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President: Mr. Stanisław TREPCZYŃSKI (Poland).

AGENDA ITEM 10

Report of the Secretary-General
on the work of the Organization

1. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): The first two items on our agenda for this meeting relate to agenda items which have been referred for consideration directly in plenary meeting.

2. The first item is the report of the Secretary-General on the work of the Organization from 16 June 1971 to 15 June 1972 [A/8701 and Corr.1 and A/8701/Add.1]. It has been customary for the Assembly merely to take note of this report, and unless I hear any objection, I shall take it that the Assembly wishes to follow that practice.

It was so decided.

AGENDA ITEM 14

Report of the International Court of Justice

3. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): The next item relates to the report of the International Court of Justice covering the period from 1 August 1971 to 31 July 1972 [A/8705].

4. I call on the representative of Costa Rica, who wishes to explain his position.

5. Mr. TREJOS (Costa Rica) (*interpretation from Spanish*): My delegation has read with great interest the report of the International Court of Justice submitted to the General Assembly [A/8705] and we wish to congratulate the judicial organ of the United Nations on the reforms it has introduced in its rules of procedure with a view to simplifying and improving its advisory and contentious procedures to the extent that such improvements lie within its power.

6. Costa Rica would like to emphasize the fact that the Court still has not completed its review of its rules of procedure, and that on 10 May 1972 it adopted only the changes which it felt were most urgent. Of the 85 articles in the current set of rules, 18 will be changed or subdivided, and new articles will be introduced. Therefore the new rules will consist of 91 articles, 23 of which will be amended or new articles.

7. The number of States that now recognize the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court in relation to any other State which accepts the same obligation, in some cases with reservations, is at the present time 46, which is a fairly low figure when compared with the figure of 132 States Members of the United Nations which as of 31 July 1972 were parties to the Statute of the Court. How can we ensure that Member States acquire more confidence in the judicial organ of the United Nations and accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court under Article 36 of the Statute?

8. My delegation considers that for the time being Article 36 of the Statute of the Court, which covers the optional

clause relating to compulsory jurisdiction, is in the present state of international law the only way of reconciling the principle of State sovereignty with compulsory jurisdiction. To include in the Statute of the Court purely and simply a compulsory clause for certain types of disputes would be absolutely unacceptable, above all for certain countries which at all costs wish to maintain the *status quo* in international relations. To keep Article 36, on the other hand, means that we are realistic, because without compulsorily committing themselves to the unacceptable limitation of their sovereignty, precisely in the exercise of their sovereignty States can set limitations for themselves by recognizing the optional clause relating to compulsory jurisdiction in order to make international relations more viable.

9. It is undoubtedly a self-evident truth to say that more recourse will be had to the Court as the confidence of States in this judicial organ increases. In truth, no other action could make a greater contribution to this purpose. However, simple consideration in the General Assembly of this question concerning the Court can in and of itself help to awaken this confidence and create a lively interest on the part of States in the judicial organ of the United Nations.

10. For this reason our delegation can assert, to the satisfaction of the countries that also included the consideration of the functions of the Court in the agenda of this General Assembly, that Costa Rica will shortly begin proceedings to recognize the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court.

11. My delegation hopes that before the forthcoming session is called to order our Foreign Ministry will have handed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations a document whereby Costa Rica recognizes as compulsory *ipso facto*, purely and simply, for an indefinite period, the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice.

12. Costa Rica has faith in the law and in the efficiency of international tribunals to settle disputes of this kind; it wishes to set an example and to join El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama, countries of Central America that have recognized the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice.

13. Costa Rica offers its warm support of the report of the International Court of Justice and expresses its hope that in the near future a larger number of Member States will recognize the compulsory jurisdiction of the judicial organ of the United Nations.

14. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): If I hear no objection I shall take it that the General Assembly takes note of the report of the International Court of Justice.

It was so decided.

AGENDA ITEM 75

Pattern of conferences: report of the Secretary-General

REPORT OF THE FIFTH COMMITTEE (A/8947)

AGENDA ITEM 77

Scale of assessments for the apportionment of the expenses of the United Nations: report of the Committee on Contributions

REPORT OF THE FIFTH COMMITTEE (A/8952)

15. Mr. PASHKEVICH (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic), Rapporteur of the Fifth Committee (*translation from Russian*): On behalf of the Fifth Committee I have the honour to present the reports of that Committee on the results of its consideration of agenda items 75 and 77.

16. The report of the Fifth Committee on item 75 is contained in document A/8947. In paragraph 10 of that document, the Fifth Committee recommends to the General Assembly the adoption of the draft resolution adopted in the Committee by 93 votes to none, with 2 abstentions.

17. The report of the Fifth Committee on item 77 is contained in document A/8952, the very size of which gives a clear idea of the scope of the debates which took place in the Committee on this matter. In paragraph 27 of that document, the Fifth Committee recommends to the General Assembly the adoption of four draft resolutions. Draft resolution A, which was adopted by 126 votes to none, with 1 abstention, concerns the rates of assessment for States admitted to membership in the United Nations at the twenty-sixth session of the General Assembly. Draft resolution B, which was adopted, in a roll-call vote, by 67 votes to 30, with 32 abstentions, relates to the lowering of the ceiling rate to 25 per cent. Draft resolution C, which was adopted, in a roll-call vote, by 99 votes to 9, with 20 abstentions, relates to the allowance formula for low *per capita* income in the calculation of rates of assessment. Draft resolution D, which was adopted by 105 votes to 7, with 17 abstentions, relates to the lowering of the floor from 0.04 per cent to 0.02 per cent.

18. I should also like to draw attention to paragraphs 13 and 25 of document A/8952, which require approval by the General Assembly.

Pursuant to rule 68 of the rules of procedure, it was decided not to discuss the reports of the Fifth Committee.

19. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): We shall take up first the report of the Fifth Committee on item 75 of the agenda [A/8947]. I shall put to the vote the draft resolution recommended by the Fifth Committee for adoption in paragraph 10 of its report.

The draft resolution was adopted by 127 votes to none, with 1 abstention (resolution 2960 (XXVII)).

20. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): We turn now to the report of the Fifth Committee on agenda item 77 [A/8952].

21. I shall now call on representatives who wish to explain their votes on any or all of the draft resolutions, A, B, C and D, recommended by the Fifth Committee.

22. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translation from Russian*): The Soviet delegation would like now, at this final stage of the consideration of the United States proposal [A/C.5/L.1091/Rev.1] regarding the reduction of its contribution to the United Nations regular budget to 25 per cent, to draw the attention of delegations to the twenty-seventh session of the General Assembly once again to this exceedingly serious matter, an incorrect and unjust decision on which by the General Assembly might have the most negative and far-reaching consequences for the whole administrative and budgetary activity of the Organization.

23. In order that each delegation may determine its attitude towards this United States proposal during its consideration at this plenary meeting of the Assembly, the following question must first be answered: Is it justified and appropriate at this time for the United States to raise the matter of reducing its contribution to the United Nations budget? That is a question which now confronts every delegation, and every delegation will have to answer it clearly and honestly before taking part in the vote on this proposal.

24. As for the Soviet delegation, it declares with firm conviction that the request for the reduction of the United States contribution from 31.5 per cent to 25 per cent is absolutely unjustified, unfounded and unjust, and therefore unacceptable. Furthermore, this United States proposal is a direct challenge to the just and only possible practice in the apportionment of expenses under the United Nations budget among Member States—a practice which was established and has existed since the inception of this Organization.

25. The United States demand contradicts in the most blatant manner the fundamental principle applied since the very creation of the United Nations for assessing the contribution of each State Member of the United Nations to the budget of the Organization, namely, the principle of the relative capacity of a given State to pay. As we all know, that principle was unanimously adopted at the very first session of the General Assembly [*resolution 14 (I)*]. Since then it has been reaffirmed many times in official documents of the Assembly and of the Committee on Contributions. At present, the principle of the relative capacity to pay is generally accepted, since it is objective, impartial and, consequently, the only correct principle. From the results of the debate on this question in the Fifth Committee, it can be firmly stated that no representative opposed that principle, which has withstood the test of time and constitutes the main criterion for the apportionment of the expenses of the United Nations among Member States.

26. The delegation of the United States passed over this question in silence. Clearly, it did not find it convenient to speak about this fundamental principle, since the United States itself has begun to violate it and is trying to push other Members of the United Nations along this false and unjust path. Even many of those delegations which, under obvious pressure from the United States, were obliged to vote in favour of this United States proposal in the Fifth Committee, at the same time advocated the need to

maintain and observe that principle and apply it consistently.

27. In this connexion, I must not fail to draw attention above all to the well-known fact that the United States, the country with the highest annual gross national product which, according to United States data, is now over \$1,100 thousand million per year, has for some 15 years enjoyed significant advantages in the matter of contributions to the United Nations regular budget, notwithstanding and in violation of this generally accepted criterion applied in the Organization for the apportionment of the expenses among States. It seems that this custom of enjoying privileges and violating that principle has become second nature to the United States and induces it to commit further violations. In fact, everyone knows that, according to the principle of the capacity to pay, the United States contribution to the United Nations budget should amount at the present time not to 31.5 per cent, but to 38.4 per cent, that is to say, almost 6.9 per cent more than the United States actually pays to the United Nations budget. This means that the United States has for a long time been paying a contribution to the United Nations budget which has been reduced by \$12 million a year. Over a period of 15 years, that has constituted a tremendous advantage already enjoyed by the United States. At the same time, it is nothing but a violation of the decision taken at the first session of the General Assembly of the United Nations to the effect that, if a ceiling is imposed on contributions, it must not differ significantly from the contribution calculated on the basis of objective criteria founded on the principle of the capacity of States to pay. That is the fundamental decision of the Assembly on this question. Notwithstanding that decision, and in violation of it, the United States enjoys this substantial advantage and over a long period of time the United States has been participating in the United Nations at the expense of other Member States which, as a result, bear an additional financial burden in their contributions to the United Nations budget—and those States include, of course, the developing countries. It is easy to see that this injustice in the matter of the reduced contribution of the United States has already existed for 15 years. Now the United States wants to aggravate this injustice. Without any foundation whatsoever, it demands for itself a further advantage, namely the reduction of its contribution to the United Nations budget to 25 per cent, in other words, a further reduction of 6.5 per cent, which in monetary terms would amount to some \$13 million in the United Nations budget for 1973.

28. In this way, the United States is demanding for itself advantages and privileges in connexion with its contribution to the United Nations budget to the tune of about \$25 million a year, as opposed to what it is required to pay to the United Nations on the basis of the principle and the criteria of its relative capacity to pay based on its annual gross national product.

29. During the period from 1958 to 1969, when the Committee on Contributions on several occasions considered the question of the lowering of the United States contribution, the Committee concluded each time that it would be inappropriate further to reduce the United States contribution to the ceiling of 30 per cent laid down by the General Assembly. Those decisions of the Committee were

always confirmed by the General Assembly. Furthermore, in its report to the General Assembly at its twenty-fourth session, the Committee on Contributions noted, in particular, that it would be inappropriate further to reduce the United States contribution to the United Nations budget in the present circumstances.¹ The Committee on Contributions accordingly assessed the United States contribution at 31.52 per cent, and not 30 per cent, as earlier proposed when the decision had been taken regarding a ceiling for contributions.

30. Consequently, the United States has absolutely no grounds for referring to any so-called ceiling.

31. Now, notwithstanding the decision taken at the first session of the General Assembly, the United States and its supporters are pressing the General Assembly to adopt a resolution which would sanction a further inadmissible departure from the fundamental principle applied in the United Nations for determining the level of contributions to the budget—the principle of the relative capacity of Member States to pay.

32. Where does all this lead? It leads to the fact that the \$25 million which will not be paid by the United States into the United Nations budget will have to be covered by many other States Members of the Organization, including a number of developing countries which are not members of the group of the least developed countries paying the minimum contribution. Can such a decision be called reasonable, just and acceptable? Not in any circumstances. Such an unjust proposal now being imposed by the United States on the United Nations can be supported only by its obedient allies or by those countries which are to a large extent financially and economically dependent upon United States monopolies and which, as they say in United Nations circles, have been subjected to United States pressure, or, as it is called in United Nations language, “unprecedented arm-twisting”. This shows that the United States has resorted in this matter to methods reminiscent of the “cold war” period. With that aim in view, operation “super-twist” was carried out on a world scale.

33. The United States demand that its contribution be reduced is even less justified in the light of the facts showing that the United States derives tremendous financial advantages from the very location of the United Nations Headquarters in New York. At the same time, other States Members of the United Nations, for the same reason, bear an excessive financial burden, since the main part of the United Nations budget is expended in that country, where the retail prices are about two to two and a half times the level of foreign trade prices.

34. States Members of the United Nations incur heavy expenditure in maintaining their permanent missions in this very expensive city of New York, and in supporting the numerous delegations attending the sessions of the General Assembly and other United Nations bodies. According to the calculations of *The New York Times*, about \$135 million are spent every year on the upkeep of the missions in New York alone. About 5,000 United Nations staff

members spend most of their salaries in New York. The money spent by the millions of tourists who visit the United Nations every year in order to look at the Headquarters of this Organization also flows into the United States economy. United States securities are augmented by about \$500 million from the United Nations Joint Staff Pension Fund. A very large proportion (about 75 per cent) of the contributions to the United Nations regular budget is spent on the upkeep of the Secretariat staff. It is a well-known fact that the United States is the country with the greatest number of citizens employed in the United Nations Secretariat. Their salaries, according to a conservative estimate, amount to over \$25 million under the United Nations budget; that is also a tremendous compensation to the United States. A large part of the expenditure connected with the United Nations becomes a significant profit through the system of federal and city taxes. All this is officially acknowledged in the report prepared on this question by United States officials for the United States Congress. That report states that no matter how much the United States pays into United Nations programmes, this amount is offset by financial profits derived from the presence of the international Organization in this country. This is official confirmation, official recognition, of the fact that the United States has no grounds for demanding a reduction in its contribution to the United Nations. What grounds does the United States have for demanding a reduction in its contribution to the United Nations regular budget? In the light of these facts, it is clear that such a demand is unjustified.

35. In view of this, there is no alternative but to conclude that the United States contention that all Members of the United Nations should share the financial responsibility on a more equitable basis does not correspond to reality. The fact is that the present scale of assessments already contains significant elements of injustice, certainly not with regard to the United States, but, on the contrary, with regard to all States Members of the United Nations with the exception of the United States, since the existing scale of assessment affords significant advantages to the United States at the expense of other Members of the United Nations. Consequently, if we are talking of introducing a more equitable basis for the assessment of contributions, what is needed is not the reduction of the present ceiling but its complete abolition, so that all States Members of the United Nations, including above all the United States, would pay their contributions to the United Nations budget strictly on the basis of the principle and criteria of the relative capacity to pay according to their national income.

36. In an attempt to justify its unjust proposal, the United States is forcefully disseminating the view that a reduction in the United States contribution would not lead to an increase in the assessments of other States Members of the United Nations. That is a false, deceitful contention, which it is not difficult to unmask and refute. The United States is attempting to argue that, with the forthcoming admission to membership in the United Nations of the two German States—the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany—the future contributions of those two States would fill the vacuum of \$13 million created by a reduction in the United States contribution. It is common knowledge, however, that the contribution of every new State admitted to membership in the United Nations is

¹ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 11*, para. 38.

distributed proportionately with the object of reducing—and I stress this—with the object of reducing the assessments of all the other States Members of the United Nations. In the present case, the United States is seeking to turn the future contributions of the two German States solely to its own advantage and to put the full amount into its own pocket, disregarding the interests of other States.

