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UNIFIED COMMAND REPORT ON THE NEUTRAL NATIONS SUPERVISORY COMMISSION IN KOREA

Communication dated 15 August 1956 from the Representative
of the United States of America to the United Nations,
addressed to the Secretary-General

New York, 15 August 1956

The Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations presents his compliments to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and has the honour to transmit herewith five copies of the United Nations Command Report on the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, together with the following five attachments:

1. Text of note received by British Chargé d'Affaires 9 April 1956
2. Text of note delivered by British Chargé d'Affaires 28 May 1956
3. Statement by United Nations Command Representative in the Military Armistice Commission at Panmunjom 31 May 1956
4. Statement by United Nations Command Representative in the Military Armistice Commission at Panmunjom 5 July 1955
5. Statement by United Nations Command Representative in the Military Armistice Commission at Panmunjom 14 July 1955

It is requested that the text of the Report and its attachments be circulated to all Members of the United Nations as a General Assembly document.

UNIFIED COMMAND REPORT ON THE NEUTRAL NATIONS SUPERVISORY COMMISSION

The Government of the United States, in its capacity as the Unified Command, presents herewith a special report concerning the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission in Korea.

On May 31, 1956, the United Nations Command, following consultations in Washington among the nations which contributed military forces to the Command, informed the Communist Command in Korea, the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, and the Commission's teams in Inchon, Pusan, and Kunsan that, because of violations of the reinforcing, reporting, and supervision provisions of the Armistice Agreement by the Communist side, and obstruction of the tasks of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission by the Communist side and the Czech and Polish members of the Commission, the United Nations Command would provisionally suspend, during the time the Communist side continued in default, performance on its part of those provisions of the Armistice Agreement governing the operations of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission in the area under its control.

The United Nations Command announcement was made only after long and continuing Communist provocation and after most careful consideration of the situation. The Unified Command considered that making clear to the Chinese Communist and north Korean authorities that they would not be permitted to benefit by their persistent violations of the Armistice Agreement would serve the interest of peace in Korea, and in Asia in general.

The Swiss and Swedish members of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission have behaved in strict accordance with the well-recognized neutral traditions of their countries. After it became apparent that the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission would not be permitted to fulfill its functions in north Korea, Switzerland and Sweden sought to terminate the operations of the inspection teams. They proposed to the Communist authorities concerned that the inspection teams be withdrawn to the Demilitarized Zone. The Communist authorities did not accept these reasonable proposals.

On April 9, 1956, the Chinese Communists transmitted a note through the United Kingdom to the Governments which had contributed military forces to the United Nations Command stating that the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission

problem could not be solved until the problems of unification of Korea and withdrawal of foreign forces had been solved. Without advancing any concrete proposals, this note suggested, on behalf of the Chinese Communists and the north Korea regime, the convening of a conference on unification of Korea and withdrawal of foreign forces, but its obvious intention was to close negotiations for solution of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission problem. The Governments which contributed military forces to the United Nations Command replied to the Communist note on May 28, 1956. This exchange of notes is attached to this report.

In these circumstances, the United Nations Command was left with no alternative but to assert its rights. In order to relieve it of the inequitable burden arising from the failure of the Communist side to observe the provisions of the Armistice Agreement respecting the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, the Command sought redress by announcing its intention to suspend provisionally, during the time the Communists continued in default, its performance of those provisions in the area under its control.

The United Nations Command, in taking this remedial step, was acting as one party to a contract with certain provisions of which the other party has failed to comply. The representative of the United Nations Command in the Military Armistice Commission had repeatedly drawn attention to Communist violations of the Armistice and particularly to Communist frustration and obstruction of the activities of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, including its inspection teams. The Communist side continued in default.

After the statement by the United Nations Command on May 31, 1956, the Communist command requested a further meeting of the Military Armistice Commission which was held on June 4. The Communist representative began by attacking the United Nations Command for alleged violations of the Armistice Agreement and demanded that the United Nations Command withdraw its announcement of May 31.

In reply the United Nations Command representative emphasized the continued efforts of the Command to obtain the co-operation of the Communist side in carrying out the terms of the Armistice Agreement. He recalled the requests previously made in the Military Armistice Commission for the Communist side to show by (1) providing the Military Armistice Commission and the Neutral Nations

Supervisory Commission with corrected reports concerning every incoming shipment of combat materiel and combat aircraft that it had made since signature of the Armistice; (2) immediately ceasing the introduction into Korea of combat materiel and combat aircraft in violation of paragraph 13(d) of the Armistice Agreement; and (3) removing without delay all combat materiel and combat aircraft introduced into Korea since July 27, 1953 in violation of the Armistice Agreement. He stated further that the course of action adopted by the United Nations Command with respect to the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission was carefully adjusted to the violations and frustrations and to the burdens and injuries involved and represented the very least that the United Nations Command must do to protect its legitimate rights under the terms of the Armistice Agreement by lawful, peaceful, and reasonable steps.

Insisting again that the United Nations Command withdraw its May 31 announcement, the Communist representative stated that his side "acceded to the proposal of the Swedish Government of March 10, 1956 for the temporary withdrawal of the inspection teams stationed in the designated ports of entry by the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, retaining its rights to dispatch these teams to a port of entry as a provisional arrangement for the time being". The United Nations Command representative replied that this proposal was not acceptable since there was no reason to believe that the past record of continued frustration of the mobile inspection teams by the attitudes of their Czech and Polish members, making impossible effective policing of the provisions of paragraphs 13(c) and (d) of the Armistice Agreement, would suddenly be reversed.

On June 5, 1956, the four members of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission sent a letter to the Military Armistice Commission, in response to the United Nations Command's statement of May 31, 1956 and to a letter of June 4, 1956 from the Communist side, accepting the Swedish proposal of March 10, 1956 described above. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission letter of June 5, 1956 stated that the Commission has "unanimously decided to recommend to the Military Armistice Commission to agree to the provisional withdrawal of the Neutral Nations Inspection Sub-teams stationed in the territory under military control of the two sides". The letter went on to say that the provisional withdrawal would be carried out expeditiously upon receipt of authorization from the Military Armistice Commission. It also stated that the

Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission considered "that this withdrawal is provisional and does not change the legal status of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, unless or until a mutual agreement in this respect is reached by both sides of the Military Commission".

In a meeting of the Military Armistice Commission on June 27, 1956, the Communist representative stated with respect to this proposal:

"It is regrettable that on June 5 the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission under the flagrant pressure of your side recommended to the Military Armistice Commission temporary withdrawal of the inspection teams.

"Taking into consideration the whole situation, our side proposes that both sides of the Military Armistice Commission make clear to the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission the following two points:

"(1) There should be no change in the function and authority of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission and its inspection teams which are inseparable parts and parcel of the Armistice Agreement.

"(2) The withdrawal of the inspection teams both from the north and the south are temporary measures. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission has the right to dispatch the inspection teams again to stations at the designated ports of entry in case either side of the parties of the Armistice Agreement brings a well-founded charge against any violation of the Armistice Agreement by the other side."

The representative of the United Nations took the following position:

"Our side is gratified to note that the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission has unanimously recommended to the Military Armistice Commission the expeditious withdrawal of the Neutral Nations Inspection Sub-teams stationed in the territory under the military control of the United Nations Command side and the KPA/CPV side. The United Nations Command side agrees that the Military Armistice Commission authorizes this withdrawal".

Since the Communist side would not accept the recommendation of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission for the expeditious withdrawal of the teams from the territory of the respective sides without attaching unacceptable conditions, the United Nations Command representative confirmed the intention of the Command to proceed in accordance with its announcement of May 31. He repeated that the

provisional suspension would remain in effect while the Communist side continued in default with respect to the reinforcement, reporting, and inspection provisions of the Armistice Agreement. At the same time he emphasized that this provisional suspension was "of no effect whatever on the continued full adherence" of the United Nations Command "to all other paragraphs of the Armistice Agreement". He went on to state that the Command would "continue to report as honestly and fully to the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission in the Demilitarized Zone as it has in the past both within and without the Demilitarized Zone".

