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Chairman: Mr. Ismail FAHMY
(United Arab Republic).

AGENDA ITEMS 28, 29, 30 AND 31

- Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (*continued*)**
- (a) Report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (A/6951-DC/229; A/C.1/955; A/C.1/L.416);
- (b) Report of the Preparatory Committee for the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States (A/6817)
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- (a) Report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (A/6951-DC/229; A/C.1/955; A/C.1/L.411/Rev.1, L.412 and Add.1, L.415 and L.417);
- (b) Report of the Secretary-General on the effects of the possible use of nuclear weapons and on the security and economic implications for States of the acquisition and further development of these weapons (A/6858 and Corr.1; A/C.1/L.413 and Add.1-3)
- Urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests: report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (*continued*) (A/6951-DC/229; A/C.1/955; A/C.1/L.414 and Add.1-2)**
- Elimination of foreign military bases in the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America: report of the Conference**

**of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament
(*continued*) (A/6951-DC/229; A/C.1/955)**

1. The CHAIRMAN: Members of the Committee may have noticed a new draft has been circulated [A/C.1/L.418], sponsored by India, the United Arab Republic and Yugoslavia, in connexion with item 31.
2. Mr. AKWEI (Ghana): In the absence of a report of substance from the members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, our discussion on the various items of disarmament will, unfortunately, be necessarily limited. This is a matter of considerable regret to my delegation, and we would urgently appeal to the Committee to redouble their efforts, since every day that passes renders the whole question of disarmament more complicated and therefore more difficult to achieve. Indeed, the disarmament effort has been a sorry catalogue of frustrations and disappointments.
3. In spite of the absence of a report from the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, my delegation nevertheless feels bound to comment, however summarily, on the various aspects of the whole question of general and complete disarmament now before us.
4. Speaking before the General Assembly on 25 September 1967, the Vice-Chairman of the National Liberation Council of Ghana and Commissioner for External Affairs stated:

“The Ghana delegation has noted the progress made by the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament in Geneva on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. It is the hope of my delegation that whatever treaty is finally presented to this Assembly will include adequate safeguards for the security and protection of the non-nuclear States. Ghana also welcomes the successful conclusion this year by the Latin American States of a declaration on the denuclearization of Latin America. This should serve as an example to the other regions of the world. In the final analysis, however, my delegation believes that it is only through general and complete disarmament that the security of mankind can be assured.”¹
5. As we all know, the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee has devoted the greater part of its time to the consideration of a non-proliferation treaty and rightly so, because the possibilities of nuclear proliferation constitute a most serious danger to success in any lasting disarmament. It was therefore with considerable disappointment that my delegation observed what appeared to be determined

¹ Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-second Session, Plenary Meetings, 1565th meeting, para. 74.

manoeuvres on the part of the two super Powers to prevent any discussion of item 28 of our agenda, that is to say, non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, and particularly sub-item (b)—the report of the Preparatory Committee for the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States, especially when resolution 2153 B (XXI) requested the Preparatory Committee to report to this session of the Assembly. Surely it would have been very dangerous for the General Assembly itself to set a precedent of ignoring specific action it has called for by means of its own resolution, simply because some powerful States wished it. We were distressed, because, in the past, the super Powers have tended to treat the non-nuclear States as if they counted for little and as if they had no interest in this vital question of war and peace. The super Powers were always apt to agree behind the scenes and to present us with a *fait accompli*, on the confident assumption that, helpless as we are, we would have to accept their conclusions.

6. What in essence was their objection to our discussion of item 28? It was simply this: that since the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee had not submitted its report we should, by our discussion, complicate the conclusion of a non-proliferation treaty. But surely none of the items under disarmament which we are now discussing—items 28, 29, 30 and 31—are covered by any reports from the Disarmament Committee; yet nobody has objected to their being discussed. With regard to the treaty on non-proliferation, particularly, would not the Disarmament Committee in fact benefit from taking into account the views expressed by us here, non-members of the Disarmament Committee? Even though a few countries may now have the monopoly of nuclear weapons, the terrible effects of a nuclear war would not be limited to their territories. This has been made crystal clear in the Secretary-General's brilliant and now famous report on the effects of the possible use of nuclear weapons, where we read:

"The effects of all-out nuclear war, regardless of where it started, could not be confined to the Powers engaged in that war. They themselves would have to suffer the immediate kind of destruction and the immediate and more enduring lethal fall-out whose effects have already been described. But neighbouring countries, and even countries in parts of the world remote from the actual conflict, could soon become exposed to the hazards of radio-active fall-out precipitated at great distances from the explosion, after moving through the atmosphere as a vast cloud. Thus, at least within the same hemisphere, an enduring radio-active hazard could exist for distant as well as close human populations, through the ingestion of foods derived from contaminated vegetation, and the external irradiation due to fall-out particles deposited on the ground. The extent and nature of the hazard would depend upon the numbers and type of bombs exploded. Given a sufficient number, no part of the world would escape exposure to biologically significant levels of radiation. To a greater or lesser degree, a legacy of genetic damage could be incurred by the world's population."
[A/6858 and Corr.1, para. 40.]

7. That is the grim and incontrovertible picture. We, the non-nuclear Powers, therefore, have a vital stake in the whole question of non-proliferation and disarmament, and we have a right to insist that our views should at least be heard, even though, as we fear, they may not be taken into much account.

8. It is in that light that my delegation welcomes the report of the Preparatory Committee for a Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States [A/6817]. As I have said already, a non-proliferation treaty, to be effective, should be backed by guarantees for the security of the non-nuclear Powers; and it was to afford the non-nuclear Powers the opportunity of exchanging views on this most important question that a conference of non-nuclear-weapons States was called for by resolution 2153 B (XXI). That resolution specifically called on the Conference to consider the following questions, among others: (a) how can the security of the non-nuclear States be best assured; (b) how may non-nuclear Powers co-operate among themselves in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons; (c) how can nuclear devices be used for exclusively peaceful purposes?

9. Those, surely, are questions which, if they were thoroughly thrashed out by the non-nuclear-weapons States, whether before or after the conclusion of the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, should help immeasurably in making the treaty effective and of the widest possible acceptance.

10. My delegation, therefore, unreservedly supports the recommendation of the Preparatory Committee that the Conference should be held next year; and I take this opportunity to congratulate the Preparatory Committee for its thorough report. In fact, we would go even further and propose that the timing of that Conference should not be changed—that is to say, that it should be held from March to April 1968, as recommended by the Preparatory Committee. The reason for this is clear: if the proposed nuclear non-proliferation treaty is to have the support of the "have nots", then it must meet their legitimate concern about, and conditions for, guarantees against nuclear attack on them. Such guarantees must therefore take into consideration the views of those "have-not" States on these issues. The Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States can therefore be only complementary to the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee.

11. It is against this background that I now wish to examine some arguments that have been put about, concerning the desirability of having a non-proliferation treaty at all costs. It has been said that a non-proliferation treaty is so imperative that questions of security guarantees or collateral obligations on the part of the present nuclear Powers should be treated as secondary or subsidiary issues which should be left to a latter-day solution. That argument is a most dangerous one.

12. Firstly, it implies a certain moral superiority on the part of the present nuclear Powers, which we cannot accept. It means that the present nuclear Powers are supposedly more responsive to restraints—moral or otherwise—in the use of nuclear weapons than new or prospective members of the "nuclear club" would be. But there is no evidence whatsoever that this is so.

13. It is interesting to note here that during the recent debate in this Committee on the idea of a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, it was mostly certain nuclear Powers that opposed most vigorously the idea of such a convention. Thus, in effect, some of the same people who tell us to forgo the acquisition of

nuclear technology because they are more likely to be responsible in not resorting to the use of nuclear weapons are also telling us that they will reserve the right to use nuclear weapons under certain circumstances.

14. That is not only illogical, but also dangerous, since, in a nuclear war, we would be the sufferers just as much as the nuclear States. In fact, we might well be the greater sufferers, since, by the adoption of such a non-proliferation treaty, we would not have the nuclear know-how to protect ourselves, in whatever limited way we could, against nuclear attack.

15. No, the logic of the matter is that the non-nuclear States have legitimate demands to be satisfied about their security and about other collateral obligations on the part of the nuclear Powers before a non-proliferation treaty is presented to us for our ratification. To do otherwise would be to put the cart before the horse—to put the interests of the two super-Powers before those of the world—unless it were argued that the two interests are coincidental.

16. Secondly, it has been argued that there is some intrinsic value in having a non-proliferation treaty, *per se*, with the sole purpose of preventing proliferation. We cannot agree. It is not a question merely of having a treaty: it is a question of what kind of a treaty we need, and for what. Any non-proliferation treaty which merely prevents proliferation, without eliminating or reducing international tensions likely to provoke nuclear conflict, is not worth working for.

17. In the absence of such guarantees, it would not be out of place to suppose that the concept of nuclear deterrence, or the balance of nuclear terror, might be relied upon to prevent nuclear conflict tomorrow, as it has been able to do today, until men and States learn the utter futility, dangerousness and foolishness of acquiring and using nuclear weapons. Any non-proliferation treaty will thus be meaningful only if it is linked to the non-use or elimination of such weapons—that is to say, only if it is comprehensive.

18. In this connexion, we are entitled to ask: Why is so much opposition developing now to holding the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States, as recommended by the Preparatory Committee? Why are the nuclear Powers reluctant to work out the problems of security guarantees for the non-nuclear Powers before concluding a treaty? Why do they not spell out their own corresponding obligations regarding their present nuclear stockpiles before offering us a treaty? Why cannot the proposed non-proliferation treaty incorporate a solution of the problem of the peaceful use of nuclear technology for development purposes before its adoption?

19. Thirdly, will a treaty of the kind proposed actually prevent proliferation? Here we have only to consider the case of Peking and France. Suppose a nuclear non-proliferation treaty is signed without Peking and France, and those States, feeling threatened, started to proliferate their nuclear know-how to their friends in order to buttress or consolidate their own security vis-à-vis the nuclear States on the opposite side: Is such a situation so inconceivable?

20. Touching now on the question of the need for the suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests, it is a matter of considerable regret to my delegation that the tests will continue. In fact, records show that, even after the 1963 Moscow partial test-ban Treaty, nuclear tests have progressively increased, from thirty-six in 1964 to forty in 1965 and sixty in 1966. We do not yet have the full figures for 1967 but I am sure the number will be equally disturbing.