37. Who would dare to call this justice and respect for the interests of other States?

38. These claims of the United States can be construed only as an illegal appropriation for its own use of the sums which would be received following the admission of the two German States to the United Nations, sums which should be used for a proportional reduction in the assessments of all States Members of the United Nations, and not only that of the United States. In other words, the adoption of the United States proposal would in practice lead inevitably to a relative increase in the assessments of all other States Members of the United Nations which pay more than the minimum contribution to the United Nations budget.

39. The United States demand contains yet another serious element of injustice. The United States, which for more than two decades has been pursuing a policy of obstinate, blatant and hostile discrimination in the United Nations system against the German Democratic Republic—that sovereign German State—now wishes to obtain compensation for that policy of discrimination from the German Democratic Republic in order to reduce its own contribution to the United Nations budget.

40. Equally unfounded is the second theory put forward by the United States, namely, that the United States allegedly fears the dependence of the United Nations on too large a contribution from one State, since in such a case that State could—so the argument goes—dictate its will to the United Nations. This contention is far-fetched from beginning to end and contradicts one of the fundamental principles of the United Nations Charter which, as is well known, proclaims “the equal rights . . . of nations large and small”. Furthermore, such a claim does not correspond to the real state of affairs in the United Nations at the present time.

41. Even the press and other organs of propaganda in the United States are constrained to recognize that, although in the past, for two decades, the United States arbitrarily dictated its will to the United Nations, as if to a subsidiary organ of its own, and although a mechanical majority of Member States, like obedient children, unquestioningly heeded its bidding, such a dictatorial attitude is no longer possible under any circumstances. It is enough to remind the General Assembly of its adoption last year of the resolution restoring the lawful rights of the People's Republic of China [resolution 2758 (XXVI)], despite the dogged opposition and hostility of the United States and some of its allies. But only yesterday, an article by a United States journalist, a veteran of the United Nations press corps, published in the *New York Post*, contained the following admission which, for clarity, I shall read in English:

“The days when the United States and its friends in the West could make use of the United Nations as a forum for their political purposes receded further into the past today.”*

42. In this connexion, it is appropriate also to draw attention to the view widely held in United Nations circles that the United States, as a direct consequence of its disillusionment with the United Nations and in revenge for the latter's insubordination, decided to take vengeance, to punish it for its disobedience and to deal a blow at the most sensitive part of this Organization—its financial situation—by reducing its contribution to the United Nations budget by another \$13 million. This is openly spoken of by delegations to the twenty-seventh session of the General Assembly, and it is the general view that this talk is not without foundation.

43. Experience of debates on this question in the Fifth Committee has shown that, in addition to the “arm-twisting” which I have mentioned of those countries which are in some way financially or economically dependent upon it, the United States tries to achieve its aim by means of direct threats or, more accurately, by direct blackmail. It intimidates the developing countries, and threatens to reduce its contributions to various United Nations funds connected with social and economic activities financed through voluntary contributions. The fact that the United States in this matter has embarked on a course of direct threats is acknowledged even by the United States press. Quite recently, on 9 December, the *Christian Science Monitor*, in its editorial “United Nations—United States”, wrote openly—and I will read it in English so that Mr. Bush will be better able to understand: “The General Assembly may not want to give in to such bullheadedness.”*

44. In this connexion, it might also be appropriate to recall the information furnished by the President of Chile, Mr. Allende, in the statement he made to the current session of the General Assembly [2096th meeting].

45. He declared that United States monopolies, both directly and through leading participation in multinational corporations, in one year alone derived from the countries of the third world, that is to say the developing countries, fabulous profits amounting to the astronomical sum of \$1,723 million in net profits.

46. Gentlemen, representatives of the developing countries, this and not the regular budget of the United Nations, is the main potential source of development financing. Yet the United States contributes to development funds, if I am not mistaken, only about \$100 million. How insignificant this sum is, compared with the almost \$2 thousand million which it extracts every year from the developing countries.

47. At the same time the United States and its delegation to the Assembly hold out their hands to the United Nations, which is bankrupt through the fault of the United States, in order to take away from it another \$13 million, threatening at the same time to reduce the voluntary contributions of the United States to the social and economic funds of the United Nations if its contribution to the regular budget is not reduced by \$13 million.

* Quoted in English by the speaker.

48. Who will deny that this is a policy of pressure and blackmail?

49. When considering this question and the financial problems of the United Nations in general, one cannot fail to draw the attention of the General Assembly to the following well-known fact: the United Nations is undergoing serious financial difficulties; it is on the verge of bankruptcy. What is the reason for this? Who bears the blame and the responsibility for these difficulties, for this financial crisis? Everybody knows that the principal blame and responsibility for this situation rests above all with the United States. It was indeed the United States which, as the leader of the Western world at the time of the internal events in the Congo, pushed the United Nations into a military adventure in that country under the guise of the so-called "United Nations Operation in the Congo". It was indeed the United States and its closest Western allies which, acting in violation of the Charter, illegally foisted on the United Nations the operations in both the Congo and the Middle East. Before that, they pushed the United Nations into a military adventure in Korea, under the United Nations flag, for which the United Nations has ever since been forced to pay out of its regular budget. Finally, the United States, manipulating its "mechanical majority" in the United Nations for more than 20 years, illegally maintained its puppet, the Chiang Kai-shek régime, in this Organization. After its expulsion from the United Nations, that puppet left behind it a colossal debt—over \$16 million—to the regular budget. But the United States does not intend to pay this debt incurred by its puppet, and nobody else will pay it. That is the reason for the financial difficulties, the financial deficit of the United Nations and the reason why this Organization is on the verge of bankruptcy. It is quite clear that the blame for all these adventures and all these actions in violation of the Charter, which have brought about such a serious financial crisis, rests fairly and squarely on the United States and its closest allies. In view of these circumstances, the United States should make a voluntary contribution of at least \$50 million to cover the financial deficit of the United Nations for which it is responsible; but instead, the United States seeks to reduce still further its contribution to the regular budget by \$13 million. Where is all this leading? Irrespective of the intentions of the United States, this will lead to a further deterioration and aggravation of the financial situation of the United Nations, rather than to its improvement.

50. In this connexion, I must express our regret also at the fact that, at the time, these violations of the Charter which were foisted on the United Nations by the United States were also supported by some developing countries, while the recent vote in the Fifth Committee on the United States proposal to reduce its contribution to 25 per cent showed that some of them also support this new unjust proposal of the United States which it is now trying to impose upon the United Nations. Let us be frank and state candidly from this rostrum what we think. What is this? Unwillingness to take account of justice, and reality or the consequence of financial and economic dependence upon United States monopolies, of which the President of Chile, Mr. Allende, spoke so convincingly to the General Assembly from this rostrum? No matter what the reasons, the consequences are obvious. Those who vote in favour of this

United States proposal are embarking on a policy of making the Assembly adopt unjust decisions in violation of the Charter and the fundamental principles and criteria for assessing the contributions of Member States to the United Nations budget.

51. In considering this question, it is important to draw attention to yet another very significant fact. On 29 May 1972, the President of the United States signed an official document in Moscow in which the United States undertook to do all in its power to support the activities of the United Nations. Yet now the United States is dealing a blow to the United Nations by reducing its contribution to the budget by such a significant sum that it undermines still further the Organization's already difficult financial situation.

52. In the light of all this, \$13 million from a State which is so rich and has such a large national income—its gross national product amounts to \$1,100 thousand million—is a paltry sum. The United States spends from \$75 to \$78 thousand million a year on the arms race; it has been spending and continues to spend colossal sums on the war in Viet-Nam, amounting in some years to \$30 thousand million. Yet here it holds out its hand to this impecunious Organization in order to take away \$13 million from it. Is this justice?

53. United States monopolies, as I have already said, receive every year thousands of millions of dollars in profits by exploiting the labour of the people and the natural resources of the developing countries. Yet the United States delegation to this session of the General Assembly is doing its utmost to try to prove that the United States is vitally in need of those \$13 million by which it seeks to reduce its contribution to the United Nations regular budget. The delegation of the United States is trying to instil into its allies and supporters in the Assembly the idea that the United States could not survive without those \$13 million which it wishes to wrest illegally from the United Nations. The Russian proverb, "It's like a rich man taking the last shirt from a pauper", fully applies to this more than strange situation.

54. Such is the unpleasant picture and such we may say frankly, is the invidious position in which the United States has placed itself before the United Nations and world public opinion by demanding, illegally, unjustly and in violation of the Charter and the principles and criteria currently applied by the United Nations in determining the capacity of Member States to pay, a reduction in its contribution to the regular budget from 31.5 per cent to 25 per cent.

55. In the light of these facts and circumstances, the delegation of the USSR considers that the United States proposal is unjust and devoid of any foundation, and therefore unacceptable.

56. As far as the USSR delegation is concerned, it has been instructed by the Soviet Government to make the following statement.

57. The adoption of the United States proposal discriminates against the other main contributors to the United Nations regular budget. Consequently, the Soviet Union

reserves the right to take the corresponding measures which it might deem appropriate in order to eliminate this kind of discrimination in connexion with its contribution to the United Nations regular budget.

58. This will take effect in the event that the Assembly adopts the draft resolutions which the Fifth Committee has submitted to it for consideration.

59. Mr. WALDRON-RAMSEY (Barbados): I have come to this podium to explain the vote of the delegation of Barbados on the draft resolutions which are before the Assembly and are contained in the Fifth Committee's report [A/8592].

60. The principal draft resolution is that in which the United States delegation seeks unilaterally to reduce its contribution to the regular budget of the United Nations to 25 per cent from an assessed percentage of 31.5. The United States does not seek this reduction because its Government is undergoing economic and financial hardship; nor does it seek the reduction to 25 per cent because an established legal or moral principle is being vitiated. The United States Government seeks the reduction to 25 per cent because it argues that, since the United States is assessed at 31.5 per cent, the Organization has become too reliant upon a single Member State, the United States, for financial support. This, in the view of my delegation, is a fallacious contention. Consequently, so runs the argument, such a position is bad for the Organization.

61. The real truth of the matter is that the Organization is not dependent upon any single Member State for financial support of its regular budget. The United States does not alone support the regular budget. We all pay our fair assessments and we all support the United Nations. Each Member supports this "club" based on the agreed principle of assessed ability to pay. The United States in fact pays less than it ought to pay, even at 31.5 per cent.

62. The existing principle upon which all assessments are made is the relative ability of each Member State to pay, based upon its gross national production and its *per capita* income. This is the existing established criterion. On the basis of this principle, the United States should in fact be paying a contribution in the region of 38 per cent of the regular budget. The United States, therefore, is underpaying.

63. My delegation regrets this unilateral political action based upon subjective political considerations on the part of the United States. This action demonstrates an unjustified and unwarranted withdrawal of political support from the United Nations by the United States.

64. If the United States were minded to found its contention upon pure principle, its first move should be to change the existing criterion upon which assessments are made. In that case my delegation would be in a position to support its proposition, for then it would have been based upon principle. But, while ability to pay remains the criterion, then the United States, like Barbados, Afghanistan or France, must contribute to the regular budget on the basis of its ability to pay.

65. We might legitimately speculate as to the real motivation for this move on the part of the richest and most powerful State in the world at this time. My delegation would be the last to suggest any untoward motive on the part of this friendly and magnanimous State; but some have argued that the United States Government is unhappy about the rejection by this august Assembly last year of its "two Chinas" proposition;² others have advanced the reasoning that the United States Government deplores the voting procedure in the Assembly by which each State, great or small, rich or poor, has one unweighted vote; still others have proffered the suggestion that the United States is disenchanted politically with the United Nations as a whole, and so this move to reduce unilaterally its contribution to the regular budget is but symptomatic of the political retrenchment endemic in its society regarding over-all support for our Organization; yet others would argue that there is a feeling abroad in the United States that the United Nations is an elegant nuisance and, as such, should be treated with benign neglect by the United States Government.

66. My delegation has encountered these arguments and we have tried to canvass the veracity of their substance. Beguiling though these contentions are, in the interests of unbiased judgement and objectivity we have considered it prudent to remain neutral on them. Nor, in this connexion, can it be a question of financial returns to the United States based on the tendentious argument that the United States is the sole financial backer of the United Nations. My delegation is aware that this is an argument that has wide currency in the vulgar and ill-informed domain of United States society.

67. The truth of the position is that the United States—and especially New York City—is a net beneficiary of the United Nations regular budget. Fifty per cent of the regular budget, it is argued, is spent in the United States; in addition, the United Nations Joint Staff Pension Fund has invested approximately \$500 million in United States stocks and bonds. The permanent missions spend roughly \$135 million annually in the United States, principally in New York. The financial benefit to the United States from the United Nations is, therefore, astronomical—and this does not take account of the experts and materials acquired in the United States for the execution of projects of the United Nations Development Programme.

68. Perhaps the relevant and admissible question is, Why now? And will the adoption of the United States proposal help to strengthen the United Nations? It cannot be disputed, it seems to me, that the Organization is in financial difficulty, and has been so for a considerable time. It must be recognized that this proposal, if adopted, will adversely affect the financial position of the United Nations system of organizations. The United States itself is not in grave financial difficulty, but the United Nations is. So we must confess that the timing is bad and the season is out of joint; for the United Nations has fallen upon hard times.

69. The proposal itself does great psychological damage to the spiritual foundations of the Organization itself and sets

² See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-sixth Session, Annexes*, agenda item 96, document A/L.635 and Add.1.

in train the moral erosion of the very conceptual edifice upon which its pristine personality was constructed. Either we support the Organization, or we do not.

70. If the idea is to change the basic criteria upon which assessments are to be made, then let us do that. But let us not violate existing practice, based upon agreed criteria. Let us not depart from well-known, established and promulgated principle. Let us change the basic rules, if we must; but let us not reject, subjectively and unilaterally, the assessments based upon those accepted and existing rules.

71. Here we are making political judgements based upon no semblance of principle whatsoever. For ever since this proposal was propounded my delegation has been in hot pursuit of this very elusive principle, which the United States proposal purports to affirm. We regret to announce to this Assembly that we have looked high and low, in every nook and cranny, but we have failed to locate it. Where does this elusive principle hibernate?

72. My delegation labours under the conviction that the best procedure in this matter would be to have a comprehensive and penetrating review of the entire question. This review should encompass all of the elements of the issue; it should deal with the proposal that the richest Member should not pay beyond a certain percentage. It should deal, too, with the inability of the vast régime of poor Member States to pay beyond a certain fixed limit. And it should deal with the hardship which would devolve upon the middle-income States as a result of their carrying the vast burden of the United Nations regular budget. It might deal primarily with the new criteria to be evolved for assessing levies for the regular budget. For it would seem to my delegation that all the Member States—Members of this United Nations “club”—want to enjoy the privileges and facilities of membership, but nobody wants to pay his fair share.

