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Chairman: Mr. Leopoldo BENITES (Ecuador).

AGENDA ITEM 97

Renunciation by States of actions hampering the conclusion of an agreement on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (continued) (A/6398, A/C.1/L.368/Rev.1 and Rev.1/Add.1 and 2)

GENERAL DEBATE (continued)

1. Mr. MOD (Hungary) said that several questions arose in connexion with the item now before the Committee. First of all, why had the Soviet Union thought it necessary to propose an item relating to the renunciation by States of actions hampering the conclusion of an agreement on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons? Secondly, what were the obstacles to the conclusion of such an agreement and who actually wished to remove them? Lastly, how much progress had been made towards removing them?

2. In the view of his delegation, it had been necessary to include the item in the agenda so that no one would take an irreparable step; that was a real possibility as far as the Federal Republic of Germany was concerned. The reply to the second question was that a vast majority of States wished to remove the obstacles to an agreement. That had been demonstrated by the unanimous adoption of General Assembly resolution 2028 (XX) as well as by a number of proposals and projects such as the Rapacki and Gomulka plans, the recommendations of the Second Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Cairo in October 1964, and the memorandum submitted to the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament by the non-aligned countries on 19 August 1966.^{1/} With regard to the last question, it was still difficult to determine precisely how much progress had been made towards removing the obstacles to an agreement. However, the statements made in the First Committee by the Soviet Union and the United States gave reason to hope that the problem was nearer solution than it had been before. At the same time, it must be recognized that the international situation and the background of the

problem were not very encouraging. The United States aggression against Viet-Nam was not only causing the international atmosphere to deteriorate but might also frustrate the efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. As the United Kingdom representative had said at the 1432nd meeting, war could not be regarded as an acceptable instrument of national policy; however, it was unfortunately that instrument which the United States was employing in South-East Asia. With regard to the historical background of the problem, it should be recalled that at its fifteenth and twentieth sessions the General Assembly had stressed the urgent need to conclude an agreement on preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and had laid down the principles which were to guide negotiations on such an agreement. Nevertheless, the Eighteen-Nation Committee had been unable to submit a draft agreement to the General Assembly, and the delay had resulted in the continuation of the nuclear arms race.

3. There was another reason for giving priority to the present item and for taking world public opinion into account. It might appear to world opinion that the Geneva negotiations aiming at the conclusion of an agreement on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons were proceeding satisfactorily; however, it must not be forgotten that there were obstacles to the achievement of an agreement, and that was what lent importance to the discussion of the question now before the Committee. With regard to those obstacles, the greatest attention should be given to two interrelated problems: the stubborn insistence of the Federal Republic of Germany on gaining access to nuclear weapons in one form or another and the fact that certain groups in the United States were prepared to meet the nuclear demands of militarist circles in the Federal Republic—in the present instance, by introducing loop-holes into the agreement. With regard to the first problem, it should be noted that, in making military preparations on the basis of nuclear industry, the militarists in Bonn were acting without regard for the interests of the German people itself. The German Democratic Republic, unlike the Federal Republic, recognized the dangers inherent in the present situation and had again declared its willingness to renounce nuclear weapons provided that the Federal Republic was prepared to do the same. That appeal remained unanswered. Government circles in Bonn should realize, as the Government of the German Democratic Republic had stated on 16 September 1966^{2/}, that a peaceful future for the German people

^{1/} See Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1966, document DC/228, annex I, sect. P.

^{2/} Statement of the Government of the German Democratic Republic of 16 September 1966, transmitted to the President of the General Assembly by a letter dated 17 October 1966 from the Permanent Representative of Hungary to the United Nations, and circulated to Member States under cover of a note by the Secretariat dated 26 October 1966.

would be ensured only if it used all its energies for achieving equal rights in the field of peaceful co-operation among the peoples and not for gaining equality in armaments, much less in nuclear armaments.

4. With regard to the second problem, it was to be noted that the European policy of the United States was based on an alliance with the militarist forces in the Federal Republic of Germany. Those forces were attempting to prevail upon the United States to permit them to have nuclear weapons; Chancellor Erhard had recently stated that in the future the Federal Republic would claim the right to play an effective part in solving nuclear problems and that it was not prepared to rely solely on negotiations. Since those remarks had been part of a statement on the Chancellor's visit to Washington, they had presumably been based on assurances given to him there. With regard to the proposal submitted to the International Atomic Energy Agency by Poland and Czechoslovakia, the United States Press had quoted official circles in Washington as saying that IAEA control would not prevent the stockpiling of United States nuclear weapons in the Federal Republic of Germany or the latter's participation in the nuclear forces of its allies. The examples he had just cited showed the contradictory nature of the attitude taken by the United States, which was confirmed by the statement made at the 1431st meeting by the United States representative, who, on the one hand, had endorsed the principles laid down in General Assembly resolution 2028 (XX) and, on the other hand, had said that collective nuclear defence arrangements did not necessarily lead to proliferation. He hoped that the United States representative had a key by which that contradiction could be resolved. It should be noted, in that connexion, that United States public opinion was also aware of the contradictions in the attitude taken by the United States. Thus, on 15 September 1966, an appeal by a number of public figures in the United States, emphasizing that it was Washington's contradictory attitude which had led to the impasse in the negotiations on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, had been published in the Press.

