

# Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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## Second session

Geneva, 22 April-3 May 2013

## Summary record of the 3rd meeting

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, on Tuesday, 23 April 2013, at 10 a.m.

*Chair:* Mr. Feruta . . . . . (Romania)

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Committee (*continued*)

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*The meeting was called to order at 10.15 a.m.*

**General debate on issues related to all aspects of the work of the Preparatory Committee** (*continued*)

1. **Ms. Hultgård** (Sweden) said that, ever since concluding that developing a nuclear arsenal would not strengthen its national security, Sweden had been at the forefront of efforts to build security without nuclear weapons. Collective efforts needed to focus on the comprehensive implementation of the actions contained in the 2010 action plan on all three pillars of the Non-Proliferation Treaty in order to ensure a successful outcome of the current review cycle. Her Government fully supported the ongoing efforts to convene a conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction.

2. Although the strategic environment was changing, many States continued to maintain the postures that existed at the end of the cold war and the reliance on nuclear deterrence. The role of nuclear weapons in security doctrines needed to be reduced. In view of the ongoing implementation of the Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (the new START Treaty), her Government encouraged further talks aimed at the continued reduction of nuclear-weapon arsenals, including all substrategic, tactical and non-deployed nuclear weapons.

3. Credible nuclear disarmament required robust verification schemes. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) should continue to play a role in that regard, given its mandate and its wide range of expertise and experience in the field. As nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation were mutually reinforcing, steps should be taken on both tracks. The entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty and an expanded safeguard and verification monitoring system would contribute to the construction of a solid framework of reinforcing treaties and commitments. In the light of the recent nuclear test conducted by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, she called for the immediate ratification of the CTBT, in particular by all remaining annex 2 States. Her Government had supported proposals that would enable negotiations to begin on a fissile material cut-off treaty, including the

establishment of the group of governmental experts on the topic.

4. As an active member of the IAEA Board of Governors, Sweden strove to strengthen the IAEA safeguards system and contributed to the IAEA Peaceful Uses Initiative. It was important to continue the discussion of multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle. Her Government looked forward to the establishment of the IAEA low-enriched uranium bank and encouraged further steps to assure nuclear fuel supply.

5. **Mr. Balslev** (Denmark) said that adequate resources were needed to uphold the Agency's capabilities, particularly in the areas of nuclear verification, security and safety. The CTBT addressed the issue of horizontal and vertical proliferation, which was straining ongoing disarmament processes. All countries that had yet to do so should sign and ratify the CTBT and refrain from all nuclear testing and the use of new nuclear weapons technologies. Given the crucial role that export controls played in the non-proliferation regime, all States should establish and maintain effective national export controls for nuclear and related dual-use goods and technology, including as required by Security Council resolution 1540 (2004).

6. Denmark was among a group of countries that advocated the so-called third-track approach to disarmament and proliferation, focusing on the possible devastating humanitarian effects of the use of nuclear weapons. However, that approach was not meant to undermine existing multilateral or bilateral nuclear disarmament mechanisms or to reinterpret well-established international humanitarian law. Increasing awareness of the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons would help to significantly diminish the role of such weapons in military and defence doctrines and promote the gradual and irreversible reduction and ultimately the total elimination of all nuclear weapons, including strategic, non-strategic, deployed and non-deployed weapons. He hoped that a fact-based discussion would help to expand the group of countries in question to include the permanent members of the Security Council.

7. His Government supported the continued development of internationally recognized nuclear-weapon-free zones. It would continue to engage in discussions on proposals for an Arctic zone free of

weapons of mass destruction, which could benefit global peace and the countries and peoples of the High North. His Government regretted the postponement of the conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons, and hoped that it would be convened as soon as possible.

8. The Non-Proliferation Treaty remained the cornerstone of nuclear disarmament, but it was under stress following the stalemate in the Conference on Disarmament and other set-backs. The lack of progress in restoring confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear activities, including at the meeting with China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States (the E3+3) in Almaty, was deeply worrying. There was an urgent need for Iran to step up its cooperation with IAEA. The recent nuclear and missile tests conducted by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea were equally worrying. He urged both Governments to comply fully with all their obligations, including with Security Council and IAEA Board of Governors resolutions.

9. **Mr. Haniff** (Malaysia) said that the achievement of a nuclear-weapon-free world rested on the fulfilment of the basic bargain embodied in the Treaty's three pillars. His Government was concerned by the slow progress in the reduction of strategic and non-strategic nuclear weapons, the lack of transparency, the high alert status of nuclear weapons, the continuing pursuit of nuclear programmes by a few countries and the insistence of some others to remain outside the Treaty. The nuclear-weapon States should fulfil their commitment to report to the 2014 Preparatory Committee on the steps being taken to eliminate their nuclear weapons.

