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President: Mr. Alex QUAISON-SACKEY
(Ghana).

ITEM 9 OF THE PROVISIONAL AGENDA

General debate (continued)

1. Mr. GANA O (Congo, Brazzaville) (translated from French): At this stage of the general debate, when many eminent speakers have already most eloquently sung your praises, paid tribute to your personal qualities and stressed the honour conferred upon Ghana and upon Africa, it is difficult to add one's voice to all those which have congratulated you from this rostrum on your unanimous election to the Presidency of this, the greatest Assembly in the world, without giving the impression that we are engaged in an exchange of purely polite formalities. I feel compelled, nevertheless, to convey to you the very sincere congratulations of the entire Congolese people, which attaches a very special significance to your election.

2. The fact that you have the honourable task of presiding over our debates today is more than an indication of the Organization's recognition of a diplomat who, for eight years, has spared no effort to advance the cause of peace, liberty and human equality; we also regard your election, coming as it does three years after that of President Mongi Slim, as one of those events which give expression to the rehabilitation of Africa and reflect the latter's realization of the increasingly important part which our continent is destined to play in international relations.

3. I refer to the rehabilitation of Africa because our continent, after initiating what is nowadays conventionally called "civilization", went on to the most humiliating form of colonialism and the most hateful exploitation, and fell into the deepest oblivion. When the United Nations Charter was drafted at San Francisco, only three independent African countries existed; today, thirty-five African countries have recovered their full sovereignty. Of these thirty-five,

two have just become Members of this Organization, together with Malta, and my delegation is very happy to bid them welcome to this great international forum. We are convinced that their whole-hearted collaboration will contribute to the strengthening of world peace.

4. I spoke of Africa's realization of the part it is destined to play because of the commendable sportsmanship with which two of its sons, Sudan and Liberia, were able to pocket their pride and withdraw their candidature for the Presidency of the present session.

5. These are facts, actions which strengthen our conviction that the Africa of tomorrow will restore to the world the balance it needs for a lasting peace. The geographical location of our continent, its vast natural resources and its historical vocation predispose it for this role. All that is necessary for Africa to be able to play this part fully is that Africans should be profoundly convinced of its necessity, that they should no longer allow themselves to be indoctrinated by one side or another and that they work towards the full flowering of the African personality with every means at their disposal.

6. Our State and Government Heads gave practical form to this idea in taking, at the Addis Ababa Conference,^{1/} the historic decision which created the Organization of African Unity.

7. We in the Congo have unshakable faith in this organization because—and it is this very fact which escapes the enemies of Africa—although the Organization of African Unity has set itself political, economic or social objectives, although it has established basic principles similar to those which govern us in the United Nations, our organization is above all the expression in juridical form of a current of strength shaped by a complex of common traditions and ideas. In other words, the most that can be achieved by the schemes at present being engineered by the imperialists in order to checkmate the Organization of African Unity is to rob it of its juridical form—if that!—without depriving it of its essential substance.

8. So far as concerns the schemes I have referred to, you know how skilfully secret forces have stirred up the Algerian-Moroccan conflict, the Somali-Ethiopian dispute and the Somali-Kenyan dispute, and the cynical satisfaction with which the hope has been cherished that our organization, so recently born, should disintegrate in face of the difficulties confronting it.

^{1/} Summit Conference of Independent African States, Addis Ababa, 22-25 May 1963.

9. Today, after the United States and Belgian aggression in Stanleyville, the imperialist Press is predicting the breakdown of the Organization of African Unity. The way to this outcome is obvious: all that is necessary is to set African against African. The tools for this task are readily available among the ranks of the traitors who are Africans in name only. The debates which are at present taking place on the Congo in the Security Council show that this is so. For the first time, the world has seen an African, one of these men of straw, one of these perfect products of neo-colonialism, daring to speak up in defence, not of the legality of a régime, as one might have expected, but of what clearly amounts to racial genocide. These men of straw, unfortunately, are still fairly numerous in Africa.

10. The people of the Congo (Leopoldville), who are suffering an indescribable crisis, one skilfully initiated and maintained in existence by the imperialists since the accession of their country to independence, have just been clumsily and deceitfully robbed of the exercise of their sovereignty by one of these perfect instruments of neo-colonialism, the eminent Dr. Moïse Tshombé.

11. Who is Mr. Tshombé? Two years ago today, to the very day, his present representative in the United Nations gave us the following definition of him, which will remain eternally valid:

"A puppet supported by vast sums of money, the friend of the racists of Southern Rhodesia and South Africa and of reactionary and fascist circles in certain States, a hunter whose favourite and easy quarry is the Baluba"—today one would say the Batelas—"the man who ordered aircraft to bomb Kongolo and the neighbouring villages"—today one would say Albertville, Kindu, Bukavu, etc.—"killing women and children indiscriminately".

And the representative of Mr. Tshombé, whom I should like to thank for this definition, which is as accurate as it is pertinent, mentioned in addition that the puppet's facile slogan was anti-communism.

12. I do not feel it necessary to dwell on this very stirring characterization of the man who will soon be consecrated in the blood of the Congolese people as the greatest leader of his country, but I would like to say that in reality the Congolese tragedy revolves around one theme: the exploitation of the people of this unfortunate country, on the pretext of the fight against communism.

13. When a sufficient number of really responsible Africans understand this, the tragedy of the Congo will work itself out almost unaided, and our brothers on the other side of the river will be able not only to exercise their independence anew, but to profit themselves by their huge natural resources, for they certainly today represent those Africans whom Governor General Eboué described as "starving men sleeping on a sack of gold".

14. It is time responsible Africans awakened to the truth of what is taking place in the Congo and refused to be lulled by such slogans as the fight against communism or the fight against Chinese infiltration into Africa. It is this awakening that will largely decide

the future of the Organization of African Unity, within which the detractors of Africa are trying to create trends by very clumsily insinuating such out-of-date notions as white, or, as it is sometimes called, Arab Africa, black Africa, the pro-West Monrovia group, the pro-communist, or "pro-Chinese" Casablanca group.

15. What crime has the People's Republic of China committed? Its only crime is that of having chosen for itself the régime which best serves the legitimate aspirations of its people. In the eyes of certain Members of the United Nations, that is sufficient reason for systematically opposing the restoration of the legitimate rights of this great peace-loving country, a founder Member of the Organization. For the Congolese people, the problem of the two Chinas does not exist. The so-called Republic of Taiwan is nothing more than a den of reactionaries, dedicated body and soul to the imperialist cause, representing neither the Chinese people nor their interests.

16. The Chinese policy of the United Nations is a sickening anachronism which must be ended immediately. This policy clearly reflects the lack of balance existing in the great international family, and shows the extent to which certain countries use the Organization as a "Trojan horse". Only the restoration of the legitimate rights of the People's Republic of China will allow the United Nations to achieve the balance which it so much needs to play its role fully and impartially.

17. Yes, we must have the courage to say that the United Nations lacks balance. And it may even be added that it is this lack of balance which is the cause of the many failures which the Organization experiences.

18. This lack of balance is the sole cause of the present financial crisis in the United Nations.

19. The Congolese delegation opposes the tendency of some great Powers, whichever they may be, to use their influence to create areas of tension in the world, secure the intervention of United Nations forces in those areas, install themselves there as neo-colonialists and apply policies there which conform to their own selfish interests.

20. It is this lack of balance also which explains the hypocritical atmosphere which reigns within these walls and the impotence of the United Nations to deal with the obstinacy of Portugal and of the racialists of South Africa and Southern Rhodesia in their colonialist policy of apartheid. From this rostrum, the imperialist Powers condemn the Governments or so-called Governments of these three countries. But the massive means of destruction which these same Powers make available to the Governments in question are no longer a secret to anyone.

21. That is why it is more important than ever before that the African countries in particular, and all the non-aligned countries in general, should work energetically towards the establishment of a genuine balance within the United Nations.

22. The present lack of balance in the United Nations distorts all political relations between Member States; but it is even more serious in the economic sphere.

Many true or false conclusions have been drawn from the Geneva Conference on Trade and Development,^{2/} but there is one conclusion at least of which we can be sure: the imperialist Powers are not in favour of the immediate dissolution of colonial bonds, and wish to perpetuate an economy of exploitation in the developing countries.

23. So long as the industrialized countries of the West continue to regard Asia, Latin America and Africa as mere reserves of raw materials and outlets for their manufactures, with all the operations involved contributing to the profit of themselves alone, it will be impossible to establish a new international order in economic relations; moreover, it seems likely that the consequence of this attitude will inevitably be a clash between the "have-nots" and the "haves".

24. However, we remain optimistic, and believe that the breaking point will never be reached. And there is evidence to suggest that we are not deluding ourselves. As we all know, some countries have already wisely explained to their people that co-operation, of which the most familiar form is assistance to under-developed countries, is a new form of relations which benefits the assisting as much as the assisted countries.

25. Once this idea of co-operation is properly understood by all the peoples of the world, we shall be able to say that we are on the right road, the road which, before it leads us to lasting world peace, will first have given every man, whoever he may be, living conditions which are acceptable and worthy of his human dignity. If these objectives are to be reached, there is one thing that is absolutely essential: to restore the balance of the United Nations.

26. These are the few modest suggestions and ideas which the delegation of the Congo (Brazzaville) has wished to bring before this distinguished Assembly.

27. Mr. BASHEV (Bulgaria) (translated from French): Mr. President, it is my pleasant duty to convey to you the sincere congratulations of the Bulgarian delegation on your election to the office of President of the nineteenth session of the General Assembly and to wish you success in your task. The unanimous decision of the Assembly by which you have been elected to this office is an eloquent tribute to your talent and experience; it is a tribute to your country's contribution to the struggle against colonialism; and it is a tribute to the important role of the African peoples in the solution of the major problems of our day.

28. You were quite right in saying in your inaugural address [1286th meeting] that fifteen or twenty years ago the election of a representative of black Africa would have been unthinkable. Colonialism and imperialism would never have permitted such an election. Today it is simply another step forward. Your election reflects the profound changes that have taken place in the world, and consequently within the United Nations, thanks to the struggle of the forces of freedom and social progress, among which the African peoples occupy an important position.

