



CONTENTS

	Page
Agenda item 28:	
Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (<i>continued</i>):	
(a) Report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament	1

Chairman: Mr. Ismail FAHMY
(United Arab Republic).

AGENDA ITEM 28

Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (*continued*)

**(a) Report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation
Committee on Disarmament (A/7072 and Add.1-
DC/230 and Add.1; A/7080; A/C.1/959-960, A/C.1/
963; A/C.1/L.421/Rev.2)**

1. The CHAIRMAN: As members of the Committee will have noted, there is a revised text of the draft resolution before the Committee, sponsored by Afghanistan and twenty-eight other Members, that has been circulated in document A/C.1/L.421/Rev.2.

2. Before I call on the first speaker for this afternoon, I should like to inform the Committee of my plans for the rest of this week and for next week.

3. If there is no objection, it is my intention that the general debate on item 28 (a) should finish on Friday.

It was so decided.

4. The CHAIRMAN: In this same connexion, I hope that all delegations will co-operate with the Chair by making their speeches at the time and in the order listed for them on the list of speakers. For the information of the Committee, there are some delegations which, for various reasons, have been unable to speak. It was difficult to accommodate them because doing so might result in reopening the general debate. However, if I find that there is sufficient time for all, or at least some of them, to speak, I shall arrange for them to do so. But if the Committee wishes to hear all of them, then I think we are bound to have a meeting tomorrow. At any rate, I shall do my best to accommodate everyone and to avoid the inconvenience of bringing representatives here especially for a meeting tomorrow. I shall inform the Committee at a later stage of what course of action I intend to take.

5. The second point is that, as from Monday next, I shall allow representatives to make statements or explanations of vote on the draft resolution or resolutions which are before

the Committee. I hope that once we finish those statements or explanations of vote on the draft resolution some time next week we can then proceed to a vote. This does not mean that delegations which prefer to make their explanations of vote after the vote will be prevented from doing so; I shall call on them after the voting has taken place.

6. I call on the representative of Finland to make a statement on behalf of the sponsors of the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.421/Rev.2.

7. Mr. JAKOBSON (Finland): The debate in the First Committee on the question of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons has now lasted close to five weeks; more than seventy delegations have so far taken part in it. The whole issue of halting the spread of nuclear weapons, with all its far-reaching implications, has been subjected to a most extensive and searching international analysis. The debate has confirmed the nearly unanimous support of Member States for the principal purpose of the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, as it is expressed in articles I and II of the draft treaty.¹ While some of the voices of disappointment that we have heard may be regarded as protests against the state of the world rather than against the draft treaty itself, many delegations have contributed in their statements valuable suggestions and ideas designed to ensure that the result of the work of this Committee and the General Assembly will most effectively serve both the security and the economic development of all nations.

8. The delegations sponsoring draft resolution A/C.1/L.421 of 1 May have carefully examined the views expressed in the course of the debate and have revised their draft so as to take into account views and suggestions put forward by other delegations. The revised draft [A/C.1/L.421/Rev.2], dated 28 May, has been circulated for members of the Committee.

9. In response to the widespread concern expressed about future peaceful uses of nuclear energy, the second preambular paragraph of the draft resolution has been rewritten to stress the urgency and great importance not only of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, but also of intensifying international co-operation in the development of peaceful applications of atomic energy. In addition, the preamble has been strengthened by a new paragraph stating the conviction that:

“...pursuant to the provisions of the Treaty, all signatories have the right to engage in research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and will be able to acquire source and special fissionable

¹ *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1967 and 1968, document DC/230 and Add.1, annex I.*

materials, as well as equipment for the processing, use and production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes”.

10. The preamble of the draft resolution has been further revised to emphasize the conviction widely expressed in our debate that the treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons:

“... must be followed as soon as possible by effective measures on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and on nuclear disarmament . . .”.

11. Operative paragraph 4 of the draft resolution now makes clear that the nuclear-weapon States as well as the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament are requested “to pursue negotiations” on such measures “at an early date”. I also wish to draw the attention of the Committee to the change made in operative paragraph 3 expressing the hope “for the widest possible adherence to the Treaty by” the nuclear-weapon States as well as the non-nuclear-weapon States.

12. The debate in the Committee has brought out the need for underlining, in the present context, the responsibility of all States to act in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter. For this reason, the following new paragraph has been added to the preamble of the draft resolution:

“*Affirming* that in the interest of international peace and security both nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States carry the responsibility of acting in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations that the sovereign equality of all States shall be respected, that the threat or use of force in international relations shall be refrained from and that international disputes shall be settled by peaceful means”.

13. Finally, an important change has been made in operative paragraph 1, which now “commends” instead of “endorses” the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. That change of wording will bring this draft resolution into line with resolution 2222 (XXI) on the Treaty on the exploration and use of outer space.

14. The resolution which the General Assembly will adopt on the subject of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons will form an integral part of the legislative process by which the treaty to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons will come into force. The text of the resolution, therefore, will have an important bearing on the implementation of that treaty. The sponsors of the draft resolution that is now before the Committee are convinced that the draft in its revised form will ensure that the international order relating to nuclear weapons which will be established by the non-proliferation treaty will be operated in a manner that takes into account the legitimate interests of all nations.

15. The CHAIRMAN: Before calling on the next speaker I should like also to inform the Committee that I intend to close the list of those who wish to make statements on the draft resolution or explanations of vote on Tuesday next, at 1 p.m., and I urge all representatives who would like to participate in that debate to be kind enough to inform the Secretary of the Committee of their desire to do so. If there is no objection it will be so decided.

It was so decided.

16. Mr. FAKHREDDINE (Sudan): Speaking at the latter stage of the debate on the report of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, the delegation of the Sudan has had the opportunity to listen with care and attention to the criticism of the draft treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons which is now before the Committee.

17. We should like to acknowledge, at the outset, the force and cogency of some of the arguments advanced here for making the proposed treaty a more effective and durable instrument.

18. The Sudan delegation, in common with many other delegations which spoke before us, would have preferred a draft of the treaty that contained an undertaking on the part of the nuclear Powers to restrict the production and deployment of nuclear weapons and offensive missiles. We should have preferred a treaty that contained a declaration that nuclear weapons would not be used against a non-nuclear country. Our sponsorship of the draft resolution as revised, recommending the endorsement of the draft treaty as it now stands, is, therefore, not due to the fact that we consider the present draft an ideal instrument for the realization of the objectives so often cited in this debate—of balancing the rights and obligations of nuclear and non-nuclear Powers and providing adequate security for those countries which decided to renounce all nuclear weapons. We do consider, however, that the revised draft resolution should meet some of the objections that have been raised. Nevertheless, our advocacy of the treaty stems mainly from the realization that, with the present rapid pace of technological development, the number of countries with the capability to produce nuclear weapons will steadily increase and, in an international climate so charged with tension, the pressures on some of these countries with nuclear capability to take the fateful step of manufacturing nuclear weapons may be difficult to resist.

19. It seems from the available evidence that seven countries not at present possessing nuclear weapons are capable of producing them independently within a relatively short period of time. Apart from those comparatively few countries which are now capable of independently producing their own nuclear weapons, there are thirty-six countries possessing nuclear power or nuclear research reactors. At present, few of the thirty-six countries possessing nuclear reactors have the economic or technological capacity that would sustain any viable nuclear weapon production programme. But, in the absence of any restraint, many of these countries may decide, even at the risk of overburdening their economy, to undertake such a programme. The facilities and technology for at least one process of plutonium separation are not difficult to acquire, and when this weapons-grade plutonium is produced the acquisition of explosion technology becomes even more feasible.