21. It was our understanding and hope that the exemption of underground nuclear tests from the Moscow Treaty was due basically to the difficulties of verification and that this did not constitute a licence for unrestricted nuclear tests. The representative of Sweden informed us in a brilliant statement last Tuesday [1547th meeting] that new identification methods which would establish a system of reliable detection of underground tests have been found as a result of independent research. It is our wish and hope that this new method would commend itself to the nuclear Powers and make it possible for underground tests also to be included in the Moscow Treaty.

22. We are aware, of course, that two nuclear Powers—one a non-Member of our Organization—are not parties to the Moscow Treaty. The People's Republic of China's non-accession to the Moscow Treaty cannot seriously be said to be of her own volition but rather by force of circumstances dictated by her exclusion from participation in the work of our Organization. My delegation has said this many times before but we are compelled to repeat it: that the continued exclusion of the People's Republic of China from the United Nations, particularly now that it is a nuclear Power, is the most short-sighted and unrealistic step that our Organization can take. Indeed, it seems to my delegation that general and complete disarmament can never be achieved until and unless we abandon this unrealistic posture and bring China into our fold and enable it to participate fully in disarmament questions.

23. We had reports recently that China, contrary to the estimates of experts, had developed rockets capable of being fired from submarines. We know also that the United States anti-ballistic missile programme is largely aimed at counteracting a possible Chinese nuclear attack. In these circumstances can we ourselves seriously expect the United States to disarm its nuclear weaponry when the People's Republic of China is fast developing hers?

24. There has been some discussion here about the Geneva Protocol of 1925 regarding bacteriological and chemical weapons,² and the need for all States to adhere to it. I must confess that it is beyond the understanding of my delegation why any country should not want to adhere to such a Protocol which was observed by all sides even in the darkest hours of the Second World War. Can it be that there are still some countries at this time which intend to use chemical and bacteriological weapons? We are convinced that the Geneva Protocol is an invaluable instrument in the cause of disarmament and peace and should be adhered to and rigidly observed by all States. That is why we shall support any move to strengthen its applicability.

² Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva, 17 June 1925.

25. I have drawn attention to the statement in the Secretary-General's report that should there be a nuclear war the whole world, the whole of mankind, would suffer. It would be in the interests of the present nuclear Powers, therefore, to bend their efforts towards offering the necessary securities and other guarantees to the non-nuclear Powers to make the conclusion of a non-proliferation treaty possible and effective because, as I am sure they know themselves, in a decade or two, no matter how sophisticated or numerous their nuclear armouries may be, they will also stand in danger. I can only, therefore, appeal to the nuclear Powers to continue to strive genuinely towards the achieving of general and complete disarmament now.

26. Mr. KOTLIARENKO (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) (*translated from Russian*): My delegation deems it necessary to expound its Government's views on that important and topical political question—the urgent need to stop nuclear and thermonuclear testing.

27. Like other peace-loving countries, the Ukrainian SSR is strongly in favour of prohibiting all nuclear and thermonuclear testing. A positive solution of this problem would not only strengthen the peace and slow down the arms race; it would also be a most important step towards nuclear disarmament.

28. Naturally, an agreement on the total prohibition of nuclear testing, important and significant as it would be, could not stop the arms race or materially lessen the threat of nuclear warfare. Nevertheless, the cessation of underground testing would mean a virtual cessation of further development of thermonuclear weapons, and, what is no less important, it would also put an end to contamination of man's environment by radio-active substances.

29. The 1963 Moscow Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water solved only one part of the problem. In signing this treaty, the original signatories emphasized in the preamble that they had arrived at such partial agreement "seeking to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time".

30. That assurance was reaffirmed in a number of important General Assembly resolutions. In particular, there was the unanimously adopted resolution 1910 (XVIII), which contains a request to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to continue as a matter of priority negotiations aimed at reaching agreement on the cessation of all test explosions. During its last two regular sessions, the General Assembly repeated its appeal and adopted resolutions inviting the Eighteen-Nation Committee to prepare an agreement banning nuclear tests in all media, and urging the immediate cessation of all nuclear weapon tests.

31. What stands in the way of agreement on this exceedingly important question and of cessation of nuclear weapon tests, which are so dangerous to the future of mankind? On the face of it, even the Western Powers are lavish in assurances that they are ready to ban underground testing of nuclear weapons. It would seem that an agreed opinion on this question could be reached without difficulty. However, as soon as specific conditions for such a ban are discussed, the United States delegation, supported

by its allies in military blocs, advances its old demand for inspection of underground tests.

32. It is generally known that when the conclusion of the Moscow Treaty was under discussion, the United States also put forward a demand for inspection. Then, as now, there was no scientific or practical basis for that demand. It was advanced then, and is being advanced now, solely for political and military reasons. In putting forward its demand for international inspection in the territory of other States as a precondition for a ban of underground testing, the United States wants to make a solution of this important international problem serve its own political purposes, which have nothing to do with the banning of underground nuclear testing.

33. Common sense tells us that international inspections can easily be used for the collection of military information of interest to a potential aggressor. States and peoples, especially those which more than once in a single generation have had to suffer the bitter consequences of aggression from outside, cannot and must not take a carefree and sunny attitude towards matters affecting their security.

34. The hidden reason for the position taken by the United States on the cessation of nuclear weapon testing underground is that the United States does not want the question to be settled, because cessation of such testing would greatly hamper further development of nuclear weapons. It is a matter of common knowledge that at United States testing sites in Nevada and elsewhere very intensive underground testing is taking place, in the course of which the Pentagon is developing low-power nuclear weapons. Military figures in the United States have repeatedly and openly stated that the underground testing programme is a highly important element in ensuring the continued effectiveness of weapons with nuclear warheads, i.e., weapons of mass destruction.

35. This explains why the United States has been totally ignoring the existence of reliable scientific and technical means of identifying nuclear explosions, which make it possible to control a ban on underground nuclear testing without any international inspection. That this is so has been fully proved by present-day practices, and peace-loving States cannot accept the Western Powers' demand for the setting up of international inspection, seeing that there is no need for it.

36. Our approach to the banning of underground nuclear tests has been meeting with increasing comprehension on the part of States. An excellent example is the Swedish position, logically founded on modern scientific data. In our view, the statement made by the Swedish representative at the 309th meeting of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on 29 June 1967 deserves great attention. The conclusion she drew regarding methods of banning underground nuclear tests is of great importance for the solution of this question. I would draw special attention to that passage in her statement in which she said, "the whole concept of control in relation to a ban on underground nuclear explosions has to be looked at anew; to our mind, the control issue can no longer be used as a convenient reason for holding up an agreement in this field".³

³ See document ENDC/PV.309.

37. In her statement, the Swedish representative emphasized that, given the present level of development of science and technology, the means of control existing in many countries fully suffice for an effective verification of the observance of an agreement banning underground nuclear tests.

38. Of considerable interest in this connexion is the "Memorandum on the Control of an Underground Test Ban Treaty" submitted by the Swedish delegation in the Eighteen-Nation Committee. In that document, the Swedish delegation, on considering the results of many experiments carried out by scientists of different countries, comes to the following conclusion: "The data on identification by complexity... indicate the possibility of an inspection-free control system with the required 10 per cent deterrence level and limiting mistakes concerning earthquakes to once in fifteen years."

39. These are the findings of one group of scientists. Another method of identification offers even more promising results. "The value of this method was recognized at an early stage by British scientists and the data on this method, published by Marshall et al. in the British report referred to earlier, indicate the possibility of an inspection-free system operating at a deterrence level of more than 10 per cent and limiting mistakes concerning earthquakes to one in a hundred years."⁴

40. This is the findings of modern science allow us to say with confidence that there is no need for any international inspection to control the observance of an underground test ban treaty. National identification methods suffice for this purpose. The sooner the United States gives up its demand for control, which in truth is a desire for legalized espionage, the sooner it agrees that underground tests, even as tests in the atmosphere, under water and in outer space can be controlled by using national means of identification, the sooner will a comprehensive treaty banning all nuclear testing come into being.

41. In conclusion, I should like to state that my delegation has no objection to the draft resolution entitled "Urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests", submitted by a group of States [A/C.1/L.414], and will vote for its adoption.

42. The CHAIRMAN: Before I call on the next speaker, the Committee will have before it another draft resolution [A/C.1/L.419], submitted under agenda item 29 (a), sponsored by Afghanistan, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Colombia, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Ethiopia, Finland, Hungary, Iceland, India, Mexico, Mongolia, Nigeria, Norway, Poland, Sweden, United Arab Republic and Yugoslavia.

43. Mr. ARORA (India): I am taking the floor today to introduce briefly draft resolution A/C.1/L.418, sponsored by India, the United Arab Republic and Yugoslavia.

44. As a non-aligned country, India feels that the existence of military blocs and great Power alliances has intensified the cold war and heightened international

tension and, in conformity with the 1964 Cairo Declaration,⁵ it refuses to take part in such alliances. As was stated at the 1964 Belgrade Conference of Non-Aligned Countries, the military blocs are turning into increasingly powerful military, economic and political groupings which, by the logic and the nature of their mutual relations, necessarily cause periodic deterioration in international relations. An effective way to reverse that unwholesome trend is to begin the dismantling of foreign military bases and the withdrawal of foreign troops.

45. The existence of military bases and armed forces on foreign soil is not only a violation of the independence and integrity of the States concerned, but endangers international peace and security, although paradoxically they are established to promote them.

46. If the United Nations is to be strengthened and peace and stability to be promoted, that realization ought not to be based on the precarious peace which results from the presence of military troops, foreign bases and so on. Otherwise, crucial decisions relating to peace and war may be made on expediency rather than in accordance with law.

47. Finally, we hope that draft resolution A/C.1/L.418, which is along the lines of last year's resolution 2165 (XXI) and which, as will be recalled, was sponsored by the United Arab Republic, Yugoslavia and India, will meet with the overwhelming approval of the Committee. With that hope in mind, we put forward this draft resolution.

48. The CHAIRMAN: I should like to announce that Italy has become a co-sponsor of the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.419. The number of sponsors is now twenty-one.