On June 8 the Senior Member of the United Nations Command Delegation to the Military Armistice Commission sent a letter to the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission which stated that "the United Nations Command is suspending performance on its part of those provisions of the Armistice Agreement governing operations of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission and the Neutral Nations Inspection Teams in the area under the control of the United Nations Command effective June 9, 1956. The United Nations Command will expect withdrawal of the teams to the Demilitarized Zone on that date. Administrative details incident to this move will be provided through normal liaison channels".

The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission met again on June 8. At that time the Commission decided to withdraw its inspection teams from the ports of entry at Pusan, Kunsan, Inchon, Sinuiju, Manpo, and Sinanju and authorized their return to Panmunjom. In a letter to the Military Armistice Commission dated June 8, the Commission advised "that it has decided to instruct the Neutral Nations Inspection Teams that they are to suspend their supervisory, inspection, and control activities in the respective ports of entry effective June 9, 1956, 0001 hours local time, and to return to Panmunjom as soon as transportation facilities requested by this Commission can be made available to them".

The teams in the Republic of Korea were accordingly flown to the Demilitarized Zone June 9. The teams in north Korea returned to Panmunjom on June 10 and 11.

The withdrawal of the inspection teams, in the view of the Unified Command, serves the basic purpose of the Armistice by terminating serious perversion of the inspection provisions of that agreement. The Communist side had consistently prevented meaningful inspections from being carried out in its territory, but

wished to preserve the inspection teams to maintain the semblance of effective supervision of the reinforcement provisions of the Armistice Agreement.

The United Nations Command has made it clear that it continues to regard the Armistice Agreement as in force and has limited its action to the particular suspension described above. Such suspension of performance constitutes an indispensable protection of its rights under the Armistice Agreement. The United Nations Command will continue to submit reports to the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission in the Demilitarized Zone as provided by paragraph 13(d) of the Armistice Agreement.

The text of the statement by the representative of the United Nations Command in the Military Armistice Commission on May 31, 1956 is attached, together with statements on July 4, 1955, and July 14, 1955, by the United Nations Command representative on the Military Armistice Commission summarizing Communist violations of the reinforcing restrictions of the Korean Armistice Agreement and Communist obstruction of the work of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission.

TEXT OF A NOTE RECEIVED BY THE BRITISH CHARGE D'AFFAIRES
IN PEKING FROM THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA ON APRIL 9, 1956

1. The Governments of Sweden and Switzerland have, on many occasions, stated to the Chinese Government the practical difficulties which they have encountered in their work in the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission in Korea and have expressed the hope that a settlement could be reached. The Chinese Government sympathizes strongly with the position of the Governments of Sweden and Switzerland and have endeavoured unceasingly to try to mitigate their difficulties. Recently the Swedish Government proposed that the whole of the six neutral observation teams, which are at present stationed in designated ports in South and North Korea, should be withdrawn for the time being and that observation teams, which are at present stationed in designated ports in South and North Korea, should be withdrawn for the time being and that observation teams should be despatched temporarily only when the need arose, while the Swiss Government proposed that the existing neutral observation teams in the six designated ports should be eliminated and that mobile observation teams only should be retained. The Chinese Government hold that fundamental solution to the practical difficulties which the Governments of Sweden and Switzerland have repeatedly raised, can only be reached when a solution has been reached on the question of peaceful unification of Korea and first of all on the question of withdrawing all foreign forces from Korea.
2. Since the Geneva Conference on Korea in 1954, Korean and Chinese sides have consistently advocated that a conference of the nations concerned should be called to discuss the question of withdrawal from Korea of all foreign forces and the peaceful unification of Korea. The Chinese Government are, moreover, convinced that if all parties concerned are genuinely desirous of seeking a settlement a reasonable solution to those questions could be reached.
3. In the light of the above considerations, the Chinese Government, both in their own name and by authorization of the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, propose to the Government of the United Kingdom and through the Government of the United Kingdom to all other Governments of the United Nations Command, to call a conference of the nations concerned to discuss the question of the withdrawal from Korea of all foreign forces and of the peaceful

unification of Korea. The Governments of Korea and China request the Government of the United Kingdom to transmit this proposal to all other Governments of the United Nations Command. The Governments of Korea and China hope that the Government of the United Kingdom and all the other Governments of the United Nations Command will give active consideration to this proposal and that they will reply as soon as possible.

TEXT OF A NOTE DELIVERED BY THE BRITISH CHARGE D'AFFAIRES
IN PEKING TO THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA ON MAY 28, 1956, IN REPLY TO THE
CHINESE NOTE OF APRIL 9

1. On instructions from Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, I have to refer to Your Excellency's note of the 9th of April concerning the difficulties of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission in Korea and proposing a conference on withdrawal of foreign forces from Korea and the unification of Korea.
2. Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, in accordance with the request in Your Excellency's Note of the 9th of April has transmitted that Note to the other Governments of the United Nations Command, who, after consultation, have requested Her Majesty's Government to reply on their behalf.
3. The Governments of the United Nations Command have long regarded the frustration of the hopes of the Korean people for unification of their country as the basic problem in Korea. At Geneva they set forth in detail their position with regard to a just settlement of this problem in conformity with the objectives of the United Nations. This position was reiterated at the past two sessions of the General Assembly, where it was endorsed by an overwhelming majority of the Members of the United Nations.
4. With regard to the proposal of the People's Republic of China and the North Korean regime for a conference on the withdrawal of foreign troops and the unification of Korea, the Governments of the United Nations Command are not aware of any change in the position of the People's Republic of China and the North Korean regime which would render such a conference fruitful. The Governments of the United Nations Command remain ready to discuss unification on the basis of the United Nations objectives. If the People's Republic of China and the North Korean regime have concrete proposals for a settlement of the Korean question in conformity with the objectives of the United Nations, they are prepared to give such proposals every consideration.
5. In the absence of willingness of the People's Republic of China and the North Korean regime to negotiate on the basis of the United Nations objectives, the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission problem can and should be separated from the problem of unification. Pending agreement on unification, the

Armistice Agreement remains in force in Korea, and all parties concerned should endeavour to maintain the effectiveness of the Armistice and to correct problems that arise regarding it. The Governments of the United Nations Command wish to reaffirm their support of the Armistice Agreement and their intention to contribute to peace in the area.

6. The Governments of the United Nations Command cannot accept the statement in the Note of April 9, 1956, that the People's Republic of China and the North Korean regime have "endeavoured unceasingly to try to mitigate" the difficulties encountered by the Governments of Sweden and Switzerland in their work in the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, since these difficulties have in fact been created by the conduct of the Chinese-North Korean side itself. The proposals of the Swiss and Swedish Governments referred to in the Note of April 9 (which the Governments of the United Nations Command regard as reasonable and which have their full support) were made necessary by the policy of systematic frustration of the functions of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission which the Chinese-North Korean side has followed ever since the Armistice Agreement was first signed. The Chinese-North Korean side has persisted in introducing military personnel and supplies into Korea through other points of entry than those provided for in the Armistice Agreement, and has failed to report these introductions to the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission. Through the obstruction of the Czech and Polish members of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, the United Nations Command has been effectively prevented from having its charges of such introductions investigated. In short, the Chinese-North Korean side has completely frustrated any effective supervision by the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission in the area north of the Demilitarized Zone. Under these circumstances, the activities of the Czech and Polish components of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission south of the Demilitarized Zone are an inequitable burden on the United Nations side. The United Nations Command will announce its position on this matter fully in the Military Armistice Commission.

