



GENERAL ASSEMBLY

FIFTEENTH SESSION

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President: Mr. Frederick H. BOLAND (Ireland).

AGENDA ITEM 85

The situation in the Republic of the Congo (*continued*)

1. Mr. SUBASINGHE (Ceylon): One of the major questions confronting the world today is the struggle of the colonial peoples for their freedom. Quite naturally, the United Nations, as an organization devised to deal with world problems, must be seized of the colonial question too. Willingly or unwillingly, the United Nations has had to consider various aspects of the colonial question from time to time in recent years. The Fourth Committee has done some very useful work in the defence of the rights of the people in the Trust Territories. The General Assembly has met in emergency session on a number of occasions in recent years to deal with various crises, many of which arose out of the attempts of colonial Powers to suppress the emergence of independent Governments with independent policies in former semi-colonial territories. Algeria, Cyprus and Angola have been the subject of discussion in the various organs of the United Nations. Apart from these specific questions of colonialism, a Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples [*resolution 1514 (XV)*] was accepted by the General Assembly without a single dissentient vote in the first part of the current session.

2. Let us make no mistake about it. Questions such as these will be haunting the world Organization from time to time in the future too, just as the Congo question has been haunting it for the last eight months. It is not an accident that colonial questions should enter these respectable chambers in rather a brusque manner. People struggling to be free invariably court the wrath of their rulers. Acts of inhumanity and repression are committed by those who want to continue the subjugation of the colonial peoples. The peoples themselves react with acts of violence. In this closely knit world of today, such events in the colonial territories readily assume an international importance.

3. The attitudes of different countries and their Governments to these questions depend on their own political outlook and the character of their political systems. My Government believes strongly in the principle of the right of subject peoples to self-determination. We also believe that the attainment of independence by the subject peoples is essentially their own task. However, since the United Nations itself has accepted this

principle of the right of self-determination, it is in the nature of things that we must discuss these questions—no matter how long it takes—and find peaceful and, I would emphasize, correct solutions.

4. We cannot evade these issues merely because their discussion and their solution may hurt one set of nations or the other. If the Congo question continues to be a major preoccupation of this Assembly, we are ourselves to blame. We have failed to find the solution. Or, I might say, it may be more accurate to state that the solution is not difficult to find or that it is obvious. But it does not suit some nations to accept the solution in good faith.

5. In the opinion of my delegation, the resolutions so far adopted by the Security Council and the General Assembly, despite all their limitations, if allowed to be implemented without overt and covert obstruction from Member nations, would have prevented this tragedy for the Congolese people. They would have saved the prestige of Belgium and established healthy relations on a basis of equality between the Congo and Belgium. They would have helped to avoid this challenge to the newly independent nations of Africa and Asia and, above all, they would have relaxed the stress and strain that the United Nations is subjected to today.

6. Take for instance the resolution of the Security Council dated 14 July 1960.¹ Operative paragraph 1:

"Calls upon the Government of Belgium to withdraw its troops from the territory of the Republic of the Congo."

7. Again take the resolution of the Security Council of 22 July 1960.² Operative paragraph 1:

"Calls upon the Government of Belgium to implement speedily the Security Council resolution of 14 July 1960 on the withdrawal of its troops, and authorizes the Secretary-General to take all necessary action to this effect."

8. Once again, the Security Council's resolution of 9 August 1960³ is still harping on the need for the withdrawal of troops. Operative paragraph 2:

"Calls upon the Government of Belgium to withdraw immediately its troops from the province of Katanga under speedy modalities determined by the Secretary-General and to assist in every possible way the implementation of the Council's resolutions."

9. In September, these demands on Belgium were reaffirmed by the General Assembly. But as late as 21 February 1961 the Security Council, in a resolution,⁴ is still urging:

¹ *Official Records of the Security Council, Fifteenth Year, Supplement for July, August and September 1960*, document S/4387.

² *Ibid.*, document S/4405.

³ *Ibid.*, document S/4426.

⁴ *Ibid.*, *Sixteenth Year, Supplement for January, February and March 1961*, document S/4741.

“...that measures be taken for the immediate withdrawal and evacuation from the Congo of all Belgian and other foreign military and para-military personnel and political advisers not under the United Nations Command, and mercenaries.”

10. Today is 4 April. The Belgians are still there. The only difference perhaps is that today they are wearing Congolese uniforms instead of Belgian uniforms and they are supposed to be in the pay of the various authorities in the Congo.

11. The presence, the interference and the political grip of the Belgians represent perhaps the only constant factor in the Congo situation. The factors that were intended to contribute to a unified, independent and democratic Congo have been eliminated. The *Loi fondamentale*, which had its birth from the joint efforts and consultations of the Congolese leaders and the Belgian Government, is set aside. Parliament, in which the sovereign power of the people is vested, is suspended. The man who represented the genuinely nationalist aspirations of the Congolese people and his closest associates have been cruelly murdered.

12. One of the functionaries who was appointed by Parliament and who, in association with Prime Minister Lumumba, invited the United Nations to intervene, in order to save the Congo from Belgian colonialism, has turned hostile to the United Nations action and is held up by the Belgians as the sole depository of the people's sovereignty. The army which was intended to maintain law and order is today the very breaker of that law and order.

13. Is this the situation which Mr. Lumumba and the Congolese people expected to be created when they invited United Nations intervention? Is this the situation that small Member States like ours expected in the Congo when they gave their full backing to the United Nations action? No. Perhaps we were mistaken because we had certain illusions.

14. The present relationship of forces in the United Nations has made it impossible for the Security Council and the General Assembly to take clear-cut decisions which correspond with reality. Too readily and quite cynically some great Powers assumed that this was a clear-cut issue between nationalism and colonialism, with a cold war content. A section of the National Government, led by Mr. Lumumba and others, was falsely accused of desiring to establish a Communist State in Africa. These boogies, however, had the necessary effect. Because of the projection of the cold war into the Congo, the resolutions adopted by the Security Council and the General Assembly were given a highly formalistic and narrowly legalistic interpretation, lest there be international complications.

15. While the United Nations was being narrowly legalistic and playing for safety, highly illegal acts were being committed under the very nose of the United Nations by the enemies of Congolese independence, both foreign and domestic.

16. In the face of illegality, one of two possible courses could be pursued. Firstly, the legal Government of the Congo and the people could have been permitted to master their enemies with whatever means they could gather from all sources. Secondly, the United Nations could have taken all measures to eliminate the elements that were attacking Congolese unity and integrity. The United Nations prevented the first course and was helpless in fulfilling the second. The helplessness of the United Nations in the Congo (UNOC) enabled

the colonialists to bedevil the Congo scene and reduce the young State to a shambles.

17. In the opinion of my delegation the question of the Congo was then, as it is now, one of a people struggling to establish its independence against the manoeuvres and intrigues of a colonial Power which was unwilling to loosen its grip on the politics, the economy and the life of the Congolese people. Somehow this cardinal fact has been forgotten. Certain Powers are obsessed by the bogey of communism. They doubt the motives of African and Asian countries which have stood squarely with the aspirations of the Congolese people to have a united, independent and progressive national State. And these same Powers, even now, are trying to play midwife to the birth of a set-up in the Congo which will ensure the acceptance of their own particular international policies and guarantee their economic interests.

18. The Prime Minister of Ceylon, Mrs. Bandaranaike, has made the position of Ceylon quite clear to the world on more than one occasion. We have no material, economic or military interest in the Congo; but we firmly believe in the right of the Congolese people to independence and their right to work out their own future. We, however, oppose any foreign Power attempting to determine the character of the Government of the Congo. We believe in the territorial integrity of the Congo and we are convinced that the *Loi fondamentale*, which came into being after agreement with the representatives of the Congolese people, provides the basic constitutional law of the country. The Government of Ceylon also recognizes the Parliament of the Congo as the one institution in which the sovereign power of the Congolese people rests.