49. Mr. GURINOVICH (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) (*translated from Russian*): Mankind has long dreamed of a world without war or weapons in it. The United Nations Charter evokes that dream, in proclaiming its resolution to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war. Quite understandably, therefore, the question of disarmament, as a highly topical, but not insoluble problem confronting the international community, has been a constant concern of the United Nations since its inception. During this entire time, the peace-loving countries, and first and foremost the Soviet Union and other socialist States, have been resolutely fighting in the United Nations and various United Nations organs for general and complete disarmament and for the realization of partial measures in the field of disarmament and averting the danger of war. As everyone knows, the USSR has not only worked out and submitted a definite disarmament programme, but has taken a number of steps in an effort to meet its partners and to promote disarmament negotiations. But there have been no results. If we are to say whose fault that is, we shall have to mention the same old names: mainly the United States of America and its allies in aggressive military blocs. They not only frustrate agreement on general and complete disarmament, they also pursue a policy diametrically opposed to such a goal.

50. The United States representative spoke here recently. His statement [1547th meeting], full of empty phrases

⁴ Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1967-68, document DC/230 and Add.1, annex IV, sect. 5.

⁵ See document A/5763.

about desire for peace, lasted something over twenty minutes, and during that same time the United States spent about \$3 million for military purposes. That country continues its criminal war against the Viet-Nameese people, boasts in its press that its murderous pilots dropped more death-dealing bombs on Viet-Nam than the United States Air Force had dropped on Nazi Germany and three times as many as it had dropped on militarist Japan throughout the Second World War. Without blushing, the United States press reports that on the average 1,500 tons of napalm are used in South Viet-Nam monthly.

51. The representatives of the Soviet Union, Hungary and other countries have cited data convincingly demonstrating the fact that the United States has ignored last year's resolution which condemned the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons and appealed to all States to adhere to the Geneva Protocol of 1925 and observe its provisions forbidding the use of such barbarous means of destruction.

52. In the light of that resolution, the role assumed by the delegation of Malta appears unsavoury. As we all know, thanks to the efforts of peace-loving forces, the United Nations is now working on a document which will allow the newly independent countries to cancel or review the unfair agreements imposed on them during the period of colonial domination. And here the Maltese delegation, serving the interests of others, proposes that we should review or alter recognized rules of international law sanctioned by the 1925 Geneva Protocol, which in its present form fully serves the interests of peace-loving peoples in that it forbids the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons. The Maltese proposal is wrong in essence, and it cannot be improved by changes in the wording. Moreover, it can be used by the opponents of disarmament as a pretext to postpone work on agreements on general and complete disarmament, the banning of underground nuclear tests, the elimination of foreign military bases in Asian, African and Latin American countries, and the ban on the use of nuclear weapons, all of which have, by our common decision, been referred to the Eighteen-Nation Committee.

53. The problem of banning the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons is properly treated in the proposal of the Hungarian delegation, which calls for the strict and undeviating observance by all States of the 1925 Geneva Protocol and invites all countries to adhere to it.

54. The United States of America is not only itself pursuing a policy of aggression but making other countries accessories to its criminal designs and instigating and supporting Israel's aggression against the Arab peoples, an aggression whose after-effects have not yet been eliminated. It has also been encouraging the arms race and threatening the rest of the world with the use of nuclear weapons by means of the so-called "space bus", whose purpose is to deliver death to the points designated by the Pentagon. We should not forget, however, that the driver of that hearse might find himself in it.

55. The United States is making a determined effort to hamper the economic development of the developing countries, and to that end delivers to them and makes them purchase its weapons. According to *The New York Times* of 26 October 1967, during the past six years the United

States has forced on the developing countries \$3,800 million worth of United States armaments, including nearly \$900 million worth during the financial year just elapsed.

56. It is once again pursuing the foolish and near-sighted policy of rearming Western Germany, a policy whose tragic consequences are well known. Being apparently aware that this policy is unpopular, the United States representative defended the West German revanchists and represented them as being meek as lambs. The declaration of the Soviet Union, which was handed to the United States on 8 December 1967, lays bare the danger to Europe and the entire world represented by the upsurge of the neo-Nazi movement in West Germany. The declaration points out that Hitler began with a *Reichswehr* numbering 100,000 men and developed it into an army of many million, which was able to attack nearly all of Europe, whereas today the *Bundeswehr* numbers close to half a million men. This army is equipped with modern armaments, including rockets and aircraft designed to carry nuclear weapons. The insistent attempts of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany to lay its hands on nuclear weapons are known to all. The USSR declaration correctly points out that the West German armed forces are intended to serve "as a framework for the formation of a huge army whose purpose would be to smash State frontiers in Europe". In the light of these facts, the United States representative would do better to think of the need to comply with the Potsdam Agreement than take up the defence of the West German revanchists.

57. My delegation notes with satisfaction the progress made in recent years with regard to security problems, from the Moscow Treaty banning nuclear tests in three media to the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies. These are important steps forward, and they furnish additional proof of the possibility of fruitful co-operation and of reaching agreed decisions in the interests of the entire world. Such achievements and prospects should serve as momentum to overcome the inertia in which that most important political problem of our day—the problem of general and complete disarmament under strict international control—is bogged down.

58. My delegation believes that now that the United Nations has at its disposal so valuable and important a piece of research as the Secretary-General's report, "Effects of the Possible Use of Nuclear Weapons and the Security and Economic Implications for States of the Acquisition and Further Development of These Weapons" [A/6858], the Governments and people of the world will once again give serious attention to the need for disarmament. The cause of peace can only gain if this document, which bears out the position taken by the socialist States, is brought to the notice of all those who continue recklessly to make a display of their military might and trust in their oversupply of nuclear warheads, or who are as yet indifferent to the danger of a thermonuclear war.

59. The draft resolution which has been submitted by Poland and other countries and which, we trust, will command general support, serves these purposes.

60. We must never forget that

“... a world war involving the use of rockets with nuclear warheads could result in the death of hundreds of millions, the destruction of entire countries and the contamination of the earth's surface and atmosphere”,

a possibility emphasized by L. I. Brezhnev, the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, in his report “Fifty Years of Great Victories of Socialism” of 3 November 1967.

61. Hence there arises with inexorable urgency the problem of restraining the imperialist forces, both those which are even now endangering world peace by waging bloody wars and those which are planning to do so in the future on an even broader scale. Disarmament, and only disarmament, is a truly reliable means of curbing the enemies of peace and strengthening general security. My delegation is firmly convinced that general and complete disarmament under strict international control is not only desirable but is a practical possibility.

62. In these circumstances, it is the duty of the United Nations to press resolutely for decisions which would serve the interests of peace, restrain aggressors, and lead to general and complete disarmament.

63. The First Committee now has before it the interim report of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament covering the period from 21 February to 7 December 1967. In this report, the Committee remarks that it concentrated its efforts on preparing a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and attained certain results. This is a truly important problem which is ripe for solution, and we wish the members of the Committee success in their noble undertaking.

64. In this connexion, my delegation welcomes the 15-Power draft resolution, which is intended to accelerate the completion of work on the treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons both in the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee and at the resumed session of the General Assembly. We also welcome the fact that this draft reaffirms earlier General Assembly resolutions, including the appeal to all States

“To refrain from any actions conducive to the proliferation of nuclear weapons, or which might hamper the conclusion of an agreement on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.”

65. My delegation also hopes that, when it has completed its work on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, encouraged by its success, will take up other problems. We trust that recent developments, which are both terrifying and hope-inspiring, will compel the Western Powers to reconsider their position and to engage in more fruitful negotiations with a view to reaching agreement on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, elimination of foreign military bases, an underground testing ban and, as a crowning achievement, general and complete disarmament under strict international control. We must make haste, for historical processes are irreversible and procrastination may result in new and unforeseeable difficulties.

66. The Byelorussian SSR, for its part, will steadfastly continue to press for both partial measures and general and complete disarmament, the latter being the one true guarantee of a peaceful future.

67. Mr. MESTIRI (Tunisia) (*translated from French*): As we come to the end of this phase of our work on the problems of general and complete disarmament and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, the Tunisian delegation feels that it has a duty to join with those who have preceded it in expressing its disappointment and its grave disquiet at the failure to achieve any progress in the direction of disarmament, which holds the key to the future of our civilization and the fate of all mankind. However, in the course of its twenty-first session the General Assembly has, we feel, done useful work by adopting a number of resolutions on which we had set great store.

68. At the opening of the current session the Secretary-General, in his introduction to the Annual Report on the Work of the Organization, put in a nutshell the alarm of the international community at the turn of events in the nuclear arms race and the risk of its spreading to other countries:

“I believe we have reached a critical period when there is an imminent danger of proliferation of nuclear weapons as more and more countries acquire the technological know-how that would permit them to make nuclear weapons. The spread of nuclear weapons to additional countries poses an incalculable threat by increasing the mathematical probability of the outbreak of nuclear war by accident, miscalculation or design.” [*A/6701/Add.1, para. 18.*]

69. It is regrettable that the great Powers, after managing to produce together an almost complete draft treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, have only been able to agree on a control system. We have no doubt whatever as to the genuineness of their intentions, and once again this year we have had occasion to hear them reiterate their profession of faith. For example, the Deputy Foreign Minister of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics said that his country:

“... is sincerely striving for a solution to this problem, and for it this is not a circumstance or tactical move in the international arena” [*1546th meeting, para. 28.*]

70. In his statement at the following meeting, the United States representative said:

“... the nuclear arsenals have grown ever and ever larger. They have grown on both sides. The United States does not believe that this course of conduct... is a wise one.” [*1547th meeting, para. 94.*]

71. Yet once again we are in an impasse, and there is no doubt that the present difficulties are to a large extent due to a lack of confidence on both sides. We are convinced that the solution of the problems of disarmament must in large measure be primarily a political solution. Unfortunately, we have to recognize that for all the encouraging signs of an easing of tension and a distinct improvement in the cold war situation and the beginnings of peaceful coexistence between the two blocs, international tension

has again been mounting. The repercussions of certain conflicts have created a mutual feeling of insecurity, not only among the great Powers, but among other nations as well. Faced with the inability of the great Powers to agree on concrete measures to reduce their nuclear stockpiles, in order to safeguard themselves from blackmail, threats and intimidation and at the same time to ensure their security, the smaller Powers seem to want to follow in their footsteps, if they have not done so already.

