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President: Mr. Emilio ARENALES (Guatemala).

Statement by the President of the General Assembly on a special meeting in commemoration of the twentieth anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights

1. The PRESIDENT (*translated from Spanish*): The General Assembly will recall that, in its resolution 2217 A (XXI) concerning the International Year for Human Rights, it approved a programme of measures and activities for that Year which had been recommended by the Commission on Human Rights and which was set out in the annex to the resolution.

2. Among the Commission's recommendations, recommendation C referred to the award of a maximum of five prizes to persons who, since the proclamation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights on 10 December 1948, had made outstanding contributions to the promotion and protection of the human rights and fundamental freedoms embodied in the Declaration and in other United Nations instruments relating to human rights.

3. The selection of the winners of the United Nations Human Rights Prize was entrusted to a Special Committee composed of the President of the General Assembly, the President of the Economic and Social Council, the Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights, the Chairman of the Commission on the Status of Women and the Chairman of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities.

4. I wish to inform the General Assembly that the Special Committee, composed of Ambassador Manuel Pérez Guerrero, President of the Economic and Social Council,

Ambassador Ibrahima Boye, Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights, Mrs. Annie Jiagge, Chairman of the Commission on the Status of Women, Mr. Pierre Juvigny, Chairman of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, and myself, has held several meetings during the current session of the General Assembly. As provided for in recommendation C, the assistance of the Secretary-General was also available to the Special Committee.

5. The Special Committee examined thirty-nine nominations submitted, in accordance with recommendation C, by Member States, specialized agencies and non-governmental organizations in consultative status with the Economic and Social Council. The high qualifications of many candidates rendered the Special Committee's task extremely difficult.

6. In view of the General Assembly's intentions regarding the award of the United Nations Human Rights Prize and the fact that it is in the year in which we are celebrating the twentieth anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights that the General Assembly, in accordance with resolution 2217 A (XXI), is first awarding these prizes, the Special Committee decided to recommend to the General Assembly that the number of prizes should this year be increased to six. I should like to ask the General Assembly if there are any objections to that proposal. In the absence of objection, I shall take it that the Assembly agrees that six prizes for outstanding contributions to the promotion and protection of human rights should be awarded this year.

It was so agreed.

7. The PRESIDENT (*translated from Spanish*): I now wish to announce to the General Assembly the names of the six persons whom the Special Committee decided to select as winners of the United Nations Human Rights Prize in 1968: Mr. Manuel Bianchi, Mr. René Cassin, Mr. Albert Luthuli, Mrs. Mehranguiz Manoutchehrian, Mr. P. E. Nedbailo and Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt. Those are the names, in alphabetical order, of the persons who have won the six prizes for 1968.

8. Paragraph 2 of recommendation B in the annex to resolution 2217 A (XXI) recommends that a special meeting of the General Assembly should be organized at United Nations Headquarters on 10 December 1968 in commemoration of the twentieth anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It also recommends that Governments should be invited to include in their delegations to the special meeting, whenever possible, persons who participated in the drafting of the Declaration. I understand that the Secretary-General has called the attention of all Member States to this provision.

9. The recommendation further states that a concert with the widest possible radio and television coverage should be organized at United Nations Headquarters on that day to celebrate the twentieth anniversary of the Declaration. In accordance with that recommendation, a special concert will be organized in the General Assembly Hall on the evening of 10 December 1968. Because of the necessity of making special arrangements for the concert to be held in the General Assembly Hall, it will not be possible to hold the special commemorative meeting the same day. I therefore propose that the special meeting of the General Assembly should be held on 9 December 1968 at 3 p.m. I also suggest that, on that special occasion, the General Assembly should agree to the list of speakers which I shall submit to it. The list might include the heads of United Nations bodies concerned with questions of human rights who are attending this session of the General Assembly, as well as some of those who participated in the drafting of the Declaration.

10. The United Nations Human Rights Prize will be formally awarded at that meeting and those recipients who are present may also wish to make brief statements. The Secretary-General may also wish to speak.

11. If there is no objection, I shall take it that the General Assembly agrees to my suggestion.

It was so agreed.

AGENDA ITEM 31

The policies of *apartheid* of the Government of the Republic of South Africa: report of the Special Committee on the Policies of *Apartheid* of the Government of the Republic of South Africa

REPORT OF THE SPECIAL POLITICAL COMMITTEE (A/7348)

12. Mr. LANNUNG (Denmark), Rapporteur of the Special Political Committee: I have the honour to present to the General Assembly for its consideration the report of the Special Political Committee [A/7348].

13. For twenty years the Assembly has been faced with the problems of *apartheid*. Seventy-four statements during seventeen meetings of general debate are a gauge of the particular and continuing importance attached to this question by members of the Special Political Committee.

14. The thorough discussion of all aspects of the policies of *apartheid* was based largely on two reports before the Committee: the report of the Special Committee on the Policies of *Apartheid* of the Government of the Republic of South Africa [A/7254] and a report by the Secretary-General on the United Nations Trust Fund for South Africa [A/7270].

15. Two draft resolutions were placed before the Special Political Committee. The first [A/7348, para. 7], dealing with the substance of the question, was co-sponsored by forty-nine States. The second [*ibid.*, para. 10], co-sponsored by eight delegations, dealt with the United Nations

Trust Fund for South Africa. Taking into account the report of the Fund's Committee of Trustees [A/7270, annex], it provided in operative paragraph 3 for revision of the purposes of the Fund and reiterated an appeal for generous contributions.

16. Before the voting, a motion was made by Mexico for separate votes on paragraphs 7 and 8(c) of the forty-nine-Power draft resolution. After its sponsors had requested that the draft resolution be voted on as a whole, the motion was rejected by 68 votes to 29, with 8 abstentions.

17. The United States amendments [A/7348, para. 13] proposing the deletion of operative paragraphs 4 and 5 of the forty-nine-Power draft resolution were rejected respectively by votes of 80 to 9, with 21 abstentions, and 77 to 9, with 21 abstentions. The forty-nine-Power draft resolution as a whole was then adopted by a roll-call vote of 95 to 1, with 15 abstentions.

18. The eight-Power draft resolution, relating to the United Nations Trust Fund for South Africa, was adopted by 107 votes to none.

19. The Special Political Committee therefore recommends to the General Assembly the adoption of draft resolutions I and II which are set forth in paragraph 25 of the Committee's report.

Pursuant to rule 68 of the rules of procedure, it was decided not to discuss the report of the Special Political Committee.