19. It is also our view that any attempt to create separate states in the territory of the Congo—in collusion with individuals who have always opposed the Central Government and a unified Congo and who have worked for the secession of the provinces—is contrary to the provisions of the *Loi fondamentale*.

20. Apart from the constitutional aspect, there is a grave danger in the fragmentation of the Congo into separate, non-viable, economically untenable states held together by a loose confederation. This would be most detrimental, not only to the people of the Congo but also to the whole of Africa.

21. Experience shows us that part of the strategy of colonialism is to promote divisive tendencies in colonial territories and the newly independent countries. The present attempts by some politicians to establish a host of sovereign states within the framework of a nebulous confederation serves only the colonial interests. The creation of such small independent states can only help to encourage tribal rivalries and heighten the clash of ambitious personalities. A collection of loosely-federated states in a country so backward will only enable countries with economic, political and military ambitions in Africa to set these states one against the other, disturb the peace and prevent any national development.

22. If the fragmentation is condoned, the process started in the Congo will spread to other parts of Africa and thus prevent the building up of modern, progressive and viable states in the colonial territories which are regaining their independence.

23. We hear a great deal of talk about the necessity for regional plans for economic development in Africa. My delegation agrees that comprehensive, co-ordinated

planning on a regional basis is very necessary. Such planning must also have a certain political basis and the most important political prerequisite is that there should be co-operation between states which are viable, territorial, economic and political units with governmental stability. My delegation fails to understand how advocacy of regional planning on a large scale can be reconciled with the implied support for the Balkanization of countries like the Congo.

24. Of course, we admit that the structure of a state must be such as to enable all the component parts of a country to participate fully in the governance of the country. We admit that linguistic, cultural and other differences must be taken into account in determining the structure of the state. One section of the people must not be placed in a domineering position over another. The respective cultures must have the opportunity to develop fully.

25. But we, the United Nations, do not have the right to impose any constitution or framework for a state structure on the Congolese people; nor do a few people who have gained power by illegal means have that right. It is the Congolese people themselves who must decide what the structure of their future State should be.

26. The *Loi fondamentale*, with all its weaknesses, has provided for the necessary organs through which the different groups of the Congolese people could realize these aspirations—organs of local administration, provincial governments and the Central Government. Our complaint is that the functioning of these organs in consonance with the *Loi fondamentale* is suspended; suspended not because the Congolese people themselves wanted it suspended but because it did not suit the colonial Power which had been a party to it originally and because it did not suit some sections of Congolese politicians. Today these sections are attacking the *Loi fondamentale* of the country, the main object of which was the defence and the safeguarding of its national integrity.

27. And this is what the decisions arrived at by the recent Tananarive Conference⁵ mean: the deliberate breaking up of the Congo into small, ineffective states under the guise of a confederation. The hand of the Belgian colonialists is all too evident in this move; for who was, and is today, the dominating individual in the proposed plan? No other than Moïse Tshombé. It will be Mr. Tshombé and the Belgian-dominated State of Katanga that will call the piper's tune.

28. It would not be out of place here to endeavour to learn some pertinent facts about the ruler of Katanga—the self-styled President of the State of Katanga. The London *Observer* of 19 March 1961, in a profile of the man whom the newspaper describes as “the most reviled African in Africa today”, says: “Moïse Tshombé shares two outstanding characteristics with the Belgian financiers who are at present among his strongest supporters. He is strongly bourgeois, and he is passionately money-minded.”

29. We are informed that young Tshombé, at the age of thirty-three, inherited a considerable estate from his father, who had been financed by the Union Minière. The son ended up in the bankruptcy court and, says the *Observer*, “like his father he was helped to his feet by the Union Minière”.

30. The London *Observer* continues:

“At the time of independence Tshombé found himself without political allies. His own tribal party, Conakat, could look only to local Belgians for support... Tshombé was willing to rely heavily on Belgian technical and military support to prop up his otherwise largely meaningless declaration of independence. In exchange, he was ready to let the Belgians conduct their campaign to undermine Lumumba's government—which also happened to suit Tshombé's purposes.”

31. Adding that the Tshombé government cannot escape the ultimate responsibility for the murder of Lumumba, the *Observer* concludes:

“Tshombé's best hope is to link himself as an autonomous, or even perhaps as a semi-autonomous, State to the other regions of the Congo, and set up a confederation. This policy has obvious attractions for other Congolese leaders, as well as for their foreign supporters.”

32. We believe that the people of the Congo have sovereign power and this sovereign power has been vested in the Congolese Parliament. The Parliament, however, stands prorogued arbitrarily. The least that the United Nations can do—and what the Members of the United Nations must insist on—is the resumption of Parliament under such conditions as will enable the members of Parliament, by free discussion, to decide the future of their country.

33. Such conditions do not obtain today. Members of Parliament are arbitrarily imprisoned. Armed groups of a section of the Congolese authorities do not want this Parliament to meet. And the Chief of State deliberately refuses to exercise his authority to bring the Parliament into activity again.

34. We believe that this situation prevails because of the attitude of the old colonial Power and some of its friends. We believe that pressure is being exercised on the Congolese authorities by the colonial Power through Belgian personnel and their foreign friends in the Congo. Political advisers, military advisers and mercenaries of all sorts are participating in political intrigues and planning military adventures.

35. The Belgian colonialists are determined to keep the Congo under their rule in perpetuity, directly or indirectly. But the forces of nationalism in Africa and the Congo are too powerful for them. Under pressure, the colonialists were compelled to agree to the transfer of power and, through the election, the genuinely nationalist elements in the Congo gained ascendancy and formed a government.

36. The policies of the Government were not in the interests of Belgian vested interests. Therefore, the Belgians made up their minds to make it impossible for the nationalist Government to continue. Hence the manoeuvres and the intrigues which culminated in the ousting of Mr. Lumumba, the suspension of Parliament and the establishment of secessionist States. These manoeuvres, intrigues and stratagems continue even today.

37. Encouraged by their successes, the Belgians are flocking back to the Congo. While the United Nations, time and time again, has called on the Belgians to withdraw, not one iota of attention do they pay to United Nations decisions. And why not? For the colonialists, no success has been greater in Africa than the continued subjection of the Congolese people.

⁵ Round-table Conference, Tananarive, 8-14 March, 1961.

And no greater proof is needed than that the colonizers find it opportune to return to gather the fruits of their exploitation.

38. *The Times* of London of 8 March 1961 has this to say of the returning Belgians:

“Unfortunately a proportion of thugs and adventurers is included among the number of the returning émigrés. They can be seen on Elisabethville airport, bearded... or tight-jawed and Prussian-capped and reminding one uncomfortably that a Belgian S.S. formation used regularly to feature in the situation reports of the 21 Army Group.”

39. The role of colonial interests in the Congo from July 1960 up to the present day tends to be forgotten too readily in the welter of confused developments and reports. In the opinion of my delegation, the question of the Congo was a colonial question prior to 30 July 1960; it has been a colonial question in the period since; and it is basically a colonial question today. The main question now, as it was then, is—how can Congolese independence be assured? The Belgian purpose was to subordinate Congolese wealth and Congolese economy to the needs of metropolitan Belgium.

40. Can we permit the Belgians, who once accepted the independence of the Congo, to subvert that independence and impose an indirect rule over the country in order to safeguard their very considerable vested interests? If we permit it any longer, the United Nations would have failed miserably. Unfortunately, there is no cause for optimism, even today. Failure seems to be well on the way, unless the United Nations acts without delay and in a more determined fashion.