20. The decision on the part of any of these countries to manufacture nuclear weapons would be bound to stimulate and provoke others to follow the same course. This danger the non-proliferation treaty—imperfect as it is—seeks to avoid. At the present moment, we have nothing better than this draft treaty, and it is our opinion that, if we delay its adoption, we may have nothing at all.

21. The urgency of the need for concluding a treaty of non-proliferation now has been stressed by many speakers; it has been called into doubt by others. But a review of the attitudes of Member States through the years succeeding the conclusion of the Moscow partial test-ban Treaty, signed on 5 August 1963; will readily and graphically demonstrate the urgency of concluding a non-proliferation treaty.

22. The conclusion of the Moscow partial test-ban Treaty was hailed as a significant curb on the nuclear arms race—as indeed it was. Most of the non-nuclear Powers urged at the time that this significant measure of nuclear disarmament should be followed by further disarmament measures. The Conference of the African Heads of State held in Cairo in July 1964 proclaimed the readiness of the States of the African continent to undertake, through an international agreement to be concluded under United Nations auspices, not to manufacture or control atomic weapons. The Conference further appealed to all peace-loving nations to accept the same undertaking, as it appealed to all nuclear Powers to respect that declaration and conform to it. The conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held in Cairo in October 1964, asked the great Powers to abstain from all policies conducive to the dissemination of nuclear weapons and their by-products among those States which did not at the time possess them. It underlined the great danger in the dissemination of nuclear weapons and urged all States, particularly those possessing nuclear weapons, to conclude non-dissemination agreements and to agree on measures providing for the gradual liquidation of the existing stockpiles of nuclear weapons. Those declarations were supported by the generality of non-nuclear States; but the nuclear test ban in all environments continued to be an illusive goal, and the arms race between the two major Powers increased in its pace and intensity. The hope for concluding a treaty on non-proliferation was still remote.

23. It is therefore understandable that some of the nations which were at one time ardent advocates of further measures of disarmament and would have welcomed a treaty on non-proliferation some years ago, are now less enthusiastic. This very attitude indicates that delay in the adoption of disarmament measures will breed disillusion.

24. If the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is not concluded now, if it does not become operative this year, then we can safely predict that the ranks of its supporters will have become visibly thinner by next year. If, at the time this treaty becomes operative, it is not followed by serious measures of nuclear disarmament, then we can be virtually certain that the nuclear-weapon States will have to admit some more members into their “club”. The danger to peace will be more present and palpable, the urge for more States to join the “club” will be more irresistible, and any further measures of disarmament will be more difficult. Should we not then interpret this treaty in the light of the urgency of our need, and should we not support it as a measure of defence against the menace of nuclear war, realizing that, defective though it may be, there is greater danger in its rejection?

25. Many substantive provisions of the draft treaty before this Committee have been fully discussed, but we consider

it our duty, even at the risk of being repetitious, to explain our stand with regard to some of these provisions.

26. One of the major criticisms directed against the treaty referred to the exclusion of the non-nuclear Powers from manufacturing or acquiring control over explosive devices. This exclusion has been presented as a major deprivation that the provisions of article V do nothing to mitigate.

27. We consider that the inclusion of explosive devices, regardless of the fact that they may be intended for peaceful uses, within the ambit of nuclear weaponry flows logically from the central concept of this treaty, that is, the restriction of the possession and control of nuclear weapons. We consider that, in the present circumstances, the exclusion of explosive nuclear devices for peaceful uses from the treaty prohibitions would present a major deficiency of control. It may well be thought that article III of the treaty provides for a system of safeguards which, if diligently applied, will obviate the danger of any clandestine development of nuclear weapons. We submit that this may not be the case since any agreement on safeguards is subject to the provision that any country, in exercising its national sovereignty, may withdraw from the treaty if it decides that some extraordinary events have occurred which would jeopardize its supreme interests if it continued to adhere to the treaty. It is not unlikely that a decision by any country to renounce the treaty would be related to its decision that it was not in its best interests to be without nuclear weapons.

28. In the case of such a hypothetical country, the danger of its developing nuclear weaponry would be lessened if it were not in possession of the materials and technology for the production of nuclear explosive devices. Further, and regardless of the fact that the materials and technology for the production of nuclear explosive devices for peaceful uses are basically the same as the technology and materials needed for production of nuclear weapons, part of the psychological advantage of the possession of nuclear weapons is directly related to the superiority in number, range, deployment and destructive capacity of such weapons as may be in the possession of a particular country over the number, range, deployment and destructive capacity of the nuclear weapons possessed by any possible adversary. Thus, the development by any particular country of the technology that can be rapidly converted into arms production may well proceed under the guise of peaceful development in order to lull potential adversaries into a position of false security until such time as that particular country is able to multiply and diversify its arsenal to the point that it considers its capability adequate for securing the advantage of superior capacity over its adversary.

29. Further, the situation can well be imagined where such a country would use this advantage even to the extent of striking a first blow in the hope of completely incapacitating an enemy unarmed with nuclear weapons or having such an inferior nuclear capacity that its retaliation potential could be neutralized with the minimum of sacrifice.

30. The question of security guarantees is another aspect of the treaty that has been the subject of extensive comment in this Committee. It has been maintained that

the Security Council draft resolution providing for immediate action in the case of aggression with nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear State does not provide sufficient assurance or adequate protection.

31. The alternative suggested was to incorporate a guarantee of security in the treaty, since the Security Council, it was said, is often hamstrung by disagreement and delay. This position is maintained in spite of the fact that, in the case of the failure of the Security Council to act with necessary and adequate despatch, there remains the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence.

32. The delegation of the Sudan does not seek to cast any doubt on the validity of the argument that the non-proliferation treaty and the proposed Security Council resolution on assurances² do not by themselves add much to what is already provided for in the Charter of the United Nations and that the extraordinary threat of annihilation by nuclear weapons requires extraordinary guarantees to those who renounce the use of nuclear weapons. The danger is so overwhelming that it is certainly legitimate to ask that the defensive action should be as speedy and effective as possible. The fear is so real that one finds justification for the hesitancy. However, it is well to remember that any criticism directed against relating security assurances to action by the Security Council is really a general criticism of the peace-keeping capability of the United Nations system. What we are really saying is that the United Nations, in certain circumstances, is not equipped to perform its major function—the maintenance of peace. It may well follow from that position that no responsible Government could entrust the security of its country to the United Nations, especially when it was facing the threat of a nuclear war.

33. Yet that argument, valid though it may be, cannot really be advanced as a criticism of the non-proliferation treaty and the remedy, if remedy is at all possible, should be directed towards the improvement of the peace-keeping capability of the United Nations. Again we are faced with a choice—a choice between some security assurances and no assurances at all; and to us the choice seems clear.

34. In the context of world peace and security, article VI of the draft treaty is most crucial as it contains the obligation that the parties to the treaty undertake “to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race . . . and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control”.

35. It has been sufficiently demonstrated that there is no lasting safety in the competitive accumulation of weapons. As we are reminded in the report of the Secretary-General on this subject, the arms race would inevitably lead

“ . . . not to a uniform state of security but, as has been said, to phases of major insecurity which alternate with periods in which relative security seems assured. The pace of this race cannot be expected to slow down until concrete steps are taken which lead to disarmament and which promote the security of all nations”. [*A/6858 and Corr.1, para. 80.*]

² *Ibid.*, annex II.

36. It is implicit in the logic of this argument that consecutive disarmament measures should follow each other—each as a step in the ascension towards a state where the world will be without arms.

