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President: Mr. Frederick H. BOLAND (Ireland).

AGENDA ITEM 85

The situation in the Republic of the Congo (continued)

1. Mr. NESBITT (Canada): When this session of the Assembly adjourned three months ago, it was in an atmosphere of deep concern over the course of events in the Congo. There is no need for me to review the developments of the intervening period. Some have been tragic. Some have been profoundly disquieting in their implications. Few have given much ground for satisfaction or for optimism. If there is one encouraging sign to be found, it is perhaps the evidence there has been in this debate of widespread concern to find a real and lasting solution to the problems which beset the Congo. Encouragement can be found in this fact, I believe, even though we cannot ignore, at the same time, the evidence of deep and fundamental disagreement over the direction in which any solution should be sought.

2. There is not, of course, just one single Congo problem. There are at least three Congo problems, and in one of these, I am happy to say, the United Nations and its agencies, with help from Governments and other outside sources, have been outstandingly successful and have earned the whole-hearted appreciation of the Congolese authorities. This is the whole field of social, economic and technical matters in which the United Nations civilian operations in the Congo have been functioning quietly and efficiently: bringing emergency relief, combating famine conditions, assisting medical and health services, helping to restore communications and co-operating in a wide variety of other technical and administrative fields. In our concern with the more intractable aspects of the Congo problem we must not lose sight of these successes or fail to pay tribute to the devoted and unselfish efforts which have made them possible.

3. The other two main Congo problems are what might be called in general terms the military problem, and the political problem. Both present unusual features, so far as the United Nations is concerned, largely because of the fact that "The situation in the Republic of the Congo"—as it appears on the Assembly's agenda—is to an important extent the internal problem of a sovereign State. The United Nations, with its strong awareness—written clearly into the Charter—of

the limitations which apply when matters of domestic jurisdiction are involved, has had no previous experience with exactly this type of problem. No such situation was envisaged, indeed, when the Charter was drafted.

4. Yet the involvement of the United Nations in the Congo was unquestionably right, and perhaps inevitable. The conflict which had broken out in the Congo was internal, but outside intervention was already a fact, and the very real possibility of major international conflict growing out of the Congo situation was evident to everyone. Negative successes are difficult to document, but it is a fact that the United Nations has contained, though not yet eliminated, outside intervention and that international hostilities have not broken out over the Congo. It is not unreasonable to suppose, at the least, that the involvement of the United Nations and the physical presence of United Nations forces in the Congo have been a factor in keeping the peace internationally. More remains to be done, of course. My delegation urges all Member States concerned to comply with the terms of the Security Council resolution of 21 February 1961¹ and previous resolutions. Only if this is done will the Congolese people be free to settle their own problems.

5. Even at the outset, the military rule of the United Nations was not solely a matter of dealing with outside intervention or of helping to prevent international conflict. From the start there was a concurrent role of technical and direct assistance to the Congolese Government and armed forces. This was broadened, through subsequent mandates from the General Assembly and the Security Council, and in recognition of the increasing degree of confusion and conflict in the Congo, until, under the Security Council resolution of 21 February, the United Nations forces have a definite role, as well, in the prevention, halting and containment of civil war. At the same time, they remain under the clearest instructions not to be a party to, or to seek to influence the outcome of, any internal conflict; they are, in other words, to be completely impartial.

6. It would be difficult to argue that measures to bring an end to violence and bloodshed, to prevent or to contain civil strife, are not an essential concomitant to any successful programme for dealing with the two other Congo problems: the problem of needed civil assistance and the problem of a political solution. It can even be maintained, I believe, that they are vital to the other aspects of the military problem, for unrestrained civil strife constitutes an open invitation to outside intervention, and carries with it the possibility of international conflict. Yet for all their justification, it is in these respects that the United Nations operation is breaking new ground. Perhaps it is not surprising

¹ Official Records of the Security Council, Sixteenth Year, Supplement for January, February and March 1961, document S/4741.

that it is here also that it has encountered the most serious difficulties and has met with the strongest criticism.

7. I do not propose to discuss these difficulties in any detail. For one thing, I do not believe that their solution will be hastened at this juncture by making them the subject of partisan debate. They can only be solved by the slow and unspectacular processes of patient negotiation and conciliation undertaken with good will and good faith. For what they have already done in trying circumstances, my country pays whole-hearted tribute to the Secretary-General and his staff, and to the Commander, the officers and the men of all nations serving in the United Nations forces in the Congo.

8. There is one point upon which I must touch, however, and that is the regrettable circumstance whereby individual members and units of the United Nations force in the Congo have all too frequently found themselves in conflict with the forces they had come to the Congo to help. Sometimes these incidents have taken the form of obstruction or harassment of individuals or small units by clearly undisciplined groups of Congolese soldiers. On other occasions, as in the recent incidents at Banana and Matadi, what has happened has been, to some extent at least, a matter of deliberate policy and direction.

9. It is difficult for me, as a Canadian, to take a detached view of these matters. Canada's contribution to the United Nations forces in the Congo is small in terms of total numbers, but this fact does not make the life or the welfare of any one of these men a matter of any less concern to the Canadian Government and the Canadian people. It is not an easy thing to see these individuals endangered or humiliated, in what can only seem to be a completely pointless manner. In addition to Canada's understandable concern about its own forces, the incidents to which I have referred have grave implications for the United Nations as a whole. What is at stake here is not some obscure point of interpretation, but the fundamental meaning and dignity of the United Nations Organization and the personal safety of its representatives in the Congo. It is Canada's view that a most unequivocal stand in this regard must be taken by the United Nations and that it must be unreservedly supported by all the Members of this body.

10. Our strong view on this matter of adequate security for United Nations personnel in no way detracts from our recognition of limitations governing the use of force by United Nations troops in seeking to prevent violence and civil war, as provided for in the Security Council resolution of 21 February. This is an entirely different matter. Clearly the United Nations is not a party to the conflict in the Congo, nor is it pitted against any faction there. It must by its mandate, as I have already noted, be impartial. It can employ force, under its mandate from the Security Council, but only as a last resort. This qualification must be taken to mean precisely what it says and must be applied in each case according to the circumstances. For the rest, the United Nations must make its best endeavour to bring about an appropriate understanding of its aims and objectives in the Congo, and to eliminate the misunderstandings which have been a tragic source of trouble in the past. My delegation has urged repeatedly in the appropriate quarters, and urges once more, that these efforts be vigorously pursued.

11. I have said that it is difficult for countries and Governments to take a dispassionate view when the

dignity, the safety, and even the lives of their nationals seem to be being placed pointlessly in jeopardy. It is almost equally difficult to be forced to watch while the complex and painful problems which I have described are cynically used, by some, to mount a vicious attack against the fabric of the United Nations and against its Secretary-General. I can only say that it has bolstered my country's confidence in the soundness of the United Nations that this cynical attempt to exploit the tragedy of the Congo for extraneous and unworthy purposes has met with so little positive response.

12. I shall wish to revert to the military aspects of the Congo problem in another context before I close, but I should now like to turn to the third type of problem I mentioned earlier—the political problem. Here we encounter a fundamental dilemma.

13. We can all agree, I think, that the ultimate achievement of a political solution in the Congo is basic to the final success of the United Nations intervention. For whatever may be done—in implementation of General Assembly or Security Council directives—to contain the threat to international peace and security and to restore order, and whatever may be done by other agencies of the United Nations to deal with the many other tragic problems which beset the Congo, these can be no more than stop-gap measures in the absence of a real and lasting political settlement. Conversely, it cannot but be recognized that a clear-cut political solution would do more than anything else to remove the threat to international peace and security, and to hasten the solution of the other problems I have mentioned.

14. But—and here is the dilemma—it has been clearly recognized that a political solution, with agreement on the constitutional and legal forms which should prevail in the Congo, must of necessity—and quite properly—be matters for the Congolese people alone to decide. Stated in its simplest terms, a political solution is vital to the United Nations, but the United Nations cannot intervene to achieve a political solution.

15. I am well aware that, while lip-service is paid to a policy of "hands off Congo politics", many if not most States represented here today have their own ideas of what the solution should be—ideas which usually correspond to those of one or another of the contending factions in the Congo itself—and they are not above doing what they can, internationally, to foster the solutions they favour. This is a subtle kind of intervention in the internal affairs of the Congo and a sort of interference which unfortunately no United Nations operation can prevent.

16. Yet, oddly enough, for this very reason, it remains true that the United Nations could not—even if it wished—impose a political solution on the Congo, for there could never be agreement on the solution to impose. Differences of opinion, reflecting to some extent the basic ideological and other differences with which we are all too familiar in the United Nations, would always prevent such agreement. No proposed solution for the Congo, no faction in its internal political conflict, can win an absolute majority of support here.

17. What is perhaps worse is that the divisions here to a considerable extent inhibit the reaching of a solution there. It must already have been remarked in the Congo that, although we insist here that the Congolese should settle their own political differences, there is no corresponding enthusiasm—there may, indeed, be

outright condemnation—when some of the political leaders in the Congo get together and do in fact attempt to settle some of their political differences.

18. This is a deplorable situation, and it prompts me to ask very seriously indeed: Is the United Nations incapable of assisting the Republic of the Congo to find a solution to its political problems? Must we perpetuate, in that unhappy country, the differences which plague us here?

19. This need not be so, I believe—but on one condition. This condition is that we admit the truth of what I have just been saying: that none of us can hope to win majority support here for the particular type of solution he favours for the Congo, or majority acceptance of the particular Congolese leader or faction he endorses. Once this is admitted, I believe that the United Nations can in fact leave the Congolese people to settle their own political problems—can even give them impartial and constructive assistance to that end.

20. It is clear that the United Nations cannot, and should not, remain indefinitely in the Congo. Perhaps it is not too early, therefore, to ask ourselves what minimum conditions of order, stability and security should be met before the task of the United Nations forces there can be completed. Looking forward to that day, we should be prepared to admit that the situation which the United Nations will leave in the Congo may be less than perfect. But is this so surprising? How many of us would claim that political conditions in our own country are ideal? Given their slender preparation and their underlying problems, should we expect more of the Congolese?

21. It is apt to be forgotten, I think, that one important effort has already been made in the direction of a political settlement. The Conciliation Commission was not, despite its commendable achievement in this field, primarily a fact-finding commission. The first task of the Conciliation Commission was to conciliate. It would appear, moreover, that it came very close to succeeding. I have in mind, particularly, the statement on this point by the representative of Ghana in his observations in annex XX of the Commission's report [A/4711/Add.1 and 2]. The Commission has, moreover, indicated a variety of ways in which the United Nations could assist the Congolese people to find a solution, and I commend them to the Assembly's attention.