72. My Government has already expressed its views on this matter during the general debate:

“We understand the concern of those unaligned countries which find it hard to renounce the right to acquire nuclear weapons, precisely because they do not wish to stand under anyone’s protection. But I can think of nothing more ludicrous and wrong than an under-developed country—and the non-aligned countries are in that category—having the means to destroy millions of human beings by nuclear weapons, while continuing to be unable to protect millions of its own citizens from hunger and destitution. Only a handful of Powers, and certainly none of our developing countries, can engage in nuclear research except at the expense of its paramount task, which is to overcome under-development.”⁶

73. We have to congratulate the Secretary-General and the experts of many different countries who helped to prepare the report on the Effects of the Possible Use of Nuclear Weapons and the Security and Economic Implications for States of the Acquisition and Further Development of These Weapons. We regard document A/6858 as a text of considerable importance in that, at a time when people seem to be coming more or less to accept atomic weapons as a fact of life, it helps to make international public opinion and Governments everywhere realize the appalling risks to which the world is exposing itself. Hence we hope that all Governments and international organizations will give this report the widest possible distribution.

74. Among the valuable information contained in the report, the section on the security implications of the acquisition and further development of nuclear weapons makes a very interesting comparison between the curve of comparative expenditure on armaments and defence, and expenditure on education and health.

75. In view of the complexity of the problem of general and complete disarmament, it seems to us that the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is the primary step, to be taken promptly, without in the meantime losing sight of the ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament.

76. My country, as one that does not possess nuclear stockpiles and does not intend to produce any, shares the anxiety of the other non-nuclear weapon countries to see their security and independence guaranteed as part of a system of collective security. For this reason we are in favour of holding the proposed conference of non-nuclear weapon States and we support any efforts to that end.

77. We find that far from diminishing, nuclear tests are unfortunately on the increase. According to the figures quoted by the representative of Sweden, Mrs. Myrdal, in her eloquent statement, the curve of nuclear explosions rose by 50 per cent between 1965 and 1966, the majority of the explosions taking place underground. The nuclear Powers must recognize that the situation is deteriorating and that time is of the essence. It may be worthwhile repeating the note of warning struck by the Secretary-General at the end of his report:

“And the longer the world waits, the more nuclear arsenals grow, the greater and more difficult becomes the eventual task.” [A/6858, para. 94.]

78. In the light of this situation, the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament must urgently tackle the question of the suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests to supplement the Treaty of Moscow on partial testing. All other measures, such as the extension of denuclearized zones, could come later. In this connexion, it is most gratifying to note that a nuclear-free zone has already been established in Latin America. We trust that in the very near future the African countries will be in a position to conclude a treaty which will give the African continent the status of a denuclearized zone.

79. In the meantime, Africa is a victim of the arms race in conventional weapons. This, as we have said, is an aspect of disarmament which today calls for more serious consideration than hitherto; and we have to take account of the latest events in the Middle East in considering the problem of the conventional arms race among the smaller countries. If the United Nations, in one way or another, managed to dispose of the arms issue, there would be nothing to stop certain small countries from yielding to the temptation to commit lightning, well-aimed acts of aggression so as to obtain political concessions from their neighbours and even to make territorial gains. Perhaps this Committee ought to embark on a study of the sums spent on armaments in the developing countries, comparing them, for example, with the funds allocated for national education and public health or, in a more general sense, for genuinely productive investments.

80. Here a connexion might be established with another item on our agenda, that of foreign military bases. It is no secret that at a time when we are witnessing the progressive disappearance of the conventional type of base, a more subtle, more discreet type of base is emerging, in the form of a massive influx of hundreds or even thousands of foreign instructors or alleged instructors. Between the so-called “training” base and the regular base the difference may be merely one of terminology, and obviously the one can conceal the other.

81. We believe that this is a matter for prompt action to prevent the irremediable commitment to the unending and disastrous arms race in countries which do not even have sufficient resources to cover their basic task of striving to join the ranks of the developed nations and to escape from the vicious circle of social and economic under-development.

82. The CHAIRMAN: I now give the floor to the representative of Czechoslovakia in order that he may

⁶ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-second Session, Plenary Meetings, 1570th meeting, para. 95.*

formally introduce the draft resolutions contained in documents A/C.1/L.416 and L.419.

83. Mr. KLUSAK (Czechoslovakia) (*translated from Russian*): The report of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, which is contained in document A/6951 and which is the basis of our present discussion on disarmament, mentions in passing that, since the Committee concentrated its main efforts on elaborating the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, it was not in a position to consider the question of general and complete disarmament in pursuance of General Assembly resolution 2162 C (XXI).

84. As my delegation said in its first statement [*1550th meeting*], we fully understand the position in which the Eighteen-Nation Committee found itself this year and appreciate its efforts to carry out General Assembly resolutions 2149 (XXI) and 2153 (XXI) calling for a prompt and expeditious conclusion of a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. At the same time, we trust that in the coming year the Eighteen-Nation Committee will successfully complete its work on the text of the non-proliferation treaty and will be able to devote its attention to other drafts on separate disarmament measures and the question of general and complete disarmament.

85. The debate in the First Committee has shown, it seems to us, that the majority of States are interested in activating and intensifying serious negotiations to conclude a treaty on general and complete disarmament, and expect the Eighteen-Nation Committee to renew its efforts with a view to making substantial progress in the matter.

86. The Eighteen-Nation Committee should also comply with the General Assembly's wishes with regard to other questions which are still awaiting settlement. The point under discussion is, however, that the Eighteen-Nation Committee should carry out its task with regard to the question of general and complete disarmament; and the General Assembly must adopt an appropriate resolution instructing the Eighteen-Nation Committee to discuss that question and to report to the General Assembly at its twenty-third session. Draft resolution A/C.1/L.419 which is before the First Committee today serves that very purpose. My delegation, as a co-sponsor of this draft, expresses the hope that it will meet with general support.

87. There is another draft resolution before us—draft resolution A/C.1/L.416—on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. As I have mentioned, the Eighteen-Nation Committee tells us in its report that it is continuing to discuss this question but has not yet finished. We are weary of repeating that Czechoslovakia attaches great importance to the conclusion of a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. We therefore believe that favourable conditions must be created so that work on this treaty can be completed. All those who sincerely want a non-proliferation treaty to be prepared should, in my view, want it to be completed at the earliest possible date. The General Assembly must therefore make provision for examining the draft treaty as soon as the Eighteen-Nation Committee has drawn it up. As the twenty-second session is nearing its end, we feel that the General Assembly should adopt a resolution to the effect that the question of the non-proliferation

of nuclear weapons remains open and that next year the General Assembly will resume its consideration of it, and that is what is provided for in draft resolution A/C.1/L.416. This text, which is the result of broad consultations, is in our opinion conducive to more favourable conditions for a speedy conclusion of the negotiations on the non-proliferation treaty, provided—and I emphasize this—provided that all Members of the United Nations take an active part.

88. This is why the Czechoslovak delegation is co-sponsoring the draft resolution, which, we are convinced, will be supported by other delegations in this Committee.

89. The CHAIRMAN: Before calling on the next speaker, I should like to announce that Burma has become a co-sponsor of the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.419.

90. Mr. FISHER (United States of America): I should like to speak on the draft resolution which has been circulated in document A/C.1/L.416 under agenda item 28, non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, which deal with the report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. This draft resolution was initially sponsored by fifteen members of this body; since its introduction, other countries, of course, have also sponsored it. I should like to speak on the reasons which led the United States to join in sponsoring this draft resolution.

91. Stated quite simply, the United States joined in sponsoring this draft resolution for the purpose of ensuring that all the members of this body would have an opportunity to participate, on a timely basis, in the discussion of the problems of non-proliferation and, in particular, the question of the non-proliferation treaty, which we hope and anticipate will be completed by the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament during the early months of 1968.

92. Our purpose in sponsoring this draft resolution was to avoid any possible concern that the nuclear weapon Powers might be attempting to achieve a non-proliferation treaty by forcing it on the non-nuclear weapon Powers. We proposed to avoid such concern by proposing a draft resolution, or joining in the sponsorship of a draft resolution, which held open the possibility of the resumption of the twenty-second session to consider the item on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

93. The draft resolution will afford the opportunity for such a session to take place at an early date after 15 March if, as the result of appropriate consultations held in accordance with our rules of procedure, that is a wise thing to do. That decision would be made in the light of the report of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament which the draft resolution calls for by 15 March 1968 and which seems to me to be a realistic date.

94. In this connexion, my delegation has studied the report of the Preparatory Committee for the Conference of Non-Nuclear Weapon States [*A/6817*]. We have studied that report with the care which such a thoughtful and thorough report deserves; and I listened with great interest to the observations of the representative of Kenya in describing it this morning, as well as to the others who talked about it.

95. As I say, this report is a thorough and thoughtful document; it covers all the aspects of the problem that a non-proliferation treaty will present, both to the nuclear weapon States and to the non-nuclear weapon States. But I think that almost without exception, all of the subject-matter which it covers is material which should be discussed at a resumed session of the twenty-second General Assembly, when we are discussing the question of a non-proliferation treaty.

96. If time had permitted, if this were an earlier stage in our session, I would have demonstrated this point by analysing all of the items contained in annex I of the report—that is, the provisional agenda for the Conference of the Non-Nuclear Weapon States. In view of the limited time available to the Committee, however, I think it is advisable to concentrate on two items on which special papers were prepared by the Rapporteur—two very useful, interesting and scholarly papers. These are item 1: method of assuring the security of non-nuclear-weapon States, and item 4: programmes for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

97. Let me deal first with the problem of peaceful uses. Turning to item 4 of annex I of the report of the Preparatory Committee, we see that this item breaks the problem of peaceful uses down into three sub-items: (a) access for non-nuclear weapon States which have renounced the production, acquisition and use of nuclear weapons to technology for peaceful uses of nuclear energy; (b) assistance to non-nuclear weapon States which have renounced the production, acquisition and use of nuclear weapons in the implementation of programmes of peaceful uses of nuclear energy; (c) the question of peaceful explosions for the benefit of non-nuclear weapon States.

98. The texts of the identical non-proliferation treaties which were submitted by the two co-Chairmen on 24 August at the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament deal with all three of these subjects. These texts—first dealing with item (a)—make it clear that nothing in that proposed treaty will have any adverse effect on the production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

99. Dealing with item (b), the nuclear weapon States participating in the discussion at Geneva have made it clear that they will co-operate with non-nuclear weapon States party to the treaty in the further development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

100. Dealing with item (c), nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes: such explosions are a part, but only a part, of the total spectrum of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy; they are a part whose economic feasibility is still under study. But, even in this area, the identical drafts of the non-proliferation treaty make it clear that the potential benefits from nuclear explosive services will be made available through appropriate international procedures to non-nuclear weapon States party to the treaty, on a non-discriminatory basis. It also provides that the charges for these nuclear explosive services should be as low as possible, even excluding any charge for nuclear research and development—and those charges, I assure you, would be great, but they are excluded under these treaty commitments.

