

COMMISSION FOR CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS

RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED BY THE COMMISSION AT ITS  
THIRTEENTH MEETING, 12 AUGUST 1948,  
AND A SECOND PROGRESS REPORT  
OF THE COMMISSION

N.B. THE COMMISSION DECIDED AT ITS FIFTEENTH MEETING ON 17 AUGUST 1948 THAT THE DRAFT REPORT PREPARED BY THE SECRETARIAT WOULD, AFTER INCLUSION OF ALL MODIFICATIONS AND CORRECTIONS ADOPTED BY THE COMMISSION AT ITS FOURTEENTH AND FIFTEENTH MEETINGS, BECOME THE FINAL APPROVED TEXT OF THE REPORT IN THE ABSENCE OF A REQUEST BY ANY DELEGATION BEFORE 15 SEPTEMBER FOR A MEETING OF THE COMMISSION TO CONSIDER THE REVISED TEXT.

RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE COMMISSION FOR CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS  
AT ITS THIRTEENTH MEETING, 12 AUGUST 1948

The Commission for Conventional Armaments resolves to advise the Security Council:

1. that it considers that all armaments and armed forces, except atomic weapons and weapons of mass destruction, fall within its jurisdiction and that weapons of mass destruction should be defined to include atomic explosive weapons, radio-active material weapons, lethal chemical and biological weapons, and any weapons developed in the future which have characteristics comparable in destructive effect to those of the atomic bomb or other weapons mentioned above.
2. that it proposes to proceed with its work on the basis of the above definition.

RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE COMMISSION FOR CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS  
AT ITS THIRTEENTH MEETING, 12 AUGUST 1948

THE COMMISSION FOR CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS RECOMMENDS that the following principles should govern the formulation of practical proposals for the establishment of a system for the regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces:

1. A system for the regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces should provide for the adherence of all States. Initially it must include at least all States having substantial military resources.
2. A system of regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces can only be put into effect in an atmosphere of international confidence and security. Measures for the regulation and reduction of armaments which would follow the establishment of the necessary degree of confidence might in turn be expected to increase confidence and so justify further measures of regulation and reduction.
3. Examples of conditions essential to such confidence and security are:

(a) The establishment of an adequate system of agreements under Article 43 of the Charter. Until the agreed forces are pledged to the Security Council an essential step in establishing a system of collective security will not have been taken.

(b) The establishment of international control of atomic energy. It is a basic assumption of the work of the Commission for Conventional Armaments that the Atomic Energy Commission will make specific proposals for the elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons and other weapons of mass destruction.

(c) The conclusion of the peace settlements with Germany and Japan. Conditions of international peace and Security will not be fully established until measures have been agreed upon which will prevent these States from undertaking aggressive action in the future.

4. A system for the regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces, in order to make possible the least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources pursuant to Article 26 of the Charter of the United Nations, must limit armaments and armed forces to those which are consistent with and indispensable to the maintenance of international peace and security. Such armaments and armed forces should not exceed

/those necessary

those necessary for the implementation of members' obligations and the protection of their rights under the Charter of the United Nations.

5. A system for the regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces must include an adequate system of safeguards, which by including an agreed system of international supervision will ensure the observance of the provisions of the treaty or convention by all parties thereto. A system of safeguards cannot be adequate unless it possesses the following characteristics:

- (a) it is technically feasible and practical;
- (b) it is capable of detecting promptly the occurrence of violations;
- (c) it causes the minimum interference with, and imposes the minimum burdens on, any aspect of the life of individual nations.

6. Provision must be made for effective enforcement action in the event of violations.

COMMISSION FOR CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS

REVISED DRAFT OF THE SECOND REPORT OF THE COMMISSION FOR CONVENTIONAL  
ARMAMENTS COVERING THE PERIOD 16 JULY 1947 - 12 AUGUST 1948\*

This revised text, prepared by the Secretariat embodies all the amendments and corrections approved by the Commission at its fourteenth and fifteenth meetings on 17 August 1948.

1. The present report of the Commission for Conventional Armaments to the Security Council accompanies the resolutions adopted by the Commission on 12 August 1948 and covers its work for the period 16 July 1947 - 12 August 1948 during which it held four meetings.
2. At its tenth meeting, on 16 July 1947, the Commission for Conventional Armaments established a Working Committee of the whole whose terms of reference were the plan of work approved by the Security Council at its one hundred and fifty-second meeting. Those terms of reference were the following:
  - "1. Consider and make recommendations to the Security Council concerning armaments and armed forces which fall within the jurisdiction of the Commission for Conventional Armaments.
  2. Consideration and determination of general principles in connection with the regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces.
  3. Consideration of practical and effective safeguards by means of an international system of control operating through special organs (and by other means) to protect complying States against the hazards of violations and evasions.
  4. Formulate practical proposals for the regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces.
  5. Extension of the principles and proposals set forth in paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 above to States which are not Members of the United Nations.
  6. Submission of a report or reports to the Security Council including, if possible, a Draft Convention."
3. The Working Committee of the Commission for Conventional Armaments, which met for the first time on 20 August 1947, has held twenty meetings, all of them in closed session, in the period covered by this Report.

---

\* N.B. The Commission decided at its thirteenth meeting on 12 August 1948 that its report would accompany the two resolutions which it had adopted. The latter are, therefore, reproduced at the head of this draft.

4. At the fourth meeting of the Working Committee on 9 September 1947, it adopted and transmitted to the Commission for Conventional Armaments a resolution defining the armaments which fall outside the jurisdiction of the Commission.
5. At the seventeenth meeting of the Working Committee on 26 July 1948, it adopted and transmitted to the Commission for Conventional Armaments a resolution recommending the principles which should govern the formulation of practical proposals for the establishment of a system for the regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces.
6. At its eighteenth, nineteenth and twentieth meetings (4 August and 9 August 1948), the Working Committee considered and adopted a first progress report covering the work of its first seventeen meetings which had been devoted to the substance of the problems involved in Items 1 and 2 of the plan of work.
7. The resolution under Item 1 of the plan of work defines weapons of mass destruction. In proposing that definition at the first meeting of the Working Committee, the delegation of the United States stated that such a definition was necessary to enable the Commission to determine what weapons fell within its own jurisdiction. The reasons for the opposition to that proposal of the delegation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics were stated at the fourth meeting of the Working Committee on 9 September 1947 to be the following: (1) that it involved a separation of the general problem of the regulation and reduction of armaments into a problem concerning atomic weapons and other weapons of mass destruction and a problem concerning so-called conventional armaments which was artificial and would divert the Commission from the preparation of proposals for practical measures for the general regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces into a blind alley, and (2) that measures for the regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces should not only require the reduction of conventional armaments, but also prohibit the use of atomic weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, and require the destruction of existing stocks of atomic weapons. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics also criticized as too restrictive the limitation of weapons of mass destruction to those to be developed in the future.
8. At the thirteenth meeting of the Working Committee on 21 January 1948 this matter was adverted to again by the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics who stated that the separation of the question of the general regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces, on the one  
/hand,

hand, and the prohibition of atomic arms on the other hand, was contrary to the terms of the Resolution of the General Assembly of 14 December 1946. That separation was contained in the plan of work. The Resolution adopted by the General Assembly, the representative of the Soviet Union stated, not only did not place in opposition to one another the prohibition of the atomic arm and the general regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces; on the contrary, it placed these two in close relationship. The artificial separation of these two questions was contrary to the Resolution adopted by the General Assembly; it would constitute an obstacle in the future work of the Commission for Conventional Armaments and of the Security Council in this field; and would involve the collapse of the efforts to implement the General Assembly's Resolution concerning the general regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces with all its consequences. The representative of the United States replied that the problems of the Commission for Conventional Armaments were basically different from those of the Atomic Energy Commission. In his opinion, the fundamental reality with regard to the physical quality of atomic energy which required the consideration of the problem of controlling atomic energy to be separated from the consideration of the problem of conventional armaments was that the production of power in atomic energy required at the same time the production of the explosives used in the atomic bomb. It was for that reason that the General Assembly Resolution had stated that it was the function of the Atomic Energy Commission to provide for the control of atomic energy for peaceful purposes only.

9. The resolution on general principles (Item 2 of the plan of work) is a composite of proposals submitted by the delegations of Australia, Canada, France, Syria, the United Kingdom and the United States, which themselves derive from working papers concerning Items 2 and 3 of the plan of work (Item 3 relates to safeguards which have not yet been considered) submitted by the eleven delegations represented in the Working Committee in 1947, and summarizes the majority opinion revealed by those working papers.

