1965 Constitutional Conference had discussed only minor aspects of the question of Fiji's attainment of independence. The administering Power seemed to be pursuing a *status quo* policy which was at variance with the fundamental provisions of the General Assembly resolutions on the Territory. The administering Power was inclined to stress the harm that might be done to various minorities if independence were granted. Thus, it claimed that special treatment should be given to certain minorities and that the multiplicity of political parties was a sign of internal disunity which would be aggravated by independence. It was said that in a memorandum published in 1964 the National Congress Party had agreed only to the granting of internal self-government to Fiji. Such manoeuvres on the part of minority groups were not unknown to the Special Committee whose concern was to identify a majority capable of governing the country in accordance with the rules of democracy and of securing the political, economic and social integration of the population.

98. He supported the Indian representative's suggestion that a visiting mission should be sent to Fiji to report on the situation there and on the obstacles which stood in the way of Fiji's independence.

D. ACTION TAKEN BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE

99. At the 462nd meeting on 16 August 1966, the representative of the *United Republic of Tanzania* introduced a draft resolution on Fiji (A/AC.109/L.320) jointly sponsored by Afghanistan, Ethiopia, India, Iran, Iraq, Madagascar, Mali, Sierra Leone, Syria, Tunisia, United Republic of Tanzania and Yugoslavia. It deplored the failure of the United Kingdom to implement the relevant General Assembly resolutions and called upon the United Kingdom Government to adopt certain measures, including the holding of general elections on the basis of one man, one vote, in accordance with the principle of universal adult suffrage for the purpose of forming a constituent assembly which would draw up a democratic constitution. Unless that was done, it would be very difficult for Fiji to achieve racial harmony at a time when the differences between the races were magnified by the administering Power. The United Kingdom Government was also requested to give Fiji a representative government, to fix an early date for its independence and to abolish all discriminatory measures. The draft resolution recommended the appointment of a sub-committee, as originally suggested by the Indian representative, to visit the Territory and report to the Special Committee as soon as possible. He hoped that the Secretariat would be able to provide all the necessary facilities for the sub-committee's visit to Fiji.

100. The draft resolution deserved unanimous support since its provisions represented the minimum which the Special Committee could expect to do for the people of Fiji.

101. The representative of *India*, speaking in support of the draft resolution, said that it embodied the consensus which seemed to prevail in the Special Committee. Some of its provisions were contained in earlier resolutions. It was time for the administering Power to fix an early date for the granting of independence to the people of Fiji so that they might attain their rightful place in the world of free nations. The administering Power claimed that the new constitutional arrangements were satisfactory but some members of the Special Committee had expressed their doubts. It was therefore necessary to send a visiting mission to study the situation at first hand and report back to the Special Committee.

102. The representative of *Australia* stressed his country's interest in the Fiji Islands because of their proximity to Australia and referred to Article 73 b of the Charter whereby the administering Powers undertook to help the peoples develop self-government and to take due account of their political aspirations. In Fiji the Special Committee was faced with a special problem because of the heterogeneity of the population. There were 176,000 Fijians of Melanesian origin, the original inhabitants of the islands, 206,000 people of Indian origin, and 36,000 belonging to other races. Between those various groups there were profound differences in race, culture and habits.

103. It was generally realized that in a similar situation the principle of majority rule, which Australia endorsed, was difficult to apply, much more difficult for example, than in New Guinea and Papua where the people, although divided into many tribes, were essentially of Melanesian origin.

104. The draft resolution tried to impose on the peoples of Fiji an oversimplified application of the principle of self-determination. Was the Committee certain that the text was in accord with the wishes and aspirations of the Fijians, as was required in Article 73 b of the Charter? There was nothing to show that the 175,000 Fijians of Melanesian origin wanted independence on the basis suggested in the draft resolution and many of the 205,000 Indians did not want it either.

105. The Committee should not force any Territory to pursue a course of political development which did not reflect its aspirations. He felt that the appeal made earlier by a petitioner from Grenada—"Let us decide"—was also relevant to Fiji.

106. The administering Power had no aim other than to fulfil its obligations in accordance with the provisions of the Charter; it had no reason for wishing to perpetuate colonial status. The allegations to the effect that fortifications had been built on Fiji were ill-intentioned and absurd. He noted that in operative paragraphs 2 and 3 the administering Power was accused of having prevented the Territory from attaining independence and that in operative paragraphs 4, 5 and 6 the sending of a visiting mission was recommended. In his opinion, the Committee should not seek to impose its views on the Government and people of Fiji. It was for them to make a choice in their own time and without outside pressure. His delegation therefore could not support the draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.320).

107. The representative of *Denmark* said that his delegation, although prepared to vote for the draft resolution, wished to express certain reservations, particularly with regard to operative paragraph 3 (c). It was not realistic at the present time to fix an early date for the independence of Fiji; moreover, it was most regrettable that the text contained no reference to the wishes of the population. The people of Fiji unquestionably had an inalienable right to independence, as was stated in operative paragraph 1, but it should not be forgotten that a colonial Territory had a choice of various possibilities, as the relevant United Nations resolutions provided.

108. The representative of the *United Kingdom* recalled that in its statements of 6 and 13 May his delegation had set out the policy of the United Kingdom Government on Fiji. First of all, it had described the aims and objectives of that policy; secondly, it had shown that there was nothing in those aims and objectives with which any member of the Committee would disagree; thirdly, it had shown that the United Kingdom Government was proceeding towards those aims and objectives at the pace which was best suited to the Territory and to their achievement; and, fourthly, it had refuted the accusations that had been made, including those to the effect that the United Kingdom wished for reasons of its own self-interest, to perpetuate colonial rule in Fiji.

109. He wished, before dealing with the draft resolution, to inform the Committee of what the Colonial Secretary, Mr. Lee, had said to the people of Fiji during a recent visit to the Pacific Territories. Mr. Lee had declared that the Territory had achieved substantial progress towards full economic viability, and representative institutions to match. It was still too early to predict the ultimate constitutional solution for the Territory, but its progress should not be determined from outside. The United Kingdom's task, with its experience of centuries of parliamentary democracy, was to help the people of Fiji to forge their common destiny. For that purpose, it was essential to weld together the differing traditions of the peoples of Fiji so as to produce a sense of national identity, making the several communities a single nation. The Colonial Secretary had also stated that the new Constitution would be an efficient and democratic foundation for government during the next few years.

110. His delegation regretted that the draft resolution did not recognize the major steps taken by the United Kingdom Government and that its recommendations ran counter to the policy which alone was likely to achieve his Government's declared objectives. His delegation would therefore vote against the draft resolution.

111. The representative of *India* said he had found the Australian representative's observations useful; he had particularly appreciated the Australian representative's comment that the Indian community in Fiji regarded that Territory, and not India, as its home. It could not be denied that there were two separate communities in Fiji and that it was not the administering Power which had made them separate. In the Special Committee's opinion, however, the administering Power was doing nothing to weld the two communities together; indeed, it was preventing them from coming together.

112. The representative of *Australia* had said that in operative paragraphs 2 and 3 the Committee was

passing judgement on the administering Power, but surely the Committee was merely doing its duty in passing judgement on situations existing in colonial Territories.

113. The Committee believed that the recommendations it was making were in accordance with the aspirations of the people. If, however, they should prove not to be, the Committee was prepared to revise its stand on the basis of the conclusions of a visiting mission to Fiji. The fact that the administering Power had refused to receive a visiting mission seemed to indicate that it had much to conceal from the Committee.

114. He wished to thank the representative of *Denmark*, who had said that his delegation was prepared to vote for the draft resolution even though it regretted that no mention had been made of self-determination for the people of Fiji. In reply to the United Kingdom representative, he would point out that it was precisely because the Committee did not approve of the administering Power's policy that it was making recommendations embodied in the draft resolution. As for Mr. Lee's statements, they had contained references which were not likely to be gratifying to the United Nations and the Special Committee.

115. In conclusion, he urged all members of the Committee to vote for the draft resolution.

116. At its 463rd meeting on 7 September 1966, the Special Committee adopted the draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.320) by 20 votes to 3, with 1 abstention.

117. The representative of the *United States of America*, speaking in explanation of her vote, expressed regret that her delegation had been unable to vote for the draft resolution despite its approval of many of the resolution's aims. The objective of communal harmony and national unity in Fiji was supported by all members of the Committee. However, the resolution appeared to contain conclusions and recommendations which ignored the realities of the situation and the efforts being made to cope with them. It was grossly inaccurate to state that the administering Power had ignored the objectives set out in the United Nations resolutions on Fiji. The primary purpose of the 1965 Constitutional Conference had been to achieve those objectives, and the reforms adopted, which would culminate in the election of a new legislature in the autumn, represented progress in that direction. The Legislative Council would be composed of members elected by the three communities. Leaders could thus emerge who would represent the whole people rather than a single community. Important steps were being taken to eliminate divisions in Fiji. Those steps, and the prospects they opened up, should not be overlooked.

118. Since her delegation did not believe that the measures called for in the draft resolution, including the appointment of a visiting mission, were such as would overcome the Territory's difficulties, it had voted against the resolution.

119. The representative of *Italy* said that his delegation endorsed the general principles and ideas embodied in the resolution just adopted but had some reservations which had prompted it to abstain. First of all, the criticisms directed at the attitude of the administering Power, and particularly the statement that it had not implemented the General Assembly's resolutions, did not seem to reflect the realities of the situation. The United Kingdom might not have done as much as the Committee would have wished, but it was not

correct to say that it was entirely opposed to the aims and purposes of the Special Committee. Secondly, it was important that the Territory's progress towards independence should be accompanied by measures designed to maintain peace and racial unity. The draft resolution, and especially operative paragraph 3, did not take that aspect of the problem sufficiently into account. Lastly, it should have been stated that the sending of a visiting mission would be decided upon in consultation with the administering Power.

120. The resolution (A/AC.109/201) thus adopted by the Special Committee on the question of Fiji at its 463rd meeting, on 7 September 1966, reads as follows:

"The Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,

"Having considered the question of Fiji,

"Having heard the statements of the administering Power,

"Recalling General Assembly resolutions 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960, 1951 (XVIII) of 11 December 1963, 2068 (XX) of 16 December 1965 and 2105 (XX) of 20 December 1965,

"Noting with regret that the administering Power continues to ignore the recommendations contained in the various General Assembly resolutions,

"1. Reaffirms the inalienable right of the people of Fiji to freedom and independence in accordance with General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) containing the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples;

"2. Deeply regrets the failure of the administering Power to implement the various resolutions of the

Special Committee and the General Assembly concerning Fiji;

"3. Calls upon the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, as the administering Power, to implement immediately the following:

"(a) The holding of general elections on the basis of one man, one vote, in accordance with the principle of universal adult suffrage for the purpose of forming a constituent assembly, which will be charged with the task of drawing up a democratic constitution;

"(b) The formation of a representative government and transfer of full powers to that government;

"(c) The fixing of an early date for the granting of independence to the people of Fiji;

"(d) The abolition of all discriminatory measures so as to foster communal harmony and national unity in the Territory;

"4. Decides to appoint a Sub-Committee to visit Fiji for the purpose of studying at first hand the situation in the Territory and to report to the Special Committee as soon as possible;

"5. Requests the Chairman to proceed with the appointment of the Sub-Committee as envisaged in paragraph 4 above;

"6. Requests the Secretary-General to provide all facilities for the visit of the Sub-Committee to the Territory of Fiji."

121. At the 483rd meeting, on 30 November 1966, the Chairman informed the Special Committee that he would proceed to the appointment of the Sub-Committee at an early date during the next session of the Committee.

CHAPTER IX*

EQUATORIAL GUINEA (FERNANDO PÓO AND RÍO MUNI)

A. ACTION PREVIOUSLY TAKEN BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE AND THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

1. Following its consideration of Equatorial Guinea (Fernando Póo and Río Muni) at its meetings in 1964, the Special Committee adopted a resolution as contained in its report to the General Assembly at its nineteenth session (A/5800/Rev.1,¹ chap. IX, para. 111). At its meetings in 1965, the Special Committee did not specifically consider this Territory, but included relevant information in its report to the General Assembly at its twentieth session (A/6000/Rev.1,² chap. X).

2. At its twentieth session, the General Assembly adopted resolution 2067 (XX) of 16 December 1965. In the fifth preambular paragraph of the resolution, the Assembly noted that the Territories of Fernando Póo and Río Muni had been merged and named Equatorial Guinea.

* Previously issued under the symbol A/6300/Add.7.

¹ Official Records of the General Assembly, Nineteenth Session, Annexes, annex No. 8 (part I).

² Ibid., Twentieth Session, Annexes, addendum to agenda item 23.

3. In the operative paragraphs of this resolution, the General Assembly:

"1. Reaffirms the inalienable right of the people of Equatorial Guinea to self-determination and independence;

"2. Requests the administering Power to set the earliest possible date for independence after consulting the people on the basis of universal suffrage under the supervision of the United Nations;

"3. Invites the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples to follow the progress of the implementation of the present resolution and to report thereon to the General Assembly at its twenty-first session."

B. INFORMATION ON THE TERRITORY³

4. The policy of the administering Power, according to the information transmitted, has been to complete

³ The information contained in this section has been taken from the information transmitted by Spain on 28 June 1966 under Article 73 e of the Charter.

the various phases of the process of establishing the autonomous system in accordance with the fundamental laws introducing that régime. The persons who were to discharge the functions of government have been elected and appointed. The original composition of the different organs of government, it is reported, has not yet undergone any change, since these organs are continuing to function for the periods prescribed by the law. The formation of the Territory's leadership was completed during the period under review with the appointment of the delegate of the Autonomous Government in Madrid.

5. In social affairs, it is reported that priority has been given to the co-operative movement, which the administering Power has promoted through long-term credits and housing construction. The work done by the National Housing Institute is reflected in the construction of 1,500 dwellings at a cost of 301 million pesetas.⁴

6. For appointment to the Labour Judicature and other bodies with competence in labour matters, eight officials who are indigenous inhabitants of the Territory have been selected for office and are at present in Madrid.

7. Educational activities during this period have consisted mainly in the establishment of new centres. As far as secondary education is concerned, the secondary schools of Fernando Póo and Río Muni have been established at Santa Isabel and Bata respectively. Teacher-training colleges and industrial apprenticeship schools have been established in the same cities. In the field of primary education, efforts have been concentrated on increasing the number of the teaching staff. As regards educational assistance in the form of scholarships, the policy has been to give preference to higher studies, which cannot be undertaken in Equatorial Guinea. Scholarships have been awarded up to a value of 3.5 million pesetas every year for study in Madrid, Barcelona and other university centres.

8. In the field of public works, it is reported that highways, water supply systems, ports, expressways to Santa Isabel Airport and other projects have been constructed at a total cost for the years 1964-1966 of 425 million pesetas.

9. In the health field, such endemic diseases as trypanosomiasis, leprosy and malaria have almost disappeared or are under control. A plan for the total eradication of malaria is being put into effect. A member of the Governing Council is responsible for the health services. He is assisted by a Director and a number of physicians.

10. As regards the training of indigenous persons for the public services, it may be noted that the Health Service has a number of indigenous physicians, including the Chief of the Service. Other organs also have indigenous personnel in their top posts. These include, for example, labour inspectors, chiefs of the Special Police Corps and other occupants of senior professional posts. Indigenous personnel, it is stated, represent almost the entire strength in other positions in the public administration.

Health services

11. In 1965, 109,730 medical consultations took place at the various health centres and 35,342 sick persons

⁴ The local currency is the Spanish peseta, which is equal to \$US0.0168.

received treatment in hospitals. Of these 10,743 were treated at Santa Isabel Hospital, 5,877 at Bata Hospital and 7,519 at San Carlos Hospital. The surgical staff performed 2,966 operations at Santa Isabel and 1,237 at Bata. There was an increase in the number of operations on victims of accidents. Further assistance was provided by the dental, ophthalmological and child health services. As regards assistance in maternity clinics, the number of births at the Santa Isabel and Bata maternity homes was 2,660 and 906 respectively.

12. The epidemiological picture finds malaria in first place, with 30,000 cases reported. This, it is stated, does not mean an increase in the incidence of the disease, rather in the assistance provided at clinics as a result of the eradication campaign. The number of cases of dysentery was 7,159. Trypanosomiasis control revealed 97 cases, of which almost half were at Puerto Iradier. A total of 393,451 blood tests were necessary to identify these cases. Among children's ailments there was an epidemic of measles this year, with 3,403 cases and a mortality of 1.2 per cent. There were also 2,317 cases of whooping cough, with one death. There were 512 cases of mumps.

13. In the field of preventive medicine, the Health Service organized and carried out a poliomyelitis vaccination campaign, which covered 44,029 persons, and a triple vaccination campaign (tetanus, diphtheria, whooping cough), which covered 86 per cent of the children. The use of an anti-measles vaccine was also begun.

14. The old and inadequate hospital at Concepción has been replaced by a new structure which can hold seventy beds and is provided with the necessary auxiliary services, including, in addition to the hospital building, a community house for the nuns who care for the sick and accommodations for the male nurses.

15. The hospital at Ebebiyín, which is approaching completion, will make it possible very soon to include another new structure in the programme for expanding and renovating the health services.

Primary education

16. There are thirty primary schools and 135 elementary schools. The School of Education continues to function. The enrolment at the end of the past year was 21,091 and 1,105 primary education certificates and 1,701 elementary educational certificates were awarded at the end of the course. During the period of autonomy, ten elementary schools have been established.

17. The manning table for substantive and auxiliary personnel in this Department is as follows: one director-inspector; one sub-inspector at Bata; eighteen national teachers; twenty-nine primary school teachers; and 350 assistant teachers.

18. The substantive and auxiliary manning table has been increased by thirty-five primary school teachers and forty-five assistant teachers. The present Director-Inspector of the Department is an indigenous inhabitant of Equatorial Guinea, as are the twenty-nine primary school teachers. The latter were trained at the Santa Isabel and Bata teacher-training colleges, which were established in this region. Twenty assistant teachers graduated from the School of Education and are now taking a practical course in the school groups.

19. The school meal and nutrition service is continuing its work, distributing powdered milk in schools as a diet supplement, and the school dining-rooms are still operating.

20. In December 1964 and January and February 1965, holiday camps were operated for the first time in the valley of Moka for four periods of twenty days each, during which school children from Fernando Póo enjoyed the pleasant climate of the valley. These camps were in operation again during the same months of the 1965-1966 school year. It is also planned that during the dry season in Río Muni, holiday camps should be maintained for students at schools in the mainland area at a high altitude.

21. In this first stage of autonomy, six education boards have been established in Río Muni in the school districts of Sevilla de Niefang, Valladolid de los Bimbiles, Mongomo, Nsoró de Guadalupe, Acurenam and Puerto Iradier, each being under the direction of a primary school teacher, an indigenous inhabitant of the Territory, who is responsible for co-ordinating the substantive and administrative work of the district's schools with the policies of the Director-Inspector of the Department.

22. During the current year, a primary education act adapted to the educational requirements of the region was drafted by the substantive personnel of the department.

Public Works Department

23. Since July 1964, when this department of the Governor-General's administration was transferred to the Autonomous Administration of Equatorial Guinea (more specifically, to the Office of Public Works, Housing and Town Planning), public works projects initiated by the former régime have been completed. These include the construction of the Santa Isabel water supply system, the expressway to the new airport and the Punta Santiago air-and-sea lighthouse. Other highway and water supply projects have been started.

24. Among the projects in progress is the highway round the eastern shore of the island. This new road is of great importance economically, since it passes through the richest cocoa-growing area of Fernando Póo, where there are a large number of small farms and where produce previously had to be transported under uneconomical conditions.

25. In Río Muni, action has been taken to strengthen the road-beds, whose peculiarities, rather than the traffic itself, make them vulnerable to the effects of tropical rains. The road network has been kept completely open to traffic and today traffic moves quite normally over the whole system.

26. Since the introduction of the autonomous system, the activities of the Housing and Town Planning Office have increased, the "new projects" budget rising from 20 million to 102,826,858.60 pesetas a year. The Office's main tasks are: (a) planning and direction of new projects; (b) maintenance of official buildings; (c) proceedings for the allocation and withdrawal of titles to land; (d) administration of official housing.

27. The sums appropriated are intended mainly for educational and health buildings, housing and offices.

28. In the field of education, a teacher-training college for 640 students and a national secondary school for 1,200 students have been built at Bata, and primary

and secondary schools with student accommodation are to be built at Mongomo and Basacato del Oeste. The total sum invested in school construction was 30,193,499.56 pesetas.

29. The total sum invested in the construction of housing for civil servants was 27,344,820.75 pesetas.

30. Investment in the Health Service amounted to 14,946,385.35 pesetas. This includes completion of the Concepción and Evinayong Hospitals.

31. The sum of 2,002,586.29 pesetas, or 1.9 per cent of the budget, was allocated to equip offices for the Autonomous Administration, especially the new Health Department where the Governing Council is temporarily housed.

32. The Governing Council was allocated 28,012,688 pesetas for its permanent premises, including the Councillor's residence.

C. CONSIDERATION BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE

Introduction

33. The Special Committee considered Equatorial Guinea (Fernando Póo and Río Muni) at its 447th, 451st, 452nd, and 454th meetings held in Africa between 15 and 21 June 1966.

34. In a letter dated 16 June 1966 (A/AC.109/185), the Deputy Permanent Representative of Spain to the United Nations requested permission for a Spanish delegation to be represented at the Special Committee's meetings in Algiers in an observer capacity and to take part in the discussions on Equatorial Guinea. At its 451st meeting, the Special Committee decided, without objection, to accede to this request.

Written petition and hearing

35. The Special Committee circulated the following petition concerning Equatorial Guinea:

<i>Petitioner</i>	<i>Document No.</i>
Mr. Daniel G. Mbandemzo'o, representative in the United Arab Republic, Idea Popular de la Guinea Ecuatorial (IPGE), concerning Equatorial Guinea	A/AC.109/PET.500

36. At its 447th meeting held in Cairo on 15 June 1966, the Special Committee heard Mr. Mbandemzo'o (IPGE).

37. Mr. Mbandemzo'o said that the Spanish colonialists and their imperialist friends were spreading various myths about Equatorial Guinea. He felt it his duty to re-establish certain facts. Equatorial Guinea had been a Spanish colony for 188 years. Geographically, it was divided into two Territories of unequal size: Fernando Póo and Río Muni. Fernando Póo covered 2,000 square kilometres and had 55,000 inhabitants, 4,300 of whom were Europeans. Its capital was Santa Isabel, a port which included the small island of Anobón, with an area of seventeen square kilometres. Río Muni covered 26,000 square kilometres and had 300,000 inhabitants, 3,000 of whom were Spanish settlers. It was bounded on the west by the Atlantic Ocean, on the north by the Federal Republic of Cameroon, and on the east and south by the Republic of Gabon. Its principal town was the port of Bata. The small islands of Corisco and Elobeyes were part of its territory. Equatorial Guinea's natural products were timber, cocoa, coffee, palm oil, cabbage-palms, bananas

and coconuts. There were also deposits of gold, petroleum, coal, tasmanite, iron, manganese, uranium and bauxite in the country.

38. In 1959, the inhabitants of Río Muni and Fernando Póo had decided to embark on a struggle against Spanish colonialism. The two secret freedom movements, the Idea Popular de la Guinea Ecuatorial (IPGE) and the Mouvement national de libération de la Guinée équatoriale (MNLGE), had been persecuted by the Spanish Government. A great many militant members had been interned; the island of Annobón had been transformed into a concentration camp. In January 1964, the Spanish Government had decided to grant the inhabitants of the country so-called "internal self-government", which had in fact left the former colonial status of Equatorial Guinea unchanged. A referendum on the so-called fundamental law had been used as a pretext for many acts of violence, the colonialist forces having sought to prevent the nationalist activists from speaking to the people. When the Guinean people had nevertheless unanimously voted against that law, the Spanish Government had proceeded to falsify the results. The Guinean nationalists had then demanded that the referendum should be annulled; the Spanish Government had riposted by arbitrarily establishing a supposedly "autonomous" Government, which naturally took its orders from the Spanish authorities. A party similar to the Spanish Falange was founded, the Movimiento de Unión Nacional de la Guinea Ecuatorial (MUNGE), which was in the service of the Western settlers and the petty bourgeoisie. In 1964, that party had been declared the only party in the country and had ordered the imprisonment of the IPGE nationalists on the excuse that the latter had held secret meetings.

39. During that period, assassinations, sentences of exile, expulsion, arbitrary sequestration and tortures had been the daily lot of the Guinean nationalists. The IPGE and the MNLGE had then decided to merge in order better to fight the bloodthirsty colonialists. That decision had been taken in October 1964, the intention being to call the new movement the Frente Nacional y Popular de Liberación de la Guinea Ecuatorial (FRENAPO). But in March 1965 the Spanish Government had decided to recognize MNLGE, thereby giving proof of collusion between that party and the administering Power. The IPGE, on the other hand, although far more numerous, had been banned and its followers relentlessly persecuted. That party was still proscribed. It had naturally withdrawn from FRENAPO, convinced that the leaders of FRENAPO were the tools of Spanish imperialist policy.

40. The Spanish Government today was harbouring fearsome designs against the Guinean people: 12,000 troops occupied the country and four warships were patrolling off Río Muni and Fernando Póo. The Spanish troops also had parachutist commandos and jet aircraft.

41. Worst of all, the Spanish Government was not only assisted by their NATO allies but were also receiving moral support from certain African countries, which were enabling the Spanish Government to prolong a disgraceful situation. Political refugees from Equatorial Guinea could no longer continue their political struggle against Spanish colonialism and the so-called autonomous government of Equatorial Guinea in some adjacent African countries. Thus, after the

military *coup d'état* which had overthrown Dr. Nkrumah, African liberation movements had been driven out of Ghana by the new régime. At present, ten activists of the IPGE were in Accra prisons. The Ghanaian authorities had recently announced that those ten revolutionaries would be handed over to Spain.

42. Another Spanish manoeuvre had been to try to persuade the rest of the world that the IPGE was a communist movement which preached violence. The IPGE was not a communist party and did not favour violence; but it would use violence if need be to defend the rights, the freedom and the dignity of the people of Equatorial Guinea. It urgently requested the Special Committee to place the question of Equatorial Guinea on its agenda, to condemn Spanish colonialism in that country, to urge the Spanish Government to grant unconditional independence to the Territory, to appeal to the Ghanaian authorities to release the ten IPGE activists in prison at Accra, to use its influence to convince the African Governments who were members of the Organization of African Unity (OAU)—and more particularly the Governments of Cameroon, Gabon and Nigeria—to allow the IPGE full freedom of action in their countries, in accordance with the resolutions adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU at Accra, and finally to appeal to independent African States and all peace-loving countries to give the IPGE the political, moral and material support it needed to bring about final and complete elimination of Spanish colonialism.

General statements

43. The representative of *Spain* said that it would be redundant to describe once again the situation in equatorial Guinea, its political development and its constitutional progress. The members of the Committee were aware that it had an autonomous Government. Members of his delegation included Mr. Ondó Edú, President of the Governing Council, and Mr. Gori Molubela, President of the General Assembly of Equatorial Guinea. Mr. Ondó Edú was a well-known figure in the United Nations: after being exiled from his country, he had appeared as a petitioner more than four years earlier. He had been repatriated when the Spanish Government had announced the referendum for the establishment of self-government and had conducted his electoral campaign in complete freedom. Since he knew his people well and could express himself easily in his native tongue "*fang*", he had soon captivated them and they had elected him without hesitation. Mr. Gori Molubela was a person with a profound knowledge of the realities of his country. Mr. Ondó Edú would make a statement at a later stage and he and Mr. Gori Molubela would be glad to explain any points concerning the item under discussion, should the members so request.

44. Spain had nothing to hide in Equatorial Guinea; in order to prove it and to enable the Committee to ascertain the true conditions in the Territory, the Spanish Government would be very pleased if the Committee or a representative group of members could visit Equatorial Guinea to see for themselves what those conditions were. If the Committee could not accept the invitation for the time being because such a visit had not been scheduled, he confidently hoped that it would be able to do so in the near future. The invitation had been extended; it was for the members to decide upon

it. He had no doubt that they would realize the importance and significance of the offer.

45. Mr. Ondó Edú, speaking as a representative of Spain, reminded the Committee that in November 1965 he had been present at the meetings of the Fourth Committee of the General Assembly at the twentieth session and had made a statement in his capacity as President of the Governing Council of Equatorial Guinea.

46. He further recalled that years ago, too, he had taken part in the work of the Fourth Committee, but in very different circumstances. He had been a petitioner who was outside his country and had found it necessary, together with his compatriots, Mr. Atanasio N'Dong, Mr. Jesus Oyono and Mr. Itanguino, to arrest the attention not only of the Spanish Government, but of the United Nations in that way. All that was past history. The Spanish Government had finally yielded to the appeal that it should grant self-government to Equatorial Guinea. Once self-government had been granted, he had come to New York, to the twentieth session of the General Assembly, and had provided full information on the electoral procedures and on the setting up of the Government. All that information appeared in the records of the Fourth Committee and his statement at its 1550th meeting had been issued as a document.⁵

47. As head of the Government of Equatorial Guinea, he wished, through the Committee, to convey the most profound gratitude of his Government and people to the General Assembly for its adoption of resolution 2067 (XX). He had been informed of the contents of the resolution by the Spanish authorities. He considered it of particular importance that the United Nations had reaffirmed the right of the people of Equatorial Guinea to self-determination and independence, but he would be lacking in fairness if he failed to point out—in observance, as he had told the Fourth Committee on 9 November 1965, of that one very simple axiom he had learnt, *inter alia*, from his teachers, past and present, namely *noblesse oblige*—that a member of the Spanish Government had informed him, in his capacity as President of the Governing Council, that it was the stated, official intention of the Spanish Government that Equatorial Guinea should choose its own political course when it so desired, that is, total independence if it regarded that as the best solution for its problems.

48. It followed that, having accepted the principle of self-determination, there was nothing to prevent Equatorial Guinea from asking for independence if it so desired. In that connexion, he wished to inform the Committee that, while his people manifestly shared that aspiration, he still felt that, as he had said in November 1965, it was essential and advisable to go through a preparatory stage and it was to that end that he had asked the Committee to help and support them and to give them assistance. Equatorial Guinea needed technical and economic assistance; it needed the aid of the International Bank for its development. It was easy enough to promote independence but it was very difficult to survive once independence had been attained. It was inadmissible that such a noble aspiration should be exploited by demagogues.

49. The elected representatives of the people of Guinea had certain responsibilities towards the people;

they were bound by those responsibilities and could not evade them.

50. Those responsibilities were basically concerned with the desire to consolidate independence and future development in Equatorial Guinea on the basis of sound social and economic realities. He did not want his country, once independence had been achieved, to be exposed to economic penetration by any foreign Power; that would be a real form of neo-colonialism as evil as political penetration and more difficult to control.

51. He reiterated that he wanted independence, even immediate independence, but it was necessary for Equatorial Guinea to go on preparing for it, so that when independence came it would be in a position to survive and to withstand situations likely to frustrate independence. That was what it wanted from Spain and what he hoped the General Assembly would consider at its twenty-first session.

52. There was no doubt that Guinea had certain problems, but responsibility for resolving them lay with those who had been freely elected by the people of Guinea. A compatriot who was still living outside the country had appeared before the Committee several times. Guinea was now a self-governing Territory which enjoyed freedom of action and there was nothing to prevent any Guinean from coming back to work for the future of his country. He, for his part, would like them to do so.

53. He was certainly not trying to hide anything from the United Nations or from the Committee which had been entrusted with the task of ensuring decolonization. Consequently, his Government had been particularly pleased about the invitation extended by the representative of Spain for the Committee to visit Equatorial Guinea, where it could see what the actual situation was and suggest what it regarded as the best solutions, which would be given careful study.

54. If the members of the Committee wanted any further particulars, the President of the Assembly, the representative parliament constituted by the people through elections which the United Nations had recognized as free and fair, was entirely at their disposal.

D. ACTION TAKEN BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE

55. At the 452nd meeting the representative of Syria, introducing a draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.314), co-sponsored by Afghanistan, Ethiopia, India, Iran, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Mali, Sierra Leone, Syria, Tunisia, United Republic of Tanzania and Yugoslavia, said that the question of Equatorial Guinea fell within the scope of General Assembly resolutions 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960 and 2067 (XX) of 16 December 1965. The Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, contained in the former resolution, was not only a progressive step in the history of the United Nations, but a turning point in human and international relations. By it the people of Equatorial Guinea had found recognition of their legitimate right to self-determination and independence and the acknowledgement of their irrevocable right to live freely and enjoy full sovereignty over their Territory and resources. In that light the administering Power had been requested to establish the earliest possible date for independence on the basis of universal suffrage, under United Nations supervision.

⁵ A/C.4/656.

56. The substance of the problem was to accelerate preparations for independence of the Territory so that its effective proclamation would not be delayed. Every effort must be deployed to overcome any problem arising in that regard, and it would appear that the administering Power had had that purpose in mind when it had taken the initiative of inviting the Special Committee to send representatives to visit the Territory and familiarize themselves with the preparations being made.

57. It was with those considerations in mind that the Afro-Asian group and Yugoslavia had submitted the draft resolution under consideration, which he presented to the Committee paragraph by paragraph. The co-sponsors hoped that all members of the Committee would support it.

58. The representative of *Sierra Leone* said that he was gratified by the Spanish offer for the Special Committee to visit Equatorial Guinea and examine conditions there. He was also glad to note that the invitation had come in the proper manner from the administering Power itself. That attitude was encouraging.

59. General Assembly resolution 2067 (XX) had specifically requested the administering Power to set the earliest possible date for independence after the holding of elections by universal suffrage under United Nations supervision. So far, however, the administering Power had not acceded to that request. The Committee had been told that the Territory was not ready for independence; but paragraph 3 of the draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.314) gave the administering Power a little more time to meet the General Assembly's request. By the time the proposed sub-committee was ready to visit the Territory, it was hoped that the administering Power could give an indication of the date when independence could be expected. The Committee had been invited by the General Assembly to follow the progress made in the implementation of resolution 2067 (XX) and to report to the General Assembly as early as possible.

60. His delegation was honoured to be able to endorse the draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.314). He hoped that the Committee could adopt it unanimously, for the proposals it contained represented an extension of resolution 2067 (XX), which had been adopted by 103 votes to none, with 2 abstentions.

61. The representative of *Chile* expressed his appreciation of the statement by the representative of Spain. The Chilean delegation could only commend the work of the Spanish Government to promote the process of decolonization in the Territories still under its administration. In so many other cases administering Powers had constituted a barrier to the Committee's progress, and had blocked the road to independence. The co-operative attitude manifested by Spain had stemmed from its awareness that colonialism could not continue in the twentieth century and that, consequently, every remaining Territory must move rapidly towards independence. An autonomous Government had taken over in Equatorial Guinea once the way had been prepared by the administering Power. Such a favourable set of circumstances appeared unusual by contrast with the unco-operative policies adopted by other Governments. Spain had just invited the Special Committee to send a mission to visit Equatorial Guinea—an unprecedented and exemplary action which should be imitated by other administering Powers. The

Committee should accept the invitation and profit from the occasion to elaborate and adopt specific plans of action.

62. Since the draft resolution prepared by the Afro-Asian group and Yugoslavia on Equatorial Guinea (A/AC.109/L.314) contained the acceptance of Spain's invitation and the decision to send a sub-committee to Equatorial Guinea as soon as practicable, he hoped that quick action would be taken to implement that decision.

63. Referring to operative paragraph 2, he called upon the Committee to bear in mind the statement by Mr. Ondó Edú, which had been greatly appreciated. Chile warmly supported the draft resolution.

64. The representative of the *United Republic of Tanzania* expressed appreciation of the administering Power's attitude. He was convinced that if others followed its example, the Special Committee's work would be greatly facilitated.

65. Despite his pleasure at the progress made in Equatorial Guinea, he felt disappointed that its population had not yet been prepared for complete independence. In his view, their self-determination had been delayed too long. Nevertheless, he wished to assure the people of Equatorial Guinea that independence would not mark the end of the close co-operation between them and the people of his country, but rather a new beginning. It was therefore in the interest of every people, and in accordance with General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) that the day of freedom should dawn as soon as possible.

66. While appreciative of the unprecedented invitation extended by the administering Power to the Special Committee, he considered it essential that certain preliminary steps should be taken to ascertain Spain's willingness to co-operate to the fullest extent. First, the Committee should call upon Spain to repatriate any political exiles or refugees who wished to return to Equatorial Guinea. Their presence would be of value not only to the Committee during its mission, but also to the young nation throughout its preparation for independence. Secondly, no obstacles should be allowed to prevent petitioners or political prisoners from testifying before the Committee during its stay. Lastly, the administering Power should do its utmost to promote the fullest implementation of the Committee's recommendations. If Spain accepted those conditions, it would facilitate the task to be performed and create new and stronger links between the administering Power and the Special Committee. The latter, for its part, would ensure that all possible measures would be sought to carry out decolonization in a peaceful, constructive manner. He reiterated his thanks to the Spanish Government for its co-operation, and expressed the hope that when the Committee's recommendations were approved, Spain would apply all the measures that had been adopted.

67. The representative of *Ethiopia* felt no need to reiterate his whole-hearted support of the resolution (A/AC.109/L.314) of which his delegation was a co-sponsor. Rather, he wished to mention the great interest with which he had listened to the statement of the Spanish Ambassador. He welcomed with satisfaction Spain's invitation to a sub-committee in order that it might discern at first hand the realities of the situation in Equatorial Guinea. Spain had acted wisely in taking that step, and must be encouraged to make a similar approach to every avenue of co-operation lead-

ing to the final goal of statehood for its Territories. For that reason the Ethiopian delegation was particularly pleased to note the Special Committee's unreserved acceptance of Spain's invitation, and hoped that it would be taken at face value with no hint of suspicion about the possible motives lying behind it. The important consideration would be to ensure that all necessary facilities were provided by the administering Power in order that the sub-committee's work might produce maximum results.

68. He voiced the hope that other administering Powers, especially Spain's neighbour, Portugal, would extend similar invitations. The situation resulting from the latter's refusal to co-operate with the Special Committee, the Secretary-General or the General Assembly, had given rise to a deplorable situation which seriously hampered the Committee's work. With the inhabitants of Portuguese Territories up in arms, the administering Power should at last consent to take the obvious and inevitable steps towards granting their independence.

69. The representative of the *United States of America* expressed appreciation of the statements made by members of the Spanish delegation. She was gratified to know that the people of Equatorial Guinea would have the opportunity to decide their own future, with a full range of choice, unlimited by predetermining arrangements made from outside. Her delegation welcomed and whole-heartedly supported the draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.314).

70. The representative of *Australia* announced his delegation's support of the draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.314). If he had found it necessary to note that the document was deficient in some respects, he had been prompted by objective considerations and not by the opposition on certain matters which he had vigorously stated to the Spanish Government in the past. Firstly, the draft resolution had failed to commend Spain for its new enlightened approach and for the reforms it had recently instigated with a view to giving the people a greater voice in the affairs of their country. It must be recognized that the administering Power had refused in the past—and to some extent still refused—to recognize the contribution of people like Mr. Ondó Edú who had protested against its former policies. Operative paragraph 3 implied prejudgement of a situation which should have been evaluated by on-the-spot observers who were capable of discovering what the people really wanted. Having simply wished to note those weak points, he associated himself with others in support of the resolution.

71. The representative of *Venezuela* said that he had been very pleased to see the draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.314) on Equatorial Guinea. The President of the Government of Equatorial Guinea, Mr. Bonifacio Ondó Edú, had given the Committee an account of conditions in the Territory on the preceding day. Once again, Spain was coming before the Special Committee and stating its intention of implementing General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) and all the other resolutions which had the same objective. In so doing, Spain was taking a further step along the course which the Committee had set itself. Spain hoped that the Special Committee would set up the sub-committee referred to in the draft resolution, and it was even inviting members of the Committee to make an on-the-spot inspection of conditions in the Territories. That attitude was in keeping with Spanish tradition and it did honour to Spain. He regretted, however, that operative paragraph

2 of the draft resolution did not mention the fact that the Committee had heard President Bonifacio Ondó Edú, in his capacity as a petitioner, tell them what he thought of conditions in Equatorial Guinea. Nevertheless, he would vote in favour of the text submitted to the Committee, and he earnestly hoped that the Special Committee would decide to set up a sub-committee, as soon as practicable, to visit Equatorial Guinea with a view to seeing how Spain was implementing resolution 1514 (XV) and the other pertinent resolutions of the General Assembly of the United Nations.

72. The representative of *Iran* welcomed Spain's invitation, which showed that it had nothing to hide from the Committee. He hoped that Spain's example would be followed by other administering Powers and that the enhanced co-operation between Spain and the Special Committee would effectively promote the conditions required for the people's self-determination. Any requests for aid from United Nations specialized agencies should be given full consideration by the visiting sub-committee.

73. The representative of *Iraq* wished to add his voice to others raised in approval and support of the draft resolution on Equatorial Guinea (A/AC.109/L.314). Spain's example should be followed by other administering Powers that had refused the visit of Special Committee missions despite numerous requests contained in resolutions and recommendations. The high esteem enjoyed by Spain in the Arab world and in Africa would certainly be underscored by the new step it had taken.

74. The representative of *Afghanistan* said that his delegation's views were reflected in the draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.314), of which it was a co-sponsor. The importance of the draft resolution lay in the fact that it marked a significant trend away from the traditional unco-operative tactics of administering Powers. He hoped that the proposed visit would speed up the implementation of General Assembly resolutions 2067 (XX) and 1514 (XV), with regard to the granting of independence to Equatorial Guinea.

75. The representative of the *Union of Soviet Socialist Republics* said that he did not share the enthusiasm of some delegations, who apparently considered that Spain had rendered a signal service to the Special Committee by inviting some of its members to visit Equatorial Guinea. General Assembly resolutions 2105 (XX) and 2067 (XX) concerning the date on which Territories under colonial domination should recover their independence had not yet been implemented. The same was true of the resolution on Ifni and "Spanish" Sahara. The fact was that Spain, with the collusion of other countries, was scheming to retard the implementation of the General Assembly resolutions which would lead to its quitting African soil.

76. He supported the statement made by the representative of *Tanzania*; all the petitioners who might wish to address the sub-committee must be allowed to do so. Political prisoners must be released and exiles must be allowed to return home. All of them must be allowed to express their views to the sub-committee and to the people, and to engage in political activities.

77. He emphasized the importance of operative paragraph 3 of the draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.314) and recalled that *Australia* had regretted the restrictive definition of the powers of the sub-committee, which in fact should work to implement the resolutions of the General Assembly. In any event, if the sub-committee's

work was to be of any value, representatives of countries which were in connivance with the colonialists must not be allowed to participate.

78. At its 454th meeting, on 21 June 1966, the Special Committee adopted the draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.314) by a roll-call vote of 22 to none as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Australia, Bulgaria, Chile, Denmark, Ethiopia, India, Iran, Iraq, Italy, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Mali, Poland, Sierra Leone, Syria, Tunisia, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Venezuela and Yugoslavia.

Against: None.

79. The text of the resolution (A/AC.109/186) on Equatorial Guinea (Fernando Póo and Río Muni) adopted by the Special Committee at its 454th meeting on 21 June 1966 reads as follows:

"The Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,

"Having considered the question of Equatorial Guinea,

"Having heard the statements of the administering Power and of a petitioner,

"Recalling General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960,

"Recalling further General Assembly resolution 2067 (XX) of 16 December 1965,

"1. Notes with satisfaction the open invitation made to it by the administering Power to visit Equatorial Guinea;

"2. Reaffirms the inalienable right of the people of Equatorial Guinea to self-determination and independence;

"3. Decides to send to Equatorial Guinea, as soon as practicable, a sub-committee to ascertain the conditions in the Territory with a view to speeding up the implementation of General Assembly resolutions 1514 (XV) and 2067 (XX);

"4. Decides to maintain the question of Equatorial Guinea on its agenda."

80. After the vote was taken, the representative of Spain said that the Spanish Government appreciated the Special Committee's acceptance of its invitation, and had noted with special gratitude the interventions of the representatives of Chile, Ethiopia, Tanzania, the United States of America, Australia, Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (who, although not completely in agreement with the formulation of the resolution, had emphasized the solidarity of his people with the people of Spain).

81. He had taken particular note of the request made by the representative of Tanzania for the repatriation of exiles to Equatorial Guinea. That request had reiterated the words of Mr. Ondó Edú who two days earlier had urged the Committee to ensure that petitioners and political prisoners be allowed to appear before the sub-committee during its mission. The Spanish representative had, however, to remind the Committee that there were no political prisoners. The awareness of that fact by members was not the fault of the Committee, but it could be remedied by first-hand acquaintance with the situation.

82. Regarding the circulation of information, he pointed out that the deadline of 15 June 1966 had been adhered to and that a report was being prepared by the administering Power, in compliance with Article 73 e of the Charter on Territories under Spanish administration.

83. Before commenting upon the resolution, he wished to express his satisfaction at the Special Committee's acceptance of the administering Power's open invitation to visit Equatorial Guinea.

84. Reference had been made in the preamble to the presence of a petitioner. His delegation pointed out that when it had learnt that the question of Equatorial Guinea had been placed on the agenda for the Algiers meeting, it had made plans to be present at the discussions. It had not known in Cairo that a petitioner would be appearing before the Committee. Although it did not attach major importance to the matter, it did feel compelled to state its reservations on the procedure that had been followed. It was known that according to Chapter XI of the Charter, petitioners from Non-Self-Governing Territories were not authorized to be present. If, however, the provisions of Chapters XII and XIII had been considered to supersede those of Chapter XI, by their reference to non-metropolitan Territories, the change might have merited being put to the vote. In the past, his delegation would in similar circumstances have asked that a vote be taken, and it might have done so once again, but would instead merely request that its reservations be placed in the record.

85. In connexion with operative paragraph 2, he recalled that his Government had recognized the right of its Territories to self-rule and independence long before the United Nations had made any recommendations to that effect. In view of his Government's known position and in view of the fact that an autonomous Government had been set up, he felt that the reaffirmation contained in paragraph 2 was unnecessary.

86. The reference in operative paragraph 3 to speeding up the implementation of General Assembly resolutions 1514 (XV) and 2067 (XX) prompted his delegation to remind the Special Committee that the administering Power had nothing to hide, a fact which was substantiated by its offer to receive an investigating sub-committee in that Territory. The invitation had not been extended with the sole purpose of speeding up the implementation of the relevant resolutions, but rather in order to enable the sub-committee effectively to evaluate the real situation. No conclusions could be reached or even outlined in advance: if they were, it would serve no useful purpose to visit the Territory.

87. Finally, his delegation knew perfectly well that when the President of the Governing Council of Equatorial Guinea had taken office, he had done so in the name of Spain but with authority vested in him by the people through universal suffrage. The same had been true for Mr. Gori Molubela, President of the Assembly. Provision for their election had been made in the Law of Self-Determination which had also conferred upon the Territory the name of Equatorial Guinea appearing in the resolution. Those facts furnished further proof of the United Nations acceptance of the Law of Self-Determination, in connexion with which the Fourth Committee had in November 1965, upon the request of Mr. Ondó Edú, ordered that the address of the President of the Council of Government of Equatorial Guinea be circulated as a document of the

General Assembly. He thanked the Special Committee once again for the recognition it had given the work done by the administering Power, and requested that his statement be included in the Committee's records.

88. The *Chairman* said that it had always been the Special Committee's practice to hear petitioners from countries on its list anywhere, and that it had accordingly heard a petitioner on Equatorial Guinea in Cairo.

89. The representative of *Poland* said that he had listened with regret to the statement by the representative of Spain, and considered his attitude to be retrograde. It would be useless for the sub-committee to visit the Territory if it could not hear petitioners.

90. The representative of *Spain* said there was no question of the administering Power wishing to interfere in the sub-committee's work, but that it was his delegation's right, representing as it did a Member State of the United Nations, to state a reservation.

91. At its 460th meeting, the Special Committee, on the proposal of the Chairman, decided that the Sub-Committee on Equatorial Guinea should be composed of the representatives of Chile, Denmark, Mali, Poland, Sierra Leone, Syria and the United Republic of Tanzania.

E. FURTHER CONSIDERATION BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE⁶

Introduction

92. The Special Committee further considered Equatorial Guinea (Fernando Póo and Río Muni) at its 482nd meeting held at Headquarters on 18 November 1966. The Committee had before it the report of the Sub-Committee on Equatorial Guinea (Fernando Póo and Río Muni), which is annexed hereto.

93. In letters dated 14 and 17 November 1966 (A/AC.109/213, A/AC.109/215), the Permanent Representatives of Cameroon and Spain requested permission for delegations of their respective countries to participate in the discussion of the question of Equatorial Guinea. At its 482nd meeting the Special Committee decided, without objection, to grant these requests.

Written petitions

94. The Special Committee circulated the following additional written petitions concerning Equatorial Guinea (Fernando Póo and Río Muni):

<i>Petitioner</i>	<i>Document No.</i>
Three petitions from Mr. Jesús Mba Ovono, Secretary-General, Idea Popular de la Guinea Ecuatorial (IPGE)	A/AC.109/PET.500/Add.1
Petition from IPGE	A/AC.109/PET.500/Add.2
Mr. Jesús Mba Ovono, Secretary-General, IPGE	A/AC.109/PET.500/Add.3
Two petitions from Mr. Pastor Torao Sikara, President General, and other members of the Movimiento Nacional de Liberación de la Guinea Ecuatorial (MNLGE)	A/AC.109/PET.529

⁶ See also chapter II (paras. 595-619) for an account of the discussions on the resolution adopted by the Special Committee at its 455th meeting on 22 June 1966 concerning the implementation of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) with regard to Territories considered by the Committee during its meetings in Africa.

<i>Petitioner</i>	<i>Document No.</i>
Petition from the Comité del Exterior, MNLGE	A/AC.109/PET.529/Add.1
Mr. Pastor Torao Sikara, President General, MNLGE	A/AC.109/PET.529/Add.2
Mr. J. W. Okori-Dougan	A/AC.109/PET.570

F. ACTION TAKEN BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON THE REPORT OF THE SUB-COMMITTEE ON EQUATORIAL GUINEA (FERNANDO PÓO AND RÍO MUNI)

95. At the 482nd meeting, the Chairman of the Special Committee, speaking as *Chairman of the Sub-Committee on Equatorial Guinea*, introduced the Sub-Committee's report (see annex). Pursuant to the resolution adopted by the Special Committee at its 454th meeting (see para. 79 above), the Sub-Committee had visited Madrid and Equatorial Guinea in August 1966, and had had an opportunity to talk both to Spanish Government officials and to a large number of bodies and individuals in Equatorial Guinea. Section I of the report gave information on the Territory, sections II and III an account of the discussions and consultations during the Sub-Committee's visits to Spain and to the Territory, and section IV the Sub-Committee's conclusions and recommendations. He was happy to report that, thanks to the spirit of compromise shown by all its members, the Sub-Committee had been able to adopt the report unanimously. He commended it to the Special Committee.

96. The representative of *Spain* said that the Territory of Equatorial Guinea, although remote from Spain geographically, was very close to Spain's heart, being the only area in Equatorial Africa where Spanish was spoken and Spanish customs were to be found. The people of the Territory were now preparing for a most important step in their history, but at the same time they did not wish to break their ties with Spain and were anxious to continue to receive Spanish assistance.

97. In inviting the Special Committee to visit the Territory, Spain had been aware that such an invitation represented a decisive step in the Committee's work. The appreciation expressed by the Sub-Committee for Spanish co-operation in the process of decolonization was gratifying, but Spain would have liked the Sub-Committee to give greater attention to Spain's achievements in the Territory.

98. He was not able to discuss the Sub-Committee's report in substance since his delegation had only just received the text and neither the Spanish Government nor the Autonomous Government of Equatorial Guinea had had an opportunity to study it. He would, however, make some preliminary comments. He wished first to pay a tribute to the Sub-Committee for its achievement in submitting such a detailed report as the result of such a brief visit. His delegation was not in agreement with the recommendation regarding the fixing of a date for independence, although it was true that paragraph 294 recognized that the fixing of a date must depend on the outcome of talks between representatives of the population and the Spanish authorities. Spain considered that it was for the population, in the exercise of self-determination, to fix the date for independence if it so wished.

99. Although he was surprised that greater importance had sometimes been given to unrepresentative groups and individuals than to the elected authorities,

he had the impression that the Sub-Committee had been able to appreciate the qualities of those elected authorities. He was also surprised by suggestions that there was no freedom of political activity, since the members of the Sub-Committee had had an opportunity to verify the existence of political parties in the Territory.

100. He had read with interest the Sub-Committee's views concerning the maintenance of the unity of the Territory; it was because Spain favoured such unity that it had granted self-government to Equatorial Guinea as a single entity. He wondered, however, whether the report perhaps minimized some of the problems in that regard.

101. The importance attributed to the powers of the Commissioner-General and the suggestion that autonomy was fictitious were, in his view, refuted by the report itself. The members of the Sub-Committee had had an opportunity to verify that the supposed wide powers of the Commissioner-General did not exist in practice. He would also have liked to see a reference to the high level of economic, social and educational development in the Territory, considered in relation to that of the region in which it was situated.

102. With regard to criticisms which might be directed at constitutional arrangements in the Territory, he wished to point out that the terms of the Basic Law establishing the régime of autonomy had been worked out in agreement with representatives of the inhabitants and had been the subject of a referendum in which all adult inhabitants, male and female, had participated. The Basic Law allowed for amendment through established procedures. Above all, it enabled the inhabitants to exercise the right of self-determination and to decide upon their own future.

103. The representative of *Mali* considered that the conclusions and recommendations of the Sub-Committee were of great importance. His delegation also attached importance, however, to the fact that the Territories of Fernando Póo and Río Muni had been united under the Basic Law to form the Territory of Equatorial Guinea. Consequently, although he agreed with the recommendation in paragraph 301 of the report concerning the speedy transfer of all powers to the people, he thought that it should be made clear that, in accordance with the Basic Law, it was the united Territory of Equatorial Guinea which was to accede to independence.

104. The representative of *Australia* said that his delegation considered that the fact that the Sub-Committee had been invited by the Spanish Government to visit the Territory was to Spain's credit. He commended the Sub-Committee for its diligence and realism; in general, it would be hard to find fault with its conclusions and recommendations. His delegation attached particular importance to paragraph 304, in which the introduction of an electoral system based on universal adult suffrage was recommended. With regard to paragraph 301, he took it that the recommendation for the fixing of a date for independence not later than July 1968 was qualified by the words "in response to the wishes of the people". His delegation would hope that the date would be fixed by representatives of the people, elected on the basis of "one man, one vote", in consultation with the Spanish authorities. He would have preferred no time-limit to have been indicated in the paragraph and the matter to have been left entirely to the representatives of the people.

105. The representative of *Iran* said that the Sub-Committee was to be congratulated on the thorough study it had made of the question of Equatorial Guinea. In view of the fact that the Sub-Committee had adopted its report by unanimous vote, he proposed that the Special Committee should decide to adopt the report and to endorse the conclusions and recommendations on the understanding that the observations and reservations of delegations would be included in the record of the meeting.

106. The representative of the *United Republic of Tanzania* welcomed the spirit of co-operation shown by the administering Power and the restraint with which the Spanish representative had expressed his views on the report. With regard to the Australian representative's remarks, he wished to make it clear that the question of fixing a date for independence had been raised by people interviewed by the Sub-Committee in the Territory; that was why the reference to "the wishes of the people" had been included in paragraph 301. He fully agreed that it was the wishes of the people of Equatorial Guinea which must be decisive; the people were naturally free to change their decision, though he certainly hoped that they would not decide that they did not want independence by July 1968. In view of the pressure of time, the details of the question could be left for discussion by the Fourth Committee, including the point raised by the representative of *Mali*. In the meantime he would support the proposal of the representative of *Iran*.

107. The representative of *Denmark* said that, as a member of the Sub-Committee he wished to express his appreciation of the co-operation that Spain had given the Sub-Committee. The recommendation concerning the date for independence had been the subject of protracted discussions in the Sub-Committee and his delegation had had some hesitation about it, but it had accepted the inclusion of the recommendation in view of the reference to the wishes of the people. The mention of a date had been made in response to wishes expressed by the inhabitants, for it had been the clear impression of the Sub-Committee that the overwhelming majority of the people wanted independence not later than July 1968.

108. The representative of the *United Kingdom* said that he did not object to the Iranian proposal. His delegation, not having had time to study the report, was not in a position to express views on it, but would not wish for that reason to hold up the Special Committee's decision.

109. The representative of the *United States of America* said that he too had no objection to the Iranian proposal. His delegation wished to express its appreciation of the hard work done by the Sub-Committee and of the co-operation given by the Spanish Government. He wished to record his delegation's reservation regarding paragraph 301, for similar reasons to those expressed by the Australian representative, and regarding paragraph 309.

110. The representative of *Madagascar* supported the views expressed by the representative of *Mali* and asked for the inclusion in paragraph 301 of a phrase to the effect that it was understood that independence would be granted to Equatorial Guinea as a single entity, in accordance with the Basic Law and the resolutions of the United Nations.

111. The representative of *Venezuela* said that he could accept the Iranian proposal but wished to state

that his delegation had not had an opportunity to study the report and therefore reserved the right to raise points in connexion with it in the Fourth Committee.

112. The representative of *Cameroon* said there were many historical and traditional bonds between his country and Equatorial Guinea and many ethnic groups common to both. His delegation was therefore particularly grateful for the statements in favour of their emancipation.

113. The proposal by the representatives of Mali and Madagascar for an addition to paragraph 301 of the Sub-Committee's report (see annex) did not constitute an amendment to the report. The addition to that paragraph would lay stress on the contents of paragraph 291, which made it clear that only a small minority among the Bubis of Fernando Póo and certain vested interests tended to favour the separation of Fernando Póo and Río Muni. The majority of the population of Equatorial Guinea unquestionably wanted their country to become independent as a single State.

114. At the 482nd meeting on 18 November 1966, the Special Committee decided to adopt the proposal of the representative of Iran. By this decision, the Special Committee adopted the report of the Sub-Committee on Equatorial Guinea (see annex), and endorsed the conclusions and recommendations contained therein, it being understood that the observations and reservations made by members would appear in the record.

ANNEX

[A/AC.109/L.348]

Report of the Sub-Committee on Equatorial Guinea (Fernando Póo and Río Muni)

Rapporteur: Mr. Rafic JOUÉJATI (Syria)

CONTENTS

	Paragraphs
Introduction	1-13
I. Information on the Territory	14-77
II. Discussions with officials of the Spanish Government	78-120
III. Consultations with the people of the Territory	121-285
IV. Conclusions and recommendations	286-310
V. Adoption of the report	311

APPENDICES

I. Itinerary and programme of meetings	398
II. Representatives of corporative bodies and co-operatives elected to municipal councils	398
III. Representatives of heads of families elected to municipal councils	399
IV. Breakdown of electorate (heads of families) at municipal council level in 1964	399

INTRODUCTION

1. At its 454th meeting on 21 June 1966, the Special Committee adopted a resolution concerning Equatorial Guinea (see para. 79 of chapter IX), operative paragraphs 1 and 3 of which read as follows:

"1. *Notes with satisfaction* the open invitation made to it by the administering Power to visit Equatorial Guinea;

"...

"3. *Decides* to send to Equatorial Guinea, as soon as practicable, a sub-committee to ascertain the conditions in the Territory with a view to speeding up the implementation

of General Assembly resolutions 1514 (XV) and 2067 (XX);".

2. At the 460th meeting on 5 August 1966, the Chairman informed the Special Committee that the Government of Spain would find it convenient to receive the Sub-Committee during the third week of August 1966, and would agree to a visit to the Territory during a period of approximately eight days thereafter.

3. At the same meeting the Special Committee, on the proposal of the Chairman, decided without objection that the Sub-Committee on Equatorial Guinea should consist of Chile, Denmark, Mali, Poland, Sierra Leone, Syria and the United Republic of Tanzania. The Sub-Committee was composed of the following representatives:

Mr. Gershon B. O. Collier (*Sierra Leone*) (*Chairman*)

Mr. Hernán Sánchez (*Chile*)

Mr. Skjold G. Mellbin (*Denmark*)

Mr. Yaya Diakite (*Mali*)

Mr. Kazimierz Smiganowski (*Poland*)

Mr. Rafic Jouéjati (*Syria*)

Mr. John W. S. Malecela (*United Republic of Tanzania*)

4. Following consultations with the Spanish Government, the Sub-Committee visited Madrid from the morning of 17 August to the evening of 18 August 1966. During its stay in Madrid, the Sub-Committee held meetings with senior officials of the Spanish Government, an account of which is included in section II of this report.

5. The Sub-Committee then visited Equatorial Guinea (Fernando Póo and Río Muni) from 19 August to 24 August 1966. It was in Fernando Póo from 19 August to 21 August 1966 and in Río Muni from 22 August to 24 August 1966.

6. On the arrival of the Sub-Committee in the Territory, arrangements were made by the local authorities at its request for the public to be informed, through the Press and by radio, of the purpose of its visit to the Territory, its terms of reference, and its programme, as well as of its desire to receive oral and written evidence from all bodies, groups and individuals, wishing to consult with it.

7. While in the Territory the Sub-Committee held meetings and had discussions with the Commissioner-General and other officials, an account of which is included in section II. The Sub-Committee also held meetings with members of the governmental and legislative organs, and with a large number of bodies, groups and individuals, an account of which is contained in section III of this report. Members of the Sub-Committee also had informal contacts and conversations with a sizable number of personalities and individuals in the Territory.

8. The itinerary and programme of the Sub-Committee in Madrid and in Equatorial Guinea is attached to this report as appendix I. During its visit the Sub-Committee was accompanied by a secretariat composed of Mr. K. K. S. Dadzie (Principal Secretary), Mr. Richard W. Wathen (Political and Administrative Officer), Messrs. Pierre Dufour and Juan Rodríguez (Interpreters) and Mrs. Cecilia T. Bowles (Secretary).

9. The Sub-Committee reconvened at Headquarters on 30 September 1966. It held thirteen meetings between that date and 18 October 1966, when it adopted its report.

10. The information gathered by the Sub-Committee concerning conditions in the Territory is contained in section I of this report. Its conclusions and recommendations are set out in section IV.

11. The Sub-Committee expresses its appreciation to the Spanish Government for the invitation to visit Madrid and the Territory, for the welcome and hospitality extended to it, and for the facilities placed at its disposal by the Spanish officials concerned with the arrangements for its visit. The Sub-Committee is appreciative also of the assistance and co-operation made available to it by the Commissioner-General and his colleagues.

12. The Sub-Committee also acknowledges with gratitude the cordial welcome and the facilities extended to it by the Governing Council and the two Provincial Councils of the Territory. It wishes to pay tribute to the warmth of the reception, the generosity, and the co-operation accorded to it by all the various bodies, groups and individuals with whom it had contact.

13. The Sub-Committee's visit to Equatorial Guinea, as well as its brief stay in Madrid, was very useful in providing elucidation of the problems of the Territory. In particular the visit was of great assistance in enabling the Sub-Committee to ascertain conditions in the Territory and in acquainting it at first hand with the aspirations of the people of Equatorial Guinea.

I. INFORMATION ON THE TERRITORY

A. GENERAL

14. The Territory of Equatorial Guinea consists of the provinces of Fernando Póo and Río Muni, the former comprising the island of that name, adjacent islets and island of Annobón, while the latter comprises the continental area bordered on the north by Cameroon and on the south and east by Gabon, as well as the islands of Corisco, Elobey Grande, Elobey Chico and adjacent islets. The area of Fernando Póo is 2,034 square kilometres, and that of Río Muni 26,017. The capital of Fernando Póo is Santa Isabel and that of Río Muni is Bata.

15. The total population of the Territory today is estimated to be 260,000. According to the 1960 census, when the total population was 245,898 inhabitants, 62,612 lived in Fernando Póo and 183,377 in Río Muni. Of those living in Fernando Póo, 58,390 were Africans, including Nigerian workers and other non-indigenous groups, and 4,222 were Europeans, while the figures for Río Muni were 180,513 and 2,864 respectively. Population density was 31 per square kilometre and 7 per square kilometre respectively. The largest urban agglomeration is Santa Isabel which, in 1963, had an estimated population of approximately 28,000. The next largest town is Bata with an estimated population of 25,700 in 1963.

16. The indigenous population consists chiefly of two groups, the Bubis in Fernando Póo and the Fangs (also known as Pámues) in Río Muni. Other smaller groups in Río Muni are the Kombes, Bengas and Bujebas. Detailed figures are not available. There is a large non-indigenous African population, mainly from Nigeria, numbering approximately 32,000 in 1966, working in the Territory usually on fixed term contracts; this element of the population is most numerous in Fernando Póo. The non-African population is almost entirely Spanish.

B. GOVERNMENT

Constitution of 1963/1964

17. Fernando Póo and Río Muni, which in 1959 had been given the status of integral provinces of Spain, were accorded a new constitutional framework in 1963 under the designation of Equatorial Guinea. This framework was defined by Basic Law No. 191/1963 of 20 December (*Ley de Bases*) granting Equatorial Guinea, in the words of the law, "a régime of autonomy".^a

18. The new constitutional structure was initiated by a declaration of the Spanish Government following a decision taken in the Council of Ministers on 9 August 1963 regarding the granting of autonomy to the Territory. A commission of the Spanish Cortes, which included participants from the Territory, drew up a bill for a basic law providing for a new system of government. The bill was approved by the Cortes. Before being sanctioned by the Head of State of Spain, the Law was submitted to a plebiscite held on 15 December 1963 which was open to nationals, African and Spanish, duly registered over the age of 21 years. The non-indigenous

African population did not, of course, qualify to vote under these conditions.

19. The number of registered voters in the plebiscite was 126,378, of whom 17,699 were in Fernando Póo and 108,679 in Río Muni. According to the administering Power the results of the plebiscite were as follows:

	Votes cast	In favour	Against
Fernando Póo	12,500	5,340	7,150
Río Muni	82,317	53,940	28,387
TOTAL	94,817	59,280	35,537

20. Following the plebiscite, the Basic Law was promulgated on 20 December 1963. During the first half of 1964, the various councils envisaged under the Basic Law came into being. The Governing Council was constituted on 15 May 1964 and on 27 May 1964 the President of the Governing Council was designated. The régime of autonomy came into effect on 16 July 1964.

21. A law providing an expanded text of the Basic Law of the autonomous régime was promulgated by Decree 1885/1964, of 3 July 1964. This law (*Ley Articulada sobre régimen autónomo de la Guinea Ecuatorial*) was drawn up in accordance with article 1 of the Final Clauses of the Basic Law whereby the Government of Spain was empowered to decree an expanded text of the Basic Law in consultation with the representatives of the autonomous régime comprising the Governing Council of Equatorial Guinea. The *Ley Articulada* contains the essential legislative basis of the present régime of autonomy.

22. The Basic Law stipulates that nationals born in Fernando Póo and Río Muni shall enjoy the same rights and shall be bound by the same duties as "other Spaniards" under the Fundamental Laws, and that "the right of representation in the Spanish Cortes shall continue to be guaranteed". Under these arrangements, Fernando Póo and Río Muni are represented in the Cortes on the same basis as other Spanish provinces, each province of the Territory providing three deputies. These are the mayors of Santa Isabel and Bata, one deputy each for Fernando Póo and Río Muni, respectively, representing the other municipal councils, and a representative of each of the two provincial councils, currently the Presidents.

Organs of government

23. The Basic Law states that the government and administration of Equatorial Guinea shall be representative in nature and shall be entrusted to a General Assembly and a Governing Council. As well as making provision for the establishment of these organs, the Law establishes the Office of the Commissioner-General, who represents the Government of Spain in the Territory and is appointed by decree of the Head of State of Spain.

24. The Governing Council is constituted by a President and eight Councillors, four from Fernando Póo and four from Río Muni. The Councillors are elected by the Assembly while the President is appointed by decree from a list of three candidates proposed by the Governing Council. They serve for a four-year term. The present President of the Governing Council is Mr. Bonifacio Ondó Edú.

25. The General Assembly consists of the Provincial Council (*Diputaciones*) of Fernando Póo and Río Muni meeting in joint session. It holds at least two sessions a year alternately at Santa Isabel and Bata. Within their spheres of competence, the two provincial councils are the organs of local government in their respective provinces. The Provincial Councils of Fernando Póo and Río Muni comprise eight and ten members respectively. Should any of these members be elected by the Assembly to the Governing Council, the resulting vacancies are filled in accordance with electoral procedures set out below (see paras. 40-42).

Powers and jurisdiction of the organs of government

26. According to the Basic Law of 1963, the Governing Council takes over the functions previously exercised by the Governor-General with the exception of those assigned to the

^a The text of the above-mentioned Basic Law is to be found in the annex of document A/AC.109/71.

Commissioner-General. Members of the Council are empowered to assume, on appointment by the President, supervisory functions over one or more of the departments of the Administration. According to the provisions of the *Ley Articulada*, these departments are under the direction of technical personnel appointed by the Spanish Government on the recommendation of the Commissioner-General who is advised by the President of the Governing Council. The Council's functions include submitting bills to the General Assembly, drawing up a draft budget pertaining to revenues and expenditures in the provinces (but not pertaining to subsidies from the Spanish Government) and implementing the decisions of the General Assembly within the sphere of its competence. It also puts forward a list of three candidates for President of the Governing Council, one of whom is then nominated by decree of the Spanish Government. It has the same functions with regard to the appointment of the Civil Governor for each province. The Governing Council is also empowered to appoint a delegate to Madrid to ensure on its behalf the better dispatch and co-ordination of affairs of the autonomous administration connected with the work of the various official bodies.

27. An important limitation to the above powers, however, are those assigned to the Commissioner-General who *inter alia*, as the representative of the Spanish Government:

(a) Co-ordinates the autonomous administration with the central administration;

(b) Advises the Governing Council in the performance of its duties;

(c) Is responsible for public law and order, having at his disposal for this purpose the Armed Forces, and may, to the extent that he thinks fit, delegate authority in this field to the Civil Governors who in these matters are responsible to him;

(d) Conducts relations with authorities outside Equatorial Guinea;

(e) May propose to the Spanish Government the suspension of the acts of the Governing Council in the following cases:

(i) When these acts concern matters outside the Council's jurisdiction,

(ii) When they constitute a criminal offence,

(iii) When they are contrary to law and order, and

(iv) When they constitute a manifest breach of the law.

The Commissioner-General may "if execution of such acts should incur a risk of serious harm" suspend such acts on his own initiative, reporting *post facto* to the Spanish Government. The Commissioner-General may also propose the dismissal of the President and Councillors of the Governing Council. He also has powers of intervention in such spheres as information and entertainments, post and telecommunications, and airports. Further, his competence extends to immigration and the police.

28. The functions of the General Assembly include the following:

(a) To propose legislation applicable to territorial affairs supplementing existing legislation. Such proposals, which require the approval of the Commissioner-General, may be returned by the latter to the Assembly for further consideration. Should the Assembly maintain its previous proposals, the final decision would rest with the Spanish Government.

(b) To approve the ordinary budget of Equatorial Guinea submitted by the Governing Council. The Basic Law provides, however, that so long as the Spanish State directly or indirectly subsidizes the economy of Equatorial Guinea, its budget must be approved finally by the Spanish *Cortes*.

(c) To request by a two-thirds majority, modifications in existing legislation which, together with the comments of the Commissioner-General, are referred for approval to the Spanish Government.

29. The General Assembly, which elects the eight members of the Governing Council, may also propose their dismissal as well as that of the President of the Council, by a two-thirds majority. The Commissioner-General, as noted above, may also put forward such a proposal. Final action in this regard rests with the Spanish Government.

30. In each province there is a Civil Governor, who is the representative of the Governing Council, although, as noted above, for the maintenance of law and order they are responsible to the Commissioner-General. According to the *Ley Articulada*, the Civil Governors must be indigenous inhabitants of the provinces to which they are appointed.

Electoral system

31. The autonomous régime of Equatorial Guinea is described in Base (or Statute) V of the Basic Law as being representative in character, and Base XII prescribes that the various councils shall be organized according to the principles of corporate representation. In Article 12 of the *Ley Articulada*, the régime is described as being "organically" representative. This is a reflection of the large part played by the "corporations", variously called corporative bodies or economic, cultural and professional entities together with the co-operatives, as the units representing the people, based upon the corporativist philosophy that man is best represented according to the function he plays in society.

32. Each of the provincial councils (*diputaciones*) which, when meeting in joint session, form the General Assembly of the Territory, is composed as follows: half its members are elected by the corporative bodies (i.e., economic, cultural and professional entities) and the co-operatives, and the other half by the municipal councils (*ayuntamientos*). A list of these bodies is given in paragraph 42 below.

33. As for the municipal councils, half their membership is elected also by corporative bodies and co-operatives and the other half by a vote of heads of families of the electoral unit. The number of councillors in each municipal council depends on the size of the population of the town in question. The mayors-chairmen of the municipal councils are appointed from among the councils concerned by the Civil Governor (see para. 30) from a list of three names proposed by these councils. In contrast, the Mayors-Chairmen of Santa Isabel and Bata, however, are appointed by the Spanish Government from a list of three candidates submitted by the respective councils. The number of municipal councils, as created by the Order of 24 May 1962, was four in Fernando Póe and eleven in Río Muni.

34. Within the jurisdiction of the municipal councils there are village councils (*juntas vecinales*) consisting of a chief and four members elected by heads of families. It should be noted, however, that these councils are concerned solely with local matters and play no part in the formation of the provincial councils, General Assembly and Governing Council. The number of village councils, as created by the Order of 24 May 1962, was forty-two in Fernando Póe and 146 in Río Muni.

35. In view of the important part played by the corporative bodies and co-operatives in the electoral process as introduced in Equatorial Guinea, it is necessary to describe them in more detail. As noted above, they account for half the membership of the provincial councils and half the membership of the municipal councils which themselves provide the other half of the members of the provincial councils. Moreover, as will be seen below, the specific corporative entities and co-operatives given the right to be represented are, in practice, substantially the same bodies at both the municipal council and provincial council levels.

36. At the municipal council level, the procedure for the election of representatives of the corporative bodies (economic, cultural and professional entities) and the co-operatives is outlined in the Instruction of 25 January 1964 issued by the former Governor-General. Each corporative body and co-operative was invited to name its delegate who, with his fellow delegates from the other corporative bodies and co-operatives in the area, proceeded to elect representatives to their respective municipal councils. These representatives were required to be residents over the age of twenty-three belonging to the bodies concerned. Their candidatures were put forward by these bodies at the same time as the latter named their delegates to act as electors in this process. The corporative bodies and co-operatives having the right to name their delegates and

propose candidates for the election of representatives to their respective municipal councils were the following:

(1) *Corporative bodies entitled to name delegates for elections to municipal councils*

(a) *Province of Fernando Póo*
For San Carlos

- (i) Chamber of Agriculture, Commerce and Industry (*Cámara oficial Agrícola de Comercio e Industria*)
- (ii) Commission of Port Administration (*Comisión Administrativa del Puerto*)

For Santa Isabel

- (iii) Provincial Social Security Fund (*Caja Provincial de Seguros Sociales*)
- (iv) Chamber of Agriculture, Commerce and Industry (*Cámara Oficial Agraria de Comercio e Industria*)
- (v) Commission of Port Administration (*Comisión Administrativa del Puerto*)
- (vi) Teacher Training College (*Escuela Normal del Magisterio*)
- (vii) St. Thomas Aquinas School for Assistant Teachers (*Escuela Superior Provincial de Santo Tomás de Aquino*)
- (viii) Bar Association (*Ilustre Colegio de Abogados*)
- (ix) National Institute of Secondary Education (*Instituto Nacional de Enseñanza Media*)

(b) *Province of Río Muni*

For Bata

- (x) Chamber of Agriculture, Forestry, Commerce and Industry (*Cámara Agrícola, Forestal, de Comercio e Industria*)
- (xi) Commission of Port Administration (*Comisión Administrativa del Puerto*)
- (xii) School of Arts and Crafts (*Escuela de Artes y Oficios*)
- (xiii) Teacher Training College (*Escuela Normal del Magisterio*)
- (xiv) Bar Association (*Ilustre Colegio de Abogados*)
- (xv) National Institute of Secondary Education—Bata branch (*Sección Delegada del Instituto Nacional de Enseñanza Media*)

For Río Benito

- (xvi) Timber Syndicate (*Sindicato Maderero*)

(2) *Co-operatives entitled to name delegates for election to municipal councils*

(a) *Province of Fernando Póo*

For Annobón

- (i) Co-operative of San Antonio

For San Carlos

- (ii) — (xvii) Co-operatives of Claret de Batete, Bocatoricho, Balombe, San Luis de Bombe, Boloco, Bantabaré, Balachá-Maule, Baho Pequeño, Baho Grande, Bilelipa, Eburu-Ehoco, Moca, Musola, Mueri, Rilaja-Oloitia, Ruitche, Ureca.

For Santa Isabel

- (xviii) — (xxiv) Co-operatives of Baney, Basacato de la Sagrada Familia, Bariobé, Bacaque Pequeño, Bacaque Grande, San Luis de Cupapa, Santa Teresa de Bososo.
- (xxv) Provincial Union of Agricultural Co-operatives (*Unión Provincial de Cooperativas del Campo*)
- (xxvi) Provincial Co-operative of Light Transport (*Co-operativa Provincial de Transportes Ligeros*)

(b) *Province of Río Muni*

For Bata

- (xxvii) Provincial Union of Agricultural Co-operatives (*Unión Provincial de Cooperativas del Campo*)

For Ebebiyín

- (xxviii) Co-operative of San Juan Bautista de Río Nsie
- (xxix) Co-operative of San Jenaro de Ovang

For Micomeseng

- (xxx) Co-operative of Santiago de Ncomo

For Valladolid de los Bimbiles

- (xxxi) Co-operative of Medina del Bosque

37. These bodies elected a total of fifty-eight representatives to the municipal councils of Fernando Póo and Río Muni with between two and five representatives per municipality depending on its size.^b The heads of families, for their part, also provided a total of fifty-eight representatives distributed on a basis of between two and five representatives per municipality again depending on its size.^c

38. The number of other electors participating in elections to municipalities was 45,286.^d These were the heads of families voting for their half of the membership of the municipal councils. For electoral purposes, heads of families are those over the age of twenty-one years with dependants and those over the age of twenty-one without dependants who do not live in the family group. They must be residents duly registered on the electoral rolls established by the Department of Statistics of the Territory. They include Spanish residents ("other inhabitants") who, according to the *Ley Articulada* have the same rights and duties as the indigenous population so long as they are residents (*avecindados*), and duly registered as such.

39. Candidates standing for election to municipal councils representing heads of family must themselves be heads of family over the age of twenty-three, resident in the areas concerned, and may propose themselves directly to the Municipal Census Office or be proposed to the latter, in accordance with one of the following conditions:

- (a) If they have already served or have been currently serving as municipal councillors for at least one year in the council concerned;
- (b) If they are proposed by four other councillors or ex-councillors of the municipal council concerned, or three provincial councillors, or two deputies of the *Cortes*;
- (c) If they receive the endorsement of one twentieth of the registered electors of the area concerned;
- (d) If they own agricultural, industrial or commercial concerns within the limits of the area concerned.

Proposed candidates are disqualified from standing for election if they are in debt, have been sentenced to prison terms or have been judged incapable of holding public office, or are involved in litigation against the municipal council in question or the services under its jurisdiction. Other disqualifications relate to personnel in the employment of the municipal council in question, as well as entrepreneurs and their personnel who provide goods or services to the municipal council, and persons who hold concessions, or are bidding for contracts or subsidies involving public funds administered by the municipal council in question.

40. At the level of the provincial councils, as mentioned above, half their members are elected by the municipal councils and the other half by the corporative bodies and co-operatives.

^b In some municipalities, however, where there were as yet no corporative bodies or co-operatives in existence to elect candidates in the manner set out in paragraph 36 above, members were nominated directly by the authorities. In the municipal council elections in 1964, 38 out of 58 members representing the corporative bodies and co-operatives were so nominated.

^c For details, see appendices II and III.

^d For details, see appendix IV.

The procedure governing these elections is set out in an instruction issued by the former Acting Governor-General on 7 March 1964.

41. The members representing the municipal councils are elected by a group of delegates appointed for this purpose by the municipal councils. These elect their representatives to the provincial councils as follows: in Fernando Póo out of a total of four, one is elected directly by the Municipal Council of Santa Isabel, and the remaining three jointly by the delegates of the Councils of Annobón, San Carlos and San Fernando. In Río Muni, out of a group of five, one is elected directly by the Municipal Council of Bata and the remaining four jointly by the delegates of the Councils of Acurenam, Ebebiyín, Evinayong, Micomeseng, Mongomo de Guadalupe, N'sork, Puerto Iradier, Río Benito, Sevilla de Niefang and Valladolid de los Bimbiles.

42. The other half of membership of the provincial councils representing the corporative bodies and co-operatives is broken down as follows: for Fernando Póo: two representatives of corporative bodies, and two representatives of co-operatives. For Río Muni: three representatives of corporative bodies and two representatives of co-operatives. As in the case of the municipal councils, the corporative bodies and co-operatives concerned appoint delegates who proceed to the election of candidates (which they also propose) as their representatives to the provincial councils. The corporative bodies and co-operatives given the right to name delegates and propose candidates are the following:

(1) *Corporative bodies entitled to name representatives to the provincial councils*

(a) *Province of Fernando Póo*

- (i) Social Security Fund (*Caja de Seguros Sociales*)
- (ii) Chamber of Agriculture, Commerce and Industry (*Cámara Oficial Agrícola de Comercio e Industria*)
- (iii) Commission of Port Administration, San Carlos (*Comisión Administrativa del Puerto de San Carlos*)
- (iv) Commission of Port Administration, Santa Isabel (*Comisión Administrativa del Puerto de Santa Isabel*)
- (v) Teacher Training College (*Escuela Normal del Magisterio*)
- (vi) St. Thomas Aquinas School for Assistant Teachers (*Escuela Superior Santo Tomás de Aquino*)
- (vii) Bar Association (*Ilustre Colegio de Abogados*)
- (viii) National Institute of Secondary Education (*Instituto Nacional de Enseñanza Media*)

(b) *Province of Río Muni*

- (ix) Chamber of Agriculture, Forestry, Commerce and Industry (*Cámara Oficial Agrícola Forestal de Comercio e Industria*)
- (x) Commission of Port and Harbour Administration, Bata (*Comisión Administrativa del Puerto de Bata y fondeaderos*)
- (xi) School of Arts and Crafts (*Escuela de Artes y Oficios*)
- (xii) Teacher Training College (*Escuela Normal del Magisterio*)
- (xiii) Bar Association (*Ilustre Colegio de Abogados*)
- (xiv) National Institute of Secondary Education (*Instituto Nacional de Enseñanza Media*)
- (xv) Timber Syndicate (*Sindicato Maderero*)

(2) *Co-operatives entitled to name representatives to the provincial councils*

(a) *Province of Fernando Póo*

For Annobón

- (i) Co-operative of San Antonio

For San Carlos

- (ii) — (xvii) Co-operatives of Baho Grande, Baho Pequeño, Balachá-Maule, Balombe, Bantabaré, Claret de Batete, Bilelipa, Bocoricho, Boloco, San Luis de Bombe, Eburu-Ehoco, Musola, Mueri, Rilaja-Oloitia, Ruitche, Ureca.

For Santa Isabel

- (xviii) — (xxiv) Co-operatives of Baney, Basacato de la Sagrada Familia, Bariobé, Bacaque Pequeño, Bacaque Grande, San Luis de Cupapa, Santa Teresa de Bososo.
- (xxv) Provincial Union of Agricultural Co-operatives (*Unión Provincial de Cooperativas del Campo*)
- (xxvi) Provincial Co-operative of Light Transport (*Cooperativa Provincial de Transportes Ligeros*)

(b) *Province of Río Muni*

For Bata

- (xxvii) Provincial Union of Agricultural Co-operatives (*Unión Provincial de Cooperativas del Campo*)

For Ebebiyín

- (xxviii) Co-operative of San Juan Bautista del Río Nsie
- (xxix) Co-operative of San Jenaro de Oveng

For Micomeseng

- (xxx) Co-operative of Santiago de Ncomo

For Valladolid de los Bimbiles

- (xxxi) Co-operative of Medina del Bosque

Justice

43. The highest court in the Territory is the Supreme Court (*Tribunal Superior*) which has the jurisdiction attributed by law to the territorial courts (*audiencias territoriales*) and the Central Labour Court (*Tribunal Central del Trabajo*). Decisions of this court may be appealed to the Supreme Court of Spain. Judicial appointments are made by the President or the Spanish Government on the advice of the Spanish Ministry of Justice in the case of candidates from the metropolitan country. In the case of indigenous candidates, appointments are made by the Commissioner-General on the advice of the President of the Supreme Court of Equatorial Guinea. The Sub-Committee noted the need for the employment of Africans as judicial officers since at present, most of these judicial appointments are held by expatriates.

C. ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

General

44. Equatorial Guinea's economy is based predominantly upon agriculture and forestry: cacao in Fernando Póo and coffee and timber in Río Muni. Other crops that are cultivated both for home consumption and export include yucca, palm oil and kernels, coconuts and bananas. The development of fisheries, although slow at the start is reported to be going ahead rapidly.

45. Of the main crops, cacao is the most important. Exports are chiefly to the metropolitan country where preferential treatment is granted. The average output is approximately 30,000 tons a year. Coffee, which is granted similar preferential treatment, reaches an average annual output of 6,000 tons.

46. In 1964 there were thirty-eight companies engaged in timber production in Río Muni, chiefly around Bata, Río Benito and Cogo where they had been granted concessions amounting to approximately 170,000 hectares; another 13,000 hectares elsewhere in the region were exploited by smaller concerns. There are about 140 different species of timber in the region which is reported to hamper concentration on those most in demand in foreign markets. In 1963 the output was

315,581 tons and investment at the time in machinery and installations was approximately 750 million pesetas.^e

47. The production of bananas at one time reached 14,000 tons per annum, while yucca, which used to be an important export to Spain, now chiefly supplies the home market apart from about 6,000 tons still exported to Spain in 1963.

48. Local industry which is in the early stages of development is chiefly concerned with the processing of foods and agricultural products such as oil and soap, the processing of cacao and by-products, yucca and coffee. Seafood canning factories have also been established. Most of these new local industries are chiefly located in Fernando Póo.

Economic and Social Development Plan

49. The Economic and Social Development Plan which was conceived as a section of the over-all Spanish plan of economic and social development was drafted by a Special Commission created by an Order of the President of the Spanish Government on 5 May 1962 after extensive field surveys and consultations in the Territory itself. The period of the Plan is from 1964 to 1967 and covers both the public and private sectors although initially, at least, emphasis is being placed on the public sector where a detailed programme of expenditure on economic and social projects has been worked out.

50. At the end of the four-year period covered by the Plan, the objective is to achieve an annual cumulative growth rate in gross regional product of 7.56 per cent. The following table illustrates results anticipated under the Plan:

^e Statistics in the following sections on economic and social conditions relate, with few exceptions, to 1963 and 1964. Up-to-date figures were not available to the Sub-Committee.

	1962	1964	1967a
	(million (1962) pesetas)		
Gross regional product	2,301	2,662	3,311
Imported goods and services	1,151	1,356	1,723
TOTAL RESOURCES AVAILABLE	3,452	4,018	5,034
Private consumption	1,450	1,709	2,185
Public consumption	235	291	371
Gross internal investment	369	525	761
Goods and services exported	1,398	1,493	1,717
TOTAL RESOURCES USED	3,452	4,018	5,034

^a 60 pesetas are equivalent to \$US1.00.

51. It may be noted that the gross regional product was reckoned at 1,501.5 million pesetas in 1954 and that the mean annual cumulative growth rate between 1954 and 1962 reckoned in pesetas of constant value amounted to 5.5 per cent.

52. Expenditures under the Development Plan, comprising both public and private expenditure, is estimated at 2,579 million pesetas (\$42,833,333) for the period of the Plan. Of this amount, public expenditure will account for 1,651 million pesetas (\$27,366,667) while private expenditure is estimated at 928 million pesetas (\$18,466,666). Total public and private expenditure planned for each year between 1964 and 1967 is as follows:

	Million (1962) pesetas	
1964	547	
1965	607	
1966	664	
1967	761	
TOTAL	2,579	

53. A summary of the programme of public expenditure for 1964-1967 by sector is as follows:

	1964	1965	1966	1967	Total
	(million (1962) pesetas)				
<i>Social expenditure</i>					
Education and vocational training	33	37	46	56	142
Health	40	52	61	76	229
Housing and urban development	47	50	53	56	206
<i>Expenditure in productive sectors</i>					
Agriculture	1.7	4.3	4.3	60	11.3
Mining	7.3	6.3	—	—	13.6
Airports	117.1	108.9	5.4	4.8	236.2
Public works	80.6	100.7	214.4	267.2	662.9
<i>State aid to local corporations</i>	30	30	30	30	120.0
TOTAL PUBLIC EXPENDITURE	356.7	389.2	414.1	491.0	1,651.0

54. The financing of the Plan's public expenditure programme is reported to be as follows:

	1964	1965	1966	1967	Total
	(million (1962) pesetas)				
Equatorial Guinea budget	159.6	200.3	225.7	265.2	850.8
Spanish State budget	197.1	188.9	188.4	225.8	800.2
TOTAL	356.7	389.2	414.1	491.0	1,651.0

55. Public expenditure undertaken under the Spanish State budget accordingly is 800.2 million pesetas, representing 48.47 per cent of the total expenditure planned for the four-year period 1964-1967.

56. Some of the predominant elements of the Plan are reported to include: (a) the training of indigenous technical and administrative personnel with considerable stress being given to various forms of technical or vocational training; (b) the modernization and diversification of agriculture involving

better credit facilities and transport to ensure better prospects of facing competition on the international market, as well as developing the production of other crops; (c) the development of processing industries, in particular fisheries, where salting and canning factories offer good prospects for export; (d) the expansion of port and harbour facilities especially in Fernando Póo to cater *inter alia* for the above-mentioned fisheries; (e) research into the feasibility of refining oil from neighbouring zones as well as prospecting in this field; (f) the extension of the free port zones of Santa Isabel and San Carlos with the addition of factories and warehouses to serve the West African coast; (g) the development of tourism especially in Santa Isabel but also in Río Muni; and (h) the rapid expansion of transport and communications upon which much of the above-mentioned items to a large extent depend.

Budget

57. According to chapter IX of the *Ley Articulada* promulgated by Decree 1885/1964 of 3 July 1964, public expendi-

ture is divided between the ordinary budget for Equatorial Guinea and the Budget of State Aid and Collaboration (*Presupuesto de Ayuda y Colaboración del Estado a la Guinea Ecuatorial*). The latter consists chiefly of subsidies, grants and direct or indirect aid from the Spanish State. It includes expenditure under the Development Plan and also on such items as administration of justice, armed forces, Commissariat-General and the maritime and air services.

58. Figures available for the 1964 financial year indicate expenditures as follows: 422,189,197 pesetas (\$US7,036,485) under the Equatorial Guinea budget; and 826,413,308 pesetas (\$US13,773,555) under the Spanish State budget. The total figure of public expenditure was 1,248,602,505 pesetas (\$US20,810,040).

59. Estimates of public expenditure for 1965 made at the end of 1964 amounted to 1,053,355 million pesetas.

60. The price supplements on subsidies for cacao and coffee represent the largest single item of expenditure on the part of the Spanish Government. It is admitted that this is a basically unsatisfactory situation and the Plan therefore recognizes the need for modernization and rationalization of the production of coffee and cacao to make them more competitive in world markets.

61. Detailed information concerning the sources of internal revenue was not available. Import taxes on consumer goods appear to be generally low, with the exception of those on wine and liquor.

62. It should be noted that according to chapter IX of the *Ley Articulada* (and Base IV of the Basic Law) the entire budget of Equatorial Guinea must be approved by the Spanish *Cortes* so long as direct and indirect subsidies are received from the Spanish State. Thus the ordinary budget is drawn up by the Governing Council based upon a technical draft submitted by the Department of Finance in the Territory. It must be approved by the General Assembly before 1 October, after which it goes to the Presidency of the Spanish Government where any necessary adjustments are made to accord with the current subsidies on the advice of the Spanish Ministry of Finance. It must finally be submitted to the Spanish *Cortes* during the first two weeks of November. It should also be noted that legislation governing taxation in Equatorial Guinea is also approved by the Spanish *Cortes*.

Co-operatives

63. The development of co-operatives began in 1940 in the Moka Valley of Fernando Póo with the aim of organizing agriculture. Later they flourished primarily in the cacao growing areas of Fernando Póo where in 1964 approximately thirty co-operatives harvested 1,200 tons of cacao. The total production, however, was over 26,000 tons. In Río Muni co-operatives are less developed. Although some figures indicate a total of thirty-four co-operatives¹ with a total of 4,232 members, those listed as having the right of electing representatives, together with the corporative bodies, to municipal councils and provincial councils amount to twenty-six from Fernando Póo and five from Río Muni. Under the Development Plan it is intended to encourage the growth of co-operatives particularly in Río Muni where they are to be based on coffee as well as other products. Since 1964 long-term credit for the development of the co-operative system amounts to about 73 million pesetas.

Housing and public works

64. In 1965 the National Housing Institute constructed about 1,500 dwellings at a cost of 301 million pesetas. A programme of houses for teachers was also undertaken. A sum of 28,012,688 pesetas has been allocated to the Governing Council for the construction of dwellings for the officials of the new autonomous régime.

¹ Figures supplied by the Secretary-General of the Trades Union Centre in Madrid indicated that in Fernando Póo there were one industrial and twenty-nine agricultural co-operatives, while in Río Muni the figures were two and fourteen respectively.

65. Public works undertaken by the Office of Public Works, Housing and Town Planning of the autonomous administration includes the Santa Isabel water supply system, the expressway to the airport and the Punta Santiago air and sea lighthouse. Other water supply and highway projects have been started, including the construction of the highway round the eastern shore of the island which passes through the richest cacao-growing area of Fernando Póo.

D. SOCIAL AND EDUCATIONAL CONDITIONS

Public health

66. The main hospitals are those at Santa Isabel and Bata and there are also others at San Carlos, Puerto Iradier, Río Benito and new ones at Concepción and Evinayong. The first two have a capacity of 350 and 345 beds respectively. There is reported to be a total of about 1,500 beds. At Micomeseng in Río Muni, there is a leper hospital with 200 beds. It was observed by the Sub-Committee that patients are divided in hospitals by tribe and by race.

Labour

67. It has been noted that agriculture, particularly the production of cacao and coffee, is the mainstay of Equatorial Guinea's economy. Indigenous farmers have small holdings of about ten acres each which produce cacao and coffee for the market. These rely on the family group and do not hire labour. On the other hand, the European-style farms devoted to these crops rely principally on Nigerian labourers, usually on three-year contracts, whose number has been constantly increasing. Although the indigenous farmers have been organized to some extent in co-operatives, it will be recalled that these accounted for only 1,200 tons of cacao produced out of a total of 26,000 tons in 1964.

68. As at the end of 1963 the wage of the average plantation worker was reported to be 445 pesetas a month, plus an additional 225 pesetas a month paid in a lump sum at the end of the contract. Board, lodging and medical care are also provided.

69. In 1964, of the total labour force of 37,400 employed by private enterprise, 28,000 were Nigerians, 5,600 were indigenous Guineans, 800 came from other parts of Africa and 3,000 were Europeans. Thus, 85 per cent of the manpower employed in private enterprise were non-indigenous people.

70. A total of 3,500 were employed in public concerns and administration in 1964 of whom 13 per cent were European and 87 per cent were indigenous employees.

71. The labour legislation in force is contained principally in the Ordinance of 24 May 1962, which regulates contracts and conditions of employment. The Department of Labour was empowered to raise minimum wages within the limits of the law and a Central Labour Court was empowered to hear and settle disputes. This Court retained its powers under the new régime, its personnel, as that of other courts, being appointed in the case of those from the metropolitan country by the Presidency of the Spanish Government on the advice of the Spanish Ministry of Justice, and in the case of indigenous candidates by the Commissioner-General on the advice of the President of the Supreme Court.

Schools

72. Equatorial Guinea's educational system consists basically of three stages: (a) the elementary school period of five years, compulsory to all children living within five kilometres of a school up to the age 12, although these are allowed to stay on until the age of 14; this course leads to the elementary school certificate which enables them to continue to the primary schools; (b) the primary schools most of which are located in the larger municipalities and offer a two-year course for children from 13 to 14 years, although here again children are allowed to stay on until the ages of 15 and 16; and (c) secondary education leading to studies at the university level outside the Territory or technical or vocational training upon which the régime sets great store.

73. As at the end of 1965 there were 135 elementary schools and thirty primary schools administered by the educational authorities of the Territory, with a total enrolment of 21,091. At the end of 1963 there was a total of fifteen primary schools. At the end of 1965, 1,701 elementary education certificates and 1,105 primary education certificates were awarded. The above figures do not include non-official or private schools of these categories.

74. Elementary and primary school teachers are trained at the St. Thomas Aquinas Provincial School for Assistant Teachers and at the Teacher Training Colleges of Santa Isabel and Bata established in 1963.

75. In the field of vocational or technical education there is the "La Salle" Professional Centre, founded in Bata in 1959, maintained by the Provincial Council of Río Muni which awards certificates in agronomy and livestock as well as administration. There is also a School of Agricultural Training dependent on the Agricultural Department, a School of Sanitary Training for male and female nurses and the School of Arts and Crafts of the Catholic Mission in Santa Isabel, subsidized by the Government. The latter offers training in printing, tailoring, carpentry, building and mechanics. Schools of industrial apprenticeship have also been created in Santa Isabel and Bata.

76. As for higher education, scholarships up to a value of 3.5 million pesetas every year have been awarded for study chiefly in Spain. In 1962, 113 students under scholarships and 100 without scholarships were attending courses at universities or technical colleges in Spain. The Sub-Committee was informed by the Spanish authorities that there were 120 students from Equatorial Guinea in 1966 in Spain. According to information submitted by petitioners, however, the number did not exceed ninety-two, some of whom were on scholarships.

77. It should be noted that trained indigenous personnel in important posts of various services as at the end of 1965 included the following: the Chiefs of the Health and Education Departments; twenty-nine primary school teachers; personnel of the Sub-Department of Primary Education Inspection; eight labour inspectors; twelve chiefs of the Special Police Corps; and a housing and town planning supervisor.

II. DISCUSSIONS WITH OFFICIALS OF THE SPANISH GOVERNMENT

A. Meeting with Director-General of African Settlements and Provinces and other Spanish Government officials

78. The Sub-Committee called on General Díaz de Villegas, Director-General of African Settlements and Provinces (*Plazas y Provincias Africanas*) in the Office of the Presidency on 17 August 1966.

79. After an exchange of courtesies, the Director-General reviewed the record of the Spanish Government in relation to Equatorial Guinea. He stated *inter alia* that the Territory had no marketing problem as regards its cacao and coffee production, as almost all the produce was imported by Spain at prices considerably in excess of current world levels. Spain was buying the Territory's cacao at 42 pesetas per kilogramme as compared with the current world price of 17 pesetas, and coffee at 67 pesetas per kilogramme as compared with the average world price of 40 pesetas.

80. The cacao and coffee producers of Equatorial Guinea were free to sell on the international market, but in fact they exported their produce only to Spain, except when there were surpluses exceeding the demands of the Spanish market. It was desirable for these producers to develop trade with other markets but they had shown no interest. However, there was no long-term agreement covering exports of these commodities to Spain. No major increase in agricultural production was to be expected inasmuch as costs were higher in the Territory than elsewhere. There were new areas of economic activity being opened up, for which provision had been made in the Development Plan. This Plan had been prepared by the Spanish Government. In the event of Equatorial Guinea acceding to independence in the near future, he could not predict the extent to which the Spanish Government would continue to give economic assistance to the Territory.

81. In the field of education there were a number of elementary and vocational schools as well as two teacher-training institutions. Facilities for higher education were not available in the Territory but dozens of students were in universities in Barcelona, Pamplona and Madrid on scholarships. The total number of students from Equatorial Guinea in Spanish institutions was of the order of 120.

82. As regards the Government of the Territory, the Director-General stated that there was an autonomous legislative body. Further, the people of the Territory were exempt from military service and the police force was small and indigenous in its composition.

83. On the question of future constitutional development the Director-General stated in reply to questions that he would not indulge in prophecy; it was a matter for the people themselves. Contact between the Governing Council of the Territory and the Spanish Government was maintained through a representative of the Council in Madrid rather than through the Commissioner-General. The people of the Territory were at liberty to submit petitions directly to the Spanish Government or to the local authorities. If the majority of the people of the Territory asked for independence, the Spanish Government would accede to their wishes. Proposals affecting the constitutional status of the Territory required a two-thirds majority in the General Assembly, or a simple majority of the people voting in a referendum. The term of the present governmental bodies would expire in 1968 at which time their membership would have to be renewed. If the people expressed a preference for direct elections, the question would require to be submitted to a referendum.

B. Meeting with the Secretary-General of the Trade Unions Centre and other officials

84. On 17 August 1966, the Sub-Committee held a meeting with Mr. Arturo Espinosa Poveda, Secretary-General of the Trade Unions Centre, Mr. Fuentes Irurozqui, National Under-Secretary for Economic Co-ordination and other officials.

85. The Secretary-General informed the Sub-Committee that the Spanish trade union organization had undertaken the training of workers from Equatorial Guinea with the aim of enabling them to operate such labour institutions as might be set up in the future. Trade union activity in the Territory centred around the promotion of co-operatives. In Fernando Póo, there were one industrial and 29 agricultural co-operatives; in Río Muni, the numbers were 2 and 14 respectively. These co-operatives were concerned with the provision of assistance to small producers in the improvement of output, the sale of produce and the extension of credit. In Fernando Póo, 25 co-operatives with a total membership of 964 had at their disposal credit facilities amounting to 48 million pesetas, and in Río Muni 11 co-operatives with 2,781 members had 44 million pesetas. These credit facilities consisted of loans to these co-operatives extended by the Spanish trade union organization.

86. With the assistance of that organization, the co-operatives in the Territory were planning to extend their activities into other fields, including the introduction of training courses and seminars in trade union work, the constitution of joint employer and employee associations, the carrying out of studies of workers' problems and the censuses of workers and enterprises.

87. One of the problems of the Territory was the lack of skilled labour. Up to 1963 there was some discontent arising from the different treatment of local workers and those from Spain, owing to the fact that the local workers did not have the training necessary to use complicated machinery. The Spanish trade union organization had therefore concerned itself with the training of skilled workers, of which some seventy had already taken the necessary courses. The organization was also interested in assisting in such fields as collective bargaining, social security and the establishment of adequate levels of employment.

88. Its activities in relation to Equatorial Guinea had begun only in recent years but it was to be noted that although there had been several difficulties involving workers in 1962, there

was no serious problem of labour unrest in the Territory. At the present time there were about 8,000 Nigerian workers in Río Muni, most of whom did not enjoy the benefit of trade union status, and over twice that figure in Fernando Póo. It should also be noted that the activities of the organization had to be related to the existing pattern of economic activity, and that the training of skilled workers was costing it 40,000 pesetas per worker.

89. In reply to questions, the Sub-Committee was informed that no indigenous engineers had been trained by the organization. There were several students taking professional and other courses in such institutions as the University of Barcelona but the figures were not immediately available. If technical assistance were to be extended to the Territory by the United Nations, the most appropriate field would be the training of skilled workers. Since most of the manpower needs of the Territory were filled by imported labour, especially from Nigeria, the problem would arise whether such training should be given to the imported workers on the spot, or to selected indigenous people at institutions abroad.

90. As regards land tenure, there was no difference in the terms extended to the Spanish and to the indigenous people. Farmers belonging to co-operatives were eligible for loans on the same terms as Spanish owners; the interest rate was of the order of 3½ per cent. Working conditions and wages were determined by standards set by the Government. Indeed these standards were such that there had been demands for the restriction of imported manpower, since the Nigerian workers in particular often expressed a wish to remain indefinitely in the Territory. The participation of the workers themselves in the determination of working conditions was limited, but efforts were being made to educate the workers so as to enable them to participate more effectively in this connexion, especially as regards collective bargaining.

C. Meetings with the Assistant Commissioner for the Economic and Social Development Plan and other Spanish officials

91. On 17 August 1966, the Sub-Committee held a meeting with Mr. Tomas Allende, Assistant Commissioner for the Economic and Social Development Plan, Mr. Juan Alvarez Corugedo, Secretary of the Commission for the Economic Development of Fernando Póo and Río Muni, and other officials.

92. The Sub-Committee was informed that the over-all Economic and Social Development Plan for 1964-1967 included a section relating to Equatorial Guinea. This part of the Plan was established by a commission which included participants from the Territory and had received the approval of the General Assembly of Equatorial Guinea. It provided for development both through public investment and expenditure, for which Spain and the Territory were jointly responsible, and by private enterprise. The governmental organs of the Territory were at liberty to develop their own plan for the future but for the time being economic policies were based on the present Plan. The purpose of the Plan was to enable the Territory to sustain international competition and determine its own economic future by the end of the period covered by the Plan.

93. The Plan envisaged an annual increase in the *per capita* income of 7.56 per cent in the Territory, as compared with 6 per cent for Spain. The achievement of this objective would imply an increase in the annual *per capita* income in Equatorial Guinea from \$132 in 1963 to \$170 by 1967. For this purpose, public investment of the order of 1,651 million pesetas over the period covered by the Plan would be required, in addition to private investment of 982 million pesetas. Of the required public investment, it was expected that 850 million pesetas, covering education, health and roads, would be derived from the Territory itself, and the remainder, including expenditure on the Santa Isabel airport and on town planning and construction, from the Spanish Government.

94. Actual performance as regards public investment by the Territory had fallen short of the target by 20 per cent, owing to increased public consumption. However, the rate of increase

envisaged in the *per capita* income had been maintained. On the other hand, the investment arrangements envisaged by the Spanish Government in respect of the Santa Isabel airport had been slightly disrupted owing to a delay in the completion of construction plans.

95. In the private sector, it was to be noted that the Territory exported to Spain all its production of cacao and coffee, which together with timber were the most important products, at prices higher than those prevalent on the international market. The subsidy thus extended by Spain on coffee and cacao amounted to some 700 million pesetas annually. However, the Spanish market was incapable of absorbing quantities in excess of the present production of the Territory. For this reason producers of these commodities stood to lose if they sold any surpluses on the international market.

96. The Plan accordingly envisaged an increase in the cultivation of bananas, yuccas and pineapples instead of an expansion of cacao and coffee production. The Plan also recommended the development of cattle-raising, fishing, and industries based on agricultural products. The prospects for the development of heavy industry were limited, owing to the lack of mineral production, but geological studies were to be carried out. In order to encourage activity in the above-mentioned areas, the Plan contained provisions for tax exemption, and for the extension of credit at low interest rates.

97. As a result of these incentives, a banana plantation had been established, a fish processing factory was under construction, and a cacao processing plant was to be built in Fernando Póo. In Río Muni, a palm oil factory was expected to begin operations shortly, and a fish processing factory was also under construction.

98. In reply to questions, the officials stated that as Equatorial Guinea was not self-sufficient as regards trained manpower, provision for vocational training, which was a primary need of the Territory, had been included in the Plan. There were opportunities for training in agricultural and industrial schools from which about 100 people graduated every year. With regard to formal education, the officials stated that the school population, which was 34,000 in 1947, had increased to 40,000 in 1966. The Plan included specific targets in this sector, as well as in the field of health.

99. On the question of incentives to producers, the officials explained that the extension of tax concessions and easy credit were limited to those activities which were most useful to the Territory, to the exclusion of cacao and coffee for instance, which were subject to over-production and unfavourable world market conditions. The officials denied that this policy might encourage the formation of monopolistic enterprises, inasmuch as there were regulations aimed against the establishment of monopolies. Foreign companies were free to re-invest their profits in the Territory or to export them; however, it was the normal practice for these companies to re-invest their profits locally, and this practice was expected to continue.

100. The officials further stated that in order to ensure the future economic viability of the Territory, the Spanish Government was refraining from the encouragement of such economic activity as required to be subsidized. Nevertheless the Spanish Government would continue extending the subsidies it had been paying even after the Territory acceded to independence.

101. Explaining the figures they had given earlier, the officials stated that the *per capita* income was calculated on the basis of the whole population of the Territory. The income of the Spanish population raised no problems in this respect as the number of Spanish residents was small: There were only 4,000 of them in Fernando Póo and 2,500 in Río Muni. A large number of job opportunities for the indigenous people had come into being as a result of the development projects under way.

D. Meeting with the Under-Secretary of the Ministry of Labour and other officials

102. On 18 August 1966, the Sub-Committee held a meeting with Mr. Antonio Ibañez Freire, Under-Secretary of the

Ministry of Labour and other officials. In their introductory remarks, they mentioned that the Spanish Government had taken important economic and social measures in Equatorial Guinea, resulting in great progress in such fields as health and education. Indeed, in the field of health, the ratio of doctors to the population, namely, one doctor to every 3,500 people in Fernando Póo and one to every 9,600 in Río Muni, was far in excess of the ratio in many other independent African countries.

103. As regards the activities of the Ministry of Labour relating to Equatorial Guinea, the officials stated that it was concerned with questions of labour and social security, and, in particular with the enforcement of labour regulations and the training of indigenous labour inspectors to supervise the application of these regulations. The second principal function of the Ministry was in the field of assistance to co-operatives in the Territory. The Spanish trade unions were in charge of the management of such assistance, while the Ministry was concerned with the provision of funds. Over the past two years, the Ministry had expended 90 million pesetas in this respect. The third main function of the Ministry was in the field of professional training for adult workers through on-the-job instruction and full time courses. In this connexion, they drew attention to the First School of Intensified Professional Training where, among others, workers from the Territory between the ages of 18 and 41 years were following six-month courses to qualify as metal or construction workers, mechanics and electricians. There were ten of these schools run by the trade unions in Spain. It was expected that the Ministry would extend its activities in this field to the Territory.

E. Meetings with the Commissioner-General and other officials

104. On 20 August 1966, the Sub-Committee called on the Commissioner-General of the Territory, Mr. Suances Díaz del Río, in Santa Isabel. The Commissioner-General assured the Sub-Committee that it was at liberty to interview whomever it wished and that he would extend his full co-operation to it. He would place himself at the disposal of the Sub-Committee in case the latter wished to hold discussions with him.

105. On 22 August 1966, the Sub-Committee held a further meeting in Bata with the Commissioner-General, Mr. Jaime de Piniés, the Deputy Permanent Representative of Spain to the United Nations, Mr. Gabriel Mañueco, the Director-General of African and Arab World Affairs in the Spanish Foreign Ministry, and other officials were also present.

106. At this meeting, the Commissioner-General informed the Sub-Committee that it was the intention of the Spanish Government to grant independence to Equatorial Guinea inasmuch as it accepted sovereign independence as the final stage in the contemporary evolution of dependent Territories. It was in this spirit that the Spanish Government had granted autonomy to the Territory as a preparatory step towards independence in conditions of stability and viability.

107. Spain had no economic interests in the Territory, as was demonstrated by the fact that it extended subsidies to and absorbed most of the export production of Equatorial Guinea. The only interest of Spain in the Territory at the present time was spiritual; historical circumstances had forged social, cultural and other links between the two countries and peoples. The Spanish Government was also concerned to protect the Territory against possible expansionist or neo-colonialist designs from outside as well as from the danger of exploitation by unscrupulous foreign economic interests. Bearing these considerations in mind, the Spanish Government was ready to grant independence to the Territory when the people so requested. The freedom with which the people had spoken to the Sub-Committee was itself testimony to the good faith of the Spanish Government in this regard.

108. In reply to questions the Commissioner-General stated that, having assumed his office only a few days ago, he had no recollection of a motion alleged to have been adopted by the General Assembly in which a formal request was made for independence. His information was that there had been some discussion on the subject but that no agreement had been

reached. He undertook to investigate and transmit the required information. Referring to another recently adopted motion in which the General Assembly had expressed its lack of confidence in the Governing Council, the Commissioner-General stated that he had not forwarded it to the Spanish Government. Since, a short time previously, the same General Assembly had adopted another motion congratulating the Governing Council on its performance, he had thought it fit to request the Assembly to reconsider its motion of no confidence.

109. Outlining the recent constitutional development of the Territory, the Commissioner-General recalled that the referendum of December 1963 had put to the people the question whether or not they were in favour of autonomy. The referendum was open to all indigenous people of twenty-one years of age and over, as well as to Spanish people who had lived in the Territory for at least two years. Other non-indigenous people were not eligible to participate. Following the affirmative result of the referendum, elections had been held for the municipal councils and the provincial councils, and subsequently the Governing Council had been established.

110. In explanation of the electoral system, the officials accompanying the Commissioner-General stated that each municipal council was composed of an equal number of members elected by the heads of family resident in the area concerned, and members elected by local co-operatives and corporative bodies; corporative bodies consisted of various economic, cultural and professional groups including local chambers of commerce, and associations of doctors, pharmacists, lawyers, engineers and teachers. In areas where no corporative bodies were in existence, the vacancies reserved for these bodies in the municipal council were usually filled by nominees of the Civil Governor. In the recollection of the officials, some twenty-two vacancies in the municipal councils had been filled on this basis. The nominees were normally persons who had failed by a narrow margin to win one of the elective seats in the council concerned.

111. The officials recalled that the Provincial Council of Río Muni consisted of ten members and that of Fernando Póo of eight members. These provincial councils meeting in joint session constituted the General Assembly. Each of them consisted of an equal number of members elected by representatives of the municipal councils, and members elected by the corporative bodies and co-operatives. There were two Spanish members in the Río Muni Provincial Council and one in that of Fernando Póo.

112. As regards political parties, the Commissioner-General stated that before the establishment of the autonomous régime, there had been some restriction on political activity in the Territory. However, since that time, political parties had been free to carry out their activities, although there was no provision for their official recognition. The authorization of the Civil Governor, who was responsible to the Commissioner-General in this respect, was required for the holding of public political meetings; such authorization was as a rule granted. Apart from the Movimiento de Unificación Nacional de la Guinea Ecuatorial (MUNGE) and the Movimiento Nacional de Liberación de la Guinea Ecuatorial (MONALIGE), which were based in the Territory, there was the Idea Popular de la Guinea Ecuatorial (IPGE) which was handicapped by lack of organization and financial support and had recently decided to merge with MUNGE. Political activity had recently increased during the period preceding the Sub-Committee's visit.

113. As regards the suggestion advanced in some quarters for the separation of Fernando Póo and Río Muni, the Commissioner-General stated that the Spanish Government was giving the matter careful study. It was a recent development. On the question of independence, the Commissioner-General stated that the Territory would find it difficult to maintain itself economically, without support from Spain. Political independence was not impossible if such support were available. It would be difficult to predict, however, when the Territory would be ready for independence unless the people reached agreement among themselves on the question. With regard to the electoral system, his feeling was that there was a majority

in favour of the future application of universal adult suffrage, but that there was no enthusiasm for its extension to women.

114. On the Sub-Committee's return to New York, it received a communication from the Permanent Representative of Spain to the United Nations in which he stated on behalf of the Commissioner-General and in response to the request previously made by the Sub-Committee to the latter that an examination of the records had revealed no information regarding the submission to the Spanish Government of a formal petition for independence by the autonomous administration. Although on one occasion a concrete proposal of this nature was discussed in the Governing Council, it obtained only one favourable vote and was therefore rejected.

F. Meeting with the Civil Governor of Río Muni

115. On 23 August 1966, the Sub-Committee held a meeting with the Civil Governor of Río Muni, Mr. Simon Ngomo Ndumu Asumu. At this meeting the Civil Governor informed the Sub-Committee that in his opinion independence should be granted to Equatorial Guinea but that in terms of the organizational requirements the Territory was not yet prepared for it. The reasons for this situation were the small size of the population and the division of the nationalist movement into three groups, namely MUNGE, MONALIGE and IPGE.

116. He himself had been associated with all these groups, beginning with MONALIGE, the original leaders of which were people from Río Muni, resident in Fernando Póo. Later he had been affiliated to IPGE which was originally based in Río Muni. However IPGE had adopted a platform which included a plan to merge the Territory with Cameroon; this plan had been unacceptable to him and to a large number of IPGE's supporters. The leaders of IPGE had subsequently gone into exile owing partly to restrictions imposed on their activity by the Government. In an effort to establish a single united political movement, MUNGE had been formed on 30 November 1963, following a conference in which representatives of all sections of the population including the various mayors participated. He was in sympathy with the objectives of this party, particularly those relating to the question of independence. The continued existence of the other political parties stemmed partly from their discontent with the distribution of official posts after the elections.

117. As to relative strength of the different parties, the Civil Governor said that from documentary evidence and taking account of the alliance between MUNGE and IPGE, MUNGE appeared to have the largest membership; his personal impression however, was that MONALIGE had a larger following among the people, especially in Río Muni. In Fernando Póo their relative strength was about the same. The alliance between IPGE and MUNGE had become operative in Río Muni but not in Fernando Póo where talks were still in progress. Neither MUNGE nor MONALIGE was completely satisfied with the performance of the present Governing Council, and wished to correct the defects in the present system.

118. With regard to the existing electoral system, the Civil Governor did not think it inadequate to the needs of the Territory after independence, considering that the structure of the government after independence would be different from that of the autonomous administration. In his official capacity he could not criticize the General Assembly, which consisted of the legitimate representatives of the people. In his personal capacity, he thought that a change could be made in the system in order to give the President of the Governing Council a greater say in the choice of members of the Council, with whom he had to work as a team.

119. Explaining his views on the question of independence, the Civil Governor stated that in referring to the organizational requirements for independence, he had in mind the importance of co-ordinating and harmonizing the ideas, objectives and efforts of the people in regard to independence. At the present time, there was an absence of dialogue between the political parties on the steps to be taken for the achievement of independence. Each of them desired independence but regarded itself as comprising the true and genuine leaders of the people.

120. On the method of appointment of Civil Governors, he stated that they were selected by the Spanish Government from a list of three candidates submitted to the Commissioner-General by the Governing Council. The Spanish Government's choice was usually dictated by the number of votes cast for each candidate in the Governing Council.

III. CONSULTATIONS WITH THE PEOPLE OF THE TERRITORY

A. Meeting with the President of the Assembly

121. On its arrival on 19 August 1966, the Sub-Committee called on the President of the General Assembly, Mr. Enrique Gori Molubela. Some other members of the Assembly were present.

122. In a statement of welcome, Mr. Gori Molubela informed the Sub-Committee that it was the desire of all the people of Equatorial Guinea that the Territory should accede to independence. The problem was how and when. For his part, he hoped there would be no undue delay. He then gave a brief historical account of the Territory, calling attention in particular to the fact that the original population of Fernando Póo consisted of the Bubis, who numbered 40,000 in 1900 but were now only 18,000 in number. The influx of settlers from Nigeria and Sierra Leone was a recent development; the Nigerians numbered some 32,000. He added that the original population of Río Muni comprised the Fangs who were also to be found in Cameroon and Gabon.

123. Referring to the growth of political activity in the Territory, Mr. Gori Molubela mentioned that he had played a part in the initiatives leading to the dialogue with the Spanish Government, which resulted in the granting of autonomous status to Equatorial Guinea. Thus it was that he had participated in the foundation of the Movimiento Nacional de Liberación de la Guinea Ecuatorial (MONALIGE) in 1961.

124. He also noted that the Idea Popular de la Guinea Ecuatorial (IPGE) was founded in 1963 by a Cameroonian. Based in Río Muni, IPGE in its manifesto had then called for autonomy and independence with a view to federation with Cameroon. He was apprehensive about the future of Fernando Póo if federation with Cameroon came about. It was therefore understandable that proposals for the separation of Fernando Póo from Río Muni were gaining ground. In this connexion, he recalled that on 29 April 1965, the General Assembly had unanimously adopted a motion calling for a revision of the relationship between the two parts of the Territory before the expiry of the term of the present administration. IPGE was at the present time rent by divisions but had not renounced its demands for federation with Cameroon. The present situation was that it was the desire of the Bubis that Fernando Póo should be separated from Río Muni.

125. Further, Mr. Gori Molubela drew attention to a document prepared by him in which, according to him, he had attempted to present for the Sub-Committee's information an objective picture of the political situation, consistent with his position as member of the Santa Isabel Municipal Council, President of the Fernando Póo Provincial Council and of the General Assembly. In this document, he asserted that the fundamental characteristics of the Territory were its small size, the economic, human and cultural diversity and individuality of each of the two provinces, their lack of geographical contiguity and the difference in their ethnic composition.

126. The document also claimed that the unitary system of government had created tensions between Fernando Póo and Río Muni, which had been increased by the dominant position of people from the latter in the Government. In the economic sector, the situation had led to diffidence on the part of private enterprise which regarded a transitional political system as risky for capital investment.

127. According to the document, the right of the people to self-determination was not exhausted by their acceptance of the autonomous system in December 1963. Evidence of this was to be found in the fact that the General Assembly and the

Governing Council were considering two matters that presupposed the existence of this right. The first was the revision of the law governing the autonomous system, and the second was the separation of Fernando Póo and Río Muni.

128. Any consideration of the timing of independence should take into account a number of factors, including the small size and population of Equatorial Guinea, the fact that the Territory's economic situation was largely due to the preferential treatment that its products enjoyed on the Spanish market, and the possibility of annexation by neighbouring States with lower incomes.

129. Describing current political trends, the document submitted by Mr. Gori Molubela claimed that with individual exceptions, the people of Río Muni accepted the unitary system of government for the Territory as a whole, while the opposite position was held in varying degrees of intensity by the people of Fernando Póo. The people of Fernando Póo regarded unification as a fiction contrary to the true geographical human and cultural nature of the two parts of the Territory, which had no common history except for their experience of Spanish colonial rule. Further, the present system of government was in effect a restriction of the right to self-determination of the indigenous people of Fernando Póo. This system meant supremacy for Río Muni inasmuch as that province commanded a majority in the Assembly and the Governing Council. In addition, Río Muni absorbed two thirds of the Territory's budgetary expenditure while contributing only one third of the revenue.

130. As regards the movement for independence, the document stated that while part of the population of the Territory was in favour of independence, there was no consensus on the subject. There was popular support, particularly in Fernando Póo, for association with Spain after independence under agreements covering defence and economic and technical aid. In the north of Río Muni there was strong sentiment in favour of association with Cameroon, and in the southern part the people tended to favour association with Gabon. However, the degree of association desired ranged from the mere maintenance of relations to federation.

131. In addition, the document submitted by Mr. Gori Molubela noted that political parties made their appearance in the Territory during the period preceding the autonomous system, their aim being almost exclusively to end colonial rule. They were the Idea Popular de la Guinea Ecuatorial (IPGE) which inclined towards federation with Cameroon, the Movimiento Nacional de Liberación de la Guinea Ecuatorial (MONALIGE) and the Movimiento de Unificación de la Guinea Ecuatorial (MUNGE). According to the document the activities of these parties had been on the decline since the introduction of the present system, which had absorbed many of their activities. In another document listing members of the General Assembly, Mr. Gori Molubela informed the Sub-Committee that of the eighteen members of that body, seven had originally been elected to municipal councils by the heads of families and the remainder represented the corporative bodies and co-operatives.

132. In conclusion Mr. Gori Molubela called attention to a speech which he made on 3 January 1966 concerning the principle of self-determination for the people of Fernando Póo. In that speech he expressed the determination of the people not to permit interference by any country in their political status. The people knew that some countries were simply awaiting the withdrawal of the Spanish presence, so as to take over Fernando Póo. The wish of the people was that any change in their status, in exercise of their legitimate right of self-determination, should be carried out solely by means of direct dialogue between the Spanish Government and their true representatives. In this connexion he recalled the pledge recently given by the Head of State that Spain would defend the people's desire freely to decide for themselves, and to defend them against any outsiders who attempted to jeopardize their future.

B. Meetings with members of the Governing Council

133. On 19 August 1966, the Sub-Committee called on Mr. Bonifacio Ondó Edú, the President of the Governing Council and the following members of the Council: Mr. Francisco Macias Nguema, Vice-President, Mr. Aurelio Nicolas Itoha, Mr. Gustavo Watson Bueko, Mr. Luis Maho Sicacha, Mr. Román Borico Toichoa, Mr. Antonio Candido Nang, and Mr. Rafael Nsue Nchama. Following an exchange of courtesies there was a discussion which led to some revision of the programme proposed by the Governing Council for the Sub-Committee's visit.

134. On 20 August 1966, the Sub-Committee had a substantive meeting with the members of the Governing Council. Following is a summary of statements made by them, including their replies to questions put by members of the Sub-Committee.

135. Opening the discussion, Mr. Ondó Edú, member of MUNGE in 1964, observed that the people of Equatorial Guinea like the people of other dependent Territories looked forward to the attainment of independence. On the question of independence, he remarked that the Territory had been granted autonomous status without adequate preparation. In his view, a date should be set for the beginning of negotiations aimed at establishing the necessary preparatory arrangements for independence. He would elaborate on these views after his colleagues had expressed their opinions. He noted that elections would be held at the end of 1967 for the establishment of a new Governing Council after 15 July 1968, when the mandate of the present Council was due to expire.

136. Mr. Luis Maho Sicacha (Councillor for Information and Tourism), member of MONALIGE in 1964, stated that the performance of the present régime required improvement. The achievement of such improvement would itself constitute preparation for independence. The Territory was facing a number of pressing internal problems which called for solutions before the attainment of independence.

137. Mr. Aurelio Nicolas Itoha (Councillor for Labour), member of MUNGE in 1964, informed the Sub-Committee that during the conversations which led to the granting of autonomy, the participants from Equatorial Guinea had refrained from asking that the duration of the autonomous status be defined. They had agreed that a date for independence should be discussed only when the people of the Territory were ready for it. When that time came, the Government of the Territory would ask for independence, bearing in mind the assurances given by the Spanish Government that it would place no obstacles in the way of such a request. Consequently there was no need to fix a date at the present time.

138. Mr. Román Borico Toichoa (Councillor for Industry and Mines), member of MUNGE in 1964, associated himself with the views expressed by Mr. Nicolas Itoha. The fixing of a date for independence should be considered only when the Territory was ready for it. At the present time he did not consider that Equatorial Guinea had had adequate preparation.

139. Mr. Francisco Macias Nguema (Councillor for Public Works, Housing and Town Planning), member of MONALIGE in 1964, stated that the people of the Territory wanted to assume control over their own destiny. Lack of preparation could not and should not be a valid reason for the postponement of independence. In his opinion, a date for independence should be set immediately. This could be done through conversations with the Spanish Government. It was not the intention of the people that relations with Spain be severed at independence, rather, they looked forward to the maintenance of relations similar to those existing between Commonwealth countries and the United Kingdom. Independence, which should be achieved by peaceful means, would enable Equatorial Guinea to take its rightful place in the international community and in the Spanish-speaking world. While it could be said that the Territory was not sufficiently viable in economic terms, it should be recalled that no country had begun its independent existence in satisfactory economic conditions.

140. In conclusion Mr. Macias Nguema asked that a target date for independence should be set without delay, so that the experience of colonization might be brought to an end.

peacefully and without violence. His own suggestion was that 15 July 1967 would be a suitable date, inasmuch as that date would allow the time necessary for negotiations and for the drafting of a constitution consonant with the aspirations of the people, which in his opinion should be the subject of a plebiscite. Referring to demands that were being made by some sections of the population for the separation of Fernando Póo and Río Muni, he stated that the question was one for the people as a whole to decide. However, he recalled that the example of other countries had shown that the problem was capable of resolution; problems of this kind were liable to arise when the different regions of a country were at different stages of economic development. Perhaps some sort of federal relationship might be the solution.

141. Mr. Rafael Nsue Nchama (Councillor for Agriculture), member of MUNGE in 1964, stated that in his view an early date should be fixed for the independence of the Territory. This view was shared by the people he represented. He thought that the date should be 15 July 1968 when the term of the present Governing Council was due to expire.

142. Mr. Gustavo Watson Bueko (Councillor for Health and Welfare), member of MUNGE in 1964, observed that the Basic Law itself envisaged the Territory as composed of two different parts. The people of Fernando Póo had attained a higher level of economic, social and educational development than those of Río Muni. It was in recognition of these differences that on 12 August 1966, a motion calling for the economic and administrative separation of Fernando Póo and Río Muni had been tabled in the Governing Council by himself and Messrs. Maho Sicacha, Borico Toichoa, and Nicolas Itoha. On 13 August 1966, the Governing Council had agreed, after a vote, to refer the motion to the General Assembly for consideration. The Assembly had not yet considered the motion. As regards independence, he thought it would be inappropriate and premature to set a date at the present time. The question of a date should be a subject for negotiation, which should begin without delay. He urged the Sub-Committee to ascertain the real wishes of the majority of the people, not those of an imaginary majority who lived in the urban areas and whose views were unrepresentative.

143. Mr. Antonio Candido Nang (Councillor for Education) member of MONALIGE in 1964, recalled that the Spanish Government had undertaken to grant independence if and when the people should ask for it. It was on this understanding that the elections leading to the establishment of the autonomous Government had taken place. He observed that the demonstrations that had taken place the previous day were all in favour of early independence. It was the duty of members of the Governing Council to reflect the views of the electorate. The attainment of independence was a necessary prelude to the consolidation of the freedom of the people, and to the decisions which the people needed to take as to the form of Government best suited to their needs and aspirations.

144. In a further statement, Mr. Maho Sicacha recalled that he was among those who had begun the struggle for independence and had appeared before United Nations bodies to testify in that connexion. In his opinion, a date should be set by the Commissioner-General for the opening of negotiations which would look towards the economic and administrative separation of Fernando Póo from Río Muni and the possible establishment, subsequently, of a federal relationship. These negotiations should also cover the question of the timing of independence.

145. Concluding the discussion, Mr. Ondó Edú informed the Sub-Committee that during 1962 he had been in exile for the sake of the independence of his country, and that he had appeared before the United Nations to request the granting of autonomy and independence. He felt bound to say, however, that during the current period of autonomy, the political solutions to the problems of the Territory, which had to be found before the attainment of independence, had not yet been achieved. In view of the small size and population of the Territory, its unsatisfactory economic situation, and the demands being made in some quarters for separation, it was not surprising that differences of view existed on the question of

independence. Indeed, the present situation could well lead to conflict and violence. For his part, he resented all the talk about separation; the Territory had been one unit for more than a century; the talk of separation had only begun now that the Territory had an autonomous régime. For instance, the people of Río Muni had given their life for the Territory as a whole. While he was by no means opposed to independence, he had his doubts whether subsequent developments would be in the best interests of the people, unless a solution was found to the problems to which he had referred.

146. At a further meeting the same day between the Sub-Committee and members of the Governing Council, Mr. Ondó Edú appealed to his colleagues not to allow their differences to become too obvious. If separation was unavoidable, it should take place only after independence. However, unity was essential both for the achievement and for the maintenance of independence. In his opinion many of the prerequisites for the existence of a nation, such as homogeneity of population, economic viability, availability of administrative and other cadres, did not yet exist in the Territory.

147. He noted with deep regret that under the present system, he as President of the Governing Council did not have the power to select his colleagues. It was therefore not surprising that no consensus existed among members of the Council on the timing of independence. Having regard to the problems of the country, it was his view that Spain had saddled the Council with a "broken dish". Neither he nor the Council had the necessary authority to initiate solutions to these problems.

148. He also said that he would welcome advice from the Sub-Committee on the question of independence. While there were some Spanish elements who would rather see the country destroyed than be denied the opportunity to exploit it, neither the Council nor the Spanish Government wanted this to happen. It was his hope that before the end of the term of the present Council, agreement would be reached on the changes necessary for the proper functioning of the autonomous régime as a preliminary to independence. In his opinion, negotiations with Spain should be initiated before the expiry of his Council's mandate, in order to establish constitutional, economic and other arrangements preparatory to independence. If the Spanish Government proved unwilling to co-operate in this respect, he would himself submit a petition to the United Nations.

149. As regards the electoral system, Mr. Ondó Edú saw no objection to the present arrangements for elections to the General Assembly, but the fact that he had no say in the choice of members of the Governing Council was deplorable. Regrettable also was the fact that he had no executive powers whatever. His position was, therefore, no more than nominal.

150. Mr. Nicolas Itoha explained that, in saying earlier that there was no need at the present time to set a date for independence, what he had in mind was not an indefinite postponement of a decision. His own thinking was that prior to any decisions regarding independence, the internal problems of the Territory should be resolved by the economic and administrative separation of Fernando Póo and Río Muni.

151. Mr. Borico Toichoa expressed agreement with the views of Mr. Nicolas Itoha. He added that independence would be an empty word if it meant that the Territory would continue to rely heavily on external assistance. In this connexion he observed that 90 per cent of the technicians in Equatorial Guinea came from Europe, the Territory lacked adequate roads, the army was maintained by Spain, and there was only a handful of indigenous lawyers, and no engineers. It would be some five years before these inadequacies were met to the extent necessary to justify accession to independence.

152. Mr. Candido Nang remarked that there was no educational programme in existence geared to the manpower needs of the Territory in anticipation of independence. This observation applied also to other fields. As Councillor responsible for education, he had no power to establish such a programme.

153. Replying to questions, Mr. Ondó Edú stated that the Commissioner-General played no part in the appointment of members of the Governing Council, and did not participate in

the Council's meetings. Prior to the inauguration of the autonomous régime, political parties had to operate in a clandestine manner. Although political parties had not been accorded official recognition since that time, their existence was unofficially tolerated. They were required to obtain official authorization for the holding of public meetings. Mr. Macias Nguema intervened at this juncture to say that, in practice, MONALIGE was rarely granted such authorization for its meetings.

154. Continuing, Mr. Ondó Edú said that in response to a Spanish suggestion that existing political parties should merge into a single movement, a congress of local and foreign-based political groupings had been held in Bata shortly after the inauguration of the autonomous régime. The congress had failed to agree to a unified political movement. Another conference had taken place in Moka in early 1965, at which the political parties operating in Fernando Póo had agreed to a temporary halt in their activities. This was the reason for the reluctance of himself and his colleagues to be identified with any particular political grouping at the present time.

155. Mr. Nicolas Itoha drew attention to a written communication which he had submitted to the Governing Council jointly with Mr. Borico Toichoa, Mr. Watson Bueko, and Mr. Maho Sicacha, on 3 June 1966, and commended it to the serious attention of the Sub-Committee. In this communication, the authors contended that the political unity on which the autonomous régime was based was fictitious. This political unity presupposed the existence of a region which in reality was non-existent. Not only were Fernando Póo and Río Muni not geographically contiguous, but their people had no common ethnic origin, culture, history or language. Their hopes that this lack of a basis for unity might be remedied by experience had not been fulfilled.

156. According to the communication, there had been a clear-cut tendency on the part of the Río Muni group in the Governing Council to appropriate all benefits for that province; while Fernando Póo was responsible for 81 per cent of the budgetary income of the Territory, Río Muni accounted for 83 per cent of the expenditure. A contraband traffic in cacao and coffee had sprung up between Río Muni and neighbouring countries, which threatened Fernando Póo with economic collapse. According to the authors, there had been considerable emigration from Río Muni to Fernando Póo, resulting in profound changes in the population structure of the latter. Friction and tension existed among the Bubis, the principal ethnic group on the island, and the Pámues of Río Muni, which had been sharpened by the present régime.

157. In conclusion, the authors claimed that the right of self-determination did not belong exclusively to the aggregate of the people living in the Territory. To deny this right to the people of Fernando Póo, who constituted a homogeneous group, would be contrary to elementary international standards. In order to ensure to the people of Fernando Póo the exercise of this right, they called for the economic and administrative separation of the two parts of the Territory. Since the necessary legislative measures were within the competence of the Spanish Government, this demand did not require endorsement by a two-thirds majority of the General Assembly. The question should be put to a plebiscite in which the votes of the people would be valid only for their province of origin.

158. The Sub-Committee held another meeting with members of the Governing Council on 21 August 1966, at which the latter elaborated their views regarding the question of independence.

159. Mr. Nicolas Itoha stated that when independence was in sight, following the negotiations to which he had referred in an earlier statement, consideration could then be given to the role, if any, which the United Nations might play in the arrangements for independence. The United Nations would be approached if its assistance was required. On the general question of independence he had nothing to add to the views he had previously expressed.

160. Mr. Borico Toichoa saw no need for United Nations intervention in the electoral or other processes leading to in-

dependence. However, he would not oppose consideration being given to inviting the United Nations to be present in an observer capacity. United Nations intervention would be called for only if the Spanish Government withheld independence from the Territory when the people asked for it.

161. Mr. Macias Nguema and Mr. Nsue Nchama expressed the opinion that given the situation in the Territory, the effective presence of the United Nations was necessary during the holding of any plebiscite or election that might be held.

162. Mr. Watson Bueko remarked that there had been no United Nations observers during the plebiscite held in December 1963 on the Basic Law. The plebiscite was nevertheless free and properly conducted. It was immaterial to him whether or not the United Nations should be invited to send observers to a future plebiscite. However, care should be taken to ensure that such observers were completely impartial and honourable men, who would not seek to impose their own ideas, or intervene between the people and the Spanish Government. He envisaged a plebiscite at which people would indicate whether or not they desired independence, followed by negotiations and by elections. The function of United Nations observers, if any, should be limited to ascertaining whether or not the voting was free.

163. Mr. Candido Nang believed that United Nations participation in bringing the Territory to independence would ensure that the result was in keeping with the wishes of the people. He thought that the assistance of the United Nations in this connexion would be necessary.

164. Mr. Maho Sicacha saw no reason why the United Nations should not be invited to observe all the processes leading to independence. He believed that it would be useful to have United Nations assistance in this respect.

165. Mr. Ondó Edú stated that in order to dissipate any doubts about the genuineness of the processes leading to independence and about their outcome, the United Nations should be invited to send observers. In this way, the intentions and performance of Spain in relation to the Territory would be clearly vindicated.

166. As regards changes which should be made in the present electoral system, Mr. Macias Nguema and Mr. Nsue Nchama expressed themselves in favour of direct elections under a system of universal suffrage for all persons, including women, over 21 years of age. Mr. Macias Nguema noted that the women had complained against their ineligibility to vote. Mr. Candido Nang was in agreement, but stated that he would prefer the voting age to be reduced to 18; he saw no reason for withholding the vote from persons of 18 years and over, since that was adjudged to be the minimum age for the assumption of marital responsibilities.

167. In Mr. Watson Bueko's opinion, universal suffrage would result in democracy of the inorganic kind. It might work in highly developed countries, but not in Equatorial Guinea where in his view organic democracy was more appropriate. Under a system of organic democracy the different sectors of the national life were represented in governmental organs. He therefore preferred the continuance of the present system, with some adjustments to meet actual needs and circumstances. In view of the difficulty the people had in distinguishing political platforms, personalities and interests, it was more appropriate for them to be represented according to the interest groups and sectors to which they belonged.

168. Mr. Borico Toichoa had no comment to make on this question. Mr. Nicolas Itoha expressed himself in favour of the present system but said he was not irrevocably opposed to universal adult suffrage. Mr. Maho Sicacha and Mr. Ondó Edú favoured universal adult suffrage.

169. Referring to reports that only Africans were sent to gaol on conviction for criminal offences, Mr. Watson Bueko said that these allegations were true of the period before autonomy but did not apply to the present time. Spanish residents who were found guilty of minor offences were subject to expulsion from the Territory. Those who committed serious offences were sent to gaol outside the Territory, usually in

Las Palmas. However, pending trial, such persons could be remanded in custody in the local gaols.

170. Mr. Macias Nguema asserted that the administration of justice in the Territory was discriminatory. He pointed out that all the Court judges were Spanish. It was the responsibility of the United Nations to secure the enjoyment by the people of equal rights. Mr. Candido Nang added that it was not the laws themselves that deserved condemnation but their discriminatory application. The African and the Spanish people were subject to the same laws, but the application of these laws as well as the punishments meted out for their infraction were different. Mr. Nsue Nchama said that he had yet to hear of a Spanish resident being gaoled in the Territory after conviction.

171. Mr. Borico Toichoa did not think that any useful purpose was being served by recalling incidents which had taken place in the distant past. He noted that the Territory was not yet independent. Mr. Maho Sicacha stated that, in his experience as a practising lawyer, the Spanish residents rarely committed criminal offences warranting their being sent to gaol. Those that did were sent to prisons outside the Territory which met the minimum conditions laid down in the Spanish penal code. There were no such prisons in Equatorial Guinea. Mr. Ondó Edú pointed out that the administration of justice was not within the competence of the Governing Council. He himself had had occasion to complain to the Commissioner-General about excessive leniency to offenders, including some Africans.

172. In response to a question, Mr. Nsue Nchama confirmed the statement made to the Sub-Committee by some petitioners that a law of 4 May 1948, which was still in force, limited land ownership by the African population to four hectares per person.

173. On the question of political prisoners, Mr. Macias Nguema said that though there had been several in the past, there were to his knowledge only three or four, who had come from outside the Territory, in gaol at the present time. Previously the number stood at six or seven, but one had been released as a result of representations made by him.

174. Mr. Nicolas Itoha denied that there were any political prisoners. Mr. Candido Nang observed that while there might not be persons in prison for political activity, it was not difficult to secure the imprisonment of persons expressing unwelcome political opinions by arranging their conviction on criminal charges. He knew of one such case.

175. In conclusion, the members of the Governing Council stated their views on the question of whether the people of Equatorial Guinea were ready for independence. Mr. Candido Nang believed that they were. Mr. Nsue Nchama agreed that they were but thought that independence should be granted not immediately, but by July 1968. Mr. Macias Nguema believed strongly that the Territory should accede to independence by July 1967. Mr. Maho Sicacha's preference was for the initiation of negotiations immediately with a view to independence in two years' time. Mr. Nicolas Itoha did not consider that the people were ready for independence; they could only be said to be ready if independence was regarded as a lottery in which the people would participate in the hope of fortuitous benefits. Mr. Watson Bueko felt that negotiations should begin in the very near future aimed at the fixing of a date for independence.

176. At the end of the meeting Mr. Macias Nguema submitted to the Committee a communication signed by himself, Mr. Candido Nang, and Mr. Nsue Nchama, on the question of independence for the Territory. In the communication the authors stated that nothing was of greater importance to the people than that the Territory should attain independence. According to them the governmental organs of the present régime did not possess the necessary powers to bring about the changes required to promote the spiritual and material welfare of the people. They recalled that in various letters they had addressed to the Spanish Government, they had requested Spain or, if necessary, the competent international organizations first to set a date for independence which should precede the expiry of the term of present ad-

ministration, and secondly the establishment of representative committees to formulate, with outside, including United Nations, assistance, if required, the agreements which would form the basis of independence.

177. In a final statement addressed to the Sub-Committee on 24 August 1966, Mr. Ondó Edú said that the autonomous status should be terminated forthwith and that negotiations for independence should be initiated immediately, with a view to the Territory acceding to independence in two years. If the period of these negotiations, as proposed by the Governing Council, did not meet with a whole-hearted welcome from Spain, and if as a result the people of Equatorial Guinea should press for independence prematurely, he would not consider himself responsible for the consequences. The two-year period of negotiation which had been proposed would be a period of preparation and of experience in the assumption of greater responsibility and freedom of action. In conclusion, he emphasized that unity and indissolubility must govern the decisions of the people if a peaceful solution to the problems of the Territory was to be achieved.

C. Meetings with groups and individuals affiliated to MONALIGE

178. Before undertaking its visit to the Territory the Sub-Committee had before it a number of petitions from leaders of the Movimiento Nacional de Liberación de la Guinea Ecuatorial (MONALIGE) (A/AC.109/PET.529 and Add.1).

179. In these petitions, the leaders of MONALIGE declared that they regarded independence as the best means of solving the institutional as well as socio-economic problems of Equatorial Guinea. They also reiterated their previous demand that a date for the attainment of independence should be fixed before the end of the term of the present Administration. The fixing of a date for independence was, in their view, justified by the political maturity of the people of the Territory. Further, the economic position of the Territory, to which the Spanish Government had repeatedly drawn attention, gave it a more valid right to independence than many other countries which had acceded to independence in less favourable circumstances.

180. In this connexion they recalled that in a speech made on 31 December 1965, the Head of State of Spain spoke of his steadfast intention to proceed, without delay or hesitation, with efforts to promote the progress of the people of Equatorial Guinea so that they might be fully prepared to meet the future; in the same speech, he had declared that, in any event, Spain would defend their desire to make a free decision. Further, the petitioners recalled that in a statement made at Algiers on 20 June 1966, the President of the Governing Council had said that, according to his official information, it was the express and formal desire of the Spanish Government that "Equatorial Guinea, whenever it so desired, should choose its own political future, that is to say, complete independence".

181. The petitioners also deplored the manoeuvres, which according to them, had been carried out with the approval of certain members of the autonomous Government with a view to keeping the indigenous people of Equatorial Guinea in a position of political, economic and social subordination. They drew attention to the failure to evolve reasonable standards for the Africanization of the Administration and to gross discrimination between Spanish Europeans and Africans doing the same work in the public service, as regards grading, remuneration and other terms of service. These conditions were responsible for the strike by civil servants that took place from 20 to 25 April 1966.

182. Moreover, the petitioners complained that the activities of MONALIGE, which had the support of a sizable majority of the population of Equatorial Guinea, were being systematically hampered with the result that the will of the people was being stifled. For instance, a MONALIGE meeting scheduled for 19 December 1965 for the purpose of submitting a formal proposal for independence had been suspended by the Spanish authorities. Subsequently, in January 1966, the leadership of MONALIGE had addressed a letter to the Spanish Government requesting that Spanish military forces

stationed in the Territory should cease all armed action or reprisal in respect of political activity relating to independence and that a date be set immediately for the early independence of the Territory through a plebiscite to be held under United Nations auspices. The letter also requested that MONALIGE be granted full freedom of action as well as permission to hold discussions with the Spanish Government regarding the timing and conditions of independence. Nothing but silence had greeted this letter.

183. According to the petitioners, an illustration of the Spanish Government's immobility was its failure to act upon a motion adopted by the General Assembly of the Territory on 29 April 1966 to suspend the Governing Council for its lack of authority and prestige among the people, for its indifferent administration and for squandering public funds. This motion had not even been officially forwarded to the Spanish Government by the Commissioner-General.

184. In addition, certain metropolitan institutions had been giving financial support to a pro-colonialist movement known as MUNGE which was in favour of the continued presence of Spain in the Territory. The neo-colonialist manoeuvres of the Spanish Government had resulted in an artificial micro-nationalism among the indigenous population of Fernando Póo aimed at separating that province from the territorial unit and keeping it aligned with Spanish interests. For this reason, MONALIGE solemnly affirmed the inviolable unity of Fernando Póo and Río Muni, which must attain independence as a single political unit.

185. The extent to which acts of the Governing Council were subject to prior censorship and dictation by the Spanish authorities was, according to the petitioners, shown by an incident that had taken place recently. During May 1966, the Governing Council had submitted to the Spanish Government a general report on the Territory, in which it noted, *inter alia*, that relations between itself and the General Assembly had not been harmonious and that no progress had been made in regard to several projects provided for in the current Development Plan. In the report the Governing Council also stressed the urgent need to annul existing legislation prohibiting the establishment of foreign companies and the influx of foreign capital. In early June 1966, the Director-General of African Settlements and Provinces of the Spanish Government had visited the Territory, held a meeting with the Governing Council, and obtained its assent to a revised version of the report which contained no reference to the above-mentioned matters.

186. In pressing its demand for independence at the earliest possible date, MONALIGE was ready to offer, by way of concessions, guarantees for the life and property of the Spanish population, freedom of entry to the Territory for Spanish immigrants, and the maintenance on a priority basis of political, economic, cultural and other relations with Spain.

187. On 19 August 1966, a group of nineteen petitioners affiliated to MONALIGE, led by Mr. Tomas Alfredo King, a lawyer, called on the Sub-Committee at Santa Isabel. Following a description of the ethnic composition of the Territory, the petitioners informed the Sub-Committee that MONALIGE, founded twenty years earlier, was representative of all the ethnic groups in the Territory, and was committed to the struggle for the freedom and welfare of the people. None of its present membership held official positions in the autonomous Government. There was in existence another political grouping known as MUNGE, the formation of which, according to them, had been inspired by divisive colonialist manoeuvres and by personal ambition. MUNGE consisted of persons who held or aspired to official positions and had received special favours. They recalled that Mr. Ondó Edú who was a leader of MUNGE used to be a member of MONALIGE. In conclusion, they informed the Sub-Committee that the people were unanimous in their support of MONALIGE's demand for immediate independence.

188. On 20 August 1966, the Sub-Committee had a meeting with the same group of petitioners. Mr. Alfredo King informed the Sub-Committee that MONALIGE had one clear aim, namely immediate independence. The people of the Territory were no more than fourth class citizens, who

were deprived of the rights, legal protection and privileges extended to the Spanish residents.

189. He noted, for instance, that some 99 per cent of the arable land was under the control of the colonizers. The Spanish settlers were permitted to acquire land freely and without limitation but the indigenous people were limited to four hectares per person. If an indigenous person wished to acquire land beyond this limit, he could only do so in the name of another member of his family who was required to submit proof that he was cultivating the land himself. Evidence of these disabilities could be found in the relevant legislation and in the administration of this legislation as shown in the official gazette. He added that it was possible in theory for an indigenous person to acquire additional land under the public auction system. However, not merely were these auctions held only in Madrid, but they were open to all Spanish citizens, corporations and companies, with the result that an indigenous person was clearly at an overwhelming disadvantage. The public auction system had led to the existence of a large number of absentee landlords, and to the establishment of huge plantations such as ENASA which was Spanish owned, and controlled 10,000 hectares of land.

190. Commerce was almost entirely in the hands of the Spanish residents. Prospective African traders enjoyed no protection from the law and were, therefore, in no position to compete in this field. The situation had been aggravated by recent legislation which conferred on Spanish residents the same rights as the indigenous people. He noted in this connexion that the people of Equatorial Guinea did not enjoy the same rights in Spain as Spanish citizens. It was not surprising that there were no important African businessmen, even in cacao and coffee.

191. Referring to labour conditions, Mr. Alfredo King stated the labour structure was pyramidal in structure, with the Spanish residents at the top and the African workers at the base. The wage system was highly discriminatory, and the legislation in force tended to perpetuate this situation. Imported African workers, who usually were employed on two-year contracts, were paid miserable wages and were not permitted to transfer to other positions or to other parts of the Territory before the expiry of their contracts. The minimum wage set by the law, namely 900 pesetas per month for an eight-hour day, was grossly unsatisfactory. Further, imported African labourers in fact received only 50 per cent of their wages locally; the remainder was held in trust and paid to them only when they were about to leave the Territory. No provision existed for pensions or social security benefits for African workers. In contrast, Spanish residents working as agricultural foremen or supervisors received at least 5,100 pesetas per month.