5. In those circumstances, his delegation felt that the adoption and implementation of the draft resolution before the Committee (A/C.1/L.368/Rev.1 and Rev.1/Add.1 and 2) could ensure that no State took action which, directly or indirectly, promoted the proliferation of nuclear weapons. World public opinion expected practical steps to be taken in that regard, particularly by the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany. An unequivocal resolution would help to create conditions conducive to the conclusion of an international agreement that was free of loop-holes and to an improvement in the international atmosphere. It was for that reason that Hungary had joined in sponsoring the draft resolution.

6. Mr. SALIM (United Republic of Tanzania) said he was pleased that the views of the representatives of the nuclear Powers were so close; he would be greatly relieved to see those Powers agree on concrete programmes for resolving the real issues which were at stake.

7. Since the draft resolution now under discussion appealed to all States to refrain from any actions

which might hamper the conclusion of an agreement on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, the question arose what kind of actions were likely to hamper the conclusion of such an agreement.

8. The first obstacle to an agreement was the absence or deliberate exclusion from the negotiating table of States with a nuclear potential. As the head of his delegation had pointed out in his speech in the Assembly's general debate (1437th plenary meeting), three of the five nuclear Powers were at present debating with several near-nuclear Powers proposals designed to keep the latter from achieving the status of the former. Even if they concluded an agreement, what value would it have in view of the fact that the two absent nuclear Powers would almost certainly boycott it?

9. A second action likely to hamper the conclusion of an agreement was the failure to include provisions designed to provide a quid pro quo for the non-nuclear Powers' renunciation of the right to possess or use nuclear weapons. A willingness on the part of the nuclear Powers to undertake phased programmes of nuclear disarmament could, for example, constitute such a quid pro quo. He wished to refer in that connexion to paragraph 2 (b) of General Assembly resolution 2028 (XX) and to the joint memorandum of 19 August 1966 of the eight non-aligned members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee.

10. A third kind of action likely to jeopardize the conclusion of an agreement would be provocative acts by nuclear States against non-nuclear States, such as statements of intention or indications of preparations to use nuclear weapons in conflicts in which only conventional weapons had previously been used.

11. In that connexion, his delegation had been greatly disturbed by the suggestions made by some extremist elements in the United States that all necessary force should be employed in order to gain a victory in Viet-Nam. Fortunately, the United States Government had rejected those irresponsible proposals, and his delegation trusted that that attitude of moderation would persist. Any other attitude would provide justification for efforts to expand stocks of nuclear weapons and delivery capacity.

12. The fourth type of action likely to hinder the conclusion of a treaty on non-proliferation would be failure by the nuclear Powers to pledge not to use nuclear weapons against States which had renounced the use of such weapons. The African States, for their part, had made the necessary commitments in the resolution on the denuclearization of Africa adopted in July 1964 by the Organization of African Unity^{3/} and confirmed by the General Assembly in its resolution 2033 (XX). He welcomed the assurance by the Soviet Government, communicated to the Eighteen-Nation Committee in a message dated 1 February 1966 from the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR,^{4/} that it was prepared to assume an obligation to respect the status of any denuclearized zones which might be established provided that other nuclear

^{3/} See Official Records of the General Assembly, Twentieth Session, Annexes, agenda item 105, document A/5975.

^{4/} See Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1966, document DC/228, annex I, sect. F.

Powers assumed similar obligations, and that it was willing to include in the draft treaty a clause on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear States parties to the treaty which had no nuclear weapons in their territory. It was to be hoped that that positive commitment by the Soviet Union would be followed by similar commitments by other nuclear Powers.

13. It was argued by some that instead of paying the price of concessions to non-nuclear States, the nuclear States should take unilateral steps to prevent proliferation—that it would be cheaper for them, for example, to restrict the dissemination of technical skills, materials and devices which could enable non-nuclear States to develop nuclear weapons. Whether or not that argument had found favour with some of the present nuclear Powers, the fact remained that the General Assembly had asked for a treaty on non-proliferation and was being offered a mere request for unilateral declarations and actions. That meagre result did not justify the hopes that had been placed in the work of the Eighteen-Nation Committee. The threat to world peace lay not only in the dissemination of nuclear weapons but also and especially in the maintenance of the status quo. That was a fact which must be borne in mind.