20. The PRESIDENT (*translated from Spanish*): I shall now call on those representatives who wish to speak in explanation of their vote before the voting takes place on draft resolutions I and II recommended by the Special Political Committee in its report [A/7348, para. 25].

21. Mr. MBEKEANI (Malawi): The Malawi delegation would like to explain in some detail its vote on draft resolution I contained in paragraph 25 of document A/7348. The Malawi delegation joins with all other countries in wholeheartedly disagreeing with the inhuman system of *apartheid*; but we regret we were unable to support the forty-nine-Power draft resolution. While we fully share the wishes of its co-sponsors to intensify the international campaign to make the Governments of South Africa give up its *apartheid* policy, we consider that the actual text is self-defeating because it contains too many paragraphs whose phrasing is too extreme or which embody measures that are essentially unrealistic or else are constitutionally out of line. I am thinking particularly of operative paragraphs 2, 4, 5, 7, 8(c), 10, 11 and 12; and, with your permission, Mr. President, I should like to explain our attitude on each of these provisions.

22. Operative paragraph 2, which would have the Assembly condemn the Government of South Africa for its occupation of Namibia and its assistance to the racist minority régime of Southern Rhodesia, seems to my delegation out of context here. Not only are these matters not under consideration in this debate, but they are the subject of two other items [64 and 68] on our agenda at

the current session. Moreover, I should like to say in passing that my delegation cannot subscribe to a wording which condemns the Government, rather than the action concerned. Although this has become an increasingly frequent practice in recent years, it is nevertheless contrary to the customary tradition of Assembly resolutions.

23. Had operative paragraph 4 been confined to drawing the attention of the Security Council to the situation in South Africa, Malawi would have been able to support it. However, as the representative of the United States pointed out in the Special Political Committee debate [615th meeting] the second part of that paragraph, together with certain preambular paragraphs, amounts to a "pre-determined finding" that the situation is an actual threat to the peace requiring comprehensive mandatory sanctions under Chapter VII of the Charter. As Members of the Assembly are well aware, only the Security Council has the constitutional right to determine whether there is a threat to the peace within the meaning of Chapter VII. They also know that the Council has to date failed to be convinced by the various arguments that a threat to the peace exists in southern Africa.

24. The condemnation, contained in operative paragraph 5, of the actions of States continuing to conduct extensive trade with South Africa has, of course, appeared in previous resolutions on the *apartheid* question. None the less, my delegation, which represents a small country that openly trades with the Republic, feels bound to record its objection to the use here of the word "condemn", the strongest expression of disapproval in the Assembly's lexicon, and to the imputation that economic and other relations with South Africa are a racist collaboration with that Government or can be construed as active encouragement of *apartheid*. This is not the appropriate moment to open a discussion on the pros and cons of imposing sanctions against the Republic of South Africa. However, what can be said now is that the language used in paragraph 5 of the draft resolution would be justifiable only if the Security Council had specifically banned all relations with the Republic of South Africa. But as we know, the sole Council ruling on this matter to date is in its 1963 resolutions [181 (1963) and 182 (1963)] calling for an embargo on sale of arms and ammunition to the Republic. The fact that the failure of the Security Council to accede to the request of nations for comprehensive mandatory sanctions against South Africa may be largely laid at the door of the Republic's main trading partners does not necessarily give the Assembly the moral right to condemn the actions of States continuing to trade with the Republic of South Africa.

25. Operative paragraph 7 seems to my delegation to be totally unrealistic, since it is well known that many Governments, particularly those of the powerful Western nations, have serious reservations about legitimizing requests for official assistance to persons dedicated to overthrowing the legally constituted Government of another country.

26. Paragraph 8 (c) adds a wholly new and, to our mind, unfortunate element to the Assembly's annual resolutions on this item. One must seriously question whether the Assembly is acting within its legitimate province in pro-

claiming that captured "freedom-fighters" in South Africa should henceforth be treated as prisoners of war under the 1949 Geneva Convention. The 1949 Geneva Convention is a full-fledged legal instrument and it seems doubtful if its terms of application can be validly extended by a simple declaration on the part of a body whose recommendations carry no legal weight. Although I am no lawyer, I can imagine that if it was ever seriously intended to put this declaration to the test in an actual case pleaded before, say, the World Court, the results might not be at all to the liking of the sponsors of the draft resolution under consideration. And if it is not intended to put the declaration to the test, then paragraph 8 (c) has merely a declamatory value and is presumably designed to provide an outlet for condemning South Africa on new grounds. For obviously, if the South African Government has persistently disregarded the Assembly's pleas to dismantle *apartheid*, it is unlikely to heed an injunction to accord the freedom-fighters in its own Territory—whom it must assuredly regard as rebels—the specific rights of prisoners of war. My delegation therefore does not feel that paragraph 8 (c) will in any way help the cause of the anti-*apartheid* forces in South Africa. And this being so, we do not consider that it is the business of the Assembly to look for new ways of vainly condemning the South African Government in the future.

27. Paragraphs 10 and 11, especially the latter, are unacceptable to us because they in effect ask Governments to interfere with the individual rights of private citizens, which would be a direct violation of specific United Nations declarations and conventions on human rights. Moreover, certain countries pride themselves on their freedom of speech to such an extent that they even permit the discredited Nazi Party to give public expression to its abhorrent views. And few Governments, at least in the Western democracies, where much of the world's skilled labour has its home, would feel themselves able to prevent or dissuade their citizens from emigrating to the country of their choice.

28. Nor can my delegation support the request in paragraph 12 that States and organizations "suspend cultural, educational, sporting and other exchanges" with South Africa. We feel very strongly—as I argued in my statement on South West Africa during the resumed session last summer [1664th meeting]—that one of the most effective methods of combating *apartheid* is to give the South African Whites the maximum exposure to the moral and rational influence of foreign Governments and organizations resolutely opposed to *apartheid* policies.

29. During the debate in the Special Political Committee [615th meeting] the representative of the Netherlands cited some particularly telling examples of how specialized national organizations can perform useful work in actively promoting legitimate political opposition to *apartheid* among equivalent groups in the white South African population.

30. It is hard to believe that the Assembly really feels that it ought to recommend that such praiseworthy efforts should be brought to an end merely for the sake of emphasizing its own expression of the world's disapproval of *apartheid*. Openly to refuse to break bread with someone whose principles are offensive doubtless provides an ef-

fective display of integrity. But we should pause to consider whether the gesture has any real moral worth if it simultaneously cuts off any chance of making the person in question alter his principles.