29. Your task will not be an easy one. You have to take over the Presidency of this session in very complex circumstances. We remember all the fresh hopes which the signature of the Moscow Treaty^{3/} and the subsequent steps to relax international tension aroused. Those measures were an auspicious start towards improving the international situation and reaching agreement on other matters of concern to the world. The peoples hoped that all nations would continue their efforts in that direction in order to achieve a complete ban on nuclear testing, general and complete disarmament and the final liquidation of colonialism.

30. While not underrating the importance of the results already achieved in the matter, we cannot ignore the fact that the prospects for an improvement in international relations do not seem to have been to the liking of certain circles and Powers. Instead of seeing swifter progress made in disarmament negotiations, we are compelled to note with regret the negative and sterile stand taken by the Western countries. Instead of making constant efforts to lessen international tension and speed up the process of decolonization, certain States have gone on creating hotbeds of trouble in the Mediterranean region and the Caribbean, in South-East Asia and in Africa, and helping the most brutal of the colonial oppressors and their puppets.

31. These facts have given rise to legitimate anxiety, which the United Nations cannot fail to reflect. It is the bounden duty of the United Nations to give fresh impetus to all proposals directed towards a solution of world problems. It is the duty of all delegations to help in this task, in accordance with the noble principles set forth in the United Nations Charter.

32. Bulgaria, for its part, has always been ready to make its contribution, modest though it may be, to the consolidation of the United Nations in order that all the possibilities for safeguarding peace and international co-operation may be effectively used. Our country is always ready to develop its relations with any State, regardless of its social system, on the basis of the principles of peaceful coexistence.

33. For obvious reasons, Bulgaria has always directed its main efforts in foreign policy towards the transformation of the Balkans into an area of peace and economic and cultural co-operation, to the mutual advantage of all the Balkan countries.

34. This policy has had considerable success over the past year. Thanks to the combined efforts of the Greek and Bulgarian Governments, a great number of agreements have been signed between the two countries in almost every field of economic and cultural relations. Lasting conditions have thus been created for the development of relations between our two peoples. We are convinced that the establishment of normal relations between Bulgaria and Greece is an important factor for mutual trust and security in the Balkans. It will be a further contribution to the relaxation of tension in South-East Europe and will thus open up new possibilities for the solution of other

^{2/} United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 23 March-15 June 1964.

^{3/} Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, signed on 5 August 1963.

problems, in accordance with the wishes of all the Balkan peoples.

35. In pursuit of this policy of reducing tension in the Balkans, Bulgaria is continuing its efforts to improve relations with Turkey. Recently the Turkish Government seemed to be showing greater interest in the settlement of the questions outstanding between the two countries. We welcome this development and reaffirm our readiness to respond in the same spirit of co-operation to any constructive step leading to the establishment of genuine relations of good-neighbourliness.

36. In the past the Balkan countries have all too often been used as pawns in the play of interests of the imperialist Powers. Certain Western Powers are still interfering in the Balkan region. The events in Cyprus are evidence of this. If there had been no imperialist interference in the domestic affairs of the young Republic and if NATO had not been determined to use this island as a military base, Cyprus would have ceased long since to be a centre of tension in the Balkan and Mediterranean region. The Cyprus question can be settled by peaceful means if all States respect the national independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus.

37. Bulgaria has always considered the rapid conclusion of a treaty on general and complete disarmament to be the primary task of all States. Only general and complete disarmament can give the policy of peaceful coexistence real meaning and guarantee favourable conditions for economic competition between countries with different social systems.

38. Our country has never had any illusions about the difficulties inherent in reaching any final agreement on disarmament. But when an organ set up by the United Nations is unable to achieve any concrete result, after a year of negotiations and in spite of the specific resolutions on which its work was based, we are entitled to ask where the responsibility lies.

39. In the introduction to his annual report on the work of the Organization [A/5801/Add.1], the Secretary-General has described the elimination of nuclear delivery vehicles as the "key issue of general and complete disarmament". In order to make it easier to settle this key issue, and taking into account suggestions made by the non-aligned countries, the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries have taken numerous steps to meet the ideas and proposals of the Western Powers half way. In spite of their firm conviction that the destruction of all delivery vehicles at the very outset of the disarmament process is still the most effective means of eliminating swiftly the danger of atomic war, the socialist delegations have agreed to the preservation of the "nuclear umbrella" until the disarmament process has been completed. They have taken similar steps with regard to a number of other factors of general and complete disarmament, in particular the question of conventional weapons, armed forces and the length of each stage provided for in the treaty.

40. Much to our regret, the Western Powers were unwilling to follow the same path. They have repeatedly accused the socialist countries of lacking a spirit of conciliation and of blocking the progress

of the negotiations on disarmament. Yet even a superficial balance-sheet of the negotiations at Geneva—and, if I remember rightly, one of the allies of the United States tried to draw up one which was not at all to that country's liking—shows clearly that it is not the socialist countries but the United States and its allies which have not shown a spirit of conciliation. In fact, when the socialist countries took substantial steps towards reconciling the points of view of both parties, the Geneva negotiations made no progress. We may well ask ourselves if we should not seek the reasons for this in their true source, namely in the unwillingness of certain Western Governments to see general and complete disarmament actually put into effect.

41. Similarly, it is this intransigent stand taken by the Western countries that accounts for the meagre progress achieved by the Eighteen-Nation Committee in the matter of collateral measures. Yet most of these measures have been receiving increasing support, both at the Geneva Conference^{4/} and in the General Assembly.

42. A fresh effort has just been made to extricate this question from the impasse to which the Western Powers have brought it. The Soviet Union Government has submitted a memorandum [A/5827] suggesting measures to lessen international tension and restrict the arms race. We consider this document to be an important factor for the future progress of negotiations at Geneva.

43. The Bulgarian Government has already taken a concrete and constructive stand on all these questions. Our delegation will have occasion to consider some of them in greater detail at a later stage but it would like at this point to dwell on two of the collateral measures which are of particular importance.

44. The first is the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons. The history of this proposal is well known; I do not know of any "collateral measure" on which the Assembly has adopted more resolutions, by an ever-increasing majority.

45. Some Governments, however, are moving in a completely opposite direction. The most specific case in point, which many delegations have already been considering for a long time, is the plan for the establishment of a NATO multilateral nuclear force. Whatever sophisms may be used to disguise the real aim of this plan, it is perfectly clear that the establishment of such a force is simply a thinly disguised means of making nuclear weapons available to West Germany. The establishment of the multilateral force would destroy every possibility of reaching agreement on the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons, would accelerate the armaments race and would thus deal an irreparable blow to European security.

46. The very fact that the Southern Balkans are included in the dangerous military and political plans of NATO means that the multilateral nuclear force represents a direct threat to security and to the subsequent improvement of the situation in the Balkans and the Eastern Mediterranean region. The Balkans require peace and confidence and not the presence

^{4/} Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

of NATO nuclear forces, which are only a source of tension and menace. We should like to hope that common sense and the national interests will prevail and that the plan for the establishment of the multilateral force will never get beyond the stage of theoretical studies.

47. Secondly, there is the question of the establishment of denuclearized zones. Having started on the right course by adopting several resolutions recommending this, the General Assembly should not lose its initial enthusiasm. Various proposals for the establishment of such zones have been made by different countries or groups of countries and it can be said that conditions are favourable for this idea to be put into practice on a wide scale.

48. Some States, however, among them, we regret to note, some small countries, basing their argument on the "balance of power", are opposed to the denuclearization of various regions and to many other parallel measures until the great world problems have been solved. There can be no doubt that an agreement on the major problems, in particular the problems of general and complete disarmament, would be the best solution of all, and this remains the final objective. But does the pursuit of this objective mean that we should fold our arms and refrain from making any effort to create the conditions needed for universal agreement? We consider that any partial solution, in any geographical region or in any political sphere, could have a favourable influence in other fields, and indeed on the whole international situation, in that it would smooth the difficult path to disarmament. There is thus every reason to persevere in our efforts to find a solution to the problem of collateral measures.

49. The Treaty of Moscow and the policy of mutual example, which has already produced tangible results, are eloquent proof of the value of this method. This certainly does not mean that the method of partial or regional collateral measures should be regarded as replacing the method of the general solution of the problem of disarmament. What must be made clear is that no formula should be allowed to disguise unwillingness to limit the armaments race and to ensure the conditions for a lasting peace.

50. With regard to the balance of power, there are many examples to prove that international agreements comparable to the denuclearization of certain regions would not bring about a change in that balance that would necessarily be to the disadvantage of the West. A convincing demonstration of this was the proclamation of the permanent neutrality of Austria. Austrian neutrality did not in any way disturb the relationship of the forces of the two blocs in the very heart of Central Europe. The denuclearization of certain countries or regions would have much more limited effects, from the point of view of international law and from the military and political point of view, than the principle of permanent neutrality. The fact of being a denuclearized zone does not entail either the obligation to withdraw from any alliance to which one may be a party or the obligation never to join a military bloc. Denuclearization does not, therefore, upset the balance of power; on the contrary, it introduces more security into international relations.

51. In our opinion, there is one prior condition which might do much to promote the establishment of denuclearized zones: namely, the obligation of all the atomic Powers to respect their special status. The Soviet Union has repeatedly declared itself willing to assume such an obligation and it is high time that the other nuclear Powers did the same. The Conference of Non-aligned Countries^{5/} recently made an appeal along these lines to the atomic Powers. The General Assembly should endorse that appeal; on behalf of the Organization it should invite the nuclear Powers to declare formally and categorically that they will never use nuclear weapons in those zones.

52. Our delegation is of the opinion that the General Assembly should also endorse the proposal of the Soviet Union concerning the renunciation by States of the use of force for the settlement of territorial disputes and questions concerning frontiers [see A/5751]. A United Nations resolution on this matter would have a beneficial effect by proclaiming, as a principle of international law, a postulate whose moral and political implications are universally recognized.

53. In accordance with its unchanging policy, the Government of the People's Republic of Bulgaria will continue to do everything possible, in the General Assembly, in the Eighteen-Nation Committee and in any other international forum, to bring about the conclusion of an agreement on general and complete disarmament and on any measure which might help to lessen international tension. Bulgaria therefore supports the proposal of the Conference of Non-aligned Countries for a world conference on disarmament, to which all countries should be invited [see A/5763, section VII], as also the proposal of the People's Republic of China for a conference of Heads of State on the total banning and complete destruction of nuclear weapons.