14. Mr. MATSUI (Japan) recalled that not long ago there had been only one State in the world that possessed nuclear weapons; there were now five. Only one people—the Japanese people—had suffered the dreadful effects of atomic bombing. To prevent the repetition of such a tragedy, a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons must be concluded as soon as possible.

15. The question of non-proliferation had been the focal point of disarmament talks for two years, because the numerous countries that had made progress in the peaceful use of nuclear energy had at the same time acquired the ability to use that energy for military purposes. In 1966, the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament had devoted a large part of its deliberations to the drafting of a treaty on non-proliferation. Its efforts had been disappointing, since they had not produced any concrete results; nevertheless, the issues at stake had been clarified.

16. It was encouraging to note that the United States and the USSR were endeavouring to find ways to eliminate the last obstacles to the conclusion of an agreement. The United States representative had said that as progress was made in the current negotiations, consultations would be held with other Governments. In the view of the Japanese delegation, such consultations should be held during the current session, or at least an agreement should be reached with regard to the machinery and procedures for consultations.

17. The negotiations in the Eighteen-Nation Committee had been hampered by differences in the interpretation of the term "proliferation". His delegation believed that proliferation should not be interpreted in such a way as to prevent non-nuclear States from taking measures they deemed necessary in order to afford them security against possible nuclear attack or the threat of such attack. It should be possible for

non-nuclear States to conclude bilateral or multilateral agreements with a nuclear State, provided that such agreements did not entail the acquisition of nuclear weapons. At the same time, attention must be given to the security problems of non-nuclear States which were not aligned with a nuclear Power; that need was underscored by the recent explosion of yet another nuclear device by the People's Republic of China.

18. What was prompting the non-nuclear States to renounce their nuclear option was their earnest wish to see the emergence of a world without nuclear arms. In return, the nuclear States should, when the proposed treaty was concluded, clarify their intention to make a maximum effort to achieve concrete measures of nuclear disarmament in keeping with the conviction expressed by the eight non-aligned countries in their memorandum of 19 August 1966 that the treaty should be coupled with or followed by tangible steps to halt the nuclear arms race and to limit, reduce and eliminate the stocks of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery.

19. As to the question of the most effective way to prevent the production of nuclear weapons by non-nuclear countries engaged in peaceful nuclear activities, he believed that the best assurance could be found in appropriate international safeguards. He was therefore interested in the suggestion made at the 277th meeting of the Eighteen-Nation Committee, on 28 July 1966, by the United States representative in a comment on article III of the United States draft treaty,^{5/} that the non-nuclear-weapon States undertake to accept the application of IAEA or equivalent international safeguards to all their peaceful activities, and that all States undertake not to provide source or fissionable material, or specialized equipment or non-nuclear material for processing or use of source or fissionable material, or for the production of fissionable material, to any other State for peaceful purposes unless such material and equipment were subject to IAEA or equivalent international safeguards. His delegation welcomed the Soviet representative's statement, at the 245th meeting of the Eighteen-Nation Committee, on 3 March 1966, that his country would be prepared to examine the possibility of taking advantage of the control arrangements worked out by IAEA. For a proper appraisal of the significance of the United States proposals, it would probably be desirable for the General Assembly to ask IAEA for a report on the latter's view of its role in preventing proliferation and on the effectiveness of its present system of safeguards.

20. In view of the fluidity of international relations, it was natural that the parties to the proposed treaty should wish to have an opportunity to review its provisions at fairly frequent intervals in the light of the problems raised by their implementation and of the progress made towards reducing and eliminating nuclear weapons and their delivery systems. The establishment of a permanent review committee might be considered. In any event, the questions of duration and review should be settled before the treaty was concluded.

^{5/} See Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for January to December 1965, document DC/227, annex I, sect. A; and ibid., Supplement for 1966, document DC/228, annex I, sect. K.

21. The problem of disarmament had been made more complex than ever by the advent of nuclear weapons. The Secretary-General had pointed that out in the introduction to his annual report on the work of the Organization (A/6301/Add.1), and the Japanese delegation warmly endorsed his suggestion that an appropriate body should undertake a comprehensive study of the consequences of the invention of nuclear weapons.

22. Self-control on the part of potential nuclear States was a factor of the greatest importance, and the views of those States should therefore be taken into account. Japan, for its part, was prepared to co-operate with other Governments in drafting a treaty that would be satisfactory to all. In the meantime, it had decided to become a sponsor of draft resolution A/C.1/L.368/Rev.1 and Rev.1/Add.1 and 2 and earnestly hoped that it would be adopted unanimously.