31. There can be no doubt that each of the paragraphs which I have mentioned—as well as one or two others that I have not mentioned—is widely regarded as controversial. It is not only my delegation that has serious reservations about their usefulness, legality, applicability, and so forth. Numerous other delegations outside the group of the forty-nine countries sponsoring the draft resolution expressed similar doubts in the Special Political Committee. Now, as their vote in that Committee indicated, some of these delegations will nevertheless choose to support the draft because they are in sympathy with its aims. We ourselves, however, are unable to follow this course.

32. First of all, it must be noted that many of the controversial paragraphs are also the crucial ones from the standpoint of the kind of aggressive action on the part of the General Assembly demanded by the sponsors of the draft resolution. There seems to us to be little value in adopting a draft resolution whose key provisions are not supported by a large number of the countries actually voting for it. The deplorable fact that these countries are apparently not to be permitted the courtesy of separate votes to record their disagreement with the contentious paragraphs does not eliminate this serious element of disagreement, except on paper. And presumably the sponsors are interested in achieving something more than paper recommendations.

33. Secondly, it seems to us unrealistic to adopt a draft resolution which it is known in advance will fail to command the affirmative votes of the very countries whose co-operation is essential if the key paragraphs are to be put into effective operation. Yet it is precisely these paragraphs that are preventing the larger Western Powers, including South Africa's main trading partners and three permanent members of the Security Council, from subscribing to the draft.

34. So what does the resolution achieve in practical terms? Certainly, it will stand as the most vigorous expression to date of the Assembly's condemnation of South Africa's *apartheid* system. And that undeniably has its value. Then, too, the draft resolution contains some useful measures for widening the dissemination of information on *apartheid*, which should have the beneficial effect of keeping the problem in the forefront of world attention.

Mr. Allimadi (Uganda), Vice-President, took the Chair.

35. But in the final analysis, I believe that the over-all impact of the resolution will be a negative one and that it will impress world opinion chiefly by its lack of realism. For, although the sponsors may be able to suppress the record of dissenting votes on certain paragraphs, the abstentions of the main trading partners of South Africa on the draft resolution as a whole will be on record for all to see. Consequently, people will shrug their shoulders and cynically remark that once again the small countries, which have comparatively little to lose by waging economic war

against South Africa, have failed to convince the rich countries to commit economic suicide. That is all they will say, since it may be expected that the international press will be likely to emphasize the controversial elements of the resolution at the expense of its more constructive aspects.

36. Thus the over-all achievement of the resolution, considered together with its voting record, will have been to publicize once again the running battle, which the small, economically poor countries—assisted by some Eastern countries—have been conducting on this issue with the rich industrial nations for so many years. This battle has become an accepted feature of our annual debates on *apartheid* and other items connected with the problem of southern Africa. But precisely because it is a feature that is so completely taken for granted, I think that its value ought now to be reappraised.

37. I confess that I find it strange that the Assembly, which has shown an increasing consciousness during recent sessions of the value of unanimous or near-unanimous resolutions on issues such as disarmament and peace-keeping, had never seen the equal merit of a similar unanimity on the question of *apartheid*—or, for that matter, Namibia and Southern Rhodesia. No doubt the resulting resolutions would contain fewer high-sounding declarations, imperious requests and violent phrases—and this might well offend the vanity of some of the vengeful States bent on broadcasting to the world the extent of their efforts to get the United Nations to “do something” about southern Africa. But at least the recommendations would have the advantage of being whole-heartedly supported in their entirety by virtually all the Members of the General Assembly; whereas at present, because of these same high-sounding declarations, imperious requests and violent phrases, the major industrial nations are unable even to join in the Assembly's public statement of its condemnation of *apartheid*.

38. Delegations should consider the advantage that a unanimously adopted but necessarily more modest resolution might have over the present controversial text. Its most important immediate effect, of course, would be to demonstrate to the white population of South Africa that on the issue of *apartheid* the rest of the United Nations membership stands united. And in so doing, it would at once serve to undercut the element of ridicule that usually accompanies the reports of the Assembly debates on this item which appear in the South African news media. Editorial comments there would then no longer be able to play up the divided vote or the emptiness of grandiose proclamations that cannot be implemented—a device which manages successfully to detract from the positive aspects of the Assembly's recommendations or the genuine unanimity of anti-*apartheid* feeling in this body. I submit that if a series of such unanimous resolutions, which confined themselves to the possible, were accompanied by intensified moral pressure exerted at all levels, international, governmental, non-governmental, the white South African—I mean the ordinary man in the street, not just members of the Government—might be impressed, and eventually we would begin to get results.

39. I cannot stress too strongly my Government's conviction that the end of *apartheid* will be brought about not

through war with neighbouring black African States or through domestic liberation movements among the black population, but through a change of attitude on the part of the white South Africans themselves.

40. As my delegation sees it then, the primary concern of the Assembly should be to concentrate on devising ways and means to, so to speak, "get through" to the white South Africans. For it is they, and only they, who, as electors, have the power to change the policies of their Government by peaceful means as enjoined by the United Nations Charter. What is required is not so much to increase dissemination of information on *apartheid* to the rest of the world, which is really to preach to the already converted, as to ensure a flow of material to the South African voters, aimed at correcting their misguided views. Of course, I am aware that the chief motive for requesting increased dissemination of information is the hope that this will have the effect of stirring the people in the rich nations to pressure their Governments into cutting off trade with South Africa. But that seems to me to be a vain hope indeed. White South Africans are more likely to nudge their Government into changing an ideological policy before world opinion can push Governments of wealthy countries into severing vital economic life-lines. But first they have to be convinced of the irrationality and fundamental injustice of their fear of the black man. So to convince them should be the main task which the Assembly should set itself and entrust to the Special Committee on *Apartheid*—to study methods for developing contacts with the people of South Africa.

41. And here it might be said in passing that diplomats and citizens from black African States would have a vital role to play in this field in persuading South African Whites that black men can be regarded as responsible adult individuals like themselves. Admittedly, the task will not be an easy one since *apartheid* today has taken on the dimensions of religious doctrine. But it can be accomplished. However, the very difficulties involved are all the more reason why the Assembly should begin immediately instead of wasting precious time and incurring unnecessary ridicule by formulating idle declarations and condemnations.

42. With those considerations in mind, I can therefore sum up the views of my delegation on draft resolution I by saying that in our opinion it is more concerned with fighting an unrealistic battle against the rich nations than it is with devising positive methods for combating *apartheid* itself. As a result, we consider that it can only have a negative outcome and are therefore unable to support it. My delegation will therefore continue abstaining on this issue.