73. Who will support the Organization, then, in these circumstances? We are told that new Members will do so. But why should new Members make good the deliberate delinquency of existing wealthy Member States—especially when those new Members were consciously and, in the view of my delegation with malice aforethought, deliberately kept out of membership of the Organization hitherto?

74. The Assembly should send this entire matter back to the Committee on Contributions for full study and recommendations. Alternatively, this Assembly should create an intersessional committee of itself, charged with a comprehensive review of this matter, as I have asserted above, and have it report back to the twenty-eighth session of the General Assembly.

75. We should assume our responsibilities in this matter as sovereign, independent States and look at the matter dispassionately and objectively. Above all, we must constitute ourselves as zealous and responsible guardians of the dignity, prestige and good governance of the United Nations.

76. My delegation, therefore, cannot support the United States proposal for a reduction of its assessment to 25 per cent of the regular budget, as it comes to the plenary

meeting of the Assembly from the Fifth Committee. There is a suggestion of immorality about that proposal: the United Nations is not dependent upon the United States or any other single Member State for its upkeep. We all pay our dues based on the existing criteria. The cumulative effect of these dues goes to the upkeep of the Organization. Nor is the situation of the world in 1972 what it was at the end of 1945. Each State pays its fair share based upon its ability to pay. That is the criterion. There are certain responsibilities which go with wealth and riches. The right to pay one's fair share is one of those responsibilities.

77. Two other draft resolutions fall within the same line of argumentation and principle. There should be no automatic drop of the floor, just as there should not be any unilateral depression of the ceiling. Nor should we eat away at the middle of the body politic. There must be a systematic pruning and readjustment of conditions. But there should never be any fatal incisions, decapitations or amputations.

78. For if we lower the United States contribution we automatically lower the contributions of the United Kingdom, France, the Soviet Union, Sweden and other rich countries, which can afford to pay because there is no national financial hardship for those countries. The specialized agencies follow automatically the same rates of assessment as the United Nations does for its regular budget.

79. Great confusion will ensue from this proposal. There is logically no automaticity in assessing the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany with the exact percentage short-fall from the given 100 per cent as a result of the United States contraction. The two Germanys, assuming they want to join the United Nations, must be assessed independently, based upon their gross national product and their *per capita* incomes. They cannot be automatically assessed the 6 per cent or 7 per cent short-fall caused by the United States withdrawal. It would not be just or equitable.

80. The three draft resolutions from the Committee indicate that the United States and the States of the “floor” contributions would seek a reduction in their assessed contributions. The middle-income countries would like new and more generous elements to be attached to their benefiting from the low *per capita* income formula. Nobody wants to pay; that is what it amounts to. How will this already impecunious Organization survive in the circumstances: by divine benevolence or wishful thinking?

81. In conditions of strict objectivity, my delegation should not support any of the three draft resolutions. And we say this, even although my Government could benefit from a reduction to 0.02 per cent of the floor contribution. But obviously, in the Fifth Committee, delegations abandoned principle and objectivity, and permitted or succumbed to the reign of the naked power of politics. In these conditions, therefore, the Fifth Committee has transmitted to us a patent aberration. But here, too, final disposition takes place in this Assembly. Here, in the name of rationality we must cry out and say, “No more”. We should reject these proposals. For the season is not yet ripe.

82. The vast régime of developing countries is languishing in great financial and economic hardship. There is a steady decline in the prices of our primary commodities and semi-manufactured goods, as against a steady crescendo of rising prices of the manufactured goods which we must buy from the developed and wealthy countries. There is always, therefore, an unfavourable balance for us in the developing countries on international current account. Yet we must pay our assessed United Nations contributions not in our own individual currencies, but in United States currency. This is a great financial hardship. For we can only get a surplus of United States dollars if we have a surplus in trade with the United States; that is simple economics. We never have that surplus in trade. So that the United States is the only country which has the privilege of paying its contributions to the various organs of the United Nations system in its own currency. This is an obvious, tremendous advantage. This is a very important point which this august Assembly should cogitate when considering this matter. These are the economic-political realities of this issue.

83. And thus in these conditions of the arrogance of pure power politics, and the manifest abandonment of principle, where rich developed countries have decided to support the request by the United States for an unwarranted reduction in its assessment to the regular budget, to the pain and suffering of the effectiveness, the well-being and the good order of the United Nations, the developing countries feel constrained in their obvious conditions of impoverishment, to look after their own interests; and so collectively they gather together around the provisions of their own texts seeking relief from the contributions, in the same manner as the wealthy countries have done. In this new political situation, my delegation has no choice but to retreat with alacrity, behind the barricades put up by the developing countries.

84. The final loser in all this surely is the United Nations itself. It is now afloat, driven by a wayward wind, and there seems to be no one to bring it back to a safe and sensible harbour.

85. Finally, Mr. President, since these proposals all fall properly, in the view of my delegation, within the province of application of Article 18, paragraph 2 of the Charter, you may wish to indicate in advance, to the Assembly, that each of these three draft resolutions requires passage by a two-thirds majority of those present and voting.

86. Mr. ALARCON (Cuba) (*interpretation from Spanish*): My delegation considers it necessary to explain the vote that it will be casting on draft resolution B recommended by the Fifth Committee, which deals with the contribution of the United States of America. In so doing, we shall try to focus our attention strictly on the merits of the problem *per se*, without going into consideration of the policy of the Government concerned, its aggressive and adventurous actions throughout the world, which, of course, have a close relationship to the considerations that have led that Government to request the General Assembly to grant it this additional privilege in respect of its contribution to the budget.

87. My delegation will try to confine itself strictly to the questions of principle of the problem that is before the

Assembly, because we believe that we are really confronted with a proposal that has multiple and very serious implications for all Member States, and for the very foundation of this Organization itself and for its work.

88. Above all, it appears to us an elementary duty of respect to ourselves and also an elementary requirement for organizing the work of the General Assembly, that we should ask ourselves precisely what is the purpose of this plenary meeting, the debate in the Fifth Committee and the report submitted to us by its Rapporteur; we should ask ourselves what this Assembly is supposed to do with the draft resolution that it has before it.

89. It is a secret to no one that some time ago the executive branch of the Government of the United States appointed a committee which considered that Government's relations with the United Nations, and made a series of proposals to the United States Government concerning the work of this Organization. Among these proposals, it recommended to the executive branch the reduction in the United States contribution to 25 per cent of the budget. Subsequently, the United States Congress adopted a decision along similar lines.

90. While this Assembly, through its Fifth Committee, was examining the proposal in question, the United States press practically never ceased for one single instant to remind us, the Member States, that the United States Government had already taken a decision to reduce its contribution to the regular budget of the Organization. The same press, of course, every day, including today in the editorial page of *The New York Times*, has referred to this problem in terms that are really insulting to Member States, relating the duty of a Member State—the United States of America, here—to contribute a certain proportion of the budget, to the behaviour of the States of Africa, Asia, Latin America or Eastern Europe with regard to specific issues that we have considered at the current session.

91. Today, in addition to the arguments repeated for many years by the United States for proposing an arbitrary reduction in its contribution, the aforementioned newspaper puts forward as a new argument—nothing less than the fact that the United States proposal on so-called international terrorism was not approved by the Sixth Committee a few days ago. In this newspaper's opinion, that is a further argument in favour of reducing the contribution of the United States.

92. Reverting to the question on which my delegation would like to have further clarification—namely, why we are meeting here—we should also add that the delegation of the United States itself has not concealed, through the United States press, the fact that the authorities of the United States had already taken a decision to reduce its contribution to the regular budget. In fact *The New York Times* of 6 December 1971 refers to a member of the United States delegation who, according to the newspaper, allegedly made two statements, on the one hand affirming that in the minds of the public and the Congress, as well as in the mind of the Administration, the United Nations is only of peripheral importance, and further on stating that, as a result of this, the Congress has already limited the United States contribution to 25 per cent of the budget.

93. I wonder what is the precise nature of the decision that it is attempting to get from the Assembly, if it has already been announced in advance that one of the Members of the Organization proposes—and to this purpose has taken the necessary decisions—not to make the contribution to the budget of the Organization which is assigned to that State by the Committee on Contributions and approved by the Assembly.

94. We have been looking at the Charter of the Organization, and there we find only one article which would appear to be relevant to this matter, that is, Article 19, which refers to States which are in arrears in the payment of their financial contributions for a two-year period and lays down the procedure whereby such States can be authorized by the General Assembly, despite the fact that they are in arrears, to preserve certain privileges in this Assembly, but nowhere did the legislators, in drafting the Charter, have in mind the unusual circumstance that a State might unilaterally decide to take decisions the only effect of which in practice could be that it would be in debt to the Organization, much less that such a decision should be announced in advance. The only thing the Charter took into account was that this Assembly would be in a position to authorize a Member to maintain its rights if it had been compelled to fall into arrears and was unable to pay its contribution, but the Charter clearly establishes that the General Assembly could do so "if it is satisfied that the failure to pay is due to conditions beyond the control of the Member."

95. The unusual fact in the present situation is that obviously the decision of the United States Government is not beyond its control. What is beyond the control of the United Nations is the decision we may take, since we already know in advance that we would be called upon only to endorse or refrain from endorsing a decision already taken by a Member State, which presumably this State is going to carry out regardless of what decision this Assembly may take.

96. For that reason, we do not understand the real reason why 132 sovereign States have been invited to meet in this hall: whether it is simply to put the seal of approval on the decision already adopted through the relevant machinery of one of its Members, to the effect that it would not contribute to the Organization in the proportion in which it should, or whether this Assembly would be called upon to reject such a decision, aware that in any event the United States Government would pursue its course undaunted. I do not know how, from the technical standpoint of the Secretariat, such a situation should be defined, but in Spanish we have only one word to describe the situation to which this Organization has been brought, and that is "extortion". Clearly a Member State which in accordance with the calculations of the Committee on Contributions has the highest capacity to pay, a State which for many years has been enjoying special privileged treatment in the sense that it is the only State whose contribution is not based on capacity to pay but in addition has a maximum limit on its contribution—this same State once again comes before this Organization suggesting a further reduction which it asks of the Organization only after it has made public the fact that in any event its contribution will not exceed 25 per cent.

97. It is also extortion because, as has already been mentioned by a number of representatives who have spoken before me, this whole process has been identified by official or unofficial spokesmen of the United States with specific decisions of the General Assembly, and the decision to reduce its contribution has been presented as a form of reprisal against the Organization or at least as an expression of displeasure at specific decisions taken here.

98. My delegation would like to emphasize that, in the first place, we consider that the United States today, before the adoption of draft resolution B—if it is adopted—is contributing or paying at a level lower than the level at which it should rightly be paying in accordance with the sole criterion applied to all other States, which is ability to pay. This has been true practically since the very foundation of this Organization.

99. In this connexion, we consider that serious doubts about the very basis of the existence of this Organization—that is, respect for the principle of the sovereign equality of States—are raised by the fact that two criteria are used in determining contributions to the budget. One is the ability to pay, which is applied to all Member States except for one Member State, and the other is applied precisely to the State that, according to the statistics and figures of the Committee on Contributions, has the largest capacity to pay. In other words we consider that the application of the so-called ceiling on contributions is not fair, is not legal and is inconsistent with the principle of the sovereign equality of States. Of course, it departs considerably from all of the demagogic literature which we sometimes hear expounded by some of the developed countries with a market economy, including the United States, about their devotion to the so-called less developed countries and their insistence on adopting special measures for them.

100. In passing—on the fringe of the debate we are engaged in—I must say that I wonder whether measures of this kind, whose only practical and specific effect will be to increase the burden on all of the other States, all of those that do not have the advantage of the ceiling, measures announced and approved before we could take any decisions on them, constitute a United States version of the special measures for the less developed countries.

101. It has been said in the course of the debate in the Fifth Committee that the other Member States would not be harmed by the reduction in the United States contribution. We must assert that a very simple arithmetical analysis shows quite the contrary. In addition, I must state that the other Member States, in particular those with the least capacity to pay, have been affected by the application of the ceiling benefiting one Member State, that is, the one that has had the greatest ability to pay ever since the Organization was founded.

102. The draft resolution gives as a justification for reducing the United States quota the admission of new Member States. If the State with the largest capacity to pay were to adhere to its present level of contributions, the net effect of the admission of new States—and everyone is thinking of the two German states—logically could serve to relieve somewhat the heavy burden for many States of their contributions to the regular budget. To use the additional

contribution which would come from the two German States to give some satisfaction to one Member State, particularly the one that has the greatest capacity to pay, is really ironic. This is all the more true when one remembers that this State, precisely because it is the most powerful and has the greatest ability to pay, has been responsible for two decades for the fact that the two German States have not been here as financial contributors and contributors in other areas, lending their assistance to the work of the Organization.

103. As is well known, we are engaged in a debate of fairly long standing. Practically speaking, it started when our Organization began its work. This question was considered as early as the first session of the General Assembly, where the two basic positions on this question of the contribution of the country with the largest capacity to pay were outlined.

104. There is one argument which has been used by various delegations, including my own, in the Fifth Committee and which the General Assembly should consider when it takes any decision on this matter. So far we have referred exclusively to the fact that the Organization applies two criteria: one for the country with the greatest ability to pay and another for the remaining Members of the Organization. But in this case it would appear necessary to remind the Assembly that the Member State with the greatest ability to pay is at the same time the only country which receives a considerable net benefit from the fact that it is the site of the Headquarters of this Organization.

105. In the debate in the Fifth Committee some Western delegations appeared to be upset because some delegations, such as my own, used the argument of the benefits derived by the United States because the Headquarters of this Organization is located in this country. In this connexion we should like to make two comments. First of all, it is a perfectly valid argument and helps to erase any concept of magnanimity on the part of the United States Government toward this Organization. Secondly, this argument was not invented by us; it was introduced at the very outset of the debate during the second part of the first session of the Assembly by delegations of countries that had very good relations with the United States, such as, for example, the United Kingdom. The United Kingdom representative in the Fifth Committee at that time made a very clear analysis of the benefits the United States was deriving as far back as 1947 from the fact that the Headquarters of the Organization was located in this country. As we see from the document of that session on the work of the Fifth Committee,³ Mr. Younger, the representative of the United Kingdom in the Fifth Committee, explained that his delegation calculated that of the \$23 million of the regular budget of the United Nations for 1947, \$19 million would be spent within the territory of the United States—\$19 million out of \$23 million.

106. The regular budget, as we all know, has been increasing geometrically in this quarter of a century. It is to be assumed that the amount of lucrative business done by the United States as a result of the Headquarters being located in New York has increased proportionately.

107. Mr. Younger coined a phrase which we thought was very accurate in describing this operation which benefited the United States from the funds of the budget of the Organization. Those \$19 million were called "an invisible import" to the United States which resulted from the existence of the Headquarters of the Organization in the City of New York.

108. The growth of the budget has led to an increase in the benefits derived by the United States from having the United Nations Headquarters here. My delegation feels it is important to stress this aspect of the benefits obtained by the United States because United Nations Headquarters is located here. Actually all of us who are members of Permanent Missions in New York have very curious experiences every day with some sectors of the population of New York, which are apparently confused by official demagogic statements about magnanimity towards the United Nations and by the synchronization of a press which is "very free" but is very careful to follow the official guidelines, particularly at voting time, and even goes so far as to use the most insulting kind of argument about Member States. Some sectors of the population of New York consider that the diplomatic community resident here enjoys a series of privileges which it receives from the people of the United States, that we enjoy a very privileged position as compared with the other citizens of this country and that the United States Government is carrying a heavy burden as a result of the fact that the Headquarters of this Organization is located in New York and that it has to service the diplomatic community, to some extent.