10. The gist of the resolution on general principles is: (1) that a system for the regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces should embrace all States, though it may be initiated with the adherence of all States having substantial military resources; (2) that to put such a system into effect there must be international confidence and security, but that the regulation and reduction of armaments and the existence of confidence are reciprocal; (3) that the conditions essential to international confidence and security include an adequate system of agreements under Article 43 of the Charter, an effective control of

/atomic energy,

atomic energy, and the conclusion of peace settlements with Germany and Japan; (4) that to conform with Article 26 of the Charter of the United Nations armaments and armed forces under such a system must be limited to those consistent with and indispensable to the maintenance of international peace and security and not exceed those necessary for the implementation of Members' obligations and the protection of their rights under the Charter; (5) that to ensure observance such a system must include adequate safeguards including an agreed system of international supervision; and (6) that provision must be made for effective enforcement in the event of violation.

11. The reasons for opposition of the delegation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the resolution concerning Item 2 of the plan of work eventually adopted by the Working Committee were stated by the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics at several of the meetings of the Working Committee as the resolution underwent drafting changes. The delegation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics expressed the view, at the seventeenth meeting of the Working Committee on 26 July 1948: (1) that the resolution did not aim to implement the General Assembly resolution of 14 December 1946 concerning the general regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces but to prevent its implementation, (2) that acceptance of it amounted to a refusal to implement the General Assembly resolution, and (3) that the consequence of adopting it would be a new armaments race, an increase of armed forces, increased budgetary expenditures for military purposes and all the consequences that this would entail. The representatives of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic have laid especial emphasis on their view that the General Assembly resolution of 14 December 1946 contains no conditions or prerequisites to the prompt formulation and implementation of practical measures for the general regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces and that there is no justification for setting conditions or prerequisites of any kind as preliminaries to be satisfied before proceeding to the prompt formulation of practical measures for the general regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces or the implementation of the General Assembly resolution of 14 December 1946 including the prohibition of use and manufacture of atomic weapons and other weapons of mass destruction and the destruction of existing stocks of these.

The setting of such conditions in their view leads the Commission into a vicious circle from which there is no escape, and they regard the resulting failure on the part of the United States and the United Kingdom to implement the General Assembly resolution as a principal cause of international mistrust and the worsening of international relations and as especially deplorable in view of the heavy burden of present military expenditures throughout the world.

12. At the seventeenth meeting of the Working Committee on 26 July 1948, the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics introduced new counter-proposals which supplemented and elaborated paragraph 1 of the working paper submitted to the Committee by his delegation on 3 October 1947 in response to the Committee's request for written expressions of view on Items 2 and 3 of its plan of work. That paper had been submitted to the Commission, before establishment of the Working Committee, to serve as a plan of work. The working paper read:

"1. The establishment of general principles for the reduction of armaments and armed forces and for the determination of the minimum requirements of each State with regard to all kinds of armaments and armed forces (land, sea and air), taking into account the prohibition of atomic weapons and other kinds of armaments adaptable to mass destruction.

"2. The establishment of the general principles which are to serve as a basis for the reduction of manufacturing war production and the determination of the maximum capacity of war production for each State, with a view to permitting the production and use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes only.

"3. The extension of the principles set forth in paragraphs 1 and 2 to States which are not Members of the United Nations.

"4. The establishment of limits for individual kinds of armaments and armed forces for each State, on the basis of the principles set forth in paragraph 1.

"5. The establishment of limits for various kinds of war production for each State, on the basis of the principles set forth in paragraph 2.

"6. The determination of the procedure and time-limits for bringing the level of armaments and armed forces and also of war production for each State into conformity with the limits set forth in paragraphs 4 and 5.

/"7. Problems of

"7. Problems of the distribution of armed forces and the question of the reduction of networks of military, naval and air bases.

"8. Measures relating to the prohibition of the use of non-military industry and non-military means of transport for purposes of war, beyond the limits arising out of those set forth in paragraphs 4 and 5.

"9. The organization and the procedure for the establishment of a system of control to implement measures regarding the general reduction and regulation of armaments and armed forces and also of war industry and war production, taking into account the co-ordination of the aforementioned system of control with the system of control over the use of atomic energy.

"10. The working out of a draft convention."

13. The new proposals supplementing and elaborating paragraph 1 of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics' working paper read as follows:

"1. The general regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces should cover all countries and all kinds of armaments and armed forces.

"2. The general regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces should provide for:

(a) Reduction of armies, naval and air forces both in respect to strength and armaments.

(b) Limitation of combat characteristics of certain kinds of armaments and the prohibition of separate kinds of armaments.

(c) Reduction of war budgets and state expenditures on production of armaments.

(d) Reduction of production of war materials.

"3. The general regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces should provide, in the first place, for the entire prohibition of production and use of atomic and other kinds of weapons designed for mass destruction and the destruction of stocks of such weapons which have been made.

"4. In order to ensure the carrying out of measures for the regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces there should be established within the framework of the Security Council and as a component part of the plan for such regulation and reduction, an international system of control, which should

/protect the

protect the states, which fulfil their obligations, against the danger of violations and evasions from the carrying out of the agreement on the reduction of armaments."

14. The representative of the United States stated at the nineteenth meeting of the Working Committee on 9 August 1948 that, in his opinion, the matters embodied in paragraph 1 of the supplementary Union of Soviet Socialist Republics proposals above had already been thoroughly discussed during the consideration of paragraph 1 of the United Kingdom resolution, and that the subject-matter of paragraph 4 of the supplementary Union of Soviet Socialist Republics proposals above had been considered during the discussion of paragraph 5 of the United Kingdom resolution, and that the United Kingdom resolution had been approved by a majority vote. With respect to paragraph 3 of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics proposals, the representative of the United States did not consider this a new proposal.

15. The representative of the United States stated also that paragraph 2 of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics proposals evidently fell within the scope of Item 4 of the plan of work (i.e. practical proposals) already adopted by the Commission for Conventional Armaments and approved by the Security Council, and should be discussed when this item came up for consideration.

On 17 August 1948 the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics requested the inclusion in the Commission's Report of the following statement in explanation of the position taken by him in the submission of the Soviet proposals set out in paragraph 13 above:

"The Soviet delegation is firmly convinced that only if these proposals are adopted will it be possible to give effect to the General Assembly resolution on the regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces, and to reduce military budgets and national expenditure on the maintenance of armies and the manufacture of armaments, without which there can be no alleviation of the heavy burden of taxation borne by the people, no improvement in their material well-being, and no strengthening of peace and friendship between peoples.

"These proposals provide as a task of the first importance, for the complete prohibition of the manufacture and use of atomic and other weapons designed for mass destruction, and the demolition of existing stocks of such weapons. This should form the most important ingredient in the measures for general regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces.

/"The Soviet

"The Soviet proposals also provide that the general regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces should apply to all countries and all types of armaments. Only thus will it attain its aim. This Soviet proposal differs fundamentally from the vague and rambling Anglo-American proposal that at the outset only countries possessing substantial military resources should be covered by the system of regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces. This Anglo-American proposal is in direct contradiction to the General Assembly resolution, which says 'to assure that such regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces will be generally observed by all participants and not unilaterally by only some of the participants.'

"Finally, the Soviet proposal provides for the establishment of an international system of control which should form part and parcel of the plan for a general regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces, and, operating within the framework of the Security Council, could protect States fulfilling their obligations as regards the regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces against the danger of violations and evasions of the execution of an agreement on the reduction of armaments by unscrupulous signatories to such agreements."

16. The Commission for Conventional Armaments was convened on 9 August 1948 to consider the first progress report of the Working Committee and the two resolutions adopted by it. At the eleventh, twelfth and thirteenth meetings of the Commission for Conventional Armaments, it considered the activities and accomplishments of the Working Committee to date and the present position of the question of the general regulation and reduction of armaments.
17. The central issues of the discussion at the last three meetings of the Commission covered by this Report, as at the seventeen meetings of the Working Committee, have been two: (1) the jurisdiction of the Commission in relation to atomic weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, and (2) the relation between the general regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces and the factors affecting the present state of international relations.
18. Discussion of these subjects in the Commission for Conventional Armaments was initiated at the eleventh meeting in a statement by the representative of the United States (Annex II), and continued at the twelfth meeting in statements by the representatives of the Union of  
/Soviet Socialist Republics,

Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom, and the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic in that order (Annexes III, IV and V), and at the thirteenth meeting in statements by the representatives of France and China (Annexes VI and VII).

19. The views of the majority of the Commission on these matters are reflected in the two resolutions which it has adopted. The grounds on which the delegations which that majority comprises hold those views and the grounds on which they are opposed have been set forth at length in the discussions both of the Working Committee and of the Commission itself. The statements by the representatives of Canada, China, France, the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom and the United States, annexed to this report, present a more complete picture of the differences of view on those questions than can be drawn here (Annexes I - VII).

20. In the statement which initiated discussion of the First Progress Report of the Working Committee and of the resolutions adopted by it, the representative of the United States quoted the language of Secretary of State Marshall in an address to the General Assembly on 17 September 1947 wherein he stated the conviction of the Government of the United States that a workable system for the regulation of armaments could not be put into effect until conditions of international confidence prevailed, and that the regulation of armaments presupposed the settlement of peace terms with Germany and Japan, the implementation of agreements putting military forces and facilities at the disposal of the Security Council and an international agreement for the control of atomic energy. (Annex II).