7. In the light of the foregoing and having regard to the attitude of the Chinese-North Korean side with respect to its obligations towards the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, as shown by its conduct in practice, the Governments of the United Nations Command believe that no evidence has been

shown of the good faith which alone could enable any new conference to serve a useful purpose. Until the Chinese-North Korean side is prepared to negotiate sincerely on the basis of United Nations objectives, the Governments of the United Nations Command believe that another conference would only bring about a repetition of the deadlock which resulted at Geneva in 1954.

STATEMENT BY UNITED NATIONS COMMAND REPRESENTATIVE
IN THE MILITARY ARMISTICE COMMISSION AT PANMUNJOM
KOREA MAY 31, 1956

I must return to an important matter frequently discussed here in the past and discussed also in the Tenth Session of the United Nations General Assembly with no satisfactory result.

The Korean Armistice Agreement has been in effect for almost three years, and its primary objective, to stop the hostilities in Korea and prevent them from being renewed, continues to be met. The danger of general war in the Far East has been greatly diminished as a result.

At the same time, there has been a notable and persistent failure of certain arrangements set up by the Armistice Agreement which were intended to contribute to the stability of the cease-fire. Among these are those arrangements concerning the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission and the reporting and inspection of introduction of military personnel and equipment into Korea. These arrangements were intended to assure that both sides would comply with the agreed limitations, which are set forth in paragraphs 13(c) and (d) of the Armistice Agreement, on such introductions. In short, the primary object in establishing the NNSC was to prevent violations of the Armistice Agreement by providing a supervisory mechanism which would be enabled to make full and adequate inspections and would thus be able to insure accurate reporting and compliance.

At previous meetings of the Military Armistice Commission the Senior Member of the United Nations Command Delegation has protested at length actions and delinquencies of your side which have prevented these inspection arrangements from operating successfully. I shall therefore only summarize the situation today.

From the time the Armistice Agreement was concluded your side has continuously made illegal introductions without reporting them to the NNSC. When the United Nations Command has called for an inspection of these illegal introductions, the Czech and Polish members on the NNSC have either vetoed such inspections or have cooperated with your side in obstructing the efforts of the Swiss and Swedish members of the Commission so as to render effective inspections, and thus disclosure, of these illegal introductions impossible. You have used the

continued existence of the NNSC as a blind behind which to hide these illegal introductions, since you have effectively prevented it from performing in North Korea the task which under the Armistice Agreement it was created to do. The United Nations Command, on the other hand, has faithfully observed the provisions of the Armistice Agreement, and has fully cooperated in the inspections made by the NNSC teams in the territory under United Nations Command control.

As a specific example, note the contrast between your performance in reporting to the NNSC and that of the United Nations Command. The Armistice Agreement requires both sides to make detailed and prompt reports of all introductions of military personnel and equipment. During approximately the first six months following the beginning of the Armistice, the period during which your side made most of its illegal introductions, your side made only 11 combat materiel reports to the NNSC, reporting the implausibly low number of 40 rounds of replacement ammunition, and no aircraft. During the same period, the United Nations Command submitted 598 reports, covering introduction of approximately 13,000,000 rounds of replacement ammunition, and 2,434 replacement aircraft. In the entire period since the Armistice Agreement went into effect until June 1955 you submitted a somewhat larger number of combat materiel reports, totalling 162. However, these still notably omit all reference to aircraft and compare unfavorably with the 1,969 reports submitted by the United Nations Command during the same period. The failure of your side to report introductions of combat aircraft is particularly conspicuous since your side now maintains in North Korea between 400 and 500 such aircraft, more than half of which are jet fighters or bombers, whereas you had none in that area at the time the Armistice Agreement was signed.

At the same time, Poland and Czechoslovakia, nominated by your side to participate in the NNSC, have refused to agree to inspections in North Korea which your side opposed or have delayed inspection until evidence of the violations could be removed. By virtue of constituting one-half of the membership of the Commission, the Czech and Polish officers on the Commission have enjoyed an unqualified veto power over any proposal laid before it. The members of the NNSC nominated by the United Nations Command, Sweden and Switzerland, have been truly neutrals in the accepted sense of the word. Their officers on the NNSC have examined and decided each proposal or charge on its merits.

Besides this fundamental perversion of the NNSC through actions of the Czech and Polish officers which allow significant inspections only in the territory under the control of the United Nations Command, your side has employed additional tactics designed to frustrate the operations of the NNSC in the territory under your control.

Your side has made introductions through other than approved ports of entry; in at least one place you constructed a railway bypass around a port of entry and introduced material and personnel through it. Your side has also restricted the activities of NNSC teams stationed in the ports of entry under your control so as to prevent them from carrying out their duties, as when you scheduled inspections of trains at unreasonable hours in the middle of the night and when you failed to give the teams sufficient notice to permit them to appear to inspect a train passing through a port of entry.

Mobile team inspections in the north have also been frustrated. As the Swiss and Swedish members of team No. 7 concluded after attempting to carry out an inspection of airfields, there "...the team was not in a position to conduct the investigation in a sufficiently thorough manner which would have allowed [it] to reach a convincing judgment..." They explained this conclusion in detail by pointing out inter alia that your side had refused to make your records of aircraft movements available and that their repeated requests to inspect even the nearest surroundings of airfields whose alleged boundaries they doubted were denied.

The United Nations Command, in contrast to the obstruction of your side, cooperated fully with the inspection teams sent to investigate your allegations of Armistice violations. Teams No. 9 and No. 10 were shown records of aircraft movements pertinent to their investigation and were allowed to inspect aircraft on the field. As the Swiss and Swedish members of Team No. 10 concluded on April 26, 1955:

"No justified complaint can be made against the United Nations Command side that it did not render the Team such assistance as could be deemed necessary for the fulfilment of the investigation. Further there is no ground for suspicions that the side did intentionally withhold information relevant to the investigation. The investigations and the inspections were carried out in all the places especially indicated by the KPA/CPV side. However, not one single piece could be found of the many different items of combat material ... enumerated in the charge..."

The co-operation of the United Nations Command in the investigations of Teams No. 9 and No. 10 in the south and the difficulties expressed by Team No. 7 in the north reflect a continuation of the attitude of the two sides described

in a memorandum submitted to this Commission on May 7, 1954 by the Swiss and Swedish representatives on the NNSC. At that time, after nearly a year's experience they said:

"The United Nations Command side, ...took from the beginning a broad view of its obligations and threw itself open to full control by the Neutral Nations Inspection Teams stationed at the ports of entry in the territory under its military control. Partly on its own initiative and partly on request, it put at the disposal of the inspection teams all documents...relating to incoming and outgoing material... The inspection teams were therefore in a position to inspect and to report on any material they felt to be interested in...

"The Korean People's Army and Chinese People's Volunteers side, on the other hand...never submitted any other documents for inspection than prior notification reports...the inspection teams were unable to check efficiently on other movements and this because of the stand taken by their Czechoslovak and Polish members...in the territory under the military control of the Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers the Czechoslovak and Polish members of the inspection teams, thanks to their 'veto' power, have kept those spot check controls to a bare minimum...they have merely become a face saving device devoid of any real significance. The inspection teams in the north have therefore never gained the insight in movements of material as have the inspection teams in the south."

The United Nations Command has made frequent formal requests in the Military Armistice Commission during these almost three years, most recently on February 25, 1956, that your side amend its behavior and comply with those provisions of the Korean Armistice Agreement regulating the introduction of combat materiel and equipment. Your side has failed to meet these demands and has given no indication of any intention to do so. It must therefore be concluded that your side intends to continue in default on its reporting obligations. It must be further concluded that your side intends to continue its practice of exploiting the unneutral conduct of the Czech and Polish members of vetoing embarrassing inspections, and that the NNSC will continue to be unable to detect and disclose the illegal introductions by your side.