192. African workers enjoyed only twenty-four days vacation every two years. Imported African workers were required to renew their contracts within ten days of its expiry; if not they had to be deported. Indigenous African workers were under the same obligation; if not they faced imprisonment under the vagrancy laws. All recruitment of African labour had to be carried out under government supervision. On the other hand, the Spanish workers who also came to the Territory on two-year contracts enjoyed not only fifteen days vacation every year, but they were granted six months' home leave, with passages paid for themselves and their families, at the end of their contracts.

193. Concerning the administration of justice, Mr. Alfredo King stated that only African people were sent to gaol on conviction of criminal offences. Conditions in these gaols were appalling. By contrast, Spanish residents guilty of these offences were never persecuted, or if they were, they were sentenced to small fines. It was only for serious offences like manslaughter that they were tried and, if convicted, sentenced to imprisonment; in such cases they were gaoled in Spain, not in Equatorial Guinea. If a Spanish resident were to be remanded in custody pending trial, he would be installed in a hotel and be provided with free meals.

194. In the field of political activity, MONALIGE was the only genuine movement. It had consistently struggled for independence. MONALIGE had formerly numbered Mr. Ondó

Edú and Mr. Maho Sicacha among its membership but having assumed official positions, they had become conservative in their political outlook. MONALIGE desired Equatorial Guinea to accede to independence as one unit, or if this was impossible, as a federation with communications, transport, defence and foreign affairs controlled by a central government. MONALIGE wanted to see negotiations initiated without delay for the setting of a date for independence. The basis of future co-operation with Spain would be one of the subjects to be taken up during these negotiations. It was the wish of MONALIGE that independence be granted immediately, but since the negotiations it envisaged were, if begun forthwith, unlikely to be concluded before the end of 1966, they were prepared to wait until the beginning of 1967 for formal accession to independence.

195. The electoral system, according to the petitioners from MONALIGE, was undemocratic. In effect, two thirds of the members of the Territory's governmental organs were appointed by the Spanish Government and related interests. The much-vaunted affirmative vote of the people in the 1963 plebiscite was the result of manoeuvres by the Spanish authorities. The clergy had also yielded powerful influence. The concern of the Spanish Government to protect the Spanish residents against any manifestation of the legitimate grievances of the African people was reflected in the continued presence in the Territory of a large number of Spanish soldiers. There were three gun-boats in the territorial waters, full of marines. Apart from the police force, there were over 100 other military personnel, "civil guards", armed with modern weapons stationed in the Territory. These civil guards went about among the people making demonstrations of armed force, and interfered in the political and social life of the Territory as well as in many matters of civil administration. They had instructions to repress any kind of political demonstrations. Also based in the Territory was a squadron of military aircraft, which flew over the Territory every day.

196. The petitioners then submitted to the Sub-Committee, as an *aide-mémoire*, a communication signed by themselves and twenty-two others. In addition to the views orally conveyed by the petitioners, the communication contained the following information.

197. The most fervent wish of the people of Equatorial Guinea was for immediate independence, that is to say, before the end of 1966, to be achieved by means of a referendum. They regarded independence as a starting point for building the country's future in freedom and without harmful interference.

198. The dominance of the Spanish community in the economic life of the country was shown by the fact that the governing body of the Executive Board of the Chamber of Commerce, comprising fourteen members, included only two indigenous persons. In the cacao section of the Chamber, only two of the nine members were indigenous persons. All the members of the sections concerned with coffee, miscellaneous products, commerce and banking, and industries were Spanish.

199. Of the total exports of cacao from Fernando Póo amounting to 28,700,000 kilogrammes only 3,980,000 derived from indigenous farmers. All coffee exports came from Spanish producers, except for an insignificant amount which was sold locally to the Spanish people. All the banana production was similarly in the hands of the Spanish people. Of the 7,600 workers imported from Nigeria, all but 180 were in the employment of Spanish enterprises. Of the 32,000 hectares of land being worked in Fernando Póo, only 2,170 were farmed by indigenous persons. Of the sales made by the Chamber of Agriculture, amounting to some 200 million pesetas, only 4 million went to indigenous people. Out of 14,500,000 pesetas worth of goods exported, permits worth only 850,000 pesetas were granted to indigenous persons. Not a single permit covering the 17 million pesetas worth of imports was granted to an indigenous person.

200. Following the meeting, the Sub-Committee received a communication from a group of indigenous workers from Río Muni affiliated to MONALIGE, in which they protested the failure of the Spanish Government to promote the welfare of the people. According to this communication, there was

grave disparity in the wages paid to indigenous and to Spanish workers. The Spanish worker received a monthly wage of 10,000 pesetas, and 12,000 if he was married, as well as the right to such benefits as a furnished house, and seven months' home leave with passages paid, while the indigenous worker was paid only 1,500 pesetas out of which he had to meet his bills for housing, furniture, etc. It was the impression of the authors, from speeches made by the President, that only petitioners who had appeared before the United Nations had the right even to complain about the wage system. Grievances over wages had led to two strikes during the first two years of the autonomous régime. The first involved civil servants and the second was against the Compañía de Telecomunicaciones, S.A. Two more strikes had been announced.

201. The Spanish Government had failed to keep its promise to grant freedom to the Territory, on the pretext that the people were not ready. Meanwhile it had done very little to foster economic development. They had suffered persecution because of their ardent desire for freedom; indeed a few days earlier, the civil guards had confiscated and destroyed the placards they intended to use in a welcoming demonstration for the Sub-Committee. In contrast, when a Minister of the Spanish Government was due to arrive, all workers were given a holiday.

202. In another communication submitted to the Sub-Committee at the same time the President of MONALIGE, Mr. Pastor B. Torao Sikara, in his own name and on behalf of MONALIGE, recalled that in speeches delivered in late 1964 and 1965, the Head of State of Spain had stated that Spain would not stand in the way of Equatorial Guinea, but would grant it independence when it so requested. He also referred to a subsequent statement by the representative of Spain in the United Nations in September 1965 that it was for the people of Equatorial Guinea to request and set a date for independence. In view of these statements, the Sub-Committee should use its influence to ensure that independence was granted to the Territory on 6 January 1967, and that negotiations with Spain be initiated forthwith.

203. The Sub-Committee held a further meeting with seventy-six representatives of MONALIGE, including twelve women, on 21 August 1966. At this meeting, Mr. Alfredo King explained that all land was owned by and could only be acquired from and through the Spanish Government. The public auction system for land acquisition was established by a law promulgated on 4 May 1948. Outside the public auction system the acquisition of land as previously indicated was limited to four hectares per indigenous person. However, another law promulgated on 23 December 1948 allowed the colonizers seventy-five hectares per person.

204. Referring to exploitation by the Spanish colonizers, the petitioners submitted documents which established that the vast majority of imported African labourers worked for Spanish employers or on Spanish-owned plantations. They also produced examples of contracts granted to African and Spanish workers which in their view showed the gross disparity in wages and other terms of service accorded to the two categories. The petitioners further stated that the forces of law and order were excessive for the needs of the Territory and that their numbers were obviously intended to intimidate the people and to discourage political activity aimed at independence. For instance, the Spanish civil guard consisted of 1 major (*comandante*), 3 captains (*capitanes*), 8 lieutenants (*tenientes*), 2 staff sergeants (*brigadas*), 4 non-commissioned officers (*sub-oficiales*), 19 sergeants (*sargentos*), 49 corporals (*cabos*), 8 privates first-class (*guardias primeros*), 8 buglers (*cornetas*), 20 telegraph operators (*guardias telegrafistas*) and 247 privates (*guardias*).

205. The petitioners further stated that they were opposed to the idea of separation of Fernando Póo from Río Muni advanced in certain quarters. It was their wish to continue relations with Spain, but this question was a matter for negotiations on a basis of equality with the Spanish Government after independence. These and other negotiations should be carried out by the genuine representatives of the people, elected through free elections, rather than persons representing Spanish interests. If there was any doubt about the aspirations

to which MONALIGE was giving expression, they should be put to a plebiscite under United Nations supervision in the Territory as a whole, in the same conditions as the plebiscite on the Basic Law. In conclusion the petitioners urged that the present electoral system be scrapped in favour of a system based on the principle of one man one vote. Primary organs elected on this basis could, if necessary, elect representatives to organs at a higher level. The important factor, however, was the establishment of direct elections on the basis of universal adult suffrage for persons 21 years and over, with the electorate of both parts of the Territory voting together as one unit.

206. In illustration of the workings of the present electoral system, the petitioners stated that Mr. Pastor Torao and Mr. Abiléo Bibao, who had received the highest votes for election to the village and municipal councils, had for some unknown reason, been left out of the Government. On the other hand, several members of the General Assembly occupied their present positions by means other than elections, or alternatively, had secured very few votes in the elections. Indeed Mr. Rondó, one of the members of the Governing Council, who had recently died, had said clearly that he had not contested the elections, but had been nominated by the Spanish Government to occupy that position. For these reasons, MONALIGE tolerated, rather than recognized, the Governing Council and the General Assembly.

207. The petitioners also called attention to a provision of the Basic Law which requires that after two years, new elections should be held to replace one half of the members of the municipal councils, the General Assembly and the Governing Council. This provision had been waived, for fear that people hostile to the Spanish Government might succeed the present members of these bodies, who were *personae gratae*. In conclusion, they stated that there was no freedom of political activity in the Territory. The only newspaper was government-owned and did not publish any views except those in favour of the Government.

208. At this juncture, the women in the MONALIGE group asked to be permitted to submit a petition bearing twenty-five signatures. In presenting the petition, they stated that all the women of the Territory were concerned about the problems of the Territory but that their presence before the Sub-Committee in such small numbers was due to the fear of their husbands. The Sub-Committee should realize that it was their only hope and salvation.

209. In their petition, the women requested total, complete and immediate independence for Equatorial Guinea, and the establishment of a federal government in a democratic manner. They hoped that the Sub-Committee would give them its unconditional support in the United Nations. They were unhappy with the vague, ambiguous so-called autonomy imposed by the Spanish Government. They demanded the immediate initiation of negotiations with a view to the granting of independence not later than 6 January 1967.

210. At a meeting with other representatives of MONALIGE in Bata on 22 August 1966, a further petition was submitted to the Sub-Committee. In the petition, the authors stated that after 165 years of colonial rule, Spain had not trained even a hundred people to carry out technical and professional functions. It had failed to grant an adequate number of scholarships to indigenous students. There was a lack of social justice in the Territory; for example a Spanish national often without any professional training was better paid than an African trained for the same work. In spite of the granting of autonomy, no programme existed for the attainment of independence or for the training of the indigenous population for the tasks to be carried out after independence. Various leaders who had been campaigning for independence, including Mr. Acacio Mane Ela, Mr. Mongomayene, and Mr. Edjodjomo, had been arrested and shot by the civil guard without trial.

211. In addition, the authors of the petition rejected the idea of the separation of Fernando Póo from Río Muni. The unanimous desire of the people of the Territory was for complete and immediate independence and they accordingly requested the United Nations immediately to set a date for independence and the transfer of all powers to the people.

212. Further, the petitioners drew attention to a letter bearing 460 signatures and 165 thumb prints which the leaders of MONALIGE had addressed to the Head of the Spanish State on 15 August 1966. In this letter, MONALIGE, which claimed to represent more than 90 per cent of the population, recalled statements by various Spanish officials and representatives to the effect that Spain would never oppose self-determination for the people of Equatorial Guinea or their desire to change their present status, if the majority so wished. They also recalled statements made by the President of the Governing Council that it was for the people of the Territory to set a date for independence. In view of these statements, and bearing in mind the political maturity of the people, to which the Spanish Minister for Information and Tourism had recently attested, it was the wish of MONALIGE that the Territory should accede to independence by 1 January 1967. However, this wish did not imply a desire to break off relations with Spain.

213. In conclusion, MONALIGE demanded that a committee freely elected by the people should be set up to draft the necessary agreements on which independence would be based. These agreements would cover such matters as respect for Spanish investments, recognition of the rights of Spain in economic, commercial, social and other matters, and free entry for all Spanish people wishing to work in the Territory. Finally MONALIGE asked that the present rulers should take no repressive measures against anyone for political activity and that it should be accorded official recognition.

214. In another petition bearing 1,008 signatures submitted to the Sub-Committee on the same day, MONALIGE gave an historical account of Equatorial Guinea since its first contact with Spain in 1472. From that time onwards, the Territory had suffered annexation by conquest or by unequal treaties, colonialism of different kinds, and the repression of all political activity aimed at liberation. The authors of the petition stated that the indigenous inhabitants had no political or civil rights. The Spanish Government did not permit the formation of parties which were truly representative of the people, and if such parties were formed, it persecuted or imprisoned the leaders. Among these leaders were Messrs. Mariano Eyama, Pablo Nsue Edu, Martin Nvo Abaga, Enrique Nguema Ngono, Florentino Nculu Esono, Francisco Oyono Mico, Agapita Mangué, Miguel Elo, Mbiang Mba, and others. The forcible repression by Spain of protesting voices and of national liberation movements had forced large numbers of people into exile. In consequence of these policies, the indigenous people were not duly represented in the organs of government, which consisted of Europeans and a few Africans who could not reflect the aspirations of the people.

215. Commenting on the educational system, the authors claimed that after five centuries of Spanish rule, the illiteracy rate was the highest in the world. Primary education, which together with secondary education was subject to an age limit, did not fulfil its purpose. The number of indigenous people attending Spanish universities was so small that it was impossible to believe that Spain was seriously trying to educate the indigenous population. There was a lack of teachers and the shortage of universities and other educational institutions was felt everywhere. This lack of concern could be seen from the fact that there were only ninety-two persons from the Territory studying in Spain, fifty-seven of whom were paying students.

216. As regards health conditions, the population was afflicted by malaria, tuberculosis, parasitic diseases, malnutrition and a high infant mortality rate. There was an alarming shortage of doctors and auxiliary health staff. For a population of 300,000 there were only 72 physicians, 27 of whom were internes, and 163 indigenous medical assistants. There were only two first-class hospitals with a total of 741 beds and two second-class ones with 254 beds. In addition, there were eleven poorly equipped health centres, sometimes headed by a doctor.

217. Various forms of forced labour conditions were in existence. Penal sanctions were imposed on indigenous workers for failure to fulfil their employment contracts. The principle of equal pay for equal work was not respected. Indigenous workers were cruelly treated. The Spanish Government did not

permit the formation of workers' organizations and trade unions so that the workers had no suitable ways of defending their interests. Racial discrimination was practised, inasmuch as a Spanish worker earned twenty times as much as the indigenous worker. Discrimination even manifested itself in the preference given to Spanish people in the provision of medical care.

218. The economic situation represented the most pernicious aspect of Spanish colonialism. The Territory had a primitive subsistence economy. Spain was the only market for the primary produce of Equatorial Guinea. The control of foreign exchange, of imports and exports, and of the prices paid to the primary producers was in the hands of Spain. The economy of the Territory was thus completely subordinated to that of Spain. Under an Act of 4 May 1948 which was still in force, the indigenous inhabitants could acquire only four hectares of land while a European could possess estates of up to 200,000 hectares. A subsequent act of 24 December 1948 made a free grant of thirty hectares to Europeans resident in the Territory for more than ten years. Furthermore, the Spanish Government did not shrink from conducting a propaganda campaign concerning its assistance to the Territory while refraining from revealing the origin of the subsidies which it claimed to be disinterestedly dispensing. It was the view of the authors that in the field of economic development, as in public health and education, the Spanish Government should seek wider co-operation with the competent international organizations for the benefit of the Territory.

219. In conclusion the authors demanded the right for the people to control their own affairs and the fixing of a date for independence. This date should be 15 November 1966, if possible, or otherwise 1 January 1967.

220. At a further meeting with a group of sixty-six representatives of MONALIGE on 23 August 1966, Mr. Angel Masie, Technical Secretary, said that it was MONALIGE's wish that Equatorial Guinea should accede to independence in the shortest possible time, in peace and understanding with Spain. In addition to the points raised in their petition, they wanted Spain to take measures to establish full equality of civil rights. Mr. Alfonso Oyono Oalogo, one of the leaders of the group, stated that in their view independence should be attained in conditions free of violence and racial discrimination.

221. Continuing, Mr. Masie said that MONALIGE comprised 90 per cent of the population of the Territory. It had some 195,000 registered members, with an additional 12,000 who had applied but were not yet registered. It included a women's section as well as a section for youth who became full members at the age of twenty-one. MUNGE, by contrast, was a minority party, favoured by the Spanish Government, and consisting mainly of government employees. It was riven by policy differences. IPGE, which had been formed abroad, was the mother organization of MONALIGE. Owing to disagreements within that movement, MONALIGE had been formed in 1962. In the event of a plebiscite being held on an independence constitution, the votes should be counted for the Territory as a whole, and not for its parts separately. The present electoral system was unsatisfactory and they were in favour of universal adult suffrage for all persons over twenty-one years of age. Furthermore they were opposed to the separation of Fernando Póo from Río Muni.

222. Mr. Henri Nkona Mdong, one of the petitioners, stated that if negotiations were initiated with Spain, the Territory should be represented by the President of MONALIGE, one member of the Governing Council, and other members elected by MONALIGE. Mr. Masie added that other political groups could also designate representatives. Mr. Oyono saw no objection to the General Assembly being represented by one member.

223. The autonomous régime, according to the petitioners, had proved very unsatisfactory. There was a vast difference, in their opinion, between rule by a small clique of colonizers and a popularly based government. During the elections preceding the inauguration of the autonomous régime, the activities of MONALIGE had been systematically hampered in

favour of MUNGE, which enjoyed the support of the Spanish authorities, and claimed to be the only political party. MONALIGE was confident that in any future elections which were not supervised and manipulated by the colonial Government, it would win the majority of seats. It was for this reason that they requested that any such elections should be controlled and supervised by the United Nations.

224. Following its return to New York, the Sub-Committee received a communication from Mr. Atanasio Ndong Miyona, Secretary-General of MONALIGE, stating that the visit of the Sub-Committee to Equatorial Guinea represented *ipso facto* recognition by the Spanish Government of the right of the Territory to independence. Independence, however, would not mean a sharp break with Spain; it would be only a transformation of relations based on principles of co-operation and mutual respect. He accordingly requested that a date be set for the Territory's accession to independence.

225. In a further communication submitted shortly afterwards, Mr. Ndong informed the Sub-Committee that in order to be able to devote himself more directly to the preparatory work for the independence of Equatorial Guinea he had decided to terminate his political exile. Outlining the position of MONALIGE, Mr. Atanasio Ndong stated that a date for the independence of the Territory should be fixed during the forthcoming session of the General Assembly. The time-limit proposed by the people of Equatorial Guinea was 15 February 1968, and the year 1967 should be regarded as a transitional period for the discussion of constitutional arrangements and for the installation of a provisional government prior to general elections. The people of the Territory were firmly determined to accede to independence as a unitary state, while taking into account local and regional conditions. Further, it was the desire of the people that the United Nations should supervise the general elections shortly to be held in the Territory. In conclusion, he expressed appreciation to the Spanish Government for facilitating the work of the Sub-Committee and registered the belief that the Sub-Committee would help the people to build the country in unity and to safeguard their Hispano-African attachment within the African continent.

D. Meetings with groups and individuals affiliated to MUNGE

226. On 21 August 1966, the Sub-Committee received a group of fifteen representatives of the Movimiento de Unificación Nacional de la Guinea Ecuatorial (MUNGE), led by its President Mr. Agustín Eñeso Nñe.

227. In lieu of an oral statement, Mr. Eñeso Nñe presented, on behalf of MUNGE, a written communication to the Sub-Committee. In this communication, he recalled that the autonomous régime which was established by the Act of 20 December 1963, had, as its corollary, a recent statement by the Under-Secretary of the Spanish Presidency that should the inhabitants of Equatorial Guinea ever wish to change the present political structure, Spain would offer no opposition. That statement had encouraged them to expect co-operation and assistance from Spain. However, as a transitional stage, the autonomous régime had failed to meet their expectations. This failure was due to the fact that the Act of 1963 had many gaps and shortcomings which had led to serious divisions between the two parts of the Territory; these shortcomings had been compounded by human and technical errors. Although that Act prescribed modes of possible change, all efforts in that direction had proved fruitless.

228. Nationhood and independence had as their purpose the development and improvement of the people. Independence was meaningless if it was not intended to achieve this goal. At the same time, independence was a natural and noble right which could not be denied on the ground of impediments of a cultural, technical and economic nature. The specific historical circumstances of Equatorial Guinea indicated that it was capable of subsisting after independence with the help of the solidarity of the world community, as a member of the great Spanish family.

* MUNGE is variously known as Movimiento de Unión Nacional de la Guinea Ecuatorial, Movimiento de Unificación Nacional de la Guinea Ecuatorial and Movimiento de Unificación de la Guinea Ecuatorial.

229. It was the wish of the people of the Territory that Spain should grant them independence at the end of the term of the present administration on 15 July 1968, even though the errors to which the people were subject would persist for some time to come and the solution of new problems might be more difficult. They accordingly suggested the formation of a constituent commission comprising all sectors and groups, particularly economic interests, political parties and representatives of the existing Government, in order to give an opportunity to the various opinions current in the Territory to be heard. In view of the fundamental importance of the Act which would be drafted by this commission, a plebiscite should be held to determine the acceptability of that Act in April 1968. While believing themselves capable of solving their own problems, they would welcome disinterested advice and would therefore be happy if a member of the Special Committee were to be present during the holding of this plebiscite.

230. In response to questions, Mr. Eñeso Ñeñe said that it was and had been since 1963, the aim of MUNGE to unite all the people of the Territory in a single movement. His party had lost faith in the present Governing Council as it had failed to carry out the people's wishes. He was aware that the Council included members who were formerly affiliated to MUNGE. The Council had paid no attention to the views of the political parties. Nevertheless, in order to avoid civil disturbances MUNGE was prepared to tolerate its existence, pending the changes advocated above.

231. His party had given thorough consideration to the question of independence and had decided that the date for independence should be 16 July 1968. On the question of the separation of Fernando Póo and Río Muni, he recalled that the motto of MUNGE was "Unity, Peace and Work". While the party acknowledged the realities of history, as well as the small size of the Territory, it considered that Fernando Póo and Río Muni were themselves too small to subsist as separate entities. In any event the question of separation was an internal matter to be settled by the people themselves.

232. MUNGE had accepted the autonomous régime as a transitional stage but its operation had failed to satisfy the people's aspirations. In anticipation of independence on 16 July 1968, the intervening period should be devoted to negotiations with Madrid by commissions composed of representatives of political parties, the Governing Council, the economic sector and religious groups. A plebiscite should be held in April 1968 on the independence constitution. This plebiscite should be carried out not by Spain but by the people themselves in democratic conditions; everyone over the age of 21 should be allowed to participate in it. MUNGE would welcome a United Nations presence in this regard.

233. It was the expectation of MUNGE that after independence, the Territory would maintain economic relations with any other countries it thought fit. On social conditions, the belief of MUNGE was that while the Territory should be maintained as one unit, the interests and problems of minority groups should be taken into account. The membership of MUNGE comprised about 80 per cent of the population. Their strength was higher in Río Muni than in Fernando Póo which had a greater variety of cultural groups. Its membership included the Bubis, but recently the Bubis had been influenced by the separatist ideas of certain members of the governmental organs.

234. In conclusion Mr Eñeso Ñeñe informed the Sub-Committee that, recognizing their community of aims and objectives, the leadership of the Idea Popular de la Guinea Ecuatorial (IPGE) had recently decided to merge that party with MUNGE.

235. On 22 August 1966, the Sub-Committee held a meeting in Bata with representatives of the *junta* of MUNGE and IPGE, who submitted two communications in lieu of written statements.

236. The first communication signed by Mr. Justino Mba Nsue, Secretary-General of the *junta*, declared that the leadership desired full independence, without in any way hampering the cordial relations which through history and culture linked the Territory with Spain and the Spanish-speaking world.

It was also in favour of healthy international coexistence with African and other countries.

237. The second communication, bearing forty signatures, contained a historical account of the Territory, and a number of representations concerning conditions in Equatorial Guinea. In this connexion, the authors stated that the achievements of Spain deserved emphasis. According to them, the rate of population increase over the past sixteen years was 2 per cent as compared with a death rate of 7.8 per thousand. The hospital in Río Muni, regarded as one of the best in Africa had 1,400 beds, and the staff of the public health service consisted of 28 physicians, 5 surgeons, 5 pharmacists, assisted by a total of 50 nursing sisters, and 350 male nurses. There were various other hospitals and health centres. Extensive campaigns had been conducted against endemic diseases, including malaria. Trypanosomiasis and leprosy were on the decline. Infant mortality had been reduced by 40 per cent.

238. As regards educational conditions, they described the position as fairly satisfactory, although there were certain shortcomings as regards full-time education, owing to the shortage of boarding schools. Generally speaking there was an adequate number of primary schools which included 302 public schools with permanent buildings. The over-all rate of school enrolment was 90.7 per cent and instruction was provided by 350 indigenous and European teachers. The average number of pupils per class was about forty-one. School children amounted to 14 per cent of the population. Pupils undergoing secondary, technical and vocational education accounted for 1.2 per cent of the population. For higher education, students had to go to Spain on scholarships or at their own expense.

239. The authors also claimed that during 1962, the total regional income was 2,036.5 million pesetas, or 7,922 pesetas per inhabitant. The cumulative annual rate of growth was 5.5 per cent. The export index of the Territory was possibly the highest in Africa. Almost all of the Territory's output went to Spain, since it received higher prices there than on the international market. A certain amount was also exported to the United States, the United Kingdom, Belgium, and other countries. The main products of the Territory were cacao, coffee and timber. Although there had been a small increase in the production of coffee by indigenous people, owing to an increase in the area cultivated, the farms of indigenous people were not as efficiently operated as the plantations and much remained to be done to increase the output and improve the quality. As regards timber production, for which concessions were awarded by auction, the initial capital required precluded indigenous participation. There was the possibility of cultivating new crops such as hevea, sisal, etc. and of improving existing products. Further, there were hopeful prospects for mining; the sedimentary geology of the Territory seemed to offer a good chance of finding deposits of petroleum, lignite, and radio-active and iron ores.

240. As regards labour conditions, the petitioners stated that the *per capita* income per worker amounted to 59 per cent of the average income in Equatorial Guinea. Rural co-operatives in cacao, coffee and vegetables, the commercial and industrial co-operatives as well as the timber syndicate were making satisfactory progress.

241. On political developments, they remarked that the movement towards decolonization had not failed to have some repercussions in the Territory, where a number of true indigenous nationalists had sought the strict application of the principle of respect for the right of all people to choose their form of government and the restoration of sovereign rights and self-government to people forcibly deprived of them. Accordingly, the Government of Spain, in keeping with the relevant provisions of the United Nations Charter, had decreed the present autonomous system. Recalling that in 1965 the President of the Governing Council, Mr. Bonifacio Ondó Edú had told the Fourth Committee of the General Assembly that MUNGE had been formed in order to combine the activities of existing political parties and thus to command the support of all the people, the petitioners believed that the best prospect for the development of political coexistence lay in the establishment of a political council which would study

the major political problems of the country and bring about understanding between the Spanish Government and the autonomous Government of the Territory.

242. They also recalled a declaration made in 1962 by Mr. Luis Carrero Blanco, Under-Secretary in the Office of the Presidency, that if one day the majority of the people of Equatorial Guinea wished to modify the present status of the Territory, Spain would see no objection to negotiating with it about its future. Mr. Carrero Blanco had also stated that no other country had more respect for self-determination than Spain. The people were therefore grateful for the efforts that Spain had made to promote the political, economic, social and cultural development of the Territory.

243. At the recent meetings of the Special Committee held in Algiers, Mr. Ondó Edú had stated that since the question of independence affected all the people directly, it would be advisable for all of them first to be given a thorough knowledge of the situation and then for them freely to express their opinions. This statement, as well as his support of the invitation extended by the Spanish delegation to the Special Committee represented a great occasion in the history of Equatorial Guinea. The leadership of MUNGE-IPGE was grateful for the Spanish gesture and requested the Sub-Committee to shoulder its responsibilities by studying the ways of meeting the aspirations of the people.

244. In conclusion, the petitioners observed that the expression of friendship and co-operation between Equatorial Guinea and Spain was in the interests of the peoples of both countries. It was the desire of the people of the Territory to develop this common interest. The Spanish Government had enabled Equatorial Guinea to reach a higher economic level than many developing countries. It had not only based its policies on the fundamental principles of human rights as recognized by the United Nations but had recognized the people of the Territory as being capable of self-government. They regarded the present autonomous system as a stage on the way to independence. At the same time, independence would not alienate them from Spain; rather it would enable them to appreciate their links and therefore to establish friendly relations on the basis of equality within the Hispanic community. Equatorial Guinea as an African country would never tolerate interference in its internal affairs and would respect the sovereignty of other countries, observing strict reciprocity in its relations with them.

245. For all the above reasons the leadership of MUNGE-IPGE was requesting that a date be set for the independence of Equatorial Guinea by means of cordial discussions between the Spanish Government and the political council of MUNGE-IPGE. The agreements resulting from these discussions should be registered with the United Nations.

246. On 22 August 1966, the Sub-Committee held a meeting with a group of thirty-two petitioners, representing the political *junta* of MUNGE-IPGE, led by Mr. Agustín Eñeso Ñeñe, the President of MUNGE, Mr. Justino Mba Nsue, Secretary-General of MUNGE, Mr. Antonino Eworo, President of IPGE, and Mr. Clemente Ateba, Secretary-General of IPGE.

247. Mr. Eñeso Ñeñe recalled that two weeks earlier MUNGE and IPGE had decided to form an alliance inasmuch as their aims and objectives were similar, Mr. Mba Nsue expressed appreciation of the initiative of the Spanish Government in inviting the Sub-Committee. This invitation was a reflection of the fact that the people of the Territory were beginning to assert their individuality and integrity. They were assuming positions of responsibility in increasing numbers. They desired independence as well as a broad measure of economic and social development, without jeopardizing their relations with Spain and the Hispanic world.

248. In response to questions, Mr. Mba Nsue explained that IPGE had been formed twelve years ago by exiles from the Territory in Cameroon, but that following the inauguration of the autonomous régime, MUNGE had been established with a view to combining all the political parties of the Territory in a single movement. Some time ago a number of exiles had returned from Cameroon, and two weeks earlier, as indicated by Mr. Eñeso Ñeñe, the leadership of the two movements had

come to the conclusion that an amalgamation was necessary in order to prepare for the future of the Territory. It was their hope that this amalgamation would be extended to include MONALIGE, and some talks had already taken place in this connexion.

249. In their view, a date for the independence of Equatorial Guinea should be fixed through negotiations between the Spanish Government and a delegation from the Territory comprising representatives drawn from the General Assembly and the leadership of MUNGE and IPGE. Meanwhile they requested that modifications be made to the present system in order to make it more efficient and democratic. They envisaged an independence constitution under which the President would be directly elected by universal adult suffrage and the General Assembly by an electoral college comprised of members of municipal councils.

250. Mr. Eworo stated that while agreement had been reached for the amalgamation of MUNGE and IPGE, the relevant instruments had not yet been drawn up. His group was in favour of complete independence, if possible by the end of 1966 or early 1967, but felt that it was for the Spanish Government to set the date, after consultation with representatives of the people at a round-table conference. Continuing, he stated that it was important for the people to be fully informed as to the political, economic and social situation and prospects of the Territory. His party regarded the autonomous régime only as a transitional stage during which the people would acquire the discipline and make the preparations necessary for the attainment of independence in the best possible conditions.

251. Mr. Eñeso Ñeñe added that they envisaged that one half of the membership of the General Assembly would be elected through universal adult suffrage and the other half by corporative bodies and co-operatives. The President, who would be elected by universal adult suffrage, would be empowered to select his own cabinet. The present electoral system under which the President was not directly elected was unsatisfactory. Mr. Ateba stated that all the legislative bodies should be composed of members directly elected by the people on the basis of universal adult suffrage.

252. In conclusion, Mr. Eñeso Ñeñe said, on behalf of MUNGE, that independence should be granted to the Territory not later than 15 July 1968, with the intervening period being devoted to negotiations in which all political parties, religious faiths, as well as members of the General Assembly and Governing Council would participate.

253. In reply to a question, the leaders of the group stated that they were not familiar with the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. Responding to another question, the leaders of MUNGE stated that, after consultation with their counterparts from IPGE, they were prepared to support the request of the IPGE group for independence during 1967. The IPGE leaders claimed for their party a membership of 160,000 and the MUNGE leaders asserted that their following combined with the membership of IPGE comprised 80 per cent of the population of the Territory. According to the leaders of IPGE, MONALIGE had in the past criticized MUNGE for opposing independence simply on the ground that the latter had expressed itself in favour of the autonomous system. However, now that it was clear that MUNGE was for independence, the chances had improved of the MUNGE-IPGE alliance being extended to include MONALIGE.

E. Meetings with groups and individuals affiliated to IPGE

254. At the outset of its work, the Sub-Committee took account of the statement made to the Special Committee at its 447th meeting on 15 June 1966 by a petitioner representing the Idea Popular de la Guinea Ecuatorial (IPGE). In that statement, the petitioner informed the Committee that the Spanish Government had been persecuting members of his party and those of another freedom movement, the Movimiento Nacional de Liberación de la Guinea Ecuatorial (MONALIGE); a large number of them had been imprisoned in a concentration camp on the island of Annobón. The granting of so-called

autonomy to the Territory had left the colonial status of the Territory unchanged. Indeed, the results of the referendum on the question of autonomy had been falsified by the Spanish authorities in order to permit the establishment of a supposedly autonomous Government which naturally took its orders from Spain.

255. In 1964, the Movimiento de Unificación Nacional de la Guinea Ecuatorial (MUNGE) which had been founded by members of the autonomous Government to serve the interests of the Spanish Europeans and the petty bourgeoisie, had been declared the only political party in the Territory. During that period, the people of Equatorial Guinea had been subjected to exile, expulsion, arbitrary sequestration, torture and assassination. An initiative taken by the leadership of IPGE and the MONALIGE to merge these parties in a new movement known as Frente Nacional y Popular de Liberación de la Guinea Ecuatorial (FRENAPO) had been frustrated by a decision of the Spanish authorities in March 1965 to recognize MONALIGE. This decision was followed by the proscription of IPGE and the relentless persecution of its members. In this connexion, the petitioner stated that the designs of the Spanish Government could be inferred from the presence of 12,000 troops in the country and of four warships as well as jet aircraft and parachutist commandos in the area.

256. In conclusion, the petitioner informed the Special Committee that IPGE was prepared to use violence if need be to defend the rights, freedom and dignity of the people of Equatorial Guinea. He requested, *inter alia*, that the Special Committee condemn Spanish colonialism in the Territory, urge the Spanish Government to grant unconditional independence to the Territory, and call on African Governments to extend to IPGE the necessary political, moral and material support.

257. Before undertaking its visit to Equatorial Guinea, the Sub-Committee also had before it a number of petitions from leaders of IPGE concerning the Territory (A/AC.109/PET.500/Add.1 and 2).

258. In these petitions, the leaders of IPGE complained of arrests, imprisonment, assassination and other acts of repression carried out against members of their party by the Spanish colonial authorities. According to them, the total number of Spanish soldiers stationed in the Territory had risen to 14,000 since 1959. The petitioners also protested against inequities and discriminatory practices which the African people of the Territory were suffering at the hands of the Spanish European element. They also asserted that the autonomous Government of the Territory was a puppet régime, in no way reflecting the aspirations of the people. They referred by way of illustration to a statement attributed to the President of the Governing Council in December 1965 to the effect that Equatorial Guinea was not yet ready for independence.

259. They called for the dissolution of the autonomous Government and for the taking of appropriate measures by the United Nations to avoid the disastrous results that had ensued in other colonial Territories where demands for independence remained unfulfilled.

260. Before its departure for the Territory, the Sub-Committee received a communication from Mr. Jesús Mba Ovono, Secretary-General of IPGE, in which he regretted his inability to appear before the Sub-Committee. He explained that he was in enforced exile in Brazzaville and that many other members of his party were in a similar situation in Algeria, Cameroon, Guinea and the United Arab Republic.

261. According to Mr. Mba Ovono, the problem confronting the Sub-Committee was simple. It was a question whether or not Equatorial Guinea should accede to independence in the shortest possible time. IPGE's reply to this question was in the affirmative, whereas the reply of the Spanish colonizers was in the negative. It was a problem which resided in the basic fact of the recognition by the United Nations and world opinion of the right of peoples to self-determination and independence.

262. He further observed that the extent of illiteracy and poverty in the Territory, which the Sub-Committee would

appreciate during its visit, was itself a condemnation of Spanish colonialism and a reason why the people must be freed from Spanish domination at the earliest possible time. It would be a contradiction to use the backwardness of the Territory as a justification for the maintenance of colonial rule.

263. In conclusion, he urged the Sub-Committee to break down the barriers which would be placed in the way of the people in their attempts to make contact with it. He also suggested that the Sub-Committee should not hesitate in the exercise of its rights to enter into discussions with people other than the indoctrinated groups acting under police supervision who would be presented to it.

264. On 22 August 1966, a number of members of IPGE presented a communication bearing five signatures to the Sub-Committee. In this communication, the authors declared that the idea of merging IPGE and MUNGE without the holding of a proper public meeting was nothing but an ambitious personal project of Mr. Antonino Eworo Obama and Mr. Clemente Ateba Nso, who had never been real members of IPGE. IPGE had been founded in Sevilla de Niefang on 30 September 1959 by Mr. Enrique Nkuna Ndongo, Chairman, Mr. Salvador Nsamiyo Ensema, Vice-Chairman, and Mr. Crisanto Masié Esono, Secretary. The Chairman and Vice-Chairman were at present Chairmen of the local committees of MONALIGE in the districts of Sevilla de Niefang and Micomeseng, respectively. According to the authors, this showed that the members of IPGE now supported MONALIGE.

265. Following its return to New York, the Sub-Committee received another communication from Mr. Jesús Mba Ovono. In this communication, Mr. Mba Ovono noted that the agreement signed by Spain with King Bankoro of Corisco in March 1778 set up a protectorate for a period of fifty years for the sole purpose of allowing trade contacts. This agreement did not involve any concession of territory or of powers of government, and stipulated that after the fifty-year period, its extension would be a matter for fresh negotiation. It was therefore clear that Spain never had any right, except that of armed force, to impose its rule on Equatorial Guinea. For this reason, many people in Equatorial Guinea had been dissatisfied with Spain colonization, and ever since the assassination of their leader, Mr. Acacio Mane Ela, in November 1959 by the Spanish authorities, had been preparing to fight openly against Spanish colonial rule.

266. Subsequently, the Spanish authorities, faced with the development of the liberation movement in the Territory, had intensified their repressive measures and had arrested, imprisoned and assassinated the nationalist leaders, a number of whom had been obliged to take refuge in neighbouring countries, particularly in Cameroon and Gabon. Further, the Spanish Government had carried out an intensive propaganda campaign designed to persuade the people not to ask for independence but simply to rest content with autonomy. It had devoted all its efforts to this end and having failed, it was preparing to bring bloodshed to the Territory. There were more than 14,000 Spanish soldiers in Equatorial Guinea, four warships were patrolling the coast and nine jet aircraft and a group of parachutists were stationed in the Territory. The installation of a puppet autonomous administration had only made the situation worse.

267. In March 1964, the Bubis had held a meeting at Santa Isabel, under the presidency of the then Commissioner-General of the Territory, at which they signed a document requesting the separation of Fernando Póo and Río Muni. This document was the result of manoeuvring on the part of the Spanish capitalist landowner settlers, and it was to be noted that these demands had recently been repeated by the Bubis.

268. Spanish colonialism was now preparing to grant independence of a neo-colonialist type with the collaboration of indigenous traitors who were simply protecting the interests of the Spaniards in Equatorial Guinea and acquiescing in the colonial exploitation of the Territory's resources. The statements made to the Sub-Committee by certain leaders of the Territory, particularly the President of the Governing Council and the President of the General Assembly ran counter to

the aspirations of the people of Equatorial Guinea who desired complete and immediate independence.

269. Nevertheless, Spain deserved gratitude for changing its former attitude and for its new willingness to grant independence to Equatorial Guinea. In these circumstances Spain should carry out the following measures as an indispensable condition for the granting of independence to the Territory at the earliest possible date: a general and unconditional amnesty for all political prisoners and exiles; the dissolution of the sham autonomous Government; recognition of IPGE and MUNGE and the organization of free elections under United Nations auspices on the basis of universal adult suffrage; a constitutional conference under United Nations supervision; the formation of a government on the basis of the results of the elections and the proclamation of independence; and lastly, the immediate withdrawal of Spanish military forces from the country.

270. In conclusion, Mr. Ovono expressed the hope that Spain and Equatorial Guinea would continue to maintain good relations both diplomatic and commercial in the future, on a footing of equality, and that Spain would comply as soon as possible with the desire of the people of the Territory for complete, immediate and sovereign independence.

F. Meetings with other groups and individuals

271. On 20 August 1966, the Sub-Committee held a meeting with a group of nineteen Bubis led by Mr. Augustín Santiago Sota Esele who stated that they were representing all the Bubis of Fernando Póo. Mr. Santiago Sota Esele informed the Sub-Committee that on 10 July 1966 a meeting of all the representatives of the Village Councils of Fernando Póo had been held in Rebola and had adopted a number of resolutions which were contained in a communication he had presented to the Sub-Committee. These resolutions contained a demand for the reconciliation and unification of all the villages in Fernando Póo and an endorsement of a recommendation stated to have been made by the Fernando Póo Provincial Council on 9 March 1965 for the abolition of all political parties. The resolutions also included a demand for the total separation of Fernando Póo and Río Muni and a request that the governmental organs of the Territory should take the necessary steps towards this end.

272. Mr. Santiago Sota Esele also informed the Sub-Committee that when its impending arrival became known, all the Bubis of Fernando Póo resident in Santa Isabel, San Fernando, San Carlos and forty-two villages, as well as in isolated farming communities held a meeting in Rebola on 18 August 1966. The proceedings of this meeting were contained in a communication bearing thirty-eight signatures which he had submitted to the Sub-Committee. In this communication the authors expressed support for the motion for separation submitted by the Bubi councillors, Mr. Aurelio Nicolas Itoha, Mr. Luis Maho Sicacha, Mr. Román Borico Toichoa and Mr. Gustavo Watson Bueco, at a meeting of the Governing Council held on 12 and 13 August 1966. They claimed that since the members from Río Muni constituted a majority in the General Assembly, the views of the members from Fernando Póo had been consistently disregarded. Further, the majority of projects for public works and improvements were carried out in Río Muni; while Fernando Póo contributed 81 per cent of the revenue, Río Muni accounted for 83 per cent of the expenditure.

273. The authors of the communication also reiterated a resolution adopted by them at a meeting in Santiago de Baney on 27 August 1964 in which they called for the complete separation of Fernando Póo and Río Muni. In support of this demand, they stated that unrestricted immigration to Fernando Póo by outsiders would lead to over-population, scarcity of land and unemployment. Recalling that Pope John XXIII, in his encyclical *Pacem in Terris*, had urged that ethnic minorities should be respected and their values encouraged, they asserted that unrestricted immigration would also result in a repression of the vitality and development of the Bubis. They claimed that their demand was in accordance with Article 73 e of the United Nations Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human

Rights and the Charter of the Organization of African Unity (OAU).

274. They also recalled that there were a number of countries, including Luxembourg, Andorra, Liechtenstein and Monaco, which were smaller in area than Fernando Póo but which were nevertheless sovereign independent States. If their demand for the complete separation of Fernando Póo and Río Muni were granted, each of the resulting entities would be ruled by its own autonomous administration, without prejudice to any assistance that they may wish to extend to each other. In conclusion, the authors of the communication stated that as soon as Fernando Póo had been separated from Río Muni, a commission appointed by the people of Fernando Póo should be established for the purpose of determining, in negotiation with Spain, the date of its independence. Subsequently, the State of Fernando Póo would proceed to conclude the necessary treaties of friendship with Spain in view of the close ties between the two countries and in gratitude for the work carried out by Spain.

275. Mr. Santiago Sota Esele also stated that the Bubis were in full support of the memorandum submitted by Mr. Nicolas Itoha, Councillor for Labour, on 20 August 1966. In response to questions, Mr. Santiago Sota Esele stressed that the Bubis desired independence, but not before the economic and administrative separation of Fernando Póo and Río Muni. Otherwise, serious difficulties might arise similar to those prevailing in other parts of Africa. Furthermore, the five members of the Governing Council from Río Muni, including the President, were in a position to outvote the four Bubi members from Fernando Póo on all questions. There was a real danger that the 200,000 people of Río Muni would increasingly disregard the interests of the 18,000 Bubis of Fernando Póo. Providence itself had segregated mankind into ethnic groups and man could not be presumed to know better. The Bubis wanted to be able to protect their families and property and their livelihood when independence was attained. They were disappointed with the autonomous administration for devoting a disproportionate amount of attention and expenditure to Río Muni.

276. On 1 August 1966, the Sub-Committee held a further meeting at Moka with a group of thirteen Bubis, also led by Mr. Santiago Sota Esele, who stated that they represented all the Bubis in the Moka area, including San Carlos and surrounding villages. He felt bound to emphasize, in view of allegations that had been made about them, that the Bubis were indeed the indigenous people of Fernando Póo and that their interests should be paramount in all matters relating to their country.

277. Mr. Juan Balboa Boneke informed the Sub-Committee that the views of the Bubis were contained in the documents presented to the Sub-Committee the previous day. It was the wish of the Bubis that the internal problems of the Territory be solved before independence was attained. The solution to these problems lay in the separation of Fernando Póo and Río Muni. If this solution were not arrived at, there would be conflict and bloodshed. For the Bubis it was a question of preserving their integrity. After separation they would negotiate the question of independence with Spain.

278. Mr. Domisio Sila stated that it was for the indigenous people of Fernando Póo to determine their own future. It was the Spanish Government which had imposed a false unity on the two parts of the Territory. The Bubis thought it essential that independence should be attained in conditions of peace and prosperity but there was a danger of conflict at the present time inasmuch as they were being pushed into an inferior position by people who had come to Fernando Póo as their guests. They were in favour of negotiations with Spain regarding independence but he shared the view that the internal problems of the Territory should be settled first.

279. On 21 August 1966 the Sub-Committee received a communication from Mr. Primo Mbomio Nso which contained a complaint that racial discrimination was rampant in the Territory. According to him, Spanish people had come to Equatorial Guinea to avail themselves of the wealth of the

Territory and had used the people as tools for the attainment of their ambition and desires without regard to the economic situation or well-being of the people. In the communication Mr. Mbomio Nso also stated that the indigenous worker who had served a firm for some five to eight years earned a smaller wage than a recently arrived Spanish worker even though the former did more work than the latter. Moreover, there were two rates of pay throughout the Territory, one for the Spanish worker and one for the indigenous worker. The Spanish community had done nothing for the Territory in the sense of industrial development. The indigenous people were housed in miserable dwellings while the Spanish residents lived in comfortable houses. In conclusion, he stated that the Spanish people had done great harm to the people of Equatorial Guinea.

280. On 21 August 1966 the Sub-Committee received a further communication from a group of indigenous workers. In this communication they complained that the Spanish worker received a wage of 10,000 pesetas with entitlements to housing, furniture, etc., while the indigenous worker was paid only 1,700 pesetas without any extras. Indigenous workers were not even given the opportunity to complain about their conditions of work. After 188 years of Spanish rule the Spanish Government had done nothing which could serve as an example to be emulated should the Territory become independent. Soon after the establishment of the autonomous régime, the Spanish Government had made all kinds of promises which remained unfulfilled, and many indigenous persons who opposed the Spanish authorities ran the risk of execution. The Spanish authorities had treated the people as slaves in their own country. This situation was clearly intended to make it impossible for them to achieve independence.

281. On 21 August 1966, a further communication bearing thirty signatures was presented to the Sub-Committee on behalf of the Fang residents in the district of San Carlos. In this communication, the authors stated that in 1915, indigenous workers from Río Muni were exported to Fernando Póo to supply the labour necessary for the exploitation of the latter. From that time onwards mutual co-operation of all kinds had developed among the inhabitants of the two parts of the Territory. Their acceptance of the unity of Fernando Póo and Río Muni had been embodied in the present Basic Law. The authors were therefore greatly surprised that the Councillors for Health and Welfare, Information and Tourism, Labour, and Industry and Mining should have submitted a motion in favour of the economic and administrative separation of the two parts of the Territory even before the end of the term of the present administration and without having any idea of the consequences of such a measure.

282. The Fangs resident in Fernando Póo were there in order to serve the country. It was to be noted that there were hundreds of workers and residents from other parts as well. They felt themselves to be at home and were therefore entitled to freedom of residence. According to the authors, the country was on the brink of economic chaos and this was the reason for recent disturbances. If the Bubis of Fernando Póo really had the interests of the country at heart they should be asking the Sub-Committee to arrange for the provision of economic assistance since it was for lack of financial and technical means that the resources of the country had not been developed. In conclusion, the authors stated that far from helping the country, the separation of Fernando Póo and Río Muni would contribute to its ruination.

G. Meeting with members of Río Muni Provincial Council

283. At a meeting held with members of the Río Muni Provincial Council on 22 August 1966, the President read a prepared statement on behalf of the members of that Council. In the statement, the members of the Provincial Council declared their desire for independence, with economic and military assistance from Spain. Only thus could the peace and security of the Territory be guaranteed. The experience of the past two years had taught them, first, that it was difficult for a small nation to live in isolation, secondly, that it would be preferable to have a greater degree of self-determination

and thirdly, that the Spanish Government, in their belief, was most willing to entertain their proposals. For these reasons they thought the time had come to negotiate with Spain the terms of independence for Equatorial Guinea.

284. In response to questions at a later meeting on 23 August 1966, they recalled that the General Assembly had previously adopted a motion calling for changes in the autonomous system and that the President of that body was expected to appoint a study group to examine and submit a report on the implications of that motion. One of the reasons for their desire for independence was that it would enable the Territory to avail itself of assistance from the United Nations and other international bodies. Further, this desire was independent of the willingness or otherwise of the Spanish Government to continue extending economic assistance. The present time was propitious for the beginning of negotiations for independence. They envisaged that following these negotiations, a plebiscite would be held on an independence constitution, the votes of which should be counted for the Territory as a whole, rather than for its component parts.

285. Referring to conditions in the Territory, they mentioned that there were only six indigenous doctors in the whole Territory, four of whom were in Río Muni. As regards the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, some of them had knowledge of it from their compatriots in Gabon and Cameroon; others were not aware of it and would wish that copies be made available to them.

IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. Conclusions

286. In accordance with its terms of reference and having ascertained the conditions in the Territory with a view to speeding up the implementation of General Assembly resolutions 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960 and 2067 (XX) of 16 December 1965, the Sub-Committee on Equatorial Guinea has reached the following conclusions.

287. The Government of Spain has stated on several occasions that independence would be granted to the Territory when the people ask for it. These statements have given rise to an understanding among the people that the present régime of autonomy represents the last stage of constitutional development towards complete independence.

288. However, the expectations of the people that at this stage they would participate effectively in the control and management of their own affairs have not been fulfilled. This autonomous régime is also unsatisfactory to some members of the Governing Council. Most of the powers are still vested in and exercised by the Commissioner-General and the Spanish Government. Neither the Governing Council nor the General Assembly wields effective power even within the scope of its competence.

289. The electoral system which is not only indirect, but is based mainly on selective corporative representation and to a lesser extent on the vote of heads of families through municipal councils, limits participation to only a small minority of the adult population in the election of representatives to governmental organs. For this reason these organs are highly unrepresentative of the people as a whole and are not a reflection of their freely expressed will and desire. In this connexion, the Sub-Committee notes that there is strong support among the people for a system of direct elections on the basis of universal adult suffrage.

290. Although people were able to appear before the Sub-Committee as petitioners, evidence indicates that freedom of political activity is curtailed. Political parties are not accorded official recognition. There was also evidence that persons expressing political opinions unwelcome to the administering Power were liable to harassment. Some petitioners complained that the presence of Spanish military forces in the Territory has an intimidating effect on the people. Further evidence was presented that justice and, in particular, criminal laws were unequally applied to the detriment of the Africans.

291. There are some tendencies favouring the separation of Fernando Póo and Río Muni with regard to certain budgetary and administrative matters. However, these views are held only by a small minority among the Bubis of Fernando Póo and by certain vested interests. They are not shared by the vast majority of the people nor by any of the major political parties. Further, it is the wish of the majority of the people that the Territory should accede to independence as one unit.

292. From the consultations held by the Sub-Committee with the people, it is clear that there is unanimity among all sections of the population in favour of the attainment of independence without delay. This view is shared by the various political parties and by most members of the Governing Council, including its President. There is also a unanimous desire that the negotiations with the Spanish Government should begin immediately for the transfer of all powers to the people of the Territory.

293. Recalling that the Spanish Government has undertaken to grant independence to the Territory when the people ask for it, the bodies, groups and individuals with whom the Sub-Committee held consultations made a variety of suggestions as to the date on which the Territory should accede to independence. These suggestions ranged from independence with immediate effect, to independence by the end of the term of the present Governing Council in July 1968.

294. On the basis of the foregoing, it is clear that the desire of the vast majority of the people of the Territory is for independence not later than July 1968. The fixing of a definite date, however, would seem to depend on the outcome of a conference between the administering Power and the various political parties of the Territory and all sections of the population. It is also clear from the evidence received by the Sub-Committee that the wish of the majority of the people is for United Nations participation in the processes leading to the independence of the Territory.

295. As regards economic conditions, the Sub-Committee noted that the economy of the Territory is basically dependent on cacao and coffee and is characterized by a lack of diversification. It is now admitted by the Spanish Government that this situation is unsatisfactory. The Sub-Committee noted that most of the commerce of the Territory is in foreign hands.

296. Although the Spanish Government has in recent years extended more aid to Equatorial Guinea through support of its main export products, its contributions to the budget and the maintenance of economic and social programmes in the area and the steps taken by it in the field of economic development have been slow and inadequate particularly in the continental part of the Territory. The Sub-Committee also noted that at no time has the administering Power undertaken effective measures to reduce the economic dependence of the Territory on Spain and to enable it to achieve rapid and balanced economic development. Further, the Sub-Committee took note with satisfaction of the statement by the Spanish Government that it would continue to grant assistance to Equatorial Guinea even after the Territory attains independence.

297. A number of petitions and petitioners expressed the need for a change in the land tenure system obtaining in the Territory. They stated that the present system was not only unfair to the indigenous people but also tended to encourage ownership of land by expatriate Spanish nationals and companies. The present system of auctions, which are held in Madrid, favours the wealthier land purchasers to the detriment of the indigenous population. Furthermore, in many cases the legal provisions limiting the permissible acquisition of property by one person or corporation have been successfully circumvented.

298. With regard to labour conditions, the present legislation favours expatriate Spanish nationals in preference to the African workers. There is gross disparity in the wages and other conditions of service granted to the Spanish and the African workers. Most of the positions of authority and responsibility in public administration as well as in the private

sector are filled by expatriate Spanish nationals. The formation of trade unions representing the workers vis-à-vis the employers is not permitted.

299. As regards educational conditions, the Sub-Committee noted that in spite of steps recently taken by the administering Power, there is a shortage of educational institutions and particularly institutions of secondary education and higher learning, as well as of teaching staff. Consequently, educational opportunities in the Territory are limited. At the same time, the number of students sent from the Territory to acquire higher knowledge or special skills abroad is inadequate to the needs of the Territory.

B. Recommendations

300. In the light of the discussions held with the administering Power and the autonomous authorities, the evidence received, and the conclusions reached above, the Sub-Committee considers that the Special Committee should make the following recommendations.

301. That the administering Power should immediately convene a conference, in which the various political parties of the Territory and all sections of the population would be fully represented, in order to establish the modalities for the transfer of all powers to the people without delay, and to fix a date for independence which, in response to the wishes of the people, should be not later than July 1968.

302. That in the meantime, the administering Power should undertake the speedy transfer of effective governmental powers to the representatives of the Territory.

303. That the administering Power should remove all restrictions on political activities and establish full democratic freedoms.

304. That the administering Power should replace the present electoral system by a system based on universal adult suffrage, and that elections should be held on this basis before independence.

305. That the administering Power should establish in law and in practice full equality of political, economic, social and other rights and should in particular:

(a) Reform the legislation and practice relating to land tenure bearing in mind the principle that the interests of the people of the Territory are paramount;

(b) Reform the legislation and practice relating to labour conditions in order to promote the interests of the African worker and ensure respect for the principle of equal pay for equal work;

(c) Permit the formation of representative trade unions which would defend and promote the interests of the workers;

(d) Ensure the equal application of justice without regard to race, creed or colour.

306. That the administering Power should intensify its assistance to the Territory and take effective measures for balanced economic diversification and rapid economic development of the Territory.

307. That a study be undertaken by the Special Committee in consultation with the administering Power and representatives of Equatorial Guinea on the best ways of securing the assistance of the specialized agencies, especially as regards economic diversification, education and health.

308. That the administering Power should establish institutions of secondary education and higher learning in the Territory and accelerate training programmes adequate to the urgent needs of Equatorial Guinea, including the training of Africans in various fields of administration and positions of high responsibility.

309. That the administering Power should continue to co-operate with the United Nations by ensuring United Nations participation in the processes leading to the independence of the Territory.

310. That the administering Power should undertake a full-scale circulation of the present report on Equatorial Guinea and the dissemination in the Territory of the Declaration on

the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV)) as well as the relevant documentation on the work of the Special Committee.

V. ADOPTION OF THE REPORT

311. This report was unanimously adopted by the Sub-Committee at its thirteenth meeting held at Headquarters on 18 October 1966.

Appendix I

ITINERARY AND PROGRAMME OF MEETINGS

Wednesday, 17 August 1966

A.M. Arrival in Madrid.

Meeting with the Director-General of African Settlements and Provinces (*Plazas y Provincias Africanas*), Office of the Presidency, and other senior officials.

Meeting with the Secretary-General of the Trade Unions Centre, the National Under-Secretary for Economic Co-ordination (*Vicesecretario Nacional de Ordenación Económica*), and other senior officials.

P.M. Meeting with the Assistant Commissioner for the Economic and Social Development Plan, and the Secretary of the Committee for the Economic Development of Fernando Póo and Río Muni.

Visit to Our Lady of Africa University College (*Colegia Mayor Universitario Nuestra Señora de Africa*).

Thursday, 18 August 1966

A.M. Meeting with the Under-Secretary, Ministry of Labour and other senior officials of the Ministry.

Visit to the First School of Intensified Professional Training (*Centro Número 1 de Formación Profesional Acelerada*).

P.M. Departure from Madrid.

Friday, 19 August 1966

A.M. Arrival at Santa Isabel (Fernando Póo, Equatorial Guinea).

Meeting with the President and members of the General Assembly.

P.M. Meeting with the President and members of the Governing Council.

Meeting with representatives of Movimiento Nacional de Liberación de la Guinea Ecuatorial (MONALIGE).

Saturday, 20 August

A.M. Meeting with the Commissioner-General.

Visit to the Santa Isabel Hospital.

Meeting with the President and members of the Governing Council.

P.M. Meeting with representatives of MONALIGE.

Meeting with the President and members of the Governing Council.

Meeting with Bubi representatives.

Sunday, 21 August

A.M. Departure from Santa Isabel.

Arrival at Moka (central Fernando Póo).

Meeting with Bubi representatives.

Departure from Moka.

Visit to San Carlos (central Fernando Póo).

Arrival at Santa Isabel.

P.M. Meeting with representatives of MONALIGE.

Meeting with representatives of Movimiento de Unificación Nacional de la Guinea Ecuatorial (MUNGE).

Meeting with the President and members of the Governing Council.

Monday, 22 August

A.M. Departure from Santa Isabel.

Arrival in Bata (Río Muni).

P.M. Meeting with the President and members of the Provincial Council.

Meeting with representatives of *junta* of MUNGE and Idea Popular de la Guinea Ecuatorial (IPGE).

Meeting with representatives of MONALIGE.

Tuesday, 23 August

A.M. Meeting with the Civil Governor.

Meeting with the President and members of the Provincial Council.

P.M. Meeting with representatives of MONALIGE

Meeting with the Commissioner-General and other Spanish officials.

Wednesday, 24 August

A.M. Departure from Bata.

Arrival at Santa Isabel.

Meeting with the President of the Governing Council.

Departure from Santa Isabel.

Appendix II

REPRESENTATIVES OF CORPORATIVE BODIES AND CO-OPERATIVES ELECTED TO MUNICIPAL COUNCILS

Fernando Póo

	Number of representatives
Annobón:	
Corporative bodies and co-operatives	2
San Carlos:	
Corporative bodies	2
Co-operatives	2
San Fernando:	
Corporative bodies and co-operatives	3
Santa Isabel:	
Corporative bodies	3
Co-operatives	2

Río Muni

Acurenam:	
Corporate bodies and co-operatives	3
Bata:	
Corporative bodies	4
Co-operatives	1
Ebebiyín:	
Corporative bodies and co-operatives	5
Evinayong:	
Corporative bodies and co-operatives	4
Micomeseng:	
Corporative bodies and co-operatives	4
Mongomo de Guadalupe:	
Corporative bodies and co-operatives	4
N'sork:	
Corporative bodies and co-operatives	3

	<i>Number of representatives</i>
Puerto Iradier:	
Corporative bodies and co-operatives	4
Río Benito:	
Corporative bodies and co-operatives	4
Sevilla de Niefang:	
Corporative bodies and co-operatives	4
Valladolid de los Bimbiles:	
Corporative bodies and co-operatives	4
TOTAL	58

Appendix III

REPRESENTATIVES OF HEADS OF FAMILIES ELECTED TO MUNICIPAL COUNCILS

	<i>Number of representatives</i>
<i>Fernando Póo</i>	
Annobón	2
San Carlos	4
San Fernando	3
Santa Isabel	5
<i>Río Muni</i>	
Acurenám	3
Bata	5
Ebebiyín	5
Evinayong	4
Micomeseng	4
Mongomo de Guadalupe	4
N'sork	3
Puerto Iradier	4
Río Benito	4
Sevilla de Niefang	4
Valladolid de los Bimbiles	4
TOTAL	58

Appendix IV

BREAKDOWN OF ELECTORATE (HEADS OF FAMILIES) AT MUNICIPAL COUNCIL LEVEL IN 1964

<i>Provinces and municipalities</i>	<i>Population of municipality</i>	<i>Number of electors on electoral rolls</i>	<i>Number of electors voting</i>
<i>Fernando Póo</i>			
Annobón	1,881	421	312
San Carlos	10,535	2,592	1,577
San Fernando	3,157	898	357
Santa Isabel	28,180	5,708	3,585
TOTAL	43,753	9,619	5,831
<i>Río Muni</i>			
Acurenám	9,280	1,853	1,724
Bata	25,760	8,583	5,381
Ebebiyín	31,752	7,640	5,929
Evinayong	18,509	4,661	4,397
Micomeseng	17,125	5,622	4,384
Mongomo de Guadalupe	12,039	3,062	2,711
N'sork	8,894	2,872	2,375
Puerto Iradier	12,118	3,239	2,245
Río Benito	12,792	4,404	2,518
Sevilla de Niefang	19,764	5,923	4,021
Valladolid de los Bimbiles	14,145	5,075	3,770
TOTAL	182,178	52,984	39,455
Total Equatorial Guinea (municipalities)	225,931	62,603	45,286

CHAPTER X*

IFNI AND SPANISH SAHARA

A. ACTION PREVIOUSLY TAKEN BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE AND THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

1. In 1964, the Special Committee considered Ifni and Spanish Sahara and adopted a resolution which is contained in the Special Committee's report to the General Assembly at its nineteenth session (A/5800/Rev.1,¹ chap. IX, para. 112). At its meetings in 1965, the Special Committee did not consider these Territories, but included information on them in its report to the General Assembly at its twentieth session (A/6000/Rev.1,² chap. X).

2. At its twentieth session, the General Assembly adopted resolution 2072 (XX) of 16 December 1965. The resolution reads as follows:

"The General Assembly,

"Having considered the chapters of the reports of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the

Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples relating to Ifni and Spanish Sahara,

"Recalling the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples contained in its resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960,

"Bearing in mind that the Declaration is inspired by the strong desire of the international community to put an end to colonialism wherever and in whatever form it may occur,

"1. Approves the provisions of the resolution concerning Ifni and Spanish Sahara adopted on 16 October 1964 by the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples;

"2. Urgently requests the Government of Spain, as the administering Power, to take immediately all necessary measures for the liberation of the Territories of Ifni and Spanish Sahara from colonial domination and, to this end, to enter into negotiations on the problems relating to sovereignty presented by these two Territories;

* Previously issued under the symbol A/6300/Add.7.

¹ Official Records of the General Assembly, Nineteenth Session, Annexes, annex No. 8 (part I).

² Ibid., Twentieth Session, Annexes, addendum to agenda item 23.

"3. Requests the Special Committee to report on the implementation of the present resolution to the General Assembly at its twenty-first session;

"4. Requests the Secretary-General to transmit this resolution to the administering Power."

3. The Secretary-General transmitted this resolution to the administering Power on 10 January 1966.

B. INFORMATION ON THE TERRITORIES³

1. Ifni

General

4. The Moslem inhabitants of the Territory are governed by their own civil laws, the Sharia courts having jurisdiction in civil and labour matters with the status of Territorial Courts. Moslems are exempt from military service, but they may enlist voluntarily in the Army or the Police and may hold officers' commissions.

5. The indigenous inhabitants of the Territory have access to the municipal administrative organs on a footing of equality with their European neighbours. Three of the present Council members are Moslems.

6. In the matter of wages, there is no discrimination on the basis of ethnic origin or social class. The labour laws provide that indigenous workers are to be paid the wages appropriate to their respective occupations and labour categories and that they are entitled to dependency and cost-of-living allowances, paid vacations, sickness and accident insurance, and other social security benefits.

Public health and welfare

7. Public health services consist of a network of dispensaries staffed by doctors, auxiliaries and assistants and a hospital (at present equipped with 200 beds) which provides, *inter alia*, the following services: general medicine, general surgery, traumatology, gynaecology, child health and paediatrics. The hospital is to be enlarged this year; a new surgical complex with two operating rooms will be built and the number of beds increased.

8. A total of 12 million⁴ pesetas was spent on public health services during 1965.

9. The maternity services of the hospital are being used by a growing number of Moslem women who come to the hospital for their deliveries.

10. In the provincial hospital, patients of both religions share the same accommodations and no distinction is made between them except as regards diet, in which the Koranic precepts are observed for Moslems.

11. In the matter of preventive medicine, there are periodic vaccination campaigns and campaigns to promote sanitation in homes and meeting places.

12. The "Gobernador Artalejo" Residence, opened at the beginning of the year, provides a home and medical care for those who, because of age, lack of a family or physical disability, voluntarily choose to enter it. This institution, which now accommodates forty residents and is to be expanded, was built at a cost of 2.5 million pesetas.

³ The information presented in this section is taken from information transmitted by Spain on 28 June 1966 under Article 73 e of the Charter.

⁴ The local currency is the Spanish peseta, which is equal to \$US0.0168.

13. Another welfare development is the establishment of the Organization for the Blind, which provides a decent livelihood for blind persons who in the past were unable to earn their living by other means.

14. In the field of social welfare in Ifni, it is noted that more than 5.5 million pesetas in retirement and widows' pensions were paid during 1965.

Education

15. In addition to the primary schools for both sexes, there are numerous Koranic schools which are subsidized by the local administration and attended by children whose parents wish them to have this type of education. During the 1966-1967 academic year two new school units, which have already been completed and can accommodate 180 pupils each, will go into operation and a new pre-school unit with five classes will probably be opened.

16. At these educational centres, each pupil receives a glass of milk as a diet supplement and many of them are given their noonday meal.

17. Secondary education is provided by the National Institute, established in 1963 to take the place of the Secondary Education Centre which has been operating in the Territory for the previous twenty years. It is attended by pupils who hope ultimately to study at the university level.

18. For those pupils who do not wish to go on to the university, there is a vocational school, which has a current enrolment of 156. The construction in 1962 of the new building in which this school is housed cost 3.5 million pesetas.

19. Studies above the secondary level are pursued outside the Territory, and scholarships are offered for this purpose. Seventy-four persons at present are studying with the aid of scholarships.

20. There is also a Preparatory School of Agriculture at which pupils nearing the end of their studies are introduced to the theoretical and practical fundamentals of this occupation.

Public works

21. The subsidy for public works to the local budget during the last financial year was 29 million pesetas.

22. A new pier was built at State expense despite the natural difficulties presented by the coastline. A port-island, linked to the mainland by a cable railway, was constructed for the purpose. The cost of the project was 210 million pesetas.

Economy

23. The budget of the Territory, which in 1964 amounted to 65 million pesetas, rose to 85 million for the year under review. This figure does not include supplementary and special credits.

24. Efforts are being made to improve agriculture and make it more productive. As a result, fruit is now being grown on land which until recently produced only barley. This programme, which is being carried out at State expense, calls for the consolidation of land holdings with the consent of the owners and the establishment of farmers' associations to work the land under a co-operative system.

25. Attention has also been given to housing construction. A development consisting of 464 houses was recently completed at a total cost of 160 million pesetas.

The Territory contributed 13.5 million pesetas to cover the cost of roads linking the development to the urban centre, the purchase of lots and the provision of electric power and drinking water. Another development is under construction at Id U Faqueh; twelve houses and the mosque have already been completed.

Communications

26. Air transport between the Territory and other countries is provided by Iberia Air Lines and maritime transport is provided under an agreement with a shipping company. The road network affords access to all rural localities.

2. Spanish Sahara

27. The Spanish Sahara has a population of 25,000, consisting for the most part of nomadic herdsmen. The administering Power reports that the most significant effort made in the Territory has been "the gradual stabilization and settlement of the population and the establishment of the basic prerequisites for a census and for the development of the first organs of administration and government on these initial foundations".

Political and social conditions

28. The Governor-General, who has a civilian status, is the highest administrative authority and the departments of education, health, public works, architecture, telecommunications, mining, finance and labour are the executive organs.

29. Organs of local administration are the *cabildo* (territorial council), currently headed by Seila Uld Abeida Uld Sid Ahmed, the municipal councils of El Aaiún and Villa Cisneros where the mayor is Suilem Uld Abdelahé Uld Ahmed Brahim, and smaller local units at Smara and Güera. There are also "nomadic sections", which are of a special nature in that they embrace those Saharans who, because they are herdsmen, cannot participate in the municipal organs.

30. The members of these bodies are selected either directly by the population or through the corporations, industry, commerce and the professions. The Christian community is represented in all of them with the exception of the nomadic sections, but proportionately much less than the Moslem community because it accounts for a considerably smaller percentage of the population. Matters arising among Moslems are settled quite independently by Sharia justice whose written and customary laws are applied in full.

31. There is religious freedom. Mosques have been built at the expense of the Spanish State, which also pays the salaries of the fakirs and professors of the Koran. Each year, the Administration sponsors the Saharan Moslems' pilgrimage to Mecca.

32. In the social field, mention should be made of the child-care dispensaries and kindergartens which have been established; according to the information received, the high infant mortality, which was impeding the growth of the nomadic population, has virtually disappeared. Primary education is provided as part of the State educational system, which extends throughout the desert. There are also secondary educational establishments, and higher education is provided by means of scholarships. The social security system in force in Spain is applied in the Sahara; it guarantees a minimum wage, unemployment benefits, health care and old-age and disability pensions. These benefits are provided on an equal basis for Christians and Moslems.

33. Nomadism is giving way to a settled mode of life, as the development of the Territory creates urban centres and, with them, employment opportunities. The Territory now has towns, such as El Aaiún and Villa Cisneros, in which 1,447 modern dwellings have been built recently. Urban centres have been appearing in the desert; there are some larger ones, such as Smara, Auserd, in the middle of the desert, and Güera, the port in the southern region, and other smaller centres. All have electric light, water, schools, dispensaries, etc.

34. An Advisory Council was recently established whose aim was to implement a plan for the development of the Territory. It is composed of representatives of the authorities, the technical departments of the Administration and the nomadic population. The latter is represented by its traditional chiefs.

Public health and welfare

35. There are maternity clinics, headed by qualified specialists, in the hospitals at El Aaiún and Villa Cisneros. In the inland villages, these services are provided by general practitioners, and patients can be evacuated in Health Department ambulances or in aircraft if specialized treatment is required.

36. These two towns also have child-care dispensaries which are under the direction of child-care specialists. In addition, children from the inland villages who cannot be treated with normal resources and skills are referred to these centres. For this purpose, examinations are conducted regularly in all schools.

37. For adult patients, there is a general hospital in El Aaiún which provides the normal hospital services (radiology, clinical analysis, surgery, internal medicine, dentistry, otorhinolaryngology, ophthalmology, etc.). There is a district hospital at Villa Cisneros, which provides the same services but has fewer beds.

38. In the villages of Smara, Auserd and Güera, health services are provided at nursing dispensaries under the direction of qualified doctors. These dispensaries have twenty beds each and serve as the first reference echelon for the rural dispensaries. The smaller villages have mobile dispensaries which are also staffed by doctors.

39. The Health Department of the Territory has a fleet of ambulances, and, for very urgent cases, aircraft which transport patients to the first echelon (the nursing dispensaries at Smara, Auserd and Güera) and the second (the hospitals at El Aaiún and Villa Cisneros).

40. Spanish Sahara has the following medical centres: one provincial hospital at El Aaiún (150 beds), one district hospital at Villa Cisneros (50 beds) and one hospital at Güera; 2 child-care dispensaries (at El Aaiún and Villa Cisneros); 2 mobile dispensaries; 2 maternity clinics; and a nursing dispensary at Smara and one at Auserd, each with 20 beds. In addition there is a dispensary in each of the villages of Hausa, Echdeiria, Mahbes, Hagunia, Bojador, Guelta Zemmur, Bu Craa, Tichla and Bir N'Zarán and a health post in each of the villages of Edchera, El Farsia, Agracha and Aguenit.

41. The Head of the Health Department is a doctor as are the directors of the hospitals at El Aaiún and Villa Cisneros. The centres are staffed by the following personnel: 10 specialists for the hospital; 2 pharmacists for the hospitals; 15 doctors for the urban and rural mobile dispensaries; 40 auxiliary health technicians from the National Health Corps; 50 qualified

health workers; 20 nursing sisters; and subordinate and cleaning staff.

42. As regards public welfare, unemployment benefits are paid to all Saharans who have no paid employment (at present, there are not more than 200 unemployed). Elderly persons, invalids and destitute children receive a monthly food ration which provides them with a minimum diet. Planning and financial arrangements have been made for the establishment of homes for these needy persons, who will receive complete care on a residential basis.

Education

43. Children aged two to six are admitted to the children's homes (*hogares de la infancia*) at El Aaiún and Villa Cisneros, on a semi-residential basis. The children are fed and clothed. In 1965 there were 300 pupils and ten teachers.

44. Primary education is given in school groups and multi-grade schools. These schools are constructed in localities where there are at least thirty pupils. So that no Saharan child will be denied an opportunity to obtain an education, portable schools have been introduced, which follow the groups of nomads in their search for pastures for their livestock. All the pupils are clothed, shod and fed at school wardrobes and dining-rooms. In 1965, there were ten school groups, twelve multi-grade schools and six mobile schools. There were fifty-seven national teachers, twenty-nine teachers of Hassania and the Koran. The total enrolment in primary schools was 2,200.

45. Secondary education is provided at the Institutes of Secondary Education at El Aaiún and Villa Cisneros, which are State-run centres. There are thirty-two teachers at these institutes and 466 pupils. For higher education, pupils are given scholarships, with no limitation on the number awarded.

46. Saharan students who are not qualified for other types of instruction are given vocational training. Until now, this training has been provided either in the Territory itself, through courses for health workers, driver-mechanics and construction workers, or at special vocational training schools in Spain, which give intensive training to sixty pupils a year. Because of this activity, it was thought advisable to establish vocational schools in the Territory itself, and plans have been drawn up and funds provided for centres at El Aaiún and Villa Cisneros.

Public works

Urban development

47. The towns of El Aaiún and Villa Cisneros and the villages of Smara and Güera have asphalt roads, water mains and sewer systems. The other villages also have water supply systems and small electric power stations.

Roads

48. Primary roads exist between El Aaiún and Playa (25 km.), Villa Cisneros and Aargub (20 km.), Güera and the Mauritanian frontier (4 km.). There are tertiary roads from El Aaiún to Daora (45 km.), El Aaiún to Edchera (30 km.), El Aaiún to Smara (180 km.), Smara to Hausa (20 km.), Hausa to Edchera (10 km.), El Aaiún to Cabo Bojador (80 km.) and along the detour to Guelta Zemmur (26 km.). These roads enable traffic to cross the desert and reach

all important centres. They are four metres wide and asphalted.

Ports

49. The port of Villa Cisneros is equipped with all services for maritime traffic; other facilities include wharves at El Aaiún and Güera and a wharf for unloading minerals.

Airports

50. The Territory's facilities include an airport at El Aaiún with asphalt runways which can be used by Caravelle jets, a similar airport at Villa Cisneros and several landing fields.

Economy

51. The Territory's budgetary deficit, representing 80 per cent of total expenditure, is met by the Spanish State. What little revenue there is comes mainly from civil servants. The indigenous inhabitants pay no taxes.

52. The report transmitted by the administering Power states that the desert character of the Territory is the reason for its poverty. The sparse population provides little opportunity for trade; the lack of raw materials accounts for the absence of industry; the soil, for the most part rocky and sandy, is not suitable for agriculture or for cattle-raising, and in addition, the climate is harsh and water scarce; there are indications that the sub-soil contains minerals, but it is doubtful that they can be profitably exploited since the deposits are at such a great distance from possible embarkation points; finally, the coastline is very steep and has not natural harbours suitable for the construction of ports, so that possibilities for trade and the establishment of fishing fleets are extremely limited.

53. Nevertheless, efforts are being made to exploit all available resources with a view to developing the Sahara. A brief outline of these efforts is set out below.

Agriculture

54. In the last few years, farming trials have been conducted in the areas where the existence of both topsoil and water gives some hope for agricultural viability. There is an experimental centre at Villa Cisneros, which supplies excellent green vegetables of all kinds for local consumption. However, the large-scale work is being done in the Aargub District, where 150 hectares are currently being prepared for farming trials, particularly the cultivation of cereals, forage crops and vegetables. This was made possible by the discovery of a large sheet of underground water, which rises under its own pressure from a depth of 450 metres. If, as is hoped, the experiment is successful, as much as 5,000 hectares can be farmed in the southern region of the Territory alone. According to the information received, it is not claimed that agriculture will save the economy, but it will help to meet local needs and, above all, produce forage which can be used to feed livestock in periods of prolonged drought when natural forage dries up. In addition, market gardens are being planted in the Northern District in places which have water; they are expected to help hundreds of families, who will consume part of the produce and sell the surplus in the urban centres. This work is being done by the Government at its own expense; once the market gardens are ready,

they will be turned over to the Saharan families, who will cultivate them with technical assistance from the Department of Agriculture.

Cattle-raising

55. This is dependent upon agriculture, and the administering Power reports that no attempt is being made to turn the desert into a cattle-raising centre. Unfavourable geographical conditions preclude the adaptation of species of the right number and quality for export. The aim is rather to keep the camel herds in good condition and also the sheep and goat herds, which adapt so well to this terrain. An attempt will also be made to introduce zebus, whose meat is prized more highly than that of the camel. In this way, and through the agricultural development described above, the nomadic population is being ensured a livelihood at low cost.

Industry

56. The almost complete absence of industry is explained by the fact that until now there have been no raw materials to be processed. However, an attempt is being made to develop this branch of the economy by taking advantage of the opportunities afforded by fishing. Since the port of Villa Cisneros has been completed and there is an abundant supply of drinking water in the area, it is hoped that fishing industries will be established. Two factories producing by-products are already in operation at Güera, and it is planned to install industrial freezers at Villa Cisneros so that the large catch can be frozen and then exported to consumer markets.

Trade

57. Small-scale trade is the only kind to be found in the Territory.

Transport

58. The population centres of the Territory are linked by roads or tracks that are easily accessible to vehicles, which have replaced camels as a means of transport. These routes, which are described in paragraph 45 above, are sometimes asphalt roads, like the El Aaiún-Smara road, which is 180 kilometres long. Others, however, are tracks running over the land itself, which is good enough for normal vehicular traffic; actual roads are built only in stretches of rocky or sandy soil where normal traffic would be difficult.

59. For maritime traffic there are regular lines stopping at El Aaiún, Villa Cisneros and Güera. In addition, specially chartered vessels provide irregular service in bringing supplies into the Territory.

60. Air travel, which is the most frequent form of travel between the Territory and Spain—either directly or via the Canary Islands—is provided by two airline companies which have three flights a day between them, both to the Canary Islands and to Spain. In addition, there are several flights a day by another company during the tourist season in the Canary Islands.

Telecommunications

61. The telecommunication services functioning in the Sahara are:

(a) A radio network which enables El Aaiún, Villa Cisneros and the most important inland villages to

communicate with the rest of the world and provides services for radiograms, long-distance calls and the transfer of money;

(b) A 5-kilowatt radio transmitter which gives clear reception throughout the Territory, in the Canary Islands, in southern Morocco and at the Mauritanian border;

(c) A television relay station which transmits programmes from the Canary Islands.

C. CONSIDERATION BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE

Introduction

62. The Special Committee considered the questions of Ifni and Spanish Sahara at its 435th and 436th meetings held in Addis Ababa on 7 June 1966.

63. By letters dated 31 May, 4 June and 5 June 1966 (A/AC.109/174, A/AC.109/175 and A/AC.109/176) the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Mauritania, the Permanent Representative of Morocco and the Ambassador of Spain in Ethiopia asked that delegations of their respective Governments be permitted to participate in the discussions of the Special Committee on the questions of Ifni and Spanish Sahara.

64. At the 435th meeting, the Special Committee decided without objection to accede to these requests.

65. By a letter dated 7 June 1966 (A/AC.109/176/Add.1), the Ambassador of Spain in Ethiopia stated that his delegation would not participate in the discussion of the question of Ifni and Spanish Sahara.

General statements

66. The representative of *Morocco*, speaking at the Chairman's invitation, said that ever since the Kingdom of Morocco had won back its freedom and independence and had become a Member of the United Nations, the constant concern of His Majesty the King had always been to regain the Moroccan Territories which remained under colonial domination and had been separated from the country under an arbitrary and annexionist policy carried out at its expense by the Powers which had placed it under the jurisdiction of their respective protectorates. That situation, which was a legacy of colonialism and was completely unjust and contrary to the international agreements and treaties guaranteeing the Kingdom of Morocco's territorial integrity, had inevitably given rise to growing and persistent opposition from the whole Moroccan people, including those living in the regions separated from Morocco.

67. The Moroccan Government firmly believed in negotiated and peaceful solutions and based its policy on the threefold principle of law, justice and respect for commitments. Thus, in the very first days of its independence it had initiated diplomatic action to open negotiations for the return of those Territories to the mother country, Morocco. That had led to the belief that the colonial chapter of Morocco's history had finally been ended and that Morocco and its former colonizer had embarked on the path of fruitful co-operation—fruitful because it was based on sincere friendship and mutual respect. Over the last ten years, the Moroccan Government, through its representatives in the competent bodies of the General Assembly, had consistently and regularly placed on record its legitimate claims to the Territories which had been taken from it. Thus, the Moroccan representatives in the Fourth Committee, the General Assembly and later, since its estab-

lishment, the Special Committee had always stated in one form or another their most express reservations and had recalled Morocco's inalienable right of sovereignty over those Territories.

68. On 16 October 1964, the Special Committee had adopted a resolution on so-called Spanish Sahara and Ifni, urgently requesting the administering Power to take the necessary steps to free those Territories from colonial domination. That unanimous decision had been the start of positive action which, the Committee's members had felt, should logically lead those Moroccan Territories to full emancipation—in other words, to their freedom from colonial domination in accordance with the provisions of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.

69. Unfortunately, the General Assembly's Committees had been unable to function at its nineteenth session, and it had therefore been impossible for the Assembly to proceed to a consideration of the Special Committee's report in 1964. Only at the end of 1965, at the twentieth session, had that report been adopted by the General Assembly. At that same session, General Assembly resolution 2072 (XX) had been adopted unanimously except for two votes, those of Spain and Portugal. In operative paragraph 2 of that resolution, the General Assembly urgently requested the Government of Spain, as the administering Power, "to take immediately all necessary measures for the liberation of the Territories of Ifni and Spanish Sahara from colonial domination and, to this end, to enter into negotiations on the problems relating to sovereignty presented by those two Territories".

70. Although Morocco had not been a co-sponsor of that resolution, it had supported it in its entirety and voted for it. During the drafting stage of the resolution, the Moroccan delegation had been consistently guided by a spirit of conciliation and compromise. Moreover, its wish had been to rely on the wisdom and perception of the Fourth Committee's members. For that reason, although the problem was a fundamental one of very direct interest to it, it had accepted certain amendments which had not exactly reflected its position.

71. In so doing, the constant concern of the Moroccan Government had been precisely to work, as it had always done, in the most vigorous way to ensure that colonialism in all its forms of domination and exploitation should finally disappear from Africa, Asia and Latin America, and give way at last to a new order in which all people would be able to live in genuine freedom and dignity and freely enjoy their national heritage, both cultural and material. Expressed in that great African capital, those ideas were bound to find a deeper response than anywhere else. That was all the more true as the peoples of the eastern part of the African continent, like the Moroccan people, had also suffered the violation of their national independence and territorial integrity through colonial aggression.

72. The principal basis upon which the Special Committee was considering, at its present session, the problem of the future and liberation of Ifni and so-called Spanish Sahara was resolution 2072 (XX) relating to those Territories. That important resolution had been adopted by the General Assembly at its 1398th plenary meeting on 16 December 1965. More than five months had elapsed since that time, and so far the

administering Power's reactions, as reflected both in its official statements and in the new measures adopted in the Territories, including demonstrations of force, indicated that the colonial policy with respect to those Territories had in no way been influenced by the spirit of that resolution. Quite the contrary, there had been an incomprehensible stiffening of the administering Power's attitude towards the local population. While the imposition of European colonization was becoming more and more marked, the civilian and military authorities were intensifying their policy of division and pressure on the indigenous population by using a wide variety of tactics. In addition, attempts, fraught with far-reaching consequences, were being made to exploit certain mineral deposits with the help of foreign capital. Those illegal activities showed how little store the administering Power set by the political and legal aspects of the problem. Moreover, a campaign of systematic virulence had been started by certain official press organs at Madrid, which had asserted with unusual vehemence that those Territories were and remained Spanish provinces, in the same way as León, Castile and Asturias.

73. Coming from a friendly country, such behaviour had rather surprised the Moroccan Government, which had always placed great hopes in the possibilities of broad co-operation between the two countries. But that co-operation must, of course, be based on the emergence of a new state of mind congenial to the requirements of decolonization in Africa and throughout the world. Therefore, the Moroccan Government, which had always attached particular importance to those requirements, with regard both to the territorial dispute pending with Spain and to the colonial problem as a whole, could not remain indifferent to the disturbing trend taken by Spain's colonial policy since the General Assembly vote on resolution 2072 (XX) the previous December. That was why the Moroccan Government, which was anxious to give greater weight to the means available to the Special Committee, had felt that the Moroccan Territories still under Spanish domination must, whatever the circumstances, be liberated. Since their liberation through negotiations based on the premise that they would be returned directly to the Kingdom of Morocco did not seem, for the time being, to meet with the agreement of the Madrid Government, the Moroccan Government proposed that they should as soon as possible be granted their independence.

74. But although the Moroccan Government, increasingly disturbed at the continuation, for an indeterminate period, of the aftermath of Spanish colonialism in that part of its national territory, had deemed it necessary to propose that methods in order to put an end to an anachronistic situation, the conclusion must not be drawn that Morocco was abandoning its rights of sovereignty. It was also important that that independence should not be a façade, aimed solely at deceiving international opinion and concealing a still more virulent and aggressive colonialism. It must be a genuine independence, enabling the people of those Territories to exercise all the responsibilities of power themselves, without any colonialist presence, pressure or interference of a military, political or economic nature. That solution had the merit both of being in harmony with the objectives of the Special Committee and of meeting the need to find a way out of the present impasse, which was of benefit only to colonialist and foreign interests. In taking that stand, his country intended

to continue its peaceful efforts and to forestall the arguments being put forward by the administering Power in an attempt to evade its obligations to the international community and, in particular, to circumvent the implementation of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV).

75. The Moroccan Government was convinced that the liberation and independence of the Moroccan people of so-called Spanish Sahara, whose patriotism and national honour had withstood all trials, would enable them to choose the path most appropriate to their interests and hopes. Once they had become masters of their own fate, the inhabitants of those Territories would be able to carry out their duties as conscientious and dignified citizens in full freedom, and would, in the very nature of things, pursue a policy in accord with the national objectives of their people within the general framework of African unity. In the conviction that unity could be achieved only through liberation and independence, Morocco could not indefinitely tolerate a situation in which Moroccans were deprived of their freedom and were subjected to a colonial régime whose policy of domination and exploitation merely became increasingly harsh. On the other hand, it was to be hoped that Spain, the administering Power, which through the voice of its leaders and of its representatives in the United Nations had already given its support to the work of decolonization going on in various parts of the world, would find it possible to probe its conscience and take into account the inalienable rights of the people involved, namely, their right to freedom and to moral and material well-being.

76. He wished on that occasion to reaffirm, on behalf of the Moroccan Government, that the stand taken by Morocco must not in any way be understood to mean that it had abandoned, in any form, its rights to the Sahara at present under Spanish domination. Those sovereign rights remained indefeasible. That national sovereignty had been established from the very earliest times of Moroccan history and had only recently been interrupted by a *de facto* colonial occupation.

77. By proposing to the Special Committee that its Saharan Territories should be granted independence, the Moroccan Government wished again to facilitate the Special Committee's work and enable it to carry out its task of decolonization. It also wished to eliminate what had so far been taken as a pretext to perpetuate colonial domination in an area where it had already endured too long. He hoped that the members of the Special Committee would take cognizance of Morocco's efforts to make a positive contribution to their work in the search for a final solution to that grave problem. The Moroccan Government believed that its present position should enable the Committee to measure the extent of its own responsibilities, which it would unquestionably be able to assume to the fullest degree.

78. In conclusion, he expressed the hope that the Special Committee, in conformity with the noble task entrusted to it, would accede to the Moroccan request by adopting a resolution and taking appropriate steps for the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples in that part of Moroccan national territory which was occupied by Spain, as the administering Power.

79. The representative of Mauritania, speaking at the Chairman's invitation, said that he would not at

that stage of the debate discuss Ifni but intended to deal at some length with the question of Spanish Sahara.

80. He recalled that under the colonial régime, Mauritania had been occupied by France and Spain. The French part had regained its independence by virtue of the *loi-cadre*.

81. The Spanish part, known as "Spanish Sahara", was made up of Río de Oro and Saguia el Hamra. It covered an area of 280,000 square kilometres situated between 9° and 17° west longitude and between 21° and 27° north latitude, and thus formed the north-west region of independent Mauritania, which was itself situated between 5° and 17° west longitude and between 15° and 27° north latitude. Geographical limits were not, however, the only factors which confirmed that Spanish Sahara was an integral part of the Islamic Republic of Mauritania. In fact, the same tribes, the same Moslem religion, the same language and the same traditions were to be found on both sides of the frontier.

82. It had only been with the advent of colonization that the country had been divided along arbitrary and, moreover, very roughly defined frontiers.

83. In 1884, Spain, basing its action on the Berlin Act, according to which any "free" territory could be occupied, had notified the other Powers that it was establishing a protectorate over the western coast of Africa in the area situated between 20° and 27° north latitude. Not until the Conventions of 27 June 1900, 3 October 1904 and 27 November 1912 had the frontiers between the French and Spanish possessions been determined, and even then with somewhat less than strict exactitude.

84. The Rabat régime had tried to insinuate that Mauritanian claims to Spanish Sahara were merely a diplomatic manoeuvre to gain recognition of the Islamic Republic of Mauritania by the Kingdom of Morocco. In actual fact, since the dawn of its independence, the Islamic Republic of Mauritania, while opposing any bargaining over its sovereignty, had consistently pressed its point of view on the problem of Spanish Sahara. It had done so repeatedly through the most authoritative voice of all, that of its Head of State, and through its representatives at the United Nations in the Special Committee, the Fourth Committee and the General Assembly. In that connexion, the historical facts recalled by the Islamic Republic of Mauritania were irrefutable. Of particular significance was the Peace Treaty of 1767 between the Sovereign of Spain and the Sultan Moulay Mohammed of Morocco. Article 18 of that Treaty stated:

"His Imperial Majesty refrains from discussing the establishment which His Catholic Majesty wishes to found south of Rio Nun, since he cannot be responsible for the accidents and ills which might arise there, as his sovereignty does not extend as far as that place, and the vagrant and ferocious tribes inhabiting that country have always done harm to the inhabitants of the Canary Islands and reduced them to slavery."

85. That document of two centuries ago demonstrated well the worth of Moroccan assertions that Morocco's sovereignty over the territories forming Spanish Sahara had been exercised for more than a thousand years. If new facts had arisen since the Treaty, they had never had the significance attributed to them

by Morocco. Those new facts were not further treaties but attempted incursions carried out with the aim of invading the Sahara, something which the local tribes had never accepted. In 1863, during his own father's lifetime, Prince Moulay Hassen had launched the first expedition, which had met failure at Agadir. In 1882, the same Moulay Hassen, by then crowned Sultan, had seized his only chance of reaching Cape Nun but had been unable to maintain his position there long enough to give the impression that the local tribes had been subdued. In 1883, in a final attempt, Moulay Hassen had tried in vain to go beyond the parallel of Agadir. Thus, the gates of the Sahara had never yielded to Moroccan invasions. On the other hand, the "Blue Sultan", as if in imitation of the glorious epoch of the Almoravides, had had little difficulty in occupying Marrakesh.

86. It had therefore only been through French intervention that the establishment of a new Mauritanian dynasty in the Maghreb had been prevented. Since that time it had been clear to what extent the term "protectorate" (the relations established between France and Morocco) had corresponded to a deep reality, in the sense that it had been a real protection of certain special Moroccan interests. It was therefore in full knowledge of the facts that the Moroccan leaders had, until recently, recognized that Spanish Sahara was an integral part of Mauritania. The Rabat régime, in an official document which had since become famous—the White Paper given widespread circulation in 1960 by His Sherifian Majesty's Ministry of Foreign Affairs—had stated in particular:

"Mauritania is a vast territory embracing the southern provinces of the Kingdom of Morocco, which lies between the regions of Tindouf and Seguia el-Hamra, the Algerian Sahara to the east, the Atlantic coast to the west and the Senegal River to the south.

"In order better to dissociate Mauritania from the rest of the Moroccan Kingdom, Spain recently substituted the expression 'Spanish Sahara' for that of 'Spanish Mauritania'.

"The capital strategic importance of Mauritania, due to its geographical location, has determined the extent of Franco-Spanish penetration since the beginning of the twentieth century."

87. The legend of the map attached to the White Paper read: "The problem of Mauritania—a simplified map showing the portion of Mauritanian territory under French domination and that under Spanish domination. Morocco includes all the territory between Tangier and Saint-Louis of Senegal."

88. The Government of His Sherifian Majesty had not countered those facts and documents, whose authenticity could easily be verified, with any convincing arguments. Having been left with no further ammunition, Morocco had had to boast of its friendship with Spain.

89. There again, it must be wondered whether the Rabat régime had not met with obstacles similar to those which had always prevented Sherifian sovereigns from occupying the Sahara. Indeed, on 16 December 1965, Mr. Manuel Aznar, the Spanish representative, had stated at the 1398th plenary meeting of the General Assembly that Ifni and the Sahara were two quite different geographical entities, that having been an unambiguous way of inviting the representative of

Morocco to limit his Government's claims solely to the Territory of Ifni.

90. Despite that warning—which by its discretion has been a friendly one—the Moroccan representative had set out to show, through quotations and words taken from the statement of the Spanish representative before the Special Committee, that Madrid and Rabat had agreed to open negotiations on Spanish Sahara. The deputy representative of Spain, Mr. Jaime de Piniés, had given an unequivocal denial in reply by stating that one could not quote one part of one or several statements and omit another part, for they all constituted a harmonious whole; the part to which the representative of Morocco had referred and which he had described as an agreement reached in 1963 had not in fact been such.

91. Since, moreover, Morocco took such pride in its good relations with Spain, it should be reminded of what had been written in 1961 in the Madrid periodical *ABC* by Salvador López de la Torre, a specialist in Saharan questions:

"In fact, a change becomes progressively apparent from a point further north, the basin of the Sous River, in the region of Agadir. It is from there that one begins to find two ways of life superimposed: the semi-nomads become gradually less numerous and give way to the great nomads, independent and proud shepherds, with whom the Moroccan Kingdoms have never had friendly relations throughout the course of history. Different ways of life first appear in the Sous basin and then become considerably more marked as one travels south in the Assaka River basin. The final frontier is in the Draa River basin. Although desert people with ties of kinship to families in the foot-hills of the Anti-Atlas may still be found in the Draa region, it is impossible, south of the Draa River, to find any trace of a link between that region and the northern region."

92. The same journalist had added:

"We have no reason to contradict the good Sultan, Moulay Mohammed, who signed the Treaty of Peace and Commerce of 1767, during the reign of Charles III, when he made this confession, which may well be recalled now:

"His Islamic Majesty refrains from discussing the establishment which His Catholic Majesty wishes to found south of Rio Nun, since he cannot be responsible for the accidents and ills which might arise there, as his sovereignty does not extend as far as that place."

"His Islamic Majesty knew what he was talking about. South of Rio Nun, that is, the present Draa River, lay the region where anarchy reigned: Bled es Siba, as the Moroccans called it, simply because it was a region to which the Sultan's sovereignty, as he himself said, did not extend. It is there, in fact, that an entirely different world begins.

"That is why we believe that the Sultan's expeditions never went beyond the Sous River, which is the first frontier of the Sahara, and that only once, taking advantage of the flight of the local tribes, who had allowed the Royal Caravan to pass in order to avoid any fighting, did he briefly reach Rio Nun, today known as Rio Draa, and then only for a few hours.

"One need only determine from a map the distance separating Rio Nun or Draa from genuinely

Saharan territory to realize the full justification for the view that Morocco is the 'Jazzirat al Maghrib', the island of the west, the island of the Maghreb, between two different kinds of sea. The history of the desert and what might be called its 'philosophy' can only be understood if the southern frontier of Morocco is regarded as a real shore-line, the border between two different worlds.

"The inevitable historical frictions between those two heterogeneous worlds have always proceeded in one direction. The confrontation of the Saharan people and the Moroccan people has consisted of invasion of the north by the south, without any counterpart in the form of a movement from the north to the south. In the conflict between these two adjacent but distinct worlds, there has always been but a single victor: the south, that is, the desert. The north, in other words, Morocco, has always been the loser. The epic story of the Almoravides, setting out from what is today Mauritanian territory, swept over Morocco and continued on to the Iberian peninsula.

"The first great victory of the Sahara against the Maghreb, moving from south to north, blazed the trail which was to become that of future wars in that part of Africa. The brief adventurous episode of Pasha Djuder against Tombouctou was to be the only exception in this one-way movement.

"Almost a thousand years after the Almoravid expedition, the "Blue Sultan" (a Mauritanian) invaded southern Morocco and occupied Marrakesh. It was a repetition, a thousand years later, of that movement of conquest which has been, as it were, a constant feature of the Sahara and fully explains the hostility of the nomads living in those territories towards the foreign threat represented by Morocco. As Montagne said: 'The Nun River, which we call the Draa, represents the line of demarcation between two different systems of social and political organization; it is the southern shore of the island of Maghreb'."

93. In the eyes of Mauritania, the Moroccan dreams represented nothing more than the vestiges of claims which President Moktar Ould Daddah had called as ridiculous as those which England might now make against France on the pretext that at the time of Joan of Arc, Paris and a large part of France had been occupied by the English.

94. The Islamic Republic of Mauritania, too, could invoke its friendship with Spain, but not in the Moroccan terms according to which good relations were a convincing argument, or at least a sufficient reason, for Madrid to cede its colonial possessions to Rabat. As the Mauritanian Government saw it, the friendship between Spain and Mauritania was based on mutual understanding and a common desire for honest co-operation. The Mauritanian Government had asked Spain to enter into a frank and sincere dialogue, in the spirit of the special ties uniting the two countries, in order to find a solution to the problem. It would never, however, ask Spain to cede Ifni, or even Tarfaya which Spain had nevertheless graciously ceded to Morocco. President Moktar Ould Daddah had made that point clear in his report of 28 November 1965 on the state of the nation:

"We know that, as part of this fruitful co-operation, it will be possible to find a satisfactory solution

which will validate the integration of Spanish Sahara into our national territory and thus make possible the total reunification of our country. The progressive attitude of the Spanish Government towards the problems of decolonization gives good reason to have confidence in the future."

95. That confidence had become manifest two months previously, when the Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs had paid a visit to Mauritania from 7 to 9 March 1966. The joint *communiqué* issued at the end of that visit had stated:

"During these talks, the two delegations considered, in an atmosphere of complete cordiality and mutual understanding, all the political and economic problems affecting the two countries. The two delegations, greatly desiring to maintain and constantly improve the excellent relations between Spain and Mauritania, expressed their firm desire to strengthen and diversify their co-operation in every sphere.

"The two delegations reviewed the progress made in the direction of this co-operation and decided to take all steps necessary to ensure that jointly agreed plans would be carried out."

96. Encouraged by that manifestation of friendship and sincere desire to enter into a frank and honest dialogue, the Mauritanian Government had decided to inform the Spanish Government that it was prepared to engage in negotiations on the problem of Spanish Sahara, having due regard for General Assembly resolution 2072 (XX) of 16 December 1965.

97. That attitude of the Mauritanian Government must not, however, be interpreted either as a retreat or as a refusal to allow the peoples of the Sahara to become independent. There could be no question of allowing a single plot of African territory to remain under foreign domination. The day when the Special Committee went beyond the resolution adopted by the General Assembly, the Mauritanian Government would not have the slightest objection to the liberation of Spanish Sahara.

98. The representative of Morocco said that the statement which he had just heard certainly excused him from continuing the debate. He had fulfilled his task of making a positive statement on behalf of his Government. The Mauritanian spokesman had been at pains to affirm the rights of Spain over that part of Moroccan territory, rather than attempting to prevail upon the Special Committee to take a stand on decolonization. His statement had consisted mainly of press extracts, including an article by a Spanish journalist described as "a specialist in Saharan questions". The point of view advanced by the spokesman of Mauritania was not an African point of view. That spokesman had become the champion of a purely colonialist argument, the defence of which by an African was for the Moroccan delegation a matter for regret.

99. The representative of Mauritania said that there was no question of the Mauritanian Government coming to the defence of colonialism, especially in Río de Oro or Spanish Sahara. As to the matter of quoting an extract from an article by a Spanish journalist, there was in the circumstances nothing out of the ordinary in making use of quotations. He fully agreed with the Moroccan representative regarding Spanish Sahara's right to freedom. That Territory should be completely independent of Spain, but also, of course, of Morocco.

100. The representative of *Tunisia* said that the Tunisian Government would examine the statements by the representatives of Morocco and Mauritania with the greatest interest and would use all the means at its disposal to satisfy their legitimate and justified claims. He was convinced that the Special Committee would give due weight to those two statements when the time came for it to seek the ways and means that might lead to a peaceful solution of the thorny problem under consideration.

101. The Tunisian delegation had spoken on all the items on the Special Committee's agenda. It would be failing in its duty if it did not state its position on Ifni and so-called Spanish Sahara, especially since they were neighbouring Territories to whose liberation the Tunisian Government attached the highest importance. The status of those two Territories was certainly difficult to settle because certain Member States disputed their right to sovereignty. But in that respect, too, the attitude of the Tunisian Government had always been clear and precise because it was dictated by reason and justice.

102. The Tunisian delegation believed that in order to settle disputes of that kind fairly, prime consideration must be given to historical and geographical factors. For example, in the cases of Gibraltar and the Falkland Islands (Malvinas), his delegation had always opposed the unjustified claims of the United Kingdom and favoured the restitution of the two Territories to Spain and Argentina, respectively, since it seemed unreasonable that a foreign Power should be able to retain a Territory which historically and geographically belonged to another country. That was a question of justice and security.

103. In the case of Ifni and so-called Spanish Sahara, the Tunisian delegation had a right to expect a similar attitude from Spain, particularly as friendly relations of very long-standing had created a bond between Spain and North Africa. Moreover, the people of those countries, who had many points in common, were bound by economic and cultural ties which were becoming still closer.

104. It was unfortunately apparent that the administering Power was thus far continuing to claim sovereignty over those Territories. The Tunisian delegation refused to accept those claims because it could no longer condone domination by foreign Powers, whoever they might be, on the African continent. It was, moreover, merely agreeing with the opinion expressed the previous day by the Administrative Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity, who had said that the African peoples would not be fully satisfied until the last square inch of African soil had been withdrawn from non-African authority.

105. With that principle established, and in view of the high esteem in which Spain was held by the Arab and African countries, the Tunisian delegation appealed to the administering Power voluntarily to renounce the sovereignty which it exercised over those Territories as soon as possible instead of stiffening its position by dividing and oppressing the indigenous inhabitants. It should also declare its willingness to enter into negotiations for the prompt transfer of powers to the indigenous inhabitants of those Territories. In doing so, it would merely be complying with the provisions of General Assembly resolution 2072 (XX), which had been adopted unanimously except

for two votes—those of Spain and Portugal. By acting in that way, Spain could not but rise in the estimation of the African and Arab countries, which would not fail to accord it more lasting and appreciable benefits.

106. His delegation would certainly make its contribution to the Special Committee's work when the time came to consider ways and means which might lead to a peaceful solution of the problem. It would, in addition, support any action conforming to the principles which he had set out in his statement.

107. The representative of *Chile* said that the statements made by the representatives of Mauritania and Morocco would be taken into account by the Special Committee in its consideration of the question of Ifni and Spanish Sahara. However, its task was complicated by the claims of two sister African States to sovereignty in respect of those Territories. He therefore appealed to Spain to assist the Committee in its task of eradicating colonialism by complying with the terms of operative paragraph 2 of General Assembly resolution 2072 (XX).

108. The representative of *Iraq* supported the Tunisian representative's appeal to Spain to implement the terms of General Assembly resolution 2072 (XX). The views expressed by the Tunisian representative would undoubtedly be shared by many other members of the Special Committee.

109. The representative of *Mali* said that his delegation would study the statements of the representatives of Morocco and Mauritania with all the attention which they merited. He associated himself with the position of the Tunisian representative and drew the Committee's attention to operative paragraph 3 of General Assembly resolution 2072 (XX) of 16 December 1965, in which the Special Committee was requested "to report on the implementation of the present resolution to the General Assembly at its twenty-first session". He also asked the Spanish delegation, if present, to inform the Special Committee of its views on the status of Ifni and Spanish Sahara, having due regard for the resolution adopted in that matter by the Fourth Committee.

110. The representative of *Venezuela* said that his delegation was convinced of Spain's readiness to decolonize the remaining Territories under its control and to comply with the terms of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), as repeatedly stated by its representatives both before the Special Committee and before the General Assembly. However, in the specific case of Ifni and the Spanish Sahara, the problem was complicated by the fact that claims to sovereignty over those Territories had been advanced by two or more countries and that, to date, neither the Committee nor the General Assembly had indicated with which Power Spain should negotiate. It was therefore the opinion of the Venezuelan delegation that the Committee should postpone further action on the matter until, in accordance with the terms of resolution 2072 (XX), Spain had reported to the twenty-first session of the General Assembly.

111. The representative of the *Union of Soviet Socialist Republics* said he was convinced that the points of view expressed by the representatives of Morocco and Mauritania would be taken into consideration by all members of the Special Committee. The Soviet delegation attached the greatest importance to them. It believed that in considering the question of Ifni and

Spanish Sahara, the Committee should bear in mind the very moving address given by Mr. Diallo Telli, the Administrative Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity, who had said that "OAU was as concerned about the fate of those small Territories as it was about the fate of the big colonies, for a question of principle was involved. The decolonization to which OAU aspired and for which it was working should cover all the African territories, large or small, rich or poor. The African peoples would not be fully satisfied on that score until the last square inch of African soil had been withdrawn from non-African authority".

112. Five years had elapsed since the adoption of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. His delegation held it to be a matter of principle, firstly, that that Declaration applied to the two Territories under consideration and, secondly, that Spain must immediately leave those Territories in order to free them from its rule. The General Assembly had most recently considered that question at its twentieth session and had at that time requested the Government of Spain to take immediately all necessary measures for the liberation of Ifni and Spanish Sahara. Unfortunately, it was only too apparent that Spain was ignoring that stand. It was engaging in diplomatic manoeuvres intended to show that it was changing its policy and paving the way for the independence of the Territories under its administration, but that was purely a diplomatic diversion. In fact, Spain was using those Territories as trump cards and as a means of exerting pressure in order to gain time and continue to exercise its domination over land which was not its own. It was in the same spirit that it was attracting foreign capital to the Territories. It was well known that half the arable land had been leased to foreign monopolies. The only conclusion to be drawn was that Spain was continuing to sell things which did not belong to it. The Soviet delegation therefore called for the immediate implementation of the provisions of General Assembly resolution 2072 (XX) of 16 December 1965.

113. The representative of Syria said that his delegation regretted that the administering Power had gone back on its original intention to accelerate the process towards self-determination and independence of Ifni and the Spanish Sahara. In view of the terms of General Assembly resolution 2072 (XX), the Special Committee was fully justified in asking what measures had been taken by Spain for the liberation of those Territories. Furthermore, it should be possible to reach a solution regarding the conflicting claims advanced in that respect by initiating negotiations on the questions of sovereignty, as required under operative paragraph 2 of the resolution. It was to be hoped that Mauritania and Morocco would soon compose their differences so that the cause of emancipation from foreign rule would prevail and that Spain would embark upon a policy of decolonization.

114. The representative of Ethiopia considered that, before the Special Committee reached any decision on Ifni and the Spanish Sahara, a thorough study should be made on the question, at which time his delegation would make its views known. He suggested that the Secretariat should prepare a detailed working paper on the matter, taking into account the statements made by the representatives of Mauritania and Morocco.

115. The representative of Iran supported those speakers who had appealed to the Spanish Government to implement the terms of General Assembly resolution 2072 (XX) and reiterated his delegation's firm conviction that colonial issues involving sovereign rights should be settled through negotiation in accordance with United Nations practice.

D. ACTION TAKEN BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE

Consensus adopted by the Special Committee

116. At its 436th meeting held on 7 June 1966, the Special Committee decided, on the proposal of the Chairman, to adopt the following consensus on the question of Ifni and Spanish Sahara:

"The Special Committee requests the Secretary-General to convey the views expressed at the present meeting concerning Ifni and Spanish Sahara to the Government of Spain and to obtain from that Government as soon as possible information concerning the measures taken by it in implementation of operative paragraph 2 of General Assembly resolution 2072 (XX) of 16 December 1965. Having regard to paragraph 3 of the same resolution, the Special Committee will resume its consideration of these Territories on receipt of the information requested."

E. FURTHER CONSIDERATION BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE⁵

Introduction

117. The Special Committee further considered Ifni and the Spanish Sahara at its 472nd, 474th, 478th, 479th and 481st meetings, held at Headquarters between 12 October and 17 November 1966. The Committee had before it a letter dated 8 September 1966 (A/AC.109/202) from the Permanent Representative of Spain in which, following the adoption by the Special Committee at its 436th meeting of the consensus concerning Ifni and the Spanish Sahara, the Government of Spain informed the Special Committee of its attitude and intentions regarding the implementation of General Assembly resolution 2072 (XX) of 16 December 1965. This letter is annexed to the present chapter.

118. In a letter dated 22 September 1966 (A/AC.109/207) and two letters dated 10 October 1966 (A/AC.109/208, A/AC.109/209), the Permanent Representatives of Mauritania, Morocco and Spain requested that delegations of their respective Governments be permitted to participate in the discussion of this item. At its 472nd meeting, the Special Committee decided without objection to accede to these requests.

119. In a letter dated 4 November 1966 (A/AC.109/211), the Permanent Representative of Algeria requested permission to participate in the proceedings of the Special Committee during its consideration of Ifni and the Spanish Sahara. At its 474th meeting, the Special Committee decided without objection to grant this request.

⁵ See also chapter II (paras. 595-619) for an account of the discussions on the resolution adopted by the Special Committee at its 455th meeting on 22 June 1966 concerning the implementation of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) with regard to Territories considered by the Committee during its meetings in Africa.

Written petitions and hearings

120. The Special Committee circulated the following written petitions concerning Ifni and Spanish Sahara:

<i>Petitioner</i>	<i>Document No.</i>
<i>Ifni</i>	
Messrs. Mohammed Bey, Lahoussine Bey and Youssef	A/AC.109/PET.532
<i>Spanish Sahara</i>	
Mr. El Abadila Ould Sheikh Mohamed Laghdaf and others	A/AC.109/PET.562
Messrs. Ould Sheikh Malainine and Mohamed Ould Haidala	A/AC.109/PET.563
Mr. Seila Uld Abeida and five others on behalf of "La Comisión elegida por el pueblo del Sáhara"	A/AC.109/PET.572

121. The three petitions concerning Spanish Sahara contained requests for hearings which were granted by the Special Committee.

122. At its 478th and 479th meetings, the Special Committee heard statements by Messrs. El Abadila Ould Sheikh Mohamed Laghdaf, Braika Ould Ahmed Lahcen and Hamdi Ould Salek Ould Ba Ali. The petitioners were accompanied by Messrs. Brahim Ould Hassena Douihi, Abdallah Ould El Khattat and Habouha Ould Abeida.

123. At the 479th meeting, the Chairman stated that Messrs. Sidi Mohamed Ould Haidala, Dahi Ould Nagem, Slama Ould Sidi Ould Oumar and Sheikh Ould Mouhamed Saleh, whose request for a hearing had been granted, had informed him that because of language difficulties they would not make a statement but would present their petition in writing. The Special Committee decided to incorporate the statement submitted by the petitioners in the records of the Committee.

124. At the 479th meeting, the Chairman informed the Special Committee that Mr. Ould Sheikh Malainine, who had originally requested a hearing with the preceding group, had requested to be heard separately. The Committee agreed to this request and Mr. Malainine made a statement at that meeting.

125. *Mr. El Abadila Ould Sheikh Mohamed Laghdaf* stated that the Saharan people confidently awaited a decision of the United Nations to free them from oppression.

126. Río de Oro and Seguí el Hamra were situated in north-west Africa and covered approximately 280,000 square kilometres. The coastline of the region lay between 27° 40' N. 20° 47' N. Those imaginary and superficial frontiers had been created by colonialism in order to dismember the African continent and divide its peoples.

127. The population of the region was over 250,000, notwithstanding the colonial Power's statement that it did not exceed 25,000. The colonial Power was trying to minimize the importance of the region so that the United Nations would take no interest in it. The chief towns of the Sahara were El Aaiún, Smara, Güera and Addakhla, which had later been named Villa Cisneros. The inhabitants belonged to the following tribes: R'zueibat, Isarguén, Ulad Delim, Ulad Tidrarin, Ait Lahsen, Filala, Ahl Cheikh aa El Ainaine and El Arosien. They were tribes of Arab origin, whose religion was Islam and whose language was Arabic. From time immemorial they had all been part of the Moroccan nation. Furthermore, the dynasty of the

Almoravides, which had ruled in Morocco for two centuries and constituted a great empire, had been founded by the Lemtouna tribe, which came from the Sahara. The Territory had depended on Morocco during the reign of the Sa'adians and the Alaouits. The Governors of the Sahara had been appointed directly by the Sultans from the time of Mulay Ismail and Mulay Mohamed Ben Abdallah in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries until the reign of Sultan Mulay Hafid, when Morocco had been reduced to a Protectorate.

128. Originally the idea of conquering the Sahara had been advocated by private Spanish companies such as the Sociedad de Pesquerías Canario-Africanas and the Sociedad de Africanistas y Colonistas. On 15 October 1884 the ships of those companies had arrived at Río de Oro and at Cabo Blanco and, under the leadership of Emilio Bonelli, the Spaniards had built wooden huts and hoisted the Spanish flag. On 3 November 1884 they had carried out the same operation in Addakhla, which since then had been called Villa Cisneros. The Spanish Government had notified the European Powers that Spain was placing the whole north-west African coastline between Cabo Bojador and Cabo Blanco under its protectorate. In that way Spain had endeavoured to make its occupation appear legal. That act had aroused French opposition and after negotiations the two Powers had signed the treaty of Muni on 27 June 1900.

129. The State and people of Morocco had reacted more energetically. The Ouled Dlim tribe had attacked the Spanish installations and driven out the invaders. Popular resistance had prevented the Spaniards from extending their occupation beyond the ports of Villa Cisneros and Cabo Blanco, set up by Mr. Bonelli. Spain had been unable to complete the occupation of Río de Oro and of Saguia el Hamra until 1934, in which year France had occupied the Anti-Atlas and the Sous region.

130. With regard to the region of Seguí el Hamra, France in a secret agreement signed on 8 October 1904 had recognized Spain's full freedom of action in the area between 26° N. and 27° 40' N. Before 1934, however, Spanish occupation had been confined to the town of Tarfaya, to the centre of Villa Cisneros and, from 1920, to the centre of Güera. After completing its occupation of the Sahara, Spain had set up military bases in El Aaiún and had fortified the existing bases in Villa Cisneros and Güera.

131. Spain had first divided the Sahara into three regions, whose names had changed according to the circumstances. The change of name had been intended to deprive the regions of their Moroccan character so that, when Morocco had become independent, it would not be able to claim them, and Spain would thus be able to perpetuate its domination. The Tarfaya region had been named the Southern Zone of the Spanish Protectorate, the Seguí el Hamra region had been named the Zone of Free Occupation and the Río de Oro region had been named the Southern Sahara. Subsequently, after all outward signs of the Moroccan character of the regions had been removed, Spain had again changed their names and Tarfaya had been named the Northern Sahara Zone, Seguí el Hamra the Central Sahara Zone and Río de Oro the Southern Sahara Zone.

132. Spain had believed it could keep the authentic Tarfaya area under its rule and for that reason had not transferred it to Morocco after that country had

become independent, as it had done with the zone it occupied in the north of Morocco. Spain's intention had been to incorporate the Tarfaya area in what it had later called, and was still calling, its overseas provinces. Nevertheless, the inhabitants had obliged Spain to recognize protectorate status for that area, which obviously went beyond the Wad Draa. Spain had returned only part of Tarfaya to Morocco and had arbitrarily fixed 27° 40' N. as the southern border of its protectorate in Southern Morocco.

133. There was no logical justification for that artificial division of Tarfaya since there was no frontier between Tarfaya and Saguia el Hamra. Geographers recognized Saguia el Hamra as one of the most important areas of the Moroccan southern Sahara. The same nomadic tribes roamed Saguia el Hamra and Tarfaya. Moreover, the representative of the Grand Vizir for the Spanish protectorate in south Morocco, Sheikh Mohamed Laghdaf, had not only been appointed by the Caliph of the Sultan in Tetuán, but had been a native of Spanish Sahara and had lived in what was now Saguia el Hamra. His father, Sheikh Ma Al Aymin, had built the city of Smara, eight kilometres south of the Seguia el Hamra River in 1898. He had been the Caliph of the Sultan in Spanish Sahara and had been appointed by a royal decree, which at the time had been called a "dahir" of the Cherif. Other "dahirs" stipulated that the authority of the Caliph extended from Tarfaya to Cabo Bojador and Cabo Blanco.

134. Those were incontestable historical, geographic and social facts. There was no dividing line between southern Morocco and Tarfaya, Seguia el Hamra and Río de Oro so far as population, topography, history, religion and customs were concerned. The people of Spanish Sahara were valiant people with an illustrious past, a culture and a civilization.

135. That did not mean that the petitioners were demanding that Spanish Sahara should become part of Morocco, for the people alone should determine the future they wanted. The situation in Spanish Sahara was serious, indeed explosive, and a solution was urgent. There was no difference between Spanish colonialism in the Sahara and Portuguese colonialism in Angola or so-called Portuguese Guinea. Both sought to foist the European element on the indigenous population for purposes of exploiting the latter. Since the end of the Spanish Civil War, Spain had been trying to make Spanish Sahara part of its own territory and had repeatedly reorganized its administrative system. Thus, in 1940, the Political Military Government of Ifni and Spanish Sahara had been established, and the Spanish High Commissioner in northern Morocco had been appointed Governor-General for those Territories. That action demonstrated, moreover, that the political, social and geographical conditions in Spanish Sahara were identical with those in the rest of Morocco. In June 1958, namely, after Morocco had become independent, Spain had again changed the status of the Territories, which had become two Spanish provinces, designated as Ifni and Spanish Sahara. Subsequently, in April 1961, it had been decided that all Spanish laws would apply in the province of Spanish Sahara and that imports from Spain would be free of duty. Thus, Spain had completed the process of assimilating Spanish Sahara both legally and administratively.

136. Spain had endeavoured to assimilate the Territory politically by such means as the following: by promoting the large-scale immigration of Spaniards into Spanish Sahara and providing them with the means and privileges necessary to ensure their supremacy over the indigenous inhabitants and their possession of the country's wealth; by oppressing the indigenous population and expelling them in order to expedite immigration from Spain; by destroying the traditions and the moral and cultural values of the indigenous population; by stationing in the Territory a large army of occupation double the number of civilian inhabitants in order to enforce its policy; and by granting extensive privileges to certain lackeys of colonialism in order to induce them to sing the praises of Spanish rule.

137. That process had been intensified when Spain had discovered mineral deposits in Saguia el Hamra, specifically phosphate and iron. Spain had then attempted to persuade large world corporations to invest in Spanish Sahara. Therein lay the danger, for the colonial interests which Spain was promoting would jeopardize the future of the Territory and stand in the way of its emancipation in conformity with the principle of human rights and the resolutions of the United Nations. The appetite of adventurous capitalism knew no bounds.

138. The Saharan nationalists were fighting that policy of Spain and suffering severe repression. The Spanish Army was bombing the villages and raping women and children. The petitioners had specific information on those atrocities which they were making available to the Special Committee.

139. At the same time as it was oppressing the people, Spain was trying to compel them as well as the sheikhs and the tribal chiefs, to sign petitions supporting integration with Spain. The Spanish authorities had recently adopted a decision under which the *saharais* could not acquire land or property unless they accepted Spanish nationality by signing a special document. Thus, expropriation of their property, annihilation of their personality and expulsion from their country represented the future which Spain planned for the people of Spanish Sahara, while paying lip service to their right of self-determination. Spain sought to convince world public opinion that it was a liberal colonial Power; yet, in Saguia el Hamra and Río de Oro, it was pursuing a policy of oppression and attempting to impose the kind of racism which prevailed in South Africa and Rhodesia.

140. There were only two courses open to the people of Spanish Sahara in fighting that colonialism: either to denounce it before the United Nations or to take up arms and fight for freedom. The *saharais* had no civil liberties which they could exercise to defend their rights and express their legitimate grievances peacefully. There was no freedom of the Press, speech or assembly in Spanish Sahara; actually, the Territory was under military occupation. The military forces were lords and masters over persons and property.

141. The people of Spanish Sahara wanted full and immediate independence for their country. Consequently, they called upon the United Nations to demand the withdrawal of foreign troops and an end to Spanish immigration into the Territory. They further called on the United Nations to supervise the process leading to independence so that they would be guaranteed the equitable implementation of their right to self-determi-

nation in good faith. The people of Spanish Sahara had no confidence in the Spanish colonial administration; they relied entirely on the United Nations.

142. At it was essential for all the *saharawis* to take part in elections to be organized by the United Nations, the refugees who had been expelled from the country or had fled from the Spanish authorities should be allowed to return. No Spanish citizen, regardless of his circumstances, should be entitled to take part in deciding the future of Spanish Sahara.

143. The people of Spanish Sahara were confident that the United Nations would protect them as it had always protected other colonial peoples and would take appropriate measures to put an end to the colonial rule and to help them fulfil their legitimate aspirations to freedom and dignity.

144. *Mr. Braika Ould Ahmed Lahcen* said that the situation in Spanish Sahara was explosive and crucial. It was urgent for the United Nations to take strong and effective action to protect the people of Spanish Sahara in their tragic plight and deliver them from their suffering before the situation degenerated into a conflict with unpredictable consequences. There must be an end to the oppression and the reign of terror prevailing in the Territory.

145. The people of Spanish Sahara had a right to freedom and independence and had put all their hopes in the United Nations as the instrument of their deliverance. They also called upon the Spanish Government to renounce its anti-African policy of European supremacy and persecution of the indigenous population.

146. The Spanish authorities of the Territory had recently forced the inhabitants, both men and women, to sign false documents with which Spain sought to prove that the people of Spanish Sahara preferred to live under Spanish colonial rule indefinitely. That colonialist manoeuvre had resulted in the dismissal of two chiefs who had refused to sign and in an uprising by 500 men who were hiding out in the mountains.

147. By means of such illegal tactics, the Spanish Government was seeking to go on exploiting the economic resources of the Territory and to establish a European majority in Spanish Sahara as the bulwark of a white-dominated régime such as that of Ian Smith. Its policy was to divide and rule and to keep the people in poverty and ignorance. Schooling remained at a very low level and was reserved for the children of prominent families. The Spanish authorities did not hesitate to use force against the nationalists or to torture and murder innocent men, women and children. Many *saharawis* were imprisoned and sent to the concentration camp at Fuerteventura in the Canary Islands. That was the policy by which Spain was endeavouring to bring the *saharawis* up to the level of the free, civilized world.

148. Spain believed that it could convert Spanish Sahara into an overseas Spain, but the *saharawis*, as Africans, Arabs and Moslems, were very far from being Spanish.

149. The Front de libération du Sahara sous domination coloniale espagnole, the organization which the petitioners represented, had fought and would go on fighting against Spanish colonialism until it won full and unconditional independence for the Territory. The nationalists were a mere handful against the colonial Power, but their loyalty to the national cause and to justice and their confidence in the United Nations

would serve as powerful weapons for the conquest of colonialism, the enemy of the free world.

150. *Mr. Hamdi Ould Salek Ould Ba Ali* said that the petitioners had come to the United Nations to state their objectives, namely, to ensure respect for the principle of self-determination in Spanish Sahara. Colonialism was weighing very heavily on the lives of the *saharawis*.

151. The people of Spanish Sahara could not accept the survival of colonialism in their Territory, and they therefore requested the administering Power to recognize their freedom and independence under the supervision of the United Nations. The petitioners regarded the other petitioners who had requested the United Nations for a hearing as their brothers, provided that they too came to seek the independence and freedom of Spanish Sahara. If, however, they requested something different, they would be regarded as collaborationists and friends of colonialism.

152. *Messrs. Sidi Mohamed Ould Haidala, Dahi Ould Nagem, Slama Ould Sidi Ould Oumar and Sheikh Ould Mouhamed Saleh* said in their written statement that the so-called Spanish Sahara was a region which on a geographical and ethnic basis was hard to differentiate from Mauritania, from which it was separated by a theoretical and imaginary line in the south. Together with the neighbouring provinces of Tiris Zemmour and Baie du Lévrier, it constituted a single region which there was no justification for subdividing. The tribes occupying the Territory numbered some 25,000 to 28,000 people. The petitioners included representatives of the various districts. The nomads who inhabited Spanish Sahara and Mauritania belonged to the same tribes and had the same customs, religious practices and language. Only colonial occupation had led to a frontier being drawn between western and eastern Tiris, two parts of the same province of Zemmour, and to the subdivision of other regions.

153. In 1884, Spain, on the basis of the Berlin declaration to the effect that any so-called free territory could be occupied, had informed the other Powers that it was assuming the protectorate of the west coast of Africa between the twentieth and twenty-seventh parallels. The frontier between French and Spanish "possessions", however, had not been fixed until the convocations of 27 June 1900, 3 October 1904 and 27 November 1912, and than only very approximately. At present, the 280,000 square kilometres making up the Spanish Sahara were treated as an African province of Spain and were administered by a department of the Spanish Government responsible for the African provinces. The Saharans, however, were a freedom-loving people with an innate desire for independence. Just as they believed in friendship, so they rejected and condemned the injustice inherent in the domination of one people by another. They therefore regarded the exercise of their right of self-determination, an inalienable right recognized by the United Nations and accepted by the Spanish Government, as the best means by which they could decide upon their future in friendship with Spain.

154. The Saharans, although distant from Morocco both geographically and in their way of life, had great respect for that country, even if they had not always appreciated its expansionist ambitions. The ties binding them to Mauritania, on the other hand, were so obvious that they scarcely needed to be mentioned. There was no difference in appearance, in dress, or in any other

respect between the Saharans and Mauritians and the similarity was reinforced by their common outlook and way of life, in addition to the many ties of blood between them. The people of Spanish Sahara were prepared, however, to refrain from mentioning those fundamental truths for some time and would gladly agree to the application of the principle of self-determination. They would urge those who showed themselves most eager for the liberation of the Spanish Sahara to refrain from using the Saharans for other ends which had nothing to do with the desire for freedom, independence and peace. The Saharans were proud and vigilant and knew where their interests lay. They would prefer not to be subjected to propaganda or involved in the political affairs of Morocco. They wanted to choose their own destiny, while preserving the many solid ties between Spain and themselves, and they believed that their future was profoundly linked with that of Mauritania. Despite their ardent opposition to colonialism, they wished to make their choice in peace and order, without bloodshed and free from interference by false friends.

155. *Mr. Ould Sheikh Malainine* said that the people of the so-called Spanish Sahara had resisted Spanish colonization ever since Spain had sought to gain a foothold on the coast of Africa. They had waged many battles, in which many heroes had fallen. They had held the conquerors at bay until 1934, when Spain had officially occupied the country. Their resistance had never ceased despite the fact that the Spanish colonial authorities had done everything possible to tame them, destroying villages, plundering property and raping, torturing, exiling and massacring the people. The Spanish were seeking to erase the African and Arab personality of the people and to establish a system based on the alleged superiority of the European, which in fact meant racial discrimination and persecution of the indigenous people. While the true inhabitants were driven into exile, the authorities encouraged mass immigration of Spaniards, who plundered the wealth of the Territory. The people were unanimous in rejecting the destiny thus imposed on them and in their determination to drive out the colonialists and gain independence under the ægis of the United Nations. There was no disagreement among the population, who formed one front against colonialism. He therefore appealed to the Special Committee to ensure that steps were taken to enable them to live in freedom and dignity. Such steps might include the withdrawal of foreign troops, the halting of immigration, the release of political prisoners and the return of political refugees, to be followed by the exercise of the right of self-determination in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

156. Referring to the statements of Mr. El Abadila Ould Sheikh Mohamed Laghdaf and the other petitioners of his group, the representative of *Spain* said that the petitioners' statements had been a tissue of lies and exaggerations. When asked about their origins and background, they had been evasive. He would simply point out that Ould Sheikh Malainine was a legal adviser at Rabat, Morocco, Hamid Ould Salek Ould Ba Ali was a caliph in the Moroccan service in the area of the frontier with Algeria, and Brahim Ould Hassena Douihi was a caliph at Tetuán, Morocco. It was therefore quite clear where they came from.

157. He categorically rejected the petitioners' allegation of ill-treatment of women and children. The

extensive information which had been made available to the United Nations with regard to Spanish rule in those Territories showed how untrue such charges were.

158. The figures which the petitioners had given in regard to the number of inhabitants and the size of the Spanish forces in the Sahara were all false. The population of the Spanish Sahara was approximately 25,000. A census was being conducted and definitive figures would be available soon. A recent issue of *Jeune Afrique* referred to a population of 30,000; that was certainly the highest possible estimate. There were 9,500 peninsular Spaniards in Spanish Sahara and a Spanish military force of 10,000 men, which because of the vast extent of the Territory—280,000 square kilometres—was required to fulfil Spain's obligations under Article 73 of the Charter.

159. The petitioners knew that in fact there had been no mass immigration into the Spanish Sahara from Spain or any expulsion of Saharans. They could not cite a single statute in support of their charges. Their references to a war of liberation were equally meaningless, for the Territory was tranquil and was going to exercise the right of self-determination. The petitioners had said that Spaniards alone had privileges, but all the inhabitants of the Territory were Spaniards and had equal rights. Discrimination against the indigenous inhabitants would be contrary to the spirit of the Spanish nation as well as to the principles of the United Nations. It had been clearly established, in the information submitted by Spain under Article 73 e of the Charter, that the term "province" had no discriminatory implications. The petitioners had also made outrageous charges that the study of the Arabic language was suppressed. Spain took pride in its Arabic cultural institutions. Disputes among Moslems were settled by Sharia justice, whose written and customary laws were applied in full. He referred members to the working paper prepared by the Secretariat (see paras. 1-61 above) for further information on conditions in Spanish Sahara. The petitioners' allegation that Spain practised racial discrimination was an intolerable insult. They had spoken of Spain's anti-African policy, but Spain, which had suffered colonial domination for many years, took pride in the enrichment of its culture by Arab civilization and had never practised racial discrimination.

160. In a letter dated 8 September 1966 (see annex), his delegation had formally stated its position on the decolonization of Spanish Sahara. Regardless of all the machinations of the petitioners and their supporters, it was ready to affirm once more its willingness to grant self-determination to the people of the Territory. Sinister efforts were being made through such persons as the petitioners to obtain by intervention what they knew could not be secured if the people of the Territory were permitted to express their will freely.

161. The representative of *Morocco* said that the Spanish representative had denied that the petitioners really represented Spanish Sahara. There was, however, an official Spanish source which proved the contrary: *Estudios Saharianos*, by Julio Caro Baroja, sponsored by the Higher Council of Scientific Research and published in 1955 by the Institute of African Studies in Madrid. In his introduction to the work, the author had said that special thanks were due to his excellent interpreter, Braika Ould Ali Moulud Ould

Ahmed Lahcen, who had assisted him greatly in his journey and who was a fine example of the new generation of young men educated under the Spanish occupation.

162. The Spanish representative had asserted that Ould Sheikh Malainine was not entitled to represent Spanish Sahara because he had served as an official legal adviser in Rabat. That allegation was easy to refute, for he had in his possession documents issued by the Rabat Court of Appeals, dated 10 March 1966, certifying that the petitioner in question had been admitted to the practice of law in Marrakesh after taking the prescribed oath on 18 February 1966 but had subsequently resigned from his position. That meant that the petitioner was a lawyer, practising a liberal profession. The Spanish representative had insinuated that the fact that the petitioner had resided in Rabat, Casablanca and Marrakesh was a crime. Morocco, however, was proud of the fact that it afforded asylum to freedom fighters from all parts of Africa, including refugees from Spanish Sahara. The petitioners had made only statements of fact, which could be verified. No matter in what guise colonialism might present itself, it was the same thing all over the world, the oppression of man by man, the domination of one people by another.

163. *Mr. Braïka Ould Ahmed Lahcen*, speaking on behalf of all the petitioners in his group, said that, contrary to what the Spanish representative had alleged, all the petitioners were sons of the Spanish Sahara and were well known in that country. He himself had been born in El Aaiún in 1930 and had studied at Ifni, El Aaiún and for some time in Tetuán. He had begun to work as an interpreter in 1946 at El Aaiún, where he was well known by everybody, including the colonialist Spaniards. Because of his activities in the liberation movement, he had been forced to flee from El Aaiún in 1957, abandoning all his property and taking with him only one small portfolio of confidential documents. He and his fellow petitioners had subsequently fought against the Spaniards, but he himself had been arrested in December 1957 and imprisoned in El Aaiún together with hundreds of others. He had not benefited by an amnesty and had subsequently been transferred to the San Francisco gaol in the Canary Islands. After some time in various prisons, he had finally been released on the mainland, but had had to walk seventeen kilometres, without shoes and without food, to the Moroccan border, where he had been well received. He had been employed at Agadir as a lawyer, but not as a government official. None of the petitioners were Moroccan government officials but all were *saharawi* nationalists, who made it a rule to devote half their earnings to the cause of freedom. It was true that they travelled with Moroccan passports and had come to New York via Dakar, but that was merely because they had no other passports and had of necessity been obliged to avoid Madrid. They were present in New York as the only genuine representatives of their country, for whose independence they were all prepared to die.

164. The Spanish representative had said that his Government was officially sponsoring the study of the Arabic language in Spanish Sahara. He challenged that representative to find a single person among the indigenous population who held a primary school certificate of aptitude in Arabic. It was true that Hassania, a local dialect, was taught in the Spanish schools but it was not pure Arabic, which was the mother tongue

of his people. The Spanish representative had also claimed that his Government observed the principles of justice in Spanish Sahara; true justice, however, did not exist in that country and not one case in the courts was judged in accordance with legal principles, by either a European or a Moslem judge, the latter being mere legal advisers to the former. He asked whether it could be called justice when a Spanish army had come to the holy city of Smara and had burned an ancient library containing the literary treasures of centuries. The mosque of that city was now used as a barracks for Spanish legionaries, while the local inhabitants had to pray at home or in the open air.

General statements

165. The representative of *Spain* said that the position of Spain on Ifni and the Spanish Sahara had been clearly stated in the letter which its Permanent Representative had sent to the Chairman of the Special Committee on 8 September 1966 (see annex). It was his delegation's fervent hope that the decolonization of Sahara would proceed at a rapid pace; with regard to Ifni, despite the peculiarities of the Territory, the contacts established with Morocco should make it possible to find a satisfactory solution for the interests involved and provide the inhabitants with the necessary guarantees regarding their future. As was stated in the document in question, Spain was firmly resolved to implement the provisions of General Assembly resolution 2072 (XX).

166. The representative of *Mauritania* pointed out that Mauritania had been divided into two parts under French and Spanish colonial rule and that only the part colonized by France had been able to accede to independence, the north-western part of the country being still a Spanish colony—Spanish Sahara. That was an abnormal situation, since Mauritania, as its President had pointed out, had a mission to fulfil in the Sahara; there was no doubt that geographically, ethnically and economically, so-called Spanish Sahara was an integral part of Mauritania. In a statement to the Special Committee in 1963, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Mauritania had said that so-called Spanish Sahara was populated solely by Moorish tribes, mostly nomads, which in language, culture, race, religion, or customs differed in no way from the other tribes which lived in the north-west of the Islamic Republic of Mauritania. Furthermore, it was clear from an official document published in 1960 by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Moroccan Kingdom that the territory of Mauritania included the southern provinces of Morocco between the regions of Tindouf and Segouia el Hamra in the north, the Atlantic in the west, and the Senegal River in the south, and that Spain had substituted the expression "Spanish Sahara" for "Spanish Mauritania". A White Paper on Mauritania issued by the Moroccan Government maintained that Río de Oro was a Moroccan region simply because it was an integral part of Mauritania and that so-called Spanish Sahara and Ifni were two distinct regions which should be treated separately. Mauritania argued that Spanish Sahara was part of its territory and that the Treaty of Peace and Trade, signed at Marrakesh in 1767 between the Sovereigns of Spain and Morocco also corroborated that view.

167. Thus, Mauritania's position on that very important question was quite clear; it wished to contribute to stability and to the maintenance of peace in the world, in particular in its own geographical region;

and it believed in the virtue of discussion and in the need for peaceful settlement of international disputes. Morocco's position had not always been so clear. Its policy in that regard had varied, and after subduing the tone of its claims on the independent part of Mauritania, it had emphasized the claims concerning the other part, namely so-called Spanish Sahara.

168. A recent *communiqué* from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Mauritania had stated that all possible confusion must be avoided between two very clearly defined questions: on the one hand, that of Ceuta, Melilla and Ifni, settlement of which lay with Spain and Morocco, and on the other hand, that of Spanish Sahara, which should be the subject of negotiations, not between Spain and Morocco, a country which had never exercised sovereignty over that area, but between Spain and Mauritania, of which so-called Spanish Sahara was an integral part. The excellent relationships existing between the Mauritanian Government and the Spanish Government gave reason to hope for a satisfactory settlement of the question. Moreover, the conversations which had taken place in March 1966 during the visit of the Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs to Mauritania had been encouraging, and Mauritania hoped for a solution that would make possible the integration of that region into its national territory; nevertheless, if the administering Power decided to apply the principle of self-determination to the people of Spanish Sahara, Mauritania would not oppose such a step. However, in that event, the inhabitants of Río de Oro and Saguia el Hamra must first be given freedom of expression once again, under the supervision of international observers, with a view to giving the application of the principle of self-determination its full meaning. In such circumstances, the Government and the people of Mauritania were certain what would be the choice made by the inhabitants of the north-western part of Mauritania, known under the name of Spanish Sahara.

169. The representative of *Morocco* recalled that the Moroccan delegation had stated its position on the agenda item under consideration at the 436th meeting of the Special Committee held at Addis Ababa on 7 June 1966, and had on that occasion made some suggestions regarding a final settlement of the problem.

170. Since its accession to independence, Morocco had never failed to make reservations, in the various United Nations bodies, and in particular in the Trusteeship Council, on the Non-Self-Governing Territories of Ifni and Spanish Sahara. At the same time, it had established contact with Spain, the administering Power, with a view to finding a formula for restoring to Morocco the Territories which had been taken away from it when it was itself under the French and Spanish protectorates. After ten years of patience and in a spirit of co-operation within the United Nations, the Moroccan Government had decided to submit the question to the Special Committee, in the conviction that that body would take appropriate measures to hasten the granting of independence to those Territories, in accordance with General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV). That was the gist of the statement which Morocco had made on 7 June 1966 at Addis Ababa. In the opinion of Morocco, as of any other truly independent African country, the indigenous populations must be in a position to decide freely as to their future, either by remaining independent or by becoming integrated in a neighbouring country at the political, economic or constitutional level. However,

if the Special Committee preferred the formula of self-determination, Morocco would not object, provided that the administering Power withdrew its military forces, which were at present as numerous as the population; that it discontinued the organized immigration of Spaniards, who were in fact and in law foreigners to the Territory and constituted a threat to the indigenous population because of their dynamism and technical superiority; and that all the refugees who had fled repression were authorized to return and to express their views freely, without fear of reprisals.

171. Furthermore, whatever formula might be decided upon by the Special Committee and the General Assembly concerning the future of the Territory, Morocco stressed that it should actively participate in arrangements for implementing self-determination. He shared the Mauritanian representative's view that international supervision was necessary if the process of decolonization was to proceed in an atmosphere of calm and good faith. In order to accomplish that, the Spanish administration would have to withdraw and leave it to the competent United Nations bodies themselves to ensure the application of any resolution that the Special Committee might adopt.

172. As he had already stated on 7 June 1966, at Addis Ababa, he hoped that the Special Committee would at the appropriate time adopt a resolution on the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples in that part of the national territory of Morocco and that all its members would endorse his desire to see the Committee's discussions brought to a successful conclusion.

173. The representative of *Tunisia* said that despite the reservations they contained, the statements of Spain, Morocco and Mauritania had in them much that was constructive and likely to prove helpful in promoting an early solution to the problem. In order to avoid wasting time, he therefore suggested that the members of the Committee should hold informal talks with a view to drafting a resolution likely to be approved by the Special Committee as a whole.

174. The representative of *Spain* said that he would like to know whether the Moroccan representative's remarks on self-determination applied only to the Spanish Sahara or to Non-Self-Governing Territories in general. The Spanish delegation stood by what was said in its letter of 8 September 1966 to the Chairman of the Special Committee (see annex), namely, that the Spanish Government was in favour of the application of General Assembly resolutions 1514 (XV) and 2072 (XX) to the Territory of Spanish Sahara. It should be pointed out that Spain had fewer than 30,000 men stationed in the Territory; nor were repressive measures employed against the indigenous populations.

175. Ifni was an enclave and therefore raised special problems, but the Spanish Government was willing to consider any suggestions which Morocco might make, its sole concern being to protect the interests of the population. The Spanish delegation wished to stress the special conditions obtaining in the Territory of Ifni, in particular the fact that Spain was not in control of the entire Territory. It drew attention to the proposals it had set out in document A/AC.109/202 (see annex). It rested with Morocco, therefore, to give its views on those proposals.

176. The representative of *Morocco* said that in the opinion of his delegation, Ifni and the Spanish Sahara together constituted a single problem. It was a colonial problem, created by the presence of a colonial Power. The two Territories in question shared a common destiny, just as they shared a common past and just as they had been subjected to the same colonial rule. In the view of Morocco, those Territories were Moroccan, and if there were a mission to be accomplished, it was for Morocco to accomplish it. As for the function of the administering Power, article 5 of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples stated clearly that immediate steps should be taken in Trust and Non-Self-Governing Territories or all other Territories which had not yet attained independence to transfer all powers to the peoples of those Territories without any conditions or reservations.

177. Spain had repeatedly proclaimed its intention of implementing the Declaration and could therefore reasonably be expected to apply it in full, particularly in the matter of the transfer of powers, which should take place, in the words of the Declaration, without any conditions or reservations.

178. The Spanish representative, after stating that the question of Spanish Sahara was distinct from that of Ifni, had said that his Government looked to Morocco to put forward suggestions concerning the latter Territory. If that invitation implied the recognition by Spain of Moroccan rights over Ifni, Morocco would not fail to respond to it. On the other hand, if no Moroccan rights over Ifni were recognized, it should be left to the Special Committee to take action. As things were, Morocco could offer only one suggestion—that the Territory should be liberated from colonial rule.

179. The representative of *Mauritania*, referring to the conditions which the Moroccan delegation had laid down for the self-determination of Ifni and Spanish Sahara, said that in the Mauritanian view there were two distinct problems. One involved questions of principle; the other, the question of confidence in the talks between Mauritania and Spain of whose sincerity Mauritania was convinced.

180. He recalled that during the Special Committee's meetings at Addis Ababa, Morocco had demanded independence for Spanish Sahara. However, the Moroccan representative had declared that it formed an integral part of Moroccan territory. The question therefore was what precisely the Moroccan Government meant by the word "independence". Indeed, the ambiguity of the Moroccan Government's statements could not fail to cause disquiet. There was a contradiction in the attitude of Morocco which it would be in the common interest to resolve.

181. The representative of *Morocco* said that his country's policy had always been that outstanding problems should be dealt with through direct contacts with Spain; and it would continue to act on that principle. The fact that the whole of Ifni was not under Spanish control was no fault of the Moroccan Government, which, in any event, had taken steps to maintain tranquillity in the region.

182. There was no inconsistency in saying, on the one hand, that the Territories were really Moroccan and should become Moroccan once more and, on the other hand, that they ought to be independent. Morocco was advocating independence in the conviction that

once Ifni and Spanish Sahara were free they would choose the path that best suited them.

183. The representative of *Syria* said that his country unreservedly supported the liberation of Ifni and Spanish Sahara. Like the Tunisian representative, he welcomed the fact that the interested parties were not only prepared for an exchange of views but actually advocated it, and that the administering Power itself was in favour of the early and unqualified application of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. As the Moroccan and Mauritanian delegations had stressed, it was important that the indigenous populations should be able to express their aspirations freely and that the administering Power should help to bring about the necessary conditions by withdrawing its troops, by putting an end to Spanish immigration, and by refraining from intervention in the process of self-determination. Such behaviour could only enhance the administering Power's prestige.

184. The representative of *Uruguay* pointed out that the Spanish representative's letter of 8 September 1966 (see annex) began with a reference to General Assembly resolution 2072 (XX), the terms of which Spain accepted. There could therefore be no doubt that Spain was prepared to carry out the provisions of paragraph 2 of that resolution, in which the Spanish Government was urgently requested "to take immediately all necessary measures for the liberation of the Territories of Ifni and Spanish Sahara". However, decolonization could come about in different ways, according to the nature of the Territories concerned. In his opinion there was no doubt that the case of Spanish Sahara was quite different from that of Ifni. The fact that Ifni was an enclave was of the greatest importance. His delegation approved the proposal of the Tunisian representative, to the effect that the parties concerned should be left to settle the matter, and that the Special Committee should confine itself to adopting a draft resolution affirming the principles on which agreement already existed.

185. The representative of *Iran* thought that the points of agreement were much more numerous than the points of disagreement. All three parties felt that an end should be put to the colonial status of the Territories in question. That being so, his delegation considered that different methods might, if necessary, be adopted in each case.

186. He supported the Tunisian representative's proposal that, since the parties were in agreement on certain principles, it was desirable to draft a resolution setting them forth clearly. The Special Committee should examine the Tunisian proposal without delay.

187. The representative of *Mali* said that the statements made by Spain in its letter of 8 September 1966 (see annex) represented some approach to the application of General Assembly resolution 2072 (XX). Since there were a number of principles which no one disputed, the fact should be placed on record in a resolution, as the Tunisian representative had proposed.

188. The representative of *Venezuela* expressed his satisfaction at the fact that there were points of agreement between the parties, and associated himself with the Tunisian proposal.

189. The representative of the *Union of Soviet Socialist Republics* said that six years after the adoption of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), Spain was still defying its provisions. The characteristic

feature of Spanish colonial policy in Africa was delaying tactics, which could not be concealed by general declarations of principle. For Spain, the Territories it dominated constituted as it were a medium of exchange. Similarly, the immigration policy applied in the Spanish Territories was designed to facilitate the worst kind of exploitation. Spain had ceded some of the resources of the Territories to Western monopolies, which were pillaging them without the slightest restraint. The Special Committee should act to prevent the Territories still administered by Spain from being sold to the highest bidder, and to that end it should demand the immediate application of General Assembly resolutions 1514 (XV) and 2072 (XX).

190. The representative of *Spain* said the Soviet representative was clearly ignorant of Spain's entire policy and position in colonial matters. Spain relied on no one's support, and was acting solely on rational principle. The policy referred to by the Soviet representative was entirely foreign to Spain.

191. The Representative of the *Union of Soviet Socialist Republics* said that his delegation's purpose had been to throw light on a number of specific facts relating to Spanish colonization in Ifni and the Sahara. Such facts were always the essential basis of efforts to liberate the colonial Territories from the domination of foreign Powers.

F. FURTHER ACTION TAKEN BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE

192. At the 474th meeting, the representative of *Tunisia* introduced a joint draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.351) finally co-sponsored by Afghanistan, Iran, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Mali, Sierra Leone, Tunisia and the United Republic of Tanzania.

193. At the 478th meeting the co-sponsors submitted a revised text of the draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.351/Rev.1). Further revisions were introduced orally at the 478th and 479th meetings.

194. In introducing the draft resolution, the representative of Tunisia said that the text was the result of long and difficult negotiations, during which the representatives of Morocco and Mauritania had both made a number of concessions and had shown great co-operation. The draft resolution dealt with the two Territories separately. Operative paragraph 1 concerned Ifni; the Organization of African Unity (OAU) had adopted a resolution in similar terms. Operative paragraph 2 requested the administering Power to prepare the indigenous population of Spanish Sahara for self-determination and independence and operative paragraph 3 invited the administering Power to consult with Mauritania and Morocco and the population of the Sahara concerning arrangements for a referendum in the Territory to determine the wishes of the population, while operative paragraph 4 asked Mauritania, Morocco and any other party concerned to assist in implementing operative paragraph 3. Algeria and Mali, for instance, might also be able to help. He hoped that a speedy solution would be found to the problems of the two Territories and that the draft resolution would be adopted with the greatest possible majority.