109. Great debates have been conducted on radio and television, in the press and in some legislative bodies about the tremendous burden placed upon the city of New York or the United States by the fact that a member of the New York City Police, for example, has to be stationed outside the headquarters of some diplomatic missions. I might say in passing that that has not prevented shots being fired at some missions, or others being attacked and assaulted and having bombs sent to them; it has not stopped all types of aggression being carried out, apparently without the said police officer noticing it.

110. But it would appear that the use of a few dozen public officials to discharge functions which in any civilized city in the world—and this is known to all the representatives present here—the police discharge with respect to all diplomatic communities—and I would add with much greater effect—is described as though it were a privileged position enjoyed by the diplomatic community. And sometimes the desire is expressed by some citizens of this country even to have the United Nations move elsewhere.

111. Frankly, from the standpoint of the interest of the United States we do not understand why the authorities of the host country have failed to engage in some more efficient sort of promotion campaign to persuade the citizens of this country that the United Nations is one of the most lucrative and extraordinary businesses in the United States.

112. Sometimes, when we are not close to voting on an issue and when it is not necessary to try to exercise pressure

³ *Ibid.*, Second Part of First Session, Fifth Committee, 24th meeting, p. 103.

on delegations, the "liberal" United States press allows a few details on this point to filter through. For example, *The New York Times* of 24 November 1971 contained an article on page 35 in which it made the following statement: "At least \$120 million each year goes into the economy of the City of New York solely as a result of the presence of the United Nations." It went on to state that that amount exceeded, as was only logical, the 31 per cent—that is, \$56 million—assessed against the United States for the regular budget. Then it said: "The facts on this matter are instructive."* Indeed, it seems to us that these are very instructive facts and that they should be better known and recognized by the United States delegation to this Organization. Perhaps if they were explained more often on a day-to-day basis to the people, some sectors of public opinion would not get such extravagant ideas about the financial relationship between the diplomatic community in New York and the United Nations.

113. The writer of the article sets out six principal factors in referring to the financial benefits which the United States, and in particular the City of New York, receives because of the presence of the Headquarters here. In the first place, he mentions the existence of 131 Member Governments—that was in 1971—which maintain missions in the city of New York separate from their consular offices. Those missions spend money on salaries, rental of offices, residences for staff, equipment, communications, transport, maintenance and so forth, without mentioning, the writer says, the expenses of the delegations and staff which come every year to attend the sessions of the General Assembly.

114. As a second factor, he refers to the large staff of the Secretariat which lives and works in New York and which spends a considerable portion of its income here.

115. The third factor is the considerable administrative costs of the United Nations itself, a large portion of which is spent here in the city of New York.

116. Fourthly, he mentions the presence of representatives of the press and of non-governmental organizations, who also swell the community of the United Nations in New York and live and spend their income here.

117. Fifthly, he mentions the purchases of large quantities of goods and services for which the United Nations contracts in United States territory, in negotiation with United States businessmen, which the author estimates to be, generally speaking, of the order of \$10 million.

118. Sixthly and lastly, he draws attention to the \$600 million of the United Nations Pension Fund which are invested here in New York in United States dollars and which also constitute a considerable contribution by our Organization to the economic life of this country.

119. *The New York Times* of 22 November 1971 published an article from their reporter assigned to the United Nations, who explained in considerable detail all of the benefits accruing to the city of New York, from the fact that the Headquarters of the United Nations was in that

city. I shall not tire the representatives by repeating data which we all know, since we all have an idea of what it means for every mission and delegation to work in New York.

120. I should now like to tackle the question from another angle, the so-called magnanimity of the United States Government towards the United Nations. I have before me a study by a United States professor, published in the magazine *International Organization*, in which the author makes a comparison between the contributions of the United States and other Member States to the budget of this Organization. He points out that the index of increase in contributions between 1940 and 1960 places the United States in a lower position than most of the Members of the United Nations. From the standpoint of the relationship between the contribution to the United Nations and the gross national product, one quarter of United Nations Members paid proportionately much more than the United States. In respect to *per capita* income, about two thirds of the Members assumed burdens in excess of those carried by the United States. In terms of proportion between contributions to the United Nations and military expenditure, in 1960, 80 per cent of the Members of the United Nations made contributions higher than that made by the United States. In conclusion, the author indicates that rather than assuming an equal burden, the position of the United States, compared with other developed countries and with the membership as a whole, has declined in the 1960s.⁴

121. For all of these reasons, my delegation considers that the recommendation of the Fifth Committee, which reflects the decision of the Executive Branch and the Congress of the United States to pay less than its rightful share to the budget of the Organization, is completely unacceptable. It is unacceptable, first because of the procedure that was followed, which places the Assembly in the sad position of simply being a rubber-stamp for decisions and opinions adopted by the relevant authorities of a Member State months ago, spread throughout television, radio, and the newspapers, with the eyes of some sectors of United States opinion fixed on the Assembly waiting to see whether 132 sovereign States would follow the orders of the United States Congress, accept the recommendations of the Cabot Lodge Commission and comply with the instructions of an Executive Branch which is that of a single Member State, but which is not the master of the international community.

122. We also consider it unacceptable because it is intrinsically unfair and discriminatory, because it undermines the rights of all States Members of the Organization, because it is designed—and its effect would be—illegally to benefit a particular Member against the interests of all Members of the Organization, including those who supported the draft resolution in the Fifth Committee and which perhaps will be doing so at this juncture. We consider it unacceptable because it sanctions special and privileged treatment for a State which is not only the one which has the greatest capacity to pay, but which is the only State that receives financial benefits from this Organization.

⁴ Edward T. Rowe, "Financial Support for the United Nations: The Evolution of Member Contributions, 1946-1969", *International Organization* (University of Wisconsin Press), vol. 26, No. 4 (Autumn 1972), p. 654.

* Quoted in English by the speaker.

123. For all of these reasons, my delegation trusts that the Assembly will act on the document before it in the only manner compatible with the principle of the sovereign equality of States, the only way compatible with the rights and interests of all of its Members, and in particular those with the least capacity to pay, and for that matter, the only manner compatible with any elementary sense of self-respect for the Assembly: namely, by rejecting the recommendation of the Fifth Committee.

124. Mr. BAROODY (Saudi Arabia): The hour is late and from the nature of the speeches, three of which we have heard, if we were in Washington, I think they would be labelled as filibustering to try to delay the vote in the hope that Members may get tired and leave. This is not so, because the pros and cons of the question have been weighed very carefully in the Fifth Committee. I believe that the position of delegations with regard to the scale of assessments for the apportionment of the expenses of the United Nations could not be changed at this late hour. The decision was made clear by the vote cast in the Fifth Committee at its 1540th meeting. We are here to ratify and possibly to add or subtract from the votes which crystallized the decision. We listened very carefully—and I in particular—to the arguments of my good friend Ambassador Malik of the Soviet Union, as to why the United States should not reduce its contribution to the budget. There is no doubt that most of his arguments are valid. But I submit that they are dialectical and not pragmatic in nature. The arguments of my good friend Ambassador Malik will not change the positions that have already been assumed by various delegations.

125. Let me make that clear to everyone here. I feel I am in duty bound to let members in on what I have come to understand about the situation. It was not Ambassador Bush or his delegation, or for that matter the State Department or the Government of the United States, that wanted a reduction in the contribution. The United States has a legislative body. The sentiment of Congress, rightly or wrongly, is not, unfortunately for us, whole-heartedly with the United Nations. I will not go into the substance. It is not my country and it is not for me to go into the reasons why the Congress thinks that the United States should not contribute more than 25 per cent. That subject was gone into by the representatives of the United States.

126. So I personally assessed what the situation would be if we voted against the reduction of the United States contribution from the full 31.52 per cent to 25 per cent. I have lived in this country for a long time. I know what the Congress could do if it wanted to. I am not barging into the domestic policies of the United States, but I have a right to say that Congress seems to be strong in membership from the Democratic Party. So if we vote against this reduction there will be a feud between politicians, the Republicans and the Democrats—not the good Republicans and the good Democrats, but the mischievous among them; there are mischievous politicians everywhere. And who could guarantee that Congress would not reduce the voluntary contribution to the extent of \$50 million or \$60 million? And, to save \$13 million, who would suffer the most if the Congress took such a decision? And the Government of the United States would have no say in the matter; it must follow the decision of the Congress. It would be the

developing countries, which receive more aid from the voluntary contributions, which, I think, amount to over \$350 million. With all due respect to my good friends of the socialist countries (and now I am not talking as a monarchist, please note that) I must say that they do not account for more than 10 per cent—let us assume it is 10 per cent—of the voluntary contributions. You are voting here by solidarity. “I am for the United States and the other fellow is for the Soviet Union.” You are not speaking for the common weal, those of you here who make a break in the United Nations, a cleavage of solidarity. Remember, my good friends, that in this very hall I voted—against the United States position—for considering Russian as a working language, because Russia had emerged on the scene as a great Power. At the same meeting and again in this very hall, I voted against the Soviet Union when it said that no interest should be paid on the United Nations Bonds which were receiving 2 per cent. I do not know what the rate of inflation is in the Soviet Union, but here it has been between 5 and 7 per cent, on and off. We who gave bonds did not give them to get interest on them.

127. In other words, what I am saying is that we should vote on the merit of every item that is submitted before us. Otherwise this Organization will break down—and I am afraid that will indeed happen—because solidarity is splintering the United Nations into groups, without due thought to equity or justice. But in this case it is not really a question of equity or justice: it is a question of pragmatism. If we do not go along with the United States, Congress will see to it that the developing countries suffer.

128. Now let me say a few words about New York. We were among the last of the founding members to opt for New York. It was the Soviet Union and others that wanted this country—not necessarily New York—to be the seat of the United Nations. But we thought the United Nations should be in a small country. That was in 1945 and thereafter, before the final decision was taken. The countries that preferred this country wanted a platform, because communism was being maligned in the world although they had been the allies of the Western countries. But once the war was over, rivalry became evident, as had happened after the First World War.

129. I would not like to see this question made into a bone of contention between the Soviet Union and the United States. I would be the last to want to see anyone able to reap benefits from differences between the United States and the Soviet Union. For it is we, the small Powers, who will pay.

130. This is why we welcome the détente—although some of my friends think that this détente is a makeshift, kaleidoscopic policy which may change from day to day. Be that as it may, we cannot afford for the Soviet Union and the United States to be at loggerheads.

131. Now, what do we find? We find trade flourishing between the United States and the Soviet Union. But our good friend the Ambassador of the Soviet Union comes to this rostrum and for almost an hour subjects us to a statement on why the United States should pay the full 31 per cent. I, too, would like it to do that. But there is an Arabic proverb—and I repeat it time and again—which in

English is to this effect: "If you cannot get what you want, settle for what you can get".

132. Whom do you think you are fooling here? You are fooling yourselves, you small Powers, who will receive less in voluntary contributions if you vote against the United States on this matter. Baroody will tell you the truth. I am no United States man, no Soviet Union man. You shift in accordance with where your interests lie. One day you are with the United States, some of you; one day you are with the Soviet Union. This is not the way of the United Nations. I must be frank with you. Be yourself. Weigh things as they should be weighed, and judge. I know that they bring pressure on your capitals. Never mind. Have courage. Brief the politicians behind you, your leaders, as to what they should do.

133. I am going to say something that is not funny, but it may sound funny. We hear that thousands of millions of dollars of wheat are going to be exported to the Soviet Union, and thousands of millions of dollars of natural gas are going to be exported from the Soviet Union, maybe to this country, maybe to Japan, and other places. Well, that bulk of trade is worth billions; you, the Soviet Union, hike the price of natural gas a little, and you, the United States, the price of wheat, and split the amount. The \$13 million should be borne by both the United States and the Soviet Union. I am sure that if the Soviet Union pays \$6.5 million, Ambassador Bush, when he goes to Washington, will tell the United States Government to pay \$6.5 million.

134. But here we are taking sides with either one or the other, and this is wrong of the so-called non-aligned countries and small countries. We are neither aligned nor non-aligned; as I have said time and again, we are independent and that is why we can afford to tell you what we think. If we are wrong we stand to be corrected. You, the United States and the Soviet Union, should pay 80 per cent of the budget because you are reaping the benefit. We are false witnesses here most of the time. We the small countries are here to save their face when there is a crisis. My good friend from Cuba just spoke here, and I remember how we met and saved your face—both your faces, you super-Powers. You are benefiting more than we are, and we small nations, we are given committees and subsidiary bodies dealing with racial discrimination and self-determination, and you say, "Let them talk their heads off; it is better that they talk", and you do nothing about it. Then you interfere in each other's spheres of influence.

135. But, be that as it may, we cannot do without the United Nations because, with all its defects, the situation in the world would be worse without it. Therefore I believe we should come to the vote, and the sooner the better. Positions have already been taken, and those of you who have no instructions one way or the other will, I hope, see my point and vote accordingly.

136. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): We have heard the last speaker who wished to explain his vote before the vote. I shall now call on those representatives who wish to exercise their right of reply.

137. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translation from Russian*): I have listened attentively to

the previous speaker, my friend and long-time colleague, Mr. Baroody. I got the impression that he was speaking from this rostrum as someone might who was preparing to stand as a candidate for the United States Congress.

138. Mr. Baroody defended Congress; he said that Congress had so decided. Mr. Baroody, if we embark on that course, and if every parliament of every State Member of the United Nations itself decides on the size of that State's contribution to the budget of the United Nations, then the Organization might really perish. That would be arbitrary behaviour. Mr. Baroody said not a word about the criteria, the principles established at the first session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, at the very beginning of its existence. There are certain principles and criteria, scientifically based and recognized by all: a State Member of the United Nations, on admission to the Organization, must pay a contribution in accordance with its capacity to pay, based on the size of its national income. There can be no other criterion.

139. What Mr. Baroody proposes would be arbitrary behaviour. I do not have with me now the figures as to how many of the 132 States Members of the United Nations are republics and how many are monarchies, but if in monarchies the monarchs and in republics parliaments were to determine the amount of the contributions of their States to the United Nations budget, the result would be arbitrariness and chaos. Can the United Nations really embark on such a course? Yet Mr. Baroody is pushing it along that path. We categorically cannot agree with him, despite all our respect for his eloquence and his arguments.

140. He spoke of the attitude and opinion of the United States Congress. But who is responsible for creating that attitude? Let us answer that question. The attitude of the United States Congress has been created by Mr. Lodge, the former representative of the United States to the United Nations. He headed the President's Commission for the Observance of the Twenty-fifth Anniversary of the United Nations and he advanced this thesis that the United States contribution should be reduced to 25 per cent. And then? And then in February of this year, Mr. Nixon, President of the United States, in his report to Congress on the foreign policy of the United States for the 1970s, developed this thesis. Subsequently, Mr. Rogers, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the United States, in his annual report to Congress on the work of the State Department and on the foreign policy of the United States, went still further into the problem. Thus, there was threefold influence on Congress from the Administration and from the United States expert on United Nations questions, Mr. Lodge. That is who created the attitude in Congress concerning the 25 per cent. Yet Mr. Baroody speaking here tells us: "Congress, Congress". But Congress, even the United States Congress, also has no right arbitrarily to establish the amount of the United States contribution to the United Nations. It must take into account the views and the procedures of the United Nations. That is the true situation.