10. His delegation would again table the resolution on the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons at the General Assembly in 2013. That resolution underscored the unanimous opinion of the Court that there existed an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control.

11. The failure to convene the conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction, while regrettable, did not lessen the importance placed on the non-proliferation process.

Nonetheless, the conference should be convened as soon as possible. The decision by any State to withdraw from the Treaty should not be made unilaterally, but in accordance with article X of the Treaty. The universalization of the Treaty was a goal that needed to be further encouraged.

12. His Government looked forward to the nuclear-weapon States acceding to the Protocol to the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone at the earliest opportunity and welcomed the continued dialogue between the nuclear-weapon States and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations to resolve outstanding issues. Non-governmental organizations played a catalytic role in the campaign for nuclear disarmament and could be highly valuable to the inter-governmental process.

13. **Mr. Sadykov** (Kazakhstan) said that nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation were the highest priorities for his Government and that the Non-Proliferation Treaty played a key role in advancing non-proliferation and the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Collective efforts were needed to promote the Treaty's universalization, to elaborate an effective mechanism against the withdrawal of States from it, and to achieve the unconditional implementation of all multilaterally negotiated and generally approved agreements. Despite positive developments, such as the conclusion of the new START Treaty and the unilateral nuclear weapons reduction initiatives by the United Kingdom and France, global nuclear disarmament remained but an aspiration. His Government called upon nuclear-weapon States to make sincere efforts towards the total elimination of their nuclear weapons in accordance with article VI of the Treaty and report on their actions to the next Preparatory Committee in accordance with action 5 of the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference.

14. The catastrophic humanitarian and environmental consequences of nuclear tests conducted in Semipalatinsk and other nuclear test sites around the globe had demonstrated that the aftermath of any use of nuclear weapons could not be controlled in time and space. The development, production or use of nuclear weapons was incompatible with international humanitarian law. The total elimination of all nuclear arsenals was the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of such weapons. A nuclear weapons convention or a package of agreements, as it

had been suggested by the Secretary-General in his five-point plan for nuclear disarmament, could help achieve that goal. His Government's initiative to draft a universal declaration on a nuclear-weapon-free world was an effective vessel for facilitating the adoption of such a convention.

15. A voluntary moratorium on nuclear testing by the nuclear Powers was not an alternative to a legally binding document such as the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). The early entry into force of the CTBT would be essential for the effective implementation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. An early start of the negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty would be an important step forward in strengthening the international non-proliferation regime. He called on all Member States to implement General Assembly resolution 64/35, initiated by his Government, declaring 29 August the International Day against Nuclear Tests. His Government had also launched the ATOM project during the 2012 International Forum for a Nuclear-Weapons-Free World it had hosted in Astana as part of a campaign to collect signatures for a nuclear-test-ban petition.

16. The Treaty of Semipalatinsk was an important contribution by Central Asian countries to peace and security in a very fragile region. His delegation called for the convening of the conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free from weapons of mass destruction, which was pivotal for ensuring both regional and global security.

17. IAEA played an important role in ensuring non-proliferation and the peaceful use of nuclear energy. The development of multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle, including the possibility of creating a guaranteed nuclear fuel supply mechanism, would facilitate peaceful nuclear energy use. His Government looked forward to concluding negotiations on establishing an international bank for low-enriched uranium under the Agency's auspices.

18. **Mr. Thongpakdi** (Thailand) said that only the Non-Proliferation Treaty addressed the equally important issues of nuclear disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation were mutually reinforcing, requiring strong political will and practical undertakings from both nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States. The universality of the Treaty was crucial for the total

elimination of nuclear weapons. His Government called for the early conclusion of a universal and legally binding agreement on negative security assurances and welcomed the convening of the high-level meeting on nuclear disarmament to discuss ways of accelerating multilateral action in that field. His Government hoped for the revitalization of the Conference on Disarmament and looked forward to starting inclusive negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile material and a nuclear weapons convention. The Oslo Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons, which had illustrated the devastating effects of the use of nuclear weapons on human life and the environment, had made evident that even contemplating using such weapons was irresponsible and reprehensible.

19. His Government was an active proponent of the Bangkok Treaty, which had established the Southeast Asia nuclear-weapon-free zone, and welcomed the progress that had been made by the States parties and the nuclear-weapon States towards signing the protocol to the Treaty. It was disappointing that the conference to establish such a zone in the Middle East had been postponed. All parties should fully support the convening of the conference at the earliest opportunity to avoid undermining the credibility of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

20. His Government had actively promoted the implementation of the Treaty, including through its participation in the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, the Nuclear Security Summit process and the Proliferation Security Initiative. It was hosting the upcoming Association of Southeast Asian Nations Regional Forum Workshop on Implementation of United Nations Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) in Bangkok, which aimed to assist in the establishment of effective domestic controls for preventing the trafficking of weapons of mass destruction.

