



# General Assembly

Sixty-seventh session

## First Committee

**10**<sup>th</sup> meeting

Thursday, 18 October 2012, 3 p.m.  
New York

Official Records

*Chair:* Mr. Percaya ..... (Indonesia)

*In the absence of the Chair, Mr. Salim (Kenya),  
Vice-Chair, took the Chair.*

*The meeting was called to order at 3.15 p.m.*

### Agenda items 86 to 102 (continued)

#### **Thematic discussion on item subjects and introduction and consideration of all draft resolutions submitted under all disarmament and related international security agenda items**

**The Acting Chair:** This afternoon we will first hear from the speakers remaining from yesterday's rolling list who were not able to take the floor on the nuclear weapons cluster.

**Mr. Cho Hyun** (Republic of Korea): It is my great honour and privilege to speak in the First Committee of the General Assembly in my capacity as Chair of The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation for the 2012-2013 term. The year 2012 marks the tenth anniversary of the Code. As the only multilateral instrument setting norms against the proliferation of ballistic missiles, the Code has contributed to building confidence among members of the international community by establishing a common basis for implementing voluntary transparency measures concerning ballistic missile launches.

Over the past decade, sustained progress has been made in our efforts to strengthen the Code. To date, 134 countries have subscribed to the Code, and many of them have faithfully implemented their obligations, such as the timely submission of annual declarations

and the provision of pre-launch notifications, as appropriate. In addition, the General Assembly adopted resolutions in support of the Code in 2005, 2008 and 2010, recognizing the Code as a practical step against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery.

Despite that significant level of subscription, implementation and recognition by the international community, much work still remains to be done, if the Code is to become an effective universal mechanism for transparency and a source of trust and confidence in relation to ballistic missile activities. As missile technology continues to develop and grow more sophisticated, we cannot simply remain complacent about the progress we have achieved thus far. The Code's 10-year milestone has provided us with a timely opportunity to move towards the common goal of strengthening the Code and building confidence.

In 2008, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon noted that the international community had long harboured concerns about the accumulation, proliferation, technical refinement, and threat and use of ballistic and other types of missiles. Although States and international organizations have actively pursued missile-related issues from within and from outside the United Nations, the diversity in the interests and aims of States and international organizations demonstrates that the establishment of a universal norm governing the missile issue still remains a vision for the future.

Indeed, the missile issue is a complex one, with a wide range of strategic, political, economic

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and commercial implications that warrant careful consideration. Nevertheless, we all share the common understanding that ballistic missile proliferation poses a serious threat to international peace and security. While fully recognizing that the Code cannot be a panacea for all dimensions of the missile issues we face, I should like to emphasize that the Code has an important role to play in controlling the proliferation of ballistic missiles.

Effective non-proliferation efforts entail actions to curb both the supply of and demand for the weapon in question. Therefore, in order properly to combat the challenge of proliferation, we need to consider both supply-side and demand-side strategies. To put it simply, the technical capability to develop a weapon is the supply-side aspect of proliferation, while the motivation to develop a weapon represents the demand-side. In practice, non-proliferation regimes focusing on the supply-side typically try to limit the technical capabilities of States or non-State actors by regulating, through export controls, the transfer of materials and technology to be used in the production of the weapon. Demand-side regimes, on the other hand, usually encourage States to refrain voluntarily from acquiring, developing or using the weapon.

While the Missile Technology Control Regime — a supply-side regime for curbing the proliferation of missile technology — plays an important role in preventing the transfer of certain technologies, it can do little to address the motivation of a State to develop indigenous capabilities. The Code seeks to fill that gap by establishing norms of self-restraint regarding the development of ballistic missiles and the diversion of space-launch vehicle technologies to ballistic missile development. Such norms need to address a range of motivations, including security considerations. To that end, transparency and confidence-building measures are currently being implemented under the Code.

Firstly, the subscribing States are obliged to submit annual declarations to the Immediate Central Contact of The Hague Code of Conduct, providing an outline of their ballistic missile and space-launch vehicle programmes. This year, 80 countries made annual declarations before the regular meeting of the Code, held in Vienna at the end of May. Secondly, the subscribing States commit themselves to providing pre-launch notifications on ballistic missile and space-launch vehicle launches and test flights. The pre-launch notifications include information on the

generic class of the ballistic missiles or space-launch vehicles concerned, the planned launch notification window, and the planned direction of the launches. The number of pre-launch notifications received by the Immediate Central Contact for the one-year period from June 2011 to May 2012 was 106.

Such concrete efforts to increase transparency and build confidence are a welcome contribution to the global non-proliferation regime. Our efforts within the Code framework remain, however, at a preliminary stage. I am fully aware that the Code has been and continues to be subject to some criticism since its inception 10 years ago. States have identified what they consider to be procedural flaws and substantive shortcomings.

As Chair, I take those critiques seriously. However, I should like to recall the aphorism that “the best is the enemy of the good”. As it stands, the Code fills, in my view, an important gap and has the potential to deliver a remarkable return for a minimal investment. The Code is the sole multilateral instrument that establishes norms against the proliferation of ballistic missiles and the only multilateral arms control instrument started in the twenty-first century. The Code focuses on strengthening universalization by minimizing the burden on its subscribing States. The Code does not impose any constraint on subscribing States’ defence policies or space programmes, as long as they are developed in accordance with international norms. Furthermore, the Code does not impose any financial burden on its subscribing States. Rather, the Code builds confidence and increases transparency among States, making an invaluable contribution to international peace and security. I would therefore urge representatives from States that have not yet joined the Code to look into its details and subscribe to it. That would surely serve us all.

I believe that it is necessary to maintain and expand the Code’s relationship with the United Nations in order to develop the Code even further. As we are all aware, the General Assembly has already adopted three resolutions in support of the Code since 2005, recognizing it as a practical step against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery.

Many States have sponsored this year’s draft resolution on the Code (A/C.1/67/L.23). The adoption of the draft resolution would renew the international community’s commitment to ballistic missile

non-proliferation and confer a blessing on the further development of the Code on the auspicious occasion of its tenth anniversary. Let me close by asking members to join the sponsors and support the adoption of the draft resolution on the Code.

**Mr. Zhang Junan** (China) (*spoke in Chinese*): Since last year's session of the General Assembly, progress has been made in the field of nuclear disarmament. The first session of the Preparatory Committee for the ninth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) was successfully held in May and built a solid foundation for the smooth development of the new review cycle.

As a follow-up to the London conference in 2009 and Paris conference in 2011, the five permanent members of the Security Council (P-5) held a conference in Washington, D.C., in June to continue discussions on measures to implement the NPT. The P-5 working group on a glossary of definitions for key nuclear terms held its first meeting of experts in Beijing from 27 to 28 September and decided to speed up compiling the nuclear glossary, with a view to enhancing mutual understanding and exchanges in the nuclear field.

With close coordination among the six presidencies, the Conference on Disarmament (CD) this year held thematic discussions on all the core issues on its agenda, including nuclear disarmament, a fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT) and negative security assurances. Member States had in-depth exchanges of views and put forward good proposals on steps and principles with regard to promoting nuclear disarmament.

China welcomes the progress made in the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones. On 17 September, the P-5 issued a joint statement to reaffirm their respect for Mongolia's nuclear-weapon-free status and for the relevant security assurance provided to Mongolia. The P-5 have already reached agreement with countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations on the content of the Protocol to the Treaty on the South-East Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone, which provides favourable conditions for the early signature and entry into force of the Protocol.

Preparation for the convening of the international conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction is under way. Meanwhile, we also note that the realization of a complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons and the establishment

of a world free of nuclear weapons remains a long-term and arduous task. China believes that the international community should foster new thinking on security featuring mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and coordination, and should make further efforts on the following aspects.

First, all nuclear-weapon States should fulfil in good faith their nuclear disarmament obligations under the NPT, and publicly undertake not to seek permanent possession of nuclear weapons. Countries with the largest nuclear arsenals should continue to take the lead in making drastic reductions in their nuclear weapons in a verifiable and irreversible manner, so as to create conditions for comprehensive and thorough nuclear disarmament. The international community should also develop, at an appropriate time, a viable, long-term plan consisting of phased actions, including the conclusion of a convention on the complete prohibition of nuclear weapons.

Secondly, all nuclear-weapon States should abandon the nuclear deterrence policy based on the first use of nuclear weapons, unequivocally undertake a no-first-use of nuclear weapons commitment, and negotiate and conclude a treaty on no-first-use of nuclear weapons against one another. Nuclear-weapon States should also unequivocally undertake not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States or nuclear-weapon-free zones, and conclude a legally binding international instrument in that regard at an early date. The policy and practice of a nuclear umbrella and of nuclear sharing should be abandoned. Countries that have deployed nuclear weapons abroad should withdraw all such weapons. Efforts by the countries concerned to establish nuclear-weapon-free zones should be supported.

Thirdly, countries that have not done so should sign and ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty in order to facilitate its early entry into force in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Treaty. The nuclear-weapon States should continue to observe their moratoriums on nuclear explosion tests. The Conference on Disarmament in Geneva is the only appropriate forum for negotiating a fissile material cut-off treaty. It has the most representative membership, with rules of procedure that can fully protect the interests of member States, as well as the rich experience and necessary expertise in negotiations. Negotiations on such a treaty, with the participation of

all the relevant parties, should commence in the CD as soon as possible.

Fourthly, nuclear disarmament should follow the principles of promoting international stability, peace and security and undiminished security for all. The development of missile defence systems undermines the global strategic balance and stability and should be abandoned. Multilateral negotiations on preventing the weaponization of outer space and an arms race in that region should be vigorously promoted so as to create a favourable international strategic security environment for nuclear disarmament.

China has consistently stood for the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons and is firmly committed to a nuclear strategy of self-defence. China has adhered to the policy of no-first-use of nuclear weapons at any time or under any circumstances, and has made the unequivocal commitment that it will, unconditionally, not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States or nuclear-weapon-free zones. Such a nuclear policy is unique among all nuclear-weapon States. China has never deployed any nuclear weapons on foreign territory. It has never participated in any form of nuclear arms race, nor will it ever do so. China will continue to keep its nuclear capabilities at the minimum level required for national security.

China is ready to work with the international community to continuously make unremitting efforts in promoting the international nuclear disarmament process and ultimately realizing the goal of the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons.

**Mr. Kwon Hae-ryong** (Republic of Korea): Since this is my first intervention, I should like to join previous speakers in congratulating Mr. Percaya on his assumption of the chairmanship of the Committee, and the other members of the Bureau on their elections. I assure them of my delegation's full support and cooperation.

Since nuclear weapons continue to pose the most destructive threat to humankind, nuclear disarmament is crucial to avoiding a potential nuclear war. We recognize that some progress has been made, especially by the two major nuclear Powers, in reducing their nuclear arsenals. However, a wide gap in perception still exists between nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States. We believe that

the implementation of their disarmament obligations by the nuclear-weapon States under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is critical if we wish to encourage non-nuclear-weapon States to remain committed to carrying out their nuclear non-proliferation duties under that Treaty. As a country faithfully abiding by its non-proliferation obligation, the Republic of Korea urges all nuclear-weapon States to carry out their part of their disarmament duty with a view to realizing a world without nuclear weapons.