54. In its Declaration, the Conference of Non-aligned Countries rightly states that "imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism constitute a basic source of international tension and conflict because they endanger world peace and security" [*ibid.*, section I].

55. The representatives of some Western countries show signs of nervousness when faced by such declarations. They endeavour to deny their part in the creation of dangerous centres of conflict in various parts of the world, but their actions belie their words. The events in the Congo are the most recent example of such actions. The armed intervention by Belgium and the United States in the internal affairs of this unhappy country shows clearly the determination of colonialism and imperialism to retain their hold on this country's resources at all costs.

56. Patrice Lumumba asked for the help of the United Nations in order to expel the white mercenaries and to achieve the reunification of his country, but he was foully murdered. Foreign intervention is once more rife in the Congo, where the white mercenaries continue to commit appalling crimes. Once again efforts are being made to subdue the Congo by fire and the sword, by the forces which have shed its

^{5/} Second Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-aligned Countries, held at Cairo, 5-10 October 1964.

people's blood and have been denounced by the United Nations in several of its resolutions.

57. Armed intervention in the Congo must be brought to an end at once. The Congolese people must be allowed to settle their own problems, in close co-operation with the other African peoples.

58. At this session we have been happy to welcome three newly independent States: Zambia, Malawi and Malta. This event, however, has reminded us that the representatives of other countries which have not yet managed to break the claims of colonialism have still not taken their rightful seat in this Hall. The forces of colonialism and imperialism are making desperate efforts to halt the process of complete decolonization.

59. World opinion and the great majority of States Members of the United Nations resolutely condemn the assistance which certain Western Powers are providing to Portugal and to the Republic of South Africa, thus enabling the colonial régime and the inhuman system of apartheid to continue in Africa.

60. At its nineteenth session the General Assembly should adopt decisions which would help to remove the last vestiges of colonialism with all speed. We accordingly support the measures proposed in the report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.^{6/}

61. South-East Asia is another part of the world where imperialism is creating dangers to peace. There is no longer any doubt that the aggression of United States imperialism against the people of South Viet-Nam is doomed to failure. But instead of drawing the obvious conclusions from the situation, United States military circles continue to enlarge the area of conflict by engaging in acts of provocation against the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam and Laos. It has recently been rumoured that the United States intends to carry the war into the territory of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam. To undertake such action would be playing with fire, as a great many delegations have pointed out. The Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam has many friends. If it were ever to become the target of United States aggression, its allies would not fail to provide it with whatever assistance it needed.

62. The dangerous situation in the Caribbean is another matter of profound concern to us. The economic blockade and other aggressive measures by United States imperialism against the Republic of Cuba are heightening tension in that region. The interests of peace demand that this dangerous policy should be brought to an end as soon as possible and that the United States base at Guantánamo should be evacuated. The differences between the United States and Cuba should be settled by negotiation, on the basis of equality between the two countries and respect for the sovereign rights of Cuba. The Cuban Government has declared its readiness to enter into negotiations with the United States. The Cairo Conference fully supported that declaration. It now rests with the

United States to show political realism by responding to that positive step.

63. Mankind's hopes for a prosperous and peaceful existence cannot be fulfilled without close economic co-operation among all the world's States, large and small, whatever their economic and social system or their level of development. Bulgaria attaches great importance to the development of international economic relations, which is a prime condition for the establishment of peaceful relations among nations.

64. The decisions of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development have an important role to play in this regard. The recommendations adopted by the Conference and the principles it approved represent a good beginning towards ensuring a natural and harmonious development of economic and trade relations in the interest of all peoples.

65. We cannot fail to observe, however, that these efforts are encountering difficulties raised by certain countries. I have in mind principally the harmful effect on international trade of the policy of discrimination practised by certain Western Powers and their closed economic groupings. It is clear that such artificial barriers as high customs tariffs, quantitative restrictions and trade boycotts are an impediment to normal economic co-operation and to the development of trade relations.

66. The Final Act of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development points out that the solution of trade problems between the socialist countries and the developed capitalist countries "would be in the interest of world trade as a whole". We were especially happy to accept the principles drawn up by the Conference to govern international trade relations and trade policies. We hope that the universal application of these principles will help to do away with the discriminatory and restrictive measures at present in operation and will improve prospects for the expansion of economic relations among all States on a basis of equality and mutual advantage.

67. Our delegation heartily welcomes the Conference's recommendations, which are of vital importance for the accelerated economic development of the developing countries. One of the major problems of our time is to close the vast gap between those countries and the developed capitalist countries brought about by centuries of colonial domination. The recommendations of the Conference are only the first stage in joint international efforts to this end. Their implementation must help the developing countries to make the necessary changes in the structure of their economy, so that they may have a more equitable place in a new international division of labour which would be economically sound and devoid of any trace of domination or economic exploitation.

68. The United Nations was established as an international institution to co-ordinate the actions of States for the protection and maintenance of peace and for the development of friendly relations and co-operation among nations. These tasks are of capital importance for mankind. That is why the question of the effectiveness of the Organization in carrying out these tasks in conformity with the principles of the Charter has always occupied the attention of all delegations.

^{6/} Later circulated as document A/5800/Rev.1.

69. At this session, the problem of the effectiveness of the Organization's preventive or enforcement measures for the maintenance of peace has taken on special significance in connexion with the financial questions arising from peace-keeping operations. Certain States Members of the Atlantic Alliance have exploited this problem in order to create difficulties at the opening of the nineteenth session. Owing to the sense of responsibility of the delegations of the socialist and non-aligned countries, it was possible to avoid a confrontation at the start of the session. The fact is, however, that not all the difficulties have been cleared away. The Assembly is still unable to organize its work and to take up the important problems on its agenda; it is therefore entitled to expect that the Western countries, too, will do what is necessary to enable the work of the session to proceed normally.

70. Peace-keeping operations were undertaken after there had been clear acts of aggression and blatant violations of the principle of national sovereignty. Instead of the aggressors being made to assume the political and material responsibility, in keeping with the elementary rules of international law, attempts are being made to shift the financial consequences of their aggressive acts to the entire membership of the United Nations, speculating on the alleged principle of collective responsibility. This illegal procedure tends to exonerate the aggressor at the expense of the Organization. Furthermore, violations of the Charter with regard to the respective powers of the organs of the United Nations are represented as "necessary flexibility". But this "flexibility" is actually nothing but a transfer of functions and powers of the Security Council to the General Assembly in violation of the Charter, which is quite explicit on this subject. It is strange logic indeed to present violations of the Charter or the arbitrary interpretation of its provisions, and actions endangering peace and national independence, as a sound basis strengthening the Organization's effectiveness. Such a course cannot but disrupt the entire machinery of the United Nations and affect the Organization's international prestige and even its very existence.

71. A different method is required: the method of specific and practical solutions based on strict observance of the spirit and letter of the Charter. This method is set forth in the Memorandum of the Government of the USSR of 10 July 1964 [A/5721], which outlines a series of constructive proposals aimed at strengthening the effectiveness of the United Nations. On the basis of those ideas, the Government of the People's Republic of Bulgaria declares its readiness to hold available to the Security Council a contingent of its armed forces, to conclude a special agreement with the Security Council on the subject, in accordance with Article 43 of the Charter, and to participate in the financing of military actions undertaken by the Security Council in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter.

72. The prerequisites for a reinforcement of the Organization's effectiveness are complex and varied, both in content and in scope. And it is, moreover, only the combination of all these elements that can guarantee the effectiveness of the United Nations.

73. In the first place, an important condition for the normal functioning of the United Nations and the accomplishment of its mission is the observance of the principle of peaceful coexistence among all States. To deny or to disregard this principle is tantamount to condemning the Organization to ineffectiveness and inactivity.

74. Secondly, the universal character of the United Nations must be confirmed. So long as the lawful rights of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations are not fully and unconditionally restored, and such States as the German Democratic Republic are not admitted to membership, we cannot speak of genuine universality and effectiveness of the United Nations. All the important issues with which the Organization must deal require the participation of the People's Republic of China. The recognition of the lawful rights of that great nation in the Organization would be an act of justice and a demonstration of wisdom and political realism.

75. The next session of the General Assembly will take stock of the accomplishments of the United Nations during the two decades of its existence. Let us hope that, mindful of our joint responsibility for world peace and the security of mankind, we shall all contribute, through sensible decisions and actions, to the efforts to build a world free from the scourges of war and colonialism. This is the only fitting way of preparing to celebrate the twentieth anniversary of the United Nations.

76. Mr. MEDEIROS (Bolivia) (translated from Spanish): Mr. President, in congratulating you upon your well-deserved election as President of this General Assembly, I salute in your person the nations of the African continent, and especially your own country, Ghana. I also extend warm greetings to the new Member States, Malawi, Malta and Zambia. I hope that their attainment of freedom and sovereignty will lead them resolutely along the path of peace, solidarity and progress.

77. I have not come to this rostrum to speak about local political issues, nor do I consider that this is the proper occasion to do so. I must, however, make two brief statements in order to explain the objectives of the Military Junta of the Bolivian Government.

78. In recent years, Bolivia has been the scene of a social and economic transformation, the goal of which was to redress age-old injustices and to place the responsibility for their destiny in the hands of the Bolivian people. History has, however, shown once again that social democracy cannot exist without political freedom. The free and unimpeded right to vote, respect for the dignity of man, and a legal system which limits power and guarantees public freedom are the essence of any democratic system. The restoration of those values, regrettably forgotten if not disregarded, was the goal of the popular movement launched at the beginning of November. The sole purpose of the presence of a Military Junta at the head of the Bolivian Government is to restore democracy and to arrange for free elections to be held.

79. The second statement refers to the fact that some of the Latin American Governments have not recognized Bolivia's Military Junta. The classic doctrine

of recognition requires objective verification of two points only: that the de facto Government is maintaining law and order and that it is fulfilling its international obligations. The Military Junta has amply satisfied both requirements. However, a subjective type of doctrine, such as that upheld by some in the name of defending democracy, would lead to the consideration of domestic matters, which are not and cannot be within the competence of other Governments, and would run counter to the self-determination of peoples. In this respect, allow me to point out, within the confines of the United Nations, the danger involved in any prolonged policy of non-recognition in terms of its effects on the internal order and sovereignty of the State of Bolivia.