41. The Security Council adopted its resolution of 21 February 1961 without a single dissenting vote. This resolution laid down certain objectives as the minimum of prerequisites necessary for bringing about peace, tranquillity and the re-establishment of independence.

42. Despite all the efforts of the Secretary-General, assisted by the Advisory Committee on the Congo, we are far from achieving a single one of the objectives. The Belgian advisers, military personnel and para-military personnel are still there in large numbers. Mercenaries hired from Western countries and South Africa are playing a leading role in fostering civil strife. This morning, we heard the news of the incidents in Manono, and in that military action the leadership was taken by Belgians and South Africans.

43. The Belgian Government evaded responsibility by insisting that it had no control over these elements in the Congo. None of the requests for the resumption of Parliament have been heeded by the authorities whose unlawful acts continue to perturb the genuine friends of the Congolese people.

44. There is a complete silence on the part of the authorities about the death of Mr. Lumumba and his followers, although a promise was held out that the men guilty of the crime would be brought to book. And now the Chief of State himself takes a very cynical view of the assassination for, when the United Nations Conciliation Commission for the Congo sought information on the assassination, Mr. Kasa-Vubu treated it very lightly. The Conciliation Commission pointed out to Mr. Kasa-Vubu that: “...the news was bound to be most harmful to his country's repute and to make the Commission's position extremely difficult” [A/4711, para. 47]. The Commission was of the opinion that it was President Kasa-Vubu's duty as Chief of State to

condemn such acts publicly and in the strongest terms, for his silence might be interpreted by the outside world as a sign of approval or even of complicity. The Commission had no intention of interfering in the domestic affairs of the Congo but such acts affected the fundamental human rights which the Republic of the Congo, as a Member of the United Nations, had undertaken to observe and respect.

45. President Kasa-Vubu replied [ibid.] that he had not yet received official information on the subject and that, when it became available to the authorities, he would in due course explain what had happened. He desired to be in possession of all the facts before replying to the Commission. The President added that “such incidents had also taken place elsewhere and might well recur”.

46. Months have passed and the President has taken no action. Far from bringing the perpetrators of the crime before a court of law, the chances are that even the international tribunal to be appointed in the terms of the Security Council resolution of 21 February 1961 will not receive the facilities for conducting its investigations.

47. For some time past there has been a campaign in sections of the Western Press against Mr. Rajeswar Dayal, the Secretary-General's Special Representative in the Congo. This same criticism of Mr. Dayal is echoed in Belgian quarters. Mr. Kasa-Vubu and his colleagues are of the same mind. This, indeed, is a very strange coincidence.

48. Now, the attacks are not confined to Mr. Dayal alone; the whole United Nations action in the Congo is being opposed in these quarters and not because the United Nations action does not go far enough to bring about a settlement. According to them, it goes too far. It is alleged that the United Nations is interfering in the internal affairs of the Congo. The United Nations may be criticized for many things, but it certainly cannot be accused of interfering in the internal affairs of Mr. Kasa-Vubu's ineffective régime. If anything, Mr. Kasa-Vubu's, Mr. Tshombé's and other secessionists' positions have been strengthened as a result of UNOC's neutrality in the conflict between nationalism and colonialism.

49. The Leopoldville troops, armed with Belgian arms and guided by Belgian advisers, carried out a military action against the United Nations in Matadi. Frequent statements are made by colleagues of Mr. Kasa-Vubu that the United Nations must withdraw from the Congo. I think that it is about time that the United Nations ascertained from Mr. Kasa-Vubu officially where he stands in relation to the United Nations.

50. If the United Nations is to continue in the Congo, there is one absolutely necessary step that must be taken. It is to break the hold of the colonialists in the Congo. That, after all, is the prime object of the United Nations intervention. This must not be confused with the future structure of the Congolese State or the relations between Mr. Kasa-Vubu and Mr. Gizenga and the other leaders. The obstacles preventing the summoning of Parliament, the promotion of a National Government and the settlement of the future form of the State by free discussion arise, in our opinion, from the presence of Belgian colonialists. Therefore, the prime task of the United Nations is the achievement of the complete withdrawal of the foreign advisers, military and para-military personnel and mercenaries. The United Nations Force must be

given the necessary powers to achieve this object. Secondly, there is something very significant in the present situation in the Congo. There is rivalry between various leaders in the Congo. Undisciplined armed groups join in these rivalries. But we hear very little of the ordinary Congolese people joining in violence. On the other hand, it is the people who are most often the victims of violence of armed groups. If this violence is to stop, the United Nations must put a stop to the free flow of arms into the hands of the military groupings which are bent on imposing their will on the people and take the responsibility for the maintenance of law and order. Only thereby can we create the conditions in which the people and their representatives in Parliament can assert themselves. It is a well-known fact that, even today, arms are being received in Leopoldville and Katanga in large quantities.

51. Therefore, there are two conditions that must be fulfilled without further delay and the United Nations operation in the Congo must be given all the powers necessary to accomplish this task. The two conditions are firstly, the complete withdrawal of all foreign advisers, military and para-military personnel and mercenaries, and, secondly, a stoppage of the flow of arms to the military groups in the Congo. Only thereby can the Congolese people peacefully solve their own affairs through the legally established Parliament.

52. My delegation wishes to co-sponsor a resolution emphasizing these two main objectives and I believe it will be in the hands of the representatives in the course of the day.

53. Mr. UMAÑA BERNAL (Colombia) (*translated from Spanish*): I would first of all again express on behalf of the Colombian delegation our sincere condolences to the Cuban delegation on the death of its distinguished Permanent Representative, Mr. Manuel Bisbé.

54. The Colombian delegation deems it necessary to make a brief statement explaining its position at this juncture in the long and tempestuous debate on the problem of the Congo (Leopoldville), which has pre-occupied the United Nations for nine months since 13 July 1960 when the Security Council first began to deal with the situation created in that Republic immediately after the proclamation of its independence. We obviously have no special interests to serve in this matter, but we believe that the course of events in the Congo may have very grave repercussions on the United Nations, jeopardizing its very existence and gravely endangering its essential purpose of preserving international peace and security. We are also impelled by a feeling of deep and sincere sympathy and brotherly friendship towards this new country, with all other nations of the African continent which have recently attained their freedom.

55. Within the limits we have set for ourselves, we have no wish to make an exhaustive analysis of the previous history of this item or of the events that followed the emergence of the Republic of the Congo to independent life on 30 June 1960, since I am sure they are already well known to the Assembly. Although we shall not fail to keep these previous events very much in mind, we wish to base our position on present realities. In adopting that position, we must not lose sight of the relevant provisions of the United Nations Charter, with which we consider ourselves bound by solemn contract to comply.

56. Last year, at the express request of the lawful Government of the Congo, both the Security Council and the General Assembly adopted various resolutions in order to deal with the problems of the Congo, which were threatening international peace and security. In addition to the resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 20 September 1960 at its fourth emergency special session [1474 (ES-IV)], there have been the Security Council resolutions of 14 and 22 July and of 9 August 1960.⁶ Lastly, we have the resolution adopted by the Council on 21 February 1961.⁷ The situation created by that most recent decision of the Council, and the difficulties encountered in carrying it out, constitute the problem which the Assembly must consider at the second part of its fifteenth regular session—a problem which it has already discussed at the first part of the session without being able to adopt any proposal at all for lack of a majority.