43. Mr. SEPULVEDA (Chile) (*translated from Spanish*): My delegation voted in favour of draft resolution I which the Special Political Committee now submits for the consideration and approval of the General Assembly in its report on the policies of *apartheid* of the Government of the Republic of South Africa [A/7348, para. 25].

44. We shall now vote again in favour of the draft resolution because, as we said in our explanation of vote in the Committee, we join fully in the resolution's condem-

nation of the policy of *apartheid* and its insistence on concepts of higher justice in social and human affairs.

45. In the general debate on this question in the Special Political Committee we expressly stated for the record that Chilean public opinion, being anti-racist and profoundly egalitarian, condemns with a clear conscience all forms of racial discrimination and therefore energetically opposes—as does the Chilean Government and its delegation to the United Nations—the existence of a régime which, in flagrant manner, seeks to thwart the principal achievements of modern civilization. We nevertheless made some reservations and abstained on some operative paragraphs of the draft resolution because we regretted that this document, far from indicating a new approach which would not meet with the disappointing fate of the earlier measures adopted to tackle this problem, in an unduly long text dwells on many unsuitable concepts and measures that so far have not led to any solution.

46. We make again, on this occasion, the reservations and objections which we made in the Committee and also wish to have placed on record our reservation with respect to paragraph 12 of the draft resolution concerning the suspension of cultural, educational, sporting and other types of completely unspecified exchanges with South Africa. We believe that culture, science, art, technology, education and other spiritual values of mankind should be sought and admired wherever they are found and that it is precisely through humanity's higher values that the social solidarity lacking in that country may best be achieved and that the racial problem which so odiously divides its inhabitants may be overcome.

47. We should have liked to see a more open and understanding attitude on the part of the majority which has been supporting the resolutions on the problem of *apartheid* adopted by the General Assembly in recent years, because, in a broader and more direct discussion with other regional groups and States principally concerned by the measures adopted, we should be able to achieve a greater measure of agreement, both on the resolutions adopted and on their application, and thus increase the effectiveness of the measures whose inefficacy has been deplored in the course of this debate.

48. Chile is sincerely interested that the United Nations should succeed in its noble task of eradicating and putting an end to the policy of *apartheid* and to racism wherever they may be found. For that reason, while we give our support to the draft resolution proposed by the Special Political Committee, we make these observations in a frank and friendly spirit in the hope that they may serve in future to bring about a more effective approach by the United Nations to one of the problems which are challenging most stubbornly its authority and its prestige.

49. The PRESIDENT: There are no other speakers in explanation of vote before the vote. I therefore now invite members to turn their attention to the recommendations of the Special Political Committee in paragraph 25 of its report [A/7348].

50. We shall first vote on draft resolution I. The Fifth Committee has submitted a report [A/7363] on the

administrative and financial implications of this draft resolution. I now put draft resolution I to the vote.

Draft resolution I was adopted by 85 votes to 2, with 14 abstentions [resolution 2396 (XXIII)].

51. The PRESIDENT: Next I put to the vote draft resolution II.

Draft resolution II was adopted by 102 votes to 2 [resolution 2397 (XXIII)].

52. The PRESIDENT: That concludes our consideration of agenda item 31.

AGENDA ITEM 64

Question of Namibia (*continued*):

(a) Report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples;

(b) Report of the United Nations Council for Namibia;

(c) Appointment of the United Nations Commissioner for Namibia

53. The PRESIDENT: Before giving the floor to the first speaker I would remind Members that at its 1730th plenary meeting the Assembly agreed to close the list of speakers on the debate on this item at 5 p.m. today.

54. Mr. OULD DADDAH (Mauritania) (*translated from French*): On 2 May 1968, during the General Assembly's debate on the grave problem of Namibia, the delegation of the Islamic Republic of Mauritania reiterated its grave concern at the non-implementation of General Assembly resolution 2145 (XXI) by which, on 27 October 1966, the General Assembly clearly and unequivocally terminated South Africa's mandate over Namibia. We voiced our concern at that time in the following terms:

“... Resolution 2145 (XXI) must not suffer the same fate at the hands of the Pretoria régime as did all the previous recommendations and resolutions of the United Nations. . . . It goes without saying that failure to apply, or to apply correctly, resolution 2145 (XXI) would be a serious blow to the prestige, the authority and the very meaning of the United Nations.” [1647th meeting, para. 4.]

55. Since the adoption of that resolution, each day that has passed has confirmed that our fears were justified. Did not the Pretoria authorities state, in the words of the head of the *apartheid* régime's diplomatic service on 14 March 1968, that they refused “to accept General Assembly resolution 2145 (XXI) as legally valid . . .”, adding that the opinion thus expressed “applied with equal force to all resolutions, including those of the Security Council” [A/7400/Rev.1, chap. VII, annex, para. 27].

56. Proof of this arrogance, this contempt for the most mandatory decisions of the United Nations, is given every day by the Pretoria authorities. The removal of populations in accordance with the despicable and inhuman policy of *apartheid* is continuing in Namibia. The Pretoria authorities

are thus continuing to defy with impunity the recognized and most sacred human rights in an international Territory within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United Nations. We see the *apartheid* régime forcibly removing non-Whites from their homes in Windhoek to the native quarter of Katutura. In carrying out their inhuman acts, in flagrant violation of human rights and the fundamental principles of the Charter and of international law, the South African police have not hesitated to torture, arrest and imprison those who have attempted to resist injustice by remaining in their homes.

57. In defiance of the Organization's most mandatory and explicit decisions concerning an international Territory within its exclusive jurisdiction, the oppressive *apartheid* régime is bent on breaking the unity of the Namibian people and destroying Namibia's territorial integrity and is seeking by this means to consolidate its illegal control of the Territory.

58. The bill to dismember Namibia, contrary to the provisions of General Assembly resolution 2288 (XXII) of 7 December 1967, was passed on 6 June 1968.¹ As is well known, that illegal bill, in flagrant violation of the Charter and of the virtually unanimous decisions of the Organization, provides for dividing up the Territory of Namibia into six separate homelands or Bantustans for the indigenous population. This action is dangerous for the unity of the Namibian people and was planned and carried out in absolute conformity with the despicable and inhuman policies of *apartheid*. We are thus witnessing the creation, on a racist tribal basis, of the homelands of Damaraland, Hereroland, Kaokoland, Okavangoland, Eastern Caprivi and Ovamboland. This fiendish act of division and disunion is now so far advanced that the Pretoria authorities have already instituted what they call “legislative councils” and “executive councils” in certain parts of that divided territory.