80. In a few days we shall begin the International Co-operation Year, in accordance with resolution 1907 (XVIII) adopted by the General Assembly on 21 November 1963. Our present labours should serve as a preparation for this event, but this will not be possible unless we show, with the eloquence of deeds, that the United Nations has made progress in the three matters which are without any doubt the pillars of international co-operation: namely, the reduction of armaments and the control of atomic weapons, economic and social development, and the strengthening of the United Nations as a guarantee of peace and security among peoples.

81. In regard to the first, the annual report of the Secretary-General [A/5801] shows signs of scepticism, and we have gained the same impression from the statements of some of the representatives who have spoken from this rostrum. For example, in the introduction to the annual report [A/5801/Add.1], the Secretary-General states that "the treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water remains neither universal nor comprehensive". In regard to disarmament, the same document, while drawing attention to some progress that has been made, states that "the expectations of the eighteenth session of the General Assembly have not been realized". Nor can it be said that the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament has achieved encouraging results, at least up to the present.

82. It would seem logical to ask what is, or should be, the position of the countries which have no atomic power but which make up the majority of the United Nations. It is true that the reduction of armaments, the prohibition of atomic tests and the control of such tests is a matter for the great Powers, for which they must bear the maximum responsibility. But when we see that more than a hundred countries are able to send their representatives to take their places round the conference tables here and to participate in the discussions in this world forum that is the General Assembly, we may say that their responsibility is in direct relation to their force as world public opinion. We have had many examples in recent years of the power of public opinion. For example, when the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was adopted, there was some scepticism about its practical effectiveness; but today no one can deny that it is so deeply embedded in the consciences of civilized nations that any violation occasions protests and denunciations,

which are actually more effective than measures of coercion. Similarly, owing to the intelligence of the majority of people, the concept of colonialism has changed in the world and a new mentality which rejects racial discrimination has developed. As a result of these changes in man's thinking, it has been possible for many political transformations to come about in an atmosphere of peace and moderation. At this very moment, the Latin American and the African countries are proposing the establishment of denuclearized zones as an expression of their determination to oppose any threat of atomic destruction. There can be no doubt that the great Powers recognize this right of the weaker countries and it is not going too far to say that denuclearization will become a reality to the extent that we ourselves are able to demand it.

83. Anything connected with economic and social development deserves close consideration in our debates, for it is impossible to speak about international co-operation unless positive efforts are made to raise the level of living of the developing peoples and to enable them to make rational use of their natural resources. As was pointed out at the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, development problems are creating tension between North and South, which is as serious and dangerous as the political tension between East and West.

84. The Conference has been judged pessimistically, particularly because many of its resolutions were adopted as doubtful compromises, designed rather to preserve the prestige of the Conference than to be of useful application. We feel, however, that the success of the Conference lies in the fact that it has evolved general and special principles which, if accepted equally by the industrial Powers and by the developing countries, would constitute a serious basis for future action. I need only quote General Principle Four to indicate the really impressive scope of the text adopted at Geneva. It reads as follows:

"Economic development and social progress should be the common concern of the whole international community and should, by increasing economic prosperity and well-being, help strengthen peaceful relations and co-operation among nations. Accordingly, all countries pledge themselves to pursue internal and external economic policies designed to accelerate economic growth throughout the world, and in particular to help promote, in developing countries, a rate of growth consistent with the need to bring about substantial and steady increase in average income, in order to narrow the gap between the standard of living in developing countries and that in the developed countries."^{7/}

85. Another success achieved by the Conference was the establishment of machinery which, under the authority of the United Nations, will be called upon to put into effect, on a continuing basis, a wide variety of principles and programmes concerning the international division of labour, the integration of regional economies, the readjustment of prices of raw ma-

^{7/} See Proceedings of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, vol. I, Final Act and Report (United Nations publication, Sales No.: 64.II.B.11), Final Act, para. 54.

terials, the balance between imports and exports, free access to markets and international trade routes, the elimination of customs barriers, and financial and technical co-operation. To sum up, the bases have been laid for constructive work. We fully support the establishment of permanent machinery for the Conference and we request the General Assembly to take the necessary decisions to enable it to go into operation without delay.

86. In examining the results of the Conference, the Bolivian delegation cannot fail to mention what the Conference has done for the land-locked countries by establishing the following universal principles: "The recognition of the right of each land-locked State of free access to the sea" and "free and unrestricted transit, in such a manner that [it has] free access to regional and international trade in all circumstances and for every type of goods".^{8/}

87. Pursuant to the Conference's recommendations, a Committee of twenty-four members met in October 1964 to prepare a draft convention on free transit for land-locked countries. A Conference of Plenipotentiaries will be held during the year 1965 for the purpose of studying and approving the draft convention. Bolivia will take an active part in this Conference and hopes that the decisions adopted will be useful and fair to the countries whose geographical position in the world makes development and progress difficult.

88. The strengthening of the United Nations entails complex political and legal problems. There can be no doubt that, politically, what has been called "decolonization", i.e., the development of a people from a state of colonial dependence to independence, has in many cases necessitated United Nations action and has constituted a real challenge to the solidity of its structure. Mr. Leitão da Cunha, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Brazil, spoke here, with ample justification and considerable perspicacity, about the problem of decolonization and violence, and suggested the establishment of a standing United Nations force whose purpose would be "not to punish or to repel aggressors, but, by their presence, to prevent the outbreak of armed warfare and to ensure respect for the cessation of hostilities" [1289th meeting, para. 24]. Instances of violence in many countries progressing towards sovereignty are still fresh in our minds and it is obvious that United Nations intervention has had no effect. Accordingly, any proposals which aim at giving the United Nations practical and effective means of acting deserve consideration and support. Decolonization and the self-determination of peoples require guarantees of peace and order.

89. From the legal point of view, the strengthening of the United Nations depends not so much on the revision of the Charter as upon the acceptance of new concepts of international law. Hitherto, relations between States have been governed by an exclusively contractual system, as was shown by the recent codification projects of the Special Committee on Principles of International Law, established under resolution 1966 (XVIII). Doctrinal concepts are still cast in the mould of private law. The will of States is unques-

tionably the most important source of international law, but it is equally certain that the evolution of the contemporary world necessitates formulae which are more dynamic and effective, such as those which would be derived from international law or which would take account of the compulsory nature of the general principles recognized by all civilized nations.

90. If there is a moral order consisting of those values which all men and all nations recognize as essential for their coexistence and well-being, why should it not be possible for international law to set its seal upon those values, making them binding on all States, beyond their own volition? Clearly the difficulty lies in the lack of a supranational authority, but it is precisely here that the United Nations has a new role to play. It would, of course, be premature to concentrate legal, still less political, power in any one organ of the United Nations. But it is clear from the facts that, in certain circumstances and for certain matters, a body like the General Assembly or a specialized conference can and should lay down regulations having binding force.

91. The mind of man has invented the most intricate technical instruments and man is now embarking upon the conquest of space, but at the same time he has forged the instruments of his own destruction. Moreover, man has not succeeded in mastering the factors of social turmoil: the population explosion, the gulf between wealth and poverty, illiteracy, hatred and anarchy. There is a disproportion between power and duty. We have been generous in proclaiming principles and have established institutions of peace, justice and co-operation; but we have begrudged them effective means of action. The task is difficult and there is not much time in which to make the hopes of the world come true.

92. This year, for the first time, Bolivia has a seat in the Security Council. We hope that our voice will always express the concerns of the developing world and will speak with the ring of truth. We have no wish to interfere in the domestic affairs of other nations, but we accept the responsibilities of collective security. We advocate the strengthening of the organs which are responsible for the maintenance of peace and for taking collective action against aggressors. We favour regional pacts and organizations, within the spirit of the Charter signed at San Francisco and we want their procedures and findings to be more effective and severe. Bolivia has shown its unfailing loyalty to the principles of international order and hopes to find a solution to its own problems through diplomacy and understanding. Lastly, we share the faith of the ever-growing number of nations which wish to live in peace and harmony under the aegis of the United Nations.

93. The PRESIDENT: I give the floor to the representative of Indonesia in exercise of the right of reply.

94. Mr. PALAR (Indonesia): As is well known, my Government does not recognize the sovereignty of Malaysia. However, in exercising the right of reply to the statements of Mr. Hanan of New Zealand and of Ambassador Ramani, I shall make frequent reference to "Malaysia". That I do so is of course in no way to be taken as implying my Government's

^{8/} Ibid., Final Act, Annexes, annex A.1.2.

recognition of that Federation. My use of the term is solely out of courtesy to you, Mr. President, and to my distinguished colleague, Ambassador Ramani, for whom I have a great personal respect.

95. I shall begin by replying to the points raised by Mr. Hanan in his statement to the Assembly on 16 December [1305th meeting]. The distinguished Minister of Justice of New Zealand chose to take my Government to task for its policy of confrontation towards Malaysia within the context of the code of international behaviour laid down in the United Nations Charter. It seems necessary to remind him that Indonesia has not recognized the sovereignty of Malaysia; and, moreover, that my Government was forced to withhold its recognition because the Federation was established in open violation of the Manila Agreements that had been signed by Indonesia, the Philippines and the Federation of Malaya in August 1963.

96. I shall be elaborating on the nature of this violation and its consequences at a later stage in my statement. For the moment, I would like to deal with certain points raised by Mr. Hanan in connexion with the Macapagal proposals for settling the dispute between Indonesia and Malaysia. For the sake of clarity, I should like to read the relevant passage from Mr. Hanan's speech, and what follows now is a quotation:

"The proposal that an African-Asian commission should be established with the responsibility to reach a settlement is one which commends itself to us as a sound basis for permanent settlement. But most important, it is a proposal which has been accepted by both Malaysia and Indonesia. There is only one obstacle to further progress, and that is the failure of the Indonesian Government to accept the one condition rightly laid down by Malaysia, namely, that Indonesia should cease all acts of hostility. This is not a condition which places onerous burdens on Indonesia. It prejudices no issue to be discussed subsequently. It is no more than any sovereign State could or would expect before entering negotiations. It calls for nothing more than a return to observance of the obligations of the Charter." [1305th meeting, para. 97.]