21. At the twelfth meeting of the Commission for Conventional Armaments, on 9 August 1948, the delegations of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic reiterated their inability to accept the resolutions adopted by the Working Committee under Items 1 and 2 of the plan of work for the following reasons: (1) that the Commission's resolution concerning its jurisdiction, by excluding atomic weapons and other weapons of mass destruction from its purview, contravened the General Assembly resolution of 14 December 1946, which according to their contention, treated the regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces as a single indivisible question and required the Commission to formulate practical measures not merely for the regulation and reduction of conventional armaments but also for the prohibition of use and manufacture of atomic  
/weapons

weapons and other weapons of mass destruction and for destruction of existing stocks of such weapons, and (2) that the Commission's resolution on general principles contravened the General Assembly resolution of 14 December 1946 which, in the view of the representatives of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic requires the Commission to formulate promptly practical measures for the general regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces and contains no conditions or prerequisites for the formulation or implementation of such practical measures. (3) The representative of the USSR especially stressed the view that the general regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces must necessarily provide for the complete prohibition of the atomic weapon as well as of other weapons adaptable to mass destruction, and that the opposition of the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom to the prohibition of the atomic weapon prevented the taking of steps designated to bring about a general reduction of armaments and armed forces. At the twelfth meeting the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics reintroduced the proposals submitted at the seventeenth meeting of the Working Committee on 26 July 1948 which appear textually in paragraph 13 above (Annex III).

22. At the twelfth meeting of the Commission for Conventional Armaments on 9 August 1948 the representative of the United Kingdom, on whose draft the resolution on general principles is based, stated that the resolution did not signify that plans for disarmament should not be worked out even in the present state of international relations, but that a beginning of implementation of those plans would require an easing of existing conditions and that, thereafter, a degree even though small, of disarmament might encourage a feeling of security which in turn might lead to further disarmament (Annex IV).

23. The representative of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic criticized the position of the delegations of the United Kingdom and the United States of America, which he said had delayed the implementation of the resolution of the General Assembly relating to the general regulation and reduction of armaments, through the presentation of a whole series of preliminary conditions, among which were a demand for a system of safeguards, the conclusion of peace treaties with Germany and Japan, the adoption of the United States plan for control of atomic energy and others. At the same time, the representative of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic supported the proposals of the Soviet Union, as providing the only effective way to implement the resolution of the General Assembly, The representative of

/the

the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic stated also that he believed that the work of the Commission for Conventional Armaments should be continued and that the Commission should be empowered to deal also with the prohibition of atomic weapons and the destruction of stocks of atomic bombs (Annex V).

24. At the thirteenth meeting of the Commission on 12 August 1948, the representative of France took the position that the regulation and reduction of armaments should be progressive and balanced; he stated (a) that the question of general disarmament was tightly bound to collective security, (b) that the study of the problem of conventional armaments could be conducted by the Commission separately from that of atomic disarmament and (c) that while substantial progress could be obtained only in a general atmosphere of confidence, certain preliminary measures should be taken even in the present condition of international relations. (Annex VI).

25. At the same meeting the representative of China stated that disarmament and international confidence should go hand in hand, that a system of disarmament could not be put into operation while international tension remained acute, and that international confidence could not be achieved while nations engaged in armaments races. The representative of China stated further that Article 43 should be implemented and a system of collective security be established as soon as possible. That would go a long way in helping to promote international confidence and to expedite the work of the Commission. (Annex VII).

26. The factors which, in the opinion of the majority of the Commission, would contribute to the easing of the present tension are set forth in paragraph 3 of the Commission's resolution.

27. At the close of discussion at the thirteenth meeting of the Commission for Conventional Armaments on 12 August 1948, it adopted without change the two resolutions which this report accompanies. The resolution which formulates the Commission's conclusions concerning its jurisdiction (Item 1 of the plan of work) was adopted by a vote of eight to two. The resolution which formulates the Commission's conclusions concerning general principles (Item 2 of the plan of work) was adopted by a vote of nine to two.

28. At the eleventh, twelfth and thirteenth meetings of the Commission a number of delegations stressed the importance of the Commission's task and emphasized the necessity of carrying it to a successful conclusion.

29. The delegation of China stated its belief that disarmament was a fundamental part of the work of the United Nations. It thought that

/there were no

there were no differences of opinion incapable of being overcome if all representatives were working sincerely for agreement in the spirit of conciliation proper to the United Nations. The Chinese delegation would therefore not be the first to despair of disarmament and maintained that the Commission for Conventional Armaments should continue its work.

30. The French delegation believed that it was essential to make preparatory studies in conformity with the resolution of the General Assembly of 14 December 1946 and that the difficulties encountered in the field of atomic energy control should not be allowed to prevent progress in the field of the reduction and limitation of conventional armaments and vice versa.

31. The delegation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics pointed out that the Soviet Government had been the first to take the initiative of raising in the General Assembly in October 1946 the question of the need for a general reduction of armaments and armed forces. In the Security Council the Soviet delegation had again taken the initiative in urging on the Council immediate steps to implement the General Assembly resolution. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics declared that his delegation continued to insist on such implementation for which purpose it introduced the proposals set out in paragraph 12 above.

32. The representative of the United Kingdom stressed the point that plans for disarmament should be worked out even in present circumstances. For that reason his Government, though with decreasing confidence, had gone on participating in the work of the Commission despite the grave doubts aroused in their minds by the disagreement on basic principles within the Commission. His Government, the representative of the United Kingdom added, would not wish to be the first to despair of disarmament so long as the present situation endured and would heartily welcome any honest attempt at conciliation. They believed, however, that the General Assembly should be fully informed.

33. The representative of the United States sought to make abundantly clear the position of his Government that the work of the Commission should be continued with as little delay as possible. The responsibility of the Governments represented in the Commission, he added, arose from Article 26 of the Charter and from previous actions of the General Assembly and the Security Council. The position of his Government, the representative of the United States declared, had been best expressed by Secretary of State Marshall to the General Assembly on 17 September 1947,

/When he said

when he said that the United States recognized the importance of regulating conventional armaments and regretted that much more progress had not been made in that field. Though the Government of the United States was convinced, Secretary of State Marshall had said, that a workable system for the regulation of armaments could not be put into effect until conditions of international confidence prevailed, he believed that the Commission should proceed vigorously to develop a system for the regulation and reduction of armaments in the business-like manner outlined in its plan of work.

34. The Commission and its Working Committee have now completed their consideration of Items 1 and 2 of the plan of work. It remains to add that, at the twentieth meeting of the Working Committee, it was agreed to proceed to a consideration of Item 3 of the plan of work.

TABLE OF ANNEXES

- Annex I Statement made by the representative of Canada at the fifteenth meeting of the Working Committee of the Commission for Conventional Armaments, 8 March 1948.
- Annex II Statement made by the representative of the United States of America at the eleventh meeting of the Commission for Conventional Armaments, 2 August 1948.
- Annex III Statement made by the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics at the twelfth meeting of the Commission for Conventional Armaments, 9 August 1948.
- Annex IV Statement made by the representative of the United Kingdom at the twelfth meeting of the Commission for Conventional Armaments, 9 August 1948.
- Annex V Statement made by the representative of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic at the twelfth meeting of the Commission for Conventional Armaments, 9 August 1948.
- Annex VI Statement made by the representative of France at the thirteenth meeting of the Commission for Conventional Armaments, 12 August 1948.
- Annex VII Statement made by the representative of China at the thirteenth meeting of the Commission for Conventional Armaments, 12 August 1948.

ANNEX I

STATEMENT MADE BY THE REPRESENTATIVE OF CANADA AT THE FIFTEENTH MEETING  
OF THE WORKING COMMITTEE OF THE COMMISSION FOR CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS,  
8 MARCH 1948

1. In commenting on the revised draft resolution which had been presented by the United Kingdom delegation (the resolution referred to was the basis for the resolution adopted by the Working Committee of the Commission for Conventional Armaments at its 17th meeting on 26 July 1948, document S/C.3/SC.3/18), I should like to say that the Canadian delegation is in agreement with the views embodied in it. In our view the principles contained in the draft resolution must rest on the assumption that no agreement on effective regulation for the reduction of armaments and armed forces is likely to be devised until conditions exist which will make it unnecessary for nations to depend on national armaments solely for their security and in which conditions of international confidence exist.

2. For this reason we attach particular importance to the principle contained in paragraph 3 of the draft resolution.

3. We view with concern the fact that no such agreements, or indeed agreement on the initial steps to be taken in preparation for such agreements has yet been reached. At the time the General Assembly unanimously adopted the resolution on the principles governing general regulation and reduction of armaments in October 1946, the Canadian representative expressed the attitude of the Canadian Government to the question in the following words:

"We are particularly concerned that the Security Council and the Military Staff Committee have so far failed to make substantial progress towards a conclusion of the special agreements with individual Members required to implement Articles 43 and those following of the Charter and thus make armed forces and other facilities available to the Security Council. We are all of us bound under the Charter to refrain from using armed forces except as provided by the Charter. The Government and people of Canada are anxious to know what armed forces, in common with other Members of the United Nations, Canada should maintain as our share of the burden of putting world force behind world law.