37. The treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is a significant step in this direction. However, if it is to be credible and durable, if it is to represent some real progress, it must be followed by other steps. The non-nuclear Powers which have demonstrated their good faith by supporting the draft of this treaty expect the nuclear Powers to demonstrate their goodwill by proceeding speedily to some further measures of disarmament.

38. The dangers of delay cannot be overemphasized. The non-proliferation treaty cannot stand alone; and unless it is followed by other concrete steps to make the world a safer place, its promise will remain unfulfilled. We would be left, to paraphrase T. S. Eliot:

“ . . . in the middle of the way . . . where every attempt is a wholly new start and a different kind of failure. Because one has only learnt to get the better of words”.

This failure we cannot afford.

39. Mr. ROSSIDES (Cyprus): My delegation is happy that the deliberations on this item in the present resumed session of the Assembly are being conducted, Mr. Chairman, under your wise guidance, with the spirit of objectivity and tact that has marked your chairmanship of this Committee during the regular session of the General Assembly.

40. After long deliberations over many years, the General Assembly now has before it a draft treaty on non-proliferation agreed upon by three of the nuclear Powers, Members of the United Nations, namely, the Soviet Union, the United States and the United Kingdom.

41. My delegation welcomes this development. We consider it a positive step forward—the result of long and arduous negotiations on a subject that presented no little difficulties, involving the concern of many States as well as the wider interest of the world community. I wish therefore to offer our congratulations to the protagonists of this treaty and particularly to the co-Chairmen of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, the representatives of the Soviet Union and the United States, and also to express our appreciation for the constructive contribution of the other members and particularly of the non-nuclear members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. At the same time, we stress the need that the co-operation shown on this item between the super-Powers be extended to the more fundamental issues of nuclear disarmament.

42. My country is certainly not one which has a nuclear potential nor is it at all likely to develop atomic energy for peaceful uses by itself. We therefore have no specific knowledge or experience to bring to this Committee. Our interest in the subject is that of a member of the world community concerned over the growing hazards from the accelerated development of nuclear weapons and their unrestricted proliferation. Cyprus, from the very day it joined the United Nations, supported every effort toward international understanding and co-operation and every

resolution designed to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons and all initiatives in that direction. As participants in the Second Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries in 1964 in Cairo, we joined in the Conference request to the great Powers:

“...to abstain from all policies conducive to the dissemination of nuclear weapons and their by-products among those States which do not at present possess them”.³

It is in that spirit that we approach the subject of our present debate.

43. The international community has been concerned with the spread of nuclear weapons for over a decade now. It was in the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission in 1956 that the Soviet Union first proposed a ban on the stationing of atomic weapons.⁴ It was followed in 1957 by a proposal by the United States, Canada, France and the United Kingdom that nuclear Powers signing a treaty would undertake not to transfer nuclear weapons out of their control.⁵

44. The General Assembly first discussed this matter at its thirteenth session in 1958, when Ireland, a pioneering spirit, submitted a draft resolution⁶ on the subject but did not press it. In 1959, a new Irish draft was overwhelmingly adopted as resolution 1380 (XIV). What did it propose? It proposed an inspected international agreement

“...whereby the Powers producing nuclear weapons would refrain from handing over the control of such weapons to any nation not possessing them and whereby the Powers not possessing such weapons would refrain from manufacturing them”.

45. Only three nations were atomic Powers at the time. It was in 1961 that a draft resolution on non-proliferation submitted by Ireland was unanimously adopted in the General Assembly as resolution 1665 (XVI) which has since become a landmark in disarmament history. This resolution called upon all States to use their best endeavours to conclude an international agreement under which

“...nuclear States would undertake to refrain from relinquishing control of nuclear weapons and from transmitting the information necessary for their manufacture to States not possessing such weapons... would undertake not to manufacture or otherwise acquire control of such weapons”.

46. In view of the unanimous adoption of that resolution it was a natural expectation that a draft treaty based on it would have been agreed upon and presented within a reasonable time. However, it has taken seven long years of deliberations and discussions in various forums before that resolution became crystallized in the present draft treaty.

47. However, in the intervening period of those seven years conditions have changed further in a rapidly moving

world. The number of nuclear weapon Powers increased to five, the People's Republic of China being one of them. Furthermore, many other States have, in the meantime, acquired nuclear expertise, so that a new meaningful distinction has had to be made between the five nuclear-weapon Powers and civilian nuclear States—of which there are now two dozen or more.

48. Following upon this development, a new resolution was adopted by the General Assembly at its twentieth session in 1965—resolution 2028 (XX)—setting out the five cardinal principles upon which an international treaty to prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons should be based. In the circumstances of these developments, when the present treaty was presented, a number of reservations to the draft treaty were made in this debate with regard to its non-compliance with General Assembly resolution 2028 (XX). At the same time positive assessments of the draft have been eloquently presented by the co-sponsors and many other States.

49. Dr. Fahmy, our indefatigable Chairman, has described the treaty as “the most important document on which the United Nations has been called upon to act since the very inception of this world Organization” [*1556th meeting, para. 3*]. That there are real benefits to be derived from this treaty can hardly be disputed. The reservations are, however, with regard to certain shortcomings which it is felt could be overcome. We feel certain that they should, and will, receive the required close consideration by the nuclear Powers, not only in reference to their merit, but also in an effort to ensure the widest possible ratification of the treaty, and essentially by the civilian nuclear States.

50. The most important reservation is that the treaty does not conform with the principle of an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations of the nuclear and non-nuclear Powers, as provided in principle (b) of General Assembly resolution 2028 (XX). This reservation has reference to the absence from the treaty of any commitment or pledge by the nuclear Powers to contain their own unrestricted vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons. It also has reference to other aspects of the treaty.

51. But with regard to that aspect, it is thought that, while the treaty prohibits non-nuclear States from manufacturing nuclear weapons, it places no restraint on the freedom of the nuclear Powers to increase their own nuclear arsenals and to pursue by underground tests the unrestricted exploration for more sophisticated and more formidable weapons of nuclear destruction.

52. The Secretary-General's report on the effects and implications of nuclear weapons points, with equal emphasis, to the grave dangers from both

“...any further increase in the number of nuclear weapons States or any further elaboration of existing nuclear arsenals...” [*A/6858 and Corr.1. para. 82*].

Indeed, the accelerated exploration for anti-ballistic missile systems in a vicious circle is already edging on the borders of uncontrollability. Humanity thus becoming entrapped in the mechanical enslavement of its own creation would be inexorably driven to its apocalyptic doom. It is therefore a matter of concern that the treaty bypasses the respon-

³ Document A/5763, Sect. VII.

⁴ *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for January to December 1956*, document DC/83, annex 5.

⁵ *Ibid.*, *Supplement for January to December 1957*, document DC/113, annex 5.

⁶ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirteenth Session, Annexes*, agenda items 64, 70 and 72, document A/C.1/L.206.

sibility of the nuclear Powers to arrest or reduce the spiral of nuclear weapons in the over-continuing arms race between them.

53. It is true that in article VI of the draft treaty there is an undertaking to

“... pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control”.

However, this undertaking merely commits them to pursuing negotiations. In the past long negotiations yielded no results. The promise of such renewed negotiations without any other commitment does not reflect the required balance of mutual responsibilities and undertakings in a common effort to restrain the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

54. Particularly discouraging is the fact that the draft treaty, in its relevant article VI, makes no mention of specific collateral measures which, by reason of their urgency and their advanced stage of negotiation, were considered mature enough to be given priority for final conclusion by the members of the General Assembly, including the affirmative vote of the nuclear Powers which were sponsors of the present draft. Take for example a comprehensive test-ban treaty to complete the unfinished work begun five years ago with the partial test-ban Treaty. In General Assembly resolution 2162 (XXI), the said comprehensive test-ban treaty is specifically mentioned, together with a non-proliferation treaty, as the two collateral measures of equal priority on which negotiations should be pursued urgently with a view to reaching agreement. Under the relevant portion of the resolution, the General Assembly

“Requests the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to pursue new efforts towards achieving substantial progress in reaching agreement on the question of general and complete disarmament . . . and . . . on an international treaty to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and on the completion of the test-ban treaty so as to cover underground nuclear-weapon tests”

The two treaties were placed in equal position of priority.