The Governments of Sweden and Switzerland have proposed repeatedly during recent months to appropriate Czech, Polish, and Chinese Communist authorities the withdrawal of the inspection teams to the Demilitarized Zone where both sides would continue to report to the Commission. This reasonable proposal has been rejected repeatedly by your side. Most recently, in its note of April 9, 1956, to the nations represented in the United Nations Command, the

Chinese Communist regime took the position that this problem could not be solved until the problems of unification of Korea and withdrawal of troops are solved. Consequently, it has become necessary to invoke the remedies available to the United Nations side to meet the situation created by the defaults to which I have referred. Your side, and also the Czech and Polish members of the NNSC, have failed to carry out faithfully important provisions of the Armistice Agreement. Therefore, the United Nations side, as a party to that agreement, is entitled to take steps necessary to protect itself from the consequences of such unwarranted conduct. Accordingly, you are no longer privileged to take advantage of those provisions of the Armistice Agreement which have been violated and frustrated by your conduct and that of the Czech and Polish members of the NNSC. The United Nations side has exhibited the greatest caution and forbearance in this matter. We have pursued every other practicable alternative course to redress the situation. The course we must now adopt is carefully adjusted to the violations and frustrations and to the burdens and injury involved and is the least we must do to protect our legitimate interests under the Armistice Agreement by lawful, peaceful, and reasonable steps.

Because of these obstructions and violations of your side and the conduct of the Czech and Polish members of the NNSC and Neutral Nations Inspection Teams, the United Nations Command is now notifying your side and the NNSC and its subordinate teams at Inchon, Pusan, and Kunsan that the United Nations Command will provisionally suspend, during the time that your side continues in default, performance on its part of those provisions of the Armistice Agreement governing the operations in the area under the control of the United Nations Command of the NNSC and NNIT's. You are informed that this suspension will be put into effect in about one week and the United Nations Command will expect withdrawal of the teams from the area to be effected at that time. The United Nations Command is taking only such steps as are indispensable to protection of its rights under the Armistice Agreement. The United Nations Command continues to regard the Armistice Agreement as in force and limits its action to the particular suspensions described above. Finally, since for the reasons above stated the NNSC teams in the north have not been able to accomplish their purpose, we see no purpose in their remaining there.

* * *

STATE--FD, Wash., D.C.

STATEMENT BY UNITED NATIONS COMMAND REPRESENTATIVE
IN THE MILITARY ARMISTICE COMMISSION AT PANMUNJOM,
KOREA, JULY 5, 1955

"A concept basic to the establishment and maintenance of the armistice in Korea was that the balance which existed between the military forces of the opposing sides on July 27, 1953 would not be altered thereafter by the opposing commanders through the introduction of reinforcing military personnel or combat material. Provisions for implementing this basic concept were clearly spelled out in detail in Paragraph 13 of the Armistice Agreement.

"Shortly after the signing of the Armistice it became apparent to the United Nations Command that the Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers were resorting to every possible subterfuge to avoid compliance with the provisions of Paragraphs 13 C. and D. of the Armistice Agreement. Whereas the United Nations Command submitted its first combat material and personnel report as prescribed in Paragraphs 13 C. and D. of the Armistice Agreement on 28 July 1953, the day following the signing of the Armistice, it was not until 12 September 1953 that your side submitted its first report of rotation personnel and not until 6 October 1953 that you submitted your first combat materiel report. Your first personnel report dated 12 September 1953 instead of reflecting actual arrivals and departures merely listed 964 departures and no arrivals for the 24 hour period of 15-16 September 1953. Apparently you would have the United Nations Command and Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission believe that from 28 July to 15 September, with a military force exceeding 1,200,000 men, the majority of whom came from Red China, not one soldier arrived or left Korea during that seven-week period.

"Your first combat materiel report of 6 October 1953 reflected an outgoing shipment of four 57 mm anti-tank guns with 20 rounds of ammunition, and it was not until 9 February 1954 that you submitted your first legitimate combat materiel report reflecting an incoming shipment--covering one 37 mm AA gun. Again, you would apparently have us believe that you could logistically support your huge military force in wartorn and ravaged North Korea for the entire first six months of the Armistice without a single incoming shipment.

"That the United Nations Command has continued scrupulously to comply with provisions of 13 C. and D. is reflected in the following figures taken from the official records covering the first year of the Armistice. From 27 July 1953, to 31 July 1954, the United Nations Command submitted 370 personnel reports covering 287,343 permanent arrivals and 362,122 departures. During this same period the Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers side submitted only 42 reports covering the ridiculous figures of 12,748 permanent arrivals and 31,201 departures.

"The United Nations Command during this period submitted 1,057 combat materiel reports covering the movement of 9,717 combat aircraft,

1,034 armored vehicles, 194,385 weapons, and 386,828,087 rounds of ammunition.

"The Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers side, on the other hand, submitted only 24 combat materiel reports covering the movement of zero combat aircraft, 14 armored vehicles, 1,848 weapons, and 746,500 rounds of ammunition.

"The United Nations Command established a system and procedures to insure that all incoming and outgoing combat materiel and personnel were shipped only through designated ports of entry and took necessary measures to facilitate free and open inspections of these shipments by the Neutral Nations inspection teams. The Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers on the other hand, established no such system or procedures, failed to use your designated ports of entry and resorted to every conceivable pretext to circumvent the provisions of 13 C. and D. Attempts by the Swiss and Swedish members of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission to carry out their functions of inspection and observation were effectively blocked by the Czechs and Poles.

"The relative merits of the inspection system established in the South as compared with that established in the North was the subject of considerable discussion and deliberation by the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission.

"In the 107th plenary session of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission on 25 February 1954, General Wacker, the Senior Swiss Member, made these observations: 'In the South, rotation takes place every day and every hour in all ports of entry with the exception of one, whereas in the North some spare parts are shipped out once a month through one or two ports of entry and then introduced again a few weeks after. I have never heard anything about rotation of aircraft, armored vehicles, or even complete weapons and ammunition in the North. I think we have the right to ask ourselves how it is possible that an army counting several one hundred thousand soldiers can be logistically supported by the amount of material as shown by the figures which are being submitted to us:in the South the teams control.....all material being brought into Korea--a control which is being carried out, thanks to documents submitted by the local authorities (load manifests, ship manifests) as well as by means of inspections on the spot. I emphasize the fact that in the South these documents and inspections concern non-combat material as well as combat material. In contrast to this, we find that in the North not more than two to four inspections of spare parts of war material have been carried out every month only in the ports of entry of Sinuiju and Manpo.'

"General Mohn, the Senior Swedish Member of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, observed that, 'Gradually the teams in the South secured an insight in the movements of all cargo in their respective ports of entry. The Polish and Czechoslovakian members of

the teams were only too eager to inspect all sorts of goods which did not even remotely have any connection with combat material. They were not in the slightest embarrassed by the restrictive interpretation of the armistice agreement apparently held by their principals in Panmunjon.....Well, what happened in the North? As we all know, the teams in North Korea had to wait an unusually long time before they found anything to put their teeth in. They wandered about aimlessly in their ports of entry, not knowing exactly what to do.'

"The airfield situation that existed in the territory under your control at the time the armistice agreement was signed is well known by your side as well as ours. All airfields under the control of the Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers had been under continuous attack and were inoperative. Photographs taken by the United Nations Command on 27 July 1953 prove that on that date the Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers had no Air Force and not one usable airfield. Our side has presented these official photographs to the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission and the evidence disclosed by them has never been challenged or refuted.

"Within a few months after the Armistice Agreement was signed our radar surveillance detected continuously increasing jet aircraft activity in the territory occupied by the Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers side. Such radar detection was irrefutable proof of your violation of paragraph 13.D.

"On 21 September 1953 this evidence was further confirmed when Senior Lieutenant Ro Kum Suk, a Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers Pilot officer who deserted from the Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers side, landed at a Republic of Korea airport and surrendered a MIG-15 combat aircraft which had been illegally introduced into Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers territory in defiance of Paragraph 13D. of the Armistice Agreement. This pilot offered irrefutable proof that from 27 July 1953 until 21 September 1953 he was engaged in the air movement of MIG-15 aircraft. These combat planes were introduced into the territory under the military control of your side subsequent to the signing of the armistice agreement and in direct and willful violation thereof. This pilot had personally observed at least 80 combat aircraft that were brought into the territory of your side contrary to paragraph 13.D.