195. The representative of *Sierra Leone*, speaking as a sponsor of the draft resolution, said that it was not perfect, but the delegations mainly concerned had had to make great sacrifices in order to agree on a text. It was important to ensure that the inhabitants of the two Territories were able to exercise their right

to self-determination and independence as early as possible.

196. The representative of the *Ivory Coast* expressed his delegation's gratitude to the delegations of Mauritania and Morocco for their constant co-operation during the consultations concerning the text. He welcomed the fact that the administering Power had decided to apply the provisions of General Assembly resolution 2072 (XX) in their entirety, as noted in the last pre-ambular paragraph. With reference to operative paragraph 1, he wished to make it clear that it was the understanding of the sponsors that the transfer of powers to Ifni should be carried out in accordance with the provisions of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), especially operative paragraph 5 of that resolution, which stated that all powers should be transferred to the peoples of the Territories, without any conditions or reservations, in accordance with their freely expressed will and desire, in order to enable them to enjoy complete independence and freedom. He reaffirmed that principle and was sure that all the members of the Special Committee would share his views.

197. The representative of *Mali* said that, as a sponsor of the draft resolution, he supported the statements of the previous speakers and recommended the text for adoption by the Special Committee. It was important to stress the fact that the administering Power was taking steps to discharge its obligations and to implement General Assembly resolution 2072 (XX). He was convinced that the administering Power, in consultation with Morocco, Mauritania and all other parties concerned, would find the right solution for the problem of Spanish Sahara, but it was important that the people of the Territory should be in a position to exercise their right to self-determination in all freedom.

198. The representative of Tunisia had referred to Mali as one of the countries which might be particularly interested in the question of Spanish Sahara. He would point out that what interested Mali was the end of colonialism in accordance with General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV). He referred to the statement made by the President of Mali to the OAU in 1963, in which he had invited all the African Heads of State to stand by the territorial boundaries as they had been established at the time the colonialists had left their countries. Mali had no intention of annexing any other territory but wished only for peace and security in Africa and throughout the world.

199. The representative of *Spain* considered that since the Fourth Committee would later be discussing the agenda item under consideration, he felt that the Special Committee should not engage in a lengthy debate at the present stage and that it would be difficult to take an important decision without such a debate.

200. Since Spain had repeatedly expressed its willingness to grant independence to Spanish Sahara, he felt that the language of operative paragraph 2 was somewhat peremptory.

201. He pointed out that in operative paragraph 3 of the draft resolution, Spain was invited to consult with Mauritania and Morocco as well as the population of the Sahara concerning arrangements for a referendum. The last-named should have been mentioned first, since they were entitled to have the first and last word on what happened to their Territory.

202. The representative of *Algeria* said that the disappearance of colonialism in Africa would help to elimi-

nate potential sources of conflict in that continent and was a prerequisite for peace and prosperity throughout the world. His country had waged relentless struggle against colonialism in order to attain independence and it therefore supported the demands of all peoples for freedom and independence. That was especially true in the case of the so-called Spanish Sahara, with whose inhabitants his country had close ties of blood, tradition and culture. In fact, the Regueibat tribes were nomads and had for centuries been wandering in search of pasture throughout the area made up of the south of the Algerian Sahara, Morocco, Mauritania and the region known as the Spanish Sahara. It was natural that Algeria should take particular interest in the future of a country with which it had common borders and in which there were tribes that spent several months of the year in Algerian territory, for it would to a great degree affect the security of the whole area and hence of that part of his country's national territory. Algeria had fought for many years to regain its territorial integrity and to achieve independence, and its sole concern was to develop good relations and friendship with all States, particularly those with which it had common frontiers. That was one of the fundamental principles of the United Nations Charter and of the OAU.

203. Since its establishment, the Special Committee had been working tirelessly to achieve decolonization and to persuade the colonial Powers to implement General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV). His delegation endorsed the views expressed by the Moroccan and Mauritanian delegations at Addis Ababa on the future of Spanish Sahara. It considered that Spain should conform to the new realities of Africa and should establish the necessary conditions to enable the indigenous inhabitants to exercise their sacred right of self-determination and independence. That was the only course which would enable all the parties concerned to reach a final solution to the problem of the Territory's future. His delegation hoped that the Territory would be a factor of harmony and peace, which Africa sorely needed.

204. The representative of *Morocco* expressed his delegation's gratitude to the African members of the Special Committee for the sustained efforts which they had made to produce a draft resolution that would be acceptable to all the parties concerned. He also wished to commend the parties concerned for their spirit of understanding.

205. Morocco had already made known its position with regard to the problem. At the 436th meeting of the Special Committee, his delegation had said that in keeping with the spirit of decolonization members should put aside national considerations and concentrate their efforts on liberating the so-called Spanish Sahara. Morocco had close ties with the people of the Territory and since its accession to independence it had tried to promote a settlement of the question both in the United Nations and on a bilateral basis with Spain. After ten years of efforts, it had put aside national considerations and was acting within the framework of decolonization as defined by the United Nations. Since June 1966, Morocco had urged that the people of the Territory should be allowed to exercise their right to independence and self-determination. His delegation had noted that the administering Power had expressed its intention of implementing General Assembly resolution 2072 (XX).

206. Although the joint draft resolution did not include all the arguments advanced by his delegation, he thought that it would enable the inhabitants of the Territory to exercise their right to self-determination. He wished to draw attention to a major concession which his country had made in agreeing that the Territory of Ifni should be considered apart from the question of Spanish Sahara. Morocco had considerable legal and historical reasons for its claim, since the two Territories were Moroccan.

207. His delegation considered that the Territory of Ifni did not present any insurmountable problems, since Spain had always shown itself to be in favour of settling the situation in that Territory. His Government had taken note of the good intentions of the Spanish Government and hoped that Spain would adopt a decisive attitude that would make a final settlement possible.

208. His delegation therefore found the draft resolution acceptable and hoped that all members of the Special Committee would support it.

209. The representative of *Mauritania* regretted that, in introducing the draft resolution, the Tunisian representative had not made it clear that the Mauritanian delegation had qualified its acceptance of the text. Since, however, a number of delegations had been in favour of the draft resolution, his delegation had not insisted on its reservations.

210. The Mauritanian delegation was happy to note the decision that the two questions should be considered separately. He pointed out that that did not represent a concession on the part of Morocco to reality but a concession to history.

211. The administering Power had emphasized the need to respect the principle of self-determination. In his delegation's view, the administering Power should decide on way and means of putting that principle into effect in the Territory, taking into account the way of life of the indigenous inhabitants.

212. The representative of *Syria* congratulated the sponsors of the draft resolution on their efforts to bring the parties together, and paid a tribute to the co-operative spirit of the delegations of Tunisia, Spain, Morocco and Mauritania. His delegation considered that the Special Committee should now concentrate its efforts on accelerating the application of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) to the people of the Territories.

213. The representative of the *United Republic of Tanzania* welcomed the Spanish representative's statement that his Government was willing to implement General Assembly resolution 2072 (XX). It was thanks to the encouraging Spanish attitude that the sponsors had been able to produce the draft resolution.

214. No interested party could agree entirely with the terms of the draft resolution and his delegation could fully understand that there should be reservations. Nevertheless it was encouraging that there had been concessions from several parties involved. The important thing was that the draft resolution should be implemented and the long overdue process of decolonization in Africa completed. The Special Committee and the parties concerned should take account of the interests of the inhabitants of the Territory.

215. The representative of *Algeria* said that the point at issue was that the people of the Territory should be able freely to exercise their right to self-determination and attain full independence. The long and difficult negotiations that had preceded the produc-

tion of the draft resolution were evidence of the complexity of the problem. Apart from its position on decolonization, his Government adhered to the principle of good neighbourly relations to which Members of the United Nations had subscribed in signing the United Nations Charter. The prime objective of his delegation was that the people of the Territory should attain freedom and independence.

216. The representative of *Uruguay* said that it had always been the deeply rooted conviction of his Government that colonial Territories everywhere in the world should be liberated. The self-determination of the people of the Spanish Sahara was a matter for serious consideration by the countries whose territory bordered the area, in view of the extensive and frequent nomadic movements of the inhabitants. The Territory should not only be decolonized; its inhabitants should be enabled to live in peace with their neighbours.

217. The representative of *Italy* paid a tribute to the efforts made by various delegations to agree on a draft resolution acceptable to all parties. It was perhaps regrettable that the consultations which had preceded the introduction of the draft resolution had not included the administering Power, with which the main responsibility for the decolonization of Ifni and Spanish Sahara rested, and his delegation hoped that the Spanish delegation would find it possible to extend its support to the text.

218. Reservations had been voiced about the advisability of the Special Committee adopting a resolution on the subject when the General Assembly had been in session for almost two months and when a debate on the two Territories had already begun in the Fourth Committee. In view of the considerable effort made by the Special Committee to come to a decision, it would perhaps not be unwise to adopt the draft resolution. He regretted, however, that the Special Committee had not waited to hear the other petitioners, who would be in New York shortly.

219. The Spanish delegation had been correct in asserting that the Special Committee had a special mandate to report on the implementation of General Assembly resolution 2072 (XX). If the second preambular paragraph of the draft resolution had been divided into two paragraphs, the first reading "*Having heard* the statements concerning these two Territories made by the representatives of the administering Power and taking note of the letter dated 8 September 1966 from the Permanent Representative of Spain to the United Nations" and the second reading "*Having heard* the statements by the representatives of Mauritania, Morocco and Algeria", the text would have been more in keeping with General Assembly resolution 2072 (XX) and would have made it easier for the Spanish delegation to accept the draft resolution.

220. In discussing problems of decolonization, the Special Committee was always faced with the conflicting demands of realism and of adherence to principle. In the present case realism had prevailed, in that the draft resolution took note of the fact that there were a number of Member States directly concerned in the future of the Territories, a future which, according to principle, should be shaped only by the will of their indigenous inhabitants. Although his delegation had always stressed the need for realism in the search for solutions to political problems, he wondered whether it would not have been advisable, for the sake of principle, for the draft resolution to place more emphasis

on the necessity of ascertaining the views and safeguarding the interests of the indigenous inhabitants of the Territories. The demands of realism could have been satisfied by asking for the co-operation of the neighbouring States, which would be indispensable in consulting the nomad inhabitants of the Territories.

221. His delegation wondered also whether, in view of the fact that the Territories might be considered to come within the category of small Territories in terms of population, a reference to General Assembly resolution 1541 (XV) would not have been appropriate.

222. His delegation also had some doubts concerning operative paragraph 3, for it thought that the administering Power might have difficulty in determining who were the "other parties concerned".

223. Despite the doubts which he had expressed, his delegation would vote in favour of the draft resolution and it hoped that the decolonization process in the two Territories would promote peace and stability in the area.

224. The representative of *Spain* recalled that his delegation had pointed out certain defects in the draft resolution at earlier meetings. His delegation would prefer to have the two Territories treated in separate resolutions and hoped that the Fourth Committee would follow its previous decision on that point.

225. He pointed out that the new preambular paragraph added by the sponsors of the draft resolution applied only to the petitioners from Spanish Sahara.

226. In previous resolutions dealing with the transfer of powers to the peoples of Non-Self-Governing Territories, it had been customary to invite the administering Power and the Government of the Territory to consult, taking into account the interests of the population. In departing from that tradition in operative paragraph 1 of the draft resolution, the Special Committee was going beyond its powers. The reference in operative paragraph 3 to other countries was also quite unprecedented. The sacred trust which Spain had accepted under Article 73 of the Charter obliged it to promote the well-being of the inhabitants of the Territories, whereas operative paragraph 3 would compromise the interests of those inhabitants. His Government was prepared to grant the inhabitants of the Territories the right of self-determination, but it did not think that the exercise of that right should be influenced by foreign intervention.

227. The representative of *Chile* said that his delegation approved the draft resolution in general and would vote in favour of it. It had doubts, however, about the reference in operative paragraph 3 to countries which were to be consulted in connexion with the arrangements for a referendum. His delegation was aware of the important and legitimate interests of those countries but thought that they should come into play only when the population of Spanish Sahara was independent. He therefore asked for a separate vote on operative paragraph 3; his delegation would abstain in the vote on that paragraph.

228. The representative of *Australia* said that his delegation would have preferred to have more time to consider the statements of the petitioners. It would therefore abstain in the vote on the draft resolution, without prejudice to its future position on the matter in the light of closer consideration.

229. The representative of *Uruguay* said that it was highly regrettable that the Special Committee had

decided to put the draft resolution to the vote when all the necessary information was not yet available. Fortunately, delegations could take a position later in the Fourth Committee, when they were in full possession of the facts.

230. His delegation shared the Italian delegation's view concerning the principle of the administering Power's exclusive responsibility and the advisability of dividing the second preambular paragraph into two paragraphs. In operative paragraph 1 there was no reference to the necessity of taking into account the interests of the population—which was the very essence of decolonization. Moreover, the reference to the Government of Morocco in paragraph 1 should be in a separate paragraph, since the basic responsibility for arranging for the transfer of powers rested with Spain. His delegation could support operative paragraph 2 whole-heartedly, but it had some reservations concerning operative paragraph 3. A complex of interests was established in that paragraph, and it was not clear which was to prevail. To invite the administering Power to consult with the Governments of Mauritania and Morocco concerning the arrangements for the referendum was unfair not only to the administering Power but also to the indigenous population of Spanish Sahara. Moreover, such consultations would further delay the exercise by the people of their right of self-determination. Accordingly, his delegation would abstain in the vote on the draft resolution.

231. The representative of *Venezuela* said that his delegation had always regarded the principle of self-determination as the right of a people to determine its own political future and considered that the interests of the people concerned took precedence over every other interest in the decolonization process. His delegation had therefore been amazed that neither operative paragraph 1 nor operative paragraph 3 of the draft resolution included a reference to the interests of the people of the Territory. His delegation would vote in favour of the draft resolution, on the understanding that its reservations would be recorded.

232. At the 479th meeting, the Special Committee voted on the draft resolution. A separate vote was taken on operative paragraph 3 which was adopted by 16 votes to none, with 6 abstentions. The draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.351/Rev.1) as a whole, as orally revised was adopted by a vote of 19 to none, with 3 abstentions.

233. In explanation of vote, the representative of *Denmark* said that his delegation was fully in agreement with the substance of the draft resolution, and had therefore voted in favour of it. He noted that operative paragraph 2 of that resolution affirmed the right of the indigenous population of Spanish Sahara to self-determination and independence. His delegation had reservations, however, concerning operative paragraph 3, for the invitation to the administering Power to consult specific States might prejudice the future status of the Territory.

234. The representative of the *United States of America* said that his delegation believed firmly in the right of the people of Spanish Sahara to self-determination. It had abstained in the vote on the draft resolution, for if that resolution was to have any chance of success it would have to satisfy the aspirations of the indigenous population and win the support of all the parties concerned, including the nations with legitimate interests in the fate of the Territories.

235. The representative of the *United Kingdom* said that his delegation had voted in favour of the draft resolution, although it had some reservations concerning operative paragraph 1 in view of the absence of a reference to the interests of the people—which were paramount under the Charter—and the inclusion of a reference to resolution 1514 (XV) which was not entirely clear. The text also dealt with matters which were the primary concern of the administering Power. He regretted that the discussion had been closed before all petitioners had been heard.

236. The representative of *Mauritania* commended the Special Committee for its adoption of the draft resolution. In his delegation's view, Morocco, while it was interested in the Territory of Ifni, had no interest in so-called Spanish Sahara.

237. The representative of *Morocco* said that the fact that the resolution had been approved unanimously was a demonstration of the solidarity of the nations of Europe, Africa, Asia and Latin America with the peoples of Africa desirous of achieving freedom, and a token of their united will to see that justice, law and the principles of the Charter prevail.

238. Morocco would play its part in a spirit of friendship and co-operation in the active application of the resolution so as to ensure that the decolonization of the Territories under consideration proceeded in an orderly, peaceful and harmonious manner in keeping with the legitimate wishes of the people, who aspired to dignity, progress and well-being, without detriment to the legitimate rights of anyone. Like all the countries engaged in the struggle against colonialism, Morocco considered that decolonization could only serve the cause of peace in the context of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV).

239. With regard to operative paragraph 1 of the resolution adopted by the Special Committee, Morocco considered that the decolonization of Ifni should be brought into line with operative paragraph 6 of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV). With regard to operative paragraph 3, his delegation considered that the question of Sahara under Spanish administration, in so far as it concerned a party other than the population of the Territory itself, was exclusively the concern of Morocco, which did not recognize the validity of any rights claimed circumstantially by other parties.

240. He hoped that note would be taken of the fact that the spirit of compromise reflected in the Committee's resolution did not affect the conviction that the Territory, which had been an integral part of Morocco from time immemorial, had a right to enjoy its right to freedom and independence without let or hindrance, with the assistance of the United Nations. Subject to that reservation, his delegation had accepted the compromise text. Morocco was prepared to co-operate with the administering Power in compliance with the resolution so that that Territories of Saguia el Hamra, Río de Oro and Ifni would become independent on that basis, in the interests of the indigenous population.

241. The representative of *Mauritania* said he had already expressed his views on the resolution adopted by the Special Committee, and what the Moroccan representative had just said did not surprise him, since of course Morocco laid claim to so-called Spanish Sahara just as previously it had laid claim to Mauritanian territory, as was proved by an official document given world-wide distribution by the Moroccan Government in 1960.

242. He would like to put on record the fact that Ifni was a Territory entirely separate and distinct from Spanish Sahara and had nothing to do with it; and he hoped that the Committee would take due note of that. Mauritania trusted that the people of those Territories would be granted the exercise of their right to self-determination, and noted that the administering Power had undertaken to grant it. He urged that no obstacle should be put in the way of the exercise of that right by confusing the issue with problems alien to the wishes of the people, and that by agreement with the administering Power, the people should be allowed to decide freely as to their future.

243. The text of the resolution (A/AC.109/214) adopted by the Special Committee at its 479th meeting on 16 November 1966 reads as follows:

"The Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,

"Having considered the item on its agenda relating to Ifni and Spanish Sahara,

"Having heard the statements concerning these two Territories made by the representatives of the administering Power, Mauritania, Morocco and Algeria,

"Having heard the petitioners,

"Recalling the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples contained in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960,

"Bearing in mind the provisions of resolution 2072 (XX) adopted by the General Assembly on 16 December 1965,

"Noting the decision of the administering Power to apply the provisions of resolution 2072 (XX) in their entirety,

"1. Invites the administering Power to expedite the process of decolonization of the Territory of Ifni and, in collaboration with the Government of Morocco, to make arrangements for the transfer of powers in accordance with the provisions of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV);

"2. Requests the administering Power to establish without delay appropriate conditions which will ensure that the indigenous population of Spanish Sahara is able to exercise its rights to self-determination and independence;

"3. Invites the administering Power to make arrangements, in consultation with the population of Sahara, the Governments of Mauritania, Morocco and any other parties concerned, for a referendum which will be held under United Nations auspices to enable the indigenous population of the Territory freely to exercise its right to self-determination, and to report thereon to the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples before the referendum is held;

"4. Requests the Secretary-General to follow the progress of the implementation of this resolution and to report thereon to the Special Committee."

ANNEX

[A/AC.109/202]

Letter dated 8 September 1966 from the Permanent Representative of Spain to the United Nations addressed to the Chairman of the Special Committee

1. In the letter dated 28 June 1966 which I sent to the Secretary-General with the request that he forward it to the Officer in Charge of the Department of Trusteeship and Non-Self-Governing Territories, I stated, in reply to the letter dated 9 June 1966^a which Mr. M. E. Chacko sent me from Addis Ababa, that the Spanish Government would inform the Special Committee in due course of its attitude and intentions regarding the implementation of General Assembly resolution 2072 (XX) of 16 December 1965 concerning Ifni and Spanish Sahara. I now have the honour of submitting this information to you.

SPANISH SAHARA

2. As the Special Committee knows, the Spanish Government has shown itself to be in favour of applying the principle of self-determination in the territory of Spanish Sahara, as stated in the official letter sent by me on 30 April 1964 to the then Chairman of the Special Committee, Ambassador Sori Coulibaly, Permanent Representative of Mali. We have consequently noted with satisfaction that at the 436th meeting of the Special Committee, held on 7 June 1966 in the capital of Ethiopia, some other countries which had hitherto opposed the application of this principle in the territory of Spanish Sahara stated that they were now in favour of it. It will thus be possible to implement General Assembly resolution 2072 (XX) by means of the free self-determination of the *saharais*, as the Spanish Government has proposed in the past.

3. To this end, my Government is in contact with the population of the Sahara and is actively making the necessary preparations for them to express their will without any form of pressure. These preparations have taken some time because of the nomadic nature of the inhabitants of the desert and the special features of the territory.

IFNI

4. As regards Ifni, the Spanish Government, inspired as always by the spirit of international co-operation and true to the cause of decolonization, must needs draw the Special Committee's attention to the abnormal situation obtaining in this enclave, in some parts of which Spain is having difficulty in exercising its authority, despite the Treaties in which Spain's rights are clearly set out. The reasons for this are well known to all and the Spanish Government is not responsible for them. All the same, because of the special features of this problem it might be advisable to establish contact with Morocco with the primary objective of restoring a lawful state of affairs as a necessary preliminary to seeking an arrangement which would satisfy the interests involved and permit the inhabitants of Ifni to obtain firm and duly guaranteed assurances regarding both their future in general and their individual destiny.

5. I believe, Mr. Chairman, that the above will show the Special Committee how clear and firm is Spain's determination to implement General Assembly resolution 2072 (XX).

^a The letter of 9 June 1966 transmitted the text of the consensus concerning Ifni and Spanish Sahara adopted by the Special Committee at its 436th meeting on 7 June 1966.

CHAPTER XI*

GIBRALTAR

A. ACTION PREVIOUSLY TAKEN BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE AND THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

1. Following its consideration of Gibraltar at its meetings in 1964, the Special Committee, on 16 October 1964, adopted a consensus as contained in its report to the General Assembly at its nineteenth session (A/5800/Rev.1,¹ chap. X, para. 209). At its meetings in 1965, the Special Committee included relevant information on the Territory in its report to the General Assembly at its twentieth session (A/6000/Rev.1,² chap. XI).

2. On 16 December 1965, the General Assembly adopted resolution 2070 (XX) which, in its operative paragraphs, reads as follows:

[The General Assembly]

"1. *Invites* the Governments of Spain and of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to begin without delay the talks envisaged under the terms of the consensus adopted on 16 October 1964 by the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples;

"2. *Requests* the two Governments to inform the Special Committee and the General Assembly, at its twenty-first session, of the outcome of their negotiations."

B. INFORMATION ON THE TERRITORY

3. Information on the Territory is contained in the reports of the Special Committee to the General Assembly at its eighteenth, nineteenth and twentieth sessions.³ Supplementary information is set out below.⁴

General

4. The civilian population of Gibraltar numbered 24,485 at the end of 1964, composed as follows: Gibraltarians, 18,615; other British, 4,153; and aliens, 1,717.

Political and constitutional developments

5. Following the elections to the eleven-member Legislative Council in 1964, a Council of Ministers consisting of a Chief Minister and five other ministers was formed. In July 1965, the Chief Minister agreed to form a coalition with the independent Opposition. The leader of the Opposition became Minister without Portfolio and Deputy to the Chief Minister.

* Previously issued under the symbol A/6300/Add.8.

¹ Official Records of the General Assembly, Nineteenth Session, Annexes, annex No. 8 (part I).

² Ibid., Twentieth Session, Annexes, addendum to agenda item 23.

³ Ibid., Eighteenth Session, Annexes, addendum to agenda item 23, document A/5446/Rev.1; *ibid.*, Nineteenth Session, Annexes, annex No. 8 (part I), document A/5800/Rev.1; *ibid.*, Twentieth Session, Annexes, addendum to agenda item 23, document A/6000/Rev.1.

⁴ This information has been derived from published sources and from the information transmitted to the Secretary-General by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland under Article 73 e of the Charter, on 2 December 1965, for the year ending 31 December 1964.

Correspondence between Spain and the United Kingdom

6. On 17 January 1966, the Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs addressed a note to the British Ambassador in Madrid⁵ in which he stated that the Spanish Government was prepared to begin without delay negotiations with the Government of the United Kingdom in accordance with the terms set forth in the General Assembly resolution of 16 December 1965, with a view to seeking a definitive solution to the problem of Gibraltar.

7. In a *note verbale* dated 14 February 1966,⁶ the British Embassy at Madrid informed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Spain that the United Kingdom Government was also ready to initiate such talks. The Embassy was instructed to propose that the talks should commence in London on a mutually convenient date in April 1966.

8. In a *note verbale* dated 23 February 1966,⁷ the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Spain informed the British Embassy at Madrid that the Spanish Government accepted the United Kingdom Government's proposal that the negotiations should take place in London at the earliest date convenient to both Governments. The Ministry held itself at the disposal of the British Embassy at Madrid for the purpose of fixing this date by mutual agreement.

Economic conditions

9. The economy of Gibraltar is largely dependent on the tourist industry, re-exports and the work provided by the dockyard, the departments of the Armed Services, the Government and the City Council. The territory has no agriculture or other primary resources. Local industry is mainly confined to a fruit and fish canning factory, tobacco processing, coffee blending and garment manufacture.

10. The value of imports during 1964 amounted to £14,928,148 of which £2,894,419 were food-stuffs. Dutiable re-exports during the same year totalled £4,710,478. Exports of goods of local origin is negligible.

11. The main sources of government revenue are customs duties, licences and excise duties, court fees, rents of government property and government lotteries. Income tax accounts for some 14 per cent of revenue. In 1964, total revenue amounted to £2,086,556 and expenditure to £2,407,298, of which £1,913,298 was recurrent expenditure. The City Council has its separate finances; in 1963 revenue and expenditure amounted to approximately £1 million.

12. In July 1965, it was announced that £1 million would be made available in Colonial Development and

⁵ The text of the note was transmitted to the Secretary-General in a letter dated 20 January 1966 from the Permanent Representative of Spain to the United Nations (A/6242, annex I).

⁶ The text of the *note verbale* was transmitted to the Secretary-General in a letter dated 2 March 1966 from the representative of the United Kingdom to the United Nations (A/6278).

⁷ The text of the *note verbale* was transmitted to the Secretary-General in a letter dated 2 March 1966 from the Permanent Representative of Spain to the United Nations (A/6277).

Welfare grants for development in Gibraltar over the next three years and a further £200,000 in Exchequer loans, should they be required. In addition, £100,000 would be made available as a special grant-in-aid for the Gibraltar budget for 1965.

Social conditions

Labour

13. Manpower statistics relate only to persons engaged in manual labour and to other workers whose remuneration does not exceed £500 a year. At the end of 1964 there were 5,641 workers of British nationality and 9,600 alien workers; most of the latter lived in Spain and entered Gibraltar daily. Some 43 per cent of the total labour force is employed by the Government of Gibraltar, the departments of the Armed Services, the Ministry of Public Buildings and Works and the City Council. The other main sources of employment are the building industry, the wholesale and retail distributive trades, the hotel and catering trades, shipping services and private domestic service.

14. In 1964, there were twelve employers' associations with a total membership of 364. The number of trade unions was sixteen with an aggregate membership of 3,734. This represents approximately 60 per cent of the resident employed population.

Public health

15. The Board of Management for the Medical and Health Services is responsible for the administration of all government medical and health services. The Board consists of three *ex officio* members and six appointed by the Governor and is presided over by the Minister for Medical Services.

16. The Government operates four hospitals. Other medical and health services administered by the Government include out-patient medical treatment, child welfare, school health services and the port and airport health service.

17. In 1964, recurrent expenditure on public health by the Government amounted to £267,266 and by the City Council to £34,330.

Educational conditions

18. The Minister of Education is responsible for initiating policy for the general progress of education in the Territory. He is advised by the Chief Education Officer who has general executive control over the Department under the Gibraltar Education Ordinance of 1953.

19. Education between the ages of 5 years and 15 years is compulsory, and it is free in government schools.

20. In 1964, primary education was provided in twelve government schools and three private schools. With the exception of a few pupils in two private schools, secondary education is provided exclusively by the Government. There were two grammar schools, a technical school for boys, a commercial school for girls and four secondary schools. The two grammar schools prepare pupils for the General Certificate of Education at Ordinary and Advanced Levels.

21. At the end of 1964, the school enrolment was: 3,014 (1,553 boys and 1,461 girls) in primary education; 1,621 (787 boys and 834 girls) in secondary education; and 153 (105 boys and 48 girls) in technical and vocational education.

22. In 1964 recurrent government expenditure on education amounted to £198,822.

C. CONSIDERATION BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE

23. The Special Committee considered Gibraltar at its 475th and 480th meetings held at Headquarters on 11 and 17 November 1966.

24. The Special Committee had before it the following written petitions concerning Gibraltar:

<i>Petitioner</i>	<i>Document No.</i>
Mr. Edward O. Recagno	A/AC.109/PET.531
Messrs. Mohammed Bey, Lahoussine Bey and Youssel	A/AC.109/PET.532

25. By a letter dated 8 September 1966 (A/AC.109/210), the Permanent Representative of Spain to the United Nations requested that his delegation be allowed to participate in meetings of the Special Committee at which Gibraltar would be discussed. The Committee decided without objection to accede to that request.

26. The representative of Spain said, that on 17 January 1966, after receiving the text of General Assembly resolution 2070 (XX), the Spanish Government had again proposed to the Government of the United Kingdom that negotiations should be initiated concerning Gibraltar. The latter Government had agreed to that proposal on 14 February, and on 18 May the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Spain and the Secretary of the Foreign Office had met in London. An offer, of which the Special Committee was aware, had been made by the Spanish Minister regarding the decolonization of Gibraltar; the Government of the United Kingdom had not yet replied to that offer. In order that the offer might be given proper study, it had been decided that the high-level negotiations would continue. Meetings had been held in June, July, September and October, and a further meeting was planned.

27. It had been decided that the negotiations would be confidential, without prejudice to the obligation of informing the Special Committee and the General Assembly. The United Kingdom Government had however broken that agreement and had announced the publication of a White Paper in which, apparently, it would reproduce the documents exchanged at the meetings. Spain, in the light of what would be said in the White Paper, reserved the right to bring relevant information to the notice of the Special Committee and the United Nations.

28. Something else had occurred which might have serious consequences. On 12 July the Government of the United Kingdom had formally notified the Spanish Government, for the first time in history, that the United Kingdom had sovereign authority over the section of Spanish territory next to Gibraltar where the aerodrome was situated. That area had been declared in the past to be a neutral zone and had been demilitarized by Spain. Spanish sovereignty over that territory had never been denied by the United Kingdom until that year at the time when negotiations under resolution 2070 (XX) had been initiated. That was a very serious act of aggression by the United Kingdom against Spain, and the Spanish Government had asked the United Kingdom to reconsider its claim to a piece of territory which had not been ceded under the Treaty of Utrecht. The United Kingdom Government had reaffirmed its claim to sovereignty, had denied the neutral character of the territory in question, was using it for military purposes and was authorizing

the aircraft of its air force to fly over the air space of Spain contiguous to Gibraltar.

29. Despite everything, Spain was continuing to negotiate and had urged the United Kingdom to reconsider its declaration of sovereignty over the territory in question and to refrain from using it for military purposes so that Spain would not be obliged to take further measures in the face of aggression.

30. Spain was studying the latest United Kingdom proposal in the light of resolutions 1514 (XV) and 2070 (XX) and expected to reply to them in a short time.

31. The representative of the *United Kingdom* said that in pursuance of General Assembly resolution 2070 (XX) his Government had been holding talks with the Spanish Government in an effort to find a satisfactory solution to the problems between them. Those talks had revealed a number of legal issues.

32. Gibraltar was British by right; but the United Kingdom regarded it as its duty to settle all disputes by peaceful means, and was therefore proposing to the Spanish Government that the legal issues in dispute over Gibraltar should be referred to the International Court of Justice. At the same time, however, the United Kingdom was bound under the Charter to safeguard the interests of the people of Gibraltar, as the Special Committee had recognized in its consensus of 16 October 1964. If the interests of the people of Gibraltar were not overlooked, a solution could be found, and as much of the disagreement hinged on legal issues, the matter should be referred to the International Court of Justice.

33. The representative of Spain had omitted in his statement to refer to the restrictions imposed by his country at several stages over the last few months at the border with Gibraltar. The United Kingdom wished to settle the matter in a spirit of conciliation and friendship, but those actions by Spain—which in October had announced still further restrictions on freedom of movement between its territory and Gibraltar, although it had been agreed that such restrictions should not be increased—were not helping to improve the atmosphere. Such measures appeared to be designed to exert pressure which would increase the difficulty of the talks; that was a factor which should be borne in mind.

34. The Spanish representative had described the British assertion of sovereignty over the southern part of the isthmus, in which the airfield was situated, as a new fact which could have serious consequences. For more than 250 years the United Kingdom had been using the southern part of the isthmus; and in 1838, to mark the extent of its jurisdiction, it had established a line of sentries, which had been replaced in 1909 by a fence in order to control smuggling. Sixty years ago the United Kingdom had made clear that it had no doubt as to its sovereignty over the southern half of the isthmus, and thirty years ago it had constructed, to the south of the line he had referred to, an airfield which it had used for military purposes during the Second World War, without any protest from Spain despite its neutrality. It could hardly be contended now that that was an act of aggression. There had been no changes in the zone for a considerable time, and there was no justification for Spain's recent restrictions and border measures.

35. It was a fact that the airfield was being used by British aircraft for military purposes and that the Spanish Government had complained of violations of its air space; but investigations had revealed only one

overflight, for which the United Kingdom Government had expressed its regrets.

36. The United Kingdom had not failed to reply to the Spanish proposals. It had made lengthy counter-proposals which were still awaiting a reply, and it considered that the talks should continue. It hoped that Spain was of the same mind, for given good faith it would be possible to find a peaceful solution which paid due regard to the interests of the people of Gibraltar. The United Kingdom had decided to publish the documents of the talks because much information had already been leaked to the Press—a fact for which Spain was not entirely innocent of responsibility—and the Spanish Government was warned of this decision in advance.

37. The representative of *Spain* replied that in a *note verbale* dated 29 September 1966 the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Spain had pointed out to the United Kingdom Embassy at Madrid that on 12 July 1966 the United Kingdom Government had informed the Spanish Government, for the first time in history and without adducing any valid grounds for its claim, that in addition to being sovereign over the Rock it was also vested with sovereignty over the part of the isthmus situated between the old walls of Gibraltar and the fence erected in 1909 by the British authorities. That territory had been unjustifiably occupied by the United Kingdom since the nineteenth century, and had been physically separated from the rest of Spanish territory by the fence in question. British occupation of the territory owed its origin to certain *ad hoc* privileges granted for humanitarian reasons by the Spanish Government on the occasion of a number of epidemics which had necessitated the construction on the isthmus of hospital encampments, later converted by the United Kingdom into permanent installations which it refused to evacuate. That part of the isthmus had been neutralized by the Spanish Government in the eighteenth century, in deference to British wishes. Since the last century the Spanish Government had made repeated protests to the Government of the United Kingdom both against the unjustifiable British presence in the part of the isthmus concerned and against the erection of the fence. The United Kingdom had never discussed the repeated statements of Spanish sovereignty over the territory. The Spanish Government regarded the recent unilateral United Kingdom declaration of sovereignty as an act of aggression against the territorial integrity of Spain, and had demanded that the United Kingdom Government should continue to recognize Spanish sovereignty over the area. The Spanish Government had reminded the United Kingdom Government that the waters and air space pertaining to the part of the isthmus in question were also under Spanish sovereignty, and that the neutrality of the zone must be respected by both countries. The United Kingdom Government had repeated its claim to sovereignty over the zone, and had stated that it was entitled to use the air space over the isthmus for defensive purposes. The Spanish Government had again reminded the United Kingdom of its rights over the isthmus and had protested against a series of violations committed by British military aircraft in Spanish air space adjacent to Gibraltar, submitting documents in which those violations were described. The United Kingdom Government had repeated its claim to sovereignty over the section of Spanish territory adjacent to Gibraltar and had without any explanation annulled the neutrality of the territory, thus arrogating to itself the right to convert a state

of occupation backed by no legal title into an outright usurpation backed by force alone. What was more, it asserted that the pilots of British military aircraft had instructions to use well-established approach lanes which did not involve any violation of Spanish rights. Pending the United Kingdom Government's explanation of what it meant by "approach lanes", the Spanish Government's position was that any British military aircraft which flew over Spanish territory or waters was committing a violation of Spanish air space. Despite the Spanish protest, British military aircraft had again violated Spanish air space. That policy of force and *faits accomplis* pursued by the United Kingdom Government obliged the Spanish Government to take steps to protect its sovereignty, raised new difficulties in relations between the two countries and confirmed the Spanish Government in its belief that the sole adequate solution would be the success of the talks in progress with a view to the decolonization of Gibraltar.

38. He read out a further *note verbale* sent on 21 October 1966 by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Spain to the United Kingdom Embassy at Madrid, in which the Spanish Government expressed regret that it was unable to regard as a final reply of the United Kingdom Government a note from the United Kingdom Embassy which merely made excuses for a violation of Spanish air space, questioned the genuineness of two other violations and affirmed that the other nine violations out of the total of twelve enumerated by the Spanish Government had not taken place. The competent Spanish authorities insisted that those twelve violations which had been confirmed by technical methods of observation leaving no room for doubt, had taken place. Still more, the Spanish Government protested emphatically against the United Kingdom Government's declaration of sovereignty over the part of Spanish territory situated between the 1909 fence and the walls of Gibraltar, and against the military utilization of that territory and the violations of Spanish air space committed. As to the last point, the Spanish *note verbale* had been accompanied by graphic descriptions of fifteen additional violations. In a statement to the General Assembly at its eighteenth session,⁸ the Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs had asserted that in dealing with the problem of Gibraltar Spain had barred itself only one road: that of violence. However, the Spanish Government was concerned to see that Her Britannic Majesty's Government appeared to interpret that solemn declaration by Spain as a blank check permitting it to repeat its violations and its attacks on Spanish sovereignty, backed by force. The Spanish Government was avoiding any resort to more drastic measures, and called upon the United Kingdom Government to reconsider its declaration of sovereignty over the isthmus and to cease utilizing the Gibraltar airfield for military purposes.

39. The representative of the United Kingdom said that in relation to the alleged flights over Spanish territory by British military aircraft, his Government had replied on 15 October 1966 that the investigations carried out by the United Kingdom authorities had revealed a single case in which a British military aircraft had inadvertently flown over the territory of La Línea; his Government had regretted the incident and had stated that it had taken steps to minimize the possibility of a repetition of it. These steps included using

new radar equipment to introduce new circuit procedure. The remaining accusations were either unfounded or of doubtful validity. His Government had subsequently received another note from the Spanish Government and was investigating the facts with the same care.

40. It was obvious that the question of the sovereignty of the isthmus was a very good example of the type of case to be dealt with by the International Court of Justice. His Government was also prepared to continue peaceful negotiations with the Spanish authorities.

41. He referred to a statement made in the House of Commons the previous day by the United Kingdom Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, in which it was emphasized that the real problem lay in the fact that the matter affected human beings, whose interests should come before all else, as was laid down in the Charter of the United Nations. There were 20,000 people in Gibraltar and their opinion was a very important factor. Although Spain felt that the wishes of the inhabitants of Gibraltar had nothing to do with the international solution of the problem, the United Kingdom considered them of the greatest importance. The talks between the two Governments showed clearly that there were juridical problems which would have to be elucidated if any progress was to be made. Those juridical points should be submitted to the International Court of Justice.

42. The representative of Syria thought it desirable that the negotiations between the Government of Spain and the Government of the United Kingdom should continue and he appealed to the United Kingdom representative to ask his Government not to place obstacles in the way of the negotiations, such as the publication of the White Paper, flights over Spanish territory, and the assertion of sovereignty over the isthmus. The fact of having occupied an area for a time or of having carried out construction work there could not provide any basis for claiming possession of a territory. The United Kingdom referred to the use of the aerodrome during the Second World War as if that precedent justified its use for military purposes at the present time, when it was not at war with anybody; if the Spanish Government, which at that time had been neutral, had not protested against it, it was not logical to make such an answer now in return for that hospitality.

43. The representative of Uruguay disagreed with the position taken by the United Kingdom Government. The Rock of Gibraltar was Spanish soil which should return to Spain, and the United Kingdom was not showing any goodwill in that respect.

44. When the Treaty of Utrecht had been signed in 1713, Spain had ceded the Rock to the United Kingdom but not the isthmus. The United Kingdom had no sovereignty over the isthmus because it had not lawfully acquired it in accordance with the rules of international law. For the humanitarian reasons which the representative of Spain had stated, the Spanish Government had permitted the United Kingdom to use that territory. Spain was now asking for the return of the territory, and by refusing to return it the Government of the United Kingdom was committing what could be described juridically as an act of usurpation. That was the reason for the incidents which had been denounced by Spain and which, incidentally, were more a matter for the Security Council than for the Special Committee or the Fourth Committee.

⁸ Official Records of the General Assembly, Eighteenth Session, Plenary Meetings, 1213th meeting.

45. The United Kingdom and Spain should stop discussing the problem in the United Nations and should enter into negotiations in London and Madrid. On the day when both finally declared that there were no longer any colonial territories in Europe, the British flag, after being lowered in Gibraltar, would be saluted by the whole world.

46. The representative of *Tunisia* expressed satisfaction that both parties had accepted the terms of General Assembly resolution 2070 (XX) and had shown themselves ready to continue negotiations. In the case of Gibraltar, it was a question of ensuring the full implementation of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV). The time had come for the United Kingdom to recognize the legitimacy of Spain's claims in asking for the return of a territory which belonged to it. His delegation would do everything in its power to help the parties to reach an agreement, the result of which could only be the recognition of Spain's rights over Gibraltar.

47. He joined the representative of Syria in asking the United Kingdom not to do anything which might obstruct negotiations and to take steps to prevent a repetition of the incidents caused by the presence of a British military base in Spanish territory.

48. The representative of the *United Republic of Tanzania* pointed out that the problem of Gibraltar was a problem of decolonization. General Assembly resolution 2070 (XX) invited the Governments of Spain and of the United Kingdom to begin without delay the talks envisaged under the terms of the consensus adopted on 16 October 1964 by the Special Committee. The two Governments, however, were also requested to inform the Special Committee and the General Assembly, at its twenty-first session, of the outcome of their negotiations. Spain and the United Kingdom were now talking about the difficulties which they were encountering and they were not reporting any concrete results. It was therefore necessary to find some way of making progress in the negotiations. It might perhaps be possible for other States which were not directly concerned in the problem to intervene in the talks with a view to expediting them, since the United Kingdom and Spain seemed to be finding it very difficult to reach an agreement by themselves. Those delays had been harmful to the process of decolonization.

49. He added that if the parties to the present dispute wished to have recourse to the International Court of Justice, it was their own affair, but his country would not support any resolution which proposed the submission of a colonial problem to the Court.

50. The representative of *Iran* recalled that in resolution 2070 (XX) the General Assembly had taken into account the historical relationship of Gibraltar with Spain and, rather than merely referring to the wishes of the population, had adopted a particular procedure which was appropriate in cases where the original act of colonial annexation had entailed the separation of a portion of territory from the mother country—namely, that of recommending negotiations between the parties concerned. His delegation found it curious that, in the particular case of Gibraltar, the United Kingdom delegation should show such unusual concern for the wishes of the inhabitants. Although recourse to negotiations was the right course of action, the General Assembly still had a duty to keep a watch on the situation and, if the negotiations were unduly protracted, it should be

ready to take steps to ensure the speedy implementation of resolution 1514 (XV).

51. The representative of *Australia* said that, in his delegation's view, the Committee must take into account not only the conflicting claims of two States to sovereignty over the Territory but also the fate of the 24,000 Gibraltarians.

52. The representative of *Venezuela* said that his delegation considered that the question of Gibraltar was a colonial problem and that General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) was applicable; nevertheless, decolonization must not be used as a pretext for acts disrupting the territorial integrity of any country. There had been unfortunate incidents such as the violation of Spanish air space and the United Kingdom was still hampering the negotiations. The Committee should stress the need for negotiations to continue and for decolonization to take place as speedily as possible. He would like those points to be covered in any resolution.

53. The representative of the *Union of Soviet Socialist Republics* said that the United Kingdom had seized Gibraltar and turned it into a military base to buttress its policies in the Middle and Far East and other areas. Moreover, Gibraltar had recently become not merely a United Kingdom base but a foothold for the aggressive policies of the NATO military bloc and its united nuclear forces. The Spanish Government was not beyond condoning that development. A Reuters dispatch in July 1966 had said that the possibility of turning Gibraltar into a combined military base for NATO had been mooted during the negotiations on the Territory between the United Kingdom and Spain. The claims and counter-claims of sovereignty over the neutral strip and the use of the Gibraltar air base for military purposes were indicative of an agreement between colonialist Powers which menaced the peace and security of the whole area. The fact that the United Kingdom was exposing Gibraltar to an influx of military weapons constituted a threat not only to the people of Gibraltar but to other peoples in the region.

54. It was a matter for concern that, in statements on the progress of negotiations between Spain and the United Kingdom, there was hardly ever an indication that the liquidation of the military base in Gibraltar had been discussed. Spain talked about decolonization and the United Kingdom talked about the rights of the Gibraltarians to self-determination, but it was evident that the bargaining between the two Powers was contrary to the interests of the inhabitants. It was plain that neither side was making constructive proposals for a peaceful solution. His delegation favoured the demilitarization of the zone and the liquidation of the base. That was the only solution in keeping with the interests of the Spanish and other peoples in the area. It would also clear the way for the ending of the colonial status of Gibraltar on an equitable and constructive basis.

D. ACTION TAKEN BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE

55. At the 480th meeting, the representative of *Tunisia* introduced a joint draft resolution on the question of Gibraltar (A/AC.109/L.356) on behalf of Chile, Iran, Iraq, Sierra Leone, Syria, Tunisia, the United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay and Venezuela.

56. The representative of the United Republic of Tanzania said that his delegation had co-sponsored the

draft resolution in a spirit of co-operation and compromise, but had some reservations about it. Firstly, Spain and the United Kingdom had not supplied sufficient details of their negotiations on the future of the Territory. His delegation would press for the fullest details of the progress of those negotiations when next the Committee took up the question, for it wanted to establish whether the positions of the two parties could be reconciled. He strongly supported operative paragraph 3, which called on Spain and the United Kingdom to report to the Special Committee as soon as possible. The Committee must have time to discuss the question in full and not hurriedly, as in the present instance.

57. His delegation would also have preferred the reference to certain acts in the final preambular paragraph of the draft resolution to be more specific. It was to be hoped, however, that Spain and the United Kingdom realized what acts were meant and would refrain from them and begin serious negotiations.

58. The representative of the *Union of Soviet Socialist Republics* stated that since the draft resolution mentioned neither the need for the denuclearization of Gibraltar, nor the demilitarization of the zone, his delegation was unable to vote in favour of it.

59. The representative of *Bulgaria* said that his delegation, while sharing the desire of other delegations that agreement should be reached on the draft resolution, had some reservations on the substance of the problem. It was astonishing that neither the Spanish nor the United Kingdom representative had referred to the essence of the problem, which was the existence of a military base in Gibraltar. The base and its future could not be considered separately from the desire of the people of Gibraltar for self-determination. It was for that reason, and in deference to the right of the people of Gibraltar to self-determination, that his delegation would abstain in the vote on the draft resolution and would speak further on the question in the Fourth Committee.

60. The Special Committee then adopted the joint draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.356) by 16 votes to none, with six abstentions.

61. The representative of *Australia*, speaking in explanation of his vote, said that his delegation would have preferred adoption by consensus because, although it appreciated the efforts made by the sponsors of the draft resolution, it felt that a consensus would have allowed a number of delegations to reserve their position at the present stage and to state their views in the Fourth Committee, where the question would undoubtedly be discussed once again. Since that had not been the case, his delegation would abstain in the vote, without prejudice to any future position that it might adopt.

62. The representative of *Poland* said that since the draft resolution did not cover all the vital aspects of the problem, however, his delegation had been obliged to abstain, without prejudice to the position that it might take on the question in the Fourth Committee.

63. The representative of the *United Kingdom* said that his delegation had abstained because not all points in the resolution were acceptable and because he had had no time to obtain instructions from its Government.

64. With regard to the remarks of the representative of the Soviet Union, he pointed out that Gibraltar was not a NATO base.

65. The representative of the *United States of America* said that his delegation had abstained not because of the substance of the draft resolution but because it had not had time to consult its Government.

66. The text of the resolution (A/AC.109/216) adopted by the Special Committee at its 480th meeting on 17 November 1966 reads as follows:

"The Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,

"Having examined the question of Gibraltar,

"Having heard the statements of the administering Power and the representative of Spain,

"Recalling General Assembly resolution 2070 (XX) of 16 December 1965 and the consensus adopted by the Special Committee on 16 October 1964 (A/5800/Rev.1, chap. X, para. 209),

"Recalling further General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960,

"Taking into account the noted willingness of the administering Power and of the Government of Spain to continue the present negotiations,

"Regretting the occurrence of certain acts which have prejudiced the smooth progress of these negotiations,

"1. Calls upon the two parties to refrain from any acts which will hamper the success of these negotiations;

"2. Regrets the delay in the process of decolonization and in the implementation of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) with regard to this Territory;

"3. Calls upon the two parties to continue their negotiations in a constructive way and to report to the Special Committee as soon as possible, and in any case, before the twenty-second session of the General Assembly;

"4. Requests the Secretary-General to assist in the implementation of the present resolution."

CHAPTER XII*

FRENCH SOMALILAND

A. INFORMATION ON THE TERRITORY

GENERAL

1. French Somaliland (*Côte française des Somalis*) on the eastern coast of Africa, lies round the Gulf of

*Previously issued under the symbol A/6300/Add.8.

Tadjourah, at the head of the Gulf of Aden, just outside the Strait of Bab-el-Mandeb. It has an area of approximately 8,900 square miles (23,000 square kilometres) most of which is desert. The Territory has common frontiers with Ethiopia on the north, west and south-west and with the Republic of Somalia on

the south-east. The coast line is about 800 kilometres in length, from Ras Doumeirah on the north to Loyada on the south.

2. The total population of the Territory was estimated at 81,000 in 1961 compared with 64,000 in 1955 and 53,000 in 1950.

3. In 1961 the population included three major groups—Danakils or Afars who numbered 30,000; Somalis, 24,000; and Arabs, 6,000. There was a French population of about 3,000 and also a population of foreign origin. Those from Aden, India, Madagascar, Greece and Italy numbered 5,000 approximately. A floating population accounted for the remainder.

4. Djibouti, the capital, had a population of about 41,000. It was composed of Arabs, Danakils, and Somalis of various groups, Frenchmen and foreigners. A few other population centres had a total of about 4,300 inhabitants. The remaining population was nomadic. It comprised Danakils inhabiting the north and west of the Territory and Issa Somalis who inhabit the south.

GOVERNMENT

Status

5. The first treaty between France and the Danakil chiefs was signed in Paris on 4 March 1862. By this treaty the Sultans of Tadjourah, Raheita and Gobaad ceded the territory of Obock to France. Several French companies were established during the following years. On 24 June 1884 the first French colonial administrator of the Territory of Obock was appointed.

6. On 21 September 1884, the Sultan of Tadjourah concluded a treaty with France for the cession of the territory of Tadjourah. Cessions of territory on the Gulf of Tadjourah were also made by the Sultan of Gobaad on 14 December 1884 and 2 January 1885.

7. On 26 March 1885, a French Protectorate over the region of Djibouti was established by a treaty concluded between France and the Issa chiefs of the region.

8. Djibouti became the capital and seat of government in 1892. By a decree of the French Government of 20 May 1896, the Territory was officially named "*Côte française des Somalis et dépendances*". It was administered by a Governor assisted by a *Conseil d'administration*.

Political and constitutional developments since the Second World War

9. A *Conseil représentatif* was introduced in 1945. The Council was composed of twelve elected and eight appointed members. Six members were elected by French citizens and six others by the Arab, Danakil and Somali electoral colleges which each elected two councillors.

10. The French Constitution of 1946 contained provisions to the effect that the Overseas Territories of the Republic would have elective territorial assemblies and would send representatives to the French Parliament and to the Assembly of the French Union.¹ French Somaliland was included among the Overseas Territories enumerated in the Law of 27 October 1946 which made provision for the constitution and election of the Assembly of the French Union.

¹ French citizenship, recognized by the Constitution, had been extended to the inhabitants of the Overseas Territories by the law of 7 May 1946.

11. An elective *Conseil représentatif* was established in French Somaliland in 1950. It was composed of twenty-five members of whom twelve were elected by citizens of French civil status and thirteen by citizens who had retained their personal civil status.²

12. The *Loi-cadre* of 23 June 1956, adopted by the French Legislature after consultation with the Assembly of the French Union, provided for the introduction of reforms in the Overseas Territories, including the granting of broadened deliberative powers to the territorial assemblies and the establishment of government councils. The *Loi-cadre* also established the electoral system based on universal suffrage of adults, irrespective of their personal status, and the single electoral college.

13. By the Law of 17 April 1957, the Territorial Assembly of French Somaliland was reorganized on the basis of universal suffrage; and elections were held for the new Assembly on 23 June 1957. The provisions of the *Loi-cadre* with regard to the establishment of a Government Council and the broadening of the powers of the Territorial Assembly were implemented by the Decree of 22 July 1957. Mr. Mahmoud Harbi was elected by the Assembly as the first Vice-President of the Government Council.

14. On 28 September 1958, the new French Constitution was the subject of a referendum in which the electorates of both Metropolitan France and the Overseas Territories participated. The constitutional text provided for the institution of the French Community. Overseas Territories which rejected the Constitution would become independent forthwith.

15. The Constitution provides that the Overseas Territories are territorial units of and an integral part of the French Republic. The Constitution also provides that the Overseas Territories may retain their status or may decide to become *départements* of the Republic or member States of the French Community. The decision was to be taken by the territorial assembly concerned within four months after the promulgation of the Constitution.

16. Mr. Harbi advised the electorate of French Somaliland to reject the Constitution. The results of the referendum, however, were 8,662 in favour (75.2 per cent of the votes cast), to 2,851 against. The French authorities suspended Mr. Harbi from his duties on 6 October 1958. On 9 October, two other ministers were suspended for taking part in banned demonstrations. The Territorial Assembly was dissolved and Mr. Harbi and his followers were defeated in new elections on 23 November. The newly elected Assembly determined on 11 December, by twenty-seven votes to four, to maintain French Somaliland as an Overseas Territory.

17. France first transmitted information on French Somaliland to the Secretary-General under Article 73 e of the Charter in 1946 and ceased to do so as from 1957 for reasons set forth in a letter dated 23 March 1959, transmitted to the Secretary-General by the Permanent Representative of France (see annex I).

Present political structure

18. The present political structure of the Territory was established by decrees issued in implementation

² "Personal civil status" was applicable only to indigenous inhabitants of the Territory who had not renounced such status in terms of the provisions of article 82 of the French Constitution of 1946.

of the *Loi-cadre*, in particular the Decree of 3 December 1956 (as amended by the Decree of 4 April 1957) and the Decree of 22 July 1957. Its main features are described below.

(a) Governor

(i) The Governor is the head of the Territory and the representative of the French Republic. He is appointed by the French Government. He is directly responsible for the administration of "State Services" (*services d'Etat*).

(ii) The list of State services may be summarized as follows: (1) services which represent the central power; (2) external affairs services; (3) general military and economic security services; (4) institutions and services ensuring respect for public freedoms, which include courts of French law, judicial police, labour inspectorate; (5) services maintaining and supervising external communications; and (6) services and establishments ensuring the solidarity of the constituent elements of the Republic, its economic, social and cultural expansion and its monetary and financial regulations (including Treasury services, financial control, planning services, higher education, broadcasting stations).

(b) Government Council

(i) The Government Council is composed of six to eight members who have the title of Minister and are elected by the Territorial Assembly from within or outside its membership. The senior minister has the title of Vice-President of the Government Council. However, the Council itself is normally presided over by the Governor. The ministers are assigned to their offices and may be removed therefrom on the proposal of the Vice-President of the Government Council. The Government Council may resign if it feels it no longer has the confidence of the Territorial Assembly. It may not be dissolved except by decree of the French Government after consultation with the Territorial Assembly. Normally it remains in office until a new Territorial Assembly is elected.

(ii) The Government Council, under the high authority of the Governor, is responsible for the administration of territorial interests. It draws up all matters to be submitted to the Territorial Assembly and adopts all orders to be issued by the Governor on territorial matters, including the organization of the territorial public services. However, if the Governor considers that a decision of the Government Council exceeds its powers or is likely to prejudice national defence, public order or the maintenance of security or public freedoms, he refers it to the French Government, which may annul it by decree. Decisions may also be appealed to the French Council of State, ruling as an administrative disputes court.

(iii) Each Minister is responsible to the Government Council for the territorial public services entrusted to his care.

(c) Territorial Assembly

(i) The Territorial Assembly consists of thirty-two members who are elected from seven multi-member electoral constituencies. In each constituency the vote, based on universal adult suffrage, is for a list of candidates and there is no proportional representation; nor

is there a run-off if no list wins an absolute majority in the first election.

(ii) The Territorial Assembly holds two regular sessions annually, the second of which is a budget session. Under the Decree of 22 July 1957 the Assembly is empowered to take decisions in the form of territorial regulations on a long list of matters which include: the general organization of the territorial services; customary law; the public lands; internal trade; agriculture, forests, animal husbandry and fishing; methods of applying the regulations governing mineral resources; savings banks; public health; liquor control; tourism; town planning and housing; education (except higher education) not including study programmes and examinations; scholarships; sports; welfare and assistance; and the prison system. Decisions on such matters may be taken notwithstanding existing acts of the French Parliament and decrees to the contrary, except for a few specified laws and subject to the provisions of international conventions. The Assembly also takes decisions concerning the local section of programmes for implementing the Development Plan for the Overseas Territories. The Assembly has the power to determine taxes, duties and contributions of all kinds in aid of the Territorial budget.

(iii) Within a time-limit of thirty days following the receipt of a decision of the Territorial Assembly, the Chief Administrator of the Territory may request a second reading or he may request the French Government to annul it on the grounds of illegality. Decisions may also be annulled by the French Council of State if they are beyond the field of competence of the Assembly.

(iv) The Decree of 22 July 1957 did not modify the budgetary powers granted to the Territorial Assemblies by previous legislation, under which they vote the appropriations for the territorial services and the taxes necessary to defray them. Decisions in fiscal matters are subject to the same control on the grounds of illegality as other decisions. In addition, if a balanced budget has not been voted by the beginning of the year, the Governor is to establish the budget provisionally and, if necessary, definitively on the basis of the previous year's budget. A number of expenses are still obligatory, though the list was considerably reduced by the Decree of 4 April 1957. The customs tariff is also fixed by the Territorial Assembly. However, its decisions in the field of customs are submitted to the French Government for approval and may be annulled by decree, which must be subsequently confirmed by a law enacted by the French Parliament.

(d) Permanent Commission

(i) The Permanent Commission is composed of five to seven members of the Territorial Assembly and meets between the sessions of the Territorial Assembly in order to conduct the business delegated to it by that body.

(e) Representation in central organs of the French Republic

(i) French Somaliland is represented in the French Parliament by a Deputy and a Senator. It has also one representative on the French Economic and Social Council.

Elections

19. The Territory is divided into seven electoral constituencies. The last elections to the Territorial

Assembly were held on 17 November 1963. Seventy-six per cent of the 21,408 registered voters went to the polls.

20. On 3 December 1963, the Territorial Assembly re-elected Mr. Ali Aref Bourhan as Vice-President of the Government Council by 27 votes out of 32; the remaining five ballots were considered invalid.

21. The Government Council is composed as follows:

Vice-President and Minister of
Public Works and the Port ...Mr. Ali Aref Bourhan
Minister of FinanceMr. Raymond Pecoul
Minister of Internal Affairs ...Mr. Idriss Farah Abane
Minister in charge of the Civil
ServiceMr. Kamil Ali Mohamed
Minister of Public Health and
Social AffairsMr. Hassan Mohamed Moyale
Minister of EducationMr. Hassan Gouled Abtidon
Minister of LabourMr. Abdi Ahmed Warsama
Minister of Economic Affairs and
the Development PlanMr. Abdoukadar Moussa Ali

22. At the election of the President of the French Republic held on 19 December 1965, the number of registered voters in French Somaliland was 30,385 of whom 26,363 (or 86.7 per cent) went to the polls. General de Gaulle, whose candidature was reportedly advocated by the Vice-President of the Government Council and the President of the Territorial Assembly, received 25,178 votes (or 95.6 per cent of the votes cast), and Mr. Mitterrand received 1,185 votes (or 4.4 per cent of the votes cast).³

Political parties

23. The main political organizations of the Territory are the following:

(a) *Union démocratique Afar*, of which Mr. Ali Aref Bourhan (Vice-President of the Government Council since 1960) and Mr. Orbisso Gaddito are prominent members;

(b) *Union démocratique Issa*, led by Mr. Hassan Gouled Abtidon, who is at present Minister of Education;

(c) *Mouvement populaire*, led by Mr. Obsieh Beuh.

24. On 20 September 1963, seven political leaders from the Territory, belonging to the three organizations, referred to above, were reported to have issued a statement in Paris in which they referred to "the weakness of the economic potential of the Territory and the great disproportion between its 80,000 inhabitants and the population of neighbouring States". They declared that French Somaliland was and should remain an integral part of the French Republic. They expressed their confidence in the Republic and the Chief of State, General de Gaulle "who would take all measures likely to promote the personality of the Territory". Finally, they rejected "with indignation the annexationist ambitions and territorial claims of foreign countries".

25. Five members of the Territorial Assembly, as well as a former President and a former Secretary, resigned from the *Mouvement populaire* in September 1964. They were said to be opposed to a statement

issued by the political leaders in April 1964, in favour of maintaining the *status quo* in French Somaliland.

26. A fact-finding mission of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) visited the neighbouring States of Somalia and Ethiopia at the beginning of 1965 and heard refugees from French Somaliland including representatives of a movement known as the *Front de libération de la Côte des Somalis (FLCS)* (Somali Coast Liberation Front). No information is available on the outcome of the mission.

27. In addition to the FLCS, which has its headquarters in Mogadiscio, a second liberation movement called the *Mouvement de libération de Djibouti (MLD)* (Liberation Movement of Djibouti), is centred at Dire-Dawa in Ethiopia.

Judiciary

28. The judiciary is headed by the French *Procureur de la République* who is assisted by a deputy residing at Djibouti. In criminal matters, all inhabitants of the Territory are subject to the single jurisdiction of the High Court of Appeal, acting in its capacity as the sole criminal court. In civil and commercial matters, certain cases between indigenous parties are brought before the judges of Sharia law, the *cadis*.

ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

29. The economic activity of French Somaliland is chiefly commercial. Djibouti is an important centre for trade, mainly transit and *entrepôt* trade, as well as a refuelling station for ships passing through the Red Sea.

30. The economy of the Territory is dependent to a great extent on the Djibouti-Addis Ababa railway, construction of which was started in terms of a Treaty between Ethiopia and France in 1896 and completed in 1917. The total length of the line is 486 miles (784 kilometres) of which 60 miles (98 kilometres) are in French Somaliland. The Franco-Ethiopian Treaty of 12 November 1959, fixed the present ownership and administration of the railway. The main provisions of the Treaty are as follows:

(a) The Company to acquire Ethiopian nationality, with headquarters in Addis Ababa.

(b) The Company's capital, fixed at 4,325,000 Ethiopian dollars, to be apportioned equally between French and Ethiopian shareholders.

(c) The Company to be formed for a fixed period, terminating on 31 December 2016.

(d) The Company to be administered by a council of twelve members, nominated by a general meeting of shareholders.

(e) The general meeting to be composed of two groups of shareholders, the one French and the other Ethiopian.

(f) Each group to nominate six administrators, approved by their respective Governments.

31. The total share issue of the company is fixed at 34,600 shares. Of the Ethiopian holding, 15,570 shares are held by the Government of Ethiopia and 1,730 shares by the Commercial Bank; of the French shares, 9,483 are held by the Government of France and 7,817 by private enterprise.

32. Customs duties were abolished in 1949 and French Somaliland was declared a "free" Territory. In that year, the Territory was given a currency of its own, the Djibouti franc, which is tied to the United

³ The votes received by the presidential candidates on 5 December 1965 were as follows: de Gaulle 25,509; Mitterrand 403; Tixier 194; Lecanuet 181; Barbu 72; and Marclhacy 43.

States dollar; the note issue is 100 per cent covered by a reserve fund in United States dollars. The Djibouti franc is freely convertible in foreign currency.⁴

33. In 1964, 2,567 vessels of an aggregate tonnage of 12 million entered Djibouti, in comparison with 2,091 vessels of 8 million tons in 1960 and 1,415 vessels of 5 million tons in 1955.

34. When considering the volume of goods handled at Djibouti in the past, a distinction should be made between supplies for shipping, transit traffic to and from Ethiopia and the trade of the Territory itself. Re-exports of petroleum products and other fuels for supply to ships amounted to 1.5 million tons in 1964, compared with 899,000 tons in 1960 and 595,000 tons in 1955. The traffic of merchandise amounted to 281,000 tons in 1964, compared to 313,000 tons in 1963, 216,000 tons in 1960 and 205,000 tons in 1955. Transit traffic to and from Ethiopia represented about 85 per cent of the total traffic of merchandise in 1964.

35. It has been reported that the Vice-President of the Government Council met with the President of the French Republic as well as the French Prime Minister in Paris in January 1966. With the latter, he discussed the need for accelerated completion of additional fuelling berths at Djibouti to relieve overflow traffic from Aden, and additional water wells to overcome the effects of prolonged drought on nomads in the hinterland.

36. Agriculture in the Territory is very limited, owing to insufficient rainfall. Cultivable land has been estimated at not more than 6,500 hectares and irrigation cannot be practised on a wide scale. The nomadic population, which was estimated at about 35,000 in 1961 is occupied in raising livestock in scattered and shifting pastures.

37. Most consumer goods are imported from France, Ethiopia, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Netherlands, Italy, the United States of America and Asian countries. Imports were valued at 2,877 million Djibouti francs in 1960. Services and tourism were the major items of revenue which, with special trade exports, mainly hides and cattle, amounted to 1,431 million Djibouti francs in the same year.

38. Transit trade to and from Ethiopia totalled 26,000 million Djibouti francs in 1964.

39. The Territorial Assembly, at its budget session from 9 December 1965 to 4 January 1966, adopted the territorial budgets projects for 1966. The ordinary budget amounts to 1,912 million Djibouti francs and the extraordinary budget amounts to 196 million Djibouti francs. The territorial budget for 1961 amounted to 1,134 million Djibouti francs. The Territory receives French aid through the *Fonds d'Investissement pour le Développement Economique et Social* (FIDES). Under the Development Plan being implemented, 1,800 million Djibouti francs have recently been allocated by France for the development of the port of Djibouti.

SOCIAL CONDITIONS

Labour

40. Labour legislation is contained in the Labour Code of 15 December 1952⁵ and the ordinances of 31 December 1953. The Inspectorate of Labour and Social

Legislation was established in 1952, the Labour Tribunal was set up in 1953 and the Manpower Bureau in 1954.

41. Labour disputes are first dealt with by the conciliation machinery of the Labour Inspectorate. If this fails, the dispute is taken before a *conseil d'arbitrage*.

42. In 1965, there were four employers' organizations and seven labour unions. In 1956 the labour force was distributed as follows: 12,570 were employed in the money economy and some 12,000 were engaged in traditional agriculture. Those in the money economy included 8,784 wage earners, of whom 2,340 were in the public sector and 6,444 in the private sector. Out of the 6,444 persons employed by the private sector, 2,000 were foreigners.

Public health

43. Public health services are under the authority of the Minister of Health and Social Welfare. The main hospital at Djibouti was completed with the aid of FIDES credits. The hospital has 600 beds and provides general medical and surgical services as well as specialized services. It has radiological and bacteriological laboratories and a pharmacy. There are also two urban polyclinical dispensaries and an anti-tuberculosis dispensary. In the interior of the Territory four multi-purpose dispensaries extend medical care to the inhabitants of the main localities. A mobile unit provides medical care to the nomadic population.

EDUCATIONAL CONDITIONS

44. Public primary education is financed from the territorial budget and private education is subsidized. The Metropolitan Government has assumed financial responsibility for secondary and technical education. Subventions for building of schools are granted by FIDES. There are schools in Djibouti and in the principal towns of the administrative *circonscriptions*. Education is free but not compulsory. The school enrolment ratio was reported to be 40 per cent in 1964, compared with 33 per cent in 1963. Figures for the school-age population are not available. The curriculum is that of metropolitan schools adapted to local conditions.

45. In 1964, primary education was provided at fourteen public and six private schools; secondary education was provided at two public and two private schools; and technical education was given at two public and five private schools.

46. In 1964, the school enrolment was: 4,014 pupils in primary education; 446 in secondary education; and 337 in technical education.

RECENT EVENTS

Incidents of 25 and 26 August 1966

47. Serious disturbances are reported to have occurred during the visit of President de Gaulle to Djibouti on 25 and 26 August. Large numbers of demonstrators waving banners and chanting "Independence" were said to have been present at the airport and in the streets. Subsequently violent clashes broke out between demonstrators and the security forces. President de Gaulle cancelled a planned open-air speech.

48. Speaking before the Territorial Assembly of the Territory, President de Gaulle said: "The banners we have seen and the agitation of those who were carrying

⁴ In 1965, the parity of the Djibouti franc to the United States dollar was \$1.00 = 215 FD.

⁵ The Labour Code was amended by law of 8 July 1964.

them are not sufficient to express the democratic will of this French Territory. It is possible that one day, by democratic means, the Territory will express a different opinion from that which it has expressed up to now... If therefore one day—everything is conceivable—by regular and democratic means the Territory were to express a different opinion as regards its destiny, France would take note of it...”

49. It was reported that the Ministers of Labour, Education and Internal Affairs of the Territory, had announced their resignations.

Events following the incidents of 25 and 26 August 1966

50. The incidents resulted in casualties estimated by Mr. Pierre Billotte, French Minister of State for Overseas Departments and Territories as four dead and seventy wounded (half of the latter among the security forces). Mr. Billotte, speaking over the Djibouti radio on 29 August, stated that foreign elements had played on the feelings of discontent of those who felt that the local Council of Government was acting only in the interests of a part of the population. There was need to assure a better equilibrium between ethnic groups.

51. Mr. Billotte went on to say that feelings must be calmed down but that there was no question of repression. The balance in the Government Council must be restored. The Territory's status could evolve by peaceful means. The French Government could be led to realize that there was a change among the people. France would certainly not stay by force in French Somaliland, but France would recognize the will of the people only as manifested by legal means.

52. On 31 August it was announced that Mr. Ali Aref Bourhan, Vice-President of the Council of Government, would leave for Paris. Mr. Bourhan left on 2 September ostensibly to attend a meeting of the French Economic and Social Council. On his departure, his post was taken over in an acting capacity by Mr. Hassan Gouled Abtidon, a Minister of Somali origin, who had resigned on 29 August, but who had been persuaded to remain in office.

53. On 9 September it was announced that Mr. René Tirant had been replaced as Governor of French Somaliland by Mr. Louis Saget.

Incident of 14 September and subsequent security measures

54. Further serious incidents were reported to have broken out in Djibouti on 14 September. Four police stations were sacked and set on fire by mobs. The police intervened using grenades. A curfew was imposed. At least one death was said to have occurred.

55. On 17 September, it was reported that, according to official sources, the recent disturbances had caused five deaths. The demonstrators claimed, on the contrary, that there had been twenty-one deaths.

56. Following the renewed disturbances, the forces of order were said to have carried out many verifications of identity and to have expelled to the Somali Republic foreigners whose situation was irregular. Some 800 persons were reported to have been deported, while 18 suspects had been brought before the courts, charged mainly with looting and 726 persons had been held. Military vehicles were patrolling the streets, but the situation was said to be calmer.

57. The opposition parties were reported to be protesting to the new Governor against the brutal methods used by the forces of order.

58. On 20 September, the Governor announced that the length of the curfew had been reduced. The verification of papers was proceeding and a further 164 people had been expelled, while 308 others had left voluntarily.

59. On 23 September, the Djibouti radio announced that the curfew had been lifted and that the scrutinizing of papers had ceased.

60. On 28 September it was reported that troops had been withdrawn from the city and that the situation had eased perceptibly.

Statement by President de Gaulle and announcement of a referendum

61. On 15 September, President de Gaulle, meeting with his ministers following his return to France, was reported by a spokesman as having said: “The population must know what it wants and then say so by democratic means; France will know what conclusions to draw. We lived without Djibouti for a long time. We have obligations towards our compatriots and we are ready to assume them and to continue to play our part. But if the people want to separate from us, France will not place any obstacles in their way”.

62. On 21 September following a meeting of the French Council of Ministers it was announced that in view of the internal and external situation of French Somaliland and having regard to the provisions which could be made by law with regard to its status and destiny in relation to the general interest of the Republic, in application of title 2 of the Constitution the Government had decided that the people of the Territory would be directly consulted on that subject by means of a referendum before 1 July 1967. The draft law concerning that consultation would be laid before Parliament.

63. Mr. Billotte, Minister for Overseas Departments and Territories, meeting with the Press after the announcement, said that if French Somaliland chose to build its future with France, some changes could be made in its present status of an Overseas Territory. If, on the other hand, it chose independence, the population must understand that that would be the end of co-operation with France and that there would be no more military, economic or financial aid from France. The Minister explained that the terms of the referendum would not be finally decided upon until the representatives of the people had been consulted. The Government Council would have its say, but it would first have to be recognized and include representatives of all parties.

64. On hearing of the announcement, Mr. Hassan Goulet Abtidon, Acting Vice-President of the Council of Government, declared that he was not surprised by the President's proposal, but would have preferred that the National Assembly in Paris and the Territorial Assembly in Djibouti should have discussed it and consulted with each other about it before the French Council of Ministers accepted it. Mr. Hassan Gouled added that every man was duty bound to consider the proposal carefully.

65. Mr. Sahatdjian, President of the Territorial Assembly, while maintaining that the demonstrations did not reflect the aims of the majority of the people,

said that a referendum was the only democratic road by which the country could make clear what it wanted.

66. Mr. Moussa Ahmad Idriss, the Opposition Leader, stated that the Opposition parties were greatly pleased by Mr. Billotte's statement. If asked in the referendum whether they wanted to be French or be independent, they would choose independence and take the consequences.

B. CONSIDERATION BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE⁶ INTRODUCTION

67. The Special Committee considered French Somaliland at its 429th and 430th meetings held in Mogadiscio and its 438th meeting held in Addis Ababa between 2 and 8 June 1966.

68. During its consideration of this item, the Special Committee had before it, in addition to the petitions listed below, two memoranda on French Somaliland, addressed to the Special Committee by the Government of Somalia (annex II) and the Government of Ethiopia (annex III) on 25 May 1965 and 8 June 1965 respectively.

Participation by the representative of Somalia in the work of the Special Committee

69. In a letter dated 1 June 1966 (A/AC.109/172), the *Chef de Cabinet* in the Office of the Prime Minister of Somalia requested permission for a Somali delegation to participate in the Special Committee's consideration of French Somaliland during its meetings in Mogadiscio. At its 429th meeting, the Special Committee decided, without objection, to accede to this request.

70. Participation by a Somali delegation in the Special Committee's consideration of this item during its meetings in Addis Ababa was requested in a letter dated 4 June 1966 (A/AC.109/172/Add.1), addressed to the Chairman of the Special Committee by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Somalia. At its 438th meeting the Special Committee decided, without objection, to grant this request.

WRITTEN PETITIONS AND HEARINGS

71. The Special Committee circulated the following petitions concerning French Somaliland:

<i>Petitioner</i>	<i>Document No.</i>
Mr. Abdillahi, Ardeye, Secretary-General, Front de libération de la Côte des Somalis (FLCS)	A/AC.109/PET.412
"Peuples Côte des Somalis"	A/AC.109/PET.413
Messrs. Ahmed Bourhan, Secretary-General, and Omar Abdullahi, Secretary for Information, Mouvement de libération de Djibouti (MLD)	A/AC.109/PET.414
Mr. Abdillahi Ardeye, Secretary-General, Front de libération de la Côte des Somalis (FLCS)	A/AC.109/PET.464
Mr. Ahmed Bourhan, Secretary-General, Mouvement de libération de Djibouti (MLD)	A/AC.109/PET.465

⁶ See also chapter II (paras. 595-619) for an account of the discussions on the resolution adopted by the Special Committee at its 455th meeting on 22 June 1966 concerning the implementation of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) with regard to Territories considered by the Committee during its meetings in Africa.

Petitioner

Document No.

Two petitions from Messrs. Ahmed Bourhan, Secretary-General, and Moussa Omar Hassan, Assistant to the Secretary-General, Mouvement de libération de Djibouti (MLD) ..

A/AC.109/PET.465/
Add.1

Petition from the Somali Student Union and the Somali Youth Union

A/AC.109/PET.485

72. At its 429th and 430th meetings, held at Mogadiscio on 2 and 3 June 1966 respectively, the Special Committee heard Messrs. Abdillahi Ardeye Abane, Djama Mahamoud Sultan, Omar Ahmed Youssouf, Osman Aden Youssouf, Abdillahi Waber Kalif, Ibrahim Taher and Djama Farah Abdi, representatives, Front de libération de la Côte des Somalis (FLCS).

73. Mr. Djama Mahamoud Sultan (FLCS) said that for thousands of years his country had been free, sovereign and united, but in the nineteenth century it had been occupied by force. The invasion of Somaliland by France had been followed by a series of treaties concluded with certain corrupt sultans and tribal chiefs. In 1862 the first treaties signed with representatives of the Sultan of Raheita and Tadjoura had given France the right to use the anchorage at Obock and the coast between Ras Doumeira and Ras Ali. In 1884, under the threat of armed intervention, the Sultan of Tadjoura had been obliged to sign a deed making over the territories of Ras Ali, Saguello and Goubet-el-Kharab to France. Another treaty transforming the Convention of Friendship and Trade of 9 April 1884 into a gift of land had been extracted from the Sultan of Gobad on 2 January 1885. In March 1885, the Chiefs of the confederation of Issa tribes, misled by seductive promises, had signed a treaty of friendship, as a result of which French troops had occupied Ras Djibouti.

74. French Somaliland provided access to the Near and Far East, Europe and Africa. Its economy was based mainly on stock-breeding, the traffic of its port, which was one of the most modern on the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean, rail traffic and traffic through the international aerodrome of Djibouti. The country was rich in minerals, although they were not being exploited. The greater part of the population lived by raising livestock (camels, goats, sheep and cattle). The policy of the French Government was to keep the indigenous inhabitants out of the economic life of the country. The entire economy was in the hands of large French companies. Small business was reserved for foreigners who had settled in the country; the indigenous population provided cheap labour.

75. In order to keep the people dependent, the colonialist French Government had refused to take any interest in cultural development. There was no institution of higher education in the country, and secondary education was almost non-existent. Less than 1 per cent of the population went to school. Children were not entitled to continue their studies after the age of twelve. Only 1 per cent of the indigenous candidates were allowed to sit for examinations, because the colonial Administration wanted to limit the number of indigenous graduates. It was worth noting that during more than a century of domination, only some twenty indigenous students had been able to continue their education in France. There was still only one Somali in the country with a higher education degree. The number of those with a secondary education diploma was not more than thirty.

76. As far as public health was concerned, French Somaliland had only one hospital. The chief town in each region had one dispensary. The hospital had two quite different classes of accommodation. The first was a de luxe class provided with all the necessary equipment; it was reserved for settlers and rich foreigners who had established themselves in the country. The second consisted of a few ten-bed wards, which represented the so-called free social services. Infectious and contagious patients, including those with tuberculosis, were not isolated from the others. Patients in the second-class section, when they did not die, often left the hospital with infectious diseases because of the insanitary condition of the wards and the lack of care and food. At that very moment, hundreds of Somali citizens were dying in an epidemic of smallpox which was spreading through the country, particularly among the nomads, who had no medical care. In order to allow the epidemic to spread, the colonial Administration, instead of putting the nomads in quarantine, expelled those who went to the towns to seek treatment.

77. Tuberculosis was ravaging the population of French Somaliland. At that time, the incidence of tuberculosis was 10 per cent among the urban population, who were underfed and lived in deplorable conditions. The poverty and the ravages of the disease were such that it was by no means rare to see adults weighing slightly more than sixty pounds. The families of the sick generally lived in the utmost destitution, and many children in French Somaliland had been abandoned and were hungry because their fathers could not find work. According to the French Government's official statistics, 30 per cent of the children up to the age of six years and 80 per cent up to the age of sixteen years had a positive reaction on skin tests. French Somaliland had the highest tuberculosis rate in the world, with 16 per cent of the population suffering from the disease.

78. As regards judicial matters, there were sixteen prisons in French Somaliland, not to mention the concentration camps in which thousands of prisoners were kept permanently. It was noteworthy that none of the prisoners were of European origin. Since the beginning of French colonization, and although the Europeans committed all kinds of crimes daily, none of them had ever appeared on the lists of those committed to jail.

79. In the political sphere, the colonialist French Government followed a dictatorial and military policy, a policy of extermination, oppression and inequality, which kept the population in poverty and ignorance. It refused to give work to the élite, passed arbitrary sentences on politicians and trade-union and religious leaders, ordered mass expulsions of citizens and organized raids to find people for the concentration camps. On the other hand, foreign immigrants, particularly from Europe, were encouraged. They were offered employment and were even given civil rights so that they would maintain the French presence in French Somaliland. The result was that over 20,000 former inhabitants of French Somaliland had taken refuge in other countries, where they lived in wretched conditions and were dying from lack of food and medical care. That had been confirmed by the OAU Commission which had been set up in January 1965 to investigate the situation of French Somaliland refugees.

80. At the present time French Somaliland was in a state of siege. All nationalist organizations, whether

political, trade-union or even youth organizations, were banned and their active members were harassed and persecuted. Mr. Obsieh Beuh, the President of the Parti du Mouvement populaire, and five members of his Committee had been sentenced to ten years on a prison farm. The entire population lived under the threat of the forces of the *gendarmerie* and the Foreign Legion. There was in every district a station of the *gendarmerie*, which had full power to imprison citizens and carry out searches without a warrant. Nomads, who often came into town to visit relatives or make purchases, were arrested and, after serving their sentences, expelled. Somali citizens had a great deal of difficulty in getting identity cards or residence permits, whereas foreigners could obtain them easily.

81. France had transformed the country into a vast military base with a concentration of more than 40,000 soldiers (Foreign Legion, marines, airmen) who had been driven out of Algeria and other former French colonies. The base was not only a great danger for French Somaliland but also a threat to the whole of Africa and to world peace. Recently, some twenty citizens had died after touching electrified barbed wire at the gates of the capital.

82. French Somaliland had a puppet Territorial Assembly and Governing Council. The Governing Council was presided over by the French Governor, a direct representative of the Minister for Overseas France, while the President of the Territorial Assembly was a naturalized Frenchman of Armenian descent. Contrary to the claims made by France, the members of the Assembly and the Governing Council had no power except to execute orders issued by the colonial Administration.

83. In the 1958 referendum, the Basic Law (*Loi-cadre*) of 1956, which now governed certain French colonies, had been imposed on French Somaliland by means of a formidable radio and press campaign and through corruption and intimidation and the falsification of the elections. Upon learning of the high percentage of "no's" (the highest after Guinea), despite all the effort deployed to get "yes's", the colonialist Government had dissolved the Territorial Assembly—which had maintained its confidence in Mr. Mahamoud Harbi, the Vice-President of the Governing Council, who had campaigned for "no", i.e., for independence—and had imprisoned all those on the "no" side, who had included government ministers, councillors and trade-union leaders.

84. There were no real elections in French Somaliland, but merely appointments. The opposition parties and any persons who showed so-called "anti-French" sentiments were not permitted to stand as candidates. The elections, moreover, took place under the shadow of bayonets and automatics.

85. On the occasion of the most recent elections, in November 1963, the French Government had dispatched 5,000 sailors to French Somaliland on board a squadron consisting of the anti-aircraft cruiser Grasse, as flagship, the aircraft carrier Foch, the flotilla leader Cassard, the rapid escort vessels Picard, Gascon and Provençal, the squadron escorts Bourdannaïs, Kersaint and Vauquelin, the supply tanker La Saine, the logistic support vessel Le Rhin and the submarine Daphné. In addition, two escort gunboats, the Commandant Bory and the Doudart de Lagrée, which had not been part of the squadron, had joined it at Djibouti. The colonialist Government, however, had dared to announce

that the people of French Somaliland had themselves chosen in 1958 to remain tied to France! General de Gaulle, on the other hand, during an official visit to Djibouti on 3 July 1959, had stated: "France, whatever happens, will never part with French Somaliland, because of its strategic and commercial importance".

86. The FLCS, a revolutionary and popular organization fighting for the freedom and independence of French Somaliland, wished to take the opportunity afforded it to tell the Committee how anxious the people of French Somaliland were to free themselves completely from the colonial régime. In the meanwhile, it called upon France to respect General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) and the right of peoples to self-determination.

87. The FLCS was convinced that the barbarous methods used by the French Government could not thwart the just struggle of the Somali people for recognition of their lawful rights as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It accordingly appealed to all States to recognize the lawfulness of its struggle, to give it the moral and material aid it needed and to condemn the colonial policy of France and its persistent refusal to apply resolution 1514 (XV). It also asked the Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees and the specialized agencies of the United Nations to give assistance to refugees from French Somaliland and requested the Committee to invite the United Nations to set up a commission to inquire into the situation in French Somaliland. The Committee might also bring pressure to bear on the French Government to grant French Somaliland full independence immediately, to respect the territorial integrity of the country, to evacuate its military bases, to free all wrongfully imprisoned political, trade-union and religious leaders, to amnesty all politicians and refugees in exile and permit them to return to the country and to restore democratic freedoms so that national organizations could freely pursue their activities.

88. In answer to questions from members of the Special Committee, *Mr. Djama Mahamoud Sultan* said that Europeans represented approximately 10 per cent of the total population and that the percentage was increasing steadily. The European population included Greeks, Italians and Armenians, but was predominantly French. Most of the French were military personnel. There were also officials and some new settlers who were "*pieds noirs*" expelled from Algeria. The French Government encouraged foreign immigration. Somalis, on the other hand, were continually being expelled from the Territory. There was a total of 40,000 foreign military personnel and 10,000 foreign civilians in the country.

89. All political parties and trade-union groups had been prohibited. FLCS was forced to operate from abroad, but it had the full support of the population. Moreover, it had been recognized by the Liberation Committee of the Organization of African Unity (OAU). The Front de libération de la Côte des Somalis was founded in June 1963 at Mogadiscio. It was composed of former members of the Territorial Assembly, trade unionists, members of the dissolved political parties and refugees. At the time of the 1958 referendum, almost all of them had been expelled from the Territory for having campaigned in favour of the reply "No" in that referendum.

90. Concerning the existence of movements other than FLCS, seeking to bring about a change in the Territory's status, the petitioner said that all political parties and all trade-union organizations had been banned in French Somaliland. The leaders of the Parti du Mouvement populaire, which had formerly been the only opposition party, had been imprisoned. At the time of the visit to Djibouti by the Minister for Overseas France in 1961, the Mouvement populaire had organized a large demonstration and submitted petitions to the Minister. It had, moreover, sent representatives to France to ask the French authorities for independence for French Somaliland. Thus, the French Government was well aware of the aims of the Mouvement, and that was why the latter had been banned.

91. The petitioner said that it was impossible to determine the composition of the electoral lists in French Somaliland. Although it was contended that the elections were held by universal suffrage, they were in fact rigged, since any Frenchman passing through French Somaliland could vote there, whereas everything possible was done to prevent the indigenous population from voting. In the elections of 17 November 1963, for example, the French Government had sent 5,000 sailors to Djibouti to take part. The Territory was divided into four constituencies: Djibouti, with fourteen Council members; Ali Sabieh, with two; Dikil, with five, and Tadjoura Obock, with eleven. Each constituency was subdivided into districts; the Djibouti constituency, for example, had four districts: a European district (with four members), two districts for the native quarter (one with three members and one with four) and a suburban district (with two members).

92. With reference to his previous statement that there was a state of siege in French Somaliland, the petitioner said that all the frontiers were closed. The indigenous population could neither enter nor leave. Screening procedures and road-blocks were set up by the Army and the police, who even had the right to make searches without a warrant.

93. Referring to the concentration camps mentioned above, the petitioner said that in each district or *cercle* of French Somaliland there were concentration camps called "penitentiary camps". The ill-treatment to which the prisoners were subjected was strangely reminiscent of Nazi practices. French Somaliland had six such camps, guarded by the Foreign Legion. The prisoners worked from dawn till dusk and were subjected to the most degrading harassment. It went without saying that the food was quite inadequate. Many prisoners died every week from the brutality to which they were subjected and from the lack of care.

94. Referring to the labour situation, the petitioner said that the best-paid indigenous workers did not receive for the same work even 20 per cent of the wages of a European worker. For example, a white mechanic was paid 90,000 Djibouti francs a month, whereas his Somali counterpart was paid only 15,000. Where a skilled white worker was paid 200,000 Djibouti francs, a Somali received only 20,000 francs for the same work. Somalis had quite menial occupations, such as those of road-sweeper or barman. In Djibouti, they were dockers. Their working conditions were regulated by a so-called collective agreement, but in reality the employers themselves fixed wage levels, since the trade-union leaders were all in prison.

95. Concerning education, the petitioner said that although France had done nothing to educate the Somali people, the latter had an Arabic culture, and the number of illiterates was relatively small. UNESCO had never undertaken any literacy work in the country.

96. In reply to questions from the Committee members, *Mr. Abdillahi Ardeye Abane* said that, as was stated in the document submitted by FLCS, the Basic Law had come into force in 1956. It had been a reform affecting all French overseas territories and had therefore not been imposed. The 1958 referendum, on the other hand, had been a product of the Gaullist régime and the result of a gigantic campaign of intimidation and trickery. Two days before the elections, French vessels had put in at Djibouti under the pretext of holding manoeuvres in the Red Sea, so that the votes of their crews would distort the results. During the election campaign, moreover, whenever a political leader who favoured voting "no" had held a meeting, the Administration had had aircraft fly overhead or sent armoured cars in order to drown out his words. When the population had learned that such despicable methods were being used, it had organized a large demonstration, after which Mahmoud Harbi, Vice-President of the Governing Council, three ministers and a member of the Council had been imprisoned.

97. The status of French Somaliland, he added, was comparable to that of Angola and Mozambique; the administration was entirely in the hands of the French, supported by a powerful army which oppressed and tortured the Somalis. It was thus a colonial administration in the full sense of the word.

98. As to the colonial Administration's education policy, there were one or two primary schools in each *cercle*. In addition, at Djibouti there were several primary schools and one secondary school which had been set up in 1963. Only 2,000 Somalis, or less than 1 per cent, attended school. The Colonial Administration took care not to train personnel, in order to limit the number of Somali teachers and leave room for the French. In addition, it paid Somali teachers very badly, so as not to encourage recruitment.

99. Regarding the economy of the Territory, the petitioner said that Djibouti was a very important town from the economic and social standpoint because of its geographical situation. It was a port of transit to the Middle East, with modern facilities, and its docks had the highest reputation in the world for their work. Some 350 vessels put in there every month. Unfortunately, the people did not benefit in any way from that economic activity, as the commercial companies, banks and even small businesses were in foreign hands. The two big French banks at Djibouti, for example, did not extend any credit to the people of the Territory but did everything possible to help immigrants, both Frenchmen and others.

100. *Mr. Omar Ahmed Youssouf*, in answer to questions from members of the Committee, said that there was no plan for the settlement of nomads. The Administration tried, on the contrary, to get rid of them by expelling them from the Territory. As they had no identity papers, they were considered aliens and arrested as soon as they entered the towns. In addition, the Foreign Legion denied the nomads access to wells, thus forcing them to move elsewhere in search of other sources of water.

101. At its 438th meeting, held at Addis Ababa on 8 June, the Special Committee heard *Mr. Ahmed*

Bourhan, Secretary-General of the *Mouvement de libération de Djibouti (MLD)*, and other members of this organization.

102. *Mr. Ahmed Bourhan* recalled that the MLD had already submitted a petition and a memorandum to the Special Committee at its preceding session and indicated that the situation in Djibouti had changed little since. The people of Djibouti, who suffered under the colonial yoke, yearned for freedom, but had not yet taken up arms because they still hoped that, in view of the pressure which the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity could bring to bear on France, the question of Djibouti would be solved by peaceful means through the exercise of self-determination by the people of the Territory. He urged the Special Committee to try one last approach to France, which was a Member of the United Nations, and to take an unequivocal decision on the Djibouti question.

103. In reply to the question from members of the Special Committee *Mr. Ahmed Bourhan* said that after the 1958 referendum, all the French colonies that had voted "yes" had been able freely to exercise their right to self-determination and had now become independent States. That had not been the case with Djibouti.

104. The 1958 referendum had unquestionably been dishonest. However, even supposing that it had not been and that the people had really answered "yes", Djibouti should have been able thereafter to exercise its right to self-determination, like the other African countries which, with the exception of Guinea, had all voted "yes". He did not know the exact number of voters. In the 1958 referendum, there had been approximately 6,500 "yes" votes and 2,500 "no" votes. The French soldiers and their families had indeed voted in Djibouti in 1958 and had taken part in all the following elections.

105. The MLD had been established in 1964. Its headquarters was at Dire Dawa, in Ethiopia, near the frontier of the Territory of Djibouti, which facilitated contacts with the people of the Territory. The MLD was fighting for independence, had already obtained some results, and intended to continue its struggle until that objective was accomplished.

106. Referring to conditions in the Territory, the petitioner said that the French were sending more and more troops to Djibouti and were attempting to paralyse the people completely. Every day Africans were thrown into prison, discharged from their jobs or expelled from the Territory, either under a court decision or simply on the initiative of the police or the *gendarmes*. Almost all the people who were genuinely indigenous to the Territory were nomads and lived in the bush with their flocks. The French Government did nothing for them; it had not built a dam or developed any water resources. The new hospitals in Djibouti were situated at the town of Djibouti itself or in the chief towns of the *cercles* and were intended not for the local population but for Europeans. The situation with respect to schools was similar. All the indigenous inhabitants were Moslems and were sent to the Moslem religious school from the age of six onwards. At about nine or ten years of age, they entered the French school, which they were compelled to leave when they reached twelve or fourteen years of age on the pretext that they were too old. The indigenous population of Djibouti, thus deprived of any

secondary education, was forced into unemployment. Up to the present, only one indigenous inhabitant had succeeded in obtaining a secondary school education. In addition, the French Government did everything in its power to undermine the Moslem religion and religious education.

GENERAL STATEMENTS BY MEMBERS

107. The representative of *Somalia* said that the Government of the Somali Republic had taken the initiative in requesting that the question of French Somaliland should be placed on the Special Committee's agenda, since it was fully satisfied that it was a Non-Self-Governing Territory to which General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960 applied and since, as a Member of the United Nations, the Somali Republic had a special responsibility to ensure that the resolution was applied to Territories inhabited by Somali people under colonialist rule. The Somali Government was not alone in that view. The Declaration adopted by the Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries at Cairo in October 1964, called upon the French Government "to take the necessary steps to enable French Somaliland to become free and independent in accordance with paragraph 5 of resolution 1514 (XV) of the United Nations".

108. The Somali Government's memorandum (annex II) briefly described the present constitutional status of the Territory in order to show, beyond any doubt, that it was non-self-governing. Its position, in short, was that of a colony. Such autonomy as had been conferred upon it was limited to internal territorial services and did not comprise any of the essential aspects of self-government such as defence, foreign relations, the judiciary, public safety and security, finance and higher education. Moreover, even that very limited internal autonomy was in the hands of political organs under French control.

109. The referendum taken in 1958 admittedly resulted in an affirmative vote, as a result of which French Somaliland acquired the status of an Overseas Territory; but to call that an expression of self-determination was ludicrous. Out of a population of 70,000 to 80,000 in 1958, the electoral register listed only 15,833, 8,661 of whom had voted in the affirmative. The French Army alone could muster more than 5,000 votes, not counting wives; therefore, it should not be assumed that the vote represented the wishes of the people. In 1958, the French Government had promised that the affirmative vote would not be a barrier to future political freedom. The Deputies of French Somaliland had asked in the French National Assembly, not once but many times, that the Territory be granted self-government. On each occasion the French Government had taken no action at all. Members of the Special Committee could, if they so wished, be provided with full particulars on the facts he had mentioned.

110. If the Special Committee was satisfied—and he was confident that it would be—that French Somaliland fell within its jurisdiction, then the only conclusion to be drawn was that the Territory would have to be liberated from French control. However, there were obviously two different questions to be faced.

111. The first related to the means by which the Territory could be liberated. His Government urged the Special Committee to utilize every available moral

and material resource and it formally pledged its full support towards that end.

112. It was his view that the Special Committee could also count upon the co-operation of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and, in particular, of the Liberation Committee. Somalia was a member of that Committee and its assistance and influence there could be fully pledged. All OAU members would surely agree that the Liberation Committee was a valuable instrument for assisting the Special Committee in any policies which it might establish. Similarly, no OAU member would wish to see the Special Committee in any way renounce its responsibility for French Somaliland because it was on the Liberation Committee's agenda. That had not been done in the case of other African Territories and, he trusted, would not be done in the case of French Somaliland. There were very practical reasons for that. In the first place, the OAU's capacity to influence France—a non-member—was necessarily more limited than that of the United Nations, of which France was a Member. Furthermore, there was a second practical difficulty facing the Liberation Committee arising from the status, policies and activities of the long-established Front de libération de la Côte des Somalis (FLCS) and a newly founded liberation front which had recently appeared in Ethiopia.

113. Since the Special Committee was to hear evidence from the two organizations and would require every assistance in weighing the evidence, he would comment upon the origins of both.

114. The FLCS, created in June 1963, operated from Mogadiscio in complete independence of the Somali Government. It had regular publications and frequent contacts with the people of French Somaliland, and had been represented both at the OAU conference and at that of the non-aligned countries; it had submitted memoranda to both the Liberation Committee and to the Special Committee itself. It might be recalled that, during the Special Committee's African session in 1965, a cable had been received from Mr. Obsieh Beuh, the leader of the Mouvement populaire, in which he had informed the Committee that the FLCS was the only lawful representative of the people of French Somaliland outside the country. That cable had been smuggled out of a French prison—where Mr. Beuh now enjoyed, for the second time, the dubious hospitality of the French authorities as a result of his political activities. His party, the Mouvement populaire, had been banned by the French Government and 105 of its members had been arrested. Members of the Special Committee might have read of those matters in a communiqué issued by the FLCS on 5 June 1965. The FLCS was therefore a well-established, effectively functioning movement, which was recognized as the only liberation front for French Somaliland and received assistance in that capacity from the Liberation Committee. That had been the position until the eve of the visit of an OAU fact-finding commission to Ethiopia in January 1965, at which time a new "Liberation Front" suddenly materialized, called the Mouvement de libération de Djibouti (MLD), of which no one had previously heard, with its headquarters in Addis Ababa. He regretted to have to say that the Somali Government regarded that as an organization set up by the Ethiopian Government for the precise purpose of destroying the effectiveness of FLCS.

115. The members of the Special Committee might ask how the Ethiopian Government, as a member of

the Liberation Committee, pledged both to the recognition of FLCS and to the principle of one front, could reconcile its obligations in that capacity with the establishment of a second front in Addis Ababa. That was a question which was still being asked by the Somali Government. However, while the morality was obscure, the reasons were obvious. It could be seen from the *communiqué* and memoranda of FLCS that it disagreed emphatically with the policy and claims of the Ethiopian Government. The Ethiopian Government was not really interested in the liberation of French Somaliland but only in maintaining the *status quo* or in annexing that Territory outright. For that reason, Ethiopia was prepared to destroy the FLCS, the only representative and effective liberation movement.

116. The second, and more difficult question to be faced related to the future of the Territory after its liberation. Obviously, nobody wanted to see it turned into a problem area, torn by internal strife or caught between the rivalries of Somalia and Ethiopia. In his Government's view, that could be avoided only by ensuring that the political future of the Territory emerged from the free choice of its people.

117. In his opinion, the Ethiopian Government did not share that view; he drew attention to the memorandum dated 8 June 1965 (annex III), which had been submitted by the Ethiopian delegation to the Committee in Dar es Salaam in 1965. That memorandum was tantamount to a claim that French Somaliland was actually Ethiopian territory. In paragraph 24, mention was made of the principle of self-determination but, as would be seen from paragraph 25, Ethiopia was only prepared to support those measures which took account of the factors listed in paragraph 23. That was a rather curious position for a member of the Special Committee to take, i.e., to state that it would support self-determination provided it resulted in its own annexation of the territory.

118. The following were the "sober facts" upon which the Ethiopian Government relied: The first "fact" was that French Somaliland had, from time immemorial, formed part of Ethiopia. The extraordinary account of the history upon which that claim was based was to be found in paragraphs 6 to 10 of the memorandum (annex III). It was not his intention to enter into a lengthy discussion of the history of the area, but certain claims in the Ethiopian memorandum had to be refuted and misrepresentations of fact corrected.

119. It was not true that the people of the French Somali coast traditionally acknowledged the sovereign rights of Ethiopia over their territory. As far as the Afar were concerned, the historical situation was as follows: while, prior to the nineteenth century, some of the northern tribes (in Eritrea) had fallen under the nominal authority of the rulers of Tigre, those in the centre and south with whom the Shoan kings had had to remain on good terms in order to ensure the safety of their caravans to the coast, had always maintained a practical independence. The most influential Afar Sultanate, that of Aussa on the Awash River, had remained independent until the reign of Menelik when, in 1895, on the pretext that the Sultan had become an ally of the Italians (then thrusting inwards from the Eritrean coast), a Shoan army had been sent against him and had forced him to pay tribute. With the incorporation of that part of Bankalia in Ethiopia after the liberation of Ethiopia, an Ethio-

pian army had reached Aussa in 1944, captured the Sultan and brought him back to Addis Ababa where he had died in captivity. Thereafter, the Aussa Sultans had continued to pay tribute to the Ethiopians. It was important to note, however, that the Aussa Sultan was not the acknowledged Paramount Chief of all the Afar, but merely the head of one of the largest and most important of a group of small independent Afar chiefdoms.

120. As far as the Issa were concerned, there was no evidence that they owed traditional allegiance to the Ethiopian rulers. In fact, they had only become subject to Ethiopian pressure after Menelik's conquest of the independent Muslim state of Harrar in 1887. It was from that base that Ras Makonnen's forces had begun foraging among the Issa, as well as among other Somali tribes. Moreover, the traditional centre, at which the Issa clan-heads had in the past regularly been installed, lay near Zeila, which fell at that time within the British sphere. The Issa Somalis of French Somaliland had never evinced any kind of traditional dependence upon the Ethiopian kings.

121. It was certainly not true, as the Ethiopian memorandum claimed, that up to one hundred years earlier, the ports along the Red Sea and Indian Ocean coasts had been Ethiopian. There had, of course, been long-standing trade through them with various kingdoms in the Ethiopian hinterland over the centuries but no Ethiopian jurisdiction had ever been exercised over them. Indeed, in the period of colonial participation, it had apparently been the deliberate policy of Menelik to encourage rival European powers to settle on the coast, leaving the hinterland free to him as an area in which he could consolidate his authority. Thus, it would be true to say that Ethiopian independence had been maintained at the expense of the colonization of the coast by European powers.

122. It was not true, as the Ethiopians had alleged, that in 1897 Ethiopia had been compelled to conclude a frontier treaty regarding French Somaliland. The truth was rather that France had been compelled, by its desire to secure Ethiopian support for its ambitions on the Upper Nile, to conclude that treaty with Ethiopia. The compulsion had been on the French side, and Ethiopia had gained new Somali and Afar territory as a result of the treaty; that was exactly what had occurred in the Anglo-Ethiopian treaty of the same year. Both France and Britain had competed for Ethiopian goodwill and support in their conflicting Nile interests, and Ethiopia had played them off against each other very successfully gaining, in each case, new Somali territory. It had also been part of the agreement reached that a Franco-Ethiopian railway would be built from Djibouti to Ethiopia.

123. The reference in the Ethiopia statement alleging that Ethiopia had resisted the attempts of Ottoman Sultan Selim I to impose Turkish sovereignty over the French Somali coast was a very garbled version of history: in the sixteenth century, when the Portuguese were holding the Christian Ethiopian kingdoms, the Muslims, for example, Ahmad Gran, had been aided by the Turks. Although the Muslim victories had ultimately been reversed, the Turks had continued to hold the ports of Massawa, Suakin and Arkiko, in Eritrea. Djibouti, at that time, had no real significance until the French developed it. On the basis of the continued Turkish coastal interest in Eritrea, Egypt had in 1866 advanced its claims to the Eritrean

and Somali coast, leading to the Egyptian occupation (1870-1884), which had extended inland as far as Harrar in the Somali area.

124. With regard to the statement in the Ethiopian memorandum that France coerced local chiefs to sign a series of treaties between 1862 and 1885, it was important to consider the events of that period in perspective. The French colony had started with the cession of the port of Obock to the French by the local Afar in 1859, and it had been bought outright in 1862. After the withdrawal of the Egyptians from the port of Tajura, the French had, in 1883, claimed that their dominion extended beyond Tajura close to Djibouti and, by 1885, having concluded treaties of perpetual friendship with the Issa of Ambad and Djibouti, they had also laid claim to that small port. As a result, a dispute had ensued with Britain which at the time wished to extend the British Somaliland Protectorate westwards. The 1888 Anglo-French agreement had defined the boundary between the two protectorates as lying between Zeila and Djibouti—thus dividing the Issa tribes. It had not so much been a question of French coercion as of French protection, which was rendered attractive by the fears of Ethiopian conquest. Coercion would more accurately apply to the methods used by Menelik in the nineteenth century in securing recognition of his authority in Aussa, among some of the Issa, the Gadabursi and the Ogaden, as well as over many Galla groups.

125. He agreed, however, with the statement made in the Ethiopian memorandum to the effect that French Somaliland was an artificial colonial creation. As an entity, it had not existed prior to French colonization. But that did not mean that it had been a part of Ethiopia. There was no evidence that it had ever constituted a part of the Ethiopian Empire, even at the height of its expansion under Menelik. The French had not detached it from Ethiopia but had in fact added to Ethiopian dominions by the treaty of 1897 which ceded part of the French Somali Coast to Ethiopia. When the French had arrived, they had not found a series of Ethiopian vassal chiefs but a collection of small independent chiefdoms and sultanates which had only trading relations with Ethiopia.

126. A map had been circulated to the Special Committee showing the various claims of Ethiopia to the Horn of Africa. It would be seen that, even in Menelik's communication to the European Powers in 1891 at the height of his power, the Ethiopian claims had not included French Somaliland. Indeed, the claims of Menelik had been regarded as nonsense by both European and African Powers. Neither the Danakil nor the Somali chiefs of that territory ever acknowledged any Ethiopian sovereignty; nor did they need to, since they never saw any Ethiopians. It would be noted that the Ethiopian memorandum was somewhat embarrassed by the need to reconcile the claim to sovereignty with the fact that those chiefs had ceded the territory to France and by the fact that, under a treaty between Ethiopia and France in 1897, the French had actually reduced the area of their Protectorate over French Somaliland to its existing limits. The only explanation of that in the memorandum was that it was due to human frailty.

127. He would not enter into further details on that aspect of the question. What was of paramount importance was the wishes of the people in the Territory in 1966. The dreams of the Amhara colonizers of the nineteenth century were, or at least should be,

totally irrelevant. But, in 1954, the Ethiopian Government had secured, by treaty with France, the cession of a part of that Territory, against the bitter opposition of the Territory's deputies within the French Parliament. That should not be allowed to happen again.

128. The second "sober fact" produced in the Ethiopian memorandum was that, viewed geographically, French Somaliland formed an integral part of the Ethiopian land mass. In fact, there could scarcely be a greater contrast than that between the high, well-watered, mountainous plateau of Ethiopia and the arid, desert-like coast of French Somaliland.

129. The third "sober fact" produced in the Ethiopian memorandum was that the port of Djibouti was dependent on the transit trade with Addis Ababa along the railway which, by Treaty of 1959, came under increased Ethiopian control without any reference to the Territorial Assembly of French Somaliland. On that matter too, the Deputy for the Territory had made protests in the French National Assembly. Such economic dependence should not be overstated: there were other assets in the Territory and, for the nomadic tribes, the railway was irrelevant. The Somali Government was convinced that there were other ways in which Ethiopian interests in the railway and the port facilities could be safeguarded and protected, regardless of the solution adopted for the political future of the Territory. In other words, the principle of self-determination could not be rejected merely to suit the economic interests of a foreign State. Those interests should, of course, be protected by treaty of guarantee, by international supervision, or some other means, but there was no need to regard Ethiopia as entitled to seize that Territory in defiance of the wishes of the peoples, because of such economic interests. It was his understanding that the Swiss, for example, traded quite successfully down the Rhine and through the Dutch ports without seizing Rotterdam.

130. It would also be noted that, in order to reinforce their claim that French Somaliland was really part of Ethiopia, the Ethiopians refused to call the Territory anything but Djibouti—the name of the port alone. They also refused to call the people living in the Territory Somalis but used the names of tribes. While that was perhaps a rather trivial matter in one sense, it was nevertheless an important indication of the motives underlying Ethiopian policy. There was also a deliberate attempt to falsify the nature of the peoples living in the Territory, which was much more serious. The picture of the two major tribes, the Danakils, sometimes called Afars, and the Somalis, as being part of much larger Ethiopian tribes living in Ethiopia was quite false.

131. As recently as 19 July 1965, the Ethiopian Ambassador in Paris had been reported in a French weekly, *L'Observateur*, as saying that, when France had withdrawn from French Somaliland, the best solution would be for those tribes to rejoin their motherland, Ethiopia. There had never been such a thing as an Ethiopian motherland for those people. The Somali Government had tried to give an accurate picture, on the basis of a French census, in its memorandum dated 25 May 1965 (annex II). The basic position was that the Somalis predominated in the south, including the port of Djibouti, and were linked with the people of the Somali Republic by ties of kinship, culture, tradition, language and religion. The Danakils inhabited the northern parts adjoining Ethiopia and Eritrea. But it was not the wish of his Govern-

ment to accentuate those differences; they were all people of French Somaliland and had the right to self-determination. Indeed, the Somali Government sincerely hoped and believed that, free from foreign interference, the people of French Somaliland would develop and demonstrate a unity of purpose which would be the foundation of their political future and liberation from colonial rule. All his Government asked was that liberation should not be long delayed, for the present policy of both the Ethiopian and French Governments was to evict the Somalis from the Territory and introduce Danakils from Ethiopia proper; it was believed that 12,000 to 18,000 Somalis had already been evicted. That policy had already been condemned in General Assembly resolution 2105 (XX) and his delegation would welcome the specific application of that general condemnation to French policies in the Territory.

132. In the Somali Government's memorandum to the Special Committee in 1965, the United Nations was urged to take certain lines of action. It was a matter of great satisfaction to the Somali Government to note that two of its proposals had already been followed: first, with the affirmation by the United Nations that French Somaliland was a Non-Self-Governing Territory to which General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) applied; and, secondly, with the inclusion of the question of French Somaliland on the agenda of the Special Committee and the United Nations affirmation of the right of the people of that Territory to self-determination, in accordance with their freely expressed wishes.

133. It was appropriate to reiterate at that point the remaining lines of action which the Somali Government had recommended for the Special Committee's consideration: the United Nations should call upon France to grant immediate independence to the Territory, within the spirit of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) and the United Nations Charter, and to withdraw its armed forces, officials and all other instrumentalities of control over the people of French Somaliland; secondly, it should call upon all other States to abstain from all forms of pressure, direct and indirect, calculated to distort the free expression of the right of self-determination of the people; thirdly, it should, immediately, upon the granting of independence to the Territory, assume the administration of the Territory for a period of two years so as to allow the formation of a political consensus within the Territory as to its future; and fourthly, it should, during the period of administration, permit the return to the Territory of all those Somalis who, during the past ten years, had been expelled or exiled by the French, subject to a proper United Nations scrutiny of their association with the Territory.

134. It might be asked why the Somali Government did not ask that full independence be granted to the Territory immediately. His Government's concern was to ensure that the people secured real, and not a fictitious, independence. It would be extremely apprehensive about the Territory's future if a choice were thrust upon its people, either with the French still in possession or immediately after their withdrawal. The French had prevented the formation of truly representative political parties and the people of the Territory therefore needed time to establish a political programme and to understand the issues to be faced. As recently as 1963, the Deputy for the

Territory in the French National Assembly had been reported in *Le Monde* as saying:

"The people there are incapable of distinguishing between independence, self-government or the status of an overseas territory. The lack of political maturity necessitates the maintenance of the *status quo*."

135. The Somali Government did not wish to maintain the *status quo* but wanted the people to be provided with proper guarantees for their self-determination, free from French, Ethiopian or any other outside pressure. If the Special Committee could envisage ways of guaranteeing the people that free choice and of protecting them from outside interference, then the Somali Government would certainly consider them as a possible and suitable alternative to a period of two years under United Nations administration.

136. The representative of Ethiopia said that his delegation took pride in Ethiopia's record with regard to the liberation of colonial Territories, irrespective of their situation, size or stage of development. It was no secret that Ethiopia had a vital interest in the Territory of Djibouti. Though it could not, however, offer a ready-made solution to the problem, his Government would, in co-operation with the Special Committee, endeavour to find the best means of implementing the 1960 Declaration in a manner consonant with the social and economic interests of Djibouti. The nineteenth century colonial conquest—a ruthless and inhuman adventure conducted by certain European Powers—had everywhere followed the same pattern of brutal oppression, atrocities and exploitation. All over Africa, and indeed throughout the world, colonialism had made disastrous inroads into the lives of peace-loving peoples. Colonialism had wrought incalculable damage, shattering the bonds between peoples and cutting mercilessly across their cultural and ethnic homogeneity. Djibouti was a typical example of the decisive and destructive consequences bequeathed by such a system to the colonized.

137. With regard to the name of the Territory, he wished to point out that, some months previously, the Committee had decided, after considering the two names "Falkland Islands" and "Malvinas Islands", to use both, the latter in brackets. In the heyday of European colonialism, many names had been coined, such as the Gold Coast (Ghana), Northern Rhodesia (Zambia), Nyasaland (Malawi) and Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe). The Territory of Djibouti, illegally severed from the East African hinterland, had also been renamed. Ethiopia, which continued to call the area the "Territory of Djibouti", trusted that the Committee would consider the application of the proper name to that colony.

138. The Territory of Djibouti, which was an important strategic area situated to the east of Ethiopia, covered an area of approximately 23,000 square kilometres, inhabited by a population of about 80,000, half of whom lived in the capital. Most of the Territory bordered on Ethiopia and, apart from the Great Rift Valley, formed a single physical unit with that country. For the most part, it was arid, so that its people could not profitably engage in agriculture.

139. In the opinion of his delegation, it would be helpful if the Committee could undertake a thorough study of the Territory's past history—a study which should also take account of the history of the larger unit of which, socially, economically and historically, it formed a part.

140. For centuries, Ethiopia had exercised full and unquestioned sovereignty over the Horn of Africa. During that time, the strategic and commercial ports along the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean had also fallen within Ethiopia's jurisdiction, serving as outlets to the hinterland and until a century or so earlier the Territory of Djibouti had been among such strategic areas under Ethiopia's sovereignty.

141. The first unsuccessful attempt to violate Ethiopia's sovereign rights had been made during the sixteenth century, when the Ottoman Sultan Selim I had issued a decree proclaiming the Red Sea coastal area to be under Turkish influence. Ethiopia had repelled the aggressor and had restored its sovereign rights. A more significant feature of the abortive Turkish invasion was the fact that the *de jure* dependence of the local chiefs, in the Territory of Djibouti, on the authority of the Ethiopian sovereign, had remained unchanged.

142. Some two centuries after the attempted Turkish invasion, a more critical confrontation had taken place between the African people and certain European colonizers. The Horn of Africa had been invaded by the United Kingdom, France and Italy, as a result of which Ethiopia became, in effect, an island in a sea of colonialism. At the same time, the Territory of Djibouti had been transformed into a French peninsula and had, for the first time, acquired separate status.

143. France had embarked upon the conquest of the Territory of Djibouti for a variety of reasons. In 1858, in anticipation of the opening of the Suez Canal, the French Government had sought a port at the entrance to the Red Sea. The French consular agent in Aden, Henri Lambert, had therefore been dispatched to the Gulf of Tadjoura. His murder, in 1859, had temporarily halted negotiations but they had been resumed by Captain Fleuriot de Langle who had concluded a treaty on 11 March 1862, under which France had received the port of Obock and a small strip of territory for the sum of 10,000 Maria Theresa thalers. Between 1862 and 1885, by coercing local chiefs to sign a series of agreements, France had also acquired certain land in and around the Gulf of Tadjoura. Finally, in 1885, the French Government had decreed the establishment of the "*Côte française des Somalis et dépendances*".

144. In 1882, Italy had occupied Assab by force and Ethiopia, by then completely encircled, had no choice but, as a matter of self-defence, to take arms against the rapid colonial thrust from the north. At great sacrifices, the nation had in 1896 repelled the aggressor at Adowa. Its resources had been exhausted by yet another mortal combat against a foreign Power on the eastern shores of the Kingdom and it had therefore only been able to save a part of its land. Thus, the Territory of Djibouti had been established on the south-eastern shore of Ethiopia, which had had to live with that, and other, injustices.

145. The great majority of the population in the Territory of Djibouti inhabited two areas, the more densely populated being circumscribed by the Red Sea and the Ethiopian highlands. The other area was bounded by the Franco-Ethiopian railway to the south and the Buri peninsula to the north. Two major ethnic groups were concerned: the Afar and the Issas. Out of a total population of 200,000 Afars, 160,000 inhabited the Ethiopian provinces of Harrar, Wollo and Eritrea, while the remaining 40,000, representing over

50 per cent of the total population, inhabited the Territory of Djibouti. The Issa group consisted of about 150,000 people; approximately 20,000 lived in the Territory of Djibouti and 100,000 in Ethiopia. Out of the Territory's total land frontier, extending for some 500 kilometres, 400 kilometres bordered on Ethiopian territory.

146. Djibouti, which was divided into four administrative areas, had the status of a French overseas territory. Under the 1956 law, it had obtained a small measure of autonomy pertaining exclusively to local matters and, following the 1958 referendum, it had retained that status. Thus, France had full responsibility for external relations and defence, as well as for certain local matters.

147. Of the three major political parties, the largest was the Afar Democratic Union. There was also the Issa Democratic Union and the Mouvement populaire. A Territorial Assembly, composed of thirty-two members, had power with regard to selected local matters. One deputy and one senator were elected to the French National Assembly and Senate in Paris. An Executive Council, consisting of eight members, elected by the Territorial Assembly and presided over by the French Governor, directed Djibouti's administrative affairs and were empowered to enact legislation for the Territory.

148. Turning to the economic and commercial situation in the Territory of Djibouti, he said that the area had little land suitable for agriculture. Of a total area of 23,000 square kilometres, only 65 hectares were cultivated. There was little or no local industry and the economic activity was limited almost exclusively to exporting salt and fishing for shark and mother-of-pearl. On a smaller scale, dates were cultivated. The Territory's principal source of revenue was derived from the services rendered by its port—the terminus of the 496-mile railway from Addis Ababa, which also handled a considerable portion of Ethiopia's trade with the outside world. It was estimated that about 750,000 tons of food passed through the port every year and a considerable amount of food and drinking water was transported by rail for consumption in the Territory. An example of the significant export-import flow via the Territory was the fact that, in 1961-1962, the ratio of freight trans-shipped through Djibouti and Assab was roughly 3:2. It was evident, therefore, that, without significant imports from Ethiopia, there would be little justification for the existence of the Territory as a separate entity.

149. Towards the end of the nineteenth century, the Government of Ethiopia had been approached by private French interests with regard to a possible joint enterprise for the construction of a Djibouti/Addis Ababa railway. The negotiations had resulted in the 1894 concessions, granted by Emperor Menelik II. Although initiated privately, the railway had later been taken over by the French Government. The 500-mile track had been completed in 1918, since which time it had served as a major link between Ethiopia and the outside world. In 1959, a treaty, to which the Territorial Assembly had given its full approval, had been concluded between Ethiopia and France providing for equal ownership and control of the railway. It also included provision for Ethiopian customs officials to be stationed in Djibouti. Thus, shipments to Ethiopia was sealed and handled by the same officials before trans-shipment to their final destination. Furthermore, in accordance with the Treaty, Ethiopia was also

entitled to use certain port facilities in Djibouti. For example, the Ethiopian Government could, if it so desired, build or purchase processing and manufacturing facilities within the port area and move and store its goods free of all local taxes with the exception of port fees.

150. As he had mentioned earlier, local industry in the Territory of Djibouti was minimal. The head offices of the major companies operating there were located in Addis Ababa. Moreover, the Commercial Bank of Ethiopia's branch in the Territory was mainly engaged in financing Ethiopian trade in transit through Djibouti, while the Djibouti branches of the Banque de l'Indochine, which had representatives in Addis Ababa, financed coffee exports. For almost half a century, the railway line linking the Ethiopian highlands with Djibouti had played a vital role in the economy of both territories, and in view of the increasing economic interdependence among the nations of the world, the wider use of the port facilities would have to be explored. Djibouti was Ethiopia's major gateway to all regions and, as such, it constituted an important corridor through which the nation's principal raw materials passed to the world market. The future of both Ethiopia and Djibouti therefore depended upon closer collaboration between the two territories.

151. His delegation had endeavoured to help the Committee to make a realistic appraisal of the situation by providing an outline of Djibouti's historical development. In that connexion three basic points had to be stressed: first, Djibouti's coastal territory had, for many centuries, been an integral part of Ethiopia. Its so-called separate status had been achieved only eighty years before, during European colonial rule. Secondly, from the geographical point of view, the Territory of Djibouti formed an integral part of the great Ethiopian land mass; and, thirdly, the Territory of Djibouti was economically dependent upon Ethiopia.

152. His delegation would unreservedly support any measures to resolve the problems regarding Djibouti's future. He reserved the right to comment further upon the matter.

153. As far as the memorandum submitted by the Somali delegation was concerned, he considered that it might have contained more constructive proposals. With regard to the Somali view that the liberation movement in Addis Ababa might destroy that in Mogadiscio, the people of Djibouti surely had every right to establish any movement which they considered would lead to independence. Moreover, Mogadiscio, unlike Eastern Ethiopia, was some 1,500 miles from Djibouti: the most logical way to fight for independence was to establish the liberation movement as near as possible to the people concerned. Ethiopia could not object to a movement which the people wished to create to fight for their independence.

154. As far as the fight against colonialism was concerned, Somalia had achieved independence only six years earlier. Ethiopia had been independent for thousands of years and had fought to remain so. The fact that Ethiopia was composed of different ethnic groups was a source of pride to his countrymen. It was regrettable that it had now been accused of establishing a liberation movement merely to destroy another elsewhere.

155. The representative of Somalia stated that his delegation considered that the Somali memorandum contained impartial and realistic proposals for the solu-

tion of the problem of French Somaliland. His Government's initiative in requesting that the question should be placed on the Committee's agenda had been motivated solely by the conviction that the status of French Somaliland represented a typical example of colonialism. His delegation was firmly convinced that the matter fell within the scope of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) and categorically rejected the contention that, as a result of the 1958 referendum, French Somaliland was an integral part of metropolitan France. The Territory's cultural heritage, as well as its geographical position and the feelings of its people, proved that it was in every way an integral part of the Somali Peninsula. Despite that irrefutable fact, his Government's initiative had not been motivated by any plan to incorporate the Territory into the Somali Republic but only by its wish to ensure that the people were granted their inalienable right to freedom through self-determination, without any undue external pressure, as had been the case with former French colonies elsewhere.

156. His delegation regretted that the Ethiopian Government, instead of co-operating with Somalia in its struggle for the liberation of French Somaliland, had, in its desire for expansion, advanced unfounded claims to the Territory. Such claims did not differ from those of France, which maintained that French Somaliland was a part of the metropolitan country.

157. As to the name of the Territory, he wished to point out with all due respect to the Ethiopian Minister for Foreign Affairs that Djibouti was the name of a town. As Addis Ababa was the capital of Ethiopia, so was Djibouti the capital of French Somaliland. With regard to ethnic groups, he fully agreed that they should not play any significant role in the modern concept of a State. However, his delegation did not agree that the Issa were distinct from the Somalis. He further wished to assure the Ethiopian Minister for Foreign Affairs that his delegation in no way intended to give any lesson regarding freedom and independence to Ethiopia; indeed, the Somali people were proud that Ethiopia had preserved its freedom and independence throughout the centuries.

158. The representative of Ethiopia reiterated his view that the Issa were a different ethnic group from the Somalis and said that the question could perhaps best be decided by the experts. As far as the name of the Territory was concerned, he pointed out that the State and the city of Kuwait bore the same name.

C. FURTHER CONSIDERATION BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE

INTRODUCTION

159. The Special Committee further discussed the question of French Somaliland at its 470th and 471st meetings, held in New York on 6 and 10 October 1966, respectively.

Participation by the representatives of Somalia in the work of the Special Committee

160. At its 470th meeting, the Special Committee decided, without objection, to grant the request of the Permanent Representative of Somalia that his delegation should be invited to be present as an observer at the Special Committee's meetings devoted to the hearing of petitioners concerning French Somaliland.

161. At its 471st meeting, the Special Committee decided without objection to accede to the request of the representative of Somalia to make a statement concerning French Somaliland.

WRITTEN PETITIONS AND HEARINGS

162. The Special Committee circulated the following additional petitions concerning French Somaliland:

Petitioner	Document No.
Two petitions from Messrs. Abdillahi Ardeye, Secretary-General, Jama Mohamed Sultan and Abdulrahman Ahmed Gabot, members, Front de libération de la Côte des Somalis (FLCS)	A/AC.109/PET.464/Add.1
Petition from the Front de libération de la Côte des Somalis (FLCS) ..	A/AC.109/PET.464/Add.2
Petition from Mr. Ahmed Bourhan, Secretary-General, Mouvement de libération de Djibouti (MLD)	A/AC.109/PET.465/Add.2
Petition from Messrs. Ali Ahmed Udun, Mohamed Dahan, Ibrahim Dahir Egeh and Omar Aboubakar, Front de libération de la Côte des Somalis (FLCS), and Abdulrahman Ahmed Hassan, former member of the Territorial Assembly of French Somaliland	A/AC.109/PET.551
Two petitions from Mr. Osman Aden Youssouf, Secretary for International Relations, Front de libération de la Côte des Somalis (FLCS) ..	A/AC.109/PET.552
Mr. Jassin Abucar, Somali Students Union in Czechoslovakia	A/AC.109/PET.5607

163. At its 470th and 471st meetings, held in New York on 6 and 10 October 1966 respectively, the Special Committee heard Mr. Ali Ahmed Udun, Mr. Mohamed Dahan, Mr. Ibrahim Dahir Egeh and Mr. Omar Aboubakar, representatives of the Front de libération de la Côte des Somalis (FLCS) and Mr. Abdurahman Ahmed Hassan.

164. Mr. Hassan said that France had taken nominal possession of the territory which was now French Somaliland in 1884, though it had not subjugated the whole area until several years later. The border with British Somaliland had been fixed in 1888 and that with Ethiopia in 1897. At the present time the Territory was divided administratively into one *circonscription*—Djibouti—and four *cercles*—Ali Sabiet, Dikil, Tadjourah and Obock. There was a Territorial Assembly of thirty-two members elected by universal suffrage, with limited powers fixed by the *loi-cadre* of 1956. The Council of Government consisted of eight members elected by the Territorial Assembly and was presided over by the Governor.

165. Nationalism had deep roots in French Somaliland; Islam had been an important factor in unifying the people and creating a national consciousness. In addition, nationalism had developed within such institutions as trade unions and youth and women's organizations. The experience of those associations had led to the creation of the political party known

as the Rassemblement démocratique somali (RDS), which had won all thirty seats in the single-list elections of 1957.

166. In the 1958 referendum Mahamoud Harbi, the leader of RDS, had campaigned for a negative vote, i.e. for secession. All male Somalis had been able to participate in the referendum and, contrary to the spirit of the *loi-cadre*, the Europeans, the armed forces and an unknown number of persons on board French ships at sea had been allowed to take part. While the Europeans had been asked to choose between the Fourth Republic and the Fifth Republic, the indigenous people had had to choose between the *status quo* and secession. The armed forces, numbering some 3,000 Europeans, had had strict orders to vote. Following the vote, the Governor of French Somaliland had announced that a majority had expressed themselves in favour of de Gaulle and the maintenance of the *status quo*. There was considerable dispute about the accuracy of the figures published. Those figures showed that, out of a population of 200,000, the number of registered voters had been 15,833.

167. Mr. Mahamoud Harbi, who was the leader of the Government and the deputy for French Somaliland in the French National Assembly, had protested about the conduct of the referendum.

168. Thereupon, six members of the Council of Government had refused, at the instigation of the Governor, to take their seats with Mr. Harbi, though they had retracted that position some days later. A motion to dissolve the Council as soon as it was convened and to call new elections had been rejected by 15 votes to 10. The local French authorities had then tried another manoeuvre; the Governor had dissolved the Territorial Assembly by decree and called new elections. He had resurrected the pro-French parties, taking advantage of personal rivalries, the general conservatism and the self-interest of bourgeois elements. He had allowed the new parties to hold political meetings and publicize their programme, and had imprisoned many of the nationalists. He had also altered the electoral system, introducing a proportional system in place of the single list, and redistributing the seats. The party entitled *Défense des intérêts économiques et sociaux du Territoire* (DIEST) had won eleven seats, and five had gone to RDS, which, further weakened by the exile of several of its leaders, including Mahamoud Harbi, had lost all its effectiveness.

169. The policy followed by Mr. Compain, the Governor, was "divide and rule". He had deliberately upset the balance between the tribes in favour of the Afars by withholding identity cards from the nomad Issas and by propagating the myth that the Issas wished to see the creation of a greater Somalia in which the Afars would be swallowed up. At that point, however, the Parti du mouvement populaire, representing not only the youth of the country but also the different trends, had come into being. Its aim was the non-violent creation of a new order through political liberation and the abolition of economic exploitation and the barriers resulting from the stratification of society. The party advocated the mobilization of all the country's energies to achieve self-government and independence. It sought to encourage a national consciousness and to build up the political structures necessary for the achievement of national objectives. Its specific goals were to develop and strengthen the popular movement, to develop unity among the indige-

⁷ This petition was circulated after the Special Committee had completed its consideration of the question of French Somaliland.

nous people, to promote secondary and higher education, to further the training of cadres, to work for the independence of French Somaliland, to promote the social and cultural evolution of Somali women, to encourage the creation of trade unions and youth and women's organizations, to procure means of self-defence for the people and to extirpate French tyranny once and for all.

170. The party had won increasing support among the population, and in the 1962 legislative elections to the French National Assembly its candidate had easily defeated the government candidate. Hassan Gouled, of DIEST, had received a very small vote. The low poll had revealed a lack of interest in the elections on the part of the local authorities.

171. To combat the nationalists, the French authorities had created a political police force, which had infiltrated the ranks of PMP. The party's activities had been hampered by arrests and intimidation, and members of the party who were nationals of French Somaliland had been expelled from the country on false pretexts.

172. The French authorities had refused to enroll women on the electoral lists, and had issued identity cards to a certain category of nationals only. The seats had been redistributed once again, the number of seats allotted to Djibouti, which accounted for half of the population of the Territory, being reduced. In the elections of 1963, PMP had obtained four out of fourteen seats in Djibouti and the two seats of Ali Sabiet. Its vote would have been higher but for the votes cast by the crews of the ships in the port, giving the Europeans an extra four seats.

173. The French authorities had continued to use all means of pressure at their disposal to weaken still further the position of the nationalists. It was to be noted that, in French Somaliland, it was possible for a civil servant to be elected to the Assembly without forfeiting his post in the Administration; that provided an effective means of pressure, especially as it was hard for anyone who had brought upon himself the wrath of the Government to obtain employment. The party was thus virtually silenced, although all it had wanted was self-government within the framework of the 1958 Constitution, in order to abolish colonial economic structures, to develop food production and reduce dependence on Ethiopia, to exploit the Territory's mineral resources, to build a dam on Lake Assal and establish a chemical industry and industries based on fisheries and animal husbandry, to improve livestock and to develop port facilities.

174. France's policies in the region represented a striking contrast with the principles which it professed; that could be explained by the fact that France regarded French Somaliland as important both strategically and as a relay point for the new nuclear testing installations in the Pacific Ocean. Measures had been introduced under which the indigenous people were liable to imprisonment without trial and extradition if accused of jeopardizing the territorial integrity of the country. Detainees were treated as common criminals and deprived of their rights of citizenship. It was interesting that no European had ever been detained in French Somaliland either as a political prisoner or under the penal law. It was clear that the judicial system in the Territory was dependent on the arbitrary whim of the Governor. In 1958 the Minister for the Interior had been arrested for authorizing a

political meeting legally requested by the Somaliland Deputy in the National Assembly. The *Procureur de la République* had protested but had been obliged to carry out the instructions of the Government.

175. Indigenous people were arrested for non-possession of identity cards and condemned to forced labour in the interior. That policy had the twofold aim of providing cheap labour for the construction of roads and strategic installations, and of weakening the ranks of the nationalists. Many had died as a result of the conditions.

176. The pastoral nomads were subjected to increasing restrictions; they were confined to a restricted area of French Somaliland on pain of losing their citizenship. The motive for such measures was to encourage the nationalistic nomads to leave the Territory. The problem could have been solved by a population census, the issue of identity cards and co-operation between district administrators and tribal chiefs in the identification of individuals. The concern of France was clearly to ensure that a plebiscite in favour of independence would not obtain the required majority.

177. In 1959, the French Government had concluded a treaty with Ethiopia, transferring the headquarters of the Compagnie Franco-Ethiopienne to Addis Ababa, granting the company numerous privileges in the Territory and establishing an Ethiopian customs office in the port of Djibouti. The Territorial Assembly, which had not been consulted, had condemned France's action unanimously. It had been by a similar treaty, concluded in 1954, that part of the territory of French Somaliland had been ceded to Ethiopia.

178. With regard to education, the rate of school attendance appeared to be high but the fact was that education had felt the influence of the "Compain policy" of creating social barriers between groups. The policy of integration between whites and indigenous inhabitants had been undermined, and the situation had been aggravated by the influx of uneducated Frenchmen from other former French colonies. European and indigenous children were now taught in separate classes. Education was geared to literacy and no more. Only a few were allowed to receive secondary education, and most of those were not permitted to attain the level of the baccalaureate. There was thus no intellectual élite; only two inhabitants of the Territory had university degrees.

179. The army was made up almost entirely of people from metropolitan France. The appointment of indigenous officers was systematically avoided, non-commissioned Somali officers with fifteen years of service being forced to return to civilian life.

180. As a result of the recent events, the population no longer sought self-government but now called for independence. There was a movement towards national reconciliation, and PMP was now co-operating closely with the Union démocratique Afar, a dynamic new party which had joined the opposition. That factor greatly strengthened the nationalist movement and weakened the position of the present régime. It was probable that further integration of various groups would follow. The reconciliation of the major indigenous groupings would have a favourable effect on relations with neighbouring countries.

181. The recent events in French Somaliland had been no surprise to informed observers. One cause of discontent for a long time had been the absolute power

of the Governor, who had been a virtual monarch, despite the existence of a deliberative assembly and a Council of Government. His arbitrary measures had brought upon him the hatred of the population, which had been awaiting the arrival of General de Gaulle in order to act, for upon his assumption of power General de Gaulle had championed the right of peoples to self-determination. Yet following the recent street fighting, more than 3,000 people had been arrested and nearly a thousand expelled to the Republic of Somalia, whose Government had been obliged to intern them in a neutral area where they lived in complete destitution.

182. General de Gaulle had informed the Territorial Assembly that, should the Territory express a new attitude regarding its future, through democratic processes, France would take note of that fact. The French Government had, however, opposed the convening of a special session of the Assembly. The fact was that French presence in the Territory was regarded as indispensable in order to keep the southern shore of the Bab el Mandeb in the hands of the West to ensure the survival of Ethiopia, a Christian bastion in a sea of Islam, and to retain Djibouti as a place of refuge for France in case of a conflict.

183. The reply of the nationalists was that the wishes of the people could not be expressed as long as the repressive measures of the French authorities continued. The people wished to be allowed to exercise their inalienable right to self-determination and they placed no hope in negotiations with France.

184. The French Government had recently announced that a referendum would be held in French Somaliland before 1 July 1967. According to reports, the population would be asked to choose between independence and the status of an overseas territory with considerable internal autonomy. Unfortunately, the experience of popular consultations under the colonial régime was not encouraging. The good faith of General de Gaulle was not in question, but the gulf which could exist between a metropolitan government and the colonial administration was well known. It was important that in any such referendum, the voting should be limited to the indigenous inhabitants. All repressive laws and measures should be repealed, such as restrictions on political parties, trade unions and the Press. The political prisoners, numbering more than 3,000 should be released and exiles allowed to return to the Territory. Finally, the government should be placed in the hands of political leaders who had the support of the people. The people of French Somaliland could not forget the masquerade of the 1958 referendum. Verbal declarations would not be enough; international guarantees in the form of a United Nations presence to organize and supervise the referendum and the general elections to follow it were essential. In the light of the threats and unfounded claims which had been made, the United Nations must also guarantee the integrity of the Territory and its sovereignty should the people of French Somaliland decide in favour of independence.

185. In line with General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), he wished to submit to the Committee the following requests: complete and immediate independence for the Territory; respect for its territorial integrity; the restoration of democratic freedoms, the release of political, trade-union, and religious prisoners; an amnesty for political refugees and their return to their homeland; non-interference in the internal affairs of

the country and no direct or indirect pressure to be exerted by other nations; the immediate cessation of expulsion measures; assistance to be given to refugees by the Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees and the specialized agencies.

186. In reply to questions from members of the Special Committee, Mr. Hassan said that the recent events, in which there had been a number of casualties, had indeed resulted from the demands of the people for independence. He could supply documents giving details on what had happened. The administering Power had suggested that outside elements had been involved, but that was a fabrication.

187. In connexion with President de Gaulle's declaration that the people of French Somaliland could have independence if they so desired, the petitioner said that conditions surrounding the 1958 referendum in French Somaliland had apparently been different from those in former French Territories. The leader of the indigenous party at that time had campaigned for a negative vote, but the administering Power had interfered with the referendum and claimed a majority of affirmative votes. The fact was that the electoral system had been deliberately altered in order to ensure that the nationalists were in the minority in the Territorial Assembly. He wished to reaffirm that the people did not doubt the good faith of the French Government or of President de Gaulle, but were concerned about the local implementation of the French Government's policies. The *loi-cadre*, for example, had never been effectively implemented in the Territory.

188. It was vital that United Nations representatives should be present to ensure that the indigenous people were able to participate in the proposed referendum. That was impossible while they were being imprisoned and expelled in great numbers. Prior to any referendum, political prisoners must be released and parties allowed to exercise their activities freely and to inform the people of the facts. A referendum under present conditions would have no meaning.

189. With regard to economic matters, he wished to point out that, under present arrangements, the Territory derived practically no revenue from the railway, since the Ethiopians paid practically nothing for transit facilities.

190. Mr. Dahan (FLCS) said that the political prisoners included some who had been in prison since 1958. Mr. Hassan had been arrested in 1959 and had been in prison until he had escaped in 1965. He himself, too, had spent some time in prison. The greatest wave of arrests, however, had occurred following the events of August 1966, at the time of President de Gaulle's visit to the Territory. On that occasion, the people had wished to demonstrate their desire for independence, in view of the claim that the 1958 referendum had proved the desire of the people to remain under French rule. The demonstrations were still continuing. He could not give the exact number of political prisoners but it exceeded 3,000. The number of those expelled to the Republic of Somalia was 3,486. Some twenty-five people had been injured in the disturbances and about twenty had died.

191. It had sometimes happened that efforts had been made to split up newly independent countries, and the people wished to ensure that the integrity of the Territory was respected.

192. The United Nations could help to ensure democratic freedom in the Territory; at present, the situation was similar to that in Angola and Mozambique, where there were no effective trade unions and no freedom of action for political parties, youth organizations and women's organizations. A number of complaints regarding violations of international labour conventions had been addressed to the International Labour Organisation.

193. The United Nations could also supervise the preparation of the voters' lists prior to the referendum; under the colonial administration there was no guarantee that those lists were correct. It was important to ensure that members of the French armed forces and their wives did not participate in the referendum.

194. Elections could be held six to eight months after the referendum. It was essential that all political refugees should be allowed to return to the country and that all political parties should take part in the elections. There were two nationalist parties in the Territory—the Parti du Mouvement populaire and the Union démocratique Afar—and they both pursued the same goal of independence for French Somaliland. When General de Gaulle had arrived in the Territory, those parties had set up a co-ordinating committee. His own party, too, which was in exile, had the same objectives.

GENERAL STATEMENTS BY MEMBERS

195. The representative of *Ethiopia* stated that it was true that the frontiers of the Territory of Djibouti and Ethiopia were artificial. For example, of the four Afar Sultanates of Rahayto, Aoussa, Gobaad and Tadjourah only the latter was entirely within the Territory of Djibouti, all the others extending into Ethiopia, where 80 per cent of the Afars lived. The same was true with regard to the Isaas, 75 per cent of whom lived in Ethiopia. The frontiers were therefore artificial, having been imposed upon the people of the Territory and of Ethiopia by colonialism. The petitioner had referred to the 1959 Treaty which governed the railway linking Djibouti to Addis Ababa. It should be noted that of 784 kilometres of rail only 98 kilometres were in the territory of Djibouti. The total traffic carried by the railway consisted of Ethiopian imports and exports and constituted 85 per cent of the merchandise shipped through the port. It was not surprising, therefore, that the port and the railway should serve both the Territory and Ethiopia. The petitioner had also mentioned the 1954 Treaty delimiting the frontier. That delimitation had been ratified by the competent authorities. The petitioner claimed that the Treaty had had the effect of depriving the Territory of a zone that would be a virtual granary. According to a study on French Somaliland, out of 23,000 square kilometres only 65 hectares were arable and 2.2 million hectares were unsuitable for cultivation. Both before and after 1954 the Territory had derived its wealth from the railway and port complex.

196. The representative of *Somalia* said that it had been only a few years since his country had emerged as a sovereign nation, thanks to the application of United Nations principles. His Government wished to devote all its efforts to the peaceful development of the country and was animated by a sincere desire to live in peace and friendship with all nations.

197. The serious situation which had arisen in French Somaliland was a source of grave concern to his country. His Government was convinced that the faithful application of United Nations principles could and must bring about a settlement of the question of French Somaliland, in the interest not only of the people of that Territory but of world peace.

198. The demonstrations that had taken place in French Somaliland during the recent visit of President de Gaulle had shown the true feelings of the inhabitants. His delegation was convinced that those demonstrations had been directed, not against the person of that great statesman, but against the short-sighted and anachronistic policies of the colonial administration. The oppressive and unjust measures that the administration in the Territory had adopted in response to those demonstrations could only serve to aggravate the situation. It was the duty of the Special Committee to seek a peaceful and constructive solution to the problem of French Somaliland and to point the way for the proper application to the Territory of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.

199. The petitioners who had appeared before the Committee had painted a true picture of the situation in the Territory. His Government was gratified by President de Gaulle's statement that a referendum would be held in the Territory not later than July 1967, but the harsh policies pursued by the French colonial administration in punishing the people of the Territory for expressing a legitimate wish for independence revealed a very different spirit. Nor could the improper manner in which the 1958 plebiscite in the Territory had been conducted be forgotten.

200. The Special Committee should bear in mind the fact that French Somaliland had a relatively small population. The smaller the number of voters called upon to decide an issue, the greater was the weight of each vote and the easier it was to falsify the outcome. It was therefore essential to have reliable safeguards for the proper conduct of the referendum: *bona fide* citizens of the Territory must not be deprived of their right to vote, persons other than *bona fide* citizens must not be allowed to vote, and there must be no intimidation, coercion or exercise of improper influence. The 1958 plebiscite had shown the most serious shortcomings in all those respects. His Government did not expect France to repeat those mistakes, but it felt that the Special Committee should recommend measures that would remove any doubt about the following three points: that the people of French Somaliland would be able to exercise their inalienable right of self-determination at a specified date and not later than July 1967; that prior to the referendum conditions would be created which would enable the people of French Somaliland to make full use of that right, which would include the right to form and belong to political organizations of their own choosing and the right of all exiled citizens to return to the Territory without fear of reprisals; and that the referendum itself would be conducted with absolute fairness.

201. The Ethiopian representative had suggested that without Ethiopian trade the Territory would not be able to maintain an independent economic existence. The question of the Territory's economy, however, was not relevant to the matter of self-determination. The United Nations had long established the principle that inadequacy of economic preparedness should never

serve as a pretext for delaying independence. Since that point was constantly mentioned by Ethiopia, however, he considered it necessary to give his delegation's views on the matter, so that Ethiopia's two principal trade links with the Territory—the railway and the port—could be placed in their true perspective.

202. The Franco-Ethiopian railway was used exclusively for transporting Ethiopian merchandise to and from the port of Djibouti. Viewed within the context of the national income of the Territory, the railway played a much smaller part in the economy than was generally known. The majority of the population of French Somaliland were nomads, to whom the railway was completely irrelevant. It had not changed their standard of living or way of life. As had been stated in the official explanation given to the French Parliament, the Franco-Ethiopian Treaty of 1959 had been prompted by the following situation. As a result of General Assembly resolution 390 (V) of 2 December 1960, which had reattached Eritrea to Ethiopia, Ethiopia had become possessed of a coastline of 800 kilometres and two ports on the Red Sea. The modernization of the Addis Ababa-Assab route and the port of Assab had caused Djibouti and the Franco-Ethiopian railway to lose the monopoly they had enjoyed since 1909. Consequently, Djibouti and the railway had begun to show an increasing deficit and France had not wished to bear the entire financial responsibility any longer. The main purpose of the 1959 Treaty had been to make Ethiopia carry an equal share of the deficit. Before 1959, all the profits earned by the railway had gone to the shareholders, all of whom had been French. Under the 1959 Treaty, half of the shares had gone to Ethiopia, which therefore received half of the profits. Thus from the point of view of the economy of French Somaliland there had been no change: the profits still went outside the Territory. The most significant thing about the railway was not the exemption of its profits from local taxation or the fact that not a single local inhabitant served on its Board of Directors, but the way in which its importance to the Territory had been exaggerated. At its peak eighteen years earlier, the entire labour force had numbered no more than 5,000 persons. That figure had declined to 2,500 in 1965. As Djibouti had a population of 40,000 and the labour force of 2,500 covered the entire line and included Ethiopians and Europeans, the railway hardly seemed to constitute a vast source of employment.

203. The financial benefits to French Somaliland of the Ethiopian traffic at the port of Djibouti consisted only of harbour dues charged on goods in transit. Those dues were 15 per cent lower than the rates charged at Aden, on the opposite side of the Gulf. The trade benefited Ethiopia rather than French Somaliland; that was borne out by the fact that while the quantity of Ethiopia's transit trade through the port had doubled since 1959 the corresponding increase in the Territory's budget had been trivial. Ethiopia had been developing the ports of Massawa and Assab at a rapid pace and the latter was beginning to rival Djibouti.

204. The port of Djibouti had an economic potential completely separate from, and potentially at least as profitable as, the Ethiopian transit trade. As a result of improvements, it had become a bunkering station whose international traffic had more than quadrupled during the past ten years. Greater attention should be given to other aspects of the country's economic poten-

tial. The fallacy that the Territory depended solely on the railway and the port had caused the French administration to neglect other possibilities of development, such as the fishing, mother-of-pearl, salt and skins industries. The prospects for the development of other small industries should be investigated with United Nations assistance and the mineral resources of the country should be thoroughly surveyed. The present economic links of French Somaliland with France and Ethiopia should be retained and increased, but the relationship should be one of co-operation for the mutual benefit of both countries. Valuable links had been forged between the peoples of France and the Territory and there was a great deal of goodwill towards metropolitan France in spite of the shortcomings of the local colonial administration.

205. In the case of Ethiopia, his delegation was sure that the people of an independent French Somaliland would wish to develop their economic relations with Ethiopia and with other African countries. That would be in keeping with the present trend in Africa towards regional economic co-operation, one of the principal objectives of the Organization of African Unity. In recent months his country and Ethiopia, together with eight other States of eastern Africa, had formed an association to promote regional economic co-operation.

206. There was no reason for Ethiopia to oppose the demand of the people of the Territory for independence or to assume that independence for French Somaliland would pose a threat to Ethiopia's economic interests. Those interests could be protected, for example, by a treaty of guarantee or some similar instrument acceptable to the people of the Territory.

207. It was relevant to stress the principle that had emerged from the deliberations of the Special Committee, namely that the freely expressed wishes of a people for independence must never be subordinated to the political or economic interests of the colonial Power or of any other State. That principle had been supported by the Ethiopian delegation in the Special Committee during discussions on the future of Non-Self-Governing Territories and by the Ethiopian representative during the debate on Aden at the eighteenth session of the General Assembly.

208. Although there was no dispute between his country and Ethiopia or between his country and France, as Somalia and neighbours of both French Somaliland and Ethiopia his people were deeply perturbed by the Ethiopian suggestion that the right of the people of French Somaliland to self-determination was in some way dependent upon, or must be limited by, alleged historical claims by Ethiopia on that Territory. Ethiopia had no such historical claims and, even if it had, they would be irrelevant. If previous history were allowed to stand in the way of self-determination, then self-determination would clearly be impossible. It would be disastrous to world peace if any country could, on the basis of old maps or historical events, claim the right to dismember or annex other countries.

209. It was not clear at what period in history the Territory was alleged to have come under Ethiopian control. It had certainly not been in biblical times, or in mediaeval times when the Ethiopian mountain plateau had been surrounded and isolated by the forces of Islam. An Arab sultanate had been established at Zeila in the seventh century and by the thirteenth century it

had developed into the powerful Adel Empire. The traditional enmity between the people of the plateau and the people of the coast had resulted, in the sixteenth century, in an attack on Ethiopia by the Somalis and Afars, aided by the Turks. Only after forty years had they been turned back, with the help of Portuguese arms and soldiers. Thereafter an uneasy balance of power had been maintained with the coastal rulers until the European nations had arrived on the scene in the second half of the nineteenth century.