101. I am aware that suggestions have been made at the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament by many

countries participating in the work of that Conference to strengthen and in some ways to restructure the provisions in the draft treaty to which I have just referred. These proposals have been given serious consideration and they will be discussed by the co-Chairmen during the Christmas recess. They will be considered again when the Conference reconvenes after Christmas. I do not think, in view of the fact that these matters are still under active negotiation, that it would be helpful to reaching agreement for me to discuss the issues in detail now.

102. But the point I am making now is that if and when the efforts at Geneva are successful and when we are discussing non-proliferation at a resumed session, all three of the points under item 4 of annex I of the provisional agenda—and it is a very well worked out agenda—will be before us, before that Committee for its consideration. I would hope that we would not take any action which would prejudice that consideration or prevent all of us—nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States alike—from participating in that discussion on an equal basis.

103. The same point that I just made can be made with respect to the item on the provisional agenda dealing with the methods of assuring the security of non-nuclear-weapon States. This problem, as I indicated earlier, is also covered by a scholarly paper prepared by the Rapporteur in annex IV of the report, entitled "Security Guarantees in the Context of Measures to Prevent the Spread of Nuclear Weapons". This subject is also the subject of the most intense discussions going on between the co-Chairmen at Geneva, and if and when success at Geneva brings us to a resumed session here, I would hope that this problem would be the subject of the most intense discussion in the United Nations. We will then have to deal with the delicate problems which this issue presents. But surely we should not take any action here which would inhibit, or in any way prejudice, the discussion of this problem in the United Nations where those States which are being asked to give nuclear assurances will have an equal voice.

104. I note, parenthetically, that both in annex I and in annex IV of the report of the Preparatory Committee of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States the question of nuclear-free zones is dealt with as a special aspect of the problem of assuring the security of non-nuclear-weapon States. As is pointed out in paragraph 8 of annex IV of the report, the identical draft treaties tabled by the United States and the USSR both contain a preambulatory provision that nothing in the treaty affects the rights of a group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories.

105. I am also aware that the representative of Mexico at the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament has made certain suggestions for an amendment placing this provision as an operative article rather than in the preamble. This suggestion, which is being given the most thoughtful consideration, is still under negotiation at the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, but again the issue will be placed before this body if and when the issue of non-proliferation is being considered at a resumed session. Here again, we should do nothing that would prejudice our deliberations at such a session.

106. I have dealt, as I said earlier, with only two of the four items under annex I, the provisional agenda for the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States recommended by the Preparatory Committee, and I will not discuss the others in great detail but merely point out that there is nothing in there that would not be appropriate for discussion at the resumed session. I note with interest—and perhaps it would not be considered inappropriate to pay a compliment to the author of the report on item III, which deals in a quite scholarly way, basically with the problem of safeguards, a problem about which we had discussions in other forums. I assure him that the matter will be subject to discussion when this matter comes up before a resumed session, and we should do nothing which would prejudice or inhibit that discussion among all Members of the United Nations.

107. In hearing some of the statements today, and in informal discussions with several representatives, I have detected a feeling on the part of some that in considering the issues involved in a non-proliferation treaty, we are considering two antagonistic sets of interests: those of the present nuclear Powers on the one hand and those of the rest of the world on the other hand.

108. My delegation cannot accept this view and I would like to urge its rejection by others. I should like to do so by quoting a statement made by one of the representatives to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament on 5 September of this year. This representative put forth his view that there were not two groups of States but three groups of States that had varying interests in the subject matter of a non-proliferation treaty. This representative stated as follows:

“Let me add that, in the present state of science, technology and economic development, not everyone becomes an atomic power that wishes to do so; only ten or fifteen countries will be in a position to equip themselves with atomic weapons, if they so desire, in the next few years. The other countries—and they are the great majority of the States Members of the United Nations, that is, at least a hundred—will only be in a position to manufacture atomic weapons in the more remote future.”⁷

109. The representative then went on to ask the question:

“What will happen to their security? Let us recall again that certain non-nuclear countries possessing a sufficient economic and industrial potential scarcely conceal their desire to equip themselves with nuclear weapons for reasons which have nothing to do with their security, for clearly aggressive purposes. What will happen to the security of a large number of countries if such countries become possessors of nuclear weapons? The proliferation of nuclear weapons is incompatible with national and international security. The mere prospect of an increase in the number of nuclear countries has the result of raising new problems and creating general complexes of insecurity.”⁷

110. This representative, therefore, saw that there were three groups of States: the existing nuclear-weapon States,

the relatively small number of States in a position to manufacture nuclear weapons in the immediate future, and the hundred or so States represented in this body who are not in a position to do so.

111. I think members of this Committee may be interested to know that I was quoting from Ambassador Christov of Bulgaria, when he spoke at the 328th meeting of the Committee. I have not always agreed with the statements of my colleague from Bulgaria at the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, and I am not wholly sure I agree completely with this, for reasons I will indicate in a moment, but I am happy to commend this statement to the consideration of this Committee. I think the Committee would be interested also in knowing that in an earlier intervention on 24 February 1966 the representative of Sweden, Mrs. Myrdal, had pointed out that there might be as many as four categories of States. Others have made other types of classification.

112. Without wishing to argue this point on classifications or categorizations, I think the Secretary-General's report on the effects of the possible use of nuclear weapons and on the security and economic implications for States of the acquisition and further development of these weapons makes one point abundantly clear—that is, that all countries have an interest in the prompt negotiation of a non-proliferation treaty because nuclear proliferation will have an adverse effect on the security of all States.

113. It is in this spirit that the United States joined as a sponsor of resolution A/C.1/L.416. It is in this spirit that we would hope to participate in the discussion of non-proliferation in a resumed session of the twenty-second General Assembly.

114. Mr. GHAUS (Afghanistan): It emerges from the report submitted by the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament [A/6951-DC/229] that, this year, the Committee has directed its efforts mainly towards the elaboration of a treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. According to this report, the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament was not in a position to devote sufficient time to a thorough consideration of the problem of general and complete disarmament and other partial or collateral disarmament measures, such as a comprehensive test-ban treaty and the elimination of foreign military bases in the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America.

115. That the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament has endeavoured during its recent sessions to find a solution to the urgent problem of non-proliferation is, of course, quite understandable. But it is our hope that that Committee, after concluding its work on the non-proliferation treaty, would find it possible in the near future to give its utmost attention to other matters submitted to it by the General Assembly. All these issues are of paramount importance for the welfare of present and future generations.

116. This being said, we believe that our consideration of the items related to the question of disarmament at the present session of the General Assembly will necessarily remain limited in scope. Owing to this fact, the delegation of Afghanistan, at this rather late stage in our discussions,

⁷ Document ENDC/PV.328, para. 18.

will confine itself to a few brief observations of a general character.

117. As we have said on many occasions, Afghanistan fully supports the principle of general and complete disarmament under effective international control. No matter how remote this goal seems to be, we must strive to reach it. Nevertheless, we have to recognize, with a deep sense of disappointment, that ever since the proposal for general and complete disarmament was put forward eight years ago, no significant progress has been achieved in this respect. On the contrary, the nuclear arms race continues unabated. New and sophisticated weapons are constantly developed. We agree with the representative of Canada, who, when speaking of the declared intention of the super-Powers to develop anti-ballistic missile systems, said that if the nuclear arms race proceeds there will be no end in sight except nuclear war.

118. It is in general and complete disarmament that the hope of mankind lies for lasting peace and security. Armaments of any kind, whether nuclear or conventional, biological or chemical, are all weapons of war and destruction and constitute a potential danger for mankind. The difficulties which necessarily exist regarding the conclusion of a treaty on general and complete disarmament should not discourage or prevent us from trying to agree on partial or independent measures of disarmament. While general and complete disarmament remains the ultimate goal, the adoption of these measures will to a great extent facilitate its attainment.

119. Although the search for nuclear disarmament has deservedly been in the forefront of our preoccupations, we firmly believe that the question of the prevention of the conventional arms race should receive serious consideration. The acquisition and dissemination of conventional weapons may upset the arms balance in a particular region and create tension and cause for friction in that area. In addition to the very real danger which the increase in conventional armaments creates for the peace and security of States, it places a heavy and sometimes unbearable financial burden on the meagre resources of smaller countries, resources which could be used advantageously for their economic and social development.

120. An additional benefit deriving from general and complete disarmament would mean for us, the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America, that a part of the funds released by disarmament in nuclear States could very well be diverted to peaceful purposes and used for the progress and advancement of developing countries.

121. Today a number of nations are considered potential nuclear Powers. If this trend continues, in a few years more nations may acquire nuclear weapons, with all their inherent dangers. This will undoubtedly engender more fear and suspicion and consequently lead to a further deterioration in international relations. If the technological advance in the field of nuclear science, on the one hand, enables man to produce deadlier weapons of mass destruction, on the other hand it makes them cheaper and puts them at the disposal of poorer countries.

122. On practically every occasion, both nuclear and non-nuclear States have invariably described the grave

dangers emanating from constantly growing stockpiles and varieties of nuclear weapons and have expressed alarm at the increase in the number of countries which make and possess them. It is this threat of wider dissemination of nuclear weapons which makes it imperative that a non-proliferation treaty should be concluded as soon as possible.

123. We have noted with satisfaction that substantial progress has been made in this connexion. We hope that the remaining difficulties regarding verification and control will be resolved. We hope also that the treaty will be drafted in accordance with the principles embodied in resolution 2028 (XX) of the General Assembly and will take due account of the views of the non-aligned countries in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. The treaty should reflect adequately the principle of an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations of the nuclear and non-nuclear Powers. It is not conceivable that the non-nuclear countries should be asked to renounce the acquisition of nuclear weapons while the nuclear Powers have not yet made a start on the road leading to general and complete disarmament.

124. We believe that serious efforts should be exerted to seek agreement on such important issues as the cessation of underground tests, the creation of safeguards against surprise attack and the reduction of the possibility of nuclear war by accident or miscalculation.

125. The Government of Afghanistan views with deep concern the continuance of nuclear tests. We hope that the 1963 partial test-ban Treaty will be adhered to universally and will be followed by a comprehensive test ban covering all environments.