59. Since the Security Council, in resolution 246 (1968), recognized “its special responsibility towards the Territory of South West Africa”, and since the General Assembly, in resolution 2145 (XXI) of 27 October 1966, declared that Namibia comes under the direct responsibility of the United Nations, these bodies owe it to themselves to do everything possible to prevent such grave and continuing attacks by the *apartheid* régime on the territorial integrity of Namibia and on the freedom, dignity and most fundamental rights of the inhabitants of that international Territory.

60. As may be seen by every Member State in the last report of the United Nations Council for Namibia [A/7338 and Corr.1], on 25 October 1968 the *apartheid* régime's police extended the already long list of their innumerable crimes, whose innocent victims are the indigenous inhabitants of Namibia, by murdering forty-six Namibians and arbitrarily arresting 117 of the indigenous inhabitants of Eastern Caprivi.

61. Every mention of the criminal activities of the *apartheid* authorities in Namibia shows the gravity of the situation and the urgent need for our Organization to

¹ See *Development of Self-Government for Native Nations in South West Africa Act*, No. 54 of 1968.

discharge its responsibilities towards Namibia and the inhabitants of that international Territory. Murder, deportation, torture and imprisonment under the most inhuman and degrading conditions are now practices to which the South African authorities submit the inhabitants of Namibia. The only crime these men and women have committed is to show their determination to contribute to the liberation of their country, in conformity with resolution 2248 (S-V) by which the General Assembly decided that everything possible should be done to enable South West Africa to attain independence by June 1968.

62. The delegation of the Islamic Republic of Mauritania wishes to associate itself with the members of the United Nations Council for Namibia in calling the urgent attention of the Security Council to the grave situation which has been deliberately created in Namibia by the partisans of *apartheid*.

63. The delegation of Mauritania also wishes to appeal to all States and all United Nations specialized agencies, as well as to the International Red Cross, to help to bring some relief to the sufferings inflicted on the Namibians by the racist authorities of Pretoria.

64. The arrogance and contempt for the decisions of our Organization and for the fundamental principles of the Charter shown by the partisans of *apartheid*, represent, in the view of the delegation of the Islamic Republic of Mauritania, a grave danger to the very survival of the United Nations; such an attitude is highly prejudicial to the authority, significance and prestige of our Organization.

65. We have witnessed and we all know what is going on in other parts of the world, and particularly in the Middle East, where the Zionist authorities of Tel Aviv have been adopting the same attitude towards the decisions of the Organization as is taken by the partisans of *apartheid* in the Republic of South Africa itself and in the international Territory of Namibia towards decisions of the United Nations.

66. On 2 May 1968, speaking from this same rostrum on behalf of my Government, I made the following statement, which my delegation wishes to repeat today:

“The people and Government of the Islamic Republic of Mauritania, who have no taste for violence and are deeply attached to the ideals of the Charter, consider it unrealistic to pretend to believe that the peoples and nations of the world can trust and support any decision of the United Nations so long as its Members, and especially the members of the Security Council, hesitate to commit fully their power and their influence to change the intolerable situations in respect of which the United Nations has thus far given the world a disappointing impression of impotence and inertia. Only if all Member States take practical and determined action to restore justice and the rule of law can the great hopes and confidence which the peoples of the world placed in the United Nations during the first years of its existence be revived” [1647th meeting, para. 12].

67. My delegation continues to believe that this hope and trust of peoples to which we have just referred are crucial in the solution of such grave problems as disarmament, the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and peace-keeping.

68. It is the bounden duty of every Member State to help the United Nations to discharge its grave responsibilities towards the people of Namibia. Namibia is directly dependent on the authority of the United Nations. The Mauritanian delegation hopes that all Member States, in particular the great Powers, will at last decide to put a definite end to the usurpation and occupation by the South African forces of Namibia, an international Territory which comes under the direct responsibility and authority of the United Nations.

69. Unless such specific action is taken by all Member States in the United Nations, it is to be feared that the partisans of *apartheid* will continue to perpetrate their abominable crimes in Namibia. In that international Territory the racist authorities of Pretoria are indiscriminately subjecting the African people of Namibia to the most barbarous and inhuman treatment—murder, torture, arrest, imprisonment, deportation—in order to destroy the territorial integrity of Namibia and, through violence and intimidation, to keep the Namibian people in slavery.

70. The situation deliberately created by the racist authorities in Pretoria is fraught with danger and threatens peace and security in that part of southern Africa and throughout the world. It is an intolerable situation which, if it continues, will result in a bloody racial war that may lead to a conflagration of unforeseeable consequences and dimensions. Without concerted and resolute action, supported by all Member States, and in particular by the permanent members of the Security Council, what can the United Nations Council for Namibia, the United Nations Commissioner for Namibia or even the Secretary-General do to counter the brutal force adopted by the *apartheid* régime to oppose the decisions of the United Nations? Failing such action, the United Nations Council for Namibia will probably continue for some time to set up study committees and sub-committees and make recommendations with no real effect on the tragic situation imposed by the *apartheid* régime on the United Nations and on the Namibian people.

71. My delegation would like to express its gratitude to every member of the United Nations Council for Namibia for the work that the Council is continuing to do under painful psychological conditions and with insufficient material resources.

72. It fully shares the view expressed by the United Nations Council for Namibia in paragraph 44 of its report [A/7338 and Corr.1] which states:

“The Council reiterates its view that the responsibility of the United Nations to avert this threat”—“the likelihood of the outbreak of violence and racial war” created by the criminal actions of the racists of Pretoria in Namibia and southern Africa—“must be exercised resolutely and without delay.” . . . “The Council reiterates its view that it is only if all necessary measures are taken for the effective removal of South Africa’s presence from the Territory that the Council can be expected to discharge its primary functions effectively.”

73. My delegation ventures to hope that that appeal will be heeded. We also hope that the United Nations will eventually find sufficient energy and sense of justice to put

an end without delay and by the required means to the intolerable situation created in Namibia by the *apartheid* régime.

74. Mr. PIÑERA (Chile) (*translated from Spanish*): We are today confronted with a very long-standing and exceedingly complex problem which has not only necessitated statements and opinions by bodies such as the International Court of Justice but, as all representatives will remember, also led to the convening of a fifth special session of the General Assembly.