22. Most particularly, I would urge upon all Member States the wisdom of abandoning the sterile sort of dispute which seeks to discredit all but one or another favoured faction in the Congo on the grounds that the others have no valid claim to legality or constitutionality. The view of my delegation is that legality and constitutionality have for so long been disregarded in the Congo that no faction is immune from this type of attack. This is not intended as criticism of any of the *de facto* authorities in the Congo. A wise Asian colleague in the Advisory Committee on the Congo has remarked that legality is not apt to be a feature of revolutionary situations, and this is very true indeed. At the same time I would urge the authorities in the Congo to return to legality and constitutionality in their actions as rapidly as possible. I would draw the Assembly's attention to the Conciliation Commission's recommendations in this connexion, because this seems to me to be the best way, and possibly the only way, in which the views of the real sovereign authority—the Congolese people themselves—can be adequately taken into account.

23. It has been generally recognized that it is of crucial importance to the United Nations effort in the Congo that there should be a legal and effective Congolese Government for it to deal with, and I have suggested some measures which might help toward the achievement of this objective. In the meantime there is, in Canada's opinion, a considerable field for constructive co-operation between the United Nations authorities and the *de facto* authorities in the Congo. My delegation urges that this area of practical co-operation be widened in every way possible.

24. Before leaving this general subject of the role of the United Nations in the Congo and the relationship between the world Organization and the Congolese, I should like to restate Canada's conception of the essential nature and purposes of United Nations involvement in the Congo. In our view, the fundamental objective of the United Nations effort is to help the Congolese people to solve their problems themselves. Whether in vital first steps to restore public order, or in the formulation of more substantive measures for a return to constitutional procedures or, when these initial problems are overcome, in bringing to bear all the varied resources of the United Nations in rebuilding the economy and administrative services of the country, the United Nations can assist the Congo effectively only in co-operation with the Congolese. The United Nations should not seek to impose solutions to the problems of the Congo.

25. It is relevant to observe that the objectives of the United Nations operation in the Congo have apparently not been fully understood by the Congolese people, nor indeed—and this is more important—appreciated by the majority of Congolese leaders. Efforts are being made to correct this situation. But since the success of the United Nations efforts in the Congo must depend on working with the understanding and support of the Congolese, this should be one of the most urgent and important tasks of the United Nations representatives in the Congo.

26. I have described the problems facing the United Nations in providing civil assistance to the Congo, in dealing with the various military questions which have arisen, and in fostering a political settlement. I have spoken of the successes achieved, of the difficulties faced—many of them new in United Nations experience—and I have suggested various ways in which, in my delegation's view, we might profitably proceed in the future. I have not laid much stress on what is at stake for the United Nations in the Congo, because I think there is no lack of awareness of it. What is at stake, of course, is nothing less than the continued ability of the United Nations to take effective action in cases of threats to peace and security. This awareness is indicated, among many other ways, by the response to the Secretary-General's recent appeal for additional troops to serve with the United Nations in the Congo. In this regard, I should like to pay special tribute to the Government of India for its action in making available very substantial numbers of troops at a decidedly critical juncture.

27. For Canada's part, we have attempted throughout the course of the United Nations involvement in the Congo to provide what assistance we can in the most appropriate manner open to us, in the form of technicians, emergency food supplies and medical aid. Because of Canada's contribution of non-combatant military personnel serving in the Congo, Canada has had a place on the Secretary-General's Advisory Committee.

It has always been our intention to play what I might call a non-combatant role in that context as well. But without violating the confidential nature of the deliberations of the Committee, I think I can say that we have found it to be, for the most part, not only a non-combatant committee but a thoroughly hard-working and constructive one.

28. I should now like to turn for a moment to some of the broad financial implications for the United Nations of operations such as that now being carried on in the Congo. The years since San Francisco have seen the Organization assume increasingly extensive functions and responsibilities in the economic and social, as well as in the political, fields. Step by step with this development, which all of us must welcome, the financial resources required have also swelled to magnitudes not contemplated in 1945. The regular annual budget for the United Nations alone already stands at some \$73 million. Quite apart from the resources made available to the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the International Development Association, and the International Monetary Fund, the total annual contributions to the United Nations specialized agencies, the Expanded Programme, and the Special Fund now total approximately \$250 million. To the strain of these commitments have been added in recent years the heavy demands of peace-keeping activities. These last, I need hardly add, lie close to the heart of the United Nations concept, and appear in the Charter as the first of the co-operative purposes which must guide us in the implementation of our responsibilities.

29. The United Nations action in the Congo is the most complex and costly peace-keeping operation ever undertaken by this Organization, and it has placed an unprecedented burden on the already strained financial resources available to the United Nations. So far, the operation has not been placed on a firm financial footing and temporary measures have had to be employed to obtain the necessary finances. These have involved heavy borrowing from the Working Capital Fund and from the reserves of the Special Fund and the Expanded Programme. The result has been what is unquestionably the most critical financial crisis the Organization has ever had to face.

30. In these circumstances, the Assembly's attention must be directed urgently to reaching a decision, on the estimates submitted for the Congo operation in 1961 [A/4703], which will ensure the continued financial health of the Organization, and ensure also that its vital peace-keeping activities will not be jeopardized simply for want of the necessary financial means. To put it more bluntly, the question is whether the Congo operation will be allowed to succeed—whether, in other words, the Organization is prepared to provide the financial resources required to implement its own decision.

31. The extreme gravity of the situation which will face the United Nations if no suitable solution to the financial problem is found, and found quickly, will be immediately apparent when viewed in the political context in which the Congo situation has evolved, a context which I have already described. Quite apart from its other novel aspects, the Congo operation represents a further advance in United Nations efforts to develop effective machinery to keep the peace when the great Powers, which are charged with this responsibility, are unable to reach agreement. If this machinery is to continue to be available in the service of international

peace, this Assembly must make adequate financial provision for it. A failure to do so at this critical juncture would not only run dangerous risks for the Congo, but would place in jeopardy the ability of this Organization to take effective action in other situations in the future, in fulfilment of its peace-keeping responsibilities. Of particular significance is the fact that financial instability could also jeopardize the ability of the Organization to maintain the pace of its vital economic and technical assistance programmes. All aspects of the Organization's work are therefore threatened.

32. These thoughts should be before us as we consider the costs of the Congo operation. I do not minimize the difficulties which Members will face in meeting the financial demands which this operation makes on them. My delegation recognizes that the burden will be particularly onerous for those Members in the process of developing their economies, many of whom are themselves receiving international assistance in one form or another. Nevertheless, we believe it is important that the peace-keeping operations of the United Nations should continue to be regarded as a collective responsibility, requiring that each Member bear his fair share. The principle which must be maintained is that the collective benefits we all reap from the existence of a strong and effective United Nations lay upon all of us a collective duty to take up loyally the responsibilities, in political, military and financial terms, which our membership entails.

33. There is at issue here the future not only of the Congo but also of the United Nations. This challenge is for all Members of the United Nations, large and small, to meet, but the middle and smaller Powers have most at stake because they have most to lose if the United Nations fails. As has been truly said before in this Assembly, it is the middle and smaller Powers, and especially those who have recently reached independence, which are the principal beneficiaries of a strong and sound United Nations. It is principally those Powers which look to the United Nations for the defence of their independence and for disinterested economic and technical assistance. And it is to those Powers that I appeal particularly to support the United Nations in this time of trial.

Mr. Adeel (Sudan), Vice-President, took the Chair.

34. Dato' KAMIL (Federation of Malaya): I would like first of all to associate my delegation and myself with other delegations in extending our sincere sympathy and condolence to the delegation of Cuba for the loss it has sustained in the untimely passing-away of Ambassador Manuel Bisbé.

35. It is most saddening that after nine months of untiring United Nations efforts to assist it in the restoration of law and order and in the attainment of a peaceful solution of its political problem, the Republic of the Congo, far from returning to normality, still remains precariously balanced on the brink of catastrophe. The Congo situation has today assumed such dimensions that if it is not arrested, and arrested quickly, it will reach the bursting point, with dreadful implications not only for the Congo but for the whole continent of Africa and indeed for the entire world.

36. The Congo crisis is a matter of extreme urgency for the United Nations. It has become a test of the greatest magnitude to the Organization and all that it stands for.

37. When the Republic of the Congo, in July 1960, in the very first days of its existence as an independent sovereign State, turned to the United Nations for assistance, this Organization, seeing in the situation an opportunity as well as a responsibility to prove its efficacy as an international instrument for the safeguarding of the independence of all States and of international law and order, responded to the Congolese appeal with an enthusiasm and zeal almost without parallel in its eventful history. Looking back, however, at the events that have taken place in the Congo during the past nine months, one is bound to recognize the fact, however unpleasant it may be, that the great experiment in international collaboration, as symbolized by the United Nations operation in the Congo, has not been an unqualified success. Indeed, the Congo situation has developed more and more into a serious international crisis, a crisis to which this Organization has found itself dangerously exposed.

38. When nine months ago the United Nations first resolved to embark upon the Congo operation, it had one primary objective in mind: to save the tottering Republic from chaos and disintegration and to put it back on its feet so that, together with the other newly-emergent states of Africa, it can develop and maintain its independence and achieve prosperity in the direction of African solidarity within the framework of the United Nations. But as the Congo drama unfolded, the United Nations found itself dragged into a crisis of its own, mainly because of dissensions amongst its Members. Today the United Nations has not only to save the Congo, but also to save itself from destruction. This is the magnitude of the problem; the crisis we are facing today is as much a crisis for the United Nations as it is a crisis for the Congo.

39. Along with the majority of Members of this Assembly which genuinely desire an early and lasting solution of the Congo problem, my delegation sees in the United Nations the only instrument possessed by mankind today which can be used effectively to arrest the crisis in the Congo and to prevent it from germinating into an open conflict between outside Powers. From the United Nations point of view the crisis in the Congo presents a challenge which it must face with all the moral and material resources at its command. Upon the success or failure of its endeavour in the Congo may well depend the future of the Organization and that of small, and especially newly independent, countries for which only the United Nations Organization can ensure a world in which their precious independence and national integrity can be safeguarded, and their collective will be brought to bear in the shaping of human destiny and a world of law, order and justice.

40. My delegation therefore strongly deplores the negative attitude adopted by some Members of this Organization in relation to the troubles in the Congo and to the United Nations itself. We fear that such an attitude can have untold damaging effects on our collective efforts to restore peace and stability in the Congo and on our endeavours to strengthen the Organization as an instrument for the safeguarding of the security and integrity of all peoples and for preserving world order.

41. No doubt in a debate such as we are having now, every delegation is freely entitled to speak its mind and in the light of the deteriorating situation in the Congo, harsh and angry words may not be avoidable

at all times. Indeed, some of these may even be justified. Criticisms may be levelled at this or that quarter, provided these criticisms are based on truth and arise out of a sincere desire to search for and facilitate a constructive and practical solution of the problem. The Congo situation has generated considerable passion and emotion among Members of this Organization. A majority of them are genuinely desirous of an early and permanent solution of the problem and are therefore impatient at the intransigent attitude of some parties who, by their stubborn defiance of the resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly, have placed a thorny obstacle in the way of a solution and have caused the Congo crisis to continue and to worsen. I shall come back to this later.