126. May I be allowed to mention that the delegation of Afghanistan welcomes the initiative taken by the delegations which have presented a draft resolution in this regard [*A/C.1/L.414 and Add.1-2*]. We are of the opinion that an agreement prohibiting underground nuclear tests would be a normal and logical complement to the treaty on non-proliferation.

127. My delegation expressed its general views concerning the question of denuclearized zones a few days ago in this Committee when the question of the denuclearization of Latin America was on the agenda for consideration. Therefore I shall not repeat them. But I would be failing in my duty if I did not mention our appreciation of the report of the Secretary-General [*A/6858 and Corr.1*] and of the team of experts who assisted in drafting it. We think that this report is an unbiased and authoritative statement on the effects of nuclear weapons, the implications of their proliferation and their further development.

128. We are of the opinion—and on this I am sure that everyone agrees—that armaments and war will not settle problems, but will certainly create new ones, will increase international misunderstanding, and will consequently add to the misery of the human race.

129. Mr. ZANDFARD (Iran): I should like to make a few general comments on some of the items now before us and I shall make my statement as brief as possible. The interim

report of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee covering its activities for the period from 21 February to 7 December [A/6951-DC/229] tells us that, since the Committee has concentrated its major efforts on the elaboration of a non-proliferation treaty, it has not been able to devote sufficient time to consideration of other questions, including that of general and complete disarmament. Even the question of concluding a non-proliferation treaty which has been the main preoccupation of the Committee has yet to be materialized.

130. We realize, of course, that submission by the United States and the Soviet Union late in August of an identical draft of a non-proliferation treaty⁸ was a major achievement but the fact remains that an acceptable draft text has yet to be worked out. It is no use denying that the clear consensus among United Nations Members which existed in favour of a non-proliferation treaty does not hold good any more. As the negotiations have painfully progressed over the years charges of imperfections in the treaty have increasingly been raised.

131. In a case like this when there are specific considerations there is always the danger of losing sight of the importance of the central and basic question. This we cannot allow to happen. Now that the treaty seems so near, there should be one more attempt at removing the last hurdle by filling in the missing article 3.

132. We shall, of course, vote in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/L.416 which, among other things, calls upon the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee urgently to continue its work and to submit to the General Assembly on or before 15 March 1968 a full report on the negotiations on a draft treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

133. The report of the Secretary-General on the effects of the possible use of nuclear weapons and on the security and economic implications for States of the acquisition and further development of these weapons [A/6858 and Corr.1] is the most timely reminder of the urgent need for a non-proliferation treaty—a reminder which comes from a very authoritative and impartial source. The unanimity which characterizes the findings of the distinguished team of experts makes it more impressive when one takes into account the fact that the experts represent different political and geographical areas. What the group has accomplished stands out as a significant achievement in international scientific co-operation. We feel indebted to the Secretary-General and to the consultant experts who assisted him in the compilation of this remarkable document.

134. We subscribe to the conclusions of the report where it outlines the devastation which could be associated with the use of nuclear weapons, or where it reviews the nature and variety of economic burdens which acquisition of nuclear weapons inevitably entails. We further share the view expressed in the report that:

“... whatever the path to national and international security in the future, it is certainly not to be found in

the further spread and elaboration of nuclear weapons”.
[Ibid., para. 94.]

135. The report also lays due stress on the security of nuclear and non-nuclear Powers as a means to achieve non-proliferation. We have consistently advocated the view that security is the prerequisite to any agreement on disarmament. As we said on a previous occasion:

“We have to resign ourselves to the fact that nations, large and small, will not be ready to put down their arms unless their national deterrent mechanisms are replaced by some yet to be devised effective and reliable international force. In our view, the problem of security and disarmament is a total one in which the many aspects of the problem should be studied together, if we are ever to cherish the blessings of a durable peace”.⁹

136. May I be permitted now to make a brief comment on the urgent need for the suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests.

137. It is now clear that almost a year after the passage of resolution 2163 (XXI) which, *inter alia*, requested the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee to elaborate, without any further delay, a treaty banning underground nuclear weapon tests, nothing has been achieved.

138. The signature of the 1963 partial test-ban Treaty by the Members of the Organization constituted in our view a promise not to turn their defence efforts in a nuclear direction. It was logical to expect that the great Powers would seek ways to unite not only on measures to halt the spread of nuclear weapons, but to initiate the process of diminishing their own reliance on this technology of war. None of these predictions has come true. Those States that have remained outside the Treaty continue on the path which they have chosen while atmospheric and underground explosions are being undertaken. The foothold so painfully won by the test-ban Treaty will be lost unless agreement can be reached to suspend nuclear weapons in all environments.

139. We can only hope that the fate of draft resolution A/C.1/L.414 and Add.1 and 2, requesting the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee to take up as a matter of urgency the elaboration of a treaty banning underground nuclear weapon tests, will be more propitious than the one we adopted during our last year's deliberations on this important item.

140. It is a prevailing view that roads leading to non-proliferation of nuclear weapons are many and varied. And thus it becomes incumbent upon us to exhaust all these possibilities. Convening a conference of non-nuclear weapon States has also been referred to as a means to further the cause of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

141. In response to resolution 2153 B (XXI) the Preparatory Committee for the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States was established and its recommendation is

⁸ Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1967 and 1968, document DC/230 and Add.1, annex IV, sects. 6 and 8.

⁹ This statement was made at the 1394th meeting of the First Committee, the official record of which is published in summary form.

contained in document A/6817 which is before us now. Ambassador Shahi of Pakistan, during his intervention this morning [1552nd meeting], marshalled once again convincing arguments in justification of holding such a conference. My delegation believes that the conference will provide a suitable forum for detailed discussion of a number of relevant issues, especially for assuring the security of non-nuclear Powers with a view to harmonizing the views on this important aspect of the non-proliferation treaty.

142. A little while ago with respect to this conference we heard the statement of the representative of the United States containing a number of interesting points and we shall study his observations with due care and attention.

143. Before concluding, may I interject here, now that the negotiations on disarmament have become the prerogative of a special group, that it is only during the debate in the First Committee that we are given an opportunity to give vent, while expressing our views, to our frustration at the lack of any achievement in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament and, in particular, to renew our appeal to the great Powers to make every effort to find at least partial answers to some aspects of the problem of disarmament. It was mainly with that objective in mind that I intervened in the debate.

144. Mr. PARDO (Malta): Mr. Chairman, I regret to inform you that extensive consultations have demonstrated that a general agreement is not possible on the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.411/Rev.1 and, at the same time, that it is not possible to combine this draft resolution with the one contained in document A/C.1/L.412 and Add.1 in view of their different objectives. The first one seeks a serious study and negotiation on a problem of general concern, while the other is perhaps motivated by more immediate political considerations.

145. In these circumstances, there are only two choices: either to proceed to vote on one or both of these documents, or to postpone a decision on the matter to a more opportune time.

146. This Committee is behind schedule in its work and this session of the General Assembly is about to end. There is little hope that the problem of chemical and biological weapons can receive at this time the attention it deserves. There is also little purpose in dividing this Committee if the only result would be to make consideration of this question still more subject to political passions and to immediate political considerations than it already is.

147. Furthermore, any favourable consideration which this Committee might give to the draft resolution presented by my delegation would not necessarily mean that serious consideration would also be given by the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to the problem in the teeth of powerful opposition. In these circumstances, my delegation believes that it would be better not to insist on a vote on the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.411/Rev.1, if no vote is requested on the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.412, in order to avoid unnecessarily complicating and prolonging the work of this Committee.

148. In informing you of this decision, we wish to make it quite clear that in taking the initiative to present, I hope, objectively, the fearful hazards of chemical and biological weapons and bringing them to the attention of the United Nations, we were exclusively motivated by considerations of the general welfare of all countries.

149. We note in this connexion, with regret but not with surprise, that the delegate of the Byelorussian SSR chose to accuse us of serving foreign interests and taking part in criminal plans. This sort of absurd language serves no one and serves no interest, not even the interest of the Byelorussian SSR. It is regrettable that a rational discussion of one of the most important, and certainly the most neglected aspects of the existing arms control problem appears impossible with those whose eyes are blinded by immediate political considerations and who, therefore, seem unable to appreciate the long term implications of the vagueness of present international provisions with regard to the definition and the use of chemical and biological weapons.

150. I regret that the representative of the Byelorussian SSR did not realize that my delegation, in making its proposal, might also have been serving, indirectly perhaps, but none the less surely, the interests of his own country.

151. Lack of international action, however, at this session of the General Assembly, will not make the extremely serious problem of the definition and use of chemical and biological weapons disappear, as if by waving a magic wand. International neglect will only aggravate and complicate the problem. As we tried to make clear, a solution cannot be sought only—I emphasize the word only—in the simplistic recommendation that all States adhere to the 1925 Geneva Protocol. We trust that in due course all countries will realize that it is in their own interests seriously to discuss the problem of chemical and biological weapons, with a view to establishing more effective international restraints on their use than those that are provided by the Geneva Protocol, without in any way impairing the validity of the principles and objectives of this international instrument until it has been replaced by one more suited to modern circumstances.

152. I hope that my delegation will be in a position to bring this extremely grave problem to the attention of the international community for appropriate action on the first suitable occasion.

153. Mr. CHEPROV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translated from Russian*): My delegation has stated on an earlier occasion that the preparation of the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons must be expedited and that it attaches great importance to the negotiations on this matter which are now in a very serious stage.

154. The urgency and importance of preventing the further spread of nuclear weapons can hardly be overestimated. The Soviet Union regards the problem of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons as one of the cornerstones of European and international security. Any increase in the number of countries possessing or being given access to nuclear weapons would greatly augment tension in international relations and increase the probability of the

use of nuclear weapons. Spread of nuclear weapons is a danger to all States. It is a danger to the nuclear Powers, which may be drawn into a nuclear war as a result of conflicts in some part of the world. It is no less a threat to the small countries, since, as has recently been convincingly shown once again in the Secretary-General's report on the effects of the possible use of nuclear weapons, if a nuclear war were to take place, all nations without exception would suffer. The importance of a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons for the peoples of Africa, in particular, is that it would hinder the South African racists, who are working on producing nuclear weapons jointly with the West German revanchists, from obtaining nuclear armaments. The Arab countries cannot but bear in mind a certain neighbouring State, whose aggressive intentions are known to all and which does not shirk from the prospect of having nuclear weapons. The conclusion of a non-proliferation treaty would be of extreme importance for Europe, which has already experienced two world wars.