"Faced by this serious development and possessed with irrefutable evidence, the United Nations Command, on 12 October 1953, lodged its first official protest against the Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers for violating the provisions of paragraph 13.D of the armistice agreement by the illegal introduction of aircraft into the territory under your control. The United Nations Command requested the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission to conduct an investigation on an airfield near Uiju, where such aircraft were

definitely known to be located. Despite the attempts of your Czech and Pole members on the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission to forestall this investigation, the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission finally agreed to dispatch a mobile inspection team, but due to collusion between the Czech and Pole members of the mobile inspection team with the Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers military representatives at the scene of the investigation, you were successful in thwarting any realistic investigation. Documents requested by the Swiss and Swede members of the team were refused on grounds that they were secret, requests by Swiss and Swede members to conduct inspections at the railroad station and other shipping points around the Uiju airfield were denied, and visual observations of the Uiju airfield were carefully restricted and controlled to insure that the team would observe no incriminating evidence.

"Based upon new and additional evidence of your continued secret Air Force build-up, on 9 February 1954, the United Nations Command lodged its second official protest against your illegal introduction of combat aircraft. A letter was dispatched to the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission outlining our charges and requesting that mobile inspection teams be dispatched to conduct special observations, inspections, and investigations at the following airfields: Pyong-Ni, Taechon, Pyongyang East, Uiju, Pyongyang Main, Sinuiju Northeast, Wonsan, Saamcham, and Sunan, as well as road and rail by-passes in the vicinity of the ports of entry of Sinuiju, Chongjin and Manpo.

"Although the Swiss and Swedish members of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission were in favour of dispatching the requested mobile inspection teams, the action was blocked by the veto power of your Polish and Czech comrades, and the investigation was thereby prevented. Previously, General Bures, Czechoslovak, on 29 January 1954, had summed up the attitudes always taken by the Czech and Polish members in regard to United Nations Command requests for investigations when he said, 'All accusations against the Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers side are nothing but groundless fabrications...' Later, 10 February 1954, Colonel Bibrowski, Polish member, in speaking of a United Nations Command request for a mobile inspection team, states, 'The Polish delegation cannot agree to consider such a request and in no case is it ready to comply with it.'

"From the actions of your side and the actions of your unneutral Czech and Pole representation in the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission on this and the previous United Nations Command protest it became obvious that any realistic neutral inspection of your illegal activities was virtually impossible. Although the United Nations Command was cognizant throughout the following year of your continued illegal Air Force build-up, it was not until you overtly employed your illegally amassed air power on 5 February 1955 by making an unprovoked attack against United Nations Command aircraft on a routine training mission over international waters that the United Nations Command lodged another protest against your side.

"In the Military Armistice Commission negotiations on this incident you inadvertently admitted that your own MIG aircraft participated in this air battle. This admission constituted conclusive corroboration of your illegal introduction of combat aircraft, of not making the proper combat materiel reports and of by-passing the designated ports of entry, all in violation of the armistice agreement.

"The third official protest against your illegal introduction of combat materiel was therefore made by the United Nations Command on 21 February 1955. Again the complaint was spelled out in detail, 'The United Nations Command charges that the Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers have between the dates of 27 July 1953 and 5 February 1955 introduced into the territory under the military control of their side combat aircraft of the MIG type, arms and ammunition therefor, in excess of combat aircraft of the MIG type, arms, and ammunition therefor in the territory under the military control of the Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers side on 27 July 1953, and have failed to report them in the prescribed manner and form to the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, in violation of paragraph 13.D. and other provisions of the armistice agreement.

"Again the United Nations Command requested a mobile inspection team investigation of 6 airfields where your illegally introduced MIG aircraft were known to be based. Again your Czech and Pole cohorts on the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission ably represented your side and successfully stalled the dispatch of the mobile inspection teams for one week, enabling you to fly your MIGs away from the bases to be investigated and otherwise remove or hide incriminating evidence. That most of your MIGs were flown out was irrefutably established by our radar surveillance. When the mobile inspection teams reached your airfields, every effort of the Swiss and Swede members to make full and impartial investigations was thwarted by the Czech and Polish members, just as they had thwarted the investigation of Uiju in October 1953. Although the official reports submitted by these teams reveal that at least 88 MIGs were observed on those fields, the Czechs and Poles vetoed requests by the Swiss and Swedes for available documents which could have established the dates when those aircraft were brought into the territory under your control. It is significant to note that these documents were the same type documents that were freely offered by the United Nations Command side to mobile inspection teams operating in the South.

"On 10 May 1955 again your illegally introduced aircraft made an unprovoked attack against United Nations Command aircraft on a routine training mission over international waters. On 13 May 1955 the United Nations Command lodged a strong letter of protest against the Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers for this hostile act and for the fourth time charged your side with illegally introducing combat aircraft in violation of the Armistice Agreement.

"An analysis of the official reports submitted by the United Nations Command and the Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers covering combat materiel shipments for the period 28 July 1953 to 31 May 1955, reflects the following:

"The United Nations Command has submitted 1,969 combat materiel reports, covering movement of 16,141 combat aircraft, 2,492 armored vehicles, 447,803 weapons, and 608,386,231 rounds of ammunition.

"The Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers has submitted 162 combat materiel reports, covering the movement of zero combat aircraft, 245 armored vehicles, 144,808 weapons, and 50,674,619 rounds of ammunition. I repeat, in the first 22 months of the armistice, despite the fact that you have twice openly employed your illegally acquired combat aircraft in large numbers in hostile and unwarranted attacks against the United Nations Command, your side has not yet submitted the report covering the movement of combat aircraft in or out of Korea.

"At approximately 1315 hours 21 June 1955, Senior Lieutenant Lee Un Yong, pilot, and Junior Lieutenant Lee In Son, navigator, both members of the Korean People's Armed Forces Air Force, after defecting from your side and leaving Pyongyang Main airfield, landed at Seoul airbase and surrendered a YAK-18 aircraft to our side. These men have also surrendered themselves and have asked for asylum from the tyranny and abuse they suffered under your control. This has been granted. Moreover, they have offered to make their full contribution toward the defeat of your iniquitous conspiracy.

"Your side will recognize their names. They are men who have held positions of high trust and responsibility in your forces. Senior Lieutenant Lee, the pilot, had served 8 years and 6 months in your armed forces. He graduated from the Air Academy in Chkalov, USSR, and the Air Officers' School in Yenchi, Manchuria. Your side has rewarded him with the 3rd Class Order of the National Flag Medal, 2nd Class Order of the National Flag Medal, 2nd Class Freedom and Independence Medal, Air Merit Medal. Senior Lieutenant Lee was a member of the Korean People's Armed Forces Air Force, 858th Independent Night-Bomber Regiment.

"Junior Lieutenant Lee In Son served in your forces for 4 years and 9 months. His services have been rewarded by the presentation of the Merit Medal. He was a member of the Korean People's Armed Forces Air Force, 858th Independent Night-Bomber Regiment.

"Senior Lieutenant Lee, the Pilot of the YAK-18 aircraft, was stationed at Pyongyang Main airfield from July 1953 until September 1954 and again from February 1955 until 21 June 1955, the date of his defection. The navigator was at Pyongyang Main from July of 1953 until his defection with Senior Lieutenant Lee on 21 June 1955. Both men had made frequent and regular flights to other principal

bases used by your air forces. Consequently both men were well informed on the airfield development in North Korea, and the strength, composition, deployment, and operations of your illegally established Air Force.