55. It is therefore a matter of surprise that the nuclear Powers, in agreeing on one of the measures in the present draft treaty, have avoided even the mention of the second measure, the comprehensive draft treaty in article VI. This is particularly odd as negotiations “with a sense of urgency” by the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to conclude this treaty were specifically requested in two previous General Assembly resolutions, namely, resolutions 1910 (XVIII) and 2032 (XX).

56. My delegation would suggest—without making a formal proposal—that article VI of the draft treaty and the corresponding paragraph of the draft resolution could profitably be amended by making specific mention of the collateral measures to be tackled in priority. Such a reference would indicate that the nuclear Powers intend and are prepared to proceed with a view to concluding

agreement on the treaties that they have already elaborated. The absence of that reference would make it appear that there is no prospect for the negotiations that were carried out on these collateral measures in order to reach agreement.

57. The next step in the comprehensive test-ban treaty would be the cut-off of production of fissionable materials as well as a freeze on the manufacture of nuclear weapons so as to bring the arms race to a halt. This would make it possible to proceed with measures of disarmament proper through the reduction of nuclear stockpiles, which already have an excessive over-kill capacity in relation to what is a logical level of deterrence.

58. A second reservation on the draft treaty made in this Committee relates to the assurances to be extended to the non-nuclear States signatories to the treaty. As has been pointed out by many delegations, the draft does not provide for adequate commitment by the signatory nuclear Powers that they will neither use nor threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear States parties to the treaty. The point has also been made that the undertaking of immediate action by the Security Council and its permanent members in cases of nuclear aggression hardly adds anything to an already existing obligation under the Charter.

59. In our view, however, there is a positive element in the draft resolution for the Security Council. It can be seen in the undertaking by the sponsor nuclear Powers to act in concert, through the Security Council, in cases of nuclear aggression or threat of aggression from whatever source it might occur. The draft resolution would thus inaugurate a spirit of co-operation in the Security Council among the permanent members, which so far has been sorely lacking.

60. After twenty-two years of rivalry between the super-Powers, with the Security Council paralysed, this hopeful change should be welcomed and encouraged. It may well be the initial step in a *détente* that will open up a new chapter in the history of the Security Council by increasingly rendering it an effective instrument of peace. In this sense, we consider it important that any assurance of protection from aggression by armed attack against the independence and territorial integrity of any State should appropriately come from the permanent members acting through the Security Council, rather than individually in the nineteenth century pattern of the Concert of Europe. International security must emanate from the United Nations through the Security Council in the spirit of the Charter.

61. In this connexion, it may be mentioned that the history of ineffectiveness of the Security Council—to which reference has been made in this debate—was only the result of antagonism between the super-Powers. If now they agree to co-operate in the Security Council—be it only in respect to nuclear attack or threat of attack—the scene changes and a new factor of peace is introduced that should be very heartedly welcomed.

62. This co-operation among the permanent members and the resulting assurance to the smaller and non-nuclear States, in order to be of practical usefulness and to be beneficial in strengthening the peace and the independence

and security of States, must be extended to cover all armed aggression or threat of aggression, nuclear or non-nuclear, against the independence and territorial integrity of any State, in accordance with the obligations under the Charter. For, indeed, the dangers of escalation involved in non-nuclear aggression are no less threatening, and must be effectively met through such co-operation in the Security Council as envisioned in the Charter. If the smaller States could rely on prompt and effective action by the Security Council to protect them from such aggression by armed attack, much of the unrest in the world, caused by fear, suspicion and military preparation, could be avoided and many threatening situations would be eased. Small developing countries might thus eventually be encouraged to spend less on military budgets and more on economic and social development thus helping to reduce the dimensions of another serious threat to peace from the growing gap between the economically developed and the less developed countries.

63. A further point made in criticism of the draft treaty is that the proposed assurances, in so far as they are related to the occurrence or threat of aggression, cannot be meaningful so long as there is no definition of aggression. Past and recent experience in the discussion of Security Council items demonstrates the necessity for such a definition in order to render possible the impartial determination of aggression in the proper application of Chapter VII of the Charter.

64. In this connexion, we express the hope that the nuclear Powers, sponsors of the treaty, acting in the same spirit of co-operation that made them agree on the question of the treaty on non-proliferation would also find an incentive to agree on the question of the definition of aggression, so as to meet the requirements of the said Chapter VII of the Charter. Agreement on such a definition would render more applicable the proposed Security Council assurances to the non-nuclear States.

65. Whatever may be said about the shortcomings of this draft treaty, its positive elements can be neither by-passed nor ignored. The treaty does constitute a definite and important move forward towards reducing the hazards of the nuclear weapon by preventing its dissemination to a greater number of States. And that is the central purpose on which, over the years, attention was focused during the discussions on a non-proliferation treaty.

66. The merit of the draft treaty in this respect cannot be doubted, particularly as the main loop-hole, which has been a matter of long controversy, is now effectively plugged. If widely ratified, the treaty would, moreover, reduce tensions, both on a world-wide and on a regional scale, more particularly in the troubled Middle East region. Indeed, the spread of nuclear weapons in that region would constitute, perhaps, one of the gravest threats of nuclear conflagration, because of the deep emotions that have stirred and continue to stir the people in that area.

67. The conclusion of the treaty would also promote the development of the East-West *détente*. It would take up the thread of understanding which was so hopefully spun by the partial test-ban agreement and the other measures of five years ago. And it is only such a *détente* between the

super-Powers that can bring about the appropriate climate for the achievement of further measures on disarmament.

68. Furthermore, the treaty facilitates and regulates the sharing with all other States of nuclear materials and techniques for the peaceful use of atomic energy. Both the representatives of the super-Powers have fully and rightly emphasized this aspect. We find that there is a commitment for sharing. For smaller countries without nuclear potential, this is a vitally important benefit that cannot be overlooked. We would, however, consider advisable and would support any possible modification of the wording of the treaty as would make that commitment clearer and relieve any reasonable anxieties in that respect by the civilian nuclear States, thereby ensuring wider acceptance of the treaty.

69. We believe the immediate benefits from the treaty, however limited they may be, must not be minimized. We should also not overlook the circumstances under which this treaty was negotiated and the difficulties involved in reaching the present level of agreement.

70. We do not lose sight of the shortcomings of the treaty with which we have already dealt, and we are fully conscious of the objections regarding the inadequacy of the assurance on the *quid pro quo* basis; but we feel they should not be stressed to the point of frustrating accommodation on a measure of such vital importance in reducing the nuclear dangers. As Professor Arthur Larson pertinently remarks, for non-nuclear weapon States to look for some *quid pro quo* flowing only from the nuclear to the non-nuclear States is an incomplete way to conceive of the bargain. The principal *quid pro quo* would run, not from the nuclear to the non-nuclear States but between the various non-nuclear States. It lies in the assurance, provided by the treaty, that their neighbours will not become nuclear weapon Powers. This is both a particular benefit for the countries concerned, and a general benefit for the whole world.