In our common effort to prevent the vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons, it is imperative for us to ensure the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). In that regard, we welcome the ratification of the CTBT by Indonesia and Guatemala this year and call upon those States that have not yet ratified it, in particular the remaining eight annex 2 States, to do so without delay. We stress the importance of maintaining a moratorium on nuclear testing until the CTBT enters into force.

A fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT) is indispensable, not only for nuclear non-proliferation but also for nuclear disarmament. We believe that the time is ripe for the commencement of negotiations on the FMCT in the Conference on Disarmament (CD). My delegation calls upon all CD members to show more flexibility and political will, so that negotiations can begin at the earliest possible date. Any meaningful progress in the pace of negotiations for the conclusion of the FMCT will serve as a locomotive for revitalizing the entire disarmament regime.

In May the first session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 NPT Review Conference provided the basis on which we can prepare for the 2013 session of the Preparatory Committee. My delegation praises the untiring efforts of the Chair of the first session of the Preparatory Committee, Ambassador Woolcott of Australia, for the success of that Committee's work. It is our responsibility to translate the action plans in the Final Document of the 2010 NPT Review Conference (NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol. I)) into tangible actions and share those actions at the second session of the Preparatory Committee next year.

In March at the Seoul Nuclear Security Summit, many countries made concerted efforts to address the threat of nuclear terrorism and to further enhance nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation in general. Nuclear security is an issue that requires the common efforts of all States as we progress towards a world

free of nuclear weapons. It is our hope that the trust built in Seoul will lead to further progress in nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation in the future.

As stated in the Republic of Korea's general debate statement (see A/C.1/67/PV.4), the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's nuclear programmes continue to pose a grave challenge to the international non-proliferation regime and to peace and security on the Korean peninsula and beyond. In particular, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's pursuit of its uranium enrichment programme and light-water reactor construction exemplify the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's ongoing defiance of its obligations under the relevant Security Council resolutions to abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programmes in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner and immediately to cease all related activities.

Moreover, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has recently expressed its intention to expand its nuclear capabilities on various occasions, while referring to itself as a nuclear-weapon State. In response, the international community sent a unified and resolute message to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea last month at the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency, where a resolution on the subject was unanimously adopted. In the resolution the international community reaffirmed that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea cannot have the status of a nuclear-weapon State under the NPT and strongly urged the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to abide by its international commitments and obligations under the relevant Security Council resolutions and the 19 September joint statement of the Six-Party Talks.

My Government once again strongly urges the Democratic People's Republic of Korea immediately to cease all nuclear activities and to take concrete measures towards denuclearization on the Korean peninsula, thus restoring the international community's confidence.

Indeed, much needs to be done to achieve the goal of nuclear disarmament. In that regard, it is necessary for all of us to reflect upon the evolution of the international environment and to find a practical way to arrive at a world free of nuclear weapons. In closing, my delegation reaffirms its strong commitment to nuclear disarmament for a new nuclear-weapon-free world.

**Mr. Dondisch** (Mexico) (*spoke in Spanish*): My delegation associates itself with the statements made yesterday at the 9th meeting of the First Committee by the representative of Sweden on behalf of the New Agenda Coalition and the representative of Turkey on behalf of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative. We invite all the members of the General Assembly to give favourable consideration to the draft resolutions that those coalitions submit to the First Committee this year.

Mexico has maintained an active, steadfast and committed position in favour of nuclear disarmament. Achieving the total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only guarantee for achieving international security. In that regard allow me to touch on a few of the central issues.

First, with regard to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), we welcome the successful results of the eighth Review Conference of 2010. The action plan adopted at that Conference (see NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol.I)) gives us a clear road map for making progress towards implementing the NPT and puts us back on track after a decade-long impasse towards the full implementation of the Treaty. Without underestimating that achievement, the path towards the ninth Review Conference, which began this year with the first session of the Preparatory Committee held in Vienna, is facing significant challenges. Mexico will tirelessly call into question the justifications adduced for preserving nuclear weapons. The indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995 does not mean that international society has accepted the indefinite possession of nuclear weapons by the five nuclear-weapon States, as identified in the Treaty, much less by those countries that have acquired them outside the framework of the Treaty itself, whether or not they are parties to the NPT.

It is irrational to continue to promote the idea that a weapon of mass destruction, such as a nuclear weapon, has some intrinsic strategic value in maintaining international peace and security. In fact, it is the very existence of those weapons that encourages States to seek to possess them. The only way to strengthen the non-proliferation regime is through nuclear disarmament, as agreed by the international community.

Mexico welcomes the stimulus given by the nuclear-weapon States to the disarmament and non-proliferation agenda in recent years and the efforts by some nuclear-weapon States to make some progress

on arms reduction, as well as the signs of greater openness and transparency by some nuclear-weapon States. It is our understanding that the nuclear-weapon States have been holding periodic meetings to review compliance with their commitments on disarmament and non-proliferation. We hope that those talks will yield some news for the rest of us, who are counting on the outcome that those exercises may lead to the irreversible, transparent and verifiable destruction of nuclear weapons, regardless of their type or their geographical location. Those efforts are valid and may be mutually reinforcing. However, they do not replace multilateral action for nuclear disarmament.

The unequivocal commitment of the nuclear-weapon States to disarm is an essential part of the original negotiating package that took shape in the NPT, as well as the decision to extend that Treaty indefinitely, a commitment which, as of today, has not been fulfilled. Achieving nuclear disarmament is a commitment and an obligation stipulated in the NPT. We must discuss how to achieve a world free of nuclear weapons and include clear points of reference and defined time frames for achieving the abolition of nuclear weapons.

Mexico has never sought to acquire nuclear weapons, and it promoted the first nuclear-weapon-free zone in a densely populated region, which became a reality in the Treaty of Tlatelolco. Mexico has strictly fulfilled its obligations as a non-nuclear-weapon State under the NPT and has completely and transparently implemented its safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) since 1973. Mexico supports the right of all States to develop nuclear energy for peaceful uses. That right must be exercised in full accordance with the safeguards agreements undertaken with the IAEA. We also believe that all States must be able to count on the necessary guarantees to ensure that there are no diversions from civil to military programmes.

In that regard we reiterate the appeal to India, Pakistan and Israel to adhere unconditionally to the NPT, as well as the appeal to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Iran and Syria to fulfil their commitments as parties to the NPT, fulfil the provisions of the IAEA, and the relevant resolutions of the Security Council on their nuclear programmes.

The entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) remains essential. That was clearly affirmed in the joint statement signed by 100

countries at the sixth Ministerial Meeting on the Treaty held on 27 September this year. Mexico welcomes the ratification of the Treaty by Indonesia, one of the countries whose participation is required for the Treaty to enter into force. Likewise, we commend Guatemala, which ratified the Treaty in January, and Niue, which signed it in April this year. Every signature and ratification shows the will of States to abolish nuclear tests and to avoid the development of nuclear weapons.

Mexico appeals to the eight annex 2 States that have not yet ratified the Treaty to do so without delay, so that the CTBT can enter into force without further delay. Although the CTBT has not entered into force, the norm established by that Treaty has proven its relevance and validity, and we therefore urge all countries to maintain the nuclear test moratorium.

Until we achieve a world free of nuclear weapons we consider it important that the international community continue to promote the establishment of legal regimes that create nuclear-weapon-free zones. The creation of new nuclear-weapon-free zones in any part of the world must be freely decided and agreed by the parties involved. In that connection, Mexico will continue to welcome the sovereign decisions of countries that want to enter into treaties that establish new nuclear-weapon-free zones.

Mexico believes that, while militarily denuclearized zones are not an end in themselves, they represent an intermediate step of great relevance for the conclusion of general and complete disarmament under effective international control. In that regard, we welcome the follow-up on an option for a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, and we welcome all work being done to that end. In addition, Mexico commends Norway on its decision to convene an international conference on the disastrous consequences of nuclear tests for humankind, and we enthusiastically look forward to participating in it.

Mexico is firmly committed to nuclear disarmament. That is why this year, together with Austria and Norway, we will be submitting to the First Committee a draft resolution that seeks to promote discussions aimed at taking forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations. We hope to have the resolute support of all delegations that are committed to that objective.

**Mr. Van den Ijssel** (Netherlands): As this is the first time we have spoken in this session of the First Committee, let me start by saying that I am particularly

pleased to see that Ambassador Desra Percaya has been elected as Chair of this Committee. He can be assured that the Dutch delegation will support him in making this First Committee session a fruitful one. Let me also seize the occasion to congratulate the delegations of those States that were elected this morning as members of the Security Council. I wish them success and wisdom in that responsible and important task in the years to come.

The Netherlands fully aligns itself with the statement made yesterday at the Committee's ninth meeting by the observer of the European Union. In addition, we would like to make the following remarks.

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation system and is essential for pursuing nuclear disarmament in accordance with article VI and for non-proliferation. The NPT is also important for furthering the development of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. After a successful Review Conference in 2010, which resulted in a bold new action plan (see NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol.I)), we should now move forward to the swift implementation of that plan. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) plays a crucial role in that enterprise. The Netherlands reaffirms its strong commitment to promote the IAEA comprehensive safeguards agreements and the additional protocol as the international verification standards.

The Netherlands also supports, through its financial contributions, IAEA actions aimed at the universalization of the additional protocol. We very much welcome the adoption of the safeguards resolution at the IAEA General Conference last month. In cooperation with the nine other States of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (NPDI) the Netherlands will continue to work on formulating innovative, practical steps to implement the 2010 action plan. We are pleased to be hosting the next Ministerial Meeting of the NPDI in April next year, at which we will finalize the NDPI's preparations for the second session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 NPT Review Conference.

The Netherlands regards the conclusion of a fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT) as an indispensable step towards a world free of nuclear weapons and an important contribution to non-proliferation. We stress the importance of starting negotiations on a treaty and urge States to overcome the continued deadlock in the

Conference on Disarmament, which has up until now hindered the commencement of such negotiations. Recently, the Netherlands and Germany have jointly organized scientific experts meetings in Geneva with a view to contributing to an early start of FMCT negotiations. In the absence of a treaty, the Netherlands continues to call upon States to declare and apply an immediate moratorium on the production of fissile material, and to dismantle or convert to non-explosive use only, facilities dedicated to the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons.

We attach great importance to the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the completion of its verification regime. The Netherlands has presented Mr. Hein Haak as its candidate for the post of Executive Secretary of the Preparatory Commission of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO), the election for which will take place in Vienna on 23 October. That is another indication of the importance we attach to that Treaty and its Organization. Mr. Haak is very dedicated to the promotion of universal support for the CTBT, to the further development of a credible verification system, and to making the CTBTO an effective and efficient organization.

The IAEA plays a crucial role in nuclear security. The Netherlands therefore welcomed the adoption of a nuclear security resolution by the General Conference of the IAEA. That contributed to further anchoring nuclear security to the work of the IAEA. We believe that the excellent work done by the IAEA in the past decade for all member States should be strengthened and expanded. The 2013 Conference, entitled "International Conference on Nuclear Security: Enhancing Global Efforts", will offer a very good opportunity to take a further step in that respect.