21. It was the inalienable right of States parties to develop and use nuclear energy in a safe, secure and peaceful manner, in accordance with their obligations under article IV of the Treaty. Those rights came with responsibilities to ensure nuclear safety, security and safeguards at the national, regional and international levels. His Government had proposed the establishment of a network of nuclear regulatory bodies within the Southeast Asian region to provide a framework for the

issues of safety, security and safeguards, based on IAEA standards and practices.

22. **Mr. Gerasimovich** (Belarus) said that the Non-Proliferation Treaty formed the foundation of the international security architecture; as such, its universality and balanced implementation were of utmost importance. His country had unconditionally acceded to the Treaty 20 years earlier and had ensured the rapid removal of all nuclear weapons from its territory. It was disappointing that the nuclear disarmament renaissance that took place in the 1990s had not produced tangible results. The Conference on Disarmament had been unable to undertake substantive work for nearly 15 years, owing to preconditions which the parties had brought to the negotiations. He hoped that the convening of a high-level meeting on nuclear disarmament later in the year would provide the impetus for multilateral negotiations, which should be undertaken with no preconditions and be guided by the moral imperatives of the individual States.

23. The speedy implementation of the new START Treaty and the additional efforts of the nuclear-weapon States to reduce their nuclear arsenals could help build trust and strengthen international security. Future measures to reduce strategic nuclear weapons and the means for their delivery must comprise both the destruction of aging nuclear warheads and obligations to halt the development of nuclear weapons.

24. One of the priorities of the current review cycle was for nuclear-weapon States to provide non-nuclear-weapon States with legally binding and unconditional security assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The trilateral security guarantees contained in the Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances were of particular importance to his Government. Under that agreement, Belarus had agreed to become a non-nuclear-weapon State and the United Kingdom, the Russian Federation and the United States had agreed to respect its independence and sovereignty and to not use economic sanctions against it. His Government welcomed the joint statement by the Russian Federation and the United States reaffirming that those guarantees would remain in force following the expiration of the first START Treaty. He called on the United Kingdom and the United States to stop exerting economic and political pressure on his Government, in contravention of their commitments under action 8 of the 2010 action plan. The Budapest Memorandum had been registered as an international

treaty, making its breach an unacceptable violation of international law.

25. His Government fully met its obligations under its IAEA safeguards agreement and supported the efforts of IAEA and States parties to strengthen the non-proliferation regime. It was important to ensure that the Agency could respond to the growing demand for technical assistance as States parties became more interested in safe nuclear energy.

26. **Mr. Corr** (Ireland) said that the ambitious set of conclusions and recommendations for action on all three pillars of the Treaty and on the Middle East that had been agreed on at the 2010 Review Conference offered a basis for achieving balanced progress in the implementation of the Treaty. Fulfilment of disarmament obligations under the Treaty remained disappointing, to the frustration of the international community. That frustration was evident in the decision of the General Assembly in 2012 to create two new mechanisms to take up issues on which the Conference on Disarmament had been unable or unwilling to make progress, as well as the decision to convene a high-level meeting on nuclear disarmament in 2013.

27. Noting that humanity would be powerless to respond to the uniquely destructive power of a nuclear detonation and that there was a groundswell of support for a meaningful discussion around the humanitarian impact of a nuclear detonation, his Government welcomed the constructive meeting held in Oslo in 2012 on the topic. He hoped that the nuclear-weapon States would participate in the follow-on conference to be held in Mexico.

28. Transparency was a key element for the success of the 2015 Review Conference. It was unacceptable that most States parties to the Treaty could not speak with precision about the number of nuclear weapons in existence, and that some States parties maintained a policy of opacity about the size of their arsenals. He called on the nuclear-weapon States to agree upon and use a standard reporting form in order to demonstrate maximum transparency and the commitment to disarm. They should fulfil the unequivocal undertaking they gave at the 2000 Review Conference to make deep, verifiable and irreversible reductions in their weapons arsenals. Downgrading the role of nuclear weapons in their security postures would be a strong confidence-building measure, and current alert levels were

excessive, increasing the risk of unintended deployment.

29. His Government deplored the recent weapons and missile tests by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and called on that State to desist from further provocative actions and to return to full compliance with its obligations under the Treaty and its IAEA safeguards agreement. The international community must remain resolute in its opposition to nuclear proliferation and urge the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to re-engage in talks on the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, immediately and without preconditions. The nuclear-weapons States had a special responsibility to make progress on disarmament, which would remove any possible incentive for a State to respond to a nuclear weapons capability by developing its own retaliatory capability. Failure to make meaningful reductions in their arsenals, through a process of bilateral and multilateral negotiations, would place the Treaty's non-proliferation objectives under intolerable pressure.