97. First of all, it is necessary to point out that the terms of the proposal as actually put forward by President Macapagal of the Philippines themselves make no mention of the need for any conditions to be observed prior to the African-Asian committee beginning its work. However, what the Prime Minister of Malaysia has always insisted upon taking place prior to negotiations is not just the cessation of hostilities but the total withdrawal of Indonesian volunteers from the territory. I think that perhaps Mr. Hanan was not aware of the real nature of the Prime Minister's demands in that respect. But Indonesian volunteers are in what is regarded as Malaysian territory only by virtue of the fact that my Government does not recognize the sovereignty of that State, and is supporting a freedom movement which could only be kept under control by British troops. Hence, the demand for a prior withdrawal of these volunteers is in effect tantamount to a demand for Indonesia's prior recognition of Malaysia, which we deliberately rejected.

98. As I have just said, my Government was forced to withhold recognition from Malaysia because it was established in violation of the Manila Agreements. So that to any unprejudiced view it must be clear that the question of Indonesia's recognition is an integral part, if not the core, of the whole dispute between our two countries. As such, it should naturally come within the purview of the negotiating committee to be set up under the Macapagal plan. This being so, it obviously makes no sense to require Indonesia's recognition of Malaysia as a pre-condition for putting that plan into effect. Such recognition is patently one of the matters to be negotiated by the Macapagal committee, and my Government has, moreover—and I would like to stress it—expressed complete willingness to negotiate it on the basis of the recommendations put forward by the committee. My Government has even announced its intention in advance of abiding by the recommendations made by the committee. It is difficult to see how much further my Government should be expected to go in the direction of conciliation.

99. Turning to the statement made by Ambassador Ramani yesterday morning [1306th meeting], it is significant that he made no reference whatsoever to the Macapagal plan for reconciling the differences between his country and mine. As it would not be appropriate for me to speculate aloud here on the reasons for this startling omission, I shall content myself with merely noting that Mr. Ramani, it seems, was more interested in delivering an eloquent denunciation of Indonesia's general policies and political attitudes than in coming to grips with the specific issues that divide our two countries. And, of course, Mr. Ramani was perfectly within his rights. Nor was his denunciation without its value as a revelation of his own Government's stand.

100. From his criticism of Indonesian foreign policy can be inferred the rather subservient policy of the Government of Malaysia. No great political insight is necessary to appreciate that the present conflict between the Indonesian and Malaysian Governments stems from opposing alignments in a fundamental confrontation of States that has made its appearance on the international scene during recent years. This, indeed, is the root cause of the dispute between Indonesia and Malaysia.

101. Those who have read or listened to the address which my President delivered to the Cairo conference earlier this year, and to the statement of our First Deputy Prime Minister, Dr. Subandrio, in the Assembly last week [1300th meeting], will know the confrontation of which I am speaking. I am speaking of the inevitable confrontation between States that represent the old order of things and the States that represent what we in Indonesia have termed the "new emerging forces". But it is a confrontation which some representatives of the former group often misguidedly attempt either to laugh off or pretend does not exist. My Government, however, considers it of utmost importance for Members to recognize the existence of the particular confrontation I am referring to. For it is this confrontation that is responsible for so much of the local strife which is evident in the world today. To ignore the underlying causes of a conflict is to court danger: accurate diagnosis is well known to be half the battle in curing a disease.

102. Now, it is against the background of these considerations that I wish to make my reply to Mr. Ramani. And in so doing I shall endeavour not only to reply to specific points which my distinguished opponent raised, but also to elaborate on the implications of the statement delivered by Dr. Subandrio—implications which appear to have been somewhat misunderstood by Mr. Ramani.

103. In relation to the confrontation between old and new forces, an illuminating parallel can be drawn between what may be called the Malaysian question and the question of the Congo, that is currently occupying the Security Council. While there are, of course, important differences in the two situations, there are none the less certain striking similarities that provide interesting matter for reflection. Allow me briefly to list these similarities for the attention of Members.

104. First, both the Congo and Malaysia are new Members of the United Nations which have only very recently been politically decolonized and are in the process of trying to establish, or to rediscover, their own national identity.

105. Secondly, the Governments of both countries face strong opposition and, indeed, rebellions which are being supported by other newly independent nations.

106. Thirdly, interference by their former colonial rulers has been, in both cases, largely responsible for the deplorable state of affairs in which the two countries find themselves. This has been most adequately demonstrated with regard to the Congo in the speeches of the various African members who have spoken before the Security Council during the past week; in the case of Malaysia, I need only note here that it was British interference with the smooth process of the work of the United Nations Malaysia mission that crippled Maphilindo and so rendered peace in South East Asia impossible.

107. Fourthly, without the support of their former colonial masters, the Governments of both countries would soon collapse.

108. The fifth similarity, a most distasteful one, arises from the fact that in both conflicts one side has made use of mercenaries, which has aroused extreme resentment among Asians and Africans: in the Congo it is white mercenaries, animated by racial hatred, which are being employed against Africans; in Malaysia, Asian mercenaries have been sent to kill fellow Asians.

109. But the relevance of the parallel between the situation in the Congo and the Malaysian question does not end there. The tenor of the entire debate now going on in the Security Council is a dramatic illustration in intellectual terms of the nature of the confrontation of which I have been speaking, and in which Indonesia is participating with regard to Malaysia.

110. Permit me to draw your attention to a highly significant difference in argumentation, which has thus far characterized the Council's debate. Those countries which support the action of the United States and Belgium in sending paratroopers into the territory

of the Congo, of course, justify it first on the grounds that it was a purely humanitarian mission. Yet by far the greater part of their combined statements are, in fact, taken up with an exposition of the legal basis for the incursion. And, I must say, the statements of Mr. Spaak and Ambassador Stevenson are almost unanswerable on those legal grounds. But, as is plain from their statements, the twenty-two Asian and African nations did not bring the matter to the Council in order to challenge the legal grounds for the United States-Belgian action. They brought it before the Council in order to expose the political issues and implications raised by powerful non-African nations having entered the territory of an African State to deal with a situation that was already under active review by the body which had been expressly created by Africa to settle African problems.

111. With these considerations uppermost in their minds, the representatives of the African States addressing the Security Council are bound to find the legalistic arguments of the United States and Belgium—to say the very least—irrelevant. And, indeed, the fact that such arguments should have been so heavily relied upon indicates a way of thinking that has neither validity nor usefulness in the circumstances. It merely shows how reluctant some of the older nations are to recognize and bow to the real trend of political events today. The danger of the arguments is that they lend the nations employing them a spurious air of rightness, without touching on the essentials of the true issue under discussion.

112. What is really under dispute in the Security Council, at the moment, is the right of new nations to settle their own affairs in their own manner without interference from more powerful nations that do not belong to that region. Africans wish to settle the affairs of Africa in an African way, and for this purpose they have established the Organization of African Unity. Asians wish to settle the affairs of Asia in an Asian manner, and for this purpose three countries, Indonesia, the Philippines and the Federation of Malaya created Maphilindo in August of 1963, which met its early demise as a result of British interference. It is the attempt by certain of the old established Powers to frustrate this legitimate desire on the part of new nations to give substance to their newly won political independence that is at the basis of the present conflict over the Congo, as it is at the basis of the conflict over Malaysia.

113. It is pertinent at this stage to ask why it is that so many of the new Asian and African nations have shown such concern to establish machinery for initiating regional co-operation, to solve common problems in their respective areas. The reason is very simple. Only by acting in concert can the small countries take effective measures to combat the encroachments of neo-colonialism by old established and powerful nations. Single-handed, the newly created nations would find it an impossible task.

114. Efforts have been made in this Assembly to pretend that what we have called "neo-colonialism" is a sort of mythical bogey having reality only in the fevered minds of over-sensitive young States. Indeed, Mr. Ramani even went so far as to impute that certain new nations—presumably among them Indone-

sia—have deliberately made use of this myth as a smoke-screen to disguise their own—he employed the term "neo-imperialism" against their neighbours. It is an imputation that is only worth mentioning, not answering. Much more deserving of answer are the attempts to represent neo-colonialism as a baseless myth, for these are in reality attempts to gloss over the fundamentals underlying so many of today's political conflicts in different areas of the globe.

115. I put it to Members: now that territorial possessions are something of an embarrassment to their owners in the era of decolonization, would it not be natural to expect that the ex-colonial countries would wish to retain as much as possible of the real benefits of their former power if they could find a respectable and discreet way of doing so? Is there anything in the recent developments with regard to the cold war that might lead us to suppose that certain large nations will not continue to find the smaller countries necessary as pawns in the confrontation between East and West?

116. Honest answers to these questions only too clearly reveal the motives that older nations might have for trying to perpetuate the realities of their power over former colonies by such covert means as economic pressure, military agreements, subversion, intervention and the threat of force. The forty-seven non-aligned nations represented at the Cairo conference this year deplored all these manifestations of neo-colonialism. If more than forty newly created countries can declare themselves of one mind on the need to resist at all costs attempts by ex-imperialist countries to retain their colonial power in a more subtle manner, then I think we may justly and without exaggeration conclude that there is a genuine confrontation between old and new forces in the world.

117. I apologize, but it seems from Mr. Ramani's statement yesterday that I will once more have to explain how British neo-colonialism in particular manifested itself in the establishment of the so-called "Federation of Malaysia" in September 1963. For, as I have had frequent occasion to say, it is not to the Federation as such that Indonesia has taken exception, but to the fact that, as established, it represents an intrusion of a subtle form of British colonial power in our area of the world. I shall endeavour to put the main points as briefly as possible.

118. The original conception of Malaysia, as defined in the terms of the agreement signed on 22 November 1961 by the then Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, Mr. Harold Macmillan, and by the Prime Minister of the Federation of Malaya, contained a clause which was undisguisedly intended to further British self-interest at the expense of the freedom of Malaysia's Asian neighbours. Paragraph 6 and annex B of that agreement laid it down that, in return for an extension of the 1957 Defence Agreement with Malaya to include the whole of the territory of the new Federation, the United Kingdom would have the sole right to make such use of its military base in Singapore as it alone saw fit not only for the purpose of the defence of Malaysia and the Commonwealth, but also for the "preservation of peace in South-East Asia"—which, for a large part, is our area.