141. There are therefore no grounds for referring to the opinion and position of Congress when we are discussing problems relating to the United Nations which are fully and solely within the competence of the United Nations. No

parliament in the world, no congress, even of the richest and most powerful country, has a right to interfere in such matters, to take arbitrary decisions and to impose its will, its demands and its claims on the United Nations.

142. Mr. Baroody asks what the United Nations would gain from these \$13 million. But, Mr. Baroody, what would the United States gain? Surely the United States is not such a poor country that it cannot survive without \$13 million? But the United Nations really is a poor Organization, it is on the verge of financial bankruptcy. As I said in my previous statement, who has brought it to this point?

143. Only today, I was talking to the Secretary-General, Mr. Kurt Waldheim. He said that the United Nations deficit amounts to approximately \$65 to \$70 million, including more than \$16 million owed by the United States puppet régime of Chiang Kai-shek. How can we meet this deficit? After we decided by a majority vote and expelled the puppet from the United Nations, who will pay? Here are \$13 million which the United States wishes to take away from the United Nations and which would be needed to cover that debt at least, because the United States does not want to pay that debt. We should think about this a little.

144. Therefore, in the light of the realities and in the light of the financial difficulties of the United Nations, \$13 million are a thousand times more valuable to the United Nations than to the United States, in view of the enormous profits which the United States derives every year from the developing countries alone, as Mr. Allende, the President of Chile, told us. These are the facts which not even Mr. Baroody can refute. Therefore, the only way to establish the amounts of the payments and contributions to the United Nations of every Member of the United Nations is on the basis of objective criteria, the size of a State's gross national product, its capacity to pay. Only in this way can we save the Organization. But if each congress, each national assembly, each parliament and each monarch, king, tsar and so on, can fix a country's contribution to the United Nations, then, Mr. Baroody, the United Nations will really perish.

145. Mr. BAROODY (Saudi Arabia): My good friend Mr. Malik seems to have forgotten the first few words of my statement, in which I said that most of his arguments happened to be valid. I was trying to say that we should choose the lesser evil. There are two evils. Reducing the United Nations budget is bad, unless we have retrenchment—and that is another subject which I shall not go into—but we, the small nations, cannot coerce either the Soviet Union or the United States to do our bidding. Rightly or wrongly—I am not going into the matter—at the nineteenth session the Soviet Union and the United States precipitated a crisis because the United States allegedly said that the Soviet Union was not contributing its share to the expenses of the Middle East forces and other expenses, and therefore the Soviet Union should not vote. We could not bring the Soviet Union to espouse such a claim on the part of the United States. The Soviet Union did not pay.

146. I am not saying that it should have paid or that it should not have paid. When you have a great Power and it takes a position, you cannot make it pay. Now it is the turn of the United States. If we tell the United States "Pay,

Congress or no Congress", and it refuses to pay, what can we do? Should we then precipitate a crisis similar to that which confronted us during the nineteenth session, when I myself had to intervene when the Assembly became so riotous that there were catcalls from the floor and I had to beg one of the speakers from the rostrum to sit down, in order to save the dignity of the United Nations. That was at the nineteenth session.

147. Which is the lesser of the two evils: to see the United States possibly reduce its voluntary contribution by \$50 million, \$60 million or \$70 million, or to give way to the United States to the extent of \$13 million? That is the crux of the question, my good friend, Mr. Malik. I told you that most of your arguments were valid. We are here, the small nations, between two giants who are crossing swords. From a distance we tell them, "Please do not cross swords". But they have their own way. That is why I submit that if we want to keep this Organization a going concern—and in this world we have no alternative to the United Nations—we have to give way.

148. We gave way to the Soviet Union. I worked behind the scenes with the late Mr. Steyenson, may God rest his soul in peace, and he retracted. He said, "All right, see what you can do". I said "You cannot compel a great Power to pay if it does not want to pay". And now we cannot compel the United States, by the same token. That is the crux of the matter. I said, "If you cannot get what you want, settle for what you can get" and "We should not cut off our nose to spite our face here at the United Nations". That is the crux of the whole question.

149. For heaven's sake, oratory can go on *ad nauseum* on this question of figures, but I am not delving into the substance here. We should vote forthwith. Everybody knows his own mind or has his instructions. Let us finish with the subject and hope that in the future the United States and the Soviet Union will see to it that this Organization is nourished, not only by their contributions but by their observing the criteria of the Security Council with regard to peace and war, with regard to justice, which sometimes they do not see their way to doing because of confrontation and the fear of confrontation that might lead to a global conflict, and because of their own respective individual national interests, which is understandable because nowadays, unfortunately, the emphasis is still on national interests and not on United Nations interests.

150. Mr. ALARCON (Cuba) (*interpretation from Spanish*): Rather than exercising my right of reply I want to correct something which our colleague from Saudi Arabia insisted on mentioning in his two statements.

151. Our delegation said very clearly that it was participating in this debate because we considered this to be a question of fundamental principle for all Member States. We do not accept the interpretation that this is a question of the opposition of the interests of two Member States, which is apparently the interpretation to be derived from the statements of the representative of Saudi Arabia. There is a contraposition of interests, but they are the interests of one Member State, the one with the largest capacity to pay, namely, the United States of America, and those of all the other Member States, which will have to continue to bear

an additional burden above and beyond what they have been bearing since 1946 because this Organization applies two criteria, one to everyone—Saudi Arabia, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France, Cuba—and another for the country with the largest capacity to pay, which is at the same time the only country deriving any direct benefit from the budget of the Organization.

152. To accept the recommendation already approved by the United States Congress would affect the interests of all Member States, and in the first instance the developing countries, the States with the lowest capacity to pay.

153. In addition there is the problem of fundamental principle involved in this question. And in passing I should like to remind the representative of Saudi Arabia that, while we are gratified that the Soviet Union has participated in the debate today, as it did in the debate in the Fifth Committee in support of our position, States that are far from being great Powers, such as Barbados and Cuba, have intervened along the same lines in opposing this draft resolution. But my delegation would like to point out that the invitation extended to us to accept the "gift" of the United States Congress—to apply the proverb that was quoted here—to accept as a fait accompli what people are willing to hand out to us, is really a serious precedent and a very serious threat to the Organization.

154. I would merely request the representatives of the developing countries—the representatives of Africa, Asia and the Arab countries—to imagine just for a moment what would be the effect of the application of that proverb, to accept what is handed to you and not press points of principle, if we were to apply this to the Middle East, to the southern part of Africa, to the Portuguese colonies or to any of the items that our Organization discusses every day. Is this the attitude that the countries of the third world are going to take and which we have taken every day: accept what Portugal wants to give us with respect to Guinea (Bissau); accept the parts of the territory that Israel may want to return in the Middle East; accept the forms of self-determination which South Africa wants to concede vis-à-vis Namibia? Or shall we fight for principles, all those States which are ready to defend them, without accepting the attempts at extortion and pressure of any country, no matter how great and powerful it might be?

155. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translation from Russian*): A great deal of what I intended to say has already been said by the previous speaker, my distinguished friend and colleague, Comrade Alarcón. I merely wish to object most categorically to the thesis put forward here by Mr. Baroody concerning an analogy between the Soviet Union and the United States in the matter of the payment of contributions to the United Nations.

156. As the whole world and all delegations to the General Assembly know, the Soviet Union has opposed, still opposes and will continue to oppose unlawful expenditure imposed by a certain narrow group of States headed by the United States following arbitrary actions, contrary to the Charter, which they have called "United Nations operations", in Korea, the Congo, and the Middle East. This position of the USSR is well founded, logical and valid.

157. In the present instance, however, the United States is attempting to violate a fundamental principle and the criteria established for the assessment of contributions to be paid to the regular budget of the United Nations by each State admitted to membership in the Organization. That is the fundamental difference. No analogy exists between the attitude of the Soviet Union towards unlawful expenditure in violation of the Charter incurred by the United Nations under pressure from a single narrow group of States some time ago and the attempt of the United States to violate fundamental principles and criteria and obtain for itself further benefits in addition to the privilege which the United States already receives from the United Nations by not paying its contribution in accordance with its capacity to pay and the size of its gross national product—on which basis its contribution would amount to 38.4 per cent—but by limiting its payment for many years to only 31.5 per cent. Now, however, it wishes to receive a further benefit still, amounting to \$13 million, so that the benefit it receives despite, and in violation of, the fundamental principle and the criteria for establishing the scale of assessments would amount to \$25 million at a time when the United Nations is in a state of financial crisis as a result of the policy of the United States itself, which has pushed the United Nations into illegal actions that have led to the Organization's tremendous indebtedness.

158. This is the fundamental difference between our attitude of principle towards the question of contributions to the United Nations and that of the United States. I would ask Mr. Baroody to understand this and not to draw analogies, because analogies are not always proof.

159. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): The representative of Barbados has requested the Chair to indicate whether the four draft resolutions recommended by the Fifth Committee require a two-thirds majority for adoption. I call on Mr. Stavropoulos, Under-Secretary-General and Legal Counsel, to give us his legal opinion on the matter.

160. Mr. STAVROPOULOS (Under-Secretary-General, the Legal Counsel): It is late and I am sorry to have to take a few minutes of your time to develop my advice.

161. You have requested my views on the question whether the draft resolutions contained in document A/8952 require a two-thirds majority under Article 18, paragraph 2, of the Charter and rule 85 of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly.

162. The text of Article 18, paragraph 2, specifies that: "Decisions of the General Assembly on important questions shall be made by a two-thirds majority of the members present and voting." It further specifies that these include certain categories, among which are "budgetary questions". It must therefore be determined whether the proposed draft resolutions relate to a "budgetary question".

163. In the first instance it is necessary to examine what are budgetary questions. It is clear that in General Assembly practice not every draft resolution having financial implications or otherwise involving expenditures is such a question. In general, it would seem that three types of questions come within this category. First, under Article

17, paragraph 1, there is the budget itself, which includes both income and expenditures; secondly, there is the apportionment of expenses under Article 17, paragraph 2; and thirdly, there are questions of principle which basically affect decisions as to the first and second categories.

164. It seems obvious that the first two—the budget itself and the actual apportionment of expenses—which are dealt with respectively in paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 17 of the Charter, must be characterized as budgetary questions. This is so because the budgetary process has two aspects: as Financial Regulation 3.2 indicates, budget estimates cover both the expected expenditures and the expected income of the financial year to which they relate. And, of course, the largest source of income of the United Nations which predominates over all others, is the contributions assessed on Member States pursuant to Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter. The estimate of this income, which must be approved by the General Assembly, is thus an integral part of the budget. Since the total of the assessed contributions consists of the individual contributions of Member States, the adoption of the scale according to which these assessments are determined must be considered as part of the budgetary process.

165. Even if it should be argued that the assessment of contributions were technically not a “budgetary question” within the meaning of Article 18, paragraph 2, of the Charter, it cannot be denied that it is intrinsically as important a matter as the determination of the expenditure side of the budget. From the point of view of any Member State, the amount that it will have to contribute to the United Nations depends on the one hand on the total amount of expenditures approved for a given year, and on the other on the scale that determines the percentage of these expenses that that State is to contribute. Consequently, the adoption of a scale should be considered as an “important” question under that same paragraph of the Charter.

166. There are no Assembly precedents directly in point, largely because in the past all resolutions approving scales of contributions or instructing the Committee on Contributions have been adopted by majorities considerably in excess of two-thirds. In only one instance do the records reflect an apparent determination that a two-thirds majority is required: when the Assembly at its twelfth session adopted resolution 1137 (XII)—the resolution that established the limit of 30 per cent for the largest contributor. The vote on that resolution was 39 in favour, 16 against, and 13 abstentions, and the result was recorded, without any ruling by the President, as: “The draft resolution was adopted, having obtained the required two-thirds majority”.⁵

167. The draft resolutions at present before the Assembly, like resolution 1137 (XII), would not actually adopt or change the scale of contributions and thus would not entail any direct financial consequences for any State; instead, they would merely instruct the Committee on Contributions as to the formulation of a new scale, which itself would require approval by the Assembly.

⁵ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twelfth Session, Plenary Meetings*, 705th meeting, para. 8.

168. They thus fall into the third category I mentioned earlier: questions that involve basic principles in relation to either the budget or the apportionment of expenditures. In my view, this third category into which the proposed resolution falls, should also be considered budgetary since decisions on questions of fundamental principle necessarily affect decisions on the other “budgetary questions”. Otherwise, the purpose of protecting a minority against a decision by a simple majority on such questions would not be achieved. This position is not based on clear precedent. In fact, none of the precedents is directly relevant. I have already observed that, with respect to certain preliminary decisions, the mere fact that a resolution has financial implications does not make it a budgetary question, and thus resolutions having only an indirect effect on the budget, such as those that called for meetings of the General Assembly in Europe (184 (II), 497 (V), 499 (V)), for the addition of Spanish and Russian to the working languages (247 (III), 2479 (XXIII)) or for the preparation of special records (1333 (XIII)) have generally been held not to require a two-thirds majority.

169. Of possibly greater significance was the decision taken with respect to resolution 2186 (XXI) for the establishment of the Capital Development Fund. One paragraph of the draft statute—article IV, paragraph 2—provided that:

“Expenses for administrative activities shall be borne by the regular budget of the United Nations which shall include a separate budgetary provision for such expenses . . .”.

The United States representative argued that, although a two-thirds majority was not required on all proposals involving any financial considerations, an important principle was being decided which would determine the way in which the matter should be settled in the budget; he therefore moved that this provision should be regarded as an important question within the meaning of Article 18, paragraph 2, of the Charter.⁶ The representative of Lebanon, on the other hand, argued that the draft statute would not put any financial burden on the Organization for the following year, and that the time to invoke the two-thirds majority rule would be at the next session of the General Assembly, when it would deal with actual expenditures.⁷ The General Assembly, voting by roll-call, rejected the United States motion, by 71 votes to 35, with 7 abstentions,⁸ thus deciding that a two-thirds majority was not required on this question of principle.

170. On the other hand, there are a few contrary instances where the General Assembly has decided that questions of a preliminary character required a two-thirds majority. One may note in this connexion particularly the question of a proposed instruction to the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions to study the question of the amortization and payment of interest on United Nations bonds.⁹

⁶ *Ibid.*, *Twenty-first Session, Plenary Meetings*, 1492nd meeting, paras. 17-21.

⁷ *Ibid.*, para. 26.

⁸ *Ibid.*, para. 47.

⁹ *Ibid.*, *Twenty-third Session, Plenary Meetings*, 1752nd meeting, paras. 362-372.

171. In conclusion, there are three types of questions which may be argued as coming within the ambit of the reference to "budgetary questions" in Article 18, paragraph 2, of the Charter: first, the budget itself; secondly, the apportionment of expenses; and, thirdly, questions of principle basically affecting decisions as to the first and second.