42. There are, however, other kinds of criticism which, because of their vehement tone and of their basis on false and groundless premises, seem to my delegation as being alien to the true interest of the Congo and the United Nations and which, if persistently pursued, could not but destroy the integrity and authority of the United Nations. My delegation regrets that some powerful Members of this Organization, capitalizing on the tragic turn of events in the Congo and on the setbacks suffered by the United Nations operation, instead of offering constructive and practical suggestions have chosen to attack the United Nations operation for its alleged failure in the Congo and to hurl against the executive organ of the Organization charges of complicity in undermining the independence and integrity of the Republic of the Congo.

43. These allegations, coupled with the incessant attacks on the person and the office of the Secretary-General, would appear to my delegation as being motivated by a sinister design to wreck the authority of the United Nations as an instrument for safeguarding international order and justice. My delegation is comforted to note that a great majority of Member States are aware of the possible implications of these charges. We join with these delegations in rejecting strongly the demand that has been repeated in this Assembly and outside for the dismissal of the present Secretary-General, Mr. Dag Hammarskjöld, and for his replacement by a triumvirate.

44. To accept the concept of a triumvirate of Secretaries-General is to accept in resignation and to perpetuate what has often been called the reality of the present-day political situation—namely, a world ruled by power blocs. We cannot transplant this reality into the highest executive office in this Organization, for to do so would deprive the Organization's executive of its independence in carrying out the policies agreed upon in the policy-making bodies of this Organization. A triumvirate of Secretaries-General, because of its built-in veto system, will put into cold storage of inaction and non-implementation most of the majority decisions of the policy-making organs of this body. It is therefore impracticable, unworkable and undesirable. To persist in demanding the replacement of the present system of a single Secretary-General by a system of a triumvirate would appear to my delegation as a deliberate attempt to wreck the authority and effectiveness of our Organization.

45. Apart from its impracticability, my delegation rejects in principle the very concept of the triumvirate of Secretaries-General because by its very idea of bloc representation it negates the principle of the sovereignty of States. As I have said earlier, to accept the triumvirate of Secretaries-General is tantamount to accepting

the implanting of power politics in the executive of our Organization. This is the same as subordinating the interests of the Members of this Organization to the whims and fancies of bloc power politics. While it may be true that some States regard themselves as belonging to a particular power bloc, and even subordinate their individual interest to the larger interest of the bloc, the Federation of Malaya, and I have no doubt the majority of the non-committed States, do not consider themselves as belonging to, nor do they wish to place their interests in the hands of, a particular bloc, call it, as you may, a neutralist bloc. Indeed, such a neutralist bloc does not exist. It is a misnomer and, as far as my delegation is concerned, contrary to the basic idea of non-commitment of the non-committed States.

46. The United Nations is an Organization in which all Members have equal status and exercise their votes freely on all issues. They will submit freely to a majority decision arrived at by a democratic parliamentary procedure. But they must not allow such a decision to be vetoed by an executive organ ruled by power blocs. My delegation joins with others in resisting any attempt to destroy the authority of the Organization. In particular my delegation associates itself without any reservation with the delegation of Ireland, whose Foreign Minister the other day appealed to all delegations, especially those of newly-independent States, to rally together in upholding our Organization. He spoke for Ireland, a country well known for its independent policies and for its tradition of liberty and freedom. But his words may well apply to all countries, particularly to the small and the weak, and with his permission I quote his words:

"Any attempt to destroy this Organization is indirectly an attempt to destroy our independence, to return to a world of jungle law in which the weak are destroyed or cruelly exploited by the strong. We are, therefore, in duty bound to our own people, and to the memory of the patriots who prepared the way for our country's independence, to resist attacks directed, through the United Nations, against our freedom." [969th meeting, para. 18.]

47. From the most severe critics of the United Nations has now come a demand that the United Nations should wind up its operation in the Congo. My delegation deplores this defeatist and negative attitude. True, the United Nations operation in the Congo has not yet been a complete success. But one has to view the whole situation against the magnitude and complexity of the problem. The Secretary-General made a pertinent remark in this connexion when, in his statement to the Assembly on 29 March, he referred to allegations of United Nations failure in the Congo. He said:

"It seems reasonable to ask those who say so whether the reason for their disappointment is that the Organization has done anything less than it could do, or that elements beyond the control of the Organization have created difficulties which at the present stage of its development are insuperable for the instrument for international co-operation which Members have created in the United Nations, even when that instrument is strained to its utmost capacity." [970th meeting, para. 8.]

48. Furthermore, it needs no stretch of the imagination to visualize what would have happened in the Congo had the situation there been allowed to develop without intervention by the United Nations. The situa-

tion would surely have developed into a civil and tribal war of the most uninhibited kind, backed by massive foreign interventions. Without the dedicated efforts of the United Nations civilian operation in the Congo, famine would have developed into catastrophic proportion and infinitely more people would have fallen victims to diseases and epidemics. And without the presence of the United Nations Force, civil strife would have spread to an infinitely larger scale and victims of brutalities and murders would have been far greater.

49. Today, thanks to the United Nations operation in the Congo, and more particularly to the resolution of the Security Council of 21 February 1961,² which gave a specific mandate to the United Nations Force to prevent civil war, the spectre of civil war, which loomed so menacingly in the days immediately following the bestial and brutal assassination of former Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba and his colleagues, had at least been kept at bay. But the threat still hangs over the Congo, and it is the United Nations, and the United Nations alone, which can prevent a Korea or a Spain being repeated in the strife-torn Congo.

50. It is to honour our deep faith in the United Nations that my Government decided to send troops to the Congo. Ours is a small country and far away from the Congo. We have no designs in the Congo nor in Africa other than to see that the people of the Congo live in peace and stability and develop their own independence and prosperity. We also saw in the Congo a dangerous situation which could develop into something catastrophic for the whole world. And we believe that only the United Nations can prevent this from happening. That is why we in the first place rallied behind the United Nations in its effort to help the Republic of the Congo.

51. When, during the early part of this year, the United Nations Force in the Congo was weakened by withdrawal of some contingents, and threatened by further withdrawals, the Federation Government viewed the situation with great apprehension. A depleted United Nations Force would be ineffective and almost a farce in the face of mounting difficulties and threats of military clashes in the Congo. It was again to honour our deep faith in the United Nations that the Federation Government responded immediately to the appeal of the Secretary-General early this year for additional troops. We did so at great sacrifice to our own limited resources, but our obligation under the Charter impelled us to make this sacrifice. We are glad to note that other States subsequently came forward to rally behind the United Nations efforts in the Congo. The decision of the Governments of India and Ceylon to send troops, following the adoption of the Security Council resolution of 21 February, and the decision of the Governments of Tunisia and Liberia to send additional contingents to the Congo, provided the United Nations Force with the reinforcements it badly needs if it is expected to carry out its task effectively. These decisions also reflect the faith that countries of Asia and Africa have in the continued United Nations operations in the Congo.

52. The resolution of the Security Council of 21 February is a significant development in relation to the Congo. It reflects a consensus of the Security Council and of the Members of this Organization in favour of the continuation of United Nations efforts in the Congo. Considering that the resolution was adopted in

² *Ibid.*

the face of strong demands for the dismissal of the Secretary-General and the winding-up of the United Nations operation in the Congo, the passage of the resolution can be regarded as a most hopeful development. My Government is fully in accord with the terms of the resolution and we would urge the Secretary-General, with the advice of his Advisory Committee on the Congo, to implement it with the utmost vigour and dispatch. We would also urge all Members of the Organization to give their unstinted support toward the implementation of the resolution. To those who have special interests in the Congo, we would appeal to subordinate their self-interest to the welfare of the Congolese people and to the larger interests of international peace and harmony. To the Government of Belgium, which was specifically mentioned in the resolution, we address a special appeal for co-operation with the United Nations.

53. That the attitude and action of the Belgian Government have been among the obstacles in the way of an early solution of the Congo problem has been established beyond question, as borne out by the report of the Conciliation Commission published on 20 March 1961.

The Conciliation Commission, in that report, states:

"The root cause of the crisis in the Congo has been the attitude of Belgium, its past performance and its continued interference in the affairs of the Congo."

[A/4711, para. 110.]

54. The Commission has pointed out that the failure of Belgium to comply with the Security Council and General Assembly resolutions, and in particular to withdraw its military and paramilitary personnel and military advisers from the Republic of the Congo and to refrain from interference in its internal affairs, has contributed to the continuing crisis in the Congo.

55. My delegation is in full agreement with this point of view. The Government of the Federation of Malaya communicated a formal note to the Belgian Government, through its Legation in Kuala Lumpur on 18 February, on the serious state of affairs in the Congo, in which my Government informed the Belgian Government that it had watched with concern the developments in the Republic of the Congo since its accession to sovereign nationhood. While it is disappointed at the Belgian Government's failure to prepare the Congolese people for independence, the Government of the Federation of Malaya views with disquiet the Belgian Government's refusal to be guided by the resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly of the United Nations relevant to this issue.

56. It is the view of my Government that Belgium's actions, both overt and otherwise, in the Congo, since the granting of independence to the Republic of the Congo, far from contributing to a peaceful solution of the country's problems, have in fact added to the existing chaos. It is generally known that there are military personnel of Belgian nationality actively participating in the operations of some of the factions in the Congo. The Federation Government considers that the withdrawal of all Belgian and other foreign military and paramilitary personnel and political advisers and mercenaries is imperative if the United Nations is not to be balked in its efforts to achieve a solution of the problem.

57. My delegation will therefore support any move in the Assembly to achieve the withdrawal of those personnel who are not operating under the flag of the United Nations in the Congo, even to the extent of

fixing a period by which such withdrawal should be accomplished and even envisioning a decision that necessary action should be taken in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations should the resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly continue to be flagrantly ignored.

58. The brutalities committed by various factions in the Congo against their political opponents have been viewed with concern and indignation by the whole civilized world. The Government and people of the Federation of Malaya have always been opposed to any form of violation of human rights, by whomsoever such violation is perpetrated. When former Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba was maltreated by his captors, the Government of the Federation of Malaya denounced the action and strongly urged that Patrice Lumumba and his fellow prisoners be accorded humane treatment and tried according to due process of law. Needless to say, the assassination of Patrice Lumumba and his colleagues shocked the conscience of the Malayan people as it must have shocked the conscience of all peoples all over the world. Along with other Governments, the Federation Government lost no time in denouncing the brutal act and demanded that the perpetrators be tried and punished.