75. General Assembly resolution 2145 (XXI), which is of far-reaching importance, revoked the mandate entrusted to South Africa by the League of Nations. That resolution was adopted almost unanimously; only two countries abstained and only two voted against it. It is the basic text from which emanate all the resolutions adopted since 1966. It is with that resolution that the international community is now faced and it is that resolution, approved virtually unanimously by the Members of the United Nations, which makes the international community responsible for its implementation.

76. Unfortunately, as time has passed, we have seen that the machinery subsequently set up has, for various reasons, not proved very effective. The situation in Namibia, instead of improving, has continued slowly to deteriorate, endangering peace in the southern part of Africa and creating an unbearable situation for the people of Namibia, whose right to freedom was recognized by the General Assembly itself.

77. Chile is part of a continent far removed from Namibia; we are however united by remote brotherly ties, and have no relations with South Africa. We have fought consistently for the Namibian cause, defending something which is lasting, the principles which are dear to us, and trying to see that justice is done to a people which should be allowed to exercise its right to self-determination without delay. We have maintained that position in the General Assembly as well as in the meetings of the United Nations Council for Namibia.

78. In this situation we feel that the only effective approach would be for the Security Council, the body designated by the Charter to consider threats to international peace and security, to take action. We believe that the Security Council has so far failed to discharge this responsibility and that it is high time it did so. We believe that the Council has failed to use all its powers and has thus given South Africa the means to continue openly to defy this Organization, which is at present the best expression we have of the international community.

79. My delegation has always held that the mandate entrusted by the General Assembly [*resolution 2248 (S-V)*] to the United Nations Council for South West Africa presupposes that the Council may establish itself in that Territory; indeed we do not see how it can duly and fully carry out its functions unless it does so. It may no doubt meanwhile fulfil some purpose, but that is not enough, in the opinion of many countries, to justify the existence of that United Nations body so long as the Security Council, as has been said in many resolutions, does not empower the Council for Namibia to carry out its functions.

80. This problem, which we consider to be of vital importance for southern Africa, must not be left to another body which acts on the basis of its own inertia, thus detracting from a function which, by definition, must be executive. We do not believe it was the intention of the Members of the United Nations merely to create an organ with functions which it could not properly and fully discharge.

81. In order to avoid any possible misunderstanding, I wish to make it absolutely clear that, in our opinion, the work which the Council can do in the present circumstances, until it is allowed, with the help of the Security Council, to carry out its task in the Territory itself, is unfortunately limited by the terms of the resolutions that this General Assembly has adopted in the last two years, which do not allow it to take decisions or to fix a policy. That is why we think that the primary responsibility of our delegation is to explain our attitude; we do not take a rigid stand about the Council, of which Chile is a member and in which we believe that it has played a modest but honest part, as it will continue to do if the General Assembly so decides.

82. However, we should like to be realistic and to put the problem in its true perspective. In our opinion, in the present circumstances, the Council is not able fully to perform its functions. It can of course do useful work but on a modest scale; it can help the Namibian freedom-fighters; it can perhaps provide technical assistance, but it is not equipped to carry out all its functions in the present circumstances unless the Security Council and other appropriate bodies give it the means to implement not only the letter but also the spirit of General Assembly resolution 2145 (XXI), which marked a turning point in the history of the United Nations in its dealings with South Africa and Namibia, being the first time that the international community declared clearly and categorically that the Government of South Africa had no rights over Namibia.

83. That was the fundamental point adopted by the General Assembly and it is in accordance with that resolution that all those who voted for it should make every effort to see that it does not remain merely another declaration but becomes a living element in the future of a free, independent, sovereign people of Namibia. As we have already said, this problem, which is of such importance for southern Africa, cannot be confined within the limits of the modest work that the Council for Namibia can at present do.

84. The Council for Namibia has submitted its report [*A/7338 and Corr.1*] and, before commenting on it, my delegation would like to state for the record that, with all due respect for the work of the Council, of which Chile is a member, recommendation (1), as it appears on page 13, does not, in our opinion, exactly correspond to the Chilean point of view. We believe that the Security Council should be asked to tackle the problem and to use all appropriate means available to it, and that the Council itself should determine the way to set about implementing the much-quoted and yet only partially implemented resolution: General Assembly resolution 2145 (XXI).

85. Consequently, and so that there may be no misunderstanding, I should like to state here Chile's attitude in the

Council. We recognize, as we always have done in the Council for Namibia, that the Council should work as a unit, because it has a task, albeit a modest one, assigned to it by the General Assembly. However, the solidarity with the Council which we have always maintained and defended and shall continue to defend does not prevent us from offering clarification on a point which for our delegation is not entirely clear in the report.

86. We have adopted this position—which I would modestly venture to call realistic—on the question of Namibia because my delegation is aware that at present members of the Security Council are participating in the work of the Council for Namibia and are privileged to analyse the problem from different viewpoints, as is logical, within the Council for Namibia and within the Security Council, each of which has its own terms of reference, but both of which are united in a common effort—and I would stress this point—to implement resolution 2145 (XXI), adopted more than two years ago.

87. One of the matters that the Council for Namibia can deal with is certainly a problem which some might consider secondary but is of some importance because it concerns human beings—that is the question of the issue of passports and travel documents. Why has the Council dealt with it? Because, within the existing international legal framework, a passport is a document which allows a free man to exercise the first attribute of his freedom, which is mobility. That is why we have concerned ourselves, and shall continue to concern ourselves, with the means of enabling the inhabitants of Namibia to obtain travel documents and identification papers.

88. The Council's report indicates that most of the Namibian refugees, or at least a great many of them, are in Zambia and Tanzania. A small delegation is therefore to be sent to Dar es Salaam, Lusaka and other capitals, as appropriate, to begin negotiations and mobility of human beings. We are not unaware of the usefulness of on-the-spot negotiations. We know that the granting of these travel documents may encounter legal or constitutional difficulties in the various countries. However, we do not believe that we should for that reason abandon this fundamental task. On the contrary, we believe that, with the co-operation of the Secretary-General, the Commissioner and the Council itself shall be able to work out with the respective Governments, in particular those of Tanzania and Zambia, a solution to enable the inhabitants of Namibia to move about freely.