172. The first two categories are clearly budgetary questions. With respect to the third, there are conflicting precedents. But it is my considered belief that, in the interests of the Organization and all its Members, such questions of principle which basically affect the financing of the Organization have to be considered as budgetary ones which require a two-thirds majority. The purpose of requiring a two-thirds majority is to protect the minority against a decision by a simple majority on certain important questions, among which, surely, are "budgetary questions". In order to accomplish this purpose, the requirement of a two-thirds majority should include questions of principle of a fundamental character which necessarily affect decisions on the apportionment of expenses.

173. It is therefore my conclusion that the draft resolutions at present before the General Assembly, which involve such questions of principle, do require a two-thirds majority.

174. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): The Assembly has heard the statement of the Legal Counsel. Under Article 18, paragraph 2, of the Charter it is my ruling that the four draft resolutions require a two-thirds majority for adoption.

175. I should like to draw the attention of the Assembly to the decision of the Fifth Committee, contained in paragraph 25 of document A/8952. If I hear no objection I shall take it that the General Assembly takes note of that decision.

It was so decided.

176. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): We shall now vote on the draft resolutions recommended by the Fifth Committee in paragraph 27 of document A/8952. I put to the vote first draft resolution A. A recorded vote has been requested.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahrain, Barbados, Belgium, Bhutan, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Dahomey, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Khmer Republic, Laos, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Republic, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico,

Mongolia, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Singapore, Somalia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire.

Against: None.

Draft resolution A was adopted by 128 votes to none (resolution 2961 A (XXVII)).¹⁰

177. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): I now put to the vote draft resolution B. A roll-call vote has been requested.

A vote was taken by roll-call.

Poland, having been drawn by lot by the President, was called upon to vote first.

In favour: Portugal, Qatar, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Swaziland, Sweden, Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Zaire, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bhutan, Bolivia, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic, Chad, Colombia, Congo,¹¹ Costa Rica, Cyprus, Dahomey, Denmark, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Khmer Republic, Laos, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Maldives, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Philippines.

Against: Poland, Romania, Syrian Arab Republic, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Republic of Tanzania, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Barbados, Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Chile, China, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Equatorial Guinea, Hungary, India, Iraq, Libyan Arab Republic, Mongolia, Nigeria, Peru.

Abstaining: Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Trinidad and Tobago, United Arab Emirates, Yemen, Afghanistan, Bahrain, Botswana, Brazil, Burma, Burundi, Ecuador, Egypt, Ghana, Guinea, Guyana, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Oman.

Draft resolution B was adopted by 81 votes to 27, with 22 abstentions (resolution 2961 B (XXVII)).

¹⁰ The delegation of Sierra Leone subsequently informed the Secretariat that it wished to have its vote recorded as an abstention.

¹¹ The delegation of Congo subsequently informed the Secretariat that it wished to have its vote recorded as having been against the draft resolution.

178. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): I now put to the vote draft resolution C. A recorded vote has been requested.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Bahrain, Barbados, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Burma, Burundi, Cameroon, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Dahomey, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Greece, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Khmer Republic, Laos, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libyan Arab Republic, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Singapore, Somalia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia.

Against: Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

Abstaining: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Hungary, Ireland, Japan, Liberia, Luxembourg, Mongolia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Sierra Leone,¹² Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United States of America.

Draft resolution C was adopted by 99 votes to 9, with 19 abstentions (resolution 2961 C (XXVII)).

179. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): The Assembly will now vote on draft resolution D. A roll-call vote has been requested.

A vote was taken by roll call.

Democratic Yemen, having been drawn by lot by the President, was called upon to vote first.

In favour: Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Khmer Republic, Laos, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Republic, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Singapore, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan,

Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Austria, Bahrain, Barbados, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Burma, Burundi, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Dahomey.

Against: None.

Abstaining: Fiji, Hungary, India, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, New Zealand, Poland, Portugal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Australia, Belgium, Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Czechoslovakia.

Draft resolution D was adopted by 111 votes to none, with 20 abstentions (resolution 2961 D (XXVII)).

180. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): I call on the representative of the United States, who wishes to explain his vote.

181. Mr. McGEE (United States of America): I want to take a moment in this afternoon's deliberations to thank all the members, regardless of their vote, for their open participation in the decision to resolve this question through the machinery of the United Nations. My Government believes that this is a constructive decision. We believe that it will strengthen the United Nations.

182. We have felt since its inception that the United Nations must be strong as an institution rather than as a chamber of commerce or a political gimmick. It must survive in its own right. It is our conviction that by holding the ceiling for the largest contributor to 25 per cent we strengthen the institutional character of this body. This is not something new, for the United Nations has steadily through its history recognized the importance of taking action on a ceiling for the maximum contributor—in 1952, in 1957 and now in 1972. Likewise we think it is important that the United Nations in this action has resisted the temptation to put it off again. Coming to grips with this issue has been delayed, and the temptation to delay is understandable; but the credibility of this body has surely been reinforced by the willingness of the General Assembly to meet this issue head on now, whatever the outcome.

183. Finally, the integrity of the United Nations has been underscored in this action. The Congress of the United States has had almost as many views as speeches on the question. Congressmen are of many stripes, but one thing Congress resolved successfully this year was that it has no prerogative to determine the assessments in the United Nations regular budget. Nor does the Supreme Soviet have that prerogative. No legislative body in any sovereign nation has that prerogative. The prerogative belongs only to the United Nations. And that is why even the Congress with all its many flares of rhetoric made the basic decision that this must proceed through the machinery and mechanism of the General Assembly of the United Nations. All that a

¹² The delegation of Sierra Leone subsequently informed the Secretariat that it wished to have its vote recorded as having been in favour of the draft resolution.

congress or a supreme soviet or a parliament or any other legislative group can do is vote on whether or not to default. That is the only prerogative it has. Therefore we believe that we have strengthened the character and the credibility and the integrity of the United Nations.

184. If there are those who indeed, as we have heard suggested, propose corresponding action, I say that the time is at hand to put our procedures where our rhetoric is: in other words, to proceed by submitting the case to the United Nations, referring it to the Fifth Committee, laying it out for free and open debate by all of the representatives—and let the decision be made by this body rather than imposed unilaterally.

185. I want to express on behalf of the President of the United States—and I do so as a member of the loyal opposition—and on behalf of the United States delegation here at the United Nations our deep appreciation of what this body has done today for the United Nations.

AGENDA ITEM 20

Co-operation between the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity

186. Mr. ZENTAR (Morocco) (*interpretation from French*): The fact that co-operation between the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity [OAU] appears now in a constant manner on the agenda of our General Assembly is an eloquent illustration of the stability, extent and strengthening of that co-operation, in keeping of course with the earnest desire of the heads of State and Government of Africa and also with the oft-repeated wish of a large number of Member States of the United Nations to see that fruitful co-operation continued and expanded.

187. The OAU, a regional organization, has won its laurels in the service of peace, freedom, concord and co-operation not only at the level of the African continent but also for the benefit of all the peoples on earth. It has always been on the side of law, justice, freedom and a just peace in all the upheavals that still disturb certain regions of our planet. From this point of view and in the light of its lofty objectives it has always played a constructive, moderating role, looking resolutely towards the future, but without hatred or acrimony.

188. The OAU is a conglomeration of States and peoples of goodwill which practise on their own continent the principles and ideals they uphold, ideals which they share with the other States Members of the United Nations.

189. How many conflicts, disputes and misunderstandings that have arisen in the African continent have found their solution in the continent itself, thanks to their having been fed back into the source that inspired and gave birth to the OAU itself and thanks to the African spirit, which is synonymous with tolerance and brotherhood, a spirit that was consecrated as the "Spirit of Rabat" during the last summit meeting, which Morocco had the honour to welcome in its capital in June. It is not the least of the reasons for which my country, Morocco, and my Sovereign, His Majesty Hassan II, have the right to feel proud.

190. The States Members of the United Nations, which are prompted by feelings of peace and harmony and therefore wish to keep out of this great forum all the disputes which the international community desires to maintain within controllable local dimensions, have welcomed the OAU's ability to reduce in such a satisfactory manner the difficulties that some might have been ready to avoid, in the interest of certain designs that our countries are far from sharing.

191. If I venture to recall all the aspects that characterize our regional organization it is because I want to show the reasons why the Security Council by its resolution 199 (1964) decided to regard the OAU as the only regional organization responsible for peace in Africa, a privilege that entails heavy responsibilities, but is in itself an undoubted encouragement and source of pride to the people of Africa that we have the honour to represent.

192. I do not believe that it is necessary to speak here of all the great moments during the course of the year that has elapsed that have been lived through by the OAU and the United Nations together. However, I could not be forgiven if I did not mention certain important events that have been experienced by our continent in the hour and under the sign of the United Nations.

193. I should like to begin by recalling the meetings of the Security Council held in Addis Ababa at the end of January and the beginning of February 1972 in response to the invitation of the OAU, thus showing the importance that the United Nations attaches to African problems, at the head of which we find the decolonization of the continent and the end of the racist régimes of southern Africa.

194. The presence of the Secretary-General in Addis Ababa, as well as his personal participation, at the invitation of His Majesty Hassan II, in the Assembly of the Heads of State and Government of the OAU in Rabat, was a great encouragement to all the peoples of Africa. In particular, the words that Mr. Kurt Waldheim was kind enough to speak before the heads of State and government who met in Rabat have consolidated and confirmed our confidence in our Secretary-General and, through him, our faith in the United Nations, which remains for us a very important organ for the preservation of peace and international co-operation. I should like to avail myself of this opportunity to express to the Secretary-General our congratulations and our thanks for his resolute action and constantly renewed efforts with a view to preserving peace and promoting ever more extensive co-operation between our regional organization and the United Nations.

195. This year has been in many respects an African year in the United Nations. African problems have undeniably held the scene in the Security Council, the General Assembly, the Committees, the Commissions and the specialized agencies.

196. The total elimination of colonialism in the Territories under Portuguese domination or in Namibia, the Sahara and elsewhere, and the end of the racist régimes of Pretoria and Salisbury have been the object of the most heated debates of the current session.

197. The Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples which held several meetings on the continent itself, thus has responded to a pressing wish of the peoples and has brought them the desired comfort and a strong ray of hope.

198. Lastly, resolution 2910 (XXVII) in which the General Assembly decided to organize in Olso in 1973 an international conference for the support of victims of colonialism and *apartheid* in southern Africa crowned this year of international efforts for the liberation of Africa, for informing world public opinion first and foremost, and for the necessary support of peoples that are struggling against injustice and under-development.

199. But co-operation between the United Nations and the OAU at the political level is not the only kind that we have tackled or wished to develop. Co-operation between the OAU and the economic, cultural and social specialized organizations is acquiring ever greater significance.

200. The Economic Commission for Africa, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, the World Health Organization, the United Nations Development Programme and the United Nations Industrial Development Organization are co-operating ever more closely with our Organization, in accordance with express recommendations of our Heads of State. We note with great satisfaction that we are favourably received at every level.

201. I should like to conclude by quoting a passage from paragraph 3 of the operative part of resolution CM/Res.273 (XIX) adopted at Rabat by the Council of Ministers of the OAU, a resolution relating to the activities of the African group at the United Nations. It states:

“The Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity . . .

“ . . .

“Welcomes the co-operation existing between OAU and the United Nations, and requests the Administrative Secretary-General to establish relations of co-operation with the specialized agencies and the international organizations of the United Nations family, and to strengthen the relations already established, in the interests of Africa”.

There can be no better reference or more clear mandate than that.

202. Mr. DAVIN (Gabon) (*interpretation from French*): My position as chairman of the Group of African States for the current month gives me the privilege of introducing at this meeting of the General Assembly draft resolution A/L.690. Before commenting on the provisions of that text, I should like to say a few words about agenda item 20.

203. The OAU from its inception decided that it would carry out the essential task, among others, of co-operating actively with the United Nations with the aim of seeking together just solutions to the problems of peace and security in Africa, fostering dialogue and mediation among

its members, and co-ordinating efforts made to put an end to obsolete colonialism still raging in Guinea (Bissau), Angola and Mozambique and in the rest of the southern part of Africa.

204. It will soon be 10 years since the regional African organization was established, and throughout that period the organization, through the African group of States, has striven to lead the United Nations to take concrete measures in the fields of decolonization, racial discrimination and the economic and social development of African States, many of which are among the least advanced of the developing countries.

205. The African group is happy to congratulate all the political groups which have constantly devoted unstinting and praiseworthy efforts to the achievement of the noble objectives of the OAU in its co-operation with the United Nations.

206. In this connexion I should like to mention especially the historic event which occurred in the life of the United Nations in the year 1972, when for the first time meetings of the Security Council devoted entirely to the problems of southern Africa were held on the soil of Africa. That important decision of the Security Council proves that the international community has become aware of the danger to peace and security posed by the continuing existence of colonialist régimes and white minority régimes in Southern Rhodesia and South Africa.

207. The draft resolution which I have the honour to submit on behalf of the 41 members of the OAU that are its sponsors represents the common efforts of the African group after reading the remarkable report in document A/8859 drawn up by the Secretary-General.

208. In the preamble to our draft resolution, the sponsors recall the earlier resolutions already adopted within the framework of co-operation between the United Nations and the OAU and welcome the encouraging results already achieved in this field.

209. In the operative part the Secretary-General is requested to continue his efforts and to intensify co-operation between the United Nations and the OAU in order to find a solution to the serious situation existing in southern Africa. It also invites the specialized agencies and other organizations within the United Nations system, particularly the United Nations Development Programme, to continue and intensify their co-operation with the OAU in order to strengthen their assistance to the victims of colonialism and racial discrimination.

210. In this connexion I should like, on behalf of Africa, to thank all the specialized agencies and the international organizations linked to the United Nations which have made and continue to make moral and material assistance available to the liberation movements, to the African refugees victims of colonialism and *apartheid*, and to all African peoples that are struggling in very difficult circumstances in order to enjoy their inalienable right to self-determination and independence.

211. I should also like to express the deep satisfaction of the African group at the decision taken by the General

Assembly by adopting resolution 2910 (XXVII), which provides for the convening next year in Oslo of an international conference of experts for the support of victims of colonialism and *apartheid* in southern Africa.

212. During the twenty-sixth session the General Assembly adopted, by 113 votes, with only 2 votes against, resolution 2863 (XXVI) relating to co-operation between the United Nations and the OAU. I should like to address an appeal to all delegations to ensure that this time again the General Assembly will adopt by at least as great majority draft resolution A/L.690, which I have just had the privilege of introducing.

213. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): I shall now call on those representatives who wish to explain their votes before the voting.

214. Mr. PATRÍCIO (Portugal): The Portuguese delegation deems it proper to make a few observations that appear to be called for by the text of draft resolution A/L.690 in so far as there are references in the text to what is described as "the grave situation in southern Africa", to which the Secretary-General is asked to find a solution, in co-operation with the Organization of African Unity.

215. We feel it is necessary to dispel a misconception here. The situation, especially as concerns the two Portuguese States of Angola and Mozambique, integrated as they are in the multiracial Portuguese nation, far from being grave, is very promising for the future—socially, economically and even politically. An atmosphere of frank harmony among all the racial strains that make up the populations reigns paramount there, evoking the admiration of all those who visit the territories without preconceived notions based on ignorance and prejudice, fed continually by the hostile propaganda of our adversaries which, for the last few years, has been buttressed by the United Nations Office of Public Information.