We are strongly committed to global nuclear security and the fight against nuclear terrorism. The Nuclear Security Summit in Seoul, in which 53 countries and four international organizations participated, was a great success. We would like to seize this occasion to express once again our gratitude to the Government of the Republic of Korea for its impressive and successful work. In Seoul, progress was made on a wide range of topics concerning global nuclear security. Among other things, we agreed on the minimization of highly enriched uranium, the inclusion in the mandate of the Nuclear Security Summit of the protection of

radiological sources, and the synergy between nuclear safety and security.

The Netherlands is honoured to have the opportunity to contribute to global security by hosting the third Nuclear Security Summit, which will take place in the World Forum in The Hague in March 2014. The objective of the Summit process is to raise awareness of the risks of nuclear terrorism, to work towards reinforced commitment to concrete measures, and to give a push to the implementation of nuclear security, thereby fully supporting the work of the IAEA in that area.

The Netherlands is seriously concerned over the steady progress made by Iran in its uranium enrichment and heavy-water-related activities and its lack of cooperation with the IAEA, in particular relating to the possible military dimensions of its nuclear programme. The burden of proof is on Iran to convince the international community of the exclusively peaceful nature of its nuclear programme. Iran should comply with its international obligations and implement the resolutions of the Security Council and the IAEA Board of Governors. In that regard, we urge Iran to implement confidence-building steps, including the suspension of all its enrichment and heavy water-related activities, including research and development, fully implement its safeguards agreement, and bring into force the additional protocol. Moreover, Iran must provide total transparency on its nuclear programme and fully cooperate with the IAEA in order to resolve all outstanding issues.

The Netherlands supports the efforts of China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States — led by European Union High Representative, Lady Ashton — to engage Iran in a meaningful diplomatic process and calls upon Iran to urgently take the necessary confidence-building steps.

Last year the Netherlands expressed concern about the non-compliance of the Syrian Arab Republic with its safeguards obligations under the NPT. Unfortunately, Syria has failed to undertake steps to remedy its non-compliance, as was required by the IAEA Board of Governors. The Netherlands therefore once again urges Syria to fully cooperate with the IAEA to resolve all open questions. Also, in the present situation the Syrian authorities remain responsible for urgently remedying their non-compliance with their Safeguards Agreement.

The Netherlands is also deeply concerned about the nuclear programme of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The Netherlands deplores the decision made by the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea not to cooperate with the IAEA. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea should work progressively towards compliance with its international obligations under the relevant resolutions of the Security Council and the IAEA.

To conclude, the Netherlands is strongly committed to non-proliferation, arms control, disarmament and the furthering of the peaceful use of nuclear energy. We need progress in all of these areas to enhance international peace and stability. Over the years, non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament, and peaceful uses have been central elements of our foreign policy. We therefore fully subscribe to the important work of the First Committee and we intend to contribute to its work again this year in a cooperative and forward-looking spirit.

**Mr. Paulauskas** (Lithuania): Let me sincerely congratulate Mr. Percaya on his election to the Chair and offer the full support of my delegation.

Lithuania associates itself with the statement delivered at the Committee's 9th meeting on behalf of the European Union and would like to touch upon a few issues of particular importance to my delegation.

We welcome the successful outcome of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and this year's first session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 NPT Review Conference. At the same time, it is disappointing that this year the Conference on Disarmament (CD) has again failed to engage in substantive work. In this regard, Lithuania supports all efforts that aim to find a way out of this impasse.

We welcome the efforts led by Canadian Ambassador Elissa Golberg to establish a group of governmental experts that would further elaborate the provisions of a future treaty banning the production of fissile material. While all items on the CD agenda are important, in our view the fissile material cut-off treaty has reached a level of sufficient maturity to start formal negotiations and remain an essential step for both nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

A world free of nuclear weapons remains our general vision for the future. In the meantime, the effective implementation of existing multilateral



and bilateral agreements related to nuclear arms control and further disarmament would pave the way to achieving this ultimate goal. In this context, Lithuania, as a non-nuclear-weapon State, considers confidence-building measures, reciprocal transparency and verification to be integral and essential parts of the nuclear arms control and disarmament process.

The first session of the Preparatory Committee gave positive impetus to the 2015 NPT review cycle. We should build on this momentum in order to make substantial progress during forthcoming meetings. The NPT regime should be further strengthened on the basis of the 2010 action plan in all three of its mutually reinforcing pillars: disarmament, non-proliferation and the peaceful use of nuclear energy. We also share concerns regarding the proliferation challenges that must be effectively addressed by the international community in order to maintain the credibility of the NPT regime.

Lithuania welcomes the successful implementation of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty concluded between the United States of America and the Russian Federation. We would like to see this cooperation expand beyond strategic nuclear weapons and, in particular, towards including non-strategic nuclear weapons in arms reduction treaties.

Lithuania remains a staunch supporter of global efforts to counter nuclear security threats. The very successful Nuclear Security Summit in Seoul laid a firm foundation for intensified international cooperation in strengthening efforts to counter nuclear security threats worldwide. Lithuania participated in the Summit and subscribes fully to the Summit's communiqué. The recently established Nuclear Security Centre of Excellence in Medininkai, Lithuania, would be a good platform from which to achieve these goals.

Finally, we hope that the progress we have made thus far will not end here and that we will finish this year with a successful Helsinki conference on a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. Lithuania would like to express its full support for the efforts of the facilitator, Under-Secretary of State Jaakko Laajava of Finland. We admire his hard work in trying to reconcile divergent views, and call on all States to assist him in successfully convening the Conference by the end of this year. We would also like to call upon all States in the Middle East to take part in this important Conference without preconditions.

**Mr. M'Beou (Togo)** (*spoke in French*): Since this is the first time that we are taking the floor since we started working, the delegation of Togo would like to join previous delegations in congratulating Mr. Percaya on his election to chair the Committee and on the effectiveness with which he has been guiding our work. My delegation also aligns itself with the statement on this theme by the representative of Indonesia on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement (see A/C.1/67/PV.9) and that to be made by the representative of Nigeria on behalf of the Group of African States concerning the Treaty of Pelindaba.

The entire international community is concerned by the threat to collective security posed by the proliferation of nuclear weapons and nuclear terrorism. Steadfast in its policy of peaceful coexistence and non-resort to the threat or use of force, Togo has always attached great importance to these issues. We have therefore ratified a number of international legal instruments that constitute the body of the international regime of non-proliferation and disarmament.

The latest steps taken by my country in this field include the ratification of the Safeguards Agreement and its Additional Protocols between Togo and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) with regard to applying the safeguards within the framework of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Moreover, in August Togo endorsed the statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency and has just deposited its acceptance instruments.

The international community has worked tirelessly for nuclear disarmament. Nevertheless, we must now admit that nuclear tests continue. These ongoing tests could restart the arms race, which must be avoided. My country welcomes the efforts of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization for broader ratification of the Treaty, and urges States that have not yet done so to ratify the Treaty so that it can enter into force.

The terrorist threat in all its forms weighs heavily on collective security and is constantly on the rise. Today, this menace has gained a foothold in Africa, where most States do not have strategies or adequate means to fight this scourge. Nuclear terrorism in particular is a threat that must be taken even more seriously. We can never sufficiently reiterate the urgent need for appropriate measures to be taken to ensure that nuclear weapons do not fall into the wrong hands.

On 21 and 22 November 2011 in Rabat, Morocco, Togo, which is gravely concerned by this phenomenon, took an active part in a regional African seminar, organized by Morocco and the United States of America, concerning the Washington, D.C., Nuclear Security Summit and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. Following that meeting, Togo joined the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, which is an international partnership to fight nuclear terrorism set up by the United States and the Russian Federation. We recently filed the official notification marking our accession to this initiative.

In this connection, my country would like specifically to stress the need for more active participation among States and to make available to them, especially countries in Africa, the appropriate means so that they will be able to contribute to ensuring international peace and security.

My delegation remains convinced that non-proliferation cooperation should also include strengthening the regimes set up by Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) on weapons of mass destruction. Resolution 1540 (2004) is a key instrument in fighting terrorism. My country urges the international community to support the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004), especially in the area of assistance, so that it will have the means to fill in the gaps most commonly seen in the implementation of that resolution.

In conclusion, I should like to subscribe to the statement made by a representative at the meeting in Rabat, to the effect that

“Today, it is more urgent than ever to provide States with the means necessary to fight nuclear terrorism. We should not let terrorism take the elevator while States take the stairs”.

**Mrs. Thongtan** (Thailand): Thailand associates itself with the statement made by the representative of Indonesia on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement (see A/C.1/67/PV.9).

As we have witnessed throughout the general debate over the past week, countries have voiced concern over the apparent lack of progress with regard to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. Thailand shares this sentiment. However, this frustration should be channelled towards our joint determination to achieve a collective desire to eliminate nuclear weapons.

Towards that end, Thailand firmly believes that nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation must be treated as substantively interrelated and mutually reinforcing. These two intertwined challenges require strong political will and practical undertakings from nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon States alike. Thus, Thailand welcomes the outcome of the first session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), held in April and May. We urge all States to fully implement the 2010 NPT action plan.

The vision of a world free of nuclear weapons will never be realized if nuclear testing is allowed to continue. In this regard, Thailand shares the view expressed in the joint ministerial statement of the Sixth Ministerial Meeting in support of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), held on 27 September this year, that the CTBT is a key component of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime and a practical and concrete measure for realizing the goal of the total elimination of nuclear weapons. Thailand reaffirms its strong commitment to accelerating the ratification process for the CTBT, and reiterates its utmost willingness to promote and ensure the swift entry into force of the CTBT and its universalization.

From Thailand’s perspective, the next milestone in the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons will be a fissile material cut-off treaty, which would help reinforce efforts to rid the world of nuclear weapons. In addition, Thailand believes that negative security assurances play a vital part in reducing incentives for nuclear proliferation. We call for a universal and legally binding agreement on negative security assurances to be pursued actively and expeditiously.

Thailand therefore hopes that the Conference on Disarmament (CD) will be able to begin negotiations on a treaty prohibiting the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons or other explosive devices at the earliest opportunity. On this note, Thailand, as a member of the informal group of observer States, reiterates its strong support for the expansion of the membership of the CD, which currently stands at less than one-third of the entire United Nations membership, as it is apparent that the current CD membership cannot reflect the global challenges and needs.

We live in uncertain times. The unpredictable nature of terrorist attacks makes it prudent to place nuclear security among the top priorities on the global

agenda. Building on the successes of the Washington, D.C., and Seoul Nuclear Security Summits, Thailand will contribute to the global effort to strengthen the nuclear security regime by offering to host one of the Sherpa meetings for The Hague Nuclear Security Summit in 2014. Thailand welcomed the Secretary-General's convening on 28 September of the high-level meeting on countering nuclear terrorism, which provided a venue to further dialogue on a range of methods and topics to increase multilateral action against nuclear terrorism.

For its part, Thailand is committed to implementing Security Council resolution 1540 (2004). We are in the process of strengthening our export control regime and have participated actively in the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism.