89. My delegation believes—we have stressed this point many times and have been supported by other delegations in the Council—that there is another task which was entrusted, in one of the first resolutions, not only to the Council for Namibia but also to that powerful instrument, the specialized agencies—I need not list them but I am thinking at present of FAO, UNESCO, the ILO, WHO, ICAO, UPU and the World Bank—that they, through discussions directed by the Council for Namibia, should co-ordinate the action which the countries' own regulations and machinery enable them to take with regard to the situation in Namibia. They can take certain effective steps; they can, for example, provide technical assistance to train the personnel who will have to govern Namibia when it

attains independence. They can also do other things. The International Civil Aviation Organization can determine how far Namibian flights and movements should be controlled by the Republic of South Africa and to what extent the Namibians themselves are entitled to set up their own system. If the other international organizations, which have their own governing bodies that are almost the same as the United Nations, make a modest effort to co-operate with our Council, they can actively assist a people which is seeking its freedom. They can also apply the measures laid down in their statutes and regulations to condemn any outrages committed by a neighbouring nation against the legitimate rights of the Namibian people to control their own destiny and decide on their own regulations.

90. We attach importance to this modest effort because, despite the exceptional problems which the Council for Namibia has to contend with in carrying out a mandate given to it by the Assembly with only two negative votes and two abstentions, it will continue, if the Assembly so wishes, to provide help so that, in the very near future, we may see the Namibian people living in freedom and independence.

91. My delegation had hoped to hear the largest possible number of speakers, in order to learn their ideas or suggestions for overcoming the insuperable difficulties with which we are faced. The eleven-member Council for Namibia would like to receive suggestions and proposals and hear the views of the international community. Perhaps the narrow framework of a Council needs the expression of such views, so that it can see how it can better carry out the task which I would venture to call—using a word that has been often repeated but that is none the less true—“sacred”.

92. As I say, we should have liked to hear the views of various delegations, in order to analyse their ideas and suggestions for solving the serious problem created for the community of nations by the refusal of one of its Members to implement its resolutions. I am not referring to the legal, juridical problem. I am referring to something much more important: moral force, which is reflected in the almost unanimous reaction of the international community, which had no difficulty in agreeing to adopt General Assembly resolution 2145 (XXI).

93. My delegation does not forget this. No argument can destroy the force of this moral decision to support the 1966 resolution. My delegation cannot and will not forget this. On the contrary, it will try to ensure that what was decided by this Assembly more than two years ago is carried out.

94. I do not wish to speak at length about the report of the United Nations Council for Namibia. I think that in essence it sets out the modest but positive steps that can be taken. At the same time, in the opinion of my delegation, it implicitly lays down the limitations of the Council for Namibia unless the international community, through its organs such as the Security Council, fulfils its obligation to support it.

95. Mr. PLAKA (Albania) (*translated from French*): The General Assembly has once again to consider the question

of Namibia, which has been the subject of innumerable debates in this Assembly in the past but which has still not been settled.

96. The Albanian delegation has taken an active part in these debates and has expressed its opinion on all aspects of the question, resolutely supporting the just cause of the Namibian people and its courageous struggle for independence against the South African racists and their colonialist and imperialist protectors. Our fundamental position, which was made perfectly clear, in particular at the twenty-first regular session [1628th and 1656th meetings] and the fifth special session [1509th meeting] of the General Assembly, is well known here and remains unchanged.

97. In fact, as we did not fail to point out, the United Nations, despite the efforts made here by the delegations of the peace- and freedom-loving Member States, has shown itself incapable of helping the Namibian people in their struggle for freedom. The colonialist and imperialist Powers—first and foremost the United States of America—have not only done everything possible to prevent our Organization from achieving effective results in accordance with the Charter on this question, which concerns the inalienable right of a people to live in freedom and independence, but also involved the Organization in the machinery of procedure by setting up special committees and councils and by constantly postponing the solution of the problem. These Powers are in fact always seeking to bring the question to an impasse, to deceive the people of the Territory, and to distract them from their liberation struggle, leaving them perpetually waiting for the United Nations to find a solution to this problem—a solution which, after twenty-two consecutive years, has not yet appeared on the horizon. These Powers are thus leaving the South African Fascists with their hands free to continue their criminal policy of *apartheid* and their policy of denationalization through the setting up of Bantustans and by their savage oppression of that freedom-loving people. This is due to the state of paralysis which exists in this Organization because of the pernicious influence exerted on it by the United States imperialists and their collaborators, who obstinately persist in using this Organization to further their imperialistic plans for world domination.

98. A typical case is the fate of General Assembly resolution 2145 (XXI), which, although it did not provide a complete solution to the problem, did represent a step in the desired direction. But even that incomplete resolution has not been implemented, just as dozens of other General Assembly resolutions on this problem have remained dead letters. The Fascist Vorster clique is continuing its illegal occupation of Namibia, contrary to the irrevocable decision of the General Assembly at its twenty-first session, and continues to defy world public opinion, and even the United Nations itself, as has once again been shown by the obstinate attitude of the representatives of the racist Pretoria régime during this very debate. In association with the monopolies of the United States and other western countries established in that Territory, the South African colonialists are persisting in the most rapacious colonial domination and the most insatiable exploitation of the human resources and natural wealth of that country.

99. The main responsibility for this intolerable situation in Namibia lies with the imperialist and colonial Powers members of NATO—particularly the United States of America, which consistently supply South Africa with multilateral political, economic and military assistance in pursuance of their policy of colonial domination and enslavement of southern Africa, and indeed the entire African continent. American imperialism, which is the main bulwark of colonial and racial domination in the world, is sparing no effort to strengthen the bloc of racist régimes in southern Africa in order to perpetuate colonial domination and exploitation and to stifle the liberation movement of the oppressed African peoples.

100. In this sinister activity the American imperialists have the full support of the Soviet revisionists, who, despite their noisy propaganda designed to deceive world public opinion, are undermining the struggle of the oppressed peoples for national and social liberation and are making common cause with the American imperialists, those sworn enemies of the peoples, in order to stifle the great liberation movement of the peoples of the world and further their policy of world supremacy.

101. The Namibian people are well aware of this neo-colonial policy of the two great Powers which is the principal cause of the unjustifiable position adopted by the United Nations towards the Namibian people's inalienable right to freedom and independence. They have no confidence in the United Nations, including the Security Council; nor do the oppressed peoples of Southern Rhodesia, Angola, Mozambique, Palestine, etc., have any illusions about the United Nations or look to it for their liberation. This has been proved by the determination of the Namibian people, who, notwithstanding the difficulties and obstacles to be overcome, have taken up arms and are now waging a courageous fight, which is the only just way of ensuring final victory against the South African colonialists and their imperialist protectors. In this fight for freedom, which is part of the national and social liberation movement of the African peoples, the Namibian people enjoy the support and solidarity of all the revolutionary peoples of the world.