"It is only when the special agreements with the Council have been concluded that we will be able to determine how large a proportion of the total annual production of our country can

/properly

properly be devoted to improving the living conditions of the Canadian people.

"Canada therefore urges that the Security Council and the Military Staff Committee go ahead with all possible speed in the constructive work of negotiating the special agreements and of organizing the military and economic measures of enforcement."

4. In the view of the Canadian delegation, the implementation of Article 43 is an essential step which must be taken if we are to move forward towards an effective system for the regulation and reduction of national armaments and armed forces.

5. We also express entire concurrence with the principle expressed in Section A, paragraph 3 of the draft resolution. We believe that it is an essential condition for the establishment of that full international confidence which is a necessary antecedent to the regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces, that agreement be reached on a plan for the international control of atomic energy. The Atomic Energy Commission, as we know, is still engaged in working out specific proposals, taking into account the special technical requirements which must be met if the plan of international control is really to ensure that atomic energy is used for peaceful purposes only, and nations are given adequate safeguards and guarantees against possible violations and evasions. That Commission should be left to complete its task, and as far as the work of the Commission for Conventional Armaments is concerned, we should assume that this result will be available in due course.

6. In short, Mr. Chairman, the Canadian delegation supports the draft resolution because we are in agreement with the main premise on which it is based. We believe that if the resolution of the General Assembly of 14 December 1946, to which we are endeavouring to give effect, is to be translated into practical policy, we should, in formulating plans in this Commission, provide in proper sequence for the establishment of those conditions of international confidence and peace, which are essential if all nations are to agree upon the reduction and regulation of national armaments and armed forces.

ANNEX II

STATEMENT MADE BY THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AT  
THE ELEVENTH MEETING OF THE COMMISSION FOR  
CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS, 2 AUGUST 1948

The United States Government wishes to draw the attention of the Commission to the action which it took in approving the United Kingdom resolution on principles at the last meeting of the working committee, and to make abundantly clear its position that the work of this body should be continued. The responsibility of my government and other governments represented on the Commission arises from Article 26 of the Charter and previous actions of the General Assembly and Security Council.

Article 26 of the Charter provides that "The Security Council shall be responsible for formulating plans to be submitted to the members of the United Nations for the establishment of a system for the regulation of armaments".

In the General Assembly resolution of 14 December 1946, the Assembly recommended to the Council that it give "prompt consideration to formulating the practical measures, according to their priority, which are essential to provide for general regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces..... The plans formulated by the Security Council shall be submitted by the Secretary-General to the members of the United Nations...."

The Security Council resolution establishing this Commission provided that the Commission will submit to the Security Council proposals (a) for the regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces, and (b) for practical and effective safeguards in connection with the general regulation and reduction of armaments.

The plan of work for the Commission for Conventional Armaments approved by the Security Council on 8 July 1947, contains the following terms:

1. Consider and make recommendations to the Security Council concerning armaments and armed forces which fall within the jurisdiction of the Commission for Conventional Armaments.
2. Consideration and determination of general principles in connection with the regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces.
3. Consideration of practical and effective safeguards by means of an international system of control operating through special

/organs

organs (and by other means) to protect complying states against the hazards of violations and evasions.

4. Formulate the practical proposals for the regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces.

5. Extension of the principles and proposals set forth in paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 above to states which are not members of the United Nations.

6. Submission of a report or reports to the Security Council including, if possible, a draft convention.

The Working Committee of the Commission for Conventional Armaments has now completed its consideration of items 1 and 2 of this plan of work. The Chairman of the Commission has suggested that the Commission submit an interim progress report to the Security Council indicating the status of its work.

The United States will support the proposal of the Chairman for the submission of an interim status report to the Security Council. At the same time, I would like to make it clear that the position of the United States is that the work of the Commission should continue with as little delay as possible. The position of the United States is best expressed in the words of Secretary of State Marshall to the General Assembly on 17 September 1947:

"The United States....recognize the importance of regulating conventional armaments. We regret that much more progress has not been made in this field. It is very easy to pay lip service to the sincere aspirations of all peoples for the limitation and reduction of armed forces. This is a serious matter which should not be the subject of demagogic appeals and irresponsible propaganda.

"I say frankly to the General Assembly that it is the conviction of my Government that a workable system for the regulation of armaments cannot be put into operation until conditions of international confidence prevail. We have consistently and repeatedly made it clear that the regulation of armaments presupposes enough international understanding to make possible the settlement of peace terms with Germany and Japan, the implementation of agreements putting military forces and facilities at the disposal of the Security Council, and an international arrangement for the control of atomic energy.

"Nevertheless, we believe it is important not to delay the formulation of a system of arms regulation for implementation

/when conditions

when conditions permit. The Security Council has accepted a logical plan of work for the Commission for Conventional Armaments. We believe that the Commission should proceed vigorously to develop a system for the regulation of armaments in the business-like manner outlined in its plan of work."

The work of the Commission has continued to be hampered by "demagogic appeals and irresponsible propaganda". We cannot but note regretfully that the Soviet system of obstructionism in this Commission is the same as that employed by them in the Atomic Energy Commission. Nevertheless, the United States believes that the Commission must proceed with its work.

## ANNEX III

STATEMENT MADE BY THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNION OF SOVIET  
SOCIALIST REPUBLICS AT THE TWELFTH MEETING OF THE  
COMMISSION FOR CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS,  
9 AUGUST 1948

The Commission for Conventional Armaments established by the Security Council on 13 February 1947 now has before it the report of its Working Committee on the Committee's work between August 1947 and July 1948.

As is well known, by its decision of 13 February 1947 the Security Council gave the Commission for Conventional Armaments a definite task - that of preparing and submitting to the Security Council within a period not exceeding three months practical proposals for the general regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces. In adopting this resolution the Security Council was guided by the General Assembly resolution of 14 December 1946 on the principles determining the general regulation and reduction of armaments, and recognized that the general regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces was a most important means of strengthening international peace and security, and that the implementation of the General Assembly's resolution on this question was one of the most fundamental and important tasks confronting the Security Council.

Quite a long time has passed since then, and a still longer time since the adoption of the General Assembly resolution in question. The implementation of the General Assembly's resolution on the regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces has, however, not moved a single step forward. For almost one and a half years the Commission for Conventional Armaments and its Working Committee have been marking time, and today they have returned to the original position from which they started out. The question naturally arises, what are the reasons for this? Who is responsible for preventing the implementation of the decisions of the General Assembly, which recognized that in the interests of the strengthening of international peace and security, and in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations, it is essential that a general regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces be carried out as quickly as possible?

The General Assembly recommended to the Security Council to proceed immediately to formulate the practical measures essential for securing the general regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces, and

for ensuring that this regulation and reduction of armaments should be carried out by all participants without exception, and not unilaterally by only a few of them.

In its turn the Security Council gave the Commission for Conventional Armaments the task of preparing and submitting to the Council concrete proposals for the speediest execution of the Assembly's resolution on the regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces. Instead of proceeding urgently and without delay to formulate, in the Commission for Conventional Armaments and its Working Committee, practical measures for the reduction of armaments and armed forces and their regulation, the delegations of the USA and the United Kingdom began assiduously to look for and formulate all kinds of conditions and proposals which they thought would demonstrate the impossibility of implementing the General Assembly's resolution on the general regulation and reduction of armaments.

From the very beginning, when the terms of reference of the Commission created by the Security Council were being discussed, the USA delegation moved a resolution that that Commission should deal only with the so-called conventional armaments and armed forces, and should not concern itself with eliminating the atomic and other kinds of weapons of mass destruction from the sphere of national armaments - i.e., that it should not be concerned with the prohibition of atomic weapons. In this matter the USA delegation was supported by the United Kingdom delegation.

It was on this basis that the delegations of the USA and the United Kingdom began their work in the Commission for Conventional Armaments set up by the Security Council. The single and indivisible question of the general regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces and the prohibition of atomic weapons and other means of mass destruction was artificially split up by them. This was an evident violation of the resolution of the General Assembly, because, as everybody knows, that resolution does not oppose atomic weapons to other kinds of weapons. Consequently, to split up and draw distinctions between questions relating to the general reduction of armaments and to the prohibition of atomic weapons is contrary to the decisions of the General Assembly. The General Assembly not only did not oppose the problem of prohibiting atomic weapons and controlling atomic energy to the problem of the general reduction of armaments, but regarded both these problems as interdependent and closely connected.

/Thus,

Thus, from the point of view of the tasks facing the United Nations in the sphere of the general regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces, it becomes quite clear that the thesis according to which atomic weapons should be considered separately from the so-called conventional armaments was only needed in order to delay and ultimately disrupt the work of elaborating practical proposals for implementing the General Assembly's resolution on the general regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces. By separating these two questions, the USA delegation dealt a main blow to the prospects of implementing the General Assembly's resolution.