30. The actions of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea highlighted the urgent need for entry into force of the CTBT. He called on the remaining annex 2 States to sign and ratify the Treaty without waiting for others to do so. While the Treaty had not yet entered into force, it represented an overwhelming international consensus against nuclear weapons testing that each State Party had a duty to protect.

31. His Government was strongly supportive of ongoing efforts to establish a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons. It was regrettable that the proposed conference on such a zone could not be held in 2012. All States of the region should continue to engage constructively so that the conference could be convened at the earliest possible opportunity.

32. It was time to start work on a single, universal and multilaterally negotiated instrument or a framework of mutually reinforcing instruments to achieve a world free of nuclear weapons. While it was vital for all States parties to deliver on the Treaty's non-proliferation agenda, it was equally important for the nuclear-weapons States to acknowledge that only they could deliver on the Treaty's disarmament agenda.

33. **Mr. Bairagi** (Nepal) said that the comprehensive review of the Non-Proliferation Treaty should include all its three interlinked and mutually reinforcing pillars. His Government advocated complete

disarmament of all weapons of mass destruction, including biological, chemical, nuclear and radiological weapons, within a set timeframe. Disarmament would allow for scarce resources to be channelled towards the eradication of poverty and hunger and raising the standard of living for the poorer segments of the world's population.

34. The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones and full implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East were not substitutes for nuclear disarmament. Pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons, nuclear-weapon States must provide unconditional, non-discriminatory and irrevocable negative security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States through a legally binding instrument. While article IV of the Treaty guaranteed certain rights to the Parties, effective supervision and verification by IAEA must be part of the process. The degree of nuclear knowledge-sharing and cooperation with the developing countries on nuclear technology for scientific, humanitarian and development purposes must be increased.

35. Lastly, he called for an immediate, unconditional and permanent ban on nuclear weapon testing and closure of all nuclear weapon test sites. A fissile material cut-off treaty, which aimed to address the proliferation of fissile material, would be vital significance for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

36. **Mr. Peters** (Netherlands), speaking on behalf of Australia, Canada, Chile, Germany, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, Poland, Turkey and the United Arab Emirates, members of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (NPDI), said that those countries were committed to advancing the consensus outcome of the 2010 Review Conference and the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation agendas as mutually reinforcing processes. The Treaty was the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime and formed the basis for the development of the peaceful uses of nuclear technology. States that had not yet done so should accede to the Treaty immediately as non-nuclear-weapon States.

37. While welcoming the ongoing implementation of the new START Treaty, NPDI called upon all nuclear-weapon States to reduce and ultimately eliminate all their nuclear weapons, deployed and non-deployed, in an irreversible, transparent and verifiable manner. They

should take practical steps to increase transparency, a vital confidence-building measure on disarmament. In accordance with actions 5 and 21 of the 2010 action plan, the Initiative had proposed a draft reporting form that they could use to detail their efforts to fulfil their disarmament commitments under article VI of the Treaty. They should also reduce the significance of nuclear weapons in their military and nuclear doctrines, which would contribute towards the goal of complete nuclear disarmament.

38. Members of the Initiative were deeply concerned at the continued stalemate in the Conference on Disarmament. An agreement was needed on a comprehensive programme of work as well as substantive work on the four core issues of the Conference. The adoption of General Assembly resolutions 67/53, 67/55 and 67/39 could give much-needed impetus to the cause of nuclear disarmament. The immediate commencement of negotiations on a verifiable treaty to ban the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices remained a disarmament and non-proliferation priority. Meanwhile, all States possessing nuclear weapons should declare and maintain a moratorium on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. The universalization and the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty were essential for achieving nuclear disarmament. All countries that had not yet done so, in particular the remaining annex 2 States, should sign and ratify the Treaty without delay. Pending the Treaty's entry into force, all States should refrain from nuclear-weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions.

39. Strengthening the effectiveness and efficiency of the IAEA safeguards system had always been a priority of the Initiative, which promoted universal adherence to key non-proliferation instruments. The IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, with an additional protocol thereto, was the international verification standard. The Initiative called on all States that had not yet concluded an additional protocol to do so without delay and stood ready to share its experience and best practices in the conclusion and implementation of additional protocols. It also called on States to rescind or amend the Small Quantities Protocol and to ratify the amended Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material.