"I now present you with the evidence provided freely and voluntarily to our side by these 2 former members of your Air Force:

"1. The YAK-18 aircraft which Senior Lieutenant Lee and Junior Lieutenant Lee flew from Pyongyang Main to Seoul on 21 June 1955 bears serial number 8715. The YAK-18 is fitted with one under-wing bomb rack under each wing, and each rack is capable of carrying a 100 kilogram bomb. Senior Lieutenant Lee stated that while stationed at Antung, Manchuria, he flew aircraft of this type in night bombing combat operations from October 1951, to March, 1952, and that he has flown 600 hours in this type of aircraft, of which 200 hours were in combat. The YAK-18 in which the defectors came to Seoul is a combat aircraft as defined by the Military Armistice Commission; it was brought to Korea in April, 1954, in direct violation of paragraph 13.D.

"2. Although we know, and our photographs taken on 27 July 1953 prove that at the time of the armistice agreement there were no airfields in the territory under your command capable of supporting combat aircraft, these defectors have stated that Uiju, Sunan, Sunchon, Pyongyang East (Mirin-Ni) and Onkong-Ni, have been restored to full operation and are supporting combat aircraft. Our radar tracks have verified the flying activity at these fields. The defectors also stated that more fields are being built to support the growing strength of the Korean People's Armed Forces Air Force. This is further evidence of your expanding Air Force strength.

"3. The 2 defectors were stationed at Pyongyang in March, 1955 during the period mobile inspection teams 6,7, and 8 were conducting their investigations. Senior Lieutenant Lee and Junior Lieutenant Lee provided specific information on steps your side took to remove, disguise and conceal incriminating evidence during the mobile inspection team investigations. Among the ruses employed by your side were the following:

"A. Your side flew many combat aircraft away from the inspected airfields.

"B. Your side hid combat aircraft in ravines in the hills in the vicinity of the airfields and camouflaged them.

"C. Your side dismantled some of the aircraft and concealed them.

"D. Your side stationed heavy guards about the hiding places and prevented inspection of these areas by the mobile inspection teams.

"E. Your side arbitrarily reduced the boundaries of the airfields, thereby restricting the scope of the mobile inspection team inspection.

"F. Your side prepared false testimony by long, detailed coaching of probable witnesses and by substituting politically indoctrinated higher ranking officers for lower ranking officers by switching insignias.

"G. Your side delayed the assembly of newly arrived combat aircraft at Taechon by leaving them in their crates until the mobile inspection team investigations were completed. Senior Lieutenant Lee, who reads Russian, noticed the wording, "Kiev Aircraft Factory" on tags attached to one of his unit's combat aircraft. This aircraft's log book showed that the plane left the Russian factory in March 1955.

"4. The defectors have also stated that since the signing of the armistice agreement the illegal build-up of the Korean People's Armed Forces Air Force has been taking place, so that at the present time there are more than 300 combat aircraft, the majority of which are jet fighters of the MIG-15 type. This has also been confirmed by our radar and by the incidents where our aircraft have been attacked over international waters by Korean People's Armed Forces Air Force fighters.

"5. The 2 defectors confirmed the fact that the MIG-15 jet fighters, which attacked United Nations planes over international waters on the 5th of February, 1955, and on the 10th of May, 1955, flew from bases in the territory under the military control of your side, and that these MIG aircraft belonged to your air forces.

"The information provided our side by your 2 most recent defectors merely served to confirm existing evidence and provide another link in the long chain the United Nations Command has constructed to irrefutably prove your illegal Air Force build-up.

"I have presented to you today the official record of your continuous and numerous violations of paragraph 13.D, paragraph 17, and other fundamental provisions of the Armistice Agreement, throughout the armistice period. It stands as monumental evidence to the United Nations Command and the free world of your complete insincerity, dishonesty, and utter lack of integrity. The combat forces, and particularly the air forces, that you have built up illegally and covertly since the signing of the armistice, constitute a grave situation which threatens seriously the very structure and stability of the armistice itself.

"The United Nations Command, at this time, lodges the strongest and most serious protest made against your side since the signing of the armistice and charges that, through your willful, deliberate and illegal build-up of your combat forces, you have:

"1. Flagrantly violated every basic provision of the Armistice agreement, including the spirit and intent of that document.

"2. Clearly demonstrated your aggressive intent of acquiring a favorable military position over the forces of the United Nations Command.

"The United Nations Command demands that:

"1. You provide the United Nations Command, without delay, an accurate accounting of all combat materiel and combat aircraft introduced into the territory of your side since the signing of the armistice.

"2. You immediately provide the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission with corrected combat materiel reports which reflect the mass of combat materiel and hundreds of aircraft you have illegally introduced into Korea.

"3. You cease immediately the illegal introduction of additional combat materiel and combat aircraft into the territory of your side.

"We have listened since last summer to the soothing music of your peaceful propaganda and your expressions for a free and independent united Korea, while at the same time contending with your continued willful and flagrant violations of the armistice agreement, your hostile and aggressive actions, and your murderous and inhumane atrocities. The time has come to demand that the powers who are directing your iniquitous activities start trying to reconcile your Dr. Jekyll with your Mr. Hyde."

State--FD, Wash., D.C.

STATEMENT BY UNITED NATIONS COMMAND REPRESENTATIVE
IN THE MILITARY ARMISTICE COMMISSION AT PANMUNJOM,
KOREA JULY 14, 1955

"In the 60 Military Armistice Commission meeting I provided considerable evidence to substantiate that your side (the Communist Side), in collusion with your Czech and Pole comrades on the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, has rendered ineffective all investigations that have been called to determine the facts concerning your numerous and continuous violations of the armistice agreement and your illegal build-up of your combat forces. In your lengthy, rambling and somewhat incoherent rebuttal, you failed completely to produce any concrete evidence to refute my charges but nevertheless, contended that the Czech and Pole members of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission have always adopted a neutral stand and carried out their duties faithfully and impartially. Apparently more evidence on this point is in order, and I now present it.

"I can think of no evidence more incontrovertible than the spoken or written words of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission members themselves. The following extracts from the official documents of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission are accordingly quoted and hereby introduced into the official records of the Military Armistice Commission.

"General Mohn, Swedish delegate, in the 112 meeting of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, said, 'since the inception of our operations the Czechoslovak and Polish members have incessantly brought unwarranted charges against the United Nations Command side for alleged violations of the armistice agreement which, in fact, existed only in their own imagination. They have never minced their words and the Swedish member has sometimes been shocked by the style, content and violence of many a Czechoslovak or Polish statement. So if the Czechoslovak and Polish members feel hurt by the accusations directed against them by the Senior Member of the United Nations Command side, they can only blame themselves. They have deliberately provoked this reaction both by their words and their deeds. And I do not think it would be befitting for them to play the role of injured innocents. When living in a glass house, it is wise not to throw stones around.'

"In that same 122 Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission meeting, General Mohn pointed out that, 'the climax was the outright refusal by the Czechoslovak and Polish members to take into consideration any request relating to the prisoners of war issue. It was, of course, no surprise to the Swedish member that the side itself took the same stand. I am getting used to notice invisible links spreading into various directions. The result of all this was that some of the most important provisions of the armistice agreement were deliberately set aside by 2 of the members of this commission.'

"The accused side has protested its innocence and the Czechoslovak and Polish members hurried immediately to its support. This attitude was quite a shock to the Swedish member and he felt that it somehow was spelling the doom of our Commission. I cannot but dismiss the specious and evasive arguments which were submitted here for our consideration as worthless. Even admitting that the request from the United Nations Command could have been better worded in some parts, there was no excuse whatsoever for not sending out mobile teams. We have miserably failed in carrying out our obligations under the armistice agreement with regard to one of its most essential parts. However, the Swedish member declines all responsibility for this unsatisfactory state of affairs.'

"The Czechoslovak and Polish members have been very exacting in their demands on the United Nations Command side, while shielding the Korean Peoples Army and Chinese Peoples Volunteers side against any embarrassing investigation and even against any efficient current control of replacements of combat materiel. They have been very successful, indeed, in this latter respect.'