57. We must first of all frankly confess that we have been very doubtful about the legality of some of those arrangements, since we do not consider that they correspond very closely with the letter and the spirit of the Charter. Similarly, we are bound to state that, since the United Nations intervention, the course of events in the Congo has on several occasions caused us misgivings about the expedience and value of the huge and dangerous operation that has been undertaken, and about the ability of the United Nations in its present circumstances to carry enterprises of such a scale through to a successful conclusion and to persevere in them until all the desired results have been attained. Nevertheless, at its fourth emergency special session, convened in September 1960, the General Assembly resolved, by the impressive majority of 71 votes to none, with 9 abstentions, to continue and expand the action previously decided upon by the Security Council. At its latest meetings, the Security Council confirmed its previous decisions in the resolution of 21 February 1961, which was also adopted by a large majority, without any of the permanent members having felt called upon to exercise the right of veto.

58. Whatever scruples we may still have, we are all involved in the "Congo operation" a premature curtailment of which would be a disaster from which the United Nations could not easily recover because of the very serious damage to its prestige and authority. Moreover, we are all obliged to do everything in our power to ensure the success of that operation and scrupulously to refrain from taking any stand that might jeopardize it.

59. What can the Assembly do about the situation created by the Council's resolution of 21 February? Here our doubts become more acute and our scruples stronger. This session is no longer the emergency special session of the General Assembly which met in September 1960 at the behest of the Council in accordance with the well-known General Assembly resolution 377 (V) called "Uniting for peace". At the present session we have not received any official communication stating that the Council has concluded its consideration of the item we are discussing, or asking us to make recommendations in the matter in accordance with the provisions of Article 12 of the Charter. While I do not wish to split any legal hairs, there are, I think,

⁶ *Official Records of the Security Council, Fifteenth Year, Supplement for July, August and September 1960*, document S/4387; *ibid.*, document S/4405; *ibid.*, document S/4426.

⁷ *Ibid.*, *Sixteenth Year, Supplement for January, February and March 1961*, document S/4741.

ample grounds at least for doubting whether we are competent to adopt a further resolution on this problem.

60. It is generally agreed that the Assembly may hold as extensive a debate as it wishes on any dispute or situation under the Council's jurisdiction; but many think it is not competent to take a decision. And, even assuming that the problem of competence is not of major importance, it is even more doubtful whether the Assembly is competent substantially to amend, enlarge or restrict a resolution adopted by the Council. The Assembly cannot, so to speak, correct the Security Council's work. Moreover, the mere recommendations which we can adopt here pale into insignificance before the mandatory decisions of the highest authority of the United Nations.

61. I should like to make it quite clear that my delegation does not wish to be excessively legalistic; but we must confess that we are disturbed by the fact that very often the provisions of the Charter are applied too liberally or not at all.

62. The approval of funds for the Congo operations which the Assembly was discussing yesterday, is something altogether different. Here the question was really whether to comply with the Council's resolutions by voting the funds necessary for continuing to give effect to them. Moreover, the question was whether to comply with them, not whether to amend them or adopt others. Hence the argument of lack of competence is groundless.

63. At the present stage of the debate we do not yet know precisely whether there will be a new draft resolution, although we know that some drafts are already in circulation. We must await the final texts before we can take a position on them; but it will not be out of place to state in advance our belief that the Assembly can do nothing more than recommend faithful compliance with the resolutions which the Council has already adopted, and make an earnest appeal to Member States, especially those most directly concerned in the problem, not to impede or hamper their speedy execution.

64. This debate has shown us that, with some few but notorious exceptions, the genuine and distinguished representatives of all geographical regions and of widely-varying political outlooks all agree that the resolution of 21 February 1961 is quite satisfactory and should be put into effect at once. Everything depends on whether it is interpreted correctly and carried out honestly and faithfully. One of the speakers who preceded me to this rostrum said that there were enough resolutions on the subject already. What is urgently needed is that both those directly and those indirectly concerned with the situation in the Republic of the Congo should further the United Nations action.

65. Without wishing to embark upon a minute analysis of these resolutions, and with the general reservations which I have already explained, my delegation supports the Security Council's resolutions and is happy to endorse the views of the representatives of Ecuador and Chile, its two Latin American members. Our reservations refer specifically to certain provisions in part B of the resolution which we think might imply a manifest interference in matters within the domestic jurisdiction of the State of the Congo, whose independence and sovereignty we have all recognized and must safeguard since it is a Member of our Organization.

66. The conclusions in the report of the United Nations Conciliation Commission for the Congo [A/4711],

a work which we must all welcome as an extremely valuable contribution to our deliberations, largely correspond to the Council's resolutions and can be very useful in their careful execution.

67. In line with the ideas I have expressed, we hope that the activities of the United Nations in the Congo will, so far as possible, be based on friendly co-operation with the local authorities and consist, as they should, of co-operation, advice and help, without any appearance of imposition or belligerency. Many recent facts indicate that there are now very good prospects for a better understanding between the Government and the political leaders of the Congo with a view to seeking a joint solution of the problems of the Republic.

68. Following the Tananarive Conference, the results of which should not be underestimated, there have been other similar developments which, if there is no outside interference, may culminate in a national agreement for the restoration of legality. The functions of the representatives of the United Nations should be to take advantage of all such factors to promote the pacification of the country and the maintenance of law and order, leaving the Congolese to settle their domestic political problems and decide on the form and procedures of their Government. They must also prevent outside interference, and work to preserve the unity and integrity of the nation. Let me say in passing that this unity and integrity are in no way incompatible with a federal system of government. This has been proved by the history of a number of countries, including some of the most important on the American continent.

69. If, through peaceful means, proper interpretation of the resolutions of the Council and the Assembly, and friendly co-operation, the Congo is successfully restored to normal, as we hope, and if it is possible to prevent foreign interference, which in our opinion has been the major cause of all the problems and conflicts that have arisen there, it will then become possible to consider a gradual reduction in the military forces of the United Nations, as the representatives of Uruguay [968th meeting] and of the Argentine Republic [970th meeting] have indicated here in their brilliant and constructive statements. We are highly gratified to find ourselves in agreement with them, at least on essentials, as well as with the very able statement which Ambassador de Freitas-Valle made on behalf of Brazil at the beginning of the debate [965th meeting].

70. We also find ourselves in general agreement with many representatives of other States, and particularly with those of the new African States, who we hope will appreciate the disinterested co-operation of the Latin American countries in seeking solutions for their problems without in any way infringing their national autonomy.

71. Among the proposals made by the representatives of Uruguay and Argentina, that for reorganization and enlargement of the Conciliation Commission as a subordinate body of the Assembly or the Council deserves the Assembly's particular attention.

72. During this debate serious charges have been levelled at the Secretary-General, Mr. Hammarskjöld, which because of their unbridled exaggeration and scurrility are unworthy of attention. It would be pointless for me to repeat here the conclusive defence of his actions which this high officer gave in his comprehensive statement of last 15 February before the Security Council [935th meeting], in which he gave a meticulous

account of all the activities of the United Nations since the day the Government of the Republic of the Congo requested its help. This explanation, which we have checked against other documents, we find fully satisfactory.

73. We believe that the Secretary-General's actions in the performance of his task have been worthy of his position and responsibilities. He may occasionally have been mistaken, just as some of his assistants certainly have, but neither his competence nor his good faith can be called into question.

74. In order not to go beyond the item under discussion, we shall not for the moment refer to the proposals for reorganization of the Secretariat by dividing up its responsibility in such a way as to make it virtually powerless through an implied veto privilege.

75. Without listing the conclusions that can be easily drawn from the text of this statement, I have recorded my delegation's position on the most important item on our agenda, alike because of its timeliness and of its possible consequences.

76. Before concluding, I wish once again to place on record our condemnation of the political murders which have been committed in the Congo and are all equally detestable.