71. The implications of renouncing the freedom to manufacture nuclear weapons will need to be imaginatively evaluated by civilian nuclear States in relation to the practical benefits that could flow from the acquisition of such weapons. It is becoming increasingly realized that, by reason of its uncontrollable and self-defeating destructiveness, the nuclear weapon is, in effect, unusable. It is thus not a factor of security, but rather an element of hazard to the State possessing it and to the safety of its citizens. The assumption, therefore, that the acquisition of such weapons would bring an advantage in terms of security is an illusion. The heavy burdens and the great hazards from its possession are a reality.

72. The whole problem of nuclear weapons will have at some time to be more realistically seen in the light of recent technological developments in the cycle of anti-ballistic missile systems. It should be approached by the nuclear and the non-nuclear weapon States with a new sense of global responsibility commensurate to the magnitude of the global dangers involved.

73. Now, turning to the treaty under discussion, in weighing its shortcomings as against its advantages, we

conclude that the treaty should not be allowed to fail. If the alternative is to be no treaty on proliferation, the result would be frustration, confusion and a set-back in the progress, however slow, towards a safer and a saner world. So, if the option were between this treaty and the uncertainty of indefinite postponement, we would certainly opt for the treaty. As experience has shown in a rapidly moving world of sudden developments, there is no room for indefinite postponements, which may eventually render the treaty unachievable.

74. As indicated in article IX of the draft, the treaty shall enter into force after its ratification by all nuclear-weapon States signatory to it and forty other signatory States. We would hope and indeed expect that perhaps twice that number would sign and ratify this instrument. Yet even then, the real test will be whether the civilian nuclear States will be among the signatories of the treaty. The absence of these States would obviously detract from its effectiveness.

75. If certain modifications to the draft treaty could be considered in order to meet reasonable demands with respect to balance of obligations and responsibilities towards the required progress in disarmament, such an attempt at improvement would be vital and should be undertaken without hesitation. We would fully support every endeavour at modification. We are not unmindful, however, of the hazards involved in opening up the present treaty to amendments, but the objective of obtaining the broadest possible backing of the treaty is so important that no effort should be spared in that respect.

76. In the spirit of what I have just stated, we shall sign and ratify the treaty. We feel that we thus fulfil our duty to the world community and serve the cause of peace. We are conscious of the benefit that accrues when this treaty is signed and the world edges a little farther and a little more firmly away from a nuclear war. But the signing of the treaty should immediately be followed by other urgent collateral measures of disarmament which are ripe for agreement. In this sense the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee should convene as soon as possible to consider the next steps. From the progress achieved in that Committee the intrinsic value and the significance of the present treaty will be judged. We reserve our right to speak more precisely on the draft resolution.

77. Mr. TEKOAH (Israel): Ever since the problem of nuclear armaments was raised at the United Nations, the Government of Israel has consistently supported resolutions aimed at preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The fact that the draft treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons has now been submitted jointly by the United States and the Soviet Union marks an important landmark in international relations and in the quest for world peace. The two Powers are to be commended on this historic effort. Special appreciation must be extended also to all members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament who have made significant contributions to the draft treaty now before us.

78. My Government, like many others, has always regarded a non-proliferation treaty as an important part of the universal effort towards general disarmament. At the

First Committee meeting of 2 November 1966, the Israel representative declared:

“... a non-proliferation treaty cannot be an end in itself. It has to serve a number of objectives of overriding importance. It must, above all, advance and accelerate general and complete nuclear disarmament.”⁷

79. The draft treaty is a significant step in this direction. We hope that agreement on non-proliferation will stimulate all concerned to seek agreement on other disarmament problems. Indeed, the dissemination of conventional weapons poses dangers no less grave and frequently more immediate than that of nuclear arms. In his message to the Geneva Conference on 27 January 1966, President Johnson said:

“... as we focus on nuclear arms, let us not forget that resources are being devoted to non-nuclear arms races all around the world. These resources might better be spent on feeding the hungry, healing the sick and teaching the uneducated.”⁸

80. My delegation has listened carefully to a number of criticisms of the proposed draft treaty that have been voiced by some delegations in this debate. They have mentioned concern for the lack of any acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations of the nuclear and non-nuclear Powers, the virtual control of nuclear explosive devices given to the nuclear Powers, the question of unhampered scientific and technological research, and the lack of effective security provisions for non-nuclear signatories to the treaty.

81. For obvious reasons, my country has a special sensitivity to the security aspect. We are involved in an unresolved conflict in which our security is being threatened, and which has thrice in two decades erupted into armed hostilities. That conflict is marked by a massive and unchecked arms race of conventional weapons which, by our standards, have a vast capacity to kill and destroy. We cannot know what dangers and threats may confront us in the future.

82. It is only natural that we should give earnest scrutiny to security provisions intended to accompany and compensate for the restrictions that non-nuclear Powers would voluntarily assume under the treaty. Attention has already been drawn to the shortcomings in this regard. The draft treaty contains no commitment by nuclear Powers that they will not use their nuclear weapons against those who do not possess them. We still hope that this deficiency will be made good.

83. The lack of universality, as far as the nuclear Powers are concerned, both with regard to adherence to the treaty and with regard to the proposed security assurances, must also be noted. Similarly, we have heard with sympathy the observations of the representative of Mexico [*1569th meeting*] that the principles of Article 2 (4) of the Charter should be inserted in the treaty. In the opinion of my

⁷ This statement was made at the 1440th meeting of the First Committee, the official record of which was published in summary form.

⁸ *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1966* document DC/228 annex I, sect. D

Government, the Charter provisions that all States shall refrain from the threat or use of force in their international relations and shall settle their disputes by peaceful means, deserve to become an operative paragraph of the draft treaty.

84. My delegation would like to associate itself with the emphasis placed by a number of representatives on the effect of the treaty on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy by non-nuclear Powers. Several delegations, including members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee, have already expressed certain misgivings in respect of the draft's provisions on this aspect. We would hope that the sponsors of the treaty would give these views due consideration. Nuclear energy opens new worlds of development and technological progress and it would be regrettable if the treaty were to leave any doubts or raise any difficulties in this field.

85. These are some of the legitimate concerns that would seem to warrant further study and discussion, including the consultation due to take place at the Conference of Non-Nuclear Powers.

86. In recognition of the universal importance of the principle expressed in the treaty, Israel will vote for the revised draft resolution [A/C.1/L.421/Rev.2] in the belief that practical and satisfactory solutions will be found for the problems that I have mentioned.

87. The adoption of this draft resolution is of significance in itself, but its real potentiality lies in the hope of continuity in the quest for general disarmament and for universal and regional security ensuring peaceful life and unchallenged survival for all States.

The Vice-Chairman, Mr. Tchernouchtchenko (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) took the Chair.

88. Mr. TINOCO (Costa Rica) (*translated from Spanish*): The Government and delegation of Costa Rica have given their unreserved and full support to all action taken in the United Nations to halt the arms race of recent decades, to avoid the proliferation of atomic weapons, to lessen the danger of a nuclear war, and to keep alive the faint hope that at some, even though remote, time, all mankind may celebrate the conclusion in good faith of a universal disarmament treaty which will release, for the development of the economically emerging peoples, the enormous sums spent on maintaining the armed peace in which we are living. In 1958 we supported with pleasure and enthusiasm the proposal of the Minister for External Affairs of Ireland⁹ which appeared three years later in resolution 1665 (XVI), and we voted optimistically and whole-heartedly in favour of the drafts which led to resolutions 1576 (XV), 1664 (XVI), 1884 (XVIII) and 2028 (XX) which form the historical background to the document now before this Committee.