216. In education, the advancement made over the last decade—and still going on—is unparalleled elsewhere in Africa, and an ever-increasing number of local élites participate in the tasks of government and administration. Industrially, the progress witnessed in Angola and Mozambique is even more remarkable and is provoking the attention of others across our borders, for whom we are also prepared to provide a share of the results of the great tasks in hand in that field. As for peace and security, except for the hit-and-run tactics and sporadic attacks launched by hostile bands maintained and financed outside those territories, there is in the great extent of the inhabited rural as well as urban areas of both an over-all atmosphere of security and freedom from fear that is rare elsewhere in the world.

217. It is a matter of regret that this year, perhaps more than at any time in the past, we have been witnessing a marked accentuation of the process of disintegration upon which this Organization appears to have embarked, through a gradual erosion of the principles that are basic to its structure. First, there was the amendment of the express provisions of the Charter, through interpretations backed by a majority vote. Then, by degrees, even this pretense at conformity with the Charter has been abandoned, and

decisions are taken and declarations approved by a simple majority vote, in utter disregard of the Charter. Falsehood and pretense have come to be used as a basis for such recommendations. We have witnessed this process in the evolution of the theory of the so-called "liberated areas" which have figured so prominently in the debates of the various organs of the United Nations this year. First, a finding is recorded based on entirely non-existent facts; then this finding of non-existent facts is justified in order to decide upon a predetermined course of action.

218. It is high time that delegations of Member States came to realize where this process is gradually taking the United Nations. There is a total disregard of the basic Charter provisions; and resolutions, however divorced from the reality of facts, are approved by a mechanical majority, which in turn is manipulated by pressure groups obeying certain ideologies and ambitions.

219. We wish to make it clear beyond all doubt that we do not recognize that the Organization of African Unity has any competence to deal with the situation, such as it is in the Portuguese overseas States of Angola and Mozambique, or for that matter in any other overseas province of the Portuguese nation. Even less do we recognize any competence of the United Nations to confer on the Organization of African Unity a power which it does not itself rightfully possess: namely, the power of intervening in what is after all matters within the domestic jurisdiction of a Member State.

220. It is a matter of regret to my delegation that we are faced with facts from which the conclusion appears inevitable that the United Nations has transformed itself simply into an agency of the Organization of African Unity and exists solely in order to implement decisions taken in Addis Ababa. It has thus abdicated all the ideals and principles that inspired its foundation.

221. Mr. von HIRSCHBERG (South Africa): The South African delegation will be obliged to vote against the draft resolution before us because of the imputations and the assertions which it contains concerning South Africa and southern Africa in general. We believe these assertions and imputations are unwarranted and without foundation.

222. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): The General Assembly will now proceed to vote on draft resolution A/L.690.

The draft resolution was adopted by 124 votes to 2 (resolution 2962 (XXVII)).

223. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): I shall now give the floor to representatives wishing to explain their vote after the vote.

224. Mr. BLANC (France) (*interpretation from French*): The French delegation voted in favour of the draft resolution, as it has done with regard to all others relating to co-operation between the United Nations and the OAU. This vote therefore is not surprising. However, I should like, on behalf of my delegation, to remind the Assembly that in paragraph 3 of the draft resolution there is mention of texts for which we did not vote. Therefore, our vote today in no

way signifies that our position has changed or that we approve texts on which we abstained previously.

225. Mr. PETRIE (United Kingdom): My delegation has voted in favour of the draft resolution as it welcomes co-operation between the United Nations and regional organizations and hopes for constructive results from such co-operation. My delegation feels obliged to point out, however, that our vote today is without prejudice to our position on certain other resolutions referred to in paragraph 3, which we were unable to support when they were adopted by the General Assembly.

AGENDA ITEM 40

United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East:

- (a) Report of the Commissioner-General;
- (b) Report of the Working Group on the Financing of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East;
- (c) Report of the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine;
- (d) Reports of the Secretary-General

REPORT OF THE SPECIAL POLITICAL COMMITTEE (A/8915)

226. Mr. AKBEL (Turkey), Rapporteur of the Special Political Committee: As Rapporteur of the Special Political Committee, I have the privilege of presenting the report contained in document A/8915 on agenda item 40 concerning the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East [UNRWA].

227. The Committee considered this item at its 829th to 842nd meetings between 2 and 20 November. During its consideration it had before it the report of the Commissioner-General of UNRWA, the report of the Working Group on the Financing of UNRWA, the report of the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine, and the report of the Secretary-General relating to this item. During the debate in the Special Political Committee, delegations devoted considerable time and energy to the various aspects of the item. The delegations, while drawing attention to the need to achieve a just settlement of the question, emphasized also the need for the continuation of international assistance to Palestine refugees pending a final solution.

228. At the conclusion of the general debate, the Committee received eight draft resolutions relating to various aspects of the question. Seven of them were adopted by the Committee. The eighth, which was submitted by 12 Member States and would have asked the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine to provide Member States, upon request, with copies of documents and material in its possession, was not pressed to a vote.

229. Of the draft resolutions adopted, four directly concern the work of UNRWA. Draft resolution I A, submitted by the United States, *inter alia*, urged greater contributions to relieve the budgetary deficit of UNRWA. Draft resolution I B, sponsored by 21 Member States,

endorsed the efforts of UNRWA to continue to provide humanitarian assistance, as far as practicable, on an emergency basis and as a temporary measure, to persons displaced as a result of the June 1967 hostilities. Draft resolution II, sponsored by five Member States, dealt with the Working Group on the Financing of UNRWA and requested it to continue its efforts for the financing of the Agency for another year. Draft resolution I F recommended the inclusion of Japan in the membership of the Advisory Commission of UNRWA.

230. The remaining three draft resolutions adopted by the Special Political Committee related more directly to other humanitarian and political aspects of the question. Draft resolution I C dealt with the situation of the Palestine refugees in the Gaza strip and called on Israel to take immediate and effective steps for the return of the refugees concerned and to desist forthwith from measures it has taken there. Draft resolution I D dealt with the question of the refugees who became displaced at the end of the 1967 hostilities, and other issues related to this question. Draft resolution I E affirmed that the people of Palestine were entitled to equal rights and self-determination in accordance with the Charter.

231. In submitting the report and the draft resolutions contained therein without going into further detail, I am confident that the General Assembly, in its desire for the alleviation of human suffering as well as for the reign of peace and justice in the area, will give its most careful and favourable consideration to the recommendations of the Special Political Committee.

Pursuant to rule 68 of the rules of procedure, it was decided not to discuss the report of the Special Political Committee.

232. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): I shall now call on representatives who wish to speak in explanation of vote before the vote.

233. Mr. GHORRA (Lebanon): Technically speaking, this is not an explanation of vote, but I should like to take this opportunity to give some clarification on a point contained in the report of the Special Political Committee which was presented by Mr. Akbel a few moments ago. In dealing with the report of the Special Political Committee I wish to take this opportunity to pay a special tribute to its Chairman, Ambassador Touré of Guinea, and the other officers of the Committee for having conducted its work with competence and efficiency.

234. The Special Political Committee has accomplished the task entrusted to it by adopting meaningful and meritorious draft resolutions concerning UNRWA, the Palestinian Arab refugees, persons displaced following the hostilities of 1967, the recognition of the inalienable rights of the Arab people of Palestine, and Israel's practices in the occupied Territories and its violations of human rights. It is not my intention now to elaborate on these various draft resolutions on which we are going to vote and which were adopted by substantial majorities and commend themselves to still wider support in the General Assembly. The draft resolutions are contained in the report just submitted by the Rapporteur.

235. However, I should like to deal briefly with one point referred to in that report. Representatives will recall that the delegations of Afghanistan, Egypt, Indonesia, Jordan, Lebanon, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Pakistan, Somalia, Syria and Yugoslavia presented a draft resolution [A/SPC/L.253] in the Special Political Committee requesting the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine to make available to parties concerned documents relating to properties of the Palestinian Arab people. However, the sponsors, responding to an appeal by the representative of the United States, which he made in his capacity as Chairman of the Commission, did not press the draft resolution to a vote in view of the consultations which were in progress between the members of the Commission and the sponsors. However, I requested, on behalf of the sponsors, that the draft resolution be recorded in the report pending the outcome of the consultations [see A/8915, para. 21].

236. I am happy to state at this stage that the consultations were fruitful and that the sponsors have received formal assurances from the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine, through its Chairman, Ambassador Phillips of the United States, that the documents will be made available to them upon request. In identical letters to the Permanent Representatives to the United Nations of Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Lebanon, dated 6 December 1972, the Chairman of the Commission stated, *inter alia*, the following:

"I am able to inform you that the Commission has decided that the Permanent Representatives of Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria, or designated members of their staff, may have access to copies or microfilms of land registers received from the Mandatory Government or copies of the following documents developed by the Commission and its staff in pursuit of its mandate:

"(a) RP 1 forms; that is, for the identification of property parcels, including individual evaluation figures;

"(b) Index of owners' names, which provides means of direct reference to the holdings recorded in the case of each owner."

237. I should like to take this opportunity to express our profound appreciation to the members of the Commission, the United States, France and Turkey, and to the Chairman of the Commission, for their co-operation and understanding. For this reason, the sponsors did not deem it necessary to reintroduce their draft resolution for action by the Assembly.

238. Mr. TEKOAH (Israel): The United Nations has discussed the Palestine refugee question in 25 sessions of the General Assembly. During this period tens of millions of persons have been uprooted from their homes in various parts of the world, have found refuge in foreign lands and have reintegrated themselves into normal, creative life. All those problems have been resolved. The only exception is the problem of Arab refugees. The great majority of Arab refugees moved merely from one part of Palestine to another. Most of them did not even cross the river Jordan that traverses the land. The remainder found refuge, not in foreign countries, but in neighbouring Arab States among

their own kith and kin. Yet the issue of Arab refugees, who constitute a tiny fraction of the refugees throughout the world in recent decades, has been preserved for political reasons.

239. Having caused the refugee problem by their own war of aggression against Israel in 1948, the Arab Governments have persistently kept it alive as an instrument of continued belligerency towards Israel. They have rejected all United Nations efforts such as the Clapp mission's plan¹³ or the informal Hammarskjöld proposals, which offered the refugees an opportunity for normal life, work and housing. They tried to restrict the refugees to camps, deny them the possibility of earning a decent living, keep them in misery as second-class citizens in Arab lands—all in order to satisfy the needs of political propaganda warfare. Similar treatment has been meted out to the persons displaced by the 1967 hostilities.

240. The Arab Governments' callousness and at times cruelty towards their own brethren has been underscored by the fact that during the same period Israel by itself has successfully absorbed Jewish refugees in numbers much larger than the total number of Palestinian refugees. Jewish refugees in Israel from Arab States alone exceed the number of Arab refugees from Israel. However, an even more striking indication of the Arab Governments' disregard for the interests of the refugees is to be found in the transformation that has taken place in the last five years in the lives of those who are within Israeli administered territories. There is no longer any unemployment. All refugees are gainfully employed. The standard of life has risen dramatically. For the first time since 1948 there are real prospects of the refugees re-entering fully productive life. All this seems, however, to have no effect on the Arab States' attitude on this issue in the United Nations. On the contrary, the desire to exploit the annual debate on the UNRWA report to further animosity and friction has become even more pronounced. Even the improved conditions under which the refugees live today on the west bank and in Gaza have become the object of cynical belittlement and misrepresentation.

241. For 25 years the General Assembly has been adopting resolutions which gave satisfaction to Arab belligerency but in no way advanced the settlement of the refugee problem. Again today a series of draft resolutions has been brought before this plenary meeting, almost all—in particular draft resolutions IC, ID and IE—reflecting the usual expressions of Arab animosity towards Israel. Ignoring facts, perverting truth, distorting legal precepts, injecting issues extraneous to the refugee problem such as the positions adopted by Palestinian terrorist organizations, those texts, as in the past, are inequitable and detrimental. As in the past, Israel will oppose them. By their one-sided and acrimonious nature, these draft resolutions re-emphasize the known inability of the United Nations to discuss objectively any aspect of the Middle East situation and to contribute constructively to its solution.

242. Utilizing their parliamentary advantage, the Arab Governments have throughout the years confined their

¹³ See *Report of the Economic Survey Mission for the Middle East* (United Nations publication, Sales No. 1949.II.B.5, parts I and II).

efforts in the United Nations to obtaining unbalanced resolutions which are inimical to Israel and ignore its legitimate rights and interests. They have thereby virtually deprived the United Nations of the possibility of playing a useful role in the advancement of peace in the area. The only way the United Nations could play such a role is, first, by replacing sterile polemical debates with serious, constructive exchanges of views; secondly, by adopting resolutions arrived at through consultation with and consent of the parties directly concerned; and thirdly, by encouraging the parties to seek agreement between themselves through negotiation.

243. As long as the United Nations continues on its present course of acrimonious verbiage, it will inevitably remain outside the arena of effective peace-making efforts. Israel, for its part, in accordance with the principle of the sovereign equality of all States as enshrined in the Charter, will be guided only by texts which are formulated in consultation with it and which give due consideration to its rights and its views.

244. The victims of the Arab States' policy in the United Nations are first and foremost the Palestinian refugees themselves. Instead of assisting them in reconstructing their lives, the Arab Governments have been feeding them, year after year, with United Nations resolutions which reflect the views of notorious violators of international law and morality such as Syria, Libya and Algeria but, because of the parliamentary mechanics of our Organization, not even the actual opinions of all those who vote with them.

245. Instead of giving the refugees hope of a solution to their problem the Arab Governments have been offering them, again and again, hackneyed slogans of hate and hostility. Instead of attending to and respecting the concerns of the Palestinians the Arab Governments have been representing in the United Nations the interests of Palestinian terror organizations, initiated, supported and controlled by them. Those professional thugs, numbering a few thousand and assisted by foreign mercenaries, are no more representative of the refugees or of the Palestinian Arabs in general than the Assassins who appeared in the Arab lands, in the Middle Ages were representative of the Arab world at that time. The Arab people, including the Palestinian refugees, know that their future lies in agreement with Israel. Indeed, the first indication that Arab Governments are seriously concerned about their fate will come when those Governments cease pressing for the adoption of texts such as those before us today and begin seeking agreement with Israel. It is time to end the annual recitals of calumny which lead nowhere, and to enter on the path towards agreement and the solution of the problems besetting the Middle East.

246. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): We shall now vote on the draft resolutions recommended by the Special Political Committee in paragraph 25 of document A/8915. I put to the vote first draft resolution I A.

Draft resolution I A was adopted by 124 votes to none, with 1 abstention (resolution 2963 A (XXVII)).

247. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): Next I put to the vote draft resolution I B.

Draft resolution I B was adopted by 125 votes to none (resolution 2963 B (XXVII)).

248. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): I now put to the vote draft resolution I C. A recorded vote has been requested.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Austria, Bahrain, Belgium, Botswana, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon, Chad, Chile, China, Congo, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Gabon, Greece, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti,¹⁴ Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Republic, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Netherlands, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Peru, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zambia.