77. I trust I have not unduly taxed the attention or patience of my colleagues, and it remains for me only to express our fervent hope that the Republic of the Congo will soon succeed in strengthening its autonomy, re-establishing internal law and order, and returning to regular constitutional procedures.

78. Mr. DIALLO Telli (Guinea) (*translated from French*): The delegation of the Republic of Guinea wishes at the outset once more to condole with the Cuban delegation upon the sudden death of its valued colleague, Ambassador Manuel Bisbé, who was stricken a few days ago in our midst at the very moment when the debate on the Congo, in which he had played so important a part in the past, was about to open. It expresses its deep sympathy with Ambassador Bisbé's family and with the Cuban Government and people on this sad occasion, and its high regard for the substantial contribution which Ambassador Bisbé had made in the United Nations on behalf of his Government and people to the triumph of the ideals of the Charter, and especially to the liberation of all the oppressed peoples of Africa, Asia, and elsewhere.

79. The Congo crisis, which for the past eight months has profoundly disturbed the political situation in the African continent and unquestionably dominated all levels of international life, is again before the Assembly. In the United Nations it has produced special repercussions: the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Secretariat and the Advisory Committee on the Congo have dealt, some almost daily, with the Congo crisis. It is actually only the most acute manifestation of the vast conflict between colonialism, determined to retain its hold on Africa at any cost, and African nationalism, resolved to break at any cost the chains of slavery that bind the African people. The most striking, disappointing and serious aspect of this unfortunate affair is that the United Nations, to which the nationalist head of the new Congolese State had appealed for help against Belgian military aggression, has become deeply involved in the tragic situation it was called on to settle. What is more, the United Nations Force in the Congo stands out more and more clearly as one of the

main factors in the deterioration and aggravation of the situation in the country. Everyone is aware that in recent years and particularly since 1959, there has been a terrific exacerbation of the conflict which actually began with the colonial conquest between colonialism represented by Belgium, and African nationalism in the form of the new Congo State.

80. Free or in chains, alive or dead, Patrice Lumumba, who faithfully and inflexibly voiced his people's profound aspiration towards the dignity and responsibility that freedom alone confers, will remain the dominating figure in this heroic struggle. And this conflict, although it has brought and is still to bring terrible suffering to Africa, will undoubtedly be one of the most decisive phases of the glorious battle for the liberation of the African continent. Throughout his struggle, Patrice Lumumba invariably sought to identify himself completely with his people which was a source of inspiration to him, the power behind all his ventures; and the central theme of the glorious epic he had lately written into the record of the liberation of the African peoples and of all the oppressed peoples of the world. For the Congolese people he sacrificed everything; they were his sole concern as long as he lived. It was the Congolese people which in January 1960 forced Belgium to free Patrice Lumumba from his Katanga gaol and appointed him to speak with its authority at the Brussels Round-table Conference where he successfully defended the cause of his country's independence and, above all, of its unity.

81. The very day that the new Congo State came into existence, 30 June 1960, I saw in my delegation's opinion a decisive turning-point in the struggle. While, with the complacent connivance of a few Congolese unaware of the responsibilities inherent in their newly-assumed functions, the Belgian King dared in a paternalistic and reactionary speech insult African dignity and make clear how minor a part and how limited a scope Belgium intended to grant to Congolese independence, the authentic voice of Africa, serene and firm, was raised to tell the world the truth in the way the Congolese people's dignity and the honour of African nationalism demanded.

82. Patrice Lumumba, who several weeks earlier had been chosen democratically by the Congolese people as the leader of the parliamentary majority, who despite all impediments and trickery had been made head of the first Government of the Congo, and who represented not only the Congo but the dignity and honour of all Africa, replied spontaneously to the Belgian King's speech in these strong words:

"You speak of independence; you say that the Congolese are not mature and should thank Belgium that peoples who could not read or write can now do so and even own houses and cars. What you say is true; but you forget the millions of Africans you have murdered. You have forgotten the centuries of killing, theft and robbery, and the vices you have spread in our country. What you say is true, but be it known that Congolese independence is no gift from colonialist Belgium but has been won by our efforts, which we will continue so that we may enlarge our independence and liberate all the rest of the African continent."

83. With this slashing retort to the paternalistic doctrine of Belgian colonialism Patrice Lumumba on behalf of African nationalism clearly set the Congolese problem in the new context of his country's regained

freedom. This unequivocal stand, taken on the day the Congolese State was established, starkly illuminates the Congolese crisis, which was revived and intensified a few days later by Belgium's brutal military, economic and political aggression against a former colony it was loath to lose.

84. Ruthlessly confronted with the situation created by this aggression, the new Congolese leaders confidently appealed to the United Nations on 12 July 1960 for the military assistance they needed to defend the interests entrusted to them. Thereafter the Congolese crisis was merged almost completely in the crisis of the United Nations.

85. Practically everything that can be said about the United Nations crisis has already been said. For its part my delegation, before the Security Council and in the General Assembly, has had ample opportunity not only to analyse all aspects of the situation and denounce the publicly-hatched manoeuvres and plots, but also to raise from the outset of what was revealed to be a betrayal of the confidence of the African peoples the cries of warning that were meant to save the Congo, the United Nations and international peace and security. The events in the Congo over the past eight months furnish abundant proof that my delegation's warnings have not been understood and its advice has not been followed.

86. The colonial Powers have succeeded in strengthening their holy alliance, mobilizing their allies and bringing the United Nations Force under their control, and are now still putting into effect their Machiavellian plans for the political reconquest of the new Congo State and after that, for the recolonization of the whole African continent, the liberation of which sounds the death-knell of the system of privileges imposed on Africa for the benefit of alien invaders from every shore. My delegation assures this holy alliance, created by the Governments of Brussels, Paris and London with the powerful support of their western allies, and its African tools that their forebodings will come true: just as Viet-Nam marked after Dien-bien-phu the death-struggle of colonialism in Asia; just as Algeria strips bare the French colonial empire; so without any doubt the Congo will be the last burial-place of all colonialism in Africa. History will record that in the Congo the United Nations executive, on which the small countries and all the oppressed peoples of the world had set their hopes, served as a handy screen for the neo-colonialists who were seeking at any cost and in various ways to maintain their usurped positions in Africa.

87. The United Nations should be judged on the facts. It was called on for assistance by the Central Government of the Republic of the Congo; from the Security Council it received a clear mandate to assist the Government to preserve law and order and safeguard the independence and territorial integrity of the country, which was possible after the withdrawal of the Belgian forces of aggression. Yet it has, so to speak, presided over the total disintegration of the Congo State; by its instigation, its presence, sometimes by its indifference but always by its direct or indirect backing, it has promoted all the external and internal manoeuvres which have led the Congo into its present tragic impasse. It is sufficient to recall that in the presence of the United Nations Force Congolese laws have been flouted and the Central Government overturned; its members arrested, imprisoned and foully murdered; the Congolese Parliament dissolved; the secessions of Katanga and South Kasai organized; political and military *coups*

d'état prepared; and traitors and usurpers encouraged, financed and assisted to carry out colonialist directives aimed at the total destruction of the new Congo State. And during this period the Belgians have infiltrated and systematically reoccupied all levels of the political, administrative, economic and technical machinery of the country.

88. My delegation has made frequent and lengthy explanations of its attitude towards all these facts and all these acts of treason, duplicity and corruption. Hence today, after recalling a few facts essential to a complete understanding of the character and gravity of the plot hatched against the Congo people, my delegation will merely comment briefly on the chief points highlighted by the events of recent months while the Congolese situation has been constantly deteriorating.