23. Mr. PARDO (Malta) said that his Government had noted with regret that the Eighteen-Nation Committee had again failed to make any tangible progress; it had reached no agreement on the conclusion of a treaty on non-proliferation, it had not endorsed the constructive proposals that had been put forward for a comprehensive test ban treaty, and the three States parties to the partial test ban treaty had continued to conduct underground tests while, in addition, the two nuclear States not parties to the treaty had conducted tests in the atmosphere. Questions relating to general and complete disarmament and measures aimed at lessening international tension had scarcely been mentioned at Geneva during the past year. Conventional arms races were continuing in some parts of the world, world expenditure on armaments had increased considerably in the past year, and arms still represented a major part of the aid granted to some poor countries. It was hardly surprising, under those circumstances, that the percentage of national income devoted by some rich countries to economic and social aid to poor countries showed a downward trend and that the goals of the United Nations Development Decade were as far from achievement now as they had been five years earlier.

24. To be sure, the nuclear super-Powers had drawn somewhat closer together at Geneva, and both were continuing the search for mutually acceptable ways of overcoming their remaining differences. If the Soviet Union and the United States could reach agreement, a treaty on non-proliferation could probably be concluded without delay among the military nuclear Powers participating in the work of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, most of the Powers currently producing nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, and the more significant non-nuclear Powers. However, the political basis of the agreement between the two super-Powers must not only satisfy both of those Powers but also take the security of all countries into account.

25. Disarmament negotiations could not be divorced from a serious examination of major political problems, particularly in the case of fundamentally unjust situations. Moreover, proliferation was not desired by any country and was not necessarily imminent. Lastly, the conclusion of a treaty on non-proliferation

and the halting of military nuclear proliferation were not necessarily interdependent. The proliferation of nuclear weapons would of course be lamentable, but, in view of the asymmetrical distribution of nuclear military power in the world, the basically destabilizing consequences of proliferation could be controlled and minimized if the nuclear super-Powers so wished. A treaty on non-proliferation was highly desirable, largely for psychological reasons, including a probable reduction of world tensions, and because it might be a first step toward the control of nuclear and conventional armaments.

26. The value of such a treaty could, however, be somewhat impaired if the political basis on which agreement was achieved did not take sufficient account of the security interests of some countries. Moreover, the signature of a treaty on non-proliferation was not so urgent as to outweigh all other aspects of disarmament. One of the basic reasons for the failure to make any appreciable progress to date in the field of disarmament might reside in the different priority which Member States gave to the search for peace, and consequently disarmament, in their national goals. According to Article 4 of the Charter of the United Nations, States Members of the Organization were by definition peace-loving, but that did not exclude the possibility that some might be more peace-loving than others. For small and weak States, the overriding goal was, and must be, peace, and the few exceptions that might exist only confirmed the rule. The small and weak nations knew that their security and independence depended on the establishment and maintenance of just international peace and security under the rule of law, on general and complete disarmament under effective international control, and on the peaceful settlement of disputes. For other countries, those objectives and peace itself must be included among national or ideological priorities, as was shown by a speech delivered on 10 June 1966 by Mr. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. It was clear from the list of objectives of Soviet foreign policy, which he had given apparently in order of importance, that the strengthening of the might and unity of the world system of socialism occupied first place, followed by assistance to liberation and revolutionary movements; peace and peaceful coexistence, however important they might be, occupied only the third place. For non-socialist countries, the search for power and influence sometimes led Governments to regard peace and disarmament as desirable goals of national policy, frequently invoked but tacitly subordinate to other more important goals. That was a fact of life which deserved to be taken into consideration if progress was to be made towards general and complete disarmament.

27. The existence of conflicting national goals, the achievement of which overrode the universal desire for disarmament, manifested itself in the creation of insoluble situations throughout the world. United Nations debates and decisions on those situations sometimes served merely to preserve an uneasy status quo or to endorse the position of one party or the other rather than to facilitate a peaceful and just solution of the underlying problem. The situations to which he had just referred did not have a direct bearing on

the discussions in the Eighteen-Nation Committee with regard to nuclear disarmament and related collateral measures; progress in that respect was mainly dependent on an understanding between the United States and the Soviet Union. But such an understanding presupposed that those Powers could reach an adjustment of their respective objectives, at least in so far as their influence in certain situations was concerned. It was clear, for instance, that the situation in Viet-Nam was not favourable to the cause of disarmament, whether nuclear or conventional. There were, moreover, other situations which were greatly injurious to the most vital rights of peoples, in particular the right to unity and independence under a freely elected Government. That was true of the German people, whose division had a direct bearing on the current conversations between the United States and the Soviet Union and on the discussions on a treaty on non-proliferation in the Eighteen-Nation Committee. The continued division of Germany was not only morally wrong and contrary to the principles of the Charter, but was also dangerous from every point of view. It was against the long-term interests of all European States, whether East or West, since a settlement of the question was a prerequisite to any enduring solution of the problem of European security and since, within Germany itself, the division was one of the main factors in the rise of extremism and revanchism. It would be illusory to believe that prosperity and economic power would permanently divert the German people from their search for unity. Therefore, prolongation of the present situation could only result in steadily increasing insecurity for all countries.