102. The Albanian people and Government have followed with particular interest the struggle of the Namibian people for freedom, and express their complete solidarity with them. In accordance with the revolutionary policy of support for the struggles of oppressed peoples for national, social and political liberation—a policy resolutely followed by the Government of the Peoples's Republic of Albania, my delegation has fought here with the African delegations and with those of all freedom-loving countries to help that martyred people in its liberation struggle and has opposed all the political manoeuvres and plots of the colonial and imperialist Powers and their collaborators.

103. The Albanian delegation expresses its conviction that the people of Namibia, by persisting in their armed struggle, will surely triumph and will inflict total defeat on the South African colonialists.

104. Mr. MARTINEZ (Argentina) (*translated from Spanish*): My delegation has deemed it necessary to address the General Assembly this afternoon in order to offer some

observations which we hope will contribute to a better analysis of the question of Namibia. It is also my intention to draw special attention to some particular aspects which are stressed in the reports of the United Nations Council for Namibia [A/7338 and Corr.1] and of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples [A/7200/Rev.1, chap. VII].

105. The question of Namibia is probably one of the problems that have received most attention in the Assembly's deliberations throughout all of its sessions. Furthermore, all United Nations organs, both principal and subsidiary alike, have considered it. What is more, special subsidiary bodies have been set up to study the problem. The question has also been raised in the specialized agencies and other bodies connected with the United Nations,

106. However, in this exhaustive study of the question, a new approach was taken at the twenty-first session of the General Assembly. Resolution 2145 (XXI) declared terminated the mandate conferred by the League of Nations upon the Government of His Britannic Majesty to be exercised through the intermediary of the Government of South Africa in what was then called the Territory of South West Africa. That resolution marks a definite turning point in the consideration of this question and, since that time, the whole approach to the problem has changed substantially.

107. Since my delegation was one of the sponsors of resolution 2145 (XXI), it is unnecessary for me to explain at length our attitude towards it. We have listened carefully to the South African Government's arguments about the powers of the General Assembly and the legal nature of the mandate received from the League of Nations. However, we do not consider these arguments to be valid and we confirm our position on resolution 2145 (XXI).

108. In our opinion, revocability is an inherent characteristic of the mandate and the competent body of the Organization which succeeded the mandator is empowered to revoke the mandate, particularly if the latter is not being carried out in accordance with the principles on the basis of which it was originally conferred. Our reiterated support of resolution 2145 (XXI) makes any further explanations unnecessary.

109. The important point is that ever since resolution 2145 (XXI) was adopted by the General Assembly, a State Member of the Organization has time and again confronted the United Nations with a *de facto* situation which does not conform to the standards adopted. This therefore, is the new aspect of the question.

110. My delegation repeats that General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) is fully applicable to the Territory of Namibia and to its people, who are entitled to political self-determination and to attain freely their economic, social and cultural development. We also wish to state here emphatically that the people of Namibia have the right of access to the natural wealth of their territory, that no Power or any kind of interests can limit that access and that no one can exploit the wealth of that Territory by using methods or procedures which are discriminatory with

regard to the payment of labour or irrational in disregarding the longer-term value of the sources of that wealth. These rights of the people of the Territory are clearly set forth in General Assembly resolution 2288 (XXII), of which my delegation was also a sponsor.

111. Apart from the decisions of the General Assembly and the guidelines set by the United Nations and by the specialized agencies, certain political changes are taking place in the Territory and the formal conditions for further changes have been established. The reports of the Special Committee of Twenty-Four [A/7200/Rev.1, chap. VII] and the United Nations Council for Namibia [A/7338 and Corr.1] which are before us, describe these changes.

112. I feel obliged to say that these changes are not only contrary to the decisions of this Organization, but also prejudicial to the people of the Territory and actually tend to consolidate the sorry situation in southern Africa.

113. Delegations here know full well that real political sovereignty requires a minimum of economic viability. This economic viability is achieved naturally in territories which are not divided. A spontaneous historical and sociological tendency makes for the formation of nations in accordance with certain principles, one of which is precisely economic viability. But if territories are divided artificially, if the reason for that division is desire for hegemony, that viability is not achieved and, therefore, true sovereignty becomes impossible.

114. My delegation has previously expressed its deep concern at the evidence that the Government of South Africa, which maintains political control over Namibia against the will of the General Assembly, proposes to carry out a dangerous parcelling out of the Territory. This point is clearly set forth in the reports which I have cited, and it is clear that the principle of territorial integrity proclaimed in operative paragraph 6 of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) is thus being violated.

115. A few weeks ago, when the General Assembly approved the admission of Equatorial Guinea as a new Member of the Organization [resolution 2384 (XXIII)] the head of my delegation gave credit [1714th meeting] to the former administering Power for the effort it had made to promote the union of various ethnic groups. The report of the Trusteeship Council [A/7204] and the statements made last week in the Fourth Committee by the representatives of France and Liberia [1814th meeting] testify to the effort being made by Australia to strengthen the national consciences of the peoples of the Territories of Papua and New Guinea. These are examples worthy of emulation in our Organization and are evidence of proper compliance with the principles enunciated in resolution 1514 (XV).

116. As we all know, resolution 1514 (XV), which guided the process of decolonization that has been carried out over the past few decades, contains a well thought out combination of principles designed to govern this process. It is incumbent upon the General Assembly, which framed that resolution, to see that it is properly implemented.

117. My country has a clear and long-standing tradition of defence of human rights. I am proud to state here that my

people do not know what discrimination based on the colour of a man's skin means. My Government and people are therefore unable to understand the philosophy of separate development and still less to accept its practical applications.

118. What in some cases may constitute a question of human rights, in the particular case of Namibia acquires a special significance due to the international "status" of the Territory. The United Nations cannot tolerate that discriminatory policies should be applied in a Territory for which it is responsible. On this point my Government's position is well known and remains unchanged.

119. Other delegations have referred to different aspects of the Namibian question which I do not consider it necessary to repeat now. My delegation understands and

pays a tribute to those African neighbour countries which have been assisting the people of Namibia.

120. The position adopted by the General Assembly concerning the future of the Territory of Namibia should be confirmed once more as a reaffirmation of the will of the international community, in accordance with an irreversible historical process.

121. It is also necessary to adopt pragmatic criteria which, taking into account the nature of this Organization and what it is able to do, may prove effective in ensuring that the South African administration withdraws from Namibia and thus enables the United Nations effectively to assume its own responsibilities towards the Territory.

The meeting rose at 5.20 p.m.