89. At the outset my delegation feels that it must draw attention to the particular responsibility borne by certain Governments and certain United Nations organs for the preparation and execution first of the disturbances, later of the chaos now prevailing in the Congo. In fact, it was apparent last November that the eviction of Belgian military and para-military personnel and a genuine reconciliation among the Congolese leaders were essential to an effective solution of the Congolese problem. That these two problems are closely linked is self-evident. Hence my delegation has stressed that to bring about national reconciliation it was urgently necessary, first to effect the withdrawal of Belgian military and para-military forces, and then at all costs to keep the United Nations General Assembly from taking sides in the conflict between the Congolese leaders. Unfortunately, at the instigation of a few delegations the Credentials Committee and later the General Assembly took exactly the opposite course: last November, in circumstances which are well known, the General Assembly made the catastrophic mistake of seating the unlawful delegation nominated by Mr. Kasa-Vubu, in clear violation of Congolese law and despite the warnings and protests of the elected representatives of the Congolese people and the representatives of those countries which had foreseen the great conspiracy this manoeuvre had presaged. Today it is generally agreed that those who assumed before history the heavy responsibility for this unfortunate action are answerable for the chaos which was knowingly instigated, arranged and fostered in the new Republic of the Congo with the object of turning it back, if not to the condition of the former Belgian Congo, at least to the status of a colonial dependency.

90. This proposal of the Credentials Committee, which was later ratified by the General Assembly, had many tragic and evil consequences. Besides finally sabotaging the mission of the Conciliation Commission for the Congo and thus justifying the refusal by the Republic of Guinea and other countries of any participation, now stultified, in the Commission's work, it led to the cowardly murder of Patrice Lumumba and the African nationalists associated with him, who preferred to die bravely on the field of honour rather than to betray their people, their fatherland, and their ideals.

91. This terrible catastrophe plunged the Congolese crisis into utter confusion. How did it come about? At the beginning of this new debate, we must of course review the development in the Congolese situation which have occurred since the adjournment last December of the first part of the fifteenth session of the General Assembly. Unfortunately, there can be no doubt about what had happened. Almost as though following

the well-planned scenario of a diabolical play, events in the Congo have aggravated the situation and made the prospect of a reasonable settlement seem more remote every day. It is painful to list the many horrible events that have occurred in the Congo since last December. Each month and week, frequently every day, sometimes every hour has brought the Congolese people its tale of misfortunes, humiliations, bereavements, tears, and indescribable physical and mental suffering.

92. Since last December the situation has steadily deteriorated, and now the United Nations Force, by one of those paradoxes of which history furnishes few such grotesque examples, is practically a prisoner of the puppets it helped to create and force on the Congolese people. Swollen by thousands of millions, strengthened by arms deliveries, incited by mercenaries and other paid technicians, these puppets are now apparently turning against some of their past creators and present defenders. It may seem a queer farce, but it remains a brutal and bewildering fact that today, after the nameless humiliations the United Nations Force has suffered at Banana, Matadi and Leopoldville, it is trying rather to negotiate, parley and excuse itself than to execute the mission which alone justifies its presence in the Congo to turn the Belgians out of the country and give the Central Government the military assistance which it needs to safeguard the independence and maintain territorial unity and integrity of the Republic of the Congo.

93. It is general knowledge that Mr. Kasa-Vubu, taking advantage of the errors of the United Nations Military Command in stubbornly and pointlessly moving troops from the Lower Congo region in order to maintain large forces in Oriental province, where no disturbance had been reported for many weeks, ordered the publicly arranged and co-ordinated military operations which resulted in the disarming of the Sudanese contingent of the United Nations Force, its expulsion from Matadi, and the occupation of that essential base by mutinous soldiers in the service of Belgium. It is general knowledge that, since this operation the Belgians have been able to bring in at will the personnel and weapons they need for all their projects of colonial reconquest. Nobody can fail to recognize the gravity of this situation, and the fact that the Security Council has not yet been summoned to discuss it is a source of justifiable concern. All these machinations were capped by the masquerade of the Tananarive Round-table Conference, at which tribal leaders in the service of colonialism joyfully divided up the Congo among themselves like their masters who in 1885 perpetrated at Berlin the same evil operation for the whole African continent.

94. Why then does the United Nations persist in supporting these men who have just undertaken at Tananarive to dismember their great country? These men are symbols of illegality, since by their own acts they have obviously ceased to be representatives of the Republic they have just publicly destroyed for the sake of a chimerical dream—the dream of becoming chiefs of ridiculous little republics within an illusory confederation. For the well-being of the Congolese and the honour of all Africa, my delegation hopes that these fanciful conceptions will never survive the drafting stage; indeed, what would become of the Congo if each of the 135 territories now included in it acquired a semblance of independence and sovereignty? Those African representatives who, here and in other forums,

unthinkingly defend the Tananarive partition, and indeed all representatives, should be asked whether they have seriously considered the terrible consequences which would result from the disintegration of the Republic of the Congo, and the possible effects on their own States. They would be well-advised to ponder these words which Mr. Tshombé has constantly repeated and which are likely to whet appetites in their own countries: that each Congolese tribal leader dreams of becoming a Chief of State. Is that really the image of the Africa you hope to rebuild to promote the happiness of the African people and to establish international stability, concord, harmony and peace?

95. During this period a systematic campaign has been waged against lawful authority and against all those patriots who possess it in various forms in the Congo. As part of this campaign, and to preclude the national reconciliation unanimously desired by the Congolese people, the puppets of Leopoldville, Elisabethville and Bakwanga, after inflicting the countless harassments of November and December, carrying out arbitrary arrests and unlawful detentions, and attempting corruption on a grand scale, took the tragic step of introducing to the Congo the technique or political assassination in order to get rid of political adversaries who had been guilty of relying solely on their lawful rights and the confidence of their people.

96. On 14 February 1961 the grief-stricken and indignant African peoples and the shocked peoples of the world learned from the confused statements of Radio Elisabethville of the cowardly murder of Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba, of Joseph Okito, the Vice-President of the Senate, and of Maurice Mpolo, the Minister for Youth. Only a few days later, when the emotion aroused throughout the world by this threefold crime was at its height, news was received from South Kasai of the murder of six other important nationalist leaders, including President Finant, Chief of the Provincial Government of Stanleyville, and Lumbala, Secretary of State in the President's Office of Patrice Lumumba's Central Government. All these murders have a factor. The victims were first detained arbitrarily at Leopoldville; later, the *de facto* authorities there, after some bargaining, transferred them to their accomplices in Katanga and South Kasai for execution, for the survival of those Congolese patriots was deemed incompatible with the maintenance of colonialist and imperialist privileges in the Republic of the Congo.

97. The reaction of African and international opinion to the announcement of these murders is already a part of history, and will tomorrow be rightly considered one of the finest pages in the history of the solidarity and sympathy shown towards African nationalism by all peoples who love justice and peace.

98. The people and Government of Guinea felt these murders as a blow against their own country, their own aspirations and the best of their comrades-in-arms. President Sékou Touré put this fact into words on 14 February when he declared in a meeting of the whole population of our capital held during the period of national mourning decreed throughout the Republic:

"I can find no words or expressions with which to convey to international opinion the profound indignation of the people of Guinea. I can find no phrase by which to make fully intelligible the community of ideas between all African peoples and all the international forces for peace and progress which came into being when they heard by radio statements con-

firming the death of a man in the Congo who has shown himself to be a fully-committed fighter for the revolutionary cause of his people, a fighter deeply conscious of the part which men and peoples must play in order to achieve their profound aspirations towards light, joy and happiness. Nor can I express our feelings about the odious murder of our comrade Patrice Lumumba. Today everyone must know the circumstances of the crime and its political significance. Some time ago the so-called Belgian Congo was known only to a few Africans. Who made the Congolese people known? Who made men and women of every continent or nationality aware of the cause for which the Congolese people has always fought? Only those men who have followed our companion Patrice Lumumba, and who by their courage and devotion, have hastened their country's development and inscribed the noble cause for which they fought in the hearts of men and women everywhere."