89. Costa Rica—its people, Government, and delegation in the United Nations—received with feelings of relief, joy and

hope the report that the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament had achieved the *rapprochement* of the powerful States which expend great effort on developing nuclear energy and nuclear weapons so that the twenty-second session of the General Assembly could resume its work on the basis of a document prepared by those States, a document which would allow the General Assembly to take a step forward on the road to peace.

90. That is the meaning we attach to the draft treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons which we have before us. It is not a document which fully satisfies the aspirations of those who have been against the arms race and for general disarmament. But it is a step forward, although it may not lead to cuts in military budgets which, after the entry into force of the treaty, may continue at the same high levels required to maintain armies, improve weapons and increase arsenals. Nevertheless, it is a constructive step, because 120 sovereign States agree to renounce the right to acquire, possess, manufacture or use nuclear weapons or even nuclear devices. Other sovereign States—perhaps three or four—agree in turn to renounce the right to sell or provide to other nations any form of nuclear weapons or devices which only they may be able to manufacture, and also undertake to refuse any contribution or assistance for the manufacture or acquisition of those weapons.

91. The possibility of bringing the world to a nuclear holocaust and the responsibility involved in the possession of weapons capable of producing it will continue to rest exclusively with the Governments of five nations, of which only four are represented in this Organization. The remote, but always possible danger that a catastrophe of such magnitude may occur is thus, of course, lessened. World-wide expenditures on armaments, although not lessened by the treaty, may at least be expected to remain at their present levels without rising substantially, with the elimination of the temptation for some States—not all with large populations nor highly developed—to manufacture or acquire some devices capable of bringing about the destruction produced by nuclear weapons, if those States should feel themselves threatened in the same way by a State they regard as hostile. Experience teaches us that weapons of such destructive power are manufactured and kept more for their deterrent force than for the purpose of using them with the same facility as other costly and complicated conventional weapons. But their acquisition, even for that purpose, is a drain on resources, which are almost always scarce, and thus deprives the respective populations of the use of large amounts of the national income for better and more useful purposes.

92. In the light of these considerations, the Government of Costa Rica has publicly announced its support of the draft treaty, which it feels should be approved and opened to signature by States during this final stage of the twenty-second regular session of the General Assembly of the United Nations. This does not, of course, exclude the fact that we consider it highly desirable to introduce in the text of the draft some amendments to improve it and make it clearer, particularly with regard to protecting the right of non-nuclear-weapon States to use the energy generated by controlled nuclear explosions in carrying out public works contributing to social and economic development. It is said that we are at the dawn of a new era in which fantastic

⁹ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirteenth Regular Session, Plenary Meetings, 751st meeting, paras. 81-88; and ibid., Thirteenth Regular Session, Annex, items 64, 70 and 72 of the agenda, document A/C.1/L.206.*

changes will occur in the techniques of executing large-scale engineering works and other activities of daily life, and it would be unreasonable to deprive the future generations of our peoples of the advantages they might derive from the use of the new techniques in community development programmes.

93. This principle was established in the Treaty successfully concluded in the Palace of Tlatelolco [*see A/C.1/946*] under the able guidance of Ambassador García Robles. This was achieved without in any way undermining the agreement prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons in Latin America, since exercise of the right remained subject to the control and supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Thus, article 17 of that Treaty states that:

“Nothing in the provisions of this Treaty shall prejudice the rights of the Contracting Parties, in conformity with this Treaty, to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, in particular for their economic development and social progress.”

and article 18 says:

“1. The Contracting Parties may carry out explosions of nuclear devices for peaceful purposes—including explosions which involve devices similar to those used in nuclear weapons—or collaborate with third parties for the same purpose, provided that they do so in accordance with the provisions of this article and the other articles of the Treaty, particularly articles 1 and 5.

“2. Contracting Parties intending to carry out, or to co-operate in carrying out, such an explosion shall notify the Agency and the International Atomic Energy Agency, as far in advance as the circumstances require, of the date of the explosion and shall at the same time provide the following information:

“(a) The nature of the nuclear device and the source from which it was obtained,

“(b) The place and purpose of the planned explosion,

“(c) The procedures which will be followed in order to comply with paragraph 3 of this article,

“(d) The expected force of the device, and

“(e) The fullest possible information on any possible radio-active fall-out that may result from the explosion or explosions, and measures which will be taken to avoid danger to the population, flora, fauna and territories of any other Party or Parties

“3. The General Secretary and the technical personnel designated by the Council and the International Atomic Energy Agency may observe all the preparations, including the explosion of the device, and shall have unrestricted access to any area in the vicinity of the site of the explosion in order to ascertain whether the device and the procedures followed during the explosion are in conformity with the information supplied under paragraph 2 of this article and the other provisions of this Treaty.

“4. The Contracting Parties may accept the collaboration of third parties for the purpose set forth in paragraph 1 of the present article, in accordance with paragraphs 2 and 3 thereof.”

94. These principles, already embodied in the written law of the Latin American States which ratified the Treaty,

sanction the right to the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes when this constitutes no danger and is carried out under the control and supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency. This was implicitly recognized at the twenty-second regular session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, when by a large majority, we adopted resolution 2286 (XXII), paragraph 1 of which reads thus:

“The General Assembly welcomes with special satisfaction the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, which constitutes an event of historic significance in the efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and to promote international peace and security and which at the same time establishes the right of Latin American countries to use nuclear energy for demonstrated peaceful purposes in order to accelerate the economic and social development of their peoples.”

95. The matter I have been discussing is of great interest to the developing States, particularly to those with sparsely populated areas where, according to technical studies, it is more feasible to use the system of controlled chain explosions to carry out large-scale engineering works, thereby greatly reducing their costs. For example, from the preliminary studies made on the possibility of constructing a sea-level canal to facilitate navigation from the Atlantic to the Pacific through the Central American isthmus, it appears that there are many advantages to the route which starts from the mouth of the San Juan River and ends in the Bay of Salinas, passing through the frontier zones of Costa Rica and Nicaragua. But this project could not be carried out by conventional construction methods because its cost would come to several thousand million dollars; whereas, according to those studies, if the controlled nuclear explosion system were used, the cost would only be about \$1,000 million. The situation is the same with regard to the other routes studied—the Sasaki-Norti in Panamanian territory and the Atrato-Truando in Colombian territory.

96. In view of these possibilities, which involve world-wide trade and economy, it seems inadvisable to close the door to the use of controlled nuclear energy, provided it is certain that human life will not be harmed, and through agreements reached with the States possessing the necessary devices or with the International Atomic Energy Agency. The draft treaty remains somewhat obscure on this point, and the statements of some representatives sponsoring it indicate that, in their opinion, this way of using nuclear energy would not be permitted because of the fear that the devices requested for peaceful purposes might be turned to military uses. But this could easily be avoided if we were to adopt the necessary safeguards of control and constant observation.

97. The delegation of Costa Rica might have made some other observations on this text if other distinguished representatives have not already done so. I speak of observations, not amendments; suggestions, not formal proposals, because the Treaty we are preparing after so many years of constant effort, although it appears in form to be that of a multilateral agreement with equal obligations and rights for all signatories, and the procedures adopted to bring about its conclusion would also lead us to

consider it as such, is basically a bilateral treaty to which the parties are, on one hand, the nuclear-weapon States, and on the other, the States not possessing this type of weapons. Contacts and frequent exchanges of views will be needed to persuade the other side that the small changes in wording which may be introduced do not affect the substance of the agreement and do meet the laudable desire of our countries to be able to take advantage of the vast potentialities of the peaceful use of atomic energy while, at the same time, keeping the road firmly blocked against the dangerous international proliferation of nuclear weapons.