40. Export controls played a crucial role in implementing the nuclear non-proliferation obligations under article III, paragraph 2, of the Treaty. All States should establish, develop and maintain effective national export controls for nuclear and related dual-use goods and technology. Recognizing the serious threat of nuclear terrorism, NPDI was participating in preparations for the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit to be held in The Hague and welcomed the International Conference on Nuclear Security, to be convened by IAEA in Vienna in July 2013.

41. The Initiative strongly condemned the third nuclear test conducted recently by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, in violation of Security Council resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009) and 2087 (2013). It welcomed the unanimous adoption of Security Council resolution 2094 (2013) and strongly urged the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to heed the warnings and condemnation expressed by the international community to comply fully with all of its obligations and to refrain from further provocations.

42. NPDI deeply regretted the lack of progress towards resolving the outstanding issues in relation to Iran's nuclear programme. It urged Iran to seriously engage with IAEA; to address the immediate concerns of the international community by engaging with the E3+3 on the proposal tabled in Almaty in February 2013; and to fully comply with its international obligations, including with IAEA and Security Council resolutions. The Initiative supported the Agency's essential role in confidence-building and efforts by the E3+3 to find a comprehensive, negotiated, long-term settlement to the Iranian nuclear issue, while respecting Iran's legitimate rights to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

43. The Initiative encouraged the establishment of internationally recognized and verifiable nuclear-weapon-free zones and called for constructive engagement of all States, especially the nuclear-weapon States, in support of that objective. It was regrettable that the conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons could not be held in 2012. The Initiative called for the earliest possible convening of the conference with the participation of all States of the region.

44. Members of the Initiative had participated in the Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons that took place in Oslo in 2013 and remained



deeply concerned by the risk of use of nuclear weapons and by the catastrophic humanitarian consequences that would result from their use. The Initiative was ready to intensify its engagement with civil society organizations in an effort to attain the goals of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. NPDI recognized the importance of disarmament and non-proliferation education and welcomed Japan's announcement of its "youth communicator for a world without nuclear weapons" programme and the initiative by the United Arab Emirates to support workshops for journalists on the subject of disarmament and non-proliferation.

45. **Mr. van den IJssel** (Netherlands) said that his Government fully subscribed to the goal of a world without nuclear weapons and believed that the Non-Proliferation Treaty was the essential instrument to that end. The 2010 action plan offered a comprehensive path forward on all aspects of the Treaty. While disarmament and non-proliferation were two sides of the same coin, the lack of progress on one should not be an excuse for the lack of effort to realize the other. Progress on disarmament would best be achieved through a step-by-step process. A treaty that stopped the production of fissile material for military purposes and the entry into force of the CTBT were essential for a nuclear-weapons-free world.

46. The continuing stalemate in the Conference on Disarmament, while disappointing, should not prevent further steps to implement actions 16, 17 and 18 of the 2010 action plan related to fissile material. His Government had actively supported General Assembly resolution [67/53](#) and looked forward to the work of the group of governmental experts on the topic. It also welcomed General Assembly resolution [67/56](#) and planned to actively participate in the deliberation of the open-ended working group on the advancement of multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations.

47. Bilateral steps, such as the ongoing implementation of the new START Treaty, were important contributions to nuclear disarmament. The next round of negotiations on further reductions of nuclear arsenals between the United States and the Russian Federation should cover all types of nuclear weapons, including non-strategic nuclear weapons. Mutual reductions that took into account the parties' different starting positions were the next logical step. He hoped that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Russian Federation could soon start discussing enhanced transparency regarding non-strategic weapons.

48. Practical steps and increased transparency did not require complicated negotiations and were very important for achieving progress on disarmament and non-proliferation. His Government looked forward to holding a constructive dialogue with the nuclear-weapon States on ways to enhance transparency pursuant to action 21 of the 2010 action plan. Twenty years had passed since the end of the cold war and, as nuclear weapons played a lesser role in the new global security environment, their position in the defence doctrines of nuclear-weapon States should be adjusted accordingly. The continued involvement of a well-informed civil and academic society was essential to strengthening the non-proliferation regime, spurring arms control efforts and enabling long-term disarmament commitments. His Government had invested in training the next generation of non-proliferation and disarmament experts and had once again included a doctoral student in its delegation.

49. The proliferation of nuclear weapons was one of the gravest threats to international peace and stability. His Government condemned Iran for its continued production of enriched uranium, the expansion of its enrichment capacities and its ongoing heavy-water-related activities, in breach of its international obligations and Security Council resolution [1696 \(2006\)](#). He urged Iran to cooperate with IAEA in resolving outstanding issues, including the possible military dimension of its nuclear programme. His Government fully supported the diplomatic efforts led by the E3+3 to find a comprehensive long-term settlement, which would build confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of the Iranian nuclear programme.