28. The fear generated in the Federal Republic of Germany by the presence on both sides of the demarcation line of large numbers of troops armed with a superabundance of sophisticated weapons of mass destruction justified its insistence on participating in the planning of a nuclear defence system; that was one of the major points delaying agreement in the Eighteen-Nation Committee. If the nuclear super-Powers reached an accommodation of their respective interests without providing for any specific step towards German reunification, that would undoubtedly make it possible to conclude a treaty on non-proliferation, but it might also cause the Federal Republic of Germany to carry out a fundamental reappraisal of its policy, to the detriment of European balance and, ultimately, of world peace. It was of course difficult to provide for unification in a bilateral context. It therefore seemed appropriate that multilateral discussions should be held as soon as possible within a pan-European context, and including participation of the United States and the Soviet Union, with a view to seeking a widely acceptable settlement of the German problem within the framework of European security. A European forum would make it possible to explore opportunities for agreement which might have been overlooked.

29. His delegation did not believe that a treaty on non-proliferation, on the lines of either of the two drafts considered at Geneva and signed by only three of the nuclear-weapon States, would by itself significantly reduce the danger that some countries now using nuclear technology for peaceful purposes might

embark on a weapons programme. It was in fact highly improbable that any of the existing civil nuclear Powers would choose to use atomic energy for military purposes, since they were fully aware of the technical difficulties, the cost and the dangers that such a step entailed. Moreover, they were subject to internal and external political pressures which would continue to inhibit the spread of nuclear weapons, whether a treaty on non-proliferation was signed or not.

30. In Asia, for instance, proliferation would be more likely to be caused by the development of a military nuclear capability on the mainland of China and by the policies of that country and other States rather than by lack of a treaty on non-proliferation. The existence of such a treaty would not prevent the States situated in the great arc around mainland China from acquiring nuclear weapons on the day when China's nuclear power justified such action. Therefore, non-proliferation did not depend so much on a treaty as on action that could be taken by the two super-Powers to stabilize the situation in the area while the strategic advantage was still in their favour. Such action would need to include the consistent pursuit by the Soviet Union and the United States of mutually agreed policies with joint, credible and comprehensive guarantees. Such a policy of joint stabilizing action might also be applied to the Eastern Mediterranean. In other words, the two major nuclear Powers must accept primary responsibility for non-proliferation, since it was their political objectives and, hence, their policies, which would largely determine whether proliferation would take place. On the other hand, none of their efforts to lessen international tension could be fully effective without the co-operation of the three other nuclear-weapon States.

31. It was incumbent upon the permanent members of the Security Council and the existing nuclear Powers to demonstrate that they were capable of co-operating in giving absolute priority to nuclear stabilization and disarmament. In the present international situation, the world must at least be assured that minimal co-operation between the existing military nuclear Powers could be achieved and given concrete form in an agreement not to disseminate nuclear weapons, the means for their delivery, or related military technology. Such an agreement between the existing military nuclear Powers would have a significance out of all proportion to its content and would provide a foundation for the achievement of results in the Eighteen-Nation Committee, since it would give the world a measure of faith in the possibility of co-operation between all the nuclear-weapon States. That was why his Prime Minister had suggested the year before that the question of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons might be envisaged in two steps: a treaty on non-dissemination and a treaty on non-proliferation. For, if the existing military nuclear States could not agree on a treaty on non-dissemination, there was little hope of persuading the civil nuclear Powers to undertake never to proliferate. He did not intend to suggest that the Eighteen-Nation Committee should passively await the conclusion of a non-dissemination treaty between the existing nuclear Powers; on the contrary, his Government's suggestion that the military nuclear

Powers should conclude between themselves a formal agreement on non-dissemination was perfectly compatible with the efforts of the Eighteen-Nation Committee to achieve a treaty on non-proliferation. A treaty on non-dissemination would, indeed, form a natural complement to any treaty on non-proliferation concluded under the auspices of the Eighteen-Nation Committee. No doubt, an agreement between the military nuclear Powers on non-dissemination would also require some minimal understanding between them on priorities concerning political objectives. However, it was precisely such an understanding which was vital if any treaty on non-proliferation concluded under the auspices of the Eighteen-Nation Committee was to endure.