59. The decision of the Security Council to conduct an international investigation of this matter³ should be carried out as soon as possible, not only to fix the guilt on those responsible, but also as a reminder to others that this Organization cannot tolerate any repetition of barbarous acts of this kind. Our information is that Patrice Lumumba and his two associates have not been the only political prisoners who have been massacred. There are others, belonging to other political factions, who have been killed. We have also heard news, which is so far undenied and which therefore can be regarded as accurate, of a number of political murders committed in reprisal for Lumumba's assassination. My delegation deplores all these brutal and uncivilized acts and strongly urges that they cease forthwith. It is our view that the investigation commission, the form of which has been apparently decided upon, should investigate all these murders and not confine itself to Lumumba's assassination.

60. The Republic of the Congo is now a divided country, divided into warring factions each supported by massive armed forces. The situation can easily develop into civil war. Although the immediate threat of civil war has at least been averted by the United Nations Force, we believe that so long as the country is divided, and so long as each faction is backed by armed force, so long will there be a danger of one or another party's attempting a military solution, and so long therefore will civil war threaten the Congo. This presents a double task to the Congo and to the United Nations. One is the insulation of the army from politics, and the other is to achieve reconciliation among all the political leaders.

61. As regards the insulation of the army from politics, my delegation is in full agreement with the Security Council resolution of 21 February which calls for the reorganization and retraining of the army with United Nations assistance. My delegation appreciates the opposition of the Congolese authorities to the resolution of the Security Council in this respect. But such opposition may have arisen from possible misinterpretation of the resolution, to the effect that it was the intention of the United Nations forcibly to disarm

³ See *ibid.*

the Congolese army and to place the Republic under United Nations trusteeship. That certainly is not the intention of the United Nations. The reorganization and retraining of the armed forces must be done after due and thorough consultations between the parties concerned, but it must be impressed upon the Congolese authorities that the insulation of the army from political life is one of the essential prerequisites for a peaceful solution of the problem in the Congo.

62. We can well understand why the Congolese people jealously regard their army as a safeguard of their newly won independence. But we appeal to them to realize that, as it is divided today into various factions, the Congolese National Army remains a potential danger to the territorial integrity of their Republic. A reorganized, well-disciplined army, insulated from political conflict and under the command of a single central authority, the form of which can be decided upon after thorough consultations between the parties concerned, will be a source of pride to the Congolese people and certainly a strong protector of their independence and territorial integrity.

63. As regards reconciliation, my delegation has always upheld this as the only practical approach to the vexed political problem of the Congo. When the debate on the question of the situation in the Congo took place early in November of last year in the General Assembly, the representative of Ghana moved that it should be postponed until the Conciliation Commission had gone to the Congo, done its work and returned to report to the General Assembly. My delegation voted in favour of that proposal, which was adopted by the General Assembly.

64. My delegation abstained from the voting which took place in the General Assembly a couple of weeks later on the Credentials Committee's recommendation on the seating of President Kasa-Vubu's delegation. On that occasion, speaking on behalf of my delegation, I expressed the feeling that it was not in the best interests of the efforts being undertaken by the United Nations to assist the Congolese to resolve their differences to have a debate and take any decision at that stage. It was our view then that, given moral support from all quarters, the Conciliation Commission could accomplish much in contributing towards the fulfilment of the purposes of the resolution [1474 (ES-IV)] of 20 September 1960, adopted by the General Assembly's fourth emergency special session. We felt that the General Assembly had the duty and the obligation to give its whole-hearted support to the Conciliation Commission, which had been established under its own resolution, and to that end to withhold any discussion and decision with regard to the seating of the Congolese delegation. It was for that reason that my delegation again supported the motion for adjournment.

65. However, the General Assembly decided to proceed with the debate, and considerable heat was generated in that debate. This was most regrettable, for, while our task was to establish confidence and harmony in the Congo and to conciliate differences among the Congolese parties, we were instead engaged in acrimonious charges and counter-charges which served only to aggravate the complications in the Congo.

66. My delegation chose, on that occasion, to refrain from participating in the substantive discussion of the matter before the General Assembly. It was our view that, in the context of the political conflict obtaining in the Congo, the question of the seating of a Congolese

delegation in the United Nations was a controversial issue. I pointed out [924th meeting] that at that stage, when the Conciliation Commission was about to leave for the Congo, it was most inadvisable for the General Assembly to take a stand on the issue in favour of one party as against another—a stand which would have the effect of hampering the work of conciliation. We sincerely believed that the Conciliation Commission had a useful role to play in the evolution of a peaceful settlement of political differences in the Congo, but to be successful in its efforts it was imperative that the Commission should undertake its task with an open mind.

67. My delegation still maintains those views, which were expressed over four months ago here in this Assembly. We also very much regret the attitude in certain quarters which forced a resumption of a debate on the Congo question before the report of the Conciliation Commission had been submitted to the General Assembly.

68. Now that the Conciliation Commission's report [A/4711 and Corr.1, A/4711/Add.1 and 2] is available to us, we may see how useful it can be as a basis for constructive consideration of the problem before the General Assembly. It is to the credit of the Commission, and it is a testimony to the Commission's objective and non-partisan attitude in undertaking its very difficult task, that its report should be quoted by so many representatives, even of opposing views, during the course of the present debate. My delegation would like to be associated with the many others which have expressed their appreciation of the efforts of the Conciliation Commission and congratulated it on the very useful report which has been submitted to the Assembly.

69. It is evident that the Commission has, in accordance with its terms of reference, made as careful a study of the situation in the Congo as it was able to make under the circumstances in which it had to operate and that, without interfering in the internal affairs of the country, it made an effort to help reconcile the various trends of opinion in order to achieve a peaceful solution of the present crisis. It is regrettable that some leaders in the Congo did not fully accept the Commission's conciliatory efforts. However, there is still hope that a peaceful settlement of the political crisis can be achieved. According to its report:

"The Commission found among many leaders, belonging to both the pro-Lumumba and pro-Kasa-Vubu groups, a general feeling of weariness and a sincere desire to reach agreement with their opponents and achieve a peaceful solution to the crisis; they welcomed the Commission's efforts and co-operated with it." [A/4711, para. 117.]

70. My delegation finds itself able to agree fully with the Commission's conclusions and recommendations. Because of the unco-operative and intransigent attitude of certain leaders, the Commission reports that the several attempts made by it to reconcile the opposing groups did not lead to positive results. Nevertheless, the Commission was able to make a careful study of the situation and to ascertain the views and feelings of most of the leaders concerned. On the basis of this study it reached a number of conclusions which, my delegation agrees with the Commission, could form the basis of future conciliation efforts.

71. My delegation is only too conscious of the very difficult task that the Secretary-General's Special Repre-

sentative has in the Congo, but we have reason to believe that there is room for improvement in the public relations of the United Nations operation in the Congo. It is our view that a great deal of the misunderstanding in the relations between the Congolese authorities and the United Nations operation in the Congo has been due to inadequate understanding on the part of the Congolese authorities of the mandate given to the Secretary-General by the various resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly.

72. We believe, therefore, that the United Nations operation in the Congo should improve its public relations services to provide vital information and clarification on United Nations policies to the Congolese people at all levels. Only if the situation were remedied in this way could better relations between the Congolese and the United Nations operations in the Congo be facilitated and better results be achieved by the United Nations operation.

73. For some time now, the Secretary-General has been assisted by an Advisory Committee here in New York in the interpretation of his mandate and other policy matters in connexion with the Congo. My delegation feels that the implementation of United Nations objectives and policy on the spot in the Congo needs the same kind of consultation in order to achieve unity and cohesion and in order to avoid any misunderstanding which might jeopardize effective United Nations operations in the Congo. It is our view that there is a need for a committee to be established in the Congo, consisting of a political representative of each country which has troops under the United Nations Command, to assist the Secretary-General's Special Representative. These representatives should have full powers to confer with one another and to advise the Special Representative on such appropriate measures as the committee may deem necessary in a particular set of circumstances within the framework of the policy directives given by the Secretary-General to his Special Representative. This committee should, of course, be under the chairmanship of the Secretary-General's Special Representative. What I should like to emphasize is that the proper implementation of policy on the spot in the Congo is very vital to uphold the prestige of the United Nations and effectively accomplish the mission with which the Secretary-General has been entrusted by this Organization.

74. The Conciliation Commission's task has not been completed in the Congo. My delegation supports the suggestion that has been made by previous speakers that the General Assembly should appoint a commission to proceed to the Congo and continue the good work of the Conciliation Commission in assisting the Congolese leaders to achieve conciliation and end the present political crisis. We also agree that the composition of such a commission should be universal, since it would represent this Organization and should therefore carry the weight of the moral opinion and the collective wisdom of the United Nations, by which it would be appointed. However, it is our view that the size of this proposed commission should be kept as small as possible, and its membership should be predominantly African.

75. The conclusions of the Conciliation Commission are in accord with the views held by our Prime Minister and the Government of the Federation of Malaya. Our Prime Minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman, in a statement on the Congo situation which he delivered on 18 February 1961, made the following points:

(a) The various opposing factions in the Congo should agree on the formation of a provisional government representative of all parties;

(b) All military activities of the various Congolese troops, including those of the secessionist groups, must cease at once;

(c) Attempts must be made through the United Nations to bring the parties together with a view to convening Parliament;

(d) Political prisoners should be released;

(e) Any support and contributions by outside Powers to the Congo must be given through the United Nations and not directly to the "provisional government" or any other government claiming such status, or to any breakaway government;

(f) Foreign troops and personnel outside the framework of the United Nations must be withdrawn at once, and the United Nations forces should be reinforced.

76. We endorse the Commission's view that in spite of all its shortcomings and inadequacy, the *Loi fondamentale* should be upheld by all concerned as the basic law of the Republic of the Congo until such time as it has been replaced. It is, of course, up to the Congolese people themselves to decide what kind of constitution they desire to adopt for their country, but the United Nations should assist them in every way in creating the conditions of peace and security in the country, in making available technical assistance and advice, and where necessary offering its good offices.

77. One of the difficulties besetting the United Nations operation in the Congo is the absence of a constitutional central government wielding effective authority over the whole national territory of the Republic of the Congo and universally accepted and recognized. It is therefore essential that such a central authority in the Congo be established as soon as possible. It is our view that the "provisional government" headed by Mr. Iléo, as it now stands, does not qualify as such central authority of the Republic.

78. Following the publication of the Conciliation Commission's preliminary report [see A/4696] on 18 February, there were several reports in the Press and elsewhere, misinterpreting the Commission's conclusions on this matter of the "provisional government", to the effect that it had endorsed the Iléo "provisional government" and recommended its recognition. The Commission found it necessary to issue a Press release on 1 March to correct this misrepresentation, and has in paragraph 126 of its final report, issued as document A/4711 on 20 March 1961, clarified its position.

79. One paragraph of the Commission's report has been underlined to emphasize its particular importance. This paragraph reads:

"The Commission feels that an appeal should be made to all States to abstain from any kind of interference in the internal affairs of the country and, in particular, to avoid assuming any attitude which might aggravate the opposition between the different tendencies in the Congo and thus make reconciliation more difficult." [A/4711, para. 143.]