It is undeniable that regional mechanisms have played an important role in striving towards the attainment of a nuclear-weapon-free world. As an active proponent of the South-East Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (SEANWFZ) Treaty, Thailand welcomes the nuclear-weapon States' co-sponsorship of resolution 66/43 on SEANWFZ last year, and urges nuclear-weapon States to sign the protocol to the SEANWFZ Treaty as early as possible.

We also underscore the importance of the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, which not only serve as a means of promoting complete disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons at the regional level, but also play a pivotal role in the area of confidence-building measures and preventive diplomacy. Thailand therefore welcomes the conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction, to be held in Helsinki in December, and encourages the full participation of all Member States of the region.

Thailand recognizes the need for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy as an inalienable right recognized by the NPT. In this regard, we commend the pivotal role of the International Atomic Energy Agency in promoting and ensuring nuclear safety and security, safeguards and verification, and science and technology. As a member of the Board of Governors, Thailand looks forward to working closely with the international community on enhancing global nuclear safety, security and safeguards.

At the regional level, Thailand has initiated the establishment of the ASEAN Network of Nuclear Regulatory Bodies or Relevant Authorities with the objective of enhancing regulatory activities and further strengthening nuclear safety, security and safeguards in ASEAN. This network will also support and contribute to the purpose of ASEAN in preserving South-East Asia as a nuclear-weapon-free zone. Moreover, in October Thailand, in cooperation with Australia, will host the third plenary meeting of the Asia-Pacific Safeguards Network in Bangkok with the aim of promoting nuclear safeguards in the region.

In closing, Thailand is convinced that multilateral agreements and cooperation are crucial to achieving the common global goal of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. We remain hopeful that, despite many pressing challenges, we will be able to see substantive progress in the upcoming negotiations and deliver the results we have all been waiting for.

**Ms. Čubrilo** (Serbia): Serbia has aligned itself with the statement made on behalf of the European Union (see A/C.1/67/PV.9). Nonetheless, I should like to stress the following points that are of special interest to my country.

Serbia shares the conviction that risks from the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery — including the growing danger of non-State actors, especially terrorist groups and individuals, acquiring this type of weapon — present the greatest challenge to international peace and security today. My country is a party to all relevant international instruments and initiatives in this domain, and its activities are focused on the full implementation of its international commitments and the improvement of overall capacities for combating these threats.

The success of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) was a major contribution to strengthening the international nuclear non-proliferation regime and reaffirming the Treaty as the cornerstone of nuclear disarmament. The adoption by consensus of its Final Document (NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol. I)) demonstrated in a clear way the renewed political commitment of the NPT parties to the goals and objectives of the Treaty. This was a genuine historical achievement, but joint efforts need to be intensified in order to translate the conclusions and recommendations of the Conference into real and concrete results.

The new cycle of the NPT review process is an important opportunity to assess the practical achievements in the implementation of the forward-looking 2010 NPT action plan and to define ways to boost progress in advancing the three pillars of the NPT relating to nuclear disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation, and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The spirit of flexibility and compromise clearly demonstrated at the 2010 NPT Review Conference is the way to smooth the path to success in 2015 as well.

A serious stumbling block to the implementation of the measures provided for in the action plan is the continued deadlock in the work of the Conference on Disarmament, which has to be overcome through the demonstration of clear political will on the part of all member States. My country attaches particular importance to the early commencement of negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices.

Serbia is committed to a consistent fulfilment of its obligations under the NPT, which it considers to be a vital instrument for achieving our ultimate goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world. Serbia has taken extensive legislative, regulatory and other measures to enhance the implementation of the Treaty, including the adoption of a law on protection against ionizing radiation and nuclear security in 2009. It provides for the establishment of an independent regulatory radiation protection and nuclear safety agency, which has been fully operational since 2010.

Active cooperation is also established with the International Atomic Energy Agency. Through a unique project, carried out with the assistance of our international partners, for the repatriation of spent nuclear fuel from the Vinča Institute of Nuclear Sciences to the Russian Federation, as the country of origin, Serbia has joined the group of countries no longer having enriched uranium on their territories. Through the Vinča Institute Nuclear Decommissioning Project, Serbia has contributed in a practical manner to international efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

My country continues to attach great importance to the fulfillment of its obligations under Security Council resolution 1540 (2004), and has pursued numerous activities with the aim of improving its legislation, standards and practices in this respect. Early this year, Serbia submitted its updated national report on measures taken in order to implement this resolution.

In April, the Government of Serbia adopted a national action plan for the implementation of the resolution for the period 2012-2016. The document was drafted in cooperation with the experts of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004), and representatives of all relevant ministries and Government agencies took part in its preparation.

The document, *inter alia*, provides for the establishment of a working group to monitor and improve the national action plan implementation and coordinate national activities in this regard. Serbia is the first country in the wider region to adopt a national action plan, and will continue to further improve its administrative and regulatory frameworks for the comprehensive and effective implementation of the resolution, as well as relevant physical and technical safeguards standards.

A sound regime against nuclear tests is one of the key prerequisites to achieving our joint vision of a world free of nuclear weapons. Serbia ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) in 2004 and remains firmly committed to its goals. The fact that several of the 64 actions contained in the 2010 NPT action plan directly relate to the CTBT confirms the continued value of the Treaty and its importance within the overall international efforts to promote nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament.

Although in recent years we have witnessed important progress towards universal adherence to the CTBT, the Treaty has yet to enter into force. Serbia welcomes the joint ministerial statement of the Sixth Ministerial Meeting in support of the CTBT, held in New York on 27 September. It strongly believes that the CTBT's entry into force would significantly contribute to reinforcing global peace and security, and that no effort should be spared to ensure it. In this context, it strongly encourages all States that have not yet signed or ratified the Treaty, especially the annex 2 States, to do so as soon as possible. Meanwhile, it is of particular importance that the moratoria on nuclear test explosions continue to be observed, in the understanding that they are no alternative to the comprehensive legal obligations deriving from the CTBT.

Serbia supports the commendable work of the Provisional Technical Secretariat of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization, and the establishment of

an effective monitoring and verification system with credible control and detection capabilities. It believes that efforts in this direction should be considered important contributions to confidence-building and to broadening support for the Treaty, bearing in mind the scientific and practical benefits from civil applications, such as tsunami and natural disaster early warning. Further efforts to improve the verification regime are the best investment for the future of the Treaty.

Serbia welcomes the initiative of the Secretary-General to organize, at the margins of the general debate of the sixty-seventh session of the General Assembly, the high-level meeting on countering nuclear terrorism, with a focus on strengthening the legal framework.

The effective implementation of the multilateral instruments aimed at preventing and combating nuclear terrorism and enhancing the security of nuclear materials and technologies, enhancing regional cooperation and stringent national control measures play a pivotal role in addressing these challenges in a comprehensive way. Serbia stands ready to play an active role in this regard.

**Mr. Ferutá** (Romania): Since this is the first time that my delegation is taking the floor, I should like to congratulate the Chair and members of the Bureau on assuming their important tasks. I assure them of Romania's full support as they steer our debates during the coming weeks.

Romania aligns itself with the statement delivered on behalf of the European Union (see A/C.1/67/PV.9), and I should like to share with representatives a few remarks in my national capacity.

The plenary session of the First Committee is a once-a-year opportunity to exchange views on the state of affairs on international security matters, and specifically on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, as well as other nuclear-related issues. My delegation shares the concern regarding the lack of progress on disarmament arrangements, particularly generated by the stalemate in the Conference on Disarmament. Like others, we also believe that the entire international community shares the responsibility for shaping concrete results and the common goal of bringing a nuclear-weapon-free world closer to reality.

We support all initiatives aimed at helping the Conference on Disarmament to fulfil its mandate, agree on a programme of work and start negotiations on the items on its agenda, in particular the fissile material cut-off treaty. We were pleased to hear, during the high-

level panel debate on Monday afternoon, that none of this year's First Committee proposals could jeopardize the role of the Conference on Disarmament as the only negotiating body on disarmament matters.

Romania remains strongly committed to effective multilateral disarmament and non-proliferation mechanisms, and consequently we consider the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) to be the foundation of the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime. We view the successful outcome of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the NPT as setting a positive trend for the future of the regime. A general commitment to the full implementation of the action plan's provisions will ensure a smooth path towards further strengthening the nuclear disarmament measures.

The challenge, of course, is to transform the goals of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation into concrete reality and thereby ensure long-lasting confidence in the regime's effectiveness. During the past year, we have witnessed the successful convening of the first session of the Preparatory Committee of the new review cycle. We are looking forward to the second session of the Preparatory Committee maintaining the progressive mood infused by the positive conclusion of the 2010 Review Conference. Debates on developments in the Middle East remain important, and we welcome the efforts aimed at convening the Middle East conference in the coming period.

The entire international community must act firmly in order to further strengthen the non-proliferation regime. This task includes specifically the implementation of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) comprehensive safeguards and additional protocol. The International Atomic Energy Agency should be equipped with the necessary resources to fulfil its mandate and, most of all, it must benefit from the political support of all its member States in order to perform its tasks to the highest professional standards. The role of the IAEA in the implementation of the third pillar of the NPT — the peaceful uses of nuclear energy — is a crucial one, in particular through its technical cooperation programmes.

Romania participated in March this year in the successful Nuclear Security Summit held in Seoul, where it had the opportunity to reaffirm its commitment to nuclear security objectives. We welcome the concrete contributions of all participants towards the full implementation of the work plan adopted at the

previous Summit, held in Washington, D.C. We look forward to continuing to engage with this process and to assess progress at the next Summit in two years' time. We hope that the particular effort to ensure a certain balance between the nuclear renaissance and the consequences and lessons learned from the Fukushima accident will continue to frame future discussions and inform assessments of the interface between nuclear security and safety.

Romania endorsed the joint ministerial statement of the Friends of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) late last month, and firmly supports the entry into force of the CTBT. This is an important step towards achieving nuclear disarmament and strengthening the non-proliferation regime. We are pleased to see the number of ratifications increasing constantly, especially with the ratification by Indonesia as an annex 2 State, which marks important progress towards the entry into force of the Treaty. In the same context, we also welcome the ratification by Guatemala and were encouraged by the statements of Iraq and Thailand on 27 September.

Romania has constantly supported the efforts of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization Preparatory Commission in Vienna to build up the Treaty's verification mechanism. As a concrete step in this regard, Romania hosted the National Data Centre Evaluation Workshop in Bucharest in October 2011, aimed at increasing awareness of the important role that the Treaty plays. The Evaluation Workshop, which was organized by the Provisional Technical Secretariat and the Romanian Government, provided a forum for national data centre experts from all regions of the world to share experience and best practices in fulfilling their verification responsibilities and to provide feedback to the Provisional Technical Secretariat on all aspects of the data, products and services they handle in their current activities.

There is a lot of work still to be done, and we look forward to opportunities to engage in a flexible and constructive manner on issues such as non-strategic nuclear weapons, export controls, multilateral nuclear fuel cycles, nuclear-weapon-free zones, the universalization of the additional protocol, and the implementation of the highest common standards of nuclear safety and security. Of course, there are also other issues. As far as we are concerned, my delegation stands ready to work with all delegations on these issues.