99. In order to express its people's horror and profound indignation, on the same day the Government of the Republic of Guinea requested its President, Mr. Sékou Touré, to inform the Secretary-General of the attitude of the Republic of Guinea towards all those, near or far, who took part in this odious murder. To that end Mr. Sékou Touré addressed the following telegram to Mr. Hammarskjöld on the same day:⁸

"You will understand the profound indignation of the people and Government of Guinea at the heinous assassination of Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba and two of his Ministers. This brutal assassination is an eternal stain upon the United Nations and places its Secretary-General in the forefront of those who have deliberately chosen to do away with legality in the Congo, and with it all the nationalists that embodied it. You will also understand that this sorry drama in which you took a predominant part, despite your repeated protestations, dishonours you personally in the eyes of the embittered public of Africa and the world. Now that the curtain has fallen on the first act of your criminal tragedy, it is essential that you draw the lesson of universal condemnation from this crime. After this painful experience, what country can again rely on the United Nations for assistance in solving any of its problems? You may be sure that the sinister method inaugurated in the Congo will not get the better of Congolese nationalism or the daily increasing determination of the African peoples to free themselves from the imperialism of which the United Nations through its Secretary-General has made itself the docile standard-bearer. Before the bar of history an awakened Africa will know how to assume all its responsibilities.

"(Signed) Sékou TOURÉ"

100. Moreover, on the very next day the Government of the Republic of Guinea, in yet another act of protest, decided that all technicians and advisers provided by the United Nations Secretariat should leave immediately, and resolved to inform the United Nations at once, in the following message from Conakry, addressed to Mr. Hammarskjöld and dated 15 February 1961:⁹

"Honour to inform you that in face of odious crime against Congolese people and African people represented by murder Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba and his companions Okito and Mpolo for which present United Nations Secretary-General undoubtedly bears heavy responsibility, Guinean Government as mark of protest against United Nations betrayal decides immediate departure from its national territory of all experts and advisers placed at its disposal by said Secretary-General. Republic of Guinea indignant at United Nations action in Congo calls for collective resignation Secretary-General and his principal colleagues . . .

"(Signed) Sékou TOURÉ"

101. Having taken this unequivocal stand, our delegation, at the last debate of the Security Council [936th meeting] asked the Secretary-General to learn the lesson of failure of his mission in the Congo and to resign, for the sake of a solution of the Congo crisis, of peace throughout Africa and the world, and of the prestige of the highly responsible post he holds at the head of the United Nations executive. The problem to which we refer is not a mere legal matter of momentary majorities or opposing blocs. It has moral aspects and involves questions of equity, justice and dignity, which are bound up with the demands of widows, orphans and all who have suffered in the Congo, with whom millions of people throughout the world express their full solidarity.

102. This has always been the unequivocal view which the Government of Guinea has felt bound to take if it is to remain faithful to the ideal for which Patrice Lumumba and his companions gave their lives—an independent and united Congo within an Africa completely liberated and restored. Patrice Lumumba is dead, but he represents a symbol which nothing can now destroy. It is our sacred duty not to allow the flame which he lit in the Congo to die down. Come what may, we shall remain faithful to his ideal and to Africa, our common land.

103. This is why, as soon as we saw clearly that the United Nations representatives were betraying their mission in the Congo, our Government decided publicly to refuse to accept responsibility by the presence of our troops, for the anti-African and anti-Congolese work which colonialism was openly preparing in the Congo. In order to show our defiance of this neo-colonialist policy of the United Nations representatives and to make a solemn protest against the disgraceful use made of our troops who were arbitrarily stationed in a marshy region in the north of Leopoldville province, where there was nothing at all for them to do, we decided to withdraw our contingent from the United Nations Force in December 1960.

104. For the same good reason, the Government of the Republic of Guinea, in its loyalty to the same ideal and its respect for the will of the Congolese peoples, thought itself bound to recognize as the Head of the only legal and legitimate Government of the Republic of the Congo the former Vice-President of the Central Government, Mr. Antoine Gizenga, who was originally invested by the Congolese Parliament and is therefore the heir and successor to the legal authority embodied by Patrice Lumumba. It is obvious that we intend to draw all the usual inferences from this recognition, in the interests of the Congolese people, which are inseparable from the interests of African nationalism and of freedom and peace throughout the world.

⁸ Official Records of the Security Council, Sixteenth Year, Supplement for January, February and March 1961, document S/4703.

⁹ Official Records of the Security Council, Sixteenth Year, Supplement for January, February and March 1961, document S/4715.

105. So many mistakes have been in the Congo, so many crimes have been committed, and so many acts of treason have darkened the prospects of a solution, that we may legitimately wonder whether the United Nations can or should remain in the country. We are convinced that there are few mistakes left for our Organization to make in the Congo, simply because our operation is already on the verge of bankruptcy. No one originally wished more fervently than the Republic of Guinea for the success of the United Nations enterprise. No one was more ready to trust the international Organization spontaneously or more anxious for its success and glory throughout the world, particularly in the continent of Africa, which had been relegated for so long to the margin of history by the colonial Powers of Europe. Lastly, none would rejoice more than we, even today, if the United Nations, learning from its mistakes, successfully atoned for its action in the Congo and restored our belief in it, so brutally shattered by the revelation of its representatives' machinations in the Congo. But such a recovery would require a complete change of policy in the execution of decisions of the Security Council and the General Assembly.

106. To seek better ways of carrying out this policy of recovery, which is essential if the Congo is to be saved, the Heads of State of Morocco, the United Arab Republic, Ghana, Guinea, and Mali, the Head of the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic, and representatives of the King of Libya and the Prime Minister of Ceylon, met at the historic conference held at Casablanca last January. These African and Asian leaders needed no foreign advisers or prompters to help them deal with the problems of their common destiny, and their meeting led to a plan of action which, if it had been put into effect at the time, could have saved the Congo from the tragic deadlock to which it has come. Need we say that this plan of action is unanimously supported by all enlightened and progressive opinion in Africa? If the Casablanca proposals were translated into action it would still be possible, in spite of the constant deterioration since last January, to restore calm and tranquillity to the Congo and also to save both peace in Africa and the United Nations. It was also in order to make a positive African contribution to the Congo crisis, in the light of the events which have taken place since the Conference of Casablanca that the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of those countries met last February at Accra to reconsider the grave situation in the Congo. Against the same background President Nkrumah, Head of State of Ghana, made a most important contribution to the inaugural meeting of this resumed session [961st meeting], submitting specific suggestions and proposals designed to restore tranquillity, order and peace within the Congo.

107. Hence the United Nations General Assembly has enough information to enable it, with full knowledge of the facts, to take a decision based on specifically African proposals, free from any foreign or colonial influence, in order permanently to retrieve the situation in the Congo. In the opinion of my delegation such a solution calls for essential measures of two kinds.

108. First, all Belgian military and para-military forces, and all mercenaries and all nationals of colonial Powers who are committing acts of sabotage in the Congo, must be withdrawn. For this purpose my delegation is convinced that an ultimatum should be delivered to Belgium, peremptorily setting a time-limit for the complete withdrawal of those of its nationals to whom I have referred. The proposed time-limit of

three weeks, if it cannot be shortened, is acceptable to my delegation, although we should have preferred to demand immediate withdrawal. The ultimatum to be effective, must be accompanied by all necessary measures for applying the sanctions provided for by the United Nations Charter if Belgium once more stubbornly refuses to comply with the decision of the United Nations.