I would like to repeat that the appeal, in particular, is "to avoid assuming any attitude which might aggravate the opposition between the different tendencies in the Congo".

80. It is the view of my delegation that if it is our sincere desire to assist the Congolese people to achieve

reconciliation and restore normality in the Congo, we must not rush into recognizing this or that disputing faction. If we backed Mr. Iléo and his "provisional government" we would be adopting an attitude which would aggravate the opposition between the different tendencies in the country as much as if we were to support Mr. Gizenga and his "government" in Stanleyville.

81. In paragraph 147 of its report the Conciliation Commission expressed the view that the present "provisional government" of Mr. Iléo "cannot bring about an improvement in the situation or contribute to the solution of the crisis until it includes representatives of the main trends of political opinion in the Congo, so that a *de facto* truce can be arranged which would lessen the present antagonisms". With these considerations in mind it recommended "the establishment of a provisional government of national unity" whose task would be the arranging of a truce between the different factions in the Congo; the restoration of law and order, with the assistance of the United Nations; the reorganization of the administration to enable it to function; the reorganization of the army, in co-operation with the United Nations; and the taking of steps to enable Parliament to adopt a constitution which would provide the Congo with a lasting constitutional structure.

82. My delegation feels that this recommendation, as well as the others contained in the Commission's report, merit serious consideration by the General Assembly. We would go further and suggest that the United Nations should take the initiative on the basis of the conclusions presented in the Conciliation Commission's report and offer its good offices in bringing the conflicting parties together.

83. The proposal for the convening of a "summit" meeting of Congolese leaders, contained in paragraph 136 of the report, appears to us to be very practical, and we feel that the United Nations should offer its good offices to make such a meeting possible.

84. We also agree that the Congolese Parliament should be convened as soon as possible, and that the United Nations should assist in providing the necessary conditions to make it possible for Parliament to meet.

85. It is essential that all political personalities, political leaders and members of Parliament who are being detained should be released, if the above efforts are to meet with any success in restoring normal constitutional life to the Congo.

86. It is perhaps necessary for me to make a brief reference to the recent meeting of the Congolese leaders in Tananarive.⁴ In the view of my delegation, this meeting had generally the same character as the round-table conference held in Leopoldville in January and February, which is referred to in paragraphs 18 to 20 in the Conciliation Commission's report. It could not therefore be considered as the "summit" meeting envisaged by the Commission in paragraph 136 of its report. It is general knowledge that as the result of the political assassinations and the arbitrary arrests and detentions perpetrated by the various factions, there was mutual fear and distrust among the leaders. We do not believe, in the light of all the available information, that it would have been possible to get all the leaders of the principal parties to attend such a meeting organized by one side or the other, and were therefore

not surprised at the absence of certain leaders from the Tananarive meeting.

87. Following so closely after the military alliance established between the Congolese authorities of Leopoldville, Bakwanga and Elisabethville, one perhaps may be excused if one is inclined to the view that the Tananarive Conference only serves to consolidate the forces of one general tendency in the country. The Conference cannot therefore be looked upon as speaking for all the main tendencies in the country. The conclusions arrived at in Tananarive are perhaps only statements of intention. However, even as mere intentions, they would cause some concern to those who would uphold the national unity and territorial integrity of the Republic of the Congo. As I have stated before, the future constitutional structure of the Republic of the Congo is a matter for the Congolese themselves to decide, in conformity with the existing *Loi fondamentale*. The United Nations operation in the Congo should not therefore accord any recognition to any alleged constitutional changes which were not in keeping with the due constitutional and legal processes.

88. But whatever construction or interpretation one may care to give to the Tananarive Conference, my delegation is certain on one aspect of it, and that is, given the necessary condition and climate, we are encouraged in the belief that, by the precedent set, all Congolese leaders will certainly accept the wisdom that only by sitting in amity and harmony around a conference table can they decide the destiny of their country.

89. In conclusion, I would like to dwell very briefly on the serious situation obtaining today in relation to Matadi and Banana. My delegation believes that for the operation in the Congo to be effective the United Nations must not be denied the occupation and use of strategic points such as ports and airfields. These constitute the life-line of the whole United Nations operation, and were one or another to be denied to the United Nations, its operation in the Congo could be jeopardized. The occupation of these strategic points does not, in the view of my delegation, constitute a violation of Congolese sovereignty.

90. In this connexion, I should like to quote the first of the three points of the basic agreement of 27 July 1960,⁵ which was in fact quoted by the Secretary-General a few days ago [970th meeting] in clarifying certain points raised in relation to this matter. In this agreement, the Government of the Republic of the Congo states:

"...In the exercise of its sovereign rights with respect to any question concerning the presence and functioning of the United Nations Force in the Congo, it will be guided, in good faith, by the fact that it has requested military assistance from the United Nations and by its acceptance of the resolutions of the Security Council of 14 and 22 July 1960."

It states further:

"...it will ensure the freedom of movement of the Force in the interior of the country and will accord the requisite privileges and immunities to all personnel associated with the activities of the Force."

91. My delegation earnestly and sincerely hopes, in the interest of good relations between the Congolese

⁴ Round-table Conference, held at Tananarive from 8-14 March, 1961.

⁵ Official Records of the Security Council, Fifteenth Year, Supplement for July, August and September 1960, document S/4389/Add.5.

authorities and the United Nations forces in the Congo, that it will not be necessary to resort to sterner measures to acquire the restoration of free and uninterrupted accessibility to and use of Matadi to the United Nations Force. We note that the authorities concerned are actively engaged at the moment in negotiations towards this end. We hope that these negotiations will be fruitful, so that the United Nations and the Congolese authorities will once again work jointly for the welfare and stability of the Congo in a spirit of co-operation and understanding, as in the early days of their common endeavour.

92. Mr. PLIMSOLL (Australia): Like the speakers who have preceded me, including the representative of Malaya who has just spoken, I should like to place on record the thanks of my delegation to the United Nations Conciliation Commission for the Congo for its work in the Congo and for the report [*A/4711 and Corr.1, A/4711/Add.1 and 2*] which it has presented to this Assembly. This Commission has done much patient and difficult work. It has presented us with a very useful report which brings together a great deal of material of a factual nature on what was going on in the Congo and which has brought together a number of documents of the greatest value to us in our consideration here. The Commission's work has given us a good guide, which we can take account of here in this debate and later on, at the same time taking account of events that are happening currently in the Congo and of some of the developments that are sure to arise in the near future.

93. The present situation in the Congo continues to be complicated. The Commission, in its report, said: "It is no exaggeration to say that the country is on the verge of catastrophe." [*A/4711, para. 115.*] We have new developments daily, some of them good, some of them bad—a good one such as Mr. Kamitatu going to Oriental province and perhaps doing something to bring together the authorities in Leopoldville and the authorities in Oriental province, and then others that are bad, such as the dispute which has been unfortunately reported today between the Congolese and the United Nations over the Elisabethville airport. But it is difficult—it has been difficult ever since the Congo became independent—to know exactly what is going on, to know what factions exist, to know who is supporting whom and which faction is represented in any particular place. There has been a kaleidoscope which seems to be tapped daily to form new patterns. I am sure that that is not just confusion on our part here at the distance of New York; it is also some confusion in the Congo itself among the various parties as they seek to form alliances and to test for themselves what are the possibilities inherent in each new situation. It is a constantly shifting situation. We here find ourselves periodically grasping at air, thinking that perhaps we have a concrete predictable situation and then finding suddenly that everything is changed and that we have to start out again almost from scratch. The report of the Conciliation Commission is most valuable in bringing the situation up to date and in giving us a clearer idea of the patterns that are unfolding in the Congo and of the opportunities that we have for action.

94. When we think of what is going on in the Congo and what we hope can be achieved in the Congo, we also have to ask ourselves what the effects of all this are in the United Nations itself. The developments in the Congo have had a most profound effect on the

United Nations. This Organization is being subjected to strains and pressures and it will never again be the Organization that it was before we were thrown into this unpredictable, turbulent, highly emotional problem of the Congo.

95. It has occupied much of our time in the Security Council and the General Assembly since the Congo became independent. There is, for example, the budget stress upon the Organization. We can and we must find the money necessary for whatever the United Nations undertakes in the Congo. Nevertheless, we should know where we are going in the Congo. We should know the period of time; and the scale in terms of which we can think when planning the military, economic and other undertakings of the United Nations. We cannot act or plan on the assumption that the United Nations forces or even United Nations civil assistance will remain indefinitely in the Congo. The burdens of the Congo operation—not merely the financial burden but bigger burdens—are causing great stresses within the very structure of the Organization itself.

96. Furthermore, the reputation of the United Nations itself is endangered. There have been attacks from within the United Nations. In every debate in the Security Council or here in the General Assembly, there have been the most vicious attacks upon representatives of the United Nations, upon the Secretary-General and upon others. The whole purpose with which the United Nations has gone into the Congo has been misrepresented. This all has its effects, not only upon the people here who are subjected to these attacks but upon the reputation of the United Nations in the Congo and the reputation of the United Nations in the world as a whole. I think we have to admit frankly that the United Nations is very unpopular in many quarters in the Congo. That is inevitable, because whenever anyone tries to do something he runs up against someone else. But, all the time, as the Congo operations go on, we find the United Nations subjected to strains, we find that its reputation is under attack, we find that the United Nations, with all it stands for in the minds of men as a symbol of international fair dealings and as a hope of peace and justice, is being endangered.

97. It would be unrealistic not to recognize that this is a great testing time for the United Nations. We cannot allow the United Nations to falter. Least of all can the small countries—countries like Australia—afford to have the United Nations falter. For the small countries the United Nations is a shield. It is a help in economic and all sorts of ways. Membership of the United Nations is a badge of the international entity of a country. We in Australia, like most countries here, particularly the smaller countries—and this was pointed out last week by the representative of Ireland in his speech [*969th meeting*—we in particular have a stake in standing up for the United Nations, in seeing that this great operation that it has willy-nilly embarked on is a success.

98. The Australian Government has from the beginning supported and continues to support Mr. Hammarskjöld, the Secretary-General. We believe that he has acted within the terms of his mandate. We believe that he has acted in accordance with the resources open to him and made available to him. We have had the greatest sympathy for him in the many difficult situations in which he and his officers have found themselves as a result of the very murky directives

that they have received from this body. Quite often the Secretary-General and his officers have been forced to choose courses of conduct that perhaps would better have been decided by the nations acting in a representative capacity as a whole, but on which those nations either in the Security Council or in this Assembly have been unable to reach a decision.

99. The attacks on Mr. Hammarskjöld are attacks on the United Nations itself. They are not attacks just on an individual. Mr. Hammarskjöld himself has said that he regards himself as an individual, as being expendable. But the attacks upon him are attacks upon the United Nations itself. It is very cheering that throughout the world, in many countries in all continents, public opinion has rallied behind the United Nations, and in doing so has rallied specifically behind Mr. Hammarskjöld, the Secretary-General.