**Ms. Al-Adhammi** (Iraq) (*spoke in Arabic*): My Government has been eager to pursue a new path in dealing with the international community, based on confidence-building and transparency, in a manner that would help restore the natural international status Iraq enjoyed before the adoption of Security Council resolution 661 (1990).

My Government believes in the importance of promoting the universality of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and affirms the need to support the efforts of the international community to facilitate the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), which is considered to be a major convention in the field of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

My Government has taken a number of steps and national measures at the legislative and executive levels for non-proliferation and the disarmament of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction by adhering to the relevant conventions and implementing their commitments. In this regard, we note the approval by the Iraqi Council of Representatives of the Model Additional Protocol of the comprehensive safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency on 28 June.

Based on Iraq's commitment to and belief that the CTBT is one of the main safeguards of international security and non-proliferation, we signed the Treaty on 19 August 2008. Iraq participated in the high-level ministerial meeting held in New York in September to facilitate the Treaty's entry into force. Our delegation was headed by the Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs, who delivered a statement in which he expressed Iraq's support for the joint ministerial statement issued by the meeting and noted that Iraq would soon ratify the Treaty.

Today we can announce the approval by the Iraqi Council of Representatives on 9 October of our accession to the CTBT. In joining the CTBT, Iraq has fulfilled all its obligations under Security Council resolution 1957 (2010). On this occasion, my Government calls for the international efforts to that end to continue, and encourages those countries that have not yet joined the Treaty to accelerate its entry into force in order to achieve the desired goals of protecting the world from the catastrophic dangers of these weapons. In the same context, my delegation welcomes Indonesia's ratification of the Treaty.

I also wish to express our deep thanks and gratitude to the Government of Kazakhstan for its efforts in organizing the international conference entitled “From Nuclear Test Ban to Nuclear-Weapon-Free World”, held in Astana in August. My delegation expresses its support for the initiative of President Nursultan Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan during the Conference.

**Mr. Laggner** (Switzerland) (*spoke in French*): Nuclear weapons have the capacity to kill millions, and even billions of people. Their effects are uncontrollable in space and time. The use of these weapons in any form or in any way would cause widespread, severe and long-term damage to life on this planet. Developing stronger and more far-reaching international instruments to ban the use of nuclear weapons and eliminate them, like all other weapons of mass destruction, is therefore imperative.

We welcome the steps taken by nuclear-weapon States to meet their disarmament obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). But such progress remains far from sufficient. Several thousand nuclear weapons remain deployed today, a significant number of which are being kept at a high level of alert and ready to be fired within minutes. Against this background, Switzerland is concerned about the situation regarding nuclear disarmament, and particularly by the absence of more substantial progress in the multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations in recent years. While nuclear disarmament is a key priority of the General Assembly and its disarmament machinery, the Conference on Disarmament has again this year failed to start negotiations.

Switzerland is particularly concerned about the development of new weapons systems or plans to that effect. This implies that nuclear-armed States intend to maintain their nuclear capacity for decades to come. This state of affairs raises fundamental questions about the willingness of these States to honour their disarmament commitments. In addition, in our view, the twenty-first century security architecture should not be based on such indiscriminate and inhumane weapons. Thought must be given to developing a new global security concept.

We therefore call for a renewed disarmament commitment, in particular on the part of the States with the largest arsenals. The United States and Russia bear special responsibility for launching a new round of negotiations on making deeper cuts, which should include all kinds of nuclear weapons, strategic and

non-strategic, deployed or non-deployed alike. This is a necessary step to ensure subsequent reciprocal steps by other nuclear-weapon States. In the meantime, we call on all States possessing nuclear weapons to halt the expansion and acceleration of their nuclear-weapons programmes, as well as the modernization of such systems.

To progress towards a world free of nuclear weapons, it is important to fully honour the commitments contracted under the NPT, in particular the 13 practical steps adopted in 2000 and the disarmament measures outlined in the 2010 action plan. I should like to underline Switzerland’s commitment to this step-by-step approach by giving two practical examples.

First, Switzerland will continue its support for the project undertaken by the non-governmental organization Reaching Critical Will, which is monitoring the implementation of the 2010 action plan. Our aim is to provide States parties with factual and readily accessible information on significant developments in the plan’s implementation. The planned 2013 publication will be available ahead of the second session of the Preparatory Committee to be held in Geneva next May.

Secondly, as coordinator of the De-alerting Group for 2012, Switzerland is pursuing its efforts in support of reducing the operational readiness of nuclear weapons. In our view, the maintenance of these arms at a high level of alert contradicts ongoing efforts to reduce the role and number of these weapons. That is why we, together with Chile, Malaysia, Nigeria and New Zealand, will submit an updated version of resolution 65/71, entitled “Decreasing the operational readiness of nuclear weapons systems”. The international community has repeatedly and overwhelmingly called for further practical steps to be taken in this area and has called upon nuclear Powers to abandon such Cold War postures. In this context, a side event was held yesterday to present a new study, prepared by two experts, that focuses on new angles for the de-alerting of nuclear weapons.

Switzerland will also continue its various initiatives to delegitimize nuclear weapons as a preparatory step towards additional legally binding nuclear disarmament instruments. Building on the acknowledgement by the NPT States parties in 2010 of the catastrophic consequences of any use of nuclear weapons and a joint statement delivered on behalf of 16 States at the first session of the Preparatory Committee, Switzerland

intends to take forward efforts with States from all regions of the world to highlight the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons.

We are encouraged by the increasing attention given to the humanitarian dimension of nuclear disarmament by States and international and non-governmental organizations. Switzerland is convinced that a better understanding of the humanitarian impact of nuclear explosions would pave the way to a multilateral process to prohibit nuclear weapons based on their destructive, indiscriminate and inhumane nature.

Nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation are inextricably linked. So long as some States have nuclear weapons, others will want them. This close correlation is yet another reason why Switzerland is concerned about unresolved proliferation cases. Indeed, any spread of nuclear weapons would be a grave threat to peace and security.

All States, whether parties to the NPT or not, have a responsibility to refrain from doing anything that would weaken the non-proliferation regime. Confidence is the key. It is what this highly important regime must be based on, and it must prevail among States. We also need to strengthen international cooperation, particularly with regard to nuclear security. While we welcome the commitment reached in Seoul at the 2012 Nuclear Security Summit to enhance nuclear security, we remain convinced that such a process should cover not only civilian but also military fissile material.

Switzerland regrets the absence of positive developments in the various outstanding proliferation issues, which have been of serious concern to the international community for a number of years. We continue to believe that such challenges can be resolved only by diplomatic means. This requires respect for international law, including the relevant resolutions.

In this context, we encourage all countries that have not yet done so, particularly those with significant nuclear activities, to conclude and bring into force an additional protocol with the International Atomic Energy Agency. We also call upon all States, particularly those listed in annex 2, to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. We commend Indonesia and Guatemala for their ratification of this instrument this year. Additional efforts, however, are needed if the Treaty is to enter into force.

I will conclude by stressing that in order to ensure the viability of the non-proliferation regime and to

establish a nuclear-weapon-free world, we need to implement the decision taken at the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the NPT to establish a zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. We fully support and commend the efforts of the Finnish facilitator to hold a conference in Helsinki in December to advance the establishment of such a zone.

**Ms. Panckhurst** (New Zealand): New Zealand is deeply committed to efforts to rid the world of nuclear weapons. Our long-standing and enduring commitment to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation is based on our strong belief that nuclear weapons do not make the world a safer place.

It remains our strong view that the only guarantee that nuclear weapons will not be used again is their complete and total elimination. That was certainly the intent of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and must remain our overarching objective. The agreement to extend the Treaty indefinitely in 1995 was not an agreement to the indefinite possession of nuclear weapons.

New Zealand is pleased to work with the New Agenda Coalition to promote greater progress on nuclear disarmament, and we associate ourselves with the statement delivered by the representative of Sweden on behalf of the New Agenda Coalition (see A/C.1/67/PV.9). As noted by the Swedish representative, the New Agenda Coalition's draft resolution addresses a number of nuclear disarmament issues on which progress is essential for the achievement of a nuclear-weapon-free world.

The Outcome Document of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the NPT (NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol. I)) provides a blueprint for action in this regard and holds the potential for real progress towards achieving our goal. If this potential is to be fully realized, however, all States, and particularly the nuclear-weapon States, must implement in full all obligations and commitments made under the NPT, including at its Review Conferences.

New Zealand is also pleased to be associated with the statement delivered yesterday by the representative of Switzerland on behalf of the De-alerting Group (see A/C.1/67/PV.9). It is of deep concern to New Zealand that large numbers of nuclear weapons remain today at high levels of readiness. We urge the nuclear-weapon States to take action to lower the operational readiness



of their nuclear weapons systems. Not only would such action bring immediate security benefits, but it would also result in a significant dividend through the reduction of the role of nuclear weapons in certain national security policies.

The entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) would also be an important step towards a nuclear-weapon-free world. We join others in welcoming recent ratifications and signatures of the Treaty, most notably by Indonesia as an annex 2 country. We are pleased to join Australia and Mexico in promoting a draft resolution on the CTBT that recognizes the importance of the Treaty in our framework of efforts to achieve a world free of nuclear weapons. We continue to call on all States that have not yet done so, particularly the remaining annex 2 States, to ratify the CTBT without any further delay.

New Zealand has long held that nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation are mutually reinforcing processes requiring urgent action on both fronts. We continue to call on all States to take steps to meet their non-proliferation obligations.

Nuclear-weapon-free zones are a powerful demonstration of the strong collective will that exists at the regional level to rid the world of nuclear weapons. Nuclear-weapon-free zones contribute strongly to both nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation objectives. In this connection, we welcome efforts to strengthen existing zones and to establish new zones in other regions.

New Zealand commends the efforts of Under-Secretary Jaakko Laajava as facilitator for the 2012 conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction, and looks forward to the convening of the conference.

New Zealand is pleased again this year to present, with Brazil, a draft of our biennial resolution entitled "Nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and adjacent areas". Similar resolutions have been adopted by an overwhelming majority in the past, with large numbers of sponsors, and we look forward to an even stronger outcome this year.

Nuclear weapons have no place in today's world. The 2010 NPT Review Conference recognized that the consequences of any use of nuclear weapons would be catastrophic. No State would be immune from their devastating impact. We are pleased to associate

ourselves with the joint statement to be delivered by the representative of Switzerland on this matter later in our debate.

Given that the existence of nuclear weapons puts the lives and livelihoods of all of our peoples at stake and at risk, it is quite right that the issue of nuclear weapons is at the heart of the United Nations agenda and has indeed been so since its inception. New Zealand calls for accelerated efforts towards the achievement of a nuclear-weapon-free world that would be safer for all.

**Mr. Kang Myong Chol** (Democratic People's Republic of Korea): My delegation would like to associate itself with the statement made by the representative of Indonesia on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM).

From 1945, the year when the first nuclear weapon was born of the Manhattan Project, humanity has lived in fear and unrest. Major Powers insist on the necessity of their possessing nuclear weapons for security reasons, but humankind will never be free from the threat of holocaust and doom as long as nuclear weapons exist.