210. In every respect, the people of the coast and the people of the plateau had developed along different lines; there had been differences in religion, language, customs and climate, and, politically, nothing could have been more dissimilar than the autocratic monarchies of Ethiopia and the coastal sultanates, whose rulers were merely *primus inter pares*. The whole history of the area was one of a clash between two different cultures in which, despite temporary advantages, neither had been able to establish permanent control over the other.

211. Until about 1880, it would be roughly true to regard the area for about a hundred miles round Addis Ababa as the southernmost extent of Ethiopian power. When, in the 1860's, the French had arrived on the coast of what was now French Somaliland, the Territory had consisted of a conglomeration of precariously independent chiefdoms and sultanates, over which the Ottoman Empire had exercised nominal overlordship through its Egyptian representative. That overlordship had been so tenuous that European powers had been able to establish thinly veiled protectorates in the area. None of the sultanates or chiefdoms, however, had been under the direct or indirect rule of Ethiopia, then called the Kingdom of Choa, which had regarded the Moslems living near its borders as enemies. Between 1862 and 1890 France had concluded a series of treaties with the chiefdoms and sultanates which had given it control not only over the coastal strip of French Somaliland but also over large portions of the hinterland.

212. During that period, Menelik had succeeded to the Ethiopian throne and had managed to unite the warring Amhara principalities. With the help of several European countries, he had extended his empire to the south by military conquest, not on the basis of any historical claims but simply in the interests of territorial aggrandizement. As Arnold Toynbee has said, the Amharas had been the only African people to join in the scramble for Africa, and today about half the population of the expanded Ethiopia was neither Amhara in nationality nor Christian in religion. It had been Menelik's acquisition of Harar which had enabled him to secure control over the lowland areas. In the 1890s, for the first time in their history, parts of the Danakil and Somali population had been brought under Ethiopian rule. At that time both Britain and France had been anxious to obtain Menelik's co-operation against the Dervishes and, as a result of treaties concluded in 1897 with both those countries, Ethiopia had acquired further Afar and Somali territory. There had been no question of its being a restitution of lost territory; at the time, Ethiopia had not claimed former sovereignty over the land occupied by the French, although about the same time Menelik had made other claims for territories as far north as Khartoum and Lake Nyanza.

213. After 1897 the frontiers of French Somaliland had remained unchanged until 1954 when France,

despite the bitter protests of the Somali delegate in the French Parliament, had ceded another piece of the Territory to Ethiopia. The Franco-Ethiopian Railway Treaty of 1959 had also granted certain rights to Ethiopia in French Somaliland which greatly affected the Territory's inhabitants, but the Treaty specifically excluded extra-territorial rights at the port of Djibouti. If the people of French Somaliland gained independence, however, arrangements undoubtedly could and would be made to protect the legitimate interests of Ethiopia.

214. His country did not blame Ethiopia for its former policies, but the era of territorial aggrandizement had gone for ever. No claims could be made now on the basis of previous annexations. In earlier times, annexations and cessions of territory and the establishment of protectorates and spheres of interest had been carried out in complete disregard for the wishes and welfare of the people concerned.

215. The suggestion that any alleged historical claims by another country might condition, or even nullify, the right of the people of French Somaliland to self-determination contradicted the letter and spirit of the United Nations Charter, of the Charter of the Organization of African Unity and of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.

216. The representative of *Ethiopia* stated that, having regard to the Chairman's statement to the effect that the substance of the question of the Territory was not on the agenda for the meeting, his delegation would reserve its right to speak when the item was taken up by the Fourth Committee during the twenty-first session.

217. His country had been accused by the representative of Somalia of harbouring the desire to annex the Territory of Djibouti. What irony this was!

218. He repeated that his delegation's position was based on well-known facts concerning the interdependence of Djibouti and Ethiopia. His delegation believed that the indigenous population of the Territory had the right to exercise genuine self-determination without any outside interference.

D. DECISION TAKEN BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE

219. At its 471st meeting held on 10 October 1966, the Special Committee, by approving the recommendation contained in paragraph 3 of the twenty-fifth report of the Working Group (A/AC.109/L.338), decided to transmit to the General Assembly the information contained in the relevant working paper prepared by the Secretariat, together with the statements made on the item by representatives and by petitioners. It also decided to inform the Assembly that, subject to any decision that the Assembly at its twenty-first session might take, it would consider French Somaliland during its meetings in 1967.

ANNEX I

[A/AC.109/L.288]

Letter from the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs dated 23 March 1959, addressed to the Secretary-General and transmitted to him by the Permanent Representative of France^a

1. The French Government, in conformity with the declaration contained in Chapter XI of the Charter, furnished regu-

^a Official Records of the General Assembly, Fourteenth Session, Annexes, agenda item 36, document A/4096, para. 3.

larly each year from 1946 to 1957 the information provided for in Article 73. On each such occasion, it pointed out that it was for the administering State alone to determine which were the Territories whose peoples had not yet attained a full measure of self-government under the terms of the Charter.

2. The French Government, as it duly notified the Secretariat, therefore ceased to transmit information on the following Territories as they reached the requisite stage of development: in 1947, on Guadeloupe, Martinique, French Guiana, Réunion, New Caledonia, the French Establishments in Oceania; and St. Pierre and Miquelon; in 1948, on the Associated States of Indo-China and the French Establishments in India; in 1956, on Tunisia and Morocco.

3. Information continued to be furnished on French West Africa, French Equatorial Africa, Madagascar, the Comoro Archipelago, French Somaliland and New Hebrides.

4. Except with regard to New Hebrides, where the existence of the condominium created a special situation, the French Government decided to stop transmitting this information as from 1957. Under the *Loi-cadre* of 23 June 1956 and the decrees issued in application thereof, a series of reforms were instituted which had the effect of granting these Territories internal autonomy. This autonomy and the liberal trend of the revolutionary process marked by the enactment of the *Loi-cadre* were strengthened in 1958 by the establishment of the Community.

5. Attached are documents relating to the status of the various Territories on which information is no longer being transmitted.^b

ANNEX II

[A/AC.109/121]

Memorandum dated 25 May 1965 from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Somalia addressed to the Special Committee

I. THE HISTORY OF FRENCH CONTROL

1. In 1862, at a time when British and Italian interest in the Horn of Africa was fast developing, the French determined that they, too, must have a hold in East Africa, and by treaty with the Danakil Chief purchased for 50,500 francs the harbour of Obok with the adjacent plain. In 1880, the French published a notice defining the limits of the French possessions, but in 1884 the Sultan of Tajurah entered into a Treaty of Protection with France, and in 1885 similar Treaties were entered into between France and the Chief of the Issa Somalis and the Sultan of Gobad, further extending these possessions. The extent of these French Protectorates was later agreed by Treaties with Great Britain in 1888 and Ethiopia in 1897, and confirmed in the tripartite French/Italian/British Treaty of 1906.

2. Thus, according to the pattern common to the "scramble for Africa", unequal treaties were forced on the people of these areas, a French "Protectorate" was assumed, and the precise boundaries were worked out between the four States—France, Great Britain, Italy and Ethiopia—engaged in this competition for territory which belonged to none of them. These are the undistinguished origins of the present French control.

II. THE PRESENT CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS OF THE TERRITORY

3. The present status of French Somaliland is an "Overseas Territory within the French Community".

4. Prior to the 1958 French Constitution, the overseas Territories were those former colonies which had not been assimilated and which therefore had a status quite different from that of France. The "basic-law" of 23 June 1956 gave to such territories a degree of autonomy, and the 1958 Con-

stitution offered the choice between retaining their status, becoming an overseas department, or becoming a member State of the Community. French Somaliland chose to retain its status, so that this, on the whole, remains as it was under the law of 23 June 1956.^a

5. The autonomy of the Territory is, however, strictly limited: one French writer has described it thus:

"But the competence of the autonomous territorial organs (Territorial Assembly and Government Council) applies only to the territorial services. A fundamental distinction is made by the law of 23 June 1956 between the territorial and the state public services. The list of the latter is rather long, and was extended by the law of 1956 to offset the autonomy granted in the management of the territorial services. The State services are: foreign relations; national defence; the judiciary, inspection of work, services assuring public safety and respect for the freedom of the citizens, exterior communications (air services, radio broadcasting), the treasury, credit, and foreign exchange; high education, mixed economy companies."^b

6. Therefore, the status of this Territory remains essentially the same as that of a British colony granted limited powers of self-government: clearly, the entirety of matters of foreign relations, defence, and many strictly "internal" matters are entirely in the control of France, and not the political institutions of the Territory itself. It is, in a word, "non-self-governing".

7. It will be recalled that when on 30 March 1964 the Chairman of the Special Committee of Twenty-Four wrote to the Permanent Representative of France requesting information on the Territories under French control to which General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960 applies, the French reply dated 24 June 1964 was that:

"The communication in question obviously relates to the France/U.K. Condominium of the New Hebrides, the only territory in respect of which the provisions of the Charter regarding non-self-governing territories still concern France." (A/AC.109/71/Add.4)

8. This view the Somali Government denies. French Somaliland is most certainly covered by the General Assembly's resolution, and it was for this reason that the Somali Government requested that French Somaliland be placed on the agenda of the Special Committee of Twenty-Four. The Somali Government calls upon the Committee to apply all its resources to the end of ensuring for this Territory the right of self-determination.

III. THE POLITICAL STRUCTURE OF THE TERRITORY

A. Political organs of the Territory

9. These consist of the following:

- (i) Governor, Head of the Territory and President of the Council of Government: a Frenchman, appointed by President de Gaulle.
- (ii) Council of Government: eight Ministers, elected by the Territorial Assembly on a system of proportional representation (4 Afars, 3 Issa, 1 Metropolitan). This Council meets under the chairmanship of the Governor, who represents the President of the French Republic. Its powers are limited to such matters as are within the autonomy granted by the basic-law of 1956.
- (iii) Territorial Assembly: thirty-two members, elected by "universal" suffrage (16 Afars, 11 Somalis, 4 Metropolitans, 1 Arab).
- (iv) Permanent Commission: Meets between the two sessions of the Assembly and conducts affairs within the limits of powers delegated by the Assembly. In addition to the above, the Territory sends one Deputy and

^a Whiteman, *Digest of International Law*, vol. 1, pp. 545 and 546.

^b Duverger, *Droit constitutionnel et institutions politiques* (1959), pp. 699-702 (translation).

^b *Ibid.*, document A/4096/Add.1.

one Senator to represent it in the French Parliament. Some reference must be made to the marked dominance of the Afars in these organs. The Afars are the party most favoured by France and through which the French Government operates the boundaries of the seven electoral districts which are purposely defined so as to ensure Afar preponderance. The French newspaper *Le Monde*, on 22 April 1964, writing of the Afar leaders said:

"It is true that their movement enjoys the quasi-official support of the administrative authorities and that the new electoral districts, skilfully carved out before the territorial elections of November 1963, have virtually ensured the admission of Afar candidates to the Assembly and the Government."

B. Political parties of the Territory

10. The three main parties are the Afar Democratic Union, which as stated above, enjoys semi-official support, the Issa Democratic Union and the Popular Movement (*Mouvement populaire*). The reason for French support of the Afar Democratic Union is that, as presently led, this party favours retention of the *status quo*. Of the two parties in opposition, the *Mouvement populaire* is the more radical and actively seeks independence from the French. Its General-Secretary, Mr. Obsieh Beuh, elected in August 1964, had only recently prior to his election served one year's imprisonment for subversive acts, having advocated freedom from French rule.

11. The French authorities oppose any attempt to form a nationalist party which cuts across tribal loyalties: on the contrary, they favour a diversity of parties based on tribal differences and seek to promote disagreement between Afars and the Issa Somalis. As *Le Monde* has said, "The Administration considers—with some reason—that these rivalries constitute a certain guarantee of stability" (22 April 1964).

12. This principle will be familiar to all members of the Special Committee of Twenty-Four as the old, colonialist principle "divide and rule". In fact, the Afars (or Danakils) and the Somalis—of whom the Issa Somalis are only a part—fundamentally have much in common. They practise a common religion, the Muslim religion, they have a common culture and they intermarry. They have no difficulty in language communication, except for the Danakils in the extreme north who have recently been introduced into the Territory. It is the French and Ethiopians who are trying to create differences and animosity between the Afars and the Somalis and to introduce greater numbers of Afars whilst expelling thousands of Somalis.

C. Electoral system

13. This is based, ostensibly, on universal suffrage. The total population numbers approximately 80,000, having steadily increased since 1948 when it numbered only 41,000. A French study in 1961^c gave the *indigenous* population figures in the four main areas thus:

Races	Djibouti	Ali Sabieh	Dikhil	Tadjourah	Total
Danakil (Afar)	2,240	—	7,760	20,560	30,560
Somalis (Issa)	14,950	6,000	3,000	—	23,950
Arabs	3,000	—	—	—	3,000
Foreigners	16,000	140	270	200	16,610
TOTAL	36,190	6,140	11,030	20,760	74,120

14. These figures do not include thousands of Somalis who, for lack of identification papers, are treated as "foreigners". The irony of granting a vote to a Frenchman as soon as he steps off the boat in Djibouti, but refusing it to Somalis whose fathers even were born there needs no comment. Thus it can be seen that the Somalis predominate in Djibouti itself and in the areas in the South, adjoining the Somali Republic, whereas the Danakil (or Afars) predominate in the areas adjoining Ethiopia to the west and Eritrea to the north.

^c"La Côte française des Somalis", *Notes et études documentaires*, No. 2714 (April 1961).

15. It may be asked how, with universal suffrage, can this totally disproportionate representation occur? The answers are several:

(a) The vote is also given to the non-indigenous French population which, in Djibouti alone, numbers almost 6,000.

(b) The vote is also given to the French Army stationed in the Territory, numbering 5,000 men.

(c) The vote is denied to thousands of Somalis by alleging that they are "foreigners", not born in the Territory. The existence of documentary proof of place of birth is very rare in these areas of the world, so that it becomes virtually impossible for the Somalis to counter this allegation. Where they do produce written, documentary proof the French authorities will usually dismiss it as a forgery and tear it up.

(d) The French authorities, again on the pretext that the Somalis are "foreigners", are pursuing a persistent and calculated policy of expulsion of Somalis. It is estimated that between 12,000 to 18,000 Somalis have been expelled in this way.

(e) The redistribution of seats resulting from the electoral reform of 1963 was designed purposely to reduce the Somali representation.

(f) The French do not hesitate to resort to coercion, threats of deprivation of the jobs of the Somalis and outright bribery. This is what is meant by the phrase "*L'administration fait les élections*".

16. It is for all these reasons that the Somali Government urges the Special Committee of Twenty-Four to bring pressure to bear on France so as to ensure that elections, and the expression of views by elected representatives, are free and fair. As things stand, the Somali Government believes that the expression of views emanating from the Council of Government or the Territorial Assembly cannot be taken as the expression of the views of the people of the Territory. Free expression could only take place if all French and Ethiopian pressure were removed, preferably by conducting a plebiscite under United Nations auspices. This must be done soon, for the French techniques of coercion, perfected in Algeria, are now being used against the Somalis. The liberation front, the FLCS appealed to the United Nations in June 1963, to investigate the concentration camps established at Obok, Tadjourah, Dikhil and Lake Assai. The Secretary-General of the Arab Workers' Union in October 1964 appealed to the Trade Unions Freedom Committee of the ILO to investigate "the atrocities being committed by the imperialist French authorities against the trade union movement and workers in the French Somali Coast". The FLCS appealed to the Refugees Committee of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in January 1965 asking for aid for the thousands of Somali refugees from French persecution. Recent estimates give the number of "registered" refugees, that is to say those who formally registered for assistance (and excluding those who sought refuge with their own families, etc.) as 6,850; the non-registered refugees are estimated at nearly twice that number.

IV. ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF THE TERRITORY

17. The entire Territory covers an area of only 5,800 square miles, or 23,000 square kilometres. Of this area, no more than 3,000 hectares are under cultivation. Almost 90 per cent of the land is desert and the remaining 10 per cent is given over to the nomadic Afars and Somalis with their flocks of cattle, sheep, goats and camels. The products of the Territory are confined to hides, oil seed, musk, pearl, fish, some coffee, cereals and the production of salt.

18. The present economy of the Territory thus rests upon two things: the French Army and the Port of Djibouti. The budget of the Territory has shown little increase: the official French figures show an increase from 1,074 million Djibouti francs in 1959 to 1,095 in 1961.^d The French Army's budget in the Territory in 1961 was 1,866 million Djibouti francs—greater than the budget for the entire Territory. The Territory faces

^d"La Côte française des Somalis", loc. cit., p. 39. One Djibouti franc = \$0.023; \$1 = 214.39 Djibouti francs.

a growing deficit in its balance of payments, which increased from 1,474 million Djibouti francs in 1959 to 1,970 million in 1961.^a Nor are there any real signs that the French authorities are disposed to develop the economic capacity of the Territory so as to decrease its dependence on the occupying Army.

19. This growing deficit in the balance of payments stands in marked contrast to the growing volume of goods in transit through the port of Djibouti. The tonnage of merchandise unloaded for Ethiopia rose from 151,000 tons in 1938 to 1.14 million tons in 1959 and has since doubled again.^f This transit trade certainly creates employment in Djibouti, but it is apparent that it is not the intention of either France or Ethiopia to allow any import or transit taxes which would directly assist the budget of the Territory.

20. The Port of Djibouti is linked by railway to Addis Ababa. Built in 1917, this railway passed into joint French/Ethiopian control in 1959 and its head office was moved from Paris to Addis Ababa. More recently France has extended 55 million French francs credit to Ethiopia so as to finance the construction of a railway line to Sidamo. It is upon these economic ties between Ethiopia and France that Ethiopia rests her present policy towards the Territory. This is, in brief, to allow the very profitable (for Ethiopia) *status quo* to continue.

21. The French Institut national de la statistique et des études économiques has summarized the position thus:

"This analysis brings out the artificial nature of the economy of French Somaliland, which is to a great extent conditioned by the number of troops stationed in the Territory and for the rest is closely dependent upon the activity of the railway port. Thus the impulsion of this economic life seems to be completely the work of centres of decision outside the Territory."^g

V. EDUCATIONAL AND SOCIAL SYSTEM OF THE TERRITORY

22. This can only be described as background. The official French figures on education for 1963^h are the following:

Schools	Public	Private	Pupils
First degree (elementary)	13	6	3,445
Second degree (secondary)	2	3	353
Technical	2	3	231

23. The *UNESCO Statistical Yearbook* for the same year does not give figures which coincide with the above figures, and it has no entry in the tables dealing with compulsory education, illiteracy or libraries. It does disclose that, in 1960, the amount spent on recurring educational expenditure was 89 million Djibouti francs (approximately \$400,000) and the amount on capital expenditure was nil. An over-all total of about 4,000 pupils receiving education in a population of 80,000 is not impressive and the absence of facilities for higher education is striking. Moreover, it must be remembered that these figures are largely figures showing the French and other foreign children at school. The French authorities are not disposed to provide too much education for the indigenous population, particularly the Somalis.

24. On the more general social level, there is one large hospital (but no free medical treatment), no permanent theatre, and the daily Press (*Le Réveil de Djibouti*) is government-controlled. It is not the policy of the French authorities to promote social integration or understanding between the Afars and Somalis, and even less between them and the French residents.

^a Institut national de la statistique et des études économiques, *Comptes économiques de la Côte française des Somalis, 1959-1961*, pp. 23-29.

^f *The London Financial Times*, 4 September 1964.

^g Loc. cit., p. 7.

^h See *Europe—France outre-mer*, No. 409 (March 1964), p. 34.

VI. FRENCH INTENTIONS IN RELATION TO THE TERRITORY

25. These are clear. They are to remain in the Territory and to defy all attempts by the OAU or the United Nations to bring about the liberation of the Territory in accordance with the right of self-determination of the peoples of the Territory.

26. In September 1964 and January 1965, the French authorities refused to allow an OAU Fact-Finding Mission to enter the Territory.

27. *Le Figaro*, on 22 March, reported that Mr. Messmer had reviewed a military parade of French troops in Djibouti and declared that "France possesses all the military potentialities to beat off any attack whatever and wherever it comes from and will stay in this country as long as she wants to."

28. *Le Monde*, on 24 March, reported that Mr. Messmer visited Addis Ababa at the invitation of the Emperor and talked with Haile Selassie. At the conclusion of their talk Mr. Messmer is reported to have said that "I conveyed to Emperor Haile Selassie that France has decided to stay in Djibouti and with that purpose in mind reinforced her military potentialities. The Sovereign did not object and our interview went on cordially."

29. The French will use every conceivable technique to encourage rivalry between Ethiopia and the Somali Republic, between Afars and Somalis within the Territory, and to alarm the foreign residents as to what will happen if France withdraws, so as to prolong her colonialist and oppressive hold. France will not hesitate to use expulsion, imprisonment and brutality in any form to put down any dissident elements within the Territory.

VII. ETHIOPIAN INTENTIONS IN RELATION TO THE TERRITORY

30. These are regarded by the Somali Government with utmost suspicion. Ethiopia sits on the Special Committee of Twenty-Four and the OAU Committee of Nine, yet in relation to French Somaliland it is clear that she has no wish to support the liberation of his Territory. All her interest is in the retention of the *status quo* with the profitable free transit through Djibouti and economic aid from France. Above all, Ethiopia is determined that French Somaliland shall not revert to the Somali peoples.

31. On 21 December 1963 the Ethiopian Foreign Minister was reported by AFP as having said:

"We cannot permit any attempt by Somalia to gain possession of Djibouti, for this port and its railroad are the very lungs of Ethiopia. Any such attempt by Somalis will be considered by us as a cause for war. Good sense demands the maintenance of the *status quo* in Djibouti" (translation from French).

32. In March 1964, in an interview with the Paris newspaper *Le Figaro*, the Ethiopian Ambassador said: "The French are our friends. We want them to stay in Djibouti..." It appears that, during the recent visit of the French Defence Minister to Addis Ababa in March 1965 the Emperor gave the same assurance.

33. However, Ethiopia's double game is transparent within the OAU. After the visit of the OAU Fact-Finding Commission to Ethiopia in January 1965 the Ethiopian newspapersⁱ were full of statements about Djibouti being Ethiopian.

34. Indeed, the Ethiopian Government carefully organized a "rally" at the airport at Dire Dawa on 20 January, in which crowds of people, purporting to come from French Somaliland, clamoured that "Djibouti is Ethiopia". As the Special Committee of Twenty-Four will doubtless realize, the Ethiopian authorities took good care to ensure that no Somalis were able to leave French Somaliland in order to meet the OAU Fact-Finding Mission whilst it was on Ethiopian territory.

35. It was during this same visit that a new "liberation front", called the Djibouti Liberation Movement, was created at Dire Dawa. It was created on the eve of the arrival of the OAU Fact-Finding Mission in Dire Dawa, a creature of the

ⁱ See *Ethiopian Herald*, 22 and 23 January 1965, and *Voice of Ethiopia*, 22 January.

Ethiopian Government of which no one had ever heard previously. It is to be hoped that neither the OAU Mission, nor the Special Committee of Twenty-Four will be impressed by this somewhat naive manoeuvre.

36. In so far as Ethiopia's concern is to safeguard her economic interests in Djibouti and the railway, the Somali Government is not unsympathetic to this concern. It will help no one to cut off this outlet for Ethiopia. However, unless it be the wish of the people that Ethiopia assume sovereignty over the Territory (and the Somali Government is convinced it is not), there is no reason why these economic interests should not be guaranteed, under fair conditions, by a treaty negotiated under United Nations auspices and, in some sense, guaranteed by the United Nations. The Somali Republic would certainly be agreeable to a solution of this kind.

VIII. THE SOMALI REPUBLIC'S INTENTIONS TOWARDS THE TERRITORY

37. The Somali Republic's intentions are the reintegration of all territory inhabited by the Somali peoples into one nation-State, the Somali Republic, on the basis of the right of self-determination of the people of the Territory.

38. However, the Somali Republic firmly believes in the need to ensure that the expression of opinion of the people of the Territory should be a free and genuine one. Hence, it will be necessary for the United Nations to guarantee this right by a plebiscite, conducted by the United Nations within the Territory, and free from *all* outside pressure in whatever form.

39. The Somali Republic, mindful of the precedent of the United Nations Temporary Executive Authority over West Irian, believes that a United Nations administration for a period of time after French withdrawal will be essential in order to allow the people to form political parties, to canvass their ideas freely and to negotiate with each other without fear of oppression. This has never been possible under French rule, and the people of the Territory will need this little time to enable a true expression of their political will to emerge. A plebiscite immediately upon independence will only produce a highly artificial opinion which will show all the fruits of French and other foreign corruption and bribery. It is for this reason that the Somali Republic regards it as essential for the United Nations to guarantee to the people of the Territory complete freedom from all external pressures.

40. Therefore, on behalf of the oppressed peoples of French Somaliland, who remain under French colonial rule in flagrant denial of their right of self-determination and of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960, the Somali Government would urge the following action as a matter of urgency:

(1) The United Nations should affirm that French Somaliland is a Non-Self-Governing Territory to which resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960 applies.

(2) The United Nations should affirm the right of the people of French Somaliland to self-determination, in accordance with their freely expressed wishes.

(3) The United Nations should call upon France to grant immediate independence to the Territory, within the spirit of the resolution of the General Assembly and the United Nations Charter, and to withdraw its armed forces, officials and all other instrumentalities of control over the people of French Somaliland.

(4) The United Nations should call upon all other States to abstain from all forms of pressure direct and indirect, calculated to distort the free expression of the right of self-determination of the people.

(5) The United Nations should, immediately upon the grant of independence to the Territory, assume the administration of the Territory for a period of two years so as to allow the formation of a political consensus within the Territory as to its future.

(6) The United Nations should, during the period of administration, permit the return to the Territory of all those people who, during the past ten years, have been expelled or

exiled from the Territory by the French, subject to a proper United Nations scrutiny of their genuine association with the Territory.

ANNEX III

[A/AC.109/122]

Memorandum dated 8 June 1965 from the Permanent Mission of Ethiopia to the United Nations addressed to the Special Committee

1. Despite the widely representative character of the membership of the Special Committee of Twenty-Four, we have always felt an inner pride in the dedicated spirit with which our membership has always sought to discharge its sacred mandates. Oblivious to the remoteness, size or stage of progress of any Territory under discussion, we believe we all have, in our various roles, exerted no small effort in the performance of our functions, effort no less dedicated than it would be were each one of us to defend the vital interests of his particular nation. That is, of course, as it should be—and herein, we think, lies the real importance of our tasks.

2. Yet, there are also occasions when one or more members of this Committee have to exercise greater initiative and vigour in the discussion concerning any given territory, not because of any lack of interest on the part of the other members, but rather because, due to the vagaries of history, the accidents of geographic proximity, and the many other chain effects of the historical process, some neighbouring countries are so closely involved with the subject matter that they feel an even greater responsibility in reaching expeditious and just solutions to problems taken up in this Committee. The Territory of Djibouti is such a one and has, therefore, particular significance for our country.

3. The Ethiopian delegation finds it sufficiently important to establish, at the outset, the question of designation of this Territory under review. We do not think the members of the Committee need to be reminded of the fact that one of the most effective instruments whereby the dismemberment of the vast number of countries in Africa was achieved during the heyday of European colonialism was precisely the invention of new names to denote artificially created territorial entities. Thus it was that the term "French Somaliland" came to be coined and subsequently perpetuated as a proper name for a Territory which we in Ethiopia more correctly call Djibouti. In so far as the Ethiopian delegation is concerned, the present discussions pertain solely to the Territory of Djibouti. Once this important point has been made clear, it remains for us to proceed to the substance of the matter.

4. The Territory of Djibouti, with an area of about 23,000 square kilometres and located in the eastern region of Ethiopia, is bounded on the east by the western shore of the Red Sea and on the west and north by Ethiopia. It has a short frontier with the Republic of Somalia to the south-east. Out of a total land frontier of about 500 kilometres, no less than 400 kilometres constitutes the frontier length between Ethiopia and Djibouti. Physically, Djibouti is part of the Great Rift Valley, which stretches from the Red Sea and runs through Ethiopia and all the way to Tanzania. The Valley forms a single physical unit. Djibouti itself is situated at the extremity of the Awash Valley. An arid land, Djibouti has very little or no rainfall, which makes it impossible for any sort of agriculture or cultivation to flourish. Its climate is one of the hottest in the world. To complete the physical and demographic description of the Territory, we need only add that the total population of Djibouti is less than 80,000, approximately half of which resides in the major town which carries the name of the Territory itself.

5. History attests to the fact that for several millennia the entire area known as the Horn of Africa formed part of and was within the jurisdiction of Ethiopia. The tribes which inhabited the coastal areas of Djibouti, no less than others in the vast land area were under the Ethiopian sovereignty, acknowledged the sovereign rights of Ethiopia over Djibouti and regularly paid tribute to the Ethiopian Crown. Nor can it be disputed that up to about a century ago, the several

strategic and commercial ports along the coasts of the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean were Ethiopian ports serving the enormous hinterlands.

6. While Ethiopian sovereignty was acknowledged over those territories, including, of course, Djibouti, there were, nevertheless, periodic foreign attempts at their occupation. One such instance was the unsuccessful attempt, during the seventeenth century and in the subsequent period, by the Ottoman Sultan, Selim I, to impose Turkish sovereignty over the Djibouti coastal area. The Sultan's Decree, proclaiming the Red Sea coastal territory as Turkish proved, however, to be of little practical effect, and the Turkish influence was never permanently consolidated in that part of Africa. Naturally, Ethiopia never ceased, over the decades, to assert her rights over her territories on the coast, and on many occasions was compelled to resort to force of arms to oust the invading army illegally stationed on her soil. This period has a further significance in that the *de jure* dependence on the authority of the Ethiopian sovereign of the local chiefs of Djibouti remained intact—a situation which called forth a positive reaction from, and tacit acceptance by, more than one European power in the nineteenth century. From the point of view of the present discussion, however, the most interesting period in the history of the Territory is the latter half of the nineteenth century, a period which has subsequently been dubbed by historians as the "scramble for Africa". It was during this period that the Territory of Djibouti acquired the status of a separate, although ill-defined, territory for the first time in its entire history.

7. The interest manifested by France vis-à-vis Djibouti stemmed from the construction of the Suez Canal, which transformed the Red Sea from a torrid *cul de sac* into an international waterway. In order to effectively control military and other traffic and to seize important economic areas in the interior of the African continent, it became imperative for France and other European powers to acquire quickly as much land as possible on both sides of the Red Sea. In these undertakings, described by some historians as "pirating the coastal lands of the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean", at least three European powers were involved, of whom France had her eyes on Djibouti. Between 1862 and 1885, France coerced local chiefs to sign a series of agreements by which several small units of land in and around the Gulf of Tadjourah were acquired. In 1885, the French Government announced by decree the establishment of the "Côte française des Somalis et dépendances".

8. It may be asked at this point why and how local chiefs could "sell" land that was under the sovereignty of a legitimate Government and its people. The answer is as simple as it is tragic; it is human frailty, which rests at the bottom of Africa's history during that unfortunate period. Distances were great and communications difficult; the colonial powers were armed to the teeth, and the African nationalists were unable to stop their unwarranted assault. Taking advantage of the adverse circumstances of the African Governments and peoples, colonial agents tempted weaker chiefs, through gifts and intimidation to sign treaties, the provisions and implications of which they did not understand. Nevertheless, it is obviously one thing to "sell" or "cede" a territory in theory, without any legal competence whatsoever; quite another matter to effectively dispose of and lawfully transfer possession of land to a third party. But we need not for the present dwell on this particular point.

9. A brief glance at the history of the last decade of the nineteenth century reveals that the period was one of the most trying in the entire history of Ethiopia. The three-pronged move against the Ethiopian hinterland, already being unremittingly pursued by the colonial powers had, by 1896, reached alarming proportions, so much so that Ethiopia, fighting for survival, had no option except to rise up in arms against the colonial advance from the north. Although the victory of Adowa gave Ethiopia a brief respite, the Ethiopian people, exhausted as they were from repelling the assaults from separate directions, were hardly in a position to wage yet another battle within a year. Thus, forced by circumstances and anxious to retain as much of her ancient land as was possible, Ethiopia was compelled, in 1897, to conclude with France

a frontier treaty regarding the newly created Territory of Djibouti.

10. While that painful colonialist era is almost past history, there is, of course, some unfinished business in the disposal of which we are privileged to participate. It is the duty of the Special Committee, indeed its *raison d'être*, to make speedy and concrete recommendations regarding the form and manner by which the remaining colonial Territories shall be effectively emancipated. The Ethiopian Government will, as always, give its full support and co-operation in carrying out the speedy and full implementation of the colonial Territories. It is with this in mind and in the hope of setting out the accurate historical development of the Territory of Djibouti that the Ethiopian delegation has taken the opportunity of presenting this short Memorandum.

11. Census authorities estimate a total population of not more than 80,000 in the Territory of Djibouti. Virtually all the inhabitants of the Territory reside in two areas: the first has a line of the Franco-Ethiopian Railway as its southern boundary and the peninsula of Buri as its northern limit. The second area in which a good portion of the people live is circumscribed by the Red Sea and the upthrust of the Ethiopian highlands. Djibouti's inhabitants comprise, besides French administrators and businessmen who form a very small segment of the population, two basically different racial groups: the Danakils and the Issas. Census authorities report further that the total number of the Danakils is approximately 200,000, of whom 40,000 inhabit Djibouti, forming over half the population of that Territory. The balance of 160,000 Danakils are inhabitants of Ethiopia, with highest concentration in the provinces of Harrar, Wollo and Eritrea. The total Issa population is estimated at 150,000, of whom 20,000 live in the Territory of Djibouti, and of the balance, more than 100,000 Issas reside in Ethiopia. The Issas in Djibouti are concentrated in an area far smaller than that occupied by the Afars. We wish to add here that the paramount chiefs of the Afars and Issas, who are so acknowledged by the tribesmen of Djibouti, live in Ethiopia. The principal language spoken in Djibouti is Danakil. French and Arabic are also spoken.

12. What we have outlined so far refers mainly to the demography and the inhabitants of Djibouti. But it is no less significant to the Territory to note that the economic and commercial activities as exist in the Territory are, by and large, the result of the establishment within Djibouti of the port facilities as is reflected in the report of the Liberation Committee of the Organization of African Unity (OAU). Prior to that period, the region itself was so sparsely populated as to discourage any economic and commercial enterprise.

13. The driving force for the construction of a seaport at Djibouti to serve as a major coaling station for French warships bound for the Far East was, of course, imperial strategy. Nevertheless, it was the construction of this seaport which gave birth to the town of Djibouti. Circumstances have, however, changed so drastically in the interval that today Djibouti owes its sustenance almost entirely to its position as the terminus of the Franco-Ethiopian Railway which connects the interior of Ethiopia with the coast. In considering the Territory of Djibouti, it is therefore important to bear this basic fact in mind.

14. We believe a brief *exposé* of the history of the Franco-Ethiopian Railway at this juncture will contribute to a better understanding of the subject under discussion.

15. The Franco-Ethiopian Railway was built under a concession granted by the Emperor Menelik in 1894 to private French interest. The concession was subsequently taken over and the railway built by the French Government itself. Completion of the line between Djibouti and Addis Ababa was effected in 1918, and from that time until the present day this rail line has served as the principal link between the Ethiopian highlands and the Red Sea. A treaty which was concluded between Ethiopia and France in 1959 provided for the ownership and control of the railway to be divided equally between the two nations. Although formally concluded between the Ethiopian and the French Governments, the 1959 treaty has received the approval of the Territorial Assembly in Djibouti.

16. Note must be made of the fact that a significant portion of Ethiopia's total imports and exports today flows through Djibouti. (In 1961-1962, for example, the ratio of freight trans-shipped through Djibouti to Assab, Djibouti's natural competitor for shipments to the Ethiopian highlands, was roughly 2:3.) It is clear, however, that were shipments emanating from or intended for Ethiopia destination directed through other ports, the *raison d'être* for Djibouti's existence as a separate economic entity would largely disappear. Djibouti's other principal activity today is as a fuelling stop for vessels passing through the Red Sea, but eliminate the cargo of Ethiopian origin or destination which today brings freighters to Djibouti, and fuelling could equally well be carried on elsewhere.

17. Under the Franco-Ethiopian Railway Treaty, concluded in 1959, Ethiopian customs officials are stationed in Djibouti, and shipments to Ethiopia are sealed there for trans-shipment to their ultimate destination. In order to equalize prices on goods trans-shipped through Djibouti and Ethiopian ports, customs duties are assessed on the landed Djibouti value. The agreement also provides for relatively unrestricted use by Ethiopia of Djibouti port facilities: for example, the Ethiopian Government may build or purchase processing and manufacturing facilities within the port area and move and store its goods free of all local taxes except port fees.

18. The facts we have briefly mentioned make it clear that the Territory's economic activity is linked exclusively with Ethiopia. Even the water drunk in Djibouti is carried from Ethiopia in tank cars. While the Djibouti branches of the Banque de l'Indochine and the Banque Nationale pour le Commerce et l'Industrie maintain representatives at Addis Ababa, their principal function has been to finance coffee exports; they do not accept deposits. Similarly, the branch of the Commercial Bank of Ethiopia in Djibouti is engaged principally in financing Ethiopian trade passing through the port. Local industry in Djibouti itself is minimal. The major companies which operate in Djibouti maintain only branches there, while their main offices are located in Addis Ababa.

19. Today, Djibouti constitutes one terminus of the rail line linking the coast with the Ethiopian highlands. As such, it has played and could continue to play a vital role in Ethiopia's economy and her future development. Djibouti is the gateway providing access to the eastern, the southern and central regions of Ethiopia, and this constitutes a vital avenue to the peaceful growth of these portions of the Ethiopian nation. The future of the areas thus opened to the sea is to a considerable extent dependent upon free access to the great lines of world trade.

20. This exposition is intended only to indicate the principal lines of inquiry, which, it is suggested, must be pursued if an

accurate and complete picture of the present and future of Djibouti is to be drawn. It is clear that such inquiry must take full account of both ancient and the more recent history of Djibouti; of the geographic characteristics of the Territory; and of the economic prospects for the Territory, considered apart from existing French interests there.

21. It is pertinent to observe that the diverse names which are haphazardly applied to the Territory are misnomers. Obviously, the land belongs to those who have historically inhabited it, and there can be no dispute on that point. But the term "Djibouti" has, at least, the virtue of being precise without leading the reader or the listener into those misunderstandings which can only create confusion and uncertainty when clarity and precision are essential.

22. Some of the conclusions to be drawn from the sober facts we have presented are self-evident—so much so as to require no repetition. Suffice it that we mention only three:

(1) Djibouti from time immemorial has formed part of Ethiopia. Not until the partitioning of Africa in the heyday of European colonialism did Djibouti achieve its so-called separate status.

(2) Viewed geographically, Djibouti forms an integral part of the Ethiopian land mass.

(3) Economically, Djibouti's life is completely dependent upon Ethiopia and has no existence apart from the Ethiopian economy.

23. These are the clear conclusions that, in our opinion, must be arrived at after a dispassionate consideration of all the facts pertaining to the Territory of Djibouti. Our chief purpose in so doing is to give as factual a picture as possible of the situation obtaining in that area in order to assist the Committee in forming an objective view of the matter, which should lead to a fruitful and effective discussion. We need hardly add that it is not, and never has been, the intention of the Ethiopian delegation to derogate, in any way, the principle of self-determination, which is the clear mandate of this Committee to apply. Our sole purpose, we repeat, is a full presentation of facts in order to facilitate the work of the Committee.

24. In conclusion, we would like to assure the Special Committee that Ethiopia stands ready to support unreservedly any measures which take into full account, *inter alia*, the geographic, historical and economic factors, and the realities which must, ultimately, determine the future of the Territory of Djibouti. The Ethiopian Government is confident that the decision of this Committee will contribute to peace in that area and to the increase in happiness and prosperity of the inhabitants of the Territory of Djibouti.

CHAPTER XIII*

OMAN

A. PREVIOUS CONSIDERATION AND ACTION BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

1. The question of Oman was included in the agenda of the General Assembly at its fifteenth, sixteenth and seventeenth sessions and was referred to the Special Political Committee for consideration. At the fifteenth session, the Special Political Committee considered the question but decided, because of lack of time, to postpone further consideration of the question until the sixteenth session. At the sixteenth and seventeenth sessions, the Special Political Committee approved draft resolutions¹ whereby the General Assembly, recalling

* Previously issued under the symbol A/6300/Add.8.

¹ Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixteenth Session, Annexes, agenda item 23, document A/5010, para. 10; and *ibid.*, Seventeenth Session, Annexes, agenda item 79, document A/5325, para. 8.

its resolutions 1514 (XV), would recognize the right of the people of Oman to self-determination and independence, call for the withdrawal of foreign forces from Oman, and invite the parties concerned to settle peacefully their differences with a view to restoring normal conditions in Oman. The General Assembly, however, did not adopt these draft resolutions at its plenary meetings because they failed to receive the necessary two-thirds majority.

2. At the 1191st plenary meeting of the General Assembly at its seventeenth session, the representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, on behalf of the Sultan of Muscat and Oman, extended an invitation to a representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations to visit the Sultanate on a personal basis to obtain first-hand information on the situation there. Subsequently, the

Secretary-General appointed Mr. Herbert de Ribbing, Swedish Ambassador to Spain, as his Special Representative to undertake that task. Mr. de Ribbing visited Oman in June 1963 and submitted a report which was made available to the General Assembly at its eighteenth session.²

3. At the eighteenth session, the question of Oman was again included in the agenda of the General Assembly and referred to the Fourth Committee for consideration. A draft resolution recommended by the Fourth Committee was adopted by the General Assembly on 11 December 1963, as resolution 1948 (XVIII). By this resolution, the Assembly took note of the report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and decided to establish an *Ad Hoc* Committee to examine the question of Oman and to report to it at its nineteenth session.

4. The *Ad Hoc* Committee on Oman was composed of Afghanistan, Costa Rica, Nepal, Nigeria and Senegal. It held twenty-five meetings at Headquarters and visited Cairo in the United Arab Republic, Dammam in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait where it interviewed petitioners from the Territory, as well as the Imam of Oman. The Chairman of the Committee also had talks with the Sultan of Muscat and Oman in London. The *Ad Hoc* Committee submitted its report to the General Assembly on 8 January 1965.³

5. The question of Oman was one of the many items included in the provisional agenda of the General Assembly, which it was unable to consider at its nineteenth session. At the twentieth session, the item was referred to the Fourth Committee for consideration. A draft resolution recommended by the Fourth Committee was adopted by the General Assembly at its 1399th plenary meeting on 17 December 1965 as resolution 2073 (XX). The resolution reads as follows:

"The General Assembly,

"Having considered the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Oman,³

"Recalling its resolutions 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960 and 1948 (XVIII) of 11 December 1963,

"Having heard the statements by the representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and by the petitioners,

"Deeply concerned at the serious situation arising from colonial policies and foreign intervention by the United Kingdom in the Territory,

"1. Takes note of the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Oman and expresses appreciation to the Committee for its efforts;

"2. Deplores the attitude of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the authorities in the Territory for refusing to co-operate with the Ad Hoc Committee on Oman and for not facilitating its visit to the Territory;

"3. Recognizes the inalienable right of the people of the Territory as a whole to self-determination and independence in accordance with their freely expressed wishes;

"4. Considers that the colonial presence of the United Kingdom in its various forms prevents the people of the Territory from exercising their rights to self-determination and independence;

"5. Calls upon the Government of the United Kingdom to effect immediately the implementation in the Territory of the following measures:

"(a) Cessation of all repressive actions against the people of the Territory;

"(b) Withdrawal of British troops;

"(c) Release of political prisoners and political detainees and return of political exiles to the Territory;

"(d) Elimination of British domination in any form;

"6. Invites the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples to examine the situation in the Territory;

"7. Requests the Secretary-General to take, in consultation with the Special Committee, appropriate measures for the implementation of the present resolution and to report thereon to the General Assembly at its twenty-first session."

B. INFORMATION ON OMAN

Introduction

6. It has been noted in both the report of the Secretary-General's Special Representative and the report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on Oman, that the term "Oman" had been used in different ways in the past. In a general sense it has meant the whole area from Dhofar, east of the Aden Protectorate in the south of Arabia, to Qatar in the north, "with the sea and the desert as ultimate frontiers". In more recent history, it has been applied to a loosely defined political entity comprising the interior of what now constitutes the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman. At times, however, both "Oman" and "Muscat" have been interchangeably used to describe the whole extent of the area ruled from Muscat by the Sultan.

7. In the course of the debate on Oman which took place in the Fourth Committee of the General Assembly at its twentieth session, the view was expressed by some delegations that the territory of Oman comprised the Trucial Sheikdoms as well as the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman. The representative of the United Kingdom, on the other hand, affirmed that the item before the Fourth Committee solely concerned the territory of the Sultanate and that other territories mentioned in the debate, such as Sharjah and Abu Dhabi were located outside the Sultanate. During the consideration of the draft resolution which was subsequently adopted by the General Assembly, a question was put to the co-sponsors as to whether the expression "Territory as a whole" in the text of the resolution was meant to include Muscat and the Trucial States. In reply it was stated that the Territory of Oman should comprise the whole geographical area referred to above, and should include the Trucial Sheikdoms as well as the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman. Accordingly, information is given below under two main headings: the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman and the Trucial Sheikdoms.

² *Ibid.*, Eighteenth Session, Annexes, agenda item 78, document A/5562.

³ *Ibid.*, Nineteenth Session, Annexes, annex No. 16, document A/5846.

1. Sultanate of Muscat and Oman

General

8. The Sultanate of Muscat and Oman lies at the extreme south-east of the Arabian Peninsula, east of the Rub-al-Khali desert. Its sea coast extends for some 1,000 miles (1,600 kilometres) and its total area is approximately 82,000 square miles (212,000 square kilometres). Physically, the Territory consists of three main geographical divisions: a coastal plain, the Batinah; the Hajar mountain range stretching from north-west to south-east and broken by a stream-bed, the Wadi Samail; and a barren plateau with an average height of 1,000 feet (300 metres) extending to the edge of the desert. The north-western section of the plateau is called the Dhahirah and the south-eastern section the Sharqiyah. In the far south, and separated from Oman by the desert, lie the fertile plains of Dhofar. In addition the Sultanate includes the northern tip of Cape Musandam known as Ru'us-al-Jibal.

9. The total population of Muscat and Oman is estimated at over 750,000; it is concentrated in the Jabal al Akhdar (Green Mountain) area in the western Hajar, in Batinah and in Dhofar. Muscat, the capital, has an estimated population of about 6,200 and nearby Matrah about 14,000. Nearly all the people are Moslem Arabs. With the exception of those living in the main towns, the people are organized into tribes. There are said to be over 200 distinguishable tribes.

10. Muscat and Oman has, in the past, been under two different political régimes. From the eighth century onwards it was an independent State ruled by an Imam who exercised both spiritual and temporal authority. About 1875, with the death of Imam Ahmed bin Said, the first Sultanate was established in Muscat on the coast. Early in the nineteenth century the predominant institution was the Sultanate, but the Imamate was revived in the interior of the country once in 1868 and again in 1913. According to the *Ad Hoc* Committee on Oman, the interior of Oman was an autonomous political entity under two successive Imams, Salim bin Rashid al-Kharusi and Mohamed bin Abdullah al-Khalili, from 1913 until 1955 when it was occupied by the Sultan's forces with British assistance. Although the boundaries of the Imamate were not clearly defined, it included the Jabal al Akhdar, the Dhahirah, the Sharqiyah and the Ja'lan. The Imamate seemed to have had the normal attributes of a State, with a Head of State, a Higher Council, an Assembly and its own system of administration.

11. The *Ad Hoc* Committee stated that the Imam was considered by his followers as the Head of State and was elected by "the leaders, elders and notables of the people from various levels and tribes" in consultation with religious figures. The Imam's authority was exercised in all fields—religious, political and judicial—in accordance with Islamic law. He was bound to consult the Higher Council in all major problems. The Assembly was composed of the members of the Higher Council, *walis* and tribal leaders and met whenever the Imam decided to convene it.

12. The present Imam, Ghalib bin Ali, was elected in 1954. He lives in exile in Saudi Arabia. He has a Higher Council which includes several Sheikhs from the leading tribes in the area, and a Revolutionary Council whose aims are "to direct the struggle of the people to regain their independence, and to educate and train them, both inside and outside the country."⁴

⁴ *Ibid.*, para. 549.

The Revolutionary Council has a Military Committee, a Financial Committee, a Cultural Committee and a Secretariat. It has appointed representatives to the Arab League and to several Arab States.

13. The present Sultan has maintained that all the people of Oman are his subjects and that there have never been two States. His family had been in power in Muscat and Oman for over 220 years and it was difficult for him to give information on other historical points.

Relationship with the United Kingdom

Treaties and agreements

14. British association with Muscat dates back to 1798, when a treaty was signed between Muscat and the East India Company, in which the former promised to exclude the French from its territory for the duration of the war which was then going on between France and England. Several other treaties and agreements were concluded in subsequent years between the United Kingdom and the Sultans, including the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation of 1891, the Agreement regarding the Cession of Territory by the Sultan of Oman of 1891, the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation of 1939, the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation and Exchange of Letters of 1951 and the Exchange of Letters concerning the Sultan's Armed Forces, Civil Aviation, Royal Air Force Facilities and Economic Development in Muscat and Oman of 1958. A detailed analysis of these instruments was set forth by the *Ad Hoc* Committee on Oman in its report. The written instruments on which the present relationship between the Sultanate and the United Kingdom is based, namely, the Treaty and Exchange of Letters of 1951 and the Exchange of Letters of 1958, are reproduced in full in annex I of this chapter.

United Kingdom representation in the Sultanate

15. The United Kingdom has had an official representative in Muscat since 1861. His title was first Political Agent. In 1867 it was changed to Political Agent and Consul. In 1951 the term Political Agent was dropped. At the present time the United Kingdom representative in Muscat has the rank of Consul-General. In the memorandum submitted by the United Kingdom to the *Ad Hoc* Committee on Oman,⁵ it was stated that British interests in Eastern Arabia had been the responsibility of the Government of India prior to 1947; British diplomatic relations with Governments in the area, including those with the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman had been conducted by members of the Indian Political Service who had employed styles and titles used by that Service.

16. Since 1861 the British Consul-General has been responsible to the British Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, whose headquarters is in Bahrain. The latter is responsible to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in London. In addition to the administration of justice described below (paras. 18-24), the Political Resident is responsible for certain other functions relating to the Territory. He has an over-all responsibility for the postal services and telegraphic communications in the Sultanate and in other States in the area. These services are administered by a Postal Superintendent of the United Kingdom General Post Office which defrays the costs and receives the revenue

⁵ *Ibid.*, document A/5846, annex VII.

from postage. These roughly balance. Telegraphic communications are conducted by Cable and Wireless Ltd., under an agreement with the Sultan's Government. The *Ad Hoc* Committee on Oman noted that the Sultanate had no stamps of its own and used over-printed United Kingdom stamps. The Political Resident also controls exchange transactions effected through the banks.

17. The administration of airfields which have been established in the Territory under the 1934 Civil Air Agreement fall within the jurisdiction of the Political Resident. By this Agreement the United Kingdom received permission to establish airfields in the Sultanate. The United Kingdom acts as the agent of the Sultan in all aviation matters. While the airfield at Masirah Island is used for staging purposes, Salalah airfield is considered as an international airport for civil airlines and is managed by the United Kingdom on behalf of the Sultan according to international rules and regulations. Use of the airfields by the Royal Air Force is governed by a separate agreement between the Sultan and the United Kingdom.

Extraterritorial rights

18. The United Kingdom has enjoyed extraterritorial jurisdiction over British subjects and protected persons in the Territory since 1891. In its memorandum to the *Ad Hoc* Committee on Oman, the United Kingdom stated that the extent of the jurisdiction allowed in the 1891 and 1939 commercial treaties had been greatly reduced by successive changes, both in and since the Treaty of 1951. The agreement providing for this limited degree of extraterritorial jurisdiction is due to expire on 31 December 1966.

19. The Muscat Order, 1955,⁶ which repealed the previous Muscat Order in Council of 1949, defined the powers of the United Kingdom Government in the field of "jurisdiction within the territories of the Sultan of Muscat and Oman". The Order was first amended in 1958, mainly to give effect to an agreement concluded between the United Kingdom and the Sultan, transferring to him jurisdiction over Indian nationals. By a second amendment issued in 1959 the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf who had hitherto himself been the Judge of the Chief Court for the Persian Gulf, was relieved of his judicial functions and provision was made for the appointment of professional magistrates to exercise the jurisdiction of the Court.

20. Cases heard by the British courts apply to: (a) citizens of the United Kingdom, its colonies and Southern Rhodesia who are not Moslems; (b) British protected persons who are not Moslems; (c) members of British naval, military and air forces, as well as of any "levy or police force raised by or under the authority of Her Majesty in any territory under Her protection". Civil suits arising from acts committed not on duty are excepted unless the person is subject to British jurisdiction under another provision of the Order; (d) corporations incorporated in the United Kingdom or in any Territory under the sovereignty, protection or trusteeship of the United Kingdom (with the exception of certain British protected areas in the Persian Gulf and Aden); (e) Commonwealth citizens, whether Moslem or not, with the exception of those from India, Pakistan and Zanzibar (if the Sultan's Government or a Muscat subject is involved, British jurisdiction is excluded); (f) British ships and aircraft.

⁶ Statutory Instrument No. 1641 of 28 October 1955.

21. The Muscat Order makes provision for a Full Court, a Chief Court and a Consular Court. The first two Courts usually sit in Bahrain, and have a wider jurisdiction comprising Bahrain, Qatar and the Trucial States. Ordinarily they are concerned with appeals from the Consular Court. The final court of appeal is the Privy Council although sentences are subject to confirmation by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. Certain civil actions may be assigned by the Consul to the Registrar. The Political Resident may appoint a Crown Prosecutor who would discharge the duties ordinarily performed by the Attorney General.

22. The laws applied in the Courts were formerly those of British India, but a special Penal Code based on the old British Code used in Palestine and simpler rules of criminal procedure have been introduced. The Court has powers of prohibition or deportation against persons subject to the Order who are dangerous to peace and order or endeavour to excite enmity or intrigue between the people of Muscat and Her Majesty or the Sultan. If a person subject to the Order is considered undesirable by the Sultan, the Court, on application by the Consul, has to order his or her expulsion from the Sultanate.

23. Mixed cases are dealt with as follows: a person not subject to the Muscat Order may institute a complaint against a person subject to it to the Consular Court provided he satisfies certain deposit requirements. In civil matters, the case may also be referred to arbitration with the consent of all the parties. If a person to whom the Order applies has instituted a complaint against a person in a *Shari'a* (Islamic law) court and wishes to appeal against the decision of this court, he may apply to the Consul who in turn may request the Sultan or his representative to refer the case to a *Shari'a* court of appeal.

24. The Political Resident is empowered to issue "Queen's Regulations" to cover matters not specifically provided for in the Order or in the legislation applied by it, and to repeal or amend such regulations. These regulations apply to persons under British jurisdiction only. Furthermore, laws issued by the Sultan on such matters as customs duties, imports and exports, alcoholic liquor, drug traffic, air navigation and the acquisition of land are made applicable to persons subject to British jurisdiction by means of these regulations.

Government

The Sultan

25. The Sultan is a traditional ruler who exercises supreme authority over his subjects. His authority is based on customs and understandings which have their origin in the tribal system prevailing in most of the country. There is no constitution or elected representative institution. The sheikhs or tribal heads are responsible for a wide range of problems affecting the tribes, but the Sultan can remove a sheikh for misbehaviour and appoint another.

26. The present Sultan, Said bin Taimur, has ruled Muscat and Oman since the abdication of his father in 1932. The dynasty, the Al Bu Said, dates back to the second half of the eighteenth century and has exercised control in varying degrees over the territories of the old Imamate of Oman. At certain periods of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the Sultanate was unable to rule the interior of Oman which reverted to the election of an Imam and attempted to unseat the Sultan residing in Muscat.

27. The capital of the Sultanate is Muscat, although the Sultan's normal residence is at Salalah in Dhofar. The administration of the provinces and main centres of population is in the hands of *walis* (governors) who are responsible to the Sultan through the Minister of the Interior. However, wherever a particular tribe is in a dominating position, the sheikhs retain their authority. On the whole, the *walis* have to act as much as possible through the sheikhs. In case of a dispute between a *wali* and an important seikh, the Sultan himself intervenes. In his report, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General stated that since 1957 the Sultan had made increasing use of *walis* to implement his decisions. Power was gradually being transferred to the central Government.

28. The functions of the *walis* include the collection of taxes on produce (*zakat*) and the settlement of minor disputes. In 1963 the number of *walis* was over thirty.

29. In 1965 the administration of the Sultan included the Personal Adviser, Major F. C. L. Chauncy, the Minister of the Interior, Syaid Ahmed bin Ibrahim, the Military Secretary, Brigadier Waterfield, and the Secretary for External Affairs, Khan Bahadur Maqbul Husain (acting).

30. There is a Municipal Committee for the two coastal towns of Muscat and Matrah. Its members are appointed and its chairman is the *wali* of Matrah.

Judiciary

31. The local courts of Muscat and Oman are *Sahri'a* courts applying Islamic law. They exist in nearly all the districts. The judges or *cadis* are appointed by the Sultan and handle cases between Moslems. Proceedings against non-Moslems or citizens of the United Kingdom and some other Commonwealth countries are subject to the extraterritorial jurisdiction of the British Consul-General described in paragraphs 18 to 24 above. At Muscat there is a bench of *cadis* and a Chief Court which settles appeals.

Armed forces

32. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General stated in his report that the troops present in Oman in 1963 were formally and technically the Sultan's armed forces with British officers in senior positions. Their strength amounted to 2,333 men, of whom 304 belonged to the *gendarmerie* engaged mainly in anti-smuggling activities. Plans were to raise the strength to 2,480 men. There were twenty-six seconded British army officers and sixteen local officers, the highest in rank among them being second lieutenant. There were also thirty-five officers on contract, of whom thirty were British and five Pakistani. In addition there were six foreign non-commissioned officers, mostly British. The Sultan's air force consisted of eight planes and ten seconded Royal Air Force personnel.

Economy

33. The economy is mainly pastoral and agricultural. The areas where cultivation is possible are Dhofar in the south, the district around Nazwa in Central Oman and the Batinah coastal plain. The chief products are dates, fish and cereals (the latter being grown for local consumption), as well as limes and other fruit. Breeding of livestock, particularly camels, is widely practised.

34. The chief exports of Muscat and Oman are dates, dried limes, dried fish, tobacco leaf, hides, goat hair and vegetables. Imports include rice, wheat, flour, sugar, cement, vehicles and accessories, cotton piece goods and other consumer goods. A part of these imports is financed by the oil companies from their exploration and other operations. In 1963, the value of total imports was around £2.7 million, excluding duty-free imports for government use which were estimated at £500,000. Trade is mainly with the United Kingdom, India, Pakistan, neighbouring territories and Australia.

35. In 1964, exports to the United Kingdom amounted to £30,569, as against £2,235 in 1963. Imports from the United Kingdom were valued at £1,575,300, as against £1,239,296 in 1963, and re-exports from the United Kingdom at £41,558 as against £15,534 in 1963.

Oil

36. The first oil concession was obtained by a foreign company in 1937, when a subsidiary of the Iraq Petroleum Company, Petroleum Development (Oman) Ltd., was granted a 75-year concession extending over the whole area except Dhofar. In 1953, a concession covering Dhofar was granted to Dhofar Cities Service Petroleum Corporation for a period of twenty-five years from the date of commercial production. In 1960, Petroleum Development (Oman) Ltd., was acquired by Royal Dutch Shell and Partex.

37. No oil has yet been produced in commercial quantities, although active exploration has been going on for years. However, in 1964, Petroleum Development (Oman) Ltd., announced that drilling had proved the existence of sufficient reserves to go into commercial production. Export of crude oil was expected to start in the second half of 1967 at a rate of about six or seven million tons a year. A pipeline was to be built through Wadi Sumail to an oil loading terminal at Saih-al-Malih, a few miles to the west of Muscat town.

38. The revenue of the Sultanate is derived mainly from customs receipts and annual payments by the oil companies. According to the latest figures annual revenue amounts to about £1,128,000. In addition, subsidies are paid by the United Kingdom Government towards development. Under the Agreement concluded between the Sultan and the United Kingdom in 1958, the latter agreed to assist in carrying out "a civil development programme which will include the improvement of roads, medical and educational facilities and an agricultural research programme" (see annex I). According to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, financial assistance has greatly increased since August 1960; in 1963-1964 it amounted to approximately £190,000, chiefly from United Kingdom funds.

39. The Development Department which was established in 1959 has set up two agricultural experimental stations, one at Nazwa and one at Suhar; research is carried out on irrigation and fertilization techniques and on the cultivation under local conditions of improved varieties of wheat, sorghum, fruit, vegetables, pulses and cotton. Approximately 46 per cent of the Department's budget in 1963 was allocated to health services, 15 per cent to the maintenance of tracks and about 15 per cent to agriculture.

2. THE TRUCIAL SHEIKDOMS

General

40. The Trucial Sheikhdoms lie north of the Rub-al-Khali, between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman; the area, also known as Trucial Oman or the Trucial Coast, extends for nearly 400 miles from the south-eastern end of the peninsula of Qatar along the southern coast of the Persian Gulf to the Gulf of Oman. The boundaries of the Trucial Coast have not been clearly demarcated and in several places have been the subject of disputes with neighbouring countries. The total area is estimated roughly at 32,000 square miles (83,000 square kilometres).

41. No census has ever been taken of the population: the estimated total is 110,000, of whom about one tenth are nomads. Dubai, the largest town, has a population of about 55,000 and serves as a commercial centre for the whole area. The majority of the population are Moslem Arabs with some Indians, Pakistanis, Iranians and Europeans in the main towns.

42. There are seven separate political entities each headed by a Sheikh or Ruler. The Sheikhdoms are the following (from west to east): Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Ajman, Sharjah, Umm al Qaiwain, Ras al Khaimah and Fujairah. When the general Treaty of Peace was signed in 1820, there were only five Sheikhdoms. In 1866, on the death of the Sheikh of Sharjah (of the Qasimi tribe) his domains were divided among his four sons, the separate branches of the family being established at Sharjah, Ras al Khaimah, and two towns on the east coast of Cape Musandam, namely Dibah and Kalba. The British recognized Ras al Khaimah as an independent Sheikhdom in 1921; Kalba was recognized as independent in 1936, Dibah then being regarded as part of it. In 1951, the Sheikh of Kalba was assassinated; since he had no direct male line, Kalba was reincorporated in Sharjah in 1952. In the same year, Fujairah was recognized as independent when its Ruler undertook to accept all the treaties and agreements in force between the other Rulers and the United Kingdom Government.

*Relationship with the United Kingdom**Treaties and agreements*

43. Contacts between the East India Company and the rulers of the Sheikhdoms date back to the seventeenth century, but it was not until 1806 that the first Agreement was signed with the Sheikh of the Qasimi (Jasimi) tribe. In 1820, following hostilities between a British naval expedition and local Sheikhs at Ras al Khaimah and other points of the Oman coast a general "Treaty of Peace" was concluded between the Sheikhs and the British Government. In 1835 a "Maritime Truce" was signed by the Sheikhs providing for a temporary cessation of hostilities between them. The Truce was renewed several times in subsequent years until in 1853 a "Treaty of Peace in Perpetuity" was concluded, whereby the United Kingdom acquired the right to watch over the maintenance of the peace and to take steps to enforce the treaty at all times.

44. In 1892, the Sheikhs signed identical "Exclusive Agreements" with the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, whereby they undertook "not to cede, sell, lease, mortgage or otherwise give for occupation" any part of their territory except to the British Government. The United Kingdom was also to become responsible

for the conduct of their foreign relations. These agreements constitute the basis of the present relationship between the United Kingdom and the Trucial Sheikhdoms. In 1911 and 1922, further Agreements were concluded (see annex II), whereby the granting of pearling and oil concessions respectively became subject to the approval of the United Kingdom Government. The Rulers have also undertaken to recognize the right of the United Kingdom to fix their State boundaries and to settle disputes between them.

United Kingdom representation in the Trucial Sheikhdoms

45. There is a British Political Agent in Dubai and another in Abu Dhabi; both are responsible to the Political Resident in Bahrain. The Political Agents maintain relations with the Trucial Sheikhdoms according to the various agreements, undertakings and understandings reached with them over the years.

46. In addition to the conduct of the Trucial Sheikhdoms' foreign relations, the functions of the Political Resident include over-all supervision in certain administrative fields with international aspects or matters chiefly affecting foreigners and the implementation of international conventions such as the Sanitary Convention and the Dangerous Drugs Convention. These fields are mainly postal services, telegraphic communications,⁷ exchange transactions, control of immigration, imports of arms and narcotics and civil aviation.

47. Advice is given to the Rulers in the administration and development of their Sheikhdoms by the Political Agents. Relations between the oil companies and the Rulers are usually conducted through, or with the knowledge of the United Kingdom authorities. Company officials are required to keep the British Political Agents or officers informed of important developments in their dealings with the Rulers.

48. On the military side, the Political Resident is the chairman of a Defence Committee consisting of senior officers from the Royal Navy, the Royal Air Force and the British Army who are stationed in Bahrain and Sharjah. The Committee is responsible for the conduct of operations in the Persian Gulf States under the control of British Forces Headquarters in Aden. The Political Resident also commands the Trucial Oman Scouts established in the Territory in 1952.

Extraterritorial jurisdiction

49. Until 1959, the extraterritorial jurisdiction of the United Kingdom Government had been exercised directly by the Political Agent, sitting as a District Court, and the Political Resident in Bahrain, sitting as a Chief Court for the Persian Gulf. The Political Resident was relieved of his judicial functions by the Trucial States Order, 1959. However, the Political Agents have continued to perform their judicial functions in addition to their executive duties. Furthermore, the Registrars of these courts are empowered to hear and determine civil actions and certain criminal

⁷ See para. 16 above. Four of the Sheikhdoms—Dubai, Sharjah, Ajman and Umm al Qaiwain—have recently established their own post offices. The British Post Office remains responsible for their representation with the Universal Postal Union. Sheikhdoms issuing their own stamps are the four mentioned above and Abu Dhabi.

cases within specified limits. The provisions of the Trucial States Order are similar to those of the Muscat Order relating to the Sultanate (see paras. 19 ff. above). However, United Kingdom jurisdiction as provided for under the former has a broader application than that stipulated in the latter.

50. The jurisdiction of British Courts extends to: (a) all persons except Trucial States subjects and corporations which are incorporated under a law enacted by one of the Sheikhs; (b) members of any levy force established by the Political Resident under the authority of Her Majesty; (c) any person whom the Political Agent at his discretion registers as being in the regular service of Her Majesty's Government or of a representative of Her Majesty; (d) British ships and aircraft and all acts committed on board these ships and aircraft. The Trucial States Order makes provision for Joint Courts to try mixed cases, i.e., cases in which both persons not subject to the Order and persons subject to it are involved. The Joint Court is composed of either a Judge or the Registrar of the British Court and one of the Trucial Sheikhs or any official appointed by him. However, with the concurrence of the Political Resident, a mixed case may be tried by the British Court that has general jurisdiction over the accused or defendant.

51. By an amendment to the Order issued in 1963, it was possible to return jurisdiction to a Trucial Sheikh in such matters as might be agreed upon between him and the Political Resident. Such a change would be subject to the approval of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. Recently, jurisdiction over traffic matters was transferred to the local court of Abu Dhabi in pursuance of this amendment.

52. The powers of the Political Resident to make "Queen's Regulations" applying to persons under British jurisdiction in the Trucial Sheikdoms are similar to those relating to the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman and described in paragraph 24 above.

Armed Forces

53. In 1952, the United Kingdom established a joint Arab Force in the Sheikdoms—the Trucial Oman Levies—now called the Trucial Oman Scouts. In 1953, the Scouts were expanded from 100 to 500 men, and in 1958 to 1,000 men; there are about thirty-nine British officers and ninety non-commissioned officers in the Scouts. The headquarters of the Trucial Oman Scouts is at Sharjah, although squadrons are stationed at various points inland and along the coast. The Scouts are under the control and direction of the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf and their costs are borne by the United Kingdom Government. Their duties include the maintenance of peace and good order in the Trucial States, the providing of escorts for British Political Representatives and the execution of warrants, orders and judgements issued by the British courts. A special wing of the Scouts has been formed to carry out police duties.

Government

The Rulers

54. Each of the Sheikdoms is headed by a Sheikh (or Ruler) who is essentially a tribal leader and a descendant of a ruling family which has had the ascendancy among the tribes for several generations.

On the death of a Sheikh, succession is decided according to custom by a meeting of the Senior members of the ruling family. In recent times the tendency has been to allow succession to pass from father to son. The Political Resident usually extends the recognition of the United Kingdom Government to the new Ruler at a formal ceremony.

55. The Rulers exercise authority over their subjects in conformity with local customs and traditions. Their rule is entirely personal and there are no constitutions or elected representatives of the people.

56. There is virtually no administrative machinery in any of the Sheikdoms except Dubai. Dubai has a Department of Customs and a Police Force, and in 1957 a Municipal Committee was formed in the main town. In Abu Dhabi, the Ruler employs a tax collector and a Chief of Police, and some members of his family have been appointed to the main centres to rule in his name. British advisers are also employed by the Rulers "to promote efficient and up-to-date methods of Government".⁸

57. In 1965 the Rulers of the Trucial Sheikdoms were as follows:

Abu Dhabi	Sheikh Shakhbut bin Sultan (since 1928)
Dubai	Sheikh Rashid bin Said (since 1958)
Sharjah	Sheikh Khalid bin Mohammed (since 1965) ⁹
Ajman	Sheikh Rashed bin Humaid (since 1928)
Umm al Qaiwain	..	Sheikh Ahmad bin Rashed (since 1929)
Ras al Khaimah	...	Sheikh Saqr bin Muhammad (since 1948)
Fujairah	Sheikh Muhammad bin Hamad (recognized in 1952)

Council of Rulers

58. In 1952, the United Kingdom sponsored the establishment of a Council of Trucial Rulers to co-ordinate action on matters of common concern to the Sheikdoms. The Council includes all seven Rulers and is headed by the Political Agent at Dubai. It has met once or twice a year since 1952. Matters discussed by the Council have included nationality and labour laws, anti-locust measures, regulations for motor traffic, travel documents, etc. It is reportedly envisaged that a new "deliberative" council might be set up, with each of the Rulers appointing one or two representatives to it.

Judiciary

59. The local courts apply the traditional system of justice based on *Shari'a* and customary tribal law. Often the Ruler himself acts as a *cadi*, although in the larger Sheikdoms the local *cadis* handle most cases. In commercial cases involving Trucial Sheikdom subjects two or three merchants act as a tribunal, and if they cannot settle the case, it is referred to the Ruler.

Economy

60. Owing to the harsh climatic condition and general dryness of the area, economic activity has, in the past, been confined to ocean trade, offshore fishing, pearl diving and the growing of date palms in the few oases. Stock-breeding is virtually limited to camels and

⁸ Central Office of Information, *Bahrain, Qatar and the Trucial States* (London, R.5680, July 1965).

⁹ Replaced Sheikh Saqr bin Sultan Al-Qasimi in June 1965 (see paras. 69 and 92 below).

there is little cultivation. Since 1930, the pearl industry has lost its importance because of foreign competition; at the same time, however, the search for and exploitation of oil resources have gradually become the leading concern and most important economic activity in the Trucial Sheikhdoms.

Oil

61. Exploratory concessions in large areas of the Trucial coast have been held by oil companies for many years. In 1958, Abu Dhabi Marine Areas Ltd.—owned jointly by British Petroleum and Compagnie française des pétroles—struck oil at Umm Shaif about twenty miles from Das Island off the coast of Abu Dhabi, and, in 1962, production began in commercial quantities. A submarine pipeline carries the crude petroleum from the oilfield to Das Island where an export terminal has been constructed. Production in 1963 totalled 2 to 3 million tons and since then has risen to 4 to 5 million tons a year.

62. The land concession in Abu Dhabi is held by the Abu Dhabi Petroleum Co., a wholly owned subsidiary of the Iraq Petroleum Co.¹⁰ The company started producing and shipping crude oil from an oilfield at Murban in December 1963. A tanker terminal has been built at Djebel Dhana on the coast. It is reported that the production of both the Umm Shaif and the Murban fields reached 17 million tons in 1965. Processing facilities are being constructed on these sites.

63. In the remaining Sheikhdoms, the exploration concessions are held by several other companies, mainly from the United States.

64. The chief exports of the Trucial coast are dates, vegetables, hides and fish products (including pearls). The port of Dubai is a commercial centre serving both the Trucial Sheikhdoms and the northern part of the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman. It has a relatively large *entrepôt* trade, particularly with Iran and other neighbouring areas. Total imports amounted to £12 million in 1964, mainly from the United Kingdom, Japan and India. A substantial portion of these imports consisted of machinery and construction materials for the oil companies. Exports to the United Kingdom from Abu Dhabi totalled £17.3 million, compared with £8.2 million in 1963; imports from the United Kingdom were worth £2.3 million, against £2.9 million the previous year. Re-exports from the United Kingdom amounted to £14,154 as against £4,189 in 1963. United Kingdom trade with the rest of the Sheikhdoms was as follows (in pounds sterling):

	1963	1964
Imports to the United Kingdom	98,500	288,189
Exports from the United Kingdom	3,721,293	3,218,289
Re-exports from the United Kingdom	20,701	49,445

65. Before the granting of oil concessions, the Sheikhdoms' revenue was derived from customs duties and taxes on produce. In 1958, annual payments made to the Sheikhs by the oil companies totalled approximately £600,000. Abu Dhabi received nearly £3 million in oil royalties in 1963 and £8 million in 1965. The Ruler of Sharjah also receives rent for the RAF airfield in his Sheikhdom.

¹⁰ Iraq Petroleum Co. is owned jointly by British, Dutch, French and United States interests.

66. Since 1956, annual grants for development have been made by the United Kingdom under the "Trucial States Development Scheme". The amount of the contribution was increased from £100,000 to £200,000 in 1964. Projects financed under the scheme have included the building of several elementary-intermediate schools and two trade schools and the establishment of a teacher-training programme; several dispensaries have been opened and anti-malarial spraying has been carried out. An agricultural school and experimental station which was opened at Bas al Khaimah in 1955 is maintained under the scheme. A number of projects in public works and communications have been and are still being carried out, including harbour improvements at Dubai, Abu Dhabi, Sharjah and Ras al Khaimah; airport improvement, installation of automatic telephones and electricity and bridge construction at Dubai; installation of telephones, water pipelines and a water distillation plant at Abu Dhabi; electricity and water distribution in Sharjah; survey of water resources and locust control. There is one hospital at Dubai to which all the Sheikhdoms contribute; a new hospital and an electric power station were due for completion at Abu Dhabi in 1964.

67. In January 1965, the League of Arab States announced the setting up of a Technical Co-operation Programme for the Trucial Sheikhdoms (Emirates) and of an Arab Fund to finance it. The programme was to include the construction of a road linking the Sheikhdoms, the installation of power stations, irrigation projects, provision of farming equipment and the building of hospitals. A committee within the League was formed to supervise the implementation of the programme.

68. On 1 March 1965, a meeting of the Trucial States Council resolved to establish a Trucial States Development Fund for the area. The Council agreed to welcome unconditional aid from any source. A Development Office was also set up to administer the fund and carry out development programmes under the control of the Council. Contributions totalling £390,000 have been made to the Fund by the Rulers of Bahrain, Qatar and Abu Dhabi (the latter's being £100,000). The British Ministry of Overseas Development announced that it would contribute £1 million in addition to its annual payments. According to press reports, the projects approved by the Council in July 1965 would cost nearly £2.5 million.

69. On 24 June 1965, the Ruler of Sharjah, Sheikh Saqr bin Sultan Al-Qasimi, was deposed and his cousin, Sheikh Khalid bin Muhammad Al-Qasimi was appointed in his place. Sheikh Saqr later stated in Cairo and Baghdad that he had been deposed and forcefully deported by the British authorities because he had accepted the Arab League plan of economic assistance to his Sheikhdom. According to British sources, Sheikh Saqr was deposed by his family council for gross neglect and mismanagement of the Sheikhdom's affairs.

70. On 20 July 1965, "The Committee of Personal Representatives of the Arab Kings and Heads of State for the Arab Gulf Emirates" adopted a resolution reaffirming its intention to provide direct assistance to the Emirates of the Arab Gulf and its refusal to contribute to the British Development Fund imposed upon the area.

C. CONSIDERATION BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE¹¹*Introduction*

71. The Special Committee considered the question of Oman at its 446th and 447th meetings held at Cairo on 15 June 1966, and at its 481st meeting held in New York on 17 November 1966.

Written petitions and hearings

72. The Special Committee had before it the following written petitions concerning Oman:

<i>Petitioner</i>	<i>Document No.</i>
Mr. Yussef Eloui, representative of the Front for the Liberation of Dhofar ..	A/AC.109/PET.495
Mr. Saqr bin Sultan Al-Qasimi	A/AC.109/PET.501
Imam Ghalib bin Ali	A/AC.109/PET.502
President and members of the Council of the Trucial States	A/AC.109/PET.503

73. At its 446th and 447th meetings the Special Committee heard Imam Ghalib bin Ali (who was accompanied by Sheikh Suleiman bin Himyar, Sheikh Mohammed bin Hamad and Sheikh Faisal bin Ali), Mr. Saqr bin Sultan Al-Qasimi and Mr. Yussef Eloui.

74. *Imam Ghalib bin Ali* expressed appreciation of the effective role played by the United Nations with respect to the question of Oman. Having sought justice for their case since 1957, the people of Oman had tried, with the support of those delegations which valued justice and equity, to promote the adoption of a resolution embodying their legitimate rights. In all those years, however, they had been confronted with a highly concentrated effort involving the distortion of facts, deception, and the exercise of pressure by the United Kingdom, which had resulted in the United Nations inability to adopt a resolution. Thanks to the *Ad Hoc* Committee on Oman, which had defeated British manoeuvres by revealing all relevant data, a just resolution had been adopted during the twentieth session of the General Assembly.

75. Historical facts had proved that Oman's existence as an independent State, with full sovereignty, went back to the eighth century, when it had been called the Imamate of Oman. The choice of its rulers, known as Imams, had been through free and direct election by the people, whose love of freedom led them to reject absolutism and tyranny.

76. The Omani case was a vivid example of a colonialist design to subjugate a people and exploit its resources by means of armed intervention and suppression. The United Kingdom's intervention in the affairs of Oman had begun with the conclusion of the 1807 Treaty with Said bin Sultan. Subsequent treaties had consolidated British domination and had extended it over other parts of the Territory. With the occupation of Nazwa, the capital, in 1954, the entire country had come under United Kingdom rule. Nevertheless, despite the difference in military strength between the United Kingdom and the defenceless Omani people, foreign Powers could never gain their allegiance, but tended rather to stir up a natural resistance. Based not on a defence of humanity or of a State's rights, but rather on self-interest, the United Kingdom's inter-

vention had violated the will of a people and the Charter and resolutions of the United Nations. The *Ad Hoc* Committee had prepared a comprehensive report¹² on Oman's painful history, including a full *exposé* of colonialism's role from the beginning. The *Ad Hoc* Committee had stated the Committee believes the Omani issue is one of paramount importance which requires special attention on the part of the General Assembly. The report had so stirred the General Assembly that the question had been referred to the Special Committee of Twenty-Four.

77. Resolution 2073 (XX), adopted by the General Assembly at its twentieth session, upheld the right of the Omani people to self-determination and independence and called for the termination of all arbitrary measures against the Omani people, the withdrawal of the British forces, the release of prisoners and the return of exiles, and the termination of United Kingdom domination of Oman.

78. However, the United Kingdom, although a Member of the United Nations, had disregarded the resolution, boycotted the Committee, and refused to help it carry out its task.

79. The resolution on Oman was an attempt to put an end to the United Kingdom's acts of suppression and violence and to reach a just solution in harmony with the people's demands. Although from the outset appeals had been made through the United Nations, the United Kingdom's rejection of the Omani requests had led to a strong opposition to the foreign intruders and to an untiring struggle for the rights and dignity of the entire population.

80. The United Kingdom's answer to the General Assembly resolution had been acts of violence, torture and expulsion, the imprisonment of innocent persons, the searching of houses, the besieging of villages, the establishing of curfews and the restricting of freedom of movement in several Omani regions. It had also resorted to a traditional "divide and rule" policy, hiring outside agents to sow seeds of dissension and to divert attention from the demand for freedom to quarrels and bloodshed. Furthermore, the United Kingdom had amassed armaments and reinforced its military strategy in the country, even to the extent of bringing in highly destructive weapons to be used against a dedicated, freedom-loving people. While talking about withdrawing from the Aden base, Britain had continued to strengthen its bases and posts in the hinterland and along the coast. A significant move in the new strategy had been the reinforcement of the large base on Masirah Island. The potential of the Masirah base was no less than that of the base at Aden, the only difference having been that the latter was known to the outside world, whereas the former was veiled in secrecy and sealed off from view. The recent enlargement of the British military base in Bahrain was proof of a continued threat to peace in the area. The transfer of troops from one Arab country to another was not going to bring security to the region as a whole, nor was it going to help end the conflict. The only reasonable course for the United Kingdom to follow was to call back its forces to its own country, where they belonged.

81. The United Kingdom was concealing much of what was taking place in Oman, thereby seeking to

¹¹ See also chapter II (paras. 595-619) for an account of the discussions on the resolution adopted by the Special Committee at its 455th meeting on 22 June 1966 concerning the implementation of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) with regard to Territories considered by the Committee during its meetings in Africa.

¹² *Official Records of the General Assembly, Nineteenth Session, Annexes, annex No. 16, document A/5846.*

avoid world censure and the condemnation of the United Nations. Yet the world was learning much about the Omani people's heroic struggle, about the increased intensity and scope of its armed resistance and its undying hope that the United Nations would help further the cause of freedom. Significant of the people's spirit had been the attack on the life of the so-called Sultan, Said bin Taimur, by his own body-guard.

82. Examples of inhuman acts perpetrated by the foreign intruders included heavy fines, amounting to three times the value of the losses sustained, which were imposed on the people of any region near which incidents took place between the revolutionaries and the occupation forces; wholesale arrests made without charges and without trial; imprisonment in overcrowded cells with but one window, with inadequate food, contaminated water, no change of clothing, no medical attention, and no gifts or communication from the outside; and, in the case of recurrent incidents, the indiscriminate shelling of homes and places of worship by means of airborne rockets. Villagers and prisoners alike had lost their homes, their health, their eyesight, and even their lives, as a result of those tactics. British officers at Beit El Falg and at Suhar Prison tortured prisoners in front of other inmates in order to evoke fear and terror. Among the methods used were the cutting off of limbs, the forcing of victims to sit in flames, dipping their hands into boiling oil, and pressing their bones between bars of wood. When Mr. de Ribbing had come to Muscat and requested permission to see the prison for himself, he had not been allowed inside.

83. Such inhuman measures had resulted in fatigue, poverty, anxiety and mass migrations to the safety of other Arab countries. Some people, who had been forced out of their homes and driven into barbed-wire enclosures while British officers searched, sacked, or destroyed them, remained exposed to the elements in summer and winter alike, and endured hunger and thirst for as long as twenty-four hours at a time.

84. The Omani issue had gone beyond the stage of resolutions and had entered the stage of execution. For that reason, the people of Oman called upon the United Nations and upon the Special Committee to take effective action to implement those resolutions, and wished them success in their noble tasks undertaken in the service of human freedom and dignity.

85. In reply to questions, the petitioner said that the treaty of Sib of 1920 had been signed after a protracted war, and after the United Kingdom had threatened the Sultan and the people of Oman. In that connexion, he quoted from a letter of 16 May 1919 from the United Kingdom Government, which stated: "We have 500,000 armed men in Iraq, but soon we shall no longer need them there. We shall need only a handful of men, to occupy Oman." At first, the British forces only occupied the Omani Coast. Later, they had penetrated deeper into the Territory, and the Sultan had concluded an agreement with the United Kingdom in order to halt the invasion. The people had respected that treaty when the United Kingdom had begun its acts of aggression and completely occupied the Territory.

Commenting on the United Kingdom's repeated claims that there were no British forces in Muscat and Oman, the petitioner said that the United Kingdom had been challenged on many occasions to allow United

Nations representatives to examine the situation in Oman. The fact that it had repeatedly refused was sufficient proof of the falsity of its denials. The British claim that there were no political prisoners was also not true. Of about 500 prisoners in the Territory, 150 were in fact political prisoners. When Mr. de Ribbing had gone to Oman to look into allegations of torture in the prisons he had not been allowed to move freely in the country, but had been taken only to the quiet areas and given false information. United Kingdom officers not only supervised tortures, but tortured prisoners themselves.

87. The petitioner said that many of the agents to whom he had referred in his statement were United Kingdom nationals dressed in Omani costumes and trained to speak Arabic in the Omani dialect; others were from other areas under United Kingdom influence. The British agents did not hesitate to resort to any measures to divide the people in order to maintain the United Kingdom's position in the country.

88. The claim by the United Kingdom that sovereignty belonged to the Sultan was made merely to cover up its intervention in Oman. All of the administrative power in Muscat and Oman, in both internal and foreign affairs, including defence and security, was in fact in the hands of the British. The Sultan's Government included British civil servants and other officials under their authority. The Sultanate's Army included officers from the United Kingdom and from countries under United Kingdom influence; the same was true of the lower ranks.

89. With regard to the curfew and restrictions on movement which had been imposed on the population, the petitioner said that its purpose was to keep the people apart and prevent them from forming mass rallies in their attempt to free themselves from United Kingdom rule. It was the action always resorted to by the colonialists against people struggling for their freedom.

90. Concerning the base at Al Masirah, the petitioner said that it had been established since the Second World War. It was under military occupation by the British, who were continually enlarging and fortifying it, digging trenches and stockpiling enormous quantities of weapons. Furthermore, the troops stationed at the base were being added to daily.

91. The Omani people hoped that the Special Committee would bring pressure to bear upon the United Kingdom to implement to the full the United Nations resolutions concerning their Territory, and to co-operate with the Committee in helping them towards self-determination. They also hoped that the Special Committee would set up a sub-committee to examine the Omani case.

92. *Mr. Saqr bin Sultan Al-Qasimi* said that both he and his country had suffered under the oppression and aggression of British colonialism. He had been evicted from his country by sheer force. He would not, however, confine his remarks to his country, but would also speak of the heinous crimes committed by British imperialism in the Occupied South, Oman and the Arabian Gulf. That imperialism, which illegally dominated that area, was playing havoc with its destiny, and planning to end Arab presence forever in the Omani Coast and the Gulf.

93. The Special Committee should pay attention to the emerging tragedy, which might prove to be a

repetition of the events that had taken place in Palestine. Jewish immigrants had taken over Palestine and their action was at present being matched by the migration of aliens to his own country, which was purely Arab, carried out by the same methods used in Palestine.

94. The imperialists were at present at the pre-1948 stage of the Palestine affair. In order to promote immigration into the Omani Coast, they were buying land and setting up camps. They were even exploiting Israeli experience in that field to organize and finance immigration operations. Those were grave dangers for the whole coast of Oman, which called for the utmost caution.

95. He could not conceal his country's lack of progress nor its dire need of aid in all fields. It also needed public awareness of its situation, for only immediate and effective action would enable it to foil the Zionist and British colonialist schemes to dissect it, and to make it an easy prey for alien occupation, in flagrant violation of the principles of the United Nations.

96. The history of British presence in the area dated back to the seventeenth century. Portuguese and English pirates had met with intense resistance from the Emirs and Sheikhs, which served to neutralize imperialism at that time. In spite of the military operations carried out for more than a century, imperialism had been unable to attain a decisive victory. Only the massacres tipped the scales in favour of the imperialists. The Arabs eventually surrendered to English pirates in 1820.

97. It would require whole books to speak of the heroism of the Arabs in resisting the usurpers, who were escorted, on their last campaign, by a force composed of 876 naval vessels and 800 small boats: the only means by which they could force themselves on the Arab Coast. After that a so-called treaty was signed by the Sheikhs of the area at bayonet point in 1820. The colonialists took great pains to ratify that so-called treaty in 1906. But it was meaningless according to international law. British presence in the area was devoid of any international support; it was unjustified because it had been secured by force of arms in an age totally different from the present one.

98. British presence was not in accordance with the wishes of the people of the Omani Coast. Incontestable evidence was provided by the protracted struggle of that people and the fact that only after 180 years were they forced to sign a treaty. An age which had seen the signing of the United Nations Charter was bound to regard such a treaty as null and void.

99. He had warned Mr. Thompson, the United Kingdom Minister of State, in May 1965 when he paid a visit to Sharjah, a month before he had been kidnapped, that he would never recognize the treaty as legal support for British presence in the area, and had asked Mr. Thompson to convey his views to his Government. Earlier he had refused to accede to semi-official requests submitted by Mr. Shepherd, the British Air Force Commander in Sharjah, aiming at extorting a promise to renew the British lease of the military base in Sharjah. He reaffirmed that the Sharjah Emirate was an integral part of the Arab homeland, extending from the Ocean to the Gulf.

100. The question of his kidnapping was a matter which, although it seemed personal, was in reality linked to the cause of the whole coastal area. An

illegal ruler of Sharjah had been appointed in his place so as to intimidate other rulers and subject them to foreign domination. A few days after he had been kidnapped and the illegal ruler appointed, the United Kingdom Government through the intervention of that ruler, was able to renew the agreement on the Air Force base in Sharjah.

101. Some free rulers had stood firm against the United Kingdom in the matter of aid from the League of Arab States. First they had accepted that aid and signified their ratification of it to the League's Assistant Secretary-General; they were, however, intimidated by the United Kingdom and quickly changed their minds. The United Kingdom had mobilized its forces, including tanks and machine-guns, and surrounded those rulers in their capitals. Similarly worded cables were sent a few days later by the rulers to the Arab League. Those cables had been dictated by the British High Commissioner. They all urged supervision of the British Development Council over the Arab League's aid and the allocation of funds according to the desires of British officers. The League of Arab States could submit these cables for the Committee's inspection.

102. The only effective solution of the coastal issue was for the Special Committee to work for the eradication of imperialism in all its forms and for the liberation of the Omani coast in an effort to integrate it with other Arab States in order to form one entity from the Ocean to the Gulf.

103. The United Kingdom had attempted to strengthen its position on the coast of Oman, by transferring its military base from the Arab South to the coast of the Gulf, Bahrain and Sharjah. The transfer of that base would only aggravate the problem. It showed that the United Kingdom was still imperialist minded, and that it still had evil intentions with regard to the coast. Its action would create a state of tension in the area, with unforeseeable consequences. The United Kingdom forces were committing atrocities in the coastal emirates, arresting free men, torturing them, and perpetuating a state of terror and menace for all those who expressed their feelings or demanded independence and the eradication of colonialism in order to lead a life of dignity and freedom in their own country.

104. The United Kingdom had banished many Arabs and terrorized the rest so as to ensure their silence. It did not hesitate to threaten the rulers of the area, and to try to raise them against each other by coaxing, promises and threats.

105. There was no justification in the action of the United Kingdom in maintaining its base, forces and influence in a land whose people would accept nothing but independence.

106. The free militants struggling for the liquidation of colonialism had a mission to carry out: the eradication of all the remnants of colonialism all over the world. The Arab land of Oman and the Gulf had suffered various forms of oppression and terror because of colonialism. The time had come for it to achieve freedom and independence to enjoy the human rights set out in the Universal Declaration adopted by the United Nations, which was supported by every free and honourable nation in the world.

107. The coast of Oman expected such action of the Special Committee and was confident that its expectations would be fulfilled.

108. In reply to questions, the petitioner said that at first the United Kingdom had paid no rent for the base at Sharah but that later a nominal fee of £2,000 a year had been agreed upon. Other bases also existed in the Territory. There were between 15,000 and 16,000 United Kingdom troops stationed throughout the Omani coast. He was of the opinion that the United Kingdom would not transfer its Sharjah base without bloodshed.

109. He did not recognize that any treaty with the United Kingdom was in existence. When he had informed the British of this he had been deposed.

110. Up to 1953 the United Kingdom had provided no education facilities. In that year he had applied to the Government of Kuwait which had provided one teacher. Since then, Iraq, Kuwait, Syria, and the United Arab Republic had sent a total of 550 teachers; the United Kingdom, however, had sent none at all, and in fact the British High Commissioner had advised him not to expand educational facilities in his country. In 1966 two graduates would be available as teachers, one from the University of Moscow and the other from Cairo. Concerning health services, he said that the United Kingdom had set up one hospital and one pharmacy. Before the United Kingdom had invaded the area, a large fishing fleet and pearl-diving industry had existed. The United Kingdom forces had burnt the fleet, which represented the country's basic economic resource. Only the pearl-diving industry remained, and that was diminishing. There was good agricultural land in the Territory but only a small part was being cultivated, and that by very primitive methods. The fishing grounds were also not fully exploited. Oil had recently been discovered in the area, but he believed it would represent a curse rather than a blessing, for because of it the United Kingdom would certainly wish to retain its hold on the Territory.

111. *Mr. Yussef Eloui* (Front for the Liberation of Dhofar) said that he was honoured to have the opportunity to place before the Special Committee the justified claims of his people, who had been invaded by force, subjugated by foreign imperialists, and denied their inalienable human rights.

112. What the United Kingdom called the Sultanate of Muscat consisted of three regions: the Muscat and Dathina as one group, Inner Oman as a second, and Dhofar as a third. The United Kingdom had started by colonizing Muscat and its littoral, then invaded Dhofar in 1887, and Oman in 1957 through an armed invasion. Despite the United Kingdom's attempts to mislead public opinion and conceal the evidence of its suppressive acts, there was growing knowledge abroad of its disregard for United Nations resolutions and of the people's revolutionary protest.

113. It was essential to note certain outstanding facts that illustrated the administering Power's tendency to impede the progress and development of the community under its domination. Those were: a military blockade imposed for strategic military purposes, with the aim of defending the United Kingdom's interests in the Arabian Gulf area against so-called communist infiltrations; strategic land, naval and air bases (with underground storehouses for nuclear weapons) linking the United Kingdom's Mediterranean and South-East Asia forces; air fleets brought in day and night, constantly in touch by radio with other overseas fleets; and the evacuation of local inhabitants

from base areas in order to establish freedom of movement for military operations, which were often the means for suppressing the people.

114. In its effort to build up military power, the United Kingdom had neglected the economic and social development of the area under its control. Ignorance and disease were rampant in localities where no schools or medical care were to be found. In a world that was launching campaigns against hunger, the United Kingdom was conspicuous for importing famine into its Territories, and furthermore of depriving a whole population of minimum social benefits, in order to promote its own colonialist aims. A reaction had finally taken shape, and on 9 June 1965 the armed revolution had broken out, in order that the people might eradicate the United Kingdom's colonial rule in all economic, military and administrative forms, including the dismantling of all bases; win freedom and self-government for the entire population; achieve economic independence and social equality by regaining control of the country's material resources and internal structures; and ensure human dignity, through adequate educational, medical, agricultural and industrial services.

115. In the interest of democracy and human rights, the people of Oman called upon the Committee to join forces with them, in supporting their just and legitimate demands by ensuring the people's achievement of self-determination; declaring the United Kingdom's colonial rule to be illegitimate, and diametrically opposed to the people's will; and calling upon the United Kingdom to withdraw its air, land and naval bases from the region, put an end to its repressive methods, release all political internees and put an end to the martial law in operation under the emergency regulations.

Statements by members

116. The representative of the *Union of Soviet Socialist Republics* said that the United Kingdom's attitude towards Oman demonstrated once again that the United Kingdom was prepared to resort to force to oppose the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. That attitude was motivated by the desire to protect the interests of United Kingdom oil monopolies, and to maintain major military bases. At the twentieth session of the General Assembly the USSR delegation had supported Oman's request for independence and had spoken in favour of the withdrawal of the armed forces stationed in the Territory. The presence of those forces, which were illegally occupying Oman and the other areas and oppressing the local inhabitants, was a major obstacle to the Territory's independence and self-determination. The Special Committee should therefore condemn forthwith the existence and the full implementation of the General Assembly resolutions on Oman.

117. The representative of the *United States of America* explained briefly her Government's position with regard to Oman. The United States had had treaty relations with the Sultans of Muscat for 133 years, or since 1833; those relations had been renewed in 1938. Based on the concept of sovereign equality, her country's negotiations had always been carried out directly with the Sultan, and not through an intermediary. It was therefore clear that the United States authorities had never questioned the sovereignty of the Sultanate. For that reason her delegation would not participate in the Special Committee's discussion of the question of Oman.

D. ACTION BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE

118. At its 481st meeting on 17 November 1966, the Special Committee, on the proposal of the Chairman, decided that it would report to the General Assembly that owing to lack of time, it was not able to complete its consideration of the question of Oman, and that, subject to any further directives the General Assembly might wish to give during its twenty-first session, the Special Committee would consider the question at its meetings in 1967 with a view to the implementation of Assembly resolution 2073 (XX).

ANNEX I

A. TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP, COMMERCE AND NAVIGATION BETWEEN HIS MAJESTY AND THE SULTAN OF MUSCAT AND OMAN

Muscat, 20 December 1961

His Majesty The King of Great Britain, Ireland and the British Dominions beyond the Seas, and Sultan Said bin Taimur bin Faisal, Sultan of Muscat and Oman and Dependencies,

Desiring to confirm and strengthen the friendly relations which now subsist between them and to promote and extend their commercial relations by the conclusion of a new treaty to replace the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation signed at Muscat on 5 February 1939,

Have accordingly appointed as their plenipotentiaries:

His Majesty The King of Great Britain, Ireland and the British Dominions beyond the Seas (hereinafter referred to as His Majesty):

For the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland:

Lieutenant-Colonel Sir William Rupert Hay, K.C.I.E., C.S.I.,

His Majesty's Political Resident in the Persian Gulf;

The Sultan of Muscat and Oman and Dependencies (hereinafter referred to as the Sultan), in person;

Who have agreed as follows:

Article 1

For the purpose of the present Treaty:

(1) The term "territories of His Majesty" or references to territories of a High Contracting Party in relation to His Majesty mean the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (hereinafter referred to as the United Kingdom) and any territories to which the present treaty applies by reason of extensions under article 15, and the term "territories of the Sultan", or references to the territories of a High Contracting Party in relation to the Sultan mean Oman and its Dependencies.

(2) The term "nationals of His Majesty" or references to nationals of a High Contracting Party in relation to His Majesty mean all citizens of the United Kingdom and Colonies, all Southern Rhodesian citizens and all British protected persons, except nationals of Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Ajman, Umm-al-Qaiwain, Ras-al-Khaimah and Kalba, and the term "nationals of the Sultan" or references of nationals of a High Contracting Party in relation to the Sultan mean all the Sultan's subjects, wherever domiciled. For the purposes of articles 3, 5, 6 and 7, the term "nationals" shall be deemed to include corporate bodies created under the law of the territories of a High Contracting Party.

(3) The term "British vessels" or references to vessels of a High Contracting Party in relation to His Majesty mean all ships registered at a port in the United Kingdom or in any territory to which the present Treaty applies by reason of extension under article 15; and the term "Omani vessels" or references to vessels of a High Contracting Party in relation to the Sultan mean all ships registered under the law of the Sultan's Government.

(4) The term "British aircraft" or references to aircraft of a High Contracting Party in relation to His Majesty mean all aircraft registered under the law of the United Kingdom or of any territory to which the present Treaty applies by reason of extension under article 15; and the term "Omani aircraft" or references to aircraft of a High Contracting Party in relation to the Sultan mean all aircraft registered under the law of the Sultan's Government.

The term "foreign country" means:

(a) In relation to His Majesty any country or territory other than:

- (i) The United Kingdom;
- (ii) Canada;
- (iii) The Commonwealth of Australia;
- (iv) New Zealand;
- (v) The Union of South Africa;
- (vi) India;
- (vii) Pakistan;
- (viii) Ceylon;
- (ix) Any Territory for the international relations of which His Majesty is responsible through any of His Governments at the date of signature of the present Treaty;
- (x) The Irish Republic, and
- (xi) For the purpose of article 6, Burma; and

(b) In relation to the Sultan, any country or territory not being a part of Oman or its dependencies.

Article 2

There shall be perfect freedom of commerce and navigation between the territories of the High Contracting Parties. Each High Contracting Party shall allow the nationals of the other to enter all ports, creeks and rivers with their vessels and cargoes, also to enter, travel, reside and pursue commerce and trade, whether wholesale or retail, in any of His territories, and to depart therefrom, provided that they satisfy and observe the conditions and regulations which are in force or may be applied therein relating to the entry, travel, residence and departure of all foreigners.

Article 3

(1) Nationals of each High Contracting Party shall enjoy throughout the territories of the other with respect to commerce, shipping and the exercise of trade all the rights, privileges, immunities, advantages and protection, of whatsoever nature, which are or may be enjoyed by the nationals of the other High Contracting Party or the nationals of any other foreign country. In particular each High Contracting Party shall allow in His territories the nationals of the other, to bargain for, buy, barter, sell, import and export all kinds of goods on the same conditions as are or may be applicable to His own nationals or to the nationals of any other foreign country.

(2) Nationals of each High Contracting Party shall not be liable in any territory of the other to taxes, duties, imposts, restrictions or obligations of any description whatever, other or more onerous than those to which the nationals of the other High Contracting Party or the nationals of any other foreign country are or may be subjected; provided however that nothing in this Article shall be construed in relation to any territory of either High Contracting Party as obliging that High Contracting Party to grant to nationals of the other, who are not resident for tax purposes in that territory, the same personal allowances, reliefs and reductions for tax purposes as are granted to His own nationals.

Article 4

(1) In all that relates to navigation and the treatment of shipping each High Contracting Party undertakes to treat in any of His territories the vessels of the other (including the passengers and cargoes carried therein) not less favourably in any respect than His own vessels or the vessels of any other foreign country (including the passengers and cargoes carried in such vessels as aforesaid).

(2) The provisions of this Article shall not apply to the coasting trade or to inland navigation.

Article 5

Nationals of His Majesty shall be permitted in the territories of the Sultan to hire and to acquire in any legal manner, property of every description, to possess the same, and to dispose thereof in any legal manner, as regards immovable property on the same conditions as are in force or may be established with regard to the nationals of the most favoured foreign country, and as regards movable property on the same conditions as are in force or may be established with regard to the nationals of the Sultan or the nationals of the most favoured foreign country.

Article 6

(1) Goods grown, produced or manufactured in the territories of one High Contracting Party imported into the territories of the other from whatever place arriving, shall not be subjected to customs duties or charges other or more onerous than those paid on the like goods grown, produced or manufactured in any other foreign country.

(2) Goods to be exported to the territories of one High Contracting Party shall not be subjected in the territories of the other to customs duties or charges other or more onerous than those paid on the exportation of like goods to any other foreign country.

(3) The customs duties leviable in the territories of the Sultan on goods grown, produced or manufactured in the territories of His Majesty and on goods imported by nationals of His Majesty shall be paid at the port or other place in the Sultan's territories where the goods are first imported, and on payment being duly made such goods shall thereafter be exempt from all other customs duties.

(4) In the territories of the Sultan goods grown, produced or manufactured in the territories of His Majesty or imported by nationals of His Majesty shall be exempted from customs duties in the following cases, namely:

(a) Goods which, being destined and manifested for a foreign country, are transhipped from one vessel or aircraft to another in any of the ports or airports of the Sultan or which have been for this purpose provisionally landed and deposited in any of the Sultan's custom-houses to await arrival of a vessel or aircraft in which to be reshipped abroad; but goods so landed shall only be exempted if the consignee or his agent shall have, on the arrival of the vessel or aircraft, handed over the said goods to be kept under custom seal, and declared them as landed for transshipment, designating at the same time the foreign place of destination, and if within a period not exceeding three months after their first landing the said goods are actually shipped for the said foreign country as originally declared and without having in the interval changed owners, and if all customs charges are paid before they are reshipped.

(b) Goods which, not being destined and manifested for the territories of the Sultan, have been inadvertently landed, provided that such goods are left in the custody of the customs authorities and are reshipped for a destination abroad within two months of being so landed, and that all customs charges are paid before the goods are reshipped.

(c) Coal, fuel and oil, Naval and Air Force provisions and stores and fittings, the property of His Majesty, landed in the territories of the Sultan for the use of the ships of His Majesty's Naval Forces and the aircraft of His Air Forces; duty shall, however, be payable if any of the goods thus exempted are sold or otherwise disposed of in the local markets.

(d) Goods transhipped or landed pending the repair of damage caused to the vessel or aircraft by stress of weather or disaster at sea or in the air, provided the cargo so discharged will be left in the custody of the customs authorities and be reshipped abroad within a period of three months from the date of the original landing and that all customs charges have been paid.

(5) In the cases referred to in paragraph (4) of this article customs formalities in respect of landing, examination, clearance and shipment of goods shall be observed.

(6) All goods remaining uncleared in the Sultan's custom-houses after four months from the date of their original landing may be disposed of by the Sultan's customs authorities by a public auction after notifying the steamer or aircraft agents concerned. The proceeds of the sale of such goods, after payment of the auctioneering fees, customs duties and charges, shall be kept as deposit for a period of one year and refunded to the owner if he establishes his claim to them during this period, after which no claim shall be entertained.

(7) In this Article the words "customs charges" shall mean charges other than customs duties and shall include landing, transit, weighing, wharfage or ground rent, supervision and overtime fees.

Article 7

(1) All customs duties leviable in the territories of the Sultan shall be paid in cash and not in kind.

(2) The value of the goods on which customs duty is to be levied shall be fixed according to their market price following the normal usage of trade in Muscat.

(3) Any dispute arising between a national of His Majesty and the Omani customs authorities regarding the value of any goods, shall be determined by reference to two experts (each party nominating one) whose decisions as to the value shall be binding upon both parties. Should these experts not be able to agree, they shall choose an umpire, whose decision shall be final.

Article 8

Internal taxes and internal charges of any kind levied within the territories of one High Contracting Party for the benefit of the State, or of organs of local or municipal government, on or in connexion with goods grown, produced or manufactured in the territories of the other High Contracting Party, shall not be other or greater than those levied in similar circumstances on or in connexion with like goods grown, produced or manufactured in the territories of the former High Contracting Party or in any other foreign country.

Article 9

(1) No prohibition or restriction shall be imposed or maintained on the importation into the territories of the Sultan of any goods, from whatever place arriving, grown, produced or manufactured in the territories of His Majesty which shall not equally extend to the importation of the like goods grown, produced or manufactured in any other foreign country.

(2) No prohibition or restriction shall be imposed or maintained on the exportation of any goods from the territories of the Sultan to the territories of His Majesty which shall not equally extend to the exportation of the like goods to any other foreign country.

(3) Exceptions to the general rules laid down in the foregoing paragraphs of this Article may be made only in the case of:

(a) Prohibitions or restrictions imposed in the interests of public security;

(b) Prohibitions or restrictions regarding traffic in arms, ammunition and implements of war, or in exceptional circumstances, all other military supplies;

(c) Prohibitions or restrictions imposed for the protection of public health;

(d) Prohibitions or restrictions imposed for the protection of animals or plants, including protection against diseases, degeneration or extinction, as well as measures taken against harmful seeds, plants and animals.

Article 10

The Sultan engages by the present Treaty to provide that the movement of goods in transit shall not be obstructed or delayed by unnecessary customs formalities and regulations, and that every facility will be given for their transport.

Article 11

(1) Either of the two High Contracting Parties may appoint Consuls to reside in the territories of the other, subject to the consent and approval of the other as regards the persons so appointed and the place at which they reside. Each High Contracting Party further agrees to permit His own nationals to be appointed to consular offices by the other High Contracting Party, provided always that any person so appointed shall not begin to act without the previous approbation of the High Contracting Party whose national he may be.

(2) Such Consuls shall be permitted to perform such consular functions and shall enjoy such privileges and immunities as are in accordance with international law or practice relating to Consuls as recognized in the territories in which they reside.

Article 12

(1) British vessels and aircraft coming to the territories of the Sultan, in distress, shall receive from the local authorities all possible necessary aid to enable them to revictual, refuel and refit so as to proceed on their voyage or flight.

(2) Should a British vessel run aground or be wrecked on or near the coast of the Sultan's territories, or a British aircraft be wrecked or make a forced landing in the Sultan's territories, the authorities of the Sultan shall render all possible assistance to save the vessel or aircraft, its cargo and those on board; they shall also give all possible aid and protection to persons saved, and shall assist them in reaching the nearest British Consulate; they shall further take every possible care that such vessels or aircraft and the cargo, stores, equipment and fittings, and articles carried by or forming part of the vessel or aircraft, or the proceeds thereof, if sold, as well as all papers found on board such vessel or aircraft, shall be given up to their owners or to their agents when claimed by them, or to the British Consul.

(3) The Sultan's authorities shall further see that the British Consulate is as soon as possible informed of any such event as is mentioned in the preceding paragraph of this Article having occurred.

(4) Likewise should an Omani vessel come to His Majesty's territories in distress, or run aground or be wrecked on or near the coast of His Majesty's territories, or should an Omani aircraft be wrecked or make a forced landing in His Majesty's territories, the like help and assistance shall be rendered by the authorities of those territories.

Article 13

Nationals of the one High Contracting Party shall, within the territories of the other, enjoy freedom of conscience and religious toleration and the free and public exercise of all forms of religion, provided that such exercise does not wound or outrage the religious susceptibilities of the country in which it is proposed to be practised, but shall not build edifices for religious worship except in places specified for the purpose by the local authorities and after approval and permission has been obtained. Nothing shall be done by either High Contracting Party that may disturb existing places of worship belonging to nationals of the other.

Article 14

All the provisions of the present Treaty providing for the grant of the treatment accorded to the most favoured foreign country shall be interpreted as meaning that such treatment shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally.

Article 15

(1) His Majesty may, at the time of exchange of ratifications or at any time thereafter, through His Consular Officer at Muscat give notice of His desire that the present Treaty shall extend to any territory for the international relations of which He is responsible through His Government in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, except Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Ajman, Umm-al-Qaiwain, Ras-al-Khaimah and Kalba, and the Treaty shall extend to any territory specified in such notice from the date of receipt thereof by the Sultan.

(2) At any time after the expiry of a period of two years from the definitive entry into force of the present Treaty either High Contracting Party may by giving twelve months' notice terminate the application of the present Treaty to any territory to which it has been extended under the provisions of the preceding paragraph.

Article 16

(1) The present Treaty shall be subject to ratification by each High Contracting Party and instruments of ratification shall be exchanged at Muscat as soon as possible.

(2) The present Treaty shall enter into force provisionally on 1 January 1952, and definitively on the exchange of instruments of ratification.

(3) If five months after the date of signature instruments of ratification have not been exchanged the provisional application of this Treaty shall then cease.

Article 17

(1) The present Treaty shall remain in force for a period of fifteen years from the date of its definitive entry into force as provided for in article 16 (2). Unless one of the High Contracting Parties shall have given to the other notice of termination one year before the expiry of the said period of fifteen years, this Treaty shall remain in force until the expiry of one year from the date on which such notice shall have been given.

(2) A notice given under paragraph (1) of this article shall apply to any territory in respect of which notification of extension has been given under Article 15.

IN WITNESS whereof Lieutenant-Colonel Sir William Rupert Hay, K.C.I.E., C.S.I., on behalf of His Majesty The King of Great Britain, Ireland and the British Dominions beyond the Seas, and Sultan Said bin Taimur bin Faisal, Sul'an of Muscat and Oman and Dependencies, on his own behalf, have signed the present Treaty and have affixed thereto their respective seals.

DONE in duplicate at Muscat this twentieth day of December 1951, corresponding to the twentieth of Rabi'al Awwal of the year 1371, in English and Arabic, the English text to prevail in cases of doubt.

[L.S.] W. R. HAY

[L.S.] Said bin TAIMUR

EXCHANGE OF LETTERS

No. 1

His Majesty's Political Resident in the Persian Gulf of the Sultan of Muscat and Oman

British Consulate, Muscat
20 December 1951

My honoured and valued Friend,

With reference to our discussions and the negotiations for the new Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation to replace the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between His Majesty The King of Great Britain, Ireland and the British Dominions beyond the Seas and the Sultan of Muscat and Oman and Dependencies signed at Muscat on 5 February 1939, I understand that you are prepared to vest in His Majesty The King of Great Britain, Ireland and the British Dominions beyond the Seas for a period of ten years from 1 January 1952, extra-territorial jurisdiction in your territory over the persons and in the manner indicated below.

(1) The Consular authorities of His Majesty shall exercise jurisdiction over the following persons who shall, for this purpose, be referred to as "Nationals of His Majesty".

(a) Citizens of the United Kingdom and Colonies;

(b) Southern Rhodesian Citizens; and

(c) British Protected Persons.

This paragraph shall not apply to any of the above persons who are Moslems.

(2) In the exercise of their powers under paragraph (1) above the Consular authorities of His Majesty may, subject

to any right of appeal which His Majesty may provide, hear and determine:

- (i) All criminal charges against nationals of His Majesty;
 - (ii) All civil suits in which nationals of his Majesty are defendants;
 - (iii) All bankruptcy cases in which the bankrupt or person whom it is sought to make bankrupt is a national of His Majesty;
 - (iv) All proceedings connected with the administration of the estate of a deceased national of His Majesty;
 - (v) All questions of personal status where the person whose status is in question is a national of His Majesty.
- (3) Over all other nationals of any country of the British Commonwealth (whether they are Moslems or otherwise), except the nationals of the Union of South Africa, of Pakistan, of the British Protected Sheikdoms in the Persian Gulf, of Zanzibar and of the States of the Aden Protectorate, the Consular authorities of His Majesty shall have a like jurisdiction save that they shall not hear and determine:
- (i) Criminal cases and civil suits, including those which arise in connexion with laws and regulations made by the Sultan, in which the complainant or plaintiff is the Sultan's Government or a national of the Sultan; and
 - (ii) Bankruptcy proceedings which the Sultan decides shall be heard and determined by his Courts.
- (4) If any decision is given against a national of His Majesty, as defined in paragraph (1) above, by a Sultanate Court, the Sultan will, if the Consul of His Majesty so requests, refer the case to a Shara Court of Appeals which shall be appointed by the Sultan for that purpose.
- (5) A national of His Majesty, as defined in paragraph (1) above, shall not be arrested nor his property seized nor his house, office, warehouse or other premises occupied by him entered and searched by an officer of the Sultanate save in case of necessity for the prevention of a breach of the peace or a breach of the Sultanate laws or regulations or in the case of a fugitive offender attempting to take refuge with a national of His Majesty, and in this event the proceedings shall be reported and the national of His Majesty so arrested and the property seized handed over to the Consul of His Majesty for trial or disposal.
- (6) All laws and regulations made by the Sultan which are or shall be applicable to nationals of the Sultan and to foreign nationals shall, unless the Sultan decides otherwise, automatically apply to nationals of His Majesty, as defined in paragraph (1), and to other nationals of any country of the British Commonwealth in cases heard by the Consular authorities of His Majesty in accordance with paragraph (3), save that in the exercise of His jurisdiction for Consular authorities of His Majesty shall follow the procedure laid down in their own law.
- (7) At the personal request of the Sultan the Consul of His Majesty shall without undue delay arrange the departure from the Sultan's territories of any person considered by the Sultan to be undesirable who is a national of His Majesty, as defined in paragraph (1) provided that nothing in this paragraph shall prevent His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom from making representations to the Sultan on behalf of any such person.
- (8) All fines imposed by the Consular authorities of His Majesty in regard to offences under the Sultanate Customs, Municipal or Passport Regulations shall be paid over to the Sultanate Treasury.
- (9) For the purposes of these arrangements corporate bodies shall be deemed to be citizens or nationals of the territory under whose laws they are created.

I shall be grateful if you will kindly confirm that I have understood correctly, so that I may inform His Majesty accordingly.

I desire to express the high consideration which I entertain for Your Highness and subscribe myself.

Your Highness's sincere friend,
(Signed) W. R. HAY

No. 2

The Sultan of Muscat and Oman to His Majesty's Political Resident in the Persian Gulf

Muscat

20 December 1951

After compliments,

We have received your Excellency's letter of to-day's date regarding extra-territorial jurisdiction and we confirm that you have understood correctly. Your Excellency may inform His Majesty the King accordingly.

Your sincere friend,
(Signed) Said bin TAIMUR

C. EXCHANGE OF LETTERS BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND AND THE SULTAN OF MUSCAT AND OMAN CONCERNING THE SULTAN'S ARMED FORCES, CIVIL AVIATION, ROYAL AIR FORCE FACILITIES AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN MUSCAT AND OMAN

LONDON, 25 JULY 1958

No. 1

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Sultan of Muscat and Oman

Foreign Office, S.W.1

25 July 1958

My honoured and valued Friend,

With reference to the discussions which I have had the pleasure of holding with your Highness in London, and following upon those which took place in Muscat between your Highness and Mr. Julian Amery in January 1958, I have the honour to set out below my understanding of the agreement which has been reached between us.

In pursuance of the common interest of Your Highness and Her Majesty's Government in furthering the progress of the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman, Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom have agreed to extend assistance towards the strengthening of Your Highness's Army. Her Majesty's Government will also, at Your Highness's request, make available Regular officers on secondment from the British Army, who will, while serving in the Sultanate, form an integral part of Your Highness's Armed Forces. The terms and conditions of service of these seconded British officers have been agreed with Your Highness. Her Majesty's Government will also provide training facilities for members of Your Highness's Armed Forces and will make advice available on training and other matters as may be required by Your Highness.

Her Majesty's Government will also assist Your Highness in the establishment of an Air Force as an integral part of Your Highness's Armed Forces, and they will make available personnel to this Air Force.

Your Highness has approved the conclusion of an agreement for the extension of the present arrangements regarding civil aviation and the use by the Royal Air Force of the airfields at Salalah and Masirah.

We also discussed the economic and development problems of the Sultanate and Her Majesty's Government agreed to assist Your Highness in carrying out a civil development programme which will include the improvement of roads, medical and educational facilities and an agricultural research programme.

If Your Highness agrees that the foregoing correctly sets out the agreement reached between us I have the honour to suggest that this letter and Your Highness's reply should be regarded as constituting an Agreement between Your Highness and my Government.

I have the honour to be, with your highest consideration,

Your Highness's sincere friend,
(Signed) Selwyn LLOYD

No. 2

London
25 July 1958

Your Excellency,

We have received Your Excellency's letter of today's date, setting out the agreement which has been reached in discussions between ourself and Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, and confirm that your letter and this reply should be regarded as constituting an Agreement between us and your Government.

Your sincere friend,
(Signed) Said bin TAIMUR

ANNEX II

Agreements between the Trucial Sheikhdoms and the United Kingdom

EXCLUSIVE AGREEMENT OF THE CHIEF OF ABU DHABI WITH THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT, DATED 6 MARCH 1892

I, Zaeed bin Khalifah, Chief of Abu Dhabi, in the presence of Lieutenant Colonel A. C. Talbot, C.I.E., Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, do hereby solemnly bind myself and agree, on behalf of myself, my heirs and successors to the following conditions, viz.:

1. That I will on no account enter into any agreement or correspondence with any Power other than the British Government.

2. That without the assent of the British Government I will not consent to the residence within my territory of the agent of any other Government.

3. That I will on no account cede, sell, mortgage or otherwise give for occupation any part of my territory, save to the British Government.

Dated Abu Dhabi, 6 March 1892, corresponding to 5th Shaaban 1309 Hijri.

Signature of Zaeed bin KHALIFAH,
Chief of Abu Dhabi

A. C. TALBOT, Lieut. Col.
Resident in the Persian Gulf

LANSDOWNE,
Viceroy and Governor-General of India

Ratified by His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India at Simla on the twelfth day of May 1892.

H. M. DURAND,
Secretary to the Government of India,
Foreign Department

(The agreements signed by the other Trucial Shaikhs, viz., the Chiefs of Dabai, Ajman, Shargah, Ras-ul-Khima, and Umm-ul-Gawain, the first three dated the 7th and the last two the 8th March 1892, are identical in form.)

CHAPTER XIV*

MAURITIUS, SEYCHELLES AND ST. HELENA

A. ACTION PREVIOUSLY TAKEN BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE AND THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

1. Following its consideration of Mauritius, Seychelles and St. Helena at its meetings in 1964, the Special Committee adopted a series of conclusions and recommendations as contained in its report to the General Assembly at its nineteenth session (A/5800/Rev.1,¹

* Previously issued under the symbol A/6300/Add.9.

¹ Official Records of the General Assembly, Nineteenth Session, Annexes, annex No. 8 (part I).

AGREEMENT FOR THE PROHIBITION OF TRAFFIC IN ARMS—1902

We, the undersigned Trucial Chiefs, agree to absolutely prohibit the importation of arms for sale into our respective territories or the exportation therefrom and to enforce this we have issued a notification to all concerned.

MAKTOOM-BIN-HASHAR (Debai)

SAGAR-BIN-KHALED (Shargah)

RASHID-BIN-AHMED (Um-el-Kowain)

ABDUL AZIZ-BIN-HOMAH (Ajman)

ZAED-BIN-KHALIFAH (Abu Dhabi)

Signed and sealed in my presence by the above-mentioned Trucial Chiefs on board the R.I.M.S. *Lawrence* on the 24th, 25th and 26th November 1902.

C. A. KEMBALL,

Lieut. Col.

Offg. Political Resident, Persian Gulf

UNDERTAKING BY THE SHAIKH OF SHARGAH, REGARDING OIL—1922

Letter from Shaikh Khaled ben Ahmed, Chief of Shargah, to the Honourable Lieutenant Colonel A. P. Trevor, C.S.I., C.I.E., Political Resident, Persian Gulf, Bushire, dated 18th Jamadi-os-Sani, 1340 (17th February 1922)

After compliments—

My object in writing this letter of friendship is to convey my compliments to you and to inquire after your health.

Secondly, let it not be hidden from you that I write this letter with my free will and give undertaking to your Honour that if it is hoped that an oil mine will be found in my territory I will not give a concession for it to foreigners except to the person appointed by the High British Government.

This is what was necessary to be stated.

Note. A similar undertaking was given by the Chief of Ras-al-Khaima, on the 22nd February 1922.

UNDERTAKING BY THE SHAIKH OF DIBAI, REGARDING OIL—1922

Letter from Saikh Saeed ben Maktoom, Chief of Debai, to Lieutenant Colonel A. P. Trevor, C.S.I., C.I.E., Political Resident, Persian Gulf, dated 4th Ramazan 1340 (2nd May 1922)

After compliments—

Let it not be hidden from you that we agree, if oil is expected to be found in our territory, not to grant any concession in this connexion to any one except to the person appointed by the High British Government.

Note. Undertakings similar in substance to the above were given by the following shaikhs on the dates mentioned:

Shaikh of Abu Dhabi 3rd May 1922

Shaikh of Ajman 4th May 1922

Shaikh of Umm-al-Qaiwain 8th May 1922

chap. XIV, paras. 154-159). The Special Committee included relevant information on the Territories in its report to the Assembly at its twentieth session (A/6000/Rev. 1,² chap. XIII).

2. The General Assembly, at its twentieth session, adopted two resolutions, one concerning Mauritius (resolution 2066 (XX) of 16 December 1965) and the other concerning a number of smaller Territories, in-

² *Ibid.*, Twentieth Session, Annexes, addendum to agenda item 23.

cluding the Seychelles and St. Helena (resolution 2069 (XX) of 16 December 1965).

3. The operative paragraphs of resolution 2066 (XX) on Mauritius read as follows:

["The General Assembly]

"1. Approves the chapters of the reports of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples relating to the Territory of Mauritius, and endorses the conclusions and recommendations of the Special Committee contained therein;

"2. Reaffirms the inalienable right of the people of the Territory of Mauritius to freedom and independence in accordance with General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV);

"3. Invites the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to take effective measures with a view to the immediate and full implementation of resolution 1514 (XV);

"4. Invites the administering Power to take no action which would dismember the Territory of Mauritius and violate its territorial integrity;

"5. Further invites the administering Power to report to the Special Committee and to the General Assembly on the implementation of the present resolution;

"6. Requests the Special Committee to keep the question of the Territory of Mauritius under review and to report thereon to the General Assembly at its twenty-first session."

4. The operative paragraphs of resolution 2069 (XX) on the Seychelles and St. Helena, among other Territories, read as follows:

["The General Assembly]

"1. Approves the chapters of the reports of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples relating to these Territories, and endorses the conclusions and recommendations contained therein;

"2. Calls upon the administering Powers to implement without delay the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly;

"3. Requests the administering Powers to allow United Nations visiting missions to visit the Territories, and to extend to them full co-operation and assistance;

"4. Reaffirms the inalienable right of the people of these Territories to decide their constitutional status in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and with the provisions of resolution 1514 (XV) and other relevant General Assembly resolutions;

"5. Decides that the United Nations should render all help to the people of these Territories in their efforts freely to decide their future status;

"6. Requests the Special Committee to examine the situation in these Territories and to report on the implementation of the present resolution to the General Assembly at its twenty-first session;

"7. Requests the Secretary-General to give all assistance in the implementation of this resolution."

B. INFORMATION ON THE TERRITORIES³

5. Information on Mauritius, the Seychelles and St. Helena is contained in the reports of the Special Committee to the General Assembly at its nineteenth and twentieth sessions (A/5800/Rev.1, chap. XIV; and A/6000/Rev.1, chap. XIII). Supplementary information is set out below.

1. Mauritius

General

6. Up to 8 November 1965, the Territory of Mauritius consisted of the island of Mauritius and its dependencies, Rodriguez, the Chagos Archipelago, Agalega and the Cargados Carajos. As from that date, the Chagos Archipelago forms part of a new Territory, created by the United Kingdom Government, which is known as the British Indian Ocean Territory (see paras. 41-53 below).

7. The total population of Mauritius at the end of 1965, excluding the dependencies, was estimated at 751,421. Racially the population is divided into the general population (Europeans (mainly French), Africans and persons of mixed origin), 220,093; Indo-Mauritians (made up of immigrants from the Indian subcontinent and their descendants), 506,552 (of whom 383,542 were Hindus and 123,010 Muslims); and Chinese (consisting of immigrants from China and their descendants), 24,776.

8. With an average of over 1,000 people to the square mile, Mauritius is already one of the most densely populated agricultural areas in the world, and a continuing high birth-rate and falling death-rate are resulting in an increase of some thirty per 1,000 annually. The growth of population has led to a reduction of living standards among certain sections of the people, and to growing unemployment.

Political and constitutional developments

Constitutional Conference of 1965

9. The decision that Mauritius should become an independent State probably by the end of 1966, after a period of six months' full internal self-government, was announced by Mr. Anthony Greenwood, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, at the end of a Constitutional Conference held in London from 7 to 24 September 1965.

10. The Conference was attended by representatives of all political parties in the Mauritius Legislature, namely: the Mauritius Labour Party (MLP) led by the Prime Minister, Sir Seenoosagur Ramgoolam; the Parti Mauricien Social Démocrate (PMSD) led by Mr. J. Koenig; the Independent Forward Bloc (IFB) led by Mr. S. Bissoondoyal; the Muslim Committee of Action (MCA) led by Mr. A. R. Mohamed; two independent members of the Legislature, Messrs. J. M. Paturau and J. Ah Chuen.

11. The MLP, the party of the working class which in the October 1963 general election won nineteen out of the forty elected seats in the Legislature, represents mainly the Indo-Mauritian and Creole (Afro-European) communities. Most of the Indo-Mauritians supporting this party are Hindus, though it also has

³ This section is based on: (a) information collected by the Secretariat from published sources; and (b) information transmitted under Article 73 e of the Charter by the United Kingdom (for the year ending 31 December 1964) on 26 July 1965 for Mauritius, on 23 July 1965 for the Seychelles and on 28 July 1965 for St. Helena.

the support of some Muslims. The majority of Muslims, however, belong to the MCA which at the last election won four seats and stood as the ally of the MLP. The PMSD, which won eight seats, traditionally represents the Franco-Mauritian landowning class and the Creole middle class. To the left of the MLP is the IFB, a rural Indo-Mauritian party, which won seven seats.

12. According to reports, the PMSD withdrew from the Conference on 23 September 1965 and did not attend the final plenary meeting. Its leader, Mr. J. Koenig, said that Mr. Greenwood had been informed that the party would not return to the Conference until he had made his decision on two vital points on which the party had insisted throughout. These points were that the United Kingdom Government must agree to, first, the right of the Mauritians to a referendum on whether they desired independence or a form of free association with the United Kingdom, and secondly, some form of proportional representation to ensure the representation of the minorities in the Legislature in approximate proportion to their numbers.

13. In the absence of unanimous agreement among the Mauritian parties, the United Kingdom Government's decisions on the future of the Territory were announced at the final plenary meeting by Mr. Greenwood. These decisions were recorded in a report on the Conference,⁴ a summary of which follows.

Future status

14. The main debate at the Conference was between the advocates of independence and of continuing association with the United Kingdom, as the ultimate status for Mauritius. A considerable time was also devoted to the question of whether advance to this ultimate status should be preceded by consultation with the people and, if so, in what form. All the parties saw the future of Mauritius as being within the Commonwealth, with the Queen as Head of State. But as between independence and some form of continuing association with the United Kingdom, they maintained their opposing views.

15. The MLP and the IFB advocated independence, and the MCA was also prepared to support independence, subject to certain electoral safeguards for the Muslim community. On the other hand, the PMSD advocated a continuing link with the United Kingdom (although not ruling out eventual independence as a possibility) and called for a referendum to allow the people to choose between independence and association. Other points of view, put forward by representatives of independents in the Legislature, included the argument that Mauritius was too small, isolated and economically vulnerable to survive as a viable unit.

16. The report on the Conference stated that the United Kingdom Government, faced with these conflicting views, had to take a decision without the benefit of unanimous advice from the parties at the Conference. After careful study of all the issues, the Secretary of State held that "it was right that Mauritius should be independent and take her place among the sovereign nations of the world". He rejected the proposal for a referendum on the ground that the main effect would be "to prolong the current uncertainty and political

controversy in a way which could only harden and deepen communal divisions and rivalries". He felt confident that "it would be possible to produce a constitution which would command the support and respect of all parties and of all sections of the population".

17. Announcing these views to the Conference, the Secretary of State said that when the electoral commission (see below) had reported, a date would be fixed for a general election under the new system, and a new government would be formed. In consultation with this government, the United Kingdom would be prepared to fix a date and take the necessary steps to declare Mauritius independent, after a period of six months' full internal self-government if a resolution asking for this was passed by a simple majority of the new Assembly. The United Kingdom Government would expect that these processes could be completed before the end of 1966.

Framework constitution

18. During the discussions, the Conference recognized that there were a number of matters which would have to be provided for in the constitution of Mauritius which would not be affected by the decision on final status. On most of these matters a large measure of agreement was reached and a framework constitution embodying the points of agreement was circulated to delegates.

19. Among subjects covered in the framework constitution are: provisions for the preservation of fundamental human rights; for securing the continued impartiality of the judicial system and of the commissions concerned with the Public Service, the judicial and legal service and the police service; and for dealing with criminal prosecutions and the exercise of the prerogative of mercy. A further safeguard against any possibility of the abuse of power is contained in the provision for the appointment of an Ombudsman, who will have a wide jurisdiction to investigate complaints against specified public bodies and officers.

20. The framework constitution also sets out provisions for the appointment of a Queen's representative who, in the exercise of his functions, will generally act on the advice of a Council of Ministers, consisting of a Chief Minister and not more than fourteen other ministers collectively responsible to a wholly elected Legislative Assembly.

21. Alterations to the constitution will require the support of not less than two thirds of all the members of the Legislative Assembly or, in the case of entrenched provisions, not less than three fourths of the members.

Electoral commission

22. A further point on which it proved impossible to reach agreement at the Conference was the electoral system to be adopted under the self-government constitution. The Secretary of State said that he was reluctant to determine such an important matter without further consultation, and therefore proposed to appoint an electoral commission to make recommendations on the most appropriate method of allocating seats in the Mauritius Legislature and on the boundaries of electoral constituencies.

23. In making its recommendations, the commission would be asked to accept certain principles: the system recommended should be based primarily on multi-member constituencies; there should be a common

⁴ *Mauritius Constitutional Conference, 1965*, Cmd. 2797 (London, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1965).

electoral roll, with provision, by the reservation of seats if necessary, for fair representation of the main sections of the population; no encouragement should be given to the multiplication of small parties; there should be no nominated members in the Legislature; and provision should be made for the representation of Rodriguez. The Commission, which consisted of a Chairman (Sir Harold Banwell) and two other members (Professor Colin Leys and Mr. T. G. Randall), visited Mauritius during January 1966.

24. In its report,⁵ which was submitted to the Secretary of State for consideration on 22 February 1966, the Commission stated that in formulating its proposals for the electoral system, it had taken into account the views presented by individuals and organizations, including the four main political parties, and the principles laid down for its guidance in the report of the Mauritius Constitutional Conference of 1965.

25. Under the proposed system, sixty members would be returned for the island of Mauritius by block voting (each elector being obliged to cast his full three votes) in twenty three-member constituencies, and two members returned for Rodriguez (the principal dependency of Mauritius) by block voting in a single constituency. The members elected for Rodriguez would also represent the interests of the two lesser dependencies, namely, Cargados Carajos and Agalega.

26. There would be a constant corrective consisting of five additional seats to be filled in turn from the runners-up among the losing candidates who were least well represented after the poll. A party would gain a seat by means of this corrective, only if it secured the return of one member by direct election and 10 per cent of the total vote cast.

27. Provision would be made for the establishment of a variable corrective system. Under this system, any party which received more than 25 per cent of the vote but less than 25 per cent of the seats would have its representation correspondingly augmented.

28. The Commission also recommended the sending of independent observers from Commonwealth countries to Mauritius during the preparation of the next register of electors and the subsequent elections, and the formation of an independent electoral commission of three members.

29. In a dispatch of 28 May 1966 addressed to the Governor of Mauritius, the Secretary of State for the Colonies stated that after carefully considering the recommendations made in the report of the Banwell Commission, he had reached the conclusion that the electoral arrangements proposed, taken as a whole, fully conformed with the relevant principles set forth in the report of the Mauritius Constitutional Conference of 1965, and that these arrangements were "as fair and satisfactory as it is possible to devise in the particular situation of Mauritius". He had accordingly decided to accept the Commission's recommendations in full, and very much hoped that all political parties would in the best interests of Mauritius willingly accept the arrangements proposed and co-operate in implementing them so that planning might go ahead on the arrangements that would be required for the elections to be held later in 1966.

30. The Secretary of State also stated that in the circumstances of Mauritius, a team of observers from Commonwealth countries was clearly appropriate as recommended by the Commission, and that he was taking urgent steps to select suitably qualified persons to undertake this task. Finally, he requested the Governor to arrange for the Commission's report and his dispatch to be published in Mauritius at an early date.

31. In the course of nearly four weeks following its issuance, the Commission's report became the centre of controversy in Mauritius, notably between the three parties participating in the present Government (i.e., MLP, IFB and MCA) and their opponents the PMSD. According to reports, the former organized the Pro-Independence Front under the leadership of the Prime Minister in protest against the Commission's proposals for the electoral arrangements. The main points of protest were reported to be that these proposals did not provide for majority rule or for direct adequate representation of the Muslim and Chinese communities. On the other hand, the PMSD was reported to be in favour of the system proposed by the Commission, mainly because it felt that this system was very much like one of proportional representation and was based on non-communalism. Both sides made charges and counter-charges and organized mass political meetings, at which resolutions were adopted, pledging support for their respective stands.

32. On 16 June 1966, a motion introduced by the Prime Minister was adopted by an overwhelming majority in the Legislative Assembly, asking for further consideration of the proposals contained in the Banwell report. An opposition amendment accepting that report was rejected by a large majority. On 27 June 1966, Mr. John Stonehouse, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary for the Colonies, began an eight-day visit to Mauritius for discussions with the four main parties concerning the Banwell proposals. As a result, full agreement was reached on certain variations of these proposals.

33. These variations, which were later approved by the Secretary of State, include the following.

34. While the system proposed by the Banwell Commission for constituency elections will be retained in full, changes have been made in the correctives recommended by the Commission. The variable corrective will be dropped. The constant corrective will be replaced by provision for eight "best loser" seats. Parties or party alliances will be permitted to qualify for these seats if registered with the Electoral Commissioner before nomination day. The requirement that a party should secure certain minimum results in the constituency elections in order to qualify for constant corrective seats will be dropped and no corresponding provision will be made for the "best loser" seats.

35. The first four "best loser" seats will be reserved for communities under-represented in the Legislative Assembly after the constituency elections. These four seats will be allocated irrespective of party. The remaining four "best loser" seats will be allocated on the basis of party and community.

36. The general effect of the application of the eight "best loser" seats as a whole will thus be to help any community to obtain a fair share of seats in the Legislative Assembly by the allocation of extra seats reserved for the purpose, and to maintain the position of the party or party alliance which led after the constituency elections.

⁵ *Mauritius: Report of the Banwell Commission on the Electoral System*, Colonial No. 362 (London, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1966).

37. On 4 July 1966, before his departure for London, Mr. Stonehouse was reported to have said that the general elections based on the revised proposals of the Banwell Commission must be held as soon as possible, but that the date at which Mauritius would assume full internal self-government could not be fixed at the present stage.

Commonwealth membership

38. On the question of Commonwealth membership, the Secretary of State made it plain that it was a matter not for the United Kingdom Government alone but for the members of the Commonwealth as a whole to decide. He indicated, however, that his Government would be happy, if the desire for membership of the Commonwealth were confirmed by a resolution of the Mauritius Legislature elected before independence, to transmit such a request to other Commonwealth Governments.

39. The Secretary of State believed that the achievement of independence by the Territory would strengthen the close and friendly relations which had existed between Mauritius and the United Kingdom for over 150 years. Mauritius would continue to be eligible for economic assistance from the United Kingdom in the same way as other formerly dependent Territories and would still benefit from the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement.

Defence

40. At the final plenary meeting of the Conference, the Secretary of State indicated that his Government had given careful consideration to the views expressed concerning the desirability of a defence agreement being entered into between the Governments of Mauritius and the United Kingdom. He announced that his Government was willing in principle to negotiate the terms of a defence agreement with the Mauritius Government before independence, which would be signed and come into effect immediately after independence. The United Kingdom Government envisaged that such an agreement might provide that, in the event of an external threat to either country, the two Governments would consult together to decide what action was necessary for mutual defence. There would also be joint consultation on any request from the Mauritius Government in the event of a threat to the internal security of Mauritius. The agreement would contain provisions under which, on the one hand, the United Kingdom Government would undertake to assist in the provision of training for, and the secondment of trained personnel to, the Mauritius police and security forces; and on the other hand, the Mauritius Government would agree to the continued enjoyment by the United Kingdom of existing rights and facilities in *HMS Mauritius* (a wireless-telegraphy station) and at Plaisance Airfield.

British Indian Ocean Territory

41. On 10 November 1965, the Secretary of State for the Colonies stated in a written answer to a question in the United Kingdom House of Commons that:

"With the agreement of the Governments of Mauritius and Seychelles new arrangements for the administration of certain islands in the Indian Ocean were introduced by Order-in-Council made on 8 November (The British Indian Ocean Territory Order 1965, Statutory Instruments 1965, No. 1920). The islands are the Chagos Archipelago, some 1,200

miles north-east of Mauritius, and Aldabra, Farquhar and Desroches in the Western Indian Ocean. Their populations are approximately 1,000, 100, 172 and 112 respectively. The Chagos Archipelago was formerly administered by the Government of Mauritius and the other three islands by that of Seychelles. The islands will be called the British Indian Ocean Territory and will be administered by a Commissioner. It is intended that the islands will be available for the construction of defence facilities by the British and United States Governments, but no firm plans have yet been made by either Government. Appropriate compensation will be paid."

42. Subsequently, it was announced that the first Commissioner of the Territory would be Lord Oxford and Asquith, Governor and Commander-in-Chief of the Seychelles, and that the new appointment would be additional to that of Governor of the Seychelles.

43. According to reports, the new Territory could become the strategic base for a new Anglo-American security system east of Suez. Although there were no firm plans, the intention was to use Diego García, the largest island in the Chagos Archipelago, thirteen miles long and four miles wide, with a population of about 500, as a communications centre and refuelling base, upon the completion of the necessary preparations. The island could be expanded into a staging post, though that was not now planned. The other islands were included in view of possible future requirements.

44. Certain other countries were reported to have been kept informed. These included Australia and New Zealand, which were believed to have an interest in alternative staging posts for air and sea transport across the Indian Ocean between the Red Sea and the Cocos (Keeling) Islands (now administered by Australia).

45. The compensation to be paid to the Government of Mauritius was reported to be about £3 million in the case of the Chagos Archipelago.

46. In Mauritius, all three Ministers of the PMSD resigned from the Government on 12 November 1965 in protest against the United Kingdom Government's scheme to detach the Chagos Archipelago from Mauritius for the purpose of setting up an Anglo-American military base. The ministers concerned, whose respective portfolios were subsequently taken by three other persons (one from the IFB and two from the MCA), were Mr. J. Koenig, the Attorney General, the party leader; Mr. G. Duval, Minister of Housing, Lands and Town and Country Planning, deputy leader; and Mr. R. Devienne, Minister of State (Development), party chairman. One of them (Mr. Duval) was said to have cabled the Indian Prime Minister, thanking him for India's opposition to the planned base. According to information provided by the administering Power, the three ministers announced at a press conference in November 1965 that they were not opposed to the detachment of the Chagos Archipelago from Mauritius for Western defence purposes but only to the terms and conditions of that detachment.

47. The discontent among the Mauritians over the above-mentioned scheme was said to be growing. On 16 November 1965, a Remembrance Day ceremony held in Curepipe was disturbed by opponents of this scheme. Several thousands of them brandishing French, Indian and Pakistani flags attended a meeting at Port Louis on 5 December 1965, during which a resolution was adopted, denouncing the United Kingdom.

48. On 2 February 1966, the scheme in question formed the subject of discussion in the United Kingdom House of Commons. In the course of this discussion, the Secretary of State for Defence stated that his Government did not propose to make any modification of this scheme following the adoption by the General Assembly of resolution 2066 (XX) on 16 December 1965.

49. He was asked whether the establishment of military bases anywhere outside the islands referred to in the resolution was liable to run into political difficulties and whether alternatives should therefore be studied. He replied: "We did not think that the resolution dealt with the problem realistically . . . We have taken certain action here that we think is wise bearing in mind that we cannot foresee what the future defence needs in the area might be."

50. With regard to the nature, purpose and cost of the defence facilities to be constructed in the British Indian Ocean Territory, he said:

"Neither Her Majesty's Government nor, I understand, the United States Government have at present any specific plans for constructing military facilities on any of these islands. There are, of course, a number of military uses to which the islands might be put in due course, as and when specific requirements arise, and this was the justification for the establishment of the British Indian Ocean Territory."

51. On the question of the proportion in which the cost of any defence facilities in the Territory would be shared between the United Kingdom and the United States, the Secretary of State said that each country would pay for the facilities in which it had the prime interest and that all facilities would be available for use by both countries without charge.

52. He was also asked to describe the extent to which this sharing of defence facilities and costs in the Far East meant an integration of the defence policy of the United Kingdom with that of the United States as well as to give an assurance that it was not the United Kingdom Government's policy to put down revolutions in other countries. Replying, he asserted that: "We have had very long and very successful experience of this sort of military co-operation with the United States".

53. At the meeting of the British Parliamentary Labour Party held on 15 June 1966, a motion presented by the Prime Minister's critics calling for a decisive reduction in the United Kingdom military commitments east of Suez by 1969-1970 was rejected by 225 votes to 54. Mr. Wilson attacked the motion on the grounds that "if we believe in peace-keeping through the United Nations and in making our contribution to it, we have to be there or capable of getting there", and that the United Kingdom could not disregard the wish of its partners that it should be able to assert influence in Asia and Africa "to neutralize the trouble spots and potential trouble spots". Mr. Wilson said that "What we want to get away from where we can is the system of great bases in populated areas. What we need more is staging posts such as those available to us in the Indian Ocean, with virtually no local population, but which will enable us speedily to get to where we are needed at minimum cost".

Economic conditions

54. Mauritius is primarily an agricultural country. In 1960, it suffered a severe economic setback brought about by two cyclones. Since then the economy has made substantial progress.

55. The gross national product in 1963 was estimated at Rs.926 million (£69 million), the highest since the Rs.542 million for 1960. In 1964 (the last year for which national income statistics are available), the total production of the agricultural and manufacturing industries declined. These industries contributed 24 per cent and 15 per cent of the gross national product respectively, with the remainder being made up by the other smaller sectors. The gross national product in 1964 was estimated at Rs.767 million, or Rs.161 million less than in 1963. During this period, the *per capita* income fell from Rs.1,300 to Rs.1,020.

56. In 1963, farming and manufacturing contributed 33 and 19 per cent of the gross national product respectively, with the remainder from the other smaller sectors.

57. The relative prosperity which Mauritius enjoys is due almost entirely to the continuing expansion of the sugar industry and guaranteed prices under the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement, which runs until 1971.

58. In 1963 and 1964, the arable land under cane continued to expand, from 213,000 acres to 215,800 acres, representing 90 per cent of the total area under cultivation. Sugar production varies according to weather conditions; in this period, it experienced a considerable decline, from 685,300 to 519,600 metric tons. But sugar exports showed a slight increase from 574,300 to 575,662 metric tons, accounting for 90 and 94 per cent of the Territory's export respectively.

59. In 1965, some progress was made in the diversification of agriculture and the expansion of the secondary industry. The arable land under crops other than sugar-cane rose by 2,400 acres to 17,600 acres, while that under cane remained at 215,800 acres. A notable example was the emergence of tea as a major cash crop following an increase in its acreage by 800 to 6,600. A total of twenty-five new industries was set up, compared with eleven in 1964 and eight in 1963. Loans granted by the Development Bank of Mauritius for agricultural purposes and industrial projects totalled about Rs.1 million at the end of 1964 and Rs.8 million at the end of 1965.

60. Capital expenditure by the mill-owning sugar companies was estimated at Rs.165.5 million for the period 1964-1969 for a target production of 800,000 metric tons of sugar.

61. The bulk of sugar-cane is produced on plantation scale. The larger plantations, with factories and modern equipment, owned by twenty-three Franco-Mauritian sugar millers, produce about 60 per cent of the total crop. The remainder is produced by some 26,000 peasants, mainly Indo-Mauritian owners. They cultivate about 20 per cent of the land under cane, and depend on the twenty-three sugar mills for the extraction of the sugar from their cane. According to reports, managerial, supervisory and technical jobs on the Franco-Mauritian plantations are a close preserve of their own community.

62. Nevertheless, the general economic situation continued to deteriorate in 1965, when the total external trade amounted to about Rs.680.1 million, down

from Rs.755.8 million in the previous year. Imports were valued at Rs.388.9 million in 1964 and Rs.367.3 million in 1965, compared with exports totalling Rs.366.9 million and Rs.312.8 million respectively. During 1965, the Territory's unfavourable balance of trade was thus widened.

63. Some important changes occurred in the structure of this trade. Sugar still dominated the export sector of the economy, but its exports decreased from Rs.344.2 million in 1964 to Rs.289.7 million in 1965. It was followed by tea (exports worth Rs.4.4 million in 1964 and Rs.5.9 million in 1965), which replaced molasses (exports worth Rs.8.8 million in 1964 and Rs.5.0 million in 1965) as the second most important export product. The changes in the structure of imports showed less favourable aspects. During these two years, imports of food and edible oils and fats increased from Rs.117.2 million to Rs.122.9 million, while those of capital goods, particularly machinery and transport equipment, decreased from Rs.133.7 million to Rs.121.1 million. As in the past, trade was conducted mainly with the United Kingdom, which received 76.2 per cent of the Territory's exports and supplied 26.7 per cent of its imports in 1965.

64. The recent poor performance of the economy has weakened the financial position of the Territory. During 1965, recurrent revenue decreased by Rs.10 million to Rs.205 million, while recurrent expenditure increased by Rs.18 million to Rs.210 million. Capital revenue amounted to Rs.38 million and capital expenditure to Rs.52 million, compared with Rs.61 and Rs.56 million respectively in 1964. Thus, there was a total budgetary deficit of about Rs.20 million. The public debt in the fourth quarter of 1965 stood at Rs.264 million, or Rs.18 million more than in the corresponding quarter of 1964.

65. The principal economic problems confronting the Territory are its economy's heavy dependence on sugar and the urgent need to widen employment opportunities for the fast-rising population.

66. The two main political parties—the MLP and the PMSD—are very much alive to these problems. The PMSD's policy of association with the United Kingdom is said to be partly inspired by the fear that independence will lead to nationalization of the sugar industry and possibly job discrimination in favour of Indo-Mauritians. In order to dispel this fear, the leader of the MLP is reported to have said that his party favoured constitutional safeguards for minorities and was opposed to nationalization.

67. The Government has made efforts to promote diversification of agriculture, but a factor hampering realization of this objective is that the guaranteed marketing conditions make it more profitable for people to grow sugar.

68. Manufacturing industries in Mauritius are still in their early stages. With a relatively small home market and no raw materials except for sugar and its by-products, aloe and some timber, the development of manufacturing industries has been confined in the main to those directly concerned with the processing of these raw materials.

69. Measures taken by the Government for stimulating the growth of secondary industries include import duty concessions or exemptions on machinery, plant and raw materials for manufacture in Mauritius and income tax incentives. These incentives have already

resulted in the production locally of a variety of goods, including car batteries, carbon dioxide, bituminous paints, nails, fibre glass manufactures, steel furniture, etc., and in the establishment of a modern sawmill, a brewery and a factory for processing milk.

70. According to reports, the leader of the MLP has said, in explaining his party's policy of independence within the Commonwealth, that Mauritius is economically more viable than other colonies that have been granted their independence; that it has never needed a grant-in-aid to balance its budget; and that it has financed the greater part of its development from its own resources.

71. The diversification of the Territory's economy and the reduction of its dependence on sugar are the basic objects of a reconstruction and development programme, which originally covered the period 1960-1965. In 1964, it was decided to increase the ceiling of the programme to Rs.400 million and to extend the period to mid 1966. The United Kingdom is contributing about one third of the total cost of the revised programme.

72. On 1 March 1964, the Development Bank of Mauritius was established to provide loans for agricultural purposes and industrial enterprises. The total amount of loans granted by the Bank up to the end of the year was some Rs.966,000.