Against: Barbados, Bolivia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Israel.

Abstaining: Argentina, Australia, Bhutan, Brazil, Canada, Central African Republic, Colombia, Dahomey, Ghana, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Laos, Malawi, Nepal, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Philippines, Portugal, Singapore, United States of America, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Zaïre.

Draft resolution I C was adopted by 95 votes to 6, with 24 abstentions (resolution 2963 C (XXVII)).

249. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): We now turn to draft resolution I D. A recorded vote has been requested.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Australia, Austria, Bahrain, Belgium, Botswana, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon, Canada, Chad, Chile, China, Congo, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Greece, Guinea, Guyana, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Republic, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Netherlands, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Peru, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal,

¹⁴ The delegation of Haiti subsequently informed the Secretariat that it wished to have its vote on the draft resolution recorded as an abstention.

Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zambia.

Against: Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Israel, Nicaragua.

Abstaining: Argentina, Barbados, Bhutan, Bolivia, Brazil, Central African Republic, Colombia, Dahomey, El Salvador, Gabon, Ghana, Haiti,¹⁵ Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Laos, Malawi, Nepal, New Zealand, Paraguay, Philippines, Portugal, Singapore, United States of America, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Zaire.

Draft resolution I D was adopted by 93 votes to 5, with 26 abstentions (resolution 2963 D (XXVII)).

250. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): We come now to draft resolution I E. A roll-call vote has been requested.

A vote was taken by roll-call.

Sweden, having been drawn by lot by the President, was called upon to vote first.

In favour: Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zambia, Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Bahrain, Bulgaria, Burma,¹⁶ Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon, Chad, Chile, China, Congo, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Guinea, Guyana, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libyan Arab Republic, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mongolia, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Peru, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland.¹⁷

Against: United States of America, Barbados, Belgium, Bolivia, Canada, Costa Rica, Denmark, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Israel, Italy, Lesotho, Liberia, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua.

Abstaining: Sweden, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Zaire, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bhutan, Botswana, Brazil, Central African Republic, Colombia, Dahomey, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Gabon,

Ghana, Greece, Ireland, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Laos, Malawi, Malta, Mexico, Nepal, Norway, Paraguay, Philippines, Portugal, Rwanda, Singapore.

Draft resolution I E was adopted by 67 votes to 21, with 37 abstentions (resolution 2963 E (XXVII)).

251. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): We turn next to draft resolution I F. If there is no objection, may I take it that the General Assembly decides to adopt draft resolution I F?

Draft resolution I F was adopted (resolution 2963 F (XXVII)).

252. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): We come now to draft resolution II recommended by the Special Political Committee. The report of the Fifth Committee on the administrative and financial implications of this draft resolution is contained in document A/8920.

Draft resolution II was adopted by 122 votes to none (resolution 2964 (XXVII)).

253. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): I shall now call on those representatives who wish to explain their votes after the vote.

254. Mr. CUEVAS (Guatemala) (*interpretation from Spanish*): The delegation of Guatemala wishes to explain its position regarding the draft resolutions recommended by the Special Political Committee for adoption by the General Assembly in connexion with its consideration of agenda item 40 [A/8915, para. 25].

255. Although my country understands that the problem of the Palestinian refugees has a highly complex political background as regards its origins and causes, evolution and projection, stalemate and solution, we have always been ready to contribute with our vote to the equitable and just settlement of this question, without at any time seeking to interfere with the exclusive and domestic jurisdiction of States.

256. Member States alien to the conflict have, however, been deeply concerned with the human suffering engendered and unduly prolonged by this situation, despite the already countless resolutions and measures adopted by the United Nations to obtain the repatriation or resettlement of the refugees, as planned, while the martyrdom of thousands of families which still languish in that unfortunate position is also prolonged notwithstanding the outstanding service rendered by the Commissioner-General of UNRWA and his staff, as well as the specialized agencies and private organizations, to alleviate their suffering and assist them in their plight.

257. My delegation, aware of the exclusively humanitarian, concrete and constructive orientation of some of the proposals seeking to solve the problem of the Palestinian refugees, voted unreservedly in favour of draft resolutions I A, I B and II.

258. On the other hand, it was not possible for my delegation to support the other drafts which, in our view,

¹⁵ The delegation of Haiti subsequently informed the Secretariat that it wished to have its vote recorded as having been against the draft resolution.

¹⁶ The delegation of Burma subsequently informed the Secretariat that it wished to have its vote on the draft resolution recorded as an abstention.

¹⁷ The delegation of Swaziland subsequently informed the Secretariat that it wished to have its vote recorded as having been against the draft resolution.

contained affirmations of facts and attribution of acts that fall within the internal sphere of other States or are not unquestionably proved, or qualify and attempt to determine situations that should be solved by direct arrangement between the parties alone, possibly with the assistance of the United Nations, as is the case with draft resolutions I C and I D, against which we voted for those same reasons. The same can be said of draft resolution I E against which we voted because, although we sincerely believe that the basic principles underlying its preambular paragraphs are fundamental for the coexistence of the international legal community, its operative paragraphs cover subjects and controversial situations between the belligerent parties that should be settled in accordance with the peaceful means advocated by the United Nations Charter and international law.

259. Finally, the votes cast by my delegation cannot be construed as acceptance or support on our part of acts that run counter to international law, such as *actum bellum*, which gives no one the right of conquest, be it territorial or of any other kind. Neither should it be inferred that our impartial attitude, inclined to favour with our vote only humanitarian as opposed to political resolutions, is the result of sympathy for some States or antagonism towards others.

260. Mr. SUKATI (Swaziland): My delegation voted against draft resolution I E because it is not properly within the subject matter entrusted to UNRWA, under the umbrella of which all seven of these resolutions have been placed.

261. The Government and people of the Kingdom of Swaziland are very unhappy about the plight of the people of Palestine and, because of this concern and from the humanitarian point of view, they have been able to contribute to the relief fund for Palestinian Refugees in the Near East this year, despite my country's meagre financial resources. But because draft resolution I E was not in accordance with the spirit of seeking a just and equitable settlement of the problem, my delegation could not support it here.

262. Mr. BENNETT (United States): The United States delegation today voted for several of the draft resolutions on the subject of UNRWA. However, we abstained in the vote on the draft resolutions relating to Gaza and to the return of persons displaced in the 1967 hostilities, and we voted against the "Palestinian rights" resolution.

263. My Government has repeatedly stated its position that the legitimate concerns and aspirations of the Palestinians must be taken into account if there is to be a just and lasting peace in the Middle East. If the wording and intent of draft resolution I E had been meant merely to reaffirm this position, we would have voted for it. However, the wording of this draft resolution and the interpretation given by its supporters carry it far beyond such meaning.

264. We continue to support General Assembly resolution 194 (III), as well as Security Council resolution 242 (1967) as the basis for the settlement of the refugee problem, and we supported Security Council resolution 267 (1969) calling on Israel to permit the persons displaced in the 1967

hostilities to return to their homes. Those resolutions take into account the sovereign existence of the State of Israel. The resolution on which we have voted today does not. The United Nations should not undertake action inconsistent with the fact of Israel's membership in the United Nations and its existence as a sovereign State.

265. Security Council resolution 242 (1967) affirms the right of every State in the region to exist with full sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity. Yet, the sponsors of this draft resolution were asking us to vote for a text intended to distort Security Council resolution 242 (1967) as a basis for a peaceful settlement in the Middle East. The debate on the situation in the Middle East in 1970, 1971 and again this year showed overwhelming support for resolution 242 (1967) as the basis for a just settlement. We should not undermine or distort that resolution, upon which hopes for peace in the Middle East rest.

266. Finally, we voted against this draft resolution because it said not a word about the subject at hand, UNRWA.

267. The United States abstained in the vote on draft resolution I C on Israeli policies in the Gaza strip. We have carefully studied the report of the Secretary-General and the remarks of the Commissioner General on this subject. We understand Israel's legitimate security concerns that gave rise to its actions in Gaza in 1971. We regret that UNRWA was not forewarned well in advance of those operations, and we also regret that there has been no progress in the Gaza strip in regard to the rehousing of the refugees whose houses were demolished in July and August 1971 and who are living in unsatisfactory conditions. We also regret that a large number of terrorist acts took place in the Gaza area which led the Israeli authorities to take the action they did. The United States abstained in the vote on this draft resolution because it alleges that certain acts contravene the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War¹⁸ without there being an impartial determination thereof, as provided by the Convention concerned. The United States has repeatedly expressed its concern for the human rights of all civilians in the area of the Middle East conflict including the Gaza Strip. We hope that all parties to the Geneva Convention—and both Israel and its Arab neighbours are parties thereto—will invoke its provisions, especially articles 9 through 12 relating to the appointment of a Protecting Power, as well as article 19, which prohibits individual or mass transfers or deportations of people from occupied areas.

268. The United States regretted that it felt it had no alternative but to abstain on draft resolution I D on persons displaced as a result of the 1967 hostilities. We supported Security Council resolution 237 (1967) and the resolutions on this subject since then which call for the return of the displaced persons. It is a matter of continuing regret to my Government that five years after the 1967 war substantial numbers of the displaced persons, including thousands of UNRWA-registered refugees, have not been permitted to return to their former places of residence in all the areas

¹⁸ See United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 75, No. 973, p. 287.

occupied by Israel since 1967. We hope that events will make progress on this problem possible in the near future. We abstained in the vote on this draft resolution primarily because it, too, alleges a violation of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War without calling on the parties concerned to apply the provisions of that Convention. We hope that the parties to the Middle East dispute will invoke the provisions of the Geneva Convention, and we do not agree with the contention of those opposed to such action that invoking these provisions is a political act. At the same time we are distressed that the actions of Israel in the occupied territories give rise to understandable concern that the eventual disposition of these territories may be prejudiced. The basic task before us should not be recrimination but a determination of what action is possible to ensure the protection of human rights in the occupied Territories. When appropriate, steps should be taken in pursuance of article 149 of the Geneva Convention for dealing with complaints as to violations of human rights. In the meantime, we believe that all efforts to obtain a lasting settlement in the Middle East must continue. Such an over-all peace will include a just settlement of the refugee problem. The peace settlement envisaged in resolution 242 (1967) provides the most promising avenue for meeting the just aspirations and concerns of the Palestinians and for providing the framework within which the state of occupation will end.

AGENDA ITEM 38

The policies of *apartheid* of the Government of South Africa (concluded):*

- (a) Reports of the Special Committee on *Apartheid*;
- (b) Reports of the Secretary-General

REPORT OF THE SPECIAL POLITICAL COMMITTEE (PART II) (A/8879/Add.1)

AGENDA ITEM 41

Comprehensive review of the whole question of peace-keeping operations in all their aspects: report of the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations

REPORT OF THE SPECIAL POLITICAL COMMITTEE (A/8926)

269. Mr. AKBEL (Turkey), Rapporteur of the Special Political Committee: As the Rapporteur of the Special Political Committee, I have the honour to introduce two reports relating to agenda items 38 and 41.

270. The General Assembly will recall that on 15 November 1972 [2085th meeting] I had the honour of submitting a report by the Special Political Committee concerning the policies of *apartheid* of the Government of South Africa. On that occasion, I indicated that the item had not yet been officially concluded by the Committee, and that it was likely that further recommendations would be made to the General Assembly at the appropriate time. It is my privilege now to introduce part II of that report by the Committee on the question. This report is specifically

devoted to the proposed International Conference of Trade Unions against *Apartheid*, as provided for in resolution 2775 H (XXVI) [A/8879/Add.1].

271. In this connexion I should like to inform the General Assembly that the Special Political Committee had the advantage of considering a recent report by the Special Committee on *Apartheid* describing the efforts undertaken at the ILO to promote a conference of trade union organizations next year [A/8722/Add.2]. Following consideration of that report, the Special Political Committee adopted at its 845th meeting a further draft resolution, which is contained in paragraph 6 of the document which I have just submitted. The fact that the draft resolution was adopted by an overwhelming majority of 99 to 1, with 6 abstentions, is eloquent testimony to the great importance attached by the Committee to the role of the international trade union movement in combating *apartheid*. It is my fervent hope that the General Assembly will give this draft resolution its full support.

272. The second report which I have the honour to introduce now is the report of the Special Political Committee on agenda item 41 [A/8926].

273. As noted in its report in document A/8888, the Special Committee on Peace-Keeping Operations had been unable to achieve progress on agreed guidelines for United Nations peace-keeping operations established by the Security Council in accordance with the Charter. During the past year, however, it elected a new panel of officers and enlarged its Working Group, a previously unsettled issue that had hampered its work for a considerable period of time. Consequently, it was able to state in its report its belief that:

“... should the General Assembly decide to authorize it to continue the work which it has undertaken, it will be possible for it, with the assistance of the enlarged Working Group, to accelerate its work in the coming year and to make a positive report to the General Assembly at its twenty-eighth session”. [A/8888, para. 12.]

274. During the course of the discussion in the Special Political Committee at its 843rd to 848th meetings, several delegations expressed disappointment that no progress had been achieved in the task of preparing the agreed guidelines for peace-keeping operations. However, a great number of representatives also expressed their appreciation of the success of the Special Committee in overcoming its institutional difficulties through the election of a new Chairman and Vice-Chairman. They hoped that this accomplishment, together with the documentation submitted by Member States in accordance with the resolution adopted by the Assembly at its twenty-sixth session, would provide a more auspicious atmosphere for a further year of effort by the Special Committee on Peace-Keeping Operations.

275. On 30 November the Special Political Committee adopted a four-Power draft resolution incorporating many of the suggestions put forward during the debate. Operative paragraph 5 of that draft resolution urges the Special Committee to accelerate and intensify its work so as to make substantial progress on agreed guidelines for carrying out peace-keeping operations. The draft resolution was

* Resumed from the 2085th meeting.

adopted by the Special Political Committee without objection, and it hopes that the General Assembly will give the same unanimous approval to its recommendation on this item.

Pursuant to rule 68 of the rules of procedure, it was decided not to discuss the reports of the Special Political Committee.

276. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): The General Assembly will first take up part II of the report of the Special Political Committee relating to item 38, [A/8879/Add.1]. We shall now vote on the draft resolution recommended by the Special Political Committee in paragraph 6 of that report. The report of the Fifth Committee on the administrative and financial implications of this draft resolution is contained in document A/8953. A recorded vote has been requested.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahrain, Belgium, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Dahomey, Denmark, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Finland, Gabon, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Khmer Republic, Kuwait, Laos, Liberia, Libyan Arab Republic, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Nigeria,

Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia.

Against: Portugal, South Africa.

Abstaining: France, Greece, Lesotho, Malawi, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America.

The draft resolution was adopted by 105 votes to 2, with 6 abstentions (resolution 2923 F (XXVII)).¹⁹

277. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): I now invite members of the Assembly to turn to the report of the Special Political Committee relating to agenda item 41 [A/8926]. The Assembly will not vote on the draft resolution recommended by the Special Political Committee in paragraph 9 of that report. If there is no objection, I shall take it that the General Assembly decides to adopt this resolution.

The draft resolution was adopted (resolution 2965 (XXVII)).

The meeting rose at 8.15 p.m.

¹⁹ The delegation of Iraq subsequently informed the Secretariat that it wished to have its vote recorded as having been in favour of the draft resolution.