It is the aspiration and desire of the international community to open an era of lasting peace in the twenty-first century by abolishing nuclear weapons. The realities, however, show that the major Powers rely on nuclear weapons more than ever before. The nuclear doctrine of mutual deterrence has been modified into the doctrine of nuclear pre-emptive strike, and the ever-increasing nuclear threat has become more blatant.

Fairness in international relations is forced to be silent; discussions and debates on disarmament issues at the United Nations do not address real threats and challenges but are distracted by unrealistic assertions on marginal issues. This year again, the Conference on Disarmament was widely split and ended its session without any results, agreeing to disagree on the priority issue. Fumbling with the branches without dealing with the root cause will only be a waste of time, producing no proper solution and extending meaningless disputes.

Nuclear disarmament is the first and foremost priority. It is the only absolute solution to the issue of nuclear proliferation, which first arose from the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons by nuclear-weapon States. Those countries that give priority to non-proliferation have an ulterior motive for freezing the status quo, characterized by a monopoly of nuclear weapons by nuclear-weapon States, and for degrading non-nuclear-weapon States to inferiority and

subordination. It is the same trick that nuclear-weapon States played on non-nuclear-weapon States in 1968 in order to seduce them into joining the discriminatory Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) with article VI as bait.

In multilateral disarmament forums, including the Conference on Disarmament, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has, jointly with the NAM countries, set nuclear disarmament as the fundamental issue of world peace and security, and remains steadfast on giving the highest priority to nuclear disarmament. Nuclear disarmament should be oriented towards the complete and total elimination of nuclear weapons. The passivism of nuclear-weapon States in implementing their disarmament obligations — for example, the piecemeal reduction of nuclear weapons and the commitment to conditional security assurances — would be regarded as a mockery of non-nuclear-weapon States and would only deepen mutual distrust.

Complete and total nuclear disarmament — namely, the commitment of nuclear-weapon States to negative security assurances, the withdrawal of nuclear weapons deployed outside their territories, and the total elimination of their nuclear weapons arsenals — would satisfy the expectations of the international community for a fulfilment of disarmament obligations.

The main obstacle to durable peace and security on the Korean peninsula is the hostile policy of the United States towards the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The hostile policy of the United States towards the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has deep historical roots. Some people misunderstand that the United States is hostile to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea because of the nuclear issue. In fact, the United States' hostile policy gave rise to the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula, and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea developed nuclear weapons to counter the ever-increasing nuclear threat from the United States.

Long before the rise of the nuclear issue, the United States defined the Democratic People's Republic of Korea as an enemy and refused to recognize its sovereignty, the institutional and legal mechanisms against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea were put in place, and military attacks and nuclear threats aimed at eliminating the ideology and system of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea were openly committed. The economic sanctions and international

pressure for isolating and suffocating the Democratic People's Republic of Korea have been persistent.

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea opted to possess a nuclear deterrent not because it pursued any so-called nuclear ambition or wanted to trade it for something, but because it had to counter the moves of the United States aimed at eliminating the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The era when the United States threatened the Democratic People's Republic of Korea with the atomic bomb has gone by. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea's nuclear deterrent for self-defence is a reliable guarantee that prevents war and ensures peace and stability on the Korean peninsula. If the United States shows courage through action by withdrawing its hostile policy towards the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and contributes thereby to peace and security on the Korean peninsula, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea will ready any time to improve bilateral relations on the basis of the principles of respect for sovereignty, equality and mutual benefit.

Respected Marshal Kim Jong Un wants to open a new chapter for the development of relations with countries friendly towards the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, and not tied to the past. If the United States continues its anachronistic pursuit of a hostile policy despite the good will of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's nuclear possession will inevitably be prolonged and bolstered.

In conclusion, my delegation would like to add just a few words with regard to the statements made earlier today in this thematic discussion. The delegation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea totally rejects the statement made by the South Korean delegation because it does not deserve even a passing note, since South Korea has no sovereign right and is at the beck and call of the United States. South Korea was elected today to a non-permanent seat on the Security Council, which, without the consent and backing of the United States, would have been impossible. Countries that exercise true independence and sovereignty will be heard with respect; otherwise, they will be ignored. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea has the status of a full-fledged nuclear-weapon State, whereas South Korea is a subordinate under the United States.

Some European representatives, such as those of France and the Netherlands, said in their statements

that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea should abandon its nuclear programme. This is the fifth time I have exercised the right of reply, and I reiterate once again that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea possesses a nuclear deterrent to counter the nuclear threats of the United States. It is a self-defensive measure. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea has nothing to do with the International Atomic Energy Agency or the NPT because it is not a party to either. As far as uranium enrichment and the construction of a light-water reactor are concerned, they are for the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

I have a piece of advice to those countries that have a biased view of the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula. Before saying anything about the abandonment by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea of its nuclear programme, they should urge the United States to stop bullying small countries with its nuclear weapons. If they do not have the guts to say so, then they had better keep silent; to do otherwise would be construed as flattery to the United States.

**Ms. Chatt** (Canada): Canada was satisfied with the largely constructive exchange at the Preparatory Committee meeting for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) that took place in Vienna from 30 April to 11 May. In the wake of the consensus outcome of the 2010 NPT Review Conference, it was important that the current review cycle got under way without the procedural delays that plagued the start of the last one. For this, we would like to express our appreciation to the Australian Chair of the Preparatory Committee, Ambassador Peter Woolcott, for his leadership and extensive consultations in advance of and throughout the meetings. As Canada stated at the Preparatory Committee session, we believe that strengthening governance and accountability remains a priority that can usefully be addressed in the current review cycle.

Canada regards nuclear proliferation as the greatest threat to international stability and security. In this regard, Canada is profoundly concerned by three blatant cases of non-compliance with nuclear non-proliferation obligations. Iran's nuclear programme can only be seen as an effort to acquire a nuclear-weapon capability. Iran wilfully ignores the requirements and obligations placed on it by the Security Council and the International Atomic Energy Agency. This non-compliance with international law and lack of respect for its safeguards

obligations devalue the work done to ensure the safe, secure and, above all, peaceful use of nuclear power.

We call on Iran, North Korea and Syria in the strongest terms to abide by relevant Security Council resolutions and to cooperate fully with the IAEA and the international community to resolve outstanding questions about their nuclear activities with a view to returning to full compliance. Only accountability and transparency will help to reassure the international community.

Beyond addressing these cases of non-compliance, there remains unfinished business to advance key instruments. First, despite strong support for Canada's 2011 resolution 66/44, the Conference on Disarmament has again failed to reach an agreement on a comprehensive programme of work that includes negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty. Canada will be introducing a draft resolution during this session that aims to follow up on the call made in the 2011 resolution to have the General Assembly consider options for the negotiation of a treaty to ban the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. We would welcome the support of all delegations in this effort so that we can begin substantive work, pursuing further steps towards nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament.

Comedian Carol Burnett once said that "comedy equals tragedy plus time". It is indeed tragic that the world's single multilateral forum for non-proliferation and disarmament negotiations has been unable to agree on and implement a programme of work. That it has failed to do so every year since 1998 may not be comedy yet, but it is certainly cause for ridicule. That North Korea was Chair of that disarmament body was also rather absurd.

*(spoke in French)*

The entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) also remains elusive. While annex 2 State Indonesia took the most welcome step of ratifying the Treaty in February, there remain eight States that must ratify it before it can enter into force. Canada was pleased to co-host a Friends of the CTBT Ministerial Meeting on 27 September at the margins of the General Assembly's high-level segment. The joint ministerial statement that was issued at the Meeting has been endorsed by 101 States. We encourage all States that have not yet done so to add their voice to the international chorus in favour of the

full implementation of the Treaty and its verification system. We reiterate our call on all States that have not yet done so, particularly the remaining annex 2 States, to sign and ratify the Treaty as soon as possible.

As announced by Canada's Foreign Minister during the September meeting of the Friends of the CTBT, Canada recently concluded a contribution arrangement with the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) in Vienna to provide state-of-the-art Canadian equipment to bolster the CTBTO's on-site inspection capabilities. This forthcoming contribution was made possible through Canada's Global Partnership Program, which coordinates Canada's contribution to the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction. The Global Partnership now consists of 24 international partners and implements concrete programming worldwide to secure, or when possible, destroy materials related to weapons of mass destruction. Since 2002, Canada has invested more than \$880 million in programming worldwide to combat the proliferation of weapons and materials of mass destruction.

At the 2012 Nuclear Security Summit in Seoul, Prime Minister Harper renewed Canada's Global Partnership Program until 2018, with \$367 million in funding. Under its new mandate, the Program will further reorient its activities to address emerging proliferation threats in the Americas, Asia, Africa and the Middle East.

In closing, my delegation will continue to contribute to a productive First Committee session and to promote Canada's priorities.

**Mr. Valero Briceño** (Venezuela) (*spoke in Spanish*): The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela associates itself with the statements made by the representatives of Indonesia on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement and Peru on behalf of the Union of South American Nations (see A/C.1/67/PV.9).

For my delegation, the lack of urgency surrounding the issue of nuclear disarmament is a source of deep bewilderment and concern. We live in a world plagued by rising tensions and growing confrontations of a political and military nature. The system of international relations to regulate the behaviour of States is under constant threat. Armed interventions are carried out with disregard for the Security Council and the cardinal principles of the Charter of the United Nations and international law.

The ambitions of world domination entertained by certain imperial Powers are inscribed on the agenda and undermine the possibility of moving towards a multipolar, balanced, peaceful world, free of nuclear weapons. New concepts of permanent war are created to justify the preservation and modernization of nuclear arsenals — for example, through the possibility that so-called rogue States may obtain a nuclear weapon.

Two decades after the end of the Cold War, arsenals still exist with the capacity to destroy the planet several times over. Around 20,500 nuclear warheads remain worldwide, more than 5,000 of which are deployed and ready for use and 2,000 under high alert. Thanks to technological developments, an important number of them have a yield between eight and 100 times greater than the bombs that destroyed Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The modernization of nuclear weapons is rapidly progressing and there is the risk that it may spread into outer space.

Along with this fast and terrifying process of modernization and expansion, there are few signs that we are on the path towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons. The large military-nuclear complex of national security, considered a Cold War phenomenon, persists and is being strengthened in some countries.

We would seem to be entering a phase of normalization of nuclear arsenals in a post-Cold War context. A new Cold War of this type accompanied by a new arms race is a real and imminent danger. Many will argue that the production and modernization of nuclear weapons need not lead to a nuclear confrontation and that, on the contrary, it contributes to deterrence and peaceful coexistence among nuclear States. They see the threat of the use of nuclear weapons as morally defensible and claim that their purpose is precisely to avoid a military nuclear confrontation. It is presumed that a military nuclear exchange will never happen.

Given these positions, progress in reducing nuclear arsenals below the threshold for total and complete annihilation of the enemy, humankind and the environment is not foreseen in the near future. Worse still is the fact that there is no guarantee that a nuclear war will not happen. The doctrine of deterrence is just that — a doctrine, a hope. The future of humankind can no longer rest on the false confidence of a few States.

For these reasons, the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela believes that the adoption of multilateral disarmament agreements is a priority for humankind.