In resolutely objecting to the separation of these two inseparably-connected questions, the delegation of the Soviet Union has repeatedly pointed out that such a suggestion contradicts the decision of the General Assembly, and that the separation of these two questions would involve not merely a postponement of the reduction of armaments, but also the creation of obstacles which would tend to upset the implementation of the General Assembly's resolutions on the general reduction of armaments and armed forces. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics delegation emphasizes especially that the general regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces should provide as a matter of obligation for the complete prohibition of atomic weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction, and that the opposition of the governments of the United States and the United Kingdom to the prohibition of atomic weapons is preventing the carrying-out of the measures on the general reduction of armaments and armed forces. The further course of events in the Commission and its Working Committee have fully confirmed the correctness of the position thus adopted by the Soviet delegation.

Taking advantage of the voting procedure in the Commission and the Working Committee, the USA delegation has imposed the separation of these two questions, and has thus prevented the Commission, set up by the Security Council to elaborate practical proposals for implementing the General Assembly's resolution on the general reduction of armaments and armed forces, from carrying out its work on the preparation of proposals for eliminating atomic weapons from national armaments - i.e., proposals for prohibiting the use of atomic weapons and other means of mass destruction for military purposes, as laid down in the Assembly resolution.

During the consideration of the question in the Commission and the Working Committee, the tactics employed by the USA delegation became more clearly defined. Having artificially separated these two questions, and created a distinction between them, the USA delegation together with the United Kingdom delegation, at the same time introduced the question of

so-called international confidence and security, affirming that no scheme for regulating and reducing armaments and armed forces could be carried out unless international confidence and safeguards for security were established in advance. Amongst the safeguards or conditions essential in the opinion of these delegations for the establishment of such confidence and security was the establishment of control over atomic energy. The matter was stated as follows: Before the Atomic Energy Commission has worked out proposals for the control of atomic energy, any reduction of armaments and armed forces is quite impossible.

Thus the question of the general reduction of armaments and armed forces and the prohibition of atomic energy, was first artificially split up, and then the general reduction of armaments and armed forces and the control of atomic energy were made conditional upon each other.

Little more remained for the USA delegation to do to block solution of the problem of the general reduction and regulation of armaments and armed forces. All that was necessary was to interrupt the work of the Atomic Energy Commission and then state that, since there was no control of atomic energy, one of the conditions or safeguards for the establishment of international confidence and security did not exist, and that therefore the general reduction of armaments and armed forces could not be carried out. One can only regard such pretexts as attempts to evade both the reduction of armaments and armed forces and the prohibition of atomic weapons.

Everyone knows that the work of the Atomic Energy Commission was sabotaged by the delegations in that Commission of the United States and the United Kingdom, and now, in the Commission created to formulate proposals for the general reduction of armaments and armed forces, these same delegations, referring in particular to the absence of control over atomic energy, are bringing matters to a stage at which the work of this Commission also will have to be interrupted.

After artificially separating the questions of conventional armaments and of atomic weapons, the delegations of the USA and the United Kingdom have introduced another series of conditions precedent or safeguards which they allege to be essential to guarantee international confidence and security before any attempt can be made to put into practice the General Assembly's resolution on the general reduction of armaments and armed forces. These guarantees include, for example, the conclusion of peace treaties with Germany and Japan, and the organization of armed forces in accordance with Article 43 of the Charter.

Thus, during discussions on the reduction of armaments and armed forces, two new obstacles have been introduced as conditions precedent

by the delegations of the USA and the United Kingdom. Quite clearly these conditions were devised exclusively as additional obstacles to the immediate implementation of the General Assembly's resolution on the general regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces. Everyone knows that Germany and Japan, which not long ago were dangerous and powerful enemies, are now defeated and under the control of the conquerors. These countries have been disarmed and a considerable part of their war industry has been destroyed. No great armed forces are required to ensure the military control of these countries until the conclusion of peace treaties with them, or to prevent aggression by them after the conclusion of the peace treaties.

Consequently the necessity and justification for maintaining inflated armies, navies and air forces has lapsed, as has likewise the need for the enormous military budgets which are such a heavy burden on the shoulders of the peoples who bore the hardships of the past war.

By making the reduction of armaments conditional on the conclusion of peace treaties with Germany and Japan, the Governments of the USA and the United Kingdom are violating the decisions of the Potsdam Conference, and by doing so postponing indefinitely the conclusion of peace treaties with those countries. And here we observe the same technique, which consists in artificially connecting and making dependent upon each other two different questions having no direct relation to each other, while at the same time delaying the solution of one of them and then disrupting the solution of the other on the pretext that, as the first is not settled, the second can also not be settled.

The third prerequisite or safeguard which the United States and United Kingdom delegations allege must precede the reduction of armaments and armed forces is the question of placing armed forces at the disposal of the Security Council under Article 43 of the Charter. This suggestion - viz. that the General Assembly resolution on the reduction of armaments and armed forces cannot be put into effect until the agreements provided for by Article 43 of the Charter have been concluded - is in direct opposition to the General Assembly resolution of 14 December 1946, which recognized the necessity of an early general regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces and recommended the Security Council to give prompt consideration to formulating the practical measures on the general regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces. In that resolution the General Assembly stressed the need for the early adoption of measures to make available to the Security Council the armed forces mentioned in Article 43 of the Charter.

The General Assembly did not, however, make the adoption of measures for a general regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces

conditional upon the preliminary obtention of international guarantees such as are now insisted on by the United States and United Kingdom representatives. On the contrary, the resolution, unanimously adopted by the General Assembly, refers to the necessity of an early general regulation and reduction of armaments and of the prompt formulation of practical measures to that end, considering that the adoption of measures for a general reduction of armaments and armed forces would automatically further the strengthening of international security and mutual confidence between nations and peoples. The proposals of the United States and the United Kingdom regarding the guarantees said to be required for the reduction of armaments conflict with the General Assembly resolution. As is well known, the United States and United Kingdom delegations tried as far back as the 1946 General Assembly to lay down a number of preliminary conditions. All the proposals for prerequisites or safeguards, however, were rejected by the General Assembly, which unanimously adopted a resolution regarding the necessity of an early general regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces, and imposed no condition precedent.

At the General Assembly the United States and United Kingdom delegations also voted along with all the other delegations for the resolution on the general regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces. In this Commission, however, which has been given the task of elaborating practical measures to implement the Assembly's resolution, the United States and the United Kingdom delegations have made it their business to search for all kinds of prerequisites, their object plainly being not to implement the General Assembly resolution but to void it. All these so-called prior conditions were incorporated by the United States and United Kingdom delegations in the draft resolution forced by them on the Working Committee and now submitted to the Commission for Conventional Armaments.

What, for example, is the point of the view put forward by the United States and United Kingdom representatives in paragraph 2 of the resolution that a system of regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces can only be put into effect in an atmosphere of international confidence and security? It is intended, in the first place, to provide some justification for the refusal to implement the General Assembly resolution immediately and without any preliminary conditions, and in the second place to show some cause for the sabotage of the work of the Commission for Conventional Armaments. At the Working Committee's meeting of 26 July the Soviet delegation put the following question to Sir Alexander Cadogan, the representative of the United Kingdom: "Is paragraph 2 of the Anglo-American draft resolution to be understood as

/meaning

meaning that, until the atmosphere of international confidence and security which you invoke has been created, there can be no question of reducing armaments and armed forces? In other words, is this Anglo-American proposal to be understood as meaning that, until an atmosphere of confidence has been created, you consider there is no possibility of even beginning to implement the General Assembly resolution on a general reduction of armaments and armed forces? Is that the sense of this proposal put forward by the United Kingdom Government?"

Sir Alexander Cadogan replied: "Yes, to my Government it certainly is." The United States delegation associated itself with that view and voted for the resolution.

It is quite clear, therefore, that this thesis of the establishment of international confidence and security was advanced essentially in order that no efforts should be made towards the reduction of armaments and armed forces in order to breach the General Assembly resolution, to prevent its implementation, and to justify all this by high-sounding phrases about international confidence and security. That is the essence of the matter.

From the very outset of the work of the Commission for Conventional Armaments, and throughout the deliberations of the Working Committee, it has been quite clear that the United States and United Kingdom delegations have aimed not at the promptest implementation of the General Assembly resolution, but have tried to delay and wreck the work of general reduction of armaments and armed forces.

Let us take a second aspect of this question of creating international confidence and security. Let us examine, for example, what the United States Government is doing to create and strengthen international confidence and security, bearing in mind that its representatives in the Commission for Conventional Armaments and the Working Committee speak so often and so industriously about the need for creating international confidence and security as the main prerequisite and prior condition for starting on a reduction of armaments and armed forces. Is the United States Government possibly taking, or has it already taken, any measures to reduce its armed forces, to decrease appropriations for military expenditure? Is it perhaps taking no part in forming war blocs and alliances? Is it perhaps endeavouring in the organs of the United Nations to see that prompt action is taken under Article 43 of the Charter, to make armed forces available to the Security Council? Is it perhaps working along with the other great Powers to hasten the conclusion of peace treaties with Germany and Japan? Finally, are measures being taken in the United States of America, in execution of the General Assembly

resolution of 3 November 1947, to combat the vile and dangerous activities of the warmongers who, especially in the United States, are carrying on their unbridled war propaganda and trying to create war hysteria, to blackmail and intimidate the population with all kinds of invented stories about war?