73. More recently, the Government has expressed great concern over an increasing level of unemployment caused chiefly by the slowdown in the economy and the rapid growth in population. The population of working age was 190,000 in 1963 and is estimated to reach 250,000 in 1970. In 1965, the Government published for the first time more detailed statistics for 1964 on employment provided by various concerns engaged in construction, electricity, mining and quarrying, manufacture and repairs, and transport. The total number of persons engaged in the above-mentioned undertakings was about 22,000. In addition, the twenty-three Franco-Mauritian sugar millers' estates had some 49,000 employees in 1964. However, no data are available for total unemployment in that year.

74. In his speech to the legislative Assembly on 16 March 1966, the Governor proposed a series of measures designed to achieve full employment by 1970 mainly through the acceleration of economic growth and the reduction of the birth-rate. Subsequently, despite the opposition from the PMSD, the Assembly was reported to have adopted a motion expressing support for these measures, which are summarized below.

75. Under a new development programme covering the period from July 1966 to June 1970, all projects will be carried out in "as labour-intensive a manner as possible", and a higher proportion of funds will be devoted to directly productive development. The Government intends to nearly double the rate of expansion of tea plantations for small-holders and discuss shortly with the International Development Association (IDA) the financing of two irrigation schemes.

76. The Government will continue to strive to create favourable conditions for private investment by such means as the strengthening of the public finance system, the establishment of a Standards Bureau and a Trade Training Centre (the cost of which will be mainly financed by the United Nations Development Programme), the maintenance of good industrial relations and stability in the basic cost of living, and the further expansion and improvement of health, housing, trans-

portation and urban facilities and services. The Government will also continue to make funds available to entrepreneurs through the Development Bank of Mauritius. Three large industrial projects, among others, in the private sector are under study, namely, in fertilizers, textiles and edible oils.

77. The Government has agreed that Mauritius should participate in the negotiations for an Economic Community of Eastern Africa, and it will take every step to promote further economic development within the Community.

78. With the assistance offered by the United Kingdom Ministry of Overseas Development and other overseas agencies, the Government is determined to check the rate of population growth through a sustained campaign of education in family planning. Where opportunities for employment of Mauritians abroad are found, those wishing to take advantage of them will be helped to do so. Improvement will be effected in the administration of public assistance to those for whom no work can be found.

79. As shown in the draft capital budget, revenue and expenditure for the first year of 1966-1970 Development Programme are estimated at Rs.65.9 and Rs.93.2 million respectively. The budget has three main sources of revenue: transfer from the current budget, Rs.12.0 million; Colonial Development and Welfare Fund, Rs.14.8 million; and loans, Rs.32.6 million. However, by the addition of the unspeared development funds amounting to some Rs.48.3 million at the end of June 1966, the total estimated capital revenue is brought to Rs.114.2 million.

80. In July 1966, the Government decided to increase both direct and indirect taxes in order to distribute the burden among those with the ability to pay and to meet the budgetary deficit of Rs.25 million for the period ending on 30 June 1966. It also decided to strengthen the monetary system by the formation in 1966 of a central bank to be known as the Bank of Mauritius with an authorized capital of Rs.10 million.

Social conditions

Labour

81. The average rate of increase of population in recent years has been some 20,000 persons a year. The estimated annual increase in the working age population (15 to 64 years) up to 1972 is about 7,500. Steps have been taken to accelerate economic growth, but thus far the economy has not expanded fast enough to provide employment for all work-seekers, and it is considered likely that the current trend will continue unless the birth-rate is reduced. More recently, the problem of unemployment has been aggravated by the continued political uncertainty and adverse weather conditions. As a result, there has been an increasing demand for emigration to the United Kingdom, but the number of applications granted has been small.

82. Measures have been taken by the Government for easing the unemployment situation. These have included a territory-wide registration of unemployed agricultural workers, the implementation of schemes for relief works and for the growing of food crops, the provision of public assistance to those for whom no work could be found, and the undertaking of a programme of family planning.

83. The largest single employer of labour in the Territory is the sugar industry, which provided em-

ployment for 40,822 and 48,635 in March and September 1964 respectively. During the year, there were seventy-eight (seven more than in 1963) associations of employees, with a membership of 48,229 (6,113 more than in 1963). There were twenty-five trade disputes involving 7,302 workers (of whom 5,447 were employed by the sugar industry) and resulting in a loss of 11,053 man-days. The cause of those disputes involving the sugar industry was dissatisfaction with rates of pay, which remained unchanged between 1963 and 1964.

Public health

84. Government expenditure on medical and health services in the financial year 1963-1964 was Rs.19,205,094 (an increase of Rs.949,888 over the previous year), or about 11 per cent of the Territory's total expenditure.

85. During 1964, the medical and health facilities were expanded by the addition of one government dispensary, one maternity ward in a government hospital and nine maternity, child welfare and social welfare centres. The number of beds available for in-patients in the Territory totalled 3,324 (an increase of 100 over the previous year). This total included 2,121 general beds, equivalent to one general bed per 345 persons. There were 118 government and sixty-five private physicians (compared with 122 and sixty respectively in the previous year). There was, thus, one physician for every 4,008 persons.

86. The main disease found among the people in Mauritius today is anaemia, which may affect as many as 50 per cent or more of certain groups of the population. This and other allied nutritional disorders lead to poor physique, intermittent sickness and general apathy.

Educational conditions

87. Actual recurrent expenditure for the financial year 1963-1964 amounted to Rs.24.9 million (compared with Rs.22.8 million in the previous year), or roughly 13.8 per cent of the Territory's total recurrent expenditure. Capital expenditure on education was Rs.3.4 million (compared with Rs.2.8 million in the previous year).

88. Enrolment in primary, secondary, teacher-training and vocational training schools in 1964 was as follows:

	<i>Schools</i>	<i>Enrolment</i>	<i>Teachers</i>
Primary education	297 ^a	132,074 ^b	3,750
Secondary education	119 ^c	31,797	1,348
Teacher training	1 ^d	496	23
Vocational training	3 ^d	301	28

^a Comprising 153 government, 56 aided and 88 private schools.

^b Representing over 88 per cent of all children of primary school age (5-6 to 11-12 years).

^c Comprising 4 government, 13 aided and 102 private schools.

^d Government schools.

89. Free primary education is provided by the Government and aided schools, but not by the private schools. One of the main objects of the Government has been to expand facilities for such education as rapidly as possible to include all children of primary school age. The Government is now faced with a great problem of primary schools overcrowding, which has been aggravated by the damage to the school buildings caused by cyclones in 1960. Ten new primary schools were completed in 1964 and an extensive school-building programme was formulated for the next year.

90. Another important problem is the need to expand the facilities for further education. At present, the majority of Mauritian students seeking such education have to go abroad. In 1964, over 1,100 students were taking full-time courses in institutions of higher education overseas, most of whom were in the United Kingdom. Forty-three scholarships and bursaries and one cadetship were awarded to Mauritian students by certain Commonwealth countries and Member States of the United Nations, and six scholarships by the Mauritius Government for students to attend universities or other institutions of the United Kingdom and other countries.

91. During the year, a request was made to the United Nations Special Fund for technical assistance in expanding the Mauritius Technical Institute. Arrangements are now being made for the establishment of a university in the Territory, which will be financed by a grant of Rs.3 million from Colonial Development and Welfare funds. The university will consist of a faculty of agricultural sciences, a faculty of development services and an institute of education. It will also run extra-mural courses.

2. Seychelles

General

92. On 10 November 1965, the Secretary of State for the Colonies announced that as from 8 November 1965, three out of ninety-two islands, of which the colony of Seychelles consisted—Aldabra, Farquhar and Desrochas, together with the Chagos Archipelago, formerly administered by the Government of Mauritius, would form a new colony, created by the United Kingdom Government, which would be known as the British Indian Ocean Territory. The population of the above-mentioned islands is approximately 100,172 and 112 respectively.

93. According to reports, the purpose of this change is to enable the United Kingdom and the United States to use the new colony as the strategic military base east of Suez (see para. 43 above). Details of the administrative, legal and financial arrangements applicable to the new territory are under consideration, as are details of what compensation should be paid to the commercial and private interests involved. In so far as the Government of Seychelles is concerned, the United Kingdom Government has indicated that it is prepared to meet the cost of constructing a civil airfield in the Seychelles to provide a link with the Indian and African mainlands.

94. On 30 June 1964, the population of the Seychelles was estimated at 46,472 in comparison with 45,089 on 30 June 1963. Seychelles, like Mauritius, is facing a great increase in population. The growth of population in the last four years was greater than had been expected and if this trend continues, may lead to an estimated total population of 57,000 by 1970.

Political and constitutional developments

95. By the end of 1964 two parties—the Seychelles People's United Party (SPUP) and the Seychelles Democratic Party (SDP)—dominated the political scene in the Territory. The major issues between them have been as follows:

(a) The question of the Territory's future status. The SPUP has been in favour of speedy political progress and independence for the Seychelles. The SDP is opposed to independence.

(b) The presence of the United States satellite tracking station on Mahé. The SPUP has declared that it conflicts with their policy of non-alignment while the SDP has hailed it as a major factor in absorbing labour.

96. Coupled with the political developments of 1963 and 1964 was a rapid growth in the trade union movement, most of the unions being associated with one or another of the two main parties. For the first time in the history of the Seychelles, organized strike action was resorted to in support of pay claims and changed working conditions. There were thirteen unions on 31 December 1964.

97. The main issue between the SDP and the SPUP—the question of the Territory's future status—produced repercussions in the Legislative Council where, in February 1964, a motion was passed calling on the Government to ascertain the United Kingdom Government's reaction "to the idea of Seychelles remaining British, and/or integrating with the United Kingdom". A reply from the Secretary of State to the effect that the United Kingdom Government had no wish to take the initiative in suggesting any change in the relationship between Britain and the Seychelles was welcomed unanimously by the Legislative Council (on 23 October 1964).

98. On 18 November 1965, in replying to a dispatch of 3 November 1964 from the Governor of the Seychelles concerning the future status of the Territory, the Secretary of State for the Colonies stated, in particular, that:

(a) In considering those matters he had throughout been "very conscious of the view expressed by the Unofficial Members of the Legislative Council as to the desirability of maintaining unchanged the present relationship between Britain and Seychelles", and that it was not his intention "to call this in question in any way".

(b) He had been "struck by the fact that although, under the existing law, the franchise is fairly wide, relatively small numbers of people in fact vote at general elections" and that it seemed to him "an unhealthy situation". Therefore he considered that "a move to universal adult suffrage should now be made".

(c) "Even if universal adult suffrage were introduced forthwith it could have little political effect until the next general election. To take this step now might well however, as I have indicated, contribute towards the political education of the people. It is also for consideration whether, in the interval between now and the next general election, certain more positive steps in this direction may not be possible."

(d) "Bearing in mind that the majority of important posts in government service in Seychelles are already held by Seychellois officers, ... unofficial members of Executive Council might now be invited to assume some responsibility for the conduct of the business of Government departments."

(e) "Consideration should now be given also to longer-term and further-reaching questions concerning the Colony's constitutional arrangements and eventual future status" ... "In other territories it has been found valuable for a constitutional expert to visit the Territory and prepare a report, in the light of the views expressed to him locally by the Government, political parties and individuals, indicating the various possible courses which may be open and the arguments for and against each."

If the suggestion was acceptable, he would "arrange for a suitable person to visit Seychelles in the relatively near future to draw up a report".

(f) "If a visit on these lines were arranged, I would suggest that, subject to any comments you may have, the constitutional expert's terms of reference might be:

"Having regard to the terms of Lord Lansdowne's despatch No. 177 of 17th August 1964, and of Lord Oxford's despatch No. 226 of 3rd November 1964, and to current economic, social and political developments in Seychelles, to examine the various paths of constitutional evolution open to the territory, taking account of the wishes of the people and the realities of the local situation; in conducting this examination to consult with the Government of Seychelles, the Members of the Legislative and Executive Councils, the political parties, and interested organisations and members of the public; and to report."

99. On 3 February 1966, it was announced that Sir Colville Deverell, former Governor of the Windward Islands (from 1955 to 1959) and Mauritius (from 1959 to 1962), had accepted an invitation from the Secretary of State to visit Seychelles as constitutional adviser. Sir Colville arrived in the Seychelles on 10 February 1966 for a visit of about one month. The Secretary of State has recently received Sir Colville's recommendations, and these have been under consideration.

100. During a visit to London in April 1966, Mr. F. A. René, a member of the Legislative Council and leader of the Seychelles People's Unity Party (SPUP), one of the two majority parties of the Territory, was reported to have demanded that the Seychelles be granted internal self-government with the enlargement of the franchise to one of universal adult suffrage during October or November 1966 and that the Territory become independent during late 1969 or early 1970. Mr. René also said that despite his party's opposition to the purchase by the United Kingdom Government of three islands of the Territory for use as military bases, it was now too late to continue discussing that matter.

Economic conditions

101. The economy of Seychelles is dependent on its agriculture. It is a single-crop economy, most of the cultivated land being planted with coconut palms. The price of copra, the principal export, representing 60 to 70 per cent of all domestic exports, is the most important economic factor governing the life of the Territory.

102. The total area planted under coconuts is in the region of 23,000 acres and the number of palms is estimated at 1,750,000. Cinnamon occupies about 14,000 acres and vanilla 700 acres. The production of copra, cinnamon and vanilla were as follows:

	Quantity (tons)		Value (rupees)	
	1963	1964	1963	1964
Copra	5,703	7,034	5,178,561	6,567,430
Cinnamon bark ..	1,007	1,174	725,089	834,296
Leaf oil	66	75.5	595,839	707,711
Quills	9	6	33,186	39,118
Vanilla	2.05	1.44	85,917	51,226

103. The average price per ton received for copra was Rs.786.05 in 1962; Rs.908.04. in 1963; and Rs.933.67 in 1964. No subsidies were paid in 1963 and 1964 by the Copra Stabilization Fund which has in recent years ensured a minimum return of Rs.800 per ton to planters.

104. The main industries in the Seychelles are the preparation of copra and vanilla pods, as well as the extraction of essential oils for export. Coconut oil for cooking and its by-product (coconut cake) for stock feeding, soap and coir rope are produced in small quantities for local consumption.

105. In the latter part of 1964, a coir factory was established. It aims to process about 1,000 tons of coir a year for export which should add about Rs.500,000 to the value of the Territory's exports.

106. There are some guano deposits on certain of the outlying islands. Between 1901 and 1960 some 687,500 tons of guano valued at over 17 million rupees were exported from these islands with the result that supplies were exhausted on many of them. Considerable deposits still remain on three islands, and it has been suggested that guano in the Amirantes should be reserved for the Territory's needs, while that from St. Pierre should continue to be sent to Mauritius. The private firm which has the lease to work the deposits on Assumption concentrated on installing equipment, extracting and crushing during 1963-1964. The company is permitted to extract up to 10,000 tons a year, subject to the payment of royalties (Rs.4 a ton) and export duty, and it expected to sell considerable quantities of guano on the world market during 1965.

107. In the absence of raw materials, the Territory has to look to the sea for new sources of wealth. However, it has not yet been found possible to attract the considerable capital necessary to provide ships, cold storage and a canning plant to handle the rich harvest of fish believed to exist in this part of the Indian Ocean. At present there is only a limited export of salted fish, valued in 1963 at about 40,000 rupees.

108. The main crops in the Territory are still coconuts, cinnamon, patchouli and vanilla, but it is hoped to introduce tea as a subsidiary crop especially on small holdings, now that the Seychelles Tea Company is established. The company has planted 100 acres of Crown land and is now engaged in planting another 200 acres. It is hoped that more planting will be undertaken on small holdings and private estates.

109. Under the Land Settlement Scheme, the Government provides land to small-holders for cultivation. By the end of 1964 there were 150 such holdings, mainly five acres in size, compared with 100 at the end of 1963.

110. Following a campaign by the Department of Agriculture, planters are showing an interest in cattle raising, which is being encouraged as a valuable aid to fertilizing the plantations, while increasing the Territory's supply of meat and milk. The Department maintains herds of creole cattle and Sindhi-Friesian cross-breeds from which young animals are supplied to the public.

111. Progress was reported in the field of co-operative development with planters' processing and marketing societies showing increases in membership and productivity. Several new societies were registered during 1964. Both Mahé and Praslin now have a chain of copra manufacturing societies so that all planters on these two islands may participate in large-scale production of copra through membership in a primary co-operative; and in the export of copra through a union of primaries which was registered in 1964. There is also a cinnamon producers' society, a poultry farmers' co-operative, and a property construction co-operative

which undertakes building contracts and the manufacture of cement blocks and pipes. By the end of 1964 there were twelve societies operating which handled produce valued at £88,400 during the year. There is an Agricultural Bank which has been granting loans to planters for debt settlement as well as development.

112. In 1964, exports totalled £649,578, compared with £515,045 in 1963. Imports amounted to £1,179,336, compared with £1,095,058 in 1963.

113. The main export items in 1964 were copra (£497,099) and cinnamon oil and bark (£160,243). The main import items were food-stuffs (rice, maize, flour, sugar, etc.), (£407,611); kerosene, petrol and diesoline (£112,527); and cotton piece goods (£77,699).

114. The whole of the import and export trade of Seychelles, except for some shipment of guano from the outer islands to Africa, passes through the Port of Victoria. Exports of copra are handled by the Seychelles Copra Association, an association of shippers and producers. The import of rice, the staple food of the islanders, is arranged by the Government of Seychelles under an agreement with the Government of Burma. The rest of the trade and commerce of the Territory is conducted by a number of agency houses and merchants.

115. Total public revenue was estimated at Rs.10,536,122 of which Rs.7,084,000 were from local sources, the remainder being from United Kingdom funds. Total expenditure was Rs.11,116,838, of which expenditure on Colonial Development and Welfare schemes amounted to Rs.2,930,356.

116. In 1964 the Seychelles Government offered its second loan to the public in the amount of Rs.267,000 to finance development of the Territory's electricity system. The loan was fully subscribed and brought the total public debt of the Territory on 31 December 1964 to Rs.1,071,000.

117. In spite of efforts to keep down the cost of living by the occasional imposition of price control on certain essential commodities, prices have continued to rise steadily. No precise figures have been published for the years under review.

118. There are neither airfields nor railways in Seychelles, but a small fleet of diesel buses operates over the main routes on Mahé. There are forty miles of tarmac-surfaced roads on Mahé and a further thirty-four miles of motorable earth roads. Praslin has thirty miles of earth roads, half of which are motorable, and La Digue has eight miles of earth roads.

119. The five-year development plan, largely financed by Colonial Development and Welfare funds, came to an end on 31 March 1964. It was calculated that about £550,000 from Colonial Development and Welfare funds would be available for the two-year period starting 1 April 1964. Expenditure was apportioned as follows: natural resources, 35.6 per cent; works and communications, 28.4 per cent; social services, 28.9 per cent; tourism and information, 2.8 per cent; miscellaneous projects, 1.6 per cent; and uncommitted balance, 2.7 per cent.

120. A new development plan for the three-year period starting 1 April 1966 has been worked out and is now under consideration by the Secretary of State for the Colonies.

121. In his statement on 18 November 1965, the Secretary of State for the Colonies said that he hoped

to be able to allocate more Colonial Development and Welfare funds to the Territory to make possible substantial economic and social development. In this connexion, he stressed the need to expand and improve agriculture, and in particular, to press on as vigorously as possible with the land settlement programme in order to enable the increasing population to secure an adequate livelihood.

122. Bearing in mind the inevitable bias towards agriculture, he was convinced that steps had to be taken to ensure the full utilization of the Territory's limited land resources. While aware that many large estates in the Seychelles were well managed and highly productive and that the Agricultural Department continued to promote improved husbandry, he nevertheless believed that neglected or unused lands inevitably constituted a heavy burden for the Territory to carry. Therefore, he felt it necessary to consider, in the context of the next development plan, what further encouragement could reasonably be given to promote good husbandry and increase land productivity, and also what sanctions (such as compulsory takeover or management in certain circumstances) might reasonably be written into the law to ensure the putting of neglected or unused lands to full use.

123. The Secretary of State also suggested that measures to ensure the maximum use of local financial resources should be examined. He thought it worth while to consider the establishment of a development corporation for the Seychelles; exploring the possibility of using the investment income of the Copra Price Stabilization Fund in such a way as to increase the pace of agricultural development; and examining whether such development could be stimulated by changes of fiscal policy. He also thought that consideration might be given to the desirability of taking measures to ensure that some part of any unusual appreciation in the capital value of land in Seychelles, particularly if it resulted from the development of an airfield, should accrue to the benefit of the community as a whole.

124. The Secretary of State said that he was aware that the peoples of Seychelles desired that progress should be made in certain other sectors of the economy, notably air communications and deep-sea fishery. Besides drawing attention to a recent announcement that an airfield was to be constructed, he pointed out that a substantial fisheries group had offered to make a survey with a view to investigating the possibility of operating from the Seychelles, and that the Government of Seychelles was conducting negotiations with that group concerning its investment in the Territory.

Social conditions

Labour

125. Compared with 1963, no significant changes have been reported in the employment situation. The number of Seychellois who benefited from the services of the Labour Office in obtaining employment abroad was 385.

126. A low-cost housing project to provide houses for 188 families was started in 1964. It is financed partly from loan funds and partly from a Colonial Development and Welfare grant. On the land settlement plots, the Government has recently been building houses at the rate of approximately fifteen a year; so far 189 cottages have been completed. Subsidies of up to £100 are offered to planters who are prepared to

build labourers' houses on their estates; in 1964 provision was made for 100 such subsidies.

127. In his statement of 18 November 1965, the Secretary of State for the Colonies said that the normal level of agricultural wages in the Seychelles remained extremely low. Any programme for economic and social development should aim to promote the well-being of the poorer members of the community. While noting with satisfaction that the level of wages paid to agricultural labourers had recently been appreciably increased he nevertheless hoped that it would in due course be possible to make efforts towards the general adoption of a 45-hour week. He considered that attempts should also be made to improve the living standard of other workers earning very low wages, and suggested that the present level of wages paid to government labourers might be a reasonable target. He was thus pleased to learn that early consideration was being given to raising the minimum legal wage for all categories of workers.

128. According to reports, a strike involving some 3,250 workers employed mainly by the Government occurred at Victoria on 13 June 1966 in support of higher wages for labourers paid by the month. They union representatives and the Government blamed each other for breaking off negotiations. The former rejected the provisional pay increase from Rs.72 to Rs. 80 a month as inadequate, pointing to the latest estimate of a government organ which showed that the cost of living for these labourers had risen by 100 per cent. The Government stated that its policy was to defer a final wage award to its unskilled workers until there was time to see what effect price controls already initiated might have in keeping down the cost of living.

129. On 16 June 1966, when the strike was extended to include the coir factory and Seychelles Tea Company workers, the Seychelles Workers' Union called on the United Nations to intercede to help end the dispute. Tension remained high until after Mr. F. A. René, the union's legal adviser, who, as stated above, is also a member of the Legislative Council and leader of the SPUP, had urged the workers to avoid violence.

130. The following day, when a landing party from the British destroyer *Carysfort* arrived at Victoria to give assistance to the police, the strikers dispersed peacefully. They returned to work on 20 June 1966, one day after the British frigate *Gurkha* with 250 officers and men had sailed from Aden for the Seychelles as an additional precautionary security move. The Government stated that it found it necessary to take measures to preserve public security after certain union members had resorted to intimidation in order to prevent others from working. The Government was prepared to reopen negotiations with the union concerned when it was satisfied that the security situation had returned to normal.

131. On 7 July 1966, the Secretary of State for the Colonies stated in reply to a question raised in the United Kingdom House of Commons that the situation in the Seychelles had now returned to normal.

Public health

132. Expenditure on medical services for the Territory in 1964 was estimated at Rs.1,235,640, or 15.09 per cent of its total budget, compared with Rs.1,141,277 in 1963 exclusive of Colonial Development and Welfare funds.

133. The Territory was practically free of epidemics in 1964. However, there has been a high incidence of venereal diseases in recent years. Under the United Nations Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance (EPTA), the Seychelles will receive assistance in a campaign against venereal diseases in 1965-1966.

134. The main islands of the Territory have four hospitals (208 beds), two clinics and a tuberculosis sanatorium that can accommodate ninety-two patients. The ratios of medical officers and hospital beds to the population are 1 to 3,006 and 1 to 213 persons, respectively.

Education conditions

135. In 1964 government expenditure on education was Rs.1,393,973, or 16.5 per cent of the total expenditure, compared with Rs.1,283,632, or 15.7 per cent, in 1963.

136. There were 8,516 children (4,146 boys and 4,370 girls) in all schools in 1964, compared with 8,156 children in 1963. The number of children in primary schools was 5,472. There were 2,916 students in secondary schools, thirty-one students at the Teachers Training College, forty-five students at the technical school, thirty students attending the special teachers' courses and twenty-two girls attending the nurses courses.

137. The educational system was modified in 1965. The primary course will take six years instead of four and will be available to all children. Primary school will be followed by junior secondary school (two years) and secondary school (three years) on a competitive basis.

3. St. Helena

General

138. The estimated population of St. Helena was 4,676 at the end of 1964, in comparison with 4,613 in 1963. The estimated population of Tristan da Cunha was 278. No recent figures are available on the population of Ascension Island, another dependency of St. Helena.

Political and constitutional developments

139. No changes have been reported in the political and constitutional fields since the Special Committee considered St. Helena in 1964.

Economic conditions

140. The area of St. Helena is forty-seven square miles, of which about 640 acres is arable land. Some five square miles is under flax, seven square miles are pasture, and some three square miles are established forest. Progress has been reported in better land usage. Some 95 per cent of the pasture areas has been fenced and subdivided and brought under a system of grazing control. A programme for continuing the development of natural resources and water supplies is being financed with Colonial Development and Welfare funds. An expenditure of some £18,000 was involved in 1964, and a further expenditure of some £19,600 a year until 1965 is planned.

141. The estimated area and production of each crop in 1964, in comparison with 1963, are shown below:

Crop	Area (acres)		Production (tons)	
	1963	1964	1963	1964
Flax (fibre and tow)...	3,350	3,350	1,016	1,411
Potatoes	100	100	200	200
Sweet potatoes	60	60	60	120
Vegetables	200	230	400	500
Cereals	50	50	20	50
Fodder (green)	200	200	600	600

142. The production of fibre, tow and rope in 1964, compared with that of 1963, was as follows:

	Tons		Value in pounds	
	1963	1964	1963	1964
Fibre	780	953	62,114	76,425
Tow	195	455	8,142	15,990
Rope and twine	41	2	4,500	221

143. In 1964, total public revenue was estimated at £277,771 (compared with £313,205 in 1963). Estimated expenditure was £277,771.

144. The value of the Island's exports in 1964 was £105,374 (£88,019 in 1963), all of which went to six countries: the United Kingdom (49.84 per cent), South Africa (39.17 per cent), France (6.83 per cent), Denmark (2.43 per cent), Sweden (1.33 per cent), Italy (0.35 per cent). The principal export commodities were fibre (£76,425) and tow (£15,990). Imports amounted to £309,974 (£279,678 in 1963), mainly from the United Kingdom (59.53 per cent) and South Africa (21.66 per cent).

145. A small harbour at Tristan da Cunha, a dependency of St. Helena, is being built from Colonial Development and Welfare funds. The total cost of the project is of the order of £80,000. When completed, it will enable shore-based fishing to be resumed. It is then expected that the fishing company will re-establish a freezing factory on the Island, which it is hoped will give employment to some Islanders.

Social conditions

Labour

146. At the end of 1964 there was a total of 145 men on unemployment relief (compared with ninety-eight men in 1963). An institution is maintained from the proceeds of a public rate in which the aged, destitute and infirm are cared for. In 1964, 113 necessitous persons were in receipt of outdoor relief in the form of food tickets and cash payments varying from 5/- to 8/- per week.

147. At the end of 1964, 150 men from St. Helena were employed at Ascension Island by Cable and Wireless Limited. One hundred fifteen men were also employed there by United States construction companies and fifty-eight by the Ministry of Public Buildings and Works.

148. According to information received from the United Kingdom Government, the labour situation has vastly changed since 1964, with the implementation of a salaries revision granting increases of 90 per cent per week to government labourers, with effect from July 1965. In consequence, the flax industry collapsed (its survival depended on low wages and a government subsidy), but this did not lead to unemployment in view of increased opportunities for work on communications and tracking projects (British Government Cable and Wireless, Ltd., United States Government and National Aeronautics and Space Administration) on St. Helena and Ascension.

Public health

149. No significant changes have been reported. Estimated expenditure for public health in 1964 was £27,762, or 10 per cent of the total budget of the Territory. There was a mild epidemic of chicken pox.

Educational conditions

150. Comprising approximately 26 per cent of the Island population, the average number of children attending school during 1964 was 1,184.

151. There were 58 full-time and three part-time teachers. A Colonial Development and Welfare scheme provides for five pupil-teacher scholarships which are awarded annually. These students undergo a year's training locally before they are appointed as pupil-teachers. After two further years' teaching in the schools, selection is made with a view to suitable candidates being sent on a three-year overseas course leading to the United Kingdom's Ministry of Education Teacher's certificate. In 1964, two pupil-teachers selected for overseas training under this policy left the Island for Stranmillis College, Northern Ireland. The Government also sends senior teachers on short courses in the United Kingdom from time to time. One head teacher left in 1964 for a year's course.

152. Estimated educational expenditure during 1964 was £22,895, or 8.4 per cent of the total government expenditure.

C. CONSIDERATION BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE

Introduction

153. The Special Committee considered Mauritius, Seychelles and St. Helena at its 396th and 470th meetings on 16 March and 6 October 1966. At its 470th meeting, the Special Committee had before it the report of Sub-Committee I concerning these Territories, which is annexed hereto.

Written petitions and hearing

154. The Special Committee had before it the following written petitions concerning Mauritius and Seychelles:

Petitioner	Document No.
<i>Mauritius</i>	
Mr. M. Ayaperoumall, President, Central Committee, Communist Party of Mauritius (CPM)	A/AC.109/PET.433
Mr. A. Bhunnoo	A/AC.109/PET.448 and Add.1
Mr. T. Sibsurun, Secretary-General, Mauritius People's Progressive Party	A/AC.109/PET.449 and Add.1 and 2
Mr. S. Ramgoolam, Premier of Mauritius and twelve others ..	A/AC.109/PET.479
<i>Seychelles</i>	
Seychelles Transport and General Workers Union, Seychelles Building and Construction Workers Union, and Seychelles People's United Party	A/AC.109/PET.533

155. The Special Committee heard the following petitioner concerning Mauritius:

Petitioner	Meeting
Mr. T. Sibsurun, Secretary-General, Mauritius People's Progressive Party	396th

156. *Mr. Teekaram Sibsorum* (Mauritius People's Progressive Party) read out the text of a petition which his party had submitted to the Special Committee on 30 August 1965 concerning the establishment of military bases in Mauritius (A/AC.109/PET.378/Add.1). He said that the population of Mauritius was opposed to the idea of bases, as had been shown by the protest demonstration staged by 100,000 inhabitants in December 1965. In September 1965, the Government of Mauritius had signed an agreement with the United Kingdom Government on the subject of the military base which the United States and the United Kingdom wanted to establish in Diego Garcia. The Government of Mauritius had never told the public about the agreement with the United Kingdom Government and the establishment of a nuclear base in the country. After the collapse of the coalition Government, the Parti Mauricien had disclosed the agreement to the people. His own party, the Mauritius People's Progressive Party, had been formed in 1963, when the rumours about the installation of a military base had started to circulate.

157. In addition, he said that there was widespread unemployment in Mauritius: out of a population of 750,000, 100,000 were unemployed. The white settlers owned all the best land and all the sugar-cane factories. Workers could not earn enough to support their families; because of a law forbidding them to work more than four days a week, they could earn only twenty rupees a week. In addition, there was an unemployment crisis, which the Government was unable to overcome.

158. Racial discrimination was found everywhere. In 1953, the United Kingdom Government had agreed at the constitutional talks that the Muslim Party would have six reserved seats, whether or not they were elected. In keeping with the United Kingdom policy of "divide and rule", there were various political parties which concerned themselves with individual racial groups.

159. The Mauritius People's Progressive Party made the following appeals: firstly, that Mauritius should be granted immediate and unconditional independence; secondly, that no military or nuclear defence bases should be established on their Territory; and thirdly, that the general elections to be held in June 1966 should be supervised by the United Nations in order to prevent bribery and corruption.

160. In answer to a question, he stated that general elections had been held in 1963. None of the four parties had won a majority and a coalition Government had therefore been imposed by the United Kingdom. There were fifty-two seats—forty-two elected and ten nominated by the Government. The Parti Mauricien had seven seats, the Independent Forward Bloc nine, the Muslim Party six and the Labour Party twenty.

161. In answer to a further question, he said that his party had asked the Governor of Mauritius for permission to participate in the Constitutional Conference held in London in September 1965. They had been told that they were not entitled to do so and that only ministers who were members of the Government and the Legislative Council would be allowed to participate. The requests of other parties for permission to attend as observers had also been denied.

Statements by members

162. The representative of the *United Kingdom* said that his delegation's comments would deal with the con-

clusions and recommendations in the report and would be essentially factual.

163. The conclusions and recommendations fell into three main categories: firstly, the constitutional and political progress of the Territories of Mauritius, the Seychelles and St. Helena; secondly, the detachment from Mauritius and the Seychelles of the British Indian Ocean Territory; and thirdly, the economic situation in the Territories.

164. With regard to the constitutional questions, his delegation had informed the Sub-Committee of major steps taken in each of the three Territories. In Mauritius, it had been decided after the Constitutional Conference in November 1965 that, if the newly elected Legislative Assembly requested independence, the United Kingdom Government would accept that request and independence would be achieved after a six-month period of full internal self-government following the new elections. Following the recommendations of an independent electoral commissioner and a subsequent visit to the Territory by a United Kingdom Minister to discuss these recommendations, full agreement among all political parties in Mauritius had been reached on a new electoral system. Registration had begun, with a team of Commonwealth observers present, and the elections would be held early in 1967. If the party favouring independence won the elections and asked for independence, independence could thus come about by the middle of 1967.

165. In the Seychelles, the elected Legislative Council had asked the United Kingdom Government to express a view on the Council's desire that there should be no change in the relationship between the United Kingdom and the Territory. In his reply, the United Kingdom Secretary of State for the Colonies had acknowledged that desire and had suggested that the time had come for further constitutional advance, including a move to abolish the minor property and literacy qualifications for the franchise and thus move to full universal adult suffrage. A Constitutional Commissioner had visited the Territory for extensive consultations with all shades of opinion and his recommendations on the various paths of constitutional evolution open to the Seychelles were being examined.

166. In St. Helena, the Governor had undertaken extensive consultations with all sections of the community and had reached virtually unanimous agreement on a set of constitutional proposals which would represent a considerable transfer of powers and responsibility to local hands. His Government was now studying those proposals.

167. None of that progress, however, had found a place in the Sub-Committee's conclusions and recommendations. There was no mention of the prospect of independence for Mauritius within a few months. There was no mention of the consultative processes leading to fresh constitutional proposals for the Seychelles and St. Helena. There was not even any recognition that the Legislatures of Mauritius and St. Helena were already elected by universal adult suffrage and that the United Kingdom Government itself had proposed a move to universal suffrage for the Seychelles. Indeed, the report asserted that the Seychelles people were "deprived" of universal suffrage and it characterized the political development in the Territories as "slow". It blindly recommended that elections on the basis of universal adult suffrage should be held as soon as possible, thus completely ignoring the facts and the decisions that had been taken.

168. With regard to the conclusions and recommendations relating to the detachment of certain small atolls in the Indian Ocean from Mauritius and the Seychelles, his delegation had already explained the matter in its statement to the Fourth Committee at its 1558th meeting on 16 November 1965. It had made it clear that the new arrangements represented an administrative readjustment which had been fully agreed after consultations with the elected Governments of Mauritius and the Seychelles. The atolls did not form any geographical, political or ethnic union with those Territories and had previously been administered as part of Mauritius and the Seychelles purely as a matter of administrative convenience. The interests of their few inhabitants, almost all migrant labourers from Mauritius and the Seychelles, were fully protected under the new arrangements. No decisions had yet been reached about the construction of any facilities in the British Indian Ocean Territory. The suggestion (see para. 46 above) that the resignation of three Ministers from the Mauritius Government had been in protest at the principle or objectives involved in the detachment of the atolls was inaccurate, as had been shown by the public statements of the Ministers at the time. In view of the fact that the two elected Governments had agreed to the detachment, his delegation could not accept the suggestions in the Sub-Committee's report that the new arrangements violated the territorial integrity of the Territories. Furthermore, his delegation knew of no supporting evidence for the assertions (see annex, para. 55) alleging anxiety about reports that military bases in Mauritius or the Seychelles were envisaged, since there were no such bases in either Territory and, to the best of his delegation's knowledge, no plans for any such bases. There were certain minor facilities which were not bases; there were the naval wireless station in Mauritius and an airfield which was used occasionally by the Royal Air Force but primarily by the Mauritius Government for purely civilian purposes. His delegation knew of no evidence that those minor facilities had caused anxiety to anyone in the Territories concerned.

169. With regard to paragraph 63 of the recommendations of Sub-Committee I (see annex), the clear legal position was, had been and remained that until independence the administering Power alone had the authority to enter into international commitments or agreements affecting its dependent Territories. His delegation could not, therefore, accept that recommendation. He would point out, however, that in recent times the United Kingdom Government had certainly not concluded any agreements with other countries affecting the basic interests of United Kingdom colonial Territories without the fullest consultation beforehand with the representatives of the Territory concerned.

170. Finally, his delegation regretted that paragraph 57 of the conclusions and paragraph 64 of the recommendations paid no regard to the information supplied by his delegation to the Sub-Committee about the economies of the Territories and about United Kingdom Government aid to them. His delegation had made it clear that 1963 had been an exceptional year for sugar prices and that that had a marked effect on the economy of Mauritius; in interpreting the annual statistics it could not be deduced from a comparison of the 1963 and 1964 figures that there was a significant economic decline. He knew of no evidence to support the allegation in paragraph 57 that foreign companies were exploiting or otherwise acting contrary

to the interests of the Territories. It was difficult to attach any meaning to the reference to "indigenous inhabitants" in paragraph 64, since the islands had been uninhabited when they had first been discovered, and no section of their inhabitants was more "indigenous" than any other.

171. On all three counts, therefore, the conclusions and recommendations seemed either to ignore or to misrepresent the basic and significant facts of the situation in the three Territories concerned. His delegation could not accept the conclusions or recommendations and he reserved his Government's position on them.

172. The representative of *Italy* said that during the twentieth session of the General Assembly his delegation had abstained in the vote of resolution 2066 (XX) on Mauritius and had voted against the paragraph of General Assembly resolution 2105 (XX) that dealt with the so-called problem of military bases in colonial Territories. He therefore reserved his delegation's position on the report under consideration.

173. The representative of the *United Republic of Tanzania* said that, as a member of Sub-Committee I, he had not been surprised to hear the United Kingdom representative disagree with the contents of the report, which was aimed at correcting the many wrongs committed by the United Kingdom Government against the people of the Territories concerned.

174. The United Kingdom representative had spoken about the revised electoral system. The Tanzanian representative in Sub-Committee I had studied the statement issued by the United Kingdom delegation and had found that system to be very complicated. Indeed, the United Kingdom representative had been obliged to explain the system in detail to the Sub-Committee.

175. With regard to the slow pace of political development referred to in paragraph 64 of the report, since the Territories had been under United Kingdom control for about 150 years, it was clear that they should have made far more progress. The Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples had been proclaimed in 1960; it is now six years later and the United Kingdom has not implemented it. The Sub-Committee had therefore been justified in noting the slow pace of political development. The people of the Territories were demanding their inalienable and sovereign rights and the United Kingdom Government was withholding those rights. The conclusions and recommendations were therefore in keeping with the facts.

176. The United Kingdom representative had said that the British Indian Ocean Territory was not part of Mauritius and the Seychelles. The Tanzanian delegation rejected that argument, since the United Kingdom Government would not have agreed to pay compensation to the inhabitants of the islands concerned if those islands were not an integral part of Mauritius and the Seychelles.

177. The United Kingdom representative had said that he disagreed with the Sub-Committee's conclusion relating to the establishment of military bases in Mauritius and the Seychelles. The Tanzanian delegation would like to hear a formal denial from that representative; it might even propose that a visiting mission should be dispatched to the Territories to ascertain the facts.

178. In keeping with its traditional opposition to colonialism and neo-colonialism, his delegation fully supported paragraph 63 (see annex), which dealt with agreements concluded between the administering Powers affecting the sovereignty and fundamental rights of the Territories.

179. The representative of *Australia* said that, on the basis of the facts just presented by the United Kingdom representative, his delegation considered that the conclusions and recommendations in the report were unfounded. It therefore reserved its position on the report.

180. The representative of *Denmark* said that the reservations expressed by his delegation at the 32nd meeting of Sub-Committee I were still valid.

181. The representative of the *United States of America* said that his delegation did not support all the conclusions and recommendations in the report. In particular, it endorsed the reservations made by the Danish representative at the 30th meeting of the Sub-Committee.

182. The United States delegation considered the emphasis on military facilities entirely unwarranted, especially in the light of the remarks of the United Kingdom representative.

183. With regard to the reference to paragraph 12 of General Assembly resolution 2105 (XX), members would recall that at the time of the adoption of the resolution the United States had pointed out that certain paragraphs were null and void because they had not been adopted in accordance with the provisions of the Charter.

184. Lastly, the report did not take sufficient account of the efforts of the administering Power and the people of the Territories which were leading to self-determination, and nothing about the possibility that Mauritius might become independent by the middle of 1967.

185. The representative of the *Union of Soviet Socialist Republics* disagreed with the representative of Australia that, on the basis of the facts which had just been presented by the United Kingdom representative, the conclusions and recommendations in the Sub-Committee's report was unfounded. When the question of Mauritius, the Seychelles and St. Helena had been studied thoroughly by Sub-Committee I, the Special Committee and the General Assembly in 1964, the United Kingdom representative had painted a rosy picture of the situation, but the dismal truth had nevertheless emerged. At the current meeting, the United Kingdom representative had objected that the report made no reference to political and economic progress in the Territories and that the recommendations, especially those concerning military bases, were incorrect. He agreed with the representative of Tanzania that, as six years had elapsed since the adoption of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples progress had indeed been slow, since the Declaration had still not been implemented in the Territories.

186. As for the economic situation, foreign monopolies were depriving the local inhabitants of the opportunity to participate in the economic life of the Territories. All the land in Mauritius which did not belong to the Crown was owned by foreign companies and big landowners, and two thirds of all the arable land in the Seychelles belonged to a small group of planters. The colonial structure of the economy of the

Territories, which was based mainly on the cultivation of a single crop, made them entirely dependent on the metropolitan country.

187. The United Kingdom representative had said that the progress achieved had not been taken into account. Yet even the working paper prepared by the Secretariat, which, it must be agreed, was objective, had stated that in 1964 the total production of the agricultural and manufacturing industries had declined and that in 1965 the general economic situation had continued to deteriorate (see paras. 15 and 59 above). According to the *Christian Science Monitor* of 6 June 1965, out of a total population of more than 750,000 in Mauritius, less than 100,000 were employed, and most of those on seasonal work. The Secretariat working paper had also referred to the increasing level of unemployment. In protest against the desperate economic situation, the inhabitants had organized strikes. In May 1965, serious disturbances had broken out in Mauritius and, according to the *Christian Science Monitor*, had been suppressed by British troops. In June 1966, a strike called in the Seychelles had been ended by the colonial Power with the help of military units from Aden and United Kingdom naval vessels. The United Kingdom representative had omitted to mention those incidents, which were yet another example of the criminal use of military bases against a people struggling for freedom and independence and a better standard of living; instead, he had reserved his delegation's position on the question of military bases and had claimed that military bases did not impede the development of the population.

188. The Secretariat working paper (see para. 148 above) referred to the use of St. Helena and Ascension Island by the United Kingdom and United States for special communications and tracking projects and *The Times* (London) of 14 February 1965 had stated that Ascension Island might be used as a base for F.111 bombers. The Secretariat working paper quoted the United Kingdom Secretary of State for the Colonies concerning the establishment of the British Indian Ocean Territory and the plans for the construction of defence facilities there (see para. 41 above), yet the United Kingdom representative had claimed that there were no such plans. Both the United Kingdom newspaper *The Scotsman* and the United States magazine *Time* had reported that the Territory could be used as a base for atomic submarines and bomber aircraft, and might even be used as a platform for rocket launchings. A petition from the President of the Seychelles People's United Party (A/AC.109/PET.321) had protested about the prospect of an Anglo-American military base in the Territory, and the Secretariat working paper described the discontent among the Mauritians over the scheme (see para. 47 above). The Governments and peoples of many independent countries were strongly opposed to the construction of such bases, which represented an attempt to perpetuate the colonial system and constituted a threat to the independence of countries and to the peace and security of peoples.

189. The Secretariat working paper (see para. 48 above) quoted the United Kingdom Secretary of State for Defence as saying that his Government did not propose to make any modification of the scheme to establish the British Indian Ocean Territory as an Anglo-American military base following the adoption by the General Assembly of resolution 2066 (XX). The United Kingdom Government, therefore, had not only failed to implement the Declaration on the Grant-

ing of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, but had violated the territorial integrity of the Territories in question. The United Kingdom's policy was fully supported by the United States, which was exerting pressure on the United Kingdom to maintain a presence east of Suez.

190. The United Kingdom Government was reported to be prepared to pay compensation for the part of the British Indian Ocean Territory which had belonged to Mauritius. The right of a people to self-determination could not be the subject of bargaining and the United Kingdom's transaction should be condemned, particularly since it was aimed at transforming a Territory into a base for aggression against the people of Asia and Africa.

191. The recommendations of Sub-Committee I had been dictated by conditions in the Territories. Only their unconditional implementation would enable the people of Mauritius, Seychelles and St. Helena to exercise their right to self-determination and to express their wishes freely concerning the future status of the Territories. The conclusions and recommendations submitted by Sub-Committee I had been fully confirmed by the facts available and were the very minimum acceptable to the Special Committee.

192. The representative of Syria asked the United Kingdom representative why Mauritius was still not independent when the Prime Minister of the Territory had stated unequivocally that it would be ready for independence by the middle of 1964. The United Kingdom representative had said that independence would be granted by the middle of 1967, but this statement was clothed with so many conditions that it had failed to convince the Sub-Committee. He would like to know whether the United Kingdom representative was in a position to say that the administering Power was ready to grant independence without conditions.

193. On the question of constitutional progress, he could not see the advantages of the complex electoral system introduced by the administering Power. Such constitutional arrangements should be left for the people themselves to decide after independence.

194. As for military bases, the fear had been strengthened by the United Kingdom representative's statement that negotiations with the United States concerned only certain facilities. The negotiations were apparently secret and the people's consent had consequently not been obtained. The United Kingdom representative had been asked which representatives of the people of Mauritius had taken part in the negotiations, but he had not replied.

195. The pace of progress should be considered in the light of 156 years of colonial rule. In that light, progress had indeed been slow.

196. As a general remark, he asked what the reservations of certain Powers meant concerning United Nations recommendations which were based on fact. Those Powers which had an opportunity to do so did nothing to alleviate the sufferings of the colonial peoples involved and that made it impossible to ensure that United Nations resolutions were respected.

197. The representative of the *United Kingdom*, replying to the representative of Syria, repeated his statement that if the party favouring independence won the elections and asked for independence, independence could come about by the middle of 1967. There was therefore only one condition for independence by that

date, namely a decision by the people, through their newly elected representatives, to ask for it.

198. The representative of the USSR had stated that his delegation had omitted to mention the strike in the Seychelles. Far from suppressing such information, his delegation had drawn the Sub-Committee's attention to terms on which the strike in the Seychelles had been settled (see annex, para. 24). He had also understood the USSR representative to say that the strike in Mauritius had been suppressed by British troops. The facts were that when some British sailors had gone ashore, a crowd of local inhabitants had cheered the party and had been relieved to see them, that football matches had subsequently been arranged and that the visit had been entirely cordial.

199. The USSR representative had said a great deal about the British Indian Ocean Territory. He had nothing to add to his delegation's various statements on the subject and he asked the members of the Special Committee to pay attention to those statements rather than to speculate on reports mentioned by the Soviet representative.

200. As for the remarks concerning the slow pace of progress in the Territories, in the opinion of his delegation the only valid yardstick for the speed of political progress was the wishes of the people of the Territories themselves. By that yardstick, progress had most certainly not been slow. The Tanzanian representative was at liberty to disagree with the people of the Territories about their wishes, but the administering Power was equally at liberty to base itself on the wishes of the inhabitants rather than on the views expressed by the representatives of Tanzania, the USSR and Syria.

201. The representative of the *United Republic of Tanzania* said that he did not claim to speak for the people of the Territories but that the United Kingdom had no right to do so either. His country would always speak in support of the rights of all peoples to control their own national territory and to exercise their sovereign rights; it considered it its duty to oppose all those who committed aggression or annexed other territories.

202. The representative of *Poland* thanked the members of Sub-Committee I for their illuminating report. He was particularly pleased that the Sub-Committee had focused its attention on the implementation, or rather non-implementation of General Assembly resolution 2066 (XX). He fully shared the view expressed by the representative of Syria in the Sub-Committee that the motives of the United Kingdom Government were twofold, namely to assure the permanence of the privileges of the minority of settlers and to use the Territories for strategic purposes against the wishes of the people of the Islands. It was immaterial whether they were called bases or "minor facilities"; the fact was that military installations did exist there and that there were plans to expand them, as had been reported in the United Kingdom and United States Press and in the Secretariat working paper. He would be glad to hear a clear statement from the United Kingdom representative that such information was false and that there were not and would not be any military installations in the Territories.

203. At its twentieth session the General Assembly had adopted resolution 2066 (XX), which included specific provisions to be implemented by the United Kingdom to enable the people of the Territories to ex-

ercise their right to self-determination in accordance with resolution 1514 (XV). The conclusions and recommendations in paragraphs 53 to 64 of the Sub-Committee's report elaborated the steps which should have been taken and were only the logical consequence of the Sub-Committee's findings. A resolution should be submitted to the General Assembly in those terms. His delegation fully supported the recommendations, especially those calling upon the administering Power to respect the territorial integrity of Mauritius and Seychelles and to refrain from establishing military bases there.

D. ACTION TAKEN BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON THE REPORT OF SUB-COMMITTEE I

204. At its 470th meeting on 6 October 1966, the Special Committee adopted without objection the report of Sub-Committee I on Mauritius, Seychelles and St. Helena, and endorsed the conclusions and recommendations therein (see annex, paras. 53-64), it being understood that the reservations expressed by some members would be reflected in the records.

ANNEX

[A/AC.109/L.335]

Report of Sub-Committee I

Mauritius, Seychelles and St. Helena

Rapporteur: Mr. Rafic JOUÉJATI (Syria)

CONTENTS

	Paragraphs
INTRODUCTION	1-3
CONSIDERATION BY THE SUB-COMMITTEE	4-65
A. Statements by members	4-52
B. Conclusions	53-57
C. Recommendations	58-64
D. Adoption of the report	65

INTRODUCTION

1. The Sub-Committee considered Mauritius, Seychelles and St. Helena at its 28th, 29th, 30th and 32nd meetings held on 12 August, 9, 12 and 19 September 1966.

2. The Sub-Committee had before it the working papers prepared by the Secretariat (see paras. 1-152 of chapter XIV).

3. In accordance with the procedure agreed upon by the Special Committee, the Chairman invited the representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to participate in the consideration of the three Territories. Accordingly, the representative of the United Kingdom participated in the 29th, 30th and 32nd meetings of the Sub-Committee.

CONSIDERATION BY THE SUB-COMMITTEE

A. Statements by members

4. The representative of the *Union of Soviet Socialist Republics* recalled that the situation in Mauritius, Seychelles and St. Helena had been studied very thoroughly by the Sub-Committee, the Special Committee and the General Assembly in 1964. That study had revealed the true situation in those Territories and had shown that the administering Power had not applied to them the provisions of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples but, on the contrary, had done everything possible to retard their attainment of independence.

5. The economic and social status of the inhabitants of the islands was deplorable. The administering Power had deprived them of the wealth which was theirs by right and, by granting concessions to foreign monopolies, had made it impossible for them to progress economically. In Mauritius and Seychelles, for example, two thirds of the arable land had been turned over to groups of planters. Without land, the inhabitants were forced to seek work on the plantations at starvation wages or else rent land. The economy was still very largely based on a single crop, which made the Territories entirely dependent on the metropolitan country. The inhabitants' standard of living was declining. The population was reduced to despair, and discontent was growing daily. In May 1965, serious disturbances had broken out in Mauritius, where the economic situation was steadily deteriorating, and the administering Power had used the Army to suppress the protests. In June 1966, a strike had been called in the Seychelles and the United Kingdom Government had brought in military units from Aden to disperse the strikers and prevent them from expressing their discontent. It was thus apparent that the administering Power was ignoring the recommendations of the General Assembly and the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. The Special Committee and the General Assembly should therefore continue to study the question and formulate recommendations calling upon the United Kingdom to take prompt action to enable the Territories to attain independence immediately in accordance with the provisions of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV).

6. The negative attitude of the administering Power was based on strategic considerations. The establishment of the new British Indian Ocean Territory, which would form the basis of a United Kingdom-United States security system, was a threat directed against the new countries of Africa and Asia, and it fully justified the fears expressed by the non-aligned countries at the Cairo Conference. The inhabitants were opposed to the idea of transforming the Territories into defensive bastions intended not only for the suppression of the nationalist movements in the islands themselves but also for use by the colonialists against those who were fighting for freedom in that part of the world. A petition (A/AC.109/PET.321) from the President of the Seychelles People's United Party protested against the construction of a military base, and demonstrations had been held in Mauritius for the same purpose (see para. 47 of chap. XIV). According to *The Times* of London of 14 February 1966, an air base was to be built on Ascension Island; an article published in the American magazine *Time* on 19 December 1965 had stated that certain nearby atolls might be used as a base for submarines equipped with Polaris missiles. The Indian people, among others, were aroused at the prospect that new hotbeds of aggression would be created in the Indian Ocean, for those plans threatened not only the independence of certain peoples but also world peace. The United Kingdom Government did not propose to modify its scheme to convert the islands into a military base (see para. 48 of chap. XIV). The United Kingdom was thus in effect hurling a challenge at the United Nations, for it was not only doing nothing to apply the Declaration embodied in resolution 1514 (XV) but also failing to respect the territorial integrity of the islands and defying the provisions of the resolution calling for the dismantling of military bases. One had only to read the Press to see that the United Kingdom was being encouraged by the United States and other imperialist Powers; during the Washington talks held earlier in the year between the United Kingdom Foreign Secretary and the United States Secretary of State concerning the development of military bases, the Australian Government had announced that large sums were to be allocated for military construction in Papua and New Guinea.

7. In order to eliminate colonialism as quickly as possible from Mauritius, Seychelles and St. Helena, his delegation suggested that the Sub-Committee should recommend the Special Committee to take decisions to the effect that: (1) the right to self-determination and independence of Mauritius, Seychelles and St. Helena and their dependencies should be reaffirmed; (2) elections should be held on the basis of uni-

versal adult suffrage; (3) following such elections, representative bodies exercising full powers should be established; (4) all land should be restored to the indigenous inhabitants; (5) the right of the indigenous inhabitants to dispose of all the natural resources of their Territories should be preserved; (6) military bases should be removed; (7) all agreements imposed on the Territories which limited the sovereignty and fundamental rights of the peoples concerned should be abrogated; (8) enterprises of the metropolitan country should refrain from any actions prejudicial to the integrity of the Territories; (9) any use of military bases should be condemned.

8. His delegation would support any recommendations which the Special Committee might adopt with a view to attaining those ends.

9. The representative of *Syria* noted that, despite the clear and straightforward recommendations made by the Sub-Committee in 1965 and subsequently adopted by the Special Committee, the question of Mauritius, Seychelles and St. Helena had to be taken up once again, because the administering Power, notwithstanding its disclaimers, was not yet willing to transfer full powers to the democratically elected representatives of the inhabitants. He did not believe that the reason for the delay was a desire for a better preparation for independence and self-determination. In fact, the administering Power had made but small contribution to accelerating the process of emancipation; it surrounded the idea of independence with all sorts of conditions which cast doubt on its good faith. The reforms which had been introduced in recent years were due entirely to the initiative and toil of the indigenous Government. In reality, during 156 years of British rule, nothing significant had been done to provide for the welfare of the masses of the people, who were exposed to extremely unfavourable meteorological conditions, to spread education or to prepare in the Territories cadres sufficiently enlightened to assume the responsibilities of government, development and industrialization.

10. He submitted that the United Kingdom Government's motives were twofold: to assure the permanence of the privileges of the tiny minority of settlers, and to use the Territories for strategic purposes against the wishes of the people of those islands and of the surrounding areas. *Syria* regarded the information given by the USSR representative on the Anglo-American plan to establish military bases in the Garcia Islands as extremely serious; the Special Committee should thoroughly investigate the matter and weigh its gravity.

11. Why, after all, did the administering Power wish to maintain the obsolete institution of the Governor, who was foreign to the country and foreign to its culture, its outlook and its aspirations, who appointed and dismissed unbound by the advice of the Public Service Commission who robbed the indigenous representatives of their legitimate right to care for their own internal security and external affairs and who, while he was supposed to act in accordance with the advice of the Executive Council, was nevertheless authorized to act against its advice?

12. Why should more than one quarter of the national representatives be nominated by the Governor, and not elected by the people, and why should the Governor, and not the representatives themselves, select the Speaker of their Assembly? Why should he have the last say on expenditure, when the island needed large funds for development? Why should bills require his assent and, worse still, why could a bill rejected by the Legislative Council be put into effect by him if he considered it expedient?

13. Of course, the administering Power had a ready answer to those questions: the country was not yet independent, it was only in the experimental stages of internal self-government. Naturally, the administering Power, invoking apparently plausible reasons of balance, objectivity and reason, wanted it to be believed that the Territories were not ready for independence and self-determination. The Special Committee was very sceptical about the alleged pace of preparation undertaken by the administering Power; moreover, it firmly believed that the problems of poverty, under-development, illiteracy,

cleavage between rich and poor and social injustice could not be solved by the administering Power, but would be overcome by the inhabitants themselves when they were independent and could freely decide their own future, their own form of government and the best way of meeting their own needs and when they would receive assistance from the community of nations in equality, equity and dignity. Credence should be given to the Chief Minister, Mr. Ramgoolam, when he asserted that the country should have achieved independence by the middle of 1964, and not to the administering Power, which invoked the need for a process of constitutional progress as a pretext for the continued denial of legitimate rights to the peoples in question.

14. The representative of *Mali* stated that the situation in Mauritius, Seychelles and St. Helena was a subject of serious concern to his Government. In Mauritius, there was a racial problem which the administering Power had kept alive with a view to perpetuating its domination, in accordance with the principle "divide and rule". It was in obedience to that principle that the United Kingdom Government had appointed the Banwell Commission to make recommendations on the electoral system.

15. *Mali* believed that the constitution of a country and all related questions were essentially matters for that country's people to decide. The administering Power had no right to make self-government and independence for the Territory conditional on full agreement among the political parties concerning a constitution which did not meet the legitimate aspirations of the indigenous inhabitants. In his view, the setting up of the Banwell Commission was simply a manoeuvre designed to perpetuate the United Kingdom presence in the Territory simply in order the better to exploit its wealth and its people; for while the attention of the Mauritians was centred on constitutional problems, the British companies were continuing to pillage the country, whose economy was in a catastrophic condition. Mauritius could not be considered in isolation in that connexion; attention must also be given to conditions in Seychelles and St. Helena, whose climate, owing to their geographical position, was ideal for diversified cultivation. Yet sugar plantations covered a total of 215,800 acres and tea plantations 6,600 acres, leaving only 17,600 acres for other food crops, and the Mauritians, and for that matter the inhabitants of Seychelles and St. Helena also, were forced to import foodstuffs from the United Kingdom and elsewhere. Thus, the decline of the Mauritian economy noted in the working paper was not surprising. In the fourth quarter of 1965, the public debt had amounted to 264 million rupees, or 18 million rupees more than in the corresponding quarter of 1964. That loss to the Territories swelled the excessive profits of the British companies, and that was why the administering Power was refusing to allow self-government and independence for the Territories. Sugar exports had fallen from 334.2 million rupees in 1964 to 289.7 million rupees in 1965, while the profits of the British companies were on the increase. Meanwhile there was heavy unemployment in the island and the Government was advising the indigenous inhabitants to go abroad to work, so that it could make greater military use of the island. He remembered the statement made by the petitioner concerning the intention of the United Kingdom and the United States to turn the island into a military base for aggression. It was interesting to recall the United Kingdom Prime Minister's recent statement that any Power called upon to participate in United Nations peace-keeping operations would have to be on the spot or in a position to go there, and that the United Kingdom could not ignore the fact that its partners wanted it to be able to exert enough influence in Asia and Africa to neutralize existing or potential centres of infection. According to the Prime Minister's own words, the United Kingdom Government had sought to abandon the system of large military bases in populated areas and to establish itself in areas which were virtually devoid of indigenous inhabitants and from which its forces would be able to move to the theatre of operations rapidly and at minimum expense. That statement, especially if it was recalled what had happened in Ascension Island two years previously, needed no comment.

16. Mali was opposed to military bases which were meant for aggression and which prevented the peace-loving peoples of the Territories, notably Mauritius, Seychelles and St. Helena, from enjoying their right to self-determination and independence. Consequently, his delegation again appealed to the administering Power to fulfil its obligations by enabling the indigenous people to attain independence, in accordance with their freely expressed desire, in the best conditions. The constitutional problem should not prevent the granting of self-government in the near future, since the Territory must attain independence as soon as possible. The establishment of the military base in the area was an unlawful act. The United Kingdom should dismantle the base and replace it with hospitals and schools, which the people certainly needed much more.

17. The representative of the *United Kingdom* said he assumed that the statement made by the Soviet Union representative at the 28th meeting of the Sub-Committee on 12 August, as it appeared in the provisional summary record, would be extensively rewritten. The new arrangements for the administration of certain small islands represented an administrative readjustment freely worked out with the Governments and elected representatives of the Territories concerned. No decisions had yet been reached by either the United Kingdom Government or the United States Government on the construction of any facilities anywhere in the British Indian Ocean Territory.

18. Since the representative of the Soviet Union had suggested that the Sub-Committee should recommend the Special Committee to take steps to ensure that all land was restored to the indigenous inhabitants of those Territories and that the rights of those inhabitants to dispose of the natural resources of the islands were preserved, he recalled that the United Kingdom delegation had already pointed out that the first human inhabitants of Mauritius and the Seychelles had come from France and those of St. Helena from the United Kingdom. He wondered whether the indigenous inhabitants to whom the representative of the Soviet Union was referring were the dodos and tortoises—the sole occupants of the islands before the Europeans had arrived.

19. At the twentieth session of the General Assembly, the Fourth Committee had discussed the question of Mauritius. The Electoral Commission, established in December 1965, under the chairmanship of Sir Harold Banwell, had recommended in February 1966 that there should be twenty three-member constituencies for Mauritius and one two-member constituency for Rodriguez, giving a total of sixty-two seats to be filled by direct suffrage. Five additional "corrective" seats would be filled, to be allocated, one at a time, to the party which had the highest average number of votes per seat won; a "good loser" candidate of that party, belonging to the community least well represented, would then be declared elected. These "corrective" seats, however, would be awarded only to parties which had secured 10 per cent of the total poll and had won at least one constituency seat. Also, under a "variable corrective", any party with 25 per cent of the votes should have its seats increased up to 25 per cent if necessary by the appointment to the Legislature of the requisite number of "good losers". The United Kingdom Government had accepted the Banwell Commission's recommendations in full, but the three parties forming the Coalition Government had protested. Only the leader of the Opposition party, the Parti Mauricien Social Démocrate, had welcomed the report. Most of the opposition had been directed towards the "correctives", i.e., the measures designed to provide assurances to minorities on the island that they would be adequately represented in Parliament and therefore that the main clauses of the Constitution should not be amended without their agreement.

20. In the course of a visit to Mauritius by a British Minister, full agreement among all political parties had been reached on a system of seventy seats in twenty three-member constituencies; sixty members would be elected by block voting (each voter being obliged to cast his full three votes). Two members would be elected for Rodriguez by block voting. In addition, there would be eight "best loser" seats. The first four

such seats would be reserved, irrespective of party, for communities under-represented in the Legislative Assembly after the constituency elections. The remaining four "best loser" seats would be allocated on the basis of party, without any qualifying requirement for a minimum number of seats or votes. That system would guarantee the fair distribution of seats among the various communities, on the one hand, and the different parties, on the other. Registration was due to begin on 5 September, but because of Ramadan the elections could not be held before February 1967. If a majority of the new Legislature favoured independence, Mauritius would therefore be able to achieve independence after six months of internal self-government, i.e., during the summer of 1967.

21. Pursuant to the Banwell Commission's recommendations, a team of observers from Commonwealth countries had been established under the chairmanship of Sir Colin McGregor, formerly Chief Justice of Jamaica. Some of them would be present in Mauritius from the outset of the registration of electors.

22. The establishment of the Banwell Commission had not been in any sense a delaying manoeuvre, as the representative of Mali had implied, because agreement had finally been reached and independence was conditional upon the outcome of the elections. That had been the most appropriate procedure, because of the divisions of opinion concerning the ultimate status of the Territory. The United Kingdom Government continued to regard independence as the right solution and would take all possible steps to ensure that Mauritius became independent as soon as possible.

23. He pointed out in connexion with the economic conditions in Mauritius referred to in the working paper, that 1963 had been in some respects an exceptional year with a record production of sugar and very high exports because of the international sugar shortage during that year. In fact, the receipts from sugar exports in 1964, although lower than those in 1963, had still been well above those in 1961 and 1962. Again, sugar production in 1965 had shown an increase compared with 1964. The Mauritius and United Kingdom Governments had taken measures to maintain the pace of economic development in Mauritius. In addition to receiving grant funds (\$US6.7 million allocated for development for 1965-1968 and nearly \$13 million in further grants and loans for cyclone reconstruction), it should be remembered that Mauritius enjoyed an outlet at guaranteed preferential prices under the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement (currently more than £47 a ton compared with the world price of about £17); the preferential price applied to an estimated 75 per cent of Mauritius sugar exports.

24. With regard to the Seychelles, he drew attention to the main developments since July 1964 and in particular to the exchange of dispatches between the Colonial Secretary and the Governor, a useful summary of which was to be found in the working paper (see para. 98 of chap. XIV). The Legislative Council had asked the United Kingdom Government for a response to its proposal that the Territory should remain British or be integrated with Britain. The Colonial Secretary had replied acknowledging the Council's desire for no change in the present relationship and suggesting that the Territory should now drop the minor qualifications for voting and move to universal suffrage. He also suggested apportioning departmental responsibilities to non-official members of the Executive Council and the appointment of a Constitutional Commissioner who would visit the Seychelles and consult all shades of opinion, including parties and individuals, before reporting on the future constitutional evolution of the Territory. The Commissioner had accordingly been appointed and had visited the Seychelles and submitted his report, which was under consideration. A strike had taken place in the Seychelles, but the strikers had returned to work, having accepted an interim wage award equivalent to an 11.1 per cent increase. His delegation thought that that information should answer the Syrian representative's questions concerning low wages in the Seychelles.

25. The Seychelles were receiving under the Colonial Development and Welfare Acts increased assistance in grants,

part of which had been allocated towards development schemes (\$3.36 million for 1966-1968) and the remainder towards the Seychelles budget.

26. There had been a number of major economic and social developments in St. Helena since 1964, which were briefly described in the working paper. Government labourers had received a pay increase of 90 per cent with effect from July 1965. That had caused the collapse of the flax industry but had not caused unemployment, owing to the other employment opportunities available.

27. The Governor of St. Helena had transmitted to the Colonial Secretary a dispatch in which he had referred to consultations which had taken place with a representative cross-section of the community in regard to possible further constitutional advance. The Advisory Council had adopted a resolution welcoming the proposed revisions of the Constitution and asking the United Kingdom Government for approval. Under the proposals, which had been almost unanimously agreed among the inhabitants of the Territory, the Advisory Council would be replaced by a Legislative Council which would include four additional elected members, bringing the total number of these to twelve. The Council would also have six nominated non-officials and two nominated officials. The Council would enact legislation, the Governor possessing certain reserve powers for use in exceptional circumstances. He would appoint committees of the Council as appropriate and delegate powers and departmental responsibilities to them. Those committees would include special experts as necessary and a majority of members drawn from the Legislative Council. The Executive Council would consist of two officials and the chairman of the Legislative Council committees. The Public Service would remain the responsibility of the Governor. The Governor had expressed his belief that those changes would enable the people of the Territory to take a much more effective and responsible part in the regulation of their own affairs.

28. The Territory already had universal adult suffrage and elections had been held in 1963. Significant and progressive developments had thus taken place in the political and constitutional evolution of the three groups of islands, in each case with the full participation and in consultation with the peoples of the Territories themselves and their democratically elected representatives.

29. The representative of the *Union of Soviet Socialist Republics* said that the United Kingdom representative's statement was intended only to confuse and to keep the United Kingdom Government from having to say what it intended to do to carry out the resolutions of the General Assembly and the Special Committee. The United Kingdom representative had spoken at length about the constitutional changes, the establishment of an electoral system and appropriate legislation, as though such matters were central to United Kingdom policy. The USSR delegation wished to state categorically that the changes in the Constitution were a matter for the people alone to decide and to ask the United Kingdom to cease manoeuvring to prolong colonial domination and to remove all obstacles to its termination, for it was time to grant the peoples the independence to which they were undeniably entitled.

30. The United Kingdom representative had tried to refute the USSR delegation's remarks by saying that no agreement had been signed between the United Kingdom and the United States regarding the financing of the base in the Chagos Archipelago, but he had been careful to say nothing about the fact that work had already started on the base. The USSR delegation had not invented those facts; the information mentioned in the Special Committee and the Subcommittee had been published in the United Kingdom and United States Press and could easily be checked. Indeed, the Press had revealed that the United States was bringing pressure to bear on their partners to remain east of Suez and carry out their obligations there. Those "obligations" were to police that part of the world. There had been reports in the United States and the United Kingdom Press that talks had taken place between the United States and the United Kingdom and an agreement had been signed giving respon-

sibility for most of the bases east of Suez to the United States, which undertook to pay for the installation of the base in the Chagos Archipelago. It was difficult to see why the Press of the two great Western Powers should publish the information if no such agreement had been signed. If the United Kingdom persisted in its denials, it would be easy to demonstrate the truth by sending a mission of inquiry to the spot, as the Syrian representative had proposed; but the USSR delegation feared that the news was well founded and that all information about the base was correct.

31. As to the original inhabitants of Mauritius, the turtles and the dodos, the United Kingdom had not told USSR representatives anything they had not known and they had replied to its comments. As the United Kingdom delegation had brought up the subject of ornithology, however, he would remind it that other birds than dodos, birds with a larger wing-span, now swept over the Non-Self-Governing Territories, and were used by the colonialists to terrorize the subject peoples. There had been talk quite recently about those that had flown over Ascension Island. The United Kingdom representative had apparently been instructed to repeat the specious arguments that had been advanced the previous year, but there was certainly much more to be said about those modern birds, a species which was neither extinct nor becoming extinct; the 1965 and 1966 summary records were very instructive on the subject.

32. The representative of *Mali* said that although the electoral system described by the United Kingdom representative, which the administering Power wished to introduce into Mauritius, was very complex—he himself had difficulty in understanding it properly—he welcomed the fact that the report of the Banwell Commission had been approved by all the political parties and that the elections would enable the Territory to attain independence beginning in the summer of 1967.

33. The representative of *Syria* agreed with the representatives of the USSR and Mali that the fundamental question was how the United Kingdom intended to apply General Assembly resolution 2069 (XX).

34. The possibility of the United Kingdom and the United States installing military bases caused concern in Africa and the Middle East, particularly as bases of that kind had recently been the starting point for acts of aggression that had been condemned by the United Nations. The representative of the administering Power had stated that there was no agreement between the two countries at present, but negotiations were apparently under way; he would like to know whether the indigenous population was represented in the negotiations, and if so by whom.

35. Constitutional development must be freely decided on by the inhabitants. The representative of the administering Power had said that when representatives had been elected by the electoral system it had proposed, they would decide the question of independence. He would like to know when the Legislative Assembly which was to be elected would meet and take such a decision. He also wondered how the problem of the different ethnic groups was to be overcome by the proposed electoral system.

36. As he had pointed out earlier, Mauritius was subject to economic difficulties because of its bad climate; and the local housing was not sufficient protection from the elements.

37. The representative of *Tunisia* wondered what might be the advantages of such a complicated, not to say peculiar, electoral system as the one proposed for Mauritius and described by the United Kingdom representative. Would national unity really be possible under such a system? Would not elections on the basis of universal suffrage be preferable?

38. The representative of the *United Kingdom* said that it had been decided not to set aside special seats for particular minorities or communities, but that the new electoral system had been framed so as to ensure their fair representation. The new system was less complicated than might appear and above all it commanded general agreement among all the Mauritius political parties. Replying to the Syrian representative's question, he said that he had already stated

in his report that the Legislative Assembly would meet immediately after the elections, or about February 1967; Mauritius would then be able to ask for independence if it so wished.

39. The representative of *Syria* asked whether the eight "best loser" seats would be filled by representatives of the island's Chinese and Muslim population.

40. The representative of *Tunisia* recalled that the question of Mauritius, Seychelles and St. Helena had already been considered by the Special Committee and had also been the subject of General Assembly resolutions 2066 (XX) and 2069 (XX). Those resolutions reaffirmed the inalienable right of the people of those Territories to freedom and independence and invited the administering Power to take effective measures with a view to the immediate and full implementation of resolution 1514 (XV).

41. Recalling that the United Kingdom representative had outlined the future of the islands at the previous meeting, he expressed the hope that the proposed electoral system would not have the effect of accentuating racial differences in the Territories but might, on the contrary, promote the interests of the various sectors of the population. Nevertheless, a serious economic and social problem remained. The main features of the economy of Mauritius, Seychelles and St. Helena, which was rudimentary and colonial in nature, were a heavy loss of revenue, the impossibility of increasing employment and the impossibility of bringing payments into balance, because exports were less than imports. The situation was so unsatisfactory that 3,250 workers had gone on strike in the Seychelles on 13 June 1966, and the administering Power had had to use troops to break the strike.

42. In addition, while resolution 2066 (XX) invited the administering Power to take no action which would dismember the Territory of Mauritius and violate its territorial integrity, it was clear that such dismemberment had already taken place. On 10 November 1965, the Secretary of State for the Colonies had stated that new arrangements had been made, with the agreement of the Governments of Mauritius and Seychelles, for the administration of the Chagos Archipelago and of Aldabra, Farquhar and Desroches. Those Territories, which had formerly been administered by the Governments of Mauritius and Seychelles respectively, were now called the British Indian Ocean Territory, and the United Kingdom and United States Governments would be able to construct defence facilities there. The administering Power had therefore dismembered Mauritius and Seychelles in order to set up a military base on the islands. The establishment of such bases in countries which were still colonized was reprehensible in every respect, and he recalled that his own country had experienced the same problem with the base of Bizerta. The Sub-Committee should therefore recommend to the Special Committee that it should invite the administering Power to take steps to implement resolution 1514 (XV), to lead the populations of the islands to independence, to abandon the plan to dismember Mauritius and Seychelles and to install military bases there, and to permit and encourage the sending of United Nations visiting missions to the Territories.

43. The representative of the *United Republic of Tanzania* said that the United Kingdom representative's statement at the previous meeting seemed to mean that, because they had been uninhabited when the French and the English had arrived, Mauritius, Seychelles and St. Helena belonged to nobody. Without going into detail on that matter, he believed that the inhabitants of the islands, whatever their origin, were none the less subjected to colonial domination. It was precisely that domination, depriving them as it did of the right to choose their own form of government, which the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania condemned. There had been nothing new in the statement of the United Kingdom representative: he had merely avoided the main issue, the obligation to allow the populations of those Territories to exercise their right of self-determination. There could be no possible doubt on that matter: that obligation was one of those laid upon the administering Power both by resolution 2066 (XX) on Mauritius and by resolution 2069 (XX) on, *inter alia*, the Seychelles and St. Helena. So far as the latter Territories were concerned, resolution 2069 (XX) also re-

quested the administering Power to allow United Nations visiting missions to visit the Territories, and to extend to them full co-operation and assistance. Those were perfectly natural requests and there should be no difficulty in implementing those resolutions if the administering Power were to honour its obligations and respect the decisions which the General Assembly had taken in accordance with the Charter. But what had happened since the adoption of those resolutions? The Chagos Archipelago had become part of the new British Indian Ocean Territory. That decision had been taken scarcely a month before the adoption of General Assembly resolution 2066 (XX), which invited the administering Power to take no action which would dismember the Territory of Mauritius and violate its territorial integrity. The present situation therefore made it highly unlikely that Mauritius would accede to independence in 1966, as had been envisaged. Instead of implementing the General Assembly resolutions, the United Kingdom Government had endeavoured to delay the important steps which it should have taken by forming an electoral commission, which had produced what might be called a scientific constitution. The strong opposition to that strange constitution was therefore quite natural, and indeed it was most unlikely that the United Kingdom Government had ever expected the Mauritians to accept it. In that connexion, the agreement which had been reached between the Under-Secretary of State for Colonies and opposition representatives in Mauritius was of no significance because there was no evidence that the discussions had been held freely. The United Kingdom Government should remember, however, that every time it had endeavoured to draw up the constitution of one of its former colonies without taking due regard of the interests of the population, those constitutions had always come to nought and had been replaced by genuinely democratic instruments.

44. The manner in which the British Indian Ocean Territory had been set up and the haste with which it had been done could not but engender suspicion. His delegation had reason to believe that the Territory was to become a military base. Apart from the threat posed by such bases to neighbouring countries in the event of war, the example of Ascension Island, which had been used by mercenaries as a base for attacking the Congolese freedom fighters, could not be forgotten. The Special Committee should therefore aim at guaranteeing the territorial integrity of Mauritius, Seychelles and St. Helena, and ensuring that they would not be used for military purposes.

45. The economic situation of those Territories was scarcely satisfactory at the moment. There had been a considerable decline in both agriculture and industry, which in 1964 had represented 24 and 15 per cent, respectively, of the gross national product of Mauritius, while unemployment was increasing rapidly. Monoculture should therefore be abandoned on Mauritius, as well as on Seychelles and St. Helena, if special disturbances were to be avoided. While it was doing nothing to stop the Southern Rhodesian Government from depriving 4 million Africans of the right to rule their own country, the United Kingdom Government had seen fit to send two warships to the Seychelles to compel strikers to resume work.

46. In conclusion, he hoped that reason would prevail and that the administering Power would eventually leave the peoples of Mauritius, Seychelles and St. Helena to rule their country as they wished.

47. The representative of *Yugoslavia* recalled General Assembly resolution 2066 (XX) on the question of Mauritius, in which the Assembly had, in particular, invited the administering Power to take no action which would violate the integrity of the Territory; the Assembly had likewise adopted resolution 2069 (XX) concerning a number of small Territories, including Seychelles and St. Helena. It seemed that, in spite of the provisions of those resolutions, the administering Power had not only failed to take effective measures for ensuring the independence of those Territories, in accordance with the provisions of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, but it had even undertaken some measures contrary to those provided for in the Declaration.

48. His delegation considered that the development of those Territories was still very slow, because of the interests which the administering Power hoped to preserve there as long as possible. As early as 1964, the Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held in Cairo, had condemned the intentions expressed by imperialist Powers of establishing military bases in the Indian Ocean, holding that such bases would constitute a threat to the new Afro-Asian countries and impede the process of decolonization. The course of events had shown that the Conference had been right, for in November 1965 the United Kingdom had decided to establish the new British Indian Ocean Territory as the site of defence bases for the United Kingdom and the United States of America. In spite of the resignation of three Ministers of the Mauritius Social Democratic Party and the protests raised in Mauritius following that decision, the administering Power had not changed its position on the establishment of those bases, as was evident from the statement of the United Kingdom Defence Secretary contained in the Secretariat working paper (see para. 48 of chap. XIV).

49. As it had already stated, his delegation held that the United Kingdom was not entitled to dismember the Territory of Mauritius for the purpose of military installations. It considered that the Sub-Committee was duty bound to recommend to the Special Committee that the peoples of the Territories in question should accede without delay to independence, in accordance with their freely expressed wishes and with the provisions of the Declaration contained in resolution 1514 (XV). It further thought that the problem of the establishment of military bases through the dismemberment of Mauritius should be given particular attention, in accordance with the provisions of resolution 2066 (XX).

50. The representative of *Denmark* expressed his satisfaction that the Territory of Mauritius was to accede to independence the following year, in accordance with the agreement established at the Constitutional Conference in London in September 1965. Following negotiations between the administering Power and the island's three main political parties, the electoral provisions made in the original draft Constitution, which had aroused some criticism by the parties, had been modified and subsequently approved by all concerned. In that connexion, the electoral system drawn up for Mauritius might seem at first to be unduly elaborate, but a similar and equally elaborate system had been functioning in Denmark for a long time, to everyone's satisfaction. Experience had shown that the system fulfilled its purpose perfectly, which was to assure fair and equal representation of all voters. The elections which were to take place on Mauritius would ensure the establishment of an autonomous Government and subsequently, after an interval of six months, accession to independence. The economic and social situation in the Territory seemed satisfactory, thanks to the determined efforts made by the authorities and the people to overcome the severe difficulties due to the losses caused a few years ago by two cyclones. Moreover, the authorities had been trying for some years to diversify the island's economy, which, at present, depended largely on its sugar production. The Danish Government thought, therefore, that the Territory of Mauritius could advance confidently towards independence, and it was looking forward to maintaining the best of relations with the new State.

51. With regard to Seychelles and St. Helena, his delegation considered, as it had often stated, that it was for the people of those Territories, and for them alone, to determine their constitutional future. The size, population and economy of those Territories might justify the adoption of special constitutional arrangements, which should not be ruled out, provided they met with the support of the population.

52. His delegation thought that in its report to the Special Committee, the Sub-Committee should express its satisfaction with the considerable progress made by the Territory of Mauritius on the path towards independence and should express the hope that the forthcoming elections would be another proof of the population's desire to accede to independence. With regard to Seychelles and St. Helena, the

Sub-Committee's recommendations should take account of the special circumstances prevailing in those Territories and should, therefore, not contain any proposals which might be incompatible with those circumstances and perhaps with the wishes of the population concerned.

B. Conclusions

53. The study of the situation in Mauritius, Seychelles and St. Helena shows that the administering Power has so far not only failed to implement the provisions of resolution 1514 (XV) in these Territories, but has also violated the territorial integrity of two of them by creating a new territory, the British Indian Ocean Territory, composed of islands detached from Mauritius and Seychelles, in direct contravention to resolution 2066 (XX) of the General Assembly.

54. The Sub-Committee notes with regret the slow pace of political development in the Territories, particularly in Seychelles and St. Helena. This has delayed the transfer of powers to democratically elected representatives of the people and the attainment of independence. Key positions of responsibility in the administration of the Territories seem to be still in the hands of United Kingdom personnel.

55. The Sub-Committee notes with deep concern the reports pointing to the activation of a plan purporting among other things to establish military bases in Mauritius and Seychelles as well as an air base on Ascension Island, a plan which is causing anxiety in the Territories concerned and among people in Africa and Asia and which runs contrary to the provisions of resolution 2105 (XX) of the General Assembly.

56. The electoral arrangements devised for Mauritius apart from being complex in themselves seem to have been the subject of great controversy between the various groups and political parties. Regarding the Seychelles, the Sub-Committee regrets that people are still deprived of the right of universal suffrage.

57. The economy of the Territories, particularly Mauritius, is characterized by diminishing revenue, increasing unemployment and consequently a declining standard of living. Foreign companies continue to exploit the Territories without regard to the true interests of the inhabitants.

C. Recommendations

58. The Sub-Committee recommends that the Special Committee reaffirm the inalienable right of the peoples of Mauritius, Seychelles and St. Helena to self-determination and independence in accordance with the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. The administering Power should therefore be urged again to allow the populations of the three Territories to exercise without delay their right of self-determination.

59. Any constitutional changes should be left to the people of the Territories themselves, who alone have the right to decide on the form of government they wish to adopt.

60. Free elections on the basis of universal adult suffrage should be conducted in the Territories as soon as possible. The elections should lead to the establishment of representative organs which would choose responsible governments to which all powers could be transferred.

61. The administering Power should be called upon to respect the territorial integrity of Mauritius and Seychelles and to insure that they would not be used for military purposes.

62. In fulfilment of the provisions of paragraph 12 of General Assembly resolution 2105 (XX), the administering Power should be called upon to refrain from establishing military bases in the Territories.

63. The Special Committee should recommend to the General Assembly to state categorically that any bilateral agreements concluded between the administering Power and other Powers affecting the sovereignty and fundamental rights of the Territories should not be recognized as valid.

64. The administering Power should be called upon to preserve the right of the indigenous inhabitants to dispose

of all the wealth and natural resources of their countries. It should be urged to undertake effective measures in order to diversify the economy of the Territories.

D. Adoption of the report

65. This report was adopted by the Sub-Committee at its 32nd meeting on 19 September 1966. The representative of

Denmark stated that certain parts of the conclusions and the recommendations of the report did not conform with his delegation's opinion as expressed in the Sub-Committee's meeting on 12 September 1966 (see paras. 50-52 above). His delegation therefore could not support all the conclusions and recommendations of the report.

CHAPTER XV*

GILBERT AND ELLICE ISLANDS, PITCAIRN AND THE SOLOMON ISLANDS

A. ACTION TAKEN BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE IN 1964 AND BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AT ITS TWENTIETH SESSION

1. After considering the Gilbert and Ellice Islands, Pitcairn and the Solomon Islands in November 1964, the Special Committee recommended, *inter alia*, that the administering Power should take urgent measures for the speedy implementation of the Declaration contained in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV). It considered that the people of the Territories should be enabled to express their wishes in accordance with that resolution through well-established democratic processes based on the principle of universal adult suffrage. It felt that the administering Power should undertake steps to accelerate the social and economic advancement of the Territories. It also felt that a visiting mission would be useful in assessing the political climate and aspirations of the peoples, and that steps might be taken to arrange such a visit in consultation with the administering Power (A/5800/Rev.1,¹ chap. XX, paras. 92-96).

2. At its twentieth session, the General Assembly, after considering the parts of the reports of the Special Committee concerning these Territories (A/5800/Rev.1, chap. XX; and A/6000/Rev.1,² chap. XIX), adopted resolution 2069 (XX) of 16 December 1965, endorsing the conclusions and recommendations contained therein and calling upon the administering Power to implement without delay the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly. It requested the administering Power to allow visiting missions to visit the Territories and to extend to them full co-operation and assistance. Finally, it requested the Special Committee to examine the situation in the Territories and to report on the implementation of the resolution to the Assembly at its twenty-first session.

B. INFORMATION ON THE TERRITORIES

Introduction

3. Information on the Gilbert and Ellice Islands, Pitcairn and the Solomon Islands is already contained in the reports of the Special Committee to the General Assembly at its nineteenth and twentieth sessions (*ibid.*). Supplementary information on recent developments is set out below.³

* Previously issued under the symbol A/6300/Add.9.

¹ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Nineteenth Session, Annexes, annex No. 8 (part I).*

² *Ibid., Twentieth Session, Annexes, addendum to agenda item 23.*

³ The information presented here has been derived from published reports and from information transmitted to the Secretary-General by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland under Article 73 e of the Charter on 7 and 14 June and 2 September 1965, for the year ended 31 December 1964.

1. Gilbert and Ellice Islands

General

4. The census taken 30 April 1963 showed a total population of 49,879. By the end of 1964 it was estimated that the population had risen to over 50,000.

Political and constitutional developments

5. The Territory has no Legislative Council. It has an Advisory Council, presided over by the Resident Commissioner, with eleven non-official and five official members appointed by him. He is required to inform or consult the Council about such matters as the High Commissioner of the Western Pacific may direct to be set before it. It may ask for information or give advice on any matter affecting the Territory, but the Resident Commissioner is not required to give such information or accept this advice.

6. In October 1965, the first political party in the Territory, the Gilbertese National Party (GNP) was formed. Its aim, *inter alia*, is reported to be "to speed up the present rate of constitutional development, aiming at a more representative and democratic form of government". Membership ordinarily is reported to be limited to Gilbertese. However, exceptions to this rule may be made in favour of part or non-Gilbertese who have spent much of their lives in the Gilbert Islands. About 85 per cent of the inhabitants of the Territory are Gilbertese and the remaining 15 per cent are Ellice Islanders. A second political party, the Christian Democratic Party (CDP), was formed at Tarawa in November 1965. No account is taken of religion or race for membership in the party which includes Gilbertese, Ellice Islanders and part-Gilbertese. Its aims are reported to be to ensure more involvement in territorial affairs; to further the welfare of and promote harmony between the people of the Territory; to improve copra production; to improve education; and to examine land tenure to ensure individual rights and increase production.

Economic conditions

7. There was no substantial change in 1964 in the general economic situation of the Territory. Its economy is based on the extraction of phosphate on Ocean Island and the production of copra on the other islands.

8. Exports and imports in 1964 were valued at £A1,201,296 and £A1,623,863 respectively, compared with £A1,276,122 and £A1,416,092 the previous year. Ninety-nine per cent of the value of all exports consists of phosphate and copra. The chief imports are food-stuffs and manufactured goods.

9. During 1964, ordinary revenue amounted to £A814,338, an increase of £A58,689 over the previous year. The chief source of revenue is a tax on

phosphate, which the British Phosphate Commissioners pay on all phosphate exported from Ocean Island, and customs duties. Expenditure, excluding grants, amounted to £A867,520, an increase of £A60,798 over the previous year. An additional £A95,960 were expended on Colonial Development and Welfare schemes.

Social conditions

10. In 1964, there were no substantial changes in labour, the conditions of employment, and the number of persons employed. Expenditures on public health totalled £A82,740 and amounted to about 10 per cent of all expenditure.

Educational conditions

11. In 1964, there was no substantial change in educational conditions. There were 11,659 primary school pupils, most of whom were attending mission schools. Four secondary schools had 326 pupils, and three teacher-training colleges had eighty-six trainees. Sixteen students were studying under scholarships at secondary schools in Australia and New Zealand, and one was attending a university. Thirty-eight others were abroad taking professional and technical training courses. Expenditure on education, including grants from Colonial Development and Welfare schemes, amounted to approximately 10 per cent of the total budget of the Territory.

2. Pitcairn

General

12. The population of Pitcairn was seventy-nine persons in 1964. The Governor of Fiji is *ex officio* Governor of Pitcairn and legislates for it. Island affairs are administered by an Island Council, consisting of three local inhabitants elected on the basis of universal adult suffrage. No information on political developments in 1964 is available.

Economic conditions

13. No information is available on the value of exports or imports. Exports consist of fruits and handicrafts which are sold mainly to passing ships. Imports consist mainly of food, fuel and clothing. Revenue in 1964-1965 totalled £41,934 of which £32,000 was realized from stamp sales to collectors and £7,684 was a grant from Colonial Development and Welfare funds. Expenditure during the same period amounted to £34,904.

3. Solomon Islands

General

14. The population of the Territory at the end of 1964 was estimated at 136,750, consisting of 128,200 Melanesians, 6,900 Polynesians and Micronesians, and 1,660 others. In recent years, immigrants from the overpopulated Gilbert and Ellice Islands have been settled in under-populated areas of the Territory.

Government

15. The Solomon Islands Legislative Council consists of eleven official and ten non-official members. Eight of the latter are elected, seven by electoral colleges composed of elected members of the local authorities, and one by direct election on the basis of universal adult suffrage. The other thirteen members are appointed by the High Commissioner.

16. Under the new Local Government Ordinance enacted in 1963, seventeen local councils had been established by the end of 1964, the membership of which is elected by universal adult suffrage. Formerly, the High Commissioner appointed the members of local councils.

Political parties

17. In June 1965, the eight elected members of the British Solomon Islands Legislative Council announced that they had formed a political party to be known as the Democratic Party of the British Solomon Islands. The main aims of the party are reported to be self-determination for the Territory within the Commonwealth; free education for all; improved industrial relations and improved machinery for the settlement of disputes; unification of all peoples of the Solomons and greater participation by women in territorial affairs.

Economic conditions

18. The economy of the territory is at present based mainly on subsistence agriculture and on the production of copra for export. However, cocoa is being developed rapidly as a second cash crop, and in 1964, field trials in rice, soya beans and oil palms were also being made, which, it was hoped, would lead to the mechanized cultivation of rice and soya beans on a large scale by 1966. Large-scale lumbering operations have also begun and timber exports are expected to reach 10 million cubic feet in the next few years, or more than ten times the amount exported in 1964. There is no large-scale mining, but small amounts of gold are extracted. A few limited industries are directed to meeting some local needs.

19. Cash crops are confined almost entirely to the coastal areas, river valleys and foothills of the larger islands. Food crops are grown generally on the basis of shifting cultivation, and principally in forested areas. There is practically no permanent arable or mixed farming, largely because of the dense afforestation of areas not planted with coconuts and cocoa.

20. The value of all exports in 1964 totalled £A1.99 million, as compared with £A1.82 million in 1963. Copra accounted for 88 per cent and timber for 8 per cent of all exports. Imports were valued at £A2.73 million, compared with £A2.31 million in 1963. The United Kingdom, Japan and Australia received 98 per cent of all exports; 70 per cent of all imports came from Australia and the United Kingdom.

21. Revenue, including grants-in-aid and transfers from special funds, totalled £A2.74 million, compared with £A2.35 million in 1963. Total expenditures amounted to £A2.61 million, compared with £A2.23 million in 1963.

22. A third development plan was drawn up for the period 1 January 1963 to 31 March 1966. Total development expenditure available for projects for this period from all sources amounted to £A3,015,800. During 1962-1964, policy papers were approved by the Legislative Council for education, medicine and public health, and agriculture and fisheries, to give direction to the various fields of development. In addition to increasing production and introducing new crops, particular attention was being given to a geological survey and to the development of forests, fisheries and co-operatives.

23. In 1965, the administering Power and the United Nations Special Fund signed an agreement for

a mineral survey of the Territory designed to aid in efforts to diversify its economy. The project is to extend over three and a half years at a cost of \$US1,565,100 furnished by the Fund and the Government of the Territory. Since the dense jungle cover in the Territory makes the identification of minerals by conventional methods difficult, aerial surveys and other new techniques, including photo-geological interpretation, will be used. The survey will be carried out in four phases. Airborne geophysical surveys will be made by magnetic, electromagnetic and radiometric methods. Photo-geological studies will then be made, followed by ground surveys using geological, geophysical and geochemical techniques. Finally, drillings will be made in selected areas to supplement the findings of the earlier stages of the survey.

24. Limited surveys carried out in the past indicate that mineral exploitation may have an important bearing on the Territory's over-all economic future, and the present project is intended to provide additional specific information.

Social conditions *Labour*

25. The total labour force of the Territory in 1964 was estimated at 9,000 of whom about two thirds were unskilled workers. The majority of all workers were engaged in agricultural work or employed by the Government. There were two registered trade unions with a total membership of 4,850 in 1964, showing an increase of 10 per cent over the previous year.

Public health

26. There has been no significant change during 1964 in the staff and organization of the Government Medical Services and those maintained by religious missions. Government medical expenditures, including subsidies to missions, totalled £A255,872 in 1964, as compared with £A214,686 the previous year, and amounted to 9 per cent of all government expenditures.

27. Malaria and tuberculosis are the two most important health problems in the Territory. At present, the concentration of resources and attention to the eradication of malaria precludes any major attack on tuberculosis. The success of the Malarial Eradication Pilot Project with the guidance and active assistance of the World Health Organization (WHO), has been the outstanding achievement in public health in the past two years. In conjunction with the latter, the Government had planned to proceed in 1965 to a pre-eradication programme, and a major allocation of funds had been approved for the purpose.

Educational conditions

28. Education is largely in the hands of religious missions. The Government maintains five primary, one secondary and one teacher-training school. It assists the churches and local councils in providing primary education. In 1964 there were 402 registered primary schools and an additional ninety schools, exempt from registration for a period of two years. The total enrolment of these schools was 20,846. The five secondary schools had 240 students and the two teacher-training schools had fifty-six students.

29. Both the Government and churches provide scholarships for secondary and higher education overseas; scholarships from other countries are sometimes available. At the end of 1964, nineteen students were

receiving government scholarships for secondary education overseas and 111 students had church scholarships.

30. In 1964, recurrent and capital expenditure on education totalled £A131,861 and £A89,637, compared with £A105,270 and £A18,796 in 1963. The total recurrent expenditure by the Department of Education has been approximately 3.8 per cent of all recurrent expenditures for the years 1962-1964. Expenditures by churches and local authorities in 1964 amounted to £A210,406.

C. CONSIDERATION BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE

31. At its 468th meeting on 19 September 1966, the Special Committee considered the report of Sub-Committee II on the Gilbert and Ellice Islands, Pitcairn and the Solomon Islands, which appears as an annex to this chapter.

32. The representative of the *United Kingdom* recorded his delegation's reservations concerning the report. He stated that his delegation had made clear its position during the meetings of Sub-Committee II, and he drew the attention of the members of the Special Committee to the summary records of those meetings. His delegation regretted that the conclusions and recommendations on those Territories did not adequately reflect the progress achieved and did not take sufficiently into account the special circumstances in the Territories.

D. ACTION TAKEN BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON THE REPORT OF SUB-COMMITTEE II

33. At its 486th meeting on 19 September 1966, the Special Committee adopted the conclusions and recommendations of Sub-Committee II concerning the Gilbert and Ellice Islands, Pitcairn and the Solomon Islands. These are as follows.

Conclusions

34. (a) The Special Committee feels that, though the administering Power had introduced, or is planning to introduce, some constitutional changes in these Territories, the progress towards the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, as contained in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), is not significant and must be speeded up.

(b) It is of the opinion that the political institutions and executive machinery are not yet fully representative of the people of these Territories. The recommendations of the Special Committee in 1964 and of General Assembly resolution 2069 (XX) have not been adequately implemented.

(c) It feels that the economic base of these Territories needs to be strengthened.

(d) It is aware of the peculiar problems of these small and isolated islands.

Recommendations

35. The Special Committee reiterates to the administering Power the recommendations it made concerning these Territories in 1964. It is of the opinion that a visit by Sub-Committee II is necessary and would be most useful in assessing the political climate, the economic requirements and other aspirations of the peoples. Steps may be taken to arrange such a visit in consultation with the administering Power.

ANNEX

[A/AC.109/L.318/Add.1]

Report of Sub-Committee II

GILBERT AND ELLICE ISLANDS, PITCAIRN AND THE
SOLOMON ISLANDS*Consideration by the Sub-Committee*

1. The Sub-Committee considered the Gilbert and Ellice Islands, Pitcairn and the Solomon Islands at its 44th, 46th, 47th, 49th and 53rd meetings held on 12 May, 2, 8, 12 and 29 August 1966.

2. The Sub-Committee had before it the working paper prepared by the Secretariat (see paras. 1-39, chapter XV).

3. In accordance with the procedure agreed upon by the Special Committee, the Chairman invited the representative of the United Kingdom to participate in the consideration of the three Territories.

4. In his statement to the Sub-Committee, the representative of the United Kingdom noted that detailed information on the Solomon Islands, the Gilbert and Ellice Islands and Pitcairn had been transmitted to the Sub-Committee in late 1964 and that the Secretariat working papers incorporated in the Committee's report to the General Assembly in 1965 and those recently issued gave an account of the main events in the Territories in recent months.

5. So far as the Solomon Islands were concerned, the existing Legislative Council was to be dissolved in April 1967 and, as the United Kingdom delegation had informed the Special Committee on 16 March 1966, proposals for the next stage of constitutional advance were likely to be discussed during 1966. In June 1965 the Acting Chief Secretary had said that, at the next stage of constitutional progress, the Opposition Bench would undoubtedly be fully elected and that the electoral college system had been purely transitional, since direct elections could not have been introduced in all districts simultaneously. The next general election would probably be by direct elections under universal adult suffrage in all constituencies and there would ultimately be an elected majority in the Council. The first political party in the Territory—the Solomon Islands Democratic Party—had been formed in June 1965 and included all the elected members of the Legislative Council. New constitutional proposals were about to be published in the Territory and when these were known his delegation would inform the Sub-Committee of them.

6. Thus in the Solomon Islands, since 1965, eight of the ten non-official members of the Legislative Council were elected and each represented one constituency; in seven of the constituencies, they were chosen by an electoral college composed of elected representatives of the local authorities in the constituency, which were themselves elected by universal adult suffrage. In the constituency of Honiara, the capital, election was direct. Those new proposals were, however, only one stage in the evolution towards the final goal of a wholly elected legislature. In addition, all members of the local government councils had been elected by universal adult suffrage since 1963. Similar progress had been made in other Territories; under the 1965 Constitution of the Gilbert and Ellice Islands, the Executive Council of that Territory had four non-official members and the Advisory Council had eleven non-official members—a majority.

7. In the Gilbert and Ellice Islands, the next stage of constitutional advance was under consideration; the Resident Commissioner had told the Advisory Council at the end of 1964 that the Advisory Council and the Executive Council established not long before had proved their value. That had been only a beginning but some people had already felt that the rate of constitutional advance was too rapid; the Commissioner had assured the Council that the United Kingdom Government would in any case not try to move faster than the population wished, although all should appreciate the wisdom of keeping a little ahead of public opinion. The Advisory Council had endorsed proposals for reorganizing local government, which was particularly important in such a scattered Territory. There had been progress in the educational

field and the United Kingdom had promised to continue to provide financial assistance for economic development. As the United Kingdom representative had told the Special Committee on 16 March, proposals to modify the existing system of representation would probably be discussed in the Territory during 1966. At the moment, five out of eight members of the Executive Council and eleven out of sixteen members of the Advisory Council were indigenous Solomon Islanders.

8. Pitcairn now had eighty-eight inhabitants. The Island Council, whose composition had been changed after the December 1964 elections, was composed of the Island Magistrate (elected for three years), three members elected annually, the Island Secretary *ex officio*, one member appointed by the Governor (who was also Governor of Fiji), two members chosen by the elected members and two non-voting advisory members, one chosen by the Governor and one by the rest of the Council. The Commissioner for Pitcairn had visited the Island in March 1965 and held discussions with the inhabitants. He had recommended wider participation by women in public affairs, and improvement in agriculture, the modernization of the land tenure system and the development of co-operative farming; he had also recommended the introduction of a housing scheme, a local broadcasting service, a programme of scholarships to Fiji and a revision of the wage structure. He had suggested discarding the idea of evacuating Pitcairn as a justifiable policy. The recommendations had been accepted but some might take some time to implement.

9. In a subsequent statement to the Sub-Committee he noted that the proposals concerning constitutional advances in the Solomon Islands had been published and were to be submitted to the Legislative Council of the Solomon Islands in December 1966, and that the effect of the main proposals would be to increase the number of elected members from eight to fourteen and, in so far as it was administratively possible, to have all fourteen members elected by direct election in their constituencies. In certain remote constituencies, scattered over a large area of sea, it would, however, be impracticable to arrange direct elections, at least for the time being. The White Paper also contained proposals for enlarging the Legislative Council, for defining the High Commissioner's legislative and other powers, and for the establishment of a Public Service Commission. Those proposals showed that very rapid progress was being made towards self-government in full consultation with the leaders and people of the Solomon Islands.

10. Similar proposals for constitutional advance had recently been published by the Government of the Gilbert and Ellice Islands. It was proposed to replace the existing Advisory Council by a House of Representatives consisting of seven official appointed members and twenty-three members elected by adult suffrage from all parts of the Territory. The existing Executive Council would be replaced by a Governing Council, which would exercise both executive and legislative powers; the Council would have five official members and five elected members chosen by the House of Representatives, which would advise it on major policy and proposed legislation. Both bodies would be presided over by the resident Commissioner, who would be required to consult the Council on virtually all policy and legislative matters.

11. In both Territories the new constitutional proposals had been widely publicized through the Press and broadcasting services and there was widespread interest in constitutional development and in United Nations activities, although the United Nations was primarily associated with the technical assistance activities from which the islanders benefited. The population of the Territories had no reason to fear that progress towards self-government would entail the withdrawal of United Kingdom assistance: the 1965-1968 development plan for the Solomon Islands provided for expenditure of £5 million, as compared with £1.2 million allocated under Colonial Development and Welfare provisions for 1963-1966; similarly, the 1965-1968 development plan for the Gilbert and Ellice Islands envisaged expenditure of £1.1 million, as compared with £300,000 for 1963-1966.

12. The representative of Chile said that the problems of the islands were typical of those affecting all the Pacific Territories. They were scattered over a wide area of sea, with poor

communications, had small populations and few natural resources; it was therefore not surprising that their economic, social and political progress should be extremely difficult and that the feeling of national cohesion should have been slow to develop. In those circumstances, his delegation considered that the new constitutional proposals for the Solomon Islands and the establishment of the first political party in that Territory represented a considerable advance towards self-government.

13. The proposals for the establishment of a preponderantly elective House of Representatives in the Gilbert and Ellice Islands and for a more representative body to replace the Executive Council were also encouraging. Nevertheless, such progress would be valueless if the resident Commissioner retained unlimited veto powers or if important decisions were outside the competence of the House of Representatives.

14. The extreme remoteness of Pitcairn Islands, its tiny population and almost complete lack of natural resources placed upon the administering Power a special responsibility for the social progress of its inhabitants and for ensuring that they exercised their right to self-determination as soon as was practicable.

15. His delegation believed that, despite the significant progress that had been made, much still remained to be done to improve the economic and social position of the Territories and to prepare them for self-determination and independence. It was accordingly most important that the Sub-Committee should be given fuller and more detailed information on the economic and social position of the people of the Territories and on their views about their political future.

16. The representative of *Poland* said that, while the geographical position and economic structure of the Territories under discussion made progress very difficult, his delegation considered that during its long administration the United Kingdom had done little to prepare them for full constitutional development. Recently however, new proposals for constitutional advance in the Solomon Islands had been made and the increase in the elected membership of the Legislative Council was a sign of progress, although it fell far short of complete fulfilment of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV). Without a sound economy, the Territory could not achieve true political freedom and his delegation would urge the administering Power to accelerate the development of its agricultural and mineral resources.

17. Similar action was required in the Gilbert and Ellice Islands, whose economy was based on the export of copra and phosphates. The economy of the islands would develop satisfactorily only when the people were in full control of their natural resources and received more financial assistance from the administering Power.

18. In conclusion, he wished to reaffirm his delegation's conviction that the people of the Gilbert and Ellice Islands, Pitcairn and the Solomon Islands should not be excluded from the universal privilege of self-government and independence.

19. The representative of *India* noted that although there had recently been several encouraging constitutional developments in the Territories, much more could have been done to help their peoples to prepare for exercising their right of self-determination. The proposed House of Representatives in the Gilbert and Ellice Islands, for instance, would not have full legislative powers and, in the absence of popularly elected bodies with full authority to speak on behalf of the people, there appeared no justification for the administering Power's impression that the islanders considered the pace of constitutional advance too rapid. The dependency of the Territory on a single economic resource—phosphates—was disquieting and the administering Power should do its utmost to develop alternative sources of revenue for the islands.

20. Although the proposals for expanded elected membership of the Legislative Council of the Solomon Islands were gratifying, the composition and powers of that body were still not entirely satisfactory. The extent and effect of the changes,

in fact, fell far short of the provisions of the Declaration. It was understandable that the islanders in all three Territories should associate the United Nations primarily with the technical assistance activities in which they were involved, but the administering Power should make every effort to ensure that they were properly informed of their right to determine their own future freely. Visiting missions from the United Nations would be of immense help in that respect and it was to be hoped that the administering Power would co-operate with the United Nations in implementing the process of decolonization as expeditiously and effectively as possible.

21. The representative of *Sierra Leone* observed that although educational standards, economic and social conditions and constitutional development varied considerably in the very small islands under discussion, they shared an overriding desire for self-determination and independence. The task of the Special Committee was to ensure that they would be free to choose the form of independence they desired.

22. Since the economic well-being of the Gilbert and Ellice Islands depended almost exclusively on revenue from phosphates, the administering Power should consider how the economy could be diversified. It should also try to improve labour conditions, expand social and health services and adapt the educational system to the requirements of rapid development. Finally, the powers of the Advisory Council appointed by the resident Commissioner should be strengthened and new impetus should be given to the constitutional development of the Territory. Similar measures to diversify the economy, improve economic, social and educational conditions and accelerate constitutional development should be taken in the Solomon Islands.

23. The United Kingdom, with its long experience of colonial rule and its general willingness to co-operate with the Special Committee, should have done much more for the material welfare and political growth of the islands. He hoped that it would intensify its efforts to make the inhabitants aware of their right to self-government and independence and of the alternatives open to them in seeking those goals. As recommended in numerous General Assembly resolutions, and most recently in resolution 2069 (XX), the inhabitants of the islands should be enabled to choose the political future they desired without coercion.

Conclusions of the Sub-Committee

24. (a) The Sub-Committee feels that, though the administering Power and introduced, or is planning to introduce, some constitutional changes in these Territories, the progress towards the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, as contained in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), is not significant and must be speeded up.

(b) The Sub-Committee is of the opinion that the political institutions and executive machinery are not yet fully representative of the people of these Territories. The recommendations of the Special Committee in 1964 and of General Assembly resolution 2069 (XX) have not been adequately implemented.

(c) The Sub-Committee feels that the economic base of these Territories needs to be strengthened.

(d) The Sub-Committee is aware of the peculiar problems of these small and isolated islands.

Recommendations of the Sub-Committee

25. The Sub-Committee recommends to the Special Committee that it reiterate to the administering Power the recommendations it made concerning these Territories in 1964. The Sub-Committee is of the opinion that a visit by the Sub-Committee is necessary and would be most useful in assessing the political climate, the economic requirements and other aspirations of the peoples. Steps may be taken to arrange such a visit in consultation with the administering Power.

CHAPTER XVI*

NIUE AND TOKELAU ISLANDS

A. ACTION TAKEN BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE IN 1964 AND BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AT ITS TWENTIETH SESSION

1. In 1964 the Special Committee considered Niue and the Tokelau Islands together with the Cook Islands. The Committee was of the view that the questions of size, isolation and limited resources should not in any way delay application to these Territories of the Declaration contained in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV). It recommended, *inter alia*, that their people should be enabled to express their wishes in accordance with the provisions of the resolution through well-established democratic processes under United Nations supervision; that the administering Power should have regard to the nature of the assistance the United Nations could render and make this known to the people; that the administering Power should further enlarge the training of administrative personnel from among the indigenous people; and that further and immediate measures be taken to develop and strengthen the economic structure of the Territories (A/5800/Rev.1,¹ chap. XV, paras. 111-115).

2. At its twentieth session, the General Assembly, after considering the chapters of the reports of the Special Committee concerning the Territory of Niue and Tokelau Islands (A/5800/Rev.1, chap. XV; and A/6000/Rev.1,² chap. XIV), adopted resolution 2069 (XX) on 16 December 1965, endorsing the conclusions and recommendations contained therein and calling upon the administering Power to implement without delay the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly. It requested the administering Power to allow visiting missions to visit the Territories and to extend to them full co-operation and assistance. Finally, it requested the Special Committee to examine the situation in the Territories and to report on the implementation of the resolution to the Assembly at its twenty-first session.

B. INFORMATION ON THE TERRITORIES

3. Information on Niue and the Tokelau Islands is already contained in the Special Committee's report to the General Assembly at its nineteenth and twentieth sessions (*ibid.*). Supplementary information is set out below.³

1. Niue

General

4. At 31 March 1965, the population of Niue was estimated at 5,124. Each year from 300 to 400 Niueans leave Niue. In 1964, the deficit between those leaving and returning was 150.

* Previously issued under the symbol A/6300/Add.9.

¹ Official Records of the General Assembly, Nineteenth Session, Annexes, annex No. 8 (part I).

² *Ibid.*, Twentieth Session, Annexes, addendum to agenda item 23.

³ The information on the Niue and Tokelau Islands has been derived from published reports and from information transmitted to the Secretary-General by New Zealand under Article 73 e of the Charter, on 14 October 1965, for the year ending 31 March 1965.

Political and constitutional developments

General

5. The Niue Island Legislative Assembly consists of fourteen elected members and the Resident Commissioner. Ordinances require the assent of the latter and must not be contradictory to any statute or regulation in force in Niue. An Executive Committee, consisting of three members elected by the Legislative Assembly with the Resident Commissioner as Chairman, was set up in 1962. It may report and make recommendations on any matter referred to it by the Resident Commissioner or the Legislative Assembly.

6. In January 1965, the Secretary of Island Territories, accompanied by a constitutional adviser, visited Niue to consult the Niue Island Assembly and the people on the question of constitutional development, and to ascertain their wishes concerning future constitutional changes and the programming of such changes. The Niueans during the discussion expressed the wish to progress gradually towards some system of internal self-government, while at the same time retaining the closest possible links with New Zealand. The complete proceedings of the meetings were recorded and broadcast in the evenings over Radio Niue and are reported to have been well received in all the villages on the island.

7. In January 1966, the Minister of Island Territories visited Niue to hold discussions concerning future developments. No information is available concerning the discussions.

Village councils

8. Village government has been largely in the hands of the local Assembly member, the pastor and the constable in each village. The Assembly has agreed in principle to the formation of village councils to be responsible for village affairs. A senior officer of the Niue Government was to undertake a study tour of the Territory of Papua and New Guinea in 1965 under the sponsorship of the South Pacific Commission to study village and district government in that Territory.

Economic conditions

9. Niue's economy is based on subsistence fishing and agriculture, as well as the production of a few cash crops, chiefly copra and bananas, and handicraft articles for export. The rocky nature of much of the island makes it unsuitable for agriculture or animal husbandry. Exports in 1964 amounted to £77,935, compared with £51,185 in 1963. Imports amounted to £228,210, compared with £163,443 the previous year. Approximately 74 per cent of all imports came from New Zealand which received 89 per cent of the island's exports. In 1964-1965, revenue and expenditures were £235,043 and £523,981 respectively, compared with £194,175 and £382,436 the previous year. Niue's revenue from exports and taxes is insufficient to balance its budget, and New Zealand makes annual grants for general and capital purposes and for meeting budgetary deficits. In 1964-1965 the subsidy amounted to £301,300, compared with £285,000 the previous year.

*Social conditions**Labour*

10. The basic wage rates in March 1965 were 1s.11d per hour for unskilled labour, 2s.1d for stevedores and a varying scale for skilled labour. No labour unions have been registered but a committee exists to determine special allowances for stevedoring, and workers have a voice on this committee.

Public health

11. Medical services are provided by the Government Health Department under the control of a chief medical officer. There are no private medical or dental practitioners. In March 1965, the staff of thirty-nine persons consisted of Niueans with the exception of the chief medical officer and four nurses recruited from New Zealand. Expenditures on health services for the year ending March 1965 were £53,111. All medical and dental treatment is free of charge.

Educational conditions

12. Education is free and compulsory between the ages of six and fourteen years and most children remain at school until they reach sixteen. Post-primary education is available to all, and most students who leave primary school attend high school. At 31 March 1965, twenty-eight students were attending New Zealand secondary schools under the New Zealand Government Training Scheme and six were taking a three-year course at the agricultural college in Western Samoa. Educational expenditures totalled £100,060, compared with £70,090 in 1963-1964.

*2. Tokelau Islands**General*

13. The population of the three Tokelau Islands totalled 1,835 at 25 September 1964.

Political development

14. At a meeting of Tokelauan leaders in December 1964, they are reported to have decided that they wanted to remain under New Zealand administration. They rejected proposals that they should merge with independent Western Samoa or with the Cook Islands. These decisions are reported to have been made after Tokelauan leaders had visited both Apia and Paratonga to study their administrative organizations. In January 1965, the Minister of Island Territories visited the Territory for discussions concerning its constitutional development. No information is available concerning these discussions. In January 1966 the Minister of Island Territories again visited the Territory for discussions on constitutional development. These are reported to have included a proposal by the Minister for the resettlement of part of the population in New Zealand over the next five years.

Economic conditions

15. The economy of the Tokelau Islands is based on subsistence crops, fishing and the production of copra for export. Revenue is derived chiefly from export and import duties, trading profits and the sale of postage stamps. The annual deficit between local revenue and expenditure is met by subsidies from the New Zealand Government. Expenditures in 1964 totalled £29,931. Information is not available on local revenue.

Social conditions

16. The Government of Western Samoa assists with the medical services of the Territory and regular visits are made by its medical staff. Two Samoan medical officers are stationed on Tokelau. At present, a Tokelauan is training at the Suva Medical School in Fiji.

Educational conditions

17. School attendance in the Territory is reported to be very close to 100 per cent. The Tokelau Administration awards scholarships to enable children and public servants to receive secondary education in Western Samoa. The New Zealand Government assists students and public servants under the New Zealand Government Training Scheme. At 31 March 1965, there were thirteen long-term trainees from the Territory in New Zealand. Twenty-nine additional Tokelauans were being trained in Western Samoa and Fiji.

C. CONSIDERATION BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE

18. At its 468th meeting on 19 September 1966, the Special Committee considered the report of Sub-Committee II on Niue and the Tokelau Islands, which appears as an annex to this chapter.

D. ACTION TAKEN BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON THE REPORT OF SUB-COMMITTEE II

19. The representative of the *United Kingdom* reserved his Government's position on the Sub-Committee's report.

20. At its 468th meeting on 19 September 1966, the Special Committee adopted the conclusions and recommendations contained in the report of Sub-Committee II. These are set out below.

Conclusions

21. (a) The Special Committee reiterates its conclusions adopted in 1964.

(b) The Special Committee welcomes the statement of the administering Power that the Declaration contained in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) continues to express the objectives of its policy towards these islands.

(c) The Special Committee notes with satisfaction the willingness of the administering Power to receive a visiting mission to these Territories were such a visit to form part of a wider tour of the area.

(d) The Special Committee is of the opinion that the peculiar problems of size, isolation and limited resources, though important in themselves, should not delay the implementation of resolution 1514 (XV) in these Territories.

Recommendations

22. (a) The Special Committee reiterates its recommendations adopted in 1964.

(b) The Special Committee reaffirms the inalienable right of the people of the Territories to self-determination and independence in conformity with the Declaration contained in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV).

(c) The people of these islands should be enabled to express their wishes with regard to provisions of resolution 1514 (XV) through well-established democratic processes.

(d) Further and immediate measures should be taken to develop and strengthen the economic structure of these Territories in co-operation with the United Nations and the specialized agencies.

(e) A visit to the Territories by Sub-Committee II is necessary and would be useful in gathering all information, and also in familiarizing the people with the assistance which can be rendered by the United Nations in regard to the free expression of their wishes pursuant to the Declaration contained in resolution 1514 (XV). In this respect, steps may be taken to arrange a visit in consultation with the administering Power.

ANNEX

[A/AC.109/L.318/Add.2]

Report of Sub-Committee II

NIUE AND THE TOKELAU ISLANDS

Consideration by the Sub-Committee

1. The Sub-Committee considered Niue and the Tokelau Islands at its 47th, 49th and 54th meetings held on 8, 12 August and 2 September 1966.

2. The Sub-Committee had before it the working paper prepared by the Secretariat (see paras. 1-17 of chapter XVI).

3. In accordance with the procedure agreed upon by the Special Committee, the Chairman invited the representative of New Zealand to participate in the consideration of the two Territories.

4. In his statement to the Sub-Committee, the representative of New Zealand said that the right of the people of Niue and the Tokelau Islands freely to decide their future was not denied, that the possibilities open to them were kept constantly before them, that the text of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) had been widely distributed in their languages, and that for several years the New Zealand Government had made it clear to them that the colonial relationship with New Zealand must terminate. Yet they appeared at present to wish to remain linked in some direct way with New Zealand indefinitely.

5. Niue was the largest of the four islands with an area of about 100 square miles and a population of about 5,000, situated midway between Tonga and the Cook Islands.

6. In 1962, it had been suggested to the Niueans that there were four possibilities open to them for the future: complete independence, integration with an independent State, membership of a (hypothetical) Polynesian federation, or self-government and free association with some other State. The Niue Island Assembly had unanimously rejected the first three possibilities, requested that the people of Niue should be able to retain their New Zealand citizenship, and proposed that any future constitutional change should be directed towards some form of self-government but that the close links with New Zealand should be retained. That decision was not an act of self-determination but merely a preliminary indication of the Niueans' views.

7. A paper had been drawn up by the New Zealand authorities suggesting a time-table for progress towards self-government and drawing attention to operative paragraph 5 of resolution 1514 (XV). The speed of the proposed changes, amounting virtually to full cabinet government by 1966, had raised considerable apprehensions in the Niue Assembly, which had asked for a team of constitutional experts to visit the island and draw up a new series of recommendations based on the views of the islanders. It might be pointed out that, in the case of Niue, it was the New Zealand Government which was pressing for political progress. There had been little pressure from the Niueans themselves.

8. Dr. C. C. Aikman, a professor of constitutional history, and Mr. J. M. McEwen, Secretary of Island Territories and an eminent authority on Polynesia, had visited the island, talked with members of the Assembly and of the public, and four

that opinion was divided on the speed with which self-government should be achieved. The reasons for the cautious attitude of the Niueans were apparently a basic lack of confidence in their capacity to run their own affairs and a fear that the New Zealand subsidy, which in recent years had represented 50 to 70 per cent of total government expenditure on the island, might be withdrawn or reduced as a result of political advance. The constitutional advisers had told them that they could not know whether or not they were capable of running their own affairs until they had tried to do so and that, whatever decision they took concerning their future, it would not affect the financial assistance given by New Zealand. Their fears on that score, however, had not been stilled.

9. The constitutional advisers had therefore recommended in their report that a complete programme for the attainment of self-government should not be drawn up, but that the next steps in the process should be outlined. In particular, early steps should be taken to create a member system under which elected representatives on the Executive Committee would be responsible before the Assembly for a particular government department or departments. One of the elected members of the Executive Committee was to be appointed Leader of Government Business and would speak in the Assembly for the Executive Committee as a whole. It was envisaged that as a result of those developments the role of the Resident Commissioner in day-to-day administration would progressively diminish.

10. In January 1966, the Niue Island Assembly had supported the recommendations in the report but had decided that further consideration of it should be postponed until after the general elections of 10 April 1966 in which it was one of the issues before the electorate. The elections had resulted in four changes in the membership of the Assembly, which had been decided to proceed with the adoption of the member system. A new Executive Committee had been elected and Mr. R. Rex had been elected Leader of Government Business.

11. Niue had therefore advanced a considerable way towards full self-government, having an elective Assembly, which since 1962 had controlled both the revenue raised locally and the entire New Zealand subsidy, and an Executive Committee which would soon represent more closely the embryonic Cabinet it was intended to be.

12. The insecurity which the Niueans obviously felt about the future was probably based in considerable measure on "the special circumstances of geographical isolation and economic conditions" mentioned in the final preambular paragraph of General Assembly resolution 2069 (XX). As a result of their geographic and consequent cultural isolation, the Niueans appeared to feel a close sentimental link with the main body of Polynesians in New Zealand, a link which had been strengthened by sixty years of contact with New Zealand administrators, teachers and pastors, and by migration to New Zealand.

13. The Niueans realized that the possibilities for further development of the island were limited. Raising the level of agricultural production—the only significant way of earning foreign exchange and of expanding much further the proportion of the budget raised locally—was slow and skilled work. The Niueans' desire not to jeopardize direct access to the New Zealand Treasury, which provided over half their present level of government expenditure, as well as the means for capital investment and development, was therefore understandable. But New Zealand did not regard economic conditions as necessarily restricting the Niueans' progress toward self-determination. They were free to decide on further steps as they wished.

14. The three barely habitable atolls of the Tokelau group, 300 miles north of Samoa, presented a basically different set of circumstances. Their total area was four square miles and none of the islets making up the atolls was more than a couple of hundred yards wide. They were subject to occasional hurricanes and the coral-based soil was thin and infertile; rainfall was heavy but inconsistent. Many Tokelauans had left the islands—over 300 had migrated to New Zealand—and the remaining 1,800 led lives cramped by the environment.

15. In the last few years the New Zealand Government had endeavoured to place the possibilities for the political future before the Tokelauans fairly, making it clear that the decision lay with the islanders themselves. The Tokelauans' first reaction, in 1963, had been to retain the existing relationship with New Zealand, which showed, incidentally, that an immediate exercise in such a Territory of self-determination as envisaged in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) could produce a different result from that expected, the decision being made prematurely. The New Zealand Government had not been prepared to see the colonial relationship perpetuated and had suggested that the more logical choice for the Tokelauans was for them to avail themselves of the resources and trained manpower of a neighbouring Polynesian community by joining with the independent State of Western Samoa or the self-governing Cook Islands. New Zealand had offered to bear the costs of administering the group for many years by handing over the annual grants to whatever community it joined, and had arranged for representatives of the Tokelauan people to visit Western Samoa and the Cook Islands. Association with the Cook Islands would mean retention of New Zealand citizenship and the right to unrestricted entry and resettlement in New Zealand, while association with Western Samoa would be logical in terms of the existing cultural and religious ties between the two territories. Faced with such a decision, the Tokelauans had, at a general *fono*, held in December 1964, chosen neither course, desiring, naturally enough, to try to get the best of all possible worlds by remaining linked with New Zealand. In January 1966, the New Zealand Minister for Island Territories had visited the Tokelauans and obtained confirmation of this desire to remain linked in some way with New Zealand and to retain the right to migrate to New Zealand. The New Zealand Cabinet had subsequently agreed that a move towards fuller self-government should be undertaken by giving the *fonos*—councils of elders and heads of families—formal consultative status in the determining of priorities of government work and in the preparation of the annual budget, while a pilot scheme speeding up the existing assisted migration projects would be set in motion. At the same time, the education system was to be improved and an extensive public works programme would be undertaken; the cost of the public works for the next four years would be about \$270,000 over and above the normal operating budget, which was about \$120,000 for 1966. Moreover, during the next two years the Government would be working out the future status of the islands more fully with the Tokelauan people. In June 1966 a joint *fono* of Tokelauan representatives had formally reconfirmed that the islanders wished to remain linked with New Zealand and had expressed support for the pilot migration scheme and the measures planned to improve facilities on the atolls.

16. Thus, after some initial reluctance, New Zealand had agreed to work towards a continued association with the islands, as desired by the people. A greater measure of self-government would be promoted and it was hoped that the problems stemming from chronic overcrowding would be relieved through greater migration to New Zealand, where the Tokelauans were expected to settle easily—as had thousands of Polynesians from other island groups and the Tokelaus themselves—into New Zealand's integrated society. But the final decisions on the future had not yet been taken. It was envisaged that in the relatively near future the people of the Tokelaus, having considered what had been achieved in the intervening period and the situation as it then appeared, would exercise their right to self-determination. It would be up to the Tokelauans to decide when that should be done. New Zealand for its part would ensure that the intervening period was used to place the people in the best possible position to take their decision knowingly and freely.

17. The last two New Zealand Territories were thus advancing, not perhaps towards the classical solution of sovereign independence, but towards a future in which they could lead a full and secure life. To avoid any misunderstanding Mr. Corner would observe that Niue and the Tokelaus had no strategic or commercial significance for New Zealand. It was impossible to build harbours on any of the islands or to construct

an airport in the Tokelaus; there was no airport on Niue, although it was hoped that one might eventually be built to reduce the island's isolation and perhaps to encourage tourism. As to commercial relations, New Zealand could buy what little produce it got from the islands as cheaply, and in some cases more cheaply, from other sources. Indeed, the islands had been costing New Zealand dear for forty years in the case of the Tokelaus and over sixty years in the case of Niue. Leaving aside the question why New Zealand had taken over responsibility for the islands in the first place, the basic reason for its remaining was the obligation felt towards two branches of a race which made up a large and increasing proportion of New Zealand's own population. Should the time come when the islanders did not want the link to be continued, they were free to break it.

18. The representative of *Chile* said that the statement of the representative of New Zealand in the Sub-Committee had once again demonstrated the good will with which the administering Power was endeavouring to achieve an equitable solution which would enable the inhabitants of the islands to exercise their right to self-determination.

19. The New Zealand representative had reported that in 1962 when his Government had suggested four possible means by which the people of Niue could decide their political future, the island's Assembly had rejected the first three alternatives and expressed a desire to retain New Zealand citizenship. It had proposed constitutional reforms enabling the islanders to institute a system of self-government under which they could maintain close ties with New Zealand. It had also approved an on-the-spot inquiry by a team of constitutional experts which was to draw up a series of recommendations after consultation with the Assembly.

20. According to the report, the Territory of Niue had made substantial progress towards self-government: not only was it managing its own budget, but it was also administering the aid funds provided by New Zealand. Indeed, its Executive Committee was increasingly assuming the character of a cabinet. It should be borne in mind, however, that Niue and the Tokelau Islands were geographically isolated and that their isolation would inevitably be a major obstacle in establishing relations with the rest of the world. Moreover, in view of their small size, the administering Power would have to exert special efforts to ensure that their inhabitants enjoyed full rights within the world community.

21. The representative of *Sierra Leone* pointed out that the majority of the population of Niue and the Tokelau Islands appeared to desire close association with New Zealand and more than half wanted to emigrate to the mainland, despite the fact that the New Zealand Government had informed them of their right to self-government and independence under General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV). Indeed, it was difficult to conceive how such small and virtually isolated communities, with meagre natural resources, could be self-sufficient and exercise the functions of an independent state. In the circumstances, the administering Power should have extended education above the primary level and encouraged the inhabitants to learn English. New Zealand teachers of English should have been sent to the islands at a much earlier date.

22. The representative of *India* said that the detailed statement made by the New Zealand representative at the Sub-Committee's 47th meeting clearly showed that the administering Power was sincere in its attempts to help the people of Niue and the Tokelau Islands, particularly in economic matters. He hoped that the administering Power would do everything it could to improve still further the living standards of the people and the educational and social conditions in the Territories. He was not entirely happy, however, about the information concerning political and constitutional progress. The New Zealand representative's statement implied that constitutional progress in the Territories was slow because of the reluctance of the islanders, which acted as a brake on the enthusiasm of the administering Power. It was understandable that at the present stage the Niueans should favour self-government and the closest possible links with New Zealand, on which country they depended for economic and other assistance; but they might at a later stage decide in favour of

complete independence, a fact which the New Zealand representative himself had recognized. It was important to note, however, that the Niue Island Assembly had rejected the idea of integration with New Zealand, which meant that there was a possibility that Niue might emerge as a separate independent State later on. He hoped that the administering Power would bear that in mind and encourage the economic growth of the island in order to make it possible. Continued dependence on New Zealand was not good for the self-esteem and dignity of the people. The administering Power should assure the islanders that they would be free to change their status any time they wished, and that the economic assistance which it provided would not be affected by any decision they might take. There was one point which he would like the New Zealand representative to clarify: in 1963, the Niue Island Assembly had resolved that the people of the Territory should be asked by secret ballot to say whether they approved of the draft constitutional programme or whether they considered it too rapid, and it had been decided to ask the New Zealand Government's advice on framing the questions in the ballot. It appeared that no such ballot had taken place so far and he would be grateful to know whether that was indeed so.

23. The representative of *New Zealand*, in reply to questions, said that the substance of the remarks which had been made during the meeting would be conveyed to the New Zealand Government and the Territories. The representative of Sierra Leone had commented on the lack of secondary education in the Territories. The New Zealand teachers whom it was intended to send to each atoll in the Tokelau Islands would help to raise the educational level as well as the knowledge of English. Hitherto, the children in the Territory who had reached secondary level had been sent to schools in New Zealand. In Niue, on the other hand, there was compulsory education up to the age of fourteen and most children remained at school until the age of sixteen. In addition, in March 1966 there had been thirty-two children from Niue in secondary schools in New Zealand. Both Niuean and Tokelauan students attended regional institutions such as the Fiji School of Medicine and Avel Agricultural College and the Teachers Training College in Western Samoa; one student from Niue and one from the Tokelau Islands were studying at universities in New Zealand and in-service training in Western Samoa or New Zealand was arranged for public servants from the Territories.

24. In reply to the representative of India, he reaffirmed that the issue of the future status of the Territories was not yet finally settled and that there had not yet been any formal act of self-determination. It was his understanding that no ballot on the rate of constitutional development had taken place following the decision of the Niue Assembly in 1963 because it was considered that the decision had been superseded by the later decision of the Assembly to call in a team of

constitutional advisers to draw up a new programme. The whole question had been put before the electorate in the elections held on 10 April 1966 and the new Assembly had made clear its views on the rate of future progress.

25. His Government had already given an undertaking that it would continue its economic assistance to Niue whatever decision the islanders might take concerning their future, but he would draw the Indian representative's comment to its attention.

Conclusions and recommendations of the Sub-Committee

26. The Sub-Committee, while reiterating the Special Committee's conclusions and recommendations arrived at in 1964, has reached the following conclusions and recommendations:

Conclusions

(a) The Sub-Committee welcomes the statement of the administering Power that the Declaration contained in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) continues to express the objectives of its policy towards these islands.

(b) The Sub-Committee notes with satisfaction the willingness of the administering Power to receive a visiting mission to these Territories were such a visit to form part of a wider tour of the area.

(c) The Sub-Committee is of the opinion that the peculiar problems of size, isolation and limited resources, though important in themselves, should not delay the implementation of resolution 1514 (XV) in these Territories.

Recommendation

(a) The Sub-Committee reaffirms the inalienable right of the people of the Territories to self-determination and independence in conformity with the Declaration contained in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV).

(b) The people of these islands should be enabled to express their wishes with regard to provisions of resolution 1514 (XV) through well-established democratic processes.

(c) Further and immediate measures should be taken to develop and strengthen the economic structure of these Territories in co-operation with the United Nations and the specialized agencies.

(d) A visit to the Territories by the Sub-Committee is necessary and would be useful in gathering all information, and also in familiarizing the people with the assistance which can be rendered by the United Nations in regard to the free expression of their wishes pursuant to the Declaration contained in resolution 1514 (XV). In this respect, steps may be taken to arrange a visit in consultation with the administering Power.

CHAPTER XVII*

NEW HEBRIDES

A. ACTION TAKEN BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE IN 1964 AND BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AT ITS TWENTIETH SESSION

1. After considering the New Hebrides in November 1964, the Special Committee recommended, *inter alia*, that the administering Powers should take urgent measures for the speedy implementation of the Declaration contained in resolution 1514 (XV). It considered that the people of the Territory should be enabled to express their wishes in accordance with that resolution through well-established democratic processes based on the principle of universal adult suffrage. It

felt that the administering Powers should undertake steps to accelerate the social and economic advancement of the Territory. It also felt that a visiting mission would be useful in assessing the political climate and aspirations of the people and that steps might be taken to arrange such a visit in consultation with the administering Powers (A/5800/Rev.1,¹ chap. XX, paras. 92-96).

2. At its twentieth session, the General Assembly, after considering the chapters of the reports of the Special Committee concerning this Territory (A/5800/

* Previously issued under the symbol A/6300/Add.9.

¹ Official Records of the General Assembly, Nineteenth Session, Annexes, annex No. 8 (part I).

Rev.1, chap. XX; and A/6000/Rev.1,² chap. XIX), adopted resolution 2069 (XX) on 16 December 1965, endorsing the conclusions and recommendations contained therein and calling upon the administering Powers to implement without delay the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly. It requested the administering Powers to allow visiting missions to visit the Territory and to extend to them full co-operation and assistance. Finally, it requested the Special Committee to examine the situation in the Territory and to report on the implementation of the resolution to the Assembly at its twenty-first session.

B. INFORMATION ON THE TERRITORY

Introduction

3. Information on the New Hebrides is already contained in the reports of the Special Committee to the General Assembly at its nineteenth and twentieth sessions (*ibid.*). Supplementary information on recent developments is set out below.³

General

4. In 1962, the population of the Territory was estimated to total 61,500 of which 55,000 were Melanesians. The remaining 6,000 were chiefly European, Chinese and Polynesian.

Government

5. Under the Anglo-French protocol of 1914, the New Hebrides was constituted a region of joint influence, in which the subjects and citizens of the Powers enjoy equal rights of residence, personal protection and trade. Each Power has sovereignty over its own nationals, but there is no territorial sovereignty and the indigenous people bear no allegiance to either Power.

6. There are three different administrations. The British and French national administrations are headed by resident commissioners acting on behalf of the British and French High Commissioners for the Western Pacific who reside in Honiara (Solomon Islands) and Nouméa (New Caledonia) respectively. The Government of the Condominium, the Joint Administration, consists of the two Resident Commissioners acting jointly, and is responsible for the joint services, which include post and telegraphs, public works, ports and harbours, public health, customs and inland revenue.

7. The Territory has no legislative council. Since 1951 it has had an Advisory Council presided over by the Resident Commissioners. It consists of six official members and twenty unofficial members. Since June 1964, eight of the latter have been elected: four are New Hebridean, two are British and two are French. The other unofficial members are nominated: six are New Hebridean, three are British and three are French.

Political and constitutional developments

8. In July 1965, the Secretary of State for the Colonies held discussions in Paris with other senior British

and French officials concerning the New Hebrides. The talks are reported to have concerned administrative problems and included labour legislation, land tenure and the co-ordination of French and British development plans in the Condominium. Further talks were to be held in London early in 1966 with the French Minister for Overseas Territories and other officials.

9. At the opening in September 1965 of the tenth session of the Advisory Council, in a joint speech, the Resident Commissioners stated that changes in the administration of the New Hebrides were being contemplated. They said that as a result of the discussions held in Paris in July, they had been asked to study various aspects of administration and the possibilities of various constitutional, judicial and land reforms. A motion was then moved asking the British and French Governments to make a statement of their policy on the future of the Territory.

Economic conditions

10. Most of the New Hebrides is mountainous and heavily forested and large areas of the interior are uninhabited. Its economy is based mainly on subsistence gardening and the production of copra. Other cash crops include cocoa and coffee. The economy has recently become more diversified with the production of manganese ore for export (since 1962) and the growth of the frozen fish industry (since 1957). The only other industries are a few small factories and indigenous arts and crafts.

11. Copra, manganese and fish made up approximately 94 per cent of all exports in 1964, the value of which totalled £3,238,970,⁴ an increase of approximately 40 per cent over the previous year. Imports, valued at £2,422,157, increased about 1 per cent. Most exports went to France and Japan and most imports came from Australia and France.

12. The budget of the Joint Administration finances the services that are operated jointly and contributes to the cost of medical and educational services operated separately by the British and French national administrations which have separate budgets.

13. Taxation is levied by the Joint Administration to provide revenue from which the joint public services of the New Hebrides are financed and subventions for some national services are paid. Approximately 70 per cent of the total revenue comes from import and export duties; there is no income tax for indigenous persons. The main heads of expenditure are public works, medical and education services and the post office.

14. Revenue and expenditure of the Joint Government in 1964 totalled £966,357 and £924,179 respectively. Estimated local revenue and expenditure of the British National Administration in 1964-1965 amounted to £A94,578 and £A475,511 respectively. The deficit was met by Britain. No information is available on the revenue and expenditure of the French National Administration in 1964.

Social conditions

Labour

15. Most of the indigenous population is mainly engaged in producing subsistence and cash crops. Most employed labour works on copra plantations, on trading

² *Ibid.*, Twentieth Session, Annexes, addendum to agenda item 23.

³ The information presented here has been derived from published reports and from information transmitted to the Secretary-General by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland under Article 73 e of the Charter on 1 September 1965, for the year ended 31 December 1964. The most recent information on the New Hebrides transmitted by France covers the year 1963.

⁴ One pound sterling = 250 New Hebrides francs = £A1.25.

ships, in stores or government service. There is generally a shortage of skilled and semi-skilled labour. No information is available on the total number of persons working for wages. Wages vary according to the type of labour and whether or not rations are included. The work week averages 44 hours. There are no trade unions, although provisions exist for them.

Public health

16. In addition to the medical facilities provided separately by the British and French national administrations, British and French medical officers run a condominium medical service providing preventive measures against malaria and epidemics, quarantine control, medical inspection of plantation and other labour, and free medical attention to the indigenous population.

17. In 1964-1965 expenditure on public health by the Joint Administration totalled £62,987, approximately 8 per cent of its total expenditure. Excluding grants, expenditure for the same period by the British National Administration was estimated to be £A59,457, approximately 16 per cent of its total expenditure.

Educational conditions

18. The great majority of all pupils attend mission schools. In addition to these, the French National Administration operates seventeen primary schools, and, in 1964, the British National Administration established a teachers' training college. The Condominium Government itself has no education service but makes an annual subsidy (at present £30,000) to the national administrations, which in turn give assistance to the mission schools.

19. It is estimated that 65 to 70 per cent of the children of school age receive primary education. Secondary education in the Territory is in its developmental stage and children are sent to secondary schools in neighbouring territories. In 1965 a grant of £126,000 was approved by the British National Administration for the construction of a post-primary school to accommodate 150 students.

C. CONSIDERATION BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE

20. At its 468th meeting on 19 September 1966, the Special Committee considered the report of Sub-Committee II on the New Hebrides which appears as an annex to this chapter.

21. The representative of the *United Kingdom* recorded his delegation's reservations concerning the report.

D. ACTION TAKEN BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON THE REPORT OF SUB-COMMITTEE II

22. At its 468th meeting on 19 September 1966, the Special Committee adopted the conclusions and recommendations of Sub-Committee II concerning the New Hebrides. These are as follows.

Conclusions

23. (a) The Special Committee feels that very little progress has been made towards the implementation of the recommendations on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples contained in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960.

(b) It is of the opinion that the political institutions and the executive machinery are not representative of the people of the Territory.

(c) It is aware of the peculiar problems of the Territory by virtue of its being a Condominium.

Recommendations

24. (a) The Special Committee reaffirms the inalienable right of the people of the Territory to self-determination and independence in accordance with General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV).

(b) The people of the Territory should be provided an early opportunity to express their wishes with regard to the provisions of resolution 1514 (XV) through well-established democratic processes based on the principle of universal adult suffrage.

(c) Urgent measures should be taken for the implementation of resolution 1514 (XV).

(d) The economic and social advancement of the Territory should be accelerated.

(e) The administering Powers should expedite the finalization of reforms in the administration of the Condominium.

(f) A visit by Sub-Committee II is necessary and would be useful in assessing the political climate and aspirations of the people. Steps may be taken to arrange such a visit in consultation with the administering Powers.

ANNEX

[A/AC.109/L.318/Add.3]

Report of Sub-Committee II

NEW HEBRIDES

Consideration by the Sub-Committee

1. The Sub-Committee considered the New Hebrides at its 47th, 49th, 50th and 54th meetings held on 8, 12 and 17 August and 2 September 1966.

2. The Sub-Committee had before it the working paper prepared by the Secretariat (see paras. 1-19 of chapter XVII).

3. In accordance with the procedure agreed upon by the Special Committee, the Chairman invited the representative of the United Kingdom to participate in the consideration of the Territory.

4. In his statement to the Sub-Committee the representative of the *United Kingdom* said that he would speak only about the United Kingdom Government and its responsibilities in the Condominium of the New Hebrides. The most significant event since the last account given by his delegation on 24 September 1964 (A/AC.109/102, annex, pp. 20-22) had been the holding of United Kingdom-French ministerial talks on the New Hebrides. The first round had taken place at Paris in July 1965, when the British Colonial Secretary and the French Minister of State for Overseas Territories had reviewed various administrative problems of common interest concerning the Condominium. The British Colonial Secretary had subsequently stated that if the Territory's progress was not to be impeded, several aspects of the arrangements for its internal administration would have to be revised and brought up to date, and it had been agreed to hold further detailed talks, both locally and at the metropolitan level, on such matters as labour legislation, land tenure and the co-ordination of French and United Kingdom development plans in the Condominium. A further round of ministerial talks had taken place in London on 11 July 1966, at which time the present British Colonial Secretary and the Minister of State for French Overseas Departments and Overseas Territories had met and exchanged views on matters connected with the administration of the Condominium.

5. Among other developments was the decision at the tenth session of the Advisory Council in the New Hebrides, in September 1965, that the composition of the Standing Committee of the Council should be broadened by the addition of

two further New Hebridean members, so that the Committee then consisted of two French, two British and four New Hebridean.

6. A grant of £73,100 from British Colonial Development and Welfare funds had been approved in August 1965 for the reconstruction of the hospital at Tanna, and subsequently £104,000 had been appropriated for a new secondary school at Vila and £59,000 for resurfacing Baverfield aerodrome. A total allocation of £900,000 had been made by the United Kingdom Government under the Overseas Development and Service Act of 1965 for development during the period ending in March 1968, and a new development plan for that period had been drawn up.

7. The representative of *Sierra Leone*, noting the information furnished the Sub-Committee, stated that it was regrettable that the Government of France, the other administering Power of the Condominium, had not found it possible to provide information for the period since 1964.

8. He considered that, so far, political and social development in the Territory had been unduly slow. There was no legislative council, and half of the twenty unofficial members of the Advisory Council were Europeans, which was inequitable, considering that of the total population of over 60,000, only some 5,000 were Europeans. Moreover, the presence of six official members on the Advisory Council and the fact that its recommendations were not necessarily accepted by the Joint Administration indicated that it was in no sense a representative body. The administering Powers should make every effort to organize a governing body composed of members elected by universal suffrage and should ensure that the people of the Territory were fully consulted about their future political status.

9. The confusing tripartite system of administration had inevitably impeded progress in the New Hebrides. Little appeared to have been done to encourage integration of the various language groups; there was no organized labour movement and conditions of employment were poor; and the provision for secondary education, at least in so far as the United Kingdom administration was concerned, was inadequate. The obvious need of the Territory was for a common government and common social educational facilities, and it should not have to suffer in any way in its progress towards self-determination because of the different systems of administration of the Powers which controlled it.

10. The representative of *Poland* said that, although the Territory was still in the early stages of development, it did, however, possess valuable economic assets—a fertile soil and some mineral deposits—which, with proper guidance and assistance from the administering Powers, could provide an adequate basis for self-sufficiency. The United Kingdom administration had so far done little to improve that part of the educational system for which it was responsible and it was therefore not surprising that political development had been so slow. It was the responsibility of the administering Powers to ensure that the people of the Territory were receiving an education which would prepare them for exercising their right to self-determination as soon as possible. Moreover, in view of the status currently enjoyed by Europeans, it was particularly important that the indigenous population should

be made aware that, on achieving independence, all special rights for citizens of the administering Powers could be abolished.

11. The representative of *India* observed that there had been very little constitutional progress in the New Hebrides since the Sub-Committee had last discussed the Territory in 1964. There had been no change in the functions and competence of the Advisory Council since 1951; it was still a predominantly nominated body with unduly high European representation and no legislative powers. The recent discussions between the Governments of the administering Powers revealed the obvious need for improvement in the administration of the islands. Moreover, the fact that in 1965 the Advisory Council had passed a motion asking the French and United Kingdom Governments for a statement of their policy on the future of the Territory raised serious doubts as to whether the population was fully aware of its right to self-determination and independence.

12. The representative of the *United Kingdom* said that the motion referred to by the representative of India had been accepted by the Resident Commissioners for reference to the metropolitan Governments. A reply would be given to the Advisory Council in due course.

Conclusions of the Sub-Committee

13. The Sub-Committee feels that very little progress has been made towards the implementation of the recommendations on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples contained in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960.

14. The Sub-Committee is of the opinion that the political institutions and the executive machinery are not representative of the people of the Territory.

15. The Sub-Committee is aware of the peculiar problems of the Territory by virtue of its being a Condominium.

Recommendations of the Sub-Committee

16. The Sub-Committee reaffirms the inalienable right of the people of the Territory to self-determination and independence in accordance with General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV).

17. The people of the Territory should be provided an early opportunity to express their wishes with regard to the provisions of resolution 1514 (XV) through well-established democratic processes based on the principle of universal adult suffrage.

18. Urgent measures should be taken for the implementation of resolution 1514 (XV).

19. The economic and social advancement of the Territory should be accelerated.

20. The administering Powers should expedite the finalization of reforms in the administration of the Condominium.

21. A visit by the Sub-Committee is necessary and would be useful in assessing the political climate and aspirations of the people. Steps may be taken to arrange such a visit in consultation with the administering Powers.

CHAPTER XVIII*

AMERICAN SAMOA, GUAM AND THE TRUST TERRITORY OF THE PACIFIC ISLANDS

A. ACTION TAKEN BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE IN 1964 AND BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AT ITS TWENTIETH SESSION

1. After considering American Samoa, Guam and the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands in November 1964, the Special Committee adopted conclusions and

recommendations concerning American Samoa, in which it, *inter alia*, requested the administering Power to undertake immediate steps for the implementation of the provisions of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV). It stated that the people should be given the earliest possible opportunity to express fully their wishes regarding their future status, and that the assistance of the United Nations could be made available

* Previously issued under the symbol A/6300/Add.9.

in this regard, if required. It considered that a visiting mission would be useful for obtaining first-hand information and that steps might be taken to arrange such a visit in consultation with the administering Power (A/5800/Rev.1,¹ chap. XVI, paras. 69-71).

2. Concerning Guam, the Special Committee adopted conclusions and recommendations in which it, *inter alia*, requested the administering Power to take urgent and adequate measures for the application of the Declaration contained in resolution 1514 (XV) to the Territory of Guam. It stated that the assistance of the United Nations could be made available to the people of Guam and the administering Power for this purpose if required, and that a visiting mission would be useful and steps might be taken to arrange such a visit in consultation with the administering Power. It requested the administering Power to provide further educational and training facilities for the people of the Territory, and to implement as speedily as possible its plans for the diversification of the economy and the establishment of new industries, thus giving a firmer basis to the economic structure of Guam (*ibid.*, chap. XVII, paras. 99-102).

3. Concerning the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, the Special Committee recommended, *inter alia*, to the Administering Authority that the Congress of Micronesia should be provided with all the powers necessary to pave the way for the speedy implementation of resolution 1514 (XV). It considered that the people of the Territory should be enabled to express their wishes in accordance with that resolution through well-established democratic processes and under United Nations supervision. It also considered that steps should be taken with a view to the early elimination of disparities in the wage structure, the establishment of an institution of higher education, and the assumption of the highest positions of responsibility by the people of the Territory. It requested the Administering Authority to set up urgently an over-all economic plan in order to develop and strengthen the economy and increase production. It considered that a visiting mission to the Territory would be useful and that steps might be taken to arrange such a visit, in consultation with the Administering Authority (*ibid.*, chap. XVIII, paras. 61-66).

4. At its twentieth session, the General Assembly, after considering the chapters of the reports of the Special Committee concerning American Samoa and Guam (A/5800/Rev.1, chaps. XVI and XVII; and A/6000/Rev.1,² chaps. XV and XVI), adopted resolution 2069 (XX) on 16 December 1965, endorsing the conclusions and recommendations contained therein, and calling upon the administering Power to implement without delay the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly. It requested the administering Power to allow visiting missions to visit the Territories and to extend to them full co-operation and assistance. Finally, it requested the Special Committee to examine the situation in the Territories and to report on the implementation of the resolution to the Assembly at its twenty-first session.