155. It is no secret that in the Federal Republic of Germany support is being given to aggressive and revanchist forces, whose great ambition it is to gain access to the most dreadful weapon known to modern man. In short, it is obvious that everyone is interested in the earliest conclusion of a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. The General Assembly noted all these facts last year and pointed out, with full justification, that an increase in the number of countries possessing nuclear weapons "may lead to the aggravation of tensions between States and the risk of a nuclear war" [*resolution 2153 A (XXI)*].

156. The conclusion of a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons would enhance general security and help to bring about favourable conditions for solving other disarmament problems, above all nuclear disarmament. The Soviet Union has repeatedly emphasized that it regards a solution of the problem of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons not as an end in itself, but as a link in a chain of other measures aimed at averting the threat of nuclear war. I should like in this connexion to quote from a statement made by A. M. Kosygin, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, on 9 February of this year:

"... we regard the solution of the question of non-proliferation as an important step towards the nuclear disarmament of States. Non-proliferation is not a way for the present nuclear Powers to preserve their special status, but an important stage in the struggle for nuclear disarmament, a ban on the use of nuclear weapons, their complete removal from the armaments of States and their destruction, and the prohibition of further production of nuclear weapons. We are convinced that in the end it will be possible to achieve a solution of all these problems and thereby to liberate mankind from the threat that is hanging over it."

157. The First Committee has before it a draft resolution co-sponsored by fifteen States representing different continents and different groups of States, and including the Soviet Union. This draft reaffirms earlier General Assembly resolutions on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Its purpose is to expedite the solution of this problem in the present situation and to facilitate the completion of a

treaty on non-proliferation. We urge the members of the Committee to support this draft resolution.

158. A year ago, the General Assembly adopted a resolution [*resolution 2149 (XXI)*] pointing out that in view of the continuing international negotiations on a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons all States must refrain from any actions which might hamper the conclusion of an agreement on this subject. The General Assembly also appealed to all States to take all the necessary steps to facilitate and achieve at the earliest possible time the conclusion of a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. The General Assembly urged States to refrain from actions which might hamper the conclusion of the above-mentioned treaty. This appeal retains its full validity and importance today. The negotiations on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons continued in the Eighteen-Nation Committee quite intensively until literally yesterday, and, as noted in that Committee's interim report, substantial progress was made. That progress is the result of efforts that were pursued over many years. It is to the credit not only of the Eighteen-Nation Committee, but of the General Assembly, which discussed the problem of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons at many sessions and repeatedly adopted important resolutions on it, which served as guidance for the work of the Eighteen-Nation Committee. The members of that Committee, representing different continents and groups of countries, took into account the wishes and views as regards a solution of the non-proliferation problem expressed in the General Assembly by non-nuclear as well as by nuclear Powers.

159. Of the various measures which today might help to curb the nuclear arms race, the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is the closest to realization. There can be no doubt that not only our contemporaries, but future generations as well will deeply appreciate the conclusion of a non-proliferation treaty, if this measure, so important for the cause of peace and international security, is carried into effect. A treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons will, in particular, open new horizons for the peaceful use of nuclear energy for the good of mankind, of all the peoples of the world. In these circumstances it is extremely important, as provided for in the 15-Power draft resolution, to enable the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to complete its preparation of the draft treaty and not to undertake anything else that might prevent it from carrying out its weighty task. The draft resolution sets a definite time limit, namely, 15 March 1968, for the Eighteen-Nation Committee to submit a full report on this problem; for without such a report it would be senseless in present-day conditions to attempt to solve the question of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

160. We are convinced that the Members of the United Nations will give proof of understanding and statesmanship in determining their attitude to the aforesaid draft resolution, and will therefore support it. Such a position on their part would be in the interests of solving the problem of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, and consequently in the interests of all the peoples of the world.

161. In connexion with the agenda item entitled "Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons", we have also received

the report of the Preparatory Committee for the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States. Our position on the convening of this conference is well known and I have no intention of restating it in detail. I would like to emphasize once again, however, that in our view the problem of guaranteeing the security of non-nuclear countries must be solved by the nuclear and non-nuclear countries jointly.

162. We urge everyone to give serious thought to the matter, bearing in mind that a juxtaposition of nuclear and non-nuclear countries in solving the question of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons would not ensure the success of the conference, and that inviting the nuclear Powers to the conference without the right of vote would not alter that situation.

163. We have noted the interpretation of the purposes of the conference given by its initiators. May I in this connexion quote from the statement of Mr. Pirzada, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Pakistan, in the general debate at this session of the General Assembly:

“Last year the General Assembly, in resolution 2153 B (XXI), decided to convene a conference of non-nuclear-weapon States to consider how best their security can be guaranteed against nuclear threat or blackmail. Pakistan had made it clear that the proposal was conceived to complement not duplicate; to supplement, and not compete with, the work on the non-proliferation treaty of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

“It was in that spirit that the Preparatory Committee established by resolution 2153 B (XXI) decided to await developments in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament as long as possible before commencing its task.”¹⁰

164. The Pakistani Minister for Foreign Affairs further stated:

“It is apparent from the report of the Preparatory Committee that it has tried its best to ensure that the non-nuclear-weapon States Conference will deliberate essentially on those questions which arise directly from the conclusion of the non-proliferation treaty but are outside the scope of the treaty.”¹¹

165. At this morning's meeting of the First Committee, the representatives of Kenya, Pakistan, Malaysia and Ethiopia, if I understood them correctly, repeated the same interpretation of the conception of the non-nuclear-weapon States conference as the Minister for Foreign Affairs for Pakistan had done. It is therefore clear that the States which have been particularly active in the matter of convening the non-nuclear-weapon States conference do not regard it as a possibility that the Conference should compete with the Eighteen-Nation Committee in working out a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons or should become an obstacle in the way to the conclusion of that treaty.

166. If it should be decided, however, to convene the non-nuclear-weapon States conference in March of this

year, as recommended by the Preparatory Committee in its report, that would create serious difficulties in the completion of the work on the non-proliferation treaty. That would be contrary to the conception of the conference held by its initiators themselves, as it would be contrary to resolutions of the General Assembly.

167. In asking for the Conference to be convened in March 1968—a step to which the Soviet Union is categorically opposed—its proponents seem to have given no thought to the exceedingly unfavourable consequences it might have. For, in truth, it might jeopardize all that has so far been gained by arduous negotiations at Geneva.

168. The USSR delegation hopes that States which are concerned with strengthening international peace and security will not embark on such a course.

169. Speaking of this conference, I should like to emphasize that the Soviet Union has the greatest respect and consideration for the views of non-nuclear States on all matters of disarmament, including nuclear disarmament. That the Soviet Union is ready to take their interests into account is demonstrated, to give but one example, by the proposal it submitted at this session regarding the conclusion of a convention banning the use of nuclear weapons. The General Assembly should pass a resolution on the subject which should facilitate the final and total prohibition of nuclear weapons, these weapons of mass destruction. There is hardly any need to remind those present what importance the Soviet Union attaches to this problem and how hard it has worked for its solution. The witnesses are assembled here.

170. The non-nuclear countries are the countries of Africa, Asia, Latin America, the socialist countries which are our brothers, and many European countries with which the Soviet Union maintains amicable relations. The majority are countries which have only recently shed the shackles of colonial slavery and are still fighting against imperialism and neo-colonialism. Co-operation with, support for, these countries and the peoples fighting for their national liberation is one of the cornerstones of the USSR policy. Together with these countries, we are waging a struggle for peace, against aggression, against imperialist stratagems, for the prompt and final elimination of the shameful colonial system, for the extirpation of the ugly evil of racism, for freedom, progress and independence.

171. The struggle for disarmament—and, in particular, against the spread of nuclear weapons—is part of the joint effort for international peace and security. Those who attempt to sow discord between the Soviet Union and its friends in Africa and Asia harbour evil intentions, are guided by selfish aims, and are adding grist to the mill of imperialist and colonialist forces.

172. In conclusion, may I once again express my conviction that our friends will understand the considerations prompting my delegation, and that all States, nuclear and non-nuclear alike, will join forces in seeking to achieve a goal that concerns all mankind: the conclusion of a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons as a step towards disarmament, the elimination of nuclear weapons, and the liberation of the world from the threat of nuclear war.

¹⁰ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-first Session, Plenary Meetings, 1584th meeting, paras. 135 and 136.*

¹¹ *Ibid.*, para. 137.

173. U SOE TIN (Burma): The delegation of Burma had not originally intended to take part in the general debate on the four items which we are now considering, relating to disarmament. The reasons for this are twofold: first, enough has been said by the delegation of Burma on the said four items during last year's discussions, and those statements have been duly recorded. Resolutions were then adopted by the Assembly, asking the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to give further, serious consideration to the matter with a view to arriving at meaningful agreements and to report back to the United Nations General Assembly.

174. As can be seen in its interim report [A/6951-DC/229] the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, during the time available between the twenty-first and twenty-second sessions of the General Assembly, could concentrate its major efforts only on the elaboration of a non-proliferation treaty, which demands high priority; the three other items could not be given sufficient time and the consideration they deserve.

175. My delegation feels that, apart from co-operating in the consultations formulating resolutions for the purpose of referring these items back to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament for further consideration, a reiteration of what has already been said on the matter would not be necessary, especially in view of the very limited time available to this Committee for discussion of these items.

176. Secondly, my delegation considers that more time should be given to the other delegations to comment on the work of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament and to give constructive and objective suggestions which would help the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament in their forthcoming deliberations.

177. My delegation has accordingly decided to limit its intervention in this Committee only to an explanation of vote on the various draft resolutions before it. But having heard the Chair's suggestion made this morning on the work programme and procedure, we have decided to co-operate with the Chair in the orderly conduct of business in this short intervention by limiting ourselves to an explanation of vote on the various drafts now before us, and thus save the Committee another round of explanations of vote.

178. Before dealing with the specific items, I would here briefly wish to state our basic concept of disarmament. Disarmament, as we see it, is a problem whose progress or lack of progress is subject to political factors in the international situation; and so long as these conditions obtain, the question of general and complete disarmament will remain inhibited. We feel that conditions of trust and confidence are essential for progress in disarmament negotiations; and if these do not exist they must be built up. We consider that these are the essential prerequisites to satisfactory progress in disarmament negotiations, whether in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament or in the Disarmament Commission, or in any other body set up for the purpose.

179. On the question of general and complete disarmament, we have before the Committee now two draft resolutions and some amendments relating to the use of

chemical and bacteriological weapons and the Geneva Protocol of 1925. I shall deal with them first.