The actual facts return only a negative answer to all these questions. The United States Government and its delegation in the Commission for Conventional Armaments have directed their efforts not towards the promptest implementation of the General Assembly resolution on the general regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces, but to delaying its fulfilment, to voiding and wrecking the resolution. They are directing their efforts not to reducing but to expanding the size of armed forces, both nationally and as regards the total strength of the armed forces and armaments to be made available to the Security Council by its five permanent Members under Article 43 of the Charter.

I shall give some details on these two points only. They are highly instructive. One need only consult United States press data to realize quite clearly what has been done in the United States with regard to the size of its armed forces all the while the United States representatives in the Commission for Conventional Armaments were discussing the reduction of armaments and armed forces and declaiming about the necessity of establishing international confidence as a condition precedent to such reduction.

Details published in The New York Times of 27 June show that in the budgetary year 1948-49 the armed forces of the United States have been expanded by 25% in comparison with the previous budgetary year, while the land forces alone have been expanded by 44%. It must be clear to any intelligent and unprejudiced person that any expansion of armed forces in any country, let alone the United States, can only increase international distrust and destroy confidence among nations. Conversely, only a reduction of armaments and armed forces would have the effect of increasing and strengthening confidence and security.

To see how the United States is also attempting to inflate the numbers of the armed forces to be made available to the Security Council under Article 43 of the Charter by its five permanent Members - the USSR, the United States of America, the United Kingdom, France and China - one need only turn to the discussion, in the Security Council's Military Staff Committee, of the numbers and composition of these armed forces. For reasons which you will understand, I shall not quote figures or give many examples. I can only say that there are many such examples. I shall

/confine

confine myself to the comparative figures on fighter planes. The United States delegation in the Military Staff Committee proposes and stubbornly insists on a number of fighter planes, to be included in the forces two and a half times as great as the number of fighters proposed and agreed on by the other four delegations in the Military Staff Committee - the USSR, the United Kingdom, France and China.

It is obvious that in view of the obstinacy with which the United States delegation is insisting on the acceptance of its clearly exaggerated and inflated fighter-plane figures - and of its figures for a number of other types of armaments also - no agreed decision is possible. As a consequence the Military Staff Committee's work on calculating the aggregate strength and composition of the armed forces to be made available by the five Powers to the Security Council under Article 43 of the Charter has reached an impasse. Or, it would be more truthful to say, has in fact been wrecked by the United States delegation, the policy of which has been to inflate armed forces and armaments, not only nationally but also with regard to the aggregate strength of the armed forces to be made available to the Security Council.

Why did the United States delegation in the Military Staff Committee insist on such an exaggerated number of fighter planes? The reply to that question becomes obvious if we read carefully paragraph 4 of the draft resolution submitted to the Working Committee by the United States and the United Kingdom delegations.

That paragraph includes the following passage:

"A system for the regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces.....must limit armaments and armed forces to those which are consistent with and indispensable to the maintenance of international peace and security."

That proposal attempts, by invoking the maintenance of international peace and security (the reference is to Article 43 of the Charter), to justify the maintenance of national armaments based, of course, on the former high levels.

When this proposal was put to the Commission for Conventional Armaments by one United States representative, another United States representative made a parallel proposal of which I have spoken, to the Military Staff Committee. This called for a number of fighter planes in the overall strength of the armed forces contemplated by Article 43 of the Charter for the maintenance of international peace and security, two and a half times greater than the number jointly agreed upon as necessary, by the other four delegations on the Military Staff Committee. A comparison

/of these

of these two proposals makes the object sought by the authors of these proposals sufficiently clear. It is, by invoking the need for a larger, an obviously exaggerated and inflated, armed force at the disposal of the Security Council, ostensibly for the maintenance of international peace and security, to justify the maintenance of large inflated armed forces on the national level, and in reality to evade executing the General Assembly's resolution for the general reduction of armaments and armed forces.

The Soviet delegation categorically objected to proposals of this sort; it voted against them both in the Military Staff Committee and in the Working Committee, and will vote against them in the Commission for Conventional Armaments.

From all that has been said it becomes comprehensible and obvious why the delegations of the United States and the United Kingdom in the Commission for Conventional Armaments and in the Working Committee found it necessary to put forward a series of prior conditions or safeguards which it was alleged, had to be realized before proceeding to implement the General Assembly's resolution on the general reduction of armaments and armed forces. These conditions were needed so that they could evade executing the Assembly's decision, could wreck and bury it, and have a free hand to engage in a continued armaments race and increase their armed forces. The same object is pursued in the resolution forced upon the Working Committee by the delegations of the United States and the United Kingdom on 26 July. The statement by the United States representative on 2 August to the Commission for Conventional Armaments does not substantially alter the position of the United States Government towards the General Assembly's resolution on the general regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces. The United States Government in this statement again affirms its view that no reduction of armaments is possible until international confidence is established. We have often heard this said by the United States representative; it is no novelty to us.

The Soviet delegation opposes the Anglo-American resolution as contradicting and violating the General Assembly's decision.

The Soviet Government, as is well known, was the first to take the initiative of raising in the General Assembly the question of the need for a general reduction of armaments and armed forces. It was on the initiative of the Soviet Government and of Mr. V. M. Molotov, the head of the Soviet delegation at the first session of the General Assembly, that the question of general reduction of armaments and armed forces was

/raised in

raised in October 1946. The General Assembly, and also the peoples of the whole world, who are vitally interested in reducing the heavy burden of military expenditure and in strengthening peace and friendship between the peoples, warmly supported the proposal of the Soviet Government. As a result the General Assembly on 14 December 1946 unanimously adopted a resolution on the general regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces. The Soviet delegation on the Security Council, in its turn, was the first to take the initiative in raising in the Council the question that the Council immediately and urgently proceed to implement the General Assembly resolution on the formulation of practical measures for the general regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces.

In the Security Council, in the Commission for Conventional Armaments, and in the Working Committee of this Commission, the Soviet delegation firmly and continually stressed the need for the speediest and unconditional implementation of the General Assembly resolution, and proposed practical measures to this end.

The Soviet delegation insisted, and insists, on an immediate implementation of the General Assembly's resolution for the general regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces, as well as on a reduction of military budgets and State expenditure on the production of armaments.

In strict conformity with the Assembly resolution, and in execution of that resolution, the Soviet delegation submitted the following resolution to the Working Committee, and submits it for the consideration of the Commission for Conventional Armaments:

- "1. The general regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces should cover all countries and all kinds of armaments and armed forces.
- "2. The general regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces should provide for:
  - (a) Reduction of armies, naval and air forces both in respect to strength and armaments;
  - (b) Limitation of combat characteristics of certain kinds of armaments and the prohibition of separate kinds of armaments;
  - (c) Reduction of war budgets and State expenditures on production of armaments;
  - (d) Reduction of production of war materials.
- "3. The general regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces should provide, in the first place, for the entire prohibition  
/of production and

of production and use of atomic and other kinds of weapons designed for mass destruction and the destruction of stocks of such weapons which have been made.

"4. In order to ensure the carrying out of measures for the regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces there should be established within the framework of the Security Council and as a component part of the plan for such reduction and regulation, an international system of control, which should protect the States which fulfil their obligations, against the danger of violations and evasions from the carrying out of the agreement on the reduction of armaments."

The Soviet delegation is firmly convinced that only if these proposals are adopted will it be possible to give effect to the General Assembly resolution on the regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces, and to reduce military budgets and national expenditure on the maintenance of armies and the manufacture of armaments, without which there can be no alleviation of the heavy burden of taxation borne by the people, no improvement in their material well-being, and no strengthening of peace and friendship between peoples.

These proposals provide, as a task of the first importance, for the complete prohibition of the manufacture and use of atomic and other weapons designed for mass destruction, and the demolition of existing stocks of such weapons. This should form the most important ingredient in the measures for general regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces.

The Soviet proposals also provide that the general regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces should apply to all countries and all types of armaments. Only thus will it attain its aim. This Soviet proposal differs fundamentally from the vague and rambling Anglo-American proposal that at the outset only countries possessing substantial military resources should be covered by the system of regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces. This Anglo-American proposal is in direct contradiction to the General Assembly resolution, which says "to assure that such regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces will be generally observed by all participants and not unilaterally by only some of the participants".

Finally, the Soviet proposal provides for the establishment of an international system of control which should form part and parcel of the plan for a general regulation and reduction of armaments and armed

/forces

forces, and, operating within the framework of the Security Council, could protect States fulfilling their obligations as regards the regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces against the danger of violations and evasions of the execution of an agreement on the reduction of armaments by unscrupulous signatories to such agreements.