119. But what can this phrase mean? Clearly nothing less than the preservation of peace to suit British interests—or why else would the United Kingdom have written this condition into the agreement in such explicit terms? And can the interests of an ex-colonial and highly industrialized Power be in any way regarded as identical with the interests of developing new nations? Clearly not, and I must say that, in the circumstances, I find it hard to be moved by Mr. Ramani's touching picture of "little brother" of 10 million pitted against "big brother" of 100 million, when "little brother" has at his disposal—and always has had since birth—the pledged support of British military might.

120. Two days before the terms of the Macmillan-Rahman agreement were published, Dr. Subandrio made his oft-quoted announcement to this Assembly [1058th meeting] that the Indonesian Government would welcome the new Federation. Even so, my Government continued to maintain that the only condition necessary was that the Federation should conform to the wishes of all the peoples concerned, including, of course, the peoples of North Borneo in the three dependencies of the United Kingdom. We might be forgiven, however, if we grew a little suspicious and began to doubt whether the wishes of the North Borneo peoples were really being taken into account—when there was so much at stake in the creation of Malaysia, both for the Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of Malaya. Meanwhile, the Government of the Philippines, which had an historical claim to the territory of Sabah, was beginning to experience similar misgivings. These misgivings were confirmed by the successful popular uprising in Brunei in December 1962, which was later quelled by British forces.

121. It was to settle the differences between the three countries that the Heads of State of Indonesia, the Philippines and Malaya held a series of meetings at Manila during the summer of 1963. There it was agreed that Malaysia would be brought into being as the happy fruit of a new spirit of Asian co-operation between the three countries, symbolized by the creation of Maphilindo. Conditions were laid down for the establishment of the new Federation, and the aid of the Secretary-General was invoked for the task of ascertaining the wishes of the peoples of Sarawak and Sabah, according to the terms of the Manila agreement signed by the three Heads of State. Had those terms been allowed to be fulfilled in the spirit in which they were conceived, my Government is convinced that all would now have been well.

122. However, as was described in Indonesia's and the Philippines' general statements to the Assembly last year, the terms of the agreement were, unfortunately, not permitted to be fulfilled because of British interference. I do not think it is necessary for me, today, to go into the details of this matter again, but I do feel it necessary to make clear why Indonesia has felt itself compelled to reject the affirmative conclusions reached by the Secretary-General on the report of the United Nations Malaysia mission [see A/5801, chap. II, sect. 14]. Indonesia would have accepted the conclusion of the Secretary-General had it not been for British meddling in ar-

bitrarily curtailing the work of the Malaysia mission and preventing the arrival of the Indonesian and Philippine observers until it was almost too late for them to serve any useful purpose.

123. It should be borne in mind that the whole point of asking for a United Nations, or impartial, ascertainment under Asian sponsorship was to try and offset the elements of British colonialism so clearly displayed in the original scheme for the establishment of Malaysia. Consequently, when the conditions for the impartial assessment themselves became the subject of British manipulation, the results of that inquiry could no longer be regarded as acceptable by Indonesia, for it had thus been summarily torn from the context of brotherly Asian co-operation in which it had been conceived. In other words, my Government had no choice but to doubt its value as a true assessment of the wishes of the people in Sarawak and Sabah.

124. Once the framework of brotherly co-operation had been destroyed by outside interference, it became necessary for us in Indonesia to sit back and assess the United Nations inquiry on its own merits as an objective ascertainment. In this regard, representatives will recall that the mission conducted its inquiry by means of open hearings and in the presence of the colonial authorities and units of the armed forces and riot police. As an ex-colonial people ourselves, we cannot help wondering whether this did not unavoidably have an intimidating effect on the persons questioned. I would remind delegates that it was the older nations of our world that first developed the use of the secret ballot. Not one of these nations, today, would ever consider undertaking an inquiry into the wishes of its own people on a crucial and contentious issue except by this method.

125. If Indonesia's rejection of the United Nations assessment on these grounds seems unreasonable to some, then the pertinent question to be answered is precisely why it was that the United Kingdom felt compelled to interfere with the process of the United Nations inquiry, if not to reassert some of the control that had been wrested from it by the terms of the Manila Agreement?

126. The fears of the Indonesian Government on this score were, indeed, shockingly confirmed when, on 31 August 1963, while the United Nations Malaysia mission was still conducting its hearings, Malaya announced that Malaysia would come into being on 16 September, irrespective of the findings of the United Nations team. That announcement was tantamount to an abrogation of the Manila Agreement, which the Head of the Malayan Government had signed less than a month previously. More than this, in renegeing on the Manila Agreement, Malaya provided the strongest demonstration possible that the new State of Malaysia would be wholly within the British sphere of influence, far more concerned with assisting in fulfilling British ambitions than with joining its two sister nations in fostering the new spirit of Asian co-operation, for the common benefit of all their countries, that had been the dream envisaged in the concept of Maphilindo.

127. The PRESIDENT: In exercise of his right of reply, I give the floor to the representative of New Zealand.

128. Mr. CORNER (New Zealand): Thank you, Mr. President, for giving me the courtesy of this right of reply, one which I had hoped would not be necessary, because the small section which the chairman of the New Zealand delegation had devoted to this question was, I believed, so clear-cut and so incontrovertible. However, certain of the remarks that were made by the chairman of my delegation have been altered in their meaning in the reply just given by the representative of Indonesia, and I believe it necessary briefly to put the matter straight and return to the original statement made by New Zealand.

129. The representative of Indonesia commenced by reminding the chairman of my delegation that Indonesia had not recognized the sovereignty of Malaysia. We need no reminder of this. We acknowledge that this is a fact, and regard it as the sovereign right of Indonesia to recognize or not to recognize any State it pleases.

130. He then went on to say that Indonesia was forced to withhold its recognition from Malaysia because the Federation was established in open violation of certain agreements. This is a question that I am not qualified to go into, nor would I wish to do so at this time. What I would like to do is merely to beg representatives in this Assembly to read the documents on the question, in particular the report of the Secretary-General, and, even more important, the records of the recent meetings, in September 1964, of the Security Council, when it considered the case of Indonesia's aggression against Malaysia, and particularly the verbatim records of the 1144th, 1145th, 1148th to 1150th and 1152nd meetings of the Council. The facts of the situation, the arguments and the counter-arguments are clearly set out in those documents, and I would leave the judgement to any representative in this Assembly who is willing to read those documents with an impartial mind.

131. The representative of Indonesia then reminded the chairman of the New Zealand delegation that the Macapagal proposals made no mention of the need for any conditions to be observed as a prerequisite for negotiations to begin. We made no such claim. We merely said—and the passage has been quoted—that the "one obstacle to further progress" in this direction was "the failure of the Indonesian Government to accept the one condition rightly laid down by Malaysia, namely, that Indonesia should cease all acts of hostility" [1305th meeting, para. 97]. May I repeat Mr. Hanan's statement. He said: "This is not a condition"—this condition that, prior to negotiation, Indonesia should cease "acts of hostility"—"which places onerous burdens on Indonesia. It prejudices no issue to be discussed subsequently. It is no more than any sovereign State could or would expect before entering negotiations. It calls for nothing more than a return to observance of the obligations of the Charter." [Ibid.]

132. The representative of Indonesia then said that "perhaps Mr. Hanan"—the chairman of the New Zealand delegation—"was not aware of the real nature of the [Malaysian] Prime Minister's demands". Indeed, we are well aware of the demand by the Prime Minister of Malaysia; it is that Indonesia cease acts of hostility and withdraw Indonesian troops from Malaysia

as a prerequisite to negotiations. We are well aware of that demand, and we think it thoroughly justified, and we believe that any Member willing to observe the Charter of the United Nations would also consider it justified.

133. But what are acts of hostility? Is the representative of Indonesia saying that the presence of Indonesian forces on Malaysian territory is not an act of hostility? Does he justify their presence on the grounds that they are volunteers, as in his statement a few moments ago, he said that "Indonesian volunteers are in what is regarded as Malaysian territory only by virtue of the fact that my Government does not recognize the sovereignty of that State".

134. First, as to the nature of volunteers, if that is the argument for the retention of troops on Malaysian soil: the Indonesian news agency, Antara, on 10 September 1964, reported the bill passed in the Indonesian Parliament which set up the Indonesian Volunteers Movement. Antara said:

"Supreme leadership of the Indonesian Volunteers Movement is in the hands of the President. Mobilizing and registration of Indonesian volunteers is done through the National Front, while the alertness and use of them is decided by the President. The manner in which these tasks are carried out is decided by the President. Social security is provided to volunteers, and all kinds of social welfare regulations are to be regulated by the Government. Disability suffered by a volunteer in the course of his duties, and making him incapable of resuming his normal work, will be compensated by the Government."

This is the nature of the "volunteers" and it is these "volunteers" who should be withdrawn from Malaysian soil as a prerequisite to negotiations. It seems to me again that any Member of the United Nations observing the Charter would agree that this should be done.

135. The representative of Indonesia then got to the essential point of his reply to New Zealand, saying: "Hence, the demand for a prior withdrawal of these volunteers is in effect tantamount to a demand for Indonesia's prior recognition of Malaysia." This, of course, is not something which the New Zealand representative said, and it is not something which New Zealand believes; the two questions are, of course, entirely separate.

136. And then, by a piece of logical legerdemain, the representative of Indonesia concludes his answer to the New Zealand statement in the general debate by saying that: "This being so, it obviously makes no sense to require Indonesia's recognition of Malaysia as a pre-condition for putting that plan—the Macapagal plan—"into effect." In other words, the representative of Indonesia has tied the question of withdrawal of forces to the question of recognition; by tying these two quite separate questions together, he has made it clear that he is using withdrawal of forces as a bargaining-counter against recognition. It may well be that the question of recognition is a matter to be negotiated; no one could have any quarrel with that. The quarrel would be with the association of the two quite separate questions.