98. I hesitated to take part in this debate because Costa Rica is a country with no army, navy or military air force, which relies only on the force of law to protect its interests. We neither wish nor can ever acquire nuclear weapons, and we have renounced their use on our territory under the Treaty of Tlatelolco. But we do hope to be able to make peaceful use of nuclear energy if this is appropriate and possible with the technology which is being created on the basis of new discoveries in this branch of human knowledge. We do hope to use it for the social and economic development of our people.

99. We should also like to mention the importance we attach to the new atmosphere of cordiality among the great world Powers which might be created if we were to encourage a large majority vote in favour of this first result of their willingness to agree. Lastly, we fervently hope that the final text of the treaty we are preparing will reflect the concern expressed here with a view to improving it rather than rendering it ineffectual or delaying its approval.

100. Mr. ABDULGANI (Indonesia): In taking the floor at this time, my Government would like to make the following observations. We have listened with close attention to the speakers and the debate thus far, and feel that many valid points have been brought to the attention of the Committee. This discussion indicates the very serious attention with which all nations regard this subject. It also indicates the profound hope on the part of all members that this debate can be brought to a fruitful conclusion in the very near future.

101. We wish to join in commending all the members of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee for their patience and diligence in overcoming the multitude of difficulties which they have faced. They all deserve our whole-hearted gratitude for this vital piece of work.

102. The co-operation between the super-Powers which were assigned the principal responsibility for the draft was, in this case, all the more rewarding. The route to our final goal of world peace and security based on general and complete disarmament is still an ideal rather than a reality, however valuable the work that has been done. We share the motivations of those who are seeking to improve and strengthen the intent of the sponsors, especially with regard to the fulfilment of the provisions set forth in articles 4, 5 and 6. Moreover, we are in agreement with the suggestions for improvement, as set forth by the representatives of Mexico, Sweden and others, in order to gain the widest possible support for the Treaty. We have heard much about what is referred to as "horizontal" as opposed to "vertical" proliferation. For many years, my Government has been

convinced that there is indeed more than a semantic difference between dissemination and proliferation, as stated by the representative of India. My Government concurs with the widespread feeling that neither aspect has been adequately taken into account in the draft treaty in its present state.

103. It is also clear that the problem of obligations and responsibilities, as between the nuclear and non-nuclear States, has not yet been resolved to the satisfaction of all members. The weight of this argument lies heavily upon us.

104. The joint statement issued by His Imperial Highness Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia and President Suharto of Indonesia this month in Jakarta reflects this concern. Both Chiefs of State, besides welcoming the developments in Geneva and New York towards the realization of a non-proliferation treaty, are convinced that such a treaty must also take into consideration the legitimate interest of non-nuclear States. We in Indonesia feel that not enough stress has been placed on this particular aspect of the draft treaty.

105. On the crucial question of security assurances, Indonesia also has some reservations and uneasiness. The inherent right of self-defence recognized under Article 51 of the Charter is not, of itself, a satisfactory solution to the question of nuclear attack or threat of attack by a nuclear-weapon State on a non-nuclear-weapon State. Even guarantees of immediate assistance under the provisions of the Security Council are subject to the risk of a permanent member veto. We share the concern expressed by other members that two of the nuclear Powers in the world today, one a permanent member of the Security Council and the other outside of the United Nations framework entirely, have had no part in framing the security assurances.

106. Another aspect of the security guarantee which gives us cause for concern is the daily reminder of the imperfections of the United Nations. The continued contempt for Security Council resolutions persistently displayed by some Members of the United Nations illustrates this.

107. As to the right of any group of States to conclude regional denuclearization treaties, it is our considered view that the effectiveness of such treaties can be achieved fully only if all existing nuclear Powers recognize and respect such zones. Since the present draft treaty does not encompass all existing nuclear Powers the security gained through such nuclear-free zones is rather doubtful. Statements made by some representatives indicate that there are certain aspects of the draft non-proliferation treaty which might prove incompatible with the Treaty of Tlatelolco [A/C.1/946]. This is a fact which should be given serious consideration.

108. Our uneasiness stems from these realities and also from the present existence of nuclear weapons in our part of the world. This then, Mr. Chairman, is the yardstick by which my Government, a non-nuclear, non-aligned country must judge the draft treaty and on which Indonesia will base its final decision.

109. I wish to make it perfectly clear that my Government is fully aware of the importance of this draft treaty. My

Government has always been in favour of any course of action which will promote peace and goodwill among nations. The eagerness with which we awaited the draft treaty, however, is tempered by a desire for further explorations of its full implications. In this connexion, we should keep a receptive frame of mind as to the possibilities of the forthcoming non-nuclear-weapon States conference. Is it not worth while considering the possibility of framing additional agreements at the conference, aimed at improving the present draft. As the representative of Pakistan has stated, by giving thought to this idea we are seeking not confrontation between the nuclear and non-nuclear Powers but co-operation, not division but convergence.

110. We have further misgivings as to the issue of controls and safeguards on the use of nuclear power for peaceful purposes, including the question of explosions for developmental projects. Many speakers have raised arguments on this aspect which seems to us to require further thought and deliberation. As a country urgently in need of speedier economic development, Indonesia shares the view of so many delegations that the opportunities of all nations to avail themselves of such nuclear technology should in fact be equal.

111. It is the strong conviction of the Indonesian Government that the steps which have been taken should be evaluated very carefully. We must lay a strong and permanent foundation for the bridge which we have yet to cross. My Government regrets that the draft treaty which is now before us does not measure up to the expectations set forth in resolution 2028 (XX).

112. These are the faults and misgivings which have compelled my Government to share with other delegations our reservations on the draft treaty as it now stands. The Indonesian Government feels that there are as yet too many unanswered questions and not enough room to provide the atmosphere conducive to arriving at a solid consensus. We do not wish our questioning to be construed as a total or absolute rejection of the draft treaty.

113. In the light of what we have stated today, my Government will give its full attention to the revised draft resolution just introduced a short while ago by the representative of Finland on behalf of the twenty-nine countries.

Mr. Fahmy, United Arab Republic, resumed the Chair.

114. Mr. HERRERA IBARGÜEN (Guatemala) (*translated from Spanish*): Mr. Chairman, before discussing the matter before the Committee, I should like to join the other speakers who have expressed their gratification at the fact that we are again meeting under your wise and impartial guidance. This has enabled us to give all our attention to the general debate on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

115. The delegation of Guatemala wishes to state that it supports any effective measure which will contribute to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, and will also support all measures designed to facilitate the complete denuclearization of armaments, so that mankind may enter an era—which today is purely utopian—of general and

complete disarmament. It has been pointed out here that the technology for producing and improving nuclear weapons has advanced more rapidly than the adoption of the safeguards obviously necessary for their control. The fact is, unfortunately, that human beings have the mental capacity to control almost everything in the material world, but have only the most tenuous control over their socio-emotional reactions. That discrepancy between their fantastic scientific development and their slow emotional adjustment has brought the world face to face with the possibility of an apocalyptic holocaust.

116. Fortunately, those who are comparatively weaker—precisely because they necessarily have the realism of the weak who react to danger by associating themselves with others—are uniting and, as time passes, may establish the basis for an adequate legal order. At the international level, particularly where the atom is concerned, an example of this legal order may be seen, in our part of the world, in the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America.

117. Guatemala is a signatory of that Treaty and, as such, is gratified to see that two of the nuclear Powers, the United States and the United Kingdom, have signed Protocol II of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, committing themselves to respect the Latin American region as a denuclearized zone. We hope that the other nuclear Powers, especially the Soviet Union and France, will also find a satisfactory arrangement which will make it possible and desirable for them to sign that Protocol.