100. We cannot ignore the fact that lack of confidence exists in the Congo—lack of confidence on both sides. Where there should be confidence, there is distrust. Where there should be frankness, there is reticence. Where there should be co-operation, there is obstruction. Where there should be practical approaches, there are legal and verbalistic disputes.

101. For example, we have only to look at the deplorable situation in Matadi. Whatever the rights or wrongs, this situation should not have arisen; it should never have arisen. Whatever the rights or wrongs—and I think there are rights and wrongs on both sides on this question—the United Nations is entitled to free and assured movement for its personnel and supplies through Matadi. I would say to our Congolese friends throughout their country, in all their provinces, whatever you feel about particular issues, whatever you feel about particular cases, do not block and do not wish to block the necessary support for the United Nations effort, because any continued, any apparently capricious interference with the operations of the United Nations has a very bad effect on public opinion throughout the world, has a bad repercussion upon the ordinary men and women in every country of the world who are anxious to see the United Nations do something, working with the Congolese to assist them.

102. We must ask ourselves how or why such a lack of confidence on both sides has arisen. There are many reasons, but I think sometimes that perhaps the most important reasons are really misinterpretations on both sides of what is going on and of what the other parties are trying to do. On the part of the Congolese there has been misinterpretation or misunderstanding, quite genuine, of the meaning of words in resolutions of the Security Council or the Assembly, in letters that passed between representatives of the United Nations and the Congolese representatives, in speeches that are made here or elsewhere. Some of these misinterpretations, some of this lack of confidence, some of this distrust and fear is bred and fostered by partisan speeches here and in national capitals. We must remember that it is the more extreme speeches that tend to get quoted throughout the world.

103. This debate has been going on now for some time, and yet if one looks in the press in different cities of the world, and here in New York itself, we find that the only speeches on the whole that draw any attention and get any report are those that use violent language or take up extreme positions. These statements, cabled throughout the world, reproduced in Leopoldville, Elisabethville and elsewhere in the Congo, cannot but

give a false impression to the Congolese not only of the substance of our discussions here, but of the spirit in which we are approaching this problem.

104. The vast majority of us, belonging to all the continents, holding different views on the Congo, are trying to approach the question in a reasonable constructive spirit. The speeches that tend to be reproduced and sent overseas are those which are vitriolic, contain abuse, and indicate that the speaker perhaps has more in mind his own particular interests, the interests of his own country, than those of the Congolese. These extreme statements and these misinterpretations of United Nations resolutions tend to build up the fears in the Congo—fears that they are going to be put under a new trusteeship, fears that particular solutions are going to be imposed upon them or that particular personalities are going to be imposed upon them.

105. Against these fears and misunderstandings and misinterpretations in the Congo, there are similar misinterpretations and misunderstandings on the part of many of us here in the United Nations. Perhaps we are inclined to expect the statements of the people in the Congo to have more precision than is intended by those who utter them. Perhaps sometimes the statements that are made in the Congo which give offence in other countries are not made in a spirit of being a precise declaration of intent. Perhaps they have meaning and connotations that the author of them is unaware of. Often, too, we expect higher standards of the Government of the Congo than we expect of other countries. We take it for granted that the Supreme Court of the United States will split 5 to 4 on a constitutional matter or on the interpretation of the United States Constitution, and yet we act on the assumption that the unfortunate people of the Congo will know without any hesitation what the *Loi fondamentale* means; that they will be in complete agreement, and that we shall be in complete agreement, on what the Charter of the United Nations means.

106. I think we ought to recognize that the Congo is in a state where its constitutional processes are rather chaotic, that its constitutional documents are indefinite, and that the very meaning of these documents is open to very great question. We must not expect from the Congolese a standard, either of behaviour or of legal agreement, that we do not expect from any other country in the world. I am often surprised in the debates here about the way in which delegations are repeatedly expecting from the Congolese the standards that we do not expect from other Members here.

107. There have been mistakes, mistakes on both sides—on all sides perhaps would be truer. And we have now the great task of building up confidence between the United Nations and the authorities and people of the Congo. I think that is one of the big things that we should all try and tackle. We should try and ease the irritants.

108. We in the United Nations should be generous, I think, when we deal with the Congolese people. It is a little, overstrained country, up against much more sophisticated, skilled lawyers and others in international relations. We must seek practical solutions, rather than keep and build up a deadening weight of correspondence. When I say that, I am not addressing my remarks only to one side. It applies to the Congolese as well as to the United Nations. We are in danger very often of forgetting the practical problems that have to be solved, and that perhaps can be solved, if we do not try to be too legalistic, if we do not try to do too much

on paper. Now, all this is easier said than done, perhaps. But it is a task for us all; it is not just a task for the Secretary-General; it is not just a task for the Congolese. Each of us in our own particular way can do something, or can refrain from doing things that increase a lack of confidence.

109. On the Congo as a whole, the position of the Australian Government is the same as was stated by me in the General Assembly when I last spoke on this subject on 17 December. [953rd meeting.] On that occasion I drew attention to the provisions of the Charter on domestic jurisdiction, upon the obligations of all of us not to interfere in the internal affairs of another country.

110. Ever since the United Nations first took up the question of the Congo, we have been skirting along on the edge of domestic jurisdiction. We have done things and we have authorized things to be done that the United Nations has not yet envisaged in any other situation. There are special factors in the Congo situation which distinguish it from others. The justification for United Nations action must be the relationship of the situation to international peace and security and the likelihood of their breach. But it is true, for legal and constitutional reasons, well set out in the Charter, that there are limits on the possibilities of United Nations intervention or action in the Congo.

111. And this is true also for practical reasons. It is true because the Congolese people themselves must find their own solution. Ultimately, whatever ideas we may have here, it is the Congolese who must find the solution. They know the circumstances of their country. They know the long historical, cultural, tribal and other factors that have to be taken account of. And though, viewed from the distance of New York, the Congolese might seem in some ways a rather homogeneous people, the closer you get to it, the more one studies the situation, the more complicated it becomes and the more one hesitates from outside to say that this should be done or that should be done, that this is the political solution, that this economic course should be avoided. From the outside we might give advice, we might offer good offices; but it is the Congolese to whom we should look for the solutions. It is their responsibility; it is their right.

112. But the Congolese also have a responsibility, and we have a right to look to them for sober exercise of their responsibilities. And we can see danger signals. We see things that are adumbrated or things that have been done that clearly would have been more wisely avoided—such things as moves towards the fragmentation of the Congo—we should hope that the Congolese will draw back from any such attempts—and things like political executions without due process of law—that is something that is wrong in itself; it is something that could bedevil relations inside the Congo for generations to come. And we feel, too, that we have a right to expect co-operation to the utmost with the United Nations.

113. Some promising steps have been taken by the Congolese themselves. Some of them have been referred to by other speakers. Reference has been made, for example, to the Conference at Tananarive. Now, this is a conference which will not satisfy everybody. Its results are open to obvious criticisms. But it is a first move towards a coming together, and it is something which, I would urge, should not be rejected out of hand, as some speakers have advocated. It is admitted by the Congolese leaders themselves—and I could refer

you to a statement by Mr. Iléo, the Prime Minister of the Republic of the Congo—that other steps will be necessary. It is admitted by them that other parties need to be brought in. The Tananarive Conference was not, as I understand from the records that I have seen, a final step; it was more in the nature of a preparatory step.

114. There is room for second thoughts—second thoughts about fragmentation, second thoughts about the degree of delegation of power to the centre, the degree of permanency of power in the centre, and second thoughts about federation versus confederation. I think the meeting at Tananarive may have loosened the thoughts of the Congolese leaders themselves as to the various possibilities open to them. And let us not in the United Nations rebuff these endeavours. Hard thinking and hard negotiation will be necessary among the Congolese about the form of a new constitution.

115. In this respect the United Nations Conciliation Commission for the Congo had what I think is some wise advice to give in its report. It said:

“The Commission is of the view that in present conditions a federal form of government can alone preserve the national unity and territorial integrity of the Congolese State. It feels, moreover, that it will not be particularly difficult for the Congolese leaders to reach an agreement on such a form of constitution, for there is a general desire among them for a greater decentralization of the powers of the Central Government and an equitable distribution of revenues between the Centre and provinces. However the Commission is of the view that this is a matter upon which only the Congolese people and Parliament can finally pronounce.” [A/4711, para. 134.]

Now, that has the endorsement of the Australian delegation, with the qualifications that were carefully set out by the Commission itself in that paragraph.

116. It is not for us—it is not for the United Nations—to dictate a form of government. But it is practical now to realize that a unitary State, in the complete sense of the word—in the most extreme sense of the word “unitary”—would have been difficult enough at any time, but, given what has happened since the Congo became independent, it is only to be expected that the Congolese leaders should look at various adaptations which may, perhaps—and which should—leave the Congo as one State, but perhaps give greater scope than was originally contemplated for regional differences and for tribal differences. We must take some account of the practical realities in a fast-developing situation. In that light the Australian delegation will view proposals on the *Loi fondamentale* and on the convening of Parliament. These two measures, which have a lot to commend them, must at the same time be reviewed in the light of a changing situation and in the light of what the Congolese themselves want, and what they can determine as a result of their process of negotiation.

117. To sum up, what is the role of the United Nations at this moment in the Congo? We cannot accept two possible situations. We cannot accept continuous fighting between different tribes and regions, leading to the authority of one imposed on the others as a result, in fact, of a civil war. Nor can we accept United Nations intervention to back one party. The most profitable role for the United Nations is somewhat along the following lines: to be a facilitating framework using good offices, and other functions of that nature, designed to bring people together, designed to create a favourable

atmosphere for negotiations, designed to provide technical assistance leading to agreements. Another important role is to keep out foreign forces and arms. One of the big achievements of the United Nations in the Congo—and it has more achievements than some people admit—has been to prevent the Congo from becoming a battleground among the great Powers, which might have engulfed the whole of Africa and possibly the whole world. Another role for the United Nations is to provide economic assistance to the people in establishing a stable and progressive State.

118. As I have said, we can do something to win the confidence of the Congolese in the United Nations. We can do something to give time and a chance to the Congolese to settle their problems. I was very impressed, as I imagine many others were, by the phrase used by the representative of the United States, Mr. Stevenson, at the beginning of this debate. He said:

"We must stop, I suggest, pulling up the roots of this fragile plant every few days to see if it is growing. That is the best way to kill the plant..."
[965th meeting, para. 110.]