The report of the Working Committee, the substance of the resolution submitted by that Committee, and the year's experience of the work of the Committee clearly show that the principal foes of an immediate and unconditional fulfillment of the General Assembly resolution on the general regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces are the Governments of the United States of America and the United Kingdom and their delegations in the Commission for Conventional Armaments, and in that Commission's Working Committee.

These are the facts and the results of the work achieved by the Commission for Conventional Armaments in the past eighteen months. They show who is really supporting the regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces and the execution of the General Assembly resolution on that matter, and who is violating that resolution and is mainly responsible for the failure to implement the decisions of the General Assembly on the general regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces.

ANNEX IV

STATEMENT MADE BY THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED KINGDOM AT THE TWELFTH MEETING OF THE COMMISSION FOR CONVENTION ARMAMENTS, 9 AUGUST 1948

In the ordinary way, the achievement of agreement on this fundamental part of our work would be a source of satisfaction, qualified only by the fact that it has taken the Committee just over a year to dispose of the first two items of its plan of work. But my Delegation cannot pretend that it feels encouraged by this result so long as the minority consisting of the two representatives from the Soviet Union maintain a dogged and completely unyielding opposition to the view of the large majority.

Those representatives have seen fit to urge the adoption by the Committee of an alternative proposal (document S/C.3/SC.3/17 of 26 July 1948) based directly upon paragraph 1 of the Soviet draft plan of work which, although rejected by the Commission on 18 June 1947, and by the Security Council itself on 8 July, was reintroduced as a fresh proposal in the Working Committee on 13 October 1947. I leave it to my Soviet colleagues, who are fond of the word "democracy", to explain how this unusual manoeuvre can be reconciled with any known form of democratic procedure. For my part I wish only to beg the indulgence of the Commission while I recall briefly the arguments on which the draft resolution now before it is based. They are not new arguments; but neither are the objections to which we have been listening, in the Commission and the Working Committee, for the last eighteen months.

When I had the honour to explain to the Commission, at its first meeting on 24 March 1947, the reasons which led my Government to welcome its establishment, I laid emphasis, as the record shows, on precisely the features which are basic to the present draft resolution and which can be summed up in the doctrine that disarmament is impossible without confidence. By that I did not, of course, mean, as our Soviet colleagues have constantly tried to insinuate, that some Utopian condition of complete security must be achieved before anything can be done, or even begun, in regard to disarmament. I have said more than once that disarmament and security must go hand in hand. Does anyone dare to maintain that the situation in the world at this moment is one that favours disarmament? But I do believe that an easing of the tension might enable a beginning to be made. Then, if it could be obtained, a degree, even though small, of disarmament might encourage a feeling of security which, in its turn, might lead to further disarmament, and so on - a progress that might be slow but for all that none the less sure.

/Our Soviet

Our Soviet colleagues have fastened on this thesis as a confession of hypocrisy; and they have used an easy appeal to the "peoples of the world" who, as they truthfully say, are tired of the crushing and unnecessary burden of armaments. But I venture to say that there is one thing of which the peoples of the world are still more tired - and that is the brooding, hopeless atmosphere of international suspicion and unrest which now prevails, three years after we hoped to have exercised such fears forever. If the Soviet representatives had been able to show that their country had been in no way responsible for this state of things, then perhaps we might have listened to them with a good grace when they summon us to abandon our convictions and accept the dictation of the usual minority.

Let us examine for a moment the contention on which the minority view is based: that the countries of the world, or rather the wicked monopolists who govern most of them according to the Soviet mythology, have only to disarm at once and confidence will follow of itself. That is indeed delightfully simple. It is, in fact, almost as simple as the frame of mind which led certain countries before and during the war to succumb to the hypnosis of Fascism - countries, I would add, not to be found only in Western Europe. It may be that in some countries, despite the devastation and misery of war, the lesson of "no disarmament without security" has not been learnt. But that is not true of my country; facts seem to show that it is not true of the Soviet Union. The "peoples of the world" may be simple-minded in the estimation of my Soviet colleagues; but they are not so simple-minded as that.

What, after all, is confidence? Surely it is a state of mind based on sure knowledge; and what certainty of security could be based on a mere paper convention, such as the Soviet draft resolution offers us? It is true that that draft resolution speaks of a system of "control", to operate within the framework of the Security Council; and those of us who have followed the history of the Security Council and the debates on a similar problem in the Atomic Energy Commission, will know how much comfort to derive from that. But there is not a vestige of recognition, in the Soviet paper, of the fact that no person on earth can have any confidence in a paper system of disarmament, whatever the excellence of its provisions, unless and until there is some evidence in the world about him of international good faith and the readiness of those primarily concerned to sink differences and co-operate for the achievement of purposes which they have solemnly undertaken. In the specific language of the draft resolution before you, this means, amongst other things, the conclusion of peace with Germany and Japan, the creation of a system of collective security

under Article 43 of the Charter, and, last but not least, the control of atomic energy - a task whose priority was acknowledged by the Assembly of the United Nations at its very first session in London. I am not now allocating blame for the failure to accomplish those tasks; but I ask whether anyone can seriously believe that, while they remain unaccomplished, a scheme of "conventional" disarmament will be worth the paper it is written on.

This does not mean - I stressed this point also in my speech of March 1947 - that plans for disarmament, as opposed to the putting into effect of disarmament itself, should not be worked out even in present circumstances. Of course they should, and that is why my Government though with decreasing confidence, have gone on participating in the work of the Disarmament Committee. But they cannot conceal the fact that the disagreement of the Soviet minority on basic principles has aroused in their minds very grave doubts of the utility of going on with the Commission's work. There are more ways than one to frustrate the hopes of the "peoples of the world" with whom my Soviet colleagues seem to be in such close touch; and one of them is to permit the continuance of a body such as this, solemnly dedicated to a great and humane purpose which it has, unhappily, every reason to believe itself incapable of fulfilling. Naturally, my Government do not wish to prejudge such an important question as this within the forum of the present meeting; they would not wish to be the first to despair of disarmament so long as the present situation lasts and they would heartily welcome any honest attempt at conciliation. But they believe that the General Assembly, which instigated the study of disarmament almost two years ago, should be fully informed of the state to which this question has now been brought; and that in the meantime all concerned should ask themselves whether deliberations in this body can be usefully pursued so long as the unhappy division upon general principles, to which I have alluded, is prolonged.

ANNEX V

STATEMENT MADE BY THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UKRAINIAN SOVIET  
SOCIALIST REPUBLIC AT THE TWELFTH MEETING OF THE COMMISSION  
FOR CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS, 9 AUGUST 1948

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics proposal made on 26 October 1946 by Mr. V. M. Molotov, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the general reduction and regulation of armaments, which was designed to ease the burden of public taxation, to utilize the material resources thus released for improving the material and cultural standards of the masses, and to strengthen confidence and hence the cause of peace and security between the nations, met with warm support from world public opinion and was adopted after discussion by the General Assembly on 14 December 1946.

Although the decision of the General Assembly was taken unanimously and not a single Government openly objected to the USSR proposal, the Soviet delegations foresaw that the execution of the General Assembly's resolution would be bitterly resisted by those financial groups who are interested in the armaments race and regard war as a profit-making business, those groups would therefore do all they could to sabotage the noble action initiated by the USSR.

In submitting its proposal for the general reduction and regulation of armaments, the USSR Government envisaged all types of modern armaments, including atomic weapons, which were subject to prohibition and elimination from national armaments as weapons of mass destruction directed primarily against peaceful populations - weapons not of defence but of aggression.

The United States delegation, however, has from the very outset taken the line of blocking the resolutions of the General Assembly of 14 December 1946, each time advancing new conditions and piling up new obstacles. At the very beginning of the work of the Commission for Conventional Armaments, the United States delegation demanded that the question of atomic weapons should be withdrawn from the competence of the Commission and made the subject of the work of a special commission and a special convention. The fate of the USSR proposal for the general limitation and regulation of armaments was thereby made to depend on whether the United States delegation would agree to give effect to the above two resolutions for the prohibition of atomic weapons. However, since official United States circles had no intention of complying with any resolutions prohibiting the production and employment of atomic weapons, they thereby also doomed to failure the work of the Commission for Conventional Armaments.

/The proof of

The proof of this is not far to seek. While United States representatives on the Atomic Energy Commission or the Commission for Conventional Armaments were talking about United States willingness to carry out the decisions of the General Assembly, the walls of the United States Congress were ringing with speeches of a different character. The most responsible Government and military officials were openly declaring that the United States of America could not envisage any limitation of her armaments, that atomic weapons must be kept in the armament of the United States forces, and that the United States must possess such military strength as would enable her at any moment to start military operations.

The USSR Government was demobilizing its armies, class by class; abolishing the death penalty in view of the end of the war and the establishment of a state of peace; concentrating all its energies on the problems of peaceful economic reconstruction. And all the while, in the United States of America, Congress was being asked to appropriate more billions for armaments and it appropriated them.