118. Obviously, the small Powers do not have a monopoly on virtue. The great Powers have proved this ever since they rallied to the cause of the growing—although still limited—development of laws regulating the atom. Suffice it to say that it was they who took the initiative in the drafting of the Antarctic Treaty of 1959 and the well-known Moscow Treaty; and, last year, they played an outstanding part in the drafting of the Treaty on the activities of States in the exploration and use of outer space.

119. Now, demonstrating a renewed interest in the problem of nuclear disarmament, of which non-proliferation is a very important and intrinsic part—although not a complete solution—the two co-Chairmen of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament have submitted to us a draft treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in annex I of document A/7072 and Corr.3. The text is undoubtedly the result of a series of delicate negotiations. The agreement of the two super-Powers on a joint text is in itself a cause for satisfaction. This public unity in a cause may well foreshadow a speedy improvement in international relations.

120. The delegation of Guatemala would now like to explain briefly its position regarding the draft treaty. However, we shall not comment on the wording of the text, since in the last five weeks many delegations have discussed it at length with respect to content and form. Perhaps some conclusions can be drawn from those discussions.

121. First, there seems to be unanimity in that all those delegations wish to control the proliferation of nuclear weapons. But there the unanimity ends. Some of them do

not accept the draft treaty for very understandable reasons, pointing out that what it actually advocates is control of the so-called vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons. In this they follow the undeniably logical reasoning that it is necessary to control what actually exists before what might exist theoretically. In other words, it is imperative to control the improvement and production of the nuclear weapons of the nuclear Powers, in the hope that they themselves will limit and gradually dismantle their nuclear arsenals, instead of stressing the disarmament of precisely those nations which have nothing to destroy and in many cases do not even have the economic capacity to become nuclear countries. We consider that to be an eminently logical argument, but it is not in keeping with present-day basic political facts.

122. The basic political fact is that nuclear weapons and their carrier vehicles have reached such a degree of sophistication, accuracy and range that that fact is lost sight of in a welter of theoretical verbiage. As the Secretary-General of the United Nations indicated in his report on the effects of the possible use of nuclear weapons,

“The basic facts about the nuclear bomb and its use are harsh and terrifying for civilization; they have become lost in a mass of theoretical verbiage. It has been claimed that the world has learnt to live with the bomb; it is also said there is no need for it to drift unnecessarily into the position that it is prepared to die for it. The ultimate question for the world to decide in our nuclear age—and this applies both to nuclear and non-nuclear Powers—is what short-term interests it is prepared to sacrifice in exchange for an assurance of survival and security.” [A/6858, para. 42.]

123. The super-Powers have reached agreement on a text concerning non-proliferation and are willing to give certain guarantees to the non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the treaty. These guarantees, set forth in annex II of document A/7072 and Corr.3, are not absolute and their legal basis is dubious. However, we believe that the solemn promise to fulfil their obligations in this case equals or perhaps exceeds the effectiveness of a formal treaty.

124. Apart from the five Powers which have exploded nuclear weapons, there are, as the representative of El Salvador, Ambassador Galindo Pohl [see 1567th meeting, para. 63] has rightly pointed out, two sub-groups of countries: one, consisting of the countries which during the initial period of entry into force of the treaty could, if they so decided, manufacture nuclear explosives; and the other, consisting of those which do not expect, however rapid their economic development, to be able to acquire that capacity. Guatemala belongs to that second sub-group, and we agree with the delegation of New Zealand that the prospect of trusting in the different degrees of responsibility of the five nuclear Powers is more attractive than depending on the responsibility of fifteen or twenty countries [ibid., para. 35].

125. Therefore, the second conclusion to be drawn is that the effectiveness of the treaty depends on the decisions of the so-called quasi-nuclear Powers, in other words, on their degree of maturity and their sense of sacrifice in the common cause. We cannot conceal the respect we feel should be paid to the statements made here on 23 May by

the representative of Canada, Ambassador Burns, who pointed out that the nuclear industry in Canada ranges from the mining of uranium and other raw materials to the production of power for nuclear reactors. Nevertheless, that country is willing to accept the proposed treaty. Ambassador Burns said, and I quote:

“The nuclear-energy industry in Canada covers the whole range from mining to nuclear-power plants. When the treaty enters into force, we would expect therefore to be subject to safeguards over an extensive range of nuclear activities in Canada. We believe that the treaty and the IAEA safeguards system are suitably designed to minimize any possible adverse effects.” [1573rd meeting, para. 49.]

126. We know that the draft treaty we are considering is the outcome of the persistent efforts of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament at Geneva, but from the documentation submitted it appears that many of the valuable suggestions made there were not accepted by the two super-Powers which drafted the final text. As many delegations have said, the viability of the treaty will depend on its acceptability within the group of sub-nuclear Powers, and even more upon its being acceptable to the greatest possible number of them. That is why a great many countries have made useful suggestions aimed at improving the text of the draft treaty.

127. We understand that what has been termed the proliferation of amendments would endanger the delicate balance we mentioned earlier. But we wonder whether the two co-Chairmen of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament and the other delegations sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/L.421/Rev.2 might not consider the possibility of presenting to this First Committee a revised text which would be more widely acceptable, after duly consulting the delegations which have suggested constructive improvements to the text of the draft treaty. In the opinion of the delegation of Guatemala, this might contribute to the achievement of international harmony.

128. In line with these ideas, we should like to draw attention—without trying to make an exhaustive list—to the constructive and specific suggestions made by some delegations. The delegation of Sweden made a constructive suggestion concerning article V.¹⁰ The three suggestions presented by the delegation of Italy¹¹ are also very sound.

129. In addition, we should like to recall that the delegations of Mexico and Chile, in the light of consultations held with other Latin American delegations, put forward suggestions which the delegation of Guatemala considers constructive, since they would not only help to clarify the draft treaty, but would, we feel, promote the widest possible acceptance. These suggestions were made in this Committee [1569th meeting] with great clarity and detail on 16 May by the representative of Mexico, Ambassador García Robles, and the representative of Chile, Ambassador Uribe. Without trying to summarize them here, my delegation would like to state that we fully agree with

¹⁰ See *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1967 and 1968*, document DC/230 and Add.1, annex IV, sect. 32.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, sect. 34.

them and therefore endorse them as they may help, as we have already said, to dispose of the reasons preventing some States from acceding to the draft treaty.

130. To conclude, my delegation, reiterating the views expressed at the beginning of this statement, wishes to reaffirm its position and say that we are aware that this is a historic moment for our Organization. We consider that the adoption of a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is an important stage of general and complete disarmament under strict international control. However, we realize that it is no more than a stage on the road to the achievement of a world-wide safeguards system such as that started by the International Atomic Energy Agency. It will require the continued efforts and goodwill of all parties interested in development and research in the atomic field to bring it to its culmination.

131. The field of atomic energy offers incalculable possibilities for furthering the welfare of mankind. It is our firm hope that the States possessing nuclear weapons will make

available to the non-nuclear-weapon States all the technology at their disposal, so that the latter may fully develop their technical and economic capacities.

132. The Guatemalan delegation is convinced that the human mind is sufficiently subtle and diplomatic negotiations are flexible enough to enable us to seek legal instruments that will improve the existing ones. It would thus make it easier for those countries which for the moment do not find it possible to accede to the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons to do so in the not too distant future. However, my delegation considers it a duty, as well as a modest contribution, to propose once again—as a subject for urgent reflection by the Powers which at present exercise the world hegemony—the possibility of their taking into consideration the suggestions made by other countries which we have mentioned in this statement, as an effective effort to achieve genuine results.

The meeting rose at 5.20 p.m.