Mr. Stevenson was referring to the United Nations effort in the Congo, but I think his remarks can also apply to the Republic of the Congo itself. We must give it a chance; we must not keep stirring it up, promoting debates in the United Nations and attacking the Congolese leaders periodically, criticizing them whenever they do something. We must now let a situation develop where the Congolese try to work out a solution themselves, to take initiatives, right or wrong, without being continually dragged before the United Nations to justify what they do. These prolonged debates, and the tone in which they are very often conducted, serve to muddy the waters. Neither we nor the Congolese can start again as though we were back in July 1960, as though nothing had happened in the meantime. A great many things have happened and any outcome must take account of the realities of a developing situation where things have changed and where we cannot go back: the realities of power, the realities of Katanga, the realities of Stanleyville, as well as the realities of Leopoldville and other parts of the country.

119. We must view the possibility of going back to the *Loi fondamentale* or of building on it in the light of such realities as exist at the time. We must regard the convening of Parliament in the same light. We need time. It is not going to be a quick process. We are not going to be able to do something and say, "Thank heavens, that solved the Congo problem". We will need time to develop the institutions, and for the Congolese to develop institutions, and gain experience in their working, to build up constitutional conventions. They will need time to develop a sense of national unity because, although the Congo is, in terms of an international political entity, one State, it consists of many peoples. Many countries of the world have had this problem of building up over a period of years, sometimes generations, a sense of national unity.

120. In these tasks, recent developments have been making it more difficult, rather than simpler. They have been creating new animosities, new rivalries and tensions on top of those that existed before. The United Nations can only help the Congolese to solve the situation for themselves. We can play a part in assisting them. We cannot impose a solution and it is to the Congolese people that we look for the solution, but it is to them also that we look for some understand-

ing of the United Nations and for co-operation with the United Nations.

Mr. Boland (Ireland) resumed the Chair.

121. Mr. GUIRMA (Upper Volta) (*translated from French*): Before taking up the question of the Congo, where the people are suffering because they wanted to be independent, I wish to convey my delegation's most sorrowful condolences to another people now struggling, in a heroic revolution, for freedom and justice. I refer to the Cuban people, who have been plunged into mourning by the sudden death here of Ambassador Bisbé. I take this opportunity of asking the Cuban delegation to accept our brotherly sympathy and our compassionate friendship, and to convey them to the Revolutionary Government of Cuba, to Mr. Bisbé's family and to the Cuban people.

122. My delegation feels bound to express its views today because the Congolese problem has given rise to a situation in which each delegation's ideas can be validly expressed only by that delegation itself. The initiative now lies with the Congolese leaders, who are meeting, talking and holding conferences, and the time has come to tell them plainly what we are thinking, in case they are willing to listen to advice; if not at least we shall have done our duty.

123. For the past few weeks our view of the Congo question has been coloured by the Tananarive Conference. Let us say right away that there are a positive side and a negative side to this Conference. The positive side is that this was a Conference of responsible leaders. Not all the men of responsibility were present but, knowing the situation in the Congo, we shall not automatically hold their absence against those who were not at Tananarive. In view of the fate meted out to Lumumba, Gizenga needed adequate safeguards. This shows that if the Congolese leaders wish to act effectively they must strive, by constructive actions, to create an atmosphere of mutual confidence.

124. When the question of seating a Congolese delegation arose here, the Upper Volta, for its part, could see no reason to prefer one Congolese to another. Arguments drawn from the *Loi fondamentale* failed to convince us; for them to do so, the *Loi fondamentale* would have had to be universally respected. But at that time it was the most flouted fundamental law in the world. Everyone distorted whichever article hampered him and put forward whichever article was to his advantage. Today, if the Congolese are truly frank at their meetings, they themselves will tell us whether the *Loi fondamentale* still exists as such.

125. We were right in thinking that the solution to the Congolese problem was not to be found lying in a corner at the United Nations. Did not the treacherous Belgian colonialists seize the opportunity to plan and commit the abhorrent murder of Patrice Lumumba under the very eyes of the United Nations, which had just cast him into the outer darkness, into the hands of his executioners? We were advocating then that the Congolese should meet, and we strongly disapproved of those who, under foreign influence, bitterly rejected the Congolese because, in their savage anti-colonialist struggle, some were cold, some lukewarm and some hot. As we see it, all the Congolese are needed as workers in building up a Congo so lacking in skilled manpower.

126. With reference to the Round-table Conference, H.E. President Maurice Yaméogo, Chief of State of

the Upper Volta, said in the course of a broadcast message to the people of the Upper Volta:

"When the Round-table Conference was announced, we had great hopes. But it is clear that such a Conference should have brought together all the Congolese who counted. What will come out of a meeting which should have been attended by all the Congolese if a full half of the Congo is missing? We entreat the responsible Congolese leaders to seek the welfare of the Congo with the Congolese, in the unity of a single, sound and indivisible fatherland."

127. I may say that, when the Congolese leaders met at Tananarive, hope was reviving. Since then, various reports, articles in the Press and other items of information have carried news that is disquieting to say the least. The leader of Katanga has been quoted as saying: "The others have five-sixths of the Congo's land. I have five-sixths of the Congo's money. I am willing to negotiate." This appeared in *Time* magazine on 24 March 1961. The daily newspaper *The New York Times* reported him as saying that, since each of the Congolese leaders wanted to be Prime Minister and Chief of State, each of them would have to be given an opportunity to hold those posts, and the problem would be solved. If those statements were true they would shock us; and in any case they offer nothing constructive for the Congo. They should also shock those whose ancestors preferred civil war to the fragmentation of their country.

128. Belgium, which is a small country, is aware that its population is composed of Flemings and Walloons who do not always agree; but it does not split up in order to give effect to the principle of the right of tribes to self-determination, all the more since it knows that its existence as a small country is not due to any tribal phenomenon. This State is thus an artificial State set up to fit two entities within their frontiers. Belgian nationhood is quite recent in origin.

129. How, then, can Congolese nationhood be dismissed as nonsense because it is of recent origin? We know that there are some who wish to cast history in moulds of their own and hence to prove that no genuine nationhood can come into being in the twentieth century because there are ogre nations thirsting for the blood of small nations. But so far as African nationhood is concerned we are here to prove the contrary, and we do not fear to do so because we did not need Shakespeare to tell us that "of all base passions, fear is most accurs'd". If we have made mistakes, we shall willingly acknowledge them for the good of Africa.

130. I must also say here, in all frankness and friendship, that certain African countries of great good will have made the mistake of viewing the Congolese problem through their own spectacles, ground to the dimensions of their own problems. They seem today to be acting as though they were defending an injured diplomatic dignity, which certainly does not make for the impartiality necessary for the settlement of the Congolese problem. Our experience should help us specifically to avoid confusing the aspects of the Congolese problem with those of the situations we have experienced in West Africa or elsewhere.

131. For the same reason I now say, in a frank and friendly way, that I also disagree with the representative of Senegal when he refers to our process of decolonization to explain, if not to excuse, the fragmentation urge of the Congolese.

132. We, for our part, will always accuse France of having Balkanized us; the reason why Chiefs of State

meet today at Abidjan, Brazzaville or Yaoundé is that no one relishes a splendid isolation that is devoid of security. There is no reason to think that, if we had attained independence in the large units we used to constitute, we might have found ourselves in a situation similar to that of the Congo. In any case France would have been able to sabotage such independence, just as Belgium sabotaged that of the Congo.

133. Let us acknowledge that France has played the game with us better than Belgium did with the Congo. It did not believe in our independence, but it did believe in assimilation, and then in the French Union. When great and very sincere Africans rose above their local loyalties to ponder seriously, and with great faith, a broad egalitarian and fraternal system, France altered the Community's course one point to port. That was only natural. It did not want equal brothers; it did not want a democratic system where it might be in the minority. It wanted a system where it would occupy first place, just as the first share always goes to the lion. In a word, it planned to give us toys and dummies so that we might play at independence if we felt like it; it wanted satellites.

134. That explains Guinea's "No" in the referendum of 28 September 1958, as well as my country's unconditional independence and refusal to join any community in which we would have no guarantee that our dignity and independence would be respected as those of a responsible country.

135. Our Balkanization can be explained, but not justified, by our having to travel so long a road, which was at the same time a broad forum of ideas, in which shouts arose amid the swarm of concepts and systems and amid the criminal bludgeon-blows of reaction and French colonialism.

136. But no African of West Africa has ever dreamed of adopting as a principle Tshombé's words: "Since each of the Congolese leaders wants to be Prime Minister and Chief of State, each of them will have to be given an opportunity to hold those posts, and the problem will be solved."

137. That is the bad way to solve the problem. Let us rather heed the words of Mr. Denis Yaméogho, Minister for the Interior of the Upper Volta, who knows very well what colonialism and its contemptible manoeuvres are:

"I defy any of those who still put any stock whatsoever in the motto 'Divide and rule' to believe—be they Europeans or Africans, and whatever their capacity for trickery—that they can still do it, in the hope of foisting themselves and lukewarm Africans on us any longer, for any purpose whatever.

"We have passed beyond the stage of deadly fictions; we have forever done away with concerted jealousy and selfishness. We have grasped once and for all that intense, collective nationalism ensures lasting independence; and even if, tomorrow, we should have to suffer in order to affirm it, does not history show that it is the blood of martyrs that makes the rest of the seeds come up, even on rock? Moreover some must die that others may live."

138. It was the Minister who said this, not an intellectual straining after fine patriotic phrases; it was a true son of the people, sprung straight from the people and speaking for them. All the Upper Volta applauded him, and other Africans beyond our borders were honoured and cheered by this avowal of faith in Africa.

139. Will it be understood why, in the Upper Volta, with all urge for vengeance cast aside, the general feel-

ing is that Providence allowed Lumumba to be sacrificed on the altar of unity for the Congo and for the Congolese people, and not on the sacrificial stone of sordid Belgian interests? For who was Lumumba? He himself said quite simply what he stood for, and the Africans heeded him: "For the people, I have no past, no parents, no family; I am an idea. The Congo has made me; I am making the Congo." What idea, then, was Patrice Lumumba, and could an African be a valid idea, capable of troubling the complacent sleep of the replete throughout the world?

140. One of our brother Negroes in the United States, despairing of Africa, the land of his origin, found it in him to write that he had never heard an African admit to any nationality other than that of his tribe. But the retort to that assertion—a proud and assured retort—came from another Negro, Aimé Césaire of the Antilles:

"Patrice Lumumba was the African who, more than any other, gave the lie to this dismal remark by Richard Wright. In the Congolese world, torn by local interests, bristling with feudal features and mottled with tribes, he embodied something great—Congolese patriotism, the will to belong to the Congo—and something beautiful—faith in Africa."

After that, how can we tell the Congolese, when they assemble in conference to build the Congo, that they can ignore—and that they are right to ignore—the will to belong to the Congo and faith in Africa?