¹ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Nineteenth Session, Annexes, annex No. 8 (part I).*

² *Ibid.*, *Twentieth Session, Annexes*, addendum to agenda item 23.

B. INFORMATION ON THE TERRITORIES

1. American Samoa

Introduction

5. Information on American Samoa is already contained in the Special Committee's reports to the General Assembly at its nineteenth and twentieth sessions (A/5800/Rev.1, chap. XVI; and A/6000/Rev.1, chap. XV). Supplementary information is set out below.³

General

6. The 1960 census showed a population of 20,051; in July 1965, the population was estimated at 26,000.

Political and constitutional developments

7. The present Constitution of American Samoa, which came into effect on 17 October 1960, provided for its automatic revision or amendment at the end of five years. No information is available concerning the hearings on proposals for the revision of certain sections of the Constitution, which were held by a Constitutional Committee appointed to review the Constitution in 1965.

Economic conditions

8. Grants by the United States Congress and direct appropriations totalled some \$12 million in the fiscal year 1964 as compared with \$13 million received in 1963. Local revenue aggregated \$2,478,330, an increase of \$793,121 over the previous year.

9. Exports showed a decline from \$12,707,373 in the previous fiscal year to \$10,529,649 in the fiscal year 1964. The decline was reported to be due to the lower value of canned tuna shipments which comprise more than 90 per cent by value of all exports. Copra exports showed a slight decline in tonnage but an increase in value over the previous fiscal year: 720 tons valued at \$124,350 in 1964, compared with 770 tons valued at \$121,035 in 1963.

10. The economy of the Territory was considerably strengthened in 1964 when a new tuna cannery and can factory began operations. The new cannery along with the existing tuna plant now provide employment for almost 700 local men and women, more than double the number of jobs formerly available in this industry. The economy was further strengthened in December 1965 when the Hotel Pago Pago Intercontinental was opened. The hotel is owned by the American Samoan Development Corporation, whose shareholders are, by law, Samoans. It is expected that the new hotel, along with the new jet air terminal, will cause an increase in the number of tourists visiting the Territory.

Social conditions

Labour

11. There is a shortage of agricultural labour to work on the plantations. An increasing number of migrants are entering the Territory to seek work and immigration restrictions are being imposed. The Government is the largest employer of labour. The fish canning companies, shipping and transport companies, petroleum marketing companies and merchants rank

³ The information presented here has been derived from published reports and from the information transmitted to the Secretary-General by the United States of America under Article 73 c of the Charter, on 4 February 1966, for the year ended 30 June 1964.

next in importance. These employers engaged 3,972 workers in 1964, compared with 3,594 workers in 1963.

Public health

12. Total expenditures for medical services increased from \$818,891 in 1963 to \$1,000,726 in 1964. The number of hospital beds rose from 194 to 198. The number of medical doctors increased from five to seven in 1964.

13. A family-planning service, available to all married women who seek it voluntarily, was inaugurated in July 1965 to combat the high population growth. In the opinion of the Governor, unless the birth-rate is arrested, the Territory's natural resources will not be sufficient to meet future needs.

Educational conditions

14. Educational television was introduced in October 1964, when a three-channel television station came into operation. The television station provides educational programmes for Samoan children in thirty-one new class-rooms at five schools. It is expected that adult literacy programmes and other programmes dealing with modern agricultural methods, public health, village sanitation and local self-government will be also introduced on the television networks. Two million dollars was authorized for the replacement of the forty-four existing elementary village schools by twenty-six consolidated village schools. Construction has already begun on eight of the new schools, which will incorporate eight rather than six grades. It is expected that the school consolidation programme and the use of television will make it possible for a small cadre of qualified teachers to reach a maximum number of pupils as well as ensure a co-ordinated school system with uniform standards.

15. The Government made thirty-one scholarship grants during the academic year 1962/63, and the same number during 1963/64. The number of students receiving continuing scholarship grants rose from twenty-nine in 1962-1963 to fifty-six in 1963-1964. Approximately fifty American Samoans attended colleges without government assistance, an increase of approximately 20 per cent over the previous academic year of 1962-1963.

16. At 30 June 1964, 8,132 Samoan pupils were enrolled in elementary, secondary and post-secondary schools, an increase of 348 students. The number of students in public schools increased from 6,316 to 6,659, while the number of students in private schools rose from 1,408 to 1,473.

2. Guam

Introduction

17. Information on Guam is contained in the Special Committee's reports to the General Assembly at its nineteenth and twentieth sessions (A/5800/Rev.1, chap. XVII; and A/6000/Rev.1, chap. XVI). Supplementary information is set out below.⁴

General

18. The population of Guam (excluding transients residing on military reservations) at April 1964 com-

prised: 38,360 Guamanians; 1,573 "statesiders"; 612 Hawaiians; 2,839 Filipinos; and 1,799 others. The total population of 44,892 represented an increase of 584 over the previous year.

Political and constitutional developments

19. The Governor of Guam, the Chief Executive and Administrator of the affairs of the Government of Guam, is appointed by the President of the United States of America.

20. In February 1966 the Speaker of the Guam Legislature is reported to have stated that Guam wished to elect its own governor, to be represented in the United States Congress by a non-voting delegate and to be able to vote for the President and Vice-President of the United States. It is also reported that late in March the Speaker and a group of legislators attended congressional hearings on an Administration bill introduced by the Department of the Interior to institute an elected governor of Guam who could be removed by the President "for cause".

Elections

21. Guam has a unicameral Legislature of twenty-one members elected by universal adult suffrage. General elections are held every two years. The most recent election was held in November 1964, when thirteen seats were won by members of the Territorial Party and eight seats were won by the Democratic Party, which is affiliated with the Democratic Party of the United States.

Economic conditions

22. Military installations on Guam are an important source of income for its civilians, and practically the entire economy of the Territory is based directly or indirectly upon these wages. Agriculture is the other principal element in the economy, but its development is handicapped by the ready employment offered by the military installations and the civil government at relatively good wages.

23. As a part of the recovery programme, aimed at overcoming the effect of the typhoons of 1962 and 1963, the United States Congress appropriated \$19.5 million to be spent during the fiscal year 1965. Scheduled for immediate construction were several schools, a new air terminal, other government buildings and a new commercial port. A project to encourage tourism has been started with the establishment of a Guam Tourist Commission and the hiring of a full-time consultant. Within the Department of Commerce, an Industrial Development Division was recently created to accelerate the Territory's economic progress, in order to promote the rehabilitation and expansion of business and to stimulate the flow of capital to the Territory.

Social conditions

Labour

24. Programmes to alleviate the persistent shortages of skilled resident labour were being implemented in 1964. It was expected that additional trainees would be accepted under the Manpower Development and Training Act. The apprenticeship training programme, sponsored jointly by the Government of Guam and the Guam Contractors' Association, was scheduled to begin in September 1964.

⁴ The information presented here has been derived from published reports and from information transmitted to the Secretary-General by the United States of America under Article 73 e of the Charter on 31 August 1965, for the year ended 30 June 1964.

25. The economy has continued to absorb almost all of the available workers in the labour market. During the fiscal year ending June 1964, the Guam Employment Service, an affiliate of the United States Employment Service of the Department of Labour, reported that the majority of job openings were for skilled workers with reconstruction projects which usually are filled by alien workers. All private businesses and government agencies wishing to import or extend alien contract workers are required to file job requests with the Service. It is the policy of the Service to screen qualified United States citizens before clearance certificates are issued by the United States Immigration Service to the firms and agencies seeking alien labour. Of the 8,628 job openings from government and private industries processed by the Service, during the year under review, 6,736 were filed by employers seeking alien contract workers.

Educational conditions

26. The total budget of the Department of Education for the fiscal year 1964 was \$4,277,088, of which \$3,130,286 was raised from local appropriations and \$1,146,802 was contributed by United States federal assistance programmes.

27. At the end of the 1964 academic term 14,920 students were enrolled at the elementary and secondary school levels. In addition, the Guam Trade and Technical School enrolled 209 students for vocational training in the following trades: automotive, drafting, electrical and refrigeration. The Trade School also conducted an adult evening programme in vocational courses for approximately 400 adults during the 1963-1964 school year. The total student body at the College of Guam at May-June 1964 numbered 2,721, of whom 943 were enrolled for college credit courses off-campus at Anderson Air Force Base and at Agat Extension.

3. Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands

Introduction

28. Information on the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands is already contained in the Special Committee's reports to the General Assembly at its nineteenth and twentieth sessions (A/5800/Rev.1, chap. XVIII; and A/6000/Rev.1, chap. XVII). Supplementary information is set out below.⁵

General

29. At 30 June 1965 the population of the Territory was 90,596, compared with 88,215 in June 1964.

Constitutional development

30. The Congress of Micronesia, a bicameral legislature consisting of a General Assembly and a House of Delegates, held its first session in July and August 1965. The organization and powers of the Congress were described in the previous report of the Special Committee to the General Assembly. Members are chosen in biennial elections by secret ballot of residents of the Territory who are citizens of the Territory and eighteen years of age or over.

31. Order No. 2882 of the Secretary of the Interior established the Congress on 28 September 1964, and

provided for its legislative powers. These provide, *inter alia*, that no legislation may be inconsistent with the following: (a) treaties or international agreements of the United States; (b) laws of the United States applicable to the Trust Territory; (c) Executive Orders of the President of the United States and orders of the Secretary of the Interior; or (d) sections 1 through 12 (Bill of Rights) of the code of the Trust Territory, which constitute the basic laws and regulations governing all residents of the Territory. The Congress has powers to levy taxes, to participate in the preparation of the annual budget of the Trust Territory, and to refer legislation twice vetoed by the High Commissioner to the Secretary of the Interior for further action.

32. Money bills enacted by the Congress of Micronesia shall not provide for the appropriation of funds in excess of such amounts as are available from revenues raised pursuant to the tax laws and other revenue laws of the Trust Territory. The Congress has no power to appropriate funds in excess of internal revenue, but it has the authority to review the preliminary budget plan of the High Commissioner before his final submission of the budget to the Secretary of the Interior for Federal funds. With respect to such portions of the preliminary budget plan, the High Commissioner shall adopt such recommendations of the Congress as he may deem appropriate, but he shall transmit to the Secretary of the Interior all recommendations he has not adopted.

33. The Congress may recommend amendments of Secretarial Order No. 2882, during any regular session, by a two-thirds majority vote of the membership of each house.

Public Service

34. On 30 June 1965, Micronesian employees in senior, professional and executive positions totalled 128, an increase of twenty over the previous year. During the same period Micronesians in professional, administrative and protective posts increased from 1,250 to 1,980. Non-indigenous employees over the same period decreased from 319 to 318.

35. In its current annual report (see para. 42 below), the Administering Authority stated that three senior administrative positions were filled by Micronesians, and one Micronesian Assistant District Administrator was awarded a Parvin Graduate Scholarship in Public Administration for advanced academic graduate and internship training at Princeton University. In September 1965, a Micronesian was appointed District Administrator of the Marshall Islands District, the first Micronesian to receive such an appointment.

36. In March 1966, pursuant to the Congress of Micronesia's joint resolution requesting the High Commissioner to develop proposals for civil service regulations for Micronesian employees of the Trust Territory Government, a task force was established to develop proposals for a Civil Service Act. At present, Micronesians are employed in accordance with policy and procedure established by the High Commissioner.

Economic conditions

37. The economy of the Territory is based primarily on subsistence agriculture and fishing and the production of one cash crop, copra. In 1964/65 the value of copra exports amounted to \$2,525,117, as compared with \$2,215,448 the previous year.

⁵ The information presented here has been derived from published reports and from information transmitted by the United States of America to the United Nations, pursuant to Article 88 of the Charter, on 25 May 1966 for the year ending 30 June 1965.

38. In its annual report the Administering Authority states that the major event regarding economic development during the year was the signing of a contract with a leading economic development consulting firm to undertake a two-year economic development programme for Micronesia. This firm will prepare an inventory of assets, liabilities, and opportunities of Micronesia which will be used in preparing a long-range integrated economic development programme for the Territory. Formulation of the development programme will be carried out concurrently with actual implementation.

39. At its thirty-third session the Trusteeship Council was informed that the firm had submitted a preliminary report identifying the areas it considered most promising and would subsequently submit specific recommendations for economic development.

40. The Trust Territory depends largely on United States grants to balance its budget. In 1962, legislation was enacted by the United States Congress to raise the statutory limitation on appropriations for the Trust Territory from \$7.5 million to \$17.5 million. For the fiscal years 1963, 1964 and 1965 a total of \$47.5 million was appropriated by the United States Congress for the administration of the Trust Territory, and since 1963 its deficits have amounted to over \$15 million annually. During the fiscal year ending 30 June 1965, total expenditures increased by \$1,419,967 to \$23.5 million, of which only \$2 million was financed from local revenue. The budget proposal for the fiscal year 1966 amounting to \$17,344,000 has been approved.

41. At its thirty-third session the Trusteeship Council was informed that the United States Congress had before it a legislative proposal to authorize the appropriation of \$172 million for capital expenditure in the Trust Territory over the next five years, in addition to an expanded operating budget totalling \$152 million for the five-year period. The proposed legislation also called for removal of the present ceiling of \$17.5 million a year for civil government operations.

Report of the Trusteeship Council in 1966

42. The Trusteeship Council at its thirty-third session in June and July 1966 completed its examination of the annual report of the Administering Authority for the period 1 July 1964 to 30 June 1965.⁶

43. By a letter dated 25 July 1966 (A/AC.109/191), the President of the Trusteeship Council informed the Chairman of the Special Committee that the Council had adopted a report on the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands for submission to the Security Council.⁷ The report contains, in addition to the Trusteeship Council's conclusions and recommendations and the observations of its individual members, detailed information on political, economic, social and educational conditions.

C. CONSIDERATION BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE

44. At its 469th meeting on 29 September 1966, the Special Committee considered the report of Subcommittee II on American Samoa, Guam and the

Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, which appears as an annex to this chapter.

45. The representative of the *Union of Soviet Socialist Republics* said that the situation in the Territories covered by the report under discussion showed that the administering Power had not yet taken all the necessary steps to enable the people of the Territories to exercise their right to self-determination and independence, nor had it taken steps to implement General Assembly resolution 2069 (XX). In spite of that resolution, the United States had refused to co-operate with the United Nations by permitting a visiting mission to visit Guam and Eastern Samoa. Such an attitude on the part of an administering Power deserved censure.

46. With regard to the political, economic and social development of the Territories, United States policy was guided not by the interests of the people but by the aim of making the Territories an economic and strategic appendage of the metropolitan country. In the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, the Administering Authority had not yet taken steps to enable the people to develop legislative and executive organs in preparation for self-determination and independence. It was often alleged that the Micronesians were not ready to manage their own affairs, but that view had been questioned, for example, by the Vice-Chancellor of the East-West Centre, where inhabitants of the Territory received training.

47. The administering Power was making no attempt to diversify the economy of the Territories but confined itself to developing those branches in which the United States was interested. According to the United States Press, the economic position of the Pacific Islands was worse than it had been under the Japanese, and the people of Eastern Samoa, too, had criticized the neglect by the United States of the island's development. The low level of the economy was to a large extent due to the part played by foreign monopolies. The two fish canneries in Eastern Samoa were owned by American companies. In the Pacific Islands, fishing was controlled by Van Camp Sea Food Company of Long Beach, California. The company Jones and Guerrero played an important part in the economic life of Guam, and the United States granted tax incentives to companies operating in the Territory.

48. Another serious matter was the use of the Territories for military purposes. The economy of Guam and of Eastern Samoa was to a great extent dependent on United States military bases. The Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands had been used for the testing of rocketry and of intercontinental ballistic missiles, and there were military radio stations and satellite tracking stations on the islands. The base of Guam was of particular importance for United States activities in South-East Asia and was used for the storage of B-52 nuclear bombers, while submarines carrying Polaris missiles with nuclear warheads were stationed at the naval base on the island. It was openly admitted that the United States had no intention of giving independence to the Pacific Islands, which were considered to be of strategic importance. The attempt to transform the Territories under United States rule into military bases was a violation of the Charter, of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples and of General Assembly resolution 2105 (XX); it should be condemned by the Committee.

⁶ United States of America, *18th Annual Report to the United Nations on the Administration of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, July 1, 1964 to June 30, 1965*, Department of State Publication 8064 (Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1966). Transmitted to the members of the Trusteeship Council by a note of the Secretary-General (T/1652).

⁷ *Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-first Year, Special Supplement No. 1.*

49. The representative of the *United Republic of Tanzania* said that his delegation had no objection to the report but would like to bring out certain points that were not fully reflected in it. The dependence of the economy of Guam on the military and other activities of the United States Government was mentioned in the Sub-Committee's conclusions. As all members of the Committee knew, however, Guam was being used as the spearhead for United States military activities in South-East Asia; and particularly Viet-Nam, and that aspect of the matter was not reflected in the Sub-Committee's recommendations. His country was opposed to the use of foreign countries, and especially of colonial Territories, as military bases, particularly as bases in an active war. His delegation would therefore like to have seen a reference to that matter in the recommendations. The use of Guam as a military base jeopardized the lives of the people of Guam, who were under colonial bondage and had no say in the running of their own affairs.

50. The representative of the *United States of America* said that it was quite inaccurate to state that the people of Guam were in colonial bondage and had no say in the running of their affairs. The Guam legislature was popularly elected on the basis of universal adult suffrage and it had adopted several unanimous resolutions supporting the United States military effort in the Pacific, an effort which the people of Guam realized was in their defence as well as in defence of the whole area.

51. The representative of the *United Republic of Tanzania* said that United States military activities were another subject, which could be discussed in another forum. Guam, however, was a Non-Self-Governing Territory and until it attained independence his delegation would regard it as being under colonial bondage.

52. The representative of *Bulgaria* said that he too was surprised that such an important question as that of the military base in Guam was not mentioned in the Sub-Committee's recommendations. The dangers inherent in the continued presence of military bases in dependent Territories had been stressed in earlier resolutions of the Special Committee and of the General Assembly. Moreover, the question of foreign military bases and their use in combating liberation movements was one which had received particular attention at the present session of the General Assembly. It would therefore seem all the more appropriate to mention the problem of the Guam base, which was being used by United States forces in operations against other peoples and countries in the region.

53. The representative of the *United States of America* said that the base offered no threat to the people of Guam and represented no obstacle to their progress; it had a long history in the defence of the United States and of freedom. History showed that the United States had no aggressive designs: it had annexed no territory following the Second World War and had helped the Philippines to achieve nationhood. The United States would welcome the day when all such military installations were unnecessary, but meanwhile must continue to take steps it deemed appropriate to safeguard its security and fulfil its commitments. The military facilities in Guam had little connexion with the Committee's mandate.

54. The representative of the *Union of Soviet Socialist Republics* said that he could not agree with

the United States delegation's arguments that the base in Guam represented no obstacle to the progress of the people of the Territory. The United States author Julius Pratt had described the dependence of the peoples of Eastern Samoa and Guam on military bases, pointing out that the bases had drawn many of the young people away from agricultural employment and made the Territories more dependent on imports for food and clothing. There was much evidence to show that the people of Guam had not benefited from the United States bases there. The indigenous people of Guam were recruited into the United States Army and sent to fight in Viet-Nam. The United States Press had reported that a number of people from Guam had been killed in that war. His delegation was not surprised by the United States assertion that the bases were being used in the defence of "freedom", but that was hardly a correct description of the United States intervention in Viet-Nam.

D. ACTION TAKEN BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON THE REPORT OF SUB-COMMITTEE II

55. The representative of the *Union of Soviet Socialist Republics* stated that his delegation supported the conclusions and recommendations in the Sub-Committee's report but considered that they could be supplemented by other recommendations. For example, the administering Power could be requested to return to the people all land alienated for military purposes, dismantle all bases and establish no new bases. The use of the bases for operations against peoples in South-East Asia should be condemned. The right of the people to utilize their own natural resources should be upheld and all laws granting privileges to foreign companies abolished. Plans for merging the Territories with the metropolitan country should also be condemned. Only thus could the rights of the people to self-determination and to control of their own future be guaranteed.

56. The representative of *Australia* said that Australia, as a member of Sub-Committee II, would not oppose the adoption of the Sub-Committee's report, but wished to state that its fears remained essentially as stated in the Sub-Committee's discussions.

57. The representative of the *United States of America* wished to say, firstly, that her delegation did not regard the recommendations and conclusions in the Sub-Committee's report as applicable to the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. That Trust Territory had been designated a strategic area and under Article 83 of the Charter all functions of the United Nations relating to strategic areas were to be exercised by the Security Council; it was to the Security Council and not to the General Assembly that the Trusteeship Council reported on developments in such Territories.

58. With regard to American Samoa, she noted that the conclusions included a reference to "positive steps", but she did not think that due importance had been given to recent developments. A full review of the Constitution had been carried out by a committee appointed upon the request of the Samoan legislature. In Guam, steps had been taken towards instituting an elective chief executive. Another fact which had been ignored by the Soviet Union representative was that the people of Guam had the full rights of American citizenship, and the people of Samoa had the rights of American nationals. Among the inhabitants of those

Territories, as she herself had discovered on a recent visit, there was a universal desire for continuing close association with the United States.

59. During the Sub-Committee's discussions, her delegation had urged that a reference should be made in the recommendations to General Assembly resolution 1541 (XV), since it was essential that the range of possibilities which had been set out by the Assembly for such Territories should be reflected. Her delegation still considered that the report would be incomplete without such a reference.

60. With regard to the question of visiting missions, the United States felt that it would be hard to justify such missions to Territories which constituted free, open societies and where there was a high level of general development.

61. She would like those views to be recorded in connexion with the Committee's decision on the Sub-Committee's report.

62. The representative of the *United Republic of Tanzania* said that his delegation would not favour a mention of General Assembly resolution 1541 (XV) in the recommendations; it had always been apprehensive about references to that resolution. General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) was extremely broad in scope and the reference to that resolution seemed sufficient.

63. The representative of the *United Kingdom* reserved his Government's position on the Sub-Committee's report.

64. At the 469th meeting, on 29 September 1966, the Special Committee approved the report of Sub-Committee II concerning American Samoa, Guam and the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands and adopted its conclusions and recommendations. These are as follows.

Conclusions

65. (a) The Special Committee feels that, though the administering Power had taken some positive steps, the progress towards full self-determination and self-government is not adequate.

(b) The administering Power still retains considerable powers of control in the executive and legislative spheres, thus restricting the exercise of self-government by the people of the Territories. The political institutions and executive machinery are not fully representative of the people.

(c) It notes the various plans announced by the administering Power to strengthen the economies of the Territories. It feels that the administering Power should further intensify its efforts to exploit and develop the indigenous resources in the Territories. It is particularly aware of the dependence of the economy of Guam on the military and other activities of the Government of the United States.

(d) It notes that the legislation providing for direct election of the Governor of Guam is expected to be enacted by the Congress of the United States in the near future. It also noted that a constitutional convention is to be convened in American Samoa in October 1966 to draft a new constitution for the Territory. Notwithstanding these developments, the Special Committee notes that there is no time-table of effective measures for a speedy implementation of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV).

Recommendations

66. (a) The Special Committee reaffirms the inalienable right of the people of American Samoa, Guam and the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands to self-government and independence in conformity with the Declaration contained in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV).

(b) The administering Power should accelerate the further political development of the Territories by expanding the functions and powers of legislature and by vesting executive authority in the hands of the indigenous population.

(c) The Special Committee urges the administering Power to expedite further the economic growth of the Territories by fully developing their agricultural and industrial potential and, particularly in the case of Guam, to implement as speedily as possible its plans for the diversification of the economy. In this regard, the assistance of the United Nations and its specialized agencies could be utilized most effectively.

(d) The administering Power is requested to increase the educational and training facilities for the people of the Territories.

(e) A visit to the Territories by the Special Committee is necessary and would be most useful, for, in addition to familiarizing the Member States with the needs and aspirations of the people, it would also increase the people's awareness of their rights which have been guaranteed to them by the United Nations.

ANNEX

[A/AC.109/L.318/Add.4]

Report of Sub-Committee II

AMERICAN SAMOA, GUAM AND THE TRUST TERRITORY OF THE PACIFIC ISLANDS

Consideration by the Sub-Committee

1. The Sub-Committee considered American Samoa, Guam and the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands at its 48th, 49th, 50th, 51st, 52nd, 53rd and 55th meetings held on 9, 12, 17, 23, 25 and 29 August and 7 September 1966.

2. The Sub-Committee had before it the working papers prepared by the Secretariat (see paras. 1-43 of chap. XVIII).

3. The representative of the *United States of America* stated that, since the Sub-Committee last discussed American Samoa and Guam, there had been steady economic, social and political progress. In American Samoa continued efforts had been made to provide the Territory with a sound economic base. The construction of a new jet airport and a new hotel had built up the island's tourist facilities, while a new tuna cannery and coconut processing plant had opened up additional work opportunities. In education, the complete overhaul of the school system, the construction of new schools and the use of the most advanced teaching techniques, including educational television, now provided all the children of school age with expert instruction and the best educational facilities. In the political field, the automatic review of the 1960 Constitution of American Samoa to be made after five years had been entrusted to a Constitutional Review Committee empowered either to submit amendments or to prepare a revised draft. The Committee had concluded its work and its proposals were to be submitted to a Constitutional Convention which would be convened in October 1966. The draft of a new constitution which might emanate from the Convention would be submitted to the electorate for ratification in November.

4. In Guam political progress was continuing. The people had long enjoyed self-government through the unicameral Legislature which had wide authority, particularly in matters of

taxation and appropriations for the operation of the local government. The Governor of Guam was still appointed by the President of the United States, but the United States House of Representatives had now passed and sent to the Senate legislation providing for the popular election of the Governor. Guam was advancing economically, and since the enactment of the Guam Rehabilitation Act the federal and local governments had co-operated to improve public services and had initiated a system of economic development planning. Through the fiscal year ending June 1967, the sum of \$29.3 million of the anticipated \$45 million to be made available under the Guam Rehabilitation Act had already been appropriated and by 3 June 1966 \$13.7 million had been spent, including \$6.5 million for educational facilities; the remainder had been used for additions to power and water systems, the building of a new air terminal and the beginning of a new commercial port. The Act had also financed a special economic study of Guam which had stressed the need for continuing effort by the local and federal governments if accelerated economic development was to be achieved. To that end the Guam Legislature had established an Economic Development Agency which had extensive powers to develop commerce, agriculture, industry and tourism. The Agency was a public corporation which was to supervise an integrated programme for the economic development of Guam and serve as a catalyst to private enterprises. It had the power to conduct research, form and operate its own industry, make loans, sell bonds, hire its own staff and fix their salaries, and build and operate plants and facilities in various economic areas; it was offering tax incentives to eligible new business enterprises. Like many tropical islands with very few natural resources, Guam looked to tourism as the most promising source of income. Two tourist-style hotels were planned, with target completion dates in two years, and tourist promotion was being stepped up. It was hoped that with the new facilities, tourism would play an important part in developing the economy of Guam.

5. Turning to the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, he referred members to the statements made by his delegation during the recent session of the Trusteeship Council. Those statements described in detail the efforts being made by the United States Government to promote the economic, social and political well-being of the people of the Trust Territory.

6. The representative of *India* stated that the efforts of the administering Power in American Samoa and Guam fell far short of implementing the demands of the Special Committee. The Sub-Committee had been informed that the next step in internal self-government in Guam would be the direct election of the Governor. That step had been promised during the discussion of the Territory by the Special Committee in 1964 and it was to be hoped that the United States Senate would not take an unduly long time in endorsing the necessary legislation which had already been passed by the House of Representatives. The powers of the Guam Legislature continued to be restricted and the Governor and the Congress of the United States still retained the power to veto all laws enacted by it. He would welcome more information on that aspect of the question. During the discussion of the Territory in 1964, many members of the Special Committee had expressed serious concern at the dependence of Guam's economy on the United States military installations in the Territory. His delegation had noted with satisfaction the efforts of the administering Power to give a firmer basis to Guam's economic structure, particularly the establishment of the Economic Development Agency, but it would have welcomed statistics to give some idea of the progress made. It was essential for the administering Power to implement, at an early date, the provisions of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) as well as the recommendations made by the Special Committee in 1964.

7. Regarding American Samoa, his delegation would have welcomed more details concerning the proposals of the Constitutional Review Committee which were to be submitted to a Constitutional Convention in October 1966. Without any detailed information, it was impossible to judge the progress so far made towards self-government, but from the information available it appeared that little had been done towards increas-

ing the powers of the local legislature. Executive power was vested solely in the hands of the Governor and the other personnel appointed by the United States Secretary of the Interior. It would have been useful if the United States delegation had made available copies of the latest annual report of the Governor of American Samoa.

8. The representative of *Poland* said that the United States representative, in his statement at the 48th meeting, had claimed that his Government was trying to create a sound economy in both American Samoa and Guam and had given several minor examples of political and social progress in those Territories. He had not mentioned, however, that the former agricultural economy of Guam had been transformed into an auxiliary service for the military base, which was the principal reason for the United States Government's interest in the island. It might, in fact, be argued that the subordination of economic activities to militaristic goals had left the economy in a worse state than it had been originally. Recent history showed that such bases tended to be used against peoples fighting for their freedom; that had been the case in the Congo and was the case in Viet-Nam.

9. To complete the process of decolonization all Member States must observe the obligations laid down in the United Nations Charter and nothing should impede discussion of infringements of a nation's sovereignty.

10. The representative of the *United States of America* stated that the Polish representative, by introducing a reference to Viet-Nam, had digressed seriously from the subject of the Territories under United States administration. The United States had tried to arrange a Security Council debate on Viet-Nam and was prepared to discuss the question at any time, but the United States delegation wondered if the Sub-Committee would wish to debate it at the present meeting.

11. He said that the United States was not the aggressor in Viet-Nam, and that for several decades the military base on Guam had been used for the defence of the United States and of neighbouring countries and for no other purpose. Furthermore, his delegation was surprised that such developments as the introduction of a bill providing for the election of a Governor of Guam by the people of the island and the convening of a Constitutional Convention on American Samoa should be considered as minor examples of constitutional advance.

12. The representative of *Iraq* referred to the conference of the United States and Territorial Governments held a few weeks previously at which the Governors had supported the United States policy in Viet-Nam. He wondered whether it was within the rights or responsibilities of the Administrators of the United States Trust Territories to support United States policy in Viet-Nam, inasmuch as they had been appointed by the United States Government and could not speak for the people of the Territories.

13. The representative of *Poland* in his right of reply observed that though the United States representative had protested on his reference to Viet-Nam, there is no way else to be blamed but the United States for the very fact that military bases are operating on this Territory. The connexion between Guam and Viet-Nam war seemed very clear in the opinion of the Polish delegation.

14. The representative of the *United States of America* said he did not consider the position attributed to the Governor of Guam surprising, and that he presumably felt free to express his views on the matters before the Conference.

15. The representative of *Chile* asked whether the United States representative could give further information about the new draft Constitution for American Samoa, the composition of the Constitutional Convention which would meet at the end of 1966 to approve it and the role played by the indigenous inhabitants in the political development of the Territory. Such information would be of fundamental importance as it would enable the Sub-Committee to judge the political maturity achieved by the islanders and the degree of self-government to be granted them by the administering Power.

16. He asked the United States representative to explain what actual power the Governor of Guam would exercise in the future constitutional framework, if, as now proposed, he were elected by the people of the Territory. The Subcommittee would be interested to receive more specific information about the participation of the people of Guam in political and administrative affairs. It was important that the indigenous people, who constituted more than three-quarters of the population, should exercise their rights to full self-determination and independence in accordance with the relevant resolutions of the United Nations.

17. He expressed his appreciation for the information which the United States representative had already given about the economic, social and political progress in American Samoa and Guam. In the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, while there were still enormous difficulties to be overcome, there was a growing sense of national identity and unity among the people and their representatives in the Congress of Micronesia. He had no doubt that the people of Micronesia would continue to make progress toward full self-determination and independence.

18. The representative of *Poland* said that the steps taken by the United States as the Administering Authority for the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands to ensure the rapid constitutional, economic and social development of Micronesia had been inadequate: the Territory was advancing towards self-government so slowly as to cast serious doubts on the sincerity of United States efforts to fulfil its obligations under the Trusteeship System. Even in the field of education, for example, where the Administering Authority had recently intensified its efforts, improvement had been relatively limited and slow. Moreover, although the political and social structure of the Territory had been strengthened, the powers of self-government of the newly established organs were minimal. The United States High Commissioner still exercised too much executive and administrative authority as compared with the Congress of Micronesia, which did not even control the territorial budget. In the circumstances, Micronesia appeared doomed to political dependence for years to come.

19. He strongly urged the Administering Authority to accelerate the process of transferring power to the Territory in accordance with resolution 1514 (XV) and to overcome its apparent reluctance to provide sufficient financial and technical assistance to prepare the inhabitants for self-determination and full sovereignty. It should be guided by the paramount interests of the population rather than the strategic value of the islands.

20. The representative of *Australia* emphasized that the problem of the economic and social development of all the Pacific Islands, with the exception of New Guinea, was different from that of other dependent Territories because the islands constituted tiny isolated land masses scattered throughout a vast area of some 3 million square miles of ocean. The last United Nations Visiting Mission to the Pacific Islands had recognized that fundamental reality and it should be borne in mind in considering the forms of independence to be granted to the inhabitants.

21. The most important political development in the Trust Territory had been the election by universal suffrage of a genuinely representative Congress of Micronesia. Although the powers of that body remained to be worked out between the Administering Authority and the people of the Territory, the soundness of that move was beyond all question. Similarly, the Administering Authority was to be commended for its efforts to accelerate economic and educational advancement: the United States Congress was considering a grant of \$300 million to the Territory for capital development and a five-year operational programme as well as the possibility of utilizing the Peace Corps to relieve the shortage of teachers and fill other gaps in the educational programme.

22. The positive measures taken by the administering Power in Guam also reflected a sound approach to its responsibility for leading the Territory towards full self-government. The bill introduced in the United States Congress providing for the direct election of the Governor by the people of Guam had

been passed by the House of Representatives and sent to the Senate for final approval. On the proposal of the Constitutional Review Committee, a Constitutional Convention was to be convened in October 1966 to discuss the Committee's recommendations for changes in the political and legislative structure. For purposes of economic development, \$29.3 million of an anticipated \$45 million had already been appropriated under the Guam Rehabilitation Act and extensive powers had been given to the Economic Development Agency. In view of those significant steps to promote the balanced development of the island, the Australian delegation looked forward to further rapid progress in Guam.

23. In American Samoa, there were no special problems likely to cause undue concern on the part of the United Nations. Indeed, as *The New York Times* had reported on 24 August, "prospering Samoa" was emerging as a "showcase of the South Seas". The people of the Territory were satisfied with the prevailing situation and there was no movement for union with independent Western Samoa. It would be recalled, moreover, that it had taken the United States Congress some twenty-five years to ratify the voluntary cession of the island to the United States by the erstwhile indigenous chiefs, indicating that possession of Guam had not resulted from any "mad grab" of territory. Since the Samoan Legislature had ratified the 1960 Constitution, American Samoa had a two-chamber Congress which gave full scope to the traditional chieftaincy or *matai* system while at the same time introducing modern, democratic concepts of government. The people of the island were successfully combining the best of both worlds and clearly knew what they wanted. In the circumstances, it would be unwise to force the pace of their political advancement.

24. The representative of *Sierra Leone* concurred in the view that the geographical situation of the islands under discussion and their small size set them apart from most other dependent Territories, and that the economic viability presented a very complex problem. Moreover, inasmuch as the Guamanians were United States citizens eligible to vote at eighteen years of age, the Samoan nationals of the United States were eligible to vote at twenty and the inhabitants of the Pacific Islands wards of the United States with no established voting age, there seemed to be no uniform pattern of United States administration. He would welcome some clarification on that subject. Similarly, while Guam had at least two political parties, one of which was associated with the major political party in the United States and sought to bring Guam into the Union as a fifty-first state, the Committee had no information concerning the organization of political parties in American Samoa or the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. Although the efforts of the administering Power to stimulate the Guamanian economy by developing tourism might be beneficial, the island was still overwhelmingly dependent on the economic advantages derived from its use as a military base. He hoped that the administering Power would reorient its efforts toward the development of Guam's agricultural and industrial resources. The United States should also endeavour to ensure the training of the skilled technical, administrative and economic personnel required for development in the three Territories.

25. Despite unmistakable signs of economic and social progress, the Territories under United States administration were advancing only very slowly towards self-government and independence. Although the local government councils and the Congress of Micronesia were representative bodies, they did not exercise efficient control over legislation: the United States, through the Governor or Administration, retained the power of veto. He therefore urged the United States to accelerate the political and constitutional development of the islands so that they could rapidly attain the goals established in resolution 1514 (XV). The United Nations Visiting Mission which was to go to the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands in February 1967 should increase the people's awareness of their right to self-determination and independence, inform them of the various political alternatives open to them, including continued association with the former Administering Authority, and provide Member States with specific information enabling them to assess the needs of the islanders more accurately.

26. The representative of the *United States of America* referred the Sub-Committee to the Administering Authority's recent report to the Trusteeship Council for a detailed account of economic and political developments in the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. The comprehensive economic survey of the Territory which had recently been completed was expected to establish realistic guidelines for future economic development and the United States administration had substantially increased its 1966 budgetary request. The two-year-old Micronesian Congress was functioning well, and would undoubtedly play an important role in charting the Territory's future development.

27. The economic report on Guam recently prepared under the aegis of a joint Federal-Territorial Commission and submitted to the United States Congress in March 1966 had recommended the development of certain major areas to strengthen and diversify Guam's economy: the establishment of industry for the export of locally produced or assembled high-tariff goods to the United States, the substitution of locally produced goods for imported goods on the domestic market, especially agricultural products, and the development of tourism. Steps had already been taken in all those fields: in 1965 Guam's first watch-assembly plant had been established, farm production figures had doubled and the first 1,300-passenger cruise ship had visited Guam in the fiscal year 1965. In addition, a large slaughter-house was planned to reduce the level of meat imports and the Economic Development Authority recently created by the Guam legislature was currently discussing with outside investors the construction of a wheat processing plant to promote United States wheat sales in the Far East. Other plans were being implemented for the completion of a \$1 million air terminal and a possible new commercial port and priority consideration was being given to increasing hotel capacity on the island. While Guam lacked local industrial resources, its potentialities as a processing and servicing centre were considerable.

28. The bill now before the United States Senate for the direct election of the Governor of Guam represented a significant step towards self-government for the island. A popularly elected Governor of Guam would serve as the chief executive of the Territory with full executive powers, and would be responsible for the execution of the laws of Guam and United States laws applicable in Guam. Moreover, the increasing participation of Guamanians in the administration of the island had been confirmed by the Governor's report for the fiscal year 1965-1966 stating that 2,227 of the 2,669 regular employees of the executive staff of the Government of Guam were Guamanians. Of the remainder, 224 were United States citizens from outside Guam. The Governor himself was a Guamanian.

29. The Constitutional Review Committee of American Samoa had proposed, *inter alia*, that the powers of the Legislature in the budgetary field be broadened. It had further suggested that the qualifications of the members of the Legislature be changed to render it more fully representative, that the maximum length of the annual legislative session should be extended and the number of days allowed to the Governor for taking action on legislative bills reduced. It had recommended deletion of the constitutional provision empowering the Governor to promulgate laws he had designated as "urgent" when the Legislature failed to act, as well as the provision limiting the number of executive departments in the Samoan Government and prohibiting the establishment of new instrumentalities without prior approval of the Secretary of the Interior. No

action had as yet been taken concerning the composition of the Constitutional Convention which was to study those proposals in October, but the Convention would probably include the Legislature as well as local representatives.

Conclusions of the Sub-Committee

30. (a) The Sub-Committee feels that, though the administering Power has taken some positive steps, the progress towards full self-determination and self-government is not adequate.

(b) The administering Power still retains considerable powers of control in the executive and legislative spheres, thus restricting the exercise of self-government by the people of the Territories. The political institutions and executive machinery are not fully representative of the people.

(c) The Sub-Committee notes the various plans announced by the administering Power to strengthen the economies of the Territories. The Sub-Committee feels that the administering Power should further intensify its efforts to exploit and develop the indigenous resources in the Territories. The Sub-Committee is particularly aware of the dependence of the economy of Guam on the military and other activities of the Government of the United States.

(d) The Sub-Committee notes that the legislation providing for direct election of the Governor of Guam is expected to be enacted by the Congress of the United States in the near future. The Committee also notes that a constitutional convention is to be convened in American Samoa in October 1966 to draft a new constitution for the Territory. Notwithstanding these developments, the Sub-Committee notes that there is no time-table of effective measures for a speedy implementation of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV).

Recommendations of the Sub-Committee

31. (a) The Sub-Committee reaffirms the inalienable right of the people of American Samoa, Guam and the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands to self-government and independence in conformity with the Declaration contained in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV).

(b) The administering Power should accelerate the further political development of the Territories by expanding the functions and powers of legislature and by vesting executive authority in the hands of indigenous population.

(c) The Sub-Committee urges the administering Power to expedite further the economic growth of the Territories by fully developing their agricultural and industrial potential and, particularly in the case of Guam, to implement as speedily as possible its plans for the diversification of the economy. In this regard, the assistance of the United Nations and its specialized agencies could be utilized most effectively.

(d) The administering Power is requested to increase the educational and training facilities for the people of the Territories.

(e) A visit to the Territories by the Special Committee is necessary and would be most useful, for, in addition to familiarizing the Member States with the needs and aspirations of the people, it would also increase the peoples' awareness of their rights which have been guaranteed to them by the United Nations.

CHAPTER XIX*

TRUST TERRITORY OF NAURU, PAPUA AND THE TRUST TERRITORY OF NEW GUINEA,
AND COCOS (KEELING) ISLANDSA. ACTION TAKEN BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE IN
1964 AND BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AT ITS
TWENTIETH SESSION

1. After considering the Trust Territory of Nauru, Papua and the Trust Territory of New Guinea and the Cocos (Keeling) Islands in November 1964, the Special Committee recommended that the peoples of these Territories should be enabled to express their wishes in accordance with the provisions of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) through well-established democratic processes under United Nations supervision. It further recommended that a visiting mission would be useful in order to assess the political climate and the aspirations of the peoples, and that steps might be taken to arrange such a visit in consultation with the administering Power (A/5800/Rev.1,¹ chap. XIX, paras. 144-155).

2. It recommended concerning Nauru that the implementation of resolution 1514 (XV) and the resettlement of the Nauruans, being distinct questions, should be settled independently, with precedence given to the first, as desired by the Nauruans. It requested the Administering Authority to assist fully in the future resettlement of the Nauruans according to their wishes. It recommended that they should be given full control over their natural economic resources and that the Administering Authority should continue to pursue negotiations to this end.

3. Regarding Papua and the Trust Territory of New Guinea, the Special Committee requested the administering Power to take urgent steps to implement the provisions of resolution 1514 (XV), and, in consultation with the House of Assembly, to take further constitutional steps aimed at the abolition of special and reserved seats in the latter and at the implementation of resolution 1514 (XV). It recommended that existing disparities in the wages of the indigenous people should receive immediate attention with a view to their elimination. It recommended that local government councils should be strengthened in order to give the population the possibility of exercising self-government in municipal matters. It felt that efforts in the economic field and the field of education should continue at an accelerated pace.

4. At its twentieth session, the General Assembly, after considering the chapters of the reports of the Special Committee concerning Nauru (A/5800/Rev.1, chap. XIX; and A/6000/Rev.1,² chap. XVIII) and the report of the Trusteeship Council,³ adopted resolution 2111 (XX) of 21 December 1965. By this resolution, the Assembly endorsed the conclusions and recommendations of the Special Committee, and called upon the Administering Authority to take immediate steps to implement the proposal of the representatives of the Nauruan people for the establishment of a Legis-

lative Council by 31 January 1966. It requested the Administering Authority to fix the earliest possible date, but one not later than 31 January 1968, for the independence of the Nauruans in accordance with their wishes. It further requested that immediate steps be taken by the Administering Authority towards restoring the island of Nauru for habitation by its people as a sovereign nation. It called upon the Administering Authority to report to the Trusteeship Council at its thirty-third session on the implementation of the resolution.

5. At the same session the General Assembly, after considering the chapters of the reports of the Special Committee concerning Papua and the Trust Territory of New Guinea (*ibid.*) and the report of the Trusteeship Council,³ adopted resolution 2112 (XX) of 21 December 1965. By this resolution, the Assembly endorsed the recommendations and conclusions of the Special Committee, and called upon the Administering Authority to implement fully General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) and, to this end, to fix an early date for independence in accordance with the freely expressed wishes of the people. It requested the Administering Authority to report to the Trusteeship Council at its thirty-third session and to the Special Committee on the implementation of the resolution. It further requested the Trusteeship Council and the Special Committee to report to the Assembly at its twenty-first session.

6. At the same session, the General Assembly, after considering the chapters of the reports of the Special Committee concerning the Cocos (Keeling) Islands (*ibid.*), adopted resolution 2069 (XX) on 16 December 1965, endorsing the conclusions and recommendations contained therein, and calling upon the administering Power to implement without delay the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly. It requested the administering Power to allow visiting missions to visit the Territory and to extend to them full co-operation and assistance. Finally, it requested the Special Committee to examine the situation in the Territory and to report on the implementation of the resolution to the Assembly at its twenty-first session.

B. INFORMATION ON THE TERRITORIES

7. Information on the Trust Territory of Nauru, Papua and the Trust Territory of New Guinea is already contained in the reports of the Special Committee to the General Assembly at its nineteenth and twentieth sessions (A/5800/Rev.1, chap. XIX; and A/6000/Rev.1, chap. XVIII). Supplementary information is set out below.⁴

⁴ The information on the Trust Territories of Nauru and New Guinea presented here is derived from information before the Trusteeship Council at its thirty-third session, in particular the reports of the Administering Authority for the period 1 July 1964 to 30 June 1965 (A/6363 and A/6364). The information on Papua has been derived from published reports and from the information transmitted to the Secretary-General by Australia under Article 73 e of the Charter on 5 August 1966, for the year ending 30 June 1965. The information on the Cocos (Keeling) Islands was transmitted by Australia on 2 February 1965, for the year ending 30 June 1964.

* Previously issued under the symbol A/6300/Add.9.

¹ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Nineteenth Session, Annexes, annex No. 8 (part I).*

² *Ibid.*, *Twentieth Session, Annexes*, addendum to agenda item 23.

³ *Ibid.*, *Twentieth Session, Supplement No. 4 (A/6004).*

1. Trust Territory of Nauru

General

8. The total population of Nauru at 30 June 1965 was 5,561, comprising 2,734 Nauruans, 1,481 other Pacific Islanders, 900 Chinese and 446 Europeans.

Future of the Nauruan community

9. The question of the future of the Nauruan community has been of special concern for some time because the phosphate deposits on the Territory will be exhausted in approximately thirty years. Investigations have been made of Curtis Island which has been proposed as a future home for the Nauruans. In its report for 1964-1965, the Administering Authority states that it has complied with the requests of the Nauruans: not to proceed with the proposal to acquire Curtis Island for a future home; and to establish an independent technical committee to examine what would be involved in and the practicability of the rehabilitation of the worked-out phosphate lands. The Committee convened in January 1966, and on 8 June submitted its report to the Minister for Territories and to the Legislative Council of Nauru. The report has not yet been made public.

Political and constitutional developments

10. Formerly Nauru had no executive or legislative council. Pursuant to an agreement reached in discussions with representatives of the Nauruans in June 1965, provision was made in the Nauru Act of 1965 for the establishment of an Executive and a Legislative Council.⁵ The Legislative Council with an elected Nauruan majority was inaugurated in January 1966. In addition to the nine elected Nauruan members, the Council has five appointed official members. At its second meeting, the Legislative Council appointed a Select Committee, consisting of five of its elected members, "to inquire into and report upon the most suitable means by which the people of Nauru can achieve complete independence by January 1968".

11. At the thirty-third session of the Trusteeship Council the Administering Authority expressed the view that talks on further political progress should be held within two or three years after the establishment of the Legislative and Executive Councils. At the same session, the Head Chief of Nauru informed the Trusteeship Council that he did not believe there would be any difficulty in arranging for talks to be held in 1967.

Economic conditions

12. Phosphate is the sole export of the Territory. The British Phosphate Commissioners are responsible for the direction and management of the phosphate industry, including the extraction and export of phosphate.

13. In its report for 1964-1965 (A/6363), the Administering Authority stated that the tonnage of phosphate delivered for the year ending 30 June 1965 amounted to 1,688,998 tons, compared with 1,653,090 tons in 1963-1964; its value for the year ending 30 June 1965 amounted to £4,771,419 compared with £4,422,016 in 1963-1964. The report also stated that it is expected that at a rate of extraction of about

2 million tons per year, the life of the deposits will be approximately thirty years.

14. The total imports, chiefly from Australia, amounted to £2,297,899 in 1964-1965 compared with £5504,100 in 1963-1964.

15. Public revenue for the year 1964-1965 totalled £650,444, of which the British Phosphate Commissioners provided £607,594. The total expenditure was £770,095.

16. In its report for 1964-1965 the Administering Authority stated that the Nauruans and the Administering Authority had agreed to discuss future arrangements for the operation of the mining industry in the first half of 1966. During its thirty-third session the Trusteeship Council was informed that discussions began in June, and after an exchange of views, were adjourned until October or November 1966. The Council was informed by the Head Chief of Nauru that the Nauruans were seeking ownership of the industry and could not accept a fifty-fifty share in a partnership arrangement on the rest of the life of the phosphate industry on Nauru. They considered that the British Phosphate Commissioners should remain as managing agents on the islands and that they would pay them a fair fee. The Nauruans were prepared to buy the equipment the British Phosphate Commissioners had on Nauru and they would compensate them for it. These questions would be discussed in more detail at a conference in Canberra.

17. He also stated that the Nauruan people disputed the point of view of the Administering Authority that the deposits were owned by the British Phosphate Commissioners, and insisted that they were the owners of the phosphates and did not recognize the right of the British Phosphate Commissioners.

Report of the Trusteeship Council in 1966

18. The Trusteeship Council, at its thirty-third session in July 1966, completed its examination of the annual report of the Administering Authority on Nauru for the period 1 July 1964 to 30 June 1965 (A/6363).

19. By a letter dated 25 July 1966 (A/AC.109/191), the President of the Trusteeship Council informed the Chairman of the Special Committee that the Council had adopted a report on the Trust Territory of Nauru for submission to the General Assembly (see A/6304). The report contains, in addition to the Trusteeship Council's conclusions and recommendations, and the observations of its individual members, detailed information on political, economic, social and educational conditions.

2. Papua and the Trust Territory of New Guinea

General

20. The combined Territories, at 30 June 1965, had an enumerated indigenous population of 2,092,807 and an additional estimated one of 25,110. The non-indigenous population was estimated to total 31,486.

Political and constitutional developments

21. Papua and the Trust Territory are administered jointly with administrative headquarters at Port Moresby. The legislature for the two Territories, the House of Assembly, consists of fifty-four members elected on a common roll by adult suffrage, and ten nominated official members. Forty-four elective seats

⁵ For details concerning the provisions of the Nauru Act, see *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-first Session, Supplement No. 4* (A/6304), paras. 356-367.

are open to candidates of all races and ten are special seats reserved for non-indigenous inhabitants.

22. The Select Committee of the House of Assembly presented interim reports in November 1965 and June 1966. The Committee was appointed in 1965 "to draft for the consideration of the House of Assembly a set of constitutional proposals to serve as a guide for future constitutional development in the Territory". At its thirty-third session the Trusteeship Council was informed that the Committee, the Chairman of which is an elected indigenous member, had travelled extensively in the Territory obtaining the opinions of a large cross-section of the community, and that the Committee's terms of reference were wide and its inquiries encompassed not only the composition of the House of Assembly but also proposals for the future constitutional development of the Territory. It was also informed that in order to meet any contingent need for possible amendments to the Papua and New Guinea Act, it would be necessary for the Committee's report on the composition of the House of Assembly to be presented to the House by August 1966.

23. The Administering Authority states that the extension of the system of local government councils has significantly increased since July 1965, and that with the introduction of the Local Government Ordinance in January 1966 provision was made for wider powers and functions for local government councils. The exercise of central government control by field officers was removed and instead invested in a Commissioner for Local Government. Council budgets are not now subject to approval, but merely to certification that

the expenditure proposed is likely to be met from revenue.

Economic conditions

24. Primary production is the basis of the economy of both Papua and the Trust Territory of New Guinea. Agriculture is the chief activity, and in 1964-1965 agricultural exports comprised 90 per cent of the total exports of Papua and approximately 86 per cent of the Trust Territory's exports.

25. The principal agricultural exports of Papua are copra and rubber; those of the Trust Territory are copra, cocoa and coffee. An important timber industry based on the Trust Territory's extensive forest resources is being developed. Gold mining, although now declining, is still an important activity. A cattle industry is being developed. Manufacturing industries are of minor though growing significance.

26. Although subsistence agriculture is still the predominant activity of the indigenous population, increasing numbers of Papuans and New Guineans are growing export crops or cash crops for local sale. During 1964-1965, indigenous growers produced approximately one half of the copra and three quarters of the coffee grown in Papua, while their plantings of cocoa trees now total approximately 947,500. Indigenous growers now produce just over one quarter of the copra, about one quarter of the cocoa and just under half the coffee produced in New Guinea.

27. The following table shows the public finances of the Territories:

	1963-1964			1964-1965		
	Papua	New Guinea	Total	Papua	New Guinea	Total
(Million Australian pounds)						
Internal revenue	5.24	6.13	11.37	6.51	7.45	13.96
Australian grant	10.01	15.23	25.24	11.00	16.93	27.99
Total revenue	15.25	21.36	36.61	17.57	24.38	41.95
Total expenditure	15.89	22.43	38.52	18.69	26.34	45.03

28. The Administering Authority provided a grant of \$A68,820,000⁶ towards the cost of the 1965-1966 combined territorial budget. Expenditure on economic activity rose from approximately 25 per cent in 1963-1964 to approximately 33 per cent in the 1965-1966 budget. The total revenue for 1965-1966 was estimated at \$A102,340,000, of which the sums of \$A34,200,000 and \$A6,140,000 were expected to be raised respectively by internal revenue allocations and from territory loan subscriptions. For the period 1 July 1965 to 31 March 1966 internal receipts within Papua and the Trust Territory amounted to \$A23,113,000. The total expenditure for 1965-1966 was estimated at approximately \$A102,340,000, and total works expenditure during 1965-1966 amounted to \$A27.6 million, representing an increase of \$A4.7 million over the previous year.

29. Companies active in Papua and the Trust Territory paid some £4.6 million in dividends and £1.5 million in taxes during 1964-1965 on taxable incomes of £10.4 million derived in 1963-1964. Corresponding figures for the previous year were £2.5 million, £1.1 million and £6.9 million respectively.

⁶ The Administering Authority changed to a decimal monetary system on 14 February 1966. A new \$A1.00 is the equivalent of ten shillings in the old currency or \$US1.12.

30. Following the recommendation made by the mission of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) which visited the Territories in 1963, an economic adviser was appointed in October 1965.

31. In November 1965, the House of Assembly passed a bill to establish a Development Bank, the main purpose of which would be to stimulate development in primary production and in industrial or commercial undertakings, on more generous terms and conditions than would be available through banking channels. The Bank will be controlled and managed by a Board of Directors, and the twelve members of the Board will include representatives of indigenous producers.

Social conditions in Papua

Labour

32. Although there have been steady increases in the numbers of indigenous people engaged in wage employment in recent years, the proportion of wage-earners to the estimated adult male indigenous population is still relatively small (approximately 13 per cent). While large numbers of the Territory's labour force are still engaged in unskilled work on plantations or in the towns, there is emerging a body of more highly

skilled and experienced workers who are capable to a much greater extent than previously of negotiating their own wages and conditions of employment.

33. At 31 March 1965 there were 29,234 indigenous people in paid employment (including 1,159 members of the police force but excluding members of the defence forces) compared with 25,147 at 31 March 1964. Private industry employed 19,124, of whom 9,839 were general plantation workers, compared with 16,270 of whom 6,301 were general plantation workers in 1964.

Public health

34. Expenditure on health services totalled £1,498,355 for the period 1964-1965; expenditure on works and services of a capital nature and on the improvement and maintenance of hospital facilities and equipment amounted to £709,700. The cost of hospital and medical equipment amounted to £40,865. The corresponding figures for the period 1963-1964 were £1,344,924 and £694,242. Local government councils reported an expenditure on health services of £22,059 to 31 December 1964 compared with £13,928 in 1963.

35. The missions are assisted by the Administration through a system of grants-in-aid and by the supply of drugs, dressings and equipment. The grants-in-aid and monetary value of supplies totalled £47,349 for the period 1964-1965 and grants-in-aid for the construction of mission hospitals amounted to £15,610, compared with £85,270 and £18,458 for the period 1963-1964. The ascertainable expenditure by missions from their own funds on medical services was £45,006 for 1964-1965, compared with £75,744 for 1963-1964.

Educational conditions in Papua

36. At 30 June 1965 there were 171 administration schools and 668 mission schools, compared with 169 and 733 in the previous year. The decrease in the number of mission schools was due to the raising educational standards. The number of pupils also decreased during the same period from 73,523 to 71,506. The following table gives the number of pupils in the various schools in 1965.

<i>School</i>	<i>Indigenous pupils</i>	<i>Non-indigenous pupils</i>
Primary	62,822	1,547
High	2,825	195
Technical	984	—
Teacher-training	367	38
Correspondence	2,728	—
TOTAL	69,726	1,780

37. In addition to pupils in Papua in 1965, fifty-four indigenous and 584 non-indigenous students were receiving educational assistance at Australian secondary schools. Nine Papuan students were undertaking higher education in Australia: six at university in faculties of law, agricultural science, social studies and arts; one at an agricultural college, and two at a technical college.

38. The commission appointed by the Australian Government in 1963 to report on higher education recommended the establishment at an early date of a university and an institute of higher technical education. The University of Papua and New Guinea Ordinance and the Institute of Higher Technical Education Ordinance were passed in 1965 and a number of appointments have been made to the University and the Insti-

tute. The first degree courses in arts and law will commence at the University in 1967. A preliminary year of studies for students of the University began in February 1966 with fifty-eight students. Courses at the Institute of Higher Education will begin in 1967.

39. Departmental expenditure on education rose from £1,504,000 in 1963-1964 to £1,926,000 in 1964-1965, or 10 per cent of total government expenditure. These figures include grants-in-aid of £134,000 and £171,000 respectively to missions to assist in their educational work. In addition, the expenditure of other departments on education and training increased from £312,000 to £492,000, while building construction and equipment expenditures declined from £646,000 to £324,000. Expenditure by missions from their own funds increased from £177,000 in 1963-1964 to £261,000 in 1964-1965.

Report of the Trusteeship Council in 1966 on New Guinea

40. The Trusteeship Council, at its thirty-third session in July 1966, completed its examination of the annual report of the Administering Authority on the Trust Territory of New Guinea for the period 1 July 1964 to 30 June 1965 (A/6364).

41. By a letter dated 25 July 1966 (A/AC.109/191), the President of the Trusteeship Council informed the Chairman of the Special Committee that the Council had adopted a report on the Trust Territory of New Guinea for submission to the General Assembly (see A/6304). The report contains, in addition to the Council's recommendations and conclusions, and the observations of its individual members, detailed information on political, economic, social and educational conditions in the Trust Territory and on institutions common to the two Territories.

3. Cocos (Keeling) Islands

General

42. The Cocos (Keeling) Islands are a group of small coral islands situated in the Indian Ocean with a total land area of five square miles. In 1964, three were inhabited and the total population consisted of 463 Cocos Islanders and 200 Europeans. The Cocos Islanders live on Horne Island and the Europeans live on West Island and Direction Island.

Political development

43. There have been no significant recent changes in the administration of the Territory. An Official Representative, appointed by the Australian Minister of State for Territories, continues to exercise and perform such powers and functions in the Territory as are delegated to him by the Minister or conferred upon him by the Cocos (Keeling) Act, 1955-1963. Under present arrangements he is responsible for general administration, including health and education. There are no elected offices in the Territory.

Economic conditions

44. The economy of the Territory is based on an international airport, a cable station and other facilities maintained by the Commonwealth Government and commercial organizations; and on the production and export of copra produced on the plantation of the Clunies-Ross Estate. Under the indenture granted in 1886, all land in the Territory above the high water

mark is held in perpetuity by the Clunies-Ross family. The grant is subject to conditions allowing Her Majesty to resume any of the land for specified purposes. Small quantities of vegetables are grown on one island, but because of limitations of soil and water on the other two inhabited islands, all supplies of fruit and vegetables are imported.

45. Expenditure on administration and on capital works and services is financed from funds appropriated by the Commonwealth Government. Some revenue is derived locally from nursing and from other sources such as hospital fees, which in 1963-1964 amounted to £A3,624. Expenditures for this period totalled £A41,787.

Social conditions

46. Cocos Islanders are employed by the Clunies-Ross Estate mainly in the production of copra and in maintaining community services. The Estate also undertakes construction, maintenance and repair work for government authorities and private organizations. Social services comprise pensions in excess of 50 per cent of wages for workers who have reached 65 years of age, and free health services and education.

47. A medical officer, two nurses and a four-bed hospital provide medical services in the Territory. Europeans are charged for medical services. Charges for services to Cocos Islanders are met by the Clunies-Ross Estate.

Educational conditions

48. Elementary education provided by the Clunies-Ross Estate on Horne Island for the children of its employees comprises two to three years' schooling in the vernacular (Malay). On West Island, the Administration maintains a primary school for European children which follows the West Australian syllabus. It had an enrolment of thirty-two pupils in 1964.

C. CONSIDERATION BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE

49. At its 469th meeting on 29 September 1966, the Special Committee considered the report of Sub-Committee II on the Trust Territory of Nauru, Papua and the Trust Territory of New Guinea, and the Cocos (Keeling) Islands, which appears as an annex to this chapter.

50. The representative of *Australia* said that the whole concept of independence and the essential ingredients of independence were being discussed with the representatives of the Nauruan people. The question was a complex one, in view of the small population of Nauru and its dependence on a single product, namely phosphates. The island community had reached a high level of prosperity, but the population was increasing rapidly and the question of the possibility of continued economic existence on the island was of much concern to the Nauruans and to the Australian Government. Attempts to reach agreement on an alternative homeland for the Nauruans had so far been unsuccessful, but the possibility of resettlement in a new homeland was not dead. A Legislative Council had only recently been established. It was in the light of all those factors that Australia was continuing to discuss the question of independence with the Nauruan leaders.

51. The representative of the *Union of Soviet Socialist Republics* said that an examination of the situation in the Trust Territories administered by Australia showed that the Administering Authority had done

practically nothing to implement the resolutions which the General Assembly had adopted at its twentieth session and which made specific recommendations regarding the advance of the people of those Territories to self-determination and independence. As could be seen from the report of Sub-Committee II (see annex) and the Secretariat working papers (see paras. 7-48 above), there had been little progress in the political field since the Special Committee had last examined conditions in the Territories. His delegation shared the conclusion of the Sub-Committee that progress towards the implementation of the Declaration in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) had been slow. The Soviet Union delegation therefore supported the Tanzanian amendment to paragraph 29 (f) of the Sub-Committee's report.

52. In the other Territories administered by Australia, too, the progress towards self-determination had been minimal and Australia was refusing to establish a definite time-table for the granting of independence to those countries. Indeed, the Australian Minister for Territories had stated earlier that year that Australia did not intend to leave Papua and New Guinea. The Soviet Union delegation shared the opinion expressed by the representative of Sierra Leone that the administering Power appeared to be making no attempt to prepare the Cocos Islands for self-determination and possible independence.

53. The situation in the economic field was equally discouraging. Only the activities that returned huge profits on foreign capital were being developed, namely, copra, cocoa, coffee, timber and phosphates. As a result, the Territories were compelled to import the basic necessities of life. Foreign monopolies occupied a dominant position in the Territories and were ruthlessly exploiting their human and natural resources.

54. The representative of Australia had informed the Special Committee that the economy of Nauru was highly dependent on the mining of the phosphate deposits and that the deposits were gradually being worked out. He had not said, however, that those resources were being plundered by foreign Powers and primarily by the British Phosphate Commissioners, who paid the Nauruan people \$A2 per ton, whereas the enriched phosphate was sold on the world market for \$40 per ton. It was known that in 1964-65 companies operating in the Territories of Papua and New Guinea alone had received an income of £10.4 million.

55. Australian representatives in various bodies of the United Nations cited impressive figures as proof of the efforts that Australia was making to develop the Territories under its administration. An analysis showed, however, that in the Territory of New Guinea, the *per capita* amount devoted to the development of the Territory was only \$15.

56. The information given in the report indicated that the Administering Authority was not making sufficient efforts to provide the people of the Territories with education, particularly higher technical training. It was known that there was racial discrimination in the Territories, particularly in New Guinea and Papua. The Administering Authority claimed that it was doing everything possible to eradicate such discrimination, but the laws in force in New Guinea and Papua testified to the fact that the Administering Authority itself was to a certain extent responsible for the existence of racial discrimination in those countries. It was sufficient to recall that the Act of 1964 concerning civil servants

had established a salary scale under which Australians received a higher salary than the indigenous inhabitants.

57. The Soviet Union delegation considered it necessary to draw attention to the fact that Australia was using the Trust Territories under its administration to build military bases, in violation of General Assembly resolution 2105 (XX). In New Guinea there were several airfields which served as bases for bombers of the Australian Air Force. According to press reports, the General Headquarters of the Papua and New Guinea division of the Australian naval forces was situated on the island of Manus. The same newspaper article had mentioned the possibility that the base was being used also by the United States of America. The Soviet Union delegation had already drawn attention to the fact that certain bases established by Australia on Trust Territories were used as transit points for troops that were being sent to Viet-Nam to crush the national liberation movement in South-East Asia.

58. The representative of *Australia*, speaking in exercise of the right of reply, said that there were no military bases in the Trust Territories under his Government's administration. There were, however, certain defence installations which his country had set up partly as a result of his country's experience in the Second World War, in which it had suffered 15,000 casualties in action in Papua and New Guinea. Moreover, under the Trusteeship Agreement, Australia was responsible for the protection of the inhabitants of the Territories under its administration. He stressed that none of the airfields in New Guinea had ever been used to support Australian operations in Viet-Nam.

59. With regard to the USSR representative's remark that progress towards self-determination had been minimal, he would point out that there was a Parliament in New Guinea elected on the basis of a "common roll", one man one vote (with no regard to race, creed or colour), and having a substantial indigenous majority so elected. Even as it went upon its parliamentary business, this very representative House of Assembly was revising its own form and strengthening its own powers through the operation of its own Committee of Constitutional Review on which the elected indigenous majority was strongly represented. This Committee was in the process of making recommendations for the next great constitutional advance (to follow a series of earlier constitutional advances made in accordance with the Australian Government's theory of orderly, progressive and constitutional development). He hoped to be able to inform the appropriate bodies of the United Nations shortly (and possibly before the end of the current General Assembly session) of the recommendations of that Committee as they then stood and of the action which was proposed by the Australian Government in relation to them. But that Parliament, elected on the basis of a universal franchise, and with its indigenous majority, was merely the pinnacle of a political development which had its roots deep in the soil and among the people through the vast network of local government councils that spread over the Territory. There were 123 of those councils in the Territory of Papua and New Guinea, representative of approximately 1.5 million people, who elected the council members on the basis of adult suffrage. Those councils had substantial and increasing powers of local government and, moreover, many of them were representative

of all races in the community; the representatives of those races were legislating at the local level together, on the basis of complete equality, for matters affecting all races in the community. Thus approximately three-quarters of the entire population of the Territory were covered by local government council activity, a result which even the most optimistic forecast could scarcely have predicted as recently as one year ago, and certainly could not have predicted two years ago.

60. The situation in the economic field was certainly not discouraging. In accordance with the recommendations of the United Nations, the Australian Government had arranged for a mission of the IBRD to visit the Territory in 1963 and was following the lines of development suggested by that mission.

61. The Soviet Union representative had suggested that Australia was fostering only such activities in Papua and New Guinea as would not compete with Australian industries. He would point out that Australia was building up the industries most suited to the Territories, in accordance with the recommendations of the International Bank. One of the industries which offered great potential for success was the cattle industry; it was common knowledge that cattle-breeding was one of Australia's most important industries. Timber production (which was second only to copra as a territory product and as an export earner) was another industry which Australia was vigorously promoting in the Territory, yet it was well known that his country was a large producer of timber from its own extensive forest areas.

62. The annual income of the Territories came under two headings: interest-free and non-repayable grants made by the Australian Government, and revenue produced in the Territories themselves. Over the past ten years, that grant had risen from \$US20 million to about \$US80 million. In addition, the Australian budget carried substantial sums in respect of Australian Government departments operating in the Territories. In all, Australia had provided about \$US100 million for development in Papua and New Guinea. In addition, he would point out that, in the 1966-1967 budget, the internal revenue of the Territory had reached a record high figure of approximately \$US48 million. As was well known, every cent of this locally raised revenue was spent by Australia directly in and for the Territory.

63. Lastly, with regard to Nauru, he would point out that the representative of the Soviet Union had given a misleading picture in comparing the royalty figure payable to the Nauruans with a market price for super-phosphate in Australia of some \$40 odd per ton. A more correct figure would be of the order of \$24 to \$25 per ton (depending on local factors, point of delivery, etc.).

64. The representative of the *Union of Soviet Socialist Republics* considered that, since Australia had been administering the Territories for several decades, the political development of the Territories of New Guinea and Papua should have made far more progress. The fact was that little had been done to prepare the indigenous inhabitants for self-determination and independence.

65. Since six of the ten members of the constitutional review committee were Australians, including three highly placed colonial officers, it was not surprising that the committee had been unable to work out specific measures for bringing the Territories to

self-government or to recommend a specific date for the granting of independence.

66. With regard to the Australian representative's statement that the Territories were not used as transit points for troops being sent to Viet-Nam, he would point out that the Soviet Union delegation had already presented evidence on that point. Moreover, according to an article in the *South Pacific Post* of 2 June 1965, Australian aircraft had provided air cover for an Australian military transport carrying troops to Viet-Nam and an airfield on New Guinea and other strong points had been used as transit bases.

D. ACTION TAKEN BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON THE REPORT OF SUB-COMMITTEE II

67. The representative of the *United Republic of Tanzania* thought that the recommendation in paragraph 29 (f) of the Sub-Committee's report (see annex) did not go far enough in merely asking the administering Power to "do its utmost to fulfil the desire of the people of Nauru to become independent by January 1968". According to paragraph 8 of the report, a decision on the matter "would largely depend on the experience gained by the Nauruans through the recently established Legislative Council". That position seemed to reveal a paternalistic assumption that the Nauruans were not capable of thinking for themselves. He suggested that paragraph 29 (f) should be amended to read: "The administering Power should take concrete measures in conformity with the provisions of resolution 1514 (XV) to fulfil the desire of the people...".

68. The representative of the *Union of Soviet Socialist Republics* said that although the recommendations and conclusions in the report of Sub-Committee II were generally positive, his delegation did not think that they went far enough. They should also condemn the use of the Trust Territories as transit points for troops being sent to South-East Asia for purposes of aggression.

69. The representative of the *United States of America* reserved her delegation's position on the Sub-Committee's report, particularly with regard to the recommendation for the dispatch of a visiting mission. She pointed out that visiting missions were regularly sent to the various Territories by the Trusteeship Council.

70. The representative of *Australia* reserved his delegation's position on the Sub-Committee's report, partly because he felt that certain facts and developments may not have been as clearly represented as they should have been, partly because, as the representative of the Administering Authority, it was not for him to make recommendations to his own Government.

71. The representative of the *United Kingdom* reserved his Government's position on the Sub-Committee's report.

72. At its 469th meeting on 29 September 1966, the Special Committee approved without objection the report of Sub-Committee II on the Trust Territory of Nauru, Papua and the Trust Territory of New Guinea, and Cocos (Keeling) Islands (see annex), and endorsed the conclusions and recommendations therein, as amended by the substitution of the words "take concrete measures in conformity with the provisions of resolution 1514 (XV)" for the words "do its utmost" in paragraph 29 (f).

73. The conclusions and recommendations adopted by the Special Committee are as follows.

Conclusions

General

(a) The Special Committee notes with satisfaction the declaration of the administering Power that its policy is to work for the social, educational, economic and political advancement of the people of these Territories.

(b) It considers that the progress towards the implementation of the Declaration contained in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) has been slow.

Trust Territory of Nauru

(c) The Special Committee notes that the Nauruan people have expressed their desire to achieve independence by 31 January 1968.

(d) It is aware of the serious problems relating to the resettlement of the people of Nauru.

(e) It notes with satisfaction that a Legislative Council has been set up in Nauru. It feels, however, that the powers of the Legislative Council are restricted.

(f) It notes that talks are to be held shortly between the people of the Territory and the representatives of the Administering Authority regarding the ownership of and control over the operations of the phosphate industry.

Papua and the Trust Territory of New Guinea

(g) The Special Committee takes note of the political and constitutional changes in the Territories, particularly the establishment of the House of Assembly and the increase in the number of local government councils. It urges the administering Power to take further immediate measures whereby the House of Assembly can function as a fully representative and effective body.

(h) It takes into account the efforts of the Australian Government for the economic and social development of the Territory, particularly the establishment of the University of Papua-New Guinea.

Cocos (Keeling) Islands

(i) The Cocos Islands have special problems of size and economic viability, but that should not preclude the administering Power from complying with the implementation of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV).

Recommendations

General

(a) The Special Committee reaffirms the inalienable rights of all the peoples in these Territories to self-determination and independence in conformity with the Declaration contained in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV).

(b) The peoples of these Territories should be enabled to express their wishes in accordance with the provisions of resolution 1514 (XV) through well-established democratic processes under United Nations supervision.

(c) A visiting mission is necessary and would be most useful in assessing the political climate and aspirations of the peoples. Steps may be taken to arrange such a visit in consultation with the administering Power.

Trust Territory of Nauru

(d) The implementation of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) and the resettlement of Nauruans are two distinct questions and should be settled independently, precedence being given to the first, as desired by Nauruans themselves.

(e) Nauruans should be given full control over their natural economic resources. The Special Committee hopes that the forthcoming discussions between the people of Nauru and the Administering Authority will resolve all outstanding questions in this regard.

(f) The Administering Authority should take concrete measures in conformity with the provisions of resolution 1514 (XV) to fulfil the desire of the people of Nauru to become independent by January 1968.

Papua and the Trust Territory of New Guinea

(g) Steps should be taken in the constitutional field to abolish the special and reserved seats in the House of Assembly and to speedily implement General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV).

(h) The local government councils should be further strengthened in order to give the population the possibility of exercising self-government in municipal affairs.

(i) The Special Committee feels that the efforts in the economic and educational fields should continue at an accelerated pace.

Cocos (Keeling) Islands

(j) The Special Committee requests that the people of the Territory should be given an opportunity to express their wishes with regard to their future status and the assistance which the United Nations could extend in this regard.

ANNEX

[A/AC.109/L.318/Add.5]

Report of Sub-Committee II

THE TRUST TERRITORY OF NAURU, PAPUA AND THE TRUST TERRITORY OF NEW GUINEA, AND COCOS (KEELING) ISLANDS

Rapporteur: Mr. C. R. Gharekhan (India)

Consideration by the Sub-Committee

1. The Sub-Committee considered the Trust Territory of Nauru, Papua and the Trust Territory of New Guinea, and the Cocos (Keeling) Islands at its 51st, 52nd, 53rd and 55th meetings held on 23, 25 and 29 August and 7 September 1966.

2. The Sub-Committee had before it the working papers prepared by the Secretariat (see paras. 1-48 of chap. XIX).

3. The representative of Australia said that, since the Australian Government's last report to the Sub-Committee and the Special Committee in 1964 on developments in the Territories, more up-to-date information had been submitted to the Trusteeship Council at its thirty-third session in June and July 1966. The latest information on the Territories would be circulated to the members of the Sub-Committee.

4. The Cocos (Keeling) Islands had a population of about 470 persons, excluding European transients. They were descended from Malays who had been transplanted in 1827. Since 1948, the precarious conditions of life on the small coral islands had led to substantial emigration to Borneo and to Malaysia. The cable station, which had been in operation for fifty years, was about to close down and, apart from the civil airport and the public service, the cultivation of coco-

nuts was the economic mainstay of the Territory. The islanders exercised their right of self-government in accordance with their local customs, traditions and religion. Health services were excellent and an atmosphere of untroubled peace reigned in the Territory which, because of its small size, was dependent on the continued support of a larger country.

5. Nauru had a population of between 2,700 and 2,800 indigenous people who were increasing rapidly. The islanders enjoyed a high standard of living thanks to the substantial royalties paid by the British Phosphate Commissioners for processing the phosphate rock mined in Nauru. The *per capita* income was about \$US3,000. In thirty years' time, however, the phosphate rock would be completely worked out.

6. Nauru was infertile and lacked fresh water. With the agreement of the Nauruan leaders, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) had sent a team of experts to consider the problems arising from the progressive exhaustion of the phosphate rock. They had submitted a report which was under active consideration by the Nauruan leaders and the Australian Government. His delegation would, in due course, place the report before the Sub-Committee and the Special Committee.

7. Consideration was also being given, at the Nauruans' request, to the question of an alternative homeland. The Australian Government had offered full citizenship and every assistance to all Nauruans who wished to migrate to Australia. It had also offered them a fertile island off the Australian coast. Nevertheless, for a variety of reasons, the Nauruans had not seen their way clear to accept these offers. But it would be wrong to consider the possibility of resettlement in some form or other as dead. The matter was closely linked with the result of the investigations by the team of experts into the possibility of restoring the worked-out phosphate land.

8. A Legislative Council had been established recently and all its members were elected by universal adult suffrage. The Nauruan leaders had asked the Administering Authority for independence by 1968. Discussions on that request were in progress but a decision would largely depend on the experience gained by the Nauruans through the recently established Legislative Council.

9. The Non-Self-Governing Territory of Papua and the Trust Territory of New Guinea were being administered jointly by Australia within the framework of an administrative union established with the consent of the United Nations. They had a single Parliament, one judicial system, and a single Public Service. In 1964, after an intensive campaign to identify the voting population even in the most remote and rugged areas, elections had been held on a common roll by universal adult suffrage. As a result, a new Legislature for the two Territories, the House of Assembly, now replaced the former thirty-seven-member Legislative Council. The new House consisted of fifty-four elected members, thirty-eight of them indigenous inhabitants, and ten nominated members. In addition, seven of the elected members served on an eleven-member Administrative Council which advised the House on administrative matters. In 1965, the House of Assembly had created a constitutional review committee with strong indigenous representation to submit proposals for the future constitutional development of the Territories. The Committee had now submitted its report to the House of Assembly. After the House had taken its decision on the report, the whole matter would be considered by the Australian Parliament to determine what the next step should be.

10. The rapid political development of the Territories had been on the basis of a grass-roots development of local government councils. So vigorously had the development of these councils been pushed ahead that their numbers now exceeded the most optimistic forecast which had been made here even within the last year or two. There were now 123 councils in Papua-New Guinea representative of approximately 1.5 million people who elected the council members on the basis of adult suffrage. Thirty-five of these Councils were multiracial—a most significant development in itself. At the same time, the number of local officers in the second division of the Public Service had increased from twenty-two in 1964

to 234, while local public servants in the third division (167 in 1964) now numbered 9,268. Expatriate public officers were being given short-term contracts so that they could be replaced by indigenous civil servants as rapidly as possible.

11. Basic to the development of the Territories was the moneys made available by the Australian Government. The largest single item in the territorial budget was the Australian grant which had increased annually over the years so that in the financial year 1965-1966 it stood at \$US68.82 million. This grant was interest-free and non-repayable. It had risen over the past ten years from \$US19.84 million in 1955-1956 to the present figure of \$US68.82 million. A further increase might be expected in the budget for 1966-1967. In addition, substantial sums for territorial development were carried on the Australian budget in respect of Australian Government departments operating in the Territory (e.g., civil aviation). In all, the figure provided by the Australian Government for development in Papua-New Guinea would be of the order of \$US100 million. In the economic field the Australian Government was following the lines of development suggested by a mission of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) which (in accordance with the basic planning of the Australian Government and at its invitation, and in accordance also, with recommendations made by the United Nations) had visited the Territory in 1963. In 1965 it had appointed an economic adviser. In recent years, there had been an expansion of the health services without parallel for Territories with similar topographical and social conditions, as well as intensive effort to develop education. The University of Papua-New Guinea had now been established with an enrolment of some fifty indigenous students for the first year. Its physical plant was being enlarged rapidly. An administrative staff college had been built to train the indigenous population in advanced administrative techniques. There was also a higher technical training institute.

12. Papua-New Guinea was not yet independent; its political future depended entirely on the freely expressed wishes of the people; it was they who would set the date for self-determination, self-government or independence. There was rapid advancement in all fields and tremendous strides towards racial harmony. The Special Committee might well consider how advisable it was to press for greater speed in implementing the absolute objectives laid down in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV). In the opinion of the Australian Government, the hasty achievement of those goals was less important than the guarantees of human rights and fundamental freedoms which the population of the Territories already enjoyed in contrast to other Territories being considered by the Special Committee, where the main problem was the denial of human rights and freedoms. The Australian Government was not prepared to abandon judgement on all subjects except speed. The end of a journey was not only a matter of going faster but also of arriving safely.

13. In considering Nauru and the Cocos (Keeling) Islands, the Special Committee should bear in mind that the solution for small and isolated Territories was not necessarily applicable to larger, more populated areas. While it was essential for all peoples to secure their fundamental rights and freedoms and realize their aspirations, the political forms by which those objectives could be attained should and must be different.

14. The representative of the *United States of America* said that while Papua-New Guinea had made considerable progress towards self-determination, the economic viability which must accompany political independence had not yet been achieved. However, the Australian Government was attacking that problem sensibly and vigorously and he hoped that the IBRD recommendations would provide guide-lines for the establishment of a viable economy.

15. The establishment of a Legislative Council and an Executive Council on Nauru represented a significant political development. While the Nauruans' desire to remain an independent national entity had been demonstrated on many occasions, they should not reject out of hand the possibility of relocating the population, if they were to avoid an economic dilemma. He hoped that the findings of the FAO team at

present engaged in a survey of the Territory's natural resources potential would help them to make a wise decision.

16. The Cocos (Keeling) Islands presented a particularly difficult problem owing to their small population and meagre economic resources, but he agreed with the Australian representative that they deserved the same opportunity as other peoples for economic and social progress and political fulfilment.

17. The representative of *Sierra Leone* said that he was grateful to the Australian Government for its co-operation and the information which it had supplied to the Sub-Committee. The political situation in Cocos (Keeling) Islands was rather different from that of other Territories considered by the Sub-Committee but the administering Power appeared to be making no attempt to prepare them for self-determination and possible independence. Admittedly, self-sufficiency might be difficult to achieve, but a more broadly based and unified educational system should be established and the islanders should be helped to develop institutions through which to elect their representatives and express their views concerning their future. He hoped that the Australian Government would take steps to bring about suitable changes in the indenture granted in 1886 to the Clunies-Ross family, and to offer the islanders the possibility of union with others in the area.

18. The Nauruans were anxious to preserve their sovereignty and national identity and therefore reluctant to leave their homeland and undertake a mass migration either to Australia or to Curtis Island. Furthermore, they claimed to be the rightful owners of the Territory's phosphate deposits and wished to exercise control over that one source of wealth bestowed upon them by nature. It was to be hoped that an equitable solution would be found by agreement between the Nauruans, the Administering Authority and the British Phosphate Commissioners, enabling the Nauruans to build their economic future on a sound basis. The Sub-Committee should be informed of the reactions of the Administering Authority and the Nauruan leaders to the recommendations of the joint commission on the rehabilitation of the island in which FAO had participated. He appealed to the Australian Government to do its utmost to fulfil the Nauruans' desire for complete independence by January 1968.

19. The percentage of the potential labour force at present employed in New Guinea and Papua was somewhat low and it was to be hoped that the development of new industries would lead to a rapid increase in employment. On the other hand, it was encouraging to learn that the new University of Papua-New Guinea was expanding, since an increase in the number of trained people was essential to economic growth. He hoped that the Australian Government would help the peoples of New Guinea and Papua to make more rapid progress towards self-determination and independence.

20. The representative of *India* stated that the people of Nauru obviously had a strong sense of national identity and separate nationhood which explained why they had refused to leave their homeland despite the prospect of the early depletion of their phosphate reserves. Although he welcomed the steps taken by the Australian Government to implement General Assembly resolution 2111 (XX), he regretted that the recently established Legislative Council was not a fully elected body and that its powers were restricted. Despite the expressed desire of the Nauruans for independence by January 1968 and the General Assembly's recommendation to that effect, the Australian Government had suggested that talks on further political progress should be deferred for another two or three years to enable the Legislative Council to gain experience and to allow time for the establishment of an Executive Council. The spokesman for the Nauruan people in the Trusteeship Council, however, had pressed for further constitutional talks in 1967 with a view to complete independence for the island by January 1968. He urged the Australian Government to co-operate with the United Nations by taking the necessary steps to grant that request.

21. In view of the rapid depletion of the phosphate deposits, the proposed talks between the Nauruan leaders and the Australian Government were of crucial importance for

the Territory's economic future. The Head Chief of Nauru had told the Trusteeship Council that Nauru claimed ownership of the phosphate deposits and was prepared to retain the British Phosphate Commissioners as managing agents for a fair fee and to purchase their equipment. Nauru should have full control over its phosphate resources, and since they were likely to be exhausted in thirty years' time, it was essential to grant the Territory independence without delay to enable the Nauruans to diversify their economy and establish other industries. In that connexion, he asked the Australian representative to explain why there had been such a large reduction in Nauru's imports from Australia.

22. It was gratifying to note the important constitutional developments which had taken place in Papua-New Guinea, but the general rate of progress seemed unduly slow. The United Nations Visiting Mission to the Trust Territories of Nauru and New Guinea, 1962, had recommended the establishment of a fully elected parliament of 100 members. Yet three years later Papua and New Guinea had a House of Assembly consisting of only sixty-four members, forty-four of whom had been directly elected by the indigenous peoples. Moreover, since 1964, the powers of the Legislature had not been expanded and the indigenous inhabitants had not been given executive powers, as suggested by the Visiting Mission. In the circumstances, he hoped that the Australian Government would give favourable consideration to the recommendations of the Select Committee of the House of Assembly. He also hoped that the powers of the local government councils to review their budgets would no longer be restricted.

23. He welcomed the appointment of an economic adviser and the enactment of legislation to establish a Development Bank. Nevertheless, he was concerned at the continued heavy reliance of Papua-New Guinea on grants from the Australian Government. The administering Power had an obligation to reduce the economic dependence of the Territories and, to that end, to promote the development of local manufacturing industries and employ a larger proportion of the adult male indigenous population. The establishment of the new university and the Institute of Higher Technical Education in Papua and New Guinea would undoubtedly make an important contribution to the training of indigenous personnel.

24. The only effective means of evaluating the constitutional progress of Papua-New Guinea and the desire of the indigenous inhabitants for freedom and independence was to send a visiting mission to the Territories. He hoped that the Australian Government would co-operate with the United Nations in assisting the peoples of Papua-New Guinea to exercise their right of self-determination.

25. The representative of Chile expressed gratification concerning the progress reported in each of the Territories. In the Cocos (Keeling) Islands, the small size of the population was the main obstacle to political and economic independence, but he hoped that a solution would be found that would permit the Cocos islanders to exercise their right to self-determination. Educational facilities should be expanded in order to prepare them for that eventuality.

26. The impending depletion of Nauru's phosphate reserves was a subject of deep concern because phosphate royalties accounted for the high level of *per capita* income in the island. The Administering Authority should make every effort to find a solution to the problem. The FAO survey of Nauru's agricultural resources might provide useful guidelines for increasing the island's cultivable area. In view of the Nauruans' strongly expressed desire to retain their identity and to attain independence by 1968, the powers exercised by the Legislative Council were still too limited to provide the necessary political experience and should be expanded.

27. In New Guinea and Papua the establishment of the House of Assembly, with fifty-four elected members out of a total of sixty-four, the creation of a constitutional review committee and the extension of the system of universally elected local government councils were signs that those Territories were rapidly advancing towards self-government and independence. Although the University of Papua-New Guinea would help to provide the high level of technical training needed for self-government, the pace of education should be

stepped up still further. Considerable progress had also been made in strengthening the economy of the Territories and the Australian Government had made efforts to implement the recommendations of IBRD. However, the economic dependence of the Territories was still an obstacle to their future independence. Notwithstanding the problems of geography, climate, communication and language differences, he was confident that the inhabitants would develop a sense of national identity and achieve the goals of self-determination and independence.

Conclusions of the Sub-Committee

General

28. (a) The Sub-Committee notes with satisfaction the declaration of the administering Power that its policy is to work for the social, educational, economic and political advancement of the people of these Territories.

(b) The Sub-Committee considers that the progress towards the implementation of the Declaration contained in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) has been slow.

Trust Territory of Nauru

(c) The Sub-Committee notes that the Nauruan people have expressed their desire to achieve independence by 31 January 1968.

(d) The Sub-Committee is aware of the serious problems relating to the resettlement of the people of Nauru.

(e) The Sub-Committee notes with satisfaction that a Legislative Council has been set up in Nauru. The Sub-Committee feels, however, that the powers of the Legislative Council are restricted.

(f) The Sub-Committee notes that talks are to be held shortly between the people of the Territory and the representatives of the administering Power regarding the ownership of and control over the operations of the phosphate industry.

Papua and the Trust Territory of New Guinea

(g) The Sub-Committee takes note of the political and constitutional changes in the Territories, particularly the establishment of the House of Assembly and the increase in the number of local government councils. The Sub-Committee urges the administering Power to take further immediate measures whereby the House of Assembly can function as a fully representative and effective body.

(h) The Sub-Committee takes into account the efforts of the Australian Government for the economic and social development of the Territory, particularly the establishment of the University of Papua-New Guinea.

Cocos (Keeling) Islands

(i) The Cocos Islands have special problems of size and economic viability, but that should not preclude the administering Power from complying with the implementation of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV).

Recommendations of the Sub-Committee

General

29. (a) The Sub-Committee reaffirms the inalienable rights of all the peoples in these Territories to self-determination and independence in conformity with the Declaration contained in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV).

(b) The peoples of these Territories should be enabled to express their wishes in accordance with the provisions of resolution 1514 (XV) through well-established democratic processes under United Nations supervision.

(c) A visiting mission is necessary and would be most useful in assessing the political climate and aspirations of the peoples. Steps may be taken to arrange such a visit in consultation with the administering Power.

Trust Territory of Nauru

(d) The implementation of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) and the resettlement of Nauruans are two distinct

questions and should be settled independently, precedence being given to the first, as desired by Nauruans themselves.

(e) Nauruans should be given full control over their natural economic resources. The Sub-Committee hopes that the forthcoming discussions between the people of Nauru and the Administering Authority will resolve all outstanding questions in this regard.

(f) The Administering Authority should do its utmost to fulfil the desire of the people of Nauru to become independent by January 1968.

Papua and the Trust Territory of New Guinea

(g) Steps should be taken in the constitutional field to abolish the special and reserved seats in the House of As-

sembly and to speedily implement General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV).

(h) The local government councils should be further strengthened in order to give the population the possibility of exercising self-government in municipal affairs.

(i) The Sub-Committee feels that the efforts in the economic and educational fields should continue at an accelerated pace.

Cocos (Keeling) Islands

(j) The Sub-Committee requests that the people of the Territory should be given an opportunity to express with regard to their future status and the assistance which the United Nations could extend in this regard.

CHAPTER XX*

BRUNEI

INFORMATION ON THE TERRITORY

Introduction

1. Information on Brunei is already contained in the reports of the Special Committee to the General Assembly at its nineteenth and twentieth sessions (A/5800/Rev.1,¹ chap. XXI; and A/6000/Rev.1,² chap. XX). Supplementary information on recent developments is set out below.³

General

2. The population of Brunei at the end of 1963 totalled 98,438, an increase of 7.9 per cent over the previous year.

Political and constitutional developments

3. As noted in previous reports to the General Assembly, the Executive Council and the Legislative Council, which were established in 1963, consisted entirely of official and nominated unofficial members until 20 March 1965 when elections were held. At that time ten members (the other eleven members are appointed) were elected to the new Legislative Council. The voters also chose fifty-five members of the four district councils in Brunei. More than 80 per cent of Brunei's 19,000 voters cast their vote in the election.

4. No information is available on the decision to introduce a ministerial system which was announced after talks in May 1965 between the Sultan and British Ministers in London. However, it is reported that the Executive Council has been changed to a Ministerial Council in which inexperienced legislators will have a chance to serve as assistant ministers. The Sultan is reported to be planning to hold a constitutional conference at some future time, and then to move to a fully elected Legislature with a Ministerial Council composed entirely of elected legislators, but no time-table has been announced concerning these steps.

5. Supreme executive authority continues to be vested in the Sultan and his assent is required for all bills passed by the Legislative Council.

Political parties

6. In the elections in 1965, nine of the elected candidates were independents. The tenth represented the Brunei People's Alliance Party (BPAP). This party, which was formed in 1963, was then reported as favouring Brunei's entry into the Federation of Malaysia, and subsequently it has advocated full independence for Brunei within the Commonwealth.

7. In December 1965, the formation of a new political party, provisionally named the Brunei People's Front (BPF), was announced. It is reported to have the support of a number of elected members in the Legislative Council and the district councils. Its president is quoted as having said that Brunei needs a party which will help the people raise their standard of living and work hard for independence.

Economic conditions

8. Brunei's economy continues to be based mainly on the oil industry. Approximately 94 per cent of the value of all exports in 1964 consisted of oil exports. Mining rents, royalties and taxes imposed on the oil industry form a large part of the total revenue of the Territory, and after the Government, it is the most important employer of labour. Other sectors of the economy include rubber, subsistence agriculture, fishing, the collection of forest products and some small-scale industries.

9. The only other export of importance, besides oil, is rubber. The chief imports are food-stuffs, manufactured goods, machinery and transportation equipment. Specific information is not available concerning imports and exports in 1964. The total value of exports was \$M187,383,007⁴ an increase of \$M4,474,130 over 1963. Imports were valued at \$M102,181,131, compared with \$M66,013,300 in 1963.

10. Brunei's annual revenue is far above its expenditure and this has resulted in a large invested surplus which in 1964 totalled \$M930,417,373. Revenue is derived mainly from taxes, royalties, rents, interest and currency. At the end of 1963, a new oil agreement between the Government of Brunei and the Brunei Shell

* Previously issued under the symbol A/6300/Add.9.

¹ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Nineteenth Session, Annexes, annex No. 8 (part I).*

² *Ibid., Twentieth Session, Annexes, addendum to agenda item 23.*

³ The information presented here has been derived from published reports and from information transmitted to the Secretary-General by the United Kingdom under Article 73 e of the Charter on 26 July 1965, for the year ending 31 December 1964.

⁴ One Malayan dollar = 2s.4d. sterling = \$US0.327.

Petroleum Company was signed which provides for the taxation of the oil company on the basis of equal division of profits. There is no personal income tax at present, but an income tax of 30 per cent is imposed on the profits of companies operating in Brunei. Revenue and expenditure for the past two years are as follows: in 1964, the territorial revenue amounted to \$M134 million and expenditure totalled \$M63 million. The corresponding figures for 1963 were \$M114 million and \$M64 million.

Social conditions

Labour

11. No significant changes in problems and general policy were reported by the administering Power concerning labour wages and conditions of employment, or in the administrative organization responsible for governmental activities relating to labour. The total labour force increased from 6,826 in 1963 to 7,094 in 1964. The great majority of these were employed by the Government or the Brunei Shell Petroleum Company.

Public health

12. Brunei has two government hospitals and one company hospital which have a total of 343 beds. These

have a medical staff which includes eighteen registered physicians, forty-six medical assistants and twenty-eight trained or certified nurses. The Territory has no private medical practitioners. Approximately 7.61 per cent of all government expenditures in 1964 consisted of recurrent and capital expenditure on public health.

Educational conditions

13. In 1964, there were eighty-six primary and kindergarten public schools with 15,222 pupils, compared with seventy-seven schools with 13,577 pupils in the previous year. Seven secondary schools had an enrolment of 1,658, compared with 1,274 in the previous year. Independent primary schools had 7,060 pupils, compared with 6,506 in 1963 and secondary schools had 1,409 pupils, compared with 1,219 in 1963. The public teacher-training school had 249 pupils, compared with 178 in 1963. The staff of public schools increased from 663 to 766 and that of independent schools from 280 to 325 in 1964.

14. Recurrent expenditure on education in 1964 amounted to \$M7,958,110, an increase of \$M1,088,102 over 1963. Capital expenditure for these two years was \$M230,798 and \$M748,194 respectively.

CHAPTER XXI*

HONG KONG

INFORMATION ON THE TERRITORY

Introduction

1. Information on Hong Kong is already contained in the Special Committee's reports to the General Assembly at its nineteenth and twentieth sessions (A/5800/Rev.1,¹ chap. XXII; and A/6000/Rev.1,² chap. XXI). Supplementary information on recent developments is set out below.³

General

2. The population was estimated to be 3,739,000 at the end of 1964, an increase of 974,000 over 1963. Of this increase, 6,994 represented the estimated net balance of migration.

Political developments

3. No additional information on political and constitutional developments is available.

Economic conditions

4. The industrial economy of the Territory is based on exports rather than on its domestic market. In general, while heavy industry such as ship-building and ship-breaking continues to be important, the Territory relies primarily on the products of its light industries.

The textile industry dominates the economy, accounting for 52 per cent of all domestic exports and employing 42 per cent of its industrial labour force; it is also a significant factor in international trade in textiles. In all sectors, the manufacture and processing of cotton goods predominates. The manufacture of garments remains the largest sector within the industry, employing 59,000 workers. From a total of \$HK682 million⁴ in 1961, the value of exports of clothing has risen to \$HK1,169 million in 1964, produced by some 1,070 factories.

5. The manufacture of plastic articles ranks next in importance. The industry manufactured exports worth approximately \$HK613 million in 1964. Various other light industries have continued to expand. These include the manufacture of air-conditioners, aluminium ware, clocks and watches, cordage, electrical appliances and equipment, enamel ware, food and beverages, footwear, light metal products, optical equipment, paint, vacuum flasks and furniture and furnishings. There has been a marked growth in the electronics industry. The manufacture or assembly of transistor radios began in 1959, and since then exports of transistor radios have doubled in volume each year to reach a total of 3.9 million sets worth \$HK95 million in 1964. The industry exports to sixty-seven countries but its principal markets are the United Kingdom and the United States.

6. The Territory is one of the world's leading centres for ship-breaking. Much of the scrap is used in rolling mills, which produce an estimated 17,000 long tons a month of metal products used in building construction; this represents a large part of the requirements of the building industry. In addition a consid-

* Previously issued under the symbol A/6300/Add.9.

¹ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Nineteenth Session, Annexes, annex No. 8 (part I).*

² *Ibid., Twentieth Session, Annexes, addendum to agenda item 23.*

³ The information presented here has been derived from published reports and from the information transmitted to the Secretary-General by the United Kingdom under Article 73 e of the Charter on 7 June 1965, for the year ended 31 December 1964.

⁴ One Hong Kong dollar = 1s.3d. = \$US 0.175.

erable quantity of rods and bars is shipped abroad, principally to South-East Asian countries.

7. With regard to imports, China was the principal supplier during 1964, providing 22.6 per cent by value of all imports and 52 per cent of the Territory's food imports. Imports from China also included textile yarn and fabrics. The value of goods imported from China increased by 32 per cent compared with 1963. Imports from Japan, the second largest supplier, increased to 17 per cent. Textile goods represented 38 per cent of imports from Japan; other goods included machinery, base metals, chemicals and many manufactured articles. Imports from the United States increased over the previous year, while those from the United Kingdom showed a decline. The principal imports from the United States were textile fibres, raw cotton, tobacco, machinery, plastic materials and fruits. The imports from the United Kingdom consisted mainly of machinery, wool textiles and motor vehicles.

8. During 1964, 49 per cent of all domestic exports went to two markets, the United States and the United Kingdom. The United States remains the largest market, importing 27 per cent by value during 1964, and thus increasing its purchases by \$HK254 million, or 26 per cent over the previous year. The value of goods sent to the United Kingdom was \$HK968 million (22 per cent of all domestic exports), an increase of \$HK105 million or 12 per cent. Malaysia remained, however, the third largest market for Hong Kong, taking goods valued at \$HK330 million in 1964. Other important markets were Japan, Canada, Australia and the Federal Republic of Germany.

9. Tourism has become one of the Territory's major industries. In the area of the Pacific and the Far East (excluding Hawaii) Hong Kong was the second largest tourist attraction after Japan. A 1962 survey estimated that tourists were spending over \$HK2,000 per person in the Territory. Although Hong Kong has been an attraction to travellers for a number of years; the decision to develop the tourist industry was made in 1958. There were approximately 43,500 visitors to the Territory in 1957 and by 1963 this figure had risen to 315,665. The 1964 figure is expected to be about 25 per cent over 1963, or approximately 370,000.

10. In connexion with primary industries, the 1961 census showed just under 90,000 people employed in farming and fishing, and another 10,000 in mining and quarrying. Somewhat more than 5 per cent of the area of Hong Kong is classified as urban. Land is scarce and almost all of the cultivated land in Hong Kong is situated in the New Territories. More than 80 per cent of the total area of the Territory is marginal land; the arable land and fresh ponds already exploited comprise only 13.1 per cent of the total area. The expanding urban areas (the remaining 5.5 per cent) tend to encroach more directly on arable rather than on marginal land.

11. Rice was formerly the most important agricultural crop but there has been a steady increase in market gardening, and pig and poultry production. The area of land under permanent vegetable cultivation increased from 2,254 acres in 1954 to 8,240 acres in 1964. Six to eight crops of vegetables are harvested annually from intensively cultivated land.

12. Marine fish is one of Hong Kong's main primary products and the fishing fleet is the largest of any port in the Commonwealth. The number of fishermen

at the 1961 census was over 40,000 and there is a fleet of nearly 10,000 vessels. One hundred and eighty-nine tons of fresh oyster meat, valued at approximately \$HK789,000, were produced, some of which was processed into dried meat or oyster juice and exported to markets overseas.

13. There is some mining in Hong Kong, but with the exception of iron ore at Ma On Shan, these are relatively small-scale operations. Wolframite and graphite are mined underground while kaolin, feldspar and quartz are mined by opencast methods. The total annual mineral production is about \$HK800,000. All the feldspar and quartz and some of the kaolin is used in local industry.

14. The total value of Hong Kong's external trade in 1964, including imports, domestic exports and re-exports, amounted to \$HK14,647 million, representing an increase of \$HK2,244 million or 18 per cent over the preceding year. Imports in 1964 were valued at \$HK8,706 million, an increase of 17 per cent. The value of domestic exports increased by 15.6 per cent and totalled \$HK4,428 million; the textile and plastic industries comprise 52 per cent and 13.8 per cent respectively of the value of the goods exported.

15. Hong Kong continued to be financially self-supporting during the year 1963-1964. In 1963-1964, its revenue totalled \$HK1,394 million, \$HK197 million more than the original estimate. Expenditure for the year was \$HK1,295 million, which was \$HK65 million less than originally estimated. In view of a programme of capital expenditure for schools, medical facilities, and road and land development schemes, \$HK114 million deficit is estimated for the year 1964-1965.

Social conditions

Labour

16. Is it estimated that more than one third of the million and a half people employed in Hong Kong, are engaged in the manufacturing industries. The 1964 returns to the Labour Department indicate that the number of registered and recorded factories showed a slight decline from 8,348 in 1963 to 8,215 in 1964. The number of persons employed in such factories totalled 350,174, a decrease of 4,220 from the previous year. The returns from the Labour Department are voluntary and do not include out-workers or people employed in cottage industries, the construction industries, or agriculture and fishing. The textile industry, which employs 148,264 persons, remained the largest employer of labour. The plastics industry, in which a large number of out-workers are known to be employed, continued its expansion as the second largest employer of labour.

17. Wages and salaries continued to rise. It is estimated that industrial wages have risen by 50 per cent during the years 1960-1965. Government officers received in 1964, as an interim award, a 5 per cent increase in salary, along with an allowance for dependants; a Salaries Commission was scheduled to be appointed to review salaries in the light of the 1965 consumer price index. Minor and unskilled government staff who had received increases of between 11 and 14 per cent in 1963 received further increases equivalent to 15 per cent of their existing wages. The Armed Services awarded a wage increase ranging from 10 to 29 per cent to their industrial employees; these increases were aimed at making the wage level of

the locally engaged industrial staff of the services departments comparable to workers of utility companies who received increases in 1963.

Public health

18. The number of available hospital beds rose from 11,719 in 1963 to 11,989 in 1964. The latter figure includes maternity and nursing homes but does not cover institutions maintained by the Armed Forces. Of these beds, 10,037 were in government hospitals and institutions and in government-assisted hospitals, while the remaining 1,952 were provided by private agencies. Apart from beds assigned to the care of the mentally ill and the treatment of tuberculosis and infectious diseases, there were 8,440 beds available for all general purposes, including maternity cases. The number of government medical officers rose from 474 in 1963 to 515 in 1964. Government dental surgeons totalled forty-eight, an increase of two over the previous year.

19. Live births, which numbered 115,263 in the year 1963, declined to 108,518 in 1964; the live birth-rate fell from 32.1 in 1963 to 29.4 per thousand of population. The infant mortality rate dropped from 32.9 to 26.4 per thousand live births in 1964. The estimated expenditure of the Medical and Health Department for the financial year 1964-1965 was \$HK93,400,300. An estimated \$HK32,418,400 in medical subsidies was paid to private organizations. The combined estimated

expenditure of the Medical and Health Department represented 8.41 per cent of the Territory's total estimated expenditure of \$HK1,496,032,510.

Educational conditions

20. The school enrolment in Hong Kong at 30 September 1964 was as follows: kindergarten, 39,642; primary, 596,971; secondary, 177,680; post secondary, 5,926; adult education, 32,969; and special education, 1,011. There were 854,279 pupils enrolled at all schools, colleges and education centres, 43,647 more than in 1963.

21. In 1964, there were 24,329 full-time and part-time teachers employed in registered day schools, of whom 6,685 were university graduates and 10,425 were trained non-graduates. Another 4,588 teachers were engaged in tutorial, evening and special afternoon classes and 100 were in special schools. At the end of the 1963-1964 school year, the ratio of pupils to teachers in all types of schools was 28:1, the same ratio which existed in the 1962-1963 school year.

22. There were 750 Hong Kong students pursuing further studies in the United Kingdom in September 1964. The number of such students has almost doubled since 1960.

23. The expenditure on education for the year ending 31 July 1964 was \$HK189,718,778, an increase of nearly \$HK25 million over the previous year.

CHAPTER XXII*

UNITED STATES VIRGIN ISLANDS, BRITISH VIRGIN ISLANDS, ANTIGUA, DOMINICA, GRENADA, MONTSERRAT, ST. KITTS-NEVIS-ANGUILLA, ST. LUCIA, ST. VINCENT, BARBADOS, BERMUDA, BAHAMAS, TURKS AND CAICOS ISLANDS, CAYMAN ISLANDS, FALKLAND ISLANDS (MALVINAS) AND BRITISH HONDURAS

A. Action taken by the Special Committee in 1964 and by the General Assembly at its twentieth session

1. UNITED STATES VIRGIN ISLANDS, BRITISH VIRGIN ISLANDS, ANTIGUA, DOMINICA, GRENADA, MONTSERRAT, ST. KITTS-NEVIS-ANGUILLA, ST. LUCIA, ST. VINCENT, BARBADOS, BERMUDA BAHAMAS, TURKS AND CAICOS ISLANDS AND CAYMAN ISLANDS

1. The conclusions and recommendations reached by the Special Committee in 1964 regarding the United States Virgin Islands are contained in its report to the General Assembly at its nineteenth session (A/5800/Rev1,¹ chap. XXV, paras. 313-321). The Committee, *inter alia*, having taken note of the statements of the representative of the administering Power concerning a constitutional convention to be convened on 7 December 1964, invited the administering Power to ensure that the people of the Territory be enabled, in complete freedom and without any restrictions, to express their wishes concerning the future political status of the Territory. The Committee also expressed the hope that the administering Power would provide it with all the relevant information concerning steps it had taken in pursuance of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV). The Committee also invited the adminis-

tering Power to transmit to the General Assembly information concerning the elections, the Constitutional Convention and the resulting recommendations and developments, so as to enable the Assembly to take suitable decisions. To this end, the Special Committee recommended the sending of a visiting mission to the Territory, in consultation with the administering Power.

2. The conclusions reached and recommendations made by the Special Committee in 1964 concerning the British Virgin Islands, Antigua, Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat, St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and Barbados are also set forth in the Committee's report to the General Assembly at its nineteenth session (*ibid.*, paras. 322-333). The Committee noted that these islands seemed to possess sufficient features in common, politically, economically and socially, to make some form of union possible among some, if not all of them. The Committee stated that there appeared to be general agreement among the "little seven" (Antigua, Dominica, Montserrat, St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and Barbados) concerning immediate independence and the formation of some sort of federation. It pointed out, however, that a more thorough investigation particularly of the opinions of the Territories' leaders was still needed and that the whole question of the amount of assistance required after independence and the various external sources that might provide it deserved a more thorough study.

* Previously issued under the symbol A/6300/Add.10.

¹ Official Records of the General Assembly, Nineteenth Session, Annexes, annex No. 8 (part I).

3. With regard to Grenada, the Special Committee noted that negotiations were in progress between this island and Trinidad and Tobago with a view to a possible association between the two.

4. Concerning the British Virgin Islands, there seemed to be movements favouring remaining outside the federation of the "little seven" and investigating, instead, the possibility of an association with other neighbouring Territories.

5. In all cases, the Special Committee invited the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to take steps which would accelerate the constitutional process within the framework of the Declaration contained in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV).

6. The conclusions and recommendations adopted by the Special Committee in 1964 concerning Bermuda, the Bahamas, the Turks and Caicos Islands and the Cayman Islands are set forth in the Committee's report to the General Assembly at its nineteenth session (*ibid.*, chap. XXIV, paras. 133 and 134). The Special Committee, *inter alia*, noted that the administering Power had not mentioned any concrete measures which it had taken or intended to take in the Territories with a view to implementing the Declaration embodied in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), and invited the administering Power to take such measures without delay and, more particularly, to accelerate the process of self-determination in the Turks and Caicos Islands and the Cayman Islands by setting up representative bodies there. With a view to obtaining additional information, the Special Committee considered the possibility of sending a visiting mission to these Territories.

7. At its twentieth session, the General Assembly having examined the chapters of the reports of the Special Committee concerning these Territories (A/5800/Rev.1, chaps. XXIV and XXV; and A/6000/Rev.1,² chaps. XXIII and XXIV), adopted resolution 2069 (XX) of 16 December 1965 whereby, *inter alia*, it requested the administering Powers to allow United Nations visiting missions to visit the Territories and to extend to them full co-operation and assistance; decided that the United Nations should render all help to the people of these Territories in their efforts freely to decide their future status; and requested the Special Committee to examine the situation in these Territories and to report on the implementation of this resolution to the General Assembly at its twenty-first session.

2. FALKLAND ISLANDS (MALVINAS)

8. Following its consideration of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas) at its meetings in 1964, the Special Committee adopted conclusions and recommendations as contained in its report to the General Assembly at its nineteenth session (A/5800/Rev.1, chap. XXIII, para. 59).

9. On 16 December 1965, the General Assembly adopted resolution 2065 (XX) on the Falkland Islands (Malvinas). This resolution read as follows:

"The General Assembly,

"Having examined the question of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas),

² *Ibid.*, Twentieth Session, Annexes, addendum to agenda item 23.

"Taking into account the chapters of the reports of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples relating to the Falkland Islands (Malvinas), and in particular the conclusions and recommendations adopted by the Committee with reference to that Territory,

"Considering that its resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960 was prompted by the cherished aim of bringing to an end everywhere colonialism in all its forms, one of which covers the case of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas),

"Noting the existence of a dispute between the Governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland concerning sovereignty over the said Islands,

"1. Invites the Governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to proceed without delay with the negotiations recommended by the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples with a view to finding a peaceful solution to the problem, bearing in mind the provisions and objectives of the Charter of the United Nations and of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) and the interests of the population of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas);

"2. Requests the two Governments to report to the Special Committee and to the General Assembly at its twenty-first session on the results of the negotiations."

B. Information on the Territories³

1. UNITED STATES VIRGIN ISLANDS⁴

General

10. At 30 June 1965, the population was estimated at 41,913, compared with 35,000 in 1963.

Constitutional convention

11. The first Virgin Islands Constitutional Convention was convened at Charlotte Amalie on 7 December 1964. It completed its work on 26 February 1965 when it adopted a draft of a new Organic Act for the Territory.

12. In accordance with Virgin Islands legislation, the Convention was composed as follows: twenty-two delegates elected at a general election held on 4 November 1964 (four delegates each from St. Croix and St. Thomas and two from St. John with twelve delegates at large), and the eleven existing Senators of the Virgin Islands.

13. The Convention organized a number of standing committees to facilitate its work and had the benefit

³ Information on the Territories is contained in the reports of the Special Committee to the General Assembly at its nineteenth and twentieth sessions (A/5800/Rev.1, chaps. XXIII to XXVI; and A/6000/Rev.1, chaps. XXII to XXV). The information set out in this section is supplementary to that contained in earlier reports.

⁴ The information presented in this section has been derived from published reports and from the information transmitted to the Secretary-General by the United States of America under Article 73 e of the Charter on 31 August 1965, for the year ended 30 June 1964.

of the advice and counsel of a number of political scientists, attorneys and legislators. The Convention held public hearings in three of the main centres.

14. The Convention unanimously adopted the draft of a new Organic Act for the Territory. The major proposals for revision are indicated below:

<i>Proposals</i>	<i>Present law</i>
(i) Elective Governor; 4-year term	Governor appointed by President with Senate approval. Term at the pleasure of the President.
(ii) Elective Lieutenant Governor; 4-year term	Government Secretary appointed by President, without Senate approval. Term at the pleasure of the President
(iii) Unicameral Legislature of 11 Senators (3 from St. Croix District; 3 from St. Thomas District; 1 from St. John District; and 4 at large). Term 2 years. No limitation on voting for members at large	Unicameral Legislature of 11 Senators (2 from St. Croix District; 2 from St. Thomas District; 1 from St. John District; and 6 at large). Electorate limited in voting for 2 at large and 2 from each District. St. John Electorate limited in voting for 2 at large and 1 from the District. Term 2 years
(iv) Resident Commissioner or Delegate or Delegate to U. S. House of Representatives	No provision
(v) Right to vote for U. S. President and Vice-President in national elections	No provision
(vi) Franchise vested in residents 18 years of age or over	21 years of age or over
(vii) Veto of local laws by U. S. President abolished	Veto of local laws by U.S. President
(viii) Comptroller appointed by Governor with consent of legislature. Term 10 years.	Comptroller appointed by U. S. Secretary of Interior. Term 10 years
(ix) Proposal of Organic Act Amendment by legislature, or to legislature by popular initiative, or by Constitutional Convention	No provision

15. The Convention also adopted a resolution on the status of the Territory, which reads as follows:

"Be it resolved that:

"1. The People of the Virgin Islands are unalterably opposed to annexation of the Virgin Islands by any State of the Union as a county, city, or precinct, or by any Commonwealth or other territory under the jurisdiction of the United States;

"2. The People of the Virgin Islands are unalterably opposed to independence from the United States of America;

"3. The People of the Virgin Islands desire to have the Virgin Islands remain an unincorporated territory under the constitutional system of the United States with the fullest measure of internal self-government and in the closest association with the United States of America, and that hereafter the Virgin Islands be designated an 'autonomous territory'

"4. The necessary constitutional arrangements to be made to entitle the people of the Virgin Islands to vote for the President and Vice-President of the United States in the national elections."

Legislation

16. It is reported that bills relating to proposals made by the Constitutional Convention have been introduced into the United States Congress. In May 1966, the House of Representatives passed two bills, one providing for an elected Governor and Lieutenant Governor, the other making provision for reapportionment and enlarging the Virgin Islands legislature from eleven to fifteen members. The reapportionment bill provides for five Senators each from St. Croix and St. Thomas, one from St. John and four Senators-at-large. Hearings on this bill were held by the Senate's Subcommittee on Interior and Insular Affairs during June 1966.

17. On 27 July 1966, the United States Senate passed the Virgin Islands Reapportionment Bill with no dissenting votes. A spokesman said that the bill passed included a committee amendment by which the reapportionment legislation would take effect in time for the elections on 8 November 1966. The House of Representatives' bill set the effective date as 1 January 1967. Because of this difference the legislation was returned to the House of representatives for conference.

18. Objectors to the implementation of the reapportionment measure in 1966 have contended that there will not be sufficient time to work out details of the election satisfactorily. They have pointed out that the Governor of the islands must call a special session of the legislature to consider the measure before the primary elections, which are set for 13 September 1966. They have also criticized the Governor for pressing for the earlier date.

19. On 5 August 1966, the Speaker of the United States House of Representatives named five House members to represent the House in a conference with the Senate on the bill. On 10 August 1966, the conference of members of the Senate and the House voted to make the reapportionment effective this year.

20. A special session of the Virgin Island Legislature was called for 13 August 1966, in order to change the date of the primary from 13 September to 4 October 1966.

21. The United States Senate has not yet taken action on the bill to provide for an elective Governor.

Economic conditions

22. In 1964 the tourist industry reached a volume of \$48 million, compared with \$41 million in 1963 and \$35 million in 1962. New industries catering to the export trade were licensed, including watch assembling, the manufacture of fibre-glass, pharmaceuticals, resort sports wear, power equipment and costume jewellery.

Three industries catering to local trade also were established.

23. A severe and prolonged drought affected agriculture during the first six months of 1964. In spite of the drought, some sectors of agriculture showed appreciable gains. In St. Croix, a record sugar crop was achieved due to excellent rainfall. A total of 15,540 tons of raw sugar was produced, as compared with 15,354 in 1963.

24. *Per capita* income was estimated at \$1,761 in 1964, compared with \$1,543 in 1963. The present figure is nearly double that of 1959, when *per capita* income was \$986.

25. Imports into the Virgin Islands from the United States mainland and abroad reached a peak of \$76 million in 1963, compared with \$61.8 million in 1962. Exports of Virgin Islands products to the United

States mainland and foreign countries reached a total of \$22.6 million in 1963, compared with some \$20 million in 1962.

26. Combined local revenues and matching funds in 1964 amounted to \$25.6 million for capital and operating requirements, compared with \$19.7 million in 1963. The internal revenue matching fund reached \$8.4 million compared with \$7.6 million in 1963.

Social conditions

Labour

27. Non-agricultural placement in 1964 numbered 1,402. The comparative distribution by major occupational groups and certification of foreign nationals for non-agricultural job openings for 1963 and 1964 are given below:

	<i>Placements</i>		<i>Foreign nationals</i>	
	1963	1964	1963	1964
<i>Occupational groups:</i>				
Professional and clerical	325	317	140	269
Service	448	466	5,300	6,644
Skilled and semi-skilled	363	382	2,687	3,369
Unskilled and other	314	237	5,222	5,734
TOTAL	1,450	1,402	13,349	16,016

Public health

28. The state of health of the population continued to be excellent in 1964. There were no epidemics, and mass immunization programmes were continued to forestall the outbreak of preventable diseases. In 1963, a total of 1,513 live births was noted, compared with 1,375 in 1962, while the death-rate was up at the rate of 10 per thousand, compared with 9 per thousand in 1962.

29. In 1964, the Department of Health took the first concrete step in the programme for creating multi-million-dollar health centres on both St. Croix and St. Thomas. This first step included preliminary design that would be sufficient to develop accurate budgeting and scheduling for the entire programme. The scope of the project included two general hospitals of 250 beds each, two long-term hospitals of 60 to 75 beds each, two public health clinics, one school of nursing, and one student nurses' residence.

Educational conditions

30. In 1964, the number of pupils in the public schools was 8,671 compared with 8,201 in 1963. The need for more rooms was met partially through the addition of 20 elementary classrooms and 14 high school classrooms. In addition, a new gymnasium, a new music suite and four vocational shops were put into use of Charlotte Amalie High School, and similar instruction facilities were under construction in St. Croix.

31. The College of the Virgin Islands successfully completed its first academic year in 1964. It appeared that the student body would double in size with a projected enrolment of up to 100 full-time students and more than 400 part-time students during its second year.

2. BRITISH VIRGIN ISLANDS⁵

General

32. In 1963 the population of the Islands was estimated at 7,400.

Political and constitutional developments

Report of the Constitutional Commissioner, 1965

33. A new constitution which would allow the British Virgin Islands to move gradually towards self-government was recommended in the report of the Constitutional Commissioner, which was published on 12 August 1965. The report was prepared by Dr. Mary Proudfoot, Fellow of Somerville College, Oxford. It contains some critical comments concerning present arrangements, which involve an administrator presiding over the Executive Council and Legislative Council, without a ministerial system. "Government at all levels seems to be little aware that the object of the whole operation was to serve the people", Dr. Proudfoot writes. "The fact that the Government is largely out of touch with the people is, I believe, one of the main reasons for the present discontent."

34. The report recommended a ministerial group of three to be formed from the seven elected members of the Legislative Council. There would be a First Minister whom the elected members would choose from among their members. He would then co-opt two others. The three ministers would be responsible for running the Government, apart from those matters which would still be the responsibility of the Administrator. In particular, the Administrator would still retain responsibility for economic and financial affairs.

⁵ The information presented in this section has been derived from published reports and from the information transmitted to the Secretary-General by the United Kingdom under Article 73 e of the Charter on 25 August 1965, for the year ending 31 December 1964.

35. This scheme would, it has been suggested, permit the steady growth of self-government, with the First Minister and his two colleagues assuming more and more responsibility, and Administrator and the officials receding further into the background. The matter of a new constitution is apparently still under discussion.

36. The report of the Constitutional Commissioner was debated by the Legislative Council in October 1965. At the conclusion of the debate, the Council unanimously adopted the following resolution:

"That the Council takes note of the report by the Constitutional Commissioner (Mrs. Proudfoot) and requests the Secretary of State for the Colonies to receive a delegation from this Council with a view to drawing up a new constitution for the territory based on that report, subject to certain modifications which will be set out in detail by the delegation."

37. Subsequently the United Kingdom proposed that a constitutional conference be held in London beginning on 3 October 1966. In May, the Virgin Islands Government agreed to this proposal.

Public Service

38. The Community Development Officer resumed duty after a one-year course at the Institute of Education at an overseas university and an administrative secretary was granted study leave abroad. In 1964, there were six overseas officers in the Public Service and twelve local officers who filled posts of a status and grade comparable to posts held by overseas officers.

Economic conditions

39. Government revenue and expenditure during the period 1962-1964 were as follows:

Year	Revenue (Value in United States dollars)	Expenditure
1962	343,617	899,011
1963	574,212	947,347
1964	613,262	873,581

40. Statistics of crops, forest products, livestock, fisheries for 1964 are not available owing to severe drought conditions.

Social conditions

Public health

41. The two medical posts were filled in 1964 but recruitment for nursing posts remained a problem. The medical staff in 1964 included two registered physicians, five nurses of senior training, thirteen certified nurses, nine partially trained nurses (including student nurses), four midwives of senior training, five certified midwives, eight partially trained midwives (including students at hospital), one sanitary inspector, one laboratory and X-ray technician, one assistant laboratory technician and one pharmacist.

42. Government expenditure on medical and health services in 1964 was \$96,358, compared with \$79,187 in 1963.

Educational conditions

43. Government expenditure on education, including subventions to institutions outside the Territory, amounted to \$152,103 in 1964, compared with \$155,265 in 1963.

3. ANTIGUA, DOMINICA, GRENADA, MONTSERRAT, ST. KITTS-NEVIS-ANGUILLA, ST. LUCIA AND ST. VINCENT

GENERAL

Constitutional proposals

44. On 12 November 1965, the Colonial Secretary was asked in the House of Commons if he would make a statement about the constitutional future of the islands in the eastern Caribbean. The Colonial Secretary replied that in recent months most of the Governments in the Leeward and Windward Islands had submitted requests for constitutional changes. These had been carefully considered by the United Kingdom Government and, as a result, he had put certain suggestions to the Governments which they were now considering. He had also asked Sir Stephen Luke, who was to be accompanied by a legal adviser, to visit the Territories on his behalf for private discussions with the Governments, and hoped to make a fuller statement on this subject after his visit.

45. Sir Stephen Luke and Mr. de Winton, legal adviser, first visited Antigua in the Leeward Islands, followed by St. Kitts, Montserrat, Dominica, St. Lucia and St. Vincent. The visit took place at the end of 1965.

46. A new constitutional status for six islands and groups of islands in the east Caribbean to be known as "States in Association with Britain" was proposed in a White Paper published by the Colonial Office on 30 December 1965.

47. The new association dealt only with the four Windward Islands: St. Lucia, St. Vincent, Dominica and Grenada, and two of the Leeward Islands, Antigua and St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla. It was decided that constitutional changes for the much smaller Territory of Montserrat would be considered separately.

48. Under the constitutional arrangements, each Territory would become a State in association with the United Kingdom, with control of its internal affairs and with the right to amend its own constitution, including the power to end this association and to declare itself independent. Such constitutional amendments would require a two-thirds majority in the legislature and a two-thirds majority of the votes cast in a referendum.

49. So long as the Territories remained States in association with the United Kingdom, that Government would accept responsibility for their external affairs and defence, and the United Kingdom Parliament and the Queen-in-Council would have legislative power for the discharge of their responsibility. Apart from these powers and responsibilities, and powers concerned with the application in the Territories of the British Nationality Acts, the United Kingdom Government would have no power to legislate for the Territories without their consent and no responsibility for the conduct of their affairs.

50. The head of the executive government would be the Queen's Representative appointed for a term of five years by the Queen on the advice of the Secretary of State for the Colonies who would be guided by the Chief Minister (or Premier) concerned. A United Kingdom Government representative in the area would be responsible for the conduct of relations between the United Kingdom and the Territories.

51. Safeguards for the preservation of democratic forms of government and for the protection of funda-

mental rights would be entrenched in the constitutions of the Territories. A superior court would be established for all the Territories whose functions would include securing the observances and interpretations of the constitutions. The President of the Court would be appointed by the Lord Chancellor. Citizenship would continue to be governed by the British Nationality Acts unless a Territory established a separate citizenship.

52. The Territories would continue to be eligible to receive British aid, including budgetary assistance. These arrangements, if accepted, would provide the basis from which fresh forms of regional co-operation either among themselves or with neighbouring islands could be considered.

53. Subsequently, the Colonial Secretary was asked in the House of Commons on 27 January 1966 what reaction the Government had received from the Governments of the Eastern Caribbean Islands to the proposals for association with the United Kingdom which had been put to them. A spokesman for the Colonial Secretary replied that it was understood that the proposals were generally acceptable as a basis for discussion and that so far an official reply has been received only from the Government of Antigua.

54. On 31 January 1966, the Chief Minister of St. Vincent declared on his return from the Chief Ministers' meeting in St. Lucia that all the Chief Ministers were united in their demands in connexion with the constitutional proposals for the Windward and Leeward Islands. He said they would present a united front to the Colonial Office when the conference was convened in London in the near future.

Constitutional conferences

55. A series of constitutional conferences on six of these Territories (constitutional change in Montserrat is to be considered separately) took place in London between 28 February 1966 and 26 May 1966 as follows:

Antigua, 28 February 1966-25 March 1966

Dominica, Grenada, St. Lucia and St. Vincent, 18 April 1966-6 May 1966

St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, 12 May 1966-26 May 1966.

56. It is reported that agreement was reached on the new constitutional status of association with the United Kingdom outlined in the constitutional proposals published in December 1965.

57. Speaking at the conclusion of the last conference, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Mr. Frederick Lee was reported as saying that he hoped the new constitutional arrangements would go into effect "about the turn of the year".

58. Comments reported to have been made by some of the leading participants at each of the conferences are set out below. These are followed by a brief summary of the principal agreements reached.

Comments on the conferences

Antigua Conference

59. Antigua was the first of the Eastern Caribbean Islands to discuss the proposed new relationship with Britain as an "associated state" (see paras. 46-54 above). A Constitutional Conference opened in London on 28 February 1966 under the chairmanship of Lord Longford, the Secretary of State for Colonial

Affairs. The Antigua delegation was headed by the Island's Chief Minister, Mr. V. C. Bird. It was announced that the other members of the Conference would include the Administrator, Mr. David Rose, as well as other high-ranking officials in government, industry and labour in the Territory.

60. At the opening of the Conference, the Secretary of State for Colonial Affairs said that some of Britain's overseas Territories, though capable of the normal domestic functions of government, had not at present the resources of men and money to manage their own defence and external affairs. In these circumstances, Britain was prepared to consider to continue to handle defence and external affairs, provided it was satisfied that it would have adequate powers and could be sure that the Territory would try to observe at all times a similar standard of constitutional government and rule of law to those enjoyed in Britain.

61. At the close of the Conference the then Secretary of State for the Colonies, Lord Longford, was reported as saying:

"We had to devise a new relationship between Britain and Antigua. These are two countries geographically very far apart and very different in size and responsibilities, but nevertheless with close ties forged by 300 years of history. We wanted to devise a non-colonial relationship in which Antigua would enjoy full internal autonomy while Britain dealt with external affairs and defence. The arrangements for this relationship had to be such as would do justice to both parties. It had to be one which the people of Antigua could enter with dignity and cordiality while at the same time they undertook tasks commensurate with their size and the scale of their resources. It also had to be one in which Britain could adequately discharge the responsibilities it was going to shoulder. Our common institutions—the respect for the rule of law, the freedom of the individual and the institutions of parliamentary democracy—have been the foundations upon which the new arrangement itself has been built. There is no reason why, if such be the wish of the people and Government of Antigua, the relationship itself should not last as long as these foundations survive. For its successful operation it will of course require mutual understanding and mutual goodwill which, I am sure, will be forthcoming from both sides."

62. Mr. V. C. Bird, Chief Minister of Antigua, was reported to have said:

"We have been considering this new relationship between the United Kingdom and ourselves where there will be a free association and, after months of giving consideration to the form that this new relationship should take, we have worked out what I feel will be a satisfactory constitution. This new constitution will give to our people the right to run their own affairs locally, agreeing for Britain to look after the affairs of external matters and defence, but at the back of it all is the right of freedom for the people, because the people of Antigua themselves will have the right to declare their independence whenever they so desire. I think with that right of abrogation we can say truthfully to anybody in the world, and to our people at home, that we are satisfied with the solution that has been found. The new constitution should enable our people to feel that they are free and they have got the reins of their destinies into their own hands."

Dominica, Grenada, St. Lucia and St. Vincent Conference

63. At the opening of the Conference, Mr. H. Blaize, the Chief Minister of Grenada was reported to have stated that he expected to discuss economics and trade as well as constitutional matters. He added that the proposed associated Territories would not thrive and grow on a constitutional exercise alone.

64. On 29 April, it was reported that the talks seemed to be "bogged down" as the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Mr. Frederick Lee, had not shown willingness to meet immigration and trade guarantees. Grenada's Chief Minister, Mr. H. Blaize, had urged the establishment in the United Kingdom of a council to promote investment in the islands. Sir Garnet Gordon of St. Lucia, Mr. Keith Alleyne of Dominica and Mr. Ebenezer Joshua had all emphasized the need for the creation of light industries to help their Territories meet growing social and economic strains.

65. A number of delegates were reported to have been disappointed at their failure to secure any substantial financial assistance from the United Kingdom. The Secretary of State for the Colonies was reported to have promised to look into the matter of greater economic assistance for the islands at some future date.

66. During the Conference, separate meetings were held with each delegation to discuss internal constitutional proposals made by the territorial Governments. The main features of each constitution are described in the paragraphs below.

St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla Conference

67. The Chief Minister of St. Kitts, Mr. Paul Southwell, was reported to have said at the opening of the Conference that his delegation wanted the new status of association reviewed every four years. He also urged the United Kingdom to do more to boost the colony's living standards and economic development. He suggested the establishment of an economic sub-committee to work side by side with the constitutional conference.

68. At the conclusion of the Conference, the Chief Minister was reported to have said the agreement was the best that could have been extracted under the circumstances. But, he continued, the accord does not "give complete cause for joy". The islands had accepted it "without undue alacrity because we have been and still are inclined toward a full-scale West Indian nation in the Caribbean".

Main features of the new arrangements

General

69. By the terms of the new arrangements agreed upon at the constitutional conferences, each Territory will have full control over internal matters while the United Kingdom will retain powers relating to external affairs and defence. Each Territory will have full power to amend its constitution including the power to end the association with the United Kingdom and declare itself independent. A summary of the arrangements is set out below.

External affairs and defence

70. It was agreed by all the Governments that the United Kingdom Government was to act in close collaboration with the Governments of the associated States in matters which affect their territories con-

cerning defence and foreign affairs and that the United Kingdom Government may confer authority upon the Government of an associate State to deal with specific foreign affairs and defence matters. It was further agreed that the Governments of the Territories would provide such defence facilities as were required by the United Kingdom; would not, without the consent of Britain, grant access to any other Government to their territories; and would not use the United Kingdom forces in the aid of civil power.

71. With respect to external affairs, the United Kingdom and the Governments of Antigua, St. Vincent, Grenada and Dominica agreed that the United Kingdom would consult with the respective Governments before entering into international obligations concerning them, that the three Territories would pass the necessary legislation, and that the fullest consultation would take place between the Governments. All the Governments agreed that authority would be granted by the United Kingdom to each Territory, provided that it did not conflict with the responsibilities of the United Kingdom Government, to apply for membership of the United Nations specialized agencies; to sign agreements of local concern with other Commonwealth States in the Caribbean; to agree to financial and technical assistance from the Commonwealth, the United States of America or international organizations of which the United Kingdom was a member; and to make migration agreements with other countries.

Termination of association

72. The procedure for termination of the association, which both the United Kingdom and the Territories would be free to do at any time, requires the approval of a two-thirds majority in the lower house of Parliament and a two-thirds majority of the votes cast in a referendum. However, in the event that the association is terminated for the purpose of joining with an independent Commonwealth country in the Caribbean, either in union, federation or association, no referendum would be required. The delegates to the Dominica, Grenada, St. Lucia and St. Vincent Conference, who had expressed apprehension at the possibility of arbitrary use by the United Kingdom of the power to terminate the association, received assurances that the United Kingdom would give six months' notice of intent to end the association, would seek the approval of the United Kingdom Parliament before doing so, and would also be prepared to hold a conference to discuss ending the association.

Constitutional arrangements

73. Separate constitutions for each Territory were drawn up at the Conference. They provide for parliaments which in the case of Dominica, St. Lucia and St. Vincent will consist of one house (with ten, eleven and thirteen elected members respectively, three nominated and one *ex officio* member) and, in the cases of Antigua and Grenada, an upper and lower house. Amendment of the constitution can only take place in the Territory concerned and will require either approval by two thirds of the members of parliament or two thirds of the electorate in the cases of basic clauses of the constitution such as fundamental freedoms or the structure of parliament. Each parliament will have a life of five years.

Judiciary

74. The Governments are to participate in a Supreme Court of Judicature whose jurisdiction could be

extended to other interested Territories in the region. The court will have jurisdiction over the following matters, among others: fundamental rights and freedoms, membership of the parliaments, and conflicts between parts of the constitution of each state. The jurisdiction of the High Court will be prescribed by the parliaments of the respective Territories.

Citizenship

75. Citizenship of the respective Territories will, as in the past, continue to be held in common with the United Kingdom and colonies. However, should the association be terminated, separate citizenship for each Territory, provision for which is inscribed in each constitution, will become operative and will apply to persons born in the Territory, those whose father is a citizen of the Territory, and women married to citizens of the Territory.

Economic aid

76. At the Antigua Conference it was agreed that after the new constitutional arrangements came into force Antigua would continue to be eligible for British aid. Colonial Development and Welfare grants and loans and research grants from 1946 to 1965 to Antigua amounted to £2.4 million, in addition to which Antigua received technical assistance, Exchequer loans and Commonwealth Development Corporation funds.

77. Early in the Conference on Dominica, Grenada, St. Lucia and St. Vincent, all the delegates pressed the United Kingdom delegation for assurances that the new status would not result in a less favourable position for the islands in respect of trade, aid and immigration. The United Kingdom delegation stated that, in view of other commitments, and as aid had been recently increased to the four islands, resulting in roughly £6 per head of population annually being made available, financial assistance could not be increased, but efforts would be made to spend it more effectively. Aid undertakings already given would be carried out in full and budgetary aid would be provided if necessary. (In 1965, of the four islands, only St. Lucia did not require budgetary aid.) With regard to trade and immigration the United Kingdom delegation explained that the new constitutional arrangement would not alter present trading arrangements, and that the United Kingdom Government could not offer specially favourable treatment to immigrants from the associated states over other Commonwealth immigrants.

Regional co-operation

78. In accordance with the proposal of the White Paper of December 1965, the Governments expressed their willingness to discuss the question of future regional co-operation among themselves and other Territories in the area later in 1966.

Entry into force

79. The new arrangements agreed to at the conferences are subject to the approval of each of the territorial legislatures and to the necessary legislation being enacted by the United Kingdom Parliament. In this connexion, it may be noted that elections for the territorial legislatures were held in Grenada in September 1962, in St. Lucia in June 1965, in Antigua in November 1965, and in Dominica in January 1966. Elections were held in St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla on 25 July 1966 as a result of which the government party was returned. Elections are due to be held in St. Vincent by August 1966.

ANTIGUA⁶

General

80. In 1963 the estimated population was 61,664.

Political and constitutional developments

Elections

81. Antiguan went to the polls on 29 November 1965 to elect ten candidates out of a field of twenty-five. The two main parties contesting the election were the Antigua Labour Party (ALP), led by Chief Minister Mr. Vere Bird, which controlled all ten seats in the last House, and the Antigua-Barbuda Democratic Movement (ABDM), led by an estate owner, Mr. Robert Hall. There were also five independents in the contest. The Antigua Labour Party was returned to power after capturing all seven of the constituencies contested in the general election. During the heated campaigning the victorious party placed emphasis on "Independence for Antigua along the lines of the Cook Islands".

Public Service

82. An in-service training course for senior officers was held during 1964 on aspects of public administration. There were 10 expatriate officers serving at the close of 1964 (5 pensionable and 5 on contract) as against 50 senior local officers. The total number of local officers of all grades (excluding daily paid staff) numbered 1,468.

Economic conditions

83. The economy of the country continued to be based on agriculture, with sugar and cotton as the principal exports. Tourism is of increasing importance.

84. During the period 1962-64, the total trade of Antigua, St. Kitts and Montserrat with the United Kingdom (British Board of Trade returns in £ sterling), was as follows:

	1962	1963	1964 ^a
Imports to the United Kingdom	1,247,320	3,635,925	2,866,717
Exports from the United Kingdom	2,245,393	2,049,415	2,439,222
Re-exports from the United Kingdom	33,043	17,165	22,478

^a Includes the British Virgin Islands.

85. In 1964, estimated local revenue, derived mainly from customs duties and internal revenue taxes, amounted to \$WI 10,231,191. In addition, the Territory received \$WI 24,168 from the Overseas Service Aid Scheme, \$WI 94,897 from Colonial Development and Welfare Scheme and \$WI 89,740 from other sources, bringing the total estimated revenue to \$WI 10,439,996, compared with \$WI 11.6 million in 1963.⁷ Total estimated expenditure in 1964 was \$WI 9,746,681, compared with \$WI 9.7 million in 1963.

Caribbean free trade area

86. A free trade agreement for Antigua, Barbados and British Guiana was signed in Antigua on 15 De-

⁶ The information on Antigua has been derived from published reports and from the information transmitted to the Secretary-General by the United Kingdom under Article 73 e of the Charter on 24 August 1965, for the year ending 31 December 1964.

⁷ The local currency in Antigua, Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat, St. Kitts, Nevis, Anguilla, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and Barbados is the West Indian dollar (\$WI), which equals 4s.2d. (sterling) or \$US0.5833.

ember 1965 by the Premiers of Barbados and British Guiana, Mr. Errol Barrow and Mr. Forbes Burnham, and by the Chief Minister of Antigua, Mr. V. C. Bird. The most important of the Convention's thirty-seven articles removes all import duties from goods deemed to have been manufactured in the participating Territories. The Convention must be implemented by the legislatures concerned. It may then be submitted for registration with the United Nations and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). It is hoped that more Territories will become party to the agreement.

Social conditions

Public health

87. The Government Medical Services in 1964 consisted of 15 registered physicians, 6 senior nurses, 4 senior midwives, 64 certified midwives, 20 sanitary inspectors, 3 laboratory and X-ray technicians and 7 pharmacists. There was one general hospital with 180 beds, a cottage hospital with 150 beds, and a mental hospital with 200 beds.

88. In 1964, recurrent expenditure spent by the Health and Medical Departments amounted to \$WI 1,334,095.

Educational conditions

89. In 1964, the number of children receiving primary education was 11,614, compared with 13,450 in 1963.

90. The first priority in the improvement of primary education would be a rebuilding programme to replace the present inadequate school accommodations in rural areas. It was hoped to replace the school buildings in eight villages in the near future.

91. To improve the pupil/teacher ratio, the Antigua Government plans to increase the recruitment of primary school teachers and to expand the existing teacher/training programme.

DOMINICA⁸

General

92. In 1963 the estimated population was 63,609, compared with 59,916 in 1960.

Political and constitutional developments

93. At elections held on 8 January 1966 the Labour Party was returned to power, losing only one seat out of eleven to the Dominica United People's Party. Mr. Edward O. Leblanc was reappointed as Chief Minister. The Labour Party now has the right to propose two members to the Legislative Council, giving it twelve seats to one in the Council.

Economic conditions

94. During 1964, there was a gradual recuperation of the agricultural sector which had been ravaged by hurricane winds towards the close of 1963. Some increase in acreages under cultivation was noted, involving both more extensive cultivation on private holdings and acquisition of new lands by purchase from the Crown.

⁸ The information on Dominica has been derived from published reports and from the information transmitted to the Secretary-General by the United Kingdom under Article 73 e of the Charter on 2 July 1965, for the year ending 31 December 1964.

95. Bananas continued to be the mainstay of the economy and the main export crop, followed by citrus fruits and by-products, and by coconut-copra.

96. In 1963, imports were valued at \$WI 11,991,464 and exports at \$WI 7,752,709, compared with \$WI 10.6 million and \$WI 7.2 million respectively in 1961.

97. Public revenue, derived mainly from customs and excise duties, amounted to \$WI 4,733,477 in 1964, an increase of \$WI 610,898 over the 1963 figure. In addition, the sum of \$WI 824,853 was received from Colonial Development and Welfare funds, \$WI 34,722 under the Overseas Service Aid Scheme and \$WI 1,305,454 in respect of an Administration grant-in-aid, making a total revenue of \$WI 6,898,507.

98. Total expenditure in 1964 amounted to \$WI 6,502,243, including \$WI 311,414 on development schemes, compared with \$WI 6,026,466 in 1963.

Social conditions

Labour

99. A newly formed Seamen and Waterfront Workers' Trade Union was registered on 23 December 1964, with a membership of 369. Six hundred and fifty-two workers emigrated to the United Kingdom, whilst 518 returned. In 1963, 180 workers emigrated to the United Kingdom.

Public health

100. During 1964, there was a great reduction in deaths in children under 2 years of age from gastro-enteritis and malnutrition which had been the major causes of death among children in previous years. The infant mortality rate for 1964 was 52.9 per 1,000 live births, which is the lowest recorded in the Territory. This improvement was due to the educational programmes given at the Nutrition and Child Health Centres and to services at crèches.

101. An immunization programme against poliomyelitis was started during 1964. All children between the ages of 4 months and 4 years were vaccinated at child health centres.

102. Ordinary public health expenditure amounted to \$WI 740,178 in 1964, compared with \$WI 609,573 in 1963. In addition \$WI 43,040 was spent from Colonial Development and Welfare funds.

Educational conditions

103. Two new school buildings, one at Concord for 33 pupils and the other at Wotton Waven for 45 pupils, were opened during 1964 to relieve pupils in those areas where they had to walk long distances to school. The Canadian Government, through its Technical Aid Programme, has donated a school, which, when completed, will accommodate 1,000 pupils. Construction of the school was started towards the end of 1964.

GRENADA⁹

Political and constitutional developments

104. In the Speech from the Throne delivered in October 1965, the Administrator said that the Grenada Government was seeking a more advanced constitution

⁹ The information on Grenada has been derived from published reports and from the information transmitted to the Secretary-General by the United Kingdom under Article 73 e of the Charter on 7 July 1965, for the year ending 31 December 1964.

to help it achieve unitary statehood with Trinidad and Tobago. He said that on 27 July 1965 his Government had asked the Colonial Secretary to consider full internal self-government for Grenada or at least to let it return to the 1960 Constitution.¹⁰ It will be recalled that by the terms of the Grenada (Constitution) Order in Council 1962,¹¹ which came into operation in June 1962, certain limitations were imposed on the Legislative and Executive Councils of the Territory.

105. In November 1965, talks aimed at the full restoration of the 1960 Constitution began. This was achieved on 1 February 1966 when a new Order in Council¹² revoked the 1962 Order in Council and restored the 1960 Constitution in its original form.

106. On 30 December 1965 the Colonial Office published a White Paper containing constitutional proposals for the East Caribbean Territories (see paras. 44-54 above), and arrangements were made for discussions to be held in London in March-April 1966 with representatives of the Grenada Legislature. The proposals provide for the Territory to become a State with full internal self-government, in association with the United Kingdom.

107. A special meeting of the Grenada Legislative Council was summoned on 17 January 1966 in connexion with the Secretary of State's Outline Constitution for Grenada which was issued at the same time as the publication of the White Paper. The only item on the agenda was a motion presented by the Chief Minister of Grenada, which called upon the Council to approve the Outline Constitution as a basis for negotiation and appoint a select committee to examine the Outline Constitution and make recommendations prior to submission of proposals to the Secretary of State. Part of this motion read: "... this new status will enable Grenada to work towards the goal of a Caribbean Economic Community of which union with Trinidad and Tobago is a part". The Chief Minister's motion was adopted.

108. The Opposition United Labour Party did not participate in the debate on the Chief Minister's motion. The reason for this absence as stated by Mr. Eric Gairy,¹³ the Opposition leader, in a press release was that:

"... the proposed new Constitution has nothing to do with the unitary state and we would not be caught debating a motion on the proposed constitution with unitary entanglement.

"If it were a motion simply to debate the Constitutional proposals and appoint a Select Committee to study the proposals and suggest amendments we would have been delighted to participate. ..."

109. Speaking in the Legislative Council on 24 February 1966, the Chief Minister, Mr. Herbert Blaize, said that he was still pursuing his goal of unitary statehood with Trinidad and Tobago. The idea of Grenada standing alone was nonsense and federation was dead. Achieving self-government was moving Grenada closer to its eventual position in a Caribbean economic community. The Leader of the Opposition, Mr. Eric Gairy, said that unitary statehood was dead

and that it was time the Government dropped the idea.

Economic conditions

110. In 1964, there were no major changes in the economic conditions of the Territory. At the end of the year, it was announced that all marketing organization retail outlets would be closed as from 31 January 1965. The marketing officer and the two produce inspectors in his division would continue to inspect all produce for export and assist with collecting and recording production statistics. With the establishment of the Grenada Cocoa Industry Association, the marketing division was assisting with the initial registration of cocoa producers and dealers. These officers would also devote considerable efforts to bring local producers, middlemen and consumers together.

111. During 1964, food-stuffs, manufactured goods, clothing and leather footwear continued to be the major part of the imports which were valued at an estimated \$WI 17,677,625 in 1964, as compared with \$WI 15,023,636 in 1963. Exports were valued at an estimated \$WI 7,233,805 in 1964, as compared with \$WI 7,854,832 in 1963. The principal exports were cocoa beans (\$WI 2,162,219), nutmegs (\$WI 1,952,009) and bananas (\$WI 1,845,325). Trade was mainly with the United Kingdom, Canada and the United States of America.

112. Total revenue, including Colonial Development and Welfare grants of \$WI 419,000 and a United Kingdom grant-in-aid of \$WI 1,365,000, amounted to approximately \$WI 8,377,000 in 1964 compared with \$WI 8,389,000 in 1963. Apart from the grants, the main sources of revenue in 1964 were customs and excise duties, totalling \$WI 3,534,000, and taxes, amounting to \$WI 1,410,000. Total estimated expenditure in 1964 amounted to \$WI 8,362,000, compared with \$WI 8,389,000 in 1963. The main heads of expenditure were education (\$WI 1,273,000), medical services (\$WI 1,243,000), public works (\$WI 1,055,000), and the central road authority (\$WI 603,000).

113. In November 1965, the Colonial Office endorsed proposals for the expenditure of \$WI 2 million for development. This sum, as it was disclosed by Grenada's Chief Minister, was to be used, *inter alia*, for the continuation of his Government's water and road schemes, and for the fertilizer subsidy for 1966.

Social conditions

Labour

114. Agriculture provides the main source of employment in Grenada. The wages of agricultural workers were increased on 1 October 1963, to \$WI 2.00 and \$WI 1.70 for male and female workers respectively with effect from 1 February 1963. The increases resulted from voluntary collective bargaining between the employers and workers unions after a Commission of Inquiry had laid the basis for such increases.

115. It was announced in December 1965 that government civil servants would receive back-pay totalling \$WI 783,000. This is retroactive to January 1965, in accordance with recommendations of the Gardner-Browne review of civil service salaries.

116. There were seventeen trade unions in the Territory in 1964.

¹⁰ Statutory Instrument No. 2200 of 1959, the Grenada (Constitution) Order in Council 1959, which came into operation on 1 January 1960.

¹¹ Statutory Instrument No. 1244 of 1962.

¹² Statutory Instrument No. 2162 of 1965.

¹³ Mr. Gairy requested a hearing by the Special Committee (see A/AC.109/PET.466), and was heard at the 463rd meeting on 7 September 1966 (see paras. 328-355 of this chapter).

Educational conditions

117. Construction was started on six new elementary school buildings in 1964, one of which was completed and occupied. Five of the buildings will rehouse existing schools and one will be used for a new girls' school. Twenty primary schools are still housed in old single-room structures and it may be some time before the physical problems which beset education may be resolved. At 31 December 1964, there were 56 primary schools (government and grant-aided) with 26,684 pupils and six secondary schools with 2,050 pupils. There is also a local teacher-training college which was attended by thirty-three students in 1964.