50. His Government strongly condemned the recent missile launch and nuclear test conducted by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in violation of several Security Council resolutions. It welcomed the unanimous adoption of Security Council resolution [2094 \(2013\)](#) and strongly urged the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to fully comply with all its international obligations and to refrain from any further escalatory actions and provocations.

51. His Government was committed to upholding the highest standards and full transparency in nuclear export controls. A good international export control mechanism was essential to maintain effective international controls for nuclear and related dual-use goods and technologies and should be adhered to by all



countries. Nuclear terrorism was a real threat with grave consequences of unfathomable dimensions. A fundamental objective of his Government's foreign policy was to ensure that terrorists could never get their hands on nuclear material. His Government was fully committed to implementing the communiqués and work plans of the Washington and Seoul Nuclear Security Summits and was honoured to host the next Summit in 2014. In that connection, it was working to reduce the use and improve the security of highly enriched uranium, achieve the entry into force of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, increase the use of the International Physical Protection Advisory Service advisory missions of IAEA, improve the security of radioactive sources and increase cooperation between Government and industry.

52. His Government recognized the right of all States parties to peaceful uses of nuclear energy. By ensuring that nuclear material and facilities did not contribute to nuclear proliferation, the Treaty created the basis for technological transfer and cooperation. His Government supported the efficiency, effectiveness and transparency of IAEA in facilitating the peaceful use of nuclear energy and continued to contribute to the Technical Cooperation Fund and to provide training in the Netherlands. The peaceful use of nuclear energy must be accompanied by the highest levels of safety and security at all stages of the fuel cycle. His Government welcomed IAEA efforts to improve those levels and their implementation.

53. **Mr. Guerreiro** (Brazil) said that the main objective of any review cycle was to reduce the asymmetry inherent in the Treaty regime between the rights and obligations of nuclear-weapon States and those of non-nuclear-weapon States. Attempts to increase that imbalance should be shunned. While the Treaty had been successful as a non-proliferation instrument, there was no commitment to multilateral negotiations on the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, as mandated by article VI of the Treaty. The situation where many States renounced having nuclear weapons while a few were entitled to keep them was unsustainable. The indefinite extension of the Treaty in 1995 could not be interpreted as permitting the perpetual possession of nuclear weapons. The nuclear-weapon States would sooner or later conclude that it was in their interest to live in a world without nuclear weapons and without the tensions inherent in a world of haves and have-nots.

54. His Government regretted the absence of the nuclear-weapon States at the Oslo Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons, and hoped that they would attend the follow-up conference in Mexico. It also regretted that the Conference on Disarmament had not been able to adopt a programme of work which would effectively contribute to nuclear disarmament, and stood ready to work towards an agreement on fissile materials for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. That agreement would have to cover past production of fissile materials or else its impact on disarmament would be less than negligible. He regretted the failure to convene the conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons in 2012 and hoped that it would be convened without further delay.

55. Neither the pursuit nor the retention of nuclear weapons could ever guarantee a nation's peace and security, nor enhance regional or international security. His Government therefore strongly condemned the nuclear tests carried out by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in violation of its obligations under various Security Council resolutions.

56. **Mr. Soltanieh** (Islamic Republic of Iran) said that the reaffirmation by the nuclear-weapon States of their unequivocal undertaking to totally eliminate their nuclear arsenal and the agreement to convene a conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons had been the most important outcomes of the 2010 Review Conference. Nonetheless, progress on both fronts was disappointing. The continued existence and modernization of tens of thousands of nuclear warheads constituted a serious threat to mankind. States that maintained nuclear weapons stockpiles for strategic purposes lacked the resolve to eliminate the risk of their use or their vertical or horizontal proliferation.

57. The continued existence of strategic defence doctrines that rationalized the use of nuclear weapons, such as the United States Nuclear Posture Review and the NATO Strategic Concept, was deeply worrying. The planned deployment of a global missile defence system was in clear breach of action 1 of the 2010 action plan; it would not increase the security of its sponsor or host countries and would only prompt countermeasures by the other nuclear-weapon States. The United States had recently conducted yet another subcritical nuclear experiment involving a model nuclear warhead to advance nuclear-weapon design, in

flagrant violation of its international obligations under the CTBT. The decision by the United Kingdom to upgrade its Trident nuclear submarine project was in breach of article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the commitments made at the 2010 Review Conference.

58. Spending on nuclear weapons had sharply increased since 2010, following the decisions by nuclear-weapon States to upgrade and replace their aging nuclear production factories, missiles, submarines and bombers. States aspiring to possess nuclear weapons were also secretly procuring plutonium reprocessing and uranium enrichment facilities and dual-use delivery systems. The sale by Germany of a number of Dolphin submarines to Israel was an unconcealed case of proliferation and non-compliance, since those submarines could be equipped with nuclear cruise missiles.