137. The sole point of the New Zealand intervention—and I trust now that these points have become unobfuscated again—is the argument that, to maintain forces on the soil of another State, whether you recognize it or whether you do not, and to use the question of the withdrawal of those forces as a bargaining-counter in further negotiations, cannot be reconciled with Article 2, paragraphs 3 and 4 of the Charter, which I regret to have to read again. Article 2, paragraph 3, states:

"All Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security . . . are not endangered."

And paragraph 4 states:

"All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations."

138. It is our argument that this Article of the Charter applies whether or not a State recognizes another State. It is because a lawless doctrine is propounded under which a State that withholds recognition from another State has the right to send its forces into the territory of that State—it is because such a lawless doctrine is propounded—that we in New Zealand, a small country of two and one-half million people, raise the matter here and express our anxiety that such a doctrine should be used by a nation of 100 million people against a small nation of 10 million people.

139. The PRESIDENT: In exercise of his right of reply, I give the floor to the representative of Malaysia.

140. Mr. RAMANI (Malaysia): I observe that the hour is late and I should not keep you waiting much longer; I shall therefore be as brief as the circumstances permit.

141. Ambassador Palar was good enough to convey his personal regards to me and how he felt towards me. I am not indulging in a mere affectation of courtesy or politeness when I say with utter sincerity that I consider Ambassador Palar as one of my very good friends, for whom I have not merely respect but great regard. That is one of the reasons why, having to reply to him after he has delivered a carefully prepared text in the form of a reply, it becomes rather difficult for me—and I personally feel almost disarmed in trying to answer his arguments.

142. But, unfortunately, we in Malaysia have the experience of the biblical story of Jacob's voice and Esau's hands. Under the gilded domes and within the panelled walls of this Assembly we hear Jacob's voice; in the jungle fastnesses of Indonesia's border with Malaysia and in the swamps surrounding the territory of the peninsula we have Esau's hands.

143. I did not quite follow whether he was justifying the attitude of his Government—the activities in which his Government indulges—or merely excusing the attitude of his Government; but I shall assume, having regard to the careful preparation his statement has had, that he intended to justify it.

144. I do not know if the Indonesian delegation has the services of a Reuters "telex" system; we, unfortunately, still defer to these "neo-colonialist tricks". And only this morning this information came through Reuters:

"Fighting flared up in Sarawak Thursday"—presumably even as I was speaking here. "All day battle late into the night. Three Indonesian soldiers confirmed killed, many more wounded in Serian district . . . about fifteen miles from Kuching."

145. Does Ambassador Palar feel happy in the thought that his countrymen should go on this adventure of killing other people and be killed in turn? Is he aware that, at the request of this own Government, the International Red Cross has been brought in to assist in looking after the comfort of the Indonesian prisoners whom we captured and hold in custody? By what right—if not by virtue of the Geneva Conventions of 1949—can the Government of Indonesia claim the right of intervention for the Red Cross and have the temerity at the same time to come to this rostrum and say they are volunteers?

146. Reuters again, dateline Djakarta, 17 December—yesterday—reported:

"Sukarno decreed dissolution of body for supporting 'Sukarnoism' to prevent disunity among people. He explained that, in order to intensify and promote the twin command to stimulate revolution and crush Malaysia, disunity among revolutionary national forces must be prevented."

Did President Sukarno say that in the help they give to freedom movements blood must be shed? He said: "Crush Malaysia".

147. I recalled when listening to Ambassador Palar's statement, how a Greek philosopher of the first century had tried to distinguish between true and false historians. Comparing them, he defined the latter as those who made a point of denigrating the martyrs and praising the persecutors, disregarding all refutations, in the expectation that the constant repetition of untruths would tend to remain after the refutations were forgotten. Well, if that is a matter of history, how much worse is it that it is possible to apply the dictum to contemporary history when the same fact can be seen in a variety of ways, one by Indonesia and the other by Malaysia.

148. Of all the things that startled me in that statement—for most of which we in Malaysia are prepared, because it is not merely a twice-told tale, but a twice-told tale told twenty times—what amazes me was his comparison of conditions in Malaysia with those in the Congo; and he sought to find an illuminating parallel between the two. I spoke yesterday of the special perspicacity of Dr. Subandrio. I can only envy this special ability to see this parallel, illumined as it is to the sole eyes of Indonesia. The Congo—as we all know, and it is not right for me to state at this rostrum what our own personal feelings and attitudes are when the matter is now being debated in the Security Council—is a matter of internal rebellion; Malaysia is a matter of external aggression.

149. I understand from the documents circulated by the Secretariat that the Indonesian Government has

lent its name to the condemnation of the intervention of Western Powers—the United States and Belgium—even for what they call "the alleged task of humanitarian interference" in the affairs of the Congo. What is the humanitarian motive? What motive does Ambassador Palar attribute to his own Government when it indulges in this sort of bare-faced aggression—which I called blatant and inexcusable yesterday? It is a tragic irony that Malaysia, which contributed its own soldiers to the Congo and shed its sons' blood there so that stability and concord might prevail in the Congo, should have it said against it today, in 1964, that it presents a parallel with the Congo—a parallel that only one State can see. As I have said, so long as these repetitions go on the refutations tend to be overwhelmed.

150. I should therefore like to put the position with regard to Indonesia's attitude toward Malaysia as briefly as I can—obviously I cannot go through the entire material so carefully presented by Ambassador Palar.

151. As long ago as 1961—indeed, on 13 November 1961—this is what The New York Times contained over the signature of Dr. Subandrio, to whom we all had the privilege of listening:

"As an example of our honesty and lack of expansionist intent, one-fourth of the island of Kalimantan (Borneo), consisting of three Crown Colonies of Great Britain, is now becoming the target of the Malayan Government for a merger. Of course, the people there are ethnologically and geographically very close to the others living in the Indonesian territory. Still, we do not show any objection toward this Malayan policy of merger. On the contrary, we wish the Malayan Government well if it can succeed with this plan."

152. A few days later, on 20 November 1961, standing at this very rostrum, Dr. Subandrio said:

"We are not only disclaiming the territories outside the former Netherlands East Indies, though they are of the same island, but—more than that—when Malaya told us of its intentions to merge with the three British Crown Colonies of Sarawak, Brunei and British North Borneo as one Federation, we told them that we had no objections and that we wished them success with this merger so that everyone might live in peace and freedom.

"For the sake of clarification, I may tell this Assembly that three quarters of the island of Borneo is Indonesian territory, while the remainder constitutes the aforementioned three British Crown Colonies. Naturally, ethnologically and geographically speaking, this British part is closer to Indonesia than, let us say, to Malaya. But we still told Malaya that we had no objections to such a merger, based upon the will for freedom of the peoples concerned."

And he added:

"So far as Indonesia is concerned, we still adhere to the agreement, based on our own national decision, on the extent of the territory of the Republic of Indonesia, which the representative of the Netherlands publicly and officially confirmed in the Security

Council of the United Nations in 1948—I repeat, publicly and officially confirmed that:

"All parties agree that what used to be the Netherlands East Indies should become an independent State as soon as possible." [1058th meeting, paras. 193 and 194.]

153. We now realize in the perspective of current history that, three years ago, Indonesia was trying to persuade the world how legitimate, how reasonable, how essential it was for it to get West Irian out of the Netherlands' hands. And that was the attitude it took then.

154. Mr. Palar referred to the different processes that were gone through in Manila, with a view to concluding agreements, and how those agreements had been violated either by us or by the "wicked" British in association with us, or by both of us, as the result of which this confrontation began.

155. Let us see what the facts are. The joint statement issued by the two Heads of Government, President Sukarno and Tunku Abdul Rahman, on 1 June 1963, read:

"The President and the Prime Minister . . . having agreed that there was need for them to meet and clarify matters regarding problems arising from the proposal for the formation of Malaysia, held discussions on 31 May and 1 June 1963."^{2/}

Therefore, presumably after 20 November 1961 and before 1 June 1963, problems had arisen between Indonesia and Malaysia.

156. In the second document issued as a result of subsequent meetings between President Sukarno, President Macapagal and Tunku Abdul Rahman, known as the Manila Accord, it was stated that these problems were being discussed; and paragraph 10, under the heading "Malaysia and North Borneo", stated:

"The Ministers reaffirmed their countries' adherence to the principle of self-determination for the peoples of Non-Self-Governing Territories. In this context, Indonesia and the Philippines stated that they would welcome the formation of Malaysia provided the support of the people of the Borneo territories is ascertained by an independent and impartial authority, the Secretary-General of the United Nations or his representative."^{10/}

157. Thereafter, they issued another joint statement which referred, in paragraph 11, to the following matter:

"The three Heads of Government further agreed that foreign bases—temporary in nature—should not be allowed to be used directly or indirectly to subvert the national independence of any of the three countries. In accordance with the principle enunciated in the Bandung Declaration, the three countries will abstain from the use of arrangements of collective defence to serve the particular interests of any of the big Powers."^{11/}

^{2/} Malaya/Indonesia Relations, 31 August to 15 September 1963, Kuala Lumpur, 1963, p. 44.

^{10/} Ibid., p. 48.

^{11/} Ibid., p. 51.

158. Therefore, it is fair to assume that the problems that had arisen then were both military problems with regard to the existence of the bases, as well as the ascertainment of the will of the people. And, if the ascertainment of the will of the people was satisfactory to the signatory States, in accordance with the certificate to be issued by the Secretary-General, then the other two States said they would welcome Malaysia. That was the sole condition; there was no question of these bases being removed, no question of a threat to Indonesia, no question of our being armed to the teeth, even though we are only 10 million against a big country—none of those things at all.

159. As a result of all those agreements, with the full knowledge of the existence of this military base and the military problem that arose as a result of it, the sole condition was that the Secretary-General should ascertain and tell the world and the two Heads of State that the people were in favour of joining Malaysia; then they would welcome Malaysia.

160. This is what the Secretary-General found. This is in the introduction to the Secretary-General's report to this Assembly:

"As is well known, the United Nations Malaysia Mission expressed the opinion that 'the participation of the two territories in the proposed Federation, having been approved by their legislative bodies, as well as by a large majority of the people through free and impartially conducted elections in which the question of Malaysia was a major issue, the significance of which was appreciated by the electorate, may be regarded as the result of the freely expressed wishes of the territory's peoples acting with full knowledge of the change in their status, their wishes having been expressed through informed and democratic processes, impartially conducted and based on universal adult suffrage'. I accepted this view of the Mission in my conclusions." [A/5801/Add.1, sect. X.]