109. Secondly, respect for law and order must be restored in the Congo. To this end Parliament, which is still the corner-stone of the democratic system in the Congo, should again be called into session as soon as possible and on a precise date to be fixed during the present session of the Assembly. There can be no valid argument against the re-opening of Parliament, which meets as of right, even if not called into session, in March and September each year. In this connexion article 69 of the *Loi fondamentale* provides that "The Chambers shall meet as of right every year on the first Monday of March and September, unless they have been convoked earlier by the Chief of State". Hence the problem of the convocation of Parliament, to which certain people refer, does not even exist. It is merely necessary to protect Parliament and ensure its safety, if necessary by promoting the establishment of a neutral zone round the place where it meets.

110. Most of those who oppose the re-opening of the national Parliament always argue falsely that the 224 members of Parliament cannot be called together at the same time both for reasons of security and because some of them have been murdered.

111. On the first point, we note that the United Nations authorities promised a few weeks ago to ensure the safety of all participants in the round-table conference which certain Congolese leaders proposed to hold in the country. Mr. Kasa-Vubu then thought there would be more than 400 participants. Also, very recently, did not the United Nations offer protection and transport to the lawful authorities of Stanleyville proceeding to the Conference of Tananarive? That being so, how could the United Nations refuse to ensure the safety of the 224 members of Parliament if they decided to meet? Or does the United Nations always prefer round-table conferences to the only legal method, that of ordinary recourse to the Congolese Parliament?

112. On the second point, the vacancy of certain seats in Parliament, it will be recalled that on 23 March 1960 the Belgian authorities promulgated the electoral law defining the conditions and procedure of Congolese parliamentary and provincial elections, and continuing in force until expressly amended. Like the Belgian electoral law itself, the Law of 23 March 1960 prescribes in its articles 50 and 59 a system by which any vacancy occurring during a term of office in either Chamber of the Congolese Parliament is filled automatically. These articles read as follows:

"Article 50. Seats shall be assigned to the candidates who have obtained the largest number of votes in each list. If a vote is tied, the order of the list shall prevail.

"Candidates who have not obtained enough votes shall be alternates on their lists. The order of alternates shall likewise depend on the number of votes obtained by each. If a vote is tied, the order of the list shall prevail."

"Article 59. Candidates in each list who have not obtained seats shall be called in the order pre-

scribed in article 50 to replace members in their list whose seats fall vacant.”

113. Hence the two arguments advanced in favour of delaying or preventing a meeting of the Congolese Parliament will not bear the slightest scrutiny; and indeed they never were more than mendacious excuses invented by persons with an interest in the disorganization of the Congolese State. So the murdered members of Parliament can and should be replaced normally under the system of substitution laid down in the provisional electoral law now in force in the Republic of the Congo. It is for Parliament, and for Parliament alone, finally to settle the Congo crisis.

114. Need we add that the true solution of the Congo crisis, the only satisfactory and lasting solution, will never be that of the colonial Powers, of the United Nations, or even of the independent States of Africa? It will be a solution chosen, in full sovereignty and knowledge of the facts, by the Congolese people, within the context of its national interests, of its solidarity with the continent and of its freely-accepted international obligations. Until further notice the will of the Congolese people will be expressed, in accordance with its present legal institutions, through the national Parliament, which must therefore echo all the grievances of the various racial sections, political groups, and leaders of the Congo and, with the help only of those from whom it chooses to ask help, must freely determine the changes in present institutions or structures which it thinks essential to the stability of the Congolese State and to the achievement of its people's profound aspirations. But there are certain natural and obvious conditions for this: the speedy punishment of the criminals and any later measures of amnesty and pardon which may be necessary in order to calm passions and bring about national concord.

115. In our opinion the United Nations, if it is to achieve its ends, has less need of an increase in its military forces than of a change in policy at the level of implementation of its decisions in the Congo. Here as elsewhere we think that means should not take the place of ends. It is therefore most important to decide on a sound and realistic policy, and only then to adapt the necessary means to the achievement of that policy. Any other method seems to us doomed in advance to another serious failure. If these proposals are rapidly translated into fact, there is every chance that they will restore stability, peace and concord to the Congo. On the other hand, any scheming or hesitation, and in particular any further betrayal, might permanently harm the future of the Congo and plunge Africa and the whole world into dramatic and fateful convulsions, through the fault of the colonial Powers and their allies' blindness.

116. Since my delegation has confidence in the wisdom of all peoples, and is strong in the justice and nobility of the cause for which it fights, it reaffirms its profound conviction that the only effective means of reaching a peaceful solution of the Congo crisis is restoration of the rule of law in the Congo by honest application of the *Loi fondamentale*, until this Law is amended by the regular process prescribed by the present Provisional Constitution.

117. Lastly, my delegation repeats most vehemently that the essential condition for the salvation of the Congo by this means is still the complete withdrawal

of military and para-military forces, of Belgian political staff, and of all military and civilian mercenaries, who must at once be removed from the Congo. If disaster is to be avoided, there is no alternative. The moment of choice arrived long ago. Now we must act, and act at once for tomorrow it will be too late.

118. May I end with a few extracts from the pathetic message which Patrice Lumumba addressed through his wife, from his prison at Thysville, to all his comrades-in-arms and to all his Congolese brothers?

“Throughout my struggle for the independence of my country I have never doubted for a moment that the sacred cause to which my companions and I have devoted our whole lives would finally triumph. We wanted our country to have the right to an honourable life, to an unstained dignity and to unrestricted independence. Belgian colonialism and its allies, however, never wanted these things, and they found support, direct or indirect, deliberate or unintentional, among certain high officials of the United Nations, the Organization in which we placed all our confidence when we appealed to it for assistance. They have corrupted some of our compatriots and bought others; they have helped to distort the truth and to defile our independence. What more can I say? Dead or alive, free or in prison by order of the colonialists, it is not I who count, but the Congo—our poor people whose independence has been made into a cage, while those outside watch us either with indulgent compassion, or with joy and pleasure. Yet my faith will remain steadfast. I know and I feel from the bottom of my heart that sooner or later my people will rid itself of all its internal and external enemies and rise to a man, to say ‘No!’ to a degrading and shameful colonialism, and to recover its dignity under a purer sun.

“We are not alone. Africa, Asia, and the free and liberated people in every corner of the earth will always stand beside the millions of Congolese who will not abandon the struggle until there are no more colonizers or their mercenaries in our country. I hope my children, whom I must leave and may never see again, will be told that the Congo has a great future, and that it expects them as it expects every Congolese, to fulfil the sacred task of rebuilding our independence and sovereignty; for without dignity, there can be no freedom; without justice, there can be no dignity; and without independence there can be no free men.”

This testament reveals the high concern, the remarkable dignity and the steadfast faith of the father of Congolese independence, and his luminous vision of the future of Africa. It marks an epoch in the history of the movement for the liberation of our continent. In it Patrice Lumumba addresses not only the Congolese people and his African brothers, but all peoples of the world and, as I am sure you realize, all of us who have met here to debate the Congo crisis and to find the satisfactory solution for which he fought and died in the service of his people and his ideal of justice and freedom. After all the sacrifices he made for this just and noble cause, let us all hear his voice from beyond the grave. Let us not again betray his profound hope in the ultimate purpose of his life: the independence, unity and prosperity of the Republic of the Congo.

The meeting rose at 12.40 p.m.