To that end, we must devote ourselves to negotiating substantive agreements on disarmament within the framework of the Conference on Disarmament — the multilateral forum par excellence — aimed at the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons.

The Bolivarian revolution, led by President Hugo Chávez Frías, intends to contribute to the development of a new international geopolitics for a multicentric and multipolar world, which can achieve balance and ensure world peace. The nuclear Powers have a primary responsibility for the required fulfilment of their commitments in the areas of disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in order to strengthen international peace and security and to ensure the survival of the human species.

**Ms. Nyhamar** (Norway): The consequences of any nuclear detonation — whether caused by a State's intentional use, a terrorist action, or an accident — would be global. As mentioned in our general statement to the Committee (see A/C.1/67/PV.6), Norway will hold a conference in Oslo in March 2013 to focus on the humanitarian impact of nuclear detonations, as well as our ability to respond to such a disaster credibly and effectively. The conference will create an arena to discuss immediate effects, longer-term impact and consequences, and the actual state of preparedness to provide an adequate humanitarian response.

By covering themes such as preparedness, protection, civilian loss of life and damage, humanitarian efforts and response capacity, refugee flows, health issues and climate effects, the conference will provide greater insight and a fact-based understanding of the humanitarian consequences of a nuclear detonation. We look forward to welcoming all States and relevant humanitarian actors that recognize the need to discuss the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons and the corresponding emergency and disaster response capacities. We will encourage participation with senior officials and experts alike.

Throughout the history of the United Nations, we have seen the humanitarian perspective grow stronger in international politics and in international arms control. The humanitarian impact of weapons has increasingly become recognized as a key consideration. However, nuclear weapons have rarely been seen in that light. This may be about to change, and rightly so, since the humanitarian impact is the most fundamental

motivation for all our efforts for disarmament, non-proliferation and nuclear security.

It is a motivation relevant for all countries, irrespective of their political and geographical affiliations, and it is an issue proving its relevance to a broad array of organizations and interest groups, since it relates to a number of issues that are of great concern for people far outside the traditional meeting rooms of international politics. It was high time that the recognition of the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons was finally brought to the forefront by the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in 2010, which in our view was one of its most important achievements.

Nuclear non-proliferation is crucial to achieving a world without nuclear weapons. Non-proliferation is essential for the security of all countries, and we should all do our utmost to make full use of the tools at our disposal. We urge all Member States to fully implement Security Council resolution 1540 (2004), and have ourselves allocated substantial voluntary contributions to the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs to this end.

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is the custodian of the global non-proliferation regime. The IAEA comprehensive safeguards and additional protocol should constitute the verification norm. We are pleased that a majority of United Nations Member States have now signed and implemented the additional protocol. However, there are still many States that need to take this vital step to enable the IAEA to conclude that nuclear activities in a given country are for peaceful purposes only.

The IAEA must be fully equipped to carry out its crucial non-proliferation efforts. Norway has on a number of occasions also expressed deep concern over outstanding proliferation challenges, such as those posed by Iran, Syria and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Norway urges Iran to do its part in restoring international confidence concerning its nuclear activities. A first important step would be to comply fully with relevant Security Council and IAEA resolutions. A political solution to the outstanding issues would greatly strengthen the entire non-proliferation regime.

Norway condemns the violation by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea of relevant Security

Council resolutions, and urges the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to abandon all its existing nuclear and ballistic missile programmes and return to full compliance with the NPT and IAEA safeguards. Norway also urges Syria to fully cooperate with the IAEA in resolving outstanding matters in relation to its safeguard agreement, and to bring into force an additional protocol as soon as possible.

All of us were very much younger than we are today, or were not even born, when the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty entered into force in 1970. Forty-two years later, we are still living in a world with nuclear weapons. We rightly celebrate the NPT Review Conference in 2010, since it achieved a detailed action plan covering all three pillars of the Treaty. But only implementation of the action plan can bring us from diplomatic achievement to results that really matter.

We are pleased that the implementation of the New START agreement is running smoothly. However, we would also encourage the United States and the Russian Federation to be guided by the Treaty's name and pursue further negotiations, including all categories of nuclear weapons. We certainly also encourage other nuclear-weapon States to engage in nuclear disarmament. We are pleased to note that all the nuclear-weapon States of the NPT are meeting on a regular basis in order to fulfil their obligations under the action plan, and we look forward to seeing the concrete results of their deliberations.

An important item in the NPT action plan is the Middle East conference on a zone free of weapons of mass destruction, to be held by the end of this year. Norway warmly supports efforts to ensure that the Middle East Conference on a zone free of weapons of mass destruction is successful in making a substantial contribution to the actual establishment of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the region, which would strengthen the security not only of the region but of us all. More than half of the world's countries have freely joined such zones today.

Nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation are also important elements in achieving nuclear security. Norway participated in the successful Nuclear Security Summit in Seoul in March, and we look forward to continuing this important process. We must secure all nuclear material, continue our efforts to develop cooperative arrangements for producing nuclear fuel for civilian reactors, and significantly reduce the use of

highly enriched uranium in all its applications. All of these tasks are doable, and they will enhance security for us all.

Norway joins others in calling for the immediate commencement of fissile material cut-off treaty negotiations. At the same time, we clearly need to accelerate the process of bringing stocks of fissile materials under IAEA safeguards. In this respect, we welcome the United States and Russian agreement on the disposition of plutonium and encourage further steps in this field.

Additionally, Norway would like to see additional steps towards bringing the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty into force. That would be an essential step towards a world without nuclear weapons. Like others, Norway welcomes the recent ratifications of the Treaty, including that by the annex 2 country, Indonesia.

There is also a need to ensure that our verification systems are robust enough to provide the necessary confidence in the integrity of both the non-proliferation and the disarmament processes, based on the principles of verifiability, irreversibility and transparency. We believe that the IAEA has an important role to play in this respect also and will work to strengthen its capacities.

Bilaterally, the United Kingdom and Norway have cooperated at the expert level for a number of years to develop technology and procedures to verify nuclear disarmament and explore possible solutions to the technical and procedural challenges in this regard. An important part of this work is to demonstrate that nuclear-weapon State and non-nuclear-weapon State collaboration in nuclear disarmament verification is both possible and necessary.

Finally, we must conclude yet again that the current state of our multilateral disarmament instruments is a challenge to us all. They are not open to all interested countries and relevant stakeholders, they are completely tied up in procedural knots, and they do not work. The responsibility and right to contribute to the development of new ideas and approaches rest with all States members of the General Assembly and are clearly needed if we are to achieve our common goal of a world without nuclear weapons. That is why Norway joins other member States in calling for a draft resolution at this year's session of the First Committee that will enable us to take forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations by exploring possible new

ways to do so. We have simply got to try. There is no doubt that nuclear disarmament is not easy and that it requires hard work. That is why we cannot allow the current impasse in the machinery to prevail. Just as nuclear weapons concern us all, so the responsibility to work for a world without nuclear weapons rests with all United Nations Member States.

**Ms. Adamson** (United Kingdom): It is very nice to see you, Sir, in the Chair. I apologize for not having a paper copy of my speech here, including to the interpreters. I will try to speak slowly and I will in any case truncate my prepared statement, which we will make available on QuickFirst.

I associate myself with the speech delivered by observer of the European Union in this segment (see A/C.1/67/PV.9).

In recent years we have seen tangible steps taken towards the goal of nuclear disarmament, and it is important to mark these successes. But we also need to make a commitment to a shared future in which we are each prepared to do our part to build a safer and more stable world — a world where those without nuclear weapons do not seek them, and those who have them no longer feel that they need them. This is of the most fundamental importance and will be our legacy for the generations that follow.

The United Kingdom Government remains absolutely committed to the long-term goal of a world without nuclear weapons. We have a strong record on fulfilling our nuclear disarmament commitments and meeting the international legal obligations that flow from our membership of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) as a nuclear-weapon State. While nuclear weapons exist and while the future security environment remains so uncertain, the United Kingdom Government remains committed to retaining a credible and effective minimum nuclear deterrent and to do so in a safe and secure manner.

At the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the NPT, we declared for the first time the maximum number of nuclear warheads in the United Kingdom's stockpile and announced a re-examination of the United Kingdom's nuclear declaratory policy. Our 2010 strategic defence and security review concluded that the United Kingdom could meet the minimum necessary requirements for credible deterrence with a smaller nuclear-weapons capability. So we set out a number of new disarmament measures announcing

that by the mid-2020s we would reduce the number of warheads on board each of our submarines from 48 to 40, reduce the requirement for operationally available warheads to no more than 120, reduce the number of operational missiles on the Vanguard-class submarines to no more than eight, and reduce our overall nuclear-weapon stockpile to no more than 180.

In June last year, we announced that the programme for implementing these warhead reductions had commenced early and that at least one of our submarines now carries a maximum of 40 nuclear warheads. We expect the reduction in operationally available warheads to 120 to take place by the time of the next Review Conference in 2015. Also as a result of our declaratory policy review, we announced a new stronger security assurance that the United Kingdom will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States party to and in compliance with their obligations under the NPT.

In addition to these important unilateral steps the United Kingdom has been working hard to make progress multilaterally. The conference of the five permanent members of the Security Council (P-5) in Washington, D.C., from 27 to 29 June was a vital opportunity for the five nuclear-weapon States to focus on concrete progress towards fulfilling our NPT disarmament obligations. Like the previous London and Paris conferences, it was significant not only for the substantive discussions that we had, but for continuing to build trust and confidence among the five NPT nuclear-weapon States and for the public outreach event with non-governmental organizations and non-nuclear-weapon States.

The disarmament pillar of the NPT is, of course, primarily about the particular responsibilities of the P-5 to work towards the requirements of article VI, but we must not forget that all parties to the NPT share responsibility across the three pillars to deliver against the agreed action plan. My colleague from Norway has just mentioned how we have been collaborating together on verification, so I will not add to that, other than to say that we have very much appreciated that cooperation and look forward to it continuing.

In addition to the work the United Kingdom has been doing unilaterally, bilaterally and with other nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States, we continue to press strongly for progress on the key multilateral instruments that will help us to move

towards the goal of a world without nuclear weapons. The entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty continues to be one of the United Kingdom's key disarmament priorities. We welcome and congratulate Indonesia and Guatemala on their ratification this year. In support of this aim, the United Kingdom is supporting a project to promote signature and ratification among small island countries, and we welcome Niue's signature earlier this year.

On the fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT), we urgently want to see the start of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament (CD). We are firmly committed to an FMCT. With a verifiable treaty in place, we will be a significant step closer to our goal of a world without nuclear weapons. Without one, we still have no legally binding way of putting a stop to the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons. Yet another year has gone by with the CD still unable to start negotiations or even agree a programme of work. The P-5 has been working together on the commitment made in Washington, D.C., to renew efforts to promote negotiations in the CD, and will continue to do so.

While the focus rests often on the disarmament pillar, and understandably so, there are challenges in non-proliferation that we must work on together to address if we are to create a safer and more secure world. Nowhere is the challenge more evident than the threats posed by the nuclear programmes of Iran and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The international community continues to have serious concerns about the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's claimed uranium enrichment programme and light-water reactor construction, and about Iran's expansion of its capacity to produce 20 per cent enriched uranium, which has no plausible civilian use.