32. In the circumstances, it was scarcely surprising that the Eighteen-Nation Committee had failed to activate the political will of the States bearing major responsibility for nuclear stabilization. Negotiations on policies and problems impeding progress in the field of disarmament were not within the mandate of the Eighteen-Nation Committee.

33. He did not intend to comment on the two draft treaties to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons submitted respectively by the United States^{6/} and the Soviet Union,^{7/} but noted that neither draft explicitly prohibited transfer of the ownership or control of nuclear devices or weapons to individuals or to entities other than States or groups of States. Thus, transfer of a nuclear device to the control of an individual or group of individuals within a State would not violate the letter of either draft treaty. He was sure that there would be no difficulty in covering that minor point when negotiations were resumed at Geneva.

34. Should the current conversations between the Soviet Union and the United States be successfully concluded, the representatives of the non-aligned States would have to see to it that a treaty on non-proliferation not only contained provisions to freeze membership in the nuclear club but represented a positive step towards balanced nuclear disarmament. It would be politically impossible not to comply with the wishes of the nuclear super-Powers should they reach an agreement; however, he believed that there was a possibility of obtaining some concessions from them towards the concept of a balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations set forth in General Assembly resolution 2028 (XX). He was convinced that a treaty on non-proliferation limited in time was possible. Should the treaty have an initial duration of three years, it might be possible to envisage the cut-off in the production of fissionable material for military purposes as taking place in stages over that period.

35. With regard to the excellent joint memorandum on a comprehensive test ban treaty submitted to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on 17 August 1966 by the eight non-aligned countries,^{8/} his delegation did not

think that the difficulties were mainly technical. For different reasons, four of the five nuclear-weapon States believed that it would be difficult to dispense completely with underground tests at the present time. Patience would therefore be required until the situation changed.

36. In view of the complexities surrounding the preparation of a treaty on non-proliferation, it was surprising that adequate guidance had not been given to the Eighteen-Nation Committee. It should have been invited to discuss and elucidate technical questions the solution of which was prerequisite to any measure of disarmament, particularly nuclear disarmament—the more so since nuclear military proliferation was unlikely to be imminent and a treaty on non-proliferation was of major significance in relation to disarmament only if it indicated a change in the policy priorities of the military nuclear Powers. Furthermore, elucidation of technical questions did not involve the vital interests of the nuclear-weapon States and others. For example, the First Committee and, *a fortiori*, the Eighteen-Nation Committee had made no attempt to ascertain the dimensions and characteristics of the problem of nuclear weapons or of conventional armaments. Nor had any effort been made to establish the extent of research into methods of chemical and bacteriological warfare being carried out by technically advanced countries. The dimensions and effects of the arms trade were also unknown. In fact, no one wanted to know these things. Thus, the attempt his delegation had made the year before in the First Committee to have the last of them considered by the Eighteen-Nation Committee^{9/} had been defeated.

37. Mr. Amjad ALI (Pakistan) said that consideration of the question of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, which the Assembly had first undertaken in 1958, had its positive side. There was little doubt that the pronouncements of the Assembly had made mankind more aware that the problem of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons deserved the highest priority among all questions relating to disarmament. The important General Assembly resolutions leading up to resolution 2028 (XX) constituted a theoretical base, already fully established, for a decision by States Members of the United Nations. Two statements of principle were now beyond dispute.

38. First, the proliferation of nuclear weapons would not merely bring about a quantitative change in nuclear stockpiles, but would also transform the power structure of the world. It would start an arms race which could not fail to cripple the economies of most countries; in brief, it would pulverize the United Nations.

39. Secondly, an agreement on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons would be, in the words of the USSR representative, a most important link in the chain of disarmament.

40. Besides promoting the recognition of those basic truths, the General Assembly had laid down, in resolution 2028 (XX), five principles on which a non-proliferation treaty should be based. The joint

^{6/} See footnote 5.

^{7/} See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twentieth Session, Annexes*, agenda item 106, document A/5976.

^{8/} See *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1966*, document DC/228, annex 1, sect. O.

^{9/} See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twentieth Session, Annexes*, agenda item 28, document A/C.1/L.347.

memorandum on non-proliferation submitted by the eight non-aligned members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on 19 August 1966 showed that those principles had received substantial support. The memorandum expressed the belief that it had become possible to negotiate a treaty which would be faithful to the mandate in the General Assembly's resolution, acceptable to all concerned and satisfactory to the international community.

41. Finally, the statements by the representatives of the United States and the USSR (1431st meeting) had confirmed reports that those two great Powers had come nearer to each other in their viewpoints about the essentials of non-proliferation.