To cloak their militaristic fever and justify the utterly unjustifiable armaments race, United States military circles are zealously cultivating the legend that the United States of America is being threatened by a potential aggressor who is only waiting for an excuse to invade her across the oceans and the icy wastes; although the whole world knows that, whereas no State threatens the United States of America, aggressive circles in the United States of America are threatening the integrity and independence of other states in various parts of the world. With the help of this legend, which is untenable either politically or militarily, those in the United States of America who are interested in an armaments race have artificially created a war psychosis tending to produce uncertainty and anxiety throughout the world. How can such actions be reconciled with words about United States willingness to limit armaments and prohibit the production and employment of atomic weapons? In the face of these uncontrovertible facts the United States delegation cannot escape responsibility for the disruption of the work of the Atomic Energy Commission and for leading the Commission for Conventional Armaments into an impasse.

It is said that to secure general regulation and reduction of armaments confidence and safeguards for security are needed. To put the matter thus is really to defy common sense and to reverse the universally applicable rules of logic. After all, general regulation and reduction of armaments and the prohibition on atomic weapons are among the most essential conditions for the strengthening of confidence between nations and the creation of durable safeguards for security between them.

/It is said

It is said that an essential condition for general regulation and reduction of armaments is the conclusion of a peace settlement with Germany and Japan. But why not the other way round? When peace settlements with Germany and Japan come to be negotiated, shall we not be told that general regulation and reduction of armaments is a prerequisite of the stability and durability of such settlements, since it is a guarantee of security? Will not the very fact of the non-implementation of the General Assembly resolution, a fact which is undermining international confidence, be used to defer the conclusion of peace settlements with these two countries? If it is argued that the disruption of the work of the Atomic Energy Commission, which has impaired international confidence, predetermines the failure of the Commission for Conventional Armaments, will not this failure be used as an excuse to bury once and for all the question of the prohibition of atomic weapons and the employment of atomic energy exclusively for peaceful purposes? We thus fall into a vicious circle, artificially created in order to confuse by casuistic arguments the perfectly clear question of the general regulation and reduction of armaments, and to divert us from our goal.

The mechanism of these "safeguards for security" is thus very simple. It only needs an expert hand to block one such safeguard and the whole mechanism of safeguards is wrecked, leaving nothing behind but the mistrust which the Anglo-American bloc needs to maintain the armaments race and the continued production of atomic weapons.

More than that, it should be emphasized that the very notion of "confidence" is one of those elastic expressions which you can interpret in any way you like when you want to wreck an agreement. Even if all safeguards remained intact, it would be enough for the party desiring to wreck the agreement to squeeze into the formula of "confidence" for instance, the acceptance of the Marshall Plan, the recognition of the partition of Germany, or any other similar condition to bring the whole question of a general regulation and reduction of armaments back to the initial stage of discussion.

Moreover, if the expression "confidence" is taken in its strict and exact meaning, even that majority which usually votes for the proposals of the United States delegation may contain some seeds of distrust, suspicion and caution among its members. One State may mistrust another because the latter is driving it out of the Near, Middle or Far East. There are States which may quite justifiably consider themselves disadvantaged by, for instance, the creation of the Western German State, which threatens their frontiers and their security. There are States in the southern part of the American continent which are alarmed by the threat of economic aggression

/by their

by their powerful northern neighbour. International confidence based only on the fact that several governments are united in common hostility towards the Soviet Union can be neither a solid nor a lasting positive factor in international life and collaboration. Such "confidence" cannot lead very far.

And yet, by means of this "confidence" device, the Anglo-American party has brought the work of the Commission for Conventional Armaments to a standstill. The United States representative now takes the liberty of describing retrospectively the USSR proposal on the reduction of armaments as a weapon of Soviet propaganda without noticing that such allegations completely betray both himself and the United States official circles that stand behind him as the enemies and violators of the General Assembly resolutions of 24 January and 14 December 1946. All these shifts throw an even stranger light on the statement made by the United States representative that the United States Government is in favour of continuing the work of the Commission for Conventional Armaments. But the question is: what are we to do with these famous safeguards for international confidence which, according to the Anglo-American party, do not as yet exist? What are we to do with the fact that the Atomic Energy Commission has ceased to function, since its success would truly have been one of the fundamental safeguards for international confidence? To demand an answer to these questions from the United States representative would be superfluous, for his own statement - which flagrantly contradicts the fiction of confidence safeguards - is nothing less than another clumsy trick to try to free the United States representatives from the responsibility for the virtual wrecking of the work of the Commissions on all types of armaments, including atomic weapons.

While placing the responsibility for the non-fulfilment of the General Assembly resolutions of 24 January and 14 December 1946 on the United States and United Kingdom delegations, the Ukrainian delegation believes that the work of the Commission for Conventional Armaments should be continued and that the Commission should be empowered to deal also with the prohibition of atomic weapons and the destruction of stocks of atom bombs. The Ukrainian delegation supports the USSR Government's proposal for the regulation and reduction of armaments put forward here by the USSR representative in conformity with the previous proposals made by the USSR delegation on the question under discussion in the Commission.

ANNEX VI

STATEMENT MADE BY THE REPRESENTATIVE OF FRANCE AT THE THIRTEENTH MEETING  
OF THE COMMISSION FOR CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS, 12 AUGUST 1948

At the moment when the Commission for Conventional Armaments is taking its bearings after nearly a year of activity, the French delegation would like to state the leading ideas which have guided it in this work. The regulation and reduction of armaments must be progressive and balanced. Although it is undeniable that substantial progress in this field can be obtained only in a general atmosphere of confidence the French delegation believes that it is essential to make preparatory studies in conformity with the Resolution of the General Assembly of December 1946, and that certain preliminary measures should be taken even in the present condition of international relations.

The adoption of these measures looking to general disarmament would contribute greatly to the development of that international confidence needed for the successful completion of our work. The question of general disarmament is tightly bound to collective security. No important disarmament measures can be carried out before a mechanism of collective security has been set up. It is, therefore, of the greatest importance that the Security Council, which is seized of the differences which have arisen in the Military Staff Committee on the basic principles for the organization of the armed forces to be placed at its disposal, should as soon as possible take every useful step to facilitate the achievement of real progress in the organization of collective security.

In the third place, the study of the reduction of conventional armaments can and should be conducted independently of study of the prohibition of atomic weapons. This principle was made clear in the discussions of the General Assembly of 1946. Moreover, the area of study is different, since atomic energy is capable of practical application and offers a new field in which everything remains to be done, whereas conventional armaments constitute a purely military domain, long since incorporated into the life of nations. Finally, it should be remembered that though atomic weapons and weapons of mass destruction are to be absolutely prohibited, conventional armaments are only to be reduced and limited. The two questions, that of atomic energy and that of conventional armaments, have absolutely distinct characteristics, and each has its own sphere which does not trespass on that of the other.

It would be deplorable, therefore, if in linking these two questions it were not possible to avoid allowing the difficulties encountered in one  
/field

field to prevent progress in the other field. The discussions which have taken place in the Commission for about a year have not revealed any factor of a kind to change this position of the French delegation which means to remain faithful in the future to its principles, already expounded on many occasions in the General Assembly and in the different organs of the United Nations.

ANNEX VII

STATEMENT MADE BY THE REPRESENTATIVE OF CHINA AT THE THIRTEENTH MEETING  
OF THE COMMISSION FOR CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS, 12 AUGUST 1948

The Commission for Conventional Armaments is now considering the first Progress Report of its Working Committee. The Chinese delegation regrets that the Committee has not been able to do more than disposing of only two items of its plan of work. A whole year has passed since the Working Committee began its work on 20 August 1947. It is regrettable that important differences of opinion have developed during the discussion. These differences are chiefly responsible for the slow progress of the work of the Committee.

The Chinese delegation believes that disarmament is a fundamental part of our work in the United Nations. No differences of opinion cannot be overcome if all the representatives are sincerely working for an agreement. The success of the United Nations itself depends upon a spirit of conciliation. The Chinese Government certainly would not be the first to despair of disarmament. We will support the proposal of submitting the first Progress Report to the Security Council. We maintain that the Commission for Conventional Armaments should continue its work.

The Chinese delegation believes that disarmament and international confidence should go hand in hand. No system of disarmament can be put into operation if international tension remains acute. It is equally true that international confidence cannot be achieved while nations are engaged in an armament race. A break must be made somewhere, either by easing of the tension, or by carrying out a small degree of disarmament. One will encourage the other, and vice versa. During discussions in the Working Committee, I have repeatedly emphasized this point. It is the belief of my delegation that a break to this effect can be made if only there is the will.

Further, the Chinese delegation believes that any workable system for the regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces must include an adequate system of safeguards to protect complying States against the hazards of violation and evasions. Without practical and effective safeguards, no system of regulation of armaments can hope to gain the confidence of the various nations which traditionally do not trust each other.

Lastly, the Chinese delegation believes that Article 43 of the Charter should be implemented, and that a system of collective security should be established as soon as possible. This will go a long way in helping to promote international confidence and to expedite the work of this Commission.