The international community must be united in its concerns about Iran's nuclear programme. We in the E3+3 are working tirelessly to resolve it, and to encourage Iran to engage meaningfully with the international community by taking the necessary concrete steps that would rebuild international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of their programme.

The British Government continues to support the establishment of a Middle East weapons-of-mass-destruction-free zone. As one of the convenors of the conference on the Middle East weapons-of-mass-destruction-free zone mandated by the 2010 NPT

Review Conference, we are working to bring all regional States together in order to discuss how progress can be made. We remain committed to the mandate, and we fully support the facilitator of the conference, Jaakko Laajava of Finland. Mr. Laajava has conducted an extensive outreach programme and consulted all States in the region in preparation for the Conference. We welcome his ongoing efforts in this regard.

The United Kingdom is clear that, in order to deliver a constructive conference, the engagement and agreement of all the States of the region would be required. We welcome all efforts to create an atmosphere conducive to dialogue, and acknowledge the serious work that some regional actors are currently undertaking.

We were very encouraged by the fact that the NPT Review Conference outcome document (NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol. I)) recognized that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocol are essential for the IAEA to carry out its international safeguards responsibilities.

I should like to speak briefly about other nuclear-weapon-free zones. The United Kingdom believes that nuclear-weapon-free zones contribute greatly to strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime and to enhancing regional and international security. In December 2011 the P-5 and States of South-East Asia reached agreement on the terms and language for the P-5 Protocol to the South-East Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone, which would grant treaty-based negative security assurances to a further 10 States. We are disappointed that the signing ceremony of the Protocol, which was due to take place on 12 July, was postponed. The P-5 States remain strongly committed to signing the Protocol as soon as possible. By signing and ratifying the Protocol, the P-5 agree to respect the Treaty and not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against its 10 States parties.

We do understand that some Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) States may have questions over statements that some of the P-5 States plan to issue upon signing or ratifying the Protocol. Such statements are a standard and permitted part of international practice. They have been employed in relation to the Treaties of Rarotonga and Pelindaba, with no adverse impact in practice on the Protocol's benefits or effectiveness, and no negative reaction by



the States parties to those Treaties. I would encourage all of us, the P-5 and ASEAN, to seize the window we now have to clinch the Protocol. It has been a long time since we had the opportunity to work together on this. Let us not let that window close before we bring this to a conclusion.

In concluding, the United Kingdom also further demonstrated its commitment to strengthening the NPT regime by signing a P-5 declaration on Mongolia's nuclear-weapon-free status last month in New York. We continue to co-sponsor the associated draft resolution in the First Committee. I wish warmly to congratulate the Mongolian delegation and its capital on all the work they have expended in this area.

**The Acting Chair:** I call on the representative of Malaysia to introduce draft resolution A/C.1/67/L.9.

**Mr. Haniff** (Malaysia): On behalf of my delegation and the 36 sponsoring member States — Angola, Bangladesh, Benin, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Chile, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Ecuador, Egypt, Fiji, Guatemala, Haiti, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, the Lao People's Democratic Republic, Libya, Mexico, Myanmar, Nepal, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Peru, the Philippines, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, the Sudan, Syria, Thailand, Uruguay, Viet Nam and Zimbabwe — I should like to express our collective appreciation to the Secretary-General for his report on the follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, as reflected in document A/67/133, which was submitted under agenda item 95 (aa).

In 1996, the International Court of Justice issued an advisory opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons. That opinion constitutes a significant milestone in international efforts aimed at nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation by making a moral argument for the total elimination of such devastating weapons. Today 19,000 nuclear weapons remain, still ready to be used. The draft resolution entitled "Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons" underscores the sponsors' concern for the threat nuclear weapons pose to humankind and our whole civilization. This threat is real and is reflected in the decision of the International Court of Justice; it should be given serious consideration by all member States.

Malaysia has introduced this text since 1996, and will continue to do so this year. Through draft resolution A/C.1/67/L.9, and specifically in paragraphs 1 and 2, important decisions of the International Court of Justice have been retained in their existing form. References to some of the elements contained in the action plan on nuclear disarmament that were consensually agreed during the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) have also been retained in their original form and language.

The elements contained in the draft resolution centre on a nuclear weapons convention that would prohibit the development, production, testing, deployment, stockpiling, transfer, threat or use of nuclear weapons, and provide for their elimination. The incremental comprehensive approach that is contained in the convention will enable States to reach a balanced implementation of nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation. It also ensures that the NPT shall remain the cornerstone of the maintenance of international peace and security by totally eliminating nuclear weapons. In order to move ahead, we require consensus on commencing this important multilateral process.

The advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons remains a significant contribution to the field of nuclear disarmament. Its humanitarian context gives weight to a moral argument in calling for the total elimination of nuclear weapons. We believe that more support for the draft resolution would reaffirm our commitment to the multilateral process of disarmament and non-proliferation. We thank all the co-sponsors and further invite more delegations to come on board and sponsor the draft resolution. We sincerely hope that all delegations will be able to support the draft resolution.

**The Acting Chair:** I now call on those representatives who wish to speak in exercise of the right of reply. I remind delegations that the number of interventions in exercise of the right of reply by any delegation on any item at a given meeting is limited to two. The first intervention is limited to 10 minutes, and the second to five.

**Mr. Ibrahim** (Syrian Arab Republic) (*spoke in Arabic*): We believe that certain countries — namely, the Netherlands and Norway — intend later to blame Syria for the hole in the ozone layer, climate change,

and the extinction of certain species. This means that they are simply ignoring facts. This double-standard approach ignores Israel's nuclear-weapons programmes, which threaten peace and security in our region and throughout the world.

The Netherlands is in violation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons because it hosts nuclear weapons on its territory. The Netherlands continues to participate in the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. In 1992, an accident took place near Amsterdam that was linked to an aircraft carrying radioactive nuclear material to Israel. That is well known.

In his book *The Age of Deception*, Mr. El-Baradei, former Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, says:

*(spoke in English)*

“One of the strangest and most striking examples of nuclear hypocrisy, multilateral and multifaceted, must surely be Israel's bombing of the Dair Alzour installation in Syria in September 2007 ... The Israeli action was a violation of every norm of international law regarding the use of force. It also showed total disregard for the non-proliferation regime. Yet very few countries — and not a single Western country — spoke up to denounce the action. ...

“In a meeting with the twenty-seven European Union ambassadors, I told them they had undermined their credibility a great deal and told them ‘When you are not able to speak on a violation of one of the most basic tenets of the UN Charter’, I said, ‘your moral authority to speak up on democracy, human rights, and other issues is also greatly compromised.’ Many of the ambassadors agreed, behind closed doors.”

*(spoke in Arabic)*

Many other things can be quoted from *The Age of Deception* by Mr. El-Baradei. This book must be read by all for the numerous facts it contains that are overlooked by many.

We would have liked to see countries such as the Netherlands and Norway, which continue to launch unfounded allegations at Syria, give credible, ethical and serious consideration to developments in the

Middle East with regard to nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction, and not to make false accusations that have well-known political agendas.

**Mr. Kwon Hae-ryong** (Republic of Korea): I should like to speak in exercise the right of reply in regard to the allegations made by the North Korean representative. Throughout last week and this, many representatives in this room have expressed serious concern over North Korea's nuclear and ballistic missile programme, which poses a serious threat to peace and security on the Korean peninsula and beyond. Many countries, including the Republic of Korea, have also urged North Korea to return to international legitimacy and comply with its commitments and obligations with respect to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the United Nations.

I will first respond to North Korea's claim concerning its peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The right to engage in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy is a legitimate right of the NPT State parties that faithfully comply with their obligations under IAEA safeguards. However, North Korea developed its nuclear weapon programme within the NPT regime and had declared its withdrawal from the NPT, severely undermining the foundations of the NPT. The right to engage in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy should not be used as a disguise for a nuclear-weapons programme, as was the case with North Korea.

Secondly, with regard to North Korea's claim for its status as a nuclear-weapon State, my delegation would draw attention to Security Council resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009), the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the NPT (NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol. I)) and the numerous IAEA documents on the North Korean issue, which clearly affirm that North Korea cannot under any circumstances enjoy the status of a nuclear-weapon State. We urge North Korea to respond to the international community's concerted effort for denuclearization as soon as possible.

**Mr. Kang Myong Chol** (Democratic People's Republic of Korea): It is heartbreaking that the North and South of Korea, which are one nation and share the same language and customs, have to bandy words with each other in the international arena instead of going for reconciliation and cooperation. But since the representative of South Korea has spoken provocatively

first, the delegation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea will say a few words.

I want to reiterate once again the position of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea vis-à-vis the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea acquired a nuclear deterrent to counter the nuclear threats of the United States, which have continued for more than half a century. Our uranium enrichment and construction of a light-water reactor are strictly for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea is already a full-fledged nuclear-weapon State and does not feel any need to be publicly recognized as such. It is satisfied that it is capable of reliably defending the sovereignty and security of the nation with its own nuclear weapons.

There is an old saying in Korea that "a puppy knows no fear of a tiger". If South Korea is truly concerned about the security situation in the Korean peninsula, it should stop following blindly in the footsteps of the United States hostile policy towards the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, cease the annual staging of anti-Democratic People's Republic of Korea joint military exercises with the United States in South Korea, and come out from under the United States military umbrella. After that, we will talk.

**The Acting Chair:** I now call on the representative of the Republic of Korea in exercise of his second right of reply.

**Mr. Kwon Hae-ryong** (Republic of Korea): I should like to exercise the right of reply again with regard to the allegation made by the representative of North Korea.

North Korea has developed nuclear weapon programmes and launched a ballistic missile. As members heard this afternoon, North Korea has persistently ignored and violated international regimes, including the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the numerous resolutions of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Security Council. North Korea's behaviour has posed a serious

threat to peace and security on the Korean peninsula, North-East Asia and the whole world.

I should like to draw attention to the fact that North Korea conducted a nuclear-weapon test and launched the ballistic missile at the cost of the lives of its people. North Korea spent huge amounts of resources in its nuclear and ballistic missile programmes. Due to the ill-designed and inefficient allocation of resources, the people of North Korea suffer from chronic food shortages. To relieve its food shortages, North Korea has asked the international community — including international development organizations, the World Food Programme and the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization — to provide it with humanitarian assistance, despite the fact that it has persistently ignored and violated international agreements and regimes.

In conclusion, my delegation urges North Korea to focus on improving the basic living conditions of its people by abandoning all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programmes in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner.

**The Acting Chair:** I now give the floor to the representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in exercise of a second right of reply.

**Mr. Kang Myong Chol** (Democratic People's Republic of Korea): My delegation would like to state clearly once again the principled position of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea vis-à-vis the nuclear issue. I repeat that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's possession of nuclear weapons is directly linked to the nuclear threats of the United States. The possession of nuclear weapons by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea will never alter, but will only be prolonged on a long-term basis unless the United States drops its hostile policy towards the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

Now that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has a solid guarantee of peace and security, economic development will follow.

*The meeting rose at 6.05 p.m.*