42. But those encouraging signs were not enough. Awareness of the urgency of concluding an agreement on non-proliferation was not of itself a guarantee that such proliferation would not take place. In fact, there were still formidable difficulties in the way of concluding such a treaty. The United States representative had made that plain in his statement to the Committee.

43. The differences in question doubtless related to the problem of nuclear armaments within alliances. They thus hinged on the question of what really constituted control over, or access to, nuclear weapons. One side stated with conviction that collective nuclear defence arrangements did not, and need not, lead to proliferation; but the other side maintained with equal conviction that such arrangements were nothing but a device to enable a non-nuclear country to acquire nuclear weapons. Although both parties acknowledged the principles laid down in resolution 2028 (XX), it was clear that they interpreted them differently. In view of the differences of interpretation between the two super-Powers and the political realities which such differences reflected, there was no avoiding the conclusion that the goal of a world-wide treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons was still distant.

44. It would perhaps be constructive to analyse the main factors that had caused uncertainty and inhibited progress so far.

45. He had already referred to the first of those factors: that of disagreement between the two super-Powers on the question of what constituted control over, or access, to nuclear weapons. That problem could not be resolved except by negotiations between the parties concerned, who, it was to be hoped, would demonstrate greater mutual trust.

46. The second factor arose in connexion with the question whether some measures towards nuclear disarmament should not be collateral to the treaty on non-proliferation. In their joint memorandum of 19 August 1966 on non-proliferation, the eight non-aligned countries reaffirmed their conviction that the treaty should be coupled with or followed by tangible steps to halt the nuclear arms race; the difference between the two alternatives was a considerable one. The eight countries went on to suggest that those various steps could be embodied in a treaty as part of its provisions or as a declaration of intent. There, too, there was the world of a difference between the two possibilities.

47. The Pakistan delegation had stated clearly that it considered it inappropriate to complicate the question of non-proliferation by examining measures which were still open to dispute. That did not mean that it did not endorse the idea that no opportunity should be neglected to bring about the progressive dismantling of nuclear stockpiles. Indeed, if no promise was held out of some measures of nuclear disarmament, the treaty on non-proliferation might serve to strengthen the monopoly of the five Powers and thus perpetuate a power position which was not acceptable to mankind at large. Awareness of the danger of what the Minister for External Affairs of Canada had called "vertical proliferation" was implicit in the formulation of the principles enunciated in paragraph 2 (b) and (c) of General Assembly resolution 2028 (XX).

48. No one questioned the desirability, and even the urgency, of taking other steps, either simultaneously with or immediately after the conclusion of an agreement to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, it had to be recognized that the present case was one of those in which the best became the enemy of the good.

49. Those who did not share that view were, it seemed, activated by the thought that the nuclear Powers might abandon the objectives of nuclear disarmament once they had been given the assurance, through a treaty on non-proliferation, that others would not acquire nuclear weapons. There had been considerable discussion during the present debate on the question whether the forswearing of the nuclear option was or was not a sacrifice. He himself would raise another question: whether that option was really a source of sufficient pressure on the nuclear Powers to compel them to reduce their atomic stockpiles? Clearly, it would be unwise to reply to that question dogmatically.

50. In any event, the representatives of the super-Powers had given an assurance that a treaty on non-proliferation could not and must not be regarded as an end in itself and that it should be viewed solely as a step towards the prohibition and destruction of nuclear weapons.

51. Only the future would reveal the true value of those assurances. The question was whether the non-nuclear countries, by accepting them, would lessen such pressure as they had mobilized for nuclear disarmament. Conversely, by not taking those assurances at their face value the non-nuclear countries would achieve no practical result except that of refusing to isolate the question of non-proliferation from the problem of disarmament as a whole. The only way of negotiating such a treaty was to negotiate it as a single item, as was illustrated by the case of the Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, signed at Moscow in 1963. At present, the non-nuclear countries, by seeking to achieve everything, were achieving nothing at all.

52. The third of the factors that introduced an element of uncertainty concerned the question of assurances given to the non-nuclear countries with regard to security.

53. In his message of 1 February 1966 to the Eighteen-Nation Committee, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR had said that the Soviet Government was willing to include in the draft treaty a clause on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear States parties to the treaty which had no nuclear weapons in their territory. He had also said that the Soviet Government was prepared to assume an obligation to respect the status of any denuclearized zones which might be established, provided that other nuclear Powers assumed similar obligations.