59. Nuclear-sharing between nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States continued to be a source of concern, as was the deployment of nuclear weapons in non-nuclear-weapon States in European countries, in flagrant violation of the Treaty. If those countries had reported the amount, location and type of their weapons-grade nuclear material to IAEA, then they had violated article II of the Treaty. If they had not reported to the Agency, then they were not complying with their IAEA safeguards obligations. The distribution of nuclear weapons in Europe had also increased the risk of terrorists gaining access to them.

60. A deadline was needed for the total elimination of nuclear arsenals, which would allow for systematic progress towards implementing nuclear disarmament obligations under article VI of the Treaty and enable the Conference on Disarmament to commence negotiations on a nuclear weapons convention. His Government was concerned that no substantive progress report had been submitted on the fulfilment by the nuclear-weapon States of their undertakings under action 5 of the 2010 action plan. In accordance with article IV of the Treaty, his Government, along with the other non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty, demanded that the right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes should be respected. The imposition of restrictions as a cover for foreign policy objectives was a clear violation of article IV and challenged the integrity and credibility of the Treaty.

61. It was unfortunate that no practical steps had been taken to remove restrictions on the transfer of

nuclear materials, equipment and technologies for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. His Government would never compromise its inalienable right to pursue all legal aspects of nuclear technology, as reiterated in the outcome documents of the 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences, including fuel cycle and enrichment technology, exclusively for peaceful purposes and in accordance with its comprehensive safeguards agreement under IAEA supervision.

62. His Government appreciated the indispensable support of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries in the preceding decade. In that time, following an unprecedented number of IAEA inspections in his country had not yielded any evidence of diversion of nuclear material for military purposes. It was shameful that the European Union and the United States had, in their interventions, equated Iran with a State that possessed nuclear weapons but was not a party to the Treaty. While Iran was paying a heavy price for its membership and full commitment to the Treaty, States outside the Treaty were being exempted from any inspection and sanctions while receiving assistance from the United States and Canada.

63. His Government had been the first to propose the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and the immediate, full, and unconditional implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East, had been an essential element on the basis of which the Treaty had been indefinitely extended. In view of Israel's history of aggression and occupation, the establishment of such a zone was extremely important for the stability and security of the region and the world. Israel's refusal to accede to the Treaty and place its nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards had prompted some States in the region to hold back their accession to certain international instruments dealing with weapons of mass destruction. His Government was ready to participate in the planned conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons. The unilateral decision by the United States to postpone the conference, despite the unanimous decision taken at the 2010 Review Conference, was a serious setback for the Treaty and indicated the disregard of the United States for repeated calls by the international community to place Israel's clandestine nuclear weapons activities under the Treaty's non-proliferation regime.

64. Having been a victim of weapons of mass destruction, the Islamic Republic of Iran firmly

believed that the international community must eliminate the threat of deliberate or accidental nuclear detonation for the sake of humankind. His Government categorically rejected nuclear weapons, which had no place in its defence doctrine. Hostile dual-track and carrot-and-stick policies were doomed to failure. His country's determination to pursue its right path was only strengthened by sanctions, assassinations of its nuclear scientists and the threat of attack by Israel. Western countries were advised to move from confrontation to cooperation and to enter into negotiations for long-term strategic cooperation with Iran, the strongest and most stable partner in the region.

65. **Mr. Bamami** (Iraq) said that, in the four decades since the Treaty had entered into force, nuclear-weapon States had failed to comply with the calls to disarm contained in both its article VI of the Treaty and the 1995 decision on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. They continued to flout the Treaty by developing new generations of nuclear weapons and maintaining the role of such weapons in their national security and military doctrines. The flaws of the Treaty and restrictions on some of its provisions could have dangerous repercussions for international peace and security if not redressed. The indefinite extension of the NPT must not be understood as entitling nuclear-weapon States to retain their weapons indefinitely.

66. His Government remained committed to complying with all international instruments and arrangements on disarmament and non-proliferation and had taken a set of legislative and administrative measures to that end. A State Party to the Treaty since 1969 and to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty since 2008, Iraq had recently ratified the additional protocol to its decades-old comprehensive safeguards agreement with IAEA.

67. The final extension of the Treaty had been inextricably linked to the creation of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons, one of a package of decisions adopted at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference. Failure to implement those decisions would have serious repercussions on the future of the Treaty regime. The failure to hold the conference on the Middle East in 2012 had been due to Israel's refusal to attend, as both the Arab countries and the Islamic Republic of Iran had indicated their willingness to participate. He hoped the conference would be convened before the end of 2013.