"General Mohn further stated at the 122 meeting that, 'time and again the Swedish and Swiss members in our teams in the north have proposed to the Czechoslovak and Polish members that something should be done to increase our control activities in the north and to render them more efficient. But the Czechoslovak and Polish members of the teams always hastened to block all attempts of this kind made by the Swiss and Swedish colleagues. So, never could a request for better control in North Korea reach the Korean Peoples Army/Chinese Peoples Volunteers side. Obviously the Korean Peoples Army/Chinese Peoples Volunteers side could not act on requests it never got. So the whole blame for the unsatisfactory situation in the north falls on the Czechoslovak and Polish members of the teams. Had the Czechoslovak and Polish members of the teams in the north wholeheartedly co-operated with their Swedish and Swiss colleagues just as the Swiss and Swedish members of the teams in the south have co-operated with the Czechoslovak and Polish colleagues, we might have had an entirely different situation in the north. So, the Czechoslovak and Polish members bear a very heavy responsibility for the inefficiency of our control activities in the north. By their attitude, they are impairing the very existence of this Commission. This is my considered opinion.'"

"Minister Escher, Swiss delegate, stated in the 179 meeting, 'as to the statement of the honorable Polish member regarding all the dreadful things happening in the south, I can only support what the Swedish member said before and I would put it in a stronger way. I think the statement of the honorable Polish member is a condemnation of all activities of units in the south and proves, if he is right, the complete futility of the activities of the units in the south. I think the hand of the honorable Polish member must shake every month when he signs the evaluation stating that we have established that both sides have remained within the limits of the AA.'

"General Mohn, in the 114 meeting of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, again correctly analyzed this situation when he said that, 'since the inception of this Commission, the Czechoslovak and Polish members have not deviated one inch from the line traced by the KPA and CPV side or allowed themselves to direct even the mildest criticism against its actions or pronouncements.'

"In the 105 Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission meeting, General Mohn summed up the attitude of the Czech and Polish members: 'When an accusation is levelled against the United Nations Command side, it is proved in advance that a violation has taken place. When a violation is alleged against the KPA/CPV side, it is proved in advance that no violation has taken place.'

"In the 122 plenary meeting General Mohn stated, 'the Czechoslovak and Polish members have claimed all along that the requests of the UN Command were not formulated in conformity with the requirements of the armistice agreement. They entrenched themselves behind legal niceties. They were not interested at all in throwing light on allegations which, after all, involved the tragic fate of human beings. Their main concern was to prevent an investigation at any cost, so they readily invented arguments to defeat each request. But when at last they realized that there was no more escape from their obligations, they bluntly declared that under no circumstances would they agree to investigation relating to former prisoners of war.'

"General Wacker, the Swiss delegate, also made mention of the duplicity of the Czechs and Poles when, in the 102 meeting he stated, 'I regret to be obliged to state that in contradiction to all rules which are being adhered to in our countries, the Polish and Czechoslovak delegates judged the situation by preferring accusation without the inquest being terminated. By accepting from the very outset -- this could be clearly seen -- the accusation brought against one of the sides, they identified themselves with one of the parties instead of discharging their duty as judges.'

"In the 96 meeting, General Mohn had this to say about the so-called impartiality of the Czechs and Poles, 'I did not have to listen to many of the sentences presented by Col. Bibrowski to realize that he was entirely "off beam" or let me say, out of order. But the more I listened to him, the more I found it interesting to have his long speech on record because it characterizes the kind of objectivity and neutrality for which he makes himself a spokesman here. And I can only heartily compliment him on the very able manner in which he interprets the KPA/CPV side's views in this connection.'

"In the 122 meeting, General Wacker, the Swiss delegate, pointed out the obvious bias of the Czechs and Poles and the very real neutrality of the Swiss and Swedes by saying, 'not unlike the Swiss delegation, the Swedish delegation agreed to the dispatch of the requested mobile inspection teams. In contrast to the attitude of the Swedes and Swiss,

the Polish and Czechoslovak delegates rejected the requests submitted by the UNC side. I shall not revert to the discussion which took place when the question was being debated at this table. I want, however, to remind the members of this commission that the argumentation submitted by the Czechoslovak and Polish delegations was in contradiction to the very clear stipulation of the armistice agreement through this attitude they have prevented our whole commission from performing its function, and, in the view of the Swiss delegate, reduced this commission to a state in which it becomes extremely difficult for the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission to successfully carry out and complete its task.'

"The bias of the Czechs and Poles was also referred to by Minister Escher, Swiss, in the 176 meeting: 'Although I do not like to repeat myself, I have to say again that what the honorable Czechoslovak member has just developed seems to me in flagrant contradiction to the standpoints taken at the meeting 10 days ago. I think, if the honorable members present will take the trouble to read the record of the 174 special meeting when we dealt with the mobile inspection team question, they will realize that it was insisted on by the Polish and Czechoslovak members that mobile inspection teams, if the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission receives a request, should be sent out without hearing first the opinion of the 2 sides. Today, it is not only suggested by the same members who took that stand last time, that the 2 sides should be heard first, but it is even requested that they should produce their evidence before we send out the mobile inspection teams.'

"General Gross, Switzerland, stated in the 133 meeting, 'I have to denounce the Polish-Czechoslovak informational reports received from the south as being poor and translucent expedience whose sole purpose it is to supply data for utterly untenable charges; in the same way as they are, on the other hand, always prone to minimize such reports as might be embarrassing to the northern side.'

"General Jodahl, Swedish delegate, made an impressive observation in the 141 meeting: 'The important thing is that the commission must prove to the Military Armistice Commission -- and I venture to say the world -- they are at least able to decide whether or not the material available to the Commission indicates that there has been a net over-introduction of military personnel or materiel. If we show ourselves unable to agree on anything except the time of our next meeting -- then I feel that it will be difficult for us to argue that this commission is showing itself capable of performing its assigned task.'

"Consider now the record of the 10 mobile inspection teams' investigations conducted since the signing of the armistice. This record clearly reveals the recurring failure to produce jointly agreed report of investigations. Each failure to agree in the north was caused by the falsification or withholding of evidence by the KPA/CPV side and by the active assistance of the Czech and Polish members in accomplishing such trickery. You refused to produce documents that

were needed, you took advantage of unneutral interpreters to falsify depositions, and you tampered with or withheld the testimony of witnesses. In the south your Czech and Polish friends undertook irrelevant inquiries and went beyond the scope of the investigations in their efforts to build up evidence of United Nations Command violations while at the same time refusing to consider pertinent records and data which were offered by our side; then as soon as negative results became apparent they revised their position and were unwilling to continue their investigation far enough to determine that there actually was no illegally introduced combat materiel.

"Mobile inspection teams 1, 2, and 3 conducted investigations in the prisoner of war camps on Koje-Do, Yong Ding and Imjin River Bridge. The teams submitted inconclusive reports to the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission and that body deliberated on these reports from 5 until 16 September 1953. No agreement could be reached and the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission forwarded to the Military Armistice Commission separate evaluations submitted by the Czechoslovak and Polish members on the one side and by the Swedish and Swiss members on the other side.

"The result of these investigations were summed up by the Swiss and Swede members of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission as follows: 'The investigation seems to indicate that the complaints from the Korean People's Army and Chinese People's Volunteers side are either exaggerated, or lacking in precision. Few of the incidents, if any, would have occurred, had the representatives of the Red Cross Society of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and of the Red Cross Society of the People's Republic of China complied with the simple regulations by the different camp authorities. Because of this non-cooperative attitude at various occasions the representatives of the Red Cross Society of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Red Cross Society of the People's Republic of China seem to have rendered the task of the United Nations camp authorities unnecessarily difficult. In some instances, it may even be questioned whether they have correctly understood their humanitarian task or not been more interested in matters which had no relation to a Red Cross mission.'