MONTSERRAT¹⁴*General*

118. In 1963 the population was 13,569, compared with 12,167 in 1960.

Political and constitutional developments

119. There is no information available other than that contained in paragraph 47 above and in the reports of the Special Committee to the General Assembly at its ninth and twentieth sessions (A/5800/Rev.1, chap. XXV, paras. 132-138; and A/6000/Rev.1, chap. XXIV, paras. 30-52).

Economic conditions

120. Economic conditions continued to improve in 1964. Real estate development and a more positive approach to the promotion of tourism were the two main factors responsible for this. A small furniture-making factory began operations towards the end of 1964.

121. Cotton continued to be the principal source of revenue for the peasant farmer but only 912 acres (1,152 acres in 1963) were planted for 1964/1965. The 1963/1964 crop yielded 375 bales of clean lint, compared with 333 bales in 1962-1963. Owing to the damage caused to plantations by hurricane "Cleo", the total production of bananas was not as good as had been expected and amounted to 16,480 stems valued at \$WI 19,666. Exports of fruit and vegetables outside the Leeward Islands, of all sorts other than bananas and syrup, were valued at \$WI 36,941. Lime juice and tomatoes accounted for 8 per cent of this figure, whilst exports within the Leeward Islands group were estimated at some 500 tons valued at \$WI 150,000. The sugar cane industry suffered some reverses during 1964. Work was not completed on a new mill under construction and there was an unfortunate breakdown in the machinery at the existing Parson's mill. As a result, only 8,496 gallons of syrup were exported to Dominica, valued at \$WI 5,947. The value of the main exports for 1964 was \$WI 232,957. In 1963, total exports were valued at \$WI 340,397. The Territory imports various food-stuffs, including flour, sugar, dried fish and rice. Other main imports include manufactured goods such as motor cars, electrical equipment, boots and shoes, as well as cotton and rayon piece goods, cement and medicine and drugs. The value of the main imports during 1964 was \$WI 1,149,966.

¹⁴ The information on Montserrat has been derived from published reports and from the information transmitted to the Secretary-General by the United Kingdom under Article 73 e of the Charter on 26 October 1965, for the year ending 31 December 1964.

In 1963, the value of the total imports was \$WI 2,743,934.

122. In 1964, the total territorial revenue was \$WI 1,240,603, derived mainly from customs duties (\$WI 482,495) and from excise taxes and internal revenue (\$WI 393,367). In addition, the Territory received grants-in-aid from the United Kingdom totalling \$WI 1,477,280, bringing the total revenue to \$WI 2,717,883. Total expenditure was \$WI 2,740,523. In 1963, territorial revenue amounted to \$WI 999,792 and the grant-in-aid to \$WI 1,086,027. Total expenditure was \$WI 1,992,786.

*Social conditions**Labour*

123. Owing to the real estate development during 1964, employment opportunities increased considerably. Forty agricultural workers were engaged under contract for work in the United States Virgin Islands.

124. The three trade unions registered under the Trade Union Act had a membership of 620. Prevailing wage rates for men ranged from \$WI 2.60 per day for unskilled agricultural labour to \$WI 5.50 per day for foremen in government employ. In industry, unskilled workers received \$WI 2.50 to \$WI 3.25 per day and skilled workers received \$WI 5.00 to \$WI 8.00 per day.

Public health

125. In 1964, there were two registered physicians, three senior nurses, twenty-four certified nurses, seven partially trained nurses, three senior midwives, twenty-two certified midwives, three sanitary inspectors, one laboratory and X-ray technician and two pharmacists.

126. The mean mid-year population was estimated at 13,885. The birth-rate was 24.6 per thousand and the death-rate 7.7 per thousand. A considerable reduction in infant mortality continued as a result of the WHO/UNICEF health programmes.

127. In 1964, expenditure on medical and health services amounted to \$WI 247,200, compared with \$WI 240,793 in 1963.

Educational conditions

128. There were 3,203 children enrolled in the schools during 1964, including 2,938 in primary schools and 265 in the secondary school. In 1963, 3,066 pupils attended primary school and 217 attended secondary school.

129. Recurrent expenditure on primary education in 1964 was \$WI 239,949, while that on secondary education was \$WI 56,292. There was no capital expenditure. School fees at these secondary schools amounted to \$WI 5,541. Expenditure on education was 13.22 per cent of the total recurrent expenditure for the Territory. In 1963, recurrent expenditure for primary education was \$WI 209,427 and that for secondary education was \$WI 62,685, representing 14.23 per cent of the total recurrent expenditure for the Territory.

ST. KITTS-NEVIS-ANGUILLA¹⁵*Political and constitutional developments*

130. There is no information available other than that contained in paragraphs 44 to 79 above and in the

¹⁵ The information on St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla has been derived from published reports and from the information transmitted to the Secretary-General by the United Kingdom under Article 73 e of the Charter on 29 September 1965, for the year ending 31 December 1964.

Special Committee's reports to the General Assembly at its nineteenth and twentieth sessions (A/5800/Rev.1, chap. XXV, paras. 149-155; and A/6000/Rev.1, chap. XXIV, paras. 30-52).

Economic conditions

131. The total value of imports for the islands in 1964 was \$WI 13.6 million, compared with \$WI 12.2 million in 1963. The main imports during 1964 were food-stuffs such as flour (\$WI 810,983), meat (\$WI 635,258), fish (\$WI 427,242), gasoline and kerosene (\$WI 329,699), wood and timber (\$WI 447,289), fertilizers (\$WI 386,005), apparel (\$WI 219,648), and motor cars (\$WI 241,338). The imported goods came mainly from the United Kingdom (\$WI 3.6 million), Canada (\$WI 2.5 million) and the United States (\$WI 1.9 million).

132. The total value of the exports from the Territory in 1964 was \$WI 9.9 million, compared with \$WI 8.3 million in 1963. The main exports continued to be sugar (\$WI 8.8 million), molasses (\$WI 346,000), cotton lint (\$WI 116,000) and salt (\$WI 89,926). Of the exports, \$WI 7.3 million went to the United Kingdom and \$WI 1.06 million to Canada.

133. In 1964, local revenue, which continued to be derived mainly from import duties (\$WI 1.7 million) and income tax (\$WI 1.3 million) amounted to \$WI 5.1 million, compared with \$WI 4.8 million in 1963.

Social conditions

134. There was an over-all increase of two cents per hour for all government non-establishment workers, with effect from 1 July 1964. The St. Kitts-Nevis Trade and Labour Union successfully negotiated a special increase in bonus payable to sugar factory workers.

Educational conditions

135. In 1966, the number of children receiving primary education in St. Kitts, including those attending senior schools, was 10,072. During the next five years the Government hopes to provide additional accommodation for about 5,000 children in St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla. Arrangements are in hand to improve the training of teachers, the programme for in-service training is to be increased, and, in addition, it is hoped to arrange for a further ten teachers a year to attend an external teacher-training college. Increased provision is to be made for textbooks and other teaching material.

136. The number of children receiving primary education in Nevis was 3,954, and in Anguilla, 1,744. Nevis has a common Education Department with St. Kitts and Anguilla, and the proposals for the improvement of education in St. Kitts apply also to Nevis.

ST. LUCIA¹⁶

General

137. The population at the end of 1963 was estimated to be 99,084.

¹⁶ The information on St. Lucia has been derived from published reports and from information transmitted to the Secretary-General by the United Kingdom under Article 73 of the Charter on 2 September 1965, for the year ending 31 December 1964.

Political and constitutional developments

138. In August 1965, St. Lucia's legislative Council, by a vote of 9 to 2, gave its Government approval to seek full internal self-government for the Territory by 1 January 1966. The action was opposed by the St. Lucia Labour Party which petitioned the United Kingdom Government to inquire into the governing of the Territory by the United Workers' Party. The United Workers' Party won eight of the ten elective seats in the Legislative Council following the elections held in June 1964. Previously the Labour Party had been in power for thirteen years.

Economic conditions

139. During 1964, St. Lucia benefited from financial assistance for economic development from the United Kingdom, the United States and Canada. The St. Lucia Government's projection for development is based on the expectation that such assistance will not only continue but will be increased during the next few years. The production of bananas, the Territory's chief crop, continued to show steady progress. In 1964, 5,142,000 stems valued at \$WI 8,189,516 were exported to the United Kingdom, compared with 4,400,000 stems valued at \$WI 6,191,000 in 1963. The other principal crops for export are copra, cocoa and coconut oil. The production of copra was 5,275,300 pounds valued at \$WI 789,225; cocoa was 233,774 pounds valued at \$WI 103,952 and coconut oil (refined and unrefined) 200,378 gallons valued at \$WI 474,255. There has been an over-all production increase due chiefly to the application of fertilizers.

140. Total domestic exports and re-exports from the Territory in 1964 were valued at \$WI 9,827,276. Total imports were valued at \$WI 20,408,831. Detailed statistics on imports for 1964 are not available.

141. The principal heads of revenue in 1963 continued to be derived from customs and excise duties (\$WI 3,666,969) and from income tax (\$WI 1,278,474 in 1964). Estimated revenue for 1964 was \$WI 7,561,706. In addition, the Territory received an Overseas Service Aid grant of \$WI 64,104, and a Colonial Development and Welfare grant of \$WI 625,920, bringing the total estimated revenue to \$WI 8,251,730. The Territory was withdrawn from grant-in-aid of administration for the first time in sixteen years.

142. In an attempt to increase tourism, the Commonwealth Development Corporation, through Caribach Hotels, has built the island's first luxury hotel, and a major housing estate is being laid out at Cap Estate, which consists of 2,000 acres in the northern part of the island. Construction costs on the latter will total about £2.5 million.

Social conditions

Labour

143. The major problems in the field of labour and employment conditions continued to be a lack of adequate up-to-date information relating to all aspects of the labour market (employment, unemployment, composition, distribution, mobility etc.) and a dearth of labour statistics, particularly those on average earnings and actual hours worked in major employment. A request was made to the UNTAB for technical assistance under the 1964-1966 programme in the field of labour statistics collection and compilation. There were seven

stoppages of work during the year, none of which exceeded two days, and fewer than 100 workers were directly involved.

Public health

144. No changes were reported in the number of hospitals or medical and health personnel. The birth-rate in 1963 was 40.2 per thousand and the death-rate was 10.8 per thousand compared with 12.4 in 1964. The principal causes of death were diseases of early infancy (11.06 per 100,000), gastro-enteritis and colitis, except diarrhoea of the new-born (99.92 per 100,000), pneumonia (99.92 per 100,000) and others. During 1964 approved estimated recurrent expenditure on public health (including Colonial Development and Welfare grants) was \$WI 991,126.

Educational conditions

145. At the end of 1964, there were fifty-eight primary schools with 23,120 pupils and 651 teachers (of whom 117 were trained) and three secondary schools with 939 pupils and fifty-three masters (of whom twenty-two were graduates), an increase of seven over 1963. During 1963-1964, three schools designed as replacements for a total of 1,080 school places were completed, while construction of a fourth school to provide 550 places was started. The construction and replacement of schools were followed by a sharp increase in school attendance which aggravated the already serious shortage of trained teachers. Recurrent expenditure on education in 1964 was \$WI 1,269,489, compared with \$WI 1,056,152 in 1963. In addition, capital expenditure amounted to \$WI 15,940, compared with \$WI 55,313 in 1963; Colonial Development and Welfare grants totalled \$WI 176,232.

ST. VINCENT¹⁷

General

146. The total population of St. Vincent at 31 December 1964 was estimated at 87,000.

Political and constitutional developments

147. There is no information available other than that contained in paragraphs 44 to 79 above and in the Special Committee's reports to the General Assembly at its nineteenth and twentieth sessions. (A/5800/Rev.1, chap. XXV, paras. 186-193; and A/6000/Rev.1, chap. XXIV, paras. 30-52).

Economic conditions

148. As in the previous year, bananas and arrowroot continued to be the main crops produced for export. Banana production remained at about the same level—28,057 short tons (\$WI 3,372,700) were exported, against 28,217 short tons (\$WI 3,006,935) in 1963. The acreage remained at about 8,500. Windstorms again did considerable damage. Arrowroot production reached an all-time peak in 1964: 58,000 barrels against 50,317 barrels the previous crop. Owing to poor market prospects it was expected that the 1964/1965 crop would be down to about 35,000 barrels. Further severe cuts in acreage to about 2,000 acres were con-

sidered necessary to avoid disastrously large carry-over stocks.

149. The area planted with cotton was increased to 966 acres (635 acres in 1963). The world price for cocoa has seriously affected efforts to promote this crop. Fortunately the local price was still attractive and this enabled small growers to put in a further 80 acres in 1964. Nutmeg prices were still fair and growers were shifting their interest to this tree crop. Modest plantings of *Robusta* coffee were made. Copra production remained steady at about 3,000 tons. Exports remained about 2,404 long tons, against 2,409 long tons in 1963. Exports of dry coconuts rose from 433,615 nuts to 678,715 nuts in 1964.

150. A new fisheries scheme has been proposed but has not yet been approved. The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) was to begin investigational and training operations in this part of the Caribbean where one of their five modern deep-sea trawlers would be based. Local fisheries departments hoped to obtain much needed help from them in training local staff and mapping fishing grounds.

151. The main export items continued to be bananas and arrowroot. Total exports in 1964 were valued at \$WI 5,989,084. Imports included food-stuffs, footwear, fabrics, timber etc. The total value of imports amounted to \$WI 16,064,114 in 1964. Trade is mainly with the United Kingdom, other United Kingdom Territories, Canada and the United States.

152. Total revenue amounted to \$WI 6,950,293 in 1964, compared with \$WI 5,416,774 in 1963. Ordinary revenue, of which over half was derived from customs, excise and other duties, amounted to \$WI 4,739,913 in 1964, compared with \$WI 4,194,416 in 1963. In addition, the Territory received a United Kingdom grant-in-aid (\$WI 1,134,907), Colonial Development and Welfare funds (\$WI 60,227) and Overseas Service Aid (\$WI 13,680) totalling \$WI 1,208,814, compared with \$WI 1,302,358 in 1963. Budgeting expenditure amounted to \$WI 5,594,141 in 1964, compared with \$WI 5,530,399 in 1963. Colonial Development and Welfare expenditure was \$WI 503,737.

Social conditions

Labour

153. At 31 December 1964, the working population was estimated at 31,000. By working population is meant the number of persons between 15 and 65 years of age who work for pay or gain or who offer themselves for such work. The working population is being constantly replenished by young entrants at the rate of some 1,000 *per annum* and the problem of finding employment for the labour force is at present engaging the attention of the Government. The activities of the Public Works Department are undertaken, as far as possible, during the slack period—June to November—at the time when very little work is available in agriculture, as St. Vincent is an agricultural community and employment is seasonal. Responsibility for the administration of labour rests with the Department of Labour.

154. There were no changes in the number of registered organizations. In 1964, 185 recruited workers returned from the United States and St. Croix, United States Virgin Islands. Two hundred and thirty-five workers were recruited during the year.

¹⁷ The information on St. Vincent has been derived from published reports and from information transmitted to the Secretary-General by the United Kingdom under Article 73 e of the Charter on 30 August 1965, for the year ending 31 December 1964.

Public health

155. The organization of the Medical Department remained unchanged. The vacant posts of senior medical officer and three district medical officers were filled in 1964. Increases in the medical facilities included one out-patient dispensary. In 1964, there were 11 government and 2 private registered physicians, 8 government nurses of senior training, 54 certified government nurses and 23 private, and 4 government midwives of senior training. In 1964, the birth-rate was 42.7 per thousand compared with 43.1 per thousand in 1963; and the death-rate was 9.5 and 11.9 per thousand respectively. The morbidity and mortality patterns continued to show the same trends observed during the previous year, except for an increase in the number of typhoid cases notified (from 15 to 29) as the result of a minor outbreak. The high mortality rate in young children remained a public health problem, the risk of death being greatest between the ages of 6 months and 2 years, the dominating causes being malnutrition and gastro-enteritis.

Educational conditions

156. There was no significant change in the educational conditions in the Territory. The construction of the Health and Welfare Training Centre (Youth Trust Fund) and the Boy's Grammar School (to accommodate 500 pupils) was completed in 1964. Primary schools are still badly overcrowded and school building has not yet caught up with the need for additional accommodation.

4. BARBADOS¹⁸*General*

157. The population of the Territory at the end of 1964 was 241,925, giving a density of 1,481 persons per square mile.

Political and constitutional developments

158. On 12 August 1965, the Barbados Government laid before the legislature a White Paper entitled "The Federal Negotiations, 1962-65 and Constitutional Proposals for Barbados" in which it was stated that the House of Assembly would be asked to agree to a resolution requesting the Secretary of State for the Colonies to fix an early date for a conference on independence; and if agreed to, the Senate would be invited to concur therein.

159. On 14 August, the Premier of Barbados, Mr. Errol Barrow, stated at a press conference that his Government had had three years of discussions with the other islands in the Windwards and Leewards on an eastern Caribbean federation and there was still no basic idea as to the formation of a federation. He asserted, however, that the White Paper and the decisions it contained had not closed the door to federation.

160. The Democratic Labour Party (DLP), the ruling party in Barbados, endorsed at its annual meeting on 21 September 1965 the proposal contained in the White Paper for independence alone, and defeated a resolution for independence within a federation.

¹⁸ The information on Barbados has been derived from published reports and from the information transmitted to the Secretary-General by the United Kingdom under Article 73 e of the Charter on 25 August 1965, for the year ending 31 December 1964.

161. Since the White Paper's release, the official Opposition, the Barbados National Party (BNP), the Barbados Labour Party (BLP) and a new group described as the "Under Forties", have publicly aired their views against independence for Barbados alone. The Barbados Labour Party charged that the White Paper contained a large number of distortions and that the material in it had been presented in a manner to deceive the public on the cost of independence. The Party's spokesman said: "The Party decided that it will sponsor a series of meetings to mobilize public opinion, and would use every means at its disposal to expose the misrepresentations and distortions contained in the White Paper and to obtain support for its view that the future of Barbados lies in an independent Eastern Caribbean Federation."

162. On 24 November 1965, the Secretary of the Barbados Labour Party presented a resolution to the Governor for transmission to the Secretary of State for the Colonies calling for a general election to decide the issue of whether Barbados should seek independence alone or as part of an eastern Caribbean federation. The resolution said also that the Government had no mandate from the people to seek independence for Barbados alone.

163. On the other hand, the Barbados Workers' Union has pledged its fullest support to the Barbados Government's plan to seek independence. This pledge was embodied in a resolution passed at the Union's twenty-fourth annual delegates' conference on 28 August 1965.

164. On 8 January 1966, the Barbados House of Assembly, after a five-day debate, passed a resolution, by 14 votes to 9, requesting independence for Barbados in isolation. Opposition Barbados Labour Party members spoke in favour of federation.

165. On 24 January, the twenty-one-member Senate passed by 17 votes to 3 a resolution authorizing the Government to take Barbados into independence alone. The Senate rejected an amendment which called for a general election to let the people decide whether they wanted to go alone or within a federation of the eastern Caribbean.

166. On the same day, the Premier of Barbados said that he expected the Territory would adjust to full independence with no disruption of parliamentary government and declared that Barbados would remain in the Commonwealth.

167. On 3 February 1966, it was announced in the House of Commons that the United Kingdom had agreed to the request of Barbados to arrange a conference on independence at a mutually convenient time. In reply to a question whether a pledge would be given before the conference that elections would be held in the island before independence was finally given, the Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies replied that "of course it is a desire of Her Majesty's Government that before independence is agreed we should have an assurance that the majority of the people in any Territory desire that independence".

168. The constitutional conference on Barbados took place in London between 20 June and 5 July 1966. Representing Barbados were the Premier and members of his party (Democratic Labour Party), the leader of the Opposition and members of his party (Barbados National Party) and representatives of the Barbados Labour Party.

169. The conference had before it the draft independence constitution prepared by the Barbados Government which had been approved by both houses of the Barbados Parliament.

170. Agreement was reached at the conference that Barbados should become independent on 30 November 1966. There were, however, a number of differences between the government party and the opposition parties over particular provisions of the draft constitution. Some of these were resolved in discussion, but on others unanimous agreement could not be reached.

171. The Secretary of State for the Colonies summed up the proceedings in a statement to the conference on 1 July as follows:

"This Constitutional Conference has now completed the major part of its business.

"We have examined the draft constitution produced by the Government of Barbados and I am happy to say that, on much of it, all parties represented round this table have reached agreement. This will be recorded in the report of the Conference where the main features of the constitution will be described. There are certain matters on which, unfortunately, it was not possible for the Government and the two Opposition parties to agree, and I appreciate the importance of some of them to the parties in Barbados. They are all matters on which it is understandable that there might be differences of view between the various groups in a democratic society framing a constitution for independence. These disagreements will also have to be set out and recorded in the Conference report.

"The Legislature of Barbados in requesting me to call this Conference proposed that as a result of it Barbados should proceed to separate independence in 1966.

"On this question of separate independence for Barbados I have as you all know had separate discussions with all the parties represented round this table. I understand that, although some of the Barbadian representatives would have preferred their country to seek independence in an association with their neighbours in the Caribbean, all parties are agreed that for the time being this aim is not attainable and therefore they concur in the proposal that Barbados should proceed to separate independence.

"In the meetings which I had with the parties separately to discuss this question I made it plain that, having heard their views, I would consult my colleagues and let them have the United Kingdom Government's decision. I am now in a position to inform the Conference that these consultations have taken place and that, subject to the passage of the necessary legislation by the United Kingdom Parliament, Her Majesty's Government agree that Barbados should become independent on 30 November 1966.

"The question of the date of the next elections in Barbados is one for the Government of Barbados to determine, bearing in mind that a Dissolution is in any case due not later than 19 December 1966. They will doubtless be announcing their decision in due course."

172. The main provisions of the new Constitution for Barbados are set out below. The provisions with which the Opposition parties disagreed are also indicated.

173. Executive authority will be exercised by a Governor-General. The general direction and control of the Government of Barbados will rest with the Cabinet consisting of the Prime Minister and other Ministers. The Governor-General will appoint as Prime Minister the person who appears to him best able to command the confidence of the majority of the members of the Assembly. He will appoint the other Ministers on the advice of the Prime Minister.

174. The Constitution will provide for a legislature that will consist of a Senate of twenty-one members and a House of Assembly of twenty-four members. All members of the Senate will be appointed by the Governor-General; twelve on the advice of the Prime Minister, two on the advice of the Leader of the Opposition and seven in the Governor-General's discretion to represent religious, economic or social interests. Provisions will be included in the Constitution to restrict the powers of the Senate along the lines of the existing provisions. The Opposition parties proposed that the Senate should be so composed that the Government would be unable to secure the required two-thirds majority for an amendment of an entrenched provision of the Constitution without the support of at least part of the Opposition. This proposal was not accepted.

175. The House of Assembly is to consist of not less than twenty-four members. The Constitution will lay down certain principles concerning the electoral arrangements and will set out the qualifications for membership of the Assembly. All other matters concerning elections are to be dealt with by laws passed by the Legislature. The Opposition parties proposed that the Constitution should lay down the qualifications for electors as well as those for membership and that both should be entrenched provisions. They also proposed that the Constitution make provision for an impartial commission to supervise the registration of electors and the conduct of the elections; for single member constituencies; and for a boundaries commission to review constituency boundaries. These proposals were not accepted.

176. The Constitution will also make provision for safeguarding fundamental rights and freedoms, irrespective of race, place of origin, political opinion, colour, creed or sex, subject to respect for the rights and freedoms of others and for the public interest. Subject to safeguards, derogation from certain of these fundamental rights and freedoms will be permitted in time of war, public emergency, or when democratic institutions are threatened by subversion. The Opposition parties proposed an alternative draft designed to avoid the use of the word "subversion". The Chairman considered that there was no difference in substance between the two drafts and ruled against the Opposition draft.

177. The Constitution will also provide for the manner in which the Constitution may be amended by the Legislature. Certain provisions may not be altered without the support of two thirds of members of both Houses. These entrenched provisions include those relating to: citizenship; fundamental rights and freedoms; the appointment of members of the Senate, including qualifications for membership; and the composition of the House of Assembly. The requirement of a two-thirds majority will not apply to an amendment to give constitutional effect to arrangements under which Barbados is to join with any other country or territory within the Commonwealth.

178. Citizens of the United Kingdom and Colonies born in Barbados, or whose father was born in Barbados, will automatically become citizens of Barbados. Commonwealth citizens or their wives who fulfil certain residence qualifications may register as citizens of Barbados. The Opposition parties did not agree that such registration should be subject to exceptions prescribed by law in the interests of national security and public policy.

179. The Constitution will also provide for such matters as the life of the Parliament, the Judicature, the Public Service and the Service Commissions.

Economic conditions

180. The production of sugar and its by-products, rum and molasses, continued in 1964 to dominate the island's economy. There were 50,848 acres under sugar cane in 1964. The total production of sugar and fancy molasses was 161,497 tons. The fishing industry landed 4.6 million pounds of fish and 1.48 million pounds of shrimp in 1964.

181. Industrial gas production for 1964 amounted to 117.6 million cubic feet which was used for domestic, industrial and commercial purposes. Applications from companies for licences to explore for oil were under consideration, and it was announced on 10 July 1965 that the Cabinet, under the authority of section 4 of the Petroleum Act, 1950, had granted a prospecting licence for a period of two years.

182. The tourist industry continued to expand steadily. A total of 57,598 tourists visited the island in 1964. In addition, ninety-five cruise ships called with 41,671 passengers. The gross hard currency earnings from this industry were estimated at \$WI 23 million.

183. Imports for 1964 amounted to \$WI 109,019,973, compared with \$WI 98,871,434 in 1963. The increase of \$WI 10,148,539 occurred mainly in items of food, chemicals, machinery and transport and manufactured goods. Imported goods come mainly from the United Kingdom (\$WI 32,566,394 in 1964), the United States (\$WI 17,590,670), Canada (\$WI 12,920,046) and other Commonwealth countries.

184. The total value of exports, excluding in-transit trade, was \$WI 60,468,621 in 1964, compared with \$WI 69,788,185 in 1963. The principal items of domestic exports continue to be sugar (140,744 tons valued at \$WI 30,893,233); molasses (10,567,427 gallons valued at \$WI 6,247,607); rum (765,403 gallons valued at \$WI 2,242,183—provisional figures); soap; margarine; edible oil; and lard.

185. An agreement for a free trade area linking Barbados, Antigua and British Guiana was signed on 15 December 1965 (see para. 86 above). The most important of the thirty-seven articles provide for free trade for locally made goods.

186. Revenue continued to be derived mainly from customs and excise duties and from taxation. The total revenue in 1964-1965 amounted to an estimated \$WI 37,398,803. Capital expenditure for 1964-1965 totalled \$WI 8,201,356, compared with \$WI 9,553,178 in 1963-1964. The total expenditure for 1964-1965 was estimated at \$WI 33,038,009. At 31 March 1965, the public debt had risen to \$WI 43,235,000 compared with \$WI 35,106,000 in 1964.

Social conditions

187. The index of retail prices in 1964 (June 1953 = 100) rose from 115.9 in January to 117.1 in

October, and declined to 116.7 in December. According to provisional estimates for 1964, the national income was \$WI 147.1 million.

Labour

188. The majority of the gainfully occupied population is engaged in the cultivation and harvesting of sugar cane, and the processing of the cane into sugar and fancy molasses. Approximately 22,264 workers were employed during the peak of the reaping season (January-June) and 15,943 during the out-of-crop period (July-December). There are no available up-to-date statistics relating to unemployment or under-employment.

189. The emigration of Barbadian agricultural workers for short-term contracts with private employers in other countries followed the pattern of previous years. At the beginning of 1963, there were 1,960 workers under contract. During the year, 1,052 workers were repatriated while 1,925 were engaged. At the end of the year, the number still under contract in the United States of America was 1,634. During 1964, 2,507 persons left for employment in the United Kingdom. Of these, 972 were under government sponsorship. Thirty-three workers were recruited for employment with the British Ministry of Public Works in the construction of the BBC Overseas Station.

Public health

190. There was no indication as to a change in the number of medical facilities in 1964. There were 43 government and 42 private registered physicians (25 of the private physicians are employed on a part-time basis by central and local government), 53 nurses of senior training, 20 certified midwives; and 20 partially trained midwives.

191. The birth-rate in 1964 was 26.6 per thousand and the death-rate 8.7 per thousand. Infant mortality was 52 per thousand births. Recurrent and capital expenditure on medical services for the year 1963-1964 amounted to \$WI 3,479,599 and \$WI 3,412,555 respectively.

Educational conditions

192. The following table shows the number of schools, pupils and teachers in the Territory for 1963-1964:

	<i>Schools</i>	<i>Teachers</i>	<i>Pupils</i>
Primary	118	801	41,322
Secondary comprehensive ...	6	193	6,479
Secondary grammar	10	210	4,716
Technical and vocational ..	2	19	572
Teacher training	1	10	141
Reformatory	2	24	80

193. Estimated expenditure on education amounted to \$WI 6,946,074 and capital expenditure to \$WI 736,324 in 1964-1965. The corresponding figures for 1963 were \$WI 6,092,434 and \$WI 1,052,234.

5. BERMUDA¹⁹

General

194. At June 1964, the estimated total resident civil population was 47,612 compared with 46,783 a year

¹⁹ The information presented in this section has been derived from published reports, and from the information transmitted to the Secretary-General by the United Kingdom under Article 73 e of the Charter on 2 September 1965, for the year ended 31 December 1964.

earlier. About two thirds of the population is of African or mixed descent and the remainder is of European origin.

Political and constitutional developments

195. As noted in the Special Committee's report to the General Assembly at its twentieth session (A/6000/Rev.1, chap. XXIII, para. 9), a Joint Select Committee of both Houses was established in 1963 to consider constitutional changes. The present Constitution provides for a nominated Executive Council which advises the Government, a bicameral legislature consisting of a nominated Legislative Council and a House of Assembly elected by all Bermudians and resident British subjects over 25 years of age. Certain freehold property owners have a second vote.

196. The report which the Joint Select Committee submitted to the House of Assembly on 12 November 1965 consisted of a majority report and four separate minority reports.

197. The Committee noted that it had submitted an interim report dealing with proposed amendments to the Parliamentary Franchise Act which would have abolished the second or plus vote on real estate and reduced the voting age from 25 to 21 years. It also noted that a bill which was introduced to give effect to these proposals had been passed by the House of Assembly by a vote of 24 to 2 but had been defeated in the Legislative Council. The Committee also pointed out that the Legislative Council had been prepared to agree to the abolition of the plus vote on real estate, but not to the reduction of the voting age.

198. The majority report, which was signed by five members, concluded that it would be in the best interests of the Territory to introduce "full responsible government". To achieve this, the majority recommended a ministerial system and a cabinet. They did not recommend the use of these terms, because they believed this nomenclature would be misleading as it suggested full-time, professional politicians. They preferred to retain the terms "member" and "Executive Council" thereby continuing the system of part-time public service which was "best suited to the needs of Bermuda".

199. The majority recommended that the Governor should select from among the members of the House of Assembly the person whom he believed best able to command a majority in the Assembly. He would be referred to as the Government Leader and would be the Governor's chief political adviser. On the recommendation of the Leader, the Governor would appoint from six to nine other members of the Executive Council and would distribute portfolios among them on the advice of the Leader. There would be no *ex officio* members. At least one and not more than two members should be from the Legislative Council. The Governor would be obliged to act on the advice of the Executive Council in all matters except defence, external relations, internal security, and matters relating to the administration of the police force, these being matters on which the Governor would retain reserve powers.

200. The bicameral legislature would be retained. The Legislative Council would consist of eleven members nominated by the Governor, four on the recommendation of the Leader, two on the recommendation of the Leader of the Opposition and five at his discretion "to represent a broad range of interests in

the community". There should be no *ex officio* members, but the Colonial Secretary and the Attorney-General should be eligible for appointment with the approval of the Leader. The Legislative Council would have delaying powers similar to those enjoyed by the House of Lords in the United Kingdom, it being able to delay a money bill for three months and a public bill for two years.

201. The majority again recommended that the voting age be lowered to 21 years and that the second vote be abolished. They also recommended the establishment of a boundaries commission whose function would be to make recommendations to the legislature from time to time on the necessity for any changes in the electoral boundaries. Other recommendations included bringing the government boards under the control of members of the Executive Council and the entrenchment in the Constitution of the independence of the judiciary and of a bill of rights.

202. The main minority report, signed by three members, concurred in all the recommendations of the majority except those concerning the lowering of the voting age and the abolition of the second vote. The member who signed the second minority report agreed with the goal of responsible government but not that the time had arrived to introduce it. The third minority report suggested an alternative method of appointing members of the Legislative Council, the abolition of the government boards and modifications concerning the proposed boundaries commission. The fourth minority report rejected the basic recommendation to introduce full responsible government and most of the consequential recommendations.

203. In December 1965, the House of Assembly and the Legislative Council adopted the majority report of the Joint Select Committee. The Legislative Council adopted the report by a vote of five to four. In January 1966, the House of Assembly approved a message to be sent to the Governor asking him to discuss constitutional changes.

204. On 12 January 1966, an amendment to the Parliamentary Franchise Act seeking to lower the voting age from 25 to 21 years and abolishing an additional vote for property owners, having already been passed by the Assembly, was passed in the Legislative Council by one vote. Later, the Governor assented to the amendment.

205. The final terms and provisions of a new written constitution for the Territory will be negotiated with the United Kingdom Government in London by delegates appointed by the Governor.

206. The Central Committee of the Progressive Labour Party (PLP) claims that the views of labour are not effectively represented in the report. In a press release, it declared that the Legislative Council should be abolished; night meetings should be held in the House of Assembly instead of afternoon sessions, to enable the working man to attend; a Bermudian should be appointed Governor; government boards should be abolished; and the right of non-Bermudians to vote after being resident for three years should be withdrawn.

207. Five parliamentary members of the PLP who disagreed with the views of the Central Committee were suspended in September 1965 and later resigned their membership, leaving the sixth labour member as sole party representative in the Assembly. The former party leader, Mr. Arnold Francis, has intimated that

he may form another party, but that in the meantime he and his five colleagues intend to serve in the Assembly as independent members.

208. It was announced on 11 July 1966 that a constitutional conference on Bermuda would be held in London on 8 November 1966. The membership of the Bermuda delegation was named by the Governor a few days later. In his announcement, the Governor stated that, on the instruction of the Secretary of State for the Colonies, the membership of the delegation had to be confined to members of the legislature.

209. The conference will consider the report of the Select Committee which was adopted by both houses of the legislature in December 1965. The Bermuda delegation will be assisted by a legal adviser, Sir Ralph Hone, who arrived in Bermuda for talks in July.

210. The Progressive Labour Party (PLP) is reported to have stated that it will demand independence at the conference.

Economic conditions

211. The economy continues to depend on the tourist industry. In spite of a 25 per cent increase in the number of tourists in 1965, the percentage increase in the Territory's dollar receipts has been smaller.

212. Bananas, citrus fruits, vegetables, milk, eggs and meat are produced for local consumption. The continued increase in population and the corresponding increase in housing and playing fields has further encroached on land available for agriculture, reducing it from 1,037 acres in 1963 to 1,020 acres in 1964.

213. There is a small fishing industry in Bermuda. It is estimated that 1,350,000 pounds of fish and 140,000 pounds of spiny lobster are landed annually, at a total value of about £250,000.

214. A retail price index was established in January 1961 and is computed quarterly. Taking January 1961 as 100, by October 1964, it stood at 103.4.

215. In 1964, imports into the Territory were valued at £30,885,509, including those into the free port of Ireland Island compared with £29,645,286 in 1963. Domestic exports were valued at £726,928 in 1964 compared with £831,429 in 1963, and total recorded re-exports at £12,488,645, against £12,908,796. Revenue from invisible items such as investment and the tourist industry resulted in an over-all favourable balance of payments.

216. Revenue and expenditure for the years 1962, 1963 and 1964 were as follows:

	1962	1963	1964
	(Thousand pounds)		
Revenue	5,602	5,711	6,554
Expenditure	5,691	6,342	6,385

217. Bermuda, which has no income tax, attracts the registration of many international companies and considerable banking and financial activity takes place on the islands.

Social conditions

Labour

218. In 1964, manual labourers in the Territory working a 44-50 hour week earned between 6/- per hour (female domestic servant) and 13/- per hour (dockworkers and electricians). Non-manual workers working a 34-42 hour week earned between 7/11 per

hour (messenger) and 29/7 per hour (senior accountant).

219. In 1964, there were six unions registered under the Trade Union and Trade Disputes Act, 1946, the Bermuda Union of Teachers and the Teachers' Association of Bermuda having amalgamated on 29 March 1964. There is also a Civil Service Association.

220. There were four labour disputes in 1964 affecting 322 workers and resulting in 285 man-days lost. Agreements were signed by the stevedores and Bermuda Dockworkers' Union, effective 1 January 1964 for three years, and by the Passenger Transportation Board and the Bermuda Industrial Union, effective until 31 December 1965, with pay increases retroactive to 1 January 1964. A revision of the salaries and a regarding of posts was undertaken in the Civil Service, effective retroactively to 1 January 1963.

221. In October 1964, the Government, after consulting the Labour Relations Advisory Committee, issued a statement recognizing trade unions in government employment, where a "substantial" number of employees concerned wished to be represented by it and where it commanded the support of a majority of the employees.

Public health

222. In 1964, the death-rate was 7.69 per thousand, against 7.31 per thousand in the previous year. The infant mortality rate was 33.04 per thousand live births.

223. Recurrent expenditure on health amounted to £895,793 in 1964 compared with £712,732 the previous year. There are four hospitals as well as a number of baby and women's clinics which are supported by the Department of Medical and Health Services.

Educational conditions

224. The principle of providing free education at all schools for children within the compulsory age limits was adopted in July 1965. Public schools are classified as "vested" or "non-vested". The former are managed by local committees, the latter are directly administered by the Board of Education. Previously education was free and, in accordance with the Education Act of 1954, compulsory for all children over 7 and under 13 years of age. This provision has led to a further division of free schools and schools in which fees continue to be charged. Under authority of the Act, the Board fixed special age limits of "over five, and the end of the term in which the child reaches the age of 16", between which children attending a free school might receive free primary education. In schools in which fees are still charged the rates vary according to the type of school, and, in some instances, according to the position of the pupil in the school. The higher fee is about £195 per annum, exclusive of the cost of books and stationery, in the top form of one of the private secondary schools.

225. The free schools include four vested and eighteen non-vested schools, and the fee-paying schools, excluding the private schools, consist of eight vested schools that provide secondary education (five of these also provide primary education), three non-vested secondary schools and one vested primary school. There are also two vested schools which provide free education in their primary departments, and fee-paying education in the secondary departments. Seven schools administered by the Board of Education and three others pro-

vide secondary education up to School Certificate or "O" level G.C.E. examinations. At four of these schools, pupils are prepared for the Higher School Certificate, or "A" level G.C.E. examinations. Commercial courses are provided at nine schools and hotel training at one school.

226. The Technical Institute provides a four-year general secondary course followed by a two-year pre-apprenticeship course. Fees are payable at these schools, the present rates being £6 per term at the secondary practical and £9 a term at the Technical Institute.

Report of the Joint Select Committee on Education

227. The majority report of the Joint Select Committee on Education was adopted in the House of Assembly on 8 July 1966 by 19 votes to 7.

228. As noted above in paragraph 224, the principle of free education for children within the compulsory age limits was adopted in July 1965. It is reported that the effect of the adoption of the majority report will be that education will be free to all children in all government schools with the exception of the "B" streams in the three secondary academic schools. This limitation was opposed in the legislature by members of the Progressive Labour Party.

229. In June 1966, the Amalgamated Bermuda Union of Teachers issued a statement setting forth its views on education in Bermuda. The Union recalled that in 1961 and 1962 figures had been released indicating low achievement in IQ tests by children in "the non-vested schools, that is coloured schools", and that it had concluded that this unusually poor performance was a result of environmental factors and not innate ability. The Union had made representations and recommendations to the Board of Education and the Joint Select Committee to convince the members that a greater effort would have to be made by the Government to make up for these children's disadvantages. It was shocked that the Administration had "chosen to follow a policy enforced on poverty-stricken countries rather than the policy open to an affluent country such as ours". As a result of this policy, the educational gap between the middle class and the lower social groups would increase and political unrest "would not come as a surprise". The Union was preparing further recommendations, "in the hope that public concern will now make them more effective than in the past".

230. The enrolment figures for 1963 and 1964 are as follows:

	Total enrolment	Boys	Girls	Under 7 years	Over 13 years
1964	12,161	5,923	6,238	2,493	2,926
1963	11,671	5,649	6,022	2,284	2,493

231. In addition, the Friendship Vale School catered for seventy-five physically handicapped children and three special schools accommodated 175 children in special categories.

232. There is no university in Bermuda. There is an agreement with Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario, Canada, which sends lecturers to Bermuda every summer to give courses to teachers and prospective teachers who wish to qualify for a university degree.

233. In 1964, the total government expenditure on education was £1,054,126, compared with £1,081,789 the previous year.

6. BAHAMAS²⁰

General

234. The last census was taken on 15 November 1963. The estimated population of the Territory at the end of 1964 was 138,500, of which 83,837 were estimated to be in New Providence.

Political and constitutional developments

235. The Constitution which was introduced in January 1964 remained in effect during the period under review. Under the Constitution, the Governor exercises discretionary reserve powers with respect to external affairs, defence, internal security and the control of the police. In other matters the Governor acts on the advice of the Cabinet which is led by the Premier. The legislature consists of an appointed Senate which has limited powers of delaying legislation and an elected House of Assembly. The next elections for the House of Assembly are due before December 1967 and will be held on the basis of universal adult suffrage.

236. In April 1965, the seven members of the Progressive Liberal Party (PLP), led by Mr. Lynden O. Pindling, boycotted the meetings of the Assembly in protest against the report of the Constituencies Commission. Mr. Pindling addressed petitions on the subject to the Special Committee in April 1965 (A/AC.109/PET.377 and Add.1) and appeared before the Committee as a petitioner at its 376th and 377th meetings in August 1965 (see A/6000/Rev.1, chap. XXIII, paras. 86-111).

237. On 2 September 1965, three members of the PLP ended their boycott of the Assembly. In a letter of that date addressed to the Speaker, the leader of the group, Mr. P. L. Adderley, explained that the group did not believe that it was in the best interests of the Bahamian people to refuse to represent them in the capacity in which they were elected. He also restated the group's opposition to the Government as "the instrument of protection for the rich and privileged". On 4 October, these three members were suspended from the PLP and on 13 October they announced that they had formed a new party, the National Democratic Party (NDP).

238. The Secretary of State for the Colonies, Mr. Anthony Greenwood, visited the Territory in October 1965 and had discussions with members of the Government and with the three opposition parties, the PLP, the NDP, and the Labour Party, each of which made their demands public.

239. The six "principal demands" of the PLP were as follows: "(1) that the Constitution's and Boundaries Order be revoked, that the Speaker resign all his party political affiliation, that future Orders be made subject to scrutiny by the Courts; (2) that there be established the proper machinery for the detection and examination of conflict of interest among the cabinet members and the prevention of their doing government business with themselves; (3) that the Hawksbill Creek Grand Bahama (Deep Water Harbour and Industrial Area) Act be renegotiated with a view to ensuring that the Government is paramount in the Port Area, that it governs there as it does in other parts of the

²⁰ The information presented in this section has been derived from published reports and from the information transmitted to the Secretary-General by the United Kingdom under Article 73 e of the Charter on 31 August 1965, for the year ended 31 December 1964.

Bahamas, that it guarantees freedom of expression and assembly for Freeport's inhabitants in general and its trade unions in particular, and that a government labour exchange be established in the area; (4) that the Trade Union and Industrial Conciliation Act be repealed and re-enacted to provide for full freedom of assembly, automatic recognition of legally constituted trade unions, full freedom to negotiate, voluntary check-off and the union shop; (5) that a new constitutional conference be held which will guarantee majority rule, representation according to population, full implementation of all human rights provisions, and single-member constitutions; (6) that a Royal Commission be appointed to investigate the internal workings of the Government and the situation in general in the Bahamas, or that the United Nations Committee of Twenty-Four be given permission to send an investigating team to the Territory."

240. The NDP called for constitutional reforms "which will ensure the establishment of a truly democratic base upon which this country may develop". It advocated the inclusion in the Constitution of fundamental rights provisions which would apply retroactively to all laws adopted since the introduction of the new Constitution. In this way, amendments would become necessary for such acts as the Trade Union and Industrial Conciliation Act, and the Hawksbill Creek Grand Bahama (Deep Water Harbour and Industrial Area) Act. The party also proposed the attainment of full internal self-government as the immediate goal. But before further constitutional development took place, they called for an equitable distribution of seats based on the distribution of population in the whole of the Bahamas, for single-member constituencies, for a complete revision of the electoral laws to provide a "more efficient and less cumbersome system of registration and voting and to provide for absolute secrecy of the ballot", and for a system of voting by the use of symbols.

241. The Labour Party stressed four basic "needs" which should be met before the Bahamas could enjoy the "full fruits of internal self-government". These were: (a) the cessation of conflict of interest in parliamentary duties by paying Cabinet Ministers and House Members and by establishing "guidelines as to parliamentary conduct in respect to their investments, business activities and their membership in non-parliamentary and commercial and business enterprise"; (b) the introduction of symbols on all ballot papers; (c) economic and social development; and (d) the repeal of Trade Union and Industrial Conciliation Act and their replacement by more "modern" legislation. The Labour Party also believed that the next general election should be supervised by the United Nations.

242. On his return to the United Kingdom, the Secretary of State for the Colonies stated in the House of Commons on 3 November that during his visit he had had discussions with members of the Government, Opposition leaders and other representatives of public opinion. He said that the Constitution introduced in January 1964 was working well and that he was glad to see the expansion of tourism on which the economy of the Territory was heavily dependent.

243. On 29 October 1965, the NDP issued a statement of policy by which the party would be guided. In addition to the reforms called for in the discussions with the Colonial Secretary, the NDP's platform calls for "full internal self-government together with a

guarantee in the Constitution of consultation by the British Government in all matters of external affairs". It also advocated the extension of the franchise to all persons at the age of 18 instead of 21 years.

244. On 5 February 1966, the four members of the PLP in the House of Assembly had decided to end their nine-month boycott and return to the legislature when it reconvened on 10 February. In a statement, Mr. Pindling said that his party had been encouraged by the "magnificent response" of the United Nations to his presentation before the Special Committee in 1965 and would return to the legislature "even more determined to continue the struggle for democratic government". He said his party had a legislative programme designed to challenge the United Bahamian Party Government to bring about the changes he had called for before the United Nations.

245. In June 1966 Mr. L. O. Pindling (PLP) introduced a bill to amend the House of Assembly Elections Act. He said the amendments would serve the purpose of "plugging up the loop-holes in the Act", and would "show the country and all observers that it is our intention to hold clean and honest elections". The amendments would serve several purposes, including helping the illiterate voter, allowing an extension on voting hours where necessary, and preventing corruption by "unscrupulous would-be candidates". During the debate, Opposition speakers spoke of the need for a law to deal with persons who give or lend money to any voter to encourage that voter to vote or refrain from voting and to prevent voters' cards from being used as "negotiable instruments".

246. Mr. P. L. Adderley (NDP) agreed that the whole system of voter registration needed to be corrected. He also offered several suggestions including an extension to the time a non-Bahamian British subject should live in the Bahamas before he is allowed to vote. He made reference to the large number of British subjects, not Bahamian-born, who were entitled to vote after being in the Territory six months. He said that they should be required to live in the Bahamas for at least five years before they could register to vote.

247. The Premier, Sir Roland Symonette (UBP), denied that corruption existed during elections. He defended the existence of the voters' cards and said that the Government was perfectly happy with the Elections Act and that he saw nothing wrong with the present law. The Opposition bill was defeated.

248. The debate in the House of Assembly on the Governor's speech from the throne, which took place during March and April 1966, was the occasion for an attack by Opposition members on conditions at Freeport and on the Hawksbill Creek, Grand Bahama (Deep Water Harbour and Industrial Area) Act.

249. Mr. Adderley (NDP) said it was regretted that the Government had not made enough money out of the gambling project at Grand Bahama to make financial provision for expansion of the police force, which he said was necessitated by gambling on that island. He added that it was pathetic that people in the Out Islands were being asked to pay for police protection for Grand Bahama when operators there, making millions of pounds, did not pay similar taxes. Mr. Adderley wondered why gangsters were permitted to come into the colony to make money while local residents were heavily fined for conducting numbers rackets. He agreed that Freeport had brought financial benefit to some people, but it had been done in such a way that the

Government had "abdicated its responsibility and relinquished its sovereign rights over a part of the country to a private company". He warned that the Government would soon have no control at Freeport. For this reason, he advocated that the Government immediately enter into negotiations for a new agreement with the Port Authority Company which controlled Freeport. Mr. Adderley also deplored the Government's immigration policy, which had resulted, he said, in dissatisfaction generally and, further, in failure to establish adequate immigration controls at Freeport.

250. Mr. Pindling (PLP) asked that a Royal Commission investigate the condition of gambling at Freeport. He said that the arrangement with the operators at Grand Bahama by which they were to pay £100,000 to the Bahamas Government was made only on condition that their books "not be audited locally". Mr. Pindling stated that the Minister for Finance had negotiated for that amount rather than a percentage. He said also that three of the men connected with the gambling at Freeport were wanted in the United States but were being protected by the Bahamas Government. Mr. Pindling also called upon the Government to renegotiate the Hawksbill Agreement with the Port Authority Company. Attacking the Government's immigration policy, he said that as jobs opened up, there were two things against Bahamians—a lack of education and a lack of experience. He urged the Government to set aside what he called "a national Trust Fund" of half a million pounds "to educate our people".

251. On 28 April 1966, Mr. Adderley proposed a resolution in the House of Assembly which would introduce legislation establishing a Casino Control Commission to exercise control over organized gambling in the Bahamas. This motion was defeated after a lengthy debate. The Premier stated that the Government already had sufficient control over the gambling situation.

Economic conditions

252. The economy of the Territory continued to depend on the development of the tourist industry. The results of the Ministry of Tourism's energetic publicity in the United States and Canada are shown by an increase in the number of visitors to the Islands in 1964—namely 605,171, as against totals of 546,404, 444,870 and 368,211 for the three previous years.

253. The expenditure on new buildings and public works during the year under review amounted to £34,701,645, compared with £24,303,908 for the previous year. Tourist expenditure in 1964 in the approved estimates was £1,239,023, compared with £1,109,107 for 1963.

254. In addition to the small industries mentioned in last year's report (A/6000/Rev.1, chap. XXIII, para. 48), there is also a straw-working industry, which exported £9,055 worth of baskets, hats, mats, handbags, etc., during the year under review. Furthermore, it is estimated that goods valued at £300,000 were purchased by visiting tourists.

255. The main domestic exports from the Bahamas were valued at £2,616,070 in 1964, compared with £1,634,960 in 1963. Lumber continued to be the most valuable export. Principal buyers of the Territory's exports were the United Kingdom, Canada, the United States of America and the British West Indian islands. The value of imports during 1964 amounted to £35,939,239, chiefly supplied by the United Kingdom,

Canada, Australia, New Zealand, the United States and Aruba, compared with £28,264,936 in 1963.

256. Because there is no income tax, nominal excise duties and liberal company taxation laws, considerable foreign investment has been attracted to the Bahamas. Much of it has found its way into Freeport, on Grand Bahama Island which occupies 210 square miles and includes modern port and bunkering facilities, an international holiday resort and a residential community. This foreign capital and the considerable invisible receipts that accrue from the tourist industry give the Bahamas a favourable over-all balance of payments.

257. The total revenue of the Territory continued to rise in 1964 to £12.16 million, compared with £9.6 million in 1963 and £8.69 million in 1962. Expenditure amounted to £11.8 million in 1964. Customs duties (£6.875 million in 1964) and receipts from fees and public utilities continue to be the main sources of revenue.

258. The Bahamas Government announced that in an effort "to encourage thrift, and to build up national savings", it planned to put forward proposals later in 1966 for the issue of government savings bonds.

259. On 14 April 1966, the Atlantic Underwater Test and Evaluation Centre (AUTEC) at Andros was formally opened. The base, which is a joint Anglo-United States project, has been under construction for the past two years and has so far cost \$17 million. It is expected to become fully operational later this year. It has been described as a "multi-purpose underwater range complex" and as the "Cape Kennedy of the oceans". The AUTEC complex will consist of three ranges: a weapons range, an acoustics range and a sonar range. It will be the final testing ground for all new detection systems. While most of the work done at AUTEC will be directed to anti-submarine warfare, it has been pointed out that the devices tested will not carry warheads. This was one of the provisions of the agreement signed on 11 October 1963 between the United Kingdom and the Bahamas and the United States. The 420-acre base will be staffed with about 400 Navy and civilian personnel.

260. The Government's decision to incur a public debt to the extent of \$62 million to finance the expansion of the harbour and the extension of the telecommunications and water distribution systems has been criticized in the House of Assembly. In March, the Minister of Finance was asked to explain how he proposed to service the debt without prompting a resultant increase in the cost of living, retrenchment in the Public Service, or the enforcement of more stringent indirect taxation on the poor of the country. The Finance Minister defended his policies saying that he hoped to effect savings without reducing the efficiency of the Government and without drastic taxation.

261. The House of Assembly was called into special session on 12 May 1966 for the purpose of introducing a bill that provides for the raising of a loan of \$14 million by the Bahamas Government (Bahamas Development Loan Act). It was explained that the bill had to be passed before 31 May, or the Government would have to pay a fee of 1 per cent. The loan, which was negotiated privately by the Government in the United States, carries interest at 7 per cent and is repayable over a period of fifteen years. The money will be used for the development of Nassau harbour. The signing of an \$18.84 million contract for this

purpose with a New York corporation was announced on 14 march.

262. It was announced during May 1966 that a \$5 million chemical plant would be built at Freeport. The plant, which is expected to be completed in August 1967, will employ fewer than 100 persons at first but this number will be increased as operations are expanded.

263. It was also announced in May 1966 that the Bahamas' first airline, a \$50 million project, had been granted a licence. The airline plans to begin services between Nassau and Luxembourg on 1 December 1966. It was reported that the initial financing had been arranged by a consortium of international bankers.

264. In April 1966, the Premier announced that "agreement has been reached between the Government and Owens-Illinois regarding their proposal to grow sugar cane and produce refined sugar on the island of Abaco". The Premier stated that the Government was sure that the Agreement would be to the great advantage of the people of Abaco and the Bahama Islands as a whole, as the introduction of a new agricultural industry with all its attendant demands would encourage the general development of Abaco.

265. The Bahamas Minister of Finance was reported to have said on 6 May 1966 that, in his opinion, it would be extremely difficult for any company to make a success of producing sugar in the Bahamas. He believed that if the Abaco sugar operation was to have any chance of competing with the cheap-labour sugar-producing areas of the world, it had to be highly mechanized. Under those conditions, the Minister did not feel that more than 500 people would be employed in the entire sugar production and sugar refining phases of this undertaking. "Therefore, while it is a very favourable contribution to the economy of Abaco, we cannot, in my view, look for any large-scale employment from this new industry", he added.

266. On 9 June 1966, the Premier introduced a bill seeking authorization for the Government to sign the Sugar Agreement with the firm of Owens-Illinois of the Bahamas. Under the Agreement, Owens-Illinois would produce 50,000 tons of raw sugar annually, plus a smaller quantity of refined sugar by 1969. The Agreement provides for Owens-Illinois to establish a 20,000-acre sugar plantation on Great Abaco, on Crown land, which it presently holds under a long-term timber-cutting lease, but which will now be granted to the company in fee simple. An option to take up a maximum of 25,000 acres more on a yearly renewable lease for twenty-five years is included in the Agreement: this will allow Owens-Illinois to double its production in the future.

267. During the discussion of the bill in the House of Assembly, Mr. Hanna (PLP) declared he did not see that the bill afforded any protection for Bahamian workmen since, under the bill, Owens-Illinois had a right to import personnel without consultation with the Government. Another Opposition speaker took exception to any dealings with Owens-Illinois, charging that this firm had been responsible for the death of over 300 Bahamians and Turks Islanders through unfair labour practices in the Bahamas. He added that the wage scale forced on employees was not only less than the equivalent of a living wage, but less than a subsistence wage.

268. On 25 May 1966, the Bahamas adopted a decimal currency, changing from pounds to dollars. The dollar is valued at 7 shillings sterling or \$US 0.98.

Social conditions

269. Prices in general tend to be high as local production is extremely limited. All classes and races of workers are included in the "cost-of-living" figures on which local statistics are based. Based on the cost of living in 1949, the index figure on 30 September 1964 was 174, compared with 169 in the previous year.

270. On 16 June 1966, the House of Assembly agreed to the appointment of a select committee to consider a resolution calling for the Government to "take immediate steps to control the rise in prices, to curb profiteering and to preserve the purchasing power of the working man". The resolution, moved by Mr. Pindling (PLP), also called upon the House to deplore "the fact that the Government has taken no effective steps to control the rise in prices and to maintain the standard of real wages". Moving the resolution, Mr. Pindling quoted items on which there had been "a substantial increase". Mr. Adderley (NDP), who seconded Mr. Pindling's resolution, said that the rising cost of living presented a situation where people lived under constant pressure of trying to exist.

271. The Minister of Finance said that the Government could not introduce price control and that, in any case, a proper investigation had to be made. Therefore a select committee was the proper body to deal with the resolution.

272. On 1 July 1966, the Bahamas Trade Union Congress (BTUC) published a retail price index it had prepared. According to the index, rents in the Bahamas have risen 126.23 per cent within the past three years while clothing has risen 29.26 per cent. Other increases include a 54.22 per cent rise in miscellaneous items covering movie theatre admission, cigarettes and haircuts, a 36.16 per cent rise in food costs, and a 33.19 per cent increase in fuel charges (kerosene and electricity). The BTUC claims that, since 1963, the cost of living in the Bahamas has risen 71 per cent. The index has been sent to the Minister of Labour and cited as justification for a general wage increase.

273. In a letter which has also been sent to the Minister of Labour, the Bahamas Trade Union Congress stated: "It is not enough that we as Bahamian workers are told that the Islands are enjoying a greater measure of prosperity than other workers of the other Caribbean Islands. As intelligent citizens, we should also understand how and to what extent, we, the workers of these Islands, through mental effort and muscular energy have greatly contributed to the present development of these Islands, and also to the stability of our economy." For the words "prosperity or wealth" to be meaningful, the letter continued, the Government and employers should seek to have a "living wage" distributed among workers in such a way as to enable them to purchase at least the basic necessities, in order that a worker will be able to satisfy his many wants. First among these wants are the amounts of food, shelter and clothing needed to maintain life and to go a step further, his educational, social, cultural development and medical and health care. "The Bahamas Trade Union Congress", the letter continued, "in expressing the opinion of the workers, is presenting to the Government and employers of the Bahamas a Retail Price Index measuring the fluctuation in the general level of prices as at September 1963 and June 1966." In view of the facts indicated by its price index, the Bahamas Trade Union Congress urged the Government

and employers to grant a general wage increase as soon as possible.

274. On 15 July 1966, the Bahamas Minister of Labour and Housing was reported to have replied to the BTUC letter, pointed out a number of errors in the methods used in calculating the price index and concluding by saying: "I trust that you will now advise your members that your claim that there has been a rise in prices of 71 per cent since 1963 is based on wrong calculations and that no credence can be given to it."

Labour

275. In 1964 there were sixteen registered trade unions, a decrease of one from the previous year, and four employers' associations. There were two work stoppages covering a total period of thirteen days. The estimated labour force in 1963 was 60,000, of whom the majority were occupied in the tourist industry; 3,500 people were engaged in fishing. Migrant Bahamian labour in the United States, which in 1963 netted \$US1,799,836 in remittances, was halted by the United States in 1965.

Public health

276. Medical and health services are the responsibility of the Ministry of Health. There are three main government hospitals with a total of 800 beds. A new periatrics and spastics hospital of 125 beds, stressing rehabilitation, was to be opened in early 1965.

277. In 1964, the death-rate in the Territory was 7.23 per thousand, and the birth-rate 33.8. The infant mortality rate was 42.7 per thousand live births. The principal diseases are tuberculosis, respiratory complaints, general abdominal complaints, hypertension and malnutrition. Alcoholism is causing considerable disease and there is alarm at its increase.

278. Medical and health staff in 1964 included 84 registered physicians (36 private), 1 private licensed physician, 6 other medical officers (private) 295 nurses (99 private), 53 partially trained nurses (6 private), 269 midwives (95 private), 85 partially trained midwives (63 private), 4 government sanitary inspectors, 16 laboratory and X-ray technicians (2 private) and 89 pharmacists (80 private).

279. Capital and recurrent expenditure by the Government on health services amounted to £1,226,424 during 1964, compared with £1,126,358 in 1963.

Educational conditions

280. Education is administered under the Education Act, 1962, and is the responsibility of the Ministry for Education. It is compulsory between the ages of 5 and 14.

281. The number of schools in the Territory at July 1964 was as follows:

	Primary	Secondary and post-primary	Post-secondary
Government	151 ^a	5	2
Aided	—	—	4
Unaided	42	8	6
	193	13 ^b	12

^a Includes 115 all-age schools.

^b Four of these have their own primary departments.

282. Primary school enrolment in 1964 numbered 27,099 compared with 27,435 in the previous year.

Some 7,034 pupils were enrolled in secondary schools, compared with 5,192 pupils in 1963 in secondary or post-primary schools.

283. No local provision is made for higher education. For Bahamians who wish to pursue their education at this level, a special relationship has been established with the University of the West Indies. Others seek admission to appropriate institutions overseas. The Bahamas Government makes provision for scholarships and bursaries at universities and colleges abroad. Precise figures of those studying abroad are not available, but some 234 students were studying abroad in 1964, in the United Kingdom (124), Canada (10) and the United States (100).

284. Government expenditure on education in 1964 amounted to £1,501,084, compared with £1,044,400 in 1963.

7. TURKS AND CAICOS ISLANDS²¹

Political and constitutional developments

285. It was noted in the report of the Special Committee to the General Assembly at its twentieth session (A/6000/Rev.1, chap. XXIII) that the Bahamas Government had stated that it could not for the time being agree to a merger as had been suggested by the Government of the Turks and Caicos Islands. It had been agreed, however, that the possibility of a looser form of association would be studied by the Governments concerned.

286. An Order-in-Council which came into effect on 5 November 1965 contained an amendment to the Constitution, by virtue of which the Governor of the Bahama Islands also became the Governor of the Turks and Caicos Islands. A further amendment provided that appeals from the courts of the Turks and Caicos Islands would lie to the Court of Appeal for the Bahama Islands instead of to the Court of Appeal for Jamaica.

287. The appointment of the Governor of the Bahamas as Governor of the Turks and Caicos Islands has been described in the Bahamas Press as purely administrative and is reported to have been welcomed in the Territory.

288. Apart from these changes, the constitutional arrangements outlined in the Special Committee's report to the General Assembly at its nineteenth session (A/5800/Rev.1, chap. XXIV, paras. 59-63) remain in force.

Economic conditions

289. In 1964, imports were valued at £300,768 and exports at £47,173, compared with £300,000 and £73,000 in the previous year. The principal items of import are food, drink, tobacco and manufactured articles. The principal exports are salt, valued at £12,603 in 1964 (£37,000 in 1963); crawfish, £75,778 (£28,000 in 1963); sisal £3,530; conches and conch shells. The total grant-in-aid in 1964 was £159,116, compared with £139,483 in 1963.

Social conditions

290. The prices of basic food-stuff remained reasonably high but all others, particularly imported tinned

²¹ The information on the Turks and Caicos Islands and the Cayman Islands (section 8 below) has been derived from published reports and from the information transmitted to the Secretary-General by the United Kingdom under Article 73 e of the Charter on 2 September 1965 and 11 October 1965, for the year ended 31 December 1964.

goods, are disproportionately expensive. In addition, because of the acute shortage of housing on Grand Turk and the increased demand brought about by establishment of the United States bases in the Islands, rents have remained high and are tending to rise.

Labour

291. The Turks Islands Salt Company, Ltd., was the biggest employer of labour in the islands until December 1964, when salt operations were closed down at South Caicos and Grand Turk. The redundant labourers have either found alternative employment or have been absorbed into government works programmes. The salt operation was kept going at Salt Bay where approximately forty-five men are regularly employed. Other sources of employment are provided by the two United States bases on Grand Turk and by the crawfish and conch fishing industry. Approximately eighty men were employed by a United States shipping company—National Bulk Carriers, Inc.—aboard its vessels at the end of 1964. Large numbers of islanders have continued to find employment in the Bahamas and their remittances are a regular source of income for their families.

292. There is only one registered trade union in the Turks and Caicos Islands, the St. George's Union in Cockburn Harbour.

Public health

293. There are two government medical officers, one stationed in Grand Turk, the other in South Caicos.

294. The average death-rate in the islands is approximately 5.1 per thousand, the highest percentage being found among infants under one year of age. Government recurrent expenditure on medical and public health (including the cost of staff) amounted to £22,321 in 1964 (11.3 per cent of total government expenditure) compared with £27,409 in 1963 (9.5 per cent of total government expenditure).

Educational conditions

295. Education is both free and compulsory for all children between the ages of 7 and 14 years. In 1964, there were thirteen elementary schools, one of which had a secondary section. Recurrent expenditure on education was £22,027 in 1964 (11.2 per cent of total government expenditure) compared with £21,604 in 1963 (7.5 per cent of total government expenditure). In addition, Colonial Development and Welfare funds provide for the training of teachers in Jamaica.

8. CAYMAN ISLANDS

Political and constitutional developments

296. The constitutional arrangements described in the Special Committee's report to the General Assembly at its nineteenth session (A/5800/Rev.1, chap. XXIV, paras. 80-84) remain in force.

297. A general election was held on 16 November 1965. The results of the election are set out below:

Party	Sets in last Assembly	Sets in new Assembly	Net loss or gain
Christian Democrats	5	4	1 loss
National Democrats	6	1	5 losses
Independents	1	7	6 gains

298. Press reports state that the question as to whether the Territory was ready for internal self-government was raised during the election campaign. No information is available on the positions taken by the political parties during the election campaign.

Economic conditions

299. The economy of the Territory continues to depend mainly on wages earned by Cayman Islands seamen. Tourism is expanding. An estimated 3,319 tourists visited the islands in 1964, compared with 2,553 in the previous year. Other industries include the manufacture of thatch rope and turtle and shark fishing.

300. The value of imports amounted to £958,120 in 1964, compared with £838,886 in 1963 and the value of exports amounted to £39,900 in 1964, compared with £34,490 in 1963. Approximately two thirds of the trade of the islands is with the United States of America, and most imports are from this source. Sugar, coffee, cement, liquor, kerosene and condensed milk are imported almost exclusively from Jamaica.

301. In 1964, revenue was £299,856 and expenditure £296,606, compared with £258,375 and £242,503 in 1963.

Social conditions

302. In 1963, the index of retail prices in George Town, Grand Cayman, was 116, taking the figure for 1959 as 100. A limited range of various standard commodities was used for the comparison.

Labour

303. One trade union is registered in the Cayman Islands. Membership is not restricted to Cayman Islands seamen, but almost all Caymanians serving on United States-owned ships are members. Total membership is some 6,099, of whom about one third are Cayman Islanders.

304. The average death-rate in the islands is 7.6 per thousand. The principal cause of death are hypertension, respiratory diseases, senility and diseases of early infancy. The highest death-rate (25.9 per thousand live births) is found in infants one year of age and under. Expenditure on public health amounted to £38,637 in 1964, representing 13.0 per cent of total government expenditure, compared with £34,473 in 1963 (nine-month period April to December), representing 14.4 per cent of total government expenditure.

Educational conditions

305. Primary education is free and compulsory for all children between the ages of 7 and 14 years. During the year under review there were eleven government primary schools, one secondary modern and one secondary grammar in operation, as well as a number of church-sponsored schools. In 1964, the Government took over the Cayman High School, which had previously been operated by the Scottish Presbyterian Church with a government subsidy. Recurrent expenditure on education was £42,354 in 1964 (14.3 per cent of recurrent government expenditure), compared with £33,833 in 1963 (14.7 per cent of recurrent government expenditure).

9. FALKLAND ISLANDS (MALVINAS)²²

General Assembly resolution 2065 (XX)

306. In letters dated 9 February 1966 (A/6261 and A/6262), the Permanent Representatives of Ar-

²² Information on the Territory transmitted to the Secretary-General on 2 July 1965 by the United Kingdom for the year ending 31 December 1964 was taken into account in the preparation of the information section of the chapter on the Falkland Islands (Malvinas) in the Special Committee's report to the General Assembly at its twentieth session (A/6000/Rev.1, chap. XXII).

gentina and of the United Kingdom transmitted to the Secretary-General the pertinent part of a joint *communiqué* issued in Buenos Aires on 14 January 1966 by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the United Kingdom, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Worship of Argentina. In the *communiqué*, it was stated that both Ministers had agreed that the discussions recommended by General Assembly resolution 2065 (XX) should be pursued without delay through diplomatic channels, or such other means as might be decided, for the purpose of finding a peaceful solution to the problem.

307. In letters dated 22 August 1966 (A/6261/Add.1 and A/6262/Add.1), the Permanent Representatives of Argentina and the United Kingdom transmitted to the Secretary-General the text of a further joint *communiqué*, issued on 20 July 1966. In the *communiqué*, it was stated that meetings on the problem had been held on 19 and 20 July 1966. The talks had been conducted in a cordial atmosphere and it was agreed that they should be continued.

10. BRITISH HONDURAS²³

Status

308. The Government of Guatemala has continued to maintain that sovereignty over British Honduras (Belize) belongs exclusively to Guatemala and that the Territory is an integral part of Guatemala. This was reiterated by the representative of Guatemala at the nineteenth session of the General Assembly.²⁴ The representative of the United Kingdom, at the same meeting, stated formally that his Government had no doubts as to its sovereignty over the Territory and fully reserved its position on the subject.

309. On 18 November 1965, it was announced that a New York lawyer, Mr. Bethuel Matthew Webster, had been appointed Ambassador by the President of the United States to mediate the long-standing dispute. On 24 February 1966 the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs informed the British House of Commons that Mr. Webster had called one plenary meeting of the three Governments concerned and had visited both Guatemala and British Honduras. He was continuing with further consultations.

Political and constitutional developments

310. There is no information available other than that submitted by the Special Committee in its reports to the General Assembly at its nineteenth and twentieth sessions (A/5800/Rev.1, chap. XXVI; and A/6000/Rev.1, chap. XXV).

Economic conditions

311. The citrus industry continued to expand during 1964. Nearly 2 million boxes of oranges and grapefruit were produced in 1964, compared with 1 million boxes in 1963. The value of timber products accounted for \$BH3.1 million, or about \$BH500,000 more than in previous years.²⁵ A new sugar factory was to come

into operation early in 1966, and this expansion was expected to increase the total output of sugar to about 150,000 tons. Sugar production of 33,591 tons during 1964 exceeded the record output of 27,840 tons during 1963 by some 5,750 tons.

312. The total trade figures for 1962-1964 are as follows:

Year	Imports	Domestic exports (British Honduras dollars)	Re-exports
1962	31,202,647	8,251,986	2,912,765
1963	26,500,000	15,400,000	3,000,000
1964	27,553,446	15,430,016	3,140,978

313. The locally derived revenue and expenditure of the Territory for the period 1962-1964 have been as follows:

	Revenue (British Honduras dollars)	Expenditure
1962 (actual)	9,217,702	11,958,069
1963 (actual)	9,344,248	17,219,056
1964 (estimated)	8,348,075	15,262,888

314. The grant-in-aid given by the United Kingdom Government in 1964 amounted to about \$BH700,000. In addition, the United Kingdom Government provided some \$BH995,000 for Commonwealth Development and Welfare schemes.

315. Of the 1964 estimated expenditures, \$BH-8,855,039 were classified as recurrent and \$BH-6,407,494 as on capital account.

316. The Finance Minister of British Honduras presented in December 1965 a budget to the House of Representatives which was designed to stimulate economic development, lower the cost of living and allow the Government to assume fuller responsibilities befitting a country which would shortly be independent. He introduced new taxes which would hit luxury goods such as cigarettes, alcohol, perfume, refrigerators, cars and radios, and declared that no self-respecting country relished a situation in which it was dependent on external aid to meet current expenses.

317. The Belize Chevron Oil Company, a subsidiary of the Standard Oil Company of the United States, was granted a licence for oil exploration covering practically the whole of the northern part of the Territory.

318. In the House of Representatives a bill was approved to raise a loan of \$BH 1,200,000 at home and abroad. This loan is to be used to improve the electricity supply in distant towns, to build a bridge at Tower Hill and to continue the assistance in loans and grants in the construction of secondary schools. These projects are part of the seven-year development plan.

319. The United States Department of State, in a press release dated 14 January 1966, announced that Great Britain, Canada and the United States would jointly sponsor an economic survey of British Honduras. The survey will analyse the economy and its growth potential and suggest guidelines for development over the next five years. The members of the team will be drawn from the three participating countries. The survey was scheduled to begin in the spring of 1966.

Social conditions

Labour

320. At the end of 1964 there were ten labour unions with a membership of 3,657, compared with nine unions and a membership of 3,507 at the end of

²³ The information presented in this section has been derived from published reports and from the information transmitted to the Secretary-General by the United Kingdom under Article 73 e of the Charter on 16 July 1965.

²⁴ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Nineteenth Session, Plenary Meetings*, 1301st meeting.

²⁵ The unit of currency is the British Honduras dollar, which is equivalent to five shillings sterling or \$US.70.

1963. Twelve collective agreements were signed in 1964 affecting the working conditions of 2,874 workers. The new Government Workers Rules, governing the conditions of employment of government manual workers, were put into operation in May and took effect from 1 January 1964.

Public health

321. The Government Medical Services in 1964 consisted of 19 registered physicians, 15 senior nurses, 61 certified nurses, 15 partially trained nurses, 5 senior midwives, 15 partially trained midwives, 14 public health inspectors, 3 laboratory and X-ray technicians, 12 pharmacists, 2 radiographers, 1 hospital administrator and 1 dental surgeon. There were six general hospitals with 257 beds, 3 cottage hospitals with 59 beds and 17 dispensaries.

322. In 1964 expenditure for the health and medical departments amounted to \$BH15,262,888.

Educational conditions

323. In 1964, there were 26,322 pupils attending primary schools, compared with 26,449 in 1963; 2,113 attending secondary schools (2,186 in 1963); and 118 attending a vocational school (85 in 1963).

324. In April 1964, at the invitation of the Government, two members of the Institute of Education of the West Indies carried out an assessment of the work of the two teacher-training colleges. As a result of this co-operation, the two training colleges have been brought into close contact, not only with the Institute, but also with training colleges throughout the Caribbean area.

C. Consideration by the Special Committee

INTRODUCTION

325. The Special Committee considered these Territories at its 463rd, 466th, 467th, and 476th to 478th meetings on 7, 14 and 15 September and 14 to 16 November 1966. At the 476th meeting the Rapporteur of Sub-Committee III introduced the report of that Sub-Committee dealing with these Territories. The Sub-Committee's report appears as an annex to this chapter.

WRITTEN PETITIONS AND HEARINGS

326. The Special Committee circulated the following written petitions:

<i>Petitioner</i>	<i>Document No.</i>
<i>Bahamas</i>	
Mr. Randol F. Fawkes, Member of the House of Assembly of the Bahamas and President of the Bahamas Federation of Labour	A/AC.109/PET.544
Mr. L. O. Pindling, Leader of the Opposition and of the Progressive Liberal Party (PLP) in the Bahamas	A/AC.109/PET.545
<i>Bermuda</i>	
Mr. W. G. Brown, General Secretary of the Bermuda Constitutional Conference	A/AC.109/PET.431 and Add.1
Mr. Walter N. H. Robinson on behalf of the Progressive Labour Party of Bermuda	A/AC.109/PET.569
<i>British Honduras</i>	
British Honduras Freedom Committee of New York	A/AC.109/PET.528
Colonel José Dolores Argueta Ruiz	A/AC.109/PET.553

Petitioner

Document No.

Falkland Islands (Malvinas)

Mr. Enrique V. Corominas, President, Comisión Latino-americana por la Restitución de las Islas Malvinas y Colonias Extranjeras (CLARIMCE)	A/AC.109/PET.455
Messrs. Eustaquio Tolosa, General Secretary, and Luis Cortinez, Press Secretary, Argentine Confederation of Transport Workers	A/AC.109/PET.530
Mr. Esteban Bellucci	A/AC.109/PET.554
Mr. Roberto Leonardi	A/AC.109/PET.555
Mr. Alfredo J. Graffigna, Managing Director, LVI-Radio Colon	A/AC.109/PET.556
Mr. Enrique Perez Sarmiento, Director-General, and members of staff, LV5-Radio Sarmiento	A/AC.109/PET.557
Dr. Ismael Moya and Mr. Luis Cortinez on behalf of the National Command for the Reconquest of the Malvinas and Adjacent Islands	A/AC.109/PET.558

Grenada

Mr. E. M. Gairy, Leader of the Opposition in Grenada	A/AC.109/PET.446 and Add.1
Mr. M. A. Caesar	A/AC.109/PET.547 and Add.1

327. The Special Committee heard the following petitioners at the meetings indicated below:

Petitioner

Meeting

Grenada

Mr. E. M. Gairy, Leader of the Opposition (A/AC.109/PET.446)	463rd
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Bahamas

Mr. L. O. Pindling, Leader of the Opposition and of the Progressive Liberal Party (PLP) (A/AC.109/PET.545)	466th and 467th
Mr. Randol F. Fawkes, Member of the House of Assembly and President of the Bahamas Federation of Labour (A/AC.109/PET.544)	467th

Hearing concerning Grenada

328. Mr. Gairy, Leader of the Opposition in Grenada, said that Grenada had a population of about 90,000, mostly of African descent. Its area was about 133 square miles, and it was one of the four islands forming the Windward Islands group in the eastern Caribbean.

329. About the middle of 1950, he had simultaneously founded two separate organizations, a trade union known as the Grenada Manual and Mental Workers' Union and a political party known as the Grenada United Labour Party. The agricultural workers, numbering about 14,000, had been the largest category in the membership of the union, which had totalled about 27,000 by the beginning of 1951. In January of that year, the union had called upon the agricultural employers for recognition as the bargaining instrument for the farm workers, whose rates of pay had been 54 cents per day for men and 44 cents per day for women and who had been required to work for eleven or twelve hours a day under the most deplorable conditions. The employers had threatened to

have legislation enacted to suppress the activities of union officials. That had culminated in a general strike on 19 February 1951. The Government of Grenada and the employers had requested help from the United Kingdom, which had sent two warships and landed troops in the Territory. Large police groups had come from Jamaica, Trinidad, St. Lucia and Barbados, and a large number of fusiliers had come from British Honduras. The workers had converged upon the city. On 20 February 1951, some union officials had been arrested and detained without charge. He himself had been arrested and taken to Carriscou, where he had been kept for two weeks and where attempts had been made to have him sign documents acknowledging responsibility for the riots and acts of violence which had taken place after his arrest. Despite threats, he had refused to sign. He had been sent back to Grenada, where he had been allowed to begin discussions with the agricultural employers. The employers had been found by a three-man arbitration tribunal to be in the wrong, and wages had been increased to one dollar for men and 72 cents for women. Working conditions had also been improved.

330. In 1951, the United Kingdom Government had granted full adult franchise to Grenada and the other Windward and Leeward Islands; elections had been held in Grenada, in which his party, the Grenada United Labour Party, had won six out of eight seats. For two years and three months he had been under constant surveillance by the police wherever he went. Despite that provocative behaviour, which had been initiated by the United Kingdom Colonial Office, his party had won seven out of eight seats in the 1954 elections.

331. In 1955, he had taken a course in the United Kingdom in parliamentary procedure and had been made a Fellow of the Royal Society of Arts; during that time, he had continued his activities to defend freedom, remove injustice and raise the social and economic level of the people of Grenada.

332. At the same time, the Colonial Office had continued its attempts to suppress his activities and in the 1957 general elections, although he had been one of the successful candidates of his party, he had been charged with following a steel band which had passed along a street where an opposing candidate had been holding a political meeting. He had been fined \$80, and had had to give up his seat in the Legislative Council and had lost his franchise. For five years he had been unable to vote or to stand for election.

333. In February 1961, his party had won eight out of ten seats, but he himself had still been deprived of his political rights. However, his party, knowing his political experience and remembering his participation in the conference on West Indian federation, had appointed him special adviser to a conference on an Eastern Caribbean Federation in London, where he had been able to argue regarding his political rights, which had then been restored in June 1961. Soon after, in September 1961, he had become Chief Minister.

334. In February 1962, the Colonial Office had called for an audit of expenditures for the four months in 1961 when he had headed the Government, although the audit report for 1960 had not yet been presented to the Legislative Council. In fact, the 1960 report had never been submitted to the Legislative Council, as

prescribed by law, and thus far the United Kingdom Colonial Office had done nothing about it.

335. An inquiry into the expenditures of his Government, lasting about seven weeks, had been conducted by jurists and by an ex-judge who, it was alleged, had been promised a job if he was able to recommend the overthrow of the Government. The inquiry had not revealed any fraud. However, the commission of inquiry had questioned his Government's "policy" and had accused it of "squandermania". The Commission of inquiry had also felt that he had not sought the consent of the Federal Government to spend money which belonged to Grenada on the construction of roads. He had also been accused of furnishing his residence in too sumptuous a manner. As a result of that report, the Colonial Office had dissolved his Government in June 1962. The judge who had been chairman of the commission of inquiry had been appointed Chief Justice of the Windward and Leeward Islands.

336. A few weeks before the dissolution of his Government, the British colonies in the eastern Caribbean had formed an Eastern Caribbean Federation, with its capital in Barbados.

337. Three months later, on 13 September 1962, new general elections had been held in Grenada, during which 17,000 names had been removed from the 1961 electoral list of 41,000 voters and 10,000 fictitious names had been added. Nothing had been done about the matter. It was clear from that account that the Colonial Office had spared no efforts to suppress his activities and those of his party, even at the expense of the people of Grenada.

338. At the time of the last general elections in 1962, the party in power had made a pledge to unite Grenada with Trinidad and Tobago within one year. During the first few months following the election of that party, it had done all in its power to impress upon the people the sincerity of that pledge. Five committees had been set up by the Government of Trinidad and Tobago, and they had made several visits to Grenada to convince the people that they were carrying out their pledge. A pamphlet entitled *Keeping Faith*, a record of progress towards the union of Grenada with Trinidad and Tobago, had been published by the Office of the Chief Minister in Grenada. He read out passages from the pamphlet, which he would make available to members of the Committee. In order further to impress upon the people that the task of uniting Grenada with Trinidad and Tobago was the Government's first obligation to the country, the Chief Minister had refused all invitations to his Government to participate in any conference with the other eastern Caribbean islands. The Government had stood fast on the mandate it had received from the voters to establish unitary statehood with Trinidad and Tobago; and any other form of association had been out of the question.

339. As a result of the Government's failure to implement its pledge, the people of Grenada had demonstrated in numbers ranging from 20,000 to 25,000, calling for general elections. Petitions, resolutions and memoranda had been signed by thousands of citizens of Grenada calling upon the United Kingdom Government for general elections because the party in power had failed to implement its mandate. Those requests had always been rejected.

340. When in December 1965 a dispatch had been sent to Grenada and the other Windward and Leeward Islands recommending a new constitution, 21,000 people in Grenada had attached their signatures to a document protesting against the right of the present Government to negotiate a new constitution over the heads of the people. The people of Grenada felt that the present Government had a mandate to take Grenada into unitary statehood with Trinidad and Tobago. It did not have the right to discuss on behalf of the people a constitution of the kind offered to Grenada.

341. The idea of unitary statehood meant that Grenada would give up whatever measure of autonomy it enjoyed and would be absorbed into the Government of Trinidad and Tobago. That was different from an association of States or a federation. Furthermore, the new constitution, as proposed, not only allowed Grenada to retain its measure of autonomy but also for the first time gave it full control of all its internal affairs. Again the United Kingdom shut its eyes to the wishes of the 21,000 people of Grenada, who called for general elections. The Grenada Trade Union Council comprised five very powerful trade unions. They had all adopted a resolution, a copy of which they had sent to the Administrator, to the effect that general elections should be held before the implementation of the new constitution. The Youth Movement, which comprised the young people of the country, and the Grenada Manual and Mental Workers' Union had followed suit, but nothing had been done.

342. On 18 April 1966, a conference had been convened in London to discuss the new constitution for Grenada and the Eastern Caribbean. Representatives of the Government and the opposition party had participated. As could be seen from the report of the Windward Islands Constitutional Conference, far-reaching changes had been made in the constitution of Grenada.

343. The people of Grenada were deeply disturbed. To permit the implementation of a new constitution with such basic changes merely by the stroke of a pen was not only an insult to democracy and to the people of Grenada but also a violation by the administering Power of Articles 73 and 74 of the United Nations Charter.

344. He urged the Special Committee to recommend the holding of general elections in Grenada under the supervision of the United Nations. He appealed to the Committee to put an end to the explosive situation which could only degenerate into a catastrophe unless immediate steps were taken. The United Nations had made a reputation for itself because of the assistance it gave to colonial peoples and because of its desire to maintain world peace. It was therefore incumbent upon it to save the Eastern Caribbean from the dangerous situation in which it found itself.

345. He was convinced that his humble attempt to present an objective picture of the situation was sufficient to warrant the Committee's attention and some modicum of action, because the opposition had signed a report of the London Constitutional Conference with reservations and because, as a result of the attempt by the authorities to deny the peace-loving citizens of Grenada their rights under the United Nations Charter, his people's suspicion of democracy would assume astronomical proportions. Democracy must not be mutilated to suit the selfish convenience of one party or another. There could be no compromising of democratic principles without defeating those principles themselves.

346. Finally, he stressed that any attempt to implement the new Constitution without general elections, at a time when so much was being said about freedom and democracy, would be an iniquitous miscarriage of justice.

347. In reply to a question concerning the reasons for the lack of progress made with respect to the Eastern Caribbean Federation, the petitioner said that there were several reasons and that it would take a long time to present them all. When the representatives of the eight Territories—Barbados, the three Leeward Islands and the four Windward Islands—had met in London in 1962, one of the contentious points had been the amount of assistance that the United Kingdom Government was going to provide. That Government had, in fact, refused to quote a figure and some of the leaders had felt rather disappointed. Furthermore, after the 1962 elections in Grenada, the United Kingdom Government had authorized the party in power to start negotiations with Trinidad and Tobago on a unitary State and that had excluded Grenada from the proposed federation. Of the ten Territories that were to constitute the original federation there remained only seven, since Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago and Grenada had pulled out in succession. Then Barbados had thought that it could have its independence. St. Lucia had felt that the original agreement was not being adhered to and Antigua had wanted a better constitution with independence. One of the main reasons was that the United Kingdom Government had not stated in 1962 what assistance it would provide, and the representatives of the Territories had not wanted to commit themselves to a poor federation. The negotiations between the Governments of Grenada and of Trinidad and Tobago concerning a unitary State had set off the process of disintegration of the federal idea.

348. Asked whether any constitutional progress had been made towards the formation of a federation after Grenada had pulled out, he replied that, at the Constitutional Conference in London in 1962, a draft constitution for the eight Territories had been discussed. A White Paper had later been drafted by the Government of Barbados. The representatives of the Territories had been quite willing to accept some compromise and to make concessions in order to achieve a federation.

349. In reply to a question concerning the reasons or obstacles which had prevented the Chief Minister from carrying out his electoral pledge concerning the projected plan for associating Grenada with Trinidad and Tobago, he recalled that the United Kingdom Government had rightly refused to give the grant of \$61 million requested by the Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago in order to take in Grenada. The people of Grenada had then said that they could make good use of the money and that it should not be given to Trinidad and Tobago. The people of Trinidad and Tobago were not in favour of adopting Grenada. Unitary statehood was not merely the signing of documents but the association of peoples. After the first year the association appeared to be impracticable and undesirable. At the London Conference in April 1966, the Chief Minister of Grenada had found himself in a tight situation and had failed to make any mention of unitary statehood between Grenada and Trinidad and Tobago. The people of Grenada felt very strongly that the Government of Grenada and the Government of the United Kingdom were obligated by convention to go to the country before a new constitution was introduced.

350. Replying to a question concerning the reservations he had formulated for the new constitutional proposals agreed to in London, the petitioner said that his party had reservations, as regards all the paragraphs and articles dealing with the transitional process, before the new Constitution went into effect. It also had reservations with regard to the size of the two houses which would comprise the legislature. A parliament comprising ten elected members and a senate comprising nine appointed members had been proposed. The United Labour Party felt that the people should be consulted first. A body should then be set up that would determine the powers of the two houses, the number of seats in the elected house and the number of constituencies. The number of members in the elected house should have some bearing on the number in the senate.

351. In reply to questions concerning political parties and their policies, he replied that there were now two political organizations in Grenada—the Grenada National Party (GNP), which was in power, and his own party, the United Labour Party (ULP). The latter tried to pursue a socialist democratic ideology, while bearing in mind that those ideas must be adapted to certain structures in the smaller Territories. It was against the old colonial dogma and principles, and also against subversive principles. It was difficult to say what policy the party in power followed. It worked for the big businessmen, the big planters and the commercial community. It had no set policy. His own party stood for a federation, which it saw as the only way of solving the economic problems of the Caribbean Territories. He himself had been advocating that a small federation, of the eight Territories he had mentioned earlier, should be started as a nucleus, which would almost inevitably be joined later by Trinidad and Tobago and Jamaica. He visualized an even larger scheme of things which included other areas such as the Netherlands Antilles—Aruba, Curaçao, St. Martin, Bonaire, etc.—the French Islands such as Martinique and Guadeloupe, and even Puerto Rico. If the West Indies were to be saved, such a federation must be set up as a starting point. The idea of a unitary State, however, with one country giving up its autonomy entirely to be merged into another country, seemed to him unworkable. It would not be fair for the people of one country to adopt a smaller nation. Trinidad and Tobago was not a wealthy country and had its own political and economic problems. The constitution about to be promulgated provided for association with the United Kingdom, but did not preclude the Territories forming some sort of federation or association. He personally preferred a federation with a strong centre, and so did his party. One of the reasons why the Federation of the West Indies had failed was that it had not been defended by its best champions. Also, the constitution of the Federation had been too weak. For that reason, his party and he himself still advocated a strong federal centre.

352. Explaining the reasons for his removal as Chief Minister in 1962, the petitioner said that when his party had come into power, the planters, the commercial community and a certain fraternal organization which had previously controlled the country's affairs had joined forces in an attempt to impress on the Administrator that the Government could not last long. His Government had had to increase some taxes and institute new ones, to the displeasure of the abo-

mentioned groups, which had complained to the Administrator and the United Kingdom Government. Moreover, a number of big business firms which had been in arrears on their income tax (in such amounts as \$12,000, \$17,000 and \$33,000) had been buying up houses for a song from poor people who had been forced to sell because of inability to pay their own taxes. He had obtained a list of the largest debtors to the State and had instructed the Attorney-General to collect the sums owed. The Attorney-General, himself a member of the fraternity mentioned earlier, had informed his friends, and some businessmen had made overtures to the petitioner to have their names taken off the list. Since the Attorney-General had failed to take action, the Government had employed an outside lawyer, and within a period of six weeks had collected about \$200,000 in arrears.

353. Under pressure from the above-mentioned groups, the Administrator had set up an inquiry into the actions of the Government. The commission of inquiry whose summons to attend the petitioner had not heeded, had recommended to the Colonial Office the dissolution of the Grenada Government. One of the grounds given had been the purchase of a piano for \$3,500. The commission's report, which had referred only to the period when he had been in power, had revealed that a sum of \$34,000 had been spent without the proper authority as he had mentioned earlier. It was for such reasons that it had been dissolved, but the Government in power in 1960 had been unable to account for a sum of \$803,945, and nothing had been done about it. His own Government had been dissolved because it had not been working in the interests of the business community, the big planters and the aristocrats, who brought pressure to bear through the Grenada Agricultural Society and the chambers of commerce.

354. Asked whether the people had been consulted in any way concerning the new Constitution, the petitioner replied that the Constitution now in force granted only limited powers to the elected representatives. Grenada now had a Chief Minister but the new Constitution provided for a Premier with added powers. It was in fact the Administrator, the representative of the Queen, who, thanks to his many reserved powers, possessed the authority. Under the new Constitution, the Administrator would become a "Governor" who would be merely a figurehead and the elected head of the people would be the practical head of the country. The people had been consulted and welcomed the new Constitution as a step towards freedom, but they had asked to be given an opportunity to determine which party should govern them. However, the United Kingdom Government had ignored that request.

355. Regarding the future possibilities for a federation, the petitioner said that, after talking to the various Chief Ministers and opposition leaders to the islands, he had gained the impression that the idea of federation was not dead. Some of the leaders, however, had felt that the new Constitution should give the local authorities greater autonomy so that they could discuss among themselves the type of federation they wanted. Undoubtedly, the federation would have greater chances of durable success if the people themselves were allowed to work out their own formula. Moreover, he had reason to believe that other foreign Governments would be more sympathetic to them if the islands could be united into a single State.

356. The representative of the *United Kingdom*, commenting on the petitioner's statement, said that there was little disagreement between the petitioner and his delegation, especially on the present situation and the future of Grenada. He would not comment on some of the matters raised by Mr. Gairy which were wholly domestic and within the jurisdiction of the Government of Grenada, which was elected by universal adult suffrage, and was answerable to the electorate. He wished to recall that the action taken in 1962 had followed a full and impartial inquiry, conducted by a West Indian judge, which had found that there had been extensive financial irregularities and improprieties.

357. Since his delegation would be dealing at length with constitutional matters in Sub-Committee III, he would confine himself to three points. Firstly, the general elections had been held in 1962 and, according to the Constitution, the term of the Legislature was to run until October or November 1967. Although the petitioner, as the leader of the opposition, favoured earlier elections, this was constitutionally a matter for the Chief Minister; there was no special circumstances to justify intervention in the annual processes. Secondly, the petitioner and the Chief Minister, i.e., the leaders of both parties in the Legislature, had both signed the Constitutional Conference Report and were in full agreement on the principles of the new constitutional proposals. There was therefore no basic difference between the political parties that would justify an appeal to the electorate in this connexion. Thirdly, the petitioner had recently voted in favour of a resolution approving the constitutional proposals. The reservations he had expressed mainly concerned the date of the elections.

358. In his delegation's view the main reason for the failure so far to reach agreement on a new federation of the Leeward and Windward Islands was the difference of opinion among the various island Governments about the powers of the central federal Government and its relationship with the territorial units which would go to make up the federation.

359. The United Kingdom Government had always recognized that a new federation would need external aid and had promised to continue to give aid to a new federation at at least the same rate as to the individual islands. It had agreed to discuss financial aid at the conference proposed for 1965 but this conference had not taken place because the various Territories had been unable to agree on the constitutional problems. As to Grenada's future relations with other countries, it was for the people and their elected Government to settle that question themselves and there was nothing in the recent constitutional proposals to prevent them from doing so.

360. In conclusion, he pointed out that there was no question of a constitution being forced upon the people of Grenada, since the new proposals under discussion were being worked out in full agreement at every stage with the elected representatives of the people.

361. The representative of the *Union of Soviet Socialist Republics* replied that, contrary to what the United Kingdom representative had asserted, the Constitution was not based upon the will of the people, a fact which had been clearly stated by the petitioner. In the last resort, it was the people themselves who had to decide upon their own future.

Hearing concerning the Bahamas

362. Mr. Pindling, Leader of the Opposition and of the *Progressive Liberal Party (PLP)*, reminded the Special Committee of his petition of 23 and 24 August (A/AC.109/PET.377), in which he had spoken of the economic and social situation in the islands. Because that situation was daily becoming worse and was more and more being taken out of the hands of the people of the Bahamas, he had come to ask for help and support.

363. Since the island's revenue was derived mainly from customs duties, the cost of living was extremely high. Basic commodities were very expensive, while luxuries such as tobacco, alcohol and perfume were cheap. That state of affairs, combined with a lack of adequate social services, made the situation alarming. One of the main subjects of concern was the agreement between the Government of the Bahamas and certain foreign interests, such as the casinos. Despite the United Kingdom's denials, he could cite specific cases in which there were scandalous conflicts of interest. *The Miami Herald* had published a series of articles to that effect between 12 and 15 December 1965, and so had the *Sunday Telegraph* of London on 9 January 1966. In February, in the House of Assembly, he had charged the Government with having "sold out" the people of the Bahamas to the gangsters and gamblers. He had referred in particular to the Minister for Finance and Tourism, charging that he had received money on several occasions for services rendered. He had asked the Government a series of questions on gambling, and the replies he had received were an admission that the Government was involved in a wicked deal.

364. A statement by the United Kingdom representative in Sub-Committee III (A/AC.109/SC.4/SR.51) showed that he was ill-informed and did not appreciate the gravity of the situation in the islands. He had said that elections would suffice to put an end to abuses, if they became really excessive, since the people had the right to select their own leaders by universal suffrage. However, the principle of majority rule did not exist in the Bahamas and had not yet been demanded by the United Kingdom; thus, elections would not affect the situation.

365. The recent economic difficulties which had led to a substantial rise in the cost of living, particularly over the last few months, highlighted the weaknesses and instability of an economy based solely on tourism and, consequently, the need to develop other industries in order to restore the balance. At present, the average weekly family income was approximately £9-5-0, which was far from adequate, inasmuch as a survey made for the United Kingdom Ministry of Overseas Development had calculated the necessary minimum income for one family for one week at £20. No effort was being made to develop industries other than tourism. More than 90 per cent of the food consumed in the islands was imported, while large quantities of foodstuffs were being exported by foreign farming enterprises, thus proving that production could be developed for local consumption. Fishing could also provide an important source of income. While hoping that the progress already made would be maintained and that the process of development in the islands would be speeded up, he wished to make it clear that it was necessary to act without undue haste and to avoid rushing into economic expansion without competent advice. He therefore hoped that the Committee would

make the following recommendations: (a) that immediate technical assistance should be offered to the Bahama Islands for the development of agriculture and fisheries with the assistance of all the specialized agencies; (b) that funds should be made available by the Special Fund component of the United Nations Development Programme; (c) that pre-investment surveys should be conducted under the auspices of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO); (d) that upon the completion of those surveys, and on the assumption that the reports showed definite economic potential, funds should be made available for the implementation of the organization's report.

366. Lastly, he renewed his request that the Committee should visit the islands to make an on-the-spot investigation. He thanked the Committee for the opportunity to testify and said that he was prepared to answer any questions which might be put to him.

367. In reply to a request to give some details concerning recent constitutional developments in the Bahamas, in clarification of his reference to the absence of majority rule in the Territory, the petitioner said that the only two questions on the subject of the Constitution had been raised by his party in the House of Assembly in the form of bills. The first had been aimed at amending the House of Assembly Elections Act and the second at redefining the status of "belonger", which was very close to citizenship. The first bill was of great significance constitutionally, in that it would amend the electoral system for the House of Assembly by first abolishing the voter's card and then trying to simplify the legislative system. In addition, it would extend the voting hours in certain densely populated areas and make bribery a crime *per se*, inasmuch as the present law stated that it must first be proved that any gift or contribution offered during an election had been offered with the intention of corrupting the voter. In fact, the bill introduced by the opposition had aimed at restoring the original law, which had been amended by the present Government for obvious reasons. The voter's card did not appear to be necessary, since there were some much larger countries, particularly the United Kingdom, which had no such cards. Moreover, owing to the fact that except in New Providence the card did not bear the photograph of the voter, there was evidence to show that the poor often sold their cards, which deprived them of the opportunity to vote. If, however, the voter's card was to be retained, the opposition would ask that the law should be amended so that the card would serve only for purposes of identification and no one could be prevented from voting, as was the case at present, on the ground that he was unable to produce it. Moreover, registration procedure was very cumbersome and was designed to discourage voters. He informed the Committee that the bill had been defeated and none of his amendments had been adopted.

368. Asked whether there was any movement in favour of independence in the Territory, he replied that there was. During the preceding week, a member of the Assembly, representing the Labour Party, had asked that the question of independence should be considered by a committee. The motion had, of course, been denied and the committee had not been set up. The view of the Progressive Liberal Party regarding independence was that independence today would be comparable with independence in Southern Rhodesia

in that it would vest power in the hands of a privileged oligarchic minority. The descendants of the original English settlers, constituting some 15 per cent of the population, had effective political and economic control of the islands, even under the Constitution which had come into effect in 1964. Independence would mean placing power in the hands of that minority. His party would welcome independence provided that the electoral system was democratized. One of the main reasons given by the Government for not permitting the motion to go to committee related to the expense involved in maintaining missions abroad. At that time, his party had joined forces with the mover of the motion and deplored the Government's short-sightedness, since independence was a matter of attaining national sovereignty and not a matter of maintaining missions.

369. Asked whether any political parties in the islands were making an active attempt to promote the independence of the Bahamas, and also whether there were any parties which advocated the federation of the Bahamas with other islands in the area, Mr. Pindling replied that, so far as he was aware, there was at present no political party in the Bahamas which advocated federation with other Caribbean Territories. With respect to the first question, he said that, with the exception of the attempt made during the preceding week by the Labour representatives, no party had as yet made any move to propose independence, although it was greatly desired. Since the system of majority rule had not yet been adopted, it was impossible for the Bahamas to become independent at the present time without prior preparation, for that would mean the domination of the majority by the minority and would very probably lead to open rebellion and violent insurrection; the Bahamas did not, however, want neo-colonialism; it wanted to live as a free country, and the people of the islands would be very happy if the administering Power began to take steps to prepare them for independence.

370. In reply to a question concerning the gangsters and gamblers he had referred to in his statement, the petitioner said that he would be interested to know who was behind them. He knew that some of the people involved were Americans and he understood that an investigation was being made in two states of the United States and in the United Kingdom concerning money which was passing through the Bahamas to the United Kingdom for the financing of casinos there.

371. Replying to a question concerning the role trade unions played in the Bahamas, he said that existing legislation did not permit the organization of workers into trade unions of their choice. Workers of different industries could not combine and form a single union; the result was that, for a working force of about 40,000, there were already some sixteen trade unions registered. The law also prohibited workers in one industry from giving any support to workers involved in a dispute in another industry. Through that policy of "divide and rule", the trade-union movement in the Bahamas was effectively suppressed. The problems facing trade-union leaders were increased by the communications difficulties in a group of islands separated by large expanses of water. The trade union leaders were doing their best to work within the system, but they were also trying to have it changed.

372. Elaborating on his reference to the selling of voters' cards, the petitioner explained that a would-be

candidate might by some means obtain the card of a voter prior to election day, thus making him unable to vote despite his being a duly registered voter. With regard to the proportion of eligible voters who had actually voted in the last elections, he said that, as far as he recalled, the poll had been over 82 per cent in the outer islands and just over 70 per cent in New Providence. In some constituencies in New Providence, the proportion of registered voters who had not voted had been as high as 35 per cent.

373. *Mr. Fawkes, member of the Bahamas House of Assembly and the President of the Federation of Labour of the Bahamas*, said that the purpose of his appearance before the Special Committee was to ask the United Nations to encourage and assist the people of the Bahamas in their efforts to prepare themselves for independence, for it was their conviction that colonialism was preventing the development of co-operation between their country and the international community and impeding its social, economic and cultural advancement.

374. On 5 September 1966 he had submitted a motion calling for the appointment of a select committee to consider the advisability of inviting the United Kingdom Government to convene a constitutional conference with a view to the granting of independence to the Bahamas. Before the Speaker of the House of Assembly had reached the agenda item calling for the appointment of select committees, the Premier had read out a statement to the effect that as a result of the 1963 Constitutional Conference the Bahamas now had a Constitution which gave the people virtually full control of their internal governmental affairs and that the country could not afford the financial burden of responsibility for security, defence and external affairs which the granting of complete independence would impose. The maintenance of embassies and high commissions abroad, and of defence forces, he had said, would require the expenditure of funds which would be better spent to promote the development of the Bahamas for the good of all its inhabitants. For those reasons, he had concluded, the Government could not support proposals for a constitutional conference at that time. When the motion for the appointment of a select committee had subsequently been put to the vote, it had been defeated by a vote of thirteen to seven. The United Bahamian Party had opposed the motion, but no member of the party had participated in the debate.

375. The Premier's statement was fallacious, for the Bahamas Government, which he had said could not afford the cost of maintaining embassies and high commissions abroad, was now operating expensive tourist agencies in different parts of the world—agencies which, it should be noted, employed almost no Bahamian personnel. Less than 1 per cent of the personnel of the tourist agencies consisted of Bahamians, the rest being British, German, American or other nationalities. They were recruited by the Ministry of Tourism, sometimes through advertisements in foreign newspapers which did not come to the attention of Bahamians.

376. According to the United Kingdom the people of the Bahamas were not Africans, yet "Bahamians" was not a legal term under the Constitution and no one could say that they were British. They studied English history and culture but were taught nothing about their own past. Because of their colonial status their economy was tied to that of the western hemi-

sphere and they paid a penalty, in the form of a high customs duty, when they traded with countries outside the Commonwealth. Similarly, the value of the Bahamian dollar was dependent on that of the British pound.

377. It had been argued that the Bahamas had a democratic Constitution based on universal suffrage, but the fact was that, since members of the House of Assembly were not paid, only the wealthy could afford to stand for election. As a result, the membership consisted mainly of merchants and people in the professions, while the working class had only very limited representation. Only two or three times in the past 200 years had the Out-Islands been represented by a person who resided there, a situation aggravated by the fact that there was no local government in those islands at all. At the top level of government, administrative duties were performed not by the personnel of the Ministries, as might be expected, but by British permanent secretaries. Without more education and greater participation in government, the people would not be prepared to assume the responsibilities of independence. He therefore requested that the United Nations should take swift action to persuade the United Kingdom to set a time-table for the eventual granting of independence to the Bahamas. In the meantime a commission of United Nations experts should be appointed to make a survey of political, economic and social conditions with a view to introducing measures which would prepare the Bahamian people to become masters in their own house.

378. In reply to a question as to the conditions he thought the United Kingdom should create to enable the inhabitants to express their views freely with regard to their future status, Mr. Fawkes replied that radical changes were needed in the electoral law. Of the thirty-three members of the House of Assembly, only one resided in the district which he represented. All the other districts were represented by merchants in the capital, whose problems were in no way similar to those of the people they professed to serve and who won election thanks to their great wealth and to the purchase of voters' cards. He would therefore make the following suggestions: firstly, the electoral law should be modernized so as to prevent corruption; secondly, the members of the House of Assembly should be paid and guidelines should be laid down by which it would be possible to recognize whether the House was discussing public affairs or the private affairs of a minister's company; thirdly, a longer period of residence should be required before a candidate could stand for election.

379. With regard to educational conditions in the Bahamas, he explained that the training of Bahamians which had been introduced since the general strike of 1958 equipped them only for inferior positions and compared unfavourably with that provided for the inhabitants of the other West Indian islands. There was, for example, no training which would equip Bahamians for positions as permanent secretaries. The trade unions were not strong enough to agitate successfully for better education for the working people, because the existing trade-union law did not permit the establishment of what might be called a blanket trade union but provided only for small craft unions. As a result there were at least twenty-one trade unions in the Bahamas, the majority of which could not even afford to maintain an office.

380. In reply to a question concerning the ratio of the labour force to the population of the Territory and how many representatives the petitioner thought the labour force should have in the House of Assembly, Mr. Fawkes replied that the labour force constituted between 30 and 70 per cent of the population. He himself, however, was the only labour representative in the House of Assembly. Other labour candidates intended to stand in the next election, but in view of the financial handicaps confronting them it could be said that representation in the House of Assembly was a luxury which the working people could not afford.

381. Giving further information about the debate on his motion for a select committee, he said that not a single member of the United Bahamian Party had spoken; in fact, the Premier and some other members of that party had walked out when the motion had been introduced, returning only at the end of the debate in order to participate in the vote. Those who had supported the motion had the impression that the issue had been decided elsewhere, before the matter had come to the floor of the House. Indeed, that was the traditional procedure in the Bahamas: major questions of policy and finance were decided elsewhere and the members of the United Bahamian Party seldom participated in debates even on motions introduced by one of their own number.

382. Further to what Mr. Pindling had had to say about voters' cards, the petitioner explained that people were paid to surrender their voters' cards, so that when election day came they would not be able to vote and the size of the electoral turn-out would thus be considerably reduced.

383. The representative of the *United Kingdom* said that he would like to comment on two matters discussed by the petitioners which he thought were of particular importance, and then go on to points of detail. Firstly, he would like to remind the Special Committee of the present constitutional position of the Bahamas. They were self-governing, with an elected legislature and Government, and the next elections were to be held on the basis of universal adult suffrage. The present Constitution had been agreed to at the 1963 Constitutional Conference by all the parties represented in the elected legislature, except for three individual points on which two delegations had expressed reservations. The last elections, held before the 1963 Conference, had been conducted under a different system so it could not be said that any alleged defects in the earlier system would automatically be present in the forthcoming elections. The apportionment of constituencies under the 1963 agreement was the task of a fully independent Constituencies Commission, whose decisions, once endorsed by the House of Assembly, could not under the Constitution be reversed by the intervention of the Governor or of the United Kingdom Government. Electoral procedures such as registration were regulated by local Bahamian law as enacted by the elected Bahamian legislature.

384. Mr. Pindling had asserted that the electoral system in the Bahamas did not constitute majority rule, presumably because the proportion of votes cast might not be precisely reflected in the proportion of seats won. That was, of course, an inevitable feature of any constituency election system, such as existed in the United Kingdom and many other democratic countries. Even if it was possible to have precisely equal constituencies, a party with large majorities

in a few constituencies could gain an over-all majority of the votes cast and still fail to win an over-all majority of the seats. It should also be remembered that under the electoral system established at the 1963 Conference the Constituencies Commission was required to observe the principle that constituencies should be as nearly equal as possible. His delegation therefore could not agree that majority rule did not prevail in the Bahamas. If Mr. Pindling's party could convince the electorate of the merits of his proposals and thus win the forthcoming elections, he would no doubt be in a position to put them into effect, but it was to the Bahamas electorate, not the Committee, that he should address his efforts.

385. Secondly, he was sure that the Special Committee would not wish to say or do anything which might imply that it was taking sides in matters of purely domestic political concern. Yet the Committee had just heard an opposition leader make a long statement concerning points of disagreement between his party and the party in power. It had heard serious allegations made, with little or no supporting evidence, against elected ministers who had no opportunity to defend themselves or state their side of the case. It had heard complaints about occasions on which the minority parties had been out-voted by the elected majority party. Finally, it had heard certain of its own members actually declare their sympathy with and support for the opposition party against the duly elected Government. His delegation doubted whether such proceedings advanced the purposes of the Committee.

386. Finally, Mr. Pindling had mentioned two points made by the United Kingdom representative in Sub-Committee III; if the Committee would read carefully what the United Kingdom representative had said in the Sub-Committee and the petitioner's remarks on that score, it would recognize that nothing the petitioner had said substantiated in any way the charge that the information given by the United Kingdom representative to the Sub-Committee was misleading, still less inaccurate.

387. Some of the other matters raised by the petitioners would be dealt with by his delegation in Sub-Committee III. He would like, however, to refer to a few points raised by Mr. Fawkes with regard to matters other than the main issue of independence. As far as the proportion of non-Bahamians to Bahamian civil servants was concerned, he would point out that, as stated in the Special Committee's own report for 1964, at the end of 1962 there had been 142 overseas officers in the Public Service as against a total of 2,418 local civil servants in all departments, and appointments were made by an independent Public Service Commission. As for Mr. Fawkes' statement that more education was needed to prepare the people for independence the fact was that in the Bahamas education was compulsory and free between the ages of 5 and 14. Lastly, the Syrian representative's question concerning the extent to which "workers" were represented in the House of Assembly was not one which he thought could have any real meaning in the context of the problem of constitutional development, which was the main object of the Committee's concern.

388. The *Chairman* said that in fairness to the petitioners he thought he should point out that they had not stated that there were no Bahamians in the civil service. What they had said was that all important positions were held by overseas civil servants.

389. The representative of the *United Republic of Tanzania* noted that the United Kingdom representative had said, in effect, that he thought the Special Committee would not want to impose anything on the people of the Bahamas, who should be free to decide on all matters which were purely their own concern. The Tanzanian delegation shared that sentiment and precisely for that reason it was opposed to the colonial bondage imposed by the United Kingdom Government on the people of the Bahamas, in whom national sovereignty should and must be vested.

390. The representative of *Syria* assured the United Kingdom representative that the question of who represented the workers had not been put by the Syrian delegation or, to the best of his recollection, by any other member of the Special Committee. In view of the petitioners' statement to the effect that the labour force was under-represented in Parliament, it had been the duty of the Committee to assess the number and proportion of that labour force in order to see whether or not the Parliament was representative. The petitioner himself had asserted that majority rule in the Bahamas was a fiction, and it had been the duty of the Committee to have further light on the situation. It would have been fairer if the United Kingdom representative had put some questions to the petitioners before their withdrawal, so that members could have benefited from their answers.

391. The representative of the *Union of Soviet Socialist Republics* said that the United Kingdom representative had implied that it was not for the Special Committee to deal with the question of who was a worker and of who was or was not represented in the House of Assembly. It was the Committee's duty, however, to make a careful study of all the constitutional changes that were taking place in the Territory. He considered that the matter raised by the Syrian representative was a completely legitimate one, for the answer to that question would give the Committee an idea of how democratic the Constitution really was and how effectively it reflected the interests of the entire population of the Territory.

392. The statements of the United Kingdom representative and the information furnished by the petitioners had demonstrated that the legislative organs of the Territory did not represent all the different classes of the population. There were various requirements which prevented the masses from becoming members of the legislative bodies. The answer which the petitioner had given to the question put by the Syrian representative showed that only the rich classes—the landowners and the merchants—were represented in the Parliament and that the administering Power was acting directly in the interests of that minority, which represented only 15 per cent of the population. As that group consisted of the descendants of the original English settlers in the Territory, all power was in fact concentrated in the hands of the white minority. It was therefore no accident that the petitioner had drawn an analogy between the situation in his country and that in Southern Rhodesia.

393. In his view, all those matters were extremely important and should be examined by the Committee, since they showed to what extent the Constitution in any given colonial Territory reflected the interests of the people of that Territory.

394. The representative of *Bulgaria* said that the United Kingdom representative had seen fit to give

certain directives to members of the Special Committee. He had reprimanded some members who had put questions to the petitioners and who, according to him, had expressed sympathy for them. According to the United Kingdom representative, those members should not have done so, since the petitioners represented the opposition.

395. The Bulgarian delegation had great sympathy for the petitioners and had always sympathized with the cause of the true representatives of the colonial peoples and with those who aspired to independence, whether they belonged to the government party or to the opposition.

396. Furthermore, the United Kingdom representative apparently objected to the petitioners being asked questions relating to the economic, social and cultural fields. Those questions were necessary, since they had been raised in the light of the information which the United Kingdom had to furnish under Article 73 e of the Charter. Since that information represented only the point of view of the administering Power, it was of the utmost importance that members should put questions to the petitioners.

397. The representative of the *United Kingdom*, replying to the Bulgarian representative's remarks, said that he could recollect nothing which had either directly or indirectly given the impression that he had not wished members of the Special Committee to put questions to the petitioners relating to the social, cultural and economic fields. He assured the Bulgarian representative that he had no such objection.

398. The representative of *Mali* recalled that at the beginning of the Special Committee's work that year the United Kingdom representative had assured members of his full co-operation. The Committee had adopted a resolution recommending that administering Powers should facilitate visits of sub-committees to Non-Self-Governing Territories so that they might ascertain the actual conditions in which the subject peoples lived. The attitude of the administering Powers on that point was well known.

399. The Special Committee now had before it petitioners who alone could enlighten the Committee and enable it to take decisions and adopt recommendations without having to rely solely on the statements of the administering Power. The administering Power, however, had refuted all that the petitioners had said and had even denied members of the Committee the right to ask certain questions. He therefore wondered what the United Kingdom delegation understood by co-operation with the Special Committee.

STATEMENTS BY MEMBERS

400. The representative of *Iran*, speaking as Rapporteur of Sub-Committee III, introduced the Sub-Committee's report on its work during 1966 (see annex). He pointed out that the Sub-Committee's recommendations on the question of visiting missions had been adopted by the Special Committee at its 413th meeting. The Sub-Committee's conclusions and recommendations on the Territories it had considered appeared in paragraphs 74, 177, 211 and 212 of the report. It would be noted that the Sub-Committee had not considered British Honduras and that it had been unable to give some Territories the consideration they warranted; it hoped that they would be considered in detail at an early stage of the Special Committee's work the following year.

401. The representative of the *United Kingdom* said that his delegation reserved its position on the conclusions and recommendations in all the sections of the report. If the report was adopted, he requested that his delegation's reservations be recorded in the Special Committee's report.

402. On two points, the report had been overtaken by events. The promised Constitutional Conference on the British Virgin Islands mentioned in paragraph 177 (9), had taken place in October and the Constitutional Commissioner's recommendations had been fully discussed. Full agreement had been reached on new constitutional arrangements, largely on the lines of the Constitutional Commissioner's recommendations. His delegation would provide detailed information in that regard at the next session of the Special Committee, but felt that paragraph 177 (9) and (10) did not take into account recent developments; in particular, the "urgent steps" called for in sub-paragraph (9) had now been taken.

403. With regard to Barbados, the representative of Bulgaria, as recorded in paragraph 96 of the report, had expressed the view that the Government of Barbados would probably not arrange elections until after independence; that opinion was perhaps reflected in the conclusions appearing in paragraph 177 (a). In fact, however, elections had been held on 3 November in accordance with the decision of the Premier of Barbados whose responsibility it was to decide on the timing of elections, and the people had thus an opportunity to express their wishes before the Territory's achievement of independence, to take place on 30 November 1966.

404. The Committee might also wish to note that a Constitutional Conference on Bermuda had begun on 8 November.

405. The representative of *Bulgaria* said that, during the Sub-Committee's discussions, he had been unable to elicit from the United Kingdom representative any information on whether elections were to be held prior to or following independence and had therefore reached the conclusion that there was no certainty that there would be elections before independence—a matter of great importance if the population was to be able to exercise genuine self-determination.

406. He regretted that the Sub-Committee had not had time to give due consideration to several Territories and hoped that, in future, the work of the Special Committee and the sub-committees could be organized in such a way as to allow all the sub-committees to complete their work.

407. His delegation had not been fully satisfied with the conclusions and recommendations adopted in all cases, but in general it had associated itself with the consensus in Sub-Committee III. The Bulgarian delegation had expressed reservations on paragraph 74 (7), relating to the American Virgin Islands, and on paragraph 177 (13), relating to the British Virgin Islands. It had been unable to subscribe fully to a statement that a United Nations presence during the procedures for the exercise of the right of self-determination was indispensable; it had felt that such a presence might compromise the position of the United Nations, since at the time when the Sub-Committee had discussed the matter conditions conducive to the implementation of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) had not existed in the Territories concerned. In his delegation's view, a United Nations presence should take the form

of a visiting mission; following that, the question of considering some other form of presence might arise.

408. His delegation was opposed to the present wording of paragraphs 74 (6) and 177 (12), and particularly to the phrase "without precluding the possibilities contained in General Assembly resolution 1541 (XV)". For the Special Committee, the basic document was General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), which in operative paragraph 2, upheld the right of self-determination and the freedom of peoples to determine their political status. It did not seem appropriate for a committee established to ensure the implementation of resolution 1514 (XV) to suggest to a people "alternatives" which were set forth in a different resolution. The purpose of resolution 1541 (XV) differed from that of resolution 1514 (XV); its aim was to provide guidance regarding the applicability of the Charter provision concerning the transmission of information, and any attempt to read it as complementary to General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) was artificial. There was no basis for extracting certain principles from resolution 1541 (XV) and representing them as possible ways of implementing resolution 1514 (XV). It was significant that resolution 1541 (XV) was not referred to in any of the General Assembly's resolutions dealing with the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, even in resolution 2063 (XX), which dealt specifically with the question of small Territories. Nor was reference made to resolution 1541 (XV) in the reports of Sub-Committees I and II in any sections of the present report other than the two to which he had referred. For all those reasons, he could not support paragraphs 74 (6) and 177 (12) in their present form.

409. The representative of *Mali* agreed with the Bulgarian representative that the present wording of paragraphs 74 (6) and 177 (12) was difficult to accept, particularly the reference to General Assembly resolution 1541 (XV) alongside resolution 1514 (XV). Resolution 1514 (XV) was the Committee's "charter" and the Committee should base its work on that resolution. He regretted that the administering Powers had been unwilling to consent to visiting missions to the various Territories. Small Territories posed difficult problems, but a visiting mission would assist administering Powers in fulfilling their obligations to the peoples, and he would like to appeal to the Powers concerned to show greater co-operation in that regard. There were signs of co-operation from some administering Powers. Spain had already facilitated the visit of a mission to Equatorial Guinea and the question of a mission to Aden was under discussion. His delegation therefore endorsed, in particular, the statements in paragraph 74 (8).

410. Small Territories had problems which were not easy to solve. In any solution it might propose the Committee must bear in mind that its purpose was the correct implementation of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), particularly operative paragraph 2 on self-determination. His delegation had expressed its reservations about the Cook Islands. In the relevant report it was stated that the people had freely chosen to maintain their links with the administering Power and the reference to resolution 1541 (XV) should be interpreted in that spirit. Small islands were not viable as independent units and it might be to their advantage to form an association among themselves or with the administering Power or to be integrated

with the latter, but it was essential that the decision should remain with the people. The Committee could not authorize administering Powers to decide the future of Territories by themselves.

411. The representative of *India* said that he could approve the Sub-Committee's report in its entirety, including the conclusions and recommendations. He was grateful to the United Kingdom delegation for the additional information it had supplied and was happy to note that elections had been held prior to independence in Barbados. He hoped that that practice would be followed in other Territories. With regard to the point raised by the Bulgarian representative, his delegation fully endorsed the provisions of General Assembly resolution 1541 (XV); indeed, the Indian delegation had played an active part in the drafting of that resolution. At the same time, he felt that the reference to resolution 1541 (XV) was not entirely relevant or necessary in the conclusions and recommendations concerning the United States Virgin Islands and the British Virgin Islands. The Special Committee's task was to recommend all necessary measures to speed the implementation of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV). Resolution 1541 (XV) dealt with the question of the existence of an obligation to transmit information under Article 73 of the Charter, and in the cases in question the administering Powers concerned had accepted that obligation. Resolution 1541 (XV) could also be relevant if there was a problem of determining whether or not a Territory was a Non-Self-Governing Territory and whether resolution 1514 (XV) was applicable to it. He would add that, should a people freely decide to integrate with the metropolitan Power, his delegation would accept their decision without any reservations. The reference seemed particularly superfluous since the rest of the paragraph already alluded indirectly to resolution 1541 (XV).

412. The representative of *Denmark* said that opposition to a reference to resolution 1541 (XV) seemed to be based either on the argument there was no connexion between the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples and the principles set out in resolution 1541 (XV), or on the argument that a specific reference was unnecessary since the text already drew attention to the various alternatives open to the people. He was not convinced by those arguments. Both resolution 1514 (XV) and resolution 1541 (XV) dealt with Non-Self-Governing Territories and they must therefore be regarded as related. The representative of *India* seemed to be admitting the existence of such a relationship when he said that resolution 1541 (XV) could be used in deciding whether resolution 1514 (XV) was applicable to a particular Territory. His delegation considered it important that the peoples of all Non-Self-Governing Territories should be made aware of their right to self-determination and of the alternatives which they could choose in exercise of that right. Naturally, resolution 1514 (XV) was of paramount importance for the Special Committee, but resolution 1541 (XV) was also important, particularly with regard to Territories such as those referred to in Sub-Committee III. Many delegations, including delegations of African and Asian countries, had drawn attention in the past to the special problems faced by small Territories and the various alternative arrangements open to them—always provided that such arrangements were in accordance with the wishes of the

population. It therefore supported the decision of the Sub-Committee to include a reference to resolution 1541 (XV), and saw no reason to delete it. If such a reference had not been made in other cases where it might have been justified, that was not a reason to omit it in the present case.

413. The representative of *Poland* said that he was opposed to the inclusion of a reference to General Assembly resolution 1541 (XV) in the recommendations concerning the United States Virgin Islands and the British Virgin Islands. The question was important, since attempts were often made by colonial Powers to invoke principle VI of resolution 1541 (XV) as defining the means by which the people of some dependent Territories might achieve independence. That principle, being taken out of context, could thus serve as a smoke-screen for the annexation of Territories. If that was not the intention, it was hard to see why certain colonial Powers should wish to introduce references to resolution 1541 (XV) where it was irrelevant.

414. According to the Sub-Committee's report, some members of the Sub-Committee apparently considered that resolutions 1514 (XV) and 1541 (XV) were somehow complementary. There was no evidence in resolution 1541 (XV) of any intention on the part of the General Assembly to regard it as complementary to resolution 1514 (XV). It would be recalled that resolution 1541 (XV) had been adopted because the factors for determining whether a Territory was a Non-Self-Governing Territory, as listed in resolution 742 (VIII), had proved inadequate and because certain colonial Powers had refused to submit information in accordance with the Charter. Thus the resolution had been designed to deal with that particular situation and not to replace or supplement resolution 1514 (XV), which had been adopted on the previous day as the basic document to guide the process of decolonization.

415. The principles set forth in resolution 1541 (XV) had been used by the Assembly in order to appraise the situation in Territories under Portuguese administration, but had not been regarded as suggesting means for the liberation of those Territories. The principles had also been used in considering the question of Southern Rhodesia; once the situation had been clarified, however, no further reference had been made to resolution 1541 (XV). That was an indication of the General Assembly's interpretation of the scope of resolution 1541 (XV).

416. All the General Assembly's resolutions of direct relevance to the Special Committee, such as resolutions 1810 (XVII), 1956 (XVIII) and 2105 (XX), directed attention to the principles set forth in resolutions 1514 (XV) and not to resolution 1541 (XV). They certainly stressed the right of the peoples of Non-Self-Governing Territories to decide their future freely, and it was true that that right must not be restricted and that the peoples must be aware of the various alternatives open to them, but it was only after political emancipation had been achieved, in accordance with the terms of resolution 1514 (XV), that the provisions of resolution 1541 (XV) could be applied in order to determine whether the transmission of information could cease. In the case of the Territories under discussion, it was clear that the stage had not been reached where the people could be said to have exercised their right to self-determination and where international supervision could therefore end.

417. For the reasons he had given, his delegation would be unable to support the report if the phrase "without precluding the possibilities contained in General Assembly resolution 1541 (XV)" in paragraphs 74 (6) and 177 (12) was not deleted.

418. The representative of the *Union of Soviet Socialist Republics* said that a careful study of the report of Sub-Committee III and all the relevant documents showed that the administering Powers for the colonial Territories in the Caribbean had not only failed to implement the provisions of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples in respect of the Territories but were seeking to preserve their control in those Territories or to annex them. It was clear from the report that United Kingdom policy with regard to the Territories in the Caribbean had led to the dissolution of the Federation of the West Indies. The United Kingdom was now endeavouring under various pretexts to bring about the association of some of the Territories with the metropolitan country. While the United Kingdom Government was trying to cover up its machinations, the United States Government was not even attempting to conceal its annexationist aims. It was easy to see that the conditions in the United States Virgin Islands were not such as to enable the people freely to exercise their right of self-determination. For example, Act No. 2082 of the Virgin Islands Legislature clearly indicated that the people of the Territory had no choice other than association or integration with the metropolitan Power. It was clear that policies of the United Kingdom and the United States with regard to the Territories under their administration in the Caribbean were completely in contradiction to the provisions of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV).

419. Generally speaking, his delegation agreed with the Sub-Committee's conclusions and recommendations concerning the Territories in the Caribbean, but it could not accept the parts of paragraph 74 (6), relating to the United States Virgin Islands, and of paragraph 177 (12), relating to the British Virgin Islands, which referred to General Assembly resolution 1541 (XV). The Special Committee's mandate was based on resolution 1514 (XV) and the consequent resolutions adopted at later sessions of the General Assembly namely resolutions 1654 (XVI), 1810 (XVII), 1956 (XVIII) and 2105 (XX). In none of those resolutions was there any reference whatever to General Assembly resolution 1541 (XV). That was understandable, since that resolution dealt with an entirely different matter, namely the transmission of information under Article 73 e of the Charter. The Special Committee's task, as set out in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), was to help dependent peoples to exercise freely their right to self-determination and complete independence. The Western Powers, however, were trying to force the Special Committee to follow another course by seeking to make use of General Assembly resolution 1541 (XV). What the Western Powers found so attractive in that resolution was not the provisions relating to the rights of the colonial peoples to self-determination and independence, but those which concerned association, such as that existing between the United States and Puerto Rico, and integration which under the circumstances meant integration of colonial Territories with the metropolitan country itself, a step which was tantamount to annexation.

420. Some representatives had referred to the statement in paragraph 310 of chapter XXV of the 1964 report of the Special Committee (A/5800/Rev.1), relating to the United States Virgin Islands, that in a world characterized by the integrationist movement, it might be desirable for the peoples of small Territories to bear in mind the forms mentioned in resolution 1541 (XV) in their achievement of the objectives of resolution 1514 (XV). Such references were invalid, since the General Assembly did not authorize the Special Committee to use resolution 1541 (XV) as a means of interpreting resolution 1514 (XV). It should also be recalled that a number of delegations had voted against that wording and that most of the members of the Special Committee had abstained. The wording had been adopted simply because the Committee had not had sufficient time to examine the full significance of that statement. In his delegation's view, that had been a mistake and the Committee should not repeat it.

421. Although paragraph 74 (7) did not make specific mention of resolution 1541 (XV), a reference to that resolution was implicit in its wording. That was also true with regard to paragraph 177 (4) and (13) and paragraph 211 (6). His delegation was unable to support the paragraphs in which reference was made to resolution 1541 (XV) either explicitly or implicitly, because that could be interpreted as supporting the annexationist policies of the administering Powers in question. In addition, it had reservations regarding the recommendation in paragraph 74 (7) for a United Nations presence during the procedures for the exercise of the right of self-determination in the United States Virgin Islands, since it considered that in the present conditions in that Territory such a presence would not serve any useful purpose and might well impair the prestige of the United Nations. The United Nations would merely be endorsing Act No. 2082 of the Virgin Islands Legislature, under which the only course open to the people of the Territory was association or integration with the United States. His delegation considered that before any decision was taken with regard to the future status of the United States Virgin Islands and the British Virgin Islands, the Special Committee should send a visiting mission to those Territories in order to ascertain the views of the people.

422. The representative of *Uruguay* said that Uruguay was not a colonialist Power but a small democratic country which firmly believed in an international community based on respect for the law.

423. General Assembly resolution 1541 (XV) unquestionably complemented resolution 1514 (XV). General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) laid down general principles and resolution 1541 (XV) had been adopted to take into account the special case of small Territories. It was the Special Committee's essential duty to facilitate and safeguard the accession to independence of all colonial Territories. In the case of the smaller Territories, the economic aspect was of great importance.

424. With regard to the Territory of Barbados, an attempt had been made to place the responsibility for the failure of the negotiations concerning federation on the administering Power. While his delegation considered that some form of association offered the best prospects for the economic viability of the Caribbean Territories, the people of Barbados had exercised their right of self-determination and had decided to seek separate independence. As he had said in Sub-Committee III, his delegation had no intention of telling

the peoples concerned what road they should follow and its observations belonged exclusively to the realm of principle (see annex, para. 68). It was for the people of the Territories to decide their future status; the United Nations should indicate the alternatives open to them but should not try to impose any particular form of government on them. The USSR representative considered that resolution 1541 (XV) was concerned solely with the transmission of information under Article 73 e of the Charter. That resolution, however, laid down criteria by which a Non-Self-Governing Territory could be considered to have reached a full measure of self-government.

425. He was not defending any colonial Power; he was acting in defence of legal principles and was merely trying to ensure that decolonization was achieved in accordance with instruments which the international community had itself devised. In his view, resolution 1541 (XV), which had been adopted for the specific purpose of complementing resolution 1514 (XV), was not an obstacle to the self-determination of peoples and there was no reason why it should not be mentioned. His delegation would therefore support the reference to resolution 1541 (XV) in the paragraphs in question.

426. The representative of *Syria* said that General Assembly resolution 1541 (XV) concerned specifically the applicability of the obligation of an administering Power to transmit information under Article 73 e of the Charter. If the question of such information had been mentioned in paragraph 74 (6) and 177 (12) of the Sub-Committee's report, then the reference to resolution 1541 (XV) would have been relevant. As it was the reference added nothing to the text and should be deleted. If the intention of the authors had been to emphasize the right of peoples to self-determination, that right was in fact the substance of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), and resolution 1541 (XV) did not interpret resolution 1514 (XV). The fact that the two resolutions had been adopted within such a short space of time showed that they dealt with two different subjects; otherwise their provisions would have been included in a single resolution. The representatives of Bulgaria, Mali and India had only said that the reference to resolution 1541 (XV) was out of place in the context; they had not said that it should not be mentioned at all. If resolutions 1514 (XV) and 1541 (XV) were considered interdependent, the latter would have to be mentioned every time there was a reference to the former, without regard to its relevancy in the context. The difficulties faced by small Territories could be solved under resolution 1514 (XV); it was hard to see how a resolution dealing with the submission of information could help to solve them.

427. The representative of *Yugoslavia* said that his delegation agreed in general with the conclusions and recommendations in the Sub-Committee's report. With reference to paragraphs 74 (6) and 177 (12), bearing in mind that General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) was the charter of the Special Committee and in view of the statements made by previous speakers, he considered that it would be sufficient, in the context, to refer only to resolution 1514 (XV). With reference to paragraphs 74 (7) and 177 (13), he considered that the United Nations should play a definite role in decolonization and should be actively associated with any procedures by which the people of the Territories expressed their wishes concerning independence, in order to ascertain their real wishes with regard to their future status. For that reason it was important for visiting missions

to visit the Territories to report on the situation there. If they were not able to do so, the only information available would be that provided by the administering Power.

428. The representative of *Italy* said that, since his delegation was a member of Sub-Committee III, its views were already set forth in the Sub-Committee's report. With regard to the Bulgarian representative's reservation concerning paragraphs 74 (7) and 177 (13), he thought that it might give the unfortunate impression that he wished to limit the role of the United Nations and to bar any United Nations presence in the supervision of self-determination; he hoped that that had not been the intention of the Bulgarian representative.

429. With regard to the suggestion made by the Bulgarian representative and supported by other speakers that the reference to General Assembly resolution 1541 (XV) should be deleted in paragraphs 74 (6) and 177 (12), he considered that resolution 1514 (XV) was fully applicable to the Territories concerned but that there were special circumstances on account of their limited size and population. His delegation had often stressed the necessity to study the question of small Territories in depth and to work out criteria to govern their decolonization and future status. The General Assembly, in operative paragraph 8 of resolution 2105 (XX), had asked the Special Committee to pay particular attention to the small Territories. No study of the special circumstances surrounding the small Territories had yet been initiated, however, and no criteria worked out. He hoped that the Special Committee would take up that question at its next session and that the General Assembly would include a specific provision to that effect in its resolution concerning the Special Committee's report. Italy, together with most other members of Sub-Committee III, had thought it necessary to indicate that the special features of the Territories under consideration made both resolutions 1514 (XV) and 1541 (XV) applicable. It would be misleading to state that the Territories should become independent on the basis of resolution 1514 (XV) alone, since the debate in Sub-Committee III had dwelt on the need for them to merge into larger associations in order to gain greater political and economic strength and to remain free from outside interference.

430. With reference to the USSR representative's statement, resolution 1541 (XV) did not speak of association or integration with the administering Power but with independent States in general. There were already several independent States in the Caribbean area with which the Territories under consideration might associate or integrate. Since no criteria had yet been worked out governing the future status of small Territories, and since the Sub-Committee had not considered it appropriate to make specific recommendations concerning an association between any given Territories or concerning a federation, it had thought to carry out its mandate best by including general references to resolution 1541 (XV). Those references should be retained. Their deletion would weaken the scope of the report's conclusions and recommendations.

431. The representative of the *United States of America*, replying to the USSR representative's allegations concerning the supposed suppression of the right to self-determination in the United States Virgin Islands, said that during the past year important progress had been made towards self-determination. The people already had a Legislature elected on the basis of universal suffrage, and progress had been made

towards providing them with a popularly elected chief executive and towards eliminating the presidential veto. There had also been measures to perfect the representative nature of the Legislature. It could hardly be argued that the Convention felt inhibited because of its terms of reference concerning the investigation of the Islands' relationship with the United States, since the final report of the Convention did go into that very question. The Constitutional Convention had been established in 1964, on the broadest possible basis of legislation with participation by the various Virgin Islands' political parties. Those attending the Convention had included twenty-two delegates, elected in November 1964 by all the islanders, as also the eleven members of the Legislature. It was therefore difficult to argue that the Convention's views were not those of the majority of the people. The Convention's recommendation concerning reapportionment of the Legislature had already been made law by the United States Congress. The recommendations concerning the election of a Governor and the abolition of the presidential veto had already been passed by both Houses of Congress. Only a few minor difficulties, such as the date upon which they would take effect, remained to be settled at the time Congress adjourned. The Administration had actively supported that measure and would press again for its adoption in the forthcoming session of Congress.

432. It had been suggested that General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) expressed general principles which should guide the Special Committee, while General Assembly resolution 1541 (XV) related to a side issue, namely, the transmission of information by the administering Powers. That was not a realistic interpretation. As the representative of Uruguay had said, they were complementary resolutions. Resolution 1541 (XV) was particularly applicable to the question of self-determination in the smaller Territories; it set forth the various ways in which such Territories could achieve self-determination. That had been the question before the Sub-Committee and there was no reason why the references to resolution 1541 (XV) should not be included in the report. To refuse to admit its existence would seem to be unrealistic and unnecessarily restrictive. There was ample precedent for retaining the references, since, in the Special Committee's report to the nineteenth session of the General Assembly concerning the Territories considered by Sub-Committee III (A/5800/Rev.1, chap. XXV), reference had been made to resolution 1541 (XV) in the general conclusions.

433. The representative of the *United Republic of Tanzania* said that he wished to draw the attention of the administering Powers to the second sentence in paragraphs 74 (7) and 177 (13). He hoped that during the procedures for the exercise of the right to self-determination the United Nations would be invited to ascertain that the process was genuine. He shared the regrets expressed in paragraphs 74 (8) and 177 (14). General Assembly resolution 1541 (XV) concerned the transmission of information and had nothing whatsoever to do with the process of decolonization. General Assembly resolution 1542 (XV), which referred to resolution 1541 (XV), made that absolutely clear. The Special Committee was not trying to decide whether the Virgin Islands were self-governing; it was considering them as dependent Territories, and the reference to resolution 1541 (XV) was therefore irrelevant. The only guiding principle should be General

Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) and his delegation would oppose the inclusion of the reference to resolution 1541 (XV) if the matter came to a vote. Only after the question of the smaller Territories had been discussed in detail would it be possible to decide whether, in the process of decolonization, the other forms of self-government mentioned in principle VI of the annex to resolution 1541 (XV) could be taken into consideration.

434. The representative of *Sierra Leone* said that his delegation considered that the inclusion of a reference to General Assembly resolution 1541 (XV) in the report was somewhat premature. As had been pointed out, that resolution had been adopted shortly after General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) and the aims of both resolutions were quite clear. Resolution 1514 (XV) was a categorical statement of the principles which should guide the Special Committee in its consideration of problems of decolonization, whereas resolution 1541 (XV) set out the principles which should guide the General Assembly in determining whether or not an obligation existed to transmit the information called for in Article 73 e of the Charter. The important thing was that the people of the Territories should be enabled to decide on their future status in full freedom. The Sub-Committee had decided not to refer to resolution 1541 (XV) because its work had been based on resolution 1514 (XV) and any reference to resolution 1541 (XV) would be premature. The latter resolution could not be considered before a Territory had reached a degree of independence as defined in principle VI of the annex to that resolution, i.e. before it had emerged as a sovereign independent State, decided on free association with an independent State, or on integration with an independent State.

435. He wished to make it clear that his delegation was not suggesting that every Territory must emerge as a sovereign independent State, but that the people of the Territory concerned must be free to decide on their future status without restraint or restrictions.

436. His delegation therefore agreed with the representatives who had said at the previous meeting that the references to resolution 1541 (XV) in the report should be deleted.

437. The representative of *Venezuela* said that his delegation maintained its position that General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) was the fundamental instrument of decolonization and should be applied to all parts of the world where the vestiges of colonialism still existed.

438. Venezuela was traditionally a defender of the principle of self-determination and supported the attainment of independence by countries and peoples under colonial rule. Independence without economic viability would place many small Territories in a situation in which they would be dependent on the former administering Power or another powerful country. His delegation therefore considered that General Assembly resolution 1541 (XV) was a necessary complement to resolution 1514 (XV), since it listed ways in which a Territory could attain a full measure of self-government other than those referred to in resolution 1514 (XV) and was intended to ensure that the decision taken by a people in the free exercise of their right of self-determination and by means of a popular referendum was the one most in keeping with their interests.

439. Several delegations had placed the responsibility for the failure to bring about a federation in the

Caribbean on the administering Power. The United Nations could not decide what form of independence a particular Territory should adopt. All it could do was to ensure that the colonial peoples concerned were able to exercise their right of self-determination in absolute freedom.

440. With regard to the Syrian representative's remark at the previous meeting that the reference to resolution 1541 (XV) added nothing to the text, it might also be asked what harm it would do, since, without the explicit reference to the resolution, the idea of that resolution would still be implicit in the paragraph.

441. His delegation supported the wording of paragraphs 74 (6) and (7) and 177 (12) of the report.

442. The representative of *Tunisia* thought that the objection raised to the inclusion in the report of General Assembly resolution 1541 (XV) were quite valid. As had been pointed out, the Special Committee was guided in its work by General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), which declared that dependent peoples should be enabled freely to exercise their right to complete independence. His delegation considered it essential that the people should be able to make their choice in complete freedom by means of a popular consultation and that the results of such a referendum should be binding on the international community. He pointed out that resolution 1514 (XV) did not limit the forms of political status open to the people. It was the Committee's task to ensure that the people made their choice freely and that no pressure was brought to bear upon them. It was for that reason that paragraph 74 (6) of the Sub-Committee's report invited the administering Power to ensure that the people of the Territory were fully aware of the various alternatives open to them. His delegation therefore saw no need for including a reference to resolution 1541 (XV), especially since the Special Committee was divided on the issue. He appealed to the representatives who wished to maintain the reference to resolution 1541 (XV) not to press their point.

443. The representative of *Australia* said that his delegation, which was not a member of Sub-Committee III, simply wished to reserve its position on certain aspects of the conclusions and recommendations of the Sub-Committee, in particular with regard to the role which the United Nations might properly play in the Territories under consideration in the particular circumstances of those Territories.

444. His delegation agreed with the general position stated by the representatives of Denmark and Uruguay with regard to the inclusion in the report of references to General Assembly resolution 1541 (XV). In his delegation's view, reference to that resolution did not create any danger in relation to the general objectives which all members were seeking in respect of the islands in question, but, on the contrary, provided safeguards in the circumstances which were peculiar to such islands. Such reference did not detract from the validity of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), but, as the Venezuelan representative had said, complemented it. The problems of such islands were indeed different from those of other Territories with which the Committee had been concerned, and the solutions to those problems must reflect their different nature.

445. The representative of *Iran* said that two points had been the subject of controversy during the debate in Sub-Committee III. The first had concerned the reference to General Assembly resolution 1541 (XV)

and the second had related to the idea of a United Nations presence in Territories during the exercise of the right of self-determination.

446. With regard to the first point, the majority of members had thought that while the basis of the Special Committee's work was General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), reference should be made to resolution 1541 (XV), so that the people of the Territories would have some idea of the various forms of political status open to them. Accordingly, the majority had decided to adopt the wording which the Special Committee had used in paragraph 310 of the general conclusions concerning the United States Virgin Islands in its 1964 report (A/5800/Rev.1, chap. XXV). Since, however, a minority of members had still maintained their reservations regarding the reference to resolution 1541 (XV) and since the Sub-Committee had wanted to achieve a consensus, members had agreed on a compromise formula, which was now before the Special Committee in paragraphs 74 (6) and 177 (12). As could be seen, it did not link resolution 1541 (XV) with resolution 1514 (XV) but merely said "without precluding the possibilities contained in General Assembly resolution 1541 (XV)". In other words, it referred to the various forms of political status. So long as there was agreement that the people should be informed of the various forms of political status open to them and should be enabled to express themselves freely, it was irrelevant whether the Committee decided to exclude or include reference to resolution 1541 (XV).

447. With regard to a United Nations presence during the exercise of self-determination, the majority of the members of the Sub-Committee had considered that such a presence was essential. A minority had said that it would not be appropriate to make such a recommendation at that stage. In the view of the majority, the best means of expediting the process of decolonization was to ensure that the people of the Territory concerned were enabled to exercise their right of self-determination in freedom and without restrictions. Only through a United Nations presence would it be possible to ascertain whether or not the people's decision corresponded with their freely expressed wishes.

448. The representative of *Uruguay* said that he could not agree with the view expressed at the previous meeting by the representative of the United Republic of Tanzania that General Assembly resolution 1541 (XV) had nothing to do with the process of decolonization. He adhered to his position that General Assembly resolutions 1514 (XV) and 1541 (XV) were complementary, a position which had been supported at the present meeting by the representatives of Venezuela and Iran. The Tanzanian representative had referred to resolution 1542 (XV), but in his view that resolution supported his own thesis. It was concerned with the question of the transmission of information under Article 73 e of the Charter; it simply applied resolution 1541 (XV) to the particular case of certain Territories under Portuguese administration and set forth the conclusion that Portugal had an obligation to transmit information on those Territories. Nothing in resolution 1542 (XV) could be construed as derogating from or repealing, either explicitly or implicitly, resolution 1541 (XV). It was quite clear from principle VI in the annex to resolution 1541 (XV)—and, in the light of operative paragraph 2, the principles in the annex had the same force as the resolution itself—that a Non-Self-Governing Territory could reach a full

measure of self-government by emergence as a sovereign independent State, or by free association with an independent State, or by integration with an independent State. In the absence of any subsequent decision by the Assembly repealing or superseding resolution 1541 (XV), that principle remained in force.

449. With regard to the appeal addressed to members by the representative of Tunisia, he was afraid that he must maintain his position, which was based on principle. His delegation had no political interest to defend in the matter but held that that cause of decolonization should be pursued in accordance with law. It would be dangerous to introduce political factors in the interpretation of legal principles. The Sub-Committee had decided, by a majority vote, that a reference to resolution 1541 (XV) in the two cases under discussion was appropriate and he did not think that that position could be prejudicial to the cause of decolonization. He considered that the text should remain as it stood.

D. Action taken by the Special Committee

450. At the 478th meeting, the Special Committee considered the conclusions and recommendations proposed by Sub-Committee III concerning the United States Virgin Islands, as contained in paragraph 74 of its report (see annex).

451. The representative of *Mali* proposed the deletion of the phrase "without precluding the possibilities contained in General Assembly resolution 1541 (XV)", in paragraph 74 (6).

452. The amendment by Mali to delete this phrase was adopted by 11 votes to 6, with 3 abstentions.

453. The Special Committee then adopted the conclusions and recommendations proposed by Sub-Committee III, as amended, without objection, it being understood that the reservations expressed by members would be recorded (see paras. 401-450 above and 454-457 below).

454. The representative of *India*, explaining his vote, said that he had abstained because, although his delegation supported General Assembly resolution 1541 (XV), reference to it was unnecessary in the present case. However, he could not vote in favour of the amendment lest it should be interpreted as a vote against General Assembly resolution 1541 (XV), contrary to the position of his delegation as stated at an earlier meeting of the Committee. His delegation wished its views to be stated in the record.

455. The representative of *Madagascar* said that he would have wished the deleted phrase had been retained and an attempt made to reach a consensus to that effect because the options offered in General Assembly resolution 1541 (XV) did not affect the provision on self-determination in Assembly resolution 1514 (XV).

456. The representative of *Iran* said that small Territories were more vulnerable than others to external pressures and they should be assured of an opportunity to exercise their right of self-determination. For that reason, the Sub-Committee had recommended the presence of the United Nations, which, for its part, must respect the freely expressed wishes of the people. The people must be made aware of the possibilities General Assembly resolution 1541 (XV) offered to it. His delegation supported that resolution, but he had abstained in the vote because reference to it in the present instance was not essential.

457. The representative of the *United States of America* said that he wished to place on record his delegation's general reservations on the chapter under consideration and on the decision the Special Committee had just taken.

458. The conclusions and recommendations adopted by the Special Committee concerning the United States Virgin Islands are set out in paragraph 469 (a) below.

459. At the same meeting, the Special Committee considered the conclusions and recommendations proposed by Sub-Committee III concerning the British Virgin Islands, Barbados, Antigua, Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat, St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, St. Lucia and St. Vincent, as contained in paragraph 177 of its report.

460. The *Chairman* suggested that in accordance with the Special Committee's decision on paragraph 74 (6), he took it that the Committee wished to vote on the deletion of the phrase "without precluding the possibilities contained in General Assembly resolution 1541 (XV)" in paragraph 177 (12).

461. The amendment to delete this phrase was adopted by 12 votes to 6 with 3 abstentions.

462. The Special Committee then adopted the conclusions and recommendations proposed by Sub-Committee III, as amended, without objection, it being understood that the reservations expressed by members would be recorded (see paras. 401-450 and 454-457 above and 463 below).

463. The representative of *Madagascar* formally stated that he would have opposed the deletion if an attempt had been made to reach a consensus. However, in view of the result of the vote, he considered that the reference to resolution 1514 (XV) would sufficiently safeguard the people's rights.

464. The conclusions and recommendations adopted by the Special Committee concerning these Territories are set out in paragraph 469 (b) below.

465. At the same meeting, the Special Committee considered the conclusions and recommendations proposed by Sub-Committee III concerning Bermuda, Bahamas, Turks and Caicos Islands and Cayman Islands, as contained in paragraph 211 of its report.

466. The Sub-Committee adopted the conclusions and recommendations proposed by Sub-Committee III without objection, it being understood that the reservations expressed by members would be recorded (see paras. 401-450 above).

467. The conclusions and recommendations adopted by the Special Committee concerning Bermuda, Bahamas, Turks and Caicos Islands and Cayman Islands are set out in paragraph 469 (c) below.

468. At the same meeting the Special Committee adopted the statement concerning the Falkland Islands (Malvinas) proposed by Sub-Committee III as contained in paragraph 212 of its report.