68. **Ms. Iskakova** (Kyrgyz Republic) said that, while the Treaty faced a number of challenges, it also presented new opportunities for the advancement of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation goals. Her Government took pride in the entry into force of the Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty, which included provisions calling for the remediation of the environmental damage to the region resulting from prior nuclear weapons activities and required the parties to adhere to the IAEA Additional Protocol. Her Government was disappointed by the postponement of the 2012 conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and considered further delays in implementing the 1995 resolution on the Middle East and in convening the conference ill-advised.

69. Her Government actively implemented Security Council resolution [1540 \(2004\)](#) and had adopted an action plan to address the proliferation challenges posed by non-State actors. It would welcome technical assistance to increase national capacity in that field. The Non-Proliferation Treaty needed to adapt to the growing risk of nuclear terrorism in order to remain viable. International safeguards and the physical protection of nuclear materials and facilities were the first line of defence against nuclear terrorism. Her Government supported efforts to strengthen the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and had completed preparations for accession to the Convention. It strongly endorsed efforts to strengthen the international safeguards system, including the adoption of an additional protocol as the safeguards standard, and welcomed the practical measures identified in the communiqués of the 2010 and 2012 Nuclear Security Summits.

70. Prior Review Conferences had addressed the importance of mitigating the environmental consequences of uranium mining and associated nuclear fuel-cycle activities. She called once again on all Governments and international organizations with expertise in radioactive contaminant clean-up and disposal to assist in remediation efforts in affected areas. Her Government welcomed the inclusion of action 22 in the outcome document of the 2010 Review Conference, which called on all States to implement the recommendations of the United Nations study on disarmament and non-proliferation education. Her delegation appreciated Japan's leadership on that issue and looked forward to working with other interested

States on developing practical steps to promote the full implementation of the measures called for in that study.

71. **Mr. Vásquez-Bermúdez** (Ecuador) said that his Government had spent the previous five decades lobbying for a world free of nuclear weapons, having signed the Treaty of Tlatelolco in 1967, which had established the world's first nuclear-weapon-free zone in Latin America and the Caribbean. It fully supported the work of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean in monitoring compliance with the Treaty of Tlatelolco and abided strictly by its own obligations under that Treaty, the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the safeguards agreement with IAEA and all other relevant instruments to which it was a party. In that connection, his delegation urged all countries that had not yet ratified the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and IAEA safeguards agreements to do so.

72. The country's Constitution prohibited the development, production, use, stockpiling and transfer of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and condemned the imposition of military bases and installations for military purposes by some States on the territory of other States. His Government welcomed the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones for their vital contribution to global disarmament and non-proliferation efforts, as well as Kazakhstan's voluntary denuclearization initiative.

73. He regretted the failure to hold the conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons in 2012 and hoped that the conference would take place at the earliest possible date with the participation of all Middle Eastern countries. It was imperative that Israel, as the only State in the region that was neither a Party to the NPT nor subject to the IAEA safeguards regime, accede to the Treaty and its oversight and verification mechanisms. To bring peace to the Korean Peninsula and to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in that region, all parties must remain engaged in constructive dialogue, and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea must also return to the Treaty.

74. The alarmingly minimal progress made by the nuclear-weapon States towards reducing their nuclear arsenals evinced their non-compliance with the Treaty and the outcomes of the Review Conferences held since 1995. It was also distressing that those States had

continued to upgrade their nuclear weapons and to retain them in their military and national security doctrines. Nevertheless, his Government was convinced that the ongoing cooperative dialogue between nuclear-weapon States could be conducive to the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons.

75. In light of the frustrating paralysis of the Disarmament Conference for over 15 years, negotiations should be launched on a phased programme for the complete elimination of such weapons that would include a convention on the prohibition of nuclear weapons and their immediate destruction. While disarmament negotiations proceeded, nuclear-weapon States must abstain from the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapon State that was a Party to the Treaty, and a legally binding international instrument on effective, unconditional and non-discriminatory security guarantees must be concluded.

76. All States had the right to use, develop and benefit from nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, in accordance with the Treaty, with technical assistance from the International Atomic Energy Agency, through its monitoring and verification of nuclear activities and nuclear safety. It must perform those tasks a technical, objective and non-discriminatory manner. By the same token, States must comply with the Agency's safeguards regime, as governed by its Statute, in good faith. Moreover, in implementation of article VI of the Treaty, there was a need to initiate negotiations on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict international control.

77. His delegation welcomed Norway's leadership and success in organizing and hosting the international Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons in March 2013. Regrettably, however, the five nuclear-weapon States, in addition to Israel and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, had not attended that Conference. In closing, he reiterated his country's commitment to continue working to delegitimize the use and possession of nuclear weapons by raising awareness of their humanitarian consequences and promoting alternatives in the hope of reducing States' dependency on nuclear arsenals.

*The meeting rose at 1 p.m.*