141. Of course, this time I agree with my friend the representative of Senegal when he says: "The situation would have been less complicated if external factors had not been brought into play in the Congo." [967th meeting, para. 17.] What are the external factors acting on the Congo? It might perhaps be said that they are the 150 Belgian officers who lead the 7,000 men of the Katanga gendarmerie. To these could probably be added the 4,000 South Africans serving in the Katanga Foreign Legion. Really, everything is incomprehensible nowadays. The Verwoerd Government in South Africa is pursuing a criminal and loathsome racist policy against Negroes. Yet at the same time, and despite *apartheid*, it sends mercenaries to serve the Negro Tshombé. The Rhodesias, which oppress Negroes, are boldly supporting a Negro in Katanga. This new form of co-operation is rather strange.

142. Is bankruptcy the reason why pay in General Mobutu's army has risen 300 per cent since last winter? These eloquent figures come from *The New York Times* of 3 April 1961.

143. The French magazine *Paris-Match*, in its issue of 1 April 1961, discloses that the Katanga copper mines alone earned more than 6,000 million Belgian francs in 1960. The same magazine, in a late February issue, published a photograph of Mr. Tshombé in an opera-hat facing his republican guard, at attention in front of his presidential palace, his *Elysée*, with the following caption: "The opera-hat was too new... for them, independence was a child's dream."

144. After these melancholy disclosures, it is clear that only the children of Katanga valued Patrice Lumumba at 40,000 Belgian francs. To the men of the Katanga mines he was worth more than 6,000 million Belgian francs. In other words the Lumumba idea is worth at least 6,000 million Belgian francs, while the Tshombé idea is worth 40,000 Belgian francs. One would really have to be blind not to see the right course.

145. Let the Congolese, within the Congo, make whatever political cuts and excisions they think best for the Congo. A decentralized administration is perfectly in keeping with the principle that it should be close to the common man whom it aims to serve. But we must express the gravest doubts regarding the viability of a federal council of ministers composed of all the Chiefs of State, each with a veto. Any such Government would be doomed to paralysis. We must express doubt regarding the possibility of maintaining as many national armies as there are tribes. We should also like to know which criteria are to determine what may constitute itself a State, and to receive an assurance that no tribe in the Congo will be oppressed, overruled, or forced to join a State in the name of the right of tribes to self-determination.

146. Even now, however, I can say that we believe too much haste been displayed in commenting on the Tananarive Conference. In any event, the Congolese know what we think. It is not for us to force them, by any kind of manoeuvring, to adopt our way of thinking. We merely warn them against Belgian colonialism, which will burrow like a weevil, the better to gnaw them.

147. However, we remind them that they share with us the responsibility of liberating Africa, utterly and completely, from colonialism. That is a sacred duty which no African can escape; and we are confident that Africa will be liberated through the efforts of its own sons. This is a revolution, and a revolution which cannot fail.

148. In revolutionary combat, heroes fall wreathed in glory. Other heroes arise to take their places. Their advance may be slowed or halted; there may be a strategic withdrawal; but one thing that is never done in a revolution is to turn aside. The colonialists and imperialists must understand that, even if it means that we must be struck down one by one. We shall wipe out colonialism in Africa, and do it thoroughly.

149. That is why I should like to draw the attention of certain great Powers to the following situation: why, in the Congolese case, does the United States, for example, support the Belgian criminals? When that country spoke out on the subject of Angola, what did the dictator of Portugal do? He realized that, without the United States, the battle was lost before it began, and that Portuguese lies in Angola and the usurpation of that territory could be maintained no longer. Scarcely a week later, the colonialists acknowledged that the Angolan nationalists deserved self-government. We warn Portugal that we already know its intentions. But we know that, for everyone, independence comes through self-determination or self-government.

150. The day when the United States Embassy at Lisbon was attacked by a mob of hysterical louts hired by the Salazar Government was a great day for the United States, since it marked the awakening of its interest in the oppressed peoples of Africa. So when will the United States Embassy at Brussels be attacked? Never, I fear.

151. I quote the exact words of Mr. Immanuel Wallerstein, a Professor of Sociology at Columbia University in New York, who wrote in the weekly magazine *The New Leader* of 30 January 1961:

"And with the Congo crisis the U.S. began to repeat the most absurd and elementary error previously made in Asia and the Middle East: simplistic division of African governments and statesmen into good and bad, on the basis of their (sometimes

transitory) position toward the Soviet world, rather than on what they represent in the internal structure of their own countries.

“...
“What is it that Africans expect of the U.S.? Most of all, they want an appreciation that the primary problems of Africa today are political ones...”

152. The same author, referring in the same article to Lumumba's being accused of communism, writes:

“The U.S. has arrived at its opposition to Lumumba because he is ‘pro-Soviet’, whereas the correct statement of the situation is that the USSR is ‘pro-Lumumba’.”

When will the United States be “pro-anything” in the Congo? It accuses the Russians of having a Russian policy in Africa; quite so; then at least let the Americans too have an American policy in Africa! And for pity's sake let them stop supporting the policy of the European colonialists, as though colonialist Europe, the Europe of the Berlin Conference of 1885, should do the thinking for the United States of Abraham Lincoln.

153. Let no-one try to claim, from what I have just said, that the Upper Volta sides with the left. The Upper Volta does not take sides.

154. The great danger for Africa lies in finding itself on a track between two lions, after escaping from the claws of the European panther. The communists love us too, as the lion loves the doe. We were dumbfounded by the statements which the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union made here last September. He said that communism was the best system in the world. He affirmed here his confidence that the whole world would ultimately turn communist.

155. Is it thought among the communists, that Africa has no other values to cultivate? And would it, by any chance, be the intention to deny us all personality and all right to self-determination?

156. In any event, we have proof that the communists too are prepared to take advantage of our internal differences. The case of Mauritania is typical. We were surprised and scandalized by the veto that turned Mauritania into a negotiable coin for use in the deals in which the communists are engaged with the Western Powers, whereas we Africans do not oppose the admission to the United Nations of any country fit to join. The Soviet attitude to Mauritania is a direct attack on the dignity of the new nations.

157. It will perhaps be said that we are, or seem, naïve. Well, we like being or seeming naïve if it means that we shall have peace and the chance to build a truly free Africa. To what role, then, will the small nations in the United Nations be committed when they refuse to act as puppets of the left or the right? Once again, I quote a statement by President Maurice Yaméogo, Chief of State of the Upper Volta:

“I have said, and I repeat, that it is the ambition of the Upper Volta to give the world an example of complete and trusting co-operation between peoples; but I have also said, and I maintain, that we are not, and shall not be, at the disposal of any Power and that our relations with the rest of the world will be governed solely by the guarantees we receive that our freedom, dignity and sovereignty will be respected. I have said, and I repeat, that we will not accept military bases in the Upper Volta, whether French, American, Russian, British or anything else. That is an unconditional preliminary. We are sure

that all those who are not blinded by passion will see in this a pledge of the durability of our independence...”

158. In his speech, the Chief of State of the Upper Volta denounces and rejects the idea of a world composed of aristocratic Powers dominating the proletarian Powers whose wealth and labour could be exploited at will:

“You know that, for a long time, from about 1815 onwards, world affairs were in reality managed by a small committee of what were termed ‘the great Powers’ or ‘the concert of Europe’. The Second World War, because of the ensuing political chaos, was to give new strength to this concept, but with this difference, that there were to be considerable changes in the list of great Powers. In short, it had become a tradition that these great Powers, and they alone, should manage world affairs, while the small countries were invited to cultivate neutrality and told what had been decided for them. The Africa of today wishes to shoulder all its responsibilities and all its obligations.”

159. Everything I have just said explains why, although we encourage the Congolese leaders, we fervently hope that they will be prudent, wise and patriotic. It would be truly impossible for us to give our blessing to a new-born Congo which bore scant resemblance to the Congo or the African Africa of today.

160. Before concluding, I should like to say a word concerning the crisis in the United Nations. We shall not criticize the United Nations as some have done, pointing a finger at something alien, as though we were not among the ninety-nine countries which make up the United Nations. That would be nonsense. In any event my delegation considers such criticism unconstructive and, here again, will not follow the example of some African countries which, when speaking of the United Nations, wear the same sneer as the great Powers.

161. It is understandable that the great Powers are getting tired of the United Nations. In 1945, they formed an association to safeguard their security and the security of the world; for they had divided the world among them and each one regarded its share of the world as its own property, which had to be respected. That is why all the colonialists adduce the United Nations Charter in defence of the usurpation of African countries. The drafting of that Charter was inspired by a body of international law which took no account of us. One of my teachers taught me that, under that body of international law, my country belonged to no-one—not even to my ancestors, who were born there, because they could not read—and that that was why his own country had been entitled to take over mine, after notifying its neighbours. What highway robbery! What could be expected of such an outlook? It was not, at all events, calculated to confer on the United Nations or to help it to discharge a function of decolonization.

162. For the United Nations operation in the Congo to succeed, it would have been necessary to decolonize the spirit of the United Nations and to make it clear that the arrival of the African countries and other colonized countries in the Organization was a positive factor for peace and international co-operation.

163. The Africans must therefore work for speedy revision of the United Nations Charter in a direction more in keeping with the world of today. The worst possible course would be to revise it as desired by only

one Power, so as to divide the world into three blocs: the communists, the capitalists and the neutrals. The time has come for the small nations to set about making themselves the conscience of a United Nations renewed by a dynamic infusion of new blood. For this reason we again urge the United Nations to do its duty, but for the same reason we shall send no troops to the Congo unless we are satisfied that they will be used, not to shoot Congolese, but to fire on the Belgians and other colonialists and imperialists, who must be expelled from the Congo with their whole diabolical bag of tricks.

164. For the same reason, again, we think that, rather than adopt a resolution or any other measures, it might perhaps be wiser to wait and see what the Congolese have to say and, at the same time, encourage the Secretary-General to implement the resolutions already adopted, under which the Belgian colonialists are to be expelled quickly, without delay. Let the Belgians leave the Congo; let the colonialists take their grasping claw-like hands off the Congo; and the Congolese will know calm and peace once again.

Statement by the President

165. The PRESIDENT: Before adjourning the meeting, I should like to make the following statement.

166. As delegations may be aware, a meeting of the existing seventeen members of the Economic and Social Council took place this morning. It was found impossible to make any progress with the work of the Council in the face of doubts expressed by several of the members of the Council as to whether that body was entitled legally to meet without the full membership prescribed by Article 61 of the Charter. In accordance with the wish expressed by the members of the Council present, my attention has been officially drawn to this situation by the presiding officer.

167. As must be obvious to delegations, this emphasizes sharply the need for finding a solution at the earliest possible moment to the impasse which at present exists in connexion with the filling of the remaining vacancy on the Economic and Social Council. I should like, therefore, to urge delegations, and particularly the delegations most closely concerned, to make an earnest effort to find a solution of the existing deadlock so as to enable the Economic and Social Council to proceed with its work.

168. I should like to be able to announce before the end of the present week the date of the next ballot for the vacancy on the Economic and Social Council, and I should like to be able to do so in the confidence that that ballot, when held, would yield a positive result.

The meeting rose at 6.5 p.m.