161. I said yesterday, and I repeat today, I entirely agree that Indonesia does not like it; I entirely agree that Indonesia has made abundant objections, so that it may support its own attitude to the result of the Secretary-General's findings. I do not quarrel with that at all.

162. One matter to which he referred, partially in answer to the representative of New Zealand and partially in answer to us—and he took me to task for not having had the courage to put it before you—was the question of African-Asian conciliation. He, therefore, thought it only right and proper to put it before you, and he made good use of the summary made by the representative of New Zealand as to why those talks were still in abeyance and uncertainty. He referred to those conditions. He expanded on a theme which is a favourite with Indonesia, that here is Malaysia asking for conditions before it will start a talk, and here is Indonesia, which gave a blank cheque to Macapagal—any recommendation to the African-Asian commission you produce; hereby we give you authority to say we accept it.

163. This is a very unfortunate use of the word "conditions". After trouble had broken out, and military confrontations had been launched—as I said

yesterday—in December 1963, no less a person than the President of the United States, being concerned about the turn events were taking in South-East Asia, sent the then Attorney-General Robert Kennedy to try to arrange some sort of a talk, so that those hostilities might cease. Attorney-General Robert Kennedy obtained the concurrence of President Sukarno that there would be a cease-fire, and the cease-fire, on the signature of President Sukarno himself, was conveyed by aircraft to all the people along the border.

164. That was the condition: that he would cease further firing and that there would be no more incursions, no more military adventures, as a condition for the talks or, as Robert Kennedy put it, in his own expressive way, "take it out of the jungle and put it on the conference table".

165. When it came before the conference table, that conference failed because Indonesia would not accept the word "withdrawal" of people within our territory; it wanted to have a form of words fashioned that would express the substance but not use that word. The Bangkok conference broke up on that decision.

166. Subsequently, when Malaysia felt that it was still keeping the door open for those talks and was willing to meet once again with anyone who wanted to talk, to bring an end to this unfortunate tragedy overtaking the peoples of both Indonesia and Malaysia, President Macapagal proposed a final conference in Tokyo. When President Macapagal proposed it to us, with the laborious endeavours of my good friend, the representative of the Philippines, we said we had had many conferences in which this question of withdrawal had been proposed and never acted upon, and that it was quite impossible to go to a talk with our sovereignty being threatened like this and, indeed, having, both metaphorically and physically, a pistol put to our heads.

167. Because of that, through the indefatigable efforts of the representative of the Philippines, Mr. Lopez, we obtained a letter from President Sukarno stating that all the people inside the territory would be withdrawn, so that the talks in Tokyo might proceed. Actually, Thailand was appointed as referee to see those people pass through the border. I shall not go into those details now.

168. Then, when we came to the Tokyo conference and President Sukarno was faced with the problem of withdrawal, these were his very words: "Withdrawal? We shall withdraw not a single soldier. I repeat it; I repeat it a thousand times!" And he walked out of the conference chamber. So that, in that context, the position is not that we are asking for a condition which is completely legitimate, constitutional, proper and cannot be quarrelled about; the real position is that we are telling Indonesia: "You have accepted the terms concerning the withdrawal of those regulars and irregulars; you have broken faith with us. We put to you your own terms, to keep faith with yourself." That is where the Tokyo conference stalled.

169. It is quite easy to come here to people who do not, normally, know all the details—I do not know what is happening in all the other 113 States—and say: "Here you are, here is Malaysia childishly putting conditions for this sort of thing. Look at me—generous

enough. Anything you decide upon, I will agree to though when the agreement comes, I will disagree, perhaps."

170. Now there are one or two matters in this speech to which I should like to refer, although they are not of very great importance, and some have actually been dealt with by Ambassador Corner. Indeed, Ambassador Palar said:

"... Mr. Ramani even went so far as to impute that certain new nations, presumably among them Indonesia"—those were not my words—"have deliberately made use of this myth as a smoke-screen to disguise their own"—he employed the term—"neo-imperialism" against their neighbours. It is an imputation that is only worth mentioning, not answering."

My only comment is: I entirely agree; if the cap fits, wear it.

171. Again and again there is this question of a "freedom movement" having allegedly broken out by the rebellion in Brunei and being put down with terrific force by British authority in association with Malaysia. That spectre keeps rearing its ugly head, no matter how often one may lay it. Both Sabah in the north and Sarawak in the south completely dissociated themselves from this so-called "rebellion", or "freedom movement" the moment it started, and the question of Azahari and Brunei was completely forgotten. Actually, Brunei had not come into the Malaysian Federation at all.

172. Ambassador Palar characterized my references to Indonesian attitudes yesterday as a "denunciation" of the attitude of Indonesia on many matters. I venture to differ from him. I ask him humbly, when he gets the printed record of my statement, to read it and ask himself whether the word "denunciation" is appropriate to that situation. I pictured in great detail—I made no secret of my own feelings about it—all the attitudes that are possible between two sovereign States, and I kept on saying: "These are your attitudes. I have no right to quarrel with them; you are entitled to hold them." If that is "denunciation", I have learned a new word today.

173. Now, if you will permit me to make a few quotations from United Nations records. This is one of them:

"It had been said that peace was founded on law; but was not law founded on justice? The term 'threat or use of force' could therefore not be limited to the direct or indirect use of physical force in any form. It should also be recognized that the coercion of a State by another State by means of economic or other methods was contrary to or inconsistent with one or more declared purposes of the United Nations."^{12/}

Again:

"... Construing the expression 'armed attack', Mr. Jessup considered that, under the terms of the

^{12/} Official Records of the General Assembly, Eighteenth Session, Sixth Committee, 809th meeting, para. 7.

Charter, alarming military preparations by a neighbouring State justified an appeal to the Security Council, but the threatened State was not entitled to use force in anticipation of an attack."^{13/}

174. And, now, another quotation:

"The principle of non-intervention was most closely related to the principle of prohibition of the threat or use of force, and even overlapped it inasmuch as intervention through or accompanied by the use or threat of force by a State constituted an illegal use of force. Moreover, both those principles derived directly from the principle of the sovereign equality of States. Intervention, however, did not necessarily imply the use of physical force."

And, gentlemen, mark this next sentence—

"Thus a State could intervene in the affairs of another State by refusing to recognize its new government and subjecting the latter to economic or financial pressure until it was obliged to resign or was overthrown. A large State could easily intervene in the affairs of a small State even without the direct use of military, economic or political force, by such means as giving moral and financial support to revolutionary elements. If the revolutionary intrigues against the national government failed, it could not only shelter the revolutionaries but could also encourage them to continue their activities against such government. Those examples were regrettably taken from everyday international life."^{14/}

175. And one last quotation:

"The delegation of Indonesia, for its part, approved the order in which the means of settlement were listed in Article 33 of the Charter."

Pausing there, representatives will remember its effort at "negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies...".

"Its own preference was for negotiation, pursued in a spirit of understanding, without coercion or pressure and in accordance with the principle of the sovereign equality of States. Those considerations were valid for all means of settlement, and it was in that way that the words in Article 2, paragraph 3, of the Charter, 'in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered', should be interpreted. Those were the essential requirements of justice, particularly in disputes between a strong and a weak State."^{15/}

176. Those were statements made to the Sixth Committee by the representative of Indonesia no later and no earlier than 12 November 1963, after "confrontation" had begun. There we see an example of Jacob's voice and Esau's hands.

177. There is one last quotation I should like to make and this, again, is from the records of the Sixth Committee:

"The problem of aggression, the problem of war and peace, was as old as humanity, for aggression was an inherent characteristic of human nature, particularly among the powerful...^{16/}

"A clear and precise statement should therefore be adopted, to cover all acts of aggression in every sphere when the obvious motive was to dominate, to enslave, to occupy or to exercise pressure that would endanger the political or economic existence of any other State or people."^{17/}

The speaker concluded:

"Aggression was in fact a 'privilege' of the powerful. The definition should therefore protect the independence of weak peoples and prevent the abuse of power in any form whatsoever."^{18/}

The speaker went on to refer to the relevant Articles of the Charter. That, again, was the distinguished representative of Indonesia, speaking, of course, in 1952. Much water has flowed under the bridges during the past twelve years.

178. Those were the attitudes of the Indonesian Government as expressed, no doubt, on a theoretical basis. The more theoretical, the greater was the expectation of the world that they would be followed. Those were the principles intended to be accepted by the Sixth Committee in 1952, and as recently as 1963, last year. What is the picture now, as I put it before you yesterday?

179. And so, Mr. President, I do not wish to take up any more of your time, but since my very good friend, Ambassador Palar, complained that I did not bring the substance of this whole dispute before you, may I ask him just one question? The entire gravamen of my charge against Indonesia yesterday was not its political attitudes, not its economic posture, not the way in which it wants to construct its own society, not against its revolution, but its attitude of having recourse to arms to settle any dispute of any nature between itself and another sovereign State. And if that dispute can be justified by merely saying "I do not recognize Malaysia", then I have the answer in their own statements before the Sixth Committee, and a further answer has already been given by my very good friend, the representative of New Zealand.

180. The main charge he has not answered. He may have excellent reasons; I accept all of them, for the sake of argument, without admitting the truth or the competence of them. But by what right, what justification, what excuse, can Indonesia continue with its aggression and hope the world will accept its views on world affairs or international relations?

181. Again, it is a tragic irony that Malaysia, which obtained its independence without shedding a single drop of blood, should, in sustaining and guarding that

^{13/} Ibid., para. 8.

^{14/} Ibid., para. 9.

^{15/} Ibid., para. 10.

^{16/} Ibid., Seventh Session, Sixth Committee, 330th meeting, para. 7.

^{17/} Ibid., para. 8.

^{18/} Ibid., para. 11.

independence, have to shed its blood so profusely, and that in the context of the existence of the United Nations.

182. That, I submit, is the greatest tragedy of 1963 and 1964. But if Indonesia wants—if the world wants—

to hear the voice of Malaysia, I do pledge here and now that, if blood is the only answer, the Malaysian Government is ready: its heart is great, and its hands are ready also.

The meeting rose at 1.10 p.m.