54. While that statement was welcome, it underlined the fact that an assurance regarding the security of non-nuclear countries against nuclear attacks had little value if it was not given by all nuclear Powers. In other words, a so-called guarantee given by one or two nuclear Powers, far from removing the danger of a holocaust, would only bring it nearer. Moreover, as the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Mexico, speaking in the Assembly's general debate (1418th plenary meeting), the word "guarantee" might suggest a kind of tutelage. The Pakistan delegation was certain that no non-nuclear country which sincerely wished to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons would make invidious distinctions between the existing nuclear Powers and seek to secure a guarantee from one or two nuclear Powers against attacks by a third. Nevertheless, it was obvious that that problem raised a series of questions for the non-nuclear countries: namely, what kind of security was necessary, by what means could it be obtained, how could it be obtained from the nuclear Powers which were not parties to the negotiations in progress at Geneva or in the General Assembly, at what stage should they obtain such assurance, should it be embodied in one or several instruments and, lastly, should the instrument in question be part of a non-proliferation treaty? The documents relating to non-proliferation gave no clear answer to those questions.

55. The fourth factor related to the peaceful uses of atomic energy. The question involved two contradictory considerations: on the one hand, the developing countries' need of nuclear energy for their economic development, and on the other the fact, mentioned by the United States representative, that the technology of nuclear explosives for peaceful purposes was inseparable from that of nuclear weapons. That being so, should a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons prohibit the manufacture by non-nuclear States of nuclear explosives for peaceful ends, or should those countries be given the possibility of co-operating in the development of nuclear energy?

56. That raised the question of international safeguards to ensure that the large quantities of plutonium which would be produced by the atomic power plants in non-nuclear-weapon countries would not be used for making weapons. On that problem, too, the non-nuclear countries were unable to reach agreement. On one side there were those, such as the Scandinavian countries, Japan, Czechoslovakia and Poland, which were prepared to place their atomic installations under the control of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and on the other there were countries which contended that such control would infringe their

national sovereignty. The Pakistan delegation had already argued that those who maintained the latter thesis seemed to forget that the international control which would accompany general disarmament would make far greater inroads into national sovereignty than would the control of IAEA over atomic facilities.

57. The four factors just considered raised a number of problems which, if left unsolved, would defeat all hopes for the lessening of tension and the harmonization of views. They were manifestations of the fact that so far there was no common viewpoint about the problems which arose with regard to a treaty on non-proliferation.

58. In view of that fact, it was clear that the efforts being made to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons needed a vitalizing force from outside.

59. There was no doubt that such a fresh impetus must be given first and foremost by the two nuclear Powers. But that alone would not be enough. One of the reasons for the sterility of the negotiations on disarmament was the monopolizing of the whole problem by the needs and interests of the great Powers. The sincerity or motives of the two super-Powers were not being questioned, but the fact was that on any problem of disarmament, and in particular on non-proliferation, those two Powers could not have, and would not claim to have, the same perspective as would the smaller States.

60. The time had come, therefore, for the non-nuclear countries to come together and concert their viewpoints on the essentials of an agreement on non-proliferation which would be truly universal in scope and about which no country, great or small, would have any cause to feel apprehension. It was in that spirit that the Foreign Minister of Pakistan, in his statement before the General Assembly on 29 September (1423rd plenary meeting), had suggested the convening of a conference of non-nuclear countries, which would consider the question of the security of States without nuclear weapons against an attack from a nuclear Power, the co-operation of the non-nuclear countries with a view to preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons, the question how nuclear energy could be used for exclusively peaceful purposes by the non-nuclear countries through mutual co-operation for their common benefit, and, finally, what type of international supervision would be necessary.

61. He proposed that a preparatory committee should be formed to consider the place of meeting and agenda of such a conference and to make the appropriate arrangements for convening it.

62. He wished to stress that the Pakistan delegation did not view that proposal as competing with the bilateral negotiations of the two super-Powers or with the efforts of the Eighteen-Nation Committee. Secondly, such a conference was not intended to divide the non-nuclear countries from the nuclear Powers, for it was obvious that after they had harmonized their own points of view the participants would have to enter into a dialogue with the nuclear Powers. Thirdly, although it had been suggested that the composition of the conference should be limited to non-nuclear countries that had attained some nuclear capability, such a suggestion was unacceptable;

for apart from the difficulty of determining which Powers might be called "near-nuclear", it would discriminate against the less well-equipped States. His delegation proposed, therefore, that all non-nuclear countries should be invited to the conference, as all were equally involved in the danger of the spread of nuclear weapons.

63. The Pakistan Government was making that proposal with no illusion that it would solve all problems, even in the restricted field of non-

proliferation, but it was confident that it would improve the atmosphere of negotiations for a treaty. There were many gulfs that needed to be bridged, not only between the super-Powers, but between other countries as well. The list of subjects he had proposed for consideration by the conference was not exhaustive, and the participants would be able to add to it. His delegation intended to submit that proposal in the form of a draft resolution at a later stage.

The meeting rose at 1.5 p.m.