469. The conclusions and recommendations adopted concerning the United States Virgin Islands, British Virgin Islands, Antigua, Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat, St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, Barbados, Bermuda, Bahamas, Turks and Caicos Islands and Cayman Islands, and the statement concerning the Falkland Islands (Malvinas) which the Special Committee adopted at its 478th meeting on 16 November read as follows:

(a) UNITED STATES VIRGIN ISLANDS

(1) The Special Committee recalls its conclusions and recommendations concerning the Territory which it adopted in 1964 and which were endorsed by the General Assembly at its twentieth session.

(2) It reaffirms that the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples applies fully to the Territory.

(3) It notes the information provided by the administering Power concerning the Constitutional Convention which met between December 1964 and February 1965 and which proposed a new Organic Act for the Territory providing for a greater degree of autonomy.

(4) It also notes that, so far, the administering Power has taken final action on only one of the proposals made by the Convention and that the proposal for an elected Governor has not yet been passed into law.

(5) It regrets that despite some measure of advancement in the political field the administering Power has not yet implemented the Declaration with respect to the Territory and urges it to do so without delay.

(6) It reaffirms the right of the people to exercise their right of self-determination in complete freedom and reiterates its previous recommendation inviting the administering Power to ensure that the people of the Territory be enabled, in complete freedom and without any restrictions, to express their wishes concerning the future political status of the Territory. It also invites the administering Power to ensure that the people of the Territory are fully aware of the various alternatives open to them, in their achievement of the objectives of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV).

(7) It reiterates its belief that the United Nations must be assured that the exercise of the right of self-determination is undertaken in complete freedom and in full knowledge of the available choices. It therefore considers that a United Nations presence during the procedures for the exercise of the right of self-determination is indispensable.

(8) The Special Committee regrets that the administering Power has not agreed to a visiting mission from the Special Committee to the Territory and affirms that a visit to this Territory is both useful and necessary. Accordingly, it invites the co-operation of the administering Power to enable the United Nations to send a visiting mission to the Territory, in order to obtain first-hand information concerning the Territory and to ascertain the views of the people and the extent to which they are aware of the options open to them, with regard to their future political status.

(b) BRITISH VIRGIN ISLANDS, ANTIGUA, DOMINICA, GRENADA, MONTserrat, St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and Barbados

General

(1) The Special Committee recalls its conclusions and recommendations concerning these Territories which it adopted in 1964 and which were endorsed by the General Assembly at its twentieth session.

(2) The Special Committee reaffirms that the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples applies fully to these Territories. At the same time, it recognizes that the small size and population of these Territories, and the nature of their

economies, present peculiar problems which demand special attention.

(3) The Special Committee reaffirms that it is for the people of the Territories, and for them alone, to express themselves freely on the form of political status they wish to adopt in order to achieve the objectives of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.

(4) The Special Committee reaffirms the right of the people of these Territories to exercise their right of self-determination in complete freedom and in full knowledge of the various forms of political status open to them. It also expresses its belief that, particularly in the case of small Territories, the United Nations should take appropriate steps to ensure that the people of these Territories are enabled to express themselves freely on their future status and in full knowledge of the options available to them.

(5) The Special Committee reiterates its previous recommendation concerning the need for visiting missions to these Territories and, to this end, urges the administering Power to enable the Special Committee to send visiting missions to the Territories.

(6) The Special Committee recalls its belief expressed in 1964 that it should be possible for these Territories to join with others in the area to form an economically and administratively viable State. It also recalls that, at that time, negotiations were being carried on between almost all of these Territories with a view to establishing a federation. The Special Committee regrets that these negotiations were not successful and that, as a consequence, each Territory has been obliged to seek a separate solution. It expresses the hope that the administering Power will do everything possible to facilitate the kind of solution desired by the people.

British Virgin Islands

(7) The Special Committee recalls its conclusions and recommendations concerning the Territory which it adopted in 1964 and which were endorsed by the General Assembly at its twentieth session.

(8) It reaffirms that the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples applies fully to the Territory.

(9) It notes that a Constitutional Commissioner visited the Territory in 1965 and that, on the basis of the Commissioner's report, a Constitutional Conference will be held during October 1966. It notes with concern the observations by the Constitutional Commissioner that there was discontent in the Territory and that one of the main reasons for this was the fact that the Government was largely out of touch with the people. The Special Committee trusts that the administering Power will take urgent steps to remedy this situation.

(10) The Special Committee regrets that, despite a certain measure of advancement in the constitutional field, the administering Power has not yet implemented the Declaration with respect to the Territory and urges it to do so without delay.

(11) It reaffirms the right of the people to exercise their right of self-determination in complete freedom.

(12) The Special Committee reiterates its belief expressed in 1964 that it should be possible for the Territory to join with others in the area to form an eco-

nomically and administratively viable State. It regrets that since 1947 no effective steps have been taken to consult the people of the Territory on their future status. It therefore invites the administering Power to take the necessary steps to ensure that the people of the Territory are fully aware of the various forms of political status open to them, in their achievement of the objectives of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV). The Special Committee also invites the administering Power to ensure that the people of the Territory be enabled, in complete freedom and without any restrictions, to express their wishes concerning the future political status of the Territory.

(13) It reiterates its belief that the United Nations must be assured that the exercise of the right of self-determination in accordance with General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) is undertaken in complete freedom and in full knowledge of the available choices. It therefore considers that a United Nations presence during the procedures for the exercise of the right of self-determination will be essential.

(14) The Special Committee regrets that the administering Power has not agreed to a visiting mission from the Special Committee to the Territory, and affirms that a visit to the Territory is both useful and necessary. Accordingly, it invites the co-operation of the administering Power to enable the United Nations to send a visiting mission to the Territory, in order to obtain first-hand information concerning the Territory and to ascertain the views of the people.

Barbados

(15) The Special Committee recalls that, when it last considered the Territory, Barbados was actively engaged in negotiations for federation or association with neighbouring Territories.

(16) It notes that, due to the failure of these negotiations, the Barbados Legislature decided to request separate independence for the Territory.

(17) The Special Committee welcomes the fixing of 30 November 1966, as the date on which Barbados will become independent.

(18) The Special Committee notes that it is still possible for Barbados to become part of a federation, should the people of Barbados express such a wish through their elected representatives.

Antigua, Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat, St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, St. Lucia and St. Vincent

(19) The Special Committee, having heard the statement of the administering Power and the statement by the petitioner from Grenada, did not find it possible to give the question of these Territories the detailed consideration it required. It therefore decides to postpone its consideration of this question and, subject to any decisions which the Assembly may take at its twenty-first session, to examine the situation in these Territories in detail at an early date during its meetings in 1967.

(c) BERMUDA, BAHAMAS, TURKS AND CAICOS ISLANDS AND CAYMAN ISLANDS

(1) The Special Committee recalls its conclusions and recommendations on Bermuda, Bahamas, Turks

and Caicos Islands and Cayman Islands, which it adopted in 1964 and which were endorsed by the General Assembly at its twentieth session.

(2) The Special Committee reaffirms that the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples applies fully to these Territories.

(3) The Special Committee regrets that the administering Power has not yet implemented the Declaration in these Territories and urges it to do so without delay.

(4) The Special Committee considers that in view of the lack of sufficient information on these Territories, and, in the case of the Territory of the Bahamas, of conflicting statements concerning conditions by the representative of the administering Power and by the petitioners, the administering Power should enable the Special Committee to dispatch visiting missions to the Territories as soon as possible.

(5) The Special Committee considers that the administering Power should take immediate measures in order to transfer all powers to the peoples of these Territories, without any conditions or reservations, in accordance with their freely expressed will and desire, in order to enable them to enjoy complete independence and freedom.

(6) It also expresses its belief that, particularly in the case of small Territories, the United Nations should take appropriate steps to ensure that the people of these Territories are enabled to express themselves freely on their future status and in full knowledge of the options available to them.

(7) The Special Committee, having heard the statement of the administering Power and the statements by the petitioners from the Bahamas, did not find it possible to give the question of these Territories the detailed consideration it required. It therefore decides to postpone its consideration of this question and, subject to any decisions which the Assembly may take at its twenty-first session, to examine the situation in these Territories in detail at an early date during its meetings in 1967.

(d) FALKLAND ISLANDS (MALVINAS)

The Special Committee recalls the provisions of General Assembly resolution 2065 (XX) of 16 December 1965, by which the Assembly: (i) invited the Governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to proceed without delay with the negotiations recommended by the Special Committee, with a view to finding a peaceful solution to the problem, bearing in mind the provisions and objectives of the Charter of the United Nations and of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) and the interests of the population of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas); (ii) requested the two Governments to report to the Special Committee and to the General Assembly at its twenty-first session on the results of the negotiations. The Special Committee takes note of the information provided by the Governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom (A/AC.109/145 and Add.1, A/AC.109/146 and Add.1) that meetings were held on the problem on 19 and 20 July 1966 and that they would be continued.

ANNEX

[A/AC.109/L.329 and Corr.1 and Add.1]

Report of Sub-Committee III

Rapporteur: Mr. Mohsen Sadigh ESFANDIARY (Iran)

CONTENTS

	Paragraphs
INTRODUCTION	1-5
I. IMPLEMENTATION OF GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 2069 (XX), INCLUDING THE QUESTION OF VISITING MISSIONS	6-13
II. UNITED STATES VIRGIN ISLANDS	14-74
A. Consideration by the Sub-Committee	14-62
B. Adoption of the report	63-73
C. Conclusions and recommendations	74
III. BRITISH VIRGIN ISLANDS, BARBADOS, ANTIGUA, DOMINICA, GRENADA, MONTSERRAT, ST. KITTS-NEVIS-ANGUILLA, ST. LUCIA AND ST. VINCENT	75-177
A. Consideration by the Sub-Committee	75-169
B. Adoption of the report	170-176
C. Conclusions and recommendations	177
IV. BERMUDA, BAHAMAS, TURKS AND CAICOS ISLANDS AND CAYMAN ISLANDS	178-211
A. Consideration by the Sub-Committee	178-208
B. Adoption of the report	209-210
C. Conclusions and recommendations	211
V. FALKLAND ISLANDS (MALVINAS)	212

INTRODUCTION

1. At its 400th meeting on 4 April 1966, the Special Committee decided to continue Sub-Committee III with the same membership as in 1965.^a

2. At its 41st meeting held on 28 April 1966, Sub-Committee III elected Mr. Leonardo Díaz González (Venezuela) as Chairman and Mr. Mohsen Sadigh Esfandiary (Iran) as Rapporteur. At the 45th meeting on 9 August 1966, following the transfer of Mr. Leonard Díaz González, Mr. Mohsen Sadigh Esfandiary assumed the duties of Chairman of the Sub-Committee.

3. At its 42nd meeting held on 5 May, the Sub-Committee decided that it would consider the questions referred to it in the following order:

- (1) Implementation of General Assembly resolution 2069 (XX) of 16 December 1965, including the question of visiting missions.
- (2) (a) Bermuda, Bahamas, Turks and Caicos Islands, Cayman Islands;
- (b) United States Virgin Islands, British Virgin Islands, Antigua, Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat, St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, Barbados.
- (3) Falkland Islands (Malvinas) and British Honduras.

4. In accordance with the usual practice, the representatives of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America, as administering Powers, participated in the work of the Sub-Committee during its consideration of the Territories for which they were responsible.

5. The Sub-Committee held a total of nineteen meetings between 28 April and 11 October 1966. Owing to lack of time, the Sub-Committee was unable to consider the Territory of British Honduras. An account of the Sub-Committee's consideration of the remaining items referred to it, together with its conclusions and recommendations on them, which the Sub-Committee recommends to the Special Committee for adoption, are set out below.

^a The members of the Sub-Committee are: Bulgaria, Iran, Italy, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Uruguay and Venezuela.

I. IMPLEMENTATION OF GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 2069 (XX), INCLUDING THE QUESTION OF VISITING MISSIONS

Consideration by the Sub-Committee

6. The Sub-Committee considered this question at its 42nd to 44th meetings held on 5, 11 and 12 May.

7. At its 42nd meeting the Sub-Committee authorized the Chairman to get in touch with the representatives of the United Kingdom and the United States to ascertain the views of their Governments concerning the request of the General Assembly contained in operative paragraph 3 of resolution 2069 (XX).

8. At the 43rd meeting, the Chairman informed members of the Sub-Committee of the replies he had received from the representatives of the United Kingdom and the United States.

9. The representative of the United Kingdom had said that the question of visiting missions raised difficult problems of principle for his Government and that he could not say anything that might encourage the Sub-Committee to expect any changes in his Government's previously expressed attitude. His delegation would be prepared to transmit to the United Kingdom Government any specific request or suggestion from the Committee for a visit to a particular Territory, but that action could not be taken to imply any commitment that the United Kingdom Government would be able to respond to such a request.

10. The representative of the United States had said that he was not in a position to give a reply to the question of visiting missions in general. Any specific proposal from the Sub-Committee for a visit to a Territory for which the United States was responsible would be transmitted to his Government but he could not offer any encouragement that his Government would change its position.

11. After considering these replies, the Sub-Committee, at its 44th meeting, adopted by consensus a recommendation to the Special Committee. The representative of Italy expressed reservations concerning the usefulness of the recommendation.

12. The recommendation adopted by the Sub-Committee read as follows:

"The Sub-Committee recommends to the Special Committee that, in agreement with the position adopted on the question of visiting missions by the General Assembly at its twentieth session, as set out in paragraph 3 of resolution 2069 (XX) of 16 December 1965 and in the pertinent part of paragraph 7 of resolution 2105 (XX) of 20 December 1965, it invites the administering Powers, in cases where the special Committee may decide to send out visiting missions to any of the Territories being considered by Sub-Committee III, to make it possible for such visits to take place and to extend to them their co-operation. The relevant paragraphs of these resolutions read as follows:

"3. Requests the administering Powers to allow United Nations visiting missions to visit the Territories, and to extend to them full co-operation and assistance;" (resolution 2069 (XX))."

"7. Approves the programme of work envisaged by the Special Committee during 1966, including the possibility of holding a series of meetings in Africa and the sending of visiting groups to Territories, particularly in the Atlantic, Indian and Pacific Ocean areas;" (resolution 2105 (XX))."

13. This recommendation, which was presented to the Special Committee in an oral report by the Rapporteur, was adopted by the Special Committee at its 413th meeting on 13 May 1966.

II. UNITED STATES VIRGIN ISLANDS

A. Consideration by the Sub-Committee

Introduction

14. The Sub-Committee considered the Territory of the United States Virgin Islands at its 47th, 50th to 52nd and

55th to 57th meetings between 18 August and 16 September 1966.

15. The Sub-Committee had before it the working papers prepared by the Secretariat (see paras. 10-31 of chap. XXII).

16. In accordance with the procedure agreed upon by the Special Committee, the representative of the United States of America, as administering Power, participated in the work of the Sub-Committee at the invitation of the Chairman.

General statements

17. The representative of the *United States of America* said that the previous two years had been years of social and economic growth in the United States Virgin Islands. Although the Territory had a population of only about 50,000, local government revenues had increased from about \$25 million in the 1964 fiscal year to almost \$29 million in the 1965 fiscal year, and were still increasing. The *per capita* income of \$2,000 was the highest in the Caribbean and bank assets were up 35 per cent to over \$90 million. Wage scales continued to rise, and the volume of the tourist industry had increased to \$54 million in 1965. Construction had been almost completed on a large aluminium plant, to be operated in a complex with a petroleum refinery; the new plant would contribute towards the diversification of the economy. In addition, the Government of the Virgin Islands had purchased the water and power facilities of the Virgin Islands Corporation, a Federal Government agency which had been set up in the 1930's to help to stabilize the Territory's economy. The Corporation now retained only a small portion of its once impressive operations.

18. The number of pupils in the public schools had risen by 8 per cent in the previous year to more than 10,000, ninety-two new classrooms and twenty-six special facilities had been constructed during the previous four years and an additional 113 classrooms would be ready by the autumn of 1966. Pre-school training, adult education and apprenticeship training programmes had been instituted, and the first class of the College of the Virgin Islands had graduated in 1965. Public health programmes had continued to expand and hospital facilities had improved. A new youth care centre and a day care centre for pre-school children had been opened and federal funds had been used to institute, *inter alia*, a neighbourhood youth programme, an unskilled workers' training programme and a pre-school training programme (Operation Headstart). Housing under construction included low-income as well as middle-income rental units. With the help of funds provided by federally supported programmes, more than 1,000 housing units per year would be built to replace sub-standard housing.

19. The budget of the Government of the Virgin Islands for 1966 was more than \$42 million, an increase of more than \$6 million, most of which would be spent mainly on education, public works, health and public safety. Revenues for 1966 consisted of \$29.5 million from local sources, \$500,000 from the federal Medicare programme and federal matching funds of \$11,750,000, of which \$5 million was to be spent on educational improvements.

20. A Constitutional Convention had been convened in November 1964, at the request of the Virgin Islands Legislature, to review the Revised Organic Act of 1954 by which the Territory was governed. Those attending the Convention had included twenty-two delegates elected in November 1964 and the eleven members of the Legislature. Recommendations in the form of a proposed Second Revised Organic Act of the Virgin Islands had been transmitted to the President of the United States and to the United States Congress in July 1965. The Constitutional Convention had not recommended any drastic changes in the relationship of the Virgin Islands to the Federal Government, but it had suggested amendments to the Organic Act to give the people of the Territory greater control over local, political and fiscal affairs. The most significant recommendations provided for a popularly elected Governor and Lieutenant-Governor, responsible only to the electorate and removable only by impeachment, and for the revocation of the power of the President of the United States to veto local legislation. Draft legislation to give effect to the

recommendations had been passed by the House of Representatives and was currently being considered by the Senate. The Constitutional Convention had also recommended re-apportionment of the Virgin Islands Legislature to provide for the election of senators on the basis of equal representation, and legislation giving effect to the recommendation had already been passed by both houses of Congress. Other recommendations were being carefully considered by the United States Government. Some of them would require amendments to the Federal Constitution, such as a proposal to eliminate the power of Congress to annul acts of the Virgin Islands Legislature (a power which had in fact never been exercised since the Revised Organic Act of 1954 had taken effect) and proposals to provide a Virgin Islands representative in the United States House of Representatives and to permit Virgin Islanders to vote in United States national elections. The progress already made clearly showed the strong interest of the United States Government in ensuring self-determination for the people of the Virgin Islands.

21. The representative of *Bulgaria* said that very little information on the general political development of the United States Virgin Islands had been provided by the administering Power in the two years since the Territory had last been discussed in the Sub-Committee and the Special Committee. The Sub-Committee had not heard any petitioners, nor had it received any information on the Territory other than that provided by the administering Power. It should draw the attention of the Special Committee and the General Assembly to that abnormal situation, and every effort should be made to obtain further information from other sources, such as the international Press.

22. The provisions of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) had still not been applied to the United States Virgin Islands. The Constitutional Convention of 1964, which had proposed certain changes aimed at giving the population greater control over local affairs, had in no way changed the basic relationship between the Territory and the administering Power. Although the United States had tried to present the Convention as a means of implementing resolution 1514 (XV), it had in fact been given a narrow mandate which excluded any possibility of discussing the question of independence. It had been convened under Act No. 2082 of the Virgin Islands Legislature, which had been approved by the Governor in April 1964. Section 2 of that Act stated that the Convention could prepare and agree to amendments to the Revised Organic Act so as to give the people greater control of their own affairs. Clearly, the Act had not only precluded discussion of independence or another solution such as federation, but had actually pointed the way towards integration with the United States. It was significant that the first preambular paragraph of the Act referred to the examples of Alaska, Hawaii and Puerto Rico.

23. The United States representative had stated that some of the Convention's proposals were being studied by the United States Government, while others would require amendments to the Federal Constitution: in other words, action on all the main proposals had been deferred. Recent developments in the Territory had revealed a failure to carry out the Special Committee's recommendation that the provisions of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples should be fully applied to the Virgin Islands of the United States. That recommendation, together with the other conclusions and recommendations adopted by the Special Committee in 1964, was still valid and should be reaffirmed by the Sub-Committee.

24. The representative of the *United States of America* said that the members of the Constitutional Convention had been elected on the broadest possible basis, and it had been under no obligation to uphold the Territory's relationship with the administering Power. Far-reaching recommendations for local self-government had been made, but the Convention had been opposed to independence from the United States. That seemed to him a clear indication of the population's present views. However, the proposals did not preclude further constitutional advance for the Territory.

25. The Convention had not been precluded from making any recommendations on the Territory's relationship with the administering Power. The Act providing for the Convention had been passed by the Virgin Islands Legislature itself, and there had been no external pressure. The results of the Convention were a significant step in the Territory's constitutional development and a clear expression of the population's wishes for its future.

26. The representative of *Iran* agreed that it would be useful for the Sub-Committee to have additional information from sources other than the administering Power. If the information provided by the administering Power were insufficient, the Sub-Committee could perhaps recommend that the Special Committee repeat its suggestion for a visiting mission to the Territory.

27. The representative of *Bulgaria* pointed out that, under the Revised Organic Act of 31 December 1960, the Act which made provision for the Constitutional Convention had been, like all other Bills of the Virgin Islands Legislature, subject to the sanction and approval of the Governor appointed by the United States authorities, and was therefore, in effect, a United States Act. It might well be that the stipulations contained in the Act concerning the matters to be discussed by the Convention had been influenced by that fact. The effect of those stipulations was to allow decisions to be made on local administration only, without reference to the possibility of changing the dependent status of the Territory.

28. The representative of *Madagascar* said that economic and social conditions in the Territory were obviously satisfactory; there was a considerable degree of industrialization and *per capita* income was high. The recruitment of so many foreign non-agricultural workers, however, was a potential source of tension and he wondered why it was necessary. He agreed with previous speakers about the inadequacy of the information available to the Committee.

29. The representative of *Iran* asked the United States representative how many political parties had participated in the election of delegates to the Constitutional Convention and what the platforms of the various individuals had been. Had any proposals been made advocating independence for the Territory or some form of association or federation with other Territories in the region? What steps had the administering Power taken to inform the people of their rights under General Assembly resolutions 1514 (XV) and 1541 (XV)? And could a United States citizen be elected Governor of the Territory under the proposed legislation?

30. The representative of the *Ivory Coast* asked whether it would be possible to produce a list of complaints that might have been made by parties in the Territory. It was important for the Sub-Committee to know the political climate in the Territory and the aspirations of the people in order to gain a clearer picture of the situation.

31. The representative of *Uruguay* said that the position of the Bulgarian representative and that of the representative of *Iran* were complementary. The Bulgarian representative had pointed out that all the information available to the Sub-Committee had come from the administering Power. The representative of *Iran* had expressed the view that it would be useful to have information from sources other than the administering Power. The information from the administering Power had not been challenged or questioned. If members thought it necessary to secure information from other sources in order to take an objective decision, it might be a good idea to postpone the debate on the United States Virgin Islands until such information had been made available.

32. The representative of the *United States of America* said that, although the Act providing for the Convention had been sanctioned and approved by the Governor, that did not alter the fact that it had been enacted by the legal representatives of the people of the Territory, the Governor's approval being merely a normal part of the legislative process.

33. In reply to the representative of *Madagascar*, he explained that the reason why so many foreigners were recruited

for non-agricultural work in the Territory was that at the height of the tourist season the supply of local labour was inadequate to meet the demand.

34. The representative of *Bulgaria* said the requirement that the Governor should approve all bills passed by the Virgin Islands Legislature was no mere formality; under the Revised Organic Act of 31 December 1960 the Executive Power of the Virgin Islands was "vested in an executive officer whose official title shall be the Governor of the Virgin Islands" and was to be exercised under the supervision of the United States Government. Moreover, the Governor held office "at the pleasure of the President" and might "veto any legislation as provided in this Act". The final approval of legislation was, therefore, in the hands of the administering Power.

35. The representative of *Uruguay* said that, when the Act convening the Constitutional Convention had been adopted, the United States, through the Executive's veto power, had clearly possessed a means of bringing pressure to bear on the Legislature of the Virgin Islands. His delegation feared that the people's right to express their views freely on their future status might be limited. He asked the United States representative whether, if free elections in the Territory revealed an overwhelming desire for unconditional independence, that decision would require an Act of the United States Congress to make it effective.

36. The representative of *Bulgaria* observed that the delegates to the Convention had proposed, not only that the Governor should be an elected official, but that his power to veto local legislation should be abolished. That was an indication that the population of the Territory objected to existing restrictions on its Legislature's freedom of action.

37. The representative of the *United States of America* said that his delegation hoped that the proposals for changing the Governor's status would be approved by the United States Congress in the near future. They had already been passed by the House of Representatives and were awaiting Senate approval.

38. The representative of *Uruguay* said that his delegation was gratified to know that one of the Territory's essential requirements for self-government was on the way to fulfilment. He hoped that the United States representative would include in the additional information he was to supply to the Sub-Committee an indication of when Senate approval for the measure in question might be expected.

39. The representative of *Italy* said that his delegation had found the questions put to the representative of the administering Power at the previous meeting by the representatives of *Iran*, *Uruguay* and *Madagascar* particularly useful as an indication of the kind of information the Sub-Committee needed for its work. The existing constitutional status of the Territory gave grounds for concern and it was to be hoped that the proposals made by the constitutional convention of 1965 concerning the election of the Governor would shortly be passed by the United States Congress. The abolition of the Governor's veto power would be a particularly important advance.

40. The interest shown by members of the Sub-Committee in current political developments in the United States Virgin Islands was an indication that they realized that their main task lay not in discussing the past history of colonial territories but in endeavouring to provide a better future for them. The Sub-Committee should accordingly encourage the administering Power to continue its current line of action, which was bound to culminate in self-determination for the people of the Territory.

41. The representative of *Venezuela* said that, although there was little information on the Territory, his delegation appreciated the efforts of the United States representative to fill in the gaps and to present a report on general developments.

42. He reviewed the most important proposals put forward by the 1964 Constitutional Convention and expressed the hope that they would be carried out by the administering Power without undue delay, thus fulfilling the freely expressed aspi-

rations of the islanders. The Sub-Committee should be informed concerning the various stages in the process of implementation.

43. The data made available to the Sub-Committee indicated that the people of the United States Virgin Islands were enjoying the benefits of an expanding economy; *per capita* income amounted to \$2,000. He was confident that the Territory's economic health, together with the increased participation of the islanders in political life, would rapidly prepare them to make a sound choice of their future political status.

44. The representative of the *United States of America* expressed his delegation's full agreement with the premise that the process of self-determination required that the population of a Territory should be informed regarding the options available to it in deciding its future political status and should be enabled to express its choice freely through reliable channels. Under the 1954 Revised Organic Act, the Legislature of the United States Virgin Islands had full powers to deal with all subjects of local application not inconsistent with the Act itself or with United States laws applicable to the Territory. It was precluded from enacting any law which might impair United States treaty rights and from taxing the property of non-residents at a higher rate than the property of residents of the Islands. It enjoyed full autonomy with regard to the raising, control and disposition of funds, with the sole exception of taxes collected in the United States on rum imported from the Islands, and although the United States Government had never exercised its right in that respect the 1964 Constitutional Convention had proposed that it should formally waive it. The Organic Act, which was the present "Constitution" of the Virgin Islands, had been legislated by the United States Congress after full consultation of the population, including hearings and a referendum. The fact that proposals to amend the Act were subject to approval by the United States Congress merely indicated that the political evolution of the Territory towards self-determination was to be worked out between the islanders and the Federal Government, as had been the case in other former colonial territories, with the notable exception of the illegal Smith régime in Southern Rhodesia. The report of the Constitutional Convention was actually a complete redraft of the Organic Act; it called for a significant increase in internal self-government.

45. It had been suggested in the Sub-Committee that the Governor of the Islands, as an appointed official of the United States Government and by virtue of his power to veto legislation, served as an instrument of the Federal Government to inhibit genuine local initiatives. The experience of the islanders, however, and the report of the Governor himself appeared to refute that suggestion. The Governor, who had been born and brought up in the Islands, gave priority to the paramount interests of the inhabitants in the exercise of his powers. He had described the Constitutional Convention's proposals for increased local autonomy as a sensible and practical document which should serve as the basic law of the Territory and had urged the United States Congress to approve it as a means of granting measures of home rule to the Islands. He had taken the lead in recommending that the Convention's proposal for a popularly elected Governor should be approved by the Federal Government, and indeed that recommendation had the full support of the United States. Any United States citizen—and the Virgin Islanders were all United States citizens—with five years' residence in the Territory would be eligible to stand as candidate for Governor.

46. The Constitutional Convention which had produced the proposals for drastic changes in the Territory's political and constitutional structure had been the result of an initiative freely taken by the Legislature, and the elected representatives had themselves established the scope of the Convention's debates. The enabling legislation had not precluded discussion of changes in the relationship between the Islands and the United States and the resolution adopted by the Convention on political status showed that the Convention had not regarded that problem as beyond its competence. On the other hand, it had focused its attention on political steps which

would strengthen its constitutional development towards self-determination rather than on drastic changes in that relationship. It had sought to perfect the Legislature as a channel through which to express the people's final views concerning their future status, but it had in no way forfeited the opportunity to suggest changes in that status.

47. The Constitutional Convention had consisted of thirty-three members, twenty-two elected from the population at large and eleven were the legislators. Any islander who obtained twenty-five signatures of registered voters had been eligible for nomination. Three political parties had campaigned actively in the elections. The Democratic Party had elected sixteen members, the Republican Party had elected one at-large member and the Virgin Islands Party had elected one at-large member, and two members from St. Croix. Two members had been elected on an independent basis without party affiliation. Of the legislators elected, six represented the "mortar and pestle" faction of the Democratic Party, while five represented the opposing "donkey" faction. Independence from the United States had not been an important campaign issue because there appeared to be little or no agitation in that direction. There was no reason, however, why independence could not become an issue at any time; the islanders were entirely free to campaign for it, particularly since they had been made fully aware of the options suggested in General Assembly resolutions 1514 (XV) and 1541 (XV). Though direct and frequent communication with residents of the other Caribbean islands and with thousands of tourists, they were in an excellent position to develop political sophistication.

48. The importation of migrant labour was necessary to meet employment demands during the peak tourist season. Under United States law, however, employers of migrant labour had to justify their requests by proving to the local authorities that suitable workers were not available in the Islands themselves.

49. Important political steps were being taken by the Virgin Islands to accelerate their evolution towards self-determination. Specific evidence of that steady progress was to be found in the announcement on 31 August 1966 that the President of the United States had signed into law a bill for the reappointment of the Legislature with a view to rendering it more representative. That proposal had been one of the major recommendations of the Constitutional Convention.

50. The representative of *Venezuela* asked what further measures had been taken by the United States Government to give effect to the proposals of the Constitutional Convention.

51. The representative of the *United States of America* replied that the Executive Branch of the United States Government had submitted to the Congress draft bills providing for a popularly elected Governor and Lieutenant Governor for the Islands and for the elimination of the President's power to veto local legislation. The House of Representatives had already passed those bills; they were now being considered by the Senate. The Congress also had before it legislation which would liberalize the authority of the Virgin Islands Legislature to raise funds by means of a bond issue. The proposals to provide a Virgin Islands representative in the United States House of Representatives, to allow the Virgin Islanders to vote in United States elections and to eliminate the unused power of the United States Congress to veto decisions of the Virgin Islands Legislature were still pending. They would require amendment of the United States Constitution.

52. The representative of *Bulgaria* asked how the national income of the Virgin Islands was distributed among the professional, employee, worker, farmer and business groups of the population. He also wished to know whether the ownership of property was open to all on an equal basis, who owned the various tourist organizations and the degree of participation in ownership and management of United States personnel and indigenous Virgin Islanders respectively. Finally, he would welcome information concerning the number of indigenous inhabitants enrolled in primary and secondary schools and in institutions of higher education.

53. The representative of the *United States of America* said that he would try to obtain the detailed information sought by members of the Sub-Committee; he did not know, however, whether such information as statistics of income distribution by occupation was available. The figure of *per capita* income in the United States Virgin Islands had been intended to indicate the general income level of the Territory and his delegation realized that it did not give a complete picture of income levels within different classes of occupation. On the subject of public funds spent on education, housing and other social fields, his delegation considered that the statistics given in his introductory statement on the Territory were convincing proof that an impressive part of the wealth generated in the Islands was being used by the Government for the broad benefit of the islanders.

54. The representative of *Iran* said that the political developments in the Territory were even more important than the significant economic, social and educational progress that had been made. The changes proposed by the Constitutional Convention would, if accepted in their entirety by the United States Government, give the islanders a greater measure of self-government; the procedures used in the election of delegates to that Convention were not, however, altogether satisfactory. It was not clear whether the people had been informed of the various forms of political status open to them such as integration, free association, federation and independence. Even in the case of Barbados, which had decided to become independent, the possibility of federation had been discussed at some length in the Sub-Committee. The Sub-Committee was also aware that, in the case of the British Virgin Islands, there had once been a desire to join with the United States Virgin Islands. Moreover, the General Assembly, by endorsing the Special Committee's conclusions of 1964, had drawn attention to this matter when it had stated that the people of the small Caribbean Territories might wish to avail themselves of one of the forms mentioned in General Assembly resolution 1541 (XV) in pursuit of the aims of resolution 1514 (XV). There would have been no such doubt if the administering Power had permitted some degree of international supervision of the procedure for ascertaining the wishes of the people, as the New Zealand authorities had done in the case of the elections in the Cook Islands. It was to be hoped that the administering Power would bear those considerations in mind in the future and provide an opportunity for the people of the Territory to obtain the constitutional status most suitable for their needs.

55. The representative of the *Ivory Coast* said that his delegation was surprised at the vehemence of the resolution on the status of the Territory adopted by the Convention (see para. 15 of chap. XXII) and wondered why the delegates had considered it necessary to be so emphatic. It might be helpful to the Sub-Committee to hear the views of the administering Power on the prospect of independence for the Territory.

56. The representative of the *United States of America* said that his Government believed in the right of the Virgin Islands to independence or any other solution the islanders might wish. Indeed, the purpose of the changes in the existing form of government was to provide the population with the fullest possible opportunity of expressing its wishes in that respect. His delegation was convinced that, at the time of the election of delegates to the Convention, the people of the Territory had been well aware of all the alternative forms of constitutional status which might be chosen.

57. The representative of *Bulgaria* said that the policy of the administering Power barred the possibility of any other choice than the integration of the Territory with the United States. His delegation still believed that the administering Power's potential veto on legislation had had the effect of limiting the subjects to be discussed at the Convention.

58. The representative of *Uruguay* observed that the principle of decolonization implied consideration of the concept of self-determination, which in the case of small Territories could be any of the forms defined in General Assembly resolution 1541 (XV). In the Sub-Committee's study of such

Territories, requests for detailed information on such matters as the distribution of income were therefore justified in so far as they were intended to establish the Territory's economic viability, but not if they were intended to determine the political form which the future nation was likely to adopt. It was sufficient for the purposes of the Sub-Committee to establish whether the existing political, economic and social system provided the people with a reasonable standard of living and adequate means of political expression. The arrangements described by the United States representative for the election of delegates to the Constitutional Convention appeared to his delegation to have been such as to insure a genuinely representative assembly and the form of autonomy described in the resolution passed by the Convention seemed to be what the Virgin Islanders genuinely desired; however hybrid members of the Sub-Committee might consider it, it was not inconsistent with the principles laid down in resolution 1541 (XV) which the Sub-Committee had a duty to interpret in conjunction with resolution 1514 (XV) in the case of Territories to which both resolutions were applicable.

59. The representative of *Bulgaria* said that the basic document in matters of decolonization was General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) and his delegation had always been opposed to any attempt to accord the same importance to resolution 1541 (XV), which had a limited objective. The right of peoples to self-determination and independence was sacred and a territory which was not independent could not enjoy the full exercise of its rights in accordance with resolution 1514 (XV).

60. The question of the distribution of wealth in the Territory was an important one, because *per capita* income figures might be insufficient to give a general idea of earnings in Territories with small populations. He pointed out that under Article 73 of the Charter administering Powers had the obligation to provide information on economic and social advancement in Territories under their administration, and members had the right, and even the duty, to elicit as much information as possible.

61. The representative of *Iran* held that the Sub-Committee's work must be based on General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) and that the right of peoples to self-determination and independence was inalienable. The Sub-Committee had two principal tasks: to ensure that peoples regained their sovereignty and to verify, if possible by some impartial international presence, that genuine sovereignty had indeed been regained. Once that had been done, small Territories with small populations, where economic and geographic conditions might warrant a status such as federation or association, should be free to choose the future best suited to them. General Assembly resolution 1541 (XV) provided a guide for such forms of status and the Sub-Committee had itself stated in 1964 (A/5800/Rev.1, chap. XXV, annex, para. 102) that it might be desirable for the peoples of a number of Caribbean Territories to bear in mind the forms mentioned in resolution 1541 (XV) in their achievement of the objectives of resolution 1514 (XV).

62. The representative of *Italy* said that the further information provided by the United States representative strengthened his delegation's view that important political developments were taking place in the United States Virgin Islands and that the Sub-Committee should encourage the administering Power to continue its current line of action.

B. Adoption of the report

Voting

63. The Sub-Committee considered its conclusions and recommendations on the Territory (see para. 74 below) at its 55th and 57th meetings on 15 and 16 September 1966.

64. Sub-paragraphs (1) to (5) and (8) of the conclusions and recommendations were adopted by consensus, while sub-paragraphs (6) and (7) were adopted by voting, as follows:

(a) In sub-paragraph (6), the words "without precluding the possibilities contained in General Assembly resolution 1541 (XV)" were voted on separately at the request of the repre-

representative of Bulgaria. The Sub-Committee adopted these words by 6 votes to 1.

(b) In sub-paragraph (7), the two sentences were voted upon separately by roll-call at the request of the representative of Bulgaria. The Sub-Committee adopted the first sentence by a roll-call vote of 7 to none, as follows:

In favour: Bulgaria, Iran, Italy, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Uruguay, Venezuela.

Against: None.

(c) The Sub-Committee adopted the second sentence by a roll-call vote of 6 to 1, as follows:

In favour: Iran, Italy, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Uruguay, Venezuela.

Against: Bulgaria

(d) The Sub-Committee adopted sub-paragraph (7), as a whole, by 6 votes to 1.

65. The Sub-Committee adopted its conclusions and recommendations, as a whole, by 6 votes to none, with 1 abstention.

Statements by members on sub-paragraph (6)

66. The representative of *Bulgaria* stated that he was firmly opposed to the inclusion of any reference to General Assembly resolution 1541 (XV). This resolution related only to the transmission of information by the administering Power. The task of the Special Committee was quite different, since it involved helping peoples to exercise their right to self-determination and independence in accordance with General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV). These two resolutions were in no sense complementary and they had never been interpreted in conjunction with one another. Resolution 1514 (XV) provided full guarantees that the people could choose their future in freedom.

67. The representative of *Italy* said that it was not quite accurate to say that the two resolutions in question had never been linked. He would draw the Sub-Committee's attention to the 1964 report of the Special Committee (A/5800/Rev.1, chap. XXV, para. 310) in which the latter pointed out, in the general conclusions concerning the United States Virgin Islands, that "in a world characterized by the integrationist movement, it might be desirable for the peoples of these [i.e., small] Territories to bear in mind the forms mentioned in resolution 1541 (XV) in their achievement of the objectives of resolution 1514 (XV)". The problem of the small Territories had begun to arise two years before, and a certain procedure for dealing with them had grown up and could not now be abandoned, even supposing that it had not been the General Assembly's intention, in adopting resolution 1541, to regard that text as one which interpreted resolution 1514.

68. The representative of *Uruguay* said that it was of great importance that General Assembly resolution 1541 (XV) should be mentioned in sub-paragraph 6 as well as resolution 1514 (XV). Even if those two texts were seemingly contradictory, it would be necessary to make every effort to give them as harmonious an interpretation as possible. The fact was, however, that the two resolutions were quite reconcilable—which was not at all surprising since they had been adopted by the Assembly in the space of two days. Resolution 1514 (XV) stated general principles, while in resolution 1541 (XV) an effort had been made to take into account the special case of the small Territories and to describe the ways in which such Territories could become associated with other countries without any detriment to the principle of independence. He recalled that, in practice, in the case of other small Territories, the idea of federation, far from being opposed, had been advocated and that the administering Power concerned had even been asked to encourage the creation of a federation. That being said, the Uruguayan delegation had no intention of telling the peoples concerned what road they should follow. Its observations belonged exclusively to the realm of principle.

69. The representative of *Madagascar* thought that a reference to resolution 1541 (XV) might restrict the choices open to the inhabitants of the United States Virgin Islands and that the alternative enumerated in it were already provided

for in resolution 1514 (XV). However, in a spirit of compromise, he was willing to support the proposal that had been made to the Sub-Committee.

Statements by members on sub-paragraph (7)

70. The representative of *Bulgaria* said that while the idea of a United Nations presence during the exercise of the right of self-determination, as mentioned in the second sentence of sub-paragraph (7), was acceptable in principle, the present situation in the Territory was such that the inhabitants were not in a position to decide their future political status in complete freedom. Ever since the United States had assumed power in the Virgin Islands, the economic, political and military organization of the Territory had been planned with a view to association with the administering Power or annexation. In those circumstances there was every reason to fear that United Nations participation in the holding of a plebiscite might commit it to giving its sanction to a ready-made solution prepared by the administering Power. Only when the report of a visiting mission was available would it be possible to determine whether fresh measures were required in accordance with the relevant decisions of the United Nations.

71. The representative of *Iran* said that the Special Committee must bear in mind that its task was to bring about speedy implementation of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) with respect to all colonies, including small Territories. The small Territories, however, because of their peculiar circumstances, such as the smallness of their size and population and the nature of their economies, were most vulnerable to outside pressure, in particular, that applied by the administering Power. Under those circumstances, a United Nations presence was indispensable to ensure that the people of the Territory concerned were enabled to exercise their right of self-determination in freedom and without restrictions. A United Nations presence would be the only possible course of action to ascertain whether or not the people's decision corresponded with their freely expressed wishes.

72. He could not agree that in the case of the United States Virgin Islands, a United Nations presence would serve merely as a rubber stamp device. He had greater confidence in the integrity of the members. Nor could he agree that the people were so dependent on the United States that they would, under any circumstances, vote in exactly the same manner as desired by the United States. While the United Nations was not in a position to influence people's subconscious behaviour or motivation, what it could do and must do, however, was to provide the necessary conditions conducive to an atmosphere under which the people would be enabled to decide on their future status in freedom and without restrictions. This could be done only if an impartial, international body was in a position to supervise and guarantee that the referendum or the exercise of the right of self-determination was carried out in full freedom and without any restrictions. This proposal was not new since the Special Committee had already decided on the need for a United Nations presence in other Territories, such as Aden and South West Africa.

73. The representative of *Uruguay* said that the remarks of the Bulgarian representative were tinged with pessimism. They seemed to question the authority of the United Nations and to imply that the material, economic and political power of the United States would outweigh the legal prestige and authority of the United Nations. He reaffirmed his faith in the United Nations and would continue to fight for the application of United Nations procedures. Explaining his vote on sub-paragraph (7), the representative of Uruguay said that if the suggestion of the representative of Bulgaria to delete the second sentence had had the unanimous support of the Sub-Committee, he would have preferred that solution; however, since that had not been the case, he had been obliged to vote on the two parts of the sub-paragraph in question in the manner he had.

C. Conclusions and recommendations

74. The Sub-Committee recommends to the Special Committee that it adopt the following conclusions and recommendations:

(1) The Special Committee recalls its conclusions and recommendations concerning the Territory which it adopted in 1964 and which were endorsed by the General Assembly at its twentieth session.

(2) It reaffirms that the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples applies fully to the Territory.

(3) It notes the information provided by the administering Power concerning the Constitutional Convention which met between December 1964 and February 1965 and which proposed a new Organic Act for the Territory providing for a greater degree of autonomy.

(4) It also notes that, so far, the administering Power has taken final action on only one of the proposals made by the Convention and that the proposal for an elected Governor has not yet been passed into law.

(5) It regrets that despite some measure of advancement in the political field the administering Power has not yet implemented the Declaration with respect to the Territory and urges it to do so without delay.

(6) It reaffirms the right of the people to exercise their right of self-determination in complete freedom and reiterates its previous recommendation inviting the administering Power to ensure that the people of the Territory be enabled, in complete freedom and without any restrictions, to express their wishes concerning the future political status of the Territory. It also invites the administering Power to ensure that the people of the Territory are fully aware of the various alternatives open to them, without precluding the possibilities contained in General Assembly resolution 1541 (XV), in their achievement of the objectives of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV).

(7) It reiterates its belief that the United Nations must be assured that the exercise of the right of self-determination is undertaken in complete freedom and in full knowledge of the available choices. It therefore considers that a United Nations presence during the procedures for the exercise of the right of self-determination is indispensable.

(8) The Special Committee regrets that the administering Power has not agreed to a visiting mission from the Special Committee to the Territory and affirms that a visit to this Territory is both useful and necessary. Accordingly, it invites the co-operation of the administering Power to enable the United Nations to send a visiting mission to the Territory, in order to obtain first-hand information concerning the Territory and to ascertain the views of the people and the extent to which they are aware of the options open to them, with regard to their future political status.

III. BRITISH VIRGIN ISLANDS, BARBADOS, ANTIGUA, DOMINICA, GRENADA, MONTSEERRAT, ST. KITTS-NEVIS-ANGUILLA, ST. LUCIA AND ST. VINCENT

A. Consideration by the Sub-Committee

Introduction

75. The Sub-Committee considered these Territories at the meetings indicated below:

<i>Territory</i>	<i>Meetings</i>
Barbados	46th-49th, 59th
Montserrat and the British Virgin Islands	48th, 51st, 52nd, 57th-59th
Antigua, Dominica, Grenada, St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, St. Lucia and St. Vincent	53rd, 59th

76. The Sub-Committee had before it working papers prepared by the Secretariat (see paras. 32-193 of chapter XXII). Members of the Sub-Committee also heard the statement by the petitioner from Grenada, Mr. Gairy, Leader of the Opposition, made at the 463rd meeting of the Special Committee on 7 September 1966.

77. In accordance with the procedure agreed upon by the Special Committee, the representative of the United Kingdom,

as administering Power, participated in the work of the Sub-Committee on these Territories, at the invitation of the Chairman.

General statements

(a) Barbados

78. The representative of the *United Kingdom* said that Barbados was the largest and most populous of the eight Caribbean island Territories which had been dealt with together by the Sub-Committee in 1964. At that time, the United Kingdom representative had given a full description of the historical, economic and political background to the situation in Barbados and of the efforts then in progress to see whether a basis for agreement could be found on a new federation between the eight Territories—Barbados and the Windward and Leeward Islands. It had been and still was the view of his Government that closer association between those Territories offered the best future prospect for the area. The matter was, however, one which had to be decided by the Territories themselves and it had become clear, after long and intricate negotiations, that no basis for agreement on a federation or other form of association could for the time being be found. In August 1965 the Barbados Government had issued a White Paper announcing that, in those circumstances, it intended to seek separate independence.

79. The developments which had led to the holding of the recent Constitutional Conference in London were described in a Secretariat working paper (see paras. 158-167 of chap. XXII). The most important decision of that Conference was contained in the Colonial Secretary's statement on 1 July 1966 announcing the agreement of the United Kingdom Government that Barbados should become independent on 30 November 1966.

80. The Barbados delegation to the Conference had included representatives of the government party—the Democratic Labour Party—and of the two opposition parties represented in the Legislature. All three parties were agreed that Barbados should secure separate independence and should become a full member of the Commonwealth.

81. The Conference had been faced with the unusual task of constructing a written independence constitution for a Territory which, in its long history of democratic government, with a legislature dating back to 1627, had developed a Constitution largely based on convention, like that of the parent country. It was therefore inevitable that there should have been differences of opinion between the Barbados political parties about the inclusion or omission of individual provisions, on some of which it had proved impossible to achieve unanimity. The new Constitution, however, followed very closely the draft submitted by the Barbados Government and was similar to those of other former United Kingdom Territories which had become independent.

82. The Constitution would include provisions governing citizenship, fundamental human rights, the appointment and functions of a Governor-General to represent the Queen, who would be the Head of State, Parliament, the Executive, the judicature, the Public Service and the service commissions, and finance. Many of the basic provisions, including those relating to the alteration of the Constitution itself, would be entrenched—in other words, special procedures would be laid down for their amendment. The main points on which the opposition parties had recorded their disagreement were the composition of the Senate (the non-elected Upper House), the non-entrenchment of the provisions governing the qualifications and disqualifications for membership of the House of Assembly (the fully elective Lower House) and the absence of any provision for constituency arrangements and elections and boundary commissions.

83. A matter of special interest in relation to the agreed date of independence was that, under the terms of the Constitution, the life of a Legislature would continue to be limited to five years and writs for a new election would be returnable within ninety days. The dissolution of the existing Legislature, which dated from 19 December 1961, would therefore be due not later than 19 December 1966.

84. Barbados would thus become, after Jamaica and Trinidad, the third of the ten islands which had earlier formed The Federation of the West Indies to achieve separate independence. The Government of the Territory did not, however, intend that independence should prevent association with the remaining islands of the Federation in the future. It had, in fact, already entered into a free trade area with Guyana and Antigua.

85. Despite its small size and population, Barbados had a comparatively thriving economy and was proud of never having had to rely on external support of its budget. Its people had made a valuable contribution to the development of the many countries in which they had settled, while retaining a justifiable pride in their homeland. The Sub-Committee would undoubtedly wish to associate itself with his delegation's good wishes to Barbados for its future as a full member of the international community.

86. The representative of *Uruguay* said that although his delegation believed that the best future prospects for the Caribbean Territories lay in some form of federation or association, the failure of the prolonged negotiations between Barbados and the Windward and Leeward Islands to produce a basis for agreement indicated that hopes of establishing such a federation would have to be abandoned, at least for the time being. The decision of the Barbados Government to seek separate independence had the support of the opposition parties in the Legislature and, in any event, the independence Constitution contained provisions for constitutional amendments to permit Barbados to enter into an association with other members of the Commonwealth at some future date, if it so desired. His delegation believed, however, that those provisions should have been made subject to a two-thirds majority vote, rather than to a simple majority.

87. One of the things the members of the Special Committee had learned from their work was that the accession to independence of a Territory was no longer a purely political issue; a Territory's prospects of achieving economic self-sufficiency within a reasonable period after independence were at least as important as its desire for liberty, since every newly independent nation had to be in a position to resist both the political and the economic pressures of stronger Powers. Barbados was clearly in a satisfactory position in that respect: its economy was soundly based and the Sub-Committee should have no hesitation in approving its elected representatives' decision to seek separate independence.

88. The representative of *Venezuela* remarked that Venezuela, as a close neighbour of Barbados, was particularly gratified that the island was shortly to become independent. He was confident that Barbados would continue, after independence, to consolidate its democratic institutions. The achievement of independence by yet another Caribbean island was a further step towards the complete elimination of colonialism from the Western Hemisphere.

89. The wide measure of political agreement among the people of the Territory offered the best possible prospect for its future political, economic and social progress and he was certain that those responsible for its future destinies would do their utmost to smooth out such differences as existed.

90. His delegation congratulated the Government and people of Barbados on their achievement and the United Kingdom on its contribution towards such a historic event.

91. The representative of *Italy* said that his delegation was gratified at recent developments in Barbados and at the administering Power's agreement to grant it independence. He shared the view that independence in association with neighbouring Territories might have offered better prospects for the area as a whole and hoped that what has proved not to be possible now will become a reality in the future. In this connexion he noted that the requirement of a two-thirds majority provided by the Constitution for altering some basic provisions does not apply to amendments giving constitutional effect to arrangements under which Barbados is to join with any other country or territory within the Commonwealth.

92. He expressed his delegation's good wishes to the people of Barbados and said he would look forward with in-

terest to the elections which were to be held in the island shortly before or after the date of independence.

93. The representative of *Bulgaria* said that, as in 1964, the only information available on the Caribbean Territories under United Kingdom administration had come from the administering Power. The Special Committee and the Sub-Committee could not carry out their task successfully unless they could send visiting missions to those Territories.

94. The United Kingdom representative had stated that, in his Government's view, closer association between Barbados and the Windward and Leeward Islands offered the best future prospect for the area. He had then passed on to the question of Barbados alone without explaining why the idea of federation had been abandoned, at least for the time being. The question could not be set aside so easily. According to the information provided by the Secretariat, a series of constitutional conferences had been held for each Territory separately. The Governments of six of the Territories had concluded separate agreements with the administering Power resulting, in most cases, in increased local control of internal affairs while the United Kingdom continued to be responsible for foreign affairs and defence. The United Kingdom had agreed to grant independence to Barbados on 30 November 1966. In 1964, the Special Committee had stated that there appeared to be general agreement on the granting of immediate independence to the Windward and Leeward Islands and Barbados and the formation of a federation. It had also pointed out that the peoples of the British West Indies were of the same ethnic origin and had a common language and culture (A/5800/Rev.1, chap. XXV, paras. 327 and 323). It had been clear in 1964 that the only obstacle to the creation of independent States or an independent federation was the precarious economic situation of the Territories, whose budgets were subsidized by the administering Power. It was the administering Power which was responsible for that economic situation and the Territories could not become genuinely independent States unless the United Kingdom repaid, at least in part, what it had taken out of them during centuries of colonial occupation. As the representative of Trinidad and Tobago had said at the Sub-Committee's 9th meeting, if the only financial assistance to be received was that being considered by the administering Power which was responsible for that economic no solution in sight (*ibid.*, chap. XXV, annex, para. 68). That was why years of negotiations had only resulted in constitutional arrangements which prolonged the dependence of the Territories. The Chief Minister of St. Kitts had perhaps expressed the feelings of other participants in the constitutional conferences when he had said that the agreements concluded had been the best that could be achieved in the circumstances but that they were not entirely satisfactory since the real aim was the formation of a single Caribbean nation.

95. The main conclusions and recommendations which the Special Committee had formulated in 1964 remained valid, in particular that contained in chapter XXV, paragraph 322 of its report (A/5800/Rev.1), namely, that the provisions of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) should be applied in the Territories in accordance with the fully expressed will of the population. In the light of operative paragraphs 2 and 5 of that resolution, he did not think that constitutional conferences were the best way of ascertaining the people's wishes. The popular consultation envisaged in resolution 1514 (XV) was not a mere formality, but was the first sovereign act of a people enjoying its inalienable right of self-determination. It was for the people to appoint representatives to draw up the constitution of a new, independent and sovereign State for the people's approval. In some cases opposition parties had left constitutional conferences convened by the United Kingdom, which had then concluded arrangements with a minority government; in other cases, either the opposition or both the opposition and the Government had been forced to accept conditions imposed by the administering Power. All the new arrangements for the Caribbean Territories had been agreed upon at constitutional conferences.

96. The people of Barbados had lived with the idea of a federation, but the island was to be granted independence as a

separate State since it was the only one capable of balancing its budget without help from the administering Power. His delegation would do everything possible to assist the people of the Windward and Leeward Islands, as well as Barbados, to achieve genuine independence. There was considerable division of opinion in Barbados on the question of independence without federation; the opposition party and a large body of public opinion had asked for general elections so that the people could express their views on their future status. Instead of arranging for the election of a representative Assembly to draft a new constitution, the United Kingdom had convened a Constitutional Conference to discuss a draft constitution drawn up without the participation of the opposition, which had nevertheless felt obliged to take part in the Conference. The Chairman of the Conference, who was a representative of the administering Power, had not accepted any of the opposition's proposals concerning important questions such as amendments to the constitution. Thus, the administering Power was imposing on the people of Barbados a constitution drawn up under its influence. In addition, there was every reason to believe that the Government would organize elections after independence, rather than before, with the result that the new Assembly would be bound by constitutional arrangements concluded under the colonial régime. In view of those circumstances, his delegation felt a certain apprehension over the conditions on which the administering Power was preparing to grant independence to Barbados.

97. The representative of *Madagascar* fully endorsed the detailed and well-documented comments made by the representative of *Bulgaria*. The decision of the people of Barbados to accede to separate independence was in line with the principles expressed in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), since it appeared that the majority of the people of the Territory were in favour of the new Constitution. As the representative of *Bulgaria* had rightly pointed out, the Caribbean Territories had a common culture and heritage, and while agreement on federation was not possible at the moment, it was to be hoped that separate independence for Barbados would represent only a transitory stage towards some kind of association. He would, however, welcome further information from the United Kingdom representative regarding the decision by Barbados to seek separate independence and the likelihood that some form of federation or association with the other Caribbean Territories would eventually be possible. He would also welcome information concerning the kind of links that independent Barbados would have with the Commonwealth after it acceded to independence.

98. The Sub-Committee should devote more of its attention to the economic and financial implications of independence. It seemed that, even after independence, Barbados would still remain economically dependent to some extent on the United Kingdom since, unlike the United States Virgin Islands, whose economy was based on light industries, some of which catered to the export trade, the economy of Barbados was dominated by a single crop, accounting for the major portion of its exports. The question of the industrial development of Barbados should therefore be given careful consideration by the Sub-Committee. Furthermore, some kind of economic association among the Territories in question, perhaps an economic and customs union, might well do much to consolidate the political independence of the country.

99. The representative of *Iran* welcomed the fact that Barbados would accede to independence on 30 November 1966 in accordance with the principles of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV). Independence for Barbados would mark another step forward towards the complete elimination of colonialism in the western hemisphere. The United Kingdom representative had pointed out that, despite its small size and population, Barbados had a thriving economy and had therefore never had to rely on external support of its budget. He himself felt, however, that when considering those small Territories which were not economically viable or which were too small to accede to separate independence, the United Nations should act with extreme caution and ensure that the administering Power had done all that was necessary to inform

the peoples of the various Territories concerning the types of independent status to which they could accede. Furthermore, the United Nations should ensure that any decision on the future of any Territory should be made by the people of that Territory in accordance with its freely expressed wishes.

100. He himself would have preferred Barbados to join in a federation with the Windward and Leeward Islands. However, the representative of the administering Power had stated that agreement on a federation was not possible for the moment. He would like to know whether the peoples of the Caribbean Territories had been properly consulted on the matter and to what extent they had been informed of the advantages or disadvantages of independence. It was fortunate that in Barbados separate independence had been chosen by representatives of all shades of opinion.

101. He would welcome further information on the apparently vast area of authority which was reserved for the Governor-General. Under the new Constitution, the appointment and dismissal of the Governor-General was within the power and authority of the British Crown. He would like to know the extent to which that relationship derogated from the sovereignty and independence of the people of Barbados.

102. In conclusion, he expressed his best wishes to the Government and people of Barbados for a prosperous and successful future. He was confident that independence would enable them to develop the country to the fullest extent possible.

103. The representative of the *United Kingdom*, replying to the representative of *Bulgaria*, said that he would answer many of the points raised concerning the Windward and Leeward Islands when he dealt with those Territories. The representative of *Bulgaria* had been highly selective in many of his remarks about the statements made by the representative of *Trinidad and Tobago* at the Sub-Committee's ninth meeting, for he had ignored the United Kingdom representative's comments on the questions raised by the representative of *Trinidad*, in the United Kingdom's statement of 15 May 1964 in the Sub-Committee.

104. He would repeat what he had said concerning the timing of elections in Barbados, namely, that it was for the duly elected Government of Barbados and not the administering Power to decide on the date of elections. As for the question of separate independence or federation, as the Colonial Secretary had said on 1 July 1966, all parties at the Constitutional Conference were in agreement that, for the time being, association was not feasible and they had therefore concurred in the proposal that Barbados should proceed to separate independence.

105. In reply to questions put by the representatives of *Venezuela* and *Madagascar*, he said that a series of consultations on the possibility of a federation had been held between the Governments of the Territories concerned, some of which had been attended by representatives of the United Kingdom Government. In April 1965, when it had still been hoped that federation was possible, the representative of *Antigua* had announced that his Government would take no further part in the discussions. That announcement had changed the situation and subsequently the Barbados Government had announced that it intended to seek separate independence, a decision which had been endorsed in a resolution by the Barbados legislature.

106. The Territories themselves had come to the conclusion that a basis for agreement between them on some form of federation or association could not be found. That view had been accepted with reluctance by his Government, without prejudice to the possible formation of a new federation at a later date. He added that the question of an eventual federation between Barbados and the Windward and Leeward Islands was far from being closed but any decision on it would have to be made by the Government and the peoples of the Territories concerned. Both the Government and the opposition party in Barbados had made it quite clear that separate independence would be without prejudice to the possibility of

federation with the Windward and Leeward Islands in the future.

107. The Barbados delegations to the Constitutional Conference had unanimously expressed the wish that, on gaining independence, Barbados should become a member of the Commonwealth. The United Kingdom Government had promised to convey their application to the other members of the Commonwealth, who would no doubt welcome it.

108. In reply to the representative of Iran, he pointed out that after independence the Governor-General would be appointed by Her Majesty the Queen, acting in her capacity as Queen of Barbados, on the advice of Barbados Ministers. The Governor-General, on behalf of the Queen of Barbados, would act on the advice of Barbados Ministers, except in the exercise of his discretionary powers such as the dissolution of the House of Assembly and the appointment of the Prime Minister. These constitutional provisions were quite standard in independent countries in which the Queen was Head of State.

109. The representative of *Bulgaria* denied that his remarks had been selective. It had been agreed that it was for the Government of Barbados to decide whether elections should be held before or after independence. If they were held before independence, it could be assumed that the people would have an opportunity to express their views on the draft constitution. If they were held after independence, the new Assembly would be bound by arrangements already agreed upon, and there was every reason to believe that that was what would happen.

110. The representative of *Uruguay* said that the essential duty of the Special Committee and its Sub-Committees was to facilitate and safeguard the accession to independence of all colonial Territories. Independence, however, should not be achieved at the cost of abandoning the constituent elements of genuine freedom. The Sub-Committee should ensure that the independence granted to a country was genuine, and not purely formal. With regard to the statement made by the representative of *Bulgaria*, he would not be able to accept the idea of separate independence of Barbados unless he was sure that it was to be a first step towards the achievement of all the objectives outlined in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV). He still believed that the best future prospects for the Caribbean Territories lay in some form of federation or association, even if that took the form of some kind of economic or customs union. Integration was a force to be reckoned with in the modern world and even the countries of Latin America, which had levels of development far higher than many of the colonial Territories awaiting independence, were working towards the economic integration of their continent.

111. He himself could find no reason to oppose the accession to separate independence of Barbados, although the Sub-Committee should at least suggest that some form of federation or association would be the most rational solution to the problems of the Caribbean Territories as a whole. The Sub-Committee should, however, view the facts objectively. Unlike the case of Basutoland, in which various petitioners had presented sometimes conflicting versions of the true situation in their Territory, and had lodged various complaints against the administering Power, no such complaints or petitions had been received from Barbados. Admittedly, the minority opposition party was not fully in agreement with the Barbados Government, but that in itself showed that conditions of genuine democracy prevailed in the island. Since there was nothing to refute the statements made by the administering Power, the duty of the Sub-Committee, in accordance with General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), was to ensure that Barbados acceded to independence without delay. Furthermore, an independent Barbados might well lead the Caribbean Territories into the kind of federation which would seem to be the best solution for the future of those Territories. Nevertheless, he continued to believe, as he had already stated, that the provisions regarding any association with other members of the Commonwealth should have been made subject to a two-thirds majority vote.

112. The representative of *Iran* said that in questions involving small Territories the United Nations should proceed

with the utmost caution. It should ensure that the peoples concerned had exercised their right of self-determination in full freedom and, if possible, under United Nations supervision. If the United Kingdom had accepted the idea which had been expressed in the Sub-Committee and the Special Committee in favour of a visiting mission, members would have been in a better position to see whether the people of the Territory really wanted separate independence or federation. As the representative of *Bulgaria* had pointed out, all the information on the Territory came from one source, namely, the administering Power. If information from other sources had been made available, members would have been able to gain a much clearer idea of the situation. However, once independence was chosen by the elected representatives of the Territory, it would be difficult to deny such independence, since that was the Special Committee's major objective under General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV).

113. The representative of *Bulgaria* associated himself with the remarks made by the representative of Iran. If the administering Power had wished to assist the Sub-Committee in its task, it would have accepted the idea of a visiting mission which had been expressed in various resolutions. It was quite abnormal that the Special Committee and the Sub-Committee, in their consideration of conditions in the Territory, should be obliged to refer only to information supplied by the administering Power. His delegation had therefore felt that the statement made by the representative of Trinidad and Tobago would be useful, particularly since that country was in the same region as Barbados and had been a member of the regional Federation of the West Indies. In addition, the statement of the representative of Trinidad and Tobago represented a source of information other than the administering Power.

114. His delegation could not agree to rejecting the idea of a federation; for several small islands it was the most logical solution. In the light of the new developments in the Territory, his delegation would like to have more information on the matter. His delegation was not seeking to delay the independence of the Territory. It was merely trying to shed some light on an unclear aspect of the question. All documents available to the Sub-Committee showed that the opposition party had expressly called for the holding of a general election so that the people could give their views on the idea of federation. Even in the government party the major trend was towards federation. Furthermore, the results of the vote on the issue had been 14 to 9, which was not even a two-thirds majority. In most constitutions a two-thirds majority vote was necessary even for an amendment. The Sub-Committee could not disregard those facts.

115. The representative of *Venezuela* said that his delegation shared the concern felt by others regarding the extent of the sovereignty of the Government of Barbados. There were two fundamental aspects of self-determination. According to Professor Rousseau, at the international level, self-determination was distinguished by the processes set out in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV). At the domestic level, self-determination was characterized by the right of the people freely to decide their political, economic and social destiny. His delegation thought that Barbados would exercise its right of self-determination at the international level but, if anything derogated from its right to self-determination at the domestic level, that right would not be properly exercised. It was clear from statements made by the representatives of the Territory that they wished to be granted independence as soon as possible. His delegation would always welcome any step aimed at bringing about the elimination of the colonial system in any part of the world.

116. The representative of the *Ivory Coast* said that a detailed examination of the documents relating to Barbados led to the conclusion that both the administering Power and the Barbadians themselves had striven to reorganize the political, economic and social structure of the Territory in preparation for its independence on 30 November 1966. It was beyond question that the political situation in Barbados had made steady progress towards the achievement of the objectives of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV).

117. The Ivory Coast was in favour of self-determination of peoples and of the progressive and orderly transfer of all the attributes of sovereignty to the genuine representatives of the countries still under foreign domination. He welcomed the fact that those principles had been respected by the administering Power in the case of Barbados and that the Territory would soon accede to independence. He thought, however, that Barbados was an isolated case in view of its favourable economic situation as compared with that of the other United Kingdom Territories in the region. He hoped that the decolonization process would gather strength and that it would be applied without exception to all the United Kingdom islands in the Caribbean area.

118. His delegation was in favour of the democratization of the legislative and executive bodies of all those Territories so that the people would be able freely to choose their political status and to decide on the type of relations that they wished to maintain with the administering Power. They must also be given the possibility of choosing between self-government and some form of association with other territories of the region, for ties favouring the establishment of a viable State certainly existed between those islands. However, no steps had been taken to achieve that objective.

119. He shared the view of those representatives who thought that an association with neighbouring islands would be in keeping with the freely expressed wishes of the people for political development and would offer the most favourable prospects for the region.

120. In conclusion, his delegation extended its sincere congratulations to the administering Power and to Barbados on the successful outcome of the negotiations which would result in early independence for the Territory.

(b) Montserrat and the British Virgin Islands

121. The representative of the United Kingdom said that Montserrat was the smallest of the British Eastern Caribbean Islands, with an area of 32.5 square miles and a population of some 13,500. A ministerial system of government had been introduced under the 1959 Constitution; there was an Executive Council, consisting of the Administrator, the Chief Minister, two Ministers from among the elected members of the Council, a nominated member and two officials. The Legislative Council was composed of seven elected members, two officials and one nominated member. The two main political parties were the Montserrat Labour Party and the United Workers' Movement.

122. The economy of the Territory was mainly agricultural, with sea island cotton as a main feature. There was also a small sugar-cane crop and a growing tourist industry. United Kingdom Government aid to the Territory in the past two years had amounted to almost \$1.6 million.

123. The British Virgin Islands was also a small Territory, with an area of about 59 square miles consisting of some 40 islands, 11 of which were inhabited. The population was approximately 8,500. The Territory, which had been under United Kingdom control since 1672, had had constitutional government with a fully elected House of Assembly and a Legislative Council with a majority of elected members since 1773. The present Constitution provided for an Executive Council and a Legislative Council.

124. The people of the Virgin Islands had made it clear in 1947 that they did not wish to become part of the proposed federation of the Leeward and Windward Islands. Montserrat, on the other hand, had been a member of the Federation throughout its existence and representatives of the Montserrat Government had taken part in discussions, after the dissolution of the Federation in May 1962, on the possibility of forming a new federation between the islands which had belonged to the previous Federation and had not subsequently decided to opt for separate independence. These discussions had reached the turning point in April 1965 when the Chief Minister of Antigua had announced at a meeting of Territorial representatives held to consider the latest position about the possibility of federation that his Government intended to take no further part in such discussions. Under those circumstances, Barbados

had also decided to reconsider its position and had ultimately opted for separate independence. It was generally agreed, both in the Territories and by the United Kingdom Government, that some form of association or federation still held out the best hope for the future of the Territories, but that there was no prospect of achieving sufficient agreement on that question for the time being. The United Kingdom Government had accordingly decided to examine the possibility of devising new constitutional arrangements for the individual Territories. It had put forward proposals for the six Territories of Antigua, St. Kitts, Dominica, Grenada, St. Lucia and St. Vincent. Constitutional changes for the much smaller Territory of Montserrat would be discussed with the Montserrat Government at a later date.

125. A general election had been held in Montserrat on 31 March 1966, at which the Labour Party had been returned to power with an unchanged majority. The question of constitutional advance had not been an issue at the elections, and the party manifestos had concentrated on measures for economic and social development.

126. The progress of the British Virgin Islands had been quite separate from development in the other islands of the Eastern Caribbean. The main event in the constitutional field had been the appointment of 1 January 1965 by the United Kingdom Secretary of State for the Colonies of a Constitutional Commissioner with the task of recommending any desirable constitutional changes, including changes in the electoral system, taking into account local opinion and the limited resources and population of the Territory. The Commissioner appointed had been Mrs. Mary Proudfoot, a Fellow of Somerville College, Oxford. She had visited the Territory early in 1965 and had presented her report in April 1965. The report, which was summarized in a Secretariat working paper (see paras. 33-35 of chapter XXII), was critical of certain aspects of the present constitutional arrangements in the Territory, although Mrs. Proudfoot had concluded that the membership system worked well. The main criticism was that there was insufficient contact between public opinion and the Legislative Council or Executive Council. The Commissioner's recommendations were therefore partly directed towards improving the relationship between the Government and the people. The report accordingly recommended that the existing basis of universal adult suffrage should remain unchanged; that the number of districts (constituencies) should be increased from six to seven; that there should be a Boundary Commission to review the districts on Tortola; that the Legislative Council should comprise two officials, one nominated member selected after consultation with the First Minister, and the seven elected members, with a Speaker elected from outside the Council; and that the Executive Council should consist of two officials and three of the seven elected members who would be called ministers and who would be responsible for those areas of government not reserved to the Administrator. Under Mrs. Proudfoot's proposals, the seven elected members would elect a "First Minister" from among themselves. The First Minister would then form a ministerial group by selecting the other two Ministers. The Ministers would be responsible to the Legislative Council and would resign if the Council passed a vote of no confidence in them. The special responsibilities of the Administrator would be external affairs, defence, internal security, the civil service, finance, economic planning, and certain legal and judicial matters.

127. The report had been presented to the Legislative Council in July 1965 and debated in October 1965. The Council had adopted a resolution taking note of the report and had requested the Secretary of State for the Colonies to receive a delegation from the Council with a view to drawing up a new constitution for the Territory based on the report. The United Kingdom Colonial Secretary had subsequently proposed that a constitutional conference should be held in London in October 1966 and the British Virgin Islands Government had accepted that suggestion. Mrs. Proudfoot's report and the modifications put forward in the Legislative Council's debates would undoubtedly be discussed fully at the conference.

128. The economy of the British Virgin Islands was based on the production of livestock and on fishing. Recent rapid economic expansion in the neighbouring United States Virgin Islands had somewhat affected the economy, chiefly by tending to draw away skilled labour. An economic survey issued in 1962 had recommended concentration on tourist development and improvements in communications. In 1965 United Kingdom grants and technical aid to the Territory had amounted to \$1.17 million compared with \$454,000 in 1964. His Government had made an allocation for the period 1965-1968 of Colonial Development and Welfare Grant funds amounting to more than \$1 million and those funds were being applied to various development works. In addition, approval in principle had recently been given to a major electrical power extension scheme to be financed by a loan of \$1 million.

129. The representative of *Bulgaria* said that, although the position of the British Virgin Islands had much in common with that of the other British Territories in the Caribbean, the pace of constitutional development had been much slower there than elsewhere. The Territory's history since it had become a British possession in 1672 fell into two major phases: the periods before and after the emancipation of the slaves in 1874. As the Constitutional Commissioner who had visited the Territory in 1965 had pointed out, the limited representative system which had been established by the 1773 Constitution had developed no further after the departure of the white ruling classes following the emancipation; the power to govern was, in fact, still largely in the hands of the Administrator, who presided in both the Executive and the legislative Councils. The Constitutional Commissioner's report had described the dissatisfaction of the people of the Territory with the existing constitutional system; it was perhaps significant that that dissatisfaction had not been brought to the attention of the Special Committee previously. The Commissioner had made recommendations which, if accepted, would end a situation in which the Administration was so out of touch with the people that both the Executive and the Legislative Councils were considered mere instruments of government, if not actively antagonistic to the people's interests. The economic and financial position of the Territory, however, was similar to that of other Caribbean Territories in that its budget could not be balanced without substantial grants from the United Kingdom; the Commission had therefore recommended that financial control should remain the responsibility of the Administrator until the colony became solvent. In this connexion, the Bulgarian delegation wished, once again, to reiterate the point of view it had already expressed. The colonial Power, which had exploited the Territory for centuries, must give back what it had taken from the Territory so that the people could exercise self-determination and choose the political and social system which best suited them. His delegation considered that the Special Committee's request to the United Kingdom to take steps which would accelerate the constitutional process within the framework of the Declaration contained in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) was still applicable.

130. The representative of the *Ivory Coast* observed that his delegation was convinced that all the information provided to the Sub-Committee on the British Virgin Islands and Montserrat showed that their economic structure was complementary and that some form of association agreed to by the population offered the best prospects for their economic viability. The efforts to establish a federation of the Leeward and Windward Islands in 1947 had broken down but his delegation would like to know whether public opinion in all the islands had changed since that time and whether it might not be worth while to make renewed efforts to achieve some form of association between them. The fragmentation of the region through the granting of independence to so many separate Territories was regrettable and in view of the admitted fact that in at least one of them, the British Virgin Islands, there was little contact between the people and their representatives in the Administration, it might be prudent to sound out public opinion again on the question of federation.

131. The representative of *Iran* said that the problems of the British Virgin Islands, a Territory with a population of

only 8,500, were characteristic of the smaller Territories with which the Sub-Committee had to deal. In such cases, solutions other than separate independence for each Territory had to be taken into account. There were a number of points that his delegation wished to ask the representative of the United Kingdom to clarify in connexion with the breakdown of the negotiations on federation in 1947. It was not clear, for instance, whether the delegates at the talks had been really aware of the views of the people of the Territories, or whether steps had been taken to ascertain their views on their future status, either at that time or more recently. It was conceivable that delegates who had no specific mandate in this regard acted on their own initiative. It was conceivable also that the people of the Territory were kept uninformed as to their rights, in particular their right to self-determination and the various alternatives open to them.

132. He pointed out that a colonial Territory, even if it enjoyed a measure of representative government, was still a colonial Territory and therefore not sovereign. Under the colonial system, the wishes of the inhabitants could be expressed in a number of ways. In larger Territories, the people could form political parties and other organizations in order to express their views. In smaller Territories where that was not always the case, the United Nations should be satisfied that the people had been given an opportunity to exercise their right of self-determination in full freedom and in full knowledge of their prerogatives.

133. With regard to the British Virgin Islands, the administering Power should take care to ensure that the colonial system was terminated in accordance with the wishes of the peoples concerned. The United Kingdom representative had said that in 1947 the people of the British Virgin Islands had made it clear that they did not wish to join the proposed federation. Twenty years had elapsed since then and members were justified in asking whether the people of the Territory had been consulted again. Many important changes had taken place and the people should be informed of the various rights available to them. It would be for them to decide on their status, but the United Nations should ensure that their choice was freely made.

134. The representative of *Uruguay* said that the process of liberation in Latin America had been essentially political in nature and economic factors had not played a great part. In the case of some of the smaller Territories with which the Sub-Committee was concerned, however, the economic aspect was of great importance. It was necessary to ensure the economic viability of the Territory concerned so that the people would be able to satisfy their spiritual, cultural and physical needs.

135. He understood that when the Sub-Committee took up the question of Antigua the United Kingdom representative would give some of the reasons why the people of that Territory had rejected the idea of a federation. Subject to the information that the United Kingdom representative would make available at that stage regarding the possibility of a new federation, he wished to make the following comments. If it was found that the majority of the inhabitants of the Leeward and Windward Islands were in favour of federation, the Sub-Committee would welcome that development. If, on the other hand, the people rejected federation, then the Sub-Committee should suggest that there should be some form of loose association. In any event, the Sub-Committee should report to the Special Committee that in its view some form of association would represent the best solution for the future development of the Territories concerned. If the people still desired separate independence, the Special Committee would have to accept their decision as an expression of their will in accordance with the principle of self-determination.

136. The representative of the *United Kingdom* said that his delegation would make some comments on the negotiations on a proposed federation of the Leeward and Windward Islands in the course of a statement on those Territories at a later meeting. Since several members had referred to the need for consultation of the people on questions affecting their future constitutional status, he wished to point out that under the British system of representative government there was

not usually any provision for direct consultation of the people on specific questions by such means as a referendum. Under that system, consultation was a continuous process, operating through the election of parliamentary candidates representing political parties, parliamentary debate, the information media and, in the case of the Territories in question, contact through the Governor or Administrator with the United Kingdom Government in London. He could not anticipate the forthcoming Conference by commenting on the Constitutional Commissioner's recommendations, but the fact that the United Kingdom Government had invited representatives of the British Virgin Islands to a conference indicated its willingness to consider constitutional changes.

137. His delegation would comment at the appropriate time on some of the contributory causes to the breakdown of the negotiations on federation, although the main point was that these negotiations had for the moment broken down; it would be for historians to identify the reasons. A large majority of those concerned had clearly wished to achieve agreement on federation but that had proved impossible. They had therefore decided to pursue the separate development of the Territories without prejudice to the possibility of forming a new federation subsequently.

138. With regard to the British Virgin Islands, the inhabitants of the Territory had expressed no interest in joining any federation with the other Leeward and Windward Islands. There had been speculation in the past about possible integration with the neighbouring United States Virgin Islands. His Government's view here as elsewhere was that it would be guided by the wishes of the people concerned. The immediate future of the Territory would be discussed at the constitutional conference shortly to be held in London.

(c) *Antigua, Dominica, Grenada, St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, St. Lucia and St. Vincent.*

139. The representative of the United Kingdom recalled that on 29 April 1964 his delegation has made a full introductory statement on Barbados and the Windward and Leeward Islands (A/AC.109/102) and had outlined the history of the Federation of the West Indies from its establishment in 1958 until its dissolution in May 1962. It had gone on to describe the continuing efforts to form a new federation of the remaining Territories after Jamaica and Trinidad had opted to proceed to separate independence.

140. The United Kingdom delegation had kept the Special Committee informed of progress in the search for a formula that would enable the Territories to come together once again in a new grouping, for it had long been clear to his Government that those small islands stood little chance of obtaining economic self-sufficiency or international status as individual States, nor could they remain colonies of the United Kingdom indefinitely. Throughout the lengthy discussions which had been held to discuss the possibility of establishing a federation between the Territories of Barbados, Antigua, St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, Dominica, Grenada, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and Montserrat, the United Kingdom had made clear that in its view the most hopeful way forward for them lay in some form of regional co-operation which seemed to offer the best prospects for their future political and economic development. It had also been made clear at the outset that the United Kingdom Government stood ready to enter into discussions concerning independence for a federation of those Territories once it had been established.

141. In May 1962 a conference held in London had reached provisional agreement on a federal constitution. In each of the Legislatures of the eight participating Territories except that of Grenada, the proposals agreed in London had been approved as a basis for further discussion. The Grenada Government which had taken office in September 1962 had however, declared its intention to seek association with Trinidad and Tobago in a unitary State. In December 1962 the Colonial Secretary had held discussions in Barbados with the ministers of the other seven Territories and a joint statement had been issued in which the ministers had reaffirmed their conviction that federation offered the best prospects for the future of their Territories.

142. In May 1963, ministers from the seven Territories had had talks in Barbados with a United Kingdom minister to discuss arrangements for a further conference to be held in London in June. The talks had revealed significant divergences of opinion between the representatives of the seven Territories and it had been decided to defer to proposed conference. Over the next year and a half local discussions had continued and in December 1964 ministers from the seven Territories had approved a new draft federal constitution, subject to various reservations. The reservations expressed by a number of Territories had shown that there had still been serious disagreement on a number of fundamental matters and in particular on the powers which the central authority should have. Some Governments had favoured a strong central authority; others had favoured a wide degree of local autonomy. Those differences had expressed themselves most sharply over the questions of federal power of taxation and the extent to which the federal authority should establish executive departments. One Government had not been prepared to agree to a customs union between the Territories unless the federal authority had the right to levy income tax, while other Governments had been opposed to its having that power. There had also been marked differences of view concerning the division of other powers and functions between the federal and unit governments that indicated that there was no firm basis of agreement about the foundations on which federal institutions should be established.

143. Following a visit to each of the Territories in early 1965, the Colonial Secretary had published the views of the United Kingdom Government in a dispatch addressed to the seven Governments. The dispatch had made it clear that the United Kingdom Government still considered that a federation brought about on satisfactory terms offered the best prospect to a solution of the constitutional problems for the area. It had also recorded the willingness of the United Kingdom Government to discuss arrangements for the federation's independence, once a federal scheme had been agreed upon.

144. Before a further meeting of territorial representatives in April 1965, the Chief Minister of Antigua had announced that his Government intended to take no further part in the discussions on the federal scheme. In those circumstances, the Barbados Government had asked for time to consider the consequences and shortly afterwards it had proposed that Barbados should proceed to separate independence before considering any further steps towards federation. Members of the Sub-Committee would recall that it had been finally decided at the conference held in June and July of the current year that Barbados should become independent on 30 November 1966.

145. The failure to establish a new federation had been a severe disappointment to the United Kingdom Government. Ever since the end of the Second World War his Government had thrown its full support behind local endeavours to establish a federation between the United Kingdom Caribbean Territories to lead to independence in political unity, but those efforts had proved unsuccessful. The Federation of The West Indies had had only a brief life and had been dissolved in the same month which had been agreed for its independence. The United Kingdom Government had encouraged the efforts of the remaining eight Territories to reach agreement on a new federation which could follow Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago into independence. That was not to be, however, and Barbados was now moving towards separate independence. While still believing that closer association between the Territories offered the most hopeful prospects for their future, the United Kingdom Government recognized that that must be a matter for local decision. By autumn 1965 it had become clear that the time had come to review the need for constitutional change in the Territories on an individual basis.

146. In considering the constitutional arrangements for the remaining six Territories of Antigua, St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, Dominica, Grenada, St. Lucia and St. Vincent, the United Kingdom Government had had to take account of the serious economic difficulties facing the islands. The Territories had one of the highest rates of population increase in the world. They had no rich natural resources and were heavily dependent

on their exports, which were preponderantly agricultural, to meet the cost of imports.

147. With United Kingdom financial aid, the islands were working to diversify their economies and progress was being made, especially with tourism, but there was only limited scope for manufacturing industries. Communications facilities were being improved. Under the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement, the islands received a higher price than the world sugar price and they benefited from access to the United Kingdom market for all their exports, over half of which went to the United Kingdom.

148. In addition to those indirect forms of aid, direct aid from the United Kingdom had also been crucial. In the past ten years the Territories had received over \$28 million in Commonwealth Development and Welfare grants. In the current three-year period 1965-1968 the Territories had been allocated \$13.58 million, a sharp increase over the development aid hitherto available to them. Several of the Territories were unable to balance their budget and received annual grants towards budgetary expenditure: in 1966 St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, Dominica, St. Vincent and Grenada would receive about \$3.65 million in budgetary support. Financial assistance had also been given to a number of regional schemes of great benefit to the Territories, such as the University of the West Indies.

149. The United Kingdom Government had also established a Development Division in the Caribbean to help the Governments to make the best possible use of the development funds available to them. At the same time the Governments of the United Kingdom, Canada and the United States had during the current year mounted a major economic survey of the United Kingdom Territories in the Caribbean to examine their development problems on a regional scale. The report of the survey put forward imaginative proposals for the co-ordination and acceleration of development in the Territories. The three Governments had indicated to the islands their willingness to discuss the report with them as soon as they had been able to study it.

150. Reverting to the question of the islands' constitutional future following the efforts to form a new federation, he said that several of the island Governments had asked for greater control over their internal affairs although none of them had proposed separate independence. The Territories had long-standing cultural and sentimental links with the United Kingdom, which they were anxious to preserve. The United Kingdom Government recognized that those requests for further constitutional advance could not be met merely by the devolution of additional powers upon the local governments in a colonial context and had set out to devise a new relationship that would be consistent with the political maturity of the Territories but would enable them to continue voluntarily such links with the United Kingdom as they wished.

151. Accordingly, in autumn 1965 his Government had sent the Governments of Antigua St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, Dominica, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and Grenada new and comprehensive proposals, which were described in some detail in a Secretariat working paper (see paras. 44-54 of chap. XXII). The United Kingdom Government had proposed that each Territory should become a State in association with the United Kingdom, with control of its internal affairs and with the right to amend its own constitution including the power to end the association with the United Kingdom and declare itself independent. The proposals had indicated the United Kingdom willingness to accept responsibility for the defence and external affairs of the States so long as the association continued. A salient feature had been the entrenchment in the constitutions of the States of safeguards for the preservation of democratic forms of government, the protection of fundamental rights and the maintenance of the constitutions themselves. It had also been proposed that a regional Superior Court should be created to serve all six States. It had been made clear that the States would continue to be eligible to receive aid from the United Kingdom under that Government's aid programme.

152. In November 1965 a special representative of the Secretary of State had visited the Territories to discuss those

proposals with the Governments and had met with acceptance of them as a basis for negotiations. The arrangements had throughout been worked out in consultation with the Governments of the Territories concerned. The United Kingdom Government proposals, modified to take account of the views expressed to the special representative, had been published in December 1965 and the United Kingdom had proposed that discussions should be held in London in spring 1966 with the Governments of the Territories and representatives of the opposition parties in each Legislature. All the territorial Governments had accepted the invitation to the series of conferences as had the representatives of the opposition parties. The Government of the United Kingdom invited the territorial Governments to prepare detailed proposals for the new internal constitutions in readiness for the Conference.

153. At the first Conference, with Antigua held between 26 February and 26 March 1966, it had been agreed that while the United Kingdom Government would have the ultimate responsibility in defence and external affairs, it would proceed throughout in consultation with the Antigua Government and that if after consultation there was failure to reach agreement in a matter that required legislation, the United Kingdom Government would, before going forward in that way, so far as practicable give the Government of Antigua the opportunity of considering whether it would wish to take steps to terminate the association. The United Kingdom Government had also undertaken to delegate to the Antigua Government a substantial measure of authority with respect to Antigua's external relations.

154. That Conference had also worked out a detailed outline of the new constitution for Antigua, including provisions for its amendment or replacement by the Parliament of Antigua. The constitution would be a fully democratic one with full safeguards for fundamental rights. There would be a Governor who as the representative of Her Majesty The Queen would exercise the powers of a constitutional Head of State acting on the advice of his Ministers; he would not be a representative of the United Kingdom Government or subject to its instructions. The House of Representatives would, like the present Legislative Council be elected by universal suffrage and the executive authority would rest with a Cabinet under a Premier who commanded a majority in the House. There would be a Senate with limited delaying powers, seven of whose ten members would be appointed on the Premier's advice the remaining three being appointed after consultation with the Premier. There would be the usual safeguards for the independence of the judiciary. Those and other important clauses of the constitution would be entrenched; any bill to amend the constitution would require the support of a two-thirds majority in each of the Legislative Houses and subsequent approval by a two-thirds majority in a referendum. In the event of a deadlock between the Senate and the House of Representatives, a bill to amend the constitution that had been rejected by the Senate in two successive sessions could be submitted to a referendum.

155. Antigua would be free to terminate the association with the United Kingdom at any time by means of the same procedure as that required for amendment of the entrenched clauses of the constitution. No referendum would be required to give effect to constitutional arrangements for Antigua to join—either separately or together with other Territories—with an independent Commonwealth country in the Caribbean whether in a unitary State, a federation or some other form of constitutional association under which the independent country would be responsible for the defence and external affairs of Antigua.

156. The Conference had agreed in principle that there should be a regional Supreme Court of Judicature. Subject to the agreement of the other Territories which would be served by the Court, the Conference had agreed that it should consist of a High Court of Justice and a Court of Appeal. Agreement had also been reached on the constitution of the Court and on its jurisdiction in constitutional questions and questions of fundamental rights and freedoms. An important matter that still remained to be settled was the practical arrangements for the establishment of the Court, including the choice

of headquarters and the distribution of costs, which were not appropriate for discussion by the Conference. It was planned to discuss those questions further at an inter-governmental conference to be held shortly in the Caribbean.

157. The second Conference with representatives from the four Windward Islands Territories (Dominica, Grenada, St. Lucia and St. Vincent) had been held between 18 April and 6 May. At the opening of the Conference, the delegates from the Windward Islands had expressed the view that the United Kingdom Government's constitutional proposals ought to have been accompanied by proposals for a closer economic relationship between the United Kingdom and the Territories which would help to raise the living standards of their peoples. No one who had studied the Islands' economic difficulties could fail to sympathize with those hopes, but the United Kingdom delegation had been obliged to tell the delegates that those problems lay outside the scope of the Conference. Its members had pointed out that for many years the United Kingdom Government had been doing everything in its power to promote the economic development of the Territories, not only by direct aid but by providing direct and favourable access to the United Kingdom market as an outlet for the Islands' export products. They had said that in view of its many commitments the United Kingdom Government could not contemplate any increase in aid for those Territories above the allocations already made, but they had drawn attention to the recent establishment of the Development Division in the Caribbean which should help to ensure that that aid was put to the best possible use. They had added that the constitutional changes would not themselves alter existing trading arrangements, but that the United Kingdom Government could not offer the inhabitants of those countries specially favourable terms compared with other Commonwealth immigrants into the United Kingdom.

158. After full discussion the Windward Islands delegates had accepted that position. Although matters of common concern to all four Territories had been discussed in full conference, separate discussions had been held with each of the delegations about the arrangements for their Islands. The arrangements agreed upon were not identical in regard either to external affairs and defence or to the internal constitution, but the differences were minor ones dictated by local circumstances and preferences.

159. Essentially, the pattern previously worked out for Antigua had been closely followed, but there had been one important departure. Several of the Windward Islands delegations had pressed for assurance that the United Kingdom's power to terminate the association unilaterally would not be exercised arbitrarily. They had received an undertaking—which would apply also to Antigua and St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla—that the United Kingdom would not terminate the association without giving six months' notice of intention to do so and that in such circumstances the United Kingdom would be prepared to hold a conference with the Territory concerned, at which the political and economic implications of the termination could be discussed. They had also been assured that the specific approval of the United Kingdom Parliament would in such circumstances be sought for the termination of the association.

160. The proposals for a regional Supreme Court, agreed upon at the Conference with Antigua, had been considered by all four Territories at the Windward Islands Conference. The Territories had agreed on proposals which would be acceptable to them if acceptable to the other two Territories concerned. Those proposals had not differed fundamentally from those accepted by Antigua. The Conference had agreed that there were administrative questions remaining which were not suitable for decision by the Conference itself and should be left for subsequent inter-governmental discussion.

161. The third Conference, with representatives of St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, had been held between 12 and 26 May. Like the delegations from the Windward Islands, the St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla delegation had laid stress on the economic problems of the Territory. The United Kingdom Government had been able to make some suggestions for various feasibility studies in connexion with the points raised and,

subject to the outcome of those studies, for the necessary financial assistance.

162. Full agreement had been reached concerning the proposed arrangements for the conduct of external affairs and defence, the internal constitution and the termination of the association. With regard to development aid, the United Kingdom Government had explained that the new arrangements would not themselves affect the position and had undertaken to consider further a proposal about the administration of budgetary aid put forward by the St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla Government. Discussions on that question had not yet been completed.

163. The arrangements for a regional Supreme Court which had been found acceptable at the previous two conferences had been considered by the St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla Conference and found acceptable subject to consideration of some further changes. The Conference had agreed that practical arrangements for the establishment of the Court should be discussed at a subsequent inter-governmental conference.

164. The arrangements agreed upon at the three conferences had been subject to the approval of the Legislatures concerned. So far, the Legislatures of Antigua, Dominica, St. Lucia and Grenada had completed their consideration of the proposals and had passed resolutions approving them. No dates had yet been set in St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla where a general election had been held on 25 July, or in St. Vincent, where a general election had been held on 22 August.

165. An Act of Parliament in the United Kingdom would be necessary to provide for the new relationship of association. The drafting in detail of the constitution of each of the Territories in accordance with the arrangements agreed with them and the settlement of the details of the constitutions in consultation with each Territory was a substantial task which would necessarily take some months to complete.

166. The agreement reached on a regional Supreme Court of Judicature at the earlier conferences had necessarily been subject to review in the light of the conclusions reached at any later conference in the series of three. Proposals had been made for a Caribbean regional conference in September, at which the differences which had resulted from the procedure would be reconciled and agreement reached on other related questions which it had not been possible to discuss at the individual conferences. It was hoped that it would be possible to settle the draft legislation for the establishment of the Court at that conference.

167. A detailed programme covering all those processes had been worked out. Subject to the approval of the Legislatures which had not yet considered the proposals agreed at the conferences, and to the enactment of the necessary legislation in the United Kingdom, it was intended that the new arrangements should be brought into effect early in 1967.

168. It would be seen that the complex and exhaustive processes of formulating new arrangements for each of the six Territories had been and were being carried forward in a hopeful and constructive manner. The essence of those processes had been close and continuous consultation at every stage between the United Kingdom Government and the island Government and political leaders, including the opposition leaders; many of the essential proposals had originated in the Territories themselves and many others, at least in their initial forms, in London. Those processes were not yet complete. Moreover, there were many other detailed provisions, for example, regarding the future internal constitutions of the individual Territories, which he would not attempt to describe in full but which the Sub-Committee would no doubt wish to study. His delegation was therefore circulating to members of the Sub-Committee the relevant conference reports, which contained full details on those points as well as a fuller account of the matters with which he had already dealt.

169. His statement was, therefore, in a real sense a progress report. The Sub-Committee would no doubt recognize that the progress made so far had been real and substantial. Much remained to be done and it was of course too early to attempt to reach any final judgement or conclusions about the eventual outcome; only when the current processes were considerably

further advanced would it be possible to view the new arrangements as a coherent whole and to set them against the historical and economic background of the area.

B. Adoption of the report

170. The Sub-Committee considered its conclusions and recommendations on these Territories (see para. 177 below) at its 57th to 59th meetings between 16 September and 11 October 1966.

171. The Sub-Committee's general conclusions and recommendations and those relating to Barbados and to Antigua, Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat, St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, St. Lucia and St. Vincent were adopted by consensus.

172. With regard to the conclusions and recommendations relating to the British Virgin Islands, sub-paragraphs (7) to (11) and (14) were also adopted by consensus while sub-paragraphs (12) and (13) were adopted by voting as follows:

(a) In sub-paragraph (12), the third sentence was voted upon separately at the request of the representative of Bulgaria. The sentence was adopted by 6 votes to 1. The sub-paragraph as a whole was adopted by 6 votes to none, with 1 abstention.

(b) In sub-paragraph 13, the representative of Bulgaria proposed that the second sentence be deleted. The proposal was rejected by 4 votes to 2, with 1 abstention. The sub-paragraph as a whole was adopted by 5 votes to 1, with 1 abstention.

173. In connexion with the conclusions and recommendations on the British Virgin Islands, the representative of Bulgaria expressed reservations with regard to the words "despite a certain measure of advancement in the constitutional field", in sub-paragraph (10), and the words "and in full knowledge of the available choices", in the first sentence of sub-paragraph (13).

174. The representative of Bulgaria said that his delegation had agreed to the adoption of the remainder of the draft conclusions and recommendations by consensus in view of the fact that time was late and it was essential for the Sub-Committee to submit a report to the Special Committee. The position of his delegation was that the Special Committee should reaffirm that the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples applied fully to the Territories and that the administering Power must implement that Declaration. It felt strongly about the need for visiting missions to be sent to the Territories in order to enable the Special Committee to fulfil its task. Since the general conclusions and recommendations just adopted were in keeping with that position, his delegation had agreed to them.

175. With regard to the conclusions and recommendations relating to Barbados, his delegation reserved its position concerning the failure of negotiations for federation, since it considered that the failure was largely due to a lack of co-operation on the part of the administering Power. The procedure adopted by the administering Power for the granting of independence was unsatisfactory and his delegation had reservations concerning the way in which the administering Power thought it was carrying out its task under General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV). He regretted that the Sub-Committee had not been able to agree to include a reference to the failure of the administering Power to enable the Special Committee to send a visiting mission to Barbados. A visiting mission could have advised the Special Committee concerning the implementation of resolution 1514 (XV).

176. With regard to the final section of the conclusions and recommendations, he regretted that the Sub-Committee had not had time to give these Territories the detailed consideration required. Such a situation should be avoided in future.

C. Conclusions and recommendations

177. The Sub-Committee recommends to the Special Committee that it adopt the following conclusions and recommendations:

(a) General

(1) The Special Committee recalls its conclusions and recommendations concerning these Territories which it adopted in 1964 and which were endorsed by the General Assembly at its twentieth session.

(2) The Special Committee reaffirms that the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples applies fully to these Territories. At the same time, it recognizes that the small size and population of these Territories, and the nature of their economies, present peculiar problems which demand special attention.

(3) The Special Committee reaffirms that it is for the people of the Territories, and for them alone, to express themselves freely on the form of political status they wish to adopt in order to achieve the objectives of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.

(4) The Special Committee reaffirms the right of the people of these Territories to exercise their right of self-determination in complete freedom and in full knowledge of the various forms of political status open to them. It also expresses its belief that, particularly in the case of small Territories, the United Nations should take appropriate steps to ensure that the people of these Territories are enabled to express themselves freely on their future status and in full knowledge of the options available to them.

(5) The Special Committee reiterates its previous recommendation concerning the need for visiting missions to these Territories and, to this end, urges the administering Power to enable the Special Committee to send visiting missions to the Territories.

(6) The Special Committee recalls its belief expressed in 1964 that it should be possible for these Territories to join with others in the area to form an economically and administratively viable State. It also recalls that, at that time, negotiations were being carried on between almost all of these Territories with a view to establishing a federation. The Special Committee regrets that these negotiations were not successful and that, as a consequence, each Territory has been obliged to seek a separate solution. It expresses the hope that the administering Power will do everything possible to facilitate the kind of solution desired by the people.

(b) British Virgin Islands

(7) The Special Committee recalls its conclusions and recommendations concerning the Territory which it adopted in 1964 and which were endorsed by the General Assembly at its twentieth session.

(8) It reaffirms that the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples applies fully to the Territory.

(9) It notes that a Constitutional Commissioner visited the Territory in 1965 and that, on the basis of the Commissioner's report, a Constitutional Conference will be held during October 1966. It notes with concern the observations by the Constitutional Commissioner that there was discontent in the Territory and that one of the main reasons for this was the fact that the Government was largely out of touch with the people. The Special Committee trusts that the administering Power will take urgent steps to remedy this situation.

(10) The Special Committee regrets that, despite a certain measure of advancement in the constitutional field, the administering Power has not yet implemented the Declaration with respect to the Territory and urges it to do so without delay.

(11) It reaffirms the right of the people to exercise their right of self-determination in complete freedom.

(12) The Special Committee reiterates its belief expressed in 1964 that it should be possible for the Territory to join with others in the area to form an economically and administratively viable State. It regrets that since 1947 no effective steps have been taken to consult the people of the Territory on their future status. It therefore invites the administering Power to take the necessary steps to ensure that the people of the Territory are fully aware of the various forms of political status open to

them, without precluding the possibilities contained in General Assembly resolution 1541 (XV), in their achievement of the objectives of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV). The Special Committee also invites the administering Power to ensure that the people of the Territory be enabled, in complete freedom and without any restrictions, to express their wishes concerning the future political status of the Territory.

(13) It reiterates its belief that the United Nations must be assured that the exercise of the right of self-determination in accordance with General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) is undertaken in complete freedom and in full knowledge of the available choices. It therefore considers that a United Nations presence during the procedures for the exercise of the right of self-determination will be essential.

(14) The Special Committee regrets that the administering Power has not agreed to a visiting mission from the Special Committee to the Territory, and affirms that a visit to the Territory is both useful and necessary. Accordingly, it invites the co-operation of the administering Power to enable the United Nations to send a visiting mission to the Territory, in order to obtain first-hand information concerning the Territory and to ascertain the views of the people.

(c) Barbados

(15) The Special Committee recalls that, when it last considered the Territory, Barbados was actively engaged in negotiations for federation or association with neighbouring Territories.

(16) It notes that, due to the failure of these negotiations, the Barbados Legislature decided to request separate independence for the Territory.

(17) The Special Committee welcomes the fixing of 30 November 1966, as the date on which Barbados will become independent.

(18) The Special Committee notes that it is still possible for Barbados to become part of a federation, should the people of Barbados express such a wish through their elected representatives.

(d) Antigua, Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat, St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, St. Lucia and St. Vincent

(19) The Special Committee, having heard the statement of the administering Power and the statement by the petitioner from Grenada, did not find it possible to give the question of these Territories the detailed consideration it required. It therefore decides to postpone its consideration of this question and, subject to any decisions which the Assembly may take at its twenty-first session, to examine the situation in these Territories in detail at an early date during its meetings in 1967.

IV. BERMUDA, BAHAMAS, TURKS AND CAICOS ISLANDS AND CAYMAN ISLANDS

A. Consideration by the Sub-Committee

Introduction

178. The Sub-Committee considered these Territories at its 51st, 54th and 59th meetings between 31 August and 11 October 1966.

179. The Sub-Committee had before it the working papers prepared by the Secretariat (see paras. 194-305 of chap. XXII). Members of the Sub-Committee also heard statements by the petitioners from the Bahamas, Mr. Lynden O. Pindling, Leader of the Opposition, and Mr. Randol F. Fawkes, Member of the House of Assembly, made at the 466th and 467th meetings of the Special Committee on 14 and 15 September 1966.

180. In accordance with the procedure agreed upon by the Special Committee, the representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, as administering Power, participated in the work of the Sub-Committee on these Territories, at the invitation of the Chairman.

General statements

181. The representative of the United Kingdom said that the four Territories of the Bahamas, Bermuda, Turks and

Caicos Islands and the Cayman Islands had been grouped together for practical purposes, although they did not form a homogeneous, geographical or political group.

182. The most recent discussion of the Bahamas in the Special Committee had been on 23 and 24 August 1965, at the 376th and 377th meetings, when the Committee had heard a petitioner and a full statement by the United Kingdom delegation covering a wide range of constitutional and other questions raised by the petitioner. Other information on the Bahamas was available to the Sub-Committee in two Secretariat working papers (see paras. 234-284 of chap. XXII).

183. The Sub-Committee might wish to take note of a new development relating to possible conflicts of interest between the official responsibility and the private interests of ministers in the Bahamas. In a small community such as the Bahamas, many private individuals with business and other interests were active in political life, but the separation of ministerial responsibility and private activities that was normal in larger countries was not regarded as practicable or even necessarily desirable in the Territory. Naturally, the ultimate sanction against any abuse of that system lay in the electoral system and the democratic right of the people to select their own leaders, on the basis of universal suffrage. In addition to that safeguard, however, the Government of the Bahamas had recently issued a new Code of Conduct governing the question of ministerial interests. The Code, published in the Bahamas on 29 July 1966, amplified and formalized the principles set out in the parliamentary statement by the Premier in April 1964, which the United Kingdom representative had quoted in full at the 377th meeting of the Special Committee. It stipulated as an immutable principle that no minister could permit his private interest to influence his discharge of his public duties. Ministers were also required to ensure so far as practicable not only that they avoided an actual conflict of interest but also that their conduct created no ground for criticism or suspicion in that respect. Where actual conflict unavoidably arose, the minister concerned was required to disclose his interest and withdraw from all official functions in relation to the matter in question and from all Cabinet proceedings in which the question was considered. If there was any borderline case or doubt about whether a true conflict of interests had arisen, a minister was required to act as if a conflict had arisen: thus the public interest had the benefit of the doubt. Finally, the Code stipulated that no minister could use for his own personal advantage any information to which he had had access by virtue of his official ministerial capacity.

184. Some points in the working papers called for comment. It was correctly stated that education in the Bahamas was compulsory between the ages of 5 and 14 years (see para. 280 of chap. XXII), but it should also be pointed out that education was free. It was stated that the next elections would be held on the basis of universal adult suffrage (*ibid.*, para. 235); the Sub-Committee might wish to bear in mind that the Territory had in fact enjoyed universal adult suffrage since 1962, when the franchise had been extended to women, and that under the new Constitution the second vote based on a property qualification had been abolished. The reference in the same paragraph to the Governor's exercise of discretionary reserve powers required slight elaboration. Under the Constitution, the Governor, acting in his discretion, was responsible for external affairs, defence, internal security and all matters relating to the police force, but he was required to keep the Cabinet informed of any matters relating to external affairs or defence which might involve the economic or financial interests of the Territory or the enactment of laws by its Legislature.

185. It was stated that the National Democratic Party (NDP) had advocated the inclusion in the Constitution of retroactive fundamental rights provisions (*ibid.*, para. 240). In fact, full fundamental rights provisions were included in sections 2 to 13 of the Constitution which had come into effect on 7 January 1964. A Commissioner had been specially appointed to consider what previous legislation might be regarded as inconsistent with those human rights provisions. The Commissioner had not reported on the laws mentioned in

paragraph 44 as being inconsistent with the human rights provisions, and the laws in question had therefore not been excepted from those provisions. All legislation passed since January 1964 was in any case subject to those fundamental rights provisions.

186. The statement that the average wage continued to be £5 per week was incorrect and apparently based on a misunderstanding of the information for 1964 supplied by the administering Power under Article 73 e of the Charter, which had stated that the cost-of-living index had been computed on the basis of an average wage of £5 per week. That basis, which had been adopted in 1949, had remained unchanged for some years and had become unreal; expert assistance in constructing a new index had therefore been sought in April 1965 from the United Kingdom Ministry of Overseas Development. The new index had been based on a wage of £20 per week and the first figures had been issued for June quarter 1966, with March quarter as the new base. No computation or estimate of the average wage had been made since 1959, when it had been calculated at £9.50 per week; since then there had been a number of wage increases.

187. The figure given as net remittances from Bahamian labour in the United States was actually the figure of gross earnings for 1964. The known figure of remittances through government channels had been \$413,855.96, but total remittances to the Bahamas had of course been higher, since sums had been remitted privately by many workers. Recruitment of agricultural workers for the United States had now ceased.

188. In reference to the demand of the Progressive Liberal Party (PLP) for freedom of expression and assembly for the trade unions at Freeport (*ibid.*, para. 239), there was, in fact, no restriction on union activities at Freeport and the local of the Hotel and Catering Workers Union had obtained recognition from one of the principal hotels in Freeport.

189. There were also extensive references to conditions at Freeport (see paras. 248-251 of chap. XXII). He would deal at some length with a number of points, since they had been given wide publicity. Many of the allegations reported had been fully dealt with in a statement published in June 1966 by the president of the two companies owning and operating casinos in Freeport and Nassau, in which it was pointed out that both casinos were operated under certificates granted by the Government. Those certificates required that the registered companies should retain full control over the casinos. The Bahamas Government had imposed a system of controls on their operation, giving the maximum security against malpractices, and a system of police clearances had been introduced to help with the checking of the staff of the casinos. There were various procedures under which a regular and continuous check was imposed on the identity and suitability of the staffs. The daily accounts of those enterprises were subject to local audit by internationally known chartered accountants, whose recent reports showed that they were satisfied with those accounts. Moreover, the taxation system ensured that the community as a whole benefited from the operation of those organizations. For example, taxes totalling \$280,000 had been imposed on each casino for 1966 and substantial annual taxes ranging from \$280 to \$840 were imposed on gambling machines. Total government revenues from those organizations had been estimated at over \$600,000 in 1966. Furthermore, the firm concerned was committed by contract to plough back a large part of its annual income in hotel development, which would bring benefits to the whole Territory. The Freeport casino alone had paid about \$315,000 in taxes to the Government in 1965 and a further \$317,000 had been contributed to a non-profit-making civic organization created to assist in the promotion of tourism. The president of the companies had also pointed out that allegations of increased crime in Freeport owing to the casinos were not supported by police statistics. Finally, he had pointed out that some 5,000 Bahamians were estimated to be employed in Freeport in the tourist industry and related occupations—a solid benefit to the Bahamas community.

190. With regard to the Opposition's electoral revision bill (*ibid.*, paras. 245-247), he gave detailed information about the objectives of that bill and outlined the basis on which the Bahamas Government had defended the system of voter's

cards—which was represented by the opposition as a factor of corruption inasmuch as in a country where confusions were difficult to avoid (many names being identical) it was difficult to dispense with it.

191. The borrowing plans for the public works programme contemplated by the Government (*ibid.*, paras. 260 and 261)—the expansion of Nassau harbour and development of the telecommunications and water distribution systems—did not amount to the figure of \$62 million mentioned. Addition of the various loans contemplated (a loan of \$14 million for the expansion of Nassau harbour, to be negotiated in the United States, a loan of \$13.8 million negotiated with the Export-Import Bank for the same purpose, a loan of \$9.4 million for the development of telecommunications, to be negotiated in the United States, and a loan of \$3.5 million, to be negotiated in Canada) gave a total of \$40.7 million, which was considerably lower than the figure quoted. The initial estimate for the total cost of the expansion of the harbour and the development of the telecommunications and water distribution systems was \$37 million, but no final costings could be made at this stage. The programme would not necessarily involve an increase in taxes and dues for the payment of the loans, and, consequently, a rise in the cost of living. In fact, the expansion of the harbour, which would allow access to large cruising vessels, would stimulate tourism and business. It would very quickly become a source of revenue. The same was true of the extended telecommunications system. Only the servicing of the loan for the water supply scheme would need to be met wholly from government revenues.

192. With regard to the introduction of new industries to the Bahamas, and in comment on the allegations reported in the working paper, he said that the interests of Bahamian nationals would be protected, since, under the terms of the agreement concluded between Owens-Illinois and the Government of the Bahamas, the company undertook to employ indigenous workers as far as possible (clause 1 (5)) and to train them (clause 1 (7)). The company could import personnel when necessary from the United States, provided they were subsequently repatriated. It had, moreover, already recruited a considerable labour force in the Territory.

193. The rise in prices in the Bahamas (see paras. 270-274 of chap. XXII) was due mainly to the substantial imports from the United Kingdom and the United States, where prices were on the rise. Possibly, the adoption of the decimal currency, with the dollar as the monetary unit, had enabled some tradesmen to increase their prices, on the pretext of rounding them off. The Chamber of Commerce had intervened to prevent abuses. In the main stores, prices had been converted accurately and notices to that effect had been posted to inform customers. In 1965 the Government, after consulting the trade unions, had proposed the adoption of a new price index, as the old index, chosen in 1949, was no longer realistic. The Trade Union Congress had proposed an index according to which prices had risen by 71 per cent between September 1963 and June 1966 but, as the Minister of Labour and Housing had said, the index was not very meaningful, because erroneous methods of calculation had been employed and account had been taken mainly of articles the prices of which had risen appreciably. The Special Committee set up to consider the question of prices and the cost of living, in pursuance of the resolutions submitted by Mr. Pindling (PLP), had so far received only three complaints of abuses in price conversion, one of which was anonymous; all three dealt with questions of minor importance.

194. The working paper on Bermuda (see paras. 194-233 of chap. XXII), also required some comment. Paragraph 28 of that document (*ibid.*, para. 221) referred to the question of government recognition of trade unions which had been dealt with extensively by a petitioner in the Special Committee. The policy of the Bermuda Government was that government boards or departments could recognize trade unions representing a substantial number of employees in the department concerned and should grant recognition where they were satisfied that the union represented a majority of the employees. In January 1966 the Bermuda Government had formally adopted a guide to the conduct of labour relations, setting out certain

fundamental principles governing good labour relations; he would be glad to make a copy available to any members of the Sub-Committee who might wish to read it. The first paragraph of section I declared that "the principles embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights by the United Nations Organization are acceptable as a statement of desirable aims". The guide went on to state that the right of workers, if they wished to be organized into trade unions and to bargain collectively, was to be fully recognized and that there was to be no intimidation or coercion in the exercise of those rights. It was recommended that where a union could show, by secret ballot, that the majority of employees within an undertaking wished a particular bargaining unit to represent them, that unit should be recognized for collective bargaining purposes. The guide had been recommended to the Government by the Labour Relations Advisory Committee, consisting of representatives nominated in equal numbers by employers' and workers' organizations.

195. The question of education had been raised by petitioners in the Special Committee and had aroused considerable interest. The information given in the working paper was now very much out of date (see paras. 224 and 225 of chap. XXII). As a result of legislation passed in 1965 and 1966, important changes had been made in educational organizations and conditions. Enrolment in accordance with the new compulsory school ages of 5 to 14 years had been effected in autumn 1965. The upper limit of the statutory school age would be raised to 15 in 1967 and to 16 in 1969. The new legislation had replaced the terms "vested", "non-vested" and "free" with the terms "aided" and "maintained". Previously vested schools located in government buildings were now classified as maintained, while those located in buildings owned by the trustees of the school were classified as aided. There were twenty-five primary schools (twenty maintained and five aided), five special schools, ten secondary institutes (five aided and five maintained), one vocational school and two places of further education (after-school classes in day schools already indicated). Education for those of school age was free at all aided and maintained schools, except for those in the fee-paying "B" streams of secondary academic schools. Thus fees were confined to "B" stream students at such schools whose parents chose to pay fees for those places at particular schools, and to those educated at wholly private schools. The highest school fees still payable were £195 a year at a private school. From September 1967, students at aided and maintained schools preparing for the "A" level examinations would receive instruction at a new Academic Sixth Form Centre. Finally, legislation had been adopted to ensure that race would cease to be a criterion for admission to aided and maintained schools. That new information had a considerable bearing on some of the complaints reported (*ibid.*, para. 229).

196. The main development in Bermuda since the Sub-Committee's last discussion of the Territory had been the announcement on 11 July 1966 that the Colonial Secretary had invited through the Government a representative delegation from the Bermuda Legislature to a constitutional conference in London, to open on 8 November. The working paper perhaps gave a slightly misleading impression of the nature of the Bermuda delegation to that conference. In fact, it would be widely representative of all points of view in the Legislature of Bermuda and would consist of three representatives of the Legislative Council and fifteen members of the House of Assembly. The members from the House of Assembly would consist of eight members of the United Bermuda Party (UBP), all three members of the Progressive Labour Party (PLP) and four independent members, including the former parliamentary leader of the PLP. The conference would consider the report of the Select Committee of the Bermuda Legislature appointed to consider constitutional changes. That Committee had produced an interim report in July 1965 and a full report in November 1965. The interim report had recommended that the voting age should be reduced to 21 and that the second vote to which certain classes of property owners had been entitled should be abolished. Legislation to give effect to those recommendations had been passed in January 1966. The Select Committee's other proposals were summarized in the working paper (see paras. 195-203 of chap. XXII).

197. There was little to add to the information on the Turks and Caicos Islands given in the working paper on that Territory (*ibid.*, paras. 285-295). As the Sub-Committee would recall, a working party which had met in Nassau in 1964 to consider the possibility of a merger of the Turks and Caicos Islands with the Bahamas had recommended ways in which the Bahamas might be able to help the Turks and Caicos Islands through the provision of staff, technical advice and in other ways. As a result, legislation had been enacted in November 1965 under which the Governor of the Bahamas had become the Governor of the Turks and Caicos Islands too. One of the reasons for that change had been the desire of the people of the Turks and Caicos Islands to have an administrative link with some outside authority, and it had therefore been welcomed in the Territory. The Government and Constitution of the Bahamas were not affected. Other legislation had transferred Turks and Caicos Islands judicial appeals from the Jamaican Court of Appeal to the Bahamas Court.

198. With regard to the Cayman Islands, the main recent development had been the general election held in November 1965. The election, at which the main issue had been the pace of constitutional advance, had been contested by the National Democratic Party (NDP), the Christian Democratic Party (CDP) and twelve independent candidates. The NDP, which had advocated that the Territory should move swiftly towards internal self-government, had secured one seat in the Legislative Assembly, as against six in the previous Assembly. The CDP, which had recommended that the pace of progress towards self-government should be more slow and sure, had gained four seats, as against five in the previous Assembly. Of the independent candidates, most of whom had been in favour of slower constitutional change, seven had been elected, as against one in the previous Assembly. Fifty-eight and four tenths per cent of the electorate had voted.

199. On 23 June 1966 the United Kingdom Colonial Secretary, answering a question about future administrative arrangements for the Cayman Islands, had told the House of Commons that the United Kingdom Government would be guided by local opinion in the Cayman Islands and had stated that he was awaiting a report on constitutional changes by a committee of the newly elected Legislative Assembly.

200. United Kingdom aid to the Turks and Caicos Islands from 1955-1956 to 1964-1965 had amounted to \$1,870,000, and aid to the Cayman Islands in the same period to \$344,000. In both cases the aid had been almost entirely in the form of grants and technical assistance. The provisional figures for 1965-1966 were \$571,000 for the Turks and Caicos Islands and \$176,000 for the Cayman Islands. Calculated on a *per capita* basis, the aid was considerable, since the Turks and Caicos Islands had a population of some 6,000 only and the Caymans just under 9,000. One particular project worthy of special mention was the improvement of the airport on Grand Cayman, for which a contract had been signed in November 1965. The project would cost \$1,280,000, to be financed by a grant of \$560,000 and a United Kingdom Government loan of \$720,000.

201. Once again, the Sub-Committee would note that the processes of democratic activity were vigorously at work in all four of the Territories. The next significant events in the constitutional field would be the report of the Cayman Islands Legislative Assembly Committee on possible constitutional changes; the elections in the Bahamas, which were due to be held not later than the end of 1967 under the new electoral system; and the Bermuda Constitutional Conference on the recommendations of the Bermuda Parliamentary Select Committee.

202. The representative of *Bulgaria* said that the representative of the administering Power had not mentioned any specific measures taken by the United Kingdom Government to implement the principles of the Declaration contained in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) and to conform to the recommendations of the Special Committee. As the administering Power had refused to allow a visiting mission of inspection to go to the Bahamas, the Special Committee had at its disposal only the limited information contained in the working papers of the Secretariat and the data provided by

the United Kingdom delegation. Little progress appeared to have been made since 1964. In the Bahamas especially, colonial rule persisted, the Governor still had discretionary powers and the electoral law had not been altered. The electoral system was such that at the last elections the Progressive Liberal Party, which had obtained 44 per cent of the votes, had won only 24.3 per cent of the seats, while the United Bahamian Party, with 36.6 per cent of the votes, had been allotted 57.6 per cent of the seats. The working papers prepared by the Secretariat showed that certain reforms proposed by the Progressive Liberal Party with a view to making the elections more democratic had been rejected by the party in power. Voting cards continued to be regarded as "negotiable assets". He drew the attention of the Sub-Committee to the part played by the casinos and gaming establishments. Most of them were controlled by United States capital, which enjoyed a privileged tax position. Apparently, the management of some of those establishments had undertaken to pay a sum of money to the Governor on condition that their books were not subjected to local audit. Many United Kingdom nationals were able to take part in elections, since they became entitled to vote after staying six months in the Bahamas.

203. He thought that the 1967 elections would probably take place in the same conditions as the previous ones. The representative of the administering Power had also ignored the question of the Atlantic Underwater Test and Evaluation Centre (AUTECH), which was, however, extremely important. The establishment of a military base on foreign soil constituted a serious threat to the peace and security of the population immediately concerned and indeed of the entire world. One thousand three hundred United States sailors and civilians would be stationed at that base which was 210 hectares in area and situated in a sensitive area of the globe. That new development was certainly not in the interests of the population of the Bahamas, which had been in no way consulted. The procedure employed by the administering Power, which enjoyed discretionary powers, to direct the foreign policy and defence of the Bahamas, was certainly contrary to the spirit and letter of the Declaration contained in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV).

204. The representative of the *United Kingdom* referred the Bulgarian representative to summary records of the 1965 meetings of the Special Committee and stated that the working papers also provided details of the changes which had taken place in regard to the Bahamas as a result of the Bahamas Constitutional Conference held in London in May 1963. The electoral system attacked by the Bulgarian representative was no longer in force; in particular, the second vote in respect of property had been abolished.

205. With regard to the Freeport and Nassau casinos, he reminded the Sub-Committee that he had already refuted these allegations.

206. As to AUTECH, he referred the Sub-Committee to the Secretariat working paper (see para. 259 of chap. XXII), which mentioned that the Bahamas had concurred in the agreement between the United Kingdom and the United States. It would therefore be incorrect to speak of an agreement having been concluded over the heads of the population concerned.

207. The representative of *Bulgaria* said that although the 1963 Constitutional Conference had proposed certain changes in the electoral system and, according to the United Kingdom representative, those changes had been made, the situation still seemed unsatisfactory, since the petitioners heard by the Special Committee during the previous session had stated that the last elections did not take place under democratic conditions.

208. As for the casinos and other gaming establishments, the United States Press had published much information on that subject, and the Bulgarian delegation had based its remarks on the data given in the official documents prepared by the Secretariat. He referred the Sub-Committee to the working paper (*ibid.*), which stated: "On 14 April 1966, the Atlantic Underwater Test and Evaluation Centre (AUTECH) at Andros was formally opened. The base, which

is a joint Anglo-United States project, has been under construction for the past two years and has so far cost \$17 million." Since the foreign policy and defence of the Bahamas were controlled by the administering Power, that Power alone was responsible for the negotiations which had taken place without the population being consulted.

B. Adoption of the report

209. The Sub-Committee adopted its conclusions and recommendations on these Territories (see para. 211 below) by consensus at its 59th meeting on 11 October 1966.

210. The representative of *Bulgaria* reserved the position of his delegation.

C. Conclusions and recommendations

211. The Sub-Committee recommends to the Special Committee that it adopt the following conclusions and recommendations:

General

(1) The Special Committee recalls its conclusions and recommendations on Bermuda, Bahamas, Turks and Caicos Islands and Cayman Islands, which it adopted in 1964 and which were endorsed by the General Assembly at its twentieth session.

(2) The Special Committee reaffirms that the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples applies fully to these Territories.

(3) The Special Committee regrets that the administering Power has not yet implemented the Declaration in these Territories and urges it to do so without delay.

(4) The Special Committee considers that in view of the lack of sufficient information on these Territories, and, in the case of the Territory of the Bahamas, of conflicting statements concerning conditions by the representative of the administering Power and by the petitioners, the administering Power should enable the Special Committee to dispatch a visiting mission to the Territory as soon as possible.

(5) The Special Committee considers that the administering Power should take immediate measures in order to transfer all powers to the peoples of these Territories, without any conditions or reservations, in accordance with their freely expressed will and desire, in order to enable them to enjoy complete independence and freedom.

(6) It also expresses its belief that, particularly in the case of small Territories, the United Nations should take appropriate steps to ensure that the people of these Territories are enabled to express themselves freely on their future status and in full knowledge of the options available to them.

(7) The Special Committee, having heard the statement of the administering Power and the statements by the petitioners from the Bahamas, did not find it possible to give the question of these Territories the detailed consideration it required. It therefore decides to postpone its consideration of this question and, subject to any decisions which the Assembly may take at its twenty-first session, to examine the situation in these Territories in detail at an early date during its meetings in 1967.

V. FALKLAND ISLANDS (MALVINAS)

212. At its 59th meeting, the Sub-Committee adopted the following statement concerning the Territory of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas) which it recommends for adoption by the Special Committee:

"The Special Committee recalls the provisions of General Assembly resolution 2065 (XX) of 16 December 1965, by which the Assembly: (i) invited the Governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to proceed without delay with the negotiations recommended by the Special Committee, with a

view to finding a peaceful solution to the problem, bearing in mind the provisions and objectives of the Charter of the United Nations and of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) and the interests of the population of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas); (ii) requested the two Governments to report to the Special Committee and to the General As-

sembly at its twenty-first session on the results of the negotiations. The Special Committee takes note of the information provided by the Governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom (A/AC.109/145 and Add.1, A/AC.109/146 and Add.1) that meetings were held on the problem on 19 and 20 July 1966 and that they would be continued."

CHAPTER XXIII*

INFORMATION ON NON-SELF-GOVERNING TERRITORIES TRANSMITTED UNDER ARTICLE 73 e OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND RELATED QUESTIONS

1. By its resolution 1970 (XVIII) of 16 December 1963, the General Assembly dissolved the Committee on Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories and, *inter alia*, requested the Special Committee to study the information transmitted to the Secretary-General in accordance with Article 73 e of the Charter and to take it fully into account in examining the situation with regard to the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.

2. It will be recalled that in order to discharge its functions under the above resolution, the Special Committee, at its 315th meeting on 17 November 1964, approved certain procedures which had been suggested by the Secretary-General (A/5800/Rev.1,¹ chap. II, appendix I). These procedures were later also approved by the General Assembly in its resolution 2109 (XX).

3. In compliance with operative paragraph 5 of General Assembly resolution 1970 (XVIII) and in accordance with the procedures approved by the General Assembly, the latest information transmitted by Administering Members was used in preparation of the working paper by the Secretariat on most of the Territories for the Special Committee. This information was taken into account by the Committee in its consideration of the Territories concerned and is reflected in the chapter of the Special Committee's report dealing with each of these Territories.

4. In its resolution 2109 (XX), adopted on 21 December 1965, the General Assembly, besides approving the procedures referred to above and requesting the Special Committee to continue to discharge the functions entrusted to it in accordance with those procedures, addressed itself to Administering Members as follows:

"2. *Expresses its regret* that not all Member States having responsibilities for the administration of Non-Self-Governing Territories have seen fit to transmit information under Article 73 e of the Charter of the United Nations;

"3. *Once again urges* all Member States which have or which assume responsibilities for the administration of Territories whose peoples have not yet attained a full measure of self-government to transmit, or continue to transmit, to the Secretary-General information as prescribed under Article 73 e of the Charter, as well as the fullest possible information on political and constitutional development".

5. In accordance with the procedures referred to above, the Special Committee, at its 472nd and 473rd

meetings, held on 12 and 19 October 1966, considered a report by the Secretary-General (see appendix) on the information which had been transmitted under Article 73 e of the Charter up to 18 October 1966 and on the action which had been taken in implementation of General Assembly resolution 1970 (XVIII).

6. At the 472nd meeting, the representative of the *United Republic of Tanzania* said that the Special Committee was once again obliged to note the fact that the fascist Government of Portugal had transmitted no information on the Territories under its administration. No condemnation could be too strong for a Government which constantly made mock of the rules recognized by the entire international community. It was common knowledge that the Portuguese Government was engaged in carrying out a policy of extermination in the Territories under its administration. The atrocities committed in those Territories were now beyond number, and members of the Committee had been able to see for themselves their full horror in the films exhibited for their benefit during their stay at Algiers. The ultimate goal of the war being waged in the Territories in question was to enable Portugal to exploit all their resources to the point of exhaustion, if necessary; and in that process of exploitation Portugal was calling on the services of foreign companies and financial groups. In that intolerable situation it was more than ever necessary that the General Assembly should be presented with information on the Territories administered by Portugal—information which the administering Power was anxious at all costs to conceal from the eyes of the world. At a moment when the machinations of the monopolies were more than ever being concealed behind the cloak of Portuguese policy, it was important that they should be exposed.

7. The report by the Secretary-General also showed that other administering Powers had failed to communicate to the United Nations all the information expected of them. For example, New Zealand had provided no information for the year ended March 1966, and the Special Committee should therefore request it to carry out its obligations as promptly as possible. The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland had transmitted no information on Southern Rhodesia; doubtless it proposed to provide no clarification of the situation in that Territory. The United Kingdom's entire attitude in the Southern Rhodesian question, in any event, confirmed that its sole purpose was to mislead world opinion, for while proclaiming its intention to take action against the Ian Smith régime it was in fact carrying on discussions with the representatives of that régime as between equals. That attitude of defiance, which had long since become intolerable, called for energetic action, and the Committee

* Previously issued under the symbol A/6300/Add.10.

¹ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Nineteenth Session, Annexes, annex No. 8 (part I).*

should insist on the United Kingdom Government's transmitting information on Southern Rhodesia.

8. The information transmitted by the United States of America related solely to the year 1964. Yet it had been reported in the Press in late September 1966 that one of the United States Samoan Islands was to be transformed into a "tourist paradise". From the reports published in the Press, the truth seemed to be that the planned improvements served the interests of the tourists alone, and in no way those of the indigenous inhabitants.

9. Generally speaking, the information on the Non-Self-Governing Territories was most unsatisfactory, being either fragmentary or insufficiently complete. The delegation of the United Republic of Tanzania therefore considered that an effort should be made without delay to improve its quality.

10. At the 473rd meeting, the *Chairman* drew attention to a letter dated 18 October 1966 addressed to him by the Permanent Representative of New Zealand to the United Nations, copies of which had been made available to members. In the letter, the Permanent Representative of New Zealand stated that his Government took most seriously the obligation to provide full information on the Territories under its administration, and expressed regret that a member of the Special Committee had been moved to express criticism of his Government's execution of that important obligation. The Permanent Representative of New Zealand also stated that advance copies of the reports for the year ended 31 March 1966 had been formally transmitted to the Secretary-General a few days earlier. As the detailed information required by General Assembly resolution 551 (VI) took months to gather, it was difficult for an administering Power to furnish such information any earlier than his Government had done. Furthermore, his delegation had previously made available directly to Sub-Committee II comprehensive information on the Territories under New Zealand administration, which, in his view was more directly useful to the Committee than the statistical material called for under resolution 551 (VI).

11. The representative of the *United Republic of Tanzania*, supported by the representative of *Syria*, said that some administering Powers had transmitted information so late that the effect was as though they had not supplied the information, since the delay prevented the Special Committee from studying it and using it for its report. One administering Power, for example, had transmitted its information on 14 October. If the information was not submitted at the proper time, the Committee could hardly give it more than routine consideration, which did not further the cause of decolonization.

12. The representative of *India* noted that paragraph 3 of the Secretary-General's report pointed out that two Powers had not complied with Article 73 e of the Charter or with the relevant General Assembly resolutions; no information had been transmitted on the Territories under Portuguese administration or on Southern Rhodesia.

13. Portugal's attitude, in holding that those Territories were a part of the metropolitan country, despite their distance from that country and despite General Assembly resolution 1542 (XV), which established that they were Non-Self-Governing Territories, should be condemned.

14. The United Kingdom's position on Southern Rhodesia was regrettable; however plausible it might seem to affirm that the Territory had been self-governing since 1923, that position was not acceptable to India or to the majority in the United Nations. General Assembly resolution 1747 (XVI) specified that Southern Rhodesia was a Non-Self-Governing Territory and that information on it should be transmitted in accordance with the Charter. The argument that the United Kingdom could not intervene in that Territory was indefensible since the unilateral declaration of independence; the United Kingdom itself had declared that the régime in Southern Rhodesia was in a state of rebellion against the United Kingdom Government and that the Territory could not be regarded as independent. In 1965 the United Kingdom had claimed that the question of Southern Rhodesia was exclusively within its jurisdiction and now, whether it wished to or not, it was obliged to take action. It could at least comply with Article 73 e of the Charter.

15. The representative of the *Union of Soviet Socialist Republics* supported the representatives of the United Republic of Tanzania and India with regard to the transmission of information by Portugal and the United Kingdom. Moreover, the information transmitted by the administering Power was not sufficient to throw light on the actual situation in colonial territories. He repeated a request made the previous year by his delegation to the effect that the Secretariat should obtain from other sources information which the administering Powers failed to supply, in order to provide a more complete picture which would permit more thorough consideration and make it possible to prepare specific statements on the situation with regard to the implementation of the Declaration.

16. The representative of *Mali* considered that Portugal should be condemned for not sending information on the Territories under its administration. Although such information as it might supply would be of only relative value, since its days as an administering Power were numbered, it should nevertheless comply with the Charter.

17. The United Kingdom Prime Minister did not recognize the unilaterally proclaimed independence of Southern Rhodesia and properly termed it illegal. That being the case, Article 73 of the Charter continued to be applicable, but the United Kingdom did not transmit information. The United Kingdom must decide whether Southern Rhodesia was a colony or whether, on the contrary, its régime was legal, as it seemed to admit by conducting secret negotiations with it.

18. The representative of *Bulgaria* said that the majority in the Special Committee shared the Tanzanian representative's view regarding the delay in the transmission of information. That situation was inadmissible, particularly since the information was also frequently incomplete, as the representative of the USSR had pointed out.

19. It was surprising that no information was supplied on Southern Rhodesia, which not only the Committee but also the General Assembly regarded as a matter of serious concern.

20. Information on American Samoa for 1964 had been transmitted only on 4 February 1966, so that the Committee did not have complete and timely data to assist it in its deliberations. It was to be hoped that the Committee would take a stronger stand in the

future so that the administering Powers might be induced to heed its views.

21. The representative of the *United States of America*, referring to the efforts of the Tanzanian delegate at the preceding meeting to suggest that there was something sinister in reported plans to develop tourism in American Samoa by establishing a park and constructing a tourist hotel, said that some of these allegations were too far-fetched to call for a response. The development of tourism was a significant aspect of economic policy in many areas of the world today, both non-self-governing and independent. The inference made at the preceding meeting was probably as puzzling to other members of the Special Committee as it was to his delegation.

22. The series of articles from which an excerpt was quoted was interesting and informative, and he commended it to the attention of anyone interested in American Samoa. With respect to the allegation that the projected investments in tourism would not benefit the indigenous inhabitants, he quoted from an article from the same series which stated that the United States policy of keeping American Samoa for the Samoans barred land ownership or settlement by mainland Americans and any business activity by outsiders in which Samoans would not have major participation. The Tanzanian delegate's analysis of this series of articles was quite incomplete and this aspect of United States policy seemed to have escaped his notice.

23. With regard to the providing of up-to-date information, he said that the current report on American Samoa was in preparation but that much of the substance had already been conveyed to the Committee in the detailed statements in Sub-Committee II. There was no intention, as the delegate from Tanzania seemed to be suggesting, to withhold information. Such a policy would be impossible, since American Samoa was wide open to regular factual reporting by the Press.

24. The representative of the *United Republic of Tanzania*, referring to a letter from the Permanent Representative of New Zealand to the United Nations which had been made available informally to the members of the Committee, said that it was absolutely essential for information on Non-Self-Governing Territories to reach the United Nations early enough for it to be used in discussion on the respective items. The explanation New Zealand gave in the letter in question was unacceptable and inappropriate. The tone of the United States representative's comments was inappropriate; the information on American Samoa for 1964 had not arrived until February 1966, and the information for 1965 had still not arrived. That was no way to co-operate with the United Nations, and he hoped that the matter would be brought to the General Assembly's attention.

25. The *Chairman* agreed with the representative of Tanzania about the statements in the letter and added that, contrary to the implication contained in the New Zealand representative's letter, it was not for the administering Power to decide what kind of information was most useful.

26. The representatives of *Syria* and *Iraq* shared the Tanzanian representative's views concerning the attitude expressed in the New Zealand representative's letter. In their opinion it should not be allowed to pass without criticism.

27. The representative of *Australia* said that New Zealand should be invited to take part in the discussion, if it desired to do so.

28. The *Chairman* stated that, according to its procedure, the Special Committee could not comply with that suggestion, since it had not received any request from New Zealand.

29. The representative of *Chile* pointed out that delays in transmitting information made the Secretariat's work more difficult. It was regrettable that Portugal was not transmitting any information at all and that, in addition, the United Kingdom was not transmitting information on Southern Rhodesia, which was undoubtedly still a colony.

30. The *Chairman* suggested that, if there were no objections, the Special Committee should take note of the Secretary-General's report and include it in its report to the General Assembly.

31. The representative of the *United Republic of Tanzania* thought that mention should be made of some of the fears which had been expressed about the lateness or incompleteness of information.

32. The representative of *Tunisia*, supported by the representative of the *Union of Soviet Socialist Republics*, said that his delegation's primary concern was that the Special Committee should receive information as to the date when the administering Power intended to carry out the transfer of powers requested in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), paragraph 5. He was in general agreement with those who had already spoken of the lack of co-operation on the part of the administering Powers and he supported the Chairman's suggestion, with the addition proposed by the representative of Tanzania. He asked the Chairman to suggest a text which would command a consensus in the Committee.

33. The *Chairman* suggested a text whereby the Special Committee would take note of the report of the Secretary-General and also of the fact that some administering Powers have transmitted information under Article 73 e. At the same time it would deplore the fact that other administering Powers had not done so or had done so insufficiently or too late.

34. The representatives of *Mali* and the *United Republic of Tanzania* suggested that the lack of co-operation on the part of certain administering Powers should be brought to the General Assembly's attention and that the administering Powers should be asked to say when they intended to grant independence to their colonies.

35. The representative of *Uruguay*, supported by the representative of *India*, agreed with the text the Chairman had suggested. He also agreed with the representatives of Mali and Tanzania, but said that the implementation of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) was much too important a question to be confused with the question of the transmission of information.

36. The representative of the *United Kingdom* said that his delegation could not support that text since it could not be divorced from the preceding discussion and the United Kingdom was one of the administering Powers to which it might appear to refer. Moreover, he could not agree with many statements made during the debate, especially some of the references to the New Zealand letter. In addition, it was for the administering Power to decide when and how much information on

Non-Self-Governing Territories was to be transmitted under Article 73 e of the Charter. It was not the case that the United Kingdom Government had failed to transmit information or that the information was inadequate or late.

37. The representative of the *United States of America* reserved his delegation's position on the text the Chairman had suggested.

38. The representative of the *Union of Soviet Socialist Republics* pointed out that the consensus indicated in the Chairman's suggested text did not in fact exist among the members of the Special Committee, since some delegations had expressed differing views and others had entered reservations. Therefore, if the Committee wished to reach a consensus, it should pursue its examination of the question further.

39. The representative of *Tunisia* observed that the reservations made the consensus text quite valueless.

40. The representative of *Mali* thought it astonishing that some administering Powers were refusing to comply with the provisions of Article 73 e of the Charter, which they themselves had helped to draft.

41. The representative of *Australia* agreed with the United Kingdom representative that it was for the administering Powers to decide when they were to send the information requested.

42. At its 473rd meeting, on 19 October 1966, the Special Committee decided without objection to adopt the text suggested by the Chairman as representing the consensus in the Committee, it being understood that the comments made by representatives would be included in the record of the meeting. The text adopted by the Committee reads as follows:

"The Special Committee takes note of the report of the Secretary-General. The Special Committee also takes note of the fact that some administering Powers have transmitted information under Article 73 e of the Charter, and deplores the fact that other administering Powers have not done so, or have done so insufficiently or too late."

43. The Committee further decided to include the report of the Secretary-General in its report to the General Assembly. This document appears as an appendix to the present chapter.

44. At the same meeting, the Special Committee decided, without objection, to transmit to the General Assembly the information contained in the working

papers prepared by the Secretariat on the Territories which it might be unable to consider before the closing of its meetings in 1966. This information is included in separate chapters of the present report.

APPENDIX

[A/AC.109/203 and Add.1]

Information on non-self-governing Territories transmitted under Article 73 e of the Charter of the United Nations: report of the Secretary-General

TRANSMISSION OF INFORMATION UNDER ARTICLE 73 e OF THE CHARTER

1. The Secretary-General's previous report on this subject (A/6000/Rev.1, chap. XXVI, appendix), listed the dates on which information was transmitted to the Secretary-General under Article 73 e of the Charter up to 7 September 1965. The table at the end of the present report shows the dates on which such information was transmitted in respect of the years 1964 and 1965.

2. The information transmitted under Article 73 e follows in general the standard form approved by the General Assembly and includes information on geography, history, population, economic, social and educational conditions. In the case of Territories under the administration of Australia, New Zealand and the United States of America, the annual reports of the matters, were transmitted. Additional information on political and constitutional developments in Territories under their administration was also given by the representatives of Australia, New Zealand, Spain, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America during meetings of the Special Committee.

3. No information has been transmitted to the Secretary-General concerning Territories under Portuguese administration, which, by resolution 1542 (XV) of 15 December 1960, the General Assembly considered were Non-Self-Governing Territories within the meaning of Chapter XI of the Charter. Nor has the Secretary-General received information concerning Southern Rhodesia which, the Assembly affirmed by resolution 1747 (XVI) of 28 June 1962, was a Non-Self-Governing Territory within the meaning of Chapter XI of the Charter.

STUDY OF INFORMATION TRANSMITTED UNDER ARTICLE 73 e OF THE CHARTER

4. In compliance with the provisions of operative paragraph 5 of General Assembly resolution 1970 (XVIII) of 16 December 1963 and operative paragraph 4 of resolution 2109 (XX) of 21 December 1965, which requested the Special Committee to study the information transmitted under Article 73 e, and in accordance with the procedure approved by the Special Committee in 1964, the Secretariat has continued to use the information transmitted in the preparation of working papers on each Territory for the Special Committee.

TABLE

Dates of transmission of information under Article 73 e of the Charter for 1964 and 1965

This table includes all Territories listed in part one, annex II, of the report of the Committee on Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories to the General Assembly at its eighteenth session,^a with the exception of Gambia, Jamaica, Kenya, Malta, North Borneo, Northern Rhodesia, Nyasaland, Sarawak, Singapore, Trinidad and Tobago, Uganda and Zanzibar.

	1964	1965
Australia (1 July-30 June): ^b		
Cocos (Keeling) Islands	2 February 1965	
Papua	28 July 1965	5 August 1966
France (calendar year):		
Comoro Archipelago ^c		
French Somaliland ^c		
New Hebrides	19 May 1966	

TABLE (continued)

	1964	1965
New Zealand (1 April-31 March): ^d		
Cook Islands	14 October 1965	
Niue Island	14 October 1965	
Tokelau Islands	14 October 1965	
Portugal		
Angola	—	—
Cape Verde Archipelago	—	—
Guinea (Portuguese)	—	—
Macau and dependencies	—	—
Mozambique	—	—
São Tomé and Príncipe and dependencies	—	—
Timor (Portuguese) and dependencies	—	—
Spain (calendar year):		
Equatorial Guinea (Fernando Póo and Río Muni)	24 February 1965	28 June 1966
Ifni	24 February 1965	28 June 1966
Spanish Sahara	24 February 1965	28 June 1966
United Kingdom (calendar year):		
Aden	31 August 1965	6 July 1966
Antigua	20 August 1965	
Bahamas	31 August 1965	5 August 1966
Barbados	24 August 1965	
Basutoland	5 November 1965	
Bechuanaland	1 June 1965	17 May 1966
Bermuda	2 September 1965	13 September 1966
British Guiana	7 September 1965	
British Honduras	16 July 1965	
British Virgin Islands	24 August 1965	
Brunei	26 July 1965	20 September 1966
Cayman Islands	11 October 1965	13 June 1966
Dominica	2 July 1965	
Falkland Islands (Malvinas)	2 July 1965	17 August 1966
Fiji	9 June 1965	12 August 1966
Gibraltar	2 December 1965	1 September 1966
Gilbert and Ellice Islands	2 September 1965	26 August 1966
Grenada	7 July 1965	29 September 1966
Hong Kong	7 June 1965	1 June 1966
Mauritius	26 July 1965	22 July 1966
Montserrat	26 October 1965	
New Hebrides	1 September 1965	22 July 1966
Pitcairn Island	7 June 1965	18 April 1966
St. Helena	28 July 1965	1 August 1966
St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla	29 September 1965	22 September 1966
St. Lucia	2 September 1965	1 September 1966
St. Vincent	30 August 1965	23 September 1966
Seychelles	23 July 1965	
Solomon Islands	14 June 1965	1 August 1966
Southern Rhodesia	—	—
Swaziland	1 October 1965	29 September 1966
Turks and Caicos Islands	2 September 1965	
United States of America (1 July-30 June):		
American Samoa	4 February 1966	
Guam	31 August 1965	8 June 1966
United States Virgin Islands	31 August 1965	8 June 1966

^a Official Records of the General Assembly, Eighteenth Session, Supplement No. 14 (A/5514), part one, annex II.

^b Period extends from 1 July of previous year to 30 June of year listed.

^c On 27 March 1959, the Government of France notified the Secretary-General that this Territory had attained internal autonomy and, consequently, the transmission of information thereon had ceased as from 1957.

^d Period extends from 1 April of the year listed to 31 March of the following year.

ANNEX*

LIST OF DELEGATIONS

*Afghanistan**Representative:*

H.E. Mr. Abdul Rahman Pazhwak

Alternate Representatives:

Mr. Ghulam Ghaus Waziri

Mr. Mohammad Mirza Sammah

*Australia**Representatives:*

H.E. Mr. Patrick Shaw, C.B.E.

Mr. Dudley McCarthy, M.B.E.

Alternate Representative:

Mr. B. B. Hickey

Adviser:

Mr. A. C. Wilson (until April 1966)

*Bulgaria**Representatives:*

H.E. Mr. Milko Tarabanov

Mr. Matey Karasimeonov

Mr. Dimiter Sabev

*Chile**Representative:*

H.E. Sr. José Piñera

Alternate Representative:

Mr. Javier Illanes

Adviser:

Mr. Jorge Huneeus

*Denmark**Representative:*

H.E. Mr. Hans R. Tabor

Alternate Representative:

Mr. Skjold G. Mellbin

Adviser:

Mr. Martin Kofod

*Ethiopia**Representatives:*

H.E. Mr. Tesfaye Gebre-Egzy (until May 1966)

H.E. Lij Endalkachew Makonnen (from July 1966)

Alternate Representatives:

Mr. Girma Abebe (until May 1966)

Mr. Berhane Deressa

Miss Kongit Sinegiorgis

*India**Representative:*

H.E. Mr. G. Parthasarathi

Alternate Representatives:

Mr. Brajesh C. Mishra

Mr. K. Natwar Singh (until March 1966)

Mr. C. R. Gharekhan

Adviser:

Miss M. Shivaraman (from September 1966)

*Iran**Representative:*

H.E. Mr. Mehdi Vakil

Alternate Representative:

Mr. Mohsen S. Esfandiary

Adviser:

Mr. Kambiz M. Ahy

*Iraq**Representative:*

H.E. Mr. Kadhim Khalaf

Alternate Representatives:

Mr. Ala'uddin H. Aljubouri

Mr. Salim A. Saleem

*Italy**Representative:*

H.E. Mr. Piero Vinci

Alternate Representatives:

Mr. Ludovico Carducci Artenisio

Mr. Vincenzo Zito (until June 1966)

Adviser:

Mr. Alessandro Grandi

*Ivory Coast**Representative:*

H.E. Mr. Siméon Aké

Alternate Representatives:

Mr. Julien Kacou

Mr. Jean-Marie Kakou Gervais

Mr. Joseph Laga (until September 1966)

*Madagascar**Representative:*

H.E. Mr. Louis Rakotomalala

Alternate Representatives:

Mr. Gabriel Rakotoniaina

Mr. Andiranampy Ramaholimihaso

Mrs. Lucile Ramaholimihaso

*Mali**Representatives:*

H.E. Mr. Sori Coulibaly (until April 1966)

H.E. Mr. Moussa Keita (from May 1966)

Mrs. Jeanne Rousseau (until June 1966)

Mr. Mamadou Moctar Thiam

*Poland**Representatives:*

H.E. Mr. Bohdan Lewandowski (until July 1966)

H.E. Mr. Bohdan Tomorowicz (from September 1966)

Alternate Representatives:

Mr. Eugeniusz Wyzner

Mr. Jan Slowikowski

Mr. Wladyslaw Neneman

*Sierra Leone**Representative:*

H.E. Mr. G. B. O. Collier

Alternate Representatives:

Mr. G. E. O. Williams

Mr. Frank P. Karefa-Smart

Adviser:

Mr. Ambrose P. Genda

* Previously reproduced in document A/6300 (part I) as annex III.

*Syria**Representative:*

H.E. Mr. George J. Tomeh

Alternate Representatives:

Mr. Rafic Jouéjati

Mr. Adnan Nachabe

Adviser:

Mr. Adnan Omran

*Tunisia**Representatives:*

H.E. Mr. Taïeb Slim

Mr. Mongi Sahli

Mr. Amor Fezzani

Mr. Hamdan Ben Aissa

Mr. Mohamed El Memmi

*Union of Soviet Socialist Republics**Representative:*

H.E. Dr. N. T. Fedorenko

Alternate Representative:

Mr. P. F. Shakhov

Advisers:

Mr. V. I. Ustinov

Mr. V. I. Gapon

Mr. A. V. Grodsky

*United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland**Representative:*

H.E. The Rt. Hon. Lord Caradon, G.C.M.G., K.C.V.O.

Alternate Representative:

Mr. F. D. W. Brown

Advisers:

Mr. D. J. Swan

Mr. B. L. Barder

*United Republic of Tanzania**Representatives:*

H.E. Mr. J. W. S. Malecela

Mr. Mohammad Ali Foun

Mr. Idi Mtwinga

*United States of America**Representative:*

H.E. Mrs. Eugenie M. Anderson

Alternate Representative:

Mr. Richard E. Johnson

Adviser:

Mr. Ernest C. Grigg, III

*Uruguay**Representative:*

H.E. Mr. Pedro P. Berro

Alternate Representatives:

Mr. Mateo Marques Seré

Mr. Felipe Montero

*Venezuela**Representative:*

H.E. Mr. Pedro Zuloaga

Alternate Representatives:

Mr. Leonardo Díaz González (until July 1966)

Mr. Tulio Alvarado (until October 1966)

Mr. Gilberto I. Carrasquero

Miss María Clemencia López

*Yugoslavia**Representative:*

H.E. Mr. Danilo Lekić

Alternate Representative:

Mr. Dimitar Janevski

*SPECIALIZED AGENCIES**International Labour Organisation*

Mr. Philippe Blamont

Mr. F. M. Abdel-Rahman

Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations

Mr. Joseph L. Orr

Mr. Morris A. Green

United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization

Mr. Arthur F. Gagliotti

Miss Ruth Barrett

World Health Organization

Dr. Rodolphe L. Coigney

Mrs. Sylvia Meagher

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