180. Regarding the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.411/Rev.1, while we entertain no doubts whatsoever about the good intentions of the sponsors of the draft, we feel a bit hesitant about accepting the usefulness of the action proposed therein, especially in operative paragraph 1. We consider that the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament has already been burdened with other practical aspects of disarmament requiring higher priority. On the other hand, we can generally support the draft contained in document A/C.1/L.412 and Add.1, with some minor amendments. We should like to express our hope that consultations between the sponsors of that draft resolution and of the amendments contained in document A/C.1/L.417 will yield results and produce an amicable solution to the matter so that the new amendment will again command our support.

181. My delegation will also support the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.413 and Add.1-3, although we have some reservations on the provisions of paragraphs 5, 6 and 7. We feel that efforts towards wide dissemination of the Secretary-General's report should be concentrated more on the nuclear and near-nuclear weapon States, rather than spreading them over all the more than one hundred other Member States, which have neither the will, the capacity, nor the technology to manufacture or use such weapons of mass destruction.

182. My delegation will also support yet another draft, contained in document A/C.1/L.419, requiring the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to resume consideration of the question of general and complete disarmament.

183. On the item entitled, "Urgent need for the suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests", my delegation, along with the other Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament neutrals and others, has co-sponsored the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.414 and Add.1-2. Considering the fact that the stalemate in discussions has been coupled with an acceleration in the pace of nuclear testing and evidence of a new race between the two nuclear super-Powers for more sophisticated nuclear armaments, we wonder whether the lack of means of verification of underground tests or the lack of political conviction and courage for nuclear disarmament is the real cause for the impasse reached in concluding a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty. Coming to item 28, the question of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, the delegation of Burma unreservedly extends its support to the draft resolution contained in A/C.1/L.416 and co-sponsored by the three nuclear Powers and others. During the general debate in plenary on 2 October 1967, the delegation of Burma, touching on this issue, stated:

"We have been particularly encouraged by the fact that the presentation of the drafts to the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament represents a welcome departure in procedure from that of the previous partial nuclear test ban treaty, in that a wider co-operation and consensus is being sought. We regret, however, that a very essential element, since the effectiveness of the treaty depends on its wide acceptance, has

been omitted from the draft: namely, the element of balanced mutual responsibilities and obligations as between the nuclear and the non-nuclear Powers.”¹²

184. We are all the more heartened now that the two co-Chairmen of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, in the draft treaty sponsored by them, have not only reaffirmed resolutions 2028 (XX) and 2153 A (XXI) but have also called upon the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to submit to the General Assembly a full report of the negotiations on the draft treaty for consideration by the entire United Nations membership at the resumed session. We see in the draft resolution a conscious attempt by the two co-Chairmen, authors of the existing two identical drafts, to fulfil the principles embodied in the General Assembly resolutions 2028 (XX) and 2153 A (XXI).

185. It is the firm belief of the delegation of Burma that the two super-Powers, co-authors of the identical draft treaties, who have laboured tirelessly and with utmost patience and perseverance to produce them, will receive and consider the various amendments, comments, and suggestions made, both in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament and in this Committee, in the same spirit in which they have been made and thus fulfil the earnest desire of the non-nuclear States to see the conclusion of a viable, effective and equitable non-proliferation treaty that would be acceptable to the vast majority of States.

186. The CHAIRMAN: I now call upon the representative of Hungary to make a statement as co-sponsor of draft resolution A/C.1/L.412 and Add.1.

187. Mr. CSATORDAY (Hungary): The representative of Malta made a statement this afternoon announcing that he will not press for a vote on the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.411/Rev.1 if the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.412 and Add.1, with its amendments, is not put to the vote either.

188. On behalf of the co-sponsors of the draft resolution A/C.1/L.412 and the amendments, I take note of this decision made by the representative of Malta. I do not wish to attach any belittling adjectives to draft resolution A/C.1/L.411/Rev.1; I do not want to return the compliment, I shall make only a very simple statement.

189. The objective of the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.412 and Add.1 was only to reaffirm the validity of the Geneva Protocol of 17 June 1925 on the basis of contemporary international law, the provisions of the Charter and many international agreements, and by this to contribute to the limitation and prohibition of weapons of mass destruction, notably of chemical and bacteriological weapons.

190. In view of the withdrawal of draft resolution A/C.1/L.411/Rev.1 my delegation, together with the other sponsors, thinks that resolution 2162 B (XXI) stays valid in full. Thus, the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/L.412 and Add.1 and the amendment A/C.1/L.417 will not press for a vote.

191. I wish to add that we had very broad consultations with a great number of representatives from all regions of the world on the merits of these draft resolutions. These consultations have been most interesting and fruitful indeed as at the end a common text was elaborated. It was not a simplistic approach. The consideration was very careful and each and every word was weighed according to its merits. We tried to formulate a draft which would promote the main aim in the most efficient way.

192. During these consultations almost complete unanimity has been achieved in unreservedly upholding and reaffirming the validity of the Geneva Protocol of 17 June 1925, not for its vagueness but for its resolute condemnation of the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons against human beings and against their means of existence. During these consultations it became evident that, almost without exception, delegations are supporting this provision of the Geneva Protocol inviting all States who have not done so to accede to the Geneva Protocol. The Hungarian delegation is in duty-bound, according to the stipulation of the Geneva Protocol, and appeals to all States to accede to this important international document. It especially calls the attention of the great Powers to this document—more especially that great Power which has not yet acceded to the Geneva Protocol, the United States of America—and hopes that it will not fail to respond to this appeal, not of the Hungarian delegation, but of the community of nations who have acceded so far to the Geneva Protocol and to the Protocol itself, and that, together with those countries who have still not acceded to this Protocol it will ratify this international convention.

193. The CHAIRMAN: I call upon the representative of Thailand to exercise his right of reply.

194. Mr. PANYARACHUN (Thailand): During the past few meetings of our Committee the representatives of some socialist countries, particularly the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic and Hungary, have, as usual, spoken in one synchronized voice against the exercise of the sovereign rights of Thailand, an independent country and a loyal member of the United Nations which, unlike some of them, has never known and has never been forced in its entire history to live under conditions of enslavement, either political or economic.

195. References have been made to the use of the military bases in my country against North Viet-Nam. In this connexion, I should like to read out part of the statement that the Thai delegation made in the First Committee in the course of last year's debate on agenda item 98 entitled "Elimination of foreign military bases in the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America":

"A study of the chronology of the Viet-Nam issue reveals, however, the real fact that the tragic situation in Viet-Nam is caused by the aggression of North Viet-Nam supported by Communist China and some other Communist countries against the territorial integrity and political independence of the Republic of Viet-Nam.

"In the face of that aggression, South Viet-Nam has the inherent right to defend itself against armed attack from the north and has the right to resort to collective self-defence measures, as recognized by international law and confirmed by the Charter of the United Nations, by

¹² *Ibid.*, 1575th meeting, para. 126.

requesting the participation, aid and assistance of other States. It is in the exercise of its rights of self-preservation and self-defence, and after the International Control Commission had proved itself incapable of stopping aggression, that the Republic of Viet-Nam has called upon friendly nations for military and economic assistance. And it is in response to that expressed request that no less than thirty nations of the world have been assisting South Viet-Nam in one form or another in defending itself against armed attack from the communist north.”¹³

196. Lest the words of the representative of Thailand be judged as being partial, I feel that it is my duty to draw the attention of the Committee to the statement made by the Head of the National Coalition Government of a country in South-East Asia whose neutrality and territorial integrity were formally recognized and guaranteed in July 1962 by fourteen Powers, including the People's Republic of China and the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam.

197. On 13 October this year, His Highness Prince Souvanna Phouma of Laos said in his address to the General Assembly:

“For years we have seen treaties violated, agreements trampled under foot, our neutrality threatened, our land invaded. For years, in the name of a so-called national liberation war, a neighbouring State”—North Viet-Nam—“imbued with a fanatical spirit of revolution and ideology, has been sending its troops to our Kingdom to sustain a multifaceted rebellion, overtly or covertly, but always as a puppet whose strings are pulled from abroad. At the moment when I am speaking here, fights, struggles, ambushes occur in the north of my country along the famous Ho Chi-Minh Trail, through which, from north to south, men and war material, everything that serves death, are being moved.”¹⁴

198. At present, according to the Laotian Government, there are no less than 40,000 North Viet-Nameese regular troops in Laos. By illegally occupying the Kingdom of

¹³ This statement was made at the 1467th meeting of the First Committee, the official record of which is published in summary form.

¹⁴ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-second Session, Plenary Meetings, 1590th meeting, para. 94.*

Laos, North Viet-Nam has been flagrantly violating article 2 of the 1962 Geneva Agreements on Laos, of which it is a co-signatory.

199. The Hungarian representative said that United States aircraft based in Thailand were bombing the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam without any declaration of war. The representative of Hungary certainly should be an expert on this matter. After all, aircraft of a Power allegedly friendly to Hungary, ironically enough, bombed his own capital a little more than eleven years ago without any declaration of war and, in fact, they were taking off not from the outside, but from the soil of his country itself. Yet the representative of Hungary does not appear to harbour any ill feeling against that Power, obviously because he feels that those aircraft were acting in defence of his Government, if not exactly in defence of the interests of his own people and country. The old adage should apply: “Those who live in glass houses should not throw stones.”

200. The CHAIRMAN: With the statement by the representative of Thailand, the general debate on items 28, 29, 30 and 31 is concluded. Therefore, with the agreement of the Committee, I shall cancel the night meeting. In order to permit representatives to consider and seek instructions on the draft resolutions, and in view of the late distribution of draft resolution A/C.1/L.420—which has been circulated in English and will later be circulated in other languages—there will be no meetings tomorrow. On Monday morning, 18 December, we shall hear explanations of vote which, the Committee has agreed, will be limited to five minutes. I hope that the Committee will then be able to vote on all the draft resolutions which have been submitted under the four items relating to disarmament, so that the necessary steps will be taken with regard to other Committees, such as the Administrative and Budgetary Committee and the Fifth Committee, and the reports of the Rapporteur on these items ready for submission to the General Assembly. The Assembly will take up all the disarmament questions, together with the item on the sea-bed, on Tuesday, 19 December. I hope that delegations will be prepared on Monday morning to vote on the remaining draft resolutions before us so that our agenda for this session may be completed.

The meeting rose at 6.10 p.m.