"The same ineffective results were obtained from Military Inspection Team No. 4. You stated in the 60 Military Armistice Commission meeting that 'the mobile Neutral Nations inspection teams...eye-witnessed the existence of large numbers of combat aircraft at Uiju Airfield, including MIG planes, which had been in the possession of our side since before the armistice and admitted that those aircraft had been in our possession since the time before the armistice.' Your statement evaded the issue. MIT No. 4 at no time reported that the aircraft they saw had been based in Korea since before the armistice, which is the point at issue under paragraph 13 D.

"You have tried to prove by devious sophistry the exact opposite of what the 'conclusion' paragraph of the MIT No. 4 final report of 26 October 53 actually states. The MIT did not, and I repeat, did not, admit that these aircraft had been in your possession since before the armistice. They merely stated that they found no evidence of aircraft being shipped in crates to the airfield at Uiju.

"In analyzing this evidence in the 62 Neutral Nation Supervisory Commission meeting, General Rihner, Swiss member, clearly summarizes just exactly what the MIT No. 4 found. He states, 'the team has not found any evidence proving that aircraft in crates had been introduced. This is the only thing that has been ascertained by the team in an absolutely unambiguous way...the team has established that there were aircraft at the airfield, but it met with the refusal to check the logbooks. Such a check would probably have made it possible to establish when these airplanes had been introduced...the only thing we can establish is that the team did not find any aircraft in crates.' This was just another example of the inconclusive results obtained by a MIT investigation.

"The Czechoslovakian member, General Bures, made this statement in the 105 meeting of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission: 'In the opinion of the Czechoslovak delegation, the United Nations Command side asked Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission for 3 mobile inspection teams to be dispatched to the north just in order to use this fact itself for its propaganda against the Korean-Chinese side and in order to deceive public opinion of the world.'

"The Czechoslovak and Polish members then in response to a United Nations Command request for a mobile inspection team investigation in February 1954, assumed that they had the right to pass judgment on reported violations before the teams were sent out and before the charges were investigated. In this respect consider the words of Colonel Bibrowski, Poland, uttered in the 105 meeting of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission on 1 March 1954 during debate on the proposal to dispatch mobile inspection teams to KPA/CPV territory. He said, 'General Lacy's recent requests to dispatch mobile inspection teams to the area controlled by the KPA and CPV and in particular his letter of 9 February force us to make very serious reflections.

"'They force me solemnly to declare that neither now nor in the future will the Polish delegate agree to send out mobile inspection teams on the basis of groundless charges, if the necessity to conduct such investigations is not sufficiently proved and if the abuse of the activities of our commission or its organs for purposes having nothing in common with observing, strengthening and consolidating the armistice in Korea is not excluded.'

"The difficulty that developed in connection with team No. 4 was duplicated when team No. 5 attempted to conduct an investigation at Onjong-Ni. On 8 April 1955 this team submitted its report to the

Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission together with a letter stating that the team had been unable to reach an agreement upon its report and that the different opinions were to be seen in information reports submitted by the Czechoslovak and Polish members as well as by the Swedish and Swiss members respectively.

"The Swiss and Swedish report said, 'Summing up, we find that the main basis for the charge brought forward by the Korean People's Army and Chinese People's Volunteers side were the statements of the witnesses. As said before, these statements, however, cannot be considered as trustworthy.'

"This report said in conclusion, '...A coherent evaluation of the whole material of both sides shows that the charge of the Korean People's Army and Chinese People's Volunteers side not only must be considered as not proved, but there are serious reasons to believe that the ascertations of this side are in contradiction to the truth.'

"In the case of team number 5, as in all the other investigations, there was a deadlock in both the team and the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission and the basis of that deadlock was to be found in the political creed of the Czechs and Poles which bound them to make decisions that would promote the Communist Party line rather than a decision based on evidence.

"Later, in response to a United Nations Command request, the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission dispatched mobile teams 6, 7, and 8 to territory under KPA/CPV control for investigations at 6 airfields. None of these teams came to an agreed conclusion as a result of its investigations and unilateral reports were submitted to the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission by the Czechs and Poles on one side and by the Swiss and Swedes on the other. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission report to the Military Armistice Commission merely stated that the charges had not been proved. This in no way resolved the conflicting positions taken by members of the teams.

"The Swiss and Swedish members of Mobile Inspection Team No. 6 who inspected Ujiu and Namsi airfields said in their report dated 26 April 1955, 'the team was not permitted to see the cockpits of any MIG aircraft; further the team was neither permitted to note nor to see the serial numbers of the inspected aircraft. They were covered with paper, except the first 4 at Ujiu. Therefore, the team was not in a position to ascertain whether any aircraft has been shown more than once to the team, the more as it was impossible to see all aircraft on the same day, because either the side or the Polish and Czechoslovak members stated both times long discussion that they never wanted to check all the aircraft.'

"At Taecheon on 10 March 1955, when members of Mobile Inspection Team No. 7 wanted to interview one of your soldiers who was on duty your liaison officer made the following absurd excuse, 'he is not belonging to this unit as he is also an insane people. He needs rest. Therefore he cannot be brought here.'

"The Czech and Polish members of the Mobile Inspection Team attempted to uphold the fiction that your combat Airforce conducted normal operations including gunnery practice and training flights over a 2-year period with little ammunition, no spare parts and no engine changes. The Swiss and Swedish members of Mobile Team No. 7 summed up the entire situation in their conclusion in which they said, 'The team was not in a position to conduct the investigation in a sufficiently thorough manner...to reach a convincing judgment whether the charge...is justified or not.'

"The Swiss and Swedish members of the Mobile Inspection Team No. 8 in the report they submitted on 9 April 1955 following inspections at Mirim-Ni and Sunan airfields declared, 'the requests for evidence submitted by the team or its members were aimed to help the Korean People's Army and Chinese People's Volunteers side to prove their standpoint, expressed many times by its representatives. It is up to the Korean People's Army and Chinese People's Volunteers side to take the responsibility if due to the refusal of requested material evidences the investigations could not be satisfactory. Those refusals stand in contradiction to the many declarations from the side to give the team all possible assistance... it is most regrettable that the side did not endeavor to help the team in this respect. Most remarkable is also the way in which the side tried several times to violate the team's integrity by offering material evidences only under conditions that they should be used only to prove that the United Nations Command charge was false.'

"An examination of the records of the fixed teams operating at the designated ports of entry discloses the same weakness that has interfered with the functioning of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission itself and in the attempts of the Mobile Teams to conduct investigations.

"The extreme difference between the inspection and control measures in the South as opposed to those in the North was the subject of considerable debate in the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission. This difference was pointed out by General Wacker, Switzerland, at the 114 meeting of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, 1 April 1954, when he urged that similar inspection procedures be followed on both sides of the Military Demarcation Line. Opposing any compromise with the Czechoslovak and Polish demands, General Wacker said, 'such a compromise solution will mean the continued existence of the status quo tantamount to the discriminatory treatment which, as it has been shown -- differentiates the North from the South. More than that, the discrimination will become even more and more flagrant. The Czechoslovak and Polish member will try hard to increase still further in the South the Neutral Nations Inspection Teams' powers which already go beyond the limits fixed by the armistice agreement as interpreted in the narrow way whereas in the North the Swiss and Swedish members will meet with increasing resistance or even obstruction on the part of their Czechoslovak and Polish colleagues.'

"It is equally as apparent today as it was soon after the signing of the armistice agreement the representatives nominated by your side to the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission are not neutral and are not remotely interested in carrying out their mission as outlined in the armistice agreement. Rather, they are true Communists and are concerned only with the furtherance of international Communism by any and all means available.

"In the 60 and now 61 meeting of the Military Armistice Commission I have presented extensive evidence to prove beyond any reasonable doubt:

"1. The unneutral and partisan attitude consistently demonstrated by the Czechs and Poles throughout the armistice period.

"2. Their active collaboration with your side in thwarting any realistic investigation of the illegal build-up of your combat forces, particularly your Air Forces.

"It would therefore appear to be appropriate and legitimate for the United Nations Command to ask at this time what, if anything, your side has to propose to remedy this unworkable situation."

State